MIRROR, MIRROR AND THE WALL: SEEING THE PROBLEMATICS OF DOING REFLECTION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ARTS CLASSROOM AS A GESTURE TOWARDS A MINOR LITERATURE OF EDUCATION

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Abstract

In this thesis I propose that, as part of subjectifying processes operating within schools, reflection in English Language Arts can be understood as both liberatory and/or enslaving depending on the degree to which it orients students' experiences toward difference and their own plural becomings or binds them within the confines of more limited ways of knowing. Illuminating this distinction, I propose that we must begin our investigation into reflection by examining the context within which it takes place. This context is not neutral but rather actively participates in constructing the im/possibilities of student reflection itself. I propose a distinction between school learning spaces and human learning environments as a way to explore how discourse and our wider culture influence reflection in theory and in my own experiences as a teacher. Attempting to move beyond traditional limits, this thesis theorizes an/other understanding of reflection that situates liberatory reflective practices in relation to ethics and social justice education.
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Chapter 1 – Situating The Problem

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is largely intended to provide a theoretical foundation for future empirical research into student reflection within school contexts. My theoretical entry point is to begin beneath “the school,” with the concept of environment. Using the work of Jakob Von Uexküll, I explore how our discussion of schools (even in constructivist discourse) often presupposes the school as an environment as opposed to a social institution imbued with power relations normalized as (but actually imposed upon) a human environment (understood as a physical and socio-cultural space). I will attempt to explore how the umwelt, or life world, of subjective experience opens up to relationality when we reconsider our sense of “learning environments.” This is done to situate the potentiality of the site within which we are asked to 'do' reflection. In order to map that site in our contemporary context, I turn to how human environments are also socio-cultural and thus discursive. This move is made to set up an examination of Neoliberalism, as the dominant organizing discursive network that currently frames our normalized personal and public reality and 'values'. This provides the frame for looking at schools.

I theorize “the school” as the “reality” in which we are asked to “do reflection” and its place in constructing what education means for subjectifying processes through a few key concepts. I explore Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, common sense and possibility, Althusser's ideological state apparatus and interpellation, Perez's supplement
to Althusser's interpellation through the concept of identification, and Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality. Taken together I suggest that these can be understood as part of what may be called (adapting a concept of Deleuze and Guattari (1986)), a major literature of education. This will set up the frame for examining the dominant effects of institutional “reflection.”

In order to examine these effects, the thesis will explore the concept of reflection underpinning the term's use in English Language Arts (ELA) curricular documents. As Lynch (2000) argues, “reflexivity is not intrinsically radical. . . [in that it is] unthreatening to conventional modes of inquiry” (p. 36). In addition, there are “a confusing array of versions of reflexivity” (Lynch, 2000, p. 27). Because of these facts, I spend time focusing on and problematizing the concept of reflection proposed by Dewey who, as a seminal thinker in education, formulated a concept of reflection “as a goal-driven, orderly problem solving process instigated by a state of perplexity or mental doubt” (Rose, 2013, p. 9) that has been adopted and naturalized in the lexicon of many educators (ibid). The thesis will then review a sampling of outcomes and statements from foundation documents and curriculum overview documents prescribing that students and teachers “reflect” to seek out how this understanding of reflection ends up operating as a liberatory or enslaving force with respect to what possibilities it affords to student subjectifying processes.

Finally, I relate and apply this reading of the major literature of education and reflection to the history of St. Bonaventure's College to examine the ways in which its
illustrious 145 year history participated in the major literature of education in Newfoundland and Labrador until and after the 1998 referendum on denominational education. My hypothesis here is that in the reconstitution of the school in its reopening as an Independent Catholic School in the Ignatian Tradition, the school has opened itself to a possibility of becoming that participates in what Deleuze and Guattari might call a minor literature of education. The minor writes in a kind of “bilingual” language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986) – one that, although using the major language of education in Newfoundland and Labrador, also expresses something different, other, minor, precisely by employing a different pedagogical set of practices to exploit the voices latent within curricular uses of “reflection” through an Ignatian understanding of that concept and practice. Ignatian pedagogy and understanding of reflection are engaged in this chapter as that which, at least in theory, participates in the movement “from here to a just world.” Although the arrival is never anticipated and the “St Bon's experience” is very much caught up in a complex tension between major and minor, we return in this final part to consider a minor treatment of pedagogy and reflection as gesturing us towards social justice education through pushing the limits of subjectivities in schools.

1.2 Situating the Topic of the Thesis

Among the seven Essential Graduation Learnings from the Newfoundland and Labrador curriculum documents for English Language Arts are Citizenship,
Communication, Personal Development and Spiritual and Moral Development. The documents state that “graduates from the public schools of Atlantic Canada will be able to demonstrate knowledge, skills and attitudes” (Department of Education, 2003, p. 15) in these areas. These “essential learnings” belie the relationship between schools and liberal democracy inasmuch as the school, via its curriculum, is the site at which the knowledge, skills, values and identity of student-as-citizen is prescribed for (re)production. The student-as-citizen constructed for “essential learning” underpins what Asher Horowitz argues are the two key elements of liberal democracy – a belief in a capitalist-market society and a simultaneous belief in the striving for a society in which each person is equally free to realize their individual capacities (Horowitz, 2010, np). The “essential learnings” appear to imply that the varied individual capacities are compartmentalized into different aspects of the individual, and that the student-as-citizen is somehow separate from the personal development, or private identity, of the student as individual, and, in addition, that spiritual and moral development are themselves yet another discrete dimension of student experience and identity.

The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that curricular documents are dialogic (Bhaktin, 1981); they are constituted by multiple, often competing voices and ideologies that are not readily reducible to a single 'reading' or meaning. As such, there could be multiple, competing ways to understand what a 'citizen,' what 'communication,'

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1The others are: aesthetic expression, problem solving and technological competence. It is interesting and problematic that nowhere in the documents are these “essential learnings” related to each other in some type of relationship, but rather they are listed independently, as discrete aspects that, it appears, are separate modes each irreducible to the other, as if “personal development” would exclude “spiritual and moral development,” etc.
what 'personal development' and what 'spiritual and moral development' might mean in
the context of this curriculum's application in the classroom, although in the documents
they are squarely framed by “increased emphasis on accountability, and globalization”
(Department of Education, 2003, p.4). While the documents do not define these terms,
they describe “knowledge, skills and attitudes expected” (ibid, p.6) to be associated with
each in general ways. For example, citizenship involves being “able to assess social,
cultural and environmental interdependence in a local and global context,” (ibid, p.8)
although to what end is left unspecified. In addition, graduates will be able to “determine
the principles and actions of just, pluralistic and democratic societies” (ibid, p.9),
although nowhere is a “just society” explained, explored or located within the document.

Descriptive statements such as these leave open many possibilities for engagement
in working out the particulars of what such a citizen, and such a society, might “look
like.” And yet, despite this apparent possibility for the multiplication of meanings for
these terms, and thus for students' experiences, schools are criticized for the narrow
reproduction of student subjectivities and their limiting effect on the relationships of
students with themselves and others (Thompson, 2011; Zembylas, Fendler, 2007; Liston,
1988). One reason for this apparent tension between what a school could be versus what
a school is has to do with the fact that schools do not exist in isolation; the discourse of
education is coordinated among other discourses which together account for the actual,
material effects produced by schools.

This is what leads Giroux (1999) to argue for the importance of interrogating the
discursive codes within our culture that play a central role in producing narratives, metaphors, and images that exercise a pedagogical force over how people think of themselves and their relationship to others. Taking Giroux's argument about culture seriously would mean that we must also ask how schools in Newfoundland and Labrador, and their application of curriculum, engage that culture in meaningful ways that move students toward the essential graduation learnings, towards their relationships with themselves and others, in less narrow and limited ways. In a multi-ethnic, pluralist society like Canada, these essential learnings take on great importance for a public sphere peopled by citizens with allegiances to other nations and cultures, as illustrated by the recent Quebec Charter. In this case, for example, the very “principles and actions of a just” society were being contested through appeals to legislative limits on peoples' freedoms of expressing religious identity and claims that such limits were a denial of juridically ensured rights. For many people, the religious symbols spoken of most often, the hijab and burka, act as metonymies for repressive political and cultural regimes from “elsewhere” whose limitations on women have “no place here.” As “citizens” try to negotiate the processes by which people from varied traditions can come together in productive conversations about shared public goods, both the need for these difficult conversations and the interrogation of our ability to enter into them through the dispositions of the subjectivities we perform are highlighted. The relationship between a school's production of “citizenship” and “personal” identities thus becomes essential in the constitution of meaningful relationships and dialogue in the public sphere. The
degree to which these subjectifying processes liberate student experiences of difference and their own plural becomings or enslaves them by binding them within the confines of their own self,

thus effects the ongoing changes to the public sphere as students “become” citizens and chose how to understand and enact that concept for themselves, whether that means participation in the traditional public sphere or the creation of “counter public spheres [as] modes of resistance” (Giroux, 2012, p. 2), such as those instantiated in the Occupy Movement or in the counter global forums that paralleled the IMF/World Bank meetings in the 1990s, such as those in Seattle, Quebec City and Washington D.C, but whose momentum was lost with September 11, 2001.

In this thesis I will explore this complex and contested relationship between politics, education and subjectifying processes. While the progressive development of the 'pre-citizen student' to the student-as-citizen construct implied within the “essential curricular learnings” would suggest that students enter into the political domain once they become citizens and have the “knowledge, skills and attitudes” necessary to participate in the public sphere, Giroux (2012) argues that student life is always already political. This is because the culture which acts simultaneous, if not a priori, to the practices of schooling is itself politically charged and, as Foucault has argued, has meaning for how people are constructed and how power operates within education (Popkewitz and Brennan, 1997). Understood in this way, the subjectifying processes within schools, and the roles of teachers and students in relation to these, are political acts. The meaning of

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2 Liberatory and enslaving forces are terms used by Deleuze. They will be introduced and discussed in a later chapter.
these political acts are not pre-determined but rather inter-act with(in) systems, structures, in contingent ways. In order to theorize how these inter-actions effect meanings, Deleuze and Guattari theorize “the assemblage,” the “appearing together” of particular elements that “characterize a particular stratum. . .of heterogeneous elements” in relation to each other (Wise, 2011, p.92) that form emergent unities. For our purposes we could consider a review class in preparation for a public exam course in which the personal experiences of students are given as examples to a teacher who then writes them into functional, instrumental reflective passages that can be quantified as scores, or examples, for the rest of the class on how to turn their experiences into marks. The classroom, the board upon which examples are formed into notes or paragraphs, the desks, the bodies of the students and the teachers, and their positions and affective relations in the room would all be part of the assemblage that codes the meaning and value of the reflection given.

In this thesis I am interested in exploring how the concept of assemblages can facilitate an understanding of how the political nature of these processes and acts can be theorized. Specifically I am interested in exploring how both “liberatory forces” and “enslaving forces,” forces that open or close the meanings and thus practices of subjectivities to other possibilities, operate in assemblages that form around practices of reflection in schools.

Through my experiences as a teacher in Newfoundland in a secondary school that follows the government curriculum I have had the opportunity to witness and participate in practices that aimed to shape and produce both public and private, 'citizen and
personal', subjectivities. It has struck me that in the English Language Arts classroom, the dominant concept deployed toward subjectifying ends is reflection; reflection in the ELA classroom is seldom about a modal perspective but moreso about a subject position reaffirmed by the act of speaking (or 'reflecting') from it in a way that is recognizable to the teacher, and thus able to be quantified in an assessment. This very process serves to affirm identity (and the instrumental uses and representations of what students expect is reflective writing) rather than to disrupt it. My interest in this thesis is to theorize how this concept operates within curricular documents and the English classroom to produce student subjectification, as well as to question how they might otherwise operate.

Specifically, given that the school at which I teach is an Independent Catholic School in the Ignatian Tradition, a tradition that insists that God is present, active and available to us through reflection and discernment, that operates from a specific pedagogy that offers a different conceptualization of reflection, as a detection of presence through attention to subtle interior movement of affect related to God's spirit, evident through relationships, with others, the world and ourselves, I am interested in examining what Ignatian ways of thinking about and doing reflection might offer to subjectifying processes in an English Language Arts (ELA) classroom.

Considering this will necessarily mean examining the ways in which this concept works in relation to culture and the political ends towards which these subjectifying processes are aimed. With respect to the aims of subjectifying processes, I am interested in examining how reflection participates either in fostering a disposition towards and
relationship with otherness and difference that constitutes the foundation of social justice education (as the study of in/equity in educational spaces) as part of liberatory forces, or dispositions towards and relationship with otherness and difference that constitute a reproduction of dominant ideology and power relations as part of enslaving forces. I conceptualize the need to examine these dispositions and relationships as necessary to working towards the “respect for cultural diversity” that, “along with a commitment to the universal right of humanity” (Todd, 2009, p. 5), informs a focus on human pluralism and its “attendant conflicts...as part of a political and ethical commitment” (ibid) in social justice education.

Although it is largely beyond my specific scope in this thesis, I feel the need to say something about pluralism and social justice as I employ them in this thesis. As Sharon Todd argues (2009), pluralism is about more than “simply claiming that cultural diversity ought to be recognized” (p. 4) because while we are different, in some essential way we are all the same. Rather, “pluralism necessarily involves the idea that each of us is different in particular ways. . .[it is] specific to the relationships, communicative contexts, languages and internal dynamics through which one makes attachments to the world” (ibid). The particular “attachments” that concern me in this thesis are those that arise from relationships, with ourselves and with others, in our schools and how they are mediated through performed, politicized subjectivities that are the effects of educating

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3 “liberated” to experience the self in relation to the other; “enslaved” to experience the self trapped within the subject.
4 These terms are employed at various points throughout the thesis but moreso in relation to other points of focus.
practices and the assemblages that frame them. The risk of the curriculum providing frameworks for these subjectivities to be “taught” and assessed, such as “citizenship, personal development, communication and spiritual and moral development,” means we must be attentive to their relative openness or closedness for the lives they make possible for students.

Is it possible for reflection in an English classroom to gesture towards the profundity of the other, including to the self-as-other, that might instantiate an affective foundation for relationships that recasts the type of attachment we have with a world of others? But one, as Todd (2009) suggests, that does not idealize peace as a binding quality of those relationships with others, but rather theorizes “democracy itself...as an unstable political moment that always contains an element of conflict and dissent” (p. 10) because there always exists a profound difference at the heart of all relationships. Could this move us away from the problematics of “representational contests over meanings of the past” that bind ego and representation to the root of a social justice's macro engagement with broader material and symbolic struggles, forces, and structures of power? Could this displacement of representation with affect, and the affective relation of difference, move us towards a micro social justice that locates the first democratic moment in the relationship of self to self, and self to other? This thesis is framed by an interest in moves that resist the apoliticization of the excessive reduction of students (and teachers) to performative subjectivities in lieu of determining a prominence given to a politics of education that recasts a democratic imperative for how reflection might operate
within the curriculum of an English classroom in order to gesture towards social justice.

1.3 St. Bonaventure's College, or the “Make Up” of a School

Valerie Walkerdine and Peter Bransel (2010) argues that “positions and practices [are] inflected by the specificity of the different contexts in which they emerge” (p. 2). As such, while this thesis attempts to set out the theoretical underpinnings for future research with students regarding the relationship between in-school experiences of reflection, subjectifying practices and dispositions toward difference and social justice, it emerges from the materiality of the specific school at which I teach in St. John's, Newfoundland, a school called St. Bonaventure's College.

While I explore St. Bonaventure's in the final chapter, I will say a few words here to illustrate particular aspects that lend to making the political in education visible at this school and which frame my interest in some of the concepts explored in this thesis. In its current incarnation, St. Bonaventure's College is an Independent Catholic School in the Ignatian Tradition. Located across the street from an affluent and prestigious housing complex, and adjacent to one of the city's most economically varied and politically mobilized, ableit recently gentrifying neighbourhoods, its physical place in the city is a telling sign of the school's historical legacy and present day complex embodiment of

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Ironically built over the ashes of St. Patrick's school, the local school for boys from working class families, after it burned down.
multiple identities. Arguably its two most dominant constructions, St. Bon's is at once a fee-based school that attracts many for whom its primary quality is that it is “independent,” as in a Private school, and also a “Catholic school,” as in the only denominational school remaining in the city since the province's 1998 abolition of its denominational system. Market materialism and identification with wealth and privilege versus religious faith based identification with marginality and ecumenicalism are the two poles of the most dominant tension with the school. There are many corollary tensions that emerge from these, such as those that revolve around admissions to the school – between acceptance of 'good' students versus acceptance of any student who would want to attend St. Bon's, space (in its literal sense) permitting. Another corollary tension surrounds evaluation – between evaluating the success of the school's programs by their output performance on standardized assessments versus evaluating success of the school's programs by the more qualitative, and yet ephemeral, 'formation of the whole person of the students' is a constant struggle. Somehow, these tensions co-exist in this school whose official motto is “From here to a Just World.”

This motto emerges from the spirit of the school's final determining identifier, “in the Ignation Tradition.” As Ronald Modras (1995) says, “Ignatian spiritual humanism is not just for Jesuits, not just for Catholics, not just for believers” (p. 5). As such, although it is a Catholic school, neither students nor teachers are required to be Catholic to attend or work at St. Bon's. There is, however, a common animating spiritual expectation for

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6 A key pedagogical principle.
both students and teachers, and it has more to do with the particular spirituality of the place that comes from the Ignatian tradition. This spirituality, Modras (2010) writes, is about “spirituality as awareness of experience; about Ignatian spirituality as engagement with the world rather than flight from it” (p. 10). Thus the two complementary aspects of Ignatian spirituality that translate into its pedagogy are action and contemplation for Justice; as Modras (2010, p. 11) represents early Jesuit thinking, “insight without action was barren, and action without insight was barbaric.”

A more recent representation of the goal of Ignatian education is the “forming of men and women for others” (ICAJE, 1993, p. 6). While I will explore some particularities of Ignatian pedagogical dynamic later in Chapter Five, it is important here to point out two important features. First, context, as the point of departure into education, always involves the “need to understand the world of the student, including the ways in which family, friends, peers, youth culture and mores as well as social pressures, school life, politics, economics, religion, media, art, music and other realities impact that world and affect the student for better or worse” (ibid, p 15). And furthermore, “reflection,” which is treated more fully in Chapter Four, is a central dynamic in the move from context into education for justice. Context, thus understood, necessarily brings the political into education as a reality of the student (and teachers). Second, given the importance and meaning ascribed to “context” as a point of departure, the “formation of men and women for others” is intended as a radically different subjectifying process than those typical of hegemonic interpellation or in the reproduction of dominant performative
subjectivities\textsuperscript{7}. Interpellation, as defined by Louis Althusser, describes the process by which ideology addresses the individual and constitutes her or him as a subject who gets caught in the illusion of the autonomous, fully coherent and actualized human subject. In fact, one could argue that a deconstruction and affective relation to the latter two are integral in the very possibility of the former. The relation and contrast of these processes will be implicated and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

In summary, an effort to “arrive” at a reconceptualized understanding of the potential of reflection in the classroom, this thesis begins by problematizing our notion of “the classroom.” Beginning “in” the classroom leads us to question what “makes” the classroom. Such an investigation necessarily focuses our attention on the complex relationships of “outside” discourses and material practices that constitute the “inside.” Once this process is elucidated, the thesis engages particular theoretical frameworks for understanding the meaning of this process in order to establish the context of “doing” reflection in the classroom. The framework established, the thesis then directly investigates different notions of “reflection” in order to understand what “happens” when students do reflection in “the classroom.” Finally, the thesis situates “the classroom” and “reflection” in the particular pedagogical context of Ignatian thinking, and particularly, in the concrete “place” of my own work as a teacher – St. Bonaventure's College. This final move is made in an attempt to theorize what happens when “we” do reflection in our English Language Arts (ELA) classes, as well as what could happen.

\textsuperscript{7} The difference is parallel to the minor from the major literatures of education. This idea adapted from Deleuze and Guattari will be explored in the thesis.
I have known since I started working at St. Bon's ten years ago that I wanted to study it critically, to theorize its pedagogy in relation to my own desire for social justice education and to evaluate its pedagogical claims against its actuality. I wanted to do this as part of developing my own understanding of what it is exactly that I “do” when I “teach” in this place in a method consistent, albeit not limited to, its pedagogy. Specifically, as an English teacher who implements state-prescribed curriculum, I wanted to think critically about whether or not this type of education, and specifically “doing reflection” in this site, could even be theorized as a possibility for the kind of poetical-political action that I have committed my life to seeking out as part of becoming educated.
Chapter 2 – Literature Review:
Locating the Con/text of the Problem of Student Reflection

2.1 Introduction

This chapter locates the context of the problem of curricular reflection within school learning spaces. The term “school learning space” is used throughout the chapter to refer to the construct of the classroom as a space for learning in contrast to a human learning environment in which (and with which) students may learn. The distinction of “for” and “with” signals the situatedness of each type of construct of the classroom within different traditions of thinking about education and knowledge. In the former, what I call the “school learning space” is associated with a tradition in which schools are bound up within societal (re)production. I will develop this argument in the next chapter with reference to the work of Louis Althusser, but it is important to note, as Olsson does, that this enactment of social (re)production “requires a specific selection and a specific organization and evaluation of what knowledge children are supposed to learn and teachers are supposed to teach” which leads to “the problem of representation and transmission” (p.xvi).

It is this aspect of the tradition that relates the classroom as “school learning space” to a focus on knowledge within a representational logic. As Olsson suggests, “[t]he idea behind this logic is that. . .it is necessary to represent in the most accurate way the world – the world out there – and transmit this 'knowledge' to children” (ibid). Even
though there exists a growing problematization of this tradition, with an increasing awareness that the processes of naming and speaking do not represent 'true' reality, the logic of representation remains pervasive within both the transmitted knowledge of institutional education and the ways in which this is evaluated. “For this logic characterizes most Western thought and inquiry, assuming as it does the possibility of a more or less accurate representation of a world that exists 'in itself', prior to and independent of the knower's experience of it” (ibid, p.xvii). As Steier thus argues, the world is kept, both physically and socially, at a distance as “an independently existing universe, and which holds knowledge as reflecting, or even corresponding, to the world” (intro, np). As a result, the “larger social circumstances of racism, sexism, heterosexism and other forms of social and structural discrimination [that] live in the context of school knowledge and in the social practices of students and teachers” (Britzman, p.252) become naturalized within the classroom learning space within the representational logic of identities and expectations. Britzman argues that there is rarely “space for articulation” within “institutional structures” to address “the complex array and disarray of the feelings, desires, and commitments towards social life that students already hold because of the lives they live” (ibid). In contrast, I hope to theorize a “learning environment” within which, and with which, students and teachers can “reflect upon who they are becoming as they go about the work of education” (ibid, my italics), as opposed to who they “are,” as an identity within a stable representational logic.

This other theorization of a “learning environment” focuses primarily on the work
of Jakob von Uexküll, a theoretical biologist, but is also supported by recent work in
cognitive science that argues “that cognition is not a representation of a pre-given world
by a pre-given mind, but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind” (Varela,
Thompson and Rosch, 1993). The learning environment, I will argue, “bring[s] forth a
world” (Olsson, xviii) rather than (re)producing a pre-given one. In terms of
“knowledge”, I will argue that an appropriate theorization of the classroom does not yet
exist to match the potentiality of constructivist challenges to meaning making which open
up new kinds of social relationships not necessarily based within representational logic.
In attempting to theorize such an/other classroom as a learning environment, we will
focus on von Uexküll's thinking of the environment as a place within which encounter,
through affect, can encourage a different kind of relationship that can challenge the
essentialist and stable subject of representational logic that “limits what we are able to
do” (Olsson, p.xxi).

This is important for my thesis because it allows for a theorization of how the
classroom in which students “do” reflection is itself an enabling or limiting force in the
act of reflecting, while then arguing for how “reflecting” might participate in moving
“towards a way of speaking and acting that can open up a more vitalistic vision for the
self – for a subject as a process of becomings that are all the time part of active processes
of movement and transformation” (ibid). This enabling or limiting force is engendered by
the types of relationships the classroom (as a school learning space or as a learning
environment) facilitates with the individual and themselves, the individual and others and
the individual and the classroom itself (as space or environment). These relationships are essential in distinguishing whether reflection leads us to representations (which may elicit feelings) or to experiences and encounters with others (which may elicit affects). The distinction and importance of feelings and affects will be explored later in the thesis, but for now it is important to note that affect, though not easy “to pin down” as it “escapes intellectual accounting,” is a “moment of singularity,” “where a universe pours in” (Seigworth, 182). Affect thus opens us to the other in ways that feelings do not, in subpersonal ways as opposed to representational ways; thus, a distinction between a school learning space and a learning environment is a distinction of the possibility of kinds of reflection and ways of being and becoming.

This distinction, developed in this chapter through the work of Jakob von Uexküll, emerges from his critique of the devaluation and flattening of the concept of environment to denote a pre-existing space into which humans move but which makes no allowance for the human sense of, and relation to, this space as constitutive of its very meaning as an environment. In this sense, the “school learning space” facilitates reified relations based on the reproduction and consumption of dominant narratives and representations (of identities) that limits student subjectivities to the confines of what is possible 'in that space,' so to speak. Greg Thompson's research in Australian schools argues that the “normalizing vision” of different student identities, positionalities and subjectivities (including that of “the good student”) is interpretive (61); it uses the meanings and representations of identities of the outside world “in” the school as if the latter were
simply an extension of the former. Theorizing the primary and yet discursive dimension of meaning in human social and cultural worlds as elemental to a school learning space allows us to consider how a dominant social framework (neoliberalism and its underpinning values of competition, individualism and consumption) encodes meaning \textit{a priori} into the school learning space as part of the reproduction of the relations of production of our current hegemonic order (which reproduces and normalizes the above mentioned values). This “order” is not meant to be understood as absolute or all-encompassing; rather, it is always involved in complex dynamics of power, counter-discourses and resistances. However, as Thompson says,

although these discourses are interpreted by students in myriad ways, they are acted on diversely, and they produce a variety of responses and attitudes that are wrestled into a cohesive face despite their contradictory performance or conduct (61).

The question of reflection is thus the question of the degree to which it leads students beyond these faces. This chapter thus begins an analysis of school learning spaces in contrast to a theorization of a learning environment that allows for a greater movement “beyond the face” through affect and ultimately reflection.

This chapter moves from an analysis of school learning spaces to a brief overview of important implications from the work of Jakob von Uexküll, who, as understood by Gilles Deleuze, helped found ethology as the study of affects. As Deleuze says, “[s]uch studies as [his], which define bodies, animals or humans by the affects that they are
capable of, founded ethology” (Buchanan, 168). von Uexküll's work introduces a way of thinking about the “relational and constructed nature of the phenomenal world” (Lock and Strong, 137) that can underpin a critical examination of what we produce when we “educate.” von Uexküll's work establishes two important dimensions for my thinking about a school as an educational environment, both revolving around the idea of affects. First, in providing ontological implications for the historical extension of a particular experience of space that mutes difference by normalizing one way of being-in-space, it offers another perspective from which to examine what happens in a school environment. Second, it will allow us to relate this 'happening' to hegemonic discourses and imperatives thereby mapping different understandings of what is involved in subjectifying processes in schools and how these may be challenged by critical pedagogies and reflective practices. Critical pedagogies challenge the normativity of subjectifying processes and “products,” while reflection may create new opportunities for experiencing subjectivity otherwise. This grounding will underpin my later argument that the effect of this process on the individual student's relation to affect and perception has important implications for understanding the potentiality of reflection for social justice education.

From von Uexküll's work this chapter will then move into a limited but sustained examination of how, in our contemporary world, economic imperatives couched within hegemonic discourses shape classroom learning spaces to set out the challenges that need to be addressed and thereby converted if we are to create alternatives, and experiences of alternative ways of being, as our learning environments. Specifically, I will examine
neoliberalism as a historical context within which to consider the school and its processes of subjectification that reproduce standardized ways of relating to ourselves and to others. This standardization of both how we know what we know and the resulting possibilities of what we can become as a result emerges as a dominant feature of the classroom learning space and its production of “reality.” The chapter ends with consideration of the implications of these processes of creating different kinds of classrooms within which we “do” reflection.

2.2 School Learning Spaces or Learning Environments?

According to Zuhal Cubukcu, the concept of a learning environment is not new. Cubukcu (2012) suggests that “its roots trace back to early apprenticeship,” as with “Socratic and similar movements that sought to immerse individuals in authentic learning experiences where the meaning of knowledge and skills are realistically embedded” (52). Learning environments “can be classified according to the manner in which they manifest their underlying foundations” (ibid). Citing the work of Land and Hannafin (1997), Cubukcu describes how learning environments have psychological, technological, cultural and pragmatic principles which both reflect and determine the kind of learning environment produced for students.

Ultimately, this understanding of “environment” (which I am calling a school learning space) can be understood, according to Cubuku, as an amalgam of discreet
principles that suggest that the whole is no more than the sum of its parts; it is a constructed whole that represents the intention of those who construct it and into which students enter. It is made up of psychological principles that “are rooted in beliefs about how individuals think and learn” and take as their reflected ends determinations regarding “individual knowledge and skill acquisition, organization and application” (52). These beliefs determine the kinds of “knowledge and skills” to be “embedded” within the environment. According to Cubuku, “[t]echnological principles look at different tools that can be implemented to constrain or enhance types of learning transactions” (ibid).

The allusion to the banking model of education aside, such a conception of a classroom space emphasizes an exchange of knowledge mediated by a technology that is not itself an object of analysis in the quest for knowledge; moreover, knowledge is privileged here over encounters in experience. In this way, even if social values are deemed important and are embedded within the classroom (and are thus designed to be discovered), these social values are still framed as a knowledge first, a knowledge that can be presented or mediated by technology and not as a resonance of experience, an affect of encounter that moves us towards a disposition towards at least recognizing those values.

Finally, “[p]ragmatic principles cover economic conditions, technological facilities and the ability to reach innovations” (ibid); they are included as part of what Land and Hannafin (1997) propose as the central elements to the foundational principles integrated in learning systems designs through which we can produce classrooms. These final pragmatic principles, which would include things like budgets and access to
projectors, would also be determinations in how to conceive of the classroom space. Their place in the construct of such “environments” reveals a degraded notion of environment. As I will suggest, while the inclusion of technological tools and consideration of access to budgets for materials are important considerations for classrooms, they do not adequately consider what an environment is such that one might call these features of a “learning environment.”

Cubukcu’s use of Land and Hannafin sets a context for his own argument against such constructs of “learning environments” in favour of “student centred learning environments” that “are set up in such a way that they give students the chance to take responsibility for organizing, analyzing and synthesizing knowledge and consequently play a more active role in their own learning” (Means, 1994 cited in Cubukcu, 2012, 53) through student “cooperation” (ibid). This gives students an active role in their own learning in that they participate in constructing the “learning environment” through decisions related to “what to learn, how to learn and what kind of help is required and deciding how much is learned” (Bery, Sharp, 1999; Lea, Sttenhans, Tray & Hartly, 1987; Sharma, Millar & Seth, 1999; Acat, 2005; cited in Cubukcu, 2012). But these choices in themselves do not reveal what makes this “space” distinct as “an environment” any more than any other space outside of it. In addition, just because students are involved in making these choices within the classroom, it does not necessarily mean that they choose in some way that is distinct from the way they choose anything else within their culture and the ideologies in which they are already situated. How does this construct of an
environment enable any distinct kind of learning that is related to the nature of the environment itself rather than to technologies or decisions made within it (as simply a space within which students are)? I would suggest that such a “learning environment” as this is as problematic as the former, and that both could really be considered classroom learning spaces, as in each the environment itself remains unthought, more like an empty space than anything with its own dynamism of place.

Pedagogy, in this model, although rarely discussed by Cubukçu, appears to function as an instrument that organizes “activities, methods and the structure of the physical space” (54). In this case, pedagogy structures space; environment relates to a notion of “physical space” to be manipulated, controlled and molded into ends that do not rely on the nature of that environment, other than that it is a malleable space. Anything necessary within the environment will be added from outside; the environment is an emptiness filled and given meaning by humans, realized by them and their ends. However, as Britzman argues, when students and teachers enter a classroom space, its meaning is always already encoded by memory, culture and even networks of power embedded within the social practices of students and teachers (1992, 252). In this respect, choices made by students about what to learn keeps “knowledge” and “learning” distanced from relationships (of students with themselves, others and their world) that predetermine the meaning of that space in a number of ways. This predetermination of the meaning of space inside and outside of such learning environments reinforces representational logic as the naturalized way to experience ourselves in the world with.
others. In this construct of an environment, “constructing knowledge” is privileged over emphasis on a relationality with each other and the environment itself in which experiences of encounter might disrupt codified social practices and the stable identities who perform them.

Although this model of a “learning environment” is not exhaustive of the concept's meaning, it is representative of some common presuppositions inherent in how we commonly (mis)understand our classroom learning spaces as “environments”, even in constructivist formulations that suggest that “meaning-making is related to individuals creating their own new understandings based on what they already know and the phenomena and ideas they come into contact with” (Richardson, p.3). As Pamela Evanshen and Janet Faulk suggest, “environments are never neutral” and yet in exploring constructivist approaches to the classroom, they do not define the environment or make it itself an object of study in the experiences “within” it (p.11). Rather, the environment to which they refer is again “a design,” “a teaching tool” that focalizes knowledge (and thus reason) over sense and experience which may move us beyond what one expected to learn or expected about what was possible to learn or even “know” (ibid, p.11,12). Thus, although there is allowance made in this construct of “classroom environment” for “physical space,” this space, and the student's interaction with it, is flat and reducible to a single way of being that is consistent in and out of the classroom. And that way of being is never directly itself understood as a relational element with and within the classroom as an environment that is tied to the perception and sense of the student. Rather, the
physicality of the space appears to be no more than the site in which learning happens, as opposed to physicality itself as an active dimension of how the learning happens (not just what might be learned). As Cubukcu says, “learning takes place in the mind” (51) and the type of learning environment envisioned reflects an underappreciation for the relationship of the body, especially in the production of perceptions and affects, to the environment as part of a student's learning. The concept of a learning environment takes a student and an environment and puts them together, as an act of addition of two discrete terms or quantities. But it is not enough to have a student and an environment – one has to account for the relation itself. Failing to do so does not push constructivism far enough in exploring our experiences and understandings of how “reality” is constructed as part of the relationality of being with(and)in the environment in which we learn and which can push us beyond our “cohesive faces” by challenging naturalized representational logic through encounter.

In this respect, moving away from a focus on the knowledge and skills embedded within the classroom learning space is a move away from the presupposition of the student 'learning' the knowledge and skills of an object-ive world “found” in the flat space of an “environment” in which they circulated and “learned.” Without this challenge, the subject stays stationary, embedded within itself, no matter what classroom “environment” it moves into or through. Not pursuing the challenge to reconceptualize the learning environment serves, then, to affirm unconsciously that “being human...means we have an individualistic nature, and are an object that can be studied...[thus the assumption] with
little reflection that [we] are unique individuals, with minds located in our heads and containing [our] powers of reasoning and memory [who have] an inner, private self which can act on the world and exercise its will-power” (Lock and Strong 2010, 227). This is the problem with focusing on decisions (on what to study, learn, know) when addressing meaning-making; the decision to learn something often affirms a lesson we have been taught about ourselves that is hidden by the very act of deciding to learn.

Yet another problem with these models of “learning environments” is that they are sustained by an inside-outside dualism mediated by “knowledge.” In the constructivist model outlined, the “embedding” of knowledge and skills “inside” comes from the outside – in this way the “learning environment”, although often a physical construct, always feels virtual; having been constructed by an outside that is somehow more real, the inside leads to abstracted knowledge built upon “knowing the prior knowledge” (Richardson, 78) that “supports the environments” (ibid). This emphasis on rationality, in coming to know, and the inside-outside duality leaves the question of the relation between student-environment unexplored because the student is presumed to move into a space that constitutes the learning environment, as opposed to always being in a learning environment which is part of what constitutes the singularity of their sense perception that creates their space. We will come back to this in the next section on von Uexküll, but it is important to suggest that if each individual student relates with their environment in this way then the encounter between students with(and)in a learning environment (as opposed to a classroom learning space), brings us closer to understanding Seigworth's suggestion
that through affect “a universe pours in” (183). Such a kind of experience, I will argue later, is what we want to consider in relation to a reflection that orients us towards others (as a foundation for social justice education).

The important distinction about the inside/outside of the classroom “environments” considered is that, regardless of student agency in constructing the environment, this construct means that the world of the student is not conceived of as a relationality with environment in itself and with which the student moves into other learning environments; that is, that their world encounters other worlds. The environment as a structure is presupposed and employed in these formulations and it is one into which a subject 'moves'. But how is environment intricately tied to the movements of the student? What is the student's environment such that they can be the being that they are in the constructed “learning environment”? How is meaning established in the relationship between environments? These unresolved questions bring us now to the work of Jakob von Uexküll.

2.3 Jakob von Uexküll and an/other nature of Environment

The work of biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) has received serious

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8 I would trace the philosophical dimension to this question back to Buchanan's (2008) reading of Heiddegger in Onto-Ethologies. Although this paper does not directly engage the philosophical underpinnings of some of its considerations I do want to recognize them and suggest that they might be explored in further study to ensure the consistency of this paper's argument.

9 Although beyond the scope of this paper, these questions have important implications for our conception of the public sphere.
attention from some of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. From Heidegger to Merleau Ponty to Deleuze, thinkers have been drawn to von Uexküll's efforts to understand links between science and the humanities. Although von Uexküll's work primarily deals with animals and animal environments, his real focus is how meaning and significance are created, and in that respect his work has applications for all animals, including the human animal;\(^{10}\) thus, while the introductory discussion will focus on animals, I will then try to draw out the inferences for students and what can properly be called learning environments (as opposed to the classroom learning spaces discussed above).

Rather than framing a (learning) environment from its outside such that meaning is embedded, von Uexküll seeks to “glimpse natural environments as meaningful to animals themselves” (Buchanan, 2). Rather than conceiving the world according to the parameters of our own human understanding, which as Buchanan suggests “has been the more prevalent approach – von Uexküll asks us to rethink how we view the reality of the world as well as what it means to be an animal” (ibid). According to Buchanan, von Uexküll “situates the subject between animal and environment” (30), precisely in the relation. As we shall see, this has important implications for the nature of the subject and subjectivity, but for now we should take a few steps back in order to move forward into

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\(^{10}\) While Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger use Uexkull's work to draw distinctions between the animal and the human, Deleuze very much uses Uexkull's thinking and examples on affects and their role in meaning and significance as a criteria for how to discuss life and relationships that constitute meaning (Buchanan, 2008). It is in this latter vein that I turn to Uexküll's work although I recognize that, given the scope and size of this paper, I have not turned my attention to any ontological distinctions between types of beings and between animals and humans but am treating the idea of 'students' as subjects quite generally.
von Uexküll's work.

The dominant contemporary understanding of nature is characterized by a “universal space and time” within which all bodies are conceived to exist and within which all bodies experience their existence. There is one space and within this space all things are situated and measurable according to mathematically expressible laws. Ecologist and philosopher David Abram calls this “abstract, homogeneous space, a placeless void” (185) and suggests that it emerges in relation to alphabetic writing and the reorientation of our senses (ibid, 183, 184). This space is governed by the single universal, “linear” (ibid) time which serves to measure the bodies inhabiting the space. According to von Uexküll, this state of affairs has been related to humans as well as to animals by the history of human thought. As Shotter argues, “Descartes, among others, helped destroy [an] older notion of the cosmos. His practical philosophy had the effect of displacing people, from a position of immersion and interplay within it,...and of transporting them to a place beyond it, thus making what then became their 'external world' available to them (or at least some of them) for their appropriation and use” (33).

Before the imposition of universal space-time on to the experiences of humans and animals (through human perception, not necessarily in the experience of animals or all humans for that matter), the universe was unified in a different way. Once, the universe was unified through perception and affection, not through space and time. We can begin to imagine the medium of perception by saying it is non-extended. This means that two "neighbouring" points in non-extension cannot be joined to one another geometrically, as
they do not occupy the same extended space. In fact, it is only for the sake of demonstration that we call them "neighbouring" points, and then refer to what cannot be done.

We inevitably come into these kinds of difficulties when trying to describe non-extension precisely because we are always speaking from the point of view of extension. As von Uexküll says,

Man...tends to cut loose the space he moves in from his sensory spheres and thus to extend his paths in all directions. The vault of the sky gets higher and higher and the centre of the world under the heavenly cupola is no longer himself but his home. Man does no longer move with a space that follows him faithfully, as his senses tell him, he moves instead in a space at rest, a space that is cut loose from him and has its own centre. Space has become autonomous as have the objects within it. (109)

The implication that emerges from von Uexküll's work is that something internal to a subject comes to be governed externally. von Uexküll's particular ontological theory of the real nature of environment thus seeks to restore a subjective dimension into the underpinning of the meaning of the objective dimensions of nature that supplanted the subjective over the course of centuries of human interaction and ideas. As a result, “the centre of the ever growing universe has changed its location several times. The
geocentric universe, with earth at its centre, was followed, after bitter struggles, by the heliocentric one with the sun as its centre, that has persisted to the present day” (ibid). And while von Uexküll suggests that the work of Kant, which exposed the complacent position of the universe as being merely a human form of perception, came close to reinstalling the subjective space of the individual human being in its proper position, it failed to because of the undeniable usefulness of an idea of ordinary life which entails an objective universe that embraces all living things.

von Uexküll concludes that “the conventional universe, where all our relationships to our fellow human beings are enacted, has brought all personal [Umwelt] spaces under a common denominator, and this has become indispensable for civilized human beings” (ibid). As a result, however, “the world” becomes an equivalent for the plane of extension that comes to define “the environment,” with its space and time – it becomes the objective. As Buchanan suggests, von Uexküll “introduces the concept of the umwelt [precisely to] differentiate it from the objective world” for all animals, including humans (22).

In A Stroll Through the Environments of Animals and Humans, von Uexküll offers an attempt at “articulating the meaning of the environment beyond a strictly human perspective” which would lead to “[n]ew worlds aris[ing] before our eyes, throughout sensations, in our imaginations” (cited in: Buchanan, 2008, p. 1). In order to do this, von Uexküll “asks us to rethink how we view the reality of the world as well as what it means to be an animal” (ibid, p. 2). Specifically, he asks us to follow his speculation that
“insofar as each animal constructs its own environment out of the midst of its perceptions, actions and relationships, 'there are, then, purely subjective realities in the Umwelten [the closed unit formed by the perceptual and active world]; and even the things that exist objectively in the surroundings never appear there as such’” (cited in: ibid, p. 2). Let us take this moment to explore the meaning of the Umwelten in more detail.

According to Locke and Strong (2010), von Uexküll's “formulation of the Umwelt [is] a lynchpin in the understanding of animal, and human, activity” because it “provides a grounding for meaning as an inherent property of life-forms in their relation to their worlds” (p. 136). In the introduction to an entire issue of the periodical Semiotica dedicated to von Uexküll's work, Kull (2001) tells us that “most of von Uexküll's work was devoted to the problem of how living beings subjectively perceive their environment and how this perception determines their behaviour” (p. 1). Essentially, the “world” in which an organism lives is “constructed by its sensory and perceptual capabilities” (Lock & Strong, 2010, p. 136). In this respect, the same subject can become a different object for different umwelts, or subject's life-worlds. Von Uexküll's famous example is of the oak tree:

Each Umwelt isolates out of the oak tree a particular part whose characteristics are appropriate to be the bearer both of the properties and activities of their functional circle. In the Umwelt of the ant the whole of the oak tree diminishes in its crack-rich bark which, with its valleys and heights,
becomes the hunting field of the ant... . In all the various Umwelten of its various inhabitants the same oak plays a widely diverging role, sometimes with particular and then again with none of its parts. The same part can be large or small, the same wood hard and soft, it can serve as a means of shelter or attack (Von Uexküll 1909/1921, p. 98, 99, 100).

Central to this passage is von Uexküll's idea about the “variability of objects,” about how “every object becomes something completely different on entering a different Unwelt” (von Uexküll, 2001, p. 108). It is interesting to note as well that for von Uexküll this encountering within Umwelt is understood as musical, as a subject finding its counterpoint in the melody of another existence.

The human experience of an oak tree participates in this many-sided reality of the oak tree, and of the human's (musical) contrapuntal relation to the tree. Yet the human experience of the tree transcends the natural aspects to which the animal experience of it is restricted. As Strauss (2009) suggests, for the natural scientist the tree is an object of analytical scrutiny, the hiker observes it as something with a particular aesthetic attraction, the criminal as a hiding place from the law, the woodworker as material from which to make furniture, and so forth (p. 779).

This human experiential perspective with its rich variety is linked to a person’s

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11 Deleuze might call this the human’s ability to become-tree; as Buchanan explains nicely with the example of the spider and fly, “the spider embodies the fly, is fly-like, not because of some instinctive response, but because it has 'adopted certain themes from the fly's melody.' The spider has adapted itself to a meaningful sign in its Umwelt and has consequently become fly-like” (34). I will attempt to draw out the implications of this becoming-other through relation as part of our encountering a (learning) environment later.
cultural calling which enables a person to be variably settled in any environment by means of cultural formation. . yet. . there is a fundamental difference between animal Umwelts and human experience, for although distinguishable, the diverse human perspectives are not mutually exclusive as it is the case with animal Umwelts” (ibid).

For humans, within the many different human views of the world, in which the same thing acquires within the mode of living of different people a totally distinct tone, it is still possible to ‘understand’ these different Umwelten because it enables the possibility of communicative interaction in respect of opposing views (ibid). In fact, as Buchanan (2010) notes, it is important to recognize that “emphasis on outward relations plays a crucial role in accentuating how an organism is always more than itself by virtue of its symbiotic reciprocation in other things” (30). With respect to humans, the implication is that the centre of subjectivity is always something other than the subject itself as relations of meaning become central signposts to identity. As Buchanan notes, the significance of this thinking relates to how each subject is already something-other in its own potentiality to relate to something that it encounters in its umwelt, “where a neutral object becomes significant to the organism because it complements its own...tone” (35). This will become important in subsequent chapters when we consider affect and connecting the self to other through reflection in a way that opens up subjectivities as educating for social justice education.

For now let us say that while the physical quality of the environment and objects
therein are highlighted in the above example, von Uexküll argues that “it is not the purely physical properties of those 'things-in-the-world' that organisms are responding to, but the meaning of the object in relation to its need. . .we are dealing with 'the relations between’” (Lock & Strong, 137) a subject and its world. Ultimately, as Buchanan points out, von Uexküll aims to discover how meaning is generated through relationships. In this way, we are not interested in causal forces but in perceptual signs or meanings. As Deleuze thus says, for an animal “a thing is never separable from its relations with the world” (Deleuze, 1998, 125; cited in ibid) because “every action ... that consists of perception and operation imprints its meaning on the meaningless object and thereby makes it into a subject-related meaning-carrier in the respective Umwelt (subjective universe)” (von Uexküll, 1982/1940, 31; cited in ibid).

With specific reference to humans, the question of relevance for this thesis is how can the imprinting of the meaning of “perception and operation” be shaped by forces outside of the subject through discourse? For example, how does a metal car speeding down a street as we walk along the sidewalk become the desire and awe or even rejection of “a Mercedes,” as a proper name with its signified connotations, at the moment of our perception of velocity and colour and shape as opposed to other imprinted meanings?

Note the importance of affect (of speed, colour and shape) in determining meaning for a subject precisely through the fact that “every action...consists of perception and operation.” In this regard, Lock and Strong suggest that perception is not passive, it is rather 'for' something - “what is perceived relates to what can be done to it, and what can
be done to it is set up by the organism's needs” (ibid), or in this case, its desires. Again, our attention here would be to question how 'natural' need and cultural 'need' will overlap in the umwelt with the human animal whose mind is in/formed by social discourses. For example, to what degree does a student perceive and imprint the meaning of an empty sheet of paper between herself and a peer for group work as a grade in need of being produced versus the need to listen to the possibility of an/other student in their effort to dialogue (or even be present together in a moment of communion beyond representation) over the prescription to translate some thought into a product to be submitted for a mark? And how do they imprint the meaning of the peer based on their “ability” to secure that desired grade?

Because the 'objects' of experience do not convey inherent meanings or values humans are to correctly register (ibid), the processes by which these meanings arise become of essential importance in our considerations of how social justice education seeks to re/turn people-as-objects in a highly commodified and reifying culture to the subjects of their own umwelt, worthy and deserving and owed dignity. Lock and Strong tell us that the “human Umwelt is unique – it provides a 'felt immediacy' (Braten, 2003) of others' actions; a participatory consciousness (Fogel, 2004)” (139) that orients us to others as elemental to our environment. Although von Uexküll constantly argues that we as human beings are never able to see, hear, smell or feel what a foreign subject sees, hears, smells or feels (Thure von Uexküll 1970, XXV; cited in Strauss 2009, 779), we have the ability to encounter them through the affects to which our perceptions orient us.
As Seigworth reminds us, “affect...cannot be converted into or delimited by the
discursive, by images or representations, by consciousness or thought” (183) but rather it
is perceived as an intensity that moves us, as the state of a body by another body (ibid).
This provides the foundational possibility for relational education for social justice not
grounded in representation. But before we can go there, we have to critically examine
what informs our orientation or disposition towards an/other which relates to and results
in the type of affect generated and to which we are perceptive in recognizing as
movement and intensity. This has to do with deconstructing our lived experience of others-
as-objects rather than as subjects in our contemporary world.12

To do this we must examine what discourses inform our “cognitive constitution”
for, as Deely (2004) points out, the focus is on the “relation, or rather network and set of
relations that obtains between whatever may be 'in fact' present physically in the
surroundings and the cognitive constitution [of the animal/human] interacting with those
surroundings here and now” (p. 127). He continues that

the being proper to experience...is the being proper to the network of

interpretive relations according to which the cognitive organism is inserted

in the environment not merely as one physical thing among others (one

12 This relates to work in human ethology that demonstrates the existence of nonverbal systems of
communication and specific organizations of categories. “Others as objects” would suggest situations in
which precoded features of faciality end up falling into categories that territorialize those others into
objects based on the categories of culture that almost reflexively end up imposed upon others. But
while this social space is formed it is also simultaneously able to be broken down and reformed.
(Guattari, Soft Subversions, 181; Albrecht-Crane, 145).
substance with its accidents among other substances with their accidents),
but as a being whose objective world is shot through and constituted by
cares and interests proper to its species constitution (p. 309).

With humans this world is understood not only as the physical world, but also as the
social and cultural world that is one's life. In this respect, the objects in an environment
with which we come into contact may have a social or cultural meaning, aside from a
physical one. However, this is also where the meaningful-ness of the relation, as
mentioned earlier in the distinction of classroom learning space versus learning
environment, shifts understanding affect as intensity and prepersonal to affect as affection
or feeling precisely of an individual, as the relation between the human subject and some
discursive meaning within the environment with which they are in relation. These are the
types of relations Thompson notes in his study of Australian schools in which
performative codings delimit possible encounters between subjectivities such as “the
good, the pastoral, the bureaucratic, the docile, the gendered, the conflictual, and the
affiliated” (p. 281-299). As understood in criticisms of consumer, advanced capitalist
societies, the pursuit of pleasure shut off from true affect and experiences of others
delimits “what” is encountered when we work through a representational lense of “who”
we are encountering, as we would a reified object of consumption.  

This will be related to the overcoding of faciality (a concept from Deleuze) in the next chapter.
2.4 Particularly Human, the Relation of Learning Environment and Discourse

If it were possible to lay bare and unfold all the presuppositons in what I call my reason or my ideas at each moment, we should always find experiences which have not been made explicit, large-scale contributions from past and present, a whole 'sedimentary history' which is not only relevant to the genesis of my thought, but which determines its significance. (Merleau-Ponty)

Now that we have problematized the conventional understanding of a learning environment by introducing von Uexküll's focus on the relational determination of meaning and the displacing of the subject to a relation of umwelt-environment, we recognize how an emphasis on otherness is present, at least potentially, as an integral, non-representational structural aspect of the relations between a learner's umwelt and an educational environment. For humans, this problem relates to the objectification of life-forms as reifed things “for” human use and consumption inherent in the discourses of what it means to be human. In this respect, from the time we are born and nurtured, whatever natural inclinations towards others we share, the meaning of others becomes mediated by the discourses that surround us throughout our lives.

In this regard, the meaning of 'things,' both objects and subjects-reduced-to-objects is latent within the discursive codes that determine, or as some might argue, overdetermine, the meaning(lessness) of things in the environment. In this way, as Ranciere (2009) argues, the world becomes series upon series of circulating images. Human experiential perspective with its rich variety is linked to a person’s cultural
calling, as much as biology, which enables a person to be variably settled in different environments by means of cultural formation\textsuperscript{14} (Portmann, 1990, p. 79). Because the social and cultural worlds are not solely encountered biologically, but also and primarily symbolically encountered through language, “cultural formation”, means that our environments of encounter are also constituted discursively and hermeneutically. This would mean that defining “what it means to be human” would have to draw heavily from a hermeneutic conception as much as a biological one. The possibilities of what being human might mean in a social/cultural moment would thus come down to these discursive/hemeneutic opportunities in relation to the situatedness of encounters and affects in environments.

The research of Jenny Arnold (2012) in science classrooms (as environments) with the life-worlds (umwelts) of female students explores this relationship of meaning making in which semiotic systems, both verbal and non-verbal, spoken and written, within environments relate to discursive practices from our socio-cultural worlds that result in student dispositions and attitudes that serve performative functions. As Arnold (2012) writes of her project,

Cartesian separations of inner mind spaces and outer social spaces are called into question because of the insight that persons and society cannot be

\textsuperscript{14}“Whereas he views human beings as \textit{Weltoffen} (open towards the world), Portmann characterizes animals as \textit{Umweltgebunden} (constrained by environment) and \textit{Instinktgesichert} (protected by instinct) (Richard Carter interpretative essay in: Portmann, 1990, 79).”
separated but are always dialectically related (Vygotsky 1978; Harré 1984; Quigley 2001). A consequence of this is that rather than the inner mechanisms of individual minds or determining structures, discursive psychology is concerned with “the intentional use of symbolic systems by active, skilled human beings in public and private contexts, for the accomplishment of various tasks and projects, jointly with others” (Harré and van Langenhove 1999a, p. 3; Harré and Tissaw 2005 cited in: Arnold, 2012, p. 236)

While I make no claim to Arnold's characterization of the relation of person-society as dialectical\textsuperscript{15}, it is important to qualify that the use of “symbolic systems” can be intentional and unintentional; either way, the presuppositions and a priori meanings of discursive codes does not make the individual the generator of the system. Rather, as Arnold (2012) says

> Any action in the social world is intentional, used by the actor for a purpose and presupposing a response from an “other” (Coulter 1999, after Bakhtin). The actor draws upon his or her Umwelt at the moment of participation and exercises choice. This gives rise to the possibility of novel action in institutional contexts resulting in the transformation of practice. Novel action

\textsuperscript{15} Considering whether or not the relation is dialectical, per se, is beyond the scope of this paper, and I do not think that this quote introduces a sufficient philosophical uncertainty over this question to undermine the overall argument, or use of Arnold's work in support thereof.
in any situation risks unintelligibility but could result in new storylines and
changes in relative positioning if taken up by others at the site (Harré 1984).
In institutional settings it is rare that novel positioning is recognized because
of the matrix of practices that make up “the way we do things around here” or
“teaching as usual” (Schatzki 2002; Davies 2008 cited in: Arnold 2012, ibid)

An example of this within my own experience comes from my time working as
a teaching assistant in an English Department of a school in Ontario.

A student wrote an essay on a Shakespearean play that did not directly
analyze the play, despite it being assigned as an analytical essay. Rather, the
student situated the analytical meaning of the play within a retelling of
Aboriginal myths that she related to her reading and responses to the play. I
brought this essay to the professor of the course and was told that the student
“had to” be given a failing grade despite having exhibited in a creative rather
than analytical way that she clearly recognized the analytical meanings she was
expected to represent in writing a “rational” and “logical” explanation, as
opposed to a creative one. Although it is not rational or quantifiable in a logical
order, the sense I perceived in my meeting with the student assured me of the
presence of our relationality, of her eyes touching my efforts to reach out to her
in a language she avoided; her stillness was the affirmation that she had heard
the news of a failing grade; her silence the intentionality of her voice between
us.
This idea of intentionality as generative in re-producing the individual from within a socio-cultural world (and its codes) brings us closer to the complexity of the socio-cultural environments in which we 'live'. In addition, it suggests, through “storylines” and relative “positionings”, the degree to which an individual human's social-Umwelt and its relation to an environment is *narratively* mediated. Suggestively, Arnold (2012) argues that “[t]he use of language or other techniques for positioning are often so well rehearsed that conscious thought is no longer required on the part of the actor in the context of moment-to-moment interaction, much like the development of a skill. Learning under this scheme is the expansion of an individual’s Umwelt to include new discursive practices” (p. 238).

Although the specific results of her findings are not our focus, two aspects of Arnold's work are important for us. First, that she discovered that environmental encounters which re-produced discursive codes through performative utterances of students could only be challenged relationally through interaction which transformed the umwelt-environment relation, much as the example I gave above of my experience with the student and her essay. Years later, working as an English teacher in St. John's, I had the opportunity to work with a young man who only wanted to take from English class what he needed to become a pipe-fitter in Labrador. The only “value” inscribed in any of his books were related to the narrative place of earning money in his future success; his “cohesive face” used “analysis” and “reflection” to pass the public exam and affirm the representation of his identity he brought into the exam, but analysis and reflection in that
context could do nothing to unseat that representation or urge it into encounter with others. Rather, a year after his graduation his mother met me and commented that he was “already earning more than a teacher,” thus very much affirming the stability of her son's (and her own) umwelt-environment.

Second, Arnold's discursive approach (2012) to examining the a priori socio-cultural codes of a learning environment opens the way for us to take a step back and ask about what types of discourses effect the a priori meaning of 'things' in learning environments, and thus potentionally for the human social-umwelts of students and teachers. Our primary focus in what follows is the 'story' of education told by neo-liberalism, and its function. This is important for the thesis in that it frames the lenses that students often use to approach the act of reflection as perceived within the context of a classroom learning space, and sets out an obstacle whose overcoming must be theorized in order to move us towards von Uexküll's learning-environment, in which relationality, affect and reflection can orient us towards others non-representationally, thus enabling new possibilities for subjectivities and encounters that transform “reality.”
2.5 Neoliberalism and Education, or What's the Story?

According to David Harvey (2005), “[n]eoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2). Neoliberalism values market exchange as an ethic in itself that seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market in order to maximize the social good by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions. It is in this sense that Deleuze (1994) talks about neoliberalism as the extension of a “single plane of logic” (p. 87) within which the social and the economic are, as Walkerdine and Bransel (2010) suggest, “seen as antagonistic” (p. 5). Within this antagonism, the economic is “desocialized in order to maximize the entrepreneurial conduct of the individual” (ibid).

From a policy perspective, neoliberalism advocates for the promotion of privatization, consumer sovereignty, user-pay systems, and self-reliance (which means the withdrawal of supports for social security programming); in addition, its focus on creating conditions of deregulation and the internationalization of the economy are aided by its global geo-political institutions, the IMF and World Bank. In today's world, in which neoliberalism is the dominant framework, “the full effects of corporatization and the establishment of multinational enterprises as key players in society have become apparent” (Peters, 2001, p. 125).
While the full scope of the history and development of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to focus on that aspect of neoliberalism, a global capitalist enterprise, that can be understood as “the contemporary mode of government through which subjectivities are constituted and regulated” (Walkerdine and Bransel, 2010, p. 2). Walkerdine's use of “government” makes use of the work of Michel Foucault, who explores the practices and institutions by which we constitute ourselves as individuals. As Peters (2001) summarizes, for Foucault there are two techniques that humans use to understand and control themselves – technologies of domination and technologies of the self (p. 127). While technologies of domination are concerned with “defining and controlling conduct of individuals, submitting them through the exercise of power to certain ends so as to lead useful, docile, and practical lives”, technologies of the self, “by contrast, permit individuals 'to effect certain operations on their own bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being' (Foucault, 1982, p. 18; cited in ibid). The question for our purpose is how these relate to education, or more precisely, to “learning environments.” In order to explore this question further we will turn to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and to Louis Althusser's concept of the school as an Ideological State Apparatus in the next chapter.

Before we do this, however, it is instructive at this point to note what David  

16 Given that Foucault's work focuses on techniques, technologies and practices that focus on how individuals have come to be significant elements of the state (Peters, 127), I will join my use of his concepts to those of Gramsci and Althusser in order to be able to supplement my analysis with some considerations of why that makes room for questions of culture, power and ideology. As Giroux (1999) argues, much of Gramsci’s work on culture prefigures aspects of Foucault’s considerations of the workings of power.
Harvey says about how a thought becomes dominant:

> for any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question (2005, p. 5).

Harvey's work allows us to posit the relationship between neoliberalism and the learning environment in a way consistent with the work of von Uexküll presented earlier. More precisely, our examination of a learning environment must consider the fact that, and the ways in which, neoliberalism (in this instance) “extends its logic” into the perceptual processes that are the relationship between student and environment, including its objects through the technique of reification of its other-subjects into objects as the operant ethic of neoliberalism\(^\text{17}\). A supposition of this chapter that will be explored further in the next is that this process happens through the 'fiction' of the normalized 'common sense' of our culture and that the world of this 'fiction' is normalized and delineated by discourses and narratives that engender “cohesive faces” that limit what reflection can do with subjectivities in our schools.

\(^{17}\) This will become a central problem to analyze and overcome in the process of trying to generate a teaching for social justice to be considered in a later chapter.
2.6 Education's Place in the Story of our Culture Today

As teachers today know, education has become an increasingly contested space. As mentioned, viewpoints “dominated by the perspective of economics,” exemplified by the understanding of education as the “producer of labour and skills and values, like enterprise and entrepreneurship, and of commercial 'knowledge,’” compete to define education's significance (Ball, 2008, p. 11). As Greg Thompson (2011) suggests, while this is not new (considering the influence of economic discourses on education for centuries), “what is new is that these economic interests have increasingly superseded [people's] private interests that are conceptualisations of the individual as self-fulfilled, self-actualised and self-reflective (Reid, 2009; cited in Thompson, 2011, p. 4). Rather, education becomes a space (or a series of learning-environments) with a function and performative meaning (over)determined by the economic socio-cultural codes of efficiency and instrumentality.  

Following the work of Michel Foucault, Peters (2001) notes that the result, which is actually related to historical developments since the Enlightenment, is the definition of the subject according to the assumptions of individuality, rationality and self-interest; the assumptions of what has been called homo

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18 While we could say that in the preceding section learning-environments in principle do have or serve 'functions', those would be understood as defined relationally (and thus relatively) to a particular situated student Umwelt. The distinction here is that this function is being generalized or universalized; as with the notion of space described earlier, this function to the environment conceptually thus extends outside of the student who moves into it – thus rather than being seen as a function that emerges from the relation of an umwelt to environment, the function appears to exist outside, 'in' the environment independent of the student who 'moves' to it.
economicus (p. 14).^{19} This process of change in “function” and meaning can be understood historically and related to a production dimension of our culture^{20}. As Burnard and White (2008) suggest, “educational achievement levels [have been linked] with economic development and international competitiveness between contemporary western democracies” (p. 667). Education becomes intricately linked to aspects of economic and epistemological production...The result is familiar to anyone involved in any aspect of education – an emphasis on measurement, testing and reporting all grounded in the notion of standardization. Across the world, state-sanctioned standards and methods give rise to modernist and bureaucratic reform agendas that prioritize neoliberal conceptions of education as business (Burnard and White, 2008). In Newfoundland, curricular documents for English Language Arts increasingly talk about the “global context” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Grade 10-12 Curriculum Overview Document, 2001, p.3), which reveals how this production is also aimed beyond the limits of the nation state towards the global transformations that affect our lives.

The instrumental incorporation of a national-global dialectic within educational discourse and policy revolves around the production of citizens who will be able to participate, and compete, in a globalized world most commonly understood in market terms. As Rizvi and Engel (2009) argue, “[s]ince the mid-to late 1980s, educational policy has increasingly been incorporated around the world within the broader discourses

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^{19} Although I only treat this concept minimally, further study of this topic would usefully explore the long history of *homo economicus* explored in economics by the work of Foucault.

^{20} For a useful table on the elements of neoliberal governmentality see Michael Peters 2001, p.21.
about the changing nature of the global economy” (p. 529). As suggested, it is generally accepted that the coordination of these discourses in expanding of the global economy most typically happens according under the auspices of neoliberalism. The coordination of these discourses with that of education means that the object of “educating and learning” becomes knowledge, understood largely in technical terms, as in information and skills related to technology and skills employed in the “knowledge sector” of the market. The citizenry produced by education in these terms is largely conceptualized as citizen-as-worker, or, as Walkerdine and Brensel (2010) have called it, “citizen as active entrepreneur of the self,” (p. 18) whereby the state's responsibility to its citizens through the curricular prescriptions of education becomes a responsibility to enable citizens “to compete” in the global market. This orientation also becomes visible in the changing meaning of educational concepts. Take, for example, concepts such as “life-long learning” and students as “independent learners.” Whereas once these concepts might have been understood through a liberal arts framework to contribute towards a humanist educational project, they may now be understood to participate in the orientation and skills necessary for the new neoliberal market – a market in which we may need to change jobs more often during our lifetime and thus have to be able to learn at all stages of our lives, and a market in which the ability to work 'independently' is a privileged 'skill.'

This is largely because, as Cassell and Nelson (2013) suggest, the virtues of

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21 This is not to suggest that these are the 'correct' or moral or imperative frameworks, but only that these would have preceeded the neoliberal model in the historical construction of the purposes of education.
enterprise and the ethos of business steadily infuse the conceptual framework of education (p. 251). The story that students accept about their world involves the needs and demands of the market as a protagonist of progress and civilization. Thus, students “are groomed to display sympathetic attitudes towards the needs and demands of capitalism in the guise of “the business world” or the “financial realities of life” (ibid). These intrusions of ethos and values are matched then by structural and operational constructs to the nature of our “world” - socially, culturally and physically. Our worlds, and the way we move and relate with(and)in them, thus become the market and are legitimized by the course of possibility articulated by capitalism.

2.7 Final Chapter Considerations, and Moving Forward

If beginning this study with the Umwelt theory of Jacob von Uexküll suggested that history could, in part, be understood as a loss of the subject-sensory centre of the individual's “world” in lieu of a general plane that pre-exists individuals and which individuals populate, neoliberalism can be thought of as an entrenchment of a kind of rationalism that advance[s] a foundationalist and universalist reason as a common sense of the general intellect produced by institutional education (Peters, 2001) within that general plane. Within institutional education, classroom learning spaces, and their focus on the student, and not on relationships, belies neoliberalism's ideological emphasis on individualism as central to 'common sense.' In this respect, the emphasis on relations as
the source of meaning making is subsumed under the sign of the individual as *the meaning maker*. In this respect, not only are we actually further away from a subjectively constituted reality, but the centre of the single spatial plane that we come to inhabit – the individual - has come to be determined and circulated\(^{22}\) by a market logic. The subject's relation to the objects around it becomes instrumentalized around a market logic, and, as suggested earlier, relations within this plane take on a meaning (over)determined by that same logic. In this respect, what we are left with is the story told by neoliberalism that is both producer and product of its very own 'telling.' Part of the problem that emerges then is that progress/terror appear to be the only roles of subjective interests\(^{23}\) within this storyline of education – students are either working hard to maximize their capital within the system or are standing along its margins looking to find a place for themselves within that world\(^{24}\). The possibility of creating new relations through education thus seems like an impossibility\(^{25}\) because, as Walkerdine and Brensel say, “neoliberalism constructs

\(^{22}\) I use the term 'circulated' here to stand for a certain kind of 'teaching and learning' that lacks critique and reflectivity and thus absently re-produces 'common sense'.

\(^{23}\) Again, I by no means intend this as a reduction of all the possible school experiences of students – clearly the student experience of school is far more complex and related to multiple, often competing discursive encodings, conscious or unconscious. Rather, I mean here to point towards a student's learning as being attracted to interests from their umwelt to the relations of meaning that relate to these interests within learning-environments. Constructivism recognizes this and seeks to move towards learning-environments 'created' by students, although I have suggested earlier that there are limitations to this to which I will return in later chapters on self-reflection and critical thinking in curriculum.

\(^{24}\) It is in this sense that student alienation can be accounted for – when that world is intuitively felt to be alien to the student's umwelt, but when that umwelt has no access to or avenue to reach an/other environment.

\(^{25}\) It is also in this way that teacher-training or workplace efforts to emphasize the political and transformative nature of teaching-learning find students or teachers for whom any way of doing things differently is foolish, a fantasy, met with derision, an impossibility unworthy of any sustained consideration. I base this comment on my own observations within the staffroom of my own school (which I will explore later in another chapter) and on conversations with Dorothy Vaandering, a MUN professor, regarding trying to teach restorative justice teaching to pre-service teachers.

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models of action” (p. 5) that embody, or incarnate, the narrative that emerges from the experiences that shape our lives. And these narratives are always related in some way to power, as with producing students-as-citizens who are used for state strategies of surveillance, normalization, exclusion and classification, strategies also used to define “good students” (Thompson, 2011, p. 62).

In this specific case, I would suggest that the loss of umwelt and the subsequent construct of the a priori classroom learning space facilitate the production of a “common sense” fiction that, as Deb Hill (2009) asserts, is related to “the loss of the rich account of the multidimensional nature [because of] the violence incurred upon perception/action by capitalism's culture of abstraction” (p. 5). Whereas the etymology and history of “weird” reveals that “the weird” were once held in awe and wonder as persons who communed with nature beyond language in ways to be respected and feared, today, calling people “weird” functions to immediately shut down the very possibility of their experiences and voices because of the impossibility of representing them – it's no wonder that “weird” is such a common student dismissive within schools in which everything must be representable and assessable for judgement.

The next chapter will examine how certain concepts from the work of Gramsci, Althusser, Perez and Deleuze and Guattari enable us to recognize how the “common sense” of the fiction of neoliberalism encodes the thoughts and actions of persons through an embodiment of dispositions and predispositions that generate practices (ibid, p.256) in the very “face” of our performed subjectivities. These will form the foundation of the
problematic for reflection in English Language Arts curriculum. In addition, this hegemonic fold that envelopes self-reflection within the functions of the reified classroom learning space will form part of what I will then argue can be understood as a Major Literature of Education.
3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter attempted to problematize the classroom as a school learning space that exists independent of the learners who move with(and)in it by suggesting how its adherence to the encodings of neoliberalism negate liberatory relational possibilities for student subjectivities. Such a space, it was argued, objectifies both the nature of a learning environment (as I have theorized it) and of a learner, as well as misses the fundamental importance of the relationship between the two as the site of meaning, according to von Uexküll's thought. The chapter suggested that when discussing humans, this school learning space can be understood both materially and discursively. Such an understanding forces us to question which discourses circulate *a priori* in the relationship between the learner and the space to give particular knowability, meaning and value to the encounter with(and)in it. It was suggested that neo-liberalism is a dominant discourse within capitalist democratic regimes that shapes our attitudes and values around what a moment of learning could or 'should' mean, where it 'happens,' and what its 'value' could be. That this presents a problematic for students' critical self-reflection was suggested, but has yet to be developed in more detail.

This chapter seeks to develop the argument of this thesis from the developments of the last chapter by discussing how the works of Gramsci, Althusser, Perez and Deleuze and Guattari can further allow us to theorize the space of, and processes of self-reflection...
in, the classroom in terms of limiting and enabling/liberatory effects on subjectivities. The chapter begins with a focus on Gramsci's ideas of hegemony, common sense and possibility to further set out the socio-political and historical situation of education today. The chapter then examines Althusser's concepts of schools as ideological state apparatuses and of ideology in the process of interpellation of subjects in order to contextualize subjectification processes within schools. Perez's thoughts on identification as a supplement to interpellation are then examined for their usefulness in situating school subjectification processes within cultural practices. And finally, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality is developed to relate these school-cultural practices to wider considerations of representational logic and identity. This latter combination of concepts works together as a supplement to Althusser's notions of the processes of subject formation. Together these thinkers better enable us to understand the obstacles to liberatory practices within the classroom related to self-reflection. Ultimately, the chapter turns to an examination of affect, as introduced in the previous chapter, in an effort to draw thinking about converting limiting forces within the school learning space context into liberatory forces with(and)in learning environment practices.
3.2 Gramsci's Work: Hegemony, Common Sense and Possibility

If we begin by accepting Giroux's observation that “culture is about the production and legitimation of particular ways of life transmitted in schools through overt and hidden curricula so as to legitimize the cultural capital of dominant groups while marginalizing the voices of the subaltern,” (1999, p. 14) then the very 'nature' of the classroom learning space suggested in the last chapter immediately becomes political. Gramsci's work offers us a language of critique to approach this hidden, naturalized political a priori constitution of classroom learning spaces that limits the possibility of student and teacher becomings. Such a political a priori is, for Gramsci, related to capitalism, to the economic system which it supports and (re)produces.

As Deb Hill (2007) argues, if we are to critically examine the “pathological reach of a capitalist epistemology and ontology upon human possibility” (p. 5) then we must consider the problem of hegemony as set out by Antonio Gramsci. Hill argues that the loss of insight about humanity's deteriorating perception of itself is very much a product of a complex ecology of sociopolitical influences that we can begin to approach through Gramsci's concept of hegemony (ibid). According to Hill (2007), for Gramsci,

[h]egemony is a problem that highlights the very real constraints imposed upon our cognitive and moral capabilities within a capitalist society – importantly translated as constraints upon our powers of practical reasoning – drawing our attention to the constituent limitations that these effects
necessarily yield upon the entire “democratic” process itself. (p. 5)

Part of the reason for this is that, rather than synthesizing a critical worldview as part of the “reality” which it (re)produces, the hegemonic order, the elaborate system of norms and imperatives propagated through global communication, mainstream media and popular culture, separates facts into discrete units in order to perpetuate a “reality” that half conceals as it reveals itself. As we know from watching any news channel, stories are always presented as separate and unrelated units, bits not connected by any underlying social reality or structure or system. In the world of schooling, a focus on “the habit of thinking” in which people “are viewed as . . .mere container[s] in which to pour and conserve empirical data or brute disconnected facts . . .serves only to create. . .people who. . .raise a barrier between themselves and others” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 20-21) through dominant social relations. As Giroux (1999) suggests, one of Gramsci’s contributions to the study of education is that he reveals how, through hegemony, schools impose and distribute meanings and values related to dominant economic and political control within a society, thus exposing the relation between power and culture (p. 2). This hegemonic role is then normalized as schools function to define legitimate knowledge and social practice.

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony suggests that hegemony is a form of cultural pedagogy. As Giroux says, “by emphasizing the pedagogical force of culture, Gramsci expands the sphere of the political by pointing to those diverse spaces and spheres in which cultural practices are deployed, live, and mobilized in the service of knowledge,
power and authority (1999, p. 17). For Gramsci, learning and politics are inextricably linked and take place in and beyond the school. In fact, this approach to the “educational site” multiplies the “classroom” as part of the “natural” experience of the everyday of the human animal. As Gramsci explains

[...]he 'normal' exercise of hegemony is characterized by a combination of force and consent which balance each other so that force does not overwhelm consent but rather appears to be backed by the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion. (1975, p. 155-156)

The first element of hegemony is thus that it produces consent among people to accept the group in power and live within existing structures. Such normalization of consent leads to an acquiescence of what is possible in terms of what students, and teachers, believe education can change, beyond rhetoric. In the case of transnational capitalism and our current political order, “group in power” can be understood both as particular individuals (investors, shareholders, etc.) and/or the global institutions that organize and reproduce the global economic-political system (such as the IMF, World Bank, etc.).

We might recall to mind a local example that circulated in mainstream media in 2013 when hydro rate increases in Newfoundland and Labrador were being introduced because shareholders had been promised a set rate of return. As a result of this obligatory rate of return, or profit on investment, people across the province were preparing to face the challenges of increasing utility costs. The news story was focused on the poor and elderly specifically and the problems they would face; however, at no point did the media
spend time examining the “given-ness” of the burden and its relation to a promised rate of
return to already wealthy persons. The obligatory burden on many based on the
structured promise of profit for few remained a normalized frame latent within the story.

In addition, representations of such “groups” (as the wealthy investors and those
seeking to become wealthy) and their relationships with other groups “below” them, as on
the popular Canadian television show the Dragon’s Den, normalize and obscure consent
towards these very positions and their appearance as apolitical. This show naturalizes the
kind of judgment and logic of scarcity evident in the evaluation schemas of most schools
and the valorization of those on honour rolls whose teleological success within the market
is an implicit aim of school 'success'. Other possible values to be celebrated find no place
within the structures that orient the desires of institutional performative subjectivities,
whether on television or in the classroom learning space.

In this way, according to Gramsci, a second aspect of hegemony is that it involves
the production of what he calls “historically organic ideologies...[that] 'organize' human
masses,...[and] form the terrain on which [people] move, acquire consciousness of their
position, struggle, etc.” (1971, p. 376-377). The latter part of this quote is significant for
our considerations as it directly relates to the imposition of an abstraction “on” to the
space in which we move, thus territorializing the earth before our perceptions and
experiences of it can discover or create meaning for us there. Rather, the meaning of
space is produced in predetermined or ideological ways that limit what is possible,
according to Gramsci. This aspect of hegemony resonates with von Uexküll's (1985)
thought on the loss of the experiences of environments in lieu of the expansion of spaces. While von Uexküll (1985) characterizes this experience based on the phenomenology of the body, Hebdige notes that for Gramsci it is a question of what possible meaning that body can make in those spaces based on the processes of ideology that are in constant formation and reformation (as cited in Jones, 2006, p.132).

It is important here to qualify our use of Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Elaborating on the work of Felix Guattari, Goodchild posits that “capital is merely an environment in which other kinds of power-formations can flourish. Guattari regarded the idea of a single, hegemonic global market as merely a myth; in fact, there are sectorial markets with independent power-formations and systems of values” (1996, p. 110). This notion fits with what Fernand Braudel (1994) and David Harvey (2005) have suggested about capital's material reality in different geophysical regions, mediated by different cultural histories, leading to variegated realities. At the same time, these exist in relation to dominant Western institutions that actively seek to align (Perez, n.p) these variegated realities with(in) dominant discourses and practices so as to extend the single plane of logic to the entire earth, at least on the macro level if not also on the micro. These complex and plural processes engender and reinforce multiple (sometimes competing) ideologies that circulate within cultures but whose general movement in a common, naturalized direction can be understood as the vector of hegemony.

As Kaela Jubas (2006) observes, “as ideologies permeate both culture (Gramsci's 'civil society') and politics, they settle into people's unconsciousness to generate a
'sedimentation of common sense', a shared understanding that the workings of society have a natural logic and are meant to be the way they are” (p. 567). This “common sense” is thus an exercise of a power that is actively lived and that relates to the boundary between desires and obligations (Jones, 2006, p. 4). It relates to what Foucault asks - “what do people think when they do what they do?” (Public Lecture Berkley, 1983) - and to how our underlying thoughts on the world effect our obligations, to ourselves, to others and to the world? (ibid). Framed by Gramsci's thought, this common sense is the necessary tool for the reproduction of (dominant) ideals and imperatives (Jones, 2006, p. 4) that leads to student consent to the very nature of their schooling. In addition, it would directly relate to influencing the degree to which affects are active or passive for students, for example, in a classroom learning space through its relation to possibility, or the muting of possibility, to be more precise.

While notions like “progress” and “success” resonate as positively connoted within “common sense” neoliberal discourse and ideology, for Gramsci (1999) “possibility” is a concept related to freedom and transformation.

Possibility is not reality: but it is a reality in itself. Whether [a person] can

26 Indeed, Giroux (1999) makes direct note of how aspects of Gramsci's work prefigure some of Foucault's.
27 As Jones (2006) suggests, this does not imply a zero-sum game of domination and resistance – of 'common sense' versus 'the truth'. Rather, 'common sense' is the form by which a particular content of how we understand and live out our 'human being' is embodied. In this way, culture can be understood as “an arean in which dominant, subordinate and oppositional values meet and intermingle...vying with one another to secure the spaces within which they can [frame and organize] popular experiences and consciousness” (Bennett 1986, xix, cited in Jones p.126).
28 Jubes' (2006) work examines this, in part, by examining the degree to which gender, race and ethnic “codes” work in “competing power structures” (and thus in different “common senses”) to determine expectations for girls within liberal democratic citizenship.
or cannot do a thing has its importance in evaluating what is done in reality. Possibility means “freedom,” [and] the measure of freedom enters into the concept of [the person]. (p. 360)

In the “common sense” of neoliberal discourse and ideology, possibility is oriented extrinsically in a manner consistent with the instrumental and representational existent mode of “having”29. Possibility thus takes on the meaning of ‘to have opportunities' wherein the subjectivity of the individual remains constant – it is the individual who 'owns,' who 'has' the possibility. In Gramsci's sense, possibility seems to signify a process of effect in which the possibility of a person changes the being of reality, what reality 'is', and in this sense possibility means freedom from the determinism of impossibility, which in itself changes the very concept of a person's being. Such a being as imbued within the flows of experience is not representational; it is not reduced to the representation of ego. As I understand it, this is fundamental to any theory of transformational education in which learning necessarily relates to possibility if the learning changes the student and the reality of their world. In addition, for Gramsci this type of learning involves an ethical dimension30. He says

To transform the external world, the general system of relations, is to

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29 For an elaboration, see Eric Fromm's *To Have or To Be*.
30 I do not want to skip over this too quickly, but given the scope of this thesis, I cannot spend time examining the nature of this ethics according to Gramsci. Gramsci (1999) does elaborate a vision of his ethics in contradistinction to Kant's Categorial Imperative; however his own description of the ethical comes very close to the Kantian notion that he critiques (p.374). More work would need to be done in the future on this point to evaluate the degree to which Gramsci's notion of ethics “works”. For now I will introduce his schema of the place of ethics into the argument of the thesis despite not filling in what that ethics might involve specifically.
potentiate oneself and to develop oneself. That ethical 'improvement' is purely individual is an illusion and an error: the synthesis of the elements constituting individuality is 'individual,' but it cannot be realized and developed without an activity directed outwards, modifying external relations both with nature and, in varying degrees, other [persons] in the various social circles in which one lives, up to the greatest relationship of all, which embraces the whole human species (Gramsci, 1999, p.366).

Thus the external expression of ethics is local while its transformative implications are directed at the fundamental core of our individual becoming. This is because ethicality includes a mode of being in the world that is distinct from a “having mode,” as a primarily instrumental and representational mode of being resonant with the neoliberal logic, or “common sense,” that circulates as a virtue of success in Western culture.

In contrast, the ethical becoming links us as a part to the whole that is the human species, and thus 'our' experience of life. In other words, we act towards our humanity, towards a meaning of what the human species could be, materially and very literally in the everyday of our lives. Humanity, in this sense, is not a finished, pre-determined category. Rather, critical understanding of self takes place through a struggle of political hegemonies of opposing directions, “first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out of a higher level of one's own conception of reality” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 333). Thus, the praxis of the ethical is always “working” towards the creation and maintenance of the conceptual.
Returning to classroom learning spaces, spaces that are already overdetermined in discursive meanings by (neoliberal) institutional values and thus register little by way of the possibility of space that might facilitate or enable affects between students that move towards different becomings than those 'required' or desired a priori. These 'requirements' are related to the fact that “schools are productive places that produce (among other things) a place for each student, a niche in which certain ways of being are open for students” (Thompson, 2011, p. 62). This type of production relates to the hegemonic values and moral codes operating within the institution that regulate the positionality of any student in relation to historically situated (although often hidden in common sense) notions of what it means to “be a child, an adolescent, or a moral being who becomes a good and self-governing citizen” (ibid).

Recognizing this, Giroux says that Gramsci believed schools had a role to play in “nourishing the tension between the democratic principles of civil society and the dominating principles of capitalism and corporate power” (1999, p. 15). This was partly to be accomplished through the “fundamental socialist principle of educating the complete person, rather than the traditional concern with educating specialists, technocrats and other professional experts” (ibid), although this, in itself, is a theoretically complex notion. Before we turn to question what might be involved in this type of education or learning, we must turn to the work of Althusser and Perez to more fully understand what makes up the challenges to transformational education.

31 We will return to this idea as expressed within Ignatian pedagogy of “educating the whole person.”
If transformational education has to do with possibility and creating new social reality then we must consider what limits or sets the “determinate conditions” that pre-form our desires such that our thinking most often merely reproduces the same world (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005, p. 29). As Perez says, “ideology lays the path our consciousness may take” (n.p) and thus acts, with discursive codes, as an already formed map of the world we encounter. The work of Louis Althusser and Gilberto Perez's notion of identification as a supplement to Althusser's thought can help us better understand how the overdetermination of the learning environment in a neo-liberal context works in limiting the possibility for student subjectivity and thought, and thus reality.

3.3 Althusser

As Wolpe (1996) says, “Althusser...provide[s] concepts for a specific theory of the articulation between education and capitalism in which education reproduces class relations rather than redressing inequalities in society” (p. 303). Today, the Marxist notion of class struggle has been expanded to recognize multiple sites of struggle and as such the notion of power becomes central in understanding the relation of education and capitalism. Subordination and acquiescence to power are trained by the apparatuses, both the institutions and agencies of a society as well as the norms and imperatives circulating as part of the “private” sphere but working in the public sphere to ensure that ideas are safe – as Cohen says, ideas that are “appropriate, correct and transposable” (Cohen, 1993,
In this way, the very possibility of expression of resistance to power is limited as schools actually work to “close the 'gaps' between naming and judging” (ibid) as opposed to opening the gaps and reintroducing affect as a means to disrupt what lies between the naming and the judging. As is the case in Newfoundland and Labrador, an educational system employing standardized and high stakes testing naturalizes the association between “a” (canonical) knowledge operating from a representational logic and “a” world of desire metonymic for “success.” Through this association, both ideas and identities become “named and judged” in the normalized and naturalized understandability of what schools teach, what they 'do' and to whom. This understandability extends then to social relations and subjectivities – both the world and those who people it have thus always already come before – the gaps of experience and the thinking that emerges from encountering the unknown (in each other and ourselves) are essentially “closed.”

For example, I recently asked a new class of Level III students what they wanted from this school year. The overwhelming answer was “academic success,” they wanted to “be good students” which meant to do well on their public exams and have access to scholarships and universities. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1995), however, we do not desire something or someone. We always desire in an assemblage of relations – as Olsson (2010) says, we do not desire a dress, we desire in relation to the particular evening out to which the dress relates, to the friends and people and places related to that.

32 The latter part of this statement jumps ahead by alluding to the chapter that discusses self-reflection in curriculum, but is also trying to echo back by alluding to an underlying dimension of footnotes 19 and 20.
evening and that dress (p. 149). For the students desiring “to be” “good students” within
the school means to accept and reproduce the representational logic both of the
knowledge they are “mastering” and of themselves, of what they “look like” as “good
students” and of what value they take on in the system of opportunity and successes
afforded to “good students.” In case they should forget what this system of opportunity
and successes should look like, it is (re)presented to them in the Careers course which
they must take in order to graduate – this course constructs the student's identity as
moving teleologically on the path of “progress” towards their “career,” a telos situated
within future economic success that will define the value of all of their life choices and
experiences.

The entire course is about mapping out the student's identity in terms of knowable,
representable, 'skills and talents and interests' that can be superimposed on to work within
the market that will help to give their life meaning. Through this process faces, social
relations, are named and judged, made knowable and valuable, by both the academic
apparatuses through which they have moved for thirteen years, but also all the other
apparatuses (economic and governmental, for example) and relations that intersect around
this “constructivist desire” (ibid) - this desire that unconsciously produces their reality as
“students wanting to be good students”. In this particular example, the good student is
related to all of the economic, social and cultural capital and opportunity that is afforded
by “becoming educated” and being “good students” in our current culture. Class and other
power dynamics and networks associated with the construction of “good” in my specific
work/school context are thus (re)produced as part of the social formation unless something can be done to disrupt this (re)production of the school learning space. As such, in order to better understand this, it would be helpful to explore the methodological tradition that facilitates an understanding of the construction of the school's place in the relationship between education and capitalism.

The processes and situations we have been discussing relate to, as Harvey and Gramsci have said, a conceptual apparatus that becomes “common sense.” According to Louis Althusser (1971), this conceptual apparatus can be considered part of the apparatus of production of the social formation. Said another way, the relations and structures that perpetuate knowledge associated with representational logic are a function of societal (re)production, including (re)production of normalized and naturalized social relations. “[I]n order to exist, every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production at the same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce (Althusser, 1971, p. 123).” These conditions are material conditions, they are embodied and in this respect they are embodiments of values, dispositions, orientations, narratives, and relations that operate as common sense.

Our preliminary discussion about the relation between the individual umwelt and the environment was an attempt to situate the site of relational reproduction (or the absence thereof) – as part of the process of reproduction and production: reproduction for the material conditions of production and production of subjectivities that themselves then enter into various types of (re)productions of realit(ies). According to Althusser
(1971), the reproduction of labour-power is, in the famous “last instance,” dependent upon the material means to reproduce itself, which he claims is wage capital (p. 126). In an obvious way, this type of production relates closely to neoliberal discursive encodings or meanings circulating as values of education whose function, Althusser would argue, relates to the ideological interpellation of subjects (1971, p. 159-161), or precisely the making of students who want to be “good students,” which means primarily oriented towards “success,” not relationality and justice. Hence the meaning, value and desire of being identified as “being on the President's Honour Roll,” an honour saved for students with high academic averages, and thus understood as “the best.” This interpellation, a kind of coercion, identifies a person as something – a subject position and a positionality that entails relating to the world in particular ways from particular values. Althusser claims that “the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects” (his italics, 1971, p. 160). This is an important concept in need of some elaboration in order to appreciate its relevance to von Uexküll's thinking.

Through an Althusserian frame, access to a “non-ideological” or “scientific” (non a-priori meaning) instance of the relation of the student learning environment is only possible once a student recognizes that they are “in ideology” (1971, p. 163-164). In some respect, when Althusser claims that his famous “interpellation scene” with the policeman hailing the individual who in recognizing themselves in the hail constitutes

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33 In terms of schools being training grounds for knowledge necessary for future (wage) employment for students, and in terms of teachers 'having good jobs' “educating” young people (conceived of as an a-political experience).
themselves as subject (1971, p.163) takes place “in ideology” and not “outside ideology...in the street” (ibid), he is suggesting that the scene of encounters between individuals and their environments is always in/formed in a way that does not allow the real encounter, the real material conditions of the encounter, to be understood. This limited understanding is simultaneously a limited experience as the interpellation involves normalized cognitive, emotional and imaginative identifications. Thus, the encounter takes place within ideology but it appears as the normal, natural 'place' within which a normal, natural encounter occurs that enables the encounter to be knowable, by a knowable subject-self. As von Uexküll (1995) suggested, the environment itself is not actually present within these “scenes” from the everyday. What Althusser suggests is that in the very 'knowability' of our encounters, our relations, “we” who “know” are being constituted (or re/produced) as such. This is what limits the possibilities of encounters to the re/production of ideology34. Let us situate this thinking now within the institution that is our focus – the school.

According to Althusser (1975), of the plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), education is the most significant. Schools, regardless of whether they are public or private schools, are determined as ISAs because they function “massively and predominantly by ideology,” although they “also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately...this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic” (p. 138). Althusser suggests that “the ideology of the ruling class does not become the ruling ideology by the

34 It seems clear how the work of Foucault on subjectivity emerges from and develops these concerns with subject formation.
grace of God, nor even by virtue of the seizure of State power alone. It is by the installation of the ISAs in which this ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology” (Althusser, 1971, p. 139). Within this concept, Althusser makes allowance for “diversity and contradictions” (ibid) within ISAs that are ultimately, “in the final instance,” coordinated by that “ruling ideology” (ibid). In addition, Althusser does not simply mean that this is the state of affairs under capitalism, but rather that “no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (his italics, 1971, p.139). In this respect, Althusser's analysis is not merely one of capitalism's formation and continuance, but rather a theory of social formation in general, as pertains to institutions re-producing that State.

If we were to go back to von Uexküll's concept of the non-extended space of the individual perception and relate it to Althusser's thinking we might see a commonality in the notion that production and coordination through ISAs serves precisely to create extension of space, although this extended space is, in a sense, a contested but necessary ideology, or what we have otherwise called a fiction. This contestation is what Althusser locates when he says, “that the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle” (his italics, 1971, p. 140). Clearly, for

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35 I understand this to mean that Althusser acknowledges that phenomena can stem from different logics, or from “a multivalent logic that results in the co-existence of systems.” Guattari calls this “machines,” which will be useful to return to later in the essay.

36 I think 'fiction' applies as well to the “simulation” aspect to Foucaultian theories of subjectivity production that develop after Althusser in which “subtle, covert, and fluid forms of power modulate conduct and organize the individual through grids that are more multiple, dynamic and amplified than in the past” (Thompson, 2011, p.88).
Althusser as a Marxist, class is the ultimate convergence for the meaning of the socio-political struggle for meaning. This thus informs Althusser's analysis of what schools “do” to reproduce the relations of production.

As AnnMarie Wolpe (1996) argues, for Althusser the education system contributes to the reproduction of social relations of production in two ways:

First, it impart[s] to the labour force a necessary competency, or know how, producing a population differentiated according to its future positions in the hierarchy of labour. Second, it inculcate[s] an appropriate attitude toward work, reproducing a submission to and acceptance of “the rules of the established order,” the ruling ideology. (p. 305)

In this way, the re/production of 'knowledge' or “know how” coupled with the “appropriate attitude” ensures the social relations of production. While the reproduction thesis has been challenged (Willis 1977; Apple 1982; Aronowitz and Giroux 1985), Althusser's highlighting of the political dimension to knowledge and attitude 'production' within schools remains important even for later critical insights into how schools

37 Understood according to the terms of this paper's overall argument, “education system” can be understood as a system (with juridico-political foundations and tools) that attempts to coordinate, or extend, its logic across disparate learning-environments. This very construct of a centralized coordination or extension serves to create a plane of 'the same' (even as much as this plane 'allows for' some kind of difference within it) that acts to re-produce “a social” that ends up being superimposed on to the individual's relation to their environment.
legitimate certain forms of knowledge, values, language and styles that constituted the
dominant culture (Wolpe, p. 303). In addition, for our purposes, an important
contribution that Althusser (1970) makes is that he identifies the reproduction of the
relations of production as capitalist relations of exploitation (p. 146). Again, while this
does not reduce all actions and values within schools to embodiments of capitalist
exploitation what it means is that schools, through the re/production and emphasis of
certain knowledge and attitudes, normalize exploitation while obfuscating its recognition
beyond the “common sense” of the “normal world.”38 In this world, the school generally
comes under little suspicion given its “natural, indispensable-useful and even beneficial”
role (p. 148).

Perhaps the greatest criticism of this view of schools draws attention to the actions
of students as active agents rather than as passive recipients of educational values and
skills (Willis 1977). But, as Wolpe rightly argues, Althusser acknowledges the existence
of resistance within ISAs; he allowed for the plurality and diversity of ideologies that
compete with and contradict each other (p. 305). He also allows for teachers who
“attempt to turn the few weapons they can find in the history and learning they 'teach'
against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped” (p. 148). As
an example, the senior high math teacher and I have designed an interdisciplinary unit
that teaches Fahrenheit 451 and parabolas for each of our respective curriculums, but is
really a unit on faciality in which students will explore the “math” of their own faces

38 It is interesting to note that both von Uexküll and Althusser use the musical metaphor to try to describe
the workings of social formations – for von Uexküll the contrapuntal is emphasized while for Althusser
the idea that there is a concert dominated by a single score occasionally disturbed by contradistinctions.
while making critical efforts to explore what makes that face “cohere” in meanings of cultural discourse. Both the math teacher and I will model this exercise first in order to critically expose the educational apparatus from our own subject positions and in order to make efforts to gesture towards other ways of experiencing and relating (to) ourselves and/with students. After the teachers, as a group we will examine the face of a woman wearing a hijab in order to make efforts to relate larger social inequalities and the problematics of representation to the classroom. Finally, students will examine their own faces in an effort to “learn how to do parabolas” and in an effort to enter into relation with their own “faces.”

The next section will explore how the concepts of identification and faciality, of Perez and Deleuze respectively, could enable a more critical understanding of the problematics of student subjectivity within schools.

3.4 Gilberto Perez's Notion of Identification as Rhetoric and Deleuze's Faciality as a Supplement To Gramsci and Althusser

Examining the “structures and forces that produce and reproduce our conformity” (May, 2005, p. 9) requires understanding how individuals come to chose to do what it is they do (Foucault Berkley lecture, 1983). Gilberto Perez (2000, online), uses the study of film and of techniques of identification as and with character (as ideology) to suggest how the construct of “character” in American politics can be understood as an act of rhetorical
persuasion. Juxtaposing this to Deleuze's thought suggests that this persuasion, these techniques of identification, are strategies employed by subjects as part of capitalist culture's “concern with the investment of desire in the production, recording, and consumption of faces” (Goodchild, 1996, p.107). Together these draw out implications for our understanding of the problematic of student subjectivity formation within neoliberal discursive codes in the context of schools that we can later relate to the problem of self-reflection and critical thinking in curriculum.

Perez's article begins by recasting Althusser's concept of interpellation as “a kind of persuasion by identification” wherein “ideology [is understood] as a comprehension persuasion, a form of rhetoric” (2000, np). Thus, “being interpellated, one is being identified as something – a subject position [in which] one is being asked to identify oneself with something – what the subject position represents” (ibid). This notion that a subject position represents something, some value within the discursive encodings of the context relates the matter of the subject, of its positionality, to desire. As Thompson (2011) argues, in schools the matter of subjectification is made more complex by the fact that not only are students involved and engaged “within a very complex production of how they are seen at school and how they see themselves, (p. 92), but also that “schools structurally require that certain groupings exist in order for operation to continue through various traditional hierarchies” (ibid). In addition, he suggests that “schools need not only adversarial groups [so the school can function as a disciplinary and normalizing machine] but also many other groups for the processes of normalization, classification,
surveillance and individualisation to produce and deploy the hierarchical understandings that shape the governable self” (2011, p. 93). Together, these participate in capitalism's dominant mode of subjectivity production, the producing of faces. This involves processes of “recording” and “participating in society according to the appearance” (ibid) by which a person is recognized.

Returning to Perez (2000), we see how the move from direct control in society to a mode of production that internalizes subjectivities which individuals then carry through different social and institutional settings (again, part of the process of extending a single plane of logic through space and muting the engendering of possibilities of learning environments) happens, at least in part, through this rhetoric of identification in the production of faces. This “production” does not, ironically, produce anything new – rather, it is better understood as a reproduction of the dominant norm “from which faciality is defined, and according to which everyone can be located” (Goodchild, 1996, p.108). As Perez suggests, “the camera cannot create a. . .system; but it can express the tenets of such a system in a rhetoric of images” (2000, np). This process, for both Perez and Deleuze, is about subjects identifying their interests with the values of society, something that “has their approval” (Perez). This “approval,” Goodchild tells us, is for Deleuze about majoritarian, or “common sense,” representational, thought and about the subject's desire to produce a face of his or her own that will be recognized and acclaimed (1996).

39 For Deleuze, this is the stability of a representational system that territorializes social representation by establishing pre-existing experiences. Much like with our discussion of space and schools versus learning environments, this is part of the problem of what possibilities are possible a priori for students.
In the first place, a grid is constructed composed of exclusive alternatives: a face is a man or a woman, rich or poor, adult or child, a leader or a subject, heterosexual or homosexual (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.177; cited in Goodchild 1996, p.107). The distinction is 'biunivocal,' in the sense that the alternatives refer to a single distinction. The subject which judges and recognizes will always be placed on one side of the distinction. Secondly, there is a selective response in the form of a binary choice: a face either passes, or is rejected, in a simple 'yes' or 'no'. These two operations can combine to give a tolerance at a more removed level: a face is neither white nor black, is it Asian? Or Arab? A face is neither male nor female, is it a transvestite? Faces which do not pass the first distinction may become acceptable and recognizable at a later level of choice. This mode of thought is majoritarian: it assigns every face a place in relation to a constant norm which [itself] always receives a positive evaluation, such as white, adult, rational, male, heterosexual, married, speaker of a major European language, dweller in a town. (Goodchild, 1996, p. 107)

What Perez tells us is that an identification in this way is not an identity, strictly speaking in that A is not identical to B, A is A completely; rather, identification is about commonality, “something shared in common or believed to be shared. . .identification is a
matter of degree: A is identified with B insofar as their interests are joined” (2000). In addition, both thinkers recognize that while this production of a “sameness in commonality” works to join, it also works to divide. In this way, “the face becomes a perspective” (Goodchild, 1996, p. 108; my italics) that grounds a point of view and opinion on everything, which is a necessity in a capitalist democracy (ibid). This need to express identity through our point of view, or opinion, and ultimately our choices, never involves recognition of the “real relations of production that compose society” (ibid).

The processes of excluding critical self-reflection of faciality can be related to what Perez calls alignment and allegiance, two different modes of identification. While Perez's analysis makes use of specific filmic examples, for the sake of our argument we can understand the processes of “character” identification here not as that of an individual viewer with a specific film, but rather of identification with the idealized individual student subject within the school learning space. For example, the posting of “exemplar” answers for previous public exam questions further regulates the possibility of what can be answered, what can be known and/or what kind of relationship the student is expected to have with the texts of the course in order to “succeed” on the exam. These relations all participate in “education, then, [as] more of an apparatus of taming instead of a place for learning” (Olsson, 2010, p.xix) because such an example “stops us [from] thinking” (ibid). The student's thinking becomes aligned to the path of success of previous students. In alignment “we share the character's path, his or her point of view in the physical sense” while in allegiance “we share the character's values, his or her point of view in a moral
sense” (Perez, 2000). The relationship between these is important in that sharing a character's “path” usually helps persuade us to share values. “Alignment serves rhetorically to promote allegiance” (ibid). In this case, the tamed subject of evaluation can be understood as foundational and transferable to the tamed student-as-citizen trying to construct a “right understanding” of their place and identity in the state through curricular documents that (re)produce the acceptable knowledge and values of neoliberal discourse and the capitalist democratic system. In this respect, “the” world becomes a set for the fiction we are encouraged to accept and align with as characters or faces who have (throughout school learning spaces) been encouraged to devalue and even distrust the power we have to instantiate new realities.

So how does this relationship between alignment and allegiance lead to the exclusion of critical self-reflection of “a character's” faciality? As Althusser (1970, 1971) pointed out, ideology operates through signification, and alignment is about organizing the thought movement of the face in line with the majority's movement of an abstract ideal. Said another way, the narrative of “progress” that emerges from the enlightenment and is coopted and assimilated by the industrial revolution to characterize the idealized “success” of an abstract subject is “the character” whom we are aligned with through the story of the West up to and including neoliberal discourse. Part of the legacy of the Enlightenment, Western liberal democracy emphasizes the qualities of reason, self-determination, and individual potential as the values we are persuaded to identify with as moral goods through our alignment with the abstract, ideal subject. That these qualities
have been gendered as masculine and men have come to embody the qualities of the complete citizen, as well as racialized and classed, etc., are not part of the alignment process. The “character” of the abstract, ideal subject lives the success, not a life on the margins; as such, we identify with the narrative of success and accept common sense notions that promise opportunity and equality with that abstract, idealized success trope. In this way, self-reflection and critical thinking appear meaningful and productive if they contribute to the moral ends of this process of subjectification. Critical self-reflection that divides allegiance and alignment unsettles because it demonstrates the normative joining and exposes production and the myth of the individual. This myth of the individual and its perpetuation by global communication, media and popular culture, is primarily how we come to desire and identify with an abstract subject that exists only in images and “faces” of “success” that has overcome obstacle.

Britzman (1992), using slightly different language and talking about a university context, talks about how graduate students “hold tightly to the construct of the rugged individual; in the power to single-handedly rise above not just the constraints of history and culture. . .but the constraints of identity, social location and power” (p. 255). In fact Britzman (1992) links this mythic trope figure to “the Western canon of literature,” but she could very well have been talking about the canon of film Westerns. Relating Britzman's graduate students back to high school students being trained to become “citizens,” “recognizing subordinating moments [in] education [is] difficult because it seem[s] to directly challenge their unarticulated hopes for a classroom [and a society]
without social conflict” (1992, p.256). This is key – our educational system (re)produces a social formation and citizenry that adheres to the codes of accepting and (re)producing the social formation – not changing it, not being in conflict with it (beyond an individual's “right” to vote against something but not to chose to not be in relation to it). The task of our characters, our students and myself as a teacher is to keep society going, not to fundamentally alter it, which would be akin to destroying what “is” now.

As Perez says, “our identification comes. . .from our involvement in the task” of a subject and so identification thus relates to action (2000, np). Perez suggests that “the bias of our culture leads us to assume that we identify primarily with individuals, with the intrinsic qualities of a person, but...it is primarily an action, an individual engaged in an action” (ibid) rather than merely the individual in themselves that we identify with. In this respect we, as isolated individuals, do not identify with characters we deem to be isolated individuals; rather, “the moment we recognize how we always identify in a context, a situation, and how we identify with an action – an action that, in that context and situation, draws us in – it becomes clear we are not dealing with a oneness of our own self but rather with a commonality” (ibid). In this way, we are brought to action, to identify with an acting together that produces the normalization of that action and thus the discursive codings that undermine it within its cultural context and naturalized power dynamics. In this way, identification is “a moving to action, or at least an inducement to

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40 The example that Perez give here is of Norman Bates from the film Psycho with whom we identify even after we know he is the murderer because of the various scenes in which we identify with his struggle through his actions.
attitude” and reflection that serves to “discover” the self will often merely discover a commonality of the abstract, ideal subject, not their own production (which offers no intrinsic values, character traits or anything else that a “character” is 'supposed' to entail).

For Deleuze this aspect relates to the pass-words of faciality in our society. As Goodchild (1996) tells us,

the dominant mode of representation is the pass-word: a face or a figure [that] allows access to the means of production, information, and consumption according to a simple binary scheme. The pass-word itself represents an abstract quantification of the degree of financial or cultural accumulation, one's credit or credibility, which itself can be regulated by salary and degree of access to the production of information. For Deleuze and Guattari, these simple processes of thought and styles of subjectivity are formed from the conjunction of complex regimes of signs. (p. 108)

Complex regimes of signs are involved in processes of signification, or ideology according to Althusser and Perez and the hegemony of the production of the single plane of capital's logic that limits all possibility to the function of the dominant mode of (social) re/production. Faciality thus addresses how subjectivity is informed and how it informs the actions and activities of the individual in relation (Thompson, 2011, p. 93) to their

41 Perez cites Kenneth Burke's work here who calls this an “incipient action.”
identifications. The faces fall into denoted places in a certain arrangement within the social machine that is the school (ibid). As Goodchild (1996) explains, Deleuze argued that faciality is organized through the individual's assigning each face a place in relation to a constant set of norms. Overcoding reinforces this face and its place to the point that “in this set of processes the faciality of the person carries such powerful meanings that the individual wearing that face is increasingly produced by it,” through their thinking and even practices of self-reflecting that affirm an identification use-full and consistent with neo-liberal and capitalist imperatives (Goodchild, 1996, p.107). This process abstracts the individual into a realm of simulation and reproduction. As Deleuze (1988) argues, “one becomes enslaved to oneself, and the power of one's own reasoning” (p. 130). In addition, what is produced here is an irony for, in actual fact, nothing is produced, no real thing is produced, only a virtuality that takes on the force of a reality, but one that is severely limited in what possibilities of life it might engender.

Because Deleuzian faciality “intertwines subjectivities with language” (Thompson, 2011, p. 309) and because of how “common sense” permeates the discursive and ideological codes of our language, the obstacle to finding creative and innovative ways to understand ourselves – as students and teachers – is intricately tied to the possibilities we might pursue to change ourselves and the world. For example, from his research in Australian schools, Thompson (2011) describes how “many of the students interviewed lacked the language to understand themselves in creative or innovative ways. Instead they seemed trapped within the limiting possibilities of their own
performances. . .as with the quiet student who understood that she was often ignored because she behaved in quiet ways and who resolved to become quieter in order to gain the attention she wanted” (p. 309, 310). Or in my own experiences as a teacher, it is the case of the working class student who thinks he is stupid in contrast to his upper class peers; he never considers how class has historically informed the conditions of possibility for the academic performance he assumes takes place on neutral footing. As a result of being challenged to consider history as part of learning to frame the curriculum's value and meaning and recast the relationships he suffers under, the student withdraws and goes further in performing the “school's just not for me” role and affirming his lower academic status to his peers although the role of class remains naturalized and invisible within their relationships. This is where the problem of self-reflection within school learning spaces as a strategy coded to circulate and reproduce faciality according to dominant discursive and ideological values happens. All too often self-reflection in this school learning space serves to reaffirm subjectivity, not disrupt it.

These examples illustrate how, through prescriptive forces, operant “common sense” and processes of discursive and semiotic identification, dominant modes of social production within school learning spaces limit the type of subjective experiences possible both in action and in what are accessible to students in their self-reflections.
3.5 Con/text as The Major Literature of Education

Considering the gap between what von Uexküll (1995) suggests is an environment, and the potential subjective pluralism of umwelts to which it relates, and the school learning space as an overcoded, reified “experience” that functions as both a producer and expression of hegemony, common sense, and faciality within the current neoliberal context, is to begin to approach what Deleuze and Guattari (1995) call an assemblage. Any assemblage is “a collective assemblage of enunciation [and] . . . a machinic assemblage of desire” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995, p. 81). An assemblage, in this sense, answers the question what is necessary to put together a reality? It is not a “static term” but rather the “process of arranging, organizing, fitting together” (Wise, p. 91). It is the concept employed by Deleuze and Guattari to deal with “the play of contingency and structure, organization and change”42 (ibid). According to Wise, “we are always caught up in and constituted by multiple assemblages” (ibid, 94). Assemblage elements include systems of things, actions and passions, as well as discourses (direct and indirect), words, “meanings,” and non-corporeal relations that link signifiers with effects (ibid). As noted

[a]ssemblages contain two axes. On one axis is a machined assemblage, that is, material processes of bodies and actions, as well as a collective assemblage of enunciation, that is, corresponding speech and signs. On the other axis the

42 Wise notes however that these pairs of terms are false alternatives as understood by Deleuze and Guattari.
assemblage contains reterritorialized lines that stabilize it, and create
territories functioning as systems of habit, as well as points of
deterritorialization, that is, movements by which we leave the inhabited
territory and break loose of habits (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 97-98).

As discussed earlier, we construct new assemblages through our desires; we produce
reality. Two important aspects of this thinking are useful to state here. First, this desiring
is machinic because it is unconscious – it operates through the encodings of order and
thought and common sense discussed earlier. As Olsson (2010) says, “these are not
machines run by a conscious subject” (p. 150), they do not happen in rationally planned
ways but rather as elemental to the processes of social (re)production. Second, for
Deleuze and Guattari, when something changes in an assemblage, bodies are being
affected or are affecting. Thus affect is centrally related to movement beyond the
(re)production of both social formations and of our determined subjectivities.

Related to our considerations of the con/text of the problem of student reflection,
when curricular documents use the term reflection as a necessary skill to be learned and
practiced by the student as subject, the assemblage of desire implied consists of the
components that relate that reflection to the desire to produce students-as-citizens. The
elements of such an assemblage could include teachers and students and report cards and
grades and portfolios and desks and clocks and friends and their place in the class and
resumes and futures, etc., that support that utterance coming to know oneself as a stable
subject in a representable reality which produces itself as such. Of course, there is no
guarantee at all that students will produce this assemblage in the act of their bodies reflecting in classroom learning space; however, without a learning environment to sustain deterritorializations of the habits of such a command “to reflect,” there is little room for a line of flight out of habit to gain consistency of action with others by reorienting students together in community through a (non-representational) *sense* for difference among them that may be explored and thus created by its very exploration. As Deleuze and Guattari (1986) suggest, the single plane of logic that extends (the meaning of) space prior to the subjective experience of it (and its possibilities for subjectivities) does so through naming, organizing, categorizing what is known and knowable and thus shaping the flows of desire. Machinic assemblages (related to the systems, actions and passions) not only fix “the initial senses of things, not only with its rooms, its offices, its books, its symbols, its topography, but also with its personnel” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 18). Teachers, students, administrators, custodians, curriculums, the system of education, et al, all become part of the school environment, of the machine, and, in addition, of the social assemblage that it presupposes. The collective assemblage of enunciation, which refers to the discourses, words, “meanings” and non-corporeal relations, would relate to the place of hegemony, common sense and ideology in constituting the “language” of education.

If we consider curriculum as an enunciation made from within the machine, by the metonymic speaker of “the Department of Education”, that makes statements about what education 'is', we can understand that these statements never refer back to a subject (ibid,
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1986), “there isn't a subject who emits the statement or a subject about which the statement would be emitted” (p. 83) regardless of “the marking of the process of enunciation” that some linguists perceive “in terms like I, you, here, now” (ibid). Rather, curricular enunciations that make statements about education relate back to what we might call a Major Literature of Education. “The enunciation precedes the statement, not as the function of the subject that would have produced it but as a function of the assemblage that makes this into its first gear in order to connect to other gears that will follow and that will be installed as time goes by” (ibid, p. 85). These “gears” of curricular enunciations, of statements about the social assemblage from which and into which our students move through all the parts that connect them to their “experiences” of “becoming educated” thus form “the common sense path” of becoming citizens to which our education is oriented. In this way we might offer a reading of the Literature of Education not as the writings of various individual authors and thinkers who develop educational theories, but rather as the set of discursive “writings” and networks that underpin the values and knowledge systems from which curricula are drawn by successive governments as prescriptions for their populations; prescriptions which can simultaneously be understood as ideological in that they reveal and produce a worldview and reality. These “writings” are always polyvocal and can be read to reveal competing ideas; however, even this competition of ideas within curriculum, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is part of the machine making the machine.

While there is no subject of these statements other than the collective assemblage
of enunciation tied to the machines of the social assemblage which is presupposed, the major literature of education speak[s] to individual concerns in individuating ways within a world defined by a dominant social milieu just as [its major pedagogy] would present information and knowledge that is perceived as important or useful to an individual as a pursuit for objective truth and knowledge in a cohesive objective social world (Helmsing, 2014, p. 73).

In addition, it would take students and teachers and all other “personnel” (as bound, discrete object-ive identities) “as part of its gears along with things, structures . . . materials,” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995, p. 81) according to the values of a certain set of desires elemental to the dominant story that produces and is produced by education, neoliberalism43. As part of a major literature, this conception of education is itself a type of fiction (that nonetheless operates as reality) that (re)produces itself as a naturalized order, but that can be more clearly understood as a con/text to student reflection. In mapping the problem of student reflection, I am not trying to suggest a reduction of all experiences of reflection to what is discussed here. Rather, by mapping out the elements involved as part of the experience and process of student reflection through curriculum in school learning spaces, I am trying to suggest how what can be done is limited by what is in place. Of course, and thankfully, there are always teachers and students and conditions that enable movement beyond these limits.

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43 I am thinking here about how a critique of this dominant type of identity formation within schools is central to restorative justice critiques of the limits of traditional forms of disciplinary action within schools (Vaandering, 2011).
3.6 Conclusion

As a major literature, this conception of education, with its assemblage of enunciation which includes hegemony, common sense, (limited) possibility, ideology as identification, and faciality, has three characteristics. First, the language of a major literature is affected with a low coefficient of deterritorialization; in the sense that we have used it, this means that a major literature becomes normalized and represented as a natural phenomenon of reality. In this context it allows us to accept and “know” what education means and what education looks like in our culture as a given of our culture. This is suggested earlier with respect to neo-liberal discourses that shape the way we speak about education, teacher and student productivity, and economic imperatives that frame the policy. Second, very little in a major literature is understood as political. In our current context, knowledge disciplines, or subjects, are discreet and divided; they may include the 'study' of politics but are seldom engaged as political – politics (and knowledge itself) becomes an object relegated to an outside of the student, of the subject, which we can enter willfully, or not, and wherein that move itself is not a political gesture. Third, everything takes on an individual value; the major literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of the individual. In this respect, the ideology of individualism and the liberal-subject reigns. We only need look at our awards systems to recognize what, or rather who, we celebrate – individual achievement. Not to mention the structure of our departments – with a single department head under a further
hierarchy of the individual.

One can consider the division of a “Guidance Department” as emblematic of such divisions that cut teachers off from the whole student reducing them to a responsibility for the student's brain, their knowledge, as the privileged domain of the individual in “learning” and becoming “educated.” Anything to do with “the heart,” with hopes and fears and desires and affects, becomes a part of the domain of Guidance, of a “specialized” education. In this landscape interactions with Guidance take on their own value codings within the system of the school distinct that feedback into academic and social divisions within the school's “order.” This becomes the landscape or territory division of the school as a learning space that reinforces and reproduces expectations of and for subjectivities in schools. This 'local' classroom or school experience is related to inter-institutional and provincial levels at which “education” is conceived and (re)produced through policies.

Taken together these, individually and in relation, produce the major literature of education which becomes an expression of the single plane of logic that embodies hegemonic ideologies and facialities that regulate subjectivities through practices that produce “citizens” who will enter the public sphere. In a sense, the question really becomes: given the normalizing production of the major literature of education as part of the practice of education, to what degree could our students-as-citizens conceive of ways to really change their own futures?

The next chapter will take a specific look at the way reflection operates within the
dominant, major literature of education to sustain an emphasis on the individual and on rationality as ways that limit what becomes possible for our subjectivities and thus our becoming educated.
Chapter 4 – Reflection, or Mirror Mirror and the Wall

“Already a fictitious past occupies a place in our memories... a past of which we know nothing with certainty – not even that it is false” Jorge Luis Borges

“She where there's a wall/there's a way/around, over, or through” Joy Kogawa

4.1 Introduction

From scholarly texts to the public pedagogy of popular media with its use of parody and irony (although most often still in the service of market forces)\(^4\), the notion of constructedness (especially of media texts) seems readily accepted; however, the situation may not be as obvious as it appears. For example, the Kotex ads that mock the company's own former ads as media constructs that presented a laughable and idealized construct of women's experiences of menstruation may appear at first as genuine and self-revealing.

In the ad a young, white woman sits in her apartment. She has a modern hair style and is dressed in urban, 'hip' clothing and necklace accessories. In the background we see books on a bookshelf and adjacent to those a wall upon which we see a notice board with random notes. These suggest her urbane, literate wit and her busy lifestyle. The former frame her sardonic tone throughout the ad – she is smart and ironic and has cultural capital. Throughout the ad the young woman ironically “thanks” advertisers for their “realistic” depiction of menstruation and their products' ability to “help her.” The ad juxtaposes her comments to images from more traditional Kotex ads that sell tampons,  

pads and liners to mock and critique the construct of women's experiences of their menstrual cycles.

Such an ad exemplifies a new type of discourse that has formed around the “obviousness” of constructions that ultimately serve to disarm critical vigilance while ultimately serving the same commercial imperatives underpinning advertising but this time aimed at more ironic, media savvy “tween” demographic. Perez's notion of identification reveals how the ad attempts to bypass the viewer's criticism and skepticism regarding advertising by naturalizing the commonality of sameness in perspective of skepticism and irony between the character – the young, hip, dry-witted woman - with the intended audience, young women.

As E. Daniel Valentine (1996) suggests, despite the great insights that awareness of constructedness affords us, “there has [still] been a flattening down of culture to a single dimension and a loss of perspective on the relative differences in resilience among various cultural constructions, as well as their relative latency” such that we sometimes miss how some constructions “[conceal] not only their constructedness but possibly their very presence” (p. 14). In other words, the public pedagogy of our culture fosters a vision that is constituted precisely to miss the way our culture teaches us to see the construction of texts by having us align and identify with an image of reflective criticality that ultimately consents to the imperatives of our market and social orders. In the Kotex ad, for example, the ad's irony and “critique” serve to distance the viewer from the constructedness of this ad by having them align and identify with the urbane wit and
irony of the woman; rather than commenting on its own construction, this ad presents itself as 'critically' distant from advertising and the woman as distant from previous women who 'consumed' these products. Insodoing, the “new” product that this ad sells, and the attitude Kotex attempts to transfer to its users, appears dissociated from the history of this particular product and its advertising. The public pedagogy imbued within this ad could be said to conceal by half-revealing. In public images that half-reveal, irony becomes enough to signify dissent; action is relegated to waiting, “waiting for the world to change,” as sung by pop icon John Mayer, as the world continues its cycle of production and consumption.

A major literature of education that reproduces dominant modes of being and the knowledge to be consumed to arrive as “success”, I contend, conceals by half-revealing, in much the same way as the Kotex ad which “teaches” a certain kind of “reflexivity” of the consumer. Put another way, the major literature of education, (the state mandated, institutional way “education” is done, what it means, its function, and all the material institutions and practices in place to “do” this), deploys a concept of reflection into assemblages of schooling which masks the presence of processes of subjectification despite apparently celebrating deconstructive impulses of “reflection” oriented towards more “authentic” learning and greater self-knowledge. If reflective practices within schools can be said to be transformative, this transformation is relegated to the domain of “the private,” to personal shifts in our knowledge rather than to experiences beyond a representational knowledge that have the power to challenge our identities by orienting us
towards a socially constituted relationality that disrupts conventional order. This conventional state of understanding and practices of reflection thus serve to (re)produce reality, not ultimately transform it. This, I contend, is the logic that underpins how reflection operates within the classroom as a school learning space.

In addition, even when reflection is meant to be used progressively within curricular documents, it is ultimately deployed into a school learning space that materially undermines creative, disruptive emergences through the nature of its very discursive constitution. For example, the fact that reflection can be turned into a thing, a product, whether in the form of a journal or a portfolio of items, to be assessed by a set of general standards, in itself already limits how and what students “reflect.” Here reflection is deemed to produce quantifiable objects in the form of words or representations. Indeed, evaluating reflection turns it into a set of practices that typically mirror back (as ‘reflecting’) what students expect the “right answer” to be. If this “right answer” means a representation of new appreciations of others, of a changed way of thinking, then a representation of these becomes the aim, regardless of the actual experience of what is being represented. Thankfully, this is not an absolute experience and sometimes reflection manages to disrupt representational order; sometimes teachers and students experience something otherwise than how we always do things and relate to each other.

This chapter emerges from my own experiences and is an attempt to theorize both of these types of reflections – the limiting and the enabling/liberatory reflection – and how enabling/liberatory reflection may contribute to the conversion of classroom learning
Rather than focus on the challenges of educators to transfer reflective inquiry strategies learned in Faculties of Education (Jones and Jones, 2013) which is (legitimately) a prevalent research concern regarding reflection in education, this chapter discusses the limits to the effectiveness of reflection in schools by focusing on what reflection means in our common sense (considering that it is almost never defined before its use), on the deployment of reflection in curricular documents and on how reflective practices employing limiting types of reflection constitute the nature of the classroom as a school learning space that participates in the assemblages (as things, ideas, languages, bodies, institutions and material practices) that reproduce current institutional forms of education, or the major literature of education. As Goodchild (1996) suggests, “education is a process of incorporation into the dominant reality, so that whatever face one may have, one is forced to think like a majoritarian, even if one has a grievance against the majority” (p. 110). This “thinking like” is an important part of the problematic of reflection in schools. But, as has been suggested in the previous chapter, one does not “think like” another recognizable subject who is easily located and can then be easily challenged. Rather, as the work of Greg Thompson (2011) reveals, the “discourses and practices [through which] students are taught to comport themselves in appropriate ways as they move from childhood to adulthood, from the role of student to that of citizen” (p. 8), are not easily located because they primarily function as perspectives, even though, as faces, they always come first from without before they are interiorized (Goodchild, 1996, 101).
In this respect, we will begin with how reflection developed 'outside' of its uses within schools in order to theorize how our common sense understanding of reflection comes from a tradition that imbues it with features that go unthought in our use of it in schools.

The chapter will begin with a review of what reflection 'is' according to how it developed historically and theoretically into its conventional uses within our current institutional educational practices. It will then move to situate the concept of reflection within curricular documents from Senior High English in Newfoundland and Labrador to examine how this construct of reflection within these documents relates to practices that limit or enable different experiences of subjectivity within classrooms. These types of experiences become important for a kind of transformational education that places orientation to the other as an act of social justice at the heart of curricular desires to educate future citizens.

4.2 What is Reflection? And what does it do?

Etymologically, reflection comes from the late 14th century “reflexion” which referenced the throwing back of light or heat off surfaces; “a reflection” was literally a “bending back,” a thing, a noun of action from the past participle stem of the Latin “reflectere.” This optical sense shifts by 1605 when “the verb 'reflect' was first used to
refer to the act of turning one's thought to something, rather than to an optical phenomenon” (Rose, 2013, p. 1). Ellen Rose tells us that by the 1650s reflection “was being used to describe a remark made after turning one's thought to a subject” (ibid) and that “in 1690, philosopher John Locke used reflection to denote the natural human propensity to turn one's thoughts upon one's own thought processes, which he offered as a primary source of ideas” (ibid, p. 2), and which led to reflection as a kind of “independent, careful thought” (ibid) that required slowness, patience and solitude (ibid).

As Leijen et al (2012) suggest, today “reflection can generally be defined as a cognitive process carried out in order to learn from experiences (Moon 2004) through individual inquiry and collaboration with others (Dewey 1993)” (p. 203). Generally, reflection is believed to lead to “deeper learning,” to achievement of more complex and integrated knowledge systems and to more accessible and usable knowledge (ibid). In addition, historical changes in the concept of reflection have led to this type of reflection ideally happening “in action” such that it becomes synonymous with “intelligent action” (Rose, 2,13). However, several authors (Leijen, et al, 2012; Griffiths 2000; Gur-Ze'ev, et al, 2001; Hatton and Smith, 1995; Van Manen, 1995) suggest that despite the importance and use of reflection, little guidance and literature exist around precisely defining and determining, facilitating and assessing the quality of reflection according to a consensus of what it actually means. Because of this, there appears to be a proliferation of different kinds of reflections and of reflective techniques. A sampling provided by Gur-Ze'ev (2001) includes: postmodern/feminist 'self reflection' (Lather),
transformative reflection (Doll), the 'reflective act' (Derrida), 'reflexive discourses, institutions or cultures' (Adam) and 'self-reflective communities' (Brown) (p. 93).

With respect to research in education, much of the work on student reflection is professional or instructional in nature and revolves around techniques to make students more 'reflective writers' or 'reflective thinkers.' It thus presupposes a meaning for reflection itself. Most critical work on reflection treats questions that emerge from prospective teacher training. Deborah Britzman examines the use of autobiographical reflection to develop critical skills that can problematize “common sense” assumptions and cultural myths about teacher, as well as the unconscious reproduction of school structures (1992, 2003). Still others critically examine ways of creating Reflective and Critical Internship Programs (Singh, Doyle, Kennedy, Rose, Ludlow, 2001) that would enable teachers to “stand aside from their own knowledge and reflect on the ideologies and cultures that inform such knowledge” (Doyle, 2001, p. 30). Such arguments see reflection working to problematize teachers' “roles in schools. . .and the function of schooling generally in society,” (ibid) whereby schools are generally conceived in terms of “settings” (ibid, p. 32) within which action (or life) happens. This keeps the practices of reflection in schools relegated to acts that either reproduce or challenge classroom learning spaces without necessarily conceiving of reflection as constituting a conversion of this type of space into something otherwise. My interest is in theorizing towards a reflection that transforms the classroom learning space back (which is to say into the potentiality of what was always already present 'beneath') into an experience (and thus
reality) of “the deeper dimensions of education” (ibid, p. 34) that constitute the learning environment.

Efforts to ground this discussion of reflection could start with reflection in the canonical Cartesian self-reflective action which, as Gillespie (2006) notes, is genuinely interactional but in which “the mind, body and world all preexist any action” and in which neither consciousness nor self-reflection are explained (p. 5). Or it could begin with George Herbert Mead's 'self-reflection' in which the self reflects in order to bridge the perspective of the other who, due to naturalistic and discursive constructivisms, echoing the work of von Uexküll, and a “profound perspectivism” such that “each organism constructs its world in a unique way and inhabits a 'private environment’” (Gillespie, 2006, p. 8) effected by ideas, is separated from that self. Through this self-reflection as consciousness, the self becomes other to its self (ibid, p. 16-21). If not with Mead, we could use the work of Dewey who, coming before Mead, considers reflection as “an active and deliberative cognitive process, involving sequences of interconnected ideas which take account of underlying beliefs and knowledge” (H.L. De Bruin, Van der Schaaf, Oosterbaan, Prins, p. 416) and which serves the purpose of becoming conscious and thoughtful about one’s actions in a consistent, consecutive manner, as opposed to acting according to a trial and error schema (Dewey, 1933, p. 4, 5). Other important theories of reflection by Kolb and Schon, whose works are based on that of Dewey but who extend his thought on cyclical reflection models (A. Leijen, Valtna, Leijen, Pedaste, 2012, p. 204; Jones and Jones, 2013, p. 74) could also be starting points.
However, in this thesis I will take the work of John Dewey as my starting point for thinking about reflection because, as Rose (2013) argues, historically, he offers “the first notable attempt to redefine reflection” from its etymological associations with “solitude and slowness” (p. 8). In addition, Dewey's influential work was “taken up by many educators. . .'becoming the bible for thousands of teachers’” (cited in Rose, p. 11), thus giving it a dominant place within our common sense. This influence largely redefined reflection “as a goal driven, orderly problem-solving process instigated by a state of perplexity or mental doubt” (ibid, p. 9). My own work as a teacher in Newfoundland and Labrador affirms this lexical understanding of reflection as oriented towards making the obscure, the perplexing, clear within teacher discourses. It is in this manner that as teachers in in-service we are asked “to reflect” on problems, or that we are encouraged to have students reflect on course content as ways of helping them review for evaluations. Clarity, as an end of reflection, and reflection as a way of addressing problems, are two important aspects of Dewey's legacy of reflection in contemporary educational discourse and practice.

In his book *How We Think* (1933), Dewey, historically acknowledged (Hatton and Smith 1995, Leijen, et al. 2011, Cornish and Jenkins 2012, Jones and Jones 2013) as a key originator in the twentieth century of the concept of reflection in education, conceptualizes reflection as the “*active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends*” (Dewey, 1933, p. 9; his italics). Dewey thus does away
with any passivity in reflection, relating it moreso to the active investigation of the scientific method (Rose, 2013, p. 10). Jones and Jones (2013) suggest that for reflection to be valuable and transferable for Dewey it must meet four criteria:

1. it must enable the learner to make connections between ideas, abstract relationships, and other experiences and ideas.
2. it must be systematic and intentional.
3. it must be a social activity, completed through interaction with others.
4. it must be viewed as a means of personal growth and continued improvement. (p. 74)

Accordingly, reflection is not a simple reconsideration of things but is rather a “systematic, disciplined, and rigorous way of thinking” (ibid). Importantly, for Dewey, the process of reflective inquiry is analogous to the process of scientific inquiry in that it has precise steps [which] include observation and analysis of an experience, generation of hypothesis and theories, gathering data, and drawing conclusions (ibid).

Though natural, this type of thinking must be taught and practiced and Dewey appears to be somewhat skeptical about whether the “mechanical administration of education,” with
its focus on the “acquisition of information identified with the amassing of isolated items, and not with assimilating mental food” (Dewey, 1933, p. 53), can sustain the necessary conditions to engender reflective thinking in students.

Dewey also believed that, apart from the conditions of the school and teaching, personal attitudes and qualities of the student were essential for the possibility of reflective thought. In *How We Think* (1933) Dewey asserts that thinking is cognitive and attitudinal. Attitudes necessary for thinking include empathy, open-mindedness, curiosity, patience, ability to handle suspense, risk taking and active seeking of feedback (Jones and Jones, 2013, p. 74). Students without these values must learn these attitudes before reflection can take place and, thus, access to reflection is not necessarily assumed or a given (De Bruin, et al., p. 415). For Dewey, students will learn those attitudes because ultimately reflection is worthwhile in that “it converts action that is merely appetitive, blind, and impulsive into intelligent action” (Dewey, 1933, p. 17; his italics). In this way, reflection “confers upon physical events and objects a very different status and value from those which they possess to a being that does not reflect” (ibid, p. 19). As Lynn Fendler (2003) points out, with Dewey

a particular kind of reflective thinking emerged in the early part of this century [which gave an increased power of control] for very modern reasons: reflective thinking represented a triumph of reason and science over instinct and impulse. Cartesian reflection is an enactment of self-awareness. In
contrast, Dewey's reflective thinking was meant to replace appetites and impulses with scientifically rational choices. (p. 18)

In this sense, reflection is the necessity for a rational society, for action based on forethought that could detect “contingencies and emergencies of life” and “protect ourselves from [their] full impact” (Dewey, 1933, p. 19).

This forethought and this reason appear to fear the contingent such that it must be ordered by reflection, and this ordering can result in rationally developing future possibilities. Fendler (2003) contextualizes this rational, “scientific” approach in Dewey's thinking by suggesting how

the faith in a science of schooling was part of a discourse related to the professionalization occurring in the social and economic structures of American society. The Progressive Era is one manifestation of a larger change in the social organization of work and the commodification of knowledge through the formation of structured communities of experts (Popkewitz, 1987, p.10; cited in Fendler, 2003, p. 19).

This highlights the historical context within which school learning space crystallizes – the classroom becomes rationalized in terms of organization, knowledge and potentiality. In this context, reflection thus relates more to an application of scientific method to the
individual's own thought and the future rather than to any notion of relationality in the present; it relates to “a thirst for knowledge as opposed to the quest for meaning” (Hannah Arendt, cited in Rose, 2013, p. 14). In some sense, Dewey's historical context, which was “increasingly prone to regard science as the primary source of knowledge, truth and authority [and] celebrated technology as its sole hope for progress” (ibid, p. 10), is consistent with today's emphasis on knowledge industries in labour and economics, as well as on science and technology as the privileged sites of knowledge. In this respect, Dewey's “exaggeration of the scientific method” (ibid) as the foundation for a reflection that improves rationality still underpins today's treatment of reflection as “purposeful process” (ibid, 11) directed at “the solution of a problem” (ibid). This type of reflection thus operates for something, something which is ultimately reified into an object (of knowledge) that can be known rationally; whether that something be ourselves or our understanding of course content, this type of reflection orders and makes things.

This rational 'thing making' dimension to Deweyian reflection is evident in the ways we have adopted Dewey's ideas into current models and practices. According to De Bruin et al, Dewey's work on reflection has been developed in a number of ways that are manifest in current educational practices (416). One of the most important developments highlighted by De Bruin et al is the iterative model with vertical dimensions of Mann et al. “An iterative model emphasizes that reflection is triggered by an experience, results in new understandings and different future actions, leading to new triggering experiences” (ibid). Two important features of this model highlight how the reflecting subject's
rational application of scientific method rigor to their own experience ultimately reifies their present in lieu of the desire for a rational future. In addition, the rational future is no longer understood as something socially transformed, but rather becomes a stable world into which the subject can continue to consume new experiences. First, the model's emphasis is on the new, not the deepening and expanding of the now, or even the past. In a hyper-consumerist world new experiences are consumed like purchased objects or products and constantly desired while old ‘things’ are tossed. Little time is spent on experiences in the present to deepen their meaning. Rather, they are desired only inasmuch as they make possible even newer experiences. A deepening of the present or the past becomes de-emphasized (whether as memory, trace, or experience in need of return which cannot be exhausted and whose return cannot be determined rationally) as the 'object' of reflection; rather than being a kind of key to meaning, 'an experience' becomes a kind of currency in the cult of experience that gives us knowledge of experiences as 'things' to be used in “scientific or professional action” (Rose, 2013, p. 13) or for purely personal “introspective understanding” (Fendler, 2003, p. 19) that, as Fendler suggests, can serve again to fix us as an object of being (ibid).

The second feature is that different future actions appear to all exist on the same plane of existence, on the same single plane of logic; they are simply other alternatives within the same set of choice. In this respect, sameness still predominates over difference here – difference appears as alternate quantity, not alternate quality; the vertical does not move us into something analogous to the hierarchy of need, or a newly accessible
qualitatively different kind of experience. As Gur-Ze'ev et al (2001) argue, the iterative model as a foundation for reflection in classrooms

[can] actually narrow the scope and possibilities for reflection. In particular, the ideal of 'reflection' gets used and promoted in pursuit of instrumental rationality and thus itself subject to 'rationalization' and control. . .Reflection in this adulterated sense refers to a theoretical attitude which aims at explanations, predictions or understandings of human action which in fact disregard the full scope of human freedom (p. 97).

This type of reflection as a tool (with its 'products' recorded, catalogued in portfolios) thus limits the efficacy of reflection as transformative whereby a different kind of living and life, with others rather than for ourselves, become possible. Especially when the transformation under consideration relates to creating new ways of experiencing one's subjectivity as a means of orienting us relationally towards the other as a constitutive dimension of our learning environments, such tools and presuppositions are revealed as, ultimately, tools of capturing or limiting possibility.

A second model adapted from Dewey's (1933) work seeks to divide reflection into particular fields that can allow for distinctions to be made, as with Dewey's original thinking on reflection, between reflective and non-reflective thought. Mezirow (1991) and Wallman et al (2008) develop this model into divisions between content reflection,
Content reflection pertains to what one perceives, thinks, feels or acts when doing a task. The student consciously thinks of what he or she did in order to solve an actual problem. Process reflection refers to how one performs the functions of perceiving, thinking, feeling or acting. The student discusses his or her performance and assesses how effective the performance was. Premise reflection focuses on why one apprehends, thinks, feels or acts the way one does and the consequences for how to act in future situations. The student includes the whole situation in the analysis, “what” and “how” are put in context and alternative methods are considered. The deeper level of premise reflection is transformative and more critical and difficult to reach than surface levels, that is content and process reflection, because the student has to prove that reflection changed the way he or she approaches new problems and that he or she has internalized this understanding (De Bruin et al, 2012, p. 417).

According to this model, “reflection is necessary for [a] change in the structure of assumptions acquired in past experiences which one uses to interpret present and future experiences” (ibid). This model appears to deepen thinking by examining assumptions related to action, although it is unclear what constitutes “the actual problem.” The relation of “task” to “problem” reinforces the impression of reflection's relation to
scientific method in which problems can be contrived or situated in the laboratory of the class- 
room (of a school learning space) ultimately reinforcing a division of the school learning space from the “real lives” of students, as they exist “outside” of school, rather than these problems having the exigency of life continuous outside and inside of student (learning) environments. In addition, this model puts the onus of “proof” on the student – on the actor – not on the witnessing of transformation in action in which “proof” does not need to be, maybe cannot be, “expressed” in the rational, linguistic or recordable forms typically privileged or available in the school learning space, such as in portfolios.

Rationality and representational logic are thus evident within this model which (re)produces certain “common sense” notions about reflection. The first 'common sense' notion is that there are levels of reflection that operate on a 'surface' reflection vs 'deep' reflection dichotomy. The surface here would be reflection largely as description, with little penetration of the “reasons for” some thing, event, feeling, action, etc. There appears to be a privileging of “deep” reflection, with it constituted as the “real” or complete or “correct” reflection. The second common sense notion is that real reflection is difficult and that, in some way, achieving this is more about some particularity of the subject who reflects than on conditions of reflective practice. The third common sense notion is that the entire process of reflection is ultimately about knowability, and that without the ability to know and represent back to some other, (the authority figure of the teacher, or the prescription of a curriculum document), the quality of the reflection is called into question; it may be counterfeit.
As with some legal notion, the student has to “prove” authenticity and the way to provide proof is through logic, rationality and communicability (not in action to be witnessed or perceived, but in a verbal or written language to be expressed by the subject as an epistemological, knowing subject versus a sensing subject). Fourth, the portfolio becomes a tool to affirm that students are self-regulated, that they have mastered strategies of personal initiation designed to improve their learning outcomes in schools (Zimmerman, 1989; cited in ibid). The school itself becomes less the focus of this process than the student himself or herself; the environment, relationality, and others are all subsumed to the individual. In this respect, the student appears self-contained; their success or failure at reflection has little relation to the context of the reflective act – the school is a reproducible site or neutral space that, if anything, may inhibit reflection due to a failure to discipline out distraction, but not effect it by the very nature of teacher and student relationship with the space itself\textsuperscript{45}. In the construct of this type of model that makes use of Dewey's reflection, future action becomes an exterior reality similar to the a priori space that students enter; in the latter case they come into it, in the former they go out into it post reflection. If anything knowledge changes, not the school changing into an environment. There does not appear to be any relationship between the student and environment as an element of the possibility of reflection. And, in addition, the changing of the student is not necessarily understood as political, or related to social justice. The

\textsuperscript{45} I would suggest that even the practice of teachers playing music or provide a text as a prompt for reflection would not be theorized as essentially related to the school environment in this process. The prompt is the key, if anything, and that prompt can be given anywhere. It and its being given are not understood, among other ‘things' and people, as part of the assemblage instantiated in that moment for and, potentially, of reflection.
change can be conceived in any number of instrumental or hedonistic or other types of ways while the school can remain intact as a school learning space, as it always was before; it is the student that changes.

This leads us to the essence of Gillespie's (2006) critique of Deweyan reflection and its legacy that runs through our curricular assumptions and practices. According to Gillespie (2006),

the Deweyan [reflection] act, despite its sophisticated temporality\textsuperscript{46}, is fundamentally individualistic. It refers only to the organism-environment relation. How can it account for the fact that humans share language and a social environment. . .[Dewey's theory of reflection] carries perspectivism forward, but it does not provide an account of perspective-taking. (p. 14)

From Gillespie's perspective, the reflection that develops from Dewey's thought is always from the perspective of the subject, or rather, “perspective is always still focused on the actor and the other is not endowed with any independent perspective” (p. 16). The claim here is that Dewey's theory of reflection is not multi-perspectival in that it does not

\textsuperscript{46} This temporality is part of Dewey's complex argument against Descartes' spatial metaphor for explaining consciousness. For Dewey, “the basic movement. . .can be schematized as: action -->rupture-->self-reflective thinking-->resolution.” (Gillespie 12). As I understand it, rupture occurs when contradictory responses lead to a subjective-objective divide in understanding. For Dewey this is the foundation of consciousness. As Gillespie says, “Dewey's contribution is to try to explain the subjective as a phase within the larger act, and thus inextricably dependent upon the goal of the actor: Mind, for Dewey, does not exist in-itself, like \textit{res cogitans}, instead it is the dissolution and reconstruction of the ruptured object from the standpoint of the actor” (ibid).
theorize the interaction between perspectives as elemental to its understanding of a social act. In this sense, Dewey's theory implicitly fails to recognize that the self is already the other from the perspective of others within social interaction, and thus if self could take the perspective of other (toward self) then it could move towards explaining self-reflection and self-mediation (the latter being an end of the former in Dewey's theory) (p. 16). According to Gur-Ze'ev, et al. (2001), “recognition of the other as totally different and, as such, as an equal partner and a possible source for new perspectives and possibilities, is a pre-condition for the transcendence and elevation of each subject participating in . . . dialogue” (p. 100). Developing their thinking through the work of Levinas, Gur-Ze'ev et al. suggest that “in dialogue, as distinct from discourse, participants are pragmatically committed to rational practices but ethically committed to each other, and they can achieve transcendence only jointly, or not at all (ibid, p. 100). The implication, it seems, is that if Dewey's theory of self-reflection, as canonical, does underpin the presuppositions of self-reflection inscribed into our educational assemblages, by virtue of their place in curricular expectations and practices, then self-reflection will always already tend towards reproducing the underlying hegemonic privileging of the individual, ironically, through its concentration upon the subject's perspective, as opposed to a relational perspective as the ground for reflection.47

This may be, in part, what leads writers like Gur-Ze'ev et al. (2001) and Fendler

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47 A further implication might be for the Deweyan notion of education as an ethical endeavour (Markham, 19). If Gillespie's critique is accurate, then Deweyan education as ethical endeavour is an ethics of the individual in relation to a world of objects, as opposed to an ethics of the relationship (between self-self, self-other, self-world, etc.).
the present order has its own 'dynamics' and 'reflection'. . .can be a response to it. But in this case it is a response to problems arising as part of the modern, instrumentalist ability to plan and foresee the future course of events. [It] is not informed by 'something' beyond the present order, something other. . .as an educational practice, it is committed to the standardization of the individual and the circumscription of her intellectual possibilities (p. 102).

They continue that “a Foucauldian analysis would emphasize individualization [of the subject as the agent of the system, of thought and of the current order] as a promotion of individual differences – almost a kind of de-standardization – [as] functional for modern societies, which require a diversity of human capital” (ibid). In either case, both participate in the hegemonic rhetoric of reflection in capitalist globalization which “ultimately profess[es] a kind of subjectivism which is only too well suited to the globalization of capitalist production and consumption. This subjectivism is itself part of a market in which identities and knowledge are privatized and reified and reduced to commodities” (ibid, p. 103).

Fendler's (2003) criticism of this kind of reflection in schools also makes reference to the work of Foucault. Fendler (2003) suggests that one of the main purposes of education in 20th century democracies has been to promote self-discipline according to
social norms. “Given that the notion of modern democratic governance is inseparable from self-discipline, it is impossible to draw a line between an authentic experience of reflection and what has already been socialized and disciplined” (p. 21). We can hear a resonance with the discussion of assemblages from the last chapter when Fendler (2003) suggests that “the practice of reflection is itself a product of specific historical power relations” and that, as such, “. . .reflection can function as a disciplinary technology whose purpose may be obscure or unrecognized because ways of thinking are subject to and produced by social practices of discipline and normalization” (p. 21). In this sense, reflection has the tendency to reproduce the subjectivities and potentialities that ensure a reproduction of the dominant state of affairs. As Thompson reports from his research, students in the Australian context he studied struggled with feeling “expected to conform to values and attitudes that were alien to [their] experience” (Thompson, 199) and recognized “the benefits” of (re)producing “normalizing judgments” of “the good”, “and they aspired to move closer to the ideal [of the good student] so as to enjoy more of the benefits this afforded” (ibid) within their schools.

In this respect, reflection disciplines difference by highlighting it as different within schools that function to affirm and produce sameness with the dominant through punishment and benefits, through power. My own experience with students who master the rhetoric of “self-reflection” as a means to a “good grade” as an end affirms these findings; the desire associated with being on the right side of the sorting function of school evaluations self-disciplines any sense of students' voices of difference, of objection
to sameness and representational logic.

Fendler (2003), following Foucault, suggests the problem of reflection in language is similar to that of fiction. They both share the same task - not to make the invisible visible, but rather “to point to the limits of thought and language” (p. 21). “The problem with trying to make the invisible visible is that in the process of becoming visible, the Other becomes assimilated onto familiar ground and loses the distinctive character that makes it Other” (ibid). This is the essential problem with the emphasis of rationality as an underpinning of reflection; according to Rose (2013), reflection can be more “closely aligned with creativity than analysis” (p. 19), as a “generative form of thought. . .that entails mulling over ideas that have no necessary connection and eventually producing from them, and from the perceived interconnections among them, new meanings and ideas” (ibid). This effort to reclaim reflection from an implicit privileging of the technical mindset that devalues non-scientific forms of mental activity, which are dismissed as part of the subjective realm of the chaotic, the affective, (ibid) is consistent with a move to push reflection to the outside, towards “the strangeness of the Other” (Levinas, 2004, p. 73). Fendler (2003) quotes Foucault here,

[h]ence the necessity of converting reflexive language. It must be directed not toward any inner confirmation – not toward a kind of central, unshakable certitude – but toward an outer bound where it must continually content itself” (Foucault, 1966/1998b, p.152; cited in Fendler, 2003, p. 20).

This “converting [of] reflexive language” is where we locate an intersection of
reflection “toward an outer bound” with von Uexküll's suggestion about the resonances of affect in the relatinality of the subject with his environment, and relatinality with others.

[D]ispensing with a representational theory of language and a structuralist impulse to inscribe being with the totality of language, Levinas posits a theory of language which reveals that there is something – *il y a* – beyond words spoken: a trace of presence exists in the speaking of speech. It is thus that we encounter the Other (the stranger) through discourse. (Todd, 2009, p. 73).

Discourse here, however, means something different from its use in earlier chapters in which it signifies the rules of a language that regulate possibility and thus the relation of the individual to the possibility of themselves, their world and the meaning of their materiality through language; rather, for Levinas, “discourse is the experience of something absolutely foreign. . .*a traumatism of astonishment*. . .the strangeness of the Other, his very freedom!” (opt cited, p. 73; italics in original). This kind of “converted reflection” is not about capture, it is about a relation with that which cannot be contained or represented; for von Uexküll, it is about *sense*, not language; it is about affect orienting us towards that other, in relation to that other.

Building towards that relation is thus an act of creativity, not analysis; as Rose (2013) suggests, it is about “resonance” in which relations “declare themselves” through “non-empirical ways of knowing” that do not reject the empirical, but are neither limited to working as verifiable data (p. 25,26). The provisional quality that emerges from
engaging with the world, with environments and others, when moved through affect “construct[s] not only new perspectives and ideas but also new ways of being in the world” (ibid, p. 28). There is thus a direct implication for subjectivity and subjectification in this reflection “converted” from rationality to other ways of knowing that resist representation and totalization.

With respect to education, Rose (2013) suggests that this type of reflection cannot be taught but that it can be fostered or cultivated as a way of being (p. 102). Most important to this fostering or cultivation is developing an attentiveness to words, to how they are used to recognize how their movement sets in motion movements of the mind through rational and non-rational means. Importantly here we have reflection as an attentiveness to affect, to being moved in ways that are not determinate but rather provisional, and which generate “a provisionality of questioning” (ibid). This provisionality resists representation of a determinate subject that “has” the knowledge of reflection, but rather places the experiences of reflecting and learning in the middle, in-between self and other. Examples of practices relating to this type of reflection are presented in Chapter Five.

For now, the question that we come to is how do these types of reflection, as well as the classroom learning space and the learning environment, relate to the way that reflection is employed in the curricular documents which outline the learnings of English Language Arts? Do the documents use reflection in a way that can direct language and experience towards an “outer bounds” or does it root us back in the individual and the
(re)production of a reality limited in its possibility for subjectivity?

4.3 Curriculum and Reflection: An overview

A survey of the Program Design and Components for English Language Arts reveals that the construct of reflection deployed in the curricular document operates in contradictory and often competing ways in relation to what reflection is expected to 'do'. The word “reflection,” or some derivation thereof, can be found on fifty-two of the one hundred and six pages of the Overview document, often multiple times on one page. Most often, it denotes actions such as “to mirror,” “to know one's self,” or even “to consider.” These uses typically represent a relationship between mirroring, knowing, or considering one's self and the ability to come to “a” judgment of some object, action, idea or state of affairs. In this way, this type of reflection aims to “teach” students to become individuals or subjects who are able to, and who do, make judgements. It aims to produce judging subjects. I will argue that this is related to a particular understanding of “the student-as-citizen” as grounded in common sense privileging of action over passivity, and in decisiveness rather than precariousness. Rather than enabling transformation, I will argue that this type of reflection is limiting and that it risks functioning as a mechanism of control. In contrast, uses of “reflection,” or its derivations, that mean “to critique” or “to question” denote exposing such mechanisms of control.

While closer to the possible enabling or liberatory impulses and effects of
reflection, this type of reflection too resides in a representational logic that can be evaluated or assessed and which ultimately is more related to the analysis of the old world rather than to the synthesis of the new world. It does not “push language to its outer limit” (Fendler, 2003, 21) in order to bring us closer to different kinds of experiences and subjectivities. In relation to earlier considerations, the reflection deployed in the curricular documents lend themselves more to (re)producing classroom learning spaces than creating learning environments. Consideration of a sampling of outcomes that employ “reflection” will illustrate this argument, and aim to suggest ways to maximize the curriculum while making efforts to move beyond it.

Early on in the Atlantic Canada Framework for Essential Graduation Learnings in Schools (2003), we are told that “key-stage curriculum outcomes for the end of grades 3, 6, 9 and 12 reflect a continuum of learning” (p. 23). “[R]eflect” here denotes a mirroring; the suggestion is that the outcomes are arranged in a manner that mirrors or corresponds to an understanding of “learnings” as “a continuum,” or as a progression that, although it may be halted in time, with respect to students' passing or failing courses, it is uninterrupted inasmuch as one phase of knowledge depends upon a phase prior to it and sets up a phase anterior to it. “Knowledge” in this respect corresponds to an image of progress. The importance here is in the subtlety of the way “the student,” as the subject of curriculum, also becomes the subject of a directional vision of history whose engine is the ascending path of progress as knowledge. This modernist bias latent within the way the curriculum positions the student and their learning within the constructs of both
knowledge and (personal) history betrays a political dimension to the curriculum as a frame for the practices and desired effects of reflection as deployed within it.

The important issue here for reflection revolves around contingency. If reflection fits within a modernist, directional vision then the success or failure of a student “to reflect” in a manner that produces a mirroring of “progress,” of “better” insights into themselves, or ideas, or course content, or whatever is the object of reflection, is all reducible to the student and their own “progress” within the course, or with their acquisition of (self) knowledge. If contingency is not a variable in the construct of reflection then the various relations into which the student enters when they are asked “to reflect” in a particular classroom, in particular circumstances, become muted and made invisible. The classroom becomes a flat plane of space into which a student enters with all focus for success or failure projected into the individual of the student. The Deweyan notion of reflection as individualistic thus extends into the legacy of current curricular documents while simultaneously playing a role in the script that “constructs” the classroom learning space. Again, this space is understood as an effect of the relations that constitute it as such, as opposed to the other way around.

In this way students from an early age are subsumed into a notion of progress, of modernist teleological, directional development that naturalizes a way of being identified and represented within the space of the classroom and school. This abstraction of the student out of the possibility of the classroom as a learning environment and into the classroom learning space is reinforced by the positionality of learning that is affirmed by
other prescriptions for reflection. The documents state that it is “crucial that students examine information texts. . .information that reflects different theoretical, ideological and cultural perspectives” (100). Although the subject of “reflects” (again here denoting a mirroring or corresponding) is “information,” this curricular objective is instructional for how it supports the de-politicized positionality of the student embedded within the curricular documents and the classroom. In this example, the students “examine” while the information “reflects”; the implication is that students will do so from a neutral position, maybe the position of the curricular document, with its prescription that rationality is how “to know” “different perspectives”. In this way, the student's relationship to what it means “to reflect” is analytical and suggests that reason, or rationality, is a position outside of positions, of perspectives and constructed “ideologies” and “cultures.” An indirect message of good grades within ELA would thus become an affirmation to the student that they occupy, or have occupied, this position; it would naturalize and normalize the relationship between analysis and reflection whose effect is to abstract the “good student” to a discursive space outside of ideology and culture, to a “reason” that feels like Dewey's privileging of scientific method.

This emphasis on rationality participates in relating reflection to knowledge and representational logic which act as mechanisms of control. This is evident in curricular outcomes including that “students will be expected to speak and listen to explore, extend, clarify, and reflect on their thoughts, ideas, feelings and experiences” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003, p.22) and that “students will make connections
between their own values, beliefs, and cultures and those reflected in literary and media
texts” (ibid, p. 35) while they can “see reflections of themselves: their times, their
country, their age, their concerns [in literature]” (ibid, p. 64). Here the first reflection
suggests coming to knowing while the second again denotes mirroring and the third
denotes what is already known. Importantly, these all have the effect of reifying the
student as the object of knowledge without making it clear that identity is, in part,
produced as an object. Rather, these processes are masked by the individual becoming
“known” to herself or himself in representational terms associated with the characters,
plots and narratives of human history and identity. The world thus becomes object-
centred, knowable by rationality, both in terms of what we are and how we show what we
are (through the representation of our identities). In Foucauldian terms, the individuals
created through these understandings and practices of reflection become tools to
normalize the ways that people see and govern themselves (Thompson, 2011, p. 31), thus
reflection becomes a mechanism of control.

This is evident to me with students entering Grade 10 who regularly express
anxiety about “what” they are “supposed to” write in reflections, and how long their
reflections “need to be.” I often withhold any prescription from the first written
reflections in order to try to understand student presuppositions about reflection and
assessment from what they write. In my experience, students do not view assessment of
reflection as “help[ing] [them] to become more self-reflective and [to] feel in control of
their own learning” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003, p. 95). The
The dominant type of reflection that I receive is a blend of description and exposition that attempts to name identity. The end is a “good grade” that simultaneously alleviates the anxiety of assessment precisely because it affirms the identity as “good” and “right” and learnings thusly “controlled.” The precariousness and uncertainty of relationality with others as elemental to learning is absent entirely because the identities of other people are presupposed as entirely knowable, as with each student’s own. This early high school type of reflection is not often yet analytical, although it already clearly aligns itself with representation. Rather, it aims for a kind of literary realism in which a representation of an image of identity constitutes “knowing” who she or he “is.” The evidence of power limiting student identity exists here not so much in the identity expressed, but rather, by the social practices that have (re)produced an understanding and expression of “reflection” in this “common sense” manner.

And yet, the curriculum also contains deployments of reflection that are more aligned with critical, analytical thinking that seeks to deconstruct these types of reified identities by challenging students to examine how knowledge is produced. Unfortunately, this becomes its own new knowledge that does not enter back into a type of reflection that becomes creative and thus synthesizes something otherwise. These too fall back into an unthought dimension within a new common sense that can be easily appropriated into the hegemonic production of profoundly individualistic subjects obedient to a subjectivity that reinforces a blindness to relationality (and thus our-selves as limited).

For example, the curricular documents require that “students reflect on their own
identities and on the ways in which social and cultural contexts define and shape those identities” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2001, p. 101) as well as that they “reflect on their identities to examine those which give them membership of a dominant group and those which make them feel disempowered” (ibid, p. 76) and “reflect critically on and evaluate their own and others’ uses of language in a range of contexts, recognizing elements of verbal and non-verbal messages that produce powerful communication” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003, p. 24). Taken together these could engender a possibility for a different perspective and sense that could be effective at destabilizing the truths of dominant subjectivity productions, and that could engender a movement toward a limit of our subjectivity formation. However, the problem of an ELA classroom that attempts to use a literary text to universalize access to these outcomes in a class of thirty students is that it still depends upon representation of experience as opposed to recognition of a non-representability that affirms difference.

An experience with a group of “good” students in Grade 12 a few years ago stands out to me as an example of this possibility and its difficulties. That year I taught Catcher in the Rye, the film Into the Wild and a sampling of poetry from Beat poets. To each of these I attached journal writing – writing which was meant to foster student reflection. My hope was that students would come to recognize what Blake called, “seeing through our eyes, not with our eyes” (cited in Williams, 2009). My hope was that they would see how vision creates perception and that perception is already interpretation (Williams, 2009). In this way I hoped that patterns of perception that have been sanctioned by
personal habits, society's laws, cultural norms and the many levels of tradition which inform us about who we are (ibid) would become evident and overcome through their learning.

I expected that between the various crises addressed in the various works, the fundamental desire to liberate meaning and identity would be a new narrative for students to align themselves with. But what I received from this group of students were journals that described what the characters had done, or who they were, or what they struggled against, in addition to “canonical” interpretations from Sparknotes. I did not receive a single journal that “reflected” on how any of this related to them. And why would I? Those texts were my choices – they related to me. The students, who were particularly concerned with scholarships and pending university applications, and thus grades, never felt any allegiance or alignment to the focalized voice in any of the texts. While they liked all of the materials, it related to them in the sense of having been entertained by an object and in the sense of being presented with “a knowledge” (of the texts) that had to be “known” and represented back (to me and to the public exam) in order for them to achieve success.

The voices, identities and values of those texts were taken as alien, as objects whose representations were to be known. They were more interested in how they could instrumentally use the canonical readings of each to satisfy me and the grade requirement for their own stories. In that way, even the “critical reflections” served as opportunities for the students to reiterate their security in self by always reading the texts against the
closed subjectivities that fixed their identities and performances “in” English class and “for” their own projected futures. There was no relationality other than with objects.

The students had no interest in pursuing what Foucault (1988) called “how the present is made” so that we can figure out “how it might be unmade” (p. 74). Rather, the make-up of the present was never really at issue. In being put in a relationship with the texts for reflection and critical analysis, the school subjectivities were affirmed as the position from which they entered that (prescribed) relation. That subjectivity is only “one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness” (Foucault, 1988, p. 253) was not a possibility of the exercise because the relation with the text never led to an encounter that disrupted their mechanisms to know themselves or “it.” The relation never moved beyond a relation with an object as an objectified relation produced within the classroom learning space.

In this example, the problem of my lesson with curricular reflection was that, in accordance with conventional teaching practice, I presented students with representations of consciousness in the texts we studied and upon which I asked them to reflect in order that they draw out themselves; however, as J. Hillis Miller (2005. p. 125) argues, there is no consciousnesses in these texts, only the representations of consciousnesses. And furthermore, these representations are never neutral, but their non-neutrality is not something we typically ask students to examine as part of their reading. Rather, they take the 'point of view' of the supposed presence of the text as a given – which means that each time they read these words in their own heads as part of English class, they are reiterating
a presupposed form of identity or subjectivity (one with which they are asked to identify) – thus “emitting, receiving and transmitting order-words,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 76). In this respect form is meaning. As such, Bloom's (1998) warning for feminists in using the narrative genre applies to my lesson with these students: structures of domination became inscribed in the process of this learning and reflecting as the students were re-inscribed into positions of gendered, classed modalities through the “story,” instrumental learning, and liberal moral expression of the 'right' voice of the subject which gets projected into a space like a reflective journal (p. 124) or assessment or public exam.

The question of voice becomes important as it relates to liberating the potentially empowering aspects of reflection within the curriculum. As Gillespie (2006) suggests, “vocal gestures are distinct from other gestures, such as facial gestures or bodily gestures because they [can be] experienced” more directly between self and other in a social act (p. 18). In a sense, taking the social position of a voice can reframe the meaning of a face or a body if we are open to the affectivity that resonates within the voice; an affectivity that is too easily obscured by the imposition of image onto face and body (or a faciality when that image is embedded into networks, discourses, institutions and material practices of power). In this respect, there appears to be potential to engage the faciality of students and of the represented characters in texts in an affective manner through the reflection imbued in curriculum by approaching it through voice if, however, it is set free from knowledge or evaluative based outcomes thus better enabling its detachment from that
institutional encoding of the activity.

Listening, becoming attuned to the sense of affect, thus becomes more important than “students' seeing reflections of themselves” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2001, p. 64). This affective manner can elicit the affective bridging of sense between self and other, rather than of knowledge between them. The biggest challenge is that this affect, this affective manner, is not rational, nor is it even “personal.” Rather, as Guattari (1995) suggests, it is “a pre-personal force” (p. 9), and as Massumi (2010) says, it is “the limit expression of what the human shares with everything it is not: a bringing out of its inclusion in matter” (p. 128). A recognition that something unrepresentable is shared with others that are different becomes the foundation for a less iconic and grand image of activism; it is an activism that makes pushing subjectivities to the boundaries of language to activate a sense of the other a political gesture. It is political in that its reflection – as an affirmation of the creativity of sense that synthesizes new ways of being in relation – liberates us from repressive, reified relations that (re)produce dominant social relations and subjectivities enmeshed in power networks. In this way, this affective dimension to reflection becomes a micro gesture towards social justice education, or at least, towards a type of micro activism (Zembylas, 2013, p. 85) that is a movement through subjectivity. This micro activism addresses the “power relations. . .reproduced by cultivating certain forms of agency” that are part of how Educational institutions exercise power (Barnett, 1999, p. 20). A consistent stringing together of liberatory forces pertaining to reflection from within the documents could thus be considered an example
of Delueze and Guattari's concept of the deterritorialization of the institutionalized Major Literature of Education

This is where we return to the situatedness of curriculum within the classroom, and of both curriculum and classroom as part of an assemblage in which reflection can function as a constraining force for student subjectivities or an enabling/liberatory force for enacting new possibilities for subjectivities. The curriculum in the classroom illustrates that “the tendency to assume that disciplinary, ritualized and hierarchical power dynamics emanate from the state and are efficacious in serving a unified political agenda” (Pykett, 2009, p. 107) is not accurate. Rather, the curriculum instantiates differences, different voices, ideologies and possibilities to be enacted. These possibilities can be enacted to the degree that the classroom becomes defamiliarized from its a priori meanings and encodings as a classroom learning space and converted into a learning environment in von Uexküll's sense, and to the degree that common sense, ideology and identification, hegemony and possibility are routinely engaged and deconstructed for their roles in subjectifying processes within the major literature of education. Together these moves determine the degree to which the major practices of reflection in schools can become deterritorialized to elicit other possibilities for student (and teacher) subjectivities. Reflection can work as an enabling and liberatory force upon faciality in order to help us think towards the limits of ourselves and our relations with others. Taken together, these processes of reflection (as related to critique but moving into practices of creativity) gesture towards a teaching for social justice education, albeit understood on a
micro level, on the level of subjects who enter and are willing to experiment with the
“where” and “how” we learn and reflect.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter attempts to set out some initial thoughts on the nature, function and
possibility of reflection in curriculum. In order to limit the scope of the chapter, a focus
for our starting point for a way to think about reflection was the seminal thinking of John
Dewey that emphasizes rationality and the individual in reflection. Problematizing
Dewey's (1933) concept of reflection as overly emphasizing knowledge accessed through
reason and individualism raised questions about whether or not reflection as inscribed
within curricular documents would enable or constrain possibilities for student
subjectivities if the outcomes also presupposed the rationality of reflection. Turning to
the Atlantic Education Foundations Document and the Program Components for English
Language Arts 10-12 in Newfoundland and Labrador and my own experiences with trying
to implement some of its outcomes revealed a manner of using the concept of reflection
consistent with Dewey's vision, but also opportunities that inscribed alternate
understandings and uses of 'reflect' and reflection. These often had competing and
contradictory effects within the curriculum; while at times the re-inscribed dominant
subjectivities and modalities of being, other times they had the potential for expanding
experiences of subjectivities and others.
The final chapter develops the examination of how the politics of the major education literature as well as understandings, practices and experiences of limiting and enabling/liberatory reflection materialize in my own experiences in my place of work. In my own context, reflection as a creative act that instantiates new ways of being is related to my own thinking and experiences with the religious concepts of grace, and of God in all things. But, like with the curricular documents, my experiences are filled with contradictions and competing understandings. The final chapter presents and explores these contradictions and competing understandings.
Chapter 5: Theorizing reflection towards a minor literature of education

“There is a crack in everything / That's how the light gets in” Leonard Cohen

“The most intense point of a life, the point where its energy is concentrated, is where it comes against power, struggles with it, attempts to use its forces, and to evade its traps” Foucault

5.1 Introduction

Our common sense understanding of reflection has changed throughout history. The last chapter examined and theorized how the unthought aspects of “reflection” and reflective practices within schools today (re)produce limits to how we experience subjectivities, both of ourselves and of others. Orienting us towards individualism rather than a subjectivism that includes a perspective towards experiencing the other in nonrepresentational ways, such a model becomes a problem for transformative, social justice education that attempts to foster citizens for the future. In addition, this limiting understanding, and the practices that employ it, (re)produce the classroom learning space, which itself is related to the reproduction of our dominant reality, and the normalizing vision that perpetuates injustice as an accepted norm.

This final chapter, will attempt to use a critical, narrative account of my own experiences of working at an Independent Catholic School in the Ignatian Tradition in St. John's, NL that employs state curriculum through a particular pedagogy in order to present the challenges and possibilities of moving towards and understanding and practicing reflection that is more enabling/liberatory than limiting. Examining some
historical aspects of the school within the narrative, I hope to illustrate the complex challenges of making such a move, not to mention its inevitable incompleteness. I will argue, however, that despite such “incompleteness,” moving towards different experiences of reflection are necessary in order to transform ourselves in relation to others and our schools as learning environments. Transformation must, I will argue, be understood relationally, so that the subject is never constituted as individual, or by individual practices, but rather as always already in relation – to others, to their environment, and, as with the tradition of my school as faith based, even to themselves as others in relation to the Divine. This focus reorients the goals we set for reflection in schools, away from producing some representable, “knowable” “evidence” of a critical, feeling individual whose underlying orientation does nothing to challenge the (re)production of social reality and its injustices. Rather, it would orient goals toward fostering students-in-relation to the plurality of natural and social life whose reflection creates affective linkages to others that, although not representable, create new ways for us to be together which honour difference. This would be the foundation for a kind of counter-discourse of education that could then engage questions and practices of solidarity and difference within the public sphere from experiences and languages different from those (re)produced in major literature education.

Such transformations, and the moves in thinking and practices that underpin them, constitute what I will call (in applying Deleuze and Guattari’s work) a minor literature of education. This other way of entering into what education is for, what it does and how, as
pertains to reflection, is not an attempt to define “the” way to transformative education. Rather, what I hope to theorize here is how this particular idea of a minor literature of education (among what could be many, many others which enter from different ideas of reflection or different concepts at play within education) might be understood to employ a reflection that creates, that constitutes a gesture towards a social justice education that brings both students and teachers closer to the affective potentialities that may enable further, new, liberatory forces to work upon our subjectivities. The idea is not that these practices bring us to a preconceived ‘place’ or point, but rather that they push us further towards the limits of ourselves where we might encounter the other in a way, such as Levinas (2004) discusses, that opens us to a possibility that we can never fully contain (p. 89). How would this then relate to a transformational, social justice education that seeks to foster citizens for life in the public space? \[48\]

Finally, theorizing this in relation to my experiences at a particular school that happens to be, as an independent and faith based school, other to the secular, public school system is not at all meant to present a binary alternative to public schools that do not use Ignatian pedagogy. Rather, this pedagogy, which attempts to foster “men and women for and with others,” comes from a theology that tells us that “the vocation for life precedes the choice of faith” (Nicolas, 2013, p. 6). In this respect, it is one tool or approach that can work in conjunction and intersection with other progressive methods and practices (and other minor literatures of education) at play in the many different

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48 This is not meant as a rhetorical question for which I have an answer, only as a question that emerges from a line of thinking I have undertaken in this thesis.
schools and educational spaces within this province. This is about adapting and experimenting to create something new, not about laying claim to a meaning or practice that dulls the creation of new opportunity for change. There is already much good work happening in this province that continues to push limiting practices into confrontations with the desire for life, for a life not yet defined, and thus in need of enabling/liberatory practices that offer opportunity for the making of new subjectivities and new realities.

5.2 Locating the Mythic Con/text of St Bonaventure's College in History

One day, a long time ago, I began to read a book which has yet to be finished. It is entitled *Noble to Our View*, by Brother J. B. Darcy. Written in part to celebrate the 150th Anniversary of St. Bonaventure's College, the book outlines the history of this K-12 school located in St. John's, Newfoundland. With an almost mythic reverence, Brother Darcy (2007) situates the conception of this particular, local school not in the mind of a single person, but rather as an emergence from the universal impulses and tensions of liberation and enslavement at the heart of both the American and French Revolutions penetrating the thought of “the [British colonial] Establishment” (p. 1).

According to Brother Darcy (2007), fear in England that “the radical ideas being introduced into the schools” (p. 2) during the period of the French Revolution might spread to the colonies, including to Newfoundland, led to the belief that the colonies needed their own schools. The idea of St. Bonaventure's emerges into history as a
classical, educational response to the 'teachings' of revolutions and the revolutionary spirit. Sir Thomas Cochrane, Governor of Newfoundland (1825-34), thus “pressed that a classical school be opened in St. John's to keep the affluent youth safely at home and away from the influence of such heretical theories” (p. 1). According to Darcy (2007), the Governor's second motive was “the foundation of a public seminary for the higher branches of learning, and useful and elegant accomplishments, [that] would do honour to our society; and spare its wealthier and middle classes the painful necessity of parting from their children at an age when parental care and supervision are supremely requisite” (p.1).

In the first act of this school's drama\(^{49}\) then, the idea of St. Bon's emerges at the intersection of the politics of fear and the desired reconstitution of hegemonic colonial power and values under attack. In this way, the first plans for the school may be understood as desiring to express an idealization of education rooted in the values of colonialism and its social and power relations, of extending the values and logic of the Centre to the physical and mental space of the Periphery. Noam Chomsky (2000) might call this aspect of the history of St. Bon's as an educational institution its participation in the “colonizing imperative” (p. 23) of Western education which itself could be described as participating in the history of the major literature of education. In this sense, the “fathers’” plan for education in the Newfoundland colony extended the “territory” of

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\(^{49}\) While I am introducing the “first act” as a name for this part of the history, Brother Darcy talks about later events as “the next act in our educational drama”. As such, I draw the notion of the structure of this story from Darcy's writing.
education from 'there' to 'here'; the codings of what education meant, and its function, for
the centre of the empire were “extended” as the ideals and methods of the “educational
spaces” to be created here; education in the colony can thus be understood as an
extension of both a logic and a set of practices that, in effect, extended the reality of
empire into this new land by creating a site for its (re)production.

5.3 The Early St. Bon's Story as a Major Literature

As suggested previously, we are taking the notion of 'the author' of the major
literature of education here to mean a set of historical discourses, systems and structures
that produce a master narrative within a particular epoch50. In this case, the major
language of this major literature is not so much a national linguistic system, but rather an
ideological matrix that 'authors' the construct of a discourse which materially produces its
texts – in this case, the socio-political and economic underpinnings of colonialist ideology
that literally determines both the form of an educational text – i.e what transmission will
look like, what the genre or architecture of its school will be – and the expression of what
this education, this school, is 'saying' into history by production of a particular kind of
“educated” student. Thus the idea of the first St. Bon's student can be understood as the
expression of a particular language of education; inasmuch as this 'language' can be

50 The presupposition to this extension is that “Reality” is itself not an objective state, but a construct
irreducible to an objective state knowable by humans. In this way, the making of a Reality is
synonymous with the making of a construct, or text, whether the maker be an individual or a supra-
individual set of forces.
understood as hegemonic, it satisfies Deleuze and Guattari's (1995) first quality of a major literature, which is that in it language is affected with a low coefficient of derritorialization (p. 16). That is to say that while hegemonic dominance constantly produces counter-tendencies and cross-currents, in this case those are either imperceptible or end up reterritorialized (or co-opted again to the logic of the old codings), and thus oriented toward the ends of the major language.

In this case, the desire for a seminary offers opportunity for deterritorialization, but “the Establishment's” political and economic imperatives for the colony intersect and reterritorialize this desire effectively (re)producing the dominant educational model. Brother Darcy's suggestion that the theological and spiritual motivations were apparent counter-tendencies to the imperatives of “the Establishment” supports the degree to which the school's latter development reterritorializes any transformative potentiality in the seminary. We see this in how Brother Darcy cites the successes of this alternative desire for the school in the number of priests ordained, rather than on the social effects these priests materialized as alternatives to the values of “the Establishment.” In effect, both desires or educations, if they can be understood as existing side-by-side or even in dialectical movement, still functioned toward synthesizing the same vision; the material telos of both was, in effect, the same, regardless of the abstract or ideational differences that may have existed between them. The place of priests and other representable identities within the codings of the system of education were (re)productions of the educational legacy transferred from there to here. In fairness to Brother Darcy, the world,
and Christians especially, would have to wait quite some time for a liberation theology that sought radicalized effects as the sense that the spiritual was, in/deed, moving (in) the world.

The second and third characteristics of the early St. Bon's as a major literature of education are evident in that little was expressly understood as political or collective; rather there was a pervasive normalization of experience and the focus on the individual. “The individual concern joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or background” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995, p. 17). In his book, Darcy (2007) next discusses the spiritual and historical concerns of the figure of Bishop Mullock, whose direct agency led to the creation of what came to be known as “St. Bon's” in 1858. Mullock's “great vision” and awareness of the “new scientific era” framed his desire to create “an education to fit [the Catholic youth] for the great destiny before them” (p. 14). As Darcy describes it, the great individual vision of the first school president was met with the equally great individual visions of the school's first teachers, all brilliant and all teaching in a highly individualistic, decentred way, albeit always teaching “a Classical education”. According to Darcy (2007), the “curriculum was breath-taking. It included Christian Doctrine, Church history, English composition, grammar and spelling. . . English history, geography; Latin, Greek, French and Spanish; algebra, geometry, arithmetic, navigation, astronomy and bookkeeping, besides singing and instrumental music” (p. 18). This aesthetic and intellectual reverence for the curriculum is juxtaposed in Darcy's book with an appreciation of the personalities of the
teachers, like “Mr. Maclaurin...[who] liked manliness and detested a sneak” (ibid). The point is that, from the curriculum to the psychologizing, or even aestheticization, of the teachers' characters, the history of the school is permeated with a depoliticized idealization bordering on a kind of pastoralization of education's past in which the individual (teacher or administrator) is the focal point.

This extends to a mythologizing of the students as well. Darcy tells us that “the first students seem to have been worthy of their teachers” (2007, p. 19). Being “lively and intelligent” and “as mischievous as schoolboys of any era” (ibid), the 'boys' are reified into an image that still exists in the reverence and glorified memories of the current St. Bon's “old boys” - the group of all male students now in their sixties to nineties who constitute what at other private schools might be understood as the wealthy alumni whose funds ensure the continuity of the experience of their alma mater. Although this group has not served this function for some time, given the shift in ownership of the school which will be discussed soon, recent efforts to reconnect this population with the new school's students is, in some way, an attempt to give the school a legacy, an image of the past by which its present can be understood and given a value through processes of identification. Ultimately, those early students were ordained to fit into positions of power and authority in the community of St. John's. Many would go on to become priests, teachers, and politicians. These varied dimensions of the school's historical experiences are, to this day, quite normalized and depoliticized in the myth that has grown up with, and maybe even been constructed by, the tradition.
By 1893 the educational context of the school was becoming more consistent across the province and the school and the social position of the school became increasingly tied to its output of successful academic results. This aspect of the major literature of education in today's high stakes assessment models appears to have had precursors to some degree in this era. As Darcy (2007) suggests, “the new system of public examinations was proving helpful to stimulate learning across the island” (p. 57) as the heads of the Catholic, Anglican and Wesleyan Colleges met with “the Government” and persuaded them to allocate $4000 a year for prizes and scholarships to be awarded to academic success. “The public exams and the scholarships and prizes now open for competition rapidly changed the educational scene in Newfoundland. The schools, colleges in particular, now realized that they were in direct competition with one another and that their results would be open to public scrutiny” (ibid). This increased competition and monetization of educational “results” through awards moved St. Bon's and education in the province more generally into a competition based model. One might wonder about the degree to which this influenced faciality and the subjectivities of denominational others, in the constructs of discourse and in “life on the streets” in that historical moment.

The school's trophy case, for example, which showcases historic victories against other (Catholic and Protestant) schools is a metonym for a glorification of how, in these instances, “the Blue and Gold”\(^{51}\) overcame “the others,” that obscures the socio-political dimensions of the faciality of “Blue and Gold.”

\(^{51}\) These were the historic colours of the school; red has been added since the schools reconstitution in 1999.
Hockey Hall of Fame website, for example, talks about how the Boyle trophy, the second oldest hockey competition trophy after the Stanley Cup, was moved, “by “several individuals with authority” (np), from provincial men's competition to the championship of senior high school hockey. The official description of the trophy on the Hall of Fame's webpage notes that “for a variety of reasons, including owning their own rink, St. Bon's teams dominated Boyle Trophy victories” (ibid). The perspective of the website begins to approach material socio-economic and political reasons that inform the glorified past of St. Bon's' teams in citing “a variety of reasons,” as well as the “owning” of a rink. Relating this to our considerations, we could ask how these, framed within experiences of schools, informed the understanding and experiences of students' subjectivities in that time? Surely they would have, and considering this question as part of a history, social studies or language arts project would politicize that which now appears apolitical. The suggestion of inequality and of the faciality of St. Bon's' advantages, as they relate to larger socio-economic and political reasons, is telling in that they are entirely absent from the story of the glorified athletes “of old” who dominated high school sports as represented by the trophy case.

Returning to the story, St. Bon's again became very successful and, in fact, had a student awarded with the highest exam marks both across the province and among all students from the province in the London exam. The image of the successful graduate entered more firmly into the psychological rhetoric and faciality of being from St. Bon's as it become increasingly identified as an elite academic school that produced students
who were recognized as such. Finally, in the era that then moves to span the two world wars, this identity of the St. Bon's student also becomes networked with the image of the sacrificing soldier, the honourable officer and the loyal citizen.

Many students from the school died in the wars – many students from many schools died in the wars. But even to this day, these students are remembered in formal ceremonies at Remembrance Day by the school community and members of the Royal Canadian Legion. They are hailed as heroes and examples of the good, and current students become, in effect, interpellated into an identification with their values and sacrifice as an act of commitment to citizenry and school. The commonality of these gestures and their ascribed meanings within the socio-cultural history of the province are elemental to the effects of the major literature of education and the assemblages of duty it creates across varied sites within the social body. We see clearly how education works with other social institutions to standardize and (re)produce values, loyalties, identifications and thus identities.

In 1962, St. Bonaventure's College was assimilated into the Roman Catholic School System operating across the province. As part of that system it lost its junior and senior high grades and became what we would today call a primary, elementary school, but which was called then a grammar school. In 1988 the Christian Brothers decided that, “because of declining numbers in their ranks, they could no longer be responsible for the school” (Darcy, 2007, p. 156). The school was passed into lay hands and was run by the Board until 1998.
In 1998, as a result of two referenda and of a determined push by the Newfoundland government, the denominational system of education, which had been in place since the 1850s with reasonable success, was replaced by a secular public school system. Secular public school boards were established and one of the first acts of the new Avalon East School Board was to move to close St. Bon's in spite of its continued success and the strong opposition of the parents to its closure. At first the Board intended the closure to be at the end of June, but the parents took legal action, prevented this, and in defiance celebrated the 140\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the school with a series of events including a dinner dance, an open house, a special Mass and reception. However, the Board did eventually win the legal battle and succeeded in closing the school at the end of August. St. Bonaventure's was the first and only school closed by the Board in 1998. (Darcy, 2007, p. 156)

The symbolism of the gesture by the Board, as the new body of authority for the major literature of education, relates to the gesture of defiance of those parents who celebrated the school's anniversary. This gesture of defiance becomes, in some ways, a foreshadowing of the shift to the minor literature of education embodied in the resurrected St. Bon's – a private, independent Catholic school in the Ignatian tradition that opened for the September 1999 school year. After the closing of the school, a group of
parents came together, within the language of the majority, and were able to collectively fund and support this independent school. What makes this group of parents' enunciation of desire to have an alternative education to the major an example of a minor language, I would argue, is that the new school's pedagogy was no longer that of the major language. The school became a choice for something other, something minor.

At this point, one line of Brother Darcy's reading of the history of St. Bon's remains unresolved - what was the destiny of the new school to be exactly? Would it be an expression of the reactionary affect and hegemonic values that gave the old St. Bonaventure's College its birth? Or would it be something else, something “of vision” engendered in a history that approaches the vitality of ideas, especially given the new Ignatian Pedagogy underpinning its rebirth. Could it become something worthy of the mythic reverence Darcy affords it (albeit one that employs that myth differently)? And how do these questions return to our theorization of the relationship between reflection and subjectivity and social justice education? Let us begin with the Jesuits' own turn towards a different kind of education.

5.4 The Minor Turn Within the Characteristics of Jesuit Education

Jesuit education is not new. It is over 400 years old and, for the majority of that
time, it participated in constructing the major literature of education across Europe. It offered the world the first standardized educational method and content with its *Ratio Studiorum*, and for centuries educated the elites of nations across Europe theorizing that by educating the highest (socio-economic and political) classes of students, those students would, in turn, *choose* to change society when they became leaders within the public sphere. In 1973 this entire understanding and model of education was challenged by the Father General of the Jesuits, Fr. Pedro Arrupe. In what has been called a “radical” address to the alumni of Jesuit schools and to Jesuit educators, Fr. Arrupe called into question the “success” of hundreds of years of Jesuit education. His problematization of producing “successful” citizens of a corrupted world system that does nothing for justice was understood as an indictment of Jesuit education's complicit relation to systems of power and oppression (Arrupe, n.p.).

One of the most important aspects of Arrupe's reformulation of Jesuit education, of the need to re-educate Jesuit education, was his move to join “the personal to social structure” as a necessary and explicit object of analysis in relation to which one must act (ibid). This orientation of action towards the relationship from personal to social structure emerges from the fact that the “entire self,” including “our 'periphery','’ as the effects of our lives in history, must be in relation to God, as the Absolute Other. Arrupe says

Let us see the meaning of this as it pertains to the relationship between
personal conversion and structural reform. If "personal conversion" is understood in the narrow sense of justification operative only at the very core of our person, it does not adequately represent the truth of the matter, for such justification is only the root, the beginning of a renewal, a reform of the structures at the "periphery" of our being, not only personal but social.

If we agree on this, conclusions fairly tumble forth. For the structures of this world - our customs; our social, economic, and political systems; our commercial relations; in general, the institutions we have created for ourselves - insofar as they have injustice built into them, are the concrete forms in which sin is objectified. They are the consequences of our sins throughout history, as well as the continuing stimulus and spur for further sin. (ibid)

The conversion Arrupe suggests as leading towards an orientation to the social and to social justice as the periphery of the self is an orientation to the Absolute Other, which we can here understand as instantiated by our relationships to others. Furthermore, these others move beyond other humans – as Jesuit theology perceives that God is in all things, this self to other relationship that is an orientation of duty to justice for Arrupe necessarily implicates our relationship with the natural world, the earth, with animals, etc. As Ryan suggests, considerations for theology that emerge and develop from an understanding of God in all things, “ultimately points toward solidarity as more than mere social planning, but rather [as] a robust sense of kinship with others in sharing public space”52 (2014, p.

52 In the context of his specific argument, Ryan analyzes Karl Rahner's theology of grace and Henri de
A clear resonance with von Uexküll (1995) exists here as pertains to redefining the individual as relational. In this Christian model, what von Uexküll theorizes as the umwelt, the “world” in which an organism lives, that is “constructed by its sensory and perceptual capabilities” acting in relation with its environment (Lock & Strong, 2010, p. 136), could be understood to mean that God is sensed and perceived, beyond the limits of existentialism’s openness to immediate context and social world, as the Divine as it moves (in) those. Related to sense and perception, such movement is not rational or representable and thus resists encoding back into any one dominant umwelt system.

More importantly, it suggests that affect is essential in orienting us towards others whose meaning we will, regardless of our efforts or shared beliefs, never contain. In this respect, this particular faith perspective that “locat[es] self/subjectivity in a tripartite context [, in] the relationship of the subject to oneself, to God and to other persons” (Ryan, 2014, p. 55) is not a limit to relationality with the other as much as it is an affirmation of a difference that resists interpretation and, in so doing, requires being experienced not known in order to be in relation. This then suggests how challenging the limits of subjectivities through relationality creates new problems to be addressed when it comes to dialogue in the

Lubac’s concept of nature. While beyond the scope of this paper, future thinking on this topic could examine these for resonances with further aspects of von Uexküll’s thought to strengthen the rigour of the comparison I am suggesting.

53 I want to recognize that what I am about to write is far beyond the scope of this thesis, although it would be very important to explore in a further elaboration of this thesis. The construct of the “Christian model” I will employ now uses the work of Ryan as a starting point for a different way of considering Christain theology, one that, for me, resonates with the arguments I have forwarded in this thesis.
public sphere and solidarity therein with others not grounded in sameness but in a relation of difference that may not be representable.

Arrupe suggests that reconsiderations such as these about relationality versus individuality lead to conversions in action not theorized towards an idealized telos, at least not in history. He says that “the struggle for justice will never end” and that encountering the world in this way is a “partial success” that affirms the “visible indications of [the] mysterious spreading among us” (Arrupe, np) by a fostering of different ways of being-in-relation that cares for life. At the heart of this action towards justice that Arrupe contemplates is the “man or woman for others” (ibid). He asks does this not contradict the very nature of the human person? Are we not each a 'being-for-ourselves'? Gifted with intelligence that endows us with power, do we not tend to control the world, making ourselves its centre? Is this not our vocation, our history? Yes; gifted with conscience, intelligence and power each of us is indeed a centre. But a centre called to go out of ourselves, to give ourself to others in love – love, which is our definitive and all-embracing dimension, that which gives meaning to all our other dimensions. To the extent that any of us shuts ourselves off from others we do not become more a person; we become less. (ibid)

Importantly, Arrupe here presents a theory of the subject that is relational at its core, not individualistic, in its ontology. Furthermore, Arrupe appears to affirm the umwelt, or at
least the validity of subjective experience, in each being “a” centre. However, that centre is relational with other centres, although this relationality and the experience of is constitutive quality, love, the “all-embracing dimension,” (ibid) are eroded by the injustice of socio-political and economic history. It may come as little surprise that this reformulation of a dominant educational paradigm and language comes in the same history as liberation theology. Before we ask how this registers a shift to a minor language of education at St. Bonaventure's College in Newfoundland and Labrador over thirty years later, let us first consider a central aspect of the Ignatian Pedagogy which was developed in response to Arrupe's call to change Jesuit education.

5.5 Ignatian Pedagogy and Reflection

Ignatian pedagogy “involves a particular style and process of teaching” (ICAJE, 1993, p. 3). It is not an entirely separate set of approaches; rather, it “calls for an infusion of approaches to value learning and growth within existing curricula” (ibid). While the pedagogy, “as a way in which teachers accompany learners in their growth and development” (ibid, p. 6), is situated within the faith system of Catholicism and “calls for human excellence modelled on Christ of the Gospels, an excellence that reflects the mystery and reality of the Incarnation” (ibid, p. 7), it does “not . . . suggest a program of indoctrination that suffocates the spirit; neither does it look for the introduction of
theoretical courses which are speculative and remote from reality” (ibid). Rather, it seeks
to provide a “framework of inquiry for the process of wrestling with significant issues and
complex values of life, and teachers capable and willing to guide that inquiry” (ibid). It is
characterized as a “pedagogy of faith and justice” (ibid). Interestingly, in order to become
this, it must also be a pedagogy of critical inquiry that ultimately gives witness to mystery
and faith. To me, these elements provide it with its force, and keep it a pedagogy that
opens rather than closes; they enable it to evade the dogmatic, judgmental and pious
tendencies that can emerge within a faith community.

One of its most important precepts is that education “for justice begins with a
reverence for the freedom, right and power of individuals and communities to create a
different life for themselves” (ibid, p. 8). As I understand it, this is foundationally an
orientation towards an affirmation of difference, and again a precept that should guard
against prescriptive a priori “ends” to the content of what an education “produces” or
creates or yields other than an open possibility for transformation and change “out of a
faith commitment with justice” (ibid). While the pedagogy does spend time elaborating
how this justice is related to the enhancing of the quality of peoples' lives, particularly
among the “poor, oppressed and neglected” (ibid), the macro effects of justice as a
relation with the other, our focus on reflection seeks to question how this works with the
personal so that the micro, an individual's changes in subjectivity, might orient them
towards others, towards difference, such that macro effects instantiated through unjust
structures cease to be abstractions, but rather become situated through relationality as real
– and thus requiring a response from us, as Levinas might argue, as an ethical responsibility of relationship with the other. An example would be in group reflections done in retreat in which an emphasis on highlighting the affective experience of our relationship with others cumulatively builds an awareness that our experiences of both linear time and homogeneous space are often punctured by other moments that gesture towards some other way of being, and the being of others. This experience could be understood as a first moment in social justice education which sets the possibility for the experience of the other that calls us to act towards injustice in both micro and macro terms.

A distinctive feature of the pedagogy is that it is understood in relation to the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, his particular method of praying that recognizes the presence of God in our everyday, that becomes a “fitting description of the continual interplay of experience, reflection and action” (ibid, p. 10). Importantly, what this suggests is that what is understood as “experience” is related to prayer-full experience – experiences filled with a world animated by God, God in others as subjects bringing God into the world; not a world of objects in which “we” alone experience but a world of other subjects expressing God in relation to us as we may to them, a world in which we experience and are experienced. Such prayer-full experiences are elemental to reorienting us towards sense and perception such that von Uexküll's environment, or God in all things with which this may be akin for a Christian umwelt, becomes an experience of the actual, not a knowledge of the abstract. This reactivates the possibility of non-homogeneous
space in which we encounter others. Such re-activation is created or constructed through a reflection that builds upon connections and new ways of being (Rose, 2013, p. 15), rather than through a reflection which focuses on critical thinking. Rather, critical, deconstructive thinking, precedes such creative reflection, thus revealing the openings in our common sense into which we may “enter” and reflect with prayer-full experiences.

These prayer-full kinds of experiences, however, are not self-evident; rather, “they are rigorous exercises of the spirit wholly engaging the body, mind, heart and soul of the human person. They offer not only matters to be pondered, but also realities to be contemplated, scenes to be imagined, feelings to be evaluated, possibilities to be explored, options to be considered, alternatives to be weighed, judgments to be reached and choices of action to be made” (ibid). For persons of faith, this process is qualified as the “seeking of the will of God at work in the radical ordering of our lives” (ICAJE, 1993, p. 10). For me, with peers and students and often with myself fluctuating in my own sense of what faith means to me, the importance rests in seeking. Community comes together then around seeking, not necessarily around what is found. Seeking is where openness to growth is instantiated; seeking and openness is what can bring us to mystery and wonder. This is what underpins our experience of being committed to diversity in a way that is open to the other, that may enable dialogue in the interstitial space of the seeking, not the finding. Engaging with an other who has found for themselves often requires no dialogue; ironically, maybe none is even possible or necessary there. Such is the affective resonance with others made possible within learning environments through
reflection. Reflection on this as experience is essential in order to “validate its authenticity, because without prudent reflection delusion readily becomes possible and without careful reflection the significance of one's experience may be neglected or trivialized” (ibid). As such, the continual interplay of the pedagogy is experience, reflection and action.

In this model, reflection employs memory, understanding, imagination and feelings “to grasp the essential meanings and values of what is being studied, to discover its relationship to other facets of human knowledge and activity, and to appreciate its implications in the continuing search for truth” (ICAJE, 1993, p. 12). Reflection “should be a formative and liberating process that so shapes the consciousness of students – their habitual attitudes, values and beliefs as well as ways of knowing and thinking” (ibid); it should impel them to move beyond knowing as an abstraction and lead them to know as an action of doing, to materialize knowledge in the consistency of an intentional action. And “while it may not immediately transform the world into a global community of justice, peace and love” it should lead us to “new experiences, further reflections and consequent actions” (ibid). Experience for Ignatius of Loyola meant “to taste something internally” (ibid, p. 17). This requires one to probe the connotations and overtones of words and events, to analyze and evaluate ideas, to reason. But it also goes beyond a purely intellectual grasp. “Ignatius urges that the whole person – mind, heart and will – should enter the learning experience. He encourages use of the imagination and feelings as well as the mind in experience” (ibid, p. 17). Thus affective as well as cognitive
dimensions of human persons are involved. In fact, in a world in which rationality is so tied to dominant discursive encodings and performances, the affective may be a necessary point of contact, as has been suggested earlier. As well, there is emphasis in this pedagogy on the context for learning. This means a number of things, but I would hypothesize that with some exploration further to that which I have begun in this thesis, the concept of “environment” here would be understood as consistent with what has been suggested through the work of von Uexküll (1995, p. 14-16). These experiences are limit experiences inasmuch as they push us to the boundaries of language and representability. Here we begin to see the potential for this theorization of reflection, and its relation to experience and action, to effect subjectivities in liberatory ways, ways to open us to the other and to difference as an act of ethics that orients us towards social justice.

Reflection in this pedagogy means “a thoughtful reconsideration of some subject matter, experience, idea, purpose or spontaneous reaction, in order to grasp its significance more fully. . .[it] is [thus] the process by which meaning surfaces in human experience” (ICAJE, 1993, p. 19). Its greatest challenge with students is the formulation of questions that will broaden awareness and impel us to consider viewpoints of others. The “challenge remains to open students' sensitivity to human implications. . .in ways that transcends [our] prior experiences” (ibid, p. 20). This final point is important because it associates our sensitivity, our ability to sense the other versus to know the other, to the “implication” of the other's profundity, and thus to our own limit. In a way, we can understand this reflection more as a process of sense than of knowledge, of sensing rather
than knowing. That the sensitivity must be opened “in ways that transcend our prior experiences” is essential because otherwise we impose an image on the sense, we “know” it a priori, we do a violence to the unknowability of the other. In this way reflection is disruptive and creative, it disrupts old formations and their imbued power relations that impose an order in the very processes of perception-as-world-making, and turn us on to an opening. Here, through action, we have the opportunity to create a consistency, a new line of flight, as Deleuze might call it, that may open into new assemblages that can deterritorialize and thus participate in the transformative change that Ignatian pedagogy seeks as an affirmation of life, of God, of love.

5.6 Gesturing toward the minor – A consideration

The minor is an/other way of entering into education, its thinking and its practices. Any minor literature of education is not the way to education, but rather it is one opening that students or teachers can choose and then “map the passage [s/he] finds [her/himself] following” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 1), and what education they are thus creating. “The map will change if a different entrance is chosen. Of importance, however, is not simply the condition of relativity to which any interpretation is subjected as a result. More important is the political strategy which 'the principle of the multiple entries' involves” (ibid). Considering reflection and reflective practices as part of a minor
literature of education is to suggest then that they lead to experimentations with(and)in
education that affirm alternative, unrepresentable experiences – the experiences of the
learning environments rather than the experiences of the school learning space.

In this respect, minor literature deterritorializes; it challenges the codes of a
general landscape of understanding and practices (in this case of education) specific in
ways that tranform the experience of that which is being territorialized in the first place.
In this way it affirms other perspectives than those of the culture within which we inhabit.
Bogue (2011) suggests that in order to understand what this means we must understand it
within Deleuze and Guattari's general theory of language. Bogue says that for Deleuze
and Guattari, “language is a mode of action, a way of doing things with words” (2011, p.
132). Language instigates “’incorporeal transformations' of bodies (bodies construed in
the broadest sense to include not simply solid physical objects but also images, sounds,
hallucinations – the gamut of the non-discursive)” (ibid). More specifically, and to
review aspects covered earlier,

[1]language's primary function is not to communicate neutral information but
to enforce a social order by categorizing, organizing, structuring and coding
the world. Every language presupposes two strata of relations of power: a
discursive 'collective assemblage of enunciation' and a non-discursive
'machinic assemblage of bodies'. These discursive and non-discursive
assemblages are regulated patterns of social action, one shaping words, the
other shaping things, and the two interacting as words intervene in things by producing incorporeal transformations of bodies. (ibid)

The subversion of aspects of the language thus deterritorialize the language 'in that they detach it from its clearly delineated, regularly gridded territory of conventions, codes, labels and markers” (Bogue, 2011, p. 133). In this respect, deterritorialization is akin to decontextualizing or shifting, stealing or moving dominant encodings and giving it a new, previously unanticipated, function or effect. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest (2005), “[t]he crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the chameleon reproduced the colors of its surroundings” (p. 13); rather, both the crocodile and chameleon deterritorialize the tree and the surrounding colours respectively, effectively using their codes for new functions – camouflauge, defense or attack. This is not representation or even imitation; rather it is an active creation of new function through relationality.

One of the first ways that I understand the contemporary St. Bon's experience, as an institutional experience, as minor is in the way that the desire for a different kind of education separated itself from while re-functioning itself through, (or deterritorialized), both the major language of education and the Jesuit model of “owning” its schools. St. Paul's in Winnipeg and Loyola in Montreal are the other two Jesuit schools in Canada. They are both owned and run by the Jesuits. These are schools of history and tradition and wealth. They struggle in different ways to “be Jesuit schools” from how St. Bon's struggles. The new St. Bon's has historically been quite poor, most often operating year
to year and paying its teachers far less than the public system as a means to use tuition monies for operational needs. While this originally emerged in order to keep tuition costs low in order to lessen the burden of making the choice to send children to the school, it has continued (albeit in a slightly lessened disparity) despite a shift in demographic over recent years related to steady increases in tuition costs. Many St. Bon's students are now from affluent, sometimes extremely wealthy, families.

The new school community invited the Jesuits to participate in the education of the school, to bring its pedagogy; however, it is the only Jesuit school in Canada not owned directly by the Jesuits. In this respect, for better or worse, the teachers and the community enter into a minor relation with the Jesuit language. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “a minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” (1995, p. 16). This small independent school uses government curricula in order to exist in the publicly recognized sphere or language of education but also constructs something within that major language that gestures towards the minor. I will briefly explore an example of this that relates reflection to the conversion of a classroom learning space to a learning environment whereby “converting reflexivity,” as suggested by Foucault (1988) and noted earlier, is involved in pushing language and subjectivities to their limits.

An example of trying to “convert reflexivity,” and thus of making an effort to convert the school learning space into a learning environment, is the relation of group
problem work with a group reflection in circle form. Recognizing Grossman's contention that students do not focus on evidence when reflecting, at least not in the early stages of its development (2009, p. 16), a precursor to the activity is to work towards teaching students “to report observations of their experiences in great detail. . .in sensory terms (what they see, hear, touch, taste, and smell)” (ibid). Although this is not what we typically consider evidence, unless it is specifically linked to conclusions (which Grossman suggests are often difficult to arrive at from here), students who make the effort to describe their experiences in rich detail are ready to engage in useful dialogue about reason and representing our experiences as part of the course concepts (ibid). These practices embody the curricular outcome of “offer[ing] perspectives that contrast and conflict with students' own experiences and invit[ing] them to reflect critically on alternate ways of knowing and being” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2001, p. 66).

As will be argued later, however, the reflection would be understood not in what students come to “know” from this activity, but rather from what experiences they can enter and the sense they can draw from the encounters with each other therein. In this way, where the groups go and engage becomes the learning environment in which “evidence,” rationality and relationality all differ from the classroom learning space. The idea is that such dialogue may itself enact a conversion of possibility with respect to the materiality of us in the room or on the field or wherever we engage, thus turning the “classroom” into a learning environment.
In order to foster this reconstruction of the room's conversion, when I employ this practice I begin the process actively with students participating in the organization of time and space in the classroom. At the beginning of a period the class's content and structure are negotiated between the myself and students – I will introduce a concept or 'course content' with suggestions of texts to be explored and students will negotiate text possibilities and/or provisional questions about the concept based on their own prior experiences and knowledge of the concept or content. In this respect, the problem that each individual student will address is not predetermined or clear from the beginning but is rather constructed together. Students can choose to work in groups of different sizes with different contents for part of the period. Groups can choose to leave the room, move outside, go to the computer lab to research some aspect of the content or stay in the classroom as part of the process. If they stay in the classroom they can transform. Although this may appear at the onset as a limited transformation, given the rigidity of the furniture in the classroom space, students often inscribe that furniture in different and unpredictable ways by moving it all away and using the floor, or by taking over the teacher's desk and chair and even computer as part of their processes. The moving and repositioning of the classroom furniture involves the classroom in active processes that decontextualize the social relations of the “space.” I move between these physical spaces and the different groups and will often enter into decontextualized social relations, primarily concerned with looking for what is taking place between students and considering any “contagious trends” (ibid) that take up between them (and sometimes me)
and which may lead to moments that “are no longer tamed and controlled” (ibid).

However, sometimes my very presence serves to recontextualize normalized patterns and expected identities, sometimes I-the-teacher serve to tame and control, despite my self. In itself this becomes one of the problems around and 'in' which I meet students meeting each other around the problem of the content. This establishes movement as a part of the process which importantly creates opportunity for encounter in ways that suspend the “already identified and already represented” (Olsson, 2010, p. 73) identities of the classroom rows and roll-call. These processes are never neat and easy.

The “never neat and easy” is what becomes the provisional questioning for the next phase, the group reflection circle. At some point after the group work (sometimes during the same period, sometimes the next period), we will return to the classroom and move all the desks to the outside walls. We will each take a chair and create a circle in the middle of the room, leaving one empty chair as part of the circle. This idea of the empty chair was shared with me by Dr. Dorothy Vaandering during a two-week professional development on Restorative Justice (RJ). The chair signifies an opening for the Other, in my specific context, that may be understood as the Divine, as God, as “one who might be wearing the face of God this day” (Williams, 2009). In a Levinasian sense, we could say that the chair is empty because it cannot contain the Other, this Other is “independent of us” (Levinas, 2004, p. 89).

The circle operates on specific principles which the group would have already agreed upon at the beginning of the year when the concept of “doing circles” would have
been first presented. Common principles include: active listening, eyes and ears turned to wonder, one person speaks at a time. These circles are indeterminate products – they do not make a pre-determined thing, they are not evaluated or assessed. The circle will have 'go arounds' in which the experience of the group activities (which includes the content of the group problem as well as the group experience of itself which can emerge as a problem or 'content for learning' of any student) are reflected upon. The 'go arounds' do not attempt to reason through the experiences in merely deconstructive ways. The 'go arounds' are creative in that they attempt to make connections, to create a perspective by working through the interpreting and conveying of each individual's experience and through witnessing and being in relation to that interpreting and conveying, that perspective making. These 'go arounds' are about attempting to open up rigid lines of thinking about and experiencing content, problems as well as about represented identities. Often multiple go arounds have students moving provisionally in and around and through their ideas and questions, often borrowing, stealing, sharing phrases, ideas, ways of describing their experiences that are suggestive of the movement of the affect of relationality in which students begin to enter relations with others rather than with fixed, pre-formed representations of who they expect each other to be. It is important to note that these relations are lived encounters, not 'knowledges produced' in the sense of data or cognitive information.

As collaborators, we might switch our language here slightly to suggest that each may become a 'teacher' for the other, although the entire circle never leaves its relation to
the empty chair, as students of the Other. According to Levinas (2004), it is in this
relation in which “the illusion of the self-sufficiency of the subject is exposed: I only exist
as a subject through the address of the other, 'bringing me more than I contain'” (Strhan,
2012, p. 95). While trying to fill in what this means for ethical subjectivity as an
emergent challenge to the performative subjectivities of school learning spaces is beyond
the scope of this thesis, Levinas' work can be gestured towards to suggest how
relationality may be understood to “open up” subjectivities as a liberatory/enabling
practice of reflection. This is a very different reflection than that (in)formed by the
Deweyian tradition outlined earlier. The former unfolds the possible experiences of
learning environments while the latter establishes the confines of the classroom learning
space.

With respect to reflection and the classroom learning space becoming a learning
environment, my own experience of these activities strikes me as different, as otherwise
in a way that “converts” the possibility of experiencing life and my self, from rationally to
relationally. There is always a reluctance to dismantle the circle; in fact, we usually leave
the circle to be taken apart and reconstructed into a classroom by the next group who may
then also have opportunity to create (by perceiving, as von Uexküll's thinking would
suggest) their own learning environment. This is an example of the first characteristic of
a minor literature - “[t]he first characteristic of minor literature...is that in it language is
affected with a high coefficient of derritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995, p. 15).
By trying to deterritorialize the classroom through notions of and practices of experience,
reflection and action, increases to the “deterritorialization coefficient” as part of the classroom is part in an effort to liberate the environment with which we learn from the classroom.

“The second characteristic of a minor literature. . .is that everything in them is political” (ibid, p. 17). In a major literature of education experiences and ideas like inclusion and bullying are situated within individual relations, not structural, political matters. Political here could mean systemic, discursive and even ideological. By the very nature of our pedagogy, these matters are understood as at the “periphery” of any subject, and are thus political – even if the subject is a student who has not directly experienced these. Imagining and seeking out a sense through the affective dimension of these for the other leads to a textuality, a content, in which “each individual intrigue connect[s] immediately to politics,” “the individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it...commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical...determin[ing] its values,” “reach[ing] the boundary where [something] connects up” (ibid, p. 17). As Deleuze and Guattari say, “what in a great literature goes on down below, constituting a not indispensible cellar of the structure, here takes place in the full light of day” (ibid). With respect to the ELA classroom, selections of varied reflection types open possible linkages in experience. Kurt M. Denk, S.J. (2006) offers a good list and description of samplings of these in “Making Connections, Finding Meaning, Engaging the World – Theory and Techniques for Ignatian Reflection on Service for and with Others.” These include: consciousness
dialogues, journals, sensory-based meditation reflections, scripture based contemplations, narrative reflections, aesthetic based reflections, community/personal (emerging) assets reflections, sociological/theological reflections, and synthetic model reflections.

One example of a modified sensory-based meditation/narrative reflection that I use draws on perspective and the senses to bring the political back into our experiences of the social world. I have students take a walk around school grounds and around the neighbouring streets. Their instruction is to slow down and attend their senses to a single moment along the walk. They are to summon their senses and memory and craft a descriptive piece of writing about this moment, situating it within their walk. The senses which elicit an impression of that moment appear to affirm a naturalized experience of that moment and whatever specifically the student was reflecting with – the sounds of a school bus, the feel of the grass, the touch of cars along the street. We will then discuss the passages in order to affirm the richness of language and depth of detail evident in each moment for each student. Then I will ask students to enter into an imaginative contemplation in which they close their eyes and picture the exact same experience, the exact same walk, this time as experienced, as walked, by a Sudanese refugee or a homeless man or woman.

When students open their eyes we discuss whether or not the experience of the moment changed when they tried to imagine it from the perspective, from the life, of an/other. This activity is designed to elicit tensions around questions of representation and the politics of positionality versus the fullness of possibility of another life. Did we
imagine resent? Why? Did we imagine the moment being experienced the same as I experienced it? Why? Can I imagine the experience from another “position”? Can I imagine the experience from another “life”? Why? And what do these answers make us feel within ourselves? Why? Do these feelings do anything to change our experience? Why or why not? These question samples can be followed in order to engage in any number of aspects of trying to “enter” the “conversion” of the classroom space from different “openings,” but fundamentally, the distinction of “positionality” draws the political back into the frame of how we experience a moment, as well as into the frame of what we can imagine for the other. The political here can be understood as functioning to rupture the (normalized and naturalized) hegemonic common sense processes through which we see and sense in our everyday precisely in order to try to create an opening for another way to sense.

In addition, our text selections enable us to expand the “content” of study in order to bring the political back into our experiences of education. Content here includes naming the school itself as “an Independent Catholic School in the Ignatian Tradition” and the many, often contradictory, meanings that can be ascribed to this naming, as previously discussed. In addition, content means naming standardized testing as a framing for the major education approach to some of our studies that we are compelled to perform, but which we also study in itself as a challenge to the limits of learning and education. The effects of standardized testing as dimensions of our subjectification are also engaged and named in both analytical and reflective ways in order to put the active,
ever present subjectification processes, squarely within view. Furthermore, canonical interpretations are named, as is the entire interpretative structure of formalized schooling and public examinations that reproduce those interpretations as the affirmed 'valuable' and 'correct' meanings. In addition, theoretical perspectives and frameworks are introduced and employed and their underlying worldviews suggested so that theory and practice are connected to the politics from which they emerge.

And finally, as much as possible, film is employed in order to try to embody concepts in images. This is done in order to appeal to the imaginative and affective identification, the alignment and allegiance that Perez develops, with the image so that identification itself may become an object of study in the classroom and be related to faces, subjectivity and power. A soon to be completed interdisciplinary project between myself and the math teacher will make efforts to relate the study of parabolas and the question of what a “perfect formula” represents to our faces and to what influences or affects what a face “means”. This project will use the novel Fahrenheit 451, a math unit on parabolas and cultural studies to draw together these complex issues as the foundation for another opportunity for students to reflect together with(and)in the classroom environment. Notions of meaning as “emplotted” and discursive will be applied to teacher faces, student faces and faces of others (a woman with a hijab, a family photo, etc.) in order to defamiliarize the present in order to push ourselves towards our own limits. In this respect, a curricular outcome like “critically evaluate others' uses of language and use this knowledge to reflect on and improve [student's own] uses of
“Language” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2001, p. 31) take on an entirely
different meaning. “Language,” although intended in this outcome to mean the personal
linguistic choices of the individual, becomes collective language, the same “thick” notion
of language as a network of history and power, materiality, ideas and expressions that
“speaks” faciality.

Such an engagement with language in these terms moves well beyond the
outcomes by placing language in relation to the political, and yet also realizes them in
ways beyond what the conventional “reflection” could. For example, “reflect[ing] on
experiences that have shaped [student] ideas, values and attitudes” (ibid, p. 37) no longer
implies merely considering or analyzing from the distance of the reflecting subject stuck
within an ideology that constitutes us as these distant, 'reflecting' subjects, but rather
conveys the possibility of moving beyond faciality by entering into relation with what
Derrida calls in Levinas' thought, the “welcome” as a “first movement” that pushes
language to “quasi-primitive and quasi-transcendental” words (1999, p. 25). In this way,
such an outcome becomes doubled, understandable both from within its major literature
of education territory and as an experience of reterritorialization in which the meaning of
each word becomes decoded and recoded otherwise, with(and)in a reflection that creates
new experiences of subjectivity that makes the action of this outcome an immanent
present making efforts to extend its reality as as “to overturn repressive, dominating
images of thought crystalized in the broader cultural public by tradition or popularity”
(Helmsing, 2014, p. 72).
5.7 Conclusion

In trying to understand what I do when I teach, especially considering where I teach, a historical view of the mythic past of St. Bon's reveals the ways in which the school's history emerges from and serves to reproduce a vision and practice of education which can be understood as a major literature of education. Since the school's reconstitution after the end to denominational education in the province, St. Bon's has made a turn to the minor in education. But this turn, constituted by its engagement with Ignatian pedagogy oriented at fostering “men and women for and with others” in a way that directly engages the injustices of social structures, is not an absolute deterritorialization of education. Rather, the school's statuses as at once independent, Catholic, and Ignatian embody the tensions that reveal competing and contradictory impulses guiding St. Bon's. In this respect, the minor at St. Bon's is clearly operating within the major; at its best, it deterritorializes and enables liberatory forces to push students to limit experiences, while at its worst it reterritorializes and glorifies the encodings of dominant values.

Such oscillations between the minor and the major are evident in the struggle to instantiate a different kind of reflection through curricular documents in the English Language Arts classroom. Moving between forces that normalize reflection as the mirroring of the individual and forces that enable reflection as a creative act that extends a reality in experience by building connections to foster new ways of being incarnates the
tension between the major and the minor, respectively. The former is rooted in the 
representation of “sound gestures of the human mouth that function to mirror us back on 
ourselves” (Abram, 1996, p. 187), to establish a “reflexivity between the human organism 
an its own signs, short circuiting the sensory reciprocity [of the latter] between that 
organism and the environment, and others” (ibid).

As suggested, certain practices experimented with(and)in the classroom and beyond can be theorized to afford opportunities with a kind of “sensory reciprocity” that affects us, that moves us towards an orientation, beyond representation, that relates us to ourselves, others and our world in new ways, through new subjectivities. Such an orientation critically exposes the limiting forces of hegemonic common sense and ideological interpellations into stable subjectivities that come both from our social “reality” and from within ourselves. But in this thesis I have suggested that the way out of such practices is not through knowledge, not unless we want to end up back within the limits of representation and rationality. Rather, the way out is to create ways out, to engage in reflective practices that constitute new experiences through our very engagement with new ways of being, new ways of sensing and perceiving that, as Levinas (2004) suggests, are never containable within ourselves. In this way mystery, wonder and the other all escape us and the limiting impulses of a culture that emphasizes the individual, knowledge and the rational.

**General Conclusions – Towards the next beginning**

“In actuality, [the] true goal – even in utilizing general
knowledge – is to understand an historical phenomenon in its singularity, in its uniqueness. Historical consciousness is interested in knowing, not how men, people, or states develop in general, but, quite to the contrary, how this man, this people, or this state became what it is; how each of these particulars could come to pass and end up specifically there”. (H.G. Gadamer)

The first two characteristics of minor literature are that it involves a high coefficient of deterritorialization and that in it everything is political. The third characteristic of minor literature seems fitting to suggest in a conclusion that can make no real claim to “conclude” the key problem of this thesis – namely, how to re-conceptualize reflection and the classroom as a learning environment in order that we might be moved, in a sense, beyond preconceived representations of ourselves, others and experiences themselves, such that new relational possibilities open up for how we might choose to live and encounter others in the public sphere. Rather than conclude, we might gesture towards a kind of education that combats hegemonic common sense and the (re)production of the individual as an image with which we align and identify. Such combat makes efforts to reconceive of a reflection that creates; rather than a reflection limited to analysis and thus claims of knowledge, this thesis tries to suggest an/other way of doing reflection that (although never perfectly) begins the project of converting classroom learning spaces into learning environments, whose focus on sense and perception as constituting acts, may bring our relation to the other more clearly into experience.
In this respect, such a reflection, in constituting a learning environment in which our relationality to the other becomes more immanently sensed as the being moved of affect, suggests the third characteristic of minor literature - that its political nature is inseparable from “collective enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1998, p. 17). A minor literature has an evolutionary potential inasmuch as it functions “to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility” (ibid). A minor literature creates “an active solidarity” (ibid) through sense not knowledge, through affect and orientation towards the other which invokes a recognition of the nonrepresentability of difference rather than a reduction to sameness. As Bogue (2011) notes,

[Deleuze and Guattari] do so not by promoting specific political action or by protesting oppression (although such actions do have their own value), but by inducing processes of becoming-other, by undermining stable power relations and thereby activating lines of continuous variation in ways that have previously been restricted or blocked. (111)

I would argue that this final characteristic is an aim of Ignatian pedagogy as a minor pedagogy. In order to fully explore this relation a sustained examination of the theology that underpins such a pedagogy would need to be elaborated. For now I have turned to the work of Gerard Ryan S.J. (2014), and his writing on such a theologizing that looks to grace as a way to orient people in meaning-full ways, despite their faith systems, in the
public sphere. This relation constitutes what I have tried to explore as the nature of the human environment as developed by von Uexküll (1995). Approaching such an environment as the base for a learning environment itself requires, as we have seen, a critical engagement with the limiting, hegemonic, ideological common sense that permeates our culture and participates in the (re)production of the single plane of logic, the homogeneous space and linear time, that limit our sense of what is possible – for ourselves, for others and for the reality of justice.

Working towards these types of “conversions” of the familiar in order to liberate the possibility of life, of each other, is the aim of my teaching. In the future I would like to develop the theories present in this thesis to consider in what ways these thoughts can be examined empirically so that I could conduct empirical research with graduates from St. Bon's and public schools to see if there are lasting effects of these various practices of reflection, with a focus on those that move students beyond theory and into the practice of entering the public sphere “differently.” To that end, the aim of our teaching must be to challenge students to create conditions within which to foster a future community to come that engages with(and)in the public sphere as itself a learning environment. Oriented toward encountering the other through affective channels that circumvent the reifying tendencies of rationality, we may be more enabled to foster ever more meaningful relations between self-other through possibilities afforded by new subjectivities as we make efforts to engage across the divide of difference. In this way we take up Giroux's (1999) challenge to make something new (out of) the public sphere; and in this way we
recognize the depth of an ethics that is the footing for the legitimacy of macro social justice claims through the relationship between individuals and individuals and structures created and reproduced by persons in the world.

This thesis began guided by the central question: is it possible for reflection in an English classroom to gesture towards the profundity of the other, including to the self-as-other, that might instantiate an affective foundation for relationships that recasts the type of attachment we have with a world of others? Despite the confusion surrounding the concept of reflection, I do believe that the Ignatian model of reflection offers a way of seeing and being attentive to both one's self, the other, and to the world in which we live relationally. But we must acknowledge that we do so imperfectly. We are always engaging with(in) the limits of our understanding of the other, always within our constructs and the many forces that influence those. First and foremost, reflection must be a tool and practice not to map the truth about ourselves, not a technology to limit ourselves according to an a priori design, but rather one that works recursively and disruptively and pushes us toward and beyond the limits imposed by our subjectivities. Within reflective practice we must be open to possibility and mystery and to encounter, as part of our interrogation of our ability to dialogue with the other beyond 'our' impositions of a face upon them (and from which 'we' operate). We must be attentive to the constantly changing assemblages that make universalizing liberatory versus enslaving forces impossible. And we must look to engage meaningfully in the moment of a micro social justice, not as an apology for the challenges of macro social justice, but as a
condition for its future success. This may not be what reflection does now, but if we work from here to there, it may be what it can do. One day.
Works Cited


