Husserl on the Relation of Self to Other in the Community

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCEVE
Husserl on the Relation of Self to Other in the Community

by

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Abstract

The problem of intersubjectivity was one of Husserl's pre-eminent interests. This essay attempts to discern the guiding themes and something of the final import of his account of the issue. The guiding themes are that, although one can experience the same things as does another, one cannot have his experiences themselves; and notwithstanding this limitation, one relates to the real other himself, not to some indication of him which one is free to interpret—the other person himself determines how he is to be interpreted.

Chapter I attempts to provide the groundwork for an analysis. According to Husserl, consciousness has two important descriptive characteristics: it is intentional, that is, it does not simply have contents, but is related to an object not identical with its contents; and it is temporal, or in ceaseless flux. Further the structure of consciousness itself determines what sense an object shall have for it.

But one object stands out among others as having a special status: the other person. He is free to determine his own meaning and unity: how can he be an intended object without losing his freedom? And supposing this to be solved: the other person experiences the same world as oneself: how can this be part of the world's objective sense?

Chapter II interprets Husserl's analysis of the foundations of the consciousness of the other. The focus is the world's objective sense, experienceable by all. Logically, he cannot presuppose this, and
therefore tries to delineate a part of the world and a kind of experience lacking this sense: respectively, one's body, of which one has sensory and motor control, and the sensibly experienced or "natural" world.

The other person's body appears as a natural body. Husserl says it is seen to be animate because of a similarity to one's own body. It is argued that this cannot work, and that the two bodies must actually come into contact, and prove that they are alive.

Chapter III examines how the other person can be known. Husserl offers a doctrine of induction such that certain regular ways of behaving reveal a "personal style". But this is not completely satisfactory, because it does not show how the person's intent can be known: his intent is not to behave regularly.

This must be supplemented, therefore, by Husserl's doctrine of expression. As here interpreted, the other person addresses himself to oneself, and, insofar as he is understood, to something one already knows. The object of the address is thus constituted as shared, but as owned by neither.

The final point is the notion of a shared world. In communication, each shares and is the source of the meaning of the expression. But no one is the full source of its meaning, thus no one fully understands or owns it: it is shared.
Preface

The present essay attempts to analyze Husserl's interpretation of the problem of other subjectivity. I have restricted my attention to the views he sets forth in the Cartesian Meditations and in the second volume of the Ideas.

The problem of other subjectivity—especially as Husserl handles it—involves a vast range of other philosophical problems, which, although in themselves important, could here only be mentioned as subsidiary topics. The references to such problems are all too frequent and brief. It would serve no purpose other than to annoy the reader to repeat on each such occasion—"This claim is problematical for these and these reasons". It is said once and generally here, and hereafter only rarely.

Similarly, several other authors—critics, interpreters, or successors of Husserl, as well as independent authors—receive brief mention. Some objections to Husserl's work are treated, but the survey of criticism is by no means comprehensive. Criticisms are mentioned principally when a brief treatment will serve to clarify the issue at hand or Husserl's views, or when it will facilitate interpretation. Mention is made of independent or alternative views with the same intent. In particular, my principal intent has not been to prove Husserl right, or to distinguish him from others, but to interpret the issue that he presents.

My first responsibility is to the topic as I understand it. I have attempted throughout to represent Husserl's views fairly and coherently. But I believe that at certain important points his account
deviates from the logic of the issue even as he presents it: at these points both the text and the topic become difficult—perhaps because of the seeming conflict. I have tried at these points to interpret Husserl's views reasonably accurately; to explain why I find them mistaken; and to outline what I believe to be a more appropriate approach to the problem. I can only hope that this will make my own mistakes clear enough.

References to Husserl's works are usually included in the text. Cartesian Meditations is abbreviated as "C.M.", Ideen...Zwentes Buch as "Id. II". Arabic numerals following the abbreviations refer to the page numbers of the (German) Husserliana editions. (Cairns's translation of the Cartesian Meditations indicates this pagination in the margin.) Arabic numerals preceded by "§" refer to the corresponding section; roman numerals to the corresponding Meditation.

Except as indicated, I have accepted Cairns's translation of the Cartesian Meditations. The translations of the Ideen II are my own; Cairns's Guide for Translating Husserl often provided valuable

assistance in translation. Whenever the translation is uncertain, the relevant part of the German passage is included either in the text itself or in a footnote.

References to all other works are in the footnotes. When appropriate, information on the edition in the original language is given first, that on the translation second; similarly, the earlier edition comes first. For subsequent references, I have used the author's surname and a short title. Where two editions of a work are cited, subsequent references give page numbers in the order of the first reference.

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Introduction.

The problem of other subjectivity has attracted everincreasing attention from modern philosophers. But it seems oddly resistant to convincing analysis: and this fact cannot simply be attributed to wrong approaches, but also to the intrinsic difficulties and complexities of the problem. Not least of the difficulties are those of focus: the problem can be approached from many different directions; and however it is treated, many important philosophical problems present themselves as subsidiary topics. It is by no means thus unique among philosophical problems: but it is harder to define than many.

Its importance is evident. With the rise in the importance of the social sciences, a conceptual analysis of all the problems of sociality has become pressingly necessary. But even apart from this, our day-to-day relations to our fellows are so close at hand as to be utterly opaque. Nothing is or can be done outside the social dimension; but just what constitutes sociality is difficult to decide.

It is therefore hardly surprising that Husserl, as the founder of one of the dominant schools of contemporary philosophy, should have paid considerable attention to the topic; nor is it surprising that his account should be highly problematical and difficult to interpret.

Husserl, it seems, considered the problem of other subjectivity to be among the most important for phenomenology. Although his unpublished work gives it the extensive attention it would then deserve, it is not so prominent in the published works. But two published
works - the Cartesian Meditations, and the second volume of the Ideas - dwell on the topic. It is principally with these that this essay is concerned. Husserl speaks of the pre-eminent status of intersubjectivity in the Meditations, but does not go on to explain fully why it is so important. Therefore, I shall here offer some general reflections on the topic, in the hope of making its status understandable.

The problem of other subjectivity presents special difficulties for an idealism, which insists upon the pre-eminent rights and the evidence of the cogito. If there is to be another subject, then it must be such as has the same rights as the self, and, moreover, these rights must be evident to the self. But the cogito is utterly private - how can the rights of an alien cogito be granted when there is, apparently, no evidence of it? Alternatively, an idealism will see all being as being for consciousness, and as evidenced only in the cogito. How can such a comprehensive consciousness, which, wherever it looks, sees only its own product, ever find its equal? How can the Other that it can find be a genuine other subject, having all the rights entailed by subjectivity, and not just the posited product of the self?

Realists have the opposite difficulties. The ontological and epistemological rights of the cogito are denied. All that is will then straightway cease to be what it appears to be. The cogito of the real Other will hide somewhere behind his public image; all that one

1. Only the Meditations was published in Husserl's lifetime, and then only in French translation. But both were, one way or another, intended for publication. Husserl's own working notes on the problem, never intended for publication, have recently been published in three volumes in the Husserliana series.
sees will be mere appearance, lacking the vitality of the Other's unattainable essence; and interaction between self and Other will become a process of more and more clever interpretation of the signs of an ultimately absent alien life.

It need hardly be said that these are not approaches but caricatures; they do, however, serve to indicate the sort of risks that our present problem involves. Idealism risks making it too easy to know the Other, indeed so easy that he would lose his autonomy; and become a function of what the ego take him to be, rather than what he determines himself to be. Realism, contrariwise, risks making it too hard, so that no experience of the Other is evidence of him; and that he is absolutely absent from the self. Both approaches are, in opposite ways, solipsist.

Now according both to the dominant interpretation and to Husserl's own self-interpretation, Husserlian phenomenology is an idealism. Subjectivity alone has absolute being, and all other being must be evidenced in the cogito. As he makes clear at the beginning of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, his worry is that phenomenology might appear to be a solipsism, unable to accommodate in its world a genuinely independent Other, bound to uncover a transcendental ego that has no peers. But Husserl wishes to accept the evidence of ordinary life that one does encounter genuinely independent Others, who determine themselves, and yet are encountered in the flesh, in person, as they really are.

Husserl's approach to philosophy in general has certain peculiarities that bear on the present problem. His analysis is in
terms of being for consciousness, or meaning, and is hence essentially bi-polar: there is on the one hand the objective meaning, or that which is intended, and on the other, the process by which it is meant. These two are essentially and internally related, and are systematically co-variant. His thesis is not that all being is mental, that the only substance is subjectivity, but rather that all being is the meant of a meaning, and that there is no sense to the notion of a being outside the realm of the meant. The meant is the intentional correlate of the process of meaning. The transcendental ego, having apodictic access to his process of meaning, bears within himself the structure of all being: it is strictly in this sense that Husserl is an idealist. The problem of the Other, then, is not (as the opening of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation indicates) to free phenomenology from the bane of solipsism, or to refute solipsism, but to demonstrate the process by which experience relates the ego to an alien subject.

In part Husserl's great interest is explained by the peculiar nature of the object of this experience. All objects but this one are inert. Here, in this unique experience, the subject is faced with an object that is essentially what he himself is: another subject. The Other, alone among objects of consciousness, is alive in the same world of the self. Moreover, the experienced Other is at once autonomous and there in person - two characteristics which are not easily held together.

But this is only half of the matter. There is no intended meaning without a corresponding process of meaning. The meaning "Other" is to be analysed: the analysis fails if it only describes the peculiarities of the object. Perhaps some of the importance of our
topic lies in the ego's act of relating to the Other; and not purely in the fact that the object itself is rather special. For by means of the relation, the cogito loses the uniqueness of its grasp on objectivity, and becomes what it could not be - one among others.

This can be more easily clarified by taking a rather more oblique view. The problem of other subjectivity is susceptible of several sorts of analysis. It can, first, be considered as an epistemological problem. It would then be appropriate to criticize the veracity of the experience of the Other, or to look for a criterion of valid judgements concerning him. Ego and alter ego would then be considered as knower and known, and they would be related in true and false judgements.

Or second, it can be considered as an ontological problem. We should then have to consider what sort of being the Other is - a real psychic substance, an irreducible and absolutely private self-consciousness, a behaving organism, or the like. We should then go on to enquire whether such an entity is possible, or actual, or necessary.

These approaches would focus on the object of the experience in question, and only secondarily on the conscious process of experiencing it. Such a focus can only with difficulty grasp the full measure of the experience in question, which, as claimed, not only intends its specific object (the alter ego) but also radically changes the nature of the cogito. Hence, I suggest, a third approach to the problem must be considered, one that will straightway complicate the matter.

I suggest that we ask not just what sort of being the Other is,
or how he is known; but how self and Other are related in a more comprehensive way. We must then take the expression "Other" with utmost seriousness: how with respect to what? How and when Other?

An alter ego is what he is surely not purely in himself, but in the presence of the ego; and this fact is essentially prior to his ontological or epistemological status.

The Other is another subject, and, moreover, is a subject intentionally related to the same world as the self. The Other strips the ego of his exclusive right to determine within the privacy of his own cogito the structure of the world. The world is essentially such as can be experienced by all. Because the experience of the Other requires such a fundamental transformation of the own consciousness, we cannot rest content with either a description of the Other as a rather special sort of entity, or a criticism of knowledge of him.

The experience of the Other, then, has a dynamical aspect: it transforms the world for consciousness into something more than a unique cogito can ever know, into a common property.

By virtue of the experience of the Other, consciousness is related to something alive, to another consciousness, to something essentially identical with itself. But precisely by being related to this that is "Identical", it loosens its exclusive hold over what was most its own - the objects of its experience. But what is a loss in one respect is a gain in another, for the objects gain a new and broader sense, "accessible to all"; and they thus give the self access to a conscious life, other than his own: they bring him to transcend himself.
in a new and radical sense.

Intersubjective experience provides for a sort of creativity.

The world heretofore has been the ego's own by being the intentional correlate of his consciousness, by being objective for him as the mean of his meaning. But it is still present as a given: that its meaning as intended is uniquely a meaning for consciousness, and not an adventitious meaning in itself, is not part of the object's sense or of the subjective processes relating to it. Consciousness lives immersed in its object, and does not attend to the process of living itself.

But here, in the intersubjective realm, the situation is quite different. The object is primarily not a given, but an institution: its sense is to be there for all, a common possession. With the appearance of the Other, consciousness becomes capable of constituting a world specific to the interaction of self and Other, a social world. Together self and Other constitute social institutions, objects whose objective sense—the medium for the interaction of self and Other—is figured in the process by which they are intended— the actual interaction. Social objectivities are explicitly what they are meant to be; and they thus reveal the creative inner dynamism of consciousness.

It is perhaps in this sense that intersubjectivity is transcendental, and that the appropriate way to approach the philosophical problems of the objective world is by analysing intersubjective experience. The world is indeed the product of the free inner dynamism of consciousness. But a consciousness that succeeds only in intending a natural objectivity has not set up an abiding product. The world genuinely transcends consciousness only when its very sense is not to be owned, but shared.
Chapter I

Preliminary Considerations

The problem of the alter ego or other self exhibits at first sight two grammatically distinct elements: an adjective, "alter", which falls under the general title otherness or alterity; and a noun, "ego", which falls under subjectivity. A useful introductory device is to present the elements separately, so that after the abstractive propaedeutic we shall more easily find our way among the very great complexities of the concrete problem. Therefore, let us here, at the beginning, present each element in turn.

Let us first take the noun, ego, and examine subjectivity as such, the pure ego, which (for present purposes) has two characteristics, intentionality and duration. The pure ego is the subject pole of acts of consciousness, and lives continuously through the temporal stream of consciousness. It is self-identical through time, and intentionally related to its objects in time. Let us very briefly consider these, each in turn, in order to evoke some important themes for the interpretation of Husserl: a detailed analysis is outside the compass of the present essay.

Consciousness is intentional, or all consciousness is consciousness of something. This observation, now so much touted as Husserl's major discovery as to have become almost trite, comprehends

1. C.M. 71. See the Second Cartesian Meditation for a fairly compact and detailed discussion of intentionality.
in its simplicity several vital characteristics of consciousness. As a purely formal description of consciousness, it is important for comprehending and hence unifying the several aspects of Husserl's interpretation of consciousness. Let us now in outline differentiate the doctrine of intentionality.

First, the object is neither contained as a part in nor identical with the consciousness of it. There is no question for Husserl of adopting a sensualism which would claim that objects are identical with the sensations of them, perhaps together with the order and configuration of the sense data (C.M. 76-77), for whereas the object remains identical through time, the sense data are evanescent. But equally, the object is not simply external to consciousness, but is immanently "in" the consciousness of it, but immanent in a distinctive way as the "objective sense" of the experience of it (C.M. 80).

Consciousness, then, is not merely a self-contained substance; but related to something; but that to which it is related is not simply different from consciousness, but is an essential correlate of it.

This can be made less vague by turning to the second issue of the differentiation of intentionality. Objects are experienced as

abiding through the experiences of them, yet the experiences pass away: in simple terms, this is so by means of a unifying of experience with experience according to the laws of synthesis. Consider Husserl's example: One looks at a die. This looking is a perspective on the die, and accordingly presents an aspect of it. Now other perspectives, which would present other aspects, are possible, and if one changes one's perspective, the previous experiences "flow away", and with them also the aspects they presented. It is easy to see, on somewhat closer inspection, that they do not flow away in just any arbitrary order - in disorder, that is - but within the "unity of synthesis" such that different aspects or appearances of the same die are presented in each successive experience, that each aspect belongs to the synthetic unity of the die, and that the order of the successive appearances is determined by that unity (C.M. 77-78).

Partly in order to clarify this, Husserl introduces the distinction between two temporalities: on the one hand, there is the time of the intended object, or objective time; and on the other, immanent or internal time, the time of the experience. The changing appearances of the object flow away in immanent time, but this in no way involves a flowing away of the object itself, which rather is intended as abiding through its appearances (C.M. 79). The enduring object is the "intentional effect" of the synthesis that identifies the several evanescent appearances as appearances of one object (C.M. 80).

The matter can now be considered in a slightly different way. Each experience of an object actually presents one aspect of the object.
Strictly speaking, experiences presenting the other aspects are not merely possible, but are concretely potential. In Husserl's view, potentialities "are not empty possibilities, but possibilities predeleinated in respect of content — namely, in the actual, presently occurring subjective process itself — and, in addition, having the character of possibilities actualisable by the Ego." An actual experience, then, is inseparable from experiences that are potential with respect to it; a present experience is present only with respect to future experiences that would actualize its possibilities. The potentialities that pertain to an actual experience accordingly are not possible merely in reality, but for consciousness, and thus make up the "horizon" of the experience. For example, only one side of a spatial object is present to consciousness at one time; this does not mean that the other sides are absent: rather they are "also meant" in the experience, and in the course of the changing perspectives on the object are anticipated or co-intended in "protention" (C.M. 82). A side is a side only inasmuch as there are others. The appearances of an object, then, are not instantaneous, but by means of protention — intentional anticipation — are continuous, and flow into each other.

3. C.M. 81-82. I have emended Cairns's translation by the addition of "presently occurring." The phrase in question reads: "im jeweiligen aktuellen Erlebnis." Cairns translates both "jeweilig" and "aktuell" with "actual," which is perfectly legitimate because the actual process can be none other than the (temporarily) present one. Yet Husserl is at pains to use the temporal adjective "jeweilig," and there is no reason not to translate it into plain English. This also makes the passage easier to interpret.

The topics of the relation of potentialities of consciousness to the notion of reality will be discussed briefly in Chapter III under the title "verification". See below pp. 81-82.
The full determinations of the object are implicit in the horizon of potentialities, and are uncovered by explication of the horizon (C.M. 62). Immanent time is the time of actual and concrete potentiality, and is constituted by protention; its order is that of the explication of the horizon of potentialities.

This brings us to perhaps the most important aspect of the doctrine of intentionality, namely, that an act of consciousness is specific to its object; it is here that the doctrine becomes a method — "intentional analysis" — whereby subjectivity and the world it intends can be critically examined and made intelligible. As already noted, the object of consciousness has a definite determination (the die, for example, is a cube of certain colours, with indentations on its faces); and correspondingly, the course of experiencing the object has a definite order (perhaps one looks at one face first, and then slowly turns the die, seeing other profiles in succession). These two necessities are not identical, but are related, yet not arbitrarily or "somehow" related, but according to essential laws that determine how the object is "meant" by consciousness (C.M. 64-65). In Husserl's view, ordinary conscious life is unaware of this relationship, but, so to speak, intends its objects through or by means of it. In other words, an experience enacts the intentional relationship, and by following the necessities of its own order, makes determinate the object that is present to it; or, by actualizing its potentialities it uncovers the determinations of its object. Intentional analysis serves to make clear how this works, how the structure of the potentialities implicit in an act of consciousness, and the necessity of
the order of their actualisation together determine the object as it is meant by consciousness (C.M.: 83-84). By so doing it reveals that consciousness is a temporal stream flowing according to a determinate order not as a mere matter of psychological fact (which could always be otherwise) but as a matter of conceptual necessity; and correspondingly, that objectivity – reality – is what it is not simply in itself and by derivation from some ontological necessity that somehow descends upon it from outside consciousness, but in virtue of the necessity of its being objective for consciousness.

Let this serve as a rough outline of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. As here interpreted, it commits Husserl to a transcendental idealism. It is idealism inasmuch as objectivity or reality is not conceived as a substance absolutely different from subjectivity, but as the unique correlate of consciousness, and as structured according to the requirements of this correlation. It is transcendental inasmuch as reality is not substantially identical with subjectivity, but is the product of the self-transcending of consciousness.


objectivity - nor consciousness - subjectivity - is for Husserl a static realm of being. Rather, consciousness is continuously in the act of producing its world, of exploring its horizons; and in doing this, it produces itself.

Let us now turn to the second descriptive characteristic of consciousness, temporality. Here again, I cannot pretend to offer a detailed analysis, but only to evoke a theme for the interpretation of Husserl. Most of what is important to this essay has already been mentioned, and need only be put in its proper order. It is by now obvious that the concepts of time and of intentionality are inseparable. Inner time is the time of (intentional) acts of consciousness. All intentions essentially have their position in this time, and their character is determined by their place.

The previous remarks posed the question of how the object endures as identical through its several appearances. We must now pose the correlative question of how the pure ego remains identical through its acts. Acts of consciousness, Husserl claims, come to be (entstehen) and pass away (vergehen), but the pure ego endures as identical through its acts, and in them, so to speak, "makes an appearance" or "presents itself" (auftreten) (Id.II 103). Here again we have an apparent conflict between a ceaseless flux and an abiding identity, which yet are essentially related. The immediately obvious way to "obviate the conflict is to espouse a "transcendental realism," the doctrine that subjectivity is a substance underlying the cogito, and related to another different
substance, reality, in its experience (C.M. §10). But Husserl refuses this option, for he would then be obliged to prove that experience is valid, is adequate to its putative object: and such a proof can have no issue, for even if it satisfies a theoretician of consciousness, it cannot satisfy consciousness itself, since the latter's evidence of objectivity is experiential and not deductive. Such a realist doctrine is absurd, because one who holds it must at once claim that consciousness does not bear within itself the evidence of its objective validity, and, without ceasing to be (merely) conscious, magically prove this validity (Cp. C.M. §41). Husserl insists, therefore, that the unity of consciousness cannot be deduced from a metaphysical principle, because this denies the rights of subjectivity; it must rather be exhibited as a function of intentionality and temporality, that is, as a function of what consciousness knows itself to be, and not of what it must be.

This requirement can be approached by considering the relationship between temporality and reflection. It is possible to make any act of consciousness the object of a second, reflective act, but both occur within the stream of consciousness, and therefore are not simultaneous (Id. II 101, 103). They could be simultaneous only if they were not separate acts. There is therefore no grasp or objectification of intentionality in act, for it has already ceased to be an act when it is grasped, and is therefore essentially modified by the grasp (Id. II 101-102). How, then, is this to be interpreted?

7. Husserl claims that Descartes is the founder of "transcendental realism": whether he is right in this is, of course, quite irrelevant to the present considerations.
To assert that consciousness is intentional is to assert that it is free, for as intentional it obeys none but its own laws; it is not co-natural with its objects, and is hence not subject to causation by a putative thing in itself which would be its object. In other words, it is the right of consciousness to determine the criteria of reality. This freedom is actual, has effect, in the acts of consciousness: it articulates itself or differentiates itself in these acts. But this articulation is nothing other than imminent time. Therefore, in order that the object be properly an "intentional effect", time itself must be produced; and this production is nothing other than subjectivity freely producing itself. Primal spontaneity, then, is self-constitution as temporal.

Now both the reflected and the reflecting acts are articulations of spontaneity, and hence are acts of one ego. The reflected act intends its object, and the reflecting act takes the first as its object, but is itself unreflected. Therefore, there is no possible grasp of spontaneity in act, for temporality is the condition of its actuality, and is therefore irremediably prior to an act of reflection. Spontaneity can only be quasi-objectified inasmuch as the reflected act is as such an act of the same ego that now reflects; or, it is an articulation of that spontaneity which is now actual in reflecting. The only original and evident access to spontaneity is access; that is, to the thing itself as actually being that spontaneity, and living its acts. The living...

8. Ge. Levinas, "Intentionalité et sensation," p. 34.
present of consciousness is to be lived, not to be reflected. 10

Let this suffice as an outline of the temporality of
consciousness. Here, again, by way of these considerations, we are led
to Husserl's transcendental idealism, or, if you will, to a translation
of it. What before was the free constitution of objects as intentional
effects is now free self-constitution in time. There is no final
experience of an object, because experience essentially has a
horizon, and a horizon is always something more. If it lacked a
horizon, it would lack unity and differentiation. Similarly, there is
no final reflection on the self, because that reflection is itself an
act of the self. A self that presumes a final reflection still has
itself both before and behind. Consciousness, then, is a mutual
implication of self and its object, or, what amounts to the same thing,
they are reciprocally concrete. Neither is an abstract pole of identity.

that many of these issues were not clearly dealt with by Husserl,
although his work prepares the way for them (p. 167). His argument
is, briefly: "The constitution of time is a creative process that
escapes reflection; we are, therefore, bound to accept the "absolute
facticity" of the ego and its time. But because this facticity is not
alien to consciousness, but its very nature, Husserl's is a philosophy
of "absolute responsibility." Cp. also Levinas, "Intentionalite et
sensation," passim, which treats similar issues. Both authors stress
the importance of the body and of sensation to the issue of time.
(The Body will be discussed in Chapter II below, pp. 43-45). Both
graphically state one common theme, that consciousness cannot in any of
its acts grasp its own "living present": "Consciousness is a senescence
and a remembrance of things past" (Levinas, p. 47). Or: there is
"more of the world and of our position in the world to understand than
can be reflectively retrieved" (Landgrebe, p. 476). Note also that
Levinas defines "life," a concept to which allusion has already been
made, and which will become quite important to this essay: The term
"to live" ("vivre") designates the pre-reflective relation of a content
with itself. It can become transitive (to live a spring) but is
primarily reflexive (but here there is no question of explicit reflection).
A consciousness which is consciousness of an object is a non-objectifying
consciousness of self, it lives [elle se vit]; it is Erlebnis [a living
through]" (p. 38).
As the final point of this preliminary consideration of subjectivity, let us now consider concrete consciousness.

Husserl's elaboration of the concept of the pure ego reveals that it is necessarily concrete, what Husserl calls a "Monad"\textsuperscript{11}. For the monad, each intention is an acquisition of an abiding way of intending, a habituality of consciousness (C.M. §32). The monad, then, is the pure ego considered as having a personal style or a character (though, of course, this vocabulary is not strictly accurate). More properly, it is the pure ego inasmuch as it comprehends its past in its present.

At first sight, it is odd, even startling, that Husserl should ascribe personality to the pure ego, for it is pure precisely of any nature or substantiality, a purely intentional and temporal subjectivity. The very notion that consciousness has a personality - even that there is an ego that is conscious - has been trenchantly and persuasively criticized by Sartre in \textit{The Transcendence of the Ego}\textsuperscript{12}. Although I believe that his objections are not conclusive, a consideration of them can help to make Husserl's meaning clearer. Sartre's fundamental consideration is the thesis just previously discussed, that reflection essentially modifies an act of consciousness\textsuperscript{13}, but he takes it, I believe, far beyond its

\textsuperscript{11.} My discussion of the monad is based principally on the \textit{Cartesian Meditations} §§30-33 and the \textit{Ideen} II §29.


\textsuperscript{13.} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 31-32/pp. 47-49.
legitimate bounds. He claims that acts of consciousness are instantaneous; but any enduring unity - a state of consciousness or even a transcendental ego - is in his view a transcendent or intentional unity, a unity for consciousness, but itself not consciousness.

Sartre analyses hatred as an example of a state. One's hatred for another is given in a feeling of repulsion. But clearly, he argues, this feeling is instantaneous, whereas the hatred itself endures. Now, at the sight of Peter, one feels repulsion; one hates him now, but hated him also last year, and will hate him next year. The hatred transcends any single feeling of repugnance, and even any finite set of feelings, however large.

But the momentary feeling of repugnance is an appearance of the hatred, or the hatred is given in the feeling of repugnance. Hence, reflection on this one feeling, the one experience, can objectify two things. First, it can take the feeling itself as its object, and of that it will have certain knowledge. Or it can take the state of which the feeling is an appearance as its object, and then its knowledge will be dubitable, for in positing the hatred, reflection commits the ego to a past of having hated and an open future of hating, that is, to potentially infinite moments of repulsion. The hatred thus transcends any experience that presents it, and does this, moreover, in the manner of any other transcendent object: It is real, and not merely a hypothesis invented to explain a set of experiences; and knowledge of it is dubitable because it is real, because the infinity of experiences to which one is committed by

15. Ibid, pp. 44 ff, 57-59/pp. 60 ff. 74-76.
positing it may well be unfulfilled. One can, for example, claim in a moment of anger to hate someone, and later realize that in fact one does not hate: the anger seemed to present an enduring hatred, but passed, leaving nothing behind 17.

With most of this I have no quarrel: it is quite evident that one can be in error about one's states or emotions. But I believe that Sartre has been overzealous in the purification of consciousness. In virtue of intentionality, he argues, consciousness is self-transcending; the several experiences of one transcendent object are unified by that object itself. There is no need of another, specially constructed unity of consciousness; and indeed such a unity would be a core of opacity at the centre of consciousness, impeding the essential openness to objectivity 18. Sartre's argument is elegant; his parsimony is costly.

Note from the start that Husserl clearly denies that any such empirical personality, any such states, accrue to pure consciousness as such. The pure ego is transparent to itself, whereas a personality is an intentional unity, and thus presumptive or dubitable (Id. II §28). But he claims that there pertain to pure consciousness unities that are to be distinguished from such intentional unities. Acts of consciousness institute "abiding meanings" (bleidende Meinungen) 19, meanings that remain the ego's and retain his thesis after the instituting act has passed (Id. II III; C.M. §32). Inasmuch as the stream of consciousness is the self-

19. The term "meaning" is ambiguous, referring either to noetic or subjective meanings, acts or processes of meanings, or to noematic or objective meanings (Cp. Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl, p. 82, sub meinen and Meinung). Husserl is clearly using the
constitution of the one ego, the meaning of the instituting act remains his, there can always be another act intending it, it continues to be accepted until revoked by another instituting act. But this persisting of the meaning "manifestly is not a continuous filling of immanent time with subjective processes": the meaning is the ego's even when he does not attend to it (C.M. §32).

By instituting such abiding meanings or "habitualities", the ego "constitutes himself as a 'fixed and abiding' personal Ego", and though the specific habitualities may change, the ego retains throughout a "personal character" (C.M. p. 101).

What distinguishes habitualities from Sartre's states is that they are not intentional unities at all. Suppose that, having considered a matter, one makes a judgement: The act of judging passes, but thereafter, one continues to hold the corresponding conviction (Überzeugung), even if he forgets the grounds of his judgement, even if he only dimly remembers the judgement (Id. II 116; cp. C.M. §32). The conviction is a potentiality, which can always be made actual. But making it actual does not consist merely in presenting the content of the judgement again; rather, the ego, in the same act that presents this content, straightway leads his thesis to the judgement. In a sense, he agrees (zustimmen) with the former judgement, yet there is no separate act of agreeing, but a "joining in" (mitmachen) with the previous act of judging (Id. II 117).

subjective sense here: and therefore the meaning in question cannot be an act or process, but something else, which I shall attempt to define.
Consider, for example, someone who learns a geometrical proof:
The theorem becomes his conviction, and it abides not by his proving it on many subsequent occasions, but by his "taking over" (Übernahme) the conviction (Id. II 118-119). That is, when he again considers the theorem, he need not wonder, Is this true?, and even less, Have I proved this before? In intending the theorem, he intends it with the thesis: proved; this act is unitary, and not susceptible of analysis into two parts, the intention of the theorem itself, and the thesis: I have proved this. Certainly these two acts are possible, but they do not combine to present the one object, a proved theorem. In other words, in proving the theorem, one is conscious of it in a certain way, as problematical; and thereafter one is conscious of the same theorem as having been proved. Or again, to state the issue in Husserl's own terms, to be of a certain conviction is not to remember that one made a decision sometime in the past, it is not to remember an event that occurred in "transcendent time", but rather to remember something that occurred in "immanent time." As he explains, this memory is not just a "reproduction" of the decision, "but a 'positing again' (Wiederersetzung), or better, an actual positing with (Mitsetzung), a taking over of what was 'previously' posited" (Id. II 119).

Hence, it seems that Husserl's detailed analysis of habituality undercuts Sartre's criticisms. The unity is not for reflection²⁰, although

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²⁰. Sartre mentions the 'doctrine of the monad of the Cartesian Meditations as subject to his criticisms (Transcendence pp. 25-26/p. 42), and that work admittedly couches the notion of habituality in the vocabulary of reflection: e.g. "If, in an act of judgment, I decide for the first time in favour of a being and a being-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now on I am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so decided, 'I am of this conviction.'" But even here, the very next sentence indicates
reflection can objectify it - and in doing so will have all the
difficulty Sartre says it will have. But whether one can or cannot
become aware of them, there are certain convictions that are now one's
own even though one does not now make the corresponding decision. When
one actualizes the conviction, that act does not stand alone as
instantaneous, but implicates its past and its future in its very,
intentional structure. To be sure, when once this implication is
transformed into a reflective thesis - what I now am doing I have done
before and can do again - it becomes problematical. But the actualizing
of the conviction does not as such posit a past, but rather takes over
the past and the intentional acts of the past as the ego's own; because
his act of owning is not the reflective thesis that he owns, it escapes
Sartre's strictures. The monad, or the subject of habitualities, is as
such self-consciously identical with its own life; which is not to say
that this identity cannot be straightway retrieved in reflection (C.M. §30).

Habitualities, then, are pre-theetic unities. They retain the
past not as something objective, to be remembered, but rather as a
history. A past decision is still present in the conviction: remembering
the decision does not make it a conviction, failing to remember does not
impede one's being convinced.

The stream of consciousness of a pure ego - its conscious life -

that the conviction is pre-reflective: "That, however, does not
signify merely that I remember the act or can remember it later.
This I can do..." - but need not do (C.M. §32, pp. 100-101). The
Idee II, which presents a fuller analysis of the doctrine, was almost
certainly unavailable to him when he wrote Transcendence (in 1936).
Although written well before then, it was published only in 1952.
is its history. Not by being a substance underneath consciousness, but by being identical with its history, is the ego identical through its conscious life.

Husserl's entire argument turns on the relationship between intentionality and temporality. Experiences do not merely take place in immanent time; rather they constitute it. Conversely, time is the condition of experience, it is the structure by virtue of which the manner of intending the object determines the object itself. An experience cannot constitute its object as a determinate unity without at once constituting itself as a unity. Hence, an experience is not transient, but is an abiding acquisition.

The monad, then, is not just an abstractly identical pole of the stream of consciousness, but rather a concrete ego, and as such it is crucial to Husserl's idealism:

The ego can be concrete only in the flowing, multiformity of his intentional life, along with the objects meant - and in some cases constituted as existent for him - in that life. Manifestly, in the case of an object so constituted, its abiding existence and being-thus are a correlate of the habituality constituted in the Ego-pole himself by virtue of his position-taking.

...This, my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality of my Ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions make up my surrounding world, so far as I am acquainted with it at the time, with its horizons of objects with which I am acquainted - that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this formal object-structure.

...Since the monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life, it is clear that the problem of explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically (the problem of its constitution for himself) must include all constitutional problems without exception. Consequently the phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole (C.M. 102-103).
The concept of the monad — the concept of the totality of actual and possible experience — is the concept of the totality of all being. There is no being other than meant or intended objectivity, or, in other words, the world is the correlate of the life of consciousness.21

This, then, will serve as an outline of the concept "ego". I have attempted to provide only the thread of an argument, rather than a detailed discussion of any issue. The main purpose has been to evoke certain dominant themes of Husserl's thought as a context for the work to be done in the following chapters; in the course of this work, we shall return to most of these themes, albeit in modified form. By far the most important theme is that intentionality and temporality are together essential characteristics of consciousness and the means whereby it transcends itself; they might be called its "dimensions"22.

By means of this outline, we have been led to the apparent crisis with which the Fifth Cartesian Meditation begins: If all possible sense and being are for the ego, then is not another ego nonsense? There seems to be a realm of being that is not merely constituted by the ego, but by itself, the Other. But this problem is exceedingly complex; let us, therefore, first consider it on a simpler level.

21. "The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely — nonsense" (C.M. 117).

22. Gurwitsch uses such a vocabulary: See Gurwitsch, "Intentionality of Consciousness," e.g. p. 71/p. 125.
We may now turn to consider the concept of otherness or alterity. I shall here offer a mostly negative definition, distinguishing it from the notion of difference; and leaving the positive definition to be elaborated in the main body of this essay. The issue of this discussion is the claim that an Other ego is not merely a logically possible or even an actually existing ego numerically distinct from the ego with respect to which it is Other, but rather is in actual or potential communion with the ego as intentionally related to a world common to both. The fact that other egos are possible or even real does not by itself establish that they do or can know each other, or that they experience the same world; much less does it establish that they know of each other, or know that they experience the same world. Yet exactly this sort of actual or potential community is implicated in the sense "Other". In order to understand it, therefore, Husserl must not present a proof of logical possibility or of real existence, but must look rather more deeply into the structure of experience.  

Now the Fifth Cartesian Meditation begins with a crisis at the heart of phenomenology: it is suggested that Husserl is committed by the results so far attained and by his method to solipsism (O.M. §42). But there are many senses of solipsism: first, it can be the thesis that there exist no other selves; or second, that there is not sufficient evidence to assert that they exist; or third, that the concept of another ego is meaningless. Now which concerns Husserl? The first, being the sort of

dogmatic claim forbidden by Husserl's approach, is obviously out of the question. Of the others, by far the more likely difficulty for his doctrine is the question of whether there is a sense "Other" susceptible of intentional analysis, and therefore consistent with Husserl's transcendental idealism. This indeed is a serious difficulty, for intentional analysis seeks to show how the object has sense as an intentional product of consciousness; but the alter ego is as such autonomous and self-constituting, and hence - it seems - is essentially recalcitrant to this sort of analysis (Cp. C.M. §12). This is the first of our problems.

But supposing this problem to be solved, another straightforwardly presents itself. The sense of any object is determined by the manner in which it presents itself to consciousness; that is, the course of experiences intending an object determines the detailed sense of the object, and whether it is given the status existing. Hence, in subjecting the sense "Other" to intentional analysis, Husserl is required to lay bare the structure of the verifying evidence of the existence of the Other. That is, he is committed to respond to some version of the second of the three difficulties.

Now it might seem that these problems are specious, for phenomenology is an eidetic science (C.M. §34), and the structure of consciousness it uncovers is therefore not peculiar to the "meditating philosopher", but is universal and instantiated in infinite possible egos. The eidetic method treats the particular as an instance of the universal, and this is no less

25. This will be more fully discussed below, pp. 81-82.
true of the particular transcendental ego. Perhaps, then, there is no serious question of phenomenology being solipsistic, and no pressing need to investigate the sense "Other".

The suggestion is spurious, for it ignores the problems specific to subjectivity. The method of eidetic intuition is free variation: the phenomenologist can uncover the essence of perception, for example, by starting with any perception whatever - say the present perception of a table - and fictively changing it. He thereby discovers what variation is inconsistent with its remaining perception, and is thus enabled to intuit the essence of perception. The particular perception is now seen to instantiate a "pure possibility," an eidos. Similarly, in examining the ego, Husserl seeks not idiosyncracies or particular psychological properties, but the structure of subjectivity as such. The particular ego is of interest only as an instance of the universal. But the universal (or eidos) is in this case discovered by self-variation (C.M. 105-106). Hence, although the phenomenologist will discover himself to be an instance of a pure possibility, he will not thereby discover how he can enter into conscious relations with other instances. Or, as Husserl says, "...in the transition from my ego to an ego as such, neither the actuality nor the possibility of other egos is presupposed. I phantasy only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not phantasy others" (C.M. 106). An Other, then, is not merely a different ego.

A plurality of egos is in principle possible, and is indeed actual; but, knowing this we do not know how they are aware of each other.

Ego and alter ego do not simply exist side by side unawares; nor is it sufficient that they in fact experience the same world. Rather, they must know, or at least be able to know of each other, each recognizing that the other experiences the same world.

It is helpful to consider briefly a rather more subtle attempt to obviate Husserl's analysis of the Other; but one that still takes the Other to be a logical possibility. An object is the unity of infinite possible experiences, and, it is claimed, there is no essential reason why these must occur within one stream of consciousness. Others who would experience the same object in different perspectives are a priori possible; whether in fact they exist is an empirical question that phenomenology has no business considering.

The criticism is argued through an analysis of the givenness of a spatial thing. Such an object is not fully presented in any one perception; rather, each perception is a perspective on the object, and presents a side of it. The totality of the infinite possible perspectives on the object is its "inner horizon"; the "outer horizon" is made up of those objects contiguous with it in the visual field, and presented along with it, in the background, so to speak. Now one in principle can attain a new perspective on the object; but this will not be a new isolated experience, but synthesized with the previous as an experience of the same object. A spatial object is experienced in continuous syntheses of this kind. Corresponding to each perspective is a unique bodily position of the perceiver, which

itself varies with variation of the perspective. But since there are
infinite possible perspectives corresponding to infinite bodily positions,
there is no final and apodictic experience of the object.\textsuperscript{30}

The critic further argues that the act of perception is anonymous:
the subject is immersed in the object, and therefore is not thecically
present to himself in the experience; only in reflection is it recognized
that there is a perceiving subject. Hence, an experience is signalled as
perception of that object, but not as by this subject; there is nothing in
an experience that ties it to a particular stream of consciousness\textsuperscript{31}.

From this the critic concludes that the several experiences of
which the object is the intentional unity need not occur in one stream of
consciousness. It is essentially possible that another perceiving subject
be so situated as to see the same object that the first sees. By knowing
that many perspectives are possible, we know that his will be a perspective
on the same object. Hence, finally, the elaborate analyses of the Fifth
Cartesian Meditation are otiose: the possibility that many experience the
same world and that objects are intersubjectively accessible is guaranteed
a priori by the object's being an intentional unity\textsuperscript{32}.

It is not hard to see the mistake. The critic has failed to
recognize the full significance of intentional analysis, which reveals that
the perspectives on an object are unified not just by a real principle of
the object in itself, but by a principle immanent in each experience of it.

To perceive a spatial object is not simply to see a certain congeries

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{30} Dauenhauer, "Husserl and Solipsism," pp. 189-190.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid, pp. 390-392.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid, pp. 191-192.
\end{itemize}
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of colours, tactile qualities, and the like; rather, the congeries is
apprehended as an appearance of, say, a diet. And this apprehension
straightway commits consciousness to the possibility of having other,
define appearances. It is not sufficient that the new appearances be
"really" appearances of the same object: they must be synthesized as
identical in accordance with the predilection (the commitment) implicit
in the apprehension. The apprehension posits more than is fully present
to it, but in such a manner that this "more" can be made present. Only
thus does the object remain the same for consciousness through its
multiple appearances. The apprehension is as such a presumption, and
in this sense the object is said to transcend the perception of it (C.M.
§ 28). This unity of the object, and its consequent transcendence can
be said to be the achievement of consciousness.

This is exactly the point that our critic has missed. The object
indeed transcends consciousness by being the unity of infinite possible
experiences. But this transcendence is reflected in the presumption of
consciousness: by means of its own presumption, consciousness is able to
posit the unity that defines objective transcendence. No appearances are
appearances of one object until consciousness can unify them as such.
The object, then, is not just a real transcendent, but is consciousness
transcending itself.

But this business of perspectives does not explain how the unity
of an object for several egos can be achieved. The criticism is vitiated
by a surreptitious realism: the same real object can surely be perceived
by many egos; but how do they go about positing it as the same? How do
they achieve the unity of the object? A rather new sense of transcendence is at work here. Our critic has perhaps pitched on the right idea, but he has failed to analyse it.

The object as an intentional unity transcends consciousness in the sense that a new perspective is always possible. One perspective is actual, the rest are potential, presumed, also-meant, or expectant: but they can be made actual, the expectancy can be fulfilled. Husserl seeks to make transcendence intelligible by analysing the concrete relationship between expectancy and fulfillment.

The intersubjectively accessible object is transcendent in an entirely different way. The ego cannot have the Other's perspective on the object, and therefore it is in no way expectantly meant in his own experience. Yet each experiences the object as the same for both. By what right do they make such a claim? This is our problem.

These considerations suggest that the Other is not just an intended object of a special kind, but that it is rather what I have called a dimension of consciousness. If the consciousness of the Other is indeed a process of self-transcending with its own specific structure, then clearly

33. Cp. Carr, "Husserl's Cartesianism," pp. 26-27. Carr refers to the two sorts of transcendence as a "weaker" and a "stronger" sense (the latter being the intersubjective transcendence). He notes that they are analogous (p. 26). But he claims - I think falsely - that the Other is "weakly" transcendent: "...while the alter ego makes it possible that the "rest" of the world exceeds my actual and possible consciousness, the alter ego does not himself exceed my actual and possible consciousness." This is so because "he is described...as not reducible to the particular act or acts in which he is given to me. He is not so reducible because he is the objective unity of actual and possible acts of my own in which he can be given!" (p. 27). This cannot be true, because the Other is still an ego, and as such is self-constituting and self-unifying; and this operation most surely exceeds the ego's possible consciousness. This whole question will be argued at length in Chapter III.
it is more the kin and the equal of intentionality and of time-consciousness than a specification of intentionality. But this requires careful examination and argument, for Husserl often speaks as if the consciousness of the Other is just a specification of intentionality.

Now if this new sense of transcendence is to become intelligible, it must be subjected to intentional analysis; the transcendence must be shown to be an achievement, a self-transcending. The Other, then, cannot be straightway accepted as a really existing subjectivity, but must be figured in the ego's own subjectivity:

In this pre-eminent intentionality [scil "the intentionality directed to what is other"] there becomes constituted for me the new existence-sense that goes beyond my monadic very-ownness; there becomes constituted an ego, not as: "I myself", but as mirrored in my own Ego, in my monad. The second ego, however, is not simply there and strictly presented; rather is he constituted as "alter ego" - the ego indicated as one moment by this expression being I myself in my ownness. The "Other", according to his own constituted sense, points to me myself; the other is a "mirroring" of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and yet again not an analogue in the usual sense (C.M. 125):

The sense Other implicates the sense self, and thereby becomes the means of the self-transcending of consciousness. Even here Husserl is able to preserve his idealism.

Neither ego nor alter ego ceases, on entering the intersubjective relationship, to be a monad - a totality that implicates in its very

34. Contrary to Ricoeur's claim. Ricoeur "Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation" in Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. E.G. Ballard and L.E. Embree (Evanston, U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 130. (The essay was prepared especially for this collection, and to the best of my knowledge Ricoeur's French version has not been published. See Translators' Preface, p. xxii). If Ricoeur only means that Husserl's idealism is transformed, then he is surely right. But it is not abandoned or in Ricoeur's words, brought up short, for even here Husserl insists that nothing transcends consciousness without the cooperation of consciousness.
subjectivity all that is or can be objective for it, and includes it in its essence. But on entering the relationship, the world for each ceases to be only his, and becomes shared. By entering the relationship the monads can be said to build "windows" for themselves, but they do not look through these windows onto something external to them, but onto their own achievement, albeit an achievement that always escapes their full recovery.

Let us now turn to the detailed analysis of this new sense of transcendence. As our first step we must examine the intrinsically first object that is the same for self and Other: the body. I propose now to consider the bodily encounter with the Other.

Chapter II
The Encounter with the Other

According to Husserl's idealism, no objective transcendency is conceivable unless consciousness, so to speak, "cooperates" with or opens itself to the object. The problem for this essay is to analyse the transcendency peculiar to the alter ego, and in particular to analyse the manner in which it is achieved in conscious life. This transcendency is pre-eminently the theme of consciousness in the encounter with the Other: accordingly, let us examine this encounter in detail.

The Fifth Cartesian Meditation begins abruptly with an apparently fundamental crisis. The monad, or concrete transcendental subjectivity, intentionally comprehends all actual or possible objectivity as the product of its own movement of self-transcending. But one intentional sense - other subjectivity - is essentially recalcitrant to such analysis; for as a subjectivity it is autonomously the source of its own sense, and refuses to be comprehended as the product of an intentionality alien to it. Now if phenomenology is to make all that is experienced into the monad's own, how can it accommodate something so radically alien as an autonomous Other (C.M. 121)? If the consciousness, of which Husserl speaks can intend only its own product, then surely there will be no real other subjectivity for it, but only a homunculus, a vain image or iteration of itself; and it is doomed to solipsism. But just as surely, the consciousness of ordinary life claims to reach over to a genuine Other, an Other that transcends the self more fully than any object yet encountered (C.M. 123).

Let us try to make this clearer. Husserl's reflections have so
far proceeded on the basis of the phenomenological reductions, the deliberate refusal of the claim of naive experience to present objects that are more than what they are experienced to be, that are independently real; phenomenology is the decision to conduct philosophy as a process of consistent self-explication, or egology, accepting as valid only what is evidenced in conscious life (Cp. C.M. §§ 6-8). But if the phenomenologist is to accept only what he experiences as evident, how can he accept that another ego than himself experiences the same objects as he? How can he, consistently with the demand of evidence, accept that there is a consciousness - a consciousness of evidence - that is not his, but other than his? Again, in making his initial decision that the world is the correlate of conscious life, and in finally interpreting phenomenology as transcendental idealism (Cp. C.M. § 41), does he not commit himself to being in theory (not possibly in fact) a solus ipse, unable to understand how the world is objective for others as for him, unable to be a member of a community of egos intentionally related to a common world? He instead condemns himself, Husserl's imagined critic accuses, to accept that since all that is objective for him is his own product, the presumed Other is not a conscious ego at all (C.M. 122).

The criticism pretends to come from outside phenomenology, from transcendental realism (C.M. 121); and from its externality derive its meaning and vigour. Phenomenology seeks to be "transcendental philosophy": that is, it claims to be able to solve by its own methods all problems of the origin, meaning and objectivity of the naively accepted world, of all

that claims to be transcendent (C.M. 121). The critic challenges phenomenology by suggesting that it is dogmatically unable to formulate even the sense "Other", that it cannot consistently with its own principles accord the Other the independence essential to him. If indeed he is right, then phenomenology must resign its pretentions, and accept that it is at best a consistent theory about a restricted region of conscious life, but not complete and true.

We have already briefly encountered transcendental realism. Its thesis was that behind the stream of consciousness there lies a substantial subject, somehow related to reality. In its present form, its first premise is that the Other exceeds any possible consciousness of him; and it easily concludes from this that the ego's experience is only a sign or representation of the Other's reality (C.M. 122). The job for philosophy would then be to criticize the veracity of the sign. This realism contrasts itself with the idealist view that the Other is "a mere intending and intended in me", an immanent part of the ego's own conscious life (C.M. 122).

The alternatives are specious. The first proposes a fundamentally unbridgeable ontological gap between self and Other, and therefore makes it unintelligible how they depend upon each other for their conscious being; unintelligible, that is, how the accessibility of the world to everyone is an experiential and not a discursive sense. The second, too, misinterprets the reciprocity of the relationship by affirming a one-sided dependency of the Other on the self, thus pre-empting any notion of the
self's also being Other for his Other. Both transcendental realism and naive idealism, then, are solipsistic, each in its own way.

Husserl dismisses the entire dispute as "metaphysical" and dogmatic, and rejects the alternatives as absurd (C.M. 122). But why are they even suggested? Perhaps because each graphically expresses a fundamental desideratum of a philosophy of intersubjectivity. In the intentionality relating to other subjectivity, both the subject (the ego) and the object (the alter ego) have special rights. Each is autonomous, but equally each depends upon the other's subjectivity to ensure that the world is experienced as accessible to all. Realism appreciates the special transcendence of the Other, but at the expense of the ego; the naive idealism with which it is contrasted makes the reverse mistake.

Now the opening pages of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation perhaps mislead the reader by presenting the problem of intersubjectivity as a doctrinal difficulty for phenomenology: they suggest that phenomenology must "escape" solipsism. A number of essays have therefore been published speculating on whether the Meditation succeeds in refuting solipsism, or in proving that phenomenology is not solipsist; or on whether there is any need for such proof. The introduction of the problem undeniably has an

3. Cp. Carr, "Husserl's Cartesianism," p. 15: "Husserl... misled his readers by using the term 'solipsism' in a peculiar way".
agonistic or polemical tone, and thereby gains vigour and vividness. But the Meditation itself is far more than an apology for phenomenology; Husserl's concern is to address a real issue, not to escape a doctrinal incongruity, or to solve an artificial conundrum, or to invent a theoretical novelty. And his introduction must be interpreted in this light.

Hence, although Husserl rejects the opening polemics, he retains their apparently conflicting desiderata as valid for his own analysis of intersubjectivity. These are, again, that the Other utterly transcends the self, and is autonomous; and yet that he is immanent, and is seen to experience what the self experiences. But his effort is not so much to accommodate these within one theory as to show how conscious life itself works them out.

Husserl therefore takes the naive or unreflected consciousness of other subjectivity as the "transcendental clue" for his analysis, as that which is to be understood. The straightforward consciousness of the Other has two aspects: First, the Other is himself objective as having a body standing among other worldly objects; but he is seen not only to be in the world, but also to experience it. Second, the world itself is given as not just the ego's "private synthetic formation", but as accessible to all (C.M. 123).

Naive conscious life takes the Other for granted. It is accepted that there is a plurality of co-equal persons - among them oneself - who all experience and live in one world (C.M. 123, 125). The naive subject trusts that his fellows see the same things as he; that in conversation they have or can have the same thing in mind as he; and so on. But this
trust hides a wealth of implicit meaning that it is our business to explicate.

Naive consciousness makes no fundamental distinction between self and Others. But with the birth of philosophical reflection, the subject arrogates to himself the pre-eminent status of the cogito. Objectivity becomes objectivity for the subject, meaning becomes meaning for the subject; and the relationship between the subject and his fellows becomes asymmetrical, for their experience does not for him have the warrant of the cogito. The philosophical problem of self and other is born, and our questions are legitimated: how does one go about accepting that the Other, too, is a subject; that one objective world is accessible to all? It is specifically to these questions that Husserl directs his attention:

... Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me - in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is" - is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life's constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification. Therefore, in order to provide the basis for answering all imaginable questions that can have any sense (here) - may, in order that, step by step, these questions themselves may be propounded and solved - it is necessary to begin with a systematic explication of the overt and implicit intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes "made" and explicated in respect of its rightful content - that is, its fulfilment-content (G.M. 123).

But the problem Husserl sets himself is more comprehensive even than this: it is in virtue of the Other's being a conscious subject that the world has the peculiar transcendence of intersubjective accessibility.

To place the intentionality relating to other subjectivity in question

5. Ricoeur, "Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", pp. 119-120.
is, then, to place the entire range of conscious life in question (C.M. 124).

The intersubjective accessibility of the world is ordinary enough in itself, but it involves two moments, the self's experience and the Other's experience, which can be isolated for analysis only by extraordinary means. If Husserl seeks to know how the ego has access to the alter ego, then he clearly cannot presuppose that access. He must attempt to discern the conceptual order of its origination. He must, that is, delimit a stratum of conscious life from which it is absent, but within which it arises. He therefore transforms the introductory objection into an argument by proposing a reduction to the "sphere of ownness" (Eigenheitssphere). He suggests that we methodologically exclude from consideration all that range of objectivity now in question: the meaning "alter ego" itself, and all meanings referring to or originating from the alter ego. For example, all cultural objectivities are excluded, for these are products of Others' constitution; scientific objectivity is excluded, for it is essentially intersubjectively accessible. Generally excluded are "all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity (C.M. 124)."

This thematic and abstractive reduction has a very specific purpose. The Other is not alien in himself, but with respect to the ego; something is alien only with respect to what is own. Hence, in order to grasp the status of the Other, Husserl must elaborate a concept of self-

hood. But, in light of the preliminary interpretation of the problem, it has a more fundamental purpose: the Other transcends consciousness in a unique way, but nonetheless in a way that essentially involves the structure of the ego's own experience. The Other is the vehicle of a transcendence more radical than any possible for the ego alone. The Other experiences what the ego himself experiences, he takes as his own what is the ego's own: he encroaches (Überschreiten) upon the ego (C.M. 128). We must first withdraw the reflected ego from this transcending and encroaching in order to understand his role in the movement.

Clearly, then, the reduction to the sphere of ownness, or the premordial reduction, is not simply the naturalistic hypothesis that all others had died, perhaps in a universal plague. They would then be merely factually absent, but there would remain a coherent sense "Other". The reduction is more radical: the primordial sphere or sphere of ownness is the ego's "private synthetic formation", something that no possible Other could experience (C.M. 125).

That which is own is non-alien (C.M. 126). The primordial sphere is no part of the objective (intersubjectively accessible) world. Yet it is a coherent stratum of the world; accordingly, primordial experience is a specific manner of self-transcending in the sphere of ownness. In

7. Cp. Ricoeur, "Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", p. 119. Ricoeur speaks of a "parentage of sense": that which is alien is another's own; hence the sense "Other" or "alien" is derived from the sense "own".
other words, to primordial experience there corresponds an "own" nature, its intentional product (C.M. 127).

Now among the objects of this own nature one stands out as unique: the ego's body or animate organism (Leib), an organ of sensation and of kinaesthesis. It is the only object in which the ego "rules and governs' immediately"; and by means of this governing, the ego has sensory access to his primordial world: he can see and touch something, and by moving, see and touch other objects, or the other side of the same object; and he has kinaesthetic power to move objects within the own sphere. All of this he does, and all is subject to his "I can" (C.M. 128). The body as an organ (or system of organs) is not one object co-equal with all others, but is a power. The organ is not the theme of sensation: for example, when one touches an object with one's hand, one does not feel one's hand, but the object, and the tactile qualities are qualities of the object, not of the hand. The sensory or kinaesthetic power of the body does not intentionally terminate in the organ, but in the object that it appropriates. In other words, the hand is absent from the touching in much the same way that the ego is absent from unreflected experience.

The primordial reduction, of course, does not invent the body, but rather makes it stand out or brings it to prominence. In virtue of being an organ, the body bears the ego's subjectivity; and in virtue of

10. Husserl more fully explores the issues of the subjectivity of the body, and of its role in the constitution of objectivity in the Ideen II, Chapter III.
being subjective it is itself unnoticed in experience. The primordial living body, then, is not a "didactic fiction," but is the very power of experiencing, the central organ of the movement of self-transcending that is essential to consciousness. The reduction to the body is not an impoverishment of consciousness, but is the revelation of how it enriches itself.

This brings us to the notion of incarnate transcendental subjectivity. As a matter of course, the empirical ego or psyche has a body: it is a psychophysical unity, a man. Within the experience of this man is to be discerned a sphere of ownness - an incarnate psyche (C.M. 131). But this incarnation is in Husserl's view "transcendently secondary": the reduction to the sphere of ownness was performed within the transcendental attitude, and discovered, therefore the manner in which the transcendental ego himself experiences (C.M. 130-131). Our attention was drawn to the body not as a constituted object, but as a constituting organ of experience. Transcendental subjectivity is incarnate: this does not mean that the ego and the body are linked as co-ordinate realities, but rather that the primordial body is essentially an experiencing body. By means of its incarnation, consciousness is enabled to assimilate the apparent transcendent facticity of sensation to its own operation.

We have thus returned to the results of our first reflections on

11. Ricoeur, "Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", pp. 119-120.
12. This is perhaps one of the most intensely problematical areas of Husserl's work. What is required is a notion of the body as constituting, rather than as constituted. See Landgrebe, "Konstitutionslehre"; cf. also Levinas, "Intentionalité et sensation".
subjectivity in general; at the same time we are led to a positive characterization of primordial experience. The acts of the own body, inasmuch as it is a subjective body, are experiences, and therefore have their place in immanent time. The totality of actual and possible consciousness is the concrete ego, the product of the self-transcending movement of bodily consciousness is the own nature, or that stratum of the objective world that is bodily accessible, and is potentially strictly presented (C.M. §47). By means of the primordial reduction, we have arrived at

...a Nature (including an animate organism [Leiblichkeit]) that is constituted, to be sure, as a unity of spatial objects "transcending" the stream of subjective processes, yet constituted as merely a multiplicity of objects of possible experience - this experience being purely my own life, and what is experienced in this experience being nothing more than a synthetic unity inseparable from this life and its potentialities (C.M. 134-135).

Primordial nature is that which transcends the body by virtue of the body's own sensory and kinesthetic power. Now, we seek the origin of that higher-order transcendency that escapes the body's potential appropriation: the world that is accessible to all. Primordial nature is the "founding stratum" of this transcendency, for "I obviously cannot have the 'alien' or 'other' as experience, and therefore cannot have the sense 'Objective world' as an experiential sense, without having this [scil. own] stratum in actual experience" (C.M. 127). How the own founds the intersubjective remains yet to be explained.

Before proceeding we might first consider an objection to Husserl's proposed primordial reduction. John Sallis suggests that it is an
attempt to recover the constitution of the alter ego as purely the ego's own activity; and that the reduction is impossible, for there is no level of consciousness from which any contribution by other subjectivity is absent. He argues that total reflection, if possible, would reveal a monad that is itself responsible for all that is objective for it; that is, nothing external can impinge upon the reflected monadic consciousness, for reflection — when total — would discover the conditions of the externality, and thus appropriate it as a constituted product. Now a total reflection on the consciousness relating to the Other can have only one of two results: either reflection discovers within the reflected consciousness the "mark" of an external Other, himself, as is the first, a complete, self-contained conscious totality, a windowless monad; or it discovers within the reflected subject the full ontological relation between self and Other — and by this discovery it will make the reflected subject alone responsible for intersubjectivity. The first is specious because it makes it inconceivable that there be any reciprocal dependency between self and Other; the second because it denies the autonomy of the Other.

This dilemma arises, Sallis further argues, because it is too easily assumed that total reflection is possible; and that the reflected ego is absolutely responsible for all that is objective for him. This assumption logically leads to an account of the Other utterly incompatible with the unreflected givenness of the Other. Husserl's own effort at a primordial reduction must therefore be shown to be impossible, by showing

13. Sallis, "Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?"
15. Ibid, p. 314. Note the similarity to Husserl's polemical alternatives.
that there is no level of conscious activity that is purely the ego's own, and that the alter ego is always already there, involved in the ego's conscious activity. There can then be no total reflection on conscious life, for the reflecting subject is not alone responsible for his own activity. Only thus can the peculiar nature of the transcendence and the immanence of the Other be correctly analysed.

The critic accordingly claims that the Other is involved in the total fabric of conscious life:

The result of the reflective regress which forms the first and necessarily anticipatory stage of the project of a second reflection is that the other is always already implicated even at the most primordial levels of constitutive activity and that, consequently, it is impossible to delineate a coherent sphere of ownness as constitutive origin of intersubjectivity. My own reflectively re-enacted activity proves to be always operative within and inseparable from a context of already constituted meanings of which I am decidedly not the originator; it proves to be such as to have always already taken for granted elements which could not have originated from my own resources. There are always meanings, taken up into my own constitutive activity, which bear a reference to a constitutive activity other than my own, and this presupposed reference to another is the limit which reflection encounters when it seeks to gain a sphere of ownness from which to exhibit the constitution of intersubjectivity.

Reflection reveals, then, an ego that is essentially situated among others, and that constitutes the world only as thus situated. The fundamental levels of constitution are therefore not recoverable by reflection; or, in other words, the attempt to reach a level of pure self-activity reveals a subjectivity already tainted by reference to another.

The results of this regress are to be tested by a movement back from the discovered origins to that which is putatively originated. The

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16 Sallis, "Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?", pp. 314-316.
17 Ibid, p. 320.
purpose of Sallis's first reflection was to discover the constitutive origins of the intersubjective world. The result was that the sense "intersubjectively accessible" is not originated by the pure constitution of a single ego - for no level of consciousness is pure of others' impinging activity - but by a consciousness already situated among its fellows. This discovery is tested by a return to the higher constituted levels, that is, by a reflective constitution; it is confirmed when it is shown that the product of the reflective constitution is identical with the theme of the original project.18

Sallis illustrates this with the example of a chair, a distinctively cultural object. He correctly points out that one does not "drape" a cultural meaning upon an object that in itself is merely physical. Rather, one sees the chair in "an atmosphere of humanity", and feels in it the "virtual presence" of the Other.19 The cultural object is not what it is in abstraction from its being objective for others. And its experiential sense, accessible to all, is not superadded to its physical presentation: the physical structure and the cultural significance condition each other, and are inseparable. Hence - if I correctly interpret the objection - there is no warrant for the claim that the experiential sense, object of primordial nature, is constitutively prior to the sense, accessible to all, because the two are given inseparably together in unreflected experience. But for this reason the view that the Other functions even at the most fundamental levels of the ego's consciousness is consistent with unreflected

experience.

This is a weighty objection to Husserl's entire effort, especially in view of the fact that it is unreflected life that Husserl wishes to understand; but there is reason to believe that it is not to the point. There is first the argument ad hominem that it is not plausible that Husserl was unaware of the problems the critic adduces. Indeed, the two alternative misinterpretations of intersubjectivity which he rejects closely resemble the two positions - transcendental realism and the naive idealism it opposes - with which Husserl introduces the problem. The two apparently conflicting moments of the experience of the Other which - according to my interpretation - Husserl evokes in his introduction to the problem, and takes as his own disiderata, become the motives of a rejection of Husserl. It is hardly believable that the introduction is an agonistic device; one would naturally expect Husserl to interpret the consciousness of the Other in light of the requirements he himself adduces. Yet the critic seems not to entertain this possibility: he first gives an account of total reflection in general; he then claims that Husserl's primordial reduction is an attempt at total reflection, and that as such it necessarily results in a mistaken analysis of the problem. The critical appeal to necessity too easily disposes of any 20.

20. In fairness to Sallis, his main intent is not to criticize Husserl, but to examine whether total reflection is possible. He argues that it is not, because own consciousness is always already "situated" among others. The problem of intersubjectivity and the problem of reflection are therefore reciprocal. (Sallis, "Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?" pp. 314-316). My concern has not been with this, his positive point, but with his critical claims. But inasmuch as his thesis is grounded in his criticism, it is in question here.
need to examine the philosopher's own views on the matter. Closer examination reveals, I believe, that although primordial experience is indeed free of another's activity, there can be constituted within it a movement to a genuine Other. But this must be dealt with later.

Second, Sallis willingly accepts that the Other's cogito is inaccessible to the ego: 'The presence of another person to himself in inherently inaccessible, and, consequently, to the extent that the other is nothing more than a pure presence to himself, he is utterly inaccessible'\textsuperscript{21}. The Other is present not "in himself" but in his situation in the world. Both self and Other are "engaged in the world" - the same world, let us note - and in virtue of this shared engagement, the Other can become present: he "stands out from his situation"\textsuperscript{22}. But he is always more than his engagement: "his presence in such a (scil. "existential") project always points beyond itself to an absence, to an interiority which is simply inaccessible \textsuperscript{23}.

Now as description this is acceptable; but it cannot count as analysis because it omits mention of several important problems. If indeed the Other's cogito is inaccessible, then there is a serious problem of how the cogitatum of that cogito can be identical with that of the ego's. Sallis seems merely to accept the identity as given, whereas Husserl attempts to analyse it. Sallis's own effort essentially

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, p. 326.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, p. 327.
depends on the notion of "the world" as identical for all - yet he does not raise the question of how it is identical. Further, he does not examine the relationship between the Other's situation as he himself sees it and his situation as the ego sees it: yet this situation must mediate the ego's consciousness of the Other.

Hence, Sallis's attempt to subvert the primordial reduction subverts several legitimate questions that Husserl raises. Moreover, Husserl exhibits more clearly than his critic the systematic connection between the "presence" and the "absence" of the Other: they appear as mutually conditioning moments of the Other's being for the ego, not, as in Sallis's work, as two accidents.

But even though, in the end, I reject Sallis's objections, I believe that he has raised serious and fundamental questions. The reduction to the sphere of ownness is highly problematical, and for the reasons he gives. Moreover, he very cogently expresses the unique transcendency of the Other - even though he misconstrues Husserl's appreciation of it. But the fact remains that he leaves too many loose ends.

Therefore, let us return to Husserl's own analysis of the problem; and in so doing, attempt the second, "confirming" reflection, the reflective constitution of the Other (as Sallis, not Husserl, suggests).

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Let us first recapitulate the doctrine of the primordial sphere. The reduction to the sphere of ownness brings to prominence the body as subjective with respect to its environment. The body is the centre of the primordial sphere, and in that sense coterminous with it: it is the "Here" with respect to which all else is "There" (C.M. §53). The body is not an object for the primordially reduced ego, but is its organ and power of experiencing, its incarnation in its own world. The reduction, then, serves to make the body stand out with its proper ontological status, free of naturalistic interpretation.

The primordial sphere is revealed by abstraction from other subjectivity, but, once attained, it is seen to be a level of concrete experience. It is a nature, a passivity, a field of sensation within which consciousness can produce itself. This is perhaps best expressed by Ricoeur:

Even if this experience is not immediate, still, to the extent that it results from an abstraction and remains derivative from an explication or from an interpretation, it is a positive experience; ownness is not defined here in negative terms simply as non-alien. To grasp the owned body, owned nature, and the whole-ownness sphere as an autonomous positive totality means to provide the subsequent constitution of the Other with an antecedent foundation. This primordial sphere must be understood to be at once the terminus of a purification and the departure point for a constitutional performance. It is a something pre-given which, by reason of its charge of potentiality and the stretch of its horizons, has the density of an I am which always precedes the I think. In this way all that one can say against the immediacy of this experience pleads in favour of its fullness. All of this potential, the ballast of the actual, gives breadth to the experience of the primordial and the owned. This endless coming

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to awareness of the "owned" penetrates a life whose wealth exceed reflection. Thus, the reduction to the ownness sphere, far from impoverishing experience, leads it from the cogito to the sum and fulfills the promise, expressed in the Fourth Meditation, of an egology which would set up the ego as a monad. By way of an astonishing detour, the transcendental, once reduced, reveals being (être) as superabundant.

The primordial reduction, then, is not an artificial move, designed to refute the solipsistic objection, but is an attempt to assimilate any proposed real and transcendent given (sensation) to the power of consciousness by inserting subjectivity at the very heart of what would transcend it. This insertion, moreover, is not made by arbitrary fiat, but is discovered by reflection on consciousness itself. Incarnate subjectivity is capable of taking nature as its object because it is in nature; nature is intentionally oriented around it because it is physically at the centre of nature.

So the criticism still impresses itself: how can a subjectivity conceived as so comprehensive and inclusive recognize another subjectivity? Indeed the problem is quite acute: if each experience is not by itself individual, but is the articulation of an inaccessible spontaneity, and if each experience takes place in the horizon of protention and retention, and essentially has its place in personal historicity, then it is absolutely impossible to be conscious of another's experience, for it would then be assimilated to one's own stream of consciousness, and the distinction between self and other would be lost:

Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there before us "in person". On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same (C.M. 139).

Was Husserl perhaps defined the privacy of subjectivity - the originality of experience - such that any conceivable Other would be inaccessibly transcendent to experience? Can such a consciousness anywhere see its like?

The Other is there "in person", but his conscious life itself is not experienced. This seems to be quite a paradox. It can be overcome only by a mediation of the Intentionality such that there is more to the experienced Other than is strictly presented, and that this "more" is his conscious life in its originality for him. The Other's body is seen to be animate by means of an "analogizing apprehension" or an "appreceptive transfer" of sense from the own to the other body. The Other's body, then, is present, and his conscious life is co-present or appresent as its complement (C.M. 139-140).

Now this sort of apperception - whereby a newly encountered object acquires an already familiar sense - is quite a common event. Whenever a thing is "noticeingly grasped" as having a certain objective sense; whenever, that is, the object is already there or pregiven (vorgegeben)²⁷

²⁷. In the passage now under discussion (C.M. 141), Cairns translates "vorgegeben" as "given beforehand" and "already given".
such that its objective sense is already constituted and need only be noticed, consciousness is referred back to a "primal instituting" of the sense, to the first experience in which a similar object was given, and in which, therefore, the sense was first constituted. For example, a child for the first time understands what scissors are, he grasps their use. Thereafter, whenever he sees a similar object, he will transfer this acquired sense to it, and see it as a pair of scissors. This he can do straightway, without explicit recollection and comparison. That is, the noticing grasp cannot be resolved into several separate acts, such as: first seeing the physical object; then comparing it with objects seen before, and noticing that it is similar to one of them; and finally reasoning that since it is physically similar to one, it must have a similar function. The objective sense "scissors" is an abiding acquisition, and is therefore pregiven, and need only be noticed, not again constituted (C.M. 141).28

Now in the case that concerns us, the objective sense is "alter ego", and that which is presented is the Other's body; the transfer of sense, then, is from the own to the other body. This is a special case of apperceptive transfer, which Husserl calls "pairing" (Paarung). The Other's body is similar to the ego's own, and acquires, when the similarity is noticed, the sense animate, by an associative pairing (C.M. §51):

In that case of association and apperception which particularly interests us - namely apperception of the alter ego by the

28. For the sake of precision, we might note that the "primal instituting" is not a final and unitary experience: obviously, any objective sense is continuously enriched or generated by several experiences. Husserl speaks as if the institution is a unitary experience, I believe, only for the sake of clarity and simplicity.
ego - pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism. Now in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body "similar" to mine - that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine - it seems clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism (C.M. 143).

The association of pairing occurs when two distinct objects are presented within a single consciousness such that their givenness founds a "unity of similarity"; as a result of the pairing, each acquires the other's objective sense. In the present case, the ego's body is always present; and when another's becomes present, being similar, it is straightway paired with the ego's, and acquires from it the sense "living" (C.M. 142).

But this process is significantly different from the transfer of sense from one pair of scissors to another. In that case there was no intrinsically first exemplar, but here there is - the own body. The own life is the intrinsically first, and indeed is the only one that is originally experienced. The Other is paired essentially with the self: "Alter' signifies alter ego. And the ego involved here is I myself, constituted within my primordial ownness..." (C.M. 140). But there is no possible iteration of the sense living as the ego experiences it in its originality; the ego does not live the Other's experiences. Therefore, pairing is not just a transfer of the sense "living" simpliciter from oneself to another; rather, it constitutes a new and unique sense -
other life - and institutes an original intentionality specific to this objective sense. In the association of pairing, both the own and the other body are present together, whereas in a transfer of sense they are present successively. Therefore, pairing is itself a constitutive process, and not simply a reference back to an instituting experience of another exemplar of life (the own body), for to apperceive another life is not to live it as one's own.

Now the notion of similarity, upon which this business of pairing is so heavily dependent, is quite extraordinary, and Husserl's critics have not been shy to point out its apparent implausibility. Schütz argues that the "ontological dimensions" of the own and of the other body are radically different. Whereas the own body is given in "internal perception" as an organ, the other body is given in "external perception". Each "stands out" in a fundamentally different way, and accordingly they could hardly be more dissimilar.

29. "If we attempt to indicate the peculiar nature of that analogizing apprehension whereby a body within my primordial sphere, being similar to my own animate body, becomes apprehended as likewise an animate organism, we encounter: first, the circumstance that here the primally institutive original is always livingly present, and the primal instituting itself is therefore always going on in a livingly effective manner; secondly, the peculiarity we already know to be necessary, namely that what is represented by virtue of the aforesaid analogizing can never attain actual presence, never become an object of perception proper. Closely connected with the first peculiarity is the circumstance that ego and alter ego are always and necessarily given in an original "pairing"" (C.M. 141-142).

30. Schütz, "Problem der transzendenten Intersubjektivität", pp. 89-91 / 61-64. Schütz refers his positive point about the difference in the ways the own and the other body are presented to Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.
The criticism can be expressed in rather different terms, in terms that Husserl himself uses. The own body is essentially at the centre of primordial nature, and orients all other things around it. The own body defines "Here", whereas the Other's body is essentially "There". Now, of course, the ego can convert any There into a Here, and thus change the perspective in which he sees any object (C.M. §53). But clearly, his Here never becomes a There for him, and the Other's body cannot become Here. The two bodies, then, have radically different ways of appearing - and, indeed, not accidentally, but because of the very structure of primordial space. The Other's body is like any other of the primordial sphere - a part of the ego's own essence (C.M. 139) - and the ego has infinite possible perspectives on it: he can walk around it. But he cannot walk around his own body. So there indeed seems to be no perceptual similarity that could found the transfer of the sense living to the other body. The reverse is more likely: the transfer of sense would found the perception of similarity.

The objection is quite persuasive, especially in view of the fact that Husserl, rather clearly speaks as if he has an image of the body in mind. In one passage, he acknowledges the present problem, but solves it somewhat too quickly:

31. But cp. Barbara Wine Morriston, Husserl on Other Minds (Northwestern University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1974). Morriston notes the difficulty and suggests that in memory one often sees one's actions from the point of view of a spectator (p. 52). But this is no use here, for reasons she herself adduces, but does not expand upon: one is not born with a body image, but acquires it (pp. 52-53). And the acquisition must somehow involve the recognition of Others.
[The] manner of appearance [of the Other's body] does not become paired in a direct association with the manner of appearance actually belonging at the time to my animate organism (in the mode Here); rather it awakens reproducitively another, an immediately similar appearance included in the system constitutive of my animate organism as a body in space. It brings to mind the way my body would look "if I were there" (C.M. 146).

Husserl seems rather definitely to interpret pairing as an association of body images. But in order to do so he must invoke the image of the own body, which he presumes to be "similar" to the primordial experience of the body, which itself is not a (perspectival) image. But he omits an account of how one arrives at this image and of how it is known to be "similar" to the primordial presentation of the body. Are we therefore to conclude that the business of pairing is inconsequent?

There is surely room to doubt that the objection is definitive. The primordial experience of the body — with which Husserl's analysis began — is, again, not a representation or image. The notion of a representation appeared on the scene rather suddenly in the effort to interpret the association of pairing: is it perhaps an intruder — Husserl's text notwithstanding? The own primordial body is a sensory and kinaesthetic power of access to the world, and has its integrity and unity as such a power, not as a synthesis of perspectives. Perhaps we can reinterpret

32. He does make some mention of this issue in a previous passage (C.M. I28), but without solving the full range of problems. Incidentally, he quite clearly claims in the Ideen II that there is no image of the own body prior to the recognition of the Other (p. 161). Why now should he change his view?
pairing such that this is the motive similarity. Thus: the Other's body is not perceived to be inert (as are natural objects) but to be organic. It interacts with objects around by appropriating or manipulating them. It touches and grasps objects, or turns its eyes to them, it walks (C.M. 148). Surely then it can be seen to be a functioning organism, a living body. Perhaps we need only focus on the right point of similarity.

It is not hard to see that this, too, is unsatisfactory: it simply repeats what we already knew. Certainly, the ego sees the Other's body forthwith to be animate. We only translate this fact when we say that the other body is seen to manipulate and to appropriate objects. But we still do not know how or why it should occur to the ego to construe the impact of the Other's hand upon the stone to be an intended act, thus fundamentally different from the impact of one stone on another. We knew to begin with that one object stands out from the others as animate: it will not do to repeat this, we must ask how and why. The proffered explanation begs the question.

Is there perhaps another error of interpretation? It has been argued that the Other is mediately present, or appresent, and that the body, as the organ of subjectivity, is the vehicle of mediation. This much is not very problematical. In interpreting this mediation, it was suggested that the Other's body - or that object which is to become the Other's body - enters the perceptual field and manipulates or appropriates objects of the primordial sphere, the ego's own objects. This gives pause: "manipulate" and "appropriate" do not yet make sense. The argument is vitiated perhaps.
by the intrusion of another unanticipated term: the object that is presumed to be "appropriated". When this object becomes the mediator of the transfer of sense, the body suddenly becomes impotent. So let us exclude this, too: the argument so far has justified nothing but the primordial body as the mediating link between self and Other.

Recall the introductory desiderata of the problem of the Other: on the one hand, he is utterly transcendent, or autonomous; and on the other, the evidence of the alien subjectivity is immanent in the own conscious life - or there is no evidence. These have the negative effect of refuting both the naive idealist attempt to reduce the Other to a function of the ego's constitutive activity, and the realist claim that the Other that the ego experiences is only a sign of the Other in and for himself. Our present responsibility is to show their positive effect.

The evidence of the Other is to be found in the own conscious life: the alien subjectivity is incarnate, and the Other's body stands in the own primordial sphere, and the Other is there "in person". The Other is autonomous: the alien body is a power, and exhibits its power in pairing, but the Other's life is not experienced in its originality by the self. Hence, the alter ego must express himself within the own conscious life. Pairing is the encounter of two subjectivities, of two bodies. The relationship is such that both terms are at once active and passive: the ego recognizes - constitutes - the Other as a subjectivity, and reciprocally the Other exercises his power as a subject on the self. These reciprocally active and passive moments are, so to speak, logically simultaneous. In order to emphasize this bilateral
essence of the paired relationship, I shall use the expression "encounter" with the Other, rather than the perhaps more usual term "recognition" of the Other, which, in its usual acceptation, would stress the ego's activity at the cost of the Other's.

The intent of this interpretation of the issue can be made clearer by briefly considering a very similar account offered by Theunissen. All that encounter involves he attempts to accommodate in a process of "Veränderung" (becoming other)\textsuperscript{33}. Veränderung has two senses: 'becoming something other (Zu-etwas-Anderem werden); and becoming someone other (Zu-einem-Anderem werden). The former is the incarnation of consciousness, and further the construal of one's body to be one among other natural bodies\textsuperscript{34}; the latter is a becoming one among other subjects\textsuperscript{35}. According to Theunissen, it is by virtue of seeing oneself as one among many, and thus being "Jedermann" - everyman - that one actually experiences the world as there for everyman, and that one is a member, with one's fellows, of a community\textsuperscript{36}.

Now this movement, this ordering of oneself as one among others involves both an activity on the part of the subject, and a passivity with respect to the Other, a "Depotenzierung" by him\textsuperscript{37}. The movement is thus resolved into two moments, and indeed into two successive moments.

\textsuperscript{34} Cp. C.M. §45; and Ricour, "Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", p. 125.
\textsuperscript{35} Theunissen, Der Andere, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, pp. 93-94.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, P. 85.
The ego first, by empathy (Empfindung) assumes (sich versetzen; hineinfühlten) the standpoint of the Other, he so modifies himself in phantasy as to make the Other's motives his own quasi-motives; he understands the Other, the active moment. The passive moment: the Other as a subjectivity of his own accord experiences the ego, who thereby is an Other for his Other: recognizing this, the ego sees himself as one among many.

This seems to be an accurate interpretation of Husserl's views, and is certainly most interesting. Two points are especially interesting: The double sense of Veränderung points out the essential relationship between the incarnation of subjectivity and the encounter with the Other. Perhaps more importantly, Theunissen's interpretation makes it clear that the intersubjective accessibility of the objective world is conceivable as an experiential sense only along with a radical transformation of the cogito. The two points are in a sense only one, for the required transformation is a Veränderung, a becoming one among others.

But there is, I believe, a serious logical problem in the account: Can the two moments — activity and passivity — be logically successive, or must they be simultaneous? The question bears thus upon the present issue: is empathy possible as an activity of the ego, or must it involve an essential passivity; that is, is the recognition of the Other's autonomous spontaneity possible as an activity on the ego's part alone? Certainly, the ego is not the source of the Other's

spontaneity: and this must be reflected in his act of recognizing the Other. The recognition, that is, must involve the Other's autonomous activity, and the ego's receptivity to it, for otherwise he could succeed only in recognizing his own product. The passivity, then, can not supervene upon the activity, but must be an element of it.

But by what means can such a relationship be accomplished? Surely by means of the embodiment of consciousness. The own body is a power of experiencing, and as such intentionally orients the entire natural (or primordial) world about it: it appropriates this world as its own. Now, that object which is to be for the ego the other living body stands within the own primordial sphere (C.M. 143). It too is an incarnate subjectivity — but neither ego nor alter ego yet knows this, and hence they are not yet ego and alter ego. How do they come to know it? Each body must act as a living body upon the other, each must exhibit to the other its life. The Other that is to be encountered must impinge upon the ego, or it is not the Other that the ego encounters.

Ricoeur suggests that "[Husserl's] analysis is much less oriented toward the pulsing, carnal, even sexual sense of the paired formation than toward its logical sense." This is evidently true, at least of the Ideen II and the Cartesian Meditations. But the logical sense, at its fundamental levels, is a carnal sense. In the logical sense, as Husserl himself rightly insists, the Other is an Other only if he is an autonomous subjectivity: but the autonomy must

be his. That is, the alien spontaneity must impinge upon the own in the encounter; the other body is living only when it proves itself to live.

Husserl seems in some passages to point to just such a carnal relationship:

The first determinate content of the appresentation of the Other obviously must be formed by the understanding of the other's organism and specifically organismal conduct: the understanding of the members as hands groping or functioning in pushing, as feet functioning in walking, as eyes functioning in seeing, and so forth. With this the Ego at first is determined only as governing thus somatically and, in a familiar manner, proves himself continually, so far as the whole stylistic form of the sensible processes manifest to me primordially must correspond to the form whose type is familiar to me from my own organismal governing \( \text{leibliches Walten} \) (C.M. 148).

Here, clearly, he has a pairing of function with function, of organ with organ, in mind. At other points, however, he seems to have images in mind. (For example: "[The other body's manner of appearance] brings to mind the way my body would look if I were there" (C.M. 147).) The clear meaning of both passages is that the two bodies stand off at a distance from each other. The intention of the first quoted is to point out that even at this distance, the ego recognizes not a visual, but a functional similarity. But the recognition is still the ego's own thesis, does not accord the alien subjectivity its rights. It does not lead the own consciousness to the radical self-transcendency that consciousness of the Other involves.

What is wanting is the encounter of the bodies as the vehicles of spontaneity and experience. Two primordial bodies are paired: any talk of similarity is inconsequent.
The foundational relationship is carnal, and involves not so much thetic consciousness as sensibility. The other body stands in the own primordial sphere: the own body appropriates it as a natural body, as part of its essence like any other natural body (cp. C.M. 149-150). But the alien body, as an independent subjectivity, resists this, the power of the own consciousness. Reciprocally, the own body stands in the alien primordial sphere, and is appropriated to it; but it, too, is recalcitrant to the appropriation. The ego loses his primordial sphere - that horizon of objects unified by his own body - not by his own decision, but by the entrance into it of an alien subjectivity that itself imposes a unity on it: henceforth, the environment is a horizon of objects accessible to all. The first object to be lost is the own body.

The basic reciprocity of the intersubjective relationship, and indeed the experiential sense, accessible to all, are established at the instant of encounter - or not at all. The encounter is with an independent subjectivity as such. The encounter takes its motive power

40. Cp. Hegel: "Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only in so far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can be brought about only by means of both." G.W.F. Hegel, Phénoméno

logie des Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 142. Translated: The Phenomenology of Mind, trans., J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 230. Hegel's intent is to show how the autonomy of the Other - the objective term of recognition - functions within the recognition itself. Thus: "The first (scil., in the vocabulary of this essay: the ego) does not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic primarily of the object of desire, but, as an object existing independently for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything of its own behoof, if that object does not per se do what the first does to it" (ibid.). This becomes especially clear in the reciprocal proof of independence in the fight for recognition (ibid., pp. 141-156/229-240).
from the alien subject's proving himself to be what he is. It is
carnal - sexual or violent - and finds its motive in the Other's
taking as his what was most the ego's own.

In its positive interpretation, the encounter results in a
radical transformation of consciousness. An object was the transcendent
unity of infinite possible experiences: it now becomes an intersubjectively accessible object. The whole movement turns on the encounter of
the bodies, the first objects that are the same for all (C.M.153).

Or, as Merleau-Ponty expresses it:

I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain
forms of behaviour and a certain world, and I am given to
myself merely as a certain hold on the world: now, it is
precisely my body which perceives the body of another person,
and discovers in that body a miraculous prolongation of my
own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world.
Henceforth, as the parts of my body, together comprise a
system, so my body and the other person's are one whole,
two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous
existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.

The encounter, then, is not simply the aesthetic recognition of the Other,
but is a new animation of the own and the alien bodies.

It is here not possible for me to analyse this issue in greater
detail and depth. Clearly, further reflection would specify the notion
of "pairing" in a way not fully anticipated in the Cartesian Meditations.
Similarity in particular would play a very different role. The other
subject is indeed in essential respects "similar" to the self; but precisely
to the extent that he is similar, he draws the self out of himself: but
something that is only similar cannot do this. The paired formation is

not a juxtaposition of like with like, where each could subsist without the other; rather, in the pairing, ego and alter ego form a systematic whole, such that each finds in the other what is his, but not fully his: that is, theirs.

Let us return to Husserl's own exposition of pairing; I shall indicate in passing how it differs from my proposed redefinition. The Other's body enters the primordial sphere, and is seen to be a living, experiencing body. The ego sees that the Other experiences objects of the own environment, that he is at the centre of an environment. With this apperception of the Other as himself an experiencing subject, as the defining centre of an environment made up of objects identical with the objects making up the ego's own, the ego's own primordial sphere fuses with the Other's to form one common, objective world: of this, the primordial sphere is but an appearance (C.M. §55). Each, of course, must do this or his own account alone.

But against this Schütz argues:

...all of this still does not yield a transcendental community unless we were to define community in such a way that, contrary to meaningful usage, there would be a community for me, and one for you, without the two necessarily coinciding. It is as if Husserl's were a doctrine of a multiplicity of solipsistic communities. Schütz is certainly right to interpret Husserl to mean that one member of the pair cannot constitute the relationship on the part of another; each must do this for himself alone. But this is not

42. Schütz, "Problem der Transzendentalen Intersubjektivität", p.100/76.
a dogmatic error, but a problem of the issue itself. The members of
the community are monads, absolute individuals (C.M. 962). The ego
does not experience the Other's perspective on the world (C.M. 139).
But this means simply: I cannot look through your eyes, nor you through
mine. The own and the alien primordial spheres are intentionally
identified as appearances of one objective world: but this identity
cannot be fulfilled for the ego in evident intuition of the alien
primordial sphere. This identity can none-the-less be constituted as
an intentional sense. What fuller "coincidence" can Schütt demand? None
is even conceivable: for if the ego could verify the posited identity of
the primordial spheres in an intuition of the Other's, then the distinction
between self and Other would be lost. But communalization cannot be at
the expense of independence.

Beyond the constitution of an objective world, the constitution
of the alter ego also involves an equalization of the self with the Other,
that is, the recognition that he himself is an Other for his Other:

If, with my understanding of someone else, I penetrate
more deeply into him, into his horizon of ownness, I
shall soon run into the fact that, just as his animate
organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate
organism lies in his field of perception and that, in
general, he experiences me forthwith as an Other for
him, just as I experience him as my Other (C.M. 158)43.

The community is thus a community of equals, all equally charged with the
constitution of the objective world and of the community.

According to Husserl, after the analysis of this first level of

43. As I have already noted, this seems to me not to be a further understand-
ing of the Other, but already contained in the first encounter, requiring only to be drawn out.
communication, the higher levels "offer relatively minor difficulties" (C.M. 157). But surely some clarifications are still necessary. Only the foundational principles governing the interaction of self and Other have so far been examined: the interaction itself remains to be clarified. Moreover, by means of the constitution of the alter ego, primordial experience is radically transformed, and a new way of self-transcendence is created: but the detailed sense of this self-transcendence remains to be clarified. These questions form the topics of the next chapter.
Chapter III
The Concept of Personality

I have so far offered an interpretation of Husserl's analysis of the constitution of the sense "Other". According to his view, this sense arises from a "pairing" of the own body with the alien body. The Other, inasmuch as he is an intentionally and temporally self-articulating subjectivity, spontaneous in both aspects, is not possibly strictly presented, but is appresent, or also there along with his body, which is present to the ego. More strictly, the alien body is identical with an object that appears in primordial experience, but this identity cannot be fulfilled in original experience of the Other's life. The intentionality relating to other subjectivity does not take on or "live" the alien spontaneity, but rather synthesizes as identical the intentional product of the own with that of the other spontaneity, which last is thus appresent to the ego. By this means, the own and the alien environments are identified as appearances of a common objective world. The intentionality relating self and Other, then, is mediated by the respective animate bodies and at higher levels by objects of the common world. There is no direct access to the Other's subjectivity in itself or for him, but only a quasi-knowledge of it.

My interpretation is slightly complicated by an insistence that the rights of the Other be respected. It is not sufficient to this end simply that the ego recognize the Other. Rather, the relationship is reciprocal, and the ego's act of recognition is possible only together with the Other's act of encroaching upon the own sphere: the Other must, so to speak, declare himself to the ego. Though by itself this is a simple
enough matter, it has far-reaching consequences.

It might now seem that we are ready to expand on other issues, and in particular on the question of the so-called higher level mediation of the relationship between ego and alter ego, which occurs within what Husserl calls in the Ideen II the "personalistic" (personalistisch) or "spiritual" (geistig) world, or in the Cartesian Meditations the "cultural world", a world made up of objects common to ego and alter ego, intended in respect of their being common, and which thereby serve to mediate the intentionality relating self and Other. Spiritual objects are such things as the state, the church, symbols of sovereignty, books, and the like, and, inasmuch as they are intersubjectively accessible, even physical objects (Id. II, 182, 194). The "cultural world" is "accessible to all", and is "a world having human significance". It can be shared in a more or less definite way - the community can be loose or tight - but by being shared it makes possible social acts, that is, acts of consciousness directed to another (C.M. 160; cp. 159), which are performed with the intention of being understood (Id. II, 194).

Using an instructive analogy, we can speak of the cultural world as the place where members of a community interact: in respect of their interaction, their environment is made up of higher-level objectivities. For example, the environment of philosophical disputants is, in a sense, a room containing tables and chairs, apprehended as naturally existing and as useful. But in another sense, that specific to what they are now doing, it is, perhaps, the heritage of Husserlian thought, a range of philosophical problems, and the like. They know
themselves to look at and to move among not so much tables and chairs as such issues as intentionality, and the like. They thereby come to live in a world that is not merely natural—physically accessible—but in a spiritual world, the product of their own interaction.

This line of thought may well be enticing, but many complications and unexamined assumptions demand attention. There is a considerable gap in our reflections between the ego's very basic encounter with the Other and his living with him in a cultural world. It has been claimed that the encounter with the Other is not just a one-sided recognition on the part of the ego, but involves the Other's own activity of impinging upon the ego. But how this is to be worked out in detail is yet unknown. Yet presumably it is this reciprocity between self and Other—the interaction—that constitutes the spiritual world, and upon this we must more properly focus our attention.

Let us try to justify this focus further. Consider the singular nature of the Other: as an intended object, it takes its unity from the intending ego; but as a subjectivity, it is the autonomous source of its own unity. This involves a great prima facie difficulty: is it not perfectly conceivable that the intended Other is an invention of the intending, a misinterpretation of the alien subjectivity as it is for itself? Bearing even lightly upon the radical transcendence of the

1. In Husserl's usage, the concepts "ego" and "environment" are essentially related. The environment is that range of objectivity specified by the ego's intentionality, or the horizon of objects as they are intended. See Ideen II.§50: "The Ego as Centre of an Environment." ("Das Ich als Mittelpunkt einer Umwelt").
alter ego, it is arguable that the Other for the ego is at best a continuous deformation of the Other in himself; that the two may be exactly parallel, but that their identity is at best empty, although necessarily, posited. Again, it is arguable that their respective primordial environments, so easily fused a few pages ago, are not identical at all, but are at best but continuous deformations of each other. The realist objection again presents itself, here in the form of the ordinary, though perhaps rather romantic notion that one never knows what another is "really" like, one never knows what an author "really" meant to express, and so on.

It is not hard to see that this apparently sceptical contradiction can be fruitfully assimilated by the concept of encounter, which by its very nature takes the autonomy of the alien subjectivity as a motive factor. But if this is to be fruitful, then the notion of the cultural world must be carefully interpreted in the light of the notion of encounter, such that an object is not simply common to ego and alter ego, but is intended by the ego precisely as an expression of the Other's irreducible spontaneity.

Another approach yields the same sort of difficulty. The encounter with the Other is still quite abstract: the Other is "some" alien subjectivity, but the account so far offered does not show how it is determinate for the ego. Yet, as reflection on ordinary life shows, one encounters — speaks to, works with — not an indefinite other subject, but an individual personality.

This devolves also on the intentionality relating to a cultural world. The cultural world is not the product of any private intentionality,
but of the community, or more specifically, of the interaction of its members; and as such it is quite determinate, consisting of a more or less definite legal system, literary tradition, and so on. But the determinacy of the intersubjectively accessible world would seem to be essentially related to the determinacy of the intersubjective access.

So again, we cannot simply claim that the cultural world is "intersubjectively accessible", and without further ado describe it, for here we are still faced with an apparently sceptical contradiction. If indeed the Other's subjectivity is not possibly the ego's own - if, more prosaically, I cannot look through your eyes nor you through mine - then how is an object the same for all? Taking the sceptical interpretation of the inaccessibility of the Other only a little farther, it can be argued that the community is impossible: for how can the ego go about living in community with another who is in his very being inaccessible, inaccessible even in respect of his sharing what exists only in the sharing? Must we bizarrely admit that there are as many communities as men, and that each invents his own for himself alone? Or must we as strangely attempt to reduce alien subjectivity to something that is not so radically private? Or again, must we search for an approximate indicator of the Other's private life? But these measures would only palliate an essential solipsism, for the intended Other would not be a genuine alien subject, or, he would not be a subject in the same respect that he is an intended object.

2. Again, Schütz believes this to be the ineluctable consequence of Husserl's position. See Schütz, "Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl", p. 106/76.
Husserl holds that there is no original experience of the Other's conscious life (C.M.139) yet that the Other is himself there in person, and that the ego does not experience a mere sign or image of the Other (C.M.151). The experience of the Other is, then, original: that is, the intended object is the thing itself, and there is no real object or thing in itself behind it, with respect to which the experience would be valid or invalid. In light of the doctrine of the inaccessibility of the Other, and of the sceptical interpretation to which it lends itself, this is a difficult view to maintain, but the alternative is solipsism.

The ultimate intent of this chapter, then, is to examine how an object can express an alien subjectivity. In effect, this is nothing more than an expansion of the doctrine of the other living body, as set forth in the last chapter. But it presents its own special difficulties, because by constituting an expressive object, ego and alter ego constitute themselves as members of a community corresponding to a cultural world; so we must face the problem that the identity of the cultural world for the ego and alter ego always threatens to dissipate because of their inaccessibility to each other.

This identity can be maintained only by a concept of personality, that is, a concept of subjectivity specific to the community. We must


4. Cp. Theunissen, Der Andere: "For only as one among Others am I a person, since I am a person only inasmuch as I order myself as a member (Mit-glied) along with other members (Glieder) of a community" p. 92.
therefore examine the ego and the alter ego in respect of their transformation upon encountering each other. That is, the encounter between the ego so transforms primordial experience that the sphere of ownness is irrevocably lost, retained only as an appearance of the objective world. The encounter transforms primordial experience by introducing a new manner of self-transcending to conscious life. It is this self-transcendence that constitutes the unity for ego and alter ego of the cultural world; and it is in respect of it that subjectivity becomes personality. Personality itself is the expression of alien subjectivity to the ego, and moreover it is what gives intersubjective unity to other objects that express alien subjectivity. It is therefore the fundamental concept of the personalistic or spiritual attitude.

Let us begin with an examination of the doctrine of induction as set forth in the Ideen II: by itself it is unsuccessful, but constitutes an essential moment of the final doctrine to be elaborated here. Let us first consider a question fundamental to the notion of personality: Husserl asks whether it is an intentional unity, that is, unified by the synthetic grasp of consciousness in a reflected act; or whether it is a unity essentially prior to reflection. Now the life of consciousness is pre-given, already there as a unity for an act of reflection. But this alone does not decide the question in favour of the second alternative, for intentional unities too, once constituted, are experienced as already there or pre-given (Id. II, 251, 250)\(^5\). Yet Husserl decisively claims

\(^5\) Cp. above, pp. 54-55.
that the unity of personality is prior to any act of unifying:

I am the subject of my life, and the subject evolves in living; its experience is primarily not of itself, but rather it constitutes natural objects, things of value, tools, and so on. As active it forms and structures not itself, but things to be done (Sachen zu werken). The ego is originally not a thing of experience - in the sense of associative apperception, in which unitaries of contextual multiplicities are constituted - but is rather a thing of life (it is what it is not for the ego, but is itself the ego). (Id. II, 252)6.

And further: "The 'coming to know oneself' is one with the evolution of self-apperception, with the constitution of the 'self', and this is accomplished at once with the evolution of the subject itself" (Id. II, 252). If we are to claim that consciousness is intentional, then let us be thorough about it: in its primary being, the subject is immersed in its intended objects, and lives through its experience. It is this not by seeking to be it, but simply by being it.

Moreover, the life of consciousness is not simply a series of isolated events, a succession of isolated experiences; rather, the series fashion its order and structure and coherence such that each experience is what it is only as determined by its position within the stream of consciousness. Each experience, by constituting a transcendent objectivity, constitutes subjectivity itself, and in this respect is retained, even if forgotten; and because of this self-constitution, the life of consciousness is not a set of possible experiences, but a

6. Husserl's last sentence reads: "Das Ich ist ursprünglich nicht aus Erfahrung - im Sinne von assoziativer Apperzeption, in der sich Einheiten von-Mannigfaltigkeiten des Zusammenhanges konstituieren, sondern aus Lehen (es ist, was es ist, nicht für das Ich, sondern selbst das Ich)."
totality of compossibles with its own rationale: only certain experiences are compossible within one stream of consciousness, and only in a certain order. The stream of consciousness is a system of compossibilities, and its system is determined by the experiences themselves (C.M. §36). The system of compossibilities is nothing other than the monad. Thus, for example, having made a certain theoretical decision, the ego cannot then make another isolated decision intentionally related to the same object: rather, the two will reciprocally affect each other in some way.

The unity of consciousness, then, is not a function of some one among its acts, but of the entire fabric of its life. Self-apperception, the positing of subjectivity in a reflective act, is essentially possible, but the ego thus objectified (me, Mich) is thereby not the ego in act (I, Ich) (Id. II 253). Reflection can appropriate the life of consciousness as its own, but life is not a product of reflection. But the unity of life is not thereby compromised.

7. The way this works is evidently quite complex, and is beyond the compass of the present essay.

8. Husserl is characteristically suspicious of the rights and legitimacy of reflection; a very clear statement of the crucial problem is found in his discussion of "hidden motivations" (Verborgene motivationen). He notes that one often does not know why one believes something or does something. But the belief or action is not simply an arbitrary fact—it must have a motivation—and the motivation must be such as can become conscious (Id. II, 222-223). But then: "We have just spoken of unnoticed, 'hidden' motivations, which are present (vorliegen) in habit (Gewohnheit) and in the events of the stream of consciousness. In the immanence of consciousness (im inneren Bewusstsein) each experience is itself 'characterized as existing'. But just here is great difficulty. Is it really characterized as existing, or is it only that there is the essential possibility of reflection, which in the objectification necessarily grants the character, existing, to the experience? And even this is not clear enough. Reflection on an experience is originally a positing consciousness. But in a 'posing consciousness', is the experience itself a given, or a constituted? (Aber ist das Erlebnis selbst in einem setzenden Bewusstsein gegebenes oder konstituiertes?)"
Now the personality determines itself in the course of its life, and its determinations are habitualities, or, as they are of present interest, abilities (Vermögen). An ability is simply the thesis "I can", and of this there are two kinds, the mental (geistig), and the physical, which is mediated by the body. For example, one can play the piano, or walk: when one sets about to do it, one knows how, one can. Or one has a vivid imagination, or one is quick-witted, and can draw conclusions easily (Id. II, 253-254). Thus, an ability is not an empty possibility (Können) but a positive [scil. determinate] potentiality, which is sometimes exercised, always ready to go into action (Tätigkeit); and this action, according to its manner of being experienced, refers back to the pertinent subjective possibility, to the ability (Id. II, 255).

An action is not an isolated event in the life of consciousness, but inasmuch as it is the exercise of an acquired ability, it comprehends the acquisition. The doing is the thesis "I can and do" (Id. II, 216) and is not an isolated event but an exercise and a continuing to live; and the past is not left behind, but is comprehended in the exercise. Correspondingly, it is by means of undertaking the pertinent action that one acquires an ability.

The subject considered as the substrate of abilities is obviously

Were this the case, we could take another step with reflection — and then would we not be involved in an endless regress?" (Id. II, 224). His question clearly is this: does reflection reveal only what is "in" the experience, or does it essentially and irremediably deform the experiences? I have in this essay assumed the former to be the case; but the assumption is highly problematical. I have, however, attempted to make allowance for the latter by also insisting, with Husserl, that it is the proper business of consciousness to "live", to be "immersed" in its objects, rather than to know itself.
a proper object of induction (Id. II, 329). For the subject himself, his actions have a double sense, to exercise and to develop the ability, and this double sense is susceptible of transformation appropriate to the attitude of one who would understand the subject: inasmuch as the subject acts from the ability and according to its determinations, the act evinces the ability for the inductive subject; and corresponding to the order of acquiring an ability is the inductive order of coming to know it (Id. II, 329-330).

This matter is more graphically and concretely — though also more briefly — expressed in the *Cartesian Meditations* in terms of behaviour. Husserl asks how it is that the Other is not merely evanescent, but is accorded the status existing; how it is that the apperception of the Other is "possible and need not be annulled forthwith". How is it that the other body holds the status existing continuously, and not only at the moment it exhibits itself to be alive, straightway losing the status, to become a strictly presented natural object? (C.M. 143). That is, how is the alien subjectivity seen to be a genuine existent?

Husserl presents the attribution of existence to the Other as a straightforward specification of his general doctrine of existence. Experience in general means its object to be not only what is now strictly presented, but to be susceptible of further experience: Consciousness means *(meinen)* or construes *(auffassen)* its object to be determinate, and in so doing predelineates more or less definitely further experience, which can be harmonious with the construal *(consistent with the predelineation)*.

and thus verify it, and make the object more determinate; or it can be discordant, and falsify the construal. An experience means more than it presents, it indicates that there is more to the object than is now grasped: the meaning is verified when this more is "itself there". In other words, experience is presumptive: but the presumption has regard to a potential experience, and can be verified (C.M. III passim, esp. §28). One sees spatial objects, for example, always in profile, from a perspective: one sees one side, but the object has other sides, and, inasmuch as the presented side is seen to be precisely one side among others, the others are anticipated in the experience, or are appresent; they can be made present by a change of perspective (C.M. 97; cp. 144). Thus, for example, one does not see a bounded white, but a piece of paper. "A piece of paper": already further experience is anticipated, elastic limits are placed on it. Further experience will reveal that it is a piece of paper of a certain weight, texture, opacity, and so on; or perhaps that the construal was mistaken, and that what was taken to be paper was a painted area on the desk.

The general doctrine need not be elaborated here. But it is not hard to see that its specification to the present case demands great care. The appresented "other side" of the body would seem to be the Other's conscious life. But this cannot become present, originally experienced as itself there, for if it did, it would be the ego's own life (C.M. 159). Still, the Other's body is seen as a living body within which an alien subjectivity "rules and governs" (C.M. 148), and proves itself to be living by continuing to behave, to exhibit alien
rule and governance. Or, as Husserl says:

...The appresentation which gives that component of the Other which is not accessible originally is combined with an original presentation (of "his" body as part of the Nature given as included in my ownness). In this combination, moreover, the Other's animate body and his governing Ego are given in the manner that characterizes a unitary transcending experience. Every experience points to further experiences that would fulfill and verify the appresented horizons, which include, in the form of non-intuitive anticipations, potentially verifiable syntheses of harmonious further experience. Regarding experience of someone else, it is clear that its fulfillingly verifying continuation can ensue only by means of new appresentations that proceed in a synthetically harmonious fashion, and only by virtue of the manner in which these appresentations owe their existence-value to their motivational connexion with the changing presentations proper, within my ownness, that continually appertain to them.

As a suggestive clue to the requisite clarification, this proposition may suffice: The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious "behaviour". Such harmonious behaviour (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behaviour from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behaviour (C.M. 143-144).

Husserl's meaning is quite clear: the encounter with the Other is no more momentary and self-contained than any other experience. It has its own specific style of verification and determination, yet follows the general form of verification. There is thus "verifiable" access to what is not "originally accessible", the alien subjectivity (C.M. 144).

The person has a personal style (Id. II, 33), that is, a monadic unity to which the ego has the sort of mediate access now in question. But again, this is not merely an intentional unity, to be ascertained by
induction, but is more properly the product of the person's own immanent history or life. The person is determined by his past not as a succession of events that have occurred in transcendent time before the present, but rather as a conscious life, a series of acts in immanent time, which are his strictly inasmuch as the present comprehends them. Thus, "I depend upon motives; in newly acting on a previous decision I depend upon that decision, I am what I now am through determination of my previous being (my being-decided)" (Id. II, 331-332).

Acts therefore constitute a personal style, and reciprocally, the personal style determines one's acts. Because of this reciprocity, the determinateness of subjectivity can be externally ascertained: "Because I have an individual style (Eigenart), because I therefore behave in a regulated way, I must be inductively interpretable (auffaßbar), and able to become the theme of inductive consideration" (Id. II, 332).

There are two attitudes possible with respect to personality: the "living" attitude, immersed in the intentionality, engaged in the continuity of personal history; and the external attitude, finding the subject to be thus and so engaged, to be of this or that personal style.

Behaviour, then, is simultaneously the Other's intentional act and the evincement for the ego of that intentionality. The ego's external attitude, then, is a continuous transformation of the Other's internal attitude towards his acts: what the alter ego (behaviourally) does, the ego sees him to do.

But this does not take us very far. The Other's harmonious
behaviour is supposed to evince his personal style for the ego. This is sensible enough, but how does it work? Let us take a very simple example, which, I believe, will make clear the paucity of inductive knowledge of the alien subjectivity. Suppose one sees, at the same time each day, a certain person hurrying in a certain direction. By means of this simple induction one knows something of the person. But we can hardly call this that is known his personal style, or part of his monadic essence. The observer has good reason to expect the same person to hurry past the same point tomorrow: his expectation is motivated by past observations. But the person's action is not motivated by these observations, nor by his own observations, nor even by the regular action, but more likely by his wanting to arrive at his destination. His action has one motivation, the induction has an entirely different one, and the two are not remotely similar.

Yet the external attitude, by means of which induction is possible, is supposed to be a continuous transformation of the Other's internal attitude: the action—and the personal style by which it is determined—are supposed to be the same for ego and alter ego. Yet in fact the internal attitude is deformed by the external, and we have two actions—the purposive act that the Other does, and the usual action that the ego sees.

The attempt to understand the Other inductively, as so far elaborated, fails because it is abstract, because it cannot adequately take into account the Other's own motivations—his internal attitude.

10. Toullmont, Société selon Husserl, p. 70. The example is taken from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts.
11. Ibid.
towards his action. Under certain circumstances, the person has behaved thus: under similar circumstances he will behave similarly. This is not a pure falsehood, nor is it the whole truth. A material thing, certainly, will "behave" similarly under similar circumstances (Cp. Id. II, 254-255). Moreover, both it and its circumstances can in principle remain the same, and endure with unceasing uniformity. The real material thing is what it is only in relation to other things, which thereby comprise its circumstances (Umstände) (Id. II, 125-126). But a subject in principle cannot remain enduringly the same in any similar sense: it lives, it is a stream of consciousness in continuous flux. What sense, then, can it have to speak of the Other's behaviour "under similar circumstances"? It is the very nature of consciousness to be dependent not merely upon external circumstances, but upon itself, and more particularly the make-up of present experience depends the make-up of past experience, upon the subject's past life as a totality (Id. II 135, op. 133, 136). It is, then, not so easy to isolate the "circumstances" of another's hurrying past a certain place at a certain time.

More accurately - if we are still to talk of circumstances - consciousness itself determines what its circumstances are, and this must

12. This sentence is a loose paraphrase of a sentence in the Ideen II, pp. 132-133: "Ferner: das materielle Ding kann, als prinzipielle Möglichkeit, völlig unverändert sein, unverändert hinsichtlich seiner Eigenschaften, auch unverändert hinsichtlich seiner Zuständichkeiten. Das schematisch-Mannigfaltige erfüllt dann die Dauer in kontinuierlich Änderungloser Gleichheit. Das seelische Ding" kann aber prinzipiell nicht unverändertem Seelenzustand verharren.

13. Id. II, 133: This passage discusses the "Fundamental Differences between Material and Animat (seelische) Reality." Husserl's doctrine of the soul (Seele) is distinct from his general doctrine of intentionality.
somehow be accommodated by any induction that presumes as its issue an understanding of the other personality. Consciousness, as intentional, is free, and determines its own objectivity. So we must now pose the questions, what is behaviour for the Other, and what are its circumstances? How is something more than a behavioural regularity accessible to the ego? How is the Other's freedom accommodated by induction?

Perhaps a rather simple example that Husserl offers will make this clear:

I know, for example, that my vice of smoking is in part the work of habit (Gewohnheit); but I do not smoke [only] because I am in the habit of doing so, but [also] because I enjoy the taste, because I seek the stimulation; and were it only a habit, I could hardly have such a distaste for nicotine-free cigars.

The argument is quite informal, and for that reason is quite graphic. The ego can only see that the Other smokes often. The Other for the ego smokes because he is of that habit, because he usually does so, whereas the Other for himself smokes because he enjoys it. So it seems that the Other for the ego is a sign or an image of the reality, the Other for himself, and the sceptical or realist contradiction with which we began is again thrust upon us.

The present difficulty can in part be overcome by more clearly defining behaviour, or, more generally, practice. Let us attempt to define practical consciousness or practical intentionality.

Now this very expression might seem to be self-contradictory; whereas intentionality is an irreal, non-causal relationship between subject and object, practice would seem to involve a causal relationship between the body and nature.

Intentionality relates the subject to things, which in this relationship make up an environment. But, "This relationship is immediately (unmittelbar) not a real relationship, but rather an intentional relationship to the real" (Id. II, 215). "Immediately": clearly Husserl refers to the relationship as it is experienced, rather than as it is interpreted or explained. For the subject, an experience is a presentation of an object; for him, there is not superadded to the presented object any awareness of a causal relationship to the object. There is within the experience no warrant for the view that there is a real thing that causes these or those impressions. The subject experiences an object, and the object may well be real, and there may well be a real, causal psychophysical relation between the subject's sense organs and the object: but even if the object is not real, and causes no sense-impressions, it is no less experienced, and the experience is no less a part of the subject's conscious life (Id. II, 215). Husserl does not deny that there are causal relations between things and the sense organs, but claims simply that experience is of an entirely different order from causality. (For example, one is afraid because he has heard that a dangerous lion has escaped—not because some innoxious sound waves have affected his ear) (Id. II, 229-231).

"The person is precisely one who represents, feels, values, strives, and acts (handelnde Person) and he stands in each such personal act (Akte)
in relation to something, to objects of his environment" (Id. II, 185-186). The environment is not the world of objects in themselves, but the horizon of objects for the subject, as they are meant in his multiply specific intentions. They are therefore not purely theoretical objects, but are also aesthetic and practical (Id. II, 186-187). They make up an environment, a horizon of objects intentionally ordered around the subject, not only to be known, but also to be used and enjoyed. Among the multiple intentional orientations is a practical orientation to the environment in striving and doing, in purposing and accomplishing.

The objects of the environment are, again, not the objects of natural science. That is, they "are not the things in themselves of Nature - of the exact science of nature, with the determinations which this science admits as alone as objectively valid - but are rather things [that are] experienced, thought or otherwise [intentionally] posited as meant [objects, considered precisely] as such, intentional objectivities of the personal consciousness. This has two senses; first, experienced objects do not act on the subject as natural causes. And second, they are stimuli (Reize) in another respect: "As objects of which the subject is already aware, although he has not yet [still, attentively] grasped them, they draw the subject to them, and where

15. The title of Ideen II §50 is "The Person as the Centre of an Environment".
16. "...und diese Dinge sind nicht die an sich seienenden Dinge der Natur - der exakten Naturwissenschaft mit den Bestimmtheiten, die sie als allein objektiv wahre gelten läßt - sondern erfasste, gedachte oder sonstwie setzende, vermeinte Dinge als solche, intentionale Gegenständlichkeiten des personalen Bewußtseins" (Id. II, 189).
the stimulus is sufficiently 'strong', the ego 'follows' it, 'yields', and turns to [the objects], and exercises upon them its explicative, conceptual, theoretically judgemental, valutative and practical activities (Id. II, 189) \(^\text{17}\). But clearly, they are not stimuli simply in themselves, but in virtue of the subject's intentional relation to them \(^\text{18}\).

But still, experience is an "intentional relation to the real" (Id. II, 215): that is, consciousness itself determines the reality of the object by reference to the coherence of its givenness; intentionality posits its object, and itself freely determines the conditions of this positing. But this is an issue of some complexity.

Let us focus more narrowly on objects of practical intentionality. Suppose one hits a ball with one's hand. The action has a mechanical effect, and moreover is susceptible of natural scientific analysis in terms, say, of muscular operations, psychomotor operations, mechanical operations, dynamic effects, and so on. The action can be construed to be a relation between the subject's natural body and the natural world, where "natural" means not primordial, but such as investigated by the

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\(^{17}\) "Schon als bewusste, aber noch nicht erfaßte (im Bewustseinshintergrund verschwebende) ziehen sie das Subjekt gegen sich hin, und bei hinreichender "Reizstärke" "folgt" das Ich dem Reiz, es "gibt nach" und verdient sich zu, es stammt aus ihnen explizierende, begreifende, theoretisch urteilende, wertende, praktische Tätigkeiten (Id. II, 189).

\(^{18}\) All of this is not to suggest that the concepts of a thing-in-itself and of an objective or real world are meaningless or fictive, but rather that they must be organically related to, and in a sense, derived from the concept of meant object and of environment, Cp., for example C.M. 496.
natural sciences (Id.: II, 217-218). But such a construal is possible only in the same way that intentionality can be taken to be a real relationship—"that is, for the subject of the action, not at all."

The body-member hand, which appears to consciousness in such and such a manner, is as such the substrate of the "I move," is an object for the subject, and is, so to speak, the theme of its freedom, of its free doing; and in the hitting it is the means "whereby" the physical thing, which is likewise intentionally given for me, can become, and indeed does become the "theme" of the hitting (of the "I hit") (Id.: II, 218).

The hand is, in the action, not a real thing, but an "object for the subject," given, according to the pertinent intentionality, as an organ. Similarly, the ball is an object that can be hit, and that the subject does hit. They are not things in themselves, but thematic objects.

The action, then, is originally not the object of experience, but is itself an experience, and an apprehension or construal of its object, and involves a specific existence-thesis or reality-thesis. There may well be no real ball and no real movement of the hand, but the evidence or originality of the experience of hitting is not thereby diminished. More consequentially, the existence thesis, the thesis that the object is transcendent, does not refer to a presentation of the object for its verification, but rather has its own specific style of verification in terms of success and failure. The thesis that there is a ball that can be hit is confirmed by successfully hitting it, falsified by finding there is nothing there to hit. But still, the ball that one hits is identical with the ball that one sees.  

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19. This is not to imply that there are two objects, one the object of practical intentionality, the other of presentation. There is only one, and one can look at the presented object to see if it can be hit (It is a rather "impractical" person who does not do this!).
The Other's behaviour, then, is not purely a mechanical and biological event, but is for him a being conscious, and as such has its place in the time of conscious life. But in virtue of its also being a presented bodily event (Op. cit., 151), it is for the ego an evincement of the alien subjectivity. The personal style of the Other, the tissue of his "I can" becomes in the act an "I can and do" (Id. II, 216), and simultaneously it becomes such as the ego can know.

But still there are problems:

When I judge others, I am for the most part guided by experience. He has repeatedly shown himself to be a scoundrel, he will do so again. But this experiential knowledge is not an understanding of the Other. If I understand him, I penetrate (durchschauen) into his motivations, and there is then no need for empirical apperception, or apperception of habits (Gewohnheitsapperception).

Naturally, this must accord with experience. Experience can contradict (Einsprache erheben) my apprehension. And then I must consider whether the consistency of experience is merely apparent. I will find perhaps that the [scil. Other's putative] motives were in fact other than I supposed (vorausgesetzt), and the situation not quite the same [scil. as I took it to be]. If indeed he is who he is, and really the same ego, then it is his style (Art) to be able to do this, unable to do that (Id. II 329).

Husserl's intent here is not to deny the rights of induction, but rather

But the evidence of practice is specifically different from that of presentation. How the identity of the object in its several ways of being experienced can be demonstrated is uncertain; it is obviously more complex than the way in which an object remains identical through several presentations. I do not know of any place where Husserl deals with this question. Unfortunately, the identity of an object through several specifically different intentionalties is essential to the thesis of this essay, especially to the present argument; and I can offer only the unsatisfactory ascertainment that it is obvious.

20. "Behaviour" is here used in a very wide sense, comprehending not only striking bails, but also speech and even turning the eyes to look at something (Op. cit. II, 216).
to point out that the personality is prior to any experiential unity. The inductive ascertainment of a behavioural regularity is not by itself an insight into the personality.

One can also attempt to gain inductive knowledge of oneself. A brief examination of this will make our present problem clearer, and will offer a solution to it. One has a personal style, "which necessarily expresses itself (sich Huetert), necessarily sets [soil inductive] associations in motion (ins Spiel setzt), necessarily constitutes in my life [soil inductive] associations of myself, so that I always constitute and continue to constitute an 'external representation' an inductive [representation] of my personal style (Eigenart)" (Id. II, 329-330). One can—and does, as a matter of course—take an external attitude with respect to oneself (Id. II, 331-332). But is this the evidence specific to the object, one's character? Is one's ability, one's freedom of intentional practice given as a result of experience, as a result of self-observation, so to speak; or is there a direct insight into it? (Id. II, 327-329; 264-266).

The answer is, in essence, quite simple. The personal style is the tissue of the subject's abilities—his concrete, determinate abilities, which devolve upon practice, upon his decisions. Now clearly it is not possible to make decisions in the 'external' attitude: one does not decide upon an action because "I usually behave this way, usually reject (verwerfen) [soil that action], so it may happen that I do so in future". Rather, one follows one's motivations (Id. II, 329)21.

21. On the question of motivation, see Ideen II §§ 56, 59, 60a.
It is one thing regularly to decide on the basis of the same motivations, quite another to decide on the basis of regularity.

Hence, although inductive ascertainment of the personality is certainly possible, it requires a final "verification in the transition from externality to internality, inasmuch as I, as I am, am not a natural thing, but am a position-taking (stellungnehmendes) ego" (Id. II 331). And similarly, the appropriate understanding of another is an understanding of his (internal) motives (Id. II, 329, §56c).

But our problems still remain: The putative understanding of the Other by the ego in the "internal" attitude is still the ego's act and the product of his constitution: how then can it be the ego's way of respecting the Other's free self-constitution? Or, if we suppose that the understood personality is the product of the Other's self-constitution, then how does the understanding supervene upon the experience of the Other as exhibiting behavioural regularities?

A brief digression might help us here. What is the intent of Husserl's insistence that the internal attitude alone is the appropriate means of understanding the Other? The ego comes to understand the Other by means of induction, and Other thus understood would seem to be a real or empirical ego: "real ego, just as all realities whatever, are mere intentional unities". The real ego is a unity of multiplicities, and takes its unity from a constitutive synthesis (Id. II, 110-111). But this is not the unity proper to a personality: the spontaneity of subjectivity is such that it determines its own unity, and that its acts are not determined by a principle external to itself. And the entire
effort of this chapter, and of Husserl's insistence on the internal
attitude, is to argue that the Other is a living personality. We
here touch on one of the most difficult problems in the interpretation
of Husserl: the relationship between the transcendental and the
empirical ego.

Theunissen suggests that the terms of the intersubjective
relationship - the self and the Other - are natural subjects in the
sense that they have, so to speak, forgotten the constitution of the
relationship. They live immersed in it, whereas the transcendental
ego, the ego that recovers the constitution of the relationship as an
accomplishment of consciousness, is aware of it for what it is, mediated
by the respective bodies. But here, the classical problem remains:
there can be discerned three egos: the one that constitutes, the one
that lives immersed in the constituted objects, and the one that
observes the entire affair. These must essentially, one way or another,
be identical, even though their functions are vastly different. A
demonstration of this identity is, of course, crucial to any philosophy
that presumes, as does Husserl's, to explicate the life of consciousness
and to exhibit its origins: but the matter still remains unsettled.
Here, we can only assume that the process of constitution of the Other
that is presumed to be uncovered is such as will result in a conscious-
ness that can be lived unreflectively, or, in other words, that the

22. Theunissen, Der Andere,
inder gegenwärtigen Kritik". Kant-Studien vol. XXXVIII (1933).
reflective recovery of the origins of the sense Other does not
destroy the originality of the sense.

A detailed expansion on this topic is beyond present purposes.
Husserl's intent seems to be to show how transcendental egos are
related: he speaks of a "transcendental intersubjectivity" and of a
"community of monads" (C.M. 158). He surely cannot by these expressions
refer to a community of reflective egos whose interest is not in
living their communalization, but in reflectively appropriating it.
Perhaps the transcendental ego and alter ego are those who live
immersed in the originality of their relationship, and who are there-
fore to be understood only in the internal attitude. Perhaps Husserl
means by his insistence on this attitude to focus on the essence of the
spontaneity of consciousness, its power to transcend itself. He perhaps
means that the proper business of the ego is not to posit some principle
of unity of the alien subjectivity, but to transcend itself in a new
way, by engaging, by living with the alien spontaneity.

The Other as an intended object is an intentional unity, and
as such is a deformation of the Other in himself, a self-unifying
subject. But is the Other for the ego just an intended object? Or are
the relations of the self to the Other in their full range nothing other
than a fundamentally misguided effort to "understand" him in terms of
an empirically ascertained character - an effort that can never
terminate in the appropriate evidence, in a knowing of the alien subject
in himself, and of his motivations as what they are, as having effect?
Surely not: we spend, in day-to-day life, rather less time ascertaining
that another is patient or irascible than actually encountering him,
engaging with his personality in dynamic interaction, depending upon
his patience to facilitate work, or causing him anger. The other
personality is not some object to which various predicates are
attributed - "in pain", "happy", "moody", "intelligent", and the like -
without the faintest hope of ever knowing what these mean in the
attribution. Interaction, intersubjective life has already ceased when
predication begins. The ego's business is not to inspect the fabric of
the Other's behaviour, and attempt to find some principle unifying it,
but rather - to live with the Other. To insist that because the evidence
specific to the own subjectivity is being it, there is no other possible
evidence of subjectivity is dogmatic - and unimaginative. The evidence
of the alien subject is specific to it, or there is none at all; and the
attempt to discover a derivative evidence is inconsequent.

When one looks at another, one sees him himself, and not just
a sign or index of him (Id. II, 234-235; C.M., 122, 139). Persons do
not only understand each other, but also act on each other and motivate
each other to action (Id. II, 194; C.M. 159-160). Our present problem
is to incorporate this into the account of the constitution of the Other.

The experience of the Other might seem to have two objects:
directly, a sign of the Other's conscious life; and mediately, that
life itself. But construing it thus leads necessarily to an attempt to
adequate the sign to the reality, which founders on imponderables. The
two are in reality one, a person, a "comprehensive unity" or "expression
and expressed", of "body and mind (Geist)" (Id. II, 236). This is nothing
other than a consequential development of the initial point of Husserl's
analysis of the problem, the doctrine of primordial experience, of incarnate subjectivity. It should not be taken to supplant the process of induction, but to amplify it: the ego knows the Other to be irascible by often seeing him to be angry; but how does he know him to be angry?

The Other as a person is an expressive unity, and as such he enters into interpersonal relations with the ego: they speak or listen to each other, work together, and so on. In all of this, the Other's body is presented; but it is not the thematic object. The body appears there, and is localized; but the sense which it expresses does not appear and has no position. But the sense is not a separate object, externally linked to the body, such that each could exist or could be conceived to exist apart from the other; rather, they form a "fused" (verschmolzen) unity, of the same sort as language, at once physical and not physical (Id. II, 236-237).

A play, for example, is an expressive unity. But one can look at it as a physical event, seeing certain objects in certain positions, and in changing spatial relations to each other. But the unity of the play as a physical event is not the same as its expressive unity (Id. II, 327). In general, to see something as a physical thing is not to see it as, say, a church, or a tool (Id. II, 328).

It is perfectly true that the expressive organ appears; this page appears. But attention is not to the physical thing. Rather, "I am immersed in understanding the sense..."("ich lebe komprensionierend im-Sinn...") (Id. II, 236). The physical structure is not the same or of the same order as the structure of the sense; yet a sense "animates"
language by "penetrating through" it ("durchdringt beseeelend").
(Id. II, 238). The expressive unity is not reducible to a physical
unity:

...the physical unity of the body (Leibes) standing
there, of the body that changes and moves thus and so, is
multifariously (vielfach) articulated, and more or less
determinately according to the circumstances. And, this
articulation is an articulation of sense (Sinnesartikulation),
which means that it is not such as to be found in the
physical attitude, as if each physical part, each
differentiation of physical properties received a "meaning",
namely, meaning as an animate body; thus receiving its
own sense, its own "spirit". Rather, the apprehension of
a thing as a man (more precisely, as a man who speaks, reads,
dances, becomes angry and rages, defends himself or attacks,
and so on) is such that animates multiple, but salient,
moments of the appearing bodily objectivity; that gives
meaning and an animate import (seelischen Inhalt); and that
further, according to the requirements of the sense, brings
the already animate particulars to a higher unity, and
finally to the unity, man (Id. II, 241).

Thus, a gesture of anger, for example, is not reducible to a physical
event. As a gesture it bears a meaning; and this meaning determines
how it is integrated into the men of the Other. But still, how is
the gesture an expression of anger, rather than a sign of it?

Here again we must consider the notion of pairing. The experienced
Other has a conscious life, but there is no original experience for the
ego of that life: the Other's life is given as an "intentional modifi-
cation" of the own. In order to clarify this rather obscure expression,
Husserl compares this modification with the modification of "a past present"
in the remembering of it. In remembering, one does not have an experience
again, but is conscious of having experienced something. The past
experience transcends the remembering, but is still given as an
experience (C.M. 144-145). "Thus with a greater or lesser degree of
explicitness, recollection renders present not only the object of the experience ... but also the experience itself. It is essentially possible to experience another experience. The objectification essentially modifies the experience, which yet does not thereby lose its character as an experience.

Husserl offers this only as an "instructive comparison", so we need not dwell on it. Whereas the remembered not and the remembering occur in the same stream of consciousness at different times, the objectified alien experience is more or less simultaneous with the objectification, but occurs in a different consciousness: the two sorts of objectification are specifically different25.

Now, again, the self is essentially "Here", and everything else, including the Other's body, is "There". The Here is a perspective on the world, and determines the presented profile of the world: the body is a power of experiencing. But equally, it is a kinaesthetic power, and in particular, a power to move and to convert any There into a Here (C.M. 1345-146). All Theres are potentially Here.

The Other's body is there. But this There, too, is a potential Here; and, inasmuch as the Other is given as living, it is his actual Here - a modification of the own. The experience of the Other, then, objectifies an experience that is not identical with the objectifying:

"I [scil. the ego] perceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is".

The Other, then, is not a duplicate of the self, and is not experienced
in the originality of his life: he is a modification of the self.

The Other's behaviour, then, is not a sign of an unreachable
interiority, but is the Other's bodily subjectivity. His behaviour is
seen, for example, "as the outward behaviour of someone who is angry or
cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under such
circumstances" (C.M. 129; cp. Id. II, §50(d)). Another person is
angry, his anger is manifest in his gesture and mien, and comprises because
one is oneself capable of anger. The self sees his own behaviour such
that it is not his own. The anger is not a pure interiority, a reality
hidden beneath "impenetrable flesh", but is seen in the flesh.

But this, surely, is not enough: it is one thing to see a
person, and understand that he is angry, quite another to be faced with
a person raging at oneself. The former case recalls one's own capacity
for anger, but permits one to stand off from the blustering and to
understand it; the latter involves the own consciousness on a rather
different way: one cannot simply understand, but must engage with the
blustering in a dynamic interaction. Husserl's illustration obscures
the issue with its simplicity: the appropriate response - the necessary
response - to an enraged interlocutor is not to understand his behaviour,
and to see in it something similar to what one is oneself capable of, but
to complement it, to complete the systematic whole formed by self and
Other. In a sense, the ego must submit to the Other's determination of
their situation, but he has freedom to make the determination along with
the Other. Expression indeed does call the own consciousness into action,
and not simply as a spectator, but as an essential element of the expressive
situation. Expression demands one to whom it is addressed, it is a kind of encounter, and a declaration to the ego by the Other: This that you take to be your intended object, to be the meant of your meaning - is mine. And this declaration demands the same in response. And through this reciprocal action, the object becomes not "mine" or "yours", but "ours", or shared.

The example of anger has both merits and demerits. It well exemplifies the necessity of a concept of reciprocity to an understanding of the intersubjective relationship: a doctrine that only explained how one understands another's anger most assuredly would leave something out. But the expressive relationship set up by an outburst of anger does not clearly exemplify that process by which objects become explicitly shared. Yet just this is the crucial point.

Expression impinges upon the ego, and is understood only to the extent that it brings his conscious life into play by attempting to alienate the own. The most vivid and precise expression has power only to awaken the own conscious life, and to show what is already implicitly seen - but to show it in a new light. By means of the communicative relationship, one's own experience becomes experience of a common world: the primordial sphere becomes the core of a world for all (Cp: C.M. 161).

Thus, as Husserl says:

It is insufficient that Others be understood as persons, and that the one who understands unilaterally direct such and such behaviour towards the Others; there need in such a case be no mutual understanding (Einverständniss). And that is just the point. Sociality is constituted in specifically social, communicative acts, acts in which the ego turns to Others who are known to him as those to whom he turns, and further who understand this turning, and perhaps in their
behaviour direct themselves to it (self acknowledge it),
and turn to the ego in acts of agreement or disagreement
(Id. II, 194).26

The passage errs, if at all, by not stating the case radically enough.
One-sided understanding is perhaps impossible. Expression takes place
within a common world, of which the core is the own primordial sphere.
But how did the world become common? - Only as a result of the Other's
entering and taking possession of the own primordial sphere. Under-
standing of the Other takes place in the common world: but the world
is common only inasmuch as reciprocity has already had effect. Unilateral
understanding presupposes reciprocity.

It hence follows, not as a possibility but as a necessity, that
the Other's expression determines the ego, and his reciprocally the Other.
Each motivates, has effect (Wirkung) upon, the other (Id. II, 231-236).
Persons have "immediate personal effects" on each other, they have
"motivating power". "In their spiritual activity they direct themselves
towards each other", and expect to be understood (Id. II, 192): "Upon
speech follows answer" (Id. II, 192): not because one first understands
what is said, and then sets out to frame a response. Rather, to the

26. Here, as in the case of the attempt to reinterpret the notion of
pairing, I must stress that I am uncertain whether the doctrine
I argue is Husserl's. Passages that support my thesis as well as
the present does are relatively rare. The present states, unambigu-
ously that sociality is constituted not by understanding the Other
at a distance but by something like the process of "impinging" or
"encounter" that I am attempting to describe. Some other passages
are as clear (see especially Id. II §56(h)). Others heavily
emphasize the ego's understanding of the Other. Obviously, then,
more research is required to clarify the relationship between
one-sided understanding and encounter.
extent that the question is understood, it addresses itself to what one already knows, but evokes a transformation of this, such that what was once private knowledge is now a common property, the appropriate object of a dynamic dialogue. The relation of dialogue reveals to each person the anticipated but yet unexpressed subtleties of his own thought.

This, I believe, is the proper sense of the Other's radical transcendence: not an unintelligible apartness, but a transcendence that figures in the very structure of the consciousness it transcends, such that what the recognize subjects share is more than what each owns, yet is still an essential transformation of the own.

It is hence evident that the entire person, and not some isolated faculty or representative sign, enters the communicative relationship, and thereby constitutes with the Other the community. That which is shared is not iteratively owned, ours is not just mine and yours; it is a specific transformation of the own. This transformation is a self-transformation on the part of each member of the community, and it is by means of their self-transformation that they constitute themselves as a community. The community is the product of their coming to be persons, and their manner of 'being persons'.

Conclusion

For Husserl, the problem of other subjectivity is one of great complexity and of wide import. I have attempted to provide a coherent interpretation of the problem as Husserl views it. But his presentation is at many points ambiguous, and sometimes, I believe, mistaken. The interpretation of Husserl offered in this essay, then, is uncertain; and the account of the issue differs from his own. These difficulties are mitigated by the presence in Husserl’s account of certain dominant themes, which in several successive interpretations form a thread of unity in his work. The two salient themes are these: logically, that the experienced Other is autonomous, and himself determines his own unity, yet he is experienced in person, as he really is; and materially, that consciousness relating ego to alter ego is mediated by their respective living bodies. These, I believe, are undeniably dominant in Husserl’s account, and thus serve to guide interpretation. Let us now briefly recapitulate the progress of the argument.

The argument began with an attempt to discern the essential nature of consciousness as Husserl understands it. Husserl speaks of two characteristics as essential to — if not definitive of — consciousness, intentionality and temporality. Intentionality relates consciousness to something — an object — that is not identical with it, but in such a manner that this object is not simply external to consciousness, but is the meant product of a process of meaning. Intentionality itself defines the way in which any object shall have sense for consciousness, and thus
defines the objective being of the object. The object, then, is the way in which consciousness transcends itself. Similarly, temporality is not simply a property of consciousness, but is a way of continuing to be conscious. The time of consciousness is constituted by the process of meaning, and is thus the self-production of consciousness. Hence, temporality, too, is a way in which consciousness transcends itself.

Now the transcendent object is the unity of infinite possible experiences of it; an experience other than the present and actual, but of the same object, is always possible. This doctrine is extensively expounded in Husserl’s works. But when he turns to consider the experiential sense of an object, accessible to all, he recognizes that this doctrine does not fully comprehend the case. The unity of an object for any single stream of consciousness depends on the continuity of the actual experience with other possible experiences, such that all can be synthesized as being of one object. But the conditions of such a synthesis are unavailable when the one object is experienced by several subjects. Yet the community of subjects related to one common world does presume to posit its world as the same for all.

Hence, a new sense of self-transcendence is required, for there is a new sense of identity. Husserl’s interest in the problem of the Other, then, would seem to have an aim beyond the constitution of a rather special sort of object: to expose a new way in which subjectivity has transcendental power, by constituting itself with its fellows as an intersubjectivity. This indeed is Husserl’s avowed accomplishment (C.M. 162). The intent of the rest of the essay is to arrive at this
self-transcendence by continuous interpretation of the dominant themes mentioned above.

Reflection on Husserl's introduction of the problem in the Cartesian Meditations reveals certain possible ambiguities and interpretative difficulties. On straightforward reading, one should most naturally interpret him to mean that his concern is with a doctrinal difficulty, with the possibility of a solipsistic objection to phenomenology. But several remarks in the introduction suggest the fundamental logical desiderata of an account of the Other mentioned above. And indeed, these are suggested again in the presentation of naive experience as a transcendental clue to guide his reflection. Here, too, the doctrine that the body must mediate the consciousness of the Other is suggested.

The first step in the analysis of the problem is the reduction to the sphere of ownness, the attempt to reach a level of experience pure of the influence of other subjectivity. This has several purposes: first, the Other is a subject, but a subject is precisely and essentially what one is oneself; and, moreover, the only access to subjectivity is actually being it; and the sense, alien subjectivity, is essentially dependent on the own. Second, if the sense other subjectivity is to be exhibited as one arising in and from the ego's own constitutive processes, then it cannot be presupposed by the analysis. This new reduction reveals as the core of the sphere of ownness, as that which is most thoroughly the ego's own, his living body. It brings it to prominence as a power of experiencing the world and as the incarnation of subjectivity in the world. The sphere of ownness itself
is a primordial nature, a realm of objects constituted by the body's power of experiencing; primordial nature thus pertains to the essence of the reduced ego.

The next step in this progress is perhaps the most difficult to interpret. An object that is to be experienced as the other's living body appears in primordial nature: by what means does it come to have for the ego the sense, another's animate body? - Clearly by a transfer of sense from the own living body, which is, again, the only body whose life is actually experienced by the ego. Husserl suggests that this transfer is grounded in a similarity of the Other's body to the own. This similarity becomes prominent, according to Husserl, in a pairing of the own with the alien body.

But this is difficult to accept. A body is not animate in virtue of any sensible properties, but in virtue of being a power of sensibility. Further, the perspectives on the own and the other body are radically dissimilar, and there seems then no way for a similarity of appearance to be perceived. On two counts, then, the similarity of the own and of the other bodies is incapable of grounding a transfer of the relevant sense.

For these reasons, I believe that Husserl's own understanding of pairing must be rejected. But this is not to say that the idea that the relation of self to other is a relation of the bodies must be rejected: rather, it must be more carefully interpreted, and indeed in the light of the logical desiderata. Thus, the Other's body, insofar as it is a living body, must prove to the self that it is living. Pairing can be
conclusive only as a carnal encounter involving on the part of both ego and alter ego a reciprocal exercise of the power of embodied subjectivity on the other. In this way, the Other's autonomy becomes the very condition of the consciousness of him, and he is not simply the product of the ego's process of meaning.

But one question remains: how can the ego understand the alter ego in greater detail? We so far know only how the ego encounters "some" other subject, and need to know how he encounters this determinate other. In response to this sort of question Husserl offers a very elaborate doctrine of induction: the Other's behaviour reveals a pattern or regularity, which reveals his "personal style". His actions are, for him, not simply physical, but are acts of consciousness, or ways or relating to the world; and it is in this sense that they integrated in a process of induction.

But the personal style discovered by induction is the ego's unification of the Other's acts; and it is always conceivable that this unification be a misinterpretation of the Other. But there is no way for this fact to become evident. Moreover, the Other's intent, in his actions, is not simply to behave regularly, but to accomplish his purposes. The inductive attitude, then, is incommensurable with the attitude of one performing an action. But how are the two attitudes mediated?

The doctrine of induction must be supplemented by Husserl's doctrine of expression, which in this essay is interpreted as a kind of encounter. The other person is a "comprehensive unity" of expression and expressed. His body is an expressive organ, and, as such, its
unity is not simply that of a physical thing, but one strictly determined by the sense it expresses. Or, in other words, the Other's body is there and presented, but is not thematic as a natural body, but as an organ of expression.

The communicative relationship is such that it is constituted by both ego and alter ego together. The alter ego addresses himself to the ego: if communication is to be established, he addresses himself to what the ego already knows, and is thus the ego's own. But in his address—inasmuch as it is understood—the Other proves to the self that this knowledge that is his is not only his, but is shared. The two thus constitute themselves as a community related to a common world, their shared property, and not owned by either.

The status of the consciousness of the Other with Husserl's philosophy should now be easy enough to see. Husserl's philosophy is transcendental idealism: it attempts to discern in conscious life a process by which consciousness transcends itself by producing an object through intentionality.

Here, consciousness transcends itself in consciousness. This is a unique transcendental power, and, Husserl suggests, the preeminent one. The intent of this essay was to attempt to uncover the workings of this power. Clearly, it is far more complex than the process of constituting a spatial thing, yet it obeys very definite laws.

Consciousness is transcendental, and the means of its being transcendental is its power of unifying; it unifies its object, and in so doing it unifies itself. Here, it posits its object as the name for all, and by this act constitutes self and Other as a community relating...
The community is a "personality of a higher order" (C.M. 160). Its members are not related to it as to intentional objects, but as to themselves; the community is a subjectivity. The constitution of the community is the self-constitution of its members; and is in Husserl's philosophy the pre-eminent transcendental power. Hence, intersubjectivity itself is transcendental.
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