"Peacekeeping When There Is No Peace to Keep:"
A Case Study of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina

GERARD GOUTHRO
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"PEACEKEEPING WHEN THERE IS NO PEACE TO KEEP:"
A Case Study of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina

by
Gerard Gouthro

A Thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
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Newfoundland
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ABSTRACT

As the Cold War drew to a close during the late 1980s, United Nations' peacekeeping dramatically expanded with respect to both the number of missions and the duties it performed. Post Cold-War era peacekeeping is controversial. Advocates and critics of this new generation of peacekeeping disagree as to whether the consequences of individual missions are positive or negative. This thesis addresses the above debate.

The present study analyzes the origins, political support, mandate, financing, and the planning and implementation of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By focusing on these factors, this case study attempts to determine the effectiveness and feasibility of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The thesis focuses upon the development of the UNPROFOR mission from its beginning until December 31, 1994. The author's conclusion is that despite the obstacles and dilemmas facing the UN mission, the peacekeepers can be viewed as making a positive difference in the conflict. The author also concludes that peacekeepers are only part of the solution to the Bosnian conflict and that a settlement lies outside the sphere of UNPROFOR's mandate. Before undertaking the UNPROFOR case study, both the history and the development of peacekeeping are reviewed to provide a better understanding of what peacekeeping is and how it has changed since the end of the Cold War. The part of the thesis title which appears within quotation marks is taken from a presentation made by retired Canadian Armed Forces Major-General Lewis MacKenzie on the CBC television program, Witness.
There are several people who deserve thanks for their assistance not only in the writing of this thesis but also throughout my entire graduate programme. First, I would like to thank the members of the Political Science Department with whom I have had the opportunity to meet and work with over the past year and a half. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students for their help and assistance during my time at Memorial University. A special thanks to Mrs. Helen Oliver, secretary of the Political Science Department, for her help with basically anything and everything throughout my stay as a graduate student.

Regarding the thesis itself, Professor Michael Wallack deserves a great deal of thanks for his helpful opinions and suggestions both in the preparation of the thesis proposal and the thesis itself. I am also indebted to Dr. Roy Rempel for his comments and suggestions on the thesis and to Dr. C.H. Wood of the Geography Department for his help with the maps. The examiners of my thesis, Dr. Gunther Hartmann, Memorial University, and Dr. J. Sokolsky, Royal Military College, read the next-to-last draft of this work and each deserve thanks for identification of errors and carefully considered suggestions for improvement. I am particularly indebted to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Bill McGrath, with whom this thesis would not have been achieved. His invaluable assistance and expert guidance in both the formulation of the research question and in the writing and editing stages of the thesis are much appreciated. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Gerard and Valerie, for their continued support throughout my university years...thus far?
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MAP 1 THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1945-91

SOURCE: Dr. C.H. Wood, Department of Geography, Memorial University of Newfoundland
PREFACE

My interest in peacekeeping was prompted in late 1993 by an incident involving several Canadian members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1993, eleven members of the Armed Forces serving with the UN mission in Bosnia were captured, detained, and subjected to a mock execution by Bosnian Serb forces. Fortunately, the peacekeepers were released unharmed, but the incident sparked off a debate within Canada on the role of Canadian peacekeepers in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With the capture of the troops, I began to question the value of Canada's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. My interest later grew to include the larger question of the viability of the whole UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Now, more than at any point in history, we are living in a world where change is an ever increasing part of our lives. Indeed, some would argue the world has changed more in the last five years than it has in the last fifty. Even after the momentous events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the political landscape of the world continues to shift and change as the international community attempts to adjust to the realities of the post-Cold War era. Peacekeeping, too, has experienced change as it has gone through a period of rapid modification and development since the end of the Cold War. It appears that the evolution of peacekeeping has not yet reached an endpoint as the United Nations continues to take on new roles and responsibilities. Indeed, UN peacekeeping is a steadily evolving technique and any venture that attempts to explain or assess it can prove
to be a very demanding task. In the words of Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, attempting "to cast some light on United Nations peace-keeping in transition...is much like trying to paint a moving train."¹ I have humbly undertaken that very task, and ask the reader's indulgence in assessing the conclusions and contribution of my work.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The Cold War is over, the Berlin Wall has fallen, and the Soviet Union has disintegrated. It is time for the emergence of a new world order. These thoughts probably echoed in the minds of many people during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, there was a new world just around the corner but it was one that would be marked by a larger degree of turmoil and chaos than peace and harmony. The new international community that has developed since the end of the Cold War may be more appropriately referred to as the new world disorder, a world which has witnessed an increase in civil wars and internal conflicts, the re-emergence of ethnic and religious struggles, and the collapse of states into anarchy. Only now, by looking back with the benefit of hindsight, is it possible to see the effect of the end of the Cold War on the international system. While the threat of a major confrontation between East and West and the threat of a nuclear war have diminished, the threat of war itself has not, as civil wars and ethnic conflicts rage on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, and other corners of the globe.

International peacekeeping missions have proliferated in response to these conflicts. Peacekeeping is never an easy task but Cold War era peacekeepers seemed to have had an easier job than post-Cold War era peacekeepers. Cold War or "first generation" peacekeeping, with the exception of the operations in the Congo and Cyprus, was fairly straightforward as each mission usually had the full consent and cooperation of the warring parties and was deployed after a cease-fire was reached. Typically, Cold War peacekeeping dealt with inter-state disputes which involved legitimate and
recognized governments. Cease-fires, consent, and cooperation usually made the mandates of traditional peacekeeping missions clear and appropriate as they were delegated the tasks of monitoring and patrolling buffer zones, cease-fires, and troop withdrawals. However, "second-generation" peacekeepers have not had it as easy as their predecessors and mandates now include potentially dangerous and complex tasks such as monitoring human rights, rebuilding the political and economic institutions of states, and delivering and protecting humanitarian assistance, sometimes by the use of force. Frequently, the new duties of post-Cold war peacekeepers have been carried out in the middle of armed conflicts in which consent and cooperation have been very shaky and limited. The recent and on-going operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Somalia are good examples of the difficulties peacekeepers face in the post-Cold War era as personnel in these operations have been harassed, shot at, held against their will, and killed.

The role of these peacekeeping expeditions is controversial. The local consequences of individual operations are debated intensely and the general question has been posed as to whether peacekeeping will be undermined or strengthened as a result of recent experiences. It seems appropriate to ask whether the UN's recent peacekeeping ventures are part of the solution to the individual conflicts or whether they instead become a part of the problem themselves? In order to determine some possible answers to these questions, it is important that particular conflicts and UN operations be examined closely.
William Durch and his colleagues provide a model for the study of peacekeeping operations in their important study, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*. Following this example, the present study will analyze the origins, political support, mandate, financing, and the planning and implementation of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By focusing on these factors, this case study will attempt to determine the effectiveness and feasibility of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will also examine the contributions, if any, that UNPROFOR has made to the evolution of UN peacekeeping.

Work on this thesis was completed at a time when UNPROFOR's future appeared doubtful. The supposed "safe-area" surrounding the Bosnian locality, Bihac was under fierce assault by Bosnian Serbs and UN peacekeepers had fallen hostage to these forces. A future thesis on UNPROFOR very well might bear the subtitle "A Case Study in Failure." It would be premature now, however, to make a definitive judgement on UNPROFOR and the best one can do is to draw provisional conclusions on the central issues this thesis addresses. The formal end-point for this study is December 31, 1994.
CHAPTER 2 - THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping during the Cold War (1948-1988)

Peacekeeping, or even the idea behind it, is not mentioned anywhere in the Charter of the United Nations. It goes "beyond purely diplomatic means for peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI, but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII." Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold best described the place for peacekeeping when he said that it might be put in a new Chapter Six and Half. Peacekeeping emerged to respond to the failure of the United Nations collective security system, a system which proved to be unworkable as a result of the Cold War. The thirteen peacekeeping operations that were set up during the Cold War consisted of lightly armed military personnel from small and middle sized countries such as Canada, Norway, and Finland. Major powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union typically did not provide troops to peacekeeping operations because they were usually directly or indirectly involved in Cold War era conflicts.

During the Cold War, there were two types of peacekeeping: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. Observer missions consisted of unarmed personnel who were assigned the tasks of monitoring, observing, and reporting on events. Peacekeeping forces, on the other hand, consisted of lightly armed military personnel who were assigned the tasks of patrolling and monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires with the aim of keeping the warring factions apart. Peacekeeping was not created to solve a conflict or dispute, rather, its purpose was to try and maintain the peace and calm on the front lines in order to buy time for the peacemakers to negotiate a peaceful settlement between
the combatants.

While there was no universally accepted definition of traditional peacekeeping, there evolved a broad degree of consensus on some of its basic characteristics. These include:

**non-use of force** - in traditional operations the use of force was prohibited except in self defense, "including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent [a peacekeeping force] from discharging its duties."6

**consent** - the host country or countries had to consent to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation on their land. If a country refused, then the United Nations could not force a peacekeeping operation upon that state. The importance of consent was demonstrated in the late 1960s with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) which was deployed in Egypt in 1956 to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. In May 1967, an Egyptian request was made for the withdrawal of UNEF troops from their positions. U Thant, Secretary-General at the time, complied with the Egyptian request in concurrence with the terms of the "good faith" agreement signed between Dag Hammarskjold, Thant's predecessor, and Egyptian President Nasser.7

**cooperation** - "The parties concerned are called upon not only to consent to the initiation and deployment of a peacekeeping operation, but also they are supposed to cooperate for the smooth functioning of the operation."8 Therefore, the principle of cooperation was seen as an extension of the principle of consent.

**non-intervention/impartiality** - it had to be made clear that the peacekeeping operation did not favour one side over another or interfere in the internal affairs of a country. When non-intervention and impartiality were lacking this created many problems. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the early 1960s, while eventually successful in achieving its mandate, demonstrated the difficulties that peacekeepers faced when these principles were violated.9

**broad political support** - all peacekeeping operations had to have the broad political support of the international community, especially the members of the Security Council. Although the General Assembly can authorize peacekeeping missions the responsibility has tended to be a power of the Security Council. Legally speaking the General Assembly, under the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, can authorize a peacekeeping mission but it has only used this power once (UNEF I) and it is unlikely that it will use it again without the approval of the Security Council.10 Therefore, the support of the
Big Five (U.S., U.K, the Soviet Union, France, China) was and still is important. No operation, even post-Cold War operations, has succeeded without the support of the permanent members of the Security Council.

*clear and appropriate mandate* - the purpose and function of the operation had to be made clear to the countries and/or parties involved, to the Security Council, and to the peacekeepers themselves. Whether the operation had only one function or a combination of two or three functions, "the drafting of the mandate should be skilful enough to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations on objectives, strategies, methods, and tactics."  


While second-generation peacekeeping missions still perform the traditional duties of monitoring and patrolling buffer zones, cease-fires, and troop withdrawals, they have also taken on new roles which have included supervising and organising elections, rebuilding states, and delivering and protecting humanitarian assistance by force if necessary. This new era of peacekeeping has emerged to respond to the vastly different political landscape which has been created by several post-Cold War global trends. These trends include the diffusion of power, the crisis of the nation-state, the re-emergence of ethnicity and religion, and the expanding scope of security.

*Diffusion of power*

During the Cold War international affairs were dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, as the "bipolar world of the Cold War saw power put to use in an intense contest of wills...when every international event was either influenced by their rivalry or filtered through its lens." The end of
the Cold War has marked the end of the bipolar world and the emergence of a much more complicated world in which there is a greater diffusion of power. The United States now is generally regarded as the world’s only superpower as a result of its powerful military capabilities and its economic strength. But increased social, economic and political problems at home have caused the United States to begin to reconsider its global interests. Hence, the development of a multipolar system appears likely.

**The crisis of the nation-state**

Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner sum up this trend:

> From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia, from Somalia, Sudan and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.

Indeed, this trend may be the most significant challenge confronting the international community. During the post-World War II era, a number of states, such as Yugoslavia and Somalia, benefitted from superpower support but with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, this support drastically dwindled. The question that remains is whether states such as Somalia and Rwanda, and other newly formed states, such as the former republics of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, are capable of sustaining themselves as members of the international community. The results of failed states could "be debilitating both for the citizens of those states and for the international community, faced with the tasks of providing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and of coping with refugees." The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the civil wars in Somalia and Rwanda have proved this point well.
The re-emergence of ethnicity and religion

Ethnic groups are people who share the same culture in terms of language, traditions, and customs. Conflict between such groups is an important recent (but not a novel) trend. The Cold War superpowers discouraged ethnic conflict in Europe. The current rise of ethnic conflicts there specifically relates to the collapse of communism and the ideological triumph of democracy. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal contend that the collapse of communism was in fact a collapse of legitimacy itself. They assert that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which dominated most of the Eastern European states during the Cold War, had the ability of dampening ethnic issues and if ethnic problems did occur they could simply be suppressed. But Cooper and Berdal contend that a democratic system of government "requires the identification of a political community to which everyone belongs; voluntary acceptance of majority decisions implies a strong sense of common destiny." They claim that if people are permitted to select who governs them, then many believe that they should also determine who is to be governed. Therefore:

it is not an accident that the sudden overthrow of authoritarian regimes and the arrival of democracy have been accompanied by ethnic tensions and secessionist movements. This is true in Africa - where the end of the Cold War also removed the legitimacy ascribed to one-party rule - as it is in Europe.

The expanding scope of security

In the new world order, the scope and meaning of security has broadened beyond the traditional military-based definition. In the post-Cold War era, nuclear and military issues still figure prominently in discussions of international security but economic,
environmental, and human rights issues are now considered by the United Nations to be important to global security. One such issue that is specifically relevant to this study concerns provision of humanitarian aid to areas affected by internal strife. Conflicts such as those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda have brought this issue to the fore. The Report of the Canadian Parliament's Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs points out that what has changed is the way in which the world perceives such conflicts or threats of conflict:

The communication revolution—the phenomenon of the 'global village'—has magnified the impact of strife everywhere. Consequently, in the discussion of emerging security issues that follows the most salient factor may well be the increasing visibility of all these issues as much as the issues themselves.23

When the violence and carnage that accompanies these conflicts appear on televisions across the world, a state's citizens might put pressure on its government to "do something." The "CNN factor"24 has applied an added amount of pressure on the international community to respond to the sufferings of populations who are the unfortunate victims of these violent and inhumane conflicts.

The Effect of These Trends on Peacekeeping

What have these trends meant to peacekeeping? These trends have created a different or "second-generation" of peacekeeping in which the main characteristics can be described as follows:

-new operations have taken on expanded roles and duties,

-they frequently include a larger civilian and police component,
-they are often involved in the organization and guidance of elections,

-they usually contain a human rights dimension, and

-they are increasingly concerned with internal conflicts which sometimes involves intervention into the domestic affairs of states.\textsuperscript{25}

Even though the duties in some of the new operations may differ from the classic operations, they still retain some of the basic characteristics of traditional peacekeeping missions; their mandates are not to end the conflict by military means; the operations still are supposed to be impartial; and, the broad support of the international community and most especially of the permanent members of the Security Council is important to the organization of these operations.\textsuperscript{26} However, there are some important differences between the two "generations" of peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Different mandates and environment}

Peacekeeping mandates are changing: in some instances the primary mandate is no longer to prevent or contain a conflict but rather to protect citizens from the effects of the conflict. For example, the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to provide humanitarian aid and protection whilst a violent struggle continues.

Whereas traditional operations were usually deployed during a cease-fire, second-generation operations are increasingly being carried out in the middle of a conflict. Also, the rules of engagement for post-Cold War operations are changing. With respect to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and UNPROFOR the Security Council authorized the use of "all necessary means," including the use of force, to achieve their
mandates.

*Limited consent/cooperation*

Second-generation operations do not necessarily have the consent of all parties involved. In civil wars or internal conflicts, not all of the warring factions may agree to the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. For example, in an internal conflict, only one of the warring factions may agree to a United Nations’ presence. The one warring faction that does not consent to the presence of the peacekeeping mission could seriously hamper the peacekeepers from achieving their intended mandate. Also, the warring factions in an internal conflict could consent to the establishment of a peacekeeping force but change their minds or refuse to cooperate with the peacekeepers after the deployment of the mission. This happened with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as the Khmer Rouge faction initially agreed to a UN presence but later, after the deployment of the mission, refused to cooperate with the peacekeeping operation.28

Consent of all parties involved may be also hard to achieve with respect to preventive deployment, a type of peacekeeping discussed by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda For Peace*. With respect to preventive deployment on one side of a border, there is always the possibility that the other party may object to its proximity.29 To date, UNPROFOR in Macedonia, has been the only preventive peacekeeping operation.
Lack of a legitimate government

Second-generation operations are increasingly confronted by states with no legitimate government or a government that is too weak to assist in the deployment of a UN operation. This was the case with UNOSOM. In instances where there are weak governments, cooperation is sought but it must be on an ad hoc basis because weak governments may be overthrown or ousted by one or more of the regional war-lords fighting for power. A weak government may consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. But, by the time the operation is deployed, a new government could be in power and it is possible that it might refuse to consent to the deployment of the peacekeepers.

Lack of a blueprint

Second-generation operations lack an operational blueprint as there are no set rules or guidance for this new era of peacekeeping. Thus, these operations cannot be generalized. Second-generation operations are confronted with different and very complex problems and what worked in one operation will not necessarily work in another. For this reason, post-Cold War peacekeeping must be approached on a case by case basis. Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has stated that the complex nature of today's conflicts requires "the United Nations to discern between conflicts and to tailor each operation to the particular circumstances of each situation." Lack of an operational blueprint was also a problem for first-generation operations, but it seems to be a greater problem for second-generation operations as post-Cold War peacekeepers
have been confronted with increasingly difficult conflicts involving a greater degree of
certainty, resulting in larger missions with a greater civilian and police component.

As mentioned previously, observer missions and peacekeeping forces were the
only types of traditional operations that were present during the Cold War. These types
of operations are still present today but the end of the Cold War has added a variety of
other types of peacekeeping missions. These post-Cold War operations can be arranged
into a continuum:

at one end are the lowest intensity operations, involving the smallest number of assets and
the least risk of conflict to UN contingents: at the opposing end conflict level is high and
involves larger military assets.31

Beginning at the lowest end, the continuum includes traditional peacekeeping, preventive
deployment, assistance in the maintenance of law and order, humanitarian peacekeeping,
rescuing "failed states" and cease-fire enforcement.32

Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping operations, which already have been described, were
assigned tasks such as monitoring and patrolling cease-fires and buffer zones. Some
traditional operations that have been set up after the Cold War include the United Nations
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the United Nations Good Offices Mission
in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military
Observer Group (UNIIMOG), and the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR).33
Preventive Deployment

This type of peacekeeping has been advocated in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda For Peace* and it simply involves, at the request of a state, the deployment of peacekeepers into a country before a conflict has begun. The main task of this type of force is to prevent the spread of a conflict into a country or to ward off a potential aggressor. Preventive deployment, which has also been referred to as tripwire peacekeeping, is being applied for the first time by UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Its purpose is to prevent the fighting in Bosnia from spreading into Macedonia. To date, the operation has been a success.34

Assistance in the Maintenance of Law and Order

The purpose of this type of operation is for the peacekeepers to assist parties involved in a dispute to implement a settlement that has already been agreed upon. With this type of operation, UN peacekeepers have been requested to perform a number of traditional and second-generational tasks such as monitoring cease-fires and troop withdrawals, supervising and conducting elections, supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces, supervising present administrations, confirming respect for human rights, and disarming warring factions. Examples of these operations include the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I,II (UNAVEM), the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). It is this
type of peacekeeping which has seen the most rapid growth since the end of the Cold War.  

**Humanitarian Peacekeeping**

In this type of operation, the peacekeepers, during civil wars and natural disasters, either supervise or protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance or deliver it themselves. Examples of humanitarian operations include the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I,II) and UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Peacekeeping missions which contain a humanitarian dimension have sometimes been authorized to use "all necessary means," including the use of force, against parties which interfere or impede the peacekeepers from achieving their mandate.

"Rescuing" Failed States

According to Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and now Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, this type of operation involves the deployment of

> a United Nations force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed, anarchy and lawlessness abound, the breakup of the country may be imminent and some external agency is needed to put it together again.

Rescuing failed states has been described metaphorically as "painting a nation blue." Painting countries blue is how Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, described the likelihood that the UN would soon be required to take over the administration of failed states once peace and order were restored. The operation in Somalia was an example of this type of operation. Although it has been argued that this type of operation is not
peacekeeping, in many ways it still retains some of the basic characteristics of classic peacekeeping: the operation is supposed to remain impartial and any action that unfairly benefits one side over the other is supposed to be avoided; it can still receive broad political support; and, the parties in the conflict can give their cooperation to the UN force and provide their consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in their territory. Since there is no legitimate government in these types of operations, the UN forces might have difficulty in obtaining consent from all of the involved parties. Even if all factions initially agree to the presence of UN forces, one of the parties may later change its position and this could cause problems for the peacekeeping operation.

The "painting a nation blue" operation, more than any other, involves the intervention of the United Nations into the internal affairs of a country. In the post-Cold War era, the UN has become more frequently involved in the internal affairs of states such as Cambodia, Iraq, Angola, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. In the case of Somalia and Iraq, the UN was not invited into these countries but rather intervened on its own to protect human rights and deliver humanitarian assistance. In the new world era, there has been a heightened debate about whether the UN has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states. Some have claimed that Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter restricts the UN from getting involved in matters that are considered to be of a domestic nature, but the same Charter article also declares that it shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Therefore, when an intra-state conflict threatens global peace, the UN can justify its
involvement into the domestic affairs of a state, with the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, by utilizing the last clause of Article 2(7).41

Cease-fire Enforcement

This type of operation has been referred to as a "forceful variant" of traditional peacekeeping as it is the same as traditional peacekeeping in the following ways: all parties would initially agree to the deployment of the operation; it would be impartial as it would not carry out any actions which would favour one party over another; and, it would have the political support of the Security Council. However, it differs from traditional peacekeeping since the operation could not only use force in self defence but also against a party that consistently violates a cease-fire agreement. With this type of operation the United Nations runs the risk of becoming part of the conflict as its actions might appear to favour one party over the other.

Cease-fire or peace-enforcement operations also differ from traditional operations in terms of the types of armed forces needed. Peace-enforcement operations are usually built around one state (the U.S. led operations in Iraq-Kuwait and Somalia during 1991 and 1993, respectively) and contain a large number of troops who are heavily armed with a full range of offensive and defensive weapons. Traditional operations, on the other hand, are built around several small and middle sized countries and contain a smaller number of troops who are lightly armed with defensive weapons.42 John Ruggie highlights an important distinction when he points out that traditional missions, unlike cease-fire and peace-enforcement operations, "are not designed to create the conditions
for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for them to be able
to perform their role." The objectives of each type of operation also differ. As
Charles Dobbie indicates, "[t]he peacekeeper to peace-enforcer is as referee to football
player....One is there to win, the other to ensure fair play. One is a supervisor, the
other a combatant."44

The following figure attempts to provide a summary representation of the
preceding discussion.

Figure 1 - Characteristics of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Peacekeeping Characteristics</th>
<th>Trad</th>
<th>Prev</th>
<th>Assistance in law and order</th>
<th>Hum</th>
<th>Failed states</th>
<th>Cease-fire enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Consent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trad - Traditional Peacekeeping
Prev - Preventive Deployment
Hum - Humanitarian Peacekeeping

Yes - usually present
* - conditionally present
No - usually not present

During the Cold War the UN security system was immobile because of the
superpower conflict, so peacekeeping emerged as an alternative solution or extension to
the collective security system of the United Nations. Traditional peacekeeping served its purpose, but after the Cold War, it was not sufficient in itself to respond to all of the complex problems confronting the world. Therefore, second-generation peacekeeping emerged as an extension of traditional peacekeeping to deal with the new political climate of the post-Cold War era. The development of these new operations is directly attributable to cooperation between the major powers of the Security Council, especially between the United States and Russia. During the Cold War the types of peacekeeping operations just discussed were impossible because their establishment would be blocked by one of the veto-powers in the Security Council. In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council is now willing to go into areas were it would not have gone during the Cold War. There is no doubt that the operations in Angola, Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia would never have been undertaken in the Cold War era. The Security Council is not only more willing to go into new areas, but it is also willing to undertake Chapter VII military operations, something that was done only once during the Cold War. Hence, the cooperation between the Security Council has resulted in some new types of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era; some parallel to Cold War operations, others diverge at much more drastic rate from the traditional definition, while others belong in the middle.

Indeed, peacekeeping has evolved into a very different concept than what was intended by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjold when they set up the first peacekeeping operation in the Middle East during the mid 1950s. It appears as the world
moves towards the twenty first century, the idea or concept behind UN peacekeeping could possibly move even farther away from its original definition as there has been talk of using peacekeepers to battle the drug trade, patrol the world’s waterways, combat terrorism, respond to environmental disasters, and verify arms control. Even the chief of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has discussed the possibility of a "third-generation" of peacekeeping.
CHAPTER 3 - THE UNITED NATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Background

The conflict in Bosnia is one that cannot be fully understood without looking at the whole Yugoslav conflict because the former is an extension of the latter. The discussion to follow, which provides background information, will concentrate on recent developments, but it is recognized that a full explanation of Yugoslavia’s break-up would require extensive historical analysis. Similar to the process of peeling an onion, one must uncover layer after layer of historical developments to reach the end result of a definitive explanation. There is not sufficient scope here to present such an analysis.

Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and subsequent civil war, was precipitated most immediately by declarations of independence made by political leaderships in two of its constituent republics, Slovenia and Croatia, during June 1991. A prior gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia’s principal integrative force, its Communist Party, had taken place during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Nationalist Communist Party leaders, committed to incompatible political goals, had come to power in Yugoslavia’s different constituent republics during the 1980’s. The most important of these leaders was Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Scholars have focused considerable attention on his role in disrupting Yugoslavia’s fragile unity. Yugoslavia’s dissolution, however, as Steven L. Burg indicates, cannot be attributed to just one factor.
their leaders' efforts to maximize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.

Serbia's push for a tighter centralized government not only stemmed from its desire to maintain its dominant role but also as a way to regain some of the power which was lost under the reign of Josip Broz "Tito." When Tito created the "second Yugoslavia" he did not try to divide the state along ethnic lines, and, in fact, it appeared that he sought to weaken the power of the Serbs by internally dividing them. According to James Steinberg:

The internal borders (which remained until the country's breakup in 1991) did not attempt to consolidate populations along ethnic lines; indeed it appeared that Tito...intentionally sought to limit the Serbs' clout by the way he drew the administrative divisions. Thus the borders of Serbia did not embrace all the areas with large Serb populations; both Bosnia and Croatia contain large Serb enclaves.

With Tito's plan, Serbia was the biggest loser; prewar "Southern Serbia" was turned into the republic of Macedonia, the former Serb kingdom of Montenegro was made a nation in its own right, while within Serbia itself two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were created. Tito's division of Serbia did not sit well with Serbs as they saw it as a deliberate conspiracy to weaken their power. Despite the Serbian grievances, the internal divisions remained.

After Tito's death in 1980, a new governmental structure, designed to cater to the interests of the various ethnic groups by rotating the Yugoslav presidency among the six republics, was implemented. It was hoped that the post-Tito government structure would be sufficient to counterbalance the different ethnic and religious interests of the Yugoslav citizens but it proved to be unsuccessful. As Steinberg has pointed out:
The prosperous Catholic republics of Slovenia and Croatia resented sharing their economic good fortune with their poorer Muslim and Orthodox compatriots, while Serbs, embittered by the fetters imposed by Tito, chafed under the new structure, which, in their view, denied them their due.  

During the early and mid 1980s, nationalist movements began to achieve momentum in Yugoslavia, as many regional leaders viewed nationalism as a way of keeping themselves in power. In 1985, a group of academics formulated a memorandum through the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences calling for a "Serbian nationalist awakening." The memorandum, which was leaked to the press in 1986, set out a plan which called for the dismantling of Tito's Yugoslavia and a return to the Serbian hegemony that was enjoyed during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Dobrica Cosic, who would later become President of rump Yugoslavia, was a prominent force behind the memorandum while Slobodan Milosevic, leader of Serbia since his election in 1987, was in agreement with its ideas.

With the call for a "Serbian nationalist awakening" and the growing animosity towards communism in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia began to gain popularity in the late 1980s. In 1990, when the Yugoslav Communist Party faltered, the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia began to call for a loose confederation of sovereign republics but Serbian leaders, who advocated a stronger centralized federation, resisted this move. In June 1990, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic warned that any attempts to transform Yugoslavia into a confederal state would make its internal borders an open political question. In issuing his warning, Milosevic asserted that Serbia "links its present administrative borders
exclusively to a Yugoslavia constituted as a federation....If one does not want a federal state, the question of Serbian borders is an open political question." As Milosevic continued to push for a stronger centralized Yugoslavia, the calls among Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians for a looser confederation or for complete independence from the Yugoslav center intensified. The conflict over the political make up of Yugoslavia was at a standstill and this standoff accelerated the drive for independence in Slovenia in December 1990 and Croatia in May 1991. Each of these culminated in votes for secession.

The Yugoslav federation was on the brink of disaster and it appeared that its disintegration was an inevitable outcome. Indeed, in this case, appearances were not deceiving and the final blow to the Yugoslav federation came as a result of a constitutional predicament. Under the rotating presidency implemented after Tito’s death, a Croatian, by the name of Stipe Mesic, was scheduled to become the Yugoslav president on May 15, 1991 but his appointment was blocked by Serbia. Any hope of keeping Yugoslavia together was shattered by this move and the federation was no longer functional.

When Yugoslavia began to unravel, the United States and the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU)66, made it clear that they were not keen on any plan that called for the dismemberment of the Yugoslav state.67 However, the Germans, who believed that Yugoslavia could only be kept together with force, began pushing for early international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.68 Western
governments, and many other members of the international community, ardently supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity for two reasons. First, many states favoured this position because they feared that an ethnic battle would erupt if Yugoslavia began to breakup, and, secondly, many felt that its demise would set a dangerous precedent for other states, especially the USSR. In May 1991, State Department Spokesman, Margaret Tutwiler, stated that "the United States will not encourage or reward secession....We firmly believe that Yugoslavia's external or internal borders should not be changed unless by peaceful consensual means." This position, in fact, echoed the feelings of many Western governments on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. The stance of the Western powers was interpreted by Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, and other Serbian hardliners, as a "green light" or support for their ideas of a stronger centralized Yugoslavia.

Despite the stance of the U.S. and the Western European governments, and the threats from Milosevic, Slovenia and Croatia opted for secession and formally declared their independence from the Yugoslav federation on June 25, 1991. The Serbian dominated federal government was opposed to Croatia and Slovenia's independence and it instructed the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to intervene to prevent the republics from seceding. The outcome was a bloody and violent conflict that would eventually engulf another republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war in Slovenia was short, and, after ten days of fighting, a cease-fire (Brioni Accords) was arranged by the European Community. By July 19, 1991, the JNA had withdrawn its forces from Slovenia in
defeat. Shortly thereafter, the Slovenian quest for independence received international recognition.

In contrast to Slovenia's move towards independence, Croatia's quest proved to be more difficult. Serbia let Slovenia go because there was no Serbian minority in the republic, but Croatia, with a 12% Serbian population, would not be let go so easily. Even before Croatia's declaration of independence, the Serb minority in Croatia clearly stated that they would not be ruled by a Croatian government nor take part in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. As Lenard Cohen points out:

> the leadership of the republic's large Serbian minority in the Krajina region had stated unequivocally that they had no intention of accepting rule from an independent Croatian government in Zagreb. The Krajina Serbs also made it clear that they would not acquiesce in either the dismemberment of the Yugoslav federation or the fragmentation of the country's Serbian population into various new state units.

As a result, when Croatia disclosed its desire to leave the federation, a conflict erupted with the Croatian military and police on one side, and the Croatia-based Serbs and the Serbian led JNA on the other. The conflict continued throughout 1991 and into 1992 and eventually, after the European Community brokered thirteen unsuccessful cease-fires, the matter was turned over to the United Nations Security Council. A United Nations negotiating team, led by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was successful in negotiating a truce between the two sides. In March 1992, a peacekeeping force (United Nations Protection Force-UNPROFOR I) was deployed in Croatia. However, by the time the UN force was deployed, the Serbs had already gained control over one third of Croatian territory. Despite the truce, and the arrival of peacekeepers in Croatia,
sporadic fighting continued. However, by the spring of 1992 the attention of the Serbs, Croats, and the international community began to turn towards the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 79

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina, a virtually landlocked state 80 with only approximately eight miles of coastline along the Adriatic Sea, is bound by Croatia to the north, west, and southwest, by Serbia to the east and by Montenegro to the Southeast (Note Map 2). The region of Bosnia was settled by the Slavs in the seventh century and in the middle of the fifteenth century Bosnia annexed Herzegovina and both these territories were later captured by the Turks. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin placed Bosnia and Herzegovina under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian empire with Turkey retaining formal sovereignty. In 1908 the regions were annexed by the Austro-Hungarian empire which soon thereafter collapsed during World War I. In 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created and it included the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This state was invaded by Italy and Germany during World War II. The defeat of the Axis Powers set the stage for the creation of a new Communist-Party dominated state and in November 1945 Bosnia-Herzegovina became a republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito. 81

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 82 one of the most ethnically mixed republics of former Yugoslavia, has always been considered a potential hot spot for conflict. When Tito
devised the outlines for his new Yugoslavia, the republic of Bosnia presented a problem. Aware that both the Serbs and Croats laid claims to the area, Tito declared that "its future would be neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim but rather Serbian and Croatian and Muslim." The Muslims, descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam when the region was captured and taken over by the Ottoman empire, were the largest ethnic group in pre-war Bosnia constituting 43.7% of the population. They speak the same language as the Serbs and Croats (Serbo-Croatian) but they consider themselves to be a separate people because of their religion and culture. The two other major groups in pre-war Bosnia were the Serbs and the Croats who comprised 31.3% and 17.3%, respectively, of the total population. Despite the fact that the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats represented over 90% of the total population there were very few areas throughout pre-war Bosnia which were ethnically pure as the groups were intermingled and scattered throughout the region. In describing the ethnic composition and make up of pre-war Bosnia, President Izetbegovic compared it to the skin of a leopard with each spot representing a separate group.

The political division of Bosnia, which would later escalate into an armed conflict, began with the 1990 Bosnian election. The election made it clear that the Bosnians had already divided themselves along ethnic lines: a Muslim nationalist party, a Croatian nationalist party, and a Serbian nationalist party. Each received a percentage of the vote that was slightly less than the ethnic percentage of the total population. Neither of the three parties had a sufficient majority to take office, so they agreed to
form a coalition government in which "the president of a seven-member Presidency was to be Muslim, the president of the assembly a Serb, and the head of the republican government a Croat." 89 Alija Izetbegovic has been the president of the Bosnian tripartite government since his election on December 21, 1990. He was re-elected by members of the Presidency in 1991 and his term in office was automatically extended in December 1992 because of a state of emergency. 90

The coalition government set up by the three groups initially seemed successful but with the growing violence and hostility between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia and the increasing uncertainty over the future of Bosnia, ethnic tensions in the republic were becoming strained. The differing ideas on the future of Bosnia strained relations even farther.

The population divided largely along ethnic lines over the future course: Croats opting either for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina or for one that was sovereign in a confederation with Yugoslavia, Serbs calling for the retention of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a Yugoslav federation, and Muslims wanting a sovereign republic in a weak federation. 91

The first signs of serious trouble began in October 1991, when the Croatian and Muslim representatives of the Bosnian legislature adopted a memorandum which supported Bosnia's sovereignty and its neutrality in the Croatian war. 92 The Serbian members of the Bosnian parliament did not support this memorandum and in November 1991 they held their own referendum on whether to remain as part of the Yugoslav federation. The results were conclusive as the majority of Bosnian Serbs voted in favour of remaining within Yugoslavia. 93

In December 1991, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, in accordance with an
agreement made by Muslims and Croats, applied for EC recognition. In response to this request, the EC suggested that the Bosnian legislature hold a referendum on independence to determine whether the population supported such a measure. The Serbs, however, continued to maintain that it was their desire to remain part of the Yugoslav federation and in January 1992 they declared the formation of their own republic in Bosnia, formally known as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia. The February 29-March 1 referendum, which was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, indicated that 99.7% of those who voted favoured an independent and sovereign Bosnia. As Bosnia moved closer and closer towards independence, the Serbs started preparing for war. JNA forces began withdrawing from Croatia and re-positioning themselves and their equipment in Bosnia along side the Bosnian Serb forces.

While ethnic dissension in Bosnia was steadily on the rise since the beginning of the Croatian war, the violence in Bosnia seemed to be ignited on March 1, 1992 when members of a Serbian wedding party, who were waving Serbian flags in a Muslim area of Sarajevo, were shot at by unidentified gunmen. Within hours of this incident the Serbs set up barricades in and around the area of Sarajevo and the resulting conflict eventually spread to other parts of Bosnia. As the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian government were faced with the possibility of separation due to Bosnian independence, they resorted to every means possible, including the use of force, to prevent this from becoming a reality. As Lenard Cohen points out, faced with the real possibility that Bosnian Serbs—the former country’s largest diasporic Serbian community—would become formally separated from Serbia proper, the Belgrade
government, Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and JNA forces in the republic shared a common
determination to use force as a means to forestall such an eventuality.99

As a result of the fighting that broke out during the referendum, the EC's response to its outcome was initially sluggish. However, with the situation in Bosnia deteriorating, the EC and United States recognized Bosnian independence in early April 1992.100 It was the hope of the EC and the United States that recognition of Bosnia would prevent further hostilities and stabilize the situation. But their hopes were dashed as a full-scale armed conflict began immediately after Bosnia was recognized by the international community. Bosnian Serbs, aided by the JNA, began a reign of terror and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and by the summer of 1992 a three sided civil war was in full tilt. The Croats sided with the Muslims but not before President Tudjman of Croatia carved out his own piece of Bosnia, while Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, supported the Bosnian Serbs.101

Eventually, Milosevic ordered the JNA out of Bosnia but when they retreated they left behind a multitude of weapons for the Bosnian Serbs, and before long the well armed Bosnian Serb forces captured large amounts of territory. By July 1992, with Serbian forces occupying two-thirds of the territory, the Bosnian Croats declared a "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bos" on the remaining third of Bosnia.102 The Muslims were left with a very small territory. For the next two years, ethnic cleansing, fierce and brutal conflicts, destruction of villages, towns and cities, broken cease-fires and promises and rejections of peace plans would take place daily in Bosnia.

The political landscape of the former Yugoslavia has vastly changed since its
destruction began in 1991. A third, and much smaller Yugoslavia, commonly referred to as "rump Yugoslavia," has been constructed between Serbia and Montenegro which has yet to be recognized by the international community; Slovenia and Croatia have achieved full recognition as independent states; the war in Slovenia and Croatia has ceased but the latter remains under an uneasy cease-fire; Macedonia has, to date, successfully avoided becoming engulfed by the war while its independence has tentatively been acknowledged pending an acceptable solution with Greece over its name.103 Bosnia’s independence has received recognition but it is far from becoming an independent and effective member of the international community. Moreover, its ongoing conflict has the potential to destabilize the whole ex-Yugoslav area. The Bosnian conflict is an extension of the former war in Croatia as both Serbia and Croatia have irredenta in Bosnia and both Serbian and Croatian nationalists have claimed that it should be theirs.104 For these reasons, a Bosnian settlement is the key to a Serb-Croat agreement and an overall solution to the situation in Yugoslavia.105 Until a peaceful and lasting settlement is achieved in Bosnia the remaining areas in ex-Yugoslavia remain in danger of becoming engulfed by an armed conflict.

Initiatives toward UN Involvement in Yugoslavia: Conflict in Croatia and the Creation of UNPROFOR

How and why the United Nations becomes involved in a peacekeeping operation affects the mission’s design, mandate, and chances of success.106 Typically, the United
Nations becomes involved through a treaty with the host state or states involved, which lays out the mandate, length of the mission, and the financial arrangements. It is important to note however, that with respect to some operations, such as those sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a treaty between the UN and the host state(s) is not necessarily a requirement. Of the 33 UN peacekeeping operations to date, the vast majority have arisen from brokered requests. Brokered requests are the result of talks between the warring factions which are mediated by outside parties. The United States, Russia, Tanzania, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the UN have all acted as mediators to help achieve ceasefires and peace plans. Once an agreement is achieved the parties then frequently turn to the United Nations for its assistance in implementing its terms.

Security Council initiatives have resulted in the creation of six peacekeeping operations. All six have been the result of wars in the Middle East in which the Security Council took the initiative to demand a cease-fire and followed up by deploying a peacekeeping mission. The third way for the United Nations to become involved in a peacekeeping operation is through local requests by the disputant parties. Local requests simply involve the parties appealing to the UN for the deployment of a peacekeeping force on their territory.

When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia, the European Community saw the crisis as an opportunity to show the world that it was capable of adequately dealing with the conflict. The United States and other principal powers initially backed the efforts
of the European Community in its lead role because they believed that the EC could use its economic influence during the crisis. Since the early 1970s, the EC and Yugoslavia were developing strong economic ties and it was thought that sanctions might prove to be an effective instrument in the crisis. But problems soon began to surface as a split emerged within the EC on how to respond to the crisis. The majority of EC members were pushing for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but others, such as Germany and Austria, were willing and ready to recognize the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Despite this internal split, the EC members were intent on declaring this crisis as theirs and, in fact, the EC did not even want the UN to be involved. In testifying before a British Parliamentary Committee on December 10, 1992, Lord Owen, the former British Foreign Secretary, said:

the United States did not want to be involved in Yugoslavia and the Europeans did not want them to be involved if truth be told. The European Community were very happy this should be a European event to the extent of us developing our own peacekeeping operation and we were not too keen to involve the UN.

The UN also refrained from intervening because a regional organization, the EC, was already involved in the crisis. In fact, Article 52 of the UN Charter requires members of the United Nations to first resort to regional organizations or agencies to achieve pacific settlement of a dispute before referring it to the Security Council. In a interview on February 11, 1993, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the UN’s view on EC involvement in Yugoslavia:

According to Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, regional disputes are supposed to be solved at the regional level, so we abstained from intervening because there already was a regional organization involved....In fact our position in Yugoslavia was that because the E.C. had established a framework and was doing something—it was doing real work, promoting a peace
process then we would not intervene. In fact, the United Nations was not the only one that did not want to get involved in the crisis. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was initially involved in the dispute but delegated its authority to the EC, the United States left the crisis in the hands of the EC to avoid becoming involved in another Lebanon, while the USSR's leaders were too busy trying to keep their own country together. Therefore, as Stephen Griffiths points out, the Yugoslav conflict "became an excellent opportunity to conduct an experiment on the feasibility of a common EC foreign and security policy."

The EC responded to the crisis by offering mediation and good offices but its efforts proved futile as each negotiated truce was violated almost immediately after, and sometimes even before, the papers were signed. The EC member states, from the beginning of the conflict, were unwilling to commit troops in sufficient numbers to enforce peace in the former Yugoslavia. Containment of the conflict, through a limited military deployment, became the effective, though not the declared policy, of EC member states. With countless broken cease-fires, escalating violence, and the reluctance of the EC to intervene militarily, it soon became apparent that the European Community was not sufficiently capable and unified to adequately respond to the crisis and it opted to request the assistance of the United Nations.

The United Nations became actively involved in the Yugoslav crisis on September 25, 1991, when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, unanimously passed
Resolution 713 which called for a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia...." Before the passing of resolution 713, there was some debate about whether the UN had the right to intervene in the Yugoslav crisis, since it was an internal conflict.\textsuperscript{121} Two principal reasons were advanced to justify intervention: firstly, UN Security Council involvement was requested by the former Yugoslavia and, secondly, the conflict was deemed to be a threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{122} While Article 2(7) states that nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in a dispute that is considered to be of a domestic nature, it also states that this article shall not prevent the UN from applying measures under Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{123} By invoking the last part of Article 2(7), and with the full support of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN was able to declare the continued fighting in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace and security and invoke Article 39 of Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{124}

Under resolution 713, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in an effort to peacefully resolve the dispute. In response to this request, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who would be replaced at the end of 1991 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appointed Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State for the United States, as his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia on October 8, 1991.\textsuperscript{125} At a November 23 meeting that was convened by Mr. Vance in Geneva, the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia together with the JNA reached an agreement that called for an immediate ceasefire. At this meeting each of the Yugoslav parties stated that they wanted to see the
immediate establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. In response to this request the Security Council adopted, on November 27, 1991, resolution 721 which approved the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, subject to some necessary conditions being met. The necessary conditions were compliance with the agreement signed in Geneva on November 23.

In mid December 1991, under resolution 724, the Security Council declared that the conditions for a peacekeeping operation still did not exist but authorized the deployment of several military and civilian personnel to Yugoslavia "as part of the continuing mission...to carry forward preparations for possible deployment of a peacekeeping operation...." When 1991 came to a close, the chances for a peacekeeping operation remained grim as fighting between the JNA and Croatian forces continued, but it appeared that the new year would bring about a cease-fire and the possible establishment of a peacekeeping operation. On January 3, 1992, in Sarajevo, representatives from Croatia and Serbia signed the Implementing Accord which called for the full implementation of the November 23, 1991, Geneva agreement. In response to this new agreement, the Security Council immediately adopted resolution 727 which authorized the deployment of 50 military observers to help maintain the shaky and often violated cease-fire contained in the Accord. Despite the so called cease-fire the conditions for the full deployment of a peacekeeping operation still did not exist.

Although President Tudjman of Croatia objected to certain technical aspects of the UN plan, he reiterated Croatia's support for the peacekeeping mission. The UN
also received assurances for cooperation with its plan from Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, and General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of the General Staff of the JNA.\textsuperscript{132} Even though the plan was supported by Serbia and provisionally supported by the Croatian government, the deployment of the peacekeepers appeared to be in jeopardy as the Serbs in Croatia had some reservations. Milan Babic, President of the Serbian Krajina, and Goran Hadzic, Prime Minister of the Serbian Region of Eastern Slovenia, objected to the fact that the peacekeeping plan referred to their areas as being within Croatia. They argued that the plan prejudged the political situation.\textsuperscript{133} However, despite these objections, the Secretary-General recommended that the full deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation commence immediately. When making this recommendation, Boutros Boutros-Ghali concluded that,

\begin{quote}
the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation will fail because of lack of cooperation from the parties is less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch will lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

Despite the fact that certain political groups were still opposed to a UN peacekeeping operation, the Security Council, on February 21, 1992, under resolution 743, established the United Nations Protection Force to assist the local parties with the implementation of the cease-fire plan.\textsuperscript{135} Shortly thereafter, on March 8, UNPROFOR I began to deploy under the command of Indian General Satish Nambiar and on April 7, 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 749, authorizing the full deployment of the United Nations Protection Force.\textsuperscript{136}

While the Yugoslavs accepted a UN brokered peace plan, it is important to note
that they did not accept the United Nations solely on basis of its ability to adequately deal with the crisis. Both the Serbs and Croats viewed the UN’s Personal Envoy, Cyrus Vance, more as a representative of the United States rather than as a representative of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{137} Since both groups were eager to gain the support of the United States for their cause, it made sense to both the Serbs and Croats to accept the peace plan brokered by Cyrus Vance. The Yugoslavs saw the Vance mission as an opportunity to use the UN in order attain American support.\textsuperscript{138} Besides winning American support, the Serbs and the JNA, who already controlled large parts of Croatia, were battle weary and they regarded the Vance brokered peace plan as a tactical compromise.\textsuperscript{139} At the time, both sides, although for different reasons, wanted to stop fighting, and a peacekeeping operation, under the auspices of the UN, seemed to be the most acceptable avenue of choice.

\textbf{Initiatives toward UN Involvement in Bosnia}

Due to the conflicting Serb-Croat ambitions over Bosnia, it was only a matter of time before the conflict in Croatia spilled over into Bosnia. Even before the February 29-March 1, 1992 referendum on Bosnian independence, tensions between the region’s three largest ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, ran high. Despite the fact that the leaders of the three groups agreed to respect the borders of the republic, the Bosnian Serbs began seizing parts of Bosnia with the ultimate aim of uniting them with Serbia.\textsuperscript{140} As the fighting grew worse, the situation continued to deteriorate in Bosnia
and when the republic was recognized by the international community in early April 1992
the violence escalated into a full scale armed conflict.\textsuperscript{141}

Again, as was the case with the initial Yugoslav conflict, the EC was to

embark on a repeat performance of the political pirouette which surrounded the Slovene and
Croat crisis, with one difference: instead of searching for an 'European' response to start
with, only to turn the entire problem to the UN later, the EC started first with the UN this
time.\textsuperscript{142}

On April 10, 1992 the UN requested Cyrus Vance to travel to Bosnia to assess the
situation and recommend what could be done to quell the hostilities.\textsuperscript{143} Although the
mandate of UNPROFOR was initially associated with Croatia only, it was envisioned that
after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)\textsuperscript{144} 100
military observers would be re-deployed to areas of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{145} On April 23 the three
ethnic groups in Bosnia signed a cease-fire in which they agreed to observe a previous
cease-fire signed on April 12, but the truce began to break down almost immediately
after it was endorsed.\textsuperscript{146} In light of the rapidly deteriorating situation, the Secretary-
General, while not being able to deploy a full peacekeeping force, decided to accelerate
the deployment of the UNPROFOR observers in Croatia by dispatching 40 military
observers to Bosnia in the regions of Mostar, Capljina, Stolac, and Trebinje.\textsuperscript{147} Their
task was to assess the possibility of a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

The deployment of the observers to Bosnia was a result of continued pressure of
the international community, mainly of members of the EC, to expand UNPROFOR's
operation into Bosnia to prevent further hostilities.\textsuperscript{148} Even though there was not a
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, there were UNPROFOR personnel already there.

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When UNPROFOR was established in Croatia, the United Nations decided to place the operation’s headquarters in Sarajevo in the hopes of preventing any further hostilities, but the plan did not work.\textsuperscript{149} While pressure grew to expand UNPROFOR into Bosnia, the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in that republic seemed bleak for two reasons. First, President Bush was reluctant to ask Congress for additional peacekeeping funds, so it seemed that if an operation were to be established in Bosnia the Europeans would have go it alone with respect to finances; and, secondly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that a peacekeeping mission would not be deployed as long as the parties continued fighting.\textsuperscript{150} Confrontations between the three sides continued in the middle of May and, due to intense altercations between the warring parties, the military observers were withdrawn from Bosnia and redeployed back to Croatia.\textsuperscript{151} Also, about two thirds of UNPROFOR I headquarters personnel, who were stationed in Sarajevo, were forced to withdraw leaving the task of negotiating a cease-fire to the remaining one third.\textsuperscript{152}

The fighting quickly grew worse in Bosnia and so did the humanitarian situation as intense shelling of Sarajevo forced the closure of the airport to relief operations.\textsuperscript{153} In response to the deteriorating situation, the United Nations, on May 15, 1992, passed resolution 752 which demanded an immediate end to the fighting and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. The resolution also called for the immediate cessation of all outside activities and welcomed the efforts of the European Community to reach a peaceful solution.\textsuperscript{154} On May 27, 1992, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bosnia, who later became the Prime Minister, addressed a letter to the President of the Security
Council requesting assistance to end the fighting and ease the suffering of the population. In keeping with the request of the Security Council in resolution 757, UNPROFOR continued to negotiate with the parties in an effort to put a stop to hostilities around the airport and re-open it for humanitarian reasons. On June 5, 1992, UNPROFOR negotiated a settlement with the local parties for the handing over of the Sarajevo airport to a UN force. With this agreement, the Security Council, under resolution 758, extended UNPROFOR’s mandate to include the re-opening of the airport and the supervision of the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the area with an additional 1,100 troops. With this resolution, UNPROFOR II in Bosnia was established.

The UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia has been one of the most difficult and challenging in the history of UN peacekeeping. Two personal experiences, involving former UN commanders, illustrate the nature of the problems UNPROFOR personnel have had to confront. For the first of these, we have an "insider's" account which provides us with a helpful introduction to the development of UNPROFOR’s role in Bosnia. Major-General Lewis MacKenzie of the Canadian Armed Forces, who served as chief of staff with UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and later as the Bosnian commander during 1992, has written a memoir which takes us step-by-step through the completion of UNPROFOR’s first task - the re-opening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian reasons.

On June 5, 1992, a trilateral agreement was reached between the UN, the Bosnian Presidency, and the Bosnian Serb army that called for the airport to be demilitarized and
placed under UN supervision for the delivery of humanitarian aid. But the signing of the trilateral agreement proved to be the easy part, implementing it would be a much more difficult process. One of the first problems encountered was getting the necessary troops to take control of the Sarajevo airport. The airport agreement called for a thousand man battalion to take on this task, but MacKenzie realized that it might possibly take a month before a battalion could be found and moved into Sarajevo. By that time, he feared that all of the good work on the airport agreement would be history.\textsuperscript{160} After some discussion between MacKenzie and General Nambiar, former Force Commander of UNPROFOR, it was decided that a Canadian battalion would be sent to Sarajevo. MacKenzie then persuaded Nambiar, and eventually the UN headquarters in New York and his own in Ottawa, to establish a new sector headquarters in Sarajevo that he would command.\textsuperscript{161}

When MacKenzie was in the process of putting his team together to travel to Sarajevo, he received reports from the city that the fighting was growing worse as reports of the UN take over of the airport became more public. According to him, this a regrettable characteristic of peacekeeping missions because

\begin{quote}
anytime there is a chance that UN action will freeze the status quo on the ground, the parties to the conflict go on a last-minute offensive to make as many territorial gains as possible before the appointed time for the cease-fire arrives.\textsuperscript{162}
\end{quote}

On June 10, MacKenzie and his advance force left Croatia and started to move towards Sarajevo by convoy. They made good progress until they hit an area outside of Pale, one of the Bosnian Serb government led by Dr. Karadzic. The closer MacKenzie and
his team got to Pale "the more belligerent the sentries at the roadblock became. In one case, the sentry kept muttering, 'MacKenzie die.'" 163

In another incident on the same day, MacKenzie overheard Serbian soldiers at a roadblock saying that "MacKenzie won't take the airport from us. We will kill you all if you try." 164 He confronted the soldiers at this particular roadblock and tried to set the story straight regarding the UN takeover of the airport. He explained to them that the UN was coming to Sarajevo to implement an agreement signed by Dr. Karadzic and their military commander, General Mladic. MacKenzie said his explanation seemed to satisfy them but he was disturbed by some insulting references they made to Karadzic and Mladic. Their anger seemed more directed at them than me. They explained that a lot of their colleagues had been killed securing the airport, and so they shouldn't have to give it up. 165

MacKenzie and his compatriots, after encountering a couple of more incidents akin to the ones described above, arrived in Sarajevo on June 11.

Before the airport agreement could be implemented a cease-fire was needed and MacKenzie, therefore, immediately began negotiating a truce between the local factions. On June 14, after hours of discussion between the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Serbs, both sides agreed to sign a cease-fire with MacKenzie, but not with each other. The cease-fire was to go into effect at 0600 hours the next day. 166 It lasted only 40 hours as the fighting resumed in and around Sarajevo on June 17 at 0500 hours and continued until the early part of July.

Besides the continual fighting between the local factions, UNPROFOR's image
of impartiality was another problem that hampered the implementation of the airport agreement. During MacKenzie's attempts to implement the agreement, UNPROFOR was viewed by some Muslims and several members of the Bosnian Presidency as being pro-Serb. This appearance of partiality resulted in several problems, especially with regard to cooperation with UNPROFOR. After one particular incident on June 22, in which the UN was accused of giving vehicles to the Serbs to transport their soldiers, MacKenzie met with the Bosnian Presidency to try and convince them that he and his troops were impartial and not pro-Serb:

you are convinced that I and my troops are pro-Serb. I can tell you that this is not the case, but you won't believe me. We are not here to pass judgement on what is going on. We send objective reports to the UN everyday. It's the UN's job to identify the culprits. Our job is to open the airport and ensure the delivery of food and medicine. To do that, we have to negotiate with you and the Bosnian Serbs. If you can't live with that then my role as a negotiator is impossible. I need your cooperation...I also need you to tone down the anti-UNPROFOR rhetoric in the media. My command is committed to doing everything within our capability and our mandate to assist the people of Sarajevo, but we can't succeed without your co-operation. ¹⁹⁷

MacKenzie said that every time he made pitch like this, he had the distinct feeling that President Izetbegovic believed him and accepted that he was impartial, but he never had the same impression regarding Vice-President Ganic or Minister Doko. ¹⁶⁸ Some Muslims civilians also viewed MacKenzie and his troops as being partial. On June 26, 1992, he received a fax from the "Citizens of Dobrinja" who wanted him to be tried as a war criminal. He said he read the fax twice, in the hopes of understanding how the citizens could have misunderstood UNPROFOR's actions and mandate, which were designed to help all Sarajevo citizens. ¹⁶⁹

Eventually on June 29, after countless negotiation sessions and meetings between
the local factions and the UN, the Bosnian Serbs handed the airport over to UNPROFOR. The Serbs' decision to relinquish control of the airport seemed to be sparked by an unexpected six hour visit by France's President Mitterand to Sarajevo airport in which he met with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Mitterand's June 28th visit seemed to be significant for two reasons; firstly, as in the words of Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, it provided the momentum for the handing over of the airport, and secondly, within two hours of UNPROFOR's takeover of the airport on June 29, France initiated the airlift by sending one of its planes into Sarajevo carrying ten tonnes of food. 170

The landing of the French military plane and the visit by Mitterand provided the needed push to overcome the reluctance of the international community to get involved in Bosnia. 171 Shortly after the arrival of the French plane, the UN airlift to Sarajevo hit full stride on July 3 as ten planes carrying 100 tonnes of aid landed at the airport. Once France initiated the airlift, other states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Sweden began to take part in the airlift. 172

Another experience which highlights the difficulties UNPROFOR has faced in Bosnia occurred in March 1993 and involved the French military officer, Lieutenant-General Phillippe Morillon, commander of the Bosnian operation at the time. Later UNPROFOR's mandate will be examined more closely, but in order to properly understand the development discussed here, it should be mentioned that the UN Security Council passed resolutions in late 1992 and early 1993 that called for UNPROFOR "to use such force
as necessary to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid" and to establish a number of "safe havens" for Bosnian Muslims.

On March 10, General Morillon set out to visit Srebrenica where 60,000 Muslims were under attack for several months by Serbian forces. When he entered the town with a UN medical team on March 11, he was surrounded and detained by thousands of desperate Muslim women, children and old people who feared that the town was going to fall to the Serbs. Due to the actions of the Muslims, Morillon, on March 13, decided on his own to stay with the refugees to calm them and "try to save them." He set up his headquarters in the local post office and promised to stay with the people of Srebrenica, under intense shelling, until the Serbian forces opened supply routes to relief convoys and allowed the evacuation of sick and wounded Muslims. Morillon said, "I will stay here among these people until the day that their survival is assured." He immediately began trying to persuade Serbian forces to allow aid convoys into Srebrenica.

At several times throughout the initial stages of his ordeal in Srebrenica, Morillon negotiated deals with the Serbs to allow the passage of aid convoys into the town but the Serbian military halted the trucks once they moved a few miles into Bosnia. For example, on March 15, he negotiated a deal with General Ratko Mladic, military commander of the Bosnian Serbs, for the passage of aid into Srebrenica and the evacuation of about thirty wounded citizens. But this deal fell apart on March 18 when the aid convoy was stopped at a Serbian checkpoint. The local Serbian
commander said that he had no directions to allow a convoy through and he ordered the trucks to leave and warned he would "shoot to kill" any UN troops who tried to pass through his area again.180 As the situation in Srebrenica quickly deteriorated, Morillon kept up his efforts to persuade the Serbs to allow aid convoys into the town. Eventually, the Serbs yielded and allowed the passage of an aid convoy into Srebrenica.181

Even after the arrival the aid convoy into Srebrenica, Morillon still did not leave the town. He said that the humanitarian aid brought people life but the arrival of a single relief convoy did not fulfil his goal of obtaining a cease-fire and assurances from the Serbs that regular uninterrupted convoys would be allowed to travel into Srebrenica and that the sick and wounded would be permitted to be evacuated.182 On March 26, Morillon worked out a deal with Mladic for a cease-fire and for the opening of a supply route to Srebrenica. The deal would permit a relief convoy of trucks to travel into the town on March 27, and once unloaded, the trucks would be used to transport women and children to the Muslim held town of Tuzla.183 On the basis of this cease-fire and other measures worked out with the Serbian military, Morillon agreed to leave Srebrenica saying, "I said I would not leave before the conditions for security in Srebrenica were established....I am now satisfied that there is an agreement on a cease-fire and on the opening of a humanitarian aid convoy to the town."184 On March 28, after the cease-fire went into effect and the convoy arrived in Srebrenica, Morillon returned to his headquarters in Sarajevo proclaiming "Srebrenica is safe."185 Morillon’s arrival in Srebrenica, and his decision to remain there until he thought the town was safe, marked
the beginning of a personal three week crusade that could very well have saved it from a Serbian takeover. Indeed, the Muslim citizens of Srebrenica concur, as they believe that Morillon’s decision to stay in Srebrenica saved the town from a destructive fate at the hands of the Serbs.\textsuperscript{185}
CHAPTER 4 - EVALUATING THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA

What determines the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation? The nature of the conflict, the degree of local and international support, the clarity and scope of the mandate, funding, and the operational aspects of a mission determine the feasibility and effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation.\(^\text{187}\) It is these matters which will be examined to assess the effectiveness and feasibility of UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

MANDATE

A mandate simply spells out the duties of a peacekeeping operation. The two most important characteristics of a mandate are its clarity and scope. The scope of a mandate is the purpose of the operation, what it is asked to do, while its clarity refers to how clearly the mission is defined. The mandate can affect the success of an operation in several ways. Firstly, with a clear and precise mandate there is less room for interpretation and thus less disagreement among the involved parties over the operation's purpose. Secondly, a clear mandate helps ensure the continued support of the operation from both the local disputants and the international community. Paul Diehl points out that

\[\text{[In order to swing the weight of domestic and international public opinion behind a peacekeeping operation, the force must have clearly identifiable goals and duties. Without those, the public may not understand why the troops are there or may question the validity of the peacekeeping strategy in the situation at hand.}^{188}\]

But while a clear and precise mandate are important for successful peacekeeping, the nature of the conflict and political support appear to have a greater effect on the
mission's degree of success. William Durch contends that

[an ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make a straightforward mission difficult, or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world cannot make an impossible mission feasible. It merely paints the impossible task in high-contrast colors.]

A peacekeeping operation's mandate tends to be a mirror image of the political situation of the Security Council. Strong, clear, and precise mandates show that the Great Powers have similar interests in the conflict while broad and vague mandates are usually a reflection of their conflicting interests. With conflicting interests, each of the potential veto users is usually willing to let the operation proceed, as long as the mandate permits the desired interpretation by the veto-holders. But with this type of mandate, the chances for success are significantly lowered. When a force is not experiencing success, the United Nation is left with three options: revise the mandate, leave the peacekeepers in the area with an unrevised mandate, or withdraw them. The first two options are used most frequently while the third option remains an unpopular choice for the UN.

The mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia is clearly that of a second generation type peacekeeping mission (Note Table I - Resolutions Establishing UNPROFOR's Mandate). While the monitoring of a no-fly zone and escorting and protecting convoys are new jobs for post-Cold War peacekeepers, the other aspects of UNPROFOR's mandate are also more akin to second generation rather than traditional peacekeeping; the mission is being carried out in the middle of a conflict; it has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate; it is providing protection to declared "safe areas;" and a
regional organization, NATO, has been authorized to assist UNPROFOR in carrying out its mandate. It also has two other aspects that traditional operations cannot claim: it is an extension of the first ever peacekeeping mission on European soil and, for the second time in peacekeeping history (UNPROFOR in Croatia being the first), Russia has contributed troops to the mission. Indeed, the operation is like no other and Bosnia could very well be the testing ground for future operations similar to UNPROFOR.

The overall mandate of UNPROFOR can be summarized quite simply as alleviation of the suffering of Bosnia's civilian population. Every enlargement of the mandate, including using all necessary means to escort convoys or protecting the safe areas, was intended to alleviate the civilian population from the effects of the ongoing war. The mandate of UNPROFOR was established by a series of Security Council Resolutions between June 1992 and June 1993 and its primary tasks include:

- *ensuring the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport*. This included withdrawal of the local forces from in and around the airport and relocation of their heavy weapons under the supervision of UNPROFOR.

- *escorting and protecting humanitarian convoys*. Due to great difficulties in carrying out this part of its mandate the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 770 on August 13, 1992 which called on all states to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations" the delivery of humanitarian assistance, by the relevant humanitarian organizations, to Sarajevo and other needed areas of Bosnia. After
some discussion it was decided that this task would be given to UNPROFOR and in September 1992 the Security Council passed Resolution 776 authorizing the enlargement of UNPROFOR’s mandate to include this task.\textsuperscript{196} The expanded duties for UNPROFOR included supporting the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Bosnia and to provide protection to the humanitarian relief efforts when and where UNHCR considered it necessary. UNPROFOR was also authorized to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) requested such action and if the Force Commander thought the request was practicable.\textsuperscript{197} In this resolution no mention was made of Chapter VII.

- monitoring the ban on military flights over the airspace of Bosnia which was imposed by the Security Council in resolution 781 on October 9, 1992. After frequent violations of this ban the Security Council decided to enforce it. On March 31, 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 816 which authorized member-states, seven days after the adoption of the resolution, to take nationally or through regional arrangements "all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban on flights..."\textsuperscript{198}

- protecting the declared "safe areas" of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac which were established by Security Council resolutions 819 of April 16, 1993 and 824 of May 6, 1993.\textsuperscript{199} Initially, under resolutions 819 and 824, UNPROFOR was only authorized to monitor the humanitarian situation in these declared safe areas.
However, due to repeated attacks on these safe areas, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 836 on June 4, 1993, which authorized UNPROFOR "acting in self defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or the armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys." Resolution 836 also authorized member states "acting nationally or through regional organizations" to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power" to support UNPROFOR in carrying out this part of its mandate. Although UNPROFOR was mandated several tasks, a large portion of its troops are used to escort and protect humanitarian aid convoys.

The majority of peacekeeping operations, whether Cold War or post-Cold War, usually experience problems in the implementation of their mandates and UNPROFOR is no exception. By far the major problem impeding UNPROFOR peacekeepers from carrying out their mandate has been the lack of consistent cooperation from the local parties. This problem will be discussed further in a later section of the paper. While the lack of cooperation has been a big obstacle confronting the mandate of UNPROFOR, the misunderstanding of its mandate by the news media has also led to some unrealistic expectations. The news media has frequently criticized the Bosnian operation as a failure because it has been unable to stop the fighting and create peace. But this would require a massive peace-enforcement mission not the humanitarian intervention operation
UNPROFOR was intended to be...

Somehow the mandate of UNPROFOR has been mistakenly interpreted as one of preventing the local belligerents from fighting each other. Therefore, because the fighting continues or is not stopped, UNPROFOR is labelled as a failure. However, this is simply inaccurate as peacekeepers, whether traditional or second generation, are and never should be assigned the task of stopping a war. UNPROFOR was never mandated this task and if the operation has failed it is not because it has been unable to stop the fighting. In fact, it would be more appropriate to say that the Security Council and other UN member states have failed to implement the resolutions that were adopted on Bosnia. Indeed, the UN has failed in this respect, but UNPROFOR has not, as it has done what it can with the limited resources at its disposal.

The purpose of UNPROFOR has also been misunderstood by both the local residents and the government of Bosnia. In a speech to the Conference of Defence Associations Institutes ninth annual seminar, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, former commander of UNPROFOR, stated that the government of Bosnia did not know how to use a peacekeeping force. The official government in Bosnia, under the leadership of President Izetbegovic, asked for and got a peacekeeping force. However, when it realized what a peacekeeping force did, the Bosnian government no longer wanted it according to MacKenzie and the government then started to blame UNPROFOR for many of the problems in Bosnia. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s February 1993 report on UNPROFOR noted that,
UNPROFOR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been characterized by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in that Republic has largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force has not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil.\textsuperscript{202}

Consequently, UNPROFOR was attacked several times by the Government and groups accountable to it, both in public speeches and through the use of violence.\textsuperscript{203} As a result of the deliberate physical attacks, UNPROFOR suffered several fatalities.\textsuperscript{204}

As was the case with the government, some of the local residents also misunderstood the purpose of the UN force in Bosnia. MacKenzie contends that one of the "stupidest things" regarding the Bosnian operation was the borrowing of its name from the UN operation in Croatia. In explaining the reasoning behind his argument MacKenzie said:

'UNPROFOR,' United Nations Protection Force; up in Croatia to protect the Serbian minorities. The Canadian battalion arrives in Sarajevo....White vehicles, all kinds of good stuff, 'United Nations Protection Force.' The expectations of the population were that it was there to protect them and to stop the fighting. Twelve hundred people, surrounded by about 150,000 to 200,000 people thrashing it out, nailing babies to boards, cutting throats and cooking people in ovens. All kinds of neat little things, and they thought we were going to stop that.\textsuperscript{203}

Indeed something as technical as the naming of the force can cause the local population to misinterpret its purpose. When the first battalions arrived in Sarajevo, many people saw the words "Protection Force" and believed that the peacekeepers were there to stop the fighting and protect them, but when the fighting was not stopped some local citizens became hostile towards the force. Perhaps a more appropriate name for the force could have been the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Force for Civilians (UNHAFC). With such a name, the purpose of the operation might have been clear to the local
population.

Any peacekeeping operation, whether traditional or second generation, has a better chance of succeeding when its mandate is clear and realistic. Unfortunately, UNPROFOR suffers from deficiencies in relation to both criteria. Resolution 836 is a prime example as it is unclear as to how the peacekeepers are to protect the safe areas. The vagueness surrounding the role of UNPROFOR in the safe areas was addressed in a recent report by the Secretary-General:

is its role to defend a geographically defined safe area or is it to deter, through its presence, attacks on the civilian populations living therein? The Security Council clearly intended the latter, but a perceived lack of clarity of intent may have contributed to misunderstandings and false expectations, both by warring parties and by the international community....

While the Security Council has adopted some unclear resolutions, it also has assigned some unrealistic tasks to UNPROFOR. They are unrealistic because the Security Council and other UN members have not provided the necessary equipment in terms of manpower and logistics to carry out the tasks contained in the many resolutions. Several of the resolutions concerning Bosnia delegate tasks "nationally or through regional arrangements" but they do not specify how many troops will be needed, who is going to provide them, who is going to pay for them, and when they will be deployed. The tendency of Security Council members appears to be one of concluding that just because they adopt a resolution saying something should be done that it will somehow be done. There exists an immense difference between what the Security Council says should be done in Bosnia and the means employed to carry out the mandated tasks. In a December 1993 interview, former UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant-General Francis
Briquemont commented on this difference by pointing out that there "is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions and the means available to commanders in the field."\textsuperscript{207}

The former UNPROFOR commander referred to resolution 836 as an example of this gap. The Lieutenant-General said that at least 7500 troops would be needed to carry out the task of resolution 836 but only 2000 troops were ever deployed to the safe areas, and as a result, UNPROFOR's ability to fulfil this task was, and still is, limited by its number of troops. The troops were probably not sent because many UN member-states might have believed that even if 7500 troops were deployed, the Serbs would have still pushed towards their military objectives. But it could have also stemmed from the fact that some states did not want to commit any more resources, regardless of whether the additional troops would have provided any more good. Indeed, the Security Council, more than likely, passed resolution 836 with the hope that its adoption alone would prove to be enough to deter the Serbian military. In other words, the Security Council might have tried to bluff the Serbs by talking tough. If that was the case, it failed as the Serbs called the bluff.

The Bosnian war has shown that adopting or passing resolutions is not sufficient to deter unwanted action. In most cases, the local parties involved in the conflict will call the bluff or at least test it to a certain limit. In instances where it is tested, the ill-prepared and insufficiently equipped force will no doubt run into serious difficulties. A clear lesson of the Bosnian experience is that the members of the UN Security Council
should give the peacekeepers the needed resources and manpower to implement Security Council resolutions. If the resources are not available then certain types of resolutions should not be adopted.

Another major problem confronting the effective implementation of UNPROFOR’s mandate is one that confronts all peacekeeping operations that deal with internal conflicts. The problem is

the difficulty of making peacekeeping work vis-a-vis armed groups outside the control of recognized political authorities with whom the United Nations can conclude the necessary political and practical agreements.201

UNPROFOR is not the only operation that has run into this problem as ONUC in the Congo, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and UNOSOM in Somalia have all been confronted with this dilemma. Armed groups or breakaway factions that are not under any effective political control within Bosnia have created problems for both the peacekeepers and the politicians. Two examples can clarify this difficulty. The first stems from the previously discussed June 1992 airport agreement that opened the way for the deployment of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. After an agreement was reached between the parties on the re-opening of the airport, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, UNPROFOR commander at the time, received a call from a Serbian soldier who insisted that he and his soldiers commanded the airport and that any attempts by MacKenzie and his troops to take it over would result in their death. The conversation went as follows:

Soldier: General MacKenzie, I command 2,000 soldiers in Ilidza. Many of my people died capturing the airport. If you go near the airport, we will kill you. No one will take the
airport from us. We will kill all your people.

MacKenzie: I'm not here to take the airport away from you. Your leaders, Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, have signed a contract with the UN to hand over the airport to us so we can bring in humanitarian aid. This is not my idea, it's yours.

Soldier: Karadzic and Mladic are fools...I command the airport area and you must stay away.

As a result of continued fighting, there was an approximate three week delay between the signing of the airport agreement and its re-opening for humanitarian purposes. Whether this fighting was directly attributable to the irate Serbian soldier and his troops is not exactly known but there can be no doubt that they were somehow involved in the fighting.

Another example illustrating this problem is the breakaway Muslim faction operating in Bosnia. On June 29, 1994, a Japanese weekly reported that there were at least 1,000 mujahedin (Muslim fighters) in Bosnia who were not under any effective government control. One of the mujahedin was quoted as saying that "we fight for Islam and are not interested in peace." Fikret Abdic, a breakaway Muslim leader in Bihac, leads another armed group that has created problems for the peacekeepers. Besides the mujahedin and Fikret Abdic there are probably a number of other small armed groups in Bosnia that have created serious difficulties for the peacekeepers. Unfortunately, about the only way that UNPROFOR can deal with this dilemma is by trying to effectively work around these groups.

UNPROFOR has confronted a multitude of problems in carrying out its mandate which is not an uncommon experience for a peacekeeping mission. Indeed, all operations
have experienced some problems with their mandate but UNPROFOR clearly has had more than its fair share. Lack of cooperation, armed groups outside of effective political control, and misinterpretation of its mandate have been the major barriers that UNPROFOR has and still is confronted with in trying to carry out its mandated tasks. But while these problems have made the peacekeeper's already difficult mandate even more difficult, none of them have effectively threatened the disbandment of UNPROFOR.

POLITICAL SUPPORT

The failure of the international community to commit support for decisive peace-enforcement in Bosnia has received considerable scholarly attention. The provision of actual support to UNPROFOR's more limited but still taxing tasks has attracted less attention. The topic deserves examination because the political context of a peacekeeping operation has a strong effect on its degree of success. Peacekeeping operations require the support of the international community and the local parties involved in the conflict. In the Bosnian case, the two aspects of political support, international and local, are at opposing ends of the spectrum with the former being somewhat supportive and the latter not so supportive. Perhaps the biggest factor working in favour of UNPROFOR has been the support of the international community, especially the Great Powers, towards the resolutions establishing UNPROFOR's mandate. The support of the permanent members of the Security Council for humanitarian assistance is reflected in the fact that
all members, except China, voted in favour of each of the major resolutions on Bosnia. China abstained in votes on resolutions 770, 776, 781, 816 (Note Table 2 - Security Council Vote on Bosnian Resolutions). It should be noted that while the permanent Security Council members voted in favour of all the major resolutions, not all of them have been willing to provide UNPROFOR with the needed tangible resources to carry out its duties. This will be discussed further below.

International Support

If any of the permanent members of the Security Council oppose an operation, then it will never get past the planning stages because they can block its implementation by using their veto power. The United States and Russia are the permanent members who are the key players in the development and deployment of UN peacekeeping operations. American support is especially critical to anyone proposing the organization of a UN peacekeeping operation. The Nicaraguan request for UN observers to monitor the Contra rebels and the French request for UN peacekeepers to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut in 1982 never got past the planning stages because these proposed operations lacked the support of the United States. Even after an operation is deployed, the continued support of the Great Powers, especially the U.S., is needed if the mission is to succeed. With the end of the Cold War, Great Power support for peacekeeping has been altered in two ways: firstly, it has been easier to achieve as the U.S. and Russia, at least temporarily, began
to cooperate and pursue similar foreign policy objectives; and, secondly, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the importance of U.S. support for successful peacekeeping has increased.

United States

When UNPROFOR was first deployed the Bush Administration supported its creation and deployment but avoided any major U.S. involvement because, as mentioned before, it did not want to get involved in another Lebanon. However, as the humanitarian situation deteriorated and pressure grew from the Islamic world to help the Muslims, the U.S. started to move towards a more active Bosnian approach. When the Clinton administration took office in early 1993, its Bosnian policy was basically the same as its predecessor's but with a little more active involvement in the crisis. Under Clinton, U.S. activities in the support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia have included: flying humanitarian sorties into the Sarajevo airport, an activity which was begun by the Bush Administration; initiating a humanitarian air drop in February 1993; helping to enforce the no-fly zone since March 31, 1993; and, in conjunction with NATO, providing protection to UNPROFOR peacekeepers in support of its mandate. In addition, the U.S. has supported and continues to support the longest humanitarian airlift in history, flying approximately one third of the missions. In November 1993, the Americans offered to double their number of flights into Sarajevo airport (as of April 1994 the U.S. has flown the largest number of humanitarian sorties into the airport). The U.S. is also the largest single donor of humanitarian aid contributing more than 370 million since 1991, and it

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has participated in over 80% of the airdrops that have brought in 10 million meals since February 1993.218

All of these contributions have helped UNPROFOR with its mandate, but the one area where the U.S. has the potential to make its biggest contribution is where it has failed to act. Since the deployment of UNPROFOR in June 1992 the U.S. has, and continues, to refuse to commit any ground troops to the UN operation in Bosnia. In discussing American ground troop involvement in Bosnia, Secretary of State, Warren Christopher stated:

If we are satisfied with the conditions for our participation, we would be prepared to participate in a NATO implementation of a Bosnian settlement. Those conditions would include good-faith agreement to a settlement by all the parities and evidence of good faith implementation.219

Thus far American participation in the Bosnian case has been helpful principally with respect to logistical and humanitarian support. Despite the lack of American troops in UNPROFOR, the U.S. has supported the operation in other important areas.

Russia220

When UNPROFOR was initially deployed in June 1992, Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, on a visit to Washington, expressed Russia’s support for the peacekeeping operation.221 Unlike the United States, Russia has taken its support for UNPROFOR one step farther. Besides pledging its moral support, the Russian Federation has offered some of its troops to UNPROFOR. On February 17, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered to send Russian troops stationed in Croatia to Sarajevo to assist in the supervision and withdrawal of Serbian heavy weapons from the
exclusion zones. The United Nations quickly accepted this offer and 400 troops were deployed in Sarajevo on February 21, 1994.\textsuperscript{222} The Serbs were under a deadline in early February 1994 to remove their heavy weapons from the exclusion zones or face the possibility of NATO air strikes.\textsuperscript{223} Russia’s policy towards the Bosnia crisis from the very beginning had a pro-Serb component opposing any Western military action.\textsuperscript{224} It is quite possible, and highly likely, that by deploying its troops, Russia’s true aim was not to help the UNPROFOR cause but rather the Serbian cause. But whatever its ultimate reasons were for offering its troops, they were no doubt a welcome addition to an inadequately manned force.

When the Yugoslav crisis began, Russia’s foreign policy was initially torn between two contending sides. On the one hand, there was the powerful pro-Serbian communist and nationalist opposition at home, and, on the other hand, there was a group favouring good relations with the Western powers who were, more often than not, antagonistic towards the Serbs.\textsuperscript{223} The West, more particularly the United States, realized that any unilateral actions in Yugoslavia, such as military intervention, could strengthen the pro-Serbian nationalist opposition and thereby threaten the democratic liberal reforms of Yeltsin’s government. By mid April 1993 the American leadership had come to accept the twin proposition not only that Yeltsin required significant political and economic help from abroad but that the United States should be cautious in pressing the Yeltsin administration into actions or policies such as military intervention in Yugoslavia that risked giving fuel to his opponents in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies.\textsuperscript{226}

This new policy was evident during the Security Council’s meeting dealing with the
imposition of harsher sanctions against Serbia in mid-April 1993. The meeting was to take place just before a critical referendum on Yeltsin's government but due to Russian objections the meeting was postponed until after the referendum. After Yeltsin scored a decisive victory in the referendum, the Russian Federation declared its support for tighter economic sanctions.\textsuperscript{227}

Since the middle of 1992, Russia's initially inconsistent policy towards the Yugoslav crisis has become more consistent and its policy towards the war in Bosnia can be summed up as follows:

\begin{quote}
[the Russians] oppose military intervention, they reject what they consider the West's unjust and excessive blaming of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs for the continuation of the Bosnia war, they oppose the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia, and they advocate halting sanctions against Serbia as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{228}
\end{quote}

Despite the fact that Russia has taken a pro-Serb slant towards the crisis in Bosnia, its policies have been working in support of rather than at cross purposes with UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{229} Whatever future efforts are going to be deployed in Bosnia, whether they take the form of continued peacekeeping, or involve peace-enforcement or military intervention, there is no doubt that Russian policy will be crucial to the success of any future plans for Bosnia.

\textit{European Community (EC)/European Union (EU)}

At an Economic Summit in July 1992 the EC stated that "[w]e welcome the efforts made in achieving the opening of the airport of Sarajevo; and we support actions taken by UNPROFOR [U.N. Protective Force] to secure the airport."\textsuperscript{230} Not only did the EC/EU support the initial actions of UNPROFOR in opening the airport but it has
also been supportive of other duties assigned to the operation. For example, regarding the idea of using force to deliver aid, President Mitterand of France said that "Italy, backed by France, believes in the use of force, at least sufficient to guarantee the security of deliveries of humanitarian aid" while British Prime Minister John Major stated that Britain supported the move being aware of the "very grave difficulties there are in proceeding without a cease-fire." ²³¹

While the EC/EU has been working in support of the United Nations so to have some of its individual members. Britain and France have been two members of the EC/EU that have pledged the strongest support for UNPROFOR as both countries have sizeable contingents in the operation.²³² They have also been willing to back up some of the Security Council resolutions with action. When resolution 770 was passed asking member states to take "nationally or through regional agencies all necessary measures" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, Britain and France, along with Canada and Spain, agreed to provide troops to the expanded UN operation.²³³ Besides taking part in the delivery of aid by land, France and Britain are also heavily involved in the Sarajevo airlift as they rank second and third, respectively, behind the United States in the number of relief flights into the Sarajevo airport.²³⁴

Besides Britain and France, another important European actor in the Bosnian crisis has been Germany. Even though the German military is now permitted to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, as a result of a Supreme Court ruling in July 1994,²³⁵ Germany has still not deployed any ground troops to Yugoslavia, and, due to
historical reasons, it is highly unlikely this will happen. However, despite the fact that it has no ground troops in Bosnia, Germany has still been working in support of UNPROFOR as its soldiers have been taking part in NATO surveillance missions enforcing the ban on military flights. In April 1993, a German court ruled five to three in favour of allowing German soldiers to remain on NATO surveillance planes enforcing the ban on military flights. In July 1994, the German parliament gave its approval, retrospectively, to allow members of the German air force to fly on NATO aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Germany was also one of the first countries to request that a United Nations peacekeeping operation be deployed in Bosnia.

When the crisis began in Bosnia the EC and the United Nations applied the "division of labour" approach used in Croatia, "the UN took responsibility for negotiating and monitoring cease-fires, while the EC led the effort to find a political solution to the crisis." The "division of labour approach" sounded good in theory but it was difficult to sustain and the dual approach was short lived. The dual approach came to a head in July 1995: when Lord Carrington, chief negotiator for the EC, mediated a cease-fire that required Bosnian Serb forces to put their heavy weapons under the supervision of UN forces. This plan did not go over well with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as he criticized the EC for committing UN forces without first consulting with the United Nations. As a result of this incident, the EC and the UN merged their efforts and the UN became involved in the political negotiations.
UN has since taken the lead in all aspects of the Bosnian crisis with the EC playing a supporting role. This is not to say a fully effective partnership was formed. Continued tension between EC policy and UN Security Council policy, shaped by American influence, has hampered the overall international effort to restore peace to Bosnia.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

Despite tensions between its leading members' policies towards Bosnia, NATO has responded positively to every call for support made by the United Nations both in Bosnia and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. For example, besides supporting UN efforts in Bosnia, NATO forces, acting under resolutions 713, 757, 787 and 820, are also in the Adriatic helping to enforce the UN imposed embargo against Serbia. The NATO contributions to the international efforts in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia are also unique as it is the first time in history that the regional alliance has directly supported the United Nations. NATO has made several invaluable contributions to UNPROFOR:

- the alliance has contributed personnel and equipment. In fact, NATO countries have made the largest single contribution to all three UNPROFOR operations in Yugoslavia, constituting approximately three quarters of the personnel. Even though UNPROFOR consists of mainly NATO troops the operation is still under the command of the UN.

- NATO Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) have been monitoring the ban on military flights since October 1992, and since April 1993, over 100 NATO airplanes have been enforcing the no-fly zone. On February 28, 1994, NATO warplanes shot down four Serbian military aircraft who were in violation of the no-fly zone.

- NATO, acting under resolution 836, has also been providing protective air power to UNPROFOR in case of attack. On April 10 and 11, 1994, NATO warplanes attacked areas in Gorazde in response to UNPROFOR requests to provide air protection for its
force.

-NATO has also been responsible for carrying out air strikes, on request and in coordination with the UN, against designated targets that threaten the declared safe-areas of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, and Zepa. NATO's tripartite duties of enforcing the no-fly zone and providing air protection to UNPROFOR and the safe areas has been codenamed "Operation Deny Flight" (Note Table 3 - Chronology of NATO Involvement in Bosnia).

The NATO-UN association has proven to be successful but the working relationship has not been without some problems. Whenever two organizations with their own political and military decision making bureaus decide to work together, it is only natural that command and control problems will emerge. Such is the case with this relationship. Although there are command and control problems in the Bosnian operation there is no doubt that the UN is the ultimate legal and political decision making authority. The UN has delegated authority to NATO to carry out the enforcement of the no-fly zone but they have not delegated the same authority with respect to ground strikes. In order to carry out ground strikes NATO commanders must first seek UN approval. There have been some minor difficulties with the NATO-UN relationship, but the negative aspects have been far outweighed by the positive contributions that NATO has made in its association with the UN and UNPROFOR.

Local Support

Besides international backing, the support of the immediate parties to a war is also a very critical ingredient for successful peacekeeping. With post-Cold War peacekeeping,
operations increasingly focused on internal conflicts involving a number of local parties, they are confronted with the question as to how many of the local parties need to give their support to the operation? For example, if there are four factions involved in a conflict, what degree of local support is needed? Is the support of two or three parties sufficient or should support be achieved from all of the parties? Does the operation have a chance of succeeding if only two or three of the parties support the operation? The answers to these questions would probably depend on the mandate of the peacekeeping operation and the distribution of military contributions.

Besides the above mentioned dilemma, there is also the problem of initial support. In some operations, particularly those involving internal conflicts, the parties at the outset may support the operation, but for some reason or another, one, two, or all of the parties, after a period of time, may oppose the presence of the UN mission. If some or all of the local parties change their policy should the operation pull out or continue with its mandate? Again, the answers would most likely depend on the mandate. Another important factor regarding local support is impartiality. When a UN operation appears to favour one side over another then local support will, more than likely, falter and the mission will experience difficulties. However, faltering support from the local parties does not necessarily spell the end of an operation but it usually does make a peacekeeper’s job more difficult.

The support and cooperation of the local parties with UNPROFOR can be best summed up as inconsistent, shaky and limited. With respect to the delivery of aid, the
local parties have at times allowed the passage of aid convoys while at other times they have been repeatedly denied access to the needed areas. While the media coverage seems to imply that the Serbs are the only ones obstructing the humanitarian convoys, the Croats and Muslims are also guilty of frequently blocking and impeding the aid convoys. The local parties have frequently signed agreements allowing for the unhindered passage of humanitarian assistance, but these agreements are not worth the paper they are written on since individual warlords or soldiers have continued to impede the delivery of aid convoys for military and political reasons. The Serbs have frequently prevented convoys from reaching Muslim and Croatian enclaves while the Muslims and Croatians have done the same to Serbian towns and villages. The Muslims have also been guilty of blocking aid to Croatian communities and vice versa. The aim of using starvation tactics by each of the local parties is to weaken the other's sides population, in the hopes of increasing their chances of winning the war.

The UN forces in Bosnia have been authorized to use "all necessary means" to achieve their mandate but they have never once fought a battle with any of the local factions to get aid through. UNPROFOR has been reluctant to force aid through because it fears that its impartiality would be lost and it would be seen as favouring one side over the others. However, as Mihailo Crnobrnja points out, even without using force, UNPROFOR personnel have, more often than not, been treated as the enemy:

they have been accused of taking sides; their vehicles have been stolen; they have been shot at, wounded, and even killed. On a few occasions the warring sides have masqueraded as UN peace-keepers, driving around in white vehicles with UN flags and opening fire on their opponents in order to draw fire against the UN troops.
UNPROFOR has also been accused of taking part in ethnic cleansing when it evacuated residents, mainly children, the elderly and the sick and wounded, from Bosnian towns and communities that were under siege. In response to these accusations, UNPROFOR then prevented large scale movements of people from various cities and towns with the aim of keeping the territories’ ethnic composition intact but the peacekeepers were then accused of taking part in the Serbian strangulation of these regions.

From its initial deployment in June 1992 up until December 1994 the cooperation from local parties with UNPROFOR has been very limited and shaky. Indeed, the single biggest problem confronting UNPROFOR has been the lack of consistent cooperation from the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The failure of the warring parties to negotiate a settlement with one another and to facilitate a peace implementation and monitoring role for UNPROFOR has circumscribed severely the mission’s operations. Achievement of territorial gains and war aims has interested the Serb, Croat, and Muslim leaders more than cooperation with UNPROFOR.

Paying for UNPROFOR

Funding can affect the success of a peacekeeping operation in several ways. First, as a result of a lack of funds, a peacekeeping operation may have to be cut short before the mandate has been achieved or before the situation has been stabilized. Second, the number of peacekeepers authorized to carry out the mandate may have to be
limited because of the lack of funds. Finally, a peacekeeping force may have to do without important equipment that is needed to effectively carry out its duties. Funding appears to be a minor determinant of successful peacekeeping because every UN peacekeeping mission has been inadequately funded yet some have still achieved their mandate. Although inadequate funding is a thorn in the side of a peacekeeping operation, to date no mission has been discontinued due to an insufficiency of funds.

Peacekeeping always has been plagued by financial problems, and with the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War, the costs have dramatically increased. In 1989, 638 million dollars was spent on peacekeeping; in 1990 417 million; in 1991 559 million; and in 1992 nearly two billion was spent. As of April 30, 1994, the annual cost of the UN's current operations had risen to about 3.8 billion dollars. Peacekeeping operations are financed by two methods. Smaller missions, such as observer and survey missions, good offices, and peacemaking activities are paid out of the regular budget of the United Nations. The rest of the missions, except the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which is paid for by voluntary contributions from a select number of member-states, are paid for by a Special Account which is based on the assessment scale of the regular UN budget. Peacekeeping operations financed by Special Accounts have been the customary practice of the UN ever since the deployment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973.

The Special Account for financing peacekeeping operations divides member states...
into four categories.\textsuperscript{255} The first group of member-states are the permanent members of the Security Council and their peacekeeping assessment is about 22\% more than their regular budget assessment.\textsuperscript{256} The second group of member-states consists of developed industrial states such as Canada, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and Iceland and their peacekeeping assessment is the same as their regular budget assessment. The third category consists of wealthier developing states such as Argentina, Israel, and Saudi Arabia which pay one fifth of their regular budget assessment while the fourth group, which consists of poorer developing countries such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nepal, and Yemen, pay one tenth of their regular budget assessment for peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{257}

Despite the fact that all UN members are assessed fees for peacekeeping many are reluctant to pay their share or lag behind in their payments. The result has been an outstanding balance for peacekeeping operations that stood at 2.4 billion as of August 31, 1994.\textsuperscript{258} A frequent complaint of many UN member-states is that peacekeeping is too expensive. However, when peacekeeping expenditures are compared to military expenditures it becomes evident that the former is a bargain. For example, the UN peacekeeping budget for 1989 (638 million) was "less than the annual operating cost of a single US Army division that is \textit{not} engaged in battle."\textsuperscript{259} Many other examples could be listed, but the point is that states are prepared to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on military equipment and supplies but they are not prepared to spend a very small fraction of that for peacekeeping operations. Indeed, peacekeeping does cost
money, but as William Durch points out, it "remains cheap when compared to the cost of modern militaries."260

The financial arrangements of UNPROFOR are both unique and innovative as no other peacekeeping operation has had a similar funding scheme.261 The only other operation that somewhat resembles UNPROFOR's financial arrangements is UNFICYP in Cyprus. UNPROFOR is paid for by two methods: its monitoring tasks are paid for by all UN members through the peacekeeping assessment scale while the states providing troops for humanitarian activities, which include convoy escort and protection duties, have borne this expense themselves.262

One would think that the UN would be happy that a large portion of UNPROFOR's bill was being paid for by voluntary contributions. Initially, it was happy to be receiving voluntary contributions until the funding scheme led to some unforeseen problems. Some countries objected that this type of financial arrangement would lead to a situation where peacekeeping operations would be only established in regions that could afford them and be staffed only by countries which could afford the costs of participation.263 Besides these objections the Secretary-General has pointed out that the financial arrangements have also worked against the integration of the respective units into an effective UN force. In his November 1992 report, the Secretary-General indicated that

\[the\text{ addition to UNPROFOR of contingents financed and supported entirely by their national governments has given rise to some teething troubles, especially as regards command and control. I have had to seek the help of the contributing governments in ensuring that all concerned recognize that the new units are an integral part of UNPROFOR, under the overall} \]
command of the Force Commander, and that newly arrived troops wearing United Nations insignia pass under United Nations command as soon as they reach the mission area. Other problems that have stemmed from this arrangement have been the reluctance of contributing states to adequately pay their forces under the command of the UN and to make sure that their troops fully comply with the legal, operational, and administrative policies of UNPROFOR. The arrangements have also set an undesirable precedent by letting wealthier states such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany off the financial hook. As a result of these problems, the Secretary-General has recommended that all activities of UNPROFOR be financed through the regular manner of the peacekeeping assessment scale which is levied on all member-states.

While the funding scheme itself has lead to some problems so has the lack of finances which has had its biggest effect on troop deployment. Several times the UN has appealed for more troops to protect the safe areas, monitor cease-fires, and perform other duties but more often than not these requests have fallen on deaf ears. Besides an insufficient number of troops, UNPROFOR has had to deal with other financially related problems such as a lack of adequate equipment and supplies. But despite these financial problems, UNPROFOR, just like every other peacekeeping operation, has had to learn to do its best with the limited resources at its disposal.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Operational aspects of a peacekeeping operation include the command, control, logistics, and coordination of a peacekeeping mission. The size and composition of the
force are also important in this regard. While peacekeeping operations are usually established by the Security Council and come under its authority, it is the Secretary-General who is responsible for their organization, planning, implementation, and control. To help with these functions the Secretary-General is assisted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which was formerly known as the Office of Special Political Affairs.

Command-Control and Field Operations

All peacekeeping operations are under the control of the United Nations in New York with the Secretary-General being at the top of the chain of command. The command of field operations is under the control of a Force Commander who is appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Security Council. The Force Commander has full control over the operation, except for disciplinary matters, and is responsible to the Secretary General. The Field Operations Division (FOD) is another important branch of a peacekeeping operation. Besides looking after the civilian component of the operation, the FOD commander, along with the civilian Chief Administrative Officer, is responsible for providing and maintaining a wide range of logistical support for both the mission and its staff.

Operational problems can affect the success of a peacekeeping operation in several ways. Even though all peacekeeping operations are under the command of the United Nations in New York, it is well known that its control is at times very weak. Another line of command problem deals with the national contingents. While the peacekeepers
are under the control of a commander, who is in turn under the control of the UN in New York, many of the national contingents still report back to their home governments especially in dangerous situations. At such moments, "governments are not averse to second-guessing UN field commanders if contingents phone home to clear orders, a process that can complicate operations and even increase the level of danger posed to troops in the field."273

Other possible operational matters that might affect the success of a peacekeeping operation are the Field Commander, the integration of the numerous national detachments into one, and obtaining the proper equipment and training. The Secretary-General usually asks a member country to provide a Field Commander and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General accepts whomever the member-country appoints. With this type of procedure the best Field Commander is not necessarily chosen for the assignment. Integration of the various national detachments into a competent mission under the sole command of the UN may also present a problem to a peacekeeping operation as its efficiency can be hampered by such impediments as linguistic and cultural differences. Delays in both training new personnel about what is expected of them and obtaining the proper equipment can stall the start date of an operation and hamper its effectiveness.274

The majority of peacekeeping missions are confronted with some operational problems but they cannot be viewed as a major determinant of a mission’s overall success. Like the funding crisis, operational problems can be regarded as a thorn in the side of a peacekeeping mission; their effect on the mission’s efficiency can be great while their
effect on the mission’s overall success is usually limited.275

The mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia grew out of the mandate of the original UN operation in Croatia. As mentioned previously, although the mandate of UNPROFOR originally was related only to Croatia it was envisioned that 100 military observers would be sent to areas of Bosnia after the demilitarization of the UNPA’s.276 However, as a result of deteriorating condition in Bosnia, the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia was extended to include an additional 1,100 troops to secure the functioning of the Sarajevo airport and supervise the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the area.277 While these troops were authorized for deployment on June 8, 1992 (Resolution 758), their deployment, as a result of intensive fighting, was delayed until June 29, 1992. When the first troops were deployed to Bosnia, they remained a part of UNPROFOR in Croatia until a new Bosnia-Herzegovina command (BHC) was established in Kiseljak (20 kilometres north-west of Sarajevo) to carry out the task of escorting and protecting humanitarian aid convoys.278

Following the adoption of resolution 871 on October 4, 1993, the military structure of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia was reorganized under three subordinate commands: UNPROFOR Croatia, headquartered in Zagreb and led by Major-General A. Tayyeb of Jordan; UNPROFOR Bosnia, headquartered in Kiseljak and led by Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose of the United Kingdom; and UNPROFOR former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, headquartered in Skopje and led by Brigadier-General Tryggve Tellefsen of Norway. The three commanders report to the Force
Commander, Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Lapresle of France who, with the civilian, administrative, and logistical components of the operation, acts under the direction of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi of Japan.279

Size and Composition of Force

The size of UNPROFOR grew as its mandate expanded. Its initial size was 1,100 troops. As of November 4, 1994, UNPROFOR consisted of 21,865 military and civilian personnel from twenty countries.280 Over half the force is drawn from Bangladesh, France, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the U.K. (Note Table 4 - UNPROFOR Personnel Strength).

Command, Communications, and Logistics

The separate Bosnian command established by resolution 871 is responsible for all peacekeeping activities within the former Yugoslavian republic, but as mentioned previously, the overall command and control of UNPROFOR in Bosnia is still exercised by the Force Commander.281 Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, who assumed his duties in February 1994, is the fourth commander of the Bosnian operation. Other Bosnian commanders have included, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie of Canada (March 1992 to July 1992), Lieutenant-General Phillipe Morillon of France (August 1992 to June 1993) and Lieutenant-General Francis Briqueumont of Belgium (June 1993 to January 1994). Commander changes have been so frequent that the image of a revolving door command comes to mind. The problems arising from this situation have been mitigated due to the positive abilities and character of the individual Commanders.
A serious problem confronting UNPROFOR's command structure is whether its chain of command is able to effectively protect the peacekeepers. By the time a request from the peacekeepers travels through the chain of command it could be too late to proceed with an effective response to the request. The inefficiency of this chain of command was highlighted last March when French peacekeepers came under fire from Serbian forces near Bihac in northwestern Bosnia. When the French troops determined that they were being shot at by Serbian tanks they began to return fire and requested protective air strikes. However, by the time the request had moved through the chain of command, the Serbs had slipped away and it was too late to take any action. The chronology of the French request can be summarized as follows. At around 7:00 p.m. on Saturday March 12, 1994, French troops came under fire and requested air protection. Lieutenant-General Michael Rose relayed the request to the UNPROFOR Force Commander but the request did not reach General Jean Cot's command, UNPROFOR Force Commander at the time, until 8:30 p.m. Officials claim that it took a while to track him down to relay the request to him. At 10:35 p.m., General Cot decided that air strikes were needed and he transferred the request to Yasushi Akashi who has the final authorization on the use of air power. Mr. Akashi called a meeting to determine whether air strikes were needed and in the meantime, as the request moved up the chain of command, the French troops were still being fired upon. Finally, at 11:39 p.m., Mr. Akashi authorized the air strikes but it was too late as the French soldiers were unable to locate the Serbian gunners. At 1:45 a.m., the
mission was cancelled as the Serbian forces managed to escape.284

Fortunately, this incident did not result in any casualties for the French troops, but it highlighted the inefficiency of UNPROFOR's command structure. Several military officials concluded that the Serbian gunners could have been destroyed if air strikes had been authorized quicker but "by the time the pilots received authorization, the targets had moved off."285 General Jean-Pierre Cot, former Force Commander of UN peacekeepers in ex-Yugoslavia, has said that three hours is an unacceptable period of time to have a request for air support authorized. In serious incidents such as the one above, he said a response time of three minutes would be perfect while a half an hour would be nice.286

The time it takes to act on a request can be reduced by creating a smaller chain of command for UNPROFOR and this can be accomplished in either one of two ways. The first and most effective scenario would be implementing General Cot's proposal of delegating full responsibility for air strikes to the UN military commanders rather than to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. General Cot has demanded the right of UN commanders to be able to call in air strikes when their troops are in danger. In early 1994, he wrote an article in the Le Monde and sent messages to Boutros Boutros-Ghali demanding that UN commanders be given this authority.287 As a result of his actions, Boutros Boutros-Ghali demanded Cot's resignation and he was later replaced by another French commander, Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Laprèse, in March 1994.288
General Cot’s proposal does not make it clear whether authority should be delegated to the Force Commander of UNPROFOR or to the UN commander in Bosnia. The latter would seem to be the most effective option as the UNPROFOR Commander and his peacekeepers are the ones on the ground in Bosnia and they know the situation better than the Force Commander in Zagreb, Croatia, or the politicians in New York. They know first hand what the situation is and how to adequately respond to any crisis that may arise. But full delegation of a UN peacekeeping operation to military officials has yet to happen and it does not seem likely in the near future. Therefore, the next best option would be to eliminate the middle man in the command chain. In this case that would be the Force Commander of UNPROFOR. By having an overall Force Commander, this only adds another unnecessary step in the bureaucratic ladder of UNPROFOR as there is no need for the Bosnian Commander to first consult the Force Commander. While not perfect, either of these options would somewhat reduce the bureaucracy of UNPROFOR and possibly lead to a more efficient and effective chain of command.

Besides the structure of UNPROFOR’s command and control the operation has also been confronted with some communication problems that are common to all UN peacekeeping operations. Problems of multiple languages, procedures, and equipment, which all have been intensified by a lack of common training, have been present in UNPROFOR. And while these problems have not been a major hindrance to UNPROFOR, they have presented frequent minor difficulties for the operation’s military
and civilian personnel. These problems have had a greater effect on the efficiency of UNPROFOR rather than its overall success. UNPROFOR, as have the vast majority of other UN operations, also suffers from a lack of communication between the ground troops in Bosnia and the politicians at the UN headquarters in New York. One of the biggest critics of the lack of communication between the military and political arms of UNPROFOR has been Major-General Lewis MacKenzie. In discussing his tour of duty as the Bosnian commander MacKenzie said,

Do not get in trouble as a commander in the field after five o’clock New York time or on Saturday or Sunday; there is no one to answer the phone. It is a nine-to-five civilian operation run out of the office.

MacKenzie also complained that the civilian logistic support personnel he was promised never arrived in Bosnia because they all volunteered to go to Cambodia where the per diem payments were higher. These communication and command problems, which by no means are unique to UNPROFOR, stress the need for the establishment of both a training center for peacekeepers and for a 24 hour command headquarters in New York. Neither would effectively guarantee success but they would definitely alleviate the problems somewhat and improve the efficiency of UNPROFOR and other UN peacekeeping operations.

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The type of conflict in which a peacekeeping operation is placed can have an effect on its feasibility and success. Some conflicts seem to be more suited to
peacekeeping than others and the consensus seems to point towards peacekeeping experiencing greater success in inter-state disputes rather than intra-state disputes. There are several reasons for the differing success rates. 296

Firstly, in inter-state conflicts there are usually, on average, only two parties involved whereas intra-state disputes typically involve more than two identifiable actors. The higher the number of players the more difficult it is to adequately satisfy them all. Paul Diehl, in his study of UNIFIL in Lebanon, points out that in this civil conflict there are more than a half dozen political factions, each with their own military force. Besides these factions, there are other actors in the Lebanon drama such as the PLO, Syria, Israel, and various terrorist groups. 297 Achieving a political settlement that satisfies all of these parties has proven to be a difficult task for the United Nations. UNTAC in Cambodia is another example that shows the difficulties peacekeepers face in civil conflicts. Satisfying all four parties in that conflict, especially the Khmer Rouge faction, proved to be a difficult task for UN peacekeepers. 298

Secondly, in internal disputes, the conflicting parties usually operate in separate regions of the affected countries requiring the peacekeepers to cover more territory which opens up the possibility of more skirmishes. Also, with civil conflicts it is more difficult to draw a cease-fire line or a buffer zone to keep the warring factions apart; "unlike an identifiable international border or cease-fire line, it may be impossible to demarcate a line or area that separates the many sides in the conflict." 299

Thirdly, a peacekeeping operation always seems to favour the status quo at the
time of deployment. A cease-fire usually favours the current government and some of the
warring factions may object to a cease-fire because it will continue the oppression they
are fighting to overthrow.\textsuperscript{300}

While peacekeeping appears to have more success in inter-state disputes than in
intra-state disputes this does not imply that intra-state peacekeeping must necessarily fail.
There have been several successful internal operations such as UNTAG, UNAMIC,
UNTAC, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).\textsuperscript{301} Rather, the argument is that
peacekeeping missions in inter-state conflicts are presented with better conditions for
success.

It has been almost three years since the war began in Bosnia and the debate
remains as to the type of conflict? Is it an internal or international conflict? Even the
parties within Bosnia disagree over how to classify the conflict. Bosnian President
Izetbegovic says that the conflict is not a civil war but rather an act of aggression of one
state against another. However, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic,
contends that it is a civil war since the Serbs are pursuing their own rights within
Bosnia.\textsuperscript{302} Both have legitimate claims but neither Izetbegovic nor Karadzic are totally
correct because the conflict has elements of both an internal and international war. It is
an internal conflict because the citizens within Bosnia are fighting each other and it is an
international conflict because other states, Serbia and Croatia, have been involved in the
fighting.
Despite the fact that Bosnia has been an independent state since May 22, 1992 and all of the fighting has taken place within its own borders, the war can still not be considered as entirely internal. Both Croatia and Serbia invaded Bosnia to carve out their own piece of territory and while both states have since officially withdrawn their forces there is no doubt that both are still involved in the conflict. The Bosnian war, a complicated mix of internal and international conflicts, is by far one of the most difficult situations that UN peacekeepers have been placed in to date. Even the most internationally supported, adequately equipped, and financially backed UN operation with the clearest and most realistic mandate would run into problems in Bosnia.

ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

UNPROFOR faces a host of problems: it is financially strapped, inadequately equipped, lacks a sufficient number of troops, is deployed in the middle of a complex conflict, has command and control problems, and most importantly it lacks consistent cooperation from the local parties. About the only thing that UNPROFOR has working in its favour is the support of the international community. With all these difficulties and frustrations can UNPROFOR be considered a success? Since the operation is still under way it is difficult to draw final conclusions on whether it has been a success or failure. However, the operation can be rated on its performance in carrying out its mandate to date. As of December 1994, UNPROFOR has experienced mixed results with respect to its assigned duties (Note Table 5 - Planned UNPROFOR Action Versus Results).
The major failure of UNPROFOR's mandate has been in the protection of the safe areas. Resolutions 819 and 824 declared six regions (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, Tuzla, Bihac) in Bosnia as "safe areas" but the majority of these areas have been far from safe. In a May 9, 1994 report by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he pointed out that the "safe area" concept has been applied with a greater degree of effectiveness in Srebrenica and Zepa than in the other four areas. While not 100% effective, the Secretary-General points out that the presence of peacekeepers in these towns has served to enhance the security of the population and stabilize the situation in these areas.

Despite the fact that it has achieved some success in these two areas the idea has not been as effective in the other four areas. But if anyone is to blame for the failure of the safe area idea, it is not UNPROFOR. The fault lies with the Security Council and UN member-states since they have failed to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary resources to carry out this duty. For example, when the Serbs began to overrun the safe haven of Gorazde in March 1994, UNPROFOR only had eight military observers in the area who could do little more than watch the Serbian offensive. How can the Security Council expect UNPROFOR to use the presence of eight military observers to deter attacks on a town with a population of 65,000 people? The only function they could serve would be to call for NATO air strikes but even eight observers would not suffice for that task. When the Security Council was contemplating the establishment of safe areas in Bosnia, it adopted the safe area concept with little regard for how it was to
be implemented and with minimal consultation with UN commanders. The Security Council, without knowing whether the proper resources would be available, established the safe-areas. What resulted was six "safe areas" that have been repeatedly and consistently attacked, shelled, and in some cases, overrun. Poor, though this result might seem, it could be argued that whole-scale slaughters have been avoided in places such as Gorazde due to the attempt to demarcate "safe areas."

Even though UNPROFOR has not experienced success with the safe-area concept, it has meet with some conditional success on three other fronts: the ban on military flights, the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. If one examines the ban on military flights in the strictest sense of the meaning then there is no doubt that it has failed as there have been over 1,700 recorded violations as of June 1994. However, if the ban is viewed through a less restrictive lens, then it could be argued that it has been a partial success since the no-fly zone has achieved its principal purpose of eliminating air power for combat purposes.

Regarding the airport, UNPROFOR successfully re-opened the Sarajevo airport in early July 1992 and despite the fact that it was forced to temporarily close several times, as a result of heavy fighting, UNPROFOR has managed to keep it open for humanitarian flights. As of the end of June 1994, twenty nations have flown over 10,000 flights into the Sarajevo airport bringing in more than 116,000 tonnes of food and 14,000 tonnes of medicine. But how much of this aid has actually made it to the intended targets? Has UNPROFOR's humanitarian operation been able to get all of the aid
through? The answer is no. They have not guided 100% of the aid through, but
UNPROFOR has met with more success than is generally acknowledged in protecting,
escorting, and delivering humanitarian assistance. At times, UNPROFOR has been able
to successfully deliver food supplies but at other times the local parties have obstructed
its efforts and denied it access to areas of need.

It is very difficult to determine what portion of the aid is reaching the intended
targets as estimates have ranged from 20% to 80% of food and medical supplies being
diverted to the fighters and the black market.\textsuperscript{309} The percentages do vary but there can
be no doubt that there have been large proportions of aid diverted to the soldiers and the
black market where the aid is then sold or traded for weapons. But is this sufficient to
call UNPROFOR's humanitarian operation a failure? It could be argued that even if
80% of the food is being diverted to the fighters, then there is 20% more aid getting
through than if UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organizations were not present. There
is no doubt that a certain percentage of food is being diverted to the fighters, but another
important percentage is also reaching the people for whom it was intended. Despite the
problems facing UNPROFOR, its humanitarian relief efforts, and its very presence itself,
have no doubt saved thousands of lives. Although it is almost impossible to determine
the exact number of lives involved, there is no doubt that UNPROFOR has been able to
save a large number of Bosnians. According to Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General
for Peace-keeping Operations, UN peacekeepers last winter saved the lives of three
million people.\textsuperscript{310}
By examining all of the successes, failures, and problems of UNPROFOR, has the operation, to date, made a difference in Bosnia or has it only aggravated the situation? In short, has UNPROFOR's presence been a help or hindrance? Despite UNPROFOR's problems, limitations, and setbacks, the operation has made a positive difference in the Bosnian crisis in the terms of lives saved. Although there have been a large number of lives lost even with UNPROFOR's presence, that number would have been much higher if UNPROFOR had not been present. UNPROFOR's civilian component (CIVPOL) has also experienced some degree of success in terms of family reunifications, anti-sniping agreements, harvest agreements (Gorazde), body exchanges, and prisoner exchanges. UNPROFOR has very serious flaws, but it has experienced a greater degree of success than is acknowledged in the news media. Small success stories such as the ones described above do not make good headlines so the only time UNPROFOR seems to make the news is when it runs into difficulties. In discussing the worth of his six month tour as commander of a British UN battalion in Bosnia, Colonel Alastair Duncan commented:

Was it worthwhile? Well, I think it was very much worthwhile. We saved lives directly, and indirectly. We saved lives directly in those actions where we actually went in and pulled people out and got them to safety. Indirectly, we were saving lives by those 35,000 tonnes of aid that we escorted in, and just our physical presence there often calmed things down. We fed, or assisted in the feeding of half a million displaced people in our area and we calmed the tension down. People thought a bit more before they did things.

The same can be said about the whole UN operation in Bosnia. While UNPROFOR has been far from a perfect peacekeeping operation it has performed an invaluable duty of saving lives. That in itself might be sufficient to consider it a partial success.
UNPROFOR has saved lives but some contend that its relief efforts amount to little more than "humanitarian palliatives" which have only served to prolong the war. Every since the onset of the humanitarian operation in Bosnia, it has been faced with a lingering question: has humanitarian aid prolonged the war? In a study carried out by the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute on humanitarian action in Yugoslavia, the Institute points out that it is hard to answer this question because of the difficulty of monitoring the aid. However, while the study does not give a definitive answer, it cites several examples which show a possible link between humanitarian aid and the continuing war.

Indeed, it is quite possible that the humanitarian operation has played some role in prolonging the war. However, regardless of what role it has played in extending the conflict, the humanitarian efforts have succeeded in saving the lives of many civilians throughout Bosnia. As one UNHCR protection officer remarked about the connection between humanitarian aid and the continuing war:

Our presence here in some ways perpetuates the war. But without us being here, be assured that many, many people would not survive. Can we simply let them be sacrificed in the name of some principle?

Perhaps the role of humanitarian action in the Bosnia conflict, and also in other wars, has been summed up best by a study group of Thomas J. Watson Institute:

In short, prolonging wars is a risk inherent to humanitarian action. If preventing the belligerents from receiving any benefits were the objective, no life-saving efforts at all would be launched. If the outcome of this war on the humanitarian side is somehow positive, the fact that humanitarian organizations sustained the war will be less of an issue. However, the humanitarian consequences could be catastrophic if seized by a sudden awareness of the connection—the international community were to disengage.
CHAPTER 5 - THE FUTURE FOR UNPROFOR AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

The Bosnian war is a very complex conflict that has presented UN peacekeepers with one of their most difficult assignments to date. But despite these problems UNPROFOR has remained in Bosnia for over two years and it will more than likely remain there in the near future. Its future presence in Bosnia rests upon two factors: the cooperation of the local parties and continued consensus among the Great Powers that UNPROFOR’s mission should be sustained. While it is possible that the lack of cooperation might force UNPROFOR to withdraw, this does not seem likely. Cooperation has been lacking for over two and a half years, and if UNPROFOR were going to pull out for this reason, it would have done it a long time ago.

A Security Council decision to lift the UN imposed arms embargo on the conflicting parties in Bosnia, for example, could render UNPROFOR’s position untenable. The United States has already decided to stop enforcing the arms embargo but the implications of this decision on the future of UNPROFOR remains unclear. Great Power consensus might break down leading to the adoption of unilateral initiatives which might necessitate UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. Furthermore, the creation of a new consensus directed towards more forceful international intervention in the Bosnian conflict similarly would require UNPROFOR’s removal. At the moment though, there is no immediate prospect that new initiatives will be pursued. But if the peacekeepers are forced to withdraw for any of the above reasons, or for other unforeseen causes, UNPROFOR can leave Bosnia knowing that, under very pernicious conditions, it carried
out its assigned duties more effectively than generally has been acknowledged.

The conflict in Bosnia not only presents the peacekeepers with a difficult situation, it also introduces a dilemma for the future of peacekeeping in general - should a peacekeeping operation be deployed in the middle of a conflict or should its deployment be delayed until there is real peace to keep? There is a case to be made on both sides. One can argue that UNPROFOR's presence in Bosnia merely has served to prolong the war and has contributed to a general weakening of international support for peacekeeping. Regarding the latter argument, Nigel White has indicated that the UN operation in Bosnia, and also the one in Somalia, appear to be

a dangerous step taken by the newly revitalized Security Council in that they destroy the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement which not only endangers genuine peacekeeping operations around the world but also the confidence of states or parties in requesting such forces simply because the United Nations, in its peacekeeping role, is no longer seen as neutral, impartial and non-interventionist.319

Alan James also poses the question as to whether operations such as UNPROFOR have had a weakening effect on international support for peacekeeping. He asks whether "going so briskly down the internal peacekeeping path, the UN is heading for - and perhaps has reached - a resounding dead end?"319 But even though he questions the validity of internal peacekeeping, James concludes that it should not be seen as having reached a dead end.

Rosalyn Higgins goes one step further and argues that UNPROFOR in Bosnia was a mistake. She contends that

the reality is that we have chosen to respond to major unlawful violence, not by stopping that violence, but by trying to provide relief to the suffering. But our choice of policy allows the
Higgins raises a very valid and accurate point. It has been argued that full scale military intervention, such as that used in Iraq, might have proved to have been a better option. Whether it would have or not might be debated. What is known, however, is that in conflicts, such as the Bosnian one, it is highly unlikely, for reasons to be explained shortly, that collective military action will be used. Therefore, one can insist that peacekeeping is, and will continue to be the only option that the international community is willing to use to respond to these types of conflicts.

When the world is confronted with a Bosnia, Somalia, or Rwanda, and the international community decides to act, the only organization that has the ability to attempt to respond to these conflicts is the United Nations. When a Bosnia emerges onto the world scene the UN is left with three choices:

-do nothing,

-use collective action as was the case in Somalia, Korea, and Iraq-Kuwait,

-use sanctions, negotiation, mediation, and good offices in an attempt to bring an end to the conflict and through the use of peacekeepers provide humanitarian assistance to help alleviate the suffering of the civilian population.

The first choice, do nothing, is a frequently used option of the international community. There can be little argument that the Bosnian war is a horrific conflict but equally appalling carnage and bloodshed are also taking place in other corners of the globe such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and
Tajakistan, and in each of these conflicts the international community has decided to do nothing. Indeed, when a conflict does not directly threaten the interests of the Great Powers, then it is quite likely that it will either be ignored or receive very little attention. In most instances, the international community, or more appropriately the Great Powers, decide to respond to these conflicts only after the atrocities and suffering that accompany these wars are broadcast across television screens around the world (CNN Factor). When this happens the Great Powers are frequently pressured to "do something" by their citizens and this usually evokes some kind of response, either in the form of collective action or peacekeeping.

Collective action, in the form of enforcement or intervention is a route that the international community will likely not travel. The problem with it is the reluctance of UN member-states to use it. Only three times in the last 45 years (Korea in the early 1950's, Iraq-Kuwait in 1991, and Somalia in 1993) has collective action been used by the international community and each time it required the lead of the United States. Without an American lead, these operations would probably never have been initiated. The Bosnian operation has proved this point. The U.S. government was, and still is, reluctant to send troops into Bosnia, whether as an intervention force or as part of a peacekeeping operation, unless there is a comprehensive and lasting cease-fire. In future conflicts, collective action will only be used when the U.S. is willing to lead and it is for this reason that this option will remain an infrequently used tool by the international community.
Since collective action is highly doubtful, the most likely choice of the international community will be peacekeeping because it represents a middle ground between absolute non-intervention and full scale military intervention. It allows Western governments to claim they are doing something without incurring the costs that full scale military intervention would bring and the criticisms that non-intervention would provoke. Western governments could not ignore the conflict in Bosnia, but they were unwilling to use military intervention, either unilaterally or as a UN multi-national force, because of the anticipated high costs. Once the Security Council chose the middle ground in Bosnia, it became apparent that peacekeeping might not have been the most appropriate choice. But regardless of whether it was or not, the UN is now involved and getting out will prove to be very difficult.

Another dilemma concerning peacekeeping during an armed conflict revolves around the image of impartiality. When a peacekeeping operation is deployed in the middle of a war zone, the operation could very well be regarded as favouring one side over the other. The Bosnian operation has illustrated this point. Bosnian Serbs might view UNPROFOR as partial because they view its intervention into the conflict as giving an advantage to the Muslims in that it has prevented the latter from losing the war. They may also regard UNPROFOR as standing in the way of their major objective - union with Serbia proper. On the other side of the conflict, the Muslims may also consider UNPROFOR as being partial because it has failed to stop a Serbian war machine from occupying over 70% of Bosnia. For example, the Muslims might have viewed the UN’s
inability to stop Serb advancements in areas such as Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Bihac (supposed safe havens), as implicit support to the Bosnian Serbs. Muslims may also look at UNPROFOR as preserving the status quo, which favours the Bosnian Serbs. There are no easy solutions or answers to these dilemmas, but they require serious consideration before future UN operations are carried out in conflicts such as Bosnia.

Given the probability that international peacekeeping efforts will continue, it is important to draw lessons from the Bosnian experience. \(^\text{324}\) UNPROFOR's experience seems to confirm the point that the political context, in terms of the type of conflict and the support of the international community and local parties, is the most important characteristic that determines the effectiveness and feasibility of a peacekeeping operation. While funding, planning and implementation of an operation are important, they do not have a huge effect on a mission's overall success. In a recent study of six peacekeeping operations, Paul Diehl concluded that "more than any other set of factors, the political context into which the peacekeeping forces were sent affected the success or failure of the operation...." \(^\text{325}\)

Peacekeeping has the potential to play a positive role in the post-Cold War era but the international community must lessen its expectations before the promising enterprise is ruined. The international community demands too much from peacekeeping operations. UN member-states should not expect that by simply placing an ill equipped and badly financed peacekeeping operation into a war zone that the conflict will cease and peace be reached. Peacekeeping is not a magical cure for Bosnia or for any other
type of conflict as solutions to the Bosnian conflict lie outside the realm of UNPROFOR's mandate. That applies not only to UNPROFOR but to all other UN peacekeeping operations and the conflicts in which they are involved. Though not a cure-all, peacekeeping missions can exercise a positive influence. In Bosnia the biggest contribution that a peacekeeping operation can make is trying to feed and protect the civilians from the effects of the war. To ask, or expect, the peacekeepers to do any more in such conflicts would be unrealistic, impractical, and unfair.

Conflicts such as the one in Bosnia should not be ignored. Whatever method the international community chooses, collective action, intervention, sanctions, or peacekeeping and/or negotiation, these conflicts must be addressed. It would be a mistake to believe that such conflicts are important only to the immediate participants. During conflicts such as the one in Bosnia, many citizens flee to bordering states in order to escape the immense human suffering and tragedy that accompany these wars. This influx of refugees places an immense strain on the political and economic institutions of the neighbouring states and further de-stabilizes the region. Besides this problem, there is also the possibility that these conflicts could lead to wider warfare. For example, an outside state or group of states might be drawn into such conflicts in cases where ethnic loyalties come into play. The immense human suffering that accompanies these conflicts is more than enough reason for the international community to act but they must also act because these conflicts have a very serious potential to threaten international peace and security.326

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Humanitarian aid is needed in the Bosnian conflict, but it will not solve the crisis because the relief addresses the symptoms rather than the causes of the conflict. What is needed alongside the humanitarian aid is some sort of political and social reconstruction. While the UN can help the local parties along with this reconstruction, it ultimately depends on the Bosnians themselves.

In the post-Cold War era, peacekeepers are going to be confronted with conflicts that are just as, or even more, dangerous than Bosnia. In future operations, consent cannot always be assumed and cease-fires will not always be present. With respect to UNPROFOR, and future operations of the like, the UN and its members are going to have to ask the following question; despite all the difficulties and limitations confronting the operation is enough aid still reaching the starving civilians to counterbalance the larger amounts being diverted to the warring parties?327

The Bosnian war has shown that regional organizations are not sufficient by themselves to deal with conflicts such as Bosnia.328 Indeed, in most cases regional organizations do not have the necessary mechanisms to adequately respond to conflicts that are present in their areas. But this does not mean that regional organizations cannot lend a hand to help solve the crisis. NATO support of UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia has shown that regional organizations can play a positive role in conflict resolution. However, their role normally should be in support of rather than as an alternative to the UN. As Olara Otunnu, an African ambassador, has pointed out:

I do not believe that it will be possible in the near future for regional organizations to respond effectively to the challenge of conflicts within states. Few regional organizations
have relevant traditions... Also, regional groups often suffer from the perception of being partisan... Moreover, in the case of Third World regional organizations, there is also the problem of resources... [For the foreseeable future, peacekeeping will have to be the responsibility of the United Nations.]

Bosnia's greatest lesson is that the UN should begin to focus its efforts more on preventing the outbreak of hostilities rather than on trying to manage or end a conflict once it has erupted. As Thomas Weiss points out:

What is required is nothing less than a shift in the dominant way that the international community attacks problems. In formulating responses, new policy lenses should be tinted with preventive peace building rather than intervention in and management of conflicts once they have erupted. The root causes of many conflicts—poverty, and the unjust distribution of available resources, and the legacy of colonial boundaries in many multiethnic societies—should be addressed before they explode.

UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has shown that preventive peacekeeping can work, but there is a potential deficiency with this type of operation as there are no contingency plans or additional troops in place if the peacekeepers are attacked. To date, the operation in Macedonia has been successful but what are the peacekeepers going to do if they are attacked by one or more of the local parties? If they withdraw at the first sign of trouble, then preventive peacekeeping will be shown as nothing but a bluff. If this happened, it would send a message out to would-be combatants that the UN does not have the ability, or will, to back up the operation with additional troops. This was in effect what happened in Bosnia when the headquarters for UNPROFOR in Croatia was stationed in Sarajevo as it was thought that the presence of UN personnel in Bosnia would deter the fighting. The military personnel involved with the operation warned against such a move but the politicians insisted, citing the fact that the presence of UNPROFOR personnel might prevent the outbreak of fighting.
However, the UN failed to address the possibility that fighting might erupt and did not consider what UNPROFOR personnel were to do in this event. Unfortunately, the UN had no contingency plans in place, and what resulted was a UN operation caught up in the middle of an armed conflict without a mandate.

The UN must have some type of mechanism available to deal with the possibility of preventive peacekeepers being attacked. The best response would be for the UN to back up the smaller preventive force with a larger force, possibly something like Operation Desert Storm which was used during the Gulf War in 1991. But it is highly unlikely that such a force, or even a scaled down version, would be assembled if the peacekeepers in Macedonia are attacked. The reason being is that the international community, or more appropriately the Great Powers, appear to lack the will or interest to intervene. Only when a region is of strategic or national interest will the principal powers take some forceful action. The will was there to assemble a force in Iraq during the Gulf War, and again in the fall of 1994 when Iraq started to mobilize troops near the Kuwaiti border. However, the will is unlikely to be present in Macedonia if the operation runs into trouble. Preventive peacekeeping is a good idea, but the UN must take a serious look at what actions will be taken if the preventive force is attacked.

There has been a lot of finger pointing in relation to the blame for the war in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Outside powers undoubtedly deserve criticism but it is the political and military leaders in ex-Yugoslavia who are to blame for the war. When it comes right down to it, it is these people and not the policies of Western governments,
who are truly responsible for the war. The same people are also the only ones who are able to end the war. In the words of Ralph Johnson, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs:

The bottom line in this crisis, however, is that the world community cannot stop Yugoslavs from killing one another so long as they are determined to do so. What we can do is use our influence and powers of persuasion to convince the parties to this conflict that they cannot win, and, indeed, can only lose, if the violence is not stopped. We can assure them that they will have our support and good will if they turn away from killing and sit down in good faith to work out a fair and equitable solution....But we ourselves cannot stop the violence or resolve this conflict. Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaders can do that.\textsuperscript{331}

Just as the policies of Western governments cannot be blamed for causing the war in Bosnia neither can the UN. In no way can UNPROFOR be blamed for accelerating the conflict in Bosnia and it would be illogical to argue otherwise. The desire to reach settlements or to make peace rests solely on the shoulders of the local parties and if that desire is absent then the warring factions will continue to fight. The desire of the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to make peace was, and still is, very low in Bosnia and it is unlikely that it would be any higher if UNPROFOR was not there.\textsuperscript{332}

Although UNPROFOR can be viewed as a substitute for intervention it cannot be looked upon as standing in the way of more forceful action on the part of the international community. When the terrible humanitarian tragedies of the Bosnian conflict began to appear on television screens across the world, the international community was pressured to "do something." It was unwilling to send in an intervention force so the UN decided to deploy a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, UNPROFOR is a substitute for intervention but it was either do nothing or send in the blue helmets.
This is not necessarily a bad thing as UNPROFOR has made a positive difference in Bosnia, but the international community must realize that UNPROFOR is not capable of solving the conflict. UNPROFOR does not stand in the way of more forceful action because the international community, or more appropriately the major powers, lack the will to intervene in this messy conflict. Indeed, intervention in Bosnia would be a difficult, and now quite possibly, an unrealistic task. The argument is not that the international community should intervene but rather that the peacekeepers did not prevent the deployment of an intervention force.333

In the new world order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, only the Great Powers, especially the U.S., are capable of maintaining a stable and peaceful world. But the Bosnian experience has shown that they will not always be up to the task and in these situations peacekeeping will likely be the choice of action by the international community. Intervention, or the use of force, will be used only when the United States is willing to take the lead, and in cases where it is not, the international community will usually respond with a peacekeeping operation. It may not always be the most appropriate choice, but what other alternatives are the international community truly willing to use.

The UN is not and cannot be a sovereign political actor in a world made up of over 180 independent and sovereign nation-states.334 The UN can only perform as well as its member-states will allow it. How can the UN itself be blamed for world problems when it is the member-states in the UN, particularly the Security Council, which decide
the how, when, where, and why of its actions? It is always puzzling to hear people say that the UN has failed in Bosnia. It is not the UN that has failed, rather it is the member-states with their unrealistic expectations which have failed the UN. When member-states want the UN to work it will work. What the UN needs are more members who are willing to contribute to its success and fewer member-states who are quick to point fingers at it for the world's problems. In the words of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

> The chief problem from my point of view is one of education. The same member states that were prepared to spend $100 billion everyday to sustain the Cold War are not willing to spend $100 billion or $200 billion to sustain the UN system. That is a contradiction.\(^{333}\)

When Yugoslavia began to fall apart, the international community took a narrow-minded approach by supporting, or more appropriately pushing, the status quo. Instead of taking a one track approach, Christopher Cvic points out that no solutions, including the demise of Yugoslavia, should have been ruled out.\(^{336}\) When the international community initially pushed for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia it should have told Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, that this was not support for his re-centralization of the Yugoslav state. Furthermore, it should have been clearly stated to Milosevic that any use of force to keep the republics from seceding would be met with their full diplomatic recognition as independent states, giving them the right to arm and defend themselves as sovereign entities.\(^{337}\) However, the international community took a one sided approach by more or less threatening Croatia and Slovenia not to secede. The political leaders in these republics were left in a very difficult position: either accept a
stronger centralized Yugoslavia under the dominant rule of Milosevic and Serbia, or secede and take the risks that would come with it. Obviously, to them, the latter seemed like the best option. A more appropriate course of action by the international community might have been to accept the fact that Yugoslavia was going to come apart and concentrate its energy towards a more peaceful separation.

By far, the biggest UN error regarding the Bosnian conflict revolves around its imposition of an arms embargo against Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia. By placing an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, the UN not only effectively gave the Bosnian Serbs a huge advantage, but it also took away the right of the government of Bosnia to defend itself, something which is enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

The inherent problem with a case study is that it restricts one to certain parameters. In this case study, the restriction applies to humanitarian peacekeeping and ethnic conflict in Europe. Therefore, what comes out of this case study cannot be necessarily applied to all peacekeeping operations. In this instance, the UN operation in Bosnia can only be used to reflect back on the aims of humanitarian peacekeeping, as opposed to all second generation operations, to determine whether UNPROFOR supports or calls into question such endeavours. However, even though it is limited in some senses, the UNPROFOR case study involves a central paradox that will likely confront future UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era - should peacekeepers be used in situations when there is no peace to keep?

The preceding analysis of UNPROFOR in Bosnia appears to both support and call humanitarian peacekeeping into question. UNPROFOR supports the idea of humanitarian peacekeeping because it has demonstrated that aid can be delivered and lives saved, even in the midst of an armed conflict. But the operation also calls humanitarian peacekeeping into question. In Bosnia, it is the local forces more often than the peacekeepers who dictate when, where, and what amount of aid will get through. By letting the local forces control the delivery of aid, the UN in effect has allowed the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, to dictate its job. In essence, the local parties became the UN’s boss.

Looking back, it is apparent that the UN was not initially as tough with the local forces as they should have been. If they had been tougher in getting aid through during the initial stages of the operation, it might have sent a message to the Serbs, Muslims,
and Croats that the UN was serious about its duties. By doing this, the UN might have established itself as the boss and showed the local parties that UNPROFOR was going to dictate the deliver of aid. But this problem relates back to the paradox of peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep. In Bosnia, many of the local forces are not under any effective political control and therefore it is hard for the peacekeepers to know who they are dealing with. Military forces, under effective control, normally prove to be more predictable since they have someone to answer to for their actions. However, it might prove more difficult with local warlords or paramilitary forces that are not under any control since their reactions to pushing aid through might prove to be unpredictable. It might work in some situations and in others it could prove to be catastrophic.

The dilemma concerning UNPROFOR in Bosnia indeed raises a serious predicament that needs to be examined when similar operations are being contemplated. Is saving the lives of tens of thousands of people sufficient reason to deploy peacekeepers in the middle of a conflict? Or are the risk and dangers that accompany these battles too great to put UN peacekeepers in? There are no easy answers but in future operations the UN could be guided by the following questions: is there a reasonable expectation that the peacekeepers can reduce the suffering and does the UN have the resources and capabilities to do it?

The Bosnian case study has not only illustrated the difficulties of peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep, but it has also demonstrated that the true idea behind
collective security, as it was intended by the founders of the Charter, is not feasible. All against one will not work and the Bosnian conflict has proven this point. To be fair, however, collective action in Bosnia would not be an easy task because of the complexities of the conflict. But despite this fact, the true idea of collective security will not work because UN member-states will, most of the time, only act when the conflict or act of aggression directly or indirectly threatens their national interest. Even in situations where national interests are threatened, collective action will only be used, or contemplated, when one or more of the principal powers are involved. In most other cases, states will usually resort to unilateral actions. Indeed, the UN as an organizer and operator of military forces is unfeasible. Then what role can the UN’s collective security system expect to play in the post-Cold War era? The legitimator model and the broker model seem to be two possible alternatives to the UN’s collective security system.  

The legitimator model, advocated by William Durch, views the Security Council as the most practical means of initiating collective action. It has been shown time and time again, that member-states are not willing to let the UN itself carry out collective military operations. Most states, especially the U.S., do not want to put their forces under the command of the UN. The legitimator model advocates that the Security Council contract out large scale military tasks to a certain country or countries. In this type of model the UN is not directly involved in the recruiting of forces or the planning or supporting stages of the operation. The advantage with this model is that it gives the operation international legitimacy without actually having the UN involved in the
command and control. Operation Desert Storm, under the lead of the United States during the Gulf War in 1991, is an example of the legitimator model. The Security Council, more or less, contracted out the task of removing Iraqi military forces from Kuwait to the United States. The U.S., which willingly accepted the task, then took the initiative upon itself to assemble the needed coalition by finding or pursuing other UN member-states who were willing to take part in the operation. Indeed, the United States had its own reasons to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but by putting the operation under the auspices of the UN, it was legitimized more than if the U.S had carried out unilateral military action. By placing the operation under UN sponsorship, a broad coalition, that was eventually supported by a large part of the international community, was able to be assembled.

The legitimator model has its advantages but it also has some problems. William Durch points out that a major flaw with this model is that Security Council resolutions do not guarantee international action. The resolution is unlikely to pass unless one of the permanent Security Council members, which still possess much of the military power in the world, is prepared to take the lead or assemble the necessary coalition. In most cases, when the national interests of the Security Council members are not at stake then collective action will be unlikely. The other problem with the legitimator model is that it works only when the country or countries involved play by the rules set out by the Security Council. Durch contends that the legitimator model worked in the Gulf War because the United States and other UN member-states stayed within the parameters set
out by the Security Council. When the coalition forces pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, the war was halted. If the U.S. had continued to push into Iraqi territory, something the Security Council did not empower it to do, then the legitimacy and credibility of the multi-national force and the UN would have been damaged.

The second model concerns the UN as a broker for military actions. With this model the UN takes on more responsibilities by making sure all the necessary pieces of the operation are put together. For example, it allocates the necessary manpower and other required resources and then hands over the operation's command and control to a specific country which would then act as an agent for the Security Council. The lead country, the UN, or both, would then recruit other states to take part in the operation. This type of model, as is the case with the legitimator model, would have the support of the Security Council and a greater degree of international legitimacy than if an operation went ahead without the blessing of the UN. But again, there is a problem with this type of model. In both the legitimator and broker model a lead country is needed, and if it is always the U.S. that takes the lead then the UN would look like nothing more than a tool for American foreign policy. Durch contends that the way to deal with this problem is for the U.S. to seek overall command only when its ground forces are involved. In situations where they are not, the U.S. could give the lead to another country but still remain a part of the operation by providing important resources such as air power, intelligence reports, and logistical support. As Durch says, "subordinating such functions to others' command on occasion may indeed prove necessary to keep others willing to
subordinate themselves to us. "By doing this, the UN would look less like a tool for American foreign policy and more as a representative of the will of the international community.

Even though these models appear workable in the post-Cold War era, they still exhibit an inherent problem. Collective action will only be used when the U.S. or the lead country has a direct or indirect national interest in the conflict. Iraq and Bosnia prove this point. Collective action was used in Iraq because the national interests of some of the principal powers were at risk. The conflict in Bosnia does not bear on the national interests of the major military powers and for this reason collective action seems highly unlikely.

It is always difficult to predict the future of global politics, and in the constantly changing world of the post-Cold War era, this task has become even more difficult. However, with respect to UN collective security, it seems safe to predict that it will only be used in circumstances where the national interests of the major powers are involved. When the Great Powers want action, it will be taken. In other cases, such as the many "small wars" that are confronting our globe, it appears that they will most often be thrown onto the doorstep of the UN. When this does happen, it seems that peacekeeping may be the only viable option. Indeed, what most states, especially the major powers, use the UN for is not for its true purpose of collective security but rather as a residual conflict tool, dealing with conflicts that nobody else wants. In the end, in a world comprised of over 180 independent and sovereign states, that might be the best role the
UN can be expected to play.
### TABLE 1 - RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING UNPROFOR’S MANDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTIONS</th>
<th>UNPROFOR’S MANDATED DUTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>758 (08 JUN 92)</td>
<td>UNPROFOR’s mandate extended to ensure the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>761 (29 JUN 92)</td>
<td>SC authorizes the SG to immediately deploy additional elements of UNPROFOR to carry out the tasks in resolution 758.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>770 (13 AUG 92)</td>
<td>SC calls on all states to &quot;take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all necessary measures&quot; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>776 (14 SEP 92)</td>
<td>SC authorizes the enlargement of UNPROFOR’s mandate to provide protection to UNHCR organized humanitarian convoys and to convoys of released civilian detainees if requested by ICRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>781 (09 OCT 92)</td>
<td>SC establishes a ban on military flights in Bosnia and requests UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the no-fly zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>816 (31 MAR 93)</td>
<td>SC authorizes member-states, acting nationally or through regional organizations of arrangements, to take, under the authority of the SC and in close coordination with the SG and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>819 (16 APR 93)</td>
<td>Srebrenica established as a &quot;safe area.&quot; SG demands that Srebrenica and its surrounding areas be treated as a safe area which should be free from armed attacks or hostile acts. SG requests UNPROFOR to monitor the humanitarian situation in the safe area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824 (06 MAY 93)</td>
<td>In addition to Srebrenica, the SC declares that the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, and Zepa should be treated as safe areas by all parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks or hostile acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>836 (04 JUN 93)</td>
<td>SC extends UNPROFOR’s mandate in order to enable it to deter attacks against the safe areas of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, and Zepa. SC authorizes UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or the armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian aid convoys. SC also decides that members states, acting nationally or through regional organizations of arrangements, may take, under the authority of the SC and subject to close coordination with the SG and UNPROFOR all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SC**-Security Council  
**SG**-Secretary-General

TABLE 2 - SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON BOSNIAN RESOLUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>RUSSIA</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>BRITAIN</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>758 (08 JUNE 92)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>15-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>761 (29 JUNE 92)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>15-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>770 (13 AUG 92)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>12-0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>776 (14 SEPT 92)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>12-0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>781 (09 OCT 92)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>14-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>816 (31 MAR 93)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>14-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>819 (16 APR 93)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>15-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824 (06 MAY 93)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>15-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>836 (04 JUNE 93)</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>13-0**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUP-Supported the resolution
ABS-Abstained on the resolution

*On these resolutions India and Zimbabwe also abstained
**On this resolution Pakistan and Venezuela abstained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER 16, 1992</td>
<td>NATO begins monitoring flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 8, 1993</td>
<td>NATO agrees to enforce the no-fly zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 22, 1993</td>
<td>Resolution 836 asks NATO to provide protective air power to UNPROFOR in performance of its mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST 2 &amp; 9, 1993</td>
<td>NATO decides to be ready to carry out air strikes to prevent the &quot;strangulation&quot; of Sarajevo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY 9, 1994</td>
<td>NATO sets an ultimatum for the withdrawal of Serbian heavy weapons from around the 20km exclusion zone in Sarajevo. On the basis of the decisions taken on August 2 and 9, 1993, air strikes, in close coordination with the UN Secretary-General, are authorized against Serbian heavy weapons if they are not removed from the exclusion zone or placed under the command of UNPROFOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY 28, 1994</td>
<td>NATO warplanes shoot down four Serbian aircraft in violation of the no-fly zone. This marks the first military action taken by NATO in its 45 year history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 10, 1994</td>
<td>NATO warplanes, in response to a request by UNPROFOR, bomb Serbian positions near the besieged Muslim enclave of Gorazde. This marks NATO's first ground attack in its 45 year history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 11, 1994</td>
<td>For the second time in as many days, NATO warplanes strike Serbian positions around Gorazde destroying a tank and several personnel carriers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 22, 1994</td>
<td>NATO sets an ultimatum for the JNA Serbs to cease their attacks on Gorazde and withdraw their heavy weapons to 20 kilometres from the center of the town. Otherwise, NATO would carry out air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other targets found within the 20km radius from the centre of town. NATO also affirms its resolve to act in the same manner for the other five declared safe areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 23, 1994</td>
<td>Serbs continue shelling Gorazde and a call for air strikes by the UNPROFOR commander is rejected because UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi asks for a delay to allow the Serbian leaders to contain &quot;rogue&quot; elements. This rejection infuriates NATO officials. The Serbs begin withdrawing from Gorazde as the ultimatum expires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 24, 1994</td>
<td>For the most part, the Serbian siege of Gorazde ends as NATO threatens air strikes if the Serbs did not cease-fire and remove their military weapons and hardware outside a 3km radius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST 5, 1994</td>
<td>NATO aircraft attack a Bosnian Serb target near Sarajevo in response to the Serbs seizure of heavy weapons from a UN storage site. Immediately after the air strike, the Serbs offered to return the heavy weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER 23, 1994</td>
<td>NATO aircraft blast a Serbian tank west of Sarajevo in response to a Serb attack on a UN armoured vehicle that wounded a French peacekeeper.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4 - UNPROFOR PERSONNEL STRENGTH (AS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BHC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (20 Countries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BHC - Bosnia-Herzegovina Command  
HQ - Headquarters  
SIV - Sector Sarajevo  
REST - Rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina

This table includes military personnel (infantry, support units and military observers) only. There are also United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and Civilian Police (CIVPOL) serving with UNPROFOR in Bosnia but the breakdown for location is not available. The entire UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia) has 618 UNMOs and 717 CIVPOL.

SOURCE: Office of the Spokesman For the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, NY 10017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Action</th>
<th>Actual Results as of August 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To ensure the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport (Res 758, 761)*</td>
<td>The airport was secured and re-opened on July 3, 1992. Between this time and December 1994 the airport was forced to temporarily close several times due to heavy fighting but re-opened shortly after the fighting subsided. The airport was placed under UNPROFOR's control in July 1992 and it still remains under their control as of December 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia (Res 758, 761)</td>
<td>As of the end of June/94, twenty nations in almost 10,000 flights have brought in more than 116,000 tons of food and 14,000 tons of medicine. Estimates vary on how much aid has actually gotten through to those who it was intended for. Reports have varied from 20%-40% of aid being diverted to the black market and the local fighters. Despite this the relief operations have saved hundreds of thousands of lives in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR authorized to use all necessary measures to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (Res 770, 776)</td>
<td>UNPROFOR has yet to use force to deliver aid in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC requests UNPROFOR to monitor the ban on military flights in Bosnia (Res 781)</td>
<td>As of June 30, 1994 there have been 1,782 violations of the ban since monitoring began in November 1992. The no-fly zone's principal purpose of eliminating air power for combat purposes has been achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting, nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, all necessary measures are authorized to enforce the no-fly zone (Res 816)</td>
<td>April 8, 1993 NATO assumes this duty and on April 12, 1993 the regional organization begins enforcing the no-fly zone in support of the UN. On February 28, 1994 NATO warplanes shoot down four Serbian aircraft in violation of the no-fly zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate of UNPROFOR extended in order to enable it to deter attacks against the declared safe areas of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihać, and Zepa. UNPROFOR is authorized, acting in self defense, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or the armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of the protected convoys; SC decides that members-states, acting nationally or through regional organizations of arrangements, may take, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate (Res 819, 824, 836)</td>
<td>Since its inception there have been frequent violations of the safe areas. While it has not been 100% successful in any of the six safe areas it has been applied to a greater degree of effectiveness in Zepa and Srebrenica than the other four areas. In Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Bihać the safe area concept has been a total failure as Sarajevo has been consistently attacked while Gorazde and Bihać were overrun by the Serbs in March/April 1994 and November/December 1994, respectively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Resolution 758 extended UNPROFOR's mandate to ensure the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy, when he judged it appropriate, the military observers and related personnel and equipment required for these duties. Resolution 761 authorized the Secretary-General to deploy immediately additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of the airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

ENDNOTES

1. Before undertaking the UNPROFOR case study both the history and past development of peacekeeping will be reviewed in order to provide a better understanding of the evolution of UN peacekeeping.


5. Ibid, 8.


11. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, its seat has been taken by the Russian Federation.


13. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989 is generally referred to as the beginning of second-generation peacekeeping. Its mandate was to "ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations." See, *United Nations Peace-keeping, op.cit.*, 50.
14. This identification of key trends is taken from the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response To A New Generation Of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, February 1993), 16-23. The brief overview of these trends presented here is based not just on the Senate Report but diverse additional complementary studies.


22. *Ibid*.


24. The "CNN factor" is the tendency of the UN and the international community to respond to conflicts that are publicized by the news media. As a result, other less publicized catastrophes and civil wars are left unaddressed by the global community.


28. See, Durch, *op.cit.*, 467-68.


34. UNPROFOR was deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the request of its President in December 1992. Its purpose is to "monitor and report any developments in its border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in that Republic and threaten its territory." See, United Nations, United Nations Peace-keeping, op.cit., 29.


37. Ibid, 459.


39. Ibid.


41. According to Adam Roberts' article, many developments under UN auspices in the last few years have raised questions about whether there is an absolute need for consent for peacekeeping or humanitarian activities, and an absolute respect for state sovereignty, especially in civil wars. He also points out that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has suggested in his An Agenda for Peace that consent by the host state may not be a needed requirement for peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. See, Adam Roberts, op.cit., 435; and Nigel S. Rodley, ed., To Loose the Bands of Wickedness International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London, 1992), 1-132 for a discussion on the UN's right to intervene into the domestic affairs of a state.


46. The former Yugoslavia, officially known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was a East European country that was bound to the east by the Adriatic sea, to the northeast by Italy, to the North by Austria, to the Northwest by Hungary, to the East by Romania, to the Southeast by Bulgaria, and to the South by Greece and Albania (Note Map 1). It consisted of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and two autonomous regions, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, with a total population of 22.4 million people in which 36% were Serbs, 20% Croats, 9% Muslims, 8% Slovenes and Albanians, 6% Macedonians, 5% Yugoslavs, 3% Montenegrins, and 2% Hungarian. These population figures are taken from the 1981 census which was the last to include all regions. Yugoslavians refer to those citizens who did not declare another nationality. See, George Fyson, ed., The Truth About Yugoslavia (New York, 1993), 10.


51. Ibid.

52. Josip Broz "Tito," simply known as Tito, was the leader of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980. Tito lead Yugoslavia's Communist Party to power during the final phase of World War II when German and Italian occupation forces fled Yugoslavia.

54. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (Summer 1993), 11.

55. Steinberg, op. cit., 31.

56. Ibid.

57. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the name for the first Yugoslav federation which was created in 1918. The new state was initially referred to as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes but in 1929 its name was shortened to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

58. On April 27, 1992, Serbia and Montenegro joined together to form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which is commonly referred to as "rump Yugoslavia" but it has yet to receive international recognition. Hereafter, when rump Yugoslavia is used it refers to the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). When the term former or ex-Yugoslavia is used it refers to Yugoslavia before its disintegration (1945-91).

59. Information in this paragraph is based on Christopher Cviic, "Who's to Blame for the War in Ex-Yugoslavia?," World Affairs, vol. 156, no. 2 (Fall 1993). 73; Stokes op. cit., 232-233; and Steinberg, op. cit., 31-32.

60. See, Steinberg, op. cit., 32.


64. Zametica, op. cit., 14 and 18.

65. Information in this paragraph is based on the following sources, Steinberg, op. cit., 32; Stokes, op. cit., 248; Cviic, op. cit., 75; Predrag Simic, "Civil war in Yugoslavia - the roots of disintegration," in Martin van den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama, eds., The Disintegration Of Yugoslavia (The Netherlands, 1992), 93.

66. With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993 the European Community became the European Union.


69. See, Cviic, *op. cit.*, 74; and Steinberg, *op. cit.*, 34.


71. Cviic, *op. cit.*, 74.

72. See, Steinberg, *op. cit.*, 32; Stokes, *op. cit.*, 249; Cviic, *op. cit.*, 75; Simic *op. cit.*, 93; and Alex Dragnich, "The West's Mismanagement of the Yugoslav Crisis," *World Affairs*, vol.156, no.2 (Fall 1993), 64.


74. Fyson, *op. cit.*, 10.


77. For Cyrus Vance's efforts at negotiating a truce see, Bratislav Dordevic, "The Situation in Yugoslavia and the United Nations," *Yugoslav Survey*, vol.XXXIII, no.1 (1992), 53 and 57. For the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Croatia see, Dragana Ivanovic, "The Situation in Yugoslavia and the United Nations (II)," *Yugoslav Survey*, vol.XXXIII, no.2 (1992), 64.

78. Stokes, *op. cit.*, 250.


82. Hereafter, referred to as Bosnia.
83. Doder, *op. cit.*, 11.

84. According to the Helsinki Watch, there is some controversy surrounding the origins of the Bosnian Muslims. The most accepted theory is that the Slavs, during the Middle Ages, practised an unorthodox form of Christianity known as Bogomilism and then converted to Islam when Bosnia was captured by the Ottoman Empire. However, some Serbs claim that the Muslims are Orthodox Christian Serbs who converted to Islam while some Croats contend that the Muslims are in fact Roman Catholic Croats who converted to Islam during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. The Muslims reject the arguments of the Serbs and Croats and claim their own religion along with a separate Slavic identity. See Helsinki Watch, *op.cit.*, 22; and Glen E. Curtis, *Yugoslovia a country study* (Washington, D.C., 1992), 82-86.

85. The population percentages for the Muslims, Croats and Serbs were taken in 1991 before the war. See, Cohen, *op.cit.*, 236.

86. Stokes, *op.cit.*, 250.


88. Hayden, *op.cit.*, 2-4. The percentage of total population (pop) versus the percentage of vote (vot) for each of the three parties was; Muslim Party for Democratic Action-43.7% (pop) vrs 37.88% (vot); the Serbian Democratic Party-31.3% (pop) vrs 26.5% (vot); Croatian Democratic Community-17.5% (pop) vrs 14.7% (vot). The preceding percentages were taken from a table in Hayden, *op.cit.*, 2.

89. Ibid, 4.


91. Hayden, *op.cit.*, 3.


93. Ibid.


95. Ibid.

96. Due to the fact that the Serbs boycotted the referendum only 64.4% of eligible voters made the move to the polls. See Cohen, *op.cit.*, 237.


100. The EC recognized Bosnia independence on April 6, 1992 while the United States recognized the state’s independence on April 7. Shortly thereafter, other members of the international community began recognizing the independence of Bosnia. April 7 was also the same day that the Bosnian Serbs declared the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.


103. On April 7, 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 817 which recommended the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) for UN membership "pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state." On April 8, 1993, FYROM was admitted to the UN. See, United Nations, "Tragedy continues with 'no sign of abatement,'" *UN Chronicle*, vol.XXX, no.3 (September 1993), 15; and United Nations, "Situation worsens as peace process continues," *UN Chronicle*, vol.XXX, no.2 (June 1993), 12.


107. This estimation was arrived at by examining United Nations Document PS/DPI/14/Rev.4, October 1993.


111. Zarnetica, *op.cit.*, 59; and Cviic, *op.cit.*, 75.


118. Zametica, *op.cit.*, 60.


121. See, Weller, *op.cit.*, 578-79.

122. Resolution 713 states "conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed the convening of a Security Council meeting through a letter conveyed by the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of the Security Council."

123. By literally reading Article 2(7) it seems to imply that permission from the host state is not needed if an internal dispute is a threat to international peace and security. Article 2(7) reads; "Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

124. The text of articles 39, 41, and 42 read;

Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.


126. The request for a UN peacekeeping operation was formally declared in a November 26 letter addressed from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of the Security Council (S/23240).

127. Weller, op.cit., 583; and Dordevic, op.cit., 50.


129. Dordevic, op.cit., 53.


132. Dordevic, op.cit., 55.

133. Ibid, 55-56; and Weller, op.cit., 585.


136. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, 40.


140. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, 41.


144. The UNPAs in Croatia are areas in which the Serbs constitute the majority or a significant minority of the population and where ethnic tensions have lead to armed clashes. The three UNPAs in Croatia are, Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina. UNPROFOR's mandate is to ensure the UNPAs are demilitarized through the withdrawal of all armed personnel and that all persons residing in these areas are protected from fear of armed attack. On June 30, 1992, the Security Council, under resolution 762, enlarged the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia to include monitoring duties in the "pink zones." The "pink zones" are particular areas in Croatia that are controlled by the JNA and populated largely by Serbs but are outside the UNPA borders. See, United Nations Document DPI/1312/Rev.1, May 7, 1993, 4-5; and United Nations, *United Nations Peace-keeping, op.cit.*, 28.


146. Weller, *op.cit.*, 600.


153. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, 43.


155. Ivanovic, *op.cit.*, 76.

156. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted resolution 757 on May 30, 1992, imposing wide ranging sanctions against the FRY as a result of its failure to take action to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 which called upon the JNA to cease activities within Bosnia. Under resolution 757, the Security Council demanded that all parties in Bosnia create the necessary conditions for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance which included the establishment of a security zone around the Sarajevo airport. The Secretary-General was requested to use his good offices to achieve the above mentioned objectives.

157. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, 43.

158. The whole UN operation in ex-Yugoslavia consists of separate operations in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. The Bosnian operation is not formally referred to as UNPROFOR II rather this has become a frequently used acronym to distinguish it from the operations in Croatia (UNPROFOR I) and Macedonia (UNPROFOR III). Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, when UNPROFOR is used it refers to the operation in Bosnia.


162. Ibid, 204.
163. Ibid, 207.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid, 208.
166. Ibid, 213.
167. Ibid, 225.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid, 237.

170. The landing of the French military aircraft was a result of a conversation between Mitterand and MacKenzie. Before Mitterand boarded his plane to leave Sarajevo he asked MacKenzie "What can I do for you?" MacKenzie replied, "Mr. President, thank you for your offer. We will probably take over the airport from the Serbs tomorrow. At that point, all we will have is an expensive piece of real estate. We need a couple of humanitarian aircraft to land here tomorrow to jump start the operation. If you were to send in French aircraft with some humanitarian aid on board, no matter how modest, it would embarrass other nations, especially your European allies, and they would rush to be the next in." Shortly after Mitterand's plane left, MacKenzie found out that two French military aircraft with humanitarian aid would be landing at Sarajevo airport the next day. MacKenzie said that he never did find out if his request for a humanitarian aircraft had "been actioned on the spot by the President," or if it was just a coincidence that his request matched Mitterand's "intention to upstage the rest of the European Community two days in a row." MacKenzie said, quite frankly, that he did not care what the reason was. For more on Mitterand's visit to Sarajevo see, Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper, op.cit., Chapter 24 (President Mitterand Drops In); and John F. Burns, "Mitterand Flies Into Sarajevo; Shells Temper 'Message of Hope,'" New York Times, June 29, 1992, A1.


188. Diehl, *op.cit.*, 73.
Carrying out an operation during an armed conflict is not something new to peacekeeping as ONUC and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were carried out in the middle of a war zone. The point is that while it was present during traditional operations the new era of peacekeeping is increasingly confronted with this problem. The same situation also applies to the use of force. It has been argued by some that the use of force is something new to peacekeeping but in fact it is not. Traditional operations have at times been authorized to use force to carry out their mandate. The debate over the use of force has always been present but it is more intense now because second generation peacekeepers are, due to the conflicts in which they are involved, increasingly authorized to use force. UNPROFOR troops still follow the normal rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations, using force only in self defence, which includes situations where they are deliberately prevented from carrying out their mandate.

Prior to UNPROFOR in Croatia, Moscow's armed forces had never taken part in such an operation, with the exception of individual unarmed Soviet officers assigned as truce monitors in the Middle East. When 400 Russian peacekeepers were redeployed from Croatia to Sarajevo, in February 1994, it marked the second time that Russian troops have participated in a UN peacekeeping operation. See, John F. Burns, "Russians March Into Croatia Armed With Promise of Peace," New York Times, March 17, 1992, A1.

203. Ibid.

204. Ibid.


210. According to MacKenzie's diary in his *Peacekeeper* book, the airport agreement was signed on June 5, 1992 but the airport was not actually handed over to UNPROFOR until June 29, 1992 with the first relief plane landing the next day. See his *Peacekeeper* book pages 198, 268, and 272.


214. Taken from same source as Table 2 - Security Council Vote on Bosnian Resolutions.


216. For a chronological account of the United States policy towards UNPROFOR and the Bosnian crisis consult *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, vol.3, no.1 (July/August 1992) through to vol.5, no.2 (September/October 1994).

218. For the offer of doubling their flights see, Secretary Christopher spoke at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Plenary Session in Rome, November 30, 1993, "Secretary Christopher Discusses Bosnia and European Security at CSCE Conference," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, vol.4, no.4/5 (January/April 1994), 103. For the other humanitarian contributions see, Secretary Christopher Announces the Six Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy, "The Shifting Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy; Peacekeeping Downgraded," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, vol.4, no.4/5 (January/April 1994), 47-48.


227. *Ibid*.


233. On August 14, 1992, France announced that it was prepared to contribute a 1,100 strong force to help implement resolution 770. Canada, Spain, Italy, and Belgium also said they were willing to send troops. The U.K. was initially opposed to the use of ground troops but later changed its mind when, on August 18, it announced that it was willing to contribute 1,800 soldiers to the UN force in Bosnia to provide protection to the humanitarian convoys. See, *Kessing's Record of World Events*, vol.38., no.8 (August 1992), 39035; and Paul Lewis, "U.N. Will Add NATO Troops To Bosnia Force," *New York Times*, September 11, 1992, A1.


235. In early July 1994, the Constitutional Court ruled that Germany's 1949 constitution did not bar German troops from joining UN peacekeeping operations or combat missions, as long as it was approved by parliament. See, "German force okayed for ex-Yugoslavia," *The Globe and Mail*, July 23, 1994, A7.

236. See, Holger H. Mey, "Germany, NATO, and the War in the Former Yugoslavia," *Comparative Strategy*, vol.12, no.2 (April-June 1993), 239-245.


238. Steinberg, *op.cit.*, 45-46.


244. Kriendler, op.cit., 19.


248. Ibid.

249. Ibid.

250. See Diehl, op.cit., 76.


252. Susan R. Mills, Deputy Controller in the Office of Programme and Planning, Budget and Finance at the United Nations in New York, discusses, in a recently published article, the different ways the UN decision-makers have found to work around their funding problems. See, Mills, op.cit., 27-29.


256. For example, the United States regular budget assessment is 25% while its peacekeeping assessment is 30%. Therefore if a peacekeeping operation costs 1 million dollars the United States is required to pay $300,000 dollars.


259. Durch, *op.cit.*, 44.


263. *Ibid*.


268. For some examples of important problems in UNPROFOR's work which are attributable to inadequate financing see, Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?," *Adelphi Paper 281* (London, 1993), 35-37.


271. The commander in charge of field operations is also known as the Chief Military Observer, Deputy Force Commander, or the Deputy Chief Military Observer.


276. The deployment of 100 military observers to Bosnia was agreed upon by all parties and was contained in the Implementing Accord signed in Sarajevo on January 3, 1992 which called for the full implementation of the November 23, 1991 Geneva Agreement.

277. Steinberg, op.cit., 45.


280. Office of the Spokesman For the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, NY 10017.


283. Ibid.

284. This summary is derived from, Ibid.

285. Ibid.


287. See, Ibid.

288. Ibid.
289. *Ibid.* According to Mather’s article the British and French have argued for a command and control structure that cuts out the "intermediaries" but it is not clear whom they mean by the intermediaries.


294. These and other important recommendations for improvement in UN peacekeeping command and control operations were presented by the Clinton Administration during the spring of 1994 in *Presidential Decision Directive 25*. I am indebted to Dr. J. Sokolsky who provided me with a copy of this document.


296. See, Diehl, *op. cit.*, 77-78.


299. Diehl, *op. cit.*, 78.

300. *Ibid*.


303. In August 1994, the situation changed when Serbia withdrew its support for the Bosnian Serbs. As a result, Serbia cut off further relations and cooperation with the Bosnian Serbs and
closed the border between Serb-dominated "rump Yugoslavia" and Serb-held Bosnia to exports of everything except food, clothes, and medicine. Furthermore, Bosnian Serb leaders were banned from the territory of "rump Yugoslavia." See, "Belgrade pulls out of Bosnian war," *The Globe and Mail*, August, 5, 1994, A8.


311. Graham Day, Civil Affairs Officer, UNPROFOR and Major-General John-Arch MacInnis, Former Deputy Commander, UNPROFOR, "Missed Opportunities in the Balkans? Lessons for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy from the Former Yugoslavia," Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy in the New World (dis)Order A Workshop Hosted by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University and the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association Saint Mary’s University, 14-16 October 1994.


314. For these examples, see, *ibid*, 123-124

315. *Ibid*.


318. White, *op.cit.*, 158.


333. Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky, in his assessment of my manuscript, pointed out that once UNPROFOR was deployed, it was much more difficult for NATO take more forceful action against the warring factions in Bosnia for fear of reprisal attacks against the peacekeepers. That is why countries with troops on the ground, such as Canada, Britain, and France, opposed the wide use of air strikes. Dr. Sokolsky says that this raises the question of "whether, when there is no peace to keep and peacekeeping forces are deployed anyway, protecting the peacekeepers and not the civilian population, becomes the higher priority."

334. For a discussion on this see, Ernest W. Lefever, "Reining in the U.N.," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no.3 (Summer 1993), 17-20.


336. Cviic, op.cit., 76.

337. Ibid, 76-77.

338. These models are advocated by William J. Durch. The discussion to follow on these models is drawn from William J. Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 1993), 22-29.


340. Ibid.

341. Ibid, 28.

342. Ibid, 29.
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