


THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIRST GENERAL DRILL REGLEMENT IN 1749:
AN ASPECT OF THE MOVE TOWARD CENTRALIZATION AND
STANDARDIZATION IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY
OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES


**TOTAL OF 10 PAGES ONLY
MAY BE XEROXED**

(Without Author's Permission)

ALEXANDER BALISCH



2000



The Emergence of the First General Drill
Reglement in 1749: An Aspect of the Move
Toward Centralization and Standardization
in the Austrian Army of the Eighteenth
Century.

by



Alexander Balisch, B.A.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts,

Memorial University of Newfoundland

ABSTRACT

The issuing of the Drill Reglement for the whole Austrian infantry in 1749 was an important part of the centralizing reforms of Maria Theresa and marked a turning point in the development of the Austrian army.

Constitutional and financial conditions, among others, had delayed the effective centralization of state and army administration before the reign of Maria Theresa; and during the later years of Charles VI's reign the army had deteriorated through neglect and lack of control from above. The lack of drill and duty regulations for the whole army, such as then existed in Prussia, had contributed to the weaknesses of the Austrian army. At the end of Charles VI's reign, in 1737, a drill manual was issued which was to have been adhered to by all infantry regiments. Various circumstances, however, prevented its general acceptance.

In 1748, after the Wars of the Austrian Succession, a military commission was set up to effect a thorough reform of the military system. One of the major tasks of this commission was the composition of a drill and duty Reglement for the whole army. In 1749 a general Reglement was issued to all regiments and its application was strictly enforced. The much improved performance of the Austrian army during the Seven Years War was due, to a great degree,

to this.

Although the contents of this Reglement have been known, the deliberations of the military commission of 1748 on this topic are here discussed for the first time. Furthermore, new light has been shed through new research by this writer on the origins and roots of this Reglement. Whereas military historians have, up to now, considered this reform, especially this Reglement of 1749, as a copy of Prussian practices and manuals, this writer's research shows that there is no indication of a conscious or intentional copying from the Prussian model as far as the Drill Reglement of 1749 is concerned.

PREFACE

The Austrian army of the eighteenth century has been treated by English speaking historians as a neglected step child. Whereas a fair number of monographs and short articles has been published in English on the French and Prussian armies of that period, very little on the Austrian army has appeared in print. It may be the lot of the vanquished to be neglected and forgotten by later generations.

To fill a small part of this gap, this thesis proposes to trace one facet in the development of the Austrian army during the first half of the eighteenth century: the development of the drill regulations, leading to the first general Reglement in 1749.¹ Introduced much later than in Prussia, general drill regulations for the whole Austrian army are said to have followed the Prussian example, to have been adopted because the proven superiority of the Prussian army had forced the Austrians to bring their army up to the Prussian standards.²

¹The contemporary Austrian term was Exercitium Reglament.

²e.g.: Max Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften, (Munich:1891), vol.3, p.2560; Grosser Generalstab, Der Siebenjährige Krieg, (Berlin: 1901), vol.1, p.143; G.Anger, Illustrierte Geschichte der k.k. Armee, (Vienna: 1887), vol.2, p.1098; A.v. Arneth, Maria Theresia, (Vienna:1870), vol.4, p.88.

It is the intention of this study to show the motives for the development of general drill Reglements and to examine the extent to which the Prussian model was in fact followed by the Austrians.

In 1748, following the setbacks of the Wars of the Austrian Succession, a military commission was formed in Vienna to devise a whole new military system.¹ Although the reforms introduced by this commission are well known, the commission's deliberations have not previously been exploited. The minutes of the commission's sessions, memoranda by commission members and other generals, and reports on the conditions in the army, therefore constitute the major original sources for the main part of this study. A brief exposition of the administrative and financial problems of the monarchy is necessary in order to elucidate the conditions under which the new general drill Reglements were formulated. For the sake of brevity, and because of its direct relevance to the purpose of this study, the discussion of drill and tactics during the period preceding the Wars of the Austrian Succession will concentrate on those of the infantry. Any reference to the situation in Hungary

¹The documents in the KA refer to this commission as Militär Commission. The references to its deliberations are based, unless otherwise stated, on the minutes (Protocoll) of the commission's sessions in 1748; KA, Mem 1748, 9 - 152.

and on the Military Border has been omitted, as, to deal at all effectively with these matters, would necessitate treating a host of special questions and would exceed the proper scope of this study.

All translations from the original sources are, unless otherwise stated, by this writer.

I wish to express my appreciation for the advice and help received from my advisor, Professor Dr. G.M.Schwarz of Memorial University of Newfoundland. My thanks also go to Dr. Kurt Broucek of the Austrian War Archives in Vienna for facilitating my research and for valuable assistance. The patience and speedy compliance with my continuous requests for more documents for my research by Mrs.(Dr.) Woinovich and the staff members of the War Archives deserve my sincere thanks. They made research a pleasurable experience. Last, but not least, I wish to express my sincere thanks to Memorial University for supplying the necessary funds, through a research grant, to make my research in Vienna at all possible.

INTRODUCTION

The term 'Austrian army' is correct only when applied to the standing army of the Austrian Habsburgs as it developed after the Peace of Westphalia.¹ The process by which the Austrian army evolved from its two roots, an Imperial German army and the levies of the hereditary Habsburg lands, was a gradual one. When, after 1648, Emperor Ferdinand III retained several regiments, he initiated the birth of the standing army; but these regiments can only be regarded as the embryo of the army which was to emerge during the following one hundred years.

Constitutional conditions, technological advances, rivalry and wars among the major European powers, a new system of recruiting, and changing strategic and tactical ideas were the main factors involved in the development of the standing armies of this period. These, in turn, led to the development of the formalized warfare and rigid

¹This writer cannot agree with E. Herschmann's thesis - E. Herschmann, Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Österreich, (Vienna: 1925) - that various regiments retained after the end of campaigns during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries for periods of up to several years, can be referred to by the term Austrian army. The concept of a standing army and proposals to create one, however, do antedate 1648.

military doctrine characteristic of the second half of the eighteenth century.

When Maria Theresa succeeded her father, 'Charles VI', in 1740, several of the European powers were anxious to deprive her of her heritage, notwithstanding their recent agreement to the Pragmatic Sanction. At this time of great danger to the House of Habsburg, she found herself dependent upon an army which she considered to be in a deplorable condition:

Who would believe that no regulations existed in my army? Each (regiment) made a different maneuver on marches, in drill and in everything. The same commands were interpreted differently....¹

How was it possible that the Austrian army, an army with such glorious traditions and history, had fallen into such a deplorable state?

The fact that the Austrian army had no general drill regulations, conducted no maneuvers and had no training camps during the period preceding 1748, occasioned little or no concern from its greatest field marshals, Montecuccoli and Eugene of Savoy,² in view of the fact that the armies

¹Josef Kallbrunner, ed., Kaiserin Maria Theresias Politisches Testament, (Vienna: 1952), p.72

²Raimund Fürst Montecuccoli, Imperial field marshal, President of the Hofkriegsrat from 1668 to 1681
Eugene Franz, Prinz von Savoyen, Austrian field marshal, President of the Hofkriegsrat from 1703 to 1736

of Austria's enemies did not have them either. Moreover, Austria had in these men generals who could outmaneuver and defeat the greatest generals of their time with an army which was ill paid, poorly equipped and not drilled to general regulations.

During their periods, Montecuccoli and Prince Eugene had focused their complaints on administrative defects and shortcomings rather than on matters of training. They deplored the lack of funds, the problems arising from the lack of co-operation between the Hofkriegsrat and the Hofkammer,¹ and the intrigues and jealousies within the Imperial Court, central government departments and the officer corps.

With the death of Prince Eugene in 1736, the succession of outstanding imperial generals came to a close. Thus, with a dearth of brilliant military leaders, and, faced in 1740 with an enemy - Prussia - whose army had recently undergone intensive reforms and training, the shortcomings of the Austrian army with regard to tactical training and drill became readily apparent. These were the greatest defects of her army in the eyes of Maria Theresa.

¹Hofkriegsrat: Imperial War Council, the central administrative department for military affairs
Hofkammer: The central finance department which controlled most of the finances, including those of the Hofkriegsrat

GLOSSARY

CA	Cabinettsakten; in Austrian War Archives
Cheveaux de frise	see: Schweinsfedern
Exp	Expedit; register of in-coming mail at Hofkriegsrat
FA	(Alte) Feldakten in Austrian War Archives
FM	Field Marshal
FZM	Feldzeugmeister; General
FML	Feldmarschalleutenant; Lt. General
FWM or GFWM	Feldwachtmeister; Major General
HK	Hofkammer (Finance Department)
HKR	Hofkriegsrat (War Council) in foot- notes: collection of HKR documents
KA	Kriegsarchiv; Austrian War Archives in Vienna
Mem	Kriegswissenschaftliche Memoiren; collection of documents in Vienna War Archives
Partisane	Halbert
Peloton	Platoon
Reg	Registratur; register of out-going mail at Hofkriegsrat
Schweinsfeder	Swine feather, Swedish feather; a stake, several feet in length, pointed at both ends, to be placed at an angle into the ground in front of the infantry lines, as a protection against cavalry attack. Several S. could be pushed through holes in an horizontal beam to produce the so- called <u>cheveaux de frise</u>
Sponton	a simplified form of halbert

CONTENTS

PREFACE	i
INTRODUCTION	iv
GLOSSARY	vii
THE STATE FINANCES	1
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS	6
THE RISE OF THE STANDING ARMY	15
TACTICS OF THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	23
THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	28
FROM THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO 1740	32
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DRILL REGLEMENTS	44
The Austrian Regimental Reglements	44
The Development of the Prussian Drill Reglements	49
Good Intentions: the Hofkriegsrat's Plan for a General Regiment	52
The Austrian Regulament of 1737	56
THE TEST: THE FIRST AND SECOND SILESIAN WARS	59
The Battle of Mollwitz	61
The Battle of Chotusitz (Czaslau)	63
The Battles of Hohenfriedberg and Sohr	64
THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD: 1737 to 1748 THE MOVE TOWARD REFORM	66
THE REFORM COMMISSION OF 1748/49	76
THE 1749 EXERCITIUM REGLEMENT FOR THE INFANTRY	91

Appendix A	100
Appendix B	135
Bibliography	154

THE STATE FINANCES

The income of the crown from its domains, the town taxes, the indirect taxes and the regalia, all administered by the Hofkammer, was used to cover the expenses of the court, the administration of the state and the ex gratia payments. Military expenses had to be covered by a special tax, called after 1621 the Kontribution, requested from and approved by the Estates of the various Länder. (In 1627 the rights of the Bohemian Estates were restricted to the acceptance of royal proposals only).¹ The income from the Kontribution never was sufficient for the efficient upkeep of an army engaged in practically uninterrupted wars. From the sixteenth century on, the history of Austrian state finances is largely one of public debt.² The system of financial administration,³ the

¹F.M. Mayer, Geschichte Österreichs, (Vienna: 1909) vol.II, p.282ff

²H.L. Mikoletzky, Österreich: Das grosse achzehnte Jahrhundert, (Vienna: 1967), p.26

³For a detailed description see: Thomas Fellner, Die Österreichische Zentralverwaltung, 1.Abteilung, 1.Bd. Kapitel 2, (Vienna: 1907)

nearly permanent state of war, corruption, and the excessive generosity of many of the emperors were the main reasons for this sorry state of the Austrian finances.

The foundation of the Hofkammer in the sixteenth century by Maximilian I and its reorganization by Ferdinand I did not lead to a true centralization of financial administration, as the dualism in the various Länder continued: the Estates retained the right to grant taxes, to collect them and even to decide on their use. Thus, the uncomfortable co-existence of the Hofkammer with the finance departments of the Estates in the Länder prevented the Hofkammer from controlling expenditures and revenue efficiently.¹ Corruption among ministers, as exemplified by the exposure of one Count Sinzendorf, who was tried and convicted in 1670, was sufficient to lead a civil servant to advise Leopold I that "Your Majesty had suffered less damage through wars than through a greedy minister."² The generosity of the emperors added to the problems. Gifts ranging in value from a few thousand to more than a hundred thousand Gulden were freely distributed to individuals while

¹H.L. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.85

²F.M. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.288

at the same time the armies lacked the most basic necessities. In 1703, for example, the widow of a court chamberlain received 120,000 Gulden in recognition of her husband's long, faithful service.¹ The expenses of the court were high, yet they were comparable with those of the other great courts of Europe. Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries court expenses continued to rise drastically, as the 'court' degenerated from a governing body into an organism with purely prestige value. The numbers of the members of the court rose from 451 under Ferdinand I to 2175 under Charles VI.² During the reign of Leopold I even parts of the crown treasure had to be pawned to cover expenses and only in 1716 were the last of these redeemed in Amsterdam and Hamburg.³

Additional expenses arose from the cost of embassies and receptions of foreign ambassadors. This was especially the case with regard to Turkey. In 1719 the ambassador of the Porte stayed in Vienna for over one year with

¹Loc.cit.

²H.L. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.87

³Ibid., p.89 and F.M. Mayer, op.cit., p.287

an entourage of 736 persons - at the expense of the emperor.¹

The high cost of wars constituted the major expense. The Turkish wars, which ended with the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, for example, cost the emperor approximately twenty million Gulden. Of this amount, only two thirds could be covered from the income of the state. As the collection of these sums was subject to frequent delays, the army continually suffered from lack of funds.²

The state finances were dependent on the reluctant cooperation of the Estates, on foreign loans and on money lenders, of whom Samuel Oppenheimer, (in Vienna from 1677 to 1703), was the least selfish.³

Exact figures on the financial situation of the monarchy during the period before Maria Theresa are unfortunately unavailable.⁴ In spite of this, the situation is clear: the state was continuously balancing along the abyss of bankruptcy. That it did not in fact become bankrupt, was one of the miracles of the House of Habsburg. The situation becomes even clearer considering that, in 1739,

¹H.L. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.115

²Loc. cit.

³See Maria Theresa's two Denkschriften in Kallbrunner, op.cit., passim

⁴E. Guglia, Maria Theresia, (Munich: 1917), vol.I, p.48

with a budget of approximately forty million Gulden, the deficit amounted to eighty-three million. In the same year the state debt reached one hundred million - an increase of forty million Gulden since 1711. This imbalance in relation to the income of the state presented a dangerous situation.¹ Although Austria then had a larger territory than France and a population about equal to that of France, the income of the state was only about one fifth of that of France.²

¹Ibid., p.49

²G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.964

THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

Any study of military developments, whether it concerns the fields of tactics, strategy, doctrines of war or logistics, etc., has to be concerned with the system of administration of military affairs, with the apparatus under which the military has to function. To-day's war ministries are, of course, of rather recent creation. The Feudal Age did not know central state departments concerned with military affairs; neither did they exist during the early part of the Age of Absolutism, during which the administration and conduct of warfare were divided between the ruler, the Estates and the great captains of the mercenaries.

During the sixteenth century the continuous and increasing Turkish threat, and the desire to centralize the administration of the various Länder, led to the establishment of a central department for military affairs. In 1526, when Austria became a great power by uniting Hungary and Bohemia with the Habsburg crown, military administration in each Land was placed under a Landeshauptmann (provincial governor) and a war council, an attempt to centralize military administration at least in each Land. In 1556,

Ferdinand I created a permanent war council - after 1564 called the Hofkriegsrat -¹ with the function of administering the armories, fortresses, supply, organization and direction of the army of the monarchy.² From its creation the Hofkriegsrat was made dependent on the Hofkammer for funds- a dependence which, originally, the latter did not desire,³ but eventually guarded jealously. As the Hofkriegsrat continued to remain dependent on the Hofkammer, a great conflict between these two central governments developed.

The situation was complicated by the fact that, from 1578 on, there existed a separate Hofkriegsrat in Graz for Inner Austria and a military department in Tyrol, each concerned with the defense measures for its respective area. These separate war councils existed until 1705, when, with the waning of the Turkish danger, Joseph I subordinated them to the Vienna Hofkriegsrat, which from then on handled all military affairs for the whole Habsburg territories.⁴

In 1615, under Mathias, the field of competence of the Hofkriegsrat became more clearly defined. It was entrusted

¹F.M. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.275

²Loc. cit.

³Oskar Regele, Der Osterreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556 - 1848 (Vienna: 1949), p.15

⁴Ibid., p.32

with all matters of defense, its competence in Turkish affairs was emphasized and it was made directly responsible to the emperor. Thereafter, all decisions by the Hofkriegsrat had to be submitted directly to the emperor, whose placet put them into effect.¹ Furthermore, Hofkriegsrat and Hofkammer were declared government departments of equal rank. As the competence of the Hofkriegsrat extended only to purely military matters, all financial matters being dealt with by the Hofkammer, the latter exerted great legal and even greater non-legal influence over the freedom of action of the Hofkriegsrat. Thus the insufficient supply of the army with money and equipment can be attributed to this division of competences and should not be used as an argument for the incompetence of the Hofkriegsrat. During the Thirty Years War this arrangement proved inadequate and only the ability, the financial resources and the personality of Wallenstein were able to solve the problems of supply, recruitment, pay and equipment of troops.

After the Thirty Years War the Hofkriegsrat underwent a reorganization. It was divided into four departments, one for food supply, one for equipment (arsenals, artillery, ammunition, etc.), one for recruiting and remounts and the fourth for fortification and other

¹Ibid., p.42

building. In addition, a new subordinate office was established: the General Kriegs Kommissariat, with control over the financial administration of the various army units (regiments).¹

The separation of competences, the equal rank accorded to the heads of the Hofkriegsrat, Hofkammer, and General Kriegs Kommissariat added intrigue and cabal to the difficulties. In addition, many of the positions in these departments were staffed by civilians, a practice which was repeatedly criticized by Austrian generals. In 1670, Field Marshal Montecuccoli, in his capacity as President of the Hofkriegsrat, informed the emperor of the Hofkriegsrat's shortcomings and complained about civil personnel being in charge of military affairs and about the complete financial dependence of this department on the Hofkammer.² Similar complaints were raised by Prince Eugene, whose military correspondence³ is full of desperate appeals for funds to cover the basic needs of his army and of complaints about the corruption and intrigues in the Vienna central government departments.

¹Ibid., p.19

²A. Veltze, Ausgewählte Schriften Montecuccolis, (Vienna: 1899-1909), vol.III, p.385f

³Eugen von Savoyen, Die militärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, P. Heller, ed., (Vienna:1848)

His letters of complaint to the emperor and especially those to his trusted friend, the Hofkammerrat von Palm, are, and this is not a journalistic exaggeration, cries of frustration.

Like most of the Habsburg central government departments, the Hofkriegsrat increased rapidly in size. In 1556, at the time of its foundation, its personnel amounted to one president, four councillors and a few secretaries and messengers.¹ By 1672 this number had risen to one president, eight councillors, five secretaries, fourteen lower clerks and three servants.² In 1719, under Prince Eugene, eleven generals were added as councillors, thus decreasing the civilian influence in this department. The greatest increase came under Charles VI. By 1740 the number of councillors had increased to thirty-six, the total personnel now numbering 144. On her accession, Maria Theresa reduced the personnel drastically.³

It would appear, however, that, to some extent at least, the increase in the clerical staff and in the number of councillors was prompted by necessity, if one considers the wide field of competence of the Hofkriegsrat, the methods of office work and the difficulties of communications during

¹Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.42

²Gilbert Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.943

³Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.42

this period. Aside from administering the military affairs of a widespread realm - from the Netherlands to the South of Italy, from Spain to the borders of Russia and Turkey¹ - it was also in charge of foreign relations with Turkey, Poland and Persia, and, until 1720, with Russia. Aside from purely administrative work, the Hofkriegsrat had to concern itself also with matters which to-day would be the concern of a general staff - that is, with the planning of operations and strategy.

The extensiveness of the Hofkriegsrat's field of competence can be seen from a list in the Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, (Vienna: 1876 - 1892), vol.I, p.191, quoted in Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.21f. It comprised:

1. The transmission of orders from the emperor to generals and army units and the drafting of directives given by the emperor
2. All organizational regulations
3. The more important personnel problems; for example, field commanders, commandants of fortresses, colonels-in-chief, generals, staff officers, etc., the emperor reserving for himself the final decision
4. Replacements of men and material, but in agreement with Hofkammer and General Kriegs Kommissariat
5. Table of organization and authorized strength of army in agreement with General Kriegs Kommissariat
6. The main directives concerning supply and pay in agreement with General Kriegs Kommissariat and Central Supply department
7. Matters concerning weapons, artillery, equipment and munitions through the State and Court Quartermaster's Department

¹Ibid., appendix 17

8. Matters concerning fortification and other military building, through commandants of fortresses and through paymaster's office in the Department of Fortifications
9. Affairs concerning river transport and bridge building through respective departments

This list shows that the Hofkriegsrat could act independently in only a few of the fields it was concerned with.

Many excuses and explanations for the cumbersome system of military administration can be given. There was, first of all, the complexity of the far-flung Austrian territories with their territorial, or provincial, privileges, with a lack of anything even faintly resembling 'national' unity. Although great strides toward the centralization of government had been made during the two centuries preceding Maria Theresa's reign, they were of necessity slower than similar strides made in states like France and Prussia. In addition to the political and constitutional problems there were the above mentioned financial ones, which, in turn, were linked closely to the system of taxation, under which the Estates had to approve the annual financial requests of the crown. Under Prussia's very real threat to the existence of the monarchy, Maria Theresa was able to improve this system by the introduction of the Ten-Year Recess, a tax approved by the Estates of some of the Länder.¹

¹Alfred Ritter von Arneth, Maria Theresia, (Vienna:1863-79), vol. IV, p.13ff

The Estates of Styria, Carniola, Goricia and Gradiska agreed only to a Three-Year Recess and Carinthia refused any co-operation. Maria Theresa was forced to collect the tax in Carinthia "jure regio die Praestanda",¹ i.e. the tax was collected by imperial officials.

The slowness of the Hofkriegsrat can be partially excused by the methods of clerical work and the conditions of communications in this period. Detailed and precise records of all decisions and correspondence had to be made to enable pinpointing of responsibilities.² This need for extreme exactness further aggravated the naturally slow process of hand copying. In many cases, however, faster reaction could have been expected: in 1702 Prince Eugene requested repeatedly the emperor's decisions in important matters of strategy and supply and complained to his friend von Palm of the incredible fact that he, as the commanding general of the army in Italy, had been kept in ignorance for more than a quarter of a year in these matters.³ The slowness of the administration was also compounded by the difficulties of extricating funds from the Hofkammer and the

¹Erste Denkschrift Maria Theresias, J. Kallbrunner, op.cit., p.61

²Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.47

³Eugen von Savoiien, Militärische Korrespondenz..., vol.I, p.35⁴ letter to von Palm, 29 May 1702

additional clerical work involved in this area. Communications from the Hofkammer to the Hofkriegsrat usually took from two to four weeks, and only in the most urgent cases could these delays be shortened.¹ In short, the military administration suffered from a complexity which was too great for the technical means of the period.

¹Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.47

THE RISE OF THE STANDING ARMY

Three things are necessary for the conduct of war: money, money and money. This old dictum, made popular by Montecuccoli, applies to the rise of the standing armies in Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century. A well developed money economy was the prerequisite for the creation of the large armies of the eighteenth century, and there lies one of the reasons why the Habsburgs were at a disadvantage. Emperors before Maria Theresa had been unable to eliminate the authority of the Estates in taxation and administration, which seriously limited the ability of the crown to tap the resources of the monarchy through taxation. This financial weakness may have been one of the reasons why some of the military theorists of this period still advocated armies of rather limited size. Montecuccoli proposed 30,000 men as the optimal size of an army: "One fights more with the brain than with the body, therefore great numbers are not always advantageous."¹ Field Marshal Khevenhüller² suggested that "the size of an

¹Raimond Montecuccoli, Gesammelte Schriften, vol.1 pp 327 and 364, quoted in Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (Berlin: 1962), vol.IV, p.429f

²Ludwig Andreas, Graf Khevenhüller, (1683 - 1744), Austrian field marshal during Wars of the Austrian Succession

army should be 1) according to (the strength of) the enemy, 2) according to the terrain, 3) according to the fortresses, 4) as small as possible."¹ There were other reasons for this advocacy of small armies besides the financial and organizational problems. The slow-firing matchlock musket was being replaced by the faster firing fusil which, together with the adoption of the bayonet, was leading to the complete disappearance of pikemen. Although these advances in weaponry brought with them changes in tactics which required well-drilled troops, they were not paralleled by the development of uniform drill regulations. For this reason, large armies, not drilled uniformly, would have been unmanageable. Problems of supply also were responsible for the limited size of the armies.

Considerations of both foreign and internal politics promoted the emergence of standing armies. In the Habsburg lands two specific reasons can be discerned: the increasing and continuous threat to the borders by the Turks during the late seventeenth century and the proven unreliability of the levies of the Estates during the Thirty Years War, when, for example, the Bohemian levies had turned against the Habsburgs. Of course, the

¹Andreas Khevenhüller, Kurzer Begriff aller militärischen Operationen, (Vienna: 1738), p.7

aggressive policies of Louis XIV, whose army could be called a standing army, also added to the desire to create a permanent force under the direct control of the emperor.

The armies of mercenaries of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were not state institutions. The Imperial army of the sixteenth century still consisted of the feudal levies, mercenaries of the emperor himself, troops recruited by the Länder, the militia of the Estates and the Hungarian Insurrektion (the feudal levies of the Hungarian magnates).¹

By the early seventeenth century the legal basis for feudal levies was still extant, but the levies were no more used. During the Thirty Years War mercenaries and the troops of the Estates had proven untrustworthy, so that the recruiting system was the only solution left. Wallenstein, with his great financial resources, developed it into what was really more a private than an Imperial army.²

In Wallenstein's day, regimental patents were issued to experienced colonels or captains, who had to finance the recruiting and outfitting of their units. Sometimes patents were issued for smaller units - Fähnlein or companies. The patents were issued at first by the emperor, later during the war by Wallenstein himself, and each holder of such a

¹Oskar Regele, op.cit., p.17

²G. Anger, op.cit., vol.I., p.695ff

patent was allotted a recruiting district. In spite of Wallenstein's popularity, reputation and resources, volunteers were not plentiful enough.¹ Hence, the excesses of recruiting parties, which had their better known equivalent in the English press gangs, developed. In addition, in spite of strict laws forbidding excesses toward the civilian population, the newly recruited soldiers, mostly old, tough veterans or the scum of the towns, committed excesses, which the authorities were unable to prevent. Therefore, towns often tried, successfully, to buy themselves off from being declared as recruiting places. Nuremberg, in 1626, paid hundred thousand Gulden to free itself from the burden of becoming a recruiting area and fifteen thousand Thaler to free itself from the billeting of newly recruited soldiers within its walls.² The excesses connected with the recruiting parties were to last well into the eighteenth century and were partly responsible for the high rate of desertion in the armies of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century. Not until the introduction of conscription under Joseph II were these shortcomings eliminated to any considerable degree.

During the early seventeenth century troops were recruited for a specified time, at least for the duration of

¹Ibid., vol.I, p.697

²Ibid., vol.I., p.696

the war, although several regiments were dissolved during periods of lulls in the fighting, e.g. in 1630.¹ The dismissal of troops always posed a danger to the countryside, as bands of discharged soldiers terrorized the peasants.

There is a dual aspect to the development of large standing armies during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Central Europe. On the one hand, the struggle for supremacy in Europe that began with the reign of Louis XIV called for far larger armies than contemplated by Montecuccoli. On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of large standing armies necessitated wresting financial authority and control of military administration away from the Estates and combining control of financial and military affairs in the hands of the crown. Such central control was imperative to make standardized drill and training feasible. At the same time, the creation of a large standing army under central control placed an instrument in the hands of the crown to enhance yet further its authority at the expense of the Estates.

The first step in this direction was taken in 1627 - after the army of the rebellious Bohemian Estates had been decisively defeated in the battle of the White Mountain in 1621 - with the Verneuerte Landesordnung for Bohemia, which, among other points, forbade the Bohemian Estates the re-

¹Ibid., vol.II, p.703

recruiting of troops. In 1635 Ferdinand II declared the ius belli armorum in Bohemia his privilege.

Even before the end of the Thirty Years War, Field Marshall Montecuccoli advocated the formation of a standing army. In his De constituenda militia perpetua in statibus Austriacis, (1648), he advocated the formation of standing forces and the building of barracks, and he argued against the supply of food to the troops by the population.¹ (The latter two suggestions had to wait to be implemented until Maria Theresa's reign). In his Memorie he argued the advantages of a standing army, which would raise the prestige of the state and make it possible to preserve peace or to make war at an opportune time or to aid friends, as there would always be trained soldiers at hand. He pointed out that the upkeep of a standing army would be cheaper than the frequent dissolution and subsequent re-recruitment and training of regiments.² He suggested that a certain number of homes in each village be assessed with the upkeep of one soldier.³ That the field marshal was no politician is shown by his naive argument that "... the Estates would not really use their powers if they would permanently approve

¹F.M. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.276

²Wallenstein, too, had tried to prove this point. See: G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.703

³Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1168

the sums they now approve annually."¹

The legal basis for the creation of a standing army was the resolution by Ferdinand III in 1649 to retain nine infantry regiments, nine cuirassier regiments and one dragoon regiment, all of which had been formed during the war. They were to receive replacements by handling their own recruiting and thus were not subject to the contributions of the Lnder. All other regiments were dissolved.²

It is of interest that, although nineteenth and twentieth century historians consider the above date the birth date of the Austrian standing army, Hoyer, writing in 1797, does not call these retained regiments a standing army. He feels that the nearly continuous wars of the late seventeenth century led to recurrent dissolution and recreation of regiments, thus giving a semblance of a standing army.³ The retained regiments of Ferdinand III can, however, safely be called the core of the Austrian standing army. The following table shall illustrate this point. As some regiments were dissolved after each war, new ones were formed soon after and the number of regiments steadily increased.

¹loc. cit.

²A. Wrede, Geschichte der k.u.k. Whermacht, (Vienna:1898) vol. I, p.13

³J. Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (Gttingen: 1798) vol.I, p.3

1649	9	infantry	regiments	10	cavalry	regiments
1672	19	"	"	20	"	"
1705	37	"	"	35	"	"
1710	40	"	"	37	"	"
1728	65	"	"	54	"	"
1740	52	"	"	40	"	" ¹

However, central control and inspection of the individual regiments remained insufficient. This became evident in the corruption connected with recruiting and promotions as well as in the continued lack of general reglements and uniform practices in field tactics.

¹A. Wrede, op.cit., vol.I, p.14 and Franz Müller, Die kaiserl. königl. österreichische Armee, (Prague: 1845), vol.II, p.279ff

TACTICS OF THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

During the seventeenth century the whole system of warfare was in a state of flux and underwent one of the most drastic changes in military history. Minor tactics changed radically as a result of changes and advances in weaponry and of practical experiences gleaned during the long wars.

Before the fifteenth century the main striking force of an army was the knightly cavalry. The appearance of well disciplined and long-serving infantry,¹ trained to withstand cavalry, led to a gradual decline in the importance of this knightly cavalry. However, with its transformation into a recruited force during the seventeenth century, the importance and relative strength of cavalry rose again. Whereas, during the sixteenth century it had formed only a small part of an army, during the Thirty Years War the cavalry formed at times half of a typical army.²

At the beginning of the Thirty Years War the pikemen formed the majority and the main striking force of the infantry, outnumbering the musketeers three to one.³ By the

¹of which the English long-bow men and the Swiss pikemen of the fifteenth century were the outstanding examples

²Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (Berlin: 1962), vol.IV, p.328

³Lynn Montross, War through the Ages, (New York:1960),p.2270

end of the war the number of pikemen had drastically declined, although the exact relation of pikemen to musketeers varied in different armies. By 1670, in the imperial army under Montecuccoli, pikemen formed only one third of the infantry.¹

Although steadily decreasing in number, pikemen were retained in all armies until about 1700, notwithstanding that doubts regarding their value had been expressed since early in the seventeenth century. Rarely did it come to a clash of pikemen during a battle; one side usually retreated before it came to hand-to-hand fighting. The German writer Grimmelshausen, who had fought in the Thirty Years War, stated in his Seltsamer Springinsfeld, (1670), that "the man who kills a pikeman, kills an innocent man: although these poor fellows are supposed to protect their brigades from cavalry attacks, they hurt no one and the man deserves his fate, who runs into a pike." He vouched that he had rarely observed a pikeman killing anyone.²

The controversy over the armament lasted for over a century. The pike was considered the only effective means of defense against cavalry and the pike squares formed the backbone of the armies of the seventeenth century. The pike

¹Raimund Montecuccoli, Besondere und Geheime Kriegsnachrichten (Leipzig: 1736), p.24

²G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.736

squares were reinforced by musketeers, who, however, had to retreat behind or to within the squares in case of cavalry attack. Such retreats often resulted in confusion and opened gaps between the pike squares. Yet, in spite of this, the number of musketeers rose continuously.

The administrative unit of an army was the regiment, the average size of which was between seven hundred and one thousand five hundred men.¹ The tactical unit, however, was the battalion, a name given to any number of infantry united in the field into a square. (e.g.: during the battle of Leipzig, 1631, two thousand men).²

The usual battle order consisted of infantry squares in the center, flanked by cavalry. The army was arranged in two lines with a third line sometimes as tactical reserve. Each infantry square consisted of a core of pikemen, flanked by ranks of musketeers, often with one or two ranks of musketeers in front. At the beginning of the Thirty Years War these squares were usually ten deep. Various considerations - the clumsiness of the massive formation, its vulnerability to artillery and even musket fire, and the difficulty of obtaining pikemen in sufficient numbers - they had less opportunity to loot than the musketeers, who could be used in the "small war" - led to a gradual reduction in the depth of the

¹J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.I, p.333f

²Ibid., vol.I, p.465

formation. By the end of the war, the imperial infantry was arranged six deep.

At the beginning of the war the musketeers, standing eight to ten deep, on the flanks of the pike squares, fired by using the caracole.¹ Gustavus Adolphus reduced the depth of the musketeer formation to six ranks. He also introduced an alternate method of firing, the peloton fire.²

The development of faster firing muskets made this shallower formation possible and desirable, as it permitted fuller use of firepower over a broader front. Moreover, this increased firepower gradually transformed the battalion into a force armed for fire action rather than shock action.

Thus, the increase of firepower, the reduction of the number of pikemen and the thinning of the formation went hand in hand.

Firing and loading was very cumbersome and slow. Nearly one hundred moves were necessary and prescribed for this process. No wonder that the musketeer found time for firing only a few rounds during a battle. At Kinzingen, in 1636,

¹In this maneuver the first line, after having fired, parted in the center, ran along the front and around the formation where it reformed behind the last rank. The other ranks followed the same maneuver in sequence. A variation provided for the musketeers to run through the lines to reform in the rear, a faster method, but it made the formation more vulnerable to cavalry attack because of the wider intervals necessary.

²The peloton was a subdivision of the battalion. The number of pelotons per battalion varied.

the Swedish infantry was praised because even the slowest musketeer fired at least seven rounds during the battle, which lasted several hours.¹

The actual process of a battle was still simple at the beginning of the war: infantry and cavalry advanced at the same slow speed toward the enemy. Maneuvers and evolutions during the battle were made nearly impossible by the clumsiness of the massive formations. Gustavus Adolphus introduced several changes which were eventually copied by other armies: deviations from the standard battle order according to the terrain and the observed position of the enemy, introduction of simple maneuvers during the battle and reduction of the depth of the formation to six ranks.

The Peace of Westphalia marked the end of a period in military tactics. Tentative innovations and experiments made during the war, especially by the Swedes, were in part adopted by other armies. During the second half of the seventeenth century the basis for eighteenth century warfare and tactics were laid by the initiative of French and Austrian generals.

¹J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.I, p.446

THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The outstanding Austrian - or Imperial - general of the late seventeenth century was Raimund Prince Montecuccoli, President of the Hofkriegsrat from 1668 until his death in 1681. He was the first important Austrian military theoretician and writer and the only one before Field Marshal Khevenhüller, who wrote during the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth century. In this area Austria clearly lagged behind France and Italy, whose military writers were the leading theoreticians of the period between the Thirty Years War and the middle of the eighteenth century. However, Montecuccoli and Khevenhüller were men of practice rather than inventors of systems, unlike, for example, Folard and the marechal de Saxe, and, as such, their writings constitute a more valuable source for actual battle tactics of their times.

In spite of the now increased fire power, a result of improved weapons, Montecuccoli still considered the pike important for the infantry - "the queen of weapons."¹ He did not believe that musketeers alone could withstand a cavalry

¹Raimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.12

attack.¹ He therefore insisted that the front of musketeers between the pike squares be no wider than seventy to eighty men,² as otherwise cavalry could open a gap in the front line. His argument seemed to have been a sound one considering the conditions of the time. In 1674 the French marshal Turenne, for example, protected his infantry against a German cavalry attack by forming a pike square with his musketeers in its center. The German cavalry did not dare to attempt penetration.³

Montecuccoli retained the formation in six ranks. A shallower one he considered too vulnerable, a greater depth would have been worthless, as the pikes of the sixth rank reached only to the first rank.⁴

The battle order, according to Montecuccoli, still consisted of the army arranged in two lines, the infantry in each line in six ranks, the cavalry in three ranks. The battalion was still the tactical unit of the infantry with a suggested strength of 1280 men: 480 pikemen, 720 musketeers and 80 shield-bearers, whose task it was to 'sneak' between the attacking cavalry.⁵ He favoured alternating infantry

¹Ibid., p.14

²Ibid., p.20

³Hans Delbrück, op.cit., vol.IV, p.305

⁴Raimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.20

⁵Ibid., p.23f

battalions and cavalry squadrons although the usual practice was, a practice which was retained into the eighteenth century, to place the cavalry on each wing of the battle order.

The handling of the musket, loading and firing, was still a slow and cumbersome process, as was the firing in formation. Musketeers standing in six ranks could keep up a more or less continuous fire only by using the caracole or by passing through the files.¹

On the subject of drill Montecuccoli still adhered to the ideas of the previous period: the soldier should teach himself the handling of his weapon and keep himself physically fit; he should be trained in groups to practice the simple evolutions used: turns, opening and closing of the ranks and files, etc. The simpler and fewer the moves practiced, the better, he thought, the soldiers would perform in battle.² He saw no need for extensive, concentrated drill. It is significant that he devotes only one page of his lengthy Kriegsnachrichten to the subject of training and drill.

Of great importance were the developments, during this period, in strategic thinking. Because of its complexity this subject can only be touched upon in this paper. The

¹Hans Delbrück, op.cit., vol.IV, p.307

²Raimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.163

gradually increasing size of field armies, coupled with the realization that living off the land seriously hampered an army's freedom of movement, led to increasing reliance on supply depots. Henceforth an army no longer had to go where food was available, but where the position of the enemy would require it to go. The reliance on depots, however, shortened the operational radius of an army, and strategy now began to aim at maneuvering the enemy away from his magazines or to capture them. New and different supply problems now arose. On the other hand, the components of an army now could be kept closer together. When the great tactical changes of the early eighteenth century, which required better drill and stricter discipline, appeared, one of the prerequisite conditions for such training - concentration of troops - was already in existence.

FROM THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO 1740

The end of the seventeenth century saw an intensification of the rapidity of change in the development of weapons and tactics. The adoption by all armies of two innovations was responsible for the most important and consequential tactical changes: the development of a faster firing, reliable fusil and the adoption of the bayonet. The fast firing fusil made it possible for the first rank to be ready to fire the second round after the volley of the third rank. Thus a formation deeper than three ranks became unnecessary and undesirable. Yet, this change to a formation in three ranks did not come suddenly. The drill manual composed by the Austrian Colonel von Ogilvy, issued for his regiment in 1690, prescribes a battle formation in four ranks. The Austrian regiments took the lead by adopting this formation in four ranks at the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹ The French reduced the depth of their formation to five in 1703 and to four during the War of the Spanish Succession.² The Prussians adopted the formation

¹Wilhelm Erben, "Kriegsartikel und Reglements als Quellen zur Geschichte der k.k. Armee," in Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Heeresmuseums, (Vienna:1902) Heft 1, p.193. This article deals only with regimental Reglements before 1737

²R.S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, (New York: 1957) p.9

in four ranks in 1702.¹

The long argument about the value of pikes was finally settled by the adoption of the bayonet, which gave the fusil of the infantry the qualities of both fire and shock weapon. The experience of the Austrians with the Turkish cavalry, which was often able to break the pikes with their sabres, may have been the reason why the Austrians became the first to abandon the pike in favour of the bayonet during the last years of the seventeenth century.² The French retained the pike until about 1703. The other armies of Europe followed shortly thereafter. However, the marechal de Saxe, (1696 to 1750), still advocated the use of the pike in his Reveries and as late as 1818 (!) two articles appeared in an Austrian military journal³ which advocated the re-introduction of the pike. However, the pike had disappeared forever.

Clearly, the increased firepower and the bayonet had brought about the thin line formation of the eighteenth century. Now the argument of the general value, effect and use of firepower became more urgent. Of the various types of firing in formation, the peloton fire in which each

¹Max. Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1652

²J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.84

³---, "Ideen über den Gebrauch der Pike," Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, (Vienna:1818) vol.2 and 3

peloton fired by ranks and the battalion by alternating pelotons to keep up a continuous fire, became the most favoured method, followed in importance by the method of firing by whole ranks in succession. Aiming was usually discouraged, partly because of the inaccuracy of the fusil, partly because exact salvoes were considered to be more effective than scattered, aimed fire.¹ Keeping up a regular peloton fire during battle proved, however, practically impossible; after one or two orderly discharges on command every man fired more or less at his own speed.² (The Prussian infantry, drilled and disciplined to a degree of exactness previously unknown, was to come closest to the ideal). In all armies, the troops were ordered not to fire without command. (The soldier who disobeyed was to be 'run through' by the nearest officer). The better disciplined and drilled an army, the better this rule could be put into practice.

Usually, an army advancing toward the enemy had to stop to fire. As it was often difficult to get the men moving again, several generals advocated attack without firing. The marechal de Saxe advocated this in his Reveries³ and the

¹Hans Delbrück, op.cit., vol.IV, p.308

²Ibid., p.310

³Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, Thom. Philips, trans., (Harrisburg: 1944), p.32

Austrians tried it in the battle of Chotusitz in 1742 but suffered great losses through the accurate, regular fire of the Prussians.

The advantages of the bayonet in the fight of infantry against infantry were only slowly realized. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the bayonet was inserted only just before reaching the enemy lines or in case of cavalry attack.¹ Although the socket bayonet was introduced around 1700, firing with fixed bayonet was not used until the Prussians introduced it in 1732.² It is of interest here to note that - as in the case of the pikes - actual hand to hand fighting with fixed bayonets rarely occurred.³

There was little difference between the armies of the great powers in regard to tactical changes and innovations. In none of the great armies did the generals fully understand all the implications of the new developments: the thin line formation, the uniformly armed infantry and the increased firepower. The first army to draw the right conclusions from all these changes was the Prussian army.

¹This, of course, had been the original purpose of the introduction of the bayonet: to replace the pike as a defence against cavalry attack.

²J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.90

³Hans Delbrück, op.cit., vol.IV, p.309. The Prince de Ligne reports that he saw this happen only once during all his campaigns

Within the span of about half a century Prussia had risen from one of the insignificant German states to the most efficiently ruled and strongest of the smaller powers. It had been blessed with a period of relative peace from the end of the seventeenth century to 1740 so that its finances were not taxed by wars. (Although Prussian contingents took part in the War of the Spanish Succession and in the wars against the Turks - on the side of the Habsburgs - she was not unduly burdened by this). A succession of three strong and able rulers had managed to harness the Prussian Estates much more thoroughly than the Austrians and even the French had managed to do with theirs. In addition, the Prussian rulers had given the nobility a purpose as servants of the king and the state. The reign of Frederick William I was especially important for the development of the army. This monarch's dedication to his army, to military spectacles as well as to the practical purposes of the army, forged the instrument, which was to become the most effective army of Europe in the hands of his son, Frederick II. Frederick William I also had the advice of able generals, among whom Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau most clearly perceived the implications of the new tactical developments. He, more than anyone else, saw the necessity for thoroughly trained and strictly disciplined troops, in order to ensure the successful application of the

new tactics.

Among the purely technical improvements introduced by the Prussians, the most important was the introduction throughout the whole army of iron ramrods in 1718, to replace the wooden ones, which frequently broke in the heat of battle. (The Austrians did not introduce them until 1744 after their bad experiences during the First Silesian War¹ and the French did not adopt them until 1745).²

These iron ramrods contributed significantly to the precision and effectiveness of the fire of the Prussian infantry, as demonstrated against the Austrians during the First Silesian War.

Of greater significance were the tactical reforms and the emphasis on drill and discipline, which later was to become proverbial for the Prussian army.

As mentioned above, the evolutions of troops and the moves involved in loading and firing had still been very slow and deliberate at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This was of necessity so, considering the many moves required and in view of the superficial drill enforced at that time in all armies. Frederick William and Leopold von Dessau realized that the effect of infantry fire depended

¹---, Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, ed. k.u.k. Kriegsarchiv (Vienna: 1896), vol. I, part 1, p.382

²Hans Delbrück, op.cit., vol. IV, p.306

not only on the number of rifles employed, but especially on the number of rounds fired within a certain span of time.¹ Therefore, the greatest emphasis was put on achieving such rapidity of fire that the enemy would be thrown into disorder as soon as it entered the effective zone of rifle fire. To achieve this, extensive training was needed and strenuous drill was soon to fill nearly the whole day of the Prussian soldier.² The new approach found its way into the Prussian drill Reglement of 1726, which repeatedly emphasized speed in all necessary moves.³

This rapid fire, of course, taxed the nerves and concentration of officers, NCOs and men to the utmost, as officers and some NCOs stood in front of the lines. Only through extensive drill could the decimation of the officers corps be avoided.

Of great importance was the re-introduction of the march-in-step, on the initiative of the Prince of Dessau. It had been used in all armies until the second half of the seventeenth century, but had fallen into disuse, as it was thought dispensable with the new line formation. Dessau, however, realized that it was only this stiff step in cadence which

¹---, Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, part 1, p.544

²J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.98, Curt Jany, Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, (Osnabrück: 1967), vol.I, p.818, : reports by officers indicate that the training in rapid fire in the Prussian army dates from about 1718

³Max Jahns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1663f

would give solidity and precision to the movements of the long, thin lines, as well as physical and psychological balance to the individual soldier.¹

The Prussians did not stop at the drill of the individual soldiers and army units. Beginning in 1714, annual training camps and maneuvers were held, in which several regiments at least were drawn together.² During Frederick William I's time these maneuvers were not yet maneuvers in the modern sense, but rather troop revues and displays of drill.³ (Tactical maneuvers with imitations of battle conditions were introduced after the Second Silesian War, around 1750). However, these military 'shows', combined with the strenuous daily drill, produced a well trained and disciplined force of such machine-like exactness that it was unparalleled in any other army.

The Prussians also realized, earlier than other nations, that the new weapons necessitated a shallower formation, which would make possible a longer line and a more efficient use of firepower. From 1718 on the Prussian infantry was formed in three ranks for the purpose of firing, i.e. during firing drill and during battle. Any line formation for a purpose other than firing still consisted of four ranks.

¹---, Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, p.545

²Curt Jany, op.cit., vol.I, p.833

³Ibid., p.834

Dessau was unable to get accepted his more radical suggestion to reduce the line to two ranks or at least to three ranks for all purposes. He realized that even the third rank was of little value: as only the first rank fired in kneeling position, the third rank usually tended to fire into the air.¹ However, the formation during battle in three ranks was better than that in four ranks, which ~~later~~ the Austrians retained until 1757.²

While the Prussians, during Frederick William I's reign, realized the implications of the new developments, the Austrian army, and for that matter, all others, remained rather stagnant and apparently did not grasp the implications. Two main explanations offer themselves for this. The Prussian king was commander-in-chief in practice as well as in theory. The Prussian constitutional development had given the monarch much more direct power and influence over all matters of state, as well as over the nobility, than the Habsburgs possessed before the great reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. This greater central control by the Prussian monarch, combined with Frederick William's nearly fanatic interest in his army, an interest, not shared by Austria's Charles VI, can answer part of this question.

¹---, Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, part 1, p.546

²J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.III, p.548

The other part of the answer may be found in the character and personality of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Whereas he did not slavishly adhere to the rather timid and doctrinaire strategic thinking of his time, and adapted troop movements to the requirements of the moment, and often gambled in making decisions,¹ he contributed little or nothing to tactical theory or to the implementation of the new technological developments. Moreover, he did not make serious efforts to intensify the training of the troops. His aversion to exaggerated drill and his conservatism was recognized by his contemporaries. Although some officers spoke out for uniform drill regulations and better training during Eugene's term of office as President of the Hofkriegsrat, he did not make use of the power of his office to initiate such measures. Although his military correspondence is full of complaints about corruption, administrative inefficiency and lack of funds, there is a conspicuous absence of similar complaints regarding the lack of training and uniform drill regulations. An officer of Eugene's army considered the prince a man of habit who disliked changing established procedures of daily military routine.² Although one of the greatest generals of Europe, he had many weaknesses in regard to matters of

¹Max Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, (Munich:1963)vol.V, p.346f and p.353

²St. Saphorin, an Austrian officer, (1729), quoted by Max Braubach, op.cit., vol.V, p.232

detail. Although he knew of the parades, maneuvers and extensive drill practices of the Prussian army, he ridiculed Frederick William's love for 'theatrics' and he did not seem impressed.¹ Furthermore, during the last years of his life, Eugene seemed to have lost much of his elan and even to have approached senility, and these were the years when the results of the Prussian training and their new discipline became most apparent. There also may have been a reluctance on the part of Eugene to stir up a hornet's nest, as the colonels-in-chief of the various regiments guarded their rights and privileges very jealously. At that time radical innovations and strict control from above might have caused trouble and might have been of doubtful success. It is of interest, however, that two years before his death he apparently recognized the success of the Prussian reforms, when he informed the Court Chancellor Sinzendorf, in 1734, that the Prussian contingents form the nucleus of the German armies, that the rest were nearly worthless.² In spite of all this, Eugene still won practically every battle he fought. The armies of his enemies were no better trained or disciplined than his own; moreover, he had most of the qualities which make a great general, and he had that portion of luck so necessary for military success.

¹Ibid., vol.V., p.438, Eugene to General Senckendorff, 1729.

²quoted in Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1669

- These factors may well have made him complacent.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRILL REGLEMENTS

The Austrian Regimental Reglements

In Austria the first drill and duty manuals, the so-called Exercitia and Reglements, were developed during the second half of the seventeenth century. Although a modern army without such manuals would be unthinkable, the mercenaries of the sixteenth and most of the seventeenth centuries did not know them. The Landsknechte apparently felt no need for drill manuals, as the experienced soldiers drilled the recruits in the use of the pike and the matchlock musket. Montecuccoli's voluminous Memorie della Guerra¹ devotes only one page to the drill of troops. The soldier was to practice by himself the handling of the musket and to train himself in running, wrestling, swimming, etc., The simple evolutions used in battle - turns, opening and closing of ranks, etc. - were to be practiced in groups. The positions of the pike, used to defend the infantry square against cavalry attack, were also to be practiced in groups. The fewer and quicker the movements taught, Montecuccoli advised, the better the performance of the army would be in

¹MS in KA, Abt. VI, first printing 1692; here used: German translation, Besondere und Geheime Kriegsnachrichten, (1736)

the face of the enemy.¹ However, Montecuccoli did recommend the appointment of drill masters in each regiment, although he felt it would be better if the officers themselves would drill the soldiers,² a remark which points to a grave defect of seventeenth and early eighteenth century armies: the fact that officers neglected their duties and paid little attention to the training of their units. Complaints about this neglect can be found as late as the middle of the eighteenth century.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries attempts were made in Germany and Tyrol to arm the country population, to form the general levy. As the improvement in firearms made more uniform drill necessary, various Reglements were composed for the instruction of such levies. The first printed Austrian drill manual was issued in Tyrol in 1653: the Handbüchel zum Exerzieren by Lt. Col. Girardi von Castel, a Tyrolian war councillor and commander of the fortress Scharnitz in Tyrol in 1648. It is possible that earlier Austrian Reglements in manuscript form existed.³ The first German drill manual had been composed by Landgraf Moriz von Hessen and printed in 1600⁴ and the manual by

¹Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.15f

²Ibid., p.162f

³W. Erben, op.cit., p.13f

⁴Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.883

Castel apparently had its roots in this Hessian manual. Other German states produced similar manuals for their levies, e.g. Nassau in 1608 and Anhalt in 1620.

These provincial levies were usually inferior to the professional armies of Landsknechte, although the latter were neither regularly drilled, nor did they use drill manuals. Nevertheless, these early militia manuals are significant, as they provided the models for the later generally used drill Reglements. Although the above mentioned Tyrolian manual incorporated several new tactical ideas, such as provision for a shallower line formation if the terrain made it possible and for loading and firing at a standstill, as well as during a slow advance, the need for the issuing of drill Reglements for the whole army was not recognized by the Austrian central authorities. On the contrary, from the end of the seventeenth century, regimental commanders began to issue their own manuals, frequently copying from each other.¹

Among the best known of these regimental Reglements are the Reglement über ein Kayserliches Regiment zu Fuss by FML² Regal, (1728), the Exercitium des Grafen Wallis'schen Regiments zu Fuss, (1705), and the Richtschnur des Grafen Daun'schen Regiments zu Fuss, (1733)³ Although designed for

¹Loc. cit.

²Feldmarschalleutnant : lieutenant general

³Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1669ff

a regiment of dragoons, the Exercitium zu Pferd und zu Fuss, (1726), by Field Marshal Ludwig Andreas Count Khevenhüller should be mentioned here, as it achieved the greatest popularity and is characterized by its clarity of explanation in stark contrast to the cumbersome language of the other regimental Reglements. The above mentioned Reglements and several others appeared in print, some in several editions, and thus achieved wider popularity. It should be noted, however, that these printed editions resulted from private initiative; most regiments used manuals in manuscript form.

The correlation between these regimental Reglements, most of which appeared between the early years of the eighteenth century and 1730, has not yet been thoroughly examined. A study of such correlation would be necessary in order to ascertain the degree to which the various Austrian regiments varied in their drill and in their tactical maneuvers. Preliminary examinations of these Reglements have shown that the main variations lay in the instructions regulating the speed of firing and in the manner of performing evolutions in formation.¹

According to the Austrian general, Prince de Ligne, these Reglements were usually poor imitations of foreign

¹W. Erben, op.cit., p.21ff

examples and their differences led to great disadvantages.¹

The significance of the absence of general drill regulations for the whole army lies not only in the differences between the various regimental Reglements, but also in the fact that the Austrian regiments, in general, were not even well trained according to their respective Reglements. Regimental commanders rarely inspected their regiments, and thus the lieutenant colonels did as they pleased, each according to his ability and sense of duty. General Regal referred to the confusion resulting from the lack of general drill regulations in the preface of his regimental Reglement which he composed between 1708 and 1713.¹ He argued that daily experience taught that anything but a consensus existed in the Imperial army, that there were as many different commands as there were generals. Officers were confused by the many and different orders, with the result that they were unsure which was correct and supposed to have been general usage. Accordingly, good arrangements, which may have existed here and there in a regiment were forgotten so that officers did not even know anymore how to receive and salute commanding generals.² Regal stated clearly and emphatically that the provisions of this manual were to be

¹W. Erben, op.cit., p.18f

²From the introduction to Regal's Reglement, quoted in Franz Müller, op.cit., vol.II, p.314f

adhered to strictly, unless commanding generals gave contradicting orders. Then their commands were to be obeyed, but only as long as they were in command, as thereafter all their orders "would come to an end."¹

The Development of the Prussian Drill Reglements

In Prussia, mainly because of the different constitutional developments, the control of the army being much more firmly in the hands of the monarch, the development of the Reglements took another direction. Here they were issued directly by the monarch and were to be adhered to by the whole army. Moreover, the inability of maintaining a large army had to be compensated for by creating an effective army with as great a fire power as possible and this required strictest drill and discipline. King Frederick I was the first Prussian ruler who attempted to bring unity into the drill and evolutions of his army. The first Reglement for the Prussian army to be generally adhered to appeared in 1702, the Exercice von den Handgriffen mit der Flint.² According to this Reglement the movements involved in firing etc. were still to be performed to a slow count and the troops were still arranged in four ranks for drill as well as during battle.

An addition to this manual, the Reglement wegen des

¹Loc.cit.

²Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1650 and C. Jany, op.cit., vol.I, p.616

Chargieren in Bataillen of 1705, already showed some of the tactical realizations, which were to make the Prussian infantry superior to others. It introduced the peloton fire, a method of firing which secured a more or less continuous, rolling fire and also prescribed the drill in firing while advancing - each peloton was to advance three steps before firing. Thus the Prussian army combined well controlled fire with continuous advance, a method which was to prove extremely successful in battle.¹

However, the 1702 Reglement did not yet lead to complete uniformity of drill. Whereas the Reglement prescribed firing in four ranks, the Lottum Corps received instructions in 1709 to fire in a formation of three ranks.²

The desired uniformity was achieved during the reign of the soldier - King Frederick William I. The first of his Reglements, that of 1714, greatly influenced by Prince Leopold of Dessau, swept away the remnants of independence regimental commanders had possessed until then. Each officer received a copy of the manual, had to read it at regular, prescribed intervals and it was expected that each officer was thoroughly familiar with its contents. The discipline of the officer corps was now emphasized and enforced with much more severity, as in general the accession of this

¹Curt Jany, op.cit., vol.I, p.618ff

²Ibid., p.615f

monarch marked the beginning of the proverbial Prussian army discipline and of the peculiar characteristics of the Prussian officer corps. A new edition of this manual, issued in 1718, enlarged further on disciplinary matters.

In regard to tactics the Reglement of 1714 brought no important changes. The speed of firing was still slow and the formation in four ranks was retained. However, the 1718 Reglement brought one important innovation: in battle the battalions were to be formed in three ranks. Thus, without diminishing the actual fire power of the battalion, the breadth of its front could be extended.¹ On the other hand, the adherence to the formation in four ranks whenever firing was not required, i.e. for drill and parades, etc., showed some reluctance to break with tradition and unnecessarily complicated drill and evolution. Although Prince Leopold of Dessau had, by that time, already realized that not only the number of fire arms, but also the speed of firing, i.e., the number of rounds fired per time interval, determined the effectiveness of fire power, the 1718 Reglement still adhered to firing to a slow, measured count. It was the new Prussian Reglement of 1726, which introduced the drastic change with regard to firing speed.² It empha-

¹Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1659

²Reglement vor die Königliche Preussische Infanterie, (Potsdam: 1726), H. Bleckwenn, ed., (Osnabrück: 1968), Facsimile edition

sized repeatedly the need for speed in firing and the word 'quickly', (geschwinde), is used in the description of every one of the moves involved in the firing drill. This Reglement provided the basis for the Prussian drill and tactics of the following decades and the subsequent Reglements issued by Frederick II did not bring momentuous changes.

It is obvious that speed of firing, considering the complicated procedure necessary for the loading and firing of the flintlock fusil, precluded rigorous drill and discipline. By 1726 both these latter conditions had reached a sufficiently high standard in the Prussian army so that the idea of rapid fire could be put into practice. In no other army of that period did these prerequisites exist. The success of the Prussian methods of drill and discipline soon became apparent to observers.¹

Good Intentions: the Hofkriegsrat's Plan
for a General Reglement

The Prussian Reglement of 1714 appeared in print on 28th February of that year. Intelligence about this publication apparently prompted the Austrian Hofkriegsrat to initiate proceedings to issue a Reglement for the whole Austrian army as well. Previous historians have stated as the only source for this move the introduction to Kheven-

¹see Prince Eugene's comment p.37f

hüller's Observationspunkte¹ in which he mentions that the Hofkriegsrat ordered all regiments to forward a copy of their Exercitia and Gebräuche, (regimental duty regulations). Until now it was presumed that no further action in this matter was taken until 1736, when a commission was set up, which in the following year produced the first general Regulament und Ordnung for the whole Austrian infantry.² However, this writer found several entries in the Index and Protocolls of the Abteilung HKR Akten in the Austrian War Archives which confirm Khevenhüller's statement on the Hofkriegsrat's directive to all regiments, but show that the matter had not been dropped entirely. In June and July 1714 all infantry and cavalry regiments were given orders to submit their Exercitia and regulations to the Hofkriegsrat and several generals were ordered to give their opinions on the plan to issue a drill and duty Reglement for the whole army.³ These documents and the replies of the generals are no longer extant, but the entries in the HKR Protocolls suffice to document the fact and also to

¹Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, p.429, Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.II, p.1589 and W.Erben, op.cit., p.17

²Regulament und Ordnung nach welchem sich gesambte unmittelbare Kayserliche Infanterie in denen Handgriffen und Kriegs Exercitien sowohl, als in denen Kriegs - Gebräuchen gleichförmig zu achten haben Original in Austrian National Library and in library of the Austrian War Archives

³KA, HKR Index Reg. 1714 -557, 756, 763, 1094
KA, Prot. Reg. 1714 June - 70, 1714 July - 361 and 386

attest that several generals approved of the plan, namely: Field Marshal von Zumjungen, FML Count Bagni, FML von Zumjungen, Field Marshal von Heister and the later president of the Hofkriegsrat, the then FML Count Harrach.¹

There is no indication of any immediate action by the Hofkriegsrat and one still can only speculate whether resistance from the regimental colonels-in-chief or the preparations for the campaign against Turkey, which began in 1716, were the reason for this failure to take immediate action on this plan for a general Reglement. In 1717, however, during the campaign against the Turks, Duke Alexander of Württemberg was commissioned to prepare a Reglement for the Imperial Infantry. He was assisted in this task by the then Prince of Bevern and other experienced generals.² An unsigned and undated memorandum, according to content written between 1749 and 1757, which deals with suggestions for improvements of the Reglement of 1749, refers to the above draft of 1717. According to this memorandum, Prince Eugene approved the draft, but when he requested the opinion of several "old generals, FM Guido von Starhemberg," then already of very advanced age," remarked that he had devised a Reglement for his regiment many years ago and does not

¹HKR, Prot.Exp. 1714 July - 455, 456, 457, 458, 253, 254 and 1714 - Oct. 257

²KA, Mem 9 - 152, fol 269f (sixth session of the military commission of 1748)

intend to make any changes in it. Therefore Prince Eugene, to preserve unity and peace in the army, decided that he could not pursue this matter any further against the wishes of the regimental Commanders-in-chief."¹ The question of a Reglement for the whole army was not taken up again until 1736, when a military commission was set up under the chairmanship of the President of the Hofkriegsrat, FM Count Harrach which adopted the draft of 1717 as the basis for the Reglement issued in 1737, a Reglement meant to be adhered to by all infantry regiments of the monarchy.² (The war against Turkey and the Wars of the Austrian Succession further delayed the general acceptance and application of this Reglement of 1737). The composition of a Reglement for the Austrian cavalry, planned at the same time, was never realized, probably for the same reasons.³

The above shows that the 1714 plan for a drill Reglement for the whole army was never totally abandoned, but the extreme delay indicates that, aside from the war - time complications, there was neither emphatic pressure from the crown nor a clear understanding that the advantages of

¹KA, Mem 4-90, fol.1f

²KA, Mem 9 - 152, fol. 269f, and see p.56 of this paper. Other members of the commission were FZM Count Wallis, FZM von Traun, FML von Fürstenbusch and FML Wenzel Wallis

³KA, HKR Prot.Reg. 1737 August - 300. See also note 1, Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, p.429

the thin - line formation and the fire power of the flint-lock fusil could only be realized with a well disciplined and uniformly drilled army. There also, as mentioned above, may well have been opposition from regimental colonels-in-chief to what they would have considered an infringement on their privileges and independence. Thus, the lack of central control, in contrast to the situation in Prussia, may have played its part.

The Austrian Regulament of 1737

Compared to some of the earlier Austrian regimental Reglements, the 1737 Regulament und Ordnung shows no real improvement. In tactical concepts it is more antiquated than the Prussian Reglement of 1726. The Austrian manual retained the formation in battle in four ranks, maintained the use of the Schweinsfeder and cheveaux de frise, elements which the Prussian Reglement of 1726 had already eliminated. The Austrian manual of 1737 cannot therefore be regarded as an attempt to copy current Prussian practices. Moreover, documents state clearly that the Austrian draft of 1717 was the basis for the 1737 Reglement.¹ It is even doubtful that a copy of the Prussian Reglement of 1726 had fallen into Austrian hands before 1737 and its contents were probably unknown to the Austrians, at least in detail, when they

¹Protocollum Commissionis das künftige militär Systema betreffend, KA., Mem. 9 -152, 1748, fol.269f

composed their manual in 1737. The documents in the files of the Hofkriegsrat referring to copies of the Prussian 1726 Reglement in its possession do not antedate 1741, possibly because of tight Prussian security measures. Each Prussian officer received his copy of the Prussian 1726 Reglement against his signature, had to treat it as secret material and the copy had to be destroyed when damaged. Furthermore, the Prussian manual of 1726 was not used during a war before 1741, excepting the uneventful campaign on the Rhine in 1734/36.

There is sufficient evidence that the Austrian manual of 1737 remained largely on paper. Maria Theresa's Denkschrift¹ and Field Marshal Thüngen's Observationspunkte bei der Infanterie² show that the Austrian army was far from having achieved uniformity in drill and tactical maneuvers. The above mentioned directives by FM Thüngen emphasize the need for uniformity in evolutions, pointing to a lack of such uniformity still existing in 1741. The continued divergence of drill and tactical evolutions between the various Austrian regiments is further attested to by various memoranda which emphasize the need for such uniformity.³

¹see Introduction p.iv

²KA. Mem. 4 - 42, 1741

³e.g.: memoir by General der Cavallerie von Hohenembs, KA, Mem. 5-82, 1741 and memoir by FZM Leopold von Daun, KA, FA/CA, 1745, 13/10 and ad 10

When, for the first time, the Austrian army faced the well drilled Prussians in the First Silesian War, it became evident that the Prussians were not only uniformly but also better trained and disciplined, the result of intensive training in training camps and of frequent parades and maneuvers. This advantage of the Prussians was increased by the fact that they were led by their monarch in person who, aside from being one of the greatest generals, did not have to account for his actions to anyone but himself. He therefore could, and did, take risks which the Austrian generals, who had to account for their actions to their queen, could not, or would not dare take. The Wars of the Austrian Succession showed the superiority of the Prussian army, rather than a general inferiority of the Austrian. Whereas the latter lost every major battle against the Prussians, they were successful against the French, Bavarians and Spanish in most of the major encounters.

THE TEST : THE FIRST AND SECOND SILESIAN WARS

During the first three decades of the eighteenth century battles had taken on a rigid and standardized form which was to become a characteristic of the battles during the remainder of that century.

Preparatory to each campaign the commanding general drew up the ordre de bataille, which was then altered only when special considerations required it. Thus, once he had decided on giving, or was forced to accept, battle, he only had to order the deployment of the army in the prescribed order, as the order of march, as well as the Lagerordnung, (camping order), corresponded with the ordre de bataille. The deployment of the army took place under the cover of light cavalry, in the Austrian army often assisted by grenadiers and tirailleurs.¹ This forming of the battle order was a slow process, often taking several hours. After the avant garde had retreated, the battle was usually opened by an artillery duel. Often one or both armies suffered heavily from this artillery fire, which could, and sometimes did, lead to a breakdown of discipline and morale. Then the attacker began his advance, cavalry and infantry, in theory at least, at the same slow pace.

¹Ludwig Andres von Khevenhüller, Kurzer Begriff aller militärischen Operationen, (Vienna: 1743), p.41

Henceforth, the officers could rarely do more than attempt to control the formation, discipline and morale of their troops. Their most difficult task was to persuade shaken troops to advance. The advance was frequently interrupted in order to straighten out the lines or to close gaps between battalions. Rarely did it come to hand-to-hand fighting; usually one side broke before the clash of opposing forces.

Of course, during such an encounter the superiority of a well drilled and well disciplined army which could co-ordinate regular fire with precision movements would be obvious. Moreover, the intensively trained soldier, nearly an automaton, could withstand the psychological strain better.

The four major battles between the Austrians and the Prussians - Mollwitz in 1741; Chotusitz in 1742; Hohenfriedberg, and Sohr, both in 1745 - demonstrated Prussian superiority. The intense training and the iron discipline of the Prussian infantry resulted in such a mechanical execution of the rather complicated peloton fire that it could be maintained with precision for considerable time even under the stress of battle. Frederick II's maxim that the soldier must fear his own officers more than the enemy had already become a fact during these wars. Furthermore, the Prussian maneuvers were executed with amazing precision on

the battle field, although not yet as speedily as during the Seven Years War. In contrast, the Austrian infantry was unable to maintain orderly fire and formation for an extended period, frequently began firing against orders, and in most cases did not show the stamina or maintain discipline as the Prussians did.

The Battle of Mollwitz,¹ 10th April 1741

The Austrian army under Field Marshal Neipperg was caught by surprise by Frederick II and was still in the process of forming the battle order when the Prussian artillery opened fire and inflicted heavy losses on the Austrian cavalry of the left wing, which had camped closest to the battle field and thus was in position first. This tempted General Römer, commanding the Austrian cavalry of the left wing, to attack the Prussian right wing, although he had orders not to move before the whole army was in battle formation. He dispersed the numerically inferior Prussian cavalry, but was unable to break the coherence of the Prussian infantry lines. After a running fight, lasting about two hours, the Austrian cavalry of the left wing, its general killed, was completely disorganized and had to -

¹The following sketches of the four battles are based on: k.k. Kriegsarchiv, ed., Der Österreichische Erbfolgekrieg, (Vienna: 1896 to 1903), vols. I, II and VII, Grosser Generalstab, ed., Der Erste Schlesische Krieg, (Berlin: 1890, 1893) and Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1813, vol. III, 1825, vol. III and IV, 1827, vol. IV

retreat. The Austrian cavalry attack had not been supported by infantry. A belated and poorly executed attack by the Austrian infantry of the right wing petered out under heavy Prussian rifle fire before it even came close to the Prussian lines. General Schwerin, who had persuaded Frederick to leave the battle field during the initial Austrian cavalry attack, now ordered the Prussian infantry to attack. It advanced in perfect order, as though on a parade square, the infantry firing continuously and regularly and the "rifle fire rolling without pause like continuous thunder."¹ At this point the discipline of the Austrian infantry began to crumble. The Austrian battalions had opened fire too soon, against orders, and could not be persuaded to advance one step. An Austrian officer wrote: "It was pitiful to see these poor recruits hide one behind the other so that the battalions stood thirty to forty deep and the intervals became so wide that one could have penetrated with whole cavalry regiments."² At that point, before it came to actual contact between the two armies, Neipperg, fearing the complete destruction of his army, ordered the retreat, which was carried out in fair order, nearly unmolested by the Prussians, who had suffered

¹Relation of an Austrian officer quoted in Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.II, p.242

²Ibid., p.241

equally heavy losses. It should be pointed out, however, that most of the Prussian casualties had occurred on their right wing during the initial Austrian cavalry attack.

After the battle, Field Marshal Khevenhüller advised Neipperg to rely from now on mainly on the small war, for which the Austrian light cavalry was superbly suited, and to avoid battles, as Mollwitz had shown the unreliability of the Austrian infantry.¹

The Battle of Chotusitz (Czaslau) 17th May 1742

The only other great battle of the First Silesian War, at Chotusitz, showed again the superiority of the Prussian infantry in drill, performance and discipline under heavy stress. The battle opened with a Prussian cavalry attack on the Austrian left wing, which developed into a long drawn-out melee, during which the cavalry of both sides gradually moved away from the actual battle field. In the meantime, the attack by the Austrian right wing on the not yet fully deployed Prussian left wing began. After an initial success of the Austrians, who threw the Prussians out of the village of Chotusitz, the day might have been won, had not the discipline of the Austrians broken down and their cavalry and some of their infantry dispersed to loot the village and the nearby Prussian camp. This gave Frederick time to rally

¹Khevenhüller to Neipperg, 19th April 1741, quoted in Oesterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.II p.657f

his troops and, in by now proverbial fashion, to launch a counter attack in perfect order, keeping up a murderous fire during the advance. This forced the Austrians to retreat and to leave the field of battle, unmolested by the Prussians, who, too, had suffered heavy losses. It was not only superior Prussian drill and discipline against ill trained and ill disciplined troops which led the defeat of the Austrians, but also the heavy losses suffered by the Austrian infantry during their attack on the village. These losses were largely due to the order given by Charles of Lorraine, the Austrian commander-in-chief, to the Austrian infantry, to advance without firing. This, against the rapid fire of the Prussians, was sheer madness.

The outcome of each battle had hung in the balance for some time. This was mainly due to the fact that the Prussian cavalry was by no means superior to the Austrian at that time. In both cases it was the counter attack of the Prussian infantry, so perfectly executed, which broke the morale and discipline of the Austrian lines.

The Battles of Hohenfriedberg and Sohr .
4th June and 30th September, 1745

The battles of the Second Silesian War were less conclusive for the purpose of this chapter. The battle of Hohenfriedberg was fought by Frederick against an Austrian-Saxon coalition army under divided command. The Saxon (left) wing was defeated before the Austrian (right) wing

entered the engagement under hopeless conditions. The battle of Sohr was lost by the Austrians mainly because Charles of Lorraine moved too slowly to make use of the opportunity to surprise the Prussians in their camp.

In both these battles the Prussian cavalry, now much better trained than during the preceding war, proved much superior to the Austrian, which had not learned the lessons the first Silesian War should have taught them. In both battles observers praised the superior precision of the fire and evolutions of the Prussian infantry.

The shortcomings of the Austrian army as compared to the Prussian were not only the lack of uniform drill regulations, but also the lack of the intensive drill, the lack of strict discipline and the persistence in outdated tactical doctrines, in short, the failure to understand and act upon the implications of the new developments. Of influence, of course, was also the inferior generalship of the Austrian commanders. As a result of these shortcomings the Austrian infantryman was not the effective fighting machine his Prussian counterpart was. He was unable to withstand for an extended period the psychological stress of battle and could not be kept under the control of officers.

THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD : 1737 TO 1748

THE MOVE TOWARD REFORM

As the 1737 Reglement was insufficiently adhered to, it did not achieve its purpose. Besides, much more was amiss in the Austrian Army than the lack of general drill regulations. Several of the Austrian generals, as well as some of the ministers of the state, realized these defects, and Maria Theresa was certainly aware of them, as her Denkschrift shows. The Austrian War Archives hold a substantial number of memoranda, proposals and reports from between 1736 and 1748 dealing with these shortcomings of the Austrian military system. Many of these shortcomings had either developed or become apparent during the third and fourth decades of the century. Two reasons seem to account for this: the increasing age of the President of the Hofkriegsrat, Prince Eugene of Savoy, which resulted in a lessened control of the army and its administration; and, secondly, the emergence of the efficient Prussian army under Frederick William I. The former fact made more apparent already existing defects in the structure and workings of the military administration and allowed these weaknesses full play; the latter showed most clearly the need for reform in the field.

The documents mentioned above show that the need for reform in all aspects of the military system was clearly perceived by some officers and officials. In these documents criticism was directed mainly against the following aspects of the existing military system: corrupt and cumbersome operation of the Hofkriegsrat, favoritism and corruption in the appointment of officers, lack of general regulations and drill Reglements, lack of discipline and sense of duty among the officer corps and the army in general, and, finally, the unsatisfactory system of financing and recruiting. Occasionally, some criticism was voiced against existing tactical practices. (See below: Thüngen's Observationspunkte).

Although most of these memoranda do not relate directly to the development of the drill Reglements, but deal specifically with other facets of the military system, they are, nevertheless, of interest to this paper as they show the extent to which reform was necessary in the Austrian military system. In addition to these military reforms, it became necessary during the first decade of Maria Theresa's reign to reform the whole system of administration of the state. The very complexity of the Theresian reforms of 1748/9 explains some of the shortcomings of these reforms. Too much had to be changed in too short a time. The development of general army Reglements during the years immediately

following 1748, was only a small part of this enormous task of reform. Without the direct and interested involvement of Maria Theresa this aspect of reform may well have been neglected or at least remained as ineffective as the earlier attempts. Considering this, the introduction and subsequent enforcement of these Reglements, in spite of their shortcomings, represents an admirable achievement.

The critique of the Hofkriegsrat voiced most frequently, was directed against its procedures of conducting business. During the thirties civilian councillors in the Hofkriegsrat attained an undue amount of influence and authority, often self acquired. Field Marshal Khevenhüller¹ criticized, in a memorandum of 7 September 1740,² the fact that many decisions were made by the civilian Referendarii³ alone, without consultation with the war councillors, sometimes even without the knowledge of the President; and these decisions were presented as the official decisions of the Hofkriegsrat. In the same memorandum he complained that, even when he requested detailed reports on current business, he often received only information on minor matters, and, not infrequently, statements falsifying the actual decisions

¹Vice-President of the Hofkriegsrat until 1744

²KA, HKR 1740 - September - 842, Exp.

³officials responsible for certain subjects

made. These conditions developed during the last years of Prince Eugene's presidency of the Hofkriegsrat and continued under his successor Count Harrach (President from 1736 to 1762). Khevenhüller strongly criticized the still continuing practice of purchase of commissions, and the malpractice of permitting officers and even non-commissioned officers to file petitions and complaints directly to the Hofkriegsrat, by-passing their immediate superiors.¹ An unsigned document, possibly by the same author,² and a memorandum by Francis Stephen of Lorraine, later Emperor Francis I,³ which contain very similar complaints and proposals for improvement, seem to show that such conditions as existed could not be rectified easily. It is obvious that a supreme administrative office, run in a manner such as described above, is not conducive to effective implementation of reform, or to the maintenance of discipline and esprit de corps. Accordingly, discipline and esprit de corps had deteriorated drastically during the late thirties and the forties of the eighteenth century. A memorandum,

¹KA, HKR 1740 - September - 842, Exp.

²KA, Mem 9 - 56, 1738

³KA, Mem 9 - 58, 1738

unsigned and undated,¹ complains that this 'Libertinage' had developed so far that even privates not only neglect to salute their officers, even generals, but also do not allow even the presence of an officer to deter them from acting contrary to regulations ("etwas Verbothenes zu thun..."). Officers, in their turn, neglect to interfere, so that a complete breakdown of discipline has resulted.

Francis of Lorraine, as newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in 1738, blamed the lack of good officers, who take their duties and profession seriously, on a deviation from old and proven practices and conditions. He believed that in the past there had been a great number of good and dedicated officers to whom it had been a pleasure to work themselves up through the ranks, and who had been perfectly satisfied to reach the rank of captain, to obtain a company command, and, eventually, through meritorious actions, to be appointed to staff positions. Favoritism, which had, for some time, been the practice of the Hofkriegerat and the regimental colonels-in-chief, he blamed as having caused many good officers to quit in disgust. At present, he complained, officers complain of being unjustly treated unless they are promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel or even colonel. This way, the emperor "has

¹ KA, Mem 6 - 102. This document can be assigned to the period between 1738 and 1749 as it refers to the organization of the infantry battalions into 12 pelotons, as laid down by the 1737 Reglement, but changed to 16 pelotons by the 1749 Reglement.

now more generals, but fewer officers." He advocated that, in future, merit alone should be the yardstick for promotion.¹

It was necessary to rectify these conditions before general drill regulations, or, for that matter, any regulations could become effective. The comprehensive army reforms, undertaken in 1748 and the following years, were to be satisfactory in this respect, especially because of the support and understanding of Maria Theresa and the organizational talents of Field Marshal Leopold von Daun.²

The experiences of the First and Second Silesian Wars had convinced many Austrian generals that the intensive training and discipline, as well as the existence of general drill Reglements in the Prussian army, had been the main

¹KA, Mem 9-58, 1738. "Alleruntherthünigster Vortrag...", unsigned. Author identified in opening paragraph through reference to the writer's recent appointment to the position of commander-in-chief of the army. Incorrectly ascribed to the Prince of Sachsen-Hildburghausen in: k.k. Kriegsarchiv, ed., Der österreichische Erbfolgekrieg, vol. I p. 415

²Leopold Josef Maria Graf Daun, born in Vienna in 1705 as son of FM (field marshal) Wirich von Daun, a proven and respected general in the Austrian army. Leopold Daun entered the army as Volontär in 1718. 1726 promotion to Lt.Col., 1731 to active colonel. 1737: GFWM (Generalfeldwachtmeister). 1739: FML. 1740 colonel-in-chief of the later infantry regiment no. 59. Participated in War of the Austrian Succession with distinction. 1745: GFZM (Generalfeldzeugmeister). 1748: member of the Military Commission and entrusted with the composition of the new army Reglements. 1751: director of the military Academy at Wiener Neustadt. 1754: promoted to FM. 1757: victorious over Frederick II at Kolin. 1758: commander-in-chief of the Austrian army against Prussia. Grand Cross of the Maria Theresa Order. 1762 to his death in 1766 President of the Hofkriegsrat.

reasons for its successes. (This writer, however, could not find any evidence that Austrian generals thought the Prussian tactical concepts at all superior to their own.)

As early as 1741, after the disappointment of the battle of Mollwitz, Field Marshal Thüngen¹ issued his Observationspunkte bey der Infanterie, apparently on initiative from higher authorities, as they were addressed to the army in general and not to a specific regiment.² The conclusion contains an order that these directives have to be followed strictly and that any questions regarding them have to be directed to the commanding field marshal of the army.

In these Observationspunkte, guidelines for the maintenance of discipline and order during a battle are repeatedly followed by the remark "that not everyone does as he pleases." To prevent the breaking of lines, as happened at Mollwitz, reliable subaltern officers and even captains ("...in case there should be some left over..."), should be posted behind the lines, on the flanks and in the center of each regiment or battalion, to redress any disorder which

¹Adam Freiherr von Thüngen, 1735 colonel-in-chief of infantry regiment Neipperg, promoted to GFWM in the same year. 1741: promoted to FZM. Killed in action at Hohenfriedberg in 1745

²KA, Mem. 4-42, 1741. The Observationspunkte vor die Cavallerie, (KA, Mem 5 - 82, 1741) by General von Hohenembs correspond closely to these directives and appear to be just an adaptation of Thüngen's Observationspunkte to the needs of the cavalry.

might develop during an engagement. Anyone leaving the ranks should be stopped, or, if necessary, cut down.¹ The lack of control over the troops during the opening engagements of the First Silesian War, also becomes apparent from Thüngen's order that the wounded should be taken only to a point directly behind the lines, and that those who took them there should return immediately to their places in the firing line, not as it happened at Mollwitz, where two or three men led each wounded soldier to the rear and never returned.² Looting and plundering was also strictly prohibited by these directives, but, seemingly, with little success, as this order was not obeyed during the battle of Chotusitz,³ with unfortunate consequences for the Austrians.

The Austrian practice of using Plänkler - forerunners of the tirailleurs - in front of the line of battle to harass the enemy, is explained in detail. Thüngen emphasizes that platoons used for this purpose should stay close to their own lines and should not be used in flat and open terrain, as such a platoon, when forced to retreat, could easily lead to a retreat of the main line.⁴ This use of

¹Thüngen, Observationspunkte..., para. 1

²Ibid., para. 5

³Thüngen, Observationspunkte, para.9 and see above p.57

⁴Thüngen, para. 4

tirailleurs was a distinctive feature of Austrian tactical practice during this period and was not used by the Prussians.

The depth of the formation in battle was not raised to an argument in the decade prior to 1748; at least, this writer could find only one reference to this question among the proposals for reform and the memoranda on the state of the army. An unsigned document, which, although undated, can be assigned to the period between 1737 and 1748,¹ makes strong recommendations to adopt the formation in three ranks and the organization of the battalion into eight pelotons. (Neither of these proposals was adopted by the 1748 reform commission). The reasoning of the author was that, as the battalions were always below full strength, dividing them into twelve pelotons each, would result in a weak peloton fire. Moreover, he felt the chronic lack of officers and NCOs would present difficulties in assigning the requisite number of them to each division and peloton. Although rejected by the 1748 commission, this proposal of the formation in three ranks is of interest, as it presents the rare example of a suggestion to adopt the formation in

¹KA, Mem 6-102, General Anmerkung dealing with the formation of battalions, methods of firing and attack and with discipline. As it refers to the composition of the battalion according to the 1737 Reglement (12 pelotons), its date must lie between 1737 and 1749, when the new Reglement divided the battalion into 16 pelotons. As it also refers to daily directives from the hohen Generalität regarding desertion of soldiers from the line of battle, it can be presumed to have been composed before the end of the Wars of the Austrian Succession.

use in the Prussian army since 1726 - a formation not adopted by the Austrians until after the battle of Kolin in 1757.

The author of this document, like Thüngen, proposed to wait as long as possible before opening fire against the enemy - until one can see "the whites of their eyes." However, his suggestion to use only fire by peloton during an engagement in open terrain, fell in line with Prussian usage. He suggested that other methods of firing, that is, with whole or half ranks, etc., should be used only to defend entrenched positions.¹ He also advocated the advance in step, starting with the left foot.

Although the memoranda of this period, preserved in the Austrian War Archives, describe the various shortcomings of the Austrian army, the remedial measures proposed are restricted to the suggestion to enforce existing regulations, including those laid down in the 1737 Reglement. The above mentioned document at least proposes a few tactical innovations.

After the Wars of the Austrian Succession, definite and urgent proposals were made to issue a new duty and drill manual for the Austrian army, for both infantry and cavalry. The writers of such memoranda clearly realized the need to combine the issuing of such Reglements with actual enforce-

¹ The 1749 Reglement retained the traditional number of different firing methods. See appendix 1

ment of discipline and with intensive training. It had become obvious that not merely the existence of such a general Reglement for the whole army, but its logical application and strict enforcement, as well as the promotion of an esprit de corps and a sense of honor and duty in the officer corps, was what could make the Austrian army again the equal of any other.

In the course of her first reforms of the state administration, commencing in 1748, of which the army reform was an important and integral part, Maria Theresa endeavoured to improve not only the conditions, training and education of the officer corps, but also the social status of the profession. Combined with this was a strict emphasis on discipline and duty. It was the efficient implementation of such reforms which made the new Reglements of 1749-51 effective.

THE REFORM COMMISSION OF 1748 - 49

Early in 1748, the exact date is unknown, Maria Theresa ordered the formation of a military commission to set up a new military system, that is, to effect a thorough army reform. Prince Charles of Lorraine was appointed as chairman and the following were selected to be members of the commission: Hofkriegsrat President Count Harrach, Prince Liechtenstein, FM Count Cordova, FZM Count Wallis, FZM Count Leopold von Daun, General der Cavallerie Count Salburg, FZM Count Schulemburg¹ and as civilian members the War councillors von Wüßer and von der Mark.²

Approximately at the time when the Military Commission was formed, an unsigned memorandum³ stressed the need for the immediate issuing of a general drill and duty Reglement for the whole army. As the composition of this comprehensive manual would require some time, the author of the

¹A.von Arneth(Maria Theresia, vol.IV, p.88), says erroneously that Count Schulemburg was added to the commission later. However, he was present from the second session on, and, in his draft of the agenda for the commission (KA, Mem 9-75), Charles of Lorraine had already included Schulemburg's name

²Protocollum Commissionis das künftige Militär Systema betreffend, KA, Mem 9 - 152, 1748

³KA, Mem 9 - 31f, 1748. According to the entry in the index this memorandum was written by the then FZM, later FM Leopold von Daun

memorandum proposed to proceed first with the introduction of a general drill manual, and, as an interim measure, to issue general instructions, covering all circumstances and situations of major and minor importance. The draft of these interim directives, probably by the same author and included in the memorandum, deals with the duties of officers, from subaltern to generals rank, during campaigns, in camp and during marches. These directives are, in fact, a concise Duty Reglement. In their attention to detail, they are indicative of the cumbersome formality and attention to detail which was to be typical of the Reglements issued under the supervision of FM Daun.

The purpose of these directives was to eliminate the particular abuse, frequent in the army, wherein general officers and regimental commanders both shirked their duties and failed to remain with the troops at all times, both in camp and on the march. The directives stress, as well, the need for order and neatness in the camps and for an efficient method of communication through the officer ranks from the commander-in-chief to the regiments and vice versa. Special emphasis is given to regular, supervised drill in the camps, especially in firing and evolutions; to the prevention of looting, desertion and other 'excesses,' and to the need for severe punishment for such offenses. Every officer was admonished to prevent and punish such offenses

and was reminded of his duty, honor and reputation. The main points of these directives were later incorporated into the second part of the Reglement of 1749.

Before the military commission convened for its first session on 8 February 1748, Prince Charles of Lorraine presented a proposed agenda to Maria Theresa for her approval. The proposed points were only vaguely formulated:

- (i) to compose a general plan for the reorganization of the army.
- (ii) to compose a general Reglement (duty manual) to eliminate the daily occurring abuses
- (iii) to compose drill Reglements for the infantry and for the cavalry
- (iv) to standardize and simplify the accounting and financing of the regiments¹

Of special interest in this memorandum are the remarks made by Prince Charles regarding the formulation of the new duty Reglement and the Exercitium:

"I believe that one could look up all existing - but never enforced Reglements; and, if your Majesty permits, also the Prussian and those of other monarchs.... and a completely new one could be proposed to your Majesty which should be as short as possible... Regarding the Exercitium.... all previous ones are to be examined, also those from individual regiments and the shorter the new one should be, the better; yet it should not omit anything of importance"²

¹Charles of Lorraine to Maria Theresa, KA, Mem 9 - 75, 1748 fol.2

²Loc. cit.

As will be shown, there is no evidence that the Prussian or any other foreign Reglements were used as models for the new Austrian Reglements.

The actual agenda of the commission dealt with a wide range of topics; its aim being, as mentioned in Prince Charles' draft under point iii, a complete standardization of all aspects of the military system. The sessions relevant to this paper are the sixth, seventh, eighth, thirteenth and fifteenth (of the fourteenth, twenty first and twenty ninth of March, the sixteenth and thirtieth of May, respectively), during which sessions the principles of the new Exercitium were discussed.

After lengthy discussions on the organization, pay and supply of regiments, among other administrative and organizational matters, the commission proceeded, during its sixth session on 14th March, 1748 to discuss the proposed new Exercitium (drill Reglement).¹ Previous to the commencement of these discussions, FZM Daun had submitted to the chairman a draft for a new Exercitium, which had been composed under his supervision. The commission began its deliberations by accepting the drill manual of 1737 as the basis for its discussions and by a reading of this manual

which in 1717, under the presidio of Duke Alexander of Württemberg, in consultation with the then Prince of Bevern and other

¹Protocollum Commissionis..., KA, Mem 9 - 152, 1748, fol. 269-288

experienced generals, had been composed in Belgrade; and by command of his late Majesty, Charles the Sixth, . . . had been taken up again, and, on 17th March, 1737 promulgated.¹

The commission then proceeded to discuss several points of this 1737 Reglement, and decided on changes.

Throughout the discussions on the drill manual it is obvious that the main concern of the commission members was to achieve uniformity, to ensure that the regulations would be strictly adhered to by all units, and to provide simplicity in the execution of all moves of drill and of evolutions. The involved discussions on uniform regulations, even down to the details of design, cut and embroidery, and of other such rather insignificant points, foreshadowed the cumbersome style, pedantry and awkward length of the final product - the 'Regulament' of 1749. Among other points of lesser importance which were discussed were: the position in the battle order of lance corporals (Gefreite) and senior privates, the positioning of the regimental flag, how the fusil should be held while shouldering it, the positions of chaplains, medics, supply officers (Furier Meister), etc. in the formation of a regiment drawn up for parade or in battle order, and, the standardization of drum rolls.²

¹Ibid., Fol.269f

²Ibid., fol.269 - 288

In comparison, points of far greater tactical importance, considering the more advanced Prussian ideas, received apparently little attention in the discussions. The question of the depth of the formation was brought up by FZM Count Wallis, who felt that the formation in four ranks, as prescribed in the 1737 Reglement, should be maintained, as it was found to be preferable to that in three ranks, especially against the Turks.¹ The only other comment on this was that made by Hofkriegsrat President Count Harrach, who conceded that the formation in three ranks could be used, but only in emergencies or for Lustfeuer (firing at celebrations), or during the De Deum, etc..² FZM Daun, like the rest of the members, was silent on this point. He remarked, in reference to the formation in line, as prescribed by the 1737 Reglement, only that "always it should be prescribed positively that the men should appear in clean gaiters whenever they are in formation," a rather amusing example of Daun's penchant for detail. The aged Count Harrach pronounced this suggestion "quite good."³

The commission decided to retain the formation in four

¹Ibid., fol.278f

²Ibid., fol.279

³Ibid., fol.278f

ranks as provided in the 1737 manual, and to accept Harrach's suggestion as outlined above. It should be noted that Harrach's view of using the formation in three ranks for ceremonial purposes only is diametrically opposed to that of the Prussian Reglements of 1718 and 1726, which prescribed the formation in three ranks for all occasions when the troops were expected to fire, i.e. especially in battle.

An important suggestion was made by Daun, and later incorporated in the 1749 Exercitium: that the battalion should be divided into four divisions, instead of three as the 1737 Reglement provided, to correspond with the administrative division of the battalion into four companies. This would enable officers, (company commanders), to remain in command of their units and would also facilitate evolutions.¹ This was, for once, an improvement over the Prussian regulations of 1726 which divided the battalion into five companies, but only four divisions, thus splitting up the company units.²

Nothing throws more light on discipline problems existing in the Austrian army at this time, than the commission's decision on the weapons for subaltern officers and NCOs.

¹Ibid., fol.278

²Reglement vor die königl. Preussische Infanterie, 1726, p.26

The traditional weapons of the infantry officers were the Partisane or the Sponton and a hanger. FZM Daun remarked that the Partisane and hanger had proven worthless as weapons for defense, and proposed, therefore, to issue fusils, instead of Partisanen to infantry officers.¹ Although they conceded that the Partisane was useless as a weapon, the commission members disagreed with Daun's suggestion. FZM Wallis and FM Prince Liechtenstein warned, and the other members concurred, that if one were to issue fusils to the officers, "especially as they are mostly young men," they would frequently 'amuse' themselves during an engagement with unnecessary firing. The empress approved the vote,² and so Austrian infantry officers and NCOs had to continue carrying the useless Partisanen. If lieutenants and captains could not be entrusted with firearms because they were deemed to lack the necessary maturity and discipline, the important role assigned by the Reglement to general officers for the maintenance of discipline during a battle becomes even clearer.

Following the discussions of these above mentioned points, FZM Daun, at this and subsequent sessions, proceeded to read to the commission the draft of his proposed

¹Protocollum Commissionis..., fol.276

²Ibid., fol.276f

Exercitium. At the close of the sixth session, he offered to present a demonstration of the drill during the next session. During the seventh session, then, one lieutenant and two sergeants were brought in to demonstrate the drill moves according to the Reglement of the Austrian infantry regiment Kollowrat, according to the Prussian Reglement (date not specified) and according to the Exercitium proposed by Daun himself.¹ In two further sessions, the eighth and the fifteenth, the reading of Daun's draft was continued. During the ninth session, 19th April 1748, Daun's draft was compared with the 1737 Reglement and, "in order to make adjustments to the new one according to the old (Reglement), marginal remarks were inserted (in Daun's draft)."² On 30th May, during the fifteenth session, Daun's draft, with the alterations and suggestions proposed during the earlier sessions, was approved by the commission and Daun was instructed to complete it.³ More than a year passed before the Exercitium Regulament was completed and distributed to the various regiments.⁴

¹Ibid., fol.295

²Ibid., flo.299. Unfortunately, the ninth session was the only one at which no minutes were taken. Only a short paragraph at the beginning of the minutes of the tenth session gives us the bare topic of the ninth session.

³Ibid., fol.352

⁴KA, HKR Reg. 1749, 11 June, 138. Circulare an die sämtl. Rgter. zu Fuss und zu Pferd

The reason for this one year delay is easily explained: the approved draft was first circulated among various generals (a list of their names cannot be ascertained from the extant documents), and then further meetings were held by the commission, beginning in February 1749, to deal with some suggestions for minor alterations. FZM Daun, FM Schulemburg and FM Wallis were ordered to bring the Reglement into its final form.¹ It was also decided to compose and issue, as soon as possible, Exercitii Reglements for the cavalry. The Hussars were to receive a different drill Reglement from the Cuirassiers and Dragoons, as their employment in the field differed too greatly from that of the latter two.²

The matter of greatest interest for this paper which was discussed during the 1749 session of the commission, was the question of the introduction of a new office, that of Inspector - General of the Infantry. In her biography of FM Lacy, Edith Kotasek states that Lacy himself, most probably, suggested the institution of a 'hitherto unknown' position, that of General Inspector of the various branches of the army.³ However, this statement is ambiguous. It

¹ KA, Mem 9 - 153 Protocollum Commissionis Militaris die 10ma Februarii, 1749 Celebrata, fol 28

² Ibid., fol.36 The Reglement for the Cuirassiers and Dragoons was issued in 1749, and that for the Hussars in 1751

³ Edith Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy: Ein Leben für Österreichs Heer, (Horn:1956), pp.68f

is possible that Lacy was responsible for getting the idea finally accepted,¹ but suggestions for the creation of such an office originated in the discussions of the Military Commission of 1749. The idea was first presented during the session on 10th February, 1749 by Hofkriegsrat President Count Harrach and FM Batthyani, (who was present at this session), who advocated the appointment of Exercier Meister (drill masters), for each of the lands of the monarchy. These officers were to have the rank of general or colonel.² FZM Daun suggested the appointment of FZM Sincere and Colonel von Angerer to supervise the implementation of the new drill regulations in Italy and Bohemia/Moravia respectively, as these officers had worked under him in the drafting of the new Exercitium.³ He, Daun himself, would act in the same capacity for the hereditary lands and for Hungary. Charles of Lorraine then proposed the appointment of FML von Dungern as Exercier Meister for the troops stationed in the Austrian Netherlands.⁴

It was the opinion of the commission that these Exercier Meister should be given a permanent position to ensure that

¹Lacy was appointed as the first General Inspector of the army in 1765

²Protocollum Commissionis..., 10th February, 1749, fol.29

³Ibid., fol. 30

⁴Ibid., fol. 31

the work of standardization and reform, undertaken with so much expense and effort, would be prevented from deteriorating.¹ The commission proposed the title of Inspector or Oberaufseher (supervisor) for these officers in the various lands and recommended the appointment of an Inspecteur General who should have the overall authority in all matters of drill and discipline. FM Harrach added that it would be of advantage to appoint one man to the position of Inspecteur General for both infantry and cavalry together, "umb die Sache andurch in desto Genauere Verknöpfung zu bringen und Vollkommene gleichheit Beobachten zu lassen."²

Regrettably, Maria Theresa remarked in the margin of the document that no action should yet be taken in the matter of the inspectors.³ The reason for Maria Theresa's refusal to accept the proposal is not clear; yet one may suggest the explanation that the empress feared to stir up a hornet's nest by subjecting the colonels-in-chief and general officers to too much control from above.

In spite of her refusal to sanction the appointment of such inspectors, at least two generals continued to promote the idea. A memorandum by Charles of Lorraine to Maria

¹Protocollum Commissionis..., 17th March 1749.
KA, HKR, Exp. 1749, March 428

²Loc. cit.

³Loc. cit., "Wegen der inspecteurs ist nichts noch zu thun"

Theresa, dated 22nd June, 1750, appears to indicate that the empress did not even inform the chairman of the military commission of the reasons for objection:

I hardly dare to propose again the (Introduction of) General Inspecteurs, 'he writes,' although they would be extremely necessary for infantry and cavalry alike... to maintain uniformity in the whole army, as is your Imperial Majesty's desire...¹

Prince Charles insists on such officers having the rank of general to ensure for them the necessary authority. He concludes:

The objection could be made that such inspectors are not a tradition in our service.... However, there had never been such uniformity in service matters, as are being proposed now; and thus, they are now more than ever necessary.²

In the same year, FZM Daun also tried to persuade the empress to reconsider her decision, in two memoranda,³ in which he emphasized the need for inspectors and a supervising Inspecteur General in order to achieve and maintain the required uniformity. Neither of these generals, however, succeeded in changing Maria Theresa's opposition to the plan. It was not until after the Seven Years War that the

¹KA, Mem 9 - 259, 1750

²Loc. cit.

³KA, FA/CA 9/1, 1750 and FA/CA 13/1, 1750

plan was taken up again.¹

In spite of the lack of general inspectors, the training of the regiments in the new drill regulations proceeded satisfactorily - if one can trust the official reports made by Daun and other generals to Maria Theresa.² The position of an Inspector General not having materialized, FZM Daun and other generals made annual tours of inspection to the various regiments. Daun's inspection report of 1750 gives the impression of objectivity and thoroughness, and contains an evaluation of most of the officers down to the rank of captain. Daun expresses his amazement at the progress made in such a short time in mastering the new drill regulations.³

One innovation which was responsible for the improvement in the training of the Austrian army was the establishment, in 1749, of annual training camps and maneuvers, which were frequently visited by Maria Theresa herself. Although these maneuvers consisted mainly of a presentation exhibition of parade ground drill, especially when Maria Theresa was in attendance, maneuvers imitating actual battle conditions were held. The frequently quoted Cogniazzo

¹In 1765 three Inspector Generals were appointed: FML Lacy for the infantry, FML d'Ayasasa for the cavalry and FML von Beck for the artillery

²KA, FA/CA 9/1, 1750 and HKR Exp. 1749, Sept. 512

³KA, FA/CA 9/1, 1750

reports a rather amusing incident, which took place in 1749 during one of the first maneuvers held. On this occasion, in which Austrian and Hungarian regiments were facing each other in a mock battle, some of the Hungarian troops, carried away by the excitement, began using their round uniform buttons in lieu of bullets against the Austrians. The Austrian troops retaliated by shooting their ramrods against the 'enemy.' The result of this mock battle was several killed and nearly one hundred wounded!¹ Such an incident is understandable if one considers the novelty of the maneuvers and the as yet uncorrected conditions of discipline in the Austrian army.

In spite of the fact that the greater part of the maneuvers consisted of exhibitions of parade ground drill, suitable, as Cogniazzo remarked, to entertain the ladies of the court during the frequent inspections by the empress,² they certainly played a large part in improving the training and precision of the Austrian army.

¹(Frh. von Cogniazzo), Freymüthiger Beitrag zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Militärdienstes...., (1799), p.24

²Ibid., p. 23f

THE 1749 EXERCITIUM REGLEMENT FOR
THE INFANTRY

The Regulament und Ordnung nach welchem sich gesamntes Kaiserlich - Königlichcs Fuss - Volck in denen in diesem Ersten Theil enthaltenen Hand Griffen, und Allen anderen Kriegs Exercitien sowohl als in denen In dem Zweyten Theil vorgeschriebenen Kriegs - Gebräuchen zu Feld / Besatzungen/ und überall gleichförmig zu achten haben¹ was the result of the deliberations of the Military Commission of 1748 - 49. It was delivered, in twenty-two copies, to all infantry regiments on 11th June, 1749, according to a draft of a letter from the Hofkriegsrat.² It consisted of two voluminous volumes; the first part, completed in 1749, contained the drill manual (Exercitium), the second part, issued a year later, contained the duty regulations (Dienst Reglement). The Exercitium was extensively illustrated with copper engravings in order to illustrate the various drill moves and formations. As the contents of this Exercitium are well known, and summaries or excerpts have appeared in

¹KA, Library, Ch5

²KA, HKR Reg. 1749 June 138. G. von Treuenfest, in his Geschichte des Infanterie Regiments Hoch-und Deutschmeister, (Vienna:1879), p.106, without giving a source, states that four copies had been delivered to that regiment in January, 1749.

several works,¹ a detailed discussion of the contents would be superfluous here. Two points remain to be examined: the first, to determine whether or not the Exercitium was a deliberate copy of the Prussian Reglements; the second, to evaluate the significance of the Exercitium within the framework of the development of the Austrian army.

It has been said that the Austrian army reforms of 1748/49 were deliberate, but incomplete imitations of the Prussian military system. The history of the Seven Years War published by the German General Staff contains the statement that "the Military Commission realized that the Prussian discipline, the firing and the art of evolutions had been responsible for the Prussian victories, and therefore, the Prussian example had to be followed."² Both Thürheim and Anger state definitely that the Prussian Reglement had been used as the model for the Austrian 1749 Reglement,³ and Jähns implies the same.⁴ Although the Prussian superiority in drill and training was realized by the Austrians, it must be pointed out that

¹ e.g. Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.III, p.2560f; von Thadden, Feldmarschall Daun, (Vienna:1967), ch.8; Der Siebenjährige Krieg, Grosser Generalstab, ed., vol.I, p.143ff

² Der Siebenjährige Krieg, Grosser Generalstab, ed., vol.I, p.143

³ A.Graf Thürheim, Ludwig Andreas Graf von Khevenhüller - Frankenburg, (Vienna:1878), p.55 and G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II p.1098

⁴ Max Jähns, op.cit., vol.III, p.2560

one can only speak of copying the Prussians when one interprets the aim of the military reforms of 1748/49 as an attempt to achieve equal efficiency for the Austrian army by centralization, by stricter enforcement of discipline and by standardization of regulations. No deliberate attempt was made to copy the Prussian drill and duty regulations, namely, the Prussian Reglement for the infantry of 1726 or Frederick II's new Reglement of 1743. (The writer could not find any documentary evidence that the latter Reglement had come into Austrian hands by 1749).

Even a perfunctory comparison of the Prussian and Austrian Reglements will make it clear that the latter is not a copy of the former, neither in regard to style nor in regard to details of drill. Compared to the precise style of the Prussian manual, the style of the 1749 Austrian one is cumbersome and pedantic - every move of the drill is explained in great, and often confusing, detail. Even the style of the Infantry Reglement of 1737 was more precise with its short, straightforward wording of the explanations of drill moves and regulations. However, the lengthy, cumbersome explanations of Daun's Reglement of 1749 should not be condemned as a retrogression. In Prussia, the army was used to uniform drill regulations since 1702, and successive changes were gradual. Thus, years of usage and practice made lengthy explanations of drill moves, evolutions,

etc., unnecessary. In Austria, in 1749, such standardization was an innovation, and it thus involved the unlearning of the old drill practices according to the various regimental Reglements and the learning of the new, standardized drill moves and regulations. Therefore, illustrations and detailed explanations were imperative to guarantee success. The illustrations were especially necessary in an army as polyglot as the Austrian.

With regard to tactical concepts and the technicalities of drill, one cannot regard the Daun Reglement as a copy of the Prussian Reglements either. The 1749 Exercitium retained the formation in battle of four ranks¹ and the drill with the Schweinsfedern and cheveaux de frise, elements, which the Prussian infantry Reglement of 1726 had already eliminated. Moreover, the Austrian manual retained the use of hand grenades, a practice, which had been eliminated in the Prussian Reglement of 1743.

Although the Daun Reglement of 1749, like the Prussian manuals of 1726 and 1743, emphasized the use of the peloton fire during an engagement, the Austrian Reglement retained a confusing number of different firing methods for different occasions. This, certainly, could not have been conducive

¹an exception was the formation of the two grenadier companies of each regiment, which were deployed on each wing of the regiment in a formation of three ranks

to achieving a machine-like precision and speed of fire such as had been achieved by the Prussian army. Equally, more numerous in the Daun Reglement, are the varieties of marching formations and of methods of setting up camps. Speed in the execution of the moves necessary for loading and firing was emphasized in the Daun Reglement, but not in the obvious, repetitious manner of the Prussian manuals. The above mentioned differences can readily be seen in a comparison of corresponding parts of the Prussian Reglement of 1726 and the Austrian Reglement of 1749. (See Appendix A and B).

The fact that the Military Commission of 1748/49 used the old 1737 Austrian drill Reglement as the basis for their discussions on the proposed new manual, presents a very convincing argument against the theory of copying from the Prussian Reglements, particularly, as the 1737 Reglement appears to have been based on the 1717 Austrian draft for a Reglement. Moreover, nowhere in the discussions of the commission is there any expression of a desire to copy Prussian methods. The word 'Prussian' appears only in connection with the demonstration of the three different drill methods arranged by Daun. Neither could this writer find such a desire expressed in any of the memoranda on the conditions in the Austrian army and on the proposed reforms of 1748.

The Austrian Exercitium Reglement of 1749 remained, in its main points, in force until 1769, when it was replaced by the Exercitium für die sämmentlich Kaiserlich Königliche Infanterie, composed under the supervision of FM Franz Moriz von Lacy. However, important alterations and additions were considered necessary and issued soon after the outbreak of the Seven Years War. The following dispositions and manuals, issued under the direction of FM Daun are of importance:

Lagerordnung, 1757
Ordre de bataille, 1757
General Schlachtordnung oder Verhaltungen
bei einem vorgehenden Treffen, 1757
Militär Feldreglement, 1759¹

The Exercitium Reglement of 1749 had not brought any tactical innovations. Its significance in the development of tactical theory in the Austrian army lies simply in the fact that it was the first generally applied Austrian drill Reglement and that its application was strictly enforced. It provided the technical means to make the Austrian army again the most formidable fighting instrument on the continent.

The introduction of this Reglement for the whole army was not alone responsible for the improvement in quality of the army during the period of peace following the year

¹Reprinted in:.....Beiträge zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Heerwesens. Erstes Heft: Der Zeitraum von 1757 - 1814. (Vienna: 1872)

1748. Daun knew how to inject the right spirit into the army and to ensure the enforcement of the new regulations. Herein lies his greatest merit. The success of the reforms can be demonstrated without having to resort to the - possibly anecdotal - 'proof' of Frederick II's exclamation during the battle of Lobositz (1756): "These are no more the old Austrians!"¹

This first battle of the Seven Years War, really was an indecisive battle, although the Austrian FM Browne withdrew his army after the battle, a move which has been termed unwarranted by some critics. Here, as in all of the engagements which the Austrians lost to the Prussians, Austrian generalship was not equal to that of Frederick's. However, no more references can be found in the sources to an inferiority of the Austrian army in regard to drill and discipline, an inferiority, which had been obvious during the first two Silesian Wars. Whereas the Austrians had been defeated by the Prussians in every major engagement during the first two Silesian Wars, they were able to inflict serious defeats on the Prussians in several major battles during the Seven Years War. Even the defeats of the Austrian army during this latter war were not decisive Prussian victories.

¹see, for example: Max Jahns, op.cit., vol.III, p.2561; Edith Kotasek, op.cit., p.19; F.L. von Thadden, op.cit., p.215

It must, however, be emphasized that the introduction of regulations applying to the whole army were only part of a general reform of state and army by Maria Theresa, a small, but yet important part.

The energy and determination of the empress, combined with her good sense to choose the right men for the right positions - in most cases at least - had brought the centralization of the state, aimed at by her predecessors, to a near fulfillment.

Centralized control had enabled Prussia, earlier than Austria, to forge an effective army and make use of the possibilities and demands of the development in weaponry. It now enabled Austria to achieve the same for her army.

The Prussians had general Reglements since 1702 and had been able to improve them gradually. The Austrians first had to create such uniformity, then they could make improvements as necessity and experience demanded.

As mentioned above, the introduction of the Reglement of 1749 would have meant little without the parallel reforms of military and civil administration, of the system of financing and recruiting, and without the change brought about in the social status and in the education of the officer corps through the efforts of Maria Theresa. The Maria Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt, the Theresianum in Vienna, (a secondary school for the education of

- future officers), the further development of the Engineer Academy in Vienna, the care for the invalids, etc., were part of these reforms. These reforms thus introduced the conditions under which the new Reglement could become effective.

APPENDIX A

Excerpt from the Austrian Exercitium
Regulament of 1749: the Chapter regulating
procedure of firing (Chargierungen). From
the original in the library of the Austrian
War Archives, Vienna.

REGULAMENT

Und

Ordnung



Nach welchem

Sich gesamntes Kaiserlich-Königliches

Suß = Sold

In denen

In diesem Ersten Theil enthaltenen

Sand = Brieffen,

Und

Allen andern Kriegs-Exercitien

sowohl /

Als in denen

In dem Zweyten Theil vorgeschriebenen

Kriegs-Gebräuchen zu Feld / Besatzungen /
und überall gleichförmig zu achten haben.

WZEN / gedruckt bey Johann Peter van Gehlen / Ihrer Königlich-Kaiserlich
Königl. Majestät Hof-Buchdruckern, 3749.

Hierzu gehende Theilung.

Von denen Chargirungen.

Auf daß ein jeder Ober- und Unter-Officier informiret seye / wie er sich in der Chargirung mit dem Feind / als auch in dem Exerciren zu verhalten habe / so ist zu wissen / daß von Hauptmann an ein jeder in seiner Ab- und Eintheilung verbleibe / wie Eingangs dieses Exercitii-Regulaments / bey der Rangirung en Ordre de Bataille einem jeden seine Distanz gewiesen worden / auch aus beyziehendem Plan das Mehrere zu ersehen ist.

Die Haupt- / Leut- / Ober- / Lieutenants- / Unter- / Lieutenants und Unter-Officiers / so im ersten Glied stehen / bleiben jederzeit in dem ersten Glied / und commandiren bey machender halben Wendung / wie schon erinnert worden / die sie betreffende Pelotons / halb- oder ganze Divisions / Feuer von beyden Flügeln gegen der Mitten jeder Battaillon; Die Haupt- / Leut- / Ober- / Lieutenants- und Unter- / Officiers aber / so auf der angemerkten Distanz hinter dem vierten Glied stehen / haben keine Feuer zu commandiren / sondern geben wohl acht / daß nirgend eine Confusion entstehe / gleiche / und gerade Linie gehalten werde / und niemand aus denen Reihen / und Gliedern trete / welches inssonderheit in der Chargirung mit dem Feind zu beobachten: Die Tambours bleiben gleichfalls allezeit auf ihrer Distanz hinter dem letzten Glied / und hinter ihren Officiers mit angezogenem Spiel / und Schlägeln in denen Händen / damit sie die sich ergebende Streich in der Egalität mit einschlagen können.

Alle Feuerung / und Ladung / desgleichen auch die darzu gehörige Movements müssen so geschwind / als nur immer möglich / und thunlich ist / gemacht werden / und ist dannenhero auch in diesen auf kein Tempo zu sehen / sondern nur / daß jedermann geschwind / und gut lade / auch alsogleich wieder schultere / ohne auf einander zu warten / und sich aufzuhalten / also mit einem Wort alles aufhalten / oder Versaumnis auch in dem allergeringsten zu vermeiden ist / desgleichen auch darauf gesehen werden / daß ein jeder wohl auf halben Mann nach der Situation / mithin nicht zu hoch / und auch gar nicht zu tief anschlage / ingleichen die Leute zu gewöhnen / und jederzeit darzu anhalten / daß sie ihre Schuß nicht gerad ausmachen / sondern diejenigen vom rechten Flügel feuren etwas nach Thunlichkeit links / und die vom linken Flügel jeder Battaillon etwas rechts / damit die Schuß kreuzen / als welche dem Feind so mehreren Schaden zufügen.

Der Obrist / Wachtmeister / oder der / so dessen Stelle vertritt / avertiret alle Feuer / welche zu machen / und laffet einen kurzen Würbel zum Zeichen mit der Trommel geben / wann jedes Feuer anzufangen ist / desgleichen laßt er auch einen längern Würbel zum Zeichen schlagen / wann jedes Feuer sich endigen soll; er commandiret auch alle Reserven / sowohl stehende ganze
Glieder

Von denen Chargirungen.

Glieder / als das im Avanciren beschehende Brech / Feuer / und dergleichen / wie in der Chargirung das Mehrere erläutert ist.

Im Avanciren und Retiriren muß alles / besonders Officiers / und Unter-Officiers wohl rechts und links sehen / daß jederzeit Schnur - gleiche Front- und Glieder gehalten werden / und ungeachtet die sich fertig machende Pelotons / halb / oder ganze Divisions um vier Schritt im Avanciren vortreten / so müssen dennoch die andere / so nicht im Fertig / machen begriffen / jederzeit gerade Linie halten.

Das Avanciren sowohl als Retiriren beschiehet mit ordinairn / und langsamen Schritten.

Damit man sich auch in denen Feuren / so durch die Officiers commandirt werden / nicht confundire / sondern die Feuer in einer Gleichheit / und Ordnung halte / ist nöthig zu beobachten / daß / wann Pelotons / weis / oder mit halben Divisonen chargiret wird / und der Hauptmann vom ersten Flügel commandiret: Schlage an / der auf dem linken Flügel fertig machen lasse / und wann der auf dem ersten Flügel feuren lasset / der auf dem linken Flügel anzuschlagen commandiret / der aus der zweyten Peloton rechten Flügels / oder nach dem sogenannten Chargirungs / Rang der dritten Peloton fertig zu machen befehle / und so fort ; mithin erhellet / daß nur die zwey Flügel jeder Battaillon genau auf einander Obacht zu geben haben / die übrigen aber sehen auf ihr vorgehendes Neben / Peloton , und wann dieses abfeuret / machet sich das Neben / Stehende fertig.

Alle / so in der Chargirung / besonders was zum Fertig / machen / Anschlagen / und Feuren gehört / zu commandiren haben / müssen die Commando nicht langsam aussprechen / oder die Wörter ziehen / sondern frisch und geschwind commandiren / mithin gleichsam nur das letzte Wort stark aussprechen / weilen durch das langsame Commando eines einigen das ganze Feuer vom Battaillon confundiret werden kan.

Wann Stuk vorhanden / werden vor jeder Chargirung beyh Exerciren so viel Schuß gefeuret / als befohlen wird.

Was übrigens bey der Chargirung / und jedem Feuer insonderheit zu beobachten ist / wird in der nachfolgenden Chargirung zu ersehen / und genauest sich darnach zu richten seyn.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.
------	-----------	------------------

Chargirungen.

Wann die obstehende Schlüssungen / oder die Douplirung vor der Chargirung gemacht worden wären / und die Officiers ihre Partisans hoch an die rechte Seiten genommen / und so Fahnen dabey / solche auch erhoben / und hoch gebracht worden / so ist alhier vor denen Chargirungen nur ein kleiner Tropp

Von denen Chargirungen.

129

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Habt acht. Man wird sich en Ordre de Bataille ran- giren, und nach der Trommel richten.		Tropp zu schlagen / womit die Officiers / und Unter-Officiers / so in das erste Glied gehören / in ihre Chargirungs- Eintheilung hervortreten / und sodann das nachstehende explicirende Zeichen zum Schlüssen gegeben wird. Wann aber die Chargirung gleich nach denen Hand-Griffen anzufangen befohlen wird / so avertiret der Obrist / Wachtmeister
		1. Würbel 1. Streich.	Auf dieses Avertissement laßt er durch den bey sich habenden Tambour schlagen / und nach einem kleinen Halt
		Kurgen. Tropp.	Wornach Ober- und Unter-Officiers die Partisans / und Kurz- Gewehrs in denen gewöhnlichen drey Tempis hoch nehmen / im Fall die Letzteren nicht schon ihr Kurz- Gewehr hoch hätten.
			Worauf Ober- und Unter-Officiers auf ihre Posten / wo sie en Ordre de Bataille zu stehen haben / nemlich diejenigen / so in das erste Glied gehören / hervor in solches marchiren / diejenigen Officiers / Unter-Officiers / und Fahnen aber / so hinter dem vierten Glied stehen zu bleiben haben / nur auf die eingänglich bey der Rangirung en Ordre de Bataille angemerkten Distanz hervorrücken / und gehörig hinter das vierte Glied placiren / und halten die Officiers durch die ganze Chargirung ihre Partisans hoch / gleichwie auch die Unter-Officiers ihr Kurz- Gewehr / auch die Führers die Fahnen.
		1. Streich.	Zu gleicher Zeit herstellen sich die Grenadiers aus vier in drey Gliedern / wie in denen Douplirungen angewiesen / falls die Douplirung vorhergemacht worden / und die Grenadiers in vier Gliedern formiret wären.
			Macht der rechte Flügel halb / links / und der linke Flügel halb / rechts / beyde auf dem linken Absatz / wie in denen Schlüssen N. 9. gesaget worden.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
		Tropp	den. Seynd nun mehrere Battaillons / oder das ganze Regiment beysammen / so beschiehet die Schlüßung dahin / wo die Mitten von allen ist / wann der Terrain es anderst leidet / die hinter dem vierten Glied stehende Fahnen / Ober- und Unters Officiers / Fourier- Schützen / Tambours / Fahnen Tragers / ic. machen gleichfalls in ihrer Eintheilung die Wendung gehörig mit / sodann laßt der Obrist / Wachtmeyster durch beghabenden Tambour schlagen / welchen alle übrige Tambours mit eins schlagen / womit das Battaillon, oder Regiment sich nach der Mitten schließet / auf Art / wie in denen ersagten Schlüßungen N. 9. expliciret worden; die ersteren zwey Glieder sowol von Grenadiers / als Fußiliers pflanzen zu gleicher Zeit ohne weiteres Commando während der Schlüßung geschwind das Bajonet in gehörigen Tempis, und geben links und rechts auf einander Achtung / daß es zugleich geschehe / und schultern wieder; alles / was sich hinten befindet / und oben die Wendung mit gemacht / treten zugleich den Schritt mit an / und bleiben jederzeit in der Distanz, und bey deme / wo sie hingetheilet / folglich / was hinter der Mitten sich befindet / nur hieort die Wendung auf dem linken Fuß links zu machen hat. Wann nun der Obrist / Wachtmeyster siehet / daß die Battaillons geschlossen / gibet er mit dem Degen ein Zeichen an alle Tambours / nach welchen selbige zugleich mit Schlagen aufhören / laßet sodann durch beghabenden Tambour schlagen / worauf sich alles en Fronte herstellt / mehrmalen 1. Streich 1. doppelter Streich, das ist: einen Streich mit zwey Schlägeln geben laßet / nach welchen die letzten drey Glieder in gleichen Austritt / vorwärts sich schließen / wie oben in denen Schlüßungen N. 1. erörteret worden; die Fahnen / und was sich hinten befindet / zu gleicher Zeit auf gehörige Distanz anrücken / da nun Reiben und Glieder geschlossen / und alles en Ordre de

Von denen Chargirungen

131

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
1	Habt acht. Man wird mit Pelotons auf der Stelle chargiren.	1. Kurzen Würbel	de Battaille rangirter stehet / avertiret der Obrists Wachtmelster. Erste Chargirung mit Pelotons auf der Stelle. Lasset darauf / nemlich auf dieses Avertisse- ment schlagen / so bald selbiger geendiget / fällt das erste Glieder in drey geschwinden Tempis mit dem linken Fuß vortretend nieder / wie in denen Hand; Griefs sen N. 47. gesagt worden / wornach die Hauptz Leute bey denen ersten Pelotons deren Grenadiers auf beyden Regiments; Flügeln / auch die ersten Pelotons aller Battaillons zugleich das Feuer an- fangen / und commandiren : Peloton macht euch fertig. Welches bey denen Grenadiers / da sie nur drey hoch stehen / von denen letzteren zwey Glie- dern stehender beschiehet / wie in denen Hand; Griefs sen N. 10. gelesen. Von denen Fuiliers; Pello- tons aber / welche vier hoch stehen / fallet bey dem Fer- tig; machen das zweyte Glied mit dem dritten Tempo dergestalt nieder / daß dessen rechtes Knie an seines kühenden Vorder; Mannes Schuh des rechten Fußes fast anrühre / mit dem linken Fuß aber trittet solcher fast bis an des Vorder; Mannes rechten Knie einwärts / das Gewehr spannend; hoch vor sich haltend. Zu merken : In dem Pelotons; Feuer bleibet das ganze erste Glied sowol von Fuiliers als Grenadiers / desgleichen auch die zwey Fahnen; Zug; als der funfzehende und sechzes- hende jeder Battaillon in Reserve , desglei- chen auch / wann nur eine Grenadiers; Com- pagnie beywesend wäre / da solche auf beyde Flügel

132

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			Flügel der Battaillons zertheilet / und gestellet wird / wie unten bey denen Douplirungen angemerket ist. Diese oben besagte zwey letzte Glieder der Grenadiers / und drey letzte Glieder der Fuiliers rucken zugleich im dritten Tempo in unausgesetzten Schritten vorwärts geschwind / und dergestalten ein / daß der linke Fuß von dem Mann des zweyten Gliedes / an seines knenden Border ; Mannes rechten Fuß einwärts links dergestalten angefehlet werde / daß die Schuh ; Spitze an des Border ; Mannes Knie fast rühre ; das dritte Glied setzet seinen Linken auch links einwärts an seines Border ; Manns - rechten Fuß / sich etwas wenigens rechts haltend / und bleibet der rechte Fuß von beyden Gliedern zuruck hinter den linken stehen / also auch das vierte Glied an das dritte antretend. Schlagt an. Da schlagen die zwey letzten Glieder der Grenadiers / und drey hintere Glieder der Fuiliers zugleich frisch auf halben Mann dergestalten an / daß das Gewehr des zweyten Gliedes der Grenadiers über seines knenden Border ; Mann / welcher zu der Zeit sich mit dem Kopf etwas vorwärts bückt / und das Gewehr sinken läßt ; das dritte aber rechts seines Border ; Manns hinaus / doch so viel thunlich / links anzuschlagen komme / das fernere Commando erwartend / auf die Art / wie in denen Hand ; Grieffen gewiesen ; das zweyte Glied der Fuiliers - Peloton schläget auch frisch über seines Border ; Mannes Kopf hinaus wohl an / die zwey Letzteren derselben Glieder aber schlagen an / wie bey dem letzten Grenadiers ; Glied erwehnet. Zu merken : Wann nun ohne zu feuern das Absähen commandiret wurde / so wird das Gewehr in einem Tempo hoch vor sich gebracht / ohne Bewegung eines Fußes / das erste Glied

Von denen Chargirungen.

133

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			Glied aber erhebet Kopf / und Gewehr mit dem Bajonet wiederunt in vorgehabte Positur / wie es vor dem Anschlagen gewesen. Feuer. Hier thun sie einen starken Zug an dem Schneller / oder Zügel / und nach gegebenen Feuer / bringen selbige mit Zurucktretung des linken Fußes neben den rechten das Gewehr hoch vor sich haltend / im dritten Tempo bringen sie es mit Zurucktretung des rechten Fußes in gleicher Balanz an die rechte Seiten / herstellen den Hahn / wischen die Pfannen aus / ergreifen die Patronen / öffnen selbige / und laden / wie in denen Hands Brieffen N. 14. / 15. / 16. / 17. / 18. / & 19. angewiesen worden ; das zweite Glied der Fußilier - Pelotons stehet mit hochnehmenden Gewehr gleich nach gegebenen Feuer auf / und verrichtet alles / wie oben beschreiben ; so bald geladen / bringet ein jeder mit geschwinden Tempis ohne Commando das Gewehr auf die Schulter / und wann solches von allen erfolgt / richten sie sich wieder auf ihre Distanz , jedoch mit der hauptsächlichen Anmerkung / daß solches so geschwind / als es nur immer Menschen ; möglich / und ohne die mindeste Abwartung deren Tempis beschehen muß ; das erste Glied erhebet nach erfolgten Feuer / Kopf / und Gewehr / wie vor erwehnet. Auf diese Art continuiret das Feuer von beyden Flügeln jeder Battaillon , von denen Officiers / so in denen Pelotons stehen / commandiret werdend / biß nach der Mitte auf die oben ersagte zwey Fahnen Pelotons / welche hier nicht der Ordnung nach feuren / sondern in Reserve verbleiben ; wann das dreyzehende Peloton jeder Battaillon abgefeuret / machen sich die ersten Pelotons jeder Battaillon wie der gehörig fertig / und wann das Bierzehende abfeuret / schlagen die ersteren Pelotons an / und so fort ; auch machen sich die ersten auseren Pelotons der Grenadiers auf beyden Regiments Flügeln zugleich

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			gleich mit denen ersten Pelotons deren Battailons wieder fertig / so oft das Feuer repetiret wird / damit sie aber (da sie nur jeden Orts in vier Pelotons stehen / wann zwey Grenadiers, Compagnien vorhanden) ihr Feuer souteniren / nemlich allezeit eine Peloton mit geladenem Gewehr haben / so richten sie das Commando und Feuer ein / wie es bey denen ganzen Divisions gesagt wird. Wann nun solches zwey- oder mehrmalen durchgemacht worden / und ein anderes Feuer angefangen werden soll / so laßt der Obrist, Wachmeister bey Abfeuerung des letzten Pelotons / nemlich des Vierzehenden der Fusiliers / 1. Fangen Würfel schlagen / welches bemerkt / daß sich das Feuer endigen solle / worauf die ersten Pelotons / da sie sich schon fertig gemacht / und anschlagen / wieder nach Commando des Officiers ab / und den Hahn in die Ruhe setzen / auch schultern / und commandiret hierauf der Obrist, Wachmeister : Diese Fertigmachung beschiehet vom ersten Glied folgender Massen. Als: 1. Tempo. Bringet der Mann die rechte Hand an das Schloß / den Daumen auf den Hahn legend. 2. Tempo. Spanneth er den Hahn mit dem erhobenen Ellenbogen / zugleich einen Ruck heruntwärts machend. 3. Tempo. Bringet er das Gewehr hoch vor sich gerade in die Höhe / den rechten Daumen auf den Hahn / den linken denen Augen gleich aufwärts an dem Schaft haltend; die zwey Reserves Pelotons aber verhalten sich / wie bey denen Pelotons; Feuern gesesst.

Erstes Glied und Reserve macht sich fertig.

Von denen Chargirungen.

135

Num.	Commando	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirung.
	Schlagt an!		get / jedoch müssen diese drey Tempo so geschwind / und gleichsam nur in einem gemachet werden. Der Obrist / Wachtmeister commandiret weiter: Dieses beschiehet von allen Fertigen gemachten zugleich frisch auf halben Mann / so viel möglich nach der Mitte / um wie gesagt / das Feuer zu creusken / woben zu erinnern / daß besonders in denen Reserve / Pelotons das erste Glied sich wohl ins Feuer lege / wodurch es allerdings etwas gebuckter kommet / mithin das auch knyende zweyte Glied süglich anschlagen könne. Beschiehet wie oben erwöhnet / mit einem frischen Drucker / nach gegebenen Feuer bringet das erste Glied gleich denen übrigen das Gewehr hoch / wie es vor dem Anschlag gewesen / sodann bringet es das Gewehr an der rechten Seiten in die Balanz, daß der Kolben hinten auf der Erden / und die Mündung vornen eine zweyte Hand von der Erden stehe / herstellet den Hahn / wischet die Pfanne / ergreiffet die Patronen / öfnet solche / schüttet Zündkraut auf / und schließet die Pfanne / die Patronen aber zuhaltend / und weilen das erste Glied knyender die Ladung zu machen / so hebet es mit der linken Hand das Gewehr / gegen sich in die Höhe / mit der rechten auf dem Einschnitt des Kolbens liegenden Hand / bringet das Gewehr vor dem linken Knye vorbei an die linke Seiten schreck / daß der Kolben zwischen dem hinteren / und desselben Neben Mannes auf der Erden ruhe / und der Lauf untersich gegen die Erden komme / mit der linken Hand etwas ober der Mitte das Gewehr ergreifend / und dergestalt haltend / daß die Mündung bey dem linken Knye etwas hervor sehe / machet die geschwinde Ladung / und wann solche beschehen / faßet mit der rechten Hand das Gewehr oben unter dem Bajonet, und erhebet es / so lang der Armen reicht / mit der linken Hand greiffet zu gleicher Zeit hinunter bis an die Batterie - Feder / und bringet es mit

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			mit einem Zug / gefüllt vor das rechte Knie / wie es vorhero gewesen. Und ist zu beobachten / daß man sich wohl nach dem rechten Flügel richte / und das Gewehr mit dem Bajonet in einer Schnur / geraden Linie einer wie der andere / mithin eines nicht höher oder niedriger / wie das andere gehalten werde / die übrige drey Glieder der Reserve / Pelotons verrichten ihre Ladung gewöhnlicher Massen. Alhier ist noch zu erinnern / daß / wann mehrere Battaillons / als eines / exerciret / oder chargiret / solche die Pelotons halb / oder ganze Divisions Feuer / jede ins besondere machen jedoch / so viel thunlich / die Battaillons auf einander Achtung geben / daß sich bey allen exercirenden Battaillons das Feuer zugleich endige. Da zu besorgen / daß meistens einiger Abgang von completen Stand sich ereignen dürfte / auch durch die sich befindenden Krancken / und ausserhalb stehenden Wachten / und Commando die Pelotons meistens dergestalt geschwächt seyn werden / daß dieses Peloton-Feuer zu schwach andurch seyn wurde / so wird in einer Action um so mehrers das unten angemerkte halbe Divisions Feuer zum Gebrauch genommen werden müssen. Gleichwie hingegen / wann die Pelotons zu sechs / sieben / und acht Reihen breit seynd / kan auch mit halben Pelotons aus jeden Divisionen von deren beyden Flügeln gegen der Mitten chargiret werden. Und zwar: Auf des Obrist Wachtmeisters Avertissement: Man wird mit halben Pelotons aus Divisionen chargiren / und darauf schlagen lassenden Würfel wird bey allen Divisionen zugleich durch die Officiers an gefangen zu commandiren: Erste halbe Peloton macht

Von denen Chargirungen.

137

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
------	-----------	------------------	---------------

macht euch fertig / worauf sich die hintere zwey Glieder ersterer Peloton gehörig fertig machen / und an die vordere vorrücken ; das zweyte Glied aber / wann das erste mit vorwärts ans Knye angelegten Gewehr schon knyet / wo aber nicht beyde vordere Glieder dieser Peloton auß rechte Knye gleich nach ausgesprochenen Commando. Wort niederfallen / und das zweyte Glied das Gewehr auf der Schulter absenket / wie hier unten N. 4. gesagt wird ; so dann commandiren die. Ersteren weiter : Schlegt an / welches also die fertig ; gemachte hintere zwey Glieder allerersteren Pelotons bewirken / zugleich aber commandiren die bey denen inneren Flügels Pelotons aller Divisions nach dem sonstigen Chargirungs ; Rang : Zweyte halbe Peloton macht euch fertig / und wann hierauf die ersten halben Pelotons abfeuern / müssen die halben der zweyten Pelotons anschlagen / die halben derer dritten Pelotons aller Divisions aber sich fertig machen / sobald die hintere halbe Pelotons geseuert / laden sie geschwind wieder / und schultern / und zugleich sethet das zweyte Glied auf / und machet sich fertig / das erste Glied aber bleibet knyen / und machet sich zugleich mit dem zweyten fertig / wie oben N. 1. expliciret worden.

Wie nun das Feuer von beyden Flügeln jeder Division gegen ihre Mitten durch die hintere halbe Pelotons lauffet / also beschiehet es auch bey denen vorderen halben Pelotons / und müssen die erstere halbe Pelotons anschlagen / wann die hinteren Helften der vierten Pelotons feuern / hingegen wann das Feuer öfters durchgemacht werden will / müssen sich die ersteren hintere halbe Pelotons wieder fertig machen / wann die vordere Helfte der vierten Peloton anschlagen / und so weiters / die Grenadiers machen alhier die Reserve, und werden bey Endigung dieses Feuers durch den Obristen Wachmeister gehörig commandiret.

S

Wann

138

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Habt acht, man wird mit halb Division auf der Stelle chargiren.		Wenn nun ein anderes Feuer solle angefangen werden / avertiret der Obrist-Wachmeister Lasset darauf durch beghabenden Tambour 1. Kurzen Würbel schlagen / so das Zeichen ist eines jeden Feuers / welches durch Officiers commandiret wird / um anzufangen / gleichwie ein langer Würbel die Feuer endiget.
2			Zwente Chargirung mit halben Division auf der Stelle. Vor dieser Chargirung ist zu merken / daß man mehrere als eine Battaillon zusammen exerciren / die Grenadiers bey diesem halben Divisions-Feuer in Reserve bleiben / wann aber nur eine Battaillon exerciret / oder chargiret / und zwey Grenadier-Compagnien dabey anwesend wären / so fanget auf dem rechten Flügel die erste halbe Grenadier-Compagnie dieses Feuer an / die erste Helfte der zweyten Compagnie auf den linken Flügel derselben folget / darauf sodann die zweyte Helfte der ersten / und hernach die zweyte Helfte der zweyten Compagnie, und endlich das Fouillier-Feuer aus jeder Battaillon von denen erstern halben Divisions gleich folget. Wenn aber auf jeden Flügel nur eine halbe Grenadier-Compagnie stehet / so fanget die ganze Helfte hiermit auf den Flügel das Feuer an / und bleibet das erste Glied in diesem halben Divisions-Feuer nur allein in Reserve sowohl von Fouillier- als Grenadiers / weilen die Fahnen Pelotons mit ihren halben oder ganzen Divisions mitzufeuern haben. Wenn nun / wie oben schon gesagt / der kurze Würbel zum Zeichen des Anfangs geschlagen wird / fanget der Grenadier-Hauptmann auf dem rechten Flügel an zu commandiren.

Halbe

Von denen Chargirungen.

139

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
------	-----------	------------------	---------------

Halbe Division macht euch fertig.

Dieses beschiehet von beyden Flügeln alternative von denen Grenadiers des rechten Flügels anfangend / nebst anderen in dem Pelotons Feuer erläuterten Observationen / und lauffet bis in die Mitten auf die achte halbe Division der Fousiliers / und wann solche feuert / und kein Würbel darzwischen geschlagen worden / so laffet der Grenadier-Hauptmann auf den rechten Flügel wieder anschlagen / nachdem er mit dem Abfeuren der sieben den halben Division fertig machen lassen / wann nun solches nach Befehl etliche mahl durchgemachet / der Würbel geschlagen / und nach Commando des Obrist-Wachtmeisters die Reserve abgeseuert / avertiret der Obrist-Wachtmeister weiters:

Habt acht, man wird mit ganzer Division auf der Stelle chargiren.

3

Dritte Chargirung mit ganzen Division auf der Stelle.

Zu merken / wann nur eine Grenadier-Compagnie anwesend / so bleibet solche bey dieser Chargirung nebst dem ganzen ersten Glied in Reserve ; wann aber zwey Grenadier-Compagnien zugegen / so machen sie die Feuer der Ordnung nach mit / nur das erste Glied deren Grenadiers gleichwie von Fousiliers in Reserve bleibet / und fanget die erste ganze Grenadier-Compagnie auf dem rechten Flügel zugleich als eine ganze Division dieses Feuer an / wann der Obrist-Wachtmeister

1. Kurzen Würbel

schlagen laffet / und commandiret der Grenadier-Hauptmann:

Ganze Division macht euch fertig.

Schlagt an.

Feuer.

Dieses

140

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
------	-----------	------------------	---------------

Dieses beschiehet von beyden Flügeln nach der Mitten / wie in Pelotons: oder halben Divisions: Feuer / und damit das ganze Bataillon vom Feuer nicht entblößet / auch süglicher continuiret werden könne / so hat der Hauptmann vom linken Flügel / als welcher das zweyte Feuer zu machen hat / nicht ehender das Fertig-machen zu commandiren / als bis der Erste das Feuer commandiret / welches auch die übrigen durch die Bataillons zu observiren haben.

Wobey zu beobachten / daß weder bey diesem Feuer / noch anderen Chargirungen / oder General-Decharge die Officiers / so nicht zu commandiren haben / im ersten Glied stehen bleiben / noch niederknien / sondern die / so nicht zu commandiren haben / sich unvermerkt bis in das dritte Glied zurück ziehen / und sobald das Feuer vorbey / wiederum in das erste Glied vortreten.

Wann nun das Divisions: Feuren sich endigen solle / und der Obrist - Wachtmeister solches durch zu beschließen avertiret / commandiret er sodann:

1. Langen
Würbel

Reserve macht
auch fertig.
Schlagt an.
Feuer.

Dieses beschiehet von dem ersten Glied / und Grenadiers / wie oben gesagt / wann solche in Reserve geblieben.

Nach geendigtem diesen Feuer also avertiret der Obrist: Wachtmeister:

4. Habt acht
Man wird mit
Gliedern aus
halbe Divisio-
nen chargiren.

Vierte Chargirung mit Gliedern aus halben Divisions.

Zu merken / alhier bleiben alle Grenadiers als lein in Reserve, mithin das erste Glied in seiner Ordnung alhier mitzufeuern hat.

Auf

Von denen Chargirungen.

141

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
		1. Kurzer Würfel	Auf dieses ersagte Avertissement lasset der Obrist;Wachmeister durch den bey sich habenden Tambour Schlagen / worauf der Hauptmann auf den rechten Flügel der Fouilliers commandiret, Halbe Division, und nach einer kleinen Pausirung Das vierte Glied macht euch fertig. Auf dieses letzte Wort Fertig tritt das zweyfe / und dritte Glied mit dem linken Fuß vor / einwärts neben des Vorder;Manns rechten / und fallen auf das rechte Knie darnieder / halten ihr Gewehr auf der Schulter wohl hoch / und gerad / und lassen das Gewehr mit dem Kolben in der linken Hand inwendig des linken Schenkels / soweit es der linke Arm ungezwungen zulasset / gerad absinken / das vierte Glied aber machet sich hurtig fertig / wie oben gesagt / zugleich mit dem linken Fuß wohl vorwärts eintretend ; der Hauptmann commandiret weiters : Schlagt an. Welches nach vorgeschriebener Art beschiehet. Der Hauptmann des linken Flügels commandiret zugleich sich rechts wendend. Halbe Division. Viertes Glied macht euch fertig. Folglich wann der von der ersten halben Division das Feuer dieser bey der zweyten halben Flügels Division das Anschlagen / und der darauf folgende / das Fertig machen commandiret / und da geschwind zu commandiren / so wird man ein beständiges Feuer unterhalten ; die Absehung nach gegebenem Feuer / und Ladung beschiehet / wie in dem Pelotons Feuer gezeigt worden.

142

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Grenadier macht auch fertig. Schlagt an. Feuer.	1. Langen Würbel	Das dritte Glied jeder halben Division, wann das vierte Glied feuret / und das Gewehr absetzt / steht gerad auf / und machet sich geschwind fertig / und sofort nach obbeschriebener Weis gehet dieses Feuer von beyden Flügeln der Fouilliers nach der Witten / alle Glieder besonders hindurch / zwey / oder soviel mahlen es anbefohlen / und wann es geendiget werde solle / laisset der Obrist / Wachtmeister schlagen / damit sich die Glieder zu weiterem Feuer nicht mehr auf das neue fertig machen / und die bereits fertig gemachten den Hahn in die Kugel he setzen / und schultern ; woben noch anzurufen / daß wann das dritte Glied in denen halben Divisionen gefeuert / das zweyte Glied auch wie das dritte aufstehet / und sich fertig machet. Das erste Glied aber bleibet in allen stehenden Chargirungen auf dem rechten Knye liegen / und machet seine Feuer / und Ladung jederzeit auf denen Knyen. Wann das Feuer continuiret / so machet sich das vierte Glied fertig / wann das erste feuret / und das dritte / und zweyte Glied fallen nieder / wann aber der Würbel geschlagen / commandiret sodann der Obrist / Wachtmeister. Hiermit feuren alle Glieder deren Grenadiers zugleich / das erste ladet knyvender auf Art / wie schon oben angewiesen worden. Zu merken / auf diese Art / wie alhier Glieder weiß aus halben Divisionen / und wie hiers unten nachfolget / aus ganzen Divisionen gefeuert wird / kan sowohl in halben / und ganzen Divisionen anstatt Gliedern mit halben Reihen gefeuert werden / und fanget sich das Feuer gleichfals mit hintersten halben

Von denen Chargirungen

143

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Frontel.	Chargirungen.
5	Habt acht mit Gliedern aus ganzen Divi- sionen zu char- giren.	1. Rürgen Wirbel	halben Stehen an / und übrigs alles / wie mit Gliedern beobachtet. Wann sich dieses Feuer mit denen Grenadiers geendiget / avertiret ferner der Obrist / Wachtmeister. Fünfte Chargirung mit Gliedern aus ganzen Divisions. Und nach erfolgenden commandiret der Hauptmann des rechten Flügels / von denen Fouilliers / weilen gleichfalls alhier alle Grenadiers in Reserve bleiben. Ganze Division. Das vierte Glied macht auch fertig. Schlagt an. Feuer. Welches auf die Art / und Weise / wie bey dem Glieder / Feuer der halben Divisions von beyden Flügeln nach der Mitten beschiehet / und auch mit denen Grenadiers sich endiget nach vorhero geschlos- senen langen Wirbel / als welches / wie gesagt / ohne jederzeit eine Erinnerung zu machen / zu ob- serviren ist. Weiters avertiret der Obrist / Wachtmeister. Sechste Chargirung mit ganzen Gliedern auf der Stelle. Dieses gehet die ganzen Battaillon , oder Re- giment an / oder wie stark man nemlichen ausgerus- set /
6	Habt acht man wird mit gan- zen Gliedern auf der Stelle chargiren.		

Nun	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Ganze Battailon das vierte Glied macht auch fertig. Schlägt an. Feuer. Das dritte Glied schlägt an. Feuer. Das zweyte Glied schlägt an. Feuer. Das erste Glied schlägt an. Feuer.		Setzt / und commandiret der Obrist / Wachtmeister ferner. Welches alles auf Art / und Weise / wie in denen vorhergehenden Glieder / Feuern angezeigt / in allen gleichförmig zu machen kommet / außer daß dieses ganze Glieder / Feuer durch den Obrist / Wachtmeister commandiret werde. Nach gegebenem Feuer des letzten / oder vierten Gliedes / wann solches nemlich nach dem Feuer das Gewehr abgesetzt / steht das dritte Glied gerad auf / und machet sich geschwind fertig / auf die Art / wie bey denen Hand / Griessen N. 10. gesagt. Dann commandiret der Obrist / Wachtmeister ferner. Dieses Glied machet das nemliche / wie oben bey denen Glieder / Feuern schon gesagt worden / und nach abgefeuerten dritten Glied / steht das zweyte Glied auf / und macht sich fertig / sodann commandiret der Obrist / Wachtmeister. Welches dieses gleichnässig auf obige Art beverstelliget / und machet nach gegebenem Feuer des zweyten Gliedes / das erste sich sogleich kugend fertig / wie oben N. 1. in der Chargirung bey dem ersten Glied in Reserve gesagt worden. Worauf sodann der Obrist / Wachtmeister wieder commandiret. Nach gegebenem solchen Feuer bringet dieses erste Glied das Gewehr / wie oben angezeigt / zur Ladung / und sodann wiederum / wann die Ladung beschehen / den Kolben vor das rechte Knie ansetzend / und mit der Mündung / und Bajonet schreckhoch vorwärts haltend / wie solches oben bey dem Pelo.

Von denen Chargirungen.

145

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
7	Grenadier macht auch fertig, Schlägt an. Feuer.		Peloton: Feuer gesagt worden. Der Obrist: Wachtmeister commandiret ferner
	Habt acht, man wird im Avanciren, und Retiriren mit Peloton chargiren.	1. Streich 1. Streich douplirten Marche	Zu merken / auf diese obige Art / kan nach vorfallenden Umständen / mit graden / und ungraden / das ist : wann die Reihen durch das Battaillon vorhero bey der Stellung in die ersten / und zweyten abgetheilet worden / mit ersten Reihen und zweyten Reihen Männern aus jedem Glied gefeuert werden / und werden erstlich die graden aus dem vierten Glied / sodann die ungraden aus dem nemlichen Glied / und ferner die graden und ungraden aus dem dritten / und so bis in das erste Glied commandiret. Wann nun obiges Feuer zweymahl durchgemacht / und nicht mehr auf der Stelle chargiret werden solle / so avertiret der Obrist: Wachtmeister: Siebende Chargirung / mit Peloton im Avanciren / und Retiriren. Der Obrist: Wachtmeister lasset auf das hienebige Avertissement durch den Tambour mit seinem Schlägel schlagen / womit das ganze erste Glied aufstehet / und nach denen bey denen Hand: Grieffen N. 48. angezeigten dreyen Tempis behörig zugleich schulsert: weiters lasset der Obrist: Wachtmeister / noch und gleich darauf den schlagen / nach welchem zweyten Streich alles / und jedes zugleich mit dem linken Fuß aus / und den Schritt antrittet. Der douplirte Marche aber von allen hinter der Front befindlichen Tambours mit eingeschlagen wird; das Battaillon marchiret mit gleich/

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
		1. Wirbel	gleichen / jedoch nicht zu geschwinden Schritten in gerader Linie aus / so / daß sich die Mannschaft nicht dränge / noch eine Oefnung irgendwo mache. Wann der Obrist / Wachtmeyster siehet / daß solches auf einer bequemen / oder gewissen Distanz angelanget ist / laßt er durch den beyhabenden Tambour, nachdem er zuvor zugleich an die anderen Tambours ein Zeichen mit dem Degen gegeben / um zu schweigen schlagen / worauf von beyden Flügeln die Grenadiers / und jeder Battailon die erste Pelotonß. commandiren. Peloton. Auf das Wort Peloton bleibet jedes Peloton, so es angehet / stehen / die Füße geschwinde nebeneinander gebracht / und nach einer kleinen fast unmerkenden Pause wird commandiret Macht euch fertig. Dieses beschiehet von denen zwey letzteren Gliedern von denen Grenadiers / und drey letzteren der Fouilliers / weilen abermalen in diesem Pelotonß Feuer das ganze erste Glied / von Grenadiers / und Fouilliers / nebst den fünfzehenden und sechzehenden / als denen Fahnen Pelotonß / in Reserve verbleiben ; alle Glieder der commandirten Pelotonß aber bringen das Gewehr fertig machend hoch vor sich / mit dem Unterscheid / daß das erste in Reserve bleibende Glied nicht den Hahn spanne / wie die hinteren Glieder. Ferner wird commandiret : Marche: Worauf die fertig gemachten Pelotonß mit vier Schritten geschwind heraus treten / und im fünften Schritt fallet das erste und anderte Glied bey denen Fouillier - Pelotonß / bey denen Grenadiers aber alleinig das erste Glied auf das rechte Knie / und

Von denen Chargirungen.

147

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			und die zwey letzteren treten hurtig ein / das gespannte Gewehr hoch vor sich mit dem Daumen auf dem Hahn haltend / gleichwie auch das zweyte Knyende bey denen Fouillieurs thun muß / das erste Glied aber / so nicht feuret / bringet solches mit dem Kolben vornen an das rechte Knye ansetzend / auf die Art / wie es in der stehenden Feurung geschehen: hierauf wird weiters commandiret. Schlagt an. Feuer. Sobald dieses Feuer gegeben worden / steht das erste Glied so gekniet wieder hurtig auf / und nimmet das Gewehr / weil es nicht gefeuert / gehörig auf die Schulter / die hinteren Glieder aber / so gefeuert / bringen nebst Zurück / Treitung des linken Fußes neben den rechten das Gewehr gerade vor sich hoch nehmend / sodann mit dem Rechten hinter dem Linken / jedoch müssen die letzteren Glieder etwas grössere Schritt / wie das zweyte machen / gehörig an die rechte Seiten / hinstellen den Hahn / und verrichten die gehörige Ladung / wie oben bey dem stehenden Peloton-Feuer gesagt worden / nur mit dem Unterschied / daß sowohl im Avanciren / als Retiriren das Gewehr nicht kan auf der Erden neben dem linken Fuß gesetzt / sondern in der Hand auf der linken Seiten / bey der Ladung getragen werden muß / und wann sie dars mit fertig / gleich ohne Commando schultern / welches alles so geschwind / als es nur immer möglich / geschehen solle. Zu merken: Im fall das den March continuirte Battaillon wehrender Zeit weiter voravanciret wäre / das erste Glied / und folglich auch die abgefeuerten Pelotons allezeit dem Battaillon gleich zu marchiren / und nach aufgeschüttetem Pulver im Marche zu laden haben.

148

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			haben / welches sowohl im Avanciren / als Retiriren jederzeit zu beobachten ist. Auf diese Art folgen alle übrige Pelotons ders gestalt / daß / wann der Officier des ersten Pelotons vom rechten Flügel macht auch fertig, der vom linken Flügel das Greben mit dem Wort Peloton, und wann Ersterer <i>Marche</i> / der Zweyte das fertig machen / ferner der Erstere das Anschlagen / der Zweyte <i>Marche</i> / und wann leztlich Erstere das Feuer / Zweyter / oder der vom linken Flügel / anzuschlagen commandiret / worauf die zwey Flügel der Grenadier, oder wann keine vorhanden / jeder Battaillons genau obacht zu geben haben; die Officiers in denen übrigen Pelotons beobachten ein gleiches / und können sich noch um so besser / und leichter reguliren / wann sich solche nach ihrem vorgehenden Neben Peloton richten / nemlich / wann das vorher zu feuern habende Peloton die vier Schritt vorzumarchiren befehliget wird / commandiret der nebenstehende folgende Officier, Peloton, und wann die vorgehende anschlaget / die nachfolgende sich fertig machet; folglich / wann die vorgehende feuert / dieses Neben stehende die besagte Schritt marchiret / und so fort. Wann nun solches auf diese Art durchaus zweymal durchgemachet / und dieses Feuer im Avanciren sich endigen soll / so läßt der Obrist; Wachtmeister schlagen / welcher nur die Endigung des Feuers bedeutet / das Battaillon aber dannoch im <i>Marche</i> bleibet / bis der Obrist; Wachtmeister einen Wink mit dem Degen gibet / wo alle Tambours den doublirten <i>March</i> zu schlagen aufhören / und commandiret sodann der Obrist; Wachtmeister an das Battaillon, oder was zum Exerciren ausdrucket.
		1. langen Würbel	
	Stall:		
	Erstes Glied, u. Reserve macht auch fertig. Schlagt an.		
			Ferner;
			Dieses

Von denen Chargirungen.

149

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Feuer.		Dieses wird auf die Art / wie im stehenden Peloton; Feuer N. 1. gemacht / mit dem Unterschied/ daß solches bey dem Commando zum fertig machen nebst Spannung des Hahns das erste Glied durchaus auf das rechte Knie niederknien müsse/ schießen und laden kniender / und wann sie damit fertig/ laßet der Obrist; Wachtmeister 1. Doppel- ten Streich schlagen/ auf welchen das ganze erste Glied aufsteht/ und schultert. Wolte man aber diese Reserve nicht abfeuern lassen / so ist auch nicht nöthig einen Würbel schlagen zu lassen/ sondern der Obrist; Wachtmeister befehlet dem beyhabenden Tambour zu schlagen/ welchen alle übrige Tambours mit eins schlagen; das Battaillon machet Rechts; umkehrt / auf Art/ wie bey denen Hand; Grieffen N. 6. gesaget / und retiriret sich mit gleicher Front, und in ordinairten langsamen Schritten; das Peloton/ an welcher das Feuer stehen geblieben/ behaltet Front dergestalt / daß / wann bey Anfang des Tropp ein Peloton vier Schritt vorgerückt / und im Anschlag liget/ solches abzufeuern / der Officier, so hierauf in Commando folget/ das Seinige fertig zu machen ohne vorzurücken commandiren muß; treffete sich es aber/ daß Ersteres eben abgefeuret hätte/ wo das zweyte sodann schon vorgerückt/ und zum Anschlag bereit seye / laßet er anschlagen/ auch feuern / und commandiret der dritte darauf folgende Officier. Peloton Fronte und Macht euch fertig. Da bleibet solches bey dem Wort Peloton stehen/ beyde Füße gleich neben einander gebracht / und nach einer kleinen Pause/ da herstelle / und macht euch fertig commandiret wird / so herstellet sich solches auf dem linken Fuß links/ gleichwie solches bey dem Retiriren auf dem linken Fuß rechts beschiehet / und wird zu gleicher Zeit das Gewehr geschwind

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.
------	-----------	------------------

Chargirungen.

geschwind fertig gemacht / wie bey dem Reserves Feuer auf der Stelle angewiesen ; das erste Glied fallet im dritten Tempo nieder / gleichwie auch das zweyte mit dem Unterschied / daß das Erstere den Kolben an das Knye vornen ansetzet / und das Zweyte knyender das Gewehr hoch vor sich gespannter / gleichwie die hinteren Glieder stehender behaltet.

Wann das Peloton abgefeuert / bringet es das Gewehr gleich nach gegebenem Feuer hoch vor sich mit dem linken Fuß geschwind / und zugleich zurück neben den rechten tretend / und commandirt der Officier ohnverweilt ganz stille :

Rechts umkehrt.

Marche.

Vor auf das Peloton sich rechts umkehret / mit dem linken Fuß austrittet / und wieder in das Battaillon, oder seine Distanz, mit Gliedern denen Gliedern gleich / mit geschwindem Schritt einmarchiret ; gleich bey Einrettung auf der Distanz wird das Gewehr in der Balanz auf die rechte Seiten gebracht / und der Hahn hergestellet / sodann Patronen ergriffen / geöffnet / und Pulver aufgeschüttet / das Gewehr zur Ladung geschwenket / und immer in währendem Marche die Ladung gemacht / und geschultert / welches die abgefeuerten Glieder des Pelotons zu beobachten haben ; das erste Glied aber / so nicht gefeuert / steht nach gegebenem Feuer sogleich auf / und nimmet das Gewehr / wie die anderen Glieder / hoch vor sich / und marchiret mit solchen bis auf die Distanz beym Battaillon, und wann die andere Glieder ihre Gewehr zum Hahn herstellen / an die rechte Seite bringen / so schultert das erste Glied behörig ihr Gewehr / und zwar in dem ersten Tempo wird das vor sich hoch habende Gewehr mit der rechten Hand auswärts mit dem Lauf gewendet / daß der Bügel gegen dem Leib komme / und zugleich mit der linken Hand frisch unten an dem Kolben gegriffen / das zweyte und dritte Tempo

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
9	Habt acht. Man wird mit ganzen Divi- sions im Avan- ciren und Reti- riren chargirẽ.		und Chargirung alhier im Avanciren in dem nemlis- chen bestehe / welche im stehenden halb; Divisions; Feuer gesagt worden. Neunte Chargirung mit ganzen Divi- sions im Avanciren/ und Retiriren. Der Obrist;Wachtmeister avertiret ebenmäßig: Befehlet gleichfalls/ wie bey denen Pelotons/ in Ansehung des Avanciren und Retirirens / und der Ordnung nach / wie oben bey dem stehenden Di- visions; Feuer / gesagt worden. Nur ist bey dem Retiriren / und Feuern annoch zu beobachten / daß in denen Divisions der Hauptmann von dem linken oder inneren Flügel zu commandiren habe: <i>Division</i> wann der Erste auf dem rechten Flügel sich fertig machen lasset / und wann dieser Erstere an- zuschlagen befihlet / commandiret er auf dem linken Flügel <i>Front</i> , womit sich nem- lich die Division auf dem linken Flügel links umkehret / und als nun der auf dem rechten Flügel feuert/lasset der auf dem linken Flügel sich fertig machen / und die jenige Division, so neben der ersten rechten Flügels ansethet/ commandiret <i>Division</i> , und sofort / damit das Divisions; Feuer in einer Gleichheit un- terhalten werden könne. Bey dem Pelotons;Chargiren im Retiriren/deß gleichen auch mit denen Halb; Divisions aber ist zu merken / daß / wann die erste Pe- loton auf dem rechten Flügel <i>Fronte</i> machet/ der Hauptmann von der Peloton auf dem linken Flügel <i>Peloton</i> commandiret/ und wann die

Von denen Chargirungen.

153

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
10	Habt acht. Man wird das Brech - Feuer machen.	1. Streich, Marche	die erste auf dem rechten Flügel sich fertig macht / die auf dem linken Flügel sich en Fronte links um herstellen / der Officier neben der ersten auf dem rechten Flügel stehens den Peloton commandiren muß : Peloton, und wann die Erste auf dem rechten Flügel anschlaget / macht die gleich neben solcher stehende Peloton - Fronte Links umkehrt / die auf dem linken Flügel aber macht sich fertig / und so fort hin durch alle Pelotons / oder halbe Divisions / bis gegen der Mitten / wie schon oben gesagt / und ist dieser rechte Flügel zu verstehen bey denen Divisions / so rechts gestellet seynd / bey denen Links stehenden aber ergibet sich solches vice versa. Zehende Chargirung mit ganzem Gliedern im Avanciren das Brech - Feuer zu machen. Es avertiret der Obrist, Wachtmeister : Auf dieses Avertissement pflanzen die hinteren Glieder von dem Battaillon, und Grenadiers auch das Bajonet ohne Commando, und schultern gleich wieder / darauf lasset der Obrist, Wachtmeister und gleich darauf schlagen / und trittet auf den jetzt erwehnten Streich alles und jedes zugleich mit dem linken Fuß in gleicher Linie den March an / und avanciret das ganze Battaillon, oder was nemlichen chargiret / in egalen Schritten / und Tritten in Schnur, gerad haltenden Gliedern / und alle Tambours schlagen den March ein. Wann der Obrist, Wachtmeister siehet / daß es Zeit zum feuern ist / gibt er mit dem Degen ein Zeichen an die Tambours / welche ein für allemal ihr Flug beständig auf ihne Obrist, Wachtmeister gerichtet haben müssen / auf welches Zeichen sie zu u schlas

254.

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Battaillon Das 4te Glied macht euch fertig. Schlägt an. Feuer.		schlagen aufhören müssen: der Obrist • Wachtmeister commandiret sodann Sobald commandiret wird Battaillon, stehet das ganze Battaillon, oder was nemlich chargiret/ unbeweglich stille mit beyden Füßen neben einander gleich / und er commandiret: Das vierte Glied macht euch fertig/ da fallen die ersten drey Glieder mit Vortretung des linken Fußes auf das rechte Knie nieder / wie bey dem stehenden Glieder Feuer gesagt worden / nur mit dem einzigen alhier bey dem Brech: Feuer sich ereignenden Unterschied/ daß / wie die drey Glieder niederfallen / sie das Gewehr von der Schulter bey das rechte Knie bringen / das erste Glied solches gerade schräg: hoch auf halben Mann / und das zweyte und dritte wohl zwischen der Reihn hervor mit der Mündung zu halten haben/ und wird dieses gemacht / wie N. 47. in denen Hand: Grieffen expliciret ist: die Grenadiers fallen alhier bey dem vierten Glied: Feuer nicht nieder/ weilen sie nur drey hoch stehen/ und das dritte Glied von denen Grenadiers mit dem dritten Glied deren Fusiliers sodann erst zu feuern hat; der Obrist: Wachtmeister commandiret weiter: Beschicket wie in der Glieder: Chargirung auf der Stelle. Hierauf givet das vierte Glied zugleich Feuer/ und nach solchen bringet es das Gewehr vor sich/ sodann in die Balanz herstelllet den Hahn / und versichtet die Ladung/ wie bey dem halben Divisions: Feuer die letzten Glieder im Avanciren gethan/ und zu machen expliciret worden; die drey ersten Glieder stehen auf/ das Gewehr mit beyden Händen gerade: hoch mit der Mündung oben vor sich behaltend / wovon das dritte Glied zugleich den Hahn spannet / und den Daumen darauf behaltet. Die Grenadiers auf beyden Flügeln bringen auf das Commando

Von denen Chargirungen.

255

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			Commando - Wort Feuer sogleich ihr Gewehr von der Schulter gerad vor sich auch in die Höhe haltend / wöbey das dritte Glied zugleich den Hahn spannet / welches aber die vorderen zwey Glieder dormalen noch nicht bewerkstelligen / sondern erwarten / bis weiters die Glieder zum Feuer commandiret werden. Der Obrist / Wachtmeister lasset durch den bey sich habenden Tambour 1. Streich, Marche. und gleich darauf wieder schlagen / auf welchen ersten Streich wieder alles und jedes in gleichem Schritt mit dem linken Fuß den Marche antrittet / und die Mannschaft das Gewehr hoch vor sich traget / mithin / wann das vierte Glied mit der Ladung fertig / solches nicht zu schultern / sondern das Gewehr von der linken Seite hoch / gerad vor sich zu bringen hat / so in einem Tempo mit rechts Hervorwendung des Laibes / Erhebung des Gewehrs mit der linken / und Greiffung mit der rechten Hand unter das Schloß beschiebet / spannen aber den Hahn nicht. Als nun der Obrist / Wachtmeister nach einigem Avanciren das dritte Glied feuern lassen will / gibet er abermalen denen Tambours das Zeichen zum Schweigen / und commandiret: Auf welches alles stille stehet. Da fallen die ersten zwey Glieder auf das rechte Knie nieder / das Gewehr mit dem Kolben an solches ansehend / und mit der Mündung und Bajonet schreck / hoch vorwärts gewöhnlich haltend: Das dritte Glied gibet Feuer / und machet sogleich seine gewöhnliche Ladung fort / die zwey ersten Glieder aber stehen auf mit hoch vor sich bringendem Gewehr / wöbey zugleich das zweyte Glied den Hahn spannen muß. Das dritte Glied deren Grenadiers feuert alhier gleichfalls / und beschiebet auf die nemliche Art / wie bey denen Fußknecht. II. 2. Der
	Bataillon		
	Das 3te Glied schlägt an.		
	Feuer.		

156

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
	Battailon: Das 2te Glied Schlagt an. Feuer. Halt: Das 1ste Glied Schlagt an. Feuer.	1. Streich, Marche 1. Streich, Marche	Der Obrist: Wachtmeister laßt durch den beyz habenden Tambour abermalen und darauf wieder schlagen/ worauf wie vorhero beym vierten Glied gesagt/ wieder in gleicher Front, und egalen Schritten avanciret wird. Der Obrist: Wachtmeister commandiret weiters Welches alles wie bey dem dritten und vierten Glied gesagt worden/ beschiehet; nach gegebenem Feuer stehet das erste Glied / welches bey dem zweyten Glied: Feuer nur allein niedergefallen/ wieder auf/ und hat sein Gewehr fertig gemacht/ womit auf den schlagen lassenden und anwiederum avanciret wird. Der Obrist: Wachtmeister commandiret / nachdem er bevor denen Tambours wieder das Zeichen zum Schweigen gegeben. Hier beschiehet das Anschlagen von dem ersten Glied stehender mit dem linken Fuß hervortretend / welches auch das erste Glied einzig und allein bey dem Brech-Feuer / mithin bey keinen andern Feuern zu observiren hat / und machen / wie gesagt/ auch die Grenadiers mit denen vorderen drey Gliedern diese Feuer mit denen Fouilliers zugleich mit. Worauf das erste Glied Feuer gibe. Will man solches nun auch im Retiriren machen / so geschiehet solches mit denen Wendungen / und Herstellungen / wie bey denen Pelotons / und halben Division-Feuern gesagt worden / mit dem Unterschied / daß wann der Obrist: Wachtmeister im Retiriren commandiret <i>Battailon</i>; daß alles stille stehet / und als er commandiret <i>Front</i>, sich alles links

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Frontel.	Chargirungen.
			links; umkehrt herstellt / und wann das vierte Glied zum Fertigmachen commandiret wird / die vorderen drey Glieder / wie bey dem Avanciren / niederzufallen / und mit Gewehr / und Kopf sich ein vor allemal etwas vorwärts zu bußen haben / um das hintere Glied im Feuern nicht zu hintern. Als man aber mit dem Bajonet einbrechen will / wird gleich nach dem gegebenen Feuer des ersten Gliedes im Avanciren commandiret
	Marche.	1. Streich,	auf diesen Streich. Das erste Glied bey dem Absehen vom Feuer das Gewehr also gleich hoch vor sich / und ferner in den linken Arm / wie in denen Hand-Grieffen N. 49. zu sehen / auf halben Mann fället / und mit gefältem Bajonet in gleicher Fronte avanciret / worbey aber zu erinnern kommt / daß solches nicht Fuß hinter Fuß / nemlich mit dem rechten nur hinter den linken anzurücken / sondern mit dem rechten allzeit jedoch ungezwungen / rechts vor dem linken getreten / und auf solche Art avanciret werden muß / die letzten drey Glieder der Fouilliers / und letzten zwey Glieder der Grenadiers / weilen das erstere von diesen das Bajonet gleichfalls vorwärts gefället / tragen ihr Gewehr mit dem Bajonet gerade hoch vor sich mit dem linken an der Seiten des Schafts ober dem Schloß angefaßten Daumen dem linken Zug gleich / und marchiren gleichfalls geschlossen / und in gerader Linie mit denen ersten / der Obrist / Wachtmeister commandiret hierauf
	March March		auf welchen doppelten Marche das Battaillon, oder Regiment mit grossen und hurtigen Schritten geschlossen / jedoch ungedrungen / und jederzeit in gleicher Fronte avanciret / bis der Obrist / Wachtmeister commandiret:
	Halt.		Dieses wird bey dem Exercitio also gemacht / oder / da nachdem der Feind repouset / und sich wieder sehen wolte.

158

Von denen Chargirungen.

Num.	Commando.	Mit der Trommel.	Chargirungen.
			Bei Verfolgung des Feinds aber ist hauptsächlich darauf zu sehen / daß Reihen / und Glieder wohl beyammen / und jederzeit geschlossen bleiben / mithin nicht auseinander zerstreuet werden. Bei diesem Brech-Feuer / und wann das Bataillon ohnedies nach abgefeuerten ersten Glied in starken Schritten avanciret / können die Hungarischen Regimenter auch mit dem Säbel ausfallen lassen / wie sie es schon eingeführet haben / wie auch dergestalten nach anderen Feuern solches beschehen kan. Nach dem Commando, halt / fallet das erste Glied auf das rechte Knie nieder / den Hahn gehörig in die Ruhe setzend / und knicker wiederum ladet / das zweyte / und dritte Glied der Fouilliers / auch zweytes der Grenadiers / als welche gleich nach ihrem Feuer wiederum geladen / fallen gleichfalls auf dieses Commando auf das rechte Knie nieder / das Gewehr mit dem Kolben / wie oben schon öfters gesagt / an das rechte Knie setzend / und das Bajonet schreyend / hoch vorwärts haltend / das vierte Glied der Fouilliers / und das dritte der Grenadiers bleiben mit hoch zum Feuer fertig / haltens den Gewehr stehen // doch ohne den Hahn zu spannen / es wäre dann ausdrücklich anbefohlen. Wann der Obrist / Wachmeister steht / daß das erste Glied geladen / und das Gewehr wiederum mit dem Kolben vornen an das rechte Knie gesetzt / und mit dem Bajonet schreyend / hoch vorwärts gebracht hat / commandirt er: Welches dann die ersten drey Glieder nach der in denen Hand-Griffen N. 48. gegebenen Explication, das vierte Glied aber wie in dem Pelotons-Feuer bey dem Retiren gesagt worden / gehörig bewirken / und das Gewehr wohl schultern / worauf das Quarrée gemacht wird / gleichwie es alhier nachstehend / sowohl auf eine / zwey / drey / auch

Das Gewehr
auf die Schulter.

APPENDIX B

Excerpt from the Prussian Reglement for the infantry of 1726: the chapter regulating procedure of firing (Chargierungen). From the facsimile edition, edited by H. Bleckwenn, Osnabrück: 1968

Reglement,

^{Vor}
Die Königl. Preußische
INFANTERIE,

^{Worin enthalten}
Die Evolutions, das Manual
und die Chargirung,

^{Und}
Wieder Dienst im Felde und
Guarnison geschehen soll,

^{Auch}
Wornach die sämtliche Offi-
ciers sich sonst zu verhalten haben.

^{Der gleichen}
Wie viel an Tractament be-
zahlt und davon abgezogen wird,
auch wie die Mundirung gemacht
werden soll.

^{Ordnung halber}
In XII. Theile, ein jeder Theil in ge-
wisse Tituls, ein jeder Titul in gewisse
Articles abgefasst.

Gegeben und gedruckt Potsdam, den
1. Martii 1726.

de stehen und marchiren, ausser im Retiriren, alsdenn sie observiren, was vorhero gesagt ist, damit sie alle Desordres und Confusion verhüten können.

NB. Es muß wohl darauf gesehen werden, daß die Officiers in der ganzen Chargirung mit ihrem Sponton recht marchiren, und die Unter-Officiers die Kurz-Gewehr wohl tragen.

II. Titul. Observations bey Formirung des Bataillons zum Chargiren.

I. Artic.

Senn das ganze Bataillon laden soll, und das Gewehr flach hat, wird der Pfann-Deckel-Riemen unvermercket geschwinde loß gemacht, und das Gewehr dabey feste und gerade in Rotten und Gliedern gehalten.

NB. Wenn ein Bataillon die Hand-Griffe gemacht hat, und darauf Chargiren soll, lauffen die Tambours nicht nach ihren Divisions, sondern bleiben auf die Flügel stehen, sonst aber sie nach den Flügeln lauffen, wenn commandirt wird: Das Bataillon soll Chargiren.

NB. Die Tambours und Pfeiffer auf beyden Flügeln sollen allezeit in der Chargirung in 2. Gliedern

bern stehen, und zwar erstlich die Musquetiers-Tambours in 2. Glieder, hernach der Grenadier-Pfeiffer und Tambour neben dem Officier, welchen selbige bey Schwencung mit Pelotons zum Hecken-Feuer auf dem Flügel von dem Peloton bleiben, und mit den Grenadiers in das Bataillon quater lauffen.

NB. In den Hand-Griffen, und bevor das Bataillon sich zum chargiren schliesst, stehen erstlich die Zimmerleute, hernach 2. Grenadiers-Pfeiffer, hernach 2. Grenadiers Tambours, und zuletzt die Musquetiers-Tambours, welche in 2. Glieder über die Grenadiers-Tambours treten, wann sich das Bataillon zum chargiren schliesst.

II. Artic.

Wenn der Major commandirt: Pfanne-Deckel ab, und geladen! wird die Pfanne aufgerissen, der Pfann-Deckel geschwinde abgenommen, und hinter das Gehende gestochen, alsdenn man Pulver auf die Pfanne schüttet, wie schon erwehnet, außer, daß, wann die Pfanne geschlossen, das Gewehr abgestossen, und dabey angehalten wird, bevor man das Gewehr zur Ladung schwencet.

Das ganze Bataillon muß wohl acht haben auf den Flügel-Mann, und das Gewehr mit starker Vortretung des rechten Fußes zur Ladung schwencen, hernach wird

wird geladen, und das Gewehr zugleich hoch gebracht, wie ordinaire; Bevor man aber schultert, muß der Flügel-Mann anhalten, das ganze Bataillon auf selbigen wol acht haben, und zugleich schultern wie in denn Hand-Griffen.

III. Artic.

Wenn das 4te Glied die 3. vordersten Glieder doubliret, muß selbiges Rottweise geschwinde einlauffen, und zwar die 3. ersten Mann vom 4ten Gliede lauffen ein zur rechten Hand der ersten Rotte, und die 3. folgenden zur rechten Hand der 4ten Rotte vom Bataillon, und so ferner das ganze 4te Glied, daß nemlich allezeit 3. Rotten übergesprungen werden.

NB. Die Unter-Officiers hinter den Bataillon marchiren im geraden Gliede bis auf die Distanze von 6. Schritt vom 3ten Gliede vom Bataillon, sobald das 4te Glied doubliret.

NB. Der Adjutant muß, wann die Hand-Griffe gemacht, und die Officiers vor marchiren, unvermercket das 4te Glied abtheilen, und einem jeden Kerl sagen, wo er zu stehen komt.

IV. Artic.

Sobald der Major commandiret: Rechts vorwärts doubliret die Glieder! Com-

Commandiret der Officier vom 2ten Zuge von die Grenadiers: Lincks umkehret euch! Marche! Halt! Rechts um! Marche! Lauffet hinter die Unter-Officiers hinter dem Bataillon nach dem linken Flügel! (woben die Grenadiers in Rotten und Gliedern gerade bleiben, das Gewehr wol tragen, und gang stille seyn müssen) commandiret wieder: Halt! Front! Marche! Rechts um! Marche! alsdenn sie bis an die Unter-Officiers vom Bataillon, und mit Rotten auf die Säbel-Spize sich schließen.

NB. Die Grenadiers müssen auf dem linken Flügel stehen, wann das Bataillon geschlossen ist, und Halt! commandiret wird, und damit die Grenadiers ohnfehlbar auf dem linken Flügel seyn können, wenn das Bataillon geschlossen ist, und man nicht warten darf, Halt! zu commandiren, sollen selbige nicht allein auf das Commando: Das 4te Glied rechts vorwärts doubliret eure Glieder! sich lincks umkehren und lauffen, sondern auch bei den Wendungen nicht anhalten, aber doch alles ordentlich und zugleich machen.

NB. Sobald der 2te Zug von die Grenadiers nach dem linken Flügel laufft, werden die Grenadiers vom jedem Flügel in 2. Züge à 5. Rotten eingetheilt; Drey Unter-Officiers bleiben auf dem

dem rechten Flügel, und zwey auf dem linken Flügel, weshalb der 1te Unter-Officier hinter dem 3ten Gliede in den 2ten Zug von die Grenadiers vom rechten Flügel, und die andern beyden in die Mitte und auf den linken Flügel von die Grenadiers vom linken Flügel eintreten.

NB. Die Zimmerleute nebst einem Grenadier-Tambour und Pfeiffer machen mit dem 2ten Zuge von den Grenadiers zugleich links umkehrt, und die Zimmerleute marchiren 2. Schritt hinter das Bataillon, lauffen nach der Mitte, stellen sich gegen die Lucke in einem Gliede, stecken im wählenden hinlauffen die Urten ein, und schultern das Gewehr. Der Tambour und Pfeiffer hingegen lauffen mit den Grenadiers nach dem linken Flügel.

V. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon links- und rechts um machet, machen die Grenadiers und 4. ersten Züge nebst Ober-Officiers, Unter-Officiers und Tambours zugleich links- und die andern nebst denen Gefreyten-Corporals rechts um, wie ordinaire. Hernach wann sich das Bataillon schließet, marchiret man mit einem kurzen Schritt, schließet sich auf die Säbel-Spiße, und, so bald eine jede Rotte stehet, stehet selbige still, wobey woll darauf zu sehen ist, daß alles ganz stille im Bataillon sey, das Gewehr

mehr wohl getragen werde, die Kerls die Hände nicht rühren, und in Rotten gerade marchiren.

NB. Die Officiers nehmen das Sponton flach, behalten es flach, bis Halt! commandiret wird, die Unter-Officiers hingegen behalten das Kurze Gewehr auf der Schulter, und die Gefreyten-Corporals die Fahnen über das Gehencke.

NB. In der Mitte des Bataillons zwischen den 4ten und 5ten Zuge, muß so viel Platz gelassen werden, daß die Gefreyten-Corporals und Zimmerleute eintreten können.

VI. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon geschlossen, und Front gemacht wird, machen die Officiers und Gefreyten-Corporals Front nach dem Bataillon, und die Unter-Officiers bey den Zügen Front hinterwärts.

VII. Artic.

Wenn die 2. hinterste Glieder sich auf die Säbel-Spiße schließern, müssen selbige gerade und geschwinde anlauffen, das Gewehr wohl tragen, sich richten und gleich stille stehen.

Die Officiers, welche die Züge und Divisions commandiren, lauffen geschwinde ein, haben gleich Front und das Sponton bey'm Fuß. Die übrige Officiers, welche

hinter dem Bataillon schliessen, lauffen durchs Bataillon hinter die Unter-Officiers in die Mitte von ihren Divisions, haben gleich Front nach dem Bataillon, und das Sponton bey'm Fuß, stehen stille, und richten sich nach der rechten Hand.

NB. Wann die Officiers complets sind, setzet hinter dem 1ten, 2ten, 3ten, 4ten, 6ten 7ten und 8ten Zuge ein Officier, wenn selbige aber nicht complets sind, muß hinter jeder Division ein Officier stehen.

Die Unter-Officiers bey den Zügen im 1ten Gliede marchiren ins 3te Glied, haben gleich Front, stehen stille und tragen das Kurz-Gewehr wohl. Die Unter-Officiers auf den Flügeln vom Bataillon bleiben, wie sie eingetheilet, ausser, daß der Unter-Officier aus dem 4ten Gliede mit hinter den Zug tritt.

Die Gefrente-Corporals lauffen ein in das Bataillon, nehmen in währendem einlauffen die Fahnen hoch in dem rechten Arm, haben gleich Front, und 2. Gefrente-Corporals stehen im ersten, zwey im 2ten, und einer im 3ten Gliede.

Die Zimmerleute lauffen auch hurtig ein, zwey ins 1te, einer ins 2te, und zwey ins 3te Glied, nehmen die Fahnen in die Mitte,

Mitte, stehen gleichfalls still, und tragen das Gewehr wohl.

Die Hautbois marchiren hurtig durch 3. Schritt hinters Bataillon, und richten sich hinter den Fahnen in 2. Gliedern.

NB. Die Hautbois, Tambours und Pfeiffers müssen im ganzen Exerciren und Chargiren stille stehen, die Augen nach der rechten Hand haben, und immer parat zu Blasen und Schlagen seyn.

Der Obriste bleibet vor dem Bataillon in der Mitten vor denen Fahnen, und hat die Front nach dem Bataillon 6. Schritt davon; Und wenn ein Obrist-Lieutenant dabey ist, marchiret er durch hinter das Bataillon, und bleibet in der Mitte hinter denen Officiers stehen.

III. Titul.

Wie die Chargirung auf der Stelle im Ausrücken, im Avanciren und Retiriren gemacht wird.

I. Artic.

Senn das Bataillon erwehnter massen zum Chargiren geschlossen stehet, wird zuvorderst 2. mahl mit Pelotons auf der Stelle, hernach 2. mahl mit Divisions auf der Stelle, hernach 2. mahl mit Pelotons

tons im Ausrücken, und 2. mahl mit Divisionsim Ausrücken chargiret.

NB. Die Chargirung mit Pelotons und Divisions im Ausrücken wird darum gemacht, weil, wenn man Spanische Reuter vor sich hat, im Ausrücken chargiret werden muß.

NB. Mit Gliedern soll niemahlen weder im Exerciren noch in Action chargiret werden; Dessen gleichen auch kein Bataillon 4. Mann hoch, sondern allezeit 3. Mann hoch chargiren soll.

II. Artic.

Der Major und die Officiers, welche Pelotons commandiren, müssen commandiren, wie bey den Commandos in der Chargirung zu ersehen ist.

NB. Wie die Pelotons und Divisions auf der Stelle sich fertig machen, laden und schultern sollen, auch was sonst observiret werden muß, ist bereits in denen Generales Observations gesagt worden.

III. Artic.

Im Chargiren auf der Stelle und im Ausrücken mit Pelotons und Divisions müssen die Officiers allezeit auf das Commando: Der rechte Flügel fänget an! geschwinde und zugleich links um machen, 2. Schritt vortreten, und so bald ihre Pelotons und Divisions zum 2ten mahl auf der Stelle gefeuert haben, augenblicklich wieder eintreten, und stille stehen

IV. Artic.

IV. Artic.

Wenn im Ausrücken chargiret wird, müssen die Pelotons und Divisions zugleich mit 3 grossen Schritten gerade ausrücken, die 2. hintersten Glieder müssen im Ausrücken auf der Sabel = Spitze geschlossen bleiben, und, wann das erste Glied niederfällt, einrücken, wie auf der Stelle.

V. Artic.

Wenn die Pelotons und Divisions geschlossen, und auf halbe Distance sich zurück gezogen haben, geben sie Achtung auf den Flügel-Mann, links umkehren sich sehr geschwinde auf dem rechten Absatz, und werffen das Gewehr zugleich herum, wobei die Mündung am Leibe in die Höhe gezogen wird, daß man seinem Nebenmann damit nicht schaden kan. Hernach die Pelotons geschwinde wieder in das Bataillon einrücken, in währendem Einrücken den Hahn in die Ruhe bringen, die Patron ergreifen und abbeissen, und, wenn sie Pulver auf die Pfanne geschütet, das Gewehr zur Ladung schwencken, wie im Hecken-Feuer.

VI. Artic.

Sobald das Bataillon avanciren soll, und

und Marche! commandiret wird, muß das ganze Bataillon mit dem linken Fuß kurz und zugleich antreten, und die 2. ersten Divisions nebst den Grenadiers, sämtlichen Ober-Officiers, Unter-Officiers, und Tambours vom rechten Flügel müssen zugleich die Köpfe und Augen links um nach den Fahnen wenden, sich nach der Mitte richten, im marchiren die Füße zugleich heben, den Kopff wohl hoch haben, sich nicht drängen, keine Lücken machen, und schnur gerade marchiren.

VII. Artic.

Die 2. Fahnen nebst 2. Zimmerleute aus dem 1ten Gliede müssen, sobald das Bataillon antritt, 2. Schritte ausrücken, die Mitte vom Bataillon muß etwas voraus marchiren, und die Flügel ein wenig zurück bleiben, alsdann ein Bataillon nicht 5. à 6. Mann hoch und in Confusion kommen kan.

VIII. Artic.

Alle Tambours müssen, wenn das Bataillon im avanciren marchiret und chargiret, continuirlich Marche! schlagen, und die Hautbois beym ersten Bataillon Marche blasen, bis der Major commandiret, alsdann sie aufhören zuschlagen, und wenn das Commando ausgesprochen, wieder an-

anfangen zuschlagen, unterdessen das Bataillon im marche bleibet, und die Tambours auf den Flügeln mit dem Bataillon sich gerade richten müssen.

IX. Artic.

Das Bataillon soll, wenn das Terrain es zulasset 50. Schritte marchiren, bevor angefangen wird zu chargiren, und man muß im marchiren im avanciren das Gewehr wohl tragen, mit kurzen und langsamen Schritten, und schnur gerade in Rotten und Gliedern marchiren.

X. Artic.

Die Pelotons und Divisions müssen, wenn die Officiers commandiren, augenblicklich stille stehen, zugleich den Kopf und die Augen nach der rechten Hand wenden, und sich richten.

NR Die Officiers treten beym commandiren im avanciren 2. Schritte vor, und nehmen das Spon-
ton beym Fuß,

XI. Artic.

Die Pelotons und Divisions rücken aus im avanciren wie auf der Stelle, und die 2. hintersten Glieder öffnen sich, so bald Feuer gegeben ist, auf halbe Distance zurück. Das erste Glied giebt Achtung, ob es vor, zurück oder gerade mit dem Bataillon ist,

alsdenn es entweder stille stehet, hurtig einrückt oder marchiret.

NB. Die hintersten Glieder müssen im währenddem Laden zwischen denen Gliedern halbe Distance behalten, daß sie laden können, und die Pelotons müssen im währenddem laden immer Fuß hinter Fuß setzen, auch die Augen wohl auf thun, ob sie vor oder zurücke im Bataillon sind, alsdenn sie in ordre bleiben können.

XII. Artic.

Die 2. hintersten Glieder rücken stark an, sobald das Peloton oder Division das Gewehr auf der Schulter nimmt, und die 4. Pelotons vom rechten Flügel wenden wieder die Köpfe und Augen nach den Fahnen, und richten sich.

XIII. Artic.

Sobald Halt! commandiret wird, stehet die Mitte vom Bataillon stille, die Fahnen treten ein, die Flügel rücken vor, bis sie mit den Fahnen gerade zu stehen kommen, alsdenn sie wiederum zugleich die Köpfe und Augen nach der rechten Hand wenden, und ganz stille stehen müssen.

XIV. Artic.

Das Bataillon muß, wenn man im re-
ziriren chargiren soll, sich rechts umkehren,
wie ordinaire, und der Capitaine von die
Gre-

Grenadiers muß 3. Schritte vor stehen, daß sich das Bataillon zugleich umkehren kan.

XV. Artic.

Sobald Marche! commandiret wird, und die Tambours Troup schlagen, tritt das ganze Bataillon nebst Ober- und Unter-Officiers zugleich an, eine Fahne nebst 2. Zimmerleuten aus dem 3ten Gliede treten zwei Schritte aus, die Mitte marchiret wieder etwas vor, die Flügel bleiben ein wenig zurück, die 3te und 4te Division nebst denen Grenadiers, Officiers, Unter-Officiers und Tambours vom linken Flügel wenden zugleich die Köpfe und Augen nach der linken Hand nach den Fahnen, die Ober- und Unter-Officiers hinter dem Bataillon marchiren, gleich wie allezeit, schnur gerade, tragen das Spon-
ton und Kurz-Gewehr gut, geben wohl Achtung, daß sie ihre Distance vom Bataillon behalten, und das Bataillon marchiret ganz langsam.

XVI. Artic.

Die Pelotons und Divisions nebst Ober- und Unter-Officiers hinter den Pelotons und Divisions müssen, sobald die Officiers wieder commandiren, gleich stille stehen, die Köpfe und Augen zugleich nach der
G 5 rech-

rechten Hand wenden, sich wohl richten, und wenn der Officier commandiret; Rechts umkehret euch! sich sehr geschwinde mit einem Tempo auf dem linken Absatz herumdrehen, sich nochmals geschwinde richten, und darauf stille stehen.

NB. Wie die Pelotons und Divisions, wenn sie geschossen, das Gewehr herumwerfen, und wieder eintücken sollen, ist schon im chargiren, wenn die Pelotons und Divisions auf der Stelle ausrücken, gesagt, und wird nur noch erinnert, daß das Gewehr zur Ladung geschwenket wird, wie ordinaire, sonst aber im wahren dem laden und beym schultern observiret werden muß, was bey der Chargirung im avanciren bereits erwähnt ist.

XVII. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon im retiriren chargiret hat, und Marche! geschlagen wird, muß das ganze Bataillon nebst Ober- und Unter-Officiers ganz stille stehen, die Köpfe und Augen nach der rechten Hand wenden, auf den Officier hinter dem 8ten Zuge acht haben, mit ordinären Tempos zugleich links umkehrt Front machen, und, sobald das Bataillon mit dem rechten Fuß zutritt, wieder zugleich antreten, die Köpfe und Augen wieder nach den Fahnen haben

ben, die Fahnen müssen wieder vorrücken, die Mitte wieder etwas voraus marchiren, und die Flügel ein wenig zurück bleiben.

NB. Der Capitaine von den Grenadiers muß wieder 3. Schritte vorstehen, wenn das Bataillon sich umkehret hat, daß es stark und zugleich zutreten kan.

XVIII. Artic.

Wenn man mit dem Bataillon wilkührlich marchiret hat, commandiret der Major Halt! und wird hernach alles observiret, wie schon erwähnt.

IV. Titul.

Wie das Bataillon Quarée formiret und chargiret wird.

I. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon sich umkehret hat, um das Quarée zu machen, bringet das 1te Glied sehr geschwinde das Gewehr an die linke Seite, wie in den Hand-Griffen, reisset das Bajonet geschwinde aus der Scheide, bringet es auf den Lauff, und das Gewehr mit beyden Händen zugleich vor sich, und hernach zugleich auf die Schulter.

NB. Die Officiers und Unter-Officiers hinter dem Bataillon rücken, sobald der Major commandiret,

V. Titul.

Wie das Bataillon zum Hecken-Feuer im Hacken marchiren, nach der Chargirung sich wieder herstellen, und wieder öffnen soll.

I. Artic.

Senn man mit Pelotons schwencken, und zum Hecken-Feuer marchiren soll, müssen alle Pelotons, sobald commandiret wird: Rechts schwencket euch! zugleich die Köpfe und Augen nach der linken Hand wenden, und, wenn Marche! commandiret wird, schlagen die Tambours Marche! die Züge schwencken sich mit einem guten Schritt. Alle 3. Glieder treten mit dem linken Fuß zugleich an, der rechte Flügel-Mann im ersten Gliede muß nicht von der Stelle kommen, und die 2. hintersten Glieder auf der Säbel-Spiße geschlossen bleiben. Hernach, sobald der linke Flügel-Mann geschwencket hat, stehet das ganze Peloton stille, richtet sich geschwinde, alle 3. Glieder treten, wenn der Officier vor dem Zuge antritt, auch mit dem linken Fuß zugleich an, und wird im marchi-

chiren observiret, wie im IVten Theile bey dem marchiren erwehnet ist.

NB. Die Grenadiers auf dem rechten und linken Flügel marchiren in einem Zuge, und werden nur in 2. Züge eingetheilet, bey Formirung des Bataillon Quasée mit 4. Pelotons zu chargiren, und in die 4. Ecken einzulauffen.

Die Officiers bey den Zügen bleiben auf den Flügeln von ihren Zügen, bis sich die Züge halb geschwencket haben, alsdenn, sie geschwinde vor ihre Züge treten, und vor selbigen marchiren, wie ordinaire, die Unter-Officiers, welche bey den Zügen eingetheilet sind, treten, sobald die Officiers vortreten, auf den Flügel ins 1te Glied.

Die Officiers, welche hinter dem Bataillon hinter einem jeden Zuge eingetheilet sind, treten, sobald commandiret wird: Marche! hinter ihre Züge, und schliessen selbige.

Die Unter-Officiers, welche hinter dem Bataillon hinter jedem Zuge eingetheilet sind, schwencken sich mit ihrem Zuge zugleich, und marchiren hinter selbigen in égaler Distance 2. Schritt vom 3ten Gliede.

Die Unter-Officiers auf dem rechten und linken Flügel bleiben auf ihren Flügeln.

Die

Die Gefrente-Corporals mit den Fahnen, die Zimmerleute, Hautbois und Regiments-Tambour marchiren auf dem rechten Flügel von der 3ten Division, wie sie im Bataillon stehen.

Die Mûsquetiers-Tambours und Pfeifers von dem rechten Flügel marchiren in zwey Glieder vor die Grenadiers, und die Tambours vom linken Flügel in zwey Glieder hinter die Grenadiers.

Die Grenadiers-Tambours und Pfeifers hingegen marchiren auf dem rechten Flügel vom ersten Zuge von die Grenadiers.

Der Obriste und Obrist-Lieutenant, wosern einer beyhm Bataillon ist, marchiren in der Mitte des Bataillons vor den Fahnen.

Der Major reitet vor dem Bataillon, und der Adjutant, den Degen in der Faust habend, hinter dem Bataillon, und muß bald hier, bald da seyn.

Der Capitaine und Lieutenant von den Grenadiers marchiren vor ihrem Zuge.

II. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon erwehnter maassen im Marche ist, schwencken sich die Tambours, und die Grenadiers, sobald sie auf
selb

selbigem Ort kommen, schwencken sich auch links, und folglich die 4. Mûsquetiers-Züge vom rechten Flügel.

NB. Der Obriste oder Commandeur vom Bataillon muß im währendem marchiren mit den letzten Divisions so weit zurück bleiben, bis er ohngefahr 50. Schritte Distance hat.

III. Artic.

Wann der 4te Mûsquetier-Zug sich geschwencket, und noch einige Schritte marchiret hat, hören die Tambours auf zu schlagen, und es wird commandiret: Halt! worauf die Officiers wieder auf die Flügel von ihren Pelotons, und die Unter-Officiers ins 3te Glied treten, und das ganze Bataillon stehet ganz stille. Dieserhalb, und damit, wenn sich die Züge wieder links schwencken, keine Lücken bleiben, ein jeder Officier in währendem marche zwischen seinem Zuge rechte Distance halten muß.

NB. Wenn das Bataillon im Hacken wieder Fronc hat, müssen sich die Pelotons wohl nach der rechten Hand richten, und gleich stille stehen.

IV. Artic.

Wenn auf Hecken im Hacken chargiret werden soll, wird alles observiret, wie schon
schon

schon beim Hecken-Feuer im Bataillon Quarée erwehnet ist, desgleichen, wenn man auf Hecken chargiret hat, und sich wieder mit Pelotons links schwencken soll, schlagen die Tambours wieder Marche! die Pelotons schwencken sich, und marchiren, wie schon erwehnet, die Grenadiers vom linken Flügel ziehen sich mit gerader Front nach der linken Hand auf ihren vorigen Platz und die 4. Mûsqûetiers-Züge geben auf selbige Achtung, daß sie es mit den Grenadiers zugleich machen, wobei die Augen nicht von der rechten Hand gewand, das Gewehr wohl getragen werden, und die Glieder ihre Distance behalten müssen.

NB. Wenn der 2te Zug von der 2ten Division auf die erste Rotte vom 1ten Zuge von der 3ten Division zu stehen kömmt, schwencket sich selbige rechts, und folglich die übrige Züge auf selbigem Platz.

V. Artic.

Wenn die Flügel vom Bataillon auf ihrem vorigen Place stehen, und Halt! commandiret wird, müssen alle Züge gleich stille stehen, und recht Distance haben, damit sie, wenn man hernach sich wieder rechts schwencket, keine Lücken machen.

VI. Artic.

VI. Artic.

Bei den Schwenckungen mit Pelotons und Divisions rechts und links, rechts oder links umkehrt, muß wohl darauf gesehen werden, daß die Züge im schwencken zugleich herumkommen, folglich auf einmal ein Bataillon wieder stille stehen kan, alle Pelotons müssen mit allen 3. Gliedern zugleich mit dem linken Fuß antreten, und, wenn sie sich rechts schwencken, auf einmahl die Köpfe und Augen nach der linken Hand wenden, sobald sie geschwencket, wieder nach der rechten Hand die Augen haben, und sich nicht mehr rühren, das Gewehr wohl tragen, sich nicht drängen oder öffnen, nicht plaudern, die hinterste Glieder müssen auf der Säbel-Spiße geschlossen bleiben, die Flügel-Männer, welche stille stehen, nicht von der Stelle kommen, und die Glieder müssen sich gerade schwencken, nemlich, es muß kein Kerl zurück bleiben oder verlauffen, sondern allezeit Schulter an Schulter haben.

VII. Artic.

Die Officiers müssen allezeit, sobald das Peloton halb geschwencket ist, hurtig vor ihre Züge, oder wenn sich das Bataillon

en

en Front schwencket, hurtig wieder eintreten; Wenn das Peloton anfängt zu schwencken, nehmen die Officiers das Spon-
ton flach, und, wenn es sich geschwencket
hat, gleich bey'm Fuß. In währendem
Schwencken kein Officier den Mund auf-
thun, keinen Kerl ziehen, oder sich sonst
was zu thun machen muß, denn die Züge
und Divisions sich von selbst schwencken
müssen.

NB. Die Unter-Officiers müssen das Kurz-Ge-
wehr wohl tragen, sich hinter ihren Zügen ge-
rade zugleich schwencken, ihre Distance behalten,
sich, wenn die Züge geschwencket, nicht rühren
und ganz stille seyn.

BN. Die Gefreyte, Corporals, Zimmerleute und
Hautbois bleiben, wie sie eingetheilet, und die
Tambours und Pfeiffers vom rechtem und lin-
cken Flügel bleiben im währenden Schwen-
ckungen auf den Flügels stille stehen.

VIII. Artic.

Wenn das ganze Bataillon rechts um
oder rechts umkehrt auf der Stelle sich
schwencket, umkehren sich die Grenadiers
vom rechten Flügel nebst denen 2. ersten
Divisions, schwencken sich, und das ganze
Bataillon tritt, wenn Marche! comman-
diret wird, zugleich mit dem linken Fuß
an,

an, und schwencket sich rechts, woben alles
observiret wird, wie schon erwehnet, bey
den Schwenckungen mit Pelotons oder
Divisions, auch wenn das Bataillon Qua-
rée formiret wird.

IX. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon sich rechts um oder
rechts umkehrt geschwencket hat, und Halt!
commandiret wird, muß das ganze Ba-
taillon gleich stille stehen, und sich voll
richten, hernachmahls, wenn das Ba-
taillon Front machen soll, die Grenadiers
vom rechten Flügel nebst den 2. ersten Di-
visions zugleich links umkehrt Front
machen, und das Bataillon sich nochmahls
richtet.

X. Artic.

Wenn das ganze Bataillon links um
oder links umkehrt auf der Stelle sich
schwencken soll, wird es gemacht, und da-
bey alles observiret, wie schon gesagt,
außer daß die 3te und 4te Division nebst
den Grenadiers vom linken Flügel sich
links umkehren, sich links schwencken,
und wenn das Bataillon wieder Front ma-
chen soll, rechts umkehrt Front machen.

XI. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon erwehnter massen die Chargirung gemacht hat, und rechts und links um machet, um sich zu öffnen, machen die Grenadiers vom rechten Flügel und die 1te und 2te Division nebst Ober-Officiers, Unter-Officiers und Tambours rechts, die 3te und 4te Division nebst Ober-Officiers, Unter-Officiers, Gefreyten-Corporals und Tambours links um, und die Grenadiers vom linken Flügel nebst Zimmerleuten links umkehrt, hernach sich die Rotten, wann Marche! commandiret wird, aus der Mitte nach denen Flügels öffnen, und die erste Rotten bleiben stehen. Die Rotten, wo das 4te Glied doubliret stehet, bleiben auf der Säbel-Spiße geschlossen, die andern öffnen sich auf ordinaire Distance. Das 1te Glied muß über die rechte Schulter etwas rückwärts sehen, um Acht zu haben, daß die Rotten nicht zu weit laufen, oder zu früh stehen bleiben, woben die Kerls sich nicht mit denen Händen ziehen, sich nicht zuruffen, sondern Mauth stille seyn, in Rotten und Gliedern gerade marchiren, und das Gewehr wohl tragen müssen.

Die

Die Grenadiers auf dem linken Flügel traben bis hinter die Unter-Officiers hinter dem Bataillon, machen links um, traben bis 6. Schritt über die 1te Rotte von die Musquetiers, nehmen ihre Distance, machen links um, marchiren ins Bataillon, machen rechts um, richten sich wohl mit dem 1ten Peloton von den Grenadiers, und marchiren, bis Halt! commandiret wird, woben wiederum erinnert wird, daß die Grenadiers ganz stille seyn, das Gewehr wohl tragen, und in Rotten und Gliedern gerade bleiben müssen.

NB. So bald der 2te Zug sich anschliesset, treten die Unter-Officiers wieder ein, wie sie vorher gestanden, und die Grenadiers formiren wieder zwey Züge.

NB. Die Grenadiers müssen auf dem rechten Flügel stehen, bevor Halt! commandiret wird.

Die Officiers treten sogleich aus, wenn Marche! commandiret wird, nehmen das Sponton flach, behalten die Front rechts und links um, nehmen ihre Distance vor dem Bataillon wie vorher, und richten sich in geradem Gliede.

Die Unter-Officiers, welche in das 1te Glied eingeheilet, treten hurtig wieder ein,

32

ein, behalten die Front rechts und links um, und tragen das Kurz-Gewehr wohl.

Die Befreyte Corporals treten aus drey Schritt vor die Front, nehmen im währendem Austreten die Fahnen über das Gehencke, behalten die Front links um, richten sich auf ihre Rotten von der 3ten Division, wie vorhero, und stehen hernach stille.

Die Tambours marchiren nach ihren Divisions, und behalten die Front links und rechts um.

Die Zimmerleute lauffen auf den rechten Flügel, und rangiren sich, wie vorhero.

XII. Artic.

Wenn Halt! commandiret wird, nehmen die Officiers das Sponton bey'm Fuß, und, wenn hernach das Bataillon Front! machet, geschiehet es wie ordinaire, woben der Capitaine auf'm linken Flügel sich umsehen, und die 3te und 4te Division auf selbigen Acht haben muß, damit die Wendung mit dem ganzen Bataillon zugleich geschehe.

XIII. Artic.

Die 2, hinterste Glieder müssen auf das Commando vom Major zugleich mit dem lin-

linken Fuß rückwärts antreten, mit geschwinden weiten Schritten ihre Distance zwischen den Gliedern nehmen, die Augen nach der rechten Hand haben, und gerade bleiben, hernachmahls gleich stille stehen, sich richten und das Gewehr wohl tragen.

NB. Die Unter-Officiers hinter dem Bataillon marchiren auch rückwärts auf ihre Distance, und haben zu observiren, wie oben erwehnet.

XIV. Artic.

Wenn das 4te Glied sich wieder herstellen soll, rechts umkehret es sich wie ordinaire, und muß, wenn Marche! commandiret wird, geschwinde auslauffen, das 4te Glied wieder formiren, dabey das Gewehr wohl tragen, die Hände hängen lassen, stille seyn und sich nach der rechten Hand richten.

XV. Artic.

Nachgehends, wenn Front! commandiret wird, links hersteller sich das 4te Glied, wie ordinaire, und es muß keine Rorte sich eher rühren, biß commandiret wird: Richtet euch! Alsdenn alle Rotten im ganzen Bataillon sich auf einmahl rühren, rechte Distance nehmen, sich in Rotten

33 und

und Gliedern wohl richten, und gleich stille stehen müssen, wie ein Holz.

NB. Die Unter-Officiers bey die Züge müssen solche Distance haben, daß sie das Kurz-Gewehr mit ausgestrecktem Arm bey dem Fuß haben können.

XVI. Artic.

Wenn das Bataillon erwehnter massen wieder recht formiret stehet, galopiret der Major nach dem rechten Flügel, woselbst er zu Pferde halten bleibet, wie allezeit, und wenn das Bataillon abmarchiren soll, commandiret der Vorste: Präsentiret das Gewehr! Das Gewehr auf die Schulter!

VI. Titul.

Wie das Regiments Quarée mit einem Regiment formiret und chargiret wird.

I. Artic.

Wenn das Regiments - Quarée gemacht werden soll, galopiret der älteste Major nach der Intervalle vom Regiment, bleibet 50. Schritte davon stehen, und, wenn commandiret wird, daß das Regiment sich schließen soll, muß der Capitaine

Bibliography

Manuscript Sources

Kriegsarchiv Vienna (War Archives)
 Abt. Kriegswissenschaftliche Memoiren
 Abt. Hofkriegsratsakten
 Abt. Feld-und Kabinettsakten
 Library

Contemporary Works Used as Sources

(Cognazzo, Jacob de). Freymüthiger Beytrag zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Militärdienstes. Leipzig: 1780

Khevenhüller, Ludwig Andreas Graf von. Kurzer Begriff aller militärischen Operationen. Vienna: 1743

Montecuccoli, Raimund Fürst. Besondere und Geheime Kriegsnachrichten. Leipzig: 1736

Regulament und Ordnung für die gesamte Kaiserliche Infanterie. Vienna: 1737. Original in Austrian State Library

Regulament und Ordnung nach welchem sich gesamntes k.k. Fussvolck... zu achten haben. Vienna 1749. Original in Library of Kriegsarchiv Vienna

Published Original Sources

Maria Theresia. Maria Theresias politisches Testament. Josef Kallbrunner, ed. Vienna: 1952

"Des Prinzen Eugen von Savoiën militärische Korrespondenz." in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. Vienna: 1813, vols. II and III

Reglement vor die königliche Preussische Infanterie von 1726. H. Bleckwenn, ed. Osnabrück: 1968

Savoyen, Eugen Prinz von. Militärische Korrespondenz. P. Heller, ed. Vienna: 1848

Secondary Sources

- Allmeyer - Beck, J.C. "Wandlungen im Heerwesen zur Zeit Maria Theresias" in Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien. Vienna: 1967
- Arneth, Alfred von. Maria Theresia. Vienna: 1863 - 1879
- ". Prinz Eugen von Savaien. Vienna: 1864
- ". Beitrage zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Heerwesens. Erstes Heft: Der Zeitraum von 1757 - 1814. Vienna: 1872
- Braubach, Max. Prinz Eugen von Savaien. Munich: 1963
- Delbrück, Hans. Geschichte der Kriegskunst. Berlin: 1962
- Erben, Wilhelm. "Kriegsartikel und Reglements als Quellen zur Geschichte der k.k. Armee." In Mitteilungen des k.u.k. Heeresmuseums im Artilleriearsenal in Wien. Vienna: 1902 Heft 1
- Der Erste Schlesische Krieg. Part one of Die Kriege Friedrich des Grossen. Grosser Generalstab, ed. vols. I and II
- Fellner, Thomas. Die Österreichische Zentralverwaltung. Abt. I, Band I. Vienna: 1907
- Frauenholz, Eugen. "Prinz Eugen und die kaiserliche Armee" in Münchner historische Abhandlungen, II, Kriegs - und Heeresgeschichte. I, Munich: 1932
- "Geschichte des Ersten Schlesischen Krieges" in Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift. 1827. vol. IV
- "Geschichte des Österreichischen Erbfolgekrieges" in Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift. 1827, vol. III, 1828, vol. III and IV, 1830, vol. III and IV
- "Geschichte des Zweiten Schlesischen Krieges" in Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift. 1825, vol. III and IV
- Heischmann, E. Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Österreich. Vienna: 1925
- Hintze, Otto. Staat und Verfassung. Göttingen: 1962
- Hoyer, J.G. Geschichte der Kriegskunst. Göttingen: 1799

- Jähns, Max. Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. Munich:1891
- Jany, Curt. Geschichte der Preussischen Armee. Osnabrück:1967
- Mayer, Franz. Geschichte Österreichs. Vienna: 1909
- Mikoletzky, Hans. Österreich: das grosse achzehnte Jahrhundert.
- Müller, Franz. Die kaiserliche königliche Österreichische Armee. Prague: 1845
- Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg. vol.I,II and VII of Kriege Maria Theresias. k.u.k. Kriegsarchiv, ed. Vienna:1896-1903
- Quimby, R.S. The Background of Napoleonic Warfare. New York: 1957
- Regele, Oskar. Der Österreichische Hofkriegsrat. Vienna:1949
- Saxe, Maurice de. Reveries on the Art of War. Trans.Th. Philips. Harrisburg: 1944
- "Die Schlacht bei Mollwitz" in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. 1813, vol.III
- Der Siebenjährige Krieg, vol.I, part III of Die Kriege Friedrich des Grossen. Grosser Generalstab, ed. Berlin:1901
- Thadden, F.L. von. Feldmarschall Daun. Vienna: 1967
- Thürheim, A. Garf. Feldmarschall Ludwig Andreas Graf von Khevenhüller - Frankenburg. Vienna: 1878
- Treuenfest, G.Ritter von. Geschichte des Infanterie Regimentes Hoch - und Deutschmeister Nr. 4. Vienna: 1879
- Veltze, A. Ausgewählte Schriften Montecuccolis. Vienna:1899-1909
- Wrede, A. Geschichte der k.u.k. Wehrmacht. Vienna: 1898



