

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
OF THE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE UNION
OF NEWFOUNDLAND

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES

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A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
OF THE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE
UNION OF NEWFOUNDLAND

by

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of the requirements for the degree of
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Department of Sociology
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Newfoundland

ABSTRACT

The Fishermen's Protective Union (1908-1925) was one of the most successful attempts by Newfoundland fishermen to challenge the status quo in the history of the island. With a membership of 20,000 at its peak, the movement achieved unprecedented economic and political victories. However, despite its strength, the FPU never managed to transcend the regional base of its support--the north-east coast. By employing a theoretically-informed analytical framework, a strong, consistent explanation of some of the factors responsible for the uneven pattern of success and failure of the Union can be constructed.

The FPU is interpreted as a struggle for power between potential partisans of the movement (fishermen) and those groups in authority who attempted to oppose it (merchants and clergy). Regional variations in the relative power of these groups, determined by differences in their level of organization, go a long way toward explaining not only why the FPU succeeded where it did out also, why it failed elsewhere. Analysis suggests that differing structures of underdevelopment influenced both the organization and degree of solidarity of fishermen as well as the ability of the merchant elite to cooperate in attempting to repress the FPU in different parts of Newfoundland. This, combined with unevenness in the strength of the clerical elite, lends support to the view

that in only one region of the island between 1900-1914 were power relations such as to permit the development of strong, sustained support for the movement. That region was the north-east coast, the stronghold of the FPU.

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CHAPTER ONE

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE UNION, OF NEWFOUNDLAND - WHY?

After a century of ineffectual and atomized struggle against exploitation and political domination by the local merchant class, Newfoundland fishermen organized the Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU) in 1908. During the era of the FPU, from 1908-1925, they achieved unprecedented political, economic, and social power. A string of Union locals formed the organizational basis for the construction of a system of fishermen-owned stores in an attack on traditional fishermen-merchant relations. The same locals provided the basis for direct participation in the national politics of Newfoundland. The 1912 'Bonavista Platform' of the FPU "was rightly hailed...as a revolutionary document: if carried into practice in its entirety it would undoubtedly have transformed the socio-economic structure of Newfoundland" (Noel, 1971:98). This political manifesto demanded previously unheard of changes, such as government regulation of the fish export trade, elected road boards, and extensive improvements in the areas of education, old age pensions, and working conditions.¹ The outcome was an election in 1913 in which eight of the nine Union candidates won seats, making them the most powerful party in the Opposition (Noel, 1971:114). In the 1919 election, the FPU received more votes than any other party

- 2 -

on the island (Graesser, 1977:17-20).

Despite a peak membership of 20,000 men gathered in over 200 locals; a newspaper with up to 9,000 subscribers; and its own company with 31 branch stores by 1919, the Fishermen's Protective Union was never able to transcend the regional basis of its support (Coaker, 1930:67; 173; 88). North-east coast fishermen and loggers were mobilized with relative ease and formed the backbone of the Union. South-west coast fishermen however, were never organized within the history of the FPU. If we look at Figures One and Two and Table One, it is clear that the movement was strongest in the districts of Trinity, Bonavista, Fogo, Twillingate, St. Barbe's; Bay de Verde and Port de Grave. It was weakest in Burgeo La Poile, St. George's, Ferryland, Placentia-St. Mary's, Carbonear, St. John's East and West, and Fortune Burin. The central concern of this analysis is to attempt to explain the factors responsible for this pattern of success and failure.

Historians and political scientists are well aware of the uneven success experienced by the FPU. However, to date they have relied on ad hoc explanations for it. Among the factors which such explanations emphasize is the role the dynamic leadership of Sir William Coaker played in creating the movement and determining its distribution. The charismatic qualities of this one man led John Feltham to write that "the




FIGURE ONE
 Newfoundland Electoral Districts, 1913
 and Fishermen's Trading Co. Branch Stores, 1917




FIGURE TWO
 FPU locals in 1914 by district (total: 188)

TABLE ONE
Selected Statistics on Newfoundland and the FPU

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Ratio of Roman Catholics to Protestants, 1911</u>	<u>% FPU vote, 1913</u>	<u>FPU membership as % of reg. voters, 1913</u>
St. John's East	1.06	0.0	**
St. John's West	1.02	0.0	**
Harbour Main	2.33	0.0	**
Port de Grave	0.35	55.5	41.5
Harbour Grace	0.26	0.0	23.1
Carbonear	0.34	0.0	**
Bay de Verde	0.29	25.1*	59.9
Trinity	0.08	37.1*	65.0
Bonavista	0.16	68.6	64.2
Fogo	0.16	69.2	73.2
Twillingate	0.12	32.9	67.9
St. Barbe	0.30	0.0	37.4
St. George	1.58	0.0	**
Burgeo La Poile	0.02	0.0	**
Fortune	0.28	0.0	**
Burin	0.53	0.0	**
Placentia-St. Mary's	4.16	0.0	**
Ferryland	36.62	0.0*	**

* Three-party contests.

** Membership in these constituencies was insignificant--a total of only 30

*** About a third of the Labrador fishery 'stationers' from these constituencies (i.e., women and children). In other constituencies this percentage was (i.e., less than 1%). See (Staveley, 1973).

Sources: (Coaker, 1930:64; Census of Newfoundland, 1911: Table I, 496-8 Table IV, 302; Graesser, 1977:17-19).

1 of

TABLE ONE

ected Statistics on Newfoundland and the FPU

Roman to nts, 1911	% FPU vote, 1913	FPU membership as % of reg. voters, 1913	persons employed in Labrador fishery and logging, 1911, as % of reg. voters, 1913
06	0.0	**	0.0
02	0.0	**	0.3
33	0.0	**	14.1
35	55.5	41.5	66.3***
26	0.0	23.1	48.9***
34	0.0	**	77.2***
29	25.1*	59.9	15.8
08	37.1*	65.0	47.6
16	68.6	64.2	43.2
16	69.2	73.2	19.2
12	32.9	67.9	36.9
30	0.0	37.4	10.2
58	0.0	**	9.0
2	0.0	**	1.0
28	0.0	**	6.0
53	0.0	**	3.5
16	0.0	**	1.0
62	0.0*	**	0.0

ncies was insignificant--a total of only 300.
fishery 'stationers' from these constituencies were non-voters
In other constituencies this percentage was insignificant
(Taveley, 1973).

ensus of Newfoundland, 1911: Table I, 496-8; Table II, 442-3;
(1977:17-19).



factor which contributed most to the precipitous growth of the FPU was the herculean efforts and demagogic appeal of the founder" (1959:27). A more recent account is similar in its emphasis:

Compelled by his cause, Coaker set out to place his ideas before the masses...As a young reporter, Joseph Smallwood, was later to describe the experience of listening to Coaker: "His manner of speaking is intense and passionate, and forceful and direct; he hits hard...words pour out of him like a torrent, rushing, streaming, tempestuous...What Coaker told the fishermen was that they must have a union - a Fishermen's Protective Union - if their rights were to be secured. They agreed and the movement expanded rapidly (McDonald, n.d.:18).

Coaker receives much of the credit for the formation and distribution of the movement in McDonald's work and also a great deal of the responsibility for its eventual failure. McDonald suggests that after 1919, when the FPU most needed an "infusion of enthusiasm and reforming energy such as Coaker had provided at its inception", the leader's age, heavy responsibilities and poor health kept him from becoming such a motivating force. Thus, McDonald continues, "with no younger Coaker forthcoming, the vision on which the movement had been initiated faded and never thereafter regained its former clarity and power" (1971:331).⁴ Reliance on the 'great man theory of history' prompts the latter historian to account for the failure of the FPU to spread to the south-west coast primarily by Coaker's inability to

coordinate all of his work on the north-east coast and visit this other region as well. It is implied that if he had visited the south-west coast, the pattern of FPU success and failure would have been transformed.⁵

Since Plekhanov (1895, repr. 1972) many social thinkers have viewed as misguided those intellectuals and would-be leaders who believe they need but go forth and arouse the masses thereafter moulding them as they desire. The 'great man theory of history' with its inordinate reliance on the charismatic qualities of leaders tends to ignore the social context in which such leaders act in explaining the development of social movements. As suggested by one author, "...while there are plenty of people with messages, these must be relevant to social groups before they begin to be received and become the basis for action" (Friedland, 1969:248). Authors of 'history from below' carry this criticism even further. Not only must masses be receptive to the message of their potential leader but other factors are also important in determining whether or not a sustained movement emerges. Utilizing Marxian ideas in their approach to social movements such authors as Georges Rude, Eric Hobsbawm, Albert Soboul and Charles Tilly "share the assumption that the social base, the organizational form, the prior claims and grievances, the present mobilization of the ordinary actors in political conflicts provide a major part of the

explanation of their actions" (Tilly, 1975:273-4). Inherent in this approach is an attempt to shift attention away from the leadership and onto the wider membership in social movements with the result that it is no longer necessary to view the FPU, or any other movement, as an historical anomaly made possible by an accident of fate: the presence of a charismatic leader in the right place at the right time. To return to the quote from McDonald cited above (page 6), what would have happened if the fishermen had not agreed with Coaker or, even more importantly, they had been unable to organize in his support?

Previous accounts of the FPU have tended to portray Newfoundland fishermen as a fundamentally homogeneous group with the same socio-economic interests. These men apparently had an identical ability to organize a radical movement, but the absence of a leader to crystallize hostile sentiment toward the merchant class in some regions limited the distribution of the FPU. The ad hoc nature of these explanations means that on the limited occasions when reference is made to specific characteristics of fishermen in one region as in Noel (1971:91-2), the absence of comparable information for other regions makes it difficult to assess the role such characteristics played in determining the distribution of the FPU.

The analysis which follows is an attempt to replace the explanations of previous authors for the

regional distribution of the FPU by a theoretically informed analysis. An investigation which fits most comfortably into the school of thought described as 'history from below', it employs a theoretical framework based on a conception of social movements as struggles for power between potential partisans and authorities.⁶ Based on the conflict theory of social movements derived from Marxism the framework focuses on the structural determinants of power. This permits the study to avoid the temptation "to consider the development of protest both as the consequence of solidarity and as the very evidence of solidarity" (Tilly, 1975:8). The three structural determinants of power are understood to be (a) the size of the group, (b) its level of social organization and (c) access to resources (Bierstedt, 1974; Brym, 1977).

Differences in the size of social groups has been shown to affect political behaviour and ideology (Brym, 1978b:64-72; 77). However, the size of a group is by no means the single determinant of its power as is evident in situations where a small minority controls a majority. Organization also confers power on a group by increasing its potential to engage in concerted action against a collective opponent. One further determinant of power is the degree to which a group has access to coercive, financial and leadership resources which among

other things, affects the ability of a community to impose sanctions on its members (Oberschall, 1973:115-7). An example which highlights the importance of access to resources is the increase in worker unrest that occurs during periods of economic expansion. Workers clearly outnumber management and unionization often precedes the development of prolonged worker unrest. However, the increase in the ability of workers to control access to their one resource, their own labour, during periods of economic expansion, raises the overall power of workers. This is reflected in an increase in strikes and other forms of unrest (see Bouvier, 1964; Hobsbawm, 1952; and Smith, 1972).

This study focuses on regional variations in the level of organization of partisans and authorities in accounting for the distribution of the FPU. This is not meant to imply that other determinants of power were unimportant. However, in the case of Newfoundland, because fishermen made up a majority of the population in almost all regions of the island, regional variations in the size of this group are unlikely to have been a major factor affecting FPU success and failure. Access to resources was, no doubt, very significant, but previous studies have tended to over-emphasize the role of leadership resources and it is, in part, to offset this tendency that the present account focuses on level of

social organization.⁷

A theoretical framework which focuses on the structural determinants of power differs substantially from that employed in the 'social disorganization' and 'relative deprivation' analyses of social movements (see, for example, Smelser, 1962; and Gurr, 1970). An explanation for the rapid growth of the FPU after 1900 which attributes it to the 'chaos' which characterized the Newfoundland fish trade during this period and the "seeds of distrust, anger and frustration" this sowed among fishermen belongs to this latter school of thought (McDonald, n.d.:13-14). In contrast, the framework utilized here recognizes that structural change may result in the disintegration of old alliances, the fragmentation of groups, and the experience of 'anomie',⁸ but it considers such change to be only indirectly associated with the emergence of incidents of collective behaviour (Tilly, 1975:244). The framework implies instead that social movements are more likely to occur among groups which are increasing their level of organization and solidarity than among individuals marginalized by the process of structural change (Oberschall, 1973; Brym, 1978b). In employing a conflict theory of social movements for the analysis of factors responsible for regional variations in the strength of the FPU, attention is focused not on psychological states of mind but rather, the "lines of

cleavage and solidarity in a society, in the bases and distribution of power" (Tilly, 1964:20).

Finally, unlike previous accounts, the thesis is essentially comparative in its approach. Power relationships between potential partisans of the FPU and those groups hostile to the movement are investigated not only in the region where the FPU was successful but also where it was not. As suggested by Tilly (1975:12):

[A]n explanation of protest, rebellion, or collective violence that cannot account for its absence is no explanation at all; an explanation based only on cases where something happened is quite likely to attribute importance to conditions which are actually quite common in cases where nothing happened.

A systematic analysis of the structural factors responsible for the pattern of success and failure of the FPU during the 1910s and 1920s seeks to meet the challenge of this theoretical desiderata.

Thus, in response to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, a sociological analysis of the FPU should prove valuable indeed. In the first place, it is a contribution to the historical sociology of one part of Canada which is at present understudied and poorly understood.⁹ Second, in contrast to other analyses of the FPU, this study is a theoretically informed investigation, inherently comparative in its approach, which permits us to evaluate the relative importance of a limited number of variables in determining the regional

distribution of the movement. Such an investigation should demonstrate the value of focusing upon structural rather than psychological variables, such as relative deprivation, in explaining incidents of class struggle.

The organization of the thesis is relatively simple. Data are divided into two chapters. Chapter Two focuses on regional variations in the level of organization of potential partisans of the FPU including fishermen, loggers, sealers and urban workers. Chapter Three is concerned with regional variations in the level of organization of authorities, that is, the clerical and merchant élites who opposed the movement. Chapter Two deals primarily with the relationship between structures of underdevelopment and regional variations in patterns of work organization. The discussion of merchant elite in Chapter Three posits a possible link between structures of underdevelopment and different degrees of intermercantile competition. In some cases, information is provided for all regions of the island. However, the thesis concentrates on explaining the pattern of support for the FPU in four parts of Newfoundland. These are (1) the centre of FPU strength along the north-east coast; (2) the south-west coast where the Union failed; (3) the east coast districts from St. John's around to Placentia-St. Mary's where Union locals were closed down; (4) Carbonear and Port de Grave where support was uneven. A fourth concluding chapter is

used to draw together the information provided on both partisans and authorities. Some possible further questions are raised and a brief discussion of the relationship between uneven underdevelopment¹⁰ and the emergence of class struggle is provided.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a description of the Bonavista Platform see Coaker (1930:44-63).
2. Feltham lists one store each in the Conception Bay districts of Harbour Main, Port de Grave, Harbour Grace, Carbonear and Bay de Verde for 1917 (1959:166-7). However, the store in Carbonear was supposedly located in Salmon Cove and an interview with an old retired fisherman from that community failed to produce any reference to it.
3. The number of locals listed totals 188. According to Coaker, there were 18 others distributed in the remaining districts to make a total of 206 in 1914.
4. Although McDonald by no means attributes the decline of the FPU entirely to Coaker, it is clear that a lack of dynamic leadership is seen as playing a major role in preventing the movement from overcoming various adverse political and economic developments.
5. Because his explanation for the failure of the FPU on the southwest coast is ad hoc, McDonald never clarifies his argument. However, he implies that this region differed from the north-east coast only in that Coaker never visited it and hence was unable to pour sustained organizational energy into it. The implication is that if Coaker had been able to do this, the Union could have been strong on the south-west coast as well. See his discussion of the organization of Union locals in the districts of Fortune and Burin and his summary and explanation for the outcome of the 1919 election in which he suggests that support for the FPU was very strong among south-west coast fishermen (1971:134f; 202-3).
6. The concepts 'partisan' and 'authorities' are taken from Gamson. He defines authorities as "those who, for any given social system, make binding decisions in that system". Partisans are that segment of the population who are affected by decisions in a 'significant way' and who are 'targets of social control' (1968:21, 32; 36).
7. When information about access to resources is available and considered relevant to the ongoing discussion it is introduced. However, differences in level of organization remains the central explanatory variable.

8. See Durkheim, (1960) for a discussion of 'anomie'.
9. One need only refer to Frank Underhill's comment that 'as for the Maritimes, nothing, of course, ever happens down there' (1968:63), in order to recognize how much the Canadian Atlantic region is understudied.
10. The phrase 'uneven underdevelopment' is taken from the work of James Sacouman. See, for example, (Sacouman, 1979:107-126).

CHAPTER TWO

PARTISANS

The Fishermen's Protective Union garnered most of its support from fishermen along the north-east coast of Newfoundland in the districts of St. Barbe, Twillingate, Fogo, Trinity, Bay de Verde and Port de Grave. This fact is demonstrated whether we measure FPU support by the distribution of FPU stores (Figure One, p. 3); FPU union locals (Figure Two, p. 4); or by membership in the FPU as a percentage of voters in the 1913 election (Table One, p. 5). The movement was much less successful in the districts of Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's; in Carbonear, in St. John's, and in the districts of Fortune, Burin and Burgeo La Poile along the south-west coast. It was also not very strong in the district of St. George's on the west coast.

Previous authors have noted that fishermen on the north-east coast were engaged in a type of work organization that facilitated the spread of the FPU (Feltham, 1959:27-9; Noel, 1971:91-4; McDonald, 1971:55-6; and Gaffney, 1977). However, a consistent, theoretically informed analysis of the role of work organization in determining the distribution of the FPU has never been carried out. In this investigation, work organization is understood as providing the basis for the organization of partisans. Patterns of work organization in all regions of Newfoundland, in the fishery, logging, sealing,

and mining industries as well as the urban industries of St. John's, are investigated and compared. A comparative study of work organization in the fishery in various regions of the island is made possible by anthropological investigations that are now available. Prior to describing regional variations in patterns of work organization an explanation for such variations is outlined based on differing structures of underdevelopment in Newfoundland at the beginning of the Twentieth century.

Structures of underdevelopment in Newfoundland:

Recent research on movements of direct producers in the Atlantic region has suggested that a relationship exists between the emergence and distribution of such movements and the type of capitalist underdevelopment which predominates in a particular region (see Brym and Sacouman, 1979). This research is based on the premise that capitalist underdevelopment, just like capitalist development, is uneven. As a result, producers in underdeveloped regions are frequently maintained in several modes of production. Fine has recently suggested that peripheral areas in the capitalist system are faced with "...obstacles to the transition both from pre-capitalist to capitalist relations of production and from a formal to a real subsumption of labour to capital." As a consequence, he argues, there emerges "an articulation within the peripheral formation of different modes of production,

each formed at a different stage of development, each articulated in turn with external fractions of capital" (1978:94). The co-existence of petty commodity production, subsistence production, and capitalist production, with the differing patterns of work organization and levels of solidarity which these involve, provides the basis for an examination of regional variations in the distribution of producer movements such as the FPU.

In analyzing the way in which fragments of capital articulate with different modes of production in underdeveloped areas, it is enlightening to distinguish between four ideal types of capitalist underdevelopment:

(1) indirect/subsistence; (2) indirect/commercial; (3) direct underdevelopment type I; and (4) direct underdevelopment type II (Refer to Figure Three). The first two of these can be defined in the following way:

Indirect/subsistence capitalist underdevelopment refers to the maintenance of surplus pools of independent petty primary producers engaged mainly in subsistence (i.e. non-market) production. Indirect/commercial capitalist underdevelopment refers to the investment of capital--by both petty producers (in means of production) and large capitalists (in the realms of transportation, marketing, and supply)--for purposes of extracting cheap raw materials from underdeveloped regions and surplus value from the direct producers. Appropriation of surplus occurs mainly through mechanisms of unequal exchange: means of production are sold high, the commodity produced is sold low. The unit of production is typically the household... (Brym, 1979:64).

		level of capital investment	
		high	low
exploitation at the point of production	yes	direct U.D. type I	direct U.D. type II
	no	indirect/commerical	indirect/subsistence

FIGURE THREE
The relationship between level of capital investment, exploitation at the point of production, and differing structures of underdevelopment.

Therefore, structures of indirect underdevelopment are based on mechanisms of unequal exchange; the means of production and direct control over production are left in the hands of petty producers.

Indirect underdevelopment is distinguished from direct underdevelopment in the following way. Direct capitalist underdevelopment type I is the expropriation of surplus value by means of control over the means of production and involves capitalist wage-labour relations of production. A perfect example is the ownership and operation of a large mine. Direct capitalist underdevelopment type II involves a combination of the petty commodity and capitalist modes of production. Large capitalists invest sufficient capital at the point of production to permit them to monopolize a portion of the product (in this way it differs from indirect/commercial underdevelopment). Petty production persists. Petty producers are not expropriated but rather maintained acting as a reserve army of labour, a mechanism for depressing wages in the capitalist sector, and a source of surplus product available during periods of high demand (Brym, 1979; Sacouman, 1980:16).

The early twentieth century Nova Scotia fishery provides a good example of direct capitalist underdevelopment type II:

[W]hile fish production remained throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries even less capitalized than agriculture, it was faced with direct destruction by externally owned, vertically integrated fish corporations--firms that employed labour on trawlers, bought fish from independents, and sold gear and other provisions to the independents. (Säcouman, 1979:117).

A portion of production was controlled by large capitalists on whom petty producers depended for access to markets and requirements for production. This combined with problems of overproduction and loss of markets to pose a direct threat to the viability of the small boat, inshore fishery in Eastern Nova Scotia. In response, these fishermen played an important role in the emergence of the Antigonish Movement in the 1930s.¹

Because structures of direct underdevelopment types I and II normally concentrate producers in large units of production and because they can produce the semi-proletarianization and/or increased indebtedness of petty producers, higher levels of organization and increased solidarity may result. In other words,

[i]n developing the social character of production, capitalist accumulation progressively deprives the individual workers of any method of producing the necessary means for their existence outside of the productive apparatus controlled by capital...From the ashes of the individual bargaining power of workers there is born the collective power of labour. The concentration and centralization of capital also concentrates and centralizes the working class developing its solidarity... (Arrighi, 1978:7).

Under structures of indirect underdevelopment on the other hand, in particular within indirect/subsistence underdevelopment, producers are atomized in small units of production. Petty producers subject to surplus appropriation through indirect means often have strong vertical ties to the merchant on whom they are dependent and weak ties to fellow producers. They may even be in competition with each other for scarce resources. As a consequence, it is probable that such producers would be less able to organize any sustained collective resistance to their exploiters than those affected by structures of direct underdevelopment.

However, it is not always the case that structures of direct underdevelopment produce a higher level of concentration of production and solidarity among direct producers than structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment. Where investment in production is only partial, producing structures of direct underdevelopment type II, this may act as a mechanism for increasing the control of merchant-capitalists over the surplus of petty producers through a reduction in intermercantile competition. One consequence could be the continued or even further atomization of petty producers. Also, if capital investment in production by merchant-capitalists does not directly threaten the economic basis of petty production the impact of atomization on solidarity will not be reduced as a consequence of semi-proletarianization.² One would not

expect class struggle to develop under these conditions despite the presence of direct underdevelopment.

Within the capitalist sector in areas characterized either by structures of direct underdevelopment type II or a combination of structures of direct and indirect underdevelopment, the availability of a reserve army of labour from petty production would undermine the potential for collective action among workers. The basis for radical action would be even further reduced if the increased concentration of producers associated with capitalist as compared to petty production was less than the concentration of capital that produced it. For example, in the case of a joint stock company controlling many small factories or introducing a putting out system, "the erosion of bargaining power which workers derived from intercapitalist competition and from their incomplete subordination to capital [is] not offset by a compensatory growth in their collective strength" (Arrighi, 1978:7). Under the above conditions, effective collective action might be more likely to develop among petty producers than in the capitalist sector. This would be the case in particular if capital investment in production was producing semi-proletarianization among petty producers, they were not atomized in extremely small units of production, and/or there was a high level of inter-mercantile competition.

The above discussion of the relationship between structures of underdevelopment and the development of class

struggle permits us to conclude that while in general we can expect producers involved in structures of direct underdevelopment to be better organized and more solidary than those involved in indirect underdevelopment, this may not always be the case. Indeed, within indirect/commercial underdevelopment where units of production are relatively large and a high level of intermercantile competition for their product exists (during periods of high demand), petty producers should be sufficiently powerful to mobilize in their own interests. Finally, where structures of direct underdevelopment type II produce the semi-proletarianization but not the atomization of petty producers without simultaneously reducing intermercantile competition the potential for collective action is also high.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to a detailed study of the relationship between the distribution of the FPU, regional variations in patterns of work organization and differing structures of underdevelopment. A systematic comparison of the north-east and south-west coasts as well as some other regions provides a good empirical illustration of the above theoretical discussion which, when combined with information on the level of organization of authorities contained in Chapter Three, produces a forceful explanation for the regional distribution of the FPU.

1. Work organization on the South-west Coast: FPU failure in the context of structures of direct underdevelopment type II

As defined here, the south-west coast region is understood to include the districts of Burgeo La Poile, Fortune and Burin (see Figure One, p. 3). The almost total failure of the FPU in these districts can be partially attributed to patterns of work organization within the fishery--the sole industry in the region with the exception of a few whaling factories and one small furniture factory. Like most parts of Newfoundland around 1900, the south-west coast fishery included an inshore branch dominated by petty producers. However, at this time, there was also a near and offshore branch to the fishery of varying importance throughout the region.³ Vessels in this sector were owned primarily by the local merchant elite. Thus, the predominant pattern in the region consisted of inshore fishermen dependent for supplies and marketing on a class of merchants who were simultaneously engaged in a capitalist offshore fishery producing structures of direct underdevelopment type II. However, within the inshore fishery, capital investment in the offshore did not constitute a direct threat to the continued survival of petty producers who were maintained in extremely atomized units of production. And, in the offshore the operation of a divisive system of incentive undermined the potential for collective action. The lack of solidarity at work provides part of the

explanation for the failure of the FPU along the south-west coast.

(a) The inshore fishery

The overwhelming trend within the inshore fishery in all of Newfoundland throughout the nineteenth century was the withdrawal of capital from production. Indirect structures of capitalist underdevelopment came to predominate as petty commodity production, based on the domestic unit, replaced a more capital intensive fishery, based on capitalist relations of production involving wage-labour (S. Antler, 1975). Rather than relying upon direct control of the means of production to extract surplus value, merchants introduced the truck or credit system. Under this system, merchants advanced supplies for the fishery on credit at the beginning of the season and took payment in the form of fish in the fall. By controlling both the price of fish and the price of supplies, they were able to appropriate a sufficiently high percentage of surplus value to force fishermen, wherever possible, to engage in subsistence activities in order to survive (E. Antler, 1977:7 and passim).⁴ Under the credit system, merchants:

[p]aid out not season's wages, but rather end-of-season payments varying directly with the size of the catch itself. Merchants paid for the fish they received. If the catch was poor, payments were low: so long as the value of the catch stayed sufficiently above the value of supplies advanced at the start of the season, the merchant had no interest in whether or not average levels of productivity of labour in the fishery were rising or falling (S. Antler, 1975:113).

The optimal profit-generating strategy for merchants under the credit system of incentive was to spread capital over as many atomized units of production as they could afford to finance.⁵ The system worked as long as merchants cooperated in price setting and were able to use the threat of credit withdrawal on fishermen who might be tempted to sell independently (MacKay, 1946:115). Surplus value generated from the inshore fishery throughout the 19th century was largely withdrawn. In periods of relatively high prices it was invested in the offshore fishery and to some extent in the profitable seal fishery but, increasingly, as prices for salt cod on the world market declined and seals diminished in numbers, levels of investment dropped and capital was exported or at least moved out of the fishing sector (Sager, 1978; S. Antler, 1975; 1979).⁶ As a result, "the countryside was denuded of capital other than the short term financing by the agents or dependents of St. John's firms to pursue the traditional fishery" (Alexander, 1974:19). This withdrawal of capital, the consequent spread of structures

of indirect underdevelopment, small units of production within the inshore fishery, and the decline of the capitalist offshore fishery, go a long way in explaining the apparent 'conservatism' of Newfoundland fishermen and their history of relative quiescence throughout the latter part of the 19th century.

The inshore fishery, which was the most important branch of the fishery in most parts of Newfoundland and the credit system of exchange between merchant and fisherman came to characterize the fishery. However, during the first decade of the twentieth century the credit system began to break down along the north-east coast but not, significantly, along the south-west coast of Newfoundland. In the latter region, merchant cooperation in setting prices, facilitated by investment in the offshore fishery, helped south-west coast merchants maintain the credit system within the inshore fishery in their region (see Chapter Three). One result was that along the south-west coast, after the turn of the century inshore fishing units were the smallest and most atomized to be found on the island.

South-west coast fishermen continued to rely on very cheap and simple technology after 1900. Hook and line technology, the predominant form, required no more than one fisherman with the result that "the most efficient productive unit (hence ideal crew) was felt to be that of the lone fisherman" (Gaffney, 1978:4-5). In actual fact, whenever

possible, crews consisted of two men, a father and the oldest son still at home. However, this production unit of two men was very unstable. The limitations on accumulation of surplus value that the credit system placed on fishermen encouraged them to exploit their sons. Since one man constituted a sufficiently large labour force to operate hook and line, it was not necessary for a father to offer any incentive to his son to continue fishing with him. As a result, while the son did fish with him, and up until the age of 21, sons were not given a full share of the catch (Gaffney, 1978:6ff). The extra share went to the father and the son received only room and board. As a result, as early as possible, sons moved off into the more lucrative offshore fisheries operated by merchants not only locally but out of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia and Gloucester, Massachusetts (Gaffney, 1978:8, 11). They were replaced in the dory by the next youngest son and the pattern would repeat itself. Consequently inshore production units remained extremely small and atomized as well as unstable.


When sons returned to fish in the inshore fishery, they would set up their own operation rather than fish with their fathers. As a result, the relationship between them and their fathers, "as between all fishermen, was marked by the competitive nature of an open access fishery of limited extent" (Gaffney, 1978:14-5).

The development of an offshore capitalist fishery did not pose a direct threat to the inshore fishermen. It

may well have placed important limits on the potential for accumulation among inshore fishermen and intensified their labour by drawing sons away earlier and forcing fishermen to fish on their own. However, the lone fisherman could still fish and his attempts to keep his sons home without providing any economic incentive would have only enhanced conflict and lines of fragmentation within the domestic unit. The continued operation of the credit system on the south-west coast and the atomized units of production which this produced combined with the early fragmentation of the domestic unit associated with the availability of work in the offshore, helped ensure that the potential for collective action among south-west coast inshore fishermen remained low throughout the period of the FPU.

(b) The near-shore and bank fisheries

Increased prices for fish in the foreign markets after 1900 led south-west coast merchants to increase their investment in schooners for use in the near and offshore Bank fisheries (see Figure Four). For example, between 1900-10 merchants between Cape Ray in the west and the southern tip of the Burin Peninsula in the east purchased schooner tonnage totalling at least 7,826 tons.⁷ Although fishermen working in the offshore were no doubt more concentrated than their inshore counterparts, the pattern of work organization and system of incentive which came to



Source: (Mackay, 1946:143).

Note: No figures available for 1892.

FIGURE FOUR
Export prices per quintal of dried cod.

dominate this branch of the fishery precluded the development of a high level of solidarity.

Vessels employed in the near shore and Bank fisheries ranged in size from skiffs with 3-5 men aboard to banking schooners with crews up to 28 (Gaffney, 1978:5). The technology employed was trawl; the pattern of work organization similar, whatever the size of the boat. When a vessel arrived at the fishing area, men were deployed in 2-3 man dories. They spent the day fishing, returning to the main vessel for unloading after which the fishermen would clean, salt and stow away the day's catch. Trawl, like hook and line, was a technology which did not require cooperative effort. Each man fished independently with his own line of trawl (Gaffney, 1978:5). Individual commitment to any particular vessel was low with a consequent high rate of mobility between vessels (Gaffney, 1978:5). Indeed, not only was commitment low, but expendability was high. In the case of any individual fisherman, "[i]f the position vacated [by him] was not...filled by another individual, the boat could continue to fish just as before" (Gaffney, 1978:5). Needless to say, this was a situation ideally suited to the elimination of troublemakers.

The problems posed by this pattern of work organization for the mobilization of fishermen were enhanced by the introduction of an extremely divisive system of incentives into the Bank fishery where the concentration of

production was the highest. Merchants attempted to meet increased demand in the foreign market not simply by adding more schooner tonnage but also by attempting to increase productivity per man and per schooner ton engaged in the fishery. A change in the system of incentive no doubt accounts in part for an almost 100% increase in productivity between 1889 and 1915-19 (Sager, 1978:30). Under the 'count' system of incentive, which was introduced sometime after 1900, fishermen did not take a share of the total catch as they did on the north-east coast (MacDermott, 1938:164; Anderson, 1977). Wages of fishermen still depended on the outcome of the voyage, however, under the 'count' system,

each fish taken from each dory was literally counted and recorded by the skipper, mate, or cook on a tally board to the credit of the specific dory crew. The tally board was kept in a prominent location at all times so that all dory crews were aware of each other's catch progress. The skipper delivered the tally board to the company office upon arrival in port (Anderson, 1977:9).

As a consequence of this system, and despite a relatively concentrated work force whose recruitment was partially family-based, "relations between dory crews were highly competitive and conflict-ridden. Men often refused to speak to each other for days and whole trips" (Anderson, 1977:13).

One final element in the workplace contributed to the fragmentation of fishermen. Those fishermen who consistently had the best catches or who were 'high dory fishermen' often had a chance at the position of skipper aboard

one of the merchant's schooners. This not only increased competition between fishermen but reduced the availability of such men for a potential leadership role in the mobilization of fishermen in their own interests.⁸

Hence, despite the presence of structures of direct underdevelopment type II throughout much of the south-west coast fishery after the turn of the century, the level of organization and solidarity of south-west coast fishermen were minimal. The persistence of the truck or credit system of exchange within the inshore fishery and technology requiring no cooperative effort between fishermen, combined with the increased availability of positions in the offshore, virtually guaranteed the fragmentation of inshore units and atomization of inshore fishermen. In the offshore fishery, despite increased concentration of producers, the patterns of work organization and system of incentives militated against the development of solidary groups of fishermen.

The fragmenting impact of patterns of work organization on the south-west coast were reflected in family relations and voluntary organization formation as well. Anthropologists have found that south-west coast communities were characterized by a low level of mutual aid within communities and even within families (Leyton, 1975:12; Chiaramonte, 1970:12-13). If we look at voluntary associations on the south-west coast as compared with the north-east coast, the associational network available at this level for mobilization of fishermen is strikingly absent. For example,

in 1911, the district of Burgeo La Poile had only .03 society halls per community compared with .12-.35 in FPU districts on the north-east coast (see Table Two). Similarly, the districts of Fbortune and Burin had only .03 and .08 society halls per community respectively.

The above discussion strongly suggests that patterns of work organization on the south-west coast produced problems of solidarity which limited the potential for collective action among local fishermen. Evidence that patterns of work organization in the few communities where FPU locals were established prior to 1914 differed from the general trend, lends support to this conclusion.⁹ Atomization and fragmentation affected the potential for mobilization among local fishermen not only in the FPU but in voluntary organizations in general. In itself, the absence of a dense network of voluntary organizations would have hampered the FPU on the south-west coast by reducing the availability of previously established contacts and leaders for use by the movement.¹⁰

2. The North-east Coast: FPU success in the context of structures of direct and indirect underdevelopment

It is not until we turn to the north-east coast that we find forms of work organization that augmented the power of producers to organize in their own interests. Not only were inshore fishermen less atomized than those on the south-west coast, but the expansion of the Labrador fishery

TABLE TWO
Society Halls in Newfoundland by district, 1911

	Loyal Orange Association***	Society for United Fishermen***	Star of the Sea ***
St. John's West	1	0	0
St. John's East	4	1	1
Harbour Main	3	2	1
Harbour Grace	7	0	0
**Port de Grave	4	3	0
Carbonear	2	0	0
**Bay de Verde	5	1	0
**Trinity	19	6	0
**Bonavista	17	7	0
**Twillingate	21	1	0
**Fogo	8	3	0
**St. Barbe	8	0	0
St. George	7	0	1
Burgeo La Poile	2	1	0
Fortune	2	3	0
Burin	3	3	0
Placentia-St. Mary's	5	1	0
Ferryland	0	0	0

- * The idea to calculate the relative number of halls by the number of co.
- ** FPU districts.
- *** These three associations are the most numerous on the island during thi
of Society Halls. SUF was originally Anglican but also included Method
Social halls in most Catholic districts were confined almost exclusivel

Sources: Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1911, Table III; Table I above



TABLE TWO
 y Halls in Newfoundland by district, 1911*

**	Society for United Fishermen***	Star of the Sea ***	Total	Total halls/ community	Ratio of R.C./ Protestant.1911
	0	0	1	1/35=.03	1.06
	1	1	6	6/24=.25	1.02
	2	1	6	6/30=.2	2.33
	0	0	7	7/31=.23	0.26
	3	0	7	7/34=.21	0.35
	0	0	2	2/9=.22	0.34
	1	0	6	6/39=.15	0.29
	6	0	25	25/146=.17	0.08
	7	0	24	24/109=.22	0.16
	1	0	22	22/198=.11	0.12
	3	0	11	11/72=.15	0.16
	0	0	8	8/177=.05	0.30
	0	1	8	8/113=.07	1.58
	1	0	3	3/56=.05	0.02
	3	0	5	5/197=.03	0.28
	3	0	6	6/77=.08	0.53
	1	0	6	6/139=.04	4.16
	0	0	0	0/30=0	36.62

tive number of halls by the number of communities came from Clint Herrick.

he most numerous on the island during this period as reflected in the census
 ginally Anglican but also included Methodists. The Star of the Sea was Catholic.
 districts were confined almost exclusively to parish halls.

d Labrador, 1911, Table III; Table I above, page 5.



provided a solid organizational base for the FPU. Seasonal involvement of north-east coast fishermen in logging, sealing and/or mining was also important. Structures of direct underdevelopment types I and II and the decline in the credit system as a mechanism for indirect/commercial underdevelopment produced relations of production that enhanced producer solidarity.

Merchant-capitalists on the north-east coast, as elsewhere on the island, responded to the high prices for salt cod in international markets at the turn of the century by increased capital investment. Capital investment in production increased both the concentration of production and the level of producer solidarity in the capitalist sector. Solidarity within one branch of the north-east coast fishery was also enhanced by the introduction of steamships which posed a direct threat to one portion of the fishing population. Within the inshore fishery, the decline in the credit system as a mechanism for indirect/commercial underdevelopment simultaneously prompted the development of larger units of production; the semi-proletarianization of north-east coast fishermen during the winter season; and greater exposure of fishermen as a group to fluctuations in the price of fish. As a result of the above developments, north-east coast fishermen developed a relatively high level of organization and solidarity which made the rapid spread of the FPU throughout this region possible.

The north-east coast fishery can be divided into three parts: the inshore fishery, the Labrador floater fishery, and the Labrador stationer fishery. By looking at relations of production within these three fisheries and in the sealing, logging and mining industries, it is possible to develop a sound, albeit partial, understanding of the basis for FPU support on the north-east coast.

(a) The inshore fishery

Many FPU locals and stores were established in communities which relied entirely upon the inshore fishery.¹¹ The inshore fishery was prosecuted throughout this region, from the district of St. Barbe around to Conception Bay. The technology employed during this period was predominantly the cod trap.¹² However, traps were expensive and not all fishermen owned them.¹³ Those that did not own traps provided a reserve army of labour working as sharemen for trap-owning families and merchants both in the inshore and the Labrador fisheries.

Around the turn of the century, the ownership of traps, because of the cost involved, was often divided between several members of the extended family. If a family owned several traps they would employ sharemen to help operate them. In extreme cases, units of production were based upon three and four generation families which pooled their resources in one company account (Firestone, 1967:48). Often, not only extended family networks but friendship

networks as well were activated in an attempt to recruit crew members (Britan, 1974; Schwartz, 1974; Firestone, 1967, Faris, 1972).

The development of larger units of production within the north-east coast inshore fishery was prompted by a partial breakdown in the credit system of exchange in this region toward the end of the 19th century.¹⁴ It was noted above that the credit system tended to produce atomized units of production because under this system merchants were normally unconcerned about average level of productivity and spread their capital over as many units of production as possible. This pattern changed with the withdrawal of capital from the fishery prior to 1900. During this period merchants began to favour fishermen who owned capital equipment such as cod traps which they could use as collateral to cover the cost of fishery supplies advanced in the spring and which helped ensure they would get a paying voyage.¹⁵ As a consequence, those fishermen without capital equipment found themselves unable to get merchants to advance them supplies for the fishery as individuals. Some were prompted to pool their resources and purchase equipment. Many were forced to leave the fishery. Others became part of a growing reserve army of labour forced to work for those fishermen who could get supplies or for merchants in the capitalist sector. In general, larger units of production were the result. This was particularly true after the turn of the century when

rising prices prompted increased capital investment by fishermen and merchants in the fishery once again.

Not only were production units larger in the north-east coast inshore fishery than on the south-west coast, but the system of incentives was one which prompted solidarity between crew members. Perhaps, because ownership of gear often represented a joint input of capital by several men, usually brothers, payment was based on the 'share' system. Co-owners would take a full share of the total catch and sharemen would get half a share. Under the share system, low prices for fish affected all crew members.

The decline of the credit system not only produced larger units of production but also provided the basis for greater solidarity between north-east coast inshore fishermen as a group. Having refused to supply fishermen on credit or, in some cases, able to mortgage their gear, merchants no longer felt obliged to purchase the catch in an attempt to recoup a possible loss on the supplies. Thus, when faced with potential losses associated with problems of overproduction and low prices in the foreign market, merchant-capitalists attempted to pass on such losses to fishermen. They drove down the prices for fish and refused to purchase the catch of many fishermen when markets were glutted.¹⁶ Fishermen found themselves faced with increased indebtedness as merchants mortgaged their gear.¹⁷ Entire communities might be affected.¹⁸ The decline in the 'buffer'

effect of the credit system¹⁹ made fishermen in general more susceptible to fluctuations in the price for fish. Uniformly affected by price fluctuations, they responded collectively.²⁰ In a manner similar to western grain growers and Annapolis Valley apple producers, they organized a cooperative system for marketing their product that would help eliminate the middleman and ensure the availability of supplies at a reasonable price: the Fishermen's Protective Union (cf. Sacouman, 1979; Alexander, 1977:19-21; Panting, 1963).

Leadership for the movement was readily available within the inshore fishery in the form of trap 'skippers' who, working as they did with several different families in the community, 'felt a moral responsibility for eight or nine families'.²¹ Skippers were local leaders in church work and voluntary associations, and could usually influence their crews politically.²² In communities where there was no local supplying merchant, these men might assume responsibility for the catch of the entire community, negotiating with a nearby merchant to send a schooner and purchase the fish produced locally. The availability of such men and the bases for solidarity generated by patterns of work organization and the system of incentives that predominated in the north-east coast inshore fishery facilitated the rapid spread of support for the FPU among this group in the context of structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment.

(b) The Labrador floater fishery

The Labrador floater fishery was an inshore trap fishery carried on from schooners along the northern Labrador coast. Fish caught in cod traps was stored aboard the schooner until the end of the season whereupon it was transported back to Newfoundland and dried before going to market. This branch of the fishery expanded greatly during the period 1900-10, increasing from a low of 470 schooners in 1898 to a high of 1,432 in 1908 (Innis, 1978:457). During this same period, the Labrador fishery as a whole which included the stationer fishery (prosecuted from stations on the Southern Labrador coast) comprised between a quarter and a half of Newfoundland's total salt cod exports (Black, 1960:267). In some cases, schooners were owned by groups of fishermen but often they were owned by merchants who would put them out to fishermen and who simultaneously dealt with inshore fishermen.²³ Structures of direct underdevelopment type II thus characterized a portion of the north-east coast fishery.

Within the Labrador floater fishery, crews were relatively large. Made up of approximately ten men, they necessitated extensive recruitment networks (Black, 1960:286; Britan, 1974:37,41; Devine and Lawton, 1944:11). Such networks were even more extensive when the Labrador floater fishery was combined with the north-east coast inshore fishery. Often, while the very young and the very old males were left

in charge of the inshore trap berths, the rest of the 'crowd' went aboard the schooner (Britan, 1974:37). In addition, up to 30 or 40 people would be required to cure the catch of one schooner upon its return from the Labrador in the fall.

Labrador floater fishermen were paid on the share system, which, like inshore fishermen, prompted solidarity between crew members. Similarly, simultaneous participation in both the inshore and the floater fishery no doubt provided important linkages between both groups of fishermen. Schooner captains, like inshore skippers, occupied important leadership positions within the community. These factors combined with the 'occupational community' of floater fishermen to increase their potential for collective action:

...the floaters joined in a great seasonal migration. Before sailing they met at merchants' wharves for the loading of supplies; while pushing their way north they often anchored in clusters to ride out a storm in a safe harbour; and once the Labrador coast was reached there were frequent rendezvous at bait depots, in sheltered creeks, and on the actual fishing grounds where dories from many schooners mingled indiscriminately. In all these places the contagious union idea spread without hinderance (Noel, 1971:91-2).

All of the above factors provided an important organizational basis for floater fishermen which was enhanced when the threat of technological obsolescence generated a high level of solidarity between floater fishermen as a group during the period 1900-10. Merchant-capitalists responded to high prices in the world market by introducing the use of

steamships both into the transport of crews to the Labrador coast and into the floater fishery. This was a formidable threat to floater fishermen (see Report...1905, JA:222 and passim). As suggested by one Twillingate schooner captain, "[t]wenty steamers with ten traps each would take up all the principal places." Indeed, if the steamers landed men on the coast instead of crews fishing directly from the steamer, two steamships could carry a sufficient number of crews to monopolize all of the best spots along the northern Labrador. There was some chance that an independent fisherman could own his own schooner, but steamers, "...being expensive must be owned by capitalists, either by companies or rich men..." (Report...1905, JA:228-30, 258).

The obsolescence of the Labrador floater fishery was hastened as problems of overproduction and glutted markets began to develop by 1907. With floater fish later coming onto the market and more expensive to produce than fish from the Labrador stationer fishery, floater fishermen bore the brunt of the low prices which resulted when markets became glutted later in the year.²⁴ As with the inshore fishery, merchants became increasingly unwilling to advance supplies for the floater fishery thereby passing a greater part of the risk onto the fishermen.²⁵ Faced with a similar threat, inshore and floater fishermen allied. As early as September, 1908, rumours reached St. John's of the planned formation of a 'planter's union', "with a view to dealing direct with the

foreign markets..." (Free Press, September 15, 1908).²⁶ The organization of the Fishermen's Protective Union in November of the same year marked the fulfillment of this drive along the north-east coast for collective action. Patterns of work organization and threatened obsolescence generated high levels of solidarity among Labrador floater fishermen which make the correlation between FPU support and participation in the Labrador fishery noted in Table One, Page 5, far from surprising.

(c) The Labrador stationer fishery

The Labrador stationer fishery was, once again, an inshore fishery based on the cod trap. It was concentrated in the southern and central portions of Labrador. Unlike the floater fishery, this fishery was carried on from 'stations' on the Labrador coast rather than on board schooners. Crews were transported to and from the Labrador coast aboard both schooners and steamers, the latter becoming increasingly preponderant during this period (Report...1905, JA). Fishermen dried their catch on the Labrador coast and merchants often shipped the catch directly to market from the coast.

Stationer fishermen came, for the most part, from a different part of the north-east coast than floater fishermen. Floater crews had a maximum of 17 men per ship (Black, 1960:286). If we use the 1911 census material

concerning the number of people and boats going to the Labrador for each district, it is possible to compute the average number of people/ship engaged in the Labrador fishery by district. Those districts with an average of over 17 people per ship can be classified as stationer districts, while those with 17 or less were probably primarily floater districts. Using this classification, the districts from Trinity north to Fogó and Twillingate were floater districts while those of Carbonear, Harbour Grace and Port de Grave on Conception Bay were stationer districts.²⁷

Although the FPU received some support from stationer districts, especially Port de Grave, there was less than in the northern bays (See Figures One and Two and Table One in Chapter One). This was true despite a determined attempt on the part of the leadership of the movement to mobilize partisans in these districts (McDonald, 1971:134). Can patterns of work organization and levels of solidarity among stationer fishermen explain the uneven success experienced by the FPU in these Conception Bay districts?

If anything, capitalist relations of production were more prevalent in Conception Bay within the stationer fishery than in any other part of the north-east coast fishery. Stations on the Labrador coast were owned and operated not only by trap-owners or 'planters' but also by large merchant-capitalists. The increased use of steamships for the transport of stationer crews to the Labrador coast around

the turn of the century helped ensure that this branch of the fishery was partially monopolized by a few large companies.

The large stations operated by merchant-capitalists employed as many as 75-100 sharemen and shipped men each.²⁸ Shipped men, unlike sharemen, signed on for a season at a set wage rather than taking a portion of the catch as payment. Even in petty production, producers were relatively concentrated. The ownership of cod traps in the stationer fishery, unlike the inshore and floater fishery of the northern bays, was often in the hands of one man. These 'planters', as they were called, might own as many as three or four traps and employ from 12 to 15 sharemen and women (Smith, 1936). Concentration of ownership of the means of production producing larger units of production and wage labour relations of production provided a strong basis for organization among stationer fishermen which can only have been enhanced by the annual migration to and from the Labrador coast. Sharemen from large and small crews and petty producers were brought together aboard steamers and the journey provided the opportunity for discussion and the organization of collective action.

It is not surprising then that there is ample evidence of labour unrest in the stationer fishery. A strike was threatened aboard the Labrador steamers as early as 1902 and one actually occurred along the coast in 1912

and again in 1914.²⁹ Sharemen were increasingly unwilling to forfeit half their share of the catch to cover the cost of food and supplies during their summer on the Labrador and, as a result, trapowners were "obliged to take a full-shareman. The men feed and clothe themselves and provide their own salt, but take a full share of fish" (Grenfell and Others, 1909:311).

Given the above evidence of large units of production and a high level of solidarity among stationer fishermen how is it possible to account for weaknesses in support for the FPU on Conception Bay? Part of the explanation might be contained in the antagonism that existed between stationer and floater fishermen. The FPU was opposed to the use of steamships on the Labrador (Coaker, 1930:10). Whereas steamships posed a direct threat to the floater fishery, they improved the chances of a paying voyage among those sharemen and trapowning stationers who had access to them. Steamships gave some stationer fishermen an advantage over other fishermen who were forced to travel aboard schooners and over floater fishermen by increasing their chances for monopolizing the best fishing areas in the neighbourhood of their station. Steamships, they argued, offset the advantage of floater fishermen who, "if they do not find fish in one harbour...can go elsewhere" (Report...1905, JA:236). Stationers, on the other hand, had to stay in the vicinity of their curing establishments. Hence, by opposing the use

of steamships on the Labrador, the FPU ran the risk of alienating those fishermen who depended on them.

It is quite possible that the trapowning or planter class among stationer fishermen were opposed to the FPU. Concentration of ownership of the means of production in the hands of these men made them small independent capitalists. This is suggested by the following description of one planter from Harbour Grace:

Thomas Codlin is a 'planter' of one of the outports...Mr. Codlin is a capitalist on a small scale and...is the middleman between the fishermen and the merchant. He takes his supplies--groceries, dry-goods and fishing requisites--from the merchant in St. John's and doles out such supplies from time to time in advance to the fisherman (Wilson, 1901:83).

For such men, the organization of their sharemen could as easily lead to demands for a fairer deal from the planter as to demands for a better price for fish from the large merchant firms. It is not surprising, then, that Nicholas Smith, a planter from Brigus, Port de Grave, never once mentions the FPU in his exhaustive account of the Labrador stationer fishery from the late 19th well into the 20th century. For Smith, the 1912 strike among sharemen was something that "made things unpleasant; and caused a delay..." (1936:145). Having benefitted by the introduction of steamships into the Labrador fishery, these men may well have perceived the organization of their sharemen as the primary threat to their independence during this period.

Members in their own elite clubs,³⁰ trapowners in the stationer fishery, unlike trap skippers and schooner captains to the north, probably did not provide leadership for local FPU councils in their districts.

One final characteristic of stationer fishermen deserves attention. According to at least one account, the size of production units within the stationer fishery decreased in the period following the 1905 Report. The introduction of a government steamship service along the Labrador coast made it possible for individual fishermen to get to the Labrador coast relatively cheaply. As a consequence, many set up their own stations along the northern Labrador glad to be free of their dependency on planter middlemen (Innis, 1978:459).

Despite lines of fragmentation among stationer fishermen, and between stationer and floater fishermen, patterns of work organization within the stationer fishery do not suffice to explain the problems encountered by the FPU in the district of Carbonear where the movement was a failure. Large units of production and high levels of solidarity created the potential for collective action among stationer fishermen which was reflected in strike activity. A full explanation must therefore look beyond the level of partisans' organization to the ability of those groups who opposed the FPU to prevent fishermen in Carbonear from mobilizing. This task is carried out in Chapter Three.

The investigation of patterns of work organization among north-east coast fishermen in all three branches of the fishery reveals that fishermen in this region were much better organized and more solidary than their south-west coast counterparts. The system of incentives, the organization of work, the large units of production, and the relatively high levels of solidarity, generated by threatened obsolescence and the decline of the credit system, all reinforced the ability of north-east coast fishermen to mobilize in their own interests. This basic organization, combined with the leadership and the dense network of voluntary association ties which it produced,³¹ facilitated the rapid development of sustained support for the FPU throughout the region. Structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment in the inshore fishery and direct underdevelopment type II in the Labrador fishery created a context that enhanced the power of fishermen.

North-east coast fishermen as loggers, sealers and miners

The decline of the credit system and seasonal nature of the north-east coast fishery combined with the increasing availability of employment outside of the fishery in this region around 1900 made north-east coast fishermen 'occupational pluralists'. The seal fishery had long provided spring employment. However, during this period there were also increased opportunities in the logging and

pulp and paper industries as well as in mining. These sectors of the economy, characterized by structures of direct capitalist underdevelopment and a high level of concentration of producers, acted as schools for collective action on the north-east coast.

(a) Sealing

For a few weeks every spring, many north-east coast fishermen participated in the seal fishery. Originating primarily from Bonavista Bay and farther north, these fishermen relied on the seal fishery to provide them with an income to carry them through the last of the winter until the cod fishery reopened. The seal fishery was a highly capitalized industry by the end of the 19th century and employed steamships. After 1894, it was monopolized almost completely by two companies, Jobs and Bowrings in St. John's. Direct capitalist control over offshore sealing combined with indirect control over petty producer 'landsmen' who caught seals from the coast to produce structures of direct underdevelopment type II. This analysis concentrates on the capitalist branch of the seal fishery.

As many as 200 sealers travelled aboard each sealing steamer and prior to departure, sealers congregated in large numbers in the few centres from which steamers departed. The organizational gains associated with this concentration of sealers were enhanced by the operation of the share system of


incentives. This gave each sealer aboard a steamer a share of the total catch of that steamer. The exploitative terms of the sealers' contract also no doubt enhanced the potential for collective action. At the time, only one third of the entire catch of seals went to the sealers to be divided among themselves (Hattenhauer, 1970:98). Out of his share, each man had to pay a fee for his place aboard the steamer as well as for his equipment.

Not only was the contract exploitative but the conditions of work were extremely perilous (Brown with Horwood, 1972:ix). The introduction of a few large steel ships during the first decade of the twentieth century not only increased the concentration of producers but generated pressures for those sealers forced to travel in the older, slower wooden steamers to take greater risks in order to make a paying voyage (Sager, 1978:13; MacDermott, 1938:196). Like Labrador floater fishermen they were faced with obsolescence because payment in the seal fishery was based on the share system. Sealers had a clear interest in which ship was first to reach the seals and hence most likely to make a paying voyage. Placed at a competitive disadvantage, sealers aboard wooden steamers were driven by their captains to work in exceptionally dangerous conditions. The consequences were often fatal.³² Antagonism developed between sealers and their captains that undercut the influence of the patronage system of recruitment to the seal fishery which

had traditionally bound sealers to captains. When 79 sealers lost their lives in the Newfoundland disaster of 1914, many sealers mutinied despite the risk of being blacklisted when their captains tried to continue the hunt (Brown with Horwood, 1972:249 and passim).

The conditions of production that prevailed in the seal fishery produced a history of unrest. As late as 1902, 3,000 sealers marched on the Governor's residence in St. John's to demand either a better price for seals or a higher percentage of the catch (Chafe, 1905:6-7). At the same time, taking advantage of their collective strength, sealers urged fishermen on the Labrador to "take a determined stand against suppliers" (Hattenhauer, 1970:104). The involvement of many of the sealing captains in the Labrador fishery no doubt provided sealers, who were also fishermen, with ample opportunity to make comparisons between the two fisheries.³³

Increased capital investment produced larger units of production in the seal fishery after 1900 (See Figure Five). Concentrated in large, solidary groups it is not surprising that north-east coast fishermen who became sealers on a seasonal basis provided a strong base of support for militance within the fishery and no doubt for the FPU. Involvement in the seal fishery probably generated friendship networks which helped the FPU spread throughout the north-east coast.



Source: (Chafe, 1924:67-69).

FIGURE FIVE
Mean tonnage of sealing vessels, 1900-12.

(b) Logging

Structures of direct underdevelopment type I began to dominate the logging industry on the north-east coast toward the end of the 19th century. Consolidation of control over the industry including timber resources, combined with capital investment to concentrate workers and increase the homogeneity of work and working conditions.

With growing demand for railway ties, pit props and lumber for export during the late 19th century, many companies were prompted to construct large, steam-powered mills on the north-east coast. By 1903, \$307,540 worth of lumber was being exported (JA, 1907:488-89). Much of the capital involved in logging was foreign, coming from Scotland, New York and Quebec.³⁴ As a consequence, increasing numbers of north-east coast men found employment in the woods and were often paid cash wages rather than being forced to deal in truck as they had previously.

The trend to larger units of production under the control of foreign ownership increased dramatically as the export trade in lumber declined around 1900, encouraging many mill-owners to sell out. Most mills in the Gander and Grand Falls area were bought out by one man, H.J. Crowe. Crowe was a Nova Scotian backed by H.M. Whitney, a New York financier who was also involved in the Bell Island iron mines,³⁵ and William Reid, Newfoundland's railway giant (Thoms, 1937-67:424-5). Crowe consolidated his holdings in

Newfoundland Timber Estates Ltd., incorporated in 1903. With this company he controlled most of the major river systems in the area and thus played a central role in the eventual take over of the area by Harmsworth, a big British company in 1905. After purchasing most of Crowe's assets as well as one million acres from the Newfoundland government and land from William Reid, Harmsworth established a large pulp and paper operation in Grand Falls. The result: most of the mills were closed down and the men were forced to begin cutting pulp wood for this one, new, foreign company. Further concentration followed within a few years with the establishment of a pulp mill at Bishop's Falls owned by another British firm, Albert E. Reed Company.

Millworkers in the company towns of Grand Falls and Bishop's Falls were concentrated to a greater extent than woodworkers by the development of the pulp and paper industry. It is not surprising then that it was the towns that first experienced labour unrest. Some of the plant workers in Grand Falls were unionized as early as 1910 and there was a strike in Bishop's Falls during the same year (Hattenhauer, 1970:166). Although loggers were more dispersed and only seasonally employed, conditions still favoured collective action.

The logging camps were characterized by "overcrowded camphouses, inadequate food, poor sanitation, and petty exploitation, such as 'blanket-rent'" (Noel, 1971:119).

According to one report, there were many camps "in which the accomodation for the men was very poor, as many as thirty men having to eat and sleep in the same small room"

(Proceedings...1916:563). Payment in wages with an occasional bonus meant there was nothing in the system of incentives to turn logger against logger and a great deal in the exploitative conditions of their work to bring them together. Employed during the winter at hard labour with poor food and lodging, and without medical services, men risked their health and even their lives for a small wage. Conditions were even worse when the company contracted out pulp cutting to small middlemen. As one observer noted, "the more work [a contractor] can get out of the men and the less the food costs him the more profit he will make off his contract" (Proceedings...1916:564).

Between 1,000 and 1,200 men worked in 30-40 camps within an area of 60-70 miles. Direct underdevelopment within the pulp and paper industry and the development of monopoly control reduced loggers and millworkers to pulpcutters. The pulp and paper industry created a framework for solidarity by introducing wage work, concentrating workers and increasing the homogeneity of their relations with capital. This created a strong basis of support for the FPU, which attempted to pass legislation guaranteeing pulpcutters a minimum wage and better working conditions (Proceedings... 1916:560-66).. Involvement in the pulp and paper industry on

a seasonal basis generated organizational networks and collective experience for north-east coast fishermen.

(c) Mining

Many north-east coast men also worked in the mines. The largest north-east coast mines around the turn of the century were the Bell Island iron mines. Foreign-owned, the Bell Island mines provided yet another opportunity for north-east coast producers to gain experience in collective action.

The Bell Island mines were opened in the 1890's and by 1900 employed 1,600 men on a seasonal basis. By 1905, 2,284 people were employed and the mines were operating year-round (Bown, n.d.:10, 18-9). Wage payment and the concentration of workers led rapidly to worker unrest. As early as 1896, when there were only 180 miners, a strike occurred. In 1900, 1,100 of the 1,600 miners organized the Wabana Workmen and Labourers Union and struck for better wages. In response, the company closed the mine; strike leaders were arrested and locked up. The strike dragged on for over a month until most of the miners began leaving the island. They settled for much less than their original demands (Bown, n.d.:12). Miners made another attempt to unionize in 1908 but do not seem to have been successful. The organization of the Bell Island Co-Operative Store in 1914 suggests that miners continued to be militant but,

unable to unionize, chose the 'middle-of-the-road' strategy of their Nova Scotian counterparts (Bown, n.d.:40).³⁷ When the Newfoundland Industrial Workers Association was organized in 1917, Bell Island miners were among its members (Hattenhauer, 1970:152).

Although no FPU union local seems to have been established on Bell Island itself, a local and Union store at nearby Kelligrews may well have relied on miners' support (Coaker, 1930:82; Feltham, 1959:166). However, the most important function of working in the mines was probably the training in collective action what it provided for fishermen along the north-east coast. Many miners were also fishermen or the sons of fishermen and they moved in and out of the mines depending on their view of the prospects offered by the fishery. These men made up a sufficiently large proportion of the men working at Bell Island that a good fishery could create labour shortages at the mine (Bown, n.d.:18-9). Other men worked in the mines only to earn enough capital to buy their way into the fishery.³⁸ As with sealing and, to some extent logging, work in the mines would have established contacts and given men organizational experience invaluable for establishing the FPU.

Patterns of Work Organization on the North-east Coast:
Conclusions

The above analysis suggests that whether north-east coast producers were engaged in one of the three major branches of the fishery or in sealing, logging or mining, patterns of work organization produced a high level of organization and solidarity among them. Inshore fishermen continued to be engaged primarily in structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment but a partial breakdown in the truck system produced relatively large, solidary units of production. Capital investment after 1900 expanded the Labrador floater and stationer fisheries. As a result, many north-east coast fishermen became involved in structures of direct underdevelopment. Large units of production, the share system, the occupational community of floater fishermen and a direct threat to the fishery posed by the use of steamships on the Labrador helped to forge a high level of solidarity among floater fishermen. Although lines of cleavage existed among fishermen involved in the stationer fishery, the concentration of men aboard large steamships and their employment in substantial fishing operations frequently led to incidents of labour unrest.

When north-east coast fishermen were not fishing, they often became loggers, sealers and/or miners. Capital investment and consolidation of control within these industries around 1900 concentrated workers and increased their ability to organize against exploitation. Hence, it is

not surprising that a movement such as the Fishermen's Protective Union garnered such strong support throughout the north-east coast of Newfoundland.

3. Remaining areas: St. John's; Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's; St. George's

Although the present analysis is primarily concerned with explaining the relationship between patterns of work organization and the degree of success experienced by the FPU on the north-east and south-west coast it is worthwhile to look briefly at the remaining areas. The FPU experienced only a limited degree of success outside of the north-east coast. In all of the areas which remain to be discussed there were few if any union locals for any sustained period of time. Support for the movement in the 1913 election was also weak (See Figure Two and Table One, Pages 4 and 5). A study of patterns of work organization in these areas provides part of the explanation for this lack of support.

(a) St. John's

St. John's was at the centre of both clerical and mercantile strength in Newfoundland. The home of the Roman Catholic Archbishop as well as the largest and most powerful merchants on the island, there is little doubt that the failure of the FPU to penetrate this urban stronghold was strongly associated with the sustained opposition of these

two elites (See Chapter Three). However, St. John's was also the largest center of manufacturing and industry which Newfoundland could boast around 1900. It was the seat of virtually all of the unions which existed in Newfoundland in 1908 when the FPU was organized. This suggests that the St. John's working class was far from impotent. An investigation of both the unions and patterns of work organization in St. John's should provide some insight into why these workers were unable to offer any substantial support to the FPU.

In discussing the St. John's working class it is important to distinguish between two different groups. On the one hand, there were the craft workers. Predominantly males and skilled workers, it was within this group that most of the craft unions were organized around 1900. A second group were the factory workers. These were often women and children and they worked either in factories or in their own homes manufacturing goods for the several import substitution industries that were established in Newfoundland after 1870. We will look first at this latter group.

In a recent article Frank claims that:

[t]he market for import substitution is internal and it must be supported through the progressive provision or extension of purchasing power at home. This economic need provides the basis for a nationalist and populist progressive alliance between national capital, the petit-bourgeoisie, and some sectors of the working class (1978:15).

Despite the establishment of a limited number of tariff-protected import substitution industries in Newfoundland prior to 1900 such an alliance never seems to have developed. At least part of the explanation for this lies in the source of capital investment which financed the industry. Most came from the traditional merchant elite many members of which continued to be involved simultaneously in the export fish trade (Joy, 1977:175f). As a group, these capitalists were unlikely to ally with a populist movement among fishermen which, while it would expand the internal market, would also drive up the wages of fishermen.

Rather than trying to change the built-in limitations to import-substitution in a relatively poor country, merchants invested only sufficient capital to meet current demand. They tended to treat these industries as a fixed source of income and withdrew capital rather than re-investing it (Joy, 1977:178). This, and the high prices on competing imports had important consequences for the relative power of workers and the owners of manufacturing enterprises.

Without the presence of competition from cheaper imports and involved in production for a very limited market there was no incentive for capital investment to increase the concentration and hence efficiency of production. As a result, despite the concentration of economic control over many industries, a large percentage of production continued

to originate in small shops employing less than 5 people (Joy, 1977:5). In the case of the Colonial Cordage Company, which produced most of the nets and line used in the Newfoundland fishing industry, much of the material was manufactured in people's homes under a putting out system (Joy, 1977:109-10). The labour force within many industries consisted of women and children. Hence, the gains in organization associated with capital investment and consolidation of control over production among merchant-capitalists were not offset by a corresponding increase in the concentration and organization of producers (Arrighi, 1978:7).

Without capital reinvestment and with production limited to a small, internal market, the import-substitution industries did not expand significantly after the mid-1880's (Joy, 1977:4ff). They continued to demand a limited number of unskilled labourers whose ability to organize in their own interests was undermined by the ever present problem of the availability of a large reserve army of labour (Joy, 1977:177). A further consequence was that this type of worker continued to make up a relatively small proportion of the St. John's population.³⁹ Often employed in small shops, embedded in a city within which they were a minority, and for the most part, without the benefits of union experience, St. John's manufacturing employees differed substantially from north-east coast fishermen. The latter

group lived in villages and indeed entire regions within which the occupational and class structure was relatively homogeneous and certainly within which they made up a majority of the population. In many villages there was not even a merchant to disrupt this homogeneity. When not engaged in fishing they worked in industries where they were much more concentrated than the St. John's workers and where they often acquired union experience. As a result, the two groups contrasted markedly not only in their level of organization but also, no doubt in the extent to which they identified themselves as members of the working class and in their willingness to support non-establishment groups (Keddie, 1980). This, and the weak position of the St. John's workers with regard to job security, would have prompted them to view the FPU as more of a threat than an ally in particular on the issue of import tariffs.

Fishermen were the group in Newfoundland hardest hit by tariffs on imports because they were the largest group of consumers. As a result, they agitated for reduced tariffs. The St. John's companies responded by claiming that without such tariffs they could not go on manufacturing in which case urban workers would lose their jobs. Interestingly enough, evidence suggests that the tariffs were not necessary (Joy, 1977:183). They may simply have helped ensure super-profits for company owners and the persistence of inefficient production techniques. However, because of their

social location and lack of organization St. John's workers tended to identify their employers' interests as their own (McDonald, 1971:83). The absence of support for the FPU is thus not surprising. A low level of organization and perhaps lack of class consciousness combined to reduce the potential for the spread of support for the FPU among this group of St. John's workers.

The situation was not substantially different among craftworkers. Many craftworkers, including sealskinners, coopers and tanners had been sufficiently strengthened by the period of economic expansion and diversification in Newfoundland at the turn of the century combined with the development of St. John's into the mercantile centre of the island, to attempt unionization between 1890 and 1910 (Hattenhauer, 1970:113-152). Labour unrest among these groups was common during this period as they struggled to improve wages, oppose mechanization and/or exclude nonunion labour. However, most unions were quite small with as few as 20 members. With the exception of the Longshoremen's Union, most were also shortlived: the majority disbanded prior to 1910. Fragmentation was also a problem as there was no formal affiliation between unions prior to 1917 and even then cooperation was shortlived (Hattenhauer, 1970:151-2). Union membership was confined to St. John's and the demand for labour limited with the result that union members were often struggling to strengthen their position at the expense

of their nonunionized outport counterparts. For example, the St. John's coopers struggled continuously to prevent merchants from purchasing barrels and other cooperage products from the outports at below union rates. As with unskilled workers, craftsmen continued to work primarily in small establishments often on a seasonal basis. Thus, their fragmentation into many small unions and once again, embeddedness in a city where they did not make up a substantial portion of the population, no doubt undermined their ability to support the FPU as a positive attempt on the part of outport men to change their exploitative relationship with predominantly the same group of merchants who were exploiting the St. John's working class. This and the overall low level of organization within the St. John's working class as a whole help explain lack of support for the FPU among urban workers.

Despite the development of structures of direct underdevelopment type I within St. John's toward the end of the 19th century, the concentration of workers and consequent gains in class consciousness and solidarity were minimal. Located, as they are, in the centre of mercantile and clerical strength in Newfoundland and confronted by a group of merchants for which joint investment in manufacturing probably produced substantial gains in cooperation (See Chapter Four), there was little potential for the development of strong support for the FPU among workers in the face of elite

opposition.

(b) East coast districts: Ferryland, Placentia-St. Mary's

As will be emphasized in Chapter Three below, the greatest single factor responsible for the failure of the FPU in these east coast districts was probably the strength of opposition to the movement on the part of the Catholic church. However, problems of solidarity among fishermen in these districts also were important in that they undermined the ability of fishermen to confront the Church on this issue.

Eleven FPU union locals were successfully organized in the districts of Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's shortly after the emergence of the movement in 1908.⁴⁰ These locals were subsequently closed down and there were only two in the area by 1914 (Coaker, 1930:80). The original establishment of eleven union locals suggests that patterns of work organization were such as to promote the involvement of fishermen in collective behaviour.

With the exception of a few local whaling factories and limited involvement in trade with foreign vessels, the major industry in these east coast districts was the fishery. Within the fishery, structures of indirect underdevelopment predominated as most fishermen were petty producers engaged in the inshore trap fishery. Otherwise, men fished aboard relatively large jack boats on the near-shore Cape Ballard Banks or, to a limited extent in a small branch of the Bank

fishery (Cashin, 1976; R. Crane, 1973). Within the inshore fishery, trap crews were quite large as "...the crew typically numbered seven men, six at the oars and one 'aft' on the 'sculling oar'." (Nemec, 1973:20). This crew structure evolved originally with the use of the cod seine (an early version of the trap) and when the trap was introduced the same format was maintained. Payment was either in shares of the catch or men were 'shipped' for the season for a set wage as in the Labrador stationer fishery.

While relatively large inshore crews and involvement in the near and offshore fisheries would have facilitated the organization of local fishermen and hence help explain the original strong support for the FPU in the area, class distinctions between trapowners and their employees may have created problems of solidarity. Trap ownership, rather than being spread among several families as was common on the north-east coast, was normally concentrated in the hands of a few families who also owned the best farmland in the area.⁴¹ Sharemen and shipped men usually came from a group of local hook and line fishermen who signed on for the trapping season of about two months and then returned to the hook and line fishery. Probably, economic distinctions between the two groups combined with the short-lived nature of trap crews to undermine the potential for sustained organization among fishermen.

The economic distinctions described above were reinforced by social distinctions perpetrated by the clerical elite. Trapowners were given a special place to stand in the local church and were made members in the church-controlled voluntary organizations that were predominant in the region (See Chapter Three). Economic and social differences between trapowners and other local fishermen and their dependence upon the church to reinforce these differences may have generated a certain ambivalence among local trapowners toward the FPU. Potential local leaders, these men, like trapowners engaged in the Labrador stationer fishery, may have feared that involvement in the FPU would lead sharemen and shipped men to demand a higher percentage of the returns of the fishery for themselves. This and their relationship to the Church would have increased their receptivity to strong clerical opposition to the movement.

In light of the above discussion it is worth looking briefly at an exception which helps prove the rule: Riverhead, one of the two communities in the area where support for the FPU persisted despite clerical opposition. Patterns of work organization in Riverhead, Placentia-St. Mary's differed substantially from those in surrounding communities. The location of a whaling factory in this village was significant. As in the community of St. Lawrence on the south-west coast, the presence of a local whaling factory with the resulting concentration of as many as one hundred employees in one factory would have raised the level of organization, hence

power, of local people to organize in support of the FPU despite strong clerical opposition.⁴²

(c) St. George's

The relationship between patterns of work organization and success and failure of the FPU has been discussed for every area of the Island with the exception of the district of St. George's. In discussing St. George's, it is worthwhile comparing work organization in this district, where support for the FPU was weak, with the district of St. Barbe to the north, which had 21 FPU locals in 1914.⁴³ St. Barbe was part of the north-east coast. The most important branch of the fishery in this district was the inshore fishery and as on the rest of the north-east coast, this was primarily a trap fishery. There were 670 cod traps in St. Barbe in 1911. In this district, units of production in the cod fishery as well as winter employment such as sealing and woods work were based upon three and four generation families which pooled their resource in one company account and all 'ate out of one flour barrel' (Firestone, 1967:48). Money earned in the seal fishery or in the woods went into the same account. Not only was each production unit organized to generate a high level of internal solidarity, but competition between trapowners for fishing spots was eliminated by virtual hereditary rights to each berth: "If some one is not using a berth, another can use

it, but when the owner wants to use it no one else will."
(Firestone, 1967:93).

Solidarity among fishermen was high in St. Barbe, and the control of the local merchant elite over the catch of fishermen was low. Fishermen in this district regularly sold their catches to visiting Nova Scotian and American schooners which would come in the spring with supplies and return in the fall to purchase the catch. They paid the difference between the cost of supplies and the cost of the catch in gold or silver (Firestone, 1967:88; Innis, 1978:462).⁴⁴ The primary problem with the Nova Scotian and American trade was its irregularity, as the foreign ships might not come during years of low demand.

Strong support for the FPU and earlier involvement in cooperatives in this district may have been in part an attempt by St. Barbe fishermen to guarantee access to fishery supplies and an outlet for the sale of their product.⁴⁵ However, the ability of local fishermen to organize sustained support for such movements depended upon the relatively high level of organization and solidarity guaranteed by large units of production and the weakness of local merchants.

Although evidence on the subject is fragmentary, work organization in St. George's seems to have differed substantially from the pattern described above. Although the dominant industry in the district was, once again, the

inshore fishery, fishermen fished for herring and lobster rather than cod. In comparison with St. Barbe, there were only 90 cod traps in this district in 1911. For the herring fishery, local men either shipped aboard American schooners which came to the area each fall or fished independently from the shore (Thompson, 1961). Although little is known about patterns of work organization in the herring fishery, attempts on the part of the Newfoundland government to prohibit the shipping of Newfoundland men aboard American ships during the period of the FPU's development would have reduced the number of men engaged in this branch of the fishery. Small, inshore units of production probably predominated.

Within the lobster fishery, units of production were very small. As on the south-west coast, the most efficient productive unit was one or two men. It is true that there were a large number of lobster factories within the district but the ratio of number of factories to number of people employed suggests that individual lobster fishermen owned these factories and used the domestic unit of production to process their catch.⁴⁶

Hence, in contrast to St. Barbe, the district of St. George's was probably characterized by small, atomized units of production. The decline in opportunities aboard American herring vessels not only reinforced this pattern but perhaps helped strengthen the local merchant elite.

With American vessels unable to obtain Newfoundland crews the control of local merchants over the marketing of herring and thus over fishermen may have increased. Americans began to buy herring rather than catching their own.⁴⁷

Conclusions

In general, the above analysis gives weight to my claim that patterns of work organization were an important factor in determining the distribution of the Fishermen's Protective Union of Newfoundland. Where production units were small and atomized or where relations of production and/or systems of incentives created lines of cleavage among fishermen, such as along the south-west coast, FPU support was extremely limited. In contrast, in areas such as the north-east coast where the movement was very strong, units of production were larger and manifested a higher level of solidarity. This was true not only in the fishery, but also in the logging, sealing, and mining industries in which north-east coast fishermen worked during the winter season.

Structures of direct underdevelopment correlated with larger, solidary units of production in the logging, sealing and mining industries but this was not always the case. In St. John's, for instance, capital investment and the concentration of control over industries did not produce a substantial increase in the concentration of producers who remained poorly organized and fragmented. Among

south-west coast inshore fishermen, structures of direct underdevelopment type II correlated with some of the smallest and most atomized units of production in Newfoundland. As we shall see in Chapter Three, the south-west coast merchant elite gained increased control over the surplus of inshore fishermen by limited investment in the offshore. This, in turn, helped maintain inshore fishermen in very small units of production. In contrast, within the inshore fishery along the north-east coast, although structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment predominated, the decline of the credit system resulted in somewhat larger units of production. Fishing units based on cooperation within the extended family provided a solid organizational basis for the FPU. Capital investment producing structures of direct underdevelopment in the Labrador fishery further enhanced the tendency for the concentration of producers in this region.

Although, generally speaking, structures of direct underdevelopment produced larger units of production within the capitalist sector, this did not always generate a higher level of organization and solidarity among potential partisans of the FPU. Capital investment increased the control of merchant-capitalists over the organization of production and system of incentives involved. In the case of the bank fishery potential gains in organization among fishermen associated with their concentration in large

numbers aboard schooners were offset by the introduction of a divisive system of incentives.

The two areas where patterns of work organization do not seem to provide a substantial part of the explanation for the pattern of FPU support are the Conception Bay districts dominated by the Labrador stationer fishery and the east coast districts of Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's.

In these areas, work organization in general seems to favour the development of relatively strong support for the FPU but the success of the movement was uneven. In order to explain not only these deviant cases but to gain a more complete understanding of the pattern of FPU success and failure in the rest of the island it is essential to investigate regional variations in the ability of the authorities, including the merchant and clerical elite, to repress the movement. As we shall see, there were important variations in the level of organization of these elites that played a vital role in determining the distribution of the FPU.

FOOTNOTES


1. Nova Scotia inshore fishermen were first involved in the Fishermen's Union of Nova Scotia, organized in 1905 (Barrett, 1976:68). Later, during the 1930s, they became involved in the Antigonish Movement (See Sacouman, 1979).
2. The concept of semi-proletarianization among petty producers is a difficult one to deal with. It seems to me that there are several different situations that would have the appearance of semi-proletarianization, each of which could have a different impact on consciousness among petty producers. Some of the possibilities might include:
 1. a situation in which family members and/or the petty producer himself are employed temporarily for wage-labour and use their earnings to either maintain or enhance the level of production on the farm, in the fishery, etc.
 2. a situation in which family members but not the petty producer are engaged in wage labour and do not utilize their wages for investment in petty production per se but perhaps in raising their level of consumption. In this situation although 'proletarianization' or semi-proletarianization might affect the consciousness of family members, it would be less likely than situation 1 to influence the petty producer himself.
 3. a situation in which family members are engaged in wage labour and use their wages to set up another separate unit of petty production more or less unaffiliated with the original unit, i.e. a fishermen's son who works on a trawler and uses his wages to purchase his own fishing gear which he operates independently of his father. Once again, while involvement in wage labour might affect the consciousness of the son, it need not influence the father.
 4. semi-proletarianization may not necessarily be associated with involvement in wage labour. Sacouman (1980) suggests that structures of direct underdevelopment type II, in which petty producers are controlled by monopolistic companies which also directly control a portion of production, will produce the semi-proletarianization of the petty producers. In this case capitalist control over

2. 4. petty production is such that the price it pays for a product can be treated as a 'wage'. Petty producers have little more real 'independence' than wage-labourers. In this situation, the extent of semi-proletarianization would be associated with
 - (a) the degree of monopolistic control
 - (b) fluctuations in market demand and perhaps,
 - (c) differences in productivity between the capitalist and petty commodity sectors associated with mechanization and changes in the social relations of production that affect the price capital is willing to pay for the product of petty producers--hence the viability of petty production.
3. The offshore bank fishery was more important than the inshore fishery in Burin and parts of Fortune district. Further west, although there was also capitalist production the inshore fishery was much more important.
4. Subsistence activities included growing food, constructing homes and boats, etc.
5. The following quote summarizes the theoretical core of Antler's argument regarding the replacement of capitalist-wage-labouring relations of production by production based on the domestic unit within the Newfoundland inshore fishery:

"...on a colonial frontier with primarily common property resources and inexpensive implements of production, surplus value can be captured by those owning merchant's capital if colonization in the extreme is carried out. Under these circumstances... implements of production attain the characteristics of tools rather than of capital, production is carried out by atomized units of labor-plus-capital, and those owning merchant's capital can capture surplus value in their dealings with the atomized productive units. Such a system resembles quite closely Marx's model of the stable putting-out system. With Marx, we predicted that under such a system, economic growth takes place with merchants' financing of greater numbers

of atomized productive units over time, and that economic development does not take place since the demands occasioned by widening of markets can be met by methods other than the revolutionizing of the means of production (1975:70-1).

6. Some merchants' capital was invested in a limited number of import substitution industries (see St. John's section below) after 1880. As in many underdeveloped countries, only when prices in the export trade became so low that it was no longer profitable did merchant-capitalists consider investing in local manufacturing (Frank, 1973:22).
7. These data would not include any schooners purchased by merchants from other merchants, fishermen, etc. that had previously been registered in St. John's. In other words, they primarily include only new schooners, and those previously registered outside Newfoundland. As a result, this may well be an underestimation of capital investment by south-west coast merchants in schooners during this period. However, the data also do not include schooners sold by the same merchants during this period which means this may not be an underestimation. Finally, included in these data would be ships purchased for use in the import-export trade and not necessarily in the fishery. The following graph of tonnage engaged in the bank fishery underestimates the size of the south-west coast offshore fishery because it does not include the "western" fishery that took place off Rose Blanche.



Total tonnage in the bank fishery, 1895-1920

Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Marine and Fisheries,
Journals of Assembly, (1896-1921).

8. Oberschall distinguishes between a 'vertically integrated' and a 'segmented' social structure. Leadership, he suggests, is more available in a segmented social structure because "talented and ambitious individuals will tend to remain trapped... with few prospects for upward mobility" (1973:21). A social structure is segmented when "the collectivity whose potential for mobilization we are examining has few links and bonds with the higher classes or other collectivities of the society" (1973:119).
9. McDonald claims that there were 29 FPU locals in Fortune-Burin in 1914 (1971:134). In actual fact there were between ten and fifteen of them and they were organized not by Wm. Coaker, as McDonald suggests, but by a member of the secondary leadership (Coaker, 1930:80). Of the five communities in Burin district where FPU locals were established by 1914, three of these were communities where the cod trap was much more commonly used than elsewhere in the area (Coaker, 1930:80).

9. Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1911, Table II: 362-381, 442-3). As we shall see in our discussion of the north-east coast, the cod trap required larger units of production than hook and line. In one of these three 'trapping' communities where there were FPU locals, St. Lawrence, there was also a whaling factory. Millais describes the town of St. Lawrence during this period but unfortunately does not discuss work organization within the whaling factory (1907:140-48). However, Cashin suggests that whaling factories provided a lot of local employment (1976:34) and an interview with a man recently involved in the management of whaling factories revealed that they probably employed as many as one hundred people (Interview with W. O'Brien, December, 1979). This suggests that they may have provided the basis for the creation of a solidary wage-labouring group which, in turn, would help explain local support for the FPU.
10. Many studies have emphasized the importance of pre-existing organizational ties in facilitating mobilization for protest movements. See for example, Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1975), Bell (1978), Thompson (1963).
11. One such example is Cat Harbour in Twillingate district. This community was based on the inshore fishery but had an FPU local as well as a branch of the Union Trading Company (Faris, 1972).
12. For a complete description of the cod trap see Firestone (1967:90).
13. In 1895, a second hand trap sold for \$100 (Baine Johnston Letter Book, 1893-97:47). A new trap was worth between \$300-400 in 1900--about the same price as many second-hand schooners. It is obvious that the trap alone represented a substantial capital investment on the part of fishermen. Alexander claims that the change in investment in gear among Newfoundland fishermen between 1898 and 1913 was no more than from \$7-16 per fisherman. Since this is an average of investment by all fishermen in Newfoundland it probably obscures increased capital investment by a certain class of fishermen. Joint investment by several men in a single cod trap might also have been a contributing factor (1974:15).
14. See Chapter Three for a discussion of the breakdown in the credit system on the north-east coast.

15. A mercantile vacuum developed in parts of the north-east coast following the collapse of the Newfoundland Banks in 1894. Many companies were forced to curtail their supply business because of lack of capital and the growing unwillingness of Canadian banks to advance credit for both this and the Labrador fishery. Many fishermen were unable to gain access to essential supplies and were hence forced to leave the fishery, become sharemen, or pay cash. Some were able to get supplied by one of the few companies unaffected by the crash such as Bowrings. With the decline in the supply trade, merchants no longer had a lien on the catch and hence competition for the purchase of fish increased. As a consequence, many trapowners were able to demand payment for their catch either wholly or in part in cash, rather than in goods as previously had been the case. Access to cash and the availability of a local army of reserve labour permitted such men to accumulate capital and expand production. One consequence was larger units of production than those which predominated under the truck system.
16. For information on glutted markets during this period, see McDonald (1971: Chapter One). The Baine Johnston Letter Book includes a discussion of one strategy merchants pursued when markets were glutted (1893-7:165). See also McDonald (1971:198, 21).
17. See, for example, Baine Johnston Letter Book (1898-1911:184a).
18. In some cases, a local trapowner would negotiate with a nearby merchant to purchase and pick up not only his fish but that of other fishermen in the village. They might have to pool their catch in order to convince a merchant to send a schooner and presumably if markets were glutted and they couldn't sell the catch, the whole community could be affected. See, for example, Bremner to Wm. King, Deer Harbour, September 7, 1895 and Bremner to a fisherman in Quirpon also September 7, 1895 in Grieve and Bremner Letter Book (1895-97).
19. Non-involvement in the supply system meant that merchants were better able to pass the losses from low prices onto the fishermen without any direct financial risk to themselves. Under the credit system, the merchant continued to carry some of the risk (Philbrook, 1966:72).

20. Brym distinguishes between subsistence and commercial production suggesting that subsistence production 'sets fishermen and farmers apart' while commercial production 'brings them together'. One of the ways in which commercial production brings them together is through the uniform impact of price fluctuations on producers (1979:65). It is being proposed here that a decline in the credit system would have the same effect as a shift from subsistence to commercial production on uniformity of experience. It is also possible that with the decline in the credit system and greater opportunities for profit created by intermercantile competition and a high level of demand for fish, fishermen reduced their involvement in subsistence activities in favour of production for exchange. The validity of this would have to be established. See also Brym (1978a:341) in this regard.
21. Interview with Aaron Bailey, a close friend of Coaker and native of Port Rexton, Trinity Bay, November 18, 1978.
22. Ibid.
23. A study of schooner tonnage newly registered at St. John's from 1900-10 reveals that merchants living in the districts of Port de Grave, Trinity, Bonavista, Fogo and Twillingate (FPU districts) were the group in these districts most likely to purchase schooners. Of the total tonnage purchased by people living in these districts merchants bought 46% in 1900; 60% in 1901; 65% in 1902; 56% in 1903; 61% in 1904; 50% in 1905; 56% in 1906, 1907, 1907; 61% in 1909 and 30% in 1910. Some of the schooners utilized in the fishery of these districts were probably owned by merchants in St. John's as well. This group owned an average of 31% of all schooner tonnage newly registered at St. John's during these years. See the B.T./108 Series Colonial Ship Registeries for Newfoundland (1900-10), in the Newfoundland Archives. I am greatly indebted to Eric Sager of the Maritime History Group, Memorial University, for showing me the registries and helping me organize these data.
24. A member of Job. Bros., Ltd. computed the cost of producing Labrador stationer fish at the company's station in Blanc Sablon at \$2.00/quintal (115 points of dried cod), whether produced by independent fishermen supplied by the Company or by shipped men in its direct employ. This was in 1907. (See Job Family Papers, Newfoundland Archives). As early as 1895, Bremner, a Trinity Bay merchant was complaining that it was impossible to produce fish for this price. His

24. firm supplied fishermen in the Labrador floater and in-shore fishery and fishermen could not pay for their supplies if they got only this amount for their fish (Grieve and Bremner Letter Book, 1895-97: Bremner to Thorburn, October 30, 1895). Stationer fish was processed on the coast and shipped direct to market during the period of the emergence of the FPU (Moynes, 1975:126).
25. See Grieve and Bremner Letter Book; Baine Johnston Letter Books; also McDonald (1971:21). By 1911, the number of Labrador floaters had declined from a high of 1,432 in 1908 to 837 (1911 Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, Table II:443; Innis, 1978:458). Innis describes this as the "subsidence of a wave of obsolescent schooners". Their obsolescence was directly related to intermercantile relations during the period (See Chapter Three).
26. A 'planter' was a trapowner or substantial fisherman. Coaker held the first meeting of the FPU in November of 1908, two months after this rumour appeared. Evidence such as this further undermines the view that the mobilization of north-east coast fishermen was dependent upon the availability of the charismatic leader of the movement.
27. These conclusions are supported by testimony recorded in the Report...1905, (JA:264).
28. During 1908; Job Bros., Ltd. employed 75 shipped men at Blanc Sablon. See Job Family Papers (1908: report on Blanc Sablon).
29. Baine Johnston Letter Book (1898-1911:68); Smith (1936:145); Weekly Mail and Advocate, (July 12, 13, 1915): Lorenzo Noseworthy vs. William A. Munn.
30. Smith discusses the annual activities of the Glee Club in Brigus at great length. He claims that members included "the influential men of our town, business men, schooner holders and owners, etc..." (1936:95).
31. Unfortunately, no thorough study of small, local voluntary associations in the Newfoundland outports has ever been carried out. However, references to organizations such as the Terra Nova Credit Union in Twillingate (Chaulk, 1969:97) and another similar organization in Trinity (Barbour, 1973:90) as well as Smith's Glee Club in Brigus (1936:95) suggest that such organizations may have been numerous along the north-east coast. One clear source of dense voluntary association

31. ties was the Loyal Orange Association which had lodges and a large membership throughout the north-east coast as well as elsewhere. See Table Two, Page 36, for an indication of the number of lodges in this area.
32. The 'Newfoundland disaster' of 1914 and sinking of the sealing steamer 'Southern Cross' in the same year with all hands lost, demonstrates the extreme danger of the seal fishery and the risk which captains and crews were willing to undergo in order to get a good catch. (See Brown with Horwood, 1974).
33. Many sealing captains including the Keans, Barbours and Bartletts ran fishing businesses in which they owned and supplied schooners or stations for the Labrador fishery.
34. Mills along the north-east coast were financed by R.J. Schaefer of New York, Messrs. Gooday and Co. of Quebec City and Lewis Miller of Scotland (See Thoms, 1937-67:417-429).
35. Acheson (1971:102) refers to H.M. Whitney of Boston who organized a syndicate of New York, Boston and Montreal businessmen and got hold of most of the Cape Breton coal fields in 1893. In 1899 he organized Dominion Iron and Steel Co. which bought up most of the assets of the Bell Island Iron mines in the same year (Brown, n.d.:8). Thoms' description of him as a 'Nova Scotian capitalist' probably stems from his Cape Breton involvement (Thoms, op. cit.:424).
36. See Note 35.
37. In his analysis of the impact of foreign ownership and control on the structure of employment in the Cape Breton coal-mining and steel industry sectors, Sacouman highlights the seasonal nature of the work and chronic state of underemployment which characterized the industry during the 1930s. These conditions reduced the potential for successful union activity while simultaneously producing a group of men who moved between mining and manufacturing and fishing and farming. This group, he argues, provided the basis for Antigonish Movement Co-Operatives, another middle-of-the-road strategy which included miners, farmers and fishermen. Thus, as with the Bell Island mines, inability to mobilize an effective union prompted workers to choose the cooperative way instead (Sacouman, 1979).
38. Interview with S. Case, September 8, 1978.

39. Joy (1977:4) indicates that only 24% of St. John's residents were trades and manufacturing employees in 1911.
40. Roman Catholic Archives, file ('The Fishermen's Union, ... etc.'): St. John to Howley, March 26, 1909. Cited in McDonald (1974:28).
41. Much of the information on Ferryland district comes from an interview with Cornelius O'Brien, a 63 year old former fish merchant and plant owner from Ferryland district, July, 1978.
42. See Note 9.
43. There may have been one FPU local at Lark Harbour in the district of St. George's (Coaker, 1930:82).
44. The weakness of the local merchant elite and ineffectual operation of the truck system probably helps explain the large units of production in the inshore fishery in this district.
45. Cooperatives were organized in the area between Flower's Cove and St. Anthony by Grenfell during the late 19th and early 20th century (Grenfell, 1929).
46. There were 364 people in 403 lobster factories in St. George's according to the 1911 census (Census of Newfoundland... Table II:442-3). Presumably either the figures are wrong or some of these factories were not in operation.
47. See the Report of the Department of Marine and Fisheries in the Journals of Assembly (1908:184-6).

CHAPTER THREE

AUTHORITIES

If we define social movements as struggles for power, then a full explanation for the pattern of success and failure of such movements must include an analysis not only of the strength of potential partisans, but also the power of their opponents. The Fishermen's Protective Union was opposed by both the merchants and the clergy. However, there were substantial regional variations in their ability to implement that opposition. Structures of underdevelopment which produced a high level of organization among north-east coast producers simultaneously generated strong competitive forces between merchants with interests in this region during the period between 1900-20. Along the south-west coast, competition between merchant-capitalists was far less pronounced at least until the First World War. An analysis of the north-east coast clerical elite reveals that they were divided into several parallel hierarchies and therefore unable to implement an effective anti-FPU program similar to that of the Catholic Church in the east coast districts.

Part I: The merchants in opposition

Previous investigations have paid little attention to the relationship between merchant opposition and the regional distribution of the FPU. Two authors have suggested that the extreme success of the movement on the north-east coast was partially attributable to the inability of St. John's merchants to take it seriously, which led them to delay active opposition until it was too late.¹ However, even this assertion is questionable and one wonders whether opposition was in fact 'delayed' or was rather somewhat ineffectual along the north-east coast. Using the evidence of McDonald, one of the above authors, it can be argued that as a group, Newfoundland merchants were overtly hostile to the FPU and actively engaged in various ploys to stop its expansion shortly after the birth of the movement.² As early as March, 1909, an attempt was made to censor FPU material in the only Newfoundland paper that was willing to publish it.³ As a consequence, within a few months of its initial organization, the Union was forced to publish its own newspaper in an attempt to counteract censorship. Although a very effective mechanism for maintaining union strength in areas where the FPU was established, the union newspaper did not have a previously established readership, hence censorship in the daily press no doubt helped limit the spread of the movement.

Around the same time as censorship was introduced, north-east coast merchants in communities where FPU union locals had been established, attempted to counteract FPU purchases of fishery supplies in bulk by raising the prices on those items in their stores which the Union did not carry (Coaker, 1930:83). In response, the Union Trading Company was organized. The St. John's merchants attempted to initiate a boycott of the Union Trading Company.⁴

Merchants also attempted to undermine the strength of the FPU by political means. If we look at Table Three, it is clear that in the 1913 election, at least 31% of non FPU candidates came from the merchant class. Although acting as politicians, merchants were unlikely to make political decisions that were independent of their own class interests (Panitch, 1977:13-14). Indeed, a definition of national interest that conflicted with their business interests would most likely have been unacceptable (Miliband, 1969:58-9). Among the approximately 30% of non FPU candidates who were lawyers, many were the sons of merchants⁵ and again, their social origins probably influenced their political views (Matthews, 1962:68). Perhaps more importantly, their present social location as politically ambitious lawyers, reliant on the merchant elite for both legal contracts and political patronage, would have affected their political values (Kerr, 1973:404). The social origins of non FPU candidates contrast strikingly

TABLE THREE
Occupation of Candidates in the 1913 election, FPU
and members of the Legislative Council, 1913

capitalist and upper middle class

	Number	General or Fish Merchant	Lawyer, Politician ²	Publisher Journalist	Contr Insur. Busin ¹
NonFPU Candidates	64 ³	31%	30%	9%	8%
FPU Candidates	6	0	0	0	0
Legislative Council	23	63%	5%	9%	0

1. Members of the Legislative Council were appointed not elected.
2. According to Smallwood, 3 candidates were professional politicians.
3. The occupation of only 59 of the 64 nonFPU candidates in the 1913 election. According to Smallwood, it is unlikely that the other six were fishermen.
4. Both of these candidates were schooner captains. One, Adolphus Yates, was Twillingate. When he lost his position due to the Liberal-FPU coalition (Papers, Memorial University).

Sources: Yearbook and Almanac of Newfoundland, 1914; McAlpine's St. John's with J.R. Smallwood, March 8, 1979.

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TABLE THREE

Number of Candidates in the 1913 election, FPU and nonFPU
and members of the Legislative Council, 1913

Candidate	capitalist and upper middle class			working class and lower middle class			Total
	Merchant, Lawyer, Politician ²	Publisher Journalist	Contractor, Insurance, Business	Fisherman, Farmer	Artisan, White Collar	Other	
	30%	9%	8%	3% ⁴	1%	9%	91%
	0	0	0	67%	33%	0	100%
	5%	9%	0	0	0	23%	100%

Candidates not elected.
 Candidates were professional politicians.
 The 64 nonFPU candidates in the 1913 election could be ascertained using these sources.
 It is unlikely that the other six were fishermen.
 schooner captains. One, Adolphus Yates, was originally the FPU candidate for
 the position due to the Liberal-FPU coalition, he joined the Conservatives (See Coaker

Newfoundland 1914; McAipine's St. John's Directory 1908-9; Noel (1971:117); Interview



with those of the six FPU candidates who were either fishermen and farmers or artisans and white collar workers. This lends further credence to the view that political antagonisms were firmly rooted in class differences.

Given the origins of its members, it is not surprising that the party in power in 1909 only fleetingly considered cooperation with the FPU before placing its support solidly behind the merchants.⁶ Also, while members of the Liberal Party agreed to form a coalition with Union candidates in 1913, it was only because of the severely weakened condition of the party at the time that they did so.⁷ In return, the Liberals extracted a concession from FPU leaders that virtually guaranteed the movement would not become a political issue in parts of the island where it was not already well established: the FPU agreed not to run candidates outside of the north-east coast districts. The coalition was brief and soon both of the established parties opposed virtually all Union legislation including an attempt to legislate against a fish merchants' price combine in 1911.⁸

Just as the origin of non FPU candidates suggests that political antagonism to the movement was motivated by merchant hostility, similarly, hostility to the movement among members of the appointed Legislative Council no doubt had mercantile roots. At this time, the Legislative Council retained the right to reject or drastically amend

legislation and as shown in Table Three, a full 63% of its members in 1913 were merchants. These men took advantage of their political position to rigorously amend whatever Union legislation managed to pass the lower house.⁹

On the basis of the above evidence it seems reasonable to assert that by 1910 at the latest, far from ignoring the FPU, the merchants were actively engaged in attempts to destroy the movement. As suggested by Smallwood (1967:47), "...the merchants above all others, were perturbed. If Coaker went on pouring dangerous ideas into the fishermen's ears, what trouble might not come out of it later? The man had to be opposed that was certain; the fishermen had to be discouraged from following him."

As with capitalists involved in the export sector in most underdeveloped countries, Newfoundland merchants were hostile to local developments that might drive up the costs of production, thereby cutting potential profits and undermining the competitiveness of their exports in international markets (Frank, 1978:15). Significantly, in Newfoundland, the same men controlled both the export trade and the import, distribution, and manufacturing of a wide range of commodities.¹⁰ Although this may have tempered their aversion to rising incomes among the local population, the majority of who were fishermen, it eliminated the potential for any strong alliance between a group of local capitalists and an emergent populist movement,

such as the FPU, in a concerted attempt to reverse the effects of underdevelopment (Frank, 1978:15). There was no substantial group of Newfoundland merchants or capitalists who might have viewed a significant redistribution of the rewards of the fishery in an entirely favourable light.

Having established that Newfoundland's merchant elite was, indeed, opposed to the FPU, what remains to be discussed is regional variations in the effectiveness of that opposition or, the role of the merchants in determining the pattern of success and failure of the FPU. The relationship between mercantile organization and the distribution of the FPU is analyzed for the south-west coast where the movement was a "failure"; for the union stronghold along the north-east coast; and for the districts of Port de Grave and Carbonear where the success of the movement was mixed.

Structures of underdevelopment and merchant organization:
the South-west Coast

One author recently suggested that because countries of the periphery are characterized by the persistence of several different modes of production, "...each formed at a different stage of development, each articulated in turn with external fractions of capital... there is a disorganization of both exploited and exploiting classes" (Fine, 1978:94; emphasis added). As we saw in Chapter Two, the degree of disorganization which

underdevelopment produced among Newfoundland producers varied with the type of underdevelopment that predominated in each region. The following investigation of the relationship between structures of underdevelopment and the organization of Newfoundland's merchant elite suggests that uneven underdevelopment produces regional variations in the organization of exploiting classes as well as exploited ones.

In Chapter Two I suggested that because under structures of direct capitalist underdevelopment producers are often concentrated in relatively large units of production and petty producers may be semi-proletarianized, higher levels of social organization and hence a greater capacity to mobilize in their own interests is generated among producers. As a result, movements among primary producers tend to occur in regions characterized by direct rather than indirect underdevelopment (see Brym and Sacouman, 1979). However, it is possible that producers' gains may be offset by the increased control merchants and capitalists acquire over production by shifting from indirect to direct structures of underdevelopment, thus permitting elites to oppose the emergence and growth of such movements.¹¹ The relationship between structures of underdevelopment, mercantile organization, and the failure of the FPU to spread to the south-west coast of Newfoundland is a good illustration of this case.

relative power of merchants and fishermen.¹³

During this period 1895-1914, merchants on the south-west coast gained greater control over the size of inshore fishing units and helped create a reserve army of labour for the offshore fishery by making limited investments at the point of production and expanding into the import-export trade. These two factors, the creation of structures of direct underdevelopment type II and vertical integration, helped maintain a low level of intermercantile competition which in turn, reinforced the operation of the 'credit' system of exchange in the inshore fishery. The reader will recall that it was the operation of the credit system that helped ensure that inshore production units remained fragmented and atomized in a regional economy dominated by the fishery. The fragmentation of inshore production units generated a reserve army of labour for the offshore which permitted merchants to introduce a divisive system of incentives among offshore fishermen. In this way, the degree of organization among south-west coast merchants, produced in part by structures of direct underdevelopment type II, was related to the elimination of a basis for the development of strong support for the FPU among south-west coast fishermen and hence the failure of the movement in that region.

A series of historical developments which permitted some south-west coast merchants to respond to rising prices

Along the south-west coast of Newfoundland, the severe atomization of inshore production units and the operation of a divisive system of incentive in the offshore fishery badly undermined the organizational basis for FPU support among local fishermen. An input of leadership and other resources on the part of the FPU leadership might have offset the problems created by a lack of organization among south-west coast fishermen. However, effective mercantile opposition to the movement in the form of censorship and political negotiations, described above, which stopped the FPU from running candidates here, prevented this from happening. As a result, the movement remained weak along the south-west coast and this apparently precluded the necessity of local merchants engaging in any active opposition to the movement except at the political level.¹²

The lack of any open confrontation between south-west coast fishermen and merchants over the FPU would seem to suggest that the level of organization of the local merchant elite was largely unrelated to the impotence of the FPU in that region: patterns of work organization were the most important factor. However, there was indeed a relationship. The system of incentives introduced into the merchant-owned offshore fishery as well as the exchange relationship between merchants and inshore fishermen were less historical accidents than a clear reflection of the

for salt cod in the foreign markets after 1900 by expanding into the import-export trade and the offshore fishery, led to the consolidation of control over the local trade in the hands of a limited number of middle-sized companies (see Figure Four, page 32). Penetration into importing was facilitated by several factors: the introduction of a regular steamer service between the south-west coast and Halifax;¹⁴ the growth of a market for salt cod in New England;¹⁵ and the construction of a bank in Grand Bank.¹⁶ These developments made it easier for middle-sized merchants to import directly, rather than at the inflated prices demanded by large St. John's companies since it allowed them to import without necessarily investing in ocean-going vessels, gave them independent access to credit, and permitted them to integrate import-export activities. Expansion into exporting was facilitated by some of the above factors as well as the spread of consignment shipping or shipping without prior sale at an agreed price. Under this system, English brokers were willing to advance almost the full value of the cargo. This meant south-west coast companies with a narrow credit base no longer had to act as middlemen between the large St. John's companies, which had sufficient capital to export, and the fishermen.¹⁷

Those south-west coast companies that were able to expand into the import-export trade were relieved of the profit-cutting impact of dependency on the St. John's

companies. As a result, they were in a position to set local prices for fish and supplies at a level profitable for them but which smaller local companies could not afford to underbid.¹⁸ This facilitated pricesetting by reducing the number of companies whose cooperation was required.

Vertical integration and the consequent increased access to profits which this produced, combined with rising prices, the availability of credit, and a large reserve army of labour on the south-west coast,¹⁹ permitted these companies to respond to rising demand for salt cod by purchasing schooners for use in the offshore fishery (see Table Four).²⁰ Without increased production, rising demand could have produced a high level of intermercantile competition for the product of inshore fishermen. This, in turn, would have undermined intermercantile cooperation within price combines, driving up local prices to inshore fishermen as well as prompting fishermen to sell independently rather than to the merchant who had advanced them supplies. The atomizing impact of the credit system depended upon intermercantile cooperation and a lack of independent selling.²¹ Without these two elements, fishermen would be in a position to accumulate capital and increase the size of their production units. Investment in the offshore helped prevent this from happening.

The south-west coast companies that gained control over the local fish trade were similarly organized and had a

TABLE FOUR
Schooner tonnage newly registered in St. John's, 1900-1910
by residents of the South-west Coast from Fortune Bay
to Port aux Basques by occupation (in percentages)

	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910
Merchants	42	57	42	48	32	55	60	65	64	62	64
Fishermen/ Planters	11	9	33	15	4	7	9	8	1	20	11
Other**	47	34	25	37	64	38	31	27	35	18	25
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Averages: Merchants--53.72% Fishermen/Planters--11.64% Other--34.64%

* Schooner tonnage newly registered in St. John's by residents in this area totalled 13,155 tons for this period. Many of these schooners would have been employed in the bank and Western fisheries but some were for use primarily in the export and coasting trades. At its peak between 1900-1920, there were just under 9,000 tons of shipping engaged in the bank fishery (See Chapter Two, Note 7).

** Predominantly mariners, master mariners, and traders.

Source: B/T 108 Series Colonial Ship Registeries for Newfoundland, Newfoundland Archives

uniform interest in keeping prices to producers down.²² Similar organization, general reliance on sailing vessels for export, high capital investment in the offshore, and involvement in the 'credit' system, meant that none of these companies could gain an easy competitive edge over the others by breaking price combines in an attempt to expand at the expense of its competitors. Hence, by 1910, the cooperation of five companies between Belleoram and Port-aux-Basques permitted merchants to set the price for inshore fish along that part of the coast.²³ Similarly, a cluster of companies in Grand Bank were able to organize their own Board of Trade where, once again, prices for fish were agreed upon.²⁴

The social basis for intermercantile cooperation does not seem to have been undermined on the south-west coast by 'fish speculators'. As is shown below, the presence of a class of capitalists who, having earned their capital in areas outside the fishery, might be prompted to respond to rising prices for fish by beginning to speculate for this commodity among inshore fishermen, could have been a very disruptive factor. The lack of economic diversification on the south-west coast meant that no such group of local capitalists existed.²⁵ Speculators from outside the region no doubt found it less attractive than the north-east coast where rather than having to deal with many, very small producers, a schooner load of fish could be purchased from

fishermen and small merchants and resold for a quick turn-over on their investment.

Stable price combines among the south-west coast merchant elite prior to the First World War²⁶ helped merchants maintain a high level of control over the surplus value produced by inshore fishermen. As a result, inshore production units remained extremely small during this period. Atomized fishermen were forced to deal with large, vertically-integrated companies. Rather than confronting a small local merchant over whom they could exercise some control, the man they dealt with was the agent of a large company that frequently had branch stores in many communities.²⁷ Fishermen found the risk of independent selling to be high; while the costs of sanction, by either demanding immediate repayment of advanced credit or refusing to supply, were small for the company. In at least one case, a fisherman was sufficiently concerned about possible sanction that he beat his wife and daughter for trying to sell fish to another local merchant.²⁸ With prices more or less the same at the various local merchants, there was little incentive to sell independently and little opportunity for the accumulation of surplus by this means.²⁹

Merchant control over the surplus of inshore fishermen via the credit system meant that often a fisherman could hope to accumulate some small surplus only by exploiting his children. A young man might be a full-time

fisherman before he was a teenager but guaranteed rewards came much later:

[a] father would continue to 'keep' his working son, providing food, clothing and shelter, beyond which compensation a young man would have to trust to the generosity of his parents. Not until he had attained the age of twenty-one... would a man be given... 'half share' ...Remaining with his father, a man could not expect a full share until marriage (Gaffney, 1978:8).

Similarly, a young girl could begin drying fish for her father at a very young age but the returns for her labour never exceeded room and board.³⁰

The lack of return for children involved in the domestic unit of production meant that it was easy to attract them into the capitalist sector. As soon as possible, young men moved into the offshore and young girls dried merchants' fish rather than their fathers'. This accounted in part for the small size of inshore production units. The young men became part of an army of reserve labour the availability of which was directly related to the introduction of a system of incentive into the offshore fishery which undermined crew solidarity. As suggested by one author,

In the late 19th century Newfoundland offshore fishery, the competition for berth opportunities, a 'chance to go in dory', must have been intense among Newfoundland fishermen... [S]ome skippers intentionally sought mixed crews for purposes of better control... Thus, despite the high priority placed upon recruitment of productive fishermen, crews of 25-27 men tended to be mixed lots of kin, friends and strangers with an uncertain productive potential.

Given these mixed lots of men from voyage to voyage, there was perhaps a shared orientation among fishermen, skippers and vessel owners that favoured the count scheme. (Anderson, 1977:20).

The 'count' system of incentive meant that fishermen were paid according to the catch of each two-man dory rather than receiving a share of the total catch taken by the schooner. As suggested in Chapter Two, its impact on the solidarity of offshore fishermen was devastating.

The bargaining position of offshore fishermen was reduced not simply by the availability of surplus labour. Investment of capital by local merchants in the offshore was limited. By combining capitalist and petty production merchants reduced their dependency on both offshore production and that of petty producers. As we have seen, expansion into the offshore reduced the level of inter-mercantile competition for inshore fish thereby increasing mercantile control over the surplus of petty producers and helping to maintain them in atomized production units. Thus, on the south-west coast, although the spread of

structures of direct underdevelopment type II increased the concentration of producers in the offshore, mercantile gains in organization and control over production offset those of fishermen. Vertical integration and expansion into the offshore fishery reduced intermercantile competition which helped maintain the operation of the credit system of exchange between merchants and inshore fishermen. This in turn kept inshore fishing units small and produced an army of surplus labour for the offshore. In this way, the level of organization of the south-west coast merchant elite figured in the failure of the FPU to spread into this region. Merchant cooperation helped maintain patterns of work organization that precluded the emergence of strong support for the movement among local fishermen; active opposition to the movement on the part of the merchant elite prevented the input of leadership and other resources which might have offset the absence of grassroots organization.

Structures of direct and indirect underdevelopment and the disorganization of the North-east Coast merchant elite

The attempts of north-east coast merchants to cooperate were plagued by strong competitive drives. Many companies, large and small, were involved in a combination of structures of direct and indirect underdevelopment. With a low level of consolidation of control at the exchange level, as well as internal differences in access to credit, economies of scale, innovative technology and overhead costs,

attempts to organize the north-east coast fish trade during the late 19th and early 20th century were largely futile.

There were attempts to set prices along the north-east coast and regulate the export of salt cod as early as 1902 on the part of the merchant elite. However, such combines were persistently unstable, dissolving again almost immediately.³¹ Cooperation remained problematic after the emergence of the FPU in 1908. Once organized the Union could withhold large portions of the catch in an attempt to break such combines, or sell to a foreign purchaser.³² As association after association dissolved and prices in both Newfoundland and the foreign market fluctuated radically, observers began to fear that the 'unrestricted individualism' of the north-east coast merchant elite would destroy the trade.³³

Historians are well aware of merchant competitiveness during the period after the turn of the century. However, the causes of such competitiveness, its basis on the north-east coast, and the relationship between intermercantile competition and the rapid spread of the FPU throughout the north-east coast have been less thoroughly explored.³⁴

During the late 19th century, structures of indirect underdevelopment became increasingly widespread throughout the north-east coast fishery. Declining profits in this sector led to the withdrawal of capital from

production (Sager, 1978:25). Reinvestment of some of this capital in a limited import-substitution sector, the tertiary sector, and in logging and mining, produced some economic diversification in this region.³⁵ Capital withdrawal from the fishery for alternative investments had a profound impact on the internal organization of the trade. Vertically-integrated companies with branches in various outports were increasingly replaced by large import-export companies concentrated in St. John's which acted in a wholesale capacity to a group of more or less independent outport retailers.³⁶ The organization of production within the inshore fishery changed. Economic diversification produced a group of capitalists on the north-east coast who had earned their capital outside the fish trade.

As prices for fish began to rise again after 1900, complications developed. Increased demands for labour in the fishery combined with alternative job opportunities in the newly established mining and pulp and paper industries produced frequent labour shortages (Royal Commission...1915: 3-5). A group of outport merchants who could potentially come into competition with their wholesalers had to be dealt with. Also, local capitalists, previously uninvolved in the fishery were prompted to begin speculating in fish. Labour shortages, in themselves, made it difficult to maintain a high level of exploitation among north-east coast fishermen. However, the development of intermercantile

competition and consequent undermining of the credit system of exchange in the north-east coast inshore fishery, greatly enhanced this problem. The following discussion analyzes three types of intermercantile competition and their relationship to the spread of the FPU throughout the north-east coast: competition between wholesalers and retailers, between various large fish exporting companies, and between large and small exporters.

(a) Wholesaler versus retailer:³⁷

The wholesale-retail relationship was characterized by a struggle over the distribution of profits. This conflict had an important impact on the ability of small merchants to oppose the FPU in the outports of the north-east coast. The outport retailer was, in fact, a middleman between large exporters and fishermen. He had various strategies for generating a profit. These included regulation of his involvement in the credit system according to his view of the market; the storage, collection and transport of fish for the large companies; engaging in barter with fishermen at the end of the season who had been unable to get a merchant to advance them supplies on credit; and where possible, vertical integration into the import-export trade. Vertical integration for retailers, as for south-west coast merchants, would permit them to bypass the profit-cutting effect of dependency on wholesalers and shift them

from a dependent relationship to a competitive one.

Wholesaler-exporters also had various strategies designed to reduce the share of profit accruing to middlemen. Monopoly of the import-export trade and access to credit helped these companies acquire access to the majority of the profits. They attempted to safeguard this control during periods of high demand by entering directly into the retail trade. During such periods, they would offer supplies to fishermen and sharemen at the same price as they sold them to retailers. If they were in a hurry to get a shipment to market, the large companies would encourage fishermen to bypass the outport retailer and bring their fish directly to them by offering a higher price in St. John's.³⁸

Wholesalers might also send out schooners to buy up fish in the outports, often at the same price they offered the retailer, who was expected to store and ship the fish for nothing. During periods of low demand, when foreign markets were glutted, these companies would attempt to put off potential losses onto fishermen and retailers, leaving them with their fish either unsold or purchased only at prices below those necessary for fishermen to pay off their accounts with retailers.

The wholesaler-retailer conflict had some important consequences for both the organization of production among north-east coast fishermen and the ability of retailers to oppose the organization of FPU locals in their community. Withdrawal of capital from the fishery in the late 19th

century had left fishermen in a position where they could not get access to credit and left control over production increasingly in the hands of petty producers. Those fishermen who were able to get supplies on credit, in particular from the large St. John's companies, or who could afford to pay cash, were able to respond to rising prices and the availability of large numbers of fishermen without credit by increasing their investment in production and hiring sharemen. As suggested in Chapter Two, other fishermen were prompted to pool the resources of their extended family in order to stay in the fishery, in particular as the spread of the cod trap raised capital costs.³⁹ This trend to large units of production was enhanced by the wholesaler-retailer conflict. In the process of attempting to restrict the profits of retailers, wholesaler-exporters simultaneously strengthened a portion of the fishing population, permitting the emergence of a class of outport trapowners or 'skippers' over which small, local retailers could exercise little control. Retailers were very limited in their ability to impose sanctions on these men who could obtain fishery supplies in St. John's or even pay cash.⁴⁰

Unlike the south-west coast, where the large companies were represented in the outports directly through their agents, on the north-east coast, large

companies dealt primarily with retailers whose interests were, to some extent, antagonistic to their own. Conflict within the wholesaler-retailer relationship produced larger inshore fishing units with a greater potential for collective action over which small retailers could exert little control. Large merchants could sanction these fishermen only at the risk of losing profits to middlemen and hindering their access to fish.

(b) Large merchant versus large merchant

Intermercantile competition was not confined to the relationship between large companies and small middlemen. Competitive forces were also strong between the large companies that monopolized the majority of the import-export trade in Newfoundland around 1900. Differences in capitalization, revealed by the bank crash in 1894,⁴¹ as well as variations in access to credit from the new Canadian banks after 1895, prevented companies from organizing strong price combines. This was particularly true after prices began to rise on the foreign markets and companies began struggling to expand and consolidate control over the fishery.

For many of the large companies, those affected by the bank crash, the period following 1894 was one of capital withdrawal from production including refusing to finance petty producers under the credit system. As noted

in Chapter Two, noninvolvement in the credit system placed virtually all of the risks of the fishery on the shoulders of the fishermen,⁴² but this meant that these companies had to rely on the difference between the price they paid for fish in Newfoundland and the price they received in the foreign market to determine their profits. Under the credit system a company could regulate both the price of fish and the price of supplies in determining its rate of profit. The credit system also guaranteed both a supply of fish for export and a market for the commodities which the company imported and/or retailed. Hence, reduced involvement in this system of exchange forced companies to compete on the open market for their fish and for the sale of their imports. Needless to say, such competition could quickly reduce the profits of the various companies and not surprisingly, the banks began to demand that the large companies organize price combines and regulate exports to the foreign market before they would advance them the capital for the fish trade. Such combines were organized as early as 1902 but collapsed repeatedly.

At least part of the explanation for the instability of combines and a consequent high level of intermercantile competition lay in the refusal of one of the largest companies, Bowrings, to join in price combines.⁴³ Virtually unaffected by the bank crash, Bowrings took advantage of the weakened condition of its competitors by

increasing its involvement in the credit system. Already with a competitive advantage based on the ownership of steamships for the import-export trade and access to almost unlimited credit, Bowrings expanded until it became one of the largest suppliers for the fishery on the island and exported the largest percentage of the catch.⁴⁴ As we have seen, involvement in the supply trade helped guarantee access to supplies of fish and a market for supplies without competing on a completely open market. Already with a substantial competitive edge, Bowrings could only increase its control over the fishery by refusing to join the combines of its competitors thereby directly endangering their access to credit from the banks. Without the involvement of their largest competitor, the other members of the combine ran the risk of losing control over even more of the annual catch as well as delaying their export dates which in turn virtually guaranteed lower prices in the foreign markets.⁴⁵ Combine after combine dissolved as merchants struggled to pass off potential losses onto their weaker competitors and onto fishermen.

Unable individually to control the price for petty producers' fish, and prompted by rising prices in the foreign markets, merchants responded by pouring capital into the fishery between 1900 and 1908. The availability of a cheap supply of schooners and high prices for Labrador fish prompted fishermen and merchants to invest in the Labrador

floater or schooner fishery producing the expansion noted in Chapter Two. Steamships were introduced into the Labrador fishery as well. Structures of direct under-development type II began to spread throughout the north-east fishery increasing the concentration of producers. However, unlike the south-west coast, the gains in producer organization were not offset by a decline in intermercantile competition. Thus, the period around 1908, when the FPU was organized, was characterized by a combination of patterns of work organization that increased the level of organization and solidarity of fishermen and a relatively high level of intermercantile competition which weakened the strength of the fishermen's opponents. These were ideal conditions for the emergence of a fishermen's protest movement such as the FPU.

(c) Large versus small exporters

The north-east coast fish trade began to be plagued by problems of overproduction and glutted markets for Labrador fish as early as 1907. Control of the more profitable stationer fishery, as well as access to steamships for use in the export trade, permitted the largest companies to pass off the burden of overproduction onto the backs of their competitors. In response, these companies cut back on their investment in production once again, thus greatly reducing the size of the floater

fishery.⁴⁶ Capital was withdrawn increasingly from the supply trade and the credit system was even further weakened until by 1914 it was reported that: "...the old fashioned supplying system has become almost a thing of the past, two firms only in St. John's now doing business in the old way...[A] large number of small merchants have started in the outports who buy and sell for cash..." In general, merchants were giving credit only to a substantial fisherman with "...proper fishing property, or who [could] contribute something to fitting himself out."⁴⁷ With the decline in the Labrador floater fishery, structures of indirect underdevelopment became, once again, increasingly dominant in the north-east coast fishery. Decreased involvement in the credit system placed control over the fishery and its products ever more in the hands of petty producers who were free to sell, if they could sell, to the highest bidder. If north-east merchants were going to break the FPU in their region once it was organized, one of the most effective ways would have been to cooperate in setting prices. However, the very low level of consolidation of control over fish exports during the period prior to and during the First World War made such cooperation very difficult.

During this period, many of the small outport retailers described above took advantage of the spread of consignment shipping and capital advances from the same

English brokers who helped south-west coast merchants to break out of their dependency upon the St. John's companies, and penetrated directly into the import-export trade.⁴⁸

This new group of small exporters was joined by some local and foreign fish speculators who were also aided by English brokers. Local men who had earned their capital during the brief period of economic diversification between 1880 and 1900 and who were finding outlets for profitable investment increasingly narrow in the import substitution sectors were drawn into the fish trade in response to rising prices.⁴⁹ With little or no overhead, these companies could purchase a schooner-load of fish at prices slightly above those offered by the other companies, dispose of it more cheaply, and still make a profit. Agents for foreign companies also began exporting fish purchased directly from local fishermen and small merchants.⁵⁰

The differing financial bases, organization and profit-seeking strategies of these various companies, which ranged from some heavily involved in the credit system to others with an overhead of no more than a schooner or two, undermined the ability of north-east coast merchants to organize sustained resistance to the FPU. Structures of indirect/commercial underdevelopment increasingly replaced direct capitalist underdevelopment within the north-east coast fishery once again after 1910. The low level of consolidation of control at the exchange level prevented

merchants from cooperating in any concerted attempt to oppose the combine-breaking strategies of the FPU. Petty producers used the new bargaining strength they had gained from unionization to exacerbate intermercantile competition by playing one company off against the others (see Note 32).

Our comparison of regional variations in the level of organization of merchant elites on the north-east and south-west coasts of Newfoundland supports the view that this was an important factor in determining the regional distribution of the FPU. Differing structures of underdevelopment affected the pattern of success and failure of populist movements such as the FPU around the turn of the century because of their relationship to patterns of work organization and level of intermercantile competition. A brief discussion of the districts of Carbonear and Port de Grave helps to confirm this conclusion.

Mercantile organization on Conception Bay: Carbonear versus Port de Grave

In Chapter Two we noted that, with the exception of Bay de Verde, Conception Bay fishermen were engaged primarily in the Labrador stationer fishery. Clearly this was the case for both the districts of Carbonear and Port de Grave (See Table One, Page 5). It was also noted in Chapter Two that despite the relatively high level of concentration of producers that characterized the stationer fishery, support for the FPU in these two districts was very

means of production as well. Consequently, unlike other Labrador merchants engaged in parts of the stationer or floater fishery, Carbonear merchants would have been less susceptible to the dangers of intermercantile competition. Direct ownership of the catch eliminated the problem of dealing with petty producers. Unable to benefit from intermercantile competition to increase their share of the value produced by their labour, Labrador fishermen operating out of Carbonear were forced to go on strike.⁵³ Although clearly stronger than their counterparts in the south-west coast offshore fishery (perhaps because of the availability of alternative forms of employment such as the Bell Island mines), striking Labrador fishermen confronted a group of merchant-capitalists who could only lose by an increase in piece-rates. Hence, aside from the danger of delaying their export dates, the incentive for cooperation among Carbonear merchants against striking fishermen was no doubt quite strong.

In many ways, the structure of the Carbonear fishery and the basis for intermercantile cooperation were more similar to the south-west coast than the north-east coast within which the district was embedded. The district was politically and economically dominated by a small group of vertically integrated companies with independent control over the import-export trade.⁵⁴ Investment at the point of production within the Labrador stationer fishery produced

uneven (See Figures One and Two, Pages 3 and 4). More specifically, the FPU failed in Carbonear but was quite successful in Port de Grave. An important difference between the two districts that helps to explain this inconsistency lies in the organization of local merchant elites.

Carbonear had a class of well established local merchants who, as a group, had managed to dominate the political representation of their district more effectively than any other body of outport merchants throughout the late 19th and early 20th century (Kerr, 1973:110, 113). During the period of the emergence of the FPU, the fishery which they controlled was dominated by structures of direct underdevelopment type II. At home in Carbonear, merchants relied on the credit system to appropriate the surplus of inshore fishermen.⁵¹ On the Labrador, however, Carbonear merchants seem to have been concentrated in the Straits area where the fishery was "...conducted by large operators from established shore rooms, and by floaters, but not by many stationers [i.e. independent fishermen]." (Report... 1905, JA:223). Wm. Penney, for example, had a large business at Red Bay on the Labrador where in 1910, he operated 25 trap boats and employed 40 to 50 men (Gosling, 1910:409-10).⁵² On the Labrador, therefore, Carbonear merchants were in fact capitalists controlling not only transportation to the Labrador coast but ownership of the

structures of direct underdevelopment which reduced the potential for intermercantile competition except at the marketing level. This, in turn, would have helped offset producer gains in organization as a consequence of concentration. Capital investment on the Labrador would also have reduced mercantile dependency on the product of inshore fishermen thereby making it easier to control the surplus of this latter group. As a result, Carbonear merchants would have been in a better position to prevent the spread of the FPU into their district than other north-east coast merchants.

The situation was somewhat different in Port de Grave where the organization of production and the structural bases for intermercantile competition were similar to the rest of the north-east coast. There were no important local merchants in the district of Port de Grave after 1866 and political representation by local men had ended as early as 1885 (Kerr, 1973:124). Although the Labrador stationer fishery was, once again, extremely important, companies from Port de Grave had their stations concentrated in the area north of the Straits between Battle Harbor and Cape Harrigan. In this area, the fishery was "...conducted by large operators and floaters, as in the Straits of Belle Isle, but also by many 'stationers'." (Report... 1905, JA:223).

Most Port de Grave companies were not large, vertically integrated companies like those in Carbonear. Rather, local merchants acted as middlemen, similar to the retailers described above, getting their supplies and facilities for transporting fishermen to the Labrador from St. John's companies through which they tended to market their catch.⁵⁵ In general, they combined direct ownership of some cod traps with indirect control over the catch of petty producers via the credit system and control over transportation to and from the Labrador. With no more than indirect control over a relatively large portion of the catch, these middlemen would have been extremely susceptible to the problems for surplus appropriation generated by the development of intermercantile competition along the northeast coast and in the Labrador fishery. The possibilities for independent selling increased for fishermen. As the large St. John's companies attempted to expand their control over the Labrador fishery, in particular during periods of high demand, fishermen could obtain supplies from and sell directly to the same companies that controlled middlemen.

Those companies in Port de Grave that either owned schooners or depended on companies with schooners to transport their crews to the Labrador were directly threatened by the introduction of steamers into the Labrador fishery. Such companies ran the risk of losing even more of the supply trade as fishermen chose the company which

could guarantee them access to a good trap berth. Access to trap berths for company-owned traps was also endangered. Finally, capital tied up in schooners was endangered as the latter became obsolete for use in the Labrador fishery. With some Port de Grave companies using steamers supplied by St. John's and others dependent on schooners, it is not surprising that intermercantile tensions were strong. Those merchants who attempted to oppose the introduction of steam on the Labrador championed the cause of fishermen instead of that of their competitors in defending their position.⁵⁶

Divided against each other by technological differences and weakened by their dependency on large St. John's companies merchants in Port de Grave shared control over their district with a group of local fishermen (planters) over which they could exercise little direct control.⁵⁷ As intermercantile competition for the product of petty producers increased, the potential for local cooperation in an attempt to oppose the FPU declined, with the result that, unlike Carbonear, the movement was quite successful in this district.

Conclusions:

In general then, not only in Conception Bay but on the north-east and south-west coasts, regional variations in mercantile solidarity seem to have played a definite role in the distribution of the FPU. The level of

intermercantile competition influenced FPU success not only directly, through its impact on the repressive power of merchants, but also indirectly by influencing the patterns of work organization in various regions of the island.

Part II: The clerical elite

The Fishermen's Protective Union encountered opposition not only from merchants but also from the clergy. Both clergymen and merchants attempted to censor FPU material in established newspapers.⁵⁸ The Roman Catholic Archbishop sent out a circular condemning the FPU as a secret society. Among Anglicans and Methodists, the Society for United Fishermen made a point of issuing a circular warning fishermen away from the movement.⁵⁹ Clerical opposition to the FPU can be explained in part by their ties to the merchant elite. Merchants and clergymen often shared positions on appointed school boards (Kerr, 1973:279-80). Merchants subsidized local clergymen by providing food and lodging as well as financial support for the church.⁶⁰ Also, merchants and clergy held joint control of most of the top positions in the voluntary associations of the island.⁶¹ These linkages combined with clerical involvement in timber speculation and attempts to attract foreign capital to Newfoundland around 1900 helped ensure that "...natural sympathies arose between merchant and cleric who often found themselves thrown together for social

and intellectual companionship in the remote isolation of small outports..." (McDonald, 1971:86). Like other 'businessmen', speculating clergymen no doubt feared the FPU would drive up local wages and discourage further investment of foreign capital in Newfoundland.⁶²

Even without their ties to the merchant elite, it is probable that clergymen would have regarded the FPU as a subversive and dangerous force. The movement was a challenge to the denominational system of education in Newfoundland and hence an important sphere of clerical power.⁶³ Based on economic rather than denominational lines of affiliation, the FPU threatened other religious institutions, in particular those based on the persistence of religious parallelism. Thus, the venom contained in the Roman Catholic Archbishop's attack on the Union was no doubt related to its emergence at the very time when he was planning to construct a club for Roman Catholic fishermen visiting St. John's.⁶⁴ Perhaps less because of their isolation together than because of the positions of social and political power that they shared, clergymen developed "the same values of economic conservatism and social paternalism" (McDonald, 1971:86) as merchants and both clergy and merchants turned a jaundiced eye on the FPU.

Previous authors have by no means neglected to discuss the role of clerical opposition in determining the regional distribution of the FPU. However, with the

exception of McDonald, explanations have too often relied on primarily psychological variables.⁶⁵ For example, Richard Gwym claims that "...[w]ithin two years, Coaker's movement swept the Island except for...the east coast Catholic districts where clerical conservatism proved more powerful than material populism" (1968:22). Arguments based on the ideological component of the Catholic religion are highly problematic because they cannot account for the failure of the FPU in the predominantly Anglican districts of the south-west coast. Nor can they explain either those Union locals that flourished in Catholic communities along the north-east coast or the eleven FPU locals which had a brief existence in those very east coast districts where conservatism presumably precluded their emergence.⁶⁶

It is clear that the ability of clergymen to mount an attack capable of repressing the FPU was uneven. An explanation based on regional variations in the level of organization of clergymen can account for this unevenness better than one based on ideology. Such an analysis suggests that in only one region of the island, the east coast districts of St. John's East and West, Ferryland and Piacentia-St. Mary's, was the church sufficiently powerful to prevent sustained support for the FPU from emerging.

The east coast districts described above composed the Archdiocese of St. John's. The area had a predominantly Catholic population and the Catholic church had been

established here longer than anywhere else in Newfoundland. The strength of its hold on the area is reflected in the value of Church buildings within the Archdiocese.⁶⁷ Early subsidies from the Association de la Propagation de la Foi at Lyons, France, and a productive system of collection had assured the wealth of the Catholic church relative to the other denominations.⁶⁸ As early as 1836, the Catholic church had "...built here a strong, efficient religious organization which functioned with a vigour that alarmed the local Anglicans and Methodists..." (Jones, 1971:48).

Similar to other Newfoundland clergymen at this time, Catholic priests within the Archdiocese controlled not only the education system but, because of the lack of local government structures, were frequently "...unofficial notaries, chairmen of local school and road boards, and ...poor relief officers..." (McDonald, 1971:86). They were also economic patrons for local people, acquiring sealing berths for them, selling their vegetables, etc.⁶⁹ Catholic priests within the Archdiocese also played a prominent role in politics openly supporting candidates as late as 1909 (Cashin, 1976:76).

If we look at Catholic voluntary associations, it is clear that clergymen played an important role. They dominated leadership positions in organizations such as the Benevolent Irish Society and the Star of the Sea Society which, unlike their Protestant counterparts, did not have a

mass membership.⁷⁰ Priests led Catholic associations which performed important community services for the Catholic working class in St. John's (Kerr, 1973:291). In the outports, similar associations acted as a mechanism for reinforcing incipient class divisions between fishermen (see Chapter Two).⁷¹ Such associations were, no doubt, one important mechanism for guaranteeing Catholic clerical influence over their flocks. Any organizations such as the FPU, where the influence of the clergy might have been restricted and which could be labelled as 'secret societies', were banned by the Catholic church.⁷²

When the Roman Catholic Archbishop sent out a circular, condemning the FPU as an organization "...calculated to cause great confusion, and an upheaval of our social fabric; to set class against class, and to end in the ruin and destruction of our commercial and business system", and hung notices in every church in the area denouncing the movement, Union locals within the Archdiocese rapidly disappeared.⁷³ Some Catholic fishermen had begun to question the right of the church to rule in their economic affairs. However, the economic and social strength of the clerical elite in these districts coupled with divisions not only within the fishing population, but between outport fishermen and St. John's workers as well, kept them from supporting the FPU at the risk of censure from the church. Foundations laid for the construction of Union

Halls remain as reminders of what might have been.

Catholics in the rest of Newfoundland were organized into two dioceses: the diocese of St. George's and the diocese of Harbour Grace. A bishop was in charge of each diocese. The diocese of St. George's included the districts from Burin around to St. Barbe and had only been organized in 1904. Catholic church resources as reflected in property ownership were much less in this area than in the Archdiocese.⁷⁴ Catholics shared the region with a substantial number of Anglicans and some Methodists as well. In general, church structures for all denominations were less nearly complete than in the older and more populated east coast districts. In isolated areas such as the Northern Peninsula there were many villages with no churches of any denomination.

The Bishop of St. George's was much more conciliatory in his attitude towards the FPU than the Archbishop in St. John's. This and his opposition to the political involvement of west coast priests reflects, perhaps, the weaker position of the Catholic church in this area.⁷⁵ Having made recent gains among the west coast Catholic population by championing their rights with the government in St. John's, as well as by at least one attempt on the part of a local priest to undermine the local monopoly of 'heartless traders and petty merchants', the Catholic church could probably ill afford to risk

alienating local fishermen by opposing the spread of the FPU (Thompson, 1961:41). The division of the island into dioceses prevented the Archbishop from forcing St. George's to follow his policies, although it is clear he would have liked to have done so.⁷⁶

The difficulties which overt opposition to the FPU posed for west coast Catholic clergymen may have been shared by other denominations. Protestant clergymen, in particular Grenfell, had championed the rights of the fishermen by establishing several cooperatives designed to undermine the monopoly of local merchants (Grenfell, 1929).

In general, although patterns of work organization throughout most of the west and south-west coasts precluded the development of strong support for the FPU, it seems unlikely that clergymen of any denomination played an important role in determining the success of the FPU in this area. Assuming they had been willing to risk alienating their congregations, the weakness of church structures in the area would have placed stringent limitations on their ability to oppose the movement.

The diocese of Harbour Grace, from Conception Bay to the Northern Peninsula, was the centre of FPU strength. With the exception of Carbonear, Catholics made up a minority of the population in this region. Other denominations with which they shared the north-east coast included Anglicans, Methodists and Salvation Army people.

The mixture of denominations meant clergymen were forced to share revenues for education as well as, no doubt, local political responsibilities. This, in itself, would have limited the influence of clergy in any one denomination.

As in the west, church structures were poorly established in parts of the north-east coast region. This was particularly true in the newly organized logging towns and along the Labrador coast where, as we have seen, the potential for support for the FPU was very high. It is significant that the only nondenominational schools in Newfoundland were in the new logging and pulp and paper towns. Along the Labrador, the visits of clergymen were relatively infrequent and when they did come, as often as not there was no church. As a result, fishermen might listen to the sermons of clergymen of their own and other denominations, all in the same building (Moynes, 1975:126-7). In the absence of clergymen, lay readers emerged, potential leaders both on the Labrador and at home in their north-east coast communities.

Even more important than the weakness of church structures was the fragmentation of clergymen into several parallel hierarchies. The denominational mixture which characterized the north-east coast ensured that there was no one group of clergy that could exercise substantial control. Significantly, clergymen were more fragmented than their congregations. North-east coast fishermen

exhibited a relatively high degree of religious tolerance.⁷⁷ Not only were they engaged in patterns of work organization that promoted solidarity and downplayed the importance of religious differences, but Protestants in particular, through their involvement in the Loyal Orange Association, were provided with an organizational framework that transcended denominational differences. Along the north-east coast, the Loyal Orange Association "provided a common ground for Anglicans and Methodists to meet for people...were Orangemen first and denominational adherents second" (Batstone, 1967:50-1). More than simply a framework for overcoming denominational parallelism, the LOA through its provision of mutual benefit services such as welfare and sickness benefits, reduced the dependence of local people on the clergy for the performance of these services. LOA leaders could potentially challenge the dominance of administrative and political positions by merchants and clergymen. Finally, the LOA and other north-east coast voluntary associations, which may well have included Catholics in their membership, provided a network of previously established contacts which, as suggested in Chapter Two, no doubt facilitated the rapid spread of the FPU.⁷⁸

As suggested by McDonald (n.d.:25), fragmentation of the north-east coast clerical elite provided an admirable context for attempts on the part of the FPU to

'play them off against each other' if they attempted to oppose the spread of the movement. However, this was not so much the case on Conception Bay where the FPU was less successful. In this area, church structures were more firmly established and older than those farther north and a history of sectarian strife including for example, the Harbour Grace Affray in 1883, had tended to heighten the importance of denominational adherence in these districts.⁷⁹ Also, with the exception of Port de Grave, Conception Bay districts tended to be either Catholic, Methodist or Church of England rather than a combination of two or three of these denominations.⁸⁰ As a result, those clergymen in each district affiliated with the dominant denomination would have been less hampered by the problems of fragmentation encountered by their northern counterparts.

Although the LOA was well established in Conception Bay, sectarian strife and control over local leadership positions within the association by Conception Bay merchants, such as Alfred Penney, Rorke and Captain Dawe, may well have limited the extent to which the organizational framework of the association was available as a basis for mobilizing support for the FPU (Senior, 1959:182-8; 194). With denominations more homogeneous within each district, the association would have been less firmly inter-denominational in the experience of its members. As a result of the above factors, it is possible that clerical

opposition to the FPU played a more important role in determining the success of the movement on Conception Bay than along the rest of the north-east coast.

Conclusions

A discussion of regional variations in the level of organization of authorities in Newfoundland around 1900 suggests that actual repression was an important factor determining the distribution of the FPU in only two areas of Newfoundland: the east coast Catholic districts including St. John's and in Carbonear. In the rural portions of the east coast districts, a group of fragmented fishermen was confronted by a strong, united clergy bent on destroying the movement in their area. And, as we saw in Chapter Two, the disorganized workers in St. John's had little chance of mobilizing strong support for the FPU embedded as they were in the centre of mercantile and clerical strength within Newfoundland (see also the Concluding Chapter). In Carbonear, the struggle for power between a concentrated and relatively solidary group of fishermen and a similarly well-organized and solidary merchant elite, although it resulted in sporadic strike behaviour, did not permit the FPU to spread into this district.

There were definite attempts to repress the FPU along the north-east coast of Newfoundland as well, but the

ability of both merchants and clergymen to achieve their goals was definitely limited. Clergymen were much weakened by the incomplete nature of church structures in this region and, more importantly, by their fragmentation along denominational lines. Similarly, mercantile solidarity in this area was at a low level between 1900-14. Decentralized control over the fishery combined with an influx of capital both from the traditional merchant elite and from outside the fishery to generate a high level of intermercantile competition for the product of petty producers. Organizational gains among fishermen as a result of capital investment were not offset by a reduction in competition between merchants. As the decline in the credit system and labour shortages interfered with surplus appropriation producing relatively large, solidary units of production, the merchant elite continued to be disorganized with little repressive potential. It is therefore not surprising that they were unable to stem the tide of populism as it spread throughout the north-east coast during the early years of the movement.

Along the south-west coast, the power imbalance so favoured the merchant elite that overt attempts to oppose the FPU never became necessary. An organized merchant elite with a low degree of intermercantile competition at the purchasing level was able to maintain fishermen in patterns of work organization that undermined their ability to organize in their own interests. In both the inshore and the offshore fisheries, a fragmented group

of fishermen confronted a solidary merchant elite.

FOOTNOTES

1. Both Noel and McDonald argue that the merchant elite in St. John's delayed their response to the FPU for primarily geographical and psychological reasons. For example, Noel (1971:95) states: "...because it was a movement originating in, and largely confined to, the outports of the north, its full impact was either unfelt or unappreciated by the geographically and socially insulated merchants, journalists, and politicians of St. John's." See also McDonald (1971:55).
2. McDonald (1974:18) later revised his position, arguing instead that "[w]hile the businessmen of St. John's, the large commercial centres of Conception Bay, and outport merchants in general looked upon the FPU's plans with a mixture of skepticism and amusement, the rapid expansion of the Union was not long in compelling them to treat the Union as a deadly threat."
3. The only newspaper that was publishing FPU material was the Plaindealer. In March, 1909, Coaker received several letters from H. Wiseman at this paper. The following is an extract from one of these letters:

The fact is that clergymen from the... down, politicians from the Premier down and businessmen of all classes have come to the conclusion that the Plaindealer is helping the Fishermen's Union, and for that reason they are jumping on us at every opportunity. We have been begged and even threatened by politicians whom you know, to drop the Fishermen's Union and publish nothing about it... Businessmen, friends of these politicians, have withdrawn their work, some even their advertising from us...

Letter to Coaker from Wiseman (March 29, 1909) and reprinted in the Advocate (May 31, 1912). Cited in McDonald (1971:52). The Plaindealer eventually stopped publishing FPU material and censorship was virtually complete in established newspapers.

4. Fishermen's Advocate (September 3, November 19, 1910; August 26, 1911; May 25, 1912). Cited in McDonald (1971:52).

5. The most thorough analysis of the social background of Newfoundland's politicians during this period is available in Kerr (1973). Regarding the connections between lawyers and merchants he states: "A lawyer-politician was able to curry direct favour from an influential family [by] accepting into his office a son as a clerk-trainee" (1973:368-9).
6. In order to prevent a potential coalition between the People's Party and the FPU, the Legislative Council, which was composed overwhelmingly of merchants, refused to back Morris in his promise to Coaker of a place for a fishermen's representative on a new Fisheries Commission. Forced to choose, Morris chose the merchants over the FPU. For a complete description of this see McDonald (1971).
7. For a discussion of the political weakness of the Liberal Party during this period and its relationship to the strong FPU showing in the 1913 election see Noel (1971:96). When the Liberals decided to form a coalition with the FPU, "...the business community deserted [them], giving at least tacit support to Morris" (McDonald, 1971:110).
8. See Coaker (1980:30), and the Fishermen's Advocate (August 12 and 26, 1911) for a discussion of FPU efforts to get the government to pass legislation against the 1911 merchant's combine. Most of the legislation introduced by Unionists during the period 1913-18 was defeated in the House of Assembly. The legislation that did pass included a bill to regulate conditions in the logging camps, and a sealing bill (Noel, 1971:119).
9. The Legislative Council amended both the logging and the sealing bill mentioned above.
10. See (Joy, 1977) and Chapter Two, the section on St. John's.
11. One way of looking at this is to argue that although structures of direct underdevelopment tend to produce a greater concentration of production, the increased concentration of capital that accompanies them may exceed the concentration of production. Although petty producers and workers are strengthened, capitalists and merchant-capitalists are strengthened to an even greater extent

16. See note 24 below.
17. For a discussion of the spread of consignment shipping and the effect of the willingness of English brokers to advance 80-90% of the value of the cargo before its sale on the ability of small merchants, including those on the south-west coast, to penetrate the export trade (See Board of Trade February Conference, February 3-9, 1920). See in particular the testimony of Sir John Crosbie. McDonald (1971:22) also discusses this.
18. See Cote (1979) for a discussion of a similar phenomenon in the pulp and paper industry.
19. South-west coast Newfoundlanders had traditionally fished in the Nova Scotia schooner fishery but this declined during the period in question (Innis, 1978:457). The French fishery also declined and along with it the bait trade which south-west coast fishermen engaged in with French and American schooners (Journals of Assembly, 1906:144). The decline of the bait trade was also associated with the passing of a Bait Act by the Newfoundland government in an attempt to prevent the sale of bait by Newfoundland fishermen to her competitors. Finally, Gaffney (1978:10-11) claims there was over-crowding in the inshore fishery on the south-west coast during this period.
20. J.W. Osborne, a 79 year old resident of Grand Bank, claimed that during this period, banking schooners were operated from the following centres: Fortune, Belleoram, Harbour Breton, Burgeo, Gaultois and Grand Bank. To this must be added the vessels used in the Western fishery. He also claims that all of the banking vessels in Grand Bank were owned by the merchants (Interview, September 26, 1979). See also (Gaffney, 1978:10) for a discussion of expansion into the offshore and nearshore during this period.
21. For example, MacKay claims that under normal circumstances, "[w]hen the market for fish is strong and prices are high the credit position of fishermen and outport merchants improves, exporters are anxious to obtain fish, and independent selling rapidly increases" (1946:115). One way to prevent this from happening would be to increase the available supply of fish rather than competing for the product of petty producers.

12. A study of merchant response to the few south-west coast FPU locals that were established, such as the one at Rose Blanche, would tell us a great deal more about this. Active merchant opposition to the local organized in Grand Bank does not seem to have been necessary due to its extreme weakness--it had only six members. In the Grand Bank case, one of the six members was a schooner captain and he changed companies after joining. This may be evidence of attempted sanction by one particular company (Osborne Interview, September 26, 1979). Correspondence from a member of the Lake family, a merchant-capitalist firm that expanded in the Fortune area during this period, suggests that merchants were definitely hostile to the movement (Letter from Philip E. Smith, November, 1978).
13. Biological factors associated with the type of cod stocks located along the south-west coast may have affected patterns of work organization (Gaffney, 1978). However, there is some evidence of a few south-west coast fishermen who owned and used cod traps. Others bought skiffs and entered the near-shore fishery, while still another group bought schooners and sailed annually to Nova Scotia where they fished and sold their catches to Nova Scotian merchants (Stiles, 1971). This suggests that small units of production were more closely related to the operation of the credit system.
14. Interview with A. Moulton (March 8, 1979). A steamer went from St. John's to Halifax calling into the larger centres along the south-west coast and then reversing its route. See also (Royal Commission...1915:16). As early as 1895, it was observed that "...the trade of the West Coast [which included the south-west coast] has been almost entirely diverted from St. John's to Halifax..." (Evening Telegram, October 16, 1895), quoted in McDonald (1971:11).
15. "The chief feature of the Bank fishery at the present time is the possibility of the vessels selling their catch 'green' or wet-salted to the United States for use by the fishing interests of Gloucester and Boston, Massachusetts, which are finding the demands of the American market more than their own catch can supply." (Royal Commission...1915:39-40). Osborne (September 26, 1979) pointed out that shipping cargoes of salt cod to the U.S. meant that schooners could return laden with supplies. This was something that was less possible in most of Newfoundland's other markets for fish.

22. Intermercantile competition producing high prices for inshore fish might well have generated labour unrest in the more capital-intensive offshore fishery from which only the merchants stood to lose.
23. Letter to the St. John's Board of Trade from Philip Clement of Clement and Company, Channel, Newfoundland, (June 18, 1910):

I think one might consider the price of fish settled on this shore...There is a buyer in Rose Blanche who is reported to be offering 25 cents more...but as Messrs. Harvey and Co. and R. Moulton have agreed to them, with ourselves and Mr. H. Clement of Burgeo, and we expect Messrs. Penny of Ramea, there is practically no one else to make trouble that we can see (Board of Trade General Correspondence File, 1910, P8/B/11 Newfoundland Archives).

24. See a Letter from the manager of the Bank of Nova Scotia, Grand Bank (January 6, 1910) to St. John's Board of Trade in (Board of Trade General Correspondence File, 1910, P8/B/11 Newfoundland Archives). Despite opposition from St. John's to the establishment of this local Board of Trade it was eventually formed and used as a meeting place for, among other things, setting local prices for fish. (Osborne Interview, September 26, 1979):
25. The economy of the south-west coast was based almost exclusively on the fishery. The effects of the introduction of pulp and paper, mining, the construction of a railway and a few import substitution industries toward the end of the 19th century in Newfoundland were confined primarily to the north-east coast.
26. Intermercantile competition for fish had spread to the south-west coast by 1919. It is significant that the rise in such competition coincided with a relatively drastic decline in the offshore fishery after 1915 from 8,000 tons/year to under 3,000 tons by 1919. See Proceedings...Exporters (1920:66).
27. R. Moulton, for example, had branches in Rose Blanche, Lark Harbour, Burnt Islands, Grand Bruit, and on the Canadian-Labrador. The head office was in Burgeo.

28. Interview with an old woman, age 78, on Ramea (December, 1978). She claimed that her father had beaten her for taking some fish to Clement and Company when he was supplied by John Penny and Sons.
29. Interview with a fisherman over 70 on Ramea, (December, 1978).
30. Interview with old woman (cited above).
31. Baine Johnston Letter Book (1898-1911:39, 60, 75, 79-80, 102).
32. The 1911 merchants' combine was broken by a St. John's Company, Franklin (Coaker, 1930:30). The 1914 combine was undermined by sales of fish to a broker for the Nova Scotian Company, Zwicker and Company (Weekly Mail and Advocate, July 12-13, 1915).
33. As early as 1897, it was noted that:

Instead of there being cooperation and a unified interest there is discord and division...when it comes to the work of distributing fish to the foreign markets. Every shipper wants to supplant his neighbour--to anticipate, to overreach him. If a new exporter appears there is a temporary unity of purpose, but...it is directed entirely to 'wolf' him. Everything of common interest is sacrificed to feed out internal disputes and jealousies...We...would sooner cut the throat of a rival than share in a common profit...some other authority must intervene...or else the whole industrial structure on which this colony depends must cease to be: (Bond in the House of Assembly, March 24, 1897). Quoted in McDonald (1974:9).
34. Alexander (1977) and McDonald (1971) refer to the 'competitive spirit' of Newfoundland merchants during this period. Indeed, McDonald discusses at length the 'chaotic' marketing procedures of this elite and some of the factors responsible for intermercantile competition. His discussion, certainly the best historical analysis of the Newfoundland fish trade during this period, proved very valuable in constructing this portion of the paper. He too relates such competition to the spread of the FPU but in

34. psychological rather than structural terms. Chaotic marketing and purchasing, he argues, made it impossible for fishermen to make rational decisions about when and where to market their product and the frustration which this generated accounted in part for the rapid spread of the Union.
35. Joy (1977) has done a very thorough study of the development of a limited import-substitution sector in the St. John's area between 1880 and 1910. Most of the capital for these industries came from the established merchant elite. Sager (1978) claims the same companies were also investing in mining and other areas. See Chapter Two, the section on St. John's.
36. See Ryan (1973:25-6); Alexander (1974:19) and McDonald (1974:5).
37. The following section is based on an analysis of the Grieve and Bremner Letter Book (1895-97). Bremner ran a relatively small retail outlet on Trinity Bay during this period and sold his fish through Bowrings. M. Thorburn was his wholesaler.
38. Bainé Johnston Letter Book (1898-1911:44,75).
39. For a description of the size of north-east coast production units see Chapter Two. A cod trap was valued at \$300.
40. The careful phrasing of Bremner's letters to many of his fishermen and payment for their catch often in either cash or gold and his general concern about possible trouble from them if he could not meet the going price suggests that he was not in a very powerful position vis à vis these men.
41. Prior to the Bank Crash, merchants had used their position as directors of the banks to draw virtually unlimited credit. This became impossible after the Crash and revealed more clearly the different financial standing of the various companies. See (Times and General Gazette, January 30, 1895) and (The Crown vs the Directors and Managers of the Commercial Bank of Newfoundland, St. John's: McCoubrey, 1894) as well as (The Crown vs the Directors of the Union Bank of Newfoundland, St. John's: McCoubrey, 1895).

42. As suggested in Chapter Two, without an advance from the merchant in supplies, fishermen faced all of the risks of the fishery without any guarantee that they could even sell their catch at the end. Not having advanced credit, merchants could refuse to purchase the catch or drive the price below the costs of subsistence without any direct effect on themselves.
43. Baine Johnston Letter Book, (1898-1911:102).
44. Cashin (1976:44f) describes the supply trade of Bowrings in the years 1905-6. See also the Trade Review (December 30, 1910). Fearn (1976) points out that during this period, Bowrings was one of the few Newfoundland Companies with an estimated capital of over \$1,000,000. Finally, according to the combine agreements in 1902-3 cited above, Bowrings was to be allowed to export the largest share of the first million quintals of cod (20%).
45. As more and more merchants got their fish to market they would frequently attempt to undersell each other and importers, seeing this, very effectively played one company against the others and drove down the fish prices. See McDonald (1971:Chapter One).
46. By 1911, the number of Labrador schooners had declined from a high of 1,432 in 1908 to 837 (Census for Newfoundland and Labrador, 1911, Table II:443; Innis, 1978:458).
47. Gosling to Morris, January 12, 1914 in Board of Trade Letter Book (5/A1, 88 Newfoundland Archives). Cited in McDonald (1971:12).
48. See note 17 above.
49. As in the Latin American countries, "...the process of industrialization through import substitution was constrained by two built-in limitations both of which derived from the existing class structure. First, Bourgeois reformers had to begin with the existing income distribution and demand structure. This meant that they had to concentrate on consumer goods particularly for the high income market. Without a major change in the class structure and income distribution, the internal market could not expand fast enough to sustain the import substitution process indefinitely" (Frank, 1973:44). By 1910, import substitution industries in Newfoundland had ceased to expand significantly (Joy, 1977). Local individuals had also made money during a wave of speculation in

49. mining and timber lands but aside from a few developments including pulp and paper in Grand Falls and the Bell Island mines foreign capital more or less lost interest in Newfoundland's resources by 1910.
50. For example, see the February Conference, Board of Trade, 1920, in particular Ryan's testimony where he describes local agents of Spanish companies purchasing fish in Newfoundland and the way in which this helps the fishermen get a better price for their product. Nova Scotians were also actively purchasing fish in particular along the West coast and this too had the effect of driving up the price of fish. See, for example, Baine Johnston Letter Book (1898-1911:36).
51. An interview with S. Case, an 84 year old retired fisherman from Salmon Cove, Carbonear (September 8, 1978). His father dealt with Wm. Duff and Sons, Ltd., one of Carbonear's largest merchants. He dealt with the same firm upon joining the trap crew of the family.
52. I have come to this conclusion using largely inferential evidence. None of the Carbonear merchants were involved in the interviews carried out by the 1905 Committee that reported on the use of steam on the Labrador for the government. Aside from Job's, who had an operation at Blanc Sablon, in the Straits area, all of the other merchants interviewed had stations north of Battle Harbour and hence north of the Straits area. The absence of reference to any of the Carbonear merchants suggests that they were not located in this area but, presumably, in the other 'stationer' section farther south. Penney's location at Red Bay provides further support for this conclusion.
53. See note 29, Chapter Two.
54. Both Wm. Duff and Sons, Limited and the Rorke family business were sufficiently large to be engaged directly in the import-export trade.
55. For example, W. Bartlett of Brigus was supplied by Bowring Bros. in St. John's and got his steamer from the same company. F. Jerrett, also of Brigus was supplied by Harvey and Company of St. John's (Report...1905, JA: 251, 253).
56. See, for example, the testimonies of Capt. C. Dawe and Capt. Goss in (Report...1905, JA:244ff, 241ff, 250, 252).
57. Nicholas Smith (1936) was one such planter.

58. See Note 3 above.
59. Roman Catholic Archives (St. John's), file ('The Fisheries: Fishermen's Union, etc.'): Circular issued by the Grand Lodge of the Society for United Fishermen, March 1909 cited in McDonald (1971:87); M.F. Howley, "Circular Letter on Secret Societies", March 31, 1909 cited in McDonald (1971:89).
60. See, for example, Barbour (1973:57) where the author describes the regular visits of clergymen to Blanc Sablon on the Labrador and claims "[a]ll received a warm welcome at our home, where they remained as long as they wished as guests of Job Brothers and Company, Limited". See also Lench (1919:56) in which Rev. Lench notes that Samson Mifflin, "being a merchant, supplied the necessaries of the minister's table".
61. Kerr (1973:279-80). With the exception of parts of the West coast, there is no evidence of a split between merchants and clergy similar to that described in Remigi (1978) for the Gaspé Peninsula.
62. McDonald (n.d.:28) notes that Coaker's explanation for the Legislative Council's rejection of his logging bill, which was designed to improve working conditions in the camps, was associated with their involvement in timber speculation and fear that such legislation would discourage further foreign investment.
63. See Coaker (1930:10) and McDonald (1974:27).
64. Roman Catholic Archives (St. John's), file ('The Fisheries: Fishermen's Union, etc.'): J.J. St. John to Archbishop M.F. Howley, February 9, 1909.
65. McDonald employs a more structuralist approach and provided some of the insights for the following discussion. See, for example, McDonald (n.d.:25-6).
66. There were FPU locals in Boyd's Cove and Fortune Harbour in Twillingate; Tilting in Fogo; St. Brendan's, Keels and Red Clift in Bonavista as well as in other Catholic communities along the north-east coast. For a reference to the 11 FPU locals in Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's see Roman Catholic Archives, file ('The Fisheries...'): J.J. St. John to Archbishop Howley, March 26, 1909, cited in McDonald (1974:28).
67. Roman Catholic churches and other buildings within the Archdiocese were valued at approximately \$934,000 in

67. 1911 whereas in the diocese of St. George's they were valued at approximately \$148,000 (Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1911, Table II:8-541).
68. See Jones (1971:174). He describes the system of collection used by the Catholic Church: "...the priests went down to the wharves to meet the ships, found out how well the voyage had fared, and made a list of Roman Catholic fishermen, together with the amounts each one could afford. The lists were taken to the merchant, who deducted the amounts from the men's accounts and sent a cheque to the Bishop. McCrea alleges that no merchant dared to refuse to do this service or he could find himself without crews for his ships."
69. See Devine and Lawton (1944:50-1); The Book of Newfoundland, (Smallwood, ed., 1937-67, Vol. II: 422).
70. See Veitch (1965). The Benevolent Irish Society had only 395 members in 1906 most of whom were concentrated in St. John's (Centenary Volume...1906:294-6). The Protestant Loyal Orange Association, on the other hand, had branches throughout the north-east coast and a membership of 3,830 as early as 1889 (Senior, 1959:174).
71. Interview, Cornelius O'Brien, (July, 1978).
72. Roman Catholic Archives, file ('The Fisheries...'): Archbishop M.F. Howley to Mr. Wallace, September 20, 1908. In this letter the Archbishop explains why he will not give his consent for the formation of the Irish Christian Society, supposedly a secret society.
73. Ibid.: Archbishop M.F. Howley to J.J. St. John, September 18, 1913. The quote from the Archbishop's circular is taken from McDonald (n.d.:26).
74. See note 69.
75. Roman Catholic Archives, file ('The Fisheries...'): J.J. St. John to M.F. Howley, October 4, 1909. In this letter St. John tells Howley about Bishop McNeil of St. George's having declared the FPU no longer a 'secret society' hence implying withdrawal of the censure of the Catholic Church. McNeil did this without the permission or the approval of Howley, the Archbishop. In the same file, McNeil to Howley, October 17, 1908 refers to McNeil's preference for political neutrality.

76. See note 74, first reference.
77. See, for example MacDermott (1938:205-6) where the author describes a group of north-east coast sealers making careful note of the lack of 'denominationalism' among them and their tolerance of the religious worship of the Catholics among them.
78. Feltham points out that Coaker's early involvement with the Orange Lodge helped him to generate support for the FPU because he had access to local Union Halls and could 'claim the kinship of brother members in almost every northern community' (1959:131). Among other north-east coast clubs that may have had Catholic members was the Trinity Benefit Club which was "...nondenominational. Its one and only objective is benefits to its members and monetary help in times of sickness and death" (Barbour, 1973:90). Another similar club was the Terra Nova Mutual Insurance Club in Twillingate which was composed of "...schooners held by planters, and others connected with the trade of W. Waterman and Co, of Twillingate, Fogo, Change Islands and Nipper's Harbour" (Chaulk, 1974:97).
79. For a description of the Harbour Grace Affray, see Senior (1959:138ff).
30. In the year 1901, Harbour Grace had a majority of Church of Englanders; Carbonear was approximately 1/2 Catholic with the rest of the population split between Methodist and Church of England; Bay de Verde had a majority of Methodists. Among the districts farther north, the only case of a clear religious majority was Twillingate with almost 12,000 Methodists compared with 5,500 Catholics or Church of Englanders (Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1901, Table I:398-9).

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

The sociological analysis of the factors responsible for the regional distribution of the Fishermen's Protective Union of Newfoundland has illustrated the way in which theoretically informed historical sociology can contribute to our understanding of social movements. Despite its limitations, the investigation represents a substantial improvement over previous ad hoc accounts. A theoretically consistent explanation for why the FPU emerged where it did and why it failed to develop elsewhere is constructed. Comparative in its approach and based on socio-economic rather than psychological variables, one of the virtues of the present explanation is that it is refutable. Patterns of work organization and levels of intermercantile competition are much more empirically verifiable than psychological states of mind inferred from past history.

By de-emphasizing the role of leadership, this study rejects any view of the FPU as an accidental consequence of the presence of the right man, in the right place, at the right time. It thus permits us to take our attention away from highly visible leadership figures and redirect it toward the rank and file without which leaders can never become great men. If the message of a potential leader is irrelevant or the costs and/or obstacles to

mobilization are too powerful he will remain no more than a man with a dream.

At the most general level, my analysis of the FPU derives from the conflict perspective. A view of social movements as struggles for power leads the study to focus on power relationships between potential partisans of the FPU and groups in authority that were opposed to it. The access of these two groups to one of three structural determinants of power, level of organization, has been isolated and researched for the regions where the FPU was successful and those where it failed.

The rapid spread of the FPU throughout the north-east coast from the Northern Peninsula to Trinity Bay, illustrated by the movement's recruitment of almost 20,000 members in this area, can be partially attributed to power relations in this region that favoured producers. Conversely, the failure of the movement in many other parts of the island, including in particular the south-west and east coast districts, was due in part to power relations which favoured either merchants or clergymen.

Patterns of work organization within the various branches of the north-east coast fishery, in mining, sealing, and the pulp and paper industry, concentrated producers in relatively large, solidary units of production thereby increasing their potential for collective action. As the withdrawal of credit from the north-east coast fishery

forced fishermen in this region into mining and pulp and paper, work experience in these capitalist sectors combined with their traditional involvement in the seal fishery meant that they became schooled in collective action. Within the cod fishery itself, their concentration in larger units of production provided the organizational basis for fishermen to mobilize a powerful movement not only for a redistribution of the rewards from their labour but, perhaps more importantly, against the decline and potential collapse of the fishery as a source of income and way of life.

While capital investment in some sectors, and capital withdrawal from others, was raising the level of organization of north-east coast producers, the persistence of strong competitive forces within the north-east coast merchant elite undermined the effectiveness of mercantile opposition to the FPU. Simultaneously, intermercantile competition contributed to the development of larger units of production. A combination of direct and indirect structures of underdevelopment provided an admirable context for the emergence of class struggle by favouring producers.

One final factor facilitating the rapid spread of the FPU throughout the north-east coast was the weakness of the clerical elite in this region. Fragmentation into several denominations crippled any attempts on the part of the clergy to prevent their congregations from developing social and economic ties that transcended religious

affiliation or from supporting the FPU. Hence, power relations not only between merchants and fishermen but between north-east coast producers and their spiritual advisors ensured that the Union was not repressed in this region.

Along the south-west coast of Newfoundland, the failure of the FPU can be attributed to the relationship between structures of direct underdevelopment type II and intermercantile competition. As suggested in Chapter Three, by increasing their investment in the offshore fishery after 1900, south-west coast merchant-capitalists were able to restrict competition among themselves for the product of inshore fishermen. Consequently, surplus appropriation from inshore fishermen remained high with the result that they were confined to small, atomized units of production with a low level of solidarity. In the offshore fishery, organizational gains associated with the concentration of fishermen in larger numbers were undermined by the availability of a large reserve army of labour which permitted merchants to introduce a system of incentives that turned man against man. Structures of direct underdevelopment thus provided a context which militated against the emergence of class struggle by keeping the organizational potential of south-west coast fishermen at a low level. As a result, active opposition to the FPU on the part of south-west coast merchant-capitalists never became necessary.

[t]he cycle of labour struggles of the first twenty years of this century shows that the higher level of capital concentration had indeed developed the collective power of the workers. But this effect was limited...The concentration of ownership and finance correspond to a much less developed concentration of production, so that the erosion of the bargaining power which the workers derived from intercapitalist competition and from their incomplete subordination to capital was not offset by a compensatory growth in their collective strength (1978:7).

It seems quite reasonable that there were gains in cooperation among merchant-capitalists in St. John's associated with joint investment in import substitution industries which occurred during the late 19th century (Joy, 1977). Investment in production meant that merchant-capitalists, rather than competing with each other for the product of craftworkers and struggling with competitors in an attempt to sell their particular import, stood to benefit whenever the products of their industry were sold, no matter who sold them. In those cases where they continued to purchase some of their product from craftsmen, direct control over a portion of production and the potential for mechanization in a factory context could only have improved their bargaining position vis à vis craftworkers. Similarly, control over steam transport to and from the Labrador combined with direct ownership of a portion of the Labrador stationer catch would have increased the control of merchant-capitalists over the

St. John's and parts of Conception Bay, especially the districts of Carbonear, provide examples of other areas where structures of direct underdevelopment inhibited the growth of active support for the FPU. Increased capital investment and the concentration of workers produced a wave of strike activity and attempts at unionization in both of these areas after 1900. In Carbonear, employment in the Bell Island mines no doubt helped radicalize Labrador stationer fishermen whose concentration in large numbers aboard Labrador steamers and on the Labrador generated an organizational base for periodic strikes. However, both within the mines and on the Labrador, the success of such collective protest was limited, no doubt in part, by the consolidation of control over production in the hands of capital which accompanied increased investment. Similarly, in St. John's, unionization within the factories where workers were most concentrated, but where control over production lay in the hands of capital, was virtually nonexistent. Even among craftworkers, where capitalist control over production was more limited, the many small, fragmented unions that did emerge were often short-lived. This suggests that in those economic sectors of Newfoundland where structures of direct underdevelopment became predominant after 1900 one can concur with a recent statement by Arrighi that:

surplus of petty producers. But the possibility of merchants purchasing fish from petty producers in turn reduced their dependency on wage-labourers and sharemen in a strike situation.

While the concentration of producers was perhaps the greatest in the mines, the pulp and paper industry, sealing and the Labrador stationer fishery, it is significant that it was in the inshore and Labrador floater fishery along the north-east coast that producers were most able to organize effectively between 1900-14. As intermercantile competition undermined the operation of the credit system and as some fishermen were able to accumulate a surplus, a middle group of fishermen emerged in this area. These men were organized in relatively large units of production with a higher level of capital investment than either their predecessors or south-west coast fishermen. They were less protected by the credit system from fluctuations in the price for fish. Similar to the middle peasantry in agrarian underdeveloped areas, this middle group of fishermen were difficult for merchants to control but not sufficiently well off to become merchants or retailers themselves. The group most vulnerable to economic change, they still relied on "...traditional social relations of kin and mutual aid" (Wolf, 1969:290ff). This combination of uniform economic vulnerability, independence from local merchants, and extensive local ties, permitted

these men, like the middle peasantry, to become a radical force. Meanwhile, the high level of intermercantile competition and fragmentation of the clerical elite continued to interfere with the repressive potential of the merchant and clerical elite making it less than surprising that the FPU was so strong on the north-east coast.

Unlike their north-east coast counterparts, fishermen in the east coast districts of Ferryland and Placentia-St. Mary's were fragmented by class distinctions reinforced by a powerful, united church. Lines of cleavage among fishermen combined with the strength of the Catholic church made this the one region in Newfoundland where clergymen were able to close down FPU locals. In addition, clerical opposition to the FPU may have been a factor limiting the success of the movement in St. John's and parts of Conception Bay.

It seems clear, then, that regional variations in the level of organization of potential partisans and authorities related to the uneven impact of underdevelopment played an important role in determining the distribution of the FPU during the period 1908-14. Although previous accounts demonstrate some awareness of such things as patterns of work organization on the north-east coast and unevenness in clerical strength, the absence of theoretically informed comparative analysis means these authors are unable to assess the significance of some factors and are unaware

of the role of others. As a result, there has been a strong inclination in previous work to rely almost entirely on the role of charismatic leadership in explaining, for example, the failure of the FPU on the south-west coast. Since this study, like all research, leaves many questions unanswered, one can only hope that future attempts to deal with these questions will be less ad hoc in their approach as a result of the present account.

What are some of the questions that this analysis of the FPU leaves unanswered? Although regional variations in one determinant of power, level of social organization, have been thoroughly investigated, the thesis leaves aside a systematic study of another determinant of power, access to resources. No doubt leadership resources, the generally high level of demand for fish during this period, and other such factors, were also related to the emergence and the relative success and failure of the FPU. At a more fundamental level, because the theoretical framework employed here is a somewhat simple confrontation model (i.e. social movements are struggles for power) no attempt is made to deal with the possibility that producers had several different avenues through which to achieve their interests, only one of which was the FPU. Thus, support for the FPU may have been influenced not simply by the power relationship between producers and authorities but also by the availability of alternative means of protest and

struggle, such as, unionization in the case of Bell Island miners. A focus on alternative means of protest might help to further explain FPU failure in parts of Conception Bay and St. John's.

Another question which the thesis cannot answer completely is why the FPU emerged when it did. Similarly, the course of the development and eventual decline of the FPU are left open as areas for further research. However, this investigation does provide some important insights into these questions. In the first place, it demonstrates the value of a comparative approach in dealing with social change. Secondly, the thesis cautions against any attempts to attribute the point of emergence and eventual decline of the FPU to no more than the role of leadership. In the case of the decline of the FPU, developments in the political career of the movement including errors in strategy probably don't constitute a full explanation. While one cannot deny the importance of such factors, changes in the power relations of merchants, clergymen and fishermen along the north-east coast prior to, throughout, and immediately following the First World War may well have been decisive.

The underdeveloped nature of current knowledge about Newfoundland's merchant elite placed an important constraint on the analysis of intermercantile competition in Chapter Three. In that chapter, merchant-capitalists are treated as if they operated Newfoundland-based companies.

engaged in the fish export trade. Although this was true for many south-west coast and other companies, many of the St. John's companies were, in fact, part of multi nationals with their head offices in Britain. Bowrings is one such example. This fact, combined with their involvement in diverse forms of trade, means that decisions on investment may have been influenced by factors external to the Newfoundland fish trade. Clearly, recognition of this constraint does not invalidate the basic argument in the thesis concerning the relationship between differing levels of intermercantile competition and the distribution of the FPU. However, it does affect any attempt to explain the origin of such regional variations. A more thorough understanding of international linkages and, not only levels of intermercantile competition, but also the development of underdevelopment in Newfoundland, would be a major contribution to our understanding of the political economy of the island.

One further question which should be explored is the relationship between the eventual failure of the FPU as a populist movement and the long term economic and political decline of Newfoundland. The movement was a radical, grassroots challenge to the status quo as well as an attempt on the part of fishermen to protect the fishery and their way of life. However, even if it had succeeded, the real potential within the FPU for reversing such large scale

processes as the development of underdevelopment and the demise of the fishery is questionable. With a growing body of literature on Latin America correlating modernization and authoritarian rather than populist governments (see, for example, O'Donnell, 1973) it would be worthwhile speculating about what might have happened in Newfoundland if the FPU had not failed.

To return briefly to the theoretical level, this study of the FPU constitutes one attempt to explore the relationship between differing structures of underdevelopment and patterns of class struggle in underdeveloped areas. Its conclusions call for a refinement of Fine's assertion that in underdeveloped areas both producers and exploiters are disorganized (1978:94). This study suggests instead that the degree of disorganization within both groups can vary substantially on a regional basis and is associated with the uneven impact of underdevelopment. Within the current underdevelopment literature authors have begun to look beyond unequal exchange in attempting to explain the role of capitalism in the development of underdevelopment. Authors such as Kay (1975) and Fine (1978) have focused their attention on obstacles to the capitalization of production in underdeveloped countries. Fine, for example, attributes the low level of capitalization, hence underdevelopment of the periphery, to the disorganization of producers and exploiters. This, he argues, prevents the

formation of a power bloc whose demands will force capital to mechanize. Kay, on the other hand, argues that capital will always choose to mechanize because this increases productivity and profits. He attributes the lack of capitalization in underdeveloped countries to the dominance, until recently, of merchant capital in these regions.

The investigation of the relationship between structures of underdevelopment and development of class struggle contained in the analysis of the FPU can offer some insights for this discussion. Sacouman's concept of direct underdevelopment (which in real historic form includes such activities as coal-mining and branches of the fishery in Atlantic Canada around the turn of the century) suggests that underdevelopment cannot be reduced simply to a lack of capitalization (Sacouman, 1980). More concretely, the evidence provided on Newfoundland's merchant elite during this period implies that they were often, in fact, merchant-capitalists combining indirect and direct control over production. It is thus difficult to sustain any argument that makes a simple correlation between merchant capital and underdevelopment such as Kay's.

In some cases, limited capital investment in production in Newfoundland during the period of the FPU reduced the potential for the development of class struggle. To the extent that Fine is correct in his assertion that without protest on the part of producers, capital will not

revolutionize the means of production, it is possible that direct capitalist underdevelopment type II provided a context for inhibiting mechanization and hence retarded increased productivity in economic sectors such as Newfoundland's fishery. Perhaps because of the incorporation of Atlantic Canada (including Newfoundland after 1949) into a peripheral relationship with central Canada and the operation of a system of transfer payments, merchant-capitalism may only now be reaching a real point of crisis in this region. The growing potential for radical behaviour in those areas characterized by structures of direct underdevelopment type II which involve the maintenance of petty producers in an 'increasingly truncated domestic mode of production' may be a symptom of this (Sacouman, 1980). As suggested by Fine "the conflict generated by intensification of the existing methods of exploitation, coupled with the paralysis of progressive-ruling-class leadership, opens the potential for revolutionary change in peripheral formations" (1978:95).

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