ZIONIST PERCEPTIONS OF NAZARETH, JEWISH
PERCEPTIONS OF JEW AND ARAB IN UPPER NAZARETH

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by

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Abstract

This thesis explores cultural discourse among Jews of Upper Nazareth in Galilee. The discourse is provoked by the fact that they have to share their living space, even their country -- the Jewish state -- with Arabs who are also citizens of this state. Although the discourse is ostensibly about Jewish-Arab relations, it is conducted internally between the Jews and, the thesis will show, is even largely *about* relations between Jews, not between Jew and Arab.

The construction of Upper Nazareth was begun in 1956; its site was deliberately chosen so as to be on a hill immediately overlooking the ancient Arab city of Nazareth, Christian and Moslem, and the thesis first looks, in detail, at the *ideological* issues that come to the fore among the pioneering Jews who build, develop, and settle Upper Nazareth.

As political and economic relations between Jews and Arabs of the two Nazareths changed (with Arabs coming to live in Upper Nazareth), so, among the Jews, the difference between Us (Jews) and Them (Arabs), instead of being self-evident, became ambiguous. Here the thesis concentrates on the changing constructions of cltural Self among the Jews of Upper Nazareth. Our analysis demonstrates how the constituting of Self is inextricably entwined with its reciprocals -- the constituting Other (Arab) and also with Jewish otherness in Upper Nazareth.

The analysis concludes by showing how questions about Self and Other are seen, by the Jews of Upper Nazareth themselves, also to raise questions concerning apparent contradictions between two founding principles of the State of Israel: Zionism and democracy. The questions are, in large part, intractable. Yet in response to them, and to changing demographic profiles, the Jews of Upper Nazareth, so aggressively secular in the early years of the town, increasingly make use of the ancient Jewish religious tradition, although without necessarily any concomitant religiosity.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Today every sixth Israeli is Arab (Moslem, Christian, or Druze), of whom seventy-five percent were born and received their education in the State of Israel (Hareven 1983:4). This thesis explores ethnic boundary processes pertaining to the interface between Jews and Arabs in a community setting where Jewish and Arab Israelis share a common living-space, by attending to the perceptions and experiences on the Jewish Israeli side of that interface. In short, the thesis is concerned with the internal cultural discourse which these ethnic boundary transactions provoke.

Upper Nazareth perches on top of the eastern plateau of the mountain ridges which envelop and overlook the ancient city of Nazareth -- one of the three holiest cities for Christianity and the larger of the only two all-Arab cities within the Jewish state[1] -- with its solid, brown stone structures, seemingly arranged at random, submerged among a sea of domes and cupolas that crown a multitude of churches and monasteries, its narrow streets and alleys alive and in motion with crowds of merchants, shoppers, tourists and priests. Nazareth itself is picturesquely cupped in the green troughs of the Lower Galilee mountains' southern slope, its residential quarters sprawling up to the tops of the western and

north-western ridges which enclose the city's centre -- and partially also up the eastern slopes, towards Upper Nazareth. The two Nazareths are both set apart from and connected to each other in space by a wide national road running south-north, "The Way of Zionism." By car it takes merely 5 minutes to get from one to the other. But unlike their geographical proximity and nominal affinity suggest, Upper Nazareth and Nazareth constitute separate local authorities; the one Jewish, the other Arab.

Viewed from the distance (say, from downtown Nazareth), the physical appearance of Upper Nazareth is dominated by modern and rather monotonous white concrete blocks, impressing upon the viewer descriptive adjectives such as "new" and "planned:" Upper Nazareth, built in the mid-1950s, was one of the first in a chain of Israeli development towns in the Galilee region. By contrast with its nominal counterpart through which one travels in order to get to the top of the mountain and which, once one has reached it, lies spread out below, the word "suburban" comes readily to mind: Wide and impeccably maintained streets divided into lanes or hemmed in by floral arrangements and greenery define town sections and neighbourhoods, and even at the busiest of times these streets seem empty. Groomed green yards interspersed with children's sandy playgrounds fill in the generous space between apartment blocks which, in fact, are off-white but appear to glare in white against the backdrop of green surrounding them -- "City on a flowering mountain," the local anthem proudly proclaims. White and green contrast with different shades of brown. Quite unusually, the town has no particular centre where commercial businesses are

concentrated and which would thus serve as a sort of social nodal point for the town residents. Instead, each of the town's main neighbourhoods includes a small, horseshoe-shaped shopping mall with at least a supermarket and a bank. "Downtown," in this sense, is the city of Nazareth, even in the cognitive maps of the people of Upper Nazareth. The physical centre of Upper Nazareth is taken up by one, the older, of two industrial parks. Industry constitutes the primary economic base of the town, involving mainly food processing, textile, printing, metal- and car-assembly plants, as well as, of late, high-tech and pharmaceutical plants. Roughly 60 percent of the town's working population is employed in industrial plants, locally or in another Jewish town within commuting distance from Upper Nazareth.

Today the town has about 25,000 inhabitants and its jurisdictional land area spans over 20,000 dunams (5,000 acres). The city of Nazareth, by contrast, counts a population of approximately 45,000, and controls a land area of circa 16,000 dunams (4,000 acres). According to recent and precise figures cited by a Nazareth Arab guest speaker addressing (in fact, confronting) a group of Jewish grade 11 students of Upper Nazareth attending a two-day seminar on Zionism and Jewishness, in Nazareth there is a land area of 188 m^2 for each resident, in Upper Nazareth the amount of land per resident amounts to 548 m^2. Among the 25,000 residents of Upper Nazareth, about 3,000 (some Jewish residents claim a number twice that high) are Arab Israelis, largely from Nazareth: Upper Nazareth is coming to be considered a "mixed town." There are no Jews living in ancient, Arab Nazareth.

Standing at the northern fringe of Upper Nazareth and looking north, the Arab village of Kfar Reina nests in the valley below. From the town's western lookout points one sees Mount Tabor in the distance and the northern edge of the Jizreel valley carving itself between the two mountain tops, bridging the space between them; depending on ones precise viewpoint, one can also catch glimpses of the Arab villages Ein Mahil to the north and Kfar Iksal to the south. Finally, facing south on the southern edges of the town, the Jizreel valley stretches out below, with Kfar Iksal situated at the very foot of the hilltop on which Upper Nazareth perches. "Upper Nazareth is surrounded by Arab villages; there is no way into or out of this town without travelling through an Arab town or village," I was told on the day of my arrival by a local resident who kindly helped me carry my luggage from the bus stop up the driveway of the Immigrant Absorption Centre where I planned to stay until I had located a flat of my own. (In response to his question as to what had brought me to this of all towns, I had told him that I intended to study Jewish-Arab relations.)

* * *

This introduction of Upper Nazareth by way of juxtaposition to Nazareth -- even though, in strictly geographic terms, Upper Nazareth is situated as close to, or as far from, a number of Arab villages staking out the landscape immediately surrounding it as it is from the city of Nazareth -- is neither arbitrary nor whimsical; I want to transmit a sense of the referentiality which informed the town's establishment and now lies at the heart of the town's internal structure, and which also guided the selection of the town as the research location.

It was ultimately in relation to the Arab city of Nazareth that Jewish Upper Nazareth suggested itself and appealed to me as a site for research. Initially, when I entered the M.A. programme at Memorial University of Newfoundland, I intended to focus on Arab Israelis (or Israeli Palestinians, depending on whether one wants to emphasize nationality or nationhood) as the subjects of my research. In retrospect, I believe this interest has to do with my own life-history: being Jewish myself and having lived in Israel with my family as a Jewish immigrant between the ages of nine to twelve -- hence my interest in Israeli society and culture -- Arab Israelis beckoned with cultural otherness, a prospect which the study of Jewish Israelis did not promise me. Otherness seemed intellectually more challenging; in addition, anthropology has traditionally considered itself to be the science of otherness (Fabian 1963; Crapanzano 1985:47; A.Cohen 1987). Moreover, as the study of ethnicity, of relations and transactions between different others, advanced beyond Barth's 1969 formulations about boundary transactions and embraced the notion of ethnicity as "a 'self-reflective' dimension of culture" and as an "authentic medium for their *internal* discourse" (Cohen 1987:18-19), there has been a tendency to focus on the internal discourse on the *minority* side of minority-majority relations. Or, where the majority is the studied subject, it has commonly been treated as a lens through which to view the minority: the majority's perceptions of and/or attitudes towards the minority. It was in line with this latter trend that I initially adjusted my research focus.

I did so for quite pragmatic reasons: I had communicative competence in Hebrew but lacked proficiency in Arabic. For the purpose of an ethnographic

exploration of Jewish-Arab Israeli relations seen through the eyes of Jewish Israelis I was looking for a locality where Jews and Arabs share a common geography in their daily rounds of life and hence comprise an "ethnic boundary system" (Wallman 1979a) on a community scale. (An additional, secondary criterion was community size.) Jews and Arabs in the two Nazareths -- and in Upper Nazareth -- form such an ethnic boundary system. This means that Upper Nazareth is not a "typical" community -- though it is precisely in this respect that most of my Jewish Upper Nazarean acquaintances insisted that their town constitutes a microcosm of Israel (if not of the Israel as it is, then as it will be in the near future). Generally speaking, ethnic minority-majority relations in Israel have been characterized by spatial segregation and minimal social contact, "with day-to-day confrontation limited to employer and employees, buyers and sellers, officials and petitioners" (Stock 1968).[2] And it was precisely this uniqueness of Upper Nazareth which was of interest to me: I hoped that it would highlight what was ("so far still," my acquaintances would insist on adding) taken for granted elsewhere.

Rarely, and only recently, have anthropologists focused on self-reflective and "self-constituting" (Crapanzano 1985:39) cultural dynamics of ethnic boundary processes among the *dominant* ethnic group or ethnic *majority*. This final turn in the formulation of my research proposal, then, was from an analytical concern with Arab Israelis as perceived by Jewish Israelis to a focus on the social image of Us, the Jewish Israelis; an image that mediates and is mediated by Our perceptions of Them, the Arab Israelis with whom We share a common

geography. The source of my inspiration here is an ethnography by Plaice (1986) of Indian/white relations as seen through the eyes of the non-Indians participants in a small Central Labrador community. Indians, in Plaice's study, are analytically treated as a 'black box' filled with white settlers' perceptions of Indians. Thus the Indians serve as "a window through which to view the development of Settler identity and social character" (p.7). "Settler perceptions of Indians," then, are shown to "say as much about Settlers' perceptions of themselves as they do about Indians. Thus, an examination of the process of boundary maintenance becomes a starting point for an exploration of internal structure" (p.8).

Plaice's use of the concept of 'black box' served as a key conceptual device, informing the final definition of the problem to be explored and guiding me in the collection and, implicitly, the interpretation of my data. Initially, I saw Arabs as the only 'black box', but later, at the stage of data interpretation, I came to realize that Nazareth constitutes yet another such 'black box'. Thus, 'Nazareth' within single quotation marks throughout this ethnography stands for Nazareth *as constituted perceptually* by Jewish Upper Nazareth's leaders and/or residents, at times embracing both Jewish and Arab Nazareth as one, at others restricted to Jewish Upper Nazareth.

Following the inception of a Jewish state in 1948, Nazareth's unique symbolic and ethno-political character created an imperative for its Judaization. Yet such a project was to prove -- precisely on account of the symbolic and ethno-political weight of the Arab town -- impracticable (Chapter 2). Judaization

features as a key concept in Israeli policy pertaining to the Galilee region and in the history of Upper Nazareth. From the Jewish-Israeli leadership's point of view, the significance of Judaization is as a message that presages action and is addressed to surrounding nations as much as to the Jewish nation itself. The message is, of course, that the land -- as far as possible, and in response to the ..izeable Arab Israeli population -- be owned, *lived* in, and thus transformed, by Jews. In this sense it is all about Jewish versus Arab Israeli population balance, Jewish versus Arab control over the land. The concept says little, however, about how the Jews ought to live on the land *as Jews*.

The Jewish dilemma of the imperative and concomitant impracticability of Nazareth's Judaization, embraces the tension inherent in Israel's dual self-definition, as enshrined in its Declaration of Independence as both Zionist and democratic. Upper Nazareth was seen as a middle-of-the road solution: the symbolic Judaization of Nazareth, immediately attending to the ideological imperative, which might eventually and gradually lead to *de facto* Judaization, thereby attending directly and fully to the ethno-political imperative. The people of Upper Nazareth, however, have had to cope ever since with this tension in their everyday lives.

The various reasons behind the idea of building Upper Nazareth and the interests that guided its implementation, made for much more than a shared geography and name: Nazareth and its people came to play a key role in the cultural Self-constitution of the town and people of Upper Nazareth (which has outlasted the idea of Nazareth's Judaization). It is this Self-constituting discourse,

via perceptions of the Arab Other of Nazareth and of the Jewish Us in relation to Them, with which this thesis is essentially concerned. The Arab population of Nazareth enters, I found, the construction and reconstruction of a sense of Us -- the town and people of Jewish Upper Nazareth. Accordingly, the (Jewish) Self and (Arab) Other are, throughout, key conceptual notions.

By employing the notion of Other in this way, I hope to communicate two points. First, Arabs and Nazareth, far from constituting arbitrary, abstract, and in this sense remote, categories of people and place in the history of the town of Upper Nazareth and in the lives of its Jewish builders and residents, comprise Significant Others (Crapanzano 1985:39; A.Cohen 1987:19). Through them Jewish Upper Nazareans can, and do, look reflectively at themselves and (re)discover their own identity. For a particular group of people thus to enter the internal discourse of another, there has to exist physical and social proximity as well as distance; a recognition of similarity (or, sometimes, of commonality) or complementarity as well as of difference -- all this at one and the same time. For had there been an absence of frequent and multidimensional social contact, and of perceived commonalities/similarities -- even as the differences between Arabs and Jews were deemed to be *quintessential* -- the Arabs of Nazareth could not have entered the formation of Jewish Upper Nazareans' identity in a meaningful way. In the case at hand, the creation of physical proximity, symbolic affinity, political and economic complementarity, if not commonality, between Them and Us is precisely what the building of the town of Upper Nazareth, structurally and culturally, was all about (Chapter 3).

Whereas the first point I wish to make by use of the concept of Other turns on proximity and similarity, commonality or complementarity, the second underlines the subjectively experienced need for subjectively recognizable distance and difference -- which must simultaneously prevail. In the case of Israel, the continued existence of distance and difference between Jews and Arabs comprises a basic, perhaps a largely taken-for-granted (because institutionally ensured), societal premise. Here ethnic categories are not negotiable, ethnicity is not situational. Israel is an ethnic state in the sense that it is a "state for Jews" (Klein 1978). Its ethnic character finds legal expression in the Law of Return of 1948 and Citizenship Law of 1952;[3] it is institutionally entrenched, first, via the the continued operation of the *millet* system[4] for the regulation of all matters concerning personal status (group membership is thus ascriptive, inter-marriage possible only by the religious conversion of one of the partners), and second, through the operation of powerful governmental and non-governmental organisations which explicitly restrict their functions to the Jewish Israeli sector (e.g., the Jewish Agency); and it is symbolically expressed via the state's dominant symbols[5] and the choice of public holidays. But Israel is not a Jewish state, as the inclusive order of the state (politically and juridically, and in respect to values expressed and symbols employed) is not *coherently* Jewish. This means that the Jewish Israeli Us is bounded by behaviour, evaluated in terms of purity, and defined against this potentially dangerous Other: too close contact with, too much similarity and/or commonality with this Other can destroy its boundaries; that is, pollute it, render it fluid and out of control. But Self-hood must be preserved, must withstand.

We will see this by following the historic flow of the interface between the two Nazareths: while it might seem at times that the salience of ethnicity is surrendered for the sake of local vested interests (the two Nazareths as one) or even the purely personal vested interests of incumbent leaders, "ethnic dichotomization" (Eidheim 1977), nevertheless, always remains an overarching cultural imperative (Chapter 4). The real cultural challenge for the Jewish people of Upper Nazareth has been to define a clear sense of Us located somewhere in-between the two extremes: Zionism and democracy.

Initially, the cultural discourse (dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4) is essentially one between the We as We once were, in the Diaspora, outside the Jewish national home, and the We (as the guiding nation- and state-builders envisioned it) of the new Jewish Self, no longer bounded by religion but by living in and building up its own national homeland. The notion of "invention of culture" (Wagner 1081) is appropriate here, and, as an underlying theme, ties together the various chapters. Jewish Self is to (trans)form in accordance with the cultural blueprint provided by statist, strongly coloured by Labour Zionist, ideology (Eisenstadt 1967). Aiding the translation of ideology into culture are the activities surrounding the building of a Jewish Nazareth which ideationally embraces a hegemony over the Arab city. Tuan's (1984) emphasis on the culture-constituting significance of place is also important to us. Or rather, it is the empirical *absence* of Jewish place, in and around Nazareth, that is so compelling. Lacking historically significant Jewish symbols in the landscape, the pioneering and development activities acquired heightened Self-constituting, cultural significance (Chapter 3).

Different chords in the mode of action of this Us (versus Them) are captured in Paine's (1988) heuristic distinction between 'doing' and 'being'. •The essence of the distinction...is time. *To do* is predicated on the passage of time but *to be* is to hold time still. *To do,* is to set a cause in motion that will be rewarded, in time, by its effects; but *to be* carries its own reward -- it is both cause and effect• (p.36). 'Doing' and 'being', then, different kinds of action: the former implies action directed at becoming what one is not (yet), the latter implies action the outcome of which is remaining as one already is (though perhaps in exaggerated form); the distinction is one between consciously intended transformation versus reproduction.

But the Arab Other of Nazareth is not unchanging. It moves from a predominant mode of ethnicity-related action characterized by 'being' to one characterized by 'doing' (Chapter 5): the Communist party gains control over Arab Nazareth's government, and this Other rejects Jewish Nazareth's political and economic tutelage and interlocution on its behalf. It insists on antagonistic differences (i.e. Arab versus Jewish national interests) and also on full equality for Arabs with Jews -- as Israelis (i.e. resource allocations). These changes lead the Jewish Self of Upper Nazareth to a watershed: Chapters 6 and 7, then, trace the process of Self-reconstitution in response to a re-constituting Other, and the internal conflicts and problems Self faces (and resolves) in this respect. Chapter 6 looks at these things at the level of the Jewish town's biography and Chapter 7 on the inter-personal level. Jewish Nazareth redefines its purpose and aim *in exclusion of* the Arab Other of Nazareth -- Self comes to be defined in terms of

ends already accomplished and processes that have become routinized (*We are a Jewish Development Town in Galilee*). With respect to Self-constituting and Self-expressive action this implies a shift from 'doing' to 'being'. But 'being' -- a *Jewish* town and Jewish in it -- also necessitates 'doing', for there remain physical proximities, economic complementarities, and conceptual affiliations between the two Nazareths; they can be ideologically negated, but the frequent social contacts these make for cannot be culturally ignored.

More critical, though, the partial residential integration initiated *then* on the Jewish side, as part of the process of integrating Arab Nazareth, not only endures, it is actually exacerbated. But not, as *then,* upon Our initiative or, at least, with Our consent; it is now directed by Their 'doing': They begin to treat Upper Nazareth as a geographic extension of Their town. So place and, most important, Israeliness, cease to serve effectively as boundaries setting Us apart from Them.

In theory Self can ensure 'being' by restoring the disintegrating boundaries between Them and Us -- turning the municipal boundaries into an ethnic fence; but, and therein lies the crucial cultural double-bind, 'doing' so entails Self-pollution, as it were: for it would be outright undemocratic, and democracy is a fundamental criterion of Our definition of who We are. Insisting on Jewish exclusivity would appear particularly undemocratic in the absence of Jewish historicity in this place (Chapter 6). Alternatively, new cultural criteria can be incorporated and stressed for the redefinition of Self. However, the cultural building-blocks available for the constitution of *Jewish*-Israeliness appear to be

limited: the most reliable (versus the Arab Other) belong to religious Jewish otherness; but in the case of Upper Nazareth, We earlier distanced Ourselves culturally from religious Jewishness. It was regarded as polluting to the new Israeli Jewish Self. But now, having to weigh pollution by the Arab Other versus pollution by Jewish otherness, the leaders and people of Upper Nazareth opt for the latter (Chapters 6 and 7).

* * *

Thus far no study, to my knowledge, has ethnographically examined Jewish-Arab Israeli ethnic boundary processes at the community level, and focused, as this ethnography does, on the Self-reflective and Self-constituting dimensions of such boundary transactions on the Jewish side of the boundary. Social science research on Israel has, by and large, treated Jewish-Arab Israeli boundary demarcation and the prevalence of a clear sense of Self (versus the Jewish or the Arab Other) on either side of this boundary, but especially on the Jewish side, as a given; ethnic boundary and identity formation, and maintenance, has not been analytically problematized. Ethnicity research as such pertaining to the Israeli context, in general, and to the Jewish Israel in particular, has concerned itself more with what constitute intra-ethnic components than with ethnicity properly pertaining to the inclusive group level. As Paine (1987:20-21) notes:

> [T]he prevalent view in Israel has made [Jewish] immigrants "ethnics"
> and "ethnicity" one of the problems of [Jewish] nation-building: Jewish
> immigrants from different lands carried with them into Israel their own

cultural and social features from which they had to be weaned so that they could embrace the inclusive model of Israeli citizenship. There was to be a convergence....In this view of ethnicity, the place and time that were to compose the new Israel were not problematized but regarded as political "givens": Israel was to be a secular, Western democracy and, somehow, "messianically" Jewish at the same time...In the next generation of research on ethnicity in Israel, around the 60s, rates of progress, and divergences, were recorded.

On the other hand, there exists an overwhelming corpus of social science, including anthropological, research on various aspects of the Arab minority *per se*; probing continuities and/or changes in traditional patterns of social organisation, it employs a whole spectrum of theoretical approaches.[6] While a considerable fraction of these studies take account of the impacts and consequences of Israeli policies, laws and/or institutions, these do not, however, address the question of ethnicity and ethnic boundary processes as such.

In so far as the interface between Jewish and Arab Israelis has been approached analytically, macro-structural analyses and survey research have predominated by far. The former look at the socio-economic, institutional and legal asymmetries which simultaneously flow from and concretize the ethnic dichotomization within Israeli society.[7] Much of the survey research (too often leaving context unspecified) probes inter-ethnic perceptions and attitudes;[8] it has been carried out as often among the Arab minority as among the Jewish majority population, and takes the ethnic fence dividing Jews and Arabs as an analytical starting point and/or a mode of explanation.[9] Another corpus of survey research has been devoted to the Arab minority's national identification.[10] The few micro-

level studies of the interface that are available either focus on overall structural patterns of distance and proximity -- integration versus separation,[11] or, those working from a transactional perspective, approach it from the Arab minority's vantage point.[12]

* * *

While the sequential arrangement of the chapters of this thesis follows the history of Upper Nazareth chronologically, from the town's inception to the immediate present, this is not because I believe in the inherent logic of chronological sequence, or in the ethnographic inevitability of starting with the beginning and working ones way up to the present. What guided me in the decision to write this ethnography in this way were my field findings. Namely, that, just as Our perceptions of Us and constitutions of Self bounce off Our perceptions of Them, so perceptions of Them and Us (and the internal discourse that flows from these *today*) bounce off Our perceptions of Arab Other and Jewish Self as they were "*then.*" In other words, what I listened to while in the field, while ostensibly learning about the present, was, in actuality, a discourse between the past and the present (and future). Thus, I am led to reconstruct the *process* of constituting Other, and via it, of Self, in historical progression.

To be sure, that history as I here (re)construct it and that history as the people of Upper Nazareth themselves represent it differ. The differences are noted as providing clues concerning the process under investigation. Not only in the

writing process, but also in the process of carrying out field research, I broke rules and taboos that were part and parcel of the current Self-constituting discourse (Chapter 7). But just as my transgressions in the writing process seems to be unavoidable if I am to communicate what I learned, so my breaches of rules concerning Self's image of Self while in Upper Nazareth helped me in the process of learning about those rules.

A first breach was contained already in my presentation of my research interests, in terms of 'their' views of the town and people of Nazareth and 'their' relations with them; and my learning experience really started with people's management or 'editing' of my topic as I presented it. Indeed, there were frequent efforts to renegotiate it with me: if I were really going to study the relations between the two towns -- and God knows how I got that idea in the first place -- it would be, I was sometimes jokingly warned, a short affair; for "We have no connections with them," or, "The two towns are completely separate." And it would be at this point that I bounced off people my 'knowledge' of the relations between the two, also historically; this usually provoked people to express their versions of the town's history and Nazareth's place in it. Thus (they would tell me) if it were Jewish-Arab relations I was interested in, I was in the wrong place; for "Upper Nazareth is not a mixed town" -- and at that point I would remind people of the Arab residents of Upper Nazareth. This, in turn, often led people to 'put me in the picture' on that matter.

Once people realized that it was definitely "Jews and Arabs" and "Upper Nazareth" around which my research would revolve,[13] they were extremely

forthcoming in helping me. The general generosity with which I was received --
people readily opened up their homes and many a private aspect of their lives to
me, introduced me to people in their network of friends and acquaintances,
directed me to sources of information, and so forth -- had a lot to do, it was my
impression, with the overall persona I was in their eyes. To most people I was,
and remained, first and foremost a Jew who had come to Israel, to Upper
Nazareth, from the Diaspora. And even though they knew that I would return to
Canada at the end of my fieldwork, I remained in their eyes a potential new
Jewish immigrant, to the country and the town; if not now perhaps later then, I
might decide to settle permanently among them. As a single woman with no
relatives in Canada but relatives in Israel, I was unsettled, in their view, and as
yet 'undefined'. At the same time, it is possible that precisely because I was an
adult and single female, the easiest way for people to make sense of who I was in
the context of their town was as "new immigrant." After all, it is a town where
married couples, about to start a family or with family, predominate; the single
population is largely restricted to divorced single parents, the town's youth up to
the age at which they enter the army (and then leave the town -- often for good,
perhaps returning to start a family of their own) -- or new immigrants (in isolated
instances). People tried their best, and some made it explicit, to make me feel "at
home" (this included a healthy amount of paternalism, quite literally and in a
positive sense). It often seemed that the possibility, usually left unspoken, that I
might want to make Israel and Upper Nazareth my home, propelled people to
share so much with me: their life-histories and their own experiences with
Zionism, Jewishness, and Jewish-Arab relations, in length and in depth, and with

such straight-forwardness -- and all the while showing patience with my constant questions and tolerance over my frequent breaches of the acceptable.

People's perceptions of me as a *new immigrant* were nourished, to be sure, by the fact that I lived in the town's Immigrant Absorption Centre for the first two months of my stay. I had not planned this, nor was the eventual decision altogether mine. The first few days after my arrival in Israel, in May 1987, I spent with friends in Tel Aviv and from there I sought to arrange for accommodation in Upper Nazareth. Since I had no acquaintances in Upper Nazareth and the town -- that much I knew -- had no hotels or guesthouses (there are, of course, many in Nazareth, but I insisted on moving straight into the Jewish Nazareth), I took the route via government housing agencies. The fact that I had lived in Israel for three years as a child and that I now intended to stay for longer than three months had earned me, already at the airport, the status of *returning minor,* stamped in my passport. And I counted as such in the eyes of housing officials who referred me to the Immigration Absorption Centre of Tel Aviv for assistance in locating a flat in Upper Nazareth (or anywhere else, for that matter).

The official at the Absorption Centre knew of several government and private housing vacancies in other places -- Natanya, suburbs of Tel Aviv; but regarding Upper Nazareth, although she knew that *there is plenty of housing standing vacant there, so it is easy to find something once there,* she had no specific addresses on hand. Why on earth did I insist on living in Upper Nazareth of all places in any case? she wondered -- trying to change my mind. Until, that is, I told her that it was for the purpose of carrying out research there; she then

became very interested to find out what exactly I wanted to research. Israelis moving to a development town like Upper Nazareth, of course, arrange their housing in advance and from a town at "the centre" (meaning major cities); and they are usually assisted by brokerage agencies. The helpful official contemplated that route, but then decided that it was "not for me" as long-term contractual commitments are usually involved. To find a flat for 7 to 8 months -- the duration of my field research -- I would have to search on the private market, and on location. To bridge the time until I would find a suitable place on my own, she suggested that I would be best off staying at the Immigrant Absorption Centre. In any case, she saw from my file (going back to those three years when I was in Israel as a child), that I had not yet used up any of my special privileges as an immigrant, part of which is assistance (by the Jewish Agency) with accommodation upon arrival -- and I "might just as well," she said. So she placed a telephone call to Upper Nazareth's Absorption Centre, explaining my case (including my research interest), and confirming that I could have a room there for up to six months.

So already upon my arrival in the town, the people at the local Absorption Centre knew what I was there for (as well as details of my personal background), and the negotiation of my topic began even before I had settled into a room, before my personal data were taken down. (At this stage the 'knowledge' of the locality by means of which I 'argued' my interest derived from newspaper articles which I had delved into in preparation of my fieldwork.) My stay at the Absorption Centre and acquaintance with the employees there proved invaluable

in several ways. They were knowledgeable of the whole array of social and cultural institutions in the locality and their officials and employees, and of the town's oldtimer residents; then there were their own life experiences (they themselves had come as new immigrants to Upper Nazareth many years ago); and the further contacts they kindly facilitated.

A subsequent learning experience (in addition to plain necessity stipulated by my housing need) was the process of trying to locate a flat in town, with the visits to government housing offices as well as to the two offices of private housing brokers. Officials' interactions with me were only a small part of it all. There were the conversations between officials and clients, and among officials themselves -- to which I became a witness while waiting in these offices (on occasions for up to an hour). Quite often the people taking part in these conversations would assume (on the basis of my looks signalling "new" and "North American"?) that I didn't speak Hebrew, and that had its advantages. (For instance, there was the time when an official and a Jewish client, seeking to find a tenant for her flat, tried their best to talk about Arabs, in whispering voices, without saying "Arabs".)

In terms of locating a flat, alas, these visits turned out less successful.[14] That I move into a flat of my own constituted an imperative in my view. First, I felt strongly that, given my motives for living in the town, I did not qualify, ethically speaking, for the "rights" to stay in the Absorption Centre which I had been so readily and generously granted -- especially in view of the perceptions of my interests in the town which it encouraged. And second, as I shared a room

with another new immigrant, from Ethiopia, it turned out to be difficult to find the privacy I needed for note-keeping and the transcription of interviews; nor had I a home to which I could invite informants for informal visits, and reciprocate their hospitality. Eventually chance came my way:[15] the flat was conveniently located, and taking up residence in that block not only gave me access to a whole array of new people, it allowed me to participate in their everyday lives as a neighbour and to observe interactions and intricate ethnic boundary processes within the unit of the apartment block -- a significant social unit in the context of Upper Nazareth. (I took care not to lose those relationships established with immigrants and employees at the Absorption Centre.)

'Hanging around', visiting and informally chatting with people, is the way to get into the flow of things -- at least this was my understanding of "doing anthropology." I had planned a number of formal interviews with government officials, the collection of life-histories of oldtimers who had pioneered the town, and a perusal of the locally available printed materials (such as governing council minutes, statistics, and local newspapers and other publications); the rest was to be "participant observation." As it turned out, I carried out more formal interviews than anticipated, largely in response -- but an indirect response -- to the understanding the people I was studying had of what "doing anthropology" involves: anthropology, in their view, entailed the study of "ethnics" -- of otherness. But I insisted that I was interested in the Jewish side, not in Arabs; and that my interest in the Jewish side was not restricted to either the Georgian Russian, the North African, or the Ethiopian Jewish community. On the one

hand, my focus on Jewish Israelis seemed not very "anthropological" to the people of Upper Nazareth; but on the other hand this led me to talking with not just anybody but especially with such people that "know" (government officials, certainly, but also other figures locally defined as 'experts' or merely "knowledgeable"); and talking "seriously" -- that is, in a formal interview.[16]

People went out of their way to provide me with names of those people who "knew," even putting me in touch with them. Whom people thought I should talk to, and about what, was in itself of interest to me. However, at certain points, a dissonance between their ideas and mine as to what I ought or ought not to be doing (or be interested in) threatened to hamper research. I had hitherto been aware that *concealing* from the studied the exact aspect which one is investigating can block one from access to certain types of information; but so, too (potentially, at least), can telling them precisely; I learned that this is most likely when informants build upon their own ideas of the researcher's key interests.

Activities such as visiting people or the Community Centre, joining people on their shopping trips or walks through the town, or chatting informally with people encountered on the street, the bus, in the stores, or the line-up of the bank (all of which comprised an essential part of my research) were not considered serious "work," not sufficient as a means of learning about them, as they saw it. Thus I was easily seen to engage in these activities excessively, as a result of which people began to question my *seriousness* -- I felt this would influence how seriously they would continue to take me, and *that* was a serious matter for me. So it was with this in mind, too, that I began to give formal interviews a larger

role in the process of data collection than I had originally intended; in this way I would be more able to give satisfactory answers to questions like "Who [of the 'experts'] have you talked to so far?", "Have you visited so-and-so [one or another knowledgeable person] yet?" To be sure, these interviews were always insightful in one way or another and, once approached in the form of an interview, people were often readily accessible for informal chats (might invite me to their homes) or provide me with another list of names of people to talk to.

My informants also actively concerned themselves with the conversational topics which, in their view, were or were not pertinent to my research focus. For example, unless they thought of themselves as key actors in the town's life (past or present), people did not see the relevance of their own life-histories (going back to the time before they immigrated to the country and town) to my research -- at least not until I had explained to them the significance I attributed to their life-histories and use to which I would put them. But then most showed themselves more than happy to have found a captive audience for their stories. Topic-focused explanations (e.g., the "influence of Nazareth on the biography of Upper Nazareth" or on "the Jewish residents' collective biographic profile") did not make much sense to them -- understandably perhaps, in view of people's perceptions and insistances today that the two towns have nothing to do with each other. Instead, I found relevance most effectively communicated in terms of the community study and local history components which my research entailed (i.e., "the kind of individual histories that make up the people of Upper Nazareth" and/or "how things were in the early days"), but presented as Self-centred.

Quite often, what my informants defined as irrelevant were matters very much of relevance both in and of themselves and in their very definition as irrelevant, which sometimes led me into illuminating negotiations concerning relevance.

To give an example: in the second week after my arrival I visited the Town Hall to introduce myself to the local government officials and on this occasion to ask for various types of data. One of the things I requested from the municipal spokesperson on this occasion (after having gone through some negotiation of my interest) was eventual access to the municipality's archives containing the minutes of council meetings since the inception of the town. "Why waste your time with this old stuff, it doesn't concern anyone anymore," was the response I was given. When I insisted that I found history fascinating, her face lit up, and she enthusiastically told me that the municipality was keeping the minutes of the very first meetings of the "security committee" that had been in charge of building the town. These revealed how the first settlers lived, how it all began. "But," she added qualifyingly, "it is mainly the first few years that are really interesting; then it gets boring...and I am not even sure that the minutes we keep cover the whole period -- we have kept, of course, the most recent years', and you are welcome to look at them." She then instructed her secretary to pull out for me the volumes of council minutes and find me a quiet place to sit and study them at my convenience -- "she wants a few of the old ones, too; the very first years only." As I then made it a routine (three weeks later for several weeks) to spend two hours or so every morning reading my way through the minutes, the

secretary, for her convenience, showed me where to find the volumes and left it up to me to pull out those I needed for the day -- the volumes covered all the thirty years of Upper Nazareth's history.

To work my way through the minutes and take notes I usually sat in the hallway, on the same floor as the mayor's office as well as the municipal secretary's -- for this was the only vacant space available. After several weeks of this it became conspicuously obvious that I was taking a serious look at each and every single volume, and the secretary as well as the mayor and deputy mayor began teasing me in passing: "Still breaking your head over these things everyone else here can't even remember?", the mayor once said in jest.

Another example: I approached the municipal engineer's office in the hope of obtaining dated maps that would allow me to follow the town's growth in space over time; and hopefully one which would show the two Nazareths on one and the same map (which the current popular map does not -- the map, that is, with which new immigrants to the town are beckoned and which are handed out to visitors and newcomers; the area where Nazareth's settled area begins appears as a blank). Here the relevance of old maps was disputed and an employee sought to correct my ignorance: "There was nothing here then, there wouldn't be much to see on old maps." Their office could not help me in this respect, nor could anyone think of a place to which to refer me on this matter. My idea of an integrated map she found particularly incomprehensible, almost amusing: "Why would there be one map? The two are totally separate cities!" I was referred to the person in charge of maps at the Ministry of Housing, situated next door to the Town Hall.

She, after some searching, eventually came up with a regional map of a scale large enough to discern, roughly, individual structures making up the various settlements -- *including the two Nazareths*. (On the map of Upper Nazareth which is enclosed in the back of this thesis [Map 3] I have taken the freedom to fill in, at least partially, the blanks on a map of convenient scale that I found in the municipality's archives [it is undated; but judging by absent structures and the time of their construction, it represents the town between 1978-1980]: I sketched out, crudely and perhaps not precisely to scale, those populated parts on the other side of the boundary which closely approximate the border of Upper Nazareth. Most of the roads I drew in represent what in actual fact are narrow streets; more often they are merely sandy tracks.)

The learning experience I owe to my research assistant whom I gradually acquired was very differently structured. Our relationship started out with him in the dual role of key informant and friend, and these roles he retained even when he crossed the boundary from informant to assistant. When I first met Shimon, he was employed as the guide of the children's programme at the Absorption Centre (late afternoons) and simultaneously as the guide at one of two local family day-centres (noon to late afternoon). He explained that it was hard to find locally one full-time job providing the income on which it was possible to subsist. Thus, in the five years in which he had lived in town (he moved to town after getting married), he had always held several jobs, often temporary ones, across the whole range of local social and cultural institutions, to make ends meet: in the past he had worked as a teacher in the *Habad* religious school (his own education

includes three years of study at one of the religious seminaries [yeshivot] in Jerusalem) and in the local high school, teaching English and Biology; during my stay he took on additional jobs in social work with *problem-children* and in the continuing education programme of the Community Centre. In the context of his work he has encountered and established personal relationships with a multitude of people of all different social strata, sub-cultural backgrounds, and age groups as well as with a wide variety of social and cultural institutions: he seemed to know everybody. He offered to share his experiences with me (including, most importantly, his acquaintance with or access to various kinds of people).

Shimon took an unusually active interest in my research from the moment he heard about it. He would knock on my door at the end of his shift at the Centre and tell me he had set up an interview with someone or other on my behalf (or that he had told someone of my research who had then shown an interest in talking to me), and he might tell me in detail about conversations he had had with different people over the course of his day. Soon he began to arrive prepared with jotted-down notes. Initially, his own eagerness was fuelled, in part, by a certain enthusiasm at playing a role in research involving the town (he has an inquisitive streak) and also in part by a need to fill a current void in his life: he and his wife had separated a year earlier and he then lived on his own, his forenoons uncomfortably unoccupied by work. Later, he enjoyed the fact that helping me in my research altered his way of living in his town; he felt he now took a greater and more conscious interest in his immediate environment and noticed things he hadn't paid attention to before. I, after contemplating the idea,

felt he could be of help: in my translations of difficult parts of council minutes; in setting up meetings with people he knew (of my choice and at my initiative); in obtaining a picture of children's and young people's images of their town and the role of the Arab Other in them, through discussions, drawing-sessions or written compositions structured around the theme "My Town;" and even, as an extra set of ears and eyes, by accompanying me on social visits when the occasion was a party or get-together. It is mostly married couples at such occasions, and men and women tend to drift into separate conversational groups, discussing different topics, and it would have been rude and off-putting, certainly to the women, if I, as a single young woman, had joined the male group. It was in this context that we used the label "assistant" most explicitly. Otherwise his help would have been rather clandestine, and his presence been invariably 'explained' (given that he was a divorced man and I a single woman) in terms that would probably have had the same effect, only via a different route, as I expected my going alone and joining the men in their conversations would have had. In the end, I also decided to ask him to accompany me on interviews with married men when they had arranged the interview at a time when their wives and children were not at home; my experience had been that accepting such invitations on my own was generally seen as inappropriate behaviour, prejudicing the informant's reputation as well as my own.[17]

But before I drew on Shimon's help in these forms, I thoroughly discussed with him the ethical issues surrounding fieldwork, to which he would have to adhere, particularly stressing that he do and say nothing which he felt would in

any way harm the other informants (or himself, for that matter). The essential aspect here was confidentiality. Moreover, while it was difficult to put an hourly monetary rate on the kind of assistance he provided, in as far as it *was* possible I paid him an hourly rate such as he could expect to receive from his other jobs; in addition, I made him little gifts in the form of cigarettes, a bottle of liquor, or a meal at a restaurant.

Whenever the explicit purpose of my visits to people's homes (or their visits to mine) was an interview, and certainly in formal interviews with government officials, I asked people's permission to tape-record our conversation. This request was never denied; in fact, on the whole it was welcomed and on occasion even insisted on by my informants. In some cases it seemed that while my concern was with *hard evidence* to prove what people said, that of the interviewees -- if they were at all concerned -- was with 'evidence' on account of what they did *not* say (i.e., that they had not talked *Arabs*). In other cases, people who had set aside an evening to tell me about the early days and what had brought them to this town, were concerned that I might forget little details they deemed important: *It's a long story; bring along your tape-recorder!*, a person might remind me. When people, as was frequently enough the case, *strayed from matters* and said things they *didn't mean to say* while the tape-recorder was running, they felt free to ask me to erase that part or at least *to keep all this here between us;* that is to say, they asked me to treat it confidentially (which I did, in the field as well as in the ethnography). I also made use of the tape-recorder on special public events, such as the conclusion of the festivities marking the town's 30th birthday,

the official receptions of delegations from a German and a French twin-city, or -- as I was interested in rhetoric -- speeches and addresses delivered to the residents by the mayor on other occasions.

Even so (and my informants' notions of my learning experience notwithstanding), the informal conversations I participated in, or those I overheard, as well as observations made on an everyday basis, constituted the most significant part of my learning experience. I relied on diligent note-taking from memory, taking notes here and there throughout the day as the flow of situations and encounters allowed it; and recording them in my journals every night, together with new insights gained and questions that had arisen during that day.[18]

As is already evident, I make no attempts at concealing the identity of the research locality by using a pseudonym. Some readers may feel disturbed by this, but I hope that my reason is now clear: the symbolic and ethno-political uniqueness of the city of Nazareth plays a key role in the internal discourse among the Jews of Upper Nazareth and in writing about it no pseudonym would hide Nazareth's identity. In addition, the people of Upper Nazareth who allowed me to learn about them and their town not only took it for granted that their town was to be called by its real name; they would be disappointed if it were not. They reasoned that if I really was interested in understanding their point of view, my writing about the town could only redress the imbalances from earlier representations.[19]

However, I do employ pseudonyms for my informants, even when they explicitly permitted me to to use their real names. Individuals, after all, may not be fully aware of a whole range of possible inconveniences (of whatever nature or scale) which they might at some later point experience on this account. Only in some cases have I made an exception, all of them key government officials or local politicians. Their very positions immediately reveal their identity (like Nazareth's), not only to locals but to anyone who follows the media regularly and takes an interest in the country's and/or the regional political scene. They talked to me with the understanding that their real names were going to be used -- some would, in fact, not have found it worth their while to talk to me otherwise.(There was also an element of cynicism among some of them: too often journalists have promised them *confidentiality* but then, nevertheless, attached their names to what they said -- as well as, they claimed, to what they didn't say.)

A few remarks on my writing conventions are in order. As here, in the Introduction, whenever isolated expressions or phrases stand in quotation marks, this indicates that I am referring to phrases commonly employed by my informants; in cases where I quote a specific informant, I clearly indicate so. Foreign, most often Hebrew, words or political party names are italicized and briefly explained in brackets (or in a footnote, if elaboration on the term interferes with the flow of the text), but only the first time they are used; full entries of the frequently employed foreign terms are collected in the glossary at the back of the thesis. The responsibility for the English translations of Hebrew interviews, town/council minutes, newspaper articles and other documents is mine (even

though I have had the fortune of having people around me who were generous in their help to decipher difficult passages, idiomatic expressions and rarely used vocabulary).

Chapter 2

The Idea of a Jewish Nazareth:
Ideological and Political Concerns

2.1. Galilee -- A Town Unlike Others in the Jewish State

According to the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947 (see Map 1), a significant part of the Galilee region was not to be part of the Israeli state; predicated upon the contemporary fact that this part of the region harboured a dense concentration of Arab villages and towns, it was to form part of an Arab state. The Israeli state's boundaries, however, were then redrawn *de facto* to include this part of Galilee in the course of the War of Independence (see Map 2).

While the region's Arab population was considerably reduced during this war, as a result of a massive flight across the Jewish state's borders as they were being redrawn, the region nevertheless retained the densest concentration of Israel's Arab population, while at the same time being one of the areas within the state most sparsely populated with Jews.

The two factors combined -- the region's exclusion from Israel according to the U.N. Partition Plan and the proportional demographic strength of the Arab population within it -- raised doubts within Israeli government circles regarding

Map 1. The U.N. Partition Plan, 1947.

LEBANON

Acre

Haifa

SYRIA

Nazareth

Jenin

Nablus

Tel Aviv
Jaffa

Lod
Ramle

Jerusalem

Bethlehem

TRANSJORDAN

Gaza

Hebron

Beersheba

0   20
km.

EGYPT

Jewish state

Arab state

International zone

Source: Lustick (1980: 42)

Map 2. Israel: 1949 Armistice Lines.

Source: Lustick (1980: 43)

both the legitimacy and practicability of retaining the region as part of the Jewish state. As Uri Thon,[20] summing up the problematic of the situation from the point of view of the Jewish authorities, put it in an interview with Lustick (1980:364,f.113):

> Our big problem in Israel with the Arab population is their concentration in the Galilee ... [E]ven Ben-Gurion said that with the concentration in Galilee they have the right to ask to be annexed to Lebanon.

The demographic imbalance in Galilee threatened to become even more exacerbated in the light of frequent infiltrations of Israel's northern borders by former Arab residents of the region who had fled but now attempted to return to the abandoned towns and villages. Among these infiltrators some proved intent on terrorist activities, and as a result these former residents came to be regarded not merely as a menace to Israel's precariously sustained sovereignty over the Galilee region but also as a menace to the security of the state as a whole. It is estimated that between 1949 and 1954 there were on the average 1,000 cases of infiltration per month along the various frontiers of Israel (*ibid.*, p.40; see also p.55).

The initial response to the problems of territorial consolidation and security was the imposition of military rule in largely Arab areas within the state. But Israeli authorities considered this solution as inevitably provisional and short-term. First, it was anticipated that the legitimacy of military rule over Israel's Arab citizens in the eyes of other nations would wane rapidly with time and political stabilization, giving Israel "bad publicity." And that, evidently, was a source of concern to Israeli authorities. Yigal Allon, in 1959, pressed for the

abolition of military government (discussions of which arose in the *Knesset* for the first time in the early 1950s)

> essentially on the basis that, given the talent of Israel's various security services, given the possibility of additional legislation regulating movement into "sensitive areas," *given the bad publicity which the military administration attracted in the international arena*, and in the light of the resentment which the military administration engendered among local Arabs, control over the minority could be achieved more efficiently without the military administration than with it (Lustick 1980:67; emphasis added).

But equally important, Israeli control over a non-Jewish, Arab minority by means of military administration painfully displayed *to the Jewish establishment* the contradiction engendered in Israel's dual self-definition, in terms of both democracy and Zionism, enshrined in its Declaration of Independence.

What emerged was a "Judaization of Galilee" policy. It involved intense government efforts directed at the establishment of a substantial number of Jewish *towns* (rather than, and in addition to, Jewish agricultural settlements) throughout the region, interspersed with Arab villages, immediately next to Arab urban concentrations, and within formerly Arab urban centres; thereby rapidly redressing the prevailing "demographic imbalance" and effectively thwarting the emergence of territorially contiguous Arab cantons or, worse, the emergence of significant metropolitan centres within the Arab sector (Lustick 1980:129). By means of such settlement, Ben-Gurion -- whose brainchild the "Judaization of Galilee" programme is said to have been -- and the Jewish leadership in general hoped to establish *faits accomplis* in opposition to demands made by the Arab nations that Israel immediately evacuate those areas outside the borders as drawn in the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947.

The conception of the idea of Upper Nazareth was part and parcel of the "Judaization of Galilee" programme and policy. Mordechai Allon -- chairman of the Interministerial Committee appointed in charge of the establishment of Upper Nazareth by the Ministry of Defence (1956-1963), subsequently appointed and later elected chairman of the Upper Nazareth Local Council (1963-1974), and finally the mayor of the town until 1976 -- explained to me:

> One of the important aspects of [Upper] Nazareth is that it was one of the first towns planned and started from scratch. Until then there had been quite a few towns like Migdal Ha'Emeq, founded where they were because they were abandoned ghost towns, Arab ghost towns to which [the government] brought new immigrants. And after us [Upper Nazareth] there then came Carmiel -- also built from scratch.

> It was a new idea in the sense that until then we [the Jews] had tried to hold on to a large area of land with relatively few people. The system of the *kibbutz* and *moshav* is based on this: a few people holding on to a large area of land, cultivating and holding on to it; because it is a known fact -- especially in the Middle East -- that conquering [land] is not enough. You have to cultivate in order to own the land.

> When we started with the idea of development towns, the big change in the way of thinking was that we had come to a point where *the number* of people counted as well. And the only way to settle large numbers is by way of urban settlement and industrial development. The area that is now Upper Nazareth could make two or three kibbutzim, two moshavim. But how many people are there in a kibbutz? Maybe six hundred? That was not the idea! Besides, the land was in any case not suitable for agriculture. Everyone knows that. The idea was to have on that size of land thousands and thousands of people [Jews]; because it was not enough any longer to cultivate it, one must also have enough people to be represented on it (Mordechai Allon).[21]

A Ministry of the Interior senior Arabist and the Northern District Commissioner for many years (until 1985)[22] provided an even more explicit and ideologically elaborated explanation of the considerations that had entered the conception of the idea of Upper Nazareth:

I think we should look at the map so that you understand what we are talking about here [he unfolds a gigantic map of Israel and spreads it out on the floor]. This here is Nazareth, right? About here, this was supposed to be the border of Israel. This whole area [he outlines that part of the Galilee region which the U.N.Partition Plan of 1947 had excluded from the Jewish state] was meant to have been outside of Israel; up to here. That is, south of Acre, the river Ne'eman, was the State of Israel. Acre was meant to be in the Arab state; Nazareth was exactly the border. Upper Nazareth was then called *Djab el-Sich*, and that area was to be part of the Arab state because of the Arab village Ein Mahil east of it, etc. Now, you must understand that when the State of Israel was established there were 600,000 Jews in the whole area [comprising the state following the War of Independence]. It's not entirely clear how many Arabs there were, but according to the census of 1949 there were about 350,000; less even: 330,000, of which the majority -- 200,000 or so -- were concentrated in this area [Lower and Central Galilee]. The remainder were in the *Little Triangle*.[23]

By the early 1950s it was clear that the Jews couldn't live with this military government -- this whole area [Galilee] was under military government then. Not the Arabs! Of course it wasn't very convenient for the Arabs either, but their concept of government was very alike to it. Moreover, in 1948 -- as a result of the Israeli Arabs' massive flight -- those who stayed on remained in fact without leadership: no political leadership, no religious leadership, no economic base; and largely illiterate. Two things were clear to us [the Jewish Israeli authorities]: that these people had to be brought to a level [of development] which would allow them to integrate into the wider Israeli society, and secondly, a way had to be found to get rid of the vacuum; because a state has no vacuum! Land on which no [Jewish] population is settled will be settled by another population! Thirdly -- and this is the most important thing and has persisted until this day -- there exists in the Middle East the culture of predation [*tarbut ha'bissah*]! That is, there are no public lands, only privately owned or unowned [fallow, uncultivated] lands; and everyone -- every *hamula* [patrilineal kinship group among Arabs] -- is waiting to grab the empty land! This is what confronted us on a large scale! Galilee was empty [of Jews], and it was clear that it was impossible to keep the Arab population under military government as they [the Labour government] did until the mid-1960s.

So, the reason for the establishment of Upper Nazareth was what we call *hityashvut ha'aliyah* [the settlement of the returning Jews in the

land of Israel]!...All I have just told you about the culture of predation,
here [in Galilee] it assumed a practical form. It became clear that in the
State of Israel we can't rule -- like they are trying to rule the [West]
Bank today -- by way of *amadot* [outpost settlements] alone. In order to
own the land of Israel you must settle on it, *live* it, simply sit on the
land! And that was the idea behind Upper Nazareth: to obtain this area
which, according to the U.N. decision of 1947, was *not* part of the State
of Israel in 1952! Jerusalem was meant to be international, but in 1952
Ben-Gurion announced that from that day on Jerusalem was to be the
capital of Israel. The same train of thought caused him to decide in
1955-1956 to make this area an integral part of the Jizreel Valley and
the Jewish settlements in Eastern Galilee which, according to the 1947
[U.N.] decision, *were* parts of Israel! This was Ben-Gurion's own
personal decision![24]

Eli -- a *sabra* (native-born Jewish Israeli), born and raised on a *Mapam*-leaning

kibbutz, and one of the pioneering first settlers of Upper Nazareth -- in his story

of how it all began echoes the government officials directly involved in the

enterprise, whose voices we have just heard:

The government policy at the time was clear: To Judaize Galilee!
And what did that mean? This was the period when the military
government was about to come to an end. As an answer to it there
emerged the following idea: To settle [Jewish] people here in Galilee on
a massive scale and to alleviate the demographic problem by increasing
the ratio of the Jewish relative to the Arab population. I don't know
whether you are aware of this, but according to the 1947 U.N. decision,
Galilee was *not* part of Israel. So there followed a period of construction
that was extraordinary -- housing, factories, public buildings! And there
was, then, a massive influx of money for this purpose!

But leaving our account of the motives underlying Upper Nazareth's

establishment at this general level -- as has been the tendency in most accounts --

could mean that we miss or misinterpret the essence and the roots of the town's

predicament which has been so extensively commented upon in Israel's national

media, namely, its relationship to its Arab Other of Nazareth. Jewish Israelis, in

any case, generally tend to dismiss answers at such a level of generality and insist

on knowing "why *dafka*...?" (why this particular place, time, person, thing, etc. of all possible?).[25] Thus, aiming to unravel subjective *meaning* and to be truthful to Israeli culture, I now want to turn -- *dafka*-like -- to those considerations that entered into the idea of establishing Upper *Nazareth*.

2.2. Christian and Arab Nazareth -- A Town Unlike Any Other In Israel

> "*In the beginning there was the idea:*
> *Nazareth was to be a Jewish Israeli*
> *town, a town like all other towns*
> *in the state...* "[26]

The motives that propelled both the idea and the actual realization of Upper Nazareth must be sought in the specific and in many respects unique characteristics of the city of Nazareth at the time of and following the Israeli state's establishment; these characteristics also stand at the core of Upper Nazareth's predicament. Nazareth stands as a key symbol (along with Bethlehem and Jerusalem) within the *global* Christian religion. From the point of view of the Zionist establishment, this fact, combined with the demographic and socio-political developments to which it gave rise, rendered *de facto* Judaization at one and the same time a political and ideological imperative yet also highly problematic. Thus, rather than attempt to culturally appropriate this ancient city, an alternative solution to this Zionist problem was conceived of: the symbolic

Judaization of Nazareth through the establishment of Jewish Upper Nazareth. A brief elaboration of Nazareth's symbolic significance is in order.

The following American student-travel guide depiction of Galilee captures, in essence, the significance of the place of Nazareth for the Christian versus the Jewish religious tradition:

> Galilee is the land of the Bible. Over these green hills Christ wandered and taught, and in these ancient towns Jewish scholars produced the great rabbinical texts, the *Talmud*, the *Mishnah*, and the *Kabbalah* (Hodes 1985:94).

What stands out is the virtual absence of major events and personalities linking the place with Jewish history and religion (and hence a lack of Jewish symbols), whereas the whole area, but particularly the city of Nazareth itself, is saturated with historic events and figures that are of central symbolic significance in Christianity.

Like Jerusalem and Bethlehem, Nazareth is directly linked with the life of Christ. It is the place where the archangel Gabriel is said to have appeared before Mary to announce the birth of Christ; the precise location of this event is marked by the Church of Annunciation, set up where the house of Mary is presumed to have been located, and within which -- even more precisely -- two columns mark the location where the archangel and Mary stood at the moment of Annunciation. Nazareth, moreover, is the place to which Mary and Joseph returned following their divinely ordained flight to Egypt (*en route* to which Mary gave birth to

Christ in Bethlehem), and where Jesus came of age, in more than one sense. St. Joseph's Church marks (underground) the carpentry shop from which Joseph earned the Holy Family's livelihood. The Greek-Catholic Synagogue Church marks the synagogue in which Jesus (who, after all, was a Jew) is said to have studied as a child and preached as a young man; there is still the book from which he learned to read, as well as the bench on which he sat while studying. The Mensa Christi, and more precisely, the round stone table situated within it, is said to constitute the Table of Christ: the place where Jesus shared meals with his disciples, the symbolically most significant of which is the Last Supper with them following his Resurrection. The Galilean hills embedding Nazareth is the place where Christ had retreated for meditation, divine inspiration, and to teach his disciples.

In stark contrast, Jewish biblical associations with this area are meagre indeed; this is of crucial importance in the light of the particular historiography of Herzlian Zionism (the principal political practitioner of which was Ben-Gurion): it sought to demystify and politicize Jewish history by deconstructing exilic and reconstructing pre-exilic, biblical, Jewish history (Paine 1987). Here, there was nothing to reconstruct. Even as pertains to the exilic history of the Jewish people -- the period in which the Galilee region as a whole gained Jewish renown as the place producing great spiritual minds and texts: the Talmud, the Mishnah, and the Kabbalah -- Tiberias and Sefad but not Nazareth became bywords of Jewish spiritual development. In sum, Nazareth is devoid of Jewish symbols, be they of the time and nature that the Labour Zionists favoured or of the period in Jewish

history which they sought to exorcise. It is in the context and light of this historico-symbolic asymmetry between Judaism and Christianity which Nazareth encapsulates that the formulation and realization of the idea of an Upper Nazareth, and subsequent predicaments this gave rise to must be situated.

Of all the Arab urban centres in Palestine prior to 1947, Nazareth was the only one which, following its incorporation into the Israeli state, not only retained its population size but experienced a population increase (see Table 1).

Table 1: Arab Population in Major Israeli Cities, 1947-1949

City	Before the War	After the War[a]
West Jerusalem[b]	75,000	3,500
Jaffa	70,000	3,600
Haifa	71,000	2,900
Lydda-Ramle	34,920	2,000
Nazareth	15,540	16,800
Acre	15,000	3,500
Tiberias	5,310	---
Sefad	9,530	---

[a] The figures, especially those for Acre and Nazareth, include substantial numbers of internal refugees.

[b] Arab-dominated East Jerusalem is not included here. West Jerusalem fell under Israeli control in 1948.

(*Source*: Lustick 1980:131.)

The source of this population increase, which contrasts drastically with the dramatic population loss of other former Arab urban concentrations, is attributable to two major factors -- behind which would appear to lie the religio-symbolic *status quo* of the city.

Following the end of the British Mandate and the U.N. decision to establish a Jewish state, Nazareth became the seat of the Arab "Liberation Army" (made up of fighters from Syria and Iraq, organised under the leadership of Faouzi el-Kaoukji)[27] which confronted the Jewish army in the War of Independence. As such, the city promised its own Arab population as well as those of surrounding villages and towns increased safety *vis-à-vis* the advancing Jewish army; this encouraged steadfastness among the local Arab residents, and tended to attract Arabs fleeing their own towns and villages in the face of the Jewish army's advance. But an even more decisive factor in encouraging steadfastness and attracting internal refugees seems to have been the city's religio-symbolic status. In the Christian world at large, every church is a place of sanctuary -- a sanctuary enforced by moral and spiritual sanctions; and it seems to have been this principle that was readily applied by the refugee Arabs, including Moslem Arab refugees, to one of the holiest towns in Christianity. Indeed, when the Jewish attack against Nazareth (and Jerusalem) was mounted in 1948, "Ben-Gurion gave strict orders that any Jewish soldier found desecrating the Holy Places was to be executed immediately" (Bar Zohar 1967:157). At the end of the war these refugees were then prevented from returning to their original homes by the Israeli authorities, and a substantial number started a new life in Nazareth.

And thus a town *unlike* all other towns in the state of Israel had begun to crystallize, creating a uniquely intensified political and ideological need for its Judaization -- even as it simultaneously defied the practicability of such a step. Instead, Nazareth was well on its way to becoming the political and cultural centre of the whole Israeli Arab sector, and -- from the point of view of the Jewish establishment -- a security risk. For, indeed, the immigration of Arab refugees from villages and what once had been other Arab urban centres in Galilee continued well beyond 1949, contributing to the speedy development of Nazareth as the centre of Arab nationalist sentiments.

Prior to 1947, the majority of Nazareth's residents had been Christian Arabs -- many of whom were well educated and of middle class status. The immigrating Arab population, on the other hand, comprised a largely Moslem population of peasant background that was now dispossessed of their homes and livelihoods. Moreover, the proportional weight of the latter was to increase rapidly, manifesting a significantly higher natural rate of increase within this segment relative to the Christian, urban segment of the Arab population.[28] These "refugees," as they were referred to locally by the original town residents even after years of residence in Nazareth,[29] began to build dwellings and to settle in the hitherto "free" land area on the north-eastern and eastern mountain slopes extending from the city's centre towards the enveloping mountain ridges.[30] This area, to this day, comprises the poorer, slum-like quarter of the city.

The concentration of a largely dispossessed and uprooted Moslem Arab peasant population combined with the presence of an Arab intellectual and social

élite (who, unlike in other Arab towns, had stayed on) was recognized early by the Israeli authorities as a potential politically 'explosive' mixture. Indeed, as early as 1951 Nazareth manifested what was considered within Israeli government circles a radical political complexion: the strongest support for the Communist Party,[31] the only anti-Zionist party in Israel:

> [Ben-Gurion's misgivings about Israeli Arabs' acceptance of the Jewish state] are borne out in the voting patterns of the most important all-Arab city in Israel, Nazareth. The citizens of Nazareth...have fairly consistently given about half their votes to the Communists...Added to this is the small but regular support for Mapam, which has always been sharply critical of Ben-Gurion-*Mapai* Arab policies, internal and external (Avi-Hai 1974:167).

Nazareth was becoming a political bellwether and cultural metropolis of the Israeli Arab sector, and all this in one of two Christian holy cities in Israel, a city on which the Christian world at large focused its eyes attentively.

Nazareth, hot-bed of Arab nationalist sentiments and sacred Christian city, unofficially was also the capital of (Jewish) Israel's Northern District. It had been the Northern District administrative seat already during the time of the British Mandate, and following the establishment of the Israeli state, the Northern District Command of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) moved into its place -- accompanied by various other regional government ministries and administration offices. The intention was to mark Jewish-Israeli sovereignty over the city and region; but there was also logistic sense to this: Nazareth was the only and well-located service and provisioning centre for the surrounding *Jewish* agricultural settlements. Nevertheless there was an uncomfortable paradox in this situation, as far as Jewish Israeli interests were concerned: this regional centre of contested Galilee was (1) Arab and (2) of focal interest to the Christian world.

Nazareth, moreover, had no sizeable or long-standing Jewish community. Following the "liberation" of Nazareth by the Israeli forces and its incorporation into the state, no more than ten to fifteen Jewish families -- according to all accounts -- were to be found in the city These were primarily military personnel and government officials, stationed in Nazareth following its conquest, and their families, most of them Jews from Arab countries, like Iraq, who spoke Arabic. The majority of them did not -- to the Jewish leadership's dismay -- take up residence in the city itself, but instead commuted daily to their places of work from surrounding Jewish settlements. Both those residing in the city as well as those commuting daily lived or behaved -- to the Jewish leadership's shock and embarrassment -- in a way deemed typical for an ethnic minority; worse, as Mordechai Allon explained to me, like the Jews in the *galut* (Diaspora), and this within the Jewish state:

[We are sitting in a little Christian-Arab coffee house, "St.Joseph's Meeting Place," in the centre of Nazareth, which is where Mr. Allon had insisted on meeting me for the purpose of our conversation. He now lives in Jerusalem.]
Before I joined the Ministry of Defence I served in the Northern Command under the General responsible for the demilitarized zone that existed at the time in connection with the U.N. One of the problems here was our government officials. They worked until 2 p.m., but in fact stopped work at 1 p.m., leaving their offices early. The joke in all of Nazareth was, "The Jews are running away from Nazareth before it gets dark because they are afraid!" And so on. This was said about government officials! That, of course, was in a way a pressure to change the situation -- Israeli officials acting like the Jews in the Diaspora! On the other hand, the situation -- for those Jews who did live in Nazareth -- *was* very similar to living in the Diaspora. There were no Jewish schools; the children had to go to the Christian schools, and there were quarrels among the kids. Here Sunday is the day of rest, there [he points up the hill towards Upper Nazareth] it is Saturday. No synagogues. In fact, for everything connected with the Jewish faith one had to be

> willing and able to travel somewhere else to find it. So, for the Jews to
> be willing and able to live in Nazareth, we had to build at least a
> Jewish neighbourhood that would provide all these [Jewish] services!

The fact that there was -- in the form of Nazareth -- a town in the Jewish state
devoid of Jewish life prior to the establishment of Upper Nazareth has been
engraved into local history in the form of a story, almost amounting to a myth of
origin, which then appeared in the Hebrew newspapers and to this day is
recounted to children in the schools of Upper Nazareth within the framework of
"My Settlement" studies (and to the anthropologist who is collecting oral
histories). It tells how Pinhas Lavon,[32] "after careful consideration of a delicate
and complicated subject, that of security, reached the conclusion that a Jewish
settlement must be established in Nazareth." What is said to have tipped the
scale is an American Jewish tourist visiting Nazareth who asked, "How many
Jews live in the city?" When he was told that there were almost none he allegedly
became all confused. "In America," he is said to have exclaimed, "there is no
town which has no Jews. And here, in the heart of the Jewish state, a town
without Jews!?"

But to rectify the situation through *de facto* Judaization was going to prove
difficult, and eventually a circumlocution had to be found -- Upper Nazareth. *De
facto* Judaization worked in those many instances of villages, even towns (e.g.
Jaffa or Acre) where the former inhabitants had left, under whatever
circumstances.[33] Nazareth, to bring out the essential factors, offered neither
vacant housing for the settlement of Jewish immigrants nor had its population
been reduced sufficiently to make the rapid creation of a Jewish majority through

large-scale settlement practicable. It was clear that the Judaization of Nazareth would call for a different approach; Jewish Nazareans would have to be settled around, rather than within, Nazareth proper; and the achievement of a Jewish population outnumbering the unusually large and rapidly growing Arab population would have to be a capital-intensive *and* long-term process.

Judaization of the city of Nazareth through the imposition of a Jewish local government -- a distinct possibility in theory -- was out of the question for various reasons. First, this would have contradicted the democratic principles which the new state certainly upheld in principle, and as far as possible -- without infringing on the State's Zionist principles on the other hand -- also in practice. In short, it would not have constituted Judaization as defined in Labour-Zionist ideology, which sought to uphold both principles. Secondly, given the significance and renown of the city in the Christian world, this way of implementing Jewish sovereignty would have brought the *bad publicity* which military rule had already invited and its abolition now sought to avoid. I suggest that Upper Nazareth, in the mind of the Israeli government, implied the *symbolic* Judaization of Nazareth; that much would be achieved in any event, and it was a stepping stone possibly leading to *de facto* Judaization at an unspecifiable point in the future.

Chapter 3

"Creating Something from Nothing":
The Establishment of
a Jewish Nazareth

The idea of symbolic Judaization entailed the establishment of a sizeable Jewish community separate from the city of Nazareth in some respects, yet inseparable in others: it was to be separated from Nazareth administratively, yet situated in close and visible geographic proximity to it and with a name blurring the actual disassociation between them. If Nazareth could not (yet) be Jewish, there would in any event be a Jewish Nazareth. Government offices and industrial development would be so concentrated that the capital of the north would be the Jewish Nazareth.

But all these symbols were yet to be created. Also, they were intended as directed at the Arab and Christian Others -- locally, in Israel and worldwide. As far as the symbolic We was concerned, the symbols would perhaps address the Israeli public at large and the Jewish community worldwide; but -- and this became crucial -- for the Jews that were to give life to and live with these symbols, the people of Upper Nazareth, there was a glaring absence of symbols telling them *how to be Jewish "in Nazareth"* and what kind of Jews to be. To be

sure, there *were* efforts (as we shall see) to construct Jewish history in place, but these were not very successful. The absence of a symbolic grid for these Jewish settlers themselves has to do, of course, with the lack of historical interconnections between Judaism and Nazareth: with the lack of Jewish history "*in place*" (Tuan 1984).[34] Hence, the cultural emplacement of Jewish Israelis in this particular place within the Jewish homeland could be expected to be problematic; or at least, could not be taken for granted (as the architects of the idea of a Jewish 'Nazareth' seem to have done). As Berler (1970:62) notes with respect to new towns or development towns in Israel:

> Because of the [Jewish] population's strong emotional bonds with the history of the country [Israel], imbued with varying degrees of religious feeling, *those places which are part of the Jewish tradition (biblical or later) enjoy a natural advantage. This unique advantage helps to create contemporary ties to such places...*The existence of these historical sites facilitates the change from an initially diffuse orientation towards the new homeland to a more specific one (emphases added).

Certainly, Upper Nazareth is hardly the only new town established in a place not directly affiliated with Jewish religious-national history. But it *is* unique among all other new Jewish-Israeli towns with respect to the immediate cultural and symbolic landscape surrounding it: an all-Arab city, saturated with Christian history and symbols -- with which, it was intended, the Jewish town was to blend symbolically and politically. More commonly, Jewish Israeli development towns compare themselves with a nearby kibbutz of whose world they may catch glimpses but into which they rarely enter (see Oz 1983:25-49); or, there is no other community in the surrounding landscape aside from their own; and new Israelis may compare their new homes with those they left behind. Here the point is that

settling in places within the new homeland that are enriched with Jewish historical symbols (religious and/or nationalist) and perhaps even with a native-born population or one of long *vetek* (seniority in the country), Jewishness is already laid out for them.

For the largest part, the newly established Jewish towns where such a symbolic grid was already in place prior to settlement are restricted to the West Bank territories occupied by Israel in the course of the Six-Day War of 1967, and they are least common in Galilee. A particularly apt example is the Jewish settlement of Kiriat Arba/Hebron, and a brief consideration of this settlement is fruitful for comparative purposes. (On occasion people of Upper Nazareth too compare the two Nazareths with Kiriat Arba/Hebron.)

Jewish attachment to the city of Hebron goes back to the earliest accounts of Abraham, the first Jew and patriarch of all Jews: he settled in Hebron where he purchased, for four silver coins, the cave of Machpela as a burial site for his wife Sarah. Machpela has long been revered by Jews as the burial site of Jewish patriarchs and matriarchs (Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, Jacob and Leah). Moreover, it was in Hebron that David founded his kingdom and ruled for seven years before he conquered Jerusalem and made it the capital and spiritual centre of Israel. For Jews, Hebron ranks second in holiness after Jerusalem, and has been continuously inhabited by Jews throughout the ages -- except for periods when their continued presence was forcibly interrupted, as it was following the Arab pogrom in 1929 (which claimed 60 Jewish lives and as a result of which British Mandate authorities evacuated the Jewish community). Thus, in addition

to the religio-historical centrality of the place, Jewish blood has been spilled for it, strengthening the bond between the Jewish people and that particular piece of land.[35]

Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the demand to re-establish a Jewish presence in Hebron on behalf of nationalistically and eschatologically motivated religious groups followed immediately upon its seizure by Israeli forces, interpreted messianically, in 1967. At first, this Jewish presence was opposed by Israeli authorities, as they were undecided on a settlement policy in the West Bank, particularly in areas densely populated by Arabs. But in the spring of 1968 a handful of these "zealots" (cf. Friedman 1975), determined to impose their will on the central government, rented rooms in a local Arab hotel -- under the pretext of wanting to celebrate the Jewish Passover festival in the City of the Patriarchs -- and refused to leave subsequently. After months of debate within the Israeli cabinet, a compromise was reached which allowed the group -- who now had assumed the mantle of "pioneering settlers" (*halutzim*) -- to establish themselves within the compounds of the military government of Hebron; and in 1970, the decision to establish a Jewish "upper-Hebron" on its eastern outskirts, to be called Kiriat Arba, was taken by the national unity government under Labour's Golda Meir. Actual implementation soon followed, and the first settlers were able to take up residence in 1971.

In 1979, several of the Jewish settler families of Kiriat Arba established themselves in the very core of Hebron, by moving into a building which prior to 1929 had been Jewish-owned (known as *Beit Hadassah*). Official condemnation,

followed by an extensive debate, finally resulted in concessions to the settlers, who were granted permission to take up residence there under military protection. In 1980, the Israeli government called for the re-establishment of a Jewish quarter in Hebron; and within a few years three additional, formerly Jewish locations were re-occupied by Jewish settlers in the heart of th Arab town, with active official backing. Thus, Kiriat Arba was revealed as a spring-board for the Jewish re-entry of Hebron itself.

In this case, then, the landscape is *a priori* well staked out with Jewish symbols; and it calls upon Jews, as it were, to (re)create the facts and live out the Jewish premises it encodes. Here *topophilia*, "the affective bond between people and place or setting" (Tuan 1974:4), is already quite specific. To be sure, "only" approximately one-half of Kiriat Arba's 2,900 settlers in 1983 were, according to Romann (1986:10), religiously and ideologically motivated, the remainder being attracted by low-cost, high-standard housing. But this is precisely my point: in *that* place secular Jewish Israelis and even those of weak ideological commitment *can* unproblematically, in terms of the implications for their emplacement and Jewish identity, be so: the place itself encapsulates the symbolic grid; all one has to do is live there.

There are, of course, those Israeli Jews for whom emplacement anywhere in the Jewish homeland, and filling their own lives with Jewish content, is unproblematic. Whichever way they may define Jewishness (or think it ought to be defined) -- and there *are* different and even antagonistic versions of Jewish ethnicity which "become bastions of ideology" (Paine 1987:3) -- is not a factor in

this respect; rather, what counts is their religious/ideological conviction and its groundedness. This said, it can be conceded that emplacement and Jewish identity are least problematic for religious Jews (orthodox as well as ultra-orthodox).

These are the major issues to be kept in mind in the subsequent detailed elaboration of the process of creating Jewish symbols and facts in 'Nazareth'.

3.1. Laying the Ground -- Two Nazareths as One

3.1.1. Administrative Separation: Jewish Nazareth Under the Authorship of the Interministerial Committee

A necessary condition for the implementation of the idea of Judaizing Nazareth was the retention of symbolic unity between the ancient Nazareth and the new Jewish community of Nazareth-to-be, while nevertheless separating the two in terms of authority and budget. The building of a Jewish Nazareth entailed intense investments of material resources: of land and of finances (as well as of settlers). Neither the acquisition nor the ethnically exclusive allocation of these essential resources would have been possible within the administrative and jurisdictional framework of the city of Nazareth, for two reasons.

First, because of the demographic dynamics in Nazareth -- but ultimately due to the city's sacred status -- much of the open land bordering or surrounding the city was, in contrast to the absentee ownership pattern in most of Israel,

owned by local individuals or church organisations These circumstances called for land requisitions by the government. Since these and the subsequent allocations of requisitioned land were carried out in the sole interest of the Jewish residents-to-be, the Arab municipality had to be excluded from participation in this process. The same logic applied to the administration of the enormous financial resources necessary to build up the infrastructure of the "Jewish residential area in Nazareth." In short, the earmarking of resources and funds in an ethnically discriminatory manner (1) would have been in clear violation of Israel's *Basic Principles*[36] and (2) could be anticipated to cause the further aggravation of already "radical" political sentiments among the residents of Nazareth (which Upper Nazareth was to counteract and appease); it would have also invited public outcry and criticism from the Christian world.

Second, administrative and jurisdictional integration of the Jewish community of Nazareth with the Arab city of Nazareth would have meant the 'still-birth' of the vision of a large-scale Jewish immigration to Nazareth; for -- as the predicament of Jews in Nazareth at the time of the inception of the idea demonstrates -- few would have consented readily to living as a national minority under non-Jewish, Arab municipal authority within the Jewish homeland, to which they had, after all, journeyed precisely in order to escape such a predicament. As it turned out, the first of the new immigrants to Israel who were settled in what ultimately became the administratively separate Nazareth perceived, initially at least, the mere geographic and physical proximity to the Arab Other as too close for comfort. Mordechai Allon, the chairman of the separate authority eventually created, recalls:

> The first group [of new immigrants to Israel settled in Upper Nazareth] numbered seventeen families. When they arrived in a bus from Haifa [the port of entry], it was difficult to persuade them to settle here; they claimed they were afraid to live in an Arab town. It seems that they had talked to people on the boat who didn't know that a Jewish Nazareth had been established, and the new immigrants had been told that they were being sent to an Arab city!

Thus, in the beginning of 1955, the Ministry of Defence effectively closed off approximately 400 *dunams*[37] of land on top of a rocky prominence above the city of Nazareth, declared the initial construction on this land as "government construction," and conferred on the "Nazareth Development Area" (as it was dubbed) the development priority status "A."[38] A year later, the government departments most directly concerned with the establishment of a Jewish Nazareth -- Defence, Labour and Finance -- appointed a "management" or "development" committee[39] to take charge of the "Nazareth Development Area." The committee was comprised of four representatives of those governmental and non-governmental national institutions that were to play a key role in this enterprise: the Ministries of Defence and Labour, the Land Development Authority[40] and *Amidar*.[41] Mordechai Allon, a sabra and former army captain then working for the Ministry of Defence's Unit for the Development of Galilee, was appointed chairman.[42]

All authority concerning the initial "Nazareth Development Area" and the subsequent development of a Jewish Nazareth was invested in this committee. As the committee's chairman pointed out explicitly at its first meeting, the committee's functions were defined loosely enough to endow it with a wide scope of powers. Point 2 of the IC's letter of appointment stated:

> The committee will be in charge of any problems concerning the development and settlement of the development area (IC Minutes, Vol.1, p.1).

There were no further instructions.

The IC's authority and power was enhanced by the fact that the building of the new Jewish Nazareth was under the immediate supervision and care of the Defence Ministry[43] -- an unusual arrangement, and as such not merely a "government project" but one which fell under the umbrella of "security." This implied absolute priority. The IC could allocate the extraordinary resources required for the project at its own discretion. Most significantly, the IC enjoyed virtual immunity from the normally close scrutiny, and from the sanctions, of the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, the time or development stage terminating the IC's mandate was left unspecified.

It is thus tempting to describe the IC's powers and authority as absolute. Yet it must be conceded that its decision-making powers were, nevertheless, restricted by the overarching aims of the project, however loosely defined 'at the top'. To this effect the IC was, like any civic local authority, even if mainly for the sake of appearance, required to submit for approval prospective plans to centralized levels of government or administration. But never was any plan submitted by the IC rejected by these authorities; in fact, approval was quite frequently sought *post factum*.

Two implications of all this are of particular pertinence for my argument

and analysis: first, the IC was virtually in control of giving Jewish Nazareth its shape (by way of land acquisition and expansion, land use, determination of the town's physical layout, infrastructural and institutional make-up, population profile, and its cultural and political climate); second, there existed, as a result, considerable opportunity for committee members to develop and actually further political and ideological interests of their own.[44] Even following the IC's disbandment (in 1962, when the Jewish Nazareth was transferred from the hands of the Ministry of Defence into the care of the Ministry of the Interior, and a civil local authority was created), this committee had had the time, authority and resources to lay the groundwork for the desired facts and symbols. Seen differently, it set the stage, as it were, for the settlers' predicament-to-be. And in fact, the IC leadership remained influential long after the committee was officially terminated.[45]

Initially, the Israeli government sought to conceal from the residents of Nazareth the fact that a *second*, Jewish Nazareth was being established. Until September 1957, Nazareth residents were led to believe that the construction on a site above their city was to comprise merely a *neighbourhood* or *housing project* for Jewish residents which, once completed, would be administratively and jurisdictionally a part of the ancient city. Such cautious maneuverings, the data suggest, was prompted by the anticipation of political unrest on account of and in protest against the implementation of the vision of Nazareth's Judaization.[46]

The government's intention to separate the Jewish community from the

Arab city in terms of budget and authority, for a longer time and for higher purposes than the given *raison d'être* of "government building" had implied -- with the fact that a second, Jewish Nazareth was being built, of which one could not know (but perhaps guess) at which point its growth and expansion would come to a halt -- became public knowledge in September 1957. By that time the Ministry of Defence had come to an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior to initiate the formalization of the proposal stated in Ben-Gurion's letter of appointment to the IC chairman: "this neighbourhood will not be part of the municipality of Nazareth." In practical terms, this meant that the Ministry of the Interior was to get off the ground the definition and demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries[47] and to set in motion preparatory steps towards the transferral of Jewish Nazareth from the hands and care of the Ministry of Defence, and the IC, to the Ministry of the Interior and a standard local authority.[48] But the changes in the public definition of Jewish Nazareth took years to implement fully, and were finalized only in 1962.

In view of the considerable apprehensions by the government about 'going public' concerning its actual plans, what explains its change of heart at this particular point? The first facts had by now, of course, been created, but by no means reached the envisioned dimensions. Yet, these newly created facts, including the establishment of private industries in the area defined as "government construction," were blatant enough to 'tip off' the citizens of Nazareth. And thus the early form of legitimating Jewish entrance into Nazareth became obsolete; all that remained as an alternative (to what now clearly revealed

itself as illegitimate and even illegal actions) was to make the Jewish Nazareth at least legal, if not legitimate; and the process of doing so could be drawn out.

It was not long after discussions of the formal administrative separation were initiated at the highest government levels that rumours of this circulated among an outraged (as had been feared) population of Nazareth. The IC expected further aggravations immediately following the notification of the Nazareth municipality that it select a delegate to represent the city on the committee drafting the final redrawing of the city's municipal boundaries. The minutes of a IC meeting on July 10, 1958,[49] tellingly read:

> In light of the rebellious situation and the possibility of aggravated relations with the population of Nazareth, as was reported by [the] Captain, [the IC] decided that in addition to the local defence precautions already taken, [the] Captain will assist in setting up further defence measures. The chairman will approach the police with a request for increased surveyance, particularly on Sundays and Christian holidays, when the residents of the Lower city [Nazareth] come to visit the neighbourhood [Jewish Upper Nazareth].

Just as the Zionist establishment had previously proclaimed that any special and separate government responsibility for and intervention on behalf of the "Jewish neighbourhood" would be temporary, it now promised Nazareth that the administrative integration of the new Jewish township would be realized in the near future. A temporary separation was justified in terms of the low ceiling the Jewish population had thus far reached,[50] but the authorities remained vague about the precise population size deemed necessary before integration could take effect.[51] Objections to municipal integration "now" were billed as having come from the grassroots of the Jewish Nazareth, from the Jewish settlers themselves.

The insistence on temporary separation thus assumed an aura of democracy. As a Hebrew newspaper reported at the time:

> The 2,000 residents currently living in *Kiriat Nazeret* don't want to be included in the jurisdiction of the existing municipality [of Nazareth]. They demand that independent governing institutions be set up for them. "In the event of elections," they argue, "we will only be able to send two representatives, at most, to the Municipal Council; their voice will be swallowed up within the non-Jewish majority. This way, we will be oppressed in two important areas -- the allocation of employment and construction; since for both of these the decision-making power lies with the municipal council." Because of this, the residents suggest: "In the meantime we will elect our own Jewish council. When our numbers increase to 10,000 or more, we will consider joining the Municipal Council [of Nazareth]." The residents of the Jewish neighbourhood approached the government with a request that they be given independent status, and it seems that the government is prepared to grant it (*Ma'ariv*, 6.1.1959).

The case has been made that the Judaization of Nazareth required the separation of the Jewish community from the Arab and Christian city in practical terms, and I have described the circumstances that dictated this way of proceeding. What still needs to be dealt with are the forms of *association*, symbolic in nature, which ran parallel to and blurred perception of the actual disassociation at these levels where it was prevalent -- not merely among Arab Israeli residents of Nazareth and the wider Israeli public, but also among Jewish settlers of Nazareth. Three means or forms of such symbolic affinity can be discerned: name of place (designatory), geographic situation in relation to Nazareth (locational), and the Jewish community's appropriation of Nazareth's functions as seat of regional government offices and secret capital of Galilee (functional and statutory). The former two, especially, are worthy of more detailed analytical attention.

3.1.2. Nominal Affiliations -- Taking Christian Nazareth's Name in

Vain

From the earliest stages (and to this day) the various designations formally and informally utilized to refer to the Jewish settlement have had two features in common: the name "Nazareth" (*Nazeret* in Hebrew) is retained in all of them, and it is supplemented with a specificatory adjunct in most instances. The adjunct is as much of interest as the name retained, on account of the variations in it and, more importantly, the premises it contains with respect to the relationship binding the Jewish settlement with the ancient city.

During the early phase of symbol production and fact creation in Nazareth, the period to which the current chapter is restricted (that is, the time of the IC), there were in use five terms of reference (with their abbreviations), in newspapers, government documents/correspondences, and IC minutes. They are:

1. *Shikun Nazrat*: the housing project of Nazareth
   or simply "the *Shikun*;"

2. *Ha'Shkhunah ha'yehudit be'Nazeret*: the Jewish
   neighbourhood of Nazareth,
   or simply "*ha'shkhunah*": the neighbourhood;

3. *Nazrat*: the adjunctive form of the proper name, but
   without a qualificatory adjunct;

4. *Kiriat Nazeret*: the township of Nazareth,
   or simply "the *Kiriah*": the township;

5. *Nazrat Illit*: Upper Nazareth.

The first two forms, quite explicitly it seems, postulate the municipal integration

of the Jewish community with the city of Nazareth, notwithstanding their separation in terms of budget and authority. To an unknowing audience these terms of reference obfuscate actual separation, while to the informed they promise that administrative separation will be temporary and contingent, that there *will* be integration (though at what point and under what conditions is left open). Under these terms the newspapers could, and did, herald the "return of the Jews to Nazareth" or that Jews were on the way to becoming the largest *eidah* (religious-ethnic group) in Nazareth. The audience were, among others, the Jewish-Israeli public (Us) and the other nations at large (Them). The message, constructed laudatorily as "Jews develop Nazareth," implied that the Judaization of Nazareth was well on its way *and* was also beneficial to the Arab and Christian Other of Nazareth. In this respect one significant Other addressed was also the Arab population of Nazareth which, as I have noted, not merely looked upon the developments in their immediate environs with suspicion and outright disapproval but, in fact, reacted to them by way of ethnic protest.

The third nomenclature, that of the adjunctive form of the proper name in isolation from the qualificatory adjunct, obliterates actual as well as cognitive boundaries altogether. This is most definitely the case in printed communication, since in the Hebrew spelling system (where vowels are generally not spelled out), both *Nazeret* and *Nazrat* are transliterated identically: N (*nun*), Z (*tzaddick*), R (*resh*), T (*taff*). As such, this nomenclature entails implications similar to the first two, although in emphasized form. Indeed, by means of this nomenclature *de facto* Judaization was being signalled even before it had been realized. And this,

it seems, is precisely what the Christian clergy of Nazareth objected to in May 1959, when it became public that instead of a Jewish neighbourhood within Nazareth a second, Jewish town with a separate budget and under the control of a separate authority -- of the name "Nazareth" -- was being legally established. The Christian clergy approached the IC regarding the *hekh'sher* (the seal testifying to the kosher quality of a product) on merchandise produced for export by the newly established sweets factory in the Jewish Nazareth. The seal stated "N.Z.R.T" (read *Nazeret* or *Nazrat*) in Hebrew and "Nazareth" in English as the place of the products' origin. This the clergy took issue with on the grounds that "in the minds of millions of Christians around the world, Nazareth -- Christ's hometown -- is considered a Christian town and holy place" (IC Minutes, 16.4.1959).[52]

The following excerpt from a December 1958 article by IC chairman M. Allon in the local monthly paper[53] (*Illon Nazrat*), which was in essence echoed in the national papers, should be considered in view of what has been observed above:

> [T]he government decided...to put into effect part of the development plans for the city [Nazareth], which had been prepared but never realized by the British Mandate,...to develop and expand the city: to make roads, establish regional government institutions, and build a modern residential area with gardens and greenery -- a modern town on the slopes of the bold mountains in order to beautify the city and its environs. We then thought, and we are certain today, that this plan is for the benefit of the public.

The fourth form of designation -- *Kiriah* -- appears, *prima facie*, to contradict the premises contained in and the messages communicated by way of

all other forms in use. A kiriah, as used in Israel's locality nomenclature, delineates administratively independent townships. It is important, however, to take into account the factors locally mitigating the meaning attributed to the concept: first, the fact that this mode is used *simultaneously* with the other modes, making at the very least for considerable ambiguity; second, in the context of Nazareth the term *kiriah* had been imbued with a very specific meaning -- the *kiriat memshalah* (a village or campus housing all government offices) *of Nazareth* that was to be set up in the *Nazareth Development Area.* So that in *this* particular instance, then, it did not necessarily imply two Nazareths, one for each national or religious group, but rather, at least potentially, one Nazareth with government offices in the new *district.*

Only in June 1959 was the Jewish Nazareth (in preparation for its transformation into a separate and civil local authority),[54] officially named Upper Nazareth. *Nazareth* was thus retained in the face of the prevailing administrative realities -- and the promise was kept alive; for, generally, when two Israeli communities share the same name (except for the adjectival adjunct, such as Upper/Lower, Eastern/Western, Old/New, etc.), this usually implies that they are actually part of one and the same municipality, as for example Afula and Upper Afula (here the distinction does not invoke ethnic boundaries). In terms of its usage, the new official name did not throw out of common usage, for quite some time, the other nomenclatures previously employed but merely added a fifth form of reference. And even long after the formal naming of the town, at least one other name has remained to this day: *Nazrat.*

Such cognitive ambiguity, if not outright confusion, regarding the belonging of the Jewish community to the city of Nazareth makes it difficult to discern what kinds of administrative relations between the two communities had been *envisioned* by the Israeli government. Importantly, a measure of such confusion seems to have been shared even by the first Jewish settlers of Upper Nazareth. There is little consensus among my informants about this matter. Some insist (perhaps interpreting the past in the light of the present?) that from the beginning Jewish Nazareth had been planned as a separate, second Nazareth; that unification had never been seriously intended, but was rather a "myth" perpetuated to appease the Arab population of Nazareth:

> Look, we know now that there never really was a plan [to merge the two towns]! There *was* a period when Lower Nazareth -- Upper Nazareth was only a little neighbourhood then · wanted to consider all this here [Upper Nazareth] a part of Nazareth. The government at the time was Mapai, and the leaders in Lower Nazareth also were Mapai, and I am certain that they [Israel's as well as Jewish Nazareth's leadership] promised them [the leaders of Nazareth] all the time, "it will be all right, it will be all right!" in order to avert real conflict over the fact that here something that went against their [Nazareth's] interest was being built. Because, the truth is, there was a long period when the Arabs saw this as a disaster, the building of Upper Nazareth!...So, it's all part of the Arabs' perception of Upper Nazareth! (Avi, one of the first settlers, a sabra, and current resident of Upper Nazareth, male, 55.)

Some navigate around a clear-cut answer, suggesting that there had prevailed uncertainty on this issue or even that the central government continually rearranged its agenda:

> First they meant to build a Jewish neighbourhood, for the Jewish government officials of Nazareth, because there was no Jewish community in Nazareth; then there was the idea of building a separate Jewish town; and then the idea of one day merging the two towns

> surfaced; then again they were to remain separate. One never knew
> what would be on their agenda! This was all higher policy. We [the local
> settlers] just tried to build up a Jewish settlement in this area where
> there were almost no Jews at the time -- a large Jewish city! (Margalit,
> of the first new immigrant settlers from Poland, female, 49.)

Others, but they are a minority, recollect that they then thought ("because we were told so") and acted in the belief that once the population of Jewish Nazareth had reached a certain minimum, there would be a united, Jewish-controlled Nazareth.

With respect to the earliest settlers' perceptions of their sense of belonging at the time it is revealing, I think, that they quite frequently and consistently switch frames of reference, just as they switch timeframes in storytelling: when talking about "the beginning," for example, some refer to the new Jewish community as *Nazeret*, whereas the city of Nazareth proper is talked about in terms of "the Arab city," "the Christian city," or "the City." On the other hand, in references to "our town" in the present, *Nazrat* is used most frequently (and, on formal and official occasions and in interactions with outsiders, the full name, *Nazrat Illit*). Yet, there is little consistency, and occasional slips into the other form do occur even among the staunchest 'separatists' (to the anthropologist's confusion, but not the locals', for whom referential clarity is provided by the situational context and topic).

The main point I wish to stress is that the ambiguity also affected the Jewish settlers themselves. This poses questions regarding the formation of a clear-cut sense of Us, of how We ought to *be* and what We ought to *do* in relation to Them.

3.1.3. Geography as a Symbol of Unity and of Separation

In accordance with the motives underlying the idea of establishing a Jewish Nazareth, three considerations determined the final location of the settlement: the availability of a large area of uncultivated and unregistered land, allowing for a settlement of the anticipated density and industrial concentration; geographic continuity with the city of Nazareth and high immediate visibility from it -- thereby impressing the Jewish presence in Nazareth; and, finally (as a result of these factors), geographic *prominence* and *elevation above* the Arab and Christian city, thereby displaying the asymmetric power relations between the two national groups. Mordechai Allon described to me the selection of the ultimate site:

> Our [the Ministry of Defence's Development of Galilee Unit's] task was to establish a Jewish settlement next to Nazareth. The big problem, however, was where to situate it -- whether on the north-western hills facing the village of Zippori[55] or maybe in the western hills facing in the direction of [Kibbutz] Kfar Ha'Horesh. Both these plans had advantages and disadvantages. There was the problem of obtaining land, of building approach roads for the comfort of the settlers, and of space for the establishment of the factories that were to be set up...We toured the area extensively, all of the possible locations, with different experts. In the end, a hill facing Nazareth, from where one has a view of the whole city, was chosen. On this particular location it was decided to build the settlement.

Thus the new city was built along the north-eastern mountain ridge -- the only ridge with a plateau wide enough to accommodate a settlement *on top* of it, rather than on its slopes. Below, the old Arab and Christian city spreads like a huge amphitheatre.

The land area of Upper Nazareth essentially derived from three sources. First, there were individual blocks of land largely or wholly owned by the Israeli government and previously registered in the British High Commissioner's name. Second, the government, via the Land Development Authority and the Israel Land Administration,[56] purchased registered land parcels from private, Arab owners. Finally, the government requisitioned, by invocation of the Absentee Property Law[57] or -- primarily (Lustick 1980:177) -- the Law for the Acquisition of Land in the Public Interest, parcels of land whose legal owners were either not present in the locality or refused to sell.[58]

A significant amount of land in and surrounding Nazareth has always been owned by churches of various denominations, including land which the IC deemed imperative to acquire. But instead of resorting to sequestration, as in the case of individual landowners, where church-owned land was at stake intense efforts were invested in negotiating sales or, at least, lease contracts.[59] Individual owners, on the other hand, were given little choice over the relinquishment of their property rights.[60] However, there were few plots of land owned by residents of Nazareth and cultivated by them, or even serving as housing for their owners, and those were generally scattered throughout the "Nazareth Development Area."

One is struck, studying the minutes of IC meetings dating back to this earliest stage of symbol- and fact-creation, by the amount of energy and resources the IC expended in enforcing requisitioning through evictions and demolitions, even though the number of private land holders who opposed land sales and requis. as was very small (fewer than twenty, it appears); nor was there always

a *planning* need for their removal,[61] as the IC claimed. Instead, the imperative for their removal was a *cultural* one, and it is *this* that made for difficulties in the bureaucratic process. The IC, therefore, quite frequently and explicitly -- as the minutes reveal -- deliberately initiated *planning* of land areas occupied by stubbornly defiant and resistant private land tenants. For example, the minutes of the IC meeting on September 17, 1956, under point 10 (*The Problem of the Mussmar Family*) read:

> The Military Governor of Galilee is requested to involve himself with the problem of evicting the Mussmar family which refuses negotiations and compensations, and which interferes with construction on the requisitioned area. The planning personnel is requested to draw up plans for the land which is still held by this family, that is, to plan ten dunams of concrete buildings the construction of which will speed up the eviction of the Mussmar family, out of the requisitioned area.

In other cases, eviction and demolition was hastened through the application of economic pressure on the steadfast tenant via his employer, as when, in a meeting on June 27, 1957, the IC resolved *to demand from X [the Arab employer of a resident refusing to evacuate and surrender his house] that the Arab resident be dismissed from his construction job in this area, since his employment delays his eviction.* The demolition of his house was then to occur immediately following the resident's eviction.

An area colloquially referred to as *Djab el-Sich* or *Djab el-Reiss* (Arabic for *Gooseskin Mountain* or *Windsbride Mountain*, my Jewish informants explained) merits particularly close attention. (It is on the north-western border of that area initially zoned off and declared the *Nazareth Development Area.*) Events there bespeak the salience of ethnic boundary maintenance as well as of

the creation of symbols, addressed to Them as well as to Us. In fact, Djab el-Sich -- through the ethno-political processes taking place there and the mythology Jews have constructed around it -- amounts to a key symbol for the inhabitants of Upper Nazareth of the interface between the Jewish and the Arab Other in the two Nazareths; as well as for who We are and how We ought to act and be *vis-à-vis* Them in this place.

The important role of Jewish ownership and settlement of Djab el-Sich for the symbolic Judaization of Nazareth becomes readily apparent through a glance at a map, and even more so by walking the area: Djab el-Sich is the highest point of the eastern mountain ridge which frames the city of Nazareth and gradually ascends from south to north. From it one has a breathtaking view of the ancient city from where, in turn, Djab el-Sich is a most visible landmark. It is thus not surprising that it was here where the creation of facts and symbols began.

What became *problematic* in the *Jewish* view, of the IC, was the close encroachment of Nazareth's north-eastern neighbourhood up the slopes of Djab el-Sich. Its outer fringes actually reached the mountain top, and this threatened a clearcut, geographically defined ethnic boundary -- a boundary that was to demonstrate visually to Us Our separateness from Them in physical space; that is, to serve as a tight ethnic 'fence'. Yet, it is precisely this that was deemed absolutely essential to create and maintain -- even, let it not be forgotten, as one worked in the long term for the Judaization of Nazareth, old and new. This *contradiction*, between approximation and affiliation, on the one hand, and separation and distancing, on the other, will be an emergent property of my analysis throughout.

It is not surprising, then, that the construction of a national highway -- tellingly named "The Way of Zionism" -- following the geographic contour of the boundary line became a key project of the IC, and especially of its chairman. Land for this purpose could be and was requisitioned under the Public Road Act.[62] But the creation and maintenance of this road *as boundary marker*, too, was continually threatened, particularly with respect to the two points where Nazareth's eastern neighbourhood was cross-cut by it, one of them being Djab el-Sich. Two problems arose; and both were of greater concern to the IC than to the government ministries involved in building the road. First, on the Jewish side of the road there remained -- particularly in the area of Djab el-Sich -- a considerable number of Arab-owned and -inhabited plots of land which their owners refused to relinquish. Second, on *both* sides of this boundary marker-to-be the owners from whom land had been requisitioned began to construct and often reconstruct buildings, dwellings and/or shops, immediately adjacent to the road on land that they still considered their own. The extent of these activities strongly suggests a form of "moral opposition" (Paine 1985)[63] to the establishment of a Jewish Nazareth and land expropriation for that end; a specific form of moral opposition which gained common currency in the specific context of the Israeli occupied West Bank territories: *sumud*, an unbending commitment to steadfastness, determination to stay put on the land as a form of indirect resistance to Israeli occupation (Shehadeh 1982:110; Shinar 1987:5).[64]

There remained six contiguous plots of Arab-owned land on the Jewish side of the boundary in the area of Djab el-Sich. All of their owners appealed, in the

Supreme Court, the requisition of their land and the evacuation and demolition orders issued by the IC (acting on behalf of the government). Initially, in 1958, their appeals were successful; but three to four years later one finds two of the properties nevertheless evacuated and demolished, under the pretext of development plans for the area. What saved the other houses on Djab el-Sich, it seems, was the topography of the actual sites, which were demonstrably unsuited for development.

Minutes of IC meetings make frequent reference to "the problem of illegal" or "unplanned [Arab] building activities;" here the IC saw itself pressed to harness the powers and authority of higher levels of government ministries and planning bodies. For, on the one hand, the authority of the committee did not -- officially, at least -- extend to the Nazareth (Arab) side of the boundary; on the other hand, Arab squatting on the Jewish side very soon took on such dimensions that this problem could no longer be countered with planning propositions alone. Thus, at the meeting of January 15, 1958, after discussing the problem of construction along the highway (still in the planning stage) the IC decided

> to request from the Director of the Ministry of Labour that he use all his authority regarding the buildings along the road, so as to put an immediate halt to the construction activities and to initiate their demolition.[65]

But the problem resisted solution. The situation at Djab el-Sich was particularly aggravating. Some of the landowners even began to take the legal route, submitting building plans for approval. In response to such developments in this mounting legal battle, the IC sought the cooperation of the Ministry of

Housing to secure a decision for the construction of a residential area for permanent army personnel on the hill top of Djab el-Sich. Known to this day as the "Permanent Army" (*Tzva Keva*) neighbourhood, it was built within two years.

A special meeting between the Minister of the Interior[66] and the Local Council[67] of Upper Nazareth on November 20, 1963 brought to the fore the major points discussed above. They were voiced by Mordechai Allon, now the chairman of the Local Council:

> I would like to emphasize that if there is no supervision over these islands of construction along the viaduct which was requisitioned, we will have the problem that this viaduct, in which 75,000 lira[68] have been invested, *will no longer be a viaduct but a road through the centre of a city!* There are already signs of construction along this road! I hope that all concerned bodies -- the Public Works Administration of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior -- will 'pull up their socks' [ya'amdu al ha'mishmar] (emphasis added).

It is perhaps significant that precisely when construction by Nazareth residents, without permits or via legal avenues, along the road and boundary marker-to-be surfaced as a salient problem, the IC of Jewish Nazareth appointed as municipal engineer for the Jewish town the (Jewish Israeli) engineer who was then serving the Arab city in the same capacity; thus the two Nazareths now had a "joint city engineer," as it is put in the minutes. One of the key functions of a municipal engineer is to issue building licenses and to supervise illegal building activities.

It should be recognized that Nazareth residents' resistance to the plans of

the IC brought these Arabs into the role of 'co-authors' of the Jewish 'script' whereby facts and symbols were created and a sense of Us on the Jewish side of the boundary was formulated. On the one hand, it challenged the legitimacy of the enterprise -- which itself arose, in part, from the sacredness and renown of Nazareth.[69] On the other hand, the opposition of the Arab Other was utilized creatively by the IC, as a pool of symbolic building blocks in the construction of Jewishness in place. The minutes of the IC bear witness to a constant concern over "the influence of construction on the local, Arab population", and counter-measures were a frequent topic of discussion. Besides intensified efforts at legitimation,[70] acceleration of the construction and stepped-up security measures within the settlement became a priority:

> The committee heard a summary from the representative of the Nazareth Military Government's Office about 'the way the wind blows' among the local Arab population pertaining to the construction of the Kiriah. It was decided to request details and numbers from [the Public Works Wing of the Ministry of Labour], the contractor, about the wages and other moneys paid to the local population since the beginning of construction (IC Minutes, 2.12.1956).

The requested data, of course, were to be used for purposes of legitimation, to demonstrate to the residents of Nazareth that benefits were accruing to them from the construction of the Jewish community of Nazareth.

Even more noteworthy is the prominent role in which the initial opposition by Nazareth residents features in the oral accounts of "the beginning" offered by the first pioneer settlers. Yael, one of the 'hand-selected' vatik settlers, recalled:

> The initial plan of the government was to put in the middle of Nazareth, on one of the hills of Nazareth, a new city and to merge it

one day into one united city. That was a bad idea! ... In any case, when we came here, they [the residents of Nazareth] were not too happy about it! The first trees that we planted along the road connecting Nazareth with us [what was to become the viaduct] -- they uprooted them. They didn't want us here from the beginning!

Another pioneer settler, she came from from Poland, concluded her story of how it all began:

At the time the idea of building a new settlement in this location seemed impossible, mainly because we wanted to set up a town in the area of Nazareth, a city whose name was famous all over the world; and because of the opposition of the city's residents.

Yochanan -- yet another of the pioneers and, like quite a number of them, resident of the *Permanent Army* neighbourhood on Djab el-Sich -- told me on a tour of Djab el-Sich (on which he insisted he take me):

Do you see this road there [he points out *The Way to Zionism* where it passes by Djab el-Sich]? At this point it is relatively narrow compared with its continuation. You notice? When they [the IC and the government; he uses *they* because he himself was not yet living in town at the time the events occurred: he arrived in 1962] established Upper Nazareth, they built a track here through which not even a car could pass. Why? Because the Arabs wouldn't let...There were court battles about this stretch of land. The Arabs wouldn't surrender their land -- it was all Arab land. The Arabs wouldn't surrender it! It went to the Supreme Court and all that. Only four to five years after the beginning of settlement were we [at that time Yochanan already lived in Upper Nazareth] able to build a decent road. It is still a narrow road at this point though!

3.2. Inventing a Jewish Culture for Nazareth: Jewishness Through Israeliness

3.2.1. But a Contemporary Jewish Symbol: The Story of Ben-Gurion on Djab el-Sich

Nazareth lacked Jewish historicity. It was devoid of Jewish symbols which could guide the process of creating contemporary and secular Jewish history and symbolism in this particular place. Nevertheless, and this is perhaps indicative of the subjectively perceived cultural significance of history in place, considerable ideological efforts were devoted initially to constructing such historicity with what even meagre historic facts that existed. One of the aims was to provide historical legitimation, *vis-à-vis* Arab and Christian Others, for the "reconstruction" of a Jewish presence in Nazareth. But I would also emphasize the importance of Jewish historicity for the settlers themselves, in the sense that it would furnish them with a sense of belonging and thus aid their cultural emplacement.

Even the slightest reference to a Jewish presence found in Jewish religious and secular writings were assembled and made use of. The historical records themselves were enriched by expanding the conceptual boundaries of Nazareth to include the surrounding areas. Moreover (and this, *faute de mieux*, breaks with the Labour Zionist and statist pattern of ignoring exilic writings), *all* Jewish historic periods were surveyed and drawn upon, and the events and figures situated in the rabbinical and kabbalistic tradition were rendered "coeval"

(Fabian 1983) with contemporary and secular ideology and values. Finally, as the Christian and Arab Other could not be ignored in the context of Nazareth, it was made part of Jewish historiography; interestingly enough, the Christian Other is given more room and emphasis than the Moslem Other. Indeed, one can say that the Jewish historiography of Nazareth amounted to the "invention of a tradition" (cf. Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983) of interethnic relations: putative affinity between Christians and Jews (hence, good grounds for cooperation and coexistence), and antagonistic relations between Jews and Christians *contra* Moslems (hence, the former two have a common interest *vis-à-vis* the latter). Several renderings of Jewish historiography composed at the time and encapsulating the various elements discerned here are provided in Appendix B.

But all these efforts notwithstanding, Nazareth simply defied the retroactive Judaization of its history and symbols. No matter how diligently the historic records are combed or how ingeniously and flexibly the existing evidence is interpreted, it is all too evident that while there are no Jewish historic symbols in Nazareth, it overflows with Christian ones. The archaeological evidence that was sought to support exhortational claims of the existence of a "flourishing Jewish settlement" in or close to Nazareth in biblical times, of the "return of the Jews" or their "re-rooting" themselves -- be it of a period pre-dating the New Testament or during the rabbinical and kabbalistic period -- never materialized. It is hardly surprising, then, that the part of the curriculum of "My Hometown" studies which deals with the history of Upper Nazareth barely treats the period prior to 1955, still less that prior to 1948 (quickly running through the meagre

facts assembled in the above histories), and instead concentrates on the pioneering of the town.

All that remained for the Jewish settlers of Upper Nazareth as a guidance in the present and into the future, is a contemporary and secular Jewish symbol in place: a story involving Ben-Gurion[71] and Djab el-Sich. It acquired the kind of symbolic salience of a 'myth of origin'. A story or myth, I say, because its authenticity cannot be corroborated, and not even those who recount and utilize it make a claim to that effect; it is the symbolic message that counts. Yochanan, the director of the local pedagogic centre, related the story to me on our walk through the *Permanent Army* neighbourhood on top of Djab el-Sich (mentioned above, p.79), * where it all began*:

> Here, among those trees on top of this ridge, there is a pillbox. There is an important story that goes with it, and we tell it to the children at school. Have you heard of Kaoukji? Kaoukji -- I am talking now about 1948 -- was the head of the 'Liberation Army' made up of several thousand Arabs from Syria and Iraq. They were groups of Arabs that fought their way through Syria across the border and conquered Nazareth. They closed the Haifa-Tiberias road, and the whole area from here to Tiberias was cut off. Being cut off haunts everyone who knows this period!

> In the end, during the War of Independence, the Jewish Army threw them out of here. Their headquarters had been here, in this very pillbox which overlooked over the whole area. I don't know whether you will be able to see that, because now trees block some of the view. As we tell our children, they [the Jewish army unit that *liberated Nazareth*] brought Ben-Gurion to this place following the victory; and as he was standing there he declared: *In this place there shall be a Jewish town, a Hebrew town!* That's the story. It doesn't matter whether or not it is true, it's a historical symbol. And what is the crux of the story? In this very place in which Kaoukji had stood Ben-Gurion stood and decided to build a Hebrew town!

Let us examine the messages contained in this symbolic story. We must consider the specific figure(s) and the place it involves: Ben-Gurion (and Kaoukji) and Djab el-Sich; and we must also consider the notion of "statist civil religion" (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:81-122),[72] for statism is indeed what characterizes the overall idea of Judaizing Nazareth and its implementation. But I shall be exclusively concerned here with the most central messages pertaining to doing Zionism and being Jewish which are contained in statism and are mediated via Ben-Gurion -- and their implications for *this* particular place, Nazareth.

Ben-Gurion symbolizes both of the two systems of value that have featured most prominently in the creation of the Jewish state (the authorship of which is largely attributable, or at least has been attributed, to him): Zionist socialism and statism. For Ben-Gurion there was nothing more important, more precious and more sacred than the security of the state (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:86). The state was the arena in which Jewish freedom and independence could be experienced and creatively encouraged -- the antithesis of exile. "State security," hence, is a prominent element of both the ontology and the interpretation of the story of Ben-Gurion on Djab el-Sich: standing in the same location from where Arab armies had controlled Nazareth and its environs, having been taken there by the Jewish army following its victory, and overlooking the Arab city almost militarily, the great national leader and Minister of Defence expressed the imperative of establishing a Jewish city. "Upper Nazareth was meant to supervise the Arab city" -- time and again this was the interpretations given to me of what Our purpose here and function opposite Them was originally meant to be.

(Though regarding how or in what sense, that is to say, as a separate or a unified Nazareth, symbolically or *de facto*, there exists considerable disagreement in the renditions I was offered.)

As far as role models for being (or better, for doing) *as Jews* in their own national homeland are concerned, I have already hinted at Ben-Gurion's reverence of the Bible, -- albeit demystified and politicized -- and his emphasis of the bibilical over the rabbinical tradition (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:90). Here there was a role model for being Jewish in the ancient/new homeland. He sought to form an Israeli culture by secularly drawing upon the traditional Judaism of the Bible as well as upon cosmopolitan culture. Traditional Judaism in its religious form, by contrast, he viewed as an impediment to the re-education of the returning exiles in the spirit of a new Israeli culture. Biblical heroes, though, provide "ideal role models, instruments to impress young Israelis that their roots [go] back to biblical times, to the period of Jewish glory, independence and creativity which formed the nation and accounted for its continued survival...The biblical figure to whom Ben-Gurion was especially attracted was Joshua; and one suspects that he saw himself as a modern-day Joshua" (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:94). In fact, history became a substitute for religious faith -- and archaeology the way to discover its religious values (pp.110-11). Here, of course, the Jews in Nazareth found themselves at a terrible disadvantage and loss; Ben-Gurion himself (on Djab el-Sich) has had to substitute for history and archaeology which he so revered and stressed but which *this* particular place was without.

Statism also espoused contemporary role models, notably, the sabra and the

vatik, which were elevated to the rank of hero. "Special characteristics were ascribed to the generation that never knew exile, those who were born and raised as free men[73] on the soil of the homeland" (p.96).[74] In view of the absence of biblical Jewish history and heroes 'in place', and also in the face of the strong representation (demographically, politically and historico-symbolically) of Others in Nazareth, this role model was endowed with magnified symbolic and pragmatic currency, as we shall see.

Finally, among the most central values and symbols of Ben-Gurion's statism stood *halutziut* (Self-realizing and Self-transforming pioneering):

> [It involves] mass participation in activities organised and directed by the state. Halutziut was now defined as engaging in any activity that strengthened the state, particularly in the fields of immigration and immigrant absorption, economic development, education and culture. In 1949 Ben-Gurion said, "halutziut is not the property of a few...it is latent in the soul of every person...[The] pressure of historical needs and guided educational programs...are capable...of raising every person to the highest levels of courage and halutziut" (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:89).

The agent of halutziut, the halutz, then, was simultaneously "the bearer of the new national mission, paving the way for national redemption" and he was also the "harbinger of the Jew of the future" culturally (pp.121-22), the former constituting both an end in itself as well as the means towards the achievement of the latter.

In this respect, as in his overall worldview, Ben-Gurion built heavily on the coercive potentials of the state and the power of the will or "spirit":

> Ben-Gurion attempted to infuse the sense of voluntarism even into

the drab instrumentalities of any state...*The state can coerce its citizens -- and it does so coerce -- to perform pioneering deeds, even if the citizen is not a pioneer*...The will, the desire to do, to achieve, overrides expertise and its balanced judgement (Avi-Hai 1974:52).

The story of Ben-Gurion on Djab el-Sich places the responsibility for the successful implementation of the vision (ambiguously defined) on the local leaders and settlers and their own willpower. Concomitantly, one would expect the settlers and leaders to experience personal failures (or perceive failures in accordance with how they defined their mission). This, of course, does not preclude efforts, in case of failure, to delegate collective responsibility, at least in part, back to the state, via the symbol of Djab el-Sich.

The story of Ben-Gurion on Djab el-Sich, then, provides a set of overarching values and actions for the builders and settlers of Upper Nazareth to embrace for their guidance. Its fulcrum, it should be kept in mind, is its orientation towards progressive action, towards doing rather than being, to use Paine's (1988) heuristic distinction. *Otherwise*, its lack of specificity, the apocryphal nature of the messages it contains with respect to Nazareth, leaves its users broad leeway in filling it with varying specific meanings at any point in time, in accordance with changing realities.

3.2.2. Forging a Culture of Ben-Gurionist Statism: Westernism, Secularism, and Pioneering Development

Like in other development towns or new towns in Israel that *had* to 'work', careful selection procedures were employed in the initial Jewish settlement of Nazareth. What specific characteristics did this selection process take on in Upper Nazareth, what criteria guided it, and what were the implications for Jewishness in Nazareth? These are the questions surrounding this aspect of local history pertinent to the current analysis.

Mordechai Allon, the man in charge of managing the whole enterprise, including the selection of the first settlers, described the process of populating the Jewish "neighbourhood" in the following terms:

> One of the first operations of the [Defence Ministry's] unit for the Development of Galilee was to prepare a list of first settlers -- fifty families.[75] In order to do this, there was a need for individual interviews with hundreds of families which were likely to be interested in settling here, such as state officials assigned to work in the area, for example. We assumed that since it is more comfortable to live near one's place of work, they would readily agree to leave other places. After a check that took a few months, we had succeeded in putting together a list of fifty families -- most of them young couples --which had expressed their interest in and commitment to being the first families in Upper Nazareth.

An entry in the minutes of the IC for June 26, 1956, explains precisely who the first families were, and sheds light on the kind of settlers deemed ideal for a Jewish Nazareth:

> The first 48 settlers [families] have been recommended: 20 Jewish
> government workers, 15 Army officers of the permanent army, 5
> security officials, the remainder being service workers (shops, education,
> etc.).

Among these first forty-eight families were, of course, the IC members and their

own families. Jewish government employees and military/security personnel

involved in the administration of Nazareth comprised a substantial majority.

These were people who, prior to the establishment of the Jewish Kiriah, had lived

either outside Nazareth and commuted to work or within the city of Nazareth as

a national minority. Higher levels of government, apparently, exerted pressure on

them to settle the new "neighbourhood" by curtailing previously allocated

benefits that covered the expenses incurred by commuting (into the city, to work;

or out of the city, for religious services). The selection of these settlers was quite

clearly influenced by security considerations (fed and magnified by the "radical

political climate" and opposition to the establishment of the Jewish Kiriah among

the Arab residents of Nazareth); but -- in light of the public image in which these

state officials had previously been held by the residents of Nazareth and their

actual function *vis-à-vis* the Arab city -- their inclusion among those pioneering

the Jewish Kiriah presumably also made a strong symbolic statement about the

Judaization of Nazareth.

As for the remainder among the first core of settlers, they were almost

exclusively native-born Israelis -- or, at the very least, oldtimers.[76] In other new

Israeli towns one also, generally, finds a small nucleus of sabras and oldtimers

among the first settlers, but in the building of Upper Nazareth their

representation was unusually stressed (and still is given disproportional emphasis

in local historical *and* current Self-depictions). The official goal was that they constitute one-half of Upper Nazareth's population not merely in the beginning, but of the town's future population as well; and a great effort was made to realize this goal. As Mordechai Allon explains:

> Especially in *this* area, you see, it was not considered at all wise to have a town based on new immigrants.[77] Without much actual experience with such a situation, mere logical foresight led to this conclusion.

Pressed to elaborate on his phrase "especially in this area," Allon emphasized both the extraordinary proximity to the adjacent Arab and Christian city and the prevalent political climate there. What he did not mention, but could very well have done, was that all this, coupled with the absence of Jewish historicity and symbolism 'in place', made a strong argument for sabras and oldtimers -- rooted Jewish Israelis -- over new immigrants to the country.

Surveying the initial group of sabras and oldtimers so carefully selected, however, an additional criterion of the ideal settler suggests itself. They were exclusively people who had left the kibbutzim (*yotz'ei kibbutz*). Allon elaborated:

> We didn't exactly want to drag people out of the kibbutzim, but we gave preference to those who had lived on a kibbutz and wanted to leave it anyways. There were quite a number of them! There were quite a number of *yotz'ei kibbutzim*, that is true! You see, when one is ready to leave the kibbutz, one might gain satisfaction from a development town, rather than just a town; to participate in some project that is *halutzi* [pioneering in nature] outside of the kibbutz. And we *were* trying to convince people that what we were trying to do was pioneering. We wanted people to feel that they were participating in something halutzi!

The Israeli kibbutz, of course, stands for much more than merely pioneering

spirit Socio-culturally it designates Europeanism or at least Westernism; politically and ideologically it spells -- for the largest part -- left-wing Zionism (granted, to a greater or lesser degree).[78] And indeed, these first hand-selected sabras and vatikim who had left their kibbutzim were exclusively of European background and either *Ahdut Ha'Avuda* or Mapai-affiliated.

Via the process of settler selection, then, those in charge of the project began to define Jewish ethnicity locally. They certainly did so in their own image: all of *them* were either sabras or vatikim of European background, and -- although not necessarily *kibbutznikkim* -- army men and Ahdut Ha'Avuda or Mapai supporters. And they were, of course, men in the image of Ben-Gurion's statism through and through, which is precisely, one might surmise, why they were put in charge of the enterprise. Nazareth was to be Judaized by the New Jew, product and carrier of the new Israeli culture. Jewishness was to be defined in terms of Israeliness.

The settlers themselves, looking from the inside out, as it were, make the same point, albeit indirectly:

> Here in Nazareth, oldtimers and sabras had to be in balance with new immigrants. It's always healthy when people with certain ideals -- be they Zionist ideals or ideals pertaining to a Western standard of living -- settle in a new town; but *here* especially! Because they are active, they pave the way for the others who are to come, guide them. Had the whole settler population been newcomers to Israel, they would all have 'turned in circles'. Imagine! But this group of idealists dragged the others along: "Come here!" "Build here!" "Develop!" We [the sabras and vatikim] fulfilled organisational functions; we were in charge of absorption, housing, socio-cultural activities -- the whole process of building up the town (Tiva, female sabra settler, age 55).

My husband and I decided to move to Nazareth in 1956. We were then living at Kfar Ha'Horesh [a kibbutz north-west of Nazareth]; someone from the Ministry of Defence came to us saying that they were going to build a new place, and asked whether we were interested in participating. The decision was all ours! They didn't offer any special enticements for us. We had to pay the full price for the flat -- the first settlers had to purchase their housing; for the same money we could have bought a beautiful house in some other place, like Tiv'on. You know, in 1956 it was -- not exactly shameful, but also not very honourable to be a town citizen. But we had wanted to leave the kibbutz, and felt we had to start something else off the ground; to trade in terms of idealism, you understand? We felt an obligation to do something for the country. For us, the important thing was that we would start something from scratch and contribute our part to the building of the area.

The idea was to bring to this place oldtimers and sabras to help the new immigrants they would bring in -- people who don't speak the language, don't know their way around the bureaucracy, the work situation, and so on. So these oldtimers and sabras were people who didn't have the problems of new immigrants and were free to help, to dedicate themselves to the integration of the new immigrants.

We had come here to create something totally new and different, not like what they did in Kiriat Shmona or Migdal Ha'Emeq or Beit Shean -- because this here was of such importance to the country, the development here. You must know that in 1956-1957 the situation in all other development towns was very bad. Why? Because their populations consisted entirely of new immigrants, and almost all of them from North African countries! That didn't work out too well: always bickering among themselves, personal interests, and very little idealism. We had to avoid this from happening here in Nazareth (Rifka, female vatik settler born in Rumania, age 58).

"Like a military operation," the IC planned the arrival of the first settler families, as a group, for November 1956; but these plans were intercepted by the

Sinai Campaign of 1956, for which most male members of settler families (including the IC) were mobilized. As a result, the arrival *as a group*, loaded with symbolic meaning, was cancelled -- the men were de-mobilized on different dates -- and the arrival of the first settlers to the Kiriah postponed until December (*Hanukkah*) of that year. In many instances women and children preceded their husbands.

The selection policy, along the lines of similar ideological criteria, endured beyond the arrival of the "first hundred," even, it is said, into the 1960s; and it applied not only to sabras and veteran Israelis but to new immigrants absorbed as well. However, there were soon fewer people with the kibbutz background than had been deemed essential in the selection of the first settler families. While the ideological motivation may have remained the same in many cases, purely economic factors entered the picture, in respect of both the settlers feeling attracted to 'Nazareth' and the selecting committee seeking to attract new settlers. Locally available occupational and cultural openings spelling upward mobility were attractive to settlers. The committee, for its part, had to balance emergent needs for specialized labour, on the one hand, and settlers in a plainly numerical sense, on the other. Also, the imperative of reaching a certain population size conflicted with ideological/cultural demands, sometimes forcing expediency upon the IC. But wherever feasible, selection still hinged on political-ideological affiliation and commitment. In the words of Eli, a settler who arrived in 1960 (after leaving a Mapam-affiliated kibbutz):

In the past, anyone who wanted to come and live here had to pass

through a kind of filter, to make sure that one was suitable. The same with me; when I wanted to come here, it took a few months before I received a positive answer. I had a job offer from one of the metal plants -- I was then working as a welder [today he is a government official]. They checked then that we were *Mapamnikkim* [supporters, members of Mapam] -- all sorts of things like that.

Another settler, Ronen, who settled in Upper Nazareth in 1963 to fill the local

position as a director of the youth centre, after having left the permanent army,

recalls:

It was a kind of Stalinism, under [Mordechai] Allon [he laughs]. Do you know that there was a kind of *numerus clausus* in Nazrat regarding the acceptance of people here? Whoever wanted to come here was checked for his political affiliation. I remember very well how they [the IC] related to me when I arrived. I came to Upper Nazareth to be the director of the youth centre. I walked into Motke's [Allon's] office for an interview, together with the inspector who had brought me to town. There we were, the three of us -- Motke, the inspector and I. In the middle of the interview Motke slipped a note to the inspector, who in turn passed back a note to Motke. As we left the office the inspector asked me, "Do you know what the note said?" I didn't. "It said, 'Is he one of us or not?'", he explained to me [laughs].

The first new immigrant families from abroad (*olim*) arrived in Kiriat

Nazeret soon after the first sabras and vatikim had settled in, in February of

1957. Until 1960, all were from Poland and Rumania. At first glance, no

particular selection method can be discerned with respect to these olim: Kiriat

Nazeret's initial settlement (between 1957-1959) coincided with the arrival of a

wave of Eastern European immigrants, and the town seems to have "just missed,"

as the town's past and current leaders stress, a large wave of immigrants from

North African countries, primarily from Morocco. Such selectivity does become

evident, however, in diachronic and comparative perspective; the original criteria

are maintained: the Kiriah continued to favour Western arrivals, particularly those without strong ties to religious tradition and, ideally, those who had had past exposure to Zionist ideas if not activism. Little interest was shown in immigrants (now arriving in large numbers) from Asia and North Africa.[79] While other new towns and development towns established at about the same time as Upper Nazareth[80] had by 1967 an overwhelming majority of non-European arrivals, Upper Nazareth had only 295 non-Europeans out of a total of 3,726 foreign-born residents (Berler 1970:74-75; Central Bureau of Statistics, data obtained from the local municipality). This one-sided selection is especially noteworthy when seen against the objective of attaining a Jewish population of significant size *as soon as possible*, together with the fact that the pool of potential new immigrants was restricted as it was -- and that of the ideal type of settler even more so.

Just as sabra and vatik settlers were selected with an eye on Kiriat Nazeret's 'mission' with respect to the Arab and Christian city, so too were the new immigrant settlers, it appears. Whereas in Israel as a whole the formation of the kind of society and culture envisioned by the statists could and would have to proceed in a step-by-step, gradual fashion, in the case of Nazareth it was considered expedient -- if not imperative -- to produce a micro universe that complied with the statist model of Israel *from the start*. If Kiriat Nazeret was to merge with the city of Nazareth eventually and the Jewish population was to live and cooperate with the Arab and Christian Others under one municipal umbrella -- and such *were* the plans -- then the Jewish Nazareth had to be of such a make-

up that would stand up to, while coexisting with, the politicizing national and symbolically strong religious Others. Such were to be the New Jews; and the least suited for this task, it was assumed, would be Jews of Asian and North African origin.

Let me be more specific; when Labour Zionists and statists said "North African," at that time at least, then -- to them -- this implied (1) "primitive," (2) traditional-religious, and (3) "Arab." As such, the new arrivals from North Africa, in the view of these leaders, possessed attributes and proclivities with respect to the Israeli Arab population which, in the context of Nazareth, spelled 'danger'. Having more in common socio-culturally with the Arab Other than with their Western and secular Jewish other, and lacking inculcations of Zionist ideals and values as the statists defined them, the settlement of new immigrants from North African and Asian countries in such close physical and social proximity to the Arab Other was seen as a threat, both to their own cultural and ideological transformation as well as in regard to the overall problem of Nazareth. On the other hand, these same immigrants, perceived as deeply committed to the Jewish religious tradition and as harbouring a pronounced dislike for Arabs (based on first-hand and frequently negative experiences with Arabs in their countries of origin, such as discrimination and even pogroms), they would, it was assumed, thwart all possibility of peaceful coexistence under one municipal government.[81]

The IC minutes of July 2, 1957 make explicit reference to an agreement with the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency (*Sochnut*) regarding locally "desirable" new immigrant settlers. The Sochnut was to select and channel new

arrivals to Israel (as well as applicants from inside Israel) accordingly. But it seems that it had made frequent (or at least serious) mistakes during the first year, despite the agreement, sending the "wrong kind" of immigrants to Nazareth. This situation caused the IC to refer to the agreement which had been made; it is mentioned nowhere else, copies of it do not exist in the local municipality's archives; in fact, that such an agreement existed is denied by both parties even today. The entry in the minutes reads:

> The committee [IC] decided to approach the Sochnut with the request to stand by the agreement reached at its time to prevent sending undesirable immigrants (mixed marriages and such that are of no utility) to the place. In addition to this, we have to make substantial arrangements to fulfill this agreement ourselves.

M. Allon, when confronted with this entry, claimed that "undesirable" and "not useful" referred to purely occupational criteria:

> At the beginning we thought ... the Sochnut was ready to help. It didn't promise anything, but it was ready to help. And when we saw that they were harming all we had done ... The first group that came over was a group of fifteen families from Russia, Polish families [Polish families that had lived in Russia as refugees of World War II]. Ten of them were tailors. There was no work for tailors here. Anyway, before we became a civil body, a local council, we were able to do this sort of thing. Once you are a legal body, you can't do this any longer.

The reference to "mixed couples" (presumably Jewish-Christian) Mr.Allon did not remember, and he refused the invitation to recollect the matter. What he suggests, by choosing the example of Polish tailors, is that "race" was irrelevant and that selection applied equally within the ranks of European olim. Yet, it is quite clear that "race" *was* part of the agreement -- because it was *assumed* to constitute a fairly reliable boundary marker, ideologically and culturally, for the

delineation of the New Jewish culture and society. (After all, the absence of olim from North African countries does stand out clearly.) But the boundary marker built upon turned out to be less reliable than anticipated. Occupation, I will show in a moment, was *not* the decisive criterion; instead, it was "backwardness," meaning a strong attachment to Diasporic Jewish tradition and its religiosity in particular. The "wrong kind" of people channeled into Kiriat Nazeret by the Sochnut in violation of the agreement were tradition-bound and deeply religious Rumanian olim, defiant of ideological and cultural transformation and of occupational retraining, which, actually, constituted an essential part of that transformation process. Interestingly enough, they are rarely mentioned in contemporary accounts of life in the early days. In the few local histories that do include them the relationship between traditional Rumanian and secular Polish olim is described as conflict-ridden. The secularized Poles are said to have accused these Rumanians of being "primitive" and "backward," and the traditional Rumanians, in turn, referred to these Poles as "Communists" and "Stalinists;" the children of the Rumanian traditionalists were exposed to harassment by the Polish children and, in turn, the Rumanians boycotted the stores of the Polish "*goyim*" (gentiles), as they are said to have called them derisively.

That the IC took concrete measures to avoid having tradition-bound settlers (particularly from North Africa) is claimed quite explicitly by Mafdal officials of the regional government at the time, as well as newspapers of the religious parties. The Northern District Administrator (and Mafdal supporter) at the time Nazareth was established, I. Koenig, told me:

In the first years...the people they brought here, the *kind* of population they brought here, were immigrants from Poland, mainly Stalinists and anti-Zionists [he means anti-religious]. They brought tradition-oriented Jews from North Africa and the Middle East[82] only from 1964 onwards, and only because they had to. But from 1957 on, they wouldn't let such Jews come here -- and that was one of the things I got angry about. There was definitely friction on the subject of democracy here!

An article in a religious newspaper[83] alleges:

The immigration to Nazareth was planned in a way so as to prevent the settlement of religious Jews almost completely. Because of this, it is impossible to find in Hebrew-Jewish Nazareth Middle Eastern and North African Jews who are known to cling to the *Torah* and traditions of Israel.

More will have to be said on the IC's efforts to create and maintain a boundary against religious Jewish otherness around Kiriat Nazeret.

The biographies of many of the first immigrant settlers from Poland to arrive in 1957, via the Sochnut, fail to corroborate M. Allon's claim that occupation upon arrival in and of itself constituted an important -- let alone the most important -- criterion in qualifying or disqualifying potential immigrant settlers to Nazareth. The biography of Shalom may serve as an example:

Shalom: From Austria I went by train to Italy, and from Italy by boat to Haifa. The boat was called *Herzl*. At Haifa port, where we arrived, they asked us what our trade was and where we wanted to go. I told them that I was a barber and that I was prepared to go anywhere I was needed -- I had no relatives or family. So they gave me a list of towns: Beersheva, Kiriat Gat, Nazrat -- a new place. I looked at the map. Nazrat: a new place, and I had friends in Haifa. So I said, "Okay, I am ready to go to Nazrat." They brought us to Nazrat in a truck. That was in the beginning of 1957, just before *Purim*. We [the new immigrants arriving together] celebrated Purim here. I was given a small flat on the first floor of one of the first houses that had been built -- there weren't many of those. Two days after my arrival I went to the

local Labour Exchange. I had been a barber in Poland. I used to own my own barber shop together with a friend.

researcher: Was there a need for barbers here?

Shalom: Here? Look, that profession isn't so much in demand anyway. But here? There were almost no people! Anyway, I did not come [to Israel] with the intention...not for lazy work. I came to build up the country. I wasn't able to participate in the liberation of the country because I was in the Russian Army in 1947. So, at the Labour Exchange they told me that there are two possibilities: relief work or construction work. I was prepared for this, because of the education I had received in Poland -- Zionist. Coming to Israel had always been my goal. At the time a lot of people came here from Poland because they were almost thrown out of the country -- these same Communists that had always been against leaving Poland for Israel! *I* had always wanted to come to Israel!

researcher: You had a Zionist upbringing?

Shalom: We used to live a Jewish life in my town: going to the synagogue on Friday nights, coming home and having a festive meal, singing -- everything! We didn't travel on *shabbat* or light a fire. That was the education I received. I finished religious school, a Torah-school with 7 classes. I knew *Yiddish*, Polish and Hebrew; I learned Polish history, the Talmud and the Bible!

researcher: You are religious, then?

Shalom: Not anymore! Look, there are good reasons for that. I was a year under the Nazis, in a labour camp. I saw what the Nazis did to the Jews! And also in my own town: I don't know whether you know, but the *Hazon Ish*[84] here in Israel was from my town. I studied Talmud with his younger brother; their family name is Kerelitz. His brother, Rabbi Yitzchak, and I were neighbours during the Nazi period. He was a rabbi who lived an austere life; not like the rabbis today. He lived for

God, not for himself. One day, it was on a shabbat, the 11th of $Av,$[35] an *akzia* -- a massacre -- took place in the ghetto of our town. My family survived, my parents and the five children. After it was all over, some Jews arrived and shouted: "If anyone is alive he can come out now, it's all over!" I came out and ran immediately to see the rabbi. I found him dead, murdered. That made a deep impression on me. I asked myself, "Lord of the Universe, this man didn't harm a fly! Why? Where were You?" Then we gathered all the dead bodies from the houses, the streets, the courtyard, the parks -- and made two graves: one for men, one for women. For the rabbi we made a separate one. After that there was another slaughter. I was in the field and heard the screams. They took people, packed like logs, onto a truck. We, working in the fields, heard screams and shots; something terrible! After that I joined the partisans in the woods. With the partisans, the second tragedy for the Jews started. It was a few months later, on *Yom Kippur* 1942. The Germans had a long campaign to clean off the partisans. Before that, we had killed some of those that had participated in the massacre; so the Germans ran away from the woods, and we had our hold-out there. It was the forest between the Brest-Moscow and Slonin-Bialoskov railway lines. We lived in little groups and terrorized the Germans; we used to capture Germans and bring them to our camp...So, the Germans decided to have this big clean-up. It was disastrous!

researcher: So all this changed your attitude towards religion?

Shalom: One can say that. Obviously I have some connection [to religion], because of what I learned in my parents' house. But not the same as it was before these events. I ask myself, where was God when they took babies and broke their heads against the wall; when they called Jews to the synagogue to pray for mercy and then set it on fire with the Jews inside? It became clear to me that the Jews have to help themselves!

Shalom, then, displayed many of the characteristics of the New Jew already upon his arrival in Kiriat Nazeret: not only Western, he was grounded in the Jewish tradition which he had exchanged in his hierarchy of values for a secular-nationalistic outlook -- the recognition of the necessity for an independent Jewish

state and of physical resistance to ensure the Jewish people's survival. He was ready to make physical sacrifices for the Jewish state: at the very least to engage in heavy physical labour, and to live humbly; and, if necessary, to fight for it. He was, as he describes himself, a staunch Labour Zionist.

Indeed, most Eastern European immigrants absorbed into the Jewish Nazareth arrived with the "wrong profession;" they were generally craftsmen or small merchants (such professions characterized Diaspora Jewry, and Labour Zionism's goal of the inversion of the occupational pyramid in the new homeland was an upshot of such a Jewish Self-image). Clearly, the demand for such occupations in the Kiriah was limited at the time but, more importantly, they were not of the kind of activities the leaders of the Jewish state and of Jewish Nazareth had in mind as the basis for the new town -- economically or culturally. Jewish Nazareth was to be an industrial and administrative centre, with immigrants channeled into "industrial development." But until the first factories were established,[86] the immigrants were to participate actively in the infrastructural building of the town: clearing the land of rocks and planting trees (relief work) or construction work.

Underlying these economic plans were, of course, the ideological premises of statist halutziut, and the new immigrants were to be made ideologically reliable and culturally transformed in the process of their involvement in development. But, and this is my major point, the "wrong" occupational training was not considered a serious hindrance in this regard -- in contrast, for example, to the strict adherence to religious tradition, cultural "backwardness," or, worse, the

two compounded. Western immigrants largely detached from religious traditions, particularly if they had already been exposed to Zionist-socialist ideas, were welcomed and were easily retrained upon arrival. We find these points confirmed by M. Allon in a 1966 interview with the Hebrew daily *Ma'ariv*.[87]

> The first group [of immigrants] came from Poland, numbering 17 families. Finding work for them was a problem, and it was part of my job as a *Histadrut* [General Federation of Workers, Israel's labour union] organiser. Nine of them were tailors, three were shoemakers, and the rest had various other trades. I spoke to them in Yiddish, trying to explain to them that there was no chance of work for them in these occupations. They had two choices: to work only occasionally, when something came up [relief work] or to learn the construction trade. Twelve of them agreed to be retrained and underwent a course in cementing and flooring sponsored by *Solel Boneh* [a Histadrut-owned construction company]. These were then absorbed into the construction trade. These immigrants built their own flats! Some of them still work in construction today. The five that didn't want to join the course or take on occasional jobs managed independently, opening stores or small workshops. And then, in 1958, the *ZeDe* factory opened with 200 housing units for their workers and provided additional employment opportunities for the new immigrants.

Yael, one of the carefully selected vatik settlers who became actively involved in immigrant absorption and who subsequently, for 20 years, was the director of the local Immigrant Absorption Centre, gives a similar account:

> The first immigrants were from Poland. They were simple people, with a low level of education; what they had was the school of war. It was a shame! So they worked in every job they could get here. At first it was relief work -- planting trees for the *Keren Kayemet*. In Zippori, when you travel from here to Haifa, all those forests were planted by our first immigrants. The trees are now thirty years old -- as old as our town! After that, courses were organised for the olim by the Histadrut for construction work. These immigrants were not young people; they were 30, 40, 50 years old. But they learned, learned to lay floors and all these jobs. It took almost two years before the factories were completed; meanwhile, people were channeled into construction and relief work.

When the first settlers moved into Kiriat Nazeret, the Kiriah comprised no more than three complete apartment blocks.[88] Forty-eight additional blocks and fifty single-house units had only been framed, and the "second hundred" housing units[89] had foundations and walls. The first stage of construction of the settlement had been carried out by *Solel Boneh* under a Ministry of Housing contract, largely by Arab labour from Nazareth and surrounding Arab villages. The allocation of housing, while formally the responsibility of Amidar, was effectively controlled by the settlement subcommittee of the IC.

The three completed apartment blocks contained seventy-two apartments of 48 m^2 each; in these were housed the first core of sabra and veteran settlers as well as the first social and political institutions: the IC's office, a local Histadrut branch (Labour Council), a local branch of the Labour parties Mapai and Mapam, a post office and a kindergarten. As there was a shortage of completed housing units, two or more institutions shared one flat initially. What was significant about this arrangement was the kind of institutions 'merging' in this sense and (one might assume) becoming inseparable from each other in the perception of the settlers: the Labour Council shared an apartment with the local Labour Exchange[90] and the various Labour party branches; on the same floor, across the hallway, the IC office was located. The spatial interpenetration of these party-political and governmental offices went hand in hand with an overlap in terms of personnel.

To the new immigrant settlers, on the other hand, only partially completed housing units were allocated. Their professional retraining for construction work -- and concomitant transfiguration into halutzim -- frequently involved completion of the very houses they lived in, as well as construction of additional housing, of industrial parks, schools and roads. These immigrants supplemented, but never fully replaced, Arab labour. They lived out the Labour Zionist ideal of Jewish self-labour, and this was one of the main reasons -- aside from economic pragmatism in view of the lack of local employment opportunities -- for the insistence on *occupational retraining.*

Although culturally and ideologically made of the stuff from which the New Jew *could* readily be formed, the local (and national) leadership was fully aware that the Eastern European immigrant settlers did not arrive as such, but still needed to be moulded in accordance with this ideal of the New Jew; they needed to be ideologically and culturally reformed. Moreover, it could not be taken for granted that these settlers themselves actively desired such reformation: some had been forced out of their home country, and no other country would readily admit them, or they came to Israel because they had relatives there; yet others had become convinced by their war experiences that Zionism (that is to say, a state for the Jewish people) was the only solution to *the Jewish problem;* and some had been Zionists (hyphenated Zionists, affiliated with a particular political and ideological stream within the movement) even prior to the war. Ultimately, the reformation process hinged on a successful combination of the pronounced economic dependency of the new immigrants and locally institutionalized ideology

-- outright pressure amounting to 'force' was rendered largely redundant on account of the careful selection procedures.

Nevertheless, a tremendous influence over the town's settlers -- and the political and cultural climate in general -- was exerted through the local apparatus of municipal, national, and party-affiliated institutions. It was these which allocated what for the new immigrants were vital material resources (such as housing, employment, financial assistance or licenses) and provided socio-cultural services (such as health- and child-care, schooling, language training, 'religious' services and cultural activities). With respect to party-affiliated institutions and associations (as we shall see), the IC attempted, quite successfully, to keep those of them that operated along competing political and ideological premises from entering the community, and aided those it deemed in line with its own outlook. Local branches of governmental and national institutions, such as the Jewish Agency, were staffed with Labour party adherents. The IC thereby attained a near-monopoly over the material resources and socio-cultural services offered to the Kiriah's settlers. In sum, as elsewhere in Israel (see Gitelman 1982:24-27), the "party-key" was applied in the distribution and provision of essential resources and services (the "key-parties" were the Mapai and Ahdut Ha'Avuda, even Mapam). Without the right party-membership a settler, particularly a new immigrant, could expect only the bare minimum of material support and, in addition, was marginal to the local society and culture.

However, institutional control in Kiriat Nazeret had aims higher than mere vote-catching. Whereas, Lissak (cited in Gitelman 1982:27) suggests, in Israel as a

whole the use of instrumental benefits came to displace ideological indoctrination in the parties' recruitment of new immigrants, here the two were strongly intertwined: on account of the political and ideological monopolization of the local network of institutions and their services. According to all accounts, a fairly close-knit moral community resulted, resembling the early (pre-1948) kibbutz, except for the obvious concentration of power and authority in the hands of a few sabra and vatik leaders and the pronounced division of labour.

Charismatic leadership, too -- the second method of the new party-recruitment strategy identified by Lissak -- played a significant role; but again, not merely to recruit party-members. It also provided ideological role models. I have already mentioned the strong emphasis given to Ben-Gurion: he was locally heroized and mythologized, as were the sabras in general. Mordechai Allon or "Motke" -- the chairman of the IC -- took on such a role and such qualities. The leading personality, he mediated between the abstract and the concrete. "Motke," in the eyes of the settlers, not merely personified Ben-Gurion locally but came to transcend the latter in terms of his symbolic significance to the settlers in everyday life. The national media coverage he received was important in this respect. What the symbol of Ben-Gurion left implicit and unspecified, "Motke" translated for the settlers into concrete and specific messages, in practice as well as in rhetoric.

One is struck by the stress given, then as now, to Jewish self-labour in the process of building Upper Nazareth. This is true not only of the local élite and ideologues but also of those undergoing ideological indoctrination, the new

immigrants; and it is noticeable in written as well as oral accounts. We have already heard it mentioned in Motke's and Yael's accounts of the immigrants' occupational transformation. Yochanan, the director of the pedagogic centre in Upper Nazareth who was somewhat of a latecomer (he arrived in the locality in 1962) but nevertheless considers himself, and is granted that status by others, one of the first pioneer settlers, took me to the first neighbourhood and told me (he also takes the school classes there and tells *them*):

> These are the very first buildings. You notice they are made of cut stone; this is how they built until the early 1960s. They utilized the very rocks they cleared off the land. In the long run, this was too laborious and expensive, of course. These first buildings were built by the immigrants themselves! The government taught them how to build houses, how to lay floors and water pipes; all these things. They were trained on the very houses they built, and they built their own houses and their town while they learned. Many people that still today live in these houses are in fact the same people that built them! That's like an ideal: to build the house you live in with your own hands!

At the same time that Jewish self-labour has been overcommunicated and idealized, the participation of Arab labour in the construction of the town has been erased almost completely from collective and individual historic ('heroic') memory. Only the occasional immigrant pioneer, and only when pressed by explicit questions, is ready to include Arab workers in his or her recollections, and then only in a minor role. Thus Shalom, the immigrant settler from Poland whose voice we heard previously:

> *Shalom*: I was offered a course in plastering by the Labour Council which lasted one month. I went and finished it, and then I started working as the foreman of a plastering team. All of us [new immigrant settlers] were offered work in *dakhak* (relief) or construction. We went through courses in plastering, floor-laying, welding, roofing -- all these

things. *Then* the Jews were the builders! We built Upper Nazareth with our own hands!

researcher: I was under the impression that Arab workers, too, played an important role in the building of the town...

Shalom: Okay, some Arabs also worked here. In my group of plasterers the assistant hands were Arabs. But there were also Jewish hands to the plasterers and roofers! In any case, I started work; me and my team, we worked for Solel Boneh for 27 years! There are very few buildings here in which I didn't have a hand: apartment blocks, kindergartens, schools, factories -- like the *ZeDe* factory, *Kittan*, or *Tass*. I look around me, and all I see is our creation; it's a good feeling!

The overcommunication of Jewish immigrant labour and concomitant undercommunication of Arab labour in the town's construction, constitutes, I suggest, only one particle in a skein of perceptions about Us, then, on *this* piece of land. Constructed in contrast and opposition to the Arab Other of Nazareth, it simultaneously established Jewish ownership rights to the land, emplaced the Jews -- at least those who actively participated -- in Nazareth, and provided the Jewish settlers with a pioneering identity in the image of Ben-Gurion's statism. Ideology, perception, and practice were in accord with each other. But in respect to Them, realities had to be cognitively adjusted to suit Our needs and interests. This was achieved either through a de-emphasis of the Other -- where They did not stake alternative claims loudly (as in the case of physically building the settlement); or, where and when They vociferously expressed counter-claims (as was the case regarding land-ownership), through the deconstruction of Their oppositional claims *in Their name*. That is to say, couching Our ideas about Them (versus Us) in terms of what They themselves have said They do and believe.

Pivotal to this last process is the condition of the land prior to the Jews' arrival, and the subsequent transformation of land and place. It embraces the climatic, topographic, demographic -- and subtly even the 'spiritual' -- state of the land. These are given expression in the form of renditions of early-day settler experiences that concentrate upon Djab el-Sich, and incorporate stories and beliefs said to have been told to the Jews by Arabs from Nazareth. Allon, for example, told me:

> The first settlers that came here in these winter days of 1956, they got a real taste of what pioneering is. The Nazareth mountains are 500 meters above sea-level, so the winters here are particularly harsh! It was a mountain exposed to strong winds, terrible winds! For this reason the Arabs called it Djab el-Sich -- "Gooseskin Mountain." They stayed away from it for this very reason; they were convinced that it is impossible to live on Djab el-Sich. In fact, what happened is this. When I came and we started the actual construction work, the mayor of Nazareth [was alarmed]. The municipality's treasurer, a Jew from Iraq, told me afterwards what happened; he told me: "You know, the mayor called me in today. From the window in city hall he saw the first power-shovel up on top of the mountain. He said to me, 'What are these power-shovels on top of the mountain?' So I told him, 'Don't you know that they are planning to build a Jewish settlement there?' He exclaimed, 'What? Are you crazy? You tell them, you Abbudiah, tell them it's crazy! Look, you don't remember this, but I can tell you...'" -- he was a very old man, 80 years or so at the time, and a Christian -- he said, "'tell them that I remember when the Bedouins from the area came and wanted to live here. They had heard that there were tourists coming, so they wanted to live here. They stayed for a few months, and then all left, moved away. Because it is impossible to live here! There are terrible winds! So just tell them, it's a waste of money and time!'" But we stayed and overcame all the problems. We managed to make a settlement of Djab el-Sich; we conquered that mountain!

And Shalom explained:

> Look, the town of Nazareth [read Upper Nazareth] was to be built on a mountain. No one thought it possible that a town could be built here in this place! Before the Jews settled here, Bedouins had tried to live

here, but even they couldn't. When I came here, there prevailed such terrible winds! And there were hyenas, lots of hyenas, not far from the blocks; one could hear them at night. And such terrible winds. The Arabs thought that we wouldn't last very long here, they were fearful of this mountain. But today, as you can see for yourself, it is a beautiful town. No one would have thought it possible that we would succeed, but we did. We made this mountain blossom! But don't think it was easy; the first settlers had to make sacrifices. Living in half-finished houses without doors and windows; often we had no electricity or water -- I lived for six months without electricity. All around us rocks and sand -- we had obviously not come here for comfort!

The above two excerpts from interviews contain the major elements present in all the early settler histories I heard; naturally, there exists wide variation in the degree of elaboration as well as with regard to the conclusions drawn from the postulates the descriptions establish -- which might or might not be spelled out explicitly. The following synoptic analysis, then, draws upon all the histories I encountered in the course of my fieldwork: in life histories, written accounts publicized in the local media, as well as artistic re-enactments of local history staged on the occasion of Upper Nazareth's 30th birthday which fell during the period of my field research.

The setting, as it were, is always Djab el-Sich. It stands for Jewish Nazareth as a whole (which has extended away from Djab el-Sich in actuality), as We see it as well as The; did. This is the place, one recalls, where Ben-Gurion is said to have conceived of the idea of a Jewish Nazareth and ordered its implementation; and being one of two 'touching points' between the Arab city and the Jewish Kiriah it became the object of legal (and symbolic) battles between the Jewish settlement and Nazareth residents.

This "mountain," the stories (part one) establish, was in a state of wilderness at the time of the arrival of the Jewish pioneer-settlers: the land was rocky and arid; hyenas (scavengers!) roamed the area; and most centrally, a strong and terrible "wind" haunted the mountain. It is very important to be aware of the multiple connotation contained in the Hebrew word for "wind" -- *ruach* (pl.*ruhot*). It can equally mean "spirit," in both an eschatological or attitudinal sense, as well as "atmosphere" in a figurative sense. Thus, whether it was merely natural or perhaps also supernatural forces that the Jewish settlers had to overcome remains ambiguous. In any event, the wild and untamed forces defined extreme physical hardship and risk for any human society seeking to carve out a living space or livelihood for itself in this place. Concomitantly, however, it offered the opportunity of value creation for those who try and succeed (sacrifice, commitment, courage, will-power, endurance; and technological superiority): all the more so when others have tried and failed, or not even tried.

The Arab Other, the stories (part two) go on to establish, were intimidated by, if not fearful of, this mountain's forces, especially the terrible and eerie "winds" (natural and supernatural?); this We know from Them: They call this mountain Djab el-Sich -- "Gooseskin Mountain". "What is gooseskin?", one of the immigrant settlers asked rhetorically (when telling me the story of the early days, and I failed to draw the proper conclusions from the name): "when someone gets gooseskin it means that he is very cold or afraid, or both." And there are stories in which an Arab from Nazareth spells this out, explicitly, to a Jewish settler of Nazareth (e.g., Allon's account). To the Arabs, then, the mountain was

unhospitable and useless: uncultivatable, certainly, but also uninhabitable. Even the Bedouin, those nomads inured to the fierce elements of nature, had been regurgitated by the mountain, as the Arabs of Nazareth are said to have recollected (*vis-à-vis* the Jewish Others). At this point of the story it has been established, and this is sometimes made quite explicit, that the land was desolate -- uninhabited and uncultivated by Arabs; and that, hence, whatever ownership rights the Arabs may claim to have had they have in fact relinquished (witness Their own "scavenging" land tenancy customs). The stage is then set to demonstrate Our ownership rights and links with the place, and to construct values for Us (in contrast to Them), the composite picture of which is that of the statist pioneer.

Part three of the stories, structurally speaking, are descriptions of the hardships and dangers the Jewish settlers had to overcome, the sacrifices they had to make, and the spiritual as well as physical strength it took "to create something out of nothing" and "against all odds." Essentially, the Jewish settlers had to repudiate -- and to overcome -- the historico-symbolic facts, and their current demographic manifestations, concerning the proximity of the Arab Other and "the way the wind blew in Nazareth" (with an absence of Jewish historicity and symbols 'in place'). These circumstances, I suggest, *heightened* the sense and experience of *pioneering* (halutziut) among the Jewish settlers. Specifically, the historico-symbolic and socio-economic problems were transmuted into others pertaining to a hostile physical landscape.

By transforming the landscape physically from wilderness and desolation

into a modern, "flourishing" settlement, and reversing the polarity of the place's wind/spirit/atmosphere from negative to positive (*mi ruach ra'ah le ruach tovah*) the Jewish settlers earned for the Jewish people and state the rights of ownership over Djab el-Sich and -- conceptually -- representation in place. Simultaneously, the sacrifices, hard labour, and courage that were entailed created a bond between these settlers-pioneers and this particular place. We see this in the pride of Jewish self-labour, and in the significance they attribute to the incorporation of rocks originating from the very land into the structures they created. Through their active involvement in the transformation of the place, then, the Jewish immigrants settling Djab el-Sich were emplacing themselves. Finally, the key elements of statist halutziut which were inherent to the transformation of the physical landscape -- Western ideas pertaining to societal and political order, modern technology, urban life-style, industrial development -- acquired meaning transcending that of state-defined nation-building pragmatism; these key elements became imbued with intrinsic values as essential boundary markers of Jewishness in Nazareth.

3.2.3. Clashing Visions of Jewishness in Nazareth: Secular Israeliness Contra Traditional Jewishness

Thus far, I have sketched the leadership of Kiriat Nazeret and the particular culture and society they were striving to create within the general framework of Ben-Gurionist statism. However, my occasional reference to two

political parties -- Mapai and Ahdut Ha'Avuda -- as the *key parties* (and informants' reference to a third: Mapam) already hints at a political diversification within the overarching idea system. It is now time to explicate this, and the ideological multivalance that paralleled it. For the particular ideological colourations bear directly upon the definition of Jewishness in Nazareth.

Around the time the Jewish Nazareth got underway to realization, Mapam had just undergone internal upheaval and a major split. From the beginning, Mapam had been set apart from Mapai (both were socialist Labour parties) through the strong Soviet Marxist overtones of its ideology, its extremely moderate position toward Israel's Arab minority,[91] and its much more pronounced negation of religion and cultural building blocks stemming from the Jewish tradition: to the point where even Ben-Gurion *compared Mapam to the Jewish Hellenizers of the Second Temple period and other Jewish assimilationists* (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:88).[92] Then, precipitated by Mapam's affiliation with the Communist International and the Soviet Union (at a time when the Soviet Union turned against Israel), the party's Ahdut Ha'Avuda movement -- from whose ranks those opting for loyalty to Jewish nationalism stemmed primarily -- split from the party in 1953. Until Ahdut Ha'Avuda would join Mapai, in 1965, its ideological place was between Mapam and Mapai.

All this pertains directly to Kiriat Nazeret's political and ideological environment. Jewish Nazareth was -- ideationally and financially -- the 'child' of Ben-Gurion and his Mapai party. All of the IC members were Mapai supporters -- with exception of the chairman, M. Allon. He was a member of the intermediate

ideological camp that had just emerged: Ahdut Ha'Avuda; while favouring the breach of affiliations with the Soviet Union, he had, in his own words, "remained a Mapamnik at heart," particularly with respect to his worldview regarding the place of Jewish tradition in Israeli culture -- and, of course, Kiriat Nazeret's.[93]

We saw Allon's extreme, secular interpretation of the New Israeli culture at work in the principles that guided the selection of the first settlers to Kiriat Nazeret and in the institutional network created locally. Yet the picture is still far from complete (extremism in this respect has still to be demonstrated) as, thus far, I have focused on those values and institutions that *were* locally represented, but not on those that were *not*. We find these latter, of course, in expressions -- political, ideological *or* cultural -- of the Jewish religion and tradition.

Even when the Kiriah was in its embryonic stage and housing was scarce, apartments were immediately set aside for the opening of a local Histadrut and Labour party branches; but no uniquely Jewish, as opposed to Zionist and Israeli, institutions or services whatsoever were provided during the first two years of the Kiriah's existence: no synagogue, no *mikvah* (public ritual bath for women), and of course no local rabbi -- let alone a religious council or a religious educational system. Needless to say, no legislation was passed by the IC enforcing the public maintenance of Jewish religious laws. Festivals of the Jewish ritual calendar were barely marked in the Kiriah's public life: the most elaborately celebrated public holidays were May Day and Independence Day.[94]

This glaring absence of even the most basic traditional *Jewish* elements

within the Israeli culture and ideology of the Kiriah, remained unproblematic (for the local leadership) until, by 1958, despite strong opposing efforts, religiously inclined, or at least tradition-oriented Jews were to be found among the new immigrant settlers; these were the Rumanian immigrants the Sochnut had sent to Kiriat Nazeret "against the agreement," deliberately or inadvertently. Their arrival meant that there was now a public that felt disturbed by such extreme secularization, and they worked to involve religious Jewish others from the national scene, governmental and non-governmental, in the matter. The IC's vulnerability on this account must be understood against the backdrop of the relationship between the National Religious Party (NRP) and the Mapai at the national level: motivated by his own ideological rootedness in the Jewish tradition, seeking to avoid a *Kulturkampf* within the Jewish nation (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:92), and in need for coalition partners against the right-wing Zionists on international and defence issues, Ben-Gurion was committed to the maintainance of a *modus vivendi* with the religious camps.[95] Even in the best of circumstances this was precariously maintained.[96]

By 1958, the absence of the most basic Jewish institution in Kiriat Nazeret -- a synagogue -- had attracted the attention and concern of the Ministry of Religion. For at this time, the Ministry purchased one of the Amidar flats within the Kiriah (via the central offices of the Ministry of Housing) and stipulated its function as a local synagogue. The conversion of the 48 m² flat into a synagogue, as well as the administration of the synagogue, was left, however, to the local authority. Thus, while there now existed a synagogue, it remained without a

Torah scroll for the time being, and the local Histadrut assumed 'ownership' over the flat: the sign outside the door read, "Histadrut -- Kiriat Nazeret Labour Council Synagogue," and the Labour Council held the key to it -- literally and figuratively. By all accounts, local and national, the "party-key" was applied also to gain access to the Kiriah's only synagogue.

Not before long (during the first months of 1959), Kiriat Nazeret came under attack from various religious camps for anti-religious coercion; this was triggered by an incident in the Kiriah on the Jewish festival of Purim which, basically, was the upshot of the presence of religiously inclined new immigrant settlers from Rumania. A number of young Torah activists from the Torah Religious Front (*Agudah*) -- *yeshiva* students of Rumanian background or origin -- came to Kiriat Nazeret from Bnei Brak (the ultra-orthodox suburb of Tel Aviv) in order to celebrate the festival in a traditional manner with their "brethren" from Rumania: that is, by "singing and dancing through the streets." The group of religious activists had even brought along their own band. But in the midst of the festivities, there arrived on the scene "a load full of bullies" on a truck, headed by the director of the local Labour Exchange, and began to attack the yeshiva boys with sticks and stones in an effort to expel them from the Kiriah. Some of the residents apparently called in the police to break up the fighting.

While the attackers were being questioned at the police station, the police received a telephone call from the secretary of the Labour Council,[97] who sought to mediate between the police and the "rioters." He admitted to having sent the Labour youths, but "only so as to prevent the use of loudspeakers during the

festivities." Moreover, he soon appeared on the scene in person to encourage people to continue the celebration. But the festive spirit had disintegrated -- especially since some of the yeshiva boys had been injured. "Jews beaten up -- Jews from the holy Christian city; is that not sufficiently disgraceful?", remarked one reporter (Tannenboim 1959) in consternation.

The religious newspapers reporting the incidence featured headlines like, "A Rule of Terror in Kiriat Nazeret: Wild Attacks by the Force of the Outstretched Arm;"[98] "Left-Wing Bullies Attack Religious Youths Celebrating in Kiriat Nazeret;"[99] or "Mapai Thugs Threaten Yeshiva Students."[100] The nomenclatural ambiguity blurring the boundaries between the Arab city and the Jewish Kiriah in this case worked in favour of the latter's leadership, initially at least. For the wider readership tended to associate reports of "terror" with Arabs and the Communist party in Nazareth. But eventually, concerned reporters caught on to this possibility and -- with some delay -- ensured the necessary explication.[101] The widespread publicity the incidence received within religious circles intensified their focus on and concern with Jewishness in Kiriat Nazeret. Religious "activists" or "workers" from both the NRP and the Agudah camps now began to take it upon themselves to "bring the Torah to the people of Kiriat Nazeret;" they assumed a brokerage role between the local religious population, on the one hand, and the IC and the religious institutions and interest groups at the centre, on the other. Initially, they were situated outside of the settlement: in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

One of the first actions taken (April, 1959) was to demand from the IC that

a Torah scroll be obtained and placed in the Kiriah's only synagogue. The IC considered it "wise" to comply with this request. Ordinarily, that is to say, traditionally, the "entering" of a Torah scroll into a synagogue is a festive occasion calling for a big celebration. This is precisely what the religious activists intended to organise and stage. They formally applied for a police license (which was granted), invited Torah activists and NRP leaders from the centre, and announced the event well in advance. But when the Torah -- along with the guests -- actually arrived for that big moment, the door to the synagogue was found locked.[102] Apparently, the secretary of the Labour Council (at the time attending a Mapai summit in Tel Aviv) sought to prevent the "entering" of a Torah. At first, he had tried to solicit the assistance of the local police, informing them that "strange people will come today to enter the Torah scroll into the synagogue" and requesting that "the synagogue be closed [on this day] and no one be allowed to enter it," as "it belongs to the Labour Council." But the police refused to interfere (in their view, the synagogue belonged to the whole public and thus every Jew was allowed to enter it; moreover, the group of religious activists had been given a licence for the festivities), whereupon the secretary ordered members of the Labour Council to lock the synagogue. Among the special guests attending the festive occasion of the arrival of a Torah scroll in Kiriat Nazeret were the NRP Knesset members Ya'akov Katz and Sh. Gross; they contacted the local police where they were informed of the Histadrut secretary's orders as well as of the whereabouts of the key, and subsequently obtained, under threat of legal action, the key to the synagogue. So the Torah scroll was "entered" after all, and the rightful ownership over the synagogue established. In their celebratory

speeches the NRP leaders called upon the local religious population to "insist upon their rights to religious expression."

This second, public incident attesting to "anti-religious coercion" in Kiriat Nazeret had now definitely 'tipped off' Israel's religious camps as to the problematic nature of Jewishness in Nazareth. In the same year, "workers" of *Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrahi*[103] (on their own initiative) sought to rent or purchase an Amidar flat in Kiriat Nazeret for the purpose of opening a local party branch. Like anyone else wishing to settle in Kiriat Nazeret, they had to apply to the IC's population and settlement subcommittee. The IC turned down the request, on the grounds that "there is no room for club-houses in Amidar housing complexes" (even though the local Labour party branches were located in a flat of Amidar). On similar grounds the IC refused the Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrahi's subsequent request to purchase a plot of land in the Kiriah: the available land, it was claimed, was planned for development.

In fact, the religious Jewish other would not succeed in penetrating Jewish Nazareth until the IC was disbanded and transformed into a civil local authority. Nor would there be a religious school system or a local rabbi before that time. What the IC did initiate and finance, however -- in the wake of the events related above -- is the construction of a mikvah inside a small cottage-type structure. But there, too, the party-key is said to have been operative. From the IC's way of handling the traditional religious impulses that began to impinge upon the Kiriah, one can discern two tendencies in interaction. One: to *yield* (albeit under mounting pressure from the religious camps at the centre, and then only

hesitantly) in the form of token expressions -- ideologically and politically -- of Jewish otherness. Two: *to invest* all its power and authority in the creation of a 'fence' against the further accretion, institutionalization and politicization of Jewish otherness in Kiriat Nazeret.

The Ministry of the Interior, too, was conversant about what the Northern District Commissioner all-encompassingly referred to as "undemocratic procedures" in Kiriat Nazeret. Yet it could not (or would not) interfere: aside from the fact that, formally, the IC was beyond the Ministry of the Interior's sanctioning, in 1958 and until December 1959 the incumbent Minister of the Interior was a member of Ahdut Ha'Avuda,[104] an anomalous situation as this portfolio was otherwise -- and has been since -- held by a member of the NRP (Lustick 1980:68; Avi-Hai 1974:102; Shimshoni 1982:120). It was the Northern District Commissioner, an NRP member and a resident of Upper Nazareth, more than any other representative of the Ministry who followed the developments in the two Nazareths closely and with disapproval. He had his own views as to the desirability of uniting the two Nazareths and, if this should occur, under what circumstances. In his opinion this would presuppose the Westernization of the Arab population, and on the Jewish side (1) a large-size population and (2) a society developed as much spiritually as infrastructurally, a society and culture rooted in the Jewish tradition (i which he deemed the democratic and humanitarian ethics a crucial component). As things stood at the time, in his view, neither side was yet ready for a merger:

If anyone had a recipe for lighting a match here [in Nazareth] it was

the idea of unification [of the two Nazareths]. Imagine Jews and Arabs sitting together in one municipal council! The problem here [in Upper Nazareth] was, as I said before, the *type* of Jewish population that was brought here initially, that is, the settlers from Poland. The first settlers in Nazrat were Polish Jews, Stalinists. They came here following the revolution of Gemolka, and among them were many anti-Zionist activists -- Jews of Stalinist Poland. They were used to a completely different rule, completely different life, than we were here. Poland threw them out, and they had to be absorbed; but their absorption was obviously problematic. It took a completely different way of thinking, behaviour, social order than that which the Arab mentality warranted [he refers for the need to instill these new immigrants from Poland with Zionist, that is, Jewish values; remember there was also the influence [negative for the Polish immigrants] of the military government all around here [Galilee and Nazareth] at the time! Nazrat could have looked completely different, if a bright-minded person [someone sharing his view] had led it; but the person who led it had all the qualities of a major, instead of those of a mayor! You haven't been in Israel long enough to know the type of people I belong to, that is, people who are first and foremost democrats; for, if there *is* a democratic religion and culture, it is the Jewish one!

So, imagine this type of population sitting at one table with the Arab population of Nazareth! Here the question is that of the mental revolution the Jewish people had undergone, and the mental revolution the Arab population has yet to undergo. You have to see this in terms of cultural friction; those talking in terms of minority-majority are dilletantes. Israel's culture has different building-blocks, and one of them is local government. Our *Weltanschauung* regarding the operation of local government -- according to my evaluation it will take 50 to 100 years for this population to reach similar thoughts about running local government the way we do. In my opinion, there is one local authority in the whole Arab sector in the State of Israel which comes close to our concept of local government, and that is the village of Daburiyah. At the head of that council stands a chap who is a graduate in economics and worked for me as a budget official. He was responsible for the budget in Jewish local councils as well; I did this intentionally! Now, Nazareth has its own tradition of government, and the fact that it is now Communist is actually irrelevant.

I was the mayor of Nazareth for a few months [following the resignation of Siff Al Din Zu'ebi] until they got a [city] council together again. I tell you, I can't imagine a resident of Nazrat who would be able or willing to live under such sanitary conditions! *Then* it would have

become a national case -- or even international -- whether to empty the garbage every day or once a week!

Could we have taken, sociologically speaking, two such minuses, two such precarious elements -- both unstable, neither one knowing their future -- put them into one sack and tie them together? It would have been like tying two male cats into one sack and letting them eat each other! I know that, mathematically, two minuses make a plus; but not culturally! (Personal interview with Israel Koenig).

It was only when the Ministry of Defence raised the issue of disbanding the IC and establishing a civil local authority in its place, and only when the portfolio returned to a member of the NRP, that the Ministry of the Interior could, and became so inclined, to consider intervention in the culture that had been locally created.

Chapter 4

Towards a Unified Nazareth

4.1. Upper Nazareth as a Civil Local Authority: Averting Religious Jewish Co-Authorship of Nazareth's Judaization

The near-monopoly of the IC leaders over the local authorship of a Jewish Nazareth began to diminish once preparations for Upper Nazareth's administrative transformation came into full swing around (1959). From then on, the IC leadership had to accept a serious curtailment both of the material resources and the wide-ranging authority which had been placed at their disposal by the Ministry of Defence -- to the level of any other local authority in Israel.

Essentially, then, the Ministry of the Interior began to assume a direct role in the co-authorship of the Jewish Nazareth. The people controlling this influential body held a somewhat different vision of a 'Jewish Nazareth' than the vision that had been inspired by Ben-Gurion, with which the local leaders had come to identify and in which they had personal political interests. Considerable status, fame and political career mobility beckoned the figure(s) who would succeed in harmoniously uniting the two Nazareths under one -- Jewish Israeli --

leadership, while thereby also creating a major symbol of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Israel. And that meant Judaizing Nazareth in the Ben-Gurionist vision.

The differences in visions centered around divergent interpretations of Jewishness. To the NRP-led Ministry of the Interior, the spiritual development of Jews in Nazareth was at least as important as the demographic growth of and infrastructural development by Jews. And as a result of the new influence the Ministry now attained in the building of a Jewish 'Nazareth', it could certainly interject elements of its own vision. Ben-Gurion -- in whose special, personal care the project had been -- resigned as Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in June 1963,[105] one month before Upper Nazareth was transformed into a local authority like any other. His successor, Levi Eshkol, did not, it appears, share Ben-Gurion's perception of the importance of Judaizing Nazareth beyond the symbolic, and the dream of a United Nazareth -- of the administrative integration of the Jewish and the Arab Nazareth -- gradually faded from the agenda of high government circles. Following the 1967 war (but especially after *Likud* gained control in Israel in 1977), settling the newly acquired territories in the Jordan Valley -- saturated with Jewish symbols and history -- acquired highest development priority.

The Jewish Nazareth that was to unfold over the subsequent decade and a half, was the outgrowth of a dialogue *on the Jewish side* between at least two different scripts (visions of 'Nazareth') and two main 'directors': M. Allon and the Ministry of the Interior. (On the Arab side, too, there existed various scripts and multiple directors, as we shall see.)

With the administrative transformation imminent, the IC leadership began to solicit for the local authority-to-be the m..imum attainable in terms of resources: government funding, land, and also authority. One strategy was to seek municipal (rather than local council) status for Upper Nazareth; that is, the status of a Development and Immigrant town. Such a difference in status has far-reaching implications regarding both the amount of financial resources flowing into a locality and the degree of relative administrative autonomy[106] it enjoys. Development Town status guarantees considerable additional financial assistance from central, governmental as well as non-governmental institutions. The decision as to which status to confer rests in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior. By law, it is not required to award municipal status to a local authority unless its population reaches a predefined ceiling (20,000); however, it can make a locality as a special case, awarding the status regardless of population size.[107] M. Allon formally requested Development town status for Upper Nazareth as early as 1961 (at that time the town's population had reached only 4,500). It is particularly in this area of formal classification that divergent visions of the Jewish Nazareth (between the local leadership and the Ministry of the Interior) as well as the redefinition of its priority within central government echelons manifest themselves.

Simultaneously, M. Allon endeavoured to consolidate, prior to the final boundary definition, as large a land area as possible, and one that was geographically advantageous *vis-à-vis* the ancient city. To this end, land purchases and requisitions were expedited.[108]

One puzzle, in view of what has previously been said about the efforts the IC invested in ethnic boundary maintenance, is the inclusion of an Arab residential area within the Upper Nazareth jurisdiction at a very early stage of the process of boundary definition (May 1959). The Kramim or Eastern neighbourhood, as it was named following its annexation, is situated on the bottom part of the northern face of Djab el-Sich; and a wide open land area lies between it and the settled area of Jewish Nazareth. The area then contained about thirty two-story houses. Previously, it had been part of the Kfar Reina local council (an Arab village north of the two Nazareths, and across the road that leads to Tiberias from that residential area). The initiative for the integration of this Arab Other, it seems, came from both sides: the Arab residents wished to gain access to superior municipal services -- notably Upper Nazareth's water system and sewage network; the Jewish side, stories have it, had an interest in marking Upper Nazareth's northern boundary, too, by way of a major road, and thus in obtaining the entire land area reaching up to the Tiberias road. (In the south, also, the Jewish leaders had their eyes on a major road -- the Afula road -- as a boundary marker.) Some of the vatik settlers even suggested to me that the inclusion of this Arab residential area constituted -- from the point of view of the local leadership -- a token symbol of Jewish Nazareth's good intentions *vis-à-vis* the Arab population and a conciliatory answer to Nazareth's allegations of ethnic discrimination and exploitation. M. Allon, too, emphasized in a similar vain that it had been the Arab residents who first approached the IC with a request for incorporation. In fact, the IC Minutes (25.5.1959) reveal that the IC insisted on a formal declaration by the Arab residents that they were joining the Jewish local authority on their own free will.

But this form of ethnic integration, it needs to be pointed out, was safe with respect to both the Arab Other's geographic proximity to and visibility from the actual Jewish settlement: it did not, in fact, threaten ethnic boundary maintenance. The Jewish settlers, in their own words, *then* barely saw and felt this Arab Other. While integrated into Jewish Nazareth administratively, the Kramim neighbourhood remained separate perceptively -- quite in contrast with the Arab Other of Nazareth which, though administratively separate, was the most significant referential *Other* perceptually. It was perhaps of some significance that the Arab population of Kramim, at that time, was not *of* Nazareth.[109]

Once the Kiriah was readied for normalized and democratic administration, Jewish religious otherness within the community could no longer be warded off. The first local authority was appointed by the Ministry of the Interior on the basis of the proportional strength of the political parties locally as expressed in the most recent (1961) Knesset elections. Of nine Local Council seats to be filled, six went to Mapai, and one each to Mapam, Ahdut Ha'Avudah -- and to *Mafdal* [the National Religious Party].[110] Thus, it was now empirically established that among the *settlers* of Upper Nazareth there was a religious population of significant enough size to warrant cultural (and political?) expression. Soon after that, in the beginning of 1962, the Ministry of Religion announced its intentions of appointing a local rabbi to Upper Nazareth; equally significant, though, the IC's input regarding the appointee was invited *and heeded*. Moreover, the Ministry of Religion offered the local authority a 60,000 lira loan (equal to 20,000 U.S. dollars at that time) for the purpose of building a befitting, monumental synagogue in

Upper Nazareth. But the IC declined on the grounds that, due to a budget shortage, it would be unable to repay the sum; yet it allotted a sum exceeding this amount for a new town hall once civil status was awarded. (Later, in 1965, an impressive synagogue in an architectural style "characteristic of the old synagogues of the Galilee region" was built with the financial assistance, obtained after much lobbying, of the Ministries of the Interior and of Religion.)

In the same year, the NRP central office commissioned party activists to settle in Upper Nazareth, to open a party branch and organise a religious school.[111] Attempts to prevent local residents from enrolling their children in religious education continued; but the Mafdal activists, being financially independent from the IC, could and did approach the Ministry of the Interior with a formal complaint. And that Ministry was now in a position to exert pressure.[112] For a religious school, however, the Mafdal activists and religious pupils had to make do with a small and dilapidated shed for the time being.

When civil status was finally conferred in July 1963, it was local council[113] rather than municipal status that was granted. M. Allon, representing the Mapai (a politically wise move, in the light of a local Mapai majority), was elected (by the Council members) chairman of the new Local Council. With the exception of the Mafdal and Mapam members, the councillors had all belonged to the former IC[114] or one of its manifold subcommittees -- and all were fully supportive of the chairman. (The local elections of 1965 brought no changes other than replacements for the two representatives of the Ministry of the Interior: one Labour Alignment member[115] and a second Mafdal representative.)

The Ministry of the Interior, by adhering to the rules and withholding the desired municipal status, was able to pressure Upper Nazareth's leadership in the direction of a relaxation of its selection policies (which they were able to apply even now, albeit informally and covertly) and to maintain the LC in a relationship of dependence which should, in the Ministry's view, pave the way for the gradual redefinition of Jewishness in Upper Nazareth toward a definition of 'Jewish Nazareth' more in line with the Ministry's own alternative vision. This point emerges clearly, I think, in the speech of the Minister at a special meeting with the LC to discuss its current stage and future plans for development, which is quoted in some length below (excerpted from the LC Minutes, 11.11.1963). But first: a summary of the points the LC raised in the meeting and its general line of argument.

The meeting opens with an update of the current stage of development and of plans for the next stage (delivered by M. Allon, the Council's engineer, and a Mapai councillor who happens to also be the District Director of the Israel Land Administration -- Mr. Cohen). In effect, the LC attempts to solicit the Minister's support both in acquiring additional land on its southern border (the south-western border of Nazareth), of which at least part seems to belong to the Nazareth municipality, and in gaining municipal status inspite of the locality's small population -- making Upper Nazareth an exceptional case. The LC speakers invest much effort in legitimating those past projects and future plans that are controversial with respect to Nazareth (such as the construction of the road, the expansion in the southern direction). Their argument combines the logic of infra-

structural and socio-economic development with ethnic dichotomization (Jewish versus Arab Nazareth). The specific vision of a Jewish Nazareth that emerges concentrates on the Jewish genius for modernization and development (as the classical economist defines these concepts). Put bluntly, Allon intended to approach Nazareth as a businessman; and to do so successfully, there was a need to accumulate in the hands of Upper Nazareth the maximum of material resources to serve as valid currency in his dealings with the ancient city's leaders.

The Minister, when his turn comes, refers to the Arab and Christian Others to promote a religious Zionist version of a Jewish Nazareth which concentrates on the *spiritual* development of the Jewish town and the Jewish genius with respect to ethics, seen as rooted in the Judaic tradition:

> I am happy to be here with you and hear about future plans of developing this town. Regarding the need to add land, I am willing to discuss this matter only after receiving a formal application from the Council. One doesn't discuss such things in a forum of this kind! *Anything on this issue calls for a lot of caution.* Regarding the status of Upper Nazareth, we have accepted guidelines as to when it is possible to award this status. It could be that you will be a special case, but at all events, you are getting close to the requirements called for. Immigration is increasing and I have no doubt that within a short while we will be able to award you the status of municipality. We won't squabble about the numbers needed; as long as we see that it is for the benefit of the locality, I am sure we will declare Upper Nazareth a municipality. I hear talk about 60,000 people. A few years ago they[116] would not have dreamed about this here. Today it is almost a reality. We see the plans for the future as good as fulfilled. And that is a good thing for us,[117] since our position in Galilee was not encouraging. With such an influx of Jews, it looks like this is rapidly changing. It is taking the shape we wanted to see. I hope that the relations between the two Nazareths be friendly, that the Arab city will develop also, and that there will be no jealousy between them. *Maybe one day it will be one city, Nazareth and Upper Nazareth together. We expect and are looking forward to this happening. And we hope that things develop in this direction.*

I would also like to see friendly relations within the Upper Nazareth Council. There is nothing more important than peaceful relations, not only between Jews and Arabs, but also between Jews and Jews. I know that the Jews like arguing among themselves. In the past it was in the synagogues, today it is in the local councils. I would like to hope that you, who see yourselves responsible for this settlement, will make sure that every resident of this place sees himself as an equal resident of the locality, and there be no differences between one resident and another. Just like we always say -- and it is true -- that there be one law for the stranger[118] and the citizen, how much more important that this be so between one Jewish citizen and another? It is important that everyone's opinion be honoured, and no one be harmed because of them. You know that there exists a certain tension in this state! I am sure that what happened here before the Council was established [reference to the conflict between religious and secular Jewish 'others'] won't happen again. I wish that peace come to this place; we don't have many friends in this world, and even the few we have often disappoint us. We must not distinguish between Jew and Jew. If we follow this path, the foundations for a great metropolis and "mother" [a place in which people feel rooted and a sense of belonging] will be created here.

This spiritual message will determine the character of Upper Nazareth. The city of Nazareth also has a spiritual image: the whole Christian world looks towards that city. It is desirable that we make Upper Nazareth the *Tel Talpiot* [spiritual mountain] of the Jewish religion. We will be able to say that *vis-à-vis* the city of Nazareth there is Upper Nazareth -- a city of Jewish sacrifice and positive values which the Jewish people have had for thousands of years.

I am certain that the chairman and members of the Council feel the full responsibility invested in them: the development of Upper Nazareth not only economically, but also spiritually. The pride of Judaism and nationalism which the Jewish people deserves, and the Jewish genius, will be victorious in this place! I would like to come and visit you when the town has 60,000 residents, and then hope to find it developed spiritually, too, to the pride of Israel (emphases added).

The request for land additions on Upper Nazareth's southern border was eventually heeded, but primarily on account of the Minister of Finance[119] whom Allon had approached directly on this issue even before broaching the plans to the

Minister of the Interior.[120]   However, in regard to municipal status the LC chairman was less successful. Here, too, he went above the Ministry of the Interior, once the latter proved not forthcoming. He raised the issue whith Prime Minister Eshkol during his visit in Upper Nazareth in June 1965, portraying the matter as one "of utmost importance to our striking of roots in Nazareth" (Allon). Much later, in August 1967 following the Six-Day War, the LC chairman portrayed the the attainment of municipal status as an "important state security step...as a way of changing the values of the Arab minority towards Israel and the Jewish people in the Nazareth area," thereby attempting to transform recent political events into symbolic currency.[121] But all to no avail: the Ministry of the Interior remained steadfast -- relations between religious and secular Jews in Upper Nazareth were in the meantime far from harmonious, as we shall see -- and no other government ministry, with greater decision-making weight, would intervene on Upper Nazareth's behalf concerning that matter. Allon raised the issue one last time with a high government official outside the Ministry of the Interior on the occasion of the visit to Jewish Nazareth of Labour Minister Yigall Allon. Again, demands for municipal status went hand-in-hand with a request for further boundary expansion and both were backed up by grandiose development plans, topped off with a juxtaposition of the two Nazareths: "The government has been treating Upper Nazareth as a neighbourhood of the Arab city." The Minister's response: "Upper Nazareth is quite obviously an independent local authority, one privileged to receive special government attention [in terms of resource allocation] at the outset. The idea of Upper Nazareth is still active, even if it won't be realized as fast as we would like."[122] In fact, Upper Nazareth did

not achieve the sought-after status conferral until 1974, when it had reached a population of 18,500.

Population size, then, became a matter of considerable significance. It had, we should remember, played a crucial role in the original idea: the Jewish population was to "outbalance" the Arab population of Nazareth; this was to be one of the preconditions for municipal integration -- for Jewish rule without violating Israel's democratic principles. But here M. Allon's vision had come to diverge from that of the national Labour leadership. The strict selection policies operative in the case of Jewish, Upper Nazareth contrasted sharply with the rapid post-Independence War population expansion of the Arab and Christian city: there was an overriding emphasis on the cultural and ideological quality of the Jewish community, at the expense of its demographic strength. Allon, for his part, worked for a United Nazareth based first and foremost on a party-political majority transcending ethnic boundaries -- a Mapai (and later, Labour Alignment) majority:

> *Allon:* The idea was that we were not going to merge the two towns under government pressure, by a higher government decision. The idea had to be accepted by both towns.

> *researcher:* Did the possibility of a merger hinge on the size of the Jewish population?

> *Allon:* Well...there was such an idea around. But I thought that it would not necessarily have to be on the basis of a Jewish majority. It was a matter of good will. There was a time when the mayor of the city and myself stood in such good relations to each other that we thought about the possibility; it was Zu'ebi, the mayor for a long time and a Knesset member -- deputy speaker in the Knesset. He was Mapai and I was Mapai...Some people, Arabs from Nazareth, told me, "Look, if you

run for mayorship in Nazareth, we don't know what exact percentage you would get; maybe not a majority, but you would get a much higher percentage than any Arab that runs here and does not belong to the Communist Party. So...

researcher: You mean to say that Zu'ebi would have featured second on the party list, leaving the first place -- mayorship -- to you?

Allon: Not exactly. At the time it was thought...rotating mayors. That was the custom -- not among the Jews, but among the Arabs. For example, there were many cases when a Member of Parliament resigned and the second one on the list took over, and so on. Especially among the Arab people.

researcher: This would really presume a lot of good will, and trust. Because if one refuses to step down, he can hardly be held to such an agreement, which is of course informal?

Allon: I told you, something like this could only be done on the basis of good will!

researcher: When exactly was this, that you and the mayor of Nazareth were on such good terms?

Allon: In the early seventies.

But in view of the emphasis upon population size -- in rules and regulations guiding the conferral of the desired municipal status in general, and by highest government officials when considering awarding this status to Upper Nazareth, in particular -- Allon, too, had to concern himself with numbers. This is reflected in two ways. First, a longitudinal inspection of the demographic profile of Upper Nazareth reveals a visible relaxation of the previous selectivity, especially in the mid- to late-1960s. Among the sabras and vatikim absorbed locally from then on, there are increasing numbers of people with North African or Asian background.

Concern with population size is also reflected in the almost ritualistic citation of inflated population figures by local leaders addressing the wider Israeli public and high government representatives. (Appendix C provides a table of divergent population figures from different sources for the same time period.) However, to judge by the town's political culture, it would appear that the concern with numbers never fully took the place of an overriding pre-occupation with political affiliation. In 1969, the town was lauded for "featuring the highest number [3,030] of active Labour party members of all the towns in the Northern region, in both absolute and in proportional terms."[123] One way or another -- via selection policies or/and the local institutional network and socio-economic pressures -- Labour hegemony was upheld.

4.2. Political and Cultural Leaders of Arab Nazareth -- Partners in Dialogue, Co-Authors of a United Jewish Nazareth

The idea of *de facto* Judaization of Nazareth, bridged by symbolic Judaization, stipulated a bivalent pattern of action for the Jewish leadership *vis-à-vis* the Arab and Christian city.

On the one hand, it spelled out an increasing intrusion of the national majority into the economic, political and ideological realm of the only Israeli city in which the national minority had remained a majority and retained relative autonomy. From the point of view of Nazareth, the steps taken to implement symbolic Judaization had already entailed more than the symbolic entry of Jews

into Nazareth: the establishment of Upper Nazareth had meant land requisitions from residents and -- as far as the use of state-owned land was concerned -- the effective constriction of the city's further growth and expansion. The beginnings of *de facto* Judaization are evident in the concentration of control over "new, additional local employment opportunities" (industrial development) in Jewish hands. They are also reflected in the plans pursued by the leadership of Upper Nazareth to 'cut in on' Nazareth's old and primary source of income, tourism, and appropriate for Jewish Nazareth the expansion and modernization of this sector (i.e., locating hotels, guesthouses, restaurants, and the central bus station in the jurisdiction of Jewish Nazareth). These plans, if indeed realized, spelled the dependence of the Arab and Christian city on the Jewish Nazareth. And all the while the Jewish leadership -- at least on the national level -- hoped that Jews would eventually come to outnumber non-Jews in Nazareth and gain control over the local government.

Yet the other side of the coin was that the Israeli government was wary lest these plans might aggravate Nazareth's politicization in directions antagonistic to the Israeli state and the Jewish people. For what was sought, via the establishment of the 'Jewish Nazareth', was a Nazareth that would be (at least overtly) "an example of cooperation and coexistence" between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The imperative here was to avoid outright and blunt imposition of Jewish control, in either the economic or the political realm, but instead to build on cooptation. This implied entering into a dialogue and establishing alliances across ethnic/jurisdictional boundaries that would result in Arab Nazareth's consent to, even participation in, the creation of Jewish-Israeli control over Nazareth.

Official alliances across ethnic and jurisdictional boundaries would come to cluster around four, under the prevalent political constellation interconnected, institutional arenas: (a) the municipal government of Nazareth, (b) the Labour party branches in the Arab city, (c) the Nazareth Labour Council, and (d) the Christian clergy of the various denominations. However, the Jewish side was to 'call the shots', and would do so in line with inalienable nationalist principles. Accordingly, the dichotomization between Jews and Arabs in 'Nazareth' was *to be bridged but not obfuscated*; and the Arab minority was to define itself (and be accepted only) in terms of cultural difference, not in terms of political and ideological incompatibility, *vis-à-vis* the Jewish Israel.

Obviously, on the other side of the boundary there had to be an interested, or at least a facilitating, party of Arab Others that were politically and culturally influential. So our discussion now pays attention to multiple authorship of the script for 'Jewish Nazareth' on the Arab side. Herein lie the roots for the delay in the initiation of dialogue and liaisons between the two Nazareths -- and for the eventual demise of the idea of a United Nazareth.

When Nazareth was captured by the Jewish army in 1948 and military government was imposed, the man who had been mayor of the city under the British Mandate and surrendered the city to the Israeli army was left in the position of running Nazareth's internal affairs until the first public local elections were held. As if to annul retroactively the betrayal committed by surrendering the city, he subsequently took an uncompromising stance, where at all possible, against any form of government intervention in Nazareth's affairs. For example,

he refused to connect the city to the national watersupply and objected to any kind of government or Histadrut initiatives within the city's limits. As Allon put it (Rabinovitch 1988), the mayor "didn't want to go into history as not only the mayor who had to surrender his city but as the one who made his city dependent on the Jews."

The population of Nazareth, on the other hand, was split relatively equally with respect to its attitude towards the new, Jewish government (and Jewish intrusion in Nazareth), a split which did not clearly follow the lines of the religious division into Christian and Moslem Nazareans. From the very beginning, clerical leadership (Greek Catholic, Protestant, and Roman Catholic) reached some sort of *modus vivendi* with the new government. Bishop Chakim, leader of the Greek Catholics, organised *Rabita*, a Christian trade union with social and cultural as well as economic activities that cooperated with the Israel trade union (Histadrut).[124] But the Greek Orthodox clergy and congregation as a whole, a large part of the Moslem population, and also some of the Roman and the Greek Catholics took an obdurately hostile stance and joined forces with the Communist Party -- the only legal anti-Zionist party and the safest and most convenient outlet for Arab opposition to Jewish-Israeli rule. Dissension between the two camps was initially pronounced enough to give rise to violent confrontations occasionally, as in April 1952 (see Alexander 1952). It was the Communist faction that most obstinately fought land requisitions for the purpose of establishing Jewish Nazareth.

This is not to say, however, that those Others who accepted Israeli rule

readily consented to Jewish attempts to gain control of the city of Nazareth, and (as part of this plan) to the establishment of Upper Nazareth. Rather, they sought to harness the Zionist establishment -- and later the idea of a 'Jewish Nazareth' -- for the procurement of resources to improve the socio-economic conditions in Arab Nazareth, as well as to enhance their own political status and power in the process (the same way Allon used the idea).

It was the faction affiliated with the Zionist parties that gained control over Nazareth's local government as a result of the first local elections in 1954 -- though by a narrow margin; and it remained in control, albeit with tenuously fluctuating and gradually decreasing strength, until 1975.[125]

4.2.1. A Ritual Co-Performance of Unity

Beginning with the first meeting of the newly-established Local Council of Upper Nazareth, a tradition of joint celebrations between the city fathers of Nazareth and the leadership of Upper Nazareth evolved; more precisely, the Municipal Council, Labour party and Histadrut leadership of Nazareth were henceforth invited to join Upper Nazareth in rituals marking special occasions for the Jewish town, or the Jewish people as a whole; likewise, the leadership of Upper Nazareth was invited to celebrations of special days in the Christian and Moslem calendars, organised by the Histadrut or the Labour parties in Nazareth.

So it was that the mayor of Nazareth found himself among the invited guests -- together with the Vice Minister of Defence (Shimon Peres), Minister of the Interior, and other high-ranking government officials -- at the Upper Nazareth Local Council's first meeting and the election of the first chairman. And as would become a tradition during such occasions, the topic of municipal unification, or rather, its 'flag', was raised rhetorically: "I am looking forward to the time when the two Nazareths become one and the artificial boundaries between them disappear," Nazareth's mayor declared.[126]

Arab city councillors who opposed such rapprochement expressed opposition on these occasions either indirectly, through their non-appearance (despite invitations) or directly, by attending but speaking out against the idea; it also manifested itself in the fact that the Upper Nazareth Council never received a reciprocal invitation to visit the Nazareth City Council. But those Arab Others who ventured into such ritual alliances consistently used these occasions (in a fashion similar to Allon *vis-à-vis* higher government levels) to turn the idea of "one Nazareth" into currency for the procurement of development aid for their ancient city; in fact, they attempted to make the idea of rapprochement and unity contingent on Nazareth's development. This point emerges especially clearly in the course of the festive inauguration of Upper Nazareth's newly constructed Town Hall in June 1964; although an invitation had been extended to the entire Nazareth City Council, only the mayor, deputy mayor and Labour party representatives on the Council attended:

Allon: Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Nazareth, Council members of

Nazareth and Upper Nazareth: These days we are inaugurating the new council building; and among the first people to extend their good wishes are the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Council members of Nazareth. I found it befitting to invite them to this festive opening to encourage cooperation between the two neighbouring authorities. I wish to make a toast to fortune, friendship, and success in everything that we intend to do.

Al Din Zu'ebi: Honoured Chairman, Deputy Mayor of Nazareth, and Council members: I am happy to participate in the inauguration of this magnificent building. I wish you much success in your endeavours to develop Upper Nazareth, but hope that Nazareth will also benefit from it. I thank you for your cooperation with us. I think that you will join us one day, although the time is not yet ripe. We will need many favours from you. I wish success to both of us.

Allon: The Mayor of Nazareth wishes to point out that the failure of the other Council members to appear today is due to a party being held in Nazareth in which these members are participating. They are said to send their blessings.
The construction of Upper Nazareth also contributes to the city of Nazareth; no one can deny this. Because the development and general prosperity of Nazareth is dependent on that of Upper Nazareth. And we will continue to work with the best of intentions.

Nadin Bad'chish [Deputy Mayor of Nazareth, Mapam]: I also extend my best wishes on the inauguration of your new Town Hall. Regarding the unification of the two local authorities into one, we cannot decide on this here and now. My personal opinion is not to join the two, but to leave them as two independent systems. But even without merging into one municipality, we can nevertheless maintain friendly relations. I would like to wish the members of your Council success in developing your place.

Cohen [Deputy chairman of the Upper Nazareth Local Council]: We have moved into a new building, but I hope this will not be our last building. The day will come when both municipalities will unite. I know this is higher policy, but I think it will be for the benefit of both Nazareths. I thank the honoured guests for accepting the invitation, but I am sorry that the other members of the Council wouldn't join us. I would like to hope that we will have another opportunity to sit together with the other members of the Council, here or in Nazareth (LC Minutes, 30.6.1964).

Regular occasions for joint rituals were Independence Day celebrations and special birthdays of Upper Nazareth. The initial structure of ritual unity embedded in them is strikingly similar to that outlined above. What deserves special attention, however, is the unique character of joint celebrations of Independence Day -- this being a national holiday -- in this *golden age* (Rabinovitch 1988) of Jewish Arab relations in the two Nazareths. There were two celebrations, one in each Nazareth, to mark this day. Understandably, the day was more of a festive occasion for the Jews and public participation was much stronger in the Jewish than in the Arab Nazareth. The celebration in Upper Nazareth incorporated military exhibitions and artistic performances (which also featured Arab folk dances) accompanied by public speeches -- including speeches by the city fathers of Nazareth. In Arab Nazareth, the occasional Israeli flag could be seen on this day outside public buildings and some private homes; and the city's leaders organised a closed celebration attended by a few hundred invited guests, including clergy and honourables of the Christian and Moslem communities and, usually, one high Israeli government official. The leaders of Upper Nazareth were not among the guests. In fact, Jewish and Arab Nazareth usually staged a third Independence Day celebration in unison, under the auspices of the Labour Councils (celebrating May 1st, Labour Day, and Independence Day in one, as the two fall close together). The structure of this Independence Day ritual nicely expresses the duality contained in the idea of a 'Jewish Nazareth' -- symbolic expressions of affiliation and unity, on the one hand, underpinned by the persistence of ethnicity as *politically* salient (two Nazareths) and the power asymmetry along ethnic/jurisdictional lines, on the other hand.

4.2.2. The Co-Production of Nazareth as a Symbol of Coexistence

Beginning with the natioual crisis preceding the Six-Day War of 1967 and continuing following Israel's victory in that war, the leadership of the two Nazareths cooperated in the production of a national symbol for coexistence between Jews and Arabs for a multiple audience: the wider Israeli public, the Western nations, and even -- as Israel, as a result of its victory, had brought a considerable Arab population under its occupation -- for the Arab population of the newly conquered territories. To be sure, ethnic competition between the two Nazareths persisted as each drove a hard bargain for material resources. But this was kept *back-stage* (Goffman 1959; 1963a), either in meetings between M. Allon and government officials behind closed doors, or between the leaders of the two Nazareths -- via higher government offices or direct communication, but always in private settings. *Front-stage* the two sides staged a play of *coexistence* and *cooperation* -- for each side had an interest in doing so: the symbol they were co-producing constituted potential currency in the advancement of *either* side's resource procurement endeavours.

Thus, in the crisis period preceding the 1967 War, the leaders of the two Nazareths organised a joint rally at which Nazareth's leadership publicly declared the city's solidarity with and loyalty to the Israeli state (Stock 1968:28; *Illon*

Nazrat, 7.7.1967). A few months following the Six-Day War, the president of Israel visited the two Nazareths and was awarded joint honorary citizenship of both (LC Minutes, 4.9.1967); and even more notable, the leaders of both Nazareths, upon the initiation of M. Allon, ventured on a joint trip "to view the battle areas, Sharm el-Sheikh, East Jerusalem, the [Gaza] Strip and the [West] Bank" and on a tour of the towns on the West Bank.[127] As Allon recalls:

> Five months after the war, we travelled as a delegation of good will to the Territories. The delegation comprised, apart from me, also Mussa Katilli and Siff Al Din Al Zu'ebi. We visited all the towns on the Bank. We met with the heads of the local authorities, with all the ex-members of [Jordanian] parliament and ministries.[128] We even visited the rural areas. We showed them how life is in Israel -- cooperation -- and especially how harmonious our life together was in Nazareth. No one harming the other.

On their tour through the West Bank, the leaders of the two Nazareths extended a joint invitation to the mayors of the conquered towns to reciprocate the visit. A "meeting of Jewish and Arab guests and hosts" in Nazareth was organised in December of the same year, attended by 'cooperationists' -- Jewish and Arab -- from different parts of Israel, except for the Occupied Territories: there were only two representatives of East Jerusalem.[129] A year later, Nazareth's mayor Mussa Katilli embarked on a lecture tour to the United States (orchestrated by an American church organisation). Katilli himself gives this account of the lecture tour:

> I spoke...about three subjects, which actually are two: the holy city of Nazareth, Israel's Arabs and the Arabs of the new Territories and about meeting them after 20 years of separation. I told the American audience about Nazareth and its various churches, about the freedom of religion and worship, and the help the Israeli government has provided in these areas.[130] I spoke about the democratic way of life we enjoy; I told them about our rights and about Arab members of parliament.

I told them especially about Upper Nazareth and our Jewish neighbours living there, about the excellent relations between us, and about the head of the Jewish Local Council, M. Allon. I mentioned the joint projects that we organised in the days of the alert preceding the Six-Day War, the joint meetings that took place at the initiation of both local governments. And I emphasized that Nazareth was only one example of the good relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel...

I am full of optimism that my visit and my explanations of the way of life in Israel will increase tourism to Israel, but particularly to our holy city of Nazareth (we will share this tourism with Upper Nazareth). I let my listeners know that the current events along the borders of Israel have no influence on tourists wishing to visit Israel and all the holy places in comfort and freedom; especially since all the important holy places are under the control of the Israeli government, so that there is no need to cross borders (*Illon Nazrat*, 7.8.1968).

The participation of Nazareth's leadership in the production of a symbol of coexistence in Nazareth soon proved rewarding to their city and to themselves. Prospective American philanthropists came to visit the Christian city to research its educational institutions and determine in which way their financial contribution would be of greatest furtherance to the city's educational system (*Illon Nazrat*, 7.3.1969). The deputy mayor, Al Din Zu'ebi, was awarded the "Fighters for the State" medal in the same month, an event celebrated -- jointly, under the auspices of the Nazareth Labour Council, and in the presence of the Northern District Administrator. The speech the deputy mayor delivered on this occasion (publicized widely in the Hebrew papers) reinforced the production of symbolic unity:

If there is anything I did to deserve this medal, I did it not for myself but for the State and my people. The force which propelled me in that direction was my deep and absolute conviction -- which I have held for a long time -- that in this area there are two sibling-peoples that must live with each other: the Arab and the Jewish people. This is in

accordance with God and a fate encoded in history. There is no force in the world that can avert this fate. And if this is so, why should we not do all in our power to live together stably and peacefully? One side complements the other, *and together we create an exemplary unity between the two noblest of peoples, the offspring of one father and grandfather [sic.]*.[131] Both of them want and have to build their lives on just and fair cooperation (emphasis added).

The leadership of Nazareth did not forget, however, to insist on *material* rewards from the Israeli government in return for their cooperation: a budget for the development of Arab Nazareth and increased government-sponsored projects such as roads, improved water- and sewage-networks, and educational facilities to match the level of government-sponsored development in Upper Nazareth (e.g. the occasion of the visit of the Minister of Finance and of Trade and Industry; see *Al Ha'Mishmar*, 7.2.1969). This was the condition, as far as the Arab side was concerned, for a possible municipal merger of the two Nazareths at some future date.

Sparked by this highly publicized co-performance between the leaderships of the two Nazareths, Nazareth indeed came to be regarded as a symbol of successful coexistence. And the respective leaders were recognized as experts in such an endeavour. For example, they were invited by the current mayor of Acre (a "mixed city") to relay to Acre's public[132] "their experience and the secret which explain the excellent relations between the two peoples in Nazareth, relations which remain 'messy' in Acre" (*Yediot Ahronot*, 10.3.1970). M. Allon was even asked informally, by a reporter of a Hebrew daily paper, whether he would be willing to stand as the head of Kiriat Arba once it would be set up, after having been complimented on what "able a director of this 'business' called Nazareth" he

was (*Yediot Ahronot*, 12.4.1970). (Allon replied: ■Although business here is good, it needs much more investment. Apart from that, I am not a piece-worker.■)

4.2.3. Rehearsing for Integration: The Liaison Between the Two Labour Councils

Mention has already been made of joint public celebrations between the two Nazareths within the framework of the two Labour Councils. But the liaisons established in this particular arena (just like those between the mayors) extended, in terms of their dimensions and significance, *far beyond the merely ritualistic and symbolic*. This was the arena in which the leadership of the two Nazareths negotiated their way towards a municipal merger by means of socio-economic and cultural exchanges which each side deemed a necessary preliminary for any future integration. Indeed, this role seems to have been attributed to this particular institution in the national leadership's vision of a Jewish Nazareth -- in accord with the Labour Zionist ideology. The Histadrut Central Committee conveyed congratulations upon the opening of a local Labour Council in Upper Nazareth:

> The establishment of a Hebrew Kiriah in Nazareth could be one of the solid foundations of proper relations between Jews and Arabs in the area; a bridge for good neighbourliness, mutual understanding and aid. The Labour Council plays the most crucial role in the development of such relations. Within the framework of the Histadrut, residents of Nazareth will meet more and more with Jewish residents of Nazareth, workers just like them, both having a common interest: the expansion and development of the place. This will cause them [the residents of Nazareth] to listen less to the propagandists preaching hate and

destruction and the dangers of foreign interests...The renewed Hebrew flourishing in the Nazareth mountains has a special significance and it is of vital importance that this be accompanied by unity, good will, and special responsibility (reprinted in *Ilon Nazrat*, September 1958:3).

And this is precisely the role M. Allon attributed to the local, Arab and Jewish, Histadrut branches.

Upper Nazareth came to the bargaining table with offers of local employment opportunities for Nazareth residents in the newly established factories of Upper Nazareth,[133] and with demands that the Arab side open up its employment sectors -- notably tourism and transport[134] -- to residents of Jewish Nazareth. Nazareth, on the other hand, was able to offer not only these desired employment opportunities, but also a large labour force -- on which the industries of Upper Nazareth and further development of this sector did then and does to this day, let it be emphasized, depend very heavily. What it demanded in return was access of the Nazareth labour force to *all* positions -- including skilled and higher-salaried jobs -- that were opening up in Upper Nazareth; indeed, that equal job consideration be given to all workers of the two Nazareths (rather than, as is standard procedure for administratively independent localities and their Labour Councils, favouring residents from within the locality and turning towards the external labour market only where positions cannot be filled locally -- usually unskilled and underpaid jobs).

The Jewish leadership -- national as well as local -- sought to gain as much as possible while giving up as little of Upper Nazareths's autonomy and resources as possible in the bargaining process. In September 1966, the Secretary of the

Histadrut Central Committee initiated the first of a series of four joint sessions between the two Labour Councils in preparation of the establishment of an umbrella council (the initiative originated from the Central Committee).[135] The idea underlying the creation of an umbrella council was, according to the Secretary, "to direct, coordinate and unify the activities of the two Labour Councils on a professional, social and cultural plane; in preparation for an all-encompassing integration of the two towns" (Rappaport 1968). But why settle for an umbrella organisation rather than achieve an outright merger, one is tempted to ask.

This is precisely the question which preoccupied the secretary of the Nazareth Labour Council, George Za'ad, who vehemently opposed the idea. He had his doubts as to the reciprocity and equality it would entail in actual fact. Who, or rather, which side was to control the umbrella organisation ultimately? And what precisely was to be the difference between the proposed umbrella council and the standing tradition of informal cooperation and negotiation between the two Labour Councils? If equal power and resource sharing was indeed the intention, why not *formally* merge, and not only the two Labour Councils, but the *municipal authorities* (which would automatically join all other institutions)? In George Za'ad's words:

> The best solution would be the unification of the two local authorities. This unification would bring about the integration of all institutions (including the Labour Councils). In this event, there would be one Employment Exchange which would have to supply Arabs as well as Jews with work in the factories developing in Upper Nazareth and set an end to the current situation where residents of the Lower Nazareth receive left-over jobs in Upper Nazareth. The 'worst' thing

that could happen [in the event of municipal integration] is tight cooperation -- economically, socially, culturally -- between the two towns. It would lead to the full integration of the two communities. On the other hand, the imposition from above of an artificial umbrella organisation ... how, I wonder, would this umbrella council resolve the two conflicting interests [conflicting as long as there are two separate towns] of the Labour Councils? Or rather, whose interests would win out? (Cited in Rappaport 1968)

Upper Nazareth's leadership, on the other hand, fully favoured the idea of an umbrella council, arguing that the unification of the Labour Councils (the pseudo-unification, that is) would have to precede a full-blown municipal merger, as a pilot project, so to say. They objected to a full merger on the grounds (as was made quite clear in the local paper [ibid.]) that an umbrella council would allow the continued operation of separate Employment Exchanges, discriminatory resource allocation along ethnic lines would still be possible, yet would institutionalize a liaison through which Upper Nazareth could pursue access to Arab Nazareth economically and -- of utmost importance to the Jewish side -- ideologically. For the latter, given the power asymmetries at the macrolevel and the resource inequalities at the microlevel, the Jewish side was obviously the best equipped. As Upper Nazareth's Labour Council secretary and Deputy Chairman of the LC explained to the Jewish audience via the local paper (Rappaport 1968):

The imperative created by the particular location in which our town finds itself, and the specific aims and problems it has had, warrant the establishment of such an umbrella council. This can aid the mutual understanding of the two peoples and the progress and development of the area. *This organisation can be a spring board for the creation of a Greater Nazareth -- a great city and metropolis in Israel.* One cannot connect municipal unification with unity at the level of the Histadrut [answer to George Za'ad's opinion on the issue]...Histadrut representations existed prior to the two towns, even before there existed a Local Council in Upper Nazareth. What does this mean? *It is clear that the unification of the labour institutions must precede the*

unification of the local authorities. The establishment of an umbrella council will not, however, annu* the necessity for two separate Employment Exchanges. But the issue of employment is not the main area of operation, in any case. The umbrella will have to operate in the areas of culture, language learning, sports and various courses that will raise an awareness of each people's specific concerns and problems; and from this will arise the recognition of the complicated nature of the State of Israel's problems (emphases added).

This umbrella council was, indeed, a preamble to a municipal merger as the Jewish side envisioned it: Arab workers would be familiarized with Zionist values and political ethnicity (on the Arab side) would be defused. It would gradually prepare the Jewish population ideologically for a merger, something that could not be taken for granted: witness the concern shown by the Upper Nazareth leadership (above), and the occasional concerned letters to the local newspaper[136] -- expressing a basic mistrust of the Other's trustworthiness (loyalty to the Zionist establishment) and worry over the equal sharing of Jewish resources with a needy and resource-hungry Other.

In any event, the steadfast opposition of the Arab side left the umbrella idea stillborn. Even so, the two Labour Councils continued their liaisons: informal bargaining, joint public ceremonies and celebrations. They even began to organise lectures, social meetings and cultural events that brought together workers from Jewish and Arab Nazareth (although, according to Jewish workers' recollections, these events rarely attracted more than up to two dozen participants from Upper Nazareth's grassroots).

The Histadrut liaison, from the point of view of Upper Nazareth's leadership, aimed at a working rapport not only with Nazareth's political and

cultural élite but, equally important, also with Arab workers. For they had to be reckoned with as a political force able to either thwart or facilitate, by means of their votes in the municipal elections, a municipal merger *such as Allon had in mind*: it would be a merger based on a party-political (Labour Zionist) majority instead of an ethno-demographic, Jewish majority. At the very least it would mean that Arab voters were to be diverted from the anti-Zionist, Communist Party, an ever-present serious competitor for the Arab votes, and brought into/kept within the ranks of the Zionist parties; their votes might even be solicited for a Zionist Labour Party whose list was ethnically integrated, featuring a Jewish candidate in second position, albeit with access to mayorship via a rotation agreement. In other words, via the Histadrut connections, M. Allon was informally campaigning among the Arab population of Nazareth for support not only of a merger but of himself as possible mayor.

What Allon promised to the Arab electorate was quite a slice of the cake that was Upper Nazareth. First and foremost was employment in Upper Nazareth's factories which meant that the residents of Nazareth would no longer have to commute daily the long distances to factory jobs in Haifa, Acre and even Tel Aviv. The positive stand taken by the Upper Nazareth leadership, aided by the national newspapers, regarding the employment of Arab workers in Upper Nazareth's industries became as much a part of this campaign effort as it had constituted, in the initial years of Upper Nazareth's establishment, a way of legitimating Jewish land requisitions and the penetration of the Arab and Christian city. (In both instances one kept quiet about the underside of the

employment of Arab labour -- that pointed to by the Nazareth Labour Council secretary.) Here are a few examples of the overcommunication of this issue of Arab labour; and examples abound, particularly in the period between 1964-1971. They are all by Allon:

> Workers from nearby and not so nearby villages in the area -- from Reina, Kfar Kanna, Ein Mahil, Yafia, Iksal -- are today employed in Upper Nazareth. In addition, of course, to the countless workers from Nazareth who have found employment there since the settlement was founded.[137]

> The hesitance and doubts [of the Arab population] around the time the new town was established in such close proximity [to Nazareth] were understandable. But over time it has become clear [to the Arab residents] that with the neighbouring Jewish town came a blessing. What more can I say than that it brought with it industry? And it became unnecessary for a sizeable portion of the residents [of Nazareth] to travel to Haifa and other faraway places to find work. In fact, one third of the work force from the city of Nazareth work "up the hill" [Le Mala, in Upper Nazareth] (in Benkler 1969).

> The number of Arab workers employed in Upper Nazareth's industries has risen to 1,500, a third of them commuters from eastern Galilee villages, the rest from the city of Nazareth, There is not one among the 80 factories in our town which does not employ Arab workers. In the textile plant they account for half of the work force.[138]

4.2.4. Partners in Business with Nazareth's Symbols: The Leader of

Upper Nazareth and the Christian Clergy

Integration between the two Nazareths at the economic level, as Allon envisioned it, was to take the form of a neat division of labour along ethnic boundaries. Upper Nazareth would concentrate and develop industries and be the seat of regional government offices, and Lower Nazareth would retain and develop its current status as a commercial centre. In fact, upon first visiting Upper Nazareth one is struck, by comparison with other towns in Israel, by the absence of a commercial centre; this gives Upper Nazareth very much the character of a residential suburb of the city of Nazareth, regardless of its extensive land area and considerable population size. The residents are quite aware of the aberration their town constitutes in this respect: in all of my encounters with people of Upper Nazareth, during the first months of my fieldwork (in which people were kind enough to brief me thoroughly on where to go and whom to approach for this or that basic need) this aspect was always identified and explained to me. The explanations, interestingly enough, excluded that part of the town's history responsible for its current layout; the idea of a *metropolis* is there, but not in conjunction with the Arab and Christian Other but, rather, in conjunction with two other Jewish settlements forming a triangle with Upper Nazareth south-east and south of Nazareth: Afula and Migdal Ha'Emeq. For example. one of the employees of the local Immigrant Absorption Centre, who came in 1965 from the United States and whose job it is now to brief all new immigrants settling in

Upper Nazareth on the ins and outs of the town, explained to me while giving me directions regarding shopping:

> You will notice that this town has no town centre -- it's not a town like all the other towns in Israel, in many respects. Instead, you have four small shopping areas dispersed all over the place. You'll find there most of the things you need, and what you really can't find you'll get down in Nazareth [she points out the four shopping areas on the map of Upper Nazareth, 1982 edition -- which has no part of Nazareth on it]. You see, when they planned this town, they had this idea that it would form a *huge* metropolis stretching out to Afula and Migdal Ha'Emeq, so they didn't think that this town here needed a centre! But that never happened; so now it seems like an odd town.

Shops and businesses, then, were to be concentrated in the Arab city. The third economic base of a United Nazareth, tourism, was to be divided between the two Nazareths: the ancient city inalienably owned the symbols that attracted tourists from all over the world; but Jewish Nazareth would market Nazareth's symbols and provide (and control) the secular modern infrastructure for the thousands of tourists that could be expected every year. Allon's plans for the development of tourism were grandiose: high-rise hotel complexes, restaurants -- and a cable-car from the Mount of Precipice, from which Jesus is said to have leaped to escape his persecutors, via Upper Nazareth, from where pictures could be taken of Nazareth, to Mount Tabor. Ownership and control of these enterprises was to be concentrated in Jewish hands, shared between Upper Nazareth's "Development Corporation"[139] -- tellingly named "The Corporation for the Development of Upper Nazareth and Nazareth" -- and national and private investors.[140] All of these plans faltered eventually due to a lack of seriously interested outside investors who often withdrew in the last minute.

Allon concentrated on the worldwide marketing of tourist Nazareth, and for this end he sought to recruit the assistance of the 'gate-keepers' of the symbols of Nazareth: the Christian clergy. Rather than leaving to chance the number of tourists coming to visit Nazareth every year, and the precise season of their visit and duration of their stay, Allon favoured a planned approach: for example an Easter package-deal promoted by the church leaders of Nazareth and, ultimately (he hoped), by the Pope. Here he had in mind that the Pope would declare Nazareth a Christian pilgrimage site during Holy Week. The local churches were to organise a special programme amounting to a Passion Play in Nazareth, and Upper Nazareth would provide accomodation and arrange short tours of Nazareth's environs, including a cable-ride to Mount Tabor.

The first of the denominational communities mobilized on behalf of this idea was the Roman Catholic. Its leaders were in favour and willing to make a request to the Pope during his forthcoming visit to Jerusalem and Nazareth at the end of 1963. The reception committees to welcome and host the new pontiff (Paul VI) were appointed by a special government committee; for Nazareth the committee appointed two Jews (representatives of the regional government: the Northern District Administrator and the Adviser on Arab Affairs), three Christians (clergy of the three Catholic denominations) and one Moslem (the mayor of Nazareth). Having a vested interest in meeting with the Pope in order to chair the presentation of the request for a decree, Allon successfully pressured for his own inclusion on the reception committee -- "Does the government intend to show the city of Nazareth as a city without Jews?", was the logic he applied (LC Minutes, 8.1.1964). This is how Allon reminisced about his plans:

We [the Catholic clergy and I] thought we should get a decree from the Pope making Nazareth the centre of the Christian world once a year -- on the 24th of March, the Day of Annunciation. I tell you, if such a decree could have been issued...! Okay, it would have been only the Catholics who would have been drawn here; but I thought the same could be done with the Orthodox, only there it's a bit more complicated, because the Orthodox Church doesn't have one head. Now, if the Pope could have just said something like, "It is desirable for every true believer to be in Nazareth on that day," it would have brought here [Nazareth], I would say, a few hundred thousand visitors or more. And I had in mind that they come here with a programme, covering three or five days -- everything would have been pre-planned: on Easter there would have been a play of church music and performances, special services and so on. And then trips to Mount Tabor -- another one of my ideas was to have Upper Nazareth connected with the Mount of Precipice and Mount Tabor via cable-car. A man from Switzerland, the same man who designed the cable-car up to Masada, was willing to build it. So, you know that the Pope -- Paul VI -- visited Nazareth?! I was on the reception committee; and there and then we brought it up, that we think that Nazareth ought to play a much more significant role in the Christian world, and that this would also help the city to develop. But the answer was...there was no answer; not then, and not later.

So then we tried to push the idea ahead without a decree. We approached all the other [denominational] communities; and the Franciscans, who were important since they own the Church of Annunciation. They were also in favour. They promised us help. And when, a few years later, a meeting of all the bishops from all over the world took place here in Nazareth, I approached them in the church. I told them about the idea of Old Nazareth, New Nazareth, integration of the two, the need to develop the place, and so on. The idea was to get their help. But...with the churches it's not so easy. It would have taken a much longer struggle, and one has to press persistently. Ultimately, it is a Christian decision.

M. Allon's rapport and alliances with the Christian clergy -- in one of the holiest of Christian cities -- also brought him the confidence of and acceptance by the Christian residents of Nazareth. Via Histadrut and the provision of

employment in industry, Allon appealed to the working class, largely Moslem Arab. Via church leaders and the development of commerce and the tourist industry, he appealed to the middle and upper classes of the Arab city. In fact, electoral support for Allon in Nazareth in the event of municipal integration that would supersede the support which "any Arab running for a non-Communist party" could expect -- as much had been promised to Allon, he says, by a Christian Arab notable of Nazareth -- was largely based among the Christian Arab population. It is with this section of Nazareth's population that Allon cultivated more frequent and intensive personal ties, he himself concedes, some of which have lasted to this day.

4.3. Upholding Ethnic Territoriality: Place as Ethnic Boundary Marker

4.3.1. Building Neighbourhoods in Upper Nazareth for Assimilated Arab Others of Nazareth

Much more remarkable than the opening up of Upper Nazareth's labour market, primarily in construction and industry, to Nazareth residents and other Arab workers -- after all, Upper Nazareth heavily *depended* on Arab labour in these areas -- was Allon's cautious policy of gradually opening up Upper Nazareth

as a residential area to people from Nazareth, even if ethnic-residential segregation within Upper Nazareth's limits continued to be maintained strictly. While at the beginning of Upper Nazareth there was talk about building a Jewish "neighbourhood" of Nazareth, by the end of 1969 the talk was about building an Arab neighbourhood within Jewish Nazareth.

In 1968/69, a housing complex for "minority members" was constructed by the Ministry of Housing's Minority Department -- on top of Djab el-Sich, adjoining the Permanent Army neighbourhood to the west.[141] The complex consisted of twenty-four two-storey buildings containing 114 spacious apartments. To be sure, these apartments were allocated to a very specific category within the Arab population, namely, those Israeli Arabs that had served in the Israeli army -- a category regarded by the Jewish population of Upper Nazareth, today, in any case, as less 'Arab' and relatively unproblematic. Among them are most frequently Druze, Circassians, and Bedouins, but also Christian Arabs who volunteered their services and were accepted following a thorough security check.[142] For an Israeli Arab to join the Israeli Army has constituted, in the view of Jewish Israelis, the pithiest demonstration of his acceptance of and even loyalty to the Jewish state.

A striking inversion of the headlines proclaiming the establishment of a Jewish Nazareth ten years earlier appeared in the newspapers; then it had been "Jews move to Nazareth," now it was "Arabs move to Upper Nazareth." The message was constructed laudatorily, as good news:

Upper Nazareth is to have an Arab quarter. Some Nazareth Arabs already live within the local council area of the Jewish town [reference to the residents in the Kramim neighbourhood and the Arab-owned houses left standing on Djab el-Sich], and their number will now grow upon the completion of the new housing project...near the municipal boundary between the two towns.

The project has the blessing of the Housing Ministry and is intended for ex-servicemen who have served in the minority units, and for young couples. Many Arabs are keen on living in a Jewish-run local authority, because of its superior standard of municipal services (*Jerusalem Post*, 25.7.1969).[143]

All the various concerns and interests of the Jewish leadership identified in the preceding argument, pivoting around problems of legitimation, contributed to this apparent breach in the ethnic territorial division -- which, up to this point, had been created and safeguarded regardless of cost and effort. But a significant additional consideration (at this particular stage in the relations between the two Nazareths *en route* to integration) was certainly the necessity to demonstrate good will and sincerity on the Jewish side, especially towards those Arab residents willing not only to tolerate the Jewish state but to 'assimilate'. The Jewish leadership clearly realized, and some of the national leaders were apparently of the same mind, that relations between the two Nazareths had now reached a stage where the population of the Arab city could be considered seriously as a potential electorate for a United Nazareth. Nevertheless, the kind of municipal merger the Jewish leadership was willing to risk would have, all indications suggest, involved an umbrella council (similar to that considered for the two Labour Councils); retaining, in fact, Jewish control over Jewish Nazareth. This meant residential segregation; that is to say, just as the Jewish leadership upheld

a principle of ethnic territoriality in the face of the alleged "blending of the two Nazareths into one employment area," so, too, it was going to uphold ethnic territoriality, literally, with respect to and in the light of residential integration: there were to be separate neighbourhoods for Arab residents of Upper Nazareth, and strict controls over the numbers and the kind of Others allowed to move in. I asked M. Allon about the apparent paradox of trying to open up Upper Nazareth to Arab residents while the guiding motto was still a *Jewish* town of Nazareth and intense and costly efforts had been expended (money spent on legal battles, but also legitimation lost) in the initial phase of building Upper Nazareth in order to clear the area of Arab tenants. His answer is revealing of the logic fuelling residential integration:

> The idea then was that if there was to be a United Nazareth, especially since a sizeable number of families from Nazareth expressed demands to live in Upper Nazareth, [Upper Nazareth had to integrate residents from Nazareth]. Look, the point is: We *did* worry about [people from Nazareth moving into Upper Nazareth]; and we thought that this 'child' [Jewish Upper Nazareth] ought at least to be able to stand on its own feet before we would risk something like this. Later on one can't *stop* this from happening in any case. One could only stop it in the beginning; one builds something and tries to protect it. Until we became a civil body. Once we became a civil body, we couldn't prevent it any longer. No place in Israel can be closed to anyone!

> I tell you, I grew up in Jaffa, with Arab neighbours. I played with Arab children as I played with Jewish children. We were living on the border between what now is Tel Aviv and Jaffa. I also studied Middle Eastern Studies; in a way I am an Orientalist. And I have always believed that, whatever will be, Jews and Arabs will have to live with each other in the Middle East, that *we* are certainly not going to throw *the Arabs* into the sea! We will have to live with the Arabs. And it is also a matter of small distance, as you know: it isn't far from Jerusalem to Jericho. And the right to live where one wants to live is important. In the event of a *real* peace, political borders would no longer constitute limits [to population migration]. I tell you a story to show what I mean:

A long time ago, after 1967, I travelled the Territories with a man who today is the Deputy Prime Minister of your country [Canada]; then he was Minister of Transport...We visited Ofra -- that's one of the first, if not *the* first Jewish settlement to be built. We met a lady who was a member of the *Gush Emunim*[144] secretariat. We discussed the situation, and she told him, "You know, Shimon Peres was the Minister of Defence when we settled on our land. He gave us permission; because it is important for the defence of Israel that we stay here, live here, build here." Now, he asked her a question: "Tell me, if there were a possibility for real peace, and you would end up living under Jordanian rule, would you leave?" She said, "I? No! I will stay! Because for me the important thing is not the flag. What is important to me is the right to live and settle where my forefathers lived. My forefathers didn't live in Tel Aviv, Bat Yam, Herzliya. The base of our forefathers is here!" The point is, in the event of real peace, one pays less attention to where this or that canton is, as long as there is a political arrangement. Meaning, no border should prevent families from settling and living where they like.

researcher: You are talking now about "cantons," about Jewish "cantons" in a presumably Jordanian state, the way I understand it [which implies that unlike the Gush Emunim woman claims, flags would be important]. And you are comparing the opening up of Upper Nazareth to people of Nazareth with opening up the Territories to Jewish settlements. A necessary trade-off, it seems. But surely it would matter if another flag was raised within Israel [proper]...?

Allon: It matters. Of course it matters!

researcher: ...so while we are talking about Jewish "cantons" across the line, I don't think many Jewish Israelis would agree to "cantons" -- Arab "cantons" -- inside Israel. In fact, Upper Nazareth is, I believe, part of an effort to prevent the formation of such a canton in Galilee; and as far as I can judge from my data, flags and boundaries played a very important role throughout the effort to unite the two Nazareths, and certainly when Upper Nazareth opened up to Arab residents. [The Arabs had to accept the Israeli flag.]

Allon: You are right, of course...You see, both sides have to be ready for real peace; that's a slow process. And meanwhile, one of course protects oneself. So, my idea at the time was -- and I worked for it and was successful in it -- to build *within* the boundaries of Upper Nazareth an Arab neighbourhood. That's right. I just said to myself, "the area

belongs to us; maybe tomorrow we can enlarge the municipal area of Nazareth [means Upper Nazareth] -- not toward Nazareth [the ancient city], but further into Galilee, and there we will have an Arab neighbourhood." I figured, the only thing we have to do is to provide an answer *to* the problems that arise; and we *knew* that there were, in the Arab community, problems with housing, because there was a shortage of land: newly-weds having nowhere to live because the land area [of Nazareth] is so small and crowded! To help them with that. They are also Israeli citizens. So, I started with that when the head of the Ministry of Labour was of the Mapam, and he fully accepted my idea. "I am going with you," he said, and he did.

researcher: This is not quite clear to me. You obviously deemed it important that Jews and Arabs live in separate neighbourhoods. But what about numbers and political representation? I assume that these Arab residents became part of the Upper Nazareth electorate? Did you never worry about maintaining Jewish control over the Local Council? If there was such a demand among the Nazareth population for housing in Upper Nazareth, and you were planning to meet...[Allon interrupts]

Allon: Look, I told you already! Sooner or later you can't stop this anyways. *The point is that you can't keep any town Jewish in the long run -- unless we start behaving like South Africa!* I can tell you...I *was* aware...Let me put it this way. 'Upper Nazareth', for the Arab population, meant: it has a nice view, the climate is more pleasant -- because it's on top of the mountain. In the old days, they lived in Lower Nazareth because they had to hide in the valley from the winds and rains and the cold. But when there stood a modern settlement, modern housing with gas and electricity to warm up your flat, then they started to think of things like a view and more wind for relief from the heat in summer. It was clear that sooner or later they would ask to live there. And, of course, since it is a democratic country, they will ask for the right of political representation. That's fine, as long as it will not be on a nationalist basis -- *that* is a different picture altogether! What one has to do, and this is what I worked for, is do whatever possible to bring them into your own party. Because any party that is ethnically separate will become a nationalistic party, even if it isn't so in the beginning. Take the Communist Party! So, if I had run for election in Nazareth,[145] I would have done it on this basis: I would have convinced many Arabs to vote for a party that gives a seat to an Arab on its list. Under no circumstances a separate Arab list! (Emphasis added)

researcher: Now we are talking about one electorate for the two Nazareths.

Allon: Yes. That was the major idea I pursued!

4.3.2. Backstage Ethnic Competition: The Cases of Control over Land and Urban Transport

A major thread running throughout my analysis of the dialogue and alliances across ethnic/municipal boundaries has been the concomitant persistence of ethnic competition and territoriality, the struggle on each side to retain (and, if possible, to extend) control over crucial and scarce resources. I will now look at this struggle -- conducted even while both sides seemed to be heading for integration -- in respect to land areas and urban transport.

What is at issue is that particular stretch of land on the southern tip of each Nazareth. I have already described Jewish strategies for its acquisition, and will therefore pay now particular attention to Arab responses. A feature of special interest is the way the two sides manage what is, in fact, a dispute while yet maintaining a working rapport. The contenders, in this instance, are the municipal leaders on either side. As if to avoid disruption, the matter of land ownership is hammered out, somewhat unseemingly yet diplomatically, via the issue of the establishment of a petrol station on the disputed land.

As early as 1061, the Upper Nazareth local authority -- then still the IC --

applied to the Israel Land Administration for permission to survey a plot of land within the controversial area for the purpose of establishing a petrol station; this was granted (IC Minutes, 25.4.1961). A year later, the IC requested a building license from the Ministry of the Interior's Galilee City Building Committee, and this, too, was issued. Upper Nazareth's development corporation immediately began preparations of the site; however, half a year later, the Northern District Administrator revoked the license. The Nazareth city council had brought to his attention that the station was actually being set up on land belonging to the jurisdiction of Nazareth. The development corporation -- or, rather, the IC, as the driving force behind the project -- was asked to apply to the Nazareth municipality for a building permit. This the Upper Nazareth local council initially refused to accept, approaching instead the Israel Land Administration for a clarification of land ownership rights; but the Land Administration confirmed the ruling. It was only then that the leadership of Upper Nazareth approached the municipal leaders of the Arab city with the request for a building license.

The Nazareth municipality refused the request on the grounds that the agent of all of Nazareth's petrol stations had recently applied for a license to set up another station precisely where Upper Nazareth insisted it must build its first. As the agent threatened with a strike unless his request for a license was met, the Nazareth municipality saw itself under pressure, it argued, to grant the license to him.

M. Allon personally approached the agent, in an effort to reach an agreement with him. Following lengthy negotiations that stretched into 1968, the

agent proved cooperative, applying for the license on behalf of Upper Nazareth's development corporation, in return for one-third of the shares in the future station. But his application to the Nazareth municipality now, too, received a negative response. It was argued that for technical reasons a petrol station could not be built on this particular plot of land. But by this time the IDF had set up a plant on tracts of land within the disputed land area, and M. Allon was successful in soliciting highest government levels, carried on parallel to the promotion of the petrol station project, for the incorporation of the plant and land surrounding it.

As if to underline a point, the Nazareth municipality, for its part, proceeded in 1969 to grant a building license to a group of Nazareth residents for a garage and a petrol station on land wedged in-between the part of the southern area which Upper Nazareth had succeeded in appropriating and the IDF army base at the southern tip of Nazareth, toward which Upper Nazareth was striving to extend. On the Jewish side, it seems quite pertinent to note that Upper Nazareth, once its efforts to build a petrol station on Nazareth land were thwarted, remained without its own station until 1977, all previous claims as to the urgency of the matter notwithstanding.[146]

Ethnic territoriality showed itself in the raw, as it were, in the sphere of urban transport. Here the contenders were the leadership of Jewish Nazareth and the national transport corporation *Egged*, on the one side, and private, Arab-owned bus companies of Nazareth, on the other. Various issues were at stake. Public transport was the only sphere with respect to affairs internal to Upper Nazareth over which the local Jewish leadership had little to no control: control

lingered in the hands of Arab Others from Nazareth. Among all other Jewish local authorities and municipalities in Israel, only Upper Nazareth depended on an Arab Other; and on an Arab Other, at that, which it intended to control economically and politically. Jewish control in this particular sphere was consequently given high priority, but this was more than a matter of ideology. Should plans have been realized to turn Nazareth into a metropolis and the Northern District capital, as well as a major tourist centre, considerable economic benefits would have accrued. Indeed, linking Nazareth to the national public transport network, by way of frequent and diverse intercity connections and the establishment of a central bus depot, was a prerequisite for the realization of such plans.[147]

It all began when Upper Nazareth was established, and Kiriat Nazeret consisted of merely a handful of apartment blocks. The first settlers, in particular new immigrants lacking private transportation, depended on public transport to reach the city of Nazareth in order to do their shopping. Even before the first Jewish settlers arrived, the IC approached Egged about a new bus route -- and with Jewish drivers -- to connect the Kiriah with the city of Nazareth. But Egged declined the request on the grounds that such a line would be unprofitable (IC Minutes, 2.10.1956).

In Nazareth, public transportation, internal as well as a large part of intercity services, had remained in the hands of three private bus companies following the establishment of the Israeli state. They had, in the words of the current director of one of Nazareth's bus companies, constituted "the national

transportation corporation of Palestine" during the pre-state period, serving all the major urban concentrations, Jewish and Arab. But after the establishment and operation of Jewish national corporations in the post-1948 period, Arab-owned companies were curtailed -- service rights for many lines were withdrawn and/or they were unable to compete. By 1956, one of the three companies was bought out by the remaining two, *Affifi* and *G&B Tours*. These, however, stood their ground in the Supreme Court as regards their monopoly in the city of Nazareth and their exclusive rights to serve several routes connecting Nazareth with surrounding villages and northern towns and cities. Eventually they even obtained subsidies from the Ministry of Transport.

When the Jewish "neighbourhood" of Nazareth was established, the two companies were only too willing to extend their services to the Kiriah, even at a time when it consisted merely of three blocks. The Jewish Kiriah's leadership could hardly object to this at a time when Jewish companies refused to serve the settlement; but they regarded it as a temporary solution, and attempted to negotiate with the bus companies the hiring of Jewish drivers, preferably from within the Kiriah.

By 1963, when Upper Nazareth was about to become a Local Council and had thousands of residents, Egged applied to the IC for licenses to run five routes between Upper Nazareth and other towns and cities, via Nazareth: Afula, Migdal Ha'Emeq, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Tiberias. The IC granted the licenses. With respect to the routes to Tiberias, Haifa and Migdal Ha'Emeq, Egged, in fact, began to operate a service parallel to that by the Arab company G&B Tours. Unofficially

it now also provided transportation within Upper Nazareth and between the two Nazareths, as each of the intercity lines (when collecting passengers from or dropping them off in Upper Nazareth) crossed the town and, without exception, drove via Lower Nazareth.

A vicious competition between the Jewish, national and the Arab, private company resulted; initially it was carried out on the roads: the two were outbidding each other in terms of bus fares, drivers haggling over fares with Jewish passengers waiting at the bus stops "as if at the *shuk* [Middle-Eastern outdoor bazaar]," and in terms of efficiency, amounting to "life-threatening races" up and down the mountain, to Haifa (where a considerable number of the Jewish residents were employed) and back. In 1964, Egged applied officially for a license from the Upper Nazareth Local Council to serve the Jewish town (which was granted). At this point the Arab bus companies took the matter to the Supreme Court.

The legal battle continued for years and has flared up again and again. It is still unresolved (Upper Nazareth's leadership still continues to contest the Arab company's rights whenever opportune moments arise). The court ordered the Minister of Transport to annul the licences which the LC issued to Egged to serve Upper Nazareth internally, ordered Egged to stop serving as an internal transport system also informally, and that the routes on which the two sides duplicated each other's services be divided up between them, the Arab company (G&B Tours) receiving 17 routes, Egged receiving 14.[148] The Minister of Transport initially refused to implement the orders, as the two concerned parties did not

accept the decision (each side insisted on a monopoly); it was only once the Supreme Court issued an injunction against the Minister personally that transport in and around Nazareth was regulated in accordance with the court's orders.

At this stage Upper Nazareth's leadership took it upon itself to oust the Arab bus company from its monopoly over the routes internal to the Jewish town. (Apparently, at a much earlier date, the then Transport Minister and Minister of the Interior[149] had informally promised M. Allon that Jewish Nazareth was to make its own decisions regarding the desired internal transport system.) It began to bombard the Ministry of Transport with complaints about the quality of service it received from the Arab bus company, claiming the latter was unable to meet the demands of the town and as a result caused serious disorders.[150] Simultaneously, the leadership agitated the local population against the bus company by providing it, via the local newspaper, with "hard facts" that the Council said it had collected regarding the infrequency and unreliability of bus arrivals; the newspaper articles urged people to communicate their "unbearable transport plight" to the Minister of Transport, who was informed by the LC that was becoming increasingly difficult to "keep the local population under control" and "avoid public demonstrations caused by their dissatisfaction with the local transport situation."[151] The Minister, however, made his own enquiries: finding the services provided by the Arab company satisfactory, indeed outstandingly so; thus he refused to take action against it. The LC proceeded to take the Minister to court, but lost the case.

Upper Nazareth had to reconcile itself to being served by an Arab bus

company from Nazareth.[152] And the company, despite all efforts of the Jewish leadership, using the Histadrut connection with Nazareth, remained adamant in its refusal to hire Jewish drivers. One of the interesting aspects of this struggle over the control of public transportation in the Jewish town and between the two Nazareths is that the leadership never resorted to the use of ethnicity as a symbolic resource; neither with the current Minister of Transport nor with the Jewish public. To do so would have injured the idea of Jewish-Arab coexistence and cooperation whose production the leaders of the two Nazareths were simultaneously working on. Moreover, ethnicity -- cultural or political (cf. Deshen 1979) -- was definitely not a line of argument that could be successfully pursued in the Supreme Court. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion or gender contravenes Israel's Basic Principles.

4.4. Upholding Labour Hegemony in Upper Nazareth

4.4.1. Arab and Christian Nazareth as a Symbolic Resource in the Religious-Secular Debate

While moving in the direction of a United Nazareth, Upper Nazareth's leadership continued to stand firm against religious Jewish others. For their part, the religiously inclined, but a small minority within the population and on the Local Council, pressed to leave at least symbolic imprints of religious Jewishness on the local public culture, even if they could not broaden their political support

and influence. Allon's vision of a United Nazareth required an absolute Labour party majority on the Upper Nazareth local council and a Labour Alignment majority within the two Nazareths. Even a seemingly insignificant minority of dissenters were thus perceived as a potential threat. The unyielding refusal of the secular Labour leaders to make any sort of accommodation -- practical or symbolic -- to the religious other is remarkable in view both of Allon's alliance with Nazareth's Christian clergy (which, of course, was in the service to the realization of his vision) and of the Ministry of the Interior's expressed displeasure over, and indirect sanctioning against, such an extreme anti-religious stance. But the local Mafdal mobilized what support they could from religious others at the political centre, notably the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Religion, Torah activist camps, and even the Rabbinate. Initially they resorted to 'dirty' play as well.

In this religious-secular confrontation two aspects stand out. First, both sides tacitly expressed an agreement that *Upper* Nazareth constituted a mixed town. That is to say, religious others at no point questioned or opposed the developing fact that Upper Nazareth ceased to be a town exclusively for Jews. Their concern was rather the inclusion of traditional Jewish values and practices into the town's public culture, and their instilling among the Jewish population. The underlying premise here seems to have been that the mere physical proximity of an Arab and Christian Other was unproblematic as long as the Jewish population was securely grounded in the Jewish religious tradition. Second, although neither side perceived the Arab and Christian Other ('within the house'

in Upper Nazareth, or 'next door' in Nazareth) as a problem to Upper Nazareth's Jewishness as each defined it (in fact, each side perceived the Jewish other as more problematic or dangerous in this sense), the Arab and Christian Other was nevertheless used by both as a symbolic resource in bringing Jewish others in line. A third feature might be added, pertaining to how the two sides differentially employed this symbolic resource: the secular, Labour faction made more extensive use of it and did so legitimately and inclusively, that is, in the name of overarching principles such as "the honour of the Jewish state" or "democracy," thereby successfully creating a sense of unity among Us versus Them. If and when the religious other resorted to this very resource in counter-argument, it essentially remained within a framework of exclusivist principles meaningful only to the religious us, namely, of religious rather than nationalist principles. The proximity of the Arab or Christian Other, it should be noted, was never used in public competition for votes; rather, it was a last resource employed back-stage among local politicians and in closed Council forums.

At the very first LC meeting, the Mafdal councillor raised the issue of a new religious school to replace the "dilapidated huts" which currently served as such (LC Minutes, 23.7.1963). The request was not met, quite to the contrary: the huts were demolished but not replaced. This move was brought *post factum* before the LC for approval; it received a majority vote on the grounds that the huts "constituted a disturbing factor in our landscape" (LC Minutes, 29.12.1964). The incident triggered a religious defamation campaign against the Upper Nazareth Council, which involved insulting and threatening telephone calls and postcards to

the Council chairman as well as the distribution of libellous leaflets. The campaign apparently originated from outside the community, from the "League for Guarding Shabbat and Family Purity" (a non-local Torah activist camp).

The Mafdal councillor also raised the issue of establishing a Religious Council (RC)[153] locally: this would have also resolved the issue of establishing Jewish religious institutions within the town. Thus far, the establishment of such a body had been blocked by the consistent voting down of RC budget proposals submitted to the LC. But even in the light of defaming publicity and a stern recommendation by the Northern District Administrator that a budget finally be passed, the Labour councillors resisted: "In the name of the Leftist parties, which comprise 90 percent of the town, we refuse to approve a budget" (LC Minutes, 23.2.1964). A few months later a request by the "National Movement for Religious Women" for a religious kindergarten was again unanimously rejected by the Labour councillors (LC Minutes, 27.5.1964).

The conflict between religious and secular Zionists now assumed a schismogenetic (cf. Bateson 1968) spiral of action and counter action: thus one headed for an "explosion" of the situation. In response to the unbending resistance by the Labour leaders to even the smallest concession, the defamation campaign picked up momentum and was now clearly co-authored by *local* religious others. Personal attacks became the rule. For example, the head of the LC received a telegram from the religious school parents' committee notifying him that a decision had been reached at their latest meeting to break the windows of the chairman's house unless a religious school would be established; Mafdal

leaflets defamed as "Hellenists" the Council chairman and Labour party councillors, as well as the local Histadrut activists, indeed, the whole town; and the Local and Labour Council members each received a postcard (postmarked outside of town) suggesting that they "leave Israel, as there is no place for *goyishe* [gentile] Jews in the Holy Land." The most vicious attack, however, was levelled against the local Jewish Agency representative and Mapai councillor, Rena Eitani, making public and turning into an issue what until then constituted an open secret.[154] It was the fact that Mrs. Eitani was a non-Jew. Once out in the open, it came to the attention of the Ministry of the Interior's Population Registry Office, and Mrs. Eitani was asked to turn in her Israeli passport and appear for a hearing, as she had not, as a non-Jew, acquired Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return.[155] Her immediate response was to apply to the Rabbinical Court of Tiberias for her own as well as her children's conversion to Judaism. But as her plans became known, a local Mafdal member approached the Rabbinical Court with the recommendation that Mrs. Eitani be denied conversion, "since she objected in the last Council meeting to the establishment of a religious kindergarten, thereby clearly indicating her true feelings about the Jewish religion and sincerity to convert" (LC Minutes, 29.12.1964). The Mafdal councillor denied any personal knowledge of and involvement in the whole defamation campaign, though he insisted that ultimately the Labour people had brought it on themselves through their uncompromising stance. He promised a halt to the campaign if minor concessions were made.

But concessions to the religious others is not how the schismogenetic

development of the conflict was brought to a halt and partially reversed. This was rather the result of an intervention by the Ministry of the Interior and -- in the face of such outside attention and interference -- of Allon's resort to the Arab and Christian Others of Nazareth.

At the request of the Ministry of the Interior, a special Knesset "conciliation committee," comprised of Mapai and NRP representatives, was formed; its task was to find a solution to the conflict in Upper Nazareth agreeable to both parties in the dispute. Allon at once called a special Local Council meeting. Its purpose was to work out an agreement in advance, to be presented to the Knesset committee, "thereby avoiding giving our town a bad name throughout the country." In his opening statement at this special Council meeting, Allon successfully set the stage for the attainment of an agreement, one essentially consonant with the Labour leadership's previous stance -- by establishing a sense of Us (Upper Nazareth) versus Them (Nazareth):

> Recent events in Upper Nazareth must not interfere with the constructive and creative endeavours toward a Hebrew Nazareth. Good relations [between us] are essential to the development of this place and its good name. The development of our town is the aim of the efforts of all of us, I know. *And certainly the honour of the State and the Jewish people is dear to us all. In close proximity to us is the Arab city below. Unless we make an effort to calm down things here, we will be their laughing stock.* It is this consideration that has prevented us from taking formal actions in respect to the libels and defamations against the Local Council and Histadrut; and I think the aim of this meeting should be to do our utmost to reach an agreement and *restore the honour of our town and of the Jewish people in the eyes of the Arab city* (emphases added).

The meeting was a long one. The Labour councillors denied allegations of anti-religious bias and insisted on a public apology concerning Rena Eitani as well as

support for her intended speedy conversion; the Mafdal councillor insisted that the final agreement presented to the Knesset committee clear the local Mafdal of any active involvement in the defamation campaign,[156] remain neutral with respect to Rena Eitani's conversion and, thirdly, contain a promise that a Religious Council be set up comprised of Mafdal representatives exclusively. The final draft of the agreement shows the Labour camp victorious: it establishes the Mafdal as the party solely responsible for the deterioration of religious-secular relations, expresses the Council's full support (including the Mafdal councillor's) for Rena Eitani's conversion, and -- while making a commitment to establish a Religious Council -- guarantees 50 percent of the Religious Council's seats to Labour party representatives, a somewhat unusual arrangement. This agreement was then presented to the Knesset committee, which approved it.

Religious extremists on the national scene, disturbed by the third clause of the agreement in particular, who sought to rekindle conflict locally by organising a belated demonstration in Upper Nazareth "against the demolition of the religious school huts." One hundred and fifty demonstrators -- from Bnei Brak, Kfar Hasidim and other ultra-orthodox neighbourhoods -- are said to have arrived, but the local religious community distanced itself from the demonstration and locals -- religious as much as secular -- altogether ignored the event. The local religious faction had been persuaded, it appears, to avoid an outright and public *Kulturkampf*, and to make national unity within the community (and *vis-à-vis* Nazareth) -- an overriding interest.

A Religious Council was thus set up in Upper Nazareth, even though it had

to settle for a smaller budget than requested and Labour party members, due to their equal representation, exerted considerable influence over budget expenditures. A small structure was eventually set aside to serve as a religious school; and the Religious Council hired a ritual slaughterer (*shokhet*). Thus far the town had relied on the shokhet from the nearby town of Afula for its kosher meat supply, a Yemenite whom the local rabbi had declared *treyf* (non-kosher). The local chief rabbi had gone as far as asking the Ministry of Religion that it request from the Ministry of Defence[157] to dismiss the IC chairman unless he found an alternative shokhet. But one of the first steps taken by the Religious Council (half of which was comprised of Labour party councillors or activists) was also to dismiss the noncooperative rabbi. He was replaced by another member of Agudah Yisrael, but a personality who would turn out extremely cooperative with the Labour leadership over the subsequent decades.

The principal of the religious school, Mr. Eisenthal, persisted in imprinting local culture with religious Jewish elements, such as the public celebration of traditional festivals or the prohibition of secular public events, effectively Histadrut cultural events, on the eve of Jewish holidays. But outright and public conflict over religious issues was avoided: Eisenthal pressed his demands -- now that religious institutions were at least represented they focused around religious legislation -- in the closed forum of the Council chamber; sometimes the Northern District Administrator was approached to lend an additional voice of support to his religious demands.[158]

Histadrut activities constituted the only potential source of conflict in

respect to the local enforcement of the Shabbat Law, since industrial plants were in any case exempted from it and permitted to operate every day of the year. Upper Nazareth's public transport facilities, being Arab-owned and operated, fell outside the bounds of this law, and the town itself had practically no privately operated public entertainment facilities as well as only few commercial businesses and shops (they relied on the Arab and Christian city's businesses which were also exempt from the Shabbat Law).

The legislation of a Pork Sale Prohibition Law, on the other hand, turned into an issue. A municipal law regulating the sale of pork -- albeit with variations -- has existed in all Jewish local authorities regardless of the proportional strength of the secular Jewish population among the residents. The taboo against the consumption of pork, grounded in the Jewish religious tradition, has in fact remained a salient public ethnic boundary marker signalling Jewishness even for secular Jews in Israel. As it happens, it is a taboo shared by the significant Other in the context of Israel -- the Moslem Arab population (for whom it is also enshrined in the religious tradition), and even, to some extent, the Christian Arab population (where it has no religious basis). Those Jews among whom pork consumption is most commonly practiced regardless of the overall taboo -- and this knowledge derives from informal observations by Israelis themselves as well as by the researcher -- are the Jewish immigrants from Rumania.

Until the Mafdal addressed the issue in January of 1967, Upper Nazareth had no by-law that concerned itself with this matter. (It is a matter of public religion which according to the Local Authority Act must be regulated, but the

specific formulation of the regulation is in the hands of the local authorities.)
Initially the local leadership repeatedly averted the Mafdal councillor's request to
deal with the issue by simply avoiding its inclusion in the agenda. Only when the
LC received a recommendation by the Northern District Administrator was the
issue eventually dealt with. By this time, the LC chairman was well-prepared, it
seems, to confront religious demands to legislate a Pork Sale Prohibition Law for
the whole of Upper Nazareth's jurisdiction. Of interest is the kind of argument
each side provided in support of its stance.[159]

Backed by the other Labour councillors, Allon essentially aimed for a law
that would affect as few neighbourhoods within the municipality as possible,
rendering all others exempted "special areas." The basis for the proposed
exemptions was the principle of democracy in general, but the fact that Upper
Nazareth had a mixed, Jewish-Arab population within its boundaries in
particular:

> The management [sub]committee recommends a law which was
> drafted by the Legal Adviser which takes into consideration that within
> the area of the Council's jurisdiction there are mixed population areas,
> and is thus in accordance with point 2 of the Local Authorities Act. The
> law [as drafted] imposes the prohibition on only parts of the area in our
> jurisdiction ... *We can't discriminate against the Arab residents of*
> *Upper Nazareth* (M. Allon; emphasis added).

The Mafdal, on the other hand, pressed for a law affecting the whole area,
precisely on account of Upper Nazareth's proximity to the non-Jewish Other and
their inclusion within its boundaries -- the law was seen as an essential ethnic
identity marker for the Jewish Us, addressing Us as well as Them:

> I don't want us to get into an argument again, but I would like to

suggest that the councillors regard this law as both practical and symbolic in essence. *We know that there is an Arab population here. This only gives the law meaning beyond its explicit framework,* and the law suggested by the other councillors does not provide an answer in this respect. Such a law has, without reservations, Jewish essence. You say you don't want to harm the Arab population. What about the Jewish soul in this place? (Eisenthal; emphasis added).

The Chairman presented two petitions that the Council, he alleged, had received in protest against an all-inclusive law -- one from the Arab residents of the Kramim neighbourhood, the other from some Jewish residents. Based on the petitions he suggested that Upper Nazareth's legal adviser study and learn from the pork sale regulation laws adopted by other local authorities which also had a mixed population and Mafdal members on their councils, such as Jerusalem,[160] Tel Aviv or Haifa. The Mafdal councillor's response is telling: Upper Nazareth cannot be compared with localities in which the representation of the Arab population is high and in which they live interspersed with the Jewish population (Haifa and Acre); in Upper Nazareth, by contrast, "the Arab population constitutes a small minority and is concentrated in one area" (is there an insinuation here, one wonders, that Labour uses the "mixed population" as a pretext?). Nor can it be compared with Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, where pork-consuming "foreign diplomats have to be taken into account." And finally, "we here [in Upper Nazareth] sit beside a Christian city of significance, and we [the Mafdal] see in this law a principle of Judaism versus Christianity" (Eisenthal). But, predictably, the Labour position won. A new law was introduced which prohibited the sale of pork in only two areas of Upper Nazareth. Neighbourhoods containing the major shopping areas (for example, the *Rasco* neighbourhood and

mall) became exempted areas. Effectively, then, the new law was without practical consequences.

The Mafdal experienced a decline of its support in the 1969 Local Council elections, losing one of the two seats it had obtained in the 1965 elections. Mafdal's loss was the gain of a new political and ideological other, *Gahal*. Nationwide, the Mafdal registered a decline in local elections that year, while the General Zionists, as Gahal and *Herut* are referred to in contradistinction to the Labour Zionists, gained support. This trend has been explained in terms of multiple variables such as the gradual acquisition of legitimacy by the General Zionist parties.[161] But an analysis of voting behaviour falls outside the scope of this thesis (and it would also be beyond the competency of this researcher). Instead, my concern has been, and is, to explore how party labels created and utilized in the realm of macrolevel politics were put to use in the specific context of Upper Nazareth.

On the national level, Mafdal signalled two things: religion (and its place in Israel's public life), and alliance and cooperation with the party in power (and in control of material resources), the Labour party. Because Labour in Upper Nazareth so obdurately denied a place to anything that smacked of the Jewish religious tradition, Mafdal there signalled, quite explicitly, antagonism to and separation from the party in power.[162] Yet Mafdal promised voters development -- infrastructural as well as in terms of social services *as if* it had the necessary resources. Here the platforms of Labour and Mafdal were consonant; though there was a seemingly minor but noteworthy difference: Mafdal spoke ambiguously

about the *development of *the locality;**Labour spoke quite openly and unmistakably of *two Nazareths*. Labour's continued emphasis was upon becoming, *together with the Old City of Nazareth, the capital of the North,* from which would follow *civil service jobs providing au additional source of livelihood for the residents of the new and old towns alike: the expansion of industry and trade and their diversification through the establishment of high-tech and pharmaceutical plants, the attraction of the free professions, the expansion of wholesale and retail trade as the central suppliers of the northern part of the country, and the expansion of the tourist industry to include Upper Nazareth as well* (*Illon Nazrai Illit*, 24.10. 1969).

Finally, the General Zionists, the political other which gained representation at the expense of the Mafdal, needs to be taken into account. Data presented pertaining to this other will also be of relevance in the subsequent development of the processes under investigation.

4.4.2. Likud[163] in Upper Nazareth: A Quiescent Opposition on the Rise

Prior to the 1965 elections, the precursory parties now comprising Gahal had had the support of seven percent of Upper Nazareth's electorate -- one percent short of attaining Council representation. The ruling Labour parties had not considered them a significant other on the local political scene, and it did not

do so now that Gahal had gained two seats on the Council. For Gahal did not constitute a serious challenge to Labour hegemony or to Labour's vision of a Jewish Nazareth. This was not surprising since Gahal -- and the Liberal party before it -- had locally defined itself largely in terms of non-local, broad national issues and, in as far as local issues were touched upon, its position was hardly distinguishable from that of the ruling Labour Alignment. Nevertheless, in the 1969 elections Gahal obtained two seats at the expense of the Mafdal and the Labour Alignment. And with the same figures heading the local lists, in the 1973 elections the General Zionist list (now the Likud, an expansion of Gahal formed prior to the national elections held concurrently) gained an additional seat at the expense of the Mafdal (which failed to achieve representation on the Council altogether this time around; the support for the Labour parties decreased by .5 percent).

Nationally, the Likud (and prior to the creation of this label nationally, Gahal), in outright opposition to the ruling Labour party, advocated a liberal-capitalist economic and social platform which emphasized privatization. It also represented a fervent and uncompromising brand of Zionism which embraced an Israel beyond the Green Line[164] and one culturally deeply (albeit secularly) rooted in the heritage (*yerushah*) of the Jewish tradition. In so far as local issues were touched upon, Likud's (and Gahal's) focus too was on development, but note: on the development of *Upper* Nazareth and along lines of the *Jewish heritage and culture* (without further specification). By contrast with Labour, I said, Likud rhetorically emphasized privatization, but with this Labour, in local *practice*, did

not disagree (when it came to attracting and establishing further industries and locating investors in tourism, private or collective, public ownership was no longer an issue).

Interestingly enough, Gahal/Likud was in fact not antagonistic to Labour (though an oppositional and affrontal relationship, was, of course, contained in the label by macro-political association; but this was not spelled out or translated into local terms of reference in public rhetoric).[165] In as far as Gahal/Likud was actually practising opposition, it was in the role of 'guardian' over the proper handling of funds. In practice this implied inquiries into financial details and, on rare occasions, allegations of fund mismanagement.

Much of the meaning of a party label is intimately tied to the personalities of the leading local 'players'. Two men were especially prominent: Ya'akov Windish, or "Yanko," as he is affectionately called, had immigrated to Israel from Rumania at the time the state was established, and served as a permanent army officer in the IDF. In Rumania he had been a member of the Revisionist Zionist *Bet'har* youth movement and later he became actively involved in youth leadership. Although Yanko now rarely talks macro-politics (except when among very close and ideologically like-minded friends), those who have known him since he settled in Upper Nazareth in 1964 say that he was and, quoting his words, "always will be at heart," an ardent admirer of Menahem Begin. It was about Begin, rather than Gahal or Likud, that Yanko would speak when electioneering. The kind of people Yanko reached locally, it appears, were those whom Labour (and Allon in particular) had failed to convince. Typically, they were middle-aged

Eastern European immigrants, especially Rumanian immigrants, who, though imbued with Labour Zionist/Statist values, remained ideologically unconvinced (be they secular- or traditionally-minded); or resented Labour's authoritarianism perhaps more than the values they imposed. To Yanko's advantage were not only his own Eastern European background and alternative political thinking (he is an ardent and outspoken advocate of democracy), but very importantly his *gentle* and *sympathetic* way of dealing with people, even if these qualities are not necessarily an advantage (his admirers add) when the need arises to engage in political bargaining for the procurement of material resources for the locality.

Likud's second key 'player' and heading the party list was Yehiel Tamir, a sabra born of Moroccan parents who had immigrated to Israel prior to the establishment of the state. He owned and operated a driving school locally.[166] Tamir largely appealed to the Upper Nazareth community with North African background or origin, which gradually grew from the mid-1960s on, and there especially to the poorer strata. He himself lived among them in the Northern (the oldest) neighbourhood. Although Tamir's persona and social network *implied* 'ethnicity', at no point did he turn this into an explicit issue. Instead, he talked 'class'; as when he referred to the *development of the Northern neighbourhood* or *the poor neighbourhood* which he saw as neglected, or when he (on one of the rare occasions on which Gahal raised an issue independently in the forum of a Local Council meeting) demanded that the prices for cultural activities by the local *matnass* (Community Centre) be handled flexibly *so that all youths of the town can participate in them, and there wil no longer be discrimination between different neighbourhoods* (LC, Culture Subcommittee Minutes, 11.3.1975).

The attempt to defuse what could very well have been constructed into an explosive issue -- 'ethnicity' -- had begun with a Labour politician, the secretary of the Labour Council (since 1962) and deputy chairman of the Local Council (since 1967), M. Ariav. His strategy had been to establish *protekzia* (patron-client-type) relationships with individual residents of North African or Asian background who were respected and who maintained an extensive network of family, friends and acquaintances within their particular community. Such individuals were assured of upward mobility (and personal favours in general) in return for promoting Labour within their personal network. They came to serve as symbols of ethnic unity.

The issue of the two Nazareths or, more specifically, of their unification was never a topic of Council meetings now that Likud was a significant presence. There is only one recorded occasion on which the Likud shows a glimmer of opposition to the idea of a United Nazareth: When, in 1974, Upper Nazareth was finally about to be awarded the long-sought status as municipality and development town (its population had reached 20,000), a change in the locality's symbol befitting the new status had to be agreed upon. Tamir proposed that, at all events, the name "Upper Nazareth" be no longer inscribed in Arabic but exclusively in Hebrew. His proposal was voted down by a wide margin (LC Minutes, 30.5.1974).

4.5. Nazareth as Home For Jews: Reflecting Images of Countries Left Behind, House of Mirrors for Christian "Jews"

Piecing together a picture of how Jewish Upper Nazareans perceived and felt about their Arab Other of Nazareth and about the idea of a United Nazareth is a vastly more difficult task than examining the perceptions and attitudes of local government and Histadrut officials. Available written records make practically no reference to the subject. And among Upper Nazareans who lived through this epoch of the town's history -- and this is telling in itself -- this epoch has practically been erased from collective memory. History, in fact, has been rewritten in view of tense and antagonistic ethnic relations that preceded and followed that period: there is an almost exclusive focus on the "negative" and "radical" elements in Nazareth's history, whose public voices outcry those of the "moderates" both before and after the so-called (in the national media) "Golden Age in Jewish-Arab relations in Nazareth" (the sixties and early seventies).[167] Such historical selectivity with cognitive skipping of entire historical periods has been a prominent ideological and cultural device of the Jewish people in the process of nation-building and emplacement in their ancient-new homeland. It is therefore perhaps not so surprising to find this form of historiography also at work in respect to local histories -- where and when it serves changing realities and cultural needs.

The local historiographies and cognitive skips of a significant historical

period they contain notwithstanding, I now to reflect on the implications of 'Nazareth' for Jewish settlers' empl..cement the formation of a distinct Jewish identity.

Jewishness, in the New Israeli cultureed in Upper Nazareth, as I tried to show in the preceding chapter, was definsecular and contemporary terms, as well as, we can now add, in geographics: In the context of Nazareth a person was Jewish by way of living withi boundaries of Upper Nazareth, being Western if not European, speaking w, and signalling, either through participation in the local pioneering efforts the form of verbal commitment -- an identification with the Jewish peopl state. Two points are of special interest. First, what might ordinarily be ered the safest ethnic boundary marker (psychologically, culturally, political historically) -- Jewish religious beliefs and practices -- had in fact been selagainst and discouraged by social and economic pressures. Indeed, the less od of it in this context, the more Jewish -- in the contemporary statist deh -- a person proved to be. Yet another boundary marker of Jewishness azareth can thus be added: an adherence to Western secular ideas arologies such as modernization, development, and democracy. But -- andid -- this did not imply cultural pluralism: identification with alternative, Jewish ethnic identities remained unacceptable.

But this definition of Jewishness mhat the ethnic boundaries around the Jewish Us are porous. And this circumstances of close physical proximity to and frequent encounters with and Christian Others, and while

steps toward institutionalized integration with Them were taken. The local Jewish Labour leadership even went as far as to propagate that We consider the Arab workers of Nazareth "workers just like us." On the surface of things, in this respect the predicament of Upper Nazareans would appear similar to that of other Israeli Jews since a reliance on Arab labour and encounters with Arab bus drivers are common facts of life in Israel. But in Nazareth these encounters took on a specific and deeper meaning: because these Others actually *lived* close by; because Their and Our house were to merge, one day -- a formal merger which was already informally in place. Encouraged by the Workers' Committees and local Labour Council, work relations were not infrequently expanded upon socially, during and outside of work hours. Even if unintended, or unorganised, the Jewish people of Upper Nazareth were bound to 'run into' their Arab work mates and bus drivers outside of the situational settings of work or of driver-passenger interactions: on outings to the local park which the residents of Nazareth and other surrounding Arab villages have always frequented -- especially on Saturdays and Sundays; or on shopping trips to Nazareth which the Jews of Upper Nazareth have had the advantage of being able to venture upon even on Shabbat and Jewish festivals -- thanks to the Arabness and Christianness of the city. And thanks to an Arab-owned and operated transport system, they have also been provided with the means of doing so every day of the year. Then, too, there are the Jewish Nazareans who have been employed in factories out of town where they have found themselves with equal frequency working side-by-side not merely with Arab Others, but with Others from Nazareth: they often share the ride to and from work -- most likely relying on public transportation, but there are many

cases where co-workers from the two Nazareths arrange among themselves shared private transportation.

Even when one does not actually see the Arab and Christian Others within the boundaries of Jewish Nazareth, so one can nevertheless hear Them. Several times a day and every night Moslem prayer calls or Christian church bells, as well as Moslem prayers and Christian masses, echo through the Jewish town. They are, of course, most audible at night when many of the sounds of city life have subsided. The most impressive, in my own experience, was the sound of the trembling voice of a Franciscan priest reciting a one-hour litany every morning at 4 a.m. in the Church of Annunciation. Due to Nazareth's enclosure by mountains and Upper Nazareth's position on top of one of their ridges, sound travels and echoes exceptionally well; and the Church of Annunciation, in particular, is architecturally designed to produce a magnified and high-pitched resonance of the sounds within. New immigrants are very aware of and attentive to these sounds, even if (as was my experience) oldtimers in town no longer hear them.

Of the greatest consequences have been the visits Jews of Upper Nazareth have made -- sometimes because they had to -- "down the mountain," to the Arab and Christian city. From the very beginning of Upper Nazareth's establishment, and particularly in the beginning, its residents have had to rely extensively on the city of Nazareth for their shopping. Although several small supermarkets and numerous specialized grocery stores have opened over the years, to find cheap deals, fresh vegetable and fruit produce, and a wide selection of produce, Jewish Upper Nazareans have gone "down" to Nazareth. Moreover,

there still is no hospital in Jewish Nazareth whereas Nazareth has three -- two of them under the auspices of an international (French and Italian) Christian church organisation; so that for hospital care, too, especially for prolonged hospital stays warranting frequent visits by relatives and friends over several weeks or for treatments not requiring special medical knowledge and technology (such as uncomplicated childbirths), the people of Upper Nazareth have relied on the Arab and Christian hospitals.[168] In addition, several government offices remained in Nazareth (even though the intention had been to move them to Upper Nazareth). Among these are some with which the public has frequent dealings, such as the National Insurance Institute (*Bituach Le'umi*), the Ministry of Health and Welfare, or a central post office from which long-distance calls can be placed.

These necessary journeys into Nazareth have become subjectively associated with both risk and opportunity, and thus have spelled both repulsion and attraction. This dual experience of Nazareth arises out of two contradictions. The first of these inheres to the ancient city. 'Nazareth', in the eyes of Jewish Nazareth, spells Easternness, Arabness, backwardness and underdevelopment -- the antithesis of the new Israeli Jewish culture -- *and* at the same time Westernism, Christianity and urbanization -- in consonance with the cultural and symbolic environment of the old, European homelands these Jews had left behind (physically, at least).

The second contradiction inheres in the Jewish settlers' life histories. Many of them, and particularly the newly arriving immigrants to the Jewish homeland amongst them, found themselves in a liminal state (cf. Turner 1964) in terms of

"being-in-place" and "being-in-culture." Rootedness is the outcome of a complex interaction between place, history and culture: "Place confines experience, but experience embues place;" place grows out of and symbolizes experience (Tuan 1984; Richardson 1984:64-5). In this sense, Jews who journeyed to the ancient-new homeland were likely still to be "in-place" and "in-culture" within the homelands and hometowns they had physically left behind. This problem and paradox was potentially shared by all Jews who made aliyah to Israel, as Schweid (1985:2) observes:

> Happy are those people that have passed all of their history in their own lands. They dwell within the existing testimony concretized in the creations of their forebears...But... [a] person raised and educated in the land of Israel does not have the full testimony of his people's past around him.

Yet, as Schweid recognizes, the severity of this condition varies considerably depending upon (a) the kind of Jew a person is -- secular or religious, and (b), where one settles within the homeland. For the new immigrant settlers of Jewish Nazareth, the attainment of rootedness was, we know, highly problematic. Yet in Nazareth there existed nevertheless three possible solutions. First, one could resort to Jewish religious tradition and find emplacement through "meta-historical" place and time (cf. Tal 1983). Second, Labour Zionist ideology -- involving a leap in historical time backward, into a period of Jewish history *in Israel*, and forward, into a utopian Jewish society and culture in the new homeland toward which one worked (pioneeringly) -- could provide, for its adherents, contemporary emplacement. Or, third, non-believers in either of the preceding senses could emplace themselves in the new homeland through a leap in

space (rather than time or level of history) and through memories of a *life* history in the Diaspora. For the ancient city of Nazareth encoded much of the environment, physical and symbolic, of that life history. It is especially this third form of emplacement that now seizes our attention.

Yael, at the time the director of the Immigrant Absorption Centre in Upper Nazareth, commented upon this tendency in the course of chatting about new immigrants and their "shopping trips" to Nazareth. It had clearly been of some concern to her:

> When we explained to the immigrants where they could do their shopping, that they had to go down to the Arab city for most of the things they needed, they didn't like the idea at first. They were of course worried about going down there. We told them that it was perfectly alright, that they wouldn't have any problems. And then I would see them carrying heavy loads of shopping bags from there. They would go there all the time -- [she smirks] and often I saw them get off the bus from Nazareth without any bags. I asked them, "What are you doing down there?" And you know what some of them told me? They said, "The best thing this settlement here has is the city of Nazareth. It's such an old city! One can feel its age walking through the alleys." Of course, there really was not very much here [in Upper Nazareth] then. And the city down there reminded many of them of home -- of Rumania, Poland, wherever they came from. Many of the new immigrants were homesick for a long time, homesick for the Diaspora. You know, the place in which one grew up, where one went to school, and so on -- it will always be one's home. Even I often remembered the little churches, the train station, the houses of my hometown [in Rumania]. I grew up in a religious family, and most of our life revolved around the Jewish community...But...the community was within the world of the *goyim* -- and of course the landscape, the colours and the smells and sounds, even the church bells -- were also very much part of my home. -- I still catch myself sometimes humming a Rumanian song! Once I had come to Israel, of course, Israel became my home. My home is here now, in Upper Nazareth. I think of myself -- and I tried to instill this feeling in my children -- as a *Nazratit* (a Nazarean). This is the town we built with our own hands, through hard work and sacrifices. It was not easy [making it fully my/our home], one had to work at it; and

I fully understood that for some immigrants it could take a very long time before they would, maybe not forget their hometowns -- one never really forgets -- but feel at home here in Israel, in Nazareth [means Upper Nazareth].

researcher: You, too, must have done your shopping in Nazareth...

Yael: For me, I tell you the truth, Nazareth is an *Arab* city. Sure, I shopped there like anyone else here; and I got to know many of the store-owners, because I was a regular customer; nice people, good people. But my home has been Upper Nazareth, a modern and clean town!

(Yael herself found emplacement via secular ideology and creative pioneering efforts in Upper Nazareth.)

Now, an *a priori* premise of all the discussion thus far has been that immigrant settlers to Jewish Nazareth were all Jewish. However, among the veterans as well as the new immigrants there was also a considerable number of non-Jewish "Jews". That is to say, settlers born to non-Jewish parents (or at least, a non-Jewish mother) who had either been converted to Judaism in their country of origin (via a speedy Reform procedure which is not accepted as valid conversion by Israel's Orthodox and Ultra Orthodox), or never converted at all but had simply publicly declared their identification with the Jewish nation. My point is that as Jewishness had been defined in Upper Nazareth, even a non-Jew could culturally be "Jewish." The degree of subjective identification with the Jewish people varied. There were some who considered themselves (and, according to their accounts, always felt) Jewish; and it was on these grounds that they regarded conversion as superfluous or a Reform conversion as sufficient, and that

they had decided to make aliyah to Israel. This was especially the case among those with a Jewish father. But there were many others, principally those born into a Christian home and raised in a Christian environment, who subjectively identified with Christianity (or at least, had some kind of cultural identification with it). They had married a Jewish spouse in the old country and had then made aliyah (with or without conversion), more for their spouse's and children's sake than their own. The non-Jewish spouse (by either *halakhic* or the subjective definition) was more frequently the wife than the husband; and "mixed couples" originated most commonly from Rumania, but also from Poland. Exact figures are unavailable or at least inaccessible. National census data fail to capture this phenomenon, as the "head of the household" (implying the husband) is asked to speak for the whole household and the reliability of his answers is not verified. Moreover, the Israeli census does not distinguish between Christian Arab Israelis and Christian "Jewish" Israelis.

The early settlers, as well as the leadership of Upper Nazareth, were quite aware of this phenomenon. From the point of view of the secular Labour Zionist *cum* statist Hebrew culture being created, such settlers were readily granted the status of *bona fide* Jews, provided that they acquired (and demonstrated) Jewish public competence.[169] Since (in Upper Nazareth's ideology) Jewishness was consonant with Europeanness, no problem arose in this regard. What remained to be done to complete one's public competence was to learn the Hebrew language; to embrace the pioneering ethos -- if not ideologically, at least in terms of contributing to the building of 'Jewish Nazareth' (either physically, through

labour, or ideationally, through organisational capacities); and to refrain from public expressions of counter-cultural (and certainly counter-national) identifications. Such *bona fide* "Jews" were, in the eyes of the local Labour Zionist leadership, in fact preferable to the traditional religious Jews.

When I asked the long-time director of the Immigrant Absorption Centre whether the immigrants she encountered and dealt with were exclusively Jewish, she replied:

> Look, every immigrant here was treated equally; we gave everyone the same assistance. If someone comes to us and says he is Jewish, then we believe that. Jews have had such a complicated, such a painful history in the Diaspora -- you don't want to start questioning their Jewishness when they finally get to Israel. That was not our purpose. That is what the Rabbinate does today: but how does one differentiate? This one had a Jewish father but no Jewish mother, that one...To me they are Jews if they want to be Jews! Everyone is welcome.

The presence of non-converts or Reform-converts was problematic to religiously-oriented settlers, and it became a vexed question particularly between immigrants from the same country of origin: for example, between Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants from Rumania. As early as 1959, an article in a German-language weekly of the Women's Zionist Organisation on the Jewish Kiriah in Nazareth reported:

> A further problem [in addition to the religious-secular Jewish conflict] are the mixed marriages, about a dozen in number. It is bad enough when one neighbour asks another, "What did this *goye* come here for?" although they both know that she did it for the sake of her Jewish husband and the children. What is even worse is when children of such marriages are called by their religious peers "goy" and "Moishe Catholic" (Thau 1959).

The non-Jewish "Jews" themselves -- even those who subjectively remained Christian -- had, of course, an interest in acquiring Jewish public competence; European Jews occupied the top of the country's and the town's power and status hierarchy, and being Jewish was certainly the key to access to various kinds of resources from a multitude of institutional bodies and levels and upward mobility. Importantly, their own competence affected the standing of their husbands and children. As far as children were concerned, although they might have been registered as Jewish or have undergone proper conversion procedures, more than their *public* competence was at stake. Ideally, they should possess a subjective sense of belonging to the Jewish nation and Israeli culture -- and to this end a non-Jewish parent had to be concerned with "management of self" (Goffman 1959) not only in public but also in the private realm of the family and home. (This might seem an impossible task, except at the expense of the quality of emotional connections between mother and child.)

For some of these settlers about whose very Jewishness there exists ambiguity, Nazareth has proved to be a 'House of Mirrors'. *Their* journeys into the city and encounters with the people of Nazareth give rise to a constant mirroring of reflections of both sides of their 'Janus-faced' ethnic identity. More than that, they experience (as I will try to illustrate) an incessant need to 'answer back' both affirmatively and at the same time denyingly, socially and psychologically, to both of these images. In short: to signal both distance from as well as affinity with both. Thus, Nazareth, to these settlers, spelled not just opportunity and risk but purity and danger (Douglas 1966). Purity in the sense

that the proximity of the Christian holy city not only aided (as it also aided secular and European Jewish immigrants) their emplacement in this new country and new town, but also sustained and often nourished their subjective identity, thereby heightening their sense of emotional security. But equally, danger pertains here to the constant need to reaffirm publicly (and even privately) their Jewishness -- part of which is the distancing of self from the Arab Other with whom, however, the Christian Other in Israel is inextricably interlocked.

The case history of Miriam supports and illustrates these points. She was born in 1953 in a middle-sized town of Rumania, to a Jewish father and a Christian mother. She has one sister and a brother. The whole family together made aliyah to Israel, and was immediately settled in Upper Nazareth, in 1968 when Miriam was 15 years of age. Her mother never converted to Judaism, but the children were converted by a Reform rabbi in Rumania shortly before their emigration. Her father found work in a factory in Haifa, whereas Miriam and her sister (three years older) immediately began to work in one of the sewing factories of Upper Nazareth; her brother was merely one year old at the time, and the mother tended the house. Five years after the family's arrival Miriam's parents divorced, but both sides continued to live in Upper Nazareth. In 1976 Miriam got married locally, to a Jewish immigrant from Georgian Russia, but they were divorced five years later. She has one child, a son now eight years old, from this marriage. I met Miriam at the family day-care centre of her son, where my research assistant works as the *madrich* (instructional guide). Initially, what intrigued me was that she had worked in local factories next to Arab work

collegues for so many years. We had had several casual chats -- on the bus, in the line-up of a bank, or on occasions when she picked up her son from the day-care centre where I sometimes helped out -- before she took me up on an offer to visit me for a cup of coffee and tell me about her life in Upper Nazareth and her work. I neither knew nor guessed her 'Janus-faced' ethnic identity until the end of our long chat one afternoon. And it was only in the light of that knowledge that certain things about her began to make sense: the emphasis she placed on Hebrew language-learning, and, especially, her seemingly contradictory oscillations over Arabs. She moved between repulsion and tolerance (at times even admiration); between dichotomization and non-dichotomization along Jewish Arab lines -- or, she moved between inclusion and exclusion of the Christian Arabs of Nazareth, or Nazareth as a whole, in the category of Us versus Them. The following diagram outlines Miriam's 'switches' in ethnic boundary delineation in the course of our conversation, a lengthy verbatim excerpt[170] of which follows.

'ARAB'	NAZARETH	'JEW'
= Moslem	= Christian	
= rural	= urban	
='backward'	= backward/modern	= modern
= Eastern	= Eastern/Western	= Western
	= Arab	

researcher: Have you worked for *Madan* [the printing-plant where Miriam is currently employed] from the very beginning?

Miriam: No. I first started in a small sewing factory for children's clothing. I worked there for one year and four months. Then I left there to go to a kibbutz -- Kibbutz Yagur. Because after a whole year and four months I still didn't speak Hebrew. So I went to an *ulpan* [Hebrew language programme] on a kibbutz.

researcher: How long did you stay there?

Miriam: Three months only. How long can one study Hebrew? After that I didn't return to the same factory. The manager had gotten very upset with me for leaving; he told me, "If you leave, don't try to come back after!" I don't know how serious he was, but I said, "Okay, I won't come back. Not necessary!" So I worked for *Atta* [a large textile plant] for a while, two months or something like that. I wasn't comfortable there -- I wanted to improve my Hebrew, and there no one spoke Hebrew. And no one took notice of anyone else.

researcher: Who were the people working there? What languages did they speak, if not Hebrew?

Miriam: They were all women. They were all women there. Because it was a sewing factory.

researcher: Were there any Arab workers?[171]

Miriam: They were all women there! I left *Atta* because I didn't like it there. I started working for *Madan*, but then it wasn't called *Madan*. It was called *Edrei Dan*, doing only book-binding, no printing. *Madan* was under construction. I improved my Hebrew there; I got to speak a lot of Hebrew, because there were no Rumanians there. Then it was nice working there: everyone was from here, from Upper Nazareth. There were no Arabs then at all. I really enjoyed going to work. I improved my Hebrew, every day a word. I did learn some on the kibbutz, but not much; they taught us grammar -- what is that important for? So I improved, I started speaking Hebrew. Then, two years later the new factory building was completed and we moved. For quite some time there was no work, no orders -- because we couldn't do printing. Then they got a printing machine, and an automatic guillotine. But for three and a half months we had no work; just went to work, stamped the card, and went back home. Then a new company took over -- I don't know what happened, I don't know the business. So,

then it was called *Incuba*. They bought the factory and paid us our wages. The Histadrut had become involved -- we hadn't been with the Histadrut before that. And when *Incuba* took over, they changed the name to *Madan*.

researcher: Who have been your co-workers?

Miriam: There is Chaim, a chap from India; there is Sammy from South America; Simon Perush -- he left, came back [to work], left, and now he works with us again. Occasionally some other Jew joined us.

researcher: I hear the foreman is from Ein Mahil [a Moslem-Arab village north-east of Upper Nazareth]...

Miriam: Yes. They [?] are all from Ein Mahil. How did they start to come in! First a guy from Nazareth worked with us, called Tahar. He had a contract there, worked for only a few months and then left. Next, someone came from Ein Mahil. Sammy was his name. I don't know what happened to him, but he left, bringing in another guy from the village. And that one brought in all of them. Now it's full of them. Because of this, work relations aren't that...I don't like being there. I don't like the work there. It's not that the work is hard -- I am used to hard work -- but...

researcher: What are the relations like between the Jewish and the Arab workers?

Miriam: They want to be 'big', to be someone; each of them wants to be a 'bigshot'! The manager doesn't like them either; though, the truth is that they hold the factory together. Without Ein Mahil the factory would close again. Almost every year around December there is no work. In summer there is lots of work, but in winter there isn't. So, then he [the manager] sends many workers on holiday -- they don't mind that.

researcher: When was it that the people from the surrounding villages started to work at *Madan*?

Miriam: I don't know exactly. Let's say about ten years ago. Ten years ago there were some Arabs there, but not many. Most were Jews then.

researcher: Why, do you think, that changed?

Miriam: Maybe the Jews are lazy, don't want this kind of work. And the manager of the factory prefers them. Why? Because he doesn't have to pay them much!

researcher: You mean, Arab workers get paid less?

Miriam: Not those working in printing [versus binding; the former employs primarily men, the latter women], it being hard work and all that. And some of them studied the trade. I could never work there! There are no women there -- the ink, cleaning the rolls, lifting the paper...It's not for women. So those in printing do get a decent wage -- more than me, certainly!

researcher: And what about the Arab women working, like you, in the binding section; do they get the same amount as you?

Miriam: No. I earn less because I don't fulfill all the demands. I can't, because I have a child and have no one to take care of him. The management wants us to work 48-hour shifts. And on this account they give additional wages. Especially in summer, when there is lots of work. I can't.

researcher: Are there any social activities, occasionally, for all the workers?

Miriam: Two months ago there was a weekend for all the workers at "Ohalo" by Tiberias. Almost every year it's the same place; never anywhere else. I didn't really want to go, because they didn't want us to bring along our children. I wouldn't have enjoyed myself without my son. What, I should go with...alone? Who would I sit with -- with them? They were the majority, because all of *them* went along. The few Jews working there didn't go. There was one other Jewish couple, and of course the managers, because they had to go! Each of them brought his wife.

researcher: So you did end up going along, alone?

Miriam: Well, I told the manager that I would not go without my son. He didn't agree at first, saying, "Why, if you bring your child, then this one and that one brings their children. This one has two, this one has four." But when I said I couldn't leave Offir alone over the weekend he

let me take him along. There was one other couple, Jews, who brought along their baby.

researcher: How did the weekend turn out?

Miriam: [laughs cynically] We arrived on Friday afternoon. We got caught in a downpour and ran into the dining room. They gave us coffee and cake, and then we were all given rooms. I was in a room with a woman from Nazareth, a very nice woman. In the evening we had supper and played bingo until midnight. On Shabbat, then, we had a barbecue. I didn't go near it! The manager had bought the meat from Ein Mahil. I didn't go near it! My friend, the one I shared room with, brought me...We didn't sit with *them*! We sat on a bench on the side; I asked her to bring me a plate of something.

researcher: Whom do you mean when you say *them*?

Miriam: Those from Ein Mahil. Do *we* [?] know how to make a barbecue? They are experts at it! The manager had bought lamb from Ein Mahil. I ate some skewers of shashlik, hardly anything. The meat wasn't cooked well and I got ill afterwards.

That's that: that's the factory, the workers, and my story. There are terrible conditions at work. We have no decent dining hall; the toilets smell -- it's disgusting to go into them; you would choke.

researcher: What about the Histadrut, couldn't the Histadrut do something?

Miriam: The Histadrut and the management work together! Look, we work until 7 p.m. and get nothing to eat. Only those working till after 7 p.m. get *falafel* or shashlik. Who, do you think, would complain? They? They are used to this, they bring food from home. Because of them, no decent food-arrangements are made. Look, if we -- the few Jews -- want cooked food...They wouldn't eat it; they are not used to our kind of food. They bring along their *humus*, *t'hina*, *fooll* or pitta-bread with *lebanni* and olives.

researcher: I quite like this food -- that's what people in Israel eat most of the time, isn't it? Falafel is almost a national dish!

Miriam: I do eat with them sometimes, but it would be nice to have some hot soup, something like that, especially in winter...The factory is getting worse all the time. When the manager buys new equipment, it's for his friends from Ein Mahil! They are the factory's future. He can't run the factory without them. But take a day when the Arabs have one of their strikes: maybe that day the factory has lots of work -- then the factory would be lost without us, because then it's the Jews who do the work!

researcher: Do you have any Arab neighbours? I understand that quite a number of people from Nazareth are coming to live in Upper Nazareth...

Miriam: Not as many as there are in the factory! I don't have any Arab families living in my block, nor in the one next to it -- there are hardly any tenants in these buildings in the Northern neighbourhood; people are leaving the neighbourhood.

researcher: I have three Arab neighbours here.

Miriam: Are they Christian or Moslem?

researcher: Both. Two of the families are Christian, one is Moslem.

Miriam: How is the Moslem family [as a neighbour]?

researcher: They are very friendly and helpful, more than most other neighbours.

Miriam: They must be from Nazareth! They are more cultured than those from the villages!

researcher: Is there really such a big difference?

Miriam: Those that grew up in a city like Nazareth...We have a woman from Nazareth at the factory. She is Christian. -- There are also Moslem women from Nazareth. But that Christian woman is completely different! She is very Western; not at all like an Arab! Like, she goes to parties -- not alone, mind you; she takes her sisters. But she goes. Women from the village wouldn't go. The girls from Nazareth are allowed to go with their parents' permission. And their dress: the women from Nazareth dress well -- fashionable, and with make-up. The

girls from the village don't; they wear strange colours. Their traditions and costumes are like a million years old. They haven't progressed!

The conversation turns to Miriam's family -- her father, sister and brother. She tells me, on this occasion, where they work and of joint trips in the area. She does not mention her mother (and I assume at this point that she either does not live here any longer or that perhaps she is deceased). Talking about her brother, who is currently in his first year of a degree programme -- in archaeology -- at Haifa University, we get on to talking about the archaeological site discovered a few years ago in Upper Nazareth.[172] It is Miriam who brings it up, in fact; first she tells me how she came to know all she knows about it:

> *Miriam:* You might wonder how someone like me knows about something like an archaeological site here! Well, I used to work with a woman -- she was an immigrant from India -- who had moved to Upper Nazareth with her husband from Ashdod [another development town], planning to build their own house in the *Build-Your-Own-Home* area. They had chosen a spot because of the nice view. But when the ground was then prepared to start the construction of the houses -- seven of them -- graves were discovered. The people building the houses were told that it was forbidden to disturb graves -- according to Judaism graves must not be disturbed. And so they were given different plots. The seven families took the project developers to court, there was a long struggle, and four years later they got a different plot.

> *researcher:* I hear they found a large ancient settlement, going back to the time of Joshua...[Miriam interrupts]

> *Miriam:* No. Jesus!

> *researcher:* No. Joshuah; that's what I heard.

> *Miriam:* Jesus! They say that Jesus lived *here*. You know where

exactly he lived? That big church in Nazareth, the Saint Joseph's Church it is called! There was his house. Have you ever been there? Many people go to look at it because of its architecture!

researcher: Yes, I looked at it once.

Miriam: Did you not see that old structure in the middle of the Church? Some kind of very, very old dwelling? They built the church on top of it.

researcher: Do you go down to Nazareth often?

Miriam: Sometimes I go visit with my sister. So he, Jesus, lived *there*; was born in Bethlehem, lived here, and they say that he ascended to heaven from Mount Tabor. He was buried on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, after being crucified. A Jew of the name of Judas sold him to the Romans for twenty silver coins. But he was resurrected and came back here, and from here ascended to heaven.

researcher: You know a lot about all this. Where from?

Miriam: [smiles] I am half-Christian.

researcher: [showing surprise] Which half?

Miriam: My mother. My mother is a Christian. I am not really Jewish. Some people know, but it never made much difference. I don't care -- that's how I was born. But don't tell Offir [her son]; he would probably think that he is an Arab then!

researcher: Where is your mother now?

Miriam: She lives here, in Upper Nazareth. But she doesn't have the time to look after Offir when I'm at work. When he is not at the day-centre, he spends his time at his father's family, with his grandmother.

researcher: If your mother is Christian she probably likes visiting Nazareth.

Miriam: She has many [women] friends there, and she goes to the churches there...I sometimes visit them, too. After shopping. For two

people there isn't that much shopping to do, what's there to shop for? So, since I am already there, I might look at one of the churches.

researcher: Do you ever go together, you and your mother?

Miriam: Sometimes we go together. But she goes on Sundays, when I don't have the time. I usually work on Sundays.

Miriam now switched the topic to her son and his education, but was in a hurry to leave. Since I also was single, and new in town, as she put it, she suggested we go shopping in Nazareth together one day, which we did a week later. It was a Tuesday afternoon.[173] We began with a shopping trip through Nazareth's shuk, where Miriam picked up very little indeed. Then a browse through the *Mashbir* (a countrywide department-store chain) -- the only large department store (modern and Western) in Nazareth. And to end our visit, Miriam took me into the Church of Annunciation. Aside from a guided tour through the Church that was in process as we entered, there were only two other people -- two middle-aged ladies kneeling in the bench rows in meditation. Miriam quickly glanced about her and then took me around, like a tourist-guide explaining the events the Church symbolizes, symbol by symbol. At the end of the tour, Miriam suggested we sit down for a little while, as the shopping had tired her feet. And so we sat there for ten minutes, quietly and almost piously.

A few minutes later we stood at the bus stop waiting for the bus taking us back "up the mountain," and Miriam switched back to her Jewish public persona: she started to complain about the irregularity of the buses going up the mountain, versus those serving the Arab villages, implying deliberate discrimination on

behalf of the Arab bus company. And she expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Upper Nazareth was having to rely on Arab buses.

Chapter 5

Arab and Jewish Nazareth Transformed:
Two Nazareths

In May 1974 Upper Nazareth was at last awarded the long-sought status of municipality and Development Town "A." A lavish public ceremony was to proclaim formally and ritually this status elevation which, as the local leadership saw it, constituted a milestone *en route* to a Jewish Nazareth. Indeed, the structuring of the ceremony -- as initially planned, amended from above, and ultimately staged -- amounted to a symbolic restatement of the statist vision of a Jewish Nazareth, a summary of struggles *en route* to its fulfillment, and a stock-taking of triumphs.

Scheduled for October of the same year (the month in which, back in 1956, the settlement of the first core of settlers as a group had been planned), the celebration promised a three-day fête taking the form of an open house party to which the population of Arab Nazareth, as well as its leadership, was to be invited and which was to be punctuated by the reception of high government officials, artistic performances (including Arab musical and dance performances), and guided tours through the town and through its pride and joy -- the factories. The climax of artistic performances and closure of the three-day celebration was to be

a musical play, re-enacting the pioneering history of Upper Nazareth, entitled "Zionism Without a Beard" (an equivocation that can mean 'young' versus 'old' and historically rooted Zionism -- in this place, but just as well, secular over religious Zionism).

But as reports of these plans reached the ears of the wider Israeli public, the NRP cabinet member (and Gush Emunim patron) Zevulun Hammer wrote to the Minister of the Interior, protesting that "plans to stage an open cocktail party for all Nazareth residents" was "in harmful contrast to the spirit of economy which should rightfully be prevalent nowadays [following the Yom Kippur War]."[174] The Minister heeded the MK's objections, demanding that the celebration be postponed by a month and kept more modest.[175] Nevertheless, the final, one-day version of the ceremony retained the symbolic messages about Nazareth. On the one hand, about the local Jewish self and 'our' relationship with the religious Jewish other; and on the other hand, about the Arab Other of Nazareth (though on a toned-down level). The day began with the festive reception of the Interior Minister (Yosef Burg), attended by town notables and representatives of the Arab city. The important visitors were given a tour of the flag-bedecked Jewish town and its factories; a second reception for the public of Jewish Nazareth (but *not*, as initially planned, for Arab Nazareth's public) was held in the afternoon. The celebrations were rounded off with the performance of "Zionism Without a Beard." In the course of a special Council meeting on the same day, under the supervision of the Interior Minister and Northern District Administrator, the councillors elected M. Allon the first mayor of what was now a Municipal Council.

But, the unaltered continuation on a course toward a United Nazareth which was itself proclaimed by the attainment of municipal and Development Town "A" status and the ritual unity which the leadership of the two Nazareths displayed on this occasion, as previously on many other occasions, was betrayed by concomitant undercurrents in Nazareth; undercurrents which heralded the failure of the vision's fulfilment.

5.1. Changing Chords of Action in Arab Nazareth, From 'Being' to 'Doing': The Ascendance of Rakkah to Local Government

Gradually, but with increasing certainty, the Communist Party, Rakkah, had been gaining the upper hand in Nazareth; this expressed itself in both Labour and City Council elections. As early as 1969 Rakkah had drawn close to one-half of all votes in Nazareth's Labour Council elections (Rakkah received 2112, the Labour Alignment 2144 votes).[176] And in 1971, apparently, the Labour Alignment factions of the two Nazareths met to discuss (with anxious foresight?) an immediate merger of the two local authorities, which would have given the joint Labour faction a new headstart to the growing Communist Party. At the time, the leaders officially denied knowledge of such an agenda, and the Adviser to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, Shmuei Toledano, when queried by the press, merely commented that there was no intention of imposing a merger from above.[177] Today, M. Allon concedes (in personal conversation with him) that such negotiations had indeed taken place at that time; though he would not reveal

what had prevented the actualization of the merger -- whether it was feared that such a move would play into the hands of the Communist Party; whether the two sides failed to come to an agreement as to who was to be placed first, Allon or Zu'ebi, on the joint Labour Alignment ticket and the first mayor of the United Nazareth; whether the merger was objected to at the highest party and/or government levels; or a combination of the above.

In fact, one year following the loud celebrations of Upper Nazareth's new status (in December 1975), the Communist Other emerged victorious from Nazareth's municipal elections. The Communist Party controlled local government with two-thirds of the Council seats and an outspoken and bustling mayor, Tawfik Ziad, to boot. *Their* script for Nazareth differed radically from that which the Zionist establishment (with that co-opted Other of Nazareth) had been authoring. Generally speaking, the Communist Arab Other insisted on a self-definition in separate nationalist terms instead of bowing to the demands of the Jewish authorities (and local Jewish leadership) that the Arab Other be Arab culturally but politically define itself as 'Israeli' (even though Israel was clearly a state for the Jews, in as much as only Jews could fully partake in Israeliness). Israeli Arabs, Ziad insisted, are an inseparable part of the Palestinian people; but they are equally citizens of the Israeli state, and as such he has demanded for them full equality within the Israeli state.

Claims for equality and shouts against discrimination were put not merely in abstract and nationwide terms, but also -- and particularly -- in specific, local terms: Jewish Nazareth became the key illustration and symbol of the fight. As

Rabinovitch (1988) has aptly put it, "Tawfik Ziad...gave vent to a new militant line that focused on the half-empty rather than the half-full glass that Zu'ebi [and the Jewish leadership and media, one might add] had raised in toast." When Ziad spoke of land expropriation and discriminatory resource allocation, he pointed a finger at Jewish Nazareth which, on account of its Development Town "A" status, was about to score yet another expansion of its land area -- from 8,780 to 18,200 dunams; while Nazareth was still, as it had always been, classified within the Central Zone, of lowest development order.[178]

Thus the celebration of Upper Nazareth's status elevation came to be -- contrary to what was planned -- the last-time rendition (ritualistically or otherwise) of the two Nazareths as one. Nazareth had always been considered, by the Israeli government, as a political barometer for the Israeli Arab sector; and the strength of support for the Communist Party, be it in national or local elections, as an indicator of "anti-Israeli," nationalist sentiments. Thus, when wary misgivings of Communist rule over Nazareth translated into factual reality, this changeover triggered a storm of 're'-thinking within highest circles of government and academia. The problem needed to be defined, and solutions found. Explanations focused not so much on Us as on Them and on broad "external factors" such as the international Israeli-Arab conflict, the Palestinian issue, and Israel after the Yom Kippur War. Solutions, in essence, entailed the stepped-up continuation of policies previously employed within the Israeli Arab sector, a central ingredient being intensified and new efforts at the cooptation of young intellectuals by use of 'reward-and-punishment' policies (see Lustick

1980:211-233); though always as always, overtly and formally somehow in consonance with Israel's democratic principles.

The Jewish Other most immediately and diffusely affected by the political turnover in Nazareth was, of course, Upper Nazareth: established to outbalance and supervise Arab Nazareth; in fact, its political mission had been to bring to a halt and perhaps reverse developments in Nazareth which could lead to the very situation which now, despite Upper Nazareth, *had* fully crystallized. This change in Nazareth, from a predominant mode of 'being' to one of 'doing' (cf. Paine 1988) Arab in Israel, had immediate and severe repercussions -- psychological as well as formally political -- in Upper Nazareth. First, it brought a sense of failure in the *national* mission with which it had been charged. Second, it sorely scarred the local sense of Self -- one of hegemony in a United Nazareth -- towards which the Local/City Council had striven over the years. Thus there emerged a need -- amounting to both a culturally and politically pragmatic imperative -- to reconceptualize 'Jewish Nazareth' in line with new realities; and not only as pertained to Upper Nazareth's present and future, but also concerning its short history which was now saturated with a vision that had failed.

However, Upper Nazareth still remained in physical proximity to and multidimensional interdependency with the Arab city. Their proximity to each other now stood as an ineradicable epitaph to an idea that once was; as for the interdependencies, even though steps could be taken to minimize the interface between the two Nazareths, dependency on Nazareth would be difficult to dissolve entirely; legally, let alone practically. Yet, it can be assumed that the

need for spatial distancing and separation, which had featured throughout Upper Nazareth's history, was particularly pronounced now that Nazareth -- and thus the Israeli Arab Other for which it itself purported to speak (and was so credited by the Jewish establishment) -- had defined itself in terms which were Jewishly interpreted as antagonistic and hostile to the Jewish state. This all the more so, since Nazareth's action had been taken with specific reference to Upper Nazareth. Spatial distancing would also have aided the process of conceptual detachment from 'Nazareth'.

But that consideration did not (and could not) prevail. Instead, Upper Nazareth -- herein lies its situationally prescribed predicament -- was destined to reconcile ideological and political detachment, and opposition, with physical closeness and regular encounters.

5.2. Political and Ideological Management of Old Proximities in View of the New Ideological Distance

"There can be no relations at this stage between the municipality of Nazareth and that of Upper Nazareth," was how the minutes of a special Municipal Council meeting (6.1.1976) summarized a synopsis given by M. Allon of the developments following the elections in Nazareth and Rakkah's victory. "But with this we must remember," Allon pointed out, "that there *are* joint projects [between the two municipalities] such as the agreement regarding garbage disposal

services, the joint Pedagogic Centre, the United Cities fire services, the first aid and sewage station.* Some of these projects, like the Pedagogic Centre,[179] had been initiated as late as the early 1970s (LC Minutes, 26.12.1972). The Council also discussed, with concern, other areas of dependency on Nazareth, such as those pertaining to the town market, petrol stations, and urban transportation. The practical concern was with Nazareth's ability to hamstring, or at least seriously disrupt in vital areas, the routine functioning of the Jewish town; for example, protest strikes and demonstrations were now to be anticipated at all levels, as Tewfik Ziad had announced loudly and clearly.

But mixed in with or beyond practical considerations there were symbolic statements to be shaped here. There was the prospect of the Arab city being in a position, via these areas of dependency, to alter intermittently the routine patterns of life within the Jewish town on days it chose. At the macrolevel even, this contained a speck of symbolic reversal of power relations. As envisioned by the national Jewish leadership it was to be the Jewish, not the Arab Nazareth that would set the tone and hold the means to sanction the other for political dissent.

Over the subsequent months, steps were taken to sever links with the city of Nazareth: Upper Nazareth proceeded to set up its own fire- and first-aid-stations, organise its own garbage disposal services, arrange its own town market once a week, and to initiate the bipartition of the pedagogic centre. Autonomizing Upper Nazareth in these spheres proved relatively unproblematic; but what of the dependency of the local factories on Arab labour, and the town's reliance on Arab Nazareth for local transportation services?

At the best of times the Arab-owned and -operated transport system had, one recalls, been a thorn in the side of Upper Nazareth's leadership. And new, as Upper Nazareth had to prepare itself for possible strikes in Nazareth, the time seemed most opportune to request the Ministry of Transport to transfer from the Arab bus company to the Jewish national corporation Egged the rights to serve Upper Nazareth. The leadership of Jewish Nazareth immediately engaged in intense canvassing to this end, but to no avail: the Arab bus company soon had the chance to demonstrate to all concerned, and it later committed itself contractually,[180] that it would do all in its might to serve the Jewish town as reliably on strike days as it did throughout the year. Under these conditions, the company retained its monopoly over Upper Nazareth.

The hiring and firing of Arab labour by Upper Nazareth's factories, on the other hand, fell within the local jurisdiction, given the structure and organisation of local Labour Exchanges. In fact, soon after the election of a Communist government in Nazareth, newspapers reported the dismissal of a number of Arab workers from several industrial plants in Upper Nazareth; and although the official explanation forwarded by the local Labour Council couched the dismissals in terms of production cut-backs, the move invariably smacked of punishment for having voted Communist (*Jerusalem Post*, 12.12.1976). (A kernel of punishment was, of course, also contained in moves to provide Jewish Nazareth with its own produce market: shoppers from Upper Nazareth had been contributing considerably to Nazareth's businesses.) But no matter how much Upper Nazareth would have liked to be in a position to unleash, fully and permanently, such

economic sanctioning on the residents of Nazareth and the Arab sector as a whole, this simply was not in the cards: Local industrial production -- and the town's ability to attract further industries -- hinged quite considerably on the Arab labour force; if only as a guaranteed pool of reserve labour. This notion of reserve labour speaks to the unpredictable availability (certainly as investors saw it) of new immigrant labour in the long-term, fluctuating with the vagaries of Jewish immigration waves to Israel, and Jewish immigration and emigration to and from Upper Nazareth. So, the old pattern continued in the sphere of employment (and in fact, would intensify due to subsiding immigration waves over the subsequent years); but that is not to say that it continued to be perceived and publicized on old terms.

Upper Nazareth's grassroots, too, expressed the need for a separatist policy and stance now; in fact, it grew outspoken on the matter. As soon as the results of Nazareth's elections became known, an *ad hoc* committee of concerned residents formed. Their platform was "economic independence for the new Jewish town," meaning, "a separate food market and transport system." "We do not want to trade with or be dependent on people who claim we are occupying their land."[181] As many as three hundred residents participated in a demonstration, staged one week following the elections in an Upper Nazareth shopping mall. The placards read, "We shall not go on buying from the supporters of Arafat...Ziad, you are wrecking what has been built up over 18 years." This constituted the first recorded and remembered incidence in Upper Nazareth's history of the formation of a militant grassroots movement; and one, at that, of which the Municipal and

Labour Council leadership openly disapproved -- reasoning that it was "doing the town more harm than good." That the leadership should have been opposed to a grassroots committee advocating the very line of action which the leadership itself, though behind closed doors, resolved to pursue, seems somewhat of a contradiction. It focuses our attention on informal guidelines pertaining to how the problem is to be defined and managed locally. At the time, these were in the process of formation; today, they inform local ways of talking about and dealing with the Arab Other in 'Nazareth'.

One of the rules (recognized in the informal guidelines) which the grassroots committee breached derives from the macropolitical realm, has its roots in Israel's Basic Principles, and is embodied in the very idea and implementation of a Jewish Nazareth. It is that measures of dealing with the "Arab problem" are not to be discussed or explicated "front-stage" -- at least not in a form in which the Other is explicitly rendered the target of action. For example, it has been acceptable practice to talk about the Judaization of Galilee, but not to talk about its de-Arabization (which, presumably, the former implies). The rule, to be sure, has frequently been violated at highest government levels, though not, ordinarily, without inviting public criticism. Judaization is Zionism (a positive value), de-Arabization is racism (a negative value). Upper Nazareth, we should recall, was the outgrowth of a concern with managing Nazareth legitimately, and its history is fraught with efforts toward legitimation. Even with this new turn of events the need to act legitimately, that is, in overtly democratic terms, should not be neglected; indeed, *especially* not at this time when Communist Nazareth was

drawing the special attention of the world upon itself. This means it was unacceptable to couch demands for changes, which in fact were in the process of being implemented, in terms of outright communal sanctioning, and certainly not by staging what amounted to an ethno-political demonstration. The leadership illustrated the proper line: taking the necessary steps without much public noise, and couching in non-ethnic, economic terms what essentially constituted ethnic demands (as we see it in negotiations regarding Upper Nazareth's transport services with the Minister of Transport), or ethnic boundary measures (as in the case of the dismissal of Arab workers).

The imperative to follow macro-rules also had multiple roots in local self-interests. For instance, the overt breach of such a taboo locally could result in the dismissal of individual local leaders by their central party secretariat. Similarly, the flow of resources into a locality could be affected. Last but not least, there was the necessity to avoid inciting exacerbated ethnic antagonism on the other side of the boundary but to find, instead, a *modus vivendi* with that Other with whom one had to live (physical proximity) and to work (economic interdependency).

Apprehensions soon became reality; a Rakkah "Nazareth Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands" (formed in late 1975 -- a successor of several earlier committees, all under Rakkah aegis) declared upcoming March 30 Land Day, and called upon all Arabs in Israel to participate, on that date, in a general strike in protest against land expropriations slated for Galilee generally, and in Nazareth, Carmiel and Sefad in particular. One of the prime movers behind it was Nazareth's new mayor, Tawfik Ziad.

On the day of the strike, three of the Arab villages whose land was to be expropriated were placed under curfew; confrontations between villagers and army units, sent in to enforce the curfew, resulted in the deaths of seven villagers, many others were wounded and hundreds arrested.[182] These calamitous events overshadowed what was generally considered to be the rather limited success of the strike itself. But the international attention the disturbances attracted, as well as the tremendous popular pressures exerted upon Arab notables who had spoken out against the strike, rendered the strike an unprecedented success for Rakkah, in terms of the political mobilization of the Israeli Arab population (Lustick, 1980:246). At Rakkah's annual May Day rally in Nazareth one month later, the speakers -- featured most prominently among them was Tawfik Ziad -- declared March 30 an annual day of protest to be marked by rallies and (as more radical fringe groups advocated) by a general strike. But in fact, for the next two years Land Day was kept at a low key on account of the violent outcome of its first show-down.

Materially, this day of protest -- marking the beginning of a new tradition in Nazareth -- did not effect the Jewish town very much: the Arab-operated bus company withstood the test, living up to its pledge of serving the town as usual; and the majority of Arab workers that had remained employed in the town's factories ignored the call for strike, showing up for their shifts punctiliously (through their Arab and Jewish foremen it had been enjoined on them that interruptions of the production process would not be tolerated). But it *did* lend moral and political force to the reconceptualization of the Other and the

restructuring of relations with Them. For one thing, a heightened security consciousness was revived, much like in the early days of pioneering Jewish settlement in Nazareth when the Arab part of the area was under military administration and protests were heard in Nazareth against land requisitions for the Jewish Kiriah. As would become a routine fact of life in Upper Nazareth on "days of unrest" in the Arab sector (read: in Nazareth), all the entrances to the Jewish town, during late evening and night hours, were manned by local civil guards asking all who would pass through to identify themselves and, if they were not residents of the town, to state their reason for wishing to enter (MC Security Subcommittee Minutes). By day, moreover, there became engraved on the local culture an awareness of the need to 'manage' visits of Self into the terrain of the Other. The media would announce (and the message would be spread by word of mouth) days on which "it is easiest" or "best" not to go "down the hill" -- if it can at all be helped. Ordinarily, these would be announced well in advance; but there would be non-routine occasions where that was not possible, as we shall see. In cases where one *had to* go (on account of employment in one of the government offices still located in Nazareth, or because one's trip to and from work outside the town invariably takes one through the Arab city), one might, just to be on the safe side, want to be thoughtful about the timing of these trips. (Journeys to the shuk of Nazareth, at any rate, *could* be avoided, for within a month after Land Day, Upper Nazareth had its own outdoor shuk once a week, with Arab and Jewish traders who toured the Jewish settlements in the region on a regular basis.)

5.3. The Definition of a New Public Problem in Upper Nazareth: The Immigration of Arabs from Nazareth

From the vantage point of the national Jewish leadership, Land Day and the associated events indicated the increasing gravity of "the situation in the Arab sector;" thus, three months following it, a special national leadership symposium, at Beit Berl, was devoted to the sole issue of future policies towards the Arab minority. Inadvertently, this symposium left its imprints on Jewish Upper Nazareth, as a catalyst in the definition of a new "public problem" (cf. Gusfield 1981) within the locality -- that of Arabs in Upper Nazareth, or, to put it in rule-bound local terms, of "empty flats" or "Jews leaving Upper Nazareth."

In the context of this symposium Prime Minister Yizchak Rabin made also a few remarks -- apparently parenthetically, but not taken as such locally -- on Upper Nazareth; his remarks were picked up, equally parenthetically and out of their full context, by the national media: "The establishment of Upper Nazareth was a mistake" and, "Not for long will we be able to prevent Nazareth Arabs from settling in Upper Nazareth."[183] The former statement must have had the impact of a 'whip-lash'. It was delivered publicly and explicitly and it came from 'the top'. It also confirmed the local subjective sense of failure. The local leadership was in the process of redefining the situation -- redefining success; now they heard that their life's work (for many of them) and their new hometown (for all of them) was essentially meaningless, if not counterproductive, from the point of view of nation-building.

Taken in isolation the Prime Minister's remarks could be read in two ways, with very different implications. *Either* as conclusive: defining failure in even wider and more absolute terms (beyond amendment) than the people and leaders of Upper Nazareth had themselves supposed; it meant not only had Upper Nazareth failed to Judaize Nazareth, but that the intended process was now being reversed -- Nazareth was Arabizing Jewish Nazareth. Moreover, the government was reconciling itself to this prospect (some even thought the Prime Minister was in fact *advocating* such a process). *Or* the statement could be read to implicitly stipulate a new way of 'doing' Zionism in Nazareth; providing the locality with an alternative version of success: to *prevent*, against all odds, the Arabization of the Jewish Nazareth.

Local residents and leaders inclined to the first of these interpretations of what the Prime Minister meant; and, understandably, "the things the Prime Minister said about our town" stirred up local anxiety and called for reactions literally in local Self-defence. But this defence of Self then more or less followed the strategy seen to inhere in that alternative interpretation. Of course, what was at issue here went beyond the Prime Minister's remarks, relating to the historical and aspirational void which the circumstantial redefinition of 'Jewish Nazareth', by the Communist victory in the Arab city, had created for the Jewish town.

5.3.1. Facilitating Trends in Upper Nazareth's Housing Market

Read whichever way, the Prime Minister's remarks had not come out of thin air, that is to say, they were founded, for instance, in new current trends in Upper Nazareth's housing market situation. These were real enough and might well be taken as indicating a scenario such as that foretold by the Prime Minister. It was only and *precisely* because of the speck of truth which the remarks reflected that they could and did impact, locally, as incisively as they did. Thus, a brief digression is in order for the purpose of explicating the developments within Upper Nazareth's housing situation.

By the mid-seventies, the local housing situation had undergone significant changes. We may recall (Chapter 3) the selection policies which were applied to the town's settlement during the time of the IC and even beyond; these could be operative, however, only as long as there existed no *private* housing market (and no shortage of potential settlers to choose from). To recapitulate: in the beginning, all housing locally available was public housing provided for and allocated by government bodies, such as the Ministries of Labour, of Housing, or even the Ministry of Defence and daughter companies thereof, in which non-governmental, national bodies such as the Jewish Agency might share ownership (as is the case with the Amidar housing corporation). Generally, the rules regulating the rental and sale of government housing render the Arab population largely ineligible: one of the clauses stipulates that the aspiring tenant or buyer must have completed army service or at least have obtained army service

clearance (as is the case for new immigrants to Israel beyond a certain age or, pertaining to women, if they are married; as well as for the ultra-orthodox Jewish population); but the Arab population, with but a few exceptions, are not drafted into the army. An exception to this general rule is housing explicitly earmarked for the Arab minority population, in which case the respective Arab departments or sections of the concerned ministries are, formally, the initiating bodies.

Tenants who *rent* government housing may not sublet their flats, so it is ensured that the actual tenants occupying the apartments also fulfill the eligibility criteria. More 'problematic' with respect to ethnic boundary maintenance -- and this is what I am concerned with here -- are the *sold* government housing units. For once the buyer fully owns his home, that is to say, once the last mortgage (if ever there was one) is paid off, what previously constituted public housing becomes private housing, and the earlier restrictions no longer apply. Many settlers of development towns -- new immigrants, vatikim and sabras alike -- are induced with offers of generous, low-interest government loans or simply pressured to buy rather than to rent: so as to nurture a sense of local commitment and permanence (and what is also likely, to guarantee the continuous availability of further building capital to the bodies concerned with housing construction).

Two implications of this are of particular relevance to us: first, it often happened that people were thus led to commit themselves prematurely in the long-term to a flat, or even to a town, which they may later, for whatever reason, find unsatisfactory and want to exchange for another. But as long as mortgage payments are still running, the flat can be neither sublet nor sold. In the past

(until the early 1970s approximately), Amidar would repurchase such flats, the people I spoke with often enough made it a point, in exchange for the sale of another *within the same locality*; in practice this entailed the transfer of mortgage payments. But as the company was thereby incurring losses, apparently, often being left with small and dilapidated flats that it could not easily market, the policy was abandoned.[184] Thus people started to sublet their flats illegally -- that is, while mortgages were still being paid -- to finance alternative housing either in the same, though more frequently in another locality.

The second implication is that between ten to fifteen years following the establishment of Upper Nazareth, as the first waves of settlers completed their mortgage payments on government housing -- there were others of course, especially from the first core group and from among vatik and sabra settlers in general, who had purchased their homes outright -- there emerged a considerable private market for housing.

The situation was aggravated by other circumstances. One being the fact that while more and more Jewish residents aspired to leave the town, the sellers' market among the Jewish population was extremely restricted: new residents wishing to purchase a home in the town became a scarce resource. Furthermore, the new immigrants were likely (as before) to choose the subsidized government housing (though here one should note that immigration waves to Israel in general, and to Upper Nazareth in particular, were beginning to abate). In fact, there existed a surplus of vacant, recently established and modern government housing that competed with the private market. For up to the mid-seventies the building

boom had continued unabated, on the assumption that the town's population would continue to increase at previous, astronomic rates. Finally, among the Arab population of Nazareth, on the other hand, the demand for housing in Upper Nazareth was seemingly unsatiable. Nazareth itself was experiencing a housing shortage; prices for housing in Upper Nazareth were significantly lower, because built with heavy government subsidy, and one could there enjoy municipal services and living conditions which the Arab city lacked, due to budget and funding inequalities along ethnic lines: relative quiet, groomed lawns and playgrounds, wide and clean streets, spacious flats -- all that close to home. And, evidently, very few Jewish homeowners who wished to sublet or sell felt hesitant about marketing their homes among interested residents of Nazareth.

It was not the presence of Arabs in the Kramim neighbourhood, nor in the minority housing complexes on Djab el-Sich -- all within the boundaries of Upper Nazareth -- that was at issue, at least not at first; concern pivoted around Arab Others of Nazareth -- who were now dispersed within Jewish neighbourhoods and apartment blocks. For the migration of these Others into Upper Nazareth had taken place without the official supervision of governing bodies; so it was unscreened in terms of quality, uncontrolled regarding quantity (in fact, in the light of Nazareth's population explosion -- it was perceived as such by the people of Upper Nazareth -- numbers became a particular concern), and uncontained locationally. All this gave cause for concern, nationally and now -- under the new prevalent realities, and after what the Prime Minister had said -- also locally. Not only had the Prime Minister drawn attention to it, he seemed resigned to let the

Arab intrusion into Upper Nazareth run its course; and among the Jewish residents this presaged an ethno-national takeover of their town.

5.3.2. Defining Proper Problem Management: Prevention Versus Accommodation

The alternatives for problem management, within the legal framework, were limited indeed; especially if the *modus vivendi* with Nazareth were to be maintained. On the other hand, and this constituted quite a paradoxical situation (and contradictory position to be in) for the incumbent leadership of Upper Nazareth, the Arab problem, and its preferred solutions, could indirectly play into the hands of local political others, and be appropriated by them. Indeed, a few days following the publication of Rabin's remarks, a grassroots organisation had, again, mobilized: it seems that the core consisted of no more than ten to fifteen members; quite a few of them Likkudnikkim, many of whom had already been part of the grassroots committee protesting the continued entertainment of economic ties with Nazareth a few months earlier. The group organised a local petition to the Prime Minister pressing for continued and, indeed, increased government support for their town (more industry and more Jewish settlers were needed). Its specific formulation is of interest: it restated the purpose of establishing Upper Nazareth in a new-old light. The role of Jewish Upper Nazareth (one of hegemony) within a United Nazareth was left unremarked; instead, emphasis was placed on Upper Nazareth as a *Jewish town in Hebrew

Galilee.* And the responsibility of the central government for the continued *success* of this contribution to the Judaization of Galilee was made plain. One of the activists gave me this paraphrase of the petition's wording:[185]:

> Please, Mr. Prime Minister, consider the national problem. The central government must do all in its powers to prevent Upper Nazareth from turning Arab. *Upper Nazareth was meant to be a Jewish town in Galilee, in line with the policy of Judaizing Galilee.* We, the Jews of Upper Nazareth, came here to provide our children with Jewish education and to raise them in a Jewish -- not an Arab -- atmosphere. We will pack up and leave here in the event that more Arabs move in. We ask that more Jewish settlers and more industry be channeled to our town (emphasis added).

Simultaneously, the group sought to tackle the Arab problem on the homefront. It petitioned the municipality to direct its attention to Arab migration into the town, and took upon itself to go door-to-door, elaborating the *problem* to individual Jewish homeowners and urging them not to rent or sell their homes to Arabs -- even asking them to sign a pledge to this effect. Such contracts were, of course, not legally binding; quite to the contrary, they legally conflicted with Israel's Basic Principles, as they had been formulated. Clearly, signing the pledge constituted a moral contract and symbolic affirmation of local Jewish Self-commitment (a copy of the pledge and signatures was enclosed, apparently, with the petition addressed to the Prime Minister). The number of signatures garnered is said to have remained below the two-hundred mark; *not overwhelming,* in the activists' own estimations. *Although most people agreed that more Arabs in our town would be a problem,* one of the activists explained, *they just didn't want to put their name to something like that;* but she could not explain the reluctance -- perhaps the *problem* had been put too explicitly for comfort and legitimacy?

An official reply to Prime Minister Rabin followed one step behind the popularistic response. But there had been a good deal of dissent over it. All agreed that there existed a real problem locally which needed attending to. Deputy Mayor Ariav spoke for Labour when he advocated, in response to Likud members' insistence that the issue be at least added to the agenda of the first management subcommittee meeting following the release of Minister Rabin's statements, that the Council generously and diplomatically pass over the Prime Minister's remarks; especially since Council had in the meantime received a personal telegram conveying the Prime Minister's apologies and a revocation of the remarks which had *slipped his mouth.* Indeed, Ariav proposed that the Prime Minister be awarded honorary citizenship of the town for the good things said in the telegram (MC Management Subcommittee Meeting, 5.7.1976). But the Likud insisted on *some* sort of reply to the Prime Minister, and -- whether out of a shared personal conviction or concern over Council harmony or mobilization of the issue by the political other -- Mayor Allon heeded the request in the MC meeting two days later (7.7.1976).

Both *Labour*'s reply as proposed by Allon and the *Likud*'s response suggested by Tamir restated the historical aims of Upper Nazareth with reference to Galilee rather than Nazareth (just as the grassroots petition had); and both spoke of shared responsibility between the locality and the central government, and the need for an intensification of development and Jewish settlement. Where the two proposed replies differed was over how immediately and directly a reply ought to refer back to -- and thus express criticism of -- the Prime Minister's comments on Upper Nazareth in public:

Allon: I move that the Council praise the Prime Minister and the government of Israel for the successful release of the Uganda hostages [reference to the raid on Entebbe] and enclose the following letter:
"The Council requests that the government continue with the *implementation of development plans for Upper Nazareth, in line with the policy of population dispersal and development town settlement. Our town is a symbol and example of that policy, as the first development town in the Hebrew Galilee.* The Council requests an immediate meeting with the ministers concerned to discuss a development plan for the further settlement and expansion of our town Upper Nazareth" (emphasis added).

Tamir: I move that the Council organise a special delegation to visit the government ministers concerned with the development of Galilee, and to make the following statements:
"The City Council disapproves of Mr. Rabin's words against Upper Nazareth, like 1) 'Upper Nazareth's establishment was a mistake'. -- We want to emphasize that this has been the most successful 'mistake' ever made. And 2), 'not for long will housing in Upper Nazareth stand vacant before it will be handed over to residents of Nazareth'. -- We want to emphasize that *Upper Nazareth was set up to Judaize Galilee.* It is imperative that residents of Lower Nazareth be our peaceful neighbours, and it is detrimental to stir up anxiety among the residents of Upper Nazareth by saying that residents of Nazareth will live in Upper Nazareth. With all the honour due to the Prime Minister, we, the residents of Upper Nazareth, want to live in and develop our town along the lines of a purely Jewish tradition and culture, next to the city of Nazareth. We request additional new immigrants and young couples [to our town] -- then there will be no more vacant flats" (emphasis added).

It was Allon's version which was actually sent to the Prime Minister's Office.

The top levels of government responded promptly. Within one month the Ministry of Defence entered an agreement with the Upper Nazareth municipality to settle one thousand members of the professional army and their families within Jewish Nazareth. Moreover, during the month of September of the same year, the Ministry of Housing offered flats in Upper Nazareth at reduced prices.[186] An

increased number of the currently arriving new immigrants from the Soviet Union, Rumania and Argentina were directed to the town; and it was in these months that Upper Nazareth's land expansion (solicited for since the attainment of municipal status in 1974) was finalized.

At the level of local government too (and here Labour -- or, more precisely, Mayor Allon -- and Likud were at one with each other), steps were initiated to attend to *the problem of empty flats,* as the problem of Arabs moving into Upper Nazareth tends to be referred to in the minutes. First of all, the extent of the problem had to be captured statistically, a task which proved more difficult than might otherwise appear: those Arab families renting or having bought housing from Jewish homeowners (who had disposed of their flats illegally, that is, prior to having paid off the mortgages on them), could not safely register formally under their new address. Also, there were those Arab residents who, though having obtained housing through fully legal transactions, preferred to retain their Nazareth address -- place of residence determines, for instance, where one is eligible to vote in local government elections and the locality in which the children receive their schooling (by the same token this means that Arab residents who have not formally changed their address are ineligible to vote or run in the Upper Nazareth local elections). Thus a house-to-house survey by a municipal employee was deemed necessary (MC Management Subcommittee Minutes, 5.7.1976).

But beyond that practical step, local handling of the problem tended to become submerged in -- and at times seemingly overtaken by -- a fractious dispute

between one Mr. Rosenbaum (with some supporters) and the leaders of the Labour and Municipal Councils. To appreciate its entanglement with the problems raised by the Prime Minister's remarks, the dispute merits closer attention.

Mr. Rosenbaum and others had, for some time, become notorious in the community for failing to appear at the appointed times for their share of civil guard duty, and for this they had been repeatedly *disciplined* by the civil guard authority. When disciplined for the umpteenth time in July 1976, however, Mr. Rosenbaum argued that he, and others, were not dodging guard duty at all; rather, the reality was that they were *on duty* around the clock, *guarding* their wives and children in the face of the presence of those Arab families now living in their blocks and neighbourhoods. In effect, Mr. Rosenbaum sought to harness the public *problem* of Arabs in Upper Nazareth as a moral resource in his own battle with the Council leaders; the councillors, in their turn, delegitimated such a move by Mr. Rosenbaum -- and by any others who might be thinking of treading that path.

It would seem that Mr. Rosenbaum's own perception of self and his present circumstances in Upper Nazareth offer plausible grounds for his behaviour and antagonism to the local leadership thus expressed. He was born in Mandatory Palestine in 1928. His father had served in the Jewish military units in the British army in World War I; and he himself became a member of the paramilitary Gadnah youth movement and later joined the *Palmach* (a defence force associated with the left-wing kibbutz movement). He participated in the War of

Independence (in which he was wounded, as he emphasizes), and remained a professional soldier in the IDF following the establishment of the Israeli state (but for some reason he did not obtain officer rank). Prior to moving to Upper Nazareth in 1960 he lived on a kibbutz in the Beit Shean Valley (near the Jordan river). His wife is one of the first new immigrant settlers to Upper Nazareth arriving from Poland.

Mr. Rosenbaum seems to have had all it took to be upwardly mobile socially and professionally in; but for some reason he was not. When he entered the work force outside of the army in the late 6Os, the only employment he could locate in town was as a driver for one of the local factories, where he -- a Halutz and a Jew -- earned no more than the Arab workers employed in the factories, or, in some cases, even less. Recollections by other vatik settlers have it that Rosenbaum had -- from the beginning -- been "anti," that is, contrary; among other things, to the local power monopoly from which he was excluded. So, for him the "problem" became another occasion for an attack on the local leadership, as well as a potential springboard for a career in local politics.

Here, then, are excerpts from a meeting of the security subcommittee; they illustrate how the charge against Mr. Rosenbaum, and his counter-charge, served to narrow consideration of the problem and provide a forum for its practicable local management.

> *A subcommittee member, representing the Likud:* Today 500 Arab families live in our town, and this has caused people to claim also that they would rather guard their own house from Arab neighbours [than to appear on the appointed guard duty]. I request that we check whether a

person renting [a flat] from Amidar or still owing a mortgage payment is in a position to rent his flat to minority citizens.

Mr.Allon (also the chairman of the security subcommittee): The number of Arabs living in Upper Nazareth is half the number which [the previous speaker] mentioned, and this is according to a house-to-house survey [Note: both figures exclude the residents of the Kramim neighbourhood; the figure cited first, however, includes the Arab residents within the government housing project on Djab el-Sich, whereas Allon's count does not]. Today a person renting from Amidar or still owing a mortgage is not allowed to sublet his flat to *anyone* else. The municipality has the power to cut off the water supply to a house in which a person lives whose address is not the same as that entered in his identity card. By this method, we can keep a check on the composition of the population of Upper Nazareth.

The security coordinator: We cannot accept the excuse that a neighbour is of the minority population for people's failure to appear on guard duty. In the past, the excuses people used ranged from the lack of a decent hut or of thermoses for hot water to the lack of walkie-talkies; this is now just another excuse, and the people using it think it is a strong one. We have to begin sanctioning people who don't arrive on guard duty [reference to the introduction of a by-law imposing a fine].

Allon: Eight [Jewish] families have already been taken to court for illegally renting out their flats!

A security subcommittee member and member of the local police force: I request that minority citizens claiming to live in the settlement [but having a different address registered in their Identity Cards] not be allowed to enter Upper Nazareth [i.e.,to live in their flats there], until the issue is clarified. I also demand that the claim made by [a guard duty dodger], that Arabs from the Territories have rented flats in Upper Nazareth, above his flat on Jizreal Street, be investigated [the claim remained unsubstantiated; Arab tenants were, for the most part, from Nazareth].

A third security subcommittee member): I request that anyone renting a flat in our town be obligated by law to change the address in his identity card to the address he is living at.

The Legal Adviser to the municipality: Every citizen is permitted today to live in any place he wishes. It is possible to make it more

difficult for those renting if the landlord owes a mortgage or for some other reason is, according to law, not allowed to sublet; but you realize this is all that can be done legally.

Allon: I request you, [the Legal Adviser], check out in detail all legal aspects surrounding town settlement.

A fourth security subcommittee member: I request that the income tax registration numbers of the landlords be updated, and that environmental pressure be exerted on the inhabitants. [It is unclear which inhabitants -- those subletting to Arab tenants or the Arab tenants. No replies to this suggestion are recorded in the minutes; there appears an abrupt switch in topic to trivial organisational matters].

Two neighbourhoods in particular came to be defined as the central loci of the problem: the Southern neighbourhood (especially Jizrael Street) and -- the then prestigious single family home area,[187] *Permanent Army* on Djab el-Sich, originally established, as the name reminds, for professional army personnel. In a way, each neighbourhood symbolizes one of the two different facets of the problem. What was happening in the Southern neighbourhood, comprised exclusively of apartment blocks (condominiums for the most part) and only completed in the beginning to the middle of the 1970s -- so that most of the original owners still owed mortgages, was susceptible to legal counter-measures (at the time the presence of Arab tenants largely involved illegal marketing of housing). In the *Permanent Army* neighbourhood, on the other hand, there lived intellectuals and professionals from Nazareth who had purchased their way in, quite legally, from departing army personnel who had either fully purchased their homes on the spot or had, by the early 70s, paid off their homes. Thus Djab el-Sich, the mountain top on which Ben-Gurion is said to have proclaimed the creation of a Jewish Nazareth, and the focus of early efforts to establish and to

maintain clearly demarcated territorial boundaries between the Jewish and the Arab town, but which had since become a symbol of coexistence, was *slowly and uncontestably returning to the hands of its original 'owners'* -- the residents of Nazareth. Now these residents, together with those professionals and intellectuals who had built for themselves homes in the Kramim neighbourhood, emerged as spokespersons for the interests and rights of the Arab residents of Upper Nazareth, for the "residents of Kramim," as they referred to Arab Upper Nazareans collectively. In doing so they conceptually integrated the "Permanent Army" neighbourhood, the minority housing project west of it, and the Kramim neighbourhood proper; this, indeed, was doing and talking the politics of place which, up to that time, had been a marked feature of Jewish hegemonistic politics in the history of Jewish-Arab relations in the two Nazareths.

Initially, the "residents of the Kramim neighbourhood" (read: the spokespeople for the Arab residents of Upper Nazareth based, for the largest part, in the "Permanent Army" neighbourhood) approached the Upper Nazareth municipal council with a demand for municipal tax reductions for the residents of Kramim proper, on the grounds that they were not receiving equal municipal services; for example; the roads were in a state of disrepair and needed widening; and educational facilities were lacking. The municipality's legal adviser informed the Council that in this situation a proportional tax reduction was unavoidable by law (MC Management Subcommittee Meeting, 18.7.1976). But soon thereafter the "residents of the Kramim neighbourhood" let it be known through the grapevine that they intended to form a local Arab list, focusing upon full services for Upper Nazareth's Arab population: a kindergarten, a school, maybe a mosque.

The chances of an Arab list drawing a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat on the council were, at this point in time, undeniably slim (due to their number, combined with the fact that many of them had not registered Upper Nazareth as their first residence). But the very prospect of a separate national minority list as much as *running* in the local elections of the acclaimed *Jewish* Nazareth posed a threat to the further growth (Jewish, that is) of the town. This would be so in multifarious respects: in the view of governmental and non-governmental national bodies on whose material support the town depends; the Jewish Israeli public at large, from which the locality continually hopes to recruit additional new settlers; the local Jewish electorate, on whose votes the ruling leadership's retention of power hinges; and also the Arab Other of Nazareth, who would thereby be encouraged (by having landed thus another victory against Jewish Nazareth). More Arabs might move up-town, and, at all events, valuable votes would be funnelled off from the local Labour Party which the Arab residents had thus far supported. The Arab ethno-politicians who threatened to organise the separate local list were quite aware of the symbolic leverage they could exert in this way.

And leverage was what insinuations of the organisation of a separate list were all about; thus, *following a few visits* (as informed Jewish residents put it with a smirk -- sometimes amused, other times maleficent) by two local politicians who were soon to become the new mayor and deputy mayor, the Arab ethno-politicians were dissuaded, the idea of a separate list withdrawn. Promises of various services were given. In December 1977, when those who promised were

then in a position to supply, the new mayor informed Council of a meeting with a representative of the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem to discuss the establishment of a kindergarten for minority children in Upper Nazareth (Minutes, 12.12.1977); and a kindergarten for Arab children -- staffed by a Christian and a Jewish kindergarten teacher -- was, in fact, opened within the following year, located between the "Permanent Army" neighbourhood and the minority housing complex west of it. Moreover, in 1979, the main road running through the Kramim neighbourhood proper was widened -- albeit the residents were asked to participate in the financial costs "due to budget difficulties" (MC Management Subcommittee Minutes, 25.12.1979).

5.4. A New Leader for a Revised Vision of Jewish Nazareth

Precisely at the time when 'Jewish Nazareth' was being ideationally and structurally redefined (at all levels and from both sides) and, in Upper Nazareth, once again the questions were being asked, "Who are We?", "Who are They?", and "How can Them and Us (because we must) share our most immediate living space?", there took place the first major reshuffling of local leadership in Upper Nazareth's 20-year history. Allon, the primary 'architect' of Upper Nazareth -- and of one Jewish Nazareth -- was being ousted from power: and not as a result of public local elections, but upon orders emanating from highest echelons of the national Labour Party. The decision itself will be considered in a moment.

In September of 1976, the Labour Party branch of Upper Nazareth received orders from its national secretariat that M. Allon be removed from first place on the local party list (and as mayoral candidate[188]) in the upcoming elections of October 1978. In his place they were to nominate M. Ariav, the man who had for more than ten years featured second on the list, and as the deputy council chairman/mayor.[189] To all concerned -- with the exception, perhaps, of M. Ariav and the devoted following which he showed to have cultivated behind the scenes -- this decision appeared to 'fall from the sky'. The local party branch duly convened and voted on Ariav's nomination: 39 in favour, 11 against.[190]

Initially, Allon was intent on fighting back -- for his honour most of all. In his own words, Upper Nazareth represented his *life's work* for which he had given his *best years.* At two Municipal Council meetings a week later, Allon removed Ariav from his post of deputy mayor, installing in his place one of the Labour councillors loyal to him; the second deputy mayor position was given to Tamir (voted onto the Council on a Likud ticket, we recall, he had left the Likud to establish an independent local list which he intended to coalesce with the Labour Alignment). Ariav and his following were absent from these meetings (a symbolic expression of their refusal to continue to accept Allon as the legitimate highest local authority figure?)

The Council was now split down the middle -- and across party-boundaries -- into pro-Allon and pro-Ariav factions. At first, Allon had four of the eight Labour councillors and one Likud councillors on his side; whereas the remaining four Labour councillors and two Likud councillors supported Ariav. But soon two

of the Labour councillors deserted Allon. In January of 1977, Allon and what had remained of his following among the Labour faction announced their dissociation from Labour and the establishment of an independent party. In a letter to the national secretary of the Labour party Allon explained that the final decision as to who would be the next mayor would thus be left to the local electorate -- as it should be in accordance with democratic principles.[191] To underline his point (and to confirm his hopes) Allon gathered 3,500 signatures testifying to the continued strength of his support locally.

But as things now stood, the 'opposition' commanded the majority of seats and the Council ceased to be functional administratively: a budget for 1977/78 had still not been passed by the end of 1977; the municipal treasurer who had deceased in May 1977 remained unreplaced; the subcommittees for tenders, finance and security had been resting inactive for months; and rates, water fees, and municipal taxes had not been collected since the beginning of the year. And when the Ministry of the Interior threatened to dissolve Council and appoint a new one, unless Council itself made arrangements to resume proper functioning immediately, Allon was under strong pressure to resign from his position as mayor. Under the supervision of the Northern District Administrator, Council was reconstituted by appointment along the lines of the new current party constellation among the councillors: the Labour Alignment occupied five seats, Allon's Independent list ("The Party for Development") was allocated three seats, Tamir's party ("For the Development of Upper Nazareth") received one, and the Likud was left with two. The Council members unanimously elected Ariav the

new mayor, and a nominee of Ariav's (from the ranks of the Likud, Y. Windish) was elected the new deputy mayor (MC Minutes, 23.8.1977; Erann 1977). Allon and Tamir behaved as an informal coalition; and in January of 1978, at the beginning of the election year, the two parties unified formally.

Contrary to appearances, however, the final party constellation, for the upcoming local elections, was far from being settled. By the time of the campaign race, the Allon-Tamir party had dissolved: Tamir ran on the Labour Alignment ticket in sixth place; Allon withdrew from the race and left town . (Interestingly enough, Allon insisted on selling his house to a Jewish buyer which delayed the sale of his house for three years [though the buyer, two years down the road, himself sold it to an Arab family]; whereas Ariav, changing residence a few years earlier, had sold his former home to an Arab buyer -- a fact which was not widely known or publicized at the time, but would be in the near future.) The man who had been the second Likud councillor (and Ariav's deputy) created, in the last minute, his own independent party (*The Party for the Development of Upper Nazareth*). Table 2 shows the final results of the 1978 City Council elections, Table 3 the results of the mayoral elections. We note that the Labour Alignment registered a loss of two seats compared with the previous elections in 1974, whereas the Mafdal scored a comeback, regaining the one seat it had had to cede in 1974 (and after the elections it, too, became part of the coalition with Labour). Finally, it is important to note that Likud -- which received the same number of seats as in previous elections -- was not the same as it had been in 1974, neither in terms of the figures using the label nor in terms of the meaning it carried. It was

now an amalgamation of the national and a local list; each headed by a person who had locally become associated with "confronting the Arab problem" through their involvement in the grassroots movement petitioning the Prime Minister (though the problem was not made explicitly a campaign issue by any of the parties in these elections).

Table 2: Results of Upper Nazareth Municipal Council Elections of October 1978.

Party List	Votes	Seats
Labour Alignment	4,766	6
Likud + Local List	1,584	2
Mafdal	669	1
Independent List	1,384	2
Total	8,403	11

Table 3: Results of Upper Nazareth Mayoral Elections of October 1978.

Candidate	Votes	% of Total Votes
Ariav (Labour)	5,009	61.18
Windish (Indep.)	1,536	18.76
Cohen (Indep. in coalition with Likud)	1,643	20.06

(*Source:* Municipal Council Minutes, 18.12.1978.)

Concerning the removal, at the behest of the national Labour Party, of Allon one would like to know what factors, or lines of reasoning, lay behind and

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propelled the decision; but what I am in a better position to explain is the specific local n.anagement of the decision its symbolic and practical implications.

Many whom I asked would not talk about it. Among those who were prepared to talk, some were elusive, others elucidatory; the explanations, inconsistent in other respects, have one common denominator: the decision to remove Allon had something to do with the idea of a Unified Nazareth and transformations therein:

> *Danny Cohen (heading the Independent List affiliated with Likud in the 1978 elections):* I am the right person to ask, since this was the starting point of my political involvement. At that crisis point I started. Motke [Allon] had nurtured beside him this man Ariav, as the secretary of the Labour Council and as his deputy on the Council; Motke wanted to grow, politically, beyond mayorsàip [of Jewish Nazareth]. At one stage he had had dreams of a United City. That is, as soon as Upper Nazareth became larger than Nazareth, he wanted to bring about a municipal merger, with him as the mayor of the United City. So he established connections with Arab leaders in the Lower Town. That was the period of Al Din Zu'ebi [mayor of Nazareth prior to 1975] and the time when the *hamulot* still listened to their heads and voted Mapai and Labour. But then came the first 'revolution' in Nazareth, then the second -- and it also became clear that the City [Nazareth] was growing faster, demographically, than Upper Nazareth. That was when the Communists came to power; but Motke must have seen it coming. So, when he realized that he would not be mayor of the United Nazareth, he wanted to run for the Knesset or some other top position.[192] I think, Menachem [Ariav] pushed him towards this, because he wanted to be the next mayor -- of the Jewish Nazareth. So, Motke looked for some position. At some stage he thought he was about to land one -- that was around the 1974 elections. So he entered a rotation agreement with Ariav: during the first half of the term Motke would be mayor, during the second half Ariav would take over. The condition was, of course, that Motke would find a suitable position. Two years later Ariav wanted to get his share of the bargain; but Allon refused to step down, because he hadn't found a position yet. Nothing he was offered suited him quite right. That's when the quarrel came out in the open.

researcher: But the decision to remove Allon came from the central party...

D.Cohen: I don't know about that. What I told you is how I heard it.

While this informant postulates the changeover was brought on ultimately by Allon's own loss of interest, others -- in the knowledge that the decision had emanated from the top -- suggest that Allon had lost touch with new realities:

> Look, Allon was past, and the party knew it, I think. It was at the time when the dream of a United Nazareth had fallen apart -- the Communists spoiled it. Allon had worked for this idea, it was like his child...He just wasn't the right man for the job any longer. That's what I think; but I can't be sure (Ruven, a Labour Party member).

Among the elusive respondents are *both* the displaced mayor and his replacement. Thus, Mayor Ariav:

> It was an inter-party thing; the decision came from above. That's as far as I want to go into that whole issue!

M. Allon proved somewhat more willing to elaborate (perhaps he felt a strong need to clarify the record concerning his place in local history):

> [Long silence before he answers my question.] Well, I resigned by...I was forced to resign, you know. It was political, an internal party matter. The party...It was a period when the party was losing the government; actually before that already, the party was losing the government. So the party was under pressure...It was an internal thing! And when I saw that my own people are not going with me -- what good would it have been? I was then offered an official mission in the Far East, so I decided to go.

> In any case, there are several things which I would have done in the meantime [had I remained mayor]; and maybe even a few things which I

did then that today, if I had to do it all over again, I would do differently. I should have faced the situation that exists today, the problems -- families living next to one another [means Jewish and Arab families]; I understand that there may be bad feelings. Maybe I should have done more of what I did for a certain period of time: we were connected with Nazareth -- with schools, with the clergy. Maybe I should have pressed harder, and for more connections. The plan, the system of building more -- within the boundaries of Upper Nazareth -- for the Arab people, *that* we should have continued, I think. When that stopped...But overall, I think, it is a very nice town as it is. I am on good terms with Tawfik Ziad, you know. But he knows that he is not going to change my attitude and ideology, and I am sure I am not going to change his. He studied in Moscow for four years, he is a Communist; I know he is a [real] Communist. I think it was in 1976; we met, both of us, in Beit Lessim. It was on the radio and television then, the discussion between Tawfik Ziad and me...Of course he came with all the nationalist slogans. I told him, "I think that it would be good if the two towns could continue to live next to each other, but it is not advisable that one enters into the other's house, to be close neighbours with the other one in one and the same house. Too many differences exist between the two communities; and, I say, even the Christians and the Moslems can't live together, but live in separate quarters! You have a Christian and you have a Moslem quarter; -- and you have a Jewish quarter!"

What should not be lost from view is the fact that Allon -- the champion of a United Nazareth -- was an explicit symbol of that idea and its implementation. Whereas Ariav, although he had worked along-side and closely with Allon, had remained in the background of public attention; so that there were few preconceptions about what his views might be concerning a Unified Nazareth. Thus he was able to give Upper Nazareth a new definition of local self.

Allon, with strong connections in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and put in control on top of the mountain, had been in a position to develop a personal interest in politicking in and with Nazareth; indeed, he excelled in three-cornered politics,

acting as if -- and seeking to convince Jerusalem and Tel Aviv of this -- that 'Nazareth' was of highest state priority (he even sought, we recall, to harness *the pope*). Evidently (and quite befitting the early days of Jewish nation-building to which he belonged), he was thinking and planning 'big', anomalously 'big' in what really comprised, on a national scale, a small scenario and small-league politics. He did so with the Arab Other incorporated in the scheme of the Zionist enterprise. However, in the wake of the new realities in Nazareth, once Nazareth rejected to play his game, to accept his interlocution and, instead, changed mode from 'being' to 'doing' Arab in Israel, Allon's virtues -- and such they were within the original scheme -- were no longer at a premium. Moreover, previously he had demonstrated restraint and diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the Arab Other (even to the Arab Other *within* Upper Nazareth); but with the tables turned, Allon proved ill-adaptive. He would certainly not negotiate with the Other, in Upper Nazareth, to avert the formation of a separate ethnic list.

Ariav, on the other hand, was a pragmatist who readily adjusted to the new situation by refocusing local politics and ideology more modestly and narrowly, in exclusion of Nazareth. In fact, he had always been more of a realist concerning the actual small-league scale of significance of Jewish Nazareth. Simultaneously, Ariav proved in the light of changing circumstances the necessary Self-restraint with respect to the management of the Arab problem in Upper Nazareth (his voice lowers when it comes to talking about the problem and measures of solving it; nor are there any written documents witnessing Ariav's involvement in tackling the problem). He evidenced an ability and willingness to negotiate with the Arab Other inside Our house. These qualities were now at a premium.

If, symbolically, the new mayor had little of the vision of a Unified Nazareth imprinted upon him, in his own way he personified and symbolized Labour Zionism and its central values, in their statist transmutation -- though in a current version of it, which tries to ignore the Arab Other, or at least leave them to their own devices, concentrating instead on the Jewish Us.[193]

The changeover of leadership might not necessarily have been formulated in such terms; rather, I have aimed at identifying what I see to be its symbolic and practical consequences -- intentional or unintentional -- which, I think, were perceived in this way, at least in part, by those immediately concerned.

Chapter 6

From 'Doing' the Judaization of Nazareth to 'Being' but a Jewish Town in Galilee

The surface appearance of the new ideological and political emphasis notwithstanding, Nazareth -- the city of the Other -- continues to be the major reference point by which Jewish Self is orienting itself. But there is one difference. In the earlier scheme of things Nazareth furnished an overarching blueprint of and target for Our *actions* (directed at *becoming*) that were *inclusive* of it (at that time the idea of One Nazareth was good news); now Nazareth is the arena of action to which the Jewish Us has to *react* so as to remain "as we were meant to be and always have been," namely, separate from and in *exclusion* of Nazareth (for now the possibility of One Nazareth has become bad news).

And it could hardly be otherwise, given Nazareth's close physical proximity, growing ever closer with Their migration into Our town. On the one hand, encounters with the Other grow ever more frequent, routinized and multidimensional as spatial boundaries cease to sketch out reliable and airtight ethnic boundaries; on the other hand, this Arab Other periodically stages ethno-political dramas, as on Land Day. These realities negate and defy any full-blown *cultural* severance of Jewish Self from Arab Other in Nazareth (however much it may be desired).

Moreover, the available options for 'doing' so as to remain both a *Jewish* and a Development town next to Nazareth, if 'doing' is to remain within the confines *of what can be done legitimately*, that is, without breaching Israel's democratic principles, are few. (We caught a glimpse in the previous chapter of the range of possible measures locally explored and resorted to.) But the local government does direct intense efforts to making the locality "more attractive" within the means at its disposal, to prospective and established residents alike. It seeks to draw new settlers to Upper Nazareth by means of inducements such as municipal grants to cover the expenses for moving, exemptions from municipal rates for a limited period of time, or additional reductions on already low-cost, government-subsidized housing. It strives to keep local residents in town, as well as to attract additional settlers, by upgrading post-secondary educational and occupational opportunities and creating a wider array of leisure and entertainment facilities locally. However, it is in such ventures as these that the two-edged nature of 'doing' so as to remain a Jewish town, but without overtly discriminating along ethnic lines, has become quite apparent. For whatever improved services and increased opportunities the municipality manages to provide, they are bound to raise demands among (and thus to attract) the Arab population of Nazareth (in fact, especially among them). The point here is that legally and legitimately practicable actions aimed at maintaining the *status quo* as a Jewish town, may help to perpetuate, and intensify, the very trends threatening it.

The same can be said of the new local leadership's efforts to maintain a

public image, at the very least, of Upper Nazareth as Jewish (rather than ethnically mixed). The leadership has tended to keep the problem quiet and low-key. But this opens the possibility of the Jewish electorate -- and political others -- (mis)interpreting such a policy as a failure to confront and deal with the problem. The most serious symbolic threat to the maintenance of Upper Nazareth's public image as Jewish is, however, the standing possibility of the formation of a local Arab party. This has consumed the largest part of the local leadership's attention and presented them with the highest risks.

What I wish to draw attention to, in this connection, are the conflicting expectations or demands pertaining locally to problem management. Local leadership has to deal with various political levels and ideological others, as well as with contradictory ideological and practical needs. This was made all the more problematic because the local Jewish population, lacked precise knowledge of what the rules and limits, pertaining to the management of the new situation, were; or what the cost of breaching them, for the sake of Zionism, would in fact turn out to be. This gap in local knowledge was soon to be rectified, and the rules to become an essential part of the stock of Jewish Nazarean's everyday cultural knowledge.

6.1. Cultural Imperative, Political Dilemma: 'Doing' For While Legitimately 'Doing' Against Arabs in Upper Nazareth

In addition to service provision,[194] the Jewish leadership has taken to initiating protekzia relationships with selected Arab residents, Christian Arab primarily. But the mayor does not act directly as the patron or front-man; instead, these patronage relationships have tended to be initiated and entertained by others (not infrequently individuals who themselves stand in direct protekzia relation with the mayor), including the deputy mayor. One such a relationship stands out for the paradox it contains (also in the eyes of the people of Upper Nazareth I spoke to) on account of the personae it involves and the specific (and legal) definition of the relationship between them. The arrangement is between Yanko -- the former Likud politician, subsequently the founder and head of the local list forming a coalition with Labour, and deputy mayor -- and Salwa -- a Christian Arab resident of the Kramim neighbourhood, a native of Nazareth, who ended up filling the position as the kindergarten teacher of the second minority kindergarten. *Salwa is the adopted daughter of the deputy mayor.*[195]

Where the local leadership seems either to have felt at a loss or to have been indeterminate is with respect to canvassing via protekzia networks among the *Moslem* Arab residents; the perceived cultural gap between Moslems and Jews, it appears, is by far wider than that between Christians and Jews. The cultural coordinator of the central Community Centre (an immigrant from South America, himself an anthropologist) told me about a telephone call he had received from the mayor, many years ago, asking him to "somehow get the votes of these Arabs

living in these blocks* (of the 'Kramim' neighbourhood).[196] But how was he to achieve this -- how to approach them, via whom, and what could he possibly promise them?

Conflicting demands -- to 'do for' the Arab Other in Upper Nazareth while striving to 'do against' the exacerbation of the local Arab problem -- are created not merely on account of the politicized Arab Other within Upper Nazareth, but also by the need to ensure local industrial interests a reliable labour fource -- a matter that takes precedence over another set of Jewish-Israeli interests, namely, those of ethno-territorial boundaries. The municipality's population department official provided me with a case in point. I had looked her up with the intention of obtaining some statistics pertaining to the number of Arab residents in Upper Nazareth, perhaps even figures indicative of demographic trends; plus data on Jewish in- and outmigration over the past five to ten years. The first thing she told me was that she doesn't deal with Arabs at all:

> I don't deal with Arabs. I don't touch that mess! And I wouldn't want to. If you want to know about them, you have to ask the mayor. Or, you can try the Ministry of Housing's Minority Department. I concern myself only with Jews!

The population official's key function (one of 'doing') is to attract new Jewish residents to the town.[197] In the process of explaining her work to me she remembered one incident involving a non-Jew:

> Once *Elsint*, a high-tech plant here, needed a computer technician desperately. They tried, and we tried, to find someone suitable and willing to move here to fill the position. But we couldn't find a Jewish candidate. So, in the end, it was filled by a non-Jewish chap. Nicolai was his name. He was a professor, the only one fully qualified for the

job. He was from Nazareth. And he was willing to take the job on the condition that he receive the same benefits any other candidate would have received -- housing at a reduced rate, the municipal grant, and all that. He was really in demand. So we brought him here, even though he was non-Jewish. But there were problems settling him here, getting him all the benefits. It took our [the municipality's] and the Ministry of Housing's Minority Department's joint input to arrange all that. And together we made it a special case, getting him all the benefits a Jew would get.

researcher: He was an Arab?

Yes, he was Arab, a Christian. So, if I am told to, if it is an exception like that, I will deal with them. But normally I don't.

6.2. Zionism Versus Democracy

6.2.1. Diverse Forms of Problem Management Reconsidered: Jewish Reactions to a Non-Routine Ethno-Drama in Nazareth

Land Day has become a routine ethno-political event on March 30 of every year, a day marked by rallies in Nazareth in which the Palestinian flag is raised and by a general (Arab) strike. Because of its fixture in the calendar, Upper Nazareth is able to prepare for and manage their dealings in and around Nazareth on this day. Importantly, the violent confrontations which had erupted when Land Day was staged for the first time in 1976, did not repeat themselves over the following years, so that, as the years and further Land Days went by, Jewish

residents of Upper Nazareth grew less stringent in their avoidance of the city on this day.

On September 22, 1982, however, the residents of Upper Nazareth were caught unprepared by a non-routine and unannounced ethno-political demonstration in the Arab city; and on top of the surprise element, it culminated in physical threats against some of Upper Nazareth's residents which led to violent clashes between demonstrators and the police of Upper Nazareth. On this day, a group of *radical elements* (labelled as such not only by the Jewish side but also by Nazareth's Mayor Tawfik Ziad who subsequently distanced himself and his party from it) -- in demonstration against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla -- broke the windows of the *Mashbir* department store as well as the *Ha'poalim* Bank in Nazareth, blocked the road leading to Upper Nazareth with burning tires, and threw stones at buses and private vehicles, damaging nine, that were travelling this road.

The event, as such, was never brought up in stories or conversations by my informants themselves, unless confronted by explicit questions -- and then local memory centres around the break of routine to which it gave rise rather than on the demonstration itself. It seems that Jewish reaction to the demonstration remains, to this day, a sensitive issue, mentioned only in private and then with apprehension by most, and with resignation and defensiveness by those who temporarily became public advocates of a new line of 'doing' (i.e., responding). One Friday evening over coffee with a middle-aged couple that has lived in Upper Nazareth since 1960 (both are sabras and ex-kibbutznikkim, self-declared *left-

over" Labour Zionists, and "against Arabs moving into Upper Nazareth"). I inquired how that demonstration in Nazareth against Sabra and Shatilla in 1982 effected them personally:[198]

> *Chaim* [to his wife Ronit]: She [the researcher] must be referring to the disturbances that caused the roads to Nazareth to be closed...

> *Ronit* [to me]: When I was returning from work there was still glass scattered all over the road...

> *Chaim* [to me]: I want to tell you something. I don't quite know how to put this. I guess one can look at this objectively, or one can look at it subjectively, as a Jew and a resident of Upper Nazareth. It is not the first time that something like this happened! It was only the first time that it received publicity, that it was made public in the papers. Why? Because the papers were sensitive to what was happening in Lebanon; so they linked the two. But it was not the first time that there were disturbances in Nazareth. What actually happened? There were simply some disturbances, and they broke the windows of the Mashbir.

> *Ronit*: They broke their own windows!

> *Chaim*: Incorrect!

> *Ronit*: What's the Mashbir? Who mainly benefits from the store? *They* buy in the Mashbir! And the employees there are all Arabs!

> *Chaim*: Not true, Ronit! The Mashbir is like a symbol of the Jewish establishment! What difference does it make that they work there? And those who broke the windows weren't those that worked there! Why do they break windows in the post office in Jerusalem? Because these are symbols of the Jewish establishment. It's like a flag. Like burning a flag! And why do they burn our flag? ...

> *Ronit*: I remember, one couldn't get into Upper Nazareth [on that day]. I was unable to return home from work! They had barricaded the road, with broken bottles and burning tires. I couldn't get home because they blocked the road. I had to wait until the road had been cleared. I waited at work until it was announced on the radio that the road was open again.

Chaim: You see, she [Ronit] was working at *Oranim* at the time [a teachers' training college affiliated with Haifa University, located between Haifa and Tiv'on]. I think that if one looks at these events historically, the actual disturbances were perhaps insignificant; but they did light the 'red light', a red light signalling danger to Upper Nazareth. The mere fact that the roads to Upper Nazareth could that easily be closed off! And of course also in crisis times, in a state of emergency. That is, the fact that they burned tires, broke bottles, threw at people [vehicles], was important only because things led to a new line of thinking about Upper Nazareth. Up until then, no one had thought such a situation feasible really: that one is dependent on a thin line that can easily be cut. And today there are plans -- I am also an army man in this place -- special plans about what to do in a state of emergency...

Ronit: Both entrances to Nazareth [means Upper Nazareth] lead either through the Arab city or an Arab village!

Chaim: I am talking about a military plan: what we have to do if something should happen tomorrow. There is a detailed plan about what everyone has to do, where everyone has to be positioned, which weapons, and so on. You see, the whole thing was a final blow to the belief that Jews and Arabs can live together. For the Jews this was quite...Look, I used to be among a group of people who always argued that we must live with each other; but later I felt: *not in the same house!* There were many people who saw in [my view] an incitement to racism. But now, after what happened there [in 1982], everyone saw that the borderline between an open and a closed road is a thin one. That was the period when something like a radicalization took place here in Upper Nazareth; when many people reached an awareness that Upper Nazareth *had* to be a Jewish town. That was the outcome of these disturbances. They gave a push to the realization that Upper Nazareth could otherwise be in trouble one day. And if there is potential for trouble, and the people causing the trouble sit within our midst, one then *has* to deal with this. No one wanted to deal with this before that.

Significant factors in the local Jewish response to the 1982 demonstration were that (1) this particular demonstration had been *illegal*, (2) the Arab Other had publicly criticized the Israeli state's *foreign policy* (as opposed to Israel's

policy towards Arabs in Israel), and (3) Jewish Upper Nazareth had been attacked not merely rhetorically but *physically*. All of this lent to Jewish reactions an aura of legitimacy which the measures in answer to the upheavals in Nazareth in 1975/76, for example, had lacked; here, in the Jewish view, quite clearly the law had been broken and Israel's Zionist principles -- indeed, "the Jewish people" -- attacked. And the Jewish side made this difference quite explicit (see, for example, M. Ariav in *Yediot Ha'Galil*, 22.10.1982).

Of particular importance was that the line between what was an illegitimate response and what was not had become somewhat blurred by the events, and this because the Arab Other of Nazareth had broken away from the rules. This situation lent itself to politicization, one in which a true and full-blown opposition could be constructed.

The new mayor's policy up to this time had been to work for the continued Jewishness of Upper Nazareth within the norms of the political economy of Jewish-Arab relations (as defined at the centre); institutional concessions to the local Arab Other seemed, to him, a small price to pay in return for the continued support of his political career by the top echelons of his national party; for the economic and logistic development of the locality, his power basis, by central governmental and non-governmental institutions; and for the maintenance of a *modus vivendi* with the Arab city on which Upper Nazareth depended economically and politically. Insofar as he had promoted Judaization with rhetoric explicitness, it had been at the regional level. In fact, in terms of a political career, Ariav demonstrated no less ambition than had Allon (whom he

replaced in 1977); Ariav, too, has had an eye on a seat in the Knesset (he features on Labour Alignment's list for the upcoming national elections in 1988). But his political springboard has been the region, not (as was the case with Allon) the locality. His key forum for regional politicking has been the Galilee Regional Council (GRC) -- formed in the late 1970s as one of the national responses to the major turning point in Nazareth; he has been its chairman, through repeated re-elections, since its inception.

At this new crisis point (1982), the mayor remained true to this political programme. More than that, his adherence to *the law*, his demonstration of cool-headedness, and his continued willingness to work for coexistence -- even in the face of such a trying situation -- was forging a virtuous image of the Jewish Self versus the Arab Other (constructed as 'spoilers'). The wider Jewish audience saw him as a regional interlocuter between Jew and Arab. But what did all this mean to residents of Upper Nazareth, concerned primarily with their everyday lives there?

Three municipal meetings took place within six weeks following the demonstration.[199] The presence of a senior official from the Office of the Adviser on Arab Affairs at one of the meetings is indicative of the serious differences within the Council concerning how Upper Nazareth should respond. The Likud advocated the total severance of any ties with the Arab Other; the incumbent leadership insisted on the need for moderation, and was backed by the District Director of the Arab Adviser's Office:

Mr. Kfir summarized the mood of the Arab public in Nazareth since the beginning of the "Peace of Galilee" War [Israel's invasion of Lebanon]. He pointed out that the disturbances of September 22 were the doings of a few hundred urchins and law-breakers who represent a minute percentage of Nazareth's population. In his opinion it would be a sinful mistake if we included the silent majority under the flag of these extremists; because we would thereby push the majority to the extreme. He proposes that we distinguish between the extreme few and the silent majority, and declare so publicly. Thereby we would lend a hand to the moderates in Nazareth (MC Minutes, 2.11.1982).

A "pointed discussion" followed, between the Likud councillor, on the one hand, and the Labour councillors and mayor, on the other.[200] By the end of the meeting, the mayor's and district official's suggestions were unanimously passed; and the organisation of an informal conciliation meeting between Upper Nazareth Council members and notables of Nazareth was agreed upon.[201]

But the Jewish electorate of Upper Nazareth had also to be taken into account; the mayor made it a point to stress publically that the leadership was battling for the achievement of the original aims of Upper Nazareth -- that is, to 'be' a Jewish city in Galilee; and was doing so with all *legal* means.[202] But (as on earlier occasions) Upper Nazareth's continued dependence upon Nazareth begged for a political solution. This time, transport services *had* been paralysed as a result of the events in Nazareth, and the leaders felt they now had a strong enough case with which to break, even in the Supreme Court, the Arab bus company's monopoly over transport services in Upper Nazareth.[203] But once again the attempt failed: the service disruption had not originated with the company; the company had merely been a victim of circumstances, just as much as had been the private vehicles seeking to reach Jewish Nazareth on that day. (However, many locals still think that the mayor did not adequately "exploit the

opportunity* to rid the town of this aggravating dependence: instead of basing his argument on service disruptions,[204] he should have pressed security considerations.)

The Council did purport to address Upper Nazareth's commercial dependence on the Arab city; this time through the establishment of a *Shekem* department store (an army co-operative) and a gigantic supermarket, *in order to ensure a regular, undisruptable supply of produce to the residents of Upper Nazareth* (MC Minutes, 3.10.1982).[205] What should be stressed, though, is that much more media attention was invited, and paid, to the Council's concern to bring about *rapprochement* and *cooperation* between Jewish and Arab local authorities in Galilee, than to sanctions against the Arab sector. An example is the organisation by Upper Nazareth's comprehensive school of a joint peace-study day for high school educators of the Jewish town and the neighbouring Arab village of Iksal; the outcome was the introduction of *peace studies,* aiming to increase *cross-cultural understanding,* as part of the curriculum in both schools (the programme made it a point to take an a-political, cultural approach) (*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 15.10.1982; 14.1.1983). Still weightier symbolically, Mayor Ariav (as chairman of the Galilee Regional Council of Jewish Settlements), arranged two joint meetings between the heads of Arab and Jewish local authorities in Galilee *to discuss ways of cooperation.* It was on these occasions that the mayors of the two transformed, Nazareths for the first time talked with each other face-to-face.[206]

Even so, Mayor Ariav did attempt to take advantage of the Arab Other's

breach of rules, to tackle the problem of Arabs within Jewish Nazareth. On a motion from the mayor, the emergency MC meeting authorized an approach to the Ministry of the Interior for the exclusion of the all-Arab neighbourhood Kramim from the jurisdiction of Upper Nazareth. But this was kept well out of the public's view; presumably a wise approach, in the event of the request not being heeded. Indeed, the Kramim neighbourhood was to stay within Jewish Upper Nazareth; and one would like to know why. My informants would not concede that there was an attempt to rid the town of the Arab neighbourhood. But they appeared to give me an answer -- in hypothetical form, "what would happen *if* the municipal government were to attempt it?": the residents of that neighbourhood "would object and even take it to the courts if necessary;" and "they could be expected to win the case, because, the way the laws regulate things, they really *should* be part of Upper Nazareth."

And at the grassroots level (or so it seemed) yet another petition was circulated asking local residents not to sell flats to Arabs, "because the money comes from the PLO."[207] Moreover, shopping trips to Nazareth were, temporarily, curtailed to the point where merchants of Nazareth began to feel the economic impact and appealed to Upper Nazareth's leadership to "find a way to improve relations between the two cities."[208] The boycott itself seemed orchestrated, the Arab response to have been invited; witness a locally distributed hand-bill proclaiming -- (not unlike the *ad hoc* committee in its demonstration in 1976), "Our answer to Arab violence is to cut off our contacts with our neighbours," that is, "unless local groups stand up and condemn such action."

The difference between the two situations was, however, that those addressing the problem of economic ties with the Arab city, publicly and quite explicitly, now did so under a specific party label: that of the local Likud.

6.2.2. MENA and Likud: Mobilizing the "Arab Problem," Explicating Rules of Problem Management

At the time of the non-routine ethno-drama in Nazareth, Upper Nazareth elections were one year away -- a time when the various parties sit down to formulate, or update, their platforms and prepare their campaign strategies. Here, then, the right issue had been created at the right time to transform symbolic and rhetorical opposition into a true political alternative. What transpired, however, was the carrying off of the issue to an extreme beyond that envisioned at the outset.

Initially, the local Herut party picked up on the opportunity in terms of economic dependency on Nazareth. Less than a month following the demonstration (and after the emergency MC meeting had taken place), the spokesman of the Herut movement in Upper Nazareth announced in the regional *cum* local paper:

> In the light of the increasing violence in the Arab sector directed at Jewish targets, in Upper Nazareth in particular and Galilee in general, the Herut movement has approached the Prime Minister and other top officials with the request to find ways of dealing with these negative phenomena that cause tensions between Jews and Arabs and put a questionmark around coexistence.....The Herut movement of Upper Nazareth has decided to call for a mass meeting in the course of which a request will be formulated to stop the services of the Arab bus company

in Upper Nazareth and bus journeys [transporting Arab workers from their villages or from Nazareth to their workplaces] through Upper Nazareth; to speed up the construction of a large *Shekem* department store and development of a fixed market [reference to a gigantic supermarket, a "hypermarket"]; and to build a central bus station [in Upper Nazareth]; all of which will cut our dependency on Arab Nazareth...These steps will make the Arab population realize the importance of peaceful coexistence with their Jewish neighbours.[209]

Quite clearly, the opposition party wished to assume responsibility for initiatives that the incumbent Labour leader was already pursuing. In essence, no novel measures were proposed, but they were made explicit and directly related to the Arab Other.

Not merely the issue of the relationship between the two Nazareths was mobilized, however; in fact, that aspect of the Arab issue soon receded into the background as the question of Arab residents in Jewish Upper Nazareth was moved centre-stage. It is difficult to be certain under which label the issue was publicly carried for the first time. What is certain is that by the middle of 1983, a local organisation calling itself MENA (a Hebrew acronym for "The Defenders of Upper Nazareth," which also happens to spell "prevention" in Hebrew) had been formed, the declared aim of which it was to keep Upper Nazareth Jewish by seeking to counteract the settling of more Arab residents in town.

The target group of MENA's preventive measures was the Jewish population itself. The group carried out an informal house by house statistical survey of the actual size of the Arab population in Upper Nazareth (which to this day has not been established definitively); and came up with "at least 7,000" -- or thirty percent of the town's population (today this is considered the "Right-wing

figure*). The group sought to *awaken* the Jewish residents of the town with this *alarming* number. They pleaded that people not sell their homes to Arab residents; and to this end MENA pushed for the formation of house committees and neighbourhood committees through which individual sales would have to be monitored. Heads of the house committees were to ask the Jewish tenants in their buildings to sign pledges, of the kind mentioned earlier, and to report impending sales to Arab residents. Tenants and landlords could still not be forced to sign the pledge, nor to stand by them should they sign; but heart-to-heart talks and social pressure by the community of neighbours, even assistance in locating prospective Jewish buyers/tenants, were brought into play. As the activists perceived it, their activities were *based on peaceful methods and ethical persuasion rooted in Zionism.* They referred to Ben-Gurion and the *original idea* of a *Jewish* city alongside Nazareth (as would Labour later on, in defending the locality's image against outside attacks provoked by MENA). Upper Nazareth's Jewishness was now postulated in the conditional, and as a matter of *becoming*: *With faith Upper Nazareth will be a Jewish town, as Ben-Gurion envisioned it.*

MENA presented itself as a non-partisan interest group *made up of local residents from the whole political spectrum;* nor was it officially affiliated with any of the local parties. However, as one pays attention -- as the local Jewish population did -- to the individuals representing the organisation, one cannot help but draw certain conclusions. The key figure was Mr. Rosenbaum, whom we have heard of earlier. From conversations with various ex-activists in MENA, it appears that Mr. Rosenbaum -- locally known for his lack of hesitation about

speaking out on the issue -- had been approached quite informally by one or two "concerned" residents of the Likud with the idea for such an organisation; he had been fully in favour. At that time, he still largely identified with the Likud, regularly attending their meetings. The actual core group of MENA apparently never exceeded 20 members, with "Likkudnikkim" forming the majority; among them was the Likud councillor (she became the public spokesperson to the media on account of her command of Hebrew, French and English) and another Council member, the head of the independent list in coalition with the Likud.

The idea of a link between the Likud and MENA is today vehemently denied by Likud politicians, at least initially; in personal conversations, the two Likud councillors eventually corroborated what others had told me, that indeed the Likud *then* made its identification with MENA quite explicit, in speeches, though much less so in print (where the problem was formulated as one of the "Jewish character of our town" and the "Judaization of Upper Nazareth"). Thus, the head of the local Likud branch, and the first name on the party's election list, announced on stage at a local party caucus preceding the elections, "We are all MENA here!", and this declaration of identification spread by word of mouth. Even Labour supporters told me that "the Likud rode the issue quite heavily, and rode it well."[210]

But people remember how *both* the Likud *and* the Labour Alignment rode the Arab question in the elections of 1983. The incumbent Labour leadership was left with little choice -- it had to address the problem in some form. For MENA, in its pamphlets, directly charged Labour with "selling out" the town to the

Arabs, drawing attention to the granting of taxi licences to Nazareth entrepreneurs and the mayor's sale, years back, of his home to an Arab family; "Mayor of the United City" was the term by which Mr.Rosenbaum referred to the incumbent mayor. Likud was making political capital out of the Arab problem, assuming sole ownership over its management; although at the time no one knew just how potent an election issue it might turn out to be. So the safest, politically wisest, course for Labour to take was to also say without really saying, which is precisely how Labour, and the mayor in particular, managed the situation through the elections. Labour never connected itself to MENA in any way (but neither did it distance itself from or take measures against it).

Labour had the most at stake in terms both of sanctions from above as well as losses from below; Likud had little to lose and much to gain in terms of votes (although it, too, had to take into account the national party's policy). Undoubtedly, the Independent Party ran the least risk. Such calculations played a significant role, apparently. Thus, the head of the Independent list in coalition with the Likud told me:

> The one hot issue at that time [1983] was Jews and Arabs in Upper Nazareth. Everything else was old stuff. And on that issue both the Labour Alignment and the Likud spoke out simultaneously. In their meetings the Likud spoke out more sharply, more sharply than the Alignment. In the printed material there was little difference. I myself appeared a lot in 1983 with this problem, and was very aggressive about it. I think that I was more aggressive from my actual convictions; I used the issue as election material, at least I thought it was good election material. I didn't have to worry about what my central party would say if I spoke out on Arabs and Jews in Upper Nazareth -- I didn't belong to a central party. And since the others *had* to worry about this ... The Likud couldn't *really* open its mouth on the issue -- not even the *Tehiya*[211] could speak up; since both, the Likud and the Tehiya talk

about a 'Greater Israel', which implies an equal number of Arabs and Jews! We had Raful [Rafael Eitan][212] here to answer some questions; someone asked him, "What can we do about the Arabs from Nazareth buying flats in Upper Nazareth?" He said, "All you can do is go and buy flats in Lower Nazareth, like those Jews buying flats in Hebron." You see, if one really draws a line *here* then one also has to draw a line in Hebron and Kiriat Arba -- if one is consistent; meaning, no more Jews in Hebron!

A local resident and active Labour party member recalled:

> The Labour party was quite aware that there was a problem here with the Arabs, and that people here are worried over it. Believe me, that issue was discussed in length -- what could be done and so on. And there are today measures, whatever is possible, to keep the problem to a minimum. But that is nowhere written down, you won't find this in any of the documents. And I can't tell you more about it.[213] The point is that there is nothing that one *can* really do -- Israel is a democratic country! That was, and still is, the *real* dilemma. The central party would not even have Labour politicians talk about the issue! And maybe talking about it only makes the whole thing worse; that's another reason why the mayor tried to keep it quiet all these years. And then suddenly it was brought out in the open, and the party [Labour] had to deal with it somehow.

But it was not only Labour whose hands were tied; Likud members were also instructed to show political restraint in regard to this issue. Likud Minister Arik Sharon, at a pre-election meeting in Upper Nazareth, was quoted as saying:

> I am not very pleased about the activities of MENA in Upper Nazareth. Jews and Arabs live side-by-side to each other, and that is a fact. There is no way that a line can be drawn segregating the Jewish from the Arab population. Not even if we were to return to the 1948 borders...The Arabs have equal rights *in* Israel, though not *to* Israel; the only thing we can do, and have to do, is to strengthen the feeling that it is ours...We must behave fairly, though strictly, towards the Arabs...[In response to Mr. Rosenbaum's bitter reply to the Minister:] The only thing you can do is to buy housing in Nazareth. We are a law-based state, and there is nothing further to be done in that direction.[214]

From here on the Likud refrained from explicit associations with MENA. The Likud councillor active in the organisation was issued an "obligatory" warning from her party to emphasize her non-partisan participation as a resident; and the party moved her down to second place (from first) on its list. (She told me that later, after the elections, the party exerted pressure on her either to drop her activities in MENA or resign from Likud.) But the link, once created, remained as far as the electorate's perceptions were concerned.

MENA had counted, at the outset, on national party and central government backing. Effectively, however, there turned out to be merely one party willing to support it ideologically and financially, and that was *Kach*, the extremist -- and generally defined as illegitimate -- party of Rabbi Meir Kahana. Kahana provided MENA with the funds to rent a flat for the use as headquarters. which MENA accepted "out of a lack of alternate choice" and without wishing to represent the Rabbi's party (the majority of activists claim). Only one of MENA's founding activists came to embrace Kach ideologically: Mr. Rosenbaum.

Upon Mr. Rosenbaum's initiation, a local Kach branch was opened -- with him at its head; and one of its first activities was to invite Meir Kahana to visit and address the public of Upper Nazareth. The national leader of Kach made his appearance in August 1983; speaking at one of the shopping malls, he was introduced in an aggressive speech by Mr.Rosenbaum. But only a handful of people stopped to listen. The contradiction was that while MENA activists had entered the pact with Kach so as to be in a position to operate effectively, this affiliation simultaneously began to eat away at the organisation's legitimacy in the

eyes of Jewish audiences at both local and national levels. The "sincere" activists (as they recall) now had their hands full trying to dispell notions of a MENA-Kach affinity. This became an increasingly difficult task on account of Mr. Rosenbaum.

In considering grassroot support for MENA, a distinction between active and moral support has to be made. According to all accounts, the active support lent to the organisation -- joining the group, reporting imminent real estate sales to Arabs, exerting environmental pressure on those about to sell, and so on -- did not amount to much. Although many people *were* concerned about the problem, it seems to have featured in a form different from that in which the organisation, in an effort of mobilize the population, was portraying and defining it: nationalistically motivated, PLO-backed, with the dimensions of an invasion or takeover by Nazareth; illustrated and underpinned by what had become a standard repertoire of persuasive metaphors.[215]

Certainly, such notions and images conjured up by MENA fed into a long-standing and widespread distrust and fear of the Arab Other. However, let us not overlook that in Nazareth there was, by that time, a cultural tradition of living next to (and interacting with) the Arab Other. There is also a deeply-rooted cultural premise (reflective of the structure of power relations between Jews and Arabs) that, in the last analysis, the Jews are in control. Such perceptions of Jewish-Arab relations are not easily dismantled. Jewish residents of Upper Nazareth -- for the largest part -- were not readily convinced of the symbolic reversal which the idea of a national takeover, propagated by MENA, implied; at

least not to the extent necessary to move people into activism of which the propriety and legitimacy was not at all clear-cut. It remained to be seen how MENA would fare: apparently, many people adopted a 'wait-and-see' stance.

At the outset a considerable proportion of the local population seems to have sympathized with the overall cause of giving a thought to retaining the Jewish character, demographically, of the town -- if this could be achieved without overtly discriminating against the Arab population. Perhaps by fostering something like a Jewish version of *sumud*, a concept thus far associated with the Arab Other: steadfastness, committment to place rooted in nationalist idealism and eventually even at the expense of material sacrifices (Shehadeh 1982). This, to many, seemed to be the route MENA was taking. But the Kach-connection (and Mr. Rosenbaum) soon marred that image: incited by Mr. Rosenbaum, a handful of extremists (within a group that itself was already considered, by some, to be extremists) started to make the Arab Other the target of their "preventive" actions; harassing Arab residents, and seeking to prevent new Arab residents from taking up residence in their new homes in Upper Nazareth.[216]

Perhaps the election results give some indication of the support MENA had garnered locally, keeping in mind Likud's standing associations with it at the time: There were 13 (instead of 11) Municipal Council seats to be filled. The Likud obtained five (gaining the two additional seats as well as the one previously held by the Mafdal -- whose voice had remained muted throughout the campaign race of 1983). The Labour Alignment received eight (the independent local list headed by Yanko Windish had been dissolved, and Yanko ran on the Alignment

list in third place): so there was no change in their number of seats from the previous local elections.[217]

Caution has to be exercised, however, about attributing the increase in Likud's support exclusively to its manipulation of the Arab issue. Upper Nazareth had experienced the immigration of sub-populations which are generally known to support Likud: Jewish Israelis of North African and Asian background, and traditional-leaning immigrants from Georgian Russia. Indeed, a breakdown of the election results by polling stations shows it was there that support for the Likud was strongest -- and these are neighbourhoods in which no Arab families had settled (even today this is still the case).

In the wake of the election, but too late to influence election results, MENA's activities in Upper Nazareth began to draw national attention; the feedback was negative through and through. It was Rakkah in Nazareth that focused the attention. It spoke of the "awakening of anti-Arab sentiments in Upper Nazareth" and reported MENA activities to the Central League for Human and Civil Rights (CLHCR) in Tel Aviv, asking the League to join them in a protest rally against MENA at one of the shopping malls of Upper Nazareth. The local police denied Rakkah a demonstration license, fearing a "disruption of peace" from a clash between Rakkah demonstrators and MENA activists;[218] but the CLHCR was now mobilized to fight MENA. As a first step, it took the Chief of Police of Upper Nazareth to the Supreme Court for denying Rakkah a license for the anti-MENA demonstration; and ten days following the aborted anti-MENA demonstration planned by Rakkah, members of the CLHCR succeeded in

obtaining a license. About thirty League members, Jewish and Arab, from all over Israel made their appearance for the demonstration, and they were joined by a handful of local Mapam members. Predictably, the MENA activists staged a simultaneous counter-demonstration opposite the League's, waving the Israeli and the Bet'har [Likud's] flag. On this side, too, the absence of popularist support was glaring. The majority of the local population, this again suggests, preferred to remain taciturn on the issue.[219]

But the national media's attention now focused in on Nazareth. Two late-night talk journals, in particular, have left a mark on local social memory. The first (*Koteret Ha'Laila*) featured a live interview with Mr. Rosenbaum. The impression he gave -- to the dismay of even his MENA colleagues -- was overtly "Kahanaist," his bearing "hysterical." He talked about outright denial of civic rights to Arabs; not about residential segregation of Jews and Arabs but the Arabs' expulsion from Israel. The aftermath of his public appearance was an official condemnation and demands, supported by individual Knesset members of the left-of-centre parties, that Mr. Rosenbaum be tried on charges of racist incitement by a specially convened Knesset Interior Committee. The problem was: Israel, at the time, had no laws against racialist incitement. But the introduction of such a law now became the centre of a national debate. A special national leadership symposium, entitled "Upper and Lower Nazareth and Israeli Society" was held in Tel Aviv in January of 1984 to discuss the phenomenon that had arisen in Nazareth.[220] Nazareth was again national news, and bad news -- but this time on account of Jewish actions (see Wallfish 1983; Tavori 1983).

In the absence of a law against racialist incitement, members of the League, and Arab residents upon the latter's encouragement, filed charges against Mr. Rosenbaum concerning his infringements, no matter how minute, of the law -- such as personal insults or threats against individual residents. People remembered that twice he was taken into custody for a day, and had several fines issued against him.

While *MENA* thus became increasingly discredited in Upper Nazareth as illegitimate and destructive, *MENA* (now to be read as Kach) itself was not deterred. Instead, the national feedback it was receiving only seemed to spur it on. On Land Day of 1984, *MENA* planned to hold a demonstration in the Arab city's central square, intending to burn a Palestinian flag. But the Upper Nazareth Labour party asked the local police to deny a demonstration permit and, in the end, *MENA* was baulked in its plans.[221] This was the first time that the mayor of Upper Nazareth officially moved against the organisation. But according to all accounts, the mayor seems to have been behind Mr.Rosenbaum's dismissal from his job in one of the local factories in the course of the following months (he now works in a factory out of town).

For a while, *to care about the town* had come to be defined in terms of speaking out and 'doing' against the Arab Other in Upper Nazareth; and the political other taking most of the credit was the Likud. But, as the ill-adaptiveness of 'doing' demonstrated itself, *caring* was redefined in terms of calming the storm raised and repairing the damages caused by *MENA* -- and on that account Labour could redeem itself.

Not only had MENA attracted nationwide condemnation and given the town a racist (rather than a Zionist) image, it had also, evidently, mobilized the Arab Other on the issue; and this was only one additional way in which, as many locals now see it, it had exacerbated the problem it purported to counteract. New Arab residents moving into Upper Nazareth, anticipating a blockade of opposing Jewish residents and determined to fight back symbolically by means of the Israeli system, often arrived with a television crew and/or under police protection (see, for example, Frey and Sheldon 1983).

The second television coverage of Nazareth (in the late-night journal *Mifgashim*) broadcast about one month following the screening of the interview with Mr. Rosenbaum, disentangled the issue of Arabs in Upper Nazareth from MENA, illuminating the different angles to the issue by featuring a live confrontation between six Jewish and six Arab residents of Upper Nazareth. The six Jews were selected to represent the whole spectrum of Jewish opinions: from those advocating the right of Arabs to take up residence anywhere in Israel to those speaking out against, among them the Likud councillor and MENA activist as well as Labourites. The confrontation inadvertently captured 'new' similarities and/or 'old', symbolically reversed asymmetries between Jewish Self and Arab Other in Nazareth (and particularly in Upper Nazareth); these are being experienced by Jewish Upper Nazareans as the problematization of the ethnically exclusive demarcation of Israeliness. It is this problematization of Our identity, I suggest, which to a large extent nourishes Jewish perceptions of sharing their immediate social and physical space -- their town Upper Nazareth -- with the Arab Other of Nazareth.

6.3. Redefining Jewishness in Upper Nazareth's Public Culture

The matter of Upper Nazareth being a Jewish town demographically has to be considered together with the problematization of being Jewish *culturally*. At any event, local perception of the immigration of Arabs from Nazareth as problematic ought not to be taken as a given; rather, it is a question for empirical enquiry wherein exactly the problem is perceived to lie. My impression is that concern over the town ceasing to be Jewish demographically is to a considerable extent an upshot of an ambiguity as to who We are. Or, phrased differently, of how to be Jewish Israeli in contradistinction to the Arab Israeli Other whom We routinely encounter in this place *and*, thus, of how to express Our Jewishness.

The ambiguity arises, in part, as a result of frequent interactions between Jewish Self and Arab Other; but also on account of partial transformations of Self and Other over time. In Upper Nazareth, the *invention* (cf. Wagner 1981) of a New Jewish or Israeli culture had -- as we have seen -- been sought that was purged of traditional Jewish religion in content. It was to be a culture oriented towards the future and towards seemingly incessant doing and becoming (in fact, 'doing' comprised one of the crucial ethnicity markers setting Us apart from Them). A culture was being built on events and activities that were a necessary and temporary non-routine; in fact there emerged a dissonance between culture as

ideologically propagated and culture as actually lived. Ideological exhortations of development, expansion, and immigrant absorption continued to be employed after they had lost their relevance and meaning in the face of alternate material realities; they acquired a hollow and worn-out ring (the price pioneering pays on account of its physical accomplishments). So the ideology that was to strike roots and translate into the culture of statism -- coloured by Labour Zionism -- became divorced from the daily practical activities of 'doing'. Since the ideology has lost its meaningfulness as a cultural blueprint, *who, then, are We?*

This transformation from a Self-conscious and Self-reflective form of being in the new homeland to non-reflective immersion in it (Jean-Klein 1987), happens to take place, as we know, in close proximity of the Arab Other of Nazareth (constantly questioning Jewish rights, and yet with whom Jewish Self has to interact frequently). This has made for a constant comparison between Them and Us, creating a need for an explicit awareness of who We are, and also for the cultural means of expressing Our difference from Them. There is, too, that incessant begging for an answer to the question as to why 'We' are here (of all places).

Under the leadership of the new mayor there is an increased openness towards traditional Jewish elements and their interjection into the public culture of the town (though *political* inroads by religious others were continually averted); and this even though Ariav, prior to being mayor, had played his full part in Labour's extreme secularist outlook and course. This change is indicative, perhaps, of the *emically perceived* problematization of Jewish ethnicity in Upper

And chance seemed to come to Upper Nazareth's aid (the timing could not have been more appropriate), promising to provide it with that expedient cultural ingredient which, beyond political control, a locality either did or did not have at its disposal: ancient Jewish history in place, and the opportunity of "rebecoming what we once were." In 1980, a team of archaeologists carrying out a reconnaissance survey on the south-eastern fringe of Upper Nazareth's settled area (at the instigation of the municipal leadership), discovered the remains of an ancient settlement. Whether the settlement was Jewish or not was not immediately apparent, though evidently a question of highest importance. In the conviction, or in the hope, that it *was* indeed Jewish, the municipal leadership -- backed by the District Administrator -- contracted out the excavation of the site.[222] And when (in 1982) a construction team, in the course of preparing ground for the establishment of a new, single-family home neighbourhood in the same vicinity, accidentally stumbled on a number of ancient burial caves, the municipality decided to employ two archaeologists to continue with the excavation of the settlement.[223] The national newspapers lauded the findings "in Nazareth:"

> Four burial caves containing ancient graves, coins, oil lamps and other artifacts which *may be* the remains of an ancient Jewish town dating back over 1,500 years were excavated recently. The Talmudic era artifacts were uncovered over the past three weeks by construction workers digging the foundations for a new neighbourhood in the southern area of the city [Upper Nazareth]. At one site a bulldozer unearthed the entrance to a two-storey burial cave, damaging it slightly.
>
> Dislodged bones were collected and reburied by representatives of the Education Ministry's Department of Antiquities. Construction work at the site has been halted temporarily at the Department's request. Upper

Nazareth's mayor, Menachem Ariav, said...that he would not permit construction to continue *if further findings show that the site is the location of the ancient Jewish settlement Ksullot.*

Several months ago, at an archaeological dig not far from the same site, researchers found remains of ancient metal-working and agricultural workshops, buildings, coins and graves. Archaeologists say the two sites are parts of a single settlement and *might be* the Jewish town of Ksullot. Some Upper Nazareth officials said *they would consider changing the town's name to Ksullot, if the ancient Jewish settlement turns out to be the precursor of the modern development town!* (Dar 1982; emphases added).

According to Jewish law (halakhah), Jewish graves must not be disturbed, consequently their archaeological excavation usually entails the opposition of orthodox religious camps. So it was in this particular case: around fifty yeshiva students from Bnei Brak appeared on the scene to prevent the excavation and examination of the burial caves' contents -- even though it was not yet established whether the graves were Jewish. The mayor of Upper Nazareth was determined to push the project ahead regardless, having obtained the permission of the local Ashkenazi and Sephardi chief rabbis.[224] Ultra-orthodox opposition, peaking in a clash with the police, itself lent support to the as yet unsubstantiated public beliefs that the remains were indeed those of an "ancient precursor of the modern Jewish town."

Loudly hailed at the time of its discovery, and deemed worthy without a second thought of the financial resources its excavation necessitated, today the archaeological site rests unattended. Excavations were never completed, the parts uncovered never transformed -- as was initially planned -- into a tourist attraction site. I stumbled on parts of the site on a walk through the area during the third

month of my stay -- no one had pointed out to me the historic attraction; and a surprising number of locals, whom I then asked about it, seemed not even to know of it. The site had fallen into oblivion -- even though its potential as a tourist attraction would be independent of whether it was a Jewish site or not. So what had happened?[225] The available evidence suggests strongly that excavations were brought to a halt because it could never be established that these were the remains of a *Jewish* town or city. In which case, instead of buttressing Jewish claims to the land and/or providing the Jewish people of Upper Nazareth with a long history "in place," the site could buttress the claims of the Arab Other. One of the teachers at the day-care centre, who has had a very close relationship with the mayor, saw it that way:

> They discovered that they were not at all Jewish, after having spent all that money on them! They then, of course, immediately stopped the excavations. Imagine! That would just give them down there [the people of Nazareth] another reason to claim that the land belongs to them and that we stole it from them!

Questions as to whether the archaeological findings were indeed Jewish struck sensitive chords and invited controversial answers.[226] The cultural implication of evidence of an ancient Jewish settlement in the place where Upper Nazareth today stands, and alternatively, the political management of contrary evidence surface quite clearly in the following excerpt from a personal interview with the Northern District Administrator I. Koenig:

> In my estimation, *this area was the ancient Ksullot!* How did I arrive at that? That is a very interesting story!
>
> From where I live, one can see the whole Valley up to Um el-Fahm [a

very large Arab village south-east of Upper Nazareth]. One day, this Arab chap, a neighbour of mine and a Doctor of Psychology, he was visiting at my house, he looks out my living-room window and says, "Do you see this land here that you [the Jews] bought [sic]? That's okay, you didn't requisition it. But you didn't buy just land -- you bought a *moledet* [a homeland]!" A Christian Arab!

(It should not be lost from view how Mr. Koenig here uses an Arab as the carrier, or source, of knowledge that is ideologically legitimating for Koenig himself and for his people. This kind of play for authorial authority, especially in respect to highly contentious issues, far from being an isolated incident conforms to a pattern that I encountered frequently in my conversations with people in Upper Nazareth.)

Mr. Koenig continues: So then I started looking in the Bible for the borders of the land parcels as divided up by Joshua among the tribes of Simeon, Judah and Zebulun following his conquest, in the period preceding the Destruction of the First Temple -- and found the exact borders of the tribe of Zebulun: the village Yafia [an Arab village] -- spelled exactly then as it is today, the rivers Kishon and Yoquneam are mentioned; and -- *the settlement of Ksullot.*[227] I went to the mayor and said, "Listen, look what we got ourselves here!..." [he laughs]. So we started excavating. Now, I am afraid that part of the site has been lost, since the "Bnei Bet'cha" neighbourhood sits on top of it today. But they even found a mikvah, a real mikvah!

researcher: I didn't see the mikvah; I took a look around the area, but couldn't see it.

Mr. Koenig: They closed it off with concrete. It is a Jewish settlement, without any doubt! With the graves facing in the direction of Jerusalem! One hundred percent! It *is* the ancient city of Ksullot.

researcher: I heard about the possibility of it actually being the settlement of Tel Tamra, and not Jewish at all...

Mr. Koenig: That's the archaeologists! *They* say that! Because of the coins and pottery they found. I am telling you, it's Ksullot.

researcher: Why were the excavations not completed, then?

Mr. Koenig: It was a matter of money, I think; it needed a lot of money. But I don't really know.

After two years in office, the new mayor endorsed the establishment, with the financial support of the municipality, of a *Habad*[228] religious kindergarten in Upper Nazareth. Eventually, the Habad religious educational system was complemented with an elementary school; and a second, public religious middle-school, was opened in the largely *Sephardi* Northern neighbourhood. Moreover, today the town boasts four large synagogues in addition to the central synagogue;[229] there are also about forty small neighbourhood synagogues that are housed in Amidar flats dispersed throughout town.

This shift to a more forthcoming attitude towards religious Jewish otherness culturally stands in stark contrast to the hostile stance adopted earlier; but among the new migrants to the town since the mid-seventies are many traditionally-oriented (for example, the wave of new immigrant settlers from Georgian Russia). They want to give their children religious education and, in general, wish to uphold the Jewish tradition, or at least elements of it, in their daily lives. To attract their votes, the respective social and cultural facilities had to be provided, especially -- and this would not escape public attention -- at a time when the mayor was setting up institutions for the Arab minority within the town.

But besides facilitating religious expression for those who wish it, outward symbolic expressions of Jewishness, rooted in Judaism, have been interjected into the town's *public culture* over the years -- in contrast to the earlier statism (Chapter Three). The Habad movement, politically neutral in the sense that it is neither Zionist, and as such a political competitor of Labour, nor vehemently anti-Zionist, and as such hostile to any brand of political Zionism, offered itself to the Labour leadership as an ideal medium for the symbolic expression of traditional Jewishness in public culture; and this appears to be the role it has been allocated in Upper Nazareth.[230] In exchange for tolerance and even financial support by the municipal government, Habad, in turn, has generally been compliant and cooperative with the Labour leadership[231] and, concomitantly, it has given to the town a 'stroke of the brush' of traditional Jewishness: on Fridays, in preparation for Shabbat, as well as on days marking the beginning of major Jewish festivals, Habad men set up a table at the two major shopping malls to invite Jewish men to lay on *teffilin*; and in the afternoon their decorated vans cruise the streets of the town announcing, through loudspeakers, the time of the beginning of Shabbat (or the holiday) and instructing the residents that *on the eve of Shabbat, every Jewish woman lights the candles.* On *Sukkot*, the Feast of Tabernacles, Habad sets up a *Sukkah* at the shopping centres, inviting passers-by in for a drink and a chat. Or, on Rosh Ha'Shanah, the Jewish New Year, Habad ensures that the *shofar* is blown at the prescribed times and audible to the public; again, usually at the shopping malls.

The major Jewish festivals,[232] then, have come to be marked by public

rituals. They are largely the doings of the local Habad, but the town's leadership features prominently in them, too. On Simha Torah, for example, there is (organised by Habad) singing and dancing through the streets, with the mayor carrying the Torah. Or, on Hanukkah, the pupils of the local high school stage a local version of the national relay race in which the runners carry the lit torch; and (again, organised by the local Habad) every evening, for eight days, an additional light of the gigantic electric *menorah* (a seven-branched candelabrum), perched on the rooftop of one of the larger shopping malls, is lit in a public ceremony by town notables (the first light is lit by the mayor). On the occasion of these major festivals, the incumbent leader has made it a custom to make his appearance at the town's major synagogues.

The pork sale prohibition by-law adopted under Allon's leadership and exempting most of the areas within Upper Nazareth's jurisdiction on the grounds that Upper Nazareth had a mixed Jewish-Arab population, was reviewed under Ariav's rule and altered so as to apply to "the whole area under Upper Nazareth's jurisdiction," without special areas of exemption (MC Minutes, 29.3.1981); -- and this (a) at a time when Upper Nazareth was truly transforming into a city "more mixed than the traditionally mixed city of Haifa" (Bar-Gal 1986) and (b) under the leadership of a Labourite who had, earlier, played a dominant role in the original formulation of the law. Also noteworthy in this context is the current Labour leader's employment of religious references in his public rhetoric, and not only on the occasion of Jewish festivals; consider this excerpt from his opening speech to the festivities concluding the celebrations of Upper Nazareth's 30th birthday (September 19, 1987):

...And we will add a prayer to the Master of the Universe in gratitude for what we have, and with a request that we may overcome all anticipated obstacles [in building a Jewish town in Galilee] -- that we be granted additional residents, institutions and industries; that we may expand and strengthen our town in all areas of life. We thank God for what He has given us, hoping for good to come; we thank every family, every resident, all the sons and daughters of this town; and we shake hands on the blessed cooperation. *Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast preserved us alive, sustained us, and brought us to enjoy this season* [a prayer generally recited by religious Jews at major festivals and at occasions on which something new is obtained (such as clothes) or consumed (fruit of the season)].

An even more telling phenomenon (in the eyes of the anthropologist Other) than the adoption of selected outward expressions of traditional Jewishness into public culture under continued Labour leadership, is an expressed need among many local residents to recapture at least a conversance with traditional Jewishness, if not introduce elements of it into daily routines. For they have a sense of cultural deprivation. This even holds for people who grew up on Left-leaning kibbutzim, who like to think of themselves as secular, and who still cling to a Labour Zionist outlook. This, I believe, reflects inescapable Jewish-Israeli Self-reflections on questions of Jewish nationalism, ethnicity and emplacement, generated by their regular confrontations with Arab-Israeli Others. Uncomfortable asymmetries and similarities seen to prevail between Them and Us, which would either not exist, or would comprise less of a problem, had the Jews not severed themselves from their religiously-rooted tradition. The dilemma is that although Jewish religion is recognized as potentially serving a useful cultural function, in ethnic boundary demarcation, it is yet, for many, deemed an undesirable way of life.

Chapter 7

Conclusion: The Problematization of Jewishness in Upper Nazareth

7.1. Tantamount to a Taboo: Talking "Arabs" in Upper Nazareth

One of the first things that struck me soon after arriving in Upper Nazareth (an impression that remained with me and sharpened with time) was the mood of normalcy, or better, the pervasive matter-of-factness, on the surface, among the Jewish residents in regard to sharing their living-space with Arab Israelis. Contemplating the town from the distance and relying largely on newspaper reports for background information, had raised expectations of a politically and socially pronounced preoccupation with Arabs.

In fact, "Arabs" rarely surfaced spontaneously as the topic of conversation in situations in which I was present, -- unless I probed; and my key informants told me that the topic is seldom raised even in social situations where no outsiders are present. I found this confirmed when, encouraged by the researcher, people *did* talk about Arabs in social settings in which either a neighbour, a close friend,

or even their spouse was present. For then it often became apparent that if they had not, amomg themselves, avoided the topic altogether, they certainly had not discussed it in sufficient depth to have discovered fine-grained differences of outlooks and opinions, let alone had ever negotiated a consensus. The topic itself proved potentially disruptive of social situations -- which might give a clue as to why it is more commonly avoided or touched upon merely in short-hand style.

On those occasions during which I had the opportunity to observe people of Upper Nazareth talking "Arabs" with each other, the reference seemed to come 'out of the blue', tended to be in short-hand style and quickly dismissed by a switch of topic that seemed as discontinuous as that which had introduced it. Similarly, in response to the researcher's explicit probings, people tended, at least initially and in public situations where a third, local party could easily overhear or join in on the conversation, to restrict themselves to very superficial comments and seek to alter the conversational topic, often signalling incomprehension of the issue's relevance in the local context (Either: 'So there are Arabs living here, so what?' Or: 'Why study Jewish-Arab relations in a *Jewish* town, where there are barely any Arabs? Why not in Haifa, a mixed town? Or in Acre?').

But by talking "Arabs," and especially "Arabs in Upper Nazareth," I learned (as one usually does) about the pervasiveness of rules surrounding the topic -- rules of which I was initially ignorant and which I, hence, broke: so I learned that in the local context this really *does* constitute something like a taboo. And, perhaps more importantly, I learned about how breaches of this taboo are managed -- the anthropologist's own breaches, but also breaches by other non-

initiated individuals such as new immigrants being absorbed locally or children.

Here are some examples:

Situation A

At the reception desk of the Immigrant Absorption Centre [the researcher is sitting in the entrance hall to the side, reading a newspaper while waiting for a friend to arrive]: Judith, a fifty-six year-old immigrant from Rumania, asks one of the employees at the Centre for the name of a "good" family doctor. She is given that of an Arab doctor, frequented by the employee herself and described as "very sensitive," though practising at the local *Kupat Holim* (medical centre) only on a few days in the afternoons, as "he has his practice 'down' in Nazareth;" this tips off Judith that he might be Arab. "Is he an Arab?" she asks. When the employee answers affirmatively, without making much of the fact, Judith protests: "What, you are sending me to an Arab doctor? I won't go to an Arab doctor!" The employee 'instructs' her: "We here don't think in these terms, Arab or not Arab! He is a very educated man, Christian, speaks the language [Hebrew] perfectly, and he is an excellent doctor! You will see that many of us go to Arab doctors; most of the doctors here are from Nazareth." And the employee turns to her attention to paperwork, indicating that she considers the conversations as terminated, leaving Judith standing startled.

Situation B

Also at the Immigrant Absorption Centre [the researcher is standing opposite the reception desk, by the public phone, waiting her turn to place a phone call]: Brian, an immigrant from the U.S. in his late twenties and single (he wears a *kippa*, though he is not religious, rather as a marker of his ethnic identity), a somewhat boisterous young man, returns to the Centre from an afternoon at the indoor swimming-pool (where he is, with the help of the centre's personnel, seeking to land a job as a physical fitness instructor; his qualifications and reference papers are expected to arrive from the U.S.). One of the employees at the desk asks him how "it went" at the pool. "That place is full of Arabs!" he retorts; "they hang at the gates staring inside, and that pizza place at the mall next to the pool -- full of Arabs! [As he speaks, the employees exchange embarrassed glances, and begin to fiddle with papers as if to show they are too busy to chat. But Brian carries on:]

But the guys [employees] at the pool take care of them! They 'shushed' them away!" At this point the employee who had initiated the conversation felt the need to re-enter the conversation after all: "Why do you say this? No one here 'shushes' anyone away. These places are for the use of anyone who likes to use them. [She slowly shifts her focus back to her paperwork] You better learn to deal with all kinds of people! And if I were you, I wouldn't say such things in front of [your boss-to-be]. By the way, have your papers arrived yet? [Apparently a rhetorical question.]" She turns to talk to her colleague.

Situation C

At a *makolet* (corner grocery store): At the opening of the store following a two-hour dinner-break, Joshua's store is usually crowded with customers: children wanting to buy sweets, adults wanting to pick up a few essentials, many have been waiting in front of the store. At Joshua's, regular customers can still obtain items on credit, the day's daily paper and/or a fresh loaf of bread is put aside for them. He is also known to give generous portions and all for fair prices. Thus, it is always crowded inside the store at this hour, with customers pushing and shuffling. It is quite common for people to just pick themselves the items they need from the shelves, calling out to Joshua, who is busy either adding up a bill, serving cold-cuts, or collecting money, "add this to my bill, will you? I'm in a hurry!" -- already on their way out of the store. Or to push ahead of a customer being served by pressing a money-bill into Joshuah's hands, holding up the item one wishes to pay for. So it is equally common for little bickerings and arguments to erupt among competing customers.

This evening, the store is busy, one of the Arab tenants of my building (a Christian Arab woman originally from Nazareth, divorced with two sons; she lives two floors above me) drops in, apparently in a hurry, picks up a loaf of bread and two bottles of beer, and pushes ahead of everyone, pressing a bill into Joshua's hands with the words: "Here, Joshua, one bread and two beers; I don't have time!" As Joshua complies by taking the money, one of a group of three six to eight year-old kids from the neighbouring block (they knew the woman, and that she is Arab, otherwise it would have been difficult to discern from either language, her dress -- or from her behaviour, for that matter), who himself had tried for quite some time -- unsuccessfully -- to be served before it was his turn, exclaimed in anger: "What's this, Joshua?! That

Arab woman is served before anyone else here? Where does she think she is?" Joshua (and most people in the store) simply ignored the boys, smiling apologetically to my neighbour (a quite self-confident woman, she herself seemed to ignore the comment). But one man in the line-up reprimanded the boys: "Look here, where did you learn to talk like this? One doesn't talk like this! All of us here are in a hurry here, everyone wants to be first. No need to start something over this!"

These situations reveal the precise sphere to which the taboo applies: publicly expressing a value-judgement (and in all of the examples presented, Arabs are talked about derogatorily). More commonly, *and acceptably*, the Arab Other is made reference to in ethnically inexplicit terms and/or via substitute metaphors;[233] and should one talk ethnicity and even explicitly so, at least then the statements made are to be kept *enthymemic*[234] with respect to value-judgement. Dwelling on the topic for too long would invariably lead to an explication of the ethnicity factor and of attribution of value; the brevity and enthymemic nature of the references allow for social exchanges -- and I will deal with the messages essentially being communicated in a moment -- *assuming* a consensus. The real taboo is dwelling on the topic to the point of elaboration. To illustrate, as I was waiting at the bus stop in front of my apartment building one Sunday morning, I overheard the following exchange between two middle-aged women from the neighbouring block who were also waiting for the bus:[235]

Shoshana: Where are you off to?

Avital: I have to go to the bank at "*Rasco*" [the Northern neighbourhood]. We spent all our money on the weekend! Just one night in a hotel, the gasoline, the food; and before you know it, half the salary is gone!

Shoshana: I know! That's why we take day-trips, and come home to sleep. Where did you go to?

Avital: We drove to Tiberias on Friday, until last night. It was pleasant, but I wonder if it's worth the money! .... That bus is late again.

Shoshana: Not really, but it [the bus] is due around now!

Avital [after a short break in the conversation; she has turned around to look at the front of our apartment buildings which are separated from the sidewalk by a deep trench and connected with it via a bridge, as they are situated on a downward slope; she is watching the construction work in progress of a patio addition to one of the ground-floor apartments (situated below street-level), the owner of which is an Arab from Nazareth]: He [the owner of the apartment] is sure fixing up that flat!

Shoshana: He has been working on this for months now! Must cost him a fortune. I wonder if I would at all want a patio out this way -- everyone walking by staring in on you; but I guess he gets quite a bit of sun.

Avital: For them [Arabs?] it's worth spending the money to fix it up; they stay put [are permanent] in the place. Not like the Jews: they first fix up a place, and then they leave anyways. That's how it is among the Jews. Then why fix it up in the first place?

Shoshana: Is your daughter still working as a fitness instructor at the community centre?

Avital: Yes, she really loves the job. But it doesn't pay much; it's only three times a week....

[The conversation turns to a neighbour, who is just carrying out her garbage. The bus arrives.]

Avital and Shoshana agree, later informal conversations with each, in private, revealed, that Jewish outmigration is a problem (and talking about it is really also talking, in inverted form, about the Arab Other); but their definitions of the Arab problem -- that is, the extent and kind of self-reflections derived from this proximity of Arab Others diverge.

It also needs to be pointed out now that there *are* a number of individuals who enjoy a local (and to some extent national) reputation for their readiness to publicly speak out on the Arab issue -- those who temporarily, at the time MENA made the headlines, acted as the self-declared public spokespeople on the Arab problem. They are associated with what once was MENA[236] or with its counterpoint at the time, the "Jewish-Arab Circle."[237] These are the people to whom I was often referred when communicating my research interest, and they are also the ones sought out, even to this day, by Israeli as well as foreign journalists writing on the Jewish Nazareth (usually instigated by further non-routine ethno-dramas in Nazareth, as on Peace Day, December 19, 1988). And these 'explicators', in turn, have a pre-formulated statement of their viewpoint and respective back-up stories ready at hand for recitation to such inquisitive outsiders intermittently looking them up.[238]

Locals, let it be said, do not see them as representing the town when it comes to Jews and Arabs in Nazareth (or in Upper Nazareth), nor do they (the average inhabitants) themselves stake such claims: quite to the contrary, they emphasize the idiosyncratic nature of their outlook. However, even those few individuals who have come to be (mis)taken by the outside as representing the town on the issue are, today, somewhat apprehensive about talking "Arabs" and are more moderate in (or cautious with) their remarks.[239]

It was my impression that when people talk about Arabs in Upper Nazareth (or refrain from talking about Them) the talk is all about Us -- as We see images of Ourselves bouncing off Our image of the Arab Other. This is the key perspective of my whole study.

7.2. Markers of Israeliness -- Them Compared With Us

7.2.1. Acting Out Nationalism and Democracy

It is not uncommon (especially among these 'explicators') that, in justifying their reservations (and eventually talking about Them and Us in Nazareth, after all), people elaborate on the taboo and on local reasoning underlying it. It was in this context that people would most explicitly give expression to perceptions of a historically reversed Jewish-Arab asymmetry that lies encapsulated in the very pervasiveness of the taboo: the aggravating issue is that of a perceived inequality pertaining to national Self-expression.

In elaborating on the taboo, my informants invariably made reference to the events surrounding MENA. The direction taken by the organisation not long after its inception and, particularly, the poor light in which it placed the community as a whole *vis-à-vis* the political centre -- Left and Right alike -- evidently gave the residents of Upper Nazareth cause for pause. They had to come to terms with, if not the moral costs then at least the practical ones, of insisting on (and advocating) the ethnic exclusivity of the town. As has been stressed earlier, the dilemma confronting Jewish residents of Upper Nazareth is the clash, and perhaps

even the contradiction, between the two guiding principles of Israeli society --
Zionism and democracy. Nothing less. MENA had brought this dilemma 'home',
as it were.

From a distanced and all-encompassing viewpoint, certainly from the
vantage point of the Arab Other, Upper Nazareth's history is strewn with
violations of democratic principles in terms of ethnic discriminations. From the
point of view of the Jewish *settlers*, however, this was not always immediately or
inevitably evident; and even if it did so become evident, it was then ideologically
and culturally negateable or, at least, justifiable. Importantly, the key agent in
this was government, local and central. This absolved the individual Jewish
settler from personal responsibility for ethnic discrimination (where such are
apparent). It even lent such actions an air of legitimacy -- indeed, of political and
cultural necessity. Thus, in the case of Upper Nazareth, as one was building up
"from nothing" a *Jewish* town -- a town for Jews -- adjacent to an Arab urban
concentration, one could focus unencumbered on the Jewish nation-building ethos
that was being lived out.

That Upper Nazareth would be, and would remain, a town for Jews went
without saying. This constituted the unquestioned underlying premise: the
question of "whether?", therefore, was never raised nor, thus, the question of
"how?". People recall today, in an attempt to come to terms with the changing
and adverse realities, that they always assumed that somehow the government
was taking care of the town's ethnic integrity. There is an appropriate corpus of
retroactively supporting myths in currency. For instance, some people even know

of laws which, they insist, were operative in the past but were abandoned in the mid-seventies.[240] Moreover, they had assumed (and some still cling to this view of the Other) that Arabs would not want to live among Jews in any case, but rather "stay to themselves."

But this changed as Jewish residents became aware of Arabs actually taking up residence in Upper Nazareth, and in *their* neighbourhoods. Now the town's ethnic exclusivity could no longer be taken as a matter of course (and of belief). It was no longer enough to depend on government; residents recognized that if indeed in the future they want to insist on the ethnic exclusivity of their town, this would demand of *them* personally and actively to discriminate, or to incite others to discriminate, along ethnic lines. It is in this way that the clash of principles manifested itself in people's lives.

I encountered a familiarity with a wide range of constraints which define, concerning Jewish-Arab relations, that which is legitimate and also economically and socially advisable locally. If earlier there had prevailed ambiguity regarding the prevalence and precise coordinates of such constraints, MENA, by crossing the boundaries, and the reactions to MENA, made explicit, and amplified, these constraints locally. People were equally familiar with a wide range of costs which We can expect to incur by violating such constraints (amounting to rules) "as the Kahana people [i.e., MENA] did *then*."

The costs, locally weighed, are both moral and material, cultural and socio-economic; they have to do with national conscience and ethics, political and

economic centres (government, political parties, private investors), or the Arab Other locally. But there exist differences as to which of these is most decisive in individual cases. However, whatever the specific cost, there is also a wide local consensus that *public* expression of objections to living with the Arab Other in the same house (or steps taken to influence the demographic composition of the town along Jewish-Arab lines) is "bad" -- bad for the town, bad for Israel and bad for the Jewish people as a whole (and, as far as local politicians are concerned, bad for their political career). All this is summed up in the matter-of-fact and short-hand statement that is often made when the topic is broached: "There is nothing to be done," or "That's how it is." This consensus is widely shared even by ex-activists in MENA.[241]

Those for whom national ethics is the most decisive factor and who morally oppose to keeping Arabs out, see Jewishness, religiously or secularly defined, as inextricably tied to humanitarian and democratic values, and rooted in a moral lesson the Jewish people learned/"ought to have learned" from the Holocaust. It is connected with the political Self-perception as a "light-onto-the-nations." This was an essential ingredient of Labour Zionist ideology. For example, Uri, born and raised in Upper Nazareth, describing himself as as a Labourite and currently employed in one of the regional government offices, insists:

> To tell you the truth, I don't think that it is a good idea for Jews and Arabs to live together in the same house; neither side is really ready for it yet. But there must never be any legal restrictions on anyone to live where they want! There are some people, also higher up, who would like to see all the people who want to live here channeled via the Sochnut; which would then mean that only Jews could live here. That's a very negative attitude, very anti-democratic! Israel is a democracy! And the

day that anywhere in Israel barriers are put up against Arabs moving into a Jewish town, Israel ceases to be a Jewish state; ceases to exist. That's when even *I* would consider leaving [the country]. What the government can do is build sufficient housing in the Arab sector, develop that sector. -- I am convinced that the Arabs would prefer to live in their own towns and villages; they want to keep their national identity, and want their children to get such a sense. Growing up in a Jewish town they might not get a sense of who they are. I have talked to them, and they say so themselves. What forces them to move here is a housing shortage down there [in Nazareth]. Anyway, I have talked more on this issue than I intended to; I talked from the heart and got carried away. [Uri had to obtain permission from his superior before granting me an interview. He then generously offered to answer questions of an informative nature connected with his office; he initially dismissed questions on the 'Arab issue in Upper Nazareth' as "talking politics" which he "would rather not."]

Similarly, Dina, a *vatik* settler who has raised four children in Upper Nazareth and to this day a staunch Labour Zionist, commented emphatically in response to my mentioning MENA, over coffee and cake at her house one afternoon:

We [the Jews of Upper Nazareth] must not try to prevent the Arabs from settling in our town, as these crazy people did! I have lost family in the Holocaust, almost every Jew here has; we know better than any other people what "discrimination" means. It's sad, but that's our history. We *have* to give the Arab minority equal rights; and if they want to live here -- I don't think they will be happy living in a Jewish town, but if they choose to -- *bevakasha* [please yourselves]! We cannot stop them. This is a democratic country; it *has* to be a democratic state to be a *Jewish* state. It's not always easy to be democratic, but we have to try. *I* also don't like to see the town I helped build with my own hands 'go' -- the Jews are leaving, the young people are leaving; the Arabs like it here, so more Jews are leaving, you understand? But what can I do? What one *can* do, what one *has* to do is to bring more Jews here, new immigrants; and develop the place, to make it more attractive. Also, we have to instill in our children some national idealism -- that, I think, we overlooked somehow. The young people don't have the idealism my generation had -- you talk to an Arab youth today, and he has more of it!....How do you like the cake? I made it myself; it's a recipe of my mother's...[Dina refuses to return to the topic]

For such people, then, the conflict between national Self-expression in the context

of Upper Nazareth and democracy represents an *internal* conflict; to be resolved by re-defining or adjusting the meaning of Zionism -- if necessary, compromising slices of *it* rather than of democratic principles.

On the other hand, for those willing to incur moral costs (and ethnic segregation of housing *is* recognized as entailing moral costs even when it is opted for in principle) in exchange for full-blown national Self-expression, the conflict is rather one externally produced. For them, the cost decisive in defining a recognized need to uphold the taboo is the social and economic viability of the town: these costs could include disapproval of the political centre and/or possible counter-measures by the Arab Other (and among these, the very demographic trends which are deemed a cause for concern). One of the most Right-wing residents I encountered (aside from the head of Kach) -- a sabra of Polish origin, born and raised on a left-leaning kibbutz but today a Likudnik, he has lived in Upper Nazareth since 1961 -- elaborated:

> We [the Jews] are going through a trauma on this issue of nationalism! No other nation I can think of has the same problems with nationalism as we do. England, France -- there you actually have a revival of national pride. We are going the other way! We feel guilty about it; nationalism has become a swearword in Israel. Why? What's wrong with national chauvinism? Nationalism should be a source of pride. For example, in the Knesset it became an issue whether it is acceptable to raise the Israeli flag beside the speaker; or whether to play the "Ha'Tikvah" [Israel's national anthem] or not. They are considering that it might be racist! Where do you find a thing like this? We are not giving it a positive connotation anylonger. Maybe because of the Nazis and what the Jewish people went through! And maybe we still feel insecure of our rights to a national homeland; could it be that the Jews, because they had to invent a form of survival without the land in the Diaspora, managed that so well that now they are unable to fully re-establish their link with it? But on the other hand, of course, Jewish

ethics is such....we have the Book of Ruth which makes a big thing of this. It says that we should respect the stranger in our Land, feed him, clothe him. It is forbidden to expel him from the Land. So Jewish ethics doesn't quite fit this whole business of nationalism! And there you have yet another problem no other people has to face: for the Jews nationalism is inseparable from the Jewish religion. We have ourselves a few contradictions here! *That* is the Jewish dilemma. And I have decided that in order to have [nationalism], I have to give a bit of [Jewish ethics].

Now, when you ask me about Upper Nazareth and the Arab problem here....I don't think it's good for our town that we pursue this national issue. It is a very delicate framework of relations, between us and the central government, Upper and Lower Nazareth. For one thing, it must be understood that the further development of a town like this depends on many government resources. Or, you tell an investor that you want him to set up a plant here; he'll tell you, "Are you crazy? Who will work in it? You are creating a Jewish-Arab war there, and you expect me to risk business in this war zone?" What does the entrepreneur want? He wants stable production conditions! He is not looking for a front!

So what am I saying? I am saying that the moment one creates a conflict of this sort, one creates unfavourable conditions for investment. Less investment means fewer Jewish settlers -- and you really make the problem worse! In fact, you don't only scare away investors, you also scare off Jews who might consider settling here. Why would they want to move where they have this national problem on their doorstep? People in Tel Aviv, as it is, can't tell the difference between Upper and Lower Nazareth -- it was a mistake to call this town "Nazareth" in the first place! They get it mixed up with the Arab city -- that could actually have been a factor in the lack of understanding in the country for us trying to keep Upper Nazareth Jewish. "Keep Arabs out of Nazareth?!" ... It's best to leave that whole mess alone. And that's the dilemma any leader here has to face up to, no matter of what party; no matter what they might promise -- if they are stupid enough to bring it up again -- there is nothing any party can really do about it. Not to mention that his own party would slap his wrists, simply dismiss him, if he were to tackle the problem!

Then there are those who stress the impact of ethnic exclusivism -- even from talking about it -- in terms of the Arab Other's counter-reactions. Economic

and social interdependencies of the two Nazareths figure prominently here; and an undue amount of power to the Arab Other -- perhaps out of apprehension at their capability to exacerbate the situation if They so wish. For example, one of my neighbours (who at the time signed a pledge not to sell his home *to someone other than an Israeli who has served in the army*) told me, after I had commented on his habitual abruptness whenever I steered the topic of our conversation in the direction of *Arabs*:

> Look, what can one do anyway? Talking about it aloud only brings trouble! There was a time when some people here thought one should and could do something about it...We saw that we have to be very careful! Whether we like it or not, we have to live next to them! And no matter what they do down there, we here have to keep quiet. It is forbidden that we respond! Our transport is Arab, you know that as well as I do. If we say too much, we end up without food supplies here and without transport. All they have to do is go on strike, or block the roads -- we have seen that before. Bringing this whole issue out into the open was probably a mistake, it made the problem worse, if anything. So those who hadn't thought about moving to Upper Nazareth suddenly got the idea! Moving up here, they realized, is a way for them to be nationalist. Of course, they also have other reasons -- a better standard of living, I don't know what else. But, like for the Jews who settled here, economic reasons have become mixed up with national motivations. That's my opinion.

Also, several of the high school students whose essays on the topic of *Our Town* I collected[242] make the taboo explicit (and thus breaking it) by linking it directly to possible reprisals by the Arab Other. For example:

> [...] In Nazareth, Jews and Arabs live together and all the buses are Arab. Because of that, the Jews have to watch their mouths and be very careful about what they say about Arabs. Many Jews move to another place because they don't like living with Arabs in one house. [She goes on to talking about the lack of entertainment facilities.]

The various constraints limiting the form and degree of Our national Self-

expression (and insistence on Upper Nazareth's Jewish exclusivity is considered by most to be part of this Self-expression) are, however, neither accepted readily nor contemplated in cultural isolation. Jewish Self's ruleboundedness, whatever its sources, is constantly compared with and juxtaposed to (a) the way We were in the recent past and (b) observations of Arab Others's national awakening and Their ability to do it, having the advantage of the 'underdog', *in the name of democracy.*

Accompanying these observations are flashes of non-recognition of Jewish-Israeli Self, the Arab Other, and the relation in which Them and Us are now found standing to each other. Thus, the Arab Others *appear* different from the way We know Them to be: politicized, unwavering, self-confident, outspoken (and very articulately, in Hebrew, at that) about Their national Otherness and equal rights in the Jewish state; but simultaneously showing a preparedness for pluralistic coexistence. The Jewish Self, by comparison, is seen to lack now the national idealism which "the Jews had in the beginning." This is commented on very frequently and seen as the real source of the problem: if Jews were committed to the town as the first settlers were, stayed put, at the expense of quality of life even, or if those who leave were willing to make a material sacrifice to encourage Jews to take over their homes, the problem would not have surfaced in the first place, the argument goes.

But beneath such argument the Jewish-Israeli Self is torn (as already noticed) by contradictory national premises. So it is Self-probing and -censoring, restrained and cautious; and because, in Upper Nazareth, culturally unprepared,

somewhat inarticulate in rationally arguing through *their* case for Jewish nationalism. This even means that they easily appear *to themselves* as "racist". A *propós* cultural unpreparedness, Itzik, a kibbutznik of Polish background who settled in Upper Nazareth in the early 1960s after leaving the permanent army, now working in one of the local plants as a technician, is interesting:

> I grew up on a kibbutz. My whole life I didn't get an education in the Jewish tradition. And suddenly it turns out to be very important that you at least know your tradition. *Ma pitom* [no way] would the kibbutzim of Ha'Shomer Ha'Tzair build synagogues, teach them [their members] the sources! But all the answers about the Jewish connection to the land [of Israel] lie in the religious sources. You see, for a religious person everything is clear; he knows who he is, what to do, why he is doing it. -- Religious people don't have any of these dilemmas and complexes. For the secular people....I today wish I had been taught more about our tradition. At gut-level I have no doubts that wanting this town to be Jewish is a matter of Zionism; but I can't say this without also sounding racist. I don't have the *Jewish* argument to back it up, you see? Only now am I starting to understand this; and suddenly it's important to me that my son have his *bar mitzvah*, that *he* learn something about Judaism. So on the one hand you see that you need Judaism, but on the other hand, you can't ask that...Me, I now know a little and have come to respect religion; but go and try to persuade fifty percent of the population that they need Judaism, need to study Judaism!

The reactions of Jewish viewers in Upper Nazareth to the television coverage of a Jewish-Arab confrontation (in connection with the national uproar MENA raised at the time -- Chapter 6) are telling. Arab participants in the programme were described to me as "very educated," "very calm and rational," "nowadays knowing their rights," "very sure of themselves." And as "open-minded" in the sense that they managed to look at, and somewhat understand the Jewish viewpoint. The Jewish participants, by contrast, were seen as

"intimidated," "uneducated" (i.e., as both inarticulate and emotional in their arguments), "hysterical," and short of *national* answers ("the Jews made it look like we are just being racist; they didn't give them the right answers, national answers"): not even the "pro-Arab" speakers managed to take account of the Arab side of the equation, I was told.[243] When I asked, however, what sort of argument the Jewish side *should* or *could* have presented, or how *they* would have managed themselves, people, aside from mentioning the Holocaust and the "Jewish problem," felt at a loss. Quite tellingly, several of my informants wished to explain the asymmetry in terms of "wrong" (i.e., non-representative) samples of voices, both Arab and Jewish. However, when then pressed to elaborate, it was conceded that in a sense the TV show, perhaps, captured "what the problem is today."

The paradox and cultural dilemma which comes to life here from the point of view of Jewish Upper Nazareans, is that the Arab Other We encounter and interact with in Our daily rounds of life outwardly appears as Israeli; and sometimes even more Israeli (in the statist vision) than We. This is so even though an implicit macro-societal premise holds that culturally full Israeliness is inextricably linked with (and hence also bounded by) Jewishness; i.e., it is the prerogative of the Jews.[244] Not only were my informants aware of this cultural 'competition' for Israeliness with the Arab Other (in respect to 'doing' nationalism and democracy), they also related it to cultural reversals (and competition) in respect to 'class' and emplacement.

7.2.2. 'Class' and Historic Rootedness in Israel

From the cultural premise of the inseparability of Israeliness from Jewishness there followed these sub-premises: that the Jews are also (a) better educated and better off and (b) more at home in the Israeli state, by comparison with their Arab co-citizens. But local realities *as perceived by the Jewish Upper Nazareans* either negate the sub-premises and thus the premise, or even result in an odd reversal of them.

To begin with the 'class' factor. Half of the surface appearance of normalcy remarked on at the outset of this section was, it needs to be added now, created by the Arab Others whom I encountered and interacted with on a routine basis. (This is routine, too, for the Jewish Upper Nazareans.) Evidently, in these everyday encounters I confronted my own preconceptions as to how the Arab Other ought to look, act, and fit in (or rather, stand out) in the context of a largely Jewish town. And my preconceptions, I dare say, derived from encounters with Arab Israelis, and encounters with Jewish-Arab encounters, in other parts of the country. I certainly found the following "by-the-way" kind of statement of an Israeli journalist, concerning the Arab debating team in the TV confrontation, confirmed by Arab Israelis routinely encountered in Upper Nazareth in general; more importantly, I believe the postulate it contains preoccupies many Jews of Upper Nazareth:

...[T]he Arabs in the TV debating team have adapted to the bourgeois Israeli environment and would manage to blend in most Jewish neighbourhoods (as they already do in their work places) (Krivine, 1983).

"Bourgeois" can also stand as the overall impression my Upper Nazareth informants gave me of the Other on the debating team (see above). And my informants often slid into talking about the kind of Other in Upper Nazareth in these same terms. Thus, Yochanan, a Labourite who had himself participated in the TV debate where he spoke out "against" Arabs in Upper Nazareth (we recall, he is one of the town's pioneers, a sabra and kibbutznik; he works as a government official, owning a single-family home in the "Permanent Army" neighbourhood), in pondering aloud the threat of an Arab list running in Upper Nazareth local elections, remarked:

There are several candidates that could run successfully in the next elections: a social worker, a bank manager ... Look, they have a lot of [powerful candidates]; many [Arab] doctors and lawyers live in Upper Nazareth! In this area here alone, I know five or six doctors. Another one has just moved in next to Dina [also one of the pioneer settlers]. These are people [Arabs], extremely rich. You can see the villas they live in. The economic position of these people is middle class *and up*. So there is certainly no problem of finance! There is one here who owns a newspaper in Nazareth; his wife works for the [Israeli] Television station. These are people that know the material, you understand? They are not new in this field [of ethnic politics]. They know how to do it. Someone like me feels like a beginner next to them! The influence of the Jews on the Arab parties has decreased in general; and there is a radicalization within the Arab parties which we won't be able to stop any longer. It's no longer like it was years ago -- you tell the candidates to lay off, throw them a bone: "We'll make some concessions, but don't go for it!" The concessions being jobs, money, all sorts of things. They don't need these; -- they can afford nationalism! [He pulls a half-amused, half-bitter grin.]

A concern with Their equally high or higher socio-economic position *vis-à-vis* Ours clearly dominated also Yochanan's exposé of the Arab problem in his neighbourhood, as he gave me a tour of it at the end of a visit to his house, so that I could "see for myself" (Chapter 3, p.82). He first took me to the edge of Djab el-Sich, where he told me about the story of Ben-Gurion and local history in general. From there, we walk eastward on Meggido Street:

> [He points to buildings on the south side of Meggido Street, where Arab-owned homes are concentrated] Here, look at this; this hurts! How close together the houses are built. Only over the last two to three years people [Jews] have started to add second storeys to their houses; I have thought about adding on for fifteen years. And *here* [the Arab houses], they are building third and fourth storeys! ... Now, a story about this house here [on the northern side]: this whole row was built by the Ministry of Housing; and here there was a vacant lot for a long time, which was eventually taken by a man who was the administrator for minority housing; we went to university together. He built this house. Half a year later he sold it to the guy who used to be the head of *el-Ard* -- I'm sure you have heard of el-Ard![245] He is a millionaire! He bought the house and added on. There are people that say he actually built under a different name -- all sorts of stories. There were people [Jews] who wanted to build here [in the past]; they weren't given permission. In the end someone with no interest in living here got to build, and he exploited the situation...As one sees -- I see -- this place is slipping through our hands. [We walk on.]

> Now, here most of the people [Jews] are the third or fourth owners. Here, in this house lives a family of pioneers from a kibbutz on the Kinneret [Sea of Galilee]; they have three children, but none of them stayed here [in town]. And it won't be long before they leave too... Soon I'll show you Motke Allon's house...This area here was free of Arabs until three to four years ago, then the chap I told you about, whose wife works for television, bought this house. He has money! It was like a knife: this happening in the middle of an area where people like the first mayor used to live; an Arab family here! And since then, three or four more houses have been bought by Arabs...Do you see this house here [owned by an Arab family]? Look at the other houses; this one used to be like them, it used to be a simple house. And now look what luxury! They worked on it half a year, invested lots of money...Here in this

house also lives an Arab family...Ah, here is Motke Allon's house, you see! Now an Arab family lives in it. Next to it, that family also has a story to it; they had a programme on television on this family: their mother is from Kfar Yehetzkel, one of the pioneers of Israel. And now the family is falling apart. They'll have to leave here, their children all left. What can I say?

The municipality's public spokesperson, too (when I met with her to obtain statistics regarding the number of Arab residents in Upper Nazareth and she, insisting that there existed no reliable statistics, steered me to statistics on the town's Jewish population), ended up talking about the kind of Arab Other residing in Upper Nazareth:

[Flipping through the statistical abstracts to locate the references to Upper Nazareth, on which she intends to base the information she gives me on the Jewish population:] The majority of the Arab population here are Christian. And middle-class and up! In that neighbourhood alone [she points towards *Kramim*] live about 1000, and most of them are academics, doctors, lawyers. In Upper Nazareth [read, Upper Nazareth minus the Arab neighbourhood of Kramim and the *Permanent Army* neighbourhood], they are mainly middle-class. And no matter what the statistics may say, there are none on welfare, maybe one or two families. I ought to know that. Most of them are self-employed, I know...Here, some figures on occupation: among the Jews 7.2 percent are self-employed; among the Christians -- the Arabs, all the Christians here are Arabs -- it says 16.2 percent are self-employed. Now, I know that this can't be; in that neighbourhood [*Kramim*] alone at least 40 percent are self-employed...Here, number of people per room: *Jews, less than one person per room -- 48.8 percent.* Again, that doesn't seem right! For most homes here there must be more than one person per room! Because most flats have three to four rooms, and couples here have three to four children. -- Here in Upper Nazareth, the Jews have many more children than the Arabs; it's usually the other way around. Every [Jewish] family has three to four children at least! The Arab families have one or two; a very Western pattern, you must know that...Now, here it says 50 percent of the Jews live in homes with four rooms or more; of the Christians, it says, 14 percent. How can *that* be when 90 percent of the people in that neighbourhood [Kramim] live in *villas*, 120 square metres each!? And there are almost no flats with more

than four rooms! [She here implies that few Jews live in single-family houses.]

However, "bourgeois" -- as a summary description of the "Israeli environment" into which the Arab team would blend so readily (above) is hardly an adequate description for *Jewish* Upper Nazareans as a whole. The majority are employed in manual labour or service industry.[246] In addition, the town's population has a relatively high percentage of old-age pensioners (most of whom can be described as working class on the basis of their past occupations). Importantly, Upper Nazareth is considered a working class town both by the locals themselves and by outsiders. On the other hand, it would be equally fallacious to classify *all* the Arab Israelis residing in the town or utilizing the town's services and facilities as bourgeois. Though, without having carried out a systematic study of the Arab residents of Upper Nazareth, my impression is (and it seems confirmed by available census data) that on the whole they tend to be of the middle- and upper-middle classes.

Much more to the point, perhaps, is that in the perception of the Jewish residents I spoke with, be they working- or upper middle class, *They are very much like Us*, in terms of life style. Yet the assumption persists that it ought to be always somewhat harder for Them than for Us to maintain that standard of living and style of life. This means that Jews, instead of comparing the collective Us with the collective Them (where a higher fraction of Them than of Us are seen as falling into the middle- and upper middle class), tend to compare themselves to Arab Others of their own occupational background and position: Their bus

drivers or factory workers are in the same position as a Jewish worker; or, looked at the other way around, Jewish workers are no better off than a bus driver or factory worker of Nazareth. Alternatively, they may compare themselves to an Arab Other who lives right next door to them (who might well rank socio-economically somewhat above the breadwinner(s) of ones own household).

It seems that it is out of efforts, often ending in failure, to come to grips with this locally-observed and as yet unaccustomed socio-economic parity or, what is even harder, to come to terms with reversed asymmetry between Them and Us, that Jewish residents of Upper Nazareth conclude that the Arab immigration into their town has been nationalistically-inspired and financially backed by the PLO. The assertion is frequently quoted in the national media when treating the Jewish-Arab issue in Upper Nazareth, and was frequently suggested to me. "How else could it be that an Arab who works in a factory or drives a bus can afford to buy a flat here?", "where does he get the money from?", people reason, asking themselves and each other. This conviction is strengthened by another unsubstantiated assumption, namely, that Arab home-buyers, despite the fact that they are ineligible for low-interest government mortgages for the largest part, offer to pay a higher price for the same flat or house than a Jewish buyer ("because," why else would Jews sell to an Arab rather than a Jewish buyer?).[247]

Even in the context of routine daily interactions, comments on the Arab Other in Upper Nazareth that can be summarized under the heading of 'class' and of 'class'-affiliated (Israeli) culture are heard quite frequently -- e.g. Their level of education; Their ability to rent, purchase and even renovate flats or houses in

town *even though* most of Them do not qualify for interest-free or low-interest government loans or mortgages; on the quality and style of Their household furnishings; the cars They drive; the number of children They have; the way They dress; Their involvement in recreational, cultural or educational *hugim* [courses, classes]; and other yard sticks perceived as decisive. The comments are patterned according to the specific 'class' and also the gender of the person doing the comparing and commenting. To be sure, such social negotiations by Jews of an Arab Other (and, inversely, of Us) are generally kept brief and the person/family is identified as ▪Arab▪ or ▪from Lower Nazareth▪ only *vis-à-vis* a discussant whom one believes not to share that knowledge (as was often the case with the researcher). Certainly the conclusions implied by such comment remain *implicit*; and they can only be drawn if placed in the context of the objective and subjectively perceived socio-economic positions of the participants in such an exchange. (Evidently, housing is one of the more salient measuring devices of 'class' locally.)

A case in point here is the brief exchange between Shoshana and Avital at the bus stop, concerning their Arab neighbours' improvement on their flat by adding a patio (above). Avital and her husband also occupy a flat on the groundfloor, and have considered the addition of a patio within the framework of a home-improvement scheme which offers *them*, unlike their Arab neighbour (who has not served in the army), a low-interest loan to do so. But even so, her husband being a labourer at a factory out of town and Avital not being employed at all, their financial situation is too tight to realize such a plan (they still have

mortgage payments on their condominium to make). The renovating Christian Arab neighbour is a bus driver employed for many years with G&B Tours of Nazareth.

A second case in point. The apartment blocks in one of which I occupied a flat for three months contain for each entrance four apartment units per floor. On my floor, one of the neighbours was Orly, a woman born in Morocco but in Israel since the age of eleven, married to a sabra of Polish origin (he has not featured in this ethnography thus far); the family has three children ages five to ten. Orly takes on temporary jobs to supplement the income of her husband who works as a clerk in the management of one of the local factories; thus they make ends meet. They have lived in this flat for many years, but are still paying off the mortgage. The flat next to Orly is occupied by a Rumanian pensioners' couple who keep very much to themselves to their network of friends and relatives out of town. Across the hallway lives a young, recently married Moslem Arab couple of Lower Nazareth, Enam and Rajwan. He is a pharmacist in Migdal Ha'Emequ [a Jewish new town, south-west of Nazareth]; she has finished her degree as a technical drawer but prefers not to work. They have one baby girl and (as Enam tells her neighbours, gathered on the bench in front of the building during the afternoons or evenings with their children to chat) they don't want any more children. Both Enam and Rajwan come from well-off families of professionals, who assisted them financially in purchasing the home in Upper Nazareth.

Orly's days are filled with chasing down the cheapest deals on food (travelling to Nazareth by bus) or clothing (she would like to dress more

fashionably, but finds it difficult to afford it), seeking employment, attending to her children (one of them always seemed to need a trip to the doctor), and upgrading her educational skills (she is striving to attain a teaching degree). Enam, on the other hand, spends her days walking her daughter to the park or visiting her mother, sisters or friends in Nazareth, always dressed and done up fashionably. The shopping is taken care off in the evenings or on weekends with the assistance of her husband who drives a car. In the evenings Enam either attends an aerobics class in Nazareth or an English class offered at the Upper Nazareth community centre; her mother or husband then baby-sit.

Orly and Enam are good neighbours. On occasions (more so in the past, according to Enam) Orly has found the time to take her kids to the local park together with Enam and her little daughter, or to sit at Enam's for half an hour in the afternoon for a chat (although Enam has never been invited to visit Orly's house; which corresponds to the Arab family's relations with other Jewish neighbours). When Enam runs out of sugar she can approach Orly; or -- as when Enam once forgot to turn off the water tab in the bathroom before leaving the house during a water cut and then found it flooded upon returning -- Orly will take in the baby for brief periods while Enam is unexpectedly unable to attend to her daughter and her husband is still at work. And they always engage in a chat when running into each other on the hallway. On one such occasion (I overheard the conversation from inside the kitchen of my flat, they were standing right in front of my door), Orly complained to her about her eldest daughter's influenza which she felt had been going on for too long despite frequent visits to the

doctor's and medication, keeping her on her feet as well as incurring medical expenses that began to exceed their budget. Enam then asked Orly who her doctor was. When Orly told her the doctor's name, Enam wanted to know which medical fund he belonged to (and Orly's family were members of). When Orly retorted it was the Histadrut public sick fund (the cheapest available in Israel; most workers belong to it) Enam, appalled, told her she shouldn't entrust her children to the care of this particular sick fund. She related her bad experience with one of their doctors in the diagnosis of her pregnancy, after which she and Rajwan switched to *Maccabee*, a private sick-fund whose members are generally middle-class, and, in fact, began to frequent a private physician in Nazareth affiliated with the French hospital. When it comes to health, Enam added, one ought not count the money spent. "What do you think? We have no choice," Orly replied defensively, now somewhat annoyed; but immediately recovered, adding "it's also not necessary, their doctors are excellent!" And she was suddenly in a hurry to get inside her door, under the pretext of having something on the stove. A few hours later (as usual in the late afternoon on Fridays, the onset of Shabbat) Orly came over to my place bringing me a plate full of food:

> *Orly:* Here, to your health! I hope you don't catch that cold going around.

> *researcher:* Thank you so much. But it isn't necessary that you bring me food all the time!

> *Orly:* What, no big deal. Enjoy it! Make sure you get lots of vitamins !

> *researcher:* Don't worry, I do eat enough. -- Come on in for a while!

> *Orly:* [She steps inside and closes the door behind her.] Hagit [the eldest

daughter] is still in bed with fever. [She lowers her voice] Get this, my neighbour on that side, the Arab woman,[248] she tells me to go to a private doctor! [She pauses, apparently waiting for a comment; as I fail to respond, she continues] What cheek! One can see that they don't lack [money]; they purchased that flat, did you know?

researcher: Yes, as most people in these blocks. No?!

Orly: You are right. And how she dresses, have you noticed? Always dressed to the teeth, and the daughter, too, already! Not like...

researcher: She has good taste in clothing!

Orly: One also needs the money! I, too, have good taste; but not everyone can buy what they like!... She also has everything in her kitchen, you know? I've been inside [their flat] and I saw it. Very modern! Nu, why not. May they be healthy [may they enjoy what they have]. But one wonders; all the time they [the Arabs] shout, they strike down there that they are given less ... Thank God, as long as one has enough to eat, I say; [she touches my arm indicating she is about to leave] and one more doesn't make a difference, so don't worry! Have a good Sabbath!

The third cultural coordinate by which, I suggested, They appear (to Us) closer to how We ought to have (thought we would) become in the Jewish homeland than We now find Ourselves to be -- rootedness in place -- is outwardly most visible on account of the difference in ambience between the two Nazareths' physical environments. The one, it becomes immediately apparent at a first glance, has a long history; but the other, by stark contrast, is a recent addition alongside the ancient city. Certainly, the Jews have struck roots in Nazareth, yet little or nothing in the physical environment suggests that the Jewish people have *re*-rooted themselves here.[249]

To be sure, there exists no absolute measure of the time-in-place which has to elapse before people feel rootedness-in-place. However, time-in-place -- in *Eretz Yisrael* -- has been, and is, crucial to the forging, by Jews, of an Israeli culture. Witness the importance of concepts like "sabra" and "vatik." It is important to note, though, that both ideologically and culturally it has been the land of Israel, rather than any particular place within it, around which ideological and cultural preoccupations with emplacement (in a homeland)[250] have revolved. Thus Nazareth comprises a mirror of Jewish versus Arab time-in-place, the reflections of which forever render the Jews recent newcomers, even after 30 years. As one high school student wrote in her essay (suggesting that the people of Upper Nazareth themselves compare time-in-place):

> Upper Nazareth was built in 1957; she [*sic*] is a very young city. In Upper Nazareth there live 25,000 people. The Jews come from many different countries. Some of the people [living in Upper Nazareth] are from Nazareth, they have lived in Nazareth for a long time because Nazareth is an ancient city. There are three religions: Christians, Muslims and Jews.

A frequent occasion on which Their rootedness-in-place was explicitly compared with Our's was in connection with the relating of an episode in the television debate between Jews and Arabs of Upper Nazareth: a female Moslem Arab participant remarking to one of the MENA activists that if she, the activist, was really bothered by the close proximity of Arabs, she had the choice of leaving the town. People would usually add a comment like, "*They* [the Arabs] feel right at home here!"

More commonly, however, such comparisons are implicit in reflections on

Jewish, especially the youths', desertion of the town; on Jewish lack of commitment -- the word here often used is "respect" -- to place (for example Yochanan, p.309, above). A lack of attachment to place among Jews is almost taken for granted when the roots of the problem of emigration are located in a general decline of idealism (combined with the inadequacy of socio-economic inducements). The point is that We continually ask Ourselves "why stay?", "why live in this particular place?" -- and We weigh the material benefits thereby gained or foregone; whereas They, on the whole, have a sense of 'belonging' to the locality (cf. Cohen *et al.* 1982) which They don't contemplate consciously or question. It is an attachment to place which requires neither national idealism nor socio-economic inducements (say We to Ourselves of Them). Thus They are seen to be truly rooted, "in-place," in Nazareth:

> Deeply rooted people...live...in the daily rounds of the present.....They are at ease in the world, content with *what they have, who they are, and where they live*;...immune from the beguilements of the future promise and the need to rehabilitate the past (Tuan 1984:4; emphasis added).

As one of my informants -- a resident of the town almost since its beginnings; involved in "enhancing young people's local patriotism" -- reflected (we had been talking about Arab immigration to Upper Nazareth):

> The young people ask themselves, "why live *dafka* in Upper Nazareth?" [why live in Upper Nazareth of all places?] "Why not live in Tel Aviv?" Go talk to the children in school here; which of them want to carry on living here? In a way Upper Nazareth is a microcosm of what is going on in Israel as a whole; there the Jewish youth asks itself, "why *dafka* in Israel?", "why not in New York, Paris, London?" But it starts *here*, with this town in which they grew up, in which many were born! Why do they even think in that way? Why think about Tel Aviv -- and New York. *This* is their *moledet* [birthplace, *patria*]! Why

don't they feel at home here? So what [big deal] that they were born here! If their concern is with making an easy life for themselves, having everything; if what matters to them is having a television, a bigger car, a bigger house? If that's their goal in life, then right, they might achieve that faster elsewhere. What reason do they have to live here, someone who doesn't have the idealism -- *nationalist* idealism? If the search is for material comfort, with no national ideal whatsoever, it is impossible to persuade a person to stay here. Look, just a week ago my wife and I talked about it: there is a price we've had to pay for living here for 30 years, a loss. We could have lived in a big city; for the price I paid for this house I could have bought the same house in Haifa. And the same house in Haifa is worth much more today. Second, my children could have studied at a proper conservatory -- they all play an instrument; at a conservatory where they might have become professional musicians. I could have finished university in three years instead of seven. But I saw living here as halutziut. There was a price in it. I want you to understand, the price would have been worth it if all the ideals I paid the price for had become a reality. But what? -- That's a feeling a lot of the vatikim here have!

The young people, my own children, say to themselves, "Okay, an ideal is an ideal; nationalism, nationalism! What I want is to *live* like everyone else in this world!" I try to convince the young people that there are more important things than comfort: nationalism, Jewish nationalism -- *Zionism*. But it's not easy; even I have to ask myself today, what is Zionism today? What actually happened is that for the past fifteen to twenty years, education has neglected this issue of nationalism in our young people! You see, the Jews have this problem: religion cannot be separated from nationality. Like for everyone else in Europe during the emancipation, for the Jews religion became secondary. Why has this become a special problem for the Jews? We are an exception because religion is our major connection to the land of Israel; because we haven't lived in it as long as the English have lived in England, say. We didn't think of that [instilling nationalism in our young people]!

Anyway, one is asking of young people to stay here. Why should they? I am not so sure *I* am interested any longer that they stay, my own children! I see my own ideals disappearing: I came to help build a Jewish town, in Galilee. And this ideal is now coming to an end. Today I would like to renovate our kitchen here, and I'm not sure it's worth it! My wife and I discussed it. I won't do it! I know that in a few years from now I'll be leaving this place My Arab neighbours are constantly investing money in their flats; they know it's worthwhile, they'll stay.

And there are many that left this place after having raised their children here -- the children didn't want to stay, the parents would have been left alone, so they moved after their children. Families in which a strong Zionism has prevailed sometimes for several generations; suddenly, in their children, it doesn't reproduce itself any longer!

7.3. New-Old Boundaries Around Jewish Israeliness: Militarism and Elements of Traditional Jewishness Reconsidered

Let me now point to what I see as the major implication of the aforegoing. It is that now that They so obviously (to Us) share quite crucial cultural attributes of Israeliness, Israeliness has become an inadequate delimiter of Jewishness. What, then, does it mean to be Jewish -- secularly? In what way, what form, is "significant difference" (cf. Wallman *et al.* 1984) expressed and signalled in the course of one's daily life, especially in social encounters with Others? The force of this question has to do with an unstated macro-societal premise, namely, that the difference between Them and Us *is* or, rather, *must remain*, culturally and ideologically significant. People in Upper Nazareth, occasionally quite explicitly, raise and respond to these questions.

Service in the Israeli army is, of course, a visceral boundary marker (particularly among the young) between Them and Us: We are soldiers. Historically (Chapters 2 and 3), security and military aspects have strongly coloured Upper Nazareth's culture and perceptions of Self: its physical location *vis-à-vis* the Arab city, its 'myth of origin' (the story of Ben-Gurion on Djab el-

Sich), the biographies of a large part of the town's male settlers (especially of the first sabra and vatik settlers) of which a professional career in the army is quite characteristic, the neighbourhood originally built for people in -- and to this day still carrying a name to this effect -- the Permanent Army; all these still contribute significantly to the town's overall self-image. And to this day, in the official local Self-image presented *vis-à-vis* national outsiders -- as on the occasions of visits by delegations from French and German twin-cities (St.Etienne and Leverkusen) which I had the opportunity to observe -- military symbolism comprises a basic ingredient: the Commander of the Northern regiment which the town has adopted joins the ranks of the town notables, in uniform; and the town's "sons and daughters" currently serving in the army, clad in their uniforms even though they are on their weekend leaves, form the backdrop of the official reception ceremony. In everyday social situations, as the women of a block sit on the bench out front of their building to chat, and this includes an Arab neighbour, it takes merely the mention of a husband's upcoming *miluim* (the three-month obligatory reserve duty in the army that men have to serve once a year until the age of 60), an anecdote of their son's or daughter's time in the army, or perhaps discussions of what their kids plan to do "after the army," to exclude the Arab neighbour. In such situations, Enam, my Arab neighbour, usually withdrew from the group quietly.

But army service is not a unfallible marker of Jewish Israeliness -- as the young people whose voices we shall hear in a moment are aware of and not without concern. In fact some Arab Israelis do serve in the Israeli army, and they

are strongly represented (relatively speaking) among the Arab residents of Upper Nazareth: the minority housing project on Djab el-Sich was built for ex-service men of the minorities. And Arab Israelis who have served in the army, or the security services in general, and their kin (of all Others), qualify for all the government aids in housing and benefits allocated for moving to a development town. Even MENA -- and from within its ranks the most "radical" element, the leader of Kach in Upper Nazareth -- conceded to admitting to their town those Arab Others who had served in the army; indeed, the pledges were formulated accordingly: not to sell to anyone who has not served on the army; the word "Arab" did not feature (as it then did, however, in MENA rhetoric).

The most reliable boundary markers, in the sense that they are inevitably inclusive of the Jewish Self and exclusive of the Arab Other, are, of course, cultural building blocks that have their roots in the Jewish religious tradition. Herein lies the inseparability of religion from nationality, and the contradiction secular Jewish Israelis grapple with. A solution for many of the people I encountered lies in a "return" to selected elements connected with the Jewish tradition -- although, to be sure, the meaning attributed to these is secular, cultural. Notably, people attributed a lot of cultural weight to things like fasting on *Yom Kippur* and/or abstaining from eating bread on Passover -- at least as far as their public presentation of self is concerned.

To illustrate, one week preceding Yom Kippur -- the Day of Atonement, on which religious Jews mourn the destruction of the Second Temple and abstain from eating, drinking or smoking for one day -- I was sitting at the home of Tova

and her husband Sharon (they lived in a flat two floors above me), watching television. Tova announced that a day off work was coming up, and she and her husband began considering what to do with their free time. "We can just sit at home and study Torah," Sharon threw out -- as a joke it seemed (both of them came to Israel from Rumania at a very young age and spent their childhood and youth on Left-leaning kibbutzim; and they consider themselves as secular). Tova then reminded him, also seemingly in jest, that he couldn't smoke on that day. Turning to me she added, now quite serious, "I think it's actually a nice idea to visit one of the synagogues on Yom Kippur. Why not? I am not religious, but just like that. How does one know one is Jewish at all? Really!" I ask them whether they usually keep the fast. Sharon, somewhat embarrassed, replies that they have been for the last few years, adding that, in any case, it doesn't hurt to take it easy one day of the year.

Come Yom Kippur, Tova and Sharon took a raincheck on the synagogue visit; but both seemed to keep the fast. Sharon spent the afternoon out in front of the building, exchanging joking remarks with passers-by or other bystanders (Jewish) about the difficulty of the fast. It seemed that the large majority of the people in our block and the adjoining one kept the fast (and all joked about it) -- with the exception of the researcher. She assumed that in a town known, among the religious Zionists of Jerusalem, as "the stronghold of secularism"[251] the thing to do would be not to fast. Like many of the residents of the building, I was standing outside the building in the afternoon, chatting with some neighbours. I pulled out my cigarettes. Enam, my Arab neighbour had joined the group with

her daughter. "What's the matter with you, don't you keep the fast?" a Jewish neighbour remarked to me -- and the issue was picked up on by the others (half in joke, it seemed). "Are you at all Jewish?", another asked me rhetorically and with a laugh. "Oh well, one day without smoking doesn't make a difference", I joined what seemed to be the consensus and put my cigarettes away. "We [the Moslems] fast on Ramadan," Enam shyly contributes to the conversation, "but I don't fast, we are not religious." Her comment is passed over, and one of the Jewish women changes topic by asking another whether she had a haircut recently.

The important role which both army service and keeping the Jewish festivals, in some form or another, plays in delineating *Jewish Israeliness*, to Us as much as to Them, surfaced in the context of a three-day Zionist seminar for the grade 11 high school students of Upper Nazareth.[252] Each day had one guiding topic: the topic of the first day was "What does it mean to be Jewish?", that of the second "Jewish attachment to the land of Israel," and that of the last day "Zionism today."[253] The topic of Jewishness was introduced with the help of a game and role-play. The students were presented with a hypothetical situation: A very rich man dies. He has no children of his own; but two nephews and a niece. In his will he stipulates that rather than dividing the money equally among his niece and nephews, it ought to go to the one who is the best Jew. But which of them was the best Jew? The students were to be the judges. The three contestants (their characters were acted out by three of the seminar leaders) then presented, in turn, their cases to the students as to why, on what grounds, they felt they were the best Jew. In essence the students were given three Jewish prototypes:

first, a Diaspora Jew making it a point that she did not want to make aliyah because of the problems Israel has, but she was contributing to Israel financially and was encouraging young people in her community to make aliyah -- a very important cause; all the members of the Jewish community attend the synagogue for the festivals and Sabbaths. The major controversy this character personified was whether living in the land of Israel was crucial to Jewishness. The students dismissed this candidate readily: "You don't even live in Israel!?" one student shouted. -- They were not so much concerned with Jewishness *per se*, it appeared, but with being Jewish *in Israel*.

The second prototype was that of an ultra-orthodox Jew in Israel. He wore a kippah and a beard and explained:

> I have made aliyah to Israel because the first *mitzvah* [religious commandment] for a Jew is to live in the Land of Israel. I live in Mea Shearim [the ultra-orthodox neighbourhood of Jerusalem]. I am married to a righteous daughter, and we have eight children [a loud "uuhhh!" goes through the audience]. We keep all the commandments. I study in the yeshiva, my wife doesn't work. I think that all of Israel should have to keep the shabbat -- no television, no cinemas, nothing; everything should be closed! ["Boo!", the students exclaim disapprovingly.] If my house were on fire, I would save the Torah and the teffilin; that's all that's important.

The controversy here, of course, is religious imposition. Although the students were to withhold questions to the three contestants, they were now provoked beyond restraint by the ultra-orthodox persona. A female student, the daughter of ex-kibbutznikkim of European background, jumps up: "You say you have eight children. I'm sure half of them are boys, and that they won't join the army! So how can you claim in all seriousness that you are Jewish? What makes you Jewish

then?' "Exactly," others join in. A second student, male, got up and asked: "I don't see why others have to keep shabbat because of you. I don't mind people like you doing as they like! And you, too, shouldn't force others. This is a democratic country!"

The third type of Jew the students were confronted with was the secular halutz, the New Jew:

> I live in a moshav. I think the Jewish people should live in its own country. I work the land, I work hard with my hands. I have participated in three wars in one of which I was wounded, but I returned to the army nevertheless; because I believe that the defence of our country is very important. Now I am in the reserve. I don't keep the shabbat or the festivals; I don't fast on Yom Kippur ["uuhh!" the students interject], I eat bread on Passover, I even eat pork ["uuhhh!!]. I don't think that to be Jewish one has to believe in a God or keep the festivals. I am tied to the Jewish people through its history and by living in Israel. I don't mind these people [he points at the ultra-orthodox "cousin"], they can live as they like; this is a democratic country!

The reactions are again strong. A male student charged: "If you don't keep the festivals at all, only when it suits you, and if you don't fast on Yom Kippur, what makes you Jewish? The Druse also serve in the army!" "Not only the Druze," someone else joined in. "But that's them. I'm Jewish. I share the Jewish history!" "And how do you know *that*, if you don't care at all about the festivals?" -- the same girl who had attacked the ultra-orthodox candidate for not serving in the army asked belligerently.

The students' votes declared the halutz-type the best Jew; the ultra-orthodox came in second (eleven of the students gave him their vote). In the discussion circles taking place subsequently, the students were asked to justify

their votes. The following is an excerpt of the discussion that took place in the one group which kindly allowed me to join them:

Nissim [his parents are immigrants from Morocco; his home can be described as traditional; he had voted for the halutz-type, but he now starts off defending the religious Jew]: Everyone attacks them! But they really don't bother anyone. Here in Upper Nazareth, what do we have to complain about? We can see a movie on Friday nights! We can even go shopping on shabbat!

Ilan [he is of European and South American background; and he had voted for the halutz-type too]: That's because here they are not the majority. What about Migdal Ha'Emequ, where they are in the majority?

A female student [as if talking to herself, interjecting in lowered voice]: And there are also no Arabs living in Migdal Ha'Emequ, are there?

Nissim [to Ilan]: Look, Tel Aviv is a big city, and there you can do a lot on Friday nights: movies, discos, whatever!

Anat [addressing herself to Nissim; she had voted for the halutz but attacked him for not keeping the festivals]: Do you eat bread on Pessah? Do you fast on Yom Kippur?

Nissim: I don't fast, and I eat bread on Pessah!

[There result strong reactions from his fellow-students now; the seminar leader asks them to restrain themselves and speak in order.]

Uri [he is of European background; his father is active in the Labour party locally]: If you don't fast and eat bread on Pessah, what makes you Jewish, tell me? How do you know at all that you are Jewish?

Nissim: Well, my mother is Jewish. And in a few months I will go to the army and defend the country!

[Two girls talking at once, one of them is Anat:] But they also go to the army, some of them do! They have that too! So just because they made you a *brit* [ritual circumcision] ? [They laugh now]

A male student: And even that they have!![laughter]

Tova [of European background]: I think that we have to keep to the religion, in a way, to be Jewish. If we don't believe in anything the Jewish religion says, then we are not Jewish anylonger.

At this point the seminar leader takes over, summing up what she gathered from the discussion: that there is definitive answer to the question what it means to be Jewish, that there are different ways of being Jewish. Before breaking for lunch, the students are asked to mark on prepared handouts containing seven attributes of Jewishness the one attribute they deem most important. There is no single one that's most important, the students protest. But the consensus reached is that serving in the army (living in Israel is an inbuilt premise here) and keeping the festivals are the most weighty cultural attributes of being Jewish -- in Israel.

<center>***</center>

To conclude. In the context of Israel the salience of ethnicity is not merely situational but an overarching cultural imperative. But I have aimed to demonstrate that this is not culturally unproblematic, at least not for Jewish Israelis living in a community setting where they must share their immediate living space inside the Jewish homeland with Arab Israelis. Such is the case of Upper Nazareth.

Built in the mid-1950s on a hill-top overlooking the ancient and all-Arab

city of Nazareth, Jewish Upper Nazareth was intended to eventually "outbalance" demographically and to control politically and economically that Arab city. Ethnic boundaries between Jews and Arabs in Nazareth were taken, by both Arab and Jew, as a self-evident cultural given. However, the Jewish Israelis who were building and settling Upper Nazareth were presented with the problem of what *kind* of Jewishness to fill that place with. The discourse was primarily one between Diasporic, traditional religious Jewishness and new, usually secular, Jewishness or Israeliness.

But the constitution of Jewish Self in Upper Nazareth is itself invariably and inextricably intertwined with the constituting Arab Other of Nazareth, which is not unchanging. With changes in the Jewish Self and Arab Other and the relations between them ethnic boundaries between the Arabs of Nazareth and the Jews of Upper Nazareth, far from remaining self-evident and clearly demarcated, became highly ambiguous. We looked at this from the points of view of Jewish Upper Nazareans. They perceived cultural boundaries as becoming porous, even in respect to such apparently crucial ethnicity markers as nationalism (Zionism) and democracy, 'class', and rootedness in place. Thus Jewish Upper Nazareans became troubled by the apparent contradiction between two of Israel's founding principles: Zionism and democracy. This goes a long way toward explaining the change, in Jewish Upper Nazareth, from the early aggressive secularity to a return to cultural markers of Jewishness deriving from the religious tradition, and of their expression in both public culture and interpersonal interactions.

Appendix A

Excerpt from M. Allon's Article,
"The Kiriah and the City of Nazareth"

In order to prove discrimination, factual data are being distorted and the land and recuisition questions are portrayed as "eviction" and "strangulation." But the correct facts prove the opposite.

The state lands in Nazareth comprise only 227 dunams; government and army institutions are built on these lands, and have existed in the same spot since the time of the mandate. The area of Nazareth comprises 4,988 dunams. Of this large area, only 560 dunams were requisitioned. And of the 10,226 dunams comprising the rural area around Nazareth, only 400 dunams were requisitioned...

Thus the picture is as follows: the state lands and its buildings which serve the population of the city take up less than one fifth, while the lands belonging to the churches take up between one quarter to one third of the city. And all of these rural areas around Nazareth could be utilized by the city's population and institutions for development -- if they wanted to. But do they want to?

The government proceeded to initiate what the city leadership did not want for many years: it requisitioned 1,200 dunams in order to develop and build the country, establishing a vibrant and blossoming town with kindergartens, schools, sports fields, cultural institutions, tree-planting on the rocky ground, new industries; and 300 new families -- most of them new immigrants -- are building their lives honourably, not harming the source of income of the city's residents...It might seem to someone who is not close to issues here that a large number of residents of Nazareth were affected by requisitions. This is not true. Only seven Arab families lived, in one way or another, on this land; the remaining land was never cleared of rocks or cultivated [sic]. In this period of immigrant absorption and building, land has been

requisitioned in various parts of the country, in urban and rural areas. There were not many people affected (relative to the size of the land), particularly not here. Regarding the seven families harmed, it seems that a few of them have flats in the city in which the second [Moslem] wife and her children 'live'. Regarding the families that were genuinely affected, a willingness has been shown to do all that is necessary to find suitable compensation.

(...) The average number of Arab day labourers working in the Kiriah, residents of Nazareth, is 130...According to tentative data by companies connected with the construction of the Kiriah, the salaries paid to Arab workers thus far amounts to 3/4 million Lira. The municipal taxi enterprise has been revived, after the drivers were forced to look as far as Tel Aviv in order to find work. The restaurants, which rely on local and foreign tourism, experienced a tremendous boost (according to the owners) following the establishment of the Kiriah. I have no data on craftsmen in the city, and on how much they get paid for work in the Kiriah, but I know that it adds up to thousands of Lira. In the same breath I will also mention the trade in shopping from among the residents of the Kiriah to the shops, the petrol station, the cinema of Nazareth, etc. Although these data are incomplete, they show the *terrible evil* the establishment of the Kiriah caused the city. And this is only the beginning; the Kiriah is still in its cradle (*Illon Nazrat*, December 1958:2-6).

Appendix B

Versions of Jewish
Historiography in Nazareth

The following, edited, version of Jewish history in Nazareth was composed by Dr. Chaim Valtera (a member of the IC) and published in the September 1958 issue of *Ilon Nazrat* under the title, "Zionism in the Nazareth Area -- 400 Years Ago." It illustrates the enrichment of historic (re)sources through conceptual boundary expansion as well as the incorporation of the rabbinical and kabbalistic tradition and establishment of coevalness (cf. Fabian 1983) between Jewish settlement "in Nazareth" during that period and contemporary Jewish settlement "in Nazareth." These kabbalists, it is postulated, were in fact *halutzim* (*halutziut* constituting a key value of the Labour Zionist ideology and also, in transvalued form, of the statist ideology); and their inquisitive activities were grounded in modern scientific premises and motives, rather than in spiritual ones. Valtera writes:

> The importance of the Nazareth area is known from the time of the Bible and the Mishnah. However, remains of earlier settlements, like Ksullot and Gat Cheffer, have been discovered (*sic*). The remains of Jewish buildings have also been discovered in Yafia, Nazareth, Kfar Kanna [all of these are contemporarily Arab], and especially in Zippori, where the capital of the whole area and seat of the *Sanhedrin* [rabbinical high court] was.....Not much material has been published on Jewish settlements in the area pertaining to a later period.

In the 16th century, many Jews came to the country. Initially from Spain, Sicily and Sardinia; and some time later, Jews arrived from Portugal, South and Central Italy, Greece and Turkey. *It is justified to speak of the Zionist character of these immigrations*, since in the days of the Inquisition the Jews of the Diaspora realized that aliyah is the only way to save the people and the only way to guard traditions and values. *Groups of these immigrants also settled in the area of Nazareth.*

(...) There was an important crossroads near where Kiriat Nazeret stands now. Within the framework of the settlement policy of the Nassi family (a family of Portuguese Jews who received permission from Sultan Suliman, the Glorious, to establish self-rule in Galilee), a new Jewish settlement was set up near this crossroads. It appears that the settlement was called Rina, after Donna Rina, the daughter of Donna Garcia and wife of Don Joseph Nassi. In Zippori, as well, immigrants settled until the end of the 16th century, as is told by the *Bayit* (Rav Moshe Yossef from Terrani), a man of Sefad.

Forests of oak and cedars existed in the Nazareth mountains in these days; strong winds and lightening frequently damaged and destroyed these trees. *The struggle of these pioneering immigrants against the wild natural elements was difficult, as was conquering the rocky lands between the forests.* Kabbalists, too, settled in the area, on the tops of the Nazareth ridges, around the El Kanna and Ein Tab Wells (see the Book of Sukkah, 53a). From then on it was called Ein Moshe, probably named after the wise man Moshe Assula who established a metereological and astrological observation point. And, in fact, *these kabbalists worked on scientific investigations according to the kabbalah and the 'scientific methods'* (see the book *Ben Porat Yossef Nassi*, published by the Nassi family of Constantinople between 1577-1580). They classified stones and trees that attracted atmospheric electricity; they demonstrated the influence of the sun and the moon on the growth of plants; and they published fascinating legends about the residents of the Nazareth mountains and their deeds (see the book *Kaftor Ve Perach*, or *Yisharesh Ya'akov*, written by Ya'akov Ben Yizehak Luzatto, published by Provinius in Basel, 1580) (emphases added).

One month after the above version of Jewish history in Nazareth appeared in the local paper, the following version was published, in the same paper, as part

of M. Allon's article, "The Kiriah and the City of Nazareth" (Appendix A). It

points to the scantiness of Jewish history and, even more significantly, represents

(however subtly) the Moslems as the 'spoilers' to Christians and Jews in Nazareth:

> Little is known to us about ancient Nazareth, and this only from stories in the New Testament. It was the town of Jesus and his family who settled there after their return from Egypt. About Jews in Nazareth even less is known, although recent archaeological excavations around Nazareth have revealed the remains of a Jewish settlement.

> Various archaeological findings have been made reaching all the way back to the days from Jesus, almost all remnants of churches from the time of the Crusaders. The recent excavations prove that a flourishing Jewish settlement existed and that its residents were involved in various branches of trade. It is also known that this settlement existed until the end of the 6th century. It seems that as waves of Moslems came from Mecca and Medina, this settlement and its many churches were destroyed. Following the Arabs' attempt to expel the Crusaders, destroying them and their churches to the foundations, Nazareth lay destroyed and neglected until the 18th century.

Finally, this following article appeared in the Histadrut-owned national daily

Davar:

> The place of Nazareth is mentioned in the holy writings and the talmudic literature. It is mentioned first in the New Testament as the town in which Joseph, father of Jesus, settled with his wife and son after returning from Egypt. In the whole world there is probably not one person who can give a clear answer to the question, "When did the Jews finally have to leave Nazareth?" The last evidence we have of Jews in the town is from the end of the 6th century. Antonius Martyr, a Christian tourist who visited Nazareth in the year 570, tells: "In the synagogue there is still the book from which Jesus learned his *Aleph-Beth*, and the bench full of wonders and miracles on which Jesus sat and studied with his friends. There are many Jewish daughters in Nazareth." But with these words ends the historic knowledge of Jews in Nazareth for a period of 1400 years.

> (...) I know that politics and metaphysics, daily life and history are a dangerous mix.....Even so, I could not rid myself of the feeling that something wasn't quite right, not clear [upon his visit to Nazareth]. Something was happening there. The Jews, uprooted for more than

1000 years from the places which Jesus, their king, conquered are now re-rooting themselves in these places. After 1400 years, Jews in the town of Jesus! It is as if nothing had happened, as if our paths had not separated once and for all. Is this coincidental?

> Upon seeing [the Jewish Kiriah, the Jewish settlers, and the man running the Kiriah] -- a man full of action, this young and vibrant man involved with life and with people, it became clear to me that in order to love mankind, a man doesn't have to escape to the desert or a monastery, as did that man of Christianity. It is possible to do this through the Jewish outlook, as suggested by the commentary on the verse, *Se eili ve an' vehu*: "be like him; just as he is forgiving and merciful, so should you be forgiving and merciful." A shy thought flashed through my mind: maybe this was the purpose of Jews returning to the town of Jesus? (K.Shabtai, Part I of a three-part series on "Jews in Nazareth," *Davar*, 13.9.1957).

This latter version of Jewish historiography in Nazareth is particularly striking. It establishes an inextricable interrelation between Jewishness and being Christian: in fact, an almost paternalistic dependence of the latter upon the former. The link in the past is Jesus -- King of the Jews and first Christian; the separation (between then and now, between Christianity and Judaism) is bridged, if not erased ("as if it never happened") by analogously collapsing that point in the past with the renewed intersection between Jews and Christians in the present -- where Jews, via the Jewish outlook, now implement the basic tenets of the Christian belief system (thereby showing Christians how to be good Christians?).

Appendix C

The Political Manipulation of Population Figures of Upper Nazareth

Year	Number Cited	Source/Context
1959	2,000	*Ma'ariv* (based on Israel Census Bureau)
	3,500	M.Allon, correspondence with Minister of the Interior
1963	10,000	Local Matnass Report (1984: 8)
	11 - 12,000	*Jerusalem Post* article
	12 - 13,000	M.Allon, presentation to the Minister of the Interior
1964	15,000	M.Allon, interview with the *Jerusalem Post*
1966	11,100	Matnass Report (*op.cit.*)
	13,500	Upper Nazareth local authority to the state comptroller
	17,000	M.Allon, in a special radio programme (*Kol Israel*) on Upper Nazareth
1967	17,000	M.Allon, to the Minister of Labour (asking for municipal status)

1969	13,200	Matnass Report (*op.cit.*)
	17,000	Local authority, to the District Administrator
1972	16,400	Matnass Report (*op.cit.*)
	∎	Weiss, Shewach (1977); in an evaluation study of the town
	19,000	Local authority, to the state comptroller (*Jerusalem Post*, 4.7.1973)
1974	18,500	Matnass Report (*op.cit.*)
1981	23,900	∎
1982	25,000	Mayor of Upper Nazareth, in an interview with *Jerusalem Post*
1983	23,520	Israel Census Bureau
	24,700	Matnass Report (*op.cit.*)
	26 - 27,000	Mayor of Upper Nazareth, in dispute with the Census Bureau
1986	25,000	Ministry of Labour and Welfare Statistics
	27,000	Mayor of Upper Nazareth; the figure publically cited

Notes

[1] The second all-Arab city being Shfar'am.

[2] In 1983, half of Israel's Arab population lived in exclusively Arab villages and small-towns (Burg 1983:19). There are six Israeli cities that are officially considered "mixed," Jewish-Arab cities (so far, Upper Nazareth has not been counted among them): Tel-Aviv with Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Acre, Lod and Ramle; but within these "it is unusual to find mixed, Jewish-Arab residential districts" (Lustick 1980:289,f.5).

[3] Granting all Jews and only Jews the right to immigrate to Israel and receive citizenship immediately upon arrival.

[4] Cf.Webber (1985). The origins of the concepts of *millet* and of *millet* social organisation go back to the Ottoman empire, where it evolved in response to the Ottomans' incorporation of a vastly heterogeneous population under their rule. The Turkish word *millet* denoted major religious communities, each of which was given a considerable degree of local authority and autonomy. By implication, religious identity becomes inescapable. British rule over Palestine (1917-1948) substantially retained this Ottoman legacy, but superimposing the notion of "peoplehood"; as, at least in part and in essence, did then the Israeli state: Jewish, Moslem, Christian and Druze religious courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over their respective community members as regards matters of personal status and family law, such as marriage, divorce, alimony, guardianship, adoption, wills, legacies, etc.

[5] The name of the state; the flag (the star of David); and the state seal (the seven-branched candelabrum, the *menorah*).

[6] Handelman and Deshen (1975), but particularly Smooha and Cibulski (1978) and Smooha (1984a) give comprehensive compilations and analyses of social science research on Arabs in Israel which include also the studies carried out in the area of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel that I refer to below.

[7] See, for example, Ben Porath (1966; 1984); Dib Nakkara (1985); Jiryis

(1976); Landau (1969); Lustick (1980); Nakkleh (1974); Peretz (1958); Smooha (1978); Stock (1968); and Zureik (1979).

[8]Perhaps a brief elaboration of what the study of "perceptions" and "attitudes," as it is approached in survey research, implies (as opposed to the ethnographic approach) is in order. Survey research deals with individuals, paying little attention to the particular social and cultural worlds of which they are an essential part and within which their perceptions and experiences are constructed, acted out, and acquire their meaning for the actors. This approach can thus not capture the worlds of meaning that lie behind the perceptions and attitudes which individuals express in response to prompting questions. Moreover, survey research gets only at what people *say* they think and do -- but anthropologists are well aware of the fact that there is often a difference between what people say and what they do; that what people think and do is often situationally shifting; and that people make statements about themselves and the world around them not only via what they say and do, but also via what they don't say and do in the course of their everyday social interactions. To capture the whole range of people's expressions of their experiences, and certainly to get at meaning, survey research is inadequate; its findings are restricted to an appraisal of broad trends.

[9]See, for example, Hofman (1972); Jacob (1974); Peres (1971); Peres and Levy (1969); and Slann (1973).

[10]See, for example, Smooha and Peretz (1982); Smooha (1983; 1984b); Peres (1970).

[11]For example, Rubin (1974) and E. Cohen (1973).

[12]See Caplan (1980) on interactions between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem; or Shokeid (1980) on the emphasis of traditional cultural patterns amongst Moslem Arabs as symbolic opposition to their minority predicament.

[13]This is how my research interest was commonly couched by my informant-acquaintances and carried off by them to their network of acquaintances and friends, many of whom later became my informants; and I realized in the field how naive it had been to assume that the researcher has full control over people's perceptions of her research!

[14]Primarily because most flat rentals involved at least a six-month, and more often a one-year contract, combined with the fact that the majority of flats (as generally in Israel, except in major cities) were completely empty, necessitating some major purchases; those partly or fully furnished (they are private) can be counted on one hand, I was told -- and in the case of the two of them for which

the lease was up for renewal (and which I was listed for), their current tenants decided in the last minute to stay, after all.

[15]One of the couples with whom I was in the process of establishing warm relations had neighbours who had managed, after looking for a buyer for over one year, to sell their flat as of the first of January 1988; but they wanted to move to their new home in Tel Aviv (where the husband started a new job at the beginning of September) as soon as possible -- and they welcomed the unexpected income which renting out their apartment in Upper Nazareth would bring them. As they were purchasing new appliances for their flat in Tel Aviv, they left me a stove, fridge and some pieces of old furniture for a small sum.

[16]I was also led in this direction out of a concern with the anthropologist's authorial authority when it comes to Us.

[17]Of course, eventually Shimon and I became the objects of considerable gossip. This was to be anticipated and I had, in fact, discussed this matter with Shimon before engaging him as an assistant -- the concern here was with his reputation.

[18]Where I feel it is unclear from an excerpt of an interview that I quote whether the text at hand was obtained in the context of a formal interview or informal conversation (and often the boundaries between the two blurred in the conversational context itself), making it difficult for the reader to discern whether the conversation was tape-recorded or not, I have added a note of specification, either in the text or in a footnote.

[19]Much has been said in the national media and written in academic publications about their town, and -- as they see it and as I see it -- usually the town and its people have not fared well.

[20]Uri Thon was the long-time Adviser on Arab Affairs to Yigal Allon in the latter's capacities as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Culture.

[21]Mordechai Allon was one of the key figures in the creation of Upper Nazareth, and will hence feature centrally in this thesis.

[22]Israel Koenig.

[23]The Little Triangle is the strip of land along Israel's 'narrow waist', excluding the coastal strip; it was ceded to Israel in 1949 as part of its agreement with Jordan.

[24]Israel Koenig is a member of the National Religious Party which has traditionally controlled the Ministry of the Interior. In 1976 -- the time when the increased politicization of the Arabs in Israel manifested itself causing concern within the Israeli governement -- his name made the headlines in the Israeli media in connection with the "Koenig Memorandum," a confidential memorandum on the Arab problem which he had co-authored (together with Zvi Aldoraty) that was leaked to the press. The memorandum, entitled "Handling the Arabs of Israel," identified a number of "worrisome" demographic, political and economic trends within the Arab sector and suggested measures of coping with them. Among the measures proposed were the creation of a new political force in the Arab sector which the government could "control" by means of a "covert presence;" the adoption of "tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and university students;" and the intensification of economic discrimination against Arabs in order to deprive them of the "social and economic security that relieves the individual and the family of day-to-day pressures, [and] grants them leisure for "social-nationalist" thought (cited in Lustick 1980:68-69). Moreover, the memorandum urged for a more systematic "reward-and-punishment" of the Arab villages and élites; the mobilization of all Jewish parties to refrain from competing with one another for support in the Arab sector; the coordination of a smear campaign against Rakkah activists; and the harrassment of "all negative personalities at all levels and in all institutions." Finally, it proposed techniques for reducing the level of liquid savings in the Arab sector, for encouraging the emigration of Arab intellectuals, and for degrading the effectiveness of Arab university student organisations (Lustick 1980:256).

[25]The people of Upper Nazareth, too, insisted on inquiring and elaborating "why *dafka*?" as pertained to most areas of enquiry *other* than why their town was set up *next to Nazareth*, and certainly with respect to the anthropologist's motives for studying *dafka* their town. This bears witness, perhaps, to the sensitivity of the issues the answer leads up to.

[26]*Ma'ariv*, 6.1.1959.

[27]Kaoukji had taken a prominent part in the anti-Jewish riots of 1929 and 1936 (Bar-Zohar 1967:107-8).

[28]Whereas in 1952 the Christian population had constituted two-thirds of the total population of 20,000 (Alexander 1952:36), by 1961 the Moslem population comprised one half of a total population of 35,000 (Stock 1968:26). Today, Nazareth has a population of approximately 45,000, of which about eighty percent are Moslem.

[29]Personal interview with Mordechai Allon.

[30]In the direction of the site on which Upper Nazareth would eventually be established.

[31]Called *Maki* until 1965; subsequently the party split along anti- and pro-Soviet lines -- roughly overlapping with the ethnic, Jewish-Arab divide -- into *Maki* and *Rakkah* (*Reshimat Ha'Kommunistin Ha'Hadashah*, the New Communist List), respectively. In the 1951 elections to the second Knesset, Maki received 48 percent of the total votes in Nazareth; and the support for Maki (and, following the party's split, for Rakkah) has since increased steadily.

[32]Pinhas Lavon was the acting Minister of Defence from December 1953 until February 1955, the period during which Ben-Gurion temporarily retired from political life, i.e., from the position as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

[33]That is, in these instances Jewish immigrants to Israel were settled on a massive scale in the houses and entire villages vacated by their former inhabitants, and in new housing complexes added on to old, and sometimes ancient, structures in place. In 1954, according to Lustick (1980:58), more than one third of Israel's Jewish population lived on "absentee property," and nearly one third of the new immigrants (250,000) settled in urban areas abandoned by the Arab population.

[34]Tuan offers a pair of concepts -- "in place" and "out of place" -- which are helpful in thinking about the *experiential* dimensions and tensions embedded in the ideological activities of the Jews journeying to their ancient-new homeland. "Being-in-place" is "being-in-culture" and, *vice versa*, "being-in-culture" is "being-in-place" (Tuan 1984:8-10).

[35]For data pertaining to Kiriat Arba/Hebron, I am here primarily relying on Romann (1986).

[36]The Basic Principles are the collection of basic laws of constitutional stature *in lieu* of and as a basis for a constitution which Israel does not have to this day. For a more detailed treatment of Israel's Basic Principles, see Shimshoni (1982:53-97) and Peretz (1970:141, 155-157).

[37]One dunam equals one quarter of an acre.

[38]The city of Nazareth, on the other hand, was classified within the "Central Zone" the zone of lowest development priority in Israel's development zoning system (Government of Israel, Prime Minister's Office 1968:307).

[39]In the minutes the committee refers to itself most frequently and consistently as the "Interministerial Committee," henceforth to be abbreviated as IC.

[40]The Land Development Authority is a state-appointed body operating wholly within the framework of the Jewish National Fund (JNF): In 1961 a "land covenant" was signed between the JNF and the Israeli government, "vesting the Fund with the exclusive responsibility for land development in Israel," performed by the Development Authority. Its task comprises land reclamation, drainage, afforestation and the opening of new border areas for settlement on all public lands (Lustick 1980: 99). Eight of the representatives on its council are from the JNF, seven from the government. Together with the Israel Land Administration, the Land Development Authority develops, leases, and administers 92 percent of Israel's land area (*ibid.*, p.107).

[41]Amidar is a public housing corporation which administers and maintains hundreds and thousands of public housing units. It is jointly owned by the Israeli government's Ministry of Housing and the Jewish Agency, which owns 25 percent (see Lustick 1980: 104).

[42]The IC expanded and contracted subsequently, either through the addition of deputies from bodies already represented within its core of four (notably, from the Ministry of Labour) or of deputies from bodies the core did not represent but whose involvement became -- sometimes only temporarily -- expedient (essentially, the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Administration). These were then appointed temporarily upon the request and recommendation of the original core, and evidenced frequent personnel turnover. Moreover, unlike the core of four, their appointment did not involve a commitment to taking up residence in the new settlement being built. The most stable and influential, in terms of defining and steering the Jewish settlement's course in the first years, was definitely the core of four.

[43]While the Ministry of Defence might participate financially and ideationally in new town projects, especially in Galilee and the Negev, new and development towns in Israel were generally in the hands of the Ministries of the Interior and/or of Housing. The fact that Upper Nazareth was one of the exceptional cases in this respect and under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence bespeaks its geo-political and ideological significance which I discussed earlier.

[44]Although officially the IC members were individually meant to represent the particular interests of the bodies commissioning them, it would be fallacious to perceive them exclusively in that role (especially since part of their appointment required a commitment to take up permanent residence in the new settlement). In

the course of fulfilling their tasks, they developed personal and group interests in their own right with respect to the course the development of the settlement would take -- as local leaders as well as in the role of local residents -- and used their authority to further these interests.

[45]Arian (1985:240) describes Israeli local government in terms of an "extreme dependence on the centre which...retains a vital role in the budgeting, planning, and development of local affairs." Between one-half and two-thirds of the budget of a local authority comes from the government; moreover, local government is dependent on the centre for the direction of new immigrants to the locality, for locating and/or expanding industry and government offices, for public housing (more than 90 percent in development towns), health services and police, and for employment exchanges. By centre I here refer not only to the government but also to the political parties and such national institutions as the Jewish Agency. But "the rules of the game in allocations and budgets are not completely spelled out, and this allows for considerable scope for bargaining and for political and economic dealing." Particularly, it is the Ministry of the Interior which must be penetrated if a local authority is to enjoy a budget for developing beyond the minimum required by law and regulation, as it authorizes local taxes, loans and budgets (p.241). What determines, then, the success of the local authority holders in shaping the locality (and accumulating political power) is access to and influence with central bureaucrats, ministers and party politicians; and their adeptness at the political task of bargaining and applying political leverage. Such political bargaining played a significant role in Jewish Nazareth, particularly following the termination of the IC and conversion to civil local council status; and the Arab Other provided the Jewish leadership with propitious moral leverage in the bargaining processes.

[46]Problems arose from this necessary effort at concealment with respect to the establishment of *private* projects (primarily industries) within the area allegedly appropriated for "government construction." In theory at least, licenses for their construction needed to be obtained via the Nazareth municipality; yet, requesting such licenses would have tipped off Nazareth prematurely. It was up to the IC to find a solution, which was: to approach directly -- thus acting like an independent municipality -- the approval bodies at levels *above* the municipal. Mordechai Allon gave the following orientation to the members of the IC in their first meeting; it sums up and demonstrates the points made in the present paragraph:

> Because of the hostile stance of the municipality of Nazareth towards the Nazareth [means Jewish Upper Nazareth] development plans, one should not request building licenses for private industries from it [the municipality of Nazareth]. Building the structures here [in the "Nazareth Development Area"] is still defined as "government project."

Because of this there is a need for formal permits. But it will be done in accordance with what the Prime Minister decided: that this neighbourhood will not be part of the municipality of Nazareth. In his letter he expressed the need to change the boundaries of the municipality of Nazareth (IC Minutes, 11.3.1956).

[47]A special border committee was appointed by the two ministries. It included, first, the administrators of the two *different* districts into which the two Nazareths were to fall: Jewish Nazareth was to be integrated into the district of Afula instead of the district of Nazareth; the former being classified as Development Zone "A," the latter enjoying no special development priority. Thereby the continued ascription of differential development statuses of the two Nazareths -- implying differential resource allocations -- was ensured. Moreover, the border committee included high officials from the Ministries of Defence and Interior; the chairman of the Jewish Nazareth; and a representative of the Nazareth municipality (to be selected by the Municipal Council itself, but faced with an ultimatum by the Military Governor of Nazareth; the intention was to appoint a representative if the Nazareth City Council had not decided on a delegate within the specified time.)

[48]Preparation of the "Nazareth Development Area" for independent administration implied primarily the formation of a "public committee" that was to run parallel to the IC and assume the more mundane tasks involved in the administration of a settlement, such as collecting water rates or taxes, which thus far had been -- to avoid the involvement of the Nazareth municipality without letting on to the fact that the Jewish settlement was run by a second, separate local authority -- carried out by the IC via the Amidar housing corporation. But only *pro forma* did there exist now two local management committees; the public committee was to be appointed by the IC and, as it turned out, it consisted of the same personnel as the latter, and the chairman of one was also the chairman of the other. The decision-making body continued to be the "Interministerial Committee."

[49]In the very same meeting, one of the IC members was asked to ensure that the respective District Administrator mail out the notification to the Nazareth City Council.

[50]There were, in 1959, 2,000 Jewish settlers in Upper Nazareth.

[51]The Hebrew daily *Davar* ("The Jewish *Kiriah* In Nazareth Will Be Expanded," 25.9.1959), reporting on the visit of Labour Minister M. Namir to the Jewish Nazareth, quoted the Minister's express belief "that with the population increase of the *Kiriah* a way will be found for municipal integration with Nazareth, which will be for the benefit of all residents." The Military Governor

of Nazareth, in an interview with the *Jerusalem Post* (G.Cohen 1959) responded to the question, whether the two communities would come to share a common administration in the event that the population of Upper Nazareth increased significantly, with the statement: "I believe that in three or four years we shall elect one City Council."

[52]The IC handed the issue over to the Adviser of Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office.

[53]By "local" is meant that the paper was edited by the IC, published by the local Labour Council (*Histadrut*), and distributed among the Jewish settlers.

[54]The final decision rested in the hands of the Prime Minister's Office, but suggestions from within the locality were invited and heeded. The one request which the IC insisted upon was that the name "Nazareth" be retained, and it suggested the adjunct "Upper."

[55]A formerly Arab village transformed into a Jewish agricultural settlement (moshav) following the establishment of the Israeli state; located north-west of Nazareth.

[56]The Israel Land Administration, together with the Land Development Authority, develops, leases and administers 92 percent of Israel's land area. The responsibility for it is shared between the Jewish National Fund (of which seven members are on its council) and the Ministry of Agriculture which, with eight representatives on the council, largely controls it (Lustick 1980:107).

[57]The Absentee Property Law, passed in the Knesset in 1950, regularized the hitherto haphazard rules and procedures used to define and administer abandoned Arab properties; it defined the term "absentee," provided for a transfer of property rights from anyone fitting that definition to a legal custodian, and enabled the custodian to sell the property to the Land Development Authority, from which it could then be transferred to Jewish settlements and institutions. Most of the property acquired under these terms was that of Arabs who had left Israel entirely in 1948 (Lustick 1980:173-5) or were not present on their properties at a specified date.

[58]The most commonly cited figures indicate that the settlement was established on 5,000 dunams of land, of which 1,200 dunams had been requisitioned from Nazareth (Lustick 1980:177; Stock 1968:27; M.Allon).

[59]For example, in 1958, after one and a half years of negotiations, the IC succeeded in purchasing an area comprising 620 dunams (the so-called "Schneller"

area) from the International Lutheran League. Located on what came to constitute the border line separating the two Nazareths, the land is the site of a large hospital (which remained under the ownership of the Church League). Most importantly, however, it is wedged in between the north- and south-eastern neighbourhoods of Nazareth which were rapidly spreading further at the time. On this slope -- and somewhat set apart from the actual Jewish settlement -- the buildings which house the Ministry of Labour's Public Works Branch were erected. The IC had approached the Public Works Branch with the request to plan the received area in 1961, quite explicitly "in order to prevent unplanned construction" -- by Arab residents of Nazareth -- on it (IC Minutes, 1961).

[60]In instances where owners refused to sell, the land was requisitioned and the owner offered compensation in either monetary form or in kind (an alternative plot of land, often larger than that requisitioned but *outside* of the "Nazareth Development Area").

[61]Some of the plots claimed by the IC on grounds of development needs (on which may have stood Arab-owned houses) stand empty to this very day.

[62]The road -- a viaduct running north- south -- would "allow people travelling in the north-south direction in Israel's interior to circumvent the heavy traffic of the city of Nazareth," but it also so happens that it facilitated an independent entrance into and exit from the Jewish settlement from and to other points in the country.

[63]Paine (1985) views moral opposition as a mode of political opposition. The concept builds on Blau's notion of "indirect competition" (1964) and Schwimmer's notion of "symbolic competition" (1972), substituting "moral" for "symbolic" and "opposition" for "competition" (p.229). "Whereas opposition in politics is ordinarily conducted in accordance with accepted procedures of the nation-state," Paine holds, "moral opposition uses alternative (often innovative) channels in the knowledge of powerlessness to register one's will *directly* through the ballot box. The alternative means chosen are moral in the sense that there is an appeal to values which are widely recognized as intrinsic and thus supra-transactional..."(p.190).

[64]*Sumud* constitutes a temporary solution adopted by Palestinians for coping with occupation. "It symbolizes a pragmatic and rational compromise between a desperate, hopeless uprising and feelings of undignified surrender. It is a "third way" [Shehadeh 1982] for the solution to conflicts in perception and self-acceptance" (Shinar 1987:5). The value of land and historicity form the foundations of *sumud*: without land a Palestinian loses his honour, and with it his sense of Self. Land also constitutes a central value for the Jews, and in this sense *sumud* appeals also to a Jewish value.

[65]It was further decided to bring a plan of this road for approval before the Galilee City Building Committee (GCBC) and concomitantly inform the GCBC that it refrain from issuing any further building licenses (which until then, counter to Jewish interests in the new Nazareth, it seems to have done). At a meeting of the IC three years later, on January 19, 1961 (the problem still persists) it is decided "to approach *Agash* [the planning wing of the Ministry of Labour] with the request to plan the area received [through requisition] on Djab el-Reiss...; on the slope to Kfar Reina...; and also the area south of the northern part of the viaduct (the "Schnellar" area) in order to prevent unplanned construction and to create a private exit from the viaduct. The District Administrator, the Planning Branch [of the Ministry of Labour] and the chairman [of the IC] are to meet with the mayor of Nazareth to ensure that building permits will not be issued for the above areas, with the claim that building on the edge of the road can cause danger to lives. Agash is also requested to speed up construction on blocks 16556 and 16557 [the second point where Nazareth and Upper Nazareth threatened to interpenetrate] in order to freeze unplanned construction."

[66]Moshe Haim Shapiro (NRP).

[67]A year prior to this the IC had been disbanded and a civil Local Council been created (see Chapter 4).

[68]In 1962 (February), three Israeli lira equalled one U.S. dollar.

[69]Mordechai Allon described Nazareth's earliest opposition to the construction of Upper Nazareth as follows:

In the initial period there was a strong objection by the town of Nazareth. The residents wanted to prevent the establishment of the Jewish Kiriah. A committee, the "Committee for the Defence of Nazareth Lands," was established in Nazareth, and clergy, members of different political parties and nationalists joined. Their aim was to prevent the settlement here. It approached the Supreme Court and other legal bodies in an effort to thwart the initiation of construction activities. In February of 1957 a demonstration was organised in which clergy and town residents alike participated. I remember that it all started the first day a bulldozer started to clear the mountain of rocks in order to pave a way to the hills. But the court decision determined that the claimant -- the Committee for the Defence of Nazareth Lands -- had no right to object to the requisitioning since the land did not belong to the municipality, and because the Committee was not an organisation registered and recognized by law. After this failure, the Committee then tried to cancel the requisitions with new trials in

which, this time, it did not itself appear as the claimant; in these trials the land owners themselves featured as the claimants. Many prevention orders were issued [by the Supreme Court], and this hampered [us in] the beginning. But eventually the claimants lost out, and work proceeded.

[70]For an example of the line of argument and form of rhetoric typically employed (it draws on the cognitive ambiguity of boundaries between the two Nazareths and at the same time reinforces this ambiguity) see Appendix A.

[71]Ben-Gurion was a co-founder of the Histadrut and its first secretary-general in 1921. He also presided over the formation, in 1930, of the Israel Workers' Party (Mapai). From 1935 to 1948 he served as the chairman of the Jewish Agency and for most of Israel's first 15 years as a state was both Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

[72]Statism affirms the centrality of state interests and centralization of power at the expense of non-governmental groups and institutions. The definition of statism as a civil religion refers to its symbols and style. In this respect "statism reflects the effort to transform the state and its institutions into the central foci of loyalty and identification...[giving] rise to values and symbols that point to the state, legitimate it, and mobilize the population to serve its goals" and even, in its extreme formulation, cultivating "an attitude of sanctity toward the state, affirming it as an ultimate value." In this sense, then, statism in the context of Israel's early years of statehood, functioned "as a quasi-religion, a substitute for traditional religion...[It] represented the State of Israel as the expression of the national Jewish spirit, the realization of the yearnings of the Jewish people for freedom and sovereignty in its own land, and the guarantor of national Jewish unity" (Liebman and Don Yehiyah 1983:84-85).

[73]And, presumably, women.

[74]"The mythologization of the sabra suited the statist values of negating the Diaspora and affirming the new Israeli rooted in the culture of his own state...In order for the immigrants to realize their own potential, they had to acquire the sabra's characteristics and abandon values and customs brought from the Diaspora. With proper education and training, the new immigrants, youngsters in particular, could become sabras" (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:96-7).

[75]The move of the very first group of settlers into the Kiriah was referred to as *aliyah al ha'karkah* (immigration, literally ascendance, on to the land). This is a quite unusual use of the concept *aliyah* which, in the context of Israel, ordinarily refers to the immigration to the land of Israel from the Diaspora (thought of as entailing a spiritual ascendance). But this first settler group, it thus needs to be pointed out, was made up of native-born and veteran Israelis.

[76]At that time, oldtimers (vatikim) were those who had immigrated to Palestine prior to the declaration and establishment of the Israeli state.

[77]Newly-arriving immigrants to Israel from abroad, that is to say.

[78]There is also a religious kibbutz organisation, part of the religious Zionist movement's socialist offshoot (*Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrahi*).

[79]In the period between 1955-1957, there arrived 101,810 new immigrants from North Africa, versus 48,231 from Eastern and Western Europe. Between 1961-1964, there arrived 114,265 North African immigrants, compared with 77,694 from European countries (Shimschoni 1982:100).

[80]For example, Netivot, Ma'alot, and Mitzpe Rimon.

[81]It is of pertinence here that following the mid-sixties larger numbers of immigrants of North African and Asian origin *were* absorbed locally. By that time, Jewish Nazareth -- now a local council -- was subject to the Ministry of the Interior's scrutiny and influence, as well as desperate for additional settlers so as to increase the local population size (Western immigrant pools were beginning to 'run dry'). But these North African and Asian immigrant settlers had arrived with the immigration waves of 1955-1957 (or often even with earlier waves), and had thus *already* been integrated into Israeli society and instilled with its values.

[82]The term he actually used was *eidot ha'mizrah* (Oriental, Eastern Jews); what he *meant* was traditional Jews from North African and Middle Eastern countries.

[83]*Ha'Tzofeh*, "Nazareth 'Out of Limits' for Religious Jews," 27.8.1959.

[84]A renowned Torah scholar and rabbi.

[85]*Av* is a month in the Jewish calendar, roughly corresponding to July-August.

[86]The first factory, *ZeDe* -- a branch of the *Elite* sweets manufacturer, began production at the end of 1958.

[87]The reportage was in honour of Upper Nazareth's tenth birthday. The edited pre-publication script of the interview is available in the municipality's archives.

[88]Today numbers 2, 4, and 6 on Hermon Street.

[89]Seventy-eight apartment blocks and thirty-two cottage-type houses.

[90]On a national level, the Labour Exchanges had been transfered out of the hands of the Histadrut and into the government's when the state was established-- to avoid the Bureau's reflection of particular political ideologies.

[91]Before the establishment of Israel, the ideology of *Ha'Shomer Ha'Zair* -- the core group of Mapam -- strongly emphasized compromise with Palestinian Arab nationalism by formation of a binational state rather than one that was exclusively Jewish or Arab (Peretz 1979:100).

[92]Ben-Gurion and his followers, by contrast, "stressed the unique aspects of *Israeli* socialism and warned against imitating the ideology or structure of other socialist states" (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:88). Ideologically, Ben-Gurion's sense of Jewishness embraced the centrality of the Bible as the Jews' unique document and claim to separate existence, observance of national holidays, and a belief in the singularity of the prophetic heritage and Jewish historical experience. He realized that Judaism was not a matter of faith or belief alone -- "the Jewish religion is a *national* religion...[so that] it is not easy to separate the national from the religious aspect" (cited in Avi-Hai 1974:94).

[93]It is for this reason that local frequently referred to him and people like him (of which there was a considerable number among the *first group* of sabra and veteran settlers -- some originating from Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim that had split along pro- and anti-Soviet lines), albeit somewhat inaccurately, as "Mapamnikkim."

[94]May Day, the international working class holiday, constituted an important national holiday in the early days of Israel's statehood; its countrywide celebration, however, placed a heavier emphasis on national themes and values -- e.g. halutziut -- than on universalistic labour themes. May Day received almost as much emphasis as Independence Day among Left Labour Zionists. By coincidence, Independence Day and May Day fall close to each other, and since May Day is dictated by the Gregorian calendar but Independence day by the Jewish one, the two holidays occasionally fall on the same day. Indeed, there were initially efforts at the national level to combine the two as complementary. Over the years, however, May Day increasingly lost its special significance in Israel; "it was emptied of its original meaning, and as a national holiday it couldn't compete with Independence Day" (Liebman and Don-Yehiyah 1983:120-21).

[95]Witness the *status quo* agreement (composed by Rabbi Yitzchak Meir

Levine of the Ultra-orthodox World *Agudat Yisrael* in June 1947) signed by Ben-Gurion. The state undertook to enshrine Jewish ritual and orthodox practice to some degree in the law and cultural life of Israel: to keep Shabbat as the official day of rest, to observe *kashrut* (Jewish dietary laws) in state-operated dining halls, to maintain orthodox control over personal status of Jews (essentially marriage and divorce procedure), and to operate four ideological "trends" in Jewish-Israeli schools (ultra-orthodox, orthodox, general, and labour). Effectively the agreement set the outer boundaries beyond which Ben-Gurion and Mapai were unwilling to step in placating their religious partners in government (Avi-Hai 1974:93-94).

[96]Conflict and friction between Mapai and the NRP surfaced over the issue "Who is a Jew?" (to which I will return later), reaching a first highpoint in 1958-1959, and remaining a salient and sensitive issue, flaring up intermittently, to this day. Moreover, concessions made to the religious parties in the *status quo* agreement and enshrined in the Basic Principles of Israel's Declaration of Independence -- the guarantee of freedom of religious expression -- were violated in practice during the early years of statehood by devout statist nation-building practitioners opposing the secular-religious compromise made by Ben-Gurion. Such violations occurred primarily in the area of religious education for new immigrant children. The most publicized controversial incident was the immigrant camp controversy of 1949-52. The head of the unified school system in the immigrant camps, Nacham Levin, had prohibited religious study in the immigrant camps and even sought to prevent the entrance of religious teachers on a voluntary basis. The religious establishment and many immigrants themselves vigorously protested the effort to impose a totally secular education, and Levin was brought before an investigating committee of the Knesset. The whole controversy led to a general moderation of the extremist elements among the statists (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:92).

[97]A new secretary had been recently commissioned by the Central Histadrut Committee (the central governing body of the Histadrut), upon M.Allon's recommendation, to fill the position locally as Labour Council secretary which, thus far, had been filled by M. Allon himself.

[98]Ha'Malchi 1959.

[99]*Ha'Modiah*, 28.3.1959.

[100]*The Jewish Herald of Johannesburg*, 17.4.1959.

[101]Thus, an article in the religious newspaper *Ne'er* reflected:

Large slogans of this [above] headline were published a few days ago in many of our towns. It is probably true that not many people noticed them and their contents, assuming that it is referring to police and Arabs, residents of the Arab Nazareth. We are approaching the first of May, the day set aside for riots -- and who doesn't remember the riots of last year, during which many residents of the locality were arrested by the police? They probably assume that today the reference is to Communists causing riots. However, whoever pauses and reads what is written remains stupified, full of embarrassment and sorrow, since what is talked about is a rule of terror and anti-religious imposition in Kiriat Nazeret ... As is known, there exists next to the Arab city of Nazareth, Kiriat Nazeret which was established in recent years as a Jewish settlement...(Ha'Malchi 1950).

[102]The information pertaining to the subsequent course of events is taken from the following sources: Tannenboim 1959; *Hakol*, 12.4.1959, "Torah Scroll Was Entered in Kiriat Nazeret Despite Histadrut Opposition;" *Ha'Modiah*, 13.4.1959, "Terrorist Rule in Kiriat Nazeret;" *Ha'Tzofeh*, 27.4.1959, "Nazareth 'Out of Limits' For Religious Jews;" and personal recollections by new immigrant settlers from Rumania.

[103]The National Religious Workers' Party.

[104]Israel Bar-Yehuda

[105]On the reasons for Ben-Gurion's retirement, see Avi-Hai (1974:272-273).

[106]For example, with respect to issuing building licenses.

[107]A case in point is Eilat which was granted the status of development town at a time when its population comprised only 7,000.

[108]Moreover, arrangements with the relevant bodies were sought to safeguard land areas for the anticipated future expansion of boundaries southward and south-westward, toward the southern edge of downtown Nazareth. Thus, the IC, in May 1962, brought to the notice of the Israel Land Administration "the need to guard the land of Nazareth in order to ensure space for the development and expansion of the New Nazareth" (IC Minutes, 2.5.1962). When the local authority was formally conveyed, Upper Nazareth comprised 6,000 dunams (1,500 acres) stretching along three-quarters of the full length of Nazareth's eastern fringe; nor did the push for further expansion halt at this point.

[109]Four years later -- two months before a civil local authority was

established -- the Histadrut of Nazareth approached the IC with the request that a plot of land be set aside on top of Djab el-Sich "to house Histadrut workers of the minorities." The IC passed the request (and thus also the buck for rejection) to the Adviser on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Housing's Minority Department; these decided that the Histadrut of Nazareth direct their request to them, the appropriate bodies, "as the requested area [was] currently under a building-freeze due to technical problems" (IC Minutes, 9.5. and 13.6.1963). But doing so would have spelled an unforeseeable number of Arab Others, of Nazareth, and amidst the Jewish residential area -- on Djab el-Sich.

[110]Until the first public local elections, to be held in 1965 concurrently with Knesset elections, there would be two representatives of the Ministry of the Interior supplementing the Council (one of them being Northern District Commissioner I. Koenig) to ensure its functioning and proper procedures.

[111]Among them was Mr. Eisenthal, who was to be the headmaster of the school and would come to be the Mafdal's representative on the Local Council. When Eisenthal arrived in Upper Nazareth with his wife, he was only 29 years old. He was born in Sedeh Ya'akov and a graduate from the yeshiva Bnei Akkiva. Before entering his position in Upper Nazareth, he had been actively involved in the guidance of Bnei Akkiva youth movements in Bnei Brak and Jerusalem.

[112]In an IC meeting the District Administrator requested that charges be investigated "that the Histadrut and its workers threaten individual families, in an attempt to dissuade them from registering their children for religious education, with the retention of welfare payments from them (IC Minutes, 9.5.1963). A similar complaint did not resurface subsequently.

[113]Henceforth the abbreviation LC shall be used.

[114]Although of the original core of four appointed in 1956 only Allon chose to stay on locally beyond the termination of the IC's mandate.

[115]At that time a merger between the Ahdut Ha'Avudah and Mapai had taken place at the national level.

[116]"They" here refers to the Arab population of Nazareth.

[117]"Us" here refers to the Jews.

[118]The concept of the "stranger" in *Eretz Yisrael* appears in the Jewish religious sources and refers -- as it does in the present context, apparently -- to the non-Jew.

[119]Pinhas Sapir; he filled this office from 1963-1974.

[120]Seeking the approval of the Minister of the Interior on this matter, it seems, was a diplomatic *pro forma* move.

[121]Moreover, the Adviser on Arab Affairs was approached with this argument; he was in full agreement, and, in fact, then acted as its advocate before the Ministry of the Interior, in the forum of a special meeting with it which he personally organised for this purpose (LC Minutes, 30.11.1967).

[122]LC Minutes, 24.12.1967; see also *Davar*, 25.12.1967, "Upper Nazareth Demands Municipal Status."

[123]*Ma'ariv*, 2.7.1969, "The Census."

[124]Once the Histadrut opened its ranks to the Arab minority (in 1955), 'cooperationists' joined the Israeli trade union directly; as did in fact, eventually, the Communists.

[125]In the 1961 elections to the Nazareth City Council Mapai, headed by Al Zu'ebi, received a mandate of 11 out of 15 seats on the council (Stock 1968:27). The man who was elected mayor on a Labour Alignment ticket in these 1961 elections, Siff Al Din Al Zu'ebi, a Knesset member, was particularly approachable to dialogue and rapprochement with Jewish Nazareth. Zu'ebi remained in office until 1965. In the 1965 elections to Nazareth's city council *Rakkah*, the New Communist List, secured 7 seats, the Labour Alignment equally 7, and the remaining seat went to the Mapam. With the support of the Communists, the Mapam council member was elected mayor; but he resigned after a brief period, as the Mapam-Rakkah coalition was opposed by Labour Alignment and proved thus too tenuous to run the city's affairs. New by-elections were called by the Ministry of the Interior; until they were held and the Council restored to functionability in November 1966, the city was run by an appointed Jewish official. As a result of the byelections, Mapam gained a second seat at the expense of Rakkah; and it formed a coalition with the Labour Alignment this time around, in exchange for mayorship on a rotation basis with the head of the Labour Alignment, it seems. With this Labour Alignment-Mapam coalition and rotation agreement, Zu'ebi filled the position of deputy mayor next to Mapam mayor Mussa Katilli until 1969, when Zu'ebi returned to fill the position as first mayor until 1974.

[126]LC Minutes, 7.7.1963; *Jerusalem Post*, 8.7.1963, "Local Council Set Up In Upper Nazareth."

[127](LC Minutes, 4.9.1967; *Al Ha'Mishmar*, 10.10.1967.

[128]M. Allon is fluent in Arabic; he is a graduate of Oriental Studies and grew up in Jaffa, "together with Arab children."

[129]*Illon Nazrat*, 6.12.1967; LC Minutes, 28.12.1967. Representatives of the Occupied Territories, of course, had little to gain by assuming a role in the performance of coexistence and cooperation scripted and staged by the leading figures of Arab and Jewish Nazareth. The play was largely local in nature -- as were the potential gains.

[130]Here the reference might be to the financial assistance the Israeli government, via the Ministry of Religion, had provided for the building of a mosque in Nazareth and was providing for the restorative work on the Church of Annunciation carried out between 1967-1969.

[131]While Jews and Arabs have a common ancestor in Abraham, it is difficult to see how Al Din Zu'ebi reconciles a two generations deep common ancestry with the bifurcation of the two peoples taking place among Abraham's sons, Isaac and Ishmael.

[132]In the context of a public discussion of Jewish-Arab relations held in Acre.

[133]Industrial development featured as a high priority in the establishment of Upper Nazareth, and quite understandably so. On a general level it was part and parcel of the nation-building ideology stressing population dispersal and development. In 'Nazareth' it was to form the economic base to sustain a population of the size anticipated for Upper Nazareth; and to provide local employment opportunities for the Arab population of the surrounding area -- one way, as the Jewish establishment saw it, of politically appeasing the Arab population and coopting it into the Zionist system. The underside of the latter, intended or not, was of course the fact that industrial initiators, public and private, thereby accessed a large pool of cheap Arab labour.

From the very beginning, land within the "Nazareth Development Area" was generously allocated, and at extremely favourable terms, to industrial initiators for the establishment of plants. Development Status "A" here implied government loans and subsidies for interested initiators. By 1975, Upper Nazareth had 49 factories and workshops, from large- to small-sized, primarily involving food-processing, textile, printing, metal and car-assembly plants. By 1985, the Jewish town had 160 factories, now including also high-tech industries, pharmaceutical and electronics plants demanding more skilled labour. In 1985,

one half of Upper Nazareth's workforce (5,000) was employed in the industrial sector (Upper Nazareth Labour Council Report, 1985).

[134]The monopoly over internal bus services, quite unusual for Israel, has been held by an Arab bus company which has recruited its personnel from among the local Arab population.

[135]The two sides met each time in the presence of the two Nazareth mayors and Upper Nazareth Local Council chairman, and under the chairmanship of the Central Committee Secretary.

[136]*Illon Nazrat Illit*, "We and Our Neighbours," 7.6.1968:4.

[137]An address to Arab workers at the Nazareth Labour Council, printed in *Illon Nazrat Illit*, 7.8.1968:3.

[138]*Jerusalem Post*, "Upper Nazareth Growing Fast," 11.2.1970.

[139]Via public development corporations local authorities are able to finance projects which the municipal/local government itself is legally prohibited from supporting with its budget, owning and operating; namely, profit-yielding public projects. These corporations exist in most Israeli towns and cities, and play a very significant role in shaping the physical and cultural environment of them, especially of large and historic urban centres like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

[140]For example, the *Egged* and *Dan* national transport corporations were to hold one third of the shares of the cable-car; for hotels and restaurants Allon sought to entice private sponsors among the well-to-do Jewry abroad.

[141]This upon the specific request of Labour Minister Yigal Allon, whom M. Allon had approached personally with this idea.

[142]Moslem Arabs do not serve in the Israel Defence Forces -- they are not conscripted, nor are they accepted on a volunteer basis, apparently in order to avoid a conflict of loyalty which is bound to arise in armed confrontations between Israel and neighbouring Arab states. Christians and Bedouin (who are Moslem), however, may volunteer for duty, and some do; the Bedouin serving mainly as scouts. The men of the small Druze and Circassian communities have been subject to conscription, the Druze since 1956, the Circassians from a somewhat later date. Although there are "mixed units" of Jews and non-Jews in the border police, most non-Jewish recruits serve in a separate "minorities unit" commanded, but not entirely officered, by Jews. There are no mixed units outside the border police (Lustick 1980:93-94).

[143]See also *Ma'ariv*, 23.11.1969 and *Ha'Aretz*, 23.12.1968.

[144]Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful") is a messianic settlement movement that strictly opposes territorial compromise. It emerged in 1968 from the ranks of the National Religious Party, with objectives paralleling those of the Greater Israel movement; but formally it was founded in February 1974, after the Yom Kippur War and at the time of (and in response to) the Kissinger peace initiative. Its leaders represent a young, militantly nationalist group within the religious bloc. The movement began as a religious revival looking, spurned by their eschatologic interpretation of the outcome of the Six-Day War, toward the messianic redemption of the Jewish people through its ties with the land of Israel; concentrating particularly on Judea and Samaria as the territorial focus of their aspirations. Emphasis is on action, the major thrust of which has been the activity of establishing Jewish settlements in these areas.

[145]While the researcher, in her question, assumed two separate electoral districts, Allon obviously already thought in terms of one for the two Nazareths.

[146]Sources: LC Minutes, 16.6.1968; *Illon Nazrat*, June 1969; interview with M. Allon; and interview with the Northern District Administrator.

[147]Sources drawn upon for the following reconstruction of events: IC and MC Minutes, 28.2.1966, 31.7.1968, 22.11.1968, 15.1.1969, 18.3.1969, and 8.7.1969; *Illon Nazrat Illit*, 7.3.1968:4, 7.4.1968:6, 7.5.1968 (addendum), 7.6.1968:4, 7.8.1968:4 and 8, 8.9.1968:5; *Yediot Ahronot*, 7.5.1968; *Davar*, 11.6.1968; *Al Ha'Mishmar*, 12.6.1968; *Ha'Yom*, 10.3.1968; personal interview with Mr. Affifi, Director of the Nazareth bus company; personal interview with M. Allon; personal recollections by early settlers.

[148]These decisions were in accordance with the recommendations made by a special committee set up by the Supreme Court, headed by the mayor of Haifa and including the (deputy) mayor of Nazareth -- but without a representative of the Upper Nazareth council (it seems that the court refused to acknowledge the latter as a concerned party).

[149]Y. Bar-Yehuda. He held these portfolios until 1959.

[150]Buses failed to be on schedule, it was alleged, the intervals between buses were unbearably long, "leaving the people of our town standing and waiting up to an hour in the cold wind and heavy rains in winter and causing them to arrive late at their work-places."

[151]To demonstrate the gravity of the situation, the LC began to operate its

own bus services by means of leased buses, free of charge, within the town and to Nazareth -- and the call went out to boycott the buses of the Nazareth company.

[152]But the LC rejected the request by the company to be largely exempted from business taxes on the grounds that it provided essential municipal services; instead, it imposed the same taxes as on any other private small business within the jurisdiction -- though it was explicitly encoded in the minutes that "the imposition of taxes does not mean that the Local Council thereby recognizes the company or grants it any rights."

[153]The Religious Council (RC) is a local body with functions parallel to those of a local government department. They operate in most localities in Israel; responsibility for the supply of services of a religious nature lies with them. Among the major functions of the RC are the organisation and supervision of ritual slaughtering (all the local slaughterers are full-time salaried employees of the RC); the maintenance of town rabbis whose salaries are also paid by the RC; marriage registration and burial arrangements; provision of religious guidance; and contact with and assistance to local synagogues. Funds for the RC's budget are provided for by law: two-thirds originating from the budget of the local authority and one-third from the Ministry of Religion. Beyond ratifying and rejecting the RC's proposed budget the local authority has little say ordinarily in its management. The RC is a source of political and material power on the local scene; and thus there exists potential friction between the local authority and the RC at the roots of which are the arrangements prevailing in the apportioning and use of the RC's budget. On the RC one finds representatives of the political parties, and decisions are made by a majority vote. In contradistinction to the LC, whose members are democratically elected, the members of the RC are appointed from above by three public bodies: 45 percent are appointed by the Minister of Religion, another 45 percent by the head of the LC, and the remaining 10 percent by the local rabbinate. (These arrangements were agreed upon at the cabinet level in 1963.) Thus the RCs will always be governed by members of the Mafdal. Even in the eventuality of the LC representatives all being members of the mayor's party, it can be assumed that the appointees of the other two bodies, where Mafdal is dominant, will be loyal to the latter (see Deshen 1970:88-89).

[154]As Allon put it to the Mafdal councillor in a meeting, even the Arab reporter of the national paper Ha'Aretz knew of it but kept it private.

[155]Under the Law of Return, passed in the Knesset in 1950, together with the Citizenship Law of 1952, every Jew has the right to immigrate to and obtain citizenship upon arrival in Israel. The question then arising -- and a controversial issue it has turned out to be -- is "Who is Jew?" What are the criteria, and who decides? For a detailed account and analysis of this controversy in Israel, see Samet (1985; 1986).

[156]Though he admitted in the forum of the Council that the defamations originated from it.

[157]This was during the IC's rule.

[158]One example is the issue concerning the screening of films on the eve of *Rosh Ha'Shanah* (the Jewish New Year). Eisenthal approached the Northern District Administrator who asked the Local Council to ensure that the Labour Council "guard matters holy to Israel in this place;" the Administrator also contacted the Histadrut Central Committee's Cultural Branch on the matter, none of which, however, effected changes in the Labour Council's practice of organising cultural events on the eves of Shabbat or Jewish holidays.

[159]Sources: LC Minutes, 31.1.1967; 4.9.1967; 25.6.1967.

[160]East Jerusalem, with a large Arab population, had only recently been 'liberated' and united with West Jerusalem. As a result, respective legislative adjustments, e.g., of the city's pork sale regulations, were required.

[161]See Weiss (1972:104-105) and Elazar (1975:223).

[162]The local Mafdal's party platform for 1969 focused primarily on a sharp criticism of the undemocratic procedures, anti-religious impositions and "corruption" of the local (Labour) leadership and rule. In its election platform, the party presented itself as the 'guardians' of democracy, of "pure values" and customs, and honesty (*Ilon Nazrat Illit*, 24.10.1969).

[163]Properly speaking, a party of the name Likud was only formed in 1973, joining what after 1965 had become Gahal (itself a recent merger of the Herut and the Liberal parties) with *La'am* and various other Right-leaning parties. Since I am referring in this section to the period preceding the Likud's (and partly even Ga l's) formation as well as that following it, the use of the label Likud which I have chosen to adopt as a section heading is inaccurate properly speaking; but I deem it less confusing to the readers, and, more importantly, it is justified in the local context as there existed continuity across the various mergers and accompanying changes in labels in terms of the people carrying and using them. In the text, however, I will make use of the contemporaneous party nomenclature -- Liberal party, Gahal, Likud, depending on the time period involved; the reader be reminded again that in terms of the people involved, there is no difference.

[164]The Green Line refers to Israel's pre-1967 borders.

[165]At Local Council and subcommittee meetings Gahal did not try to bring

forward a separate agenda: Labour decisions were generally accepted in principle. The only exception concerns the allocation of Council positions, there Gahal/Likud councillors vied for more than they could rightfully claim on the basis of their proportional strength (for example, the position of deputy council chairman, or disproportionally high representation in decisive subcommittees).

[166]I know little about him, or rather, only second-hand, as Mr.Tamir left Upper Nazareth in 1978 and I was unable to establish his current whereabouts. The reasons for his leaving the town seem related to events which are the focus of the subsequent chapter. Interestingly enough, those who surely must have known him showed little inclination to recall their memories of him.

[167]See, for example, Rabinovitch (1988).

[168]The researcher thought that, surely, this aspect of Jewish life in 'Nazareth' -- especially as regards giving birth -- must be of some concern to the Jewish people of Upper Nazareth, a potential source of cultural ambiguity. Those I talked to about this matter, on the other hand, even women who gave birth in one of these hospitals, spoke of it in a matter-of-fact way, the way they might mention their shopping trips to Nazareth. At least as people presented their experiences to me, there seemed nothing unusual or problematic in their eyes about these stays in a Christian hospital, attended to by nuns and Arab doctors.

[169]Ben-Gurion himself believed that Jewish nationality could be bestowed on a person who wanted to be Jewish regardless of his/her fulfilment of the requirements stipulated by the halakhic definition of a Jew; but for the sake of maintaining a *modus vivendi* with the religious camps he conceded that the definition for the purposes of determining nationality (and qualification for citizenship under the Law of Return) be synonymous with the halakhic definition. In 1957 the director of the Interior Ministry's Population Registry (an NRP member) ordered that the religion clause in new immigrants' papers be subjected to meticulous examination (a mere declaration by the immigrants no longer sufficing). The order originated on account of a growing number of mixed couples among new immigrants from Eastern European countries; but as the Rabbinate adopted more stringent conversion procedures, so non-Jewish immigrants took greater pains to conceal their backgrounds in order to avoid conversion. But in 1958, when a member of Ahdut Ha'Avuda (Bar-Yehuda) served as Interior Minister, new directives were issued under which a person's Jewishness was determined not on the basis of halakha but on the basis of a person's subjective feelings about membership in the Jewish nation. This infuriated the NRP, which withdrew from government in protest in June 1958. Subsequently, in July 1959, Ben-Gurion revoked these new directives. And when a new government was formed at the end of 1959 (and the portfolio for the Interior Ministry reverted to the NRP), the new minister -- Moshe Haim Shapira, hastened to issue new

guidelines under which a Jew -- for the purposes of the population registry -- was a person whose mother was Jewish or who had been converted according to halakha (Samet 1985:88-89; Avi-Hai 1974:102-108).

[170]The conversation was conducted in Hebrew; it was tape-recorded with her permission, which she granted after I guaranteed confidentiality, promising not to reveal the content with her name attached to it.

[171]*Atta*, at the time Miriam is talking about, employed many Russian and Rumanian immigrants; and ca. one-half of the workers were from surrounding Moslem-Arab villages: Yafia, Kfar Reina, Kfar Kanna, Iksal, and Ein Mahil (Histadrut secretary, personal interview).

[172]There will be more to say on these excavations in Chapter 6.

[173]Upper Nazareth has its own weekly outdoor market on Tuesday mornings.

[174]*Jerusalem Post*, 11.10.1974, "MK Scorns Lavish Municipal Celebration."

[175]*Ibid.*, 21.10.1974, "Upper Nazareth Fête Put Off."

[176]*Davar*, 16.11.1969, "Supreme Court Refuses Rakkah's Request Regarding Labour Council Elections in Nazareth."

[177]*Jerusalem Post*, "Merger Mooted," 5.1.1971.

[178]The additional area consisted of vast open "industrial lands," this time in the north-eastern direction, which, for the largest part, belonged to the surrounding Arab villages of Kfar Reina, Ein Mahil and Kfar Kanna. In 1975, the Arab villages fought the expropriation in the Supreme Court, though it was apparent that they would not be successful; and indeed, in September 1976 ~ the date is noteworthy -- Upper Nazareth received the requested land area.

[179]Local pedagogic centres are interlocutory institutions between the Ministry of Education and municipal education departments, on the one hand, and the local school systems, on the other hand; concerned with teaching curricula and materials. The joint office was located in Upper Nazareth, staffed by a Jewish and an Arab official, each responsible for the respective Nazareths.

[180]Personal communication with the Director of the Arab bus company.

[181]*Jerusalem Post*, 14.12.1975, "Upper Nazareth Group Wants No Ties With Arabs;" 17.12.1975, "Upper Nazareth Residents Want Separation."

[182]Lustick 1980:246; *Jerusalem Post*, 31.3.1976; *Ha'Aretz*, 31.3.1976; *Zoo Ha'Derech*, 7.4.1976.

[183]*Jerusalem Post*, 25.6.1976; MC Minutes, 7.7.1976.

[184]Director of the Northern District Ministry of Housing Office, Population Department, personal interview.

[185]See also the *Jerusalem Post*, 25.6.1976, "Upper Nazareth Jews Will Leave If More Arabs Move There."

[186]*Jerusalem Post*, 2.9.1976, "Upper Nazareth Flats."

[187]In the subsequent years, a new single-family home neighbourhood ("Bnei Betcha") would be built on the eastern fringes of Upper Nazareth, facing Mount Tabor. Today it is *this* neighbourhood that is regarded the "prestigious" residential area.

[188]Concerning changing regulations for the election of mayors and local council heads, see Arian 1985:239.

[189]*Jerusalem Post*, 17.9.1976, "New Candidate in Upper Nazareth's Elections."

[190]There would have been a higher number of votes against, had not Allon and eight of his closest and most loyal adherents walked out in protest (*Jerusalem Post*, 17.9.1976, "New Candidate in Upper Nazareth;" 19.9.1976, "Mayor to Resist Replacement Vote").

[191]*Jerusalem Post*, 10.1.1977, "Upper Nazareth Mayor Quits Labour to Run Independently."

[192]The much more common local perception of Allon's politicking -- and the more likely one -- is that Allon pursued the idea of a United Nazareth *so as to* gain a Knesset seat one day; rather than considering to run for the Knesset in the event that 'Nazareth' should fail.

[193]Born in Rumania, he had grown up in the environment of a Nazi Germany. He lost his father at the age of nine and entered the work force at a very early age -- completing his education, however. Prior to World War II, at the age of 15, he joined and underwent training with "Grudonia Young Maccabees," a Labour Zionist movement. While his mother and younger brother made aliyah to Israel around this time, Menachem stayed behind to rise in the hierarchy of the

movement's leadership, eventually reaching the position of training coordinator in the Rumanian branch of the movement; and eventually becoming the general training coordinator of "Halutz," the union of all Zionist movements. In 1948, following the disintegration of the movement he became, in his words, a "Prisoner of Zion" on account of his activities -- "wandering from place to place" to "hide his footsteps." In 1949 he made aliyah. Once in Israel, he joined a kibbutz movement in the Negev called "Nir Am," and from there he embarked on a career in the Labour party: from his position as purchase manager and assistant treasurer of his kibbutz, he was elected general treasurer of the Negev regional factories that were under the auspices of the Labour settlements (Sha'ar Ha'Negev); and he was the key initiator of the Sha'ar Ha'Negev regional school.

In June 1962, the Histadrut Executive Committee offered him the position of Labour Council secretary in Upper Nazareth which had opened up. And from this basis he carved out for himself (with Allon's support) a place in local leadership with an image as "one of the town's founding fathers." Although Ariav had not participated in the War of Independence, he was nevertheless an "army man" on account of his being an officer in the Israeli Defence Forces.

[194]Mention has been made (p.242) of the minority kindergarten which the new mayor of Upper Nazareth arranged to be established next to the "Permanent Army" neighbourhood, in an effort to deflect the creation of an Arab list to compete in local elections. Approximately two years later, the Municipal Council decided to open yet another, second minority kindergarten in time for the upcoming educational year, and located in the midst of the Jewish residential area, in the Southern neighbourhood. As had been the case with the first kindergarten initially, the second one was staffed by a Christian Arab and a Jewish (of Moroccan background and thus Arab-speaking) teacher. By this time, the kindergarten of the 'Kramim' neighbourhood had an additional class and a third, Moslem teacher; special transportation arrangements had been made by the municipality to collect and drop off the children on Saturdays on which days regular school buses geared towards the Jewish school week do not operate.

[195]I had the opportunity to hear the story behind the adoption from the adopted daughter. The minority kindergarten is located adjacent to the Jewish day-care centre in which my research assistant is employed; in fact, each occupies one half of the same building, and they share one playground (though using it at different times of the day, the day-care centre on late afternoons, the kindergarten on mornings and noons). As the working hours ordinarily overlap by an hour or two at noon, the teachers/guides of the two institutions often sit together for a chat before one side goes home and the other commences work. On one such an occasion -- I was visiting the centre -- Salwa asked me in to have a look at the children's drawings. As I studied the drawings pinned up on the wall, I noticed a group photograph of the children together with the current deputy mayor:

He is my father! I am Christian, but I have a Jewish father [she laughs amused]. Yanko adopted me...He has been my father for many, many years now. About ten years ago -- I used to work in City Hall [in Upper Nazareth] -- Yanko came up to me one day and said, "I want *you* to be my daughter!" He doesn't have any children of his own, you know. I guess he liked me. "And your children will be my grandchildren," he said. I don't have any parents, so I said, "okay, but you'll have to come to my house for Christmas every year." So, every year on Christmas he comes to my house for the Christmas party; Menachem [Ariav] and his wife, too, but they never stay very long, just come by to say hello, wish us a merry Christmas. And every time he [Yanko] takes a trip abroad, he brings back boxes of clothes and things for my children. Next year he'll take along my husband [who is a clerk in the municipality] on a delegation abroad.

[196]The minority housing project on Djab el-Sich, where the majority of residents are Moslem. Many of those who came first, in 1968, did not remain and, like their Jewish counterparts, they are renting out or have sold their flats to Arabs who have not fulfilled the requirements they themselves had to meet.

[197]She is a liaison, first, between the municipality and development offices located in the major cities which mediate between couples interested in settling in a development town and the development towns; and second, between the municipality and newly-arrived sabra or vatik settlers from "the centre of Israel." She communicates local needs, primarily occupational, and local preferences pertaining to new settlers, as well as the inducements offered, to the central offices which then attempt to channel interested settlers accordingly. She is also in charge of determining new settlers' eligibility for special benefits and their allocation.

[198]I did not tape-record our conversation on that evening, but reconstructed in from memory immediately upon returning from my visit; during my visit, while in the washroom, I hurriedly jotted down rough notes and quotations.

[199]Already on the eve of the demonstration, the mayor made a statement of principle (Management Subcommittee Minutes, 22.9.1982), broached to the MC in an emergency meeting (Minutes, 3.10.1982), and given the backing of the District Director of the Office of Adviser on Arab Affairs in a special and closed meeting between the latter and the MC, called by the mayor (MC Minutes, 2.11.1982).

[200]Alas, although the MC minutes make mention of it they do not reproduce its contents, not even in synopsis.

[201]MC Minutes, 2.11.1982; *Yediot Ha'Galil*, 5.11.1982, "A Marked Chance For Discussions Between Upper Nazareth and Nazareth."

[202]See, for example, *Yediot Ha'Galil*, 8.10.1982.

[203]See *Yediot Ha'Galil*, 8.10.1982. "Upper Nazareth Municipality: We Will Cut the Dependency on the Arab Sector;" MC Management Subcommittee Minutes, 22.9.1982; MC Minutes, 28.9.1982; MC Minutes, 3.10.1982.

[204]See *Yediot Ha'Galil*,7.10.1983, "Upper Nazareth Complains About Faulty Transport."

[205]The hypermarket was, in fact, to be the first project of *Na'am*, a league of three Jewish settlements -- Upper Nazareth, Afula and Migdal Ha'Emeq, located east, south-east and south-west of Nazareth, respectively. This was established on the initiative of Upper Nazareth's mayor, immediately following the Arab demonstration, with the purpose of initiating "regional [Jewish] cooperation in the areas of municipal services and equipment, transport and tourism" (MC Management Subcommittee Minutes, 28.9.1982). The market was to serve, and hence be equally accessible, to all three Jewish settlements; and thus was, once set up, positioned alongside the road connecting -- and, in fact, equidistant between the two Nazareths. In fact the market has ended up being staffed largely by residents of Nazareth and being frequented most regularly by those -- Jews *and* Arabs -- who have private means of transportation. So it is presented today as one of the "points of integration" between the two Nazareths and evidence of Jewish goodwill.

[206]Ziad, on these occasions, insisted on talking about equal municipal budgets, especially for education; brought up "land theft;" and asked that the heads of Jewish local authorities in the region support Arab localities in the struggle for equality -- in fact, that they set an example by admitting Arab local authorities to the Galilee Regional Council. Ariav, for his part, denied claims of land theft from Arab citizens, dismissed discussions of budget inequalities on the grounds that budgets are determined not by the local authorities but the central government, and worked around the admission of Arab local authorities to the Jewish Regional Council -- one of whose key interests was the Judaization of Galilee -- by arguing different emphases of interests (*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 21.1.1983; 11.3.1983).

[207]*Jerusalem Post*, 18.10.1982, "Tension Rises Between Two Nazareths."

[208]Dar 1082; MC Minutes, 2.11.1982; *Yediot Ha'Galil*, 5.11.1982, "Concern in Nazareth Over the Fall in Trade With Upper Nazareth."

[209]*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 15.10.1982, "The Herut Movement in Upper Nazareth: 'We Will Work to Judaize the Town and For Economic Independence'."

[210]There are no minutes of MC meetings from September to November of 1983 (the time when MENA became an issue nationally) -- in fact, no MC minutes contain any references whatsoever to the organisation or the cause it was dedicated to.

[211]The Tehiya is an ultra-nationalist party list which was founded before the 1981 national elections, in part by Gush Emunim members. Its platform centres around the demand for Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the demands couched largely in secular, political terms (as opposed to religious-messianic) terms.

[212]Eitan was IDF Chief of Staff during the invasion of Lebanon; on his retirement he became one of the leading figures of the national Tehiyah party. He is known for his "singleminded support for annexation" (Aronson 1987:103) of Judea, Samaria and Gaza; in fact, he advocates the establishment of a Greater Israel by means of military power that would stretch into Lebanon (p.3, p.305). The hatred for Arabs which he harbours has become "legendary" (p.103). Eitan does not distinguish between Arabs within and outside the Green Line, between Palestinians under occupation and Israel's Arab citizens: they are one people with identical national aspirations -- the desire to fight the Jews and set up a Palestinian state throughout all of Palestine (p.299). Eitan lives in a moshav in the Jezreel Valley (Tel Adashim) neighbouring Upper Nazareth to the south.

[213]The same informant, who is also a member of the local Community Centre's Management Board, later related to me, in a different conversation, one example of what was thought of as a measure to 'do against' Arabs in Upper Nazareth which was instituted in the wake of MENA. For years, Arab residents of both Nazareths -- professionals -- had been attending the "early-morning swim" at the Community Centre (from 5 to 7 a.m.). As the "Arab in Upper Nazareth" issue was mobilized by MENA, Jewish participants in this early-morning activity started to "turn extremely nationalistic," complaining about the attendance of "Arabs from Nazareth" (some, in fact, were residents of Upper Nazareth). The Community Centre's Management Board brought it up at one of its meetings, and decided that while it could not introduce overtly discriminatory regulations that would "keep Arabs out," it could at least ensure that "Arabs don't come *en masse*," that is, to exclude the lower classes from the Arab sector (the majority) by introducing the "card-system." The card-system implies that local residents can obtain a membership card which automatically lowers the cost of tickets to any of the centre's activities to a level affordable even for working class people. "Out-of-town" residents, on the other hand, cannot obtain the membership card, and have to pay a much higher price for participation in the centre's services.

This does not, of course, affect well-to-do Arab Others, or even those less well off that live -- and are registered as living -- in Upper Nazareth.

[214]*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 16.9.1983, "Minister Arik Sharon in a Meeting of the Likud of Upper Nazareth. The Topic: The Settlement of Arabs in Town."

[215]An example is the the air-raid shelter story which is to this day related by ex-activists to communicate to outsiders (media representatives as well as the anthropologist) the urgency of the situation to which MENA's actions were a response. As one of the ex-activists in MENA related it to me:

> Imagine a war situation (and it has happened here in Upper Nazareth, because during the Yom Kippur War there were already some Arabs living inside the town)! My husband, every Jewish man, goes to war. And who stays behind, at home? The Jewish wives and children! But who stays behind among the Arabs? -- Everyone! The men as well! Now, think about it: My husband in battle not only defends me, he also defends *them*. As long as he [the Arab] sits in his own village, city, he receives my protection because he is also an Israeli citizen. But if he sits with me in the air-raid shelter, the Jewish men are gone...You understand? And that's what happened during the Yom Kippur War! During the first few days, things didn't look too good for Israel at all; and [the Arabs here] started to feel great. The Arabs were winning, and they sat in the shelters with us, already dividing things up: "I'll take your apartment, he'll take your apartment. And don't be afraid, if you are left [without a husband] we'll take care of you and the children!" This is how they talked!

The same story is related in Shipler (1986: 104-5); Frey and Sheldon (1983); and Krivine (1983). The person relating it to me (and to journalists) concedes that she has had no personal experience of sitting in an air-raid shelter with Arabs; nor does she know of any specific person who has. The point of such 'experiences' is persuasive communication of subjective unease, as she made clear herself: "When I tell this story, people start to think a bit; and suddenly they see *our* point of view. They might still not *understand*, but they think about it!"

[216]See, for example, *Jerusalem Post*, 18.11.1983, "Police Help Arab Family Move To Jewish Building."

[217]In the mayoral elections, Labour's Ariav registered a slight (five percent) loss, retaining the mayorship with 56.2 percent of the votes; whereas the Likud's candidate drew 39 percent. (Danny Cohen, heading the list in coalition with the Likud, ran separately for mayorship and procured 4 percent of the votes; in the previous elections, we recall, Cohen had been the Likud's mayoral candidate, drawing 20 percent of the total votes.) So that the Likud registered, all in all, a significant increase in its support.

[218]*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 7.10.1983, "The Rakkah Demonstration in Upper Nazareth Was Spoiled."

[219]*Yediot Ha'Galil*, 21.10.1983, "A Protest Guard in Upper Nazareth Against Housing Discrimination Against Arabs."

[220]The consensus between Labour and Likud was that "only a narrow line divides the national aspect of the problem of Upper Nazareth from the civil rights aspect, creating harsh dilemmas for the Jews;" that the "tension between two national groups" had been exploited by political opportunists; and that "pressure on Upper Nazareth would be reduced if the government provided for more public housing the young Arab couples of Nazareth" -- the long-standing and widespread underlying assumption being that Arabs, if they have a choice, prefer "to stay among themselves" and are driven into Jewish localities by economic pressures (Hoffman 1984).

[221]"MENA" threatened to press for its right to demonstrate even as far as the Supreme Court, but eventually refrained from doing so when even the Prime Minister's Adviser on Arab Affairs urged that MENA be prevented from following through on its plans (*Jerusalem Post*, 6.3.1984, "Labour Moves Against Mena in Upper Nazareth;" 8.3.1984, "Nazareth Group to Fight Ban On Anti-Arab Rally;" 20.3.1984, "Anti-Arab Rally Banned").

[222]MC Minutes, 3.2.1981.

[223]MC Management Subcommittee Meeting, 19.1.1982.

[224]MC Minutes, 1.6.1982; *Jerusalem Post*, 3.6.1982, "Yeshiva Students Arrested At Nazareth Dig."

[225]According to the MC minutes (21.2.1984), the municipal leaders decided to discontinue the project and refrain from renewing the archaeologists' contracts two years after the ancient remains had first been discovered, due to "financial difficulties." This is also the answer I received from the town leadership, as well as from one of the archaeologists contracted by the municipality (he seemed to hold a lot of resentment against the municipality, refused to elaborate on the site and his findings, referring me to the mayor for details). Logistically the lack of resources makes little sense as the Ministry of the Interior had, evidently, been prepared to allocate a budget for this purpose and, presumably, the tourist income from the site -- if developed successfully -- would have more than compensated for the expenses incurred by the excavations. (Some people mentioned also, in addition to the budget factor, "some kind of disagreement between the municipality and the archaeologists" due to the archaeologists' "incompetence.")

[226]The director of the pedagogic centre -- socially very involved, taking a particular interest in raising an awareness of local history and Zionist idealism in the young generation of the town, and hence, one would assume, a person who ought to be informed -- was evasive and claimed he didn't know. The municipal spokesperson (on behalf of the mayor) told me emphatically (without being asked) that the site was most definitely Jewish, mentioning even the discovery of a mikvah which, however, was now "closed off;" as did the District Administrator when questioned on the issue. The remains are indeed, these local leaders agree, those of the ancient Jewish settlement of Ksullot. The Director of the Northern District Ministry of Education's Archaeology Department was more cautious. He *believes* (stressing that the evidence is not conclusive) that the burial caves, dating back to 50-100 B.C.E., are Jewish. Evidence for the Jewishness of the graves, in his view, is the fact that oscifae (engravings on the rock surfaces) were found, and these usually characterize Jewish graves (though not exclusively Jewish graves). But not the settlement, which is from the time of Christ and which he refers to as Tel Tamra. He understood, however, that the leaders *would like* to be able to claim that a Jewish settlement had existed in this place in the ancient past. Finally, and most reliably one would assume, an archaeologist who participated in the excavations and then worked on the interpretation and publication of the findings (which are now kept in the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem) told me in the course of a telephone conversation that the site did definitely *not* represent a Jewish settlement. A brief summary of the site published in *Archaeological News* (Hebrew) in 1982 leaves the question open whether it is that of a Jewish settlement or not.

[227]The place in the Bible making explicit mention of the settlement of Ksullot is Joshua 19:12:

> And it [Zebulun's territory] turned from Sarid eastward toward the sun rising into the border of Ksullot-Tavor, and it went out to Deborath, and went up to Yafia (*The Holy Scriptures, Book of the Prophets*; 1917).

[228]In the context of modern-day Israel, Habad is a sub-community of the wider *Hassidic* community, that faction of the ultra-orthodox in Israel (collectively referred to as *haredim*, the God-fearing) which (together with Naturei Karta), to a greater or lesser degree and with more or less militance, has taken distance from modern, Herzlian Zionism. However, Habad hassidism represents one of the more moderate and accommodating strands of hassidism in terms of the stance adopted towards the State of Israel; it is best described as non-Zionist rather than anti-Zionist. The men, unlike members of other hassidic traditions, do serve in the Israeli Defence Forces.

[229]One of them is located in the Northern neighbourhood, for the Sephardi Jewish community, and two in the Southern neighbourhood, frequented primarily by the Russian, White and Georgian, communities which are concentrated in this part of the town.

[230]When, on the other hand, religious Zionist activists from the centre of Israel applied to the municipality in 1981 for its permission and financial support to open a Yeshiva in Upper Nazareth that would also serve as the regional basis for their operation ("*Or Ha'Galil,*" the "Light of Galilee"), the request was denied (MC Management Subcommittee Minutes, 8.4.1980).

[231]On only one occasion did Habad oppose the Labour leader, namely when the latter demanded, in 1982, that Habad admit the newly arriving Ethiopian immigrant children to its school for religious education. Habad did not consider these children as properly Jewish, that is, in accordance with halakhah; and on these grounds refused their admittance. In the end, however, the mayor won out -- under threats of cutting Habad off from further financial support.

[232]By "major" here I mean in terms of the significance they assumed in their statist interpretation, a hierarchy which is not necessarily consonant with that of traditional Judaism.

[233]One such metaphor used is local transport (for reasons familiar by now to the reader). On the other hand, *because* of the relatively overt link between transport and Arabs of Nazareth, this metaphor constrains the users in terms of the depth and detail in which the Other may be discussed via it -- without turning explicitly to ethnicity.

At first it seemed paradoxical to me that, on the one hand, people frequently and at length exchanged with each other what seemed to be grievances about the local transport system (not enough buses running, never on time, sometimes not heeding a passenger's signal to stop to let him/her off or on the bus, etc.); while, on the other hand, the bus services in Upper Nazareth are exceptionally passenger-friendly -- not merely in the researcher's own evaluation, *but also in the opinion of local Jewish residents* as expressed in their briefing of the researcher on local transport facilities and in answer to her questions explicitly pertaining to their satisfaction with transport services. Via the topic of transport, I learned from several situations, overheard as a by-stander, that people may air and exchange general thoughts and feelings on relations between Them and Us which, if made more explicit, would be in breach of the taboo.

[234]That is to say, their propositions are left implicit or assumed. It is left to the listener(s) to supply the implied propositions or to supplement the statements with a proposition nearer their own beliefs and prejudices (see Paine 1981:14).

[235]When the bus finally arrived, the researcher, instead of getting on the bus as planned, returned home to record the conversation while fresh in her memory.

[236]MENA in its initial mantle; *not* the "MENA" as it metamorphosized into a local branch of Kach.

[237]The "Jewish-Arab Circle" attracted no more than three Jewish members and, like MENA, was not operative for very long. The man who stood for the Circle, a member of the Israeli Communist Party, organised cultural evenings at his house for Arabs from Nazareth and Jewish residents from Upper Nazareth. Discussing the problem was *not* one of the Circle's intended functions. What disillusioned the Jewish members was that the Arab members, who came exclusively from the ranks of Rakkah, insisted on discussing the Arab problem. Whereas the intention had been that the Circle function on Jewish terms: the Arab members were to join in an appreciation of "universal humanitarianism," directing the focus away from the strife between Jews and Arabs 'at home'. As the organiser elaborates:

> Despite all the criticism I have of the attitude towards Arabs in Israel, I have always been proud -- to this day -- that there has always been a large part of the state which fights for equal rights for Arabs. This emphasis on justice and equality deserves respect; *and it is a very Jewish trait*. In this respect the Jews have nothing to be ashamed of. But what about the Arabs? We expected that this minority would try to integrate more, to contribute something to this struggle [for justice]. I can say from my experience: the Arab population -- including all the sectors and parties within it -- don't make *any* contribution. It is impossible to find among them what one can find among the Jewish students -- a willingness to fight for international issues: Vietnam, feminism, rights for blacks. Among the Arabs this doesn't exist! [The Arab] will only fight for the issues that concern him. An example is the Communist Party in the Lower city: they have only a nationalist struggle, for their own small issue! In the Circle, all [the Arabs] ever wanted to talk about was *their* problems! We got tired of it!

[238]Thus, I found excerpts of first and formal interviews with such informants reproduced (or, better, reproducing) fractions of interviews with the press, published in various newspaper articles; sometimes verbatim.

[239]Two of them, ex-activists and, in fact, key personae in MENA, form an exception in this respect; one of them being Mr.Rosenbaum. But they, on the other hand, are also locally perceived to constitute exceptions -- as "extremists" and as "Kahana;" and as such they are socially marginal and tend to be almost

ostracized. The ex-coordinator of the "Jewish-Arab Circle," too, is an exception in this respect -- an important difference being that he is known for talking *for* Arabs.

[240]For example, I was told about the operation, until about ten years ago, of an "acceptance committee" by the Ministry of Housing, screening anyone wishing to move to a development town and automatically screening out Arabs. Someone else told me about a 'law', abandoned about ten years ago, prohibiting an Arab resident of Nazareth to rent or buy a flat in Upper Nazareth unless he maintained a first residence in Nazareth -- so the place in Upper Nazareth would be only a second residence. This raises the issue of *class* differences across the ethnic boundary, something Jews of Upper Nazareth sometimes show themselves to be well aware of: "Imagine the kind of money they must have, being able to afford two residences!" (See later in the chapter.)

[241]Again, the man who locally represents Kahana's Kach is an exception.

[242]I approached a teacher at the local high school (teaching Biology and English) with the request to assign his students -- two grade 11 classes made up of 14 and 16 students with an average age of 17 -- an essay on their town, Upper Nazareth; concentrating on the things they liked and disliked about it the most. My request happened to fit in with an idea that he and his students had discussed already, namely, to prepare a little brochure in English and Hebrew on their town. Thus they kindly complied with my request. The essays were written in English (interspersed with Hebrew expressions where students lacked the English vocabulary). All of the students received bonus points (were upgraded) for writing them; grades could not be given, as I wanted the essays to be written anonymously. They were given two weeks to compose the essays, thus giving them the opportunity to consult their teacher for vocabulary and idiomatic expressions they could not find in a dictionary.

[243]And the *Jerusalem Post* commented:

> The Arab team was reasonable, polite, liberal-minded. The Jewish side was chauvinistic, reactionary and sulky. It was appalling: words like racialism, segregation, apartheid sprang to mind. An Arab sensibly asked what the response of the Upper Nazarenes [*sic*] would be if, in a French city, the population of a certain quarter decided that Jews are undesirable and should be kept out" (Krivine 1983).

[214]For example, the concept of the sabra, the "native-born Israeli" epitomizing Israeliness culturally, denotes *Jewish* Israelis, exclusively; I have never encountered an application of the term to a native-born *Arab* Israeli.

[245]El-Ard is the name of group comprised of a small number of Arab intellectuals which became known for the strongly nationalist tone of a magazine which they intermittently published, around 1964-1965 -- still during the time of the Military Administration of the Arab sector in Israel. The group attempted to present a list of candidates for the Knesset elections, to be called the Arab Socialist List, and to represent the Arab minority. But permission for the list to appear on the ballot was refused, and el-Ard's leaders apparently separated and banished to remote Jewish towns (see Lustic 1980:128).

[246]According to a national census carried out in 1983 (State of Israel, 1985), 40 percent of the Jewish working population of Upper Nazareth in 1983 were blue-collar workers, and 35 percent employed in services; 22.2 percent were classified as employed in academic or managerial positions; 20.1 percent as employed in clerical positions. The category "services" is somewhat ambiguous, in part overlapping with that of "blue-collar" and in part with that of "clerical."

[247]This widespread assertion that Arab buyers pay more was not corroborated either by the Arab home-owners in Upper Nazareth with whom I spoke or by the Jewish owners of the two private rental and real estate agencies largely acting as the brokers between Jewish sellers and Arab buyers. The simple fact seems to be that among people of Nazareth there is a relatively large demand for housing in Upper Nazareth, while the housing demand among Jews is extremely limited.

[248]Here Orly almost breaks the taboo (I say almost, because even though she talks ethnicity, she does not talk derogatorily about Arabs. Orly would probably not have added "the Arab woman" *vis-à-vis* one of her long-time Jewish neighbours, or even *vis-à-vis* me in their presence.

[249]An irony and paradox are the rhetorical and ideological exhortations of the Jewish pioneers and leaders of the town over having "created something *from nothing*," while, on the other hand, on the national level, the Jews are purporting to have "returned" to their *ancient* homeland.

[250]Cf. Benvenisti (1986b) and Schweid (1985) for contemporary Zionsit essays on Israel as "homeland."

[251]According to, for example, one of their representatives, a rabbi who, because of that and the immigration of Nazareth Arabs, moved into town with his family and opened a yeshiva (religious studies centre) two months before I left the field.

[252]Apparently, all Jewish Israelis undergo these Zionist seminars at least

once in the course of their secondary and post-secondary education. The seminars are organised by the Ministry of Education, and at the high school level are usually implemented ('chaired') by Jewish-Israeli graduate students concentrating their studies on related areas.

[253]A seminar-day lasted from 8.30 a.m. to 2 p.m., divided into two parts by a one-hour lunchbreak. Each half was initiated by a presentation by one of the four seminar leaders of the specific issues to be dealt with and for which the three grade 11 classes were together in one hall; subsequently the classes broke up into four discussion groups, each in a separate classroom and under the guidance of one seminar leader.

Glossary

Ahdut Ha'Avuda: Zionist Socialist Labour Party in Palestine founded in 1919. In 1930 this movement merged with Ha'Poel Ha'Tzair and formed Mapai. The name was taken by Faction Two, the anti-partition and anti-Ben-Gurion opposition in Mapai, when it formed a separate party in 1944. In 1948 Ahdut Ha'Avuda merged with Ha'Shomer Ha'Tzair to form Mapam. It split from Mapam in 1954 and in 1968 merged with Mapai (and Rafi) to form the Israel Labour Party.

Agudat Yisrael (Agudah): ultra-orthodox religious party with a non-Zionist ideology, founded in 1912 as the World Organisation of Orthodox Jews. Initially anti-Zionist, it became cooperative with political Zionism following the Holocaust. As a party in the Israeli state it has contested all the national elections and has participated in government coalitions.

akzia: (Yiddish, from the German word *aktion*) military operation.

Alignment: name of the election list composed of the Labour parties Mapai and Ahdut Ha'Avudah in the 1965 election; and of the list including the Israel Labour Party and Mapam between 1969 and 1984.

aliyah: (trans. "ascent" or "going up") Jewish immigration to Palestine and later Israel from the Diaspora; associated with spiritual ascent.

amadot: (pl.) outpost or look-out settlements.

Amidar: public housing corporation, owned in part by the Israeli government's Ministry of Housing and in part by the Jewish Agency.

bar mitzvah: ceremony marking a boy's initiation, at age 13, into the Jewish religious community when he assumes an obligation to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. Also, the attainment of religious and legal maturity.

Bet'har: youth movement affiliated with the Revisionist Zionist movement and, later, the Herut party.

British Mandate: the British administration of Palestine by a decision of the League of Nations after the First World War until 1948.

dafka: (adj.) contrary, spiteful; (adverb) just, exactly this of all (places, times, persons, things, etc.).

dakhak: literally "relief;" often short-hand for avudat dakhak -- relief work provided for new immigrants to Israel, involving the physical transformation of the new homeland: tree-planting, construction, etc.

Djab el-Sich: (Arabic) "Gooseskin Mountain;" according to a lore among Jewish pioneer settlers of Upper Nazareth the term used (in the past) by the Arabs of Nazareth to refer to the northern peak of the mountain ridge framing

the city of Nazareth to the east and which Jewish Upper Nazareth now perches.

dunam: areal measure; one dunam equals about one quarter of an acre.

Egged: Hebrew acronym for a national public transport corporation associated with the Histadrut.

Eidah: (pl. **eidot**) country-of-origin community among Jewish Israelis, and/or religious community among Arab Israelis; tantamount to intra-ethnic components of Jewish and Arab Israelis, respectively. Frequently, the term as used by Israeli politicians and social scientists has had the connotation of "ethnic group."

Eretz Yisrael: the Land of Israel, denoting the biblical Promised Land.

falafel: a Middle Eastern dish, made up of deep-fried chickpea and crushed wheat balls; usually eaten stuffed in pita-bread pockets together with a wide variety of salads. Falafel has come to represent Israel's national dish.

fooll: a Middle Eastern, Arabic dish prepared of dried beans, garlic and olive oil; often eaten as a dip with pitta bread.

Gahal: Hebrew acronym for the Herut-Liberal Party bloc. Established as a joint list in 1965, expanded and re-named Likud in 1973.

galut: (trans. Diaspora) word used to refer to the Jewish communities outside of Palestine/Israel both before and after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 C.E.; composed of both voluntary and involuntary emigrants from the Land of Israel. The term carries the overtones of "exile", but also -- and more commonly in the everyday use of the word among Israelis today -- denotes simply the geographically dispersed Jewish communities outside The Land (Israel).

goy: (Yiddish, pl. **goyim**, adj.**goyish**) gentile.

Gush Emunim: (trans. "Bloc of the Faithful") messianic settlement movement; strictly opposed to any territorial compromise. It emerged in 1968 within the National Religious Party; with objectives paralleling those of the Greater Israel movement; but formally founded in February 1974, after the Yom Kippur War and at the time of (and in response to) the Kissinger peace initiative. Its leaders represent a young, militantly nationalist group within the religious bloc. The movement began as a religious revival looking, spurned by their eschatologic interpretation of the outcome of the Six-Day War, toward the messianic redemption of the Jewish people through its ties with the Land of Israel; concentrating particularly on Judea and Samaria (parts of the territories conquered in the course of the Six-Day War) as the territorial focus of their aspirations. Emphasis is on action, the major thrust of which has been the activity of establishing Jewish settlements in these areas.

Habad: a splinter movement of Hassidic Judaism, affiliated with the Rabbi of Lubavich; while the Hassidic community overall is known as anti-Zionist,

Habad's stance to modern Zionism and the State of Israel has been more moderately and accomodatingly non-Zionist; e.g., Habad men serve in the Israeli Army.

Halakha: (trans. *the way to walk*) The whole body of rabbinic law and particular provisions which, by majority vote, are accepted as legally binding. It covers trial, civil, ceremonial, and criminal law.

halutz: (pl. **halutzim**, adj. **halutzi**, active noun **halutziut**) pioneer, especially in agriculture, in the land of Israel.

hamula: (Arabic, pl. **hamulot**) a common term in the Middle East applied to a corporate agnatic minimal lineage; a hamula may have from forty to four hundred (and even more) members.

Hanukkah: eight-day Jewish festival, known as the Feast of Lights, commemorating the victory of Judah Maccabee over the Syrian king Antiochus Ephianes and the subsequent rededication of the temple (known as the Maccabean revolt); a minor festival in traditional Judaism, it was transformed into a major *national* holiday in the context of Labour Zionist nation-building efforts following the establishment of the Israeli state.

Ha'Poel Ha'Mizrahi: the socialist offshoot of the religious Zionist movement in Eretz Yisrael, formed in 1922 by young elements of the religious faction of the World Zionist Organisation (*Mizrahi*).

haredim: (also: **eida ha'haredit**) ultra-orthodox group rejecting modern political Zionism.

Ha'Shomer Ha'Tzair: (trans. *The Young Guard*) Zionist youth organisation and former Palestinian political party formed in Galicia in 1913, striving for an integration of Zionism and Marxism; in 1948 it participated in the formation of Mapam.

hekh'sher: seal of approval issued by a rabbinical authority attesting to the kosher quality of a product.

Herut: right-wing Zionist party headed by Menachem Begin.

Histadrut: (abbrev. for Hebr. *Ha'Histadrut Ha'Klalit Be Eretz Yisrael*) General Federation of Workers of the Land of Israel; a federation of trade unions founded in 1920.

humus: Middle Eastern salad prepared of pureed chickpeas.

IDF: Israel Defence Forces; Israel's army.

JNF: see **Keren Kayemet**.

Kabbalah: (adj. **kabbalistic**) the Jewish mystical tradition.

Kach: party and election list of the Jewish Defence League formed by Rabbi Meir Kahana, renowned for his explicitly racist, anti-Arab stance.

Keren Kayemet (Le Yisrael): The Jewish National Fund; an institution of the World Zionist Organisation established in 1901. Its mandate has consisted of purchasing and reclaiming, holding in custodianship, and developing in the interest of the Jewish people and the Zionist movement, land in Eretz Yisrael both prior to and following the establishment of the Israeli state.

kibbutz: (pl. **kibbutzim**) collectivist Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael based primarily on agriculture (but today also engaging in industry).

kibbutznik: (pl. **kibbutznikkim**) a person born and raised, or at least raised for the most part, on a kibbutz.

kippah: skullcap which constitutes part of the daily garb of religious Jewish men; worn by all Jewish men on religious occasions.

kiriah: township.

Knesset: the Israeli Parliament, made up of 120 elected members.

kosher: ritually clean and fit to eat according to Jewish dietary laws.

Kupat Holim: (trans. "sick fund") sick fund providing health insurance and treatment.

lebanni: cheese made of goat's milk; its consumption is widespread in the Middle East.

Likud: a coalition of Right-wing Zionist political parties: Herut, Liberal Party, La'am, and others; founded in 1973, it was the ruling party between 1977 and 1984.

Likudnik: (pl. **Likudnikkim**) a supporter of Likud.

Ma'atz: Hebrew acronym for "Public Works' Administration," a wing of the Ministry of Labour.

madrich: group guide, instructor.

Mafdal: Hebrew acronym for the National Religious Party (see also *NRP*).

Maki: the original Israel Communist Party; following a schism in 1965 over affiliations with the Soviet Union one of the factions retained the name and subsequently joined with Left-wing Zionists to form the extreme Left-wing party Moked which was renamed "Shelli" in 1977 (see also *Rakkah*).

makolet: a small, corner grocery store.

Mapai: Hebrew acronym for the Israel Workers' Party; created in 1930, it was the dominant party in Israel until its merger in 1968 with Ahdut Ha'Avudah and Rafi to form the Israel Labour Party.

Mapam: Hebrew acronym for United Workers' Party; a socialist-Zionist party left of Mapai; both before and after 1948 Mapam showed a particular interest in Zionism's relations with Arabs in Palestine, was part of the movement

advocating a bi-national state when the establishment of a Jewish state was negotiated; between 1969 and 1984 was aligned with the Israel Labour Party.

Mapamnik: (pl. **Mapamnikkim**) a supporter of Mapam.

matnass: community/neighbourhood cultural centre.

MENA: Hebrew acronym for "The Defenders of Upper Nazareth," also meaning "prevention;" a grassroots' organisation formed in Upper Nazareth in the middle of 1983 (disbanded by the end of 1984) aiming at the prevention of Arab Israeli immigration into their, largely Jewish, town.

menorah: a seven-branched candelabrum which was one of the most sacred objects at the Holy Temple in Jerusalem; lit on the Jewish festival of Hanukkah; following the creation of a Jewish state, it has become a major national symbol, symbolizing the attainment of national freedom.

mikvah: public ritual bath for Jewish women.

moshav: Jewish small-holders' cooperative settlement in Eretz Yisrael, mainly agricultural.

Mishnah: (from the verb "to repeat," "to learn") the systematized collection of laws (*halakhot*) codified by Judah the Prince around 220 C.E.; more than simply a "code," the Mishnah is a textbook giving the essence of oral law as it was known to the sages of that time and remains the authoritative source for Jewish law; it consists of six orders (*sedorim*).

NRP: National Religious Party; historically, Israel's most powerful religious party and a constant coalition partner in government.

olim: (pl.; sing. **oleh** [masc.] or **olah** [fem.]) personal noun derived from *aliyah*; new immigrants from abroad; literally, those who ascend (to the Land of Israel).

Palmach: Hebrew acronym for *plugot makhatz*, "shock companies") the striking arm of the Haganah, a clandestine Jewish organisation for armed self-defence in Eretz Yisrael established by the Labour Zionist movement under the British Mandate; it eventually evolved into a people's militia and became the basis for the Israel Defence Forces.

Pessach: Passover, an eight-day Jewish festival commemorating the exodus from Egypt; during this time leavenous food-products are abstained from.

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

protekzia: colloquial expression for "pull" or informal influence in patron-client-type relations; characteristically involves bureaucrats, government officials and other individuals in relative power positions as the patrons; widely accepted as an institution of Israeli society.

Purim: spring celebration of the historical event which saved Babylonian

Jews from annihilation.

rabbi (rav): fully qualified Jewish cleric.

Rakkah: Hebrew acronym for *Reshimat Ha'Kommunistim Ha'Hadasha*, "the New Communist List"; split from Maki in 1965 and has since constituted the only anti-Zionist party in Israel; its support base rests largely within the Arab Israeli sector.

Rosh Ha'Shansh: the Jewish New Year, falling in autumn.

ruach: (pl.**ruhot**) wind; spirit; atmosphere (figur.).

sabra: native-born Jewish Israeli; attributed the cultural traits of the New Jew as envisioned by Labour Zionism, in negation and diametric opposition, in his characteristics, to the Jew born and raised outside his own homeland, in the Diaspora.

Sanhedrin: rabbinical high court.

Yiddish: language spoken by East European Jews since the 11th century, as Hebrew was considered a sacred language the use of which in everyday life would constitute a defilement; its roots are primarily Germanic, Hebrew, Slavic and Romance languages.

Sephardi: (adj.) a variant of Jewish tradition and custom that developed in medieval Spain; also used to refer to adherents thereof; colloquially the term is employed to denote Jews originating from North African and Asian countries.

shabbat: the Jewish Sabbath; it starts at sunset on Friday and ends at nightfall on Saturday. In orthodox procedure, travel, kindling of fire or light, and other "work" are prohibited.

shikun: housing project or housing complex.

sh'khunah: neighbourhood, residential quarter.

shokhet: the ritual slaughterer of animals according to kosher requirements.

shofar: ram's horn traditionally blown during the Rosh Ha'Shanah and Yom Kippur services.

shuk: Middle Eastern bazaar, outdoor market.

Simhat Torah: annual holy day marking the completion of the annual reading-cycle of the Torah scroll and the beginning of the Jewish New Year.

Sochnut: the Jewish Agency; an international non-government body whose aims are to assist and encourage the development of and Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael.

sumud: (Arabic) steadfastness in a given place; in the context of Israel the term has come to denote a form of indirect, symbolic opposition among Palestinian refugees of the West Bank and Gaza to Israeli occupational rule.

Sukkot: (Feast of Tabern cles) Jewish festival which commemorates the wanderings of the Jews in the Sinai desert for forty years on their way from Egypt to the Promised Land; on this festival observant Jews are commanded to build a *sukkah*, an outdoor-booth built of products deriving from Eretz Israel (the Four Species collectively known as The Lulab: citrus fruit, palm tree branches, branches of the three-leaved myrtle, and willows of the brook) and to take all their meals in it for seven days; the building of a sukkah has become a fairly widespread custom among secular Jews in Israel as well.

Talmud: the body of Jewish teaching containing records of commentary and discussion of Jewish law by generations of scholars and jurists.

tefillin: two small, black leather boxes (phylacteries) containing parchments inscribed with passages from Exodus and Deuteronomy in Hebrew; during morning prayers, Jewish men strap them to their left arm (on the left side because it is the side of the heart) and forehead.

Tehiya: ultra-nationalist party list founded prior to the 1981 national elections, the singular political demand of which has been Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Although founded partly by Gush Emunim members the party is not religious in ideology and also includes secular members.

Torah: the first five books in the Bible (the Penteteuch, the Five Books of Moses); it also refers to the entire corpus of Jewish traditional practice and lore, both oral and written.

Torah Religious Front: joint list of Agudat Yisrael and Po'alei Agudat Yisrael (Workers of Agudah Yisrael).

Torah scroll: scroll of the Penteteuch, ritually used in synagogue services.

ulpan: intensive Hebrew language programme; geared especially towards new immigrants to Israel.

vatik: (pl. **vatikim**) veteran Jewish-Israeli; an oldtimer in the Jewish homeland.

vetek: seniority in the Jewish homeland.

yeshiva: Jewish academy devoted primarily to the study of the rabbinic literature.

Yom Kippur: Day of Atonement; commemorating and mourning the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem; among observant Jews the day is marked by fasting.

Tzva Keva: permanent army.

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Yediot Abronot (Hebrew)

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MAP 3. UPPER NAZARETH.

Scale: 1: 10 000

N

KFAR REINA

EIN MAHIL

NAZARETH

KFAR IKSAL

1 SUMB EL-SIDH
2 WAY OF ZIONISM
3 PERMANENT ARMY NEIGHBOURHOOD
4 KRAMIM NEIGHBOURHOOD
5 GOVERNMENT OFFICES CAMPUS
6 INDUSTRIAL AREA A
7 INDUSTRIAL AREA B
8 ARCHAEOLOGIC SITES
9 MINORITY HOUSING PROJECT
10 IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION CENTRE
11 COMMUNITY CENTRE
12 ITALIAN HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL