ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN FAILED STATES

PHIL ORCHARD

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Humanitarian Interventions in Failed States

by

Phil Orchard

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Abstract

Failed and failing states are a growing concern throughout the world. These states leave the United Nations and the international community in the position of either helping or ignoring them. Unfortunately, when the UN has chosen to intervene, it has been unsuccessful in solving the state's long term problems. This thesis will examine two case studies of 'failed' interventions, Somalia and Haiti, and existing theoretical models in order to 1) explore the strategies available to the UN to stop complex emergencies in failed states and then to reconstruct them, and 2) propose a new humanitarian intervention framework embodying these lessons.

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more,

Or close the wall up with our English dead.

In peace there's nothing so becomes a man

As modest stillness and humility,

But when the blast of war blows in our ears,

Then imitate the action of the tiger.

Stiffen the sinews, conjure up the blood,

Disguise fair nature with hard-favoured rage.

William Shakespeare, *Henry V* Act 3 Scene 1

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List of Acronyms

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
CINCCENT	Commander- in-Chief, United States Central Command
CINCUSACOM	Commander- in-Chief, United States Atlantic Command
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
DFAIT	Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
HNP	Haitian National Police
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HRO	Humanitarian Relief Organisation
HRS	Humanitarian Relief Sector
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MNF	Multinational Force (Haiti)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
QRF	United States Quick Reaction Force (Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
U.S.	United States
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
USF	United Somali Front

ROE	Rules of Engagement
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNDU	Somali National Democratic Union
SNF	Somali National Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRSG	Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
VSN	Voluntaries de la Securite Nationale (Haiti)
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

Chapter I: The United Nations and Failed States

I. A Preliminary Orientation

Since the end of the Cold War, a new and growing phenomenon has emerged: states that, for all practical purposes, fail. These failed states create three substantial problems. They create violence as parties within the states begin to wage war. They create refugees and internally-displaced persons as people flee the fighting. Most importantly, they create humanitarian emergencies as the population can no longer receive the fundamental requirements for life.

The international actor of last resort, the United Nations, has always seen itself as having four main purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to co-operate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. [1]

The end of the Cold War gave the UN a new ability to intervene decisively in countries that appeared to be a threat to international peace and security, a category that grew to encompass these failed states. But the UN is "a characteristic institution of international society and the creature of its Member States..."[2] It prides itself on providing "the means to help resolve international conflict and formulate policies on matters affecting all of us. At the UN, all the Member States - large and small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems - have a voice and vote in this process."[3] While all Member States agree to accept the principles of the UN Charter, this acceptance often takes a back seat to the principles of sovereignty.

This meant that through its first 45 years, the UN chose to intervene in member states only with their consent.[4] The end of the Cold War and the emergence of failed states altered this considerably. The UN accepted that this norm could be overridden for two reasons: to protect the international order, where "the intervention is taken for valid reasons of international peace and security,"[5] and for humanitarianism, where "the intervention is to protect the population of the target state...from grave abuses at the hands of their own government or anti-government rebels or as a result of domestic anarchy."[6]

With this change of emphasis, it did not take long before the UN found itself intervening in two failed states -Somalia and Haiti- in an effort to end the anarchy and then to rebuild each country. Unfortunately, while the tools at the UN's disposal increased dramatically, it was poorly equipped to deal with states that literally had no government left. This meant that substantial mistakes were made, both in the short and long term, resulting in the failure of both missions.

Perhaps the solution is simply not to intervene in such states. Despite the rhetoric, failed states seldom pose a direct threat to international security. In the past, they have been allowed to simmer with hardly a problem- why choose to intervene in Somalia and not the Sudan? When a country is ripe for peace, its problems may be solved far more easily through negotiations than through an intervention. Edward Luttwak argues that peace becomes attractive to belligerents only after hopes of military success have faded. Therefore, the United Nations and other international actors, when they choose to intervene in a state through actions such as enforcing cease-fires, which allow belligerents to rest, reconstitute and rearm their forces,[7] and through NGOs, which aid the belligerents

because the belligerents steal from them,[8] "perversely... can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace... peace takes hold only when war is truly over."[9]

However, the indirect effects of failed states and combat in general can be significant. Refugee flows and arms smuggling may destablize the entire region- the fear in Sierra Leone that has since prompted a similar United Nations intervention. Thus, failed state problems may very well flow into other countries. Further, internal wars have more often ended in stalemate than in peace.[10] Therefore, "rather than a fight to the finish- which would come at horrendous cost to civilians... regional crises need competent intervention (and not just of the military sort) appropriate to local conditions."[11]

The core problem is that a failed state is not a benign place. In the two cases that will be examined, armed conflict caused the state to fail. Once this happens, basic essentials such as food and health care became unavailable, resulting in widespread famine and disease, which in turn produce humanitarian or complex emergencies. The UN Charter imposes on the international community the obligation to protect fundamental human rights- rights that can no longer be enjoyed in failed states. When the international community has chosen not to intervene- such as in the genocide in Rwanda- this lack of action has returned to haunt it. Therefore, while a mission may meet failure, it is still in the interest of the international community to intervene.

After first determining what constitutes a failed state and how such states emerge, this thesis will explore the strategies available to the United Nations and other international actors to: 1) Prevent and conclude short-term complex emergencies in failed states and 2) to reconstruct failed states in the long term in order to avoid the root causes

of conflict. These issues will be investigated by anazlying case studies of the interventions in Somalia and Haiti and by a review of existing theoretical models to conclude with a new framework for humanitarian interventions.

As the international actor of last resort, the United Nations became involved in failed states throughout the 1990s. However, in the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the UN was unwilling to accept that intervening in failed states was different from other interventions. This resulted in neither mission realizing its long-term goals, and led to the spectacular failure of the mission in Somalia. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss what constitutes a failed state, the mechanisms the UN used to deal with the cases of Somalia and Haiti, and the new mechanisms have been proposed since these missions.

II. What is a Failed State?

Failed states are states "which cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance... Failed states are juridical shells that shroud an insecure and even a dangerous condition domestically..."[12] They have ceased to possess coherent identities, an agreed upon societal and political consensus, and governing powers strong enough to impose unity without this consensus. They are anarchic, with different armed self-governing groups controlling territory and contesting control of the central government by force. They may or may not still have a presence internationally.

But how can a state, the most important element of the international geopolitical arena, fail? At its core, a modern state is built around three key points. Any state must possess a binding conception of what principles the population holds in common and classifies as 'the national interest'. A state must also have a physical base, some territory

that it alone controls. Otherwise, its citizens can never be unique and independent participants in the international community. And a state must have a government as an institutional base for the expression of its unique being.[13]

Combined with these three factors are two of lesser importance. The first is that a state, in order to be able to govern effectively and efficiently, must be of a certain size. While the exact size necessary is unknown, it is generally assumed that a state must have a population greater than 100,000 to be completely viable.[14] A state must also be sovereign: it must be able to claim supreme authority and should have no higher level of political authority affecting it.[15]

The institutional base is the government, which is not identical to the state. A government:

> [D]erives its just powers from the governed and generates a viable political competence that can and will manage, co-ordinate, and sustain security, and political, economic and social development. Legitimate governance is inherently stable because it has the political competence and societal support to adequately manage internal change and conflict affecting collective and individual well-being.[16]

The stability of a government depends on three things: its economic base and continued growth, its effectiveness, and its legitimacy. Effectiveness means "actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population ...see them," while "legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."[17]

However, states can exist that do not possess all these attributes. In general, a state's legitimacy benefits from the simple feeling that its citizens believe anything is better than a return to the state of nature,[18] where life was "nasty, brutish and short."[19]

Therefore, the historical record shows that a state may be viable even if it only provides some security, and in fact a state may pose a considerable threat to its own people, yet still maintain legitimacy.[20]

Then, how may a state fail? Legitimacy, John Locke argued, occurs as "the community put power into hands they think fit..."[21] A state retains legitimacy by continuing to enjoy the support of the people, a support that may be based on a government pursuing 'higher' and 'nobler' purposes,[22] through binding rules, or through fear.[23] Similarly, a state that possesses legitimacy must "successfully [uphold] a claim to the exclusive regulation of the legitimate use of physical force in ensuring its rules within a given territorial area."[24]

An existing state that loses this legitimacy may also lose its identity. When "large numbers of people begin to doubt or deny the claim of government to regulate force, then the existing state is in peril of dissolution."[25] A government can always be challenged. This idea, too, evolved from Locke, who saw that a state that acts on its own authority, without the consent of the people, subverts the end of government.[26]

But, while changes of government occur often, and even revolutions are commonplace, why then are failed states so rare? A failed state will not emerge from a state that has developed a unifying identity, or strong institutions. Rather, it will emerge from weak states, which range the gauntlet from states still in the process of consolidation -which do not yet have political and societal consensus- to states that did not even have a coherent or accepted idea, nor enough power to impose unity.[27] A weak state does not yet, and may never have, a legitimate monopoly of the use of force, nor legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

This does not mean all weak states will fail. States are notoriously hardy, and some have existed for far longer than one would have expected without possessing any of the vital attributes of 'stateness'. Similarly, a state may evolve. They may also continue to exist through international support and domestic political payoffs. Weak states in Africa have been characterised as 'Lame Leviathans,' defined as where the state has the capacity "to incarcerate its internal enemies, tax international agencies (by threatening to disintegrate) but not its own population, and provide domestic order through foreign-funded police surveillance. It also has the capacity to reward its sycophants with relatively attractive employment."[28]

A weak state becomes a failed state when the basic functions of a state are no longer performed. As the decisionmaking centre of government, the state is paralysed and inoperative. Laws that are required are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not maintained. It no longer creates a unique identity. Its territorial integrity is no longer assured. As a political institution, it has lost its capacity to command and conduct public affairs. And it ceases to function as a socio-economic organisation. In other words, the state has lost the right to rule.[29] Further, as civil conflicts within a failed state increase, the state begins to replicate "the well-known pattern of Hobbesian competition for security in the 'state of nature', where no sovereign power protects fearful individuals from each other. In this anarchical setting prudent self-help may require preventive attacks to hedge against possible threats..."[30]

III. How does such a decline occur?

Two different sets of criteria have been proposed to demonstrate a state's decline. The first set, proposed by William Zartman,[31] argues that the decline of a state can be marked by slow failure within its government. Five signposts, of equal importance and unclear chronological order, can mark this:

- Power devolves to the peripheries because the centre dissolves in internal conflict.
- Power withers at the centre as people stop supporting or obeying government.
- The government avoids making necessary but difficult choices.
- Politicians practice only defensive politics, concentrating on procedural stratagems.
- Finally, the centre no longer controls its agents, who begin to operate independently.

The second set of criteria focuses on the state as a whole, and was proposed by experts at a round-table held at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. [32] This set of criteria suggests that the descent of a state from normalcy to anarchy occurs through four phases within each of the four realms of the modern state: military, social, political, and economic:

The first phase sees the emergence of threats:

- The military ceases traditional security activities.
- Socially, there is communal break up; a disintegration of cultural values; a decreased tolerance of other ethnic groups; reduced individual and collective security; a general perception of hopelessness; and localised or individual anarchic behaviour.

- Politically, there is a cessation of representation by government; an erosion of public regard for institutions; dissolution of some political borders; and the loss of institutionalised control mechanisms.

The second phase of decline sees the loss of confidence in the state:

- Militarily, there may be competing military forces; the breakdown of military organisations; and resistance to international assistance efforts.
- Socially, there may be destruction of religious institutions; collapse of the educational system; and breakdown of the health care system.
- Politically, there is the loss of control of the population by the leadership; no attempts are made to settle differences; the judicial system collapses; and there is the cessation of information programs.
- Economically international finance becomes unavailable, and energy resources and communications systems are destroyed.

The third phase sees institutional breakdown and the collapse of organisational structures:

- The military see a disinterest in or inability to restore order and the accessibility of arms among the entire population increases.
- Socially, the systematic devaluation of human rights begins; the elites depart; there is an inability to achieve basic subsistence and widespread disease occurs; there is an increased displacement of the population; and there is the destruction of civil and political structures.

- Politically, there is the existence of competing power centres and there is decreased attention to international opinion or affairs.
- Economically, the commercial base becomes inactive; banks and financial institutions collapse; the physical infrastructure is destroyed; currency circulation ceases; remittance capital is gone; and environmental degradation occurs.

By its very nature, a weak state, or a failing state, is positioned somewhere within these three stages. A failed state is a unique case. It is a fourth phase, one of complete political and social collapse, extreme lawlessness, constant and widespread violence, and severe deprivation and starvation.[33] A failed state represents anarchy.

IV. Are Failed States A New Phenomenon?

Today we view failed states as a product of the end of the Cold War. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the UN, stated that "the end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere... The end of the Cold War seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of such wars in Africa..."[34]

But while the end of the Cold War may have generated this upsurge, failed states have existed throughout modern history. Particularly when a state has not yet consolidated, violence is commonplace:

> Internal war is especially likely in countries that begin the process of state building with modest amounts of power relative to the groups they seek to govern. Whether the focus is on the European civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or today's conflicts in Central Europe and the Third World, the process of redistributing power from the periphery is often a bloody, long-term affair.[35]

Similarly, the early Latin American states found that fighting long wars of independence left them with economic disaster, vast loss of life, little trade, and constant conflict:[36] "From the 1820's until mid-century, political authority in Spanish America was weak; the state, as a central institution, did not wield much autonomous strength."[37] For thirty years, and much longer in some smaller states, authority was not institutionalised, but rather rested in the hands of individual strongmen, *caudillos*, who rules for as long as they could mobilise and arm their personal supporters.

V. Why now the interest in failed states?

If failed states are therefore not a new occurrence, why since the end of the Cold War has the UN and the international community focused on them? A failed state often becomes a complex emergency, which is "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme."[38] The institution most applicable to dealing with a complex emergency is the United Nations, which through widespread membership and programs, can generate the necessary international response to deal with the problems. combining the need for humanitarian assistance with political and military factors.[39]

Three trends not directly related to the emergency also contribute to the problem. The first is demographic. There is simply now a larger population, particularly in Africa, that becomes subject to displacement by these wars.[40] The second is the role of the media:

> The increasingly pervasive nature of the media coverage of humanitarian catastrophes has created new pressures on policymakers as diaspora and political constituencies demand some form of response. Ease of international communications and travel will ensure that media-saturated

> societies in the West have immediate access to information about such humanitarian disasters. Nongovernmental organizations will advocate intervention and policymakers will search for initiatives that respond both to issues of injustice and humanitarian need as well as to domestic political pressures.[41]

The final trend is that the humanitarian response to these problems "is evolving from one of providing asylum in Western countries to containment of movement and humanitarian intervention to address the proximate causes of displacement in the states of origin of would-be refugees."[42] Therefore, as governments choose not to harbour more refugees, but are pushed by public opinion into 'doing something,' the easiest solution is to repair the damage within the failed state itself.

VI. The Role of the United Nations in Humanitarian Interventions

Failed states beget violence because within them a security dilemma exists, as "each party's efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others."[43] With such a security dilemma, three possible solutions exist. The first follows from Thomas Hobbes: "establish a sovereign authority capable of enforcing a hegemonic peace upon all the fearfully contending parties."[44] However, failed states occur precisely because no group can assume sovereign authority. Therefore, this is impossible. The second is to develop a solution whereby each party can protect its own security through solely defensive measures. While this may occur eventually in a failed state, in each case study presented here the belligerents still believed victory and complete control of the remaining state apparatus was possible.[45] The third solution is to assure that the contending parties lock themselves into an institutional framework that guarantees each group's self-restraint, done either through balanced power sharing among all parties or by delegation of powers to an impartial authority.[46]

Given the UN's abilities within the three planks of dispute resolution: diplomacy, peacekeeping, and international law,[47] it has emerged as the ultimate impartial authority, and this is the task it sought to take on during the interventions in Somalia and Haiti. However, the UN was not created to fulfil this task. This change only occurred through a long evolution of practices. The first purpose of the UN was always seen as to preserve international peace and security.[48] The Preamble of the Charter states that the UN was founded for this task and "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind..."[49] For these ends, the UN pledged to:

> practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure... that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.[50]

However, given both the power of the Security Council embodied within the Charter, and the ability of the superpowers to block actions they did not agree with, the full use of the provisions allowed to the Council in order to maintain international peace and security rarely occurred. Therefore, the Council resorted to other measures to prevent conflict, based on the consent of belligerent member states and the deployment of lightly armed troops to patrol agreed upon boundaries.[51] This became known as traditional peacekeeping.

A. Traditional Peacekeeping

The first observer mission occurred in 1948,[52] but it was not until the Suez crisis in 1956 that a true traditional peacekeeping mission was deployed. While it was established as little more than an improvised response to a specific occasion,[53] the

characteristics of the mission would become the basis for most of the peacekeeping missions of the Cold War.[54]

Traditional missions are "operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict."[55] They require impartiality on behalf of the UN forces, the consent of the protagonists, for the forces to be both non-hostile and lightly armed, and the use of force only for self-defence.[56] Such missions had little actual power and were completely reliant on outside actors, in particular the Security Council for their mandate and legality, and UN Member States for the actual forces. They could not create peace. Rather, the conditions for a non-violent environment had to exist before they were deployed. [57]

Traditional peacekeeping forces, therefore, assume the position of invited guest. Any party can revoke their invitation, and the peacekeepers cannot attempt to impose a peace.[58] In fact, the first United Nations Emergency Force, deployed to protect the Egyptian-Israeli border, was forced to leave Egypt when the Egyptian government withdrew its consent in 1967.[59]

These missions became almost benign activities. It was a method through which the middle powers of the world could work to prevent the expansion of conflict and therefore the involvement of the Security Council, which in turn would have brought about the involvement of the superpowers and potentially wider scale conflict.[60] Over time, traditional missions assumed clear tasks while deployed, such as defusing tensions, stabilising situations, preventing the outbreak of violent conflict, and establishing at least the semblance of normal conditions. They also acted as arbiters and mediators, even as

instruments of law and order where none existed. And they worked on a variety of humanitarian tasks, such as rebuilding infrastructure.[61] Only one peacekeeping mission during the Cold War violated these trends: the Congo.

The Congo

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) initially began in order to assist the government of the Congo in maintaining law and order after Belgium unilaterally deployed troops to protect Belgian nationals in the country during a period of escalating conflict.[62] The presence of the Belgians allowed the Congolese government to argue for the dispatch of UN troops to protect the country against "present external aggression which is a threat to international peace"- even though the main threat was internal.[63]

Therefore, while the Belgians quickly removed themselves after the rapid deployment (peacekeepers were on the ground within 48 hours of the mandate passing the Security Council[64]) of the UN mission, the peacekeepers decided to remain to deal with the internal threats from the secessionist Katanga province and civil war.[65] They were initially under the rules of traditional peacekeeping[66], but rapidly were caught in an escalating situation that would eventually involve 20,000 peacekeeping troops and the use of armour and fighter aircraft.[67]

On 21 February 1961, after the UN forces were challenged repeatedly, the Security Council passed a resolution that urged the UN to "take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort."[68] This resolution allowed the

UN to become a *de facto* actor in the conflict, and throughout the Congo the forces dealt with all forms of civil unrest while trying to adhere to the principle of self-defence, thereby improving the security situation considerably by the fall of 1961.[69] In Katanga, the UN began launching offensive strikes against the rebel forces that eventually captured the two secessionist strongholds and the collapse of the movement.[70]

The Congo represented an archetype of the missions the UN would encounter in failed states. The country was composed of over 200 tribes, and the Belgians left the country unprepared to govern itself. There was virtually no sense of national identity or unity.[71]

Therefore, the experience in the Congo should have taught the UN four valuable lessons. First, it showed the dangers of mission creep, whereby a traditional peacekeeping mission evolved into offensive warfare, and the lightly armed peacekeepers eventually acquired air power. The mission drifted into peace enforcement.[72] Second, the force learned that while impartiality could be maintained, neutrality in such a situation could not. Third, deploying a fully equipped combat force to begin with would have most likely solved the problems more quickly, rather than giving a traditional force piece-meal combat capability.[73] Fourth, it showed the problems inherent in the UN co-ordinating complex operations, which suffered from logistics problems, poor co-ordination, and poor communication between the various headquarters.[74]

Unfortunately, while these lessons were fundamentally important, the UN was determined never again to undertake such a complex operation, and therefore did not systematically analyse the mission in any detail.[75] The UN had drawn its line in the sand, and it was a line that would hold for nearly 30 years. With the end of the Cold War,

however, new opportunities and problems, would emerge. While the UN felt it could expand its role, it would once again encounter similar problems.

B. Second Generation Peacekeeping

The end of the Cold War and the substantial success of the Gulf War appeared to give the UN a broader scope for action[76]. The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued that:

> [A]n opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter- a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". This opportunity must not be squandered. The organisation must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed. [77]

He suggested that the UN could become a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and should therefore have five aims: To seek to identify at the earliest possible state situations that could produce conflict, and, through diplomacy, remove the sources of danger; to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that lead to or create conflict; to use peacekeeping forces to work to preserve peace where fighting has ceased and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers; to assist in peacebuilding by rebuilding institutions and infrastructures destroyed by war and to build the bonds of peaceful mutual benefits among countries formerly at war; and finally to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. [78]

In hindsight, the Gulf War proved to be an atypical scenario, and the vision of the Secretary-General was based on the natural but unrealistic optimism that emerged from the end of the Cold War.[79] But the blueprint laid out in the *Agenda for Peace* would be

used substantially, and would dramatically expand the UN's role in troubled countries- particularly those that had fragmented and experienced internal wars due to the end of the Cold War.[80]

By adopting such a wide and varied role, the UN had to enter into areas that previously had been sacrosanct. The result was two-fold. First, the issue of sovereignty, while no longer overpowering, still prevented the UN from acting decisively in these cases. Further, the UN was now directly entering countries where the belligerents were not committed to any form of peace or negotiations.[81]

These problems were tempered by the fact that the United States had redefined its interests, and was now prepared to work more closely with international organisations. As Warren Christopher, then U.S. Secretary of State, put it, "working with others gives us an option in humanitarian and political crises when the only other alternatives -acting alone or doing nothing- are often unacceptable. It permits us to influence events without assuming all the risks and costs."[82]

The direct effects of both the *Agenda for Peace* and this new U.S. policy direction were that the UN gradually adopted two new forms of intervention on top of the more traditional methods it had previously used. Traditional tools under Chapter VI of the Charter are still used and are focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes, rather than on clear enforcement measures or under the guise of adding international peace and security.[83] But the UN now also uses peace enforcement and humanitarian support missions, which can be full scale interventions under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Table II-1: Typology of Humanitarian Support and Peace Operations

	Mandate Rules of Engagement	Peace Accord	Degree of Opposition	Size and Complexity
Preventive Action	None	No	None- Envoy seen as impartial	Very small
Peacemaking	Self-Defence only (Ch. VI)	No; Incipient	None- Peace Force seen as impartial	Small (under 500) Observers/Mission Support
Peacekeeping	Self-defence, Observation, Verification	Yes	None- Peace Force seen as impartial	Medium (500-6,000) Observers, some peace building
Peace Enforcement	Use of all necessary means (Ch. VII)	No	Peace Force seen as antagonist	Large Offensive combat capability
Humanitarian Support	Variable (Ch. VI, VII)	Variable	Variable	Variable

Source: *Strategic Assessment 1996: Elements of U.S. Power, Chapter 11: Peace Organisations and Humanitarian Support* www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa96/sa96ch11.html (13 October 2000), 2.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter gives the UN, under the auspices of the Security Council, the power to investigate a dispute or to call upon parties to a dispute that threatens international peace and security to settle their differences through "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."[84] It further gives the Security Council the ability to take action should a conflict not be peacefully settled, or to make recommendations to the parties in an effort to end the situation.[85] But the actions available under Chapter VI are considerably restrained. Any action requires the consent of the parties, and must be circumspect. Thus, the tenets of traditional peacekeeping were reborn and then modified in the 1990s.

1. Preventive Action

Preventive action consists of the UN taking action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating, and to limit the spread of disputes if they occur.[86] The UN has a variety of measures to use for preventive action:

negotiations, which can include the Secretary-General's good offices, the appointment of mediators; missions, which revolve around fact-finding and goodwill; and targeted economic sanctions.[87] Negotiation and mediation, especially, are often conducted directly by member states, which generally have better track records than the UN.[88]

2. Peacemaking

Once conflict has broken out, the UN can use peacemaking policies, "the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute... [Peacemaking] excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities"[89] Peacemaking is usually performed by mediators, diplomats and politicians, and combines negotiation with non-military tools of coercion, which may include threats of deployment.[90]

The UN has also experimented with preventive deployment of troops, which stations lightly armed troops as a trip-wire to deter the spread of conflict.[91] Currently, the UN Preventive Deployment Mission in Macedonia remains the only mission so launched, but is believed to have, until recently at least, contributed greatly to the peace and stability of Macedonia and the southern Balkans, and was considered a success.[92]

3. Traditional Peacekeeping

The UN continues to make use of traditional peacekeeping methods, whereby impartial military observers verify implementation of either a cease-fire or monitor the separation of belligerent forces.[93] New missions such as the UN operation in El Salvador in 1991, in Mozambique in 1992, and in Angola in 1995 continued to follow traditional methods and numerous observer missions have been ongoing for a number of years.[94]

C. Chapter VII Missions

The UN has also launched missions that either straddled or entered the territory of a 'Chapter VII' mandate. Such missions fall under Article 39 of the Charter, which says that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations... to maintain or restore international peace and security."[95] Chapter VII missions can occur in different ways: Missions can be launched in the event of a humanitarian emergency within a country, due to severe civil war, or as collective security enforcement operations.

Until 1992, Chapter VII missions had only occurred twice: during the Korean War and the Gulf War. These were both collective security enforcement operations. Humanitarianism was not accepted as a reason for an intervention because UN actions were believed to be bound by Article 2 of the Charter, which argues that the UN shall not intervene in areas that are the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Therefore, the principal of sovereignty remained near absolute.[96]

With the end of the Cold War, however, the UN sought to expand its presence in the area of human rights, encompassed in Article 55 of the Charter:

> With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms...[97]

This article is controversial because of the suggestion that state violations of human rights are not solely within domestic jurisdiction, but are rather something that must involve international organisations. While this does not license wholesale intervention in the states (nor would the Security Council support such actions), it does

leave the door open to question the sovereign prerogatives of the worst violators.[98] In essence, the UN was willing to alter the norm for intervening in a state.

Originally, the UN would do so only with the consent of the legal government of the target state or due to valid reasons of international peace and security[99] -which in the Cold War boiled down to invasions of member states. But with the end of the Cold War, the UN chose to launch interventions for the controversial principle of humanitarianism, or to "protect the population of the target state (or segments of it) from grave abuses at the hands of their own government or anti-government rebels or as a result of domestic anarchy."[100] Thus the principal of humanitarian interventions, or "the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognised human rights,"[101] was born.

The UN Charter forbids such action, however, unless authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[102]

Therefore, by invoking Chapter VII, or arguing that an intervention is in the interest of international peace and security, the UN can launch a peace mission without the consent of the sovereign power of a state.[103] While the UN will argue that the language of Article 2 is still in effect, the concept of domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty has changed in substance, if not also in law.[104]

Dealing with complex emergencies has resulted in the UN choosing to launch full scale humanitarian interventions which are based around two newer concepts for the UN: peace enforcement and humanitarian support operations.

1. Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement missions are "military operations (including possible combat actions) in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities."[105] Peace enforcement missions generally do not have the consent of all or even any of the parties to the conflict, and must be designed to exercise a wide range of combat capabilities in order to force a cease fire on the combatants.[106]

However, peace enforcement missions are also constrained. While they may prepare to fight a war, they must still be governed by "political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table... [peace enforcement] cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involves the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war."[107]

Peace enforcement missions have far larger mandated forces than traditional peacekeeping missions in order to ensure a proper combat capability, and they rely much more on the importance of force. The peacekeepers are often deployed not only with personal weapons for self-defence, but also with most high-intensity warfare equipment, including support weapons, armoured vehicles, and air and naval support. Increasing the size and cost of missions also creates a proliferation of mission tasks, resulting in the forces embracing mandates with wide scope. The peacekeepers do not only create a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, but also rebuilding the

judicial system, infrastructure, refugee resettlement, supporting elections, disarmament and weapons storage, mine clearance and mine education, and the protection of safe areas.[108]

However, the sheer size of these missions make them difficult for the UN to handle:

> [N]either the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale... the experience of the last few years has demonstrated both the value that can be gained and the difficulties that can arise when the Security Council entrusts enforcement tasks to groups of Member States. On the positive side, this arrangement provides the organization with an enforcement capacity it would not otherwise have and is greatly preferable to the unilateral use of force by Member States without reference to the United Nations. On the other hand, the arrangement can have a negative impact on the Organization's stature and credibility...[109]

When the UN chooses to launch a peace enforcement mission, it has generally subcontracted them to other organisations, for example NATO in the former Yugoslavia and the United States-led missions in Somalia and Haiti. This occurs because the UN does not have the necessary capacity to carry out these operations, and it is left to the member states or other regional organisations to do so. Thus the UN is already witnessing a new division of labour, where "the regional organisation carries the main burden but a small United Nations operation supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner consistent with positions adopted by the Security Council."[110] This results in the UN's stature and overall role often being lessened, and creates co-ordination problems between the various national and international organisations involved.[111]

2. Humanitarian Support Operations

Humanitarian support operations are the other tool that the UN now uses. They entail conducting, assisting, or safeguarding the delivery of food and medical supplies and

the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While such missions were undertaken during the Cold War only infrequently and usually as an afterthought, they are now being undertaken with increasing frequency and scope by the UN and other regional organisations in order to reduce deaths and alleviate human suffering on a massive scale during complex emergencies. Major UN missions that have had a humanitarian support component include Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia.[112] While involvement generally starts with civilian NGOs, the sheer scale of many of the operations in the 1990s often overwhelmed these actors and required growing involvement by the military.[113]

Complex emergencies vary in scope, scale, duration, and international attention received; however they do share a number of analytical characteristics. They tend to emerge from internal conflicts. They also tend to be multifaceted in nature, characterised by political conflict and a simultaneous process of social, economic, environmental and cultural disintegration. They also tend to result in large-scale forced migrations. Finally, because of the migrations, they tend to be international in nature, drawing in other countries and international organisations.[114]

In these situations, NGOs have begun to wield considerable power. They are often present in the crisis area before the UN, and in most failed and weak states, "NGOs have become major sources of employment and income."[115] This in turn has meant a closer relationship with the UN, "especially in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and in post-conflict peace-building."[116] However, NGOs do not operate by the same rules as military forces or international governmental organisations. It has been

suggested that for humanitarian actors to succeed, they must follow eight guiding principles:

- To relieve as quickly as possible life-threatening suffering.[117]
- To act in accordance with proportionality: "humanitarian action should correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs."[118]
- Humanitarian efforts must be non-partisan, and relief is "compromised when political considerations are injected into lifesaving ministrations."[119]
- Independence, or the freedom to act without interference, is required.[120]
- Accountability is also required. Actors must be accountable both to their sponsors and beneficiaries.[121]
- Appropriateness: action should be tailored to local circumstances.[122]
- Context: effective humanitarian action "should include a comprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of outside efforts."[123]
- When suffering occurs, sovereignty must not be taken as absolute. "When sovereignty and suffering clash, the latter should prevail."[124]

Too often within complex emergencies, these principles either fall by the wayside or are not understood by all actors.

Similarly, military involvement is both beneficial and cumbersome for the UN. It helps not only by providing a secure environment, but also through its unrivalled ability to deliver large amounts of relief at very short notice in any terrain.[125] However, humanitarian support operations have shown a tendency to evolve from peacekeeping missions into Chapter VII peace enforcement missions when the traditional methods do

not work.[126] This often results in humanitarian principles being ignored by the command structure, and thereby placing NGOs in a poor position with regards to their accountability. Similarly, the involvement of the military very quickly challenges any attempts by NGOs to be non-partisan or act without interference.[127] Finally, management often becomes problematic, because military and civilian agencies often have different goals and government decisions regarding troop deployment can be capriciously taken back once casualties start mounting.[128]

The main result of these two changes has been that the UN has intervened in countries that would simply have not been on the agenda ten years ago. However, as these operations have become larger, they also become more complicated. This leaves the UN in the position of having to deal directly with both member states and NGOs, groups that are vital to any mission, but which have very dissimilar interests. And the UN is not and cannot be in a position to control them.

VII. Long-Term Questions

With the failure of interventions in both Somalia and Haiti, many questions have been raised by the UN and other international actors about the viability of humanitarian interventions. The US in particular has been far less supportive of such measures: "[T]he United States must also consider many issues – such as financial cost, diversion of national military resources for other missions, the risk of casualties and the fragility of domestic and international support for peace operations – in the context of whether participating furthers important nation interests."[129] This does not mean the interventionism is completely dead. Joseph Nye has argued that the national interest can be altered:

> The national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, if the public feels that those values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.[130]

However, he suggests that the US now focuses too much on the Somalias and Haitis of the world, which are "contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests."[131] Somalia proved that Americans are reluctant to accept casualties in cases where the only foreign policy goals are humanitarian interests. In such cases, Nye feels the U.S. should avoid the use of force except where its humanitarian interests are reinforced by the existence of other strong national interests.[132]

There have also been harsh critics of this apparent attempt to return to humanitarian isolationism. Chester Crocker, for example, argues that rather than examining the more esoteric ramifications of American national interests and foreign policy, it is the actual record of the U.S. peace operations that is worthy of criticism. Similarly, he argues it is important to see that Somalia itself resulted in a larger regional security instability, and that the failure in Somalia resulted directly in the tragic case of Rwanda.[133]

Certainly, the "springtime of intervention" has ended. Civilian humanitarians argue that military force actually complicates their work. In the short run, it "works against the impartiality, neutrality, and consent that have traditionally underpinned their work; and in the long run, it addresses none of the structural problems or root causes that had let to the eruption of violence."[134]

Perhaps what is needed is a new theoretical framework. Since the failure of the missions in Somalia and Haiti, a variety of international actors have attempted to create frameworks that would attempt to deal with the problems these two missions highlighted.

A. The United Nations

1. Preventive Action

Boutros Boutros Ghali, in one of the last documents he wrote as Secretary-General, argued that the UN has learned several important lessons from its failures. Each state decides its own path and creates its own political culture, therefore each state must find its own institutional balance between the state and civil society, and therefore any attempts to support democracy must also be coupled with development.[135] The UN, when choosing to intervene in a country, must understand that institution building is considerably more complex than merely holding elections. The most important role is that of co-ordination, in order to avoid waste, duplication, and conflicting advice, and the UN, which maintains global capabilities, is well placed to facilitate proper co-ordination.[136]

Kofi Annan, upon becoming Secretary-General, also understood that change was necessary. The UN's capacity continues to be hobbled by the failure of Somalia. Because of that failure, the UN can no longer respond swiftly and decisively to crises, and that this initial failure directly led to the inaction of the international community during the genocide in Rwanda.[137] However, focusing on preventive deployment, preventive action and traditional peacekeeping is an active policy aimed at nipping violent conflict in the bud.[138]

2. Peace Operations

The UN also engaged in a comprehensive review of all peace operations[139], chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, who earlier was the popular Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Haiti. The report made wide sweeping prescriptions for change within the UN hierarchy, arguing that:

> [F]or preventive initiatives to reduce tension and avert conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from member states... no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force. However, force alone cannot create peace; it can only create a space in which peace can be built. In other words, the key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy. 140

While the UN has expertise in traditional peacekeeping operations, it does not have the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations rapidly and to sustain them effectively.[141] Rather, in such an operation, it must be the goal of peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment, while the peacebuilders work to render that environment self-sustaining.[142] In cases where peacekeepers are deployed, they must have a mandate that is clear in order to ensure unity of effort in potentially dangerous situations and have rules of engagement that are robust enough to ensure that the UN contingents do not cede the initiative to their attackers.[143]

In complex operations, moreover, there is also a requirement to define properly and identify the elements of peace building. In order to rebuild a country, peacebuilding requires engagement with local parties. Free and fair elections should be viewed only as part of a broader attempt to strengthen government institutions. Civilian police monitors must be tasked to reform, train, and restructure the local police and ensure that the courts become politically impartial and free from intimidation. The protection of human rights is

necessary in order to ensure national reconciliation. Finally, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants is key to post-conflict stability.[144]

The report accurately portrays most of the requirements for an intervention in a complex emergency. The only concern is that by tasking peacekeepers to keep only the peace, it may walk down the road faced in Somalia, where the forces did not engage in anything more complex than securing the overall environment, leaving the aid agencies at risk.

B. Other Theoretical Models

1. Patterns of Peacebuilding

The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has created its own peacebuilding hierarchy that pinpoints substantially different concerns, and is focused around three levels of conflict: Post-colonial, post Cold War, and "independent conflict which does not finds its origins and characteristics in systemic or international causes, but rather is focused inwards and occurs in a predominantly national, unilateral manner,"[145] or failed states.

When peace does occur, it is not because of the influence of foreign actors, but rather "originat[es] domestically. Foreign actors can encourage and facilitate this process, but the idea of the conflict being "ripe" for settlement is vital for a successful peacebuilding process."[146] When this occurs, security should be limited to ensuring the cease-fire, and elections must be held quickly in order to establish the credibility of the process.

Once these first steps are taken, the next set of steps involves the building of domestic capacity: This "must occur in the NGO sector in order to create mechanisms to

balance the role of the government as well as assist it in the implementation of economic and social reconstruction efforts."[147] Then, the international community can focus on both reconstruction and demobilisation.[148]

But this model is not expanding on the lessons from failed states in order to solve them faster. Rather it is merely saying that failed states are difficult to work in, and therefore, they should be left alone until peace appears ripe. In some cases, this may be the correct attitude. However, failed states that descend into complex emergencies can and should not be left alone.

2. A Legitimate Governance Theory of Engagement

The United States military has also focused on the problems of deploying peacekeepers in an effort to address the previous failures. The U.S. framework suggests that interventions in failed states can not be determined by the results of military or police actions, but rather depend on:

> a protracted, multistage use of political, economic, and moral as well as physical efforts to gain influence over or control of the society and its political system. In short, success depends on the ability to achieve political competence and legitimacy.[149]

The first step is to try and strengthen failing states through outside help in the short term and create a stronger foundation for the state in the long term. In order to succeed, a state's government and institutions require help to create legitimacy, in economic development, and in sheer competency.[150] This will result in increased stability. It is important to realise that, in such cases:

> experience shows that the long-term commitment of human, financial, and other resources can be staggering... experience also demonstrated that ignoring an instability problem or only providing short-term and cosmetic solutions to a related threat can be debilitating. Because instability in one place can cause instabilities elsewhere, related threats can ultimately become directly menacing to

> the United States... Failure to recognise and deal with a threat in its early stages is a threat in itself.[151]

Thus stability depends on three factors: military-police capability, economic capacity and political competence, with political competence as the most important. Focusing solely on the military-police capability and economic capacity in the hope of creating political competence results in failure. Political competence will not develop by itself. Therefore, in order to ensure stability, a state must focus on the free, fair and frequent selection of leaders; the level of participation in or acceptance of the political process; the level of corruption; the level of political, economic, and social development; and finally the level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.[152]

This framework has two important assumptions. Firstly, that an intervention, in order to succeed, must remain for the long term. Secondly, that a mission must focus on creating political competence in a state. Long-term interventions harken back to previous U.S. policy, such as the intervention in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. It is positive because by accepting long term interventions, the U.S. will become more likely both to participate in them, and to engage in nation-building activities. Focusing on political competence is also important, since it suggests that merely creating new democratic elections may not help in the long run, and that a state, rather, will need substantial help.

However, this also opens a potential quagmire. Earlier U.S. interventions in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic were exercises in imperialism. Similarly, such policies may result in leaders gaining power due to their support for the intervention and the intervener, rather than due to their natural abilities. Further, a long-term intervention may also open up the intervention forces to charges of neo-colonialism and even to

national 'liberation' movements being created. Therefore, such a strategy, while beneficial, must ensure that the intervention force maintains its own neutrality and popular support from the population.

3. New Peacekeeping Partnership

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre also created its own set of recommendations, suggesting that there is a need for all the groups involved in failed state interventions- the military and police, NGOs, the UN and other IGOs, diplomats, and the media- to engage in what they term the new peacekeeping partnership, a continuous co-operative effort to co-ordinate activities.[153] This is certainly an excellent idea, and the centre, through extensive courses and workshops, is attempting to make it a reality.

It suggests that the "earlier interventions are implemented, the greater their effectiveness."[154] Interventions therefore should begin on the diplomatic level and become progressively larger as the state stumbles down the downward spiral, progressing from a UN envoy, to a UN mandate to a Chapter VI mission to finally a Chapter VII mission in a failed state.[155]

This certainly is relevant to the problems of Somalia and Haiti. In both cases, earlier interventions could well have solved the problems with less force. However, it also sees the danger of a traditional peacekeeping operation being deployed into a country where it simply does not have adequate power, therefore lessening the credibility of the international actors.

VIII. Conclusions

While failed states may not be a new phenomenon, only since the end of the Cold War has the international community been in a position where it could effectively

intervene in them to prevent or halt complex emergencies. But while humanitarian support missions have become commonplace, humanitarian interventions have proven far more difficult to get right.

Initially, these problems were caused by a lack of theoretical understanding of how to deal with failed states. With the failure of the missions in Somalia and Haiti, there was an attempt by a number of international actors to create this understanding, and improve the methods by which the international community can launch humanitarian interventions.

But these new models do not take into account all the problems that the international community faced in Haiti and Somalia. Similarly, even with this new theoretical basis, the UN continues to make the same mistakes. The rest of this thesis will therefore examine in detail the UN missions to Somalia and Haiti, then conclude with a brief examination of the mission to Sierra Leone and present a revised humanitarian intervention framework.

[1] United Nations < www.un.org./Overview/brief.html> (21 June 2001).
[2] Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, "The Character of Independent Statehood" in *States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis*, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 8.
[3] United Nations < www.un.org./Overview/brief.html> (21 June 2001).
[4] Jackson, Robert, *The Global Covenant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 252.
[5] Ibid., 252.
[6] Ibid., 252.
[7] Edward N. Luttwak "Give War a Chance" in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1999), 36.
[8] Ibid., 43.
[9] Ibid., 37-38.
[10] "Internal wars have qualities that tend toward stalemate, not peace: Chechen and Dagestani warlords began battling Russians in the 1830s; Sudan has been at war for most of the past 45 years; Kashmir and Sri Lanka fester more or less on their own with rare bursts of external 'meddling'; Angola's factions notoriously reject or scuttle peace initiatives." Chester Crocker , "A Poor Case for Quitting" in *Foreign Affairs*(January/February 2000) www.foreignaffairs.org/Search/document.asp?I=20000101 faresponse19.xml (21 June 2001). 4
[11] Ibid., 4.
[12] Jackson, Robert *The Global Covenant*, 296.
[13] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 64-65.
[14] Ibid., 66. Buzan also argues that the United Nations has actually acted to ease the criteria for statehood, with the result that a number of quasi-state units are now recognized. "The full status of many of these as states, however, remains in doubt." Buzan, 66. It has also been argued that embodied in the Charter is the principle that member states must be able carry out their charter obligations. By ignoring this, the UN has allowed failed states to gain international recognition: "If Article 2 (which established the sovereign power of states) were not generally respected and Article 4 (which creates this substantive requirement for membership) was not generally disregarded failed states would probably not exist. Instead, colonies, protectorates, trust territories, and other kinds of dependent states would still be in existence." Jackson, 297.
[15] Ibid., 67. See also Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 266-7.
[16] Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, "Confronting the New World Disorder" in *Managing Contemporary Conflict* ed. Max G. Manwaring and Wm. Olson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 32.
[17] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 64.
[18] Buzan, 43.
[19] Thomas Hobbes, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery" in *Classics of International Relations, 3rd edition* ed. John Vasquez (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 220.
[20] Buzan, 43.
[21] John Locke, *The Treatise on Government* (London: Everyman, 1993), 184.
[22] Robert Dahl , *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, 1982), 16.
[23] Ibid., 53.
[24] Ibid., 17.
[25] Ibid., 18.
[26] Locke, 187.
[27] Buzan, 99-101.
[28] David D. Laitin "Somalia" in in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 155.
[29] William Zartman, Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 5.

[30] Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis "Civil War and the Security Dilemma" in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 16-17.
[31] Zartman, 10.
[32] Alex Morrison and Dale Anderson (eds.), *Peacekeeping and the Coming Anarchy* (Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1996), 11-13.
[33] Morrison (1996), 13.
[34] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, 1995* 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995), 7.
[35]Stephen David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures" <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v049/49.4er_brown.html> (15 March 2001).
[36] Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 37.
[37] Ibid., 40.
[38] Thomas G. Weiss *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 20.
[39] Antonio Donini, "Asserting Humanitarianism in Peace-Maintenance" in *The Politics of Peace Maintenance*, ed. Jarat Chopra (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 83.
[40]Arthur C. Helton, "Forced Displacement, Humanitarian Intervention, and Sovereignty" <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v020/20.1helton.html> (15 March 2001), 61.
[41] Ibid., 62.
[42] Ibid., 65-66.
[43] Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," 16.
[44] Ibid., 17.
[45] It has been argued that in Somalia, the major sides continued to fight for control of the state apparatus: "The war in Somalia was a fight over power" (see David D. Laitin, "Somalia," 153). Similarly, negotiations with the Cedras regime in Haiti faltered continually because "Cedras believed the U.S. would never invade Haiti because there was extensive opposition among many OAS members and in the U.S. Congress" (see Lester Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont: Regina Books, 1998), 53-54. No one would adopt a defensive security posture when there were still prizes to be gained.
[46] Ibid., 17-18.
[47] Richard Jackson, "Review Article Conflcit Resolution in Africa: Intervention, Indifference, and Indigenous Solutions" in *African Affairs* (2001: Issue 100), 321.
[48] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 4.
[49] United Nations, *Charter, Preamble* < www.un.org.aboutun/charter/preamble.htm> (12 October 2000).
[50] Ibid.
[51] United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*. 4.
[52] Ibid., 4.
[53] Georges Abi-Saab, "United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues" in *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, ed. Daniel Warner (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 1.
[54] Ibid., 2.
[55]Carlisle Barracks. *Peacekeeping Doctrine*. <www.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki/doctrine/game.htm> (12 September 2000), II-1.
[56] United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*. 4.
[57] Allen Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 18-19.
[58] Carlisle Barracks, II-2.
[59] United Nations. *The Blue Helmets*, 54-55.
[60] Ali-Saab, 2; Alex Morrison, *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), ix.
[61] Ibid., 19.
[62] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 177.

[63] Ibid.,2-3
[64] Ibid., 178.
[65] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 179-180.
[66] Ibid., 5. The force commander actually made a radio broadcast stating that the troops would "...bear arms, but will only use them in self-defence..."
[67] Thomas Mockaitis, "Civil Conflict Intervention: Peacekeeping or Enforcement?" in Morrison (1997), 32.
[68] United Nations Security Council. *161 (1961). Resolution of 21 February 1961.* <www .un.org/documents/sc/res/1961/s61r161e.pdf.> (12 November 2000).
[69] Mockaitis, 33.
[70] Ibid., 34-35.
[71] Trevor Findlay The Blue Helmets' First War? Use of Force by the UN in the Congo, 1960-64, (Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), 1.
[72] Mockaitis, 35; Findley 158
[73] Findley, 154.
[74] Mockaitis, 35, Findley, 152-154.
[75] Ibid., 36.
[76] James Mayall *The New Interventionism: 1991-1994*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10.
[77] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace- 1992" in *An Agenda for Peace 1995, 2nd ed.* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 39.
[78] Boutros-Ghali *An Agenda for Peace 1995 2nd ed.* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 43.
[79] Mayall, 2,10.
[80] Thomas Weiss *International Security and the United Nations: Some Thoughts about Future Research*, (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1995), 6.
[81] Mayall, 14.
[82] Warren Christopher in Weiss (1995), 11.
[83] Sens, 20.
[84] United Nations *Charter: Chapter VI, Article 33* < www.un.org.aboutun/charter/htm> (12 October 2000).
[85] United Nations *Charter: Chapter VI, Article 37, 38* < www.un.org.aboutun/charter/ htm> (12 October 2000).
[86] Sens, 48.
[87]United Nations, *Preventive Action and Peacemaking* <www .un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/ peacemak.htm.> (10/12/2000), 1.
[88] Adam Roberts highlights especially the U.S.-led negotiations in the Middle East, which have been substantially more productive than those of the UN's. Similarly, the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General in places such as Cyprus has "served many useful functions but has not yet succeeded in its central purpose." Adam Roberts, "Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia" in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (ed.), (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 37-38.
[89] Ibid., 1.
[90] Carlisle Barracks, I-1.
[91] Strategic Assessment 1996: Elements of U.S. Power, Chapter 11: Peace Organisations and Humanitarian Support www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa96/sa96ch11.html (13 October 2000), 4.
[92] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 564.
[93] Strategic Assessment, 1996, 5.
[94] Ibid., 7-10.
[95] United Nations, *Charter*.
[96] Ibid; Jackson, 252.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Brad Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law* (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1999), 31.
[99] Jackson, 252.
[100] Ibid., 252.

[101] Sean D. Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 11-12.
[102] United Nations. *Charter*.
[103] Roth, 33, 171.
[104] Weiss, 21.
[105] Carlisle Barracks, III-1.
[106] Ibid., III-1.
[107] Ibid., III-2.
[108] Sens, 50-52.
[109] Boutros-Ghali (1995), 28-29.
[110] Weiss (95), 3-4.
[111] Boutros-Ghali (1995), 29. Another possibility would be to reactivate trusteeships for states "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" as provided for in Article 73 of the UN Charter. This needless to say is not a popular concept as trusteeships are strongly identified with colonialism. It may, however, be a solution. See Jackson, 302-303.
[112] Strategic Assessment, 1996, 18.
[113] Ibid., 220-221.
[114] Sadako Ogata, "Humanitarian Responses to International Emergencies" in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* ed. Michael Doyle and Olara Otunnu (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 216-218.
[115] Weiss (1995), 5.
[116] Boutros-Ghali (1995), 33.
[117] Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 60.
[118] Ibid., 63
[119] Ibid., 68
[120] Ibid., 73
[121] Ibid., 77
[122] Ibid., 84
[123] Ibid., 90
[124] Ibid., 96
[125] Ibid., 222.
[126] Strategic Assessment, 1996, 18-19.
[127] Ogata, 224.
[128] Ibid., 223.
[129] Strategic Assessment, 1996, 15.
[130] Joseph S. Nye Jr. "Redefining the National Interest" in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1999), 23.
[131] Ibid., 26-27
[132] Ibid., 32
[133] Crocker, 1-2.
[134] Weiss, 3.
[135] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996), 8.
[136] Ibid, 21.
[137] Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council: The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. (New York: United Nations, 1998), 8.
[138] Ibid., 9.
[139] *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, <www .un.org/peace/reports/peace_ operations> (10/12/2000),
[140] Ibid., 2.
[141] Ibid., 2.
[142] Ibid., 5.

[143] Ibid., 9.
[144] Ibid., 7-8.
[145] DFAIT, *Patterns of Peacebuilding* <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacebuilding/pcs_patterns-e.asp> (19 November 1999), 1.
[146] Ibid., 5.
[147] Ibid., 5.
[148] Ibid., 6.
[149] Manwaring, 33.
[150] Ibid., 33-36.
[151] Ibid., 36.
[152] Ibid., 40-42.
[153] Morrison (1996), 7-9.
[154] Morrison (1996), 15.
[155] Morrison (1996), 17-19.

Chapter III. Somalia

Somalia represents the first time in the post-Cold War era that the United Nations intervened in a failed state. It is also the first time a Chapter VII mission was launched by the UN to further humanitarian goals, rather than the principles of collective security.

By the time of the UN intervention, the Somalia state had completely failed. The Somalis suffered from inadequate nutrition, rudimentary health services, poor access to safe-drinking water and sanitation, and faced widespread famine and disease even at the best of times.[1] By 1992, however, the onset of war coupled with the collapse of the government and institutional infrastructure, all at the time of a drought, had ushered in a disastrous catastrophe. Somalia was a complex emergency. Almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total population, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases. Some 300,000 people were estimated to have died that year.[2] Seventy percent of the country's livestock had been lost, its farming areas devastated, and some 500,000 people were in refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.[3]

This failure emerged due to a number of intertwined problems. To begin with, the clan structure of society in the country ensured that the early governments could not exert a form of centralised control. Then, the Siad Barre regime, which ruled before the failure, was prone to the worst vices of dictators: an autocratic regime based around a personality cult, patronage, corruption, and support of some clans over others. Finally, the huge number of refugees that Somalia accepted after the Ogaden war (1977-78) produced dependence on aid that caused fundamental reforms to cease and produced a culture of theft.



4

I. A Historical Background to State Failure in Somalia

~ Eighteenth Century: Somalis are Islamic nomadic pastoralists,[5] who have a complex clan structure. There are six different Clan-Families, embracing twenty-one different clans.[6] The clans are an integral part of Somali society with elders and chiefs wielding substantial power and individual clans claiming traditional territories.[7] At the end of the nineteenth century, Somalia becomes vital due to its position on the Red Sea and its proximity to the Suez Canal. Great Britain, France and Italy divide its territory into five parts.[8]

Independence: 1 July 1960:

The independent Somali republic is established by the combination of British and Italian Somaililands. For nine years, it is ruled under a parliamentary system wrought

with instability and violence as the government and the clan structures fight for political positions and state resources.

Barre Assumes Power: 1969-1977

Following the assassination of the President on 21 October 1969, the military stages a coup and a new government is formed, headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre.[9] New institutional mechanisms result in further powers going to the clans.[10] Barre is a staunch supporter of pan-Somalism, the belief that all Somalis should be unified into one country,[11] and follows a socialist path in an attempt to reorganise society by eliminating clan consciousness. He also seeks the aid of the Soviet Union, and receives aid and advisers.[12] However, he increases his own personal power by fostering both a personality cult based around himself as the 'Victorious Leader,' and by producing his own uniquely Somali path to socialist revolution in his little blue-and-white book. He begins to favour some clans, particularly his own and his family's.[13]

Barre's Regime Withers Away: 1978- 1991

Between 1977 and 1978, Somalia launches an unsuccessful war against Ethiopia in an attempt to regain the Ogaden region. The Soviet Union abandons Somalia for Ethiopia, Somalia becomes an international pariah,[14] and much of the Somalia National Army is destroyed.[15] The defeat marks the end of Somali irredentism as the sole unifying factor in Somali politics,[16] and a failed coup by dissatisfied Somali National Army officers leads to the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in northeast Somalia.[17] This becomes open warfare in 1981 as the Somali National Movement (SNM) is launched in the northwest.[18]

The insurrection causes Barre to rely increasingly on his family clans while marginalizing the others.[19] He also uses patronage to appoint other supporters to the highest positions, and allows them to embezzle funds,[20] and he attempts to rebuild the Somali National Army with military aid from the United States.[21] While fighting the insurrection, the military becomes dependent on supplies of food aid ear-marked for the refugee population, whose numbers are severely over-represented.[22] Other aid money creates an economy of dependence on humanitarian aid throughout the government:[23] "Military, economic, and food aid perpetuated a political system that was not self-sustaining, nor did it fulfil the basic requirements of a sovereign government."[24]

Civil War: 1988-1991

In 1988, the Issaq clan under the SNM banner launches an open rebellion against the Barre regime in the northwest. The SNM are able to capture Hargeisa, the region's largest city, and the government then destroys the city through a combination of aircraft and artillery.[25] The human rights atrocities perpetrated by the regime against the Issaq cause international aid to be cancelled,[26] and the end of the Cold War means that Barre no longer has international cards to play.[27] By 1990 this results in a virtual cessation of all aid.[28]

By 1989, it becomes apparent that Barre is prepared to enter negotiations. However, the opposition insists it is too late.[29] In hindsight, senior US advisors suggest that this would have been the best time to either act as a negotiator or recruit other countries to put pressure on the opposition to negotiate. However, at the time it was not considered vital and, as Herman Cohen, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa

puts it, "we continued to have access to the port and airfield at Berbera, and the Somali people were 'naturally warlike,' so why panic?"[30]

In 1990, fighting spreads to central Somalia,[31] while in Mogadishu a manifesto calling for a national conference to reconcile the various movements and ethnic groups is published and signed by 144 well-known and moderate political leaders. However, there is no support within the rebel groups and little concerted actions in the international community. Nothing comes of it.[32]

In August, Iraq invades Kuwait, which leads to a quick withdrawal of U.S. interest from the Horn: "Thus, eleven years of US military protection from 'over the horizon' evaporated as the threatened countries welcomed US forces on their own territories. Military facilities in east Africa suddenly diminished in importance."[33] The U.S. quickly halted all economic assistance to the Barre regime.[34]

In January, 1991, Barre flees south from Mogadishu with a rump force after the army collapses.[35] The USC assumes control of the city, and appointed several of the signatories to the manifesto to provisional positions. Ali Mahdi, a member of the Abgal, is appointed president, but is rejected by other groups, including General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Habr Gedir, the USC's military leader.[36] Relief operations run by the UN, UNICEF, UNHCR, the ICRC, and other NGOs begin throughout the country even as the UN closes its offices in Mogadishu.

In June and July, attempts are made by the provisional government to hold a national reconciliation conference, however these fall apart after only lukewarm support from the various rebel groups and absolutely no outside support. It has been argued that at the time the UN bureaucracy dealing with multilateral affairs was suffering from 'conflict

fatigue:' "When the Somalia crisis exploded, the UN was already running a dozen peacekeeping operations on five continents. The system was saturated."[37]

The failure of the conference results in the various rebel groups breaking apart and starting to fight amongst themselves over the remains of the country. No central government exists, rival militias fight over different regions and towns, and looting and banditry are widespread. The SSDF takes power in the northeast. The rival factions of the USC fight over Mogadishu. The SNM proclaims an independent state in the northwest, named 'Somaliland'. In the south, the Somali National Front emerges out of the remains of the old Somali National Army and is led by Barre. Elsewhere, several new factions come into being as clans not originally involved in the fighting seek to secure their own territory.[38]

Somalia is no longer of interest to the U.S. and UN: "Assuming that the clan system would somehow find a way to bring order out of chaos, with US forces well accommodated directly in the Gulf, and with our embassy closed, we more or less dropped Somalia from our radar screens. As Ambassador Frank T. Crigler...observed: 'The United States turned out the lights, closed the door and forgot about the place.'"[39]

UN involvement begins: 27 December 1991:

Only in December 1991 does the outgoing Secretary-General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, begin UN involvement in Somalia by sending James Jonah as his special envoy to visit the area in an attempt to further reconciliation in order to allow the aid agencies to reach people in need.[40]

II. The UN Intervention

Numerous NGOs and international agencies were already involved in Somalia by 1991, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which had all been there since the 1970's. However, violence hurt and then halted their efforts; and as Mogadishu was swept into the civil war the United Nations closed its offices in the country.[41] Other NGOs continued their efforts, and the ICRC remained in the country throughout the violence.[42] The little humanitarian relief that continued became an important factor in the political economy of the military factions, who used it for their own purposes. Looting was commonplace, and factions often levied heavy taxes of some 10 to 20 percent on cargoes, and charged exorbitant rates for 'protection.'[43]

By the time the UN became involved in Somalia, they had already missed three opportunities when preventive action and peacemaking might have worked: when the SNM captured Hargeisa and Barre's government used extreme force to dislodge them; when the May Manifesto was published calling for national reconciliation; and finally when the government collapsed and the USC assumed control of Mogadishu and attempted a conference of national reconciliation.[44] Each of these points represented a time when peace was within reach. But the UN failed to take advantage of them.

The UN also failed to understand how complex the situation was in Somalia. The UN displayed no real understanding of what a failed state is. Too often, it negotiated with the military factions as if they were the legitimate government of Somalia. This resulted in the UN often marginalising the very groups that it had initially set out to help. The UN

also failed to consider what was needed to repair and rebuild the country, and how long such a project might take. Finally, there was no clear understanding of what military forces might be needed during a mission, with the result that too often, the UN was trapped in a reactive situation- reacting to what the factions wanted or did- rather than in advancing its own agenda.

A. Initial Steps: Preventive Action and Peacemaking

The UN began its involvement in Somalia by using the good offices of the Secretary-General to send a special envoy to Somalia, backed in full by the power of the UN. The envoy, James Jonah, visited the area in an attempt to further reconciliation in order to allow aid to reach people in need.[45] Jonah was initially viewed as having taken sides because after arriving in Mogadishu for a single day, he met only with General Aidid. Further, he showed little understanding or sensitivity to the Somali people.[46] Nonetheless, he did succeed in reaching an interim agreement among the UN, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the two main parties to the dispute in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi and Aidid, which saw a cease-fire implemented and a UN technical team sent to Somalia.

The technical team secured an agreement that would see the UN deploy unarmed peacekeepers to monitor a cease-fire between the factions, and deploy security personnel to protect UN personnel and operations.[47] This led to the creation of the first United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I) by the Security Council on 24 April 1992.

B. Second Step: Traditional Peacekeeping- UNOSOM I

UNOSOM I was composed of 50 military observers and 500 security personnel, who were armed and equipped with light vehicles and one armoured vehicle. The force

would abide by the "traditions of United Nations observer missions."[48] However, the mission was underequipped for its mandate. Mohamed Shanoun, the mission's head, recalls:

> [H]ad limited resources with which to work, yet we were expected to help supply food, provide administrative expertise and coordination for relief operations, help restore infrastructure and, of course, mediate all kinds of clan disputes. There was no military option at this stage. The UN mission had to rely to a large degree on moral suasion to get things done.[49]

The operation encountered problems from the beginning, when the 500 Pakistani troops did not arrive until mid-September, a month and a half late, and were unable to capture control of the Mogadishu airport until November.[50] Aid agencies were able to expand their programs and ensure that necessary relief got through, but they could not guarantee the delivery of supplies overland.[51]

Further, Somali leaders consisting of local elders and clan leaders, rather than the military faction leaders, agreed to deal with the UN. However, they insisted on an urgent and large humanitarian assistance program in order to prevent the militias gaining control. This was aid the UN could not and did not provide.[52]

The mission failed to make any headway. A minimum of 50,000 metric tons of food was required for the country, but only half the amount was pledged and even less arrived. The few open hospitals remained totally dependent on foreign assistance. The sanitary situation continued to deteriorate, livestock continued to die and refugees continued to head into Kenya at the rate of 1,000 a day. By the end of August, Shanoun found that a "lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages contribute significantly to the level of violence and insecurity..."[53]

To solve these problems, the UN chose to deploy a more robust peacekeeping force based in four zones in order to establish a presence in all areas of the country. The new force would have 3,500 troops- this before the first 500 had even been deployed.[54] The four-zone model had been proposed by the UNOSOM team in order both to decentralise operations, and prevent the mission becoming dependent on the conditions prevailing in Mogadishu, thereby preventing the mission from becoming too Mogadishu-centred. This would favour the emergence of a new regional leadership to offset existing faction leaders.[55] Shanoun hoped that a policy of regionalization would allow the traditional bases of authority throughout the country- clan elders, intellectuals, religious leaders, and the emerging professional class- to reconstruct civil society.[56]

The change, however, did little besides upset member states. The U.S., for example, "had estimated that at least 30,000 heavily armed troops would be needed. Neither the number of troops available- they were angered by Boutros-Ghali's plucking the number 3,5000 out of a hat at random- nor the mandate were designed to do the job."[57] The decision also undermined the position of the UN within Somalia, as none of the Somali leaders and elders, the surrounding countries, or UNOSOM itself were consulted before the announcement.[58] Worse, this proved to be an empty promise, as by December troop strength had reached only 564.[59]

The result was a further loss of confidence in the UN. Complicating the problem were bizarre incidents that were not investigated of UN planes unaccountably delivering money and weapons to Ali Mahdi's faction[60] and rumours that the UN sought to occupy the country. This resulted in an increased level of violence throughout Somalia and a decline in relief supplies arriving at their destination. Then the forced resignation of

Mohamed Shanoun, based on critical comments he had made concerning the UN, cost the UN even more credibility, as he had won the trust of several clan leaders. To top this off, the Somalis had little respect for Boutros-Ghali, who was seen as having supported the Barre regime when he served as Egypt's foreign minister.[61]

The result was that the consent from the factions the UN had earlier gained disappeared. On 28 October 1992, Aidid declared that UNOSOM would no longer be tolerated in Mogadishu, and on 13 November, opened fire on UNOSOM forces at the Mogadishu airport.[62] This was the deathknell of UNOSOM. By 25 November 1992, the Security Council deemed the situation in Somalia intolerable.[63]

The Secretary-General proposed a substantial change in the mandate of UNOSOM, whereby the United States would temporarily assume command of the mission: "[T]here is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter... If forceful action is taken it should preferably be under United Nations command and control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by Member States..."[64]

The Problems with UNOSOM

UNOSOM had failed. The problems with the first mission in Somalia can be broken down into two areas: management and co-ordination.

Regarding the management problem, the UN was unprepared to run such an operation. Supplies were slow in arriving and troops even slower. Had the initial peacekeepers arrived at the time the mandate was given, or even as late as September, it would still have been possible to create a secure delivery environment.[65]

Similarly damaging, co-ordination on all levels was equally poor. The headquarters in New York did not properly communicate its actions to the mission. As well, the various aid agencies in Somalia, including UN departments, were unwilling to either follow the mission's lead or to decentralise their operations in any meaningful way.[66]

Perhaps in light of the foregoing, it has been argued that applying a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission to the situation was inherently flawed: "The purpose of such a consent-based operation is to separate warring states after they have reached an agreement. Somalia was in the midst of internal war between faction-based warlords who lacked overall domestic legitimacy and respect for civilians. The application of a Chapter VI mandate to this crisis legitimated the warring factions as leaders..."[67]

The result was a collapse in confidence in the UN, and thus in the mission. Replacing Shanoun, a known and respected figure, further eroded the Somalis' faith in the UN. The result was that UNOSOM could not succeed in its mission with its assigned level of peacekeepers, under the norms of traditional peacekeeping, and with its mandate. The choices were to abandon Somalia, or to expand the mission. The Security Council decided that the mission could not be abandoned, and therefore supported its expansion into a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission led by a member state, the United States.

C. Third Step: Peace Enforcement by Proxy –UNITAF

The Unified Task Force, UNITAF, was created on 3 December 1992. Its goal was simple: the Security Council authorised the member states, under Chapter VII, to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian

relief operations in Somalia."[68] The implementation of the mission would be left in the willing hands of the U.S. government.

This represented a sea-change in U.S. policy towards Somalia. The U.S. had started a humanitarian airlift operation, Provide Comfort, in August 1992, but had shown an unwillingness to venture further.[69] The American government had also been as reluctant as other Western governments to use Somalia as a test case for the reinterpretation of Chapter VII.[70]

Conditions changed radically when President Bush lost the U.S. election in 1992. During his last days in office, he was no longer constrained by domestic considerations and as the architect of the "new world order" he wanted to achieve a lasting change in the U.S. position vis-à-vis peacekeeping.[71] Further, by late November the humanitarian situation in Somalia had become such a crisis that elements within the National Security Council felt that it was a "challenge in which the United States could rapidly make a significant and tangible difference."[72] Finally, within the Department of Defence, previous opposition had become measured support from General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,[73] and a definable, feasible mission plan had emerged, provided it had the full support of the U.S. government. Powell, however, still wanted the pitfalls clearly identified and questioned whether conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth handoff to the UN once a secure environment was created.[74] Similarly, the State Department felt that it would be necessary to deal with Mohammed Farah Aidid.[75]

With this knowledge, the U.S. government began consulting with various international actors, including the Security Council, delegates from African countries, and members of NATO. Furthermore, the Secretary-General was fully behind the mission, as

he saw it solidly entrenching the UN's international security function in world opinion: "Unlike Bosnia, Cambodia, or Angola, Somalia had no ideological or political factors. It was purely humanitarian."[76] Thus, when the Security Council endorsed the United States' offer, it was unanimous.[77]

There have been questions about how fully aware President Bush was of the problems of UNOSOM I, and what role public perception played in his decision.[78] This last issue refers to the effect that the 'sixth member of the Security Council', CNN News, had on the public.[79] But even if hastily and without full information, the U.S. had committed itself.

1. *The Mission*

The U.S. mission statement clearly reflected the military's view that they were there solely to create a secure environment:

> When directed by the National Command Authorities, CINCCENT [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. central command] will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations, and to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. [80]

The operation was divided into four phases, to begin with U.S. forces seizing Mogadishu, and then expanding their hold in the country until they had secured the 40 per cent of the country considered in the most trouble.[81] Initially, the plan called for U.S. forces to reach 28,000 troops, with other nations contributing 17,000;[82] however, only 21,000 U.S. and 9,995 non-U.S. troops were actually committed.[83] This reduction had no noticeable direct effect on the implementation of the mission.

The core of UNITAF was the U.S. Joint Task Force Somalia, code-named Operation Restore Hope, which was organised around the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force

and included the 10th Mountain Division (a light infantry division equipped with helicopters). The international forces included units of the elite French Foreign Legion and veteran units of the Australian and Canadian Armies.[84] UNITAF was an integrated combined arms force and could rely on infantry, mechanised units, armour, attack helicopters, gunships, fighter-bombers, and naval gunfire.[85] The deployment was well co-ordinated. The lead elements of the mission arrived on 10 December 1992 to begin the handover,[86] and the Marine Expeditionary Force was assigned as the headquarters of and nucleus for the mission in Mogadishu. This allowed both a continuation of relationships and procedures, and –most importantly- established a unity of command between the U.S. forces, the 20 different countries that sent forces, and the UN and NGOs.[87]

The U.S. also used Ambassador Robert Oakley, their special envoy to Somalia, to diplomatically create a secure environment. He pursued a peacemaking agenda, whereby: "Our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using implicit threats of coercion to buttress requests for co-operation among factions and with UNITAF."[88] Oakley also reminded the faction leaders that the massive firepower used during Desert Storm could be unleashed against them.

As the mission got under way, Oakley succeeded in once more engaging and giving roles of importance to traditional community leaders. That policy was first started by Shanoun but was pursued haphazardly by his successor, Ismat Kittani. The U.S. military presence facilitated the implementation of this policy, as local elders no longer needed to fear the factions.[89] Further, Oakley argued that any top-down approach would be a recipe for failure: "We're not trying to impose something external or something from above on the Somalis but (to) help them develop their own institutions..."[90]

By this strategy, therefore, UNITAF initially succeeded in its objectives. Overall, the force was highly effective. It arrived quickly, including a night landing of the Marine forces prepared for combat conditions, and was quickly reinforced by the 10th and the Foreign Legion forces.[91] Further, the force quickly established its legitimacy- clear support for the operation from participating forces and belligerents alike- by demonstrating both clear impartiality and the capability to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[92]

During this period, the UN sought both to continue humanitarian relief work and to negotiate some form of national reconciliation. This second goal was secured on 15 March 1993, when the leaders of 15 Somali political movements, as well as representatives of the UN and other international organisations met in Addis Ababa and created the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia.[93]

The Agreement consisted of four parts. The parties first agreed upon the need for complete and simultaneous disarmament throughout the country combined with the establishment of a national impartial police force. Then they acknowledged the need for continued relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction work. They also recognised the need to settle all disputes through legal and peaceful means and to restore all illegally seized property. Finally, they resolved to create a body to oversee the reconstruction and building of democratic institutions over the following two years.[94] With the Agreement in place, the U.S. government felt that the handover to the UN could begin.

UNITAF made a significant contribution both to co-ordinating relief and military operations, and succeeded at least partially in co-ordinating activities with the 49 NGOs

in the country. However, the mission only deployed in about 40 percent of Somalia, and co-operation between the military and civilian forces varied considerably from area to area.[95] Moreover, very few of the peacekeeping elements engaged in traditional confidence building exercises; rather UNITAF conceived of itself as solely a military operation. The result was disagreements between many of the international actors.

2.Disagreements

The UN and U.S. very quickly got into a dispute over what the mission's mandate entailed. From the very beginning, the Secretary-General had stressed that the mission, in order to be successful, must have two key foci. First, a secure environment could only exist if, at least, "the heavy weapons of the organised factions are neutralised and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed."[96] The Secretary-General also felt that the operation should create a secure environment throughout Somalia from the outset: "It is true that the quantity of suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere..."[97]

a. Disarmament

Disarmament in particular, and what constituted a secure environment in general, were a constant thorn in the two sides. It led to open disagreements between the U.S. and UN, with U.S. Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater saying that "disarmament was not a stated part of our mission and that has not changed."[98] The U.S. forces in Somalia agreed, with Robert Oakley arguing that the Security Council Resolution was " a clearly defined mission, which is to establish security conditions in Somalia to provide for the uninterrupted flow of relief supplies. It does not include disarmament." Lieutenant

General Robert Johnston, Commander of the U.S. forces, supported him, saying: "people will need to change the terms of my mission before I get into a wholesale disarmament."[99]

The U.S. took this position for four reasons. First, they made a clear distinction between humanitarian and strategic intervention. Since Somalia belonged to the former category, they had no wish to interfere in its domestic affairs. Second, the U.S. feared that systematic disarmament could involve significant casualties. Third, Washington was wary of the complexity of the security environment in Somalia, and believed that under the circumstances, it would be impossible to fully disarm the country. Finally, the Americans believed a policy of active disarmament would have been potentially very expensive.[100] The UN, by contrast, argued that a secure environment was inconceivable without disarmament, that any future mission would be acutely vulnerable to the factions, and that the work achieved during UNITAF would be a mere band-aid exercise.[101]

When weapons-control policies were adopted, they were generally accepted, even welcomed, by the Somalis, and had a positive impact on the level of violence as measured by the number of gunshot victims admitted to hospitals.[102] But these attempts, and various voluntary disarmament programs such as 'food for guns' and 'cash for guns' generally failed to create real results, simply because Somalis were unwilling to surrender their weapons in a still insecure environment.[103]

Still, the situation became more favourable to disarmament during the intervention, particularly after the Addis Ababa peace accords, in which all sides agreed to disarm. "Thus the U.S. could have argued that as an impartial force, it was only helping enforce what the Somalis themselves had decided. Indeed, many Somalis fully expected

to be disarmed and were surprised by the lack of action on the part of the U.S.-led forces."[104]

b. The Secure Environment

Over time, the security situation in Somalia gradually deteriorated, with renewed fighting in Mogadishu and the southern port of Kismayu. This caused UNITAF forces to begin patrolling more aggressively, and they did begin disarming Somalis carrying weapons openly.[105] They also started doing periodic weapon searches and confiscations. However, this did not constitute a comprehensive disarmament plan, and neither was it considered by the U.S. now to be part of its mandate.[106]

To complicate the situation further, until January 1993 Robert Oakley insisted that creating new local police forces was not on UNITAF's agenda. However, the expanding violence caused a change of face, and UNITAF began supporting efforts to form a new police constabulary in Mogadishu which, on 6 February, saw 2,000 members deployed, albeit with little training. A judicial committee was also formed, with each of the two main factions naming an equal number of magistrates. However, "the legal process was fundamentally compromised by the involvement of appointees from the two warring factions. Neither group would permit the arrest of its own members."[107]

c. Relief Problems

There was also considerable trouble in co-ordinating operations between the UNITAF forces and the UN agencies and NGOs. Because there was no government, there was no central co-ordinating body; therefore the U.S. military found itself in the position of adopting this role. "Dealing effectively with those agencies became the primary challenge for civil-military operations in Somalia. This was an important function

because the [Human Relief Operations] not only provided many of the relief supplies... [but they] were on the scene prior to the arrival of our forces and long after their departure."[108]

The operation planners realised that in this anarchic environment, relations between the groups would be strained, since many of the organisations were there before the military forces, and thereby knew the environment better. Furthermore, many civilian organisations have an intrinsic distrust of the military, and therefore did not want to be controlled by them. The U.S. military planners therefore created two organisations to deal with these problems: first a centralised authority in the Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC), based in Mogadishu; and second, they divided the country into nine Humanitarian Relief Sectors, each with a civilian-run headquarters.[109]

The CMOC was designed to be the key co-ordinating point for the NGOs in their dealings with UNITAF, including co-ordinating all requests for military support by the various aid agencies and acting as an interface, facilitator and co-ordination agency between UNITAF, the NGOs and the UNOSOM headquarters staff.[110] The leadership of the CMOC was the military, representatives of civil agencies, members of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Relief and the UNOSOM co-ordinator of humanitarian operations.[111] However, the CMOC was not located in the command headquarters, which directed military support to NGOs, and the NGOs themselves were very dispersed, which caused slow communications.

For each humanitarian relief sector, the command staff also established a humanitarian operations centre (HOC). Each HOC worked to develop and implement relief strategy, co-ordinate logistic support for the NGOs and arrange military support.

However, each HOC did not answer to central authority or to one another. Therefore, there was no central co-ordination: "The resulting command relationship could be best depicted by overlapping circles rather than by a schematic diagram."[112]

While it has been argued that the CMOC was "an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational co-ordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions,"[113] there were clear problems with the system. There was no clear military/NGO leadership relationship. Neither group successfully grabbed the lead, resulting in constant negotiation with everyone involved at every step in the operation.[114] Complicating this were the different UN and U.S. roles in the country. UNOSOM, in UN eyes at least, remained fully responsible for the political and humanitarian aspects of the mission, but the U.S. both controlled the forces and engaged in its own political activities. The result was that the UN representatives lacked power on the ground and became marginalised except at key moments like the Addis Ababa conference, which was in turn criticised by the U.S. as being impractical.[115]

Also, the military officers themselves had different views of the mission and how to support the NGOs. Particularly the Marines and U.S. command staffs felt that the military was there to assist NGOs indirectly through overall security, but to allow the NGOs to provide relief. By contrast the CMOC staff felt that the military was there to assist the NGOs both directly and indirectly. [116]

In fact, operations that saw greater military-civil co-operation not only were generally more successful, but also produced lower overall levels of violence. The two examples in the next section highlight this.

d. Alternative Methods

The 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, which took control of the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector, had trained extensively in civil-military relations before being deployed.[117] The commanding officer donned the mantle of 'military governor' of the sector and positioned the troops above the armed clansman by doing both "'aggressive' protection of humanitarian work and the 'domination' of the HRS through the use of static security positions, patrolling and on-call quick reaction forces."[118] Furthermore, the Australian government adopted a broad interpretation of the mandate, and included widespread disarmament. While it accepted the potential risks, the government stated that " we believe that for there to be an effective long-term solution to Somalia we will have to disarm the people."[119] The Australians also embarked on a process of 'bottom up' political reconstruction by meeting with clan leaders and rebuilding confidence in the rule of law and the local judicial system.[120] The result was that the situation was not only stable, but the armed militiamen had completely disappeared by the time the Australians were rotated out.[121]

Similarly, the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battlegroup, deployed to the Beltet Huen HRS, treated it as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Thus it engaged in tasks that included containment of heavy weapons from all the factions, creation of a civil/military co-operation unit to provide technical assistance to NGOs, the reconstitution of the local constabulary and the judicial system, transport, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure.[122] Rebuilding, however, had never been the goal of UNITAF. It had always remained clear on its concept of operations: "get in, distribute the food, quell

the famine, turnover to follow-on UN forces and leave."[123] Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. command left the long-term goals to the UN.

3. UNITAF Leaves

By March, the U.S. argued that they had succeeded in their mission, and that a secure environment now existed, though to what degree was not clear. Even Robert Oakley admitted that "problems of banditry persisted... several major militias had not been demobilised, and hidden weapons were abundant. Personal and clan tensions remained high..."[124] The UN disagreed with the U.S. decision, with the Secretary-General stating that UNITAF forces continued to be the target of sniper and harassment fire.[125] Nevertheless, with the passing of the Addis Ababa accords, which secured agreement among Somali leaders, and the passing of Security Council Resolution 814, which established the UN follow-on force, UNOSOM II, UNITAF began its transition to UN control, with May 1 set as the date of departure.[126]

4. Conclusions

UNITAF was considered by most players to have been a success, albeit a limited one. It had secured the major sea and airports of Somalia, ensured the safe transfer of relief supplies, and had halted the massive famine that had engulfed the country. However, its relief co-ordination with the civilian actors had been marginal at best, particularly in Mogadishu. Furthermore, the mission had failed to create a presence throughout the country, it had failed in any meaningful way to rebuild the judicial system, and it had chosen not to disarm the population.

While these seemed minor points at the time, they would ensure that UNOSOM II, run by the UN rather than by the U.S. but still with a dominant American presence, would have trouble from the beginning and eventually fail.

D. Fourth Step: Peace Enforcement -UNOSOM II

1. The Mandate

UNOSOM II would have a far wider mandate than its predecessor did. Acting once more under Chapter VII of the Charter, its task would be to continue to provide humanitarian relief and other assistance, as well as aiding the Somali people to rehabilitate their political institutions, economy and promote national reconciliation. It would also help resettle refugees and help with mine clearing.

It would also have an expanded role. Firstly, it was to re-establish the Somali police in order to assist the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Secondly, its mandate demanded that all Somali parties fully comply with the commitments of the Addis Ababa Accords, in particular the maintenance of the cease-fire and full disarmament. Finally, UNOSOM II was to bring these efforts to all parts of Somalia, rather than the forty percent previously covered by UNITAF.[127]

On paper at least, the forces assigned to UNOSOM II, unambiguously a peace enforcement mission, would consist of 28,000 troops, encompassing a headquarters, five brigades and a logistic support group. Further, it was felt that this force required the ability to engage in all forms of warfare.[128] In other words, the forces deployed, albeit smaller than UNITAF, would have similar combat capabilities. Whether it would have been possible for such a force to secure peace on the ground in Somalia cannot be known.

It would still have been forced to more actively disarm the population, and expand its efforts throughout the entire country, with fewer men than UNITAF had had.

2. The Early Problems

Unfortunately, the force that was assembled did not have these capabilities. On transition day, the planned 28,000-strong forces was fielding only 14,000 troops. Its various combat elements would trickle into the country between May and September.

The combat capability of the force was also significantly lower. UNITAF had shown that with a large, capable, force, it was possible to impose a secure environment on the factions. UNOSOM II did not have the same advantages. Rather than having the bulk of the force being composed of one country's forces (the U.S.) and allied countries, which had been trained to operate together, most UNOSOM combat elements were in a strength of a battalion or less, and from a variety of countries with widely differing equipment, training, doctrine, and leadership. Furthermore, the U.S. combat forces were reduced from two divisions to the brigade-sized Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which was composed of elements of the 10th Mountain and which was under control of the UN force command only during emergencies.[129] Finally, the force would lack the logistical support that UNITAF had, with far fewer engineers and lift, scout, and attack helicopters. The only U.S. engineers left in Somalia, for example, were specifically assigned with supporting the QRF.[130]

The changeover was chaotic. Among other problems, the Indian Brigade expected in May did not arrive until September because of political delays. Similarly, the Pakistanis, who assumed the U.S. Marines job of guarding Mogadishu, did not even start

to arrive until the last weeks of April and were not as numerous or well-equipped as the previous force.[131]

Furthermore, there were co-ordination difficulties. The UN believed that support for the mission would decline if it were seen as the U.S. dropping an insolvable problem onto the UN, therefore U.S. support was still required for the mission to succeed. Thus, Admiral Jonathan Howe, President Bush's National Security Advisor, became the Special Representative of the Secretary General, and Lieutenant-General Levik Bir, a Turk who had previously worked closely with NATO, became force commander. The result was that "this inevitably gave UNOSOM II a strongly American orientation which, when UN forces became embroiled in actual fighting, made it difficult to decide whether the Pentagon or Boutros-Ghali was calling the shots."[132]

While UN personnel were more inclined to use the traditional methods of peacekeeping to resolve tensions, the U.S. personnel quickly became impatient. This resulted in the mission quickly taking a different turn and in allegations that the U.S. in fact hijacked UNOSOM II, and allowed the Force Commander "to participate and acquiesce to what Admiral Howe and the Deputy Force Commander, guided by U.S. authorities in the Pentagon, had already decided upon."[133]

3. The Events of 5 June 1993

Very soon after the transition occurred, it became clear that Aidid would not co-operate with the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Furthermore, in assuming a far more ambitious disarmament program, UNOSOM II "was a direct threat to the position of the clans within the local power structure and was resisted accordingly."[134]

When UNOSOM II forces approached one of the USC/SNA designated weapon storage facilities on the premises of Radio Mogadishu on 5 June, they came under heavy attack with the end result that 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed and an additional 56 were wounded.[135] The events of that day showed several key mistakes[136] that would continue to haunt the rest of the mission.

To begin with, the UNOSOM mission command failed to co-ordinate the operation properly. The military division did not consult with the political division, which later said that it "would have advised against the inspection of the cantonment site close to the radio station...had [it] been informed about the planned inspection."[137] Even the few civilian political advisers who were consulted failed to grasp the implications of the inspection, and regarded it purely as a military mission. There were also few seasoned peacekeepers among the military leadership to advise on the useful practices learned under traditional peacekeeping. There was also a lack of useful intelligence. No one predicted such an attack would occur, or even knew what forces Aidid had in the area.[138] The action also created a rift within the UN forces. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, no one grasped that the events of that day, and the following reaction, would alter irrecoverably the relationship the U.S. would have with the people of Somalia.

4.The End of Impartiality

The direct result of the events of 5 June 1993 was that the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837 which strongly condemned "the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel... which appears to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation the Operation from carrying out its mandate..." It further, however, raised the bar by demanding for the "neutralising [of]

radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against the Operation." And it requested that UNOSOM II be brought up to its full deployment, with member states contributing military support and transport on an emergency basis in order to take "all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks... including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment."[139]

Resolution 837 produced two results. First, it gave *carte blanche* to the operation to take any and all actions against the perpetrator, who was quickly identified through circumstantial evidence to be Aidid.[140] Secondly, the mission would irrevocably abandon any pretence of being a 'neutral' force, while not having the necessary forces to assume the role of a combatant. In order to pursue this role, UNOSOM became increasingly controlled by the U.S., since "because these operations clearly outran the capabilities of other UNOSOM II forces, there was an immediate expansion in the use of the Quick Reaction Force,"[141] which was under direct U.S. control. Furthermore, UNOSOM II headquarters was neither organised nor equipped to function as a battle staff, and therefore had to greatly adjust its responsibilities under pressure.[142]

As missions against Aidid began to increase in size and scope, Admiral Howe began "behaving as though he were the sheriff of Mogadishu, proclaim[ing] Aidid an outlaw, offering a reward of U.S. $20,000 for his capture."[143] As a result UN operations began to concentrate too much on Aidid's capture at the expense of the reconstruction and disarmament programs: "In this period, some elementary but significant measures useful for the country's economic reconstruction failed to be taken... General (Bruno) Loi (the Italian force commander) observed that as a consequence of the UN attitude Somalis'

expectations were frustrated, 'they just could not understand what the UN had come to do in their country.'"[144]

The results of this near-open warfare were that support among UN members, particularly the Italians, declined. Italian Prime Minister, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, accused "the UN of having transformed a peace mission into 'a military intervention almost as an end in itself, against the wishes of those who [were] carrying it out.'"[145]

The Italians argued that Aidid was becoming the central, if not only, objective of the mission.[146] They believed rather that a two-track policy was necessary, whereby "the primary task was to engage in a dialogue with all Somali factions in an effort to convince them to lay down weapons and promote the process of social reconciliation. Only if this approach did not yield results, would the use of force be justified."[147] The result of the mission's failure to follow this approach was that the Italians increasingly looked to Rome for verification of orders, and in fact found themselves accused by Admiral Howe of siding with Aidid and sabotaging efforts to capture him.[148]

Furthermore, the UN simply was not very good at running this type of mission, and while they led a number of raids on suspected Aidid hideouts and strongholds, they failed to capture him.[149] This resulted in the U.S. truly taking the mission into their own hands by deploying a special forces group, Task Force Ranger, that answered to the U.S. Central Command, without going through already established UN or U.S. channels.[150] However, the U.S. military command also had its hands tied, as U.S. Secretary of Defence Les Aspin, General Powell and members of the U.S. Congress did not want any further troops deployed. Thus, while the UNOSOM forces did receive the Ranger group, a request to deploy heavy tanks, Bradley armoured fighting vehicles, and additional

helicopters was denied by the US government.[151] But the military was equally remiss in not performing a comprehensive reassessment of the mission as these new troops were being deployed and the level of violence used by both parties continued to escalate.[152]

Task Force Ranger was deployed in late July 1993 based on arguments made by UN officials that they simply did not have the expertise to engage in such a combat situation. It included elements of the Delta commandos and the U.S. Rangers, along with helicopter transport.[153] The Task Force was composed of elements of the best units the U.S. military could field, and while their first mission was bungled- with the forces accidentally descending on a UN compound- their next six missions were considered successes. By the end of September, Aidid was actually in contact with the UN in an attempt to end the conflict.[154] These early successes made the force decide to launch a larger scale mission, one that would prove to be a catastrophe.

5. The Ranger Raid

On 3 October 1993, the task force was dispatched to raid the Olympic Hotel, where Aidid was thought to be meeting with his senior lieutenants and supporters.[155] The mission went smoothly at first, but troops were then pinned down and suffered heavy casualties.[156] Nineteen U.S. soldiers were dead or missing, seventeen from Task Force Ranger, and eighty-four had been wounded. One Malaysian soldier was also killed and three wounded. In exchange, an estimated three hundred to a thousand Somalis were killed and at least eight hundred were wounded.[157]

> Given the fact that the raid succeeded and that the Rangers and Delta had held out for over ten hours against overwhelming odds before withdrawing in good order, it had to be counted as a victory... By any objective standard the siege at the Olympic Hotel should have been seen as a U.S. triumph, but by the alchemy of press and policy it had been turned into an incredible political defeat.[158]

The short term outcome of the Ranger raid was for the U.S. to send even more troops, comprising a joint task force of air, naval and ground units including M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles[159] -ironically, the equipment that Montgomery had earlier requested but not received. The U.S. forces in Somalia even began to plan a major campaign against the SNA, "whose faction had been severely weakened and demoralised by the large losses taken in the 3 October raid."[160]

Very quickly, however, domestic opinion in both the U.S. and other contributing countries was soured by the losses, particularly when international television showed the mutilated body of one of the dead helicopter crewmen dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by cheering Somalis.[161] President Clinton announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Furthermore, Clinton once more sent out Robert Oakley, "ostensibly to lend American support to new Ethiopian and Eritrean efforts to broker a political settlement, in reality to secure the release of prisoners taken by Aidid's forces."[162]

The result was a substantial change in UN policy towards Somalia, and ironically saw the UN embrace the strategy previously espoused only by the Italians.[163] To aid in this change, the USC/SNA faction declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against all UNOSOM II forces after 9 October 1993.[164] Peace enforcement, at least in Somalia, had failed, and the UN attempted to return to a traditional mandate.

E. Fifth Step: Failure of the Mission

The UN was not yet willing to abandon Somalia. In October, Boutros-Ghali flew to Somalia, and after consulting with military and civilian UNOSOM officials, Somali

elders, and other local governments, returned to New York and asked the Security Council to allow the mission to continue on an interim basis.[165]

The UN Security Council decided on 4 February 1994 to have the mission focus solely on humanitarian assistance, and to work solely with the co-operation of the Somali people. Even with this renewal, however, UNOSOM was fading fast. Many of its project offices were being transferred to other UN organisations.[166] Negotiations, once again in Addis Ababa, in March reached (once again) statements forswearing violence, urging general disarmament, and implementing an interim government by 15 May 1994. However this agreement, like the previous one, came to nought.

By May 1994, the military force was down to 19,000, and the U.S. and European countries that were originally part of UNOSOM II had been replaced by forces from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Nepal and Egypt. The force was far less capable, stretched very thin, and had seen the QRF shrink to a mechanised company.[167] Furthermore, increasingly less-than-credible reports from the mission, increasingly careless largesse -including money lavished on faction leaders and unofficial hand outs- and the theft of $4 million from a UNOSOM filing cabinet finally resulted in the Security Council deciding to terminate the operation in September.[168]

F. UNOSOM Conclusions

In the short run, the mission could be considered a success. Even during the darkest times of UNOSOM II, aid workers from over 40 NGOs were able to deliver assistance that would have otherwise been impossible. The UN was successfully able to co-ordinate humanitarian activities not only with its own operational arms but also with the host of other agencies, many of whom remained even once UNOSOM II departed.[169]

Infrastructure improvements also occurred. Thirty-two hospitals were operating by November 1993, along with 81 maternal and child health centres and 103 mobile vaccination teams. The amount of potable water had increased, with the systems in several cities being rebuilt. The agricultural industry also began to expand, with the vital food production and livestock sectors being revived. And primary education was once more available in many areas.[170] Long term progress was also made, particularly in law enforcement, with almost 8,000 Somali police being recruited by May 1994.[171]

However, with the departure of the final peacekeeping force in February 1995 the country collapsed back into warfare. The long-term efforts of the mission were all for nothing. Only in August 2000, did work progress on creating a new government with negotiations supported by clan representatives, local businessmen and the Islamic clergy. Clan allegiances to the various factions had finally withered after a decade of fighting,[172] allowing for a proposed transitional assembly divided along clan lines: "Civil society groups had initially hoped to avoid this, but...one had to be realistic about the way Somalia society works."[173] However, it does advance some civil society goals, in particular 25 seats are reserved for women.[174]

III. Lessons Learned from Somalia

A. Failures

1.Policy

There are, needless to say, many lessons from Somalia. At the broadest level, it is vital that any organisation trying to stop conflict in a failed state intervenes at a time appropriate for its success. The UN clearly missed three opportunities to intervene in Somalia before it reached an anarchic state. It is also vital that an intervener, in whatever

guise, both understands that a humanitarian intervention cannot be a surgical strike, but rather requires involvement over the long term, and that a failed state can not be treated as a normal country:

> The UN, being a collection of governments, found it useful to adopt the fiction that Somalia still existed as a state. The imperative to relate to a government, inevitably drove the U.S. and the UN into the hand of the warlords who, as a group, most closely approximated organised power centres in the country.[175]

Notably, when the UN generally had the most success, it was with the envoys who were willing to ignore this fiction, and instead deal with the other sectors of the Somali culture, especially the clan elders and other local government officials who still had some power, and to whom the intervention was most beneficial. But when the UN dealt with the factions, it failed to comprehend that it was dealing with groups that were at best ambivalent, at worst hostile, towards their intervention and progress.

This principle also needs to be extended to the attempted reconciliation conferences. The UN still considers the Addis Ababa Conference, along with other meetings, to be one of its greatest achievements in Somalia, noting that the civil society of Somalia was well-included: "Although the implementation of agreements reached at those meetings was forestalled by subsequent developments, the agreements continued to serve as the major frame of reference in the political life of Somalia."[176]

This is, at best, a convenient fiction. While the Addis Ababa conference may have included a wide range of civil society members, it was truly only negotiated amongst the factions, who were then expected to abide by its recommendations. With the UNITAF decision not to enforce the disarmament clause, arguably the most important in the short term, the agreement was quickly reduced in importance. The second Addis Ababa

conference succeeded only in producing a very similar sounding agreement, one that not even the UN truly believed would ever be enforced. With conferences that truly do involve all sectors of the country- as the 2000 Agreement has done, and as negotiations around the May Manifesto in 1990 would likely have done- success is much higher.

2. Mandate

At the mandate level, the problems were overwhelming. UNOSOM, acting as a traditional peacekeeping mission, had abjectly failed. But there were no systematic examinations of its problems. Introducing a military element under any conditions requires a revaluation of the parameters. But introducing one, as with UNITAF, where the parties involved in the intervention are not in agreement will only lead to problems. Further, the adoption of Resolution 814- supported by the Clinton administration- the mission abruptly changed its goals from humanitarian relief to nation building.[177] The UN and U.S. had distinct ideas of how the mission should proceed, and unfortunately, they never clarified them until after the troops were deployed.

UNITAF had adequate forces to secure at least temporarily the area under its control. But since no effort was made to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate the combatants, by the end of UNITAF, Somalia was gradually getting more violent. The areas where the peacekeeping forces exercised their powers towards disarmament, and notably used more traditional peacekeeping methods, had far more success, but this policy was not widespread. Perhaps the greatest irony during UNITAF was that the forces had been deployed to protect humanitarian operations, and yet particularly the U.S. forces treated direct support of NGOs to be a form of mission creep.[178]

The deployment of UNOSOM II into an unsecure environment was dominated by a complete lack of proper co-ordination for the transfer of power.[179] Not only was peace absent, but the follow-on mission was completely unprepared. But the UN choose to accept the pretence that it was, and deployed a smaller, less capable force, with a far broader mandate. Particularly by embracing the need to disarm the population, UNOSOM II was setting itself up for a confrontation. However there was a failure to comprehend where these events would lead. Finally, the adoption of Resolution 837 destroyed any impartiality the mission may still have had by signalling out one faction,[180] which could only result in failure. Peace enforcement was new to the UN, which meant it should have proceeded more cautiously. Instead by UNOSOM II's policies, it directly sought out confrontation.

3. Operational

At the mission's operational level, the majority of problems revolved around poor co-ordination. This is perhaps not surprising, based on the huge number of organisations involved. However, the problems were clearest in two areas: co-ordination between the military and civil authorities; and co-ordination within the military forces.

The UNITAF and UNOSOM forces did a great deal to co-ordinate efforts between themselves and the NGOs in Somalia. But overall, these efforts failed to do their jobs effectively for three reasons. First, there was no clear leadership relationship. Neither the military nor the NGOs nor the UN could control each other's actions. Second, the military, particularly in Mogadishu, was often unwilling to lend direct support to the NGOs, and the NGOs expected a great deal more support than the military felt it could

offer.[181] Finally, on all levels there was insufficient planning. There was little advanced operations planning that included both groups:

> During cease fire and disarmament planning, for example, military officers committed agencies to provide relief at certain sites before co-ordinating the locations and requirements with HROs. Similarly, agencies did not inform the military of their decision to establish soup kitchens in Mogadishu, even though the military may have been called upon to provide security.[182]

At the most basic level, much of this confusion emerged simply because of the far different doctrines under which military and civilian groups operate. One clear example of this was in medical care, which was provided both by the peacekeeping forces and NGOs such as Medecins sans Frontieres. Their actions were often poorly co-ordinated, resulting in both extensive duplication and different groups following differing (and sometimes incorrect) drug and epidemiology guidelines. But furthermore, fundamental differences existed in their doctrines, with the peacekeepers seeking to win over the 'hearts and minds' of Somalis, whereas the NGOs were seeking to rebuild the capacity of the country to provide health care without foreign assistance.[183]

Culturally, the twain did not meet. The military forces in Somalia were frustrated "by what they viewed as disorganisation and waste growing out of a tendency not to conduct detailed planning. Individually, they saw relief workers as young, liberal, anti-military, academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriated cowboys who came to an area for a short time to 'do good' without fully considering the consequences."[184] Furthermore, it has been suggested that the NGOs themselves created a lot of the economic turmoil in Somalia themselves by providing an overabundance of cheap food that ruined the few farmers and artificially increased many Somalis' incomes.[185]

But the NGOs were equally frustrated by military officers who were perceived as "inflexible, conservative, and bureaucratic. They found them insensitive to Somali suffering and viewed their concern over "mission creep" as obsessive, an excuse to do the minimum and go home."[186] While bridging this gap may certainly be difficult, including NGOs more thoroughly in operations and changing each other's perceptions through group activities and wargames when not deployed go a long way to solve it.

4. The Military

The military must also shoulder a great deal of the blame. While they may have perceived the NGOs as disorganised, their own command structures in Somalia were a labyrinth of red tape:

> There should be no mistaking the fact that the greatest obstacles to unity of command during UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on itself. Especially at the end of the operation, these command arrangements had effectively created a condition that allowed no one to set clear, unambiguous priorities in designing and executing a comprehensive force package.[187]

This was complicated by the involvement of a multitude of other countries, which resulted in severe interoperability problems:

> UN peacekeeping operations will inherently encounter some difficulties in command and control among the national units that make up the force. These include communication problems stemming from the use of different languages, the lack of common training, redundant staff structures, and multiple chains of command.[188]

Both during UNITAF and UNOSOM II, forces with prior peacekeeping experience- such as the Canadians, Australians, and Italians- generally did far better than the forces without it. Furthermore, when the escalation began, the military command in Somalia was both lacking in officers with prior peacekeeping experience, and in the intelligence necessary to see where the mission would head. Therefore, it quickly

escalated into a near open war, thereby destroying any semblance of impartiality, but without the necessary force to fight such a war:

> Peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude an approach by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those normally found on the field of battle- an adjustment to suit the needs of peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action.[189]

IV. Conclusions

In Somalia, the UN used all four peacekeeping tools that it had at its disposal. It began with preventive action, through the use of envoys. It then went to peacemaking, where the UN negotiated entrance for a force into Somalia. It then proceeded to traditional peacekeeping, under UNOSOM I, which failed. It then proceeded to peace enforcement, first under the auspices of the U.S., then under the auspices of the UN. This, too, failed. The result was an eventual complete retreat from Somalia, without solving any of its long-term problems.

Somalia shows the problems involved whenever the international community decides to intervene in a country- for whatever reason- without establishing a conceptual basis and understanding of the current situation. Furthermore, a mission requires a workable mandate with adequate forces deployed in a timely manner. It also requires clear co-ordination between all actors. Finally, a mission can not abandon the tenets of traditional peacekeeping without having adequate forces to do the job.

[1] United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1996), 13.
[2] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 287-288.
[3] Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 16.
[4] Source: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, *Somalia* < go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/Somalia.htm> (3 April 2001).
[5] Helen Chapin Metz, *Somalia: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1993), xxi.
[6] Somali Clans-Families and Clans

		Somali			
Daarood	Isaaq	Hawiye	Dir	Rahanwayn	Digil
Ogaden	Habar Yoonis	Habar Gidir	Gadabursi		
Majeerteen	Habar Awal	Abgaal	Ilse		
Mareehaan	Habar Tol	Mururšade			
Dulbahante	Jaalo	Biyamaal			
Warsangali	Habar Jaalo	Hawaadle			
Yuusuf	Ildagale	Ujuuraan			
Kablalah					

Source Metz, Somalia: A Country Study, 71-3.
[7] United Nations. *The United Nations and* Somalia, 9.
[8] Alice Bettis Hashim, *The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia* (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1997), 47-48.
[9] United Nations. The United Nations and Somalia, 9.
[10] Hashim, 77.
[11] Metz, 28.
[12] Hashim, 79, 98.
[13] Metz, 42.
[14] Hashim, 100-101.
[15] Metz, 184-186.
[16] Herman J. Cohen Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 200.
[17] Ioan Lewis and James Mayall "Somalia" in *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* ed. James Mayall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 100.
[18] United Nations. *United Nations and Somalia*, 9-11; Hashim, 103.
[19] Sens, 71.
[20] Hashim, 104-105.
[21] Metz, 211.
[22] Lewis, 105; Weiss, 74. While Somalia government statistics claimed 1.4 million refugees, the number appears to have been closer to 400,000.
[23] Ibid., 100.
[24] Weiss, 74.
[25] United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 11.
[26] Metz, 211-212.
[27] James Mayall, The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9.

[28] Lewis, 105.
[29] Cohen, 202.
[30] Ibid., 216.
[31] United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 11.
[32] Sahnoun, 7-8.
[33] Cohen, 203.
[34] Ibid., 203.
[35] United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 11.
[36] Sahnoun, 9; United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 12.
[37] Cohen, 206.
[38] United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 12.
[39] Cohen, 203-204.
[40] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 288.
[41] United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 15.
[42] Ibid., 15-16.
[43] Lewis, 108.
[44] Shanoun, 6-8.
[45] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 288.
[46] Marc Michaelson, "Somalia: The Painful Road to Reconciliation" *Africa Today*. 40, No. 2, (1993), 62, 65.
[47] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 289-290.
[48] United Nations, "Document 11: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, recommending the establishment of the United Nations operation in Somalia, 21 April 1992" in United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 137-138.
[49] Shanoun, 16.
[50] Lewis, 109.
[51] United Nations, " Document 23: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia..." in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 184.
[52] Shanoun, 17-18.
[53] Ibid., 18-20.
[54] United Nations, " Document 23," 186-7.
[55] Shanoun, 27.
[56] Weiss, 82.
[57] Lewis, 110.
[58] Shanoun, 39.
[59] Mockatis, 38.
[60] Shanoun, 39.
[61] Mockatis, 38.
[62] Serge Lalande, "Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping" in *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping* ed. Daniel Warner (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 75.
[63] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 293.
[64] Ibid., 212.
[65] Shanoun, 38.
[66] Shanoun, 39.
[67] Weiss, 82.
[68] United Nations "Document 35: S/RES/ 794," in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 216.
[69] Cohen, 209; Laitin, 161.
[70] Mayall, 110.
[71] Mayall, 110-111.
[72] Oakley, Robert "An Envoy's Perspective." <www.fas.org/man/dod.101/ops/docs/jfg0802> (10 October 2000), 45.

[73] Mayall, 110.
[74] Oakley, 45.
[75] In fact, at a meeting Herman Cohen (then assistant secretary of state for African Affairs) brought this up explicitly. He says that "in response to my statements Admiral Howe (then deputy national security advisor, later the SRSG in Somalia) asked 'Do you mean that we will have to clean Aideed's clock?' I said yes." Cohen, 213.
[76] Cohen, 210.
[77] Ibid., 46.
[78] Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haitit, and Bosnia 1992-1998 (Claremont,Ca: Regina Books, 1998), 19-20.
[79] Mockatis, 38. Joseph Nye suggest that the CNN effect makes it hard to keep otherwise lower priority items off the top of the public agenda. Nye, 26.
[80] Jonathan T. Dworken, "Coodinating Relief Operations" <www. fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/0508> (10 October 2000), 15.
[81] United Nations "Document 40: Letter dated 17 December 1992 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the activities of the Unified Task Force," in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 221.
[82] United Nations, "Document 40," 221.
[83] United Nations "Document 47: Letter dated 19 January 1993 from the United States to the president of the Security Council transmitting a report on the progress made by UNITAF" in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 235.
[84] Thomas J. Daze and John T. Fishel, "Peace Enforcement in Somalia" in *The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations*, ed. John T. Fishel, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 163-164.
[85] Ibid., 165-166.
[86] Kevin Kennedy, "The Relationship Between Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope," in *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 101.
[87] Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.* (Ft. McNair, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 23.
[88] Oakley, 47.
[89] Lewis, 113.
[90] Michealson, 60. However, there have been questions about how far Oakley was really willing to push the warlords, simply because the U.S. wanted to be able to leave Somalia in three months, something that could not occur if the warlords resisted: "Although he made several efforts to trim the warlords' sails... he necessarily became hostage to the order that the warlords could provide, as this order was the key to the humanitarian effort." See Laitin, 162.
[91] Daze, 165.
[92] Ibid., 158
[93] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 299.
[94] United Nations "Document 53: Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993," in *The United Nations and Somalia* United Nations, 264-265.
[95] Mockatis. 39
[96] United Nations "Document 36: Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to President Bush of the United States discussing the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuos consultations," in *The United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 217.
[97] United Nations, "Document 36," 217; see also Cohen, 214.
[98] Robert G. Patman, "Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention, 1992-1993," in *African Affairs*. 96 (1997), 511.
[99] Ibid., 511.

[100] Ibid., 512.
[101] Ibid., 511.
[102] Kennedy, 111.
[103] Patman, 514.
[104] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1995), 7.
[105] Mayall, 114.
[106] Patman, 516.
[107] Ibid., 517.
[108] Allard, 67.
[109] Ibid., 54.
[110] Ibid., 109-110.
[111] Oakley, 48.
[112] Dworken, 16.
[113] Oakley, 48.
[114] Dworken, 18.
[115] Jonathan T. Howe, "Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing With Somalia" in *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 184,
[116] Dworken, 18.
[117] Patman, 519-520.
[118] Ibid., 521.
[119] Ibid., 522.
[120] Ibid., 524-525.
[121] Ibid., 526.
[122] Sens, 105-106.
[123] James Cox, "Watershed in Somalia." in *Peacekeeping with Muscle*, ed. Alex Morrison (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), 130.
[124] Oakley, 51.
[125] United Nations, "Document 49," 245.
[126] Howe, 178.
[127] United Nations "Document 52: Security Council Resolution on the size and mandate of UNOSOM II," in *United Nations and Somalia* United Nations, 262-263.
[128] United Nations, "Document 49," 252-253.
[129] Daze, 166.
[130] Howe, 178.
[131] Howe, 179.
[132] Lewis, 116.
[133] Cox, 130.
[134] Allard, 64.
[135] United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 50.
[136] The events of that day may never be completely known. It is clear that the UN force had notified the USC/SNA command that the inspection would occur, and that the USC stated publicly that they were strongly opposed to it, saying that if the inspections were performed, it would lead to war. Aidid's faction had a easily deployable militia of at least 500 men, full knowledge of the UNOSOM force's movement. And because his influence was threatened by UNOSOM's work towards reconstruction, particularly by creating the new neutral police force, he was essentially spoiling for a fight to cement his leadership.
The attack on the UN forces itself was well co-ordinated, with the ambushers making use of good locations and camouflage, and other forces providing sufficient flank protection to prevent quick relief from other UNOSOM forces.

It is also clear that the units that were to inspect the sites had been ordered to force entry if need be. These orders included the radio station, where US special forces technicians were to inspect the radio equipment. Furthermore, 11 faction leaders had made it public that they urged the mission to seize control of the station based on its broadcasts.

The peacekeepers themselves were also poorly informed. The Pakistanis had recommended that either no notice be given or if given, that no inspection be carried out until the SNA's reaction was communicated to them. However, the Pakistanis were never informed about the hostile reaction to the notification, and would have otherwise reorganised the teams and equipped them with stronger fighting and protective vehicles, rather than the soft-skinned vehicles used. Furthermore, UNOSOM was unprepared for a hostile reaction, with many key personnel away from headquarters and the QRF stationed down in Kismayo, then seen as the more violent location.

Finally, it is unclear as to the actual purpose of the inspection. Rumours had spread within SNA circles that the UN was planning on seizing this station, and opinions continue to differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine, or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu. It has even been alleged that Admiral Howe announced publicly that the UN would close down the station because of its UN criticism.

See Tom Farer , "Report of an investigation into the 5 June 1993 attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia," in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 289-299; "Document 88," in *United Nations and Somalia*, United Nations, 375-376, 384; Brune, 30; Paolo Tripodi *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 149.

[137] Document 88, 384.

[138] Document 88, 384.

[139] United Nations "Document 55: Security Council resolution authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani troops serving in UNOSOM II," in *The United Nations and Somalia,* United Nations 268.

[140] Document 88, 381.

[141] Allard, 31.

[142] Ibid., 56.

[143] Lewis, 116.

[144] Tripodi, 158; Lewis, 117.

[145] Osvaldo Croci, "The Italian Intervention in Somalia," in *Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic,* ed. Carol Mershon and Gianfranceo Pasquino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 198.

[146] Croci, 201-202, 204.

[147] Croci, 205.

[148] Croci, 207; Tripodi, 154-155.

[149] Paul F. Diehl, "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II," in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 19 (1996), 156.

[150] Allard, 57.

[151] Brune, 31-32.

[152] Allard, 58.

[153] Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998a), 261.

[154] Ibid., 262.

[155] Ibid., 262.

[156] The forces were deployed smoothly by helicopter, and some 60 Rangers quickly surrounded the building and captured 24 senior members of the clan and two of Aidid's top aides. However, the Ranger force had underestimated how quickly a force could be brought against them. The Humvee and truck evacuation force was firstly delayed by the crowded streets and then by a makeshift ambush. Aidid's troops also quickly rushed to the hotel, and began firing automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades at the forces, and succeeded in shooting down several helicopters. At the first crash site, a 14-man combat search and rescue team secured the area but came under heavy fire, and their reinforcements were almost all

wounded before they could reach the site. Only light covering forces were able to reach a second crash site, and came under heavy fire that would eventually kill all the US forces apart from one pilot. At the hotel, the US forces managed to secure a perimeter within several buildings, and with the onset of night gained an advantage through the use of nightvision goggles.
However, it was not until 2am that other UNOSOM forces were able to reach them and break the siege. A first rescue attempt by the rest of Task Force Ranger was made but was ambushed and forced to pull back. After this set back, they requested the aid of the QRF, but it rapidly became clear that the QRF, on its own, did not have the force to fight its way through. Therefore, in quick succession they liased with Pakistani and Malaysian forces, with the Pakistanis performing a recon which revealed that there were at least 1,000 armed Somalis around the area. Therefore, the QRF (under General Montgomery) assumed commanded, and after receiving four tanks and three Armoured Personnel Carriers from the Malaysians launched an advance on the two crash sites at 11:30pm, coming under heavy sniper, RPG, and mortar fire and encountering reinforced roadblocks. The tanks, however, were able to clear these areas, and the force reached the Rangers and evacuated them, still while under heavy fire.
See United Nations *The Blue Helmets*, 301; Adams (1998a), 263-265; United Nations "Document 88," 409-410; Allard, 58.
[157] Adams (1998a), 264.
[158] Ibid., 264-265.
[159] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 301.
[160] Adams (1998a), 265.
[161] Ibid., 265.
[162] Lewis, 118.
[163] Croci, 210.
[164] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 301.
[165] Ibid., 301.
[166] Ibid., 308.
[167] United Nations, "Document 85," 357-358.
[168] Lewis, 120.
[169] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 315.
[170] Ibid., 301-302.
[171] United Nations, "Document 85," 359.
[172] CNN *Somalia's gunmen consider peace after decade of war* <www.cnn.com/2000 /world/africa/10/02/somalia.miltiamen.reut> (13 October 2000).
[173] BBC *Haggling at the Somali peace talks*. <www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africe/newsid_ 869000/869516.stm> (15 October 2000)
[174] BBC, Haggling at the Somali peace talks.
[175] Clarke, Herbst, 17.
[176] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 315.
[177] Laitin, 163.
[178] Dworken, 18.
[179] Laitin, 165.
[180] Thomas Weiss refers to it as creating a "Wild West style." Weiss, 89.
[181] Ibid., 18-19.
[182] Ibid., 19.
[183] Timothy Pitt "Medical Peacekeepers are bad for your health," Unpublished Presentation, Canadian Society for International Health Conference, Ottawa Canada, 13/11/00.
[184] Dworken, 19.
[185] Laitin,166.
[186] Ibid., 20.
[187] Allard, 60.
[188] Diehl, 161.

[189] Allard, 39.

Chapter IV. Haiti

When Haiti collapsed, it appeared to be a chance for the UN to salvage the idea of humanitarian interventions in failed states. After the newly elected democratic government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup in 1991, the international community was quick to react to what it perceived as a potential humanitarian emergency. The United States also became interested, both because of recent history and because of Haiti's proximity to the U.S. and the potential for refugee flows. The result was the UN attempting, first diplomacy, then a traditional peacekeeping mission, both of which met with failure. The UN then approved a U.S-led peace enforcement mission to establish a secure environment, aid humanitarian efforts, and begin institutional reconstruction.



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By the time the UN intervened in Haiti, the government, through a combination of its own incompetence and international sanctions had ceased to function and NGOs were forced to assume the provision of social services. The ruling junta committed widespread human rights abuses. The economy had all but collapsed. This, coupled with massive refugee flows to the surrounding islands and the United States, created a complex emergency that needed immediate, widespread, and long-term help.

But Haiti has a history even more complicated than Somalia's. While the intervention appeared to be a chance to repair the damage to international prestige that was generated by the full scale failure of Somalia, the lessons from that failure were not applied. Like Somalia, a great deal of Haiti's troubles stemmed from the fact that Haiti was not able to create a social contract among the population that would lead to a sense of national unity.[2] The result was that the Haitian mission suffered from the same problems as Somalia and failed to make long-term improvements.

I. A Historical Background to State Failure in Haiti

Early History

Originally discovered by Columbus in 1492 and founded as a Spanish colony on the eastern side of the island of Hispaniola, the current Dominican Republic, the French occupied the Western third in the late Seventeenth century, and converted what would become Haiti into a planter's paradise.[3] By the time of the French Revolution, the colony was the richest in the Western Hemisphere.[4] However, the Revolution sparked a movement to free the black slaves, which resulted in a revolt and eventual independence.

The Nineteenth Century

After winning independence from France in 1804, the population of Haiti is horribly divided:

> Slavery in Saint Domingue [Haiti's colonial name] had been particularly brutal, with commonplace whipping, mutilation, and torture, and the war for independence was marked by atrocities on all sides. With the defeat and withdrawal of French troops, the white French colonists either emigrated, in part to South Carolina and Louisiana, or were massacred by the newly independent Haitians. The colonial period and struggle for independence left Haiti with a confused legacy of racial pride and antagonism, plus a persisting fear of white enroachment. The rigid colonial caste system, in which admixture of white blood determined social status, persisted to the extent that Haitian mulattos continued to enjoy social and economic advantages over blacks.[5]

The result is a country built around a segmented society, where the colour of a person's skin, as well as their education and wealth, still determined their place in the national hierarchy. Haiti's inhabitants have neither a common language (the wealthy speak French and the poor speak Creole) nor a shared religion (the poor practice Voodoo, while the rich are Christian).[6] Furthermore, there has never been a Haitian nation: "It began, instead, as a rebellion that begot an army. The army begot a national apparatus. That militarized apparatus, in turn begot the state. The nation trailed behind. Or, to pursue the metaphor to its bloody end, the state miscarried the nation."[7]

Over time, Haiti's political culture became "characterised by the use of military force, the growing divisiveness among the population, troubled financial programs, and inefficient administration."[8] Between 1845 and 1915, 21 people held the presidency, most serving for two terms or less and only one completing his full term.[9]

American Intervention: 1915

The U.S. decides to intervene in Haiti after a collapse of government authority and attacks on foreign legations requires a force to "occupy Port-au-Prince for the purpose of

protecting life and property and preserving order."[10] In actuality, the intervention hopes both to protect American interests and to prevent European countries from establishing military bases that could challenge U.S. dominance in the Caribbean.[11]

The U.S. occupation is marked by three elements. The U.S. dismantles Haitian independent government by exerting control over the Haitian Congress and the President.[12] Washington also exerts its control through the creation of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, an American controlled native military force intended to be a "efficient, non-partisan, centralised force sufficiently powerful to ensure continuity of pro-American political regimes and to eliminate the problem of instability caused by cyclical revolutions."[13] The U.S. further resurrects an old French practice, of forcing peasants to perform labour on local roads in lieu of paying a road tax. The system, known as the "corvee", quickly resulted in widespread abuses.[14]

Finally, the U.S. military forces engaged in systemic racism, which sees the unlawful execution of Haitians,[15] a belief among the U.S. administrators that fair elections and other republican institutions were impossible in Haiti, [16] and the imposition of Jim Crow- style racial segregation. [17] There is also a widespread fear in the U.S. government that withdrawing the troops would result in a victory by guerrilla forces and the discrediting of U.S. policy. Therefore, the intervention continues for almost two decades.[18]

Nevertheless, there is a positive side to the occupation. The corvee, for all its brutality, did manage to build a substantial road system.[19] For the first time, civil service reform occurs.[20] Formal agriculture training is also offered, though Haitian subsistence

farmers who feel they can not risk their crops ignore it.[21] The occupation also sees Haitian nationalism take its first few steps, particularly through the writings of Jean Price-Mars:

> Price-Mars sought to restore the self-confidence and pride of Haitians in themselves by helping them to realise that they were members of the human race who had developed a distinctive culture... [He] hoped to inspire a national spirit that would weld intellectual elites and illiterate peasants together and enthuse Haitians as a group to resist oppression of any kind.[22]

The Changing American Role: 1929-1956

By 1929, the U.S. reconsiders its policies, and begins work to Haitianizie the government. Unfortunately, Price-Mars loses the Presidential race to Stenio Vincent, a mulatto, who becomes increasingly dictatorial as the U.S. occupation winds up[23] and would later have himself declared dictator, decreeing that Haitians were too immature for democracy.[24]

The nineteen-year American occupation of Haiti failed to focus on supporting long-term development in Haiti and on rebuilding its national capability. The only substantial change the occupation made was the professionalization of the Haitian Army, which during the 1940s emerged as the dominant force in Haitian politics and would continue in that role until the 1990s.[25]

In 1941, the U.S. pressures Vincent to step down. He is replaced by Elie Lescot, who "was not only corrupt but also obviously inept and increasingly insulting to black Haitians, who were systematically excluded from positions of power."[26] This gave strength to the negritude movement, designed to place power in the hands of black Haitians.

Papa Doc and Baby Doc: 1957-1986

After a series of incompetent regimes, the Negritude movement allows the election of Francois 'Papa Doc' Duvalier. Fearful both of the Haitian rich and of the army, he creates a cult of personality and a presidential guard, 'les Voluntaries de la Securite Nationale' (VSN).[27] The U.S. supports him because he is perceived to be an anti-Communist, and Haiti receives large amounts of investments and foreign aid from the U.S. government. The country becomes dependent on the aid.[28]

In 1971, Jean-Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier succeeds his father. Through his 'economic revolution,' he attempts to form an alliance of the Duvalier supporters with the traditional bourgeois and foreign capital, and dismisses the principles of negritude. The revolution fails and the economy lies in shambles.[29] Haitians complain about low wages and the repressive government, and the U.S. begins to experience a flood of Haitian refugees. There is also increasing evidence that the Haitian military and Jean-Claude Duvalier himself are profiting from the illegal trafficking of narcotics.[30]

Post-Duvalier Haiti: 1986-1991

The United States begins actions in 1985 to remove Duvalier from office, including cutting aid, further delaying other assistance, and counselling U.S. firms to leave Haiti. He flees in 1986.[31] In 1987, the army assumes control with the partial support of the United States. While initially pro-democratic,[32] the new President, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy begins to collude with Duvalierist forces and delays national elections. [33] When elections are held in January 1988, the preferred military candidate wins, but is then removed when he tries to take back control of import revenues from the army. Namphy reassumes the Presidency.[34]

Opposition to Namphy soon mounts, and he is removed by the military when he attempts to collude with Duvalierist supporters, including the VSN, to form a block which he would totally control. He is replaced by another general, who is then removed by a fourth military coup in early 1990.[35] His successor, a former Supreme Court Justice, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, is then forced to resign after widespread fiscal ineptness.

This mobilises the remaining Haitian elites –quiet until now-, who warn that interference in the next elections would not be tolerated. They then ask both the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to monitor the election, which is held with the country in a state of near-anarchy and with a bankrupt government. The winner is a Catholic priest, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who is supported heavily by the poor and disenfranchised.[36] Aristide wins a landslide victory- receiving 67.48% of the vote- which in turn establishes a mandate to transform the old regime, which still dominates the government and military, into an equal and democratic Haiti.[37]

II. The Collapse of the State

Haiti, throughout its history, had never truly been a truly functioning state. It always suffered from great weakness. But by the time of the 1990 election, the government was bankrupt. By Zartman's criteria,[38] Haiti had already hit all the signposts of failure. As aid monies dried up, the government not only ceased to make difficult choices, but to function altogether. But, most importantly, power in the country was not centred in the government, but rather in the Army, the remaining Duvalierist elements, and in the elites. Therefore, the government did not have true control over its own policies or agents. Haiti was already a failed state, but in the next four years this failure would increase in scope into a complex emergency.

Aristide's Government and the Coup

Aristide's government would last only seven months before the military launched another coup. The reasons for the coup are hotly debated. It is suggested that the new President simply lacked the political manipulative talents necessary for the job and failed to understand the role of compromise.[39] Similarly, his attempts to reform both the military and the economic basis of Haiti alienated most of the country's elites in an effort to bring on side the country's bourgeoisie.[40] Aristide established a minimum wage, instituted a war against both corruption and drugs, attempted to reform the civil service, started a literacy campaign but also often advocated class warfare.[41]

Because of this, he faced problems from three core groups. One was the army, still dominated by pro-Duvalier elements, and very fearful that Aristide might abolish the army altogether. Opposition also came from a variety of social organisations, ranging from other pro-Duvalier groups, to disgruntled members of Aristide's own coalition, upset both with his rapprochement to the U.S., IMF, and World Bank and his failure to give them government jobs. Finally, the business community feared that his policies might negatively affect both the economy and their own lifestyles.[42]

Aristide also began to act undemocratically, pressuring opposition parties to vote in favour of his legislation , even threatening them with the *Pere LeBrun,* necklacing with burning tires. On 21 September 1991, he made a speech before the UN General Assembly laced with populist rhetoric, and then returned to Haiti where, in a public speech, he stated "if you see a faker who pretends to be one of our supporters...just grab him. Make sure he gets what he deserves."[43]

Unsurprisingly, a coup occurred on 29 September 1991.[44] The commander of the military, General Raoul Cedras, who was personally appointed by Aristide, assumed the presidency and allowed Aristide to flee to the United States. Cedras immediately took to the airwaves to state that "after seven months of democratic experience, the country once again finds itself a prey to the horrors of uncertainty. With all Haitians, we will bring the ship to port."[45]

III. The UN Intervention

A. Initial Steps: Preventive Action and Peacemaking

The international community moved quickly after the coup. On 2 October 1991, Aristide met with the OAS ministers for foreign affairs, and on 3 October, they adopted a resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The next day, an OAS delegation arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of civilian groups and the military, but was forced to leave on 7 October.

Meanwhile, also on 3 October, Aristide addressed the UN Security Council, who condemned the coup and on 11 October, the General Assembly passed a resolution which condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutionally elected president and ordered the immediate restoration of the government.[46]

However, an impasse quickly developed, with the Army refusing to surrender control of the government.[47] It also became apparent that within Haiti there was a pattern of gross and widespread human rights abuses, and this coupled with a deteriorating political and economic situation meant thousands of Haitians started to flee the country.

The UN and the OAS sent a joint high level mission on 15 July 1992, which did not make any progress toward negotiating a political solution. The UN then sent a special

envoy, Dante Caputo, who succeeded in negotiating a mandate for an international civilian mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). MICIVIH would verify respect for human rights, including the rights to life, the integrity and security of person, personal liberty, freedom of expression and of association. It was deployed on 5 March 1993.[48] The UN also took action to force the Army to abdicate power. On 23 June the UN imposed a full oil and arms embargo, which included a freeze on all international funds.[49]

By the end of June 1993, both sides appeared to be interested in reaching a compromise. General Cedras informed the special envoy that he wished to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide in order to end the crisis.[50] At the same time, the international community, particularly the U.S., was interested in a compromise as well, due primarily to large scale refugee problems, which U.S. agencies now saw as a threat to U.S. national interests.[51]

B. Second Step: Traditional Peacekeeping

After a week of negotiations in New York, the Governor's Island agreement was signed. It included provisions for Aristide's return to Haiti, Cedras's early retirement, a return to democracy as quickly as possible, and for the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The mission would modernise the armed forces, create a new national police force, and aid MICIVIH. In exchange, sanctions would be immediately suspended.[52]

The agreement was a complete failure.[53] While the UN advanced team was deployed by plane, the bulk of the force composed of 200 U.S. and 25 Canadian soldiers and civilians was sent on the *Harlan County*, a U.S. ship, on 11 October. The ship was prevented from landing in Port-au-Prince by an armed mob. Under the threat of violence

the other components of the mission -the UN police monitors and MICIVH, also retreated from Haiti.[54]

Prospects for the mission had never been auspicious. Violence and demonstrations continued throughout Haiti, but the peacekeeping forces had assumed that theirs would be a traditional role, and were lightly armed.[55] Furthermore, the U.S. had just seen the venture into Somalia dissolve into disaster, which resulted in an unwillingness to put U.S. troops in danger: "'Crossing the Mogadishu line' and the disasters that lay therein now became a fixation in Washington... U.S. peacekeepers must never again become party to a conflict' their protection must be the overriding priority of U.S. policy."[56] The Haitians also linked these peacekeeping forces with the scenes of violence from Somalia.[57] Finally, it has been alleged that U.S. personnel informed Cedras that the UN forces could be easily thwarted, encouraging him to call their bluff. [58]

The result was that the UN, and particularly the Clinton administration, retreated from the crisis, and the ruling junta was shown that the international community was not prepared to follow tough talk with action.[59] The failure produced two major effects: the UN imposed even more stringent sanctions and the junta continued its human rights violations.[60]

1. Sanctions

The role of sanctions as a tool has often been questioned. Particularly when these are not targeted in ways to harm the ruling hierarchy, they can end up hurting the population of a country. In Haiti, the sanctions had notably direct effects, none being what the UN intended. The sanctions actually ended up disproportionately hurting the poorest, who saw both employment fall and prices, including food, rise. The result was

that during *La Crise*, as it is known in Haiti, per capita income fell by 30 percent, while inflation rose by 138 percent.[61]

Further, the Army actually benefited from the sanctions. Since the military hierarchy effectively controlled the Haitian economy, it was in the position to make windfall profits from the black market, while at the same time they used threats of violence to extort money from the population.[62] Furthermore, the military also appropriated an increasingly large share of the country's wealth, and received forty percent of the country's budget.[63]

Thirdly, the General Assembly resolution calling for sanctions stated:

> That there were to be no relations with the de facto government. This resolution was interpreted by the international agencies still operating in Haiti to mean that no resources, including humanitarian (aid) could be channelled through the public sector at any administrative level, including the level of the community health centre and school."[64]

Thus, there was no distinction made between the government, the state, and various state agencies. This meant that not only did the apparatus of the state effectively atrophy, but that aid agencies in Haiti were often forced to assume the role the state had previously held to ensure delivery of food and basic medical services.[65]

The result of the sanctions was that the state apparatus fell apart, "...weakening one of the key institutions required for Haiti to make a successful transition to democracy."[66] And because of the economic collapse they created, the sanctions actually reduced the capacity for political mobilisation.[67] It was only through the actions of international aid agencies that famine was avoided, epidemics contained, and social services in the country preserved.[68] In fact, it has been argued that "ironically, the most important humanitarian impact of the Chapter VII military intervention may well have

been the end of the coercive economic sanctions... that had devastated the local economy and the Haitian poor."[69]

2. Violence

The second change was further repression and greater violence within Haiti. As early as 1992, violence had substantially increased when Colonel Michel Francois, the head of Haiti's police, broke with Cedras.[70] His officers, particularly in rural communities, targeted directly any peasants who favoured Aristide and either intimidated or killed them.[71] The military also saw all forms of independent association to be potential sources of popular unrest, thus a potential challenge to their rule. Therefore, the army decided to return the country to "the atomised and fearful society of the Duvalier-era so that even if international pressure secure[d] the return of President Aristide, he would have difficulty transforming his personal popularity into organised support needed to exert civilian authority over a violent and recalcitrant army."[72]

The Army targeted large numbers of groups, including the media -ten radio stations were shut down on the first day of the coup and at least five journalists killed, pro-Aristide elected officials, rural development and peasant organisations, neighbourhood and community associations, trade unions, literacy groups, pro-democracy groups, students' groups, and womens' groups. All public signs of dissatisfaction with the junta were swiftly repressed, meetings of any kind, including chance encounters, were banned, and even the groups not threatened directly with violence were often extorted by the military.[73]

Thus, as the UN sat in limbo, unable to muster the forces necessary to push for a more forceful intervention into Haiti, the country itself was facing myriad problems. The

government, which had always relied on aid, had ceased to function in any meaningful way and the military swiftly repressed any challenges to their authority. Violence and corruption were endemic. Haiti did not collapse into a humanitarian emergency only because NGOs were already there to support the necessary functions of life. But the Haitian state itself, by 1994, had ail but collapsed.

C. Third Step: Peace Enforcement

In light of the problems crippling Haiti, and coupled with massive numbers of new refugees washing up on U.S. shores, the United States began preparing for a multinational military intervention: The junta's "three year history of intransigence and duplicity indicated that a credible threat of force would be necessary to remove the illegitimate regime."[74] On July 31 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 940:

> By the terms of the resolution, the Council... authorised Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and 'to use all necessary means' to facilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate government authorities."[75]

Thus, the UN was once again approving a peace enforcement mission that would be run under Chapter VII of the *Charter*.[76]

The U.S. would provide the bulk of the initial forces, with President Clinton arguing that:

> [T]he fundamental interests of the U.S. justified an attack if it was the only method to restore democracy in Haiti. If the U.S. did not lead this effort, the nation faced both the continuation of gross human rights violations in a neighbouring island and the continued refugee problems bringing more Haitians who fled whether for political or economic reasons."[77]

The U.S. military had long prepared for a possible intervention, and a plan began to come together in the fall of 1993. Involved in this exercise senior officers from all four branches of the military, many of whom had had experience either in Haiti or in other

U.S. operations in the Caribbean.[78] By May 1994 the planners had created two possible scenarios. The first assumed an invasion, and was classified as secret, which meant that few people outside of the military knew of its existence. The second plan, however, assumed a permissive entry into Haiti and became more of a humanitarian support plan. It had a lower classified status, which meant the military could co-ordinate the plan with other U.S. aid organisations that would be involved.[79]

By September 1994, President Clinton publicly stated that all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and force might have to be used, adding that more than 20 countries had agreed to be part of the initial force.[80] On 17 September, with U.S. forces already on route to Haiti, a last diplomatic mission, consisting of ex-President Jimmy Carter, retired general Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn, head of the Senate Armed Services Committee managed to get the Haitian government to sign a peace agreement which allowed for the permissive entry of the U.S.-led force.[81]

1. Uphold Democracy

The U.S. invasion of Haiti, while not met by violence, still worked to secure the environment quickly, seizing first the airport and seaport in Port-au-Prince, connecting them, and then establishing a base on Cap Haitien. From there the mission expanded to all parts of Haiti. Rapid reaction forces were available at all times, with air, helicopter, and rapid deployment troops poised on the aircraft carrier USS America.

The U.S. mission, known as the Multinational Force (MNF) and the follow-on UN mission, UNMIH, both had the same long term strategy. MNF's job was to create a secure environment and then pave the way for UNMIH, which would then redevelop the country.[82] The U.S. mission had five main goals: To maintain security and stability in the

country; To return Haiti to constitutional rule and reinstate President Aristide; To create a new, legitimate national police force; To hold both national and local elections; And finally, to work to restore basic services and infrastructure.[83]

2. UNMIH: The Humanitarian Mission

UNMIH would focus on humanitarian needs, the restoration of government, and economic recovery. In order to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the intervention provided food, health services, and short-term jobs. The U.S. government and other agencies provided a million individuals with one meal a day, and NGOs would provide health services to 2 million.[84] In order to create a long-term secure environment, the mission focused on rebuilding the Haitian National Police (HNP). In order to restore the government, the mission also organised local and parliamentary elections, worked to rebuild government ministries that were literally gutted during the military occupation, and finally worked to strengthen local government and the community in order to avoid the corruption that was endemic within the central government.[85]

In the long term, the mission hoped to reconceptualize the role of the state and its relationships with all levels of government and NGOs, which might well include contracting out services to NGOs while maintaining oversight, regulatory and planning control.[86] It would also be necessary to overhaul the education system, which suffered from low participation, poor access in rural areas and poor instructional quality.[87] Finally, the public health system was to be improved, as Haitians continued to suffer from poor sanitation, inadequate nutrition, and unequal access to health care.[88]Since the mission's main goals focused around the creation of the HNP and holding elections, the mission

started to be drawn down in early 1996. However, it remained active to support Rene Preval's newly elected government in its attempts at institutional reform.[89]

D. Fourth Step: A Return to Traditional Peacekeeping

UNMIH was then replaced by three successive missions that operated under traditional peacekeeping guidelines. The first, the UN Support Mission in Haiti, was to "assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force."[90] The next mission, the UN Transition Mission in Haiti, was to assist the government "by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police."[91] These missions were mounted because, during UNMIH, the UN realised that: "the creation of an effective, non-political police force is the work of years, not months."[92]

But these missions still focused on a force that was highly centralised -much like the force created in the earlier U.S. intervention: "In Haiti particularly, the potential for the misuse of a centralised force, no matter how well trained or how neutral, would remain high."[93] They also ignored the earlier focus on community-based development.[94]

The final UN mission in Haiti, the UN Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH), was created in an attempt to solve this contradiction. While it would focus on the continued professionalization of the police, it was also tasked with "further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and judiciary..."[95]

To a degree MICAH was successful. But it also repeated the mistakes of the previous missions, and its final report found that "institutional, social and economic

development must [still] be addressed in an integrated manner in order to consolidate democracy and peace."[96]

In the end, the UN ended MICAH by determining that the government of Haiti ultimately beared the responsibility to reform its institutions, provide security for the population and to reform the electoral process,[97] thereby abrogating the UN's own responsibility.

IV. Lessons Learned

A. Successes

The UN missions did have some notable successes, and certainly were not the same abject failure as Somalia. The UN succeeded in three areas: policy, by initially moving quickly to deal with matters; mandate; which was clear, allowed some lee-way, and allowed for a clean handover; and operationally, through clearer co-ordination between all parties.

1. Policy

The UN moved quickly to deal with matters. President Aristide was restored to power on 15 October 1994, less than a month after the MNF arrived.[98] Furthermore, the UNMIH advance team arrived in Haiti on 18 October, which allowed the two groups to quickly establish good co-operative relations. The first international police monitors arrived on 24 October, even while the U.S. military was still drawing down its invasion forces to its long term MNF commitment of 15,000.[99]

2. Mandate

The mandate was clear, which facilitated both effective planning and resource allocation. Furthermore, while the Security Council provided clear support, it was hands

off with limited interference. And while there was some mission creep, the tasks were considered to be both vital to the success of the mission and to re-establish the roots of the government.[100] The result was that when problems emerged, the mandate was flexible enough to deal with them.

Humanitarian aid was also quickly re-established, and when aid convoys and warehouses were targeted by gangs, UNMIH quickly expanded its mandate to protect them by carrying out patrols, escorting convoys and providing back-up for Haitian authorities in law and order situations. UNMIH also assumed a large civil affairs role, engaging in projects to improve the Haitian power supply, transporting repatriated refugees and aiding both the national and municipal governments.[101]

Finally, the transfer to UNMIH was seamless. The long lead time that the advanced team had in the country meant that when the MNF stated on 15 January 1995 that a secure and stable environment now existed, the transition consisted of the troops switching from wearing kevlar helmets to blue berets. Since the MNF had fielded upwards of 20,000 troops at its maximum, and UNMIH would only have 6,000, the decision was made early on to reduce the MNF size to 6,000 in order to show the Haitian population that the force was still large enough.[102]

3. Operational

The long term planning paid off. Not only did the several missions have the advantage of using the lessons learned from previous U.S. operations, including Somalia and other actions in the Caribbean, they also enjoyed the advantage of a permissive entry, and had a great deal of flexibility built into their operations. This meant that U.S. forces quickly adapted on the ground, including changing their Rules of Engagement when

Haitian military forces were seen attacking and killing civilians. Furthermore, the MNF was combined with both an appropriate UN force and with the international police forces, allowing for a more robust set of options to deal with any problems or crises.[103]

The MNF and UN forces also had the co-operation of the government of President Aristide. Equally importantly they understood that the political legitimacy of the mission lay in quickly holding elections, which they did in December 1995.[104]

Many UN organisations and NGOs were also already involved in the country, and knew what help was needed. Thus, when MICIVIH returned to Haiti on 22 October 1994 not only did it already have experience monitoring human rights in the country, and thus could quickly resume its mandate, but it was also able to contribute to rebuilding Haitian institutions.[105] Finally, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, met regularly with President Aristide and was able to closely co-ordinate problem areas.[106]

B. Failures

The missions also featured five substantial failures in the areas of policy, operation, and the role of the military: 1) short-term bias that ignored proper institutional reconstruction except in the case of the police. 2) overarching co-ordination problems; 3) difficulty rebuilding the police; 4) the role of the military was not clear; 5) little proper institutional rebuilding.

1. Policy

a. Short Term Bias

The missions constantly worked under the assumptions that a democratic government would be able rebuild the institutions of the country after they left. Therefore,

they were unwilling to engage in any projects which necessitated long term involvement in the country. Any attempts at true nation-building had been irrevocably damaged by the problems in Somalia, and therefore the intervening forces set the bar low. Ambassador William Swing argued that "we achieved the objectives we aimed for... so from our point of view it has been a success."[107] This attitude focused prominently in both the failure to rebuild the police force, and in the failure to create an accountable democratic structure.

b. Institutional Reconstruction

The police force was the only state institution on which the UN mission focused. Even this failed because the judiciary was not reformed and was viewed as corrupt and held in low esteem: "Although the new police force enjoys substantial legitimacy, the judicial system does not. This disjuncture threatens to undermine the entire criminal justice system."[108] President Rene Preval, who succeeded Aristide, described the Haitian justice system as 'putrid.'[109] The Haitian elites themselves preferred a pliable justice system, and therefore were not interested in an independent judiciary, while the few NGOs assigned to the task performed badly as "project managers had either no relevant technical skills or lacked appropriate country experience."[110]

This lack of institution building also fundamentally threatened Haiti's democratic system. U.S. commentators suggested that Aristide was not a democrat, but that rather, during his first term of office, he:

> did not distinguish himself as a democrat, peacemaker, or friend of the United States. Instead he railed against the United States and the Catholic Church, urged his followers to physically destroy their (and his) political enemies, reportedly worked to create his own paramilitary goon squad, and did little to advance the cause of capitalist democracy...[111]

A second problem arose, because the 1995 election, which Aristide's handpicked successor, Rene Preval, won by a landslide had only a 30% participation rate. Many Haitians did not vote because they believed that Preval would automatically win.[112] Preval's government went on to intertwine party and government business[113] and failed to make substantial reforms: "Enjoying less popularity than his predecessor, Preval's limited public support impeded his ability to move forward with unpopular reforms."[114] By 1997, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Enrique Ter Horst, stated that in Haiti, "democracy has not been able to deliver the goods-and that is dangerous... There isn't even a functioning state right now."[115] The problems continued even into the 2000 election, which was filled with delays, logistical difficulties, and violence that was often caused by supporters of Aristide.[116] U.S. Congressman Porter Goss went as far as to directly implicate Aristide in the problems: "There has been calculated violence meant to disrupt the democratic process. It has been alleged that former president Aristide is responsible, in part, for this."[117]

2. Operational

a. Overarching Co-ordination

The overarching co-ordination of the two missions was cumbersome and often difficult to work in. This can be partially explained by the organisational and cultural differences of civilian and military organisations,[118] and by the simple fact that by December 1994 there were over 400 NGOs of all sizes and descriptions providing humanitarian assistance.[119] However there were also widespread systemic problems.

As in Somalia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, nominally in charge of the operation, had little authority over the various UN agencies. He also lacked

any staff mechanism to co-ordinate directly or indirectly the activities of the military and NGOs.[120] Haiti demonstrated that the personal qualities of the SRSG can be fundamentally important. For example, Lakhdar Brahimi was remembered even two years after his departure from the post for both his activism and for being a 'true friend of Haiti'.[121]

Further, there had been no attempts to fully integrate operational-level interagency co-ordination in the planning and preparation stages, with no civilian-military co-ordination for the first thirty days.[122] Not only was the military surprised that their civilian counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building plans, but they also expected NGOs to immediately receive money once the embargo was lifted and U.S. forces were on the ground, something that just did not occur. As in Somalia, the military did establish Civil Military Operations Centres and the non-military and more benign looking Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Centres, which, in conjunction with USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, worked to co-ordinate activities between the two groups.[123] However, they had no overt authority even within the US military, and instead were forced to rely on persuasion for their influence.[124]

Finally, as with most peacekeeping missions, there was a fundamental difference in the style of peacekeeping of the various forces. The peacekeepers, particularly the Pakistanis and U.S. civil affairs teams, who made an effort to assist communities with projects that addressed local needs ensured a repository of goodwill which resulted in a more secure peacekeeping environment. This occurred even though such projects were not recognised explicitly in the mandate, and only occurred at the discretion of senior

officers who "creatively interpreted their general mandate to ensure local security and the security of their troops as including better community relations."[125]

b. The Police

Another source of considerable problems was the newly created Haitian National Police. When the handover to the UN occurred, 5,000 police were deployed who had only 4 months experience, and whose neutrality was suspect. As reports of police crimes increased, including police beating or killing victims,[126] questions were raised about both the force's leadership and training. MICIVIH argued in support of the force, saying "although police officers frequently used excessive force, they were not systematically repressing the population for political or other reasons."[127] The force itself also faced a deliberate pattern of intimidation and of assassination which did not simplify the situation.[128] Therefore, there was a realisation that long-term security could only be provided by a force accountable to the rule of law.

3. The Military

The military's role in Haiti proved troublesome. There was a great deal of initial confusion simply because the military had in fact had so long to plan. In the eleven months prior to the operation, policy changed dramatically. This resulted in different groups planning different missions, working with different parameters, and arguing different long-term strategies. While it was eventually all combined, the sheer scope of planning both led to unnecessary delays and the involvement of too many people for real candour and easy adaptation of the plans when problems were noticed.[129]

The military also handled disarmament poorly. While the missions did focus more on this issue than the Somalia mission did, it was seen as "just something 'everybody

knew' was probably impossible and almost certainly counterproductive."[130] The missions confiscated all visible weapons and took control of the stocks of Haitian military weapons.[131] They also engaged in voluntary programs, including a weapons amnesty and a weapons buy-back program.[132] The actual success of the program, however, was limited with even its proponents arguing that it was marginally successful in disarming those who directly threatened the national peace,[133] In total, all disarmament operations in Haiti netted 30,000 of the estimated 175,000 small arms that were in circulation.[134]

Finally the ROEs for the military forces were ambiguous. While they were consistent among all the forces, their interpretation was not. Thus the U.S. Army forces in Port-au-Prince were instructed not to become involved in law and order problems, and watched as military troops fought and killed civilians. A change in posture occurred rapidly after this, but mission participants later noted that "no change in the ROE itself occurred, but a new interpretation of the original ROE emerged from the... events."[135]

V. Conclusions

In the end, the Haitian mission failed not from the problems of mission creep, but rather due to a limited mandate and limited commitment. The mission was hamstrung by the need for a clear exit policy:

> ... The international community had applied to Haiti a methodology for peace support operations that had been developed elsewhere. This methodology was characterized by benchmarks by which international officials could claim to have restored a country to good health. All international interventions were seen as needing an "exit policy" and benchmarks for the implementation of this policy. On the political front, these benchmarks were usually elections, and an elected government that could be recognized as legitimate... Expensive elections and other democracy-building exercises were, therefore, conducted in several conflicted societies not on the basis of any local rationale, but in order to "exit" quickly.[136]

Because of this need, the mission failed to concentrate on institution building. Quick fixes could not solve a long history of problems. What was needed in Haiti was

social engineering to change fundamentally the relationship between the state and civil society.[137] But the mission did not focus on this. A U.S. diplomat referred to it rather as a model "only for the national war college: exit strategy as diplomacy."[138]

Had the new democratic system in Haiti worked then the state may well have been able to rebuild, or at least renew, its own institutions, particularly with the degree of international aid it was receiving. But basing an entire operation around this assumption, which is essentially what the Haitian mission did, does not properly identify the long-term problems in a failed state. Haiti had failed, or never started, for a reason. At its simplest level, it can be argued that Haiti never generated a sense of nationhood, and that the few attempts to do so, particularly with Jean-Price Mars at the end of the prior U.S. occupation, had failed as the government once again became oppressive and saw the Haitian civil society as a threat.

As in Somalia, in the short term the mission was a success. A growing complex emergency was stopped through international efforts, and a secure environment was created. But in the long term, nothing changed:

> Other than halting the mass exodus of Haitians to the U.S., the long-term effects of intervention are negligible as of April 1999. The underlying conditions that caused the original problems remain: i.e. political instability; civil unrest; and economic collapse. Political instability is growing due to the inability to peacefully transfer political power after President Aristide's term. Civil unrest has grown to the point that General Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, Southern Command, had called for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Haiti on the grounds that they are devoting more time to self protection than any mission.[139]

[1] Source: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, *Haiti* < go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/haiti.htm> (3 April 2001).
[2] Jennifer L. McCoy "Introduction: Dismantling the Predatory State" in *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects,* Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 4.
[3] John Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: the United States military campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997.* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1998), 3-4.
[4] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 19-20.
[5] Schmidt, 20.
[6] Ballard, 9-10.
[7] Michel-Rolph Trouillot "A Social Contract for Whom?" in *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects,* Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 50.
[8] Ballard, 11.
[9] Ibid., 16
[10] "Admiral Caperton's Operations Order, July 28, 1915," in Ballard, 225.
[11] Schmidt, 53.
[12] Ibid., 73.
[13] Ibid., 86.
[14] Ibid., 101.
[15] Magdaline W. Shannon, Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite and the American Occupation, 1915-1935 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 53.
[16] Ibid., 54.
[17] Schmidt, 137.
[18] Ibid., 155.
[19] Ibid., 100.
[20] Ibid., 156.
[21] Ibid., 158.
[22] Shannon, 67.
[23] Ibid., 169.
[24] Ballard, 30.
[25] Ibid., 28.
[26] Ibid., 30.
[27] Ibid., 33.
[28] Ibid., 35; Brune, 39.
[29] Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of Democratic Revolution. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 48.
[30] Brune, 39-40.
[31] Ballard, 41.
[32] Ibid., 41.
[33] Dupuy, 51.
[34] Ballard, 41-43.
[35] Ballard, 43.
[36] As a priest, Aristide had always believed that the top priority for his pastoral work would be the poor. By 1990, he had became the most important symbol of the anti-Duvalierist opposition. A late candidate to the election campaign, he had earlier argued that elections would do nothing for the Haitian people. But a boycott by the left led him to believe that "the elections would be held and unless a candidate 'from the people' entered the race, the field would be open only to those opposed to changing the status quo. He also realised that because these elections would be supervised by international observers, their outcome –and the winner- would have unprecedented legitimacy. He saw his candidacy as a messianic mission: "It has often been written that I considered myself more and more as a prophet...[but] I only had the impression of obeying the word of God and of being the representative of communities which, themselves, were certainly prophetic." Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Dupuy, 80-81; see also Dupuy, 71-74; Ballard, 43-44.

[37] Dupuy, 89.
[38] Zartman, 10
[39] Brune, 45.
[40] Donald E. Schulz "Culture, change, and violence" in *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects*, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 96.
[41] Ballard, 48.
[42] David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: the Case of Haiti, 1990-1997 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1998), 59.
[43] Ibid., 61.
[44] Ibid., 61.
[45] Cedras, in Malone, 61.
[46] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 613-614.
[47] Irwin Stotzky argues that these impasses occurred because the military leaders "refused to believe that either the United States or three of the other four 'friends of Haiti'- Canada, France, and Venezuela- would ever take serious military action to restore Aristide. Irwin Stotzky, *Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promise of Deliberative Democracy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 30.
[48] Ibid., 615.
[49] Ibid.,.616.
[50] Ibid., 616.
[51] Ballard, 77.
[52] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 617.
[53] Stotzky, 33.
[54] Ian Martin, "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism," *Foreign Policy*, 95 (1994): 72-73; Stotzky, 35.
[55] Brune, 50.
[56] William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 122.
[57] Martin, 79.
[58] Brune, 50.
[59] Martin, 77.
[60] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 619.
[61] Elizabeth D. Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 11-13.
[62] Ibid., 13.
[63] Schulz, 101-102.
[64] Gibbons, 29.
[65] Ibid., 69-72.
[66] Ibid., 29.
[67] Ibid., 38.
[68] Ibid., 72.
[69] Weiss, 192.
[70] The junta however did not exist as a single monolithic bloc. Military power was concentrated in Port-au-Prince, where the military general staff and the Haitian police engaged in an uneasy coexistence. The Duvalier era had created a fractionalised armed forces. Much of the senior office corps had trained under Francois Duvalier, and were mostly from the black middle class and expected to have complete loyalty to the regime Since 1971, however, training under Jean-Claude Duvalier was often for his friends and supporters, based around the mulatto elites. These officers were generally scorned by their seniors and today possess different loyalties.
See *Haiti-Operations Other Than War: Current Situation in Haiti.* <call.army.mil/call/spc_edtn/94-3/chp2/htm> (11 September 2000), 4-5.
[71] Brune, 47.

[72] Americas Watch, Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 1.
[73] Ibid., 4-6.
[74] Stotzky, 38.
[75] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 623.
[76] Ibid., 623.
[77] Bill Clinton in Brune, 55.
[78] Ballard, 62.
[79] Ibid., 68, 73.
[80] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 623.
[81] Ballard, 96; *The Blue Helmets*, 623. The agreement created controversy, however, as it allowed "'certain military officers' to retire honourably, without leaving Haiti, thereby allowing the junta to remain in Haiti." Stotzky, 39.
[82] Thomas K. Adams, "The US and the UN in Haiti" in *The Savage Wars of Peace*, ed. John Fishle (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998b), 176.
[83] *UNMIH* < www. un.org/Depts/dpkp/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm> (12 October 2000), 1.
[84] Mark L Schneider, "Haiti's Recovery Program" in *US State Dept. Dispatch.* <dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/breifing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no45.html> (12 October 2000), 1-2.
[85] Ibid., 3-4.
[86] McCoy, 11.
[87] Ibid., 12.
[88] Ibid., 14.
[89] The Blue Helmets, 631-633. President Aristide was constitutionally obligated to step down at the end of his first term in 1996. He was re-elected in 2000.
[90] *UNSMIH* <www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm> (12 October 2000), 1.
[91] *UNTMIH* <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm> (12 October 2000, 1.
[92] Ibid., 178; McCoy, 24.
[93] Kumar, 78.
[94] Ibid., 78.
[95] *MIPONUH* <www. un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm> (12 October 2000), 1.
[96] Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, 10.
[97] *Statement by the President of the Security Council, 15 March 2000.* <www .un.org/Docs/sc/statements/2000/prst8e.pdf> (12 October 2000), 1.
[98] Malone, 117.
[99] Ibid., 119.
[100] Ibid, 131-132.
[101] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 626.
[102] Adams (1998b), 180.
[103] Margaret Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti~ A Case Study.* (Washington: National Defense University, 1998), 27.
[104] Adams (1998b), 178.
[105] United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 626.
[106] Ibid., 629.
[107] Ambassador William Swing, in Johanna McGeary, "Did the American Mission Matter?" in *Time* 147 (8): < www .time.com/time/magazione/achiveve/1996/dom/960219/world.haiti.html> (12 October 2000), 1
[108] McCoy, 18.
[109] Malone, 139.
[110] Kumar, 77.
[111] John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti" in *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 143-144; See also Irwin Stotzky, 30-31.
[112] Sweeney, 145-146.

[113] Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti. <www .un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/150e.pdf> (12 October 2000), 2.
[114] Weiss, 190.
[115] Enrique Ter Horst, in Malone, 147.
[116] Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, 3-4.
[117] Congressman Porter Goss, in Paula Wolfson *Congress/Haiti.* Voice of America, <www .fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/991109-haiti1.htm> (13 October 2000), 1.
[118] Hayes, Wheatley, 37.
[119] Adams (1998a), 272.
[120] Adams (1998b), 180.
[121] Chetan Kumar, *Building Peace in Haiti* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998), 49.
[122] Hayes, Wheatley, 38.
[123] Adams (1998a), 272.
[124] Adams (1998b), 181.
[125] Kumar, 50.
[126] Brune, 59.
[127] Malone, 139; see also William G. O'Neill "Justice in Haiti" in *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects,* Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 206.
[128] Adams (1998b), 179.
[129] Hayes, Wheatley, 31-33.
[130] Adams (1998b), 188.
[131] Ibid., 188.
[132] Haitians citizens were paid cash for surrendering weapons and ammunition. Ballard, 149-150.
[133] Robert I. Rotberg, "Clinton was Right" in *Foreign Policy*, 102 (1996): 135.
[134] Adams (1998b), 189.
[135] Hayes, Wheatley, 48.
[136] Kumar, 75.
[137] Adams (1998b), 190.
[138] McGeary, 3.
[139] *Operations Other Than War, Lessons Learned: Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti 1993-1995* <www .ootw.quantico.usmc.mil/downloads/Lessons%20Learned/Haiti.pdf> (10 October 2000), 1.

Chapter V: Conclusions- The Need for a New Humanitarian Intervention Framework

Have the lessons learned in Somalia and Haiti, coupled with the research done by the UN and other actors, actually enabled the UN to launch a successful humanitarian intervention? Unfortunately, the UN intervention in Sierra Leone, a state that suffered a long-term civil war and saw the failure of basic government services, a classic failed state, shows that the lessons are still not being applied.

I: Continuing Failures- The Case of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone had been locked in a three-way civil war since 1991 between the government, the army, and a rebel force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In 1997, the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo and authorised a military observer group (ECOMOG) from the Economic Community of West African States. In 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by the rebel and army forces, launched an overt military operation that led to the collapse of the forces in Freetown, the capital, and paved the way for negotiations that led to a peace agreement in July of 1999.[1]

The UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed in October 1999 under a traditional peacekeeping mandate to co-operate with the government of Sierra Leone to implement the peace agreement; to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the combatants; and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With the withdrawal of ECOMOG, the mission was expanded under Chapter VII for fear that Sierra Leone might destablize the region. The new mandate called for UNAMSIL to provide also security at key locations and government buildings; insure the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance; to co-ordinate and assist the government in reconstituting the police and army; and to guard weapons depots.[2]

3

The mission, however, had problems from the start implementing these goals. To begin with, "progress in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme has generally been very slow…[which] is compounded by continuing unrest among ex-combatants in disarmament…camps".[4] As well, peacekeepers found themselves under attack from RUF forces timed to coincide with the ECOMOG pull out in early May, with the situation stabilising only after the United Kingdom deployed troops and established a naval presence, which restored the confidence of the peacekeepers and Sierra Leoneans.[5] Finally, the focus of the mission was not on rebuilding the core institutions of government, but rather that "the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean armed forces… as well as the training of the police, will require important support from the international community."[6]

These problems resulted in the size of the mission swelling from 4,000 peacekeepers under the original mandate to an authorised strength of 13,000 by May

2000.[7] Furthermore, with this rapid change in mandates, a Security Council Commission found that "some of the key actors continue to work in unharmonized and, in certain cases, competing directions. Among the Government, ECOWAS and UNAMSIL, and in each of them, we found different perceptions of the reality on the ground, and of policy objectives and the strategy and means necessary to meet them."[8]

The Commission determined that the mission- over a year after it was deployed- still lacks a comprehensive strategy with clear objectives and that the establishment of an UN-based mechanism for overall co-ordination is all-important.[9] However, even with these changes, the mission will face long term problems. The UN, while accepting that "... after more than eight years of brutal conflict, building trust and confidence will take time and will require a concerted effort by all parties... as well as the international community," refuses to take long term responsibility for the mission, stating that "the responsibility for the success of the peace process ultimately lies with people and leaders of Sierra Leone."[10]

Therefore, in Sierra Leone today the situation is similar to that of Somalia in 1992-1993. The mission has been expanded without adequate examination of the actual requirements for a successful deployment, neither is there any long term nation-building occurring. While the UN has focused on disarmament -a process implemented very slowly and thereby creating its own problems-, it has failed to focus on institutional reconstruction apart from the military and police, thereby failing to create a government and leaders that will be perceived as legitimate and accountable.

II. A New Humanitarian Intervention Framework

Is it possible to launch a successful humanitarian intervention? To return to an earlier observation, what we have seen in the 1990's does not in itself place in question the merit of such missions, but rather the actual record of the operations themselves.

When the U.S. and the UN became involved in Somalia, it was for the right reasons. However, their view of the situation was skewed, both by the end of the Cold War and the success of the Gulf War, and by a lack of understanding of what constituted a failed state. In Somalia, the decision to not fully disarm the combatants, to abandon impartiality by adopting Security Council Resolution 837, and not to engage in long term societal reconstruction, effectively ended any chance of success the mission had. In Haiti, the intervention forces demonstrated a far greater understanding of what they were entering, however the failure of Somalia had effectively already poisoned this mission, as well. Once again, no long-term reconstruction was attempted –except in the case of the Haitian police.

Similarly, both missions demonstrated how hard it was to intervene in a failed state. In hindsight, in both cases, it was agreed that had the intervention occurred earlier, it would have both been more effective and far cheaper. Therefore, any proposed framework must be based around the type of intervention that is necessary. Once a failed or failing state is recognised, and depending on how bad the domestic environment of the state is, there are three phases of intervention the international community may choose: *Pre-failure Intervention*; *Limited Intervention*; and *Humanitarian Intervention*. Once an intervention has begun, the fourth phase, *Long-term Development* should then be followed.

Table V-1: A New Humanitarian Intervention Framework



Table V-2: Expansion of Phase IV



A. Phase I: Pre-Failure Intervention

The first phase revolves around the need to intervene as early as possible in a failed or failing state. Waiting until the situation has completely degraded produces increasingly complicated peacebuilding efforts. In the case of Somalia, for example, Mohamed Shanoun pinpointed three times when the UN could have intervened earlier with significantly less expenditure of money and life.

1. Preventive Action

The first theme is preventive action, whereby the UN makes efforts to prevent the state from failing. While the UN has only recently proposed this, it would see the organisation work to "develop diagnostic, analytical, planning and training instruments that will help African governments and their civil society partners to formulate proactive politics and strategies for managing disputes and diversity in their societies in pre-emptive, constructive, non-violent ways."[11]

The UN would focus both on building governmental and NGO capacities to further national development, while supporting institutions and mechanisms geared to manage and regulate disputes before they escalate into violence.[12]

The UN would build preventive action around three major steps. The first, early warning analysis, would start by analysing the key causes of conflict in a country, prioritise sectors for responses, and define specific objectives. The second step would be geared around identifying the range of potential preventive measures for each objective, determining the proper combination of measures, and assessing where the UN or NGOs have the advantage and should be used. The third step would be preventive action, starting by integrating the participation of UN departments and agencies and clearly identifying lead agencies for each measure, then consulting with all lead departments to determine objectives and measures, and finally identifying operational requirements including mandates. The UN would then co-ordinate operational implementation of each preventive measure and partner with local actors, such as the host government, regional organisations and NGOs. The UN would also monitor the action, evaluate the success of

each measure and assess any negative outcomes and finally determine the criteria for success and the clean withdrawal of assistance.[13]

2. Diplomacy

The other theme in early intervention is the use of diplomacy. Intervening in a state without the consent of all parties and a peace agreement is considerably more complicated than intervening in a peaceful society. Therefore, the earlier the international community can create a workable peace agreement, the easier long-term reconstruction becomes. The UN generally uses two types of diplomacy.

a. Envoy Diplomacy

The first type is to use diplomacy in an effort to have the parties negotiate their differences and produce a workable peace agreement. This can be accomplished within the country itself, using neighbouring countries or other neutral countries, using regional organizations, or using the good offices of the Secretary–General. It is vital that diplomacy does not deal solely with military leaders, but also with the traditional leaders of the country- including, elders, intellectuals, business owners, religious leaders and the political opposition- as well as dealing with local levels of government and its representatives.

b. Peacemaking

The second type of diplomacy is the use of peacemaking. The negotiating body continues to negotiate in good faith, however it is made clear to the belligerents that if an agreement is not reached, then UN or other forces will be deployed to bring peace without the consent of all parties. Thus it is the use of a threat of a military intervention to prevent

the need for one. The actions of the Jimmy Carter-led negotiating team in the days before the U.S. invasion of Haiti are an excellent example of this.

B. Phase II: Limited Intervention

If a state has already failed, preventive action (needless to say) cannot work. Therefore, as it becomes in the interest of the international community to remedy the problem, more concrete actions are required. This is done through two methods: the involvement of UN agencies, other international organisations, and NGOs; and the use of limited military force in traditional peacekeeping roles. These actions, however, assume that the belligerents within a state are willing to give at least their partial consent to these operations. Furthermore, negotiations to reach a peace agreement must continue.

1.Civil Interventions

The first method revolves around the need to ensure that the population's basic needs are taken care of, since the state can no longer fulfill this function. For example, in Haiti, NGOs were able to ensure that even without a functioning government, the population did not suffer from widespread disease and famine by assuming the role of the state, particularly in the delivery of health care. While still an urgent situation, this gave the international community more time to attempt to negotiate a peaceful transition of power.

2.Military Interventions

Should these groups be unable by themselves to provide the assistance due to the intransigence of local forces or the belligerents, then military assistance may be required. This can come in two forms: limited assistance and peacekeeping missions.

a. Limited assistance

Limited assistance ensures the delivery of aid stuffs, with the military only in a supportive role, such as the earlier U.S. military operation in Somalia, *Provide Comfort*, which airdropped relief supplies. Such action may occur before or during a traditional peacekeeping mission.

b. Peacekeeping mission

Should limited assistance not be enough, the UN –with the consent of all parties- may deploy a mission to deal solely with the humanitarian emergency, operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, while continuing to negotiate a peaceful end to the violence. However, caution should be exercised in deploying a traditional force into a failed state. Because of the volatility of the environment, a force must have both an adequate mandate and force structure to deal with potential problems. Furthermore, if the consent of the belligerents is withdrawn, the force can not be effective, and therefore it too should be withdrawn, or have its mandate changed. Leaving a traditional force in such a situation will only work to delegitimize it.

C. Phase III: Humanitarian Intervention

If limited assistance and negotiations do not succeed, and the situation in the failed state has degenerated into a complex emergency, then a humanitarian intervention should be used. The intervention, acting as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, will necessitate the use of a large number of troops, potentially for a long period of time, will be very costly, and will carry with it the risk of failure.

A humanitarian intervention requires a clear, operationally specific mandate that identifies the sectors of society that need aid and establishes clear objectives for all forces

involved. Furthermore, it requires an adequate force structure, deployed in a timely fashion, appropriate to the scope of the mandate, and adequate support from the UN, its agencies, and NGOs to ensure that peacebuilding efforts can be undertaken once a secure environment is established. Finally, it requires a co-ordinating body with clearly defined and agreed-to authority over all actors -civilian and military- to be established as quickly as possible.[14]

If a proxy force is initially used, whether from NATO, the U.S., or other organizations, then the UN must still maintain a presence, and prepare to take over the mission once the initial secure environment is created. In Haiti, the handover went smoothly because of such prior preparation. In Somalia, there was no preparation, which was a contributing factor to UNOSOM II's failure.

Peace negotiations should continue with all groups, and at no time should the mission abandon impartiality. By abandoning impartiality or not negotiating openly with all groups, the mission will quickly be put in to the position of being a belligerent, which will complicate the situation enormously and potentially cost the lives both of civilians and of peacekeepers.

Finally, even during a peace enforcement mission, peacekeepers should perform the reconstruction tasks that characterise traditional missions. This helps both to rebuild the country and to increase the legitimacy of the mission, ensuring greater support and an easier time.

D. Phase IV: Long-Term Development Steps

After an intervention has begun, there are then four clear stages through which any mission must pass to ensure the long-term, peaceful stability of the state. The first

step is to establish the immediate physical security of the population, whether through aid to the state's institutional apparatus, through the use of a traditional peacekeeping mission, or through the use of a peace enforcement mission. Only after this is established can the mission move on to the next stage. The second step deals with the long-term security of the population, and requires the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of the combatants into society. This ensures both the safety of the civilian population, but also allows for the drawing down of peacekeepers.

The third step, which can take place simultaneously or after the second step, is rebuilding the core institutions of the state. This includes introducing structures of poltical accountability, rebuilding the national police forces and judiciary, and insuring that basic institutions such as the health system are reconstituted. These institutions should be completely overhauled, with the participation of both government and legitimate leaders of civil society (i.e. religious leaders, tribal elders, and the intelligentsia). Furthermore, holding elections, while creating legitimacy for the mission and the state and therefore an important step, should only be done in conjunction with institutional reconstruction. Otherwise, as in Haiti, the country may very well fail to change any of its core features.

The fourth step focuses on the long-term reconstruction or creation of civil society, the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the creation of a politically stable country. The end goal is to create a country that has both a state and a nation, where the citizens enjoy a collective identity fortified by the country's institutions. This tier is the work of years, if not decades, and therefore the mission needs to work in co-operation both with the government and the civil society of the country, in order to avoid being seen as a neo-colonial or occupation force.

III. Implications and Conclusions

A humanitarian intervention that seeks to deal with the roots of a complex emergency, rather than merely alter the state cosmetically, must be willing to make a long-term commitment. Failing to make this commitment will simply result in the widespread failure of any mission seeking to prevent the return of violence. Therefore, the international community must clearly decide what outcome it wishes from the outset.

Similarly, choosing the correct personnel for such a mission is also vital. The mission must be sensitive to local realities, and work with all local actors to ensure support for the operation and ensure its long-term success. Furthermore, the leaders of these missions should not be appointed for political reasons, but rather for their ability. Ideally, the international community should create a body of people both experienced with failed states in general and in local conditions in particular in order that they can be deployed into these situations.

This framework also deals with three important problems. Failed states do not exist in isolation, nor do they emerge suddenly with no prior warning. Thus, including a preventive action element highlights the importance of early warning systems and early interventions. This thesis has highlighted that in both case studies, an early effort would have both been more successful and substantially less expensive than what later occurred.

Similarly, the methods of intervention need to be dynamic. Once the warning bells start ringing, the UN and other international actors must quickly assess the situation, and decide what form of intervention is required. A time span of months or years before a mission can be deployed jeopardises any hope of success. Furthermore, they must also attempt to gain consent and support of the local population, and if they have it, to work to

retain it. Finally, whichever form of intervention is taken, the mission must always be aware that the situation in a failed state can deteriorate very quickly.

The framework also highlights the need for the fourth phase, long term development. In both the case studies examined, the mandates for the mission initially divorced security and reconstruction. However, it is impossible to ensure long-term security of the population without disarming, demobilising and reintegrating the combatants, and reconstructing the state's institutional apparatus.

This framework is a synthesis of both the lessons learned from the missions to Somalia and Haiti, and a reworking of the new theoretical models proposed by the UN and other international organisations. Theoretically, it will solve the major problems that the UN has faced. But its elements need first to be tested. This is gradually occurring. The UN mission in Sierra Leone, while having problems, has embraced the need to deal first with the combatants before moving on to other measures. The mission to Kosovo has placed all authority, with the exception of the NATO troops, within the UN SRSG, and has clearly delineated which groups should deal with each part of societal reconstruction.

These are excellent first steps. The 'springtime of humanitarian interventions' has ended. However, even failure teaches us important lessons. While the problems in the Congo were forgotten for thirty years, the problems of Somalia and Haiti have been examined, and we can now learn from them. Whether we will see the UN launch another failed state intervention on the scale of Somalia is unclear, but already in Africa there are states that are sliding towards failure- Sudan remains a perpetual problem, the Congo only recently once again saw peacekeepers deployed to end an internal war. Similarly, the good projects in Haiti appear to have already crumbled. It is likely that in the near future,

we may well see another complex emergency. Therefore, once these lessons have been learned again, it is vital that they are not forgotten. Failed states will not disappear. Nor, therefore, should they be ignored.

[1] *UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.* < www .un.org/depts/dpko/unamsil.pdf> (05 March 2001), 2-3.
[2] *UNAMSIL Mandate.* <www un.org/Depts/spko/unamsil/UnamsilM.htm> (05 March 2001).
[3] Source: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, *Sierra Leone* < go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/sraleone.htm> (3 April 2001)
[4] United Nations, Second Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 11 January 2000. <www .un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/3e.pdf> (05 March 2001), 3.
[5] United Nations, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone <www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/455e.pdf> (05 March 2001), 9-10.
[6] United Nations, *Second Report,* 6.
[7] UNAMSIL, 1.
[8] United Nation,. *Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, 16 October 2000,* <www .un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/scmission.pdf> (05 March 2001), 12.
[9] Ibid., 12.
[10] United Nations, *Second Report,* 10.
[11] Capacity Building in Conflict Resolution, 2.
[12] Ibid., 2.
[13] United Nations Staff College Project, *Policy Planning for UN Preventive Action: Nine Sept Process Outline* < www. itcilo.it/unsc/programmefocus/earlywarning> (10/12/2000), 3-5.
[14] Such a system has been established in Kosovo, where the UN vested all authority over the territory and people of Kosovo in the UN mission, and particularly in the SRSG. It also created four pillars, focusing on humanitarian assistance, headed by the UNHCR; civil administration, falling under the UN itself, democratisation and institution building, under the OSCE; and reconstruction and economic development, under the EU. Whether it will be successful in the long term is unclear, but it does demonstrate a new, clearer model for Chapter VII mission – albeit without a failed state to deal with. See United Nations *Bringing Peace to Kosovo: Mandates and Tasks* <www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm> (18 June 2001).

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