Consent and character in Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of the will

Bromley, Edward Thomas (1973) Consent and character in Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of the will. Masters thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland.

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Abstract

This study explores the concept of "consent" in the eidetic framework of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy of the will. Consent, the third 'moment' in the act of willing, emerges as the epitome of the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary in its patient acceptance of the triple involuntary: character, the unconscious and biological life. We shall concentrate on consent to character. -- Chapter I examines Ricoeur's phenomenological method, accenting the notion of intentionality and the double bracketing imposed by the Husserlian method of pure description. Phenomenological bracketing eliminates the "natural standpoint" which tends to reduce the phenomena to their causal factors while eidetic bracketing removes the existential 'accidents' of the Fault and Transcendence, permitting access to the fundamental structures of the act of willing. -- Chapter II shows how 'consent' differs from the theoretical stance of 'assent' in that it is an active adoption of the ineluctable 'situation' confronting us in deciding and acting. This adoption necessitates a return to the subject experiencing necessity, although it does not prohibit the use of objective indices provided by science since these serve diagnostically in the understanding of the 'corps propre'. In Chapter III, "caractère" is described as the finite mode of freedom, the perspective from which values are viewed. Consent to one's limited perspective enables character to be assumed as one's own. Yet, consent is always on the verge of collapse. The synthesis of freedom and nature seems to elude phenomenological grasp and, in Chapter IV, we show Ricoeur's move from pure description towards active participation in existence and the invocation of a second Copernican Revolution, replacing subjectivity by Transcendence and hope. -- Chapter V attempts to translate Ricoeur's eidetic adumbrations into an embryonic hermeneutic of the pegagogical process.

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