TIME, EVENT, PLACE:
HEIDEGGER ON SPATIALITY

CRAIG CRAMM

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BY

CRAIG CRAMM

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Memorial University of Newfoundland

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This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth - enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide stormy ocean, and the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.
            - Immanuel Kant, <u>The Critique of Pure Reason</u>

Time: on a 'spree', 'carousal'. A party, celebration or event; esp. a communal gathering with dancing and entertainment. ... Essentially, a 'time' is an occasion of sanctioned deviation.
            - <u>Dictionary of Newfoundland English, 2nd. Ed.</u>

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations will be used to refer to the works of Martin Heidegger. These works include published books and individual essays published in collections and journals. The specific translated editions will be initially footnoted and thereafter appear as these abbreviations.

AP   ON THE BEING AND CONCEPTION OF ΦΥΣΙΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S
          PHYSICS B, 1

AS   ART AND SPACE

BDT   BUILDING DWELLING THINKING

BPP   THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

BT   BEING AND TIME

CT   THE CONCEPT OF TIME

HCT   HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME

IM   AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

KPM   KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS

MFL   THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC

OWL   ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE

WM   WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

WT   WHAT IS A THING?

ABSTRACT

I.

This thesis examines Martin Heidegger's philosophy of spatiality. The term "spatiality" is inclusive of Heidegger's thinking on "space" and "place", and their related structures.

The distinction between "space" and "place" is a contentious question in Heidegger's philosophy and contemporary thinking. In the "Foreword" to Max Jammer's Concepts Of Space (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), xii-xiii, Albert Einstein summarizes the problem as follows:

> If two different authors use the words "red," "hard,"
> or "disappointed," no one doubts that they mean
> approximately the same thing, because these words
> are connected with elementary experiences in a
> manner which is difficult to misinterpret. But in
> the case of words such as "place" or "space," whose
> relation with psychological experience is less direct,
> there exists a far-reaching uncertainty of
> interpretation. ... as to the concept of space, it
> seems that this was preceded by the psychologically
> simpler concept of place. Place is first of all a
> (small) portion of the earth's surface identified by
> a name. The thing whose "place" is being specified is
> a "material object" or body. Simple analysis shows
> "place" also to be a group of material objects. Does
> the word "place" have a meaning independent of this one,
> or can one assign such a meaning to it?

Is "place" (when compared with "space") as simple a concept as Einstein would have us believe? In "Smooth Spaces and Rough-Edged Places: The Hid," 3-5, (*a work in progress currently available on the internet) Edward S. Casey concludes:

> Time insists on its own oneness, whereas Space tends
> toward twoness in its disparity from place, its binary
> other.
>   The difference between space and place is one of
> the best-kept secrets in philosophy. Above all in
> modern philosophy, where the very distinction came to
> be questioned and then discredited: one way of
> understanding modernity ... is by its very neglect of
> this distinction. ... the pre-modern and the post-modern
> join forces in a common recognition of the importance of
> place as something essentially other than space,
> something one cannot afford to ignore in its very
> difference from space. ... Koyré has aptly described ...
> this triumph of space over place as a movement "from the
> closed world to the infinite universe." [*Quote is from

The complex continuity and importance of Heidegger's thinking on spatiality will be examined in this thesis.

The continuity and change of Heidegger's thinking on spatiality throughout his career is an often neglected aspect of Heidegger's work. But a close examination of spatiality provides a depth to Heidegger's philosophy that is often neglected in commentaries taken up with other themes of his philosophy, i.e., time, Being, event and language.

Why?

My claim is that Heidegger's thinking on spatiality underlies and provides the justification for, the changes in direction in his thinking throughout his career. However, this is not easily seen. In the majority of Heidegger's writings after Being and Time, thinking on spatiality is embedded in his analyses of a variety of topics, i.e., art, truth, poetry, ethics, language and event. Heidegger does not acknowledge that his thinking is guided by a spatial preoccupation or why this is so.

This thesis will examine how the importance of spatial thinking develops in Heidegger's early philosophy; how his conception of "place" and "space" operates and changes in his

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the title of Alexandre Koyré's From The Closed World To The Infinite Universe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968).]

Martin Heidegger reconsiders modernity's conceptions of spatiality. This move can be seen as a pivotal occasion that marks the transition from modern to post-modern. Heidegger's problem with spatiality in his early thinking leads him to re-examine the complexities and intrigues found between "space" and "place". Heidegger leaks the secret of modernism.

middle period; and how Heidegger examines spatiality in his late writings. The success of this analysis depends on a demonstration of four propositions:

1. Heidegger deconstructs the cognitive subject by demonstrating that the subject is really the aesthetic operation of time. Heidegger attempts to found metaphysics on the hegemony of time ontology.

2. Heidegger fails to demonstrate that spatiality can be derived from time or subordinated to time. Time alone cannot found an ontology of Dasein. Therefore metaphysics on a purely temporal ground is untenable.

3. Because Heidegger's time-hegemonic project for metaphysics wrecks itself on the question of spatiality, Heidegger alters the direction of his thinking towards spatiality. Evidence for this claim is scattered throughout his writings from the late 1920's onward.

4. In Heidegger's late writings, talk of time as hegemonic or directive of spatiality disappears. Heidegger moves to Place as the content of his thinking.

II.

Current culture appears to be preoccupied with spatiality. Prominent thinkers from a wide assortment of traditions and fields have recently taken up examinations of spatiality. Some current terms used in spatiality thinking include: `nomadology', `geophilosophy', and `deterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari); `heterotopoi' (Foucault); `human geography' (Buttimer); `the

envelope' (Irigaray); `topo-nomology' (Derrida); `divine places'
(Nancy); `behavior in its place' (Meyrowitz); `enclaves' (Lyotard);
`delocalization of the local', `cyberspace', and `virtual space'
(Virilio); and `sacred space' (Eliade). Michel Foucault, in "Of
Other Spaces," says:

> The present epoch will perhaps be above all
> the epoch of space. ... The anxiety of our
> era has to do fundamentally with space,
> no doubt a great deal more than with time.

Given the current preoccupation with spatiality in
contemporary thinking, it is surprising that examinations of
Heidegger's conception of spatiality are so few (at least in the
anglo-american world) and are largely limited to Being and Time or
to later `topology'. When compared to the mammoth number of
articles and books on Heidegger's notion of time and other themes,
the current literature on spatiality looks very small indeed.

The majority of these writings miss the influence that
Heidegger's examination of spatiality has on his thinking
throughout his career. If this thesis is intended to demonstrate
anything at all, it is this: Heidegger's thinking on spatiality is

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Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," trans. J. Miskowiec,
Diacritics, 16(1), 24. See also "Questions on Geography," in
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977,
ed. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

The small list of commentaries are as follows: Yoko Arisaka's
(1997) "Spatiality, Temporality, And The Problem of Foundation in
Being and Time," Michael Heim's (1981) "Topics, Topicality and the
New Topos," Otto Pöggler's (1975) "Metaphysics and Topology of
Being in Heidegger," George F. Sefler's (1973) "Heidegger's
Philosophy of Space," D. Franck's (1986) "Heidegger et le problème
de l'espace," Maria Villela-Petit's "Heidegger's Conception of
Space," Luce Irigaray's (1984) An Ethics of Sexual Difference,
Edward S. Casey's (1997) The Fate of Place.

not a side issue for Heideggerian criticism but one of the central
problems of his thinking.   Given the current preoccupation with
spatiality in culture, Heidegger's thinking on "space" and "place"
is a major mine of thought that is characteristically Heideggerian,
rich and original.

INTRODUCTION

I.

In a series of seminars given at Le Thor (September, 1969), Heidegger explains that his `path' of thinking had ranged over three distinct territories: "Meaning, Truth, and Place." The phrase **Ortschaft des Seins** is explained by Heidegger to mean "truth as the locality of Being," which "certainly presupposes a comprehension of the place-Being of place: hence the expression Topologie des Seins." Heidegger further explains his move to the "topology of Being" :

> In Being and Time, however, `the question of Being'
> takes a very different direction. There it is a
> matter of the question of Being qua Being. This
> question bears thematically, in Being and Time,
> the name of `the question of the meaning of Being.'
> This question is abandoned later for that of `the
> question of the truth of Being' - and finally for
> that of `the question of the place, or of the
> locality of Being' - whence the name Topologie des Seins.
> Three terms, which carry each other forward
> even as they mark the stages of the path of
> [my] thought: Meaning - Truth - Place (topos).

As quoted in Edward S. Casey's monumental treatment of place entitled The Fate of Place, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1997), 244.

Ibid., Fn. 227, 456. Casey's citation is Martin Heidegger, Questions IV, trans. J. Beaufret, F. Fédier, J. Lauxerois, and C. Roëls (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 278.

Ibid., 456. Heidegger defines `place' here as `topos'. Heidegger's examination of the `topos' of Being during his `late' period is subtle and further complicated by numerous analyses of spatiality that span his entire career. From his Marburg lectures given in the early 1920's, to his last published work entitled "Art and Space," Heidegger's philosophy contains extensive and problematic spatial analyses which employ a complex array of spatial terminology. Otto Pöggeler ("Metaphysics and Topology of Being in Heidegger," Man and World, Volume 8, No. 1 (February 1975): 3-27) argues that Heidegger's examination of the topology of Being is a turn to the old title of `topics', that is, "Topics is the ars inveniendi, the art of finding arguments and basic concepts for a dialogue about something. (25) ... Heidegger proceeds in

Heidegger's admission that his thought had traversed three distinct territories gives us a means of thematically expressing the constitution of each of these three territories. Each territory of thinking (Meaning, Truth and Place) has a particular preoccupation, namely, time, event, and place. This thesis will examine selected books, essays, and lectures on the nature of spatiality that span these three preoccupations.

II.

For the remainder of this thesis, the terms `ontological' and `existential' signify the structures that constitute existence.

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such a way as to concentrate on individual guiding-terms and guiding-propositions, that is, to focus on topoi ... by using the terminology of Topics. ... topology means a saying (legein) of the region or site (topos) of the truth, a determination of the region which unfolds as places of gathering, and gathering-together `logos` of guiding terms (topoi) of European thought and in this way a gathering of the basic terms of one's own thinking. Topoi are guiding terms like aletheia, idea ... Topological thinking tries to achieve something very simple: it calls our attention to presuppositions hidden in concepts we use, it seeks to speak language meditatively by asking us to keep in mind that in speaking as we do, namely from our site, we get incorporated in the coming to pass of truth." (26) Pöggeler's account of Heidegger's topological examination of the basic concepts of European thought is valid and valuable. However, Pöggeler does not address the question of `why' Heidegger moves to topology. Heidegger's move to topology is not accidental. Heidegger's move to topology is foreshadowed and embedded in his early problematic treatment of spatiality and time, and in his middle period's use of locational analysis in the formulation of the event of appropriation. This thesis is an examination of Heidegger's move to topology as a direct consequence of certain problems in his philosophy, namely, the inability to derive spatiality from time.

This thesis will not examine in any depth the complex and influential relation that Heidegger's conceptions of spatiality have on the nature of language, poetry, technology, event, etc., after his period of thinking on the primacy of time. Rather, this thesis attempts to restrict itself to Heidegger's direct analyses of spatiality.

The structures of constituted existence are signified by the use of the terms `ontic', `existentiell', `pragmatic', `factical', and `instrumental'.

The term `spatiality' is used in this thesis to encompass Heidegger's account of space and space-related structures, which includes his specific examinations of `place', `region', `de severance', `re-motion', `aroundness', `where to', `distance' and `closeness'; the existential structure of `Being-in', and the `there' [*Da]; and his accounts of `dwelling', `building', and `location'.

The term `place' has a triple function in this thesis. First, place is a specific aspect of Heidegger's account of instrumental spatiality. Secondly, place is used to signify Heidegger's existential or ontological spatiality, i.e., the `there' [*Da] being, structure of Dasein. Thirdly, in Heidegger's post-Dasein examinations, place is gradually given a distinction apart from the modern conception of calculative space.

III.

Heidegger's elucidation of Meaning consists in a demonstration that time alone is the ground of existence. Heidegger's concern with the primacy of time pervades works such as Being and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, and the destruction of Kantian metaphysics in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

These three works are not exhaustive of Heidegger's territory of Meaning, e.g., The Concept of Time, History of the Concept of Time, and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The works cited

Heidegger's `fundamental ontology' of human being in Being and Time bases the origin of Dasein's unity in time. In order to realize his project in Being and Time, Heidegger must demonstrate that rational cognition is not needed to found an ontology of human being, and that time is capable of unifying the care-structure of Dasein, or human being. Heidegger believes he has demonstrated the former in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and the latter in Being and Time.

Heidegger's demonstration of the unique primacy of time is hardly mentioned in later writings and lectures. Why? I will argue that the exhaustive exclusivity of time offered instead of the cognitive constitution of human existence cannot be made tenable because spatiality is unarticulated. Heidegger's problem with spatiality is so pronounced in Being and Time that Heidegger makes the following rare retraction in a late essay entitled "Time and Being": "The attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable." Heidegger does not tell us how this untenability occurs. It is the project of Part One of this thesis to do what Heidegger passes over in silence, that is, to analyze the untenable nature of making spatiality derivable from time.

IV.

Part Two will examine Heidegger's analyses of spatiality

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in the text can serve as boundary markings of Heidegger's thinking on the primacy of time.

"Time and Being," in Martin Heidegger's On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969), 23.

within his thinking on the event. Spatial thinking becomes increasingly important during this period of his thinking. For instance, in "An Introduction to Metaphysics" (1935 Freiberg Lectures), "Dasein should be understood, within the question of Being, as the place (Stätte) which Being requires to disclose itself. Dasein is the place of openness, the there [Da] ... ."

The focus of Part Two will be Heidegger's problematic analyses of spatiality and time together; political spatiality in "An Introduction to Metaphysics"; Heidegger's examination of Aristotle's conception of spatiality; and most importantly, the essay "Building Thinking Dwelling," which is cited by Heidegger in "Time and Being" as being his discourse on the origin of space.

V.

Part Three of this thesis will examine Heidegger's move to "place" through the essay "Art and Space" (1969). Heidegger explores the distinction and tension between modern technical-scientific "space" and "place" in the plastic arts, especially sculpture. In this essay, Heidegger also implicitly defines what "place" is.

Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 205, in Casey's The Fate of Place, 261. I have kept Casey's changing of "site" to "place" as a translation of Stätte.

PART ONE: TIME

I. The End of Cognition?

Heidegger's analysis of Kant's treatment of time in the Critique of Pure Reason provides the substructure and justification for his `fundamental ontology' of Dasein. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics can be viewed as a vindication of Being and Time.

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, which was intended to be a part of Being and Time, we see clearly Heidegger's debt to Kant's transcendental philosophy. The justification for the project of Being and Time can only be adequately understood through Heidegger's treatment of time in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics is Heidegger's examination of time in Kant's First Critique. In KPM, Heidegger claims he has overturned the subject. This destruction provides the metaphysical defence for Heidegger's `fundamental ontology' of human being, where time, not rational cognition, is the unique source of human being's unity.

Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a tracing of the primacy of `finitude' in Kant's transcendental philosophy, and through a repetition of this "fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of the primordial possibilities

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Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translation and introduction by James S. Churchill (London: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 3&4. Heidegger states: "The task of the following investigation is to explicate Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in order thus to present the problem of metaphysics as the problem of a fundamental ontology. By fundamental ontology is meant that ontological analytic of man's finite essence which should prepare the foundation for the metaphysics `which belongs to human nature.' Fundamental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein necessary if metaphysics in general [of Being] is to be possible."

concealed in it." What is disclosed as a `primordial possibilit[y]' concealed in the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> is the possibility of metaphysics through an ontology of the finitude of human being itself: human Dasein. <u>Being and Time</u> is Heidegger's `analytic' of human Dasein.

<u>Being and Time</u> can be viewed as developing Kant's position in the <u>First Critique</u>, namely, the primordial ontological priority of time expressed in the finitude of human being. For Heidegger, `fundamental ontology' is constituted through an initial analytic of the finitude of human being.

In order to secure the justification for an ontology of Dasein, Heidegger must first establish that the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> hinges on Kant's treatment of time, and not on Kant's `critique of pure reason' itself. Kant treats time as a `form of intuition' that is transcendentally located prior to the rest of the transcendental conditions of possible experience.

For Kant, time is an `aesthetic' formal intuition. Time does

In <u>Being and Time</u>, Heidegger's philosophy can be viewed as attempting a fundamental ontology of finitude. In <u>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</u>, pp. 224-228; Heidegger states: "... finitude is not merely an accidental property of human reason; the finitude of human reason is finitization, i.e., "concern" about the ability to be finite.[224] ... The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude itself can first become a problem. The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is a "dissociation" (analytic) of our knowledge, i.e., of finite knowledge, into its elements. Kant terms it `a study of our inner nature.' [225] ... if the task of a laying of the metaphysics admits of an authentic repetition, then the essential connection between the problem of a laying of the foundation and the question inspired by it, namely, that of the finitude in man, must be exhibited more clearly and with greater precision." [227-228]

not involve any cognitive synthesis. Time's intuitional irreducibility means that it is apprehended as a non-conceptual whole and cannot be derived from anything that is non-temporal, e.g., concepts. This does not mean that time is not intelligible. Time is an irreducible `intuition' that has an intelligible structure.

Time is basic for the constitution of the a priori conditions of possible experience, but it is the act of cognition that constitutes the possibility of the empirical world. For Kant, the total operation of the a priori conditions of possible experience constitute a synthetic act of cognition. A synthetic act of cognition constitutes the empirical world.

Heidegger must `deconstruct' Kant's total transcendental machinery of cognition in order to secure the ontological priority of time as the basis for metaphysics. If Heidegger can demonstrate the ontological priority of time over the transcendental operation of cognition, then he has secured time as the ground for metaphysics. If Heidegger is successful in establishing time as the primordial ontological constituent of existence, then he has `deconstructed' Kant's need for a synthesizing cognitive subject as the foundation of metaphysics.

Heidegger's project is nothing less than a deconstruction of the requirement for cognitive subjectivity as the ground of metaphysics. Heidegger requires human finitude, not the transcendental cognitive subject, as the appropriate ground to investigate the possibility of metaphysics.

However, Heidegger transforms the Kantian `critical method' itself. Transcendental conditions have been appropriated to mean ontological conditions of Dasein's factical being-in-the-world, where temporality, not cognition, is the primordial constituting unifying mode of human existence. Heidegger points out in a lecture written just before Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that "there is an intrinsic connection between the a priori and temporality," that is, "directed toward and by the problem of being, temporality must be shown to be the basic constitution of Dasein."

For Heidegger, time's overturning of the transcendental machinery of cognition initiates a `fundamental ontology' of Dasein because it is finitude, not synthetic cognition, that is the most basic structure of human being. The fundamental ontology of Dasein is the first stage in establishing metaphysics. Metaphysics is initially investigated in an analytic of Dasein's finitude, i.e., Being and Time.

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger's reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is based on Kant's first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. According to Heidegger, this volume contains a key account of the relation between the transcendental imagination and time. This account is absent in the second edition and all subsequent editions. This aspect of

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Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, translation by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 149-150.

Heidegger, Kant, p. 168.

Heidegger's reading of Kant's <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> becomes a crucial point of departure for his analysis of time in the <u>First Critique</u>. Heidegger puts enormous critical weight on Kant's [apparent] `recoil' from the original function of the transcendental imagination and its relation to time.

In <u>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</u>, Heidegger is only partially successful in overturning the total transcendental operation of the conditions of possible experience. For Kant, the simultaneous operation of all the a priori conditions of possible experience constitute the act of cognition that further constitutes the empirical world. But Heidegger restricts his interpretation of Kant's <u>First Critique</u> to the `Transcendental Aesthetic', up to and including the `categories of the understanding'. That is, Heidegger never addresses the primary question of Kant's analysis of `Pure' Reason itself. Further, Heidegger claims that time alone is enough to unify Dasein and provide the foundation for metaphysics. But he never addresses the problem of spatiality's relation to time in the unification of Dasein.

If Heidegger's criticism of <u>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</u> centres on Kant's `recoil' from the primacy of time in the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>, we will equally see Heidegger's repetition of Kant's recoil, which is expressed in <u>Being and Time</u>

Martin Heidegger, <u>The Essence of Reasons</u>, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 41. Heidegger says: "For Kant, the transcendental has to do with the "possibility" of (in the sense of that which makes possible) the kind of knowledge which does not illegitimately "go beyond" experience, i.e., which is not "transcendent" but is experience itself."

as a recoil from spatiality.

II. Repetition and Finitude

a. Mapping and Repetition

Perhaps, it is best to give a preliminary mapping of terminology in both Kant's and Heidegger's philosophies to see the degree to which terms from their different languages, systems, or models 'fit' together, i.e., have compatible or identical 'meanings'. Two terms have comparable or even identical meaning if it can be demonstrated that to some degree they both apply, and can be interchanged, within a given horizon of employment or possible employment.

Kant's division of the transcendental and the empirical, and Heidegger's division of the existential (ontological) and the existentiell (ontic), have compatible meanings. (KPM, 20-22) But they are not identical. What is the difference? Heidegger's notion of `repetition' is the key to the transformation of the transcendental into the ontological, and experience into the ontic. We will trace the difference between the ontological and the transcendental through an examination of the concept of `repetition' in Heidegger's analysis. (KPM, 93 & 208)

`Repetition' is the repeating of metaphysics' "act of origination." The act of origination arises out of the "strength and weakness of a tradition which designates in advance its possible points of departure." (KPM, 5)

The `strength' of Kant's transcendental philosophy is the `transcendental method' itself, and what it secures as the possibility of a metaphysics, namely, the primacy of time within

human Dasein. (KPM, 228 & 252)   The transcendental method is the
`analytic' or critical method.   The analytic method, in Kantian
terms, is a transcendental philosophy's critical ability to mark,
index, and explain the conditions that constitute experience.   The
analytic method, in Heideggerian terms, is the ability to `unpack'
or analyze the ontological conditions that constitute the ontic,
factical structures of Dasein. (KPM, 44-45 & 228)

The `weakness' in Kant's transcendental philosophy is its
inability to recognize the primacy of time, as expressed in the
finitude of human existence.   According to Heidegger, Kant
`recoils' from establishing time as the condition of human
existence.   Kant recoils by redefining the function of time within
the transcendental imagination in the second edition of the
Critique.

After the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
changes the imagination from a `function of the soul' to the
imagination being a `function of the understanding':

> ... in first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
> wherein Kant first introduces the imagination as an
> `indispensable function of the soul' [A 78, B 103,
> NKS, p.112] he later modified ... in a way which is
> highly significant.   In place of `the function of the
> soul,' he substituted `function of the understanding.'
> Thus, the pure synthesis is assigned to pure
> understanding.   The pure imagination is no longer
> indispensable as a faculty in its own right.   Thus the
> possibility of making it the essential basis of
> ontological knowledge is apparently eliminated, even
> though the chapter on schematism, wherein this thesis is
> presented clearly enough, remains unaltered in the second
> edition. (KPM, 168)

For Heidegger, Kant's redefining of the imagination as a function

of the understanding signifies a move back or `recoil' from the primacy of time as the basis of ontology. That is, if the imagination can provide an "essential synthesis" of time without the understanding, the need for cognitive subjective synthesis disappears. Heidegger cites Kant's doctrine of schematism as the issue where Kant's original primacy of the imagination is still strikingly evident. It is in the analysis of Kant's schematism that Heidegger demonstrates the `essential synthesis' of time in the imagination. On the basis of the primacy of time in Kant's schematism, Heidegger assumes he has proved the primacy of time for metaphysics. By demonstrating the originality of time in human being, Heidegger proposes that he has eliminated the need for the cognitive subject. In order to conduct a fundamental ontology of Dasein, Heidegger requires only time.

According to Heidegger, Kant has to recoil from the original synthesis of time in the imagination in order to preserve the synthesizing act of cognition as the ground of metaphysics. Eliminating cognition establishes human temporal finitude as the ground of metaphysics.

b. Tracing Finitude

Heidegger wants to `repeat' Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a `metaphysics of metaphysics' or the method of establishing metaphysics, and "put to an end" any interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a theory of knowledge. (KPM, 238) For Heidegger, metaphysics is first `originated' through the acknowledgement of finitude as the initial point of departure for metaphysics. (KPM,

237-238) Heidegger claims that the primacy of human finitude in metaphysics is something Kant discovers but recoils from. According to Heidegger, Kant assumes that human reason takes priority over human finitude as the basis of metaphysics.

Heidegger claims that Kant takes human finitude for granted; that is, human finitude, for Heidegger, is more basic than human reason as the starting point of metaphysics. Heidegger criticizes Kant's taking "self-evident presuppositions" for granted. (KPM, 27) These 'presuppositions' may be summarized in Heidegger's following thesis:

> The fundamental source of the laying of the
> foundation of metaphysics is human pure reason,
> so that the human characteristic of reason,
> i.e., its finitude, becomes essential for the
> problematic of the laying of the foundation.
> It is advisable, therefore, that in characterizing
> the field of origin we concentrate on the
> clarification of the essence of the finitude
> of human knowledge. (KPM, 27)

Heidegger is not directly criticizing Kant's critique of the conditions that constitute cognition, because, "in order to disclose the essence of the finitude of knowledge a general characterization [critique or analytic] of the essence of cognition is required." (KPM, 27) For Kant, the laying down of the method which constitutes metaphysics takes the form of a <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>, because reason constitutes human cognition. Human cognition constitutes the empirical world.

What Heidegger is criticizing is Kant's neglect of the human 'existential' factor found within any attempt to critique cognition: the finite character of human understanding or reason

itself. Finitude is our "fundamental way of being." For Heidegger, finitude is the expression of time within human understanding. Insofar as cognition is finite, thinking must also be constituted by the primordial working out of time. Thinking is conditioned by time.

Kant would admit that our understanding is finite, but that unity on the basis of time and the imagination alone is not tenable. Without reason's regulation and synthesis of subjectivity there can be no unity of finite being. Without reason there is only fragmented unconnected instances of experience. Reason provides the subsumption of fragmented experiences under intelligible concepts which provide the intelligible continuity of experience. For Kant, in Heideggerian terms, time alone cannot provide the unity of Dasein.

Heidegger posits time where Kant places the total operation of the transcendental conditions that constitute our understanding of the empirical world. The fundamental question we are addressing in Part One is whether this `replacement' is tenable.

Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, Trans. William McNeil and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 6.

III. Recoil

A. Time, Space and Intuition

For Kant, space and time are pure intuitions. Pure intuitions are the irreducible primordial a priori conditions that are located prior to all other a priori conditions that constitute experience. "Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearance whatsoever," and hence, for Kant, time takes transcendental precedence over space. Why?

Space, for Kant, "serves as the a priori condition only of outer appearances," and since "all representations" are derivative of "inner intuition," which is the form of time, "time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever. Time is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances."

As time is the constitutive conditional intuition of inner representations, it is transcendentally prior to space, which is the intuitional condition of outer appearances. The inner formal intuition must first be evident in order for outer intuition to become a possibility. In a 1935-36 lecture at the University of Freiburg entitled "Basic Questions of Metaphysics," Heidegger explains the relationship between Kant's notions of space and time

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Heidegger, Kant, 52. Quote from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1929), A 34, 77. Further, Heidegger states: "[Time], as universal pure intuition, ... must be the dominant and essential element of pure knowledge and hence of transcendence as well, since it is pure knowledge which makes transcendence possible."

CPurR., A 34, 77.

as follows: "Space is the form wherein all outside appearances encounter us. Time, however, is not limited to these; it is also the form of inner appearances, i.e., the appearing and succession of our modes of relation and experiences. For this reason time is the form of all appearances in general."

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger's project for the transformation of Kant's notion of time runs as follows:

> The following interpretation will reveal how time
> in the course of the development of the several
> stages of the foundation of metaphysics comes
> more and more to the fore and thereby reveals
> its proper essence in a more original way than is
> possible by means of the provisional characterization
> in the `Transcendental Aesthetic'. (KPM, 52)

Time provides the principle of unity that constitutes finite knowledge. Heidegger must demonstrate that "The finitude of knowledge manifests an original and intrinsic dependence of thought on intuition or, conversely, a need for the latter to be determined by the former." (KPM, 61) Heidegger deconstructs Kant's `need' for time as intuition, time as the constitution of the pure productive imagination, and time as the unity of apperception.

For Kant, the unity of the intuition of time precedes and constitutes the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination. The synthesis of imagination is given prior to the unity of

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Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing, trans. W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1967), 230.

Heidegger, Kant, 81. Heidegger states: "The unity which unifies a priori must anticipate the encounterable. What is encountered is itself, however, already included in advance in the horizon of time pro-posed by pure intuition."

apperception. The unity of apperception is the unifying a priori act of pure thought or synthesis: the `transcendental cognitive subject'. Since "the pure synthesis [of apperception] must unify a priori. ... what it unifies must be given to it a priori." (KPM, 86. Time is the universal pure intuition which is a priori, receptive, and productive. Therefore, "pure imagination must be essentially related to time. Only in this way is pure imagination revealed as the mediator between transcendental apperception and time."

Kant defines the working out of time in the conditions that constitute the act of synthesizing cognition. Heidegger reverses Kant's construction of these transcendental conditions. If Heidegger can give a `reduction' of the total operation of Kant's transcendental conditions to the primordial unity of time itself, then he has grounds for replacing the transcendental conditions that constitute the synthesizing rational subject's act of cognition with the ontological conditions of temporality that constitute Dasein.

More specifically, the `triplicity' of elements - pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure apperception - no longer appear as a juxtaposition of faculties. The status of the unity of apperception, as the synthesizing operation of the categories of the understanding, will lose its unifying status when it is demonstrated that it has to be grounded in the pure imagination.

Heidegger, Kant, 86. Further, "... the medium wherein joining and forming connections is possible is time as the universal pure intuition."

This `destruction' of the transcendental subject by the primacy of finitude is detailed in Heidegger's criticism of Kant's "The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding." (KPM, 94)

B. Heidegger's Critique of Schematism

Heidegger posits a strong connection between schematism and finitude:

> All conceptual representation is essentially schematism. Now, all finite cognition is, as thinking intuition, necessarily conceptual. Necessarily contained, therefore, in the immediate perception of a given thing ... Thus, schematism takes place necessarily because our cognition is ... a finite cognition. This is why Kant must state, "This schematism ... is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul." Hence, if schematism belongs to the essence of finite knowledge, and if finitude is centred in transcendence, then transcendence must take place as a schematism. Therefore, Kant must necessarily be concerned with a "transcendental schematism" as soon as he tries to light the intrinsic possibility of transcendence. (KPM, 106)

The finitude of transcendence is comprehended as the ground of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics. For Heidegger, the ontological conditions of transcendence are manifested in schematism, and not in the unity of apperception. Schematism is the operation of the conditions of finitude. The conditions of finitude are constituted by the temporalizing possibility of time within the operation of the transcendental imagination. We need go no further in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant must `recoil' from this conclusion, and `conceal it in the soul'. Why?

For Heidegger, metaphysics is not to be founded upon the regulative, unifying conditions of the understanding. Kant cannot justify going that far in his analysis, because transcendence is not dependent on any synthetic unity of apperception.

Transcendence does not depend on the cognitive operation of subjectivity.

Heidegger presents his overturning of Kant's subject in the section entitled "The Transcendental Imagination and the Problem of Human Pure Reason." In the subsection, "Time as Pure Self-Affection and the Temporal character of the Self," Heidegger claims that he demonstrates the identity of time and subject. (KPM, 193)

Heidegger's argument is best viewed through a series of passages and explications.

Passage 1.

> Time is pure intuition only in that it spontaneously preforms the aspect of succession and, as an act both receptive and formative, pro-poses this aspect as such to itself. This pure intuition solicits itself by that which it intuits (forms) and without the aid of experience. Time is, by nature, pure affection of itself. But more than this, it is that in general which forms something on the order of a line of orientation which going from the self is directed toward ... in such a way that the objective thus constituted springs forth and surges back along this line. (KPM, 194)

Explication 1.

For Heidegger, time is 'an act both receptive and formative'. That is, time is a going forth and a return back: time is the irreducible substratum that acts as a peculiar system of creativity, self-containment, indivisibility and irreducibility. The root of the imagination's transcendence is, for Heidegger, to be identified with original time as pure self-affection. That is, "Time is the condition of the possibility of every act which is formative of representation, that is to say, it makes pure space manifest." (KPM, 205) He adds: "To admit the transcendental function of pure space does not in any way imply a refusal of the primacy of time." Heidegger never demonstrates how these claims are justified. Unlike Kant, who gives a demonstration of why space is derivable from time, Heidegger, who has apparently collapsed the

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As quoted in Maria Villela-Petit's "Heidegger's Conception of Space," in <u>Critical Heidegger</u>, translation Christopher MaCann (London: Routledge, 1996), 137.

subject into original time, does not demonstrate how space is derived from time. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how it is possible (without Kant's total transcendental apparatus operating) to derive space from time within Heidegger's formulation of pure self-affected time. Rather than succeeding in deriving space from original time, Heidegger appears to exclude space altogether from his metaphysics based solely on original time.

Time is the only ontological condition of the possibility of the 'objective' (qua ontic) world. What Heidegger is proposing here is the nature of time as presented in Being and Time, namely, that time is the primordial ontological condition of Dasein. Dasein in being inauthentic or 'going from the self' cannot escape itself, because all there is is finitude or the operation of time in finite being.

Perhaps, the most significant departure point between Heidegger and Kant on time is the notion of activity. Heidegger's 'analytic' of time in Being and Time is an examination of time as the sole unifying construct of the possibility of existence. In this sense, Heidegger can be seen as collapsing the total operation of Kant's transcendental machinery into the primordially active constitutive substratum of time. Kant's view of time is more passive. That is, Kant's working out of time is dependent on the total operation of the transcendental machinery. Each piece of Kant's transcendental machinery has a different function in relation to time. Some parts primordially assemble time, i.e., intuition, others act as a template over time and sensation, i.e., schematism, and still other parts regulate the machinery that assembles and works out time, i.e., reason.

Passage 2.

> As pure self-affection, time is not an active affection concerned with the concrete self; as pure, it forms the essence of all auto-solicitation. Therefore, if the power of being solicited as a self belongs to the essence of the finite subject, time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity. (KPM, 194)

Explication 2.

Time in its primordial ontological state, 'as pure self-affection', is the condition of the possibility of an empirical self or 'concrete' ontic identity. 'Pure self-affection' and 'auto-solicitation' are phrases Heidegger employs to emphasise that we are maintained in our everyday contingent finite experiences of personal identity through being unified and constituted by time's futural ecstatic dynamism [* Futural ecstatic time will be examined in Part I, Section IV, C, (iii)].

If the 'essence of all auto-solicitation' or condition of the possibility of 'becoming' an ontic self is time, and if the 'finite subject' is so constituted by time as to be 'the power of being solicited as a self', then time is the exclusive, singular constitutive condition of subjectivity.

Passage 3.

> ... time as pure self-affection is not found "in the mind" "beside" pure apperception. On the contrary, as the basis of the possibility of selfhood, time is already included in pure apperception and first enables the mind to be what it is.
>
> The pure finite self has in itself a temporal character. Therefore, if the ego, i.e., pure reason, is essentially temporal, the fundamental determination which Kant provides for transcendental apperception must first become intelligible through this temporal character. (KPM, 197)

Explication 3.

As time is the singular, irreducible, active and pure self-affected condition of the possibility of the empirical subject, so what is regarded as the subject, i.e., 'pure reason', is itself finite, and therefore, reason is only intelligible on the basis of being so constituted by time as to be a possibility of being a subject. More simply, time is prior or primordial as the condition of what is finite in Dasein's understanding, namely, reason itself. In order to render intelligible Kant's function of transcendental apperception, i.e., as the synthesis of conceptual knowledge via the regulating ideas of reason which constitutes the act of the transcendental subject, time must first be rendered intelligible as the only real 'active' condition [*to the exclusion of space] that constitutes its possibility.

Passage 4.

> Time and the "I think" are no longer opposed to one another as unlike and incompatible; they are the same. Thanks to the radicalism with which, in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Kant for the first time subjected time and the "I think," each taken separately, to a transcendental interpretation, he succeeded in bringing them together in their primordial identity-without, to be sure, having seen this identity expressly as such. (KPM, 197)

Explication 4.

Given the accumulating evidence that the subject is nothing without time, Heidegger claims time and the subject are identical. More precisely, the subject is time, because in order for the subject to be a subject it must be primordially constituted, in the strongest sense, by the activity of time.

Heidegger claims that Kant's philosophy brings this implicit conclusion to light through being the first philosophy to submit the 'I think' and time to a rigorous transcendental analysis. For Heidegger, Kant draws the line of connection, priority, and identity between time and the subject so subtlely as to secure the

transcendental subject (reason itself), and not time, as the only possible ground of metaphysics.

Passage 5.

> Can one still consider it to be of no importance that in speaking of time and the "I think," Kant used the same essential predicates?
> In the transcendental deduction, ... "The abiding and unchanging `I' (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all of our representations" (A123, NKS, p.146). And in the chapter on schematism wherein the transcendental essence of time is brought to light, Kant says: "The existence of what is transitory passes away in time but not time itself" (A 143, B 183, NKS, p.184). And further on: "Time does not change" (A 182, B 225, NKS, p.213). (KPM, 197)

Explication 5.

As further evidence of the subject's identity with time, Heidegger points out that Kant uses the same `essential predicates' when describing both the subject and time, i.e., `abiding' and `unchanging'.

In this proof, Heidegger maintains he has demonstrated the identity of time with the subject. By proving their identity, Heidegger claims that the subject is time's pure self-affection; that is, if the subject is nothing but the activity of time, reason is excluded from the subject's constitution. **If reason is excluded from the subject's constitution, then there is really no subject at all. There is only time and time's temporalizing.** Time does not require any synthetic centre, i.e., transcendental subject, in order to provide the unity of the temporal order. Time is purely aesthetic and provides unity by its relational activity between the tenses. Time is the pure self-affected unity of Dasein.

In The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, 207, Heidegger states that time "does not centre in a kind of thing [*transcendental subject] ... which would be the common centre for

For Heidegger, an analysis of existence does not center in a subject. An analysis of existence needs only time's ontological and ontic structures. These structures arise out of time's self-affecting, self-integrating relational activity. The unity of existence, the ground of metaphysics, can be maintained by time without a subject.

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initiating and unfolding" the tenses. [* ...] is the author's insertion.

IV. Unity, Time and Space

In securing time as constituting the ontological conditions that further constitute existence, what has Heidegger achieved exactly? Kant himself recognized the primacy of time in his analysis; but time alone, without the employment of the a priori conditions of possible experience, could not account for unity. Unity, in Kant's sense, is the integrated act of cognition that both secures the identity of the subject and the constitution of the empirical world.

The critical question of how spatiality fits into integrating temporality is never addressed in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The existential status of Dasein's spatiality is the major threat to Heidegger's purely finite rendering of a fundamental ontology of Dasein.

If time cannot provide the unification of Dasein by accommodating Dasein's spatiality within that temporal unity, Heidegger's project of replacing rational cognition with time as the unity of human being is undermined. As Didier Franck remarks, "if 'spatiality' has to intervene in the derivation of inner-time from original temporality, the whole project called Being and Time would thereby be called in question."

Heidegger's project appears to be the maintaining of constitutive unity through the imagination alone, through the

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'D. Franck, Heidegger et le problème de l'espace (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986), p. 115, as cited in Christopher Macann's (Critical Heidegger) translation of Maria Villela-Petit's "Heidegger's Conception of Space," 135.

operation of temporality within finite human existence. Heidegger's position has a problem with spatiality. This problem makes maintaining the unity of Dasein a critical problem. In order to explain this problem in the concluding sections of Part One, I will analyze Heidegger's account of time and spatiality. First, I will analyze time's unification of Dasein through his early essay entitled The Concept of Time. Secondly, I will explain Heidegger's early formulation of Dasein's spatiality in History of the Concept of Time. Third, in Being and Time, I will examine Dasein's spatiality, the ecstatic nature of time, and Heidegger's attempt to derive Dasein's spatiality from Dasein's temporality.

A. The Concept Of Time

In a lecture delivered to the Marburg Theological Society in July of 1924 entitled "The Concept of Time" (Der Begriff der Zeit), Heidegger introduces his ontological way of asking the question 'what is time?' Time is rendered intelligible through human existence.

Heidegger quickly points out that the ontological way of asking (and answering) the question of time differs from that of theology, physics and cognitive transcendentalism, i.e., from "acts of consciousness." The ontological way of investigating time is not grounded in theological notions of 'eternity', physical notions of punctuating instances, i.e., 'clock-time', and nor does it "get around" the problem through "mental processes." (CT, 7E)

Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, translation by William MacNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 6E.

The question of what time is points toward Dasein, "if by Dasein we mean that entity in its Being which we know as human life; this entity in its specificity" is "the entity that we each ourselves are." (CT, 6E) `Specificity' is individuality, or it is that which "in so far as it is what it can be, it is in each case mine." (CT, 10E)

The point of departure for asking what time is is not an analysis of the "limitations, uncertainty or incompleteness of our cognitive faculty," but by asking what human life is. (CT, 10E) The question of time "is grounded in a fundamental possibility of its [*Dasein's] Being," which gives "a possible connection between that which is in time as authentic temporality to become visible from the very beginning." (CT, 10E & 7E)

What becomes visible from human life regarding the nature of time?

Heidegger introduces his peculiar ontological definition of "the fundamental phenomenon of time" as the "future." (CT, 14E) The primordial phenomenon of time within human life is futural. The dominance of the present is not the authentic way of living. As Heidegger formulates it:

> Dasein is authentically alongside itself,
> it is truly existent, whenever it maintains
> itself in this running ahead. This running
> ahead is nothing other than the authentic
> and singular future of one's own Dasein.
> In running ahead Dasein is its future,
> in such a way that in this being futural
> it comes back to its past and present. Dasein,
> conceived in its most extreme possibility
> of Being, is time itself, not in time. (CT, 13E-14E)

To be alive as a human being is to have the possibility of

oscillating in ontological distance from future to present, and future to present-past. This "coming back" to the present creates two possibilities for human life: 1) to be consumed with `everyday' activities, i.e., "idle talk," "restlessness," and "bustle and business;" and 2) in coming back to the present Dasein "is its past," and this recognition of Dasein's historical continuity is the ground of "conscience." (CT, 13E-14E & 19E) Heidegger does not discuss any further what `conscience' means here.

The past, present and future tenses collapse into temporality's futural constitution of Dasein. For Heidegger, asking `when' (future) or `how much' (present) is to cover the more primordial question of time in human life. Existence is futural motion. Futural motion takes existential priority over extension (quantity) as the dynamic of past and present's constitution.

Heidegger's ontological way of answering the question of time in terms of futural priority offers a striking critique of present-centred temporality. To view time as the quantifiable present, a `how much', is to take time to mean the `now' of the present. In the `now' of the present, we reside with everyday sensory empirical objects, and bodily and psychological preoccupations: "in everydayness the happening of the world is encountered in time, in the present. The everyday lives by the clock, that is, concern incessantly comes back to the now; it says: now, from now till then, till the next now." (CT, 16E-17E)

Measuring temporal distance by clock and calender, which is based on the predictable empirically quantifiable rotation of

celestial spheres, places the now as the primordial interpretation of time as present tense. Time "is already interpreted as present, past is interpreted as no-longer-present, future as indeterminate not-yet-present: past is irretrievable, future indeterminate." (CT, 17E) We encounter what occurs and exists as "running through a present," a now, whose direction is said to be a singular and irreversible sequence from an irretrievable past to an infinite future.

Heidegger asserts two things that are characteristic of time as now, present, or "how much." First, the dogmatic rigidity of the everyday accepted phenomenon of the irreversibility of time, which is further maintained and propagated by science and technology, covers whatever may remain of authentic time to be rendered intelligible. Dasein's authentic futurity is veiled because this way of looking at time "looks away from the future towards the present, and from out of the present its view runs after time which flees into the past." (CT, 18E) Inauthentic now-centred time severs the futurity which makes it possible. Time's irreversible rolling through the now into the irretrievable past "is grounded in the fact that time was reversed beforehand": that is, authentic time runs from the future into the present-past, not from the past-present through the present-present into the future-present.

Secondly, present-centric time homogenizes authentic time into space. The process of homogenization expels all futurity from itself into a present. The present is the integration of time

coordinates within a mathematical co-ordinated system of spatial positions, i.e., "time becomes the coordinate t alongside the spatial coordinates x, y, z." (CT, 18E) The assimilation of time to space is the homogenization of time to spatial "Presence pure and simple." (CT, 18E)

Heidegger maintains the Cartesian notion of spatiality as pure quantifiable extension. Heidegger uses Cartesian space as a `strawman' to show the metaphysical prejudice contained in time's disappearance into metric spatiality. Why is space not given a complementing ontological reformulation? Why are the ontological possibilities of space passed over in silence by Heidegger? In the end, Heidegger's ontological revolution transforms the question of time from "what is time?" to "who is time?," where the answer is: "time is Dasein." (CT, 20E) But can the question "what is space?" be transformed to "who is space?," where the answer is: "space is Dasein"?

B. <u>History</u>

Heidegger's early treatment of time and spatiality in <u>History of the Concept of Time</u> (Marburg, 1925) prefigures <u>Being and Time</u>. I will not examine Heidegger's treatment of time and its constitution of Dasein (concern and everydayness) in the <u>History</u> because those themes are more fully developed in <u>Being and Time</u>, and will be discussed with reference to that work. Heidegger's analysis of spatiality in the <u>History</u> is a problematic explanation for spatiality being derived from time.

In the section entitled "Spatiality of the World," Heidegger quickly rejects Descartes' formulation of **extensio** as the primary foundation of being in the world. Spatiality "is a constitutive element of the world," but is not, in Heidegger's formulation, the sole ground of the reality of the world. Heidegger's understanding of 'spatiality' here is mathematical "pure metric space." Heidegger's project is to make spatiality (in the sense of "pure metric space") derivable from the "environing world."

World is the content of the ontological constitution of Dasein. At this point in Heidegger's lectures, world has two other unitary elements co-constituting Dasein's ontological structure, namely, time (concern) and everydayness. Heidegger has elaborately demonstrated time's constitution of everydayness in constituting the world of Dasein. The question now arises, can Heidegger derive spatiality from time? But first I will investigate what the unitary structure of spatiality is.

Heidegger attempts to avoid a dualistic position on spatiality that defines "**res cogitans** negatively against **res extensa**, conceiving spirit always as non-space." (HCT, 224) Heidegger's project is to free space from its association with corporeality and the "constant fear of materializing the spirit." (HCT, 224) As Dasein is strictly finite, so "Dasein itself is spatial," and further, "there is absolutely no reason to oppose this and to

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Martin Heidegger, <u>History of the Concept of Time</u>, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 223.

think, on the basis of whatever metaphysical presuppositions that spirit, person, the authentic being of man, is some sort of an aura which is not in space and can have nothing to do with space." (HCT, 224)   If space is not abstracted mathematical extension or associated with a descriptive mapping of corporeal matter, what is it?

The phenomenal structure of the worldhood of space is "aroundness."   The phenomenal structure of aroundness is constituted by remotion, region and orientation (directionality). Remotion involves `nearness' and `distance' understood not as geometric spacing [**Abstand**] between two points but as the referential connection of things that are removed or remote from Dasein. Heidegger uses the example of a room with a chair and a window to explain remotion. The chair is remote from the window only on the basis of the "particular nearness or remotion of the chair or window to me." (HCT, 225) Dasein becomes a kind of zero point of origin for the spatial world. The primacy of Dasein's spatiality makes geometric spacing a possibility.

The character of remotion is the `where to' of a "place." Re-moting [**Ent-fernen**] is removing distance which both brings near and distances places. Places imply regions.   If I get up from my chair (place) and move near (region) the window (place), I simultaneously distance myself from my chair.

Place is the `where' of `where to'. Region is the `to' of `where to'.   That is, region is the orientating direction. Nearness, distance and direction give the basic structure of

Dasein's spatiality as aroundness: "The aroundness in the world is the regional nearness and distance of the intimate with-which of concern." (HCT, 226) Concern is constituted by time. Heidegger is introducing a subtle move that makes concern, therefore time, more basic than space in the unitary constitution of Dasein. But before we deal with the question of what ground can be offered for such a move, Heidegger must position place as the axle on which spins his notion of Dasein's spatiality.

Heidegger's treatment of place is the key move in his treatment of spatiality that seeks to avoid the Cartesian notion of space as corporeal extension. Place explains how something can be near or far for Dasein without being a geometric spacing. Place explains how remotion operates. Place explains how aroundness functions as the unitary spatial phenomenon of Dasein's constitution. Place explains why Dasein's spatiality does not necessarily entail a split between non-spatial cognition and material extension.

Heidegger states, "all environmental things are placed," and that "something is near or far insofar as it has a regional place, a place orientated to Dasein." (HCT, 226) Place has a unitary spatial `doubling' affect regarding Dasein's constitution. First, there is the everyday natural experience of things `being-on-hand.' Heidegger uses the example of the sky, where the sun "has its particular places." (HCT, 226) Secondly, immediately handy environmental things have their allocated place: "`Place' is the where of belonging of what is handy or on hand in concern," and

more importantly, "concern has the possibility of allocating its particular place to a thing, which is not at all obvious." (HCT, 226) What is not "obvious" and never demonstrated is how concern (time) allocates places for things.

Place functions as a pragmatic view of space. Dasein's spatiality is orientated (regionalized) by the remotion (nearness and distance) between places. Place has a double employment in Dasein's pragmatic spatiality. First, place explains how we view everyday spatiality as the regionalized remotion between places by serving as both point of origin and destination. On this pragmatic level, Dasein's everyday move between places is familiar and unlimited. Secondly, Heidegger maintains that concern constitutes the everyday place of things on hand. Concern, which is constituted by time, somehow allocates the individual places of things. Heidegger positions concern as the ontological constitution of everyday pragmatic places, and through place, concern is the ontological constitution of Dasein's spatiality.

Concern provides the possibility of the remotion of Dasein in its everyday directive regionalizing between places. Heidegger views concern as a constitutive explanation of how these places are allocated in their everyday instrumentality. Why Heidegger sees concern as the ontological constitution of pragmatic place is understandable. If concern is constituted exclusively by time, then time constitutes the allocation of places. Through the allocation of places, time constitutes the centre of Dasein's ontological spatiality. The implication of concern allocating

places is that the unity of Dasein's constitution can be reduced to time. Dasein's spatiality can be derived from time.

Heidegger's turn to place attempts to solve the problem of how space can be understood apart from quantifiable (metric) extension. That is, the metric view of space maintains that abstracted geometric spacings mapped onto corporal extension entails a separation of cognition from that corporeality due to the process of the act of abstraction-cognition itself. Place, for Heidegger, is as Edward Casey points out "a **via media** between body and mind, both of which are set aside in order to concentrate on what happens between them. ... this open between - this between of the Open." Heidegger calls it a `clearing' in these early lectures.

However, place has no ontological power of its own. The places of Dasein's everyday being on hand, which allows the aroundness structure to function as the unity of Dasein's spatiality, is allocated by concern. What is not `obvious' is how concern allocates places, namely, how time constitutes space.

Heidegger's `clearing' has no ontological possibility outside its purely pragmatic use in concern: "The placing of environmental things, the determination of where they belong in a region, is in turn founded in the primary presence of concern." (HCT, 226) The characteristic of concern's placing is `clearing'. Concern's placing is a presence (time's presence). Placing is a determination of the use or unusable character of things in the

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The Fate of Place, 244.

environment, where what is unusable must be "`cleared' out of the way." -HCT, 226)

What Heidegger subtly glosses over in his purely everyday pragmatic treatment of place, which becomes more obvious in Being and Time, is the possibilities of Dasein's spatiality functioning on an ontological level. That is, as in his lecture "The Concept of Time," how spatiality can be derived from time is concealed because Heidegger does not say what possibilities spatiality has outside its use in concern on a purely factical everyday level of remotion. Could it not be that Dasein's spatiality has a constitutive unified structure of its own? Could the `clearing' that takes place on any everyday level be constituted by the ontological openness of place itself, the `Da' of Dasein, at the primordial ground of Dasein's existential spatiality or in some kind of co-constitutional relation to time? It is these spatial preoccupations that orientate Heidegger's thinking from the 1930's onward.

For the remainder of these early lectures, Heidegger constantly repeats how Dasein's spatiality is constituted by time, e.g., "nearness is nothing but reduction in the loss of time," and "remotion is determined here according to how I have time." (HCT, 227 & 231) Unfortunately, however, repetition without demonstration does not show that spatiality is derivable from time. Heidegger's recoil from the possibilities of spatiality reaches far into the heart of Being and Time itself. Heidegger's project to unify Dasein through time alone is not tenable without a demonstration of

how spatiality can be derived from time.

C. Being and Time

1. Introduction

As Heidegger's elaborate ontological structure of Dasein unfolds in Being and Time it becomes clear that time again is the ground of Dasein's unity. Heidegger concisely summarizes his position in the following theses:

> Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite.

The fundamental change in Heidegger's notion of time in Being and Time is time's ecstatic character. Does this move help Heidegger provide an acceptable demonstration of spatiality being derived from time?

This section will examine three questions. What constitutes Dasein's spatiality? What does it mean for time to be `ecstatic'? Does Heidegger offer a demonstration for Dasein's spatiality being derived from ecstatic temporality?

What constitutes Dasein's spatiality?

Edward S. Casey gives an exhaustive and masterful analysis of Dasein's pragmatic spatiality in Being and Time in the chapter entitled "Proceeding to Place by Indirection" in his The Fate of

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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translation by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 380.

Place.   Therefore, this thesis will not attempt to repeat Casey's unrivalled and economical (although some forty pages!) treatment of Dasein's spatiality in Being and Time.   What this thesis will attempt to add to Casey's analysis of Dasein's spatiality is a closer examination of the `Da' of Dasein given in of Section V of Being and Time entitled "Being-In As Such".   In this section, Heidegger gives an account of Dasein's `existential spatiality' as the `Da', `there' or `disclosedness' of Da-sein.

ii   The `Da' of Dasein

In his 1927 Marburg lectures, Heidegger makes a brief aside: "Openness belongs to its [*Dasein's] being. The Dasein is its Da, its here-there, in which it is here for itself and in which others are there with it; and it is at this Da that the handy and the extant are met with."   This brief break from the purely time-centred nature of Heidegger's 1927 Marburg lectures is enough to peak the curiosity of Heidegger's translator Albert Hofstadter. Hofstadter offers a brief but revealing "A Note on the Da of Dasein" from his "Translator's Appendix" of his translation of Heidegger's 1927 Marburg lectures entitled The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

The Fate of Place, pp. 244-284.

Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translation, introduction, and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 300.

Following Hofstadter, Da is the "the ability to open up." More precisely, Da is the "let-be-unveiled as uncovered or disclosed is the ability to exist as the Da." (BPP, 334) The German adverb "da" can be mean many things: as spatial or locational - "being-here" and "being-there" - and as temporal - "being-then," "being-when" and "being-at-the-time." (BPP, 334-335)

The Da suggests first a spatial or locational priority. But under Heidegger's usage in Being and Time, the Da, although first introduced in its spatial and locational character, eventually weighs in heavily on the side of a temporal bias without a cogent demonstration of why the "Da's" temporal constitution takes priority over its spatial constitution. As Hofstadter points out:

> These temporal connotations fit into Heidegger's usage, but the aspect first stressed in Being and Time is a spatial one. Later, when the role of time and temporality, especially Temporality, is comprehended as constitutive for the Dasein's being, the notion of the Da takes on a temporal sense which does not appear so clearly at the beginning. (See, for instance, the connection between ecstasis and openness, p.267 [*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology]. (BPP, 335)

Spatiality is disclosed as the being of Da. Spatiality is constituted as a possibility by the disclosedness of Da. Only

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Albert Hofstadter, "Translator's Appendix: A Note on the Da and the Dasein," 334.

As Heidegger's notion of `Da' is suggestive of both spatial and temporal examination, so Heidegger's notion of Presence in these Marburg lectures is suggestive of both spatial and temporal analyses. `Anwesen': "to be present," and `Anwesenheit': "Presence" is essentially ambiguous; that is, both terms can be applied to both time and space. In these Marburg lectures, Heidegger certainly obscures spatial presence in favour of temporal presence.

through the disclosedness of Da can pragmatic spatiality be rendered possible, and "only so can the human being be `here' as `I-here' in its being towards beings which are `there'." (BPP, 335) Da, as `opening up', primordial placial `clearing' or disclosedness, is the ontological condition of the pragmatic spatiality of being. Da is an aspect of the ontological constitution of human being, which is therefore rendered "Dasein." Da is the existential structure that constitutes Dasein's pragmatic spatiality.

The ontological role of Dasein is to be its Da; that is, to be its `cleared' or disclosed constitution which makes the ontic-pragmatic distinctions of `here' and `there' a possibility. To become Da is to be rendered in `openness'. In this essential disclosedness, "the spatiality of the world becomes possible within which beings can be distinguished from their being and understood by way of their being and so encountered as the beings they are, so that human comportment toward them as beings becomes possible." (BPP, 335)

Da is the existential condition or "essential disclosure" that makes the pragmatic spatial `here' and `there' a possibility. The ability to "let-be-unveiled" is the capacity to exist as the Da. The capacity to exist as a Da is the source of the pragmatic

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Basic Problems, 335. Hofstadter goes further in stating: "The German for to be Da is Da-sein. The entity, the being whose role it is to be (its) Da can therefore be called Dasein. Here Heidegger uses a Sein-word, a being word, to denominate a Seienden, to name certain beings, those whose role it is to sustain this mode of being. Dasein's role is to sustain Da-sein, and that is why it has this special ontological name."

spatiality of the world. Therefore, as the Da is the existential

condition of Dasein's pragmatic spatiality; Heidegger says, "Dasein

is its disclosedness." (BT, 171) And at this point in <u>Being and</u>

<u>Time</u>, Dasein's spatial disclosedness is strictly constituted by the

existential placial openness of the `there' or Da.

In chapter 5 of <u>Being and Time</u>, Heidegger explains the "there"

or Da as follows:

> The entity which is essentially constituted
> by being-in-the-world is itself in every case
> its `there' [*DA]. According to the familiar signification
> of the word, the `there' points to `here' and a `yonder.'
> The `here' of an `I-here' is always understood in a
> relation to a `yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a
> Being towards this `yonder' - a Being which is de-
> severant, directional and concernful. <u>Dasein's</u>
> <u>existential spatiality</u>, which thus determines its
> `location', is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world.
> The "yonder" belongs definitely to something encountered
> within-the-world. `Here' and `yonder' are possible only
> in a `there' - that is to say, only if there is an entity
> which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of
> the `there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being
> the character of not being closed off. In the
> expression `there' we have in view this essential
> disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this
> entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there (`Da-
> sein') of the world, is `there' for itself.
> When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the
> **lumen naturale** in man, we have in mind nothing other than
> the existential-ontological structure of this entity,
> that it is in such a way to be its "there." To say that
> it is "illuminated" ["erleuchet"] means that as Being-in-
> the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not
> through any other entity, but in such a way that it is
> itself the clearing [`Lichtung']. Only for an entity
> which is existentially cleared in this way does that
> which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light
> or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings
> its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is
> not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein;
> indeed, it is not this entity at all. **Dasein is its**
> **disclosedness**. (BT, 171)

What is striking about this passage is Heidegger's account of

existential spatiality being the `clearing' or `disclosedness' of the `there' or Da of Da-sein. That is, Dasein's disclosedness is the existential constitution of Dasein's ontic-pragmatic spatiality structure.

In Being and Time, Dasein's existential structure is first given a spatial priority, a priority of the primordial `there' of placial openness. However, Heidegger does not `connect' the existential spatial account of the Da to his pragmatic analysis of Dasein's spatiality. Instead of grounding ontic-pragmatic spatiality in the existential structure of the Da, Heidegger attempts to ground Dasein's pragmatic spatiality in existential ecstatic temporality through its constitutional structure of care.

The question we will address next is whether Heidegger's formulation of ecstatic time can provide the justification for spatial thereness being derivable from ecstatic temporal thereness. In order to give Heidegger full benefit of the possibility of time as the singular primordial constitution of Dasein, of time being more basic than spatiality, of spatiality being derivable from time, we will examine Heidegger's formulation of ecstatic time, which will include his other relevant formulations of ecstatic time besides that given in Being and Time itself.

(iii) Ecstatic Time

Dasein is so constituted that time is its definitive activity. The unitary extensity of being alive is time's segmented point and continuum, stasis and flow, originating from one unified formation of being, namely, ecstasy. Paul Ricoeur economically summarizes

temporality's unifying function in <u>Being and Time</u> in the following three theses:

> The first one says that the question of time as a
> whole is enveloped, in a manner that remains to be
> explicated, by the basic structure of "Care." The
> second one says that the unity of the three dimensions
> of time - future, past, and present - is an ecstatic
> unity in which the mutual exteriorization of these
> ecstases proceeds from their very entanglement with one
> another. Finally, the unfolding of this ecstatic unity
> reveals, in turn, a constitution of time that may be said
> to be layered, a heirarchization of the levels of
> temporalization, which requires distinct denominations:
> temporality, historicality, and within-time-ness. '

For our purposes, we will assume the validity of Ricoeur's first and third points concerning time's elaborate unifying constitution of Dasein. But since what we are after here is the detailing of Heidegger's notion of ecstatic time and its use in Heidegger's attempted derivation of Dasein's spatiality, we will restrict ourselves to the structure of ecstatic temporality itself.

In <u>Being and Time</u>, the question of Being-a-whole, the structural unity that integrates Dasein's existentials, leads to the ecstatic 'whole' or unity of temporalty. The question of time becomes the question of Dasein's structural wholeness: "the potentiality-of-Being-a-whole can ... be carried back to the power of unification, articulation, and dispersion belonging to time."

Time maintains Dasein's unity through its ecstatic character. Temporality can be designated by the Greek term ekstatikon:

Paul Ricoeur, <u>Time and Narrative Volume 3</u>, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 63.

Ibid., 68.

"Temporality is the primordial `outside-of-itself' [Ausser-sich] in and for itself." (BT, 377) The essence of time "is a process of temporalizing in the unity of ecstases." (BT, 377) Ecstatic unity is, as Paul Ricoeur further points out, "that of the differences among ecstases. This differentiation is intrinsically implied by temporalization insofar as it is a process that gathers together in dispersing. The passage from the future to the past and to the present is at one and the same time unification and diversification." Unity is maintained through the interplay of the tenses' differences - each toward each. The interplay of past, present and future constitutes the `whole' of temporalization. The whole of time is the unifying fourth dimension of time. The whole of time or the ontological `ecstatic-horizon' of Dasein is constituted by the dynamic interplay of the three tenses. The whole of time maintains unity and is itself asymmetrical - it is itself an opposition, an oppositional unity that unites the relation of oppositions between tenses.

Without reason, idea, concept, schema, or centre of synthesis, ecstatic time "needs no support or pillars," because "the unity of the ecstases is itself ecstatic." (MFL, 207) Ecstatic time is transcendence itself. The ecstatic activity of `temporalization' itself comprises the possibility of being. Radically immanent temporalization has no ground beyond its instances. But this does not mean that Heidegger's notion of time has the problem of `distributive unity'. That is, ecstatic time is more than any

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Ibid., 71.

particular time, and cannot be defined by its instances because, like Kant, Heidegger takes time as an aesthetically given whole or unity.

Time is always more than its instances in its `futural surge'. This futural surge is the ontological limit of present and past. Temporality is "free ecstatic momentum." (MFL, 207) The dynamism of temporality is such that human being is so constituted as to participate in temporality's temporalization: "the free oscillation of the whole of primordial temporality; time reaches and touches itself." (MFL, 208) The priority of the present collapses under Heidegger's notion of ontological temporalization. To be alive is to be projected into the future. It is the future, not the present, that defines authentic Dasein. But, if the future were in the present it would be `Nothing', therefore, any description of the aesthetic event of temporalization is necessarily devoid of the positive content of presence. Only negative tracings of the futurity of Being are rendered possible. For Heidegger, the surge of absence defines presence. That which is revealed as presence is constituted by the surge of what necessarily cannot be present: futurity.

Futurity so defines human existence, in its `ecstatic-horizonal' constitution of being, that the activity of the pure relational structure of the differences between past, present and future maintains unity. In The Essence of Reasons, Heidegger states:

The Concept of Time, 16E.

> ... the project of world and preoccupation with
> being, as ways of grounding, belong to one
> temporality which they jointly institute. "In"
> time, the future is anterior and is only temporalized
> insofar as past and present are also temporalized
> in the specific unity of time; the three ways of
> grounding which arise from transcendence bear a
> corresponding relationship to one another. This
> correspondence exists because transcendence is
> rooted in the essence of time, i.e., in its ecstatic-
> horizonal constitution.

Ecstasy, from the standpoint of human being or Dasein, is understood as the surge, the `going out' or `stretching along' of time. Time is `ecstatically-elastic' because human being's orientation is futural.  That is, as we are futural in constitution, so the present becomes both the site of the return of the future to the past, and the site of everyday empirical experience.  Past here is not the `no-longer-present', but the returning of authentic futural Dasein to itself in the dynamic interplay of ecstatic unity.

Heidegger's project reverses the conventional interpretation of time as irreversible and homogenized presence. That the present is the measure of past (`no-longer-present') and future (the indeterminate `not-yet-present') is rendered ontologically invalid or `inauthentic' according to Heidegger. Heidegger claims that the constant repetition of present centred existence denies the authentic futurity of being, which maintains human unity through

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The Essence of Reasons, 109.

I take this concise formulation from Dr. James Bradley's "The Nature of Existence: Strong or Weak?," (Memorial University of Newfoundland Philosophy Colloquium, 1997), 9.

being a constant return to its past in the present.

A human being's "expectancy" of the future, says Heidegger, "is not a mode of being conscious of time but, in a primordial and genuine sense is time itself." (MFL, 203) To be alive is to be in futural `motion'; that is, "time neither passes nor remains but it temporalizes itself. Temporalization is the primal phenomenon of `motion'." (MFL, 198) As Heidegger formulates it:

> expecting one's own capability-for-being as mine,
> I have also come toward myself already and precisely
> through expecting. This approaching oneself in
> advance, from one's own possibility, is the primary
> ecstatic concept of the future. ... this having-been-
> ness temporalizes itself only from out of and in the
> future. (MFL, 206)

The passage from the future to the past and present is a "coming-towards" that already has the past and present contained within it. But why should the future have such a privileged position? Could we just as correctly say that the present has the future and past contained in it, and the past has the present and future contained in it? Why does a particular tense (the future) have a necessary priority in the whole of time? Heidegger claims that the futural orientation of existence collapses the priority of present-tense-centred existence. Indeed, the priority of the future does replace the priority of the present, but does not maintaining a future-tense-priority encounter the same problems as present-tensed-priority, namely, the priority of any tense over the other tenses fractures the asymmetrical unity of time. As Ricoeur points out, "Do we take as self-evident that the fact that the past is determined and the future open? This asymmetry separated from its

hermeneutical context does not permit us to apprehend the intrinsic relation between the past and the future, however."

I will put aside the dense problems arising out of Heidegger's formulation of futural ecstatic time itself. **It is enough for the purpose of this thesis to have demonstrated that Heidegger's notion of ecstatic time attempts a unification of Dasein's complex and layered structure of `being-as-a-whole' without any appeal to Dasein's existential spatiality.** Let us now return to Heidegger's attempted derivation of spatiality from time in section 70 of <u>Being and Time</u> entitled "The Temporality of the Spatiality that Is Characteristic of Dasein."

iv Deriving Spatiality from Time

Heidegger claims that "Dasein's spatiality is `embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded upon it." (BT, 418) What is Heidegger's demonstration of his claim? As Heidegger formulates it:

> Temporality is the meaning of the Being of Care. Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of temporality ...
> Hence Dasein's specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality. (BT, 418)

As a creature of care, whose very meaning is temporal in character, Dasein cannot but be founded in temporality. Dasein's spatiality "must be grounded in temporality" in order to keep time as Dasein's

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<u>Time and Narrative Volume 3</u>, 70.

This section of my analysis owes a great debt to Edward S. Casey's subsection II of his chapter "Proceeding to Place by Indirection" in <u>The Fate of Place</u>, 256-259.

unitary structural formation. If Dasein's spatiality cannot be demonstrated to be a derivative of time, the whole project called "Being and Time" collapses because time cannot unify Dasein.

"Spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality," claims Heidegger, but any demonstration of this claim "cannot aim either at deducing space from time or at dissolving it into pure time." (BT, 418) Is Heidegger protesting too much here? Heidegger admits that a Kantian priority of time over spatiality is untenable given his destruction of cognition in favour of aesthetic-ecstatic temporality. Further, to `dissolve' spatiality into time is equally untenable because it is impossible and not, as Heidegger would have us infer here, because he is drawing back from this demonstration. If dissolving spatiality into time is possible, I am sure Heidegger would be more than willing to demonstrate spatiality's disappearance into time!

If Heidegger cannot deduce spatiality from time or dissolve spatiality into pure time, how is spatiality to be derived from time?

Heidegger refers to his `demonstration' as an "existential-analytical inquiry as to the temporal conditions ... for the possibility of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein." (BT, 419) What are these `temporal conditions'? Instead of an exhaustive analysis that demonstrates the existential temporal constitution of Dasein's spatiality, Heidegger, following again the stumbling of his 1925 Marburg lectures, gives us a series of statements without demonstration, e.g., "Dasein can be spatial only

as care," and "Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space." (BT, 419 & 421)

Does the ecstatic nature of time help Heidegger derive spatiality from time?

We read that "the self-directive discovery of a region is grounded in an ecstatically retentive awaiting of the `hither' and `thither' that are possible" and that "both bringing-close and the estimating and measurement of distances within that which has been de-severed and is present-at-hand within-the-world, are grounded in a making-present belonging to the unity of that temporality in which directionality too becomes possible." (BT, 420) But Heidegger does not make it clear what the analysis of `hither' and `thither' gains by being described as "an ecstatically retentive awaiting," much less how these two modes of Dasein's spatial regionalization are grounded in temporality. Moreover, in the case of bringing-close, de-severing, and directionality, Heidegger does not offer any demonstration of how these modes of Dasein's spatiality are grounded in the `making-present' attributed to unifying ecstatic temporality.

Heidegger admits that "the function of temporality as the foundation for Dasein's spatiality will be indicated briefly," (BT, 420) but such unpersuasive analyses of the sort just examined are revealing of Heidegger's failure to derive spatiality from time. Further, Heidegger states that these unsubstantial analyses exposing his inability to derive spatiality from time are "no more

than is necessary for our later discussions of the ontological meaning of the coupling together of space and time." (BT, 420) But Heidegger never returns to an analysis of the `coupling together' of space and time in <u>Being and Time</u> and he later admits in "Time and Being" (1962) that his attempt to derive space from time in section 70 of <u>Being and Time</u> is untenable. (TB, 23)

Heidegger's recoil from Dasein's existential spatiality is so pronounced that it leads Edward S. Casey to conclude that

> <u>Being and Time</u> exhibits, at the level of explicit intention, an overall effort to delimit Dasein's spatializing powers by subordinating them to the putatively greater dynamics (or, better, ecstatics) of temporality. In performing this subordination, the book embodies a form of flight - a shrinking back before the spatial structures of Dasein, as if these structures occasioned a special philosophical anxiety in Heidegger himself during the period of its composition.

Heidegger fails to derive spatiality from time because Dasein's spatiality has an existential structure of its own distinct from temporality. Dasein's primordial disclosedness, openness or placial `clearing' is its `existential spatiality' (BT, 171). Heidegger should have grounded his pragmatic analysis of Dasein's spatiality on existential spatiality. Instead, Heidegger erroneously attempts to derive both ontic and existential spatiality from existential ecstatic temporality in order to maintain the hegemony of time in human existence. This `error' leads to a series of problematic questions left unanswered in <u>Being and Time</u>:

1. If spatiality cannot be derived from time, can time alone unify

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Casey, <u>The Fate of Place</u>, 259.

existence?

2. If time alone cannot unify Dasein, does Heidegger's `fundamental ontology' collapse?

3. Could spatiality and time together be existentially constitutional of human being?

4. Could spatiality and time's co-constitution of human existence, and existence in general beyond the confines of human Dasein, have a relation `between' them without one subordinating the other?

5. Is Heidegger's flight from the original `Da' a covering of the existential priority of spatiality over time?

6. Would it be more cogent to derive ecstatic time from the primordial spatial openness of the `there'?

Heidegger's failure to derive spatiality from time opens up a metaphysical quicksand that threatens to devour any priority of time in an ontology of existence, and leads him to `turn' his thinking away from his ontological project given in early lectures, Being and Time, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

V. Summary and Transition

Summary

Part One of this thesis can be summarized as follows: Heidegger claims he has deconstructed the need for a synthetic unity of cognitive subject as the basis of metaphysics; Heidegger claims he needs only time to conduct a unified ontology of existence; Heidegger fails to derive Dasein's spatiality from time; and the time-hegemonic unification of existence appears to collapse on the basis of the inability to derive spatiality from time.

Transition

In Part Two of this thesis, I will examine Heidegger's `explanations' of the relation and priority of time and spatiality; his problematic formulation of political spatiality; Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's conception of spatiality; and his account of the origin of space. These analyses present Heidegger's attempt to re-conceptualize spatiality apart from modern calculative space as an indirect result of his struggle to determine the nature of the relation between time and spatiality.

PART II: EVENT

I.

In the essay "What Is Metaphysics?" (1929), much is made of Dasein's `Da'. The `Da' is "that place of human being within which man endures, as at home, in the enduring," and further, "`Being-there' names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place - namely, the location of the truth of Being." Heidegger's turn to the "place" of truth is a direct confirmation that Da-sein's ontological spatiality (in the language of Being and Time) is much more important than Being and Time would have us believe. But despite the shift to the priority of the `Da', Heidegger's brief remark on time is indicative of the problem he faces in explaining the relation between time and spatiality:

> the interpretation of time is the horizon of
> every possible attempt to understand Being ...
> Time is decisively present in the history of
> Being, without being recognized or thought about.
> To this Time, space is neither co-ordinated nor
> merely subordinated. (WM, 274-275)

What is remarkable about this aside is that Heidegger admits that his attempt to subordinate spatiality to time in Being and Time is not possible. What is not clear is what he is referring to; ontological Da or pragmatic-ontic spatiality. Heidegger's move to the "truth-place" of Being, the open `Da', is what is called ontological spatiality in Being and Time. If the "place" of truth is the spatiality he is referring to here, or if its ontic

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Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" reprinted from Existence and Being, translation by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick (New York: Henry Regency Company, 1949) in Existentialism From Dostoevsky To Sartre, editor Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian Books, 1975), 261&271.

spatiality, for that matter, Heidegger offers no explanation of what the relation between spatiality and time is in this essay.

If spatiality is neither `co-ordinated' nor `subordinated' to time, what is its relation to time? Heidegger passes this question over in silence in "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger does make another attempt to explain spatiality's and time's relation in the winter semester, 1935-36, at the University of Freiberg in a series of lectures entitled "Basic Questions of Metaphysics."

Heidegger states that the question "what is a thing?" includes the questions "what is space?" and "what is time?". He asks the question he avoids in "What Is Metaphysics?," namely, "how and why are space and time conjoined?". Heidegger's problematic revision of the relation between space and time is as follows:

> ... we will give the composite "Zeitraum" a meaning that is designated to indicate the inner unity of space and time. Thereby, the real question applies to the "and" [*relation]. That we should name time first, that we say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit, should indicate that time plays a special role in this question. But that should not mean at all that space can be deduced from time or that it is something secondary to it. (WT, 16)

As in "What Is Metaphysics?," Heidegger readily admits that spatiality cannot be subordinated to time. This is another direct confirmation that his attempt to derive spatiality from time in <u>Being and Time</u> is not tenable. But Heidegger still claims that time has a `special' directive relation regarding spatiality, i.e., `we say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit.' Given that Heidegger has admitted that the `Da' (ontological spatiality) is the ground of

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<u>What Is A Thing?</u>, 16.

thinking, it is unclear what `space' he is referring to in his formulation of `Zeitraum'.

In this lecture, as in his attempt to derive space from time in Being and Time, the expectation is that Heidegger will explain what time is, what space is, and how the relation between them is to be understood such that he can demonstrate his claim that time has a special leading relation regarding space. Heidegger must demonstrate how the time-space relation is Zeitraum and not Raumzeit as the priority of the `Da' strongly suggests.

Does Heidegger succeed in this lecture where Being and Time failed? That is, does he explain how space and time are related? The remarkable answer we shall see is - no! What Heidegger does instead is to criticize Descartes and reject the notion that space and time are external to things. For Heidegger, space and time are somehow `interior' to things. What does `interior' mean here?

> Space is not only around a thing but directly
> in it; but this space is occupied, filled up.
> ... The thing takes up this space, encloses
> this space by its surface, in itself, as its
> interior. ... space is not an exterior frame.
> ... Our question has been what the interior
> of a physical body looks like; more exactly,
> the space `there'. The result is: this interior
> is always again an exterior for the smaller
> and smaller particles ... where does the
> interior begin and the exterior end? Does
> the chalk consist of space? Or is the space
> always a container, something of an enclosure,
> of which the chalk consists? (WT, 19-21)

Heidegger answers his questions as follows: the thing

> only fills space; a place is always placed
> into the thing. This placing in of space tells
> us exactly that the space remains outside.
> Whatever occupies space always forms the
> border between an outside and inside. But

the interior is really only an exterior lying
further back. (Strictly speaking, there is
no outside or inside within space itself).
But where in the world would there be an
outside and inside, if not in space? Perhaps,
however, space is only the possibility of outside
and inside but itself neither an interior nor an
exterior. The statement "Space is the possibility
of inside and outside" might be true. What we
call "possibility" (Möglichkeit) is still rather
indefinite. "Possibility" can mean many things.
We are not of the opinion that we have decided
with such a statement the question of the relation
between the thing and space. ... We were concerned
to reflect on whether space and time are `exterior'
to things or not. (WT, 21)

Heidegger's notion of the relation of a thing to its "place" and
"space" is as quickly closed as it is opened up. What is the
distinction between "space" and "place" such that there can be a
`placing of space'? If the `placing of space' forms the between of
a thing such that it can have a discernable inside and outside, is
the thing the "place" of the `placing of space'? That is, what
makes a thing a thing is its in-being of "place" on both physical
and ontological levels. Ontological and physical "place"
constitute the `border', the open, that both separates and holds
together the interior and exterior of matter and the ontological
difference `between' being and Being.

Heidegger quickly retreats from this place-prioritized
position on the nature of a thing and turns to time. Heidegger
asks, "in what relation do things stand to time?" (WT, 22) But he
offers little by way of answer here to this question, and nor does
he say anything particularly cogent about the difference between
"space" and "place" and the relation between "space-place-time" and
a thing. What started out in this lecture as a bold attempt to

answer the question of "space-place" and time's relation quickly
dissipates into an unsatisfactory and undemonstrated claim that
"only on account of this position [*Zeitraum] do particular things
become just there (je diesen)." (WT, 22-23) Following a pattern
set in his earliest Marburg lectures, Heidegger fails to recognize
that saying something over and over does not make it so.

The identity of things is certainly involved in the "space-
place" and time relation, but Heidegger's attempt to articulate the
relation between "space-place" and time is never cogently explained
in these lectures.

II.

Heidegger examines spatiality again in the summer of 1935 at
the University of Freiberg in a lecture series entitled "An
Introduction to Metaphysics." First printed in Germany in 1953,
"An Introduction to Metaphysics" is still surrounded in political
controversy. The essay is a rich mine of thinking regarding
Heidegger's leap into truth and politics. The key to Heidegger's
controversial reading of truth and politics is his analyses of
spatiality, more specifically, political spatiality.

Heidegger turns to the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus
and Parmenides in order to trace the fundamental question of
Metaphysics: "Why are there essents?" Heidegger claims that "the
essent was called physis" in Greek thinking, and that the Latin
translation of physis as nature, `natura'-to be born, thrusts aside

the original meaning.' According to Heidegger, the word `physis'
denotes

> self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming
> of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which
> manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves
> and endures it; in short, the realm of things
> that emerge and linger on ... physis means the
> power to emerge and endure. (IM, 12)

The realm of being as such is meta-physis, and "meta," in Greek,
means beyond something. Therefore, "philosophical inquiry into the
realm of being as such, meta ta physika; this enquiry goes beyond
the essent, it is metaphysics." (IM, 14)

Questioning the ground of metaphysics "moves us into the
open," to be our `Da', and "casts a new space over everything and
into everything." (IM, 24) What `casting space' means is not
explained here, but perhaps, by engaging the open `Da' "place" of
our there-being in questioning the ground of metaphysics, the
ground of existence, we transform our ontic space or world of
everyday experience.

Heidegger refines the question of metaphysics to "where is
being situated?" (IM, 29) Heidegger's immediate answer is grounded
in the context of technology, with Germany as the site of National
Socialist revolution whose "inner truth and greatness" is the
"encounter between global technology and modern man." (IM, 166)

Perhaps, Heidegger's formulation of the polis can give us
some understanding of his apparent apology for National Socialism.
For Heidegger, the polis is the "foundation and scene of man's

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'Martin Heidegger, <u>An Introduction to Metaphysics</u>, translation
by Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 11.

being-there," it is "the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, the there in which, out of which and for which history happens." (IM, 128)

Heidegger has a double there-being operating in this essay. There is the individual `Da' "place" of Da-sein, and the polis `Da' there-being. These two enfold each other with the polis having the most power or physis at the expense of individual being-there. How the two are supposed to be related is not directly examined in "An Introduction to Metaphysics." What can be said is that the polis takes priority over individual Da-sein, that is, whatever conflict there is between the polis and an individual sides heavily on the side of the polis. Why?

Heidegger offers no explanation besides that the polis, in its historical being-there, has exponentially more power. The act of being-there of the state does not ground itself in the primacy of the individual human subject because Heidegger claims he has deconstructed the need of the cognitive subject as the basis of metaphysics. If the basis of metaphysics is not the rational subject, where is the ground of existence to be located? In "An Introduction to Metaphysics," Heidegger locates the basis of metaphysics in the there-being of the polis - not in the `Da' there-being of individual human beings. For Heidegger, what counts in existence is power or physis as such which Heidegger interprets as the power of the polis, `ein volk', as opposed to there-being power of individuals. Physis means

(1) the emerging and arising, the spontaneous
unfolding that lingers. In this power rest
and motion are opened out of original unity.
This power is the overpowering presence that
is not yet mastered in thought, wherein that
which is present manifests itself as an essent.
But the power first issues from concealment;
i.e. in Greek: al*theia (unconcealment). (IM, 51)

(2) Since the essent as such is, it places itself
in and stands in unconcealment, al*theia. ... the
Greek essence of truth is possible only in one
with the Greek essence of being as physis. ...
between physis and al*theia ... The essent is true
insofar as it is. The true as such is essent. This
means: The power that manifests itself stands in
unconcealment. In showing itself, the unconcealed
as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is
not an appendage to being.
        Truth is inherent in the essence of being. To
be an essent- this compromises to come to light, to
appear on the scene, to take one's <its> place <sich
hin-stellen> ... . (IM, 86-87)

Heidegger's equation of power-to-be and truth means the polis
is the most true because it has the most power-to-be. `To take
one's place' as a polis is destructive because there is only power
as the basis of action. Power is truth and truth is the basis of
action. But Heidegger appears to hesitate over this polis power-
truth regime, where "we have embarked on the great and long venture
of demolishing a world that has grown old of rebuilding it
authentically anew ... the violent act of laying out paths into the
environing power of the essent," (IM, 106 & 132) when he examines
the Greek notions of "chōra" and "topos".

Heidegger describes "place" as belonging to individuals.

That wherein something becomes refers to what
we call "space." The Greeks had no word for
"space." This is no accident; for they
experienced the spatial on the basis not of
extension but of place (topos); they experienced
it as chōra, which signifies neither place nor

> space but that which is occupied by that which
> stands there. The place belongs to the thing
> itself. Each of all the various things has its
> place. That which becomes is placed in this
> local "space" and emerges from it. (IM, 54)

If a "place" belongs to the thing itself, is there an inherent tension between what is my own "place", what is each our own personhood, and that most powerful place, the polis? More simply, if individuals come into conflict with the power of a polis that seeks to destroy them, are they not obligated to preserve and protect themselves by resisting that polis? If the "polis-place" threatens the inherent given of the "person-place" that we each ourselves are, what "place" takes priority?

For Heidegger, the only means of assessing the value of such a question is power. The polis has more power and therefore the polis is the origin of truth. Individual "places" function for the truth of the polis. This power-truth-polis configuration is reinforced by logos.

Heidegger draws a further relation between alétheia, physis and logos. He claims that logos is at its source "alétheia and physis, being as unconcealment." (IM, 102) Heidegger presents logos as the permeating power of physis that is a `gathering' that maintains a unity of unconcealment (alétheia) and concealment. Logos "maintains the full sharpness of their tension." (IM, 113) Logos unites/gathers the chaos between the oppositions of concealment and unconcealment as the emerging power of physis. Logos unconceals as truth, alétheia. Truth is unconcealment and it is intelligible as the `event' of logos which has gathered through

the emergent power of physis: "Initially the logos as gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it." (IM, 155)

Heidegger claims that "being-human is logos, the gathering and apprehending of the being of the essent: ... legein, to collect, ... to make manifest (un-conceal) in opposition to conceal ... on the strength of its essential relation to logos in the sense of physis." (IM, 143) For Heidegger, humanity is

> the site which being requires to disclose itself.
> Man is the site of openness, the there. The essent
> juts into this there and is fulfilled. Hence we say
> that man's being is in the strict sense of the word
> "being-there." The perspective for the opening of being
> must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there
> as such for the disclosure of being. (IM, 171)

Humanity's "being-there" is fully soaked in the truth that unconceals as the power of the polis, which is "the disclosure of being." The logos of individuals functions as a `site of openness' or theatre of operations for the polis. For Heidegger, humanity is not seen as individual "places" or sites of individual emergent unconcealing power-truth that we each find ourselves being. Rather, humanity is that which `hears' the logos-unconcealment of power-truth of the polis. Humanity is humanity only insofar as it is dwelling in the terror of the polis's power as the disclosure of truth.

III.

Heidegger's turn from the spatiality of the polis as the origin of human being and his critique of modern calculative spatiality is grounded in his examination of Greek thinking on

spatiality and temporality. Also, in his examination of Aristotle's Physics, Heidegger explains what he means by `topology', the "logos" of "topos" or the language of "place."

In the winter semester of 1941, Heidegger states

(1) The modern habit of thinking time together
with "space" (already prefigured in the beginning
of metaphysics with Aristotle) leads us astray.
For according to this way of thinking time is
considered solely in terms of extension, and this
as a counting up of fleeting now-points. Thought
in modern terms, time is a parameter, like space,
a standard scale according to which something is
measured and estimated. Space and time are
essentially related to "calculation."

(2) However, in Greek ωρα, means what corresponds
to τόπος, to the place where each respective
being belongs. ωρα is the always favorable and
granted time as distinguished from the untimely. Ωρα
never means a serial order of now-points one after the
other, but the allotment character that lies within
time itself as what is always proper [schicklich],
sending [schickenden], granting, and ordaining time.
We do not apprehend "time" when we say "Time is ...."
We are closer to apprehending it when we say "It is
time." That always means it is time that this happens,
this comes, this goes. What we thus address as time
is itself the kind of thing that directs and allots.
Time is the allotment of presencing for what presences
in each case. Time is the expansion of the respectively
enjoined abiding [Weile], according to which what
presences is always something momentary [jeweiliges].
In overcoming the unfit of itself, the momentarily
presencing ωρα corresponds to the enjoined
abiding of transition. By giving what is fit to
enjoinment, and by each one mutually acknowledging the
other, each respective presencing corresponds to the
allotment of abiding. That beings are in the respective
correspondence of their "being" to "time" means nothing
other than: Being itself is lingering, presencing.

(3) Presencing is abiding, and its non-essence lies in
the lingering that would like to persist unto a final
duration. The essence of being repels this limit. In
abiding, which is always essentially only an abiding,
being extricates itself from the unfit, and, through
elusion, saves that One and Same as what enjoins,
which is egress and pervasiveness and disclosure for

every being.[ ]

In this dense passage, Heidegger appears to be saying that "place" (topos) is `where each respective being belongs' and "time" is that which corresponds to the "place" such that there is an `enjoined abiding' of "place" and "time" in a being. "Time" gives and allots a particular duration within a particular "place". Presence is the enjoined abiding of "place" and "time".

"Place" cannot be derived from "time". "Time" assumes its `where' or "place" in order to allot and grant duration. Although the `enjoinment' (*the "coupling" of <u>Being and Time</u>) of "time" and "place" is needed for the presence of a being, "place" is prior in some peculiar ontological sense. That is, in existence, "place" most somehow be `there' first in order for "time" to grant its duration. The strange nature of "place's" `firstness' is examined in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's <u>Physics</u>.

Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's <u>Physics</u> B, 1 was given in the first trimester at Freiberg in 1940. Heidegger claims that "Aristotle's PHYSICS is the hidden, and therefore never adequately studied, foundational book of Western philosophy."[ ] In his examination of Aristotle's notion of Physis or `Nature', Heidegger makes an indirect reference to Aristotle's `topics' as the method of analysis. Topics are the "region(s) in which the question of

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[ ]Martin Heidegger, <u>Basic Concepts</u>, trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 103-104.

[ ]Martin Heidegger, "On The Being and Conception of Φύσις in Aristotle's Physics B, 1," translation by Thomas J. Sheehan in <u>Man and World</u>, Vol.9, No.3 August 1976, 224.

... has to be lodged" such that "the proper force and weight of our language" does not "replace the Greek" but serves "to place us into the Greek and in so doing to disappear into it." (AP, 227&226) Topics are the proper "placing" in language of "places".

In this essay, there is "place" and "placing". "Place" is the constituted and "placing" is the constituting activity. The obscure character of "place" and "placing" can perhaps be clarified by Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek notion of Nature itself, Physis. Heidegger translates the Greek term for `Nature' to mean "that which lets something originate from itself." (AP, 221) The `itself' is "place" and the `origination from itself' is "placing". There is `the self' (place), and there is `selfing' (placing).

Heidegger's examination of Physis `lodges' itself in "place", not "time". This absence of "time" is all the more striking when one remembers that Heidegger's lectures in the late 1920's on Aristotle's notion of presence in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are almost exclusively "time" hegemonic.

"Place" and "placing" are the two key concepts in his formulation of Aristotle's notions of motion, differentiation, presence and appropriating. "Place"

> is something different from the modern
> conception of the change of location of
> some mass in space. Τόπος is the ποῦ,
> the place where a determined body
> belongs. What is fiery belongs above,
> what is earthly belongs below. The places
> themselves - above, below (heaven, earth) -
> are special: through them are determined
> distances and relations, i.e., what we call
> "space," something for which the Greeks had

> neither a word nor a concept. For us today
> space is not determined through place, but
> rather all places, as constellations of points,
> are determined by infinite space that is
> everywhere homogeneous and nowhere distinctive.
> But something that continues to occupy the same
> place and so is not moved in the sense of change
> of place, can nonetheless be in the process of
> being moved. For example, a plant that is rooted
> "in place" grows (increases) or withers (decreases) -
> ... On the withering tree the leaves dry up, the
> green becomes yellow. The tree that is moved in
> the twofold sense of growing and withering is
> simultaneously at rest insofar as it is the tree
> that stands there. (AP, 229)

As Heidegger sets it out in this essay, movement is not to be interpreted as external change of Cartesian position of some mass in infinite space. Movement is internal to the "place" where a determined body belongs. Movement is appropriately internal to 'special' or individual "places", and there are only particular "places". Movement is "a mode of Being" that "has the character of emerging into presence" such that the "origin and ordering of change" has "this ordering within itself." (AP, 230)

The emerging into presence of the internal ordering of differentiation into the identity of a special "place" is characterized by beingness, ousia or οὐσία. Heidegger rejects the translation of οὐσία as substance or essence. Rather, "οὐσία, beingness - that which distinguishes a being as such" is "in a word: Being." (AP, 238) Heidegger, in an anticipation of his later analysis of Ereignis, maintains that, for Aristotle, the word οὐσία "still retained its common meaning whereby it signified house and home, possessions, capabilities, we might also say 'one's present holdings,' 'real estate,' that which lies present. ...

[and] the very lying-present itself." (AP, 238) For Heidegger, Being has the dual character of the "place" of what is present, that which lies there, and a manner and mode of becoming present itself, i.e., the "placing-of-place." `Thereness' or Being of a being is the origin, ordering and end of its own identity. Being is what is internally appropriate to particular "places", to particular self-differentiatingly identical being-theres.

Being is the appropriate "placing" of a being such that it is differentiated from all other beings. In that "placing", the self-identical differentiating emerging into presence, Being constitutes that which is as being as a particular "place", as a particular identity or `this'.

Being limits or "places-place", but this "is not limit in the sense of the outer boundary, the point where something ends. Limit is always that which limits, determines, gives footing and stability, that by which and in which something begins and is." (AP, 245) Being limits, defines, or "places" internally self-differentiating identical there-being by "coming into the unhidden," or further, "becoming-present [Anwesung] in the sense of coming forth into the unhidden, placing itself into the open." (AP, 245&247) Being "places" itself into the `open'.  The `open' is the "place" of limit, of what internally differentiates as origin, ordering and end of being such that it maintains identity.` In short, Being appropriates, "places" what is special, in the open

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`Aristotle (Physics Bk4., Ch4., 212a20) says that "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place."

"place" of being.

In human terms, what is specially "placed" by Being in the open "place" of humanity is Λόγος. Language is not a property or capacity among others. Language is that "distinguishing characteristic of the Being of man that he has, and holds himself in, ' ,ος (Logos).' (AP, 251) Language is what is "placed" in the open there, the open "place", of humanity such that humanity is internally self-differentiatingly identical as the origin, ordering and end of its being.

Λόγος means to collect or gather in such a way as to bring differing scattered things into an identity and "to bring forth this unity as gathered, i.e., above all as becoming present; thus it means the same as to reveal what was formerly hidden, to let it be manifest in its coming present." (AP, 252) In short, Being is seen internally to beings themselves as the act of revealing or unconcealing of Λόγος. Λόγος is the relation on which alone what is present gathers itself internal to beings in such a way as to reveal Being, i.e., "to speak the Being of beings." (AP, 253)
The word is the ground of humanity's relation to beings as such.
Beings are that which is gathered and revealed internally as the "placing" of Being in the open "place" of human being, language.

Language is `appropriate' or proper to human being as the open "place" of Being's "placing", the event of unconcealing and concealing that is the relation of human being to beings. Heidegger examines `appropriation' in the example of a table:

> But it isn't just any wood that has the character
> of appropriateness for a table, but only this wood,

selected and cut to order. But the selection and cut, i.e., the very character of appropriation, is decided in terms of "production" of "what is to be produced." But to "produce" means, both in greek and in the original sense of the German Herstellen, to place something, as finished as looking thus and so, forth, into presence. Ὕλη (*matter) is that which is appropriate and orderable, that which, like flesh and bones, belongs to a being that has in itself the origin and ordering of its being-moved. But only in being placed ... is a being what it is in the given case and how it is. (AP, 253 & 254)

The "placing" into "place" of a being is the event of appropriation. The "placing" into "place" is the internally referential orderability that is always a particular being, a 'this'. The "placing" into "place" is the 'End' (τελος) of a being, an end that is not the stoping point of external movement of mass at some coordinated point in infinite homogeneous space. Rather, the 'end' is "the beginning of being-moved as the ingathering and storing up of movement" such that a being is internally self-originating in order to be itself, to be its end, to be what-was-it-to-be a finally appropriated being. (AP, 256) The act of changing, the event of appropriation, itself "breaks out into the open" in such a manner that "the emerging appropriation (ἐντελέχεια) of the appropriated (δυναμει) gathers itself up and "has" itself (ἐχει) as in its end." (AP, 257) Heidegger translates Aristotle Physics Γ, 1, 201 b 4f. as "The having-itself-in-the-end of the appropriated as appropriated (i.e., in its appropriation) is clearly (the Being) of being-moved." (AP, 257) Being's "placing"

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I follow Dr. John Scott of Memorial University of Newfoundland in translating Aristotle's teleological principle **to ti en einai** as being-what-was-it-to-be a thing.

into "place" is `this' being's internally appropriated `having-itself-in-the-end'. Moreover, Being is the end, the origin and orderable preceding condition of finality and immanent finiteness of `this' being's presence, self-placing or "being-on-the-way," of itself.

The end is in being in order that a being can be what- it-was-to-be, a finally appropriated being, that is, a "self-placing" becoming what-was-it-to-be present to itself by being "the becoming-present of a becoming absent." (AP, 266) The end is absent from presence, but `absent' does not simply mean `void-there' negation of a thing itself; rather, becoming-absent constitutes becoming-present internal to a placed being as the appropriating placing event of Being. The lack must be `there' in becoming-present in order that becoming-present is rendered a potential. Lack or absence is the necessary desire or `rage' to exist given internally to beings such that they can become what they are. Heidegger says that this "becoming-present-by-becoming-absent ... constitutes a mode of Being." (AP, 266)

Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's Physics is a significant moment in his thought. Heidegger turns to Greek philosophy for conceptual re-alignment on the nature of spatiality and he appears to break with the modern conception of spatiality. Heidegger's departure from the scientific-modernist project of the quantifiable homogeneous metric space of technological mastery is made beautifully apparent in his essay entitled "Building Dwelling Thinking."

IV.

Heidegger poses two guiding interrogative questions at the beginning of his essay "Building Dwelling Thinking," namely:

    1. What is it to dwell?
    2. How does building belong to dwelling?

First, what is dwelling?

Heidegger asks the question, "do houses in themselves hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them?" (BDT, 146) Heidegger examines the terms "building" (noun) and "building" (verb):

> Yet those buildings that are not dwelling places
> remain in turn determined by dwelling insofar as
> they serve man's dwelling. Thus dwelling would
> in any case be the end that presides over all
> building. Dwelling and building are related
> as end and means. (BDT, 146)

The "dwelling place" precedes any possibility for the construction of physical enclosures or shelters. Heidegger rejects this common distinction between building and dwelling as a 'means-end' relation, because "building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling - to build is in itself already to dwell." (BDT, 146)

What is the source of the confusion regarding the 'means-end' interpretation of building and dwelling?

The covering of the "building as dwelling" relation is a symptom of the technocratic appropriation of language. Our assuming to be the "shaper and master" of language is invalid, because it is language which is the "master" of humanity. Language

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Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in <u>Poetry, Language, Thought</u>, translation by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p.145.

is the source of our dwelling. Language the `opening of the open place', the Da of our being of Being.

Heidegger's dissection of the meaning of key archaic terms is indicative of proper "place" dwelling. Heidegger traces the Old High German word **bauen**, "which means to dwell," or "to stay in place." BDT, 146) Heidegger examines what it means to be a human being in terms of **bauen**, namely, "to be a human being means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. ... to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for." (BDT, 147) To build, as dwelling, is to preserve and nurture, and to not be consumed in a "rage" of making things. The "care" meaning of building-dwelling has been obscured in favour of technocratic "construction."

Building-dwelling as the care and nurturing of special living internally "placing" "places" has been violently appropriated by technocratic building-dwelling as construction of inanimate extended spaces. A river is not a giver, sustainer and taker of life to be preserved and even worshipped as a sacred place. A river is a source of energy, a source of resource to be controlled and harnessed as a site of construction.

There is a tension between dwelling-building as the cultivation, preserving and sparing of living "places" and dwelling-building as the construction of inanimate things.

Heidegger states in On The Way to Language, trans. P.D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 112, that "language, in granting all this to man, is the foundation of human being."

The "placing" of "places" is what Heidegger calls `Nature' in his examination of Aristotle's Physics.

Heidegger only examines the latter dwelling-building and what should be proper to it. Heidegger's main point in this essay is to make the construction-building of inanimate "places" not inherently destructive of cultivated living "places".

With his recollective tracing of **bauen**, Heidegger derides humanity's ignorance of the power and "mystery" of the "primal call" of words that both hide and reveal the truth. For Heidegger, we should listen for the "place" where language "falls silent," because it is there that the truth cracks through. Humanity "fails to heed this silence," and thereby, fails to listen for the unconcealing of truth within untruth. (BDT, 148) "But if we listen to what language says in the word **bauen** we here three things":

> 1. Building is really dwelling.
> 2. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals
> are on the earth.
> 3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building
> that cultivates growing things and the building
> that erects buildings. (BDT, 148)

"Building as dwelling" of human beings is the condition of the possibility of either building as `cultivation' of living things or the construction of material enclosures.

What does this dwelling-building entail?

Heidegger traces what is properly recollected in the meaning of a word. This time it is the Old Saxon **wuon**, and the Gothic **wunian**. The Old Saxon word **wuon**, like **bauen**, means to remain in "place", while **wunian** tells us much more of how this remaining in "place" is "experienced." Briefly, Heidegger traces the Gothic

word to mean "peace," "free," "preserved from harm and danger," and "to free actually means to spare." (BDT, 149)

What is this `sparing'?

Real sparing is not only negative, e.g., as to spare a cat from being run over, but also positive. Positive sparing "takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being; when we `free' it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace." BDT, 149. The positive sense of sparing is preservation, a removal of impediments that returns a thing to its own nature. Sparing is the preserving, cultivating, and care of living and inanimate constructed "places". Further, "To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving." (BDT, 149) This "sparing and preserving" is the essence of human dwelling "on the earth." (BDT, 149)

At this point in the essay, Heidegger introduces his "fourfold" manifold of "earth and sky, divinities, and mortals." BDT, 149. These four maintain a unity or "primal oneness." Each element maintains its own identity only insofar as "we are thinking the other three along with it." The unity of the fourfold cannot

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Ibid., pp.149-150. Let us look a little closer at Heidegger's poetical expression of each element: earth "is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal;" sky "is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year's season's and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and

be separated into discrete elements and atomistically analyzed. Each element maintains its identity only insofar as the other three are held in the dwelling nearing distance of the whole of the fourfold. Human beings are "in the fourfold by dwelling," and the elemental constituent of dwelling is "to spare and preserve." (BDT, 151) Dwelling is thinking the fourfold. It is through thinking that mortals spare and preserve the essences of things, and thereby, "safeguard[ing] each thing in its own nature." (BDT, 149) To think is to dwell as a human. To dwell as a human is to cultivate and spare our open Da. In being our open Da, we preserve things in their essences by recollecting what needs to be of a thing to be a thing, i.e., its proper or appropriate nature.

What is the relation of human being's (thinking) `dwelling-preservation' to the elements of the fourfold unity? First, human beings dwell to "save the earth" or "to set something free into its own essence," which is contrary to the usage of earth for "boundless spoliation." (BDT, 150) To save the earth is not to "wear it out," but to preserve, cultivate, and `spare' it (both positive and negative). Secondly, human beings dwell to "receive sky as sky." (BDT, 150) We should not interfere or attempt to transform the natural cycles - we should accept "their blessing and

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inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether;" the divinities "are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment;" and mortals "are the human beings. They are mortals because they die. To die means to capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities."

their inclemency." (BDT, 150) Third, we dwell to "await the divinities as divinities." (BDT, 150) We hope for their coming and do not make false idols for worship in the meantime as a response to mistaking "the signs of their absence." (BDT, 150) Fourth, human beings dwell through initiating "their own essential nature - their being capable of death as death ... so that there may be a good death." (BDT, 151) This is not to say we should initiate death; rather, in our dwelling-sparing-preserving we prepare the way for the end as Good. Good death means the acceptance, cultivating and sparing of our essence as mortal fragile beings. Death is not the void, but our "own essential nature." Death is the still absence of withdrawal that gives the light of presence, and requires `preserving and sparing' because it is ever present as the condition for life.

How does human being's dwelling preserve the unity of the fourfold?

> Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing
> the essence of the fourfold into things. But
> things themselves secure the fourfold only when
> they themselves as things are let be in their
> essence. How does this happen? In this way,
> that mortals nurse and nurture the things that
> grow, and specially construct things that do not
> grow. Cultivating and construction are building
> in the narrower sense. Dwelling, inasmuch as it
> keeps the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping,
> a building. With this we are on our way to the
> second question. (BDT, 151)

Dwelling that "preserves the fourfold," and thereby, brings "the essence of the fourfold into things" is a building as cultivation of living things and a building as the construction of non-living things. How does the dwelling-building of mortals "bring the

essence of the fourfold into things?"

In order to provide an answer for the above question, Heidegger begins Part II by restating the second of his interrogative questions, namely, "in what way does building belong to dwelling?" (BDT, 151) In order to provide an answer to this question, "we limit ourselves to building in the sense of constructing things and enquire: what is a built thing?" (BDT, 152) Heidegger uses the example of a bridge to "serve as an example for our reflections." (BDT, 152) The bridge "gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals." (BDT, 153) The bridge in its essence gathers the fourfold into a primal unity. The bridge `let be' in its essence maintains the fourfold as a `thing'. How?

The bridge as a thing that gathers the fourfold into a unity is a dwelling-building-construction that stands in the landscape as part of the landscape. The bridge in its essence gathers the fourfold as a unity; it gathers the fourfold as its essence as a thing:

>   Earth - The bridge gathers the earth as landscape
>   around the stream.
>
>   Sky   - The bridge is ready for the sky's weather
>   and its fickle nature. Even where the
>   bridge covers the stream, it holds its
>   flow up to the sky by taking it for a
>   moment under the vaulted gateway and then
>   setting it free once more.
>
>   Mortals - Now in a high arch, now in a low, the
>   bridge vaults over glen and steam - whether
>   mortals keep in mind this vaulting of the
>   bridge's course or forget that they, always
>   themselves on their way to the last bridge,
>   are actually striving to surmount all that

is common and unsound in them in order to
bring themselves before the haleness of the
divinities.

Divinities - The bridge gathers, as a passage that
crosses, before the divinities - whether
we explicitly think of, and visibly give
thanks for, their presence, as in a figure
of the saint of the bridge, or whether that
divine presence is obstructed or even pushed
wholly aside. BDT, 152-153.

When mortals dwell, we bring the fourfold essence into things. When mortals dwell we recollect what is proper of our open. Language is proper of our open. The bridge is a thing (dwelling-building-construction), a `gathering or assembly' of earth and sky, mortals and divinities. Dwelling gathers the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals into a unity that is a thing.

Heidegger rejects the common notion that the bridge can be divided in its essence as a "mere bridge" or an objective materially extended object, and later the bridge can become a symbol constructed by subjective musings. The split of the bridge into "mere bridge" and symbol "does not belong to it." (BDT, 153) Such a split violates the bridge's essence as a thing, namely, the gathering of the fourfold as a primal unity of recollective dwelling. The gathering of the primal unity is the essence of the bridge as a building-dwelling-construction-thing.

The bridge "is a thing of its own kind," because "it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it." (BDT, 154) `Site' appears to be Heidegger's principle of identity and difference. Site is the condition of individuation. Things are different from other things insofar as they are different

expressions of the dynamically generating constitution of site. The fourfold unity, i.e., earth and sky, mortals and divinities, combined with the generative aspects of building-dwelling, namely, location, thing, site and space provide the structure of unity that constitutes the difference and identity of things.

In "Time and Being," Heidegger says that the structure of a dwelling thing is the "origin of space." (TB, 23) The 'origin of space' is found in "Building Dwelling Thinking." The following quotation is Heidegger's account of original spatiality or 'location'.

> Only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for.
> Only things that are locations in this manner allow for spaces. What the word for space, **Raum**, designates is said by its ancient meaning. **Raum, Rum**, means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. **A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely, within a boundary**, Greek **peras**. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding. That is why the concept is that of **horismos**, that is, the horizon, the boundary. **Space is in essence that for which room has been made**, that which is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is always granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that is, by such a thing as a bridge. **Accordingly, spaces receive their essential being from locations and not from**

"space."

> Things which, as locations, allow a site we now in
> anticipation call buildings. They are so called
> because they are made by a process of building-
> construction. Of what sort this making - building
> - must be, however, we find out only after we have
> first given thought to the essence of those things
> which of themselves require building as the process
> by which they are made. These things are locations
> that allow a site in the fourfold, a site that in each
> case provides for a space. The relation between
> location and space lies in the essence of these
> things as locations, but so does the relation of
> the location to the man who lives at that location.
> BDT, 154-155)

The thing is that which gathers the fourfold within its

coinciding location, and constitutes the site of the fourfold's

unfolding into space. The thing-location-site-space dynamic is

further predicated on mortals as building-dwellers. Heidegger

employs two interrogative questions to further examine his notion

of site, namely, "what is the relation between location and space?"

and "what is the relation between man and space?" (BDT, 155)

The relation between location and space is predicated on a

thing. The thing "allows a space into which earth and heaven,

divinities and mortals are admitted." (BDT, 155) The space allowed

by a thing has many positions near or far from it. These postings

may be treated as measurable distances between positions.

Distances (Gr. **stadion**) have already "been made room for" in

the sense that a space constituted by positions of "intervening

intervals" is such that the "nearness and remoteness between men

and things can become mere distance [*Lt.**spatium**], mere intervals

of intervening space." (BDT, 155) Space's transformation into "mere

distance" or **spatium** is the beginning, for Heidegger, of the improper covering of the true essence of space through geometric appropriation. Through this covering of "pure space," human being's essential relation to things and locations is inappropriately constituted.

Space, as **spatium**, represents a thing merely in a contingent position, which "can be occupied at any time by something else or replaced by a mere marker." (BDT, 155) Further, the manifold three dimensions of breadth, height, and depth allows for abstraction of space as **spatium** or intervals. Heidegger examines the further transformation of space from three dimensional spatium to the "analytic-algebraic relations" of space as **extensio**.

The sum conclusion of the geo-mathematical appropriation of space is that the space "contains no spaces or places." (BDT, 155) The progression of the geo-mathematical notion of space as "universally applicable ... numerical magnitudes" of extension can in no way be the "ground of the essence of spaces and locations." (BDT, 156) This type of space-thinking has buried the thing.

Heidegger's project is to uncover the essence of location or "place" that has been veiled by the progression of the analytical/mathematizing of space; more specifically, at this point, the unveiling of the relation between humanity and "place".

I am equating the term "location" with the term "place" at this point in the analysis because of "location's" identity of function with the conception of "place" previously examined in Heidegger's analysis of "Zeitraum" and Greek philosophy.

What is the proper relationship between humanity and "place"?

Heidegger puts forward the following relational axiom between humanity and "place-location": "Man's relation to locations, and through locations to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought essentially." (BDT, 157) "Place", thought essentially, is a priori within our existence. Human beings "persist through spaces" through our dwelling with locations and things. We sustain "place" through "staying constantly with near and remote locations and things." (BDT, 157) We sustain the essences of distant locations and things through dwelling. In short, in language dwelling we are our "place". When we dwell we let distant locations and things be in their essence.

Dwelling is the preservation of the nature of things and locations devoid of exploitive technocratic spatial quantification. We qualify "places" by bringing the fourfold unity into things when we dwell in our open "place" of language. We do not quantify spaces if we are truly dwelling.

This essay does not directly confront the possible conflict between dwelling-building-construction, i.e., Heidegger's bridge, and dwelling-building-cultivation of living things and locations. Heidegger does not examine dwelling-building as the care of living locations. What Heidegger does is say that building-construction need not be destructive to living locations if we would only dwell in the proper "place" of language. If we dwell properly in language, then technocratic spatial destruction of living locations

can be avoided.

But is contemplation enough?

What about action, resistance, protest and politics? What about a renewed contract with nature as a force of nature, as a presence of humanity on the earth equal to that of the sea? On Heidegger's reading, there is a sense that whether we go from destroyer to shepherd of the earth (from quantifying abstractors of "space" to qualifying dwellers of "place"), humanity is still held outside of the earth or nature. In short, spatial exploitation and placial shepherding stem from the same source. That source is the erroneous "placing" of humanity external to the rest of being by the hegemony of history. As long as this thinking is rooted in this same tradition of outsidedness of nature by history, be is technocratic exploiter or the protesting shepherd of Being, the rage will continue.

In our `time', history has entered nature, and our history has entered nature creating the need for a new view of humanity as a geological internal force of nature, not as shepherds outside watching, waiting for Being. Thinking "place" calls for the destruction of history as an irreversible succession of discrete events that has a beginning and an apocalyptic end called the technocratic oblivion of the earth as property resource.

V.

Summary and Transition

Heidegger's problem of explaining the relation between spatiality and time within his fundamental ontology leads him to

examine spatiality apart from time. This apparent failing of time-hegemonic philosophy is significant because it leads Heidegger to critique the modern conception of spatiality as first explained by Galileo and Newton.

Heidegger's indirect path from a failed ontology to a serious reconsideration of spatiality breaks the silence of modernism's stifled debate on the distinction and significance between physical-technical "space" and onto-theo-logical "place". In "Die Kunst und der Raum," Heidegger makes his challenge to modern calculative spatiality explicit in the context of sculpture or "artistic space."

Gianni Vattimo argues that "the 1969 lecture signals the climatic moment of a process of rediscovery of `spatiality' by Heidegger," The End Of Modernity, trans. Jon R. Snyder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 79-80,

PART III: PLACE

I.

Heidegger quotes Aristotle's Physics at the beginning of his essay "Die Kunst und der Raum" (1969):

> It appears, however, to be something overwhelming
> and hard to grasp, the topos - that is, place-space.

Heidegger appears to be picking up where he left off in his 1940 lectures on Aristotle's Physics. This time Heidegger limits his examination of spatiality to sculpture:

> Sculptured structures are bodies. Their matter,
> consisting of different materials, is variously
> formed. The forming of it happens by demarcation
> as setting up an inclosing and excluding border.
> Herewith, space comes into play. Becoming occupied
> by the sculptured structure, space receives its
> special character as closed, breached and empty
> volume. A familiar state of affairs, yet puzzling.
>   The sculptured body embodies something. Does
> it embody space? Is sculpture an occupying of
> space? Does sculpture match therewith the technical
> scientific conquest of space? (AS, 3)

The basic question this essay is addressing is whether we can conceive, in the realm of sculpture at least, of a spatiality different from the modern technical space "which received its first determination from Galileo and Newton"? (AS, 4) Heidegger explicitly questions the validity of the `technical scientific conquest of space':

> Space - is it that homogeneous expanse, not
> distinguished at any of its possible places,
> equivalent toward each direction, but not
> perceptible with the senses?
>   . . .
> Compared with it, are all other articulated
> spaces, artistic space, the space of everyday
> practice and commerce, only subjectively
> conditioned preconfigurations and modifications
> of one objective cosmic space? (AS, 4)

Martin Heidegger, "Art and Space," translation by Charles H. Seibert in Man And World, Volume 6, 1973 (3-8): 3.

Regrading the 'artistic space' of sculpture, and the space that "must show forth from space itself" via the sculpture, Heidegger's answer is that authentic spatiality is not a derivative mode of one prosaic cosmic space. (AS, 4-5) If original spatiality is not to be lodged in calculative housing, where can we discover original spatiality? Heidegger presents art as the locus of "genuine" spatiality:

> Once it is granted that art is the bringing-into-the-work of truth, and truth is the unconcealment of Being, then must not genuine space, namely what uncovers its authentic character, begin to hold sway in the work of graphic art? (AS, 5)

Art is the 'bringing-into-the-work of truth' insofar as it is the occurrence of 'genuine' spatiality. If we take the "emergency path" of listening to language, in the word "space" we hear that

> Clearing-away (Räumen) is uttered therein. This means: to clear out (roden), to free from wilderness. Clearing-away brings forth the free, the openness for man's settling and dwelling. When thought in its own special character, clearing away is the release of places toward which the fate of dwelling man turns in the preserve of the home or in the brokenness of homelessness or in complete indifference to the two. Clearing-away is release of the places at which a god appears, the places from which the gods have disappeared, the places at which the appearance of the godly tarries long. In each case, clearing-away brings forth locality preparing for dwelling. Secular spaces are always the privation of often very remote sacred spaces.

Heidegger's introduction to the distinction between genuine spatiality and physical-technical space has a forceful theological character. Authentic spatiality is "the release of places at which a god appears." (AS, 5) 'Secular' homogeneous spaces "are always the privation of often very remote sacred spaces." (AS, 5) Heidegger invokes piety as the tone of his examination of spatiality. The difference between secular and sacred spatiality

Clearing away is release of places. (AS, 5)

Genuine spatiality is the `sacred' spatiality of human dwelling.

Heidegger asks us to think space theologically, to think space as

if: "Die Götter sind da!" The design of `sacred' spatiality is the

intricate interplay between "Clearing-away" (**Räumen**), "the open"

and the "opening" (**das Offene, die Offenheit**), "place/locality"

(**Ortschaft**) and "region" (**Gegend**).

`Clearing away' is "releasing making-room (**Einräumen**)" which

yields places. (AS,6) `Releasing making-room' is a twofold

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is the difference between the absence and presence of gods. To
enter sacred space is to enter the presence of a god. The secular
`technical scientific conquest of space' is, in some sense, the
destruction of the gods. Modern space is godless.
    In The Sacred and Profane, trans. Willard Trask (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1959), 22-24, Mircea Eliade
expresses the distinction between `sacred' and `secular'(*Eliade
calls it `profane') space in a way very similar to Heidegger:

> For profane experience ... space is homogeneous
> and neutral; no break qualitatively differentiates
> the various parts of its mass. Geometrical space
> can be cut and delimited in any direction; but no
> qualitative differentiation and, hence, no orientation
> is given by virtue of its inherent structure.
>   ...
> Yet this experience of profane space still includes
> values that to some extent recall the nonhomogeneity
> peculiar to the religious experience of space.
> There are, for example, privileged places,
> qualitatively different from all others - a man's
> birthplace, scenes of his first love, or certain
> places in the first foreign city he visited in youth.
> Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all these
> places still retain an exceptional, a unique quality;
> they are the "holy places" of his private universe,
> as if it were in such spots that he had received the
> revelation of a reality other than that in which he
> participates through his ordinary life.

"granting and arranging":

> 1) Making-room admits something. It lets
> openness hold sway which, among other things,
> grants the appearance of things present to
> which human dwelling sees itself consigned.

> 2) Making-room prepares for things the
> possibility to belong to their relevant
> whither and, out of this, to each other. (AS, 6)

Einräumen lets the openness of places. This openness disclosures

the content of our everyday experience of our surroundings. This

openness of places makes the belonging "to their relevant whither"

a possibility. The `relevant whither' where places belong is

called `region' (**Gegend**). Making-room grants the openness that

yields places. Places themselves grant the openness that yields

regions: "Place always opens a region in which it gathers the

things in their belonging together." (AS, 6) Places `gather' the

things that properly belong together into regions. `Gathering'

Versammeln)

> comes to play in the sense of the releasing
> sheltering of things in their region. And the
> region? The older form of the word runs "that-
> which-regions" (**die Gegnet**). It names the free
> expanse. Through it the openness is urged to
> let each thing merge in its resting in itself.
> This means at the same time: preserving, i.e.,
> the gathering of things in their belonging
> together. (AS, 6)

Regions are opened by gathering places. Regions let openness

In his "Conversation On A Country Path," in <u>Discourse On Thinking</u>, translation by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 65ff, Heidegger tells us: "**die Gegnet** ... that-which-regions regions all, gathering everything together and letting everything return to itself, to rest in its own identity. ... It appropriates man's nature for its own regioning."

secure things in identity with themselves as individuals. Regions also preserve the `community' of things in their relation with one another.

The openness of making-room yields places. The openness of places yields regions. The openness of regions preserve things in their identity and community.

What is this mysterious `openness'?

Heidegger never explicitly answers this question in this essay. But Heidegger does give a somewhat indirect definition of `openness' in his "A Dialogue On Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer." The Japanese explains the japanese words `Iki' and `Ku'. `Iki' literally means `breath' and has the same root meaning of the Latin `spiritus' - from `spiro', to breathe. In this dialogue, the Japanese explains `Iki' as "the nonsensuous shine through. ... the gracious ... the breath of the stillness of luminous delight." (OWL, 14, 43&44) `Ku' names "emptiness and the open." (OWL, 15) `Emptiness and the open' mean "the same as nothingness ... that demands uncommon concentration. ... emptiness is the loftiest name for what you mean to say with the word `Being' ... ." (OWL, 18&19)  There is a significant interchangeableness about the terms `emptiness', `openness' and `Being' that will become meaningful as the essay nears its end.

Heidegger subtly reverses his conception of place as a product of the openness of making-room. Making-room takes "its special

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Martin Heidegger, <u>On The Way to Language</u>, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

character from the reign of gathering places." (AS, 6) Heidegger

makes `space' (**Räumen/Einräumen**) a product of place. Place is

genuine spatiality. Heidegger's replacement of **Räumen/Einräumen**

with **Ort/Ortschaft** as the ground of spatiality has five immediate

effects on Heidegger's concept of spatiality:

> 1) search for the special character of
> clearing-away in the grounding of locality;
>
> 2) meditate on locality as the interplay of
> places;
>
> 3) take heed that and how this play receives its
> reference to the belonging together of things
> from the regions free expanse;
>
> 4) recognize that things themselves are places
> and do not merely belong to a place;
>
> 5) Place is not located in a pre-given space,
> after the manner of physical-technical space.
> The latter unfolds itself only through the
> reigning of places of a region. (AS, 6)

`Physical-technical space' cannot reduce place to bare calculative

position of mass in an interstellar homogeneous expanse because it

is place that precedes and conditions the possibility of space

through the relational interplay of places in a region.

Places do not occupy space.

Physical-technical space receives its possibility from the

play of places. The interplay of places are things themselves` and

the community of their shared relations, the region. Places, "in

preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered

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This was previously formulated in his lectures on Aristotle's
Physics in Part Two, III.

around them which grants the tarrying of things under consideration and a dwelling for man in the midst of things." (AS, 7) Humanity participates in the interplay of places by being individual places, and through the complex mesh of relations found in the region of individual human beings, i.e., families, cities, provinces, economic class, nations, states and languages. Humanity is also a part of the general interplay of all other thing-places and regions.

Heidegger does not discuss the significance of viewing humanity as a complex interplay of places. Heidegger returns to his discussion of the plastic arts. Heidegger says, "sculpture would not deal with space. Sculpture would be the embodiment of places." AS, 7' If sculpture is not the occupation of calculative physical space, then `volume' would cease to be the authentic "place seeking and place forming characteristics of sculptured embodiment." (AS,7)

If we can no longer employ volume or any other mathematical description of space, what can we say about place embodying structures? Heidegger says we must see `emptiness' as a preparation of place and not as a failure to fill up a lack or gap. Heidegger turns to language for a hint on the nature of emptiness.

In "Letter On Humanism," from Basic Writings, intro. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 233&235, Heidegger says: "**ethos** means abode, dwelling place," and **ethos** "names the open region in which man dwells. ... [*If] `ethics' ponder the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man ... is in itself original ethics."

The German verb "to empty" is **leeren**. Heidegger hears in the word **leeren** "the original sense of the gathering which reigns in place. ... To empty a glass means: To gather the glass, as that which can contain something, into its having been freed. ... To prepare for them this place." (AS, 7) Emptiness is the place embodying structure of sculpture, "emptiness plays in the manner of a seeking-projecting instituting of places. ... an embodying bringing-into-the-work of places. ... the embodiment of the truth of Being in its work of instituting places." (AS, 7-8) `Being' and `emptiness' name the way of the instituting of places.

Being grants the openness of places. Places' openness yields a region of free gathering. `Free gathering' is the interplay of places' belonging together. Being places places. Being is genuine spatiality.

II.

Heidegger rejects modern physical-mathematical space as unauthentic spatiality. Original spatiality is grounded in Being, Place and Region. This triadic structure constitutes the instituting of places, and through the relation between places, regions. Being is `emptiness' or `openness' that institutes places. Being maintains the relation between places as the free expansive interplay of a region.

Heidegger's formulation of place is significant because it offers a cogent critique of modern calculative spatiality. Heidegger's thinking on place is informed by ancient and medieval philosophy, theology and aesthetics as opposed to contemporary

physics and mathematics. Heidegger radically distinguishes place from modern calculative space. This move is significant because, like his thinking on time, it challenges the omnipresence dogma of science and technology on one of its most fragile concepts, space.

Heidegger's thinking on genuine spatiality is important because it discovers or recovers the distinction between space and place. That is, the hegemony of modern calculative spatiality first instituted by Descartes, Newton, and Galileo attempted to empty itself of the concept of place as found in Greek and Medieval thinking. This was a `revolution' in western culture. What did it mean? Alexandre Koyré summarizes: this `revolution'

> can be described roughly as bringing forth the
> destruction of the Cosmos, that is, the
> disappearance, from philosophically and
> scientifically valid concepts, of the conception
> of the world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically
> ordered whole ... and its replacement by an
> indefinite and even infinite universe which is
> bound together by the identity of its fundamental
> components and laws, and in which all these
> components are placed on the same level of being.
> This, in turn, implies the discarding by scientific
> thought of all considerations based upon value-concepts,
> such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and
> finally the utter devalorization of being, the
> divorce of the world of value from the world of
> facts.

The concept of place was once rich with debate on the value internal to the world. The question `where?' had the qualitative value of proper dwelling on the earth as beings of Being. Place recognizes the valuative nature of being. Modern spatiality emptied out the values of place and replaced them with the facts of

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Koyré, <u>From The Closed World To The Infinite Universe</u>, 2.

space. Space recognizes only calculative external position of things. Things and communities of things are not internally valuable places; they are as Heidegger says `standing reserve' [**Bestand**] for instrumental appropriation of property resources.

Of course, Heidegger's and Koyré's critique of modern calculative spatiality can be argued against. Did not the 17th century scientific revolution attempt to curb the excesses of superstition and religious fanaticism in favour of verifiable `fact' over irrational opinion? Did not this scientific revolution help crack the strangle hold of repressive `hierarchies' such as the Church and aristocracy and pave the way for democracy? Did not modernity turn towards an open universe of novelty, freedom and progress over a finite, static, and repressive world?

These things may be true of modernity, but the violent excesses of modernity have been uncovered in contemporary western culture like the excesses of the medieval world in the 17th century. Martin Heidegger is a thinker who both participated in a violent excess of modernity (National Socialism) and pointed to the heart of one of its dark secrets, the destruction of divine place.

Heidegger takes place from the shadow of modern space and rests it in the light anew.

POSTSCRIPT: PLACE FRAGMENTS

When the seventh day dawned I loosed a dove
and let her go. She flew away, but finding
no resting place she returned. Then I loosed
a swallow, and she flew away but finding no
resting place she returned. I loosed a raven,
she saw that the waters had retreated, she ate,
she flew around, she cawed, and she did not
come back.
- "Utnapishtim's Flood Myth," <u>The Epic of Gilgamish</u>

With the separation of heaven and earth,
all dichotomies were prefigured, light
with its sun and moon and stars filled
the space between heaven and earth.
Space got its name lying as it did between
these two wide bowls of heaven and earth.
As it was lying between them, it was called
antariksa "that lies or shines between."
      - Stella Kramrisch, <u>Space in Indian Cosmogony</u>
            <u>and in Architecture</u>

We may begin with a truism: Space is everywhere.
It is the where and also the situation of things.
Everything is somewhere because it is situated,
because it is in relationship. Being is being-with
(co-esse) but also being-in (in-esse). This amounts
to recognizing that Space is everything, but not `all
of everything'. Space co-exists with everything.
Space surrounded by Space is unconceivable, could we
say paraphrasing Aristotle. But how could it be
otherwise without destroying all intelligibility to
Space?

 For this reason we begin with an open gate.
Properly speaking we cannot enter an open gate. It is
no gate at all. We are already in - and equally out.

 - R. Panikkar, <u>There Is No Outer Without Inner Space</u>

And so far as regards these statements of the
Peripatetics, it seems likely that the First
God is the place of all things. For according
to Aristotle the First God is the limit of
Heaven. ... And if God is identical with Heaven's
limit, since Heaven's limit is the place of all
things within Heaven, God - according to Aristotle
- will be the place of all things; and this, too,
is itself a thing contrary to sense.
            - Sextus Empiricus, <u>Adversus mathematicos</u>

    Peripatetic theory of place rested upon two
essential propositions: According to the first,
the place of a body must contain the body.
    According to the second, the place of a body
must be a motionless thing, for it is the fixed
term to which all local movement is referred.
    - Pierre Duhem, <u>Medieval Cosmology</u>

Insofar as it considers the place of a
body as replaced by another body when the
ambient matter moves locally, this opinion
is true, but insofar as it admits the corruption
of place because of this local movement, it is false
- it proceeds from the false thought that place is a
relation really distinct from the containing body.
                    - William of Ockham

`What is God?'
`He is length, width, and height'
- St. Bernard of Clairvaux

When we shall have enumerated those names
and titles appropriate to it, this infinite,
immobile, extended [entity] will appear to
be not only something real but even something
Divine (which so certainly is found in nature);
this will give us further assurance that it
cannot be nothing since that to which so many
and such magnificent attributes pertain cannot
be nothing. Of this kind are the following,
which metaphysicians attribute particularly to
the First Being, such as: One, Simple, Immobile,
Eternal, Complete, Independent, Existing in itself,
Subsisting by itself, Incorruptible, Necessary,
Immense, Uncreated, Uncircumscribed,
Incomprehensible, Omnipresent, Incorporeal,
All-penetrating, All-embracing, Being by its
essence, Actual Being, Pure Act.

   There are not less than twenty titles by
which the Divine Numen is wont to be designated,
and which perfectly fit this infinite internal
place (locus) the existence of which in nature
we have demonstrated; omitting moreover that
the very Divine Numen is called, by the Cabalists,
MAKOM, that is Place (locus). Indeed it would be
astonishing and a kind of prodigy if the thing
about which so much can be said proved to be a
mere nothing.

   - Henry More, <u>Enchiridium metaphyiscum</u>

The earliest indication of a connection between
space and God lies in the use of the term "place"
(makom) as a name for God in Palestinian Judaism
of the first century.
                    - Max Jammer, <u>Concepts of Space</u>

... for the Hebrews the name of this Infinite
was Makom; as it is that of St Paul's `it is
nearer to us than we are to ourselves.'
                    - Joseph Raphson, <u>De ente infinito</u>

Place is a part of space which a body takes
up and is according to the space, either
absolute or relative.
- Issac Newton, Mathematical Principles
of Natural Philosophy

These Gentlemen maintain therefore, that Space
is a real absolute Being. But this involves
them in great difficulties; for such a Being
must needs be Eternal and Infinite. Hence Some
have believed it to be God himself, or, one of
his Attributes, his Immensity. But since Space
consists of Parts, it is not a thing which can
belong to God.
        Space is Something absolutely Uniform; and,
without the Things placed in it, One Point of Space
does not absolutely differ an any respect whatsoever
from Another Point of Space. Now from hence it
follows, (supposing Space to be Something in it
self, besides the Order of Bodies among themselves),
that it is impossible there should be a Reason, why
God, preserving the same Situations of Bodies among
themselves, should have placed them in Space after
one certain particular manner, and not otherwise;
why every thing was not placed the contrary way,
for instance, by changing East into West.
        - Gottfried Leibniz, The Leibniz-Clark
    Correspondence

Contemporary physics has taught us that the
centre of space is everywhere; and ancient
cosmologies, Eastern and Western, have told us
something similar, though invariably for different
reasons and with a different understanding. Our
first space centre, however, is not everywhere:
after the womb, it is home, the place in which we
happen to be born and begin to grow up and discover
ourselves. In these first two respects we are like
other animals; in the third, probably, not. In the
course of time, our place of birth is replaced by
other spaces we live in. Our subsequent spans of
life consist of a succession of `centres of space'.
It takes a long time before we mature and transcend
the many horizons that help us discover that our
personal, regional, cultural and traditional spaces
are infinitesimally small parts of the wider space in
which everything lives and moves - the space of the
universe.
- Frits Staal, <u>The Centre of Space: Construction and
   Discovery</u>

In the days of the Apocalypse the old dragon
was red. Today he is grey. He was red,
because he represented the old way, the old
form of power, kingship, riches, ostentation,
and lust. By the days of Nero, this old form
of ostentation and sensational lust had truly
enough become evil, the foul dragon. And the
foul dragon, the red one, had to give way to
the white dragon of the Logos - Europe with the
glorification of white: the white dragon. It
ends with the same sanitary worship of white,
but the white dragon is now a great white worm,
dirty and greyish.

<div style="text-align: right">- D. H. Lawrence, <u>Apocalypse</u></div>

The Mediterranean separates two worlds in me,
one where memories and names are preserved
in measured spaces, the other where the wind
and sand erases all trace of men on the open
ranges. ... without help or deliverance, on
a fortunate shore and in the light of the
first mornings of the world, and then alone,
without memories and without faith, he entered
the world of the men of his time and its dreadful
exalted history.
                    - Albert Camus, <u>The First Man</u>

I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence
and universalities, the one who, in the inertias
and constraints of the present, locates and marks
the weak points, the openings, the lines of force,
who incessantly displaces himself, doesn't know
exactly where he is heading nor what he'll think
tomorrow because he is too attentive to the
present ...
- Michel Foucault, Foucault Live

If we think, after all, that the boat is a
floating piece of space, a place without a
place, that exists by itself, that is closed
in on itself and at the same time is given
over to the infinity of the sea and that,
from port to port, from tack to tack, from
brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the
colonies in search of the most precious
treasures they conceal in their gardens, you
will understand why the boat has not only been
for our civilization, from the sixteenth century
until the present, the great instrument of economic
development ... but has been simultaneously the
greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is
the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations
without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the
place of adventure, and the police take the place of
pirates.
- Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces

... the end of all the exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
       - T.S. Eliot, _Four Quartets_

Fisher: Why can't we take to the sea anymore?

Poet: We have killed all the fish as we will
         kill everything else. Instead of preserving
         and shepherding the sea we have mastered and
         violated her. We must return to her what we
         have taken and beg forgiveness.

Thinker: We cannot be master or shepherd anymore. We
         have become a force of nature. We cannot take
         to the sea again until we learn how to be a sea.
         We have to again find our place.

finding new land

I
there the rock stands
and there it erodes
with the bite of brine,
flesh, blood and bone beating,
beating its armour;
not with stone dulled ebb and flow
held in the crash of tides;
but the raw throb of memory quickening,
quickening faint forgotten fires
on long forsaken shores
where music played
for a moment
once.

II
there we red cheeked youngsters
run between shadows
under bent mothers nursing,
nursing fish flakes
in the setting sun;

there head, guts, burgundy blood
propelled from splitting tables
into the brink
sink
in the setting sun;

there names have bodies
and memories
still
sealed on garden, beach, rock
and barren
in the setting sun;

there we widows in windows peer
over the sea and wait,
wait for the secret
found past the horizon
in the setting sun;

there our palms are cut
with compass points:
the left a barb of maple leafs,
the right a fist
clutched hard
in the setting sun.

III
there the sun weeps
blood and shadow
as the dove
darkened
dies

IV
there we ghosts dance
and there the wind sings
beothuk anglia eire
fish seal gull
round round
the fire

chorus bone
chorus ash

down west
down west

still

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