The problem of embodiment in Heidegger's fundamental ontology

Redekopp, Brian (2004) The problem of embodiment in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Masters thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland.

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Fundamental ontology is Heidegger's attempt to clarify the meaning of being through a descriptive analysis of human existence, which he conceives as a system of intentional relations that precedes the subject/object dichotomy. His interpretation of human being seems to promise an innovative solution to the problem of how we are corporeally immanent in nature at the same time as we transcend nature in our understanding. Yet Heidegger pays little attention to the problem of embodiment in fundamental ontology. This thesis addresses the question of what accounts for his neglect. In Chapter One, I formulate the problem in terms of Heidegger's ontological concepts. Chapter Two shows that despite appearances to the contrary, the problem of embodiment is crucial for fundamental ontology. Chapter Three develops the central claim of the thesis, which is that Heidegger neglects embodiment because to treat it adequately threatens to undermine the transcendental character of fundamental ontology.

Item Type: Thesis (Masters)
Item ID: 11323
Additional Information: Bibliography: leaves 92-95.
Department(s): Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of > Philosophy
Date: 2004
Date Type: Submission
Library of Congress Subject Heading: Ontology.

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