

**Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology: An Investigation Into What the Human Being Can
Make of Themselves.**

By

© Shannon Michael O'Rourke

A Thesis submitted to the

School of Graduate Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Philosophy

Memorial University of Newfoundland

May 2015

St. John's Newfoundland and Labrador

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to articulate the tension between reading Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* as either intrinsic or extrinsic to his critical work. Kant characterizes the opposition of physical and pragmatic anthropology, respectively, as the difference between "what nature makes of the human being", and what "he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself."¹ In his *Logic*, he lays out his four questions:

- 1) What can I know? [Was kann ich wissen?]
- 2) What should I do? [Was soll ich tun?]
- 3) What may I hope for? [Was darf ich hoffen?]
- 4) What is the human being? [Was ist der Mensch?]

Kant tells us the first is addressed by metaphysics, the second by morals, the third by religion, and the fourth by pragmatic anthropology, however, he adds at the end of this section in the *Logic*, that "Foundationally, all of these questions come to anthropology, because the first three questions must define it."²

Kant's anthropological works, both the published work of 1798 and the lecture notes, enables a vantage point with the potential to determine how the anthropology fits into his corpus and future it enables the possibility of evaluating whether it places plays the pivotal role, Kant purports it does, in uniting his philosophical

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Robert B. Louden and Manfred Kuehn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7:119.

² Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols., Deutsche Akademie Der Wissenschaften Zu Berlin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902), 9:25.

system and in the attainment of Science, because it is through anthropology that science is reached.³

³ Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften Abt. 4, Vorlesungen; Bd. 2. Vorlesungen Ueber Anthropologie*. (Berlin: Reimer, 1997), 25:1435.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Why something and nothing? The same question that continues to inspire philosophers' desire to know, and the same question that often acts as a sleeping aid to those non-philosophers who are "fortunate" enough to be acquainted with some philosopher.

Nothing comes from nothing. It took me a long time as a chemist to realize that philosophy is the same curiosity by another name, and I have so many people to thank for helping me foster this curiosity. I want to first thank my siblings who were submitted to barages of questions throughout my youth. They designated a "question time" so that only one of them at a time would be forced to stand before the firing squad. Although it was with my brother DJ that I would spend the most time asking the difficult questions of existence. After he had enough questions regarding the nature of existence he would simply ask me in a loving way "What would you do if I killed you?" I always knew this was the cue to stop asking questions and go to bed. He always wanted me to say, "I would die!" But my tenacious reply was always, "I would kill you first!" Determined always to have the final say, we would then go to sleep. Though all of my siblings Jeff, DJ, Tyler and Rubyanne had their part to play in helping me develop into the thinker and person I am today, and so I wish to thank them all.

I would like to express my immediate gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Peter Gratton who has been a great source of inspiration, advice and information in the development of my thesis. He has opened his home and office to me on innumerable occasions, for discussions of my thesis or simply to say hello. Without his feedback this thesis would not be possible in the shape it is today, nor in the time frame.

The entire cast of the philosophy department at MUN are encouraging engaged philosophers that care. I would like to thank them all for their patience and help.

Though his corporeal body is no longer apart of this world of becoming, he remains a part of the being that I am, and I couldn't imagine not thanking my father David John O'Rourke (July 28, 1948 - March 1, 2013) for all that he has given to help me become the man and thinker I am. Some of the earliest memories I have, are of him teaching me to read, write and fish (even though I caught more fish with my hands than my fishing rod). On evenings after working all day, he helped me prepare for my spelling bees. He and my wife have always encouraged me to make my own path, and in this way they taught me what it meant to be enlightened before I had to occasion to find the works of Immanuel Kant.

Finally I would to thank Serena, my wife. Without her a less readable version of this thesis would still have been possible, but my life would have been immeasurably poorer.

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Key to References

When possible, the works of Kant will be listed with the volume and page numbers from the original German texts instead of the standard page number as is the practice with Chicago-Turbian . References to Kant are taken from Kant's *gesammelte Schriften* (KGS), Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 25 volumes (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902) [except for the *Critique of Pure Reason*] and will be listed with the volume in Roman numerals, and the page numbers in Arabic. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are from the Paul Guyer and Allen Wood translations are referenced using the standard A and B pagination.⁴

APPV	<i>Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht</i> , in KGS, vol. VII; <i>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</i> , trans. Louden Robert B. Kuehn Manfred. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Idea	“Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,” in KGS, vol VIII; “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” in <i>On History</i> , trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
CPraR	<i>Kritik der praktischen Vernunft</i> , in KGS, vol. V; <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i> , trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956).
CPR	<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> , trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
CPJ	<i>Kritik der Urtheilskraft</i> , in KGS, vol. V; <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i> , trans. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press., 2000).
Letters	“Briefe,” in KGS, vols. X–XIV; <i>Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99</i> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
LoE	<i>Lectures on Ethics</i> , trans. Peter Heath (New York: Cambridge

⁴ In an attempt to remain consistent with current Kantian Literature, this table was taken in large part from one provided by Holly Wilson's in *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

	University Press, 1997).
Log	<i>Logik</i> , in KGS, vol. IX; <i>Immanuel Kant, Logic</i> , trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover Publishing Inc., 1974).
Menschenkunde	<i>Lectures on Anthropology. edited by Robert B. Loudon; Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 ; Also in KGS, vols. XXV.</i>
PP	“Zum ewigen Frieden,” in KGS, vol. VIII; <i>On History</i> , trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
Rel	<i>Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft</i> , in KGS, vol. VI; <i>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</i> , trans. Allen Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
RzA	“Reflexionen zur Anthropologie,” in KGS, vol. XV; <i>Lectures on Anthropology, edited by Robert B. Loudon; Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).</i>
VzA	<i>Vorlesungen zur Anthropologie</i> , in KGS, vols. XXV; <i>Lectures on Anthropology, edited by Robert B. Loudon; Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).</i>

Note to the Reader

Firstly, the literature on the Kant's Anthropology is often explicitly gendered to discuss what the "man" can become, what "man" should do, etcetera. The question that guided the anthropology lectures series was "Was ist der Mensch?" The German word "Mensch" is often translated as man in the literature, but I believe it would be more inclusive, and hopefully less patriarchal to translate the term as the 'human being' or using 'she' or 'her' where acceptable. For the sake of brevity and style, I will often refer to the human being as her.

Secondly, throughout the work I use the term *Anthropologie* when discussing the overall project of anthropology from a pragmatic point of view that Kant lays out in the lecture series and the published work of (1798). I use the German word simply to indicate that I am referring to both, that is, when the lecture notes and the published work are in concord, however, when there are in discord, or there is a specific reference, I will indicate whether it comes from the lecture notes, or from the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* text of 1798.

Introduction

Immanuel Kant wrote a staggering number of seminal works in a wide range of subject matters, hence any inquiry into his impact on the modern world is prone to underestimation. He is often studied for his so-called critical works, that is, his writings between 1781 and 1788, and less so for his works on geography, anthropology, education, and religion. The fact that these works are less well known does not mean they are of little value. There is a tradition of commentators focused on issues of epistemology and ethics in the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)* and the *Critique of Practical Reason (CPraR)*. Recently however, the merit of Kant's pre-critical work has been renewed with interest evidenced by updated translations of these works, such as Kant's geography and anthropology, which have become available in English only in the last forty years. There is still much translational work to be done concerning the student notes on the lectures series, but in 2012 a large collection of these notes were published by Cambridge University Press under the editorship of Allen Wood and Robert Louden.⁵ New translations of both the student notes and the anthropology text offer a chance for a wider range of scholarly investigation. These new perspectives offer insight into often-overlooked aspects of the Kantian system. Many scholars read the critical works of Kant as extrinsic to his pre-critical work. They attempt to understand Kant's system as primarily arising

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, ed. Robert B. Louden; Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

and subsisting in these critical works. Many critics, when considering the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, hold that the work is either trivial or confused, and they attempt to demonstrate this through ad hominem attacks directed toward an ageing Kant, or alternatively they argue that the pre-critical works, which concern a posteriori knowledge, can have no bearing on the a priori work of the Critical period.⁶ This epistemological issue is complex and will be discussed in greater detail in this work. My fundamental claim is that Kant's overarching project of the Critical period is an attempt to articulate what it means to be a human being and thus concerns what man as a free being *can* and *should* make of himself. The emphasis here on the "can," as opposed to what man *is* or merely to what *ought to be*, will be crucial in what follows.

In any event, the suggestion that Kant's anthropological work is only from a period in which Kant was senile is easily dismissed given that the anthropological lectures developed over more than twenty-five years. While the book was compiled during Kant's latter years, it was done so from a collection of the lecture notes he compiled in his prime. The second problem requires careful consideration since it essentially points out that theoretical entities, if they are to be apodictic, cannot find their guarantor in experience. If Kant's pragmatic anthropology is going to be anything more than anecdotal, then this investigation must demonstrate how the anthropology is essential to realizing a science of the human being. The realization of this goal, as Kant says in his lecture notes, is where "science is reached."⁷ In order

⁶ See Brian Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften Abt. 4, Vorlesungen; Bd. 2. Vorlesungen Ueber Anthropologie*. (Berlin: Reimer, 1997), 25:1435.

to show this, the current labour must investigate how it is possible that empirical experience offers insight into necessary features of human existence.

Determining how Kant would attempt to resolve these issues requires understanding the place of the pre-critical works within his overall oeuvre. Nevertheless, determining the interplay of the pre-critical works on the critical ones could easily consume a scholar's whole life. This investigation is a more modest endeavour and will focus on the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, and when permitting, the other pre-critical works, especially the *Geography*, but only when it is helpful or necessary to the current aim. It is enough now to say that Kant has a third way to address how a posteriori human experience in a deterministic phenomenal world informs a priori concepts of freedom in the noumenal domain, and that this occurs when the agent wills as if he were free, which is the presupposition for the moral law. However, the issue of how it is possible for experience to create or realize a priori knowledge, or even that the *Anthropology* is even doing this, must be addressed because it represents a main objection as to why the pre-critical works, especially the anthropology,⁸ are often considered to be outside the Kantian system.

The views expressed in many of the pre-critical works, often taken pejoratively as "un-critical," are viewed as conjectural at best. The main goal of this thesis will be to illustrate how the anthropology is vital to the realization of a science of man. Kant's science of man, especially concerning race, would not meet

⁸ For brevity, I will use the term Anthropologie when refereeing to the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* lecture notes and the published work of 1798. However, it should be noted that for Kant this is also Transcendental Anthropology, which details the conditions necessary for possibility of an *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.

the rigor of contemporary anthropology, but Kant was not doing anthropology in the contemporary sense. This science of the human being must consider her in both a priori and a posteriori terms and thus it is concerned with what nature makes of the human being but also crucially what the human being as a free agent makes of herself. This can only be accomplished by considering freedom and determinism in light of determining and reflective judgment. I will show that Kant's anthropology was impetus of the critical works.

It will be helpful for now to consider the kinds of questions Kant thinks philosophy is interested in and how this investigation of the anthropology might be served by this conception. In his *Logic* (1800), Kant lays out four questions that are meant to describe the goal of philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense:

- 1) "What can I know?" [*Was kann ich wissen?*]
- 2) "What should I do?" [*Was soll ich tun?*]
- 3) "What may I hope for?" [*Was darf ich hoffen?*]
- 4) "What is the human being?" [*Was ist der Mensch?*]⁹

He tells us that the first of these questions is answered by his critique of metaphysics and is considered at length in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). The second question is answered by morals, which was the topic of his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) along with his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). The third question is answered by religion, which Kant attempted to address in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1792). Kant says that the fourth question is answered by pragmatic anthropology. Though Kant only articulates the question this way once, in the

⁹ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:25.

“Doctrine of Method,”¹⁰ Kant alludes to and expresses aptly in the *Logic* that, “foundationally they might all be considered as pertaining to the anthropology, because the first three questions must refer to the last.”¹¹ In short, he argues that the canonical questions in the *Logic* must be taken up in terms of a larger anthropological system.

Patrick Frierson begins his work on the *Anthropology* by differentiating “transcendental anthropology” from empirical or pragmatic approaches. These are different avenues to address the guiding question, “What is the human being?” Transcendental anthropology, he tells us, is almost exclusively addressed in the CPR,

Transcendental anthropology provides normative, from-within accounts of what it is like to be human, accounts that define how one should think, feel, and choose based on what we take ourselves to be doing when we engage in thinking, feeling, or choosing. Empirical anthropology provides scientific (in a loose sense), observation-based descriptions and categorizations of how observable humans think, feel, and act. And pragmatic anthropology puts these two approaches together, drawing on empirical descriptions to provide advice about how best to satisfy the norms elucidated within transcendental anthropology.¹²

According to Frierson’s interpretation, the first two Critiques address the fourth question in terms of the transcendental and empirical, that is in terms of the possibility of experience, while the pragmatic approach elucidates the space where Kant attempts to bring the grounds for the possibility of experience into concert with actual experience in order understand what the

¹⁰ *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 833-34.

¹¹ *Ibid.* “Im Grunde könnte man aber alles dieser zur Anthropologie rechnen, weil sich die drei ersten Fragen muß also bestimmen können.”

¹² Patrick R. Frierson, *What Is the Human Being?* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 6.

human being is, and what the human being can become, given that she is noumenally free and phenomenologically determined.

Kant offers the best key to deciphering the significance of his anthropology in his preface to *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (APPV)*, written in 1798. There he distinguishes anthropology in a physiological sense from anthropology in a pragmatic sense. The former concerns “the investigation of what nature makes of the human being,” whereas the latter concerns “the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”¹³ That is, against his suggestion in the opening of the *Groundwork* that anthropology would answer, “what is” the case for human beings, the question of freedom is at the heart of what man *can* and *should* make of himself. It would be anachronistic to associate the physiological anthropology with the modern four-field approach of anthropology, but it is helpful. The four-field approach to anthropology as a discipline began only in the nineteenth century, but its roots can be traced back to the last part of the eighteenth-century. The four fields of modern anthropology are cultural, linguistic, physical, and archaeological. These fields concern anthropology in terms of what nature has made of man in a biological and historical context. Philosophy of anthropology however, can have two senses: either it is studied in what Robert Burch calls the objective-genitive sense, or in the subjective-genitive sense. In the former, what is at issue in anthropology is the philosophical study of anthropology, which itself usually has two aspects: philosophy provides a definition of anthropology while providing a methodology or epistemology of anthropological

¹³ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:119.

investigation. However, Kant is interested in the anthropology in the subjective-genitive sense, where what is at issue is anthropology as philosophy, or philosophy as anthropology.¹⁴ It is unique among academic disciplines in its attention to the entire human condition and its holistic approach to the study of human life. Thinkers such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Ernst Platner, and Kant influenced the foundation of the anthropological field, though they shifted in their study of the philosophy of anthropology in either the objective-genitive or subjective-genitive senses. Manfred Kuehn aptly points out that the investigation into the nature of man grew out of concerns of the Enlightenment, and it was “conceived as an alternative to the theological understanding of the nature of man and born of the belief that the proper study of mankind is man, not God.”¹⁵ Indeed, it is Michel Foucault’s claim that the *Anthropologie* marks the precise historical moment when “man,” as such, became both the object and origin of scientific study.

Herein lies the ambiguity of this Menschen-Kenntniss which characterizes anthropology: it is the knowledge of man, in a movement which objectifies man on the level of his natural being and in the content of his animal determinations; at the same time, it is the knowledge of the knowledge of man, and so can interrogate the subject himself, ask him where his limitations lie, and about what he sanctions of the knowledge we have of him.¹⁶

Man is the being who at once attempts to grasp the whole picture, and becomes a subject among objects. “Man is not just trying to know about objects but to know

¹⁴ Burch, Robert. “Kant’s Anthropology.” Class Lecture, Philosophy 445 from University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, January 13, 2011.

¹⁵ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, vii.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007), 117.

one's self as subject. Man has become both the subject and object of her own understanding."¹⁷

Physiological anthropology on the other hand is more akin to the empirical approach of modern anthropology than it is to Kant's conception of pragmatic anthropology, though it is still relevant. It is further helpful, as mentioned in the note to the reader, to refer to Kant's conception of anthropology as "*Anthropologie*" since Kant's conception of pragmatic anthropology is distinguished from both a purely empirical or theoretical endeavour. The discussion of the *Anthropologie* here includes a consideration of the book of 1798, as well as the lectures series.

It is the project of this thesis to demonstrate that understanding Kant's fourth question in light of his definition of pragmatic anthropology offers a perspective from which to judge the intrinsic importance *Anthropologie* plays in Kant's overall philosophical system.

¹⁷ James Marshall, *Michel Foucault: Personal Autonomy and Education* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 170.

Chapter I

Context of the Anthropology

Kant, as noted, is not often studied for the extra-critical works, but something vital is lost if the Kantian system is reduced to only those views and ideas he defended in the critical works, not least since he was still working on the anthropology and geography during the same period. He was actively engaged in teaching his courses on *Anthropologie* and physical geography throughout the entirety of this time, and there are pieces of the anthropology notes dispersed throughout the critiques, especially in the third *Critique* with regard to its discussion of taste, feelings, and genius.¹⁸ The focus here remains grounded in the importance the *Anthropologie* has relative to the *Critiques*, but that is not to say that other great insights cannot be found in his work on geography, religion, education, and history. The *Anthropologie* as an investigation would be incomplete without considering many of the other aforementioned extra-critical works, especially the physical geography, but discussing this relationship is limited in this thesis. While comments concerning Kant's dementia, such as those presented by Benno Erdmann, do have some bearing on the published work of 1798, it is the development of Kant's thought throughout the lectures over thirty years and the correlation with the published work in 1798 that illustrate best the plan for Kant's philosophical system. The

¹⁸ Frederick Patrick van de Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy* (1966), 109.

physical geography and the *Anthropologie* were coextensive courses and operate to give different perspectives on the investigation “What is the human being?” [*Was ist der Mensch?*] The geography was meant to give knowledge of the world [*Weltkenntnis*], while the *Anthropologie* was designed to teach knowledge of the human being [*Menschenkenntnis*].¹⁹ They were conceived initially as the same course, the physical geography being the first part provided in the fall semester, and the *Anthropologie* the second part, in the winter. An important contextual note is that the German word *kenntnis* comes from the German verb *kennen*, and *kennen* means to know, like the English word *ken*. *Kennen* has the significant connotation of an acquaintance type of knowing that requires worldly interaction, as in experience.²⁰ Thus “*Weltkenntnis*” and “*Menschenkenntnis*” are not only knowledge in a theoretical sense, but also knowledge acquired through engagement in the world, that is, pragmatically. Throughout the collected lecture notes on the *Anthropologie*, Kant equates “*Weltkenntnis*” and “*Menschenkenntnis*.” He says “*Weltkenntnis ist Menschenkenntnis*” and vice versa that “*Menschenkenntnis ist Weltkenntnis*.”²¹ For Kant, knowledge of the world and knowledge of the human being are by acquaintance and are mutually coordinating; they are both required to give insight into one another. The investigation of the human being is for Kant an investigation of the world; the investigation of the world is an investigation into the human being. The anthropology and geography form the basis of a much larger plan,

¹⁹ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 15:659.

²⁰ E. L. Fackenheim, “Kant's Concept of History,” *Kant-Studien* 48 (1956).; Robert Burch, “Kant's Anthropology,” in *Philosophy* 445 (University of Alberta Jan 13, 2011).

²¹ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 15:659.

the realization of the science of the “human being.”²² Kant understands this science as positing the possibility of an evolution towards a kingdom of ends that is realizable in the species, where each individual, each part, is of intrinsic worth.

Kant’s intellectual development is essential to understanding and situating the *Anthropologie* relative to his critical works. It is in and through his personal and academic development that a better interpretation of Kant’s aim is uncovered. Part of this uncovering reveals the transitional relationship of the work being done in the pre-critical and Critical period. It is important to keep in mind that the work of the pre-critical period, especially his lectures on geography and anthropology, continued throughout the Critical period. Kant was trying to work out a whole scientific system with one eye on the justification of the system via epistemology, which I take to be focus of the CPR, and the other on the applicability of his system to explain the moral dimension of human life, which is the major concern of the CPraR. The three critiques were designed to address issues of knowledge, morality, and judgment in a systematic a priori manner. Through these works Kant sought the necessary and universal conditions for a whole sphere of human intuitions and cognitions. The apodicticity of the critical works is often contrasted with the pre-critical works (i.e., those on geography, anthropology, history, religion, and education) as contingent, empirical, and “un-critical.” However, when Kant discusses the fourth question in the *Logic* he says these other questions might all be considered, vis-à-vis the critical works, as pertaining to the anthropology, because

²² Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* Abt. 4, *Vorlesungen*; Bd. 2. *Vorlesungen Ueber Anthropologie*, 25:1435.

they must all come through, or out of it.²³

There was a great emphasis on the “pure” philosophy in the *Critical* period, while the pragmatic anthropology lectures taught students about the world and the human being through observation. Observation alone was not enough for Kant to endow students with prudence, or eventually wisdom. In order to gain knowledge of the human being in the manner that Kant thought necessary, one had to understand the empirical in light of the “pure,” and the ‘pure’ for Kant began in experience. Though it begins in experience, as Kant declares in the introduction to the *CPR*, the concepts of the understanding are not from experience, they are the very possibility of experience. Kant reiterated this in his Lectures on Metaphysics,

We can think of a connection of our cognitions as science, from the first grounds up to the last consequences, and this would comprise in it the entirety of all inferred cognitions; but this goes beyond our powers. (The first ground is simple - namely of something - but to have the last consequences we have to go through the whole field of experience, which cannot be done.)²⁴

Kant does not think this task of navigating the entire nexus of human experience is possible, he only wants to carve out a piece of the system, “namely the science of the highest principles of human cognition.”²⁵ The *Anthropologie* was the synthesis of this project and as such, the *Anthropologie* course in many ways, called for the creation of the Critical period in order to define [*Bestimmen*] what the human being is, was, or could become.

In his investigation of what man *can* become, Kant “adopts man’s rational

²³ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:25.

²⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁵ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften Abt. 4, Vorlesungen; Bd. 2. Vorlesungen Ueber Anthropologie.*, 25:1435.

capacity as the object of inquiry.”²⁶ For Kant, it is the human being’s power to objectify the self that “constitutes him as a person, and provides the unity of consciousness so necessary in a moral agent.”²⁷ It is from this egoism that Kant develops the first part of the *Anthropologie*. He says that self-interest has three aspects, “Egoism can contain three kinds of presumption: the presumption of understanding, of taste, and of practical interest; that is, it can be logical, aesthetic, or practical.”²⁸ The study of man can thus follow a logical, aesthetic or practical investigation and the structure of the book reflects this type of investigation. Part I of the *Anthropologie* am divided into three parts and deals respectively with the logical (Book I: On the Cognitive faculty), the aesthetic (Book II: On the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), and the practical investigation (Book III: On the faculty of desire).

The books of part one of the *Anthropologie* deal firstly with, the intellect and the human being’s power of perception in general, “but it is the intellect proper, composed of understanding, judgment, and reason, which receives the greatest attention;”²⁹ secondly, with the aesthetic aspect of man “with sensuous pleasure, taste, and the sublime receiving primary attention;”³⁰ and thirdly, with the appetitive faculties of passion, bravery, timidity. But it is under the heading of passion that Kant considers “the inclination toward freedom, the desire for vengeance, and the desire for influence over other men. This last passion is divided

²⁶ Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 18.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:128.

²⁹ Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 19.

³⁰ Ibid.

into the search for honor, the desire for power, and the problem of avarice.”³¹

In part II of *APPV* Kant deals with character, and the notion of the person and the species. Even though Kant discusses here many physical characteristics of the human, it is clear as Pitte points out, “Kant intends the person to be understood as a moral agent, rather than simply as a conglomeration of physical and mental characteristics.”³² *APPV* ends with a consideration of the consequences of character, he explains that “the man of principles, from whom we know for sure what to expect, not from his instincts, for example, but from his will, has character.”³³ With this background in mind and a definition of character, we now turn to sketch Kant the man.

Kant the academic was interested in the assurance that the mechanism of science (*Wissenschaft*) seemed to provide. The Newtonian worldview Kant studied at university was one of causal determinism, a view clearly imported into the critical system. Implicit in this understanding of the physical world was consequence that if enough initial information is provided, then the system, like a great machine, can predict with pinpoint accuracy the next event to occur in a given causal chain. The result of this deterministic view of nature can be seen in the works of Baron d’Holbach, where he expresses the view that determinism results in the loss of freedom, or even the early modern work of Spinoza. In turn, this loss of freedom means human beings do not make themselves and are not responsible for their actions. All human beings under this depiction of deterministic nature would be

³¹ Ibid.

³² Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, 285; Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 19.

³³ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:285.

organic mechanisms formed through a causal chain for which they had no control; in their daily lives people choose activities, lovers, etcetera, but the choices they make are not freely made under this model, even if they seem to the subject like they are, rather people are merely impulse machines that do not determine themselves after a plan of their own making, they are instead determined by the system. An anthropological investigation of this sort could only be physiological, and could not answer the question “what is the human being?” in the moral and pragmatic dimensions that Kant sought. Kant’s transcendental answer to this determinism is well known, but he always thought this as part of a larger anthropological science.

The deterministic model that was popular in Kant’s era reduced the Aristotelian potency/act distinction that guided philosophy for almost two thousand years to cause and effect without teleology. Under Newtonian mechanics, if not in Newton’s own theological views, empirically determined “universal laws” are used as governing principles to predict the probability of an effect, not the actualization of a providential plan. Kant’s conception of providence is the actualization of a plan over multiple generations; it is not about probabilities as it is about the strange attraction of systems towards a system of ends. Kant understands providence to be played out in multiple generations, even though human desire often seems to interpret providence superstitiously as immediate; for Kant, it is played out in the history of mankind. Providence in Kant’s conception seems to be more like the image of a gentle guiding hand of a beneficent creator, as opposed to a micromanaging deity that removes all choice and thus responsibility. Moreover, this

teleology is not immanent to a scientific system, but is rather fully moral in his conception.

What really distinguishes the teleological view and the causal deterministic view concerns whether nature has a providential plan or an accidental one, and whether nature illustrates emergence of systems through chaos or not. Kant's works on history illuminates the paradox the historiographer has, at once recording mechanistic temporal events as they unfold while simultaneously recording the actions of free agents in the world, which would seem to put those very beings within relations of cause and effect. This is precisely his critique of Leibniz's view of freedom, since the latter thought he could keep man an agent even if it were redescribable in terms of causal relations. Kant distinguishes between the spheres of causal determinism and transcendental freedom and offers a solution in the third antinomy of the *CPR* by proposing that while the human being is causally (phenomenally) determined they are in-themselves (noumenally) free. This solution curtails the paradox of causal determinism and freedom by positing two different perspectives on existence, while not positing two different kinds of world. This is the Kantian distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental. However, it raises questions akin to the mind-body problem of how it is possible that something that is not mechanistic interacts with subjects in the world. Emile Fackenheim addresses these specific issues in his essay on "Kant's Concept of History" (1956).³⁴ The focus here is not the issue of recording freedom, but Kant's shifting perspective from seeing the universe as causally determined to it being free

³⁴ Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History."

and yet purposive. The universe for Kant is teleologically ordered, even if this underlying purposiveness is only a regulative ideal. The teleological ordering of the universe must remain regulative because “the concept as a natural end is not demonstrable by reason at all, i.e., it is not constitutive for the determining, but is merely regulative for the reflecting power of judgment.”³⁵

In the preface of the *CPR* Kant indebts himself to Hume for waking him from his dogmatic slumber, which motivated his critique of metaphysics. However, it was likely Rousseau who woke up Kant from his moral slumber and motivated his reevaluation of morals. As numerous Kantian biographers have noted,³⁶ the shift in Kant’s perspective from holding scientific knowledge as the highest aspiration of mankind towards considering the moral sphere as the highest end of human life happened after he read Rousseau. Kant said he had to read Rousseau’s works as often as possible to make the beauty of their style disappear from their page so that he could judge the content without bias.³⁷ Kant had only one picture on his wall and that was of Rousseau, and he is reported to have only once interrupted his routine walk, to pick up his new copy of the *Emile* that had just arrived at the post office. This is all to say “Kant regarded Rousseau not as the founder of a new ‘system’,” as Ernst Cassirer notes, “but as the thinker who possessed a new conception of the nature and function of philosophy, of its vocation and dignity.”³⁸ In Kant’s own words:

³⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:396.

³⁶ See Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). How the regulative ideal works in judgment is discussed in the fourth chapter.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 153.

³⁸ Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe; Two Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), 1.

I am myself by inclination a seeker after truth. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge and a restless passion to advance in it, as well as a satisfaction in every forward step. There was a time when I thought that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau set me right. This blind prejudice vanishes; I learn to respect human nature, and I should consider myself far more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that this view could give worth to all others to establish the rights of man.³⁹

The establishment of the “rights of man” is not a civic right, nor a practical duty or *Recht*, but concerns what man *can do*. As such, the rights of the human being concern pragmatic anthropology as establishing the domains of what the individual can make of herself.

After Rousseau, Kant changed gears and began to focus more on the worth of the individual and less on the worth of the intellectual life for the sake of itself. He thought that his way of life, that of the philosopher, would be less deserving of praise or worth than the practical job of the labourer if it were not for the possibility that his work could inspire societal change, that is, could help his fellow human being attain or maintain her freedom and dignity. Thus Kant saw it as his duty to help make the world the kind of place where the dignity of others was respected.

He realized after reading Rousseau the value and dignity the human being has as a free autonomous agent. There are two main ways to discuss freedom, transcendental freedom and practical freedom. Both will be addressed in the following chapters. It is vital to address freedom in this work on Kant’s *Anthropologie* because it links the moral to the pragmatic, though it is not merely pragmatic. The practical and pragmatic concerns what the human being make

³⁹Kant, *Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften*, 20:44; Kuehn, *Kant : A Biography*, 131-32.

makes of herself, and she cannot make anything of herself if she is not free. If the purpose of the Kantian system is to help mankind realize its highest end, then establishing freedom is a necessary ingredient, but is not sufficient.

Kant lectured for forty-nine semesters over forty-five years (1756-1796) on the geography; it was his third most taught class next to the logic and metaphysics.⁴⁰ He also spent a great deal of time thinking through his lectures on *Anthropologie* that began in the winter of 1772/1773 and ended in 1796/1797. Both classes were generally taught over the academic year, with the physical geography in the fall and the anthropology course in the winter. Stuart Elden aptly remarks that these dates vary widely across the literature, but what is in consensus is that Kant spent a great deal of his time thinking through the *Geography* and the *Anthropologie*.⁴¹ Holly Wilson, in *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology*, makes a noteworthy distinction regarding the relationship of the physical geography and the *Anthropologie*:

I distinguish between 'origin' and 'arise': the anthropology lectures arose out of the psychology lectures, but had their origin in the physical geography lectures. Kant's banning of psychology from metaphysics initiated the movement toward an independent series of lectures on anthropology, but the intent and content of the anthropology lectures finds its origin in the physical geography lecture, which were initially given fifteen years prior to the start of the anthropology lectures.⁴²

As Wilson points out, the *Anthropologie* has its origin in the "physical geography" lectures whereas this thesis is trying to illustrate how the critical works have their

⁴⁰ Stuart; Mendieta Elden, Eduardo, *Reading Kant's Geography*, Contemporary Continental Philosophy Series (New York: SUNY Press, 2011), 1-12.

⁴¹ Stuart Elden, "Reassessing Kant's Geography," *Journal of Historical Geography* 35, no. 1 (2009): 5.

⁴² Holly L. Wilson, *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 3.

origins in the *Anthropologie*. Psychology undeniably plays a large part in the *Anthropologie*, but not empirical psychology; Kant does not think that psychology alone can answer satisfactorily the question “What is the human being?” and thus does not address the pragmatic question of what man can be.⁴³ The geography lectures began fifteen years prior to the anthropology lectures, and the anthropology lectures began eight years before the first edition of the *CPR* was published.⁴⁴

The banning of psychology from metaphysics is key, because psychology is a description of our empirical inner sense, while metaphysics seeks what is transcendental, or rather the conditions of the possibility of any inner sense. Kant’s investigation into “What is the human being?” is addressed in both the *Anthropologie* and *Geography*, but while knowledge of both reciprocally give insight into the other, “*Weltkenntnis ist Menschenkenntnis*” and vice versa, it is in the *Anthropologie* that the *pragmatic* development of the human being is accomplished through the human being’s engagement with the world. Thus the *Geography* is the precursor to the science of man, but it is only a precursor in a chronological sense.

As Wilson puts it,

Cosmopolitan knowledge could be gained in a two-part lecture course in which the fields of nature and human beings were covered, first, by physical geography, and, then, by anthropology. The purpose of the two courses was not just to introduce the students to the scientific facts of outer and inner nature, but also to help them orient themselves in relationship to the world as physical and cultural. In other words, the intent was not only to make them scientifically

⁴³ See Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 253.

⁴⁴ It is interesting to note that while Kant taught the anthropology lectures for twenty-three years, he did not once teach a course on his *CPR*.

competent, but also to prepare them for social, pragmatic, and practical realities.

For Kant knowledge of the world is knowledge of the human being, and vice versa, because knowledge of the world gives man knowledge of the exterior, while knowledge of man gives insight into the inner sense of man. Understanding man in the inner sense with knowledge of the world allows man not only to know what he *ought* to make of himself, but also what he *can* make of himself.

The fourth question is considered throughout his works on education, history, and propels his three critiques.⁴⁵ The investigation into the essence of the human being is, of course, no small project, and the project of physiological anthropology is “small” by comparison: it seeks “only” to discover “what nature makes of man.” An investigation that tries to understand what the human being is, as free autonomous agent, is a task perhaps without completion. Kant thought there was great value in understanding the world and physiology; he just did not think that it was the only thing that was important.

The reception of the *Anthropologie* when first published in 1798, was, underwhelming considering the importance that Kant placed on the work. As mentioned, he taught the course for at least twenty-three years and it was there that he attempted to work out his so-called fourth question. The current consensus on the work seems to reflect well the criticism first provided by Friedrich Schleiermacher in 1799: “A summary of this book could not be much more than a collection of trivial matters. If, on the other hand, it were intended to give a sketch of

⁴⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B833-34.

the plan of its execution... it would necessarily give a distinct picture of the most peculiar confusion."⁴⁶ The caricature of the *Anthropologie* depicted is one that it is either trivial or confused—or both. Still it seems perplexing to esteem Kant as one of the greatest thinkers in western history and so easily dismiss the subject matter that he seemed to hold most dear. This does not mean that the content ought to be accepted *prima facie* because Kant tells us it is important. While it has not been completely ignored, it merits serious consideration in Kant studies, and should not simply be dismissed as the drivel of a senile academic. As, I have previously remarked, Kant may have been approaching senility when the text was published in 1798, but he thought through his course systematically, and with each year the system continued to develop. But the improvement must be shown, and the best indication of this improvement is found throughout the lecture series. In a letter to Marcus Herz 1778, he says, "I lecture on anthropology, but since I make improvements or extensions of my lectures from year to year, especially in the *systematic and, if I may say, architectonic form* and ordering of what belongs within the scope of a science."⁴⁷ Whilst he may have published *APPV* late in life, he worked out the concepts of his system of *Anthropologie* when he was an academic titan, and the seven manuscripts of student notes collected in Vol. XXV of the Academy Edition in 1997, partially translated into English by Allen Wood and Paul Guyer in 2010, make clear the twenty-five-year development of this project, helping us to ascertain greater insight into Kant's thinking on the relationship of society to history, the

⁴⁶ Andreas Arndt and Wolfgang Virmond, *Band 1 Briefwechsel 1774-1796, (Briefe 1-326)* (1986), 366-69; Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 10.

⁴⁷ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 10:243. *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 170.

nature of the empirical workings of the mind, and how all of these relate to his well-known works on politics, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics.

Kant did not believe that the investigation into the human being was realized with the publication of the *Anthropologie* in 1798, but he seems to hint that such a project might one day be fully realized—perhaps even as a “new tectonic,” as he put it years earlier—through the evolution of the species.⁴⁸ In limiting reason to make room for faith, Kant removed from reason the ability to prove immortality and thus made possible the realization of morality.⁴⁹ Though Kant’s optimism regarding the realization of such a project should be reconsidered in the light of his optimism that the development of the critical footpath of his *CPR* might be completely transformed into the scientific highway of the synthetic a priori by the end of his century.⁵⁰ This is all by means of saying that the project of the *Anthropologie* is not likely to be realized fully. In fact it could only be realized with the perfection of the species, which is one of the reasons immortality is a postulate of pure reason, and thus remains a regulative ideal. The hope nonetheless is that even though the individual’s limited perspective is unable to grasp the causal nexus of even a seemingly simple moment, the investigation into the essence of the human being might still progress as a project for the species. The creation of universal law based

⁴⁸ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 8:27.

⁴⁹ One of Kant’s postulates of pure reason was the immortality of the soul. While the term “human being” has been used and might give the impression that Kant meant only “human beings” from earth, this is not the case. Kant begins the anthropology with the statement that it is because the human being has the “I” in his name that lifts him above things, and makes him a subject. Therefore, so long as the being in question was conscious of themselves as an “I,” Kant would probably include them.

⁵⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B883. *On History*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 2001).

on empiricism is doomed to fail because it inevitably misses some minutia of experience; the relation of the knower to the thing-in-itself [*Ding an sich*] is never realizable, it is a chasm. As Hume and philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty point out, there is always something missing when we attempt to subsume perception under the laws of nature, especially when these laws are meant to hold universally. The memory of the perception, the imprint for Hume, is never so clear as immediately grasping the thing, just as for a phenomenologist such as Merleau-Ponty perception is primary, because while empirical science is a worthy project, it does not and cannot discover the truth of the thing-in-itself, i.e., the thing behind perception. This is because human being is at the same time both the subject and object of this thought, and as such an ineradicable freedom gets the pragmatic anthropologist only to what the human being *can* be, not just what she *ought* [*Sollen*] to be. Kant is not providing the architectonic of the conditions of the possibility of thought in the *CPR*, nor is he providing the duties that the rational being described in the *CPR* ought to give himself. Rather, the human becomes both the subject and object of investigation. But as Foucault and Holly Wilson note, this is not about an inner sense of “man,” but rather her “behavior” in space or through outer sense. It is not an empirical psychology or something like a “transcendental psychology,” but an *Anthropologie*.

The laws that attempt to grasp the *Ding-an-sich* fail necessarily because the noumenal is always out of reach and forever inaccessible to the causal agent. The framework of the *Anthropologie* is built within a context of philosophy trying to address issues of determinism and freedom, theoretical and empirical, phenomena

and noumena. Those who would object to empirical intuitions informing *a priori* concepts in the introduction, rely on the understanding, that for Kant there is a distinction between the kinds of proof provided by empirical science and the critical/theoretical approach. The empirical scientific approach relies on perception while the critical/theoretical path progresses systematically and apodictically.⁵¹ It is with the distinction between the kinds of certainty provided by the theoretical and practical proofs in mind that the first and second *Critique* might be best considered, and are considered throughout the present work.

These remarks represent the major preparatory considerations needed to address the purpose of this investigation. The main points are, 1) though Kant was morally trained from a young age he seemed to embrace his scientific and mathematical education primarily and was thus impelled towards a mechanistic view of nature; 2) though he was raised in a pietistic family and was interested in philosophy and morality in his early life, it was not until he read Rousseau in 1762 that he began to embrace this way of thinking as his primary purpose. In order to address the issue of the gap of human freedom, he had to work through the issue of how it was possible for the human being to be simultaneously determined and free; 3) He began working on his anthropology course by 1755, which was the second part of his geography lectures. By the time the *Anthropologie* was developed into its own course in 1772/1773, Kant had formulated his plan for nearly twenty years. While Kant was initially forced to use a textbook for the course, for which he chose to use the third part of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, it could only function in part as a

⁵¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, B833.

framework for the *Anthropologie*.⁵² He quickly diverged from Baumgarten and generated his own notes for the course. The new material, though influenced by Baumgarten, was onto something new as Foucault suggests. This was the move to making the transcendental-empirico doublet, that is, man as both subject and object of thought, a figure for investigation for the first time in the history of ideas. In any case, the lectures continued to improve and evolve into an architectonic for *Anthropologie* as a letter to Marcus Herz in 1773 indicates, and it is clear from the development of the Critical works and *Anthropologie* lectures notes of 1772/1773 that Kant had the foundation of a science in mind, and while these ideas find root in the soil of the *CPR*, the germination is made possible only through the pragmatic education of man.

The renewed interest in the pre-critical works continues to reveal the extent to which the Kantian project is interested in the nature of the human being and a science in which to articulate it. It would be a futile conjecture to attempt to pin point when Kant began thinking about the nature of the human being, but it is safe to assume that by 1755, when he began lecturing on physical geography, he had considered the nature of man for some time. The fact that Kant was interested in the nature of the human being or a science of man was not revolutionary;⁵³ what was revolutionary was the progression of Kant's thought which eventually attempted to understand and articulate this nature within his doctrine of transcendental idealism. It is partly through this progression and evolution of critical ideas that the holistic

⁵² Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*.

⁵³ See Wilson, *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance*; Elden, "Reassessing Kant's Geography."; Elden, *Reading Kant's Geography*; Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*.

view of *Anthropologie* is made clearer. The transcendental doctrine, though inspired by *Anthropologie*, is an avenue that allows for the system and architectonic of the *Anthropologie* to be made explicit. The transcendental doctrine maintains that in knowing the world the subject is involved as an interpreter and, in terms of the *Anthropologie*, that which is interpreted, whereby human understanding and judgment unify intuitions. In the following citation from the lecture notes, Kant proposes that there is a type of translational project going on in the *Anthropologie*, and this translational program when complete is the science that Kant is seeking to find through his *synthetic a priori* of the *CPR*. In the Busolt lecture notes of 1788/1789, mentioned in the previous sentence, Kant says, "Worldly cognition is thus just the same as cognition of the human being. When this *observation* of human beings 'anthropography' is brought to a science, it is called 'anthropology,' and one attains to this science."⁵⁴ If the *Anthropologie* is a translational program whereby observations made by 'anthropography' are brought to a science, then *the CPR* might be seen as akin to the rules of grammar that a language requires if it is going to have meaningful dialog. If the *CPR* were the grammar of the aforementioned translational project, then the human being would be the Rosetta stone. The human being can act as a Rosetta stone because man exists as part of the phenomenal and noumenal world simultaneously. Thus the human being is inherently part of the laws of nature that determines her as object, yet as subject, she is free and thus exists as a noumenal agent. The evaluation of this project is not possible at this point because it would require the completion of the system, and the completion of this system is the

⁵⁴ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 25:1435.

attainment of the whole of science. This thesis can only characterize the translational program; still, this should help situate the role that the first *Critique* plays in the realization of a perfect civil society.

It is important to keep in mind that the *CPR* was written over a decade and it was Kant's first critical work. Kant scholars often refer to this period as the "silent decade," and while his publications reflected this silence, the system and architectonic of his lectures on geography and anthropology continued to grow and evolve. Through this period of little publication Kant developed in the *CPR* an epistemological framework in which the sorts of questions he was interested in, could be raised in a non-dogmatic fashion. The first *Critique* also served to delimit the types of responses that would count as answers. In the preface to the first *Critique*, Kant famously said that he had to limit reason in order to make room for faith.⁵⁵ However, Kant did not want to bar completely investigation into the postulates of pure reason; he wanted to delimit reason in order to establish the absolute insolvability of God, freedom and immortality. It is clear from *What is Enlightenment?* and the rest of the preface to the first *Critique* that Kant wanted the free and public examination of science, philosophy, and religion.⁵⁶

The desire for the public examination of ideas was one of the moving principles of the Enlightenment according to Kant. His motto for the Enlightenment was "dare to know" [*Sapere Aude!*], and he seemed keen to find a science that would enable him to know the nature of the human being. The field of anthropology, as Kuehn points out above, grew out of the Enlightenment's changing understanding of

⁵⁵ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxx.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

the human being and while Kant's perspective on human nature seems to have changed slightly throughout his writing, what remains static is the idea that "the sciences are the *principia* for the improvement of morality."⁵⁷ The revolutionary move of the Enlightenment to look reflectively within mankind for the answers to human nature is mirrored in many respects with what the preface to the *CPR* did for epistemology. In the preface to the *CPR* Kant explains his Copernican Revolution,

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.⁵⁸

According to Kuehn, the emergence of anthropology as a field of study is indirectly born out of a philosophy and methodology directed at reflexive inwardness and thus reflective judgment. The key points of Kant's *Copernican Revolution* are that, 1) the new understanding of perceptions turns the world inside out; where once the subject attempted to get onto the world, Kant proposes that the very modes of human cognitions are a priori, and thus that the very possibility of perceiving the world is determined in advance of experience. Human understanding and judgment build concepts and evaluate them, in order that the human being has neither empty concepts nor blind intuitions.⁵⁹ Kant proposes, 2) to establish with his transcendental idealism "something about objects before they are given." By this he

⁵⁷ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 27:462; Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*.

⁵⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 110.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, B75.

means to discover the *a priori* conditions for all possible experience, but he also quasi-employs this methodology in the *Anthropologie*. That is, he employs the methodology in a manner where it cannot provide the assurance that Kant thinks metaphysical claims can. The reason it cannot provide the assurance he desires for metaphysics goes back to the issue that was brought up in the introduction of this thesis, the distinction between the certainty of theoretical *a priori* claims and the lack of it in empirical *a posteriori* claims.

Kant alludes to the possibility of creating systematic and architectonic categories of understanding through a pragmatic endeavor in the opening of the *Anthropologie*.⁶⁰ These categories, while derived from experience *a posteriori*, are supposed to reveal to agents who analyze the architectonic autonomously, necessary conditions about what the human being *can do, or become*. This might sound like empirical psychology, which Kant banished from the *Anthropologie*, but according to Kant, empirical psychology cannot provide the complete ground of a science of the human being.⁶¹

The belief that human beings can discover synthetic *a priori* concepts that make sense of, or inform, their understanding occupies an extensive amount of scholarly consideration, and demonstrating it is the project of the *Prolegomena* and the *CPR*. It was with this same attitude that Kant approvingly “compared Rousseau to Newton, for both discovered ‘the hidden law, the observation of which justifies

⁶⁰ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:131-32.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, fn7:141.

providence.”⁶² The hidden laws of physics and morals seemed to justify providence by demonstrating an ordered disorder to nature that while lacking exact explanation provides insight into the unity of human experience. In much the same way Kant respected the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume as encompassing the method by which “the abiding nature of man” can be uncovered in the plethora of his empirical appearances.⁶³

The plan for Kant’s science of man and the systematic investigation is styled after A.G. Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*.⁶⁴ Kant, like Baumgarten, promises to evaluate historically and philosophically what happens before showing what ought to happen.⁶⁵ This promise was developed into the realization of the three *Critiques*, or attempted to; depending on whether one judges that he accomplished the aim there.

As noted, there are many focal points of criticism that critics have concentrated on in order to demonstrate error in the critical works. The usual suspects are Kant’s analysis of the gap of human freedom, or the possibility of the synthetic *a priori*. For Kant, the only possibility of an empirical science that could generate the necessary, *a priori*, conditions of consciousness, or the possibility of experience, are the synthetic *a priori*. Thus Kant needed the *CPR* in order to explain the possibility of the synthetic *a priori*, which is to set metaphysics on the path of a science. Only if experience can be analyzed for its synthetic *a priori* features can it

⁶²Immanuel Kant, *M. Immanuel Kants Nachricht Von Der Einrichtung Seiner Vorlesungen in Dem Winterhalbenjahre, Von 1765-1766* (Koenigsberg: Johann Jakob Kanter, 1765), II, 311. *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), 7.

⁶³ *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, fn6.

⁶⁴ This is no surprise, considering that Kant used Baumgarten’s textbook on metaphysics as the required text for the course. It must be acknowledged that he diverged from the textbook often and it was used often, only for the preliminary introduction into the topic under consideration.

⁶⁵ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 2:305-14.

provide the clues necessary to build a science of the human being that is more than 'anthropography,' that is, an *Anthropologie*. The science of man and the normativity of morality within the human dimension rest upon freedom and the synthetic *a priori*. In order to work out the how the synthetic *a priori* is possible, Kant has to elaborate how his Copernican Revolution works in the everyday.

According to Kant, the manifold of human experience is unified through the categories of the understanding. In the preface to the *CPR*, Kant explains that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."⁶⁶ Thus for experience to have meaningful concepts and in order that intuitions not be vacuous, human understanding must employ intuitions and concepts simultaneously. Heidegger's concept of thrownness, that is, that human beings are absolutely historical, might be helpful, at least in one respect, in understanding how the *Anthropologie* and *CPR* come together, as Kant's notions of intuition and concept, and how the faculties of understanding and judgment come together in and through the thrownness of man. In the *CPR* perceptions are unified through categories and through the faculty of judgment the concepts are understood as being subsumed under some universal principle that was there before experience, thus the human being has no access to concepts before they are given in experience. For Kant, "there is no doubt whatsoever that all our cognitions begin in experience," but he stresses that "although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not account

⁶⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, B75.

all arise from experience."⁶⁷ This is what Kant wanted to emphasize about objects before they are given.

Intuitions and concepts coming together set the stage for the possibility of any experience. The *CPR*'s framework for experience as sensations unified through the categories of understanding enables Kant to make claims about any experience whatsoever, but his understanding of judgment matures as he progresses through the *Critical* period, and he begins to turn more towards the subject. The maturation of judgment is the topic of the fourth chapter of the present work. Throughout the development of the *Anthropologie* Kant discusses in the lectures notes and the published book how a pragmatic anthropology can discover things about the world and the nature of the human beings by being engaged pragmatically in the world and learning from narratives. He is careful to restrict the knowledge gained from narratives and experience by declaring that this knowledge into the nature of human beings and the world can only be gained if the observers have already come to understand the concepts as necessary conditions, thus once they can be subsumed under concepts, that is under a plan. The critical plan of the *Anthropologie*, like the history of the Enlightenment, began when man started to look inward. Looking inward through reason allowed the human being to determine what she ought to make of herself, but the application of this ought finds its actualization in the exterior world. The realization of practical reason's ought is similar to, but the reversal of the translational project of the anthropography to anthropology. In the former, practical reason prescribes what *ought* to be the case

⁶⁷ Ibid., B1-B2.

and it must be enacted by an agent in the world, whereas the translational project describes what is the case of some agents action. When the graphic of this anthropography is translated into a law it gives anthropology. Together practical reason and anthropology are prescriptive and descriptive, but that is not all anthropology is. If it were, then it would be merely anthropography. Because the human being has reflective judgment she is able to create laws via ratiocination, so while practical reason elaborates on what the human being *ought* to be, it is because the individual can generate new universal principles that she is able to make herself.

Kant's Copernican Revolution was the first step in attempting to dismantle the dogmatic context in which the majority of his contemporaries worked, and via it and the rest of the *CPR*, Kant attempted to set science on a path to apodictic certainty. The suggestion from Pitte, Frierson and Wilson is that Kant attempts to work out an apodictic system of science, but along the way, probably when he is trying to work out how reflective judgment works, he discovered that the science [*Wissenschaft*] of the human being cannot be apodictic. He thought that the critical path would offer science the potential to progress to solve the many issues that Hume raised, and he no doubt thought that this path would be instrumental in the discovery of the science of the human being. After all, he says, that for the sake for which the three questions serve is depicted in the "doctrine on method," whereby the first three questions condense to the questions of the pragmatic and happiness.

The first advises us what to do if we want to partake of happiness; the second commands how we should behave in order even to be worthy of happiness. The first is grounded on empirical principles; for except by means of experience I can know neither which inclinations there are that would be satisfied nor what the natural causes are that could satisfy them. The second abstracts from

inclinations and natural means of satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of a rational being in general and the necessary conditions under which alone it is in agreement with the distribution of happiness in accordance with principles/ and thus it at least can rest on mere ideas of pure reason and be cognized a priori.⁶⁸

Kant may have set out the goals and logic for the science of the synthetic a priori in the first *Critique*, but the overall plan for the education of the human being was elaborated in his *Pedagogy*. Just as anthropology can be studied in a physiological or pragmatic sense, so too Kant says, that the “doctrine of education” is either “physical or practical.”⁶⁹ In Kant’s work on *Education* he says, “physical education is the part that the human being has in common with the animals.”⁷⁰ This distinction resonates with another claim he makes in the *Anthropologie*, where he distinguishes between the “human animal” and the “human being.”⁷¹ Aristotle gave man priority because of his rationality. Kant however claims that man is not always an “*animal rationale*,” but rather develops this ability as an “*animal rationabile*.”⁷² The human animal is endowed with the potential to be a rational being, but the human animal must actualize this potential to become a human being proper. Kant thinks that the only way the human being can realize this potential, at least initially, is through education. He says, “human beings can only become human beings by education.”⁷³ Here, the influence of Rousseau is apparent, education is meant to develop the human towards the recognition of the intrinsic worth of every human being.

⁶⁸ Ibid., B833-34.

⁶⁹ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:445.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:331-32.

⁷² Ibid., 7:321-22; *ibid.*

⁷³ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:443.

For Kant, practical or moral education must be developed in order that the human can live as a freely acting being.⁷⁴ The relationship of the pragmatic anthropology to freedom will come up in the next chapter on practical reason. The focus here is on the plan of education according to Kant:

- 1) Scholastic-mechanical formation with regards to skillfulness, which is therefore didactic (the job of the instructor),
- 2) Pragmatic formation with regard to prudence (the task of the tutor),
- 3) Moral formation with regard to ethics.⁷⁵

Kant's plan for education, as previously mentioned, was heavily influenced by Baumgarten's *Metaphysics*. While Kant's ideas on pedagogy and his early philosophical works were structured similar to Baumgarten's, the contents were heavily altered and contained Kant's own nuanced views regarding the perfection of the human being, and as Brian Jacobs points out "there is a transformation of Baumgarten's defense of aesthetics into an increasing systematic defense of sensibility as a distinctive type of intuition."⁷⁶ Kant developed his concept of evolution of the race through progressive generations more than a half century before Darwin did the same for biology.⁷⁷

Studying Kant's plan for education is helpful in honing a precise definition of "pragmatic." It is in the educational work that the pragmatic aspect falls in the middle of the program for human education. But before the pragmatic aspect of knowledge can be developed, the theoretical part needs to be cultivated. Here

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 10.

⁷⁷ Kant develops these ideas comprehensively in his On History essays and the third *Critique*.

theoretical means firstly, the apodictic theoretical concerns that are central to the *CPR*; secondly, theory as a the knowledge gained from an inculcation into the practices of the community; The primary cultivation of the theoretical in the individual, that, is the *a priori* apodictic system Kant develops in the *CPR*, is needed first in order that the pragmatic knowledge can be subsumed in a system with meaningful concepts. The acquisition of world knowledge, or knowledge of the human being (*Menschenkenntnis ist Weltkenntnis*), if it is to help in the development of the human being and the science of human nature then it might be more than just action without a plan. For Kant we act as if there is a providential plan guiding the course of history, and thus the development of the human being. This guiding force is responsible for the course of nature, and thus man and the movement of the stars. This plan can be either unknown or the work of a wise creator, but in either case, there is an order to the universe. This force, either mechanical or providential, operates as a practical regulative ideal that directs human beings to the realization of her final end, the development of the moral dimension in the individual and world. The progress of the development of the moral world requires first addressing issues of freedom and determinism in the next chapter.

Chapter II

Practical Reason

Kant's famous second question considers what I, taking into account the inestimable value of each life, *ought* to do. However, before he could attempt an answer to this question he had the "small" chore of establishing moral responsibility, which has its presupposition in human freedom. This "small" chore relates to the third antinomy of pure reason. In order to establish freedom, bearing in mind the transcendental path cannot provide proof because freedom transcends all proof; Kant employed the only avenue that remained at his disposal to solve the problem of freedom, i.e., the path of practical reason.

The introduction and the first chapter laid out the problems and context in which the fourth question initially evolved. In differentiating physiological anthropology and pragmatic anthropology Kant needed to distinguish between what nature makes of the human being and what she, as a free agent *can* make of herself. The latter distinction centres on the issue of freedom and determinism. After Rousseau, Kant's understanding of man changed to prioritize the intrinsic value of each human being, over scholastic knowledge. The distinction between physiological and pragmatic is necessary to show how the pragmatic anthropology works within a normative framework that informs the agent what they should do. Once an agent knows what she should do, she can determine what kind of person

she can make herself, or retrospectively she can judge what kind of person she has made of herself. The division between the practical and pragmatic become clearer when “what man can make of himself” in *Anthropologie* is seen in the shadow of what the individual *ought* to make of herself in the second *Critique*.

Theoretical reason cannot prove the existence of freedom, but reason knows full well that freedom is a problem. Limited by reason Kant made room for God, freedom, and immortality, by putting them outside the bounds of pure reason. There are many ways of articulating each, but now under consideration is how freedom is necessary in order for human beings to make themselves. Indeed, what the human being can make of herself is only possible once Kant establishes the possibility of freedom. For Sartre, the individual is free only if there is no God, but for Kant freedom occurs within a providential plan. Thus nature or providence makes something of the human being, but nature does not delineate and make all that the human being *can be*. Through freedom the person begins to make herself as a moral agent. The third antinomy is concerned with the conflict between freedom and necessity. “The thesis argues for the existence of freedom alongside the causal necessity. The antithesis argues for universal determinism and denies the existence of freedom.”⁷⁸ Kant attempts to prove the thesis by describing how the causal principle in its unlimited application falls into self-contradiction. Kant’s resolution to the third antinomy proves neither thesis nor antithesis, but leaves open the possibility of both. While the antinomy provides no conclusion, it does not bar the possibility that the human being can make herself. The issue raised by a

⁷⁸ T.K. Seung, *Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed* (New York: Continuum, 2007), 78.

physiological anthropology is the problem of an anthropology that is deterministic, while Kant is interested in what the human being makes of herself outside of the causal determinism of nature. Thus the pragmatic anthropology is the anthropology of freedom, of what the human being *can be*.

Another approach to distinguish between the physiological and the pragmatic is to distinguish between theoretical and practical knowledge: the former knows how to do something theoretically, while the latter knows why it is to be done. The pragmatic is neither the theoretical knowledge, nor the practical knowledge that knows why something ought [*Söllen*] to be done. The pragmatic point of view is concerned with what the human being *can* [*Können*] make of herself, while this freedom relies on the autonomy that comes with giving oneself the duties that one *ought* to do, this only gets the human being so far in realizing what *can* be willed, and what *can* be willed looks to discover how much this will can have “success” in the world in which she finds herself. Thus there is no thinking Kant’s notion of freedom, of what the human being can make of herself, without an elaboration of those duties one gives oneself. While the pragmatic may look to happiness, since this is what nature makes the human being want and leads the individual to form hypothetical imperatives, these inclinations have no moral worth if followed for the sake of this happiness. But while practical reason is *a priori*, the pragmatic however, as the modal *can* [*Können*] implies, is concerned with a kind of play [*Spielen*] between what the self-rules it should will and what the human being can make of herself. The “play” of the *Anthropologie* is analogous to the creation of art, as it too requires free play. That free play *can* create something beautiful for

instance, or that the pragmatic anthropologist *can* create themselves and the world, presupposes teleology in nature, which directs actions, and makes possible judgments as to the success or failure of said creation(s).

It is now the goal of this inquiry to show in more depth the issues of the practical/pragmatic and how the gap of freedom is bridged. “Everything is practical that is possible through freedom”⁷⁹ according to Kant. This makes it clear that not everything is possible through freedom. Human beings’ wills are constrained by diverse empirical conditions, but when these conditions are made clear, they “enter into the formulation of rules of skills and counsels of prudence.”⁸⁰ But freedom is also constrained because we coexist with other free rational beings.

The *Anthropologie* is meant to engage its students with acquaintance knowledge of the world. This *kenntnis* of the world is supposed to develop prudence [*Klugheit*]. The *Anthropologie* does this by drawing on experience, which is part of the problem critics cite. The problem stems from understanding the *a priori* theoretical via the *a posteriori*.

If in the first *Critique*, anthropology is what needs to be expurgated entirely in order to secure the space for concepts of reason, moral philosophy reserves a place for it as precisely this vital counterpart to a priori moral laws. In the *Groundwork*, Kant argues for a twofold metaphysics: one of nature and one of morals. “Physics would thus have its empirical but also a rational part. The same for ethics, although here the empirical part could be called especially practical anthropology and the rational [part] morals.” Furthermore, “All moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part and is applied to the human being; it borrows not the least from the knowledge of this

⁷⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 828.

⁸⁰ Eckart Foerster, *Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 139.

latter (anthropology), but rather gives him, as a reasoning being, laws a priori.”⁸¹

Nonetheless, Kant recognizes that knowledge of things of the world is not enough.⁸² Knowledge of the world is only the first part of education; Kant claims that it only provides theories, because it only describes the way the world is, not why it is not otherwise. For Kant however, reason must do more than understand and judge if it is to provide insight into the nature of the human being, it must do this by ratiocinating. Understanding the world theoretically and in practice is still essential to answer what it means to be a human being, but it is not enough. Kant thinks it is through the abstraction of experience via ratiocination of concepts that the science of the human being is discovered. Ratiocination for Kant is a kind of play of the imagination, through the use of reason, whereby the human being is able to create laws and give them reflexively to themselves. While these laws might be inspired by experience, as any anthropology must be concerned, it is through the creation and combination via reason that these concepts reveal what the human being *can* become. The discussion of ratiocination is concerned with reflective judgment which is discussed in the next chapter, but as interesting point worth mentioning is how free play, ratiocination, is similar to Charles Sanders Peirce’s idea of an abductive leap, and Thomas Kuehn’s distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery. Both Peirce and Kuehn point out that there are leaps, or revolutions, which enable insight into how things work. Insights in to nature that enable the human being to understand better what nature makes of her, and in a

⁸¹ Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 112.

⁸² Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:140.

negative way, as a limitation, these leaps reveal better to the pragmatic anthropologist what she *can* make of herself.

Kant's *Anthropologie* was meant to introduce young inexperienced students into the pragmatic world.⁸³ Prudence was the main skill [*Geschicklichkeit*] that Kant aspired to teach his students, and like the skill of the tightrope walker, it is different from *a priori* knowledge and practical reason.⁸⁴ Kant claims that theoretical knowledge, as an understanding of how something works, and artistic knowledge is different. In the former case, "if one knows it, then one can do it," while the latter requires some sort of natural disposition, or a tacit, hands-on acquaintance with the world.⁸⁵ Although, the artist needs to know how something is done in the practice of art if they are to make art, still theory is not all that is required. Kant would not refuse to call what the tightrope walker does art, even though what the tightrope walker does is in theory simple.⁸⁶ The dynamics of the relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge and pragmatics of the tightrope walker can be seen in the similar relationship that exists between theoretical and practical knowledge in the *CPR* and the *CPraR*. It is through freedom that human beings discover what they out to make of themselves.

Kant's proof for freedom could not come from pure reason as he says in the preface to the first Critique. In a footnote to the second *Critique* that he says

When I now call freedom the condition of the moral law and afterwards, in the treatise, maintain that the moral law is the condition under which we can first become aware of freedom, I want

⁸³ Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99*, 139-41; *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 10:143-46.

⁸⁴ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, fn183.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

only to remark that whereas freedom is indeed the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom.⁸⁷

Kant is not discussing freedom as a theoretical problem that gives rise to the antinomies in the first Critique here. Rather, he is now engaged at the practical level, which is a presupposition of giving oneself the moral law. It is the essence of morality that there be freedom (*ratio essendi*) and in turn the moral law is how freedom comes to be known (*ratio cognoscendi*). The moral law is the guarantor of freedom, because the moral law is only possible if human beings are free. From this Kant concluded that there is practical freedom and practical reason could now determine what man ought to become, and it determined that man's highest end was the realization of his morality. What the human being makes of herself is through free choice, but what she ought to make herself results from practical freedom and reason.

Thus a large motivating factor of the *CPR* and the *CPraR* is demonstrating the apodictic certainty of the moral claims and articulating the universal laws of action. Practical reason illustrates what is universal for moral agents, while the pragmatic moves the discussion towards the concrete and singular, or what the Marxist's would call the universal made concrete. This thesis has looked at how the pre-critical works influenced and gave insight into the plan of philosophy. Kant's pre-critical portrayal of man is realized in and through the critical works. The fulfillment of the critical works is not captured merely by the theoretical of the *CPR*; nor by the

⁸⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), fn140.

practical reason of the *CPraR*, but by an overarching project that understand the Critical period as a part of the architectonic of the human being.

While the *CPR*, according to his *Education*, is a propaedeutic to any study of the world and thus the human being, it is only when the human being is capable of unifying the concepts and intuitions of experience into a whole that the higher ends of the human being are attainable. The unification of intuitions and concepts in experience is what begins to act as a key to unlocking what the human being can do, which is the subject of the *Anthropologie*. This key functions to decipher future experience, and to understand the aims to which this education prepares the human being for what they ought to become. The discovery of what the human being ought to become, even if only as a regulative ideal, offers a secure footing for Kant.

Along the same line of thought, Kant's transcendental idealism never guarantees the physical world: Kant's Copernican Revolution only guarantees that the human being understands the world through perception and intuitions, and makes sense of the world through categories of the understanding and judgment. Kant was interested in agents realizing their autonomy, and he thought that an enlightened agent would be able to use its reason to make the leap to the conclusion that there is more to experience than perceptions and the rules these perceptions fall under; there is also room for creation, genius, and ratiocination. The only possibility for understanding the nature of the human being comes after the human being understands positive freedom, which Kant demonstrated in the third antinomy, also practical freedom that is lived through pragmatic engagement in the world. Through engagement in the world human beings look to bring into nature a

moral order that is found through practical reason. From the *a priori* concept of the moral law, the human being can infer freedom as the only possibility of the moral law.

Theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge of freedom, and developing prudence are necessary requirements for the realization of the science of the human being, but answering the fourth question still requires working out what self-making entails. The translational project of anthropography to anthropology is a self-making program, which for Kant is accomplished through the action of autonomous agents. The brief overview of Kant's education was meant to summarize his understanding of the development of the human being, and this is only possible when she is free. The insight that she makes herself has reverberations with Kant's conception of the Enlightenment where "man is freed from his self-incurred minority."⁸⁸ The transcendental move of Kant's Copernican Revolution also demonstrates an affinity towards inwardness by stressing the importance of how the world conforms to the knower's ways of knowing. The pragmatics is not just transcendental however, because that would just be practical reason. Rather the pragmatics marks the play from the transcendental to the particular and concrete. But the point of the *Anthropologie* is how the human being can move outward, and this is why Kant says that it is knowledge of the world. The Kantian anthropologist is looking for what the human being *can* do, and not what she *has* done (history) or what we are (whether as transcendental subject [CPR] or as subject of nature [empirical psychology]).

⁸⁸ Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften*, 8:35.

The *Anthropologie* begins with a brief description of the subject that distinguishes what human beings can become from what things are and how they can be treated.

The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all the changes that happen to him, one and the same *person* – i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals.⁸⁹

Kant quickly explains what it means to have an ego in terms of the intrinsic worth of subjects’ imbued with a persisting consciousness.⁹⁰ However, unlike the *CPR*, the issue with subjectivity in the opening of the *Anthropologie* is not epistemological, but moral. As a moral agents, human beings are responsible for *who* they become, even if *what* they *are*, is due to nature. The Copernican turn allowed Kant a means to articulate in a critical manner what his moral inclinations and education were already telling him, namely that there is a pragmatic dimension to the human being, and it is needed to understand the human being as a being that exists in two modes simultaneously, as a transcendental-empirical doublet, to use Foucault’s terminology from *The Order of Things*. This is not to say that the whole of the world is relative to the individual’s perspective, quite the contrary, the individual is always within a community of agents and the moral law applies equally to each. Kant’s articulation of the Categorical Imperative is, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:127.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 57. *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 4:403.

Turning inward is how the autonomous agent gives a law to herself; through her action, the agent wills that the law should become a universal law for all rational beings. What is revealed clearly from the critical works is the vital role that freedom plays in Kant's whole system. The definition of Kant's pragmatic anthropology as concerning "what man makes or can make or should make of himself" sets up important philosophical issues. The most important idea is the presupposition of freedom and thus that the human being has the capacity to make herself. The second stems from the fact that for Kant nature is teleological, that is that nature has purposiveness. Freedom is one of the postulates of pure reason that Kant sets limits to in the first Critique. He thinks he adequately discusses the antinomy of freedom and determinism in his third antinomy of the *CPR*. There the solution is to claim that there are two perspectives or ways of considering things, either as things appear or as they are in themselves. Henry Allison draws the important distinction that there are not two different kinds of things,

Kant's idealism holds that the transcendental distinction is not primarily between two kinds of entity, appearances and things in themselves, but rather between two distinct ways in which objects of human experience maybe "considered" in philosophic reflection, namely, as they appear and as they are in themselves.⁹²

If there were two different kinds of things, then it would open up a new dimension of issues concerning how these two things relate to one another.⁹³ Another conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of freedom in the first *Critique* is that the concept of freedom is timeless, in which case it is virtually unintelligible in explaining free action, or freedom is not timeless in which case its unrestricted

⁹² Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3-4.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 15.

scope must be abandoned.⁹⁴ Kant attempts to formulate the answer to freedom in the *Groundwork* but he is unable to found the solution epistemically. In the *CPraR* Kant explains that freedom is encountered in the empirical experience of the moral law, but it is given by pure (*a priori*) practical reason. From this point onward the footing of the critical path is not as firmly founded as in the first *Critique*. Whether Kant can come back from this is not the problem here. If the contention of critics is that the *Anthropologie* is not as theoretical as the *Critiques*, i.e. *a priori*, then a simple reply might be that Kant knew full well that it could not provide this assurance. Yet freedom is never proven through practical reason either, it is assumed as the possibility of the moral law, but it too is taken on faith, even if it is a rational faith.

Kant's conception of education is advantageous when investigating the relationship between freedom, morality, and *Anthropologie* because it proposes a plan to link the pre-critical and Critical works together. In his essays *On History* and work on *Pedagogy* Kant expands on the proper end for humanity and how "education is involved [with] the great perfection of human nature."⁹⁵ However, a nuanced tension of a seemingly familiar problem arises, that is between freedom and providence, where a distinction between providence and determinism must be made or else the whole endeavor of *Anthropologie* in determining what the human being makes or should make of herself is confused. In *Perpetual Peace* Kant distinguishes between fate and providence,

The mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposiveness plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord. This design, if we regard it as a

⁹⁴ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁵ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:444.

compelling cause whose laws of operation are unknown to us, is called fate. But if we consider the purposive function of the world's development, whereby it appears as underlying wisdom of a higher cause, showing the way towards the objective goal of the human race and predetermining the world's evolution, we call it providence.⁹⁶

The distinction between fate and providence for Kant is thus the difference between the determinism of cause and effect and a moral conception of nature. However, simply because Kant thinks that there is providence in the world does not mean that this determinism is the noumenal dimension of God. Freedom is enacted as if there were providence. It is one that is aligned to a future kingdom of ends. To say that it is simply in the world suggests that it could come about without the arduous work of individual autonomous agents. It is about what can be, not the fate of what must be the given case of nature. In fact the moral characteristic of God would mean that there is unity in God's plan for the world, and the plan that men ought to make of themselves, that is to become moral agents towards the same ends. The phenomenal directs man towards morality because of the realization of freedom, this practical freedom ensures noumenal freedom, and thus the human being can come to understand that his highest end is achieved in the moral world. Kant understands the world as a unity in difference between phenomenal and noumenal, pragmatic and theoretical, the human being as self-creator and God as the creator of nature, while questioning character of this God remains.

The *Anthropologie* is not primarily concerned with knowledge in the strictly theoretical sense, which is *a priori* necessary concepts, because *Anthropologie* is as a study of what the human being can make *a posteriori*. However,

⁹⁶ *Kant : Political Writings*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 108.

through the free play of the imagination in ratiocination and reflective judgment the agents are able to give laws to themselves, and thus make themselves. How this is possible and the limit to which it is possible would be a subfield, and would concern *Anthropologie* so far as it helps the anthropologist understand the interplay between what reason determines the human being to be theoretically, and what a pragmatic investigation uncovers she can become. Kant's work was written in a historical context that valued tradition and dogma. Part of the project to realize the science of the human being required setting science on a sure footing, i.e., the first *Critique*. The second part was working out categorical laws of morality and how things ought to be, i.e., the second *Critique*. Understanding how pure reason and practical reason come together to determine the limits that reason is responsible for giving the human being insight into the a priori limits of reason is the task of the third *Critique*. All the Critiques can be seen as part of a greater whole, whereby education lays out the plan that is actualized when the pragmatic discovers the limit of practical reason and discovers the possibility of realizing the kingdom of ends on earth.

Chapter III

Reflective Judgment

While Kant was writing the first *Critique* he became aware of the importance of working out judgment.⁹⁷ It was during this time that, according to Michel Souriau, he first began to realize the significance of a discovering judgment (i.e., reflective judgment), though this idea was not developed until after the completion of his second *Critique*. It was then that Kant became acutely aware of the gap between “the speculative philosophy of nature and the practical philosophy of human freedom.”⁹⁸ As John Bernard says of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPJ)*, it was meant to serve “as a means of combining the two parts of philosophy (pure and practical reason) into a whole.”⁹⁹ Pitte reminds the reader that Kant’s attempt to rectify his failure in considering the “specific nature of the powers of the mind,” by appealing to another critical examination, demonstrates Kant’s understanding of the “mental powers of man to constitute the most essential element of human nature.”¹⁰⁰

The insights of the third *Critique* were discussed extensively throughout the *Anthropologie* lecture notes, especially regarding taste and feeling. The insights of the CPR were considered at length in the Mrongovius notes of (1785), and it is in these notes that new discernments were afforded regarding the importance and in

⁹⁷ Michel Souriau, *Le Jugement Réfléchissant Dans La Philosophie Critique De Kant* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1926).

⁹⁸ Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 70.

⁹⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Critique of Judgement* (London: Macmillan, 1914), 12.

¹⁰⁰ Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 70.

the working out of reflective judgment in the CPJ. Forest Williams remarks that there was a growing awareness by Kant of the role that *Anthropologie* exhibited on the aim of the critical works in general.

Returning for a moment to the view of Kant's philosophy we have called "classicist," it can now be seen why this view is incompatible with any intimation of a Kantian philosophical anthropology. The *Critique of Judgment*, on this view, is a link between the too-hastily severed phenomenal and noumenal of the first *Critique*, between the determinism and categorized nature and the freedom of rational activity of the second *Critique*; but a link which does not by its office of connecting two realms effect any radical transformation of the initial Kantian philosophy.¹⁰¹

For Williams there are two readings of the third *Critique*, one that "classically" interprets the CPJ as "a link between the too-hastily served phenomenal and noumenal of the first *Critique*, between the determinism of categorized nature and the freedom of rational activity of the second *Critique*."¹⁰² For Robert Louden however, the third *Critique* is the project of "establishing a bridge between the seemingly separate worlds of nature and freedom, so that the moral world can be created out of nature."¹⁰³ Williams and Pitte agree that connecting these two modes (i.e., phenomenal and noumenal) do not "effect any radical transformation of the initial Kantian philosophy."¹⁰⁴

The pragmatic-anthropological reading of the CPJ according to Williams however, holds that the third *Critique* marks a radical change in the critical philosophy. This radical change is due to the introduction of reflective judgment,

¹⁰¹ Forest Williams, "Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," *Kant-Studien* 46 (1954): 177.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 78-79.

¹⁰⁴ Williams, "Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," 177; Pitte, *The Anthropological Basis of Kant's Philosophy*, 70.

and is implicit in the Mrongovius notes of 1785.¹⁰⁵ Williams notes “the emergence of reflective judgment in the philosophy of Kant is not now the addition of a new mediating faculty, but the transformation of a whole philosophy.”¹⁰⁶

Pitte and Williams place Kant among the classical interpreters of the CPJ, however, the Friedländer lecture notes from 1776 indicate that Kant was aware of the importance of reflective judgment as a requirement for the ability of human beings to ratiocinate before the first *Critique* was ever published; Kant maintains, in the Friedländer notes, that ratiocination is essential to understanding the nature of the human being.¹⁰⁷ Williams is correct in placing the third Critique in terms of the anthropological project, but he is misled in seeing the *CPJ* as something new in Kant’s philosophy, since it was in fact already apparent in his anthropology lectures of 1775. That is, if one sees the *CPJ* as a break with the Critical project, then one neglects to acknowledge the pragmatic anthropology that guided him throughout the years he wrote the *Critiques*. On this note Paul Guyer argues that aesthetic theory is already there in the anthropology lectures.

But the basic strategy of his later deduction of aesthetic judgments was already present [in the *anthropology lectures*], namely that of showing that judgments of taste rest on a foundation that is just as universal as that of ordinary cognitive judgments; only at this point his view is not yet that judgments of taste are grounded in the subjective satisfaction of the conditions for judgment in general that is constituted by harmony between imagination and understanding.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, 25:545-53.

¹⁰⁶ Williams, "Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," 80.

¹⁰⁷ Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, 25:546.

¹⁰⁸ Jacobs, *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, 143-44.

Nevertheless, the ability of the human being to ratiocinate is differentiated from understanding and judging, which animals can do. The difference between understanding, judging, and ratiocinating is the difference between knowing the world and having the world. The animal and the human can understand and judge things, to lesser and greater degrees, but only the human being for Kant can ratiocinate, and thus only the human being can have the world. Ratiocination has to do with the creation of universals informed from experience, that are universals informed by experience. The creation of these universals is possible because human beings possess a creative power through which we attempt to understand nature teleologically, even if this teleology is only a regulative ideal, i.e., a hermeneutic. Nature, if understood providentially, allows for those judgments that lie outside determining judgments, to be placed in a new order, a new architectonic, after a plan of our own making yet modeled after the 'plan' of nature. However, the plan the human being creates through reflective judgment must be given to herself. The reworking of judgment to incorporate the reflective judgment enables her to make herself according to a plan of her own devising. Kant opens *APPV*, because "man" is "a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all the changes that happen to him, one and the same person – i.e., through rank and dignity a different being from things," thus what the human being *can* become, is because of the power of reason, a subject and thus completely different from things.¹⁰⁹ The ability of the human being to create a path from and for herself through the use of her own reason is characteristic of Kant's notion of Enlightenment; that is, the human being

¹⁰⁹ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:125.

is both the object and subject of the *Anthropologie*. It is only once the human being begins to think for herself that she becomes an “*animal rationale*.” That is an animal not merely capable of realizing reason, but the actualization of this potential. The first *Critique* teaches the human being the limits of what reason can provide, while through practical reason the human being learns what she ought to make of herself, however, it is through prudential training and pragmatic education that Kant thinks the human being learns what she *can*, as a reflexive *nomos* generating being, make of herself.

Reflective judgment is vital in understanding what the human being can make of herself, but in order to position the discussion of reflective judgment it is indispensable to differentiate between general and reflective judgment for Kant: “The Power of Judgment in general is the faculty for thinking the particular as contained under the universal.”¹¹⁰ This form of judgment is often referred to as “determinant judgment.” In order for a judgment to be determinant, it must subsume the given particular under a universal, whether it is a rule, principle, or law. A reflective judgment is one where the given particular does not preliminarily fall under any universal, and thus the universal must be discovered.¹¹¹

The reflecting power of judgment, which is under the obligation of ascending from the particular in nature to the universal, therefore requires a principle that it cannot borrow from experience, precisely because it is supposed to ground the unity of all empirical principles under equally empirical but higher principles, and is thus to ground the possibility of the systematic subordination of empirical principles under one another. The reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining

¹¹⁰ *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 66; *ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 71,74. Kant, *Kant's Critique of Judgement*, 5:180-1.

power of judgment), nor can it prescribe it to nature: for reflection on the laws of nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it that is in this regard entirely contingent.¹¹²

The importance for reflective judgment in what the human being *can* make of herself is a result of the human being's ability to give these laws to herself when a determining judgment fails to subsume the experience under a concept. Free play and the imagination are involved here because it is through ratiocination, and thus reason, that the human being discovers something about the universal, but this is not done *a posteriori*, but upon the reflection of *a posteriori* experience. Thus reflective judgment, like freedom, is a necessary requirement in the translational project from anthropography to *Anthropologie*. It is through reflective judgment that the human being is able to unify the observance of particulars that do not fall under the universal. What the human being can become is just such a concept that does not fall under a general universal; the human being looks at the particular and then attempts to reflect on what moral law will be in force for this practical instance. This suggests that there is no universal as such, but rather the point is freely to think through what universal applies to this particular.

As subjects, human beings have a different potential from things. The ability of human beings to create and give laws to themselves enables them to be subjects; this makes the human being a *someone* and not a *something*. Where there is no freedom, there is no room to create and give laws reflectively to one's self. By working out *what* the human being can make of herself, Kant had to work out *how*

¹¹² Ibid.

the human being gave laws to herself, and thus made herself. This is an issue Kant had indirectly begun working on when he first started his investigation of the human being, which Stuart Elden points out Kant could have been working as early as his first geography lectures (1755). As previously mentioned, the geography lecture notes were divided into two parts where the second division was *Menschenkenntnis*, this term can be translated as knowledge (as a kind of acquaintance) of the human being. The particulars of the *a posteriori* empirical world that do not fall under the universal law require the agent to create laws and give these laws to themselves. When the human being began to look inward during the Enlightenment she discovered the power of reason to shape the exterior world. The outer world is the world in which the human being acts and develops through actions the kind of person she becomes, and through the investigation of the particular human being, that is herself, she determines not only the physical limits of what she can become, but also through reflection, she discovers what she does make of herself.

Reflective judgment plays the vital role in the Kantian system of enabling agents to give laws to themselves.¹¹³ Through the purposiveness discovered via pragmatic engagement with the world, the reflective judgment unifies experience. Reflective judgments operate in conjunction with determinate judgments, where the latter subsumes and the former creates. The resolution of so much with reflective judgment also poses one of the bigger problems for Kant's system. The possibility

¹¹³ Human beings can give laws to themselves when determining judgements fail, however, human beings cannot give moral laws to themselves. Human beings discover the moral law through pure practical reason. For Kant, "the moral law is the condition under which we first become aware of freedom." (KGS, 5:5fn).

exists that there are no *a priori* categories of judgment except those created by reflective judgment, and thus consciousness is merely the coherence among principles and categories that have no ground other than in the individual's reflective power of creation. This would be the case if all determining judgments were just the second stage of reflective judgment, that is to say the whole of the concepts of consciousness are just the coherence of the free play of concepts derived from ratiocinating reflective judgments. Of course in Kant's third *Critique* he is more interested in demonstrating how reflective judgments are possible in aesthetic and teleological judgments. Working out how reflective judgment does this in the *CPJ* offers insight into the larger work of the *Anthropologie* by means of explicating what it is that the mind does, or why the mind does, give a law to itself; that is when determining judgments fail to capture the wonder of experience.

Nevertheless, within the Kantian system, reflective judgment offers insight into how, not only the beautiful is created, but how purposiveness as a regulative ideal links the speculative and noumenal, and also makes possible the existential self-making of the human being. The realization of *Anthropologie* as a science of man depends on the ability of reflective judgment to create self imposed laws. Kant thinks that it is through prudence and education that these laws, not only unify the human being, but also help her develop towards her proper end, i.e., a kingdom of ends.

Though Kant uses the purposiveness in nature as his Archimedean point to anchor his teleological explanation of judgment, he is not interested in proving it, nor can his limited conception of pure reason attempt such a proof. Kant's

arguments for design indicate that he already sees order in the world; the determination is whether it is intelligent (providence) or fate (a chaotic determinism). Kant aims at discovering the science of the human being, which sees the human being as the fusion of pure reason, practical reason, and pragmatic training. In the third *Critique* Kant indicates that art is,

Distinguished from science, (to be *able* from to *know*), as a practical faculty is distinguished from a theoretical one, as technique is distinguished from theory (as the art of surveying is distinguished from geometry). And thus that which one can do as soon as one knows what should be done is not exactly called art. Only that which one does not immediately have the skill to do even if one knows it completely belongs to that extent to art.¹¹⁴

Knowing, in the above citation, is theoretical in this sense, while doing is practical in a pragmatic sense. The science of the human being is more than a knowledge of what the human being ought to become, but is interested in what the human being is *able* to become. The *Anthropologie* as a science of the human being is concerned with what the human being *ought* to make of herself, while the investigation into what the human being is able to make of herself, according to Kant's distinction between art and science, is not properly a science of the human being but an art.

Kant employs the notion of genius in order to distinguish how it is possible for the artists to both, follow the theory or rules of art, and at the same time, when creating beautiful art, to break the rules. The focus on art is the free play in creation that is void of the mechanistic compulsion, which "evaporates" the "spirit" of the work (*Kunst*) in the working.¹¹⁵ Kant's definition of art requires it to be done freely, for the sake of itself without mechanistic compulsion while following at least some

¹¹⁴ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:303-04.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

basic rules. The rules that the artist must follow, seem to work in a similar fashion of the rules of the “*sensus communis*,” that is as the basic rules to get by or to get something down whereby everybody within the community could judge the success or failure of the work.¹¹⁶ The average artist and genius artist both abide by a set of rules that govern the possibility of a harmonious unity between the understanding and the imagination, but the genius is able to alter the rules as they apply in experience because they have insight into nature, one possible only because nature predisposed the genius.

While the rulebook of the artist functions to set out the necessary conditions for a work of art to be art, it cannot and must not be able to provide the sufficient conditions. It cannot provide the sufficient conditions because then beautiful art could be reduced to taste and formula, just as a formula for the human being would reduce her to only formula and thus would only allow her to know the world, and be known by the world. In order to have the world, *Anthropologie* like beautiful art must at once follow the path that nature has laid out, while at the same time human beings must create and give laws to themselves. Freeing one’s self from self incurred immaturity means understanding that nature does make part of the human being, but as a free-acting agent the human being also makes herself. What the free-acting agent makes of herself cannot be reduced to a formula, because then like beautiful art, it could not function as a bridge between what practical reason prescribes and what through pragmatic engagement man can become. The gulf is bridged for Kant by a “reflective judgment,” that is a “judgment that seeks to

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 5:293-4.

discover a concept for a particular object that is given to it rather than to find a particular object to which to apply a concept that it already has," the latter is a "determining judgment."¹¹⁷ Kant argues that both the "aesthetic and teleological judgments are strictly speaking non-cognitive: they may discover concepts or something like concepts and use them for various purposes, but they do not themselves yield knowledge."¹¹⁸

The ability of the artists to know the rules, as a practice of theory, and yet to break them due to insights endowed to them by nature is characteristic of both the genius and the anthropologist from a pragmatic stance. The Kantian anthropologist does not break the moral laws; she breaks the rules of tradition via a revolution of concepts. This happens when the human being, while unable to use a determining judgment in which to subsume a concept of a law, or because the anthropologist/artist is given insight into nature, through some context of discovery that can only be explained as an abductive leap, creates a new law by which to direct her action, and in so doing creates who it is she can become, and on a global scale sheds light on what the human being can become.

A simple breaking of the rules would not produce beautiful art, nor insight into the human being. Theoretical knowledge in the strict sense is knowledge that gives insights into the necessary conditions of a plan. Teleological judgment presupposes an order in nature by which to judge nature, to judge as if it had a purpose, and reflexive judgment whether teleological or aesthetics allow the artist or human being to create laws, and thus create art, herself, and the human being in

¹¹⁷ Paul Guyer, *Kant* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 308.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

general. The *CPR* gives knowledge of a positive kind, by setting limits to reason and knowledge, and thus that synthetic *a priori* judgments can build knowledge through *a priori* concepts. It also sets out the framework in which human beings are able to justify or guarantee claims of the critical path. The second stage, according to Kant's pedagogical work is the development of pragmatic engagement with the world. The third stage again, is the moral education of human being, but this involves a bridge between the theoretical of the first and second *Critique* with the pragmatic education of prudence foreshadowed in the *Pedagogy*, but taught throughout the *Anthropologie*.

The pragmatic aspect is supposed to help the student as participants in the world realize different modes of the world. The modes students are supposed to realize through pragmatic education are modes of *having* the world, as opposed to *knowing* the world, which both the animals and the *animal rationabile* can do.¹¹⁹ However, engagement with the world only develops the science of the human being empirically, if it is not guided by a plan. Understanding and judgment are both important in getting around the world, but Kant thinks that the *Anthropologie*, if it is to be a science of the human being, needs the insights provided by ratiocination, which is a form of reflective judgment that relies on aesthetic and teleological judgments. For Kant, paying attention to the world means observing the necessary conditions and thus the theoretical framework that grounds experience. Through paying attention in this way the human being can chart the progression and methodology of the science of the human being. However, the progression of the

¹¹⁹ Die Welt haben und die Welt kennen.

human is not some kind of chart that, like science, enables induction into what she will become, because she is not a thing. What it the understanding the methodology and epistemology the world and how she interacts with it, sets the boundaries which enable a science of the human being to be created by working with concepts in light of their apodicticity. Said otherwise, the tenants of the *CPR* do not discover what the human being is, that is accomplished by the human being through reflective judgment and the use thereof, what the *CPR* does, is to offer assurance, even if only a regulative ideal, that the science of the human being is progressing along some path, and that this path that is discovered in reflective judgment is revealed by pure practical reason as the categorical imperative. The *Anthropologie* is meant to, on the one hand, teach the human being the prudence prerequisite to realize this plan, but also that the complete system of the Critical work and pre-critical inspiration are meant to come together and unify the goal of human history. The aim human history, according to Kant, is to realize the kingdom of ends on earth, in the species and not the individual.¹²⁰

The evolution of the species involves not only *knowing* the world but also having the world. The physical geography was meant as an introduction to the former, while the *Anthropologie* teaches the *Klugheit* necessary to *have* the world. The distinction between being acquainted with the world and having the world [*die Welt kennen and Welt haben*] is crucial in answering the fourth question.¹²¹ The

¹²⁰ Darwin too thought that nature, through deterministic mechanisms and pressures, sought to realize an end in the speices. The end in the crudest biological sense would be survival and propagation of genes, however, some pretty nasty consequences can follow if one, as an singular entity or plural society, attempt to augment the practical ecomnoy of nature via human mechanims .

¹²¹ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 7:120.

former represents a certain theoretical knowledge of the world, which for instance enables a spectator to understand a game [*Spiel*], but *die Welt haben*, is to be acquainted with the world as a participant.¹²² The development of prudence [*Klugheit*] that Kant wrote to Marcus Herz about was the prudence of having the world.

I am trying to prepare a preliminary study for the students out of this very pleasant empirical study, an analysis of the nature of skill (prudence) [*Klugheit*] and even wisdom that, along with physical geography and distinct from all other learning, can be called knowledge of the world.¹²³

The pragmatic experience was meant to give insight into and expand the student's theoretical knowledge by engagement in the world. The insight is partly into the positive theoretical knowledge provided by the *CPR* but also the results of how moral freedom works in the *CPraR*.

Understanding what the human being is is the unification of the *a priori* practical and pragmatic anthropology, where here again pragmatic here means more than just *a posteriori*. Here pragmatic means the free play of applying the *a priori* to the *a posteriori*, however, the pragmatic through reflective judgment and ratiocination is also able to create new laws, which in turn creates the possibility of an evolutionary creation, i.e., the evolution of the human being in particular and through iteration the evolution of the species. It involves insight into nature's plan, but also developing the ratiocinating ability to make and provide laws from themselves, and thus establish the science of the human being that Kant seeks. Yet,

¹²² Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:120; *Lectures on Anthropology*, 25:1209-10.

¹²³ Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99*, 10:146.

there seems no more ability to produce the science of the human being than to produce a science of the beautiful. Certain people might have great insight into the nature of the human being, by means of an advanced physical anthropology, but articulating that science does not change the issue setup in the third antinomy, i.e., that deterministic science can never disprove freedom. In fact, the more a physical anthropology advances in its explanation of what nature makes of the human being, via the numerous forms of recent and future advancement, the more the fundamental indeterminacy of the universe is revealed. Yet the facts that science have generated regarding deterministic mechanics have led many people to believe, especially among scientists, that the human being is not free. In the sciences, specifically neuropsychology, it has been demonstrated that patterns of neural excitation can indicate certain brain states, and thus statistical modeling the sciences have exhibited an ability to predict future behavioral patterns. But what must be admitted at the outset of the sciences is the fact value distinction that blurs the results of science. Said briefly, the aim of science and what science counts as an answer is chosen by human beings. The sciences, especially after Kuhn's *Structure of* 1962, have been concerned with "fruitfulness," and thus the *modus operandi* of such sciences always fail to grasp the holistic picture, and they will always fail to grasp plurality of mechanisms that interact within a given system as complicated as the human organism in order to close the third antinomy on the side of determinism once and for all. The insolubility of the third antinomy in light of the advanced physical anthropology is a style of cat and mouse game, akin to the one Schrödinger played with his cat, where the cat is neither alive nor dead, but simultaneously alive

and dead. So too does any causal investigation of the human being reveal a dimension outside its purview and while not proving it, at least provides it room to speculate.

Even if science for Kant is seen as a systematic understanding of the human being, it presupposes a system, and thus the possibility of understanding this system as subsumed under laws. His systematic view is not supposed to be purely mechanistic, but neither is it to be a completely relativistic system of laws. Thus his *Anthropologie* seems to have the impossible task of blending two unlike modes into one. The dualism of mind and body, which Kant says he does not intend to address at the onset of the *Anthropologie*, is similar to the issues that the subject must address as the self-making human being. Human beings must make themselves as both phenomenal and noumenal agents, and thus the science of the human being has the same issues concerning reflective judgment, how it is possible that through reflective judgment the determining agent is supposed to create laws, and through principles these laws are supposed to hold for all human beings.

The conception of the progress of the human being according to providence, whereby she is able to create laws, seems more akin to a heuristic algorithm of a determined system than the free action of moral agents. Nonetheless, Kant's program for the development of pragmatic freedom depends on reflective judgment and its ability not only links the first two *Critiques*, but also goes beyond by the creation of new laws via reflective judgment.

In creating new universals through reflective judgments, knowledge is able to go beyond the initial universals which the determining judgments used to

subsume intuitions under concepts, and thus the science of the human being is the investigation into what it means for the human being to be able to make laws and give them to herself is nothing else than a metaphysics of the human being. He does say that this is what he is out to do in the *CPR*, that is, set science on a path to discerning the science of the human being. According to the insights of reflective judgment, this is nothing other than learning to know oneself, and the laws which are self legislating; an insight given to philosophy as an inscription at the temple of Delphi more than two thousand years ago.¹²⁴

In *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* Kant attempts to bridge the gap of religion and reason through a type of rational faith. The science of the human being Kant is articulating is far broader than the modern conception of science, it is Aristotelian in the sense that it is a collection of related and organized concepts, and it is especially important for Kant to demonstrate the order, or architectonics, of the science in question. Reflective judgment enables the science of the human being to evolve beyond the current universal and generate new, more fitting approximates via ratiocination. Kant says he is trying to set science on a secure path, yet this path can only be after truth if purposiveness directs judgment, and thus science for Kant is more than a set of practices, it is a kind of art. Kant is strongly opposed to equating science and art, because art relies on ability [Geschicklichkeit] and knowledge practices, whereas science to Kant is closer to mathematical theory. Once one understands math, one can do it, whereas a skill requires engagement, just as in *Anthropologie*, prudence requires engagement with the world in order that the

¹²⁴ Gnōthi seauton

agent does not merely know the world, but more importantly that the agent has the world. If the science of the human being is an art then the science of the human being can never be achieved, and thus it can never have a formula. It makes sense that with such a formula, the human being, as a subject cannot exist, because it would provide the best proof for the antithesis of the third antinomy, i.e., that the human being is determined. Kant's aim for *Anthropologie* is to promote and accelerate "the growth of science for the common good."¹²⁵

The common good, is a good for all humankind, and because the human being is "a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all the changes that happen to him, one and the same person, – i.e., through rank and dignity a different being from things," the good is directed at subjects. It is with this in mind that Kant is interested in teaching prudence [*Klugheit*]. It is fortuitous that while attempting to teach and address so many diverse issues in the *Anthropologie*, he does not want the *Anthropologie* to address the mind-body problem, but he does want to illustrate throughout, that because the "human being" has an "I," that is the human being has an ego, it enables the human being a different horizon of activity from things and animals.

The role of Kant's *CPJ* within his overall *Anthropologie* is meant to explain how it is possible, once freedom is established, that the human being as a free agent makes herself, and is thus essential in delimiting what she can become. Whereas, through determining judgment she knows the world as subsumed under universals, it is through reflective judgment that she has the world as a plan after her own

¹²⁵ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 7:120.

making. Because she can have the world, she can make it both hers and the one she inhabits with other subjects. The attainment of prudence for the human being is crucial according to Kant, because it is the skill [*Gesicklichkeit*] necessary for human beings to become enlightened and develop both in-themselves and in-the-world a moral union of the species.

Conclusion

The content and character of Kant's *Anthropologie* varies widely and depends, at least in part, on the audience by which it is received. Received by inexperienced students, it is meant as an introduction to the study of the human being engaged in the world and was meant primarily to teach young students prudence about the world. Kant thinks that the course would also be useful as an introduction to his critical philosophy. However, the *Anthropologie* might also be read as the driving force for which the critical work was taken up. Thus the *Anthropologie* serves as both introduction and a coming full circle of Kant's critical work.

The purpose of this thesis has been to show that pragmatic anthropology is a crucial part of Kant's overall system, and is the sake for which the critical project was undertaken. Through prudential education Kant attempted to show his students, in conjunction with practical reason that informs the human being what she ought to become, prudential training engages the subject with the world and makes apparent what she can become, given what kind of thing she is. The difficulty in framing what kind of thing the human being is, comes from the realization that she is not only a thing, in fact, Kant would likely say that she is not primarily a thing. The human being is an ego, a subject, and it is in this dimension that the human being is above all other things. However, Kant is not ignorant to the role that the

matter of the human being, that is to say the body, has limitations. In order to know what she is, one must also so know that the embodied subject can become. It is pragmatic education that delimits, at least within the historical context, what the human being can, as a free acting agent, make of herself. Because the human being is a historical being, her conception of what she is can evolve, and that is why prudential education is crucial. The tension of the main issue could be stated as follows, "Doubtless the path of the pragmatic is crucial, but is it the 'end' of the critical project?" I would argue that they both paths are the ends. They are both guides and co-implicate in one another along the path towards the Kingdom of Ends. Separating the two and privileging one over the other is misleading, because it presupposes that one is more important than the other. Kant wanted to teach his students prudence, because it is the skill that enables human beings to choose carefully between different ends. The hope being that with this careful consideration, the agent chooses the law better suited to realize the moral world. This goes hand in hand with what she ought [*Söllen*] to make of herself, which was the focus of the second *Critique*.

Thus, the goal of the *Anthropologie* was twofold; on the one hand Kant wanted to offer a course where he could teach material that would aid inexperienced students to gain the skills [*Geschicklichkeit*] of prudence [*Klugheit*] and wisdom [*Weisheit*].¹²⁶ Wisdom for Kant is

The idea of a practical use of reason that conforms perfectly with the law is no doubt too much to demand of human beings. But also, not even the slightest degree of wisdom can be poured into a man by others; rather he must bring it forth from himself.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 10:143-47.

The attainment of wisdom for Kant is done by following three maxims “1) Think for yourself, 2) Think into the place of others (in communication with other human beings), 3) Always think consistently with oneself.”¹²⁷ Kant’s ideas of wisdom inform us how it is that the human being becomes wise through self-making. The main goal of the *Anthropologie* is to teach students prudence by engagement, but the hope is that the students become wise. In learning to think for themselves students take the first step, and by investigating other human beings they learn to “think into the place of others.” In a letter addressed to Marcus Herz (1773), Kant says he was working on a “doctrine of observation” meant to teach his students just these very skills.¹²⁸ The skill of prudence for Kant means more than just cleverness aimed at using people, for Kant it also means, “being useful [*Pragmatische*] as a citizen of the world.”¹²⁹ Kant is interested in developing these abilities in his students because he sees the world in a cosmopolitan sense, which understood teleologically means that the human being is progressing towards something better, a moral world.

In the first and second thesis of his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* Kant states, “All natural capacities of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively,” and that “In the human being (as the only rational creature on earth) those predispositions whose goal is the use of his reason were to develop completely only in the species,

¹²⁷ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:200.

¹²⁸ Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99*, 10:143-7.

¹²⁹ Wilson, *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance*, 27.

but not in the individual.”¹³⁰ For Kant, teaching prudence [*Klugheit*] to his students was about enabling them as individuals to help the evolution of the race, and in doing this it enabled these students to take their place as citizens of the world. In order to attain the “moral world,” human beings need to know, not only what they ought to become¹³¹ but also what they *can* become. The *Anthropologie* might be seen as a propaedeutic for students in the development of the moral world, and the epistemological works of the first *Critique*, along with the revelation of freedom through practical reason in the second *Critique*, might also be seen as propaedeutic to the *Anthropologie*. The *Education Lectures* lay out the plan that Kant thinks humans traverse in their development, and though he thinks the *Anthropologie* might serve as a good introduction to students, he begins his course by introducing the theoretical as a backdrop in which the pragmatic and practical cohere through *APPV*, and in the latter parts of the lecture series. The reason to teach this cleverness or prudence of the world was also aimed at addressing the problem of establishing a perfect civic union that Kant sees as the realization of “nature’s secret plan” for mankind.¹³²

The realization of nature’s plan is the final stage of education, i.e., the development of the moral world through moral character. The development of moral character is dependent on the development of prudence; since it is by developing prudence that all other skills that the human possesses, or have the potential to possess, depend. They rely on prudence because it is through this skill

¹³⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8:18-9.

¹³¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, B836-47.

¹³² *Anthropology, History, and Education*, 8:15-31.

that the human being is able to use their other skills to contribute to the development of the world, keeping in mind how the consequence of actions impact others. It is this development of the respect for others that makes prudence vital.

Educating is an art; just as pragmatic anthropology or self-making is a kind of playing [*Spielen*].¹³³ The practice and training is perfected over the course of many repetitions or generations.¹³⁴ Each new generation is able to consider and hopefully improve upon the previous generation's knowledge. This development leads to the "natural predispositions proportionally and purposively, thus leading the whole human species towards its vocation."¹³⁵ "Providence has willed that the human being shall bring forth by himself that which is good, and she speaks, as it were, to her: "Go forth into the world," so might the creator address humanity, "I have equipped you with all predispositions toward the good. It is up to you to develop them, and thus your own happiness and unhappiness depends on you yourself."¹³⁶

Near the end of the first *Critique* in "the Canon of Pure Reason," Kant discusses the endeavour of philosophy in general and the ends to which human reason can be put in order to deal with its peculiar fate. Kant finds it humiliating that human reason "accomplishes nothing in its pure use."¹³⁷ Nevertheless, while pure reason does not, and cannot, provide positive knowledge of the world; it provides the boundaries of reason in a negative manner and thus limits sophistical claims.¹³⁸ The hope remains that the pragmatic path might prove more fruitful in establishing

¹³³ Ibid., 9:445-46.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ *Critique of Pure Reason*, B823.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

the secure path by which man *can* realize the highest ends of humanity.¹³⁹ It was in the *CPR* that he depicted the goal of philosophy as ultimately directed at the pragmatic, where morality is co-implicated in the pragmatic. The path of morality is the one that the human being must follow in order to be worthy of happiness, and the pragmatic path is education, which shows how to attain this happiness, even though happiness is not a moral drive, but a natural desire. Though *a priori* freedom is not proven through pure reason, in practical reason it establishes the categorical imperative, while practical reason is concerned with what human beings ought to make (theoretically), it is the pragmatic that investigates what human beings can make of themselves. It is only via the combination of both that the theoretical and pragmatic that the human being has a plan by which to make herself, and through prudence she knows how to actualize the potency endowed to her as a moral agent.

Through practical reason the human being considers what he ought to make of herself regardless of the conditions of her birth. It is the physiological that is concerned with the conditions provided from birth and one's environment, that is to say the human being is provided with a potential from nature. Still, the pragmatic deals with what the human being as free agent makes of herself, or can make of herself. The *can* of Kant's *Anthropologie* must be seen in light of what she should make of herself, which is prescribed by the categorical imperative of practical reason.

¹³⁹ Ibid., B824.

Kant understood that “reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design,”¹⁴⁰ and the design that he understands the human being as giving to herself is a cosmological one, i.e., one which unfolds through multiple generations in the species and not the individual. It requires education of the human being if the design is to reach its proper end. In the pedagogical work he claims that only through education are the highest ends of mankind achieved,¹⁴¹ and thus it is through education that the human being develops from the “*animal rationabile*” into the “*animal rationale*.”¹⁴² Where once the human being has the potential to realize his humanity, through education and the pragmatic vocation she comes to realize what she can make of herself. This progression occurs according to Kant when the human begins first begins to know the world architectonically.¹⁴³ The second stage again, is the pragmatic development of the human being, when the human being learns what she *can* become. The final stage of education is the moral dimension. The highest end the human being can attain according to Kant is the move to realizing the intelligible moral world in the sensible here and now, this is the kingdom of ends, and the realization of the moral world.¹⁴⁴

The project to realize the moral world does not take place in one generation, but through the iterated project of the whole of humanity. Kant understood that the “peculiar fate of human reason” disallowed the transcendental proof of God, freedom, and immortality, but it did not bar practical reason from developing a

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Bxii-xiii.

¹⁴¹ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:442-5.

¹⁴² Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7:321-2.

¹⁴³ Kant, *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, 9:442-5.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 8:29.

priori concepts.¹⁴⁵ The potential for the plan to be realized through practical reason enabled an understanding of what the human being ought to become.

For Kant, “everything is practical that is possible through freedom.”¹⁴⁶ The pragmatic depends on practical reason because, while *a priori* concepts of practical reason are independent of the pragmatic, it is together that they operate and coordinate in the world. Practical reason gives insight into what the human being *ought* to become, while the pragmatic into what the human being *can* become. It is critical to understand the problems of freedom in the third antinomy in order to distinguish between two kinds of freedom, 1) transcendental freedom, which is a postulate of pure reason and limited by Kant in the B preface;¹⁴⁷ 2) practical freedom, which is demonstrated when human reason realizes the only possibility of the moral law, as the condition of the possibility of an agency that would carry out the moral law and thus be autonomous results in the conclusion that human beings are free. According to Allison, Kant unsuccessfully attempts to prove freedom transcendently in section III of the *Groundwork*.¹⁴⁸ However, freedom’s inference from practical reason provides Kant’s strongest leg to stand on in order to demonstrate the force of the categorical imperatives, and thus what the human being ought to make of herself.

The attainment of the moral world can only be realized if human beings are free. Kant’s solution to the third antinomy was to show that it is possible to hold both that human beings are free and determined, but in different respects. The

¹⁴⁵ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Avii.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, B828.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Bxxx.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, B xxx.

world of nature is phenomenal, and in this world the causal nexus of events physically determines the human being. The study of the human being in this respect would be the physiological anthropology that Kant wants to distance his pragmatic anthropology from. Physiological anthropology is only concerned with what nature makes of the human being and not what she makes of herself as a free agent. The study of what the human being makes or can make of herself is pragmatic, and requires, at least initially, an empirical investigation of the world and the human being. It is from this empirical investigation that practical reason can begin to uncover, if the human being is educated theoretically, what she is, ought to be, and can become.

The investigation into what she makes of herself, or can, or should make requires knowledge of the world and knowledge of the human being. Reason needs to know what it is capable of in order for it to formulate a plan of what it *can* [Können] do. Thus, in order for her to be self-making she must have not only a theoretical knowledge of the world, i.e., *a priori* concepts, but also the pragmatic knowledge to carry out the plan. Again, the prudence taught in the *Anthropologie* course was meant to be instrumental in teaching students how to attain the ends that practical reason establishes through the categorical imperative. The interaction of the theoretical, that pertains to the unity of consciousness of the *CPR*, and the categorical imperative of practical reason, has greater value for answering the questions “what does it mean to be a human being?” In order to understand the human being, it is essential to understand him as stretched across time and space. The human being is not something at any given moment; she is always becoming

something. While the human body might be considered a something, she is properly “No-Thing” as Sartre suggests. The human being as both phenomenal object and noumenal subject is always changing and thus becoming something and someone new. What she becomes as an object is the study of physical anthropology, but what she makes herself as a subject is the study of pragmatic anthropology. For Kant the plan for the constitution of the moral world is worked out in the education [*Bildung*] of the human being, who by means of a pragmatic anthropology develops prudence, but in the end is meant to lead the human being towards the moral world by making her make herself wise. There is a view, and not an unreasonable one given the *Groundwork* and his *Lectures on Ethics*, that Kant thought that the good will was good unto itself. Kant says so in the opening section of the *Groundwork* “it is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a *good will*.”¹⁴⁹ Thus it seems that Kant could not give a damn, morally speaking, about actual actions in the world. This is the utilitarian and virtue ethics critique of him. However, in the *Anthropologie* he develops a notion of prudence, one might argue, that is not just self-interested, as it is in the *Groundwork*, but informs a “character” who is driven to bring morality into the world and to figure out the best way to do so. The development of this character relies on the development of reflective judgment and prudence, with the former, the human being is able to give laws and with the latter the human being through *praxis* knows the best way to direct this power of judgment.

¹⁴⁹ *Practical Philosophy*, 4:393.

The science of the human being is reached in the *Anthropologie* because it is only in, and through the pragmatic anthropology, that she engages in the translational project of the anthropography to anthropology. Here she discovers the architectonic of what it means to be a human being, and how it is that she can have the world. Having the world as the *praxis* of the anthropology teaches still relies on theories, but it knows know not only what, but how to achieve an end. While the design requires theoretical and practical knowledge, these two are joined as agents engaged in the pragmatic self-making activity of being in the world.

It is from the theoretical that she discovers the limits of what she is, and it is through practical reason he discovers what she should make of herself. The prescription of the moral law is provided by freedom, as understood noumenally, and it needs to be unified with the practical through reflective judgment. It is then that knowledge of the world and man is united with knowledge of the intelligible aspect of what the human being *ought*, and *can* be. Once this is attained she no longer *knows* the world, she *has* the world.

Having the world is only possible for a free agent, and through practical reason Kant has shown that the human being is free. Because freedom was neither affirmed nor denied through pure reason in the *CPR*, it left the possibility for an intelligible moral world. What Kant needed was a way to prove freedom in order to ground moral philosophy. Practical freedom is not limited by speculative considerations the same way that transcendental freedom is. The practical dimension of freedom is established through a forensic investigation of reason and

the very possibility of the moral law applying to autonomous agents.¹⁵⁰ Kant claims that the moral law is the *ratio cognoscenti* and freedom is the *ratio essendi*. While this kind of proof is not from pure reason, it needs to provide the same level of certainty that a transcendental proof would offer in order to operate as a guarantor of what the human being ought to make of herself.

The *CPR* set negative boundaries of speculative reason and thus set the science of man on a more secure path. The first part of education is reached when man understands the theoretical/scholastic limitations on knowledge. In a limited respect the pragmatic anthropology is concerned with what nature makes of the human being. It is as a perceiving subject that the human being engages in the world and through this experience comes to know the moral law. It is from this knowledge of the moral law that human beings establish the certainty of the freedom and thus asserts that there must also be transcendental freedom, which gives men laws that establish what the human being ought to do in order to realize a moral world.

In 1773 Kant told Marcus Herz that his new course on pragmatic anthropology was concerned with teaching prudence [*Klugheit*]. This “Klugheit” is the key to deciphering Kant’s overall project of *Anthropologie*, because it is through engagement with the world that one learns prudence. Kant lectured for a quarter of a century on pragmatic anthropology. He concerned himself with teaching students how to go about making them-selves in the world, and making the world. The goal of happiness is not a normative ideal, but practical/natural end. This engagement was to be meaningful because Kant attempted to teach the students how human beings

150 Ibid., fn 5:5; *ibid.*, 4:393.

understand how the world is built by the coextensive operation of the faculties of the understanding and judgment. In the introduction to the *CPR* Kant says that all concepts start in experience and while the principles by which we are able to come the world are *a priori*. The categories of the understanding make possible the conception of experience, and thus the structures of the mind make possible experience as something that can be ordered in consciousness. Engagement with the world is able to give insight into what she can make, a knowledge that can only be discovered through experience with acting in the world (regardless of whether the world is material in and an objective, or subjective sense). The way that the human being is able to make sense of the world, especially when the world provides the human being with a novel experience or concept, is the application of reflective judgment, and thus reason. The categories of the understanding unify human perceptions and judgment, which not only determine but also make possible the building of concepts via power of judgements. The creation of concepts, which are not empty, and intuitions that are not blind is the goal of the science of the human being. As a result of education the human being can engage in the world meaningfully because she can see a plan in the world. The underlying structure of how the human being understands and judges the world allows for *Anthropologie*, and through this a science is reached where she knows from practical reason what she *ought* to make, and from the pragmatic what she *can*. The pragmatic anthropologist is able to decipher between what the world makes of the human being (physiological anthropology) and what she makes of herself as a subject, as something (someone) completely different than a thing in world.

Knowledge of the world is not unimportant for Kant. As has been discussed, knowledge of the world is knowledge of the human being, and vice versa. They both help uncover what the human being is and can become. *Anthropologie* is the second stage in the progression of the education of the human being, and for a science to be reached practical reason has to educate man as to what he ought to become. Kant knew at the onset that *Anthropologie* as science could not provide the apodictic ground of assurance that the *CPR* and *CPraR* did. In order to evaluate the question "What is the human being?" Kant first had to work out a system in which to discuss the answer, and this I argue forms the basis of his Critical work.

The context of epistemology required that Kant first set science on a sure path in order that he could build the science of the human being that many, including Hume and Locke said could not be build. Yet, at least Hume contends that such a science, though not possible, is the only science on which the human being will have a leg to stand. Once Hume awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber he was not hasty to propose a system that might answer the questions that interested him. It was during his "quiet decade" (1772-1781) that he worked out his epistemological system, the *CPR*, that attempts to make sense of the unity of human apperception

As an agent of the world, the pragmatic is concerned with what the human being can make of herself. In the "The Canon of Reason" Kant says that three questions that summarize his interest in the critical all condense to question of the pragmatic and happiness. The concern that scholars have regarding the *Anthropologie* have been centred on showing that the work is extrinsic to the

critical, or as has been noted, that the critical path is sufficient. Patrick Frierson sets up the problem as follows,

The transcendental anthropology in Kant's critical works not only sets up the general framework of phenomenal-noumenal humanity but also specifically addresses the non-causal laws that govern human beings, providing a normative account of the human being from-within: an epistemology, an ethics, and an aesthetics. However, "transcendental anthropology" is incomplete as an overall answer to the question "What is the human being?" Because human beings appear in the empirical world, transcendental anthropology must be supplemented with an empirical anthropology that describes what humans look like "from-without." And Kant's a priori moral philosophy requires supplementation by an "empirical part" that will involve "judgment sharpened by experience" to know how the moral law should be applied and how "to provide [it] with access to the human will" (4: 388–89).

Frierson points out that though the context in which the critical path arose, and the sake for which Kant's overall system developed, depends on understanding the critical path as a part of a system which culminates in the highest ends of the human being, as a subject who at once must theorize herself, but most also makes herself in the empirical world. This project is taken up in a cosmopolitan sense for Kant. *Anthropologie* has application by teaching students to go beyond speculative knowledge of the world, to pragmatic knowledge that enables the subject to have the world.

What she can make of herself can only be known *a posteriori*, while for Kant what she ought to be is *a priori*. Before experience of what human beings are capable of becoming, human beings can only theorize as to what they are, can do, and become. But again, while this aspect is also important, as physiological anthropology is important, it can only provide an answer to what the human being

is as a thing of nature. Practical reason establishes what she should do, and this seems to imply what human beings should be able to accomplish, even if it has not been accomplished yet. As mentioned, Kant understands the progression of the human being as occurring in infinite time and a cosmopolitan sense, thus the development of the science of the world would be the completion of science and the human being.

Thus the critical works are articulating a system that makes sense of the worth of the person, as the only known being which gives laws to itself, and thus through free play creates themselves. The *Anthropologie* and the *Geography* provide pragmatic knowledge of the world, which is knowledge of the human being and knowledge of nature.¹⁵¹ Kant understood that physical geography and pragmatic anthropology individually do not provide experience in the strictest sense, i.e., even though for everything started in experience for Kant, it does not all lead to the realization of *a priori* concepts. In the strictest sense, experience of the world is possible when the knowledge of the world is united with the experience of the human being through reason, i.e., when reflective judgment creates/realizes new universal laws. The reason that Foucault thinks that the *Anthropologie* is so important is because it is the moment in history when the human being becomes both the subject and the object of inquiry. It is the Critical period that deals with what is transcendental, whereas the *Anthropologie* is concerned with how the transcendental and the empirical come together in order to understand the place of the human being, in terms of empirical capacities and theoretical limits. It is only

151 *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften.*, 9:157; *Practical Philosophy*, fn 5:5.

when the transcendental and empirical are united that the subject is revealed, because the subject must coexist within the phenomenal world of experience and the noumenal world of the transcendental.

The Enlightenment for Kant is about learning to think for oneself, and Kant's whole enterprise for philosophy, after reading Rousseau, might be summarized as an attempt to realize the moral world. Kant understood, that while the moral world could be derived from reason, it must be realized in the phenomenal world and that is why teaching prudence was so important. Prudence was taught in the hope that the students could over time develop wisdom, and thus help the path of realizing the kingdom of ends. The realization of the moral world is only possible as the subject object doublet. "Was ist der Mensch?" as Kant alludes to in the *Logic*, can be seen as coming out of the other three questions because they, on the one hand are inspired by the pragmatic anthropology, and on the other also define [*Bestimmen*] what the human being can become.

A critic might point out then, that any study that centers on the *Anthropologie* without an in depth consideration of the *Geography* is incomplete, and this is a valid contention, but it must be pointed out that much of the pre-critical period was devoted to knowledge of the human being, and here it was through pragmatic consideration that it was excluded. Kant says in the *CPR* that the three questions that guide philosophical investigation in the *Critical* period are directed at deserving happiness and thus the pragmatic aspect of human experience. Kant's lecture on the *Geography* and *Anthropologie* are a part of that system, but even when they are considered together they do not make up the whole. The whole of the system of the

science of the human being must be seen in cosmopolitan sense and not in a merely physiological sense.¹⁵² The fulfillment of the science of the human being is unrealizable, because she is always changing, creating, and breaking the rules of nature. Human nature, or the science of the human being as I have been referring to it, is always in a state flux due to the free play of the imagination while determining judgment is unable to direct understanding absolutely. The play [*Spiel*] of creation, of reflective judgment, is not properly a science, but art. Thus what Kant provokes in the pre-critical works, and what he attempts to work out in the *Critical* period, is not a science of the human being, but the art of “what it means to be a human being,” the art of what it means to make one’s self. “Was ist der Mensch” cannot be formulaic because art is not; the person is a living self-making creation, which for Kant is always progressing towards the providential realization of the kingdom of ends.

152 *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften.*, 9:157; *ibid.*, 9:157.

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