

**Heidegger's Primordial Temporality:
A Hermeneutical Analysis of the Phenomenology of Time**

By © Emily-Jean Gallant

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Abstract

This thesis explores the phenomenology of time according to Martin Heidegger by taking a hermeneutical detour through Saint Augustine's *Confessions* and Paul's *Letters to the Thessalonians*. In order to adequately discuss Heidegger's notion of time we first require a historical mediation, i.e., to go back to and interpret the time phenomenon by engaging in a hermeneutical analysis. Therefore, the method that Heidegger adopts (the hermeneutical situation) is the method that I adopt throughout. It is important to note that I will be conducting my own phenomenology, i.e., I will be phenomenologizing in an attempt to better understand the time phenomenon in relation to factual life experience. This allows me to discuss Heidegger's account of primordial temporality, the foundations of which can be hermeneutically uncovered in the past.

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Introduction:

A phenomenology of time can be uncovered in the philosophical contemplations of past thinkers. Phenomenological tendencies reveal themselves to us when we revisit these past ideas with a particular comportment, i.e., by hermeneutically examining them. Alternatively, others have attempted to uncover and interpret the original intentions of an author when examining past ideas. Essentially, they strive to understand the work of past authors just as those authors would have understood themselves. This is the approach many historians and even philosophers opt for—to investigate the ideas and events of the past as accurately as possible. In order to achieve this accuracy, it is generally presumed that one must set aside one’s own cultural, historical and even temporal situation. This approach is not necessarily false; however, it can restrict questioning and prevent certain inquiries from being opened up. Consequently, the phenomenon under investigation becomes concealed. This analysis, on the contrary, intends to unconceal the past phenomenological tendencies found within the works of Saint Augustine and St. Paul by adopting Heidegger’s hermeneutical method. This will be accomplished by exploring the interpretations of time that Augustine and Paul put forth and in which the phenomenology of time can be revealed and discussed “anew” via factual life experience.¹

¹ Heidegger states that “we need to understand the ancients anew.” Martin Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview,” from *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren, trans. Charles Bambach (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 176. Here I am insisting that, in order to properly understand Heidegger and the phenomenology of time, we need to adopt this same approach not only to his conception of time, but also to the conceptions of time put forth by Augustine and Paul.

The basic structure of Heidegger's hermeneutical method consists of a reduction, destruction and construction. The reductive part 'goes back' to and outlines the dominant view with respect to the phenomenon in question. This dominant view is then delineated and allows for the unveiling of certain tendencies. Following from this is a revelation about the dominant interpretation, which has a tendency towards "levelling down"² the phenomenon and thus revealing that there must be an alternative interpretation. Revealing that the interpretation is faulty (or at the very least does not capture the entire phenomenon) is the destructive part. In destroying the interpretation, by revealing the problems therein, one is able to open up the possibility for an alternative explanation of the phenomenon. This destruction of the dominant interpretation unconceals something new—these new features (of the phenomenon) are outlined and thus become the constructive part. Something new arises out of this process (something that allows the phenomenon to show itself from itself), i.e., a new encounter with the phenomenon is factually experienced.

I will be providing a reduction, destruction and construction of the phenomenon of time as it appears in Augustine and Paul. My reconstruction of Heidegger's hermeneutical method consists of three parts: 1) Everyday Conception of Time (the Reduction); 2) Ecstatic Horizon (the Destruction); 3) Temporality (the Construction). I will be relying heavily on Heidegger's earlier works: from the early Freiburg and Marburg Periods, including *Being and Time* and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. It is in Heidegger's early writings and lecture courses that he implements his

² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 165.

hermeneutical method in order to uncover questions regarding the meaning of being and time. These early works also set the foundation for Heidegger's *magnum opus*, *Being and Time*, which demonstrates that his use of the hermeneutical method enabled him to realize and construct his own ontology and phenomenology. Some of the secondary sources that I will be referring to include John van Buren's *The Early Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, Theodore Kisiel's *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, S.J. McGrath's *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology of the Godforsaken* and *The Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life* edited by S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski. It is important to note that I will be conducting my own phenomenology, i.e., I will be phenomenologizing in an attempt to better understand the time phenomenon in relation to factual life experience. This will allow me to discuss Heidegger's account of primordial temporality, the foundations of which can be hermeneutically uncovered in the past. I am not going to investigate these past ideas simply to emphasize the influence that they had on Heidegger—even though the historical influence is undeniable. Furthermore, I am not going to conduct a literary review or a critical assessment of Augustine and Paul's writings in order to understand them as they understood themselves. On the contrary, I am asserting that, in order to adequately discuss the phenomenology of time, we have to go back to thinkers like Augustine and Paul who can be regarded as "proto-phenomenologists."³ Such an assertion necessarily means that I will be destroying the traditional interpretations of

³ See Graeme Nicholson, "The End of Time: Temporality in Paul's Letters to the Thessalonians," from *The Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life*, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 226.

Augustine and Paul in order to unconceal a new interpretation—an interpretation that Augustine and Paul did not intend and that many scholars may not appreciate.

My analysis will begin by discussing the significance of everydayness for Heidegger, followed by a reduction of the everyday concept of time. Book XI of Augustine's *Confessions* will be offered as the everyday concept of time, which I will deconstruct. The construction will then be attained by exemplifying Paul's *Letters to the Thessalonians* in which authentic and primordial temporality can be revealed. My reason for selecting Augustine's notion of time as opposed to Aristotle's is partially due to Heidegger's favorable reference to Augustine's treatment of time.⁴ Although Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle's conception of time is "more rigorous," Augustine is nevertheless recognized to be one of the exceptions (along with Kant) to the everyday treatment of time.⁵ Heidegger detects something in Augustine's conception of time that, at least in some respect, breaks free from the tradition (despite it still remaining Aristotelian "in principle").⁶ Therefore, the Augustinian conception of time ought to be examined more closely especially if he is considered to have treated "the time phenomenon more originally" and is cited as being one of the exceptions to the common, everyday understanding of time.⁷ Furthermore, by examining Augustine, the continual influence that Aristotle's treatment of time has had on the history of philosophy can be clearly observed. As a result, a hermeneutical analysis of Augustine's notion of time

⁴ See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 232: ". . . Augustine sees some dimensions of the time phenomenon more originally."

⁵ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 232. I have included the full quote, which is on page 9 of my analysis.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 232.

reveals the Aristotelian influence and thus the everyday notion of time is again displayed (through Augustine). Rather than merely recapitulating Heidegger's treatment of the everyday notion of time, I shall conduct a new treatment that will lead to the same conclusion that Heidegger himself unveiled. Moreover, by exemplifying Paul's *Letters* and their connection to Heidegger in the construction, eschatology and kairological time can be properly exposed.

It ought to be noted that other historical figures could have been utilized; however, I have selected Augustine and Paul due to their link to Christianity, which is a vital turning point for the investigation into the phenomenology of time. Heidegger's construction of the time phenomenon, it will be exposed, is an attitude towards time that originated in Judaism and became explicit with the rise of Christianity. Heidegger was thoroughly educated in the tenets of Christianity and, as a result, certain aspects of his philosophical thought reveal that influence.⁸ Hence, by examining the notions of time put forth by Augustine and Paul, the phenomenology of time in relation to Heidegger can be properly revealed. For it shall be demonstrated that others throughout history (e.g. Augustine and Paul), have dealt with factual life experience in connection with time and by illuminating these experiences the phenomenology of time (as well as Heidegger's project) can be understood "anew." Factual life experience—hermeneutically uncovered in the philosophical contemplations of past thinkers—proves to be the appropriate initial position to adopt when investigating human existence.

⁸ See S.J. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology of the Godforsaken* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 8. See also John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 295.

Heidegger maintains that the being of the human being (*Dasein*) lives, for the most part, in average everydayness. *Dasein* is absorbed in the world of its concern, i.e., occupying itself with worldly tasks such as working, going to school, and even talking to one another. These everyday dealings enable *Dasein* to get on and navigate in the world—it is a basic constitution of the being of the human being. Average everydayness, however, is also responsible for concealing a more primordial notion of the being of the human being, viz., its “*ownmost*” being gets covered up (much more on this later).⁹ This covering up has distorted various concepts and ideas throughout history, such as the notions of being and time, which have become “equated with constant presence-at-hand.”¹⁰ The history of philosophy, especially metaphysics, is responsible for the notion that being is “a-temporal”—a “*presentifying* absorption in the present.”¹¹ Being and time become reduced to what is “*now*,” what Heidegger believes is a perpetuation of the Aristotelian model of time as “*now*.”¹² Thus average everydayness is responsible for making time into what is constantly present—the concept of time gets lost in everydayness:

The more that everyday *Dasein* becomes absorbed in shared concerns, the less time it has and the more precise the clocks become. . . . for using a clock means to turn all time into the present.¹³

⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 355.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹¹ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 209 for “a-temporal” and see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 350 for “*presentifying* absorption in the present.”

¹² See Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 170: “This now is not, however, my now, but the “now” of the clock that we can speak about together, the public now of being-with-one-another. This is the time of the everyone that belongs to publicness.”

¹³ *Ibid.* See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 261-263.

According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy, principally metaphysics, is guilty of this reduction of the concept of time to the present. In other words, time has been construed “as a *sequence of nows*,” where the present or “the now” is elevated.¹⁴ This way of conceiving time causes the past and the future to be forgotten. For Heidegger, the Scholastics are among the worst offenders—for they disseminate the notion of a creator, which causes the objects under investigation to be covered up even further. This analysis will show that mixing the notion of a creator with one’s investigation into time leads to a misconstrual of the time phenomenon (as it reveals itself). Thus, by conjoining theology and philosophy, i.e., when philosophy becomes preoccupied with theology, a distortion of the time phenomenon occurs.¹⁵ Therefore, theology, according to Heidegger, is not the appropriate theme for philosophy—theology mixed with philosophy becomes *ontotheology*. As with average everydayness, ontotheology is responsible for the forgetfulness of being;¹⁶ however, average everydayness is not something we can necessarily avoid. Philosophers, on the other hand, can choose not to engage in ontotheological discourse, mainly because ontotheology seems almost akin to purposely hindering one’s inquiries. Factual life experience is the proper theme for philosophy and ontotheology (the history of Western metaphysics) only distracts philosophy from investigating its proper theme.

¹⁴ See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 257.

¹⁵ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 208-209.

¹⁶ See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 21-35 & 75. See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 112-121 for a discussion of “the inadequate foundation of the traditional treatment of the problem” of being.

This analysis intends to go back to the works of Paul (theology) and Augustine (ontotheology) in order to uncover a phenomenology of time therein. There is an important distinction to be made regarding factual life experience and religion. On the one hand, it could be concluded that religious life is factually transparent in philosophy. Such an assertion highlights the primacy of religion over philosophy—that philosophy derives from religion—or rather, that religion aids philosophical contemplation. Philosophy would then require religion in order to adequately discuss human existence, something that has been lacking in philosophy for some time. Heidegger’s primordial temporality could be interpreted, in this case, as being derived (or even pilfered) from Christianity. On the other hand, it could be determined that there is something factually transparent about religion, i.e., that factual life experience is primary and can be uncovered in religion. Religion, in this case, is derived from factual life experience and, through philosophical contemplation, one is able to reveal the significance of religion. Thus philosophy becomes the appropriate *modus operandi* to understand human existence. Heidegger’s primordial temporality would be interpreted as being primary (as the name suggests) and exemplifiable in Christianity. Although arguments can be made for both interpretations, the approach that I will adopt will be the one that Heidegger adopts—that religion (in particular Christianity) is derived from factual life experience.¹⁷ Contrary to what Heidegger may suggest, this does not diminish the importance of religion; quite the reverse, it demonstrates that we have to include religion in our

¹⁷ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 205.

analyses. If factual life experience can be found in religion, then we ought to explore religion in order to gain better access to factual life experience.

In the 1920-21 lecture course, which includes “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” Heidegger appears to commend Christian life experience, which helps one to comport oneself in a temporal manner. However, when *Being and Time* was published in 1927, all mention of theology in connection with factual life experience ceased. Many speculations have arisen regarding “Heidegger’s theological silence” and some of those speculations and criticisms will be outlined, albeit only in brief.¹⁸ It is indisputable that Heidegger adopts tenets of Christianity in his own ontology; however, he concurrently maintains that philosophy has to remain “*in principle atheistic*.”¹⁹ Pointing out such an apparent contradiction does not suggest that in adopting a certain structure one necessarily has to adopt all that that structure encompasses, i.e., the entire belief system. On the other hand, Heidegger’s staunch opposition to theology and his adoption of it is rather perplexing. Max Scheler believed that Heidegger adopted a theological base for his thought, i.e., that he had pre-philosophical commitments in *Being and Time* (in the form of theology no less).²⁰ Karl Löwith also accused Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as being a “disguised theology.”²¹ Heidegger, it has been

¹⁸ McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, ix.

¹⁹ Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” in *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, trans. & ed. John Van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 121.

²⁰ McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 3-4 & 173. See also Jaromir Brejdek, “*Philosophia Crucis*: The Influence of Paul on Heidegger’s Phenomenology,” in *A Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life*, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 211. See *ibid.*, 213 for Heidegger’s re-construction of Pauline anthropology in *Being and Time*.

²¹ Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 423. See also McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 22 & 173. See quote by Rudolf Bultmann from *ibid.*, 185: “Above all Martin Heidegger’s

asserted, has a “hidden theological agenda,” which can be observed with his use of terms such as “falling,” “guilt,” “resoluteness” etc.²² It has been suggested that Heidegger’s lack of acknowledgment regarding the “theological origin” of his thought was specifically to avoid using “Christian terminology.”²³ Even the term *kairology*, which Heidegger used in 1922-23, was no longer employed—despite the idea of kairology shaping division two of *Being and Time*.²⁴

For whatever reasons, some perhaps unconscious or simply inadvertent, Heidegger in his final draft, contrary to the previous draft, is subtly downplaying, disguising, or otherwise distorting some of the deepest roots of his thought.²⁵

Perhaps Heidegger decided that Christianity “for its own sake” was not central to his thought, but rather its methodology and structure were exemplary and worth appropriating.²⁶ Hence, upon adopting said methodology and structure, he did not feel the need to discuss religion anymore. His primary goal was to “develop the formal schematism of time which is most appropriate.”²⁷ Thus, if the formal schematism that is most appropriate derives from early Christian texts, then that is the schematism he must use. Heidegger’s “de-Christianized” version of the appropriated terms (resoluteness, authenticity, guilt etc.), as suggested above, might be intended to reveal that these notions were actually originally appropriated by Christians.²⁸ In other words, these notions and

existential analysis of Dasein appears to be nothing more than a secular philosophical presentation of the New Testament insight into human existence.”

²² Ibid., 173.

²³ Brejdek, “*Philosophia Crucis*,” 211.

²⁴ See Kiesel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 421-423.

²⁵ Ibid., 422.

²⁶ Gerhard Ruff, “Present History: Reflections on Martin Heidegger’s Approach to Early Christianity,” in *A Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life*, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 233.

²⁷ Kiesel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 423.

²⁸ For “de-Christianized” see McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 22.

this formal schematism is representative of and grounded in our way of being-in-the-world, our existence.²⁹ Christianity would be investigated, therefore, in order to unconceal and return to these original ideas, which are located in the being of the human being.³⁰ Heidegger, therefore, adopts and promotes these notions and, in particular, the meaning of the terms kairology and eschatology (through not the terms themselves) throughout *Being and Time*. This allows him to answer the main question regarding the meaning of being and time.

Heidegger demonstrates how our common way of conceiving time (such as clock time) is responsible for concealing this more primordial notion of temporality—the temporality that is the condition of the possibility of being. The possibility of Dasein reckoning with time and “using up its own time, the time allotted” to it, depends on primordial temporality.³¹ Everyday time usage is derived from primordial temporality, which is our ability to recognize phenomena such as ‘before,’ ‘at this moment,’ ‘after,’ etc.³² Without the ability to identify instances of ‘before,’ ‘at this moment’ and ‘after,’ Dasein would not be able to navigate in the world. Indeed, the possibility of language would cease. In order to arrive at his conclusion, Heidegger appropriates two essential ideas—one from the Greeks and the other from the Christians. Beginning with the Greeks, Heidegger was able to unveil (what he believes is) the origin of the term *aletheia*, which is not defined as truth, but rather as unconcealment. Heidegger actually

²⁹ Ibid., 206.

³⁰ See ibid., 205 for “. . . philosophy reclaiming from Christianity what is rightfully its own.”

³¹ Piotr Hoffman, “Dasein and “Its” Time,” in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 330.

³² See Heidegger’s discussion of “Temporality [Temporalität] and a priori of being: The phenomenological method of ontology” in Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 324-330.

unconcealed this meaning of the term *aletheia* after hermeneutically destroying its common origin and meaning.

It is not for the sake of etymology that I stubbornly translate the name *aletheia* as unconcealment. . . . Rather, *aletheia*, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth.³³

Hence, Heidegger applies this method of *aletheia* to time by actually destroying the common conception of time and thus unconcealing primordial temporality as a result. The Greeks' conception of time, on the other hand, is rather problematic for Heidegger and it is understandable, therefore, that he turned to Christian eschatological texts. What is most intriguing, however, is the connection between truth and time for Heidegger: using the Greeks *aletheia*—albeit in a newly constructed way—and applying its basic methodology to our common view of time, Heidegger ends up with a view that is akin to Christianity's eschatological time.³⁴ Heidegger “positively appropriates” two historical views—*aletheia* from the Greeks and eschatology from the Christians—in order to ground his notion of primordial temporality. The question of the meaning of being and an inquiry into beings is only possible if there is already a notion of primordial temporality that allows for there to be such questioning in the first place. As stated above, language is only possible and, by extension, questioning is only possible provided that we have primordial temporality. Before Dasein can engage in any inquiry (whether it be philosophical, scientific or historical), it must have a notion of primordial temporality. Before Dasein can even engage/live in the world (whether that engagement/life be authentic or inauthentic), it must have a notion of primordial temporality.

³³ Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972), 68-70.

³⁴ See Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, 422.

It shall be argued that in order to adequately discuss the phenomenology of time, one has to hermeneutically uncover ideas from past thinkers, namely that “the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality.”³⁵ Therefore, by going back to Augustine’s extension of the soul (*distentio anime*) and the factual life of Christians (exemplified by Paul), Heidegger’s primordial temporality can be properly revealed. Since these two Christians possess a phenomenology of time, albeit unbeknownst to them, it is imperative that we return to these past ideas in order to move the analysis forward. Likewise, it is only by starting from our present situation that we can make this return in the manner that we do; uncovering something in these past ideas that can modify our present analysis. As a result, the reliability of Heidegger’s project leading to primordial temporality can be ascertained and thus more credence can be granted to his phenomenological account of time. Where future analyses into the phenomenology of time will go can only be determined provided that such analyses allow past and present discussions to reveal themselves. Consequently, looking ahead, future analyses will modify this present and these past examinations into the phenomenology of time.

³⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 488.

Chapter 1: Everyday Conception of Time (the Reduction)

It is important to reveal what everydayness is and how it constitutes Dasein—in particular, the ways in which Dasein lives in and engages with the world. For Heidegger, this everyday engagement with the world results in Dasein and Dasein’s inquiries to be “levelled down.”³⁶

So it is by looking at the most pronounced examples of Dasein’s autonomous self-interpretation that we can lay bare Dasein’s discoverature in light of its tendency for concealment. Public opinion and curiosity are modes of discoverature brought about by the being of Dasein itself in the shape of everydayness.³⁷

The “examples of Dasein’s autonomous self-interpretation” are made available to us by revealing and exploring the “modes of discoverature,” which are simultaneously concealing. The “tendency for concealment” applies to the being of Dasein that conceals/covers up its ownmost being and, consequently, to the inquiries that Dasein concerns itself with.³⁸ These inquiries and their subsequent conclusions—motivated by “public opinion and curiosity”—have been concealing as opposed to revealing the “question of the meaning of being” and time.³⁹ This everyday and ordinary way of investigating and understanding these concepts, especially the concept of time, “has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later.”⁴⁰ Dilthey, however, may be recognized by Heidegger as being an exception—for he was seeking to discern an understanding of “human self-knowledge” not conceptually, but rather by means of a

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, trans. Ingo Farin with Alex Skinner (New York: Continuum, 2011), 33.

³⁷ Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 33.

³⁸ See Heidegger’s discussion of “semblance” and Dasein “bringing itself into deception” in Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 260.

³⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 1; Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 33.

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 39.

“vital questioning.”⁴¹ He acknowledged “certain structures in life,” however, he did not go far enough and pose the correct questions concerning the being of the human being and “thus his own intentions remained unrealized.”⁴² It is therefore important to see how the entire history of philosophy, including Dilthey, has continually bypassed and concealed the question of the meaning of being and time.

This tendency to cover over is nothing other than Dasein’s flight from itself into publicness, a flight that has important consequences for understanding the phenomenon of time.⁴³

Thus a new account—namely a phenomenological one—is required in order to advance “Dilthey’s own position” and, accordingly, inquire into the questions that have been continually concealed.⁴⁴ Furthermore, before an investigation into the phenomenon of time can occur, the ways in which these questions have been covered over must be revealed. Heidegger believes that time has to be understood “as the reality of our own selves” and that our everyday way of dealing with time thus characterizes the being of Dasein, namely, as inauthentic being-with-one-another.⁴⁵ In fact, Heidegger begins his own analyses by revealing the importance of the “customary” and everyday interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation.⁴⁶ Heidegger’s examination of time, therefore, begins by first conducting his hermeneutical method on the everyday interpretation of time, which he achieves by using Aristotle as the exemplar. It is in this examination that

⁴¹ Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 153-155.

⁴² Ibid., 158, 162. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 18.

⁴³ Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 165.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 172.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 172. See also Ibid., 162: “We will attempt, phenomenologically, to set forth characteristics of the being of human being and to see human being just as it shows itself from itself in its **everyday existence** [*Dasein*].” My emphasis.

Heidegger reduces, destroys and constructs the everyday conception of time as it is depicted by Aristotle. Therefore, an outline of everydayness shall be provided followed by a brief discussion of the everyday notion of time that has been precipitated by Aristotle. How Heidegger deals with this everyday interpretation of time—the method that he adopts to assess it—will also be discussed and exemplified in this section.

1.1. Heidegger's notion of 'everydayness' and the everyday notion of time

How and why Dasein is absorbed in everydayness is not due to some “event that merely happens to Dasein” (as if by accident), but it is a basic constitution of Dasein.⁴⁷ Dasein is *in-the-world* and it is precisely this world (and the activities that are taken up in that world) that Dasein is concerned with. Being concerned means that Dasein “become[s] caught up in its own worries” and finds itself in a “fallen state.”⁴⁸ Dasein deals with things in the world out of concern and as a result, it falls away from itself. This falling away occurs when Dasein is faced with a particular threat.⁴⁹ That which threatens Dasein is not fear—for fear is precisely fear of something encountered in the world, e.g., a fear of heights, a fear of spiders, etc. The threat that Heidegger is referring to is not something that is encountered in the world, but rather one that is located in the being of Dasein.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 33.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 34. See also Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 164: “This everyone-Dasein has the tendency to lose itself in its concerns with the world and to fall away from its own self. The human being is inauthentic in its everyday world, and it is precisely this fact that defines the primary reality of the human Dasein.”

⁴⁹ Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 34.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 34. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 179-182, 228-235, especially 230 for a distinction between “fear” and “anxiety.” See also van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 174, for a distinction “between “fear” directed toward “something definite” in the world and “anxiety” directed toward the “nothing” of “the possibility of possibility.””

Dasein's being-in-the-world is lived, for the most part, in the security of average everydayness, which, as stated above, conceals. Everydayness is responsible for covering up that which is threatening, namely, it covers up its *ultimate possibility*.⁵¹ Thus, the ultimate possibility of Dasein threatens and causes Dasein to flee into "the familiar, secure, average, public everydayness. . . ."⁵² This occurs because Dasein exists in possibility; it is always "what it can be."⁵³ In everydayness, Dasein's "what it can be"—its possibility—is worldly. In other words, Dasein's possibility is what Dasein strives for, e.g. to get a job, to have a family, to retire, etc. Possibility in the everyday sense is one's future goals, that towards which one is striving. On the other hand, Dasein's ultimate possibility is not a worldly occasion or goal, but "is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein," viz. death.⁵⁴ Death is threatening and is what Dasein flees *in the face of*, which results in Dasein becoming immersed in the world of its concern.⁵⁵ Thus, in everydayness and in the world of its concern, Dasein lives its death by fleeing from it. The act of dying is not the problem, but rather, it is living with death in the present that is the cause for concern.⁵⁶ Dasein therefore has different ways of "standing before its death"—in everydayness death is dealt with "indifferently," i.e., it is "thrust aside."⁵⁷ (Another way of standing before death, authentically, will be expounded upon in the constructive part of this hermeneutical analysis, which is on pages 58-72). Dasein, in

⁵¹ Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 40.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 35.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 294.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 229. See also Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research," 166: "Death is not something that comes to me from somewhere; it is rather what I myself am. I myself am the possibility of my own death. Death is the utmost end of what is possible in my Dasein; it is the most extreme possibility of my Dasein."

⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, 42 and Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research," 166-167.

⁵⁷ Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research," 166-167.

caring for itself in everydayness, evades death as a possibility and focuses solely on the things that it still intends to do.⁵⁸ It is important to note that Heidegger does not hold that Dasein, at some point in time, realizes its ownmost being (its eventual death) and then flees from it into everydayness. On the contrary, everydayness is a basic constitution of Dasein and not something that simply comes about or develops, as if it were in some way avoidable.⁵⁹ Fleeing in the face of one's ownmost being (death) has shielded Dasein, it has comforted and soothed Dasein. On the other hand, it has also prevented Dasein from inquiring into and uncovering the phenomenon that is closest to it.

Perhaps everydayness can be discerned in both a positive and a negative way; it is positive in that it is how we are for the most part, how we 'get on' and navigate in the world of our concern. By investigating how we navigate in the world—how we engage with objects ready-to-hand and other Daseins—we are able to acquire a positive depiction of the being of human being. It is negative, however, in that we become absorbed in everydayness, which causes us to forget our ownmost being. Likewise, it causes our inquiries to be absorbed with these navigations and engagements (everydayness), thus making it even more difficult to attain original and genuine access to the phenomena. Interestingly, by discerning everydayness in such a manner, we can see a double instance of forgetting, i.e., when lost in everydayness we forget our ownmost being, but when faced with our ownmost being we forget everydayness. Of course, forgetting everydayness opens up the possibility for alternative lines of inquiry regarding factual

⁵⁸ Ibid., 166-167.

⁵⁹ See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, especially 156.

life experience, which is the appropriate theme of philosophy.⁶⁰ Thus, forgetting everydayness (or at least casting it aside) becomes the appropriate and, in turn, the positive path to follow for the sake of philosophical inquiry. It is the forgetting of our ownmost being, however, that is the reason an adequate investigation into being has never occurred—for it continually “*covers itself up*.”⁶¹

. . . *time* needs to be *explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of being, and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being*. This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be distinguished from the way in which it is **ordinarily understood**.⁶²

Thus, the inquiries that have been put forth in the past have continually overlooked the phenomena that are closest to Dasein, the meaning of being and time.⁶³

Heidegger’s discussion of the everyday concept of time was accomplished by using Aristotle, for he believes that Aristotle was able to express “in clear conceptual form . . . the common understanding of time.”⁶⁴ It is therefore necessary to cite what Heidegger reveals about Aristotle with respect to his interpretation of time:

It can be said that subsequent times did not get essentially beyond the stages of Aristotle’s treatment of the problem [concerning time]—apart from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the Aristotelian concept of time.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ See Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 11.

⁶¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 168.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 39. My emphasis. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 5-6, 141.

⁶³ Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 160: “Returning to self-evident things concealed from the consciousness of everyday life is always the genuine path to great discoveries.”

⁶⁴ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 232.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 237.

Book IV of Aristotle's *Physics* reveals that "time and movement always correspond to each other."⁶⁶ Aristotle does not go so far as to assert that time is motion—for he makes it quite clear that what gets measured, gets measured in time, however, that which gets measured can also be at rest.⁶⁷ Therefore, time is something that belongs to movement and every movement occurs in time. Aristotle seems to have developed a reciprocal relationship between time and motion—for "we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement."⁶⁸ Aristotle also discusses notions of before and after and their relation to time itself: what is before and what is after can only be deemed 'before' and 'after' so long as there is a 'now' to divide them.⁶⁹ The now for Aristotle becomes a "boundary," it is an "attribute" of time (just like before and after), however, it is considered to be the link between the two.⁷⁰ It is not that time *is* the now, but rather, that time is divided, measured (and potentially understood) by the now.⁷¹ Heidegger examines this in far greater detail; however, it is essentially this idea that supplies Heidegger with his conclusion: that Aristotle's interpretation of time, revealed "as a *sequence of nows*," "corresponds to the common prescientific understanding of time."⁷²

Even today it is usually maintained that the past is no longer and the future is not yet, thereby elevating and privileging the present. This is due to our tendency to count, measure and deal with time in a way that suits our everyday activities. This comportment

⁶⁶ Aristotle, "Physics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol. One*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 371.

⁶⁷ Aristotle, "Physics," 375.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 373. See also *Ibid.*, 371: ". . . if any movement takes place in the mind we at once suppose that some time has indeed elapsed; and not only that but also, when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it seems to have taken place."

⁶⁹ See *ibid.*, 373.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 373. See also *ibid.*, 372: "Time, then, also is both continuous by the 'now' and divided by it."

⁷¹ See *ibid.*, 372-373.

⁷² Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 257.

towards time—this construal of time—requires the use of clocks to mark the passage of events in order to act in the world of our concern. Aristotle’s interpretation of time, which Heidegger reduces and which reveals this comportment, is only an “*initial approach*.”⁷³ The time phenomenon requires further interpretation, i.e., a destruction that can highlight these everyday tendencies and lead to the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. Heidegger is then able to assert something about the time phenomenon: the features of this common, everyday view of time “[point] back to an original time, *temporality*” and it is this “original time” that has allowed for the everyday interpretation to arise.⁷⁴ Much more could be said about Aristotle, especially in connection with Heidegger; however, the purpose here is to set the foundation for this analysis, i.e., to introduce how Heidegger assessed Aristotle in order to foreshadow how I intend to assess Augustine.

As mentioned above, the use of clocks is vital to our daily lives; however, such an activity (one that is so prevalent) is not investigated and yet, it is presupposed in these everyday interpretations. Our ability to *reckon* with time, to *have* time, to *take* time, etc., is never really explored.⁷⁵

Why are there clocks? Because everyday life wants to have the course of the world available in the “now.” Now and then, and then, and then. . . . Nothing but more nows that one wants to make available in the realm of the everyone. To make these nows universally accessible requires a clock.⁷⁶

By uncovering and investigating these time phenomena, which are revealed to be taken for granted in the everyday interpretation (but that are so essential to our everyday dealings), Heidegger is then able to construct a new understanding of time. Before

⁷³ Ibid., 257.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 257.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 258.

⁷⁶ Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 170.

Heidegger reveals his own interpretation (whether it be his interpretation of time or truth or being) he has to begin by first going back to the common or everyday interpretation that dominates philosophical inquiry.

My method, like Heidegger's, will begin with the everyday interpretation of time. Likewise, facticity will be taken as the initial position, which will determine my approach to Book XI of Augustine's *Confessions*.⁷⁷ Book XI titled "Time and Eternity" will be scrutinized and hermeneutically investigated in order to uncover something new in his views on time. Augustine and likewise Augustinian scholars may not consider Augustine's notion of time to be phenomenological. However, as stated above, upon further examination and with a particular comportment (a comportment that should be acknowledged), phenomenological tendencies reveal themselves. This comportment is one that reflects our current perspective—our present place in history. Our perspective recognizes the pervasiveness of phenomenological inquiry, which drastically affects our interpretations of past ideas in philosophy. In other words, our current temporal situation is one that includes phenomenology as one of our philosophical methods. Having knowledge of phenomenology enables us to go back to past ideas in which we can uncover early forms of phenomenological expression (or "proto-phenomenology").⁷⁸ Uncovering early inklings of phenomenology in the past does not suggest that such inklings were purposely constructed or even recognized by the authors themselves. Our present temporal situation (our knowledge) is what is being implemented when we

⁷⁷ See Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle," 126.

⁷⁸ See Graeme Nicholson, "The End of Time," 226.

examine the past ideas. Therefore, by interpreting Augustine in this manner—a manner that is starkly different from how Augustine himself viewed his work—opens up the possibility for something new to reveal itself, viz. that Augustine’s account of time has phenomenological inklings.

Heidegger insists that those scholars who intentionally try not to read anything into past ideas are inevitably “caught in the act of reading something into” those same ideas.⁷⁹ In order to get “the past to speak to us” we need to be aware of and formulate our “initial position of looking,” our “direction of looking” and our “scope of looking.”⁸⁰ These three ways of looking are temporally conditioned, i.e., they are recognized and determined by us and influenced by where we find ourselves in a particular time.⁸¹ To simply state that one requires an “initial position”, “direction” and “scope of looking” at an object under investigation may sound similar to a construction of a scientific method, i.e., making clear the parameters and regulations regarding one’s investigative method. On the contrary, hermeneutics is a “phenomenological explication of human existing itself.”⁸² It is not solely about understanding past ideas inasmuch as it is about attempting to understand the nature of ourselves *as we are in the process of examining* those ideas. Heidegger emphasizes that the being who asks the question of being (the inquirer), in that very act of questioning, reveals his/her own being:

⁷⁹ Ibid., 112.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 138: “...the return can also be performed so that it goes back *prior* to the questions which were posed in history, and the questions raised by the past are once again originally appropriated.”

⁸² Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 42.

The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities for its being, we shall denote the term “*Dasein*.”⁸³

Therefore our way of examining *Dasein* must be by going back to how others have inquired, i.e., what sort of questions *Dasein* has posed in the past and how *Dasein* currently stands in relation to that past (from out of a present). Therefore, we can never rid ourselves of the prejudices of our present perspectives in an effort to view ancient ideas and thoughts in ways that the ancients would have viewed them, for such a feat is dubious.

In order to show, practically, how problematic it is to be oblivious of your own position/direction/scope of looking—the “how” of being interpreted⁸⁴—an example from the field of anthropology shall be provided.⁸⁵ Anthropologists and, in particular, ethnographers will live with another society (usually an indigenous group) in an attempt to study and understand them and their culture. Ethnographers strive to leave their biases, prejudices and ethnocentricities aside for the sake of immersing themselves in the cultural ways of an “other.” They actually attempt to attain a different perspective—to absorb themselves in the everyday existence of the other by performing the activities that the other engages in—however, this is not easily accomplished. The researchers will always be referring back to their knowledge base, especially during the publication of their findings. The self-other dichotomy is not something that can be overcome so easily,

⁸³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

⁸⁴ Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle,” 111.

⁸⁵ In the *History of the Concept of Time* (2), Heidegger discusses the *crisis of the sciences*, I intend to show, in one of the social sciences, yet another crisis: trying to understand an “other” in anthropological discourse.

particularly when a researcher (despite having the best intentions) infiltrates the cultural space of an other. The mere presence of the ‘alien’ researcher modifies the peoples’ behaviours and, consequently, the results of the ethnography. The best that an anthropologist can hope for is not to prejudge, censor or condemn the other, which is a fundamental element in the training of anthropologists today. It is therefore vital for anthropologists to be aware of what they are bringing to the interpretation, i.e., the position, direction and scope of looking and an awareness of what is mere observation verses what is supplementary explanation.⁸⁶ For such explanations have had terrible consequences for the history of anthropological theory and, as such, the cultural ways of the other have been continually covered up as a result of the unacknowledged presuppositions of the researcher.⁸⁷ Looking back to ancient thoughts and texts, not only is the world extremely different, but we are faced with the problem of language and translation. Therefore, it seems that endeavouring to understand the ancients and their ideas in the exact same way that they understood themselves and their ideas is rather futile:

The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated from out of **our own historical situation** and facticity. At issue is what the sense of history can signify **for us**, so that the “objectivity” of the historical “in itself” disappears. **History exists only from out of a present.**⁸⁸

⁸⁶ See Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research,” 158-159.

⁸⁷ In 1877 anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan proposed that human beings exist in different ethnical periods: “Savagery” “Barbarism,” and “Civilization.” He placed societies (past and present) into these periods: “All such tribes, then, as never attained to the art of pottery will be classed as savages, and those possessing this art but who never attained a phonetic alphabet and use of writing will be classed as barbarians.” Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society: Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1877), 10. This no doubt skews any adequate interpretation one can have of another society—for one’s initial position of looking at the object under investigation (the other) is informed by strongly held ethnocentric beliefs.

⁸⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 89. My emphasis.

The possibility that now past philosophical research will have an effect on the future of research can never consist in its results as such, but rather is rooted in the primordially of questioning which is attained and concretely worked out in each particular case, through which past research can become a present in ever-new ways as a model that evokes problems.⁸⁹

Therefore, we bring something to the ideas of the past—our interpretation becomes an essential part of the past ideas that we examine.⁹⁰

Past ideas also help us recognize where our current tendencies—in how we construe a problem—come from. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger examines the problem of time, which is very familiar to us, but quickly turns into something “strange and puzzling” once we try to clarify it.⁹¹ This difficulty of clarifying time is something that Heidegger takes from Augustine’s *Confessions*, which Heidegger quotes.⁹² It ought to be noted that Augustine, like Heidegger, also takes this “puzzling” problem of time from the past, in particular from Plotinus who makes a similar claim.⁹³ Thus time is something that is so close to us—we reckon with, count, and deal with it regularly—yet we seem to be at a loss when attempting to scrutinize it and “make it clear.”⁹⁴ This can be a possible reason why questions into the meaning of being and time

⁸⁹ Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle,” 113.

⁹⁰ See Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 430: “It is a reminder to the phenomenologist to become absolutely clear about the presuppositions of the hermeneutical situation from which he inescapably, that is, ontically starts.”

⁹¹ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 229.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 229: “What then is time; who can explain it easily and briefly? Who has comprehended it in thought so as to speak of it? But what is there that we mention in our discourse more familiar and better known than time? And we always understand it whenever we speak of it, and we understand it too when we hear someone else speak of it.—What then is time? If no one asks me about it, I know; if I am supposed to explain it to one who asks, I do not know; yet I say confidently that I know: if nothing were to pass away there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming there would be no time to come, and if nothing were to exist there would be no present time.”

⁹³ Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 230 (see footnote 19).

⁹⁴ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 229.

have been bypassed and forgotten—even considered to be “superfluous.”⁹⁵ Heidegger has a solution to this problem, however, and that is to begin with the common, everyday understanding of time, which “reached conceptual expression” in the early days of philosophical inquiry.⁹⁶

As has been stated previously, Heidegger commended Augustine for his account of time, which appeared to break from tradition. Heidegger, however, came to this conclusion once he uncovered the common, everyday interpretation of Augustine’s *Confessions* provided by Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack and Wilhelm Dilthey.⁹⁷ He demonstrated the “motivational centers” for all three interpretations, which further conceal the object under investigation, viz., Augustine’s *Confessions*.⁹⁸ After destroying the dominant interpretations, which categorized the *Confessions* as an autobiography, Heidegger was able to provide his own interpretation; he viewed Augustine’s *Confessions* as being “a three-part interpretation of the historical self.”⁹⁹ Heidegger saw that Augustine’s account of time, in particular, was linked to the soul and, as such, was akin to an expression of factual life experience.¹⁰⁰ Augustine’s extension of the soul (*distentio anime*), for example, allows for the possibility of the experience of “memory,” “immediate awareness” and “expectation.”¹⁰¹ By going back to his predecessors’ philosophical conceptions of time, Heidegger was able to acquire a “portrayal of the time

⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 2.

⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 230.

⁹⁷ See Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 115-125 for a complete discussion of the three interpretations of Augustine.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁹⁹ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 202.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, 235.

phenomenon.”¹⁰² It is this portrayal that Heidegger reduces and then destroys, which reveals something that was not previously there, i.e., something that was concealed by the common, everyday understanding is unconcealed. That which becomes unconcealed will enable Heidegger to make time “clear” and define what primordial temporality is. This is the method that I shall now adopt.

1.2: Everyday conception of time exemplified by Saint Augustine

In Book XI: “Time and Eternity,” Augustine begins, as in most sections of his *Confessions*, by pleading to God for assistance in acquiring knowledge:

Lord, eternity is yours, so you cannot be ignorant of what I tell you. Your vision of occurrences in time is not temporally conditioned. Why then do I set before you an ordered account of so many things? It is certainly not through me that you know them.¹⁰³

Augustine has presupposed that God is outside of our temporal structure—God is not bound by time in the same way that finite beings are. This is how Augustine can account for our way of experiencing time, which is fundamentally different from how God experiences time. Finite beings live in successive moments whereas God lives outside time and can see all moments simultaneously. The other problem for Augustine, however, is how heaven and earth were created, noting that if they exist (which they obviously do) then they must have been made. He justifies this view by stating that heaven and earth did not always exist; for something that “was not the case” but now “is” must indicate that it was “subject to change and variation.”¹⁰⁴ This is markedly similar to

¹⁰² McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 230.

¹⁰³ Augustine, *Confessions*, 221.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 224.

Aristotle's notion of the unmoved mover who caused "eternal motion," which precipitated the emergence/movement of finite things.¹⁰⁵ Even more interesting, however, is its similarity to the presocratic philosophers' struggle to comprehend how an infinite or indefinite substance accounts for the possibility of definite things coming into existence.¹⁰⁶ Equally for Augustine, it is apparent that heaven and earth could not have created themselves—they did not already exist "to be able to make" themselves.¹⁰⁷ The question now arises: how did God make heaven and earth and what "material" or "equipment" did he use to make them?¹⁰⁸

Augustine reveals how humans make things by already having at their disposal certain materials with which they can use to make other material objects. This is certainly not how God created heaven and earth. For humans, the material that they need to be able to make things already exists, but for God, no material or tools were available prior to God's creation of them.¹⁰⁹ Augustine concludes that heaven and earth were therefore created when God "spoke" them—by God's word he spoke them into existence.¹¹⁰ This speaking, however, appears to be rather complicated: for how exactly did the speech occur? This is where time becomes an issue for Augustine who pleads to know how the speech "moved:"

The voice is past and done with; it began and is ended. The syllables sounded and have passed away, the second after the first, the third after the second, and so on

¹⁰⁵ Aristotle, "Physics," 446.

¹⁰⁶ Patricia Curd, ed. *A Presocratics Reader*, trans. Richard D. McKirahan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996). See, in particular, the account provided by Anaximenes (14-16) who put forth a more complete analysis of the processes which take place.

¹⁰⁷ Augustine, *Confessions*, 224.

¹⁰⁸ See *ibid.*, 224 for "material" and see Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 97-98 for "equipment."

¹⁰⁹ Augustine, *Confessions*, 224-225.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 225.

in order until, after all the others, the last one came, and after the last silence followed.¹¹¹

Augustine confirms that the voice had to have come through a “movement,” which was in the service of the Lord’s will, but which was “itself temporal.”¹¹² The Aristotelian influence is apparent here; the idea of movement in connection with time figures prominently.

The problem for Augustine is that the utterance had to have taken time to convey the message so that heaven and earth could be created. Due to this, Augustine believes that something else had to have been created prior to heaven and earth. Thus temporal changes were already required in order for the message of the utterance to be sent. How could something else exist before heaven and earth?¹¹³ Only something that was created by God could have existed prior to heaven and earth, but this something could not have been made in the same manner as heaven and earth, viz., with words. Therefore, the words must have been “spoken eternally,” otherwise if the words followed in a successive manner, then time and alteration would exist prior and there could be no eternity.¹¹⁴

And in this way he is the beginning because, unless he were constant, there would be no fixed point to which we could return . . . Wisdom is the beginning, and in that beginning you made heaven and earth.¹¹⁵

Something constant (God) is responsible for creating movement and alteration (time), which is the condition for the possibility of finite things coming into existence. Augustine

¹¹¹ Ibid., 225.

¹¹² Ibid., 225.

¹¹³ Ibid., 226.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 226.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 227-228.

has demonstrated that before heaven and earth, time had to exist. Time, however, did not exist as some eternal thing which has always existed, but rather as something that came into existence out of the eternal word. This eternal realm, out of which the eternal word arose, had to always and already exist, otherwise it would not be eternal and, furthermore, there would be no eternity or immortality.¹¹⁶ Time was created by God and seems to have been necessary in order for God to be able to create heaven and earth—where these created things are affected by movement and alteration. Augustine has framed the problem of time as being something that we fret about due to our inability to experience the eternal; we are restricted to experiencing everything in time.¹¹⁷ We change and grow but God “subsists in simultaneity” and there could not have been any time prior to God.¹¹⁸

Augustine appears to struggle with the idea that time appears differently to humans than it does to God. As part of the reduction, it is important to discuss (in brief) the different interpretations of Augustine’s account of time. This will allow me to properly explicate and reduce the Augustinian perspective on time and to reveal how contemporary scholars have grasped his account—perpetuating the everyday notion of time as a result. What does it mean to have two different times, one for humans (subjective) and one for God (objective)? Is it even appropriate to discuss two distinct times in connection with Augustine, i.e., subjective vs. objective, or, put differently, the constructed time that humans experience vs. the objective time that God observes

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 226-228.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 228.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 230.

(alteration vs. simultaneity)?¹¹⁹ There are different ways to interpret the consequences of Augustine's notion of time. The subjectivist interpretation, held by prominent figures like Bertrand Russell, Etienne Gilson, and R. A. Markus, declares that time possesses no reality (or objectivity), but is merely a "construction of the mind."¹²⁰ Another interpretation, however, supports the notion that time is in fact real, but the "sequentialization" of time is "mind-dependent."¹²¹ Supporters of such a notion, such as Robert Jordan, Hugh M. Lacey, and Wilma Gundersdorf von Jess,¹²² state that humans live in time and "know things temporally," but God exists "outside of time" and "knows eternally."¹²³ A clear tension can be observed—what is the relation between time and eternity?

As revealed above, Augustine holds that time was created out of the eternal and thus the eternal is in some way responsible for the existence of change and alteration:

. . . dealing with the problem of the difference between objectivity and subjectivity . . . For Augustine, this amounts to an answer to the paradox of how eternity and temporality are compatible, or how the interaction between God and God's creation is possible.¹²⁴

God *used* time to create heaven and earth. Time was needed in order for heaven and earth to come into existence and thus heaven and earth are *in* time (created), but God remains *outside* time (eternal). Importantly, God created time (from *outside* time) and then

¹¹⁹ See Donald L. Ross, "Time, the Heaven of Heavens, and Memory in Augustine's *Confessions*," in *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991), 191-205.

¹²⁰ Ross, "Time, the Heaven of Heavens, and Memory," see pages 191-192.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 192.

¹²³ Herman Hausheer, "St. Augustine's Conception of Time," in *The Philosophical Review* 46, No. 5 (1937), 509.

¹²⁴ Danne W. Polk, "Temporal Impermanence and the Disparity of Time and Eternity," in *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991), 63-82. See page 64.

“speaks *in time*” to create heaven and earth.¹²⁵ It can be argued that created things and God are exclusively connected through time and in order to overcome the problem of time and eternity, Augustine has to provide a genesis of time to show the obvious link between the two. God required time in order to create heaven and earth, thus time is that which links God (the eternal) to us (the creation), which can account for the possibility of there being interaction between God and God’s creation. This link between eternity and time has been interpreted in a way where time is actually among the “fallen parts of a universal whole.”¹²⁶ In this interpretation, time is construed as a movement away from the eternal and hence a “diminution” of the eternal.¹²⁷ This movement away from the eternal is consistent with Augustine’s explanation of how God created time in which movement and alteration reside and opened up the possibility for the eternal word to speak heaven and earth into existence.

Now that Augustine has demonstrated his genesis of time, he moves on to discuss exactly what time is.¹²⁸ How are the past, present and future to be explained? Augustine begins by explaining that the past ceases to exist and the present exists, but only for the sake of passing out of existence, and the future is yet to exist.¹²⁹ Thus, the present is conceived as “being the only real time” despite its eventual annihilation when it becomes past.¹³⁰ Augustine therefore explores the notion of the present with the intent of

¹²⁵ Polk, “Temporal Impermanence,” 64. *My emphasis*.

¹²⁶ Paul J. Archambault, “Augustine, Time, and Autobiography as Language,” in *Augustinian Studies* 15 (1984), 7-13. See page 8.

¹²⁷ Archambault, “Augustine, Time, and Autobiography,” 8.

¹²⁸ Note that the title of section 81 in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is “Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the Ordinary Conception of Time,” 472.

¹²⁹ Augustine, *Confessions*, 231.

¹³⁰ Hausheer, “St. Augustine’s Conception of Time,” 503.

understanding when the present is actually present. This seems to be quite polemical, he is personally addressing Zeno and engaging with his paradoxes—for he brings up the impossibility of the present in virtually every circumstance. A century could not exist because it can be broken up into decades, which in turn cannot exist because a decade, too, can be broken up into years and so on.¹³¹ This can occur all the way down to the time that “cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments,” which would be all that constitutes the present.¹³² This problem of the present is one that Augustine will overcome by introducing the extension of the soul; however, as explained above, this notion is solely related to human beings and not to God. Thus, in order for us to understand time, we have to analyze how we measure and live in time. This is the crucial conclusion that will be expanded upon further, especially as it relates to our initial position of looking and, by extension, to Heidegger’s primordial temporality.

The elucidation (reduction) of Augustine’s conception of time has revealed that in his conception there are many tendencies that are consistent with the common, everyday interpretation of time. Hence, prior to an explication of Augustine’s extension of the soul, this analysis will bring these tendencies in Augustine’s conception of time under scrutiny. It is only by discounting these tendencies that lead to the everyday notion of time that the more appropriate account of time can emerge (liberated from those tendencies). Augustine’s extension of the soul can therefore emerge after the destruction has taken place; the extension of the soul will act as a connecting component that links the destruction and the construction. It is in Augustine’s idea of “extendedness” that the

¹³¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, 232.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 232.

construction of the time phenomenon (as it reveals itself) can begin to manifest. The extension of the soul, however, will undergo a semi-destruction of its own—for, despite its innovation, it remains absorbed in everydayness. It is a pre-constructive element in this, albeit slightly modified, hermeneutical method. Hence, Augustine's extension of the soul initiates the unconcealment of the time phenomenon and can be utilized as an appropriate prologue to the construction.

Chapter 2: Ecstatic Horizon (the Destruction)

Before Augustine's extension of the soul is discussed, the destruction of what has been laid out thus far will ensue. It seems fitting to begin this destructive examination with the presupposition of God being outside time and thus not affected by alteration and change. Not only is this presupposition made early in Book XI, but it appears to be a common strategy that others have adopted throughout the history of philosophy. The problem of ontotheology—a practice that is also not unique to Augustine—will be scrutinized. Thus, these two elements, the presupposition and the ontotheological discourse, will be shown to bring about “now-time,” which is the continued privileging of the now over the past and future.¹³³ Such privileging of the now is what causes Augustine's notion of time to remain in the everyday.

According to Augustine, God lives in an “eternal present,” which situates God outside space and time, i.e., God “is immobile eternity.”¹³⁴ Boethius will come to the same conclusion in his *Consolation of Philosophy* in which he is then able to account for free will within God's foreknowledge.¹³⁵ Even Kant resorted to presupposing noumena where our presupposed God/freedom exist and phenomena where the realm of appearances exist.¹³⁶ Kant created this split in order to solve the problem of freedom within necessity and to account for the immortality of the soul, which has profound

¹³³ Heidegger, *Being and time*, 474.

¹³⁴ Hausheer, “St. Augustine's Conception of Time,” 509.

¹³⁵ Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. P.G. Walsh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 108-114.

¹³⁶ See Immanuel Kant's, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 535-553.

implications for his ethics.¹³⁷ These problems—God’s foreknowledge, freedom and even the possibility of human morality—have been explained away with presuppositions. The objects under investigation (God, freedom, etc.), are presupposed to be outside our spatiotemporal existence. It is thought that our experiences cannot adequately explain these objects and thus any experiences we have of them (if any) are starkly different from how they are ‘in themselves.’ Therefore, rather than actually investigating our experiences of the phenomena, philosophers have continued to rely solely on presuppositions.

2.1: The Destruction of everyday time leading to Saint Augustine’s Extension of the Soul (Distentio Anime)

With our initial position in mind, we have to construe what is going on in these presuppositions. For the most part, it seems as though Augustine (and Boethius and Kant) are actually looking away from the objects that they are supposed to be investigating. Augustine is not allowing the object, viz. time, to speak to him. By presupposing that God is outside of time, both God and the time phenomenon are simply being ignored. In this explanation, time becomes relegated to a description of what God is not and, in turn, a negative description of God follows—God becomes known only by those attributes which God is not.¹³⁸ Nothing positive can be determined about God in such explanations and, furthermore, the time phenomenon gets explained away. So why are their objects

¹³⁷ See Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. & ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 238 & 246.

¹³⁸ See S.J. McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 13 for a discussion of a possible phenomenological experience of God, which Heidegger denies.

under investigation (God and freedom) being presupposed to be outside time and what does that then mean for the time phenomenon?

One possible answer is that in order to provide an account of ‘the beginning’ or the creation of the world, one has traditionally supposed a creator (unmoved mover, God etc.). This creator is therefore responsible for creating all that exists, which must necessarily include time. As stated above, it seems as though the concept of time is being conjoined with creation. Time was created and that which is responsible for creating time (God) is not bound by time, thus the possibility of distinguishing the creator from the created is opened up. If the creator is outside (and not bound by) time and likewise responsible for creating time, then an explanation of the genesis of time has also been provided. Hence, time can be investigated in order to distinguish finite beings from God and equally God can be investigated in order to explain the origins of time. The creator and time appear to be mutually reliant on one another for the possibility of providing explanations. Such explanations have concealed the phenomenon of time by not investigating it as it actually appear to us.

The problem of time must be grasped in the way we originally experience temporality in factual life experience—entirely irrespective of all pure consciousness and of all pure time.¹³⁹

Augustine has assumed a creation of the object under investigation that is not actually accessible to us—we cannot factually experience the creation of time. Augustine’s causal explanation demonstrating God’s act of creating time (and heaven and earth) has merely covered up and even distorted the time phenomenon.

¹³⁹ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 44.

These presuppositions (God being outside of time and thus the creator of time) are what Heidegger would call ontotheology.¹⁴⁰ Basically, philosophers have been trying to explain many things, in particular the concept of time, by relying on notions such as the “unmoved mover,” the “constant” and the “eternal.”¹⁴¹ The problem, as mentioned above, is that the phenomenon of time does not reveal itself to us in a manner that permits us to adequately discuss its creation and generation. In other words, we cannot experience time prior to its/our existence and thus philosophers cannot investigate it in such a manner without relying on (grandiose) assumptions. They have, therefore, resolved to investigate time as an object detached from factual life experience—adopting an “attitude” that directs and focuses “away from[*themselves*] toward the *matter*.”¹⁴² By ignoring the “relational meaning,” the phenomenon of time has been continually covered up and the everyday interpretations have prevailed. This is the problem of ontotheology, which Heidegger associates with the Scholastics (and the entire history of metaphysics), claiming that ontotheology is responsible for the perpetual forgetfulness of being.¹⁴³ Ontotheology has not only “exempted” us from investigating the question of the meaning of being, but, as stated above, has actually hidden many truths, especially the truth about primordial temporality.¹⁴⁴ By discussing the creation of time in this manner (i.e., with the presupposition of the Biblical interpretation of genesis and thus detached from factual

¹⁴⁰ For a discussion of Heidegger’s notion of ontotheology, see Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger On Ontotheology: Technology And The Politics Of Education* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁴¹ For “unmoved mover” see Aristotle, “Physics,” 446; for “constant” see Augustine, *Confessions*, 227; for “eternal” see Boethius, *Consolations of Philosophy*, 110.

¹⁴² Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 33. See also *Ibid.*, 40: “I must see away from the what-content and attend only to the fact that the object is a given, attitudinally grasped one. Thus the formalization arises out of the relational meaning of the pure attitudinal relation itself, not out of the “what-content as such.””

¹⁴³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 21.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 21. See also 389 & 392.

life), it seems that Augustine has adopted yet another everyday retelling of the story of time.

If fundamental definitions of human being which are dogmatically theological are to be excluded in radical philosophical reflections on being . . . , then we must refrain from an explicit and especially a hidden, inexplicit orientation to already defined ideas of human being.¹⁴⁵

Although the above quote is in relation to an inquiry into human being, the same can be said of an inquiry into time, for the two are interconnected.¹⁴⁶ By following and recapitulating the Biblical tradition (or any other tradition for that matter), it can be argued that Augustine simply elevates his own “world-view” and does not go back to “scientific philosophy” in which lies the “*proper and sole theme of philosophy.*”¹⁴⁷ According to Heidegger, philosophy as world-view is merely related to the “particular contemporary Dasein at any given time,” whereas scientific philosophy is “philosophy as science of being.”¹⁴⁸ It is a distinction between ontic (world-view) and ontological (science of being), which is why the phenomenon of time is being covered up by Augustine’s everyday interpretation of it.

Perhaps this is what Heidegger means when he classifies Augustine’s view of time as not being rigorous in comparison to Aristotle’s. Interestingly, this can also be regarded as one of the possible explanations for why Heidegger felt the need to keep philosophy and theology separate—finding that by keeping a “world-view” one is perpetually prevented from (rigorously) investigating the question of the meaning of

¹⁴⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 23.

¹⁴⁶ Just as the infinite or constant element in creation appears to be conjoined with time for the “ontotheologians,” Heidegger conjoins being (Dasein) and time.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 6 & 11.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 6 & 11.

being. This does not in any way suggest that those who have religious beliefs are being lead astray. On the contrary, it simply points out that any strongly held belief (not only religious beliefs, but essentially any pre-philosophical commitment that one may have), might constrain one's inquiries. The philosopher may find it difficult to go back to a time when such beliefs and commitments were not present, which prevents the object under investigation from revealing itself. The "*crisis of the sciences*," which Heidegger notes, is due to the uncertainty of the "basic relationship" of the sciences to their individual "subject matters."¹⁴⁹ Relying on methodologies that are developed out of a "propaedeutic" analysis results in similar presuppositions and assumptions discussed above.¹⁵⁰ For the object cannot reveal itself if there is already an answer provided.¹⁵¹ In fact, returning to Augustine, his position is so strongly fixed that one can actually feel the constraints on his philosophical contemplations—he presupposes many things as a result of his religious convictions:

To whom shall I cry? 'The day is yours and the night is yours' (Ps. 73:16). At your nod the moments fly by. From them grant us space for our meditations on the secret recesses of your law, and do not close the gate to us was we knock.¹⁵²

Augustine admittedly believes that there are things that we do not know and that all we can know is what God allows for us to know. It can be argued that the adoption of such a starting point causes him to acknowledge a serious constraint on his ability to know and inquire. This obviously comes from the belief in Divine knowledge vs. human

¹⁴⁹ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 3.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁵¹ See Heidegger, *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 23.

¹⁵² Augustine, *Confessions*, 222.

knowledge, which has been disseminated by notions of perfection vs. imperfection.¹⁵³ Augustine clearly recognizes the limits of human knowledge in comparison to Divine knowledge, which restricts his inquiry.

That is not to suggest that we ignore the possible constraints; on the contrary, we have to be fully aware of them and embrace them. For example, the genesis of time is not something that we can investigate, i.e., I am aware of my constraints when investigating the time phenomenon. In addition, Heidegger acknowledges “how constraining the vocabulary of conscience is” when trying to capture the phenomenon under investigation.¹⁵⁴ Not having the adequate vocabulary can prevent one from being able to simply pose the correct question, viz., the question of the meaning of being. This is why Heidegger uses phrases like ‘being-towards-death’ and ‘ready-to-hand’ in order to describe existentiell/existential states of being. In order to be able to express such states, one requires the corresponding vocabulary. If no such vocabulary exists, then one must create the vocabulary (as Heidegger has done). The constraints, as stated previously, are made clear by my initial position—the fact that I cannot factually experience time before it existed and have trouble even discussing the question of being with our limited vocabulary. Thus all inquiries into such notions of the genesis of time (aside from the genesis of time throughout history) are impossible given my initial position. Likewise, in order to investigate the question of being adequately, certain terms need to be put forth for the sake of factually capturing existence. In order to avoid getting lost in

¹⁵³ See James Wetzel, “Time after Augustine,” in *Religious Studies* 31 (1995), 341-357. See page 351.

¹⁵⁴ Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, 433.

everydayness, I must be aware of my constraints when investigating the phenomenon of time.

Augustine, however, seems to be wholly unaware of his initial position, direction and scope of looking (the “how” of being-interpreted).¹⁵⁵ In this case, Augustine can be said to be following a tradition that has been handed down to him (the everyday way of interpreting time) and not how the phenomenon of time is actually revealing itself. This is not unique to Augustine; in fact, the way the time phenomenon has been treated throughout the history of philosophy has been confined to the everyday interpretation. Hence the object under investigation is being concealed by this traditional way of examining it, i.e., the concept of time falls into “the public way of having been interpreted.”¹⁵⁶ For Heidegger, traditional metaphysics is “the tendency to falling in prephilosophical life” and Augustine’s way of examining time is yet another example of such a tendency.¹⁵⁷ By concealing the object under investigation (time), a concealment of life ensues, i.e., “life is concealed, alienated” from itself.¹⁵⁸ Alienating life from oneself further constrains one’s ability to investigate life. Additionally, Augustine is not only constrained by the alienation that he has conjured for himself (by adopting the traditional everyday interpretation), but he also assumes yet another constraint: that his knowledge is limited to what God allows for. He is in fact putting an additional constraint on himself.

¹⁵⁵ See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 154. See also Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 61.

¹⁵⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 277. See also van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 140: “Factual ruinant life ‘has no time’ because its basic movement, ruinance itself, takes away ‘time’ The ruinance of factual life has this enactment-sense of the *effacing of time*.”

¹⁵⁷ van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 138.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 138-139: “It has disguised itself from itself with the “mask of public interpretedness” and leads a larvant phantom life of ambiguity, illusion, pulling the wool over one’s eyes.”

By adopting such an assumption (that he can only know what God deems appropriate), he essentially constrains himself further—for the assumption of a constraint is, in fact, a constraint. Thus, by not acknowledging his own position of looking and by assuming a superfluous constraint, he is alienating himself further away from the object under investigation. It can be argued, in addition, that Augustine’s assumed constraint actually contributes to the concealing of his own initial position of looking—for he cannot even pose the correct questions as a result. Such questions can never arise if one assumes that the answer cannot be known due to certain limitations (that God has) put on the human mind. It could be argued, of course, that Augustine is aware of his initial position by the sheer fact that he is working within the dominant religious structure of his time (applying his temporally conditioned present situation, which is predominately Christian, on to his analysis). However, he does not acknowledge this, he simply takes his position for granted and it thus becomes more akin to dogma than the “how” of being interpreted.¹⁵⁹ Thus, many presuppositions appear in Augustine’s thought that can be seen to be limiting his inquiry and, as a result, the possibilities that can be opened up.

Setting aside the ontotheological problem, the next problem of this (everyday) conception of time is that it continues to privilege the ‘now.’ By continually asserting that the present exists (but the past and future do not), philosophers such as Zeno have found themselves lost and falling into paradoxes:

The “nows” are what get counted. And these show themselves ‘in every “now”’ as “nows” which will ‘forthwith be no-longer now’ and “nows” which have ‘just

¹⁵⁹ See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 154.

been now-not-yet.’ The world-time which is ‘sighted’ in this manner in the use of clocks, we call the “now-time.”¹⁶⁰

Heidegger arrives at this conclusion by discussing how we deal with time in average everydayness, i.e., we count and measure changes by following the “travelling pointer” on a clock or a sundial or by simply following the sun itself.¹⁶¹ Discussing the movement of the sun is a common method used to investigate time,¹⁶² which points to something very significant about the way we interpret our experiences of time. For the most part, time is being dealt with in a chronological manner—as a sequence of events, a “flowing stream of nows.”¹⁶³ Augustine’s everyday way of interpreting time is yet another example of philosophers continuing to believe that time is chronology. Chronological observations of time appear to have dominated philosophy in which events occur in an orderly fashion; event *a* followed by event *b* followed by event *c* etc. The word chronology and its meaning can be traced back to the Greek god Chronos:

Yet the gods who always existed are probably conceived as original forms (by etymology) of conventional figures from the traditional theogony; and one of them is ‘Time’ [Chronos], which might naturally be felt, without any deep reflexion, to have been unborn.¹⁶⁴

The god Chronos is also thought to be responsible for the initial creation of the other deities, which were created out of his seed.¹⁶⁵ In other words, Chronos is responsible for an ordered sequence of events occurring, which is a common element of most creation myths. There appears to be a frequent theme here, which goes back to the previous

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 474.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 466, 469 & 473.

¹⁶² Augustine, *Confessions*, 234.

¹⁶³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 474.

¹⁶⁴ See G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 56.

¹⁶⁵ Kirk, Raven and Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 24 & 56.

discussion: that time is the condition for the possibility of other created beings coming into existence. This focus on the origins of time and its contribution to cosmogony is one that has clearly pervaded philosophical inquiries into time. For Heidegger, this is a result of the adoption of “Greek ontotheological thinking” that infiltrated Christian theology—something that is clearly observable in Augustine.¹⁶⁶ The problem of such a fixation on cosmogony (that seems to disseminate the notion of chronology), is that the more qualitative way of defining time, namely time as “Kairos,” has been forgotten.¹⁶⁷ As opposed to chronological time, which is sequential, kairos “is the temporal dimension of decision,” i.e., it is an attitude or a way of being-towards time.¹⁶⁸

Augustine is an interesting case—for he denies the existence of the past and the future, but appears to have provided an explanation for why both ‘times’ seem to impact our daily lives. Augustine is interested in exploring why we appear to have a conception of the past and the future despite them having no actual existence. He attributes this conception to an “extension”—one that occurs in the mind where, in the present, events are “remembered” and “expected.” Although Augustine still maintains that they do not exist, he is including an account of our way of dealing with time which is more kairological than chronological, i.e., how we factually experience time as opposed to simply counting it.¹⁶⁹ This is probably what Heidegger means when he states that

¹⁶⁶ See van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 159.

¹⁶⁷ For a complete discussion of kairological time in association with Heidegger, see van Buren, *The young Heidegger*, 279-285.

¹⁶⁸ Felix Ó Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 14: “In the context of human action, we experience chronos as continuity and kairos as a moment of vision—*Augenblick*—that breaks with the continuity, as an other time, as a time which is opportune for action in the emphatic sense.” Murchadha, *The Time of Revolution*, 3-4.

¹⁶⁹ See, again, *ibid.*, 279-285.

Augustine appears to be an exception to the tradition, but nevertheless remains Aristotelian “in principle.” On the other hand, he is moving in the right direction by proposing the “extension” that is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s “ecstatic temporality,” which will be discussed in section 2.2.

Now that the common, everyday interpretation of time has gone through a reduction and destruction, it is time to lay the foundations that will initiate the construction. In the destruction, problems with the everyday interpretation of time were revealed: the initial position of looking was overshadowed by presuppositions, which are a result of ontotheology (cosmogony) leading to the conclusion of chronological or “now” time. Cosmogony can include the investigation of the act of creation by God or simply how everything came into existence *sans* God, i.e., a scientific account of the genesis of all that exists. Either attempt—God or science—causes the phenomena under investigation (being and time) to be conceived as constant presence-at-hand. By failing to notice the initial position and the deeply ingrained pre-philosophical commitments, the inquiries into time have become lost in everydayness. Time was not being explored as it reveals itself, but rather was being dealt with in an everyday manner; by counting it, measuring it and, of course, by curiously investigating its origins.¹⁷⁰ It is not so much that this way of dealing with time is completely inaccurate, in fact (just like our everyday way of living) it is how we deal with time for the most part. We are absorbed in everydayness and, as a result, our experiences of time are absorbed in everydayness as well, hence we

¹⁷⁰ See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 277: “The Anyone, which in idle talk defines the public way of having been interpreted, at the same time controls and prescribes the ways of curiosity. It says what one must have seen and read.”

cannot help but count and calculate time in our daily lives. It then follows that our inquiries into time (even the most rigorous) have become levelled down. By continually neglecting the initial position, direction and scope of looking at an object under investigation—the “how” of being interpreted—the time phenomenon has continued to evade philosophers. Chronological time, the time that philosophers have been hitherto preoccupied with, is not wrong, but it is not the entire story. Out of the destruction comes a construction. By revealing these everyday accounts it is now possible to uncover something new about the time phenomenon, something that can be found in Augustine’s same treaty on time. Augustine’s notion of the extension of the soul—the pre-constructive phase—will now ensue.

Augustine’s explanation of time has been reduced and destroyed; however, he possesses another account that must be revealed. This account deals with how we experience time, i.e., what is actually happening to us when we experience time as opposed to time (in itself) that is beyond our experiences. Augustine is very clear that this experience of time is solely related to human beings and their experiences and is not how God sees it:

Nevertheless, Lord, we are conscious of intervals of time, we compare them with each other, and call some longer, others shorter. We also measure how much longer or shorter one period is than another.¹⁷¹

Humans perceive time not only as it occurs in those instantaneous moments, but rather as time which is over and time which will be, but how is this possible? Augustine still wishes to maintain that the past and future do not exist, yet we seem to be aware of them

¹⁷¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, 233.

(despite their lack of existence). Past and future are produced in the present, by us, not as actual events but as “words conceived from images of them.”¹⁷² Images are produced in the “memory” from events past while the future is the “images of realities” that are yet to exist, i.e., we are accustomed to thinking of what is going to occur in the future, a “premeditation” of our actions, events, etc.¹⁷³ Our memories and premeditations occur in our present and thus the existence of past and future resides in these forms in our present. For Augustine, the soul has “these three aspects of time:”

. . . a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. . . . the present considering the past is memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation.¹⁷⁴

We therefore conclude that there are three times: past, present, and future. Augustine takes note of the fact that speaking in such a way is “incorrect”—it is the “common usage” that is applied in our “common place everyday” discourse.¹⁷⁵ Although it is incorrect, much like “most of our language,” the idea nevertheless gets “communicated” and is representative of our way of experiencing time.¹⁷⁶ Time, therefore, must be an “extension”—something that is measured—but it is not a measurement of time itself.¹⁷⁷ Augustine concludes that such an endeavour, to measure time itself, is not something that has been reached. It can be argued that, at least in this case, Augustine is in fact acknowledging a legitimate constraint with respect to our ability to experience time.

¹⁷² Ibid., 234.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 234.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 235.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 235.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 235-237. Augustine is acknowledging a form of everydayness, however, he is not linking it to our inability to pose the correct questions. He is, however, viewing human interaction in a way that is starkly similar to Heidegger’s notion of *Mitsein*—the common/communal discursive way of being-in-the-world.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 238 & 239.

Augustine therefore concludes that (given the evidence thus explored) “time is simply a distension.”¹⁷⁸ This distension occurs in the mind where the impressions of things stay with us when they have passed away and cease to be. This is why it is the mind that “expects and attends and remembers”—what is expected gets passed into attention which gets passed into what is remembered:¹⁷⁹

A person singing or listening to a song he knows well suffers a distension or stretching in feeling and in sense-perception from the expectation of future sounds and the memory of past sound.¹⁸⁰

This is what time is for human beings, but for God, which was discussed previously, no such sequential or successive time exists.

The significance of Augustine’s extension of the soul is something that went unrecognized by many philosophers, including Augustine, until recently—for it was only in later times that its significance was discerned.¹⁸¹ For the most part, the everyday interpretation of time persisted and thereby concealed certain essential features. Although the extension of the soul was not entirely ignored, it was not until later that its implications would be exposed—especially with the rise of phenomenology:

And, Augustine will show us, and contemporary phenomenological philosophers will tend to agree with him, that this field of presence is not the presence of God, but rather, it is the presence of ourselves in the existential unfolding of our own experiences.¹⁸²

The tendency to construe Augustine’s thought as phenomenological will now be unconcealed once again. Husserl marveled at Augustine’s account of the extension of the

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 240.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 243.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 244.

¹⁸¹ See, for example, the discussion of Dilthey’s recognition of “Augustine’s contribution” in McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 197-199.

¹⁸² Polk, “Temporal Impermanence,” 66.

soul.¹⁸³ Before Augustine, time was viewed, for the most part, as being outside the mind as “cosmic time,” i.e., a time which is independent of human beings and their experiences.¹⁸⁴ Aristotle adopted such a view of time, which, as Heidegger points out, set the foundations for the everyday notion of time that pervaded philosophy for so long. Augustine does have some notion of cosmic time, which was destructed above. Hence Augustine never broke away entirely from the everyday conception and continued to remain Aristotelian (in principle). On the other hand, Augustine observes the time phenomenon in a way that is much more phenomenologically sophisticated than any of his predecessors. The notion of a “field of presence,” attributed to Merleau-Ponty, maintains that time *is* this field of presence or horizon.¹⁸⁵

By interpreting Augustine in this way, i.e., by interpreting him in light of an “existential unfolding of our own experiences,” something extraordinary reveals itself to us. Not only can it be said that later phenomenologists were clearly influenced by Augustine, but it demonstrates exactly what Augustine is ‘doing.’ As was mentioned earlier, Augustine is ‘doing’ phenomenology, albeit, unbeknownst to himself. His explanation of the extension of the soul—as a way to comprehend time—is clearly (what we in our temporally conditioned situation would call) phenomenological. Augustine is accounting for human experiences of time and not simply time that objectively encompasses the entire cosmos. Accordingly, Book XI of the *Confessions* can be divided into two sections: (1) the creation of time by God who is located outside of time; (2)

¹⁸³ Ibid., 63.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 65.

human beings' factual life experience of time. This division is not something that Augustine himself necessarily intended; however, in this analysis, such a division has been clearly delineated. Creating such a division is only possible provided that we look back at these texts from a present, which allows for such interpretations to arise. Thus, in this thesis, chapter 1 (in particular section 1.2.) fell into everydayness and guided a misconstrual and concealing of the time phenomenon. Chapter 2, following the destruction, has thus far outlined Augustine's extension of the soul. For it is in the section on the extension of the soul that the construction of the time phenomenon (as it reveals itself to us) is attempted. As mentioned above, it is a distinction between cosmic time and phenomenological time—both of which are found in the same treatment of time put forth by Augustine.¹⁸⁶

Augustine's great discovery is that an adequate treatment of the reality of time requires an account which will address the fact that the time is experienced perspectively.¹⁸⁷

This is why it is appropriate to reconstruct Heidegger's hermeneutical method with Augustine—for such an analysis can account for the everyday interpretation of time and introduce time as it is factually experienced. With our initial position—facticity—in mind, we can view Augustine's account of the extension of the soul as an example of how one deals with factual life experience in relation to time. We find within this account elements of human factual life experiences that Heidegger himself discussed. The phenomena of memory and expectation (ways of accounting for the past and the future within the present) are two human experiences that Heidegger will deal with in

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 63.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 67.

Being and Time. This analysis does not intend to provide a comparison of Augustine and Heidegger, but rather to consider both in order to attain a better understanding of the phenomenology of time *vis-à-vis* factual life experience.

2.2: Heidegger's Ecstasis - Inauthenticity

Like Augustine, Heidegger wishes to explain how time is actually experienced by human beings. For Heidegger, Everyday Dasein finds itself “thrown” into a particular “there;” this throwing of Dasein into a “there” can only occur provided that there was something that came before the “there.”¹⁸⁸ In other words, Dasein finds itself in a particular “state-of-mind” that resulted from the past—state-of-mind “temporalizes itself primarily as “having-been.”¹⁸⁹ We find ourselves in a particular state-of-mind, but that state-of-mind is not something that arose out of nowhere; on the contrary, it is grounded in and arises from our past. Hence, Dasein’s “being-thrown” is simply Dasein finding itself in a state-of-mind.¹⁹⁰ The experience of a mood is the “equiprimordial disclosure” of the “there,” i.e., one finds oneself in a mood, which ontologically manifests itself as “how one is.”¹⁹¹ Again, the mood that one finds oneself in is derived from events that have passed and that now, in the present, determine “how one is.” Therefore, Dasein always finds itself in a mood: “Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its being.”¹⁹² Effectively, “Dasein is its “there”” and finds itself in a

¹⁸⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 289-290.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 390.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 389.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 173 & 389.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 173. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 253.

state-of-mind in which a mood is always disclosed.¹⁹³ In having a mood, one either “turns towards the burdensome character of Dasein” or away from it—for the most part Dasein, in an everyday manner, turns away and experiences moods such as “elation.”¹⁹⁴

What all this means for Heidegger is that the past events are what determine the “there” in which Dasein finds itself, i.e., the past enables and determines the present.¹⁹⁵ The way that Dasein engages in the present, however, is by occupying itself with tasks in order to accomplish certain goals. As was discussed in connection with everydayness, Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern and the projects that Dasein undertakes are for the sake of realizing goals. These goals, however, are not to be understood teleologically, but rather as that which Dasein moves towards, e.g., I cut down a tree “in-order-to” chop it into pieces “in-order-to” build a shed and so on.¹⁹⁶ State-of-mind temporalizes itself as having-been (as something that resulted from the past), however, state-of-mind also has its understanding.¹⁹⁷ By engaging in projects “understandingly” in this manner, Dasein is ontically “able to manage something,” i.e., has an understanding of how to complete certain tasks.¹⁹⁸ Ontically, one knows what one needs to do in order to complete a specific task and to attain a certain outcome. This knowledge is knowledge of what one wants the future to be, i.e., what the wood *will be* (in the future) is a shed. Dasein moves towards that which does *not yet* exist for the sake of bringing that which does not exist into existence. Ontologically, Dasein is therefore revealed as “possibility,”

¹⁹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 289-290. See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 159 & 164-165.

¹⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 119.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 182.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 183.

Dasein is always “what it can be,” it is “being-possible.”¹⁹⁹ Hence, this “in-order-to” in which Dasein undertakes projects is called, quite rightly, “projecting.”

Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility. In each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be.²⁰⁰

Tasks are completed “for-the-sake-of” some outcome, which is futural.²⁰¹ Dasein is a “thrown-projection”—thrown from the past and projecting into the future by engaging in projects.²⁰² This can be easily exemplified in an ontic way, an example of which was demonstrated with the building of a shed above; however, it is an ontological determination. This is what Heidegger calls the “ecstatical character of primordial temporality.”²⁰³ Ecstasis means being outside of oneself. In an ontic way it can be described as daydreaming or even planning ahead. It is operative anytime that one drifts off into the past or the future, but this ecstasis always comes back to the present in which the present is then affected by the drifting. Past knowledge thrusts Dasein into tasks that Dasein undertakes with a future outcome expected and, with that past knowledge and future expectation, Dasein can act in the present accordingly (e.g. building a shed). In other words, the ecstatic horizon of past, present and future are connected such that, as was demonstrated above, one’s “having-been” and “to-come” affects one’s “now.”²⁰⁴

Moods temporalize themselves—that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstases are modified by having been.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. See also Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 13.

²⁰⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 385-386.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 119.

²⁰² Ibid., 185. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 309.

²⁰³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 377.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 390.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 390.

This modification is not unidirectional, but rather circular—for it is not simply the “having been” that modifies the present and the future, but also the future that modifies the present. Moreover, the present and the future modify the “having been” (just as with the hermeneutical situation where a present inquiry modifies the “having been” of previous ideas, revealing something new in those ideas). This ecstatic horizon sounds similar to Augustine’s notion of extension, in which one “remembers,” “attends” and “expects.” Both Heidegger and Augustine use these modes to describe the same phenomenon: factual life experience in relation to time. Augustine’s explanation of extension clearly had an effect on Heidegger—for he quotes Augustine’s explanation of extension in *Being and Time*.²⁰⁶ Although they are both dealing with the same factual life experience, there are some significant differences between their interpretations of those experiences that should be observed.

It is important to note that for Heidegger there is an “authentic” and “inauthentic” way of experiencing the ecstases. When Dasein is absorbed in everydayness it “is its there in an everyday manner.”²⁰⁷ For example, “awaiting” is an inauthentic mode of the future, “forgetting” reveals an inauthentic past, and “curiosity” or “falling” reveals an inauthentic “making-present.”²⁰⁸ Awaiting is akin to expecting, where one expects something with which one is concerned, i.e., expecting to build a shed. Awaiting and expecting are awaiting and expecting certain things in the future, “a concerned expecting

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 499: “Hence it seemed to me that time is nothing else than an extendedness; but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness, I do not know; and it would be surprising if it were not an extendedness of the soul.”

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 171.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 386, 391 & 397.

of” something or other.²⁰⁹ Being preoccupied with the future in a way where the objects of its concern are encountered in the world, causes Dasein to “forget” its “ownmost being.”²¹⁰ Dasein’s inauthentic relation to its future influences its relation to its “having been” (its past), such that it forgets. Dasein is absorbed in everydayness, which is caused by fleeing in the face of Dasein’s ultimate future. This brings us back to the notion of impending death: what is “threatening *come[s] back* to one’s factually concerned potentiality-for-being.”²¹¹ In other words, as pointed out in the section on everydayness, by ignoring one’s potentiality-for-being (death), Dasein flees from and forgets itself. Thus the future directly affects the past—by having an inauthentic relation to the future (avoiding one’s ownmost being), Dasein becomes preoccupied and forgets its having-been. Consequently, by inauthentically relating to one’s future and past, one inauthentically dwells in the present. Curiosity is a “making-present” that “leaps away.”²¹² Dasein constantly seeks something out of curiosity and once Dasein has caught “sight” of that something, it leaps to the next thing which is available.²¹³ This may explain the tendency to connect time to cosmogony. As stated previously, philosophers seek answers to the phenomenon of time by entwining it with stories of creation. Therefore, by curiously exploring time in connection with cosmogony, philosophers have been concealing as opposed to revealing the objects that they are investigating. For Heidegger, this is the “existential-temporal condition for the possibility of

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 387.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 392-393.

²¹¹ Ibid., 391. See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 312-313.

²¹² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 398.

²¹³ Ibid. See also Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 25, 49, 51 & 61.

“distraction.””²¹⁴ The notion of falling into everydayness, which is also connected to curiosity, is the other way of explaining such a phenomenon: Dasein falls into average everydayness in which the “they-self” takes over one’s burden of being.²¹⁵ Dasein flees in the face of its ownmost being and turns to “the they,” the everyday and common way of understanding:

The category of ruination expresses the fact that the *kinesis* of inauthentic life is not only a “toward itself,” but simultaneously the “against itself,” “away from itself,” and “out of itself” of falling-away, which Heidegger now called the plunge or crash (*das Sturz*) out of authentic time and into the domain of the They.²¹⁶

These are the ways of public interpretation—the future becomes nothing more than an extension of the present.²¹⁷ It is a “collapse into the presence of the today,” which can be seen in Augustine’s extension of the soul that privileges the present and thereby relegating the future and past to mere extensions that occur in the mind.²¹⁸ These three inauthentic states, which have been outlined only in brief, refer back to the everyday being of Dasein.

Although Augustine appeared to deal with the time phenomenon more originally—dealing with time as it reveals itself—he did not go far enough. From the Heideggerian perspective, Augustine’s extension of the soul remains absorbed in the everyday way of experiencing time; it is an example of the inauthentic ecstases. Augustine’s notion of expectation signals back to the preoccupation that we have with things in the world, which is not an authentic attitude to have towards the future.

²¹⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 398.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 312.

²¹⁶ van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 139-140.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 140. See also Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 24-25 for “talk” and “having-been-interpreted.”

²¹⁸ Ibid., 140: the *effacing of time*.

Augustine discusses the phenomenon of memory; however, if the future is construed inauthentically, then the past and present will necessarily be construed inauthentically as well. This is why Augustine's notion of time was used as the everyday example and, additionally, as a pre-constructive element in this analysis. Augustine did not go far enough—he did not deal with time authentically—and this is why he is not being used as an example in the full construction. Augustine is nevertheless an important contributor to the development of the phenomenology of time and is clearly vital when it comes to discussing how the time phenomenon reveals itself to us in everydayness. However, just like Aristotle who only proposed an *initial approach*, there must be something more primordial than what Augustine has offered, viz., something that “temporalizes itself authentically.”²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 387. See Ibid., 377: “But this very levelling off, in accordance with its existential meaning, is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporalizing, in conformity with which temporality temporalizes as inauthentic the kind of time we have just mentioned. If therefore, we demonstrate that the time which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, “*a potiori fit denominatio*,” we are justified in designating as “*primordial time*” the temporality which we [will] now [lay] bare.” See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 294: “But it itself *points back to a still more original temporality*.”

Chapter 3: Temporality (the Construction)

Augustine's notion of the extension of the soul was able to account for the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. This account is phenomenological and its implications—the factual human experience of time—was unprecedented for its time and not even acknowledged until centuries later. Obviously this acknowledgement only comes about following a hermeneutical analysis of Augustine's work, something that he did not necessarily anticipate. Augustine's treatment of time was not intentionally constructed to be classified and separated into two different accounts—cosmic vs. phenomenological. This is something that we (living in a temporally particular present) are able to acknowledge, now. As has been stated earlier, Heidegger believes that the past is only past when seen from a present, hence we must include our present in our analysis of the past. In other words, we have to be aware of our initial position, direction and scope of looking at an object of inquiry, in this case, Augustine's notion of time. Facticity was our initial position in looking at Augustine's notion of time and what we sought throughout this analysis, which was clearly exemplified.

Despite Augustine's immense contribution to the phenomenology of time, he nevertheless discussed the time phenomenon as it is revealed inauthentically. Augustine appears to have become absorbed with Greek metaphysics, which concealed that which he was seeking.²²⁰ He did not possess an authentic attitude towards the ecstases and thereby continued to cover up notions of kairological time and primordial temporality. In order to unconceal these notions, we have to make clear the authentic ecstases. The

²²⁰ See Dilthey's criticism of Augustine in McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 199.

following section will begin with an elucidation of authenticity, which will lead us to the appropriate attitude toward time that can be adopted; this attitude will be exemplified in primal Christianity.

3.1: Authenticity

The authentic modes of the ecstatic horizon result when we comport ourselves in a particular manner toward our past, present and future. As was discussed previously, the ways in which we encounter our past drastically affect how we perceive and experience our present and future. Once more, this is not unidirectional, so how we encounter one time component (past, present or future) will determine how we experience the other two. If we momentarily suspend our preoccupation with our worldly concerns, viz., if we un-absorb ourselves with the world, then we open up the possibility of encountering our ownmost being. This encounter amounts to an attitude that we adopt toward the past, present and future resulting in an authentic experience of time. *Anticipation* is the authentic future, *retaining* is the authentic past and *moment of vision* is the authentic present. The following section will be a repetition of the previous discussion that took place regarding Dasein's inauthentic being; however, it will be with regard to Dasein's authentic being in which the ecstases are experienced.

Anticipation is unlike awaiting and expecting—for it is anticipation of something that is not a worldly concern. As has been stated numerous times, Dasein exists unto its no-longer-being-in-the-world, which is the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of

Dasein”—death.²²¹ Dasein is a thrown-projection—thrown into the world and projecting into the impending future, which is no-longer-in-the-world. Hence, Dasein is always its “having been;” however, in this case, not as state-of-mind/mood, but rather, as the nullity of being. This was emphasized previously by the ways in which the past, present and future relate to one another. Dasein cannot be anything but what it always already was, i.e., Dasein was not-in-the-world (not born), but emerged into-the-world (born) and will eventually no-longer-be-in-the-world yet again.²²² By ecstatically anticipating the nullity of being, as opposed to expecting and being distracted by random objects of our concern (shed building), Dasein can be “resolute.”²²³ It is only when Dasein willingly accepts this—where it came from and where it is going—that it can come back from this impending potentiality to the present. Dasein must *choose itself* by coming face-to-face with its ownmost being, i.e., Dasein has to achieve a “*drawing back from the Everyone by way of self-choosing.*”²²⁴

Dasein is not itself the basis of its being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from its own projection; rather, as being-its-self, it is the *being* of its basis. This basis is never anything but the basis for an entity whose being has to take over being-a-basis.²²⁵

Essentially, one has to take hold of one’s existence “in its entirety” and in spite of its “unfinished character,” i.e., to accept what one is and what one is not, which is the same thing (a nullity).²²⁶ The fact that we are existing now does not cancel out the fact that we

²²¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 294.

²²² Ibid., 289-296.

²²³ Ibid., 314.

²²⁴ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 318-319.

²²⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 330-331. See also Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 434.

²²⁶ Ibid. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 311 for a discussion of Dasein’s “wholeness” and “*being-finished.*”

were not existing before and will no longer exist at some point (at any point) in time. This is why we are not the basis of our own being—for “our existence is never our own.”²²⁷ The inauthentic way of standing before death revealed that death is no longer dealt with; it is cast aside, ignored, while we preoccupy ourselves with worldly possibilities. Likewise with the inauthentic “making-present” and the inauthentic “forgetting” of one’s “having been” there is something more primordial, that of the “moment of vision” and “retaining.”²²⁸ In *anticipatory resoluteness* Dasein comes back from its potentiality-for-being (no-longer-in-the-world) to the “moment of vision” in which Dasein “retains” (or “remembers”) its “having been.” In this anticipatory resoluteness, one has taken hold of its ownmost being and, as a result, all three time components are modified to reflect that. This is the exact same modification that was described in connection with the inauthentic ecstases (on page 38). It is therefore important to note that the relation between the three time components—past, present and future—operate in the same manner, i.e., the same modification occurs whether they are experienced authentically or inauthentically. The authentic way of experiencing the past, present and future will be expounded upon further as the construction of the time phenomenon is carried out. For now, however, a brief reiteration concerning what has been achieved thus far and where this analysis still intends to go as a result shall ensue.

Augustine was treated as the exemplar of the everyday notion of time in which Aristotle’s influence was clearly observed. Although the direction that Augustine took to explain time is quite different from that of Aristotle—Augustine adopted the Christian

²²⁷ Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 435.

²²⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 387.

perspective—similar presuppositions and tendencies nevertheless revealed themselves to us. Such tendencies include the connection between time and movement, the privileging of the ‘now,’ and even (it can be argued) the genesis of time. Aristotle may not have provided a description of the creation of time as such; however, he did describe the unmoved mover in which he was able to account for the creation of motion and (by extension) the possibility of time. Aristotle’s influence is easily detectable within Augustine’s notion of time driving the everyday conception that has permeated philosophical inquiry. In the destruction it was revealed that, like Aristotle, Augustine has propagated the everyday notion of time, which covers up the time phenomenon in the process. In destroying Augustine’s notion of time it became apparent that Augustine was in fact able to go further and address the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. This is one of the primary reasons that Augustine was selected in this analysis—for he not only perpetuates the everyday notion of time, but he (at the same time) moves closer to the time phenomenon as we factually experience it. The extension of the soul, hermeneutically assessed, is clearly a phenomenological account of how we factually experience time, albeit in an everyday manner. It is this everyday manner in which time has been continually dealt with that leads Heidegger to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic ecstases bringing us closer to the construction of the time phenomenon.

This construction, however, is one that can be uncovered in a previous idea, an idea that Heidegger appropriately goes back to: Paul and the notion of kairological/eschatological time. This section shall deal with Paul’s *Letters*, both as Heidegger himself engaged with them and how others have construed Heidegger’s

affiliation with them (for much can be observed about what Heidegger says and yet does not say about Christianity in relation to his own thought). A brief section discussing the influence that Judaism had on primal Christianity will first be provided, which will shed more light on how the time phenomenon was later developed by Christians (and arguably Heidegger). Following from this, the importance of the factual life of Christians will be uncovered and exemplified in Paul's *Letters*, allowing for the notion of kairological time to reveal itself.

Early rabbinic culture²²⁹ does not appear to have a concept of time *per se*; however, such an “absence of time” is only observed when time is referred to as a “concept” put forth for philosophical or scientific inquiry.²³⁰ By thoroughly inspecting the existing early rabbinic literature, there appears to be no indication of philosophical or scientific discourse, hence time was never discussed.²³¹ Perhaps the absence of philosophy and science and, by extension, the absence of the concept of time, is advantageous, i.e., the time phenomenon was not being concealed by philosophical and scientific discourses. The people were dealing with time in the manner of “timing and time-reckoning.”²³² The timing of rituals and other human activities would have been central to life in early Jewish culture and, it can be argued, resulted in a particular comportment to the time phenomenon. That comportment is one that deals with time as it

²²⁹ “A survey of the entire corpus of early rabbinic sources . . . (dating from the third to seventh centuries CE), confirms that the category of time is never explicitly referred to, let alone commented upon or discussed.” Sacha Stern, *Time and Process in Ancient Judaism* (Portland: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2003), 26.

²³⁰ Stern, *Time and Process*, 30.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

²³² See *Ibid.*, 46: “. . . that early rabbinic culture did not conceive of time as a category or entity in itself, appears to run counter to the importance accorded in ritual halakhah (law) to timing, time-reckoning, and hence, one would assume, to time itself.”

is factually experienced in life as opposed to being covered over by philosophy and science. That is not to suggest that other ancient cultures did not recognize the importance of timing and time-reckoning; on the contrary, such timing and time-reckoning is essential to human factual life experience. The difference is that alongside the development of philosophy and science—in attempting to make the time phenomenon clear—the time phenomenon was actually concealed further. As has been mentioned, no such discourses existed in early Judaism and thus they were able to deal with the time phenomenon as it reveals itself in factual life.

In *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, which includes Heidegger's 1920-21 lecture course "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," Heidegger discusses Christian life experience and directly deals with Paul's *Letters to the Galatians* and *Thessalonians*. By examining these letters, Heidegger intends to uncover the factual life experience found primal Christianity.²³³ The word "primal" is important—for it was thought that as Christianity became more widespread, even during Paul's life, it "lost its apocalyptic edge."²³⁴ Furthermore, Heidegger was not interested in Christianity as a faith, but rather, as an example of *how* to live in a temporal manner.²³⁵ Heidegger is more focused on revealing a "new paradigm of time" through an exemplification of Christian facticity.²³⁶ He does not wish to dwell on "content" in a manner that his mentor Husserl did; on the contrary, Heidegger seeks to gain access to "the original enactment process,"

²³³ van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 157. See also Brejidak, "Philosophia Crucis," 209: "Heidegger's reflections on religion is inscribed into the context of the theology of experience . . ." "our experiential attitude. . ."

²³⁴ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 47.

²³⁵ Nicholson, "The End of Time," 220. See also McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 192-193.

²³⁶ Brejidak, "Philosophia Crucis," 213.

which he uncovers in the factual life of those who *became* Christian.²³⁷ The importance of factual life experience cannot be over emphasized—for philosophy “arises from” factual life experience and “hinders philosophizing itself.”²³⁸ As was discussed, factual life is lived, for the most part, in everydayness so it is evident that factual life is also responsible for hindering philosophical inquiries. Nevertheless, it is from factual life experience that philosophy must advance:

We must ask, rather, what is temporality originally in factual life experience? What do past, present and future mean in factual life experience? Our way takes its point of departure from factual life, from which the meaning of time is won.²³⁹

In other words, it is only by turning to facticity and analyzing how we factually experience time that the time phenomenon can be uncovered. This idea, that our way of access to the time phenomenon is through factual life (which was experienced by ancient Judaic people), is one that can be observed in early Christian texts as well. Such experience is historical and “happens in time,” i.e., it is *enacted* in time.²⁴⁰ Heidegger maintains that “Christian religiosity is in factual life experience,” that to be a Christian means to “[live] temporality as such.”²⁴¹ The problem occurred when Aristotle’s philosophy was incorporated into Scholasticism, which resulted in “the deworlding of the factual world of primal Christianity.”²⁴² As was mentioned previously, philosophy “fell prey” to the Greek method of ontotheology instead of going back to the original facticity

²³⁷ Ibid., 212. See also Ibid., 218: “Heidegger appropriated Paul, Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard in order to create a new philosophical beginning. . . a radical reform of the phenomenological position.”

²³⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 6 & 11.

²³⁹ Ibid., 44-45.

²⁴⁰ Brejidak, “*Philosophia Crucis*,” 209 & 210.

²⁴¹ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 55.

²⁴² van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 165. See also Brejidak, “*Philosophia Crucis*,” 211.

practised in ancient Judaism and more explicitly described in early Christian texts.²⁴³ One has to go back to these texts by challenging the dominant views (which also “fell prey” to everydayness) that have been put forth by philosophers and historians alike. Luther’s *theologia crucis* destructs the Greek *theologia gloriae* and *ontologia gloriae* claiming that such metaphysics “turns everything upside-down.”²⁴⁴ Heidegger was heavily influenced by Luther and much could be discussed regarding this influence;²⁴⁵ however, the objective here is to construct the time phenomenon—*temporality*.

Heidegger’s notions of “falling,” “inauthenticity” and “authenticity” are elucidated in relation to the Christian experience.²⁴⁶ Obviously Heidegger is suggesting that the adoption of Aristotle’s thought by later Christian thinkers (including Augustine) is an indication of the Christian falling into everydayness.²⁴⁷ When engaging with historical texts, these thinkers missed the appropriate position/attitude that must be adopted in order to get the past to speak to them.²⁴⁸ By contrast, Heidegger does not deal with “the historical” as a “science of history,” but rather he expresses the importance of encountering the historical “in life.”²⁴⁹ The historical proceeds in time and in factual life experience and thus, the historical object has to be dealt with as it is, i.e., as it changes in time.

²⁴³ van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 159. See also Ibid., 163: Luther’s notion of “falling away from the historicity of the Cross.”

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ See McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 151-184.

²⁴⁶ van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 177.

²⁴⁷ See ibid., 186: “Augustine here loses the original Christian “intensification of life in its selfworld” and falls back to Greek “objective metaphysics”” See also McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 163.

²⁴⁸ See van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 178: “For Paul, and the young Heidegger, philosophy is an expression of fallen life: see to it that no one steals you away through philosophy and empty deceit, which depend on human tradition and the basic principles of the world.”

²⁴⁹ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 23.

The historical actually will, in each case modify itself according to the character of the object; and yet in principle the historical stays the same.²⁵⁰

The reason the historical will modify itself according to the character of the object is a result of the various representations of history, which are based on “formative subjectivity.”²⁵¹ Such subjectivity—accounting for the multitude of ways of engaging with the past—is necessarily “dependent upon a present.”²⁵² This brings us back to the importance of the present when discussing past ideas, i.e., each construal of the past is “orientated towards the present.”²⁵³ It is essential that we not only take note of that present when delving into the past, but also that we incorporate the present into our analysis of a particular object—a hermeneutical analysis. Paul is exemplified, therefore, by Heidegger as one who is living and *proclaiming* authentic temporality.

Heidegger provides a modest biography of Paul. This biography, however, is not dealing with who Paul actually was, for no one can readily attain such information without relying on presuppositions (and perhaps even myths).²⁵⁴ On the contrary, Heidegger wishes to depict Paul in light of what can be interpreted from his letters, in particular, the factual life experiences that can be extracted from them. Paul lives during a time when the end of the world is believed to be near—Paul lives “*in extremis*,” being-towards-the-end.²⁵⁵ Heidegger’s notion of authenticity is only experienced when one breaks from the everyday and comes face to face with one’s potentiality for being, viz.,

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 25.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 28.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ See Ibid., 62: “One difficulty is that we cannot at all, with our ideas, put ourselves in Paul’s place. [Such an attempt] is misguided because what is crucial is not the material character of Paul’s environment, but rather only his *own situation*.” My emphasis.

²⁵⁵ Nicholson, “The End of Time,” 219.

one's no-longer-being-in-the-world. Paul appears to be a perfect example of someone who is living with this exact comportment and, as a result, Paul lives "within some definite form of temporality."²⁵⁶ Heidegger is therefore going back to Paul in order to attain an example of the life that is experiencing/living temporality.²⁵⁷ Heidegger's analysis of Paul's *Letters* reveals what it means to *become* Christian, i.e., Paul came to Christianity "through an original experience."²⁵⁸ This experience is something that all Christians go through and *accept*. Paul, however, was faced with the problem of proclaiming "the Christian life experience against the surrounding world."²⁵⁹ Christianity was a new religion and one that had to be communicated to the world (if it was going to succeed). Perhaps this need to communicate was one of the reasons why the time phenomenon—as it is factually experienced—was more explicitly described in primal Christianity, which did not occur in early Judaism. Communicating to others (whether it be with regards to religion, philosophy, science etc.), for the most part, causes the communicated discourse (*talk*) to fall into everydayness.²⁶⁰ What gets communicated gets lost in "the they." Due to its link to Judaism and the importance of original experience and acceptance, early Christians were able to withstand the everyday tendencies that many other thinkers throughout history fell prey to. Heidegger, therefore, examines the expressive modes of Paul: "The Phenomenon of Proclamation," which is the relation of Paul to himself, to the surrounding world and to the communal world.²⁶¹ The "how" of

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 220: "[Heidegger] wants to learn something about *time* from Paul's apocalypticism."

²⁵⁷ See Ibid., 221 for the connection between *experience* and *life*, which are essentially synonyms.

²⁵⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 49.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 50

²⁶⁰ See Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 25-27.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 55.

proclamation must be assessed—the “how” of being communicated—in order to understand the “how” of the “complex of enactments” along with their meaning.²⁶² This is done by way of analysing Paul’s *Letters* from factual life and revealing the phenomenological experience of the proclamation; hence, the letters will reveal something about Paul and “his situation.” This is the biography that Heidegger is seeking and not his upbringing and adult life issues. The factual life situation that Paul finds himself in and “how” he communicates this to himself, the surrounding world and the communal world is revealed in his letters.²⁶³ This emphasizes the importance of starting from factual life experience, something that has been the initial starting point of this entire analysis—for it is only by beginning with this that we can attain original access to the time phenomenon.

Paul’s situation is one that gets “co-experienced” with his experience of his congregation. The way that Paul experiences the Thessalonians is, at the same time, the way that he experiences himself—for he experiences himself in his experience of them.²⁶⁴ Therefore, the congregation’s “having-become” (Christian) is Paul’s “having-become” (Christian).²⁶⁵ This is not difficult to understand once the basic tenet of Christianity is reveal.

²⁶² Ibid., 56.

²⁶³ Ibid., 61: “How does Paul, in the situation of a letter-writer, stand to the Thessalonians? How are they experienced by him? How is his communal world given to him in the situation of writing the letter? How does Paul stand to this communal world?”

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 65. This sound remarkably similar to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in particular, the section on “self-consciousness” in which the self encounters the other that is like the self. Of course this leads to a conflict (“struggle to the death”), however, the two are “recognizing themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111-112.

²⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 65.

You have accepted the *how* of the Christian standard of living, etc. that which is accepted concerns the how of self-conduct in factual life.²⁶⁶

“To become” a Christian means “to accept” a certain life; however, there is more to this acceptance than simply this way of living.²⁶⁷ In fact, this acceptance is profoundly connected to time. By having knowledge of our own “having-become,” we are then able to experience our “being-present,” which carries great significance for our anticipation of the future.²⁶⁸ The idea in Christianity is that we are “turning-towards God” in a manner where we factually enact specific ways of being, e.g., “serving” and “waiting.”²⁶⁹ To be a Christian means to live in a manner that is serving God and, as well, to await the *Parousia*—the second coming of the lord.²⁷⁰ The importance of the second coming lies in the fact that there was a first coming, that Christ came and this arrival is what is accepted by Christians—Christ came and will come again at the end of the world. Living with such a burden—awaiting the end—“determines each moment of [Paul’s] life.”²⁷¹ Paul’s life is basically “stretched out between the first and second coming.”²⁷²

It is apparent in his letters that he feels the need to reinforce this fact, for some in his congregation have not been living appropriately, i.e., they are absorbed in the world of their concern and have become expectant of “what life brings them.”²⁷³ They have

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 66.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 66-67. See also Nicholson, “The End of Time,” 225: “Memory of their conversion brings them knowledge of their future as well.”

²⁶⁹ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 66. See also van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 190.

²⁷⁰ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 67: “The acceptance is an entering oneself into anguish. This distress is a fundamental characteristic, it is an absolute concern in the horizon of the *Parousia*, in the second coming at the end of time.”

²⁷¹ Ibid., 68-69.

²⁷² Nicholson, “The End of Time,” 222.

²⁷³ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 72. See also I *Thess.* 5:6-8: “Therefore let us not sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober. For they that sleep sleep in the night; and they that be drunken are

forgotten where they came from by forgetting where they are headed and Paul feels impelled to bring the “Thessalonians back to themselves,” back to the knowledge of their having-become.²⁷⁴ This idea of remembering one’s own becoming and awaiting one’s own impending future is structurally comparable to Heidegger’s notion of authentic time. Paul even attempts to “free the Thessalonians from a common place understanding of time,” which is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s notion of unconcealment—allowing for something else to reveal itself once the destruction of the dominant view has ensued.²⁷⁵ Time, according to Paul, has to be thought of in a different way in light of the inevitable ‘end times:’

Paul is urging his congregation to adopt an appropriate bearing towards the great coming event. Heidegger’s reading . . . is especially alert to the bearing which the Christian must have towards the future, which brings with it a special bearing towards the past.²⁷⁶

It is clear that, unlike Aristotle, Paul is not privileging the present but is, in fact, privileging this notion of being-towards-the-end—*eschatology*. With the end (apocalypse) in view one is able to come back to one’s present, which is highlighted and experienced differently. By living in a manner where one’s bearing is such that (at any moment) the end may come, one is able to experience every (present) moment more

drunken in the night. But let us, who are of the day, be sober, putting on the breastplate of faith and love; and for an helmet, the hope of salvation.”

²⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 72. See also II *Thess.* 2:5-6: “Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time.”

²⁷⁵ Nicholson, “The End of Time,” 221.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

profoundly and venerated.²⁷⁷ One has to live with a certain “relation to the *eschaton*, the final situation.”²⁷⁸

For Heidegger, it is being-toward-death, towards-one’s-ownmost-potentiality-for-being that one comes face to face with. Facing this future, i.e., the nullity of being or the “possibility of the impossibility of being,” one is then able to come back to the present and, as a result, live in the present with a different orientation toward the past and the future. Put simply, by anticipating one’s own finitude (death), one lives in the present with a “resolve,” an acceptance and even a willing of one’s ownmost being (or non-being).²⁷⁹ This resolve is akin to Paul’s description of the appropriate *attitude* that one has to adopt towards the future; an *attitude* that willingly accepts that Christ came and will come again.²⁸⁰ For such an attitude towards an event past and an event still to come (the return of the same event) will determine our attitude toward the present, i.e., *anticipatory resoluteness*.²⁸¹ Such a resolution is that which “reveals the corner stone of the self as nothingness:” for Heidegger, the self was not-being (in-the-world) and will cease to-be (in-the-world); for Paul, Christ came (into the world) and will come (into the

²⁷⁷ See van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 190: “The coming will arrive only in the Kairos, the moment, “the fullness of time.”

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 158. See also McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 193.

²⁷⁹ Heidegger appears to be offering a “Godless eschatology” by adopting these Christian notions and leaving out the theology. See Ibid., 2-3. See also Ibid., 197: “This structure of fused temporal horizons is lifted directly out of Pauline eschatology.”

²⁸⁰ For *attitude* see Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 32-33, for “attitudinal foreconception” see Ibid., 35 and for “attitudinal relation” see Ibid., 40.

²⁸¹ See van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 190-191: “The original Christians live in a constant, essential, and necessary insecurity . . . a context of enacting one’s life in uncertainty before the unseen God,” in “daily doing and suffering.” The temporal enactment of this fluid situation means a resolute and open *wachsam sein*, being-wakeful for the incalculable Coming within the moment.”

world) again.²⁸² To be awake and mindful of the impending futural coming (the return of the same), means to be necessarily experiencing anxiety in the face of this event.²⁸³

It opens up a horizon of meaning only for those with the courage to feel anxiety and persevere in front of nothingness. Only in this way can we be authentic.²⁸⁴

Paul must remind the Thessalonians of this fact, for he does not wish to see anyone in his congregation caught off guard like “a thief in the night.”²⁸⁵ None of this would be possible, however, if it were not for primordial temporality, which makes our experiences of expectation, anxiety, anticipation etc., possible.

3.2: Primordial Temporality

Primordial temporality can only be uncovered once the everyday conception of time that has concealed this primordial temporality has been exposed. In fact, “they” have not only concealed this notion, but rather, they have themselves sprung from primordial temporality. Before primordial temporality can be explicated clearly, a brief commentary on how an analysis can bring forth this more original notion of time. For one thing, how does anticipatory resoluteness, which was ontically demonstrated in primal Christianity, link to an ontology of being? As was described above, anticipatory resoluteness is a specific attitude that one can adopt and live with; however, can an attitude lead to an ontology? Heidegger makes a distinction between ontic and ontological or existentiell and existential, which accounts for our worldly experiences (ontic/existentiell) on the one

²⁸² See Brejidak, “*Philosophia Crucis*,” 216.

²⁸³ For “anxiety” in connection with Christianity, see van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 174-175. For “anxiety” in connection with Heidegger, see *Being and Time*, 232-233.

²⁸⁴ Brejidak, “*Philosophia Crucis*,” 217.

²⁸⁵ I *Thess.* 5:2.

hand and our essential being (ontological/existential) on the other.²⁸⁶ Simply describing an existentiell situation does not appear to give one the authority to make existential or ontological determinations. On the contrary, this is precisely what Heidegger wishes to establish: how we get to the ontological is specifically by way of the ontic, thus the ontological must be grounded in the ontic.²⁸⁷ The very questioning of being—the existentiell act of posing a question—is what opens up the possibility of inquiring into and uncovering a fundamental ontology. Therefore, “ontological conceptualization [should] not let itself be cut off from our ontical experiences.”²⁸⁸

From what has been delineated, it is clear that temporality plays a significant role for Dasein. This is more than simply an extension in which nothing but the present exists. Rather this demonstrates that the past and the future play just as considerable a role as the present does for Dasein. It may be suggested that the past and future are more vital than the present—for the present, like Aristotle said, becomes the link between the past and future. For Heidegger, however, this link is not something to be privileged or elevated, in fact, it is the time component that we leave in order to go back to the past and anticipate the future. One does not dwell in the present without notions of the past and future. The present is actually lived with a perception of the past and future in mind, i.e., one’s comportment towards the past and future will determine one’s present. One’s present is therefore dependent on the past and future in such a way that one could not act in the

²⁸⁶ See Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 427-428.

²⁸⁷ See *Ibid.*, 428-429. See also Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 357.

²⁸⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 341. See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 280-281 & 328. It has been suggested that Heidegger “violates his own rule” by dismissing religion—for more on this see McGrath, *Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, xii.

present without a relation to the past and future. Ontically, of course, people get on in the world without perfect retention of the past and without a perfect understanding of the future. However, even such forgetting and lack of expecting is a relation. A relation to the past in the form of forgetting is what constitutes everydayness, which, as has been discussed, is how we get on in the world for the most part. Equally, a relation to the future in the form of expecting is what constitutes everydayness. Finally, a relation to the present that is curiously distracted by things in the world is also what constitutes everydayness. It then follows that if such relations were severed, then one could not function in the world either authentically or inauthentically. Thus, the common understanding of time is nothing more than a forgetting of a more primordial temporality. Forgetting is only possible provided that a more primordial notion of temporality exists—for that is precisely what gets forgotten in everydayness. Interestingly, in Aristotle's discussion of time, a notion of forgetting can be found:

In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view.²⁸⁹

Of course Aristotle's notion of forgetting may not necessarily be the same forgetting that Heidegger discusses; however, the fact that it is time which is being held responsible for the forgetting is intriguing. We cannot forget unless we have time in which the forgetting can occur. This is what primordial temporality is, the enabling of experiences of 'earlier,' 'at this moment,' and 'after' in which the phenomena of 'forgetting'/'retaining,' 'making present'/'moment of vision' and 'expecting'/'anticipating' occur.

²⁸⁹ Aristotle, "Physics," 376.

All ontological propositions can be regarded as “*a priori propositions*,” which means that they require an idea of “an earlier.”²⁹⁰ Such an idea is only possible provided that there is a conception of temporality—“the earlier” could not exist without already having a notion of time that allows for there to be *an earlier* in the first place.²⁹¹ It must therefore be concluded that temporality is the condition for the possibility of the earlier.²⁹² Interestingly, as was revealed in the reduction, Augustine believes that prior to heaven and earth there had to have been something that enabled the words of creation to be delivered, and that something was succession and alteration. Time, for Augustine, was necessary for finite beings to be brought into existence; time became the condition for the possibility of heaven and earth. Likewise with Aristotle (who utilized the unmoved mover to explain the beginning of motion), time being linked to motion therefore becomes the condition for the possibility of things. Furthermore, the Greek god Chronos (time) created the other deities from out of his seed thus allowing for the creation of other beings. These ontotheological notions of the genesis of time, which have been heavily criticized, appear to re-emerge in connection with Heidegger’s primordial temporality. Of course, Heidegger was not so bold as to assume a creation myth to explain primordial temporality. Heidegger remains phenomenological in his account, i.e., primordial temporality is a notion that we always already have in order to be able to navigate in the world.

²⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 324.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 324-325.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 324-325.

These ideas dealing with time in an everyday/inauthentic manner uncovered in the past reveal this fact: that they must have a notion of primordial temporality in order for them to be able to put forth their everyday/inauthentic time stories.

Roughly speaking, use of time is made in the understanding of being, without pre-philosophical and non-philosophical Dasein knowing about it explicitly.²⁹³

The fact that time is always already there, with or without our knowledge of it, indicates that this primordial “time temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest.”²⁹⁴ How could one conduct a historical analysis if no notion of ‘before,’ ‘prior,’ ‘previous,’ ‘earlier’ etc., were available? The wonders of writing, reading and mathematics would not be possible if ideas such as ‘after,’ ‘later,’ ‘soon,’ ‘subsequent’ etc., were not accessible. Of course there could be no present—for how could the present be present if there were no notions of before or after with which to contrast the present with? Therefore, Heidegger maintains that these notions are ones that are there, in our being; we have this idea, notion, and *experience* of ‘earlier,’ ‘at this moment’ and ‘after.’

Thus the fundamental ontological task of interpreting being as such includes working out the *Temporality of Being*. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of being will first be concretely answered.²⁹⁵

This is exactly what primordial temporality does: it opens up the possibility of concretely answering the question of the meaning of being. Furthermore, it opens up the possibility of possibility itself—for “the origin of possibility” is time.²⁹⁶ Therefore, being is not only lived “in time,” i.e., in the manner that Augustine depicts with his distinction between

²⁹³ Ibid., 303.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 325.

²⁹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 40. See also Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 280 & 294.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 325.

God's eternal present and human beings' temporal experiences, but rather being is time.²⁹⁷ Time makes possible the ability to be-ahead-of-oneself, the ability to have/take time in order to . . . , and the ability to go back one's having-been—authentically and inauthentically.²⁹⁸ Being is only graspable with respect to time, hence even notions of “supra-temporal,” “non-temporal” and eternal are actually temporal insofar as they are made possible due to our knowledge of primordial temporality.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 40. See also Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 319: “The being, in which Dasein can be its wholeness authentically as being-ahead-of-itself, is *time*.”

²⁹⁸ See *Ibid.*, 319-320.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 475: Heidegger maintains that primordial temporality, once “levelled off,” is responsible for our ordinary conception of time, which includes all notions of extra-temporal, non-temporal and eternal.

Conclusion

Phenomenological accounts of time reveal themselves to us in the ideas of past thinkers like Augustine and Paul. This was established by engaging in a hermeneutical analysis of these ideas and not by simply restating what “they” have already and explicitly said about time. If the intent of this analysis was to discuss Augustine and Paul in a traditional manner, i.e., to attempt to understand how they understood their own ideas (in their own temporally particular situation), then this analysis would have gone astray. Fortunately this was not my endeavour. I sought to go back to these thinkers with a particular comportment and with a particular motivation—to better understand the phenomenology of time as it was laid out by Heidegger. In order to attain this better understanding—as was proposed in the beginning and demonstrated throughout this analysis—a return to Augustine and Paul was necessary. This return revealed that Heidegger’s account of time is not something that emerged out of nowhere; on the contrary, the roots of his thought can be located in these past ideas.

Thus, Heidegger’s phenomenological account of time is historical. Heidegger did not simply take these ideas and appropriate them for his own gain, although a certain level of appropriation was necessary. What has been demonstrated, rather, is that others throughout history can be seen to be dealing with time as it is revealed in factual life experience, albeit unbeknownst to them. The fact that these ideas have been discussed throughout history, i.e., the fact that facticity was dealt with in relation to time in the past, reveals that facticity is the appropriate initial position to adopt when investigating time. Even though Augustine and Paul did not necessarily recognize their work to be based on

(or coming from) a notion of factual life, they nevertheless dealt with the phenomenon of time as it is factually experienced. This is what the return to their ideas has revealed—by revisiting the ideas of Augustine and Paul with our initial position in mind, it can be demonstrated that factual life was in fact motivating their analyses. They may not have been aware of this motivation, but it is something that can be concluded from this analysis.

Heidegger used Aristotle's notion of time as the everyday example with the intent of demonstrating that the discussion of time had not gone beyond Aristotle's account. The everyday way of interpreting time can be seen in Aristotle's construal of time and as well in other philosophers' accounts, such as Augustine. By using another philosopher, viz., Augustine, instead of Aristotle, I was able to show the Aristotelian influence within Augustine's everyday conception of time. Interestingly, Aristotle has been held responsible for stunting the investigation into time and, furthermore, the influence he had on Scholasticism appeared to hinder their progress. Aristotle has been recognized, in addition, for delaying the sciences with his theory of motion, which is the primary reason why the geocentric model of the universe endured for centuries.³⁰⁰ It was Galileo who disproved Aristotle's theory of motion, which allowed for the new (or not so new) view of the universe to unconceal itself.³⁰¹ It is important to see the profound influence that Aristotle had on history, not only with respect to philosophy, but even within the

³⁰⁰ See Vesselin Petkov, *Relativity and the Nature of Spacetime* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2005), 13: "And indeed Aristotle's view on motion looked self-evident even in the seventeenth century since it appeared to be in perfect agreement with the common-sense view based on people's everyday experience. This view was almost certainly the ultimate reason for the rejection of the first heliocentric model put forward by Aristarchus of Samos (310-230 B.C.) immediately after Aristotle's geocentric system of the world."

³⁰¹ Petkov, *Relativity and the Nature of Spacetime*, see 17-25 for a discussion on how Galileo disproved Aristotle's theory of motion.

sciences. It can be asserted, then, that by investigating other historical figures, such as Augustine, the authority that Aristotle appears to have had (with regards to philosophy and science) can be easily discerned.

Augustine put forth a cosmic account of time in which he dealt with its origins. By adopting such a position towards time, i.e., by investigating its origins, Augustine repeated what many before him (throughout history) had done. Going back to the Presocratics, we can find (with the monist thinkers in particular), cosmological accounts of the origins of existence that resemble, at least in principle, the account that Augustine provides. Obviously, as it should be noted, the Presocratics did not discuss the origins of the universe for the sake of uncovering an account of time, as Augustine seem to do. However, the idea of an indefinite or eternal substance being the condition for the possibility of all that exists is markedly similar to Augustine's account of Genesis (clearly linked to the Bible). Many other everyday inclinations can be found in Augustine's cosmic account of time—being wholly unaware of his initial position of looking, the investigative constraints that he ignores (constraining him further), and even the presupposition of an additional constraint. Augustine has concealed the time phenomenon due to these traditional everyday interpretations and presuppositions; an example of the “tendency to cover over.”³⁰² By disseminating traditional ideas regarding existence, Augustine's account of time has fallen into everydayness. On the other hand, Augustine did put forth an account of time that appears to have dealt with the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. The extension of the soul recognizes the way in

³⁰² Heidegger, “Wilhelm Dilthey's Research,” 165.

which human beings actually experience time by remembering/forgetting, being immediately aware and expecting. This had profound implications for philosophy, even if those implications were only recognized in later centuries. That is why I decided to break up Augustine's account of time into two different accounts, the cosmic account and the phenomenological account. Both are supposed to make time clear (as a single account of time); however, as has been asserted throughout this analysis, only with the extension of the soul does Augustine deal with the time phenomenon, whereas the other merely perpetuates the Aristotelian model of 'now time.'

Augustine and Paul were selected due to their link to Christianity, which altered how we deal with time. Ancient Rabbinic culture did not have a concept of time as such; however, living and dealing with time—time-reckoning—was vital, which may have assisted them in avoiding the everyday interpretation. That is not to suggest that they did not fall prey to everydayness, for that is a basic constitution of Dasein and is unavoidable. What this does suggest, however, is that they were not further concealing and covering up the time phenomenon with philosophical/scientific explanations in an attempt to make it clear. Such a comportment towards time clearly influenced early Christian life experience, which can be located in Paul's *Letters*. It is in these letters that factual life experience, along with the authentic and appropriate attitude toward time, was uncovered and discussed in a way that makes it relevant for Heidegger. Not only did Heidegger recognize the importance of early Christian life experience, but, as many have suggested, even his own account of time appears to be grounded in this Christian life experience. It would be wrong to assert that this ground is something that went unrecognized by

Heidegger, for he would have been fully aware of the structural similarities. Perhaps he merely sought to find the most appropriate schematism of time in order to gain original access to the time phenomenon. Once he attained this schematism he was then able to detach it from its traditional worldview associated with Christianity and properly appropriate it. This is what fundamentally allowed Heidegger to develop his phenomenological account of time leading to primordial temporality. Once revealed, primordial temporality is not something that needs to be proven—no genesis of the creation of this phenomenon is necessary. The simple fact is that we have it and it determines our being, our existence.

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