THE SEMANTICS AND METAPHYSICS OF RIGID DESIGNATORS

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by

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Abstract

The aim of this research is to evaluate the relationship between Kripke's semantical doctrines about proper names and his metaphysical doctrines about essences. Throughout *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke claims that his semantical doctrines have substantive metaphysical consequences. The assessment of this relationship is important, since the metaphysical consequences of semantics and vice versa are often regarded with suspicion. Semantics concerns the relationship between language and the world, and metaphysics is about the world itself. The claim that the way we picture the world imposes some constraints on the world is odd enough to deserve suspicion. My aim in this work is try to show how the relationship between semantics and the metaphysics of essence can be explained by the concept of a rigid designator.

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Introduction

The main purpose of this work is to evaluate Saul Kripke's semantical doctrines about proper names and his metaphysical doctrines about essentialism in *Naming and Necessity* by assessing the concept of rigidity and its role in relation to these two topics. This work also seeks to clarify the relationship between semantic doctrines and metaphysical doctrines independently from Kripke's defence of them.

Naming and Necessity, which has had effects on many fields of philosophy, is one of the most important philosophical works in the twentieth century. In *Naming and Necessity,* Kripke presents arguments against some important theories in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, and he defends some original views on these matters. He argues that the descriptive theories of meaning and reference attributed to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell are wrong, and instead defends the direct reference theory of proper names. He also defends the coherence of metaphysical essentialism, and subsequently develops some provocative and seminal metaphysics views; namely, in particular, a metaphysical view of the concept of necessity and possibility.

Despite the many topics Kripke covers in his book, the two main concepts, as the title suggests, are about naming, which belongs to semantics, and necessity, which is a metaphysical notion. In the beginning of the first lecture, Kripke mentions that he hopes people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, he will clarify this connection during the lectures.[1] Although Kripke's arguments about different topics seem

[1] Kripke (1980), 22.

to be convincing, the relationship between the two main topics is not initially evident, and is still the subject of debate. In many cases, it is not clear whether his arguments for or against a metaphysical doctrine are derived from a semantics doctrine or if they are separate from each other.

The aim of this research is to evaluate the relationship between Kripke's semantical doctrines about proper names and his metaphysical doctrines about essences. Throughout *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke claims that his semantical doctrines have substantive metaphysical consequences. The assessment of this relationship is important, since the metaphysical consequences of semantics and vice versa are often suspicious. Semantics concerns the relationship between language and the world, and metaphysics is about the world itself. The claim that the way we picture the world (semantics) imposes some constraints on the world is odd enough to deserve suspicion. Searle aptly considers such a claim as a metaphysical sin: "the original sin in metaphysics, the attempt to read real or alleged features of language into the world."[2] My aim in this work is try to show how the relationship between semantics and the metaphysics of essence can be explained by the concept of a rigid designator. Once we can properly understand the semantics of names, some previously unforeseen possibilities about the metaphysics of essence become legitimate options, and some previously influential anti-essentialist arguments become much less compelling. Through clarifying this matter, the purpose of this work is assessing this mutual relationship.

[2] Searle (1969),164.

To this end, the first chapter of this work introduces the notion of the rigid designator, involves a brief discussion of its different kinds, and assesses Kripke's claim about the rigidity of proper names. The main point I will consider is that the rigidity of proper names is based on our semantical intuition about proper names in the context of modality, and it is not a consequence of any semantical theories about proper names or metaphysical theories about things and their properties. However, we should note that this claim has affected semantical theories about proper names and essentialism and anti-essentialism debates.

In chapter two, by introducing two main semantical theories about proper names (namely descriptive theory and direct reference theory), I will assess the relationship between the rigidity of proper names and the semantic theory about proper names. In this chapter, I will claim that every semantical theory must explain rigidity, since it is a semantical character of proper names. I will show that although the direct reference theory attributed to Kripke well explains the rigidity of proper names, the rigidity of proper names is not sufficient for determining a comprehensive semantic theory.

The focus of the third chapter is the relationship between the rigidity of proper names and Kripke's defence of essentialism. After defining "essential property" and "accidental property" I will introduce three levels of essentialism defended by Kripke in *Naming and Necessity*. Then, I will address the relation between these essentialist claims and the rigidity of proper names, and in this way I will clarify how and to what degree these claims are related to the rigidity of proper names. The main point I will consider is that in any level of essentialist theories, if a step is taken between metaphysics and

semantics, this step follows from the rigidity of proper names; and since any correct semantic theory about proper names explains the rigidity of proper names, then any plausible theory of names commits us to this metaphysical consequence.

§ 1. Rigid Designators and Proper Names

"Rigid designation" is a name that Kripke uses for a concept that has been discussed at least since the development of quantified modal logics.[3,4] Kripke's representation of the concept of rigidity, in *Naming and Necessity*, has attracted wide philosophical attention. In this chapter, I will assess Kripke's claim about the rigidity of proper names. The main objective of this chapter is to show that the rigidity of proper names is based on our semantical intuition about proper names in the context of modality and is not a consequence of any semantical theories about proper names or metaphysical theories about objects and their properties. To this end, section 1-1 of this chapter is devoted to introducing both the concept of the rigid designator and its precise definition. In section 1-2, I make an introductory remark in order to avoid confusion regarding rigid designators. Then, in section 1-3, I will introduce different kinds of rigid designators including strong/weak, *de jure*/*de facto*, and obstinate/persistent rigidity. The basis of Kripke's claim about the rigidity of proper names is the subject of section 1-4, and then, in the following section, I will present Kripke's intuitive test for distinguishing rigid and non-rigid designators.

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[3] For example, in Smullyan (1948) in response to Quine's objection to quantified modal logics, Kaplan (1968), and Kripke (1959), 1963.
[4] Sullivan (2005).

1-1- Definition

In *Naming and Necessity,* Kripke presents a rigid designator as "a designator [that] rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever the object exists."[5] Using the concept of possible worlds, this means a rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists. The idea behind this definition is that the referent of a rigid designator must remain the same as its referent in the actual situation, even when the designator is used to describe different situations and counterfactual situations. But Kripke's original definition fails to capture this intuition. For the referent of an expression to remain the same in counterfactual situations, it must not only designate that object wherever the object exists, but it also must not designate anything else. Kripke thus modifies the definition: "a designator *d* of an object *x* is rigid, if it designates *x* with respect to all possible worlds where *x* exists, and never designates an object other than *x* with respect to any possible world."[6] More precisely, a singular term *t* rigidly designates an object *o iff*

(*i*) *t* designates *o* in every possible world and

(*ii*) *t* does not designate anything else but *o* in any possible worlds.

Following this definition, we can conclude that if *t* is a rigid designator designating object *o,* then sentences containing *t* are true with respect to different possible worlds such as w_1, w_2, w_3 *iff* one and the same object *o* has the relevant properties those sentences attribute to *o* in w_1, w_2, w_3 , and so on. In other words, the truth value of sentences containing *t* (such as **F***t*) that attribute the property φ to *o* in different possible

[5] Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (1980), 46.
[6] Kaplan (1989), 569.

worlds depends on the situation of *o* (referent of *t* in actual world) relative to those possible worlds if *t* is a rigid designator. That is the proposition expressed by **F***t* relative to any possible world

(*a*) is not true unless *o* has the property φ in that possible world,

(*b*) is not false unless *o* lacks the property φ in that possible world.

Now we can define non-rigid designators simply: a singular term *t* is a non-rigid designator *iff* it violates either (*a*) or (*b*).

1-2- Some Primary Remarks

1-2-1- There is confusion regarding rigid designators that is important to avoid. It might seem that the following two claims are incompatible:

(i) A proper name, for example 'Aristotle', is a rigid designator. This name refers to the same individual in all possible worlds.

(ii) It is possible that Aristotle was not named 'Aristotle'.

To avoid this confusion, we must note that the three-place relation ....*refers to* ... *with respect to* ... hold between a name *n*, object *o*, and possible world *w iff n* refers to *o* as it is used in the actual world.

1-2-2- As Christopher Hughes points out, there is a difference between the way that Kripke uses 'rigid designator' in *Naming and Necessity* and the way that some other philosophers use this term. [7] Sometimes "rigid designator" is defined as a designator that cannot refer to anything different from the thing it actually refers to. Following Hughes,

[7] See Lowe (2000), McGinn (1982), and Putnam (1975).

let us call such a designator an inflexible designator. It should be obvious that every rigid designator is an inflexible designator, but every inflexible designator is not necessarily rigid. To be considered rigid, a designator must not only refer to its actual referent in other possible worlds but it must also refer to its actual referent in every possible world in which it exists. Hughes illustrates this point with the following:

> [S]uppose that Abel's origin is essential to him, so that no one but Adam could have been Abel's father. Then 'the father of Abel' could not have designated anything other than its actual referent. But it is not rigid, since it does not designate Adam in all the worlds in which Adam exists. (It fails to designate Adam in worlds in which Adam is childless).[8]

1-3- Different Kinds of Rigid Designators

1-3-1- Strong and Weak Rigidity

A designator is strongly rigid if its referent exists in all possible worlds. It is weakly rigid if its referent exists in some possible worlds. Kripke is most interested rigid designators in the latter sense. He writes, "Of course we don't require that the objects [*i.e.* the referent of a rigid designator] exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal course of things."[9] While according to a prevalent view about mathematical and abstract entities, singular terms such as '2' and 'the least prime number' are strongly rigid, ordinary proper names such as 'Nixon' are weakly rigid.

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[8] Hughes (2004), 20.
[9] Kripke (1980), 48.

1-3-2- *De jure* and *de facto* Rigidity

Both 'Aristotle' and 'the least prime number' are rigid designators, but it seems there is a difference between them. Kripke addresses "the distinction between *'de jure'* rigidity, where the reference of a designator is ***stipulated*** to be a single object, whether we are speaking of the actual world or of a counterfactual situation, and mere *'de facto'* rigidity, where a **description** 'the *x* such that *Fx'* happens to use a predicate *'F'* that in each possible world is true of one and the same unique object"[10] in a footnote in the Preface of *Naming and Necessity*. This distinction is important since while the *de jure* rigid designators designate their designata simply because of their semantic properties, *de facto* rigid designators designate their designata not only because of their semantic properties but also because of other doctrines. For example, the rigidity of 'the least prime number' depends on a metaphysical doctrine that mathematical truths are necessary truths and a mathematical truth that '2' is the least prime number in addition to a semantical doctrine that '2' is a rigid designator.

1-3-3- Obstinate and Persistent Rigidity

A further distinction that is often made in discussions of rigidity is the obstinate/persistent distinction.[11] Our definition of rigid designators does not address the behavior of rigid designators with respect to the possible worlds in which their designata in the actual world do not exist. Assume that *t* is a rigid designator for an object *o* and *X*

[10] Kripke (1980), 21, ft 21, emphasis are mine.
[11] Salmon (1981).

is the set of all possible worlds in which *o* does not exist. There are three possibilities here:

(1) *t* designates the same thing in respect to all possible worlds whether *o* exists there or not.

(2) *t* designates nothing in respect to members of *X*.

(3) *t* designates *o* in respect to some members of *X* and designates nothing in respect to the others.

While the third case is not philosophically interesting, the first two cases correspond to the obstinate/persistent distinction. Accordingly, obstinate and persistent rigid designators can be defined as follows:

A rigid designator *t* designates *o* obstinately *iff* it designates *o* in all possible worlds regardless of the existence of *o* there. And *t* designates *o* persistently *iff* it designates *o* in all possible worlds in which *o* exists and designates nothing if *o* does not exist.[12,13]

It seems that Kripke uses rigid designators in both senses. For instance in "Identity and Necessity", he uses them as persistent while in *Naming and Necessity,* he uses them as obstinate.

> [W]hen I use the notion of rigid designator, I do not imply that the object referred to necessarily exists. All I mean is that in any possible world where the object in question does exist, in any situation where the object *would* exist, we use the designator in question to designate the object. In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist.[14]
> I speak of a rigid designator as having the same reference in all possible worlds. I also don't mean to imply that the thing designated exists in all possible worlds, just that the

[12] This distinction also is known as Kaplanean/Kripkean rigidity.
[13] One might note that strong rigid designators are both obstinate and persistent.
[14] Kripke (1971) 146.

> name refers rigidly to that thing. If you say 'suppose Hitler had never been born' then 'Hitler' refers here, still rigidly, to something that would not exist in the counterfactual situation described.[15]

1-4- Rigidity and Proper Names

Regarding the definition of rigidity, in this section I will assess the basis of Kripke's claim of the rigidity of proper names in natural language. Before this, we need to know what he means by the term 'proper names'. According to Kripke, proper names are expressions of natural language that correspond to 'name' in the ordinary sense, such as 'Aristotle' and 'Copenhagen'. They are used to refer to objects, people, times, and places. Kripke uses proper names exactly in this ordinary sense. Thus Kripke's usage of this term is broader than Russell's[16]but narrower than Frege's.[17]

The semantics of proper names remains a contested subject in the philosophy of language. The story of proper names, at least in the modern era, started with Mill who argues that "proper names are merely labels for individual persons or objects and contribute no more than those individuals themselves to the meanings of sentences in which they occur,"[18] and later continued by Frege and Russell who defend a descriptive theory of proper names and finally to Kripke, whose argument echoes Mill's[19].

As we will see in this section, the rigidity of proper names is an intuitive doctrine based on our intuition about semantical value of sentences containing these terms with respect to the possible worlds. Therefore, Kripke's arguments in support of the rigidity of

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[15] Kripke (1980), 77-78.
[16] Russell (1918).
[17] Frege (1892).
[18] Lycan (2008).
[19] Mill (1872).

proper names are intuitive arguments and not tendentious or theoretically loaded arguments. As he says in *Naming and Necessity,* "one of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators"[20] and "in these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators."[21] The importance of this matter will be clarified in the following chapters, in which the relationship between rigidity and theories that Kripke talks about in *Naming and Necessity* are evaluated.

For understanding these relations, we need to pay attention to Kripke's view that the rigidity of proper names is not based on semantical theories about proper names, but it is due to our intuition about behavior of proper names on modal contexts. I will further assess this matter in Chapter Two where the relationship between rigidity and semantical theories about proper names will be evaluated. Also, if the rigidity of proper names has metaphysical consequences, we need to address the point that rigidity is an intuitive property of proper names and not a specific semantical theory that explains this property. Therefore, the semantical theory is not responsible for metaphysical consequences. Moreover, if proper names are rigid as Kripke claims, every semantical theory about proper names has to explain this property; that is, every semantical theory about proper names must accommodate rigidity and thus also accept any metaphysical consequences of rigidity.

[20] Kripke (1980), 48.
[21] Kripke (1980), 49.

1-4-1- The basis of Kripke's Claim on the Rigidity of Proper Names

Proper names such as 'Aristotle' and 'Nixon', definite descriptions like 'the teacher of Alexander' and 'the U.S. president,' and indexicals such as 'I' and 'here' are called singular terms and are used to refer to objects, people, times and places. When one utters 'Aristotle was fond of dogs,' one uses the proper name 'Aristotle' to designate or to refer to Aristotle, and thereby to talk about *him* and attribute the property of 'being fond of dogs' to *him*. Since the definite description 'the teacher of Alexander' designates to Aristotle as well, the sentence 'the teacher of Alexander was fond of dogs' is about Aristotle and attributes the property of 'being fond of dogs' to *him* as well.

However, a language is not used only to describe actual situations but is also used to describe other possible situations. It seems uncontroversially true that "there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are,"[22] and we can describe these counterfactual situation using natural languages. For instance, even though Aristotle in the *actual* world was fond of dogs, it was possible that *he* was not fond of dogs. To illustrate this point, consider the following sentences:

(I) Aristotle was fond of dogs.

(II) It was possible that Aristotle was not fond of dogs.

'Aristotle' in both sentences must designate the same person *i.e.* Aristotle himself. By uttering (II) one intends to attribute the property of 'not being fond of dogs' to (a) the same individual and (b) only to the individual to whom the property of 'being fond of dogs' is attributed by (I). When we use the proper name 'Aristotle' to describe a counterfactual situation about Aristotle, we in fact speak about Aristotle himself

[22] Lewis (1973), 84.

independently of his description, whether or not he has the relevant attributes in that possible world. In other words, intuitively, truth value of a sentence by which the proper name 'Aristotle' attributes a property to Aristotle in other possible worlds depends on whether or not Aristotle himself has this property in that possible world. The idea that the designatum of proper names is constant in counterfactual situations is the basis of Kripke's claim on the rigidity of proper names in natural language. Consider the following sentence:

(III) It was possible that the teacher of Alexander was not fond of dogs.

This sentence utters a counterfactual situation about the teacher of Alexander, but it is not necessarily about Aristotle. In some counterfactual situations, the teacher of Alexander is not Aristotle; thus this sentence is not about Aristotle who is the designatum of 'the teacher of Alexander' in the *actual* world. In other possible worlds, in fact the designatum of 'the teacher of Alexander' is whoever teaches Alexander in that possible world.

As we saw, the rigidity of proper names is based on our intuition about behavior of proper names in modal contexts. It is important to address the point that we have accepted the rigidity of proper names before accepting any semantical doctrine about proper names or modal doctrines about properties of objects. As the rigidity of proper is based on intuition and it is intuitively defendable, then any view that refuses this intuitive view commits to a semantical or metaphysical theory which is incompatible with an intuitively evident property of proper names. In such situations, the view that refuses this intuitive view is responsible for the defence of their position. As the modal arguments

show proper names are rigid designators, but they are not only rigid designators. Based on the behavior of rigid designators in modal contexts, Kripke designs an intuitive test for distinguishing rigid and non-rigid designators.

1-5- Intuitive Test for Rigidity

In both *Naming and Necessity* and "Identity and Necessity", Kripke presents the rigidity test similarly:

> [A]lthough someone other than the U.S. President in 1970 might have been the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon.[23]

> [W]e have a simple, intuitive test for them... We can say that the inventor of bifocals might have been someone other the man who *in fact* invented bifocals. We cannot say, though, that the square root of 81 might have been a different number from the number it in fact is. If we apply this intuitive test to proper, such as for example 'Richard Nixon', they would seem intuitively to come out to be rigid designators.[24]

Accordingly, it seems that Kripke suggests that *t* is a rigid designator *iff* nothing but *t* could have been *t*. The problem, however, is that this test only corresponds to the second condition[25] in the definition of rigid designators. Therefore it can be a test for recognizing inflexible designators but not rigid designators.[26] One might try to modify this test by suggesting that *t* is a rigid designator *iff t* cannot exist without being *t*. This test, however, just corresponds to the first condition[27] in the definition of rigid designators.[28] Soames suggests the following test:

> *t* is a rigid designator iff the sentence *The individual that is (was) actually t could have not have existed without being t, and nothing other than the individual that is (was) actually t could have been t* expresses a truth.[29]

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[23] Kripke (1980), 48.
[24] Kripke (1971), 148-149.
[25] (*ii*) *t* does not designate anything else but *o* in any possible worlds.
[26] 'Abel's father', for instance, satisfies this test's condition.
[27] (*i*) *t* designates *o* in every possible world.
[28] Given the necessity of origin, it is possible to construct some non-rigid terms that can pass this test.
[29] Soames (2003), 342.

According to this test, ordinary proper names such as 'Aristotle' and 'Denmark', and some definite descriptions such as 'the least prime number, and 'the successor of 2' are rigid designators, but some description such as 'the last great philosopher of antiquity' and 'Abel's father' are non-rigid.

As we saw, proper names are rigid designators, and on the other hand we introduced different kinds of rigid designators, but which kinds of rigid designators are proper names? Since ordinary proper names are used to refer to objects that only exist in some possible worlds but not all possible worlds, they are weak rigid designators. However, proper names that are used to refer to abstract or mathematical entities might be considered as strong rigid designators. Ordinary proper names are *de jure* rigid because they designate their designata just because of their semantic properties. Finally, according to the prevalent view, ordinary proper names are obstinate rigid designators. Let us see why. Assume that one utters that Kripke is dead. The truth value of this sentence clearly depends on the time it has uttered. If it is uttered now, in 2010, it is false. However, it will be presumably true if it is uttered in 2100. But if in 2100 when Kripke does not exist anymore, 'Kripke' fails to designate the same individual that it designates in 2010, 'Kripke is dead' will have no truth value then. Moreover, 'It is possible that Kripke does not exist' is intuitively true. But it means 'Kripke does not exist' must be true at least in one possible world let us say *w*. Thus, Kripke does not exist in *w*, but if 'Kripke' designates not hing in *w*, 'Kripke does not exist' has no truth value there. Therefore, ordinary proper names are obstinate rigid designators.

1-6- Summary

In this chapter, after a offering definition of the concept of rigid designators, Kripke's view about the rigidity of proper names was assessed by an intuitive test for rigidity. We have considered that the rigidity of proper names is an intuitive claim about proper names in the context of modality. Then, by introducing important distinctions among different kinds of rigid designators, it was suggested that ordinary proper names in natural language which denote individuals and things are weak and persistent rigid designators.

§2. Rigidity of Proper Names and Semantical Theories

Semantical theories about proper names can be divided into two main groups: descriptive theories and direct reference theories. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke introduces a number of arguments against a certain reading of descriptive theories about proper names which he calls the "Frege-Russell Theory", and Kripke's modal argument based on the rigidity of proper names is the most important of those arguments. In this chapter, I will assess the role of the doctrine of rigidity in our judgment of semantical theories about proper names. To this end, in section 2-1 of this chapter, I will introduce the semantic value of proper names. In section 2-2, I will discuss the direct reference theory and the problems that led Frege and Russell to the descriptive theory. Then, in section 2-3, I will present Kripke's modal argument against the Frege-Russell theory that proper names are semantically identical to descriptions. In the following sub-section, I will assess Michael Dummett's defence of the Frege-Russell theory and Kripke's answer to Dummett's doctrine, which is an attempt to maintain consistency between the doctrine of rigidity and the descriptive theory.

2-1- Semantics

A plain fact about a language is that its users *understand* the expressions of that language, and *understand* their *meanings*; therefore, one motivation for philosophical inquiry is to understand these notions of linguistic understanding and meaning systemically. In simple terms, informal or formal theories of meaning are two main approaches in this regard. There are some facts about language that every theory about

language has to take into account. For example, an interesting fact is that users of a language can understand potentially infinite sentences just by learning a relatively small number of words; another fact is that each meaningful sentence has parts that are themselves meaningful and they contribute to the meaning of that sentence.[30]When we take these into account, we can postulate a compositionality thesis or principle for any language. To formulate such a thesis, one must determine what semantic properties should be taken into account. Since Frege was particularly interested in the nature of arguments, he approached this question by figuring out which properties of expressions are relevant to the validity of arguments in which they appear.[31]Having these points in mind let us define the semantic value of any expression as a "feature of it which determines whether sentences in which it occurs are true or false" and accordingly, the principle of compositionality is as follows: "the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the semantic values of its parts."[32]

Frege defines the semantic value of a proper name[33] as the object to which it refers or stands for, and the semantic value of a sentence as its truth-value.[34] Thi s definition can be justified by recognizing that the property that is relevant to the validity of arguments in which a proper name appears is the referent of that proper name, and that

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[30]According to Davidson, all theories of meaning must provide compositionality and productivity, which respectively mean the ability of understanding new sentences constructed from familiar part and creating new sentences using such parts.

[31] In fact in logic the meaning of propositions are defined recursively in term of atomic propositions.

[32] Miller (2007).

[33] Frege treats definite descriptions as proper name in regard to their semantic value.

[34]The semantic value for other linguistic expressions can be defined similarly. For example, "the semantic value of a predicate is a first-level function from objects to truth-values; the semantic value of a sentential connective is a first-level function from truth-values to truth-values; the semantic value of a quantifier is a second-level function from concepts to truth-values.", Miller (2007).

the property that is relevant to the validity of arguments in which a sentence appears is its truth-value.

2-2- Semantical Theories about Proper Names

2-2-1- Direct Reference Theory

Proper names, intuitively, play a different role than definite descriptions in sentences. In the ordinary sense, proper names are expressions of natural language that correspond to 'names' such as 'Aristotle' and 'Copenhagen'. They are used to refer to objects, people, times, and places. A proper name refers directly to an object, whereas a definite description denotes its referent by specifying a property that is uniquely true of that object. According to the intuitive view, the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. This view goes back to John Stuart Mill:

> Proper names are connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. When we name a child by the name Paul, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse.[35]

This view, which is a basis of the theory of direct reference and received wide attention in the late 1960s, follows the works of philosophers such as Kaplan, Putnam, Kripke, Donnellan, and Salmon. Kripke's arguments in *Naming and Necessity* were one of the most important reasons for the return to Mill's view about proper names. Reviving and defending Mill's theory about proper names was a reaction against descriptive theories about proper names that goes back to Frege and Russell in the early twentieth century.

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[35] Mill (1872) , 33.

As Kripke points out, the reasons against Mill's view and in favour of the alternative view adopted by Frege and Russell are really very powerful.[36] Some of those problems are as follows:

Bearerless expressions: Consider a sentence such as "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep" in which the expression "Odysseus" lacks a referent. If the semantic value of a proper name is its referent, since there is no Odysseus, "Odysseus" has no semantic value, and neither does the whole sentence it appears in. But if having a semantic value were the only semantic property, we would have to regard the mentioned sentences as meaningless.[37] But certainly such sentences are not just meaningless gibberish, and so a semantical theory about proper names has to explain this intuitive view.

Negative existentials: The sentences such as "There is no Odysseus" are not only meaningful but also true. If the semantic value of a proper name is its referent, the sentence itself does not have a semantic value. In other words, it lacks a truth-value – it is neither true nor false.

Substitution into belief contexts: Suppose Jack is a person with a little bit of knowledge in English literature, and the only thing that he knows about George Eliot is that *Middlemarch* is a novel by George Eliot. We can express this fact by saying that:

(1) Jack believes that George Eliot wrote *Middlemarch*.

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[36] Kripke (1980) , 27.

[37] Maybe negative examples can illustrate this point more vividly: "there are no unicorns" will turn out meaningless since one of its part[S] has no referent.

However, George Eliot is Mary Anne Evans' pen name. Therefore, both names, "George Eliot" and "Mary Anne Evans", refer to same person and have the same semantic value. Now, if we accept the principle of compositionality, we have to accept one of its corollaries which says: "Substitution of a constituent of a sentence with another which has the same semantic value will leave the semantic value of the sentence unchanged". Given the truth of (1) the following sentence must be true as well.

(1a) Jack believes that Mary Anne Evans wrote *Middlemarch*.

But it cannot be the case since the only thing Jack knows about George Eliot is that *Middlemarch* is a novel by George Eliot.

Problems such as those above, which Mill's theory was unable to explain, led Frege and Russell to the conclusion independently of each other that Mill was wrong. They present a descriptive theory about proper names (a certain reading of the descriptive theory) and believe that the descriptive theory can present suitable solutions for such philosophical problems.[38]

2-2-2- Descriptive Theory

2-2-2-1 Frege-Russell Theory

As we have seen, according to the direct reference theory, a proper name refers directly to its referent, whereas in the descriptive view, the relationship between a name and its referent is indirect; that is, a name denotes its referent by some description that is true of that object. However, the central claim that Kripke attributes to both Frege and

[38] Look at Lycan (2008) , 31-36 to see descriptive theory's solution to these problems.

Russell is that when a proper name is used appropriately, it is just an abbreviated definite description that is uniquely satisfied by the object to which the speaker refers.

2-3- Modal Argument against the Frege-Russell Theory

As previously discussed, a semantical theory about proper names has to explain the semantic characters of proper names, and one of these characters is rigidity. In section 1-4, Kripke's argument shows that the Frege-Russell theory does not adequately explain this character of proper names. According to the Frege-Russell theory, definite descriptions that are semantically identical to proper names are attributed by speakers to the referents of the names. For example, one of the definite descriptions attributed to Aristotle is "the teacher of Alexander"; according to this theory, "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander" are identical to each other. If "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander" are semantically equal, then the semantic value of a sentence in which "Aristotle" is replaced with "the teacher of Alexander" has to be the same. To illustrate this point, consider the following sentences:

(I) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.

(II) Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander.

(II) is the consequence of replacing the definite description "the teacher of Alexander" with the proper name "Aristotle" in (I) that according to the Frege-Russell theory, "the teacher of Alexander" and "Aristotle" are semantically the same. But intuitively, (II) is true and (I) is false. Therefore, the truth-value of these two sentences, and consequently, their contents, are different. As the *only* difference of these two sentences is replacement

of "Aristotle" with "the teacher of Alexander", the difference between two sentences is attributed to a difference in the semantic values of the expressions "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander".

In fact, the difference between these two sentences is that proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions are non-rigid designators. The proper name "Aristotle" that refers to Aristotle in the actual word is rigid because Aristotle could not exist without being Aristotle (although Aristotle might not have been called "Aristotle") and anyone else could not be Aristotle (although anyone else might have been called "Aristotle"). In other words, in every possible world in which Aristotle exists, he must be Aristotle regardless of other properties he has or lacks in those worlds. That is, he must have the property of being the very individual he is. On the other hand, according to the rigidity test presented in Chapter One, most definite descriptions that speakers attribute to common names are non-rigid. For example, intuitively we acknowledge that the sentence "The teacher of Alexander might not have been the teacher of Alexander" is true because in other possible worlds, someone else might have been the teacher of Alexander. Regarding the concept of rigidity, Kripke's modal argument can be rewritten as the following: names are rigid and descriptions that speakers attribute to names are non-rigid, and so, names could not be semantically equal to descriptions. Here, one can ask why Russell did not pay attention to the point that definite descriptions considered equal to proper names are not rigid. As Kripke argues:

> One reason is that, here as elsewhere, he did not consider modal questions; and the question of the rigidity of names in natural language was rarely explicitly considered after him. Second, it seemed to Russell that various philosophical arguments necessitated a description theory of names and an eliminative theory of descriptions. Russell acknowledged that his views were incompatible with our native reactions (though the

> rigidity issue was not mentioned), but powerful philosophical arguments seemed to him to compel adoption of his theory.[39]

Supposing the correctness of this argument, proper names, in contrast to the Frege-Russell theory, could not be semantically identical to descriptions.

2-3-1-Dummett's Defense of Frege-Russell's Theory

In this section, I will assess Dummett's defense of Frege-Russell's theory against the doctrine of rigidity. Although Dummett agrees that Kripke has shown an important difference between the behavior of rigid designators and definite descriptions in modal contexts, in Dummett's opinion, this difference does not explain the non-equivalence of proper names and definite descriptions in semantical characters like rigidity. He believes that the difference between the behavior of proper names and definite descriptions can be explained by appealing explicitly to the mechanism of scope. If Dummett's account is correct, the Frege-Russell theory will be saved from the contention that it is unable to explain the rigidity of proper names.

In the Preface of *Naming and Necessity*[40], Kripke demonstrates that Dummett's account is not able to explain the difference between proper names and definite descriptions and this view that reduces rigidity to scope is in error.

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[39] Kripke (1980).
[40] Kripke (1980), 11.

2-3-2-Dummett's Answer to Kripke

To explain Dummett's answer to Kripke's doctrine of rigidity we need to consider the following two sentences:

(1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.

(2) Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander.

As we saw, (2) intuitively is true because there are possible worlds in which Aristotle might have died in the early stage of his life, in which case he never would have become a philosopher at all. In contrast to (2), the sentence (1) intuitively is false. As the *only* difference of these two sentences is the replacement of "Aristotle" with "the teacher of Alexander", according to Kripke, the difference between the two sentences is attributed to a difference in the semantic values of the expressions "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander". The proper name "Aristotle" is rigid, whereas the definite description "the teacher of Alexander" is not. These two expressions, therefore, cannot be semantically identical and consequently, a semantical theory such as the Frege-Russell theory, which considers the equivalence of proper names and non-rigid designators, would be false.

The point of Dummett's doctrine is that one can account for the distinction between (1) and (2) without supposing a difference in the semantic value between "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander". That is, one can account for the distinction without supposing that "Aristotle" is rigid and "the teacher of Alexander" is not. In Dummett's view, all that the distinction between (1) and (2) demonstrates is that there is a syntactic constraint on terms such as "Aristotle", which forces them to take a wide

scope with respect to modal operators.[41] Accordingly, a semantically proper name is equal to a definite description that takes wide scope with respect to modal operators. Therefore, the truth-value of the sentence (1) is equal to the sentence (2) in which the definite description "the teacher of Alexander" takes a wide scope with respect to the modal operator (might). In the notation of symbolic logic, the sentence (2) is as the following:

(2*)

$(\exists x)(x = Aristotle \wedge \Diamond (x \neq (\iota y)(Fy))$ *(Narrow scope)*

(2**)

$(\exists x)(\exists y)(x = Aristotle \wedge x = (\iota y)(Fy) \wedge \Diamond (x \neq y)$ *(Wide scope)*

The truth-value of the sentence (2*) is true because there are possible situations in which the actual denotation of "Aristotle" died as a child. According to Dummett, this reading of (2) is not a true one because the definite description "the teacher of Alexander" as a replacement for proper name "Aristotle" takes a narrow scope with respect to the modal operator, whereas the sentence (2**) is a true reading of (2) and its truth-value is false as the sentence (1). Thus, Dummett's doctrine accounts for the distinction between (1) and (2) without postulating a semantic difference between proper names and definite descriptions. In fact, if Dummett's doctrine is correct, proper names can be identified with definite descriptions that take an obligatory wide scope with respect to modal

[41] Dummett (1973).

operators, and therefore, the Frege-Russell theory will be rescued from this critique that it is not able to explain the rigidity of proper names.

2-3-3- Kripke's Answer to Dummett

Kripke believes that Dummett's account is problematic. The central issue in Kripke's argument is that the intuitive distinction between names and definite descriptions is not limited to modal contexts. Consider the sentence "Aristotle is Aristotle", which has no modal operator. According to Dummett, this sentence is equal to the sentence "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander". If these two sentences are semantically equal, all their semantical characteristics, in particular, their truth-values, have to be the same in all possible worlds. But they obviously have different truth-values because we can consider a possible world in which the denotation of "Aristotle" died as a child; therefore, the sentence "Aristotle is Aristotle" is true, whereas the sentence "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander" is false. As both sentences lack modal operators, the difference between them cannot be explained based on a syntactic constraint on proper names within modal contexts. According to Kripke, the difference between these two sentences is attributed to a difference in semantic values of the expressions "Aristotle" as a rigid designator and "the teacher of Alexander" as a non-rigid designator. Stanley[42] illustrates Kripke's argument against Dummett in considering the following discourse:

(3) Aristotle is Aristotle. That's necessary.

[42] Stanly (1997).

(4) Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander. That's not necessary.

Both (3) and (4) are intuitively true, but it is difficult to see how Dummett's account could make both of them true. In order to see these two sentences in Dummett's doctrine, we need to determine the content of the occurrence of "that" in the above sentences. According to the prevalent view, the occurrence of 'that' refers to some "value" of the preceding sentences, either the proposition it expresses, or some other semantic feature. Therefore, when we say a sentence is necessary, we are in fact claiming that the proposition it expresses is necessary. Regarding this point, Kripke's argument against Dummett can be rewritten as the following: since both sentences (3) and (4) are true, and the semantic value of (3) has a necessary property while (4) does not, according to Leibniz's Law[43], then the semantic value of these two sentences cannot be identical. As no modal operators occur in the sentences of (3) and (4), the difference in semantical value of these two sentences cannot be explained by Dummett's account, and the difference can *only* be explained by the difference in the semantic values of the expressions 'Aristotle' and 'the teacher of Alexander'. Therefore, Dummett's doctrine cannot explain the rigidity of proper names and consequently it is incorrect.

What Kripke's argument seems to show is that no syntactic account of the distinction between proper names and definite descriptions is possible. Thus, the difference between proper names and definite descriptions must be attributed to a difference in the semantic values they receive. The reason that "Aristotle is Aristotle" is true with respect to all possible worlds, and 'Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander' is false

[43] If x is identical to y, then every non-relational property of x is a property of y, and vice versa.

in some possible worlds is that "Aristotle" is rigid, and denotes to Aristotle in all possible worlds, whereas "the teacher of Alexander" is not. Every semantical theory about proper names must be able to explain the rigidity of them. As Kripke's argument shows, modifying the Frege-Russell theory that considers non-rigid definite descriptions identical to proper names based on a syntactic account in modal contexts is not able to explain rigidity, and the rigidity of proper names affects the content of modally simple sentences; that is, sentences not containing modal terms. Kripke describes this point as follows:

> The intuition is about the truth conditions, in counterfactual situations, of (the proposition expressed by) a simple sentence. No wide-scope interpretation of certain modal contexts can take its place. To the extent that a theory preserves this intuition, so much the better for it.[44]

If Kripke's argument is accurate, the rigidity of proper names cannot be explained based on a syntactic account, and consequently, as he claims, rigidity is a semantical characteristic. The rigidity of proper names itself does not simply show the falsity of descriptive theory; however, it demonstrates that every semantical theory about proper names that considers proper names semantically equal to non-rigid expressions, like the Frege-Russell's theory, is wrong.

2-4- Summary

According to this chapter, we can conclude that although the doctrine of rigidity shows the falsity of any descriptive theory like the Frege-Russell theory, the rigidity of

[44] Kripke, (1980) , 12.

proper names is not sufficient for determining a comprehensive semantic theory. Since rigidity is a semantic character of proper names, any correct semantic theory about proper names must explain the rigidity of proper names. The direct reference theory attributed to Kripke explains the rigidity of proper names well. If any descriptive theory can explain the rigidity of proper names and answer other objections, it could be considered as good as the direct reference theory in this respect.

§ 3. Rigid Designators and Essentialism

The notion of the rigidity of proper names has an important role not only in Kripke's semantical doctrines in *Naming and Necessity*, but also in many of his arguments and claims for or against other philosophical doctrines he discussed in these lectures. Kripke develops some seminal arguments concerning the metaphysics of essence, the notions of necessity and possibility, necessary *a posteriori* truths, contingent *a priori* truths, and the mind-body problem.

One of the most important subjects mentioned above is essentialism and Kripke's defence of it. Essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine about objects and their characteristics. In many parts of *Naming and Necessity,* especially in the first and third lectures, essentialist doctrines and semantical doctrines go hand in hand in such a way that the pure semantical doctrine might be thought to entail essentialism. However, the relationship between those two doctrines is not clear. Does Kripke conclude the correctness of essentialism only from the rigidity of proper names or merely from non-essentialist premises? And if he concludes correctly, what is the meaning of this essentialism that he defends? Is the rigidity of proper names itself based on essentialism? If Kripke could solve the significant controversy between essentialism and non-essentialism by the rigidity of proper names or merely by non-essentialist premises, at first glance, it would be important, but also strange. It would be important because it is one of the major challenges in the history of philosophy, but strange because it seems that the relationship between words and its referents (semantical doctrine) entails a doctrine

about the nature of objects (essentialism). It seems we should not be able to deduce a metaphysical consequence from a linguistic theory. In Salmon's words, "[y]ou can't pull a metaphysical rabbit out of a linguistic hat."[45]

The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the relationship between the rigidity of proper names and Kripke's essentialist claims in *Naming and Necessity*. Therefore, after introducing the notions of essential and accidental properties, essentialism and anti-essentialism, I will assess the role of rigidity in Kripke's arguments. Kripke's defence of essentialism can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, Kripke defends the distinction between essential properties and accidental properties. His main purpose in this stage is to reject Quine's arguments against the intelligibility of essential and accidental properties. In the second stage, Kripke claims that some properties are essential for objects.

3-1- Essentialism and Anti-essentialism

The distinction between *essential properties and accidental properties* has been characterized in various ways, but it is most commonly understood along these lines: an *essential property of an object* is a property that it must have, and without that property the object cannot exist, while an *accidental property of an object* is one that it happens to have but that it could lack. With respect to possible worlds, *essential and accidental properties* can be defined as the following:

[45] Salmon (1981), 3.

P is an essential property of an object o if o has the property P in any possible worlds where o exists.

P is an accidental property of an object o if o lacks the property P at least in a possible world where o exists.

Essentialism[46] in general may be characterized as the doctrine that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties; that is, (at least some) objects necessarily have properties *independently of how they are explained or referred to*. This view can be traced back to our intuitions about objects and their properties. Most people believe that although Aristotle was a philosopher, the teacher of Alexander, and a student of Plato, he could exist without having these properties. It would have been possible that Aristotle died in the early stage of his life and did not have any of these properties, or that Aristotle studied Art instead of Philosophy. In other words, there are possible worlds where Aristotle exists without having any of these properties. However, from an intuitive view, Aristotle has some properties without which he could not exist at all. For example, Aristotle could not exist without being a human being or being non-identical to Plato. For an object to be Aristotle, it has to have these properties. In other words, Aristotle has these properties in any possible world where he exists. Therefore, the latter properties are much more controversial than the former.

According to what has been discussed above, we need to distinguish between two anti-essentialist views: moderate and radical anti-essentialism. The former view believes that objects have no essential properties and that for every non-trivial property of

[46] According to radical essentialism, all properties of an object are essential ones. This view is attributed to Leibniz.

an object, a possible world can be considered in which the object lacks that property. Such anti-essentialist views accept that the distinction between essential and accidental properties is intelligible, but they claim that the set of non-trivial properties of objects is empty. Accordingly, both essentialists and such moderate anti-essentialists believe we can ask about an object independently of its description, whether this object possesses or lacks a certain property, but their answers to this question are different. Essentialists believe that (at least) some properties of an object are essential. However, anti-essentialists claim that objects have no non-trivial properties.

On the other hand, according to radical anti-essentialism, such a distinction between essential and accidental properties is not genuine and intelligible. Willard Van Orman Quine's objections to the consistence of modal logic, this view does not claim all properties are accidental but refuses such metaphysical distinction among the properties of objects. As Kripke says, this view claims "[a] particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property on the way it's described."[47] In the next section, I will assess the basis of Quine's objections and the role of the concept of rigidity in Kripke's response to these objections. In order to evaluate Quine's arguments against essentialism and Kripke's answer to them, we need to see who is responsible for presenting arguments in defence of their position. As Kripke's claim is based on intuition and it is intuitively defendable, then the view that refuses this intuitive view needs to present its arguments. In such situations, it seems that merely showing the invalidity of the arguments against the intuitive view is sufficient defence.

[47] Kripke (1980) , 40.

3-2- Quine's Objections against Essentialism

Quine asserts that the notion of essential property is not an intelligible one and also that essentialism is an incoherent metaphysical doctrine. Presenting Quine's criticisms of qualified modal logic (henceforth QML) will help us to better understand his objections against essentialism. During 1943-1960, Quine levelled a number of objections against QML, claiming the whole project of QML was incoherent. According to Quine, QML is bound by the condition that the necessity operator (or the possibility operator) can only meaningfully prefix closed sentences.[48] In Quine's view, confining modal logic to *de dicto* sentences trivializes it. On the other hand, if modal logic includes *de re* sentences too, it entails essentialism and it is contradictory. Therefore, either the only kinds of QML modal sentences are *de dicto* ones, or QML includes *de re* sentences as well. A sentence is syntactically *de re* just in case it contains a pronoun or free variable within the scope of an opaque verb that is anaphoric on or bound by a singular term or quantifier outside the scope of that verb. Otherwise, it is syntactically *de dicto*. In Sainsbury's words, "[a] sentence expresses 'necessity *de re*' iff it is adequately **QN**-formalizable by a sentence in which there is a name-letter within the scope of some occurrence of box or if there is an occurrence of box within the scope of a quantifier. Let us say that a sentence expresses 'necessity *de dicto*' when it expresses necessity but does not express necessity *de re*."[49]

If *de dicto* sentences are considered the only kinds of QML modal sentences, necessity needs to be explicated in terms of analyticity in the way that Carnap and Lewis

[48] A sentence in which all variables are bound is a closed sentence.
[49] Sainsbury (2001), 287.

did. In other words, the intelligibility of the notions of modality depends on the existence of distinction between analytic-synthetic statements. However, Quine argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable.[50]If modal operators are only intelligible based on the analytic-synthetic distinction, the notion of necessity and possibility would be meaningless without such a distinction. Even though we disagree with Quine's claim on the analytic-synthetic distinction, this condition on QML modal sentences trivializes the notions of necessity and possibility. Everything that can be said based on the notions of necessity and possibility can be said without them.

On the other hand, if QML is not confined to any condition, it includes a *de re* sentence such as "□ *Fx*" as well. Quine claims that in this way, the notion of an essential property that is a metaphysical one will be meaningful. However, in order to understand why the acceptance of *de re* sentences leads to essentialism, we need to pay attention to the semantical rules of QML.

Quine holds that we cannot draw a distinction between the essential and accidental properties of objects. He believes that using essential and accidental property is the only way to explain the concept of essential properties. Quine's own example is **being greater than 7** for the number 9. He claims we cannot ask whether this property is essential or accidental for the number 9. If the number 9 denotes "9" as its referent, the following sentence

□ (9>7)

[50] Quine "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951).

will be true. Therefore, if the concept of essential property is meaningful, the property of **being greater than 7** for the number 9 will be essential. However, Quine asks us to consider the following sentence when the number 9 denotes "the number of planets" as its referent.

□ (The number of planets > 7)

The above sentence is false because the number of planets could be 5, for example. Then, the property of **being greater than 7** for the number of 9 is not an essential property. Regarding "The number of planets=9" it can be concluded that this property is both essential and non-essential. Therefore, it is a contradiction. According to Quine, being an essential or accidental property of an object depends on the way it is denoted and not on its metaphysical properties. For more clarification, Quine presents another example: suppose the two following definite descriptions, "the greatest mathematician" and "the greatest cyclist", denote a person as the referent at the same time. Suppose this person is the referent of "the greatest mathematician". Consider the two following sentences:

(1) The greatest mathematician is necessarily rational.

(2) The greatest mathematician is necessarily two-legged,

(1) is true and (2) is false because it seems the concept of being a mathematician, in contrast to the concept of being two-legged, includes the concept of being rational. Thus, we can conclude that the greatest mathematician is necessarily rational, and accidentally two-legged. However, if we consider the same person as "the greatest cyclist" of two following sentences,

(3) The greatest cyclist is necessarily rational.

(4) The greatest cyclist is necessarily two-legged,

(3) is false and (4) is true. According to this definite description, the same person is two-legged necessarily and rational accidentally. Therefore, as we see, the property of being rational or two-legged is both essential and non-essential for a person. If essential and accidental properties are to be considered metaphysical ones, the conclusion that the property of being rational or two-legged for a person is both essential and non-essential, that is contradictory. Therefore, such a distinction cannot be a metaphysical one. As Quine says,"[J]ust insofar as we are talking referentially of the object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent."[51] Quine concludes that since there is no principled and non-arbitrary way of selecting (an arbitrary object *o* and property *P*) among different terms that refer to the object in question, being an essential property of something independently of how it is described is not intelligible. Therefore, being an essential or accidental property of an object depends on the way it is described.

3-3- Rigidity and Defence of Essentialism

In Kripke's view, the notion of essential property is intelligible. In contrast to Quine, Carnap, and Lewis, he considers the notion of necessity and possibility as a metaphysical notion. In fact, Kripke's defence of these notions and of essentialism

[51] Quine (1960), 199.

revived the metaphysical debates in anti-metaphysical atmosphere due to logical positivism. However, how can the notion of rigidity be related to Quine's objections? According to Quine, objects have or lack properties based only on the ways that they are described. Since there is no principled and non-arbitrary way of selecting among different terms that refer to an object, the notion of essential property is not intelligible. If the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators is a genuine one, then rigidity can help to answer some of Quine's challenges.

Being an essential property of an object is related to whether the object has this property in any possible worlds in which that object exists. Therefore, *n* has to be a rigid designator in order for us to talk about its referent in any possible worlds in which it exists. In other words, Kripke claims the connection between the essential properties of an object and the truth value of sentences such as "It is necessary that if *n* exists, then t is *F*" can only be provided by rigid designators. He, in contrast to Quine, says non-rigid designators cannot be used for showing the distinction between essential and accidental properties. As neither of the two referential terms "the greatest mathematician" and "the greatest cyclist" are rigid designators for their referents, sentences such as those mentioned in (1) - (4) that contain a non-rigid designator of the object *o* cannot be used for drawing a distinction between essential and accidental properties. By contrast, if we use proper names instead of non-rigid designators, we cannot drive the contradiction that Quine showed.

Since an essential property of an object is defined as a property the object could not lack in any circumstance in which it existed, it seems there is a connection between

the notion of rigidity and the claim that an object has an essential property. Soames formulates this connection: "If *n* is a rigid designator of *o*, and *F* is a predicate expressing the property *P*, then the claim that *P* is an essential property of *o* is equivalent to the claim it is necessary that if *n* exists, then *n* is *F*."[52] The proof of this claim can be shown as follows:

Assume that the sentence "If *n* exists, *n* is *F*", in which *n* is a rigid name that designates an object *o* and *F* is a predicate expressing property *P*, necessarily is true. As the rigid designator *n* designates *o* in all possible worlds, the above sentence attributes property *P* to *o* in every possible world. Since this sentence is true in all possible worlds, *o* cannot exist without having the property *P*. Thus, *P* is an essential property of *o*. On the other hand, assume *P* is an essential property. Consider the sentence "If *n* exists, *n* is *F*", in which *n* is a rigid name that designates an object *o* and *F* is a predicate expressing property *P*. As the rigid designator *n* designates *o* in all possible worlds, then the above sentence attributes property *P* to *o* in every possible world. Also, since *P* is an essential property of *o*, then *o* possesses *P* in any possible world in which *o* exists. Therefore, the above sentence is true in all possible worlds and consequently is necessarily true.

A Quinean might at this point say to Kripke is that all Kripke presented is that if rigid designation makes sense, then essentialism also makes sense as well. But does rigid designation make sense? The defender of Quine claims that rigid designation makes sense only if the properties of an object exist independently of how it is described, and also only if the notions of necessity and possibility be considered as metaphysical notions

[52] Soames (2003), 347.

independently of analytic or synthetic notions. However, this is something Quine does not accept. Thus, Kripke's answer to Quine is question-begging. However as Soames suggests such an answer to Kripke is entirely misguided.[53] It is not up to Kripke to prove the intelligibility of essentialism from premises that are acceptable to Quine. In Kripke's view, essentialism is an intuitive view and almost everyone understands this view about objects. By contrast, it is the job of the opponent of essentialism to prove that our ordinary, common sense views are in error. However, a defender of essentialism only needs to show that the opponent's argument is false and is based on premises that are not defendable. Kripke himself explains this situation as follows:

> It is even suggested in the literature, that though a notion of necessity may have some sort of intuition behind it (we do think some things could have been otherwise; other things we don't think could have been otherwise), this notion [of a distinction between necessary and contingent properties] is just a doctrine made up by some bad philosopher, who (I guess) didn't realize that there are several ways of referring to the same thing. I don't know if some philosophers have not realized this; but at any rate it is very far from being true that this idea [that a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description] is a notion which has no intuitive content, which means nothing to the ordinary man. Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, 'That's the guy who might have lost'. Someone else says 'Oh no, if you describe him as the winner, then it is not true that he might have lost'. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive man? It seems to me obviously to be the second. The second man has a philosophical theory. The first man would say, and with great conviction, 'well, of course, the winner of the election *might have been someone else*. The actual winner, had the course of the campaign been different, might have been the loser, and someone else the winner; or there might have been no election at all. So, such terms as "the winner" and "the loser' don't designate the same objects in all possible worlds. On the other hand, the term "Nixon" is just a *name of this man'*. When you ask whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, *this man* would in fact have lost the election. If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or contingent property (forget whether there *are* any nontrivial necessary properties [and consider] just the *meaningfulness* of the notion) is a philosopher's notion with no intuitive content, he is wrong.[54]

[53] Soames (2003), 352.

[54] Kripke (1980), 41-42.

Regarding Kripke's defence of essentialism, the response to this claim that Kripke drives a metaphysical consequence from semantical premises can be as follows: Kripke does not prove essentialism by rigidity, but replies to Quine's objections to essentialism. Quine's criticism is semantics, as it is based on Frege-Russell's doctrine about proper names. Therefore, Kripke's answer to Quine would be a semantical one as well. As Quine believes that proper names such as "Aristotle" can be replaced by definite descriptions, he claims that names are removable. Consequently, he only evaluates situations of non-rigid definite descriptions. In fact, the rigidity of proper names reveals the falsity of Quine's objections to essentialism and also explains why Quine made such a mistake.

Another point that we need to consider is that Kripke's defence of the intelligibility of essentialism is based on the rigidity of proper names, that it is an intuitive doctrine and not a semantical theory about proper names. If we are careful about the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators, then Quine's objections to the intelligibility of essentialism are false. Note that the semantic value of a proper name as its referent does not have any effect on Kripke's defence of essentialism. In other words, in both situations, Quine's arguments against essentialism are not acceptable.

3-4- *A Priori- a Posteriori* and Necessary-Contingent

An important consequence of *Naming and Necessity* is more careful attention to the distinction between necessity-possibility, *a priori-a posteriori*, and analytic-synthetic.

In Kripke's view, many philosophical mistakes are due to neglect of these distinctions. These three distinctions can be considered as follows:

The necessary-contingent distinction belongs in the realm of metaphysics. A necessary statement is one in which the truth value remains constant across all possible worlds. Thus a necessarily true statement is one that is true in every possible world, and a necessarily false statement is one that is false in every possible world. By contrast, the truth value of contingent statements is not fixed across all possible worlds. For any contingent statement, there *is* at least one possible world in which it is true and at least one possible world in which it is false

The *a priori-a posteriori* distinction is epistemological and refers primarily to how or on what basis a proposition might be known. A statement is knowable *a priori* if it is knowable independently of experience. By contrast, a proposition is knowable *a posteriori* if it is knowable on the basis of experience.

The analytic-synthetic distinction belongs in the realm of semantics. A statement is analytic if its truth depends entirely on the definition of its terms, while the truth of a synthetic statement depends not on mere linguistic convention, but on how the world actually *is* in some respect.

Although such distinctions – especially the analytic-synthetic one – have gained attention since Hume's time, their conceptual distinction from each other and their relationship with the necessary-contingent distinction is not clear. Hume seemed to presuppose that analytic-synthetic distinction was aligned with the distinction between *a priori-a posteriori*. Until Kant, analytic statements were regularly equated with *apriori*

verification, and synthetic statements were equated with *a posteriori* verification. By contrast, Kant claimed that although all analytic statements are *a priori*, all synthetic statements are not *a posteriori* and that there are synthetic *a priori* statements. In *Naming and Necessity,* Kripke does not pay much attention to analytic-synthetic distinction. Instead, he pays greater attention to two the distinctions necessary-contingent and *a priori-a posteriori*. He accepts the current view that analytic statements are both necessary and *a priori*. Until Kripke, it was widely accepted that the *a priori-a posteriori* distinction was aligned with the distinction between necessary-contingent. And it was claimed that:

A statement is *a posteriori* iff it is a contingent statement.

A statement is *a priori* iff it is a necessary statement.

However, Kripke accepts neither of the two above statements. In *Naming and Necessity*, he claims that the existence of both *a posteriori* necessary truths and *a priori* contingent truths can be shown. In the next section, I will show how the rigidity of proper names entails necessary *a posteriori* statements. Kripke and Kaplan also claim that there are contingent *a priori* statements and they believe that the existence of such statements is a consequence of their semantical doctrines. One of Kripke's examples of such statements is "stick S is one meter long" in which "one" is to fix the reference of "meter" as the standard of length by the length of stick S that is a certain stick or bar in Paris.[55]

According to Kripke, such statements are *a priori* knowledge since this kind of denoting can be done without measuring the length of stick S or any experimental test

[55] Kripke (1980), 54.

that shows the length of stick S is one meter. As "one meter" is a rigid designator that designates a certain length in all possible words, and the definite description "the length of stick S" does not designate anything rigidly, the above sentence is not necessary but contingent. In every possible world, "one meter" designates the same length that it designates in the actual world, but in some counterfactual situations, the stick might have been either longer or shorter, if various stresses and strains had been applied to it.

It can be questioned whether or not such examples are genuine *a priori* knowledge. And, are there more important examples of *a priori* contingent statements? It may be that we do not accept some of Kaplan, Kripke, and others' examples of *a priori* contingent or *a posteriori* necessary statements, but the attention that this conceptual distinction has gained is more important than these examples themselves. As Kripke states, these notions are different and even if these distinctions can be aligned with each other, they are not trivial and need to be proved:

> More important than any particular example of something which is alleged to be necessary and not *a priori* or *a priori* and not necessary, is to see that the notions are different, that it's not trivial to argue on the basis of something's being something which maybe we can only know *a posteriori*, that it's not a necessary truth. It's not trivial, just because something is know in some sense *a priori*, that what is known is a necessary truth.[56]

3-5- A Posteriori Necessary Truths and Trivial Essentialism

3-5-1- *A Posteriori* Necessary Truths

Although the existence of *a priori* contingent statements is controversial, the existence of *a posteriori* necessary statements has been widely accepted. The most

[56] Kripke (1980), 39-40.

important example for such statements is identity statements consisting of two distinctive names joined by is or are like 'a is b' or 'a=b'. The necessity of identity statements was one of the controversial consequences of modal logic. Such statements were the derivation of the following argument in QML:

(I) (x) (y)((x=y) → (Fx → Fy))

(II) (x) □(x=x)

(III) (x) (y)((x=y) → (□(x=x) → □(x=y))) ((III) is a substitution instance of (I)).

(IV) □(a=a) (universal instantiation on (II)).

(V) (a=b) → (□(a=a) → □(a=b)) (universal instantiation on (III)).

(VI) □(a=a) → ((a=b) → □(a=b)) ((VI) follows from (V) truth functionally).

(VII) (a=b) → □(a=b) (by *modus ponens* on (IV) and (VI)).

Note that the above derivation is valid only if a and b are rigid designators. Therefore, to derive philosophical consequences from the logically true statement "a=b → □ (a=b)", a semantical premise is needed, in which the referential terms that used to express those statements are rigid designators. Examples like "Hesperus is Phosphorus" in natural language have caused a great deal of uncertainty for the acceptance of such consequence. Both Hesperus and Phosphorus are rigid designators; they are legitimate candidates for a and b in (VII). Accordingly, both logic and the theory of direct reference commit us to the truth of "(Hesperus is Phosphorus) → □(Hesperus is Phosphorus). "Hesperus is Phosphorus" was a scientific discovery that showed that Hesperus (the morning star) and Phosphorus (the evening star) refer to the same planet, Venus. If we add this astronomical fact to "Hesperus is Phosphorus", we have □ (Hesperus is Phosphorus), which says

Hesperus could not have been anything else than Phosphorus. Although Hesperus and Phosphorus turned out to be the same planet, they might have turned out to be different planets. Such issues caused considerable uncertainty about the acceptance of the necessity of these arguments. One of the solutions to this puzzle was that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' unlike 'a' and 'b' in the above argument are not really names, then'a' and 'b' cannot be replaced with 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. Indeed, this is one of the original motivations for the Frege-Russell theory. Therefore, we can accept the soundness of the above argument and still claim that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is contingently true. Another solution was that (3) really is not an instance of (1), on the grounds that there is no such property as being necessarily identical to x.

In essentialist terms, that is, being Phosphorus is an essential property of Hesperus. A seemingly more interesting result can be derived: "If Hesperus is a planet, then Phosphorus is a planet" is a necessary truth.[57] It seems that an empirical fact transcends to the level of a necessary truth with help of the theory of direct reference, a phenomenon that needs to be explained. Salmon's explanation is that the property of being Phosphorus is a trivial essential property of Hesperus. Although, he tries to clarify what he means by "trivial essential properties", he admits that his distinction between trivial and nontrivial essential properties is vague. I wish to show that trivial essential properties are those properties that have already been presupposed by logic and the theory of direct reference, at least in the relevant contexts.

[57] Salmon (1981), 82.

According to Kripke, the above objections are due to the confusion between the concept of necessity and *a priority*. These objections are based on the presupposition that a statement is necessary if and only if it is an *a priori* one. However, as Kripke points out, this is hardly obvious. Being necessary is a metaphysical property and being *a priority* is an epistemic property of a statement. Therefore, these two concepts are conceptually independent and distinguished from one another.

Another important distinction that Kripke points out, in response to the objections above, is a distinction between the metaphysical notion of necessity/possibility and the epistemological notion of necessity/possibility. Up to this point I have discussed the metaphysical necessity. When we are talking about necessity as a metaphysical property of the statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus," in fact, we are claiming that if this statement is true, it is true in all possible worlds. That is, if Hesperus is Phosphorus in the actual world, Hesperus cannot help being Phosphorus in any other possible worlds. This is independent of our knowledge about the truth or *falsity* of the statement. However, when we say Hesperus and Phosphorus might have turned out not to be the same planet, we are talking about an epistemic possibility and not a metaphysical one. A statement is said to be epistemically possible if its possibility cannot be ruled out by our present knowledge. There is no conflict between such an epistemic possibility and an acceptance that if a statement is true, it is (metaphysically) necessary. Kripke's example of such a distinction between the two concepts of necessity and possibility is Goldbach's conjecture. According to Goldbach's conjecture, an even number greater than two must be the sum of two prime numbers. Epistemically this claim can be true or false, that is, we cannot

reject the truth or falsity of this claim based on all we know. But if this statement is metaphysically true, it is necessarily true and if it is false, it is necessarily false.[58]

After drawing the distinction between the concept of necessity and *a priority*, Kripke presents some examples of the necessity of *a posteriori statements*. One group of these statements is identity statements consisting of two distinctive proper names joined by 'is' like 'a is b', or like 'a=b'. A statement such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is *a posteriori*, but necessary. The necessity of such statements is due to the rigidity of the proper names used in these statements. Assume that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true in the actual world. Consequently, both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are different names used to name the same object, in this case the planet Venus. Since both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are proper names and proper names designate their designata rigidly and, obstinately, in respect to all possible worlds, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate Venus in all possible worlds. Therefore, '[i]f Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true in all possible worlds. It is necessarily true because Hesperus could not have been anything other than Phosphorus. This argument can be briefly shown as following:

1- Hesperus is Phosphorus
2- If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then necessarily, if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus
3- Consequently, necessarily if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus,

Being *a posteriori* of the result in the argument above is due to being *a posteriori* of the first premise. The first premise is an empirical discovery, but the second one is *a priori*

[58] Kripke (1980), 36.

and its truth is related to the doctrine of rigidity. Thus, any identity statement such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', in which its truth is *a posteriori* and consists of two proper names, entails a necessary a *posteriori* truth.

Note that the necessary a *posteriori* status of the statement 'if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus' is only based on the doctrine of the rigidity of proper names, and is not a semantical doctrine about proper names that explains the rigidity of proper names. Since rigidity is a result of semantical character of proper names, every correct semantical theory about proper names must explain the rigidity of proper names. As the rigidity implies being necessary a *posteriori* of the statement such as 'if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus', every correct semantical theory has such consequences. Then, a commitment to the existence of necessary *a posteriori* statements, in this trivial sense in contrast to Salmon, is not due to difference between the direct reference theory and the descriptive theories.[59]

As mentioned, the main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the relationship between the rigidity of proper names and Kripke's essentialist claims, and in this way to assess the role of rigidity in Kripke's arguments in defence of essentialism and against non-essentialism. As we saw, Kripke defends the distinction between essential properties and accidental properties in order to reject Quine's arguments against the intelligibility of essential and accidental properties, and claims that some properties are essential for objects. In the following, I will show the role of rigidity in Kripke's arguments, and how and to what degree these claims are related to the rigidity of proper names. I will also

[59] Salmon (1981), 77.

show how the relationship between semantics and the metaphysics of essence can be explained by the concept of the rigid designator.

3-5-2- Trivial Essentialism

In section 3-3, the connection between the notion of rigidity and the claim that an object has a property essentially was evaluated. As we saw:

> "If *n* is a rigid designator of *o*, and *F* is a predicate expressing the property *P*, then the claim that *P* is an essential property of *o* is equivalent to the claim it is necessary that if *n* exists, then *n* is *F*."

Moreover, in the previous section, it was shown that the doctrine of rigidity entails that statements like 'if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus' are necessary. We also saw that being necessary of such a statement is a consequence only of the doctrine of rigidity, supplemented by this empirical fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Regarding the relationship between the essential property and the rigidity of proper names, we can say:

- 'Hesperus' is a rigid designator that designates the planet Hesperus.
- The statement 'if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus' is necessary.
- Consequently, the expressed property by the predicate '... is Phosphorus' is an essential property of Hesperus.

Therefore, given certain empirical premises, completely free of any essentialist import, the rigidity of names entails that objects have some essential properties. The character of these properties is dependent on the theory that we select to explain the rigidity of proper names like 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. If the rigidity of proper names is considered as

a direct reference, the expressed property by the predicate '... is Phosphorus' is the property of *being identical with phosphorus*. In fact, according to this theory, the rigidity of proper names entails that the property of being this very thing is an essential property of an object.

Accordingly, logic and the direct reference theory commit us to the truth of '(Hesperus is Phosphorus) → □(Hesperus is Phosphorus)'. And if we add an astronomical fact, namely 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', we have □(Hesperus is Phosphorus), which says Hesperus could not have been anything other than Phosphorus. In essentialist terms, being Phosphorus is an essential property of Hesperus. An arguably more interesting result can be derived: "If Hesperus is a planet, then Phosphorus is a planet" which is a necessary truth.[60] It seems that an empirical fact transcends to the level of a necessary truth by the help of the direct reference theory: a phenomenon that needs to be explained. Salmon's explanation is that the property of being Phosphorus is a trivial essential property of Hesperus. If we accept the distinction between essential and accidental properties, being essential of the properties above cannot be rejected. Although such properties are different from each other, they all have one thing in common: one object is identical with another in the actual world. In other words, an object could not have been anything other than what it is in the actual world. In fact, the intelligibility of rigidity commits us to the existence of a minimal sort of essentialism. Therefore, this derived result is not due to a transition from semantics to metaphysics; however, it may be claimed that this is a transition from metaphysics toward semantics. That is, it seems

[60] Salmon (1981), 82.

as if Kripke derives the rigidity of proper names from a metaphysical doctrine about objects and their properties. However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, in Kripke's view, the rigidity of proper names is merely an intuitive doctrine to evaluate proper names in respect to counterfactual situations. Supporting this claim, Kripke appeals to our intuition about the semantic value of these terms in modal contexts and counterfactual situations. Trivial essentialism is also an intuitive doctrine about objects and their properties. Although the concept of rigidity presupposes trivial essentialism, it does not mean that Kripke derives the rigidity of proper names from such essentialism (or vice versa). The person who does not accept this minimal sort of essentialism and intelligibility of rigidity is responsible for presenting the argument. One has to also explain the intuitive phenomena on which the above claim is based.

3-6- Non-Trivial Essentialism

As we have seen, in *Naming and Necessity,* Kripke considers identity statements containing two rigid terms as necessary *a posteriori* statements. Moreover, he presents other examples of necessary *a posteriori* statements that are not in identity statement form, such as the wooden table and Queen Elizabeth. The former example: let 'T' be a name (rigid designator) of a table made from a hunk of wood rigidly denoted by 'H'. However, the following statement:

(5) If T exists, T was made from H,

is *a posteriori*, it is also necessary.[61] In regards to the second example: if we suppose Queen Elizabeth originated from the gametes 'G_1' and 'G_2', where 'G_1' and 'G_2' rigidly denote the gametes from which she actually sprang, then according to Kripke, the following statement:

(6) If Queen Elizabeth exists, she was originated from gametes 'G_1' and 'G_2',

is necessary and *a posterior*.

In the sentence above, T and Queen Elizabeth are rigid designators that denote their designata. Therefore, with respect to the connection between essentialism, rigidity and necessary statements, it can be derived that the substance of an object is essential. A wooden table could not be the very table that it is if it were not made from the very material out which it is made. Also, an individual could not exist if he or she were not originated from the very gametes out which he or she sprang. This essentialist claim, in contrast to essentialist the claims in the previous section, is not trivial. Kripke claims that not only is the distinction between essential and accidental properties is intelligible, but objects have also some essential properties. It can be questioned if Kripke derives these essentialist consequences only from a doctrine of rigidity and non-essentialist premises. If so, it can be claimed that Kripke derived metaphysical consequences from semantical ones. The assessment of this relationship is important, since the metaphysical consequences of semantics and vice versa are often suspicious. As it mentioned in section 3-1, semantics concerns the relationship between language and the world, and

[61] Kripke (1980), 113-115.

metaphysics is about the world itself. The claim that the way we picture the world (semantics) imposes some constraints on the world is odd enough to deserve suspicion

As we have seen, in the previous session, being necessary of identity statements such as 'if Hesperus exists, Hesperus is Phosphorus' follows from the rigidity of proper names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. The consequence of this derivation is that the trivial essentialist's claims are implied by the doctrine of rigidity. In fact, this essentialism claims that both the origin of objects and their substance can be a consequence of the doctrine of rigidity, and some non-essentialist premises *only* if being necessary of the statement (5) and (6) follows from the rigidity of proper names used in the statements. Salmon (1979) shows that the necessity of such statements cannot be derived from such premises as (5) and (6):

Consider the two following sentences:

(1) Proper name T is a rigid designator (semantical claim)

(2) The table T is made from the hunk of wood H (empirical claim),

according to Salmon, *only* from these premises cannot be derived that:

(3) Necessarily, if T exists, T is made from H.

In Salmon's view, the argument above is not valid unless it is supported by the following premise:

(4) A necessary condition for being the very table is that both tables are made from the same hunk of wood.

If it is possible for a table x to originate from a hunk of matter y, then necessarily, any table originating from hunk y is the very table x, and no other. Therefore, the conclusion

(3) can be derived from the argument above only by addition of premises (4). However, as Salmon points out, the premise (4) is not a consequence of the doctrine of rigidity, but it is itself an essentialist doctrine. In fact, premise (3) states that the substance from which the table T is made is an essential property of the table T. In other words, T could not exist without this property.

All that can be said about the substance of an object, as mentioned above, can also be said about the origin of an object. The following argument needs an essentialist premise (3') for validity:

(1') The proper name Queen Elizabeth is a rigid designator (semantical claim).

(2') Queen Elizabeth is originated from the gametes 'G_1' and 'G_2' (empirical claim).

(3') A necessary condition for being the very individual is that two individuals are originated

from the very gametes,

(4') Necessarily, if Queen Elizabeth exists, she is originated from the gametes 'G_1' and 'G_2'.

Therefore, Kripke's non-trivial essentialist claims in *Naming and Necessity* are not based on his semantical doctrine. One can accept the doctrine of rigidity but reject the consequence of the argument above. One can agree with all of Kripke's semantical claims but will not accept his metaphysical view used in premises (3) and (3'). Therefore, the rigidity of proper names is independent of Kripke's essentialist claims. However, either essentialism or anti-essentialism presupposes rigidity.

3-7- Summary

In this chapter, after introducing three levels of essentialism defended by Kripke in *Naming and Necessity,* the relation between each of them and the rigidity of proper names was assessed. The first claim was about the intelligibility of the concept of essential properties and the doctrine of essentialism excluding claims about the existence of such properties. At this stage, Kripke shows the falsity of Quine's arguments against the intelligibility of essentialism of the rigidity of proper names. The main point at this stage is that Kripke does not derive intelligibility of the concept of essential properties from the rigidity of proper names. According to Kripke, the distinction between essential and accidental properties is an intuitive one. Following the Frege-Russell semantical doctrine about proper names, Quine doubts the intelligibility of such a distinction. The rigidity of proper names shows that Quine's arguments are false and that an intuitive view is defendable.

The second claim showed that trivial essentialism asserts that some properties of objects are essential, such as the property of being the very object. As we have seen in section 5-3, this kind of essentialism follows from the rigidity of proper names supplemented by empirical and non-essentialist premises. Any semantical doctrine that explains this property of proper names commits to trivial essentialism. Therefore, though Kripke takes a step towards metaphysics, it is not an important one.

Non-trivial essentialism, which asserts some properties of objects are essential, was evaluated in the third claim in section 3-6. In this section it was shown that essentialist claims, in contrast to the claims presented in the second stage, cannot be

derived from the rigidity of proper names supplemented by non-essentialist premises, but are themselves based on essentialist premises. Therefore, it can be said that the difference between Kripke and those who do not accept this kind of essentialism is not in the semantical doctrine, but in its metaphysical premises. At this stage, no illicit transition from semantics to metaphysics is made.

Conclusion

My main aim in this dissertation has been to address the relationship between Kripke's semantical doctrine about proper names and his metaphysical doctrine about essences in *Naming and Necessity*. As mentioned Kripke claims that his semantical doctrines have substantive metaphysical consequences. The metaphysical consequences of semantics and vice versa are often suspicious since semantics concerns the relationship between language and the world, and metaphysics is about the world itself. To this end, I examined the role of the rigidity of proper names in Kripke's arguments about semantical doctrine and his metaphysical ones. Through my analysis, I attempted to show how the relationship between semantics and the metaphysics of essence can be explained by the concept of the rigid designator. As we have seen trivial essentialism follows from the rigidity of proper names, and any semantical doctrine that explains this property of proper names commits to trivial essentialism, but in contrast to Kripke, non-trivial essentialism cannot be derived from semantical doctrines.

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