

THE METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITIONS:  
"STRICT CRITICISM" IN KANT'S RECONCILIATION  
OF THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

HAROLD DUGGAN







The Metaphysical Expositions: “Strict Criticism” in Kant’s Reconciliation of  
Theoretical Foundations

By  
Harold Duggan

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## Abstract

This thesis seeks to present an account of Kant's Metaphysical Expositions that shows them to be a model of philosophical reasoning in a mode that functions beyond sheer adversarial dispute. According to this account, agreement on the metaphysical status of the concepts of space and time requires different philosophical standpoints to set aside their strict foundational differences so that they might work corroboratively. The transcendental turn provides the opportunity for these otherwise philosophically diverse standpoints to work from such agreed unity to consensus regarding the ground of the concepts of space and time. However, so that there might actually be corroboration, the differences of these individual standpoints need, in some sense, to be respected. If not then the corroborative account provided is merely ceremonial. Therefore, the structure which permits the unity of these positions must also permit these individual philosophical voices to retain their distinct character. It is the aim of this thesis to examine this structure and to examine the importance of such a structure for the first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The conclusion of this thesis will suggest that although Kant's account is consistent, it is nevertheless a limited conception of the problem. Because Kant's solution to indifferentism is limited, the standpoint of indifferentism threatens to return.

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## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Introduction: Kant's Metaphysical Expositions: A Model Of Philosophical Engagement Beyond Foundational Dispute.....	xi

I. Introduction .....	x
II. Indifferentism and Kant's Methodology of Indifference, Doubt, and Strict Criticism.....	xv
III. The Value and Situation of Indifference.....	xxiii
IV. The Importance of Common Content.....	xxix
V. The Division of Chapters.....	xxxiii
VI. Topics treated not treated by this Thesis .....	xxxviii
VII. Conclusion of the Thesis .....	xl

Chapter 1: Envisioning Intuition: The Inception of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic .....	1
1.1 The Need for Pure content.....	1



1.2 The Identification of Pure Content: Overcoming the ‘Problem of Blindness’ .....	11
1.3 The Distinction Between the Argument in the B Introduction and the Argument from Abstraction in the First Section of the Transcendental Aesthetic.....	21
1.4 The Synthetic Unity of Kant’s Critical First Principle of Cognition.....	26
Chapter 2: The Science of Receptivity as a Body of Principles.....	29
2.0 Organizing Kant’s Preontological Account According to his Twofold Meaning of the Object.....	31
2.1 Affect verses Effect.....	35
2.2 Affect and Consistency within the Scope of the First <i>Critique</i> .....	39
2.3 Buchdahl’s Account of Affect.....	41
2.4 Moltke S. Gram’s Account of Affect .....	46
2.5 Affect, Sensibility, Thought.....	51
2.6 Appearance.....	56
2.7 Falkenstein on Matter in the First Section of the Transcendental Aesthetic.....	58
2.8 Movement to the Metaphysical Expositions.....	66
Chapter 3: The Metaphysical Expositions as Demonstrations.....	68

Introduction .....	68
3.0 Part 1: The Apriority of the Concepts of Space and Time.....	76
3.1 First Exposition.....	76
3.2 The Second Argument for the <i>A Priority</i> of the Concepts of Space and Time .....	87
3.3 The Relation of the Two <i>A Priority</i> Arguments.....	90
3.4 Problems with the Relation between ‘Representing’ and ‘Thinking’ .....	94
3.5 Reinterpreting Kant’s Second Argument for the <i>A Priority</i> of the Concept of Space.....	102
3.6 Part 2: The Intuition Arguments.....	115
3.7 The relation of the <i>A Priority</i> arguments to the Intuition arguments.....	115
3.8 The First Intuition Argument .....	116
3.9. General Account of the First Account of the Intuitionality of Space.....	117
3.10 General Account of the First Argument for the Intuitionality of Time.....	117
3.11 The Second Intuition Argument .....	120
Conclusion: The Self-known Limitation of Transcendental Idealism as a Standpoint that Falls back into Indifferentism.....	123
4.0 Review.....	123

Appendix.....	129
Selected Bibliography.....	150



### Table of Citations

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is quoted by the pagination used in the translation by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Descartes *Principles of Philosophy* is quoted by the pagination used in the CKMS translation. The following abbreviations are used:

Abbreviation	Title
<i>Critique</i>	Immanuel Kant, <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>
Inquiry	Immanuel Kant, Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality
<i>Principles</i>	René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy

## Table of Appendices

I.	The Transcendental Expositions.....	129
II.	The ‘Neglected’ Alternative.....	133
III.	Allison on the Givenness of Space and Time in the Metaphysical Expositions.....	138

# Kant's Metaphysical Expositions: "Strict Criticism" in the Movement Beyond Foundational Dispute

## I. Introduction

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant gives his account of receptivity as a faculty, or capacity, of cognition. Such an account is important because Kant intends to transform the way in which the object is conceived by philosophy, from something to which cognition must conform, to something which is thought to conform to cognition. Thus receptivity, named intuition by Kant, is the direct presence of the object to any "means of thinking" (A 19/ B 34). Accordingly, the question that is asked of receptivity is not how receptivity is in relation to the object as something beyond cognition. The object is held by Kant to be "given" via "affect". The question that should be asked is how reason can necessarily, and *critically*, demonstrate that first, there is such a receptive faculty, and second, if there is such a faculty, how it is that it can be intellectually discussed.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that sensible intuition as an element of cognition. In the first section Kant presents terms that are necessary to the 'science of receptivity'. Intuition is the means through which thinking can be in an immediate relation with the object. The intuitive presence of the object is dependent on affect, a term which does not admit of a mechanistic account, but instead denotes that inquiry into the basic presence of the object can only reveal that the object must be taken as "given" to us. Appearance is then introduced and said to contain both *a priori* elements and *a posteriori*



aspects. By *a priori* is meant that which can be known without empirical investigation. By *a posteriori* is meant that which requires empirical investigation to be known. Matter is said, by Kant, to be the *a posteriori* aspect of appearance, whereas form of appearance is that through which sensation is determined. Since form of appearance is what makes matter determinable, it cannot itself be sensation. Kant follows this brief consideration of the distinctness of form from sensation with an argument from abstraction. In this argument from abstraction Kant can be understood to be identifying the concepts of space and time with the condition through which matter is determined. Thus it is in this passage at B 35/ A 21 that Kant claims that the concepts of space and time belong to pure intuition as “forms of intuition”. This means two basic things. First, they can be known without empirical investigation. Second, being forms of *intuition* they are not intellectual constructs.

In the second section of the Transcendental Aesthetic, referred to by scholarship as the Metaphysical Expositions, arguments are presented that justify Kant’s claim that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition. In both editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* there is a metaphysical exposition of the space and a metaphysical exposition of the time. In the B edition, Kant specifies that the metaphysical expositions treat the *concepts* of space and time. Because refers to space and time as concepts and a forms of intuition, this emphasizes that there are indeed concepts that are grounded *a priori* by intuition. With regards to the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space in the second edition there are two arguments for the *a priority* of space, and two arguments for

the intuitional nature of space. As concerns time there are three arguments for its *a priori* status, and two arguments for its status as intuition<sup>1</sup>.

In the second edition the Metaphysical Expositions are followed by what Kant calls Transcendental Expositions. These Transcendental Expositions seek to demonstrate that any necessary knowledge permitted by space and time as forms of intuition could only come from these forms of intuitions (B 41). As regards space, Kant argues that the necessary knowledge obtained in geometry can only be accounted for once spatiality is understood to be a form of intuition (B 41). As regards time, Kant argues that since an object's movement through space would be contradictory understood as only a spatial phenomenon, our account of object motion could only be necessary once time is understood to be a form of intuition (B 48 – B 49).

This thesis seeks to present an account of Kant's Metaphysical Expositions that shows them to be a model of philosophical reasoning in a mode that functions beyond sheer adversarial dispute. According to this account, agreement on the metaphysical status of the concepts of space and time requires different philosophical standpoints to set aside their strict foundational differences so that they might work corroboratively<sup>2</sup>. The

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<sup>1</sup> This thesis follows tradition in the literature in treating the metaphysical exposition of space more closely except where the metaphysical exposition of time provides elucidation.

<sup>2</sup> It is unusual to use the word 'corroboratively' as an adverb, and it might be thought that 'collaboratively' is, in being more common, a better term in that it says something similar without having the burden of being a term unusually used. However, there are specific advantages to the term 'corroborate' which lead this term to be preferred in this thesis over 'collaborate'. 'Collaboration' implies that a group is working together toward a common goal. 'Corroboration' implies that a position is strengthened because evidence is provided by a multiplicity of sources. This thesis examines the interrelation of various philosophical standpoints: transcendental idealism, empiricistic thinking, and rationalistic thinking. Supposing that all three standpoints begin from the conception of the object reconceived by the transcendental turn does not mean that these three distinct positions intend to defend intuition as cognition's direct access to any object. Instead, empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking seek to undermine the principles that transcendental idealism puts forward *following* the transcendental turn. It is especially important for this thesis that it be



transcendental turn provides the opportunity for these otherwise philosophically diverse standpoints to work from this unity to consensus. However, so that there might actually be corroboration, the differences of these individual standpoints need, in some sense, to be respected. If not, then the corroborative account provided is merely ceremonial. Therefore, the structure which permits the unity of these positions must also permit these individual philosophical voices to retain their distinct character. It is the aim of this thesis to examine this structure and to examine the importance of such a structure for the first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The conclusion of this thesis is that, although Kant's account is consistent, it is nevertheless a limited conception of the problem, and is ultimately faced with the possibility that indifferentism will reemerge.

For this it is important that the methodology explored be situated in such a context. Toward this end, then, this introduction will provide a brief examination of indifferentism, as it is presented by Kant in the A Preface. The following presentation of 'indifferentism' is not intended as a historical criticism, either for or against Kant. Rather its purpose is to explore what Kant suggests to be a general problem facing philosophy of his time. By doing this a context is provided which shows the relevance of this thesis' interpretation of the Metaphysical Expositions.

Material presented in the *Critique's* second edition is vital, as well, for this investigation. This is because it is in the second edition, especially in that edition's Preface and Introduction, that Kant provides arrives at an account of how foundational

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understood that it is through their efforts to undermine the system of receptivity conceived under transcendental idealism that they *strengthen* and *provide evidence for* the system of receptivity conceived under transcendental idealism. Because 'corroborate' is supportive of this connotation, this thesis will use the term 'corroborate' as an adjective despite the fact that such a use is unusual.



diversity in the philosophical community can be overcome. He does this by suggesting that the object be thought of as conforming to cognition (B xx – B xxi), and then demonstrating that the understanding cannot be thought to be the only faculty of cognition (B 5 – B 6).

Even though the argumentation that shows how Kant thought that metaphysics could come into unanimous agreement is provided mainly in the second edition, it is unlikely that Kant did not have such an aim in his first edition. There Kant speaks of an indifferentism that is both an achievement of philosophy and, conversely, philosophy at a new height of self-destruction. In the “A: Preface” Kant gives his brief account of this indifferentism (A x). He also states that he has found a path, and, in the *following* of this path he has “discovered the point where reason has misunderstood itself” (A viii). According to Kant in the effort of following this one path reason learns of its own limitation and comes to satisfaction concerning its theoretical pursuits<sup>3</sup> (A viii). At the end of the A: Preface, we see Kant asking the reader to “unite his effort with that of the author” (A xix). The response to indifferentism in this Preface seems to be that it is a good thing that philosophy has rejected dogmatic assertions. However, what is left is for philosophy to overcome is its lack of foundational unanimity. The ‘court of justice’ (A xi – A xii), that is to be instituted, itself suggests that this effort is an effort of the community as a whole. What is indifferentism and how does Kant think that it can be overcome?

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<sup>3</sup> Keeping this in mind, when Kant later states that he has “found it necessary to limit reason in order to make room for faith” (B xxx) the necessity is not contingent on the need of making room for faith, but is the necessity of (theoretical) reason’s own comprehension of its own limitation. In this manner Kant’s capacity to limit reason is necessary in a sense that includes that it is first possible to do so.

## II. Indifferentism and Kant's Methodology of Indifference, Doubt, and Strict Criticism

Indifferentism arose, according to Kant, from the presumption that all possible ways to alleviate metaphysics of its dogmatic foundations had been tried in vain (A x).

Once in recent times it even seemed as though an end would be put to all these controversies, and *the lawfulness of all the competing claims would be completely decided*, through a certain physiology of the human understanding (by the famous Locke); but it turned out that although the birth of the purported queen was traced to the rabble of common experience and her pretensions would therefore have been rightly rendered suspicious, nevertheless she still asserted her claims because in fact this genealogy was attributed to her falsely: thus *metaphysics fell back into the same position of contempt out of which the science was to have been extricated*.

Just prior to this, Kant states that metaphysics was never rebuilt "according to a plan unanimously accepted among themselves"<sup>4</sup> (A ix). In the quote above, Kant states Locke's "physiology of the human understanding" that it seemed as if it could unite all "competing claims." Thus, according to Kant, Locke's system very nearly produced unanimity within the philosophical community.<sup>5</sup> While Locke's physiology of the human understanding nearly explained how competing claims could be united lawfully, its capacity to create or to sustain such a unity failed because his system was still dogmatic.

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<sup>4</sup> All different standpoints within dogmatic metaphysics.

<sup>5</sup> The intention here is not to question Kant's assessment of Locke's system according to whether or not it was actually being accepted unanimously or not, or even whether it was dogmatic. The purpose of this exercise is just to provide a textual examination of indifferentism by looking at the conditions Kant claims lead to its inception. By doing this, this term, which receives no further treatment in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, can be elucidated. At the same time, this exegetical examination also provides insight into the fact that, even in this early section of the first *Critique*, Kant is considering the relation of different viewpoints within philosophy. That Kant is taking into consideration the importance of unanimity within metaphysics is essential when Kant's later statement, at A xi, that "indifference, doubt and finally strict criticism are rather proofs of a well grounded way of thinking".



There are then two elements that must be achieved in order to end the threat of scepticism. First, there must be unanimous agreement within metaphysics over how metaphysics should be rebuilt. Second, metaphysics must eliminate its dependency on dogmatism. The elimination of its dependency on dogmatism directly overcomes the sceptical threat. However, as internal division can reduce metaphysics to anarchy (A ix), to have a sustained resistance to sceptical attack, the rebuilding of metaphysics must come from a unanimously agreed to plan.

As was stated above, after Locke it was presumed that every means to remove dogmatism from metaphysics had been tried and found wanting. Thus, according to Kant, it was conceded that rigorous philosophizing could never defend metaphysics from the charge of being dogmatic. Such a concession led to the philosophical standpoint of indifferentism in which rigorous philosophical argumentation was rejected. In his introduction to his translation of the Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* Paul Guyer states,

Another philosophical stance Kant encountered was what he called *indifferentism*, which did not reject metaphysical assertions themselves but did reject any attempt to argue for them systematically and rigorously. Here he had in mind a number of popular philosophers who were often in substantive agreement with dogmatists on metaphysical issues such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, but who were unconvinced by the scholastic subtlety of the dogmatists' propositions and proofs, holding instead that the beliefs on these matters that we need for the successful conduct of human life are simply given through "healthy understanding" or "common sense." (2007, 2)

Guyer also states of indifferentism that it,

is a reference to popular Enlightenment Philosophy, such as that of Johann August Eberhard (1739 – 1809), J. G. Feder (1740 – 1821), Christian Garve (1742 – 1798), Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733 – 1811), and Moses Mendelssohn (1729 – 1786). It emphasized appeals to healthy commonsense over

rigorous argument, and the popular dissemination of progressive ideas with practical import over the investigation of metaphysical questions, toward which they often expressed contempt. (2007, 715)

Indifferentism reflects philosophy's dissatisfaction with dogmatic metaphysics. However, Kant finds indifferentism's solution inconsistent. Indifferentism's solution is not to reject those metaphysical entities and topics which are dogmatically asserted and then rigorously defended by dogmatic metaphysics. Instead, such metaphysical entities are still accepted as legitimate philosophical subject matters so long as they are found in healthy common sense. What is rejected is the attempt to rigorously defend those subject matters. The *indifference* of indifferentism is toward any rigorous metaphysical defense of such theoretical entities and topics. Because indifferentism simply presumes these subject matters can legitimately be treated as they happen to present themselves to common sense, Kant accuses indifferentism of falling back into dogmatism (A x).

Kant states that indifference is important to the demonstration that a science is a well grounded way of thinking (A xi). How can Kant say this of indifference after he accuses indifferentism of being dogmatic? This thesis understands Kant to use indifference methodologically in order to develop his transcendental account of receptivity. Kant does not develop his account of indifference as a methodological tool, yet his statement that it is involved in the demonstration of well-grounded thinking must be thought of as important to his development of critical philosophy insofar as his aim is to demonstrate that philosophy can be put on a scientific path. If indifference is to function methodologically, it must be asked what indifference, as a methodological tool, is indifferent to?



As Kant is developing a critical philosophy, a philosophy which is known not to be dogmatic in its development, Kant cannot be indifferent to dogma itself. Further, Kant's philosophy is quite obviously systematic and rigorous. Therefore he cannot be indifferent to rigorous argumentation. As will be discussed below, Kant requires that any plan to rebuild metaphysics must receive unanimous agreement. This thesis argues that, as the first stage in obtaining such agreement, Kant affects a temporary indifference towards those other members of the philosophical community. He does this in order to develop his systematic account of receptivity. Thus, unlike the philosophical standpoint of indifferentism, indifference as a methodological tool allows a philosophical standpoint to develop its own account of its chosen subject matter in a temporary period of isolation from other standpoints of the philosophical community. Using this period of isolation, Kant can arrive at critical justification of his science of receptivity. In his critical justification, Kant will show how receptivity is something which reason can treat philosophically and then analyze receptivity in order to demonstrate what principles are inherent in it. During this period, he will not consider the input of other philosophical standpoint, but will develop a transcendental account of receptivity from the implications of the transcendental reorientation of the object (B xvi). Once this critical examination is complete, indifference to the larger philosophical community is no longer required. This thesis holds that Kant proceeds from indifference to a methodological doubt in order to involve the greater philosophical community in the examination of receptivity as a capacity of cognition.

In the wording of Kant's statement regarding the demonstration of a science's well-grounded manner of thinking, doubt follows indifference (A xi). This thesis holds that doubt can function methodologically to bring those other philosophical standpoints, which had been temporarily set aside during what this thesis holds to be Kant's affection of methodologically indifference, into the discussion of intuition. Kant does not discuss doubt in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. However, there is reason to think that methodological doubt is important for the progression of Kant's philosophical treatment of the concepts of space and time which includes the criticism of empiricistic and rationalistic thinking as competing philosophical viewpoints. There are three textual justifications in the A Preface from A ix to A xii that enable this thesis to claim the unanimous assent of the philosophical community as a whole is essential for Kant to arrive at certainty regarding his claim that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition. First, Kant states the internal division within metaphysics was from an "ancient barbarism" and resulted in internal strife. Second, at A ix Kant implies that the lack of unanimity in every effort to rebuild metaphysics after sceptical attack contributed to its susceptibility to sceptical attack. Third, the fact that Kant uses the image of a court of justice implies a communal effort is needed to overcome the problems inherent in the use of pure reason. Kant's message here is that one sided efforts to rebuild metaphysics are insufficient. The plan according to which metaphysics is to be rebuilt must come from consensus, thus must involve all potentially competing standpoints within metaphysics.

The question is: how can doubt function methodologically to create conditions conducive for unanimity? This thesis treats Kant's claim that space and time will be



found to be two pure forms of sensible intuition as the implementation of methodological doubt (A 22/B 37). Methodological doubt is not understood by this thesis to reflect a type of insecurity. After all, when Kant makes the claim concerning what space and time are, affecting of methodological indifference has already allowed Kant to develop the principles of his science of receptivity. He makes the claim from the principles that he has developed. From within the standpoint of transcendental idealism, Kant is justified in making his claim. However, insofar as Kant holds that unanimity is important, *certainty* involves the philosophical community as a whole. Thus doubt, as a methodology, is the recognition that it is insufficient for one philosophical standpoint to reconstruct metaphysics on its own. It is possible for one philosophical standpoint to develop its own solution to the problem of dogmatism in metaphysics; however, that solution needs to undergo a process of strict criticism from other standpoints within philosophy in order to see if it can be accepted unanimously. Kant's claim, thought of as a representation of methodological doubt, is then something similar to a scientific prediction. It is made with the awareness that it needs to be tested. This thesis will argue that the Metaphysical Expositions used by Kant to bring his claim to strict criticism. The claim that space and time are forms of pure intuition represents Kant's intension to involve empiricism and rationalism in his discussion of the intuition as a cognitive faculty.

The methodology of strict criticism applies the arguments of other philosophical standpoints in order to test the acceptability of the proposed system. In the case of the Metaphysical Expositions, Kant uses the reasoning of empiricistic and rationalistic thinking to criticize his own claim that space and time will be found to be two pure forms

of sensible intuition. If either empiricistic thinking or rationalistic thinking can show Kant's predictions to be false, then Kant's science of receptivity is shown to arrive at a false claim. This would undermine the acceptability of his science of receptivity because it arrived at an inaccurate claim. However, what is shown in the metaphysical expositions is that rationalistic and empiricistic thinking confirm Kant's claim. Thus they provided corroboration of Kant's claim.

The above discussion has presented how this thesis understanding Kant to employ the methodology of "indifference", "doubt", and "strict criticism" in order to arrive at a unanimously accepted account of receptivity as a cognitive faculty. Indifference allows Kant to develop the principles of receptivity. These principles of receptivity allow him to make a claim concerning the nature of space and time. This claim is made with the awareness that its validity is dependent on its capacity to be accepted as correct by the philosophical community as a whole. Thus this claim represents Kant's implementation of methodological doubt. Rationalistic thinking and empiricistic thinking proceed to criticise this claim, and so they make possible the third condition of a science's demonstration of its well grounded way of thinking: that it be able to withstand strict criticism.

This thesis will use certain language that is meant to reflect the nature of Kant's methodological approach. The first term is the term "claim". While this thesis will continue to use the "claim", it should be remembered that this thesis uses it in a special sense. Therefore, when the term refers to what Kant states space and time will be found to be, then it should be understood to mean something similar to a testable prediction.



Second, and lastly, to reflect the methodological use of strict criticism, this thesis will use language which will reflect Kant's effort toward unanimity. This thesis argues that the *acceptance* of Kant's reorientation of the object is foundational to unanimity<sup>6</sup>. This thesis will then understand the Metaphysical Expositions to be, beyond their argumentational function in demonstrating the validity of the claim that space and time are pure forms of intuition, depictions of the process of the philosophical community coming to unanimous agreement. As part of this depiction, this thesis will sometimes use language that will present rationalistic and empiricistic thinking as having already agreed to try thinking of the object as reoriented. This in no way is to suggest that rationalist philosophers and empiricist philosophers actually ever sat down and came to such an agreement. It is only meant to represent one of the two aims the methodology of 'indifference, doubt, and strict criticism'<sup>7</sup>, that is, the achievement unanimity within philosophy as a whole. What this thesis argues in its third chapter is that Kant's reorientation of the object has the power to transform these alternative philosophical standpoints and that this transformation is instrumental in obtaining the unanimity that Kant is after. For this transformation, the agreement to try the reorientation of the object is essential. Using language that depicts such agreement is not meant to suggest that in the wake of the Metaphysical Expositions, metaphysical philosophy actually entered into unanimity. The language used to depict such an agreement is only meant to foster an element of the methodological process.

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<sup>6</sup> Kant proposes that the object be thought to conform to cognition (B xvi).

<sup>7</sup> The other aim is the overcoming of dogmatism as stated above.

### III. The Value and Situation of Indifference

It would seem, according to Kant's account in the Preface of the *Critique's* first edition, that philosophy had entered into a phase which could be characterized according to its extreme, dualistically opposed, implications. On one hand, philosophy had reached a mature wisdom that was no longer satisfied with "illusory knowledge" (A xii). This achievement heralded great opportunity. On the other hand, this phase of philosophy was the "mother of chaos and night in the sciences" (A x). Kant has stated earlier in the same paragraph that it was the case that, after an attack of the skeptics, in the past the dogmatists were always able to rebuild "though never according to a plan unanimously accepted among themselves." However, according to Kant, after Locke's attempt to ground metaphysics in a "physiology of the human mind" was found to rely on dogma (A x), it seemed impossible for metaphysics to move beyond dogmatic assertions. Yet, philosophy had arrived at the understanding that dogmatic assertions were inherently problematic insofar as such assertions made metaphysics was vulnerable to sceptical attack.

Indifferentism is understood by Kant to be a highly unstable standpoint of philosophy. There are two reasons for this. First, as was discussed above, Kant states that indifferentism always returns to dogmatic metaphysics (A x). This is because it rejects the idea that philosophy must show that certain metaphysical subjects, such as God and the immortality of the soul, can legitimately treated by philosophy. This rejection is made because indifferentism holds no rigorous metaphysical demonstration is sufficient to



overcome sceptical attack. However, rather than denying these metaphysical subjects altogether, indifferentism simply proceeds to treat these metaphysical subjects as they appeared in common sense. In this, indifferentism misdiagnoses the problem. It erroneously thinks that rigorous argumentation itself makes metaphysics susceptible to sceptical attack. Kant argues that it is the presumption that these metaphysical subjects are legitimate for theoretical reason at all that makes metaphysics prone to sceptical attack. To presume that these subjects are legitimate for philosophy is, in this uncritical presumption, dogmatic. So, indifferentism is inherently instable because it is a dogmatically grounded rejection of dogmatic metaphysics.

Indifferentism's rejection of rigorous and systematic philosophy can be seen to be unstable for second reason. At A ix Kant states that internal warring was responsible for metaphysics initial disintegration into anarchy. Following this, he states that it has never been the case that metaphysics was rebuilt according to a unanimously accepted plan. It is reasonable to think that, in each instance of rebuilding, internal division threatened to weaken metaphysics internally. Indifference proceeds in its philosophical accounts from what appears to it in healthy common sense. However, healthy common sense cannot lead to unanimous agreement unless common sense is universally the same for all. To assert that common sense is the same for all, without rigorous examination, is dogmatic. If, in order to avoid using rigorous examination, it is acceptable that healthy common sense might be different for different people<sup>8</sup>, then division is permitted. By permitting such foundational division, fundamentally different standpoints might arise just because

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<sup>8</sup> This is also dogmatic as it has not been rigorously shown.



common sense is different for different people. Kant would surely think that this internal division contains the seeds of anarchy. It is important to see Kant's systematic effort to be a means to overcome such division, that is, to see that Kant aims towards unanimity within metaphysics.

To this end there is a relevant discussion in the B Preface that might be looked at. There Kant speaks of 'secret' keys<sup>9</sup> that were necessary in order to fully understand the teachings of each philosophical school (B xxxiii – B xxxiv). The implication here is that, in presuming to have its own 'unique' key, it is possible that each school could originate in a radically different position from any other standpoint, opposing or otherwise. Of course, the fact that Kant states that these keys were kept from the public does not mean that there was a certain isolation of one school from another at the academic level. Kant's suggestion that a speculative science, which would be beyond the interests of the general public, could "sever the root" of different strands of 'dangerous' thinking could be understood only to mean that the general public would lack interest in this matter, not that it should be kept from them.

This speculative science is presented by Kant as a means to disunity in the purely academic forum. Kant states:

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<sup>9</sup> "The alteration thus concerns only the arrogant claims of the schools, which would gladly let themselves be taken for the sole experts and guardians of such truths (as they can rightly be taken in many other parts of knowledge), sharing with the public only the use of such truths, while keeping the key to them for themselves (*quod mecum nescit, solus vult sciri videri*). Kant goes from here to discuss the *speculative* philosopher as being the trustee of a science instead of a key. The intention of this science is not to become popularized, but is a science for metaphysics itself. This science considers arguments for or against certain truths in which the public takes interest, so disciplines the metaphysician in order that the metaphysician does not fall into the 'scandal' of falsifying his or her own doctrines. (B xxxiv – B xxxv)

[t]hrough criticism alone can we<sup>10</sup> sever the very root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, of freethinking unbelief, of enthusiasm and superstition, which can become generally injurious, and finally of idealism and skepticism, which are more dangerous to the schools and can hardly be transmitted to the public" (B xxxv)

It would seem here that Kant strove for a greater unity than was available without such a *speculative* science. It can be presumed then that, in the absence of this speculative science the schools of philosophy were, through their self-claimed origins, thought by Kant to be disparate. Without this speculative science the certainty that dogmatic knowledge was illusory knowledge could not be tempered with a wisdom that comprehended what a non-dogmatic first principle of philosophy was. Therefore, there would be no means to distinguish *i*) a proper ground of thought from *ii*) an improper ground of thought except through demonstration in experience. Hume had undermined experience as something that could be used to ground strictly necessary knowledge. Therefore, every instance of scientific thought could be challenged sceptically.

Importantly, Kant's treatment of indifference should not then be understood as a simplistic 'barbaric' rejection of indifferentism. That is, it is not a straightforward claim that indifferentism is wrong. Such a claim could only introduce *more* division within philosophy. Further, on what grounds could Kant claim that indifferentism is wrong? It is the progress of reason throughout the text itself, and in particular the text prior to the Transcendental Analytic, that presents the possibility of rigorous philosophy. Thus if Kant were to *begin* from the claim that indifferentism is wrong, then he would be adopting an ungrounded dogmatic position, and thus would "still retain traces of ancient

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<sup>10</sup>My italics.



barbarism" (A ix). Neither should Kant's treatment of indifferentism be thought to be an indifferent, or equal, alternative to indifferentism. Rather, Kant recognizes that the error of indifferentism was only misapplied indifference. What it was indifferent to was the means by which a philosophical standpoint could rigorously examine its own assertions. Kant recognizes that indifference *is* a legitimate philosophical method when it is used by a philosophical standpoint to internally examine itself in order to discover, and eventually overcome, its own dependence on dogmatic assertions. Thus, Kant does not reject indifferentism completely; he takes what is valuable and transforms it into the first stage of philosophy's critical self-development.

As was discussed above, methodologically affected indifference is conceived by Kant to be the first stage of his threefold method of proving a sciences' well grounded way of thinking. Kant intends to put philosophy on the scientific path (B xv, B xviii). Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Kant would use this method to prove *philosophy's* well grounded manner of thinking. During its period of indifference, any standpoint of philosophy can develop a philosophical system that is critically designed, or, in other words, is not dependent on dogmatic assertions. Such a philosophical system will be thought, by that particular philosophical standpoint, to be its *own* 'key' necessary to move itself beyond its *own* dependence on dogmatic assertions. However, if metaphysics (as a whole) is to move beyond dependence on dogmatic assertions *unanimously*, that is, in total agreement on one way of doing so, then it needs to be known that this 'key' is acceptable and correct for all philosophical standpoints. Such unanimity is required, according to Kant, because internal division within metaphysics results in "anarchy" (A



ix). Thus, in order to arrive at such unanimity, there needs to be a forum wherein all philosophical standpoints are able to challenge such a 'key', and, in the end, either reject or adopt it.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Metaphysical Expositions are this forum. It is there that rationalistic and empiricistic thinking can challenge Kant's science of receptivity. They do this by attacking the claim that his science has enabled him to make<sup>11</sup>. In this, the Metaphysical Expositions function methodologically as "strict criticism". There the claim that space and time are two forms of sensible intuition is challenged by rationalistic and empiricistic thinking. This claim is ultimately accepted by both. In accepting Kant's claim that space and time are two forms of sensible intuition, they also accept that intuition, as a capacity of cognition, is the only means through which cognition has direct connection to any object of experience.

It is only through '*the claim*' (as methodological doubt) that any such forum is at all possible. Unless the standpoint that puts forward its own critical account acknowledges that what is necessary for certainty, within the philosophical community, is the consensus of the members of the philosophical community, then that standpoint is ultimately dogmatic. It is dogmatic because when it asserts that its claim is correct for metaphysics as a whole, it begins from a position wherein it uncritically accepts the validity of its own standpoint. It does not acknowledge that external criticism could reveal any flaws. In this, it isolates itself from the community as a whole, and contributes to conditions that can only result in anarchy. This anarchy arises when each standpoint

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<sup>11</sup> That space and time are forms of pure sensible intuition.

within metaphysics uncritically asserts the validity of its own standpoint. 'The claim' functions, not as an assertion of certainty, but as methodologically affected doubt. This doubt creates the possibility of a critical forum because it represents the acceptance philosophical community's critical input.

#### **IV. The Importance of Common Content**

As was stated, this thesis takes as its interest the potential for Kant's Metaphysical Expositions to be expressed as modes of cooperative and corroborative philosophy. Indifference is expressed by Kant as the instigation of philosophy's movement toward critical philosophy. Thus, if this corroborative effort is essential to philosophy in its critical expression, then it too is a stage that philosophy must pass through. As was argued in the previous section, corroboration is obtained after a process of strict criticism.

The chapters of this thesis examine Kant's movement from indifference to corroboration. What is examined then is how Kant might be seen to move from reformed indifference to the activity of corroboration. I will argue the movement is accomplished in three stages. First Kant can be shown to present a critically conceived common object. Second, this common object exists as an organizational device for a body of principles. These principles must be sufficient to qualify certain claims capable of accepting criticism by the philosophical community. Thus, third, the Metaphysical Expositions are a forum for criticism of the principles of receptivity proposed by Kant. Such criticism is advanced through the claim regarding the nature of space and time that Kant's 'science of



receptivity' takes itself to be qualified to make for itself. However, the critical voices of the philosophical community, or expressions of dissent, are ultimately brought to corroborate the claim that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition. This transition to corroboration occurs through the consistency of their<sup>12</sup> reasoning, and *not* through the failure of their reasoning.

As discussed above, the development of a body of principles in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic is an example of reformed indifference. Indifference here refers to the 'isolation' inherent in the activity undertaken by a science in the development of its own principles. What is aimed at in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic is the development of a 'science of receptivity' (A 21/B 36). It should be remembered here that Kant states in the B Preface that experiments are to be conceived by a science with the principles of that science in mind (B xiii – B xiv)). As will be shown in chapter one of this thesis, Kant has, prior to the Transcendental Aesthetic, already found its content and is now engaged in developing a system of principles it hopes are sufficient to treat the discovered content. But these principles also must be understood to be the means through which this standpoint of philosophy might enter into a communal forum insofar as they enable Kant to put forward a claim that space and time are pure forms of intuition. Thus this initial 'indifference' is not developed only for the benefit of one standpoint of philosophy. Or, if it is developed with only one standpoint of philosophy in mind, that philosophy is transcendental idealism. Kant conceives transcendental idealism as a solution to the problem of sheer foundational distinction inherent in the interrelation of

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<sup>12</sup> The expressions of dissent within the philosophical community.



philosophical schools in his time. Thus the aim of transcendental idealism is not to exclude other standpoints, but to integrate them in a manner that acknowledges their integral, but not foundational, differences. So, if these principles are principles for transcendental idealism, they are also thought to be principles for philosophy that comprehends itself as a community.

Within the Transcendental Aesthetic, all three philosophical standpoints are thought by Kant to be oriented around the transcendently reconceived object. This does mean that empiricistic and rationalistic thinking have actually made such an agreement, but, only that Kant is understood by this thesis to suppose such agreement in the *Metaphysical Expositions*. Kant has acknowledged the importance of the other members of the philosophical community by affecting methodological doubt<sup>13</sup>. Now it is necessary, for methodological purposes only, to conceive of the criticizing standpoints as having already adopted the transcendental conception of the object. Otherwise, their agreement or disagreement has not been arrived at through a thorough consideration of transcendental idealism. They have merely stood against it. For strict criticism to work methodologically, there needs to be an agreement to try Kant's conception of the object to see whether "we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics". By conceiving of the object as conforming to cognition, Kant makes receptive cognition the common *content* of all three standpoints. Once the object is considered to conform to cognition, the cognitive conditions under which the object can be experienced themselves become essential. Because the conditions under which an object might be for us become essential,

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<sup>13</sup> See page xxi.

within the Metaphysical Expositions as a method of strict criticism, receptive cognition itself becomes the one *content* of all three philosophical standpoints.

As the object is understood to conform to cognition it is no longer possible for empiricistic thinking presume that objects exist beyond cognition as grounds of our spatiotemporal concepts. After the object is understood to conform to cognition in Kant's account, dualism is no longer a dualism of mind and body. The dualism is located in cognition itself, between the understanding and receptivity. Thus, adopting the transcendental conception of the object directly affects the empiricist's reasoning process because it involves a fundamental alteration of its ground. Rationalistic thinking is undermined as well. No longer can it presume that the understanding simply constructs spatiotemporality. It is forced to contend with Kant's account of cognition that shows cognition to have a receptive element.

The importance of establishing receptive cognition as this single philosophical content of the Transcendental Aesthetic is that it forces empiricistic and rationalistic thinking to reason from an entirely new ground. They are presented by Kant as reasoning according to this ground, and the arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions reveal both, the inconsistencies that arise in these two standpoints once this new ground is tried, and how, in overcoming such inconsistencies, these two standpoints end up corroborating Kant's claim that space and time are *a priori* forms of sensible intuition.

## V. The Division of Chapters

In Kant's assessment, metaphysics had been struggling longer than other sciences to clarify its scientific nature (B xv). One element that seemed to be missing from theoretical philosophy was a proper metaphysical content that could ground common experience. Without this, how could, for instance, empiricist and rationalist thinking both have an identical foundation as their first principle? Therefore Kant's project of unification required that such a common content be both found and shown to be such a common content which could yet appeal to both. It is possible to understand Kant to be arguing for such content in the B Introduction in a positive manner, and not merely claiming it on the grounds that it is necessary for synthetic *a priori* judgement. Appropriately, the content found can be understood to contain elements that would be natural to both a rationalist and empiricist standpoint. Thus, not only is this content relevant to transcendental idealism, but it is also relevant to these other potentially competing philosophical standpoints.

The first chapter of this thesis, in treating relevant aspects of the B Preface and Introduction, will present the material necessary to start the examination of what I take to be Kant's attempt to proceed beyond mere argumentative response to the problem of dogmatic metaphysics. Discussion will be focused upon arriving at a conception of reason's potential to know its own limitation. In showing that Kant can claim such self-knowledge prior to the Transcendental Aesthetic the way is prepared to discuss the first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic as proceeding in a critical manner.



Especially pertinent to this discussion is Falkenstein's *Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic*. This chapter presents Falkenstein as challenging Kant's critical capacity to treat intuition, as a cognitive capacity. The problem is how to understand Kant to "[separate] off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts" (B 36/ A 22) while simultaneously retaining his right to treat intuition as a cognitive capacity in an intellectual manner<sup>14</sup>. So, what is interesting with regards to Falkenstein, is the manner in which his presentation of 'problem of blindness' is directed at the critical structure of the *Critique*. His is an effort to show that Kant may have undermined his own ability to treat intuition in an intellectual manner<sup>15</sup>. In suggesting the manner by which Kant can be understood to begin the *Transcendental Aesthetic* from a critical standpoint what is suggested at the same time is a means by which intuition can be intellectualized even after the thinking of the understanding is abstracted from intuition. This then overcomes Falkenstein's concern with 'blind' intuition.

In its second chapter, this thesis attempts to show how the terminology of the first section of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* can be conceived systematically rather than as mere definitions that prepare the way for a discussion of receptivity. It is through this systematic relation of principles that certain claims are possible. As a consequence of the

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<sup>14</sup> What is meant by 'treating intuition intellectually' here is not akin to saying that intuition is intellectual. It refers to the question of whether Kant retains the right to examine intuition in a metaphysical manner once he removes all that the understanding thinks from it. This is an important question for Falkenstein, and is referred to by him as 'the blindness problem'.

<sup>15</sup> Since Falkenstein is so adept at articulating the problems associated with the *Transcendental Aesthetic* in a manner that links these problems to the question of whether or not Kant *has* arrived at that position critically, Falkenstein figures prominently throughout this thesis.

claim that space and time are two forms of sensible intuition, criticism of this system of principles from distinct, yet foundationally similar standpoints, is possible.

The main project then of the second chapter is to show how the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic might be conceived as a systematic unity. What is more, this systematic unity must be developed within the constraints of a critical philosophy. The demands of a critical philosophy require that principles used in the subsequent stages of that philosophy are already worked out in a sufficient fashion so that no point of the structure is dependent on mere hypothesis<sup>16</sup>. Since there does not appear to be any such system as it stands in the text<sup>17</sup>, some organizational principles must be introduced to reveal the systematic order of this section. However, any 'introduced' principle must already be accounted for by Kant in a critical fashion. Using principles from the B Preface and Introduction already discussed in my first chapter, this second chapter will show how it is possible to comprehend the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic as critical systematic unity.

The third chapter presents the Metaphysical Expositions as a forum wherein philosophical standpoints can dispute certain principles of the 'science of receptivity'

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<sup>16</sup> "As far as certainty is concerned, I have pronounced the judgement that *in this kind of inquiry* it is in no way allowed to hold opinions, and that anything that even looks like a hypothesis is a forbidden commodity, which should not be put up for sale even at the lowest price but must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered" (A xv).

<sup>17</sup> It is possible to ask here if Kant is not guilty of hiding his key, since it was not stated in so many words and since its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic requires so much work. As discussed above, Kant has stated that it is improper for a standpoint of philosophy to hold secret the key to understanding its position. Of course it is possible to ask if this is not a hidden doctrine. Further, since Kant himself refers to his own difficulties in making things clear, it may have been something Kant thought was obvious in what he wrote. A number of such scenarios might be imagined. The effort of this thesis is to show such a key and its implications, and it does not speculate on the contingencies that might surround this question. This thesis does not attempt to pass judgement on this matter, it only undertakes the effort required for a direct presentation of such a synthesis insofar as it may be beneficial in understanding Kant's position.



even after having conditionally agreed to the transcendental turn<sup>18</sup>. According to what seems to be the traditional account, the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic outlines and defines certain pertinent concepts and propositions, while the second section follows a traditional format of philosophical dispute<sup>19</sup>. Space and time are then understood to be *a priori* forms of intuition insofar as the opposing viewpoints expressed in the metaphysical expositions are wrong. But, if this is the case, and Kant is single mindedly intent on affirming the correctness of his position over and above disagreeing standpoints, this hardly seems to be an institution of community in place of the barbaric tendencies of metaphysics. The first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic are always then just another standpoint that puts its own distinction first.

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<sup>18</sup>If the aim of this third chapter is compared with Gerd Buchdahl's assessment of this dynamic, in his work *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: the classical origins Descartes to Kant* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), the difference can be seen. On page 576 he states that "no other theory of knowledge is capable of 'explaining' or 'accounting for' the status of space and time which these forms do in fact possess as basic components of empirical language." In this assessment, since the opposition cannot explain the concept they must concede to the superiority of transcendental idealism. In this thesis what is maintained is that these accounts do actually explain the concept in their own reasoning (but from the common standpoint). But, the concept explained in their correct reasoning is identical to the claim that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition. The philosophical community, as a multiplicity organized around a common content, is required to comprehend the nature of the metaphysical concepts of space and time.

This comparison is not intended to reflect a negative assessment of the work of Gerd Buchdahl. In fact, certain aspects of Buchdahl's work are quite important for this thesis. Buchdahl is mentioned here because his scholarship is very much influential to our understanding of Kant, for instance in his recognition of the importance of the third *Critique* relation with the first. In pointing here to Buchdahl what is being referred to is the pervasiveness of this competitive conception of the Metaphysical Expositions, *even in* a scholar as original and influential as he is.

<sup>19</sup> I am here thinking of accounts such as Allison's who views the first section as only introducing some "key terms". He states "[a]t the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic, after defining some key terms and linking space with outer sense, defined as "a property of our mind" through which "we represent to ourselves objects as outside us in space, and all as in space," and time with inner sense, defined as the means by which "the mind intuits itself, or its inner state" (A 22/ B 37), Kant turns abruptly to the question of the nature of space and time" (2004, 97). Allison discusses the Metaphysical Expositions in a purely adversarial sense, where it is presumed that Kant is intent on defeating these empiricistic and rationalistic thinking (2004, 99 – 111)



Once the system of principles that makes up Kant's presentation of the 'science of receptivity' is presented, then the Metaphysical Expositions no longer need to be presumed to be Kant's effort to make 'his', or 'transcendental idealism's' point. Instead it is already possible to claim what space and time are as metaphysical concepts from within the 'science of receptivity'. The Metaphysical Expositions serve to check whether or not other means of thinking indeed corroborate Kant's claim. What is conceived, then, is the capacity of critical philosophy to value disagreement so long as this disagreement proceeds from a common and critically accepted subject matter.

These disagreeing voices do not articulate their distinction on a foundational level. Instead, their distinction is expressed as disagreement with a particular aspect of the 'science of receptivity's' account of appearance. The first disagreement is with the involvement of the subject with matter. The second disagreement regards Kant's qualitative judgment concerning form. However, insofar as these positions are ultimately transformed by consensus regarding the re-oriented object, their disagreement does not extend to the foundation or content of the science, that is, the transcendently reoriented object. Disagreement is disagreement with the body of principles which qualifies the claim that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition that maintains their distinctiveness. Ultimately, and through their own reasoning, they are brought to corroborate the claim that space and time are forms of intuition.

## **VI. Topics not treated in this Thesis**

In its second chapter this thesis seeks to reinterpret the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic by using principles and reasoning provided by Kant in the second edition Preface and Introduction. The most important conception introduced as an organizational element in this section is the object as conceived under two meanings (B xxvii – B xxviii), first as appearance and second in the object's capacity to be thought of as complete unto itself. As such this thesis might be taken to involve a debate concerning either, how we should understand Kant's 'thing-in-itself, or whether Kant needs to posit a world of objects beyond the world of appearances.

Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have engaged in a lengthy debate over how Kant's conception of the object is to be understood. Allison argues that Kant's conception of the object is of an object that is considered under two aspects: as a thing in itself, and as appearance. Guyer argues that Kant must be really talking about two distinct objects. It is important to include here however, that Guyer's most recent position is that a two world theory is one interpretation among several, and that, while the other positions admittedly have their own strengths, his position may have some strengths not shared by others (2004, 67 – 70). The second chapter of this thesis will argue that matter is entirely located within appearance as a consequence of Kant's transcendental turn. Thus this thesis would seem to favour Allison's reading over Guyer's reading. However, this thesis is not an attempt to resolve this dispute between Guyer and Allison. This thesis' examination of Kant's twofold meaning of the object, and of his systematic development of receptivity in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, is intended to bring attention to Kant's architectonic



development. This architectonic development is then used to provide an alternative reading of the Metaphysical Expositions.

I will also limit the extent to which this thesis discusses the ‘thing in itself’. The notion of thing in itself will be limited to that which is necessary to think the object as logically complete, as is suggested by Kant’s discussion of the “twofold meaning of the object”. This does not mean that I understand this to be Kant’s complete conception of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is perhaps the single most notorious issue in Kantian scholarship. There is no singular correct conception given by the *Critique*. Allison, for instance, presents Kant’s multitude of different locutions of the thing in itself, showing how each has its own important meaning (2004, 50 – 57). Even within the Transcendental Aesthetic there is contention regarding the thing in itself as Kant refers to rainbows as things in themselves (A 45/ B 62, A 46/ B 63). For the purposes of this thesis the thing in itself will refer to a conception of the object that cannot be realized by theoretical reason. To say that something can be thought of as a thing in itself is to say, as Kant admits, that the unconditioned is necessary to think the object as complete. However, Kant limits theoretical reason to an investigation of experience. Experience is always conditioned by cognition. Therefore, that which is unconditioned is beyond the scope of reason in its theoretical use.

Furthermore, this thesis will not be specifically treating the Transcendental Expositions. There are certain concerns regarding the Transcendental Expositions which might indicate that they are problematic in the *Critique* as a whole. First, the possibility of strictly necessary knowledge is dependent on a successful account of the relation



between the presentation of the 'science of receptivity' and its demonstration in the Metaphysical Expositions. Whether or not other sciences have achieved strict necessary knowledge is to their credit or otherwise and, philosophically, is a separate question which might be taken up in a thesis specifically involved in the philosophy of science. Second, it would seem as if the Transcendental Expositions might contravene Kant's own advice regarding extending the boundary of science into another distinct science. (B viii – B ix) Third, if the relation of philosophy to such sciences as geometry in Kant's time bolstered the reputation of philosophy by virtue of its ability to explain necessary knowledge such as Euclidean Geometry, this certainly is not universally the case at present. Though this thesis does not directly treat these expositions, the appendix does discuss how an examination of the Transcendental Expositions might be possible given what this thesis has found.

## **VII. Conclusion of the Thesis**

The conclusion of this thesis will present its claim as to what space and time are known to be following the Metaphysical Expositions: pure forms of sensible intuition. This is to say that this thesis ends up agreeing with Kant. However, what is revealed by the thesis is that Kant has not had to defeat rationalistic and empiricistic thinking in order to prove that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition. Rather Kant's account of transcendental idealism has allowed him to claim what space and time will be found to be. The task of corroborating this claim is given to rationalistic and empiricistic thinking. As such, Kant has obtained unanimity on the matter, at least within the *Critique of Pure*

*Reason* itself. Thus, what this thesis' interpretation of the Metaphysical Expositions shows is how metaphysics can be moved beyond dogmatism to unanimous agreement.

## **Chapter 1 Envisioning Intuition: The Inception of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic**

### **1.1 The Need for Pure Content**

We can find a clear example of what is needed for philosophy to enter upon a scientific path, in Kant's estimation, by comparing the realization of "those who study nature" with Kant's reorientation of the cognition/object relation. With regards to the first Kant states:

a new light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgements according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles – yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants him to say, but like an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer the questions he puts to them. Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to the inspiration that what reason would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter (though not merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature. This is how natural science was first brought to the secure course of a science after groping about for so many centuries. (B xiii – B xiv)



Here an important observation of Kant's should be brought forward: this observation is that, in scientific investigation, reason itself contributes to its object of study<sup>1</sup>. Kant has already discussed this with regards to mathematics (B x – B xii). Now he states that those who study nature “comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design,” and, that physics “has to seek...what reason itself puts into nature” even when it must look to nature in order to learn<sup>2</sup>. Without this contribution observations are merely accidental and cannot be connected “up with a necessary law” (B xiii).

Reason's design, which is produced by itself, is then set in relation to its object through experiments which are “thought out in accordance with these principles” (B xiii). It then seems reasonable to assert that for these experiments actually to connect “otherwise accidental observations ... up into a necessary law” the experiment needs to

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<sup>1</sup> What might be expected here is a definition of “the object” or “the thing” as opposed to the object or thing of consciousness even though readers are generally aware that the transcendental turn expects the object to conform to cognition. Under this there seems to be a presumption of a process of conforming wherein the object or thing enters into conformity with cognition. This thesis does not begin from here, but rather it is interested in the critical argumentation that structures the early sections of the *Critique*. As such its presumption is that Kant is working according to an architectonic structure as he discusses at A 832/ B 860. In following such a structure what is discussed is how philosophy can make distinctions like cognition versus object. Thus, the object understood to conform to cognition is the beginning of a line of reasoning that eventually intends to account for these ontological distinctions and epistemological distinctions. Thus, when the object is spoken of, what is understood is the first object of cognition. I argue this first object is, for Kant, cognition itself in its receptivity. Therefore, at this stage of the *Critique*, no non-dogmatic distinction between to object and cognition is possible.

<sup>2</sup> Gerd Buchdahl provides confirmation that Kant is consistent in the application of scientific theory to the discovery of the principle of the understanding, so in philosophical use. In his paper entitled “Transcendental Reduction” (New York: Walter de Gruyter & Company, 1974) he states “A scientific theory must not be regarded as a description but as a projection” (1974, 30) He refers to Kant's claim at A 647/ B 675 that “[t]he hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of the understanding, and this unity is the *criterion of the truth* of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a *projected* unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. *This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the understanding in its manifold*”. Thus, in later stages of this chapter, when reason is accounting for the empirical concept of a body, this thesis will presume that Kant is undertaking what he would consider to be a scientific inquiry into the principle of reason, that is, into its own limitation.

concern itself with those observations as well. When a science observes its object scientifically, the design of the experiment must take its specific object into consideration. For instance, if it is gravity that is being observed, the material of the experiment must be something that can be brought under gravitational effect, otherwise the experiment will fail to represent gravitational events. The design of the experiment will need to involve the principles of the science itself so that laws might be derived. Through the experiment, the principles of the science are 'put into' the object observed. The activity of demonstrating the unity of principle with object in the act of experimentation is characterized by Kant as "an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer the questions he puts to them". The predictions of the natural science are put to the test. It might be thought that all importance is given to active reason insofar as science is acting as a judge who "compels" the witness (the object) to answer the questions put to it.

Though the object is to be thought of as being compelled, but it should not be thought of as being coerced. The term coerced is introduced here<sup>3</sup> in order to indicate a condition wherein the object is forced by the experiment to give a particular answers looked for by the experiment just because they confirm the experiment's predictions, rather than just being force to answer the questions put to it according to its own nature. Kant's conception of the object qua witness is that it can be compelled to answer. To have value for experimentation it must answer according to its own nature, rather than to just giving the answer that is looked for by the natural science<sup>4</sup>. If its testimony is nothing

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<sup>3</sup> By this thesis.

<sup>4</sup> I am here working with Kant's model of experimentation. I am aware that it is now understood that observation does influence results in scientific experimentation. This thesis isn't examining Kant's



that could dispute the predictions of the science, then the value of the experiment is nil. In order to know whether or not the principles under which the experiment has been conceived are valid, the object must be able to contradict the expectations of the science. Thus scientific progress, as outlined here by Kant, can be divided into three parts: principles, experimentation, and the object. Though the object is what is experimented on, and though reason no longer understands itself to be in a passive relation to nature, the object is yet a required element insofar as it responds in the experiment.

Kant moves from the description of the transformation of natural science to the question of whether or not such a transformation is possible for metaphysics. In the first paragraph of the following quotation Kant communicates the problem at hand. In the second paragraph he proposes a methodological solution.

Now why is it that here the secure path of science still could not be found? Is it perhaps impossible? Why then has nature afflicted our reason with the restless striving for such a path, as if it were one of reason's most important occupations? Still more, how little have we to place trust in our reason if in one of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it does not merely forsake us but even entices us with delusions and in the end betrays us! Or if the path has merely eluded us so far, what indications may we use that might lead us to hope that in renewed attempts we will be luckier than those who have gone before us?

I should think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they now are through a revolution brought about all at once, were remarkable enough that we might reflect on the essential element in the change in the ways of thinking that has been so advantageous to them, and, at least as an experiment, imitate it insofar as their analogy with metaphysics, as rational cognition, might permit. Up till now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us try whether we do not get farther

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argumentation from the perspective of the philosophy of science. This model of experimentation is only examined insofar as it provides context.



with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. (B xv – B xvii)

In his discussion of revolution in the sciences Kant observes that this capacity of a science to revolutionize its comprehension of its relation to its object is general and significant. The question of how philosophy can be put on its scientific path is then situated in the question of ‘how philosophy can revolutionize its relation to the object of its investigation.’ Thus Kant wants to present an analogy between philosophy and those sciences that have already undergone such a revolution. The analogy originates from the fact that sciences share “rational cognition” as a common element. Quite plainly, mathematics and natural science might not share one another’s objects, and they might not share the object studied by metaphysics. The commonality these sciences do share is “rational cognition”, insofar as they all seek to have their particular observations “connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires” (B xiii). What needs to be generalized, then, is not the special content one scientific approach might have, but rather the revolutionary methodology inherent in the possibility of connecting particular observations with necessary law.

Even though the particular objective content of one science need not be generalized throughout all sciences, Kant does seek content for metaphysics. Furthermore, it is clear that Kant intends to show that this content is general, not only to philosophy, but also to other sciences.<sup>5</sup> Kant seeks a content that is distinct from the activity of

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<sup>5</sup> This is most easily seen in the Transcendental Expositions, but also follows from the fact that this content is present for Kant even in common experiential objects (B 41, B 48 – B 49)

thinking because, according to the analogy with natural science, the object is a necessary element of experimentation. This means that to have a proper object<sup>6</sup> is a necessary element for any science<sup>7</sup>. Philosophy, too, must then have its proper content if it is to embark on a scientific path. The focus, in this examination, is how this content could be common to philosophical approaches interested in theoretical reason, as this is a discussion concerning Kantian grounds of theoretical philosophy in general, rather than a discussion regarding Kantian grounds for the 'philosophy of science'.

Of course, it is not sufficient to say that there is such content just because theoretical philosophy requires it, any more than it is sufficient to say that there is this content just because the synthetic *a priori* judgments of metaphysics require it. The proposition that there is such content – just because it is needed – retains the quality of hypothesis which is, of course, not valuable enough to Kant even to be sold at the lowest price (A xv). Yet, though this need cannot itself argue for such content, it does imply that *if* there is such a pure content for metaphysics that this content might be common to all philosophical standpoints that engage in *theoretical* reason. This content could be common to all different approaches to theoretical philosophical inquiry if, as Kant states, all synthetic *a priori* judgements require the particular content that Kant argues for (A 8/ B 12 – A 10/ B 13 in the A Introduction, A 8/ B 12 – A 10/ B 14 in the B Introduction).

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<sup>6</sup> Here it might be wondered 'what the object is as distinct from cognition?' What might be looked for is some distinction between, object or thing as distinct from cognition, or, object or thing as object or thing of cognition. However, this thesis proceeds by looking at the critical argumentation used to organize different standpoints of philosophy prior to a formal description of the object as such. Thus, it focuses on what Kant refers to as the architectonic structure (A 832/ B 860). In the presumption that the object conforms to cognition, is at this stage of architectonic development of the *Critique*, not distinguishable from cognition.

<sup>7</sup> General Logic might be a special case insofar as it, according to Kant, does not need to look any further for its content.



With regard to the content which is necessarily required of synthetic *a priori* judgements there are three options: first there might be no such pure content and therefore no synthetic *a priori* judgements; second, it might be the case that there is a multiplicity of pure contents; third, that there is only one pure content. This chapter argues that it is Kant's aim to show that there is *at least* one pure content. Of course, this leaves the possibility there might be a multiplicity of foundational pure contents upon which different strains of metaphysics might be built, but this question is the concern of the Metaphysical Expositions, so is taken up by the third chapter of this thesis.

Just finding some content that is appropriate to metaphysics is Kant's concern in the first *Critique* prior to the Transcendental Aesthetic. He has already, in the introduction to the first edition, alluded to the mystery that is to be the subject matter of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

A certain mystery thus lies hidden here, the elicitation of which alone can make progress in the boundless field of pure cognition of the understanding secure and reliable: namely to uncover the ground of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgements with appropriate generality, to gain insight into the conditions that make every kind of them possible, and not merely to designate this entire cognition (which comprises its own species) in a cursory outline, but to determine it completely and adequately for every use in a system in accordance with its primary sources, division, domain, and boundaries. So much provisionally for the peculiarities of synthetic judgments. (B 13/A 10)

Judgement can be divided into two basic forms for Kant, analytic and synthetic. Analytic judgements clarify knowledge internal to the concept. If I say that all bachelors are unmarried men, the concept bachelor is clarified in the statement that bachelors are unmarried men, but nothing by this is added to the concept 'bachelor'. Synthetic judgements, on the contrary, join one independent concept to another, thus they are



ampliative. This sort of judgement was held by Hume to happen only in accordance with experience. For instance, the colours red, green, or yellow could be attached as predicates to the concept apple. But the synthesis of the predicate [colour] with the subject [apple] is an empirical judgement and can by no means happen without the experiential object: the apple.

Of course apples can be thought of as coloured in a fashion not possible for natural experience, perhaps having purple and pink stripes. This would merely be taking a colour from other experience and applying it to the concept apple, so this too exemplifies synthetic *a posteriori* judgement. However, according to Kant “[e]verything that happens has its cause” is a synthetic judgement (A 9/B 13). If ‘happening’ is analytically examined, it is Kant’s position therefore that ‘causation’ will never be derived. In other words, if the concept ‘happening’ is isolated and its intrinsic contents clarified, the concept ‘cause’ will never be derived. ‘Happening’ and ‘cause’, as concepts, are understood by Kant to be attached in a synthetic judgment. Further, Kant claims that this synthetic judgement is made without appeal to experience, and this means that the judgment ‘everything that happens has its cause’ is an example of a synthetic *a priori* judgement. However, it should be kept in mind that presenting an example of synthetic *a priori* judgement does not also present the “something X” that makes this judgment possible prior to experience.

Returning for now to the comparison of natural science with metaphysics, both sciences, if they are to have ampliative knowledge, require “something X” in order to join

the predicate to the subject in an objective manner. In the case of natural science, which works directly with experience, there is no problem in identifying this "something X".

In the case of empirical judgements or judgements of experience there is no difficulty here. For this X is the complete experience of the object that I think through some concept A, which constitutes only a part of this experience. For although I do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in general, the concept nevertheless designates the complete experience through a part of it, to which I can therefore add still other parts of the very same experience as belonging to the former. (B 12/A 9)

Not so with metaphysics, since it does not proceed from experience but from what is pure. Since experience is not able to directly present what is pure, but at the same time given as an object, it is not obvious how synthetic *a priori* judgements can claim their appropriate object (or objects). What is claimed as common between natural science and metaphysics is participation in "rational cognition". But this rational cognition itself was not taken by natural science in the same immediate fashion as were that science's objects. After all, a revolution occurs within its structure. According to the example that Kant provides here, at one time natural science approached nature in a passive fashion expecting to be taught; then the structure of rational cognition in its approach to nature was reversed. As a result of this revolution, natural science was able to connect given particular occurrences with natural law. It is the object that is taken by a natural science to be standard; the foundational presuppositions inherent in examining such a standard are open to revision.

If there is to be an analogy between natural science and metaphysics through rational cognition, then Kant must hold that the analogy applies in three ways. First, in metaphysics as in natural science, the comprehension of rational cognition with regards to itself must be malleable. It must be able to 'look' at its actions with a capacity to see errors within its fundamental presumptions and restructure itself accordingly. Second, if



metaphysics is to arrive at necessary knowledge, then it must have some sort of “resistance”, or, “witness” that is available and proper to it. In natural science experience is able to provide this resistance. However, in order to show philosophy in ‘scientific action’ the object needs to be presented without merely taking what is given by experience. This is why using the example of a synthetic judgement is not enough to establish that there is such an object merely on the grounds that there must be such an object. The object needs to be compelled to give witness; it must be called to the stand, thus it cannot be presumed. Third, metaphysics must be able to design experiments in accordance with previously thought out principles that aim to test those principles.

As was stated above, it is not the case that nature answers to the whim of the ‘judge’. In order to be of value the answer compelled must accord with what the object is. Likewise, if, once the object of metaphysics is presumed to conform to cognition the object proceeds to give positive confirmation to any question put to it, then Kant’s experiment is undone<sup>8</sup>. Kant will approach the object “with...principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles” (B xiii). However, the object, being completely pure, can be nothing other than cognition itself. The difficulty is in showing *critically* how it is that cognition can be its own source of

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<sup>8</sup> In the third chapter the Metaphysical Expositions are presented as the means by which Kant’s system of principles concerning receptivity are tested and corroborated. Two different means of thinking will test the object. If each means of thinking succeeds in its test without affirming the system of principles provided by Kant this means one of two things. First, the object may just be giving a positive response to any experiment which indicates the incapacity of metaphysics to treat it (at least under Kant’s ‘science of receptivity’). Second, there may be more than one pure content: one taken up by empiricistic thinking, one taken up by rationalistic thinking, and one taken up by transcendental idealism. In the first Kant fails because his science is ill conceived. In the second Kant fails because there is no common foundation from which to get beyond indifferentism.



resistance, that is, its own object. This is only possible, for Kant, if dualism is inherent in cognition itself *rather than being between cognition and the object*.

## 1.2 The Identification of Pure Content: Overcoming the ‘Problem of Blindness’

It might be presumed that the Transcendental Aesthetic is intended by Kant to demonstrate how reason can examine an object after all that through which the understanding thinks is removed. That is, Kant seeks to show that when the concepts of space and time are philosophically examined, they show themselves to be grounded in intuition, and not the understanding. Under this estimation, the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic presents terminology relevant for Kant’s effort, relegates matter to the sensation, argues for the *a priori* of the form of appearance, and finally asserts the possibility of a ‘science of receptivity’ wherein space and time are held to be these forms of intuition. Then, on the strength of Kant’s arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions space and time are demonstrated to be both *a priori* and forms of intuition, and, just because these *a priori* forms of intuition are forms *of intuition*, intuition is also shown to be *a priori*.

In his book *Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic*, Falkenstein brings to attention a potential problem regarding the ‘blindness’ of intuition. Falkenstein points out that the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Expositions must come from a demonstration of intuition’s *a priori*; otherwise space and time are known to be *a priori* forms of intuition only in a weak sense. The forms of intuition cannot be

known to adhere to matter in its entirety. As will be discussed in the next chapter, his claim is that matter is divided matter of intuition and matter of appearance, and that space and time are only applicable to matter of appearance. So, when it is stated that space and time are only known to be pure forms of sensible intuition in a weak sense, what is meant is that, according to Falkenstein, they do not account for the total range of conditions of the determinability of matter. For Falkenstein, there must be some matter beyond appearance that space and time, as pure forms of intuition, do not extend to. A strong account of space and time, which holds to what Kant claims at B 34/ A 20, would argue that they the base conditions under which matter itself is made determinable.

The foundation of Falkenstein's attack is what he calls the blindness. This blindness occurs when Kant 'arrives' at intuition by "separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts" (B 36/A 22). Once abstraction is made, intuition may literally be inaccessible to the understanding. This potential inaccessibility of bare intuition is referred to as the 'problem of blindness'. This seems to challenge Kant's ability to refer to intuition at all. However, rather than denying all access to intuition, Falkenstein is content with an account that argues from experience to an intuitive capacity that must thereby be posited.

What is interesting is the account of how Kant might be understood to have undermined his own ability to talk directly of intuition as a receptive faculty. In showing the origins of what he considers to be Kant's "problem of blindness" to come from Kant's own development into his critical philosophy, Falkenstein is showing that there may be a structural, or architectonical, problem with Kant's reasoning. The problem, so



expressed, challenges Kant's claim to have produced a philosophy wherein all claims are *critically* known.

However, an argument can be made to show that this problem stems from an incorrect presumption. This incorrect presumption is that the Transcendental Aesthetic must provide this demonstration. However, Kant's account of the understanding's capacity to examine intuition is not located in the Transcendental Aesthetic, but can be shown to occur in the "Introduction" to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is possible, in Kant's discussion regarding the presence of *a priori* knowledge in the "experiential concept of a body", to account for the understanding's capacity to examine intuition. In this argument what will be shown first is how other attempts to respond to Falkenstein's version of problem of blindness have not resolved this issue at the critical level. What will be shown secondly is how the argument from the *Critique's* second edition Introduction can attend to the issues at the heart of the problem of blindness in its own distinct manner. Third, and finally, what will be shown is how the argument from abstraction in the Transcendental Aesthetic (B 35/A 21) cannot function to demonstrate the understanding's capacity to discuss pure intuition.

Falkenstein argues that the 'problem of blindness'<sup>9</sup> originates as a consequence of two of Kant's own standpoints. The first is the "sharp distinction between sense and intellect that splits the cognized world in two" (1995, 52). The second is that "Neither the

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<sup>9</sup> Falkenstein's observation of the consequences of blindness is not limited to his presentation of the 'problem' in his book *Kant's Intuitionism: a commentary on the transcendental aesthetic*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). He distinguishes the sense in which he considers Kant a 'nativist' in his paper 'Was Kant a Nativist?' (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 51, No. 4 573-597) Arguments in his earlier paper 'Kant's Account of Intuition' (*Canadian Journal of Philosophy* v. 21 (June 1991) p. 164-93) are similar to those he presents in *Kant's Intuitionism*.



products of the intellect (concepts) nor the products of sense (which Kant now proceeds to call 'intuitions') are supposed to yield knowledge when taken in isolation" (1995, 53). How is Kant able to have intellectual knowledge of intuition while maintaining the sharp distinction between those two faculties? It is fine that intuition is known in experience and spoken of from experience. For here cognition is understood to be a unity of both faculties. "There is no obvious impediment, therefore, to Kant arguing from the content of our intellectual representations back to their intuitive grounds" (1995, 73). The problem is arguing from isolated intuition, by means of the intellect, once the understanding's means to think has been removed.

So the question is: how can Kant justify his discussion of the structure of intuition, a structure posited by Kant to be spatiotemporal? Falkenstein states "Kant is forced –as a consequence of his blindness thesis – to begin his accounts of intuitive representations by referring, not to the structure of intuition itself, but rather to the appearances that emerge when the intuitive array is synthesized under concepts" (1995, 104). However, while he argues that the implications of blindness are not overcome by Kant, he asserts that to "describe what an intuition is like prior to all intellectual synthesis...demands that we identify distinct causal agents responsible for producing the distinct effects (the *constitution* of the cognizing subject, on the one hand, the *effects* of an external object, on the other)". If these causal agents can be identified then discussion of bare intuition should, on such grounds, be admissible. The question then becomes: In what way can it be shown that the understanding is capable of inquiry into intuition as a distinct faculty,

without granting to the understanding a special capacity<sup>10</sup> that would allow it to obtain knowledge of intuition unconditioned by experience?

The 'problem of blindness' has also been taken up recently by Graham Bird in his book *The Revolutionary Kant: A Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason*. Bird first presents what he takes to be a weak argument and follows this with what he understands to be a stronger argument. Under the weak argument experience is not strictly divided between intuition and our conceptual knowledge, but there is a varying spectrum wherein some experience is predominantly intuitive and vice versa. Insofar as both intuition and intellectual activity must be appealed to in order to account for experience Kant is justified in positing and discussing pure intuition. (2006, 127-128) In his stronger argument Bird makes the case that we can talk of intellectualized intuition because it is true that we know that subjects can react to intuitive experience without also having an intellectual account of said experience (2006, 129). This amounts to a demonstration that sense can be identified without concepts (2006, 130), and so falsifies the claim that "It is impossible to identify a (sense content without concepts)" (2006, 129). Intuition is therefore accessible even after the means of thinking has been abstracted from a particular intuition.

Bird's arguments do not acknowledge that Falkenstein asserts that it is perfectly reasonable to speak of intuition once it is within experience. Instead, what is asked by

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<sup>10</sup> I am referring here to Falkenstein's discussion of the 'real' as opposed to the logical use of the intellect (1995, 44 – 45) To posit the real use of the intellect is to posit a capacity of the intellect to know things of the object beyond what is given by sense. In the intellect's logical use, in contrast, is dependent on sense. In his *critical* philosophy Kant denies that our intellect can theoretically account for the object non-sensibly. At B xx states that the result of his 'revolutionary' experiment there is a strange result wherein metaphysics (and here he is talking about the theoretical and not the moral (see B xxvii – B xxxi) "can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience".



Falkenstein is how Kant's argument *itself* can account for apparently special knowledge of intuition. Falkenstein is importantly challenging the *argumentative* grounds whereby Kant can claim theoretical knowledge of intuition itself, as it is separate from experience which is already a unity of intuition and concepts. Working within experience to the necessary postulate will only ever provide "comparative necessity" and not the strict *a priori* necessity Kant is seeking. Fundamentally, the challenge is to Kant's claim to have produced a *critical* philosophy wherein all principles are *critically* known. Answering that sensibility limits us to the object as given does not provide the answer looked for by Falkenstein<sup>11</sup>.

In his work *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and a Defense*, Henry Allison does not directly attack the problem of blindness, yet he argues against what Falkenstein takes to be a consequence of that problem. Given the problem of blindness it does not follow necessarily that presentational order is of mind, but it might equally be supposed that what accounts for such order might be "given *a posteriori*, as a result of appearance" (1995, 136). This proposes that the origin of presentational order could be matter itself. In Kant's defence Allison asserts that the possibility of this presentational order originating as such is argued against in the first and second arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions since they show that space and time cannot

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<sup>11</sup> Andrew Brook discusses Falkenstein's 'problem of blindness in his *Critical Notice* (1998) on Falkenstein's work. There he states: "How then should we take Falkenstein's worry about Kant and the blindness of intuition? Kant could not allow that we have any *immediate awareness* of intuitions prior to conceptualization that yields knowledge; but then I am not sure that he ever does allow this. On the other hand, he can perfectly well allow that we can gain knowledge of unconceptualized intuitions by *drawing inferences* about what intuitions *must be like* if our experience is to be as it is--and this he does, repeatedly, using something like Humean distinctions of reason." (§III. Kant's Big Theses) Thus, in a similar fashion to Bird, Brook here does not acknowledge the fact that Falkenstein does not have a problem working from experience to intuition.



be from experience (2004, 131). However, since Falkenstein has challenged Kant's ability to have *a priori* knowledge of intuition in a strict sense, Allison's appeal to the metaphysical expositions, though textually sound, presume the very thing that Falkenstein questions.

In the interest of addressing the 'blindness problem' on critical grounds I turn to the B Introduction to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first section of the B Introduction Kant provides discussion of what he means by *a priori*. Kant's argues here that a) only one of two criteria (necessity or strict universality) need be shown for something to be judged *a priori*, and b), that what is *a priori* is not from experience, so can be known to be of the subject<sup>12</sup>. The term *a priori* applies strictly to knowledge known not to be grounded in experience (B2 – B3). Kant then moves to show that *a priori* knowledge can be demonstrated to be found even in common understanding.

First, Kant reduces the criteria by which something can be said to be known *a priori*<sup>13</sup>. What is *a priori* is necessary. What is *a priori* is 'strictly' universal. Strict universality and necessity then mutually imply one another, so if one of these can be shown, said knowledge is also known to be *a priori*. Second, Kant locates that which is known *a priori* in the subject, rather than in experience. Since experience can only provide comparative necessity which cannot demonstrate strict universality, that which is

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<sup>12</sup> With the exception of things in themselves of course.

<sup>13</sup> Karl Aschenbrenner refers to the importance of Kant's presentation of *a priori* here in his work *A Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. However he does not go on to deduce the significance of the later argument in this section for reason's comprehension of its own limitation.

strictly universal and necessary cannot be derived from experience and must be of the subject<sup>14</sup>.

Kant's defense of the presence of *a priori* judgements in ordinary cognition appears to be similar to his argument in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The greatest distinction is the context that surrounds each articulation. In the B Introduction Kant argues that *a priori* cognition is to be found in the "experiential concept of a body".

Gradually remove from your experiential *concept of a body* everything that is empirical in it – the colour, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impenetrability – there still remains the space that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely disappeared), and you cannot leave that out. Likewise, if you remove from your empirical concept of every object, whether corporeal or incorporeal, all those properties of which experience teaches you, you could still not take from it that by means of which you think of it as a substance or as dependent on a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object in general). Thus, convinced by the necessity with which this concept presses itself on you, you must concede that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition *a priori*. (B 5 – B 6)

The argument that I derive from this passage does not merely provide an argument from experience to what must be presupposed<sup>15</sup>. Kant is not claiming here only *that* there must be a second cognitive faculty. Kant can be seen here to argue *how* he can claim that a

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<sup>14</sup> This is a defense of Kant's manner of argumentation insofar as the understanding can be known to address the internality of intuition as a subjective capacity, i.e., without addressing the internality of things in themselves. I am not, however, entering into a debate on the *a priori* itself. For an account of this one might look at Michael Friedman's *Dynamics of Reason* (Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001) wherein he addresses the development of the *a priori* from Kant's time till now.

<sup>15</sup> When this argument was first presented to Suma Rajiva in our meeting, although she agreed that it sounded like a good argument, she cautioned me to consider how this argument could be contained to this section of text. It is important not to think that Kant is here accounting for substance, but is only stating that if we remove substance from an experiential concept of a body it ceases to be an experiential concept of a body. With this guidance in mind I also decided to see how this argument could be distinguished from other arguments that seemed similar. So, as will be discussed later in this chapter, this argument will be distinguished from Kant's argument for the *a priority* of form which also proceeds from abstraction. (B 36/ A 22). Also, as will be discussed in the third chapter, this argument should be distinguished from the second argument for the *a priority* of space which *appears* to be an argument also grounded on abstraction.



conceptual metaphysics, without some special claim to know another as it is in itself, can cognize the nature of a necessarily distinct faculty. This then is situated in the context of Falkenstein's inquiry. It can be shown that this argument demonstrates that the understanding can know the presence of this other faculty in a manner that would enable it to inquire into the internality of this necessarily distinct faculty.

The first hurdle to get past is the problem of abstraction. How is Kant abstracting predicates from the object? In short: He is not. With regards to the cognitive grounds of our "experiential concept of a body", Kant must be understood to be engaged in theoretical reason. Kant states that as a result of supposing the object to conform to cognition (B xvi) the object needs be conceived in two meanings (B xix - B xxi, B xxvii). The first meaning takes the object as appearance. The second meaning, adhering to reason's right to demand that the causal account of the object be complete, is the logical thinking of an object as a thing in itself. As Kant is investigating the *experiential* concept of a body it must have more constraints than mere logical possibility<sup>16</sup>, so is considered under the meaning of the object as appearance.

The second hurdle is to show intuition can be said to be within the scope of the understanding's power to examine. Kant's process is intended to reveal something present in cognition itself, thereby confining the procedure (in its scope) to the meaning of the object as appearance. Of what is found, it could afterward be asked if its origin is not distinct from theoretical cognition entirely. This would be to inquire into what Kant

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<sup>16</sup> For logical possibility all that is required is the law of non-contradiction. Kant presents a distinction between real possibility at A 221/ B 268, A 244/ B 302, A 243/ B301 – A 246/ B 303, B 308 – B 309. Straightforwardly, Kant holds that logical possibility is not sufficient to ground the real possibility of something.



holds to be strictly logical completeness. In this exercise the understanding finds terms according to the understanding's own grounds (operations). These terms could be considered as they would be in themselves, but instead, are considered in relation to the understanding<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore, this means that Kant is not thinking the object in itself. Put in terms that Falkenstein would use, the understanding is not engaged in an activity that would presuppose the 'real'<sup>18</sup> use of the intellect. Straightforwardly, Kant states that he is discussing the "experiential *concept*"<sup>19</sup> of a body".

Kant is testing<sup>20</sup> predicates to determine whether or not they can be known to have purely subjective origin. If the predicate succumbs to the process of abstraction, or negation, then it cannot be universal. If it is not strictly universal the relation can provide no more than comparative necessity. Comparative necessity is insufficient to establish that a claim is known *not* to be grounded by experience. If a predicate persists, so that it is only through this predicate<sup>21</sup> that the body can be thought at all as subsisting and spatial, then that predicate must be strictly universal to our experiential concept of a body, and is thereby generally inherent in any cognition involving the experiential concept of a body.

Saying that the predicate is strictly universal is also saying that the predicate is necessary. If it is necessary then it cannot be from experience and must therefore be from

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<sup>17</sup> This is not necessarily circular reasoning. It is possible that the understanding finds nothing beyond itself in this exercise and then the understanding would be conceived as in a pure relation to itself.

<sup>18</sup> For discussion of the 'real' verses 'logical' use of the understanding see Falkenstein (1995, 44 – 45).

<sup>19</sup> My Italics.

<sup>20</sup> When referring to the similar passage in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Allison, in his text *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and a Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Allison favours calling this a thought experiment (2004, 106).

<sup>21</sup> Or predicates.

the subject itself. Both spatiality and the means through which an object is thought of as substance were seen to be predicates that persisted beyond the power of the understanding itself. This is so even though these predicates are found adhering to the *experiential* concept of the object. As such, the object (content) providing witness here, i.e., 'in' the experiential concept of a body, is fully an element of cognition and is not content beyond cognition. These predicates instigate the comprehension that the understanding is not sufficient to describe the whole of cognition. They, in this sense, *cause* the knowledge that the understanding is not a complete description of cognition. Therefore it is through these predicates that the knowledge of the necessity of a second cognitive faculty is presented within the understanding itself.

### **1.3 The Distinction Between the Argument in the B Introduction and the Argument from Abstraction in the First Section of the Transcendental Aesthetic**

It can now be shown how the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic does not need to provide its own argument concerning how the faculty of intuition can be accessible to the understanding after Kant "separate[s] everything from the representation of a body [...] which the understanding thinks about it" (B35 /A 21). I am not here going to account systematically for the entirety of this section<sup>22</sup>, but what pertains directly to Falkenstein's claim that Kant has not accounted for "blindness" in this section.

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<sup>22</sup> I do however provide a full account in the next chapter.



In this first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant begins by presenting his claim that cognition is immediately related to the object via intuition. Intuition is for Kant a non-active cognitive faculty, whereas the understanding is active, but does not give itself the object. The understanding is thereby dependent on receptivity for its direct involvement with the object. The object is taken to affect mind, and the mind's own capacity to be affected is named sensibility. The capacity does not produce the affect itself, but is dependent for activation on an object. Kant adds in the B edition that thought of the object relates to the object as an individual through "certain marks"<sup>23</sup>.

Following this we are introduced to appearance. Sensation is said to be involved with the effect of an object "upon the faculty of representation" which I understand to be sensibility as a general capacity of the subject. When sensation relates to an object that sensation is termed empirical, and if we consider the relation itself and leave the object undetermined we then consider appearance. Take, for instance, a black cat wearing a hat. If the blackness of the cat, or even the catness of the cat, moreover if the kind or quality of the hat worn by the cat is considered, then what is considered is the empirical matter of that appearance. But if the capacity to have such a sensible relation is considered, then what is considered is appearance in general. Here the question asked is: What is sensibility *itself* as it is for us?

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<sup>23</sup> It might be thought that marks need be conceived as material marks. In her paper, "Kant's Metaphysical Exposition: On Philosophical Expositions Considered as Analysis of Given Concepts" (*Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 © Philosophia Press, 34 – 46) Anita Leirfall argues that metaphysical expositions can articulate "how analytic judgements may become synthetic *a priori* judgements" (Leirfall 2004 pg. 45). In this paper she argues how Kant can be seen to analyze a concept according marks inherent to that concept itself in order that *a priori* synthetic judgments might be obtained. With this in mind 'marks' in the passage in the Transcendental Aesthetic does not need to be understood to refer to material.



Following this Kant presents a division within appearance. That in appearance that can be said to be grounded by sensation is termed matter. Conversely, that by which matter made is determinable, or orderable, is said to be the form of appearance. Kant asserts that since form is that by which matter can be determinable it must not be from experience. Form, therefore, must be *a priori*. Its *a priori* allows this “form of appearance” to be distinct “from all sensation” (B 34/A 21). It is precisely this argumentation that is disputed by Falkenstein.

Now it is possible to inquire into whether or not Kant’s abstractive argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic can accomplish the expected task. Could it justify the notion of intuition in general looked for in the problem of blindness? If it is to function as such there are two questions that must be satisfied by Kant’s argument from abstraction in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. First, can this argument defend the claim that cognition has an immediate relation to the object via intuition or does it follow from such a claim? Second, if yes can be answered to the first question, can this argument from abstraction defend the claim that the structure of intuition itself is knowable? I hold that since it cannot do the first it therefore cannot do the second.

First, as has been said above, Falkenstein argues that the argument from abstraction at B35/ A21, does not show that the understanding can examine pure intuition. In fact, he holds that it brings the problem of blindness to a head insofar as it leaves the understanding no means to examine pure intuition. However, in order to know what this argument applies to, what Kant is discussing prior to this argument must be considered. In fact this argument is situated immediately after Kant’s discussion of the concept of

appearance. Yet Kant's claim that cognition is dualistic is contained in the first sentence of this section. What Falkenstein holds is that this argument is supposed to qualify the understanding's ability to consider intuition. In holding this, he presumes that this argument defends Kant's claim that cognition is dualistic, and moreover, that the understanding can examine intuition as a necessarily distinct faculty of cognition. When this argument is presumed to address these issues, then when Kant performs the abstraction at B35/ A 21, intuition does indeed appear to be accessible to the understanding. But this is only because Falkenstein has given no consideration has been given to Kant's earlier argument at B6 which establishes that the intuition expresses itself in concepts within the understanding. Thus, because the earlier argument is left unattended, the argument that form is the determining condition of matter appears as if it undermines Kant's ability to examine intuition in the *Metaphysical Expositions*.

However, the argument in the B Introduction has already established that the understanding can be in possession of concepts that do not originate in the understanding. If what is removed from the representation of a body is only those concepts that can be attributed to the understanding, but not those concepts that can be attributed to intuition, i.e., space and time, then these concepts remain available to the understanding's thinking. Thus, the understanding is not blind to intuition because, through intuition, it is still in possession of certain concepts, that is, that the experiential concept body must be thought of as being spatial. Unless Kant's argumentation at B 2 – B 3 is understood to show that the understanding is not the ground of all concepts, then once Kant removes everything through which the understanding thinks, it seems as if there are no concepts left at all.



However, once, the argumentation at B 2 – B 3 is seen to identify that a second faculty of cognition is necessary to account for certain concepts, or predicates, within our experiential concept of a body, then the forms of appearance, which are *a priori* and distinct from matter, are, in fact, concepts. These forms then, as concepts, remain once everything the understanding thinks is removed from the representation of a body. What is removed are any concepts that are grounded by the understanding. This leaves behind concepts that have their ground in the intuition. Thus Kant's argument at B 2 – B 3 permits him to claim that space is a concept which always contains intuitive content; for a concept to be immediately connected to intuitive content is just what Kant means by the phrase "pure form of sensible intuition". Understood in this fashion, space<sup>24</sup>, as a form of intuition, and therefore, as a concept grounded by the intuition, is neither empty nor blind<sup>25</sup>.

What then is the purpose of the argument from abstraction that is presented in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic at B35/ A21? If the context is considered, the argument is not supposed to argue for the necessity of intuition as a distinct faculty, but rather the argument is just supposed to affirm the distinction between matter (of appearance) and form (of appearance). When everything that the understanding "thinks" <sup>26</sup> regarding a representation of a body is removed, what remains is presentational order, or form, which, is expressed directly to the understanding in concepts. Matter is not considered because it is as known only through empirical

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<sup>24</sup> And time as well.

<sup>25</sup> This is a reference to Kant's statement that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind" (B 75/A 51).

<sup>26</sup> By that which the understanding "thinks" in regard to a representation of a body I understand that which the understanding can actively negate.



investigation. The argument does not show that pure intuition is available to the understanding, but confirms that form of appearance remains after everything through which the understanding thinks is removed from the representation of a body.

#### **1.4 The Synthetic Unity of Kant's Critical First Principle of Cognition**

This chapter began from the question of how, in cognition's scientific efforts toward self-knowledge, cognition could be a witnessing object for metaphysics. Kant's argumentation for the accessibility of intuition as a second capacity of cognition was shown to involve a progression of thought that began with the transcendental reorientation of the object, involved the twofold meaning of the object, and followed from Kant's reasoning concerning subjective location of knowledge known to be grounded *a priori*. With these in mind spatiality was seen to be predicates that persisted beyond the power of the understanding itself. As such, the understanding itself was forced to posit a second, qualitatively distinct, faculty. This second faculty is intuition, or cognition in its merely receptive capacity.

This argument then has both synthetic and analytic implications. It is analytic insofar as the predicates contained within the experiential concept of an object are found by showing what must of necessity be contained in that concept. However, Kant's capacity to think of the experiential concept of an object in such a manner is enabled by the unification of separate principles. In distinction from its analytic phase, it is also then, a consequence of a synthetic procedure of reason. If Kant had not reoriented the

cognition/object relation, then he would not be able to talk about what is *a priori* with regards to the cognition of an object. This being so, Kant would not have been able to locate the origin of what is *a priori* in the subject. Further, if Kant had not reoriented the cognition/object relation, then he would not be able to conceive the object under a twofold meaning. Without the twofold meaning of the object, Kant would not have been able to separate the meaning object as appearance from its meaning as something unconditioned. Separating the object into something that appears and something that is unconditioned allows Because of Kant can separate the object between these two meanings, he can claim that appearance is the proper domain of theoretical philosophy. At B 2 – B 3, Kant is engaged in a theoretical examination of the experiential concept of a body. He is not treating the grounds of something that requires the unconditioned, but only a condition under which an object can be for cognition. What Kant shows is that, when the cognitive grounds through which an object can be an appearance are examined, the understanding cannot be thought of as a complete account of cognition. This is because certain predicates do not succumb to the understanding's power of negation, therefore certain predicates must have their ground in a distinct cognitive faculty. As a result, cognition must be thought of as dualistic. Because of this, Kant can begin §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic with the claim that intuition is the means through which cognitions have direct connection to the object.

What this means for this thesis is that Kant's first critical principle of cognition is, in being a principle, a synthetic judgement. This accords well with Kant's statement that "Synthetic *a priori* judgements are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences." (A

10/B 14) It is however, for Kant, not merely a synthetic judgment that relies on some existent, distinct, and immediate object for its justification. Cognition here does not have to be shown to conform to a distinct object, since the object is presumed to be conformed to cognition. The 'experiential concept of a body' is already understood to be relevant to the 'experiential object'. If this were not the case then it could very easily be demanded that Kant need still show the origin of that synthetic judgement. After all, synthesis demands a third, a 'something X'. The third is this experiential concept of a body. Posterior to the transcendental turn, as was just stated, this concept is conceived as relevant to an experiential object. Furthermore, since this concept that is universal to the experience of object contains an *identifiable* element that resists the power of the understanding, this resistance can function as the 'witness' in a scientific examination of the source of such resistance. This is then a synthetic judgment that has provided the something X that is necessary for the synthetic structure. Therefore cognition itself has been presented in a structure sufficient for a theoretical investigation.



## **Chapter Two: The 'science of receptivity' as a Body of Principles**

In the previous chapter an argument was presented for how pure predicates, within the understanding itself, could be the means through which the understanding demonstrates to itself the necessity of a necessarily distinct cognitive faculty. In the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant will say that intuition is the means through which particular cognitions relate directly to object (A 19/ B33). This faculty second faculty is then intuition, cognition's receptive capacity. The predicates, by which the experiential concept of a body could be thought to be substantial and spatial, were shown not to succumb to the understanding's power of negation. This showed the origin of these predicates to be distinct from the understanding, for, being an autonomous capacity, if the understanding was a sufficient description of cognition as a whole, its effect on all predicates should be the same. Thus, in comprehending that such is not the case, that the same effect is not produced, the understanding comprehends the necessity of a second cognitive faculty.

However, the reasoning under which it was possible for the understanding to name the origin of these persistent predicates as cognition was the transcendental turn. Once the object is conceived as conforming to cognition, the ground of these predicates cannot be thought to be outside cognition. So, these predicates must be thought to be grounded by cognition, though not by active cognition. However, since these predicate indicators were found by the understanding to be within the understanding, the understanding could be

known to insufficiently describe the whole of cognition. What is more, since its limitation is expressed in predicates, even though the ground of the predicates is not the understanding itself, it is reasonable to suppose that these predicates might be available for exposition so long as it is remembered that this exposition does not lead to a theoretical claim to know these predicates as they would be beyond all relationality, that is, as complete in themselves.

Since this comprehension of its own limitation within cognition was a result of the transcendental turn, the knowledge that the understanding is limited was shown to come from Kant's process of reasoning. As was discussed in the introduction of this thesis, this process of reason began with the intent to locate indifference as the first stage in a movement away from *dogmatic* metaphysics. This correction of the philosophical role of indifference involved discussing the structure of revolution in science as a cognitive activity. If philosophy were to induce the same revolution in its own thinking, then, according to Kant, philosophy could find its way out of indifferentism, understood to be the final philosophical standpoint. In order to be able to participate in such a revolution, philosophy needed to show that its methodology could be divided into a threefold structure: principles, experiment, object. What is more, philosophy needed to be able to make an alteration in the way in conceived its own interaction with its subject matter.

Kant reorients philosophy's conception of the 'the object', and, as a result, the object was given a twofold meaning: as appearance, and insofar as it can be thought of as complete in itself (B xxviii). The virtue of this twofold meaning was that it provided a capacity to check whether or not critical philosophy failed or succeeded (B xx – B xxi).



Further, insofar as theoretical reason was to confine itself to the meaning of the object as appearance, this twofold meaning of the object provided the limits for the theoretical use of reason. However, the reorientation of the object did more than just situate the object in a twofold meaning; it enabled Kant to inquire into *a priori* knowledge. According to Kant, once the object is considered to conform to cognition it is possible to determine what knowledge of the object must be entirely from the subject (*a priori*), and what knowledge cannot be claimed by theoretical reason to be entirely of the subject (*a posteriori*).

## **2.0 Organizing Kant's Account According to his Twofold Meaning of the Object**

In the above manner it can be seen how Kant's first principle of cognition, that cognition's immediate relation to objects can be accounted for under a dualistic conception of cognition (A 19/B 33), is the result of a process of reason. What this means is that the terminology presented in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic need neither be conceived as arbitrarily introduced nor be conceived as externally organized by some previously unaccounted for principle or network of principles. Rather, as the first principle of cognition is in fact synthetic<sup>27</sup>, any of the aspects contained in this principle should be able to be unpacked and used in this the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. As such, any of the relevant principles and arguments used to arrive at the critical conception of dualistic cognition should be accounted as available in any effort to show the systematic account of Kant's 'science of receptivity'.

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<sup>27</sup> Being the result of a process of reason that involves itself with a pure content.



The twofold meaning of the object is the primary means this thesis uses to present the systematic account of receptivity in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The twofold meaning of the object is a conception of the object as an object available to theoretical reason while it is thought under its meaning as appearance. However, even within theoretical reason, reason demands the “unconditioned” in “everything that is conditioned” (B xx). This is why, at B xxviii, the object is divided into a twofold meaning. The meaning of the object as something in itself must then be included in the theoretical account, even if, as is discussed below, the object as a thing in itself is not what this thesis considers a cognitive operator.

The two-fold meaning of the object is a consequence of the reorientation of the object. This thesis therefore understands dualism to be instituted by the reorientation of the object. The question is no longer how cognition conforms to the object, but how the object is always for cognition. Thus there is no longer a mind/body dualism as such, but cognition has taken dualism into itself. As becomes clear early in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the integration of dualism within cognition expresses itself as cognition as receptive and cognition as spontaneous. Once the object is taken *first* to conform to cognition, then both the material of the object, and the distinction of the object from the cognitive observer, are held within cognition. What is available for theoretical observation is said to be appearance, and what must be demanded in order that the object is thought of as complete in itself is relegated to merely logical thinking. Theoretical thinking is interested in how the object is for cognition, and so, theoretical thinking is relegated to the meaning of the object as appearance. When the dualistic structure is

taken to apply to cognition itself, then receptivity is conceived as the immediate or direct presence of the object in cognition. This understanding is faithful to the first line of the Transcendental Aesthetic where Kant states that “[i]n whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition” (A 19/B 33). If we attempt to abstract from an object of experience, say a table or chair, then, according to this reading of dualistic cognition, our abstraction should lead us to a consideration of the conditions under which the object could be for us and not to a table or chair that exists, as such, beyond those conditions. This does not mean that it cannot be demanded that the table or chair can be thought as such a thing that as complete in itself, but this thought is recognized as outside the parameters of theoretical reason.

This two-fold meaning of the object will be used to organize the first three paragraphs of §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic (A 19/B 33 – B 34/A 20). The first paragraph, at A 19/B 33, will be presented according to the logical meaning of the object, while, the third paragraph of the section will be presented according to the meaning of the object as appearance. Accordingly, the terms presented in the third paragraph, at B 34/A 20, will be understood to be operators in Kant’s theoretical account, whereas the terms in the first paragraph will be understood to be admitted in the theoretical account only insofar as the right to demand a complete account of the object is retained as a consequence of the reorientation of the object (B xx). The second paragraph, at B 34/ A 20 is presented as a transitional paragraph that recognizes that, when within a mere



logical conception of the object, as soon as the object is considered in its capacity as an individual (for a subject) the thinker is moved from the mere logical conception to an account of the object that is prior to any 'ontological' consideration of the object<sup>28</sup>.

Such a prior account is necessary, not only so the science can know what it puts into its object, but so as to show how the test made possible by the object conceived under two meanings, remains within the 'science of receptivity'. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the object tested is not coerced by the questioning of the science; rather the object must function like a witness whose testimony is demanded, yet depended on.

In §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant develops the terminology of the science of receptivity in isolation from the philosophical standpoints that will challenge the claim that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition in the Metaphysical Expositions. This isolation should be thought of as the "indifference" that Kant holds to be inherent to a proof of "a well grounded way of thinking" (A xi). Indifference is here understood to refer to the introspective process a standpoint of philosophy needs to go through in order to develop its own account of a certain subject matter, here receptivity as a cognitive capacity<sup>29</sup>. Kant's account of receptivity, from the perspective of transcendental idealism,

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<sup>28</sup> By this is meant an account of the principles that are to be used in, and that are thus part of, any ontological account of an existent object in general and ultimately an individual object and its relation to the physical and social world. Insofar as Kant is building a science, this preontological account is necessary insofar as the knowledge of what that science is going to contribute to its object is required for necessary knowledge. Gerd Buchdahl discusses such a conception in his work entitled *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason* which will be momentarily discussed. (1992, 155) This does not mean, of course, that Buchdahl holds the same conception as does this thesis. Such an account of the object, that Buchdahl describes as prior to any ontological account, is the product of a reduction. This thesis holds that the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic is intended to clarify a concept. What is clarified is the concept of receptivity as a cognitive capacity.

<sup>29</sup> I am not here stating that such develop must always occur in isolation. Instead, I am asking, if the process of going from indifference, through doubt, to strict criticism is held to be proof of well grounded thinking, how can Kant be seen to manifest this process in the Transcendental Aesthetic?



can then be said to have the character of indifference. “Indifference” is not identical with “indifferentism”, which, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, falls into dogmatism even though it is a rejection of dogmatic metaphysics (A x).

In his footnote at A xi, Kant states that “indifference, doubt, and finally strict criticism are rather proofs of a well grounded way of thinking”. This chapter argues that Kant’s claim that space and time are “two pure forms of sensible intuition” should be understood to represent “doubt” (A 22/ B 37). What is meant here by “doubt” is an understanding that the other members of the philosophical community, empiricistic and rationalistic thinking, must corroborate this prediction before the claim that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition is known with certainty. So, instead of viewing Kant as making this claim with complete certainty, this thesis understands Kant’s claim to function like a testable prediction. This claim by Kant is therefore made with a degree of doubt. This is so because the claim is made with the understanding that it needs to be tested. Thought of in this way, transcendental idealism does not aim to utterly defeat these other schools of philosophical thinking in the *Metaphysical Expositions*. Instead, as is explored in the third chapter of this thesis, it is inclusive of these other manners of philosophical thinking even though it shows them to be limited.

## **2.1 Affect verses Effect**

The first and third paragraphs of §1 of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, from A 19/ B 33 – A 20/ B 34, are taken by this thesis to each apply to one of the two meanings of the

object that Kant describes at B xxviii. Thus in the first paragraph, which is understood to correspond to the meaning of the object as something in itself, the term “given” can be understood to refer to that aspect of receptivity that implies the utter dependency of a receptive faculty on an ‘other’. If the intuitive faculty is merely receptive and does not produce the object itself, then, in order to think of the object of cognition as complete the object as absolutely distinct from cognition must be posited. This does not entail that such a logical assertion has further implication within the theoretical. This is because, as will be discussed below, *affect*, which this thesis argues should correspond to the meaning of the object as a thing in itself, should not be thought to be within causality. This is how *affect* is distinguished from *effect* terminologically. Effect is within appearance and can be understood to function in causality. Affect, on the contrary, merely represents an implication of receptivity, that is, the meaning object as a thing in itself. Kant states that the principle of causality does not apply to this second meaning of the object (B xxviii).

“Appearance”, in distinction, refers to the comprehension that a merely receptive faculty receives ‘something’<sup>30</sup>. To ask what this ‘something’ is prior to being received is to ask what this ‘something’ is outside relationality, that is, as a thing in itself. This is permitted as the demand for logical completion but remains only as the right to demand. Whatever is shown to belong to appearance, including appearance in general, is understood to be caught up with what is received and, unlike the merely logical implications, can be treated theoretically.

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<sup>30</sup> Something that the understanding itself does not ground.

Affect and effect are, under this dualistic model, presented by Kant as distinct. Though they are both modes of receptive relationality, this does not mean that one mode of relationality is sufficient to account for relationality in general. Form of appearance is contained within the implication that something is received. Ultimately the forms under which what we experience can be said to be determinable are space and time. Space and time emerge as predictions from transcendental idealism's conception of appearance as the forms under which the object of experience can be for us directly, that is, how objects are intuited. The logical thought of the object as complete, is the thought of the object as complete in itself beyond cognition's receptive capacity. Appearance is a consideration of the conditions under which the object can be for us, thus the merely logical thought of the object does not take spatiotemporality into consideration. *Effect*, by virtue of the fact that it is contained in a domain which is held by Kant to be accessible to theoretical investigation, can, within the confines of a 'science of receptivity', be further determined as spatiotemporal relationality. *Affect*, being confined to what is merely permitted as a logical demand, cannot *in a theoretical science* be further determined, even though we can, for instance, identify that there is no logical contradiction in holding that if spatiotemporality is the exclusive to appearance, and if things in themselves are not appearances, then things in themselves can be said to be 'known' not to be spatiotemporal. Kant has already distinguished that objects of experience must be investigated according to the meaning of the object as appearance and that freedom and morality are thought of solely in accordance with the law of non-contradiction (B xxvi –



B xxx). So, as far as a cognitive 'science of receptivity' is concerned, the object, considered under affect, is not an object within the theoretical scope.

What is required then, to articulate this distinction, is to disconnect affect from the domain of the theoretical by dissociating causality from the notion of affect. If Kant is to have a 'science of receptivity', then this science must isolate and take as its element that which is cognizable, while permitting that which is thinkable only as a right, but not as what this thesis calls a cognitive operator. If causality takes affect into itself, either by reducing affect to causality or by claiming its domain to include that which causes affect, then the 'science of receptivity' threatens to take into itself givenness and affect. But then it would seem that the actuality of the thing in itself is cognizable in theoretical reason. As was seen earlier, Kant explicitly has stated that if an object is able to be thought identically under both meanings, the science has failed. That is, the two-fold meaning of the object provides a check insofar as it states that thinking of appearances as corresponding to things in themselves should result in the fact that "the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction" (B xx). But if there is a causal connection between things in themselves and appearances, then this is to say that there is a correspondence between things in themselves and appearances. However, Kant has stated at B xx that "our cognition from experience conforms to things in themselves", should lead to a contradiction after the reorientation of the object. This would suggest that Kant's ability to distinguish affect from effect, so that "givenness" is understood not to be subsumed within causality, is of vital importance.

## 2.2 Affect and Consistency within the Scope of the First *Critique*

This thesis does not itself treat the entire *Critique* nor does it attempt itself to demonstrate how the claims it makes are to be reconciled with the *Critique* as a whole. However, the distinction between affect and effect as a consequence of the twofold meaning of the object is fundamental to the thesis. The thesis cannot presume that there is a consensus that such a distinction is important to the understanding of the *Critique*, so an account of how it has been shown to be important needs to be presented<sup>31</sup>. Fortunately, solid accounts of this distinction have been made by important commentators, and this thesis will now present several of these accounts as evidence that there are indeed grounds to make such a distinction.

Even in Guyer's earlier work *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, where he is less forgiving of Kant's overall account than in his recent work simply titled *Kant*, there seems to be an admission that appearance is the context for causality. He states that for Kant, even though "concepts such as causality are *a priori*, [they are] concepts which can

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<sup>31</sup> Of this problem H. W. Cassirer observes in his book entitled *Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954) "[s]ensible appearances are, according to Kant, due to, or grounded in, things-in-themselves. If this means anything, it must mean that, in some sort of way, they are actually causally dependent on them. *But he himself should have been the first to concede the inadmissibility of such a hypothesis.* For it will become evident from his discussion of causality that causation is inapplicable except within the field of sense-experience. Consequently, he should have acknowledged the impossibility of resorting to any kind of causal relation for the explanation of the dependence of the sensible on the supersensible" (1954, 43). This thesis is in agreement with the fact that causality is limited to sense experience, and this observation itself by Cassirer is important in this regard. What he doesn't do is inquire into how givenness might be conceived so that it might not be thought of as operational in a theoretical sense. Because he does not do this, he attributes the inconsistency to Kant, and does not observe that the inquiry into relationality between the thing in itself and appearance is to move the theoretical beyond the boundary that reason has found for itself. In other words, just because Kant has started from a critically known first principle, does not mean that all the implications of that first principle are available to reason in its theoretical operations.



be utilized only on the basis of a material given *a posteriori*, and it draws a close connection between the two apparently independent concepts of accident and causality.” (1987, 213) Directly after this Guyer states that for Kant the concept of substance can only be “applied with the assistance of causal judgements.” It is then an intention of Kant’s, according to Guyer, that on one hand the concept of cause can only ‘be utilized’ in the presence of *a posteriori* matter, while on the other, that the application of the concept of substance is only possible with the mediation of the concept of cause. As ‘matter’ itself will be shown in this thesis to be limited to appearance, such an account as Guyer’s would seem to require both cause and substance be relegated to appearance. For Kant then, the limit of the *theoretical* is the scope of causation, and does not extend to that which *affects* mind.

But it might be asked ‘*Why should it be a concern what Kant’s intentions were? It may be the case that Kant’s account itself is inconsistent unless we presume affection to be brought under the domain of cause.*’ Certain commentators have taken it upon themselves to show that this is not the case. They argue that even though appearance is only possible insofar as the “object affects mind”, thinking such an object to be the *cause* of affection cannot provide us with any theoretical benefit. Holding the object to be known to be the *cause* of affect would be, for Kant, to extend the domain of the theoretical inappropriately into practical reason’s domain. Importantly, however, this restriction should not be understood to be a ‘willed’ restriction, whereby reason is arbitrarily restricted in its theoretical domain so that practical reason is presented with a mandated territory. Rather, the ‘cognizable’ represents the actual limit of theoretical



reason for Kant, as the thing in itself is, for Kant, *thinkable* but not *cognizable*. Kant wishes to show that when reason attempts to *cognize* the entire ground of thought, reason enters into an error concerning its own self-estimation.

The thesis now turns to two commentators: Gerd Buchdahl and Moltke S. Gram. Buchdahl is important in this respect insofar as he argues in his book *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason* that the thing in itself is unavailable for consideration as the *cause* of affect. In his understanding the transcendental object, while theoretically available, cannot be distinguished utterly from sensible matter. Since the transcendental object is not utterly distinguished from the object as realized as appearance it cannot itself be said to be the *cause* of the affect which produces the appearance. Moltke S. Gram, in his work entitle *Kant's Transcendental Turn*, shows that attempting to overcome difficulties inherent in Kant's theory of interaction between objects and subjects (by subsuming affect into the causal chain) only succeeds in bringing what is difficult to understand to a realm where no theoretical explanation whatsoever is possible<sup>32</sup>. For Buchdahl, there is no theoretical entity to be claimed as a cause of affect; for Gram, there is no resultant theoretical gain achieved by positing such a theoretical entity.

### 2.3 Buchdahl's Account of Affect

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<sup>32</sup> Gram does more than this, of course. He discusses how the Double Affection theory supports itself by claiming that it overcomes certain contradictions or problems within Kant's theory. So the first part of Gram's effort is always to show that they do not actually solve these supposed contradictions. The second part of the effort is to show that these contradictions do not need to be supposed in the first place. But insofar as I am only interested in showing that the attempt to bring affect into the causal domain is *ineffective*, I do not treat the latter.

According to Buchdahl, the transcendental object cannot be distinguished from the object of appearance in a manner which would allow the transcendental object to be taken as a *cause* of affect in the object-mind relation. What Kant states at (A 372 – A 373) shows that Kant would not have thought that the thing in itself was something that could be known theoretically as such a ground (1992, 154). The relevant passage from the *Critique* is as follows:

For in fact if one regards outer appearances as representations that are effected in us by their objects, as things in themselves found outside us, then it is hard to see how their existence could be cognized in any way other than be an inference from effect to cause, in which case it must always remain doubtful whether the cause is in us or outside us. Now one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuition, but this is not the object we understand by the representation of matter and corporeal things; for these are merely appearances in us, and their reality, just as that of my own thoughts, rest on immediate consciousness. (A 372 – A 373)

What is important to notice here is that the inferential movement from effect to cause would always remain in doubt. Buchdahl uses this to convince the reader that there is no such “aetiological” account possible between *affect* and the thing in itself. However, and conversely, insofar as Kant goes on to state that “one can indeed admit that something that may be outside us in the transcendental sense is the cause of our outer intuitions”, the transcendental object might here be a causal entity in the affecting of mind. Buchdahl argues that it is possible to show that the transcendental object is as little able to be the *cause* of affect in Kantian doctrine as is the thing in itself. Therefore the transcendental object cannot be presumed to be the cause of *affect*. If neither the thing in itself nor the transcendental object can be known to be the cause of *affect*, then causation is limited to appearance.



To illustrate this, Buchdahl goes on to propose the object be taken as under a series of *correlated* descriptions (1992, 155). The earlier material of his book has already introduced us to the object as being conceived under multiple descriptions. But here he is primarily concerned with two stages referred to wherein the object is first taken under reduction, then second, as realized. In the reduction the object is recognized as not having as of yet an ontological account (1992, 155). Buchdahl contrasts this reduced object with “an opposite stage or level, where the transcendental apparatus (sensibility, understanding, etc.) is being activated or employed leading to what I shall call the ‘realization’ of the transcendental object as something which is thereby moved to, or converted into, the object as an appearance.” (1992, 156)

The reason why Buchdahl is interested in these two stages is that he thinks that, if he can show sufficient correspondence between them, then he has given grounds whereby it can be seen that they should not be regarded as sufficiently distinct from each other as to support knowledge of their causal relation. Ultimately the transcendental object can be “at best construed only as a ground and as part, of one and the same single object at the stage of reduction” (1992, 159). According to Buchdahl, passages which speak of supersensibles as causes, must be read with Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgement* in mind wherein Kant states that cause is there to be understood as only ground (1992, 157). Something supersensible can be thought of as something beyond cognitions receptivity. Thus it is unconditioned. Kant has stated that this unconditioned object, the object complete in itself, is not subject to the principle of causality (B xxvii). Thus when Kant speaks of the supersensible as a ground, he does not have to be understood to be bringing



the supersensible into causal relation. So passages which have been taken to support a causal account of affection do not do so merely because they use the word ground.

The correspondence between the transcendental object and the realized object of appearance is a multi-staged process. To illustrate this, Buchdahl first shows textual basis for a correlation between the form of the transcendental object and understanding (1992, 157). He then gives textual verification that the matter of appearance corresponds with sensation (A 20/ B 34). He states that the correspondence between the matter of the transcendental object and the matter of appearance is given in the chapter on the Schematism (1992, 157). Kant states, “[t]hat in objects [qua appearance] which corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves” (Sachheit, reality)” (A 143/ B 183).<sup>33</sup> So first the matter of appearance was said to correlate to sensation. Here sensation is taken to correlate to the matter of the transcendental object (1992, 158). What is most important here for Buchdahl is that the ‘reality’, or the thing-hood, or the utterly general “state of affairs’ that is the object at the reductive stage, is said to correlate to sensation.

Now it would seem here that all that is being said is that the transcendental object is related to the object as appearance via sensation. Of course this is precisely what is said

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<sup>33</sup> Buchdahl has indicated that he is using the Kemp-Smith translation “except where the translation seemed unreliable” (1992 notes, 165). In cases that he finds the Kemp Smith unreliable he uses his own. Upon comparison this quote provided by Buchdahl seems to be his own translation which would indicate that he found the Kemp Smith unsatisfactory. The Kemp Smith is as follows “that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is not the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality).

” (Sachheit, reality). Clearly the essential difference between the two translation is that the Kemp Smith holds that what corresponds to sensation is *not* the transcendental matter, whereas the Buchdahl translation states that transcendental matter *is* what corresponds to sensation. If the Guyer translation is consulted, it can be seen that agreement is given to Buchdahl: “that which corresponds to the sensation in these *is* the transcendental matter of all objects”.

in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Therefore this does not seem to provide much clarity. But Buchdahl points out that Kant's spatiotemporal theory does not permit the question of 'how' but only asserts 'that' "such qualities [are] a function of sensibility" (1992, 157). The full statement is as follows:

So in terms of our scheme, at the reductive stage *Sachheit* which in English may be rendered as 'the concept of holding of some state of affairs', corresponds to sensation at the realizational stage. But before turning to the significance of this case of correspondence, let us consider the place of 'sensation' in the Kantian scheme. The transcendental vehicle, which makes sensation possible, is of course sensibility. Now at B44 Kant adopts a more or less Lockean stance on secondary qualities, laying it down that the latter are entirely a function "of our manner of sensibility", in *addition to which*<sup>34</sup>, unlike Locke, the 'primary' spatio-temporal qualities are of course similarly a function of sensibility. What follows from this is that at the reductive level, with the 'how' of such qualities being a function of sensibility, and thus no longer defined, the only feature that remains is the 'that' of these qualities (1992, 157).

What Buchdahl is holding Kant to is just that affect and givenness are inexplicable theoretically just because Kant has stated that there is no theoretical ground to inquire into how mind is affected insofar as the how of affect is necessarily eliminated as a part of spatio-temporal cognition. However unsatisfying this might seem if what one wants is a full explication of givenness, Buchdahl's assessment is in line Kant's intention. The thing in itself cannot be conceived as related to appearance in an aetiological account. The matter of the transcendental object and the sensible in appearance are not appropriately understood to be distinct moments in a causal chain. Therefore affect and givenness, as descriptors of a type of relationality between cognition and the object, are eliminated as cognitive elements in a 'science of receptivity'.

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<sup>34</sup> My emphasis



## 2.4 Moltke S. Gram's Account of Affect

But perhaps the argument can be made that, pragmatically, "*We should include the thing in itself or the transcendental object in a 'science of receptivity' because we might, by choosing what we can see works best, gain some theoretical ground that is otherwise lost in the well meant attempt to be faithful to the philosopher.*" Though such an account might not be able to situate itself within strict adherence to the *Critique*<sup>35</sup>, discrepancies such as these might be overlooked if they nevertheless reward us with a more coherent theory. Gram's discussion of affect is therefore important because it shows that in the attempt to bring the second meaning of the object into the cognitive domain, by subsuming affect under causality, nothing is done to increase our theoretical account. Rather, the terminology involved in double affection only masks the problem and presents no opportunity for explication.

According to Gram, the case for double affection, or DA as he shortens it, is not made from a legitimate understanding of affection. He states,

DA arises, not from the Kantian notion or theory of affection itself, but rather from a faulty theory of what affection is supposed to be and how it fits into Kant's account of the relation between things in themselves and appearances. I shall also argue that the dilemma [upon which DA is founded] is ultimately spurious. (1984, 11)

DA, then, tries to reduce affect to effect. Gram's conception of DA's initial argument is as follows (1984, 12 - 14). First, we are not supposed to be able to perceive things in

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<sup>35</sup> I am not hereby stating that people who advocate for a dual affection etc. do not also claim to find support in the text itself. I am simply limiting the scope to what is applicable at this point to my thesis. I have already above presented Buchdahl's discussion on the consistency of Kant's argumentation. Further, Gram does challenge the textual origins of the sorts of contradictions that Double Affection claims to solve, but I am only here focused on what might be understood as pragmatic grounds for reconstruction.

themselves. Second, if things in themselves affect mind and cause appearance, as Kant *seems* to suggest in the Transcendental Aesthetic, then insofar as we are in some form of causal relation with thing in themselves it must be said that we do “perceive things in themselves under a description appropriate to them”. Third, since perception of things in themselves is impossible according to Kant himself, it must *instead* be the case that phenomenal objects themselves *affect* us. Fourth, in order to avoid the problem that what is said to be a product of affect is also the cause of affect, two types of affection are posited. One type of affect is empirical affect. The world of the empirical ego is a world that consists of empirical objects that *empirically affect* the empirical ego. However, this empirical world is the result a second type of affection where the ‘ego in itself’ is *transcendently* affected by ‘things in themselves’.

The problem is, according to Gram, that such a solution does not actually resolve anything. The act of dividing affection in two does not change the fact that transcendental affection is still affection (1984, 19). The question to be asked then is: is any theoretical progress made by dividing affection in two? As Gram states, “What should be noticed is that, even in the case of transcendent affection, there is a kind of intuition. And this requires that there be sensibility for the ego in itself with characteristics of its own.” Gram here refers to “transcendent affection” as only a “kind of intuition” because, its counterpart, empirical affection has gone and left it without any transcendental spatiotemporal apparatus. So, according to Gram, at the outset DA theory is plagued with needing to rely on a mode of relationality beyond the sort of relationality Kant’s theory can use to explicate the grounds of causality.



Gram summarizes this problem quite clearly and succinctly in the following:

The distinction [between types of affect] cannot be drawn in terms of the presence of or absence of any intuitive faculty at all. But once it is seen that even an ego in itself has a sensibility if it is to be perceptually aware of particulars, the problem that the distinction between the two types of ego [and thereby two types of affect] breaks out all over again with regards to an ego that does not have forms of intuition. Even if we assume that the ego itself lacks the forms of sensibility that distinguish it from the empirical ego, we must assume that it has some forms of sensibility or other. The rejection of this assumption would prevent the ego in itself from being affected at all. But the acceptance of this assumption would merely raise all of the problems facing the notion of an appearance in itself at another level. (1984, 20)

Even in its design then, DA lacks the ability to deliver the solutions to these supposed problems concerning affection. This is because affection is supposed by DA theory in a manner quite opposed to Kant's own notion of affection. Of course, this is precisely what Gram means when he says that the origin of DA is a "faulty theory of what affection is". This is to say that the fault is with DA's understanding of Kant's notion of affection rather than a fault with Kant's notion of affection itself.

Although Gram goes on from here to provide extensive criticism of the theory of Double Affection, this thesis will only examine one more argument which quite plainly illustrates that Double Affection has no grounds to claim a pragmatic victory. The next problem that DA tries to mend, according to Gram, is the problem incurred when attempting to explain variation in the multiplicity of spatial appearances. The criticism begins from the claim that it is one thing to say that space, as a form of intuition, accounts for the spatiality of outer appearance in general, but we cannot then say that space as a form also accounts for the individual and particular spatial shape of all individual things (1984, 25 – 26). Kant's own account seems to contain a contradiction. On one hand Kant

holds that “appearances in themselves determine the difference between spatial characteristics of perceptual object”, on the other hand “he says that what accounts for the very same fact is the character of things in themselves” (1984, 26).

All is not lost for the DA theorist however. All that needs to be presumed is that “things in themselves *remotely* determine the spatial characteristics of things we intuit. What we intuit in that intuition, however, is proximately determined by an appearance in itself.” (1984, 26) So, on the one hand, things in themselves “transcendently affect the ego in itself” while, on the other hand, “appearances in themselves empirically affect the empirical ego”. There is no contradiction because spatiality is being played out, on an utterly general level wherein outer objects are determined as spatiality in general. For DA this utterly general level is a transcendent affect through which things in themselves affect the ego in itself. However, a second affection is attributed to empirical relations in order to account for the particular spatiality of any empirical object.

Gram does give a brief account of how this problem is not actually a contradiction as Kant accounts for it. This thesis will however, stick to Gram’s account of why, even if this contradiction is granted, double affection cannot provide any solution whatsoever. The problem here for DA is not, according to Gram, a problem arising just because DA has taken to itself a new challenge. Rather, DA has taken its solution to the first problem and used this same problematic solution in an attempt to resolve a second problem. Thus initial inconsistency is understood to afflict DA in this new attempt, and, if Gram’s account is followed completely, it can be seen that he understands this affliction to be terminal in all DA’s attempts.



What does DA offer to relieve this conflict? We are given two relations of affection, one of which relates the thing in itself to the empirical ego. This may remove the contradiction at one level. But what results only reproduces the problem it was supposed to solve. The existence of a sensibility even for the ego in itself as a necessary condition of nonsensuously intuiting anything only permits us to raise the difference between two kinds of account of the diversity of what we see all over again for that ego. For such an appeal merely *resurrects*<sup>36</sup> the distinction between the way in which something is constituted apart from any sensibility whatever and the way in which that object appears to a perceiver [ ... ] DA cannot, therefore, be confirmed in virtue of its power to remove that alleged conflict in Kant's account. (1984, 27-28)

There is then no pragmatic justification for bringing affection into Kant's cognitive scope, because what we are presented with is a reproduction of the problem we were trying to explain. A mode of sensibility distinct from what is required for empirical sensation would have to be developed and demonstrated. Yet, after this was done, it could still be asked: "how do we differentiate between the general account necessary for the non-empirical sensation and its own equally necessary relation of multiplicity?" The situation merely repeats, and there is therefore no theoretical gain. But this has nothing to do with a misunderstanding on Kant's part, but is the precise implication of what Kant takes to be the error of reason. Reason will always presume that it is making strides when it attempts to use theoretical reason to approach the unconditioned. This is precisely the activity however that DA attempts to engage in when it posits a *transcendent* affect as operational in the theoretical scope. Kant's point is that the understanding can identify how attempting to approach the unconditioned is an error. Thus for Kant, the attempt to subsume affect under effect, and in so doing appealing to the transcendent within

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<sup>36</sup> My italics.

theoretical reason, may seem like a pragmatic advantage, but is inadmissible as it lacks critical grounding.

In light of the above discussion it can be seen that this thesis has grounds for holding that givenness and affect are not to be taken as cognitive operators in Kant's estimation of a 'science of receptivity'. This thesis made this assessment of givenness an affect based only on material covered in the Prefaces and Introductions, and on the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In so doing such an assessment was in danger of being short sighted, since the material it looks at is quite brief in comparison to the rest of Kant's critical philosophy. However, rather than being hindered, this assessment seems to be fully in line with accounts that take into consideration the entire *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in the case of Buchdahl, the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* as well.

## **2.5 Affect, Sensibility, Thought**

Sensibility is the name given to our receptive capacity, and is the general condition through which immediate relation to objects is conceived. It might seem odd that, though the object is said to be given through sensibility, that Givenness is not available for theoretical explication. Here again the question of a causal relation starts to surface. However, if Kant had here stated that the object affects us by its own capacity, and not in respect of a subjective capacity, then surely there would be an inconsistency. But this is exactly what is wondered when the object is conceived as matter present prior to givenness in order that there be sensibility (of something) in the first place.



This thesis would suggest that when the object is thought by Kant to conform to cognition, it is not therein thought to be caught up in a process. The conformed object is always conformed. Any consideration of the object that conceives the object as an existent outside cognition in order for there to be a cognition-object relation is a return to the conception of the object prior to the transcendental turn. But, for Kant, this thinking can be acknowledged as the logical demand for the object to be thought as complete. This demand is permitted in the 'science of receptivity' under the term givenness, which in no way itself entails a causal relation. But, matter, being involve in the relationality of the object is contained within the theoretical scope, so is contained in appearance.

Since Kant states that the object is individuated by certain marks it is not completely clear that givenness and affection can be disconnected entirely from any matter. After all, if marks are the means through which an object is to be conceived as individual, does the term 'marks' not imply some material present in some inexplicable fashion in order that givenness and affection might occur? In her paper, 'Kant's Metaphysical Exposition: On Philosophical Expositions Considered as Analysis of Given Concepts' Anita Leirfall argues that metaphysical expositions can articulate "how analytic judgements may become synthetic *a priori* judgements" (2004, 45). In this paper, which provides an account of how analytic concepts can develop into synthetic judgements, there is a discussion concerning marks inherent in analytic concepts themselves. Leirfall includes passages from Kant's pre-critical publication 'Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of Principles of Natural Theology and Morality' which are quite revealing regarding this matter. The thesis will provide one such passage as context

for the discussion. The intent of this discussion is only to present an account wherein 'marks' do not refer to material marks so that the context of Leirfall's discussion can be appreciated.

The concept has to be analyzed; the characteristic marks which have been separated out and the concept which has been given have to be compared with each other in all kinds of contexts...For example, everyone has a concept of time. But suppose that that concept has to be defined. The idea of time has to be examined in all kinds of relation if its characteristic marks are to be discovered by means of analysis: different characteristic marks which have been abstracted have to be combined together to see whether they yield an adequate concept; they may have to be collated with each other to see whether one characteristic mark does not partly include another within itself. (*Inquiry*, Ak. 2 pp. 276-7)

It can be seen here that the clarifying process of analysis is performed here on the characteristic marks of a concept in order to arrive at a comprehension of the parts inherent to a concept. Therefore, just because Kant uses the term 'marks', marks do not necessarily refer to material marks. It is more likely that in the analytic consideration of the object as conceived as logically complete in itself, which must therefore include the conception of individuality, the understanding is led to an awareness of its immediate dependency on the faculty of intuition as sensible receptivity as soon as it is asked what such individuality is for cognition. This is, after all, the point made at the beginning of the paragraph where it is asserted that means of thinking is directed to intuition. When the individuality of the object is considered as something to be accounted for by theoretical reason, theoretical reason must first appeal to the grounds under which something real might be thought of as available for cognition, and so is directed to appearance itself.



There is then a transition between reason considering the sheer dependency of receptivity and reason considering the implication of receptivity that something real is received. The second paragraph of the Transcendental Aesthetic (B 34/A 20) introduces us to *sensation* in distinction from the general capacity of *sensibility*, to *empirical* intuition, and to empirical intuition without any determinate status which is “called an *appearance*”. The paragraph in full is as follows, “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called an appearance” (B 34/A 20).

With the term ‘sensation’ we can talk of the *effect* of an object, whereas with sensibility this was impossible. As something sensible, and therefore empirical, this account of receptivity presumes<sup>37</sup> content within itself<sup>38</sup>, and is thereby available for theoretical investigation. However, given what Kant states about the terminology in this paragraph, all that can be said here of the “object of an empirical intuition” is that it is undetermined and therefore it is appearance (in general). There is nothing considered that would permit such an object to be determined as anything other than appearance itself. We have then moved from the completely general towards a capacity to discuss the particular even though what is considered is still undetermined, or, is only determined as

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<sup>37</sup> The term ‘presumes’ is used here because what is occurring is the speculative development of a body of principles from the discovery that a second faculty of cognition can be necessarily posited. So, ‘presumes’ here does not mean, presumed with no critical ground. However, the development of principles is not itself certainty so these principles are not held to be correct independent from the corroboration provided by the metaphysical expositions.

<sup>38</sup> The logical thought of completion is a consideration of the object or content outside of all relationality. In appearance then, content is conceived in relationality, so the content is available.

appearance itself. We can see then that as soon as we move to the particular we have the potential for a cause and effect relationship between sensation and the particular object.

Effect and affect seem here to have their distinction from each other minimized by Kant in the first sentence of the second paragraph (A 19/ B 33). But, as we have seen, affect corresponds to our general receptive capacity and therefore refers to a meaning of the object that remains, for Kant, beyond philosophy's capacity to theoretical explication. Sensibility, when it is used to imply the necessity of considering the object as complete independent of subjective relationality, is never supposed as a vehicle of *empirical intuition*, but only refers to the theoretical limitation of cognition itself. It is the expression of the limit of cognition's immediate relation to objects and it represents the denial of any 'real' use of the intellect in the theoretical forum.

Kant moves on in his account of relationality by moving from the general toward the capacity to account for particularity. This move is, however, precisely the move from the above mentioned implication of dependency to a second implication of receptivity: that in receptivity something empirical is received. Hence, Kant moves from givenness to appearance. Appearance here is not appearance fully realized, that is, understood to be determined as a chair or a cat. It is not, as of yet, even (known to be) spatiotemporal. It should be noticed however that, even though it is not even shown to be spatiotemporal, it is nonetheless referred to as empirical. This would imply that, for Kant, the account of empirical intuition is prior to the knowledge that empirical relationality is spatiotemporal; it is prior to the account of *why* empirical relationality is spatiotemporal. In other words, for Kant to *predict* that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition, he must first, not



only show that form can be considered apart from matter, but he must also situate both matter and form in the empirical, that is, in appearance.

Form is, for Kant, the ground of connection between our understanding and our receptive faculty. Being forms of intuition, space and time are how matter is presented as already determinable<sup>39</sup>. So we are presented with the undetermined empirical appearance, which however, remains inclusive of the right to logically demand completion inaccessible to the theoretical account of that which appears. This is why this thesis understands this paragraph to be a *transition* between the logical demand and the theoretical form. There is no sense in which Kant ever leaves this logical demand behind. Rather, the logical demand is contextualized. In this way appearance is still held by Kant to be connected with that *thinking*, so metaphysics can still be seen to be driven by the unconditioned even though it does not presume that the unconditioned is accounted for by reason's theoretical activity. Such an inclusion of the right to logically demand completion is conditioned however by the understanding's self-comprehension of its own limitation. This is how Kant shows the understanding's comprehension of its own limitation to be an activity of enlightenment, rather than an excuse wherein the intellect humbly concedes. Rather, what is possible when limitation is grasped is the opportunity to develop a body of principles through which the intellect might reason beyond itself, though not beyond cognition as a whole.

## 2.6 Appearance

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<sup>39</sup> Though this is not yet discussed by Kant.

Appearance is the domain of terminology considered to be operative in the 'science of receptivity'. Thus within appearance is effect, sensation, matter, and form. These are not to be considered bare definitions necessary for proceeding with the 'science of receptivity'. As Leirfall notes: "Kant defended the view that philosophy cannot begin with definitions" (2004, 34). Rather, these are to be considered as initial clarifications of the second implication of receptivity: that something empirical is received<sup>40</sup>.

Thus, matter and form are to be considered as clarifications within appearance and not just as two definitions that must be taken into consideration if we consider things only as appearance. Matter and form are to be understood to be a clarification of appearance itself. Matter is to be considered to *a posteriori*, as that which cannot be known to have origin absolutely known, but must be reflected on with the knowledge that relationality is the theoretical limit of what can be known in a fundamental sense. Form, being universal to all matter, is, by virtue of its universality, *a priori* and can therefore be known to be of the subject. Moreover, since form is known to be of the subject and present to the subject in a mode appropriate to the activity of explication, it is possible to predict what form is conceptually with the foreknowledge that these predictions are fully accepting of metaphysical criticism. However, such criticism is only meaningful from the standpoint of a body of principles. In its absence each attempt at criticism could not know whether it proceeds from precisely the same content or a content of its own. The body of principles is thus conceived as a point of philosophical communion, overcoming the relation of indifference in an admission of doubt before entering into strict criticism.

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<sup>40</sup> Receptivity itself, in this thesis' first chapter, was shown to be more than a mere definition as well.



## 2.7 Falkenstein on Matter in the First Section of the Transcendental Aesthetic

Now it is possible to see the dividing point between Falkenstein's account of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the account presented by this thesis. The heart of division stems from the expectation placed on the Transcendental Aesthetic's first section. This thesis holds that Kant is interested in presenting a scientific, or critically systematic, body of principles grounded on a necessary conception of cognition as dualistic<sup>41</sup>. It is clear that Falkenstein understands Kant to be beginning with ontology rather than with a discussion of how philosophy might begin a discussion of ontology. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Falkenstein introduces a distinction between matter of appearance and matter of intuition. Matter of intuition is matter that is involved in experience yet is not open to intellectualization.

Beginning with the ontological, however, begins with the object as it happens to be there for philosophy. So, rather than conceiving of receptivity itself as theoretical reasons first content, what is looked for is a content out in the world. Kant must then make his case from an uncritical acceptance that the object is there for philosophy. But the indifferentist is likely to agree with this assessment. What else is claimed by indifferentism, as presented by Kant, besides the fact that there is an element of reality that philosophy need merely accept and, from which, philosophy can build its case. If Kant is to distinguish himself from indifferentism, yet hold to givenness, givenness

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<sup>41</sup> It is worthwhile to wonder if this is a necessary conception that necessitates that cognition be conceived as dualistic, or a necessary conception that necessitates that cognition be conceived as *at least* dualistic.

cannot be just this kind of matter of fact. Givenness refers to the inexplicability of the mode in which the object is immediately given if it is asked what it is that logically must be thought as beyond receptivity. Givenness does not have implications that have a consequence over the rigorous quality of argumentation however. Even though givenness represents a limit to what can be known theoretically, givenness as a clarification of receptivity is rigorously justified in a critical manner.

Accounting for the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic as a stage in which a standpoint of philosophy engages the development of its principles has a number of strengths not shared by an account which simply assumes ontological significance. First, it represents the effort to account, not for the object, but for philosophy's account of how it can discuss ontology. As such, it would seem to fit with Kant's critical aims where in philosophy is challenged to come to self knowledge (A xi). Second, even though such an account aims at accounting for how philosophy can discuss the given object, and even though its aim is at a complete system of receptivity, this account can avoid looking to the logical meaning of the object in order to obtain theoretical satisfaction in Kant's system. Third, understanding Kant to be engaged in a transcendental account allows this first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic to have its systematic structure clearly presented.

Falkenstein challenges the notion that "sensations are the matter of appearance" (1995, 106) in favour of a view that distinguishes matter from appearance and holds that "Sensations are matters of 'outer' (spatiotemporal) as well as 'inner' (strictly temporal) intuition. As evidence Falkenstein presents several of Kant's claims regarding sensation that are supposed to stand against any evidence that matter is solely matter of appearance.



So he states "Rather than claim that appearances are constructed out of sensation, Kant is normally careful to distinguish sensations from the parts or properties of appearances. He describes sensation as the matter of experience. (1995, 107)"

The passage Falkenstein presents as evidence is to be found at A 223/ B 270. Kant in this passage begins:

But if one wanted to make entirely new concepts of substance, of forces, and of interactions from the material that perception offers us without borrowing the example of their connection from experiences, then one would end up with nothing but figments of the brain since in their case one did not accept experience as instructress nor borrow these concepts from it. Invented concepts of this sort cannot acquire the character of their possibility *a priori*, like the categories, as conditions on which all experience depends, but only *a posteriori*, as one goes through experience itself, and their possibility must either be cognized *a posteriori*, or not cognized at all." Kant concludes this paragraph stating, "As far as reality is concerned, it is evidently intrinsically forbidden to think it *in concreto* without getting help from experience, because it can only pertain to sensation, as the matter of experience, and does not concern the form of the relation that one can always play with in fictions

In the preceding paragraph Kant is discussing the problem of thinking an object to be actually based on logical possibility alone. This paragraph explains that the matter of experience via sensation is necessary because, as Kant states, logical possibility is not enough for it may always be contradicted by the object in reality.

What does Kant's discussion here have to do with Falkenstein's point? True, Kant states here that concrete thinking always must pertain to the matter of experience through sensation. This is precisely because the logical thought of the object is only subject to the law of contradiction. The confirmation of the actuality of the object needs to be conditioned by experience. But how is this supposed to happen except by sensation? And, just because Kant here links the matter of experience to sensation, does this forbid him

from saying that, when receptivity is generally considered, the matter of appearance is a consequence of sensation<sup>42</sup> thus attributing matter to the domain that is theoretically treatable? Perhaps if the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic is thought of as an ontological account, so that *what is presumed* is that every reference to the object is supposed to be a reference to some type of matter distinct from cognition, there might be some problem.

For instance, in the above quote Kant is arguing against the creation of new substantial and *a priori* concepts directly from “the material that perception offers”. He then states that such concrete thinking must be conditioned by the “matter of experience” given by sensation. If it is supposed that the account of receptivity in the Transcendental Aesthetic is thoroughly ontological, rather than transcendental, then the material of perception here mentioned is contrasted ontologically with the matter of experience. If all that is presumed of the Transcendental Aesthetic is that it aims to produce a transcendental account of receptivity (so that the ‘science of receptivity’ can know what it brings to its attempt to ontologically account for object) then this appears very differently. When Kant states that it is wrong to create an account merely on the grounds of the material of perception he can be understood to be saying two things. First, when a phenomenon is perceived it is wrong to ground a solely logical account of that phenomena; rather, experience is also needed to instruct our reasoning. Second, that the transcendental account given in the Transcendental Aesthetic is not to be understood to be an adequate account of reality as it is in totality, but instead its function was to

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<sup>42</sup> Affect is the necessarily posited non-causal relation of sensibility which is only logical.



demonstrate that we could treat *a priori* content. Being able to treat *a priori* content allows Kant to consider the possibility of a transcendental logic (A 56/B 80). The transcendental logic opens up the possibility of an ontological account.

Even though Falkenstein recognizes that “[t]he ontological question, about whether space and time are *just* forms of intuition or whether they may not also be relations or determinations of things in themselves is not pertinent to this issue” (1995, 148), his treatment of matter in the first sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic is still ontological. As we see in the above discussion the matter of experience is contrasted with the matter of appearance as if ‘matter of appearance’ was derivative, and so, not truly matter at all. But, even in the paragraph Falkenstein discusses, Kant speaks of experience as an “instructress”. From what Kant states in the B Preface, is it not clear that a science must refuse to be naïvely instructed; yet without some account of our own receptive faculty, and without the ability to justify the use of transcendental logic, how can this instruction be anything other than naïve? The conception of matter, beyond the scope of the ‘science of receptivity’ and upon which the ‘science of receptivity’ must be ultimately dependent, is the failure of any ‘science of receptivity’. Such a ‘science’ will always have a mysterious matter, a theoretical unknown, as its beginning. Since the aim Kant’s of theoretical philosophy would seem to be to account for the know-ability, or the determinability, of matter, what sense does it make to suppose that Kant was placing matter beyond receptivity in terminology meant to refer to the unconditioned?

Falkenstein also points to what he considers to be a divergence in Kant’s use of the term appearance in the Anticipations of Perception. There Kant states:

One can call all cognition through which I can cognize and determine *a priori* what belongs to empirical cognition an anticipation, and without a doubt this is the significance with which Epicurus used his expression προληψις. But since there is something in the appearances that is never cognized *a priori*, and which hence also constitutes the real difference between empirical and *a priori* cognition, namely the sensation (as matter of perception), it follows that it is really this that cannot be anticipated at all. (A 166/B 209)

In this account Kant is interested to demonstrate that there is only one thing that can be known *a priori* about sensation (as the matter of perception), and that is that any sensation will have to have a magnitude beyond zero. The magnitude of zero is presented by Kant at (A 176/ B 218) as being in opposition to something that could conform to cognition.<sup>43</sup> All that is being said here in the “Anticipations of Perception” is that a sensation always presents with something received, but what is received, matter, cannot itself be anticipated. When Kant states, at B 208/ A 166, that “there is also possible a synthesis of the generation of the magnitude of a sensation from its beginning, the pure intuition = 0, to any arbitrary magnitude” he is stating that 0 equals pure intuition, that is the receptive capacity itself. This is exactly how this thesis has presented appearance. Form is known *a priori*. Matter is known *a posteriori*. Both are aspects of appearance. Appearance is the recognition that in receptivity something real is received, but, when the “pure form of sensibility” is considered itself, what Kant calls this is “pure intuition” (B 35/ A 21). There is no indication that “intuition = 0” in being named “pure intuition” means that Kant was referring to some “matter”. Rather, he was referring to the capacity for which matter is something.

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<sup>43</sup> This is an important point that Falkenstein does not include when he supposes in Kant’s second argument for the *a priori* of space to operate from the assumption that space can logically be conceived as empty.. This will be discussed in the next chapter.



Neither of these accounts then stands to contradict what this thesis has stated about matter as it is discussed in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In the first case, the problem resided in treating matter ontologically. What the Transcendental Aesthetic aims at is a presentation of principles followed by a series of experiments designed according to those principles. Matter, as part of the process of clarifying receptivity, is caught up in appearance as part of an architectonic progression. In the second case, the conception of matter in a transcendental account, as a consequence of sensation within the scope of appearance, does nothing to contradict Kant's later sentiment that *within appearance* sensation provides the "real difference between empirical and *a priori* cognition".

The fact that the real difference is associated with "matter of perception" is not then to dissociate matter from appearance, but to reinforce the point already made that matter (in appearance) is *a posteriori*, so cannot be anticipated entirely, and is only fully known only through investigation. Of course, neither does this dissociate matter from form, as any reflection on experience takes as its beginning point that matter is determinable. The argument that is made regarding the separation of matter from form works from the fact that matter is always held to be determinable, that of matter which allows for its determinability must be universal. It is after this that the abstraction to extension and form is made which are said, by Kant to belong to pure intuition.

Far from being a divergent use of the term appearance on Kant's part, it is rather, entirely consistent. It is Falkenstein's interpretation that is inconsistent in that it takes matter to be something distinct from appearance, so something unaccounted for as

theoretically available in the critical 'science of receptivity'. Of course, being theoretically available is not synonymous with being known *a priori*. As Kant makes clear here that when sensation is considered as 'matter of perception' all that can be known *a priori*<sup>44</sup> is that something is in fact received. Beyond this, the theoretical availability of matter is as something known *a posteriori* but made determinable by form.

When matter is conceived within appearance as sensation there are three things that are *not* asserted: first, it is not asserted that matter is a totality known as a thing in itself; second, it is not asserted that matter is known *a priori*<sup>45</sup>; third, it is not asserted that matter is separable into what appears and what is a precondition of appearance. The project underway, however, is not to account for the object ontologically, but to demonstrate that philosophy can intellectualize what it knows to be cognition's receptive capacity. This process of intellectualization has begun with a systematic clarification of the concept of receptivity as a cognitive capacity. Importantly, the determination of this other faculty is made on *a priori* grounds. Only from such a critical standpoint could the design of the principles make no appeal to experience, and, only from a body of principles could the metaphysical expositions be thought out in advance of experience, but with pure content in mind. If there were some matter left behind that was, therein, a matter that could only be thought as primary, it would be difficult to see how Kant could claim that the Transcendental Aesthetic demonstrated that reason could consider a pure content. The content considered would be known to be a derivative of matter via sensation which was yet unapproachable by reason. On what grounds could Kant claim

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<sup>44</sup> Beyond the fact that forms can be known *a priori*.

<sup>45</sup> Beyond the fact that sensation is not a zero magnitude



his account of receptivity was scientific if it needed to admit some mysterious matter beyond its reaches? Thus, only in the comprehension of matter as something fully within appearance can Kant arrive at the condition for the considerations of the Transcendental Analytic.

## **2.8 Movement to the Metaphysical Expositions**

The tone that is present in the final paragraph of the Transcendental Aesthetic seems to be one of confidence. The project of abstraction is presented as a matter of fact. Further, it is claimed that space and time will be found to be the “two pure forms of sensible intuition”. This thesis would suggest that this final paragraph should be read as the recognition of the importance of doubt in the philosophical progression from indifference to its critical standpoint. The confidence is the confidence of presenting predictions made by a critically justified system of receptivity. However, Kant has only shown that there is pure content to which philosophy can appeal. He has not shown that there is just one pure content. Empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking will take it upon themselves in the Metaphysical Expositions to challenge the principles of the ‘science of receptivity’. If they succeed it could be that there is a multiplicity of pure contents, which would throw philosophy back into indifferentism. Further, since the transcendental turn was not presented by Kant as a necessary refutation of the conception of the object as something to which mind must be shown to conform, it is still up reader

to decide if the agreement to try the transcendental turn will hold, and this second condition is dependent on the assessment of how well Kant's system works.

In the next chapter what will be shown is that attempts to disagree with the principles of the sciences of receptivity turn and corroborate the predictions of the 'science of receptivity'. In this manner both means of disagreement show that their theory must proceed from the one content of transcendental idealism. In this way the first condition mentioned above is satisfied. However, the corroboration provided is ultimately dependent on the agreement of those voices of dissent to retain their commitment to the conception of the object as reoriented. What will be perceived ultimately however is that so long as the transcendental turn is assented to dissent always leads to corroboration. In the conclusion of this thesis this loss of the ability to fully express dissatisfaction threatens Kant's efforts to overcome indifferentism. As part of its consideration the conclusion of this thesis will suggest a manner in which this might be handled.

### **Chapter 3: The Metaphysical Expositions as Demonstrations**



## Introduction

Having presented his proposal for a 'science of receptivity', and having predicted that space and time will be found to be "two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of *a priori* cognition" (B 36/A 22), Kant now moves into the demonstrative phase of the Transcendental Aesthetic wherein corroboration of his predictions will be provided by what are presumed to be opposed philosophical standpoints. At the outset of this section Kant asks three questions of space and time: "Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or relations of things yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to anything at all" (B 37/A 23)? The first question asks if space and time are things in themselves. The second question asks if they are constituted as part of an objective relationality. The third question is whether they are not rather subjectively grounded modes of relationality. Kant has predicted the third, and hopes that the reasoning of other means of thinking will also confirm this.

The Metaphysical Expositions are not presented in this chapter in a traditional fashion, wherein each argument is taken to be Kant's attempt to refute alternative positions on space and time, but this chapter reads the arguments from the position of the other two standpoints: empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking. There is a tendency in commentary on this section's arguments, which will be discussed below, to presume

that Kant himself is pointing to certain deficiencies in the historical account of space and time. This tendency is most clear in commentary on the first argument for the *a priori* of space. This argument is treated as if Kant is taking it upon himself to point to the incorrectness of, rather than the limitation of, empiricistic thinking. Understood in this aggressive fashion, Kant's argumentation threatens to isolate the school of empiricistic thought, rather than exhibit a desire to work toward community. The effort of this chapter will be to show that these arguments are representations of the reasoning of each school, in their effort to dispute the principles of the 'science of receptivity'. In the end, however, each attempt to undermine the transcendental principles results in the corroboration of the prediction that space and time are "pure forms of sensible intuition" (A 22/ B 37).

With this in mind, this thesis makes use of a certain 'historical distance' in its presentation of the Metaphysical Expositions. What is meant by 'distance' is that, once, as Kant asks, agreement is obtained to try the transcendental turn, empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking are no longer identical to these same positions prior to the transcendental turn. This change occurs as a consequence of the transcendental reorientation of the object. Prior to this new conception of the object, for instance, empiricistic thinking could think of objects as they existed apart from cognition. Cognition was supposed to conform to the object. Once the object is reconceived as that which conforms to cognition, there is no material object beyond cognition for empiricism to appeal to. Instead, the object is conceived under a twofold meaning (B xx, B xxviii), and matter is contained in appearance (B 34/A 20). Of course, it might not be explicitly clear how such a reorientation of the object transforms empiricistic thinking, which is



why the first spatiality argument of the Metaphysical Exposition argues is designed to show that the concept of space cannot be grounded on experience (A 23/ B 38).

It is true that Kant never straightforwardly states that the Metaphysical Expositions are the expressions of such transformed positions. Nevertheless, there is a reason why such a reading could be considered to be valuable. The focus of this thesis is to investigate what happens to the first two sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic once it can be shown that they begin from a truly critical standpoint. The result, as I have argued, is that, with regard to the first section, the 'science of receptivity' can be shown to emerge through the organization of the terms presented in that section so long as they are organized according to the two-fold meaning of the object. This 'transformation'<sup>46</sup> elevates the need for Kant to defend his claim that space and time are forms of intuition in the Metaphysical Expositions. The claim that space and time are forms of intuition is based on the transcendental account of receptivity as presented in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Instead, the Metaphysical Expositions function to test his claim with "strict criticism" (A xi note).

This "strict criticism" comes from empiricistic and rationalistic thinking. Kant's claim, that space and time are forms of intuition, is challenged from both of these philosophical standpoints. This chapter will argue that Kant's aim is not to defeat these other philosophical standpoints out and out. Instead, the Metaphysical Expositions are understood to test if, subsequent to the transcendental turn, both rationalistic and empiricistic thinking must agree that space and time are pure forms of intuition. If this is

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<sup>46</sup> Transformation is placed in scare quotes to indicate that while this thesis takes the approach to be novel in relevant commentary, it cannot claim that such transformation is novel to Kant's own thinking.

necessary for both, then Kant obtains their corroboration. Since, in this interpretation, what Kant is after is corroboration of his claim, his purpose cannot be to show that the empiricistic and rationalistic standpoints are simply inconsistent standpoints. Rather, they need to be understood to be consistent philosophical standpoints that are able to either confirm or reject Kant's claim that space and time are two pure forms of sensible intuition. What is shown in this chapter is that the Metaphysical Expositions function to display these two philosophical standpoints as limited, yet integral positions within transcendental idealism.

In this alternative reading, Kant's claim that the *Critique* is not a critique of other systems and books is taken seriously (A xii). Granted, it is surely not the case that Kant formed his thoughts regarding space and time in a historical vacuum; however, this thesis argues that, in altering how philosophy conceives of the object, the transcendental turn also alters the standpoints within philosophy. If it is presumed that, for the sake of seeing whether it works better, the transcendental reorientation of the object must necessarily be adopted, then these positions *are* transformed on a foundational level. This means that, in his effort to employ the methodology of strict criticism, Kant can be understood to treat empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking *as if* they had agreed to try his transcendental conception of the object. Such a transformation does not make itself clear at first, but, as the Metaphysical Expositions show, both of these standpoints ultimately express that they, as means of thinking, are directed to intuition. This means that neither empiricistic nor rationalistic thinking may claim a privileged object as its foundation. Thus, empiricistic thinking cannot claim a material object beyond cognition as its ground



and rationalistic thinking cannot claim a purely intellectual ground. Both, through their own reasoning, conclude that these 'privileged' objects require intuition as foundation. This is what is meant when this thesis states that the Metaphysical Expositions are corroborative rather than being *primarily* adversarial.

The transcendental turn is Kant's hope to unify these distinct philosophical schools. It functions by replacing the foundational object of each school with the one content of transcendental idealism. Thus, rather than reading the Metaphysical Expositions to be involved with a disputation that directly concerns foundational matter, the disputation is centered on principles and predictions. The presumption that the transcendental reorientation of the object will be tentatively tried functions methodologically to create a forum where empiricistic thinking and rationalistic thinking can dispute Kant's account of intuition, as a capacity of cognition, as every means of thinking's direct connection to the object (A 19/ B 33). Rationalistic and empiricistic thinking will not directly attack the principles of receptivity, or the science of receptivity, outlined in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Instead they will attempt to show that these principles have caused Kant to arrive at an incorrect claim regarding the nature of spatiotemporality. If they can show that the predictions are not supported by the principles, then there is reason to question the principles of the science, which includes the principle that the immediate presence of the object to thinking is accounted for by a dualistic conception of cognition. If this first principle is questionable, then the immediate relation of the object *in cognition* is questioned, leaving open the possibility that there might be a multitude of proper foundational philosophical contents. If each

school can have its own privileged content, then indifferentism is affirmed as a legitimate standpoint of philosophy.

This thesis finds that there are two important results of an examination into the 'transformation' of these positions through acceptance of the transcendental turn. First, focus is placed on the process through which seemingly divergent standpoints end up providing corroboration. Second, it is seen how while it is confirmed, within transcendentalism at least, that the principles of the 'science of receptivity' are required to ground these other two standpoints, transcendental idealism requires these other standpoints to develop as consistent means of thinking in order that their corroboration can be regarded as credible.<sup>47</sup> If their reasoning is inconsistent, then their corroboration cannot be regarded as credible. Thus, it is in Kant's own interest that these standpoints be shown to be consistent, but limited, standpoints.

But this does not mean that the means of thinking should bear no resemblance to their historical counterparts just because they have been transformed by the transcendental reorientation. So, by way of example, the first argument concerning the *a priori* of the concepts of space and time, Falkenstein will point out that Locke's

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<sup>47</sup> It was always the intention of this chapter to show that each complaining standpoint had to appeal to intuition. In an earlier model taken up by this thesis, what was argued was that each of the two complainants immediately collapsed into the position of the other, thus into inconsistency. Therefore transcendental idealism was the correct position. Empiricistic thinking ended up in absolute relationality, and rationalistic thinking ended up with an absolute object. In discussion S. Rajiva pointed out that this was in fact a problem because the argument ended up in this reversal of the positions. Such an extreme distortion would likely not be acceptable to Kant, especially in light of discussion in §7. Upon reflection, not only was this problematic in regards to the representation of the standpoints, but was also methodologically problematic as well. If each complaining standpoints immediately turned into the other then they were inconsistent and could not be considered reliable in their corroboration. The relation of empiricistic thinking to rationalistic thinking, and vice versa, needed to be shown to be mediated through the principles of the 'science of receptivity' and the transcendental turn. Thus, in showing each position to be consistent, yet corroborative of a prediction of the 'science of receptivity', each distinct complainant is held to the one content of transcendental idealism.



empiricism is circular in its nature and correctly points out that Kant's argument understands this circularity to be a deficiency in the empiricistic account. This thesis, in maintaining a distance from direct appeal to the historical articulations, is in agreement that this is indeed how Kant envisions the empirical account progressing even after the transcendental turn. Similarly, in the second argument of the Metaphysical Exposition, which continues the account of how space can be known to be grounded *a priori*, empiricistic thinking argues that the representation of space is conceived by as a general but empirical condition of the apprehension of relationality. Empiricistic thinking therefore presents space as an absolute object.<sup>48</sup> Likewise, with regard to Kant's arguments for the intuitive nature of space and time due to their being given as infinite or unbounded, he seems to be arguing against something similar to Descartes' account of extensionality in his *Principles of Philosophy* where he argues that "*the extension of the world is infinite*" (*Principles* #2. 21; CMSK, 1, 232). Of course, Kant's point will be that the concept of space, thought as such, loses its function as a discursive concept, so it must be intuition.

It should be acknowledged that Kant, in fact, points to the strengths and limitations of these standpoints in § 7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. There Kant states that

The first [mathematical investigators of nature] succeed in opening up the field of appearances for mathematical assertions. However, they themselves become very confused through precisely these conditions if the understanding would go beyond this field. The second [metaphysicians of nature] succeed, to be sure, with respect to the latter, in that the representations of space and time do not stand in their way

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<sup>48</sup> Jill Vance Buroker says much the same of Newton's absolute space in her 1981 work entitled *Space and Incongruence: The Origin of Kant's Idealism*.

if they would judge of objects not as appearances but merely in relation s to the understanding; but they can neither offer any ground for the possibility of *a priori* mathematical cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid *a priori* intuition), nor can they bring the propositions of experience into necessary accord with those assertions. On our theory of the true construction of these two original forms of sensibility, both difficulties are remedied. (A 40/ B 57 – A 41/ B 58)

Transcendental idealism is said to remedy the individual difficulties faced by both the mathematicians of nature and the metaphysicians of nature. However, if Kant is authentic in his observation that both of these two standpoints have contributed positively to theoretical inquiry, then both these positions do deserve to be given credit for what they have achieved. In the conclusion of this thesis it will be discussed how the Metaphysical Expositions present the manner in which Kant acknowledges the contribution of these other standpoints.

It may be thought that this thesis anticipates § 7 of the “Transcendental Aesthetic. This is not the case, however. This possibility arises from, and is carried forward from, the inception of the Transcendental Aesthetic. As was discussed above, the stand points that present their case in the Metaphysical Expositions are not considered in this thesis to be identical with those same standpoints prior to the transcendental turn. In fact, there is reason to think that the account of reason’s knowledge of its own limitation is itself the inception of these two alternate standpoints. The standpoint which argues that the concepts of space and time are grounded by an external relationality, for instance, is not just historical empiricism, but the empiricistic standpoint that emerges from the deduction of the understanding’s capacity to know its other through an examination of an *experiential* concept, and, which then seeks to disagree with the containment of matter



entirely within appearance. Conversely, given the fact that the understanding knows its own limitation within its own mode of thinking, that is, predicates, it is conceivable that these predicates themselves can be grounded completely by the understanding, especially since form of appearance can be examined apart from all *a posteriori* content. Thus, like empiricism, rationalism threatens to reemerge from within the transcendental standpoint. The fact that Kant goes on in § 7 to acknowledge the virtues of these standpoints is in fact evidence in support of the thinking in this thesis.

### **3.0 Part 1: The Apriority of the Concepts of Space and Time**

#### **3.1 First Exposition**

Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representations of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearances through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation. (A 23/ B 38)

Time is <1> not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them *a priori*. Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively). (B 46/ A 31)

In his assessment of this first argument of the Metaphysical Expositions Falkenstein maintains a distinction between 'matter of appearance' and 'matter of intuition' as a means to show that Kant was not begging the question when he makes the argument that the concepts of space and time must be presupposed of, and not "derived from sensations

or perceptions” (1995, 160). He makes this distinction even though he admits it is not textually supported by Kant’s own account of the argument. So he states that:

I do not follow Kant in speaking of ‘sensations’ as being arrayed in space. I instead use the expression ‘matters of appearance’. Kant takes the matters of appearance to ‘correspond’ to sensation, but I do not want to go even that far. Throughout this chapter I want to use the expression ‘matter of appearance,’ to be understood to refer just to whatever it may be in our experiences, as they appear to us through intellectual processing, regardless of how these matters [of appearance] may be supposed to be related to what Kant calls ‘sensations’. In chapter 6, I begin to relate what Kant establishes concerning the ‘matter of appearance,’ so defined, to sensation considered as the matter of intuition and as the properly empirical element of intuition. (1995, 160)

The problem, as Falkenstein sees it, is that the material that Kant purports to be addressing in this argument, i.e., sensations qua intuition, is not a material that Kant has *first* established the right to intellectualize. Thus he states that:

Sensations are matters of perceptions, intuitions without concepts are blind, so we might ask how Kant could know what our sensations are like without first conceptualizing them, and how he could be so sure that, in the processes of conceptualizing them, the intellect does not draw something from *them*<sup>49</sup> that leads it to assign them to certain locations relative to one another, and, in effect, to construct a representation of them as arrayed in space. In this case, our concepts would be based on what is given in sensation, contrary to Kant’s conclusion.” (1995, 160)

So, under this assessment, if Kant has not shown how he can legitimately intellectualize intuition (as it stands in distinction to the intellect), and, if Kant then states that space and

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<sup>49</sup> My italics. I wish here to point out a sticky issue that is dealt with later on. Kant is arguing that space is an *a priori* concept. So, his primary aim, purportedly, is to predicate space with subjectivity (in a special sense of subjectivity, i.e., universality). What is said of space is that it is a prior and necessary subjective means to present objects as spatial. But *them* here appears to refer to objects that are in space, which either might have their spatiotemporality grounded by the subject or might themselves be the empirical ground of spatiotemporality, depending on the success of the argument. As such, it might seem as if what Falkenstein is doing here is inappropriately assuming that there are such potentially distinct objects, especially in the wake of the object/cognition reversal, and especially since Kant is interested in showing space and time to be predicated as cognitive grounds so that the question itself is understood to be prior to any actual subject object relation. As this section progresses I will discuss how Falkenstein can legitimately presume this.



time (as concepts) are prior to sensation (which is directly matter of intuition), then Kant is engaged in an activity without first knowing that such an activity is possible. In this case Kant would certainly be going against his own critical aims.

It is not however the case that Kant would be begging the question. He is only presumed to be begging the question because Falkenstein has not sufficiently isolated the aim of the first argument. The supposed problem revolves around two presumptions. The first presumption is that Kant has not resolved, and is perhaps not even fully aware of, the implications of his own blindness thesis. The second is the presumption that this argument is dependent on the claim that space is intuitive. It is true that, if both the blindness thesis is a problem and the argument involves the claim that space is intuitive, then Kant might here be engaged in circular reasoning.

The circle would appear as such: if space is claimed to be intuition in the first argument, without it first being known how a concept can be attributed to intuition, then all that is being said is that space can be attributed to intuition because intuition can be attributed to space. Since, in this case, there would be no prior and independent argument for philosophy's capacity to intellectualize intuition there would also be no case made for how space, as a concept, could be known to be an *a priori* intuition in any manner but the most immediate. Bringing the problem of blindness into this argument presumes that this argument somehow is intended by Kant to explain the intuitive nature of these concepts. The claim would be that space, in its *a priority*, is immediately comprehended as intuition. However, because this would be a direct claim with no critical apparatus to mediate, the converse would also be true. Intuition would be known to be spatial. Beyond being

circular, the argument understood as such would be disastrous for Kant's project in the *Metaphysical Expositions*.

If intuition is immediately comprehended as spatial then how can Kant claim that intuition is also temporal? Space and time would not merely be different forms of intuition. They themselves would be completely different intuitions. There would then be an unexplained division within intuition *as the receptive faculty*. But then Kant's claim that spatiality can be for us just because it is united with temporality (A 34/B 51 – A 35 /B 52) would be completely hypothetical. The important question would be to ask, how can Kant establish that there are two distinct intuitions?<sup>50</sup>

Of course, Kant does not want to demonstrate is not that space is intuition and time is intuition in the above sense. Rather, he wants to demonstrate that space and time are forms of intuition as a general receptive capacity of cognition. The argument concerns only the *a priori* of space, and not its nature as either intuition or intellectual. The intuitive nature of space and time is addressed in the third and fourth arguments. So, even if Kant had no means to claim that intuition could be intellectualized, it would not be the case that he commits *petitio principii* in the fashion that Falkenstein worries about. What the first argument for the *a priori* of space shows is merely that, once the presumption – that the concepts of space and time can only have their ground in external relations is critically examined, it can be seen that this presumption has not actually provided an

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<sup>50</sup> Instead of two forms of one quality of cognition which is receptivity, or, intuition. Robert Palmer, in his paper entitled "Absolute Space and Absolute Motion in Kant's Critical Philosophy" (*Proceedings of the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Kant Congress*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 172 – 187, 1971) discusses the fact that Kant does mean to strictly distinguish space as intuition from time as intuition. He points to (A 23/ B 37) where Kant states "Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us". Kant claims that space and time are two forms of intuition. This does not mean that intuition itself is divided.



answer to the original question. That question is: If space as a concept concerns my external relation to objects, what is the ground of the concept of space? The only response provided by empiricistic thinking is that the ground of space and time must be empirical. Once this assertion itself is challenged the argument from experience has no means defend its claim<sup>51</sup>.

Despite the fact that Kant is not engaged in circular reasoning here, Falkenstein does raise an important concern associated with this first argument. The problem begins from what Falkenstein takes to be an inconsistent use of the term perception on Kant's part. Falkenstein claims, at B 297, perception is defined:

very narrowly as consciousness of what is given empirically, and hence as consciousness just of sensation (if we follow A 42 /B 60 in taking sensation to be the properly empirical element of experience). [...] But Kant also uses the term 'perception' more broadly (e.g., at A119-20, B 160), to refer to any kind of consciousness that contains something empirical (*whatever else it might contain*). *But, if space and time are indeed the forms of intuition then such a consciousness could exhibit spatiotemporal structure in addition to empirical content. And then it would be wrong to say that perception could not exhibit time, or that time could not be 'derived' from perception. What Kant really wants to claim is that our concept of time is not derived from the matter that is given in perception, that is, from the relata that are perceived as standing in temporal relations.*<sup>52</sup> Kant's point again appears to stand in need of the more rigorous formulation proposed above for the space passage. Let us proceed, therefore, by taking Kant's point in both sections of the First Exposition to be just that our concepts of spatiotemporal relations are not derived from the relata that appear or are perceived to stand in these relations. (1995 Pg. 161)

By "whatever else it might contain" Falkenstein would hold that perception also contains, besides what is properly empirical, i.e., 'matter of intuition,' matter of appearance and form of appearance. Space and time cannot be derived from the 'matter of appearance' so

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<sup>51</sup> This will be examined more fully below.

<sup>52</sup> My Italics.

'matter of appearance' is *always* for us as *already* spatiotemporally structured. By limiting the application of Kant's first argument against the empiricist to the mere 'matter of appearance' it is felt any problem of blindness can be avoided. However, cognition is still dependent on matter which relates to us through intuition (A 19/B 33), while the spatiotemporal "appear[s] to us through intellectual processing" (1995 Pg 160).

But how does 'matter of intuition' become 'matter of appearance'<sup>53</sup>? Such a relation could not be spatiotemporal as this is relegated to appearance. It might be said that this is an affectionate relation in distinction from cause and effect. However, even if Falkenstein's solution speaks to a certain resistance to the notion that matter can be contained entirely in appearance, it certainly neither simplifies the account nor circumvents any of the difficulties. Instead of needing two meanings of the object, the logical and the appearance, now three meanings are needed. The object merely given could be distinguished from the object conceived as pure intuition to which, Falkenstein proposes, intellectual processing is applied. Such a pure intuition would still be a matter received. As this 'matter of intuition' is still an element of receptivity it is not complete unto itself, but is only so if it is considered beyond all relation. Therefore, in speaking of 'matter of intuition' Falkenstein certainly hasn't named the thing in itself. Further, there is also a need to account now for relationality between 'matter of intuition' and 'matter of appearance', which is done by saying that 'matter of appearance', in distinction from

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<sup>53</sup> Falkenstein holds that the second argument of the Metaphysical Expositions functions as Kant's attempt to overcome blindness, so it might be thought that this question is asked too early. However, this thesis has presented its case already why the blindness problem is not necessarily the issue that Falkenstein claims. Granted, Falkenstein can claim that his account of the second argument permits him to address this issue in a weak fashion. However, this thesis also holds that the arguments concerning the *a priori* of space and time can be understood to function independently. The question that is asked here is asked with such a concern.



'matter of intuition', is spatiotemporal because of "intellectual processing". This leaves 'matter of intuition' unaccounted for in relationality in a way that is not thought when an object is considered as a thing in itself, as something beyond all relationality. So, the object that affects still remains distinct from 'matter of intuition'. The object as matter of appearance would then be the third meaning of the object and would then be held in a tripartite meaning: first, as something that affects, second, as pre-spatiotemporal matter of intuition, and third, as spatiotemporal matter of appearance. In this way, positing 'matter of intuition' as distinct from 'matter of appearance' has only complicated the situation to no apparent improvement.

There is however a traditionally supported aspect to Falkenstein's argumentation. This line of argumentation suggests that the problematic circularity is the historical empiricist's, and that Kant's argumentation is supported because it reveals the circularity inherent to the empiricistic account. Falkenstein says of Locke:

what enables us [according to Locke] to order our ideas in time in the way that we do is not that these ideas actually occur in temporal succession, but rather that they are regularly accompanied by certain other ideas of reflection by which we think of the first ideas as earlier or later. This is a sort of vivacity criterion, except it is not the vivacity of the idea itself that supplies the temporal index but what is thought in accompanying the idea of reflection.

But far from explaining time-cognition, this account merely begs the question in a new way. What, we may ask, is it that determines that one idea rather than another should be had 'with this additional Perception annexed to it, that is has been had before'? And what is it that determines how much earlier an idea of memory is thought to have occurred? Is it that the mind is so constituted that ideas that, in fact, occurred earlier in sensation are thought to be older in memory? But then a real succession of ideas is presupposed as the actual ground of cognition of time. (1995, 168)

Falkenstein identifies an important element of Kant's account of how space and time, as concepts, are known to be grounded *a priori*. Empiricistic thinking, in the "Metaphysical Exposition's" first argument, fails to address how it is that experience could ground the concept of space in a critical fashion. Instead, as Falkenstein points out, if it is asked how ordering occurs the answer is not that experience itself produces this order, but their (our ideas) relation in reflection. This places importance on cognition itself. It also suggests that time (and ultimately space as well) is grounded on some sort of dynamic. Kant's transcendental idealism has provided this dynamic in a critical fashion, that is, as a dynamic within appearance itself that occurs between matter and form. Since this dynamic is contained in appearance, which is available to theoretical reason, this dynamic itself can be investigated by theoretical reason. The argument from experience has not accounted for this dynamic in a way that supports investigations into all its aspects, but has presumed this relation.

Like Falkenstein, Allison holds that the first argument for the *a priority* of space and time is best understood to turn on the fact that any explanation of our perception which does not place the subjective conditions first is ultimately tautological. This is certainly true, but also like Falkenstein, Allison's understanding of the scope of this argument is that it is externally directed to other, historical, empiricistic accounts. The problem of circularity *for space* is shown to be avoided by comprehending the dual sense in which the German term *ausser* might be understood. It is on one hand understood to refer directly to space, but on the other hand it could be taken to mean merely "to be distinct". Allison had originally held that such a distinction in meanings could show how



this first argument was not circular if it could be shown that Kant was using *ausser* to refer to things that are distinct from mind and not merely that spatial relations require a representation of spatial relationality. This possibility is refuted by Falkenstein and Warren who argue that Kant's intent must be understood to refer to space as the possibility of spatial relations, and not as the means by which merely distinct entities are represented spatially<sup>54</sup>. Allison adjusts his position to reflect this criticism (2004, 101) stating that what Kant is pointing to is the fact that empiricistic explanations are circular because *they* conflate the two senses of *ausser*.

However, Allison asserts that even though Kant must be taken to be solely referring to the spatial sense of *ausser* Kant still avoids circularity because he is not actually talking about space as it is itself in a direct manner. This is because:

space must [not] be presupposed in order to represent things as spatial, but rather that it must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of the perception of the relations from which the empiricist's account claims it must be derived. [...] In other words, for Kant this argument of itself shows not simply that the representation of space is *a priori* but that it is such precisely because it serves as a condition of outer experience (2004, 101-102)

What is pertinent to the inquiry is the ground of space, that is, whether that ground is empirical or *a priori*. As such, the question is not *what* space is<sup>55</sup>, but, given that we have a conceptual representation of space, what is it that could ground this representation. If

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<sup>54</sup> Allison admits that his first edition contained this error and gives credit to Lorne Falkenstein (1995, 163 – 165) and Daniel Warren "Kant and the Apriority of space" (*Philosophical Review* 107, 179 - 224) for pointing the error out.

<sup>55</sup> This should be obvious as the Expositions divide between arguments for the *a priori* ground and arguments regarding an intuitive ground. Even so, the third chapter will argue that even the arguments regarding the necessity that space be considered as intuition rather than intellectual do not commit Kant to an ontological claim.

the answer to this question is that space itself grounds space as a concept, it is difficult to see how this is a meaningful departure from the circularity inherent to supposing that experience itself grounds our concept of space. This is why it is important to restrict the scope of the question to space or time as a concept, and to avoid thinking that the *a priori* arguments concern anything of the nature of space itself, i.e., that it is intuition, beyond the fact that space can be known to be grounded *a priori*.

When Allison states that issues of circularity can be cleared away in noting that “that space must [not] be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of the perception of the relations from which the empiricist’s account claims it must be derived” this points to the negativity of Kant’s claim. This negativity needs to be seen in relation to the positivity of Kant’s own standpoint presented in the previous section. Otherwise the argument stands as merely a negative response. It is not the case that Kant is only accusing the argument from experience of reasoning circularly. Rather, Kant is answering a challenge that can be seen to emerge within the transcendental account itself. Kant has made the positive prediction that space and time will be found to be *a priori* forms of intuition. This prediction is now confronted<sup>56</sup> by the claim that experience itself could ground the concepts of space and time precisely because matter, as presented in Kant’s system, can only be known *a posteriori*. Kant’s point from the previous section is that experience itself cannot be considered a simple ground, but is a dynamic relation of

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<sup>56</sup> If there is no freedom from the historical then Kant is not confronted, but Kant is only reacting. But, in the acknowledgment that ‘empiricism’ can emerge within the transcendental standpoint itself, then this is a present challenge that Kant must respond to, and not just a historical means of thinking that Kant is reacting to.



matter and form where any *a posteriori* investigation is conditioned first by form<sup>57</sup>. Any consideration of this dynamic is going to involve the cognition.

If the subjective aspects of cognition, that is space and time as forms of intuition known to be of the subject, are left as merely something that need be presupposed (without first being worked out from a critical beginning), then the argument retains its air of circularity. The only improvement made concerns, then, the fact that the circularity involved in arguing from experience has been confronted, and the circularity inherent in transcendental idealism grasps the issue more fully just because it can see the circularity inherent in appeal to experience. Having increased the content of the circle with the introduction of the essential subjective element, what might be avoided is the charge of being a vicious circle.

Experience, conceived as that which appears for us, is not simple, but, as was shown in the previous chapter, receptivity is presented as a dynamic relation of matter and form in appearance. Form makes matter determinable. When this structure is challenged by empiricistic thinking, so that what is claimed is that relations of objects beyond experience can function as a ground, the response to empiricistic thinking is to point out that experience is not a relation between some objective reality beyond cognition with mind, but, that all elements of experience involve cognition once the

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<sup>57</sup> This may seem to open up the possibility that matter and form could be seen to mutually, or simultaneously condition one another, especially since Kant does hold that "all our cognition begins with experience" (B 1). Once matter is seen to be fully contained in appearance however, there is no matter beyond the confines of form to condition form, but any investigation into matter will be first conditioned by form as form is the condition of determinability whatsoever. Allison provides discussion on this issue as it stands within the first argument of the *Metaphysical Expositions* itself, attributing it to Maaß (2004 Pg.103), and suggesting that Maaß is incorrect to raise this complaint here in the first argument. Allison suggests, however, that the Maaß' complaint could have relevance in the second argument. (2004, 106)

object is presumed to conform to cognition. This dynamic is, of course, not the activity inherent to the understanding, but, just implies the complex of matter and form in appearance. Appearance is comprised of both *a posteriori* aspect and, that which makes matter determinable, *a priori* form of appearance. Though there is an element that can be found in common experience which can be known to belong solely to cognition and which is thus considerable apart from all *a posteriori* aspects, the unity of the *a priori* elements and the *a posteriori* aspects in appearance is primary. The distinction between what is *a priori* and what is *a posteriori* is not a distinction that can be used to ground the *a priori* elements. Otherwise this first argument for the *a priority* of space is just a reiteration of Kant's account of the fact that form can be treated in distinction from matter because it is *a priori*. Rather, in this argument empiricistic thinking comes to understand a consequence of the transcendental turn. The transcendental turn, and the argumentation following from the transcendental turn, removes the possibility of matter beyond cognition that could function to ground the concept of space. Once this consequence is realized by empiricist thinking, then empiricistic thinking comprehends the insufficiency of its own argument.

### **3.2 The Second Argument for the *A Priority* of the Concepts of Space and Time**

Kant's second argument for the *a priority* of the concept of space, and his second argument for the *a priority* of the concept of time, proceed as follows:



Space is a necessary representation, *a priori*, that is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an *a priori* representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances. (A 24/ B 39)

Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed. (A 31/ B 47)

With regards to the space argument, in particular, it is taken usually as a positive articulation of the first argument. It is the positive assertion that space *is* prior to, and is given to, empirically derived relationality. Of course, even pure appearance is not to be thought of outside the empirical, as Kant has stated at A 20/ B 34 that appearance is the “undetermined object of an empirical intuition”, so there is an inherent complexity in stating that Kant now argues that space is prior to empirically derived relationality. This can be resolved by asserting that space is prior to determined relationality, which is just what Kant has claimed in § 1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic, that is, space as an *a priori* form is just what makes an object spatially determinable. However, this thesis holds that it is not Kant’s intention to defend himself in the Metaphysical Expositions, but to be open to strict criticism. So the question this thesis asks is how can this second argument be known to be a development from the first, that is, an argument of empiricistic thinking that is distinct argument in its own right?

As the interpretation of this argument usually proceeds, which amounts to dispute within Kantianism itself, the dispute is taken in three directions. First, what is meant by thinking is logical thinking, and the assertion is that empty space can be thought by 'logical thinking'. Second, what is meant by thinking is psychological thinking, and the assertion is that psychological thinking can think of space as empty (2004, 105). Of course, resorting either of these two options is problematic. It could be argued that what is meant by 'thinking' is either logical thinking or psychological thinking, and since neither logical thinking nor psychological thinking can prove the priority of space, because logical thinking is inconsistent with Kant's own account and psychological thinking is always contingent, the argument fails.

What will be maintained in the following is that the argument can be shown to work without interpreting it as an appeal to either psychological or logical thinking once it is shown that Kant's argument addresses an empirical strategy distinct from the strategy treated by the first argument for the *a priori* of space. Such a strategy, does not necessarily need to come second, but only is second because it follows from the realization that the first has inadequately recognized the terms of agreement. In the case where this is already realized, the first argument may be ignored. This position might also be considered to be the last refuge of an empiricistic thinking that agrees that Kant's first argument has made its case, but does not agree that it entirely refutes the empirical position. This second argument represents an important development in the transcendental argumentation. It will illustrate how transcendental assertions need not be noble standpoints inertly presiding over the structure of argumentation as merely



defensive buttresses. Instead the transcendental argument is shown to have direct participation in the transformation of philosophical standpoints. Thus this argument is a highly complex and extraordinarily subtle move on Kant's part that has been up to this point not reflected in the traditional accounts.

The argument for time appears less problematic, and so receives less treatment in the literature. The universality of time to both inner and outer experience necessitates its *a priority*. This draws on Kant's earlier argumentation that strict universality signifies *a priority* as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. It may be complained, legitimately, that this in fact is just a reiteration of that earlier argument, so does not function as a demonstration. Though this complaint would be respectfully accepted by this analysis, it would not prevent Kant from performing such a demonstration. Kant would then need to merely repeat the strategy presented for the *a priority* of space, though since time applies to both inner and outer experience the argument would have to take both of these into consideration, so the argument would become significantly more complex. As such, this section primarily treats the argumentation for the *a priority* of space.

### **3.3 The Relation of the Two *A Priority* Arguments**

Regarding the relation of the first and second arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions there seems to be a consensus that the second addresses an inherent deficiency in the first. Falkenstein proposes that it represents Kant's attempt to overcome the blindness problem in a manner that the first cannot (1995, 191 – 192). Allison states

that the second argument brings forth a matter of importance left untreated in the first. After the first argument we can know that space is prior relative spatial relations, but this does not establish that space is *a priori*. It may itself be experienced prior to relative spatial relations, thus, all that Kant has shown is that space is prior to relative spatial relations. On this matter, Graham Bird states that there are two general criticisms of this first argument: 1) that the argument is trivial (as is already discussed above), and 2), that the argument establishes the 'priority' of space rather than the *a priority* of space. Bird's strategy to counter these objections is to hold that the argument against the empiricist is not complete until the second and third arguments are presented. It is only through cumulative successes that Kant can stand against the empiricist and hold that space and time are *a priori* and not just prior.

This cumulative strategy can be observed in the argument against the *mere* priority of space. What is held is that the first argument may point out the circularity of appealing to experience, but it cannot itself prove that the concepts of space and time are grounded *a priori*. Mere priority holds that, though our representation of space and time might come first, this does not eliminate the possibility that it could be given *a posteriori*. It could just so happen that space and time are always the first things grasped in a purely experiential event. Bird argues, as do Falkenstein and Allison, that this rebuttal does not address the full implication of Kant's thought. The accusation by Kant, that the empirical explanation is a vicious circle, is never faced by those who would seek to show that space and time are grounded *a posteriori* (Bird 2006, 163). 'Positive' proof of an *a priori* ground can be derived, however, from the universality of space and time. Such



universality is taken to be demonstrated by Kant in the second argument. The universality of space and time to human cognition amounts to a claim for *a priority* (2006, 163-164).<sup>58</sup>

Such a strategy seems to be fine if it is presumed that there is actually only one argument possible for an empirical, or experiential, ground of space. As will be discussed below, however, there is a lack of internal consensus as to how the second argument actually works to provide such positive proof. So, this strategy has two problems to overcome. First, it may be not be true that the argument from experience manifests in only a singular complaint. Second, long standing division among commentators raises the question of whether or not the second argument has been properly understood. There may be some other way to understand the second argument that may be better suited to Kant's aims. As this section deals with the relation of the first two arguments, the only question now asked is whether or not a cumulative approach, which posits a positive compliment to a negative rebuke, is the best description of the relation of these two arguments.

What is shown in the first argument of the Metaphysical Expositions is that empiricistic thinking begins from a merely hypothetical presupposition. Its claim that experience can ground our concept of space is hypothetical, because it does not ask how

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<sup>58</sup> Though the following is not discussed by Bird, this second point proceeds from the first, and functions to push the empiricist into skepticism. The empiricist claims that space is prior but not *a priori*. If we know that space is prior, then we know that though it is empirically derived, it is empirically derived prior to matter. Therefore space and time always is perceived first. The empiricist can say that this does not amount to necessity, so does not amount to *a priority*, because this is after all something has always been observed, but may not always be observed by humans. But this is a position of doubt that admits no means of examination, thus is merely a skeptical position. This could also be a dogmatic position as well, if it were claimed that it could only be that space is merely prior as it is something always first perceived, but this would again be a position of necessity. If the *a priority* is overturned on the matter of whether or not space and time are strictly universal it would make more sense to focus on the limitation of these forms to cognition dependent on receptivity, and in particular, cognition that is human.

relative spatial relations<sup>59</sup> could ground a necessary representation of space. As discussed in chapter one of this thesis, spatiality is universal, and hence necessary (B 6), to the experiential concept of a body. Unlike empiricistic thinking, Kant is able to account for the determination of relative spatial relations via space as an *a priori* representation. The transcendental reorientation of the object has created the conditions for Kant to argue that matter is within appearance and is made determinable by subjective conditions, that is, the forms of appearance. It is only after this that Kant allows himself to claim that space is a pure form of sensible intuition. Empiricistic thinking, however, has merely presumed that relative spatial relations could ground the concept of space without first accounting for how these relative spatial relations are themselves grounded. Empiricistic thinking needs, therefore, to modify its argument against transcendental idealism. In its second attempt, empiricistic thinking will have to answer how experience itself can ground relative spatial relations.

To do this, empiricistic thinking will have to posit absolute space as a ground of relative spatial relations. If our concept of space can be shown to be derived from a relation between absolute space and relative spatial relations, empiricistic thinking may be able to claim that experience itself can ground our concept of space<sup>60</sup>. It is not Kant who needs a second argument. Rather, it is empiricistic thinking that needs to change its argument in its attempt to argue against Kant's claim that space is an *a priori* representation. So the difference between this interpretation and Graham's interpretation, which holds that Kant needs a second argument, is that the second argument is reflective

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<sup>59</sup> Such as things "outside <and next to> one another" (A 23/ B 39).

<sup>60</sup> Although it turns out that this second argument too fails as a consequence of the transcendental turn.



of a development in empiricistic thought as it begins to comprehend the consequences of the transcendental reorientation of the object.

### 3.4 Problems with the Relation between 'Representing' and 'Thinking'

Falkenstein's synopsis of Kant's second argument is as follows:

The second exposition contains an argument drawn from the claim that there is an imbalance in the dependence relation between space and time, on the one hand, and 'objects' or 'appearances,' on the other. While it is impossible to 'make a representation' of the absence of space, or to remove time from any appearance, it is purportedly possible to 'think' that space does not contain 'objects' and to remove all appearances from time<sup>61</sup>. (1995, 186 – 187)

Falkenstein states that Kant has created a difficult situation in this argument by contrasting representations with thinking. Representing is held to be cognitive, so is susceptible to contradiction by experience, whereas the logical is only susceptible to the law of contradiction. He then asks how these two actually function together to show that space is *a priori* (1995, 187 – 189)?

Of course, the problem of the blindness of intuition again shows up, (1995, 191), and again it is taken to indicate that Kant might be begging the question. As Falkenstein states:

Given that intuitions (understood as immediate representations) without concepts are 'blind,' how can Kant make any claims about what intuitions exhibit prior to or independently of all intellectual synthesis? How, in particular, can he be sure that the spatial order is originally given in intuition and not subsequently constructed by the intellect as part of the process of bringing the intuited manifold to unity under concepts?<sup>62</sup> (1995, 191)

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<sup>61</sup> Falkenstein later refers to this as the independence of space from its objects.

<sup>62</sup> So long as the effort is being made to fully question Kant's argument, one more question might be added in order that it is not presumed that what is held is that this argument unquestionably follows *a fortiori* from

Just as in the first argument, however, the situation wherein Kant is presented as potentially begging the question is tied, not only to the problem of blindness but, to the presumption that Kant is here discussing space as intuition. But it is simply unclear why this must be presumed. All that is claimed is that both space and time are necessary grounds of *intuitions*. The pluralization of *intuitions* even suggests that what might not be considered here is intuition as a mode of receptivity, but intuitions might just refer to particular objects of a sensible nature. So, it would seem textually unsound to presume that this argument discussed anything but the *a priority* of the representation.

Falkenstein concludes that the primary function of the second argument of the Metaphysical Expositions is to attack the blindness problem. Falkenstein surmises that this likely shows up, now rather than earlier, since there had been no previous historical occurrence of such a problem (1995, 216). What is accomplished by this argument is that the concepts of:

space and time must be supposed to be present in our experience prior to or independently of objects or appearances, but it does not establish that space and time are entirely independent of all intellectual processing whatsoever. There might be some sort of intermediate intellectual synthesis (the figurative synthesis of the imagination, for example) that generates an array of matters in space and time prior to any perception of the objects but subsequently to the intuition of sensory impression. This final, loose end is addressed by the Later Expositions. (1995, 216)

Interestingly here, though Falkenstein is correct in his assessment that Kant does intend here to show that space and time must be prior to experience, he also concludes by stating

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the first. It should also be asked how can Kant be sure that the spatial order is not given by the empirical object?



that the question of whether space and time are intuition or intellectual is properly handled by the third and forth arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions. He seems then to acknowledge that the question of whether space and time are intuition in this argument is premature even though his charges of circularity in both the first two arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions rely on this very premature presumption.

Though Allison does not express the same concern over the blindness issue, he follows a similar line of interpretation. Since space and time need to be presupposed so that other empirical predicates might be predicated of the object, space is known to be prior to those empirical predicates (2004, 104). Both the purely psychological reading and the purely logical positions are, as unqualified interpretations, refuted<sup>63</sup> (2004, 104 - 105). Given the contingent nature of the psychological account, space can hardly therein be held to be necessary on Kant's own account. The logical account is, according to Allison, not supported by the text, and more importantly, inconsistent with Kant's doctrine. Allison suggestion seems to be that merely thinking about things as they are in themselves indicates that there is some sort of capacity to "represent that there is no space" (2004, 105). Of course, whether thinking the object in a merely logical fashion is

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<sup>63</sup> Lawrence Friedman, in his paper "Kant's Theory of Time" (*The Review of Metaphysics*, Volume 7, Number 3, 379 – 388) names George Schrader as the individual who successfully challenged the then common position that Kant was arguing for a psychological position. Schrader's paper, entitled "The Transcendental Ideality and Empirical Reality of Space and Time" (*The Review of Metaphysics*, Volume 4, Number 4, 507 – 536) makes a complaint against the psychological interpretation stating "One finds in many texts books and a few of the commentaries the explanation that Kant regarded space and time as 'coloured glasses' which serve to impose a peculiar form upon the sensible manifold. Although some of Kant's remarks suggest such a view, this does not represent his theory of transcendental idealism." (1951, 515). Further down the page he states: "What kind of necessity could be provided on a psychological interpretation? I suppose at best it would be the sort of necessity which can be assigned to a psychological law. But since the latter is contingent it is no more transcendental than the law of universal gravitation." In this Schrader shows the textual inconsistency involved in the presumption that Kant is claiming that, in being forms of intuition, space and time are fundamentally psychological.

actually a representation that there is no space, or merely a representation wherein space is not represented, is another question.

The solution, according to Allison, regards the ineliminability of space (2004, 105). For Falkenstein, the solution revolves around the independence of space insofar as space can be considered without its objects whereas the objects cannot be considered without it<sup>64</sup>. (1995, 186) It is noted by Allison that this interpretation seems to have a textual difficulty with the rest of the *Critique* insofar as Kant frequently denies that the perception of empty space or empty time is possible<sup>65</sup>.

Rather than arguing how thinking of space wherein no objects are to be encountered is consistent with the rest of Kant's assertions in the *Critique*, Allison suggests that it is probable that Kant is here performing a thought experiment. (2004, 105) According to this, what Kant is doing here is performing an abstraction from the object to its necessary, and therefore *a priori* components. The second argument in the *Metaphysical Expositions* is taken to be a short hand of the argument from abstraction that Kant develops in section one of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. Allison states of the argument in §1 of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (B 35/ A 21):

This much discussed passage from the introductory portion of the *Aesthetic* is best seen as a statement of what Kant hopes to show rather than as a self-

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<sup>64</sup> Bird calls this an asymmetrical relation (Bird 2006, p. 144).

<sup>65</sup> Falkenstein provides lengthy discussion on how Kant does not need to be taken to absolutely restrict such a thing in his discussion of the second argument (1995, 203 – 210). Paul Guyer, in his latest work entitled *Kant* simply makes no distinction in his criticism stating, "Kant claims that we must have *a priori* representations of space and time that do not depend upon empirical intuitions of objects, because although we cannot represent particular objects without representing space and time, we could represent space and time themselves without also representing particular objects in them." (2006, 56) While Guyer is by no means convinced by Kant's arguments for the *a priori* of space, he too reads this as referring to an unequal relation of spatial representation over determinate spatial experience, as do those mentioned above who seek to defend Kant in their own manner.



contained argument. Accordingly, like the comparable passage from the *Prolegomena*, it gestures toward the thesis that the representation of space is a pure intuition. Nevertheless, it also serves to illustrate the more basic point that if one abstracts from both the conceptual and sensory content of the empirical representation of a body, the extension and form or figure [*Gestalt*] of this body, that is, its purely spatial features, remain. These remain not in the sense that they can be perceived independently of the sensory content but that they provide a representational content with a determinant structure (presumably topological, affine, and mereological), which is not dependent on this sensory content. (2004, 107)

This abstraction argument has, of course, been discussed by this thesis both in its initial formulation in the B Introduction, and in its subsequent, but nevertheless altered articulation in the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The first articulation presented predicates which the understanding could use to comprehend its own limitation. The second articulation was shown not to be able to accomplish this task, due to the fact that it followed from the conception of appearance, but it could argue that form indeed was something within appearance that could be considered apart from matter. The problem with returning to the abstractive argument again, to argue that space is *a priori*, is that it reduces the argument to *petitio principii*. The very reasoning which claimed form to be *a priori*<sup>66</sup> is now directly appealed to in the ‘proof’ of the *a priority* of that which is to be such a form.

As discussed above, Allison maintains that, when Kant states that though “[o]ne can never represent that there is no space [...] one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it” (A 24/ B 39), “thinking” should be taken to have psychological import. Conversely, Falkenstein maintains that ‘thinking’ can, without

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<sup>66</sup> The reason why this should be considered to repeat the second argument from abstraction is that Allison states that what is abstracted from is the empirical representation of a body and not an empirical concept of a body. The same problem would remain if the first argument from abstraction was used by Kant here.

textual contradiction, refer to a logical thought of empty space. Falkenstein concludes that:

it needs to be stressed that Kant's claim is not that we actually experience empty space or time as so described but that we are able to conceive the real possibility of such an experience. It may be that there is no such thing given to use as a total absence of any object in space or time, and that even the darkest consciousness (as Kant puts it in *Prolegomena*, §24) contains some infinitesimally small quantity of the 'real.' But since we regularly experience the fading of colour, the cooling of heat, the loss of resistance, and so on, we can readily extrapolate from this experience to form the conception of the ideal limit (equal to zero) of the continued progress of this process and form some conception of a completely empty space or time. Nor is this conception a mere idea of reason. For all we know, some of our experience of black, cold, silent, permeable, etc., regions may, in fact, be actual experiences of this result.

It is in this sense that we can 'think' that there may be no objects in space, or remove all appearances from time. To 'think' there are no objects in space or time is not simply to conceive of the conception of empty space or time without involving ourselves in a contradiction; but neither is it to do so much as experience a sensible representation that we know to be of an absolutely empty space or time. (1995, 212-213)

There are two problems with Falkenstein's interpretation. First, like Allison's account, this account is founded on a process of abstraction. The 'logical' thought is obtained in a continual diminishing presence of objects in our sensible field. So, if we follow Falkenstein here, whereas a process of abstraction in the first section of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* was insufficient to argue for the *a priori* of intuition, and thus insufficient to overcome the problem of blindness, a process of abstraction is sufficient to argue for the logical thought which demonstrates the *a priori* of space and time as forms of intuition. If this is permissible it is only so because of Falkenstein's assertion that in the *Metaphysical Expositions*, 'matter of appearance' can be treated distinctly from 'matter of intuition.' Ultimately for Falkenstein, Kant never shows space and time



apply to matter in totality, but only matter of appearance. Thus, this abstraction can work here because the capacity to identify the intuitive is presented in this diminished sense. However, the capacity to distinguish matter of intuition from matter of appearance has been challenged by this thesis. Thus, if what is happening in the second argument is a reiteration of the abstractive process, then circularity becomes a problem in the same manner described for Allison.

The second notable error results from the fact that Falkenstein's arguments for the logical thought of empty space stem from a misunderstood textual issue. The premise held by Falkenstein is that sensibility can be reduced toward a zero sum. This is referred to in the above quoted text as the "ideal limit" but is more explicitly shown to be a fundamental premise of his argument when he states:

But though Kant may have taken space and time to be mere relations, that cannot exist apart from relata, it does not follow that these relata have to be objects. They could instead be *sensations*, or some other sort of matter that exists only in our subjective experience. Of course, it would need to be proven that there is a valid distinction to be drawn between sensations, or other purely subjective matters of apprehension, and objects, and that not all of our sensations refer to objects. But this is an issue that has to do with real possibility and the facts of how our experiences are to be interpreted, not with mere conceivability. It does seem at least conceivable that there might be certain sensations or matters given in subjective experience that do not refer to any object.

...[a]dmittedly, such 'subjectively full but objectively empty' spaces are not truly empty. But Kant's claim in the Second Exposition is not that space can be thought apart from any sensation, but just that it can be thought apart from any object. (1995, 2004)

According to Falkenstein, Kant's second argument for the *a priori* of space is consistent with the claim that it can be supposed that sensation can equal zero. Falkenstein has already, as was discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, quoted from the

Anticipations of Perceptions, and should be aware that such an abstractive process is not applied to objects of experience in a manner that would qualify the *a priori* nature of the concept of space. In the conclusion of that section Kant states:

The quality of sensation is always merely empirical and cannot be represented *a priori* at all (e.g. colours, taste, etc.). But the real, which corresponds to sensation in general, in opposition to the negation = 0, only represents something whose concept in itself contains a being, and does not signify anything except the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general. (A 176/ B 281)

As can be seen here, if a reduction to zero were to transpire, then this would be a negation of sensation. Thus, using logical thought to arrive at a zero magnitude would be to arrive *in experience* at that which would be the negation of sensation, that is, something that could not correspond to sensation. Therefore, this would ground our spatial thinking on the meaning of the object as a thing in itself, which, of course, Kant argues against.

This is why the *a priority* of intuition must precede the knowledge that space itself is *a priori* and must precede, as was seen in the first chapter of this thesis, the abstractive argument that concluded that form was *a priori*. If either of these two later abstractive arguments are used to validate the *a priority* of intuition, then Kant has entered into a circle. The first argument which used abstraction to ascertain that certain predicates were beyond the understanding's power to negate does not enter into circularity circle in this manner however. The understanding was not abstracting qualities to justify *a priori* knowledge. It abstracted qualities to see if all qualities had an identical response to its negating power. As they did not have an identical response it was necessary to conclude that there was a second cognitive faculty (given the transcendental



turn as explained earlier). Transcendental idealism then set out to arrange terms and principles that would follow from this find, and to make predictions that could be tested. The conditions for the *a priori* of intuition arise directly from the transcendental turn itself, and not from any subsequent abstractive argument.

### **3.5 Reinterpreting Kant's Second Argument for the *A Priori* of the Concept of Space**

Following from the above discussion it would seem that it is neither permissible to rely on strictly logical conception of thinking, nor is it permissible to understand Kant's argument as relying on a certain quality of thinking in the psychological sense. How then is the argument supposed to be understood? The problem itself arises from the insistence that this argument need be in some fashion a positive affirmation of the first. This insistence itself is a consequence of understanding the Metaphysical Expositions to be arguing for the *a priori* of intuition in the same act as arguing that space and time are themselves both *a priori* and intuition. But, if a case has been made that Kant has already argued for the *a priori* of intuition, then the Metaphysical Expositions can be seen to dispute only whether or not rationalistic and empiricistic thought are compelled to adopt intuition as their ground. Since the *a priori* of intuition has been accounted for, and since it has been shown how Kant comes to space and time are known to be *a priori* from the perspective of transcendental idealism, this thesis is not required to show any one of

Kant's arguments to be arguing for the *a priori* of space and time in an *exclusively* positive sense, though there may be both positive and negative aspects in both.

The second argument for the *a priori* of the concept of space can be understood to address the self-corrected and developed complaint of the standpoint concerning space and the possibility of an experiential ground. This experiential standpoint, as a consequence of the transcendental turn, needs to consider experience to be a dynamic relation. According to transcendental idealism, the dynamic relation is within the cognition itself. However, empiricistic thinking will want to show that this dynamic structure within experience is prior to cognition. The empiricistic aim is to show that the ground of space is external to cognition. As will be shown below, positing absolute space as a means to ground relative spatial relations is merely hypothetical as it cannot actually correct our spatial thinking. As a result, empiricistic thinking ends up corroborating Kant's claim that space is an *a priori* concept.

At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that there is a freedom from the historical because of Kant's reorientation of the object. If the object is no longer thought of as something to which cognition must conform, the object is no longer understood to be some epistemological standard external to cognition. Therefore, a position which relies on such an external object as an epistemic criterion endures an inherent change in its thinking because the standard it has historically relied upon has been removed. Nevertheless, the historical arguments can valuably be considered as indications of the sorts of arguments Kant might be attempting to work with here in the *Metaphysical Expositions*. Jill Vance Buroker's work entitled *Space and Incongruence* provides some



indication of the sort of argument Kant might address that is, itself, an effort to address the awareness that experience needs to be expressed as a dynamic structure to avoid circularity<sup>67</sup>. Such an idea is to posit absolute space as an object from which relative spatial relations can be comprehended. The subject, passively receiving both the relative and the absolute, experiences the dynamic conditions necessary for the concept of space and thus there is no need to posit the concept of space as an *a priori* ground.

Buroker's discussion itself does not concern itself with this, but merely provides a description of Newton's conception of absolute space along with some of its difficulties. There she states that "Newton conceives of space as an actually existing thing, which, although not itself material, serves as a container for all material objects and a condition of their existence (1981, 9)."<sup>68</sup> The solution to the problem of not being able to ground the concept of space on determinate spatial relations alone is then to posit an interaction between such determinate spatial relations and absolute space<sup>69</sup>. Given that the argument from experience can identify its oversight regarding its incapacity to provide a critical account, due to its presumption that experience is simplistic, the introduction of a

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<sup>67</sup> Robert Palmer also provides excellent discussion on the distinctions and similarities between Kant and Newton's notions of absolute space in his previously mentioned 1971 paper "Absolute Space and Absolute Motion in Kant's Critical Philosophy".

<sup>68</sup> Buroker goes on to detail Newton's empirical proofs of Absolute Space and their problems in her chapter entitled Absolute and Relational Theories of Space.

<sup>69</sup> Buroker accuses Kant of "not meeting Newton's argument on its own terms." (1981, 126). With regards to Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, she holds that he never treats the fact that for Newton, objects can be in absolute motion and relative motion simultaneously. With regards to the *Critique of Pure Reason* she states that Kant cannot answer Newton's question of whether, in a one object universe, spinning motion could be observed in part because he has failed to work out "the relation between motion considered kinetically (with respect to the spatial relations between objects) and as a dynamical process (with respect to the forces causing and resulting from an object's motion)." Buroker sees Newton as not having such a difficulty because he can appeal to an absolute space in which to situate the single object (1981, 125). Given this thesis' interpretation of Kant's second argument, as precisely addressing the notion of an absolute space, it may be possible to respond to Buroker on this matter.

dynamic relation within experience itself represents a development in that standpoint. So, the introduction of an absolute object, i.e., absolute space, is a separate strategy employed by the complainant who would argue from experience in order to challenge the subjectivity of space and time.

So the traditional interpretation of this argument stands to be reconceived. Instead of conceiving of this argument as having a positive relation with the first, this argument is conceived as having a distinct strategy. Thus, it is necessary for Kant to have a second strategy because, as was shown above, it is possible for the attempt to ground the concept of space on experience to accept the position of the first argument and reply with a developed second strategy. The question now becomes how Kant's second argument can be seen to address such a second strategy, not how it merely compliments or reinforces the first argument.

The puzzle of the argument seems to reside in how 'representing' and 'thinking' can operate to demonstrate the *a priority* of space. This peculiarity is well noted by Falkenstein, as he states that "the space argument does not come off well, because the point of contrast is not drawn in the same terms in the two opposed circumstances" (1995, 196). Thinking is taken to contrast with representing, and there is no clear way to demonstrate that these two are comparable opposites. This is, however, the very heart of the error. The error consists in taking thinking and representing to be contrasting opposites, however natural this contrast is suggested by Kant's formation of the argument.

Instead, thinking and representing are not contrasted, but thinking is held to be insufficient to ground the *a priority* of space, either in its logical scope or its



psychological scope. It has been shown above why logical thinking is not here permissible. Further, even though Allison provides a good account of why a psychological account might be entertained, this account, due to its inherent contingency, is not as strong an account as is possible. It should be understood that the first two arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions question whether or not the representation of space is empirical or *a priori*. The following two arguments question whether or not this representation is intuitive or whether this representation is intellectual. It should not be supposed that the Metaphysical Expositions question whether or not there *is* a representation of space. The empiricist would not deny that there is a representation of space, but state that space is grounded in experience. Problematic idealism<sup>70</sup> would not deny that there is representation of space, but would admit that we may not be able to know whether it is a deception<sup>71</sup>. Even the sceptical standpoint would probably not assert that there is no representation of space, but would assert that the representation is false. Therefore, when Kant states that “One can never represent that there is no space” it can be understood that the complete clause would include – the presumed – “[there is spatial representation]”. The complete clause might read: there is spatial representation and “[o]ne can never represent of that there is no space”. So the contrast here is contained within representing itself rather than manifesting itself between ‘thinking’ and ‘representing’.

It has been shown how interpreting thinking as ‘logical thinking’ in general, as is required to think to the object as complete unto itself, is inconsistent on multiple accounts.

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<sup>70</sup> In the Refutation of Idealism, Kant refers to Descartes as a problematic idealist (B 274 -275).

<sup>71</sup> Unless a beneficent God is posited as well.

To this it can be added, that within this thesis, the *a priori* arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions are presented as confirming the bifurcation of appearance into matter and form, and so are a question of appearance, and not a question of the givenness, or the logical completion, of space in itself. The effort to read this second argument as an appeal to the *ability* of either psychological thinking, or logical thinking, to ground space, may come from an effort to defeat the 'empiricistic' argument outright. However, empiricistic thinking might be content to admit a structure of thinking, so long as that structure of thinking is governed by an object, in this case, by absolute space. As what is aimed at in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a critical philosophy, the question is: 'can empiricistic thinking show that positing absolute space is anything more a merely hypothesis? What is argued below is that empiricist thinking's second effort is still only hypothetical.

To examine this the thesis must appeal to the Introduction of the Transcendental Analytic. This is held to be appropriate on the following two accounts. First, the material is from an Introduction, and not the Transcendental Analytic itself. Kant is establishing the grounds for using transcendental logic, so this section is directly tied back to the Transcendental Aesthetic. Second the material is definitional and not argumentative. What is presented is Kant's definitional distinction between general and applied logic (B 78/A 54 – B 79/ A55). And as both forms of logic might be used to claim that thinking of empty space is logical, such definition is directly relevant to the argumentation here examined. Further, insofar as it is merely definitional, it is not, in the articulations of those definitions, dependent on the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic.



The relevant passage is as follows and concerns Kant's distinctions regarding logic of the particular use of the understanding<sup>72</sup>:

In general logic that part that is to constitute the pure doctrine of reason must therefore be entirely separate from that which constitutes applied (thought still general) logic. The former alone is properly science, although brief and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding requires. In this therefore logicians must always have two rules in view.

- 1) As general logic it abstracts from all contents of cognitions of the understanding and of the *difference of its objects*<sup>73</sup>, it has to do with nothing but the mere form of thinking.
- 2) As pure logic it has no empirical principles, thus it draws nothing from psychology (as one has occasionally been persuaded), which therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the understanding. It is a proven doctrine, and everything must apply to it *a priori*.

What I call applied logic (in opposition to the common signification of this word, according to which it ought to contain certain exercises to which pure logic provides the rule) is thus a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*, namely under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this use, and which can all be given only empirically. It deals with attention, its hindrance and consequences, *the causes of error*<sup>74</sup>

General logic of the particular use of the understanding (as opposed to applied logic of the understanding, which is the use of the understanding *in concreto*) is an inappropriate choice to attribute the thinking of space as free from objects. First, and against Kant, if the aim is to justify the system of principles supposed to make up a legitimate 'science of receptivity' with the logic that governs those very rules, then Kant is again entering into circularity. So, if Kant were attempting to show that thinking of

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<sup>72</sup> For Kant's discussion on the separation of pure and applied logic see B 76/ A 52 – B 77/ A 53.

<sup>73</sup> My italics

<sup>74</sup> My italics

space as free from objects was correct, it would be problematic for him to appeal to general applied logic of the understanding. Conversely, if this logic is used *in the effort against Kant's position* the only way this could work is by making a hypothetical claim regarding the nature of the object in question that would take it as distinct from particular use of the understanding. This is because general applied logic still abstracts from "all contents" and does not account for "differences of its objects". Because it does not account for difference of objects, it cannot be used to critically support the claim that asserts a difference between cognition and an actually existent experience itself. It would therefore not serve to support the claim but only to reiterate the hypothetical nature of the presupposition. As neither Kant, nor the empiricist can make such an appeal to rules of the particular use of the understanding, it would seem then that the remaining logic is applied logic.

The aim of the attempt to show that experience itself can ground the concept of space is to show that such a distinct general matter of experience must be posited because it actually serves to ground spatial thinking. Applied logic is the appropriate choice for the effort to ground the concept of space in experience itself as applied logic deals with the "contingent conditions of the subject" taking into consideration the subjective use of the understanding *in concreto*. Therefore this logic can consider the empirical and can consider distinction of objects from subjective cognition. The empiricistic effort to ground space in experience will attempt to show that the concept of space must, in its subjectivity, be conditioned by experience via applied general logic so that spatial thinking can be verified. The transcendental effort, on the contrary, will show that it can



account for why we *might* have the thought of space as empty, but does not, therein, suppose that it has grounded the concept of space *a priori*. Instead, Kant's argument shows that the 'empiricist' effort can only account for this thinking of space as empty except hypothetically. Empiricistic thinking posits a distinction between an absolute space (which could be thought of as empty) and relative relationality (which requires objects). If it is momentarily granted that absolute space indeed exists, empiricistic thinking should be able to resolve the question of why thinking space as empty is either a correct, or an incorrect thought. If absolute space cannot resolve this question, then empiricistic thinking has no critical grounds to posit absolute space.

As was stated above, Kant's effort is not to give an account for the *a priority* of space. After all, he has already given an account of why it can be thought as such in §1 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. His aim is to obtain corroboration from empiricistic and rationalistic thinking. The argument from experience is then the challenger to Kant's earlier claim. Its claim is that there is an objective distinction manifest in experience that can be used to ground the concept of space. However, if this dynamical depiction of experience is challenged at its roots, this position is revealed to be hypothetical only. By supposing that there is a separation of spatiality into absolute and relative spatiality the question arises, 'Is it correct to think of space as free from objects?' It might be thought that the answer should be an affirmative, given the nature of absolute space as a receptacle. But, as Buroker points out, presuming that absolute and relative spatiality can be treated in distinction ignores that these two are not to be treated in exclusion (1981, 10). But, even if this is admitted, and it is then held that, given the fact that absolute and

relative motions are only conventionally treated in exclusion, it is not correct to think space as free from objects (except in a special sense), neither can the supposed experiential ground show that it is incorrect to think of space as free from objects.

The problem with positing absolute space as a ground of the concept of space turns on the fact that there is no equal and oppositional representation, to serve as a basis for an applied logic of spatial thinking. Kant makes a claim regarding the singularity of our spatial representation in stating that we do not have a "representation of there being no space". We do not in fact have a multiplicity of general experiential grounds of spatial thinking. We only have space itself as a representation from which our thinking of space is derived. This singularity of representation is similar to Kant's claims in the intuition arguments. However, the *import* here is on the subjective, or *a priori*, ground of space. The empiricist's effort to ground the concept of space on experience is here to show that our spatial thinking cannot be conditioned by experience even if space, as existent, is posited as absolute.

Positing absolute space as a ground of relative spatial relations, does not posit a dynamic of *equal* experiential relations which could be used to correct an otherwise utterly subjective and contingent thinking of space. What is created is a singular object which is itself treated as a condition of relative relations, even if the absolute and the particular cannot be observed in complete distinction from one another. It is possible that any correction of our spatial thinking made possible by absolute space is trivial. It might be trivial because we only have a representation of there being space, and we "can never represent that there is no space" (A 24/ B 39). If the thought of space as empty is



incorrect, then it is incorrect because empty space is not space. We might not be able to judge whether or not the thought of space devoid of objects is correct, because we do not have a representation of there being no space. As such, the empiricistic conception of absolute space, as something that can correct our spatial thinking, relies on our spatial experience being correct. It cannot then explain how 'absolute space' functions to correct our spatial thinking. Thus its assertion of absolute space is merely hypothetical.

Absolute space is a perfectly reasonable *hypothesis* arrived at from thinking how determinate experiential relations could be grounded on experience. However, hypothetical necessity is not sufficient within a critical standpoint, so the sufficiency of this object cannot be presumed but must be demonstrated. As such, even though absolute space might not be directly observed (Buroker 1981, 19) the standpoint itself should be able to give an account as to why it is either correct<sup>75</sup> or incorrect to think of space as free from objects since it is positing just such a theoretical independent when it posits absolute space. It is now possible to show how the claim that space is an *a priori* concept is corroborated.

Presume that a critical ground, experiential or otherwise, must be sufficient to be able to correct an otherwise contingent mode of applied thinking. Here Experiential A represents absolute space, and *a* and *b* represent variables where *a* is a correct spatial thought and *b* is an incorrect spatial thought. In the case of Kant's second argument for the *a priority* of space *a* represents the thought that space cannot be thought as empty and

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<sup>75</sup> If what is shown however is that, from the effort to ground the concept of space experientially, that it is correct to think of space as empty, this runs into the problem that Buroker points out that motion, spatiality, is always describable under both relative and absolute conditions simultaneously. Thus it is inconsistent for the position to reason to the conclusion that space can be thought of as free from objects (exclusively).

$b$  represents the thought of empty space. It should be kept in mind here that even if thought  $a$  is taken here to be correct, and  $b$  is taken here to be incorrect, they should not have their correctness, or incorrectness, presumed. Experiential A should be able to demonstrate their correctness and incorrectness.

Experiential object A is taken to be sufficient to determine the correctness of our thinking either  $a$  or  $b$ . If we only have A to verify our thinking, yet we still think  $a$ 's and  $b$ 's, then the assertion  $a$  and not  $b$  (because Experiential A) is open to the criticism that A, as an Experiential, is insufficient to account for the totality our thinking since relation  $ab$  is, under observation, structurally diverse in comparison to Experiential ground A. Absolute space is supposed to be one, and, from its singularity, the diversity of relative spaces are conditioned. Since absolute space is supposed to condition relative spatiality, it is presumed true in order that relative space can be known to be correctly comprehended. It is not, in the empiricistic argument, constructed from relative spatiality. Rather, empiricistic thinking would here be trying to find an empirical condition to ground spatial thinking which involves itself directly with relative spatiality. So even though, as Buroker contends, *absolute space is not supposed to be thought in distinction from relative spatial relativity*, it cannot be the case that relative spatiality conditions absolute space<sup>76</sup>. Even if such were the case then all that would be said would be that absolute space conditions relative space while relative space conditions absolute space, and beyond the circularity,

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<sup>76</sup> When Palmer does discuss Kant's thoughts on absolute space he includes Kant's 1786 work *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. As Robert Palmer states "Kant's exposition here is indeed the very opposite of Newton's, for where Newton begins with absolute space in terms of which he characterizes relative space, Kant begins with relative spaces, in terms of which he characterizes absolute space" (1971, 52). So though Kant does end up speaking of absolute space in his critical period, it is not identical with Newton's.



neither would function as a standard. Empiricistic thinking must admit that the postulate of absolute space is not a critical postulate, but a dogmatic postulate, that cannot function to correct thinking, but merely confirms what is given in experience.

Unlike the attempt to ground space in experience, Transcendental Idealism can provide a meaningful response to the question of whether or not we can think space as empty. We can think space as free from objects in two ways. It can be thought of as empty in a logical fashion only, where it is thought of as something subsisting beyond relationality. This inclusion of the logical is because its inclusion is demanded, as previously noted, even though it itself carries no theoretical weight. Space can also be thought of as empty in a purely psychological fashion, but this is only contingent. Neither of these two means of thinking space can be thought of as grounding the concept of space. The first treats space like a thing in itself, thus it would be possible to think of space both as an appearance and as a thing in itself at the same time. The second is entirely contingent so would itself be dependent on the concept of space, rather than being the ground of the concept of space. The prediction of transcendental idealism has been that space is *a priori*. This is because the determinability of appearances is universal to appearances, so is known to belong entirely to the cognitive conditions of the subject. So, even though logical thinking cannot be appealed to, the *a priority* of space implies its necessity since necessity and universality are conditions thereof. Of course, placing the ground of the concepts of space and time in cognition itself does not specify what in cognition grounds these concepts. To do this Kant goes on to argue that the concepts of space and time are not grounded by the understanding, but by intuition.

Even though the object presupposed by empiricistic thinking in the attempt to ground the concept of space experientially can be discarded as hypothetical, the thought process itself can be retained as coherent. What the thinking from experience shows is that the concept of space must be grounded in universality. Absolute space is proposed as a general condition of particular spatial attributes. The standpoint from experience arrives at the conclusion that absolute space is the general and universal condition of relative space. But, in acknowledging this in a project of theoretical reason posterior to the transcendental turn, what is shown is that, even if an argument is made from experience, the concept of space must be an element of cognition as it is grounded on something universal, and so is contained in the subject. This has been the prediction of transcendental idealism, but, having the confirmation from the empiricistic effort to ground space in experience, the transcendental standpoint is corroborated.

### **3.6 Part 2: Intuition Arguments**

#### **3.7 The relation of the *A Priori* arguments to the Intuition arguments**

Having obtained corroboration concerning his prediction that the concepts of space is grounded *a priori*, Kant moves on to obtain corroboration that the concept of space is grounded in intuition. Kant's effort, again, is not to show rationalistic thinking to be utterly inconsistent. Rather, his aim is to obtain corroboration of his claim that space is grounded in intuition. The arguments against the concept of space as a form of



intuition will seek to show that speculative philosophy can account for the merely logical implications of receptivity, i.e., the object in its meaning as a thing in itself. However, as with empiricistic thinking in the first two arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions, the effort to dispute Kant's claim that the concept the complaint can be understood to be attempting to comply with Kant's efforts to introduce a critical criterion. So, in rationalistic thinking's effort to dispute Kant's claim that space is a form of intuition, rationalistic thinking will need to account for all its presuppositions in a manner that shows its account of space to be critically grounded. As with empiricistic thinking's effort to dispute the *a priori* of space, the rationalistic effort to show that space is not grounded in the intuition is divided into two arguments. In the first argument, rationalistic thinking's argument does not reflect the full impact of the transcendental turn. In the second argument, rationalistic thinking's argument strives to overcome the deficiency of its first argument. However, it only succeeds in affirming the predictions from the 'science of receptivity'. This is because rationalistic thinking must conclude its own means of thinking of the concept of space is dependent on intuition.

### 3.8 The First Intuition Arguments

Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an *a priori* intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it. Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g.,

that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather from intuition and indeed derived *a priori* with apodictic certainty. (B 39/ A 25)

Time is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time. That representation, however, which can only be given through a single object, is an intuition. Further, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise from concepts alone. It is therefore immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time. (B 47/ A 32)

### **3.9 General Account of the First Account of the Intuitionality of Space**

With regard to the first argument for the intuitional groundedness of the concept of space, the singular uniqueness of space is the thrust. The argument starts with the idea that space can be represented as it is in itself as a construct of its component parts. The challenge for the rationalistic thinking is to show how it is that it can demonstrate this knowledge of space as such. Kant's insistence is that, in the thought of a constructed space, the component parts always refer to what is understood to be the same unique space. Since from within the pure concept of space there is nothing of space itself that would allow rationalistic thinking to claim that it is inherently differentiated, it cannot critically justify its claim that space, as it is in itself, is known to be a construct of many parts. The concept of space precedes any differentiates its parts. Rationalistic thinking has merely presupposed that its thought of space as composed of parts was adequate to account for space as it would be in itself.

### **3.10 General Account of the First Argument for the Intuitionality of Time**



The appeal to singularity is made with regards to the representation of time in similar fashion as was the case with regards to space. The prime difference here is that with regards to time reference is made to a singular (given) object whereas with regard to space what is said is that space is singular and unique. The argument begins with the pronouncement that time is not discursive but is a "pure form of sensible intuition". It then, in similar fashion to the argument for space, claims that different (parts) of time are referents to "one and the same time". Following from this time is known to be singular, and here Kant makes the claim that the representation of time, like all representations "which can be given only through a single object, is an intuition" So the primary difference between the two first intuition arguments is that, in the argument for space, space is presented as singular and unique, whereas in the argument for time, time is presented as a singular *given* object.

Falkenstein breaks the space argument down into three fundamental premises:

- 1) Either a representation is a discursive or universal concept or it must have been originally given in intuition.
- 2) All our representations of space are such that, in principle, they can signify just one object (or delimited parts of this one object).
- 3) A representation that is such that, in principle, it can signify just one object cannot be a discursive or universal concept.

Although Falkenstein finds the third and the second premises defensible (1995, 218-219, 219-222), he finds that the first premise is ultimately founded on an incorrect presumption that a disjunctive argument is sufficient to describe the condition. He asks, "Granting that space is a particular and that our representations of space and spaces are representations of singular objects rather than of abstracted, common features, why should we suppose that these representations must have been originally given in intuition

rather than only subsequently constructed through intellectual synthesis?" This question, understood as directed toward the critical structure of the argument recognizes that Kant holds that <either> cognition is discursive <or> cognition is intuitive.

Kant has, however, provided a reasoned account of why certain aspects of cognition cannot be thought to arise out of intellectual synthesis. As examined in chapter one of this thesis, Kant's argument at B6 establishes that certain necessary elements of the experiential concept of a body arise from a cognitive source other than the understanding. Following from this, Kant has argued that intuition represents any means of thinking's direct connection with the object. Upon examining receptivity itself, Kant was able to locate both "matter" and "form of appearance" in appearance. Moreover, he was able to argue that the "form of appearance" could be examined in isolation from matter. Thus it is not the case that Kant has given no account of why we should "suppose that these representations must have been originally given in intuition rather than only subsequently constructed through intellectual synthesis". Further, once Falkenstein's introduction of 'matter of intuition' is seen to be illegitimate, it seems likely that his resolution, i.e., that space originates as a product of synthesis of the imagination, is something that a rationalist would agree to. The 'rationalistic' standpoint is attempting to challenge the intuitional ground of space in favour of an intellectual ground. Without "matter of intuition", Falkenstein's claim that space can be grounded by the imagination has lost its ability to stand apart from the rationalistic effort.



### 3.11 The Second Intuition Argument

Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such<sup>77</sup>, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition, not a concept. (A 25/ B 40)

The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation of time must therefore be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented<sup>78</sup> only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, (<for they contain only partial representations>), but immediate intuition must ground them. (A 32/ B 48)

In the previous argument Kant has shown that there can be no appeal made to an internal structure, or differentiated manifold, for a rationalistic construction of space and time. Instead, the rationalistic construction operates from the conception of space and time as wholes while illicitly presupposing a differentiating structure to support its activity. In the absence of any differentiating structure the representation of space and time, *if understood to be intellectually grounded*, must then be conceived as unbounded, so not as any determinant structure, but as pure relationality. Any boundary introduced is a boundary that can be exceeded. So space must then be predicated as infinite.

Falkenstein's main criticism of this argument stems from his preoccupation with 'matter of intuition' conceived as aspatial in opposition to 'matter of appearance' conceived as spatial. He states:

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<sup>77</sup> What does "as such" refer to here. It would seem to point to a concept as a representation, in contrast to a concept as something directly given.

<sup>78</sup> Determinate is represented.

it is hard to follow Kant in seeing this argument as premised on anything like a complete enumeration of all the possible alternatives. Were space to first originate through a synthetic intellectual process, whereby one aspatial matter originally given in intuition is set next to another to generate a spatially arrayed matrix, and were this process of combination to be such that it could be indeterminately extended, without any obvious end-point ever being reached, then, too, there would be a sense in which our representation would arise through 'unboundedness in the progress of intuition' – an unbounded series of matters of intuition would have to be successively given as material for the construction of a representation of space thought to be infinite (or at least indefinitely extended). But, from this, it would not follow that the space is originally given in intuition rather than constructed through the intellectual process of combination of matters. Its infinity would be a mere inference, drawn from the fact that the process of combination is apparently unending. (1995, 239)

The problem, as Falkenstein sees it, originates solely from his own division of matter. Once spatiotemporality is attributed to 'matter of appearance' via intellectual process, as discussed in this chapter's section on the first *a priori* argument, it should come as no surprise that intellectual construction threatens to replace intuition as the ground of spatiotemporality. It has been discussed, however, why it is that no such division need be made.<sup>79</sup>

An infinite predicate cannot be discursive<sup>80</sup> and must therefore be intuitive. The deduction made by the complainant that, since determinate relationality cannot ground the concept of space, then if there is to be a ground of space and time in the intellect such a ground must be infinite, is a correct deduction. It is only the articulation of what such an infinite ground implies that is incorrect. So here the position of the 'rationalist', as emergent within Kant's own transcendental account, is mobilized, and provides

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<sup>79</sup> Allison has a section concerning the problem of givenness in the *Metaphysical Expositions*. However, this involves discussion on material in the *Transcendental Analytic*. As such Allison's concerns regarding this are not treated here, but are treated in the Appendix of this thesis.

<sup>80</sup> "A concept cannot have an infinitely rich intension, however, because such a "concept" would lose its discursive character." (Allison 2004, p 111)



corroboration that space and time must be conceived of as intuition. It is possible that the complainant could have been correct in attempting to criticize the claim that space and time are forms of intuition, but, because Kant has established the need to conceive of cognition under a dualistic model, and because of the limitations inherent to discursive thinking itself, the complainant affirms Kant's claim instead of correcting it. In this fashion Kant can be seen to be showing that, just as with the effort to ground space and time in experience, the consistency of this standpoint argues toward the predictions of Kant's 'science of receptivity', and in this fashion, the *Metaphysical Expositions* are not just arguments against competing standpoints, but corroborating investigations from standpoints that seek to criticize Kant's 'science of receptivity'.

## **Conclusion: The Self-known Limitation of Transcendental Idealism as a Standpoint that Falls back into Indifferentism**

### **4.0 Review**

The aim of this thesis was to present Kant's Metaphysical Expositions as a mode of interphilosophical engagement that does not begin from foundational dispute, that is, where, for instance, empiricistic thinking begins from the assumption of a mind independent reality whereas transcendental idealism begins from the object conformed to cognition. It was put forward that the ability to surpass foundational dispute was reliant on their being a singular pure content for philosophy. Kant's aim of overcoming indifference did not eliminate antagonism in the Transcendental Aesthetic entirely. For empiricistic and rationalistic thinking in the Metaphysical Expositions were interpreted as disputing Kant's 'science of receptivity' in an effort to regain the right to claim their own individual foundational content. In this, the Metaphysical Expositions were understood by this thesis to be the implementation of "strict criticism". This alternative reading was made possible by showing that Kant's claim that space and time would be found to be pure forms of sensible intuition could express doubt<sup>81</sup>. The antagonistic relation between transcendental idealism, empiricistic thinking, and rationalistic thinking was ultimately undone in the Metaphysical Expositions when, in their attempt to critically test Kant's prediction, rationalistic and empiricistic thinking gave way to the admission that, as means of thinking, they were always 'directed toward intuition'.

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<sup>81</sup> What is meant by doubt is the admission that Kant's claim that space and time will be found to be pure forms of sensible intuition at A 22/ B 37 is not certain until it has undergone the strict criticism provided in the Metaphysical Expositions.



The primary aim of the first chapter was to show that Kant can be understood to begin the Transcendental Aesthetic from a critical standpoint. Since Kant must begin the Transcendental Aesthetic critically, the critical beginning must be developed in the Prefaces and Introductions. A rigorous account of this was found in the second edition Preface and the second edition Introduction in reasoning that elucidated how the understanding could come to knowledge of its own limitation. It found the ground of its limitation to be a separate faculty of cognition that is given in certain predicates. Since it is given in predicates, this ground is indeed knowable and is in a form which can be treated in exposition. The compulsory demand that the understanding admit this second faculty of cognition is critical knowledge of dualistic cognition. This conception of the constitution of cognition as a dualistic structure can be presented in the form of a principle of cognition which then functions as the critically grounded starting point of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Starting from this synthetic principle of dualistic cognition, where it is posited that to comprehend an immediate relation to an object a second (receptive) faculty must be posited, the complex, or the system, of the 'science of receptivity' was discussed. Since the systematic nature of Kant's account of the 'science of receptivity' is not readily apparent in the text itself, the relevance of Kant's argumentation in the second edition Preface and Introduction to the first section of the Transcendental Aesthetic needed to be developed.

The introduction of a structure which is sufficient to show the inherent systematicity of Kant's 'science of receptivity' was the aim of chapter two. Principles, for Kant, contain

synthetic *a priori* judgements (B 14). Since the reasoning in the systematic organization proceeds from a critically derived principle it can be understood to be a synthetic construct of *a priori* judgements. In the examination and clarification of this principle, certain *a priori* judgements contained therein are to be considered as initially critically available, as they have constituted the necessary first principle without any further clarification. Thus, the starting point of the Transcendental Aesthetic is a product of reasoning, and can be taken as being capable of moving judgments developed in the conception of critical philosophy expressed in the Prefaces and Introductions, thus manifest in the first principle itself, into the Transcendental Aesthetic.

The two fold meaning of the object was used to show the systematicity of Kant's 'science of receptivity'. Under this construct it was possible to clarify the logical implications from the cognitive operators of receptivity. This permitted the thesis to argue that both form and matter were exclusively inherent to appearance, thus that they are both fully available as principles of theoretical reason. The comprehension of appearance as a unity of matter and form is the condition under which it is possible for Kant to make predictions concerning the metaphysical conception of space and time. The prediction that both space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition was proposed to be the opportunity of intercourse between potentially distinct modes of philosophizing, i.e., means of thinking. They are 'potentially' distinct because they intend to demonstrate their own private content by showing the inconsistency of Kant's system of principles that make up the 'science of receptivity'.



In the third chapter transcendental idealism can fully allow itself to be confronted by voices of criticism. This is because, in the *Metaphysical Expositions*, transcendental idealism is understood to have already come to what it considers to be an accurate assessment of the concepts of space and time. It is not interested in defending itself, but in allowing these dissenting voices to consider the principles it has provided. Thus, voices which resemble historical philosophical standpoints, such as empiricism and rationalism, confront transcendental idealism's claim to have situated matter in appearance and form with intuition. However, these voices are not identical with philosophy prior to the transcendental turn, but emerge within the transcendental standpoint itself given the conditions under which the understanding finds its limitation. As such, these voices of dissent refer their disagreement to the body of principles rather than to the foundational content. This is because they have agreed to try the transcendental turn. If they can demonstrate a problem with the principles, then the implication of the transcendental turn – that there is one content for all expressions of theoretical philosophy – is undermined.

What was shown in the *Metaphysical Expositions*, given the interpretive lens of this context, was the transformative power of transcendental idealism once assent is given to the reformation of the philosophical object. Within the conception of the object after the transcendental turn, where cognition is comprehended as a totality of thinking and of content, there is no matter beyond theoretical cognition to which appearance is indebted and, within this reformation of the object, *any* theoretical element that is general and universal can be known to have its ground solely in the subject. Because 'empiricistic

thinking' is able to conceive that its initial standpoint, regarding the ground of the concept of space, has failed to address the actual question it intends to answer. In order to correct itself this thinking then generalizes its position. Thus because its consistent account involves an absolute and general ground, 'empiricistic thinking' becomes a corroboration of the transcendental science. Conversely, 'rationalistic thinking' seeks to challenge 'the attribution of form to receptivity as a subjective capacity'. This complaint is still made within the transcendental standpoint as it is the activity of the understanding that reveals non-active cognition. In coming to its coherent account of spatiotemporality rationalistic thinking conceives of space and time as infinite. As infinite, spatiotemporality is acknowledged to be a general element of our rational conception of objects and of space and time themselves. Since the rationalistic means of thinking must posit the nature of space and time to be predicates of an infinite nature, the rationalistic account articulates why it is that space and time cannot be conceived to be discursive concepts. Defined as infinite, space and time are posited beyond the functionality of discursive thinking, so are predicates beyond the principle of the understanding, and must be directed to a receptive faculty of cognition.

Despite the fact that these voices can only provide corroboration of the predictions and principle of systematic receptivity, they play an important role in the increase of philosophy's comprehension of its pure content. The principles of systematic receptivity are, as presented by transcendental idealistic reasoning, bare principles. Appearance is a dynamic of form and matter. Space and time are merely predicted to be forms of intuition. Transcendental idealism's expression of its account of spatiotemporality within the



Transcendental Aesthetic provides no detail or elucidation of space and time as forms of intuition. They are simply predicted to be the *a priori* forms of receptivity. Once a relation of corroboration is adopted however, empiricistic thought and rationalistic thought are shown to be contributing members through their engagement in Metaphysical Expositions. Thus, according to transformed empiricistic thinking, space and time can be conceived metaphysically as an object even though this object itself is understood to be an element of cognition. Further, according to transformed 'rationalistic' thinking, space and time can be conceived metaphysically as an intellectual construct even though this thinking is directed immediately to intuition. Through the work of 'empiricistic' and 'rationalistic' thinking, what is shown is how these otherwise diverse means of thinking, which *prima facie* appear to be in conflict with both each other and transcendental idealism, make explicit the realm of theoretical reason concerning receptivity itself. In this manner the comprehension of space and time as forms of intuition is synthetically enriched in an ampliative fashion. There is no aspect of matter or form which eludes theoretical philosophy. These implications do not follow directly from the system of principles that constitute the 'science of receptivity', but come from the development that takes place within these other means of thinking insofar as their developed thought corroborates the predictions of the 'science of receptivity'.

## **Appendix**

### **I. The Transcendental Expositions**

This thesis is supportive of Kant's negative conclusions regarding space at (A 26/B 42). There Kant states, for instance, that "[s]pace represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other"; and, "[f]or neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of things to which they pertain". Certainly the account of the Metaphysical Expositions given in this thesis neither affirms that space is a "property of things in themselves" nor does it affirm that space is derived from relations. Thus, its account is in agreement with the claim that "space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense". So there is no contradiction of Kant's claim that space is a mode of receptivity, and that this receptivity is the ground of the concept of space (A 26/B 42). Thus, this thesis can state that, within the transcendental standpoint, the "name of space" is only, and directly, referential to intuition (receptivity) (A 27/ B 43).

However, this thesis must recognize that it is not in a position to confirm the following:

Our expositions accordingly teach the reality of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, but at the same time the ideality of space in regards to things when they are considered in themselves through reason, i.e., without taking account of the constitution of our sensibility. We therefore



assert the empirical reality of space (with the transcendental ideality), i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we leave aside the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it as something that grounds the things in themselves. (B 44/A 28)

The divergence between what Kant claims and what this thesis can confirm is a potential disagreement over what *might* be concluded after the “transcendental exposition” of space is performed. By appealing to geometry it would seem that Kant hopes to show that the pure philosophical (metaphysical<sup>82</sup>) knowledge of space has credence with a science otherwise distinguishable from philosophy. This would show that there is reasonable cause to presume that space, as a metaphysical concept, is relevant and sufficient when such a particular science involves itself in spatiality. Since, for Kant, geometry is an *a priori* science where individual determinate spatial forms are considered, it might be concluded that grounded metaphysically space can have its manifold purely determined.

However, Euclidean geometry is presented by Kant as a science which already can be recognized as a science. Yet Kant now argues that it is after all indebted to a form of receptivity that can only be treated by philosophy. It would seem that what is hoped for is that the success of this science gives credence to the truth of the transcendental ideality of space. It does not seem like transcendental idealism supports this other science: rather, it seems that the success of geometry supports transcendental idealism. Of course, according to Kant geometry had to go through an analogous transformation, so it perhaps

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<sup>82</sup>The term metaphysical emphasized here because this thesis is in agreement so far only with the Metaphysical Expositions considered within the transcendental turn. I will state later that this thesis *could* be in agreement with the ‘transcendental ideality’ of space and time and thus could be in a position to agree with the sentiment that transcendental idealism is a means to empirical realism. All that has been shown so far is that within space and time there can be philosophical communion, so the move from a pure determinable content to a pure but determined content has not yet been justified.

need not be held to support philosophy so long as it follows the analogy. In this, the success of geometry would point to the capacity of cognition to evaluate its own activity. The examination of the possibility of this evaluation is not itself within the scope of geometry, but is properly taken up by philosophy. In such a way there may be some indirect activity of corroboration between philosophy and geometry<sup>83</sup>.

What this thesis maintains is that the process of the Metaphysical Expositions affirms the principles of the preceding section of the Transcendental Aesthetic. There, appearance is defined as “[t]he *indeterminate*<sup>84</sup> object of an empirical intuition”. The difference between a metaphysical exposition of space and a transcendental exposition of space, for this thesis, is precisely the question of whether or not such a transition from ‘pure indeterminate’ to ‘pure but determined’ space is possible. For it might be the case that Geometry exclusively possesses some ground of thinking which allows it to purely determine its objects. Such certainty might follow from an immediate *observation*, on the part of geometry, that such pure shapes can be thought in the first place. Critical philosophy might not be able to operate from such an observation. If such is the case, then showing that spatiality is inherent to geometry might not then necessitate that philosophy itself has this secondary mode of thinking space, that is, beyond a purely philosophical and conceptual mode. More may need to be shown if what Kant hopes to show is that philosophy can speak of pure, yet determined space.

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<sup>83</sup>This thesis does not delve into the question of non Euclidean geometry. Discussion here should be considered to be a sketch of how this thesis could enter into an engagement with the Transcendental Exposition. Its aim is to examine the relation of the first and second sections of the Transcendental Aesthetic given a critical starting point, and such a relation needs be worked out before any large examination involving the relation of the Metaphysical Expositions to the Transcendental Expositions given a critical starting point.

<sup>84</sup>My italics for emphasis



As with space, this thesis is supportive of Kant's considerations of the transcendental ideality of time. It agrees that it can be shown, within the transcendental standpoint, that "[t]ime is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination" and that "time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us." (B 49/A 32 – 33). Further, it agrees that Kant has shown that, within the transcendental standpoint, "[t]ime is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state". However, this thesis must be reserved in its judgement on the empirical reality of time.

Temporality would seem to be the stronger of the two Transcendental Expositions. Given that space is here presented as being dependent on time insofar as it is the case that "time is the formal condition of all appearances in general" it might be possible to reduce the importance of the Transcendental Exposition of space, or, *perhaps*, reformulate it in a way that is transformative of geometrical thought in general (A 34/B 51).<sup>85</sup> Given these considerations this thesis is merely reserved in its judgment regarding Kant's success in showing the empirical reality of time, and, upon more consideration, could become convinced of the validity of this position as it stands within the transcendental turn. Likewise, if the transcendental exposition of space were reworked to avoid the above mentioned difficulties, this thesis could be convinced of the validity of this Exposition within the transcendental scope as well.

This thesis can make some unreserved conclusions which are necessary for agreement with Kant's claims regarding the transcendental ideality of space and time,

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<sup>85</sup> Understood like this, the unseating of Euclidean geometry might actually be a boon to philosophy.

and which, for instance, allow this thesis to be in agreement with Kant's statement at A 35/B 56 that "[s]pace and time are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn *a priori*". This thesis understands space and time to be sources of cognition as they are identified as predicates which refer directly to intuition. They themselves are representative of an element of cognition (receptivity) that itself has been systematically clarified. To go further, as the forms of intuition originate from a clarification of a critically justified conception of the constitution of cognition, and since this principled consideration of receptivity is ampliative increased via metaphysical exposition, these forms of intuition represent the intellectualization of intuition as a cognitive capacity.

## **II. The 'Neglected' Alternative**

The 'neglected alternative' argues that Kant, in presuming spatiotemporality to be merely subjective has neglected the possibility that space and time are given along with the object as given. Guyer's treatment of the neglected alternative correctly identifies that Kant does not neglect the alternative, but excludes it (1987, 363). What Kant is supposed to neglect is the fact that intuitions, or things in themselves, could be inherently spatial beyond the subject's receptivity, and so objects that are perceived by the subject are objects that have the property of being spatiotemporal already, so these objects could be the ground of our concept of space and time. As Guyer points out on the same page, the reorientation of the cognition/object relation is a rejection of just such an alternative, so



to express this problem to be a problem of neglect is to misunderstand what it means to reorient the cognition/object relation (so treating it as a process which still requires an object that is originally beyond cognition). It is however possible to disagree that Kant has made the case for such a reorientation and therefore its consequences, but this is to acknowledge, as Guyer does, that Kant is not guilty of neglecting the alternative.

Guyer states that the problem is in a confusion on Kant's part over what sense of *necessity* is achieved by his arguments for spatiality. So he states that:

As I have suggested, the answer to this question lies in Kant's interpretation of the necessity inherent in our knowledge of space. My formulation of the alternative to the assumption that independent existence is incompatible with *a priori* knowledge depends on expressing the conclusion of Kant's argument that spatiality is a necessary condition on our perception of objects as a *conditional necessity*. That is, this formulation supposes that Kant's argument is intended to yield a result of the form, "It is necessary that *if* an object is perceived by us it must be perceived in space" (or even in Euclidean space). It is indeed natural to explain perception of an object understood as satisfaction of this *conditional necessity* by the assumption that any object actually perceived is spatial (and Euclidean) independently of our perception of it. But this is not how Kant interprets the necessity implicated in our *a priori* knowledge of spatiality and Euclidean geometry. Kant interprets this necessity as *absolute necessity* and believes that knowledge of absolute necessity is incompatible with the independent existence of the objects in question. (1987, 363)

Ultimately Guyer concludes that:

But Kant simply has no basis for claiming that the *a priori* forms of intuition as well as conceptualization are such "self-thought first principles" instead of mere subjective necessities, unless he makes the additional assumption of the absolute rather than conditional necessity of the premises of his argument. Without such an assumption, Kant has no ground on which to exclude a "preformation-system" of either pure reason (that is, understanding) or pure intuition (1897, 369)

It is important to note that the difference between Guyer, who holds that Kant may have been unjustified in excluding the alternative, and those who hold that Kant neglects it, is that Guyer's accusation attends to Kant's critical capacity to make the claims he does. To

accuse Kant of neglecting the alternative makes an incorrect assessment of the range of possibilities that Kant actually addresses. Guyer holds that, insofar as Kant has only achieved conditional necessity, Kant does not have warrant to exclude the possibility of the "independent existence of the objects in question" (1987, 363). As such, it just so happens, or it is only a conditional truth, that all the objects we perceive are spatial. From Guyer's perspective then, it is not possible for Kant to make the further claim that it can be known *absolutely* that there is nothing of objects as they are beyond what is perceived that could ground spatiality. So the disagreement with Kant's exclusion is presented in a formulation which tries to show that there are *general* conditions of spatiality that have been excluded by Kant without sufficient justification.

However, the account of Kant's critical beginning provided by this thesis could help toward a response to Guyer's more appropriate account of what originally was formulated under the name 'neglected' alternative. What is pointed out in this developed position is that the complainant's original expression did not address the breadth of possibilities achieved by Kant's transcendental turn. Having appreciated this oversight, the position is developed and formulated in critical terms which can now be brought into meaningful discourse with critical philosophy.

Kant's response can be that the *a priori* ground of space *can* have more than conditional necessity; that from within the transcendental standpoint it is critically known that there is no material object beyond the appearance. It is also possible to see that Guyer's complaint, in its new and more critical formulation, is ultimately directed toward an immediate relation to the object through intuition. In other words, Guyer's alternative



identifies with the incompleteness inherent to receptivity, which is also fully admitted by the transcendental standpoint. However, the complainant is in error when the comprehension of incompleteness is taken to extend to the theoretical operators, in this case to matter. The correct appreciation of Kant's position is to comprehend how the cognitive operators are sufficient within the theoretical framework even though they are not sufficient to account for the object 'as it is thought to be complete beyond all relationality'.

With the above in mind, consider the situation of matter. Matter is a cognitive operator. Matter is fully within appearance. So far as our theoretical concerns go, matter is sufficient as a division of theoretical reason, that is, of the exploration of the grounds of objective relationality. As regards causality, as was discussed in the second chapter, matter is involved with effect, even though the thought of its logical completion requires the inclusion of affect. Affect and effect are not reducible but each has a distinct meaning. Effect is tied up with causality, and, as such, is the realm available to theoretical reason. Conversely, affect is an implication of receptivity that does not *directly* involve itself with causality. When receptivity is posited as a capacity of cognition it can be asked how that capacity is thought of as complete. The thought of receptivity is complete when it is comprehended that receptivity immediately implies an other. Nothing is said of this other besides its necessity in the consideration of receptivity as a whole.

Matter only comes forward once the consideration goes beyond this logical completion of receptivity, and turns to the second implication of receptivity: that something real is received. If it is asked how this object (in the case of the Transcendental

Aesthetic receptivity itself) is complete, then what is appealed to is not an object per se, but instead receptivity as the condition of appearance. Receptivity, taken as a content for active cognition, is considered as complete under the second meaning of the object, and all that is claimed is that it can be thought as causally complete in a manner that obeys the law of non-contradiction. If Kant means otherwise – that the object considered as complete must have some imperceptible material existence – then Falkenstein's concern regarding the 'real use of the understanding' – which posits that the understanding can think what is inherent to the object in a manner beyond what is possible for experience – is certainly valid. However, it is possible to show that the object as appearance is not dependent on some 'mysterious' matter, but that matter contained within appearance is directly linked to the strictly logical implication of receptivity: that receptivity demands that there be an other, though only in a logical meaning.

Without a model of how Kant critically arrives at the constitutional composition of cognition as dualistic, the adequacy of situating matter in appearance is impossible to appreciate. Since the adequacy of this is not appreciated, it seems as if Kant is leaving something of matter behind when he situates it in appearance and it therefore appears impossible for Kant to completely consider the entire scope of matter in his theoretical investigation. Thus it appears that Kant has achieved only conditional necessity. Concerning the 'neglected alternative', even though Guyer's improvement correctly directs its force against Kant's critical argumentation, what is still insisted upon is that the merely logical meaning of the object must contain some aspect of matter: despite the



fact that Guyer, as mentioned above, concedes that the *Critique of Pure Reason* cannot be taken to require a two-world, or two-object interpretation.

However, after the transcendental turn, whatever is the concern of *theoretical reason* and is put in general or universal terms, is truly known to be of the subject. Thus expressed in the non-adversarial methodology examined by this thesis, Guyer's articulation of the neglected alternative provides corroboration of the transcendental position. This is because in developing the complaint so that it approaches what is acceptable in critical philosophy, what is shown is that there is a ratio between the degree of error in reason's self-estimation and the stability of its conclusions. As the reasoning of a complaint against transcendental idealism begins to comprehend the implications of the transcendental turn, and so identifies with Kant's solution to the origin of reason's self-misunderstanding, the complaint itself turns and provides example of the correctness of transcendental idealism. Once matter is known to be fully within appearance, nothing of matter remains neglected by Kant's conception of appearance.

### **III. Allison on the Givenness of Space and Time in the Metaphysical Expositions**

Givenness, in the arguments for the intuitional nature of space and time, has provided difficulty in comprehending the relation of the Transcendental Aesthetic with the Transcendental Analytic. In his book *Kant*, Guyer warns that "we must be careful about Kant's claim that space and time are *given* as infinite, for it will later be central to

Kant's argument in the "Transcendental Dialectic" that we cannot represent the universe as infinite in spatial or temporal extent" (Guyer 2006, 57 – 58). Guyer's solution to this requires a distinction between thinking space and time 'as such', and thinking the world as spatial. In thinking space and time 'as they are' distinct from the consideration of the world, it is difficult not to attribute an ontological quality to space and time, that is, spatiotemporality without a world.

This thesis does not consider space and time in the Metaphysical Expositions 'as they are' but as special conceptions wherein modes of philosophy can come to agreement from principled, but not direct foundational, disagreement. In the Metaphysical Expositions the concepts of space and time are shown to be forms of intuition. Accordingly, space and time are understood to be given to us rather than constructed by the intellect. Henry Allison points out, for instance, that in "the Axioms of Intuition [...]" Kant claims that space can be represented only by means of a successive synthesis, which seems incompatible with its presumed givenness" (2004, 112), and then provides an argument for how this *apparent* discrepancy can be resolved. It should be said here that, even though what Allison argues will be examined, this thesis cannot fully give an account of the relation of these separate sections since this thesis does not officially go beyond the Metaphysical Expositions in its chapters. However, since Allison suggests that any account of the intuition arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions should be able to suggest how it would handle this issue, this thesis takes it upon itself to present how it would address this issue.



What concerns Allison is that in the Axioms of Kant “claims that space can represented only by means of successive synthesis, which seems incompatible with its presumed givenness [in the Metaphysical Expositions]” (2004, 112). Allison begins his discussion of the problem of givenness by conceding “that we cannot blame Kant for being unable to say everything at once” (2004, 112). So Allison is accepting of the fact that Kant may intend to develop his account of space and time in the Transcendental Analytic. Of course, Allison correctly expects that any development made to the account of space and time should at least be consistent with what Kant states in the Metaphysical Expositions. Therefore, even in granting Kant leeway to develop his notion of space and time later on in the *Critique*, as mentioned above, there are potential consistency problems regarding Kant’s theory of spatiotemporality as it appears throughout the *Critique*.

While it can be agreed that Kant may want to develop his account of space and time throughout the *Critique*, and while it also can be agreed that there should not be issues with consistency in such development, it is possible to question Allison’s solution to the problem of givenness. His solution will be questioned below on two grounds. First, Allison’s expectation that it is permissible for Kant to develop the account of space throughout the *Critique* does not do enough to show in what sense Metaphysical Expositions are complete. Kant needs to demonstrate that reason can treat pure subject matter in the Transcendental Aesthetic so that he can use transcendental logic in the Transcendental Analytic. The Metaphysical Expositions play a primary role in this demonstration. Since part of Allison’s solution is to say that the Metaphysical

Expositions need not be thought to be Kant's complete thought on space, it is possible to question whether or not the Metaphysical Expositions actually demonstrate that reason can treat pure reason. So, it needs to be shown how the Metaphysical Expositions are sufficient for the task they need to accomplish. Second, in order to resolve the inconsistencies in Kant's account of space throughout the *Critique*, Allison resorts to what he calls "pre-intuition". However, as will be discussed below, this pre-intuition seems to be similar to Falkenstein's 'matter of intuition' insofar as seems to leave some aspect of intuition unaccounted for.

Allison makes a convincing case for his claim that Kant wishes to develop his account of spatiality in the Transcendental Aesthetic. He points out for example, that for Kant, these original representations are always understood to be in unity with conceptual conditions, thus Kant's statement that "neither [receptivity nor understanding] is to be preferred to the other" and that "[o]nly from their unification can cognition arise" are significant (B 75/ A 51, B 76/ A 52). If such statements are taken into consideration when reading the Metaphysical Expositions then it seems possible that Kant's attempt to address intuition in isolation is understood only as an exercise while not ultimately an actual theoretical possibility. Allison will go on to state that what is given "is said to confront thought as a brute datum...though not as a distinct object that might somehow be inspected independently of all conceptualization" (2004, 113). Later Allison will state that "[s]ince Kant's concern in the Aesthetic was to isolate sensibility in order to determine its particular contribution to cognition he had to ignore at that point the necessity of a synthesis for determinate representations of space and time ( formal



intuitions)” (2004, 192). Under these conditions, the Transcendental Analytic is presented to clarify and develop the comprehension of space and time as representations in a manner that was important to the conception of spatiotemporality, though not possible in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Certainly it would be inadvisable to disagree with the fact that Kant is developing the comprehension of space and time in his later discussion on the subject of spatiotemporality. Of course, that this is so is no great revelation of Allison’s. Kant himself states that “[i]n the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts” (B 160 – 161)<sup>86</sup>. It is Kant himself who implies that the unity in spatiotemporal experience was not completely treated in the Transcendental Aesthetic. But this does not necessarily mean that the account given in the Aesthetic is insufficient for its aims. A problem arises however when the account of space and time in the Aesthetic is taken to be incomplete *and* Kant is also held to state things about space and time that he later seems to contradict. In the first, ‘incomplete’ account, space is said to be given. In the second, ‘complete’ account, space is said not to be merely given. Here it appears that the earlier account is not just incomplete but, in the face of later development, insufficient. Since the intuition arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions need to be revised by Kant’s later statements, the term ‘givenness’ takes on

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<sup>86</sup> In her work *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998) Beatrice Longuenesse has her own very interesting interpretation of this wherein she holds that “[t]he goal of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is “fully attained” only when it leads to a *rereading* of the Transcendental Aesthetic” (1998, 213). While Longuenesse makes important contributions to this subject, she does not account for the consistency and correctness of the *first* reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Hence, she is led into the same circle as Allison insofar as the Aesthetic is to validate transcendental logic. Transcendental logic is of primary importance to the Transcendental Analytic. Then according to both Allison and Longuenesse, the Transcendental Analytic is held to have some important contribution for the Transcendental Aesthetic, so that the Transcendental Aesthetic can be thought to be complete.

quite a tentative quality. It is in this piecemeal fashion, then, that the Metaphysical Expositions have their significance and credibility reduced.

Certainly it should not be denied that Kant's statements concerning spatiotemporality should in some manner be shown to be consistent throughout the *Critique*. This is problematic because holding that Kant was required to postpone issues that were *integral* to the conception of space leads to the conclusion that the Transcendental Aesthetic is insufficient in its aim. It should not be forgotten that the success of the Aesthetic is the precondition of the primary tool of the Analytic: transcendental logic. However, there is a yet a more interesting problem at hand if the Transcendental Aesthetic is taken as unable to directly deal with receptivity as pure content. As mentioned above, Allison holds that Kant does not completely treat intuition, as something isolated entirely from the understanding. Because of this he is open to the introduction of a pre-intuition which is presupposed of the activity of spatiotemporal synthesis. Thus, according to Allison, the differences in Kant's account can be resolved by showing how each is able to either treat or to rely on this pre-intuition. As this thesis suggests, however, such an introduction is not necessary to account for givenness in the Metaphysical Expositions.

Allison also treats two specific problems regarding the givenness of space and time. The first regards Kant's statement in the Axioms of Intuition that space is represented by way of successive synthesis (A 162/B 202). The second involves Kant's statement at (A 291/ B 347) "pure space and time ... are to be sure something, as the forms for intuiting, but are not in themselves objects that are intuited (*ens imaginarium*)"



Of this statement Allison asks “if space and time are not given as *objects* of intuition, in what sense can they be said to be given (or intuited) at all” (Allison 2004, Pg 113)?

Dealing with the second question first, Allison states that for Kant “the conceptualization of space presupposes a pattern or order (in Kant's terms a pure manifold), which both guides and constrains this activity (Allison 2004 Pg 113). The solution is to conceive of a 'pre-intuition' underlying the activity of conceptualizing space. This pre-intuition “guides and constrains” the activity inherent to the conceptualization of space without itself every being perceived as such. Pre-intuition seems to be another way of stating indeterminate intuition (Allison 2004, Pg 115), so is not taken to be utterly distinct from intuition or the activity of conceptualizing space.

However, this still leaves a foundational element of cognition at that unaccounted. It is only accounted for as it must be posited and not as it can be explored by thinking. So, even though Allison does not follow Falkenstein on the 'blindness issue', pre-intuition seems to be an element of receptivity Kant's receptivity would not be able to account for, and yet, in being material, should not be organized under the mere thinking of the object as complete. Receptivity is certainly explicated by Kant. Both matter and form are within appearance which is treatable by theoretical cognition. True, both of these can be thought of as complete in a sense that requires logical thinking, but to state that intuition is beyond what is thinkable by the understanding<sup>87</sup>, such that it cannot be theoretically treated, is to leave out a very important element of Kant's system. As a consequence, within theoretical philosophy – wherein reason is supposed to arrive at full satisfaction

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<sup>87</sup>As this thinking was defined in the first chapter of this thesis.

(A viii) – the ground of all its spatiotemporal synthesis is left as if it is only a '*matter*' needed for logical completion.

This 'pre-intuition' also plays an important role in the resolution of the first problem presented by Allison, which concerns the "Axioms of Intuition". In very much the same manner as above, the intellectual activity that is inherent to the synthesis must be known to 'presuppose' the form of intuition as representative of pre-intuition (Allison 2004, 116 – 118). In chapter 7 of his book Allison goes on to state that Kant was pragmatically ignoring certain issues which could be more fully treated elsewhere.

The tension between 'Kant's' claims in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the Transcendental Analytic can, however, be resolved without supposing that the Transcendental Analytic overshadows the Transcendental Aesthetic. Once it is recognized that the arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions are not the reasoning of transcendental idealism, but of certain distinct voices which arrive at corroboration, then there is very little in the way of Kant developing transcendental idealism's account of space and time later on. With regard to the issue at hand, it is the rationalistic account that arrives at the proposition that space and time are given as infinite. Importantly, what is simultaneously recognized by rationalistic thought, in light of the transcendental turn, is that such a proposition is directed immediately to intuition. Such an infinite concept cannot be sustained by the activity of thinking, but must immediately require intuition as a second cognitive faculty. Rationalistic thinking comprehends that when space is thought of as an infinite concept that concept can no longer be thought of as discursive. The concept of space is not then grounded by the understanding, but by the intuition.



Thus, the rationalistic stance corroborates the principles of the 'science of receptivity' without merely imitating the thinking of transcendental idealism. But transcendental idealism has already predicted this outcome from its own principles. Transcendental idealism is indebted to the complainant for corroboration, but not for the specific means through which such a prediction was made.

Transcendental idealism is thus free to consider space and time once again in the science of pure understanding where these concepts can be considered according to the activity of the understanding. Such a development is possible because the Transcendental Aesthetic has affirmed that philosophy can use transcendental logic (A 55/B 80). All three considered standpoints, transcendental idealism, empiricistic thinking, and rationalistic thinking, have demonstrated that they can think pure content, though since transcendental idealism has a set of principles that can link thinking to intuition, thus providing stability to such thought, it is the most complete.

Since all three have demonstrated an ability to think pure content all three pass into the Analytic and contribute to the next science. However, rationalistic thinking and empiricistic thinking are situated within transcendental idealism due to its completeness. What this means, of course is, that even if space and time are more fully accounted in the Analytic, it is only by virtue of the fact that the 'science of receptivity' has completely achieved its aim. In the Transcendental Aesthetic transcendental idealism has provided philosophy with a system of principles that can account for receptivity as a cognitive faculty. Rationalistic and empiricistic thinking have, as has been discussed above, synthetically increased the account of receptivity through the breath of their self-

development, and through their corroboration. There is a difference between ignoring something integral to our comprehension of space and time and treating the subject matter in a critical fashion, where each step is a complete unity according to its aim. In the *Metaphysical Expositions* the concepts of space and time are considered as unifying grounds for distinct philosophical voices. Nothing is considered of an ontological nature. What is considered is how, in these concepts, a philosophical means of thinking, without its own sufficient body of principles, is turned over to its opposite, that is, into agreement with the voice of philosophy that is capable of producing a sufficient body of principles.

Presumably what is considered in the *Transcendental Analytic* is how transcendental idealism can account for space ontologically, that is the consideration of the “application of the categories to objects of the senses in general” (B 150). Kant does make comments concerning the synthesis inherent to the conceptualization of space. Allison supposes these to be a development in spatiotemporal theory, but does not answer for how the account of spatiotemporality in the *Aesthetic* is complete according to its own aim *and* consistent with Kant’s later claims. He holds to a notion of presupposition that questionably relies upon mere hypothesis. This is because pre-intuition is for Allison “not as a distinct object that might somehow be inspected independently of all conceptualization” (Allison 2004, Pg 113). However, just because a postulate is necessarily required for a theory does not make that postulate itself necessary. Such is the self-awareness of the *critical* philosophy: the theory is not to presume its correctness, but proceed from what has been demonstrated. What is more, even the first principle of cognition, that cognition must be described dualistically, certainty is not taken for granted.



From such a principle predictions are made that are meant to involve the philosophical community in an investigation of the very structure of Kant's science of receptivity.

Further, holding that the account is not complete until Kant can speak of synthesis is dubious. On one hand it is of course necessary to talk about the synthesis inherent to the spatiality. After all, Kant does hold that space and time are ideal. This brings them into a relation with a manifold without which they are merely forms and not themselves objects (A 28/ B 44, A 36/B 52). So it makes sense that Kant goes on to argue for the synthetic nature of the conceptualization of space. This does not change anything about the form of intuition. As Kant states in the Axioms, "All appearances contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time, which grounds them *a priori*. They cannot be apprehended, therefore, i.e., taken up into empirical consciousness, except through the synthesis of the manifold" (A 161/B 202).

Kant is certainly holding here that intuition as such is the given ground, even though the activity of taking up the appearance into empirical consciousness involves a synthesis (which necessarily<sup>88</sup> involves spatiotemporality as *a priori* form of intuition). This is entirely consistent with Kant's statement in §7 that "[t]ime and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn *a priori*". (A 39/ B 56) *Of course* without pure intuition this synthesis would be impossible to justify. But to hold the Aesthetic to be deficient in its capacity to treat spatiotemporality because Kant develops transcendental idealism's account of

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<sup>88</sup> "All appearances" is a universal statement that is strictly necessary. This means that it is *a priori* and involves solely the subject. But, form of intuition concerns directly a faculty which is known necessarily to be given. Thus the form is still held to be given even though in the next sentence Kant states that spatiotemporality is brought into empirical consciousness by means of synthesis.

spatiotemporality later on seems quite circular. The account of spatiotemporality in the Aesthetic is necessary to get to the Analytic, but the account of synthesis in the Analytic is necessary to complete the account of space and time in the Aesthetic. Once it is recognized that all the Aesthetic aims toward is the demonstration that reason can treat pure content, and that all means of reason treat the same content, the supposed conflict disappears.



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