A LICENCE FOR SURVIVAL:
EXPLORING STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND POWER
WITHIN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR’S
SHELLFISH PROCESSING INDUSTRY

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A Licence for Survival: Exploring Structure, Agency, and Power within Newfoundland and Labrador’s Shellfish Processing Industry

Darryl Maddigan ©

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ABSTRACT

Following the 1992 cod moratorium, many fishing dependent communities on Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula were forced to switch prey species in an attempt to achieve some measure of economic and social recovery. Many turned to harvesting shellfish, however, the shellfish industry provided fewer employment opportunities than the ground fishery, and subsequently, there was an increased demand for licences to process the newly targeted species.

This thesis utilizes a case study to examine the process through which crab licences are allocated in Newfoundland and Labrador. More specifically, I conduct a sociological inquiry into how the licencing system operates by exploring the complex interplay between structure, agency, and power within the relationships of the system’s three major players; communities, processing firms, and the provincial government.

Utilizing an approach to structure, agency, and power similar to that of Anthony Giddens, Peter Berger, and Michel Foucault, as well as studies into small scale fishery survival, I propose a power hierarchy among the major social actors with communities at the bottom and the provincial government at the top. Position in the hierarchy is determined by the constraining and enabling effects of the social structure as well as each group’s ability to access the social and cultural resources inherent to membership in their particular group. Additionally, I assert that the inability of communities to improve upon their position in the hierarchy is due in part to the persistence of clientelistic tendencies within the fishing industry.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Many fishing dependent communities in Newfoundland and Labrador experienced the realities of resource collapse in 1992 when the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) announced a moratorium on harvesting northern cod (Gadus morhua), specifically in the stock area 2J3KL (Figure 1.1) of Canada’s 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It was initially believed that a two year moratorium would allow for the significantly diminished stocks to recover to a degree that would permit the resumption of the inshore fishery by the spring of 1994. However, stocks did not recover to the extent anticipated by government and resumption of the cod fishery to any significant extent has not yet occurred to this day.

Further complicating the crisis was a historical lack of diversification with respect to species harvested. For centuries, the first and only choice of Newfoundland fish harvesters had been northern cod. Without a tradition of species diversification, many communities in the province suffered economic devastation through the loss of their primary and often only means of subsistence. Thirteen years later, a detailed community review conducted by an interdisciplinary team of social, economic, and health researchers revealed that few, if any, of these communities had fully recovered (Murray et al. 2005). Communities successful in achieving significant economic and social recovery did so often through refocusing fish harvesting and processing towards new, profitable species such as snow crab and shrimp. This practice of prey switching is a common response when a previously abundant prey species can no longer be harvested in quantities.
sufficient for economic viability. In instances when there is little or no economic diversification and, therefore, no secondary sources of income to augment the loss, as was often the case among Newfoundland fishing communities, prey switching held one of the few possibilities of survival.

An example of prey switching is evident from 1991 to 2001. While annual cod landings in Newfoundland and Labrador had decreased from 180,000 tonnes to 20,000 tonnes, crab and shrimp landings increased from 40,000 tonnes to 130,000 tonnes (Figure 1.2). As a result, the annual value of landed crab grew from 13 million dollars to 230 million dollars in the 10 years following the moratorium, while the total value of shrimp landed grew from 51 million to 172 million dollars during the same period (Murray et al. 2005).

Figure 1.1: Map Depicting Newfoundland’s Economic Fishing Zones
(Source: NL Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture)
This significant increase in total landings and value did not result in increased employment opportunities however. The shell fish industry is less labour intensive than its ground fish counterpart, especially with respect to processing, and thus the number of individuals employed in the fishery declined by approximately thirty percent in the decade following the collapse. While the harvesting of shrimp and crab was financially alluring, the actual number of employment opportunities available within the industry was significantly less than when cod and other ground fish were the primary focus for harvesters (Murray et al. 2005).

To capitalize on these new economic benefits associated with processing crab and shrimp, successful application had to be made to the provincial government for new licences through which older fish plants could be modified to accommodate the newly targeted species or entirely new processing plants could be constructed. Yet, despite an increased demand for licences, only a select few processors were successful in the
application process in the years following the moratorium as the provincial government strove to control capacity and avoid a reoccurrence of the cod stock collapse (Murray et al. 2005). Accordingly, three crab licences were granted in 1993, neither on the Avalon Peninsula, the area of the province with the highest concentration of licences and this research’s chosen area of study. Six processing licences were allocated on the Avalon in 1997, and two more in 2001. This study deals exclusively with crab licences since there are no processors on the Avalon currently processing shrimp.

This sociological research explores how the structure of the processing licence allocation system in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador influences individual and collective agency and thus the ability of social actors to exercise power within that system. The work positions the process through which licencing decisions are made in relation to the complex social relationships existing between individual community members and groups, processing firms, and the provincial government. Specific attention is given to the influence of an asymmetrical distribution of power governing those relationships. Through exploration of the specific experiences of those directly involved in the fishery and those with intimate knowledge of the fishery’s operation, I examine the intricate dynamic existing among the three main players in the licence allocation process identified above. More specifically, I conduct a sociological inquiry into the operation of structure, agency, and power within that process, including identifying particular social strategies and resources available to the actors and the means by which those individuals and groups exert agency and exercise power within the licencing system. Through such
an analysis, it is hoped that a clarification and a further understanding of the operation of structure, agency, and power within that system will result.

Given the importance of processing licences to community recovery, ultimately, the research aims to identify attributes of the licencing system structure that could serve to hinder a community's ability to act, exercise power, and recover from resource collapse. Identifying potential obstacles would aid in developing strategies to minimize the constraining effects of the licencing structure and in turn further attempts at community recovery. As a result, the study examines in detail the experiences of a fishing dependent community on Newfoundland's southeast Avalon Peninsula as it attempted to secure a crab processing licence as part of its community recovery strategy in the years following the moratorium. Although the community (known in this thesis as Roland's Cove) has been unsuccessful to date in its endeavor to obtain a licence, this sociological inquiry deals less with the outcome of the application process, that is whether a licence was awarded or denied, and more with how the structure of the licencing system generally influences how decisions are made. Through a reflexive and recursive process I identify themes within the collected data, and in conjunction with sociological literature, propose a theory concerning the ability of each of the three main groups of social actors (communities, processing firms, and government) to exert agency and exercise power within the licencing system. I place special emphasis on the theme of political favouritism, which I in turn relate to the particular sociological concept of clientelism or patronage. I argue that clientelism's continued persistence within the fishery, as well as
stock collapse and plant closures, have significantly hampered the ability of communities to act and exercise power in their efforts at recovery and survival.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the theoretical literature referenced in this study. The theories of Peter Berger (1963), Anthony Giddens (1984), and Pierre Bourdieu (1983) provide a thorough sociological understanding of the duality of structure, including how social action and inaction continually change the structure and thus reproduce social systems. The concepts of power put forth by Michel Foucault in conjunction with the above theorists situate power at the core of all sociological relationships and place emphasis on the means through which power is exercised. The use of discourse by the state and its actors to exercise power is of particular importance to Foucault (Rabinow 1984). These theories proved invaluable to my arguments concerning which actors are the most likely to exercise power within the licencing system. Bent Flyvbjerg's (2001) notion of "phronetic social science" provides an approach to research excellently suited to the theoretical foundations provided above. He too places power at the core of all sociological analysis and is most concerned with the how of social processes as opposed to the why. Flyvbjerg's study of the use of discourse to exercise governmental power in Denmark was a valuable resource for this research. Studies into clientelism conducted by Mark Fletcher (1994), Luis Roniger (1994a), Jeffery MacLeod (2006), and especially S.J.R Noel (1971), provide support for my suggestions regarding the highly politicized social environment in which licencing decisions are made and the nature of relationships within that environment. Finally, Richard Apostle and his collaborators (1992; 1998) along with Marilyn Taylor (1985) and Sharon Taylor (2001)
supply studies of small scale traditional fisheries attempting to overcome resource collapse and/or plant reduction. Of particular importance to these researchers, and to this study as well, is the corrosive effect industry crises have on the social and cultural bonds of community networks and their members.

Chapter 3 details the research methodology utilized in this study. It defines the research area under analysis, a region referred to in this thesis as the Long Shore of Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula, and lists the contributing factors that led to the region’s selection, namely the historical fishing tradition and the high concentration of crab processing licences. The section also describes how Roland’s Cove was chosen as the specific community under analysis, how potential research participants were identified, and how interviews were structured. There is also a discussion of the scope of the study which details how the direction and design of the research shifted during the initial stages of data collection as a result of characteristics inherent to qualitative research.

Chapter 4 provides the historical context for the study and includes a description of the history of the fishery on the Long Shore, specifically in Roland’s Cove. The community began as a migratory fishing destination and eventually evolved into a permanent settlement with a traditional family based inshore fishery governed by a credit system. The community experienced significant change resulting from the switch to an industrialized consumer based fishery during the mid-twentieth century, and over time, was forced to deal with the realization of a future in which the fishery alone was no longer able to provide the necessities for daily survival. There is particular emphasis
placed on the Roland’s Cove processing plant as its importance to this study cannot be overstated. In addition to being the economic backbone of the community and region for several decades, the plant’s operational status also figures prominently in determining the social and political climate of the region. Further, there have been past sociological studies into the impacts of the cod moratorium and the associated plant reductions and closures on the Long Shore, namely those of Marilyn Taylor (1985) and Sharon Taylor (2001), and the findings of those studies provide context and support for my assertions concerning the current social, economic, and political conditions of the region.

In Chapter 5, I utilize the data collected as part of the interviews in conjunction with the social theories and concepts discussed above to explore the nature of the complex social interactions existing between the major players in the licencing process to determine the ability of each player to act within the structural constraints of that particular social environment. I suggest that there are three main social actors within the licencing system; communities, processing firms, and the provincial government, and that there exists a hierarchy with respect to the ability of each to exert agency and exercise power within that system with the government being most able and the community members and collectives least able. Each actor’s position is a result of their ability or inability to draw upon the resources associated with membership in their particular social group to act with or against the existing social structure. I also assert that in many communities, including Roland’s Cove, there has been a disassociation from traditional community social networks, making it particularly difficult for residents to draw upon their group’s resources to act and exercise power. I feel that there has been further
community constraint resulting from clientelistic tendencies which have permeated the fishing industry in this province since the earliest days of self government and have yet to be completely removed. I provide a description of the social conditions under which such tendencies flourish and liken that to the social environment under which the current licencing system operates. Finally, I examine some recent important licencing decisions and changes within the system and explain those actions and their consequences using the same theories utilized above and in relation to the arguments put forth in this research.

The final chapter provides a combination of summary and conclusion, restating the goals of the research, outlining the theories and methods utilized, and presenting deductions and assertions concerning the power hierarchy existing between the three major actors, the structural components which limit and enable their agency, and the composition of the social environment in which the power dynamic operates. The chapter also details why I chose to study the licencing process in the manner that I did; that is using structure, agency, and power to explore how licences are allocated. I felt that as all three concepts are at the core of all social relationships as well as most studies into those relationships, utilizing them would allow me to readily examine the licencing process and understand it from the perspective of the three main actors. At the same time, the theories surrounding structure, agency and power proposed by Giddens, Foucault and others approach the concepts in a way that allowed me to be thorough enough in my approach to properly explain the licencing dynamic while recognizing the complexity of the relationships involved. Also included in Chapter 6 are the conditions under which my findings could possibly be generalized to other Newfoundland fishing communities.
and/or other fishing communities in Atlantic Canada, as well as suggestions on how to build upon the results of this study and conduct further research into how processing licences are allocated. Finally, I propose some measures to aid community efforts to exert agency, exercise power and gain some measure of control in their plight to overcome resource collapse and other industry challenges.
CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature

Although there has been past social research into limited entry licensing in Atlantic Canadian fisheries, there has been little exploration into the process by which those licences are granted. Social researchers such as Peter Sinclair (1983) and Anthony Davis (1988) have conducted studies into how restricted access to fish resources through licencing has affected fish harvesters and/or the socio-economic status of a particular community or region. Yet, despite the economic significance of possessing licences, my literature review failed to reveal any sources detailing the process of how such licences are acquired. While the socio-economic status of communities is a concern in that licences are being relied upon to improve that status, I prefer to examine the structure of the licencing system, the ability or inability of those within it to act, the relations of power existing among the actors, and the social environment in which this all occurs. Consequently, I utilize sociological works, theories, and concepts that help to explicate the licence acquisition process.

At the heart of sociological understanding lies the complex interplay between social structure and agency. For the purposes of this study, structure includes the organizations, institutions, relationships, rules, and resources existing in a social system that both constrain and enable independent action within that system. Agency refers not to an individual’s or collective’s intention to act within the structure’s boundaries, as it has often been defined, but by their capability to do so. It is simply doing. Despite this relatively straightforward approach to structure and agency, the relationship between the
two is seen as anything but simple in sociological circles where it is a highly debated issue. How are these social structures created? How do they determine what actions individuals take, and what are the limits on one’s ability to act inside and outside of the structure? Some argue that individuals independently create their world and that the role of social structure is highly exaggerated. Others view social structure as the sole determining factor in an individual’s characteristics and actions. For the purposes of developing a sociological understanding of the process through which applicants procure a shellfish processing licence, it is appropriate to employ a view shared by theorists such as Peter Berger (1963) and Anthony Giddens (1984), who build upon the works of classical social theorists such as Karl Marx and Max Weber in an attempt to reach a compromise between the two extreme positions previously mentioned. Both Berger and Giddens advocate that while individuals do create their world through the meanings that they give to it, these meanings over time become institutionalized and turned into social structures which in turn come to both limit and enable the actions of social participants (Abercrombie et al. 2000).

In An Invitation to Sociology, Peter Berger compares the relationship between individual action and social structure to a prison environment where man is dominated and controlled by society. He argues that to fully understand the relationship between individuals and society we must first comprehend the meaning of what it is to be “located in society.” The assigning of one’s particular location begins in childhood as we learn who we are and how we should act in relation to others, most notably through interactions with parents, family, and authority figures. One’s social location provides the
individual with the rules and procedures that have to be obeyed in order to remain in that location. These rules are enforced through “mechanisms of social control,” such as violence, economic pressure, customs, and governmental controls, such as laws and licensing. When these mechanisms are ordered and structured they become institutions; a sort of regulatory agency guiding human action. “Institutions provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned, compelled to go, in grooves deemed desirable by society. And this trick is performed by making these grooves appear to the individual as the only possible ones” (Berger 1963: 87). In addition, one’s class within a stratified society provides a sense of what we can expect from our location. Certain classes are able to produce and maintain a desired social situation through the use of the power inherent to their class and the institutions they influence and control.

Despite this bleak outlook on the individual/structure relationship, Berger also contends that in this prison society that we find ourselves in, individuals also have the option of changing their situation through action. In order for social control mechanisms to be successful, our compliance is needed. Therefore, social structures are not static but are constantly being changed and redefined by individuals who choose not to comply with the constraining effects of the pre-existing structure. While society defines us, it is also defined by us. Berger asserts that this re-definition is accomplished through transformation, which includes refusing to recognize existing definitions of society and self and acting contrary to how society expects someone in our particular location to act; detachment, which is a withdrawal from society to pursue art, religion or other causes;
and manipulation or using social structures for reasons and in ways outside the norm (Berger 1963).

Like Berger, Anthony Giddens theory of structuration, also emphasizes the integration of agency and structure. Traditionally, social thinkers did not consolidate agency (micro) and social structure (macro), instead preferring to treat the concepts as separate from one another. Giddens however, argues that one cannot study society simply by viewing it as an accumulation of the micro, nor can one study it solely with a holistic macro approach. A relationship exists between agency and structure which prohibits the study of one without the other. Giddens (1984) refers to the nature of this relationship as the “duality of structure,” and it is crucial to his theory of structuration. “The rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction” (Giddens 1984: 19). The rules and resources Giddens refers to is the structure. Through defined rules, the structure constrains, but through the provision of resources it also enables. As individuals exert agency and draw upon these rules and resources as they go about their social lives, they are at the same time changing them and reproducing the social system. The change occurs as individuals draw on the rules and resources of the social structure, but it also occurs as they ignore them, replace them, or use them differently (Gauntlett 2002). The constant changing of the structure and the reproduction of the social system thus occur practically through the continuous actions of the individuals and groups within it as they do what needs to be done for the continuation of social life (Tucker Jr. 1998). Unlike the traditional functionalist view, which associates structure with a rigid outer protective layer of
society, Giddens' structuration disputes this notion of structure's solidity, at least in the absence of action. Structure cannot be seen as such since to Giddens it does not exist in time and space as a solid entity, but becomes solid only through the performing of social acts. This co-dependant dynamic makes the study of one impossible without the other (Giddens 1984).

However, this approach to the structure/agency relationship cannot alone fully serve to describe the extent of that relationship, nor can it on its own provide a thorough sociological understanding of the practice of processing licence allocation in Newfoundland and Labrador. For this, one must include an explanation of the power dynamics existing among the participants in the particular social process. For Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu, and others heavily influenced by the works of Michel Foucault, power is central to all sociological processes and must be included in any inquiry into those processes, especially one with specific concentration on social action. Any act of agency invariably involves the exercise of power since an agent by definition is "one who exerts power or produces an effect" (Giddens 1984: 9). Like Foucault, Giddens also places significant emphasis on the use of language or discourse in the exercise of power. Given the highly politicized nature of the licencing process, the inclusion of power is crucial, since the relationship between members of government and those they govern is one quintessentially bound by asymmetrical power dynamics.

Giddens contends that the rules people follow as part of the social structure are conditioned as part of our being located in society. But these rules are not the sole determinants of social interaction; differences in power and resources also shape
outcomes. Giddens notion of power takes on a dual form similar to that of the duality of structure. It provides the ability to act or to exercise agency as part of one’s regular social life, but it also allows for one to act even in the face of opposition. Power is both productive and thus related to freedom and independence, and repressive, as related to constraint. He calls this dual quality of power the “dialectic of control” (Tucker Jr. 1998). In the end, “the resources available to different people will determine the extent to which they can exercise freedom or become subject to coercion” (Tucker Jr. 1998: 114). These resources are not just material in nature, however, but come in the form of cultural capital, which could include favourable personality traits, verbal skills, or support from a group to which one belongs.

The social power of an actor, and, in turn, that actor’s ability to obtain a desired outcome within the relations of power are both dependant upon the resources and strategies available to that actor. According to Pierre Bourdieu, social capital is such a resource. Like Giddens, Bourdieu advocates the elimination of the structure/agency dualism in favour of a more unified approach and places power at the centre of all sociological inquiry (Tucker Jr. 1998). Bourdieu argues that social capital or cultural capital cannot be drawn merely from the existing social structure, but is in fact a resource that is inherently linked to membership in a network or group where there are normalized or systematic relationships of acquaintance and recognition (1983). This cultural capital is unequally distributed among society’s classes, as is the cultural power that results from its possession, resulting in a continuous reproduction of the class structure (Tucker Jr. 1998). While power is a dimension of the relationships between individual actors or
nodes, we can also explore the power and agency of the collective, as an imbalance may exist between groups with respect to the resources available to them. We can observe the power and agency of the social network through the means by which the resources are deployed (Sinclair and Ommer 2006).

As previously stated, Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s notion of power relies heavily on the theories of Michel Foucault. All agree that power is to some degree present in all societal relations, and in order for participants to act within those relations, this power must be exercised. This productive or enabling nature of power is central to Foucault’s theories. Power “produces its own objects and then disciplines and controls them” (Tucker Jr. 1998: 105). Modern state surveillance is also a prominent component of many of Foucault’s arguments. Beginning in sixteenth century France, the implementation of state strategies aimed at collecting demographic data on its population allowed for the increasing manipulation and control of that population through changing definitions of deviance and through other forms of discourse. Prisons and asylums came to epitomize the control mechanisms of the modern surveillance state. Therefore, Foucault asserts that analyses of power should go beyond class to the acts of discipline and surveillance performed by the state and its actors (Rabinow 1984).

While he stressed the productive nature of power, Foucault cautioned that there always exists a possibility of resistance, as resistance is inherent to power. This is because in the relations of power, power is not an entity to be possessed and controlled, but is something that can be exercised and applied by any participant. Foucault’s notion of the microphysics of power demonstrates that power can also operate on many levels;
from the state to the individual, and is more often than not exercised in subtle covert means as opposed to blatant demonstrations. Yet, while anyone can exercise and apply power, the ability to do so is not distributed equally among those in the relations of power (Rabinow 1984). For example, in a slave/master relationship, the slave can exercise power through song or language, but the master’s ability to exercise power far outweighs that of the slave. The main avenue for exercising power, according to Foucault, is through discourse or expert knowledge. He advocates that as particular belief systems or discourses, such as those held by priests, doctors, or governments, come to be rationalized and accepted as common knowledge, those discourses come to determine what is acceptable and what is deviant. They become undeniable truths and the actions associated with them become normalized (Rabinow 1984). In other words, they become part of the social structure as institutions. Thus, those able to get their discourses accepted as common knowledge in turn gain power.

Bent Flyvbjerg details such a situation in which rationality was dominated by power exercised through the normalization of expert knowledge in his work *Making Social Science Matter*. He documented how the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Aalborg, Denmark, through its illegitimate rationalization of a single survey, was able to use discourse to exercise power and become masters of a city planning project. Rational democracy gave way to the rationality of the strongest group as they exercised power in a Foucauldian sense through the manipulation of expert knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2001).

Flyvbjerg substantially guides the style and scope of my research, since his phronetic approach to social science advocates the use of many of the theoretical
principles put forth by social thinkers such as Giddens and Foucault. For instance, Flyvbjerg’s phronetic research attempts to study both actors and structure, not in external relation to one another, but as part of one another. Additionally, any social phenomenon is researched and interpreted as a process, placing the emphasis on how and not the more traditional why. Most importantly perhaps is Flyvbjerg’s assertion that power be placed at the core of any phronetic analysis. His conception of power is characterized by a number of features reflecting a Foucauldian influence. Power is seen as both productive and restrictive. Power is not something that is localized and possessed, but is omnipresent in all societal relations and is exercised. Who has the power or why they have it ceases to be the central question. Instead, the focus of research is on the process of how the power is exercised. Finally, Flyvbjerg stresses that knowledge and power and rationality and power are inseparable as one produces the other (Flyvbjerg 2001). However, “while power produces rationality and rationality produces power, the relationship is asymmetrical. Power has a clear tendency to dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between the two” (Flyvbjerg 2001: 154). His use of a case study, another core element of phronetic research, as it applies to Aalborg, Denmark, demonstrates exactly how that domination can occur.

As Bent Flyvbjerg demonstrated the often asymmetrical nature of power relationships in his study of Aalborg Denmark’s municipal government, social researchers such as Mark Fletcher (1994), Jeffrey MacLeod (2006), and S.J.R Noel (1971) explore similar power dynamics in the form of social relationships based on patronage or clientelism. While the research of Robert Paine (1971) often figures
prominently in discussions of patronage in Canada, I chose to utilize the works of the above mentioned theorists, as their research in the Maritimes and Newfoundland and Labrador are particularly relevant to my specific arguments. Prior to such discussions, however, it is necessary to provide an explanation of patronage and clientelistic relationships as they apply to this study. I rely on definitions supported by Mark Fletcher (1994) in his look at the historical evolution of provincial politics in Nova Scotia and Ontario. Fletcher advocates a definition of patronage popularly used in Canada. He defines it as simply “getting something from a friend in government” (1994: 146). The patron could be an elected official, a member of a political party, or simply someone with influence among those with political and/or economic power. What the client receives from the patron and what the patron gets back in return can vary. The government friend could cut through bureaucratic red tape for the client, provide them with a contract or insider knowledge, or expunge a traffic ticket. The patron does not necessarily expect immediate compensation, but anticipates that at some point in the future, the client may make a campaign donation, provide them with pertinent information, or provide support, political or otherwise, in some other form. Traditionally, clientelism is known to differ from patronage in that the former encompasses all levels of the relationship; economic, political, and personal, such as with feudalism. Conversely, patronage is seen as limited and dependent on context, existing on a personal or professional level, but not both. This study uses the terms patronage and clientelism synonymously, however, as do most researchers in Canada (Fletcher 1994). Similarly, while S.J.R Noel has developed a three stage model of clientelism which figures prominently in his works, this research limits its
scope to stage one, the simple patron/client dyad. Nonetheless, clientelistic relationships display unequal power distributions in a manner very similar to that employed by Bent Flyvbjerg. Relationships based on patronage “are built around asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open ended transactions and predicated on the differential control by social actors over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies” (Roniger 1994a: 3).

Regardless of the social position of the actors, both patron and client aim to improve their particular location. Although everyday power relations do not usually result in both participants improving their position, the asymmetrical nature of the interface, the notion of differential control among participants, and its position within a stratified society are commonplace in most studies of power.

Mark Fletcher (1994) and Louis Roniger (1994a) put forward another attribute of patronage in Canadian provincial politics that is crucial in understanding the development of this study’s argument, a feature exceptionally illuminated by Fletcher, Jeffery MacLeod (2006), and S.J.R. Noel (1971) in their studies of politics in the Maritimes and Newfoundland and Labrador. Fletcher and Roniger in their individual works, argue that invariably, clientelistic relationships develop and evolve in a manner which makes them especially resistant to change. They do not disappear or move to the periphery with successive political regime changes, even if such changes are to a completely new political party or ideology. They simply take on a new form; no less important than their previous structure, but one that reflects the social and political context in which they exist. Despite this, however, the relationships are not impervious to outside scrutiny, especially from social actors who support more formal, universal principles of politics.
and social organization, or by those excluded from the clientelistic network (Fletcher 1994; Roniger 1994a).

In separate studies, Fletcher and Jeffery MacLeod traced the relationships of patronage as they existed throughout the evolution of politics in Nova Scotia, isolating a crucial component of patronage as it applies to this province as well. Together, they cover provincial politics in Nova Scotia from eighteenth century British colonial rule to Dr. John Savage's failed attempts at eliminating clientelism as leader of the provincial Liberal party in the 1990's. In both instances, the authors describe an environment of patronage deeply rooted in the cultural history of the province (Fletcher 1994; MacLeod 2006). S.J.R Noel (1971) outlines a similar process in Newfoundland.

Beginning with colonial rule in the eighteenth century, an extremely centralized system of political administration evolved in this province, one in which power was highly concentrated and political affiliations were tied to traditional ethnic, religious, and class divisions. In such an environment, Noel argues, politics and patronage were synonymous. Newfoundland was granted representative status as a colony of Britain in the constitution of 1832, lagging behind other colonies such as Nova Scotia which was granted such status in 1758. The new government was comprised of a crown-appointed governor, Legislative Council, and a fifteen member Assembly consisting of members from nine electoral districts. It was overwhelmingly centralized in its administration, as issues including a lack of hard currency due to a credit system hindered all attempts at local government outside of St. John's, which became the sole source of political, economic, and legal authority. Additionally, power was highly concentrated at the top
with the cabinet and House of Assembly, and with the prime minister who commanded
the entire state from St. John’s to the furthest outport. To maintain or enhance this
position of power, Noel (1971) asserts, the Governor in Council would form networks of
patronage with party supporters in the Assembly. The absence of local governments
resulted in the centralized government, namely the governor, being the sole provider of
funds to the districts. Those district representatives that showed loyalty to the government
in power would receive a political, personal, or commercial favour, perhaps in the form
of a district grant. Those that did not received only the barest of government support. At
the same time, the district member was also in a position of power. In addition to
providing legal advice to constituents, the member would also be the sole avenue through
which grants, contracts, and appointments could flow from the government in St. John’s
to the outports. Therefore, clientelistic networks also existed at this more local level
between representatives and their district members (Noel 1971).

Also emerging and evolving in nineteenth century St. John’s was a dominant
social class referred to as the “fishocracy.” It was an oligarchy led by merchants and
included the politicians and Protestant church officials the merchants supported (Noel
1971). At the other end of economic gulf was a class made up of poor fishermen
(predominately of Irish Catholic descent on the Long Shore) who held little or no power
due to the constraints of the truck or credit system. In such a system, fishermen were
outfitted with food and fishing supplies by merchants prior to the fishing season and
attempted to repay the merchants at the end of the season through their catches. Most
often, however, the fishermen’s catch did not cover the entire debt owed to merchants
and fishermen became involved in a crippling cycle of borrowing and debt (Higgins 2007a). The result was a social system in which patronage flourished within the confines of a political system based on traditional ethnic, religious, and class divisions with power heavily concentrated at the top. This trend continued with the formation of political parties, with the English Protestants dedicated to maintaining the existing system supporting the Conservatives and those dedicated to reform and responsible government favouring the Liberals. Noel asserts that this political system and its basic power structure continued into the twentieth century with certain aspects still existing into the 1960’s when outside ideas, including a greater understanding of Canadian politics and increased education levels, slowly began to erode facets of the historical political culture (1971).

Although patronage undoubtedly contributed significantly to the structure of the fishing industry throughout the province’s history, and may continue to do so today, there are other factors inherent to small traditional coastal fisheries that determine a community’s ability to act and exercise power, particularly during periods of industry crisis. For specific information on the social and cultural composition of such fisheries and the environment in which they exist, I benefit from the research of Richard Apostle and his colleagues (1992; 1998), as well as Marilyn Taylor’s (1985) study of fish plant reductions on Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula and Sharon Taylor’s (2001) research into meanings of community on the Long Shore following the cod moratorium. In the work, Emptying Their Nets, Apostle and his collaborators investigated the factors that have allowed independent coastal zone fisheries to survive and flourish as well as resist capitalist trends towards larger scale and concentration. In addition to resource and
market based factors, the authors highlight family/community structure and inter-firm networking as crucial to the survival of small scale fisheries. Families and communities with a historical reliance on small-scale fisheries rely on co-operative relationships among members for social and cultural resources which allow them to curb changes in the industry that threaten their survival. Individuals share a collective mentality based in fishing tradition and the continued survival of their way of life, and draw upon resources stemming from their membership in familial and community networks in times of hardship. Similarly, inter-firm networking, a concept based upon Giddens’ theory of structuration, describes strategic alliances or partnerships among groups with similar interests for the benefit of all involved. For example, the authors emphasize that traditional networks existing between fishers, plant workers, and plant owners/processors are instrumental to a plant’s continued survival and to the success of any small-scale fishery. According to the authors, the majority of these relationships are grounded in informal ties based on strong community relations and a cohesive social fabric, and not on formal obligations such as monetary investments. As a result, under particular conditions, such as diminishing stocks, resource collapse, or inadequate governmental support, family, community, and inter-firm networks stemming from informal traditional ties can be mobilized for resistance purposes (Apostle et al. 1992). However, more recent work by Apostle and Barrett indicates that drawing upon the resources from these networks has become increasingly difficult.

In *Community, State, and Market on the North Atlantic Rim*, Richard Apostle and his colleagues again delve into the inner workings of the small scale fishing community;
this time exploring the often conflicting interests between community and the economic sector. Here the authors speak of embeddedness, a term analogous to Berger’s notion of being located in society, and similarly, is also an avenue for the accumulation of Bourdieu’s notion of social capital as well. Embeddedness describes an individual’s integration into a social group, such as a family or community, and also refers to the rules and procedures of the group that shape each individual and their social life. Again, it is argued that fish processors have traditionally been strongly embedded into rural fishing communities, with strong familial and friendship bonds existing between fishers, managers, and plant workers. “In embedded communities, small firms have typically drawn heavily upon social capital in the form of social solidarity and interpersonal trust that stems from the social relations within which these firms and their managers are involved” (Apostle et al. 1998: 233). The differences between smaller firms and the larger multi-plant processing groups with respect to their level of embeddedness and their role in the licencing process will be discussed in the data analysis portion of this report. Nonetheless, the authors assert that modern capitalism has severed the ties between the social and the economic and that the resulting disembeddedness has weakened the social and cultural bonds of the community. This, in turn, has threatened the survival of traditional social networks relying on those bonds. What is needed it is argued, is a re-embedding into these networks so communities can individually and collectively draw upon social capital to reassert control over their local resources and the resulting employment opportunities (Apostle et al. 1998). While case studies such as the Fogo Island Cooperative are utilized by Apostle and his colleagues to demonstrate such action,
it is rational to argue that this type of action could also be manifested in other forms, for example attempting to draw upon the resources from these traditional kinship networks to influence licencing decisions or changes to rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the authors demonstrated that rural fishing communities are by no means passive recipients of the hardships associated with exploiting such an unpredictable resource. In fact, through individual and collective decisions rooted in social relations and cultural norms, these communities have continually demonstrated a great propensity for organization and action in the face of adversity. Although Apostle (1992; 1998) focused on the economic survival of small scale fishing communities in the wake of increasing capitalist trends in the fishing industry, the relationship between economic survival and community survival in small coastal fisheries necessitates that a study into one must also include the other. Similarly, Michel Foucault asserts that power relations are not external from economic processes but are, in fact, characteristic of such processes (Rabinow 1984). Therefore, Apostle offers valuable insights into how communities may be restrained by existing power relations, but also how they may exercise power in a productive sense and mobilize resources in order to act or exert agency.

In 1985, Marilyn Taylor from the Centre for Human Relations and Community Studies at Concordia University in Montreal conducted a study exploring resources and strategies available to two Newfoundland fishing communities, Roland’s Cove being one, in response to fish plant reductions. Utilizing an existing conceptual framework distinguishing three major aspects of community competency; social vitality, economic viability, and political efficacy, she identified thirty-eight characteristics of community
strength and vulnerability which she applied to her study of Roland’s Cove. These characteristics included health and education resources, community support, employment sources, sources of leadership and community confidence and commitment. She began by rating on a scale from one to five the strength of each characteristic prior to the plant reduction and then if the reduction increased, decreased, or had no effect on each characteristic’s strength. In the end, neither of the characteristics as they applied to Roland’s Cove increased with the reductions at the processing plant. The area where the most significant decreases occurred was within the social vitality facet of community competence. Here, six out of the fourteen characteristics showed decreases in strength as a result of the plant reductions. They included social structures promoting interaction among community members, housing and utilities, recreational resources, community sources of esteem, social participation, and mental health. Additionally, Taylor (1985) notes that changes in the characteristics of one competency aspect often influenced the others. She warned that a sense of helplessness on the part of those in the community could likely occur and lead to undesired social and personal results, and she made a series of recommendations emphasizing how community/government relations are crucial to any attempt at avoiding such an outcome. These suggestions included, “maximum community involvement in decision making and problem solving... maintenance of high contact and two way communication between governments and communities... clear information as soon as possible about the future of the fishery and fish plants... and allowance for time and expertise to communities for becoming informed and organized” (Taylor 1985: xi). Her study also lends merit to the notion of disembeddedness as
proposed by Apostle and Barrett, because erosion of facets of community esteem and
social participation would most likely drastically impede the ability to draw upon the
resources from traditional community networks. Taylor’s research also contributes
significantly to suggestions found in this study’s conclusion on how to improve
community agency. Ultimately, I assert that the 1992 moratorium only served to further
erode the community self esteem and social participation and interaction described by
Taylor. This assertion is supported by the work of Sharon Taylor.

In her work *Living on the Other Side of Nowhere*, Sharon Taylor explored the
social construction of the meanings of community among the residents of Comorra on the
Long Shore, a community very similar to Roland’s Cove with respect to size and
dependency on the fishery. Taylor (2001) examined how the sudden closure of the cod
fishery, which the community had relied upon for centuries, influenced residents’ sense
of community. Her definition of community refers to “social connections which promote
a sense of belonging...based on identification with common elements such as place,
shared history, the fisheries, the church and the ocean” (2001: 39). There is a separation
from other groups through the positioning of a boundary where community members fix
a line of belonging. The commonly accepted past, while contributing to that sense of
belonging, can also be empowering. Remembering past oppression can help identify “the
ways in which particular social practices undermine and reproduce inequality and
domination and the power for individual and collective agency in negotiating courses of
action amid social constraints” (Taylor 2001: 48). Recognition of these constraints
enhances the power to act promoting resistance and social change.
Taylor (2001) found that while meanings of community differed somewhat among the social actors interviewed, relatively all shared a sense of community that placed significant emphasis on a history based in kinship ties and the past and present oppression of residents. Also part of their sense of community was a persistent resistance to ruling groups or those above them in particular power hierarchies. In the past, these groups included the English, the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church, and the merchant class. Since WWII, residents have viewed fish processing firms and the provincial and federal governments as their prime inhibitors. Interestingly, this is the same period in which the traditional family based mercantile fishery was replaced by an industrialized consumer based system. Nonetheless, participants in Taylor’s study often used terms related to courage, rebellion, and power in stories describing the history of Comorra and its residents, while at the same time often relaying a sense of shared powerlessness when it came to resisting oppression and responding to fisheries crises. This shared sense of powerlessness resulted in a collective “we” mentality which began to break down and fragment in the late 1940’s as the issue of Confederation with Canada caused conflict and division within the community. The mismanagement of the cod fishery and the resulting moratorium further weakened the community as research participants indicated that resources that were once used in forecasting and combating such disasters had been dramatically compromised leading to a sense of helplessness and loss of control. Taylor found that communities were further marginalized through the federal government’s use of “ideological frames” as part of The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS). These frames are abstract categories which the federal government
developed and implemented through policy and documents. In fact, Taylor asserts that these documents were “central to the exercise of power by the federal government in relation to the fisheries” (2001: 152). Using textual analysis, she suggested that the federal government approached the fisheries crisis as an individual problem and had little consideration for family or community when devising solutions. For example, labour solutions were designed largely to help individual fishermen find jobs outside the fishery, and income support was available only to those fishermen who participated in the related career counseling. The failure to treat the crisis as one of family and community resulted in community divisions where groups such as fishers were viewed as privileged, while others such as plant workers were often seen as second class citizens. Further, the only groups government included in consultations concerning the rebuilding of the fishery were fishermen’s organizations and plant owners, excluding women, young people, elders and those in businesses other than the fishery. Also part of the federal government’s ideological frame were undefined and abstract terms, such as needs, transitional, long term, support, and labour adjustment programs (Taylor 2001).

Taylor found that in the end, the TAGS ideology of individualism hampered collective action, undermined and eroded informal networks and relationships from which individuals usually drew support, and left community members with little power to oppose government constraint. Yet, participant responses indicated that they were aware of and resistant to the ideological frame used by government. The “lines of fault” or differences between what residents knew from everyday lived experiences and what was contained in TAGS policy served to strengthen the boundary of community belonging by
providing opposition from the outside from which to rally against. Taylor advocates equality and justice in government policy related to the fishery and recognition by government of the insight of community social actors. She notes that failure in these areas lead to barriers to the lines of communication needed for social change and a reproduction of the system of relations which serves to rule and constrain community action (Taylor 2001).
CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

In selecting a general area of study in which to examine the complex social dynamic existing between the major actors involved in the licencing system, the Avalon Peninsula was an obvious choice due to the high concentration of crab processing licences in the region compared to the rest of the province. The high volume of licences presented numerous potential opportunities with respect to finding a social environment from which to readily observe the interaction of structure, agency, and power within the licencing system. In the end, a southeastern section of the Avalon referred to in this study as the Long Shore (Figures 3.1 and 3.2) was determined to potentially be such an environment based on two determining factors. First, the area’s geographic position on the eastern most section of the province made it one of the earliest sites for European migratory fishermen, as well as for colonization and permanent settlements. Perhaps nowhere else in the province is the cultural tradition of the fishery more deeply rooted. This historical tradition allows for a longitudinal examination of social relationships among those involved in the fishery in the area. Secondly, the defined area of the Long Shore has a relatively high concentration of processing plants in a small geographic locale. It is perhaps where the licencing process is the most competitive and where the ability to act and exercise power would undoubtedly be essential to success, providing a social environment where the exercise of power can be readily observed.
Figure 3.1: Map depicting NL’s southeast Avalon Peninsula
(Source: MSN Encarta)

Figure 3.2: Map depicting specific area of study
(Source: MSN Encarta)
Initially this research study was designed to examine the experiences of two fishing dependant communities on the Long Shore; one that was successful in obtaining a crab processing licence and one that was unsuccessful. It was believed that a comparative analysis would serve to demonstrate how the structure of the licencing process enabled or constrained the ability of communities to exert agency and exercise power by identifying factors and/or strategies that may have contributed to success in the application process. Further, a quantitative component was also to be included in which the two communities under study were compared on the basis of social, economic, and health indicators to explore the potential effects having a processing licence has on community recovery and well being. However, that initial research design was altered early in the data collection process as a result of factors to be discussed below.

Nonetheless, to choose the communities of analysis, I began with a list of successful processing licence applicants since 1992 obtained from the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Since there are no plants currently processing shrimp on the Avalon, the list was confined to crab licences only. A total of three licences were granted in 1993, none of which was given to processors in the chosen area of study. Six communities on the Avalon received new licences in 1997, and two more in 2001. There were a number of communities on the Long Shore that had been granted licences post-moratorium. However, since privacy restrictions prohibited the province from releasing the details of unsuccessful applications, there was no comparative basis on which to choose a successful applicant. Resultingly, I conducted preliminary research on non-licenced communities on the Long Shore to determine if attempts had been made to
secure a licence after the moratorium and if those involved would be willing to discuss their experiences. Roland’s Cove was ultimately chosen as the non-licenced community for several reasons. It has a similar population size and fishing dependency to several licenced Long Shore communities. It was among the earliest destinations in the province for English migratory fishermen, and therefore, has one of the oldest fishing traditions of any community in the province. It was also one of the first communities on the Long Shore to construct a processing plant. This had a dramatic impact on not only the community itself, but the entire Long Shore, as Roland’s Cove became the economic hub of the region. Further, the circumstances surrounding the plant’s closure and the resulting social, economic, and political consequences have been the focus of past sociological studies, providing context for my study and, in the end, support for my assertions concerning the current social environment in the community and region. Finally, there have been several unsuccessful attempts by those within the community to secure a crab processing licence since the moratorium, and preliminary inquiries indicated a willingness among residents to discuss the circumstances of those attempts which were often described as being highly politicized. The community of Marten’s Harbour was then chosen as the licenced community under study based on its similarity to Roland’s Cove with respect to many of the characteristics discussed above, including geographic proximity, population size, dependency on the fishery, and fishing tradition.

Ultimately, my research utilizes a qualitative approach in which document examination and semi-structured interviews with eleven key informants were used in data collection. As the initial research design focused solely on the relationship between
communities and the province, those were the two groups chosen for analysis. However, preliminary interviews and theoretical literature revealed that processors, both currently and traditionally, also play a significant role in the licencing process, warranting their inclusion. Research participants were chosen using a ‘snowball’ sampling procedure in which an initial participant was identified, contacted, and interviewed, and then asked to identify other potential participants. All subsequent research participants were determined from information gathered from previous interviews. Interviews adopted a semi-structured format in which the direction of the interview was determined by both researcher and participant. While there were a number of predetermined scripted questions, the interviewee was also given a certain degree of freedom with respect to the course the interview would take.

All fishers, plant workers, and committee members interviewed from Roland’s Cove were to varying degrees involved in the processing licencing procedure. As a result, most questions dealt with the history of the fishery in the region, the subject’s involvement in the industry, as well as their knowledge of and participation in attempts at securing a processing licence. The interview with the current owner of the Roland’s Cove plant and sessions with former and current plant managers were aimed to determine the scope of the processing firm’s involvement in the licencing process and thus concentrated on the relationship between processors and the community as well as between processors and the government. The interview with the director of licencing and quality assurance at the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture was structured to gain further insight into the licencing process, including application requirements and the
configuration of the review process, as well as to gain insight into the actions and motives of the province as a social actor within the licencing power dynamic. There are undoubtedly additional groups of social actors who form part of the licencing power relations, namely the Association of Seafood Producers (ASP) and the Fish, Food, and Allied Workers Union (FFAW). However, the historical and cultural tradition existing among fishers, plant owners, and the province is of particular importance to this study. Further, I believe that examining structure, agency, and power in the holistic manner advocated by theorists such as Berger and Giddens within such a complex social dynamic as the province’s fishery necessitated limiting the number of social actors under analysis to the three major groups identified. There is, however, reference made to the roles other actors, such as the ASP and FFAW, play in the licencing process, most notably in relation to recent developments within the industry detailed in Section 5.6.

Data collection began in Roland’s Cove in December of 2007 with an interview with a member of the town’s municipal government. Initial attempts at securing participants from the community of Marten’s Harbour however were unsuccessful, and subsequently, data collection in the community was delayed. At the same time, analysis of the Roland’s Cove data indicated that the community could potentially be an exceptional source with which to examine how the structure of the licencing process impacts a community’s ability to act and exercise power within the licencing system. Most notable was a consistent theme of political favouritism, which almost all of those interviewed, felt directly influenced licencing decisions. As is often the case with qualitative research, its inductive nature often results in changes to previously defined
approaches and theories based on factors such as the nature of the collected data. After
discussions with my supervisors, it was decided that a study of Roland’s Cove alone
could yield sufficient data on which to base a Master’s thesis. This potential, in
conjunction with the favourable historical characteristics that led to the community’s
initial inclusion in this study, as well as the delay in collecting data from Marten’s
Harbour, resulted in a change in research design in which the comparative analysis and
quantitative component were supplanted with a purely qualitative study of Roland’s
Cove. Using this specific case, the experiences of the three major groups identified above
were documented and utilized to explore how structure, agency and power contribute to
how the licencing process generally operates.

It should be clarified that the Long Shore, Roland’s Cove, and Marten’s Harbour
are pseudonyms for the research area under analysis. Although maps and historical
context presented in this study could possibly be utilized to identify the region and
communities, the geographic and cultural characteristics of small fishing communities in
the province, as well as the nature of the data being collected, necessitated specific
measures aimed at maintaining confidentiality and anonymity. While there are multiple
communities lining the Avalon’s southeast coast, there is little geographic separation
between them, and therefore, fishery related issues affecting one community invariably
affect others. Similarly, there is a shared cultural tradition of the fishery among the
residents of the region, which translates into a shared interest in issues relating to the
fishery. Both these factors contribute to free flowing lines of communication within the
region and thus pose somewhat of a challenge with respect to confidentiality and
anonymity. Further, from the onset of data collection it was obvious that the information being collected was highly politicized. As a result, there was a fear among some participants that if individuals within the provincial government became aware of their comments, there could be some sort of retaliatory measure taken against them or their community. This not only contributed to the use of pseudonyms, but also prevented participants from permitting the audio recording of interviews. In turn, detailed written notes were taken during each interview and then transferred to a word processing software package shortly after for secure storage. Many of the factors just discussed that necessitated the use of pseudonyms in this study are revealed in the following section detailing the historical development of the research area.
CHAPTER FOUR

Historical Context

The Long Shore region of Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula is an area rich in history and fishing tradition. Although some dispute the location of John Cabot’s landfall at Cape Bonavista in 1497, there is no disputing the fact that within a decade or so after Cabot’s arrival to the New World, fishing vessels from England, France, Spain, and Portugal were making annual visits to Newfoundland to exploit the vast stocks of cod inhabiting its waters (Colony of Avalon Foundation 1999). The eastern coast of the Avalon Peninsula was especially attractive to European migratory fishermen, not simply because it was the closest area of landfall for vessels making the exceptionally long voyage from western Europe, but also due to the geography of the region, which is characterized by deep bays, providing shelter and protection from the harsh Atlantic weather (Seary et al. 1968).

Although the English claimed discovery of this “New-Founde-Land,” their involvement in the migratory fishery was limited during the first half of the sixteenth century. Also during this time, there was little interest on the part of England to establish Crown colonies in Newfoundland. In fact, laws were devised that prohibited migratory fishermen from remaining after the fishing season ended in late summer or early fall. To the Crown, the only worthwhile aspect of this harsh new land was its abundance of cod. Therefore, Newfoundland was viewed primarily as an industry and not as a place to establish any form of permanent settlement. Beginning around 1560 however, English participation in the migratory fishery increased dramatically, and by the mid seventeenth century, the English had claimed exclusive rights to a southeast section of the Avalon that
became known as the English Shore (Figure 4.1) (Colony of Avalon Foundation 1999). The Long Shore section of the English Shore quickly became the hub of the English migratory fishery. When vessels arrived in the spring they were instructed to rendezvous at either Cape Race, Renews, or Roland's Cove. Additionally, English vessels were heavily concentrated in the areas from St. John's to Trepassey and utilized harbours all along the shore including those in Roland's Cove, Marten's Harbour, Bay Bulls, Cape Broyle, and Renews (Galgay 1983).

The first half of the seventeenth century also spawned the first formal attempts at colonization on the English Shore, undoubtedly due in part to the increasing French presence on the island. There had been instances of bands of fishermen previously wintering on the island, but it was not until 1610, under the instruction of King James I, that John Guy, along with forty-one settlers, established the first official colony at Cupids in Conception Bay. However, due to factors such as poor climate and soil conditions, harassment from the pirate Peter Easton, and Guy's insistence for land and wages due to him, the colony failed economically, and the English merchants who had funded the colony, the Newfoundland Company, sub-divided their original plot of land and resold it to a number of other proprietors looking to establish their own colonies on the English Shore (Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Web Site 1996a). Colonies funded by groups of investors were called charter colonies, while those launched by individuals were proprietary colonies (Hiller 1997).
Among the proprietors purchasing land from the Newfoundland Company was Sir William Vaughn. Vaughn purchased a large section of land on the southern Avalon, and in 1617 sent a number of colonists to Aquaforte on the Long Shore, appointing fishing master Richard Whitbourne governor. Whitbourne quickly moved the colony to better conditions at Renews. However, the colony was eventually abandoned in 1620, at which time Vaughn sold sections of the area he purchased from the Newfoundland Company to Sir Henry Cary; Lord Falkland, and Sir George Calvert; Lord Baltimore. Cary purchased the area of Roland’s Cove, while Calvert received the area of Ferryland (Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Web Site 2005). Vaughn, Cary, and Calvert were all instrumental in the history of what were to become the communities of the Long Shore. Sir Francis Tanfield established a colony at Roland’s Cove which eventually
failed, but Calvert’s plot of land would become synonymous with the tenacious spirit of Newfoundland. In 1621, under the direction of Captain Edward Wynne, the first twelve settlers established Calvert’s Colony of Avalon at Ferryland. Although economic hardships and Calvert’s distaste for the harsh Newfoundland climate caused him to all but abandon the settlement in 1629, leaving but one representative, the approximately thirty men, women, and children that remained maintained the colony and survived in large part due to the annual influx of migratory fishermen. Regardless, Avalon was the first permanent Newfoundland colony and among the oldest English settlements in Canada (Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Web Site 1996b).

From the first Spanish and French fishermen to the Basques and the eventual domination of the Long Shore by the English, the fishery has been the primary and often sole industry of the area. In 1700, there were a reported seventy-nine fishing vessels sailing from the Long Shore to overseas destinations, such as England, Portugal, and Spain. In 1800, the fleet had grown to over two hundred. However, wars between England and France in the early nineteenth century made transatlantic travel extremely dangerous, and the bank fishery suffered as a result. Even after these wars had ceased, the bank fishery did not return to its former glory, and by the mid nineteenth century it had been supplanted by an inshore fishery conducted in boats much smaller than the bankers (Galgay 1983).

Notably, it was also during this period that a large number of Irish servants were brought over to Newfoundland to work in the fishery, as many of the English were recruited to the navy to fight in the wars against France. Not surprisingly perhaps, a
significant proportion of today’s Long Shore population is predominately Roman Catholic, with the small number of Protestants stemming from early Church of England missions established in communities such as Ferryland. Nevertheless, the move towards a smaller inshore fishery continued into modern times, with only those communities with processing plants relying on deep sea draggers, and today the fishery is just as essential to the survival of the communities on the shore as it was in the sixteenth century (Galgay 1983).

While the Long Shore area of the Avalon Peninsula is indeed rich in history and fishing tradition, to adequately explore agency, structure, and power within the process of crab licence allocation, it is necessary to narrow the unit of analysis somewhat and utilize a more micro approach, focusing on the specific experiences of individuals, groups, and government officials. After all, the focus on a specific case is a frequent approach utilized in phronetic research. As previously stated, Roland’s Cove has been selected as the community from which to attempt such an analysis. As historical context and cultural tradition are pivotal to the central argument of this thesis, an understanding of that context and tradition within the community must precede any attempt at explaining the structure/agency/power relationship.

Any account of community history on the Long Shore is synonymous with an account of the fishery in that community. With respect to Roland’s Cove, no account of the community’s fishing tradition is complete without reference to its processing plant; not simply because of the plant’s significance to the community, but also due to its impact on the Long Shore region as a whole. Prior to the establishment of a processing
plant however, the community began like any on the Long Shore; it was a destination for English migratory fishermen. Although Sir Francis Tanfield’s original attempts at settlement on behalf of Lord Falkland failed, the area remained a popular destination for both seasonal and permanent settlers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A 1677 account numbered the summer population at 160 men, and by 1732, census records indicate 376 inhabitants comprised of English masters, women, children, and servants, many of which were Irish. By the end of the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth, Irish settlement continued to escalate, and in 1845, the first Roman Catholic Church was established (Irish Loop Development Board 2008). An 1884 assessment estimated the population of Roland’s Cove to be 713, most of those being of Irish decent (Pittman and Skanes N.d.(a)).

Until the mid-twentieth century, the fishery in Roland’s Cove operated as it did in many Long Shore communities. It was a traditional family based fishery governed by the truck or credit system with cod trap crews salting and drying their spring and summer catches and selling it in the fall to fish merchants in exchange for goods and supplies provided at the beginning of the season. However, changes to this traditional system beginning in the mid-twentieth century significantly altered the economic and social composition of the community. It was during this period that Newfoundland and Labrador moved away from the traditional family based mercantile system and into an industrialized consumer based system where fish was caught on company owned vessels and processed in company owned plants to be shipped to market elsewhere (Higgins 2007b). Also during this period, the traditional method of salting and drying fish on
flakes or stages prior to sale was gradually replaced by a green fishery where fish was sold fresh immediately after being landed. The reason for this change was twofold. First, with the onset of WWII many individuals left the fishery for military service, and upon their return, many of the stages and buildings utilized in the curing process were dilapidated and no longer usable (Power 1982). Second, the change from the mercantile based system to an industrialized consumer system meant that salt fish was no longer desired. Instead, fresh catches were processed in fish plants and then immediately frozen for shipment (Higgins 2007b). Also noteworthy, hard currency, which was traditionally non-existent in most Newfoundland fishing communities where the credit system existed, became the principal mode of exchange during this period (O’Dea et al. 1972). Perhaps the most significant development stemming from the changes occurring in the fishing industry during the mid-twentieth century, however, was the establishment of a fish plant in the community in 1952.

The plant was built by Silas Moores, father of former Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Frank Moores, and its effects were immediately felt in the community, primarily in the form of employment opportunities for many different groups of individuals. Women, and young men not already part of a trap crew, who had previously been involved in the drying and salting process, were now free to work in the plant and contribute to the family’s income. Even men who were part of a crew received only half shares for their first several years; so the plant offered a number of enticements including readily available money, independence from fathers and/or older brothers, and unemployment insurance stamps. The structure of the local class system resulted in the
availability of another willing group of workers. The structure distinguished between industrious trap or boat owners with rich family fishing traditions and those less industrious individuals who owned no such property. The latter were parts of crews but were the first to leave to work in the plant upon its establishment. Also providing a labour force for the plant were school drop-outs, students, and the previously mentioned industrious fishermen and owners who had become disaffected with the changes occurring in the inshore fishery. Many fishermen, however, were reluctant to leave the fishery to work in the plant. Some did not want to give up the independence, reward, and tradition of the trap fishery, despite its often uncertain nature, in exchange for the secure but lower paying plant job. Others viewed the plant jobs with the accompanying low wages and back breaking labour as somewhat below or inferior to fishing for a living (Barnable 1973).

Socially, the opening of the processing plant altered the traditional organization of many of the community’s families. In addition to women now working in the plant, many fathers and eldest males objected to young men’s involvement in the processing industry. Traditionally, the young men worked on the family crew skippered by their fathers or older brothers and received earnings based on their individual economic and marital status. This often meant that many young men fished from their early teens until they were married without getting a single share. Working in the plants meant that these younger family members now “have money in their pockets without ever passing over a cent” (Barnable 1973: 20).
There were also numerous indirect economic benefits associated with the establishment of the Roland’s Cove processing plant, and not all of them were limited solely to the community. The need to transport fish from neighbouring communities to the plant for processing and then from the plant to market required significant improvements to the road system of the Long Shore. A shore wide athletic association was formed in part due to the plant. Two new central high schools were constructed for the entire Long Shore area. A number of new stores were opened and new employment opportunities were created as well, such as the establishment of a shore-wide bus service. The plant also attracted workers from many of the Long Shore communities outside of Roland’s Cove, with many of these workers moving to the area permanently (Barnable 1973).

For the first twenty years of its operation, the plant depended solely on catches from the seasonal inshore fishery. In the 1970’s, however, the plant became a year round operation as draggers provided raw material for processing during the fall and winter months. At the peak of productivity, the plant handled approximately 200,000 lbs of fish per day, employing between 250 and 300 people (Pittman and Skanes N.d.(b)). While the population of the community increased from 311 to 503 from 1961 to 1971, partially due to the influx of new workers from surrounding communities and partially due to the government’s resettlement program, the size of the work force gradually decreased as the community’s younger residents migrated to other areas for education and more secure employment opportunities. As a result, the average age of the community’s workforce increased (O’Dea et al. 1972). In the 1980’s, restructuring pushed by government as a
consequence of a noticeable decrease in the availability of raw material caused the plant to once again become a seasonal employer (Pittman and Skanes N.d.(b)). The 1992 announcement of the cod moratorium resulted in the complete closure of the plant, and today all catches unloaded at Roland’s Cove are trucked to various plants around the province for processing.
CHAPTER FIVE

Structure, Agency, and Power within the Licencing System

The principal research problem on which this study is based addresses how the structure of the processing licence allocation system in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador influences individual and collective agency and thus the ability of social actors to exercise power within that system. In answering that question, there is less emphasis on why a particular licence was awarded or denied, and a greater concentration on how the general licencing structure enables or constrains the actions of those in the system. As previously discussed, in the years following the 1992 cod moratorium, any degree of community recovery for the most part necessitated refocusing harvesting and processing practices towards new species such as crab and shrimp. In order for a particular community to benefit economically as well as socially from the processing of crab, specific application had to be made to the provincial government for a processing licence. Therefore, any inquiry, sociological or otherwise, which examines the system through which such licences are allocated, must include the major actors within that system, namely individual community members and collectives, processing firms, and the provincial government. Moreover, for any such inquiry to be adequately thorough, it must include not simply an examination of the players within that system, but also the dynamics of the relationships existing amongst those players and the structure of that system as it enables and constrains the action of participants. Also required is a description of the social environment in which this dynamic exists. Such a focus is necessary in order to study structure and agency in the holistic manner advocated by
theorists such as Peter Berger and Anthony Giddens. In order to meet the conditions and requirements outlined above, a case study was employed in which the first hand experiences of community members, processors, and government representatives involved in licencing attempts for the community of Roland’s Cove were utilized to explain how structure, agency, and power interact generally to influence licencing decisions.

5.1 Literature Summary

Meeting the criteria of sociological inquiry mentioned above also requires a theoretical foundation to support assertions made from collected data. Although a detailed description of the theoretical base for this study is provided in Chapter 2, I will highlight some of the most significant concepts used in interpretation of the data that is to follow. To explicate the licence acquisition process in the province and in turn answer the question of how the structure of that process influences licence allocation, I employ sociological theories that consider structure and agency not as separate entities to be studied individually, but as interconnected concepts whose relationship dictates simultaneous analysis. Within such an approach, structure refers to the rules and resources which enable and constrain action within a social system, while agency is simply the capability to do or act within that system. I also rely on particular theories which place power at the core of all sociological processes and require any inquiry into those processes to do the same. As presented in Chapter 2, prominent theorists who adopt such stances as those just noted include Peter Berger (1963), Anthony Giddens (1984), Pierre Bourdieu (1983), and Michel Foucault (Rabinow 1984).
Building on Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) in my own phronetic approach, I look to the rules and resources of the existing social structure as a source of the productive and constraining nature of power. Whether individuals and/or collectives are enabled or constrained by the social structure, they nonetheless act or exert agency. Consequently, to determine the degree to which a participant in the social relations of the licence allocation system may be able exercise power, I examine the degree to which that participant is enabled or constrained by the rules and resources of the existing structure. The less constrained the social actor is by the existing structure, the more ability they have to draw upon the resources needed to act and thus exercise power within the relations of power.

I also posit that large processing firms and actors within the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture rely on clientelistic relationships to solidify their position in the relations of power and to in turn reproduce the social structure and the social system in a manner conducive to the continuance of these relationships. I use the terms clientelism and patronage synonymously to describe a process where by someone gets a favour from a friend in government, and I describe the social environment in which patronage most often persists, citing specific cases in Newfoundland and Labrador as well as in Nova Scotia. I then liken such environments to the one in which the current licencing process operates. In support of my arguments, I utilize the research of Mark Fletcher (1994), Luis Roniger (1994a), Jeffery MacLeod (2006), and S.J.R Noel (1971).

To make assertions concerning the effects of resource collapse on the ability of individuals and communities to draw upon the social and cultural capital required to exert agency and exercise power, I employ the works of Richard Apostle and his collaborators...
(1992;1998), as well as that of Marilyn Taylor (1985) and Sharon Taylor (2001). Apostle (1992;1998) found that small scale fishing communities rely heavily on social capital stemming from traditional family and kinship networks to curb the effects of resource collapse and other undesirable trends in the fishing industry. However, modern capitalism has served to disassociate many community members and groups from these networks, making it extremely difficult to access the social and cultural capital required to exert agency and exercise power. Similarly, Marilyn Taylor (1985) discovered that fish plant reductions and closures have significantly diminished measures of community esteem and social solidarity in Roland’s Cove, while Sharon Taylor (2001) noted the detrimental effects individually focused TAGS policy had on residents of Comorra with respect to their ability to draw upon informal networks and relationships to act collectively and exercise power to oppose government constraint. I rely on this research, in conjunction with the interview data, to support my positioning of individual community members and collectives at the bottom of the power hierarchy existing between them, large processing firms, and the provincial government.

5.2 The Licencing System Power Hierarchy

Based on the works of the theorists and researchers outlined earlier, I propose that there exists a hierarchical structure with respect to the relations of power within the licencing system. Those actors with the greatest ability to exercise power come from the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, since this is the least likely group to be constrained by the existing structure of the licence allocation system and is the most likely to be able draw upon the necessary classed based and other social resources to
exercise power. After all, it is the provincial government which determines and provides most of the rules and resources used by the other major actors in the relations of power—i.e. community members and groups and processing firms. Further, as proposed by Foucault, the class dimension of power is often transcended by the state when the state elite exercise power through expert discourse as a means to control and survey society’s members (Rabinow 1984). Berger’s mechanisms of social control, which include rules such as licencing, serve a similar function for the state (1963).

Following the provincial government, processing firms are the next most likely group to be able to act without excessive constraint and exercise power within the licencing system. This particular group does not include all processing firms however. All processing firms have to some extent the ability to exercise power given their status as businesses and major community employers. As discussed previously, small firms were also able to draw upon the social and cultural capital from their positions in traditional social kinship networks as the processing plant was the community’s social and economic hub. However, if the ability of communities to access this capital has been severely constrained, then these smaller firms would have almost just as much difficulty in their efforts (Apostle et al. 1992). Perhaps they are able to rely on classed based resources a little more than communities in their efforts to exercise power. Nonetheless, I assert that large processors who operate multiple plants in multiple locations would have the ability to exercise power to a degree much greater than the small single plant owners. These are major industry players with far reaching influence, including the potential to influence government licencing decisions to some extent. If patronage exists in some
form within the licence allocation system today, it would be these large processors who would be the most likely candidate as clients. While the patron may be in the greatest position of power, the mutually beneficial aspect of the clientelistic relationship assures the client some ability to act and exercise power as well. That is not to say they would not be constrained by the existing structure of the licencing system. They are subject to many of the same mechanisms of social control as fishers and plant workers. They are also limited in their access to resources as a result of their status as clients in networks of patronage (Roniger 1994). Clients agree to relinquish control over resources to the patron within the relationship, but their membership in those same networks would also provide them with an extra ability to act within the licencing process and subsequently to exercise power. The inclusion of processing firms in policy decisions during the TAGS era when most other community members and groups were excluded supports the assertion that processing firms have such ability (Taylor 2001).

The individuals and collectives of the communities who apply for crab processing licences would be least likely to exercise power in the relationships among the major actors in the licence allocation system. They are constrained as plant owners are by the general rules of bureaucracy within the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture; they are constrained by the actions of the processing firms as they exert their own influence; and they are further constrained by the clientelistic networks from which they are excluded. They are also the most likely of the major actors to suffer from clientelism's continued existence. Sharon Taylor (2001) found that since WWII, residents of Comorra have identified processing firms and the federal and provincial governments as the prime
groups that have constrained them and hampered their ability to exert agency in response to fisheries crises. Further impeding action and the exercising of power, the ability to draw upon the resources stemming from membership in familial and/or community groups has been significantly diminished by the collapse of the cod fishery. Marilyn Taylor’s study of Roland’s Cove in 1985 demonstrated a significant erosion of facets of societal interaction and community self esteem resulting from earlier plant reductions. If a degree of disembeddedness had resulted from these reductions, the 1992 moratorium could only have served to hasten and worsen that process, restricting access to cultural capital and diminishing the ability to exercise power. Sharon Taylor (2001) demonstrated that that is exactly what happened. Taylor found that the federal government’s focus on individuals as opposed to families and community in the development of TAGS hampered the ability of residents of Comorra to draw upon the resources available from traditional kinship networks and thus obstructed collective action and the exercise of power. Community individuals and groups do have the ability to resist and recover from fishery reductions and closures and change the system through social action, but it requires being re-embedded into their respective social networks, which is accomplished, according to Bourdieu (1983) and Apostle (1998), by being able to once again draw upon the resources of cultural capital inherent to group membership. In Newfoundland fishing communities these resources are based on membership in traditional familial and friendship networks. To reconnect to these traditional networks and again foster community esteem and solidarity, according to Taylor (1985) and Taylor (2001), requires increased communication with government and recognition by policy makers that
community members are insightful social actors who must be included in industry decisions. Unfortunately, other advantageous social resources stemming from class membership are unavailable to community individuals and collectives as they comprise the lowest social class among the actors in the relations of power.

5.3 Community Members and Collectives

It is now necessary to examine the collected data to determine if the social theories utilized can in fact account for the themes emerging from the interviews and in turn explain how licences are allocated. I begin with the group believed to be the most constrained by the structure of the system - individual community members and groups. There was an anticipated distinction among descriptions of community life in Roland’s Cove prior to and after the collapse of the cod fishery among research participants. Yet, all of those describing their knowledge of and participation in the fishery spoke of its historical importance to their community and to the entire Long Shore region. One former plant manager described the fishery of the 1970’s as booming, with Cape Broyle, Witless Bay, Trepassey, and Roland’s Cove all boasting successful fisheries. Similar sentiments were expressed by residents from Roland’s Cove, who described the cod fishery in the years prior to the moratorium as being very important specifically to their community. One individual emphasized that the fishery was the main, and often only, industry in Roland’s Cove. Another participant considered Roland’s Cove a town with a significant historical reliance on the fishery. According to the previously mentioned plant manager, communities such as Roland’s Cove and Trepassey had an extra advantage in the success of their processing plants. He spoke specifically of the Roland’s Cove plant, which he
formerly managed, relating how busses transported workers from surrounding communities, some from as far as Bell Island, to work there. He was quick to clarify that cod was the exclusive species of choice then, and fishing and processing crab was not a consideration. Residents of Roland's Cove also stressed the importance of the town's plant. One individual noted that at the height of productivity in the 1970's there was even work at the plant during the winter months, and that the plant was the primary source of income for Roland's Cove residents as well as for many of the inhabitants of surrounding communities. Almost all employed residents of Roland's Cove who were not teachers, postal workers, or service industry employees were reported to have worked in some capacity at the plant. Another resident called the plant "the economic hub of the Long Shore," a phrase with similar sentiments to Apostle's notion of the plant as the pulse of the community.

In addition to the knowledge of the fishery gained from simple residency in a Long Shore fishing community, many of those interviewed also detailed their experiences of personal employment in the fishery, especially the processing industry. Two participants who grew up in Roland's Cove and still lived there at the time of the research spoke of working in the town's processing plant as teens. One described how she complied with traditional familial notions of involvement in the fishery by giving all her earnings to her parents to contribute to the family's income. In later years, this woman's husband was employed loading trawlers with supplies at the town wharf. Another noted that the attraction associated with a steady flow of income was strong among young
people in the community, and at least in her case, it also led to a diminished interest in school.

As previously mentioned, I also interviewed plant managers as part of my research as they were often members of the traditional social kinship networks existing among residents of embedded fishing communities. Plant managers are also able to provide first hand accounts of the actions of plant owners within the industry as their job requires them to have a close working relationship with owners, making them privy to information not available to the average plant worker. One manager ran the Roland’s Cove plant for several years and the other was once responsible for production operations at the Marten’s Harbour plant. The former began as a plant worker in Roland’s Cove and progressed, eventually becoming a supervisor, production manager, and finally plant manager. The latter had worked in the Marten’s Harbour plant for twenty three years, beginning in building maintenance and eventually graduating through various positions to production manager. At the time of research, he oversaw operations at the Roland’s Cove plant. From the description of these experiences, as well as those described above, it is clear that many of the traditional aspects of the Newfoundland fishery outlined in the historical context section, including lifetime involvement, particular family dynamics, and the fishery’s role as sole community employer, were still present during the productive time of the 1970’s and early 1980’s.

It was during the 1980’s, however, that catches became noticeably lower and rumblings of potential problems in the availability of resources became louder. In Roland’s Cove, it was during this period that the processing plant reverted back to being
a seasonal employer after years of annual operation. The former Roland’s Cove plant manager acknowledged the observable decline in catches reported by Long Shore fishers during this time, but he, and others in the community as well, cite another reason for cutbacks at the Roland’s Cove plant - what they refer to as “feeder plants.” The former manager stated that compounding the decline in resources was the haste with which the provincial government began issuing fish processing licences. The newly licenced processing plants began feeding on raw material that was once being processed solely in Roland’s Cove but was now being divided among multiple plants. He believed that licences were issued to too many communities in too small a geographic area of the Long Shore, leading to fewer workers for the Roland’s Cove plant and less raw material for the remaining workers to process. In addition, he stated that many of managers and owners of the feeder plants were in the practice of underbidding each other with respect to fish prices and paying fishers under the table, which is an informal arrangement in which fishers are paid solely in cash. He was disappointed to note that by 1984, despite initially being “the first plant on the block,” the plant operated for only twelve weeks a year.

Other interviewees also stressed the detrimental effects of feeder plants. One former plant employee noted the reduction in the amount of processing work available as surrounding communities built their own plants and were given licences to process cod and other species. Another former plant worker believed the emergence of the feeder plants was the beginning of the end for the Roland’s Cove plant. Even the plant’s current owner, who first became a shareholder in 1986 after the plant went into receivership, believed that too
many plants in too small an area, all vying for a share of a increasingly limited resource, was the reason for the plant’s demise.

One participant lays some of the blame for the plant’s inactivity and lack of strategic direction on past owners and operators, some of which she asserted assumed control over the facility solely for associated government grants and with little concern for the long term health of the plant or community. The seemingly zealous nature with which the Newfoundland government allowed the building of new plants and dispensed processing licences in the 1980’s was undoubtedly in part an attempt to counter the effects of a depleting resource. Yet, it is just one of a number of reasons why the Roland’s Cove plant began to suffer in the 1980’s. The diminishing cod stocks themselves and the aforementioned past management mistakes were also contributors. Regardless, the 1992 cod moratorium all but guaranteed that unless a dramatic switch to processing new species occurred, the plant would no longer provide the community of Roland’s Cove with the employment opportunities needed for its survival.

Post moratorium accounts of life in Roland’s Cove support this assertion. There has been little activity at the plant in the years following the 1992 closure of the cod fishery. The former plant manager described the facility as being closed for all intensive purposes. A Roland’s Cove resident noted sporadic periods of employment since 1992, but little notice was given to the community as to when these periods would begin or end. Another participant stated that most of the time town residents are not even sure who the current owner is, as there is often much going on behind the scenes. Each year there are rumors that the plant will open, but usually nothing materializes. With respect to the
importance of the fishery in general to life on the Long Shore post moratorium, most interviewees see little hope for the future. One participant observed a significant decline in fishing activity in the region, while another indicated that the only role Roland’s Cove plays in the fishery today is as an offloading site for catches to be trucked elsewhere for processing. Thus, she was less than optimistic about the community’s future. This same person asserted that in one five year period after 1992, the population of the community declined by twenty percent. Since then, many others have either left or intend to do so. A large contingent of locals has migrated to Alberta and Nova Scotia, including this lady’s daughter and husband. She believes that very few young adults want to stay in the community, so much so that older adults and their young children comprise most of the town’s population today. This woman’s daughter once tried working in the plant, but did not like it and thus moved to Nova Scotia, where her father, the interviewee’s husband, is also employed. When asked why she remains, the participant admitted contemplating a move to St. John’s, but she has a house in Roland’s Cove, and she has doubts concerning her ability to own a house in the capital city, especially with most jobs there being in the low paying service industry. The woman also indicated that even the Roland’s Cove town council was having difficulty recruiting new members. With respect to the processing plant, she believes that even if the town was granted a crab processing licence, there would be few Roland’s Cove residents able to work there. When participants were asked to list potential employment opportunities that may alleviate some of the losses suffered through the moratorium in Roland’s Cove, only two were provided - the marine
fabrication and repair facility constructed by the federal government in 1990 and a wind
generation project under construction at the time of research.

The fact that the residents of Roland’s Cove speak more fondly of the pre­
moratorium years than they do of those post 1992 is not unique. Those sentiments would
be expected in most small Newfoundland fishing communities. To demonstrate that the
theories put forth by Richard Apostle and his collaborators concerning disembeddedness
are applicable to these data, and thus that members of these communities are potentially
hampered in their attempts to access the resources stemming from their membership in
traditional familial and community networks, I explore the circumstances in which this
particular social condition exists. The authors stress that familial/community structure
and inter-firm networking is especially important to the survival of small scale fisheries.
They describe the processing plant as often being the pulse of the community and the
relationship between those involved in the plant’s operation - fishers, plant workers and
owners - as being grounded in cultural and social traditions (Apostle et al.1992).
Integration in these relationships is how one is embedded or located in the particular
social group (Berger 1963). In times of crisis, the resources available from membership
in the group can be mobilized for resistance and survival. Apostle asserts that modern
capitalist trends such as increased harvest levels have severed the ties between the
economic and the social and weakened traditional social and cultural bonds (1998). I
argue that the moratorium on harvesting northern cod would only serve to facilitate such
a condition if it were present. Was it already occurring on the Long Shore prior to the
moratorium? Evidence presented by Marilyn Taylor (1985) seems to suggest so.
Recall the social and economic benefits associated with a fully operational processing plant in Roland’s Cove as described in the previous chapter. There were improvements made to the roads on the Long Shore as well as the establishment of a Long Shore athletic association and bus service. New schools were constructed and stores opened, and an influx of workers moved to the community to work in the plant. These developments would obviously help foster social solidarity and community esteem both in Roland’s Cove and on the Long Shore as a whole. In other words, they would provide avenues from which to access family and kinship networks and thus embed individuals into these networks, solidifying traditional social and cultural bonds. Circumstances changed dramatically, however, as detailed in Marilyn Taylor’s study. Taylor (1985) measured three facets of community competency in relation to the resources and strategies available to two communities in response to fish plant reductions. These were social vitality, economic viability, and political efficacy. We will rely on data concerning Roland’s Cove because it is the only Long Shore community of the two studied.

Social vitality is the most significant category with respect to its importance in exploring individual and community embeddedness. Taylor used a one to five scale to measure fourteen particular characteristics of community strength and vulnerability within the social vitality category. Each characteristic was given a pre-plant reduction rating and then measured post-plant reduction to explore the nature of any changes. She found that six out of the fourteen social vitality characteristics had decreased in strength as a result of plant reductions, the most among the three categories. Among the characteristics decreasing in strength were social structures promoting interaction among
community members, community sources of esteem, and social participation, all crucial attributes to being embedded or located within the familial and community groups of small traditional fisheries (Taylor 1985). Undoubtedly, a cod moratorium and complete plant shutdown would do little to reverse these trends. Research conducted by Sharon Taylor in the Long Shore community of Comorra, a community very similar in population and fishing dependency to Roland’s Cove, indeed supports this assertion. Taylor (2001) demonstrated that the sense of community held by the majority of Comorra’s residents was based on identification with commonalities such as a shared history and involvement in the fishery and was rooted in traditional kinship ties and the past and present hardships experienced by residents. This provided a sense of belonging that separated residents from outside groups. However, she discovered that the cod moratorium and the resultant government strategies to combat it, particularly TAGS, created divisions and conflict within the community that impeded the ability of members to draw upon resources stemming from traditional kinship networks. This in turn led to feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness among community members (Taylor 2001).

What impact would this dislocation from traditional relationship groups have on community members’ ability to exercise power within the licence allocation system? According to Giddens (Tucker Jr. 1998) and Bourdieu (1983), and supported by Apostle’s (1998) work, the determining factors in exerting agency and exercising power are the social, cultural, and material resources available to members of particular social groups. Due to the existing class structure, the greatest resources available to harvesters and plant workers involved in small scale fisheries come from traditional familial and
community networks. If they have become somewhat separated or disembedded from these networks, as Marilyn Taylor’s (1985) and Sharon Taylor’s (2001) findings suggest they had, their ability to draw upon the social and cultural resources needed to act and exercise power within the licence allocation system would be significantly limited, especially in the wake of the cod moratorium and plant closures.

With the task of exerting individual and community agency severely limited as suggested by the notion of disembeddedness, particular responses from residents of the Long Shore suggest a further impediment to their ability to exercise the power needed to improve their social condition. While dislocation from a particular social network is suggested as one means by which individual and community agency has been hampered, it is the exclusion from another network that has possibly further stifled their ability to act. Traditionally, the members of Newfoundland fishing communities have had little influence on many of the political decisions impacting their lives. This stems from both the St. John’s centered political system that defined early Newfoundland political life and the frequent use of patronage as a tool within that system. Are there still remnants of clientelism existing within the province’s political structure today? The persistent ability of facets of these networks to survive decades of political change, especially if such facets are embedded into traditional industries such the fishery, supports at least the possibility. The responses from Roland’s Cove residents with respect to why they believed their past attempts at obtaining a processing licence were unsuccessful again further suggests such a possibility.
I asked participants if they had any knowledge of the procedure for acquiring a crab processing licence in the province, if they had been direct participants in the process, and what factors they felt led to the outcome of a particular application. One respondent noted a particular attempt a number of years previously in which she was an active participant. At that time, she was part of an eight member committee that lobbied the provincial government on behalf of Roland’s Cove in an attempt to demonstrate the need for a processing licence. She spoke of the factors she felt made Roland’s Cove an obvious choice for such a licence: the structural soundness of the plant and its capacity to process multiple species at once, its strategic location in a deep sheltered harbour, and the presence of a reliable water supply, a crucial necessity to any plant’s operation. Yet, in the end the town was not awarded a licence. When asked, despite the plant’s apparently favourable characteristics and the lobbying of government, why she felt they were unsuccessful in their bid, she asserted that there was a significant degree of politics involved and that John Efford would be the best candidate to answer that question. Mr. Efford was the provincial fisheries minister responsible for licence allocation in the years immediately following the cod moratorium.

Another research participant detailed a similar story, speaking of the community committee whose principle form of lobbying was to write letters to the provincial government stressing the desire and need for a licence. She also detailed the advantages that she felt worked in favour of the community, including the deep harbour, the best in the province next to St. John’s according to her, the plant’s structural advantages, and its prime location immediately adjacent to the principal landing site for many harvesters on
the Long Shore. She also laid the blame for the unsuccessful attempt on a significant political personality, this one particularly well known to Long Shore residents. She spoke of Loyola Sullivan, former town councilor, former mayor of Roland’s Cove, and member of the provincial House of Assembly for the Ferryland district which includes the entire Long Shore. Despite his significant history in the district, she asserted that not only did Mr. Sullivan not openly support the Roland’s Cove licencing attempt, but he lobbied against it. She said Mr. Sullivan was supporting a bid from the Barry Group processing firm for the plant in Calvert owned by Mr. Sullivan’s brother. Mr. Sullivan was also born and raised in Calvert. She also emphasized that Mr. Sullivan and his family had a vested interest in the nearby Witless Bay processing plant, which was granted a crab processing licence prior to 1992. Ultimately, this respondent felt that there was too much politics involved in that particular licencing bid. In fact, she said that it was all politics. She said her sentiments concerning Mr. Sullivan’s role in their particular unsuccessful attempt at a processing licence were common in the community of Roland’s Cove.

Responses from a third individual with knowledge of Roland’s Cove’s attempt at securing a licence seem to support this claim. This participant was also a member of the government lobbying committee previously discussed. For the most part, she noted, their pleas and requests went unanswered, but they did receive acknowledgment and support from former federal Fisheries Minister John Crosbie. Mr. Crosbie even aided in securing an operator for the town’s processing plant. However, with such a large concentration of processing plants on the Long Shore, some with processing licences and the others competing for available licences, the task was arduous. She recalled walking out of
meetings with government officials in which the committee had pleaded the community’s case, only to have another group from another community immediately follow and lobby against them. She described the situation as unreal and mind boggling with every move made by the players in the process being political in nature. She echoed the opinion of other respondents, remarking that there were powerful people on the Long Shore, namely Loyola Sullivan, lobbying against them. In an attempt to further emphasize the political nature of the licencing process, the participant described a situation in 2007, in which she said a licence transfer from the community of Gaultois was rejected, again due to political intervention from those in positions of power. This viewpoint in which government is seen as impeding attempts a licence attainment supports research conducted by Sharon Taylor (2001) in the Long Shore community of Comorra. Community members interviewed had a strong sense of community partially based on identification with past and present oppression and constraint. Since WWII, government and processing firms have been seen as the principal inhibters to the ability of community members to exert agency in the wake of fisheries crises.

Despite the claims of those interviewed, however, I am not asserting that political patronage was the sole contributor to Roland’s Cove’s inability to secure a licence. Undoubtedly, the government is in a very difficult position. Many communities are in need of these licences, but if every application is approved, overfishing is inevitable. As a result, stock levels, the number of processing plants that occupying a particular geography, and other factors to be discussed in Section 5.5 figure into government licencing decisions. Even interview participants from Roland’s Cove noted the
detrimental effects of too many licences in too small an area on their plant when cod was
the primary processed species. What I do assert, however, is that interview data, as well
as historical and theoretical evidence support the claim that the social environment in
which licencing decisions are made is especially political and conducive to patronage,
and that whatever the degree of influence, clientelism and the associated power dynamic
have and continue to play a role in the allocation of licences in addition to the other
factors outlined above.

5.4 Processing Firms
The initial scope of this research involved community members/groups and their
interaction with government as they attempted to recover from the cod moratorium
through crab processing. As a result, there was little initial focus on the experiences of
plant owners. However, as the theoretical literature was reviewed and the study
progressed, it became clear that owners played a significant role in the power dynamic of
the licencing process. While there was only one direct interview with a plant owner,
significant data were collected from former and current plant managers, and since these
managers work very closely with owners and are involved in virtually all aspects of a
processing firm’s daily operating activities, they are privy to information not possessed
by the average plant worker. Similarly, plant managers are also often members of the
traditional kinship networks of embedded fishing communities, providing yet another
perspective from which to approach the licencing dynamic. Therefore, I rely on the
experiences of these managers, in addition to the interview with a current plant owner, in
an attempt to explore the degree to which large processing firms especially, are able to
exert agency and exercise power within the licencing process. As previously stated, I believe that processing firms in general have the ability to exercise power to a degree greater than that of community members and/or groups because of the particular resources available to them as members of ownership groups. There also exists the possibility that the large, multi-plant ownership groups are involved in patron/client relationships with government officials, thus further increasing their ability to exercise power within the licencing process.

The current majority owner of the Roland's Cove fish plant first became involved with the facility as a shareholder in 1986 when the plant was operating on a seasonal basis. He noted that the 1992 cod moratorium killed the plant, and he became majority owner a number of years later in an attempt to save it. Although the plant's location, in close proximity to the deep sheltered harbour where much of Long Shore catches are landed, was a significant advantage, it was not enough to compensate for the emergence of multiple feeder plants on the shore vying for a share of a limited amount of raw material. Nor has that advantage aided in the plant's application for a processing licence. When asked as to why previous attempts had been unsuccessful, despite the plant's location and harbour facilities, and despite its potential to economically re-vitalize the entire Long Shore, the owner simply blamed greed and politics. He stated that particular plant owners and operators in this province, contrary to European nations such as Norway which have survived similar fisheries crises, look out only for themselves and are driven by greed; hurting and impeding the progress of other owners and operators as opposed to working together. It is because of these particular people and their associated groups that
processing plants like the one in Roland’s Cove are unable to survive. In fact, he asserted that these groups act to ensure such plants do not survive, especially if the plants are in direct competition with plants owned by these groups. The ability of the large ownership groups to act in such a manner stems principally from their location in favourable positions the participant emphasized.

In addition, the owner blames the provincial government for action, or lack thereof, in response to the moratorium, including the licence allocation process. He believes that bureaucrats in this province take no responsibility for their action or inaction. They fail to act when they should, content on maintaining the status quo, and are hostile to suggestions from those who have achieved a fair measure of success when faced with similar resource collapses. As previously mentioned, similar change resistant attitudes within government circles often facilitate the continued existence of clientelistic networks, or at the very least, partial remnants of such networks. The participant advocates increased co-operation among all the players in the industry and a change from the confrontational mindset currently held by the government to one of acceptance with regard to aid from those outside the industry or province.

Even if one was to put aside the dire economic need for a processing licence for Roland’s Cove and the logistic advantages associated with the processing facility itself and its location, this plant owner argues that issues of product quality alone would warrant a licence for the town. He believes that the main obstacle facing the entire shellfish processing industry in this province today is poor quality. He recounted a story of a Japanese businessman who was amazed at the quality of crab landed at the Roland’s Cove processing facility.
Cove wharf. However, upon seeing the crab that had been landed, shipped to plants across the province, and then shipped back to Roland’s Cove for secondary processing, he was less than enthusiastic. The ideal scenario, the owner believes, would be to process crab immediately upon arrival at the wharf thus avoiding quality issues stemming from long distance transport of raw material. With a processing licence, the Roland’s Cove plant could once again be a hub of processing activity, simultaneously stimulating the municipal and regional economies while providing a solution for one of the largest concerns currently facing the industry. Yet, for reasons already alluded to, that scenario has yet to materialize.

A former manager of the Roland’s Cove plant expressed similar sentiments. As with the plant owner, this participant provided two principal arguments as to why the community would be an ideal candidate for a crab processing licence; one centres around issues of quality and productivity thresholds, while the other concerns logistic advantages offered by the plant and its location. He estimates that in 2007, approximately 33 million lbs. of crab were landed on the Long Shore with 5-6 million lbs of that remaining to be processed at various plants in the region - Witless Bay, Aquaforte, Cape Broyle, and Marten’s Harbour. Of the 33 million lbs., 10-12 million lbs. was landed at the Roland’s Cove wharf, none of which remained on the Long Shore for processing. Some of the material is shipped to plants as close as St. Mary’s Bay, while some is trucked as far as the west coast and the Northern Peninsula. In addition to the obvious quality concerns stemming from shipping raw material great distances prior to processing, the former manager notes that many of the destinations for the material may already have significant
amounts of raw material on hand, resulting in even further delays before the trucked material can be processed. He argues that there is plenty of raw material available to support the Roland’s Cove plant in addition to the other plants currently operating in the region, especially since, from his experience, these other plants rarely, if ever, operate at full processing capacity (Table 5.1). Neither of the plants listed are reported to operate above 58% capacity, with Marten’s Harbour being the lowest, operating at about 40% of its maximum. The former manager asserted that even if half of the annual 10-12 million lbs. landed at the Roland’s Cove wharf remained there for processing, that would suffice to operate the plant and re-vitalize the town and regional economy. This may in fact be the case to some extent, however, the inability of the region’s other plants to operate at full capacity suggests that there are too many plants occupying the same geographic area already. Additionally, many within the industry believe that there is not enough raw material to maintain the plants currently in operation, let alone to justify adding a new licence to the region, despite the opinions of those interviewed.

Table 5.1: 2007 Estimated Crab Processing Distribution for the Long Shore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plant</th>
<th>Annual Weight Processed to 2007</th>
<th>Maximum Processing Capacity</th>
<th>% of Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Witless Bay</td>
<td>3.5 – 4</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquaforte</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Broyle</td>
<td>1.6-1.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marten’s Harbour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weights in millions of lbs
(Source: Former Roland’s Cove plant manager)
As with the owner of the Roland’s Cove plant, the former manager stressed the importance of the community’s harbour and the plant’s strategic location adjacent to it, as well as the plant’s capacity to process multiple species, in an attempt to convey the idea of Roland’s Cove as an obvious choice for a processing licence. He ranked the harbour, in terms of its depth and relative freedom from sea ice, as second only to St. John’s. In addition, he conveyed that many of the fishermen harvesting in economic zone 3L prefer to land their catch in Roland’s Cove because of the safety of its harbour and its proximity to fishing grounds. The former manager also emphasized that currently there are no plants on the Long Shore processing shrimp, revealing yet another niche that the plant could possibly serve.

While many participants detailed the apparent logistical advantages associated with the Roland’s Cove plant that should have resulted in a licence prior to other plants in the region, there is no assertion within this study that the other plants were logistically inferior and thus did not deserve a licence. There were no specific data collected on the other plants, and thus no basis for comparative analysis. The apparent advantages provided by the participants are principally utilized to demonstrate the conflicting rationales between community members and government with respect to how licencing decisions are made and how one rationale comes to dominate another. Further, the multitude of operational plants in the region and the perceived shortage of raw material are apparent factors working against Roland’s Cove in their application bid. On the surface, this may appear contradictory to my arguments about how the licencing process operates, in that it could have been these rational reasons and not patronage stemming
from unequal power dynamics that impeded Roland’s Cove’s licencing attempts. However, there are thee important considerations to note. First, I am not trying to determine specifically why Roland’s Cove did not get a licence. I am simply using the experiences of those within the community to describe how the licencing process generally operates for all those involved and to determine what factors may contribute to licencing decisions. Secondly, recall that I am not arguing that unequal power distribution is the sole determinant of licencing success, only that it plays a significant role in the process in addition to other factors such as the geographic distribution of licences and stock levels. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, rationality and power are inseparable as one produces the other, but the relationship between the two is asymmetrical, with power often dominating. One could argue that the reasons put forth by participants advocating a Roland’s Cove licence (such as the deep sheltered harbour) and the diminished operational capacity of surrounding plants are rational reasons supporting the licencing bid. Others may argue that the concentrated regional licencing distribution and diminishing stocks are rational reasons working against the community. While both arguments are rational, in the end, however, it is those with the greatest ability to exercise power, provincial politicians and officials, who determine which rationality is accepted. Further, one cannot argue that rationality devoid of power led government to reject the Roland’s Cove application because, similar to structure and agency, both rationality and power are inherently linked as one produces the other. Recent licencing decisions and changes to rules and regulations governing the process appear to suggest that power’s
clear dominance over rationality, at least within the licencing process, may be diminishing somewhat. This will be discussed further in this chapter.

In response to why, despite its apparent advantages, Roland's Cove has yet to be successful in a licencing bid, a well placed informant stated that bureaucratic and political flaws in the current system of licence allocation were the principal inhibitor. One of those bureaucratic failings, he noted, was the need for a thorough business plan, even if the plant is currently in operation and simply looking to transfer a licence from another facility. Such plans can cost upwards of $30,000. Politically, there are too many old timers currently involved in the process, he argues. They are content to continue to reap the personal benefits associated with their positions and maintain the status quo while the problems that have plagued the industry as a whole continue to persist. He identified four major processing firms that dominate processing on the Long Shore and who he asserted, put pressure on the provincial government to make decisions that are in the best interest of those four. The Daleys, the Quinlans, the Barry Group, and Ocean Choice International, he insists, dictate the path of crab processing licencing, not only on the Long Shore but in the province as a whole. If plants that apply for crab processing licences could potentially feed off and diminish the availability of raw material and thus the processing capabilities of those four groups, then in his opinion it is very unlikely that these plants would be successful in their applications. The former manager described a particular experience of being verbally insulted by individuals from one of the four groups over the price he was paying fishermen for their catches. He also showed me clippings from the local newspaper in which a number of communities had demonstrated
their intent to apply for a processing licence as per government regulations. He asserted that the “big four” would pressure the government to grant licences only to those they supported, and the government would most likely comply. Just because your buddy is John Efford, former provincial fisheries minister, he argued, that should not necessarily guarantee you a licence. Again, we observe residents of a community who view processing firms and government as somehow inhibiting the ability of their community to recover from resource collapse. Interviews conducted by Sharon Taylor with the residents of Comorra contained identical sentiments. In that case, Taylor (2001) traced these feelings among Comorra’s residents back to the 1940’s, providing evidence of a historical relationship between processing firms and government with respect to their role as oppressive ruling groups in the community/processor/government power hierarchy. The research participant also spoke of conversations he had with former Newfoundland and Labrador Fisheries Minister Tom Rideout in protest of how the process operated but noted that Mr. Rideout was also too set in his ways to change.

In 2005, the licencing process was altered somewhat with the Fish Processing Licencing Board (FPLB) being introduced to make the final recommendation on licence allocation to the minister. It was hoped this would remove some of the ambiguity associated with the decision making process and make it more transparent. Although the new process also offers the opportunity for any individual or group to support or protest a particular application, the former manager believes it has in fact hampered opportunities for informal protest like the above mentioned one-on-one sessions with Mr. Rideout, which he felt were more likely to be effective. It is obvious from these and similar
comments discussed throughout this report that the 2005 changes to the licencing process did not suffice to alleviate all of the concerns of those within the industry. More recent amendments to licencing regulations and the associated industry reaction appear to indicate that some, but not all, of these concerns are being alleviated somewhat. These are discussed in detail in Section 5.6.

The individual currently responsible for operations at the Roland’s Cove plant also conveyed strong opinions on the perceived shortcomings of the province’s licence allocation process. This individual is also a former production manager of the Marten’s Harbour facility, having worked at the plant in one capacity or another for 23 years, and therefore is well informed about the inner workings of both facilities and the fishing industry on the Long Shore as a whole. He, like the previous research participant, is a strong advocate for Roland’s Cove to receive a processing licence. He indicated that there is sufficient raw material available to support the operation of the plant and that in his estimation, the amount of crab landed at the Roland’s Cove wharf would increase significantly in 2008. He invited me to visit the site of the plant during the night when there are as many as seventeen vessels waiting to offload their catch at the wharf. In his opinion, when the first processing licences were granted post-moratorium, Roland’s Cove should have been among the first to receive one. The workforce is there he notes, as well as the harbour, support materials, and infrastructure. The participant recounted visiting many plants throughout the province during his years in the industry, and that only the Bay de Verde facility is on par with the plant in Roland’s Cove. The reason Marten’s Harbour received a licence in 1997, he asserts, is basically because of the personal
convictions of John Efford. He believes politics dominate the licencing process in this province. Government officials have their favourites, he notes, and they are too set in their ways. This is why there has been little change in the industry and why Roland’s Cove has yet to receive a licence. The big boys, a term referring to major ownership groups in the region (Quinlans, Daleys, and the Barry Group), own plants elsewhere on the Long Shore, and it is these locations that are most likely to be granted licences.

As for possible suggestions to reverse past trends, the participant is a strong believer in the power of individual and community lobbying despite its lack of success for Roland’s Cove residents during previous attempts at licence attainment. He noted a situation in Port de Grave where community members demonstrated at the home of former provincial Fisheries Minister John Efford in an attempt to influence government to build a new wharf. In that instance, the lobbying effort was successful. Also, the former manager suggests that changes to the structure of the licencing process are also necessary if previous trends are to be reversed. He believes that the FPLB should be an entity which is kept separate and at arms length from government influence. Additionally, he suggests that the board should have some members with backgrounds outside the fishery, and that there should be members from all the economic fishing zones in the province. Also, he asserts that an infusion of young blood is necessary if any change is to occur, since present board members, he believes, are afraid of change. Finally, the former Marten’s Harbour processing manager and current Roland’s Cove plant operations manager stated that getting Memorial University involved in the process in some capacity
would add credibility to the plight of Roland’s Cove residents and help illuminate the need for some measure of licencing reform.

From the above accounts of the community members, plant owners and managers interviewed as part of this research, there is a collective sentiment that the ability for individuals and communities to exert action and exercise power within the licencing system structure has been severely limited by the provincial government and a small group of plant owners whose social position has provided them with particular resources that allow them to act within that structure to a degree greater than most others. Membership in those select groups in accordance with Bourdieu (1983) has provided the social and cultural capital necessary to act, exercise power, and maintain the status quo. These processing groups often provide most of the employment opportunities for a community and thus carry significant political clout. Such a group’s members are also often among the wealthiest members of their respective communities and regions and thus gain cultural capital from that membership as well. Such an ability to exercise power would only be strengthened through membership within clientelistic networks.

Interestingly, Sharon Taylor (2001) notes that following the cod moratorium and the introduction of TAGS, processing firms were one of only two groups consulted by government in relation to strategies to overcome the crisis in Comorra. Fishermen’s organizations were the other group. Notably, other community members and organizations were not consulted.

The critical stance employed by respondents and detailed in the two preceding sections with respect to government’s actions or lack thereof within the licencing process
raises an important issue that warrants attention prior to examining the third of the three major actors in the process. One could argue that the comments detailed above are highly subjective and stem principally from disappointment and frustration, and it would be difficult to disagree. However, qualitative research is inherently non-positivist in nature, and as a result, is often subjective, but that does not diminish the merits of the data or this study’s arguments.

Max Weber, whose work influenced many of the theories utilized in this study, especially those of Anthony Giddens, while in support of objective social research, argued that humans attach subjective meanings to their social world unlike most subjects of scientific inquiry, and that these meanings must be studied as they allow the researcher to understand behaviour and social development (Hamilton 2009). For example, theoretical concepts such as embeddedness utilized in this research are subjective in nature, hinging on the feelings and personal experiences of those involved and are not easily observed or tested, but these concepts are crucial to understanding the ability of communities to exert agency and exercise power within the licencing process. Similarly, the ability to achieve a deeper understanding of a particular research problem is an advantage often attributed to qualitative research in relation to more positivist research methods. Further, while critics of qualitative research often list the inability of such research to be generalized to larger populations as an apparent disadvantage in relation to quantitative studies, I will argue in the concluding chapter that this criticism is not always valid, at least not in relation to this study. As a result, I chose to examine the licencing process solely from the subjective viewpoint of the three major actors, because I felt that
it would give me the best opportunity to observe and understand how the structure, agency, power dynamic really operates within the licencing process. Also, I felt that given the nature of the fishery and the stakes involved, it would be extremely difficult to achieve any measure of objectivity with respect to the data. Just because comments are born out of disappointment and frustration, that does not necessarily make them any less credible or valid. If that were the case, then much of the data collected in qualitative studies, especially those related to the Newfoundland fishery, would be unusable. Finally, the responses provided by the provincial director of licencing and quality assurance to be discussed in the next section are potentially equally as subjective and biased as those provided by the other respondents. The province has as much to gain or loose as fishers and plant workers in the licencing process, and to suggest they are purely objective in their actions and assertions would be naïve and erroneous. In fact, my argument is that the province is anything but objective.

Ultimately, what is important, regardless of the nature of the collected data, is that the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology are recognized and compensated for. With respect to my research, I am not trying to definitively prove clientelism’s existence within the licencing process. Besides, such proof could only come from an admission from the patron or the client, and given the consequences, such an admission is extremely unlikely. I am trying to describe the general operation of the licencing process through the personal experiences of those involved and through the meanings they attach to those experiences. Moreover, I do not rely on interview data alone to accomplish my research.
goals, but utilize respondent's comments in conjunction with historical and theoretical evidence.

A final point with respect to the stance taken by participants as outlined above has to do with the nature of power in general. Within power relations, it is not always the act of exercising power that constrains or impedes action, but often it is simply having the ability to act and/or threatening action. While I believe the interview data and supporting literature point to clientelism's continued persistence in the fishing industry, most importantly perhaps is the fact that community members and groups believe such political favouritism is occurring. This belief figures just as prominently in the actions of community members within the existing structure as witnessing the favouritism first hand.

5.5 The Provincial Government

Having explored the responses of two of the three major participants in the licence allocation power dynamic, I now turn to the provincial government. Recall, I suggested that it is the government which has the greatest ability to exercise power within the licencing allocation system due to the ease with which it is able to act, relatively unrestrained by the existing social structure, in fact, significantly enabled by it. This ability would be further strengthened if it is shown that government members participate in clientelistic networks or enter into relationships rich with remnants of such networks. Proposing that the provincial government is the most likely participant in the licencing system dynamic to be able to exercise power is not a novel thought. After all, they are the architects of much of the licencing structure and are significantly more enabled by that
structure than constrained by it. But, they are also simultaneously part of that structure and continuously alter it with their actions. In this way, they are like any other social actor. Yet, recall Foucault's assertion that all social actors are able to exercise power, but that ability is not evenly distributed. As a result, it is the manner in which power is exercised that makes government different from the other social actors, and following Bent Flyvbjerg, it is that how which is of most concern to this research.

While the roles and responsibilities of the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture within the licencing process is well defined in the guidelines for processing licence application (http://www.fishaq.gov.nl.ca/processing/applications/), I spoke to a department representative to discern exactly how government defines its role in the process as well as how it executes particular mandates. That information will then be interpreted in conjunction with the responses from members of the previous two groups in an attempt to discern if their notions of the licence allocation system and government’s involvement within the system are supportable. In particular, I explore the possibility that clientelistic remnants allow participants in the process, particularly government officials, but also the previously mentioned large processing firms, to exert a greater degree of agency and thus exercise power to a larger extent than other players in the process.

Although I was aware from the provincial fisheries department website of the government’s roles and responsibilities within the licencing process, I asked the province’s director of licencing and quality assurance to describe the most common application scenarios encountered. He explained that licences are allocated to plants currently processing a designated species but wishing to expand to other species; plants
that have yet to be constructed but will be if application is successful; plants that wish to expand from primary processing (basic preparation for exportation) to secondary or value added processing; and for the transfer of a licence from one facility to another. I indicated that I was principally concerned with the allocation of new licences to existing plants or to plants yet to be constructed, to which the director responded that the great majority of such licences are given to existing facilities looking to expand their processing scope.

Licences are rarely granted to processors without an established facility in which to process its raw material. Undoubtedly, a proportion of this rationale stems from the government’s demand for a complete business plan as part of the application process. The plan must include a description of the processing facility, funding and expenditure components, as well as the number of anticipated employees. Such information would be difficult to provide without an existing facility. Further, growing concerns within the industry with respect to overcapacity would make any measure that encouraged the construction of new plants irresponsible on the part of government. Recent changes to licencing regulations to be discussed in the next section all but guarantee a moratorium on the construction of new plants in the province for the foreseeable future.

The director also provided an overview of the licencing process describing the most significant stages. Even before potential applicants can begin preparing their application for submission, they must first advertise their intent to apply in local newspapers. This serves to inform the public of an applicant’s intentions and in turn allows the public the opportunity to voice their opinions to the government, whether in favour or against the proposed application. Once the application is submitted for
consideration, it is first checked for completeness to ensure all necessary information has been provided and all necessary components have been included. If this is not the case, the applicant must first provide the supplemental information before further processing can occur. Completed applications are given to the Licensing Board Secretariat (LBS) for review and consideration, and summaries and recommendations are then passed on to the licensing board itself. The board was described by the director as an independent entity with no government affiliation. Members are, however, appointed by cabinet. Potential candidates are simply required to have a relatively thorough knowledge of the industry and no direct affiliation with a harvesting operation or processing plant. The duration of a board member’s appointment ranges from two to four years, and the director emphasized that all attempts are made to ensure that both genders are equally represented on the board and that members come from as many different regions of the province as possible. After a thorough review of the application, and after all applicable parties, including the public, are able to present their views and argue their positions, the FPLB will then make a recommendation to the minister of fisheries, who will make the final decision.

The director informed me that this particular system of licence allocation was implemented in 2005. Prior to this, the process was principally an internal one, with little involvement from individuals or groups outside the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Many people, he noted, viewed such a system, in which decisions were principally made behind closed doors, with suspicion and as being conducive to biased decision making. As a result, the system was amended to its current state in the interest of transparency and fairness. The director noted that to the best of his recollection, the
minister has yet to go against a board recommendation since the current system was introduced in 2005. In April of 2009, however, provincial Fisheries Minister Tom Hedderson did indeed overrule the FPLB’s recommendation to award a shrimp processing licence to a plant owned by Beothic Fish Processors Limited in Valleyfield, Bonavista Bay. While the minister cited the inability of current shrimp processing plants in the region to operate at capacity in his decision not to award new licences, many, including former licencing board chairman Richard Cashin and Hedderson’s Tory colleague, Bonavista North Member of the House of Assembly (MHA) Harry Harding, believe that the province was misled by particular processors looking to protect their own interests in the area (Bartlett 2009). This will be discussed further in Section 5.6.

With regard to granting new processing licences, the director informed me that the province’s decision to make one or more new licences available is based primarily on a figure called the resource threshold. The department’s website defines the resource threshold as “the average volume of raw material for a species or species group that has to be available per year per active licence in order for any consideration to be given to issuing a new licence for that species or species group” (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008a: 2-1). With respect to snow crab, the resource threshold is 2,200 tonnes per year per active licence. To ensure that a particular threshold is adequately meeting government objectives, the thresholds are automatically reviewed when the average amount of raw material available for an active plant in a given year reaches eighty-five percent of the present threshold. I could not find an explanation on the department’s website describing how the resource threshold level is determined and thus asked the director how it was
decided how much raw material would need to be available for the government to consider issuing new licences. He admitted that the resource threshold is a somewhat arbitrary number that is not necessarily grounded solely in science. In most cases, for a new licence to be given, a new quota must first be provided by the province in which the resource threshold is increased. However, he did indicate that if an application, especially the business plan component, is particularly well developed and presented, then a new licence could be awarded without an increase in the resource threshold. Such a scenario however, had yet to occur as far as the director could recall.

I am exploring the various relations of power that exist within the provincial licence allocation system to determine how the structure of that system may influence agency and the ability to exercise power. To accomplish this I am searching for patterns within those relations that may explain how power is distributed and exercised within the system. This knowledge would go a long way in illuminating how the composition of the structure enables and constrains agency. What can individuals and community groups do, if anything, to exert some kind of influence within the process on their own behalf, and what sorts of social facts are acting for and against them? We saw how the structure of the system enables individuals and community collectives to present their opinions concerning whether they believe a particular applicant should get a licence. But what aspects of the structure constrain agency, and who are the most likely to be constrained?

The rules and procedures for licence application discussed previously constrain agency. It is those applying who are the most constrained by the strict directions for application, and when those applying are individuals and small community collectives, they are also, as
argued, the least likely to be able to exercise power. Isolating additional constraints against individuals and small groups would require isolating patterns in the decision making process.

I noticed on the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture website that there is a question on the application that asks if the company applying for the licence is publicly traded or privately owned. I inquired into the question’s purpose as it pertains to determining if a company would be a good candidate for receiving a licence. The director relayed that the government will allocate licences to large and small companies alike and that the answer to the question does not determine whether or not a licence is awarded. However, if we examine desired characteristics of a licence holder from the government’s standpoint, we see that the answer to that question is more important than it may appear. Ultimately, fish processing is a business, and obviously, for that business to be continually successful the government would require licence holders who are financially sound and who would provide stable employment to as many workers as possible for as long as possible. Again, it appears that it is the larger processing companies that are the most likely to appeal to the board as to who would make the best use out of the licence and be the most likely not to fail to uphold the conditions of ownership and default on the licence.

A processing licence, once issued, is valid for one year, corresponding with the province’s fiscal calendar from April 1st to March 31st. It is the responsibility of the licence holder to apply for renewal annually. In addition, the plant must meet a production threshold of twenty tonnes over two years or the licence is no longer
guaranteed upon request for renewal. Under these conditions, the government may deny a request for renewal and award the licence to another applicant. Yet, the director pointed out that there are groups in the province that have held licences for over forty years and that the minister is not generally in the business of revoking licences. Which groups are generally more experienced, more financially sound, and more likely to be a stable licence holder? It is the group of larger established processing firms. Such a statement is supported by the long historical involvement of the Daleys, Quinlans, and Barry Group in fish processing in the province and by the inclusion of processing firms in government consultations in Comorra following the cod moratorium. Additionally, it is this history that makes the relationship between large processors and the provincial government ripe with potential for clientelistic tendencies. It is not illogical to assume that larger, more established businesses as opposed to smaller community based firms, were more appealing to government in the past when it came to the business of the fishery and the potential for return on their investment. We already saw, especially with the work of Noel (1971), how patronage played a significant role in the political development of the province, particularly within the fishery. We also observed how there is a traditional philosophy with the government as it applies to long time licence holders continuing to maintain their licenced status. It is difficult to dispute that the licencing process at the very least could provide the conditions or environment necessary for a clientelistic relationship or for the remnants of a network of patronage to linger and still influence processes to some extent.
Groups of processors with relationships with government spanning decades and generations continue to reap the benefits associated with membership in that historical relationship, even in the face of measures aimed at eliminating discrimination based on membership. Based on social conditions and previous research, this scenario is at least plausible. Proving concrete existence would require direct confirmation from members of the clientelistic relationships. Such confirmation is unlikely given the political, economic, and cultural stakes, but to assume that such social relationships, and the power they provide, have completely faded away since the beginnings of self-government would be a significant underestimation of the attraction of clientelism. Nonetheless, if one was searching for evidence of patronage, the provincial licencing process, for the reasons just discussed, would be a logical place to look.

I asked the licencing director about geographic determinants in the decision making process. For example, does the presence of multiple licences in a geographic location or proximity of an applicant’s plant to harvesting grounds influence the probability of success? He indicated that the regional distribution of licences is a consideration, pointing out that the majority of current holders of crab processing licences are on the Avalon Peninsula. He also acknowledged that quality is an issue, with fishermen preferring to land their catch as close to the fishing grounds as possible, and that it is ideal to process quickly upon landing. However, while these things are considerations, plants are not favoured or restricted based on these factors. With the exception of area 2J in Labrador, where the short fishing season requires that crab be processed where caught to provide sufficient hours for Employment Insurance (EI), there
is no condition stipulating that crab be processed close to where it is landed. In fact, it has already been discussed how crab is often trucked all over the province for processing. Perhaps such a consideration should factor in the board’s decision. It would undoubtedly help improve some of the quality issues described previously by industry insiders. Recent developments in the industry to be discussed later in this chapter indicate that in fact these factors are now determinants of licence allocation.

My final inquiry concerned the absence of a formal appeals process for those denied in their attempt at securing a licence. I asked if there were any avenues that applicants can take once a decision has not gone in their favour. The director indicated that most denials of applications result from either licence inactivity (non-renewal) or in cases of requests for a licence transfer. There is an appeals process for those who have already been granted a licence. For example, a plant has twelve months from the expiry of a transitional licence in which to appeal the species or species group issued on that licence. However, the only circumstance under which a non-licenced plant can formally appeal a denied application is when the licence is not issued due to “extenuating circumstances such as fire, labour dispute, natural disaster, and/or discrepancies in production data provided to the Department” (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008b: 7-1). The director asserted that there is somewhat of an appeals process for unsuccessful applicants in that if new information or information not previously submitted is acquired, then it can be submitted for review. Auditors with the LBS will examine the new information and provide the board with a summary, and the board will re-deliberate and decide whether to issue a new recommendation to the minister or retain their previous
stance. When asked if there is anything an applicant can do to aid their cause, outside of the quality of their application, the director pointed to the public announcement of intention to apply and the opportunity applicants and others have to speak to the board and make presentations based on their personal stances. While this is without a doubt important, it occurs during the application process. Once the board recommendation has been made and the minister has announced his/her decision, there is little else applicants can do. So if individuals and small groups are less likely than larger groups to look attractive as licence holders initially as discussed above, once the decision has been made such recognition is virtually impossible to attain.

Through this research, I am not attempting to prove that patronage exists within the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. Qualitative research such as this is inherently non-positivist in nature. I am suggesting that under particular social conditions, remnants of clientelistic networks can still persist today and influence social action and that the province’s licencing system provides such conditions. Using the research of S.J.R. Noel (1971), it was shown that patronage heavily influenced early Newfoundland political life, which historically is synonymous with the fishery. It was also shown, using the research of Jeffery MacLeod (2006) and Mark Fletcher (1994), that clientelistic networks are particularly adept at evolving to counter political change. Further, a historical relationship between processing firms and the provincial government was established using interview data and the research of Sharon Taylor (2001). I argue that while there are multiple factors contributing to licence allocation, the structure of the licencing process continues to foster the social conditions necessary for clientelistic
remnants to remain in this province’s fishing industry and influence licencing decisions, especially given the traditional bond between politics and the industry and between government and processing firms as well. Nonetheless, what I am ultimately attempting to explore is structure, agency, and power within the industry. Patronage is but one means by which power is exercised. Relying on Anthony Giddens (1984), Pierre Bourdieu (1983), and Peter Berger (1963), I approach structure and agency as one entity to be studied simultaneously. The structure permits and constrains social action while that action is simultaneously changing the structure and reproducing the system. Similarly, I approach power, similar to Foucault, as something to be exercised at varying degrees by all players in a social relationship. In this instance, the players are individual community members and groups, processing firms, and the provincial government, while the licencing process is the structure. Using Apostle (1992; 1998), Marilyn Taylor (1985), and Sharon Taylor (2001), I explored the propensity for those involved in small scale fisheries to become disembedded from traditional social and cultural ties due to fisheries crises. This severing of traditional bonds has hampered fishermen, their families, and community collectives in their ability to draw upon crucial cultural resources and has thus diminished their ability to exercise power within the fishing industry. Such a situation has resulted in individuals and community groups within the structure of the licencing process being the least likely among those in the power dynamic to exert agency and exercise power. This has led to a shared sense of powerlessness and hopelessness. For particular groups of processors, membership in their group has provided particular resources which allow them to exercise power to a degree greater
than that of individuals and community collectives as well as other smaller processing firms. Their positions as employers, community leaders, and the economically well-off have enabled them to draw upon class based and other social resources not available to most others. As architects of mechanisms of social control such as licences, the provincial government is the most likely to act and exercise power at will within the licencing power dynamic and are the prime inhibitors, along with large processing firms, to community members and groups in their attempts to exert agency and exercise power. As Roniger (1994), Fletcher (1994), MacLeod (2006), and Noel (1971) demonstrated in their research, provincial governments in Atlantic Canada with strong historical ties to traditional industries such as the fishery have been and continue to be breeding grounds for networks of patronage. While the existence of patronage within the licence allocation system cannot be labeled a certainty, I have demonstrated that at the very least, the conditions conducive to its existence and persistence continue to be present. If it does persist to some degree, it is but another mechanism by which individuals and communities are restrained from action within the social structure, and by which large processing groups and the provincial government to a large extent are enabled by the structure. Recent developments in the industry indicate that while this power hierarchy remains firmly intact, individual and collective fishers and plant workers are making strides to increase their ability to exercise power and therefore assume increased control over the fate of their communities.
5.6 Recent Developments in the Processing Industry

Recent significant developments within the process of licence allocation in the province have provided additional information with which to approach structure, agency, and power in the manner utilized in this thesis. During September of 2008, it became known within the fishing industry that the current provincial Fisheries Minister, Trevor Taylor, was considering requests for new processing licences. On September 30th, a group of 100 fish plant workers presented a petition at the provincial legislature opposing any such action on the merit that overcapacity is a problem within the industry and that currently there are “too many plants and too many workers making too little income” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008a: 6). On October 27th, Minister Taylor announced that in agreement with the FPLB, he had decided not to approve a new licence request for the processing plant in Englee on the province’s Northern Peninsula. In addition, he announced the transfer of two existing licences. A crab processing licence moved from Trouty, Trinity Bay to Conche on the Northern Peninsula, while a shrimp processing licence was transferred from St. Josephs to La Scie on the Baie Verte Peninsula. Transferring the licences was, according to Minister Taylor, a better option than adding new ones in that it “avoided the adverse consequences of adding capacity while at the same time....providing for a more stable industry” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008b: 10). Also included in this announcement were amendments to the rules governing licencing and licence holders in the form of a Revised Seafood Processing Framework (RSPF). Among the amendments was a single species transfer rule and an increased
reliance on resource thresholds in decisions to grant new licences (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008c).

We will examine these new developments from the perspectives of the three players in the power dynamic discussed throughout, beginning, as we did previously, with those least likely to be able to act and exercise power within the structure of the licencing process - individual community members and community collectives. However, in this instance, the group of plant workers that presented the petition to government protesting the allocation of new processing licences, were acting within the confines of the licencing structure and were exercising power, and in the end, got what they wanted. This appears contradictory to my argument, in that if a certain degree of disembeddedness has occurred, severing traditional bonds and preventing the access to resources stemming from those bonds, then this group of plant workers should not have been able to mobilize the necessary resources to exercise power. However, power to some extent can be exercised by all social actors, and in keeping with Giddens, it can be productive as well as repressive in nature (Tucker Jr. 1998). Also, recall that Apostle and his colleagues (1998) posit that there exists a possibility for re-embedding where communities can reassert control over their local resources through collective action. Berger (1963) likewise asserted that we can change the conditions of our prison society and redefine the social structure through action. While society defines us, it is also defined by us, and one way in which this re-definition is accomplished is through *transformation*, which includes refusing to recognize existing definitions of society and self. Acting contrary to what is usually expected from a social actor in a particular
position is one way in which transformation occurs. This will be discussed in greater
detail further in this section. In relation to Giddens and Bourdieu, the ability of the
petitioning plant workers to exercise power is an example of the duality of structure, this
continuous reciprocal exchange between agency and structure. As social actors draw
upon and sometimes ignore the rules and resources of the social structure through action
or inaction, they are at the same time changing and reproducing that structure as well as
reproducing the social system (Giddens 1984; Bourdieu 1983). This line of reasoning as
it applies to the above mentioned actions of plant workers supports the notion that agency
and structure cannot be studied separately. While they may be the least likely to be able
to mobilize the resources needed to exercise significant power within the power dynamic
of the fishing industry, as demonstrated by Apostle (1998) with the Fogo Island Co-Op
and reconfirmed here, fishers and plant workers are by no means passively surrendering
to the challenges associated with resource collapse.

Most often, however, as Roland’s Cove residents are all too aware, a
community’s limited ability to exercise power, while undoubtedly beneficial, is not
enough to bring about the fundamental change to the structure needed to disrupt past
trends of oppression and constraint. In this recent case, the community of Englee will
have to endure without a processing licence. The Mayor of Englee, Ed Fillier, made a
significant statement concerning the structure of the licencing process when he said, “I
couldn’t believe that some political person, or non-political people, could make a decision
to take this away from us” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008c: 6). Similarly, a
recent editorial in The Telegram asserted that the degree of political involvement in the
licencing process in the past is one of the reasons there is a problem with plant overcapacity today (The Telegram Editorials 2008). We see here again evidence that notions concerning the close relationship between politics and the fishery in this province continue to persist, lending credence to the assertion that the licencing process is a social environment conducive to the persistence of patronage.

If the existing structure of the licencing process can indeed support some level of patronage, then the large processing groups should benefit in some manner by government’s recent decisions. Their status as significant players in the industry has already provided them with class based resources, allowing them to exercise power to a much greater degree than community individuals or groups. They also have a historical relationship with government and have been involved in past policy decisions where most community members and groups have been excluded (Taylor 2001). As the most likely candidate to receive government patronage, what did large processors gain from recent licencing decisions? With respect to the crab processing licence moving from Trouty to Conche, The Barry Group, one of the large processing groups mentioned by the interviewed plant managers, in fact lost its crab processing licence for the Trouty plant. Although the second licence transfer, from St. Joseph’s to La Scie, was for shrimp, it too is important in explaining the how of the licence allocation process. Again, a licence was taken from one of the large processors, this time the Daley Brothers, and given to a relatively smaller operation, Cold North Seafoods.

From the two scenarios outlined above, it may appear that the empirical facts are contrary to the expectations of my theoretical model in that the large processors did not
gain from recent licencing decisions, but in fact lost valuable processing licences. Yet as previously shown with respect to the apparent contradiction in the ability of community members to exercise power while being disembedded from traditional kinship networks, the nature of this research requires that a thorough analysis into the licencing process must go beyond the empirical facts, and as a result, I believe an examination of the context of those licencing decisions explains much of this apparent contradiction.

Ultimately, the Barry Group should not have been surprised to loose their Trouty licence since the plant had been closed since 2007, and two straight years of inactivity would not guarantee renewal of that licence upon application. Further, there was little public challenge on the part of Barry to the licencing decision, which appears to indicate that the firm either was not overly concerned about the loss of the licence or was already aware that the licence would be lost or both.

Let us examine the decision from the perspective of the businesses involved. The Barry Group operates a total of 17 plants in Atlantic Canada, 11 in Newfoundland and Labrador. Northern Seafoods, owned by Derek Green, is relatively small in comparison. They operate two plants in the province, one in Conche, the other in Winterton. The larger Barry Group lost a licence while the much smaller Northern Seafoods gained one. Nonetheless, it is not as if the Barry Group is significantly hampered by the decision, especially given their plant’s previous closure. The same cannot be said positively for Northern Seafoods. If the decision had not gone in their favour, it is hard to imagine it not hampering the small business, as Mr. Green called the licence critical to the survival of his plant. If we return to the arguments of Richard Apostle and his colleagues (1998),
these smaller processing firms were possibly already finding it difficult to operate and survive, since they have been part of the same traditional kinship networks as community members and would also have found it increasingly difficult to access the cultural capital needed to exercise power. The larger processors face no such obstacle.

With respect to the licence transfer from St. Joseph’s to La Scie, it is important to note that only the shrimp licence transfers from St. Joseph’s. The Daley Brothers plant retains its other licences and continues operation despite the fact that one of the new conditions announced by the minister is that in all future transfers, the plant transferring the licence must transfer all licences and then close. It is hoped this will avoid processors trading licences as commodities (The Telegram Editorials 2008).

In the end, although the large processors lost licences in the recent government decisions, how much did they really loose? The Barry Group lost a licence that was not being utilized for a plant that was no longer operational, while the Daley’s lost a shrimp licence but retained all other licences despite changes to licencing regulations that should have seen them lose all licences and then close their plant. In difficult times, success comes often not to those who gain the most, but to those who lose the least. In such a fragile time for the Newfoundland fishery, when there is so much public scrutiny surrounding every decision made, perhaps the reward given to large processing firms by the government as part of the clientelistic relationship is simply not to lose too much. In the end, the lost licences appear to have done very little to disrupt the daily operation of the large processors or their ability to exercise power within the industry.
As there are always multiple factors contributing to social life, there are additional explanations that could account for the apparent contradiction to my theoretical model as well. The Association of Seafood Producers, of which the Barry Group is a member, is an association whose members represent upwards of 60 plants in rural Newfoundland and Labrador and which aims to make significant contributions to governmental policy decisions with respect to the regulation of the industry (Association of Seafood Producers 2004). Perhaps the major industry players in association with government approved the decisions to some extent in order to avoid the potential backlash from industry workers that would undoubtedly have come if a new licence had been issued or transfers had not been approved. I also believe that the collective action of plant workers protesting at the provincial legislature did what it was designed to do in influencing government to take the path of least resistance and transfer licences to those who needed them for community survival as opposed to granting new ones. Interestingly, such collective action on the part of individuals and groups is one of the few strategies proposed to have the ability to disrupt the influence of clientelistic relationships and threaten their continuance.

While the reasons provided as to why large processors lost licences in recent government decisions are speculative in nature, that does not make them any less possible, nor does the fact that large processors lost licences necessarily contradict my theoretical model. Given the importance of these processing licences to community survival, especially now that the licences are becoming more scarce and regulations stricter, and the associated public scrutiny of government decisions, I believe that the dominance power holds over rationality within the industry is beginning to wane.
somewhat. As a result, decisions are being made with an increased awareness of their impact on communities and the potential public backlash that may result. I do not believe however that this trend is a conscious decision on the part of government, but is most likely the result of the persistent collective action of fishers, plant workers, and other community members. This in no way signals the end of the dominance power has over rationality in the industry. The social actor(s) with the greatest ability to exercise power will always determine what is rational, especially when that actor is the state and it can use discourse in its efforts. However, collective action and, perhaps most importantly, publicity are the most effective means to combat patronage. I believe that ultimately it was these two factors that led to the recent licencing decisions and ultimately explain why large processors did not outwardly gain as my theoretical model suggested they should. The exercising of power through collective action and publicity forced those within the clientelistic relations to move those relations, at least temporarily, to the periphery and to yield to the power of fishers and plant workers and accept their rationale. Changes to licencing regulations to be discussed below also support my assertion concerning the loosening of the stronghold that government power has over rationality in the industry.

Lending much credence to the argument put forth by proponents of a Roland’s Cove licence is the fact that the ability to process raw material adjacent to where it is landed and avoid quality pitfalls was a main determinant in the recent decision to transfer licences. In fact, Minister Taylor explicitly stated that “moving the licences to these new locations will provide for adjacency to the resource, reducing trucking of product and
improved quality of seafood” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008b: 4). An industry member also commented that shrimp landed at La Scie passes within fifteen feet of the town’s plant on its way to the truck which will transport it to St. Joseph’s for processing. In his words, that was why the transfer was reasonable or rational. Fish, Food and Allied Workers union president Earle McCurdy made the argument as well. Both the owner of the Roland’s Cove plant and the former and current managers interviewed for this study all expressed similar sentiments in their assertions concerning their facility. We cannot say that licences were in this case awarded or denied based on closeness to the resource, but the minister’s comments made it clear that it played a much larger role here than perhaps it did in the past decisions the licencing director was referring to when we discussed the importance of processing material close to where it is landed. Perhaps, as indicated above, conditions are beginning to reverse somewhat and the rationale advocated by many communities is beginning to overcome government power. Ultimately, this does not change the structure of the power relations. Government still maintains its dominant position over other industry actors, however, it is clear that factors that were simply considerations in licencing decisions in the past became licencing determinants as a result of the amendments, and it is difficult not to attribute some of that change to the actions of fishers, plant workers, and other community members. All social actors can exercise power to some extent. It is just that that extent is not equally distributed. Unfortunately, the number of licences already on the Long Shore and the opinions of many industry players and the province have significantly diminished Roland’s Cove’s chances of receiving a licence. In the end, it is not surprising then that
Englee was also denied in its bid. The town’s plant had not been operational for several years due to maintenance problems, and Englee’s officials had in fact applied for land from the government to build a new plant. Given the opposition surrounding granting new licences to existing facilities, it is hard to imagine granting a licence to someone who is intent on adding to the existing multitude of plants in the province. Minister Taylor supported this reasoning when stating, “I think it’s fair to say that the days of new plants being built anywhere in Newfoundland and Labrador ----- I won’t say it will never happen again, but I don’t see it in the foreseeable future” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008c: 12).

In an interview with the Telegram, Derek Butler, executive director of the ASP said that the association was pleased with the government’s decision as it was strongly against issuing any new licences. He also expressed the association’s support for the new guidelines announced by the government through the RSPF, which Mr. Butler felt would make the conditions for approval stricter (McLean 2008). While FFAW President Earle McCurdy also generally agreed with government’s recent rulings, he noted that the union representing industry workers in the province was not sold on the idea of being unable to transfer single species licences (VOCM 2008). The licencing decisions and new regulations seemed to be embraced by much of the industry’s workforce as well. A content workforce will also benefit the industry. This open praise by the processing industry for the decisions lends additional support to my assertions given that such public endorsement is often the means by which clients fulfill their obligations to patrons within
clientelistic relationships. That is not to say, however, that processors and government agree on all issues.

Detractors to my theory concerning the dynamic between large processing firms and the provincial government may point as evidence against a clientelistic relationship between them to the January 2009 decision on the part of the processing industry in which processors voted to reject a proposal by government for the establishment of a province wide marketing council. However, as with the previously discussed apparent contradictions to my assertions, closer analysis of the context of that vote provides a more suitable explanation. First of all, as mentioned previously, these large processing firms, while able to exercise significant power due to their class positions and clientelistic involvement, are not exempt from the constraining effects of the social structure. They have to abide by the rules and regulations imposed by government and are just as vulnerable to government’s ability to exercise power as community members and groups. Additionally, while the clientelistic relationship is mutually beneficial, like the power inherent in it, that benefit is not equally distributed. The client agrees to relinquish control over existing resources within the relationship and thus relinquish some power as well. Thus, processing firms do face constraint from government and therefore may periodically find themselves in disagreement with the patron’s decisions and subsequently act to combat that constraint. Yet, these disagreements are far outweighed by the advantages stemming from the clientelistic relationship. With respect to the vote, fifty percent of processors were in favour of the initiative. However, those yes votes were also required to come from plants that in total represented more than half of the
production value of seafood in the province. In the end, the plants voting yes represented less than forty eight percent of that production value (NovaNewsNow.com 2009). Which plants are most likely to have the highest combined production values? Most likely it is those owned by the large processing firms. Perhaps they consciously acted to show displeasure with the government’s proposal. Even if this is not the case, it is hard to imagine these firms not significantly influencing the outcome of that vote, whether intentionally or not.

Another recent event within the industry further supports the ability of processors to influence licencing decisions. In April of 2009, provincial Fisheries Minister Tom Hedderson overruled the FPLB’s recommendation to award a shrimp processing licence to a plant owned by Beothic Fish Processors Limited in Valleyfield, Bonavista Bay. From most accounts, this was the first time since the inception of the FPLB in 2005 that a minister has vetoed a licencing recommendation. Mr. Hedderson noted that although ninety-nine percent of past recommendations have been accepted, he could not accept this one, citing feasibility, threshold capacity, and regional balance as the three criteria influencing his decision. He argued that to give shrimp to Valleyfield would cause a ripple effect that would result in a diminished capacity for other plants to process shrimp. However, prominent players in government and the industry, most notably Hedderson’s Tory colleague, Bonavista North MHA Harry Harding, and chairman of the FPLB at the time, Richard Cashin, refute Minister Hedderson’s reasoning, believing that it is inherently flawed. Harding believed that the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture was misled by other processors, stating “I believe that it’s the processors wanting to
protect their own turf, just as Richard Cashin said in his report, more so than their concern about excess capacity” (Bartlett 2009). Cashin called the decision “the most egregious decision he’s ever seen regarding the fishery in his forty seven years of experience” (Bartlett 2009). Cashin stated that the board was no longer independent and was being treated with contempt, and that he was planning to resign over another dispute but stayed on to hear the Valleyfield case. NDP Leader Lorraine Michael made an important point when she noted that instances of Tory MHAs and backbenchers speaking out against the William’s government are very rare and have not boded well in the past for those doing the speaking, and the fact that Mr. Harding had done so here makes her “sit up and wonder” (Bartlett 2009). Whether or not pressure from processors played a part in Minister Hedderson’s decision, it is hard not to adopt a “where there’s smoke, there’s fire” mentality, especially since here it is not frustrated community members making the accusations, but a MHA and the former FPLB chair.

I will next explore these significant new developments in the processing industry from the perspective of the provincial government, the group, which it is suggested is the most powerful within the processing power dynamic and in conjunction with processing firms, is the prime inhibitor to community agency. Michel Foucault placed much emphasis on the state’s use of discourse or expert knowledge as an avenue for exercising power. Governments often define and re-define concepts which eventually come to be rationalized and accepted by society. Through these discourses, governments come to determine what is acceptable and what is considered deviant (Rabinow 1984). Similarly, Peter Berger (1963) noted how rules and other mechanisms of social control come to be
institutionalized within the social structure. Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) demonstrated how a Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Aalborg, Denmark illegitimately rationalized the interpretation of a survey to assume control over a city planning project. Flyvbjerg asserts that power and rationality are inseparable much as structure and agency are to Giddens, and similarly, the relationship between the two is not symmetrical, with power often dominating rationality (Flyvbjerg 2001). I believe that this concept could possibly serve to answer an important question raised by many of those interviewed. Some Roland’s Cove community members, despite having their own theories, were baffled about how they keep being denied in their licencing bids, despite apparent logistical advantages offered through the town’s plant. They have a good harbour, ice and water supplies, and proximity to where catches are landed, yet to date have been unsuccessful. At the same time, the province has its own criteria for licence holders, and since power has the tendency to dominate rationality and logic, even though Roland’s Cove may be a rational choice to those within the community, the power dynamic, including clientelistic relationships, may dictate another course of action, one in which government’s rationality dictates the course of the industry. As briefly mentioned above, recent licencing decisions and changes to regulations, such as processing close to landing sites to improve quality, appear to suggest that this trend is reversing somewhat and that fishers, plant workers, and other community members are acting in a manner which has allowed them to exercise power in the face of opposition from the other major players in the industry, allowing the logic and rationality put forth by communities to supplant, at least temporarily, previously established power relationships aimed at maintaining the status
quo. Despite this, however, the provincial government continues to be the most able to exercise power within the licencing process and thus continues to maintain its position atop the power hierarchy.

So far in this section I have utilized recent licencing decisions and changes to regulations to demonstrate how two of the three major social actors may mobilize the necessary resources to act and exercise power within the licencing process. However, those most able to exercise power, provincial government actors, have an advantage in that they can do so even in the face of opposition from the others. What gives them such an advantage? Obviously as architects of much of the licencing structure, they dictate the course of action, but specifically it is the resources at their disposable which enable them to shape the structure and continue to reproduce a social system conducive to maintaining and solidifying their place in the power dynamic. Two of those resources as it applies to this study are discourse and patronage.

How do state’s best exercise power? According to Foucault, it is through the use of discourse. I believe that the provincial government exercised power through the announcements of the decision to transfer the licences and through the amendments to regulations governing licences contained in the RSPF. Through the amendments, the government is rationalizing another version of the rules and altering the mechanisms of social control to coincide with its current stance on granting new licences. Another of these amendments (in addition to the single species transfer rule and the government’s preference to process close to where landing occurs) has to do with availability of raw material. Many throughout the industry have been telling Minister Taylor that there is not
enough raw material to support the current licences and definitely not enough to justify adding new ones. In early March 2005, the minister announced the introduction of the Raw Material Sharing (RMS) system in accordance with recommendations made by Eric Dunne in the 2004 Dunne Report on Fish Processing Licence Policy. The introduction of the arms length licencing board also came from this report. The RMS system utilized an arbitrator to share the production capacity from the strong regions across regional lines so that all plants would have material to process (Newfoundland and Labrador 2005a). Shortly thereafter, several crab fishermen disrupted the provincial legislature protesting the new plan, saying it would “take away hard-fought power from the harvesting sector” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008d: 4). An independent review led government to drop the policy. According to a local newscast, since then, the market has been the primary determinant of whether plants continue to operate or shut down. Now, according to Minister Taylor, “the most important factor guiding decisions on processing licences will be the volume of what’s swimming in the ocean” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2008c: 11). This relates to an earlier discussion concerning the resource threshold and what actually contributed to arriving at that figure. Also, we saw how a combination of factors contributed to licence allocation according to the provincial licencing director, but with no one appearing more important that another, including adjacency to fishing grounds, which now appears to be a determining factor. Additionally, stock numbers are apparently now the most important factor. Here we see a direct example of the state using discourse to exercise power. State actors alter definitions of concepts and restructure rules and regulations, and by doing so, they are also
exercising power and altering the social structure to maintain or improve upon their current position in the power dynamic. As discussed previously, the continuous changing of the social structure is not easily observable due to its tendency to change in small increments over an extended period of time. That is one reason why agency must be included in any study of structure. Recall Giddens’ assertion that the structure becomes solid only through the performing of social acts. While fishers, plant workers, and processors were altering the structure and reproducing the system through their actions, the province was doing the same through licencing decisions and changes to rules and regulations governing licencing. However, the changes to the rules were not drastic. Many of the licencing conditions announced recently by government were considerations in the past, but now they appear to be determinants. Through these small changes to the structure of licencing regulations and the choice of specific terminology, the province is utilizing discourse as a means to maintain its position of power within the industry despite opposition from the other major social actors. A similar situation involving the state’s use of discourse was described by Sharon Taylor (2001) when textual analysis revealed that documents related to the federal government’s Atlantic Groundfish Strategy contained abstract and undefined terminology, such as long term, support, and labour adjustment programs. Taylor asserted that TAGS documents were “central to the exercise of power by the federal government in relation to the fisheries” (2001: 152). Ultimately, the use of discourse by state actors further impedes the actions of those with little ability to exercise power, while enabling those most likely to exercise it. This results in a constant reproduction of the system through the continuous structure/agency interaction.
The second of the special resources available to the province enabling it to maintain its position in the licencing power dynamic has been utilized by governments in this province for centuries, especially as it applies to the fishery. We have already discussed the historic permeation of patronage into the provincial government, specifically with respect to its role in the fishing industry. We have utilized theoretical literature to demonstrate the persistence of clientelism once it has become part of the social system, and we have discussed studies, including this one, in which participants appeared certain of a special relationship grounded in political favouritism between processors and the province. In 2005, in announcing the new processing regulation amendments, a government news release stated that “these licence decisions will no longer be made behind closed doors, without the benefit of public scrutiny and a suitable business proposal. The licensing board will increase transparency, ensure solid analysis of viability, and remove politics from licensing decisions” (Newfoundland and Labrador 2005b: 10). This is an admission from the government that politics have been involved in past licencing decisions. Minister Taylor’s recent statements again noted that the new framework will increase transparency in the overall process and provide clearer guidelines to those reviewing applications (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008c). Again, the strong bond between politics and the fishing industry has been demonstrated. If politics needed to be removed from the licencing process in 2005, and further transparency and clarity are still required today, not only does this suggests that the industry is a favourable environment for the continuance of patronage, but that it is the most likely place to find it if it still persists within the province’s political system.
Further, Minister Taylor noted in his recent announcements that the decision not to award a new licence to Englee was made by the FPLB and that he accepted its recommendation. He also said the RSPF was designed in part to provide clearer guidelines to the board (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008c). While the FPLB was described by the director of licencing as an independent entity with no government affiliation, its members are appointed by cabinet and the final decision on licencing is made by the minister. This, I believe, makes the FPLB susceptible to interference from those involved in networks of patronage. As discussed previously, in 2009, for the first time since the board’s inception in 2005, a fisheries minister went against a board recommendation, rejecting a proposal to award a licence to the plant in Valleyfield, Bonavista Bay.

One could argue that one instance in four years does not demonstrate clientelistic interference, and this would be correct. But what it does demonstrate is that the FPLB is not the politics free, transparent, independent entity government claims it to be. Also, the group critics of this recent decision believe influenced the minister is the large processors looking to protect the interests of their own plants. Further, consider who is making these claims? It is not frustrated fishers and plant workers, but a member of the current government and the former board chairman. Finally, if the government were involved in clientelistic relationships with large processing firms, vetoing board recommendations on a regular basis would bring increased scrutiny to the process and thus threaten the continuation of those relationships. However, strategic measures aimed at concealing such relationships would enable them to persist despite licencing reform. In the end,
while nothing less than admission from the involved parties would serve to demonstrate the existence of patronage within the licencing process, the theoretical literature, the description of the social environment in which the process operates, as well as the discussion of the context of recent developments in the industry presented in this study all indicate that it is a resource on which the provincial government relies to exercise power in the industry and ensure the continuous reproduction of a social system that has served to protect their interests for centuries.

While clientelism would undoubtedly enhance the ability of the provincial government to exercise power within the licencing dynamic, structure and agency are also crucial components to this dynamic as well as to this research. In fact, it is the interaction of structure and agency that has continuously reproduced a social environment in this province conducive to patronage. The provincial government, through its actions and inactions, has fostered a highly politicized fishing industry in which maintaining the status quo has continued to be a mandate among many of its representatives and transparency a mandate among few. Clientelistic relationships were able to survive successive governments, because while the party in power changed, many components of the structure did not. The actions of those involved continued to alter the social structure and reproduced a social system that enabled past clientelistic tendencies to persist. As noted above, when studying structure and agency in the holistic manner inspired by Giddens, the constant change to the structure and the reproduction of the system happens often without much notice. Often, it is not a particular all encompassing act that changes the structure, but the everyday actions of those within the system going about their
everyday social lives. Taylor (2001) noted that it was these everyday experiences which allowed community members to recognize the nature of their constraint, determine lines of fault with TAGS policy, and devise solutions to further collective action and exercise power. What often occurs, and what has appeared to have occurred with patronage in the fishing industry, is that the actions of the most powerful, no matter how deviant in nature, come to be normalized and engrained over time, making it all the more difficult to disrupt their continuance. In other words, these actions and their effects become institutions.

While the actions of those involved in clientelistic relationships changed the social structure to enable themselves, they were simultaneously constraining the actions of another group; fishers and plant workers. There is little doubt that harvesters and plant workers on the Long Shore were historically hindered in their ability to exert agency within the fishing industry. Recall that most Long Shore residents are of Irish Catholic decent and that the first Irish settlers on the Long Shore were brought over by the English as servants. Also, the merchant led “fishocracy” which arose in the nineteenth century utilized measures such as the truck system to limit the ability of fishers to exercise power (Noel 1971). This oppression continued well into the twentieth century when processing firms and government replaced merchants as the prime community inhibitors. According to Marilyn Taylor (1985), even prior to the moratorium, the closure of the Roland’s Cove plant had resulted in diminished community esteem and decreased societal interaction. Further, Sharon Taylor (2001) demonstrated that TAGS policy following the moratorium contributed to a disassociation from community-based relationships among residents of
Comorra and hampered their ability to draw upon the group resources which had traditionally aided them in times of crises.

Despite this however, in following the theoretical reasoning of this thesis, communities are not passive onlookers to their oppression. They are aware social actors searching for ways to help themselves. Berger (1963) asserted that social control mechanisms and systems as part of the existing social structure require our constant confirmation and re-confirmation in order to operate effectively, because however slight, all social actors can exercise power to some extent. To challenge and change the existing social structure, those under constraint can withhold this confirmation/re-confirmation in three ways; detachment, manipulation and transformation. Through theory and interview data, it has already been demonstrated that residents of the Long Shore became detached from traditional community kinship networks before and after the moratorium. In this case however, that detachment was involuntary, and occurred not as a deliberate act of social resistance as Berger asserts, but was a result of the constraining effects of the existing social structure. The protesting plant workers who presented the petition to government condemning the issuing of any new processing licences did, however, manipulate the system. By using the provincial legislature as an avenue to communicate their stance to government, they were utilizing the legislature it in a way not included within its “official operating procedures” and were demonstrating their ability to “work the system” (1963: 134). Berger’s (1963) third method to withhold confirmation of the structure’s social control components provides an example of a way in which fishers and processors were able to exert agency and at the same time challenge historical
clientelistic tendencies. The plant workers that petitioned government, as well as the 3,200 individuals who signed the petition, realized what issuing new processing licences would do to an already fragile industry and refused to accept the existing licencing structure and attempted to change that structure through collective action. It has never been said here that these individuals and groups could not exercise power. What is especially important is how they choose to exercise the little power they are able to exercise. In this case, and in other instances mentioned in this document, community individuals utilized collective demonstrations and petitions to mobilize the group resources necessary to act against the constraining force of the existing social structure and exercise power. In doing so, they were in fact refusing to accept existing and historical definitions of society and self which they recognized as a threat to their very existence. As a result, they mobilized and began to act in ways that were not in line with these pre-existing definitions. By changing the definitions, they transformed components of the social structure and thus the social system. Today, we see increased transparency within the industry and an acknowledgement within the government that such transparency was and is necessary. We also see a promise on the part of government to make licencing decisions based on the availability of raw material and not politics. While it would be likely erroneous to assume that patronage does not persist in some form within the licencing system, recent developments concerning government involvement in Memorial University suggest it may persist in the education system as well) the changes to the structure just discussed could only serve to enable community members
and groups and allow them to exercise more power within the industry; something that that particular group have been historically constrained from doing.

In concluding this chapter, the point I want to emphasize most is that my explanations of the how of the licencing process are by no means the only explanations, nor do they encompass all the social action surrounding the process. The interplay between agency and structure continuously reproduces the social system, but the action of community individuals and groups, plant owners, and the government within the licencing structure are but a part of the larger social system. There is rarely, if ever, one sole explanation for a particular social condition or circumstance. The complex interplay between agency and structure almost guarantees that. This research attempts to further delve into that relationship utilizing the province’s processing licence allocation system as the social environment from which to observe the structure/agency dynamic and the complex social relationships which result from it. Yet, even within such defined boundaries, there are multiple other actors and structural components contributing to this particular social situation - the federal government, worker’s unions, scientific research trends, and global market conditions are just a few. With that in mind, what are the implications for generalizing my findings to a wider geographic area and for conducting further research into structure, agency, and power within the fishing industry? Such issues will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Following the collapse of the northern cod stocks and the resulting 1992 government imposed moratorium, many small Newfoundland fishing communities struggled to survive amid the loss of a way of life that had sustained them and their ancestors since the first permanent settlements were established on the island beginning in the early seventeenth century. Compounding efforts to regain some measure of economic vitality in the wake of the moratorium was the fact that many of these communities had never attempted to diversify prey species, mostly because prior to the stock collapse there had never been much reason to, as the cod fishery had traditionally provided relatively all that was needed for individual, family, and community subsistence in outport Newfoundland and Labrador. When cod was no longer a harvesting option, however, it became rapidly evident that if communities were to survive in the wake of the cod stock collapse and still rely on the fishery to do so, a new fisheries strategy had to be adopted in which alternate prey species replaced cod as the focus of harvesters and processors. In the years immediately following the moratorium, shellfish such as crab and shrimp, which had traditionally been regarded by fishers as ocean parasites to be thrown back if found amongst their catch, became the species on which many communities rested their hope of economic recovery. Consequently, the demand for licences to process these newly targeted species increased dramatically as it was believed that a processing licence would provide the employment opportunities and economic stimulus needed for community recovery. A detailed review into community well being conducted by a number of social,
economic, and health researchers in 2005 supported this assumption, finding that very few, if any, communities had fully recovered from the cod stock collapse. Those that did achieve significant economic recovery did so by refocusing harvesting and processing practices towards new profitable species such as crab and shrimp. In an attempt to avoid a repeat of the mismanagement practices that had plagued the cod fishery, the provincial government was relatively frugal in its allocation of new licences as it strove to regulate overall capacity. Given the importance of these new processing licences in community recovery and survival, a sociological inquiry was conducted into the process of licence acquisition in Newfoundland and Labrador in an attempt to examine how social structure, agency and power are manifested within the licencing system and the extent to which they interrelate and coexist to contribute to or influence how licences are allocated. Specifically, I utilized the case of Roland’s Cove to explore the complex relationships between the principal actors in the licencing system - community members and collectives, processing firms, and the provincial government - to determine the resources and strategies available to each group and how these resources are used to exert agency and exercise power within the structure of the licencing system.

Although there are many players with varying interests within the province’s licencing system, I chose to concentrate my efforts on what I believe to be the three main participants. Based on the social theories outlined in Chapter 2, I then proposed a theory concerning each participant’s position within the complex dynamic of the province’s licencing system and their resultant ability to exert agency and exercise power within the structure of that system.
I proposed that the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture would be the most likely to be able to act and exercise power within the structure of the licencing system principally because its personnel are the architects of the licencing structure that serves to constrain and enable action within the system. In addition to providing the mechanisms of social control under which the system operates, their particular social position also enables them to avail themselves of resources in the form of social or cultural capital that are unavailable to most other social actors since these resources are unequally distributed within society and stem from membership within a particular group or class. I suggest that two particular ways in which provincial politicians and officials may be utilizing the resources and the accompanying power stemming from their positions is through the use of discourse and clientelistic networks.

Further, I suggested that processing firms are the next likely group to be able to act and exercise power within the licencing dynamic. While they are subject to the constraining effects of the province’s mechanisms of social control, a particular group of processors, those operating multiple plants in multiple locations, hold elite social positions. Their relative wealth and class positions in comparison to most other community members, as well as their role as employers in a struggling but crucial industry, provide them with particular resources that foster their efforts to act and exercise power in the face of the constraints of the social structure. Moreover, their position as major industry players with far reaching influence among industry workers as well as their historical relationship with government makes them the most likely group to be recipients of political patronage if such relationships still persist. While such an
association is rarely as advantageous to the client as it is the patron, it is mutually beneficial and, therefore, these large processing firms have potential resources at their disposal that are not available to most others in the industry.

Finally, I asserted that individual community members and collectives would be the least likely to be able to exert agency and exercise power within the licencing system. They are subject to the same governmental mechanisms of social control as most plant owners and processors; yet, they are further constrained by those same processors, whose social position provides resources which enable them to act and exercise power in ways not always beneficial to individuals and community collectives. The exclusion of individual community members from potential clientelistic networks would also significantly hamper their efforts to exercise power to the degree necessary to overcome some of the effects of stock collapse. At the same time, past fisheries crises and oppression by groups in greater positions of power have drastically impeded the ability of these individuals to draw upon what limited resources they did have as members of traditional small scale fishing communities. The cod moratorium further impeded this ability. With no other sources of cultural capital, i.e. class based resources, they have a diminished capacity to act in the face of the existing social structure, not to mention in the face of the other major participants in the licencing process. This has led to a sense of hopelessness and powerlessness among communities combating resource collapse. Yet, as Berger (1963) asserted, there always exists the possibility that social actors can combat the constraining effects of the “prison society” through changing the social structure and thus social system through action. Similarly, power is exercised by all participants in
social relationships, but because of its unequal distribution, it is how the power is exercised that determines the ability to achieve significant social change.

Ultimately, the data collected for the case study of Roland's Cove appear to support the suggestions outlined above. While there is no surprise that individual community members and groups were devastated and discouraged by the cod moratorium, there is evidence that supports the disembeddedness from traditional social bonds as suggested by Richard Apostle and his colleagues (1992; 1998). Many respondents detailing their involvement in the fishery stressed the importance of the processing plant, often describing it as the hub of their community. They also spoke of the unique traditional relationships among fishers, small processing firms, and workers. As modern capitalist trends served to weaken the ties between the economic and the social through stock collapse and plant closure, they too have weakened the bonds of traditional social relationships. Individuals are not as embedded or located within these relationships as they once were and thus now have difficulty availing themselves of the resources that accompanied membership within these social networks. Further, Marilyn Taylor (1985) found that crucial characteristics of embeddedness have diminished significantly due to plant reductions prior to the moratorium. A complete stock collapse only served to exacerbate such a trend, thus dramatically impeding the ability to draw upon the previously relied upon resources to foster community recovery. This in turn, would make it very difficult to act and exercise power, especially in the face of opposition from the other players in the industry. This statement is supported by the research of Sharon Taylor (2001). Taylor, in her study of the social construction of the
meanings of community in Comorra, found that the sense of community, belonging, and “we” mentality stemming from a shared history and the past and present oppression of residents by groups such as the government was eroded by the cod moratorium and the individualized structure of TAGS. This obstructed access to resources that the community had traditionally relied upon to deal with past fisheries crisis and thus severely limited the ability of community members and collectives to exert agency and exercise power (2001). Continued constraint through mismanagement, neglect, and inadequate support programs, namely by processing firms and the federal government, led to a sense of helplessness similar to that which Marilyn Taylor warned would result in Roland’s Cove if social solidarity and community esteem did not improve. Accounts from community members involved in past attempts at licence attainment in Roland’s Cove also suggest the possibility of clientelism within the licencing system. Many spoke of the connection between licencing decisions and those in positions of political power with vested interests in such decisions. While there may be some amount of speculation and/or resentment behind such accusations, data collected from other participants involved in the licencing process as well as recent significant developments in the industry appear to lend credence to these assertions. Despite being somewhat disembedded from the traditional relationships which historically provided them with the resources required to exercise power, and despite the constraining effects of clientelism’s continued persistence within the fishery, recent developments within the industry demonstrate that communities are not idle recipients of hardships, but through individual and collective action are
disrupting unfavourable components of the social structure and changing the social system in an attempt to secure their survival.

Relying on the accounts of former plant managers and a current plant owner, not only does it appear that processors can avail themselves of resources not available to individual community members and groups in their attempts at exercising power within the licencing system, but that a significant portion of those resources is possibly the result of membership in clientelistic networks. Taylor (2001) noted the inclusion of processing firms and the exclusion of most other community members and groups in government consultations concerning policy development in response to the cod moratorium. Further, a constant theme running through the interviews is the inability of Roland’s Cove to secure a processing licence despite a plethora of advantages that they felt should have put them ahead of many other previously licenced communities. Many asserted that certain groups of plant owners are purposefully acting to ensure other plants do not flourish, relying often on their social position or group membership to do so. A desire to maintain the status quo among government officials, a desire often linked to political patronage, is also a frequently mentioned contributor to some of the shortcomings found today within the licencing process and in the industry as a whole. It was also suggested that those most likely to be approved for licences were the large processing firms, since these groups are the most likely to meet the province’s applicant standards of experience, financial security, and overall stability. There is also an historical affiliation on the Long Shore between processing firms and government, and the recent accusations by a government member and a former licencing board director that processing firms influenced the
minister’s decision to overrule a board recommendation suggests that that affiliation could very well continue today. Whatever the nature of the relationship between large processing firms and the provincial government, the accounts of all of those interviewed as well as recent industry events indicate that these firms have the ability to avoid many of the constraints of the licencing structure and often act as they see fit. The average community member, community collective, or small processing firm does not possess this capacity.

An interview conducted with the province’s director of licencing as well as recent major changes in the manner in which processing licences are awarded in the province provided important knowledge and information to explain how the actions of government influence the licencing dynamic. One method used by governmental actors to exercise power is though the rules and regulations that govern the licencing process. It was asserted that discourse, (in a Foucauldian manner) through changes to licencing rules and regulations and the use of ambiguous terminology, aided in manipulating the structure and enabling the state’s ability to exercise power to a degree greater than the other major actors. Taylor (2001) raised a similar issue in her study of policy documents relating to TAGS. She found frequent use of undefined ambiguous expressions such as long term and support and highlighted a deliberate focus by the federal government on the individual as opposed to the family or community. This led to community division and conflict and impedance to community agency. In using discourse as a means of social control within the licencing system, the provincial government has utilized power to impose measures that it considers rational. This in part explains how the apparently
favourable logistical characteristics of the Roland’s Cove plant did not result in a licence. While it may have been a rational choice to those within the community, power often dominates rationality, especially when power is being exercised by the state through discourse. In the end, the accepted rationality, the one that eventually becomes institutionalized, is that which comes from those most able to exercise power.

The 2005 implementation of a processing licencing board to advise the minister was an effort on the part of the provincial government to introduce transparency into the licencing process. Another goal of the restructuring was to remove politics from licencing decisions. This admission on the part of the government of the connection between the fishing industry and politics, and the need for transparency, lends much credence to the earlier discussed statements from interview participants concerning the outcome of past licencing attempts in Roland’s Cove. It also serves to demonstrate that the fishing industry is a social environment that at least until recently had retained much of the same structure that was present in the earliest days of the industry when political patronage was rampant. Also supporting the potential for clientelistic relationships within the licencing process is the fact that the large processing firms proposed to be involved in such relationships were not adversely affected as a result of recent government licencing decisions. One firm lost a licence for a plant that was no longer operational, while another lost one licence, but retained all others, ensuring the continued operation of that plant, despite new regulations that should have seen the plant lose all other licences and close upon transfer of the single licence. Further, through open public support for the new licencing decisions and regulations, the Association of Seafood Producers
demonstrated a common manner in which the client often repays the patron for their political favour. In this case, such support amongst producers would also serve to draw the support of industry workers, benefiting both government and processors. Finally, in 2009, provincial Fisheries Minister Tom Hedderson overruled the FPLB’s recommendation to award a shrimp processing licence to a plant in Valleyfield, Bonavista Bay. Former licencing board chairman Richard Cashin and Hedderson’s Tory colleague, Bonavista North MHA Harry Harding, believe that the province was misled by particular processors looking to protect their own interests in the area and that these processors influenced the minister’s decision (Bartlett 2009).

The decision to study structure and agency in the first place in relation to the licencing process was based on the complexity of that process, primarily the complex interplay among the social actors involved in the process as they attempted to evolve and modernize the fishing industry to ensure community survival while at the same time dealing with the traditional and historical context in which the fishery operates. As a result, I wanted to utilize an approach that was able to reach the core of how the licencing process operated but at the same time had enough depth to explain some of its complexities. Since structure and agency (and power) have been and continue to be at the root of most sociological inquiry, I chose to examine the licencing process utilizing those concepts. Further, the approach to structure and agency supported by Giddens and other social theorists provided the best opportunity to examine how the actions of those involved in the licencing process affected the ability of others to act and exercise power in the system.
Within the core of the licencing system there is action, there is structure that enables or constrains that action, and there is the power that comes from the ability to act. By studying a specific community and examining the personal experiences of three of the major players in the process, exploring each one’s ability to act, the factors that constrain or enable that action, and the power that results, I was able to clearly comprehend and describe the social process of licence allocation and how events likely unfold within that process. There are of course more than three players within the licencing dynamic. The FFAW, the ASP and the federal government all also play a role. Market and other economic factors influence licencing decisions to an extent as well. My research goal was to develop a further understanding of the licencing process in order to shed light on the plight of many of the fishing communities in Newfoundland and Labrador that are attempting to recover from the debilitating effects of the cod moratorium. In order to accomplish this, I felt it necessary to operate on a level in which fishers, plant workers, and community groups were the most active, and that was within the dynamic with processing firms and the provincial government. The specific case of Roland’s Cove provided first hand accounts of exactly how and under what social conditions such a dynamic operates.

While I believe that using the simultaneous approach to studying structure and agency to explain the how of the licencing process worked extremely well in this particular research project, it is not the only way to approach the research question. As mentioned earlier, the debate surrounding the relationship between structure and agency continues to persist within most sociological circles. As a result, it would have been just
as legitimate to study structure and agency as two separate concepts and in a more cause and effect manner. The structure of the licencing process regulates the actions of the social actors within the system, and as this structure changes so do the actions of those involved. One can say that the social structure is the sole determinant of social action, but as shown here, that is not always the case. In some instances, the structure is ignored or used in ways outside the norm. In such cases, it is the agency of the social actors that determine the composition of the social structure, not the other way around. Given this often cyclical property of the structure/agency relationship, the choice to study the two concepts as Giddens (1984) and Berger (1963) suggest, that is as one, was undoubtedly beneficial in meeting the goals of this research project.

Similarly, traditional approaches to structure and agency position the two concepts at opposite ends of the sociological spectrum with agency being approached as the micro and structure the macro. The approach advocated by Berger (1963), Giddens (1984), and Bourdieu (1983) does not set boundaries for each concept’s study. Structure and agency exist on both a micro and macro level. It is not just large scale acts that result in changes to the structure, but the everyday acts of all those operating within the social system. Likewise, these everyday acts may not bring about large noticeable changes to the social structure. The structure is just as likely to change in small increments over an extended period of time. Those intent on maintaining clientelistic relationships did not make large changes to the structure to ensure those relationships persisted throughout multiple government changes in this province, but acted in a manner in which their everyday actions altered the structure to their continued benefit in small ways over time.
At the same time, the everyday actions of those most constrained by such a structure served to make them aware and to recognize the nature of their constraint so they could exercise power by acting in ways outside of the structure. This seemingly ideal balance between agency and structure further legitimizes studying the two concepts simultaneously in the manner advocated by Berger (1963) and Giddens (1984).

With my research goal met, what evidence and what methodologies are needed to further generalize my findings? Can they be generalized at all? While critics of qualitative studies often discount the ability of such research to be generalized beyond its defined scope, I believe that the findings of this study contradict such an assertion.

Roland’s Cove is but one of a multitude of Newfoundland fishing communities which have attempted, and continue to attempt, to achieve some measure of economic and social recovery from the cod moratorium through the obtainment of a shellfish processing licence. The public scrutiny concerning the recent decision to transfer licences from Trouty and St. Josephs to Conche and La Scie and the minister’s vetoing of a FPLB recommendation demonstrate the continued importance of these licences, both practically and in the minds of those impacted. Roland’s Cove is unique to an extent in the number of high profile government officials, including provincial and federal fisheries ministers, with ties to the community and region, and in the apparently favourable logistical conditions present in the community with respect to landing and processing high quality crab. Yet, there are undoubtedly numerous other fishing communities in the province with strong historical ties to government and with the facilities in place to produce high quality products. Further, large processing companies own and operate plants in
communities all over the province and therefore would undoubtedly take whatever measures are required to protect their interests in all those communities, including maintaining already established clientelistic relationships and entering into new ones as well. There is also a relatively good chance that fishers and plant workers from those communities have similar theories to those from Roland’s Cove as to why past licencing attempts have failed. Naturally, some of those opinions stem from frustration and the need to blame someone for their community’s shortcomings, but as seen with the accounts of those on the Long Shore those opinions could also contain a fair measure of truth.

The inability of individual community members and groups to exert agency and exercise significant power within the fishing industry is not limited to one community; rather it is a problem encountered by virtually all fishing communities at one time or another, whether it be through attempts at combating major catastrophes in the industry such as plant closures or resource collapse, or simply through everyday attempts at maintaining a living. Additionally, as demonstrated by the work of Fletcher (1994), MacLeod (2006), and Noel (1971), patronage is rarely isolated to one particular group, circumstance, or industry. More often than not, it had been a traditional characteristic of the political system in question and had survived multiple changes in government and in governing party by permeating multiple levels of government, becoming a culture that is far reaching and institutionalized. A recent *Telegram* article concerning governmental involvement in the search for a new president for Memorial University details a history of clientelistic tendencies in relation to the province’s education system, such as former
premier Joey Smallwood’s direct appointment of a university president in 1966 (Bartlett 2008). At the same time, Jeffery MacLeod’s study of patronage in the Nova Scotia Liberal party in the 1990’s demonstrates that the continuance of traditionally engrained clientelistic networks spreads far beyond this province to other regions of Canada (2006). Similar research, such as Roniger’s (1994b) essay of clientelistic elements within the present day Israeli government, has demonstrated its persistence in political systems all over the world. Consequently, I am confident that my findings with respect to the ability of social actors to exert agency and exercise power within the structure of a licencing system could be applicable to many other Newfoundland communities beyond the Long Shore. Further, I believe that many of the suggestions made and conclusions drawn with respect to the structure of licencing system and the dynamic of its actors here can potentially be generalized to other industries and to other geographic locations as well. One must be careful, however, in attempting to make generalizations based on the results of one case study. In order to be confident in the propensity to generalize, further research is most often required.

One of the determinants for choosing the Long Shore as my area of study stems from its distinction as having one of the oldest, if not the oldest, fishing traditions in the province. This was a crucial characteristic in my assertions concerning the continuance of patronage in the region. Any further study into structure, agency, and power within the licencing system would require a wider geographic consideration. Ideally, the study would include communities from multiple locations throughout the province and with varying degrees of dependency on the fishery. While it is suggested that the relationship
between communities, processing firms, and the provincial government will be similar in most Newfoundland fishing communities with respect to each actor’s ability to exert agency within the licencing system and the propensity for patronage to influence that ability, exactly how that dynamic operates in different geographic locales with different levels of dependency on the fishery has the potential to vary. Location may alter the degree to which clientelism persists depending on the level of traditional and current political interest and involvement in the area, as well as the number of processing plants in the region and who owns and operates them. The concentration of processing licences in the region, the outcome of past attempts at exerting individual and collective agency, and the level of public dissatisfaction with the process may also influence the licencing dynamic. Similarly, the extent to which a particular community is dependent on the fishery will influence the urgency with which they attempt to find solutions to save their communities and way of life. This will in turn affect the vigor with which they will attempt to act and exercise power and the measures they will utilize to do so.

In addition to choosing a wider area of study and incorporating multiple communities, future efforts at explaining the how of the licencing process should involve conducting significantly more interviews. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to conduct more interviews with plant owners, particularly owners of the large processing firms. There should also be a concentrated effort in future studies to conduct interviews with individuals that are not fishers, plant workers, plant owners, or government officials. Although I concentrated my efforts on those particular actors in the licencing dynamic, they were not the only players that attempt to act and in turn alter the social structure as
they do so. Union leaders, processing association leaders, licencing board members, federal fisheries officials, as well as purchasers of processed crab products could also be valuable sources of information. Any other social researcher who attempts to build upon the research conducted here may or may not choose to describe the licencing dynamic from the perspective of these other social actors as well. Regardless, these actors could offer valuable insight into the actions of the three groups included in this research.

Further, the persistence of patronage in other regions of Atlantic Canada has already been demonstrated by researchers such as Mark Fletcher (1994) and Jeffery MacLeod (2006). It would certainly be worthwhile to conduct interviews with fishers, plant workers, plant owners, and government officials from provinces such as Nova Scotia, as there is a historical relationship with the fishery among many of the communities in these provinces as well. This would be essential if one were to attempt to generalize the findings of this study to regions outside of Newfoundland and Labrador.

Another manner in which this research can be expanded upon is to explore structure, agency and power within other systems or industries within the province. Although not as historically significant as the fishery, the oil and gas industry has become by far the province’s principal source of economic stimulus. It has also become a means for individuals and communities to combat the loss of the fishery. Contracts are regularly awarded to various companies and communities where facilities and/or equipment are to be constructed. It would be interesting to explore the structure of that system and what ability workers and potential workers have to help themselves and their communities within the dynamic with these often multinational companies and the provincial
government. Finally, a quantitative approach, such as the one originally designed for this study, could be utilized as well to compare licenced and non-licenced communities with respect to measures of social solidarity and community health and well being to determine the statistical significance of holding a licence with respect to the strength of these measures.

In returning to the social dynamic outlined in this study, I presented a hierarchical structure with respect to the ability of actors to exercise power within that dynamic. So what can communities do to disrupt the constant reproduction of a structure that has traditionally hampered their ability to exercise power? Interestingly, I believe that many viable options have to some degree already been discussed. One measure needed is for communities to simply act in a way that will change that structure to their advantage. In keeping with Peter Berger (1963), they must continue to withhold the confirmation needed for the continuance of social control mechanisms, as did the protesting fishers and plant workers discussed in Chapter 5, through manipulation and transformation of the existing social structure. They also must one again re-embed themselves into networks based on traditional kinship and community ties as suggested by Apostle and his colleagues (1998) and again demonstrated by the collective action of the protesting fishers and plant workers. They have been separated from these networks as a result of modern capitalist trends, plant closures, resource collapse, and the actions of government, but the networks can also be mobilized for resistance purposes if community members reconnect to traditional ties and draw upon the social capital available. In accordance with Taylor (2001), it is important that communities first recognize the manner in which
they are being constrained in order for them to develop solutions to counteract. Adopting a collective mentality aids in restoring community esteem and provides a boundary separating “us” from “the others.” It is a countermeasure often adopted by communities. Roland’s Cove members used it to in an attempt to help secure a processing licence, a former plant manager described how it was used to get a new wharf in Port de Grave, and plant workers have in the past mobilized to protest licencing decisions and changes to rules and regulations. That same former plant manager stressed that collective lobbying was in his opinion crucial to attempts at disrupting undesirable trends in the industry and restoring equality to the licencing process. This sort of impulse to act collectively is especially interesting given that such action has been described as one of the few ways to restrict the continuance of patronage as well.

In addition to equality among actors, another characteristic of political systems advocated by those looking to cease clientelistic relationships is transparency. I believe it is crucial if communities are to have equal opportunity within the licencing process in this province. The provincial government acknowledged the need for transparency when it began utilizing the licencing board and then again in announcing the latest changes to the rules and regulations. As principal actors in the system and with their very survival often riding on the outcome, the public has a right to scrutinize how licencing decisions are made. Government’s reluctance to allow this in the past, I believe, stems from the leaders’ desire to maintain the clientelistic relationships which have traditionally governed the process. Roniger (1994a) suggests that to “avoid the privatization of the public domain,” it would probably be best to “publicize the private domain,” stressing
that the public needs to recognize patronage and demand transparency and public scrutiny (15).

In her study of fish plant reductions in Roland's Cove, Marilyn Taylor (1985) provided suggestions for communities looking to exert some measure of control over their situation. Taylor warned that a continued decrease in the strength of community attributes promoting social solidarity and community esteem would lead to a sense of helplessness among community members. To avoid such an outcome or to improve an already undesirable situation, she stresses open communication between governments and communities, prompt and clear delivery of information concerning the future of fisheries and plants, and a need for communities to be informed and organized (Taylor 1985). Similarly, Sharon Taylor (2001) noted a sense of shared helplessness and powerlessness among Comorra residents dealing with resource collapse and the actions of government. She also advocates equality and justice in government policy related to the fishery and recognition by government of the insight of communities, both individually and collectively. Failure in these areas, she notes, leads to barriers to the lines of communication needed for social change (Taylor 2001). Fortunately, the recent changes and developments in the licencing process appear to support those very recommendations.

Despite these positive signs of change, further amendments to the licencing process and the rules that govern it are required. I believe that in making the volume of raw material the most important factor guiding decisions government is making a mistake by placing less emphasis on the other contributors, such as the concentration of existing
licences in the applicant's region and the quality of the application and business proposal. These other contributors should continue to figure significantly in licencing decisions. What is required is not necessarily a change to the rules but a clear definition of what the rules are. While transparency is important to removing public distrust, I believe that what is perhaps more of an issue is that the government was simply not clear and consistent enough in the past. The board was in place to help refute public claims of closed door deals but ambiguous terms such as resource threshold and a lack strict determinants of a successful application caused more speculation and distrust among those in the public.

What is also needed, and suggested by Marilyn Taylor (1985) and Sharon Taylor (2001), is a clear line of communication between communities and government and the prompt sharing of accurate information on all facets of the industry. Communities must first be aware and informed before they can act and exercise power in a manner most beneficial to them. Interestingly, the recently announced Revised Seafood Processing Framework was designed in part to clarify licencing guidelines and provide industry with information as to the future actions of government (Newfoundland and Labrador 2008c).

In addition to the above, I suggest a re-examination of the role of the minister and licencing board in the process as well as to the conditions of their involvement. Many interviewed for this study believe that long time government employees in the fisheries department are content with maintaining the status quo and thus resist change in the licencing process. Some of those same participants, one with past relationships with former fisheries ministers, insist that these "old timers" need to be replaced in order to facilitate the change needed to improve the industry. Government cabinet shuffles often
result in new fisheries ministers, but sometimes the new minister had held the portfolio previously. If clientelistic relationships had existed during a particular minister’s previous term, they will most likely permeate subsequent terms as well. While a regular change to the fisheries minister post would not necessarily remove patronage in the licencing process (patronage has survived entire government changes after all), creating a stipulation that a former minister could not hold the same portfolio again for a set number of years may serve to infuse the new ideas and approaches advocated by many.

With respect to the board, the limit on their appointment term and their strict non-affiliation with a plant or harvesting operation are important conditions. However, Minister Hedderson’s recent rejection of a board recommendation indicates that, despite claims to the contrary, government is in fact “hands on” with respect to the board and not “at arms length.” Further, in order to foster an open concise line of communication between government and communities, the government should actively seek out community members and groups and ask for their input, whether for or against a particular licence allocation, and not simply wait for someone to come forward. The province needs to be proactive and assure communities that they are indeed a part of the process by, in fact, making them a part of the process. After all, despite their often unfavourable social and economic positions in times of resource collapse, communities are rarely passive recipients of industry problems, nor should they be. They most often do whatever they deem necessary for their survival. It is time processing firms and the federal and provincial governments promoted that action instead of restraining it.
References


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APPENDIX I

Research Information Sheet

In the years following the 1992 cod moratorium, few fishing communities on Newfoundland and Labrador’s Northeast coast have fully recovered from the economic downturn resulting from the loss of their primary means of employment. In instances where significant socio-economic recovery has occurred, it was achieved in large part through an increased involvement in the shell fish industry, particularly snow crab and shrimp. In an attempt to take advantage of the economic benefits associated with shell fish, many communities applied to the provincial government for licences to operate processing plants. Demands for such licenses considerably exceeded supply. However, to avoid over exploitation of yet another resource, despite the fact that many communities met the application criteria set forth by the province, only a select few licences have been granted. Given the importance of these licences to community recovery and survival, my research will address the question of how some applicants were successful while others were not. Of particular interest are important enumerating factors and the social processes underlying them that resulted in success or failure in license procurement, including the capacity of individual communities and plant owners to identify and respond to opportunities available beyond that of meeting general eligibility requirements. In an attempt to explore such factors, strategies, and processes of successful applicants, one successful and one unsuccessful fishing community of relatively similar size, level of fishing dependency, and geographic distance from urban centres will be studied. As a result, I am seeking the help of individuals who play prominent roles in those communities to provide information concerning their experiences that may assist in achieving the above research goal.
APPENDIX II

Research Participant Consent Form

I have read and understand the information sheet describing the proposed research on shellfish licensing and agree to be interviewed based upon the information in it. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and in fullest confidence. I may refuse to answer any particular question and may withdraw from the interview at any time. Should I do so, information collected will be destroyed. I also understand that every reasonable effort will be made to conceal my identity or any information that could reasonably lead to my identification.

In addition, I agree to the following: (Please check all which apply)

☐ that quotations from the interview without any identifying personal references may be used in subsequent writings by the researcher

☐ that the interview be taped and transcribed

☐ that I be provided with a copy of any tape recording made

☐ that I consent to retention of interview material after completion of project up to a period of five years provided it is stored in a secure location

☐ that I be provided with a copy of any reports or papers based on the interview material

If you have any additional questions or would like to comment on any aspect of the research please contact one of the following:

Darryl Maddigan Dr. Larry Felt Dr. Peter Sinclair
Principal Researcher Acting Supervisor Acting Supervisor
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The proposal for this research has been approved by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research at Memorial University. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 737-8368.

______________________________
Signature of Consenting Party

______________________________
Printed Name of Consenting Party