

OUR WAY OF LIVING: SURVIVAL STRATEGIES
IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS
IN PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES

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MAUREEN LARKIN, B.A.



OUR WAY OF LIVING:
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS
IN PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

by

(C) Maureen Larkin, B.A.

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ABSTRACT

The survival of the lobster fishery is dependent on many factors, both inside and outside the fishing household. This thesis argues that an adequate explanation of the survival of this petty commodity form of production necessitates an understanding of the tension between external structures such as state policies and the internal dynamics of fishing households. It examines the impact of changing state policies, during the period of the mid-1960s to the 1980s, on the survival of lobster fishing households. Recent changes in the area of licensing and unemployment insurance programs, resulted in both new constraints and new opportunities for the survival of lobster fishing households in PEI.

Many analyses of the survival of fishing production have focused on the influence of state policy on the activities and decisions of the fisher. However, fishers are embedded in fishing households. State policies impact on members of fishing households, other than the fisher, and the survival of the fishing unit is dependent on the ability of the household as a whole to respond to changes in state policy.

Drawing on data from interviews with men and women in fishing households in Naufrage, located in northeastern P.E.I., this thesis demonstrates that household members have actively and creatively responded to changes in state policy in developing strategies to reproduce their production unit.

Initiatives on the part of women have been a key component in household survival strategies. They have creatively adapted to the constraints of external forces as well as lobbied for changes in state policy that, in turn, extended the survival options for fishing families. The success of survival strategies depends on the internal characteristics of the fishing household such as life-cycle and the intersection of gender relations and household dynamics.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The lobster fishery is the backbone of the inshore fishery on Prince Edward Island (PEI). It represents more than 70 per cent of the total landed value of the PEI fishery which in 1989 amounted to \$56 million. Since the beginning of the commercialization of the lobster fishery in the 1870s, lobster has been the main fishery in PEI. In 1989, there were 1,385 bonafide¹ inshore fishers on PEI and 1,309 of these had a lobster licence (Prince Edward Island, 1989). For these inshore fishers, over 70 per cent of their fishing income comes from the lobster fishery.

The lobster fishery on PEI has two seasons, spring which extends from May 1 to June 30, and fall, which extends from August 10 to October 10. PEI is presently divided into three lobster districts. Two districts, 7B(24) and 7B1(26), have a spring harvesting season and district 8(25) has a fall season. The area of my research is in district 7B, which extends along the north shore of PEI from East Point to Seacow Pond. The

¹Bonafide is a fisher who is registered as a commercial fisher, holds a limited fishery license, and, as well, meets one of the following conditions:

- 1) holds a Category A license;
- 2) is able to show proof that 75 percent or more of his/her income was derived from his previous year's fishing; or
- 3) can show proof of sale of fish of a landed value in excess of \$15,000 (Annual Report, P.E.I. Department of Fisheries, 1988).

majority of the fishers on PEI, approximately 1,050, fish in the spring season and the bulk of the lobster product is landed during the months of May and June.

The objective of this thesis is to look at the impact of state policy in the PEI lobster fishery from the mid-1960s to the present, and to investigate the survival strategies that fishing households in one particular area of PEI have developed in responding to these changes.

One of the key areas of changes in the lobster fishery during this 30-year period has been increased state legislation. The lobster fishery is the oldest regulated fishery in the Maritimes with the first regulation dating from 1873. The discussion of changes in state policy focuses on two state policies. The first is licensing, which includes limited-entry and personal licensing policy, the buy-back program and trap limits. The second is the unemployment insurance program (UI).

Traditionally, studies on the fishery, especially at the primary level, have focused on the people directly involved in fishing, which in most cases were the men in fishing families. However, lobster fishing enterprises are household units and changes in the development of the lobster fishery affect all members of the household. Likewise, responses to outside forces in the industry do not just involve the fisherman of the household. Survival strategies depend on the ability of both men and women to adjust to the constraints of state

policy and creatively respond to the opportunities for support. Thus, in the analysis of the different factors influencing survival strategies of fishing households, I pay particular attention to the role of women. In examining fishing households the study draws on data from the port of Naufrage, located on the northeastern shore of PEI.

A key element in the analysis is the concept of survival. Various writers have looked at survival in fishing communities from different perspectives. Any examination of inshore fishing households quickly reveals their vulnerability to the forces of nature, to the demands of capital and to changes in state policy. As in the case of all fixed gear inshore fisheries, lobster landings are extremely cyclical due to the vagaries of the weather and other factors that affect stock levels. Fishers' incomes are also very susceptible to the forces of capitalism. Clement (1986) states that their social relations give them independence with respect to the labour process but not independence from the banks or processors. They own the means of production but have no control over the market (p.75).

The vulnerability of lobster fishers in Prince Edward Island to the forces of capital was particularly evident in the 1989 and 1990 lobster season, when the prices for lobster dropped to mid-1970 levels. Fishers are also captive to the opposite end of the capitalist market in that they have no control over the cost of inputs.


The heavy intervention of the state in the fishery has provided some buffer to market forces, but it has also made the lobster fishery very susceptible to changes in state policy. Along with disastrously low lobster prices in 1989 to 1990, lobster fishers are also being threatened with more stringent requirements for income support programs such as unemployment insurance benefits.

Though fishing households are affected by changes in capital structure and in the State, this thesis focuses primarily on the response of fishing households to changes in state policy.

1.1 Description of Research Community

The research is focused on the harbour of Naufrage, located on the north shore, about 30 kilometers from the eastern tip of PEI (figure 1). There were 84 boats fishing out of this harbour in 1989 and the main species is lobster. They are engaged in a day fishery leaving the harbour in the morning and returning at night. Traditionally, the fishers in this area have fished lobster, followed by groundfish and mackerel. In the 1960s Irish Moss became an important product and in the 1970s tuna appeared in Island waters and many fishers began participating in this fishery. Since the mid-1980s, after lobster fishing, more fishers have been temporarily operating out of other ports to fish tuna, herring for roe, and to a lesser extent, groundfish.

FIGURE 1: P.E.I. FISHERIES STATISTICAL DISTRICTS



SOURCE: P.E.I. FISHERIES STATISTICAL REVIEW 1988.

* P.E.I. LOBSTER DISTRICTS/AREAS

There is a fairly high concentration of fishers in this harbour due to migration of fishers from the south side of the Island in the 1960s and 1970s. This has resulted in two distinct groupings of fishers in the harbour. About half of the fishers come from communities immediately surrounding the harbour, within a 15-kilometre radius. The other half come from communities on the southeastern coast of the Island ranging from 15 to 40 kilometers distance. The first group have more ties to each other on a social and community level and their families have been fishing in this area for many generations.

I chose this harbour for my research for the following reasons. Naufrage has particular characteristics that are helpful in analyzing the concept of survival. The communities surrounding this harbour are heavily dependent on the fishery for their survival, both in processing and harvesting. District 88² (figure 1), within which this harbour is located, has the largest number of lobster fishers of any statistical district in PEI (DFO statistics). The high concentration of fishers, combined with rising costs and limited increases in lobster landings, compared to other areas in PEI have created a situation where fishers have had to combine income from fishing and non-fishing activities to reproduce their fishing

²As indicated earlier, PEI is divided into 3 lobster districts. However, for most fishery statistics, it is divided into 10 statistical districts (See figure 3).

unit. These kinds of conditions make it a good location to examine household strategies for survival.

In addition, there are many women in this harbour who work for wages outside the home and a growing number who fish with their husbands. I wanted to examine in some detail the role of women in fishing households. This harbour seemed like a good place to look at the contribution of women from different perspectives.

Furthermore, I had previously worked in this community and knew a number of the fishing families, thus making it easier to find respondents for interviews. I had a certain level of credibility and trust with the people because of my previous work, which would enable me to get more accurate information about their fishing lives than if I came in as a stranger.

While Naufrage harbour has some unique characteristics it also has many aspects that are similar to other lobster fishing areas, especially on the north shore of PEI. Thus, an analysis of the impact of changes on fishing households in Naufrage is helpful in understanding similar changes in other areas in PEI.

1.2 Methodology

When I started this research project, I had two main objectives. One was to have a clearer understanding of the structure of the lobster fishery and the other was to gain

some insights into how lobster fishing families were affected by, and had responded to, changes in state policy since the 1960s.

Two main methodological approaches were used. One was to research available information, analyses and statistics on the lobster fishery , focusing particularly on changes in the harvesting sector since 1967. Sources for this data include: information from provincial and federal departments of fisheries; interviews with staff from both these departments; interviews with staff of the Maritime Fishermen's Union; reports on the PEI fishery by government resource people and private researchers. The second was to gather in some systematic and representative way information from members of fishing households in Naufrage. Fifteen fishing households were selected, and structured interviews were conducted with both the boat-owner and the spouse³ on a variety of topics about attitudes and practices concerning both their fishing activities outside the home and their relations within the fishing households.⁴

The participants for the interviews were selected from fishers fishing out of Naufrage harbour and residing in the communities adjacent to the harbour. The interviews were organized with the objective of collecting data from both a

³It was not possible to interview spouses in two of the households. In one case the fisher was single and in the other the spouse was in a rehabilitation centre.

gender and a generational perspective. Fifteen fishing households were selected and where possible, both partners were interviewed. Participants were selected according to the number of years they had fished with their own outfit. They were divided into three different generational groups; those fishing 25 years or more, those fishing 15 to 25 years, and those with less than 15 years experience. The households were also selected so that in half of them women were fishing with their spouses and in the other half they were not.

The reason for choosing fishers from three different generations was to get some information concerning changes in the lobster industry and to examine similarities and differences in the experiences of older and younger fishing families in terms of both supports and constraints for their survival.

The criterion of women fishing was chosen because of my observation of women's increasing participation in fishing with their husbands. My original hypothesis was that this was part of a survival strategy that younger fishing households were engaging in. By getting involved in this work, women were entering an occupation that previously was open only to men. I wanted to determine if there were particular supports or constraints either in households or in the community that affected women's entry into this new occupation. It is true that the percentage of women who are fishing is higher in my sample of interviews than in the general population. Only

about 10 to 12 per cent of the fishing enterprises in Naufrage have women fishing with their spouses, whereas my sample has 50 per cent. However, having a larger number of fishing women in my sample allowed me to get more in-depth information and a broader perspective as to why women went fishing and the prevailing attitudes towards women fishing. My previous knowledge and experience with fishing communities indicated that, as costs rose much faster than income, more women used this option as a way of increasing household income. An appendix contains more detail on the topics covered and some comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology used. Since the interviews were confidential, any names in quotes from the interviews that appear in this thesis are fictitious.

1.3. Thesis Outline

The following is an outline of how the remaining chapters are organized. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework that I use to explain survival of fishing households. It includes a review of literature that focuses on the following three theoretical areas. The first discusses different theoretical approaches to explaining the survival of petty commodity production. The second examines a theoretical approach to explaining the sometimes contradictory role of the state in the fishery. The third reviews some perspectives on the role of gender in household strategies.

Chapter three is divided into three sections. The first section is a brief overview of the development of the lobster fishery since its commercialization in the 1870s, which provides a context for understanding its present status as a seasonal fishery closely allied to the household. The second section discusses the impact of state intervention since the 1960s, focusing particularly on licensing policies and unemployment insurance programs during the period 1965 to 1990. Thirdly, the chapter outlines how the organization of the fishery and fishing practices in Naufrage harbour changed during this period.

Chapter four draws on data from the interviews with fishing families and discusses the different strategies that inshore fishing households have used to survive as full-time fishers. These include increasing capital investment to fish lobster more intensively; exploiting other species to complement lobster income; generating income through wage labour of other members of the household, particularly women. All of these strategies are interrelated, and the income from one often facilitates the implementation of another. In some cases, the availability of women's wage labour provides the necessary financial security to implement strategies of increased capital investment.

Chapter five focuses particularly on the issue of women fishing. Changes in state policy have opened up new survival options in the 1980s by extending eligibility for unemployment

insurance benefits to women fishing with their spouses. This chapter analyzes the supports and constraints for women moving into this area of work and discuss how, in turn, the changing role of women is affecting gender and social relations in the household and the community.

In chapter six I discuss the implications for future survival by outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the survival strategies that households have employed. I also outline some questions and other areas of research that have been raised in this study but will need further exploration.

CHAPTER 2.

UNDERSTANDING SURVIVAL: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Definition of Survival

The inshore fishery continues to hold an important place in the economic, political, social and cultural life of Prince Edward Island. Any investigation of this fishery reveals that the reasons for its survival are very complex. A number of different factors have contributed to its survival including: the role of the state, ecological factors, marketability of a high quality product like lobster, and the active desires of members of fishing families to find ways of creating and reproducing their social existence.

A definition of survival for fishing households includes a wide range of possibilities, both in levels of production and in motives for continuing as a fishing unit. At a basic production level, survival means being able to maintain minimal means of production such as a boat and fishing gear. However, the day to day reproduction of the fishing unit involves various combinations of fishing and non-fishing income, which depend on the support of many household members, not just the fisher/producer. But survival is not just defined in terms of the economic viability of a fishing production unit. It also includes the preservation of other non-economic values such as living in a rural environment,

having a sense of independence in the work process, and bringing up children in a small community with connections to extended family. Thus, survival depends on the cooperation of various people in the household who might have very different motives for supporting the fishing enterprise. This chapter develops a theoretical framework through which we can examine the impact of these factors on the survival of lobster fishing households.

Firstly, the thesis examines survival from a historical perspective. It looks at the impact of state policy on inshore fishers and examines how these policies both influenced and were influenced by the social relations in fishing households during the historical period from 1965 to the late 1980s.

2.1.1 Survival from the Perspective of Household

The thesis also looks at survival from the perspective of the household as opposed to a community or regional perspective. There are a number of reasons why it makes sense to examine the survival of inshore fishing from this perspective. Lobster is the main inshore fishery and the specific nature of this fishery has meant a close alliance between its development and the household. Recently, rural sociologists have been developing commodity specific analyses to explain the survival of some forms of production (Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981; Marchak, 1983; Sinclair,

1986). This analysis is based on the recognition of significant differences in the "natural imperatives of production, ways in which production is organized, structures of commodity markets and state policies influencing the conditions of production and marketing" (Koc 1989:2). The way that lobster production is organized has facilitated its close connection with the household.

In the case of lobster fishing, many decisions are made at the level of the household. At the processing level, the lobster fishery is a non-monopoly industry. Hence, fishers have some latitude in deciding where to sell their product. State policy has strengthened the role of households by dissipating corporate control, especially in the harvesting sector. Licensing policy prevents companies from owning lobster licences¹, and individual fishers from operating more than one lobster enterprise. The individualization of household strategies is further highlighted by the absence of structures to collectively negotiate prices and the relatively weak, non-commodified relations between households.

Perhaps the most important reason for analyzing survival from the perspective of the household lies in the pluralistic work pattern of fishing households. As this thesis demonstrates, most lobster fishing enterprises cannot survive on fishing income alone. Thus to analyze the fishing

¹Lobster fishing licences were awarded to companies in 1971, but for offshore lobster only.

industry only from the perspective of activities and production decisions of male boat owners, provides an incomplete picture. Taking into consideration the activities and decisions of all the members of the fishing household allows for a more dynamic and comprehensive view of survival. Very little work is done at this level, especially in the PEI fishery, despite the fact that it is important for a more grounded application of often abstract theories of survival.

In examining survival from this perspective I do not want to minimize the importance of survival strategies at other levels. If household strategies are to be effective in the long term, they must be linked to a political program that will develop strategies of survival at a community, regional and national level, which will give the inshore fishery an important place in the whole fishing industry.

2.2 Lobster Fishing as Petty Commodity Production

Lobster fishing is an example of petty commodity production (PCP), also called domestic, independent and simple commodity production. It is a form of household production where the product is exchanged on commodity markets to realize the value of what is produced and to acquire both the means of production and personal consumption goods (Sinclair 1984:35). PCP embodies a unique combination of labour and capital. The fisher owns the means of production and, in the reproduction of the household,

combines his own labour with the paid and unpaid labour of other members of the household.

There are many debates around the survival of PCP as a form of production. The theorists can be broadly divided into three groups. The largest group (De Janvry 1980; Goss et al 1980; Hedley 1981) draw on classical writings of Lenin and Kautsky and perceive PCP as a limited, transitory form in the process of differentiation and proletarianization. The second group holds the position that PCP survives because its continuation is functional for capitalism (Mann and Dickinson 1978). 'Place's or 'spaces' are continually created for this form of production as "effects of the law of value in capitalist competition, accumulation and concentration (including technical change)" (Bernstein 1988:263). The smallest group argues that differentiation will occur in some cases and not in others (Friedmann 1982; Llambi 1988; Sinclair 1985,1988). It depends on a combination of circumstances that differ according to historical period and geographical area. However, as Sinclair states, a weakness of many sociological accounts is that very little account is taken of "specific ecological or cultural circumstances which condition how macro-structural forces will be perceived and what coping strategies people are likely to adopt" (1984:36-37).

What is needed is a way of analyzing petty commodity production which takes into account the reciprocal relations

between the structures of the external environment and the internal dynamics of households, as well as the particular characteristics of the products being produced. L l a m b i (1988) outlines two approaches to understanding the emergence/destruction/recreation of a specific form of production. One approach is to look at the constraints and opportunities imposed on the unit of production by their economic and political environment. The other is to examine the internal dynamics of enterprises and their social agents' practices. Both these approaches can give us insights into how PCP survives, but to use either one or the other unilaterally, is to run the risk of determinism on the one hand or, on the other hand, to treat production units in isolation from their environment (359-360).

In this thesis I am examining the impact of changes in state policy on the lobster fishery and how fishing households have responded to these changes. Fishing families in Naufrage cannot survive only on fishing income. They are dependent on income generated from both fishing and non-fishing sources and by other members of the household besides the fisher who is generally the male head of household. The ability to generate other income depends on many factors which are influenced by larger economic and political structures but also by skills, needs and desires of household members. We need a theoretical framework that considers the role of the State in the fishing industry, the dynamics of

households, including gender and generational divisions, as well as the tension between objectives of larger social structures such as the state and those of fishing families. The remainder of this chapter develops this framework by drawing on theoretical concepts from three different areas. The first area is petty commodity production. In this section, I focus on those theorists who analyze the survival of petty commodity production by looking at the interaction of external and internal factors. Secondly, I discuss some theoretical perspectives concerning the often conflictive role of the state in the fishery. Thirdly, the thesis emphasizes the role of women's work within the survival strategies of fishing households. The chapter reviews some theoretical positions that take into account the intersection of gender and household dynamics in their analysis of survival.

2.3 Conceptualizing Survival in Petty Commodity Production Theories

Most of the literature on petty commodity production deals with agriculture, but many of the concepts clarifying social relations in agriculture apply to fishing as well. Both are examples of primary production where the household is an integral part of primary production. Both are dependent on the market to sell their raw product. Various theorists have tried to deal with the tension between the

internal and external factors in petty commodity units. Friedmann (1978,1980) proposes that the conditions of reproduction, decomposition or transformation of agrarian social relations are determined by the context of the social formation combined with the internal structure of the unit. The basic unit of petty commodity production, the household, has a 'dual character as enterprise and as family'. In her analysis of the survival of the family farm in advanced capitalism, Friedmann (1986) states that whether family farms take the path of reproduction or transformation depends on external and internal factors: the market for the product, the availability of capital, and the specific relations within the family. Friedmann has argued that the stability of the family farm is due to particular mechanisms in internal relations in farm households such as 'generational cycle, balances between consumption and investment, and between effort and leisure' (Llambi 1988:361). These give it some advantages over capitalist units of production, which are more vulnerable to the direct pressures of the market.

In her earlier works Friedmann (1978, 1980) places much emphasis on the 'demographic' cycle as the main mechanism in regulating the labour force. The family is treated as a monolithic unit and it is assumed that there is unity of purpose among all members of the family farm in its efforts to reproduce the production unit. In discussing balances between consumption and investment, there is little

consideration as to who, in the farm family, is making the sacrifices to ensure its reproduction.

Llambi (1988) also uses a conceptual framework that includes outside and inside factors in theorizing the survival of the capitalized family farm. He proposes that "market and political forces [as well as] culturally inherited patterns of behaviour generate the parameters which establish farmers' goals and the means they choose to attain them. They all exhibit a similar predisposition towards income maximization and risk minimisation" (p.370). However, not all petty production units respond in the same way. He accounts for their differences by: 1) different access to natural and financial resources, 2) different degrees of knowledge of technical, mercantile and political conditions, 3) different value patterns and attitudes, which in turn affect economic choices (p.370).

A consideration of these categories gives insights into why fishing units are at different levels of stability from region to region or even within regions, although all are subject to the same state policies. However, Llambi's analysis does not treat the responses of the production unit in a dialectical way. The practices and performance of production units vary in their response to outside forces because of the different internal characteristics of production units. But he does not consider that these household practices may in turn influence the market and

political forces. Llambi discusses the differences between households, but not those within households. Again, the household is treated like a monolithic unit. There is no mention of gender differences in petty production units. He discusses production units as if both men and women in these units have the same goals and interests.

In her article on the nature of social relations in petty commodity production, Winnie Lem (1988) conceptualizes social relations in petty commodity production in a much more dynamic and active way. She is critical of Friedman's rigid, dichotomous conceptualization of non-commodified internal relations vs. commodified external relations in her analysis of petty commodity households. Lem maintains that it cannot adequately capture the "multifaceted quality of social relations that operate among petty commodity producers" (1988:505).

She argues that social relations cannot be fully explained in structural terms, but are the result of conscious decisions made by members of producer households.

[Social relations] are not only the product of abstract, developmental and structural logics of petty commodity production within a larger social formation, but they are also the outcome of human consciousness and human action. Producers consciously pursue various courses of action in their daily livelihood strategies to ensure the reproduction of their enterprises and their social world (Lem 1988:506).

Lem's analytical framework examines social relations in a dialectical way. They are influenced by outside structural

forces, but they in turn contribute to shaping the process through which these structures interact with the petty production unit.

In her analysis of social relations of wine-growing households in Languedoc, Lem describes the household as composed of members with diverse and often conflicting interests. The continuation of the production unit depends on the labour of both men and women. The 'survival imperative' structures relations in the household between parents and children and particularly between husbands and wives. The continuity of the enterprise often requires the "subordination of the individual to the collective or family effort" (1988:517). One of the results of this is that women often assume a double burden of responsibility as their labour is necessary to maintain both the production unit and the household as a home. But another result is that the woman may withdraw her support for the production unit, which can have implications for its survival.

I prefer Lem's approach to explaining the process of changing social relations in the case of lobster fishing households in Naufrage. State policy has had significant influence in shaping the social relations in these fishing enterprises. But the response of the members of the household in turn affected the direction and development of state policy.

In many of the debates on the survival of petty commodity production, there is a strong emphasis on economic factors. However, my interviews with fishing households demonstrate that survival involves a mixture of economic and non-economic concerns, including preservation of certain values like independence, closeness to nature and preference of rural environment for raising children.

Hedley (1988) maintains that many producer households reject a view of farming (fishing) which sees it narrowly as "a profit maximizing activity, or a practice in which the absence of such activity is constituted as problematic" (Hedley 1988:68). The farm (fishing) household is "a social product through which a way of life is created and lived...a significant context within which people seek to impose their own direction on the production of their social existence" (p.68). Non-economic concerns cannot be treated as 'culturally curious' or 'impediments to progress'. Rather these concerns are a central part of the analysis of the rural world and they can be a strong motivation in the development of survival strategies.

2.4. Contradictory Role of the State

The intervention of the State has been a significant factor in the survival of lobster fishing households. However state policy has had a contradictory role, presenting both constraints and opportunities for survival of fishing

families. The contradictory dynamic expresses itself in various ways. Licensing policy, which was implemented to limit new entry and remove part-time fishers from the lobster fishery, was based on the logic that with fewer participants in the fishery, those who remained would have higher incomes and be less in need of state subsidies. With few employment alternatives, many marginal fishers, when faced with the possibility of losing their lobster license if they remained part-time, opted to become full-time fishers. Their decision to remain in the fishery was helped by other state initiatives such as the unemployment insurance program.

Sinclair (1987, 1989) has developed a theory to explain the contradictory impact of state policies in the fishery. It is based on an understanding of the state as an institution whose parts are "loosely integrated and often work at cross-purposes." He argues that state policy should be treated as "an active creation limited by the structural location and cultural vision of actors" (1989:105). He refers to Theda Skocpol's description of the state as "a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity" (Sinclair 1989:105, Skocpol 1979:27).

Sinclair's (1987) model for the development of fishery policy includes the following points. The state interacts in a particular social and economic environment. Thus,

fisheries policies are formulated to cope with problems in that environment. The state is not an abstract entity; rather it expresses itself through people who occupy state positions and have particular interests and experiences and act out of a specific set of beliefs. The people/groups making the demands are not all equal in power or in ability to articulate their needs. The need for legitimation of the state and maintenance of order makes for avoidance of state policies that will be met with mass rejection. The availability of resources, especially in finances and information, is a central factor in many policy decisions (Sinclair 1987:62-3).

According to this model of development of fisheries policy, contradictions in state policy can be explained by the following factors: the independence of state actors often resulting in expression of different interests; the fragmentation of the Canadian state where the two levels of government and different government departments often have competing agendas; and, the uneven levels of power and articulation of needs by the various groups involved.

John McMullen (1987) also ascribes some of the confusion in the implementation of limited-entry licensing policy in the B.C. salmon fishery, to conflicts between department personnel. He maintains that in the 1970s there was considerable institutional instability in the Department of Fisheries. The state was "an arena of conflict, but its

personnel were weak participants in policy disputes." From 1971 to 1978 the department of fisheries was only one of a number of disparate agencies in the conglomerate of the Department of the Environment and "suffered for attention, focus, consistency, and qualified personnel at senior levels" (McMullen 1987: 148-9).

Sinclair's model provides some interesting insights into how to deal theoretically with contradictory state policies. These, in turn, have implications for survival strategies. However, this theory does not give us a way of understanding how responses from fishing households can impact on state policy. In my model for analyzing survival, I am arguing that the survival of inshore fishing is explained by the dialectical process between fishing households and external structures such as the state. It is based on the premise that fishing households are dynamic entities composed of various individuals who are actively involved in determining and carrying out the survival strategies of the enterprise. Consequently, state policies produce contradictory results, not only because of different interests among state actors and state institutions, but also because of different needs, desires and interests among the members of fishing households who are responding to, and influencing these policies.

State actors develop fishery policy as though the only person to be affected by the policy is the fisher-man. For example, the goal of licensing policy was to reduce

participation in the fishery. The thrust of the policy was directed at the license-holder, in nearly all cases, the male head of household. However if a fisher has to leave the fishery, he is not the only one affected. Because of the lack of alternative employment possibilities in an area like Naufrage, leaving the fishery usually means leaving the area. If, for a variety of reasons, the fishing family doesn't want to do this, the woman in the household might decide to engage in wage labour to supplement fishing income and to enable her husband to continue fishing. Thus the results of state policy are influenced by the actions of other members in the household.

Taking the household seriously means that we can explain how state actors sometimes have to adjust policy or expand state programs beyond their original objectives in response to actions of household members operating out of a survival imperative. For example, in the 1980s, women used their constitutional rights to fight for access to unemployment insurance benefits for spouses of self-employed workers. This was not a collective decision, but individual women used the legal system to force changes in the unemployment insurance act which expanded the options of fishing women in developing household survival strategies. This expansion of the unemployment insurance program is directly contrary to state efforts to cut back on UI benefits to workers and fishers.

A model which takes seriously the complexity of fishing households as well as the complexity of state institutions means that in analyzing survival we have to examine the actions of fishing households as well as the those of the State.

2.5. Gender and Household Relations

An examination of fishing households involves a recognition that they are made up of men and women who have different roles and often have different reasons for wanting its continuance. Therefore gender dynamics is an important concept in developing an analysis of survival.

A rich body of literature on the Atlantic inshore fishery has provided important insights into how this petty commodity form of production has survived under the domination of capitalist relations of production. However, much of the analysis has concentrated on the individual's relation to production, and where the household has been considered, survival was primarily determined by the activities and decisions of the male head of household.

Marilyn Porter has critiqued the work of the 'Maritime Marxists'- Sacouman (1981), Veltmeyer (1979), and Clow (1984)- as well as the Newfoundland writers, Sinclair (1985) and Fairley (1985) for their gender-blind analysis of the fishery in Atlantic Canada. While their work does take greater account of the connections between the family and the

economy, it does not recognize the "place of gender in such relations" (Porter 1987:51-2).

However, there is a growing body of literature that is making women's economic activity in the political economy of the Atlantic region more visible. MacDonald and Connelly's work (1983) is based on the understanding that in a dependent regional economy, households have "always required more than the male wage to survive". They have had to combine incomes from various sources, whether through wage labour of different members of the family, the informal economy, or a combination of petty commodity production and wage labour. MacDonald and Connelly have concluded that the "allocation of women's work between the home and the labour force has been a response by the family household to changes in the economy". The State has also played a role in altering work patterns as fishing families adjusted to regulations of licensing policies or the unemployment insurance program (Porter 1987:47; MacDonald and Connelly 1983:68, 1989:46,69).

The possibilities for women to develop new work roles in fishing households are influenced by external economic and political structures that affect employment possibilities; but they also depend on internal characteristics such as gender relations in the household and personal skills, educational qualifications and likes/dislikes of the women involved. Consequently, any analysis of household responses to economic and political changes must take into account

"gender and household relations" (MacDonald and Connelly 1989:61).

For example, changes in state policy in the 1980s, namely in unemployment insurance regulations, have made it more attractive for women to go fishing with their husbands. But the exercise of this option is affected by other factors, some of which are related to the personal choice of the woman, and some of which are due to a male work culture and exclusionary practices that restrict women from moving into work roles that were previously only taken up by men.

An economic logic has pushed women to take on new work roles. Taking on wage labour outside the home or moving into traditionally male work roles, such as that of helpers on lobster boats, has broken down some of the barriers of sexism and has given women a new confidence about their own abilities. Unfortunately, women have few choices in the kind of work available to them, especially in rural communities, and often are victims of low wages and unattractive working conditions.

Women view work choices from different perspectives. Armstrong and Armstrong (1983) in their study of women and work concluded that women explain their work choices in rather negative terms. The most common reasons were:

they needed paid employment, this was the work available, it didn't have the worst working conditions, and it allowed them to do their other work at home (1983:41).

Nevertheless, many women in fishing households see their work as a way to exercise an active and creative role in the survival strategies of their households. It is a mechanism to preserve a certain way of life for themselves and their families.

However, changes in work roles do not necessarily change unequal gender relations. In the case of the women working on the boat, the fact that the man is the boat-owner and the woman a worker maintains an unequal relationship of power. In most situations, women, by working at wage labour outside the home, take on a double workload as they still retain responsibility for maintaining the household. But changing work roles have the potential to change gender relations. With more economic independence, women may have more space to negotiate their contribution to the fishing enterprise.

This will have implications for survival. In a patriarchal household where work choices are restricted to what the male head considers acceptable, work options may be more limited. In households where, within the constraints of the dominant economic and political structures, gender relations allow for negotiation between husband and wife about work allocation, there may be more possibilities of the household surviving.

In the model used in this thesis, I have argued that survival depends on the contributions of other members of the household besides the male producer, particularly women. The

theoretical concept of gender is essential in understanding how household relations influence the shape of survival strategies and in turn how these strategies influence state policy. It also helps us to see that the ideas and goals of women, which reflect their gendered roles, might provide different motives for survival.

2.6. Conclusion

The conceptual framework used in this thesis is drawn from three interacting and mutually dependent theoretical areas. First, the survival of petty commodity production is understood through an analysis of the interaction between internal and external forces. The survival of the production unit is determined by the context of the social formation which exerts certain pressures. It is also mediated by the many and varied internal dynamic forces which influence and are influenced by the structural context. PCP's survive as integral components of the economic system. As well they exist as a product of the conscious and subjective decision-making of the whole producer household. These decisions are based on a mixture of economic and non-economic concerns. The customs and values of the community and the relations among the producing households are also important in the survival of this form of production.

The second aspect of the model utilized in this thesis is the contradictory role of the state in its interventions. It

is not uncommon for the state to legislate two policies in the same sector which are at cross purposes to each other. These conflicts sometimes are explained by internal contradictions within the state institutions which derive from the limitations of state actors and the diversity of interests the state simultaneously represents and serves. However, they may also be the result of different needs, desires and interests of people who demand changes in state policy and direction. Thus an explanation of the survival of PCP must take into consideration the complexity, both of producer households as well as state institutions.

Third, an essential component of the conceptual framework of this thesis is the impact of gender and household relations on the survival of petty commodity production. Specifically, this involves focusing on the impact of women's work, decision-making, creation of alternatives and the negotiation of economic and domestic relationships within producer households.

Using a conceptual framework that considers the interaction between the outside macro-structural factors and the agency of fishing households allows for a more comprehensive explanation of the survival of petty commodity production. This method of analysis allows us to look at households in a more dynamic way. It permits us to take seriously the gender and generational dimensions of fishing households, and to consider the creative contribution of

members of the fishing household other than the male fisher
in developing survival strategies.

CHAPTER 3.

STATE POLICIES AND CHANGING ORGANIZATION IN THE PEI LOBSTER FISHERY

3.1 Historical Overview

This thesis is concentrating on changes in state policy in the lobster fishery from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. However, first I would like to briefly outline the history of the lobster fishery to provide some context for its specific character and its present role in the PEI fishery. Lobster had very little economic value until the mid 1850s because there was no way of preserving them. Unlike fish, they could not be dried or pickled; they had to be cooked almost immediately. Before modern means of transportation and refrigeration, lobster were limited to a small local market. George Leard in a book on lobster folklore says that

[i]n early Acadia and down to almost modern times, lobster were an unappreciated food that had to be eaten fresh. ... They could not be marketed and were accordingly despised by the early settlers (Leard 1975:1).

The commercialization of lobster only became possible with the discovery of canning technology. This was first used in the lobster fishery in the mid-1800s. As a result of the canning process, this product became the cornerstone of the Island fishery. There were other species in the waters surrounding PEI, such as cod, hake and mackerel, but

for several reasons, the development of the lobster fishery enjoyed the most success (Wells, 1986; DeWolf, 1974).

There was an abundance of the resource in PEI waters. A relatively small amount of capital was required for harvesting and canning, and lobster was a highly valued and marketable product. Another reason, which is not often cited, is that the social structure of Island communities and the multi-occupational character of fishing/farming households was suited to the development of the lobster fishery.

The kind of lobster fishery we have today evolved as a result of state regulations, environmental conditions, geographical and market factors. The lobster fishery is one of the earliest regulated fisheries in Canada. Very early in its history, regulations turned the lobster fishery into a seasonal fishery. The first regulations, passed in 1873, prohibited the capture of soft-shell lobsters to prevent the canning of a poor quality product. By 1876 this regulation was changed to a closed season during molting time, lasting from one and a half to two months, from July to September. Later, closed seasons were introduced not only to prevent the canning of poor quality lobsters, but also "as a means of decreasing exploitation". By 1879, the fishery in PEI was closed from August 20 to April 20 (DeWolf 1974:17-19). This set the stage for today's long closed season of ten months in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence. One effect of this

regulation was to make the lobster fishery into a part-time activity. Fishers in PEI have always engaged in a multi-species fishery, and many combined fishing with subsistence farming and other wage jobs.

In the beginning, all of the lobster in the region was marketed as canned product. Within the first 30 years, however, the live lobster trade started to develop. It began on a small scale in 1878 between Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and Boston. During the rest of the 19th century the live lobster trade was conducted exclusively out of southern New Brunswick and western Nova Scotia, because of their proximity to the Boston market. As more and more lobster from southern New Brunswick and Southwest Nova Scotia were destined for the live market in the United States, the canneries disappeared from this area. However, in areas such as eastern Nova Scotia, PEI and northeastern New Brunswick, which were farther away from the American market, the canning industry continued to grow and develop. Most of this canned product was shipped to England until the end of the first world war when the markets shifted to the United States (Dewolf 1974:18-19; Wells 1986:160).

By the end of World War I, the Maritime provinces was divided into two distinct areas, a 'market' area in the south and a 'canner' area in the north. A two-tiered price system also developed with the rise of the live lobster trade, in which the 'market' lobster fetched a higher price than the

'canner' lobster (DeWolf 1974:19-22). This had implications for the development of the fishery. In the market area, fishers harvested only the larger 'market' lobster and all the product was sold on the live market. Consequently, more of the surplus was appropriated by the harvesting sector and lobster fishers in this area tended to have higher incomes. In the canner region in which PEI is included, the fishers were harvesting the smaller lobster and hence, the canneries played a key role in the development of the industry. Because of the need for wage labour in the canneries, other household members became more directly involved in the lobster industry.

PEI did not start shipping live lobster to the U.S. until 1928. However, the lobster canneries remained an important part of the Island lobster industry up to the mid-1950s, though they steadily decreased in number from a high of 246 canneries in 1900 to 49 in 1947. More recently, with the development of freezing technology, canned lobster declined in popularity and has been replaced by cold pack and frozen lobster in the shell. Although the processing industry has changed from canned to frozen products, the PEI fishery remains primarily a 'canner' fishery. Over 80 per cent of the lobster caught is sold as a processed product, rather than on the live market.

To summarize, as a result of state regulations combined with market forces, the PEI lobster fishery has developed as

a canner fishery closely allied to fishing households. Because the fishery was seasonal and harvesting took place close to home, it could be combined with fishing other species and with farming. It became a type of industry suited to family labour. The men fished for the factory owner and both women and men worked in the small factories that were dotted along the Island coast. It created an industry where fishing households were dependent on multiple incomes for survival.

The particular way the lobster fishery in PEI developed makes it a good place to study the interaction between external structures, such as state policy and capital investment, and the internal dynamics of petty commodity households.

3.2. Changes in State Policy in the 1960s

Up to the 1960s the fishery was open to anyone who wanted to fish. There were no limits on traps and the cost of entry was minimal. In the 1960s, new kinds of state intervention, in the form of licensing policies and unemployment insurance, changed the shape of the lobster fishery and had an impact not just on the fisher who held the licence but on the entire fishing household in which he/she was embedded. In this next section, I outline the implementation of licensing and unemployment insurance policies and the response of fishing households. I discuss the impact of state policy on the

organization and fishing practices of fishing households in the area around Naufrage.

The period from the mid-1960s to the 1980s was very significant for the lobster fishery. Although the industry had been systematically regulated for over 100 years, it was not until the late 1960s that restrictions were imposed on access. For the first time there were limits on the numbers of fishers participating in the fishery, and the number of traps used (Scott and Tugwell 1981:43). Previous regulations, which dealt primarily with minimum size, protection of egg-bearing lobsters, and closed seasons, were mainly concerned with conservation. Licensing policies and trap limits represented a new direction for state policy, which was more directed toward economic goals. According to Gordon DeWolf:

One of the main goals of the federal government in the 1960s with respect to the lobster fishery was more efficient management in an attempt to increase net incomes of fishermen. As it is generally agreed...that the same total catch of lobster can be taken with much less total fishing effort, regulations controlling effort were introduced. Effort control is expected to reduce unit fishing costs so that net incomes will be increased providing revenue does not change (1974:26).

A real flaw in this argument is the assumption that revenue will not change. Without any controls on price, the fishers' revenue is a very unstable factor and thus, even if costs are reduced, there is no guarantee that net incomes will rise.

These state policies of limited-entry and gear controls were responsible for the elimination of some fishers from the

lobster fishery, and for those who remained, they encouraged a change in the organization of the fishery and in fishing practices. In discussing licensing policy I deal specifically with limited-entry, personal licensing policies, trap limits, the buy-back program and the Bonafide licensing policy.

3.2.1. New Goals for State Policy in the Fishery

In Canada as in other countries such as Norway, Iceland and the United States, state policy in the 1970's was dominated by liberal solutions. These took the form of state intervention designed to regulate access to the resource (Neis 1988:44).

Up to this time, government involvement in the fishery was limited to researching and developing technology, income assistance policies, such as unemployment insurance, and building infrastructure. Ownership and management were not part of state policy (Sinclair 1988:163).

Doug House (1988) maintains that the seeds for policies on resource management were sown by the fisheries economists of the 1950s. Since the 1950s canadian fisheries policies have been based upon the following fundamental assumptions:

- 1) fish like any other national resource, should be exploited in the most rational, efficient, productive manner possible; 2) that rationality can best be achieved by industrializing and modernizing the fishing industry on the model of other successful resource and manufacturing industries; and 3) that the peculiar, common property nature of fish as a resource means that unrestricted free enterprise by itself cannot

rationalize fishing efforts; the state must intervene to regulate the industry in the best interests of society as a whole (House 1988:179).

Thus, government regulations, like limited entry licensing policy, were promoted to counter "excess harvesting capacity and an inefficient use of the factors of production". (House 1988:179). Limited entry in the lobster fishery was the forerunner of more direct state intervention in the management of all fish resources. Sinclair (1988) states that this change in fisheries policy to more direct involvement in resource management, which culminated in 1976 with the announcement of the first comprehensive policy for Canadian Fisheries called Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries, heralded a redirection in the attitude of government toward fisheries management and development.

Implicit in the new orientation is more direct intervention by government in controlling the use of fishery resources (Canada 1976:5).

The 1976 document showed the "powerful influence of economic theories of open access resources". Economic problems in the fishery caused by too much effort and resulting in low incomes were identified as a consequence of the 'tragedy of the commons'. Sinclair (1988) summarized the main argument of this theory, promoted by various theorists (Scott 1955; Scott Gordon 1954; Gulland 1974) in this way:

As a fishery becomes commercially attractive, capital investment and labour are directed towards it in anticipation of profit. When no controls are exercised, however, individual fishers acting in their own interests will catch as much as possible rather than leave fish for their competitors. If prices fall,

they fish harder to increase their returns. A frequent result of this spiral is an economic decline, as costs of production rise, and the possibility of resource extinction increases (Sinclair 1988:164).

Acting on this theory, state planners concluded that the biological and economic goals of a common-property resource could not be reached without continuous state control over inputs (Scott and Tugwell 1981:49). In a symposium on Policies for Economic Rationalization of Commercial Fisheries, the economist J.A. Crutchfield presented the position that an open access fishery causes a multitude of ills such as excessive use of labor and capital inputs. He maintained that theory and experience have shown that "no management program that does not include control over inputs to fishing can offer much lasting improvement in economic performance over open access"(Crutchfield 1979:743).

Many writers (Alexander 1974; Sinclair 1988; House 1988; Davis 1984; McMullan 1987) have argued the pros and cons of limited-entry licensing policy, concluding that while they may have solved some problems for the inshore fishery, they also created new constraints. McMullan alleges that downsizing the fleet does not necessarily remove excessive capacity (1987:126). Sinclair (1985, 1988) concludes that limited entry has no doubt improved the incomes of some fishers by keeping out competition. However, it has done so at some social cost, by creating inequalities and sometimes hostility between those who have licences and those who

don't. It has also led to significant increases in the cost of limited-entry licences such as lobster.

Neis (1988) has criticized the 'tragedy of the commons' thesis as not providing an adequate answer to the problems of low incomes for fishers. It "provides an explanation for the crisis in the fishing industry as being based on the nature of the resource and regulations surrounding access to the resource" (p.48). It ignores the fact that these problems can only be solved by looking at "the wider socioeconomic system within which the fishery is located" (p.53). These economic theories have other limitations in that they provide a rationale for limited access based on an assumption that the ability of a fishing enterprise to survive is determined solely by the economic activities of individual fishers. The theories do not take into account that fishers are embedded in households. The survival of inshore fishing enterprises cannot be adequately understood only by examining the activities of fishers. The decisions and actions of other household members also have an impact on survival.

3.2.2. Rationalizing the Lobster Fishery.

The lobster fishery, as well as other fisheries on the Atlantic Coast, has long been characterized by inadequate incomes and low productivity. Excessive inputs of labour and capital were considered to be the major cause of this situation. As far back as 1950, H. Scott Gordon, in an

extensive report on the PEI fishery from 1919 to 1949, concluded that "the lobster resources of Prince Edward Island could be exploited with half the men, boats and gear currently used without lowering the average annual catch by so much as a hundredweight" (Gordon 1952:109).

During the 1960's, the number of lobster fishers increased all over the Maritimes (Table 1). The number of participants in the PEI lobster fishery reached a total of 3,103 in 1967, the highest in the history of the fishery. According to a Report on the Atlantic Fisheries done by the Atlantic Development Board there were several reasons for this increased participation. Rumours of restricted entry encouraged people to return to the fishery to ensure their future participation. Also the price of lobsters to fishers increased from 32.1 cents to 58.2 cents (81.5 per cent) between 1961 and 1965 (Table 2). Between 1957 and 1965 lobster landings remained fairly steady but the landed value more than doubled from \$2.4 million to \$5.1 million (Canada 1969:30). Unemployment insurance for fishers had been introduced in 1957. This would also have aided in making the fishery more stable, thus attracting more entrants.

Although this report points out that incomes improved for PEI fishers between 1957 and 1965, it goes on to point out that they were still low compared to the provincial and

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF LOBSTER FISHERS,
MARITIME PROVINCES, PEI
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1984.

YEAR	P.E.I.	MARITIMES
1950	2,313	15,415
1955	2,380	17,137
1960	2,659	16,177
1961	2,810	16,485
1962	2,792	16,608
1963	2,798	16,973
1964	2,809	16,981
1965	3,043	18,075
1966	2,898	16,247
1967	3,103	16,025
1968	2,993	16,420
1969	2,654	14,267
1970	2,470	13,290
1971	2,353	12,847
1972	2,705	12,543
1973	2,703	12,500
1974	2,410	13,182
1975	2,391	N/A
1976	2,371	N/A
1977	N/A	N/A
1978	1,575	10,057
1979	1,685	9,538
1980	1,893	9,838
1981	1,942	9,862
1982	1,931	9,910
1983	2,032	10,509
1984	1,310	8,561

Source: Economics Branch, DFO, Ottawa 1959-1971,
Canadian Fisheries Annual Statistical Review, 1972-1984.

TABLE 2: LOBSTER LANDED VALUE, P.E.I. SELECTED YEARS

YEAR	LANDED VALUE (\$ 000'S)	PRICE PER POUND cents
1957	2,456.2	28.8
1961	3,055.0	32.1
1965	5,177.0	58.2

Source: Fisheries Statistics of Canada. D.B.S.

Canadian average. It uses statistics from an extensive economic appraisal of the Canadian lobster fishery by Rutherford, Wilder, and Frick (1967) for the Fisheries Research Board. This survey analyzes the different sources and levels of income for lobster fishers (Table 3). A comparison of these incomes with those at the national and provincial levels, demonstrates that incomes from the inshore fishery were indisputably low. The personal income per labour force member in 1961 was \$4,374 for Canada and \$2,970 for PEI. Even though the incomes of PEI fishers, which are included in the sections on the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Western Northumberland Strait, are the highest in the region, they only represent 83 per cent of the provincial average and 57 percent of the Canadian average (Canada 1969: 33).

Both the report from the Atlantic Development Board and the Rutherford report concluded that there were too many men, boats and equipment engaged in a basically limited resource. They saw little likelihood of significant increases either in the volume or in the landed value of the lobster fishery on PEI. There was no other fishery on PEI which could be expanded sufficiently to provide this increase. The species that did have potential for increased yields, such as crab, shrimp and herring, require more investment in larger boats and different gear. Therefore lobster fishers could not easily move into exploiting these species.

TABLE 3: NET INCOME FOR ALL SOURCES PER ENTERPRISE OPERATOR
IN LOBSTER FISHERY, 1961.

AREA	UNIT	NET FISHERY INCOME	FORESTRY & AGRICULTURE	LABOUR INCOME	OTHER INCOME	TRANSFER PAYMENTS	U.I.	TOTAL
SOUTHERN N.B.	\$ %	1,451 65.1	24 1.1	241 10.8	151 6.8	77 3.4	286 12.8	2,230 100
WESTERN N.S.	\$ %	1,375 65.4	40 1.9	328 15.5	91 4.3	112 5.3	161 7.6	2,117 100
S. SHORE N.C.	\$ %	845 50.5	56 3.3	312 18.7	13 0.8	195 11.7	251 15.0	1,672 100
EASTERN N.S.	\$ %	637 43.2	45 3.1	368 24.9	55 3.7	134 9.1	236 16.0	1,476 100
GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE	\$ %	1,240 51.1	166 6.8	532 21.8	68 2.8	155 6.3	273 11.2	2,441 100
WESTERN NORTHUMBER- LAND STRAIT	\$ %	1,382 55.2	169 6.7	298 11.8	77 3.1	280 11.1	304 12.1	2,515 100
NEWFOUND- LAND	\$ %	584 42.1	81 5.8	187 13.5	2 0.1	274 19.7	261 18.8	1,389 100

Source: Rutherford, J.B., D.G. Wilder and H.C. Frick. An Economic Appraisal of the Canadian Lobster Fishery. Bulletin 157. Fisheries Research Board of Canada. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967.

As a result they recommended that the number of lobster licences in the Maritime region be cut in half (Rutherford et al 1967:80; Canada 1969:33-36).

A 1967 economic analysis of the fishing industry on PEI aimed at formulating a programme to raise the income of individual PEI fishers through improved management of fishery resources (Prince Edward Island 1967). It, too, ascribes the inefficiency of the fishery to the common property nature of the fishery in that:

[a]n uncontrolled fishery will always have more productive factors than are socially desirable ...The resource does not earn economic rent and the fishermen need not economize in its use (Prince Edward Island 1967:20).

It criticized the kind of regulations that had been implemented in the lobster fishery up to the 1960s as a "major impediment to improvement in efficiency and income" (p.3). Lobster enterprises reacted to restrictive regulations, such as the use of the trap as the only legal means to harvest lobster, the prohibition on egg-bearing lobsters and closed seasons, by intensifying the use of productive factors. As a result, the number of fishers, boats and gear in the lobster fishery increased.

Some bureaucrats and fishers were suggesting that to improve the lobster fishery, it was necessary to implement trap limits and increase the minimum size. The Report concluded that controlling some factors of production through trap limits or raising minimum size would have no beneficial

effect if entry controls were not also implemented. If changes in any one factor of production caused an increase in total revenue, more people would enter the fishery thus dissipating any benefits to individual fishers (Prince Edward Island 1967:21-8). Again the assumption in this report is that the improvement in the lobster fishery is determined only by the activities of the fisher. Input from other members of the fishing household are completely ignored.

In summary, in the lobster fishery on PEI from 1960 to 1974 two things were happening. Landings had steadily declined from 10.1 to 6.2 million pounds (Table 4).¹ At the same time, however, landed value was increasing from a low of \$3 million in 1961 to a high of \$7.5 million in 1973 (Table 4). High lobster prices together with unemployment insurance for fishers attracted new people into the fishery. There was great concern on the part of the state that growth in fishery revenue would attract new entrants, thus diminishing any chances for increased individual incomes. Some fishers were concerned that these new entrants were fishing only lobster and were taking income from this fishery on which full-time fishers were more dependent. In the 1970s, larger numbers of traps were being used to offset lower landings, which further increased the costs of production. Thus freezes on lobster

¹ These two figures represent the highest and lowest points in landings since the 1940s.

licences and trap limits were seen as mechanisms to stop new entrants, reduce costs and improve incomes.

TABLE 4: LOBSTER LANDINGS AND VALUE, P.E.I.
1960-74

YEAR	LANDINGS (000'S)	LANDED VALUE (\$ 000'S)
1960	10.1	3,212.3
1961	9.5	3,055.0
1962	8.7	3,218.9
1963	7.4	3,155.8
1964	7.8	4,210.8
1965	8.8	5,176.6
1966	7.9	3,925.7
1967	9.0	5,228.9
1968	8.7	5,328.9
1969	8.2	5,375.8
1970	8.7	6,231.2
1971	8.2	5,860.6
1972	7.3	6,360.8
1973	7.7	7,503.2
1974	6.2	6,347.0

Source: Fisheries Statistical Review, 1989.
P.E.I. Department of Fisheries.

It is interesting that in all of the government reports on the lobster fishery, they never cite low prices as a reason for inadequate incomes for fishers. The explanation that the problems of the lobster fishery are primarily due to open access is criticized by Barbara Neis (1988) who draws on the work of Rosemary Ommer (1985) to argue that the:

relative wealth and poverty of fishers... are determined not so much by the extent to which the resource is 'open access', as by the price of fish, access to and the nature of markets, the

organization of fish processing, and other factors
(Neis 1988:50).

The State's solution to low incomes for lobster fishers did not challenge any of these factors around price, markets or the domination of the processing sector over the harvesting sector. Rather their response has been to reduce participation in the latter sector.

3.3. Introduction of Trap Limits and Licensing Policy

Trap limits were established before a licence freeze. They were first implemented in District 8(25) in 1966 where a limit of 250 was set. The following year a limit of 500 was set for the north side of PEI, in district 7B(24). In 1968 the trap limit went down to 400 in district 7B and was reduced again to 300 in 1977 (Canada 1975:65). The difference in trap limits is due to the rhythm of landings. In the Fall lobster season, (district 8), over 50 per cent of the total landings for the season is landed in the first two to three weeks. This area of PEI was also most affected by reductions in lobster catches.

In 1968 the number of lobster licences was frozen. In 1969, the limit that was placed on the number of operators was changed to a limit on the number of licensed boats. Placing the limit on boats controlled the actual number of enterprises engaged in the fishery, and was a more effective way to control new entry. There were two categories of

licences for lobster fishing vessels. Class "A" licences were given to all boats that had fished a minimum of 100, 75 or 50 traps in 1968, depending on the district. For PEI the minimum number was 100. Boats that had fished less than the minimum number were classified as "B" boats. Licences for class "B" boats were not transferable.

In 1977, administrative changes were made to these regulations and licensing went back to the pre-1969 practice of attaching it to the fisher rather than the vessel. The substance of the 1969 regulations remained the same with the trap limit applying to the vessels of category "A" or "B" fishers. This categorization was clearly a strategy to differentiate 'full-time' from 'part-time' fishers. Persons were ineligible for a category "A" licence if they were fully employed in work other than primary industry employment or, they had full-time seasonal employment, and their gross earnings during the twelve-month period preceding the application for the licence exceeded the minimum wage plus 25 per cent (Tugwell 1981:29-31). The main result of this was to prevent people who had wage jobs outside of primary production, from fishing lobster.

The licence freeze prevented new entry into the lobster fishery but it did not reduce the numbers significantly. With the categorization of fishers into 'full-time' and 'part-time', there was pressure from some fishers to get rid of part-timers, or 'moonlighters', as they were sometimes

denoted. Romeo LeBlanc, the federal minister of Fisheries from 1974 to 1984, announced a lobster management plan in 1976 after he had received a report from the Lobster Fishery Task Force set up in 1975. He intended to remove the part-time fishers from the lobster fishery. LeBlanc announced that part-time fishers would be notified early in January, 1976 that their licences would be revoked. His justification was that lobster licences should be restricted to those who needed them. Appeal committees were set up in each of the twelve lobster districts in the Maritimes. There were so many appeals in the three Maritime provinces that they could not be settled before the spring lobster fishery in 1976, and LeBlanc had to abandon this plan for another year (Charlottetown Guardian Mar.31,1976).

There was some disagreement between the licensing guidelines proposed by LeBlanc and the program proposed by the PEI Fishermen's Association and the provincial Department of Fisheries. The PEI government and the Fishermen's Association favoured a buy-back program that would voluntarily remove licences, whereas the Federal Government was pushing to get rid of the part-timers as a pre-condition to setting up a buy-back program. The Lobster Fishery Task Force (1975) had recommended against a buy-back program, saying that "without extremely large expenditures of

funds...a buy-back program would only eliminate the marginal² fishermen and therefore achieve no substantial reduction in effort" (Canada 1975:77).

Clearly there were different interests between federal and provincial politicians. Provincial politicians realized that revoking licences from so-called part-time fishers created a lot of antagonism among PEI fishers, most of which was directed at politicians. Buying back licences was a more 'politically popular' way of reducing participation in the fishery. Furthermore they realized that fishers were not going to leave the fishery without some compensation. However, at the federal level, it was difficult to get approval for public funds that would be used "to purchase a privilege in order to protect persons from competition" (p.77).

At the end of 1976, LeBlanc announced that those fishers who did not need to fish lobster for a living would be removed from the fishery within two years. Fishers would be categorized according to three categories: Category A, fishers dependent on the fishery for their living and without other year-round employment; Category B, fishers with another full-time job or who had started fishing before 1969;³

² The marginal fishermen here refers to those who may be fishing a small number of traps. The concern about large expenditures of funds did not refer so much to the cost of buying back licenses in P.E.I. but more to buying back licenses in the whole region.

³ Category B fishers are to be allowed to set 30% of the maximum number of traps established for the district.

Category C, fishers who did not fit into A or B, but who had acquired a registered vessel after 1969. Category C licences were issued only until the 1978 fishing season (DeWolf 1974; Scott & Tugwell 1981; Charlottetown Guardian Nov.9, 1976).

3.3.1. Buy-back Program

In 1977, a Lobster Licence Buy-back Program was introduced. This was much more effective in reducing effort in the Maritime lobster fishery than the limited entry program (Scott and Tugwell 1981:44). The lobster Vessel Certificate Retirement Program⁴ was first introduced in PEI under the Prince Edward Island Comprehensive Development Plan. This 15-year Development Plan was initially implemented in 1969 by the provincial and federal governments to promote the economic and social development of the Island. An integral part of this plan was the rationalization of the primary industries of fishing and farming. The objectives for developing the inshore fishery under this plan were based on a number of assumptions. It stated that:

The fishery of the Province had a number of serious problems... The limited resource base, the large number of small ports, and the over-exploitation of certain species, are all reflected in the low incomes from fishing and its seasonal nature (Prince Edward Island 1971:33).

⁴ This was the official title of the program which was popularly called the Lobster Buy-back Program. Through the program the fishers withdrew from the fishery by selling their lobster vessel certificate.

One of the main objectives of this plan was to raise the income of fishers. The planning document stated that "the supply of fish does not permit any appreciable expansion in total activity. Accordingly good earnings for the individual will be possible only with a smaller number of fishermen" (Prince Edward Island 1971:34). The Plan recognizes the limits of the resource, but it does not consider a higher price to fishers as a way of improving their incomes. The state chose an approach that would give higher incomes to fewer fishers and at the same time maintain the right of the corporate sector to accumulate surplus.

The objectives of the development plan were in accord with the federal government's limited-entry licensing policy. But the planners felt the federal program was too slow and was not actually reducing the number of participants in the fishery. They therefore proposed a compensation plan to encourage people to leave the industry.

The new Federal regulation which licences lobster fishermen will limit entry and therefore gradually reduce the number of fishermen. This will be a slow process however. The need for rationalization as the basis for higher incomes per fisherman, means that there should be some form of compensation to provide active encouragement and assistance to people who want and are able to leave the lobster fishery (Prince Edward Island 1971:35).

The funding for the Buy-back program on PEI was shared by the province and the Department of Regional and Economic Expansion, with the latter providing 90 per cent. The project was to last three years and its goal was to

voluntarily withdraw 400 licences from the lobster fishery. The stated purpose was "to ease pressure on the resource and to increase the incomes of those remaining in the fishery" (Scott and Tugwell 1981:30). A total of 187 licences were bought back, only 45 per cent of the stated target number. Compensation, based on average landings for the previous three years, ranged from a minimum of \$2,000 to a maximum of \$6,000.

The program was extremely popular in the first year but was less attractive in the second and third years. One reason was that lobster landings had increased from 9 million pounds in 1977 to 11.8 million pounds in 1979, and the total landed value had increased from \$10 million to \$18 million in the same period. Lobster fishing was now considered a more viable option than in the early 1970s and worth risking an investment. As a result, fishers could obtain more for their licence on the market than from the Buy-back Program (Prince Edward Island 1979a:63-64; Scott and Tugwell 1981:30).

3.3.2. Bonafide Licensing Policy

By the end of the 1970s there was a lot of confusion regarding the licensing changes that had taken place in the previous decade. The government licensing policy to remove participants from the lobster fishery was welcomed by some, but caused a lot of uncertainty for others. Many fishers alleged that the DFO was terminating licences that were not in use. There were also constant complaints that patronage played a big role in the granting of licences (Calhoun, forthcoming).

To sort out these problems, Romeo LeBlanc appointed Cliff Levelton, former assistant deputy minister of DFO, to study the issue and make recommendations. In his 1979 report, Levelton agreed with the fishers that "the Atlantic coast licensing system has become overburdened, inconsistent in application, cumbersome, misunderstood and somewhat unresponsive" (Levelton 1981:2). In response, in 1983, the federal fisheries minister announced a new licensing policy for fishers in the southern Gulf called the Bonafide Licensing Policy. This policy classified fishers as Bonafide and Commercial. 'Bonafide' fishers were those who had a Class A lobster licence and/or made 75% of their income from fishing. What made a fisher bonafide was not a particular licence but a 'bonafide permit'. This permit allowed holders to transfer or acquire other limited-entry licences and gave them priority in receiving new licences. Other fishers were

classified as commercial.⁵ To acquire a bonafide permit, a fisher had to fish with a commercial licence for two years. One of the advantages of this new policy was that it gave more flexibility to bonafide fishers to transfer individual licences if they so wished. Another change was that the fisher was licensed, not the fishing vessel. Thus s/he could transfer his/her licence without transferring the boat.

The Maritime Fishermen's Union was very involved in developing this licensing policy. The Southern Gulf Bonafide Fishermen's Licensing Policy has been described as one in which fishers had a great deal of input. According to the fishers who were fighting for this policy, this policy recognized that the fishery in the southern Gulf was a multi-purpose fishery. The Bonafide permit gave fishers flexibility to choose a fishery in accordance with their needs, as well as the condition of the stocks. Fishers were no longer forced to use their licences every year just to keep them (Calhoun, forthcoming).

The effect of the licensing regulations during the 1970's, and especially this Bonafide policy of 1983, was to prioritize people who were fishing full-time, and remove those who were combining lobster fishing with other wage jobs that were perceived to be well-paid. The logic for this was that

⁵ A Commercial fisher is a person 16 years of age or older who has participated in commercial fisheries and is registered with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans as a Commercial fisherman (Prince Edward Island 1988:62).

the benefits of the lobster fishery should be left to those who were making their living primarily from fishing.

It is clear that these licensing policies changed the nature of the inshore fishery. Some part-timers did leave, although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many left and how many became fulltime.⁶ However, because of the licensing policy, some fishers who previously had combined lobster fishing with other jobs now became full-time fishers. There was increased pressure on full-time fishers to get more returns from the fishery. Also, the price of lobster licences rose significantly during the next ten years making it difficult for young people to enter the fishery.

The freeze on licences prevented new fishers from entering the fishery. The categorization policy and the buy-back program were responsible for removing some licences from the fishery. However, in some areas at least, licensing policies did not reduce participation to the extent that was originally anticipated.

⁶An examination of table 1, showing the numbers of lobster licenses in PEI from 1950 to 1984 might lead us to conclude that the number of licences were reduced by half during that period. However these numbers may be somewhat misleading. Before 1970, all people fishing lobster had a lobster licence, both boat-owners and helpers. After the limited-entry policy, and categorization of licences, the number of lobster licences reflected only boat-owners. After 1977 helpers are not included in the lobster licensing statistics. As a result we cannot conclude that the reduction in numbers represent a consequent reduction in lobster enterprises.

3.4. Impact of Lobster Regulations on Fishers in Naufrage

In the area around Naufrage up to the mid-1960s, the fishers could be broadly divided into two groups. The first group, who would consider themselves full-time fishers, fished for six months, catching a variety of species such as lobster, groundfish, mackerel and herring. During the remainder of the year they would work at wage jobs. The second group fished only lobster. They were considered part-time fishers, and combined this with subsistence farming, or would engage in wage labour immediately after the lobster season. Both groups had access to unemployment insurance benefits after 1957 with the implementation of the Fisheries Regulations as part of the Unemployment Insurance Act.

Many people in this area also fished along the shore in small shore boats of 20 to 30 feet. With the categorization of fishers into full-time and part-time, some of these left the fishery and others, who had previously only fished lobster, became full-time fishers. Those who remained in the fishery relocated to Naufrage as a point of departure because it had a wharf and could accommodate bigger boats. Of the respondents who were fishing in the 1960s and 1970s, 50 per cent had been fishing in small shore boats, but during the period 1965-1975 they relocated to Naufrage.

The removal of part-timers from the fishery received mixed support from the fishers along this shore. The comments

below from the fishers I interviewed demonstrate a range of views:

I never fished and farmed. A lot of people did. I made a living only from fishing. Everyone was getting into fishing [in the 60s] so they tried to control it before it got out of hand... There was some pressure from the fishermen on people who had other jobs to leave fishing. At one time one buyer had 3 boats in Naufrage. Some fishermen had two fleets. Those regulations forced fishermen to become fulltime fishermen. Sometimes people are pushed into things they didn't want to get into. ...But there are probably still too many boats up there [Naufrage].

The regulation to do away with part-time fishermen has helped. We would be better off down here with 50 boats than with what we got here now. [There are 84 boats in 1989].The government should buy back now.

Licensing policies eliminated the practice of fishers operating more than one boat or hiring other people to operate the boat. The holder of the licence has to be present in the boat during fishing and they are only allowed to fish in one lobster district.

Not all fishers were in agreement with the reclassification of part-timers:

The government passed regulations a few years ago that you weren't allowed to have any other jobs besides fishing. They would reclassify your licence if you were only part-time. It brought a lot of part-time fishermen fulltime into the fishery. I don't think it was a good thing. There were restrictions on licences anyway. There were no new licences being issued. If a fellow had something else to go to, let him go ahead... That regulation changed the fishery. Before that, some people worked on the car ferry. They took their holidays and went lobster fishing.

As this fisher indicated, it changed the fishery as fishers now were expected to make their living only from fishing.

There was general agreement among the fishers interviewed that trap limits were a good regulation. Most thought it gave everyone equal access and cut down expenses:

There was some complaining but people accepted the change. It was no good. There was no one making a half-decent living at it. Some were fishing 1,000 traps and some had 100 traps. When they put the trap limits on, everybody was fishing 300 traps. It made the thing more competitive. All of a sudden everyone was fishing the same.

Some thought it was good for conservation:

In terms of trap limits, it's good to regulate them. We are getting as much fish now with 300 traps as with 400 traps because we are fishing them better. The regulations are good for conservation.

If the fishers are getting as much lobster as before, it is questionable whether trap limits decreased effort. What the trap limit did was cut down competition.

When I started [in 1968] the trap limit was 400 traps. The people with 1000 traps didn't want to change just like today. ... There was some pretty poor fishing in the 1970's and some left and never came back.

Economists allege that the limit was set too high to result in any real reduction in effort. There is much debate among fisheries economists as to whether trap limits actually reduced the total number of traps. Most argue that the total number of traps went up because before the trap limits many fishers were fishing below the limit. DeWolf in his study on

the economic effects of regulations in the lobster fishery states that:

licence limitation and trap limits as introduced in the late 1960s will redistribute incomes more equally, will not affect total fishing effort substantially, may lead to an increase in the total number of traps, may have an adverse effect on economic efficiency, and will increase the value of boats as the right to fish lobsters becomes capitalized (1974:53-4).

Rutherford (1967) maintains that the real motivation for the trap limits was a desire on the part of fishers to equalize access (1967:91). The actual reduction in total number of traps did vary from region to region. It seems as if there was some reduction in PEI. The Acres Report (Prince Edward Island 1967) indicated that the total number of traps in PEI in 1964 was 550,000. In 1989 the total number of official trap tags issued by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was 379,400.⁷ However even if the overall number was reduced, there is a strong trend to build bigger, more efficient traps; thus there is probably increased effort.

3.4.1 Increase in Concentration of Fishers in Naufrage

The goal of state policies like limited-entry and removal of part-timers was to reduce participation in the lobster

⁷ This number was calculated by multiplying the number of bonafide fishers in the three lobster districts on P.E.I. by the number of traps allowed for each fisher.

TABLE 5: NUMBER OF BOATS FISHING OUT OF NAUFRAGE 1967-89

YEAR	# OF BOATS	YEAR	# OF BOATS
1967	78	1978	82
1968	82	1979	84
1969	82	1980	82
1970	97	1981	81
1971	97	1982	81
1972	94	1983	81
1973	96	1984	82
1974	97	1985	81
1975	98	1986	81
1976	95	1987	81
1977	87	1988	81
		1989	84

Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Morell, P.E.I.

fishery and thus increase the income of those who remained. If there was some reduction in the overall fishery on PEI, this reduction was experienced more in some areas than in others. In Naufrage harbour the number of boats actually increased in the period 1967 to 1975 (See table 5). Part of the increase in numbers can be explained by the relocation of the shore boats to Naufrage harbour.⁸ However, there was a major increase in fishing effort due to the movement of boats from the southeastern part of the Island to the north shore.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, when lobster landings began to decrease in the southeastern part of PEI, fishers came over to the north shore where the landings were higher. At

⁸. The relocation to Naufrage only changed the point of departure. They were fishing the same grounds as when they were fishing off the shore. Thus the addition of these boats did not reflect new fishing effort in Naufrage harbour.

that time, District 7B included the whole area of the north shore and the southeastern shore from East Point to Victoria and fishers could legally fish anywhere in the lobster district. In the mid-1970s, due to pressure from fishers in the Naufrage and North Lake area, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans subdivided District 7B drawing a line straight east from East Point. This regulation made a new lobster district of the area from East Point to Victoria. As a result, the fishers who had moved to the north shore were prevented from returning to their home port when landings improved in the late 1970s. This was an example of two different state policies working at cross purposes. The regulations on limited entry and removal of part-timers were promoting the removal of fishers while another regulation actually kept the number of fishers high in this particular area.

By the early 1980s, limited-entry licensing and the categorization of fishers as bonafide and commercial had created a lobster fishery much different from that of the mid-1960s. The goals of these state policies were to rationalize this fishery, remove part-timers who had access to other full-time jobs, and professionalize the status of those remaining as fulltime fishers. The policies were based on the logic that inefficient fishers would drop out of the fishery and go to other jobs. Thus the fishers remaining

could be more economically efficient, increase their effort per unit, and consequently raise their incomes.

However, in reality, these policies had very uneven effects because fishing households responded in different ways. In the Naufrage area, due to a lack of other employment alternatives, many fishers who previously were part-time, did not drop out; rather, they became full-time so that they could keep their lobster licence.⁹ Conflicting state policies maintained a high concentration of fishers in Naufrage. The requirement to be full-time fishers resulted in increased capital investment and higher costs. In some areas of PEI, these rising costs were offset by increased landings. However Naufrage experienced only modest increases in lobster landings (See table 6). As a result many lobster fishing households maintain that without the support of other state programs such as unemployment insurance, it would be very difficult to survive as inshore fishers.

⁹It is difficult to get accurate information on exactly how many lobster fishers in this area dropped out as before 1967 DFO did not have clear records of fishers according to harbours. Also many fishers in the 1960s in this area were fishing along the shore. After limited entry, some of them moved to Naufrage and some went to the other neighboring harbour, Red Head.

One indication that limited-entry licensing policy did not remove many fishers from the Naufrage harbour is that in conversation with fishers, they always refer to the buy-back program as having the most effect on reducing the number of fishing enterprises in Naufrage. As a result of this program, 14 licenses from Naufrage harbour were bought back between 1977 and 1979.

TABLE 6: LOBSTER LANDINGS,
NAUFRAGE, P.E.I. 1978-89

YEAR	NAUFRAGE	P.E.I.
1978	347	5036
1979	351	5354
1980	335	5354
1981	346	5399
1982	340	5535
1983	391	7033
1984	322	6171
1985	282	6806
1986	263	8303
1987	319	8575
1988	412	9982
1989	389	9664

Source: Fisheries Stats Review,
P.E.I. Department of Fisheries.

3.5. Unemployment Insurance

A State policy that has had significant impact on the development of the inshore fishery is the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Program. Fishers were given access to unemployment insurance benefits in 1957 and still remain the only group of self-employed workers who have access to this program.

To qualify, self-employed fishers must have at least ten weeks of insurable earnings. With recent changes, only six weeks have to be from fishing. The remaining four weeks may be obtained from other work. Fishers are eligible for benefits under Part V of the Unemployment Insurance Regulations and are classified as either "year-round" fishers

or "seasonal" fishers.¹⁰ Approximately 90 per cent file claims as seasonal fishers. Fishers are eligible for benefits for a period of 29 weeks, from 1 November to 15 May for fishers on PEI. A week of insurable earnings is calculated to be 75 per cent of the gross value of the weekly catch, and must be a minimum of \$99 to qualify. In 1983, changes in the regulations allowed fishers who had 15 weeks or more of insurable earnings to base their benefits on the best ten weeks. As a result of this change, fishers could fish in the shoulder seasons when catches are low or sporadic without it affecting the size of their benefits (Canada 1986:241-3; 1987b:2).

Over the past 30 years changes in the overall economy, as well as changes in the licensing system have created a situation where unemployment insurance plays a more significant role in supplementing the incomes of fishers than in the past. Rutherford's study in 1967 indicated that 11.5 per cent of the incomes of fishers in the Gulf came from unemployment insurance. In surveys of fishers' incomes in 1984 and 1988, unemployment insurance accounted for 29 per cent of the total income of full-time fishers in PEI (Canada 1987a:90; Information from DFO). Insurance claims for

¹⁰ "Year-round" self-employed fishers must have 20 weeks of insurable employment. Their last job must have been on a vessel designated by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission as "year-round", and they must have demonstrated "year-round" fishing employment. These fishers are entitled to the full benefits of the regular Unemployment Insurance program. Ten percent of fishers fall into this category. "Seasonal fishers" are so called because they fish for species that have a designated season (Canada 1986).

fishers in PEI rose from \$5 million in 1978 to \$19.2 million in 1988 (Table 7).

TABLE 7: AMOUNT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
PAID TO FISHERS ON PEI, 1978-1988

YEAR	AMOUNT (\$ 000'S)
1978	5,035
1979	5,900
1980	7,244
1981	7,439
1982	8,686
1983	12,229
1984	12,063
1985	13,063
1986	15,928
1987	15,978
1988	19,275

Source: Canada Employment and Immigration,
Charlottetown.

Limited entry did not reduce dependence on state income-support programs, such as unemployment insurance, as was implicitly expected in the original objectives. As licensing policies and changes in the wider economy reduced options for fishers, they were forced to invest more in the fishery. But in areas like Naufrage, due to a high concentration of fishers and limited fish resources, there is less possibility that even with increased investment, individual fishers will achieve significant increases in income. Thus programs like unemployment insurance are all

the more necessary for their survival. They give the inshore fishery a stability it would not have if fishers were dependent only on fishing income.

Unemployment insurance for fishers has been under severe attack since the mid-1980s. It has been criticized in the Forget Report (1986) as imposing a heavy cost to taxpayers¹¹ and for maintaining a "high level of participation in the fishery which reduces the viability of the industry, impedes its restructuring and to some extent the restructuring of the provincial economies of Atlantic Canada" (Canada 1987b:4). The critics argue that since it no longer acts like an insurance program it should be eliminated and replaced by an income support program. This has been promoted by various governmental and private consultants since the Kirby Report of 1983.

Jim Overton (1990) argues the view that UI no longer acts as an insurance program is based on ignorance of the history of the program. If we examine the history of unemployment insurance, we discover there has been a long debate about whether it should just be an insurance program or "meet other, broader social objectives". Overton maintains that since the 1960s:

¹¹. Witnesses to the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans noted that there is a significant imbalance between premiums and benefits. Over 90 per cent of the benefits paid to fishers have been paid out of federal general revenues. However the total benefits for self-employed fishers were less than 2 per cent of all UI claims in 1984. These benefits at the local levels provide a minimum of protection in an industry subjected to many external and internal pressures (Canada 1987:3-5).

the trend has been to extend UI coverage to more and more workers and towards the creation of a comprehensive national system for pooling the risks and costs of unemployment (p.28).

It has been argued that fishers' UI should be replaced by other 'more appropriate' income stabilization programs, because of its use in recurring periods of seasonal unemployment. The majority of seasonal workers in Atlantic Canada use UI as a means of 'maintaining income' in the off season. However there seems to be a more systematic campaign to replace UI with an income stabilization program for fishers than for other seasonal workers.

Fishers' organizations such as the Maritime Fishermen's Union and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union in British Columbia have expressed grave concerns about the dismantling of the unemployment insurance program for fishers. They have emphasized its essential role in providing a much needed, basic level of income during the off-season. They see UI as minimum protection in an industry subjected to many external pressures, such as fluctuating export prices and exchange rates, as well as internal pressures, such as weather, resource availability, and lack of collective bargaining rights. They have argued that the income supplementation programs would be more vulnerable to countervailing duties (Canada 1987:5).

Fishing incomes vary significantly in PEI from year to year. Fishers emphasize that the benefits they receive do not represent a huge amount of money and if they have a good

year and a higher than usual amount of income, it is taxed back.

Unemployment is really important in a year like this [1989]. Two years ago I paid it all back to the government in taxes. This year I won't pay any income tax. I will be glad to get my unemployment.

Fishers reject the idea that they are a big burden on taxpayers.

If you are making \$12,000 net income, you need UI. If I was fishing lobsters on the south side, I don't think I would need it. ... [UI] is not a lot of money. The government knows it's not a lot of money and if people are making a lot of money, it is taxed back.

The continuation of unemployment insurance as a state policy is demanded by workers as a way to counteract the risks and costs of unemployment. It was based on the premise that unemployment is not the fault of the worker, and that the state has an obligation to support workers when they cannot find gainful employment. It was extended to fishers as a response to the economic reality that fishers could not survive on fishing income alone. Interviews with fishers make it clear that they look at unemployment insurance as part of their fishing income.

3.6. Conclusion

Licensing policies, as well as other changes in the economy, have changed the activities of fishers from a pattern of occupational pluralism to one where there is more concentration on fishing production. This has reduced the flexibility of fishing enterprises, an essential factor in an industry where producers have no control of the price of their product, nor of the resource. Thus state programs such as unemployment insurance play an important part in survival strategies by supplementing both the fishing income of the fisher and the wage labour earnings of other members of the household.

The two policies of licensing and unemployment insurance operating at the same time have often had contradictory effects. As licensing policies attempted to downsize the fishery, unemployment insurance has enabled fishers to counter some of the insecurities and thus remain in the fishery. Fishing households developed survival strategies that responded to the new direction of state policy, but also took advantage of the opportunities it offered to extend their options in reproducing their fishing enterprise.

CHAPTER 4.

SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF FISHING HOUSEHOLDS

4.1 Introduction

State policy implemented from the mid-1960s to the 1980s changed the shape of the inshore fishery. At the same time it presented new challenges and new constraints on the survival of lobster fishing households. Through licensing policy, the state froze new entry in the lobster fishery, classified licenses as full-time and part-time, and reduced the number of participants by removing part-timers. Fishing households responded to these constraints in a multi-lateral way by intensifying their fishing efforts and also by expanding household income through wage labour. In this chapter I will discuss survival strategies that fishers in Naufrage adopted, outlining them according to three main areas. I will first talk about changes in the lobster fishery; secondly, the exploitation of other species; and thirdly, other sources of income generated by the wage labour of other family members or fishers themselves.

4.2 Strategies in the Lobster Fishery


During the decade 1978-1988 the PEI lobster fishery experienced overall increases in both lobster landings and landed value. Lobster landings rose from 11 million pounds in 1978 to 22 million pounds in 1988 (Table 8). Lobster

landed value increased from \$16.6 million to \$56 million in the same period. Figures 2 and 3 showing five-year averages of lobster landings since 1893, both for PEI and Canada, indicate that the increases in this decade of 1978-1988 were higher than in any previous decade in this century¹.

These increases in landings, along with the freeze on licenses, present a general impression of prosperity for lobster fishers on PEI during the 1980s. But not all areas of PEI experienced the benefits of increased landings and prices to the same degree. Lobster landings in the Naufrage area, for example, did not increase to the same degree as other areas. To demonstrate the unevenness of lobster landings, Table 9 compares percentage increases from 1978 to 1989 for Naufrage harbour; the lobster district in which it is located, 7B; the other spring lobster district, 7B1; and PEI as a whole. Because of fluctuations in landings, I am using averages of 4-year periods to compare these percentage changes. While the 4-year averages have increased 21 per


¹ No one has an adequate explanation as to why the lobster landings have been increasing every year. Some possible explanations are diminishing cod and hake stocks which are predators of lobster, escape mechanisms on traps to let small lobster escape before the trap is hauled to the surface, better gear resulting in increased effort and warmer than average water temperatures. But biologists have no really solid scientific explanations for the increases and historically lobster stocks go up and down without warning. The landings in P.E.I. dropped 1 million lbs. from 1988-89 after increasing every year since 1978.

Fig. 2: PEI Lobster Landings
Five-Year Averages



Each date is the 3rd yr. in each period
The last figure covers only 1986-89.

Fig. 3: Canadian Lobster Landings
Five Year Averages



Each date is the 3rd yr. in each period
The last figure covers only 1986-89.

TABLE 8: LOBSTER LANDINGS
AND LANDED VALUE,
PEI. 1978-1989.

YEAR	LANDINGS	VALUE
	('000's)	(\$000's)
1978	11.1	16,649
1979	11.8	18,074
1980	11.8	15,458
1981	11.9	18,519
1982	12.2	22,599
1983	15.5	29,056
1984	13.6	23,137
1985	15.0	33,591
1986	18.3	44,494
1987	18.9	49,532
1988	22.0	56,129
1989	21.3	46,058

Source: Fisheries Statistical
Review, PEI, 1989.

TABLE 9: 4-YEAR AVERAGE OF LOBSTER LANDINGS,
NAUFRAGE, DISTRICT 7B, 7B1, 1978-89.
(Metric Tonnes)

YEAR SPAN	7B	per cent change	7B1	per cent change	FOUR-YEAR AVERAGES Nau- frage	per cent change	PEI	per cent change
1978-81	2926		1312		344.7		5284	
1982-85	3046	+4	1819	+39	331.8	-4	6408	+21
1986-89	3541	+16	3744	+106	345.8	+4	8649	+35

Source: Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown.

cent and 35 per cent for PEI as a whole, and 4 per cent and 16 per cent for District 7B the averages for Naufrage show only slight variations. An examination of the lobster landed value for Naufrage from 1978 to 1989, reveal some fluctuation but no significant increases. If we calculate these values in constant 1978 dollars, we see that between 1978 and 1989, real lobster income for fishers in Naufrage has decreased by almost one-third (Table 10).

In addition the degree of concentration of fishers varies from area to area. While district 7B has experienced lower percentage increases in landings than 7B1, it has 20% more fishers (Table 11). As outlined in Chapter 4, the area around Naufrage has a particularly high concentration of fishers because of the movement of fishers to this area in the early 1970s. Considering that all the fishers in 7B and 7B1 fish an equal number of traps, the possibility of individual fishers in Naufrage increasing their landings is limited.

Finally, the overall prosperity of the lobster fishery and the freeze on lobster licenses have caused significant increases in the cost of lobster licenses and upward pressure on other costs. At the same time, the establishment of lobster fishers as full-time has increased fishers' dependence on fishery income. Fishers have responded to these changes by increasing their capital investment with the expectation of enlarging their individual share of the catch.

TABLE 10: LANDED VALUE OF LOBSTER
NAUFRAGE HARBOUR, 1978-1989

YEAR	TOTAL LANDED VALUE	
	(\$ '000's) current dollar	(\$ '000's) constant dollars
1978	1,129	1,129
1979	1,183	1,075
1980	927	756
1981	1,181	844
1982	1,359	866
1983	1,616	970
1984	1,314	756
1985	1,471	813
1986	1,203	638
1987	1,609	816
1988	2,311	1,123
1989	1,749	808

Source: Statistics Division, DFO,
Charlottetown.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF LOBSTER LICENSES
IN PEI BY LOBSTER DISTRICT.

DISTRICT	NUMBER LOB.LIC.	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
7B(26)	642	49.5
7B1(24)	401	30.2
8(25)	<u>266</u>	<u>20.3</u>
TOTAL	1,309	100.0

Source: 1988 Annual Report,
PEI Department of Fisheries.

4.2.1. Fishing Harder

Many fishers improved their equipment by buying bigger boats and building larger traps. They have also adopted more flexible fishing practices with the use of electronic equipment such as the Loran C and fish-finders. This equipment as well as bigger and better boats and equipment allow them to fish in inclement weather as well as increase their ability to exploit other species after the lobster season. Eighty per cent of the fishers interviewed bought bigger boats in the period from 1980 to 1989. Seventy-five per cent of these were new and the remainder were second-hand. Of the five fishers who had started fishing since 1977, four started with smaller, second-hand boats. Within five to seven years they had purchased bigger and better boats.

The trap limits of the late 1960's were implemented because it was felt that there was too much effort for the amount of lobsters being harvested. The same amount of lobsters could be harvested with a much smaller number of traps. The limit of 300 traps per fisher was intended to equalize access to the resource and keep costs down. Since the restriction on traps, nearly every fisher has moved to bigger traps, from 3-bow to 4-bow during the 1970's, and to large square or double-ender traps in the 1980s. The latter, with two openings for the lobster to enter and two bait lines, function almost like two traps in one. Of the 15

fishers interviewed in Naufrage, 14 are still actively fishing. Of these 14, 8 were in the process of changing their traps from 4-bow to larger square traps or double-ender traps.

These traps are more expensive to build and they only have an advantage at the beginning of the season when there are lots of lobsters. In June, when there are fewer lobster available, they do not fish any better than the smaller ones. But fishers using these traps feel that they can get maybe 1,000 to 2,000 more pounds in May. Everyone feels that if they don't change to this type, they will be unable to compete:

This year [1989] my catches jumped 2,000 pounds from last year. I built 100 double-ender traps 1 st winter. You have to work hard if you want to catch any amount of lobster.

Right now the way everyone fishes, they have really good traps. I'm using double-enders. They're no better when fishing is not heavy. But when fishing is good, at the start of the season, they fish better [than the single bait-line ones].

Investing in electronic equipment, such as Loran C's, made it easier for fishers to move their gear around the fishing grounds, to use shorter strings of traps, and to search more actively for grounds where lobster may be more plentiful. When they were dependent on visual clues in the surroundings to find their gear, they tended to set longer trawls and had to set them close together so as not to lose them.

Without a Loran C you have to keep your gear in a line so you can find it. With a Loran C it is scattered all over. If you find a good fishing spot, you can go right back to that spot. You get more fishing time with a Loran...It increases your catch because you don't lose as many days. Every bit of grounds are covered with this equipment. You don't save money or you don't save time but you might get a better catch.

Of the 14 active fishers interviewed, nine acquired Loran C's in the 1980s. None of the fishers interviewed had Loran C's before 1980.

The use of Loran C's, which facilitate navigation even in fog and bad weather, and bigger, and more seaworthy boats allows fishers to fish many more days than previously:

With better gear you can go out in bad weather. That is one reason why people want to improve their gear. It allows them to fish more days.

In May of 1989 fishers in Naufrage did not miss one day hauling their traps. Their total number of days fishing during the lobster season was between 50 and 60. Data collected in surveys done by the PEI Department of Fisheries from 1970 to 1974 indicate the average number of days fishing per season was 37 days, and from 1977 to 1981 the average number of days fished was 39 (Prince Edward Island, 1974, 1977, 1979-1981). These numbers show an increase in the average numbers of days fishing over the past 15 years.

It is obvious from the statements of fishers that they are under pressure to increase their catch:

If you don't move when the fish is there, you're going to get less fish and you're going to get less

dollars to make your payments. Around here the fishing is only real decent for three to five weeks.

The fish are fished way harder than they used to be...The fishermen that are in it now have to work hard at it. Even the good fishermen have a tough time to make a go of it. People who weren't fishing seriously have gotten out of it because it is pretty competitive.

Better equipment doesn't give fishers access to new grounds. Community rules prevent fishers in this area from fishing the grounds of neighboring harbours. Neither does it increase the overall number of lobsters on the ocean floor. It just allows those fishers who make this investment a chance to increase their individual share of the overall catch, especially in the first month of the season. It also means that the lobster is caught sooner, with the consequence that during the last two or three weeks, landings are low:

The overall landings at this wharf [Naufrage] have not gone up much but with better equipment the individual fishers are trying to get a bigger share of the catch. The better equipment you have, the more likelihood that you will catch more. But this means someone else will catch less.

People improve their gear with the hope of increasing their catch. Sometimes it happens, sometimes they don't. Now we have 4-bow double-ender traps. If the fishing isn't heavy, they're no better. If the fishing is good, they are an advantage.

These higher capital investments, as well as increases in fuel costs, maintenance and basic equipment, push up the per unit cost of harvesting the lobster:

I see a difference from when I was fishing with my father. The payments are more. It costs more for bait, for a hired man.

Even though some fishers feel that they could catch the same amount of lobster with smaller traps over a longer period of time, they feel they have to build larger traps to compete. The larger number of traps there are in the water, the less effective they are in giving individual fishers a competitive edge. It seems highly probable that increasing the effort will either put unacceptable pressure on the stocks or will raise the per unit cost of production so high that it dissipates any economic rent in the fishery. There is some concern about the overall effect larger traps will have on the stocks.

I built 150 double-enders last year and I am going to build 75 more this year. They already are having an effect on the resource. Last year we had a real good May and nothing in June. The only way I see it is that you have to get them in May when everyone else is getting them.

But many fishers say that, judging from the overall landings in the 1980s, the stocks seem to be in better shape than they have ever been.²

Some fishers feel the size of the rings on the larger traps could be affecting stocks. They allow them to catch larger female lobsters than was possible in the smaller

²The lobster landings for Prince Edward Island in the latter part of the 1980s are the highest they have ever been this century (Figure 3).

traps. These females are capable of producing thousands of eggs and fishers state that they are catching more of these large female lobsters in June, when there is more possibility that they have eggs ready to extrude. It could be damaging for the future of the lobster fishery. It is only illegal to catch females if the eggs are visible on the outside of the body. Thus it is not in any individual fisher's interest to return them to the water because it would not guarantee that someone else would not catch them.

The increased capital investments provide fishers with some short-term gains in the lobster fishery, but to the extent that everyone does it, it will provide diminishing returns. As well, no one knows what the increased pressure will do to the stocks. But fishers don't make these improvements in their boats just for the lobster fishery. They also do it to give them more flexibility to fish multiple species.

4.3 Fishing Other Species: Making a Day's Pay

Most fishers in the Naufrage area emphatically state that it is very difficult to survive in this area only on lobster income. Thus another survival strategy involves fishing other species. Besides the economic factors, most fishers don't feel they are 'real' fishers if they are just fishing lobster. The lobster fishery is only a two-month season and from the point of view of using their skills and capital

equipment, most want to fish as long as the weather permits, which is generally until the end of October.³

Fishers in this area expect to make the largest portion of their income from lobster,⁴ and they use the income from this fishery to cover the major costs of reproducing their fishing enterprise. However, they will engage in fishing other species if they can get wages or as they often say 'make a day's pay'. This income allows them to at least cover living expenses during the summer.

The fishery in Naufrage has always been a multi-species fishery. For decades, full-time fishers in this area have fished groundfish, (such as cod, hake, flounder), and mackerel during the summer months. In spite of yearly fluctuations in landings, all of these species were easily available on the grounds around Naufrage until the 1980s and could be caught with relatively little investment. In the next section I will discuss some of the difficulties and opportunities that fishers have experienced in the exploitation of other species.

³One other reason why fishers want to fish until the end of October is because they are not able to collect unemployment insurance until the first of November.

⁴ Lobster landed value represents 71.7 per cent of the total landed value of the PEI fishery.

4.3.1 Groundfishery

Fishers who fish groundfish with fixed gear can be divided into two broad groups. There are some fishers who invest considerable money in nets and fish seriously all summer. There are others who mainly handline or have a few nets. The latter do not invest a lot of money in it and if there is not much fish, they don't go out.

The groundfishery began to experience declining landings in the mid-1980s (See Table 12). This has forced fishers who want to earn any significant income from groundfishing to invest more money in it and use nets which are more costly than gear for jigging or trawling. Four of the 15 fishers interviewed regarded groundfishing as their main fishery after lobster and used a large number of nets. Besides the capital investment, preparing for net fishing requires a lot of time and energy in the winter. Monofilament nets are better quality than nylon, but they are also more expensive. The price of monofilament nets ranges from \$40 to \$60 a net. This represents only the cost of raw material; it does not include the cost of the fisher's labour in rigging them. The cost of nets has increased significantly in recent years. One fisher, for example, stated that, "rigged nets in 1978 were worth approximately \$90. In 1988 they are worth \$190".

The fishers who invest money and time in preparing 40 or 50 nets want to get a return on their investment.

About half the boats in Naufrage fish groundfish. A lot of them are just jigging. They're not making a

lot of money at it but they make spending money. But if you have money invested in nets, you've got to get that money back. You don't want just a day's pay.

Of the fishers interviewed, four fish groundfish all summer with 30 nets or more and "have had some good years". In good years they can make as much money from groundfish as they do from lobster. The figures in Table 12 indicate that groundfish landings were high for this harbour from 1983 to 1985 inclusive. They declined somewhat in 1986 and 1987, but in those years the price of groundfish was high (Table 13). Cod was selling at 25 cents and 30 cents a pound in 1986 and 1987 respectively, as opposed to an average of 14 cents a pound for the other years in the 1980s. Hake was selling for 30 cents a pound in 1987 as opposed to 8.5 cents on average for the other years.

Another reason for the relatively good earnings from groundfish is that only a few fishers are fishing with a large number of nets. Thus there is not so much competition in this harbour for the resource. Some fishers counteract low prices by negotiating special deals with a buyer. They agree to truck the fish to a special buyer for a better price.

This summer [1989] we weren't getting that big a price for cod. I did better because I sold to a guy in Fortune. He has a small operation and supplies a local market. I had to truck them over but I got a better price. When I first started fishing groundfish, I didn't have nets. I would put out

TABLE 12

GROUNDFISH LANDINGS FROM INSHORE SET GEAR, NAUFRAGE,
1980-89

YEAR (Pounds)	COD	HAKE	FLOUNDER	TOTAL
1980	259,190	100,034	10,412	369,636
1983	566,071	78,287	4,823	649,183
1984	462,405	60,256	5,284	527,945
1985	452,174	72,705	2,669	527,345
1986	384,308	88,851	11,855	485,107
1987	388,539	244,128	43,202	676,316
1988	182,544	158,469	7,362	351,722
1989	165,382	65,914	1,710	236,831

Source: Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown.

TABLE 13

LANDED VALUE OF COD AND HAKE, NAUFRAGE HARBOUR
1980-1988.

YEAR	COD (dollars)	PRICE PER LB. cents	HAKE (dollars)	PRICE PER LB. cents
1980	36,287	14.0	9,203	9.2
1983	70,759	12.5	4,697	6.0
1984	57,801	12.5	3,615	6.0
1985	63,304	14.0	5,816	8.0
1986	96,077	25.0	7,997	9.0
1987	116,562	30.0	73,238	30.0
1988	27,383	15.0	15,847	10.0

Source: Fisheries Statistical Review, 1989.
Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown.

trawl and catch 400-500 lbs. a day. At that time you could jig and get some good fish. Now what you take jigging is not worth catching. You have to use nets.

Fishers who are using nets acknowledge that they have to use more and more nets every year to catch the same amount of fish. One stated: "With 12 nets I could catch 1500 pounds/day in 1977-79. In 1988 I was lucky to catch 1200 -1500 pounds a day with 40 nets." They blame the destruction of the groundfishery on the big draggers. They maintain the draggers are catching a lot of small fish and throwing them over without including them in their quota. Besides the scarcity of fish and the smaller size, a more recent problem for fishers fishing groundfish in this area is the increasing number of dogfish. These fish destroy the nets. The dogfish were so bad in the summer of 1989 that the fishers had to stop fishing for periods of time.

Other years I made wages in groundfish. After you take out the cost of your nets you can make wages. This year a lot of weeks I could not make wages. Between the dogfish and the seiners, it is pretty near finished. It used to be the draggers could only drag in sand. Now with rock-hoppers they can drag everywhere.

With the exception of a few fishers, groundfish and mackerel do not represent a major part of fishing income in this area. Nevertheless they are an important supplementary income to lobster. All fishers lament the scarcity of groundfish. With mackerel, the problem is more one of marketing. They talk of earlier years when these fish were plentiful:

When I started fishing [1964] there was no worry about other species. Now there are only one or two people fishing mackerel. There is not much difference in the price of cod 20 years ago than now. It was no problem then to get 2,000 pounds a day but now you cannot get them.

There were lots of groundfish then. We jigged, used nets and trawls. Sometimes you would get codfish that would weigh 80 pounds. We tried to make a day's pay. If you could get 400 pounds/day just jigging, you could make a day's pay. In those days everyone fished groundfish, mackerel, different species. The cod prices haven't gone up that much. The mackerel have gone down.

I never fished groundfish for a season. I fished it in spurts. For a couple of months, you could make \$500/wk. If you were by yourself you could make \$1,000/wk. That's not really big fishing. But you cannot do it now.

Shortages of groundfish represent an important constraint on the survival strategies of inshore fishers. Groundfish and mackerel were species that everyone fished and in earlier times they gave fishers some secure income during the summer months without a great deal of capital investment. Declining landings, uncertain prices combined with higher costs of gear make for unpredictable returns from these species.

4.3.2 Tuna Fishery

Another species that provided significant income for some years to a number of fishers in Naufrage was tuna. The number of tuna caught in Naufrage ranged from a high of 83 in 1976 to a low of 4 in 1987 (Table 14). The landed value for tuna was highest in 1978. In District 88 it reached almost half a million dollars. In addition, the costs involved in

catching tuna were relatively low. By the mid-1980s, however, tuna disappeared from the waters at this end of the Island.

Tuna fishing is still an option for fishers from Naufrage but they now have to travel to the south side of the Island or to Nova Scotia to catch them. This increases their costs. The number of fishers who participate in this fishery varies from year to year depending on income from other fisheries and the availability of tuna in the area. In 1989, of the 15 fishers interviewed, 5 were engaged in the tuna fishery. It is difficult to get accurate data on the number of tuna caught by fishers in Naufrage as they are landed in other harbours and do not appear in the statistics for Naufrage.

There is a great deal of uncertainty in the tuna fishery. As one fisher exclaimed, fishing for tuna is 'like playing the lottery'. They can invest a lot of time and money and not catch any. However, the price in the late 1980s has ranged as high as \$15.00 per pound. Hence, a tuna weighing 1,000 pounds could net the boat as much as \$15,000. This makes it worth taking the risks.

TABLE 14: NUMBER OF TUNA LANDED
 IN NAUFRAGE, 1974-1988

YEAR	NUMBER	YEAR	NUMBER
1974	24	1982	10
1975	17	1983	61
1976	83	1984	44
1977	47	1985	34
1978	69	1986	4
1979	N/A	1987	4
1980	N/A	1988	0
1981	N/A		

Source: Fisheries Statistical Review, PEI
Department of Fisheries, 1978,1988,1989.

4.3.3 Herring Fishery

Before the mid-1980s, fishers in Naufrage fished herring mainly for bait. In the mid-1980's a number of fishers in the north side of the Island started fishing herring for roe. They have to travel to the southeastern shore of PEI as this is where the large schools of herring are located. The herring roe fishery became an important fishery in PEI because of the rejuvenation of the herring stocks and increased demands for roe in Japan. The price hovered around 9 to 11 cents until 1988 when it dropped to 8 cents. In 1989 it plummeted even lower to 6 cents and in some cases as low as 4 cents. Many fishers who geared up for catching herring in 1986 and 1987 didn't even bother going fishing in 1989.

Fishing for herring roe was a new fishery for fishers in Naufrage harbour in the second half of the 1980s. It is expensive to gear up because fishers have to put decks on

their boat and buy nets. They were also encouraged to invest in insulated boxes to maintain as high a quality as possible. Initially, it seemed like a very promising fishery, but the volatility of the market has made it quite uncertain. An examination of the Herring landings and landed value for District 87 from 1980 to 1988, show the volatility of both landings and prices (Table 15).⁵

This fisher's experience sums up the uncertainty of fishing this species.

I started fishing herring three years ago when I got my new boat. With my old boat I couldn't do this kind of fishing. The first year I caught about 200,000 pounds at 10 cents a pound. Last year [1988] I caught only 100,000 pounds at 8 cents a pound. This year I got about 80,000 pounds at 6 cents a pound. Some people got as low as 4 cents a pound. That will give you some idea of how the thing goes.⁶

Another young fisher expresses it thus:

Last year [1988] I went at the roe fishery. You have to buy all new equipment, put decks on your boat. My father bought all the equipment last year and we paid for it and this year we thought we could make some money. The price went down and we fished two nights and we came home...The same amount of fish has been there for the past number of years but the price has gone down.

⁵The fishers from Naufrage engage in the herring roe fishery on the southeast side of the Island. Thus their landings would be included in those of District 87 instead of 88, where Naufrage is located.

⁶The differences in landings are due to various factors. For instance, in 1988 the fishers had a strike during the season. By the time they went back fishing the better part of the herring season was over and the fish had moved to Nova Scotia. In 1989 the price was so low that fishers gave up fishing.

4.3.4. Irish Moss

Irish Moss is one of the many seaweeds that exist in the waters around PEI. Irish Moss became marketable during the Second World War as a source of carrageenin⁷. When American imports of a Japanese product called Agar were cut off, a technical breakthrough made carrageenin commercially feasible (Wells 1986:168). However, it was not until the 1960s that Irish Moss reached any significant value as a fishery in PEI.

The Irish Moss that produces carrageenin is harvested at the western end of the Island. A similar seaplant is harvested, in somewhat lesser quantities, at the eastern end of PEI.⁸ The accessibility of this seaweed as well as the relatively good prices during the 1960s and 1970s made it attractive for many families to get involved in harvesting it along the shore from St. Peters to East Point (See Figure 3).

The peak year was 1974, when 34.7 million pounds was harvested in District 88 with a landed value of \$736,804. The majority of that amount was landed at Naufrage and the neighbouring harbour, East Point. In the early 1980s, landings had declined sharply and by 1988 landings in

⁷It is a generic term for the extract of the seaweed that is used as a stabilizer as well as a thickener and a gelling agent in food products.

⁸The extract from this plant is actually called Furcellaria which has similar uses as Carrageenin though it is not considered to be as high a quality. Both are popularly known as Irish Moss and are lumped together in the statistics. Thus it is difficult to know how much of each is produced.

Naufrage were down to half a million pounds (See Table 16). This was partly due to less moss washing ashore, and partly due to marketing problems.

This product was unique in the fishery because it was harvested by the whole family. Many women were involved in gathering moss and it was an important part of fishing household income. People gathering moss were eligible for unemployment insurance. In terms of survival strategies, families along this shore saw it as an important contribution to household income.

There are two methods of gathering moss, either by tidal action or by mechanical means (Anderson et al 1978:3). The former was the only one used in eastern PEI until 1988 when an experimental project was started in Naufrage to gather moss using mechanical means. Six more licenses were issued in 1989 and on the basis of the results of these experiments, a limited number of permanent licenses may be issued.

An interesting difference between the mechanical type of harvesting and that of raking it on the shore is who is involved in it. Shore-gathering moss is not a limited-entry fishery and many harvesters were part-time fishers. However, only bonafide fishers will be eligible for the new licenses being issued for mechanical harvesting. It will also require more investment as you need a boat and mechanical equipment, and the harvesting method is not as

TABLE 15

LANDINGS AND LANDED VALUE OF HERRING,
DISTRICT 87,88 1974-88.

YEAR	DISTRICT 87 LANDINGS ('000 's)	VALUE ,	DISTRICT 88 LANDINGS ('000 's)	VALUE \$
1974	34	1,105	33	1,942
1975	--		16	620
1976	--		26	1,246
1977	1	36	14	552
1978	2,857	272,272	456	40,307
1979	n/a		n/a	
1980	1,012	142,462	272	38,319
1981	2,106	218,805	101	10,499
1982	7,015	701,457	142	14,153
1983	7,013	701,275	682	68,225
1984	7,462	746,226	726	72,577
1985	8,040	803,974	694	69,430
1986	14,947	1,494,746	563	56,331
1987	20,402	2,244,223	663	72,877
1988	11,445	1,030,031	1,062	95,617

Source: Fisheries Statistical Review, PEI Department
of Fisheries. 1978.1989.

TABLE 16

IRISH MOSS LANDINGS AND LANDED VALUE,
NAUFRAGE, 1980-89

YEAR	MOSS (WET) LANDINGS (000 's)	VALUE \$
1980	5,118	225,880
1982	1,143	57,156
1983	396	19,823
1984	--	--
1985	--	--
1986	--	--
1987	358	25,077
1988	533	42,648

Source: Statistics Division, DFO, Charlottetown;
Fisheries Annual Review, PEI Department of Fisheries,
1989.

suitable for family labour. However, if it produces a marketable product in sufficient quantities, this will be one more option for fishing households in an area where alternative species are needed for survival. A small amount of shore harvesting is still done but the mechanical method provides a larger quantity and allows the harvester to actively rake it rather than wait for it to be blown in on shore.

4.3.5. Unpredictability of Secondary Species

Most striking about the stories of the fishing activities of these fishers is the uncertainty associated with fishing secondary species. Because of this uncertainty, it is always difficult for fishing households to decide whether they will gear up to catch other species. When they either cannot catch them or cannot sell them, their losses are bigger than if they had not made any investment. The summer of 1989 was an especially difficult one for fishers in the Naufrage area. The following testimony gives some idea of the fishing experience of these fishers in 1989:

I have been fishing groundfish for the past two or three years, usually later in the fall. This year [1989] I tried it right after lobstering. I got a bunch of nets geared up and a drumhauler. It was a big mistake. Tom and I put out 30 nets and then we fished them 2 or 3 days. Other years I made wages fishing groundfish. [meaning they don't make any return on the investment in their gear]. This year I couldn't make wages. Between the dogfish and the draggers that are at it now, it is pretty near finished. There was just none. We were then going to go mackerel seining, but that didn't work out. Then

we were going to go at herring. We couldn't find a buyer. We would have to get pans and deck the boat. To get geared up for herring it would take \$2500 and it was too much of a gamble this year. Last year we went on strike for 8 cents. How could you spend \$2500 and go fishing for 4 to 6 cents. Then I went fishing tuna. This is the first year since 1979 that I didn't catch a fish.

In interviewing fishers, I was struck by the stress that this uncertainty causes and how it affects family relationships. In times when there was an abundance of groundfish and mackerel, it was taken for granted that fishers would fish all summer if the weather was suitable. They would not make a lot of money, but neither would they have big losses. In the 1980s, fishers have less assurance that the landed value will give sufficient returns to the fisher to make up for this added investment. If not, then fishing households are compelled to turn to other means to increase their income so as to cover this capital investment.

4.4 Other Household Incomes

As fishers invest in more equipment and different types of gear to increase their fishing income, there is an increasing need for more cash in fishing households. Consequently, wage income becomes an important component of household strategies. It can be contributed by the fisher or by other members of the fishing household. I will first discuss the options of the male member of the fishing

household and secondly, contributions of women in these households.

4.4.1. Options of Fisher-men in Generating Wage Income

A few fishers decide to fish only lobster and after lobster season they will work at other wage jobs. Fishing other species involves buying a bigger boat and investing in more gear and some fishers think that the income is too unpredictable and not worth the risk. Of the 14 active fishers interviewed, however, 11 of the men are involved only in fishing activities. Two others fish only lobster and work at other jobs after the season is finished,⁹ and one is engaged in a combination of fishing and farming. A small minority of fishers in this harbour live only on lobster income and unemployment insurance. It means having a marginal income, and is more possible if their wives earn a secure income, if they have minimal costs, or if they are single without a family to support.

Most fisher-men in this community use fishing activities as their main source of income. There are various reasons for this. Their identity is connected with fishing. Hence, if they can make a living fishing, that is their choice. Once fishers have decided to invest time and money in preparing for fishing activities, it is difficult to shift

⁹One of these men was not the boat-owner. His wife was the boat-owner and he was the helper. All the other men interviewed were boat-owners.

back and forth from fishing to non-fishing activities. Licensing policy, which states that bonafide fishers "cannot have year-round employment or full-time seasonal employment during the period that coincides with the fishing season in which he or she may wish to fish", has discouraged the practice of engaging in non-fishing activities (Canada 1989:14). Another reason is that there are few alternate employment possibilities in this community that would provide them with more income than fishing.

4.4.2. Women's Contribution: Non-paid labour and Wage Income

Survival for fishing households in the community of Naufrage does not depend on just the activities of the fisher. The contribution of women, both in the form of wage income and of non-paid labour, has played an important part in household survival strategies. Women's contributions to the household take many forms, such as income support, emotional support, organizational support and management of tension. In this thesis I am prioritizing the contribution of women's labour in fishing households.

Nadel-Klein and Davis (1988) lament that too often women's role in fishing communities has been cast as a passive one, of 'waiting at home for the man to return from the sea'. They argue that we must call attention to the "enormous variety of contributions that women make to fishing

communities and to the way in which women see themselves and their work." It is also important to remember that women's role is not static, that as economies are transformed, so are women's roles. They are dynamic and creative actors who respond to new situations as they present themselves (Nadel-Klein and Davis, 1988:8). The contribution of women in the fishing households of Naufrage has demonstrated their creativity and adaptability in responding to different situations in their wider social and economic environment.

An examination of the work of women in fishing families from the older group (over 25 years fishing) indicates that their contribution was primarily through activities in the household. Their work included such tasks as knitting 'heads' for traps¹⁰, preserving food for winter, making children's clothes, looking after farm animals especially when their husbands were out fishing, preparing of meals and childcare. Besides this unpaid labour, they often made small, though important cash contributions to the household through picking and selling berries, keeping boarders, etc. Before the availability of unemployment insurance, these non-paid and cash contributions were essential in a production enterprise where there was little or no cash income from October to May. The following story of one woman whose husband was an active fisher from the late 1930s to the mid-

¹⁰The 'heads' are the part of the trap which is made of twine. They are constructed using a needle and with an action similar to crocheting.

1960s demonstrates the importance and variation of tasks that women were involved in:

In those days we knit all the mitts and socks and I made the children's clothes. We were farming then too. I raised chickens and looked after the cattle in the morning when [her husband] was fishing. I used to can lobsters and chicken for our own use during the winter. I picked wild strawberries until they came out my ears. I'd put them up for the winter. I usually boarded a couple of teachers for \$10 a month. You could buy a lot of stuff with that money then. When we started mossing I was involved with that and all the kids helped. I was out picking moss the day I had to go to the hospital and Gerard was born.

Women continue to do these activities but as rising costs could not be met adequately with fishing income, women also looked for ways to earn wages to enable the fishing enterprise to continue.¹¹ Of the 13 women interviewed, 12 have worked outside the home. Two of these are professionals, one a teacher and one a nursing attendant. The remaining ten have worked at a variety of wage labour jobs. At present seven are fishing, two are working at fishplants, one is retired but has worked at a fishplant. An

¹¹In this thesis I am discussing women's wage work since the 1960s. However it is important to note that, historically, the development of the lobster fishery as primarily a cannery industry meant that women in many fishing households worked for wage labour in the canneries. In the coastline of P.E.I. around Naufrage, there were a number of lobster canneries operating from the early 1900s until the early 1950s, which were an important contribution to employment in this area. Both women and men worked in these factories. The limited data I have on the canneries suggest that the majority of the women working on the production line were young, unmarried girls with some married women employed as cooks.

examination of work histories indicates that women's wage work has changed as new opportunities in the area have presented themselves.

Moss harvesting became an important commercial fishery in the mid-1960s and women and children, as well as men, were involved both in gathering the moss off the shore, and later, in cleaning and drying it in preparation for sale. Of the ten women working at wage labour, six had been involved in gathering moss.

Fish processing (including lobster) moved into frozen products in the 1960s. Plants were established in Souris and Morell, neighbouring communities of Naufrage. At this time, many women from fishing households began working in these plants. Seven of the ten women worked in fishplants in the area at some time in their working lives. Five of these were seasonal jobs in non-unionized plants paying minimum wages or slightly higher. The seasonal fishplants process inshore fish, principally lobster, but also some other species such as mackerel, herring, or crab. Three of the women worked at a year-round fish processing plant. This plant is unionized, pays better wages, \$7 to \$8 an hour, and the workers are employed approximately ten months of the year. The year-round plant processes off-shore fish, mostly redfish and in lesser amounts, cod, flounder and other groundfish species. More recently, in the late 1970s and 1980s women started to fish with their husbands. This was a new area of work for

women and an increasingly attractive one especially for younger fishing families. (I will deal with this in more detail in the next chapter.)

In this particular community at the present time, a high percentage of women are working outside the home, compared with the national average. According to Statistics Canada, in 1980, 50.3 per cent of women in Canada were participating in the labour force (Armstrong and Armstrong 1983:249). Information from the interviews and discussions with key informants in the community suggest that, in 1989, there were only two or three households in the whole community which were dependent on one income, that of the 'male head of household'.

Despite the different types of work that women choose, it was obvious from almost every interview that the income of women is very important to the household. Their incomes provide some measure of security in a very vulnerable fishery.

All of the women interviewed state that they see their contribution to the household as part of a shared project. They don't look at their household income in a fragmented way that separates 'my' income from 'my husband's' income. This arrangement often hides the fact that the fishing enterprise cannot reproduce the production unit on fishing income alone. Many fishermen say that maintaining or expanding the fishing

unit has priority when it comes to allocating fishing income.

One fisherman expressed it this way:

To increase income, people tend to spend more money and go into another fishery. The fishery comes first. Your money goes to the fishery before the house. When I bought my boat, I could have taken the money and bought a house. But I cannot make money with a house. Everyone I talked to said to me, get the boat first and then get the house later.

But they can only do this if the woman's income is available to pay the day-to-day expenses of the household. The women recognize that their income is necessary to pay household expenses.

My income pays the day-to-day expenses, lights, phone, groceries. I wish sometimes it was more secure so that not all our income would have to go into the fishery. We need two incomes to keep the family going.

The income from my job is used to pay for things around the house, like lights, groceries, etc... Things would have been fairly slack these past few months [summer of 1989] if I had not been working. If I wasn't working this household would have a more difficult time surviving, especially this year.

Other wage incomes in the household keep debt levels down:

I certainly think it has a bearing. Jack does not have a boat payment. If I had not been working, maybe he would still have a boat payment. He can buy more things with cash now. If I had not been working, he may not have been able to pay cash. My income goes to pay a lot of household expenses. I never minded that. That's our way of living.

Another fisherman discussed the importance of a wife's income in bad years and for people buying a new outfit:

Now people are worrying about the fishery. The Bankers are worried. The fishermen are worried but some of their wives have real good jobs. They could have no money at the end of the year but if their wife is making good money, it helps. Most fishermen that are paying those big prices for outfits cannot do that unless they have another income in the home.

However, some women added that financial necessity is not their only reason for working. They also want to work outside the home:

I am not going to work just because we need the money. I couldn't live out here if I wasn't working. I couldn't sit around the house and do nothing...Even with a new baby, I was glad to go back to work. I have been working since I was 18 years old.

I needed the money. But I like to work outside the house too. The income is necessary to keep the house going. If [husband] needed money for fishing supplies, I wouldn't see him stuck.

The high incidence of women in fishing households working for wages may be a result of various factors. The increased investment and rising costs in boats, gear and electronic equipment indicate a need for more cash income in the household. The difficulty and unpredictability of generating sufficient fishing income to sustain the reproduction of fishing enterprises create insecurity among fishing households. Having another income in the household provides some stability especially in years when landings or prices are down. However, the presence of fish processing plants in the area also increases the need for female workers. Armstrong and Armstrong in their study on working women state that women have been "pushed into the labour force by

economic necessity." But they also have been "drawn into the labour force by the growth in demand for female workers" (1983:32).

Women have taken an active and creative role in enabling fishing households to survive. They have taken advantage of changing economic opportunities such as moss gathering, working in the fishplants, and most recently, going fishing with their husbands. As state licensing policy caused increasing pressures on fishing income, the earnings of women provided survival options. Other state policies such as unemployment insurance supported their ability to contribute to household income by supplementing their seasonal and often minimum-wage earnings with unemployment insurance benefits.

In the 1980s, prompted by demands of women fishers, state regulations were changed to make benefits available to women who were fishing with their spouses.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the various strategies that fishing households in Naufrage have developed in response to changes in state policies. Licensing policies forced fishers to generate a greater part of their income from fishing. Consequently, they increased their capital investment to

intensify fishing efforts both in lobster as well as in other species. As rising costs increased the need for more cash income, wage labour became a necessary part of survival strategies.

Women in fishing households actively responded to this need by engaging in wage labour outside the home. They have shown creativity and adaptability in responding to different economic and political situations in their external environment. The variety of ways they have explored to bring another income into the family is testimony to the diversity and versatility of fishing households. The strategies used are interrelated and the success of one often depends on another. The fact that women's wages bring another income into the household often gives fishers the flexibility to invest in new gear or equipment for the boat. This in turn gives them more options to offset fluctuations in landings and prices.

It is evident from the examination of survival strategies used by fishing families, that the continuance of fishing as a petty commodity form of production depends on the contribution of various members of the fishing household. The future of this form of production will be influenced by forces which provide support or present obstacles to the inshore fishery. It will also depend on the availability of sources of wage labour for other members of the fishing household as well as their ability to take advantage of them.

As new economic pressures present themselves in the 1980s, fishing households look for ways to cut costs and concentrate fishing income in the household. Some women responded to this challenge by going fishing with their husbands.

CHAPTER 5.

WOMEN FISHING

5.1. Introduction

Fishing is a new option for women that has only been exercised in PEI during the last 15 years. I am devoting a whole chapter to this issue because it demonstrates in a particular way the model for understanding survival that I am adopting in this thesis. The thesis has argued that the survival of lobster fishing enterprises has depended on the ability of household members to respond in a creative and dynamic way to the ever changing economic and political factors in their environment. The model also challenges ways of analyzing survival that consider only the activities and decisions of the male fishers in the household. As I discussed in chapter 5, many women in fishing households responded to rising costs and new uncertainties in fishing income by engaging in wage labour outside the home.

In this chapter, I will focus on how some women have extended the options of wage labour by moving into the non-traditional area of working in the boat. It was a way of maximizing fishing income by keeping the helper's wages in the household. As well, it gave women the opportunity to earn a higher income and have more flexibility in responding to child care and household responsibilities.

There are still only a small number of women engaged in fishing. However I am discussing this strategy in more detail because I feel it is an important example of how women are actively searching for ways to survive, when faced with new economic pressures. It also demonstrates how women's responses to state policy forced changes in government regulations so that the benefits of state programs were extended, hence opening up new options for survival strategies. The changes in government regulations were not as a result of particular actions of women in Naufrage, but they benefited from the actions taken by women in other regions.

It should be noted that women's involvement in non-traditional work activities is not new in most rural communities. In farming households women have always moved back and forth between household work and farm activities. However, this fluidity between household and area of production did not extend to fishing households in PEI to the same degree. Women have always done a variety of tasks to support the fishing enterprise, but except for rare examples, they did not engage in the harvesting of fish. The combination of new economic pressures in the 1980s and changing state policy has created a situation where some women have adopted this strategy.

In 1975, the first woman went fishing in Naufrage harbour. In 1989, approximately 12 per cent of the 84 boats

fishing out of Naufrage harbour have women working as full-time helpers. All of these women are fishing with their male partners with the exception of one, who is fishing with her brother. Their growing presence as fishers' helpers testifies to the need, in many fishing households, to find new ways of dealing with high costs and unstable fishing income.

5.2. Supports/Constraints for Women Going Fishing

There are many factors that provide both supports and constraints to the use of this strategy. In the next section of this chapter I will discuss some of these factors such as: the nature of the lobster fishery, changes in unemployment insurance policy, women's own initiatives in developing survival strategies, life cycle in fishing households, and attitudes both in the household and community towards women engaging this work.

5.2.1. Nature of the Lobster Fishery

The presence of women in fishing is more common in the lobster fishery than in other fisheries, although in Naufrage some women have also participated in the groundfishery. There are some characteristics of the lobster fishery that have facilitated the entry of women to this fishery. It is a day fishery, which does not require fishers to travel long

distances from the harbour. While they may leave the harbour early in the morning, in the Naufrage area, most lobster boats are back at port between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. This makes it more convenient for women to combine this work with household and child care responsibilities, especially if the children are young.

The work process on a lobster boat is such that helpers do not require much previous fishing experience. Most boat-owners treat reliability, good work habits and willingness to learn as important as experience in choosing a helper. This is advantageous for women because they often have not had the same opportunities as men to learn these skills. Men often learn these fishing skills as young boys through fishing with their fathers, but daughters rarely fish with their fathers.

5.2.2. Changes in Unemployment Insurance Regulations

The other factor that has made fishing more economically attractive to women in the 1980s has been changes in state policy giving women who fish with their husbands access to unemployment insurance benefits. Although some women went fishing before wives of fishers were eligible for unemployment insurance, many women would not have found it advantageous to choose fishing over a job that would provide UI benefits. Because these changes had important

implications for fishing women, I will outline the process by which these changes occurred in some detail.

5.2.2.1. Eligibility for Wives of Fishers

Prior to 1980, women fishing with their husbands could not collect unemployment insurance benefits. This was due to regulation 195(2) of the Fishermen's Regulations, the section of the Unemployment Insurance Act governing self-employed fishers, which stated that in a situation where the wife of one of the crew was also a member of the crew, the earnings of the wife would be added to those of her husband. This meant that wives who were fishing could not collect unemployment insurance benefits in their own name. In the 1970s, there were a number of complaints from fishing women in Newfoundland¹ who were denied UI benefits because they were fishing with their husbands. They took their case to Ottawa but only managed to get some minor revisions. The basic discrimination against women remained. In 1980, a British Columbia woman who was working in a boat with her husband was cut off from benefits. She took the case to the British Columbia Human Rights Commission and won. (Women's Unemployment Study Group, [n.d.] p.71). On the strength of this, a group of five women filed a complaint through the

¹For more information on these cases read "Not for Nothing", a booklet on Women, Work and Unemployment in Newfoundland and Labrador, published by the local Oxfam Committee, St. John's Newfoundland.

appeal court of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. On July 22, 1980, Judge J.J. McGuire, a Commission Umpire heard the appeal and ruled that this regulation was ultra vires (Federal Court of Canada, NF 624, 1980). After this ruling, wives were treated like any other member of the crew as far as the Fisheries Act was concerned. However another regulation in the regular Unemployment Insurance Act prevented women from having the same options as other members of the crew.

5.2.2.2. Eligibility for Spouses of Self-employed Workers

For people engaged in fishing, there are two possible ways to qualify for unemployment insurance. In some cases the crew on a boat are regarded as co-adventurers. This is the case where the proceeds of the catch are shared among all members of the crew and every member of the crew is liable for risk of loss, as well as a share in the profit. Under this arrangement, crew members are regarded as self-employed fishers, and for UI purposes, are governed by the Act which refers to Fisheries Regulations. Thus they can draw benefits from November 1 to May 15 if they are "summer" fishers, or May 1 to November 15 if they are "winter" fishers. A second arrangement allows crew members to enter into a contract of service with a boat-owner where they are paid a wage and are not liable for losses or expenses incurred in the fishing activities. These workers are eligible for unemployment

insurance under the regular part of the Unemployment Insurance Act, the same as any worker in any other insurable employment. In the latter case, they can draw benefits as soon as they have completed the required minimum number of work weeks.

Before 1988, crew members who were wives of boat-owners could not use the second option outlined above, because of another regulation in the Unemployment Insurance Act. Section 3(2)c of the UI Act precluded coverage of persons who were employed by their spouses. In the case of self-employed people who hired their spouses, these spouses were not eligible for UI benefits. As a result of the regulation, women fishing with their spouses were not eligible for benefits under the regular Unemployment Insurance Act. Thus they could collect benefits only under the fisheries regulations.

This regulation was declared discriminatory as a result of ruling by the Human Rights Commission on the "Drukin Case" in 1988. The Drukin case involved four women who went to the Human Rights Commission claiming discrimination because of marital status. They had been denied unemployment insurance benefits because they were spouses of their employers (Canada 1987c, 1988a). On August 15, 1988 the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding that the regulations which denied access to unemployment insurance benefits for the spouses of self-employed persons were

invalid (Canada:1988b). As a result of this ruling, in 1989, women fishing with their husbands could claim benefits under the regular Unemployment Insurance Act, the same as any other fisher's helper. They can claim benefits as soon as they fulfil the minimum number of weeks required.

Both of these changes have opened up important new options for women in fishing households. It is important to note that these regulations were changed as a result of women taking a stand against discrimination. Fishing women have used their constitutional rights and the support of the wider women's movement to push for changes in state policy which have, in turn, had implications for the survival of fishing households.

5.2.3. Naufrage: Women Took the Initiative

Of the women interviewed, those who are now fishing were all engaged in other forms of wage labour before deciding to go fishing. They decided to go fishing with their partners because they saw it as a way to increase their earnings, cut fishing costs, as well as to integrate work and their family responsibilities. All of the women state that the decision to go fishing was their own:

I always wanted to try it. I do not have a fishing background at all. I worked at the fishplant one year. After that I said, forget it. I'm going lobster fishing next year.

I was the one who wanted to go. I was working in Parkdale. I wasn't home with the kids. Other people

who were smaller than me were doing it and they didn't seem to mind, So why not?

For some women it meant working at something they liked, earning a good income, and working as a family unit:

Ben, [my husband] was elated when I said I'd go. It was my initiative to go. I never talked to other women about what it was like. My main reason for going fishing at the time was that it was a job. I'd be working with Ben and it was outdoor work. I always enjoyed outdoor work. I could get my unemployment stamps, although that was never a problem. I was mousing before I went fishing with Ben and we got our stamps there. It was a good, healthy, clean living. My reasons for continuing are the same. I'll fish until I can't get out of the boat. I can't think of anything else where you can go to work at 4:00 a.m. and be home at noon. Your day is done then. I can't imagine any other job like that and if you enjoy it...an awful lot of people are doing work that they don't enjoy.

Most women had to overcome some resistance from their husbands/fishing partner to letting them work on the boat:

I loved the water and the outdoors. I wanted to go for years, but my husband didn't think it was the right kind of work to do when you are planning on having babies. When I was done having kids I thought fishing would be the answer [to economic problems].

I was working at the fishplant and I didn't particularly like it. I couldn't see why he hired a man. I bugged him and bugged him to go fishing. One year he did it. I was green at the time. I'd never seen lobster fishing done. It grew on me. It wasn't easy. But now I like it.

This fisher tells how his wife convinced him that it was a better deal for her to go fishing than continue at her other job:

Julie wanted to go fishing. I had some reservations about it because I thought the work was too hard for her. She had a good job... and was making fairly

good money. But she had to travel 80 miles every day and she couldn't be with the family. This way she can be home with the children for much of the year and make some money besides.

What surprised me when talking to women in fishing households was the confidence they showed even though many of them had no previous experience doing this work. As this was a non-traditional job, they had to convince people, especially men, that they could do the job:

I wasn't the first [to go fishing] but it was still a new venture. I didn't have any thoughts that I couldn't do it. It's easier than housework. I knew that women could do it. If men could do it, women could do it. Some of the fishermen there are so tiny. You wonder how they can handle it.

I always had an approach to life that I could do whatever I wanted to do. I worked at other jobs that weren't traditionally for women...I had been out in the boat a few times but I never fished. I was a little nervous in the beginning, but not now. There are some hard parts to it but I know it's a job I can do. I needed the job and I thought it would be interesting. I like fishing most days. Some days I wish I was home but most jobs are like that.

Many of the fishing women I talked to had a very enthusiastic attitude towards working in the boat and highlighted the positive aspects of the work. This might be partly due to the fact that women in a non-traditional work situation often feel that they have to emphasize work satisfaction to counteract popular attitudes that women can't do these jobs, or that it is not appropriate work for women. However, their

strong assertion that they took the initiative to move into this kind of work was an indication of their active involvement in survival strategies.

5.2.4. Flexibility in Combining Work and Child care Responsibilities

An examination of women's choice of work outside the home reveals the complexity of fishing households and the variety of motives that influence women's choice of work. Many women who are fishing chose this work because it gave them a decent income and allowed them to have time at home with their children. The women were asked to outline the activities of a typical day during the fishing season. The following are two sample descriptions and they amply demonstrate that, despite women's paid work, the majority of the childcare and housekeeping tasks remain their responsibility:

I usually get up around 3:00 in the morning. I would make breakfast. When breakfast was ready, I would get Jack down. After breakfast we would gather our things and go. We would leave the harbour by 4:30. We would start hauling and haul until we were all done. We don't stop for lunch or anything like that. Then if we had to haul the nets for bait, we would do that. Then we would go in, sell our fish and go home. When we get home sometimes I would do some housework, sometimes go to town. Sometimes we would have a nap but not always. I would get the evening meal. I would help the kids with their homework and get them ready for bed (when they were younger). Jack doesn't do a lot in the line of household chores. I don't mind that. The division of work overall is pretty even. He does other things. I'd rather do the housework so I know that it is done properly.

We get up around 3:30 a.m. I get breakfast and I pack lunch in the morning. We leave here around 4:30. We go to the harbour, untie the boat, get the bait. On the way to the first buoy I prepare the mackerel. At 10:30 we finish fishing. I have to clean up the boat, and put water in the tank. At 12:00, we come home and get lunch. If she [housekeeper] didn't have something ready I would make hamburgers or something. The kids have usually eaten by the time we get home. In the afternoon you don't have that much to do. You might have some laundry to fold or something like that. Then you get supper and get the kids fed and bathed and ready for bed. I do all this myself. Sometimes I get the lunch ready or I do it in the morning. We do the grocery shopping together. I do the shopping for clothes. I take the kids to doctor's appointments and things like that. Either [my husband] or I pick the kids up at school. We don't have a garden. I would like to but I don't have time. Sam looks after repairs on the boat and all those kinds of things. I don't have a nap in the afternoon, but he sometimes falls asleep on the couch. My husband doesn't help me much with household tasks. The housekeeper we had last year was really good. She did the children's laundry and she baked for us and many times she put a roast on for me when I came home.

Of the seven women who are fishing, five of them have children who are living at home and in need of parental supervision. The sixth woman has two children, but they are both teenagers and the seventh woman has no children. While not the only reason for women's decision to go fishing, the flexibility it gave them to combine work and child care responsibilities was an important factor. One woman left a full-time job as secretary with good pay to go fishing because it gave her a chance to be home with the children:

I wanted to be home with the kids and this seemed like a good way to earn some money and be home with them. I was working in Parkdale. I wasn't home with the kids. Other people who were smaller than me were doing it and they didn't seem to mind. So why not? It

allows me to be home with the kids when they are growing up. I have a secretarial certificate from Holland College and I worked for three years with the Schoolboard. But when the kids are small, I like to be home with the family.

Another woman with three young children states her preference for fishing over working at the fish plant, because with the wages she was earning at the plant, it did not pay her to work if she had to hire a babysitter.

There were many reasons[to go fishing]. One is the kids. When they're small, you're home with them so much of the time. So it's good to get out of the house. The hours are good for the kids because I am home early in the day. Plus the money. The money stays in the family. If you have to pay a hired hand, it's expensive. I always wanted to try it. I do not have a fishing background at all. I worked at the fishplant one year. After that I said, forget it. I'm going lobster fishing next year. By the time we paid a babysitter and a hired man I wasn't making any money.

The women chose fishing because they saw it as a better option than most other labour jobs that were available to them. It gave them a higher income and kept the helpers' wages in the household.

5.2.5. Life-cycle

Another factor influencing whether women will go fishing or not is the life cycle of the fishing family. Fishing families in Naufrage have a high incidence of kin relations between boat-owner and helper. Thus, if the family has a son old enough to go fishing this can compete with the mother working on the boat. Of the 14 active fishing households

interviewed, the crews are related in the following ways: four crews are father/son relationships; one crew is a son/father where the son is the boat-owner; two crews are brothers; one crew is a brother/sister; six crews are husband/wife. Two of the households where women are fishing have sons who are old enough to fish as helpers. But these two women have stated that their sons will not replace them as helpers.

This has not been a major issue yet, as in most of the households where women are fishing, the children are still young. One of the factors influencing whether the son or the mother works as a helper will be the economic situation of the household. But gender relations will also determine if the woman will be able to freely negotiate whether she will continue with the job as helper or give it over to the son. Some boats have two helpers, but as fishing income declines and unemployment insurance regulations tighten, this will become more difficult.

5.2.6. Household and Community Attitudes Towards Women Fishing

The ability of women to enter non-traditional work roles such as a fisher's helper is influenced by social and cultural supports and constraints. One of these factors is household and community attitudes to women fishing.

5.2.6.1. Household Attitudes

Since, for the most part, the men in the household are the boat-owners, the husband's support is essential if a women wants to go fishing. Since half of the households in this sample have women helpers, it is understandable that there would be a high proportion of the sample demonstrating positive attitudes to women fishing. Of the 15 men in the sample, 11 were generally open to the idea of women fishing. The statements of the men in favor of women fishing ranged from a position of tolerance to enthusiasm. Many fishers stated that if women could do the job, they had no problem with it. Others alleged that it was an economic advantage to households, and some claimed that having their wife with them was a distinct advantage over other helpers who did not have the same vested interest in the fishing enterprise:

I suppose my attitude has changed some. I was never against women fishing, but I remember when the first woman went fishing. There were a lot of snickers that she wouldn't last. It was considered weird. But now people have changed their mind. They accept the fact of women fishing. Julie wanted to go fishing. I had some reservations about it because I thought it was too hard a work for her. She wanted to be home with the children for most of the year and make some money besides. But she works hard. She has a day's work after she gets home from fishing. I don't know how she does it. She has more energy than I have. The first few years we fished together, I don't think we did as well because I was babying her a bit. But now I prefer having her to another man. Last year when she was off for pregnancy, I missed her. We work well together now and she knows where there is good fishing, etc. She takes more interest in the fishing than a hired man because she is benefiting directly. She understands the fishery much better since she has been fishing. For example, before she could never

understand why I would be fretting over whether I would leave gear inside if there was bad weather. Now she understands you have to go where the lobsters are.

I never saw anything wrong with it. If they can do the work and they want to-- go ahead. My wife fishes with me and as far as I am concerned, I never had a man that was any better in the boat. I really miss her in the boat when she doesn't come with me. I'm sure that everything is going to be done right. She has been fishing with me for 13 years.

For many fishers, as for their wives, women engaging in fishing represent economic advantages for the household. It helps keep expenses down and increases household income.

I never had a problem with women fishing. Some men are very superstitious. There was a very strong feeling that women in a boat were bad luck. People are faced with high costs. They have to cut costs, so they take their wife in the boat. I see the number of women who are fishing increasing. It keeps your expenses down. The way the fishing is here now, with the cost of things, we make almost as much on our Stamps² as we do on Fishing. Look at your income and figure out what you have to pay a man. Four hundred dollars a week, that's \$4,000 a year. That's \$4,000 you don't have to pay [out of the household]. Of course you don't gain it all, because you have to pay a babysitter.

Some saw it only as an economic issue. When women could not collect benefits from Fishers UI during the summer, there was more economic advantage in working as a wage laborer than in fishing:

I am in agreement with women fishing if they can do the work. Some go out every day and they seem to be doing well. Before this year, women could only draw UI for six months of the year. I told [my wife] that it wouldn't help during the summer months. She got a

²Stamps refer to unemployment insurance benefits

job on the road the last two years and before that she worked at the plant.

A number of men stated that old superstitions against women fishing were based on ignorance and narrow-mindedness. They felt the only criteria should be women's desire and willingness to do the work:

It really doesn't bother me. If they want to go out there and they can do the work, it might as well be them as some young fellow in the boat who doesn't want to work. A couple [of women] down there are like splinters, they're so small. One works all summer with her husband at nets. I don't know how she does it. She's tough.

Some men don't like it. But I don't see anything wrong with it. They have stupid reasons. 'No place for a woman'. I don't see the sense of that. If they can do the work, why not. I don't hear too many around here that it is bothering. There are not too many women fishing around here yet. Most of the women just fish lobster; a few fish cod. There's no reason why they can't. It's not really that hard a work anymore. There would be some things that women couldn't do but there are some things that men couldn't do either.

I remember days when there wasn't a woman allowed on the wharf. Some of the old fellows would have forty fits. My attitude has changed. There is not a thing wrong with it if they fish. More and more women are fishing fulltime. I never thought that my wife couldn't do it. She was out a few times before. It didn't change anything from having a man the year before.

But there are also attitudes among men that are less supportive of women going into fishing. Some object that the work is rough and dangerous and not fit for women:

Many people think it is not a job for women. I myself don't think it's a job for women because it's

rough, dangerous work. I don't think my wife would fish if I had anything to say in it. I think it's too hard.

Other men say quite clearly that while they are not against women in general fishing and recognize the financial advantages, for personal reasons they themselves do not want to have their wives as helpers:

If she was going to fish, she would have to fish with somebody else. If you had a little spat in the morning, you don't want somebody there who is going to be in bad humour all day. Some days when you come in, you sit around and have a couple of beer. You don't want somebody there nagging you, let's go home. I don't think I would feel comfortable fishing with my wife. There's a lot of people like myself who don't want a woman in the boat. It's mostly wives and husbands fishing together. It's quite a saving. Over 10 weeks it's over \$5,000. If the woman is capable of doing the job and you want to have her there, no problem with me.

The most common objections to women going fishing are that they are not able to do the work, and that the Captain is at a distinct disadvantage if he has a woman helper. This statement from a young fisher is a sample of this attitude:

Where the wives are going at it, it's cutting corners. I know a lot of fellows that have their wives fishing, no matter what they say--that she loves it and all that-- it's for the money. It's not a place, as far as I am concerned for a woman. It's too hard a work for a woman. The lifting is too hard. The bigger traps, rough weather, dangerous weather, it's not a very safe job. A lot of things can happen out there. If you have a husband and wife out there and something happens and the boat goes down, they both go down.

Like I say the bottom line is money. If I do get married myself, and she's out there [fishing], it will be because we need the money. There are still those who make out they like it. Bullshit. I know for a fact that it doesn't do anything for them. It's great on a nice day when the sun is out and there's lots of fish. But not all days are like that.

You get some where the husband is a good worker. If I was working as a helper with them, and if I wasn't doing my share, I would be ashore and he would have someone else in the boat. If your wife is out there you're doing it for them. Some fishermen don't get the fish and that could be part of the reason. They don't want to move the gear and the wife is tired or it's a dirty day and they don't haul those last ten trawls. If the helper was a young fellow, he'd probably haul those last trawls.

Although the attitudes of men can act as a support or constraint to women going fishing, the response of other women is also important. In the interviews, it was striking that not one woman respondent expressed negative views about women fishing.³ Women who are not fishing themselves see the economic advantages for the households:

With the way everything is today and everything costing so much, it takes two working to rear a family. It's wonderful that they have the opportunity to do that. It think it's great. It's not as if they are away all day. They are in early [from fishing]. When the women went first, I admired them for the courage they had to go out in the boat. I never wanted to go out in the boat. Some days it wasn't too hot out there, especially in the spring. Now the boats are comfortable.

Some women said that they have changed their attitudes after seeing women in this work. Many openly expressed support and encouragement for moving into this male-dominated field:

My attitude has changed. One time you would never think of it. You would never see a woman fishing. I don't see anything wrong with women fishing. If they can go out and fish, fine.

³The fact that the interviewer was a woman may have had some influence on the responses.

More power to them, if they can do it. The work wouldn't bother me. It's not that hard. There was a woman working at the plant who used to fish and she said that it was easier than working at the plant. You're not eight hours on your feet; you are your own boss; if you want to sit down, you can sit down. At the fish plant you're standing there in one place for eight hours. I never had a desire to fish but I always felt that if they wanted to do it, they could go ahead.

Some women wondered why more women were not fishing:

I think there should be more women at it. I don't think they understand. It's not as hard as they think it is. They have not spent a lot of time around the water as much as my family. For a lot of women, there is no fishing in their family. They probably think they don't know enough about it. If they gave it a try, they would know there is nothing to it.

The openness and acceptance that women expressed towards other women doing this work is an important factor in the continuance of this option as a survival strategy.

5.2.6.2. Community Attitudes

While there were some objections to women fishing, especially in the beginning, there did not seem to be strong negative reactions in this community. One group in the community directly affected by women going fishing is young men who are interested in working as fishers' helpers. At present, approximately 12 per cent of fulltime helpers in this harbour are women. Previously, these jobs were exclusively available to males. Although the number of women fishing is still a minority, 10 to 12 jobs in a small

community is a significant number. I did not interview any of the male helpers but I attempted to find out from the fishers how young men in the community felt about the increasing participation of women in fishing.

There was a mixed reaction but more positive response than might be expected, considering the fact that the advantages of better pay and more flexible working conditions make the job of fishermen's helper as attractive to men as to women. But it is important to note that, while the interviews give me some idea of general opinions in the community, I did not hear from the people most directly affected.

In general the fisher-men did not perceive any negative response from the young men in the community, although one man mentioned that it is a lot more difficult to get a job as a fisher's helper now, than it was ten years ago:

You never hear anything from them. Most of the women fish with their husbands. There's nothing you can do about it.

As I said before, I corked⁴ for five years [before he bought his own outfit] and I never once had to ask for the job. People came to me and asked. But now you can probably ask ten people and not get a job fishing. One of the reasons is because more women are fishing. But I don't hear men complaining about it.

⁴"Cork" is a colloquialism for fishers' helper in P.E.I.

The women responded more to this question than the men. Some had heard comments suggesting that women were taking jobs they weren't capable of doing:

I haven't heard anything directly. My mother has. Someone mentioned to her about these women out fishing and taking the jobs from 'capable' men. Which I suppose it's true. But everyone has a right to a job.

There are not that many jobs around here for men. It's a problem for young fellows just starting out getting a job fishing. They're starting to complain. They haven't come right out and said that it's the women's fault but I think that's what they are implying. We have ten women fishing fulltime. So they must be feeling the pinch. That would be ten male jobs in a small community.

There may be some resentment. Some men feel that they are more qualified. They think that women are not qualified for these jobs; they only get them because it is their husband's boat. But I think that women have as much right to these jobs as men do.

But more said that while there was more competition for jobs, there was also an understanding of why women were going fishing:

What I hear most is that it's better for the wife to be fishing. Most know what it's like to work for \$4.50 an hour. You have to pay \$2.50 an hour for a baby-sitter. That's not much to make. When you pay a Cork besides, you're only making half of his wages. You're losing \$150 a week that you could be getting if you were in the boat.

I don't think they mind. I suppose if there were a lot of women fishing, maybe the men would complain that they can't have these jobs.

The fact that the women are fishing with their husbands has a double effect. It generates both understanding and resentment among young men in the community. On the one hand they know that women are working as part of the family enterprise, and that it's important for survival. If women were competing for helpers' jobs outside their family enterprise, then it would probably generate more conflict. On the other hand, there is a perception that women are not 'really qualified' for these jobs. They only have them because of their position as the wife of the boat-owner.

Many men (and women) stated that women working as fisher's helpers was only workable if they were fishing with their husband or another member of their family. Most felt that women helpers were operating with some handicap by reason of the fact that there were some tasks they did not have the physical strength to do. All stated that their husbands have to hire someone extra to set traps at the beginning of the season and to land the traps on the last day of the season. Several women suggested that having them as helpers meant their husband had to do some of the heavier work in the boat. There probably are some limitations to having a woman helper. However, all workers bring various strengths and limitations to whatever job they have. Perhaps there are some tasks that women cannot do as efficiently as men because of the physical strength required. But it is equally true that they bring certain strengths to this work

that not all male helpers would have. These may be conscientiousness, creativity, willingness to learn, and certainly for women who are fishing as members of a family enterprise, a vested interest in working for the best possible results. These may more than compensate for any limitations they might have in physical strength.

5.3. Implications for Survival

Women working as helpers has implications for the future survival of the fishing enterprise. It is a way of concentrating more income from fishing in the household. However, it also makes the fishing households more vulnerable. All of the sources of income for the household are dependent on the fishery. State policy is a key factor in women deciding to use this option. Thus households adopting this strategy are more susceptible to changes in state policy. Households where woman are earning wages from other sources may have more stability in the event of a downturn in the fishery. On the other hand if women are not directly engaged in the fishery, they may be less willing to use their incomes to sustain the fishing enterprise.

5.3.1 Changing Gender Relations

More direct participation in the fishing enterprise has affected gender relations in the household and in the

community. The statements of both men and women indicate that the actions of women have broken down sexist attitudes and prejudices against their working in the boat:

I think that most of the fishers are accustomed to the fact that it's a way of life. At first they probably thought that they [women] didn't belong there. But now they accept it.

People don't care. I remember when it happened first. The younger people didn't mind, but the older people said that it was bad luck for a woman to get in a boat. Once they got at it, attitudes changed. You never hear anyone talking about it now.

Some men at the harbour think it's not a good job for women. But attitudes are changing as more and more women go fishing. Tony thinks that there is a place for women fishing but men are better helpers than women.

Changing gender attitudes have created an environment allowing more women to choose to fish with support from the community and the household. As a result more households can choose this option as a survival strategy. Some fishermen told me three years ago that "their wives would never go fishing". In 1989, women in these households are fishing with their husbands. It is true that these changes are motivated more by economics than by equality. However it is a dialectical process. As economic pressures build, some women decide to go fishing. The action of more women fishing promotes changes in gender relations.

Although the 'production' relationship of men and women in the fishing boat is still one of boat-owner to helper, women have entered into a process of partnership. They do

not have equal power but they do have a much closer identification with the fishing enterprise. They have proven that they can competently perform most of the tasks of a helper on a lobster boat. They have gained some experience and knowledge of other tasks like operating electronic equipment and sailing the boat. They are also aware of the issues in the fishery and have demonstrated interest in learning more about these issues. This has given them a new confidence, which hopefully will translate into more decision-making power.

On the other hand, the entry into this new area of work may not be a liberating experience for women. In some cases, they are under the domain of their husband both at home and at work. For some women, working outside the house gives them the opportunity to develop talents and skills and to have friends and colleagues away from the influence of their husband. It provides them with a freedom they don't often have in the home. Working closely with their husband may create new tensions, which, when combined with economic pressures, sets up a very stressful situation for women.

Women going into the boat also has implications for intergenerational survival. In many fishing families, the fishing enterprise is handed on to one of the sons. It has been the custom in many families in this community for sons to fish as helper. In this way skills and knowledge are passed on from one generation to another. If the mother has

been working as helper, then this means that a young person who wants to go fishing has to find a job with some other boat-owner. Again the decision as to whether son or mother works as the helper is influenced by various factors. At the economic level, the woman may have to continue as helper because her income is necessary for the survival of the enterprise. If the helper's salary goes to the son, then it will not be used to cover household costs. At another level, the woman may not want to give up this job, even if there are economic reasons for her to continue. Her option to continue will depend on gender relations in the household.

5.4. Conclusion

The ability of women to move into different kinds of work in response to political and economic changes in the fishery challenges existing theories, which say that survival depends only on the activities of the male producer. It has strengthened the theory that survival depends on the cooperation of the whole household. It also demonstrates that fishing households are not just restricted to responses to state policies, but they also actively shape state programs to be more in accord with household needs.

Economic pressures as well as women's active desire to find ways to deal with them, created a situation where women moved more directly into fishing. Their ability to do this

has been influenced by gender relations in the household. At the same time the practice of women fishing has broken down, in turn, many stereotypes and prejudices against their doing this kind of work. Women need to become more involved in the fishery at an organizational and political level. If they are prevented from doing so because of the male, hierarchical structure, they may push to change this structure. If it is not changed, the process of creating conditions of equality between men and women will have severe limitations.

In the long run, it is clear that the best strategies for survival include mechanisms that provide for maximum input of men and women. Women in fishing households in Naufrage have made key contributions at the economic and social level. Their contribution on the organizational and political level has been less significant.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The survival of petty commodity production has been a subject of much debate in the literature. Llambi (1988), Friedmann (1978, 1980), Chevalier (1983) and Bernstein (1988) have approached it by looking at the tension between external factors, such as the constraints and opportunities imposed by the political and economic environment, and the internal dynamics and practices of production households. However, petty commodity households are often treated as monolithic units and not enough consideration is given to how the interests and needs of the individual members can influence survival strategies. Llambi and Friedman discuss how responses of households vary because of internal differences, but they do not consider that they can also influence changes and adjustments in external structures. There is little or no recognition in the literature that men and women in PCP households may have very different reasons for supporting or not supporting the continuance of the production unit.

This thesis has looked at different dimensions of the survival of lobster fishing production in Prince Edward Island. It has examined the impact of external structures, such as state policy, on the development of the fishery, as well as the active involvement of fishing households in responding to state policy. I have argued that an adequate

understanding of survival must consider the responses of PCP households in a more dynamic and gender-conscious way. The model it uses for explaining survival assumes that survival strategies reflect the impact of the varied interests, needs and concerns of different members of fishing households. The analysis focuses on the interactive process between fishers and state initiatives, fishers and their spouses, and between spouses and state initiatives.

Changes in state policies in the area of licensing and unemployment insurance have had a significant, and sometimes contradictory, impact on the development of the lobster fishery. Licensing policies were introduced in the 1960s to reduce participation in the fishery, thus improving incomes for those remaining. The policy was based on the logic that with fewer participants, their chances for survival would increase. However, the state planners' definition of economic viability is not the same as the definition of survival of fishing households.

State planners develop policy on the assumption that the survival of fishing enterprises depends on the income and activities of the fisher, which in most cases is the male head of household. Fishers, however, are embedded in fishing households and state policies affect all members of the household. In an area like Naufrage, for example, a fisher leaving the fishery often results in the whole family having to move from the area. Since this is not always an

acceptable alternative, members of fishing households will find ways of extending and supplementing fishing income so that the fishing enterprise can continue.

The recognition that fishers are embedded in households, whose members are active participants in reproducing their own existence, has implications for understanding the contradictory impact of state policy. For example, members of fishing households took advantage of opportunities created by changes in other policies, like unemployment insurance, to remain in the fishery. This undermined the effectiveness of licensing policies in reducing the number of fishers.

6.1. Survival Strategies and Changing State Policies

Licensing policy has both presented challenges and imposed constraints for the survival of fishing enterprises. It has prevented new entry to the fishery and thus restricted further erosion of the economic rent of the resource. However, the move to full-time fishing has put new pressure on lobster fishers to intensify fishing effort. They have invested more capital in bigger boats, larger traps and electronic equipment, which has meant more efficient fishing of the grounds and additional days fishing. The increased investment has improved catches in the short run but it has also made fishing households more vulnerable by creating higher capital costs, heavier debt loads, and consequently, more cash requirements. The greater pressure on fishers

to fish harder and to maximize their landings has implications for the future of the stocks. Though the lobster fishery does not seem to have experienced the same problems with stock depletion as the groundfishery, more investigation should be made of the effects on the lobster stocks of increased catching capacity, efficiency of gear and increased effort per fishing unit without a corresponding reduction in the units of effort.

Fishers have increased their capital investment, not just to improve their lobster catches but also to give them greater flexibility in exploiting other species. Even though these species represent a relatively small part of the total landed value of the PEI fishery, nevertheless, they play a key role in its survival. The lobster fishery is only a two-month fishery. Apart from the economic difficulties of living off an income from the lobster fishery in an area like Naufrage, multi-species fishing is important in terms of symbolic identification as a fisher.

But in the mid-1980s, fishing other species has created vulnerabilities as well. On the one hand, there have been some opportunities to increase fishing income by engaging in the tuna fishery, herring roe fishery, or the groundfishery (using gillnets). But the volatility of prices, the insecurity of markets, as well as the unpredictability of supply resulted in significant differences in income from one

year to the next. Consequently, it has also made gearing up for these fisheries an uncertain investment.

Limited entry, first introduced in the lobster fishery in 1967, has significantly increased costs for new entrants into the inshore fishery. In 1981, licence restrictions were extended to groundfish, herring (gillnet) and tuna licences in 1981, and to mackerel licences, both gill-net and purse-seine, in 1987. Fishers entering the fishery in the 1980s have to buy all these licences on the market, thus adding to their initial capital investment.

6.1.1. Women's Contribution: Multiple Incomes

Even with the intensification of effort, it is very difficult for fishing households in Naufrage harbour to survive just on fishing income. The increased capital investment has created a need for more cash. The contribution of women's income has been a key factor in counteracting rising costs and uncertainties in fishing income. Women challenged state policies and extended survival options by going fishing with their husbands. They have broken through the barriers of sexism and have moved into a new area of work that previously was only open to males. Their activities have been an expression of resistance to the constraints of state policy and of creative response to the changing political and economic situation around them.

However, for many women, taking on new work roles has meant a double work load as they still have the primary responsibility for child care and household duties. As well, many of the options for wage labour in the area did not pay that well. Women found that they were in a double bind if they were working for minimum or low wages and had to pay child care costs. Also, some resisted commuting long distances to work because this kept them away from their children, a problem especially when the children were young. For these reasons, and because of increasing cash requirements, some women became more interested in fishing with their husbands. Although a few women started fishing in the late 1970s, the ineligibility for unemployment insurance created a barrier for many. As discussed in the thesis, women's efforts to change this legislation made the option of fishing with their husbands more viable.

These moves into new areas of work challenged many stereotypes about women's role in the fishery, both in the household and in the community. The process of being more directly and consciously involved in survival strategies gave women more possibility for negotiating an equal say in ongoing strategies.

The new initiatives of women have helped households survive, but they have also subjected them to new vulnerabilities. Fishing households where women are fishing are almost exclusively reliant on fishing income and

unemployment insurance. Thus, they will be especially affected by any changes in this state policy. Fishing income is concentrated in fewer fishing households, hence potentially isolating fishing households from others in the community. As financial pressures increase, there is more pressure on women who are not presently fishing to engage in this work. This could create more stress in the fishing households.

Because the total income of the household is dependent on fish, there is more pressure on stocks, not just lobster but also for other species. Many of these species are migratory and access to them depend on regional stocks, some of which are in trouble. The division of regional quotas among the provinces in the southern Gulf is increasingly more conflictive as each province demands more fish.

6.2. Future Survival and New State Initiatives

The latest crisis in the Atlantic fishery has been accompanied by a variety of new state initiatives. Changes in unemployment insurance and proposals for increases in the minimum carapace size in both canner and market lobsters are two examples. These and other changes, such as free trade rulings and declining prices, will have a significant impact on survival. I will briefly deal with the changes in unemployment insurance, declining prices and the carapace size issue.

6.2.1. Unemployment Insurance

All of the survival strategies discussed in this thesis are affected by the state policy of unemployment insurance. Fishers' unemployment insurance is an important supplement to fishing income during the winter season. UI is also a key factor in mobilizing the wage labour of women in fishing households.

The recent changes in UI regulations, which now require a minimum of fourteen weeks for eligibility, has created difficulties in a fishery that depends primarily on an eight-week lobster season to give helpers and plant workers the majority of their work-weeks to qualify for benefits. The need for more weeks will definitely increase the pressure to fish other species. The decision to fish other species will not be based on whether it is economically advantageous, but rather on the need to get fourteen weeks of insurable earnings. Consequently, as more people compete for scarce resources and markets, the economic advantages that result from fewer fishers participating will diminish.

These changes in UI will have repercussions at every level. Whether women are fishing with their husbands or working in local fish plants, the requirement to have fourteen insurable weeks will probably result in lower weekly earnings, which in turn will result in lower UI benefits and less household income. Women who are fishing hire local people for child care during the lobster season, and give them unemployment

insurance stamps. These child care workers will have a difficult time to get extra weeks of work after the lobster season is finished.

In recent years unemployment insurance for fishers has suffered from particularly negative attitudes. These attitudes have been expressed in terms like 'abuse of the system, fraud, cheating'. The context of the critique gives the impression that fishers don't have a right to unemployment insurance. This attack on fishers' access to UI is accompanied by the another familiar theme, 'there are too many fishers for too few fish in Atlantic Canada'.

The goal of the licensing policy was to reduce participation in the fishery. However, this did not succeed to the extent expected, partly because the state, in its implementation of the licensing policy did not take into consideration that fishers were embedded in households. Unemployment insurance and other household incomes supplemented fishing income, allowing fishers to stay in the fishery even when their fishing income was declining. Thus the recent attacks on unemployment insurance may be a new attempt to reduce membership in the fishery.

The issue of unemployment insurance is a complex one because it not only assists in the survival of the fishery at the harvesting level, but also plays an important role in subsidizing the processing sector. If fishers were not receiving unemployment insurance, there would be much more

pressure to increase the wharf price to fishers. As well, the state through unemployment insurance subsidizes the labour costs of processors who do not have to pay any of the subsistence costs of workers when they are not working.

6.2.2. Declining prices and Changes in American Legislation

The lobster fishery in 1989 and 1990 has been particularly hard hit by severe cuts in prices to fishers. In the middle of the spring lobster season in 1989, prices dropped overnight from \$2.60 to \$2.00 a pound for canners, and from \$3.25 to \$2.50 a pound for market lobsters. In 1990 the situation was even worse with prices starting at \$1.25 for canners and \$1.75 for markets. These were similar to prices in the late 1970s.

Processors are blaming the low prices on soft markets and high inventory costs. A historical dependence on the U.S. market has meant that processors have not been very aggressive about finding new markets or developing new products. The dependence on this market has made the lobster industry very vulnerable to factors like a high Canadian dollar or changes in the American lobster industry. In 1989, the United States increased the minimum carapace size of lobster. Fishers voted against having a similar increase in the minimum size of market-sized lobster in Canada. Consequently, any market-sized lobster smaller than the American minimum size could not be sold in the U.S. market.

However, as a result of pressure from the processors in the Maritime region, and from some fishers, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans implemented legislation in August of 1990, putting the new size into effect for the Fall lobster season. This was strongly opposed by fishers in P.E.I. as they feel they can't sustain reductions in catches in a year when they are already suffering from huge cutbacks in prices.

6.2.3. Carapace Size Increase for Canner Lobsters

Another issue that will have more consequences for fishers in PEI and especially in the area of Naufrage is the proposal to increase the minimum carapace size for the smaller, canner lobster. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has been promoting an increase in the legal minimum size of the canner lobster in the southern Gulf from $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches to $2\frac{3}{4}$ or 3 inches since the late 1970s. Fishers in PEI, particularly those in district 7B, have opposed this measure more strongly than their counterparts in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. They maintain that over 80 per cent of their catch is canner lobsters, and an increase in minimum size would result in significant decreases in their landings.

In 1989 and 1990, the crisis in the lobster fishery resulting from low prices and soft markets has caused renewed interest in increasing the size of the canner lobster. Those fishers and processors promoting the increase are arguing

that if they take small lobsters, which have questionable economic value, off the market, it should reduce the overall supply of lobsters on the market and cause upward pressure on the price.

The Maritime Fishermen's Union conducted a study of this issue in PEI and eastern New Brunswick in 1988 and 1989 to examine both the supports for and constraints against increasing the size of the canner lobster in different parts of the southern Gulf. The preliminary results of the survey indicate that the question is still a divisive issue. The majority of fishers in PEI are still opposed to a size increase (Maritime Fishermen's Union 1990:29-31).

In the research on the issue of increasing the minimum size of the canner lobster, there has been very little discussion as to how this change would affect other members of the fishing household. Changing the carapace size could affect the processing industry, which would have implications for sources of wage labour and, in turn, household survival strategies. I must emphasize that decisions favoring the processing industry are not necessarily the most efficacious for fishing households. The industry does provide jobs in fishing communities, but these jobs are often non-unionized and low-paying. If a larger lobster would mean higher prices to fishers, it would result in the transfer of surplus from the processing sector to the primary sector. However, there is no guarantee that the fishers will get a higher price.

The important point is that any adequate analysis of this issue must take into account the effects of the legislation on the lobster fishing household.

6.3. Areas for Future Research

This thesis has discussed the interaction between state policy and survival strategies of fishing households focusing particularly at the harvesting level. We also need to investigate the interaction of household strategies for survival, individual strategies regarding work and strategies of capital in the PEI lobster fishery.¹ Since lobster fishing households are dependent on wage labour for their survival and these jobs are often provided by processing plants, which in turn are buying the lobster from fishers, it is important to see the connections between processors, fishers and workers in processing plants.

Research also needs to be done on the relationship between large and small capital in the processing sector. The nature of the lobster fishery facilitates the entrance of small buyers purchasing product directly from the fisher at the wharf. This has created competition at the wharf level and has caused some upward pressure on the price to fishers. However, in the last few years, there seems to be more agreement among the buyers on wharf prices.

¹. This is an idea that was suggested by MacDonald and Connelly (1989:69).

The present crisis of slow markets and low prices to fishers highlights the necessity for research into the whole area of marketing of lobster. There is a need to investigate the destination of products, the kinds of processed product, changing consumer tastes and competition on the international market from other shellfish producing areas. This research is useful for fishers' organizations to assist them in mounting campaigns for fair prices for their product. All of these issues point out the need to explore inter-household strategies of survival.

6.3.1 Unionization

In this thesis I have dealt only with household strategies. However these strategies will only be effective if linked with other survival strategies at a provincial and regional level. The new crises around falling prices and new regulations involving minimum size and unemployment insurance regulations underline the need for fishing households to be involved in organizations that will enable them to develop a collective response to the threats to their survival.

It was obvious from the interviews that there is very little involvement with formal fishers' organizations on the part of either men or women in Naufrage harbour. There is some degree of organization at the port level, which occasionally extends to joining forces with fishers from other ports to fight for certain issues. But most lobbying

is directed from the port level to individual federal or provincial politicians. This sets up a situation that aggravates differences between harbours and promotes a system of divide and conquer among fishers.

In Naufrage harbour I sensed that fishers had a distrust of fishers' organizations, both unions and associations, and a lack of confidence in their ability to change anything. This distrust seems to come from different directions: from a perception that organizations cannot do anything to change government's lack of responsiveness to the needs of inshore fishers, from previous negative experiences with fishers' organizations, and from a belief that the individualism of fishers prevents them from working together. There have been some examples of fishers in this area coming together to present their demands in a collective way. The challenge is to find ways to build on these experiences and encourage further collective action.

There are two fishermen's organizations in PEI, the PEI Fishermen's Association and The Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU). The MFU is the most progressive organization of fishers in the region. Formed in 1977 as a union of inshore fishers in the Maritime Provinces, it was initially involved in fighting for collective bargaining rights. More recently, it has played a key role in influencing government policy to protect and support the inshore fishery. It has a regional rather than a provincial focus, which is important in

developing a collective response to managing the resources of a Gulf fishery, as opposed to fragmented, provincial strategies with fishers fighting each other. It has been closely linked to the labour movement of the region and has demonstrated a more defined class perspective than other organizations in its fight for a viable inshore fishery in the political economy of the region.

However the members are all boat-owners and ideologically, the MFU has analyzed survival in the inshore fishery from a male, boat-owner perspective. Women have been minimally involved in the union. If women's contributions are necessary for the survival of the inshore fishery, then any changes in policy will affect them as well as the male fisher. They should be involved in the process of developing policy that will take into account the needs of the whole fishing household. Therefore organizations such as the Maritime Fishermen's Union need to consider developing structures that allow women of fishing households to become full members.

6.4. Conclusion

The lobster fishery has changed significantly in the past twenty years. This fishery as a form of petty commodity production is very vulnerable to the constraints of external economic and political structures. However, within those constraints fishing households have found space to exert

their influence. Individual fishing families in Naufrage have shown creativity and ingenuity in developing household survival strategies. This thesis has demonstrated that survival is a complex issue. It is influenced by a number of factors such as: gender and generational differences; the skills, interests and needs of the household members; the negotiating space between men and women; availability of wage employment. The negotiation of survival strategies depends on both the economic and non-economic concerns of fishing households as, within the constraints of external structures, they work out a way of living that best meets their values and goals as fishing families.

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Two main methodological approaches were used in this research. One was researching available information on the lobster fishery. The second method of gathering information was through interviews with members of fishing households. The interview schedule is included in Appendix B.

The purpose of using semi-structured questions was to allow fishers more freedom in expressing ideas on how the fishery had changed over the span of their fishing lives. The main advantage of this method is that it gave more scope for fishers to express their views on a wide variety of issues.

The disadvantage of such a wide range of topics is that, in a two-hour interview, it was difficult to get detailed information on any one topic. For example, for the sections on expenses, capital investment and income, the information was quite uneven and not very useful. It was only possible to get information on general trends. I was trying to compare figures for three specific years, 1978, 1983, 1988, but found that fishers did not have specific information on their income and expenses. Many fishers have only started organizing their financial records in some systematic way in the last few years. I also observed that the fishers are not

used to interviews, and with some it was difficult to sustain interest to the end of the interview.

For the interviews, I developed two separate interview schedules, one for women and one for men. They contain some common questions and some separate sections. The sections on the men's interview guide that were not on the women's required more detailed information regarding the activity of fishing, such as fishing practices, relations with buyers, relation with helper, capital investment and expenses. I found that the women did not have much information on these issues. My goal was to get some historical perspective on these topics. I wanted to find out how fishers had experienced changes in various areas, such as landings and prices of various species; kinds of gear; capital investment and relationships with buyers. Even though some women are now engaged in fishing, it is a relatively new experience. As well, most women are only involved in fishing lobster and I was soliciting information on other species as well. It also indicates that men are still primarily involved in many of the activities and decisions around fishing.

In the women's questionnaires I did use specific questions about child care and housekeeping tasks since these are factors that often determine women's options in working outside the home. I also observed from the interviews that the responsibility for most of these tasks still falls to women. It was a weakness not to have asked these questions

to the men also. After the first few interviews, I tried to rectify this by including some questions on child care and housekeeping responsibilities in the men's interviews. However, these were long and it was difficult to deal with additional issues in any comprehensive way.

The selection of respondents was made according to the number of years fishing as boat-owner. My reason for doing this was to compare fishing experiences across different generations and to see if there were different problems between younger fishers and older ones. The differences between generations were not as distinct as I had expected. This may have had something to do with the particular respondents selected. I had only three cases in the older group, for example. Interestingly enough there were not many older fishers in this community. As the criterion was years as boat-owner rather than age, there were wide differences in age and position in the life-cycle of the family between the respondents in the two older groups. Thus it was difficult to determine common characteristics of each group that made them clearly distinct from the others. I had hypothesized that older fishers would have fewer debts and more financial security than younger fishers. Thus their way of coping with the current problems of low price and high costs might be quite different. I discovered that the criteria of years fishing was not necessarily a useful indicator in determining financial security. While in general younger fishers tend to

have bigger debts, there are other factors that determine debt level, such as inheritance of license versus buying it on the market. While I could observe some general differences between the groups, there were not enough common characteristics in each group to enable clear comparisons between them.

Since most studies on the survival of small boat fisheries focus on the activities of male fishers, it was important to do research on the contribution of women to survival of fishing households. Even though not all the same questions were asked of both men and women, interviewing each one separately gave me an idea of how each perceived the challenges and problems of the fishery. The exercise of talking to both men and women in the fishing household gave me helpful insights into developing the model of survival I am using in this thesis. The process of doing the research in this way has sharpened my own awareness of the importance of looking at survival strategies as a household response, rather than just that of the fisher.

Another criteria that was used in selecting households was to choose half where women were fishing and half where they were not. The percentage of the sample with women fishing is much higher than the population. This may create a perception in the research that the phenomena of women fishing is much more pervasive than it actually is. However choosing a larger number of women who are fishing gave me a

chance to examine in more detail how changes in work allocation are affected by and in turn affect gender relations.

Having two groups of fishing households allowed for a comparison of attitudes to the survival of the fishing enterprise. It was also useful in determining if a greater dependence on the income generated from fishing was a constraint or an opportunity for survival.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MEN IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS

NAME _____
ADDRESS _____ PHONE NO _____
HOW MANY YEARS FISHING? _____
HOW MANY YEARS AS BOAT OWNER? _____

A.WORK-HISTORY SINCE HIGHSCHOOL

- 1.What was the last grade you finished in school?
- 2.What other certificates, educational qualifications do you have?
- 3.What has been your work history since you left school?

B.FISHING PRACTICES.

- 4.Describe your early fishing experience.
When did you start? Did you fish with your father?
How many years did you fish as a helper?
How did you learn the skills you have?
- 5.What kind of gear did you have when you started - boat, gear, electronic gear on your boat?
- 6.What were the fishing practices when you started? How have they changed?
- 7.What kind of species did you fish then? Changes in volume and price.

C.FISHING GROUNDS.

- 8.Before government regulations were introduced regarding lobster districts, what were the informal rules about who could fish in the harbour and where?
- 9.Have these practices changed over the years? Why or why not?
- 10.Has the number of boats in the harbour increased or decreased over the last number of years? What have been the factors that has caused the increase/decrease?

D.RELATIONSHIP WITH BUYER:

- 11.Describe the buying and selling practices when you started?
- 12.Are there different buyers now? Did new buyers coming in affect the price of lobster?
- 13.Where did you get the following inputs for your fishing enterprise? Bait, Fuel, Credit

14. Has the relationship with the buyers changed over the years? Are fishers more/less independent from the buyers?

E. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNER/OPERATOR AND HELPER.

15. Do fishers look to family or kin first to find a helper?
16. How do boat owners pay their helper? Wages? Shares?
Is the reason for choosing based on custom? Preference of owner/operator? Is there a boat share?
17. Is fishing experience a factor in choosing a helper?

F. SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME

18. What are the sources of your household income?

INCOME FROM FISHING

Lobster _____
Groundfish _____
Mackerel _____
Herring _____
Tuna _____
Other _____

INCOME FROM WORK BESIDES FISHING _____

What kind of work?

INCOME FROM U.I. _____

INCOME FROM OTHER MEMBERS

How many other members in the family? _____

How many members earn income? _____

Sources of income

NON-CASH INCOME

Cut your own wood _____
Help from family in house repair _____
car repair _____
Build your own traps, rig nets _____
Garden _____

G. EXPENSES

19. Compare the costs of the following items for 1978, 1983, 1988.

Gear, Helper, Boat, Bait, Fuel

H. GOVERNMENT REGULATION/POLICY:

20. How do you think Government regulation has affected the fishery?
21. What are the advantages of regulations? disadvantages?
22. How does unemployment insurance affect the fishery?
23. How has Government policy in general affected the inshore fishery?

I. CAPITAL INVESTMENT.

24. What was a lobster license worth when you started fishing?
What licenses did you have to buy on the market? Price?
25. How many boats have you bought? New/second-hand? Price?
26. Which of the following equipment do you have on your boat?
two-way radio _____
VHF _____
Loran C _____
Sounder: coloured _____ paper _____
Plotter _____
27. What was your fishing outfit worth when you started fishing?
What is worth today?
28. If you make any extra money in any one season, what do you do with it? (Priorize)
Pay Bills _____
Invest in fishing operation _____
Invest in the household _____
Invest in other enterprises _____
RRSP/Savings _____

J. DEBT LEVELS.

29. How do you purchase supplies to get ready for fishing?
One Buyer Cash _____ Credit _____
Various Buyers Cash _____ Credit _____
Retail Outlet Cash _____ Charge to Buyer _____
30. What kind of bill would you have with the buyer at the beginning of the season when you started fishing?
31. How does increased debt in your fishing operation affect your fishing?
32. From whom do you borrow money when you started fishing?
buyers _____ banks/Credit Union _____ PLA _____ private _____
33. From whom do they borrow today?
buyers _____ banks/C.U. _____ PLA _____ private _____

K. ROLE OF SPOUSE IN FISHING ENTERPRISE?

34. How is your spouse involved in the fishing enterprise?
fishing _____ renewal of license _____
building/repair of gear _____
communication with buyers _____
books _____
communication with partner at sea _____
correspondence _____
banking/paying bills _____ other _____
35. If she is not involved in fishing in the boat, why not?

L.FISHING DECISIONS.

- 36. Do you discuss with your partner decisions about fishing matters? Why or why not?
- 37. Does the fact that she is fishing/not fishing affect her involvement in decisions around fishing?

M.ATTITUDE TOWARD WOMEN FISHING.

- 38. Has your attitude changed in regard to women fishing?
- 39. What do other fishers in the harbour think of women fishing?
- 40. What does your family, (parents, brother, sisters) think of women fishing?
- 41. What do men who are also looking for jobs as helpers think about women doing this kind of work?
- 42. Do you see your daughter going fishing?

N.ROLE OF CHILDREN.

- 43. Do your children participate in the tasks of preparing for fishing? Has that changed over the years? Do they get paid for doing these tasks?
- 44. Do they go out fishing with you? Do you pass on fishing skills to your children?
- 45. Is there a difference in labour contributed or skills learned between girls and boys?
- 46. Do you see your daughter/son going fishing?
Do you see fishing as a good profession?
What are the obstacles to their going fishing?
Would you help them get started?

O.ORGANIZATION

- 47. What is your perception of how fishers are organized? at level of harbour? at level of province? at level of region?
- 48. What are the problems in organizing fishers? Benefits?
- 49. Have you ever been involved in fishermen's organizations? at port level? at provincial level? at regional level?
- 50. How do you solve problems that pertain only to this particular harbour? (ice facilities, repair of wharf,)
- 51. What would you do for a problem that cannot be solved at the individual harbour level? (i.e. quota problems, price,
- 52. Do you feel that fishers' organizations can have any effect on problems in the fishery?
- 53. Are there any particular obstacles to lobster fishers organizing?
- 54. Do you think men and women should be organized separately?
- 55. Is the Maritime Fishermen's Union active in this harbour? the Fishermen's Association?

56.What is your perception of the difference between the two organizations?

P.RELATION WITH COMMUNITY.

57.What is the attitude of the community to fishers? Do they play an important role in the community?

58.Are you involved in community organizations? Do you hold executive positions?

59.Is it important for you to continue living in this community?

60.How important is the lobster fishery to the survival of this community?

61.How do people survive in a bad year?

62.Would you like to see your children have a choice of living in this community?

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR WOMEN IN LOBSTER FISHING HOUSEHOLDS

NOTE: I used the same basic interview schedule for women who were fishing and for those who were not. There would be a change of emphasis from one group to the other. For women who were fishing, section B was much more extensive. For women not fishing I would spend more time on section H. extensive.

NAME
ADDRESSPHONE.....
YEARS FISHING

A.EDUCATION AND WORK HISTORY:

- 1.What grade level did you finish in school?
- 2.What other certificates or qualifications do you have?
- 3.Give me some details about your work history after finishing school.

B.FISHING EXPERIENCE:

- 4.Do you fish with your partner? Yes ____ no ____
- 5.If no, why not?
Have you ever wanted to go fishing?
Is your family a fishing family?
- 6.If yes, tell me something of how you made the decision to go fishing.
Was it your idea or your husband's? Were you influenced by the fact that other women were fishing?
Did you discuss it with other women to see what it was

- like? What were the prime reasons for going fishing?
Are your reasons for continuing different than for starting?
7. How often do you go fishing?
a) Every day b) 5/6 4/6 3/6 1/6 (CIRCLE ONE)
c) Occasionally
8. Do you fish other species besides lobster?
9. Describe the tasks you do on the boat?
Are there tasks that you feel you cannot do? How did you learn these tasks? Do you feel that you are always learning new things? Are there other tasks that you would like to do that you don't do now? Do you ever drive the boat or operate any of the instruments such as Loran C, radar, etc.? Would you like to learn how to operate these instruments?
10. Are you the only helper on the boat?
If there is another person how do you and the other helper share the tasks?
11. Are you paid by shares _____ wages _____
What is your wage? How do you actually receive your wage?

C. FISHING TASKS OUTSIDE FISHING

12. Do you help with any other tasks related to fishing besides working in the boat?
fishing _____
renewal of license _____
building/repair of gear _____
communication with buyers _____
books _____
communication with partner at sea _____
correspondence _____
banking/paying bills _____
other _____
13. If not, why not?

D. DECISION MAKING

14. Does your partner discuss decisions about fishing matters with you? Do you consider that your opinion is important? Does your partner consider that your opinions are important?
15. (IF NOT WORKING IN THE BOAT) Do you find that not working in the boat has any effect on your participation in fishing decisions?

E.CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS:

- 16.How many children do you have? ____
What are their ages? _____.
17.What kind of child care do you have?
Is finding adequate child care a problem for you?
How do you find somebody?
Do you take responsibility for finding someone? Does
your partner help with this task?
Is it kin? neighbours?
What is the regular wage paid for child-care in this
area?
Do you give stamps to your child-care worker?

F.HOUSEWORK AND CHILD CARE TASKS:

- 18.Describe to me an ordinary day during the fishing season.
19.In your household, who usually does the following tasks?

	Wife	Husband	shared
child care	_____	_____	_____
preparation of meals	_____	_____	_____
washing of clothes	_____	_____	_____
cleaning of clothes	_____	_____	_____
dishes	_____	_____	_____
gardening	_____	_____	_____
grocery shopping	_____	_____	_____
other shopping	_____	_____	_____
chauffeur for children	_____	_____	_____

- 20.Does your partner help you with the household chores more
during the fishing season than at other times?
21.Are you satisfied with the division of labour in the
house?
Would you like your partner to help more with
household tasks? Do children help with household
tasks?
22.Do you feel that the work you do in the household is a
contribution to the fishing enterprise?

G.ATTITUDE TO WOMEN FISHING

- 23.Has your (or other women's) fishing in the boat changed
your attitude to women doing this work?
24.What does your partner think of you or other women
fishing?
25.What do other fishers in the harbour think of women
fishing?
26.What does your family (parents,brothers and sisters) think
of women fishing?
27.If you did not go fishing with your partner, would he hire
someone else in the community as a helper?

28. How do men in the community feel about women are doing this kind of work?
29. Does the fact that you don't work in the boat affect your knowledge of fishery issues? If someone called the house asking about information on fisheries issues, do you feel you could talk about it? If someone comes to the house and talks about fisheries issues, do you feel comfortable about joining in the discussion? Do you feel that you could make decisions about the kind of equipment to buy?
30. Do you see your son/daughter going fishing? Do you see it as a good profession? Do you see any particular problems in their going fishing? What do you see as the advantages? Would you be willing to help them get started? Are they learning fishing skills? Is there a difference between boys and girls in the possibility of learning fishing skills?

H. WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME.

31. Do you have another job outside the home besides fishing?
32. IF YES, what type of job? What is your main reason for working outside the home? Is the income from this job necessary to maintain the fishing household? How does work outside the home affect your life at home?
33. IF NO, do you want to work fulltime outside the home?
34. What are the employment possibilities in the area?

O. ORGANIZATION

35. What is your perception of how fishers are organized? at level of harbour? at level of province? at level of region?
36. What are the problems in organizing fishers? Benefits?
37. Have you ever been involved in fishermen's organizations? at port level? at provincial level? at regional level?
38. How do you solve problems that pertain only to this particular harbour? (ice facilities, repair of wharf,)
39. What would you do for a problem that cannot be solved at the individual harbour level? (i.e. quota problems, price,)
40. Do you feel that fishers' organizations can have any effect on problems in the fishery?
41. Are there any particular obstacles to lobster fishers organizing?
42. Do you think men and women should be organized separately?
43. Is the Maritime Fishermen's Union active in this harbour? the Fishermen's Association?
44. What is your perception of the difference between the two organizations?

P.RELATION WITH COMMUNITY.

- 45.What is the attitude of the community to fishers? Do they play an important role in the community?
- 46.Are you involved in community organizations? Do you hold executive positions?
- 47.Is it important for you to continue living in this community?
- 48.How important is the lobster fishery to the survival of this community?
- 49.How do people survive in a bad year?
- 50.Would you like to see your children have a choice of living in this community?



