THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
PRESUPPOSITIONS OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
HEGEL vs. HOBBES

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: HEGEL VS. HOBBES

by

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of the requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

The doctrine that political philosophy has as its immediate prerequisite a psychology, or science of man, is as old as the Greeks. This study concentrates upon two philosophers who share this doctrine, viz. Hobbes and Hegel. For both these thinkers, though their doctrines vary in form and content, social and political institutions have their roots in and are the manifestation of principles which govern human nature. This study provides an examination of the psychologies of both philosophers; it is argued that Hegel's psychology obviates difficulties present in Hobbes's psychology of biological self-interest and thus that Hegel's psychology provides the more adequate ground for politics. The argument proceeds as follows:

In chapter one the metaphysical foundations of Hobbes's doctrine are delineated. The manner in which Hobbes uses the principle of motion to elucidate human nature is presented; further, it is shown how, from his account of human nature, he demonstrates the necessity of the commonwealth. It is argued that the psychology which Hobbes provides is mechanico-naturalistic throughout and that it serves as the basis for a doctrine of prudential obligation.

In chapter two a critical appraisal of Hobbes's doctrine is presented. It is argued (a) that the metaphysical
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**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
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principle which serves as the foundation of Hobbes's psychology is dogmatically naturalistic, and (b) that the politics which Hobbes derives from his account of man is limited by that account.

In chapter three an examination of Hegel's psychology and politics is provided. The chapter concentrates upon two principles: (a) man as the transcendence of nature, and (b) man as free personality. An examination of both principles is given; it is argued that these principles enable Hegel to ameliorate and overcome difficulties present in Hobbes's doctrine. Hence, it is argued that Hegel's psychology provides the more adequate ground for political philosophy.
INTRODUCTION

The claim that political philosophy has as its immediate presupposition a psychology, or doctrine of man, is an old one. In attempting to determine the effect which justice or injustice has upon the life of man, the Socrates of the Republic, for example, elects to turn to a study of the genesis of society. His reason for this seemingly round-about way of answering the question put to him by Glaucon and his other interlocutors is the belief that in society we shall be able to see justice written up... on a bigger scale.' For, says Socrates, "we think of justice as a quality that may exist in a whole community as well as in an individual, and the community is the bigger of the two... Possibly, then, we find justice there in larger proportions, easier to make out.' 1 Socrates's contention, put in its broadest form, is that all the institutions of society--class structure, law, art, religion and so on--are the external manifestation and embodiment of the virtues of the human soul; that society is the outward expression of the inner principles which govern human life. This contention of Socrates's, viz. that psychology and political philosophy are inextricably bound up with each other, is one that is shared also by the two philosophers examined in this study,

Thomas Hobbes and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. For each of these thinkers, as for Socrates before them, psychology, or the science of man, serves as the immediate ground of political philosophy; for each of them, though their doctrines vary in both form and content, social and political institutions find their roots in and are the manifestation of the principles which govern human nature.

The work of Thomas Hobbes—whose Leviathan according to R.G. Collingwood "incredibly overtops all its successors in political theory"—has as its background the political turmoil of seventeenth-century England. His is an age of political and social unrest, the age of Cromwell and the Revolution. The cause of this unrest, and indeed of political unrest in general, Hobbes attributes to ignorance of the principles upon which the proper functioning of social institutions and government depend. Thus in his Behemoth, for example, he attempts to show by an examination of the deeds of the Long Parliament that confused and mistaken views in political philosophy can spell disaster for the commonwealth. And if ignorance is the cause, the cure, Hobbes claims, is to be seen in knowledge, and specifically knowledge of the principles of political science. For if the leaders of the country can be taught the principles upon which secure government rest, the affairs of the commonwealth can be placed upon a stable footing, since the common people always follow

their immediate leaders. Security and stability in government, in other words, hinges upon knowledge of the principles of political science.

The key to attaining these principles, Hobbes holds, lies in the fundamental tenets and in the resolutive-compositive method of the new science of Galileo and his disciples. What these tenets and this method reveal when applied to the science of human nature, is that man is a self-preserving engine, an engine driven inexorably by a desire for power and by a fear of violent death, an engine for whom only prudential reasons matter ultimately. We might note that Hobbes sees himself as the first to place political philosophy upon a firm and scientific foundation; he situates his own work squarely within the framework of the birth of modern science and of the discoveries of Galileo, whom he describes as "the first that opened to us the gate of natural philosophy universal." Just as it had fallen to Harvey to apply the new science to the human body and thus to attain to an understanding of the circulatory system, so Hobbes claims that he will apply the new science to human nature itself and on the basis of his findings construct once and for all the definitive political philosophy. From a study of man and of the forces which move him, in other words, Hobbes hopes to deduce the necessity of leagues, covenants and the commonwealth. In such a manner politics.

will attain an adequate scientific ground.

The political doctrine which Hobbes derives from his account of man as a self-preserving engine is one that may best be described as a 'politics of power'. On the basis of man's fear of violent death he proceeds to give a picture of the commonwealth ruled by a sovereign invested with absolute and indivisible power. For man is a machine driven by an infinite desire for power and pre-eminence over his fellows; yet he is also moved by a fear of violent death. Hobbes makes use of the latter to restrain the former. And for Hobbes this involves investing the sovereign with as great a power as is imaginable, for only fear of the threat of absolute power, viz. fear of the sword of justice, will keep men to the covenant upon which the commonwealth rests. The peace and security of the commonwealth are, in short, directly linked to the absolute power which the sovereign wields and to the fear which this is able to engender. For, as Hobbes says: "...the passion to be reckoned upon is fear." Hobbes thus makes fear the foundation of social order and the ultimate source of authority.

In the body of the thesis which follows we shall argue that it is doubtful that a stable political order can be built upon the foundation of power, force and fear which Hobbes uncovers. Though the Leviathan and Hobbes's other works in the realm of political philosophy represent an impressive attempt to plumb the depths of politics and to

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disclose for the view of all the principles upon which social and political order rest, Hobbes's findings are in the final analysis crippled by his psychology and by the dogmatic mechanico-naturalistic framework in which his psychology is set. Moreover, we shall argue that the inadequacies which we encounter in Hobbes's doctrine are ameliorated and overcome in what we shall designate as Hegel's 'psychology and politics of free personality'.

For Hegel, political order, as we shall see, rests not on force and fear, but rather on man's self-conscious recognition of the state as his substantive groundwork and end: "For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest on it;...What dominates in the State is the spirit of the people, custom, and laws. There man is recognized and treated as a rational being, as free, as a person." 5

Unlike the political thought of Hobbes, that of G.W.F. Hegel has received but scant and unsympathetic attention in English-speaking countries. 6 Bertrand Russell, for example,


6 Like Hobbes, Hegel wrote at a time of great political and social upheaval. His was the age of the French Revolution and Napoleon. Unlike Hobbes, however, Hegel holds that it is not the job of philosophy to give instruction. He writes: "One word about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the World, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed...When philosophy paints its grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk." The Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox (Oxford: University Press, 1971), Preface, pp. 12-13.
writes: "It follows from his metaphysics that true liberty consists in obedience to an arbitrary authority, that free speech is an evil, that absolute monarchy is good...that war is good, and that an international organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes would be a misfortune." Perhaps part of the reason for such a superficial and unqualified misreading of Hegel, a misreading not uncommon in English-speaking countries, is the difficulty of his thought in light of the often tortuous language in which it is clothed. Goethe himself remarks upon the infelicity of Hegel's language and style. But whatever the cause of such enormous prejudices and misunderstanding, it is necessary that a more balanced view be presented if Hegel is to receive a fair hearing and if we are to reap the benefit of his insight in the realm of political philosophy. It is our hope that an understanding of the manner in which Hegel grounds politics in a doctrine of man as free personality will go some way towards redressing this imbalance. We hope too that it will provide some indication of the richness and scope of Hegel's political thought; for the principle of man as free personality enables Hegel at once to encompass the partial truth of Hobbes's naturalistic doctrine while avoiding the difficulties which beleaguer this doctrine. In showing the constitution of the principle of man as free personality, Hegel provides the ground for a political philosophy which

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comprehends the politics of power and which transcends it.

The plan in accordance with which the argument will proceed is as follows:

In chapter one we shall delineate the fundamental tenets which serve as the cornerstone of Hobbes's systematic endeavours in the realm of philosophy. We shall show how, on the basis of these tenets, Hobbes constructs his doctrine of man as a self-preserving, prudential engine and how, from this account of man, he deduces the necessity of contracts and the commonwealth.

In chapter two we shall take a critical look at Hobbes's doctrine. We shall show (a) that the metaphysics which serves as the foundation of that doctrine is dogmatically naturalistic, and (b) that the politics which Hobbes derives from his account of man is limited by that account.

Finally in chapter three we shall turn to a consideration of Hegel's psychology and politics. We shall concentrate upon two principles: (a) man as the transcendence of nature, and (b) man as free personality. An examination of the first of these principles will provide an indication of the manner in which Hegel overcomes the naturalistic standpoint; analysis of the second will reveal the import of Hegel's psychology. It will be argued that as a result of these principles Hegel is able to provide a psychology and politics which are comprehensive of Hobbes's psychology and politics and which go beyond them. The extent to which this is so we shall indicate in a concluding section.
CHAPTER I

HOBSES'S MOTIONALIST PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter we shall delineate the account Hobbes gives of the ground civil society finds in psychology, or, as he calls it, the science of the motions of the mind. We shall show that the shape which this science takes is determined in large measure, though not exclusively, by a concept of motion—a concept which may be shown to be the copingstone of all Hobbes's attempts to provide a systematic philosophical account of the realms of nature and of mind. We shall attempt to show further that the political and moral obligation which Hobbes derives from his account of human nature is one that may only be described as a system of universal, or common, prudence. The sense in which this is so should become clear as we proceed.

Section I: The fundamental metaphysical tenet and Hobbes's systematic intent.

To set the scene for the discussion and to gain some insight into Hobbes's conception of the scope and aim of philosophical inquiry we might with profit turn to the opening chapters of De Corpore where these matters are dealt with in some depth. In the first few pages of this work Hobbes defines the philosophical enterprise as follows: "Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation. And again, of such causes or generations as
may be from knowing first their effects. Hobbes's intent in providing this definition is to set the boundaries within which all genuine philosophical inquiry operates. The subject-matter whereof philosophy treats is "every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may by consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of composition and resolution." The job of the philosopher is by 'true ratiocination' to methodically seek out the causes responsible for the generation of any body. Excluded, therefore, from the realm of philosophical inquiry is the doctrine of God, or Theology, for God is eternal, ingenerable and indivisible. Excluded also is the doctrine of angels and all other incorporeal beings in view of the fact that there is "in them no place neither for composition nor division, nor any capacity of more and less, that is to say, no place for ratiocination." Excluded in addition, Hobbes maintains, is history, natural as well as political, for though such discipline might be useful, indeed necessary for philosophy, the knowledge contained in them is but a matter of experience. It might be noted that this exclusion of history from the realm of philosophy is in keeping with a distinction which operates quite generally throughout the whole of Hobbes's philosophy; viz. that between purely experiential knowledge

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1All references from Hobbes's works will be taken from the Moleworth edition: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Sir William Moleworth ed. (London: John Bohn, 1841). Vol. 1, p. 3. Future references will be abbreviated as follows: EW which is shorthand for English Works, followed by Volume and Page number. Thus the reference just given is EW 1 3.

2EW 1 (De Corpore) 10

3EW 1 (De Corpore) 10
and true scientific or philosophical knowledge. The former, Hobbes holds, is the product of sense and memory and is given us "immediately by nature." The latter, on the other hand, is the product of 'true ratiocination'. It deals with bodies and their causes and proceeds in a methodical, systematic manner.

What is this method in accordance with which philosophical inquiry is carried out? Philosophy, as has been seen, concerns itself with the knowledge of causes and effects; it seeks either from given causes (or generations) to arrive at knowledge of the effects of these causes, or conversely, to attain from given effects knowledge of the possible causes (or generations) of these effects. In both cases the procedure is methodical. In the one case, however, reason proceeds regressively from given effects to causes which, in accordance with the fundamental principle of philosophy (this principle as we shall see shortly is the principle of motion), might account for their production. This is the procedure Hobbes often uses in the explanation of particular phenomena of nature and it is the one to which he calls attention at the beginning of Part IV of De Corpore, the section devoted to physics. In the other case, reason proceeds progressively from causes to the effects which these generate.

In outlining his plan for providing a systematic account of the realms of nature and of mind it is to this latter procedure that Hobbes gives the place of prime importance. He holds that from first principles, intuitively known, it is possible to

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4 EW I (De Corpore) 3
deduce the fundamental structures of both these realms. But
how, more precisely, are these first principles attained?
And what, in greater detail, does this deductive science of
nature and mind look like?

All knowledge, according to Hobbes, finds its initial
point of departure in the phantasms of sense and memory.
"There is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first
totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense."6
However, philosophy does not rest content with this purely
experiential knowledge; it seeks by way of analysis to
discover the dioti of the mere hodi, the causes responsible
for the generation of the 'what'. Now in this quest for causal
knowledge, philosophy may search either simply or 'indefinitely',
that is, the philosopher may seek the cause of some determinate
appearance, say of light or of heat, or he may seek "knowledge
of the causes of all things, as far forth as it may be attained."7
If this latter be the case, it is requisite that he seek the
causes of universal things; "or of such accidents as are common
to all bodies, that is, to all matter, before...[he]...can know
the causes of singular things, that is, of those accidents by
which one thing is distinguished from another."8 Hobbes provides
an illustration of what he means at this point. If, for example,
the philosopher seeks the 'universal things' (universal accidents)
which constitute the nature of some particular thing, say a
square, then he will by a process of analysis, or resolution,

6EW III (Leviathan) 1
7EW I (De Corpore) 68
8EW I (De Corpore) 68
arrive at the following; plain, terminated with a certain number of equal and straight lines and right angles. By way of resolution or analysis, in other words, the philosopher will be led to those 'things' which are agreeable to all matter; viz. line, plane, limitation, angle, straightness, rectitude, and equality. These universal things, together with their causes, constitute the sufficient cause of a square. Or another example. The idea of gold may be resolved into the idea of solid, visible, heavy and other things more universal than gold itself. These, in turn, may be further resolved until one arrives at such things as are most universal. "I conclude, therefore," says Hobbes, "that the method of attaining to the universal knowledge of things, is purely analytical."\(^9\)

Now these universal things do not, Hobbes holds, represent the ultimate terminus of the philosopher's quest; for as noted in the case of the square just given he must seek also the causes of these universal things. We arrive here at the central point of all Hobbes's endeavours in the realm of philosophy.

But the causes of universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest of themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to nature; so that they need no method at all; for they have all but one universal cause, which is motion. For the variety of all figures arises out of the variety of those motions by which they are made; and motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides motion; nor has the variety of those things we perceive by sense, as of colours, sounds, savours, etc. any other cause than motion.\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) EW I (De Corpore) 69

\(^{10}\) EW I (De Corpore) 69 - 70 Italics mine.
The claim, in short, is that 'all causality is motion'; it is in terms of this 'one universal cause' that everything is ultimately to be explained and understood. Even geometry, which is generally taken to be a purely formal science\(^\text{11}\), is to be grasped in terms of this fundamental principle. Hobbes intends the example of the square just given to be taken quite literally. To understand a square means to understand its cause; and this knowledge of its cause is made up of knowledge of the causes of the universal 'things' which constitute its nature; viz. line, plane and so on. And what are the causes of these universal things? They are motion; for what is a line but motion of a point, and superficies - but motion of a line.\(^\text{12}\) For Hobbes, in other words, the whole of philosophical or scientific reality is to be given a dynamic interpretation in terms of motion; ultimately everything admits of a kinematic explanation.

Philosophy deals with bodies and their causes or generations. By a process of analysis or resolution the philosopher arrives at the universal things which constitute the nature of any

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\(^\text{11}\) Hobbes's introduction of motion into a formal science like geometry was to find strong opponents. For an account of his debate with the Oxford geometer John Wallis, see J. Laird, Hobbes. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), pp. 102 - 9.

\(^\text{12}\) For another example of Hobbes's claim that geometrical figures will truly be understood only when their construction by motion is comprehended, see W.I (De Corpore)§ 5 'How properties are known by generation and contrary'. There the example of a circle is considered.
given body. But the causes of these universal things are not themselves arrived at by means of the analytical or resolutive method; for "the causes of universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest of themselves, or (as they commonly say) known to nature; so that they need no method at all." 13 The fundamental principle, viz. that "all causality is motion" is, then, intuitively known, or as Hobbes says, manifest of itself. As self-evident it needs no method. It is this one self-evident principle that constitutes Hobbes's fundamental metaphysical claim; it provides the key to the understanding of the whole of reality.

Philosophical knowledge is knowledge of cause; and all causality is motion. Quite generally what Hobbes means by 'motion' in this claim is local movement. The generation of any effect whatever may be traced ultimately to movement of one sort or another. The variety of geometrical figures has its origin in the variety of movements by which they are constructed. Perception is the result of internal movement in the percipient occasioned by the effect which the movements of external objects have upon the organs of sense. The production of effects in nature consists of a continuous process wherein one body is affected by movements in another body, and so on. For Hobbes, in other words, all effects, as already stated,

13 EW I (De Corpore) 69
have motion or movement as their primary cause. However, to gain a clearer picture of the full implications of this claim, we might take a look at how Hobbes understands causality.

Hobbes's account of causality is contained in chapters ix and x of De Corpore. The account opens with the statement and explication of certain general propositions concerning the nature of cause and effect and then proceeds to link these general ideas with the concept of motion. "A body," writes Hobbes, "is said to work or act, that is to say, do something to another body, when it either generates or destroys some accident in it."\(^{14}\) This acting body is to be called the agent; it is the 'power' or 'efficient cause' responsible for the generation or destruction of some accident. Now, an agent implies a patient, a body in which the accident is generated or destroyed by the acting power. This patient in which the effect is generated Hobbes calls the 'material cause'; together with the 'efficient cause' it constitutes the 'entire cause': For an agent "hath its effect precisely such, not because it is a body, but because it is such a body, or so moved... The fire, for example, does not warm because it is a body, but because it is hot."\(^{15}\) The causes of all effects, in short, consists in certain accidents both in the agents and the patients, such that when they are all present, the 'entire cause' being present, the effect is produced. But if one or other of them is lacking, the effect

\(^{14}\) EW I (De Corpore) 120

\(^{15}\) EW I (De Corpore) 121
will not be produced. The accident, either in the agent or the patient, without which the effect cannot be produced is termed the *causa sine qua non*. Hobbes, thus, defines a simple or an entire cause as "the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any one of them is wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced."  

It will be seen from this, that in so far as the entire cause is present, the generation of any accident occurs of necessity. Moreover, the entire cause is identical with the sufficient cause: "an entire cause is always sufficient for the production of its effect, if the effect be at all possible."  

The presence of the sufficient or entire cause dictates the necessary production of the effect.

That the ultimate cause of all effects is motion Hobbes takes to be manifest of itself. It is thus not surprising that he link the general characterization of cause just given with the concept of motion.  

16EW I (De Corpore) 121-22  
17EW I (De Corpore) 122  
18It might be noted that in keeping with his definition of philosophy, Hobbes intends his account of causation to refer only to things generated. Thus it does not refer to the 'First Mover', though Hobbes does say that anyone who makes "any profound enquiry into natural causes" EW III (Leviathan) 92 will be inclined to believe in the existence of a 'First Mover'. We might note further that with respect to this First Mover, Hobbes does not hold it to be itself immoveable. He says: "though from this, that nothing can move itself, it may rightly be inferred that there was some first eternal movent; yet it can never be inferred, though some used to make such inference, that that movent was eternally immoveable, but rather eternally moved. For as it is true, that nothing is moved, by itself, so it is true also that nothing is moved but by that which is already moved." EW I (De Corpore) 412.
sections of the chapters devoted to cause is to connect this account of causation with two principles basic to his system: viz. that the cause of all change or mutation is motion, and that nothing but motion can cause a motion. To this end he declares (i) that if a finite body at rest in space began to move without an external cause it would have to move itself "alike all ways at once; which is impossible;" and (ii) that if a body were at rest and not in contact with some other body "we may conceive it will continue so till touched by some other body." In order that causal interaction take place both contact between bodies and the transmission of motion is necessary. Hobbes rejects the idea of actio in distans; if bodies are not contiguous and yet influence one another contact must be achieved either by emanations or through a medium. For "there can be no cause of motion, except in a body contiguous [or indirectly contiguous by means of emanations or through a medium] and moved." To show that all mutation or change is motion Hobbes argues that "we do not say anything is changed but that which appears to our senses otherwise than it appeared formerly;" that is, that since sensible appearances are motions in us, change in these must be due to other motions—a conclusion that seems to follow only if all changes are indeed changed but that which appears to our senses otherwise than it appeared formerly; that is, that since sensible appearances are motions in us, change in these must be due to other motions—a conclusion that seems to follow only if all changes are indeed changed but that which appears to our senses otherwise than it appeared formerly; that is, that since sensible appearances are motions in us, change in these must be due to other motions—a conclusion that seems to follow only if all changes are indeed changed but that which appears to our senses otherwise than it appeared formerly; that is, that since sensible appearances are motions in us, change in these must be due to other motions—a conclusion that seems to follow only if all changes are indeed changed but that which appears to our senses otherwise than it appeared formerly; 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that is, that since sensible appearances are motions in us, change in these must be due to other motions—a conclusion that seems to follow only if all changes are indeed changed but that which appears to our senses
changes of motion. Be this as it may, Hobbes's cardinal point throughout is that causal interaction demands contiguity and the transmission of motion. Causality, in short, is the transmission of motion between bodies in contact.

The significance of the claim 'there can be no cause of motion except in a body contiguous and moved' cannot be stressed too much. Implied in it is Hobbes's complete and total rejection of any idea of final cause. "A final cause," he says baldly, "has no place but in such things as have sense and will, and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an efficient cause." With this Hobbes discards the Aristotelianism of the schools. As Brandt puts it: "It is curious to read these few lines about final causes; on his Aristotelian contemporaries they must have had the effect of the blow of a bludgeon. A whole world perished with the giving up of final causes. There only remains the naked causal relation, the 'efficient causes' which are not determined by any purpose. This disregard of the teleological is by no means a surprise. Hobbes's starting points are of a purely mechanico-naturalistic nature." In place of the teleological view of his contemporaries, Hobbes conceives of a world of bodies composed of particles in causal relation with other bodies composed of particles. The interaction of these bodies is due to motion, for all causality is motion. It is this which constitutes Hobbes's fundamental insight.

Thus far we have seen that philosophy treats of bodies,

their causes and effects. We have seen also that in order to scientifically understand particular phenomena it is necessary to resolve them into the universal things which constitute their nature. The cause of these universal things, of those that have any cause, we have seen to be motion; this Hobbes says is manifest of itself, known to nature. However, having once attained knowledge of these universal things and of their cause we do not, Hobbes insists, stop here. For we proceed now to employ this knowledge; we proceed, that is, to inquire what motions produce what effects. We inquire, for example, what motion produces a straight line, and what a circular; what motion pushes, what pulls, and in what way, and so on.

We proceed, in other words, to make use of our principles. The method to be followed in this employment of the first principles, Hobbes calls compositive or synthetical.

From the knowledge we have of universals and "their causes, which are the first principles by which we know the dicti of things, we have in the first place their definitions, which are nothing but the explication of our simple conceptions." 26 These definitions are to form the starting point of a great, systematic undertaking to be carried out in accordance with the compositive method. "The whole method... of demonstration," Hobbes says, "is synthetical, consisting of that order of speech which begins from primary or most universal propositions... and proceeds by a perpetual composition of propositions into syllogisms." 27 What Hobbes is outlining here is a procedure

26EW I (De Corpore) 70  
27EW I (De Corpore) 80-81
for the deduction of all the matters whereof philosophy

treats from a set of universal propositions. These
definitions, or propositions, the most fundamental of which
is the intuitively known principle that the ultimate cause of
all things is motion, are the central conceptions in terms of
which everything else is to be explained and demonstrated.
Hobbes's majestic plan, in other words, is to provide a
comprehensive science of all that is of philosophical interest;
vi. a science of body, man and citizen. This science is to
have as its controlling idea, the concept of motion as the
root of all causality.

The groundplan of this great systematic undertaking
Hobbes outlines in De Corpore. We can provide but a brief
overview here. We begin, he says, by considering the effects
which a body moved produces, if we take cognizance of nothing
in it except its motion. From considerations of this sort
there arises geometry, the science of motion simpliciter.

Next, says Hobbes, we pass to the consideration of the effect
which one body in motion produces upon another body. The
science which arises from these considerations is that which
deals with the laws of action and reaction, i.e. mechanics;
it inquires into what motion causes such and such a motion
in another body taken as a whole, which way and with what
swiftness a body at rest or in motion will be moved if struck
by another body and so on. Next, claims Hobbes, comes physics,
that science which treats of the internal and invisible motions.
of any body and which seeks to explain "how it comes to pass, that things when they are the same, yet seem not to be the same, but changed," 28 Sensible qualities such as light, colour, opacity, transparency, sound, odour, savour, and the causes of sense itself are to be dealt with and explained in physics. After this science, we pass to moral philosophy wherein the 'motions of the mind', viz. appetite, aversion and their species, love, benevolence, hope, fear, etc. are to be considered. This science follows physics because all the motions of the mind have their causes in sense and imagination which are the subject of physical contemplation. Finally, we arrive at the last of the sciences, civil philosophy, the science which considers natural right, the causes and necessity of constituting commonwealths and civil duties. Within the system, however, this last science and indeed the science immediately preceding it, occupy special positions. For in both cases it is not absolutely requisite that in our study of them we begin at the first of the sciences, viz. geometry; that is, both civil philosophy and the science of the motions of the mind may be considered independently of the preceding three sciences. The motions of the mind, says Hobbes, "are known, not only by ratiocination, but also by the experience of every man that takes the pains to observe those motions within himself." 29 Consequently, not only those who have begun their ratiocination at the first part of philosophy may attain to knowledge of these two sciences; for by introspection it is possible to acquire

28 EW I (De Corpore) 72  
29 EW I (De Corpore) 73
knowledge of the motions of the mind and from here to elaborate the principles of commonwealths and the necessity of their generation. Ultimately, however, these two sciences take their logical places after the other three and like them are to be considered as instances of motion and of the effects generated by bodies in motion. All five parts of philosophy have this idea as their controlling conception.

The systematic and methodological intent of *De Corpore*, then, is the elaboration of a unitary comprehensive science of body, man and citizen. This science is to proceed synthetically from first principles, the most fundamental of which is the principle of motion itself. It is to begin with geometry, the science of motion simpliciter, and to proceed through the doctrine of motion (i.e. mechanics, wherein the laws of action and reaction are considered), physics, the science of the motions of the mind (i.e. psychology), and finally to find its completion in civil philosophy. This, we say, is the systematic intent. However, as just indicated Hobbes claims also that the science of the motions of the mind and civil philosophy may legitimately take another beginning, viz. a beginning based on self-knowledge and self-examination. And, indeed, in the preface to *De Cive* Hobbes speaks of having pursued both of these sciences in accordance with this method and of their being 'ripened and plucked' from him before any of the other three. Such state-

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30 EW II (De Cive) xx
ments on Hobbes's part have led some critics, notably Professor Leo Strauss, to speculate that Hobbes's political philosophy is entirely humanistic in orientation and that it owes nothing to "a general scientific or metaphysical theory." And prima facie there would seem to be a great deal of evidence to corroborate this claim. In the three major works devoted to civil philosophy—The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan—it is the 'introspective' method which Hobbes adopts. Yet such evidence is misleading; though Hobbes does not (perhaps could not) carry out his great deductive plan in extenso he, nonetheless, brings to his political studies, as Professors Watkins and Brandt have convincingly demonstrated, the conviction that civil philosophy is but a particular instance of motion and of the effects generated by bodies in motion. For Hobbes this idea provides the conceptual key to unlocking the secrets of the whole of scientific reality. As we shall see, life, according to Hobbes, "is but motion of limbs"; liberty is "an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion".

32 J.W.N. Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," in Hobbes Studies. K.C. Broun (ed). (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 237-262. Watkins shows, conclusively in our opinion, that Hobbes "philosophical, (i.e., metaphysical) ideas are in the forefront of his... political theory." Brandt, op. cit. See particularly Chapter II devoted to an analysis of the Little Treatise. This work, completed prior to any of the works which deal with civil philosophy, already contains what Brandt calls Hobbes's 'fundamental viewpoint', viz. that of motion. This viewpoint colours all of Hobbes's subsequent thought; indeed so crucial is it that Brandt suggests (p. 379) that if we are to put any label on Hobbes's philosophizing it be that of 'motionalism'.
33 E.M. (Leviathan) ix. 34 E.M. (De Cive) 120.
nuances in the wit of individuals are to be attributed to differences in the rapidity or "swift succession of one thought to another" and so on. Motion permeates all—that is to be philosophically understood. However, let us turn to Hobbes's psychology and civil philosophy and see this in operation.

Section ii: The appetite-aversion apparatus.

Basic to Hobbes's account of human nature is the principle that all causes are antecedent motions. As already seen, Hobbes expresses this principle as follows: 'there can be no cause of motion, except in a body contiguous and moved'; there can be no action at a distance. Now in the case of a great many things that occur for which there was presumably some cause, it is often difficult to see any motion in a contiguous body that could have been the cause of that occurrence. In such cases recourse is had to unobservable motions either within the body itself or between bodies. Hobbes makes use of this idea of unobservable motions in his concept of 'endeavour or conatus', which he defines as 'motion made in less space and time than can be given; that is motion made through the length of a point and in an instant or point of time.' It is in terms of the concept of infinitely small motions, which as Brandt has shown, "enters freely into Hobbes's collective endeavour to understand everything by motion" that Hobbes is able to 'bridge the gap' between the movements in external bodies which are transmitted by means of a medium to the sense organs and the movements of the body in appetite.

35 EW III (Leviathan) 56
36 EW I (De Corpore) 206
37 Brandt, Op. Cit., p. 313
and aversion. In Hobbes's attempt to develop a philosophical system based upon the principle of motion it is this concept that enables him to show the continuity between physics, physiology and psychology.

According to Hobbes, motions of external bodies work upon the organs of sense and produce phantasms or images; "and this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call the object." 38 However, these phantasms or images are not the only effect produced by the action of the external object upon the sentient; "...there are also other effects besides these, produced by the same objects in the same organs; namely certain motions proceeding from sense, which are called animal motions. For seeing in all sense of external things there is mutual endeavour opposing one another, it is manifest that the motion of both of them together will be continued every way, especially to the confines of both the bodies." 39 Hobbes is laying the ground here for his concept of animal or voluntary motion. The motion of the sense organs proceeds via the brain to the heart. There it causes some change in the vital motion about the heart, the motion of the blood. This change, if it be such as to help vital motion, causes pleasure; if it be such as to hinder vital motion it causes pain. In the former case, that is, in the case where vital motion is helped or

38 EW I (De Corpore) 390 39 EW I (De Corpore) 405

40 Vital motion is the motion begun in generation and continued without interruption throughout the entire life of the organism. It includes such things as "the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction...etc." EW III 38. It is the generic motion of all life. That all living things must exhibit vital motion, Hobbes seems to posit as manifest of itself.
increased, the body, says Hobbes, will be moved in such a way as to preserve that motion. "And in animal motion this is the very first endeavour, and found even in the embryo, which while it is in the womb, moveth its limbs with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it and for pursuing of what pleaseth it." This first endeavour, if it is directed towards objects that are known by experience to help vital motion and to cause pleasure, is called appetite; if, on the other hand, it is directed away from objects known to hinder vital motion and cause pain, it is called aversion.

Before proceeding further, we might pause here to make a few comments on what has been said of human nature thus far. First, it will be seen that according to Hobbes human nature is so constituted that all men, even the embryo, seek from the earliest stages of life to attain those things which enhance vital motion. From inception, as it were, man's prime concern is with self-preservation and the increase of vital motion. It is this which constitutes the necessary and sufficient grounds of his action. Indeed, for Hobbes, appetite and aversion are essentially reduced to vital motion; for it is so far as particular objects of sense are perceived to help or hinder vital motion that a man seeks, and seeks necessarily, to attain these objects or to avoid them. Animal motion is always determined by its perceived significance for the advancement or inhibition of vital motion. Second, it might be noted that this account of endeavour, desire and aversion

41 EW I (De Corpore) 407
is meant by Hobbes as the general framework within which all the passions, viz. love, hate, contempt, joy, hope, etc., are to be understood. Actions which arise from any of these passions or motions of the mind are directed either towards or away from the objects which are their causes, depending on whether the effects of the objects are such as that they help or hinder vital motion. All the passions are instances of desire or aversion. Third, it should be noted that Hobbes's account of appetite and aversion is mechanical and naturalistic and entirely in accordance with the fundamental tenet of his system, viz. that all causality is motion. All action is the effect of motion, phantasmagoria generated by the effects produced on the organs of sense by the movements of external objects cause changes in the vital motion about the heart. Depending on whether these changes help or hinder vital motion, the objects are either sought or avoided.

Now, says Hobbes, those things which a man desires he calls good; those things which are the object of his aversion he calls evil. Further, if a man find no 'lents or hindrances' to his appetite, that is if a man be at liberty, he will seek to attain that which he desires and to avoid that which causes aversion. But it is possible with respect to one and the same object that a man experience alternately both appetite and aversion. In this instance, the man will embark upon a process of weighing the good and evil consequences of the object sought or the action intended. This calculative process,

42 EM V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 305
Hobbes holds, is called deliberation; it involves the "whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible."\textsuperscript{43} The resolution of this deliberative process, or more accurately, "the last appetite, or aversion, we call will."\textsuperscript{44} Willing, in other words, is animal motion; it is appetite or aversion directed towards or away from those things or actions which men conceive may help or hinder vital motion. Specifically, it is the last appetite in the calculative or deliberative process; it is directed always towards the enhancement of a man's well-being, or what he takes to be such. Let us take a closer look at these three concepts; viz. liberty, deliberation and will.

In Leviathan Hobbes provides the following definition of liberty: "Liberty, or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational...But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say, it wants liberty; but the power to move;..."\textsuperscript{45} Hobbes's account of liberty is natural or physical and entirely in keeping with his "motionalism". A man's freedom consists in the absence of external impediments to his motion; if the impediments to motion are entirely internal, then it is power that the man lacks, not freedom. Thus, says Hobbes,

\textsuperscript{43}EW III (Leviathan) 48
\textsuperscript{44}EW III (Leviathan) 48
\textsuperscript{45}EW III (Leviathan) 196
a sick or a lame man lacks the power to move, but not the freedom, for the impediment to motion is internal to them; a man who is tied, on the other hand, "wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bonds." When properly applied, then, liberty denotes the absence of opposition to motion; the meaning of the term is conceived in accordance with a physical model of explanation. So conceived (and Hobbes argues that this is the 'generally received meaning of the word') the term may be 'properly' applied only to bodies, for "that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment." To say that a man is free is to say that he finds no impediments to his motion towards or away from the objects of his desire. But how is this motion towards or away from objects understood? Let us turn our attention to the concepts of deliberation and will.

As already noted, for Hobbes the deliberation that precedes action is conceived as an alternating series of appetites and aversions. It is in some sense a calculative process; "to consider an action is to imagine the consequences of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth." And this process is not something peculiar to man; "for though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation." Animal and human deliberation are in principle the

46EW V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 368.
47EW III (Leviathan) 197
48EW III (Leviathan) 197
49EW IV (Elements) 273
50EW V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 95.
same: both deliberate as they are moved to action by the hope of good or the fear of evil. 51

The termination of deliberation is action: the last in the series of contrary appetites, that is, the one "immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible" 52 is that which we call will. Will; in short, is the last appetite in the deliberative process; it is the last dictate of judgment. The manner in which this entire deliberative process is to be conceived, and specifically the manner in which the 'last dictate' functions, Hobbes indicates by way of a number of analogies. The last dictate of judgment, he says, may be likened to the last feather, which being laid upon the horse's back, is the one that finally breaks it; and when he comes to expand upon this comparison he adds; "the objects, means, etc. are the weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now one way, now another; and that inclination is the will." 53 In both these analogies we observe once again Hobbes's preoccupation with mechanical models. Human action, like all explicable action, admits of mechanical analysis, for all action is the effect of motion. Specifically all action is ultimately the effect of vital motion. External objects which work upon the organs of sense provide the content of specific appetites and aversions. If these objects are known by experience to help vital motion,

51 EW IV (Elements) 244 52 EW IV (Elements) 273
53 EW V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 326
the object is sought. If, on the other hand, the object is known to hinder vital motion it is avoided.

Section iii: The demonstration of the necessity of the commonwealth.

Thus far we have given Hobbes's account of the appetite- aversion apparatus. We may now look at the consequences which he draws from this account. The first steps in this process are contained in the ideas of 'felicity' and 'power'. Continual success in obtaining those things which a man desires is, Hobbes says, felicity. Further, the means of achieving this, that is, the means of assuring one's continual success in attaining those things which help vital motion and of avoiding those things which hinder it, is power. Hence in all men there is a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death."54 Since "life is but motion, and can never be without desire..."55 all men are ceaselessly involved in a process of seeking to obtain objects which they desire and to avoid objects which cause aversion. And since the means whereby the end, viz. perpetual prospering in this process, may be achieved is power, all men ceaselessly seek power. Moreover, this 'power after power' which all men seek is not of any finite quality. The cause of this, Hobbes points out, "is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."56

54EW III (Leviathan) 85-6  
55EW III (Leviathan) 51  
56EW III (Leviathan) 86
Thus, though some men might be quite content with moderate power they are driven to a restless pursuit of power after power in order to protect those things which they deem necessary to the maintenance of their vital motion. In order to protect themselves from the ravages of their fellows involved in a similar activity of seeking to attain that which they desire, every man is driven to the pursuit of infinite power. With this idea, viz. man's desire for infinite power, Hobbes arrives at that point where his doctrine of human nature takes on explicit significance for his political thought. For as we shall see, each man's quest for unlimited power creates a situation where the felicity which each seeks is frustrated. This in turn leads man to the recognition of the necessity of instituting commonwealths.

Now considered strictly as individuals, Hobbes maintains, all men are substantially equal to one another. Granted some men may be physically stronger or quicker of mind than others. Yet, when all is reckoned these differences are not so considerable, "for as to the strength of body the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.""57 The competitive struggle for power as the means to assuring preservation and well-being, then, is a struggle between men who are by nature equal. With respect to their inability as individuals to assure absolute security no man is

57EW III (Leviathan) 110
greater or lesser than another. 58

In their quest for power as the means of securing preservation and the enhancement of vital motion, then, there naturally arises among men a struggle. This struggle is one in which 'every man is enemy to every man'. It leads to a situation, Hobbes holds, where neither arts, letters nor society is possible: it is a state of war. Worst of all, it places man in "continual fear and danger of violent death." 59

In such a state, the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." 60 Moreover, in such a state the chief end which men seek, viz. the maintenance and increase of their well-being, is made unattainable. The unlimited quest for power frustrates the end which man of necessity 'sets' himself; indeed, it places him in contradiction with himself. As Hobbes says: he "that desireth to live in such an estate, as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself. For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary..." 61 The pursuit of unlimited power, dictated by the passions, then, leads to an impasse. It makes the achievement of man's chief end impossible. How is this contradiction resolved?

58 Hobbes claims that only 'absolute power is irresistible. Irresistible power, he holds, is wielded by God; in claiming that the sovereign's power is to be made as great as can be 'imagined', his aim is to make this power as irresistible as possible. As regards their natural power, that is the power that derives from the functioning of each man's vital motions, men are substantially equal. As individuals, no man can be absolutely certain of defending his acquisitions (i.e. acquired power in the form of money, fame and so on) against ravage, nor of maintaining his natural power against the ultimate impotence, death.

59 EW III (Leviathan) 113
60 EW III (Leviathan) 113
61 EW IV (Elements) 85
We have seen that the result of man's quest for unlimited power and precedence is a state of war of every man against every man wherein the chief end which all men seek is frustrated. We have seen also that in such a state, a state which Hobbes designates as the 'state of nature', each man lives in constant fear of violent death, the complete and total cessation of vital motion. It is the aversion occasioned by this latter passion, fear of death, that provides the impetus for finding a solution to the contradiction in which man finds himself. For, says Hobbes: "since it is supposed by the equality of strength and other natural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby, whilst he remaineth in that state of hostility and war, reason... dictateth to every man for his own good to seek after peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same." 62 Through his fear of violent death, in other words, man is led to rationality, a faculty "no less of the nature of man than passion, and... the same in all men." 63 It is reason which tells man that the means to preservation and the enhancement of vital motion is peace. It is this that he must pursue if he is to attain his own good.

Reason dictates peace; it dictates also the 'ways of peace'. These ways of peace Hobbes calls Laws of Nature. He defines the term as follows: "A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life.

62 EW II (De Cive) 12
63 EW IV (Elements) 87
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be preserved. Natural laws are rational precepts; they are 'theorems' of 'conclusions' conversant about those things which every man must do if the conditions for the successful attainment of his chief end, the maintenance and enhancement of his vital motion, is to be achieved. As rational precepts, Hobbes points out, they are but improperly called laws, for "law, properly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others." If, however, "we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws." This last claim, viz. that the laws of nature are commands of God, we shall have to consider more closely when we come to look at the place of God in Hobbes's system. For the present we will regard the characterization of them as 'rational precepts' as adequate; and, indeed, we shall see that it is this characterization that most closely accords with Hobbes's express systematic intent.

In the state of nature there is nothing of which a man cannot make use, if he deems that thing necessary to preservation and the enhancement of vital motion. Naturally he has a 'right' to all things. The unlimited exercise of this

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64 EW III (Leviathan) 117
65 EW III (Leviathan) 147
66 EW IV (Elements) 87
67 Hobbes's use of the term 'right' here implies no correlative duty or obligation. He defines the 'right of nature' as follows: "The right of nature...is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." EW III 116.
natural right, however, frustrates the attainment of his principle end. Consequently, reason suggests general rules, i.e. the laws of nature, wherein the conditions for the successful achievement of this end are delineated. The first and most fundamental of these rational precepts Hobbes gives as follows: "every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it..." or, if this should prove impossible, to provide himself with the helps and advantages of war. The second law of nature, Hobbes claims, is derived from this first. It states "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things." Hobbes follows this law with a discussion of the various ways in which rights may be 'laid aside'. This, he says, may be done in one of two ways: either by renouncing or transferring. If rights be simply renounced, the renouncing party cares not to whom the benefit of these rights redound. If right be transferred, they may be contracted, covenanted or given as a gift. A contract is a mutual transferring of right; a covenant is a contract in which one party must be trusted to perform his part at some future time; a free gift is a unilateral transferring of right with the purpose of gaining thereby reputation of charity or friendship. These distinctions are followed by a statement of the third law of nature, "that men

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68 EW III (Leviathan) 117. 69 EW III (Leviathan) 118
perform their covenants made. Without this law, Hobbes holds, "covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war." Hobbes terms this law "the fountain and original of justice." With it injustice, viz. the non-performance of covenant, first becomes a possibility, for prior to the act of covenanting, that is, in the state of nature where each man has a right to all things, unjust actions are impossible.

In a crucial sense these three laws are the most essential and basic of all the laws of nature which Hobbes outlines, for with them are given the primary conditions which must be fulfilled if preservation and the enhancement of vital motion are to be achieved. With these three rules or rational precepts the essential conditions for the establishment of civil society are outlined. In each of the major works devoted to political philosophy, however, they are followed by further laws: in the Elements there are thirteen, in De Cive eighteen and in Leviathan sixteen. These further laws represent a more detailed spelling out of the rules and virtues requisite for peace and the maintenance of society. In De Cive, for example, Hobbes includes laws which proscribe drunkenness, gluttony and other things which tend to the weakening of the rational faculty, "forasmuch as the laws of nature are thought else but the dictates of reason; so as unless a man endeavour to

70EW III (Leviathan) 130
71EW III (Leviathan) 130
72EW III (Leviathan) 130
preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe
the laws of nature." 73 In general, however, we may take the
first three laws as containing the essential elements of what
Hobbes wishes to say. In them the fundamental conditions for
each man's maintaining and enhancing his vital motion is
delineated; thus, in them also lies the immediate possibility
of commonwealths.
Section iv.: Psychology and the doctrine of prudential obligation.
We have seen that the laws of nature are rational
precepts stating the conditions that must be fulfilled if man
is to attain his chief end, viz. preservation and the enhance-
ment of vital motion. As such, they represent the resolution
of the contradiction in which man found himself due to his
quest for 'power after power' in the state of nature. To this
extent, they are derived from the account of human nature which
Hobbes provides, for a man is led to them by the fearsome
prospect of the violent cessation of his vital motion. It must
be pointed out, however, that this interpretation of the laws
of nature, and of the prudential obligation that flows from
them, is not one that would be accepted by all students of
Hobbes's political philosophy. In an essay entitled "The
Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," for example, A.E. Taylor claims
that Hobbes's account of the laws of nature and of the obligation
that arises from them bears "no logically necessary connection."

73 EW. II (De Cive) 44
Studies, op. cit., p. 37.
with his egoistic psychology. And Howard Warrender, following Taylor, writes:

Hobbes says so much about self-preservation that it is easily regarded as being central in his theory of obligation. This is so far from being the case that it is not a part of that theory as such but an empirical postulate employed in its application. A denial of Hobbes's psychology, therefore, merely poses a new problem of application but leaves his theory of obligation, in the proper sense, unaffected. 75

Now these views, essentially similar, are certainly challenging. What they are claiming is that Hobbes's doctrine of the laws of nature and of obligation are logically independent of his psychology, or science of the motions of the mind. Such a claim, however, may be maintained only by ignoring Hobbes's express systematic intent. Even if it be admitted that the majestic plan of De Corpore, viz. the derivation of all the matters whereof philosophy treats from a set of universal definitions grounded in the principle of motion, is not carried out in extenso, it must be recognized that in his political philosophy (even when using the 'introspective method') Hobbes intends to demonstrate the causes and necessity of commonwealths from a science of human nature. Speaking of method in the Epistle Dedicatory to De Civis Hobbes writes: "Having therefore thus arrived at the two maxims of human nature; the one arising from the concupiscible part... the other proceeding from the rational... I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connection... the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts, and thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil

prudence." 76 Hobbes's contention is to have derived the grounds of civil society from a science of human nature. From the two 'maxims' of human nature, viz. man's appetite for unlimited power which leads to a state of war of all against all and his aversion to violent death which leads him to seek peace, he claims to have demonstrated the absolute necessity of the founding of commonwealths.

Moreover, the claim that the statement 'man necessarily desires self-preservation' functions entirely as an empirical postulate is surely mistaken. Rather does it seem to be part of a much wider claim Hobbes makes concerning the nature of living things in general. All living organisms seek to maintain and enhance their vital motion; for Hobbes this appears to be self-evident. In asserting this, that is in asserting self-preservation, biological self-interest as a necessary and universal characteristic of bodies possessing 'vital motion', Hobbes's claim is clearly more than an empirical one. On the basis of this claim, and it is this that is really at the root of man's desire for infinite power in the first instance and his desire for peace in the second, Hobbes proceeds to deduce why men must found commonwealths. Further, it might be noted that, strictly speaking, the claim is one that goes beyond what can be totally accounted for in terms of the kinematic analysis. The posited fact of 'self-preservation' may be analysed in motionalist terms, but it cannot be demonstrated.

76 SW II (De Cive) vii Italics mine.
What significance Hobbes attaches to this is unclear. What is clear is that Hobbes does claim biological self-interest as a necessary characteristic of all things possessing vital motion; of man, he says that he seeks his own good, viz. self-preservation and the enhancement of his vital motion "by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward."\(^7\) So far from being logically independent of his psychology, then, Hobbes's doctrine of the laws of nature and of the prudential obligation that derives from these possesses a strong and (to use Hobbes's own, perhaps over-confident, words) a 'most evident connection' with that psychology. To deny this link is to deny the unity which Hobbes himself understood as existing between these two sciences.

In presenting the laws of nature as general rules or precepts which a rational man must act upon if the conditions for the successful achievement of his chief end are to be fulfilled, we have, of course, presented them as fundamentally prudential in nature. And since for Hobbes "the laws of nature are the sum of moral philosophy"\(^8\) it follows that for him morality is fundamentally prudential. Each man of necessity desires his own good, or what he conceives will contribute to such; this constitutes the necessary and sufficient grounds of his actions. However, there are passages in Hobbes that are not easily squared with such a presentation. The most conspicuous of these have to do with the laws of nature as

\(^7\) EW II (De Cive) 8  
\(^8\) EW II (De Cive) 49
commands of God, with justice and with the virtue of the just man.

In an attempt to draw a distinction between the justice of an act and the justice of a person Hobbes writes:

When the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit.... That man is to be accounted just who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind. 79

It has sometimes been claimed that this passage may be made consistent only with a strict deontological interpretation of Hobbes's doctrine of the laws of nature and of the obligation that derives from them. 80 On this reading, it is argued that we are to take Hobbes's utterances apropos of the laws of nature qua commands of God quite seriously; the natural law is the moral law. 81 The distinction being made in the passage cited is that between actions which merely accord with the law and those done from the law. For a man to merit the title just it is not enough that his actions be in accordance with law; the action must be one that conforms to law simply because it is law. He who performs righteous acts for fear of the punishment annexed to the law 'is properly said to be unjust'.

79EW. II (De Civ) 33 80 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 35-55.
81 In Chapter xiv of his work, Warrender even constructs a hierarchy of commands: with the Laws of God at the apex and municipal laws at the bottom. Warrender, op. cit., pp. 299-311.
There are just and unjust motives. What is to be said of such a reading?

In the first instance, it must be pointed out that the passage cited is a difficult one, not without its ambiguities. If Hobbes is indeed calling attention to the strictly deontological character of moral actions, then the passage is one that is all but impossible to square with his account of human nature and the motions of the mind. But it is not clear that this is what he is doing. It is possible, for example, to give the argument a utilitarian twist. On such a reading justice would be simply a far-sighted prudence; for, it might be argued, only if every man regarded the laws of nature as if they were laws and acted with the motive of obeying them simply because they were such could the profit which flows from them be experienced. Justice would then be but a form of prudence. This might be one approach.

More convincing, however, would be an analysis which was able to find a ground for justice in Hobbes’s doctrine of human nature and which was able to account for the distinction which he wishes to draw between just and unjust motives. Such a reading is provided by Professor Strauss. Strauss contends that Hobbes incorporates into his two 'postulates of human nature'—viz. fear of violent death and the quest for infinite power—principles of right and wrong. He argues that prudence and the voice of conscience find their ground in the first of
these postulates, fear of violent death. In *De Cive*, he points out, Hobbes says: "...in the state of nature, what is just and unjust, is not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and conscience of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done with right..." The just man is he who performs his actions from inner conviction; that is, from the inescapable necessity of his fear of violent death, the total cessation of vital motion. The unjust man is he who acts without such inner conviction, who acts, for example, from fear of punishment, etc. Thus we find a plausible psychological ground for just and unjust motives.

Finally, it might be noted that interpretations which argue for a strict deontological reading of Hobbes's doctrine can be held only by taking his statements apropos of the laws of nature as commands of God quite seriously and thereby transforming a system which purports to be naturalistic into a theistic one. The price to be paid for such a transformation, however, is the rejection of the logical standards which Hobbes set himself, standards which he professes time and again to be following. Moreover, contrary to what the theistic interpreters maintain it is not altogether clear that unless we regard the laws of nature as commands of God we are forced to the conclusion that they are in no sense obligatory. As D.D. Raphael points out, though the "atheist is not obliged 'to obey God in his

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82 EW II (De Cive) 46 fn.
natural kingdom,'...he can still be determined by hope or fear to yield to the power of nature, and the necessity of his decision can still be described in his thought by such words as: 'I must,' or 'I am obliged to' or 'I ought to do this for self-preservation.' As rational precepts, in other words, the laws of nature involve prudential obligation. They are the conditions which must be fulfilled if preservation and the enhancement of vital motion are to be assured.

Within the avowed systematic framework, then, morality and obligation are for Hobbes prudential. To say 'this is an action which ought to be performed' is to say 'this is an action which reason dictates because it is requisite for preservation and the enhancement of vital motion.' Au pied de la lettre moral obligation is prudential; and duties are duties only if they are necessary for the individual's well-being. This said, however, it must be pointed out that Hobbes does manage to smuggle moral values—in senses other than the prudential one—into his system. We have seen, for example, that Strauss finds a moral basis, principles of right and wrong, in Hobbes's two postulates of human nature. Moreover, we do often find Hobbes commending certain virtues in senses other than strictly prudential ones. When speaking of justice, for example, he writes: "That which gives to human actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or gallantnesse of courage, rarely found, by which a man

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scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This justice of manners, is that which is meant, where justice is called virtue. 84

What Hobbes appears to be doing here is commending these characteristics, 'noblenesse and gallantnesse of courage,' as admirable in themselves, quite apart from any prudential base. Why he does so, given the systematic framework, is difficult to explain. We might speculate that these are things which Hobbes found in his first-hand experience of human life and which he felt called upon to account for in his work. Yet, in doing so he imported into his system things for which strictly speaking, there is no place.

"But having said this, there still remains a question: What, ultimately, is the role of God in Hobbes's doctrine of obligation?" This is a difficult issue, made all the more difficult by Hobbes's own ambiguity with respect to it. His writing is often couched in irony and he not seldom gives the impression of dissembling. Yet, considering his voluminous outpourings on matters religious in nature—over one half of Leviathan, for example, is devoted to religious matters—it would be foolhardy to conclude that Hobbes is entirely disingenuous in his religious utterances. Our own opinion is that he was a sincere, though extremely Erastian, Christian. In all probability he embraced himself the fundamental 'article of faith' which he gives in De Cive and Leviathan as "Jesus is

84 W III Leviathan) 136
the Christ." However, having pointed this out, it must be stated once again that, strictly speaking, this 'article of faith' can play no significant role in the realm of scientific or philosophical knowledge. It is Hobbes's intent when writing civil philosophy to derive the causes and necessity of commonwealths either synthetically from the first principle of motion as in De Corpore or 'introspectively' from the 'two maxims of human nature' as in the Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan. He writes for rational men bent on self-preservation and the enhancement of vital motion, whatever their religious beliefs might happen to be. There are, of course, passages which are difficult to square with this express intent and which strongly suggest a theistic line of development in Hobbes's thought. Yet such passages represent importations into a system which is avowedly naturalistic; and certainly a consistent interpretation of Hobbes's psychology may be given without them.

Such, then, is Hobbes's argument. It represents an impressive attempt to find for civil philosophy a ground in psychology or a science of the motions of the mind. By so grounding civil philosophy it is Hobbes's express purpose to show the absolute necessity of civil society and of civil duties; for since "from the not knowing of civil duties, that is, from the want of moral science, proceed civil wars, and the greatest calamities of mankind, we may very well attribute to such science the production of the contrary commodities." 

85 EW II (De Cive) 306; EW III (Leviathan) 590
86 EW I. (De Corpore) 10
Hobbes felt, in other words, that a civil philosophy which was scientifically grounded in psychology would show men, his self-preserving 'engines'\textsuperscript{87}, the way to peace, security and the maintenance of well-being.

\textsuperscript{87} EW III (Leviathan) ix.
CHAPTER II

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF HOBSES'S DOCTRINE.

In this chapter we shall take a critical look at Hobbes's doctrine. Though there is much that might be said of his system in general we shall limit ourselves to two issues directly relevant to the subject at hand; viz. the psychological presuppositions of his political philosophy. First, we shall attempt to show that Hobbes's mechanico-naturalistic account of appetite or will finds its final ground in a dogmatism; for the notionalist framework within which his analysis of human willing is set rests ultimately upon a principle that is asserted, rather than demonstrated, to be the case. Second, we shall briefly examine the political doctrine which Hobbes derives from his account of human nature. We shall suggest that this doctrine is beset by difficulties that may be traced directly to Hobbes's account of man. In this respect, we shall pay special attention to the problem of security and the keeping of the covenant; we shall suggest that it is not evident that the absolute concentration of power which Hobbes deems necessary for political security is able to assure that security.

Section i: The dogmatic metaphysical foundations.

Hobbes's account of appetite or will, as has been seen\(^1\) is set within the framework of an attempt to provide a systematic explanation of all the matters whereof philosophy

\(^1\) See supra, Chapter I, Section ii.
treats; viz. of body, man and citizen, in terms of a single ultimate principle; the principle that motion is the root of all causality. Everything that admits of a scientific explanation, he holds, is an instance of motion and of the effects generated by bodies in motion. Now, since there can be no cause of motion except in a body contiguous and moved, human action is occasioned by some antecedent motion in a contiguous body. The pivotal concept at this point, as we have seen, is that of conatus or endeavour. By way of the concept of infinitely small or unobservable motions Hobbes is able to argue for the continuity between physics, physiology and psychology. Motions of external bodies work upon the organs of sense and produce phantasms or images. This motion of the sense organs proceeds via the brain to the heart where it causes some change in the vital motion about the heart. If this change be such as to help vital motion, the result—and the result is a necessary one—will be that the organism will endeavour to preserve that motion by the apperception of the object, provided there are no 'lets or hindrances' to such apperception. If, on the other hand, the change be such as to hinder vital motion the result will be that the organism will endeavour to avoid that motion by the aversion of the object; provided once again, there are no 'lets or hindrances' to that motion. Throughout, it may be seen, the mode of explanation is mechanistic and naturalistic. Human action, like all action, may be reduced to motion and the effects of

2From II (De Civ) 8
bodies in motion.

One of the keynotes of this analysis is the claim that the human engine is so constituted that it seeks always to attain those things which enhance its well-being; that is, that the necessary and sufficient grounds of all human action is a striving to obtain those things which are conducive to self-preservation. We have argued above\(^3\) that the posited fact of the living organism's desire for self-preservation functions as the background against which Hobbes's resolution of human behaviour into its constituent elements is carried out. This resolution or analysis is given in terms of vital and animal motion; the former being the generic motion of all living things, the latter, the motion involved in such things as "to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our mind."\(^4\) Moreover, for Hobbes, animal or voluntary motion (the two terms are synonymous) is mediated always by vital motion. Hobbes's account of human nature is not given simply in terms of extrinsic, antecedent stimuli as is sometimes suggested.\(^5\) Granted, voluntary motion has its origin in the excitation of the senses caused by motions in the external object; nonetheless, animal or voluntary motion is always mediated and ultimately determined by its perceived significance for vital motion. The organism

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\(^3\)See supra, Chapter I, Section iv.

\(^4\)EW III (Leviathan), 38

acts from biological self-interest. It seeks to attain those things which maintain and enhance vital motion and to avoid those which hinder it.

That the organism is so constituted that it seeks to maintain itself and to avoid the principle of all evils, violent death, Hobbes appears to derive from introspection and self-examination. In the introduction to Leviathan Hobbes writes that he who would understand "not this or that particular man, but mankind" must learn to read himself, nosce teipsum. The purpose of this introspection is to "teach us...the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another...I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the passions...for these the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary." The principle passion which Hobbes discovers in the course of his introspective experiment is man's desire for self-preservation and his concomitant fear of violent death. For Hobbes, as Strauss puts it, "death takes the place of the telos. Or, to preserve the ambiguity of Hobbes's thought, let us say that the fear of violent death expresses most forcefully the most powerful and the most fundamental of all natural desires, the initial desire, the desire for self-preservation." From this

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6EW III (Leviathan) xii
7EW III (Leviathan) xi
introspective fact, which "admitteth no other demonstration" than that each man carry out the introspective experiment for himself, Hobbes proceeds to deduce the necessity of leagues, contracts and commonwealths. Self-preservation and the attendant fear of violent death are thus posited on introspective grounds as the prime motive force in determining human action.

The fact of self-preservation is not proved in terms of the general doctrine of motion; it is posited on the strength of introspective evidence. But the analysis which Hobbes gives of this posited introspective fact is one that is carried out in accordance with the tenets of his motionalism. The actions of man, these self-preserving engines, are resolved into their constituent elements: vital and voluntary motion. And of these two types of motion it is the former that is of key importance, for voluntary or animal motion is measured always against its significance for the maintenance and enhancement of vital motion. That Hobbes should attempt so to comprehend the actions of the self-maintaining engines that are men is understandable given his fundamental metaphysical claim that motion is the root of all causality. "All action," he writes, "is the effect of motion." This line, which occurs in the work The Question's Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, is meant by Hobbes to refer explicitly to human action: Like the phenomena of geometry, mechanics and physics,

9EW III (Leviathan) xii
10EW V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 305
human action too admits of a motionalist analysis, for the whole of reality, in so far as it is caused, has motion as its cause. It is this principle, as noted above, that provides the key to the understanding of the whole of reality.\(^{11}\)

The ground upon which Hobbes asserts this fundamental principle is self-evidence. He writes: "But the causes of universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest of themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to nature; so that they need no method at all; for they have all but one universal cause, which is motion...\(^{12}\) Beyond this, Hobbes provides no illumination as to how the ultimate principle is arrived at; nor does he provide any criteria of self-evidence such as clearness and distinctness. He says simply that the final principle is manifest of itself 'or (as they say commonly) known to nature.' What he seems to mean by this is that the human mind is so constituted that it is able intuitively to recognize motion as the animating principle, the universal cause, of all things, of those things that have any cause. But what this amounts to is little more

\(^{11}\) In the Epistle Dedicatory to de Corpore Hobbes situates his work squarely within the framework of the birth of modern science and of Galileo's discoveries in the realm of 'natural philosophy'. He conceives his work as a consistent and systematic development of the motionalist principles expounded by Galileo. (EW I viii). One of the most significant of his systematic developments is that of providing an ultimate metaphysical ground for the new science in the principle 'all causality is motion'. As R.S. Peters puts it: "... Hobbes is to be regarded as the metaphysician of the new scientific movement rather than as one of its field workers... [He]... used the scientific notions of the new physical sciences and generalized them to cover man, who was viewed as part of the mechanical system of nature... Hobbes justly prided himself on his originality." R.S. Peters, Hobbes. (London: Penguin Books, 1956), p.-76.

\(^{12}\) EW T (De Corpore) 69
than a dogmatic assertion. It provides Hobbes with scant ground for confuting those who do not recognize motion as the universal cause of all things or who claim that an analysis in terms of motion is not adequate to the concept of distinctively human action. Evidence of this difficulty emerges in the course of Hobbes's philosophical 'duel' with John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry. In his encounter with Hobbes, Bramhall is concerned to argue that a motionalist analysis of human action cannot give an adequate account of the human agent.

Bramhall's arguments, in many respects equally as dogmatic as Hobbes's, are directed primarily against the mechanistic and naturalistic account of deliberation and of willing as appetition which Hobbes gives. His claim is that the human agent is not merely a self-preserving engine to be analysed in terms of vital and voluntary motion; for man is not only a part of nature. He transcends nature; as a rational being he is possessed of the ability to determine his will in accordance with 'moral causes' that make other than natural claims upon him. Speaking of the relationship he conceives as holding between the understanding, choice and will, he writes: "...the manner how the understanding doth determine the will...is not naturally but morally. The will is moved by the understanding, not as by an efficient having a causal influence into the effect, but only as by proposing and representing the object. And therefore, as it is ridiculous
to say that the object of sight is the cause of seeing, so it is to say that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will is the cause of willing." Bramhall's point is that deliberation is not a mechanical process as Hobbes's analogies of the balance scale and the feather on the horse's back would indicate; neither is willing a wholly natural phenomenon, the activity of a self-preserving engine capable of analysis in terms of vital and voluntary motion. Actions that follow upon understanding and choice have what Bramhall calls 'moral causes'; and these causes are not an antecedent series of motions in the external object of sense or the internal motions of the vital life processes. Moral causes, he suggests, derive from the intellectual appetite and have to do with what is honest, future, universal and spiritual. In so far as the will determines itself in accordance with these motives it acts in accordance with a dictate of reason. As such it is not determined naturally by the object or by the vital processes; rather is it "free to will, or nill, or suspend, and may reject that which the senses say to be good, and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil, according to the dictate of reason." Actions which follow upon choice have causes other than natural ones. They have rational, moral causes and are not adequately accounted for.

13 EW V (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 73-74.
14 See supra, Chapter I, Section ii.
if they are reduced to a series of motions: viz. external motions of the object, movement of the sense organs, internal motion and so on. Man, Bramhall argues, is consciously self-determining; Hobbes's account which conceives of man as a self-sustaining engine to be analysed in terms of vital and voluntary motion can not be adequate to the concept of human actions, since these have moral causes which cannot be accounted for in naturalistic terms.

Hobbes and Bramhall begin their respective arguments from positions that are fundamentally antithetical. In so far as both find their ultimate ground in dogmatic assertions (the one posits motion as the ultimate cause of all reality, while the other posits for human action a moral causality grounded in reason) their arguments pass one another by in essential respects. Thus, for example, Hobbes's reply to Bramhall's talk of choice and moral causes is essentially nothing more than a reiteration of his doctrine of motivation, of man's desire for self-preservation and of the interrelation of vital and voluntary motion. Nor can it be more than this: for in as much as Hobbes holds on dogmatic intuitive grounds that the universal cause of all reality is motion and that hence human actions too may be resolved into efficient-motationalist causes, he can do little else than repeat the analysis he has already given. Bramhall, on the other hand, who does not share Hobbes's self-evident conviction concerning the ultimate metaphysical principle, contends for moral causes that cannot be sufficiently analysed in naturalistic terms. Thus the
debate reaches an impasse, an impasse dictated by differences in the respective starting points dogmatically laid down.

We have noted that within the context of Hobbes's systematic enterprise of demonstrating the necessity of leagues, contracts, and covenants (an enterprise we now see to be dogmatically grounded) man is presented as a self-maintaining engine to be analysed in terms of vital and voluntary motion. Biological self-interest constitutes the necessary and sufficient ground of human action. We might point out, however, that there are passages in Hobbes's work that are ambiguous and that are not easily squared with his systematic analysis. The principle of these have to do with love and charity. In De Homine Hobbes writes: "...there is yet another passion sometimes called love, but more properly good will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity."\(^\text{17}\) This passage fits easily the analysis already given; charity is conceived as a species of vanity and self-gratification, for in assisting other men a man finds concrete proof of his own power.\(^\text{18}\) But in Leviathan Hobbes writes: "Desire of good to another, Benevolence, good will, charity. If to man generally, good nature."\(^\text{19}\) And in the Latin version of De Homine a distinction is drawn between a self-seeking love, as in the case of the love of a man for a

\(^{17}\)EW IV (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 49
\(^{18}\)See supra Chapter I, Section iv. \(^{19}\)EW III (Leviathan) 43
woman, and love for another's good, as in the case of love between men: "nam illum amando, illi; hanc amando, nobis bonum quaserimus." In these latter two passages Hobbes appears (though both remarks are somewhat cryptic) to be drawing attention to passions rooted not in biological self-interest, but rather in concern for the good of another. If this be so, it would seem we have here another instance of Hobbes's importing into his systematic analysis things from personal experience and observation, things for which, strictly speaking, there can be no place. For within the dogmatic framework of the system, man is a self-preserving engine, an engine in which animal or voluntary motion is mediated always by its significance for vital motion. It is this concern with his own well-being that constitutes the necessary and sufficient ground of any man's actions; from this, Hobbes deduces the necessity of covenants and the commonwealth.

Section II: The politics of power and fear.

According to Hobbes, initially, viz. in the state of nature, each man has a right to all things. There is nothing of which he cannot make use, if he deems that thing necessary to preservation and the enhancement of vital motion. The unlimited exercise of this natural 'right', however, leads to a situation in which the chief end which all men seek is frustrated. This being so, "reason...dictateth to every man for his own good to seek after peace, as far forth as there

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20. Leibniz II 109. "for in loving him we seek his good, in loving her, our own."

21. See supra. Chapter I, Section iv.
is hope to attain the same." The means whereby peace may be achieved is the act of covenanting through which the commonwealth and the sovereign are instituted. It is through this act and through the civil institutions that arise from it that each man seeks to assure himself the maintenance and enhancement of his own well-being.

Hobbes's account of the manner in which the commonwealth and instituted dominion arise from the act of covenanting is connected in Leviathan with a theory of "artificial personality" and authorization. As Hobbes defines the term, a person is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction." Hobbes is concerned here to develop a set of formal distinctions. A 'natural person' is one whose words and actions are his own; a 'feigned or artificial person' is one (or many) whose words and actions are considered as representing the words and actions of another. Now in the case of artificial persons, "some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the author, in which case the actor acteth by authority." Thus, an actor is an artificial person whose words and actions are owned by some other man, or body of men; this man, or body of men, is the author of the actor's actions. The actor's dominion or

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22 EW II (De Cive) 12
23 EW III (Leviathan) 147
24 EW III (Leviathan) 148
authority to perform any act derives from those who own
the action; "by authority, is always understood a right of
doing any act; and done by authority, "done by commission,
or licence from him whose right it is." With this set
of definitions and formal distinctions in hand, Hobbes sets
about the task of delineating the act of covenanting by
which commonwealths are instituted.

Instituted commonwealths arise when a body of men
agree and covenant 'every one, with every one' to give up
the use of their right, or some portion thereof, to another
man, or assembly of men, who is henceforth to act for them
and "to bear their person...in those things which concern
the common peace and safety." The formula in accordance
with which the multitude of men 'authorize' or confer upon
the actor this right Hobbes conceives as follows: "I
authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this
man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that
they give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions
in like manner." By this act, says Hobbes, a multitude

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25 EW III (Leviathan) 148 Right is not used here in the
sense of right in the state of nature. In terms of the formal
analysis it is the actor's instituted or delegated right to
perform acts owned by a man, or a body of men; viz. the author.
There follows from this, as a logical consideration, that as
long as the authorization lasts the author must forgo any right
whose effect it would be to undo the act of authorization.
When worked out in terms of Hobbes's psychology, however, this
does not mean that we have here any sense of obligation in the
deontological sense. As pointed out above (Chapter I, Section
iv), for Hobbes man is obliged only so far as he deems any act
requisite for the maintenance and enhancement of his vital
motion.

26 EW III (Leviathan) 157-58  27 EW III (Leviathan) 158
becomes one person, since each man gives his own authorship to the authority of the actor; "and he that carrieth this person, is called sovereign,...and every one besides, his subject."\(^\text{28}\) The sovereign is thus an artificial person; he is an actor who derives his authority or right to perform any act from the authors of the covenant.\(^\text{29}\)

But covenanting of itself is not sufficient to assure the security of the commonwealth. For having once made the covenant, how can we be certain that men will abide by it? Hobbes states the problem and hints at the solution as follows: "The force of words, being...too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants, there are in man's nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And these are either a fear of the consequences of breaking their word; or a glory, or a pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual

\(^\text{28}\) EW III (Leviathan) 158

\(^\text{29}\) Even in the case of 'commonwealths by acquisition,' viz. a commonwealth where sovereign power is acquired by conquest, dominion or authority derives from covenant (though in this case the covenant appears to be between sovereign and subject and not between the multitude as in the case of an instituted commonwealth). Hobbes says: "It is not the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant." EW III 189. At least one of Hobbes's aims here is to show the derivation of sovereign right. This right, he holds, must be as great as is imaginable (EW III (Leviathan) 195; 196) and accompanied by unlimited power for given the fact that man is psychologically necessitated to seek only his own good and capable only of prudential obligation, only unlimited power can assure the security of the commonwealth. We thus see that the substance of Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty is determined by his account of human nature.
pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon is fear." 30 The passion that holds the majority of men to the performance of covenants is fear of the consequences of breaking their words: viz. fear of violent death, the cessation of vital motion. But what are the causes of this fear? Hobbes argues they are two: the power of spirits invisible and the power of men. Of these two powers; he says, "though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear." 31 By the power of men which 'commonly' constitutes this greater fear (for a few very religious individuals the power of spirits invisible might constitute the greater fear), Hobbes does not intend the power of men in so far as these exist in the state of nature; rather does he intend the 'sword of justice', viz. the power of the instituted sovereign. It is the fear of a sovereign who is capable of imposing upon men penalties that outweigh any advantage that might accrue from violation that holds most men to the covenant: "covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." 32 For the maintenance of the covenant; then, it is necessary that the sovereign possess power capable of instilling fear in those who might otherwise contemplate violation. But how much power does Hobbes conceive as necessary

30 EW III (Leviathan) 128-29. At EW II (De Cive) 63 Hobbes writes: "It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by breach than observation of the laws, they will willingly violate them."

31 EW III (Leviathan) 129

32 EW III (Leviathan) 154
for instilling in these self-maintaining engines—engines psychologically necessitated to seek only their own good—the fear necessary for the keeping of the covenant? To answer this we have to turn to Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty.

Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty is one of the most discussed aspects of his political theory. We shall consider it but briefly here under two essential heads: viz. its absolutism and its indivisibility. First, as Hobbes conceives it, the act of authorization must confer upon the sovereign rights sufficient to make the subjects secure against one another (and to make them secure as well against external enemies). To achieve this end, right, and the power which accompanies it, must be as great as can be imagined: "so it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and Scripture, that the Sovereign power... is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse." 33 Only absolute power is sufficient to effectively maintain peace and security; the want of it, Hobbes lists as the first "of those things that weaken, or tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth." 34 The sovereign must be able to determine the means of peace and defence and to make war or peace, to judge what doctrines are 'fit' to be given

33EW III (Leviathan) 194-95  
34EW III (Leviathan) 309
his subject and what views they may express; to determine property-rights and property disputes, to reward and punish, and so on; moreover, with respect to his subjects the sovereign can perform no unjust act, since every subject owns the acts of the sovereign and no man can be unjust to himself.\textsuperscript{35} Civil liberty lies "only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted."\textsuperscript{36} Second, sovereignty must be indivisible. For, says Hobbes, "...what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other."\textsuperscript{37} Hobbes's reason for this claim appears to derive, in part at least, from his own practical experience: for "if there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided and fallen into civil war."\textsuperscript{38} Only an indivisible sovereignty is capable of exercising the absolute power requisite for peace and security; for power when divided leads to competition and mutual destruction.

It cannot be stressed too much that the shape which Hobbes gives his doctrine of sovereignty is determined by his initial premises concerning human nature. Men are not like ants or bees which, quite naturally and as a matter of

\textsuperscript{35} EW III (Leviathan) 163. \textsuperscript{36} EW III (Leviathan) 199. \textsuperscript{37} EW III (Leviathan) 313. \textsuperscript{38} EW III (Leviathan) 168.
course, live socially together and work for the common good. Rather are men asocial individuals, self-maintaining engines, driven by a desire for power and an aversion to violent death. In order that these self-preserving engines live together, covenants and the institution of commonwealths are necessary. But why must men abide by their covenants and live in accordance with the rules of the civil institutions which are laid down by the sovereign? Might a man not decide to break his covenant if he believes that some greater advantage might accrue to him by breaking it, for all men are psychologically necessitated to seek only their own good. Hobbes's answer lies in his doctrine of sovereignty, and the absolute and indivisible power with which the sovereign is invested. If men are to be really consistent in their determination to avoid violent death, they must make some arrangements whereby it will never be in anyone's interest to break a covenant or, in fact, transgress any of the other laws of nature. For the laws of nature, the third of which it will be remembered is that men should keep their covenants, are only theorems (except as commands of God) which any rational man will accept. To be effective, they need the backing of the sword. Since life is but a race which has "no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost" and since men are continually in selfish competition

39 EW III (Leviathan) 168
40 EW IV (Liberty, Necessity & Chance) 53
with their fellows for honor, dignity and pre-eminence, they need a "common power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit." If civil society is to serve as the means to peace and security, then it is requisite that the sovereign possess and wield absolute power; for only power, unlimited and indivisible, is capable of assuring absolute security and for Hobbes salus populi suprema lex.

But, it might be asked, is civil society ruled by a sovereign possessing absolute and undivided power really to be preferred to the state of nature? We might refer to John Locke's objection: "Are men so foolish that they care to avoid what mischief may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to be devoured by lions?" For absolute rulers are only men with all the passions Hobbes ascribes to them, and "he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood and corrects the baseness of human nature need but read the history of this or any other age to be convinced to the contrary." Locke's objection is that the despotic sovereignty of Hobbes's civil society represents a state of affairs that is many times worse than

41EW III (Leviathan) 156  
42EW III (Leviathan) 157  
44Ibid. p. 52.
the state of nature; for in the state of nature men are at least substantially equal in their ability to kill or harm one another, while in the civil society, as a result of the act of authorization, one man, or a group of men, acquires power sufficient to lord it over them all. 45 Hobbes's reply, of course, is that only absolute power is capable of assuring the chief end which all men seek; viz. self-preservation and the enhancement of vital motion. He does not deny that civil society might involve some inconvenience; but these inconveniences, he says, are outweighed by "the consequences of the want of (such power), which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour." 46 If Locke's objection is to have any force, he must be able to show either that the state of nature is not a state of war of 'every man against every man' or that limited sovereign power is capable of assuring man peace and security. But neither of these possibilities, Hobbes argues, can be allowed given the fact that man is a self-preserving engine moved by an egoistic desire for power and an aversion to violent death.

We return once again to the absolute centrality of Hobbes's psychology to his political philosophy. But this psychology, as we have seen rests ultimately upon a dogmatism. Man's desire for self-preservation is a posited introspective fact, against the background of this fact and in keeping with Hobbes's

45 Locke might mean that ultimately Hobbes is unable to distinguish between monarchy and tyranny. And Hobbes does say: "...they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny;..." EW III (Leviathan) 171.

46 EW III (Leviathan) 194-5.
fundamental metaphysical tenet that 'all causality is motion',
the human engine is resolved into its constituent motions.

However, if we grant for the moment Hobbes's premises
concerning human nature (if we grant, that is, that man is a
self-maintaining engine moved by a desire for power and an
aversion to violent death and psychologically necessitated
to seek only his own good) we might still ask whether civil
society as Hobbes conceives it is really possible? For Hobbes,
as we have seen, only an absolute and undivided concentration
of power in the person of the sovereign can assure peace and
security. But this sovereign, whether one man or a small group
of men, cannot, Hobbes realizes, tend to and administer all the
affairs of the realm. To do so he requires viceroys, governors,
prefects, military commanders, public ministers and other
agents whom he authorizes and empowers to act on his behalf.
In addition, he requires councillors, for "a man that doth his
business by the help of many and prudent councillors, with
everyone consulting apart in his proper element, does it best,
as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their
proper stations." 47 But, surely, as soon as this vast structure
of delegated authority becomes well established, and as soon
as the sovereign begins to rely on the advice of his counsellors
they will come to share in his power, hence making the indivisi-
bility of sovereign power somewhat of a fiction in practice.
Moreover, if men are egoistic engines ceaselessly in competition,

47 E W III (Leviathan) 249
for honor, dignity and pre-eminence over their fellows, it is difficult to see why the men who share in the sovereign's exercise of power will not compete among themselves, destroying each other and civil institutions in the process. Hobbes, of course, claims that "the passion to be reckoned upon is fear." But as D.P. Gauthier points out: "...the institutional arrangements which make any concentration of power possible depend for their effectiveness on the willingness of those who staff the institutions to co-operate in maintaining them, rather than only to compete in aggrandizing power. This co-operation cannot rest entirely on the fear of some further power. At some point, barring a Kafkaesque regress without limit, some degree of voluntary co-operation on the part of some persons is the condition of the continued working of all social and political bodies." If Hobbes's systematic premises concerning the fundamental constitution of human nature are accepted, then the free and willing co-operation necessary for any social and political order could not exist: for according to Hobbes it is the fact that the sword dangles over the head of every member of a state, that provides the sole motive strong enough to counteract the disruptive passions of men.

Moreover, as with the sovereign and his ministers, so also with the sovereign and his subjects. The sovereign cannot regulate all of a man's actions; nor is it possible that the sword be present everywhere and at all times. Hence,

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48 Edward III, *Leviathan* 128-9
49 D.P. Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon-
if men are concerned always and everywhere to exploit every weakness and every lack of power so as to maximize their own strength political order will break down. Interestingly enough, Hobbes claims that men will recognize the necessity of commonwealths; he claims too that man will recognize and acknowledge the authority invested in the sovereign. But he claims further that given the fact that man is an egoistic engine driven by the invincible constitution of his nature to desire power and to avoid violent death, an engine for whom, only prudential reasons matter ultimately, the sovereign must wield absolute power. Since man is driven irresistible by fear like a stone rolling down hill, the sword is necessary; the passion to be reckoned upon. Fear. But, as Plato points out, even between a band of robbers, if they are to be successful, there must be unforced loyalty. More than power, force and fear are required if political society is to operate effectively. There must be a willingness to freely co-operate on occasion at least, a willingness which Hobbes's psychology effectively rules out.

Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty represents an impressive attempt to understand the nature and function of political institutions. From start to finish, as we have seen, his aim is to show man the way to peace and security; salus populi suprema lex. This end may be best accomplished, he thinks, if political philosophy is deduced from psychology.

or as he calls it, a science of the motions of the mind.
The psychology which he delineates, a psychology dogmatically grounded, conceives of man as a self-preserving engine, an engine necessitated by the invincible constitution of its nature to seek only its own good. He is an engine moved by a desire for power and a fear of violent death, an engine for which only prudential reasons matter ultimately. Given this view of man, we have argued that it is doubtful that political society could exist at all. Of itself, fear is not sufficient; if political institutions are to function effectively, some amount of genuine tractability is required. Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty is hamstrung because of his psychology. Its limits, we might say, are determined by the limits of his doctrine of man.
CHAPTER III

HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF 'FREE PERSONALITY'

In this chapter we shall turn to a consideration of Hegel's psychology; specifically we shall consider the manner in which Hegel grounds political philosophy, or as he calls it 'the science of right', in psychology. We shall argue that the principle upon which this psychology turns is that of man as free personality; we shall provide an examination of what Hegel understands by this principle and show how it serves as the foundation of a politics which regards social and political institutions as the embodiment and manifestation of man's free, creative activity in the realm of history. Further, we shall argue that the inadequacies which we encountered in Hobbes's politics of fear and the selfish maximization of each individual's well-being are ameliorated and overcome in Hegel's psychology and politics of free-personality. We shall argue that the psychology which Hegel outlines is one that is able to provide a more adequate ground for political philosophy than that which Hobbes's psychology is able to provide.

Section 1: The politics of 'free personality'

Thus far we have given an account of Hobbes's attempt to provide a ground for political philosophy in a doctrine of man; i.e. in a psychology. This account, we have seen, is colored throughout by Hobbes's fundamental metaphysical tenet,
viz. the principle that 'all causality is motion'. Man, Hobbes maintains, is necessitated by the invincible constitution of his nature always and everywhere to seek to preserve and enhance his own well-being; this essential fact of human existence Hobbes lays down on the basis of introspective evidence. His modus operandi, in keeping with the fundamental systematic claim that all causality is motion, is to resolve human action, or rather the actions of these self-preserving engines, into their constituent elements.

From this mechanico-naturalistic account of man, an account which finds its final ground in premises dogmatically laid down, Hobbes proceeds to show the necessity of leagues and covenants and of a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign possessing absolute and indivisible power. The relation which obtains between sovereign and subject, and between the sovereign and his ministers, is one that is rooted in fear. Men enter civil society because of their fear of violent death, the complete and total cessation of vital motion; and they maintain the social order out of the 'fear of the consequences of breaking their word,' For the sole motive strong enough to assure compliance with the covenant by these self-preserving engines—engines driven by a desire for power and an aversion to violent death, engines for whom only

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1 See supra: Chapter I Section ii. The formal definition of motion occurs in De Corpore. Hobbes defines the term as follows: "motion is the privation of one place, and the acquisition of another," and again: motion is "the leaving of one place, and the acquiring of another continually." EW I (De Corpore) 70, 81.

2 See supra: Chapter II: Section ii.

3 EW III (Leviathan) 128.
prudential reasons matter in the final analysis—is fear of the absolute and indivisible power wielded by the sovereign. It is upon this foundation, and this foundation alone, Hobbes maintains, that every social order ultimately rests. But, as we have seen, it is doubtful that any stable political order could be built upon this foundation; if political society is to operate effectively, more than power, force and fear are required. But Hobbes's psychology effectively rules out any other possibilities. We may, thus, conclude that his psychology fails to provide an adequate ground for effective political order. What is needed, if we are to provide such a ground, is a psychology capable of giving a more positive characterization of the relationship which obtains between the sovereign and his subjects, or between social and political institutions and the citizens of the commonwealth. This psychology must provide a more adequate account of human agency, an account which makes something other than fear the basis of political action and compliance with social rules. In what follows, we shall argue that Hegel's psychology of man as free personality provides us with such an account.

Hegel's psychology of free personality finds its point de départ in man as the transcendence of nature. Unlike Hobbes who conceives of man and of human action as admitting of a purely naturalistic analysis (for him, we remember, man is simply a complicated animal capable of resolution in motion-alist terms) Hegel conceives of man as free personality, a
being essentially transcending nature. The natural realm, according to Hegel, is a realm of externality; that is, it is a realm of finite things, mutually external to one another, and in a relation of action and reaction to one another. "We know," he says, "that natural things are spatial and temporal, that in Nature one thing exists alongside another, that one thing follows another, in brief, that in Nature all things are mutually external, ad infinitum." This description of mutual externality and reciprocity characteristic of natural things fits well crucial aspects of Hobbes's account of man; for on his dogmatic account men are essentially individual or atomistic engines, engines whose actions are basically reactions determined by the significance of any sense content for the enhancement or inhibition of vital motion. For Hegel, however, any such naturalistic account cannot do justice to the reality of man as free personality. Granted man has nature as his presupposition, but as free personality the principle in accordance with which he is defined is other than a natural one. For man is freely and consciously self-determining; as such his actions are not biologically determined reactions, capable of reduction to naturalistic terms. Moreover, says Hegel, as a result of man's actions in the world, the world acquires characteristics which, qua natural, it does not possess. As free personality, man exists in a world of his own creation, a world constituted by him and which is the development and manifestation of his freedom.

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5 The Philosophy of Mind § 381.
(This self-constituting activity is what we understand by Hegel's term Mind or Spirit, viz., Geist). In man as free personality nature is sublated; in free actions it is transformed for man's consciously determined ends. However, what does Hegel understand by man's ability freely and consciously to determine himself; that is, by man's ability to will any action? And how does Hegel demonstrate that man is free or self-determining? Before we proceed to this latter question, which may be effectively answered only by an account of Hegel's psychology, we shall give a brief characterization of what Hegel understands by 'will' and delineate some of the consequences of this doctrine of will for political philosophy.

The precise place and point of origin of the objective order constituted by man as free personality is the will. The will, as Hegel describes it in the introduction to his Philosophy of Right, contains three moments. It contains, in the first instance, the element of 'pure indeterminacy'; this is the universal moment of the will and "involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever." 6 This side of the will involves the recognition of the inadequacy of the natural as such to the principle of the will as free; for the will can exclude from itself any content whatever.

and make itself an empty form, the bare principle of self-determination. The one-sided freedom characteristic of this moment of the will Hegel calls negative freedom, or the 'freedom of the void'. When taken as the whole truth of the will, it results in the 'Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation' or in politics in 'the fanaticism of destruction', for "only in destroying something does this negative will possess the feeling of itself as existent."\(^7\)

The second moment of the will is the moment of differentiation; or determination; as this moment, the will steps forth from its 'pure indeterminacy' and gives itself a content. "Willing," says Hegel, "is not pure willing but the willing of something. A will which, like...[the previous moment]..., wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing and is therefore no will at all."\(^8\) To be will, it is necessary that the will choose some determinate content, that is resolve upon some definite thing or action. Choice and a determinate content are thus intrinsic to the nature of will; but even so they do not constitute the whole of the will as free. For as mere choice the will is open to a multiplicity of content, the endless variety of things the world has to offer. Considered solely as this moment, the will's choice of any one of these things as opposed to another is a matter of pure arbitrariness and contingency.

The third moment of the will involves the unity of these

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\(^7\)The Philosophy of Right, §5.

\(^8\)The Philosophy of Right, §6 Zusatz
two moments; that is, the unity of form and content. As this moment the will is the concrete activity of giving itself true expression in a determinate world; each aspect or element of which it recognizes as the embodiment of itself and the freedom which constitutes its substantiality, "just as weight constitutes the substantiality of a body."

Unlike the previous moment where the will accepts some natural desire and resolves to make this the substance of its willing, as this third moment the will has itself and its freedom as its end. The free will, says Hegel, is the will which wills the free will (der freie Wille, der den freien Willen will). This is the will as it is in its truth; the will which in choosing and resolving constitutes a world which is the embodiment of its freedom. The will has to do here only with its own handiwork; it finds in the world—in morality, in the system of laws and in the social and political institutions—concrete embodiments of its own freedom.

Man as free personality wills freedom; that is, he consciously makes his own freedom the object and end of his willing. But this concrete freedom is not something given; rather it is something that is mediated through history. For the history of man as free personality, argues Hegel, is the history of man's gaining consciousness of himself as free through his interaction with the objective world surrounding

9 The Philosophy of Right, § 7
10 The Philosophy of Right, § 27
him. This is the education, Bildung, of man. Man becomes free; his freedom is not something which he finds in a state of nature, but rather something which he achieves through his efforts to dissociate himself from a primitive, savage state of existence: "The savage is lazy and is distinguished from the educated (Gebildeten) man by his brooding stupidity."\textsuperscript{11} Nor is the explicit consciousness of himself as free personality something that is present in each and every historical age. In the ancient polis, for example, man did not have as the principle of his will the manifestation of his freedom in the objective order: "In the states of antiquity the subjective end simply coincided with the state's will."\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, argues Hegel, it is only in the modern world that the principle of man as freely and consciously self-determining has come into its own. In this age, and in this age alone, has man consciously taken as the principle of his will the development and manifestation of his substantive freedom in the intersubjective realm of social and political institutions. The modern state has, as its basis, the principle of man as free personality. What are some of the implications of this for the political order?

Hegel's doctrine of the state—much discussed and often misrepresented—is a topic of great detail and intricacy. We shall limit ourselves here to a brief discussion of a few

\textsuperscript{11}The Philosophy of Right, § 197.

\textsuperscript{12}The Philosophy of Right, § 261, Zusatz. We are indebted in the remainder of the section devoted to Hegel's 'politics of free-personality' to Sholomo Avineri. See Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972) Chapter Nine: 'The Hieroglyph of Reason'.
aspects of this doctrine directly relevant to showing the consequences of the principle of man as free personality to the development of political society. The state, argues Hegel, 'when articulated and genuinely organized'\(^\text{13}\) represents the embodiment of the free will; in the state and its institutions man consciously finds the substance of his will, his freedom, manifested. For the state "is the ethical mind qua substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing itself, accomplishing what it knows, in so far as it knows it...Self-consciousness...finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom."\(^\text{14}\) What this means is that the state is at once the product of man's free activity in the realm of history, and when 'articulated and genuinely organized', the concrete embodiment of his freedom. Human actions in the state are motivated by the conscious recognition that the social, political and legal institutions of the state have their ultimate source in the subjective will, in man as free. As such, the state ideally represents the unity of the free will with itself. For the free will, as we have seen, is the will that wills freedom. Hegel's argument is that in the state, and only in the state, does the free will find an adequate forum for its activity.

The state rests upon the conscious recognition on the part of its citizens that social and political institutions

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\(^{13}\) The Philosophy of Right, § 260; Zusatz.

\(^{14}\) The Philosophy of Right, § 257.
represent the embodiment of their freedom. There exists, as it were, an identity between the citizen and the state, or commonwealth—an identity, which when lacking, places the state in jeopardy of disorder and dissolution. For says Hegel, "the state is actual only when the members have a feeling of their own selfhood and it is stable only when the public and private ends are identical. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is perfectly true. If all is not well with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, then the footing of the state itself is insecure." The feeling of identity between citizen and state, the feeling that their own freedom is fulfilled only in and through the social and political institutions of the state, Hegel calls politische Gesinnung, patriotism. By patriotism he means not merely a readiness for exceptional sacrifices on the part of citizens in times of national emergency, but rather "the sentiment which, in the relationships of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognizes that the community is one's substantive groundwork and end." It is the

15 The Philosophy of Right, § 265, Zusatz.
16 The Philosophy of Right, § 268. By contrast for Hobbes, as Strauss points out, "...there exists an insoluble conflict between the rights of government and the natural right of the individual to self preservation." This "insoluble conflict" comes to the fore in times of national emergency; for if the individual is motivated always by egoistic considerations, then it is difficult to see why he would willingly put his life in jeopardy in times of war, instead of moving to safer climes. Hobbes says: "When armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away: yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably." EB IV 414. But in granting this he destroys a considerable part of the basis of national defense. Strauss claims that "the only solution to this difficulty which preserves the spirit of Hobbes's political philosophy is the outlawry of war or the establishment of a world state." See Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 197-98.
sentiment or consciousness that the citizen's interests, both
substantive and particular, are realized only in and through
the state; that the institutions of the state represent the
extension of the individual's self-conscious freedom.

Hegel takes some pains to spell out the full implications
of the claim that in the state social and political institutions
represent the extension of the subject's self-conscious free-
will. What this means with respect to the legal order is that
the laws of the land are not something externally imposed upon
the subject by an authority alien to him, but that they are
rather the expressions of his own will: "[the laws]...are not
something alien to the subject. On the contrary, his spirit
bears witness to them as to its own essence in which he has a
feeling of his own self-hood..."17 In the state, its laws and
institutions, the citizen finds the manifestation and embodi-
ment of his own free will, and thus feels secure. "When we
walk the streets at night in safety, it does not strike us
that this might be otherwise. This habit of feeling safe has
become second nature, and we do not reflect on just how this
is due solely to the working of special institutions. Common-
place thinking often has the impression that force holds the
state together, but in fact its only bond is the fundamental
sense of order which everyone possesses."18

17 The Philosophy of Right, § 147.
18 The Philosophy of Right, § 268, Zusatz.
of the state rests upon the recognition that what is being ordered has its final source in the free will; laws are not merely external commands, but the embodiment of man's self-conscious freedom.

Of course Hegel does not doubt that laws, and indeed the state itself, might from the standpoint of purely individual interest sometimes appear as an external necessity, as something imposed from without. His claim, however, is that beyond this external appearance, the state and its laws and institutions represent the necessary development of the principle of man as free personality. The state embodies man's highest relationship to his fellow human beings, and is alone the forum in which his freedom finds full and adequate expression. But to warrant this lofty description the state and its laws must reflect man's freedom. Hegel thus enters the following caveat: "The state is actual, and its actuality is this, that the interest of the whole is realized in and through particular ends. Actuality is always the unity of universal and particular... When this unity is not present, a thing is not actual though it may have acquired existence. A bad state is one which merely exists; a sick body exists too, but it has no genuine reality." The state, in so far as it has 'genuine reality', is the product of the activity of man

19 Politische Gesinnung, according to Hegel, "is, in general, trust (which may pass over into a greater or lesser degree of educated insight)..." See, § 268.
20 The Philosophy of Right, § 270.
as free personality; in and through it man comes to conscious recognition of himself as free.

From this brief description it is evident that the focal point of Hegel's doctrine of the state is the principle of man as free personality, man in his spirituality. Unlike Hobbes who conceives of man in purely naturalistic terms, and of the commonwealth and the institutions which make it up as based ultimately on fear and on man's selfish desire to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of his own well-being, Hegel conceives of man as free personality as the activity of constituting in the external realm an order which is the embodiment and manifestation of his freedom. As a result of this, Hegel is able to give a positive characterization of the political order, to view social and political institutions as extensions of man's free self-conscious activity. The state finds its ground not in force, power and fear, but in freedom. Yet this is not to say that Hegel denies what we might call the 'partial truth' of Hobbes's position. For, as just seen, he is fully appraised of the necessity of the citizen's finding in the state the fulfillment of their own selfish interests, the fulfillment of particular desires, wants and needs. But he

21 The selfish maximization of one's individual wants and needs constitutes the principle of what Hegel calls the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, the state in its appearance. Hegel writes: "Civil society - an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by needs, by the legal system - the means of security of person and property - and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. This external state is brought back to and wielded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of
claims that this phenomenon does not constitute the essence of the state. The foundation upon which the state rests is the principle of self-conscious freedom. And, for Hegel, this involves the unity of particular and substantive interests. "The universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized." The principle which serves as the ground and secure footing of the state involves the unity and living development of both universal and particular. Within the principle of man as free personality both aspects receive their due. But how does Hegel demonstrate that man is free personality, the point upon which his entire doctrine turns? To answer this, we must turn to Hegel's psychology, wherein the development of this principle is traced and its nature demonstrated.

Section ii: Man as the transcendence of nature.

Hegel opens his Philosophy of Mind by citing the injunction of the Delphic oracle: Know thyself. This injunction, he tells us, delivered to the Greeks at a

both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto." Philosophy of Right, § 157. We might note that it is not accidental that "Hobbes is often designated as the 'father of political economy'. For his characterization of man is identical with homo oeconomicus. Economic science knows no other good than the thing desired. See G.B. Macpherson, "Hobbes's Bourgeois Man," in Brown, Hobbes Studies, op. cit. pp. 169-183.

22 Philosophy of Right, § 260, Zusatz.
particular point in world history does not have the meaning
of a command imposed upon man, or more specifically upon
the human mind, from without; "on the contrary, the god who
impels to self-knowledge is none other than the absolute
law of mind itself." 23 Mind seeks to know, to constitute,
its true self; it is man seeking to know himself in his
spirituality. Indeed, says Hegel, "mind is... in its every
act only apprehending itself, and the aim of all genuine
science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in
everything in heaven and on earth." 24 The end of all
genuine science is that the human mind come to full and
total possession of itself, that mind be wholly transparent
to itself. The knowledge thus commanded, says Hegel, is
not "mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular
capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the
single self," 25 knowledge that goes under the name of
Menschenkenntnis. Rather, "the knowledge it commands means
that of man's genuine reality--of what is essentially and
ultimately true and real--of mind as the true and essential
being." 26 Man's knowledge of himself as spirit is, in short,
knowledge of his universal and substantial nature; it is the
explicit recognition of his true and essential self. For
Hegel, as we have seen, this involves man's cognition of
himself as free personality.

23 The Philosophy of Mind, § 377 Zusatz.
24 The Philosophy of Mind, § 377 Zusatz.
25 The Philosophy of Mind, § 377.
26 The Philosophy of Mind, § 377.
As free personality, viz. as the self-conscious human agent who knows himself as free and who has his freedom as the object and end of his willing, man is the transcendence of nature. In the human mind or spirit, nature is subsumed and transformed; "mind negates the externality of Nature, assimilates Nature to itself and thereby idealizes it." 27 One must be careful at this point not to confuse Hegel's use of the principle of man as the transcendence of nature with Bramhall's talk of man's transcending nature in moral actions. Bramhall, we remember, affirms a radical distinction between man's spirituality and nature and dogmatically asserts a moral causality for action that is grounded in the intellect and which is in no sense continuous with nature. Hegel, on the other hand, is concerned to point to the wrongheadedness of any approach which constructs an impassable gulf between mind and nature. For mind has nature as its pre-supposition; that is, nature is the very condition of mind's activity. As J.N. Findlay points out: "There is for Hegel nothing ideal or spiritual which does not have its roots in Nature, and which is not nourished and brought to full fruition by Nature." 28 Nature is not simply and ineradicably the non-spiritual; it is the pre-spiritual from which mind or spirit first emerges. Indeed, for Hegel, the entire sense of nature lies precisely in its overcoming of

27 Philosophy of Mind, § 381 Zusatz.
the self-externality (Aussersichsein) and asunderness (Aussereinandersein) characteristic of it, and in the gradual achievement of "a kind of self-dependent unity which is only adequately realized in Spirit."\(^{29}\) The procession of mind or spirit from nature constitutes, for Hegel, the emergence and demonstration of the principle of man as the transcendency of nature, the principle which, as pointed out above\(^{30}\), serves as the point de depart of Hegel's psychology of free personality. Before turning to a consideration of this psychology, we shall attempt an examination, though a brief one, of what Hegel means by the principle of man as the transcendency of nature and of how he conceives of the relationship which obtains between mind and nature.

Hegel introduces his study of nature with a critique of other methods of considering the natural realm and natural entities in general. He makes it clear that his own philosophical treatment of Nature is meant to obviate difficulties which he sees as inhering in these other approaches. His own consideration of nature, he tells us, "will not adopt the practical standpoint. For this standpoint, though it pays close attention to the individual products of nature, does so from the perspective of appetite "which is self-seeking; need impels us to use Nature for our own advantage, to wear her out, to wear her down, to annihilate her.\(^{31}\) The result

\(^{29}\) Findlay, loc. cit.

\(^{30}\) See supra, Chapter III, Section 4.

\(^{31}\) Philosophy of Nature, § 245, Zusatz.
of this is that natural objects are considered always in relation to human wants and needs and never as they are in themselves. A second approach, the theoretical approach, attempts prima facie to avoid this difficulty by beginning from the arrest of appetite but falls into another. For though this standpoint seeks to leave natural objects as they are, to stand back from them and to give us knowledge of their universal and essential aspects, it has the effect of reducing them to mere abstract laws, forces and genera: with this approach, nature's "...abundant life, wearing a thousand wonderful and delightful shapes, shrivels into arid forms and shapeless generalities..." More, this approach has the effect of establishing "a duality of object and subject and their separation, something here and something yonder." But in the speculative study of nature this is not our intention; for our aim is to "comprehend Nature, to make her ours, so that she is not something alien and yonder." Clearly, says Hegel, what is needed is an approach to nature which is

32 Philosophy of Nature, § 246, Zusatz. For Hegel, Hobbes's reduction of nature to the abstract motionalist laws of action and reaction would be guilty of this; so also, of course, would the abstract perspective of modern science in general.
able to recognize the essential and universal in her while at the same time doing justice to the wealth and manifold configuration of her individual aspects. Such an approach, he argues, is the one adopted in the Philosophy of Nature. It represents the unity of the practical and theoretical approaches and the correction of their respective one-sidedness: philosophical knowledge, or "the cognition which comprehends (begreifendes Erkennen) is the middle term in which universality does not remain on this side, in me, over against the individuality of the objects: on the contrary, while it stands in a negative relation to things and assimilates them to itself, it equally finds individuality in them and does not encroach upon their independence, or interfere with their free self-determination."\(^3^4\) That is, the philosophical approach is one that aims at a comprehensive grasp of nature as she is both in her universality and particularity.

What does this comprehensive approach, this begreifendes Erkennen, "reveal nature to be?" In the first instance, says Hegel, it reveals her to be a realm of asunderness and self-externality, of Aussereinanderseyn und Aussersichsein. In nature one thing exists alongside another and follows another; that is, in the natural realm all things are mutually external, ad infinitum. But this is not all; it reveals in her as well, even in her first and most immediate determination, viz. space, a certain unity, the prefiguration of the spiritual.\(^3^5\) Indeed,

\(^3^4\) Philosophy of Nature, § 246.

\(^3^5\) Philosophy of Nature, Introduction, p. 3. "Spirit is presaged in nature."
as Findlay points out, for Hegel "the philosophical interpretation of Nature, must ... consist in seeing in it a series of stages which evince the gradual triumph of self-explanatory unity over mutual externality and otherness."36 That is, what the philosopher sees in nature is a process which exhibits the progressive amelioration of nature's own self-externality; the very stones cry out, says Hegel, and raise themselves to life and to mind or spirit.37 The course of this ameliorative process, this progressive overcoming of the endless extension of partes extra partes, encompasses, Hegel shows in his Philosophy of Nature, the whole of the natural realm. Very generally, it involves the movement from mechanics, the science wherein inert matter and matter impelled into motion by external influences is studied, to physics, the science which deals with matter essentially in relation with other matter, to organics, the science of the living organism. With this last science, and specifically with the study of the animal organism, says Hegel, we see the highest point, 'the most complete triumph over externality which nature achieves. In the animal organism we have to do with a whole "so pervaded by its unity that nothing in it appears as independent, every determinateness is at once ideal, the animal remaining in every determinateness the same one universal, so that in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is revealed." 38

With the feeling-unity of the animal organism, an organism in which each aspect or determinateness manifests one total reality, we reach nature's apex. At this point, a point which represents in incipient fashion the internality and immaterial unity of conscious thought, nature passes over into mind.

The procession of mind or spirit from nature, Hegel makes clear, is not to be understood as if mind were simply the result of nature, as if nature were the absolute prius and mind something secondary. Granted nature pre-exists mind and in a temporal sense is the condition for the emergence of mind. But temporal priority does not make nature the absolute beginning; the history of the earth prior to the appearance of life, and more specifically of conscious thought, represents, says Hegel metaphorically, "the movement and dreaming of one asleep, until it awakes and receives its consciousness in Man, and so confronts itself as a stabilized (ruhige) formation." Mind is not something derivative, rather is it nature's own truth, the reason for her existence. The entire process of nature, viz. the progressive amelioration of asunderness and externality, finds its adequate realization only in the internality of mind or spirit. Moreover, Nature is assimilated and idealized in mind. "The illusory appearance which makes mind seem to be mediated by an Other (i.e. Nature) is removed by mind itself, since this has, so to speak, the

sovereign ingratitude of ridding itself of, of mediating, 
that by which it appears to be mediated, of reducing it 
to something dependent solely on mind and in this way 
making itself completely self-subsistent. Through the 
assemblagation and idealization of nature mind comes to exist 
for itself as self-sufficient. But this does not mean that 
nature is annihilated in mind; rather does it mean that in 
mind nature finds her truth and fulfillment. In this sense 
mind constitutes the presupposition of nature and is the 
praeus of the latter.

Mind emerges from nature as the truth of the natural 
realm; in man as spirit, nature is idealized and transcended. 
This transcendence of nature in mind represents the beginning 
of mind's coming to exist for itself as it is in its essence 
and overcomes, as already noted, as the starting point of Hegel's 
psychology of free personality. Indeed, the emergence of 
mind from nature has precisely the meaning that the essence of 
mind is freedom: "The substance of mind is freedom, i.e. the 
absence of dependence on an Other, the relating of self to 
self." Unlike the natural realm where each existent is a 
particular mutually external to each other thing and yet, 
dependent upon these other things for its explanation, mind is 
self contained, self-dependent. Even at the highest stage of 
its triumph over externality, viz. in the animal organism, 
nature does not attain to the unity and self-containedness of

40 Philosophy of Mind, § 381, Zusatz.
41 Philosophy of Mind, § 382, Zusatz.
conscious thought. "...the animal soul is still not free; for it is always manifest as a one determined as feeling or excitation, as tied to one determinateness."42 But mind is tied down to no one singular content; there is nothing from which it cannot turn in abstraction and assert itself, viz. be aware of itself, as the self-identical unity present to itself throughout all its experience.43 Mind, as Hegel says, has a power over every content present in it, and this power "forms the basis of the freedom of mind."44 Mind, in short, exists for itself as self-dependent and self-determining. As such it is the truth and goal of the ameliorative process observed in nature.

As a self-dependent unity, that is, as it exists for itself, mind has a power over every content present in it and is self-determining; it is free. But this freedom which constitutes the essential and substantive nature of the human mind is not something of which mind immediately upon its emergence from nature is wholly in possession. Mind's conscious recognition, its knowing, of itself as free is something that is achieved. "...in its immediacy, mind is free only implicitly, in principle or potentially, not yet in actuality: actual freedom does not...belong to mind in its immediacy but has to be brought into being by mind's own activity."45 Mind's knowing of itself as it is in its essential nature (and this involves mind's cognition of itself as free personality) is...

42 Philosophy of Mind, § 381, Zusatz
43 Philosophy of Mind, § 382
44 Philosophy of Mind, § 382, Zusatz
45 Philosophy of Mind, § 382, Zusatz
something gradually realized; mind constitutes, comes to know itself. Indeed, says Hegel, "it is... as the creator of its freedom that we have to consider mind in philosophy."\(^{46}\)

The course which mind travels in coming to know itself as free personality, viz. as the possibility of constituting in the objective order social and political institutions that are the embodiment and manifestation of its freedom, Hegel traces in his doctrine of subjective mind, the first part of his *Philosophy of Mind*. In what follows we shall attempt a brief recounting of this doctrine; our intention is to show in a very general manner the constitution of the self-conscious agent capable of free actions in the objective order, that is, the formal constitution of the principle of man as free personality.\(^{47}\)

Section iii: Man as free personality.

The three main forms of mind subjective are, Hegel says, soul (Seele), consciousness (Bewußsein) and mind as such (Geist als solche). The first of these, soul, is dealt with in Anthropology; that science wherein the first forms which the human mind takes in its emergence from nature is studied. In this science, we have to do with "mind which is

\(^{46}\) *Philosophy of Mind*, § 362, Zusatz.

\(^{47}\) When we say 'formal', we mean that in his doctrine of Subjective Mind Hegel is concerned to clarify the formal powers of the human mind. These powers are, of course, developed in the nexus of social and political circumstances; we have seen above that Hegel holds that the principle of man as free personality finds its adequate historical manifestation only in the modern state.
still in the grip of Nature and connected with its corporeity, mind which is not as yet in communion with itself, not yet free. 48 Soul, according to Hegel, is the "sleep of mind—the passive nous of Aristotle, which is potentially all things; 49 it is the 'substance' of all further developments of mind as consciousness and rational thought and will and serves as the 'basis of man'. As the basis of man, it is mind in its immediacy, the first faint spiritualization of man's naturalness. The stages exhibited throughout the Anthropology will display the development wherein the soul takes possession of its natural features and comes to actualize itself as the ideality of its corporeity, its body. When this is achieved, the soul will have attained to self-mastery of its natural features, will have absorbed them and made them truly its own.

But as it proceeds from nature, Hegel points out, mind exists first in an immediate oneness with its natural aspect; the natural soul (natürliche Seele) is soul in its implicitude. It has its determinations in the manner of properties and is itself unaware of them. Included at this stage are mind's abstract attunement with the universal planetary life, racial traits, phases of the individual's growth and maturation, and the alternating rhythms of sleep and waking. Included also at this stage is sentience (Emp-finding), the highest moment of the natural soul. The five senses, Hegel seeks to show, form a system of 'corporeity specified', a

48 Philosophy of Mind, § 387, Zusatz.
49 Philosophy of Mind, § 389.
system which contains in 'microcosmic fashion' the macrocosm of nature. As Hegel says, "My body is the middle term by which I come together with the external world as such."\(^{50}\)

In the next stage of the Anthropology, feeling soul (fühlende Seele), the particular and contingent content of sentience receives a higher and more comprehensive form. The feeling soul contains stored up within it "an infinite treasury of sensations, ideas and acquired lore",\(^{51}\) a manifold which it has immediately in the form of dreams and premonitions. At this stage we have to do with a form of the human mind that later came to be systematically investigated in depth psychology.\(^{52}\) Hegel calls this feeling soul a self-contained 'monad', since its content does not confront it as something external to it and objectively structured, but rather "constitutes its actual livingness and subjectivity."\(^{53}\) As instances of the immediate knowing characteristic of this form of mind Hegel points to the phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy, phenomena in which a knowledge mediated by neither space and time, nor cause and effect, is observed. In sicknesses of insanity, dealt with also at the level of the feeling soul, we see, says Hegel, the monadic self engrossed with and dominated by some particular content of self-feeling (Selbstgefühl), a domination which results in the obstruction of the

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\(^{51}\) Philosophy of Mind, § 403


\(^{53}\) Philosophy of Mind, § 402, Zusatz.
fluid universality of the life of mind. In habit, the final moment of the feeling soul, the self returns from the particularity of its content to itself in its universality; as habit, says Hegel, "the soul has the contents in possession, and contains them in such a manner that in these features it is not sentient, nor does it stand in relationship with them as distinguishing itself from them, nor is absorbed in them, but has them and moves in them, without feeling or consciousness of the fact." With this, the soul reduces its corporeity to an 'instrument' and renders itself free for occupation with other things. It has its corporeity in possession.

In taking possession of its corporeity, the soul 'actualizes' (verwirklicht) itself as the 'ideality' of the body; the latter has been molded and made so thoroughly the soul's own that it is now the soul's own 'work of art', its sign. In its corporeity—in stance, attitude and physiognomic expression—the soul has its "free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself felt." We have here the truth of the progress which we have witnessed throughout the whole of the Anthropology, as Murray Greene points out:

The soul's development in the Anthropology is presented by Hegel above all as a struggle toward freedom, a striving by the psychical selfhood to actualize its telos as Spirit by rising above its immersion in its feeling-life to genuine self-determination. The struggle requires a sunderance of the self from its natural being.

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54 Philosophy of Mind, § 410
55 Philosophy of Mind, § 411
56 Greene, Hegel on the Soul, p. 156
In its Befreiungskampf towards true self-possession the soul attains its actuality when its outwardness, its body, is but the sign and instrument of its own spiritual inwardness. At this point, says Hegel, the soul loses the meaning of the mere soul, or the immediacy of mind. It sets itself in opposition (gegenüberstellen) to the being of its corporeity, while absorbing this and making it its own. 57 As such, it has inwardized (erinnert) itself in its externality and is infinite self-relation. Mind thus 'awakens' to itself as ego and gains the position of thinker and subject, specifically the subject of the judgment (Urteil), 58 in which the ego excludes the natural monadic content of the previous stages as an 'object' (Gegenstand) or world external to it. With this soul becomes consciousness, abstract universality which in its object is immediately reflected into itself—the subject-matter of the science of Phenomenology.

Phenomenology, the second of the sciences of mind, subjective, emerges as a 'result' of the Urteil of soul and has as the focus of its study the various general modes of consciousness. Unlike the Anthropology which deals with the natural monadic self as mind or spirit 'in itself' (an sich), it has as the subject-matter of its inquiry mind as infinite self-relation, mind 'as it is "for itself, but at the same time in its relation to its other, an other which...is determined

57 Philosophy of Mind, § 412.
58 Philosophy of Mind, § 412. For the etymological significance Hegel attaches to the word Urteil, see Encyclopedia Logic, § 166. Translated by W. Wallace (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
by that relation as both implicitly an object and also as negated. 59 Consciousness, Hegel tells us, is the relational mode of mind; it is mind "in its manifestation (als erscheinend), as exhibiting itself in its opposite."60 But this opposite to which consciousness is related and which for it has the shape of something external and independent is implicitly one with consciousness. For consciousness, says Hegel, is the contradiction "between the independence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one."61 This identity, however, is something of which consciousness at the beginning of the Phenomenology is unaware. For this reason the stages of consciousness's development throughout this science appear always as an alteration on the side of the object. The goal of the movement exhibited throughout this science is that consciousness come to know itself as the truth of the changing show before it; that is, come to know the identity of the two sides. When this occurs, Hegel says, consciousness will have raised itself to truth, will know its other as itself, and itself in its other.

As it emerges as a result of the Urteil of soul, consciousness is, first, sensuous consciousness, das sinnliche Bewusstsein. In this mode, consciousness is the immediate certainty of its object as a 'somewhat' and as a 'here'. It appears, Hegel says, as "wealthiest in matter, but as poorest in thought."62 For this reason, it passes over to perception

60 Science of Logic, 782.
61 Philosophy of Mind, § 414
62 Philosophy of Mind, § 418.
(Wahr-nehmung) where a more adequate characterization of the object is achieved. In this mode the object appears not merely as an individual 'somewhat' and a 'here' but as a thing, the bearer of qualities or properties. But as a characterization of the object this too proves inadequate; the unity and exclusivity of the Thing cannot be reconciled with the presence in it of various mutually distinct sense-qualities, sense qualities present also in other things. For this reason, sense perception passes over into intellect (der Verstand) where the chaotic manifold of sense perception is brought under laws, which suppress the multiplicity of the sensible and yet contain it, "but as an interior 'simple' difference which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearances." With this, Hegel argues, consciousness has raised itself to self-consciousness; for as intellect, viz. in being aware of laws, consciousness "relates itself to an object in which the 'I' finds again the counterpart or reflex of its own self" as the activity of bringing its object under laws, in other words, consciousness relates itself to itself and is self-consciousness.

In its procession from consciousness, self-consciousness is in the initial instance immediate and abstract. It is the contradiction, Hegel says, between itself as consciousness and as self-consciousness; that is, between the intransigence and opacity of its object and its knowledge that everything in the world is its and is intelligible to it.

63 Philosophy of Mind, § 422. 64 Philosophy of Mind, § 423, Zusatz.
that in the world it finds itself. What we witness throughout this section of the Phenomenology is mind's gradual overcoming of this contradiction. The first step in this direction occurs at the level of appetitive self-consciousness (die Begierde). As appetite, mind finds itself confronted by an object other than itself and hostile to it. To demonstrate the object's nullity and to show its ownership of the world, appetite proceeds to consume and destroy the object which confronts it. But in destroying this, it destroys that upon which its satisfaction and the demonstration of its ownership depends. Moreover, it finds itself confronted by another object which it must in turn dominate and destroy. Immediate self-consciousness is thus caught up in a monotonous progress ad infinitum of appetite and its satisfaction. The resolution of this monotonous alternation, Hegel says, comes when self-consciousness finds itself confronted not by a natural object, but by an other "filled with the 'I';" viz. another self-consciousness. In having as its object another free and developing consciousness, mind has raised itself above the selfishness of merely destructive appetite, and is

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65 Hobbes, as we have seen, is also aware of the infinity of appetite. Unlike Hegel, however, who shows that appetite's infinity lies in the very nature of its relationship to its other, Hobbes attributes this infinity to man's fear of violent death. See above, Chapter I, Section iii. It might also be noted that Hegel's analysis of appetite's infinity would form a fruitful starting point for a study of what might be called the 'consumerism' of contemporary society; Hegel's analysis shows that the satisfaction which appetite seeks always eludes it. For in taking possession of its object it consumes and destroys that upon its satisfaction depends, thus giving rise to the progress to infinity of appetite and its satisfaction. Hegel designates this monotonous alternation ad infinitum an instance of the 'spurious or counterfeit infinity.' For a logical consideration of this schlechte or negative Unendlichkeit, see Encyclopedia Logic, 93-94.

66 Philosophy of Mind, § 429, Zusatz.
self-consciousness recognizable (das anerkennende Selbstbewusstsein).

As recognizable self-consciousness, mind has as its object another ego in which it beholds itself and yet "also an immediately existing object, another absolutely independent of me and opposed to me." This natural immediacy of the two opposing and independent egos leads, Hegel says, to a struggle for recognition in which either side attempts to show itself as a free self and to exist for the other as such. We have here the famous, or infamous, discussion of the master-slave relationship. For this struggle, Hegel tells us, is a battle; and in this battle, which becomes a life and death struggle, one side eventually gives way and becomes the slave and the other, the master. But the master's victory over the slave is in reality no victory at all; for in treating the vanquished as a slave, the master

67 Philosophy of Mind, § 430.

68 As pointed out above (fn. 45), in the realm of mind subjective Hegel is concerned to trace the formal constitution of the principle of man as free personality. We see here the role of interpersonal conflict in this formal constitution. On another point, we find here also an indication of how Hegel might regard Hobbes's position concerning force in politics. Hegel writes: "...the fight for recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the state because here the recognition for which the combatants fought already exists. For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest on it; violence, in producing the State, has brought into existence only what is justified in and for itself, namely laws and a constitution. What dominates in the State is the spirit of the people, custom, and laws. There man is recognized and treated as a rational being, as free, as a person;..." Philosophy of Mind, § 432 Zusatz. And in § 433 he writes: "Force...is the external or phenomenal commencement of states, not their underlying and essential principle."
treats him not as a fully self-conscious, free individual, but as a complex thing to be dominated and manipulated at will. Thus in the master-slave relationship, self-consciousness finds but an inadequate medium for self-expression.

The solution to this difficulty, Hegel says, may be achieved only in a situation of reciprocal recognition, of individuals "mutually throwing light upon each other." Here, in the affirmative awareness of self in another self, self-consciousness finds a medium adequate to it and is universal self-consciousness. As such it is the explicit recognition of itself in its other, and of its other as itself; that is, the explicit recognition of the objectivity of its subjectivity.

With this recognition, Hegel says, the science of mind als erschienend ends and passes over into the science of reason or 'mind as such'; that is, passes over into the science of psychology proper.

Psychology, the third and final science of mind subjective, has to do with mind which has "defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness," mind as rational intelligence and will. Unlike in the Anthropology where mind is enclosed within the monadic self, or in Phenomenology where mind 'appears' as an entanglement with an external object, in Psychology mind "starts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own features." In psychology, mind has its own determinations explicitly for itself; hence mind at this stage of its development is to be cognized as

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69 Philosophy of Mind, § 437. 70 Philosophy of Mind, § 440

71 Philosophy of Mind, § 440.
a knowing of reason (Wissen der Vernunft); viz. reason's knowing of itself, of its own faculties and modes of activity. Within this science, Hegel points out, each content has from the very beginning the two-fold aspect of 'being', and of being mind's 'own' (die des Seienden und die des Seinigen). The course of mind's movement throughout this science will be such that, that which mind finds in itself as seiend will be appropriated as das Seinige (the movement of theoretical mind), and conversely that which mind has as das Seinige will be liberated from its mere subjectivity and brought to universality such that it is ready to be set forth and given existence in deed and act. When this is achieved, mind will have raised itself to Free-mind (der freie Geist), mind which knows itself as free and which wills itself as this its object. As such, mind will have come to recognize itself as free personality; viz: as the possibility of constituting in the external order social and political institutions that are the embodiment and manifestation of its freedom.

The first general form which mind takes in its emergence from the Phenomenology is that of theoretical mind or rational intelligence. In considering mind in this aspect, we have to do with the modes of activity whereby mind takes possession of the world and renders a seemingly alien 'found-content' its own. The first of the modes of activity through which this is achieved Hegel gives as intuition (Anschauung). Intuition, he tells us, is that
faculty or power in which theoretical mind 'finds' itself determined; it is a mode of activity of mind in its self-externality, its content having the forms of self-externality as such; viz. space and time. But intelligence does not remain in this its immediacy; "the nominal knowledge, which is only certitude, elevates itself, as reason is concrete, to definite and conceptual knowledge." In its subsequent modes—viz. in the various stages of representation (Vorstellung), namely in recollection, imagination and memory—the externality of mind as intuition is progressively inwardized. Finally, in thinking (Denken) the last traces of mind's self-externality are overcome. As thinking, Hegel says, intelligence is cognitive: "it knows that what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in so far as it is a thought." As such, mind exists explicitly for itself as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity in the realm of cognition and as itself in this respect wholly in possession. Moreover, in knowing itself as determinative of its content,

72 Philosophy of Mind, § 445.
73 This claim is as old as Parmenides and thus, as Hegel asserts, as old as Philosophy itself. He says: "Philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives the absolute as Being, says that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.' Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought." Encyclopedia Logic, § 86, Zusatz. And in the Philosophy of Mind, § 465, Zusatz, he says: "Those who have no comprehension of philosophy become speechless... when they hear the proposition Thought is Being. None the less underlying all our actions is the presupposition of the unity of Thought and Being... Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation is capable of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete perversion of the nature of mind."
mind is not only theoretical but also practical. For, "when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content, which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will." 74 Thus theoretical mind passes over to practical mind.

As will says Hegel, mind is consciously autonomous; it is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. 75 But in its initial form, that is, as it emerges from theoretical mind, it does not yet know itself in its universal and substantial nature. For in its immediacy practical mind is burdened with the form of subjectivity; it seeks its self-fulfillment in its own abstract satisfaction and has not as yet identified this with 'matured reason'. The movement exhibited throughout mind practical will be that wherein this initial formal will fills itself with its essential nature; viz. with freedom, and thus comes to attain a content that is truly objective and universal in and for itself. But considered in its immediacy, practical mind is first practical sense or feeling (das praktische Gefühl). As such, it finds itself determined by a content which is natural and contingent; the claim of its essential autonomy to control some existent mode of fact is the "utterly subjective and superficial feeling of pleasant and unpleasant." 76

But if will is to know itself as 'the author of its own conclusions' the conformity between itself and the existent thing ought not be something 'found', but rather something

74 Philosophy of Mind, § 468
75 Philosophy of Mind, § 469
76 Philosophy of Mind, § 472
brought about by will's own activity. This active institution of the conformity between practical mind and the objectively valid begins in impulse (Trieb) and continues through choice (Willkür). As Willkür practical mind is reflective, sees impulses and inclinations as its own, and chooses from the manifold for fulfillment some particular of these. But the choice which it exercises in the face of this manifold is a matter of purest contingency and arbitrary caprice. Moreover, as Willkür, practical mind discovers that it can achieve only an infinite regress of passing satisfactions.\(^77\) Hence, practical mind is lead first to happiness, where a manifold of particular inclinations is subsumed under a universal—though again in a subjective and arbitrary fashion—and finally to free mind (der freie Geist) where a true unity of universal and particular is achieved, in that mind has for its contents and aims not

\(^77\) We might note further that when speaking of contingency in respect of the will Hegel says: "The Freedom of the Will is an expression that often means mere free-choice, or the will in the form of contingency. Freedom of choice, or the capacity of determining ourselves towards one thing or another, is undoubtedly a vital element in the will (which in its very notion is free); but instead of being freedom itself, it is only in the first instance freedom in form." We have seen above that Hegel calls purely formal or negative freedom the 'freedom of the void' and claims that such freedom results in the 'Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation' or in politics in the 'fanaticism of destruction.' He continues: "The genuinely free will, which includes free choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm and fast and knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its own. A will, on the contrary, which remains standing on the grade of option, even supposing it does decide in favour of what is in import right and true, is always haunted by the concept (italics mine) that it might, if it had so pleased, have decided in favour of the reverse course. When more narrowly examined, free choice is seen to be a contradiction, to this extent that its form and content stand in antithesis." Encyclopedia Logik, § 145, Zusatz.
some mere subjective end but its own infinite mode of being, viz. freedom itself. As freie Geist, mind has liberated itself from the formalism and fortuitousness it had as mind practical and begins consciously to order its deeds and acts to accord with its substantive freedom. In short, it knows itself as free personality and sets about giving itself objective existence in the realm of abstract right, ethical community and the state.

With the emergence of der freie Geist, mind stands transparent to itself as an immanently determined self-unity. It has liberated itself to itself; it knows itself as free and makes its freedom the object and end of its willing. This liberation of mind's essential nature to itself we now see as the goal of the movement witnessed throughout the whole of the realm of mind subjective. In the Anthropology this Befreiungskampf took the form of mind's struggle for complete self-mastery in its corporeity, to recognize itself as the 'ideality' of its body. In the Phenomenology, it was evidenced as mind's struggle to know itself as the identity underlying the subject-object dicotomy. Finally, in Psychology we have seen it as mind's struggle to overcome its own self-externality, to know its substantive nature and hence attain to full and total possession of itself. Throughout, the trust has been in keeping with mind's absolute commandment, 'Know Thyself.'\(^{78}\) In raising itself to free mind, the telos of the realm of subjective mind has been achieved and Hegel has shown the

\(^{78}\textit{Philosophy of Mind}, \S\ 377.
formal constitution of the principle of man as free personality. For as freie Geist, mind is aware of its substantive and universal nature and is ready to give this objective existence in the realm of history.

Section iv: Conclusion.

What may be said of this account of man as free personality and of the politics which follows from it in comparison with that which we have seen Hobbes propound? Very generally, it is doubtless the case that the doctrine of man which Hegel gives is fuller, more complex and more comprehensive than that which Hobbes provides. And it achieves this not by disregarding man's natural aspect—an aspect that is all important in Hobbes's account—but by embracing this within the principle of man as free personality. For in the unity of self-conscious thought nature is sublated and idealized; and this does not have the meaning that nature is annihilated in mind. Rather does it mean that in mind, nature finds her truth. As free personality, man transcends nature; in him the particularity of nature and of individual impulses and inclinations is brought to truth under a principle of unity and self-determination.

Moreover, just as the psychological principle itself is more comprehensive than Hobbes's, so also is the political philosophy which Hegel derives from the principle. Unlike Hobbes who conceives of his commonwealth as peopled by self-preserving machines, machines bent on the selfish maximization
of their power and the avoidance of violent death, Hegel conceives of the state as the groundwork and the manifestation of man's self-conscious freedom. But this is not to say that Hegel is unaware of the partial truth of the Hobbist position; for as a recent writer makes clear:

In developing his theory, Hegel endows the state with a dual quality which accentuates the dialectical nature of his whole attitude: on the purely subjective level, the state is merely instrumental, people view it as a convenient device to secure their ends, to smooth the functioning of economic institutions, to alleviate some of the glaring tensions created by the system of commodity production. But on a higher plane, the state embodies man's basic universal nature, the immanent necessity of man to transcend individualistic interests.

Hegel is aware that the individual must find in the state the fulfillment of his own self-interest; he is aware too that if social and political institutions are to function properly a system of laws with organizations to enforce these is necessary. But he is aware further that the adequate functioning of the state cannot rest solely on these principles of self-interest and the administration of laws--principles characteristic of what Hegel calls civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft). For the state to be actual, it is necessary that the citizenry possess politische Gesinnung, the recognition--of greater or lesser degree--that the community is their substantive groundwork and end; that the state is the embodiment and manifestation of their essential nature, at once means and end.

doctrne of the state, in short, encompasses Hobbes's and elevates it in accordance with the principle of man as free personality.

In essential respects, Hegel's position comprehends Hobbes's; the politics of free-personality, we might say, comprehends and elevates the politics of power. And in doing so it makes clear the central role which psychology plays in shaping political philosophy. Hobbes's Leviathan and the politics of power which it embodies does not arise in vacuo; it follows from the doctrine of man which serves as the ground of his politics. His conclusion, as Bertrand de Jouvenel rightly points out, follows from his "premises of an absolute libertarianism. Where each man acts as he wills and his will is made up for him by his desires, this liberty of his, if it is not to engender 'the war of all against all', can be kept in being only within the rigorous framework of laws strictly applied and exactly obeyed."81 If we conceive of man as an appetitive engine, then the politics of power follows of necessity—a fact which leads de Jouvenel to draw from Hobbes the following 'lesson': "To the entire extent to which progress develops hedonism and moral relativism, to which individual liberty is conceived as the right of a man to obey his appetites, nothing but the strongest of powers can maintain society in being."82 In other words, to adopt Hobbes's view

82 Ibid., p. 246.
of man as a capricious appetite is to be on the road to adopting his politics of power, force and fear.

In like manner, from Hegel's psychology of free personality there follows his politics of self-conscious freedom—a politics which is more comprehensive than Hobbes's politics and able to obviate the difficulties of that politics precisely because the psychology upon which it is based is more comprehensive. Throughout his account of man, Hegel is concerned to argue for a doctrine of the will which embraces both a particular and a universal element. Hegel's will is neither one-sidedly appetite (Begierde), impulse (Trieb) or free choice (Wille), though it comprehends all of these. When taken by themselves, Hegel argues, each of these is inadequate to the principle of the will as free. He does not ignore the naturalistic and particular elements—elements which Hobbes considers all important. But neither does he make them absolute; for Hegel is concerned to give a doctrine of the will which is full both in form and content, a doctrine which conceives of a concrete unity wherein universality and particularity both receive their due. The principle of man as free personality involves particularity, but it involves this in such a manner that it accords with the substantive, and universal nature of man. The free will is the will which wills its substantive freedom in its particular actions and deeds; as such its principle is not caprice or arbitrariness. Rather, it is freedom; a freedom moreover which is determinate. The free will is the concrete activity of giving itself true
expression in a determinate world, each aspect or element of which it recognizes as the embodiment of itself and of the freedom which constitutes its substantiality. It finds in the world, in the state and in history, its own handiwork, the results of its free self-conscious activity. From the principle of man as free personality, in other words, there derives a political doctrine which regards social and political institutions as embodiments of the freedom which constitutes man's essential nature. The psychology of free personality thus serves as the foundation for a state based not in force and fear, but, rather, a state which serves as the vehicle in which and through which man's freedom is realized.

For both Hobbes and Hegel, then, politics is man 'writ large'. As go their doctrines of man, so go their doctrines of the state or commonwealth. If anything is to be learned from this, it is the absolute centrality of an adequate psychology to political philosophy. From an account of man as an appetitive engine, we have seen, there proceeds as a matter of course Hobbes's politics of force and fear. If we are to avoid the abstract one-sidedness of doctrines such as this, it might be said as a general guide that we would do well to travel in Hegel's footsteps, viz. to attempt to draw a psychology which conceives of man in his concrete, living totality. For to conceive of man in anything less than his living complexity is to run the risk of a politics which enslave man, rather than one which is a genuine vehicle for human fulfillment and self-realization.
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