POACHING IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR:
THE CREATION OF AN ISSUE

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DARRIN MICHAEL MCGRATH
POACHING IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR:
THE CREATION OF AN ISSUE

BY

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

In September, 1982 newspapers in St. John's reported that the provincial government had declared a "war" on big game poaching. Perhaps the most significant of the initiatives announced by the provincial Minister of wildlife were amendments to the provincial Wildlife Act. These legislative changes increased fines and jail terms for convicted poachers and also made the confiscation of any vehicle or equipment used in a big game poaching incident mandatory.

This thesis examines how and why poaching became an issue for the government of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1982. Legislation governing poaching had first been enacted in Newfoundland in 1845. Why did poaching, a crime for 150 years, emerge as an issue in 1982? The analysis draws on the body of sociological research dealing with the "discovery" or "creation" of social problems. This literature suggests that a social problem is a social construct. It results from a process of definition in which a given condition is recognized as a social problem.

In this thesis, Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four stage framework for investigating the emergence and
maintenance of an issue is utilized, in conjunction with Best's (1987) analysis of rhetoric, to argue that the emergence of the poaching issue was inextricably linked to the provincial government’s desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry. Poaching did not emerge as an issue in 1982 because of an escalation in poaching incidents. The key factor was the provincial government’s renewed interest in outdoor tourism, a specific part of which was non-resident big game hunting.
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The War on Poaching
In September, 1982 newspapers in St. John’s reported that the provincial government had declared a "war" on big game poaching, or illegal hunting. For example, one news item reported that "The provincial government has declared 'war' on big game poachers" (The Evening Telegram September 17, 1982). Another newspaper ran the headline "Simms reveals all out effort: New 'war' on poachers!!" (The Daily News, September 18, 1982). Simms, the provincial Minister of wildlife, announced measures the government would be taking to reduce poaching. The most significant was the strengthening of penalties under the provincial Wildlife Act.

These legislative changes increased fines and jail terms for convicted poachers and also made the confiscation of any vehicle or equipment used in a big game poaching incident mandatory. These harsh new penalties had very real effects on a variety of people. People convicted of poaching lost vehicles, had to pay large fines and were often imprisoned. At the same time, the amendments to the Wildlife Act made Wildlife
and thus may have gone to extremes to avoid capture. The new legislation was given approval in principle on November 23, 1982 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5489). Simms and officials with the wildlife division claimed that poaching was the factor prohibiting the growth of the province’s big game herds. Other possible factors for lack of herd expansion such as habitat destruction, the imprecise nature of big game science, or poor management were raised. Due to a variety of reasons these alternatives were unable to compete against the argument concerning poaching.

Statement of Problem
This thesis investigates this "war" on poaching. Specifically, it examines how and why poaching became an issue for the government of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1982. Legislation governing poaching had first been enacted in Newfoundland in 1845 (Peters and Burleigh, 1951:31). Why did poaching, which had been a crime for

1 It is important to note that legal definitions of what constitutes poaching have changed considerably over this one-hundred and fifty year span. There has also been considerable variation in the extent to which, and the enthusiasm with which the game laws have been enforced. Laws may exist on the statute books but unless people are aware of them and the laws are enforced effectively they might as well not exist. Evidence suggests that for much of Newfoundland's history game laws have been enforced only minimally. There have, however, been exceptions to this; periods in which considerable effort has been made to enforce existing laws and re-work and extend legislation. Usually these efforts have been accompanied
one-hundred and fifty years, emerge as an issue in 1982? That is, why did the provincial government declare "war" on poachers in the early 1980's? On the surface the "war" was fought to deal with what was claimed to be a serious and escalating problem of poaching. However, I believe more than just governmental concern over wildlife conservation was behind this "war." I argue that the emergence of poaching as an issue in Newfoundland in the early 1980's was inextricably linked to government's desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry. That is, "war" was declared on poaching largely due to the fact that the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador had taken a renewed interest in promoting the province's outdoors as a tourist commodity. An integral part of this revived interest in promoting the "sportsman's paradise" was, of course, the province's wildlife. These resources, coupled with the province's

to enforce existing laws and re-work and extend legislation. Usually these efforts have been accompanied by attempts to create public awareness of the importance of game and thus support for more effective policing.

2 Historically, the "great Newfoundland outdoors" had been an important part of the tourist industry. For example, at the turn of the century, caribou hunting and salmon angling were both actively promoted. Wealthy sportsmen who went afield at that time left accounts of their exploits (Davis [1895]; Millais [1907]; and Rogers [1912]). In the late 1930's, the tourism department of Newfoundland hired a professional sportsman to promote the country's wildlife and natural setting abroad (Wulff, 1967).
extensive countryside, were regarded by government as a source of potentially great revenue in the late 1970's. I maintain that poaching emerged as an issue in 1982 because of the provincial government’s renewed interest in outdoor tourism, not because of an escalation in poaching incidents.

There are no indications that poaching actually worsened in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In fact, research revealed that the government agency responsible for managing and protecting big game populations was unsure of both how much poaching was actually occurring and its effects on animal populations. For example, one Newfoundland and Labrador wildlife division document stated that "information required to ... understand natural losses and poaching is far from adequate" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a:3). One big game biologist stated in an interview (August 9, 1990) that in the formula used by the wildlife division to set licence quotas, the amount of animals poached represent a "fudge factor" or "guesstimate." Another biologist wrote in an internal report that the division had "no apparent means to gauge how many animals were taken illegally"

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3 As Freeman (1989) has shown, big game science is very imprecise. This uncertainty is heightened when considering poaching. One reason is the so-called "dark figure" which surrounds all crimes.
(Oosenbrug, 1985:1). Such evidence makes clear that a critical viewpoint is warranted when investigating claims that "poaching is out of control" and a "war" is needed. This evidence also suggests that it is reasonable to question the motives behind the declaration of a "war" on poaching.

More evidence which lends support to my assertion that it is sensible to critically analyze the poaching offensive was the very nature of the "war." The 1980's was a period of fiscal restraint. The state in Newfoundland did not have the resources necessary to fight or win a "war." In fact, while certain measures were implemented (such as the wildlife act amendments) government did not really try to win the "war." It did not provide adequate resources to the wildlife division for either counting the roaming, scattered big game animals, or for the protection and enforcement of the wildlife regulations. The declaration of "war" raised expectations of both wildlife agents and hunters that increased protection efforts would be implemented. However, by the late 1980's, both resident sportsmen and wildlife officers publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with government's steadily diminishing efforts to combat poaching. Therefore, the "war" might be described as a phantom "war;" while its consequences were
real, government did not really try to win it.

Another reason to question the initiation of a "war" on poaching is historical evidence (presented in chapter three) which demonstrates that poaching has been occurring in Newfoundland since the game laws were first enacted in 1845. That is, poaching was not a newly discovered phenomena in 1982; it had existed and been identified for about one-hundred and fifty years. This is more reason to be critical of the "war" on poaching. Why would a one-hundred and fifty year old crime emerge as a problem in 1982? Other studies of game laws such as the work of Thompson (1975), Hay (1975), Overton (1980) and Ives (1988) show that game laws are class laws which serve vested interests and that revisions to game laws are often made to serve wealthy, powerful segments of society. For example, Overton (1980) argues that by the twentieth century in Newfoundland, game laws had transformed wildlife resources into sporting resources. Some of the primary beneficiaries of this change were those involved in the tourist industry. Ives (1988) makes a similar argument in his analysis of amendments to game laws in the late 1800’s in Maine. Such studies show that game laws do more than just regulate the taking of wildlife. They also define wildlife resources as valuable commodities to both individuals involved in the outdoor
tourist industry and governments seeking potentially lucrative development sectors.

The activities of some of the key actors involved in the "war" also suggest that more than just concern over illegal hunting was behind the poaching offensive. It is significant to note that the Minister of wildlife who declared "war" on poaching had a brother heavily involved in the tourist industry. In 1987 this Minister tabled a very controversial government policy paper on the outfitting industry.\(^4\) The late 1970's - early 1980's witnessed a growing body of private groups which had vested interests in wildlife resources. Typically, these groups described themselves as "conservation groups." However, I suggest that they are better seen as interest groups, primarily concerned with the potential economic returns wildlife resources could generate. These groups lobbied government to ameliorate poaching and expand outdoor tourism. I also discovered that key actors were often members of more than one group, creating an informal network between groups. There was a consistent link

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\(^4\) The outfitting industry is essentially the hunting and fishing camp business. However, outfitting operations can also include related recreational activities such as wilderness canoeing. An outfitter is the owner/operator of a camp site, lodge, cabins and related facilities used as a base for outfitting operations for sports fishing and/or hunting and related commercial activities (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1990:280-281).
between claims concerning the resources lost to poachers and the potential benefits of outdoor tourism. Significantly, I also found there were links between these wildlife interest groups and key individuals within the state and the outdoor tourist industry. For example, I focus on one particular interest group, the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland (SPAWN), which was very outspoken on both the poaching issue and the potential benefits of outdoor tourism. Some of the executive members of this group were owners/operators of hunting and fishing camps. I argue that these tourist entrepreneurs wanted more wildlife resources for use in the tourist industry; specifically to sell to non-resident hunters. Significantly, the founding president of this group became the civil servant responsible for the province's outfitting industry in 1984. This same man also writes a weekly column for a province-wide publication, The Newfoundland Herald, in which he continues to make claims about poaching and outdoor tourism. 5 Another member of SPAWN was the brother of the man who would become Premier of the province in 1989.

^5 It is important to note he became owner/operator of a fishing camp in 1991. This writer had (has) the potential to reach and influence many people. Due to his occupation and background, it seems reasonable to infer he has economic interests in wildlife resources. This undoubtedly influenced the content of his columns.
Another group I focus on is the Wilderness Society. At least two key wildlife division employees (the Chief Biologist and the Chief of Information and Education) were members of this group, which typically called for increased wildlife and wildland protection and an expansion of the outdoor tourist industry. This group’s membership also included tourist entrepreneurs and media columnists. Thus, there were links between lobby groups, the tourist industry, the state and the media. The bridge between interest groups and the media meant that groups could reach a broad audience with claims concerning poaching and wildlife tourism, contributing to the atmosphere of endangered wildlife stocks and supporting calls to expand outdoor-based tourism. Significantly, both of the groups discussed above, also had their own means of spreading information; SPAWN published an annual magazine, while the Wilderness Society had a bi-weekly newspaper column. Clearly, these groups had the potential ability to reach and influence many people.

I argue that news media played a crucial role in the "war" on poaching. I contend that news reports on poaching were not unbiased, "fact" based accounts reflecting the reality of poaching. Newspapers acted as both a forum for claims-makers and as a source of claims. For example, featured articles reported arguments
concerning poaching and outdoor tourism, while editorials and columnists pressed claims of their own. This contributed to the atmosphere of concern about diminishing wildlife stocks and the potential of outdoor tourism. I examine the relationship between "official sources" and the media and discuss the media’s at times unquestioning acceptance of government statements as "fact." I pay particular attention to the role wildlife columnists played in the "war" and to the messages they presented about poaching and wildlife tourism. I demonstrate that specific columnists were connected to the outdoor tourist industry, interest groups and the state. These links suggest the content of such columns has to be viewed critically.

Individuals and groups did not have equal access to newspapers. For example, some interest groups wrote/published their own newspaper columns and magazines. At the same time writers of wildlife columns in the local print media were not unbiased, objective observers of the poaching "war." I focus on several columnists and their claims about poaching and outdoor tourism, arguing these columns helped expand the poaching issue through their inflammatory, rhetorical use of language and their often unquestioning reliance on wildlife division sources. It is also important to make
clear that several newspaper columnists examined had links to interest groups and the state, for example, the above mentioned outdoor tour agent who writes for The Newfoundland Herald. Thus, certain groups and individuals involved in the "war" on poaching had better chances to "get heard" and thus influence public opinion.

Theoretical Framework
My analysis of how poaching became an issue in the early 1980's draws on the body of sociological research dealing with the "discovery" or "creation" of social problems. This work suggests that a social problem is a social construct. It results from a process of definition in which a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem. A social problem does not exist for a society unless it is recognized (Blumer, 1971:301).

This social problems literature covers such diverse problems as the "discovery" of child abuse, fear of violence in Newfoundland, the emergence of satanism as a problem in Canada, the spread of mugging in England, and the "war" against social security abusers in Canada. This body of work raises important questions for the student of any social problem. Which individuals and what institutions gain from an issue being discovered? Who becomes responsible for attending to the problem
(Gusfield, 1981:5)? What is the role of the state with regard to the issue? How has the state changed its stance toward the issue? What problems, fears and anxieties are reflected in the issue? What is the role of the media in the creation of the issue (Hall et al., 1978:viii)? I argue that the natural history model provides a suitable way to address these questions with respect to the poaching problem. The natural history model is a framework for analyzing the emergence and maintenance of an issue or problem. I utilize Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four stage variant, in conjunction with Best's (1987) analysis of rhetoric to examine the poaching "war." The theoretical framework is discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Significance of Work
The investigation of a "war" on poaching may, at first glance, seem to be a research topic of little interest to the sociologist. However, there are several reasons why poaching is a worthwhile research topic. First, Newfoundland has a long history of exploiting wildlife resources and hunting is still a part of the male socialization process in much of the province. Second, residents of Newfoundland spend more days hunting than residents of any other Canadian province, only New Brunswick has a higher percentage of hunters (Filion et al., 1987:20-23).
A sociological analysis of the "war" on poaching is warranted then, because it was part of a government policy which effected the lives of many people, such as hunters, poachers and wildlife agents.

Another reason why this study of a "war" on poaching is important is because it says something about how and why government policy is established. This analysis of the "war" on poaching provides insight into the political process and agenda setting. That is, it contributes to our understanding of the political process, the state, and the relationship between policy and interests. In this particular case, the state was interested in developing the wildlife based tourism sector. At the same time, there were links and channels of communication between the state and tourist entrepreneurs (such as outfitters), who were lobbying for certain concessions. In such a case, one might expect the state to have first provided a climate suitable for outdoor tourism's growth, and second, to have responded favourably to the lobbying of tourist entrepreneurs. This is what I found. That is, what issues got on the political agenda, what groups got asked for input, what groups or individuals "got heard" and what policies were enacted regarding poaching and outdoor tourism was not an open process, in which all participants had equal chances for success. Certain
groups occupied better positions than others. In this case, policy on poaching and outdoor tourism was influenced by actors who had links to interest groups, such as outfitters associations and organizations of "sportsmen," which had specific interests in game stocks. This implies that opposition groups and individuals would lose out in the struggle to get action on their claims. This is what I found in my research.

Two significant examples of "losers" in the poaching "war" were the Wildlife Protection Officers' Association and the Hunters Rights Association. The former was a lobby group made up of the province's wildlife protection agents (i.e. the men responsible for enforcing the wildlife act and apprehending poachers), the latter was an organization of working class hunters who lobbied for the right to hunt on Sundays. Both groups were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to get actions on their respective claims concerning poaching. WPO's claims received little action for two reasons. First, because

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6 Hunting on Sundays is illegal in the province of Newfoundland. Thus, if one gets caught hunting on Sunday one is breaking the wildlife act and is poaching. The Hunters Rights Association was formed in 1989 and was led by a man convicted of hunting on a Sunday. This group was a grass-roots movement to change hunting laws. The Wildlife Protection Officers Association was formed in 1988 to collectively represent WPO's. Two of its main arguments were for an increase in protection staff and for WPO's to be issued side-arms. Both groups are discussed in detail in chapter seven.
the 1980's was a decade of fiscal restraint for the Newfoundland government. That is, the state could not afford to expand the protection staff and replace old equipment. That is, the economic conditions that the "war" was fought in played a major part in defining what groups "got heard" and what policies were enacted.

Related to the economic conditions perhaps was the state's expansion of wildlife education programs. In 1980 an Information and Education section was added to the wildlife division. One of its primary goals was training hunters to behave like "sportsmen" and obey the game laws. This initiative was important because if hunters could be successfully taught to follow the game laws, then fewer WPQ's would be needed. Also it is significant to note that near the end of the 1980's, private groups demanded they be involved in wildlife protection.

Typically, such arguments claimed civilian/volunteer wildlife agents be used to help enforce game laws. Related to such claims was the notion that lands be privatized, thus controlling access to resources and supposedly better protecting them. It is significant to note that outdoor tourist entrepreneurs would benefit most from privatized lands. By 1990, interest groups were being given an active hand in protection efforts and government unsuccessfully attempted to enact legislation which would allow private ownership of land around inland

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waterways. However, this legislation was not enacted due to widespread resident opposition.

Significantly, government’s "war" on poaching and its expansion of outdoor tourism faced opposition from residents. I also document how opposition came from both inside and outside the official boundaries of the state. For example, some wildlife officials resisted increasing non-resident licence quotas. In fact, research found that the non-resident hunt was last on the wildlife division’s big game user priority list. At the same time, individuals and some groups opposed the growth of the outdoor tourism sector because they feared they would lose "traditional" use and access rights. This was particularly true in the late 1980’s, when opposition was so strong that government was forced to withdraw proposed outdoor tourist legislation.

Similarly, government’s fighting of the "war" also came under attack from various groups and individuals. The 1980’s was a period of fiscal restraint and the wildlife division experienced prolonged budget cuts. This resulted in manpower reductions and a lack of new equipment. Thus, fewer and fewer wildlife agents, with aging trucks, outdated radios and decreasing helicopter time were asked to do more work (i.e. fight a "war"). At
the same time, higher fines made their work more
dangerous, as poachers had more to lose and may have
become more prone to violently resist arrest. This
resulted in wildlife agents becoming increasingly angry
with their employer (i.e. the government) and their
militancy steadily increased into the 1990’s. At the same
time, some influential groups and individuals (including
some of those linked to the tourist industry discussed
above) began to complain about government’s handling of
the "war." For example, some outfitters called for
increased spending on wildlife protection, perhaps to
help guard their investments.

As mentioned above, both government and vested
interest groups wanted to expand the non-resident hunt.
That is, they needed more big game licences for tourist
entrepreneurs to sell to non-resident hunters. The
problem facing government was that only a fixed amount of
animals could be allocated for culling without
jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. I argue
that budget reductions and the character of wildlife
science combined to make the precise size of big game
herds very uncertain. That is, big game managers were
unsure as to exactly how many animals there were, or how
many were being lost to poachers. Thus, government faced
a dilemma: how could non-resident licence allocations be
increased without jeopardizing stocks? Where were the animals needed to immediately expand the non-resident hunt to be found? One way was to implement programs to increase herds. However, this would have been a long term solution and would not have produced the necessary animals quickly enough. I argue that in order to promptly increase non-resident licence allocations, government reduced resident allocations and shifted these licences to non-resident hunters.\textsuperscript{7} Taking these animals from residents was politically dangerous and the reductions in resident quotas produced complaints, as seen in letters to the editor and the formation of hunter’s groups. However, government did not publicly state it was reducing resident quotas and increasing non-resident quotas; it blamed the reduction in resident allocations on illegal hunting and declared "war" on poachers.

The "war" on poaching then had two main effects. First, it may have reduced the number of animals "lost" to poachers. While government and wildlife managers were unsure exactly how many animals were taken by poachers, every extra animal meant another potential non-resident licence sale. A second effect of the "war" was that it provided government with a scapegoat for its reduction of

\textsuperscript{7} This reallocation process is examined in detail in chapter five.
Government decreased the number of resident big game licences, publicly stating this was done to help stocks recover from rampant poaching by residents. There was no mention of the subsequent redirection of these licences to non-residents (or of poaching by non-residents). That is, the "war" might be seen as an attempt to quiet unhappy resident hunters. It is important to note that the number of resident hunters was steadily increasing. That is, there was an increasing resident demand for big game licences, at the same time that the non-resident hunt was growing. A "war" on poaching helped distract attention away from the sleight of hand that accompanied the expansion of the non-resident big game hunt.

This is yet another reason why a sociological study of how poaching became an issue in 1982 is a socially relevant undertaking. This study stands to contribute to our understanding of how social problems emerge; it contributes to our understanding of the politics of social problems. How and why do social issues, such as

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8 In my thesis I detail the way in which poachers and poaching were typified by the primary definers of the issue. I examine how the manner in which poachers were typified changed over the course of the 1980's. Generally it was claimed that poachers were becoming more violent, cunning and ruthless. Typically, the poacher was linked to "associated evils" such as drinking, unemployment and a lack of morals.
poaching, become "problems?" My research suggests that poaching was put on the political agenda (i.e. became a problem) not because it was suddenly discovered, or not because it was actually escalating, but primarily because the state in Newfoundland had taken a renewed interest in wildlife and wildlands as economic commodities. That is, the "poaching war" was not fought to combat an escalating poaching problem, but because it fit in with government’s desire to expand tourism based on wildlife and wildlands. That is, poaching emerged as a problem for very different reasons than the motives stated by the key actors involved. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:155) support this line of reasoning when they write that governments may attempt to create one problem in order to divert attention away from another.

It is important to critically investigate the social process by which poaching emerged as an issue, because it can help us understand the mechanics of how other social problems emerge, are created or get discovered. In large, heterogeneous complex modern societies, a vast array of potential social problems exist. However, only a relatively small amount develop as fully as the poaching issue did in Newfoundland in the 1980’s. It is important to examine how problems emerge and get slated for action because the government policies enacted have very real
effects on large numbers of people. It is also significant when one considers all the issues in our society that do not receive government attention and intense media coverage. Also this research argues that poaching was put on the political agenda in order to be a "smoke-screen" and draw attention away from other politically more problematic policies, such as expansion of outdoor tourism. This may be important in helping us understand how and why government acts, and can help direct future research into other social problems. Thus, my study of the "war" on poaching initiated by the government of Newfoundland in 1982 suggests that work of Spector and Kitsuse (1977), Gusfield (1981; 1989), Becker (1967), Blumer (1971) and Best (1987; 1989) and other so-called "social constructionist writers" is the most appropriate viewpoint from which to analyze the emergence of social problems. That is, my thesis suggests we follow the trail blazed by the above mentioned authors when investigating the discovery or emergence of social problems. Thus my thesis also suggests the appearance of social problems deserves focused, critical analysis because of the underhanded, devious manner in which the government of Newfoundland used the "war" on poaching to draw attention away from its expansion of the outdoor tourist industry. That is, critically analyzing the emergence of social problems can help us understand the
mechanics of the state, how it works and who it best serves.

Research Methods
The research was based on a combination of interviews of key personnel and examination of secondary sources, especially newspaper reports. Work began in September, 1989 with two preliminary interviews. The subjects were a wildlife protection officer and the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for wildlife. The purpose of these interviews was to make contact with personnel inside the wildlife division and gather basic facts about the running of the division, the poaching issue and identify key personnel.

Further preliminary work involved investigation of media clippings on poaching and other related wildlife issues dating from the late 1970's. Additionally, newspapers on microfilm were searched for items concerning poaching. Newspaper offices were visited and any available files searched. News reports told of government "crackdowns" on poaching, and spoke of the increasing violence and cunning of the poacher. From this

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9 It is significant to note that The Evening Telegram, a long-running daily St. John’s newspaper which has an extensive library of clippings, did not begin a file on poaching until 1982, the year "war" was declared on it.
media search it was apparent a "war" had been declared on poaching in the early 1980's by the Newfoundland government. This media coverage was used to frame the study and pinpoint the most visible actors and agencies involved in the "war." In this way, a preliminary interview program was assembled. It consisted mainly of former provincial government Cabinet Ministers, other government members, wildlife division officials, interest group representatives and media personnel. Since relying on media reports to gather preliminary data may have been somewhat problematic, steps were taken to offset possible methodological problems.

In order to better understand how poaching emerged as an issue in 1982, it was decided to visit five main research sites. 10 The primary sites were selected because they housed Wildlife offices: St. John's, where the wildlife division's provincial headquarters are located; Clarenville which is home to the eastern region wildlife office; the central region office at Gander; the western region office in Pasadena; and Goose Bay, which

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10 The costs associated with this field research were paid for with money provided through a research grant provided by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
houses the Labrador regional office. I also hoped to investigate whether there was any variation in the poaching "war" from region to region. I travelled from St. John's to a site, stayed there from three to seven days and then returned to St. John's to transcribe tapes, rewrite field notes and contact subjects at the next research site. The main research period was from May to August 1990, and during those months the primary sites were visited and 43 unstructured interviews conducted.

Babbie (1986:247) defines unstructured interviews as essentially a conversation in which the interviewer establishes a general line of questioning and pursues specific topics raised by the subject. The interviewer typically has a general plan of enquiry, but no specific set of questions that must be asked in a certain order. Ideally, the subject does most of the talking and the researcher probes into what was said. Some of the interviews were highly formal, involving high ranking civil

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11 Additionally, other communities such as Deer Lake, Rocky Harbour, Grand Falls and Lewisporte were visited.

12 Two important interviews were conducted in early 1991. The recently retired, long time director of the wildlife division was interviewed on May 8, 1991. The leader of the opposition party, who had been Minister responsible for wildlife in the early 1980's was interviewed on April 24, 1991. I had been unable to reach either man prior to this.
servants, and were often conducted in Confederation Building in St. John's. Others were more informal, such as an interview with an interest group representative conducted on his patio, or a conversation with a wildlife officer in his pick-up truck.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into eight (8) chapters. Following the introduction, chapter two reviews the literature on the natural history model and outlines the theoretical framework utilized in the thesis. It traces the natural history model from its appearance in 1941 up to more recent adaptations of the model, paying particular attention to the variant put forth by Spector and Kitsuse (1977). The model is critiqued and Best’s (1987) attempt to move beyond its limitations is also detailed. Best’s work is used alongside Kitsuse and Spector’s to analyze the data.

The third chapter provides a general background on Newfoundland and Labrador necessary for an appreciation of the use of wildlife as a resource. It briefly outlines the geography and history of the province, placing particular emphasis on people’s traditional use of wildlife resources and state efforts to manage them. This chapter demonstrates that, historically, residents of
Newfoundland relied heavily on wildlife resources to supplement their diets and incomes. It argues that, by the late 1800's, wildlife had begun to be used for tourism and that game laws enacted at that time increasingly defined game as sporting/tourist resources.

Chapters four through seven outline the natural history of poaching in Newfoundland. The fourth chapter details stage one in the natural history of poaching, which, I argue, lasted from early 1980 until September, 1982 when the provincial government declared "war" on poachers. The chapter begins by focusing on the importance placed on tourism, the rediscovery of wildlife as a specific part of this emphasis and the period of fiscal restraint the provincial government was entering. The structure of the wildlife division and the importance of wildlife education are then discussed. The bulk of the chapter investigates agitation around the poaching issue. Four categories of claims-makers are identified and particular attention is paid to the types of claims made. Agitators claimed that poaching was endemic and was seen by many residents as socially acceptable behaviour. Stage one concluded with controversy and heightened awareness of the issue.

Chapter five examines stage two in poaching's
natural history, which began in mid-September 1982 and lasted until December, 1984. The "war" on poaching is described and analyzed, as is the reported escalation of lawlessness in the province's countryside. It is argued that a "moral panic" in the countryside provided the backdrop for the "war" on poaching. It was believed that law and order was disintegrating in the woods and barrens of the province, that there was an increase in violent, lawless behaviour perpetrated by a new type of hunter who was willing to go to any lengths for a successful hunt. I argue this stage witnessed a redefinition of poaching, as claims-makers alleged that poaching was now being carried out for black-market sale. The 1982 revisions to the Wildlife Act are also discussed and it is argued that these laws can be best analyzed as social class laws. They were enacted by the state to improve control of hunters and benefit outdoor tourist entrepreneurs. Also discussed is the growing opposition government faced to its wildlife management programs and its expansion of the outdoor tourism industry.

The sixth chapter examines the third stage in the natural history of poaching. No new definition of poaching developed in this stage. There was a lull in media coverage of the issue in 1985 and most of 1986. Then in late 1986-early 1987 news coverage of poaching
expanded substantially. The most important theme of this chapter is the complaints lodged against government for its handling of the poaching problem and its management of the outdoor tourist industry. This chapter concludes with the province’s wildlife protection officers (WPO’s) growing steadily dissatisfied with their work situations and becoming increasingly militant. This development continued into the fourth stage in which WPO’s formed an Association to represent their concerns and voice their opinions. Two other new interest groups were also formed in this final stage, and the chapter focuses on these three groups and their activities. Stage four saw another redefinition of poaching; it was claimed that poacher’s reactions had changed, that poachers were more apt to react violently toward enforcement personnel. The final chapter summarizes the thesis, and makes suggestions for further research. I now turn to chapter two and detail the theoretical framework utilized.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the literature on the natural history model. The work discussed ranges from some of the first presentations of that model up to more recent critiques and attempts to go beyond it. The purpose of this discussion is to familiarize the reader with the theoretical framework used to analyze how poaching became a problem in 1982.

THE NATURAL HISTORY MODEL
The natural history model is a framework widely used to analyze social problems. The framework was developed more than forty years ago by Fuller and Myers (1941) in their study of how trailer camps had become a problem in Detroit in the 1930’s. Fuller and Myers asserted that:

social problems exhibit a temporal course of development in which different phases or stages may be distinguished. Each stage anticipates its successor in time and each succeeding stage contains new elements which mark it off from its predecessor. A social problem thus conceived as always being in a dynamic stage of "becoming" passes through the natural history stages of awareness, policy determination and reform... The "natural history" as we use the term is simply a conceptual tool for the examination of the data which constitute social problems (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 321).

As this quote highlights, Fuller and Myers' natural history model had three stages (awareness, policy determination and reform) through which the authors asserted social problems progressed. A decade later Lemert (1951) failed in his
attempted replication of Fuller and Myers’ study. Lemert attempted to apply the natural history model in his work on the appearance of, and reaction to, trailer camps in five California cities. At each stage Lemert found results unlike those of Fuller and Myers (Lemert, 1951:217-222). Lemert concluded:

In conclusion we can say with considerable certainty that the Fuller-Myers formulation of a natural history of social problems is inapplicable to the rise and regulation of trailer camps in California cities. Furthermore it appears to be an insufficient conceptualization of the interplay of public opinion in culture conflicts in modern society (Lemert, 1951:223). Clearly, Lemert (1951) thought there was little value in the natural history model.

Lemert (1951) may have failed to find the three stages as outlined by Fuller and Myers (1941), and his criticism of their work is well founded. Yet, his total rejection of Fuller and Myers’ model is unnecessarily harsh. Fuller and Myers may have moved too hastily in generalizing from one case to a broader class of problems, and their model may have been overly rigid and mechanical, but this does not warrant the total rejection of the natural history model for the study of social problems” (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:134). The model, as presented by Fuller and Myers may have been imperfect. However, many writers have successfully used some form of a natural history model to analyze different social problems (for example: Becker, 1967;
The main point of Fuller and Myers' (1941) model was that a social problem consisted of an objective condition and a subjective definition. The two interacted to form a social problem when an objective condition was defined by members of society as a problem about which something ought to be done (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 320; Becker, 1967:2). Fuller and Myers suggested that sociologists must study both the objective conditions and the value judgments of people involved, which cause them to define a problem as such (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 321; Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:146). There are difficulties in this approach, however, specifically concerning the role of objective conditions in the creation of a problem. In attempting to explain the existence of objective conditions, Fuller and Myers' position resembled the functionalist view that objective conditions become social problems only if one assumes society must be maintained as it is (Becker, 1967:4). The functionalist study of social problems is inadequate, as it focuses on analyzing problems as societal dysfunctions and does not clarify who decides that they exist and deserve attention (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:145). That is, it does not focus on power and who has the resources to define something as a problem.
Another difficulty with Fuller and Myers’ (1941) focus on objective conditions arises when we ask if a non-existent social condition can be defined as a social problem. This is indeed possible, as witnessed by the Salem witch hunt or the scape-goating of Jews in Nazi Germany. Social problems may or may not have a factual basis, and the social scientist must be attuned to this (Becker, 1967:6). Theoretically, objective conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause a social problem to be identified (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:146). Additionally, Fuller and Myers’ model seems to imply that a consensus exists as to what does or does not constitute a social problem (Becker, 1967:6-8). However, research has shown that a social problem often means different things to different interested groups, some of which may even use a particular problem to achieve their own agendas (see for example Lippert’s [1990] essay on the construction of satanism as an issue in Canada). Finally, Fuller and Myers’ model was simplistic in its assertion that all social problems moved through the stages they outlined. Later work made it clear that very few potential social problems actually become recognized as such (see for example Blumer, 1971).

Fuller and Myers’ (1941) original conception of a natural history of social problems was problematic, but the
concept none the less is an efficient means to analyze how problems emerge. The fact scholars are still using some form of the model today points out its usefulness. The natural history model may be imperfect, but it gives the social scientist "a more complete understanding of the relevant facts and their interrelations" (Becker, 1967:9). An examination of some of the adaptations of the natural history model can make this clear.

Adaptations of the Natural History Model

As stated above, a number of writers have used some form of natural history model since Fuller and Myers (1941) popularized the framework. For example, Becker (1967) argued:

Fuller and Myers, a generation ago, presented a definition of social problems that is implicit in much of this book. Though their examples are dated, their conception is as useful now as it was when first presented (Becker, 1967:2).

Becker went on to write that:

We need not accept the terms they use, or the stages they posit, to share Fuller and Myers principal idea: to understand a social problem fully, we must know how it came to be defined as a social problem (Becker, 1967:11).

Becker still viewed social problems as resulting from a political definitional process in which arguments and compromises occur as different viewpoints are put forth.
(Becker, 1967:13). He then outlined his own three stage adaptation of the natural history model.

Becker (1967) asserted that the first step in social problem development occurs when an interested party (a person or group) perceives a set of objective conditions as problematic. He outlined several questions the social scientist might consider. For example, who becomes interested in a given condition? What brings it to their attention? What types of conditions appear as troublesome to what kinds of people? (Becker, 1967:12). This differed from Fuller and Myers' (1941) stage one, establishment of a state of awareness, in that Becker (1967) focused on the origins of the problem in stage one and widespread awareness of the problem in stage two.

Becker’s (1967) stage two was that concern with a given problem "must become shared and widespread if it is to achieve the status of a social problem". The original definer of the problem must convince others that the problem in question requires public action. Who will the primary definer be able to convince? Who will oppose her/him? What tactics will be used? What is the media’s role, and how is it accessed? (Becker, 1967:12). Becker’s (1967) stage two was part of Fuller and Myers’ (1941) stage one and his separation of definition and awareness (both
contained in Fuller and Myers’ stage one) was important as it recognized these two very important events in the career of a social problem. Becker’s (1967) stage two was similar to Fuller and Myers’ (1941) stage two, as it involved the possibility of squabbling between different interest groups.

The third stage of Becker’s (1967) model was that the problem in question had to become embodied in an organization or institution if it was to achieve lasting existence as a social problem (Becker, 1967:12). Becker wrote of two possible outcomes at this stage, one in which an existing organization takes responsibility for the problem, another in which a new organization might be set up to deal with the problem. In either case, however, personnel involved will redefine the problem to conform with their own opinions of the problem. If police are given the responsibility for a new problem, they will redefine it as a law enforcement problem. If a new mental health organization is set up to deal, for example, with alcoholism, it will likely be staffed by personnel from an established institution, who may redefine alcoholism as a mental health problem (Becker, 1967:12–13). This is similar to Fuller and Myers’ (1941) stage three of reform, in which the machinery of government begins to move, experts step in to deal with
the problem, and new legislation is proposed (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:132).

Becker (1967) asserted that once an organization takes responsibility of a problem, interest groups may lose interest in the problem, as they no longer have to worry about it. This was a tenuous conclusion, however, which would be addressed in later adaptations of the natural history model. Becker made an important point, however, when he stated that once an organization takes responsibility for a problem, its personnel may build their lives and careers around its continued existence. Anything which threatens to lessen "their" problem's importance is perceived as a threat. The organizational personnel responsible for a problem must show attempts at enforcement and control of the problem are effective, while at the same time showing that the problem still exists. Therefore, enforcement organizations, especially when they are seeking funds, may claim that the problem is nearing solution, while at the same time arguing the problem is worse than ever and requires increased efforts to control it. Becker concluded that "every social problem has a history and develops through a series of stages" (Becker, 1967:13). Becker seems to have fallen into the same trap as Fuller and Myers, in asserting that all social problems develop through the natural history stages. This view fails to
consider that many issues come to widespread attention in the mass media, but not all of them receive vigorous government attention. This fracture in the natural history model was addressed by Blumer (1971).

Blumer’s (1971) thesis was that social problems were "products of a process of collective definition"; that process was responsible for a problem’s emergence, for how the problem was seen, how it was considered, and for the planning, and implementation of the official response (Blumer, 1971:301). Blumer went on to argue that the process of collective definition "determines the career and fate of social problems, from the initial point of their appearance to whatever may be the terminal point of their course" (Blumer, 1971:301). He presented a five stage model, similar to the three stage models of Fuller and Myers (1941) and Becker (1967), but introduced an important qualification to their statement that all social problems move through each stage. Blumer emphasized that movement from one stage to the next is highly problematic (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:139). Blumer’s five stages are:

1. The emergence of a social problem
2. The legitimation of the problem
3. The mobilization of action
4. The formation of an official plan
5. The implementation of the official plan
Blumer (1971) discussed the concept of contingency, a branching point between two adjacent careers, to explain how a social problem may proceed so far, and then stall, failing to reach subsequent stages. Blumer stressed that social problems develop unevenly and problematically. This model might be thought of as a funnel; a number of possible problems enter stage one, but very few go all the way to stage five. Along the way many possible problems are "choked off, ignored, avoided" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:140; Blumer, 1971:302-303). Societal recognition of problems is a highly selective process and many potential problems push for recognition in "what is frequently a fierce competitive struggle" (Blumer, 1971:302). Thus, while altering Fuller and Myers' (1941) model, Blumer remained close to their main thesis that a problem only becomes a problem when it is recognized to exist by a society. It is a mistake to assume any kind of harmful condition automatically becomes a problem. Certain conditions may be ignored at one time, yet without change in their makeup, become "matters of grave concern at another time" (Blumer, 1971:302).

For a social problem to continue on its path, Blumer (1971) asserted the problem had to acquire legitimacy and endorsement. The problem must have, or gain, the necessary degree of respectability which entitles it to public
consideration in recognized arenas of public discussion such as the media, church, schools, civic organizations and legislative assemblies. Without respectability, the problem is doomed. Even if a condition or problem is recognized by some people in society as a problem, this does not mean it will enter arenas of public consideration. Of the many social conditions recognized as harmful, very few gain legitimacy (Blumer, 1971:303).

At the next stage, mobilization of action, the problem becomes the object of discussion and controversy among interest groups with diverse claims. Clashes occur between those seeking changes in the area of the problem and those trying to protect vested interests. Interplay between groups can greatly affect the career of a problem; often the problem may be redefined as compromises are reached. In stage four, an official plan is formulated, representing how the problem is now perceived by society’s official apparatus and how it intends to act on the problem. The final stage occurs when the plan is put into practice, and is modified and adjusted, to accommodate and appease various interested parties, thereby ushering in a new definition of the problem (Blumer, 1971:303; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:140).
Blumer’s (1971) analysis, like that of Fuller and Myers (1941) and Becker (1967), ends with some form of official action in the problem area. Yet this seemingly goes against his own argument about the problematic nature of social problems. The fate of the problem after the final stage seems to be that it is solved, or that it at least falls from public visibility once acted upon officially. Blumer, like Becker, and Fuller and Myers before him, failed to describe what happens after legislation has been enacted, institutions or agencies set up, and programs implemented. All fail to consider the question of when the social problem ceases to exist (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:142).

Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) work attempted to answer this question in a book that Best (1989) described as one of the most influential on the sociology of social problems (Best, 1989:251). They posited a four stage natural history model, with stage two corresponding to the end of Blumer’s (1971) and Fuller and Myers’ (1941) model. Spector and Kitsuse’s stages three and four present a way of examining a social problem after official policy has been developed and implemented. They are a "kind of second generation social problem in which the solutions to previous problems (responses to previous demands) become the basis for renewed claims and demands" (Spector and Kitsuse,
1977:142). The model put forth by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) is the same model posited in a 1973 essay, in which the authors pointed out "[O]ur presentation of them (four stages) should be taken as an ideal type model of social problems" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:148).

Spector and Kitsuse (1977) wrote that their model is hypothetical, an outline of what they think natural histories of social problems should examine. Their four stage model is a guide for social problems researchers (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:141). While going beyond Blumer’s (1971) model in their consideration of what happens after official action has been taken, Spector and Kitsuse do share some of his ideas. For example, Spector and Kitsuse share Blumer’s view of the uneven and problematic development of social problems. They also share his assumption that official and government agencies are prominent parties in the history of social problems (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:142). Spector and Kitsuse’s four stages are:

1. Group(s) attempt to assert the existence of some condition, define it as offensive, harmful, or otherwise undesirable, publicize these assertions, stimulate controversy, and create a public or political issue over the matter.
2. Recognition of the legitimacy of these group(s) by some official organization, agency, or institution. This may lead to an official investigation, proposals for reform, and the establishment of an agency to respond to those claims and demands.

3. Reemergence of claims and demands by the original group(s), or by others, expressing dissatisfaction with the established procedures for dealing with the imputed conditions, the bureaucratic handling of complaints, the failure to generate a condition of trust and confidence in the procedures, and the lack of sympathy for complaints.

4. Rejection by the complainant group(s) of the agency's or institution’s response, or lack of response, to their claims and demands, and the development of activities to create alternative, parallel, or counter-institutions as responses to the established procedures (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:142).

Ritzer (1986) also used Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) model to outline the career of a social problem. Ritzer calls stage one Agitation, stage two Legitimation and Co-optation, stage three is labelled Bureaucratization and
Reaction, and stage four is Reemergence of Movement (Ritzer, 1986:9). A more detailed account of Kitsuse and Spector's model is now presented, since it is the main analytic framework used in the thesis.

SPECTOR AND KITSUSE'S NATURAL HISTORY MODEL

Stage One: Agitation

The roots of a social problem are planted when some group(s) attempts to remedy a condition it sees as offensive and undesirable. This primary definer may, or may not be directly affected by the condition. For example claims about the physical abuse of children were made by pediatric radiologists (Parton, 1980). Activities at this initial stage "often consist of attempts to transform private troubles into public issues" (Ritzer, 1986:8). However, not all attempts are successful, there are many contingencies in this stage. For example a group's problem defining activities may go unnoticed, it may lose its backing, it may go unnoticed by the media, the group may be weakened by in-fighting, or it may be unable to mobilize economic resources. The most critical aspects of this first stage are "the ways complaints are raised and the strategies used to press claims, gain publicity and arouse controversy" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143). The successful development of a social problem may be relatively independent of the
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) assert that social problems originate through the claims of groups. Any claim might become the basis of a social problem, but very few actually do, as most claims are disposed of. To understand how only a small portion of claims about problems actually become social problems, we must consider the power of the problem-defining group, the type of claims it is making, and the strategies it utilizes (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143).

A problem-defining group's power is very important with regard to their claims becoming a social problem. Generally groups will be more successful in pressing their claims if they have wealthy members, are large and well organized, and are held in generally high esteem. Groups will often try to enlist powerful supporters in this early stage to increase their strength. While groups may loudly proclaim themselves to be very powerful, they may in reality be unable to mobilize the strength they claim (Ritzer, 1986:8).

The type of claims a problem-defining group makes also influences whether a particular issue becomes a social problem. Claims about a particular condition may be very
specific, or they may be very general. Problem-defining groups may have no idea who created, who is responsible for, or who caused the condition in question; conversely they may have very specific ideas about who, or what is to blame, and possess well defined remedial plans and proposals for change. The problem-defining group may enter into a coalition with others, gaining numbers, prestige, and access to authority, but this may water down their issue, as their claim may be considered as part of a larger problem. Generally, the more specific a claim is, the better its chances for successful reception (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143-144).

The type of claim a group makes is important, but just as important is how that claim is made. Does the problem-defining group know who to complain to? If they complain to the wrong party they may get no results, bad advice, or reveal their position to an adversary, thus undermining their position. To be successful, a group has to know who to complain to. Similarly, the way the media is handled greatly affects the problem’s career. Attracting and holding the media’s attention is important. Using press releases and informing the media before hand about scheduled events can help influence the effectiveness of a group’s claim. Often a group will support its claims that a particular condition deserves action with “expert"
testimony, or "official" statistics (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:147).

Social problems emerge from claims by problem-definers that some existing condition is intolerable and requires changing. This may lead to controversy, as groups that prefer things the way they are may lobby against proposed changes. This conflict may heighten public awareness of the issue, and is the culmination of stage one. The problem may be stalled here, it may move to the next stage, or it may wither away (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:148).

Stage Two: Legitimation and Co-optation
Legitimation occurs with official acknowledgment of the condition. Stage one activities were almost entirely unofficial; with official recognition, however, the problem-definers may now be treated as concerned citizens, invited to attend hearings and submit briefs. This may increase the prestige of the group, but it may also signal a lessening of control by the original problem-definers, and they may now become only witnesses. Official hearings may silence groups and cool the problem. The original group may be overshadowed as powerful agencies and organizations become involved, and the group becomes only a supplier of information (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:149; Ritzer, 1986:9-10).
Co-optation occurs when some official agency takes control of the problem as its own; often the unofficial problem-defining group may be phased out of operation. The government may claim to have a monopoly on understanding the problem, and the problem may be redefined and expanded (Ritzer, 1986:9). Several outcomes can result from this co-optation. The problem-defining group may be "cooled-out" as government promises to study their complaints. Another outcome might be that the group's claims are exposed as unfounded. Another outcome could see the government supporting the group's claims, yet the problem may still go untended. Finally, the government might take effective action to address the group's complaints. Co-optation by government does not imply that the problem is either solved or buried. Commonly, an organization is set up or an existing one given responsibility for dealing with complaints about the problem. Once this occurs, personnel of the responsible agency take a vested interest in the problem and lobby for larger budgets arguing that they are doing their job, but the condition is worsening and they need more money. When some agency develops a vested interest in handling complaints about a problem, stage two is finished (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:151).
Stage Three: Bureaucratization and Reaction

Stages one and two see attention focused on claims that there is a problem. In stage three, complaints are raised about the way the problem is being handled. Official procedures and channels may be seen as inadequate or unjust to protest groups. Bureaucratic handling of the problem is seen as unsatisfactory, as the responsible agency seems to be doing little to alleviate the problem. At this stage the problem is not the problem, but the bureaucratic response to the problem. As a result, the agency responsible for the problem may now move further away from dealing with the problem and may begin to ask, "How can we get them to stop complaining?" (Ritzer, 1986:12).

The outcome of stage three might be a reform of existing procedures, a change of government personnel, or establishment of a new agency. Or groups may get tired of fighting through an endless sea of red tape, lose confidence in government procedures and organizations, and begin to mobilize, protesting the manner in which things are handled. This is the beginning of stage four (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:151-152; Ritzer, 1986:12).

Stage Four: Reemergence of Movement

This stage in the career of a social problem occurs when some group(s) become disillusioned with government rules
and regulations, and begin to plan their activities on the notion that "it is no longer possible to work within the system" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:153). The group or groups involved at this stage may or may not be the original problem-defining group, but the focus of complaints is to create and establish alternative solutions for their problem. There is a rekindling of interest in the problem and outcry against established channels for dealing with it. In stage four groups are liable to challenge the legitimacy of established organizations and their methods for handling a problem. The problem at this stage can develop in two directions: one towards the development of new public organizations to deal with the problem for the benefit of all; the other, towards private solutions to the problem, chiefly benefiting group members. In either case, the problem's development hinges upon people coming to see established channels as ineffective and deciding to work outside the system (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:153; Ritzer, 1986:12-13).

Group activities at this stage face many of the hurdles and pitfalls faced at earlier stages. For example, groups must be able to mobilize support, overcome opponents, access the media and avoid being co-opted by some government agency. Co-optation is a "frequent outcome of stage four social problems" (Spector and Kitsuse,
1977:154). Attempts to set up new organizations outside the existing establishment may create new experts. Existing organizations may view these attempts to work outside their jurisdiction, and the new experts, as threatening, and may try to take over the new organization, or co-opt its leaders. By making leaders of critical groups part of the existing structure they were criticizing, established organizations may effectively silence and discredit outspoken detractors. In this way the group’s claims are placed in a questionable light and its future power is weakened (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154).

Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) natural history model makes clear that the emergence of social problems is a political process in which the problem comes to be widely accepted and official responses are molded and remolded. Politics is a process in which not all have equal power and resources. Who is able to "get heard," and get action on their definition of a problem is what social scientists must look to when examining how something became a problem. Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) model is useful for this reason (Ritzer, 1986:13). In addition, the model directs the researcher to examine the role of "moral crusaders" and government. This does not imply these are the only actors in the career of a social problem; "moral crusaders" and
government officials represent only a portion of the possible range of actors who may try to define a problem.

We must remember that actors may not act as we might stereotypically assume they will. Just because the natural history model focuses on political activities a "consistent treatment of the definitional process of social problems" is not ensured (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:155). In addition we must remember that government and other official agencies not only respond to cries of concern, they also raise their own cries about a problem and may play a major part in defining it. Government may attempt to create one problem in order to draw attention away from another (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:155). The natural history model must be treated with care; it is not perfect. The discovery that one social problem was created in this way does not prove all other social problems were created in a like manner. It may well be impossible to find a sequence of events common to all problems. A writer using the natural history model may fall into the trap of making the data fit the model. Care must be taken to avoid this. However, the model does provide the student of social problems with a general guide for considering how a particular problem emerged. In the study of a social problem "a hypothetical natural history may serve as a temporary procedural manual,
a checklist of things to attend to, and a first order of business" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:158).

Beyond Spector and Kitsuse’s Natural History Model
Since the publication of Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) natural history model, there have been some attempts to critique and go beyond it. Two significant critiques appeared in 1985. Woolgar and Pawluch’s (1985) essay offered an incisive critique of social constructionist work and a "critical commentary" on the social constructionist framework (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:214). While this essay focused on the broad body of social constructionist literature, it is important for this thesis, since the natural history model is part of the constructionist school.

The main component of Woolgar and Pawluch’s (1985) critique was that social constructionist work, including Spector and Kitsuse (1977), assumes that the imputed conditions have not changed. The authors asserted that assuming conditions have not changed allows social constructionists to focus on the "fact" that changes have occurred in the definition of the problem and the claims made about it (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:215). Woolgar and Pawluch reviewed a large amount of social constructionist
research and in each case found that the key assertion was that the actual character of the condition in question had not changed, but that definitions of the imputed conditions had. Woolgar and Pawluch maintained that by making this assumption, social constructionist authors make claims of their own:

In naming, identifying or describing conditions, these authors (constructionists) inevitably give definition to the putative behaviours and conditions they discuss. While the claims of the claims-makers are depicted as socio-historical constructions (definitions) that require explanation, the claims and the constructive work of the authors remain hidden and are to be taken for granted (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:217).

Despite offering this cutting criticism, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) wrote that their critique was "not a call for a return to the study of social problems in the style opposed by definitionalists" (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:224).

Pawluch and Woolgar argued their critique offered guidelines for further constructionist research. For example it suggested that caution be used when attempting constructionist studies and that certain inconsistencies are inevitable. They also suggested that sociologists focus on the rhetorical strategies of social problems explanations (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985:224-225). As will be seen shortly, more recent constructionist work has attempted to focus on the rhetoric used in social problems activities.
Another important critique of constructionist work appeared that same year in Schneider's "review and critique of the origin and development of the sociology of social problems" (Schneider, 1985:209). However, unlike Pawluch and Woolgar, Schneider focused more on Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) natural history model. He outlined the natural history model in some detail and also discussed other relevant research (Schneider, 1985:210-223). Schneider then detailed both the problems and the insights of the perspective.

Schneider (1985) argued that sociologists studying social problems must try to avoid participating in social problems activities and defending or challenging the claims and definitions about putative conditions (Schneider, 1985:224). Schneider critiqued the natural history model and, like Pawluch and Woolgar, argued that both verbal and nonverbal activities that convey meaning about the problem or condition should be considered as data. Schneider stressed that language was highly important and careful attention should be paid to it. He went on to suggest that Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) concept of "viable claims" understood as those claims and definitions that claim-makers can "get away with" needed clarification. Schneider also suggested that a clearer understanding of how partici-
pants' activities affected claims was needed (Schneider, 1985:224-225).

Schneider (1985) used Troyer's unpublished (1983) work to suggest that the concept of a natural history directs attention to loose similarities across cases. Schneider then drew attention to Wiener's (1981) work on the politics of alcoholism to argue that the sequential aspect of natural history models may be misleading when considering the definitional process (Schneider, 1985:225). A more realistic view might be one of "overlapping, simultaneous and continuously ricocheting interaction" (Schneider, 1985:225). A natural history model may also encourage overstating the extent to which specific kinds of activities occur at particular stages. Schneider argued this seems likely for Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) stages 1 and 3 (Schneider, 1985:223). He then asserted that Wiener's (1981) work reinforces Kitsuse and Spector's view that the social problems process is open ended. Despite offering this detailed review, Schneider concluded that the "insights of the constructionist perspective as detailed by Spector and Kitsuse appear intact, criticisms notwithstanding" (Schneider, 1985:226). He maintained that Kitsuse and Spector's model proposed bold new changes that should be judged more for what it called for and stimulated than what it ignored (Schneider, 1985:226).
In 1987 another significant contribution to the study of social problems appeared in the form of Best's (1987) work on "rhetoric in claims-making". This essay focused on the words and arguments used in social problems activity and perhaps stemmed from Schneider's, and from Pawluch and Woolgar's suggestions concerning the importance of language. Best followed Kitsuse and Spector and other constructionists' assertions that sociologists of social problems focus on the process of claims-making and not on objective conditions. However, Best attempted to go beyond Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) work.

Best (1987) argued that most constructionist research intentionally paid far more attention to the process of claims-making and the claims-makers themselves, rather than claims. He asserted that while Spector and Kitsuse (1977) did acknowledge that the "claims of groups may be grounded in values, they warn against trying to explain claims-making by simply specifying claims-makers values and motives" (Best, 1987:101). Best wrote that while Kitsuse and Spector argued that values are resources used by claims makers in defining a problem, they and other constructionist case studies, did not explore how values were incorporated into claims; they "treat claims as a given" (Best, 1987:101). Best's work built on Gusfield's (1981) argument that scientific claims made about a problem have to be
viewed in terms of rhetoric and not simply as objective evidence. Best applied rhetorical analysis to the claims made in the construction of the missing children problem (Best, 1987:101).

Best (1987) asserted that rhetoric is central to claims-making about social problems as claims-makers hope to persuade and claims-making is rhetorical activity (Best, 1987:115). He used Toulmin’s (1958) *The Uses of Argument* to examine the rhetoric used in creating the problem of missing children. Best outlines three of Toulmin’s (1958) concepts: grounds, warrants and conclusions. Grounds are the data or basic "facts" the argument is based on. These "facts" are socially constructed. Warrants are justifications for what steps are taken or called for. Conclusions are typically calls for action (1987:102). Best further divided each category into types.

Best (1987) outlined three types of grounds; definitions, examples and estimates of extent. Defining a problem is perhaps the most fundamental form of claims-making. The problem is named, identified, and boundaries for further discussions set, as some issues are made relevant and others relegated out of bounds (Best, 1987:104). Definitions can take two forms. Domain statements set boundaries and are especially important when a new problem is being
identified as they call attention to the previously unacknowledged. In addition to identifying a problem's domain, claims-makers often attempt to orient the problem by giving some type of assessment of it. Orientation statements can influence the way a problem is interpreted, by offering one particular judgement over another (Best, 1987:104-105).

Examples are the second type of grounds discussed by Best (1987). He suggested that definitions may actually be preceded by examples (Best, 1987:105). In his work on missing children, Best found that media reports on the subject often opened with atrocity tales or horrific examples. He writes that opening with an "emotionally riveting grabber" is a standard journalistic technique that focuses attention on the problem in question. Often, the atrocious examples become reference points for further discussions of the problem (Best, 1987:105-106).

Numeric estimates of extent are the final type of grounds Best (1987) discussed. He argued that estimates are important claims because the "bigger the problem, the more attention it can be said to merit" (Best, 1987:106). Therefore, most claims-makers emphasize a problem's size. Incidence estimates are perhaps the most straightforward way to establish a problem, by estimating the number of
cases, incidents or people affected. Claims-makers may argue a problem is widespread and thus demands attention. Growth estimates are the second type of estimate outlined by Best. These often show the problem is worsening and suggest that, unless action is taken, further deterioration will occur. Range claims show the problem is endemic, thus making everyone a potential victim and making everyone believe they have, or should have, a vested interest in the problem (Best, 1987:104-108).

Warrants are statements which justify drawing conclusions from the grounds. Warrants are often implicit and in them values most often come into play (Best, 1987:108). Best (1987) suggested that since warrants are often implicit, any list of warrants would be selective and incomplete (Best, 1987:109). He outlined six warrants he found in claims around the missing children problem. For example, one such warrant concerned the value of children. Claims-makers stressed that children were sentimentally priceless and "our most valuable resource" (Best, 1987:109). The other warrants outlined by Best were: blameless victims; associated evils; deficient policies; historical continuity; and rights and freedoms (Best, 1987:108-112). These shall be discussed at more length below in the body of the argument.
Conclusions are the final rhetorical device outlined by Best (1987). These are typically calls for action to alleviate or eradicate the imputed problem; claims-makers may have an agenda with several goals (Best, 1987:112). Three conclusions outlined by Best were awareness, prevention and social control policies. Claims-makers around the missing children problem often tried to increase public awareness and involvement. They emphasized the importance of prevention and they demanded new social control policies (Best, 1987:112-113). Best concluded his essay by stressing the significance of the rhetoric used by claims-makers.

SUMMARY
This chapter has completed two tasks. First, it has reviewed the literature on the natural history model. Secondly, it has outlined the analytic framework to be used in this thesis. Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) natural history model is used in conjunction with Best's (1987) analysis of rhetoric to examine how poaching became an issue in 1982 and to follow its career into the 1990’s. Before commencing analysis of stage one activities, an overview of the province’s geography and history is presented. Attention is focused on the historical uses of wildlife resources within Newfoundland.
CHAPTER THREE
THE SETTING

INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the geography and history of the province to provide necessary background for the reader of this thesis. The first section examines the physical setting, while the second examines the settling of the province and people’s use of wildlife resources.

THE PHYSICAL SETTING
Location
Situated in the North Atlantic, on the eastern edge of North America, between 46 and 52 degrees N. lat., Newfoundland has a landmass of 43,359 sq.mi., and is the sixteenth largest island in the world (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:13). Newfoundland is geographically distinct from, but politically linked with, Labrador (112,826 sq.mi.; 52-60 degrees N.lat.) and together they make up the most easterly, and seventh largest, of Canada’s ten provinces (see map 3.1). The island portion of the province is a tilted plateau rising northwestward from the east coast. Western Newfoundland, the most mountainous portion of the island, is home to the Long Range Mountains. These rise to over 600 m in some locations, and are geologically part of the Appalachian Mountain chain (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:13). West of
the Long Range Mountains, a low lying coastal plain stretches the entire length of the west coast. The Avalon Peninsula is on the east coast of the island, and is home to the capital city, St. John's, and 246,608 of the province's 568,349 residents (Statistics Canada, 1986 Census).

Landscape

Newfoundland and Labrador has an abundance of excellent wildlife habitat. Much of the interior of the island is similar to alpine barrens, and is dotted with shallow rocky ponds and lakes (Mednis, 1981:218). The terrain ranges from the gently undulating to the ruggedly hilly, to open barrens and bogs, to thick forests. Just over half the island is presently forested (56%), while the remaining 44% consists of peatlands, barrens, and fresh water (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:25). Bogs are common throughout the island, especially in the southern interior and on parts of the west coast. Common plants in bogs are sphagnum moss, Labrador tea, bakeapple and pitcher plant. The forest grows in a variety of formations, with varying degrees of success. The principal species are coniferous; balsam fir and spruce are common varieties, but a wide range of deciduous species are also found (Summers, 1967:250). Often there is no distinct boundary between barrens and forest (Mednis, 1981:243–246). The effects of glaciation have
left much of the province unsuitable for large scale agriculture; generally the province has poor, thin soils. The bottom half of the west coast of the island is generally more fertile than other areas of the province (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:13-23). The coast is heavily indented and deep fiords occur on the southwest and northeast coasts.

Labrador’s physical landscape is similar to that of the island, being composed mostly of barren rocks, muskeg and lakes. However, Labrador has more tundra (Mednis, 1981:218). The northern part of Labrador is beyond the tree line of the northern coniferous forest zone and possesses the moss-heath-lichen vegetation of the tundra. Labrador’s rugged coast is also much indented with long fiords, but it is more mountainous than the island’s coast. Geologically, Labrador is part of the Canadian Shield and its northern Torngat mountains contain the highest point of land in the province, Mount Caubvick (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1991:7).  

1 Space constraints dictate that this discussion be kept brief. Those interested in a more in-depth discussion of the province’s geography and natural history, might consult Meades (1990) work.
Summers are usually short and cool, winters range from temperate to arctic, depending on latitude and distance from the sea. All but the interior of insular Newfoundland possesses a marine climate, while southern and central Labrador has a sub arctic climate and Northern Labrador experiences an arctic climate. Temperatures in Newfoundland and southern Labrador are generally temperate and cool, while northern and interior Labrador experience severe extremes, ranging from -49 degrees centigrade in winter to +38 degrees centigrade in summer (Hodgson, 1981:452-453).

Southern Newfoundland has an annual precipitation rate of 127 to 140 centimeters, which decreases the further north one goes. The smaller amount of precipitation in northern parts of the province are offset by snowfalls, which during a winter, are often greater than 254 centimeters. Similarly, southeastern Newfoundland, including the Avalon Peninsula, experiences more fog than do the western and northern parts of the island and Labrador (Rowe, 1980:6). Prevailing winds are generally from the west. Frost free days vary from approximately 145 along the south coast of the island to much less in the Strait of Belle Isle, where frost can occur even in summer (Hodgson, 1981: 452-453). For the first European settlers, the means of obtaining a
livelihood was influenced perhaps as greatly by the physical environment as by economic opportunities of the time (Summers, 1984:494). The rugged adversity of the surrounding physical environment held the resource base which made successful settlement eventually possible. A brief description of the settlement of Newfoundland will now be presented.

THE HUMAN POPULATION

Aboriginal People

Prior to European settlement, at least three aboriginal groups occupied parts of Newfoundland. Each of these groups relied heavily on the surrounding environment to provide necessary supplies. These three groups were the Maritime Archaic Indians, the Paleo or Dorset Eskimos, and the Beothuks (Rowe, 1980:23-29). The Archaic Indians occupied the island 4900 years ago, while the Dorset Eskimos arrived around 2700 years ago. Both groups mysteriously disappeared. It is known that the Dorset presence overlapped with the Beothuks, but scholars are unsure when the Beothuks arrived. Unfortunately, the Beothuks were unable to cope with European diseases and weapons and became extinct around the 1820’s. By the mid eighteenth century Micmacs from eastern Canada had become permanent residents of the island. Labrador is home to the Montagnais-Nascapi, a people of the interior until
this century (Rowe, 1980:23-29;153-173).²

Europeans

Norse Vikings are known to have established a settlement on the tip of the Great Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland, at L’Anse aux Meadows around 1000 AD (Marshall, 1977:43). It is thought the Vikings only remained a few years at L’Anse aux Meadows. Almost five-hundred years later, John Cabot sailed from Bristol, England under the sponsorship of Henry the VII and "discovered" Newfoundland in 1497. Like the Vikings, the first English settlements in Newfoundland were of a brief duration (Thoms, 1967:528-535).

After Cabot’s discovery of the island, no formal European attempt at settlement took place until 1610, when John Guy, under charter from King James I, started a colony at Cupids (Rowe, 1980:119). In the 1500’s, however, English fishermen may have been leaving winter crews in Newfoundland, like the Basque whalers in the Strait of Belle Isle (Rowe, 1980:119). The first formal

² Native people became highly visible in the late 1970’s in discussions surrounding wildlife management issues, particularly big game hunting. For example, the Innu of Labrador received concentrated media attention in The Evening Telegram in 1977 and 1978 when several people were charged with poaching caribou from the Mealy Mountain herd. Native people continue to press claims regarding access and use of wildlife resources.
attempts at settlement were the results of British merchants’ plans to colonize the island and tap local resources besides the cod (Mannion, 1977:5). The first recorded birth in Newfoundland occurred in 1613 and, by 1637, there were known to be approximately 356 families in Newfoundland (Thoms, 1967:528-535). The population continued to grow until, by 1901, there were 220,249 people on the island (Mannion, 1977:13). The majority were fisher folk, who spread out along the coast of the island and Labrador, pursuing the cod fish.

The interior of both the island and Labrador was uninhabited and unexplored until the nineteenth century (Hutchings, 1967:372-377). By 1898, a narrow gauge railway across the island was virtually completed, which opened up the interior to development. Subsequently, several towns grew up near the rail line. For example, Grand Falls and Bishop’s Falls became sites of pulp and paper mills, Badger was a logging depot and Millertown a saw-mill centre. Other towns like Clarenville, Gambo and Glovertown also grew up near the rail line, which cut close by the bottom of all the great bays (Rowe, 1980:21 and 129). Having briefly outlined the history of European settlement, the manner in which residents used wildlife resources is now presented.
WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY

The Traditional Newfoundland Lifestyle

As mentioned, the majority of Newfoundland's settlers were fisher folk. However, hunting played an important part in their economic activity. The early English settlers supplemented their meager diets with fish, game and the natural vegetation of the land (Peyton, 1987:6). For example, sea-birds and their eggs were a vital part of people's diets. The great auk was used for food, bait, feather mattresses, and oil (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:211). Another source relates that settlers were beginning to trap fur as early as 1760 (Rowe, 1980:126), again demonstrating settlers' utilization of natural resources.

Similarly, the native caribou (Rangifer tarandus), either fresh or salted, was the main source of meat for many of the inhabitants of Newfoundland. One writer at the turn of the century theorized that "Newfoundland is probably the only country in the world where venison, salted or fresh, is a staple article of diet for the masses" (McGrath, 1902:63). This same source discussed how settlers used caribou antlers and hides in their homes (McGrath, 1902:63). Saunders (1986) relates that settlers on the northeast coast of the island at the end
of the 1800’s took caribou whenever they needed it (Saunders, 1986:237). Moose (Alces alces) was introduced to the island in 1878 and 1904 (Pimlott, 1953:563), and subsequently replaced caribou as the most important big game species (Peters and King, 1959:3-4). One writer argues that by the time the first open season on moose was declared in 1936:

moose meat had become one of the staples of the outport diet, and in some parts of the country was at least as important as the dole in carrying people successfully through the great depression (Horwood, 1986:39).

The snowshoe hare or rabbit (Lepus americanus) was also introduced in the mid-1860’s and became an important source of fresh meat in winter to those living along the coast and on offshore islands (Saunders, 1986:160).

Not only were wildlife resources important food items, they were also significant cash crops. Murre’s eggs were gathered and shipped aboard schooners to market in Halifax or Boston where they sold for huge profits. The great naturalist Audubon visited the Quebec Labrador coast in June, 1833 and left accounts of the heavy exploitation of seabirds. He estimated a party of four men took nearly 40,000 eggs the previous spring (Suzuki, 1988:6). Rabbits were also an important cash crop; Butler (1980) details how, in 1914, five men from Placentia caught rabbits in central Newfoundland and
shipped them to St. John’s, where an agent paid 16 cents each for them (Butler, 1980:90-101). Another source describes how, in the 1920’s, rabbits caught in Gander Bay were shipped in one pound cans to St. John’s for sale (Saunders, 1986:160-163). Caribou was also an important cash crop, as an account from the early 1900’s demonstrates:

This south coast deer hunt is a regular industry, like the catching of cod or lobster. The settlers are fitted out for it by their merchants just as they are for the other pursuits named. The outfits consist of advances of requisites for the hunters families, the deer killed being turned over to the merchant on the close of the hunt to offset advances received...the product of the hunt is then loaded on dog teams and hauled out to the coast, where the outfitters ship the meat to St. John’s, there to be sold on the open market for what it will fetch. In January, 1900, the mail steamer...brought 411 and 575 carcasses in two shipments...choice cuts of venison can be bought for five cents a pound (McGrath, 1902:64).

Clearly, wildlife resources were highly important for residents into the twentieth century. At this point a sketch of wildlife management and protection efforts is presented.

The Game Laws

The first European settlers to the island were initially unrestrained in their hunting efforts. They broke with English traditions, which favored the exclusive use of wildlife by propertied sport hunters. Wildlife was viewed
as a free for the taking resource (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:209). However, there were complaints made to the English government concerning unregulated hunting and, by at least 1793, game laws were being enforced on the island. That year, several men from Greenspond were flogged for taking eggs from Funk Island in a closed season. The flogging was ordered by the colony’s first magistrate under an English Act of Parliament (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:212).

Newfoundland did not get its own game laws until April 23, 1845, when "An Act for the Protection of the Breeding of Wildfowl in this Colony" was passed (Peters and Burleigh, 1951:31). On April 20, 1859, "An Act for the Protection of the Breeding of Wildfowl and Preservation of Game" was passed. This 1859 Act recognized the rights of poor settlers to take wildlife resources for consumption purposes (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:213). The special rights of poor settlers continued to be recognized in wildlife laws, until they were amended in 1896, after which time poor settlers were not mentioned specifically in wildlife legislation (Overton, 1980:44-45). That is, one could suggest that by the early twentieth century, wildlife resources had been transformed from a resource free for the taking into a recreational/sporting resource governed by laws. The laws in
place by the early 1900's specified when wildlife could be taken, how much might be taken and in what manner. These laws defined wildlife resources as sporting resources.

Other measures to protect wildlife were undertaken by government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1898, a Department of Marine and Fisheries was created and took responsibility for hiring wardens (McNeily, 1910:5-6). Prior to this, an organization of sportsmen, the Game Protection Society, had been responsible for the appointment of wardens. In 1906, a Game and Inland Fisheries Board was created on paper, but no actual Board was appointed until 1909. The first vice-president of the Board, A.J. McNeily, had been a vice-president of the Game Protection Society. He wrote that the Game Board was created in 1906 as the result of a political scandal, since the appointment of wardens had become a matter of politics and patronage (McNeily, 1910:6). After several meetings with government, the Board was able to influence the creation of "The Game and Inland Fisheries Act, 1910" (McNeily, 1910:6). This Board remained responsible for game protection and propagation until 1934, when the Commission of Government revised the Game and Inland Fisheries Act and transferred the responsibility for making regulations, protecting and
propagating animals and birds to the Commissioner of Natural Resources (Ewbank, 1938:88).³

Another effort to protect wildlife resources in the early twentieth century was the implementation of a closed season on deer and moose from 1925 to 1936 (Pimlott, 1953:573). Also at this time, a National Preserve for deer was created on the Avalon Peninsula (Overton, 1980:46). These initiatives to protect wildlife, came at a time when various other sources were agitating to have wildlife protection strengthened. For example, by the early 1900’s, sportsmen’s organizations had become active in Newfoundland. The Game Fish Protection Association was concerned chiefly with game fish, while the Game Protection Society of Newfoundland established in 1890, was concerned with game birds, deer and other animals (McNeily, 1910:5). The Game Protection Society was only active for nine years, but was an important organization since, as mentioned above, it was responsible for appointing game wardens until 1898 (McNeily, 1910:5-6). In 1927 the Game Protection Association was established. This private organization was

³ In 1934, under the Commission of Government, a Newfoundland Ranger Force was created. One of their major functions was enforcing the game and forestry laws (Horwood, 1986:12-13). In 1938, the Commissioner for Natural Resources delivered an address to the St.John’s Rotary Club on preserving game and fish (Ewbank, 1938).
"founded by a group of public spirited citizens who desired that greater attention should be paid to the conservation of the various species of wildlife" (Muir, 1937:218). This group agitated for stricter enforcement of game laws, better regulation of open seasons and the establishment of game sanctuaries (Muir, 1937:218). Other sources also lobbied for increased wildlife protection, for example, the Game Board in its report for 1914 (Game and Inland Fisheries Board, 1914:8). Well known individuals, like Sir Wilfred Grenfell, also called for better enforcement of the game laws. Similarly, newspapers and elected government representatives also called for tighter wildlife protection (see for example: The Evening Chronicle, February 18, 1910; Newfoundland, 1910a:686-687). Clearly, game and fish protection were issues both for government and for various individuals and groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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4 In 1908, Dr. Grenfell introduced 300 reindeer from Lapland for his mission on the Great Northern Peninsula. The herd was heavily poached, particularly from 1914 to 1917. Dr. Grenfell lobbied the Game Board to amend the laws, to protect the animals better. Amendments were made, but poaching continued and in 1917 Grenfell offered the remaining 230 animals to the Canadian government. They were subsequently moved to Anticosti island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence (Grenfell, 1967:423-424).
Wildlife Resources for Tourism

At the same time as concern with protecting wildlife resources was increasing in Newfoundland, efforts were also being made to use these resources to attract hunter/tourists. By the end of the nineteenth century, organized attempts were made to lure tourists to the country by using wildlife resources as bait (Overton, 1991:9). To a colony looking to diversify its economy beyond the fishery, the seemingly inexhaustible supply of game, fish and wilderness appeared as an attractive development alternative. The railroad company played an important part in transforming the caribou into a tourist resource, as the trans-island line had opened up the interior, thus allowing access to the migrating caribou herds. For example, a sportsman who visited Newfoundland at the turn of the century wrote that "hundreds of camps are set up near the railway to intercept the deer" (Millais, 1907:3). Another source estimates that from 1911 to 1915, 1,000-1,500 deer were killed annually along the railroad track (Horan, 1981:351).

The railway company was also a big booster of the outdoor tourist industry and produced some of the first tourist promotional literature, which described Newfoundland as a "sportsman’s paradise abundant in caribou and
other game" (Overton, 1991:10). The railway company built a hotel in the early twentieth century, perhaps to capitalize on the increasing tourist traffic (McGrath, 1902:69). The vice-president of the Game and Inland Fisheries Board paid tribute to the railroad company for opening up the interior to tourists, explorers and sportsmen. He stressed that the interests of the company paralleled the interests of the colony (McNeily, 1910:8). Evidence which supports the argument that the Newfoundland government viewed wildlife as economic commodities is found in the Legislative Council Proceedings on the debate of the Game Board Bill. The elected representative who introduced second reading of this Bill stressed that the colony’s wildlife needed protection, since it was a valuable economic asset that could help increase tourist traffic (Newfoundland, 1910a: 686-687). Similarly, Muir (1937) refers to a Royal Commission of Inquiry, which emphasized the advantages of the country as a natural fur farm (Muir, 1937:218).

Other sources from the early twentieth century pressed the potential benefits of outdoor based tourism for Newfoundland. For example, Prowse, in his history of Newfoundland, theorized that:

To the sportsman, the tourist, the angler, and the canoeist, the new railway will offer unrivalled attractions. For the hunter of big game there is the noble cariboo, a species of rein-
deer peculiar to the island; they range over the woods and barrens in countless thousands, the whole interior is one vast deer park...our island offers some of the finest grouse shooting in America...wild geese, ducks, snipe and curlew are abundant (Prowse, 1895:632-633).

Contemporaries of Prowse also argued that wildlife could be used to attract tourists here (see for example: McGrath, 1902; Wood, 1911). A newspaper article from 1910, "Slaughter of Caribou by Newfoundlanders" further supports the argument that wildlife resources were being used to attract wealthy sportsmen to the island. This report discussed the killing of large numbers of caribou on the island's south coast and asserted that this "wanton destruction...will (sic) affect considerably the chances of the sportsman" (The Evening Chronicle, February 18, 1910).\(^5\) Clearly wildlife resources had become highly important economic commodities to Newfoundland's government.

Opposition to Game Laws and Conflicts over Wildlife
As alluded to in the section on the traditional economy, residents of the island did not discontinue harvesting

\(^5\) The promotion of Newfoundland's wildlife as tourist resources continued into the 1940's. For example, at that time the Tourist Development Board of the Department of Natural Resources hired a professional sportsman, Lee Wulff, to promote the country's wildlife resources to the North American market (Wulff, 1967:346). Wulff became involved in the war on poaching in the mid-1980's as will be seen below.
wildlife resources after the implementation of the game laws. In fact there was much opposition to the game laws and there is much evidence which demonstrates that the game laws were not closely adhered to. For example, the previously discussed newspaper item from 1910 concerning the "slaughter of caribou" reported that a policeman from St. John’s had been sent to the area in question to check out reports of poaching. It was also reported that fines and jail terms had been assigned by magistrates (The Evening Chronicle, February 18, 1910). Another example highlighting people’s disobedience of the wildlife laws is found in the Game Board Report of 1914. This report stated that deer were being killed throughout the year, for both food use and for sale in adjoining settlements (Game and Inland Fisheries Board, 1914:8).

Another example of people’s defiance of the game laws may be inferred from Horwood’s (1986:39) statement that moose meat had become a dietary staple by the time the first open season was declared in 1936. Similarly, Pilgrim’s (1986) work on the accidental death of a Newfoundland Ranger shows that in the winter of 1935-36 much poaching of caribou was occurring on the Great Northern Peninsula. A significant example of resident opposition to the game laws comes from the early 1940’s when the Commission of Government banned the summer
shooting of shearwaters or bawks, a coastal bird. This law was met with huge popular resistance, prompting a local songwriter to ridicule the government in a song entitled "The Shooting of the Bawks":

The ones who made this law can sit, eat chicken, drink port wine, But what about the poor old ghost who hauls a fishing line? He has to watch bawks flock round, upon a foggy day, And watch them rob his trawls of bait, and watch them fly away: He’s not allowed to kill one, or someone sure will squawk, for there’s a bloody law agin’ the killing of a bawk.

No doubt our wise Commissioners will formulate a plan, to furnish fresh meat for everyone who lives in Newfoundland. They’ve got a million pounds I hear, from over cross the sea, They’ll want it all to feed the men who in the pen will be. For Mary dear I’ll kill a bird in August, June or May, And if they put me in the pen, why there I’ll have to stay, For men with children underfed, would rather far be sued, then keep this bloody law that stops a man from getting food... (in Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:215).

It seems clear that residents defied the game laws and wildlife resources remained an important part of the subsistence lifestyle.

By the twentieth century, the stage had been set for conflict over wildlife resources. This conflict would pit settlers involved in a subsistence lifestyle against sportsmen and government-supported capitalists involved in the tourist industry. To a colony promoting itself as a sportsmen’s heaven and wishing to attract wealthy foreign sportsmen, wildlife resources had to be treated as economic commodities in need of protection and
management. To the government of the day and to those involved in the tourist trade, the disregard of the game laws by the resident population was most certainly a problem that needed to be dealt with. The assertion that the game laws served certain interests is supported by the reaction of two elected representatives from the south coast to a report on the "slaughter of caribou" (The Evening Chronicle, February 18, 1910). The representative for Belleoram argued that the article was biased towards sporting interests, which had "yet to learn that the deer of this country were put here as an article of food for its inhabitants" (Newfoundland, 1910b:311). The representative for Burgeo-La Poile argued that:

The fact is that the sportsmen are jealous of the fishermen...they (fishermen) never kill any more than is allowed by law, and they have as much right to the deer as any outside sportsman who comes here and kills for mere pleasure (Newfoundland, 1910b:311-312).

This comment highlights the conflict between settlers, who used wildlife as a food resource, and sportsmen and capitalists, who viewed wildlife resources as economic commodities.

The different views of wildlife held by the settlers and government-supported tourist/sporting interests are important. Montecucchi and Tuck (1987) argue that the second phase of North American wildlife exploitation
began in the twentieth century and is characterized by legislation which eliminated "utilitarian endeavors" and emphasized the recreational aspects of wildlife as sporting resources (Montevecchi and Tuck, 1987:210). Similarly, Marchak's (1987) work on the fish processing industry in British Columbia provides useful insight into the transformation of Newfoundland's wildlife resources. Marchak (1987) writes:

This accumulation process is the motive force of a capitalist system, differentiating it from the subsistence system within which groups can sustain communal property. Once accumulation, rather than subsistence, is the reason for catching fish (or cutting trees or any other activity), there is a need to define and defend property rights; without such definition, individuals and companies would be unable to ensure that they, rather than any others, should benefit from their investments and activities (Marchak, 1987:11).

If we substitute gathering wildlife resources where Marchak has written, "any other activity," it might be reasonable to argue that the state and various capitalists had become interested in wildlife resources as economic commodities at least by the late 1800's in Newfoundland. Poor residents continued to use wildlife resources to supplement their diets and incomes. However, state supported interests held an opposing view and game laws were stringently enforced. The use of game as a food item in the traditional economy was not tolerated; for

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6 Wildlife laws are discussed in more detail in chapter five.
example, the Ranger’s pressed many charges for poaching during the late 1930’s (Horwood, 1986:40).

SUMMARY

It has been suggested that by the early twentieth century, game laws in Newfoundland had transformed wildlife resources from a food resource to a sporting resource. By this time, game was an important part of a fledgling tourist industry and laws defined wildlife as a resource pursued for recreation and amusement by wealthy sportsmen. Laws specified when and how wildlife resources might be gathered. However, the residents of the province, still involved in a subsistence lifestyle, ignored the game laws and continued to use wildlife as food resources. This scattered human population, combined with the large area of the island, readily available animals and a lack of wardens, made effective enforcement of the game laws hard. Having outlined the historical pattern of wildlife use and early attempts to manage and promote it, analysis of the 1982 war on poaching will now commence. The following chapter outlines stage one in the natural history of poaching.
CHAPTER FOUR

STAGE ONE: AGITATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines stage one in the natural history of poaching, which lasted from early 1980 until September 1982. However, in order to place the poaching issue in context it is necessary to examine big game management, tourism and related issues in the 1970's. These issues are considered under two headings, the provincial government and the provincial wildlife division. Subsequently, agitation about the poaching issue is examined.


The Tourism Industry

Prior to 1973, the wildlife division was a part of the department of mines, agriculture and resources. In 1973, wildlife was moved to the newly created department of tourism (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1973:24). Tourism was one of six departments in government's resource policy group. The others included forestry and agriculture; fisheries; industrial development; mines and energy; and rural development. The 1973 Budget stated that "An important part of our resource development programme is the expansion of programmes in the tourist industry" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1973:24).
More evidence that tourism was receiving increased government attention is found in a major study of the industry conducted in 1976 by government. This study set the stage for a significant event in the province’s tourism industry, that being the formulation of a cost-sharing program with the federal government to expand tourism in this province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:48).

The Canada-Newfoundland Tourism Subsidiary Agreement, was signed on February 22, 1978. Its main objectives were:

(a) to promote the expansion of, and to assist in the development of the private tourism industry:

(b) to increase the net benefit of tourism to the provincial economy. This will include such factors as:

- to extend the length of the tourist season
- to increase tourism related employment
- to increase tourism spending

(c) to improve the quality and availability of tourism plant and services (accommodation, food, information and other services) throughout the province to meet the expanding requirements of the industry through public investments in areas such as natural and historic attractions and public infrastructure which are important tourism industry resources and where the private sector cannot be expected to contribute;

(d) to induce tourism growth in selected regions in association with the rural development objectives of the Province; and

(e) to ensure that all tourism development programs are consistent with the preservation of the Province’s culture and heritage (Canada-Newfoundland, 1978:2).
The 1978 provincial Budget also made clear that emphasis was being placed on the tourist industry. It referred to the above mentioned agreement, and stated that "Over $13,000,000 will be spent over the next five years to improve tourist attractions and to improve accommodations" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978a:11). Accompanying the Budget that year was a Blueprint for Development, which singled out tourism as an important area for economic growth and expansion in the coming years (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978a:1-2;11;15). Government continued to nurture the tourist industry into the 1980's. The 1980 provincial budget was accompanied by Managing All Our Resources, which was a development plan for the period 1980-85 in which tourism was given a prominent place (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:47).

By the mid to late 1970's, the provincial government had taken a renewed interest in using wildlife and wildlands to attract tourists. As mentioned above, in 1973 the wildlife division became part of the new provincial department of tourism, suggesting the status wildlife was given by government at this time. Another example of the attempt to link wildlife and tourism was the wildlife division's plan to implement a "caribou sports hunt in the northern management zone of Labrador" (Ames, 1977:iv).
response to this proposal the Labrador Inuit Association ¹ commissioned a report, which voiced their concerns that the provincial game laws seem "to be geared for the southern sports hunter"

...it (provincial government) regards hunting as a tourist attraction; caribou hunting for sportsmen and sport salmon fishing are viewed as a lucrative means of gaining tourist dollars (Ames, 1977:8).²

The Tourism Subsidiary Agreement also contains evidence of increasing government interest in outdoor tourism. Point (c) of that Agreement (see above) explicitly

¹ The native people of Labrador were highly visible in the late 1970’s in discussions surrounding big game management. Media coverage from that period makes this clear. For example, at least 15 articles or reports dealing with native people and big game use appeared in The Evening Telegram, in 1977 and 1978. One of the focal points of this conflict was the Mealy Mountain caribou herd, which ranges south of Goose Bay. In the late 1970’s this herd gained prominence when several native people were charged with poaching. The Minister of Tourism at that time received much media coverage for his handling of the situation (see for example: The Evening Telegram, August 25 and 27; October 15; 20 and 26, 1977; July 1 and September 14, 1978).

² An important part of the context of using wildlife resources as tourist resources is opposition from local hunters. Historically, tension existed between those who would use big game resources for tourism and local hunters who viewed the same animals as food resources. As Ames’ (1977) report exemplifies, opposition to tourist/sport hunting was still very much alive in the late 1970’s. This opposition continued to be a factor throughout the 1980’s and into the 1990’s. Thus government was forced to find ways to undermine and weaken this opposition. I argue that hunter education programs were one means government used to try and weaken opposition by training hunters to behave in a sportsman-like manner. The hunter education program is discussed at more length in chapter five.
recognized that natural resources were important tourist resources. The "development of natural and scenic attractions" was identified as one of the programs that Newfoundland’s government would arrange to carry out (Canada-Newfoundland, 1978). It seems clear that natural areas and resources were recognized as important segments of this province’s tourist industry.

The 1978 Blueprint for Development also emphasized the outdoors and natural resources as tourist commodities. This document acknowledged the importance of tourism, at the same time placing emphasis on cultivating the rural economy by development of the "primary resources of the forests, fields and seas" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:11; my emphasis). Resource development was to include the outdoor tourism sector: "Potential exists for continued growth in the tourist industry based upon historic sites and the natural scenic beauty of the province" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:15; my emphasis). Thus Newfoundland’s great outdoors was again being looked upon as a potential source of revenue. Another example of the rediscovery of wildlife resources as economic opportunities occurred in late 1978 when Tourism Minister James Morgan announced the first open season on black bears since 1975. A report of this announcement noted that most bear hunters were interested in the skins for souvenirs (The Evening Telegram, November 1,
1978). This Minister asserted that bear were hunted for recreation and trophies, which again suggests that sport hunting was being expanded by the provincial government. By the late 1980’s black bear hunting would become a much promoted aspect of the outfitting business.

Late 1978 and early 1979 also saw government attempting to increase standards in the outdoor tourist industry. For example, a newspaper article announced that an "Inspector will be appointed for hunting and fishing camps" (The Evening Telegram, November 13, 1978). It was reported that this move was to coincide with a crackdown on camp operators who "ripped off tourists." Evidently, the provincial government (or at least the department of tourism) was increasing its regulation of the outdoor tourist industry. The "increased emphasis on the inspection" of tourist facilities was also mentioned in Managing All Our Resources (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:48). In 1981, government demanded that outfitters improve their facilities. These examples demonstrate government was shaping the outfitting industry and was attempting to increase and regulate the quality of tourist facilities.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Tourism is a highly competitive industry and quality of product is very important. Since government was placing so much emphasis on tourism, it is understandable that regulation of facilities was increasing.
Another example of the growth of outdoor tourism occurred in May, 1980 when "The Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Act" was passed in the provincial legislature. The act gave government the power to set aside important natural areas throughout the province "for the benefit, education and enjoyment of our people today and tomorrow" (The Evening Telegram, May 2, 1981). Wilderness Reserves were to be "areas that show little permanent evidence of man's presence;" they were to be maintained in their natural state, free from industrial developments (Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:IV). People were to be allowed access to Wilderness Reserves to camp, hunt, fish, pick berries and use them for "adventure and recreation." Wildlife, like caribou, which need large wild living spaces would be protected, as would important rivers and other special landscapes. Ecological Reserves would generally be smaller than Wilderness Reserves and serve a more specific purpose, like protecting a seabird colony or rare plant or animal. They were to be more numerous than Wilderness Reserves (Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:IV). It may seem that government was concerned chiefly with wildlife and wildland conservation and preservation. However, government was also interested in economic returns:

Reserves also provide important economic returns. They will attract increasing numbers of
tourists from all over the world as wilderness and natural areas grow scarce elsewhere. In this way our reserves can provide the foundation for outfitting and guiding enterprises (Nfld. and Lab. Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:VII).

Clearly, more than concern for animals was behind the implementation of this act.

Fiscal Restraint

By the end of the 1970's, the provincial government was entering a period of spending cuts. This attempting to follow a policy of limiting or cutting spending in many areas would prove to be highly important in the coming "war" on poaching. The need for budgetary restraint was alluded to in the Blueprint for Development (1978):

...the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador through its various resource departments is prepared to take the steps necessary to ensure that this Blueprint for Development is successfully realized. It will not be easy. As a Province, we must be prepared to accept a levelling off of our standard of public services, and a postponement of expectations for new and improved social programs. The private sector must be prepared to invest in the creation of new business enterprises and the expansion of existing operations. Government can only go so far. It can create a favourable climate in which investments in our energy, fishing, forestry, tourism, mining and agriculture sectors can be made without excessive risk on the part of the private sector. The rest is up to the private entrepreneur (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:24).

This quote demonstrates that government was aware it would be facing difficulties achieving the agenda of the 1978 Blueprint. It also recognized the important role the...
private sector would be expected to play in development initiatives.

The anticipated fiscal constraint was clearly evident in May, 1982 when the provincial government brought down a "Hard-times budget," which included increased taxes and fees for government provided services. In addition a "Salary and Wage Restraint Program" was implemented (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982a). Government was cutting spending, but at the same time, it was nourishing the outdoor tourist sector. By the end of the 1980's, government would attempt to cut spending further by increasing the control of those involved in the outdoor tourist trade; that is, by privatizing wildlife resources.

**The Federal Government: late 1970’s to early 1980’s**

It is important to consider the federal level of government because the RCMP and the Canadian Wildlife Service are both federal agencies responsible for some aspects of wildlife enforcement in Newfoundland. As well, the province is very much dependent on federal government transfer payments. What happened on the provincial scene has to be viewed in this context.

As discussed above, the federal government entered into the 1978 Tourism Agreement with the province. Obvious-
ly, it was interested in this industry. Similarly, the economic benefits of wildlife had been established through a national survey conducted in 1981 by the Canadian Wildlife Service. Survey results found that one in ten Canadians did some type of hunting, spending an estimated $1.2 billion, or about $602 per hunter (Filion et al., 1983). This survey demonstrated how widespread, popular and economically important wildlife was to Canadians. It can reasonably be assumed this survey influenced provincial governments.  

In 1980, a comprehensive Canadian wildlife policy was first discussed at the 44th Federal-Provincial Wildlife Conference. One of the guiding principles of the Guidelines for Wildlife Policy in Canada was that "conservation of wildlife depends upon a well-informed public" (Canada, 1983:7). This conference was attended by various officials from both the federal and provincial governments. Therefore, we might assume that conservation education was an issue for provincial and federal levels of government in 1980. Significantly, the provincial wildlife division's information and education section was set up that year. As mentioned, education was regarded as having an important

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4 Newfoundland's representative to this Committee for a National Survey on the Value of Wildlife (created in 1980) was the Director of the province's Wildlife Division (Filion et al., 1985:320).
part to play in the transformation of wildlife into economic sport/tourist resources as it allowed government to shape attitudes and opinions towards wildlife. The Guidelines (1982) suggested that:

Most Canadians feel that wildlife is important to them, at the very least as a symbol of a desireable quality of life or, more specifically, for the recreational and economic benefits and pleasure that wildlife provides (Canada, 1983:1).

By the beginning of the 1980’s, the importance of wildlife and of wildlife related public education had been recognized and established.

THE PROVINCIAL WILDLIFE DIVISION

The Structure of the Wildlife Division

Since 1980, the division has been composed of four branches: research and management; protection; information and education; and administration (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:130). The information and education branch was added in 1980. The division had been more or less the same, minus information and education, since 1973. Prior to 1973 the division had two units, research and management, and protection and administration. The recently retired director (1965-90) of the division explained that the decision to change the division’s structure in 1973 was made at the executive level; that is the Minister and his deputies (interview, May 8, 1991). Significantly, this internal restructuring occurred the same year that the
wildlife division moved from the department of mines, agriculture, and resources to the newly created department of tourism (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1974:24). The division remained in this department until 1979, when governmental restructuring moved it to the new department of tourism, recreation and culture (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1979). In 1981, more re-alignment saw the division shifted to the department of culture, recreation and youth, where it remained until 1989 when it became part of the department of environment and Lands (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1981 and 1989). Figure 4.1 clarifies the structure of the division as it stood in 1982.

**Figure 4.1: wildlife division, 1982**

- Departmental Minister
- Deputy Minister
- Assistant Deputy Minister
- Director of Wildlife Division

Chief of Research  Chief of Information  Chief of Protection
In order to simplify the management and protection of wildlife the province has been subdivided into four regions with a headquarters in St. John’s (see map 4.1 taken from Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983:133). The regions have a head office from which the regional supervisor manages the region. The eastern region office is in Clarenville; the central region office in Gander; the western region office in Pasadena; and the Labrador region office in Goose Bay. Each region has both wildlife protection officers (WPO’s) and management officers (MO) assigned to it. In addition, each regional office has a regional biologist stationed there. Table 4.1 illustrates the regional breakdown as it stood in 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Region</th>
<th>Central Region</th>
<th>Western Region</th>
<th>Labrador Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.Q.</td>
<td>H.Q.</td>
<td>H.Q.</td>
<td>H.Q.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarenville</td>
<td>Gander</td>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>Goose Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
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<td>Supervisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 WPO</td>
<td>11 WPO</td>
<td>14 WPO</td>
<td>10 WPO</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 MO</td>
<td>6 MO</td>
<td>6 MO</td>
<td>3 MO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the 48 full time wildlife protection officers (WPO’s) and the chief of protection, there were also 17 part-time staff employed during peak seasons (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:156). Regions were further sub-divided into patrol districts. In 1982 there were 30 protection districts (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:156). The regional breakdown remains the same today. However, the numbers of staff have declined.

Counting Big Game Animals

It is important to critically examine the way in which the size of big game herds and the extent of poaching are estimated. First we must consider the methods used to count big game animals in Newfoundland. One method is the so-called block census, which is the preferred method for counting both moose and caribou. Newfoundland has been divided into big game management areas, which are further subdivided into blocks one kilometre square. Four of these blocks are taken together in a square, or quadrat, measuring two kilometers by two kilometers, and represent

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5 The chief of education (Minty) and the central region biologist (Forsey) co-wrote a half-page newspaper article on conducting a census of big game herds which provides some useful information for this discussion (The Evening Telegram, September 7, 1982). Also useful are Bergerud and Manuel’s (1969) work on the aerial census of moose and Bergerud et al.’s (1983) work on the Avalon Peninsula caribou herd.

6 At present there are over fifty management areas (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1989b:18).
one sample unit. A management area may have a number of sample units within it, depending upon its size. To estimate the number of animals in a management area, a number of sample units would be randomly selected and surveyed. The survey involves a slow, thorough search of the block by a helicopter flying a criss-cross pattern. Observers record the number of animals seen and the total number of animals counted is then multiplied by the number of sample units. For example, if, in a management area comprised of 100 sample units, one sample unit was surveyed and eight animals counted, eight multiplied by 100 would give an estimate of 800 animals for the particular management area. The central regional biologist and the chief of information and education compared this method of counting big game to estimating the number of raisins in a loaf of bread by counting the number of raisins in a few slices and then multiplying by the total number of slices. Minty and Forsey (1982) stated that this method will not be exact, but very close.

Another form of counting is the "strip census," in which a fixed-wing aircraft flies a straight-line several kilometers long and observers count the numbers of animals seen and then extrapolate from this figure. The strip census is useful in open country with little woods or rough terrain in which animals can hide. It is less expensive
than the block census since fixed-wing are cheaper to rent and more country can be covered in a shorter period of time. However, they are less accurate than the block census and are not practical for counting moose in wooded country (Minty and Forsey, 1982). The wildlife division does not completely survey each management area, but instead samples about 12% of an area when estimating moose numbers and about 15-20% when sampling caribou numbers (Minty and Forsey, 1982). Additionally, the division does not sample each management area every year. For example, in 1982 five moose management areas were sampled (1A, 2, 10, 24 and 37) while in 1983 only three areas were completely surveyed (11, 13 and 24) and two areas were partially surveyed (23 and 26) (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:131). Trend data are used to estimate populations in the other areas.

In addition to census results, the wildlife division relies on two other types of data supplied by hunters: licence returns and the lower jawbone of animals taken. The former are questionnaire-like devices which all licenced big game hunters have to return. These indicate population fluctuations or trends. The jawbones indicate the age composition of the herds. By 1983-84, continual cuts to aircraft budgets forced the wildlife division to rely heavily on trend statistics from hunter reports and lower mandible collections (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1984:2).
However, when relying on such data, wildlife managers are forced to do much guessing, as the comments of the chief biologist show:

Essentially what we do, well to do it correctly of course, we’d need a count first. Then you’d need an estimate of mortality and your productivity...then theoretically you should plug this into a population model...barring that, you normally don’t have that for most populations, there’s, ah, you work with data on other areas that are similar or adjacent. And you look at your trend data to see if you know if your population is increasing at a certain rate. And ah again, you plug the same figures with a lot of guessing into you model and come up with an estimate (interview, July 25, 1990).

It is important to point out that the data gathered from licence returns are problematic. Both the central region biologist and the chief biologist made this clear in separate interviews (July 18 and July 25, 1990). For example, both men suspect that the high hunter success rate in moose management area 37 (Grey River East) does not reflect the actual number of moose legally taken in that area. These two biologists believe that hunters apply for a licence in this remote area on the province’s south-coast, but hunt and kill an animal in a more accessible area. Both biologists suspect that hunters apply to hunt in Grey River East because there is less demand for this area and hence it is easier to get a licence. This example suggests that relying on hunter returns to estimate the number of animals taken from a management area and the remaining population is highly problematic.
It is important to consider the accuracy of these sampling methods because the estimates arrived at influence the setting of licence quotas, which are obviously an important part of government's wildlife policies. The chief of education and the central regional biologist claimed that aerial censuses are about "90 per cent accurate" (Minty and Forsey, 1982). That is, a population estimated to contain 1,000 animals may actually have anywhere from 900 to 1,100 animals. Estimates are often corrected for "sightability"; for example, in 1982 the wildlife division estimated the total caribou population of Newfoundland was between 36,776 and 40,119 animals, with a 10 to 20 percent correction for sightability. Without a correction for sightability, a figure of 33,433 animals was arrived at (Mercer et al., 1985:20). One study conducted by the wildlife division suggested that "less than one-half of the moose in any given area are generally seen by observers from either helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:137). Similarly, Bergerud and Manuel (1969:914) wrote that "quadrat census can provide accurate results in central Newfoundland. However, the necessary conditions are extremely rigorous." Bergerud and Manuel (1969) went on to specify that counts be conducted within a few hours of a fresh snowfall, before tracks of animals mingle, and that experienced pilots and observers and highly maneuverable aircraft are also highly signifi-
cant with regard to influencing estimates. However, other sources suggest that estimates of big game herds are highly speculative. For example, the black bear and caribou biologist, in a brief to the independent review panel on northern cod wrote that:

The Grey River Caribou herd inhabits a region of the south-central Newfoundland barrens, an area of open, gently undulating terrain comprised primarily of extensive bogland and heath communities...Between 1979 and 1987 a total of 26 complete or partial surveys of this population were conducted, providing estimates of population size that varied by as much as 3 times! (Mahoney, 1989:6-7).

Similarly, Freeman (1989) discusses the imprecision of big game science and the problematic nature of the estimates produced by biologists. Clearly, estimates of the size of big game herds are highly variable and imprecise.

Having produced an estimate of the size of big game herds, biologists are then asked to set quotas for culling. These quotas try to maximize hunter participation and economic benefits, and at the same time ensure the future viability of herds. It is important to examine the formula used to set quotas because it is here that the effect of poaching on the herd is considered. This management tool is also significant because it again demonstrates the uncertainty involved in big game management. Hunting quotas are established using the following formula:
Quota = Annual Increment - mortality rate 
[includes natural mortality + poaching mortality 
+ crippling loss + desired rate of increase] / 
predicted hunter success rate (Mercer et al. 
1988:15). 7

Clearly this formula involves many estimations, which, as discussed above, are often extremely imprecise.

This formula includes big game mortality due to poaching. Currently, the division estimates poaching losses at 5% annually. When I asked the chief biologist how the figure for poaching loss is arrived at, he replied that it was really a "guesstimate...when you look at it and try and pin down how many animals are being poached every year, that's a rough thing to do" (interview, July 25, 1990).

Similarly, the black bear and caribou biologist also described the 5% figure used to represent poaching loss as a "guesstimate." He went on to state that when wildlife biologists estimate herd size, the number of poached animals used in the formula is "a fudge factor," since

7 A slightly different variant of this formula was given by the chief biologist when he was interviewed. He stated that:

\[
\text{Quota} = \text{Population} \times \text{Recruitment}^* - \text{Mortality}^* \\
\text{Success Rate}
\]

* indicates the percent of yearlings
** includes kill by hunters, natural loss, crippling loss (i.e. shot but not retrieved by hunter) and kill by poachers.
there is "no mechanically accurate way of finding out the illegal take" (interview, August 9, 1990). It seems clear that the wildlife division was unsure of how much poaching was actually occurring. Concomitantly, the reliability and accuracy of population estimates of both moose and caribou herds in Newfoundland must be questioned due to the nature of big game science and the problems associated with counting roaming animals in rough terrain.

Since a "war" was declared on poachers in 1982, it is important to question the figures and estimates of big game scientists. How certain were wildlife biologists that herds were decreasing in the early 1980's? How certain were these biologists that poaching was the cause of herd decline? It is important to briefly consider the history of caribou and moose populations in Newfoundland. It is estimated that around 40,000 native caribou inhabited Newfoundland at the turn of the twentieth century. A decline in numbers began in 1915 and by 1930 there were approximately 3000 remaining on the island. However, since then an increase has occurred; by 1967 caribou numbers were estimated at around 8,000 animals and by 1982 Newfoundland was conservatively estimated to have 33,433 (Mercer et al., 1985:20). Moose were introduced to Newfoundland in 1878 and 1904, and from the latter date to 1960 moose numbers steadily increased (Mercer et al., 1988:46). At that time
a decline begin, which continued until 1973. Then moose numbers began to increase, but around the late 1970’s wildlife division estimates showed a slight decrease, which continued until 1982, when moose began to increase. This trend continues today (Mercer et al., 1988:46; Mercer and Strapp, 1978:229-230; Mercer and Manuel, 1974). It is significant to consider the explanations given by biologists for the drastic declines that occurred in the caribou and moose herds. Moose are believed to have declined rapidly after 1960 due to over-harvesting (both legal and illegal) and from over-browsing in inaccessible areas (Mercer and Strapp, 1978:230). Caribou are believed to have experienced the dramatic decline due to over-harvesting and high predation by lynx on the calves (Bergerud et al., 1983; Peters and King, 1958). Significantly, in both cases over-harvesting was not the only factor believed to have precipitated herd declines in the past.

By the early 1980’s reports indicate that wildlife biologists generally thought caribou populations were doing very well; as mentioned, Newfoundland was conservatively estimated to have 33,433 animals (Mercer et al., 1985:20).

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8 Over-browsing essentially means that there are too many animals for the available food supply. This surplus means that food quantity and quality will diminish resulting in a decrease in animals.
The Avalon Peninsula caribou herd had increased from approximately 700 animals in 1967 to 3,000 by 1979 (Bergerud et al., 1983:989). Moose populations were thought to be experiencing a slight decline in numbers in the late 1970's (Mercer et al., 1988:46; Mercer, interview, July 25, 1990). As mentioned above, previous declines in big game herds had been precipitated by more than illegal over-harvesting. Why, in the early 1980's, with caribou populations estimated to be increasing and moose populations estimated to be experiencing only a slight decline, was a "war" declared on poaching? Why did wildlife division employees and government Ministers claim poaching was rampant and out of control? Maybe concern with the decline in moose numbers led to the "war" on poaching. This explanation does not carry much weight because caribou seemed to be the main concern of claims-makers. Other reasons, such as a desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry, may have precipitated the poaching offensive, as will be discussed below. An examination of the education section and its importance will now be presented.

Wildlife Education
Wildlife education had been recognized as highly important by the 1980's and the establishment of the information and education branch in 1980 was a significant event for the coming "war" on poaching. The mandate of this branch was to
inform the public about matters affecting wildlife resources and help foster attitudes and actions that were in the best interests of the people and wildlife. Many of government's initiatives launched in the "war" on poaching originated from this section. For example, the information and education branch launched formal training programs and conducted extensive public relations work through media releases and speaking engagements. This branch had three sections and seven permanent members by 1982.9

Conservation education was (and is) vital to big game management in Newfoundland. The recently retired, long time director of the division stated that he would consider the creation of this section one of the highlights of his 25 year career as director (interview, May 8, 1991). The addition of the education branch in 1980 has to be seen as highly important when considering why a "war" on poaching

9 The three sections of the education branch were the general education program, the hunter education program and the Salmonier Nature Park. Its employees included a branch coordinator responsible for "establishing direction and programs for the entire Branch"; a hunter education coordinator, responsible for "developing and implementing the Hunter Education Program"; a Hunter Training Officer; and Salmonier Park staff (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983:161). Salmonier Nature Park is an outdoor education centre and its most important role was to increase the awareness of park visitors, preferably residents, of the province's rich wildlife heritage and the need to conserve it (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983:170). The discussion in this chapter focuses on wildlife education generally. In the next chapter a more focused analysis of the hunter education program is presented.
was declared in 1982. This was made clear by the recently retired chief biologist:

...if the people didn't cooperate, we'd be out of business. People have to cooperate...we've only got fifty wardens. Now if the people did not cooperate with these wardens there's nothing they could do, absolutely nothing...the key to wildlife enforcement is public relations essentially, and to get people "on side" (interview, July 25, 1990). 10

This quote highlights an important point: with less than 50 wardens, the chances of effectively policing 500,000 people, scattered over more than 150,000 square miles, was slim.

The importance of wildlife education had been recognized as early as 1958 by the wildlife division:

The public attitude towards game laws and their enforcement is one of the basic problems of wildlife conservation throughout the province and a program of public education is probably the only means by which this attitude may be changed...Conservation education is not the provision of factual knowledge but rather a process of building up within the public mind an appreciation of the wildlife resource. It is the creation of a real, living philosophy suited to our times and needs, practical in its application and carrying a true sense of values that will extend our wildlife resource assets over generations (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:160).

The creation of an information and education section signalled a new initiative in wildlife management in the

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10 In 1978 the chief biologist was quoted as stating "If you don't have the cooperation of the people then you're sunk! There's nothing you can do" (The Evening Telegram, September 14, 1978).
province. Both hunters and non-hunters were to be educated in wildlife conservation ethics. Hunters particularly were taught to behave like "true spokesmen." This also might be seen as a move by government to train hunters to police themselves. In a large province with few wardens, hunters who wish to disobey the game laws have a good chance of not getting caught. Young people were also targeted for education, the argument being that attitudes developing in young minds were more easily influenced than attitudes of middle-aged people (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:161). Following this logic, a program was established, beginning in 1982-83, to integrate wildlife education into the province's school system. Finally, by 1990, "Project Wild" was being introduced to the province's school system (interview, September 5, 1990).

The creation of the position of chief of information and education also created an official source, a "primary definer" of the poaching issue. This man was in a position to make claims about poaching and offer possible remedies for the problem. When interviewed, he stated that from

11 In 1977, government attempted to increase its control of hunters with the introduction of a Hunter Safety program. This program required hunters to do a written capability test and a marksmanship test before they could apply for a big game licence. This demonstrates that government was increasing its regulation of resident hunting.
either a law enforcement, or a management point of view, without education there is not much hope of protecting wildlife. In March 1981 this man made clear how important he believed his job was when he wrote:

It is very clear that if more people do not gain a greater understanding and appreciation for wildlife, its future in this province is in jeopardy. That is why the job of this section is one of the most important facing the wildlife division today (The Evening Telegram, March 28, 1981).

The need to educate people about wildlife conservation had become his career, and he was in a position to have much influence in shaping the poaching issue. It seems probable that this newly created arm of the wildlife division may have tried to demonstrate its value and carve out a niche for itself by acting vigorously in the area of poaching. That is, the education section had to justify its existence, it had to show that it was needed and that it was operating effectively. It seems probable that the recently appointed chief of education would have wanted to make his presence felt by being highly visible in his area of specialization, which included the poaching issue.

More support for my assertion that the creation of the education section played a key role in increasing awareness around the poaching issue is found in Freeman’s (1989) discussion of state employed big game biologists. Freeman suggests that biologists are "like most other people in
having strong personal feelings about issues close to them, including advancement in their careers” (Freeman, 1989:95). Freeman goes on to suggest that state employed biologists may even misrepresent data to receive public support and increased funds during a period of intense competition (Freeman, 1989:100). Similarly, Becker (1967) discussed how:

...personnel of the organization devoted to the problem tend to build their lives and careers around its continued existence. They become attached to "their" problem, and anything that threatens to make it disappear or diminish in importance is a threat (Becker, 1967:13).

If poaching was worsening, the education branch might have been given more funding to increase its efforts. By the early 1980's the provincial government was entering a period of fiscal restraint; so the wildlife division and its education branch may have found itself in a competition for funds. In such a situation it is possible that the poaching problem may have been used to maintain existing levels of funding. This is not to suggest that the chief of education acted cynically, and simply out of self-interest. The man may have believed in what he was doing, that his assignment was an important and necessary one. The chief of education was in a new job, in a new section of the wildlife division. Wildlife education had become a priority for government, but at the same time budgets were being cut. In such an atmosphere, it is easy to see how the
poaching issue could have appeared very appealing to the education section. It is also important to consider that tourism based on wildlife resources was a priority for government at this same time. The combination of these factors contributed to the emergence of the poaching issue in the early 1980’s. Stage one in the natural history of poaching, Agitation, will now be presented.

AGITATION

Claims-making activities are the crucial aspects of this first stage. It is important to consider the ways complaints about poaching are raised. That is, what strategies are used to press claims, gain publicity and arouse controversy? These strategies affect the life of the issue and whether or not the issue will move into subsequent stages. The power of claims-makers and the types of claims are also significant factors to consider. The objective seriousness (the actual extent of the poaching problem) may have been "relatively independent" of the successful development of poaching as a problem (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143). Best (1987:115) argues that rhetoric is central to claims-making activities. Thus, it is important to consider the words and arguments used to make claims about the poaching issue. Since the argument of the thesis is that the poaching issue was linked to government’s renewed interest in outdoor tourism, claims about outdoor tourism
are also examined. The discussion begins by examining four categories of claims-makers: provincial government Ministers; wildlife division staff; media personnel; and private interest groups. Then the types of claims are examined using Best's (1987) framework.

**Provincial Government Ministers as Claims-makers**

Three Ministers (Ron Dawe, Hal Andrews and Len Simms) made claims about poaching. These men were consecutively Minister of culture, recreation and youth, responsible for wildlife from 1980 to 1982. How powerful a claims-maker is depends on monetary support, social status, knowledge, organization and skills (Ritzer, 1986:9). The more of these attributes a claims-maker possesses or can draw upon, the better the chances he/she will be successful in pressing his/her claim (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:143). Dawe, Andrews and Simms were all extremely powerful individuals. All were elected members of the provincial House of Assembly and had the support of their constituents. Additionally, all had been made members of the Premier’s Cabinet. They were official sources and would have no difficulty in gaining access to the news media. In fact, Hall et al. (1979:58) argue that the media relies heavily on those in powerful positions because of constant press deadlines and "professional demands of impartiality and objectivity". Fishman (1980:145) makes a similar argument,
writing that reporters rely on official sources to meet deadlines and avoid slander suits.

As Ministers, these men had the knowledge and skills of wildlife biologists to draw on. Similarly, they also had the organized structure of the wildlife division and government behind their claims. The importance of a Cabinet Minister as a claims-maker was made clear by Mr. Simms:

Well to be perfectly frank with you, if the Minister didn’t have an interest, the chances of it (the 1982 crackdown) ever occurring at that time were somewhat slim, very slim... if the Minister doesn’t feel comfortable, for whatever reason, in taking it to his cabinet colleagues, maybe because he knows from talking to his cabinet colleagues on a daily basis that they don’t think it’s a big problem, they’re not prepared to put up money for it, so he’d be wasting his time bringing it to cabinet. So clearly the Minister has to have the commitment to do something about it. I don’t think there’s any question about that. No matter how much pressure you get from interest groups, or your own officials, the Minister, the buck stops with the Minister... the key there would obviously have to be the Minister having the, ahh, wanting to do something about it, or having a commitment to do something about it (interview, April 24, 1991).

Simms’ comments make clear the power Ministers have. Simms was an important figure in the "war" on poaching, since he was the Minister who declared war. He was an extremely vocal claims-maker and remained highly visible throughout his tenure as Minister of Wildlife (1982-1984). Significantly, Simms’ brother was highly involved in the tourist industry. For example, he was the founding president of the
Tourism Industry Association of Newfoundland and Labrador (Pumphrey, 1984:127). This link between a government Minister and the tourist industry is important, since such connections may have increased the monetary support the Minister could draw on, thereby increasing his power. Such a link was also important when one considers that tourism based on wildlife was being nurtured at this time.

Wildlife Division Officials

Three powerful claims-makers from the division were active in this stage: the director, the chief of research and management (both now retired) and the chief of information and education. The director had started with the division in 1957 as an assistant wildlife biologist and was the bureaucrat responsible for running the division since 1965. He had the knowledge and skills of division employees to draw on, plus the organization of the division itself. His power was made clear when the 1982 amendments (discussed in the next chapter) to the Wildlife Act were being debated in the House of Assembly. At that time, the Minister responsible for wildlife stated any MHA could "...feel free to contact myself or any member of the department, especially the director of wildlife..." (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b). By stressing, "especially the director," the Minister demonstrated that the director was the person to talk to about matters related to wildlife.
Adding to the power of the director was the fact he was advisor to the Executive. For example he accompanied the Ministers to press conferences. The director was the head civil servant responsible for wildlife; his length of service provided continuity and stability to elected politicians, who often had a high turnover rate. As mentioned, there were three wildlife Ministers from 1980-84. These elected officials may not have had any background in wildlife related matters; they certainly could not have had the familiarity with the division structure and the process of wildlife management that the director possessed. The reliance of Ministers on civil servants for advice was supported by the comments of Simms, who, when asked why poaching was an issue in 1982, replied:

Well, I think the answer's pretty obvious, because there was a great deal of concern among the professional people in the department, uh, that the population of big game in particular, was being eroded and a major reason for it was that poachers were having a great time of it... (Interview, April 24, 1991).

Simms repeatedly stressed the concern evident among the experts in the division. More evidence that Ministers get advice from "experts" came from the Telegram's present outdoor columnist. When discussing why government seemed to be doing little to help WPO's fight poaching at the end of the 1980's, he told me:

...Now you can't blame the Ministers, because they're only running the department. Most of
them haven't got a clue. They've only been given advice by their deputies, who are given advice by the bureaucrats. And these bureaucrats who are sitting down there running the Division are mostly biologists... (interview, May 14, 1990).

In his opinion, biologists influence the Deputy Minister(s), who in turn influence the Minister. It is significant to note that the Deputy Minister for the department responsible for the wildlife division, from at least 1974 to 1988, was a former wildlife biologist. Also, as mentioned the director was a former biologist. The research and management section (i.e. wildlife biologists) were connected to the Minister's office through the long time Deputy Minister. For example, this man (Frank Manuel) had co-authored a paper on moose management with the former chief biologist (Mercer and Manuel, 1974) and with another former Division biologist (Bergerud and Manuel, 1969). Thus the wildlife division was and continues to be connected to the Minister's chair.

The chief biologist and the chief of education were also powerful claims-makers. Like the director, these individuals had status derived from their respective positions. They were two of the "experts in their fields," to whom former Minister Simms often referred when interviewed. They had knowledge garnered from university educations; both could draw on the organization of their respective sections and the resources of the division as a

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whole. These men might be thought of as the owners of the poaching problem. Gusfield (1989) writes that:

...knowledge is the mandate for a profession’s licence to "own" their social problem...To "own" a problem is to be obligated to have information and ideas about it given a high degree of attention and credibility, to the exclusion of others. To "own" a social problem, is to possess the authority to name that condition a "problem" and to suggest what might be done about it. It is the power to influence the marshalling of public facilities-laws, enforcement abilities, opinion, goods and services—to help resolve the problem (Gusfield, 1989:433).

As owners of the poaching problem, wildlife division "experts" were in the position to make claims about what exactly the problem was and how to fix it.

Gusfield (1981:18) writes that the construction of factual reality rests on the authority of research and scientific study. Similarly, Herman and O’Sullivan’s (1990) work on the "terrorism industry" also shows how reality can be constructed. They argue that terrorism has been defined by experts and supportive institutions in the western world in such a manner that violence carried out by western governments is often rationalized as counter-terrorism (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1990:10). Best (1989) writes that most claims-makers use statistics and that these numbers need careful examination; he suggests that official statistics reflect the organizational practices of the agencies that compile them. Wildlife division experts were highly powerful claims-makers. The status bestowed on these
men and the importance placed on scientific knowledge furthered their power. Also, as made clear above, the fact that a former biologist occupied the deputy minister’s chair provided management staff with a conduit to the Minister’s ear.

The News Media

The media are powerful claims-makers, as many sources have shown (Fishman, 1980; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1987; Lippert, 1990). Concentrated media attention confers status and increases public concern around an issue (Hall et al., 1978:62). Most of what people know about the world comes from the media (Maclean, 1981:5). Lippert (1990:420) suggests the media act “as both claims-maker and a forum for other claims-makers.” The news media play an important role in defining a problem; they shapes perceptions about a problem and also show which groups made claims (Lippert, 1990:420). The Canadian media are controlled by a very few extremely wealthy families (Maclean, 1981:140) and these media moguls hire editors who share similar views and ideals. This results in the media being homogenized, as people with similar ideas of what is newsworthy and how to present it gravitate together (Maclean, 1981:124-130). For example, when the Telegram’s Outdoors Editor, was asked how important his column is to that paper he replied:

   It’s important to the paper as the newspaper’s philosophy is preservation of the environment;
conservation of wildlife; protection of wildlife; enhancement of salmon rivers. That's been our editorial policy, it favors all these things, and always has, going right back to the founding of the paper. Mr. Herder was a great outdoorsman, and that's sort of permeated the Telegram, right since the time he founded the newspaper. Of course, all the Herders are great outdoors people anyway. Even the publisher today is a very avid fisherman, not so much a hunter but he is a salmon fisherman (interview, May 14, 1990).

This quote suggests that in the area of wildlife preservation, at least, this particular paper may not be objective. Media editorials are an important source of complaints, since they often take the "public voice," and claim to speak for the public. This "represents the media in its most active campaigning role" (Hall et al., 1979:63). An advertisement described the Telegram as "Dedicated to the wise use of resources" and went on to describe the paper as "your voice in salmon enhancement, care of the wilderness and conservation programs (in the SPAWNER, 1985:67).

Obviously, the Telegram was important both as a vehicle for claims-makers, like wildlife officials, and as a claims-maker itself. As the above quote demonstrates, the Telegram's editorial policy was (and is) very pro-conservationist. The fact the paper has an outdoors column demonstrates that this paper caters to hunters/outdoor users. This column was the source of important claims about poaching. The present Telegram outdoors columnist explained
that the column format allows writers a free hand to say more or less what they want as long as no one is slandered:

A columnist has much more editorial licence, as you can imagine, than we'll say, a general reporter does, who only has to report the facts. Columnists can also give the facts but also give his opinion at the same time. So this is why it's better to be a columnist than just a general reporter.

The outdoor column's influence on readers was important, as Simms made clear when asked if media people influenced government:

...not all media influence government, but certain media, or certain individuals in the media ...there are some who have more credibility than other. Those with the most credibility generally have the most influence on people's thinking. Certainly writers like Ray Simmons, who I knew very well, and Bill Power, both on that issue (poaching) and on other issues often influenced me. I listened to them and read them.

Columnists with the Telegram were influential claims-makers in this first stage of the natural history of poaching. The news media's relationship with official sources is such that news might be thought of as ongoing communication between journalists and influential sources (Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1987:9). Media reliance on official sources helps frame issues and set the boundaries for further debate (Hall et al., 1979:58). In the case of the "war" on poaching, the news media unquestioningly accepted the claims of wildlife and government officials concerning
poaching, despite the fact that estimates of big game herds and of poaching involve a substantial margin for error.

A useful tool for analyzing the role of print-media columnists is Becker’s (1989) concept of the "crusading reformer." The reformer is fervent, righteous and unsatisfied with how existing rules deal with some evil. The reformer’s ethic is that the problem "is truly and totally evil" and "any means are justified to do away with it" (Becker, 1989:21). Becker’s analysis is similar to Cohen’s (1980) work on "moral panics," when "a condition, episode, person or groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests" (Cohen, 1980:9). The media play an important role in creating a moral panic as "sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary and the deliberate heightening of those elements in the story considered as news" serve to increase concern over a problem (Cohen, 1980:31).

The outdoor writer/claims-maker Ray Simmons is a good example of a crusading reformer. He was a hunter and was highly active in at least three wildlife groups: the St.John’s Rod and Gun Club, which he helped start, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, and the

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12 Moral panics are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
Atlantic Salmon Board. He wrote a weekly outdoors column for the *Telegram* and *The Newfoundland Herald*. He was espousing the benefits of conserving animal populations as early as 1975 in an address to the St. John's Kiwanis Club (*The Evening Telegram*, January 15, 1975). His columns used a variety of the persuasive techniques outlined by Maclean (1981) such as generalization, abuse of language, misusing statistics, meshing fact with opinion and excluding the details. His columns carried such inflammatory titles as: "Bloody carnage on 'Sad Saturday'" (*The Evening Telegram*, September 30, 1980) or "Some wildlife still fighting a losing battle" (*Evening Telegram*, January 2, 1981). If news consumers read only these large bold headlines, certain images and ideas would have been established in their minds. In addition, through using phrases like "All over Newfoundland, men and women are taking up the cudgel on behalf of wildlife," (*The Evening Telegram*, April 4, 1981) Simmons attempted to give the impression that he was part of a popular movement to save wildlife. Also, by using the metaphor of battle, Simmons

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13 Maclean (1981) gives an excellent analysis of the many bias and propaganda techniques often used in media reports (Maclean, 1981:30-43). Her discussion suggests that media reports be viewed critically and that the manner in which these reports are constructed often leads to an unsound argument being presented to the news consumer as the truth. Van Dijk's (1988) analysis of news as discourse is another excellent guide for critically examining media reports.
helped establish an atmosphere of declining wildlife populations under attack. Clearly, wildlife columnists specifically, and the news media generally, played an important part in agitating about poaching.

Private Groups
There was considerable claims-making activity in this first stage by private lobby groups. It is significant to note that actors were often members of more than one group, creating an inter-group network. Also, key state employees and media personnel were often members of the same groups. The various groups active from the late 1970's to mid 1982 are identified in table 4.2 (p. 127). The table is incomplete; however, it shows that many groups were operating at this time.

These groups actively lobbied government, agitating about different issues. Some groups, like the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation (NLWF), had very broad interests, as specified in its Constitution and Bylaws:

To join together as a Provincial Federation the Sportsmen of Newfoundland and Labrador for the exchange of information and united action for the promotion and conservation of fish, game and other wildlife resources (NLWF, 1983).

Other groups may have had more specific interests, such as the Trappers Association. Some groups lobbied specifically about the poaching problem, while others lobbied for the
setting aside of wilderness areas, or the need to regulate All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) use on caribou grounds. The important point is that there was a large body of groups concerned with issues adjacent to the big game poaching issue. A government interested in protecting wildlife resources for economic reasons had a large pool of potential allies to draw on in the coming "war" against poachers. Groups may have found it beneficial to side with government as the government appeared to be taking an active interest in protecting the outdoors. Also, by siding with government, groups may have been better able to get their views heard about their particular issues. That is, groups like the Trappers Association, or the Salmon Preservation Association, may have tried to "piggyback" their issues onto government's broader mandate. Also important to note is the link between the groups and the tourist industry. Some groups had an obvious interest in wildlife related tourism; for example, the outfitters associations. Others like the Wildlife Federation may also have been interested in promoting wildlife, as seen in the above quote from that group's constitution. Still other groups, like the Salmon Preservation Association (SPAWN), had direct connections to the outfitting industry, as will be seen below. SPAWN may have linked their desire to conserve salmon to the potentially great economic benefits it could mean. Three of the most active groups in stage
one, were the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland, the Tuckamore Club and the Wilderness Society.

SPAWN was highly important for several reasons. First, it had (and still has) the resources to publish an annual magazine, the SPAWNER, which is sold throughout the province, and hence had the potential to influence many people. That is, this group was powerful because it had the ability to get its views heard. This was exemplified by a brief presented to the Premier, by SPAWN in February, 1980. This document primarily discussed the Humber River and salmon, but it also called for the recreation of a Newfoundland Ranger Force to ensure "all types of poaching is (sic) sharply curtailed (in the SPAWNER, 1982:15). Also significant to note is that the founding president of SPAWN, Len Rich, went on to become provincial hunting and fishing development officer in 1984, responsible for invigorating the province’s outfitting industry. By 1981, SPAWN had at least one former outfitter on its Board of Directors. Many of its members at this time were "commercial fishermen, outfitters or guides who depend on the annual salmon harvest to supplement their incomes" (in the SPAWNER, 1981:3). Its president in 1988 went on to become the first president of an umbrella group for all conservation organizations in the province, the Salmonid Council,
established officially in February 1989. The 1989 president of SPAWN was the brother of the Premier. The president in 1990 was the wife of an outfitter. Clearly, this group was connected to the outfitting industry and the provincial government. It would also become linked to the most powerful conservation group in the province.

The Tuckamore Club was another important group. It was active as early as November, 1980, when the club’s director wrote a letter to the editor of the Telegram concerning the island’s caribou. This group was based in Corner Brook and lobbied to have wilderness areas protected. It is significant to note that the director of the club in 1980 would become a board member of the Salmon Preservation Association in 1981 (the SPAWNER, 1981:1) and was also a former outfitter (The Evening Telegram, March 21, 1981). This group received media coverage in 1981, when it suggested that a wilderness area be established on the southwest coast of the province, thus protecting the area’s caribou (see for example: The Evening Telegram, January 10, 1981). At this time the club submitted a brief to government, which demonstrated the resources it could muster. It was supported by the Wildlands Society in this action. Significantly, rural residents of the area opposed the wilderness area called for by these two urban based groups. Residents of the Burgeo-Baie D’Espoir and La Poile areas presented
petitions against the wilderness area to their MHA's, who subsequently presented these petitions in the House of Assembly (see for example: The Evening Telegram, March 6 and 7, 1981). This theme of local opposition to outside conservation groups would be repeated throughout the war on poaching, as will be shown.

Another prominent group in this first stage was the Wilderness Society, established in January, 1981, as a broad based environmental group. Its major goal was to preserve and protect the natural heritage of the province (The Wilderness Society, October-November, 1983:1). This group was a powerful and highly visible claims-maker. It had the resources and organization to publish a newsletter. In addition, it possessed several significant attributes, the most important of which was its connection to the wildlife division. Two of the groups founding members were the chief biologist and the head of information and education. As early as March 1980, these two men were trying to help organize a group concerned with "environmental issues and conservation concerns" (Newfoundland Natural History Society, March-April, 1980:40).
Table 4.2: Groups Active 1979-1982

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estab./Active</th>
<th>Issue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPAWN</td>
<td>1979/1979</td>
<td>salmon</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAEN</td>
<td>1979/1979</td>
<td>salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuckamore Club</td>
<td>?/1980</td>
<td>caribou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goose Bay Rod and Gun Club</td>
<td>1980/1980</td>
<td>caribou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nfld. Trappers Assoc.</td>
<td>?/1981</td>
<td>marten</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLWF</td>
<td>1962/1973</td>
<td>all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilderness Society</td>
<td>1981/1981</td>
<td>all</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNHS</td>
<td>1937/1981</td>
<td>all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlands Soc.</td>
<td>?/1981</td>
<td>all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERMA</td>
<td>1982/1982</td>
<td>salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab. Outfitters Assoc.</td>
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The Wilderness Society was also connected to the media as the *Telegram’s* outdoor columnist, Simmons, joined the

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14 SPAWN is the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland and is based in Corner Brook; SAEN is the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland and is based in St. John’s; the NLWF is the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation and is a province wide umbrella group of rod and gun clubs, hunters and anglers; the NNHS is the Newfoundland Natural History Society, based in St. John’s; ERMA is the Environment Resource Management Association and is based in Grand Falls.
society in January, 1981. The man who would eventually write an outdoor column for The Sunday Express, Tony Thomas, was also a member of this group. The Wilderness Society began a bi-weekly column on May 1, 1982 in the Telegram (Wilderness Society, October-November, 1983:8). At a meeting of the society in 1984, it was suggested that column writers remain anonymous to allow government employees to speak out without fear of retribution (Wilderness Society, February 2, 1984). This newspaper column increased the power and status of the Society, allowing it to reach more people with its claims. Obviously the group was well organized with access to skills and resources. It was a powerful claims-maker in this first stage.

STAGE ONE CLAIMS
Lippert (1990) asserts that Best’s (1987) framework is useful for analyzing claims. In this section Best’s analysis of rhetoric is applied to the claims made about poaching from 1980 to mid 1982. As outlined in chapter two, Best (1987:102) separates claims into three categories: grounds, warrants and conclusions.

Grounds
Grounds are the socially constructed facts upon which a claim is founded (Best, 1987:102). They are divided into three types: definitions, examples and estimates. All
claims-makers discussed above defined poaching in a similar way. All argued that poaching was widespread within the province and that it was seen as socially acceptable by many residents. Agitators often stressed that an attitude of "it's okay to take what I want" was prevalent throughout the province. Such a claim is what Best (1987) calls an orientation statement. An orientation statement specifies the boundaries of a problem (its domain) and also assesses the problem; in this case that poaching was endemic and was viewed as acceptable behaviour. Ministers and wildlife officials argued that poaching was the factor keeping big game herds from expanding as they should (see for example, Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981; March 28, 1981; April 20, 1982; June 23, 1982; Atlantic Insight, December 1980-January 1981).

Other claims-makers like media columnists, interest groups and the chief biologist raised claims about the detrimental effect of habitat loss on wildlife populations (see for example: The Newfoundland Herald T.V. Week, February 2-8, 1980 and The Evening Telegram, January 10, 1981; Zierler, 1980-1981). However, the problem was defined in such a way that (in the words of one Minister) "The main factor that is keeping our moose and caribou herds from growing as they should is poaching" (see for example: The Evening Telegram, March 28, 1981). Best (1987) writes that
definitions name a problem, making some issues relevant and relegating others out of bounds (Best, 1987:102). The problem that was keeping big game herds from expanding was defined as poaching. Issues like habitat destruction were raised but were squeezed out of the picture. Perhaps the 1980 enactment of the Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Act made this possible, as government could counter any claims about habitat destruction by pointing to this 1980 Act. Likewise, inadequate management was not raised as a possible explanation for declining big game herds, nor was the imprecision of big game science questioned.

It is also important to consider that poaching was what Nelson (1984) calls a valence issue. Such an issue "elicits a single, strong, fairly uniform emotional response and does not have an adversarial quality" (Nelson, 1984:27). Those who argued poaching was a serious problem did not face controversy or competing viewpoints because of the nature of the issue. Poaching was a "motherhood issue;" it was unlikely to generate formal opposition. Poaching was claimed to be a problem by a variety of claims-makers, both within and outside the state. Powerful primary definers framed the issue in such a way that poaching was identified as the problem affecting big game herds and deserving attention. Also, by arguing that poaching was socially
accepted by residents, the need for increased education programs was reaffirmed.

Examples

The examples of poaching in this first stage helped focus attention on the problem. One way this was accomplished was through the use of atrocity stories. Best (1987:106) writes that "opening with an emotionally-riveting 'grabber' is a standard journalistic technique." Similarly, Hall et al. (1979) assert that crime by definition is news, but that much crime is routine. However, linking violence to the crime increases the visibility of the crime in question (Hall et al., 1979:66-68). In this stage, claims-makers used examples which stressed violence, atrocity, brutality, viscousness, and wastefulness. One such atrocity tale appeared in the Telegram. The report discussed how a poacher had crippled a cow moose, with a shotgun slug, leaving it to suffer and eventually die. A "postmortem revealed" the poacher had actually killed three moose as

15 A "slug" is a lead bullet, with grooves on its sides, designed to be fired from a smooth-bore shotgun. Such a bullet is accurate and effective up to about one hundred yards (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985). During the war on poaching, various groups and individuals called for shotgun slugs to be banned. It was argued that this ammunition was used by big game poachers, masquerading as small game hunters and carrying shotguns. It is interesting to note that as early as 1910, complaints were being made about "settlers using seal guns loaded with slugs" (see for example: The Evening Chronicle, February 18, 1910). Claims to have slugs made illegal will be discussed at more length in the next chapter.
the cow was pregnant with twin calves (The Evening Telegram, March 12, 1981). When combined with the recent "caribou murders" (The Daily News, September 15, 1980) one can see how atrocity became a referent for poaching. Other examples discussed the cunning of poachers who in winter painted snowmobiles white or wore white clothing (The Evening Telegram, March 27, 1982). Poachers were described in these examples as "doing as they pleased", or threatening or roughing up wardens (Knight, 1981:68). Drinking was also linked to poachers, who were described as "predators" (The Evening Telegram, March 27, 1982; April 20, 1982). The examples used to typify poaching in this first stage were important in framing the issue. As Best (1989) makes clear, claims-makers draw attention to examples which justify their claims, and they shape people's sense of the problem by illustrating a problem through examples. The example comes to represent the larger problem as claims-makers emphasize some aspects over others; they promote specific orientations to the problem and they focus on particular causes and suggest particular solutions (Best, 1989:xx-xxi).

**Estimates**

Estimates are important claims because the "bigger the problem the more attention it can be said to merit"; claims-makers generally emphasize a problem's size (Best,
1987:106). Two types of estimates made about poaching were incidence estimates and range claims. The former gauge the number of cases occurring, while the latter suggest the problem is endemic (Best, 1987:106-108).

As mentioned above, all claims-makers emphasized that poaching was widespread. This is a form of range claim (Best, 1987:108). Often epidemic metaphors were used to make such claims. In this way the claims-maker could make anyone feel as if they had a vested interest in the problem. This was also an attempt to mobilize support for the "war" on poaching. Claims were made by wildlife officials that hunters and ordinary citizens suffered because of poachers (see for example: The Evening Telegram, September 1, 1982), while others, like members of the Salmon Preservation Association, claimed that poachers "were stealing from everyone" (Knight, 1981:70). Similar claims were made by Minister Hal Andrews, who described the number of poachers apprehended as the "tip of the iceberg" (The Evening Telegram, April 20, 1982). Andrews successor, Simms, described "poaching as the most persistent problem plaguing the province's wildlife" (The Evening Telegram, September 17, 1982). Another range claim made by wildlife officials was that poaching was having a significant impact on big game herds in this province. For example, the chief wildlife biologist stated:
If our figures are accurate—and I think our figures are pretty good—the herds should be increasing exponentially... We could have well over 100,000 caribou on the island, if we could control the poaching (Zierler, 1980-1981).

Since the magazine article informed readers that there were estimated to be 25,000 caribou on the island at that time, the implication was that 75,000 were being lost to poachers. Similarly, a media columnist claimed one animal was poached for every legally taken animal (The Evening Telegram, September 1, 1980). These last two estimates might also be considered incidence estimates as an estimate of the number of cases, incidents or people affected is contained in the claim (Best, 1987:106).

Neither the inaccuracy of big game science, or the problems associated with estimating the extent and effects of poaching were mentioned. Gusfield (1981:72) argued that single cause arguments are used to persuade; he goes on to write that when facing a hostile audience whose behaviour is to be controlled, an indisputable argument must be presented (Gusfield, 1981:80). To admit the facts are not clear is counter-productive to the claims-maker. Similarly, Lippert (1990:423) writes that estimates of extent are often worded in "vague, imprecise ways" to increase their persuasiveness. Maclean (1981:35) asserts that politicians often pinpoint an enemy, in this case poachers, and thus set themselves up as being for something, in this case
wildlife conservation. Maclean (1981:35) also discusses the problematic nature of statistics and how they are often used incautiously by claims-makers.

Warrants

Warrants are statements which "justify drawing conclusions from the grounds" (Best, 1987:109). They act as a bridge between the basic facts claims are laid on (grounds), and the calls for action (conclusions). Warrants are "often implicit" and in them, values most often come into play. Frequently, claims are based on motherhood issues. Nelson's (1984) previously discussed "valence issue" is an example of this. Best (1987:108-112) discusses six warrants he found in claims about missing children, and two of these (value and inadequate policies) were found in claims about poaching. Warrants concerning the value of wildlife and the inadequacy of policies were found in the poaching claims of all claims-makers, regardless of affiliation. All claims-makers in this first stage asserted that big game animals were valuable and that existing policies and programs were unable to deal with the problem.

Arguments that existing policies were deficient were made as early as 1978 by the first treasurer of the Salmon Preservation Association, Chas Loughlin, in "An Address to the Corner Brook Rotary Club." The main focus of this
address was "the serious poaching problem" of salmon. Importantly, Loughlin also discussed protection of moose and caribou, and called for joint enforcement of inland fish laws and the provincial game laws by one force of men:

What I would visualize would be a Newfoundland Forest Ranger, a full time policeman fully armed, possibly trained initially with the RCMP, and then branching out into game preservation. His would be a year round job. The Ranger would supplement the river warden by assisting in making arrests, following up on tips and, in the off season assist with moose and caribou conservation (Loughlin, 1978:59).

In this same address it was stated that "penalties for poachers should be really stiff" (Loughlin, 1978:59) suggesting that he believed existing penalties were inadequate. His call for "highly trained, armed Rangers" suggests that he thought significant measures were required to fight poaching. Similar claims were made in a Salmon Preservation Association brief presented to the Premier in February 1980, which discussed the re-creation of Ranger Force (SPAWNER, 1982:15).

Government Ministers also suggested that policies were insufficient. For example one stated that:

You could have a wildlife officer for every moose and caribou on the island, but we would still lose animals through poaching (The Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981).

Similarly, a media columnist wrote that his column was "not meant to be critical of our meager force of game wardens" (The Evening Telegram, March 27, 1982). Two of the Minis-
ters made claims that they would increase fines for poaching, implying that existing penalties were deficient (see for example: The Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981; September 17, 1982). By claiming existing policies were inadequate, claims-makers presented warrants for change (Best, 1987:111).

The other warrant found in this first stage concerned the value of wildlife. One Minister claimed that caribou poaching was "to the detriment of people on the peninsula" (Port au Port) (The Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981). This suggests that a loss results from poaching; i.e. big game is valuable. Similarly, when the Minister who declared "war" on poaching was asked if the promotion of the province as a 'sportsmen heaven' was connected to the crackdown on poaching because a crackdown would mean more animals and hence more licences for sale, he replied:

Oh that was definitely one of the arguments that I would have put forth to cabinet in getting support for it obviously, and that would have been supported strongly by the Minister of Tourism of the Day. Yes, because we have in Newfoundland, for as many years as I can remember, certainly as many years as I've been involved, we've tried to promote the province as an "outdoor haven", I suppose, particularly for people in the United States. The market in the United States is the type of market you'd go after, to get people to visit Newfoundland. It wasn't just simply for hunting, although big game hunting and trophy hunting was a major part of it, it was simply to enjoy an outdoors excursion, or to see caribou, or whatever, or to see
mooe, or to do whatever it is people do in the outdoors.

Other claims-makers, such as a media columnist and interest groups like the Salmon Preservation Association and the Newfoundland Natural History Society, also pressed the value of wildlife (see for example: The Newfoundland Herald, January 10, 1981; SPAWNER, 1982; The Evening Telegram, March 14, 1981). Clearly, claims were made about the potential value of wildlife for the tourism industry. Claims-makers tried to persuade people that poachers took from "us," that "we" suffered as a result of poaching.

Wildlife division claims-makers also made several statements which fall into this warrants category. Economic claims were found in the wildlife division's Annual Report (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:130). However, other benefits of wildlife were also recognized. Wildlife was said to be valuable for "food, sport, recreation, tourism, culture, aesthetics, science, education and nature's balance" and was most valuable for its contribution to the quality of life" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:130). Similarly, the director claimed there were future benefits to be had by allowing animals to roam unmolested (The Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981). Parallel claims were made by the chief of education branch who claimed animals were "a part of our history, culture and lifestyle" and that animals were part of "our rich heritage" (The Evening
Telegram, March 28, 1981). Such claims were perhaps an appeal to Newfoundland nationalism. The caribou was and is a symbolically important species within the province. For example, caribou adorn the colors of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment.

Not only was caribou a significant emblem, it was also visually appealing. Freeman (1989) writes that "caribou occupy a special place in the mind of the Canadian public, for in important ways they symbolize the northern wilderness that is so quintessentially Canadian" (Freeman, 1989:97). As made clear in chapter three, caribou was replaced by moose as the most important meat source for residents of the island. Therefore, it is important to consider why there was so much emphasis placed on caribou in the early 1980's by claims-makers, especially since we know that caribou populations were generally believed to be stable and increasing at that time. As mentioned, one goal of Managing All Our Resources was to increase caribou herds

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16 The early 1980's witnessed the growth of a kind of neo-nationalism in Newfoundland. For example, a "Newfoundland Culture" course was added to the province's high school curriculum. Paine (1981:3-4) suggested that the Premier at that time, Brian Peckford, politicized Newfoundland ethnicity. Peckford described himself as a "born again Newfoundlander" (The Evening Telegram, June 4, 1980) and presented himself as a defender and saviour of Newfoundland culture. Part of this was a "battle" with the federal government over control of offshore resources. A variety of academics offered interpretations of this "cultural revival;" for example Paine (1981), Overton (1985) and Jackson (1986).
to 35-40,000 animals by 1985 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:158). The first claims around poaching focused mainly on caribou; for example the interview with the chief biologist (Zierler, 1980-1981); the Minister’s claims that public concern was the best protection for the island’s caribou herds (The Evening Telegram, January 22, 1981); or The Tuckamore Club’s concern with west coast caribou (The Evening Telegram, November 19, 1980). A 1958 disease study by the department of mines and resources on Newfoundland’s caribou stated that:

Caribou’s worth lies in its importance as much sought trophy by native and foreign sportsmen, and for its aesthetic importance (Peters and King, 1959:4).

Similarly, a 1987 provincial government policy paper on the outfitting industry also talked about the importance of caribou to sportsmen:

who are challenging world records or working on completing the North American Grand Slam, the woodland caribou and the Labrador caribou are 2 of 27 required animals (Earles et. al., 1987:49).

To a province promoting itself as a sportsman’s paradise, looking to increase its outdoor tourist industry, the caribou was an important species.

Supporting claims about caribou’s link to Newfoundlanders’ heritage and culture were claims that wildlife might disappear altogether. For example, the chief of education wrote "If the ‘right to hunt’ attitude persists,
there will soon be no wildlife for anyone" (The Evening Telegram, March 28, 1981). Media sources also claimed that animals were threatened with extinction (The Newfoundland Herald TV Week, February 2-8, 1980) and that wildlife was part of all Newfoundlander’s heritage (The Evening Telegram, March 21, 1981). Such claims were an attempt to draw people in, to appeal to people’s sense of being a Newfoundlander. Other groups also made similar claims, and thus contributed to the atmosphere of vanishing wildlife. For example, the Natural History Society wrote how "hope (was) dim for Eskimo Curlew" (The Evening Telegram, August 11, 1981), while the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation and the Newfoundland Trappers Association claimed the pine marten was in danger of becoming extinct (The Evening Telegram, July 16, 1981). Freeman (1989:106) writes that the threat of biological extinction is a powerful motivating force:

Extinction implies irreversible finality, as well as invoking such emotive and accusatory notions as tragedy, ignorance, greed and human weakness. Clearly no decision-making officials or their advisors wish to stand accused of permitting such failures to overtake common-property resources whose conservation is their direct responsibility (Freeman, 1989:106).

Claiming animals might be lost forever, justified the calls for action.
Conclusions

Conclusions are "typically calls for action to alleviate or eradicate the social problem" (Best, 1987:112). Best also points out that claims-makers may have an agenda with several goals. In his work on missing children, Best found three conclusions: awareness, prevention and social control policies. These three conclusions were all present in poaching claims. All claims-makers, regardless of affiliation, tried to increase awareness about the poaching problem and also tried to enlist the public's help in fighting poaching. Best found the same results in his work on missing children. Lippert (1990), in his study of the emergence of satanism, found the "vast majority of conclusions emphasize awareness by publicizing the claims in the media" (Lippert, 1990:427). Similarly, most poaching claims-makers in this first stage used the media as a vehicle for pushing their claims about poaching.

The conclusion that it was important to prevent poaching was also stressed by the majority of claims-makers examined. This conclusion might be seen as stemming from the warrants about the value of wildlife. Wildlife was valuable for many reasons and belonged to everyone. Therefore, it was important to prevent poaching to ensure future generations would be able to hunt and fish, that a

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part of Newfoundland's heritage and culture would not be lost, to stop the theft by poachers and to benefit the province through the many advantages abundant big game herds could offer.

The final conclusion found by Best (1987), also discovered in this first stage of the natural history of poaching, is that new social control policies were called for. As shown above, all claims-makers in this stage concluded that existing penalties were too lenient, that there was an insufficient number of wardens, and that increased public cooperation and involvement were necessary to inhibit poaching. Public involvement and cooperation were needed by the government because of the impossibility of effectively policing a scattered human population who had easy access to animals. The chief biologist made this clear when he was asked how important good information and education was to his job:

Oh it's important, you couldn't do a thing without it...You've got to remember that it's people cooperating more than anything else that's important.

This was also part of the new social control policies called for; i.e., the need for conservation education. Various claims-makers, like interest groups and media personnel, called for increased education. Some groups even began education projects of their own, such as the Wilderness Society's newspaper column, or the Salmon Preservation
Association's conservation contest for schoolchildren. As will be seen in the next chapter, education efforts were one of the main government actions undertaken in the "war" on poaching.

**Strategies and Mechanisms for Pressing Claims**

As outlined in Chapter One, Spector and Kitsuse (1977:145) asserted that the way claims are made is highly important in determining whether or not an issue will expand. Similarly, Ritzer (1986:8) asserted it is important to get people to listen without alienating them. Also prominent are identifying the correct audience to complain to and effectively handling the media (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:145). Due to the nature of the topic and the relationship between the press and official sources, claims-makers had little trouble in pressing their claims. All claims-makers examined might be thought of as credible sources, whether they were a Minister, a biologist or president of an interest group. In addition, many claims-makers had access to the press.

Poaching was a valence issue; the chances of alienating people were slim. While there may have been local underground opposition to claims, official responses from interest groups, media personnel and even members of the Opposition party in the House of Assembly were supportive.
of the idea that something had to be done about poaching. Claims-makers knew whom to complain to and the proper channels through which to press their claims. Groups complained to the government through the Premier, the Minister, and bureaucrats in the wildlife division. Given the connections outlined between the Minister and the wildlife division, various interest groups, and the press, it seems reasonable to conclude that much behind the scenes lobbying took place. This was often alluded to by subjects during interviews. At the same time assertions that the future of hunting was threatened were directed at the hunting public and the general public. Such claims were sure to be effective, since hunters want continued hunting opportunities. Suggestions that the future of hunting was threatened were almost guaranteed to mobilize support. The general public would listen because of the nature of the topic, the power of the claims-makers and the methods used to press claims.

Stage one saw poaching put on the political agenda in Newfoundland. It culminated with controversy and increased awareness (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:148; Ritzer, 1986:10). However, this conflict did not arise from competing groups challenging the claims of other groups. Most claims-makers agreed on the definition of the problem and how to solve it. While research was unable to determine
where exactly agitation around the issue first began, it is clear that a considerable amount originated from within the state. A problem could remain at this point of heightened awareness and controversy; it could wither and die, or be rapidly transformed into the next stage (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:148). The latter occurred in Newfoundland, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the first stage in the natural history of poaching. By 1980, the Newfoundland government had taken a renewed interest in outdoor tourism. Claims that poaching was a problem arose at this same time. Often claims originated from sources intimately tied to the outdoor tourist industry. At the same time, crucial changes were occurring within the wildlife division, and there was a growing conservation movement in the province. This complex array of factors came together in the early 1980’s, resulting in controversy and heightened awareness about poaching.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines stage two in the natural history of poaching, which began in mid-September 1982, with the declaration of "war" on poaching, and lasted until December 1984. The first section discusses adaptations to the model, the poaching "war," the reported escalation of lawlessness in the province’s countryside and the efforts of the department of development and the wildlife division. The second section outlines the active claim-makers, while the third analyzes the measures implemented by government during the "war."

Adaptations to Stage Two

As outlined in the second chapter, Spector and Kitsuse (1977) assert that stage two occurs with official acknowledgement of the problem. This contrasts with stage one activities which were "almost entirely unofficial" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:148). Both of these assertions are problematic when applied to the poaching issue in Newfoundland. Spector and Kitsuse’s definition of stage two apparently assumes that the original problem definition came from outside state agencies, and that these original problem definers will lose control of the
issue (co-optation) in the second stage when official action (legitimation) occurs. This seemingly contradicts their assertion that governments may attempt to create one problem in order to divert attention from another (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:156). As well, their definition of the second stage assumes that no prior legislation existed in the problem area.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, much claims-making about poaching came from agents of the state. The wildlife division did not enter the debate in the second stage and then take control of the poaching problem as Ritzer (1986:11) suggests happens in stage two activities. The wildlife division had been in existence previous to the 1980 re-emergence of the poaching problem and was responsible for dealing with poaching long before 1982. The state in Newfoundland, the provincial government, was one of the key agitators during the first stage of the poaching issue’s career in 1980 and 1981. Agitation about the poaching issue originated from within government, not just from outside interest groups and the media.

While the second stage of Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) model is somewhat problematic when applied to the poaching problem, it nonetheless serves as an excellent guide for assembling data. The separation between the
first and second stages of the poaching issue might best be thought of as a matter of emphasis and not of rigid division. This having been said, stage two analysis will begin in mid-September, 1982, because at that time "war" was declared on poaching and legislative changes were slated for introduction to the House of Assembly. First stage activities were often official, in the sense that claims often came from state actors, or the state agency responsible for poaching. However, the declaration of "war" was an escalation in the issue, as laws governing poaching were strengthened. Obviously the poaching problem was legitimized prior to mid-September 1982, since game laws had existed since at least 1845. However, the declaration of "war" on poaching in 1982, signaled an intensification in the issue. At this time, government made clear it was acting. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:148) write that:

When governmental agencies or other official and influential institutions to which claims might be put respond to the complaints of some group, the social problems activity undergoes a considerable transformation.

Therefore, the September 1982 declaration of "war" is used as the start point of stage two. By declaring war, government was responding to claims about poaching. The "war" on poaching will now be examined.
The "war" on Poaching

The offensive against poaching was big news in both St. John's newspapers publishing at that time. "Much harsher penalties promised for poachers," read the headline in *The Evening Telegram*, (September 17, 1982), while *The Daily News* (September 18, 1982) ran the headline "Simms reveals all out effort: New "war" on poachers!!." The *Telegram* article related how "The provincial government has declared "war" on big game poachers and Mr. Simms, Minister of culture, recreation and youth, fired the first volley today" (*The Evening Telegram*, September 17, 1982). The *Telegram* reported that the Minister said he would be introducing amendments to the provincial Wildlife Act during the fall sitting of the House of Assembly. Existing legislation called for a first offender to receive a fine between $500.00 and $1000.00 or a prison term of from three to six months. Under the proposed amendments, fines for first offenders would be not less than $1000.00 and not more than $5000.00. In default of payment, a jail term of not less than one month and not more than six months would be imposed. If the first offender was not fined at all, the courts would have to impose a jail term. A second offender would be redefined as somebody who had committed a second offence within a five year period after his last
A second offender would receive a jail term of from one to six months, plus a fine between $3000.00 and $10,000.00. In default of payment, additional jail terms from two to six months would be imposed. Significantly, the confiscation and forfeiture of any vehicle used in any big game poaching incident was to become mandatory under the proposed regulations (The Evening Telegram, September 17, 1982; The Daily News, September 18, 1982; see also Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5473-5479).

The Minister described poaching as the most persistent problem for the province’s wildlife and he asked the public to get involved by helping government fight poaching (The Evening Telegram, September 17, 1982; Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5475). He outlined steps the wildlife division would be taking to combat poaching. Protection efforts were to be increased by establishing checkpoints and using fixed-wing, helicopter and all-terrain vehicles for patrols. An information program was to be implemented to increase public awareness about all aspects of wildlife management. Royal Newfoundland Constabulary and RCMP officers would also be enforcing the Wildlife Act.

Later that fall, the proposed amendments were intro-
duced by the Minister in the House of Assembly, where they were widely supported by both government and opposition members. For example, one opposition MHA (Torngat Mountains-Labrador) wondered why government had not enacted legislative changes earlier "especially when you see that there really is a crackdown under the Wildlife Act." Another Labrador MHA (Eagle River) stated that "stronger tightening of the regulations" was needed (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5243-4). Even the Leader of the Opposition supported the government's initiatives, stating that "there is too much poaching, there is too much breaking of the law as far as wildlife is concerned" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5250).

The bill was debated that fall in the House of Assembly and the new legislation given approval in principle (i.e. second reading in the House) on November 23, 1982 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5489).

In January, 1983 it seemed the state was escalating its "war" efforts. At that time, a news-conference was held, at which the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the director of wildlife introduced the implementation of a non-refundable five dollar fee on big game licences, which was to be used to improve the Hunter Education program and hire additional WPO's (The Evening Telegram, January 25, 1983). In September, 1983 the province's
hunter education program was broadened and strengthened, with the publication of *The Newfoundland and Labrador Hunter Education Manual* (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c). This program expansion was to "promote responsible hunter conduct, emphasize the importance of wildlife management, laws and regulations and to encourage the safe handling of hunting equipment" (Simms, 1984:1). Also in October 1983, Operation SPORT (Stop Poaching Report Today) was begun on a trial basis in the Corner Brook, Deer Lake, Bay of Islands area (Simms, 1984:3). This was a toll-free, twenty-four hour anonymous "hotline" for reporting poachers. The media reported these two initiatives as "a double-barreled effort", under the headline "Anti-poaching campaign stepped up" (*The Evening Telegram*, September 21, 1983). By the fall of 1984, Operation SPORT was made available to all residents of the province. Also in 1984, a "drive" was initiated by government to recruit and train instructors to deliver the hunter education course. A "series of workshops" were to be held, starting in fall 1984, to teach new instructors and re-train veteran instructors. It was government's goal to get 400 instructors a year delivering the course across the province (Simms, 1984:2).

From September 1982 until September-October 1984 the
provincial government and the wildlife division seemed to be actively increasing their efforts against poachers. From 1985-1986 (stage three) the poaching issue contracted and received little media attention, but the "war" continued to be fought on a smaller scale. In early 1987 (the beginning of stage four) the issue expanded once more, accompanied by an escalation in the "war." Thus the "campaign" against poaching was maintained throughout the decade. For this chapter, however, the main focus is the "war" effort from September 1982 to December 1984. Before analyzing the war, it is necessary to describe briefly what was happening on the provincial scene in this period.

Crime, Outdoor Tourism and the Wildlife Division

In this section three topics are examined: first, the reported crime wave that occurred in the province’s countryside; second, the continued growth of the outdoor tourism industry; and finally, the wildlife division. By the early 1980’s it was widely believed that crime and violence were "increasing in frequency and becoming more serious in character" within the province (Overton, 1991). Support for this assertion comes from the House

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1 Overton’s (1991) unpublished work on concern about violence and child abuse in Newfoundland argues that the late 1970’s and early 1980’s saw growing concern that crime and violence was growing in frequency and becoming more serious in nature.
of Assembly debate around the Wildlife Act amendments.

The Opposition leader at that time, Steve Neary, stated that:

I do not know if there is a complete breakdown in law and order in this province, but crime seems to be increasing in Newfoundland and Labrador at an alarming rate. I do not know if...crime is out of control in this province, but it would appear that way. There seems to be a dropping off of respect for law and order in this province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5246-5247).

Concern about poaching may have been related to this broader fear of crime. While the "war" on poaching was being waged, there was heightened concern expressed in the media about the state of affairs in the wilderness of the province. A general disintegration of law and order on the hunting grounds of the province was reported.

There was what Cohen (1980) might call a moral panic:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself (Cohen, 1980:9).
Obviously there was heightened concern about poaching; a "war" had been declared. As discussed in the previous chapter, violent, atrocious examples were used by the media and official sources to shape the poaching issue in stage one. In this second stage, violence and atrocity would again be used to frame the issue. However, media reports at this time suggested an increase in a new type of violent behaviour and a disintegration of order.

For example, one of the Telegram's outdoor columns carried the headline "Great outdoors becomes more dangerous as hunters become more aggressive" (The evening Telegram, November 6, 1982). The writer, Simmons, had previously written about the potential conflict between "old fashioned foot-slogging hunters" and "three-wheeled cowboys" (The evening telegram, October 30, 1982). Simmons' column of November 6 appeared less then two months after the "war" on poaching had been declared, and its title clearly stated that hunters had become more aggressive. Simmons claimed the cause for this increased aggression was the "dwindling numbers of game animals" (The evening Telegram, November 6, 1982). An example was

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2 "Three-wheeled cowboys" refers to three-wheeled all-terrain vehicles (ATV's). There is an obvious contrast presented between old fashioned, "foot-slogging hunters" and the new mobile "cowboy." ATV's increased the range of hunters, making remote areas much more accessible.
then given of a conflict between rabbit catchers and rabbit hunters. The former, mainly residents of outport areas, used snares to catch rabbits for consumption and sale. The latter group, mainly residents of St. John's, hunting with hounds, shot the same animals for sport. Obviously, a conflict of interest existed:

...residents have struck back at hunters from other districts who have "invaded" their private hunting grounds. In one area, St. John's rabbit hunters are finding their prized beagles in cruel traps and snares or slashed or hung up on sharp hooks set in rabbit trails (The Evening Telegram, November 6, 1982).

Clearly, the setting of trawl hooks to impale rabbit hounds was cruel, harshly violent and unsporting.

The violence seemingly escalated the next year when it was reported that "Hunters claim snarers poisoning their dogs" (The Evening Telegram, October 15, 1983). Three weeks earlier Telegram readers had been informed that six moose had been shot and left to rot in one area of the province (The Evening Telegram, October 6, 1983). Such wanton destruction was addressed by the Telegram's new outdoors columnist, Bill Power, who wrote that:

...hunters and anglers who believe in sportsmanship and fairplay...should be declared an endangered species. There was a time in Newfoundland when sportsmanship was such a natural thing to hunters and anglers that they didn't even need a name for it. It was part of

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3 Power took over the position following Simmons death in February, 1983.
their nature and their culture and they didn’t need to have it taught or explained to them...it is being replaced by something alien-GREED. Caring and sharing, once the trademark of a Newfoundlander, are fast going down the tube along with a lot of other noble characteristics of the race such as pride, independence, industriousness and the work ethic (The Evening Telegram, October 22, 1983).

This writer believed that there was a change occurring in the very essence of the Newfoundland character. Other examples from this period also claimed there was a loss of hunting skills and sportsmanship, and an increase in lawless behaviour. In September, 1984, "Another caribou slaughter" was reported (The Evening Telegram, September 3, 1984). Two months later, wildlife officials were investigating the snaring of 39 moose (The Evening Telegram, November 20, 1984).

The conflicts between sportsmen and subsistence hunters, including the violent confrontations and traps reported in the Telegram, provided the backdrop against which the "war" on poaching was declared and fought. However, the unsporting behaviour that was reportedly rampant throughout the province was important for other reasons. Cohen (1980:11-16) writes that the reporting of certain "facts" can be enough to generate public anxiety about a problem, but when this coincides with perceptions that certain values need protecting, the basis has been laid for social problem definition. This is important
because as will be seen below, poaching was re-defined in this second stage. For a problem to be created, that is for the re-definition to occur, it is important that people perceive the problem to be worsening. The problem’s actual existence is not that important. The media’s use of "sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary and the deliberate heightening of those elements in the story considered as news" increases concern over a problem (Cohen, 1980:31). The use of powerfully symbolic imagery may help to further distort and exaggerate an issue.

The picture painted of the province’s outdoors shaped people’s opinions and beliefs about what was occurring. Hasson (1981) has shown how a media campaign effectively shaped Canadian’s opinions that unemployment insurance fraud was widespread in the late 1970’s-early 1980’s and that increased regulation was needed. Similarly, Fishman (1980:5) writes that the media not only inform people about crime waves, but assemble them. Fishman (1980:5) defines a crime wave as a theme in the news that is continuously and heavily reported. For a crime wave to exist around a particular problem, all that is needed is for some incidents to occur and there be considerable concern among the media’s sources. Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1987:22) make a similar argument. Crime
waves help newspapers relate diverse incidents under one similar theme; they are important in raising public fears and apprehensions about crime (Fishman, 1980:4-11). Obviously concern about big game herds existed among the media’s official sources, because a "war" on poaching had been declared. Conflicts between rabbit snarers and rabbit hunters could be incorporated under the theme of wildlife warfare and a breakdown in societal values. Since concern about violence and crime was also high at this time, the reported lawlessness in the countryside fit well with this theme.

Poachers as Folk Devils
Cohen (1980:10) defines folk devils as "visible reminders of what we should not be." Similarly, Chibnall (1977) quotes Box’s (1971) work to argue that deviant behaviour occupies so much news space because it is "intrinsically instructive" as social rules are stated and people warned that violators will not be tolerated (Chibnall, 1977:xi). Hall et al.’s (1979) work on mugging in Britain showed how the concept of mugging was imported by the British press from the United States. However, not only was a new label imported for street crime (which had existed for centuries), but the idea that a host of evils went hand in hand with street crime was also imported. As the

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mugging label was introduced, fear was heightened (Hall et al., 1979:21-28). In Newfoundland’s countryside, a variety of unsavory behaviours reportedly accompanied the emergence of the new hunter. This was important in setting the stage for the re-definition of poaching.

The images used to describe the conflicts in this period contrasted the supposedly, friendly ethical sportsman of the past with the aggressive, "three-wheeled cowboy" of the present. A picture was painted of the modern, mobile hunter willing to go to any lengths to be successful, including breaking traditional rules of behaviour and the game laws. This was important because as Duster (1989) points out in his work on drug laws in the United States, laws obtain their legitimacy in terms of some primary reference point - the moral order (Duster, 1989:29). State agencies are some of the main means through which morality is regulated (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985:5). The picture presented in the media of hunters’ behaviour in this period was one of right and wrong. The impression was produced that hunters seemed to have moved away from the "proper" way of behaving. This legitimized the "war" on poaching and set the stage for further escalations by government in the war, specifically in the area of hunter education.
Expanding Outdoor Tourism and the "War" on Poaching

As fear of lawless behaviour in the countryside was growing, the outdoor tourism industry continued to be developed on two fronts. Government undertook a series of steps in this period to develop outdoor tourism further. By far the most significant of these initiatives was the department of development’s hiring of a provincial hunting and fishing development officer in October, 1984. When interviewed, this man related that as development officer he had many roles:

Essentially I had four or five roles; ah, promotion of the outdoor product; creating a public awareness of what the outfitting industry was, its tourism potential and so on and so forth; and also monitoring the industry, doing some training and education of the guides, and the outfitters themselves in current business practices, and I guess finally monitoring the facilities and the operations ensuring that they were the best we could possibly make them (interview, June 13, 1990).

The filling of this position was followed by the Minister of development’s announcement that the province planned to implement commercial hunting of the George River

4 Conditions for outfitters were improved further in 1983 and 1984. For example, in 1983 a spring black bear hunt was held for the first time. A wildlife division brochure argued that several auxiliary benefits accompanied this hunt, one of which was to be an "aid to outfitters who might cater to non-resident sportsmen eager to hunt black bear" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985c:6). The Minister of wildlife at that time also made claims concerning the viability of the bear hunt (The Evening Telegram, January 25, 1983).
caribou herd in northern Labrador. The Minister reported that ten outfitters would be allocated licences in 1985 (The Evening Telegram, November 27, 1984). The period from mid-1982 until 1984 saw government implement important changes in the outdoor tourist industry.

Government’s continued efforts to expand the outdoor tourist industry were accompanied by the persistent lobbying of pro-tourism claims-makers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, government had demanded outfitters improve their facilities in 1981. In response to this demand, the province’s outfitters "asked for and received a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 1982" (Earles et al., 1987:12). The province’s outfitters made at least two more representations to government concerning licence allocations that resulted in an increase in non-resident caribou licences and the opening up of a new area, Middle Ridge, to non-resident hunters (Earles et al., 1987:13). Clearly the outfitters associations were actively lobbying government to increase big game licences in the period 1982-1984. This lobbying resulted in more animals being allocated to non-resident hunters. If government was interested in selling more licences to non-residents, then a "war" on poaching

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5 It is significant to note this guarantee on licence allocations began the same year that "war" was declared on poaching.
was perhaps one way to reach that goal. Moose licences sales to non-residents increased in this period (table 5.1).

Table 5.1: MOOSE LICENCE SALES, 1976-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Licences sold</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Non-resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9,407</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11,210</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>12,815</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>11,970</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,220</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10,226</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,029</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9,166</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10,940</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>11,605</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>12,225</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>13,585</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: chief wildlife biologist

The data in table 5.1 were gathered from the chief wildlife biologist when he was interviewed on July 25, 1990. However, some of these figures are contradicted by numbers gathered from other sources. For example, a government policy paper on the outfitting industry states that 815 moose licences were allocated for non-residents in 1981 (Earles et al., 1987:12). Data gathered from the wildlife statistician (June 11, 1990) showed that from 1986 to 1988 835, 845 and 985 moose licences were
allocated to non-residents. Despite these contradictions there is a clear trend of increasing licence allocations to non-residents. It is significant to note that increasing licence allocations to non-residents at a time when resident licence allocations were being reduced was a potentially explosive political problem. The reduction in resident quotas corresponds with the stated motives of the "war," and may have been generated by concern with wildlife populations. However, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the wildlife biologist's were unsure as to how much poaching was occurring, or its effects on herd growth. It is important to consider that caribou populations were thought to exceed 30,000 animals in the early 1980's and were generally stable and increasing in Newfoundland (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:140; Mercer et al., 1985:16-20). Moose populations on the other hand were thought to be decreasing slightly by the late 1970's (Mercer et al., 1988:46; Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:134-139). To a government wishing to enlarge the

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6 From this table it is apparent that in the 1980's non-resident quotas generally increased. It is significant to note that from 1980 - 1981 resident licences were decreased by almost 1000. In that same period non-resident allocations increased. In 1982, both resident and non-resident quotas were reduced. However, the non-resident reductions were relatively minor. Similarly, resident quotas were reduced by almost another 1000 in 1983, while non-resident quotas again experienced a minor cut.
non-resident moose hunt this posed a problem. Outfitters had received a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 1982. At the same time, resident demand for big game licences was increasing (WFO’s, 1990:30; Earles et al., 1987:12). Thus the problem facing government was this: with moose herds thought to be experiencing a slight decline, where were the licences needed to allocate to non-residents to come from?

At this point it is appropriate to consider the role of the provincial department of development in this stage. When Mr. Simms was asked if the Minister of development may have been involved in the declaration of "war" on poaching, he replied "He would have been involved." Simms was then asked if the Minister, or the department of development, made representations to him concerning the need to expand the number of non-resident big game licences:

Oh sure. That's ongoing, year after year after year. I suspect it's still ongoing. I mean that's good economically and all the rest of it and in fact I think over the years licences have increased to outfitters, Newfoundland outfitters. Sure, it would have been an issue then (interview, April 24, 1991).

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7 This department continued to cultivate the outdoor tourism business, seen clearly in the "Hunting Camp Users Survey" it conducted in 1982. This was an attempt to describe the outfitting industry and detail the factors that influenced selection of an outfitting vacation (Earles et al., 1987:8).
Similarly, the former provincial hunting and fishing development officer discussed the efforts of the department of development to secure more non-resident licences:

... what's happened is we've expanded the number of non-resident licences. This has been a real, ah, real touchy thing with the wildlife division. Their priorities are based on, number one, subsistence, or the food aspect of it, and number two, resident demand, and number three, finally, the lowest on the totem pole is non-resident demand. Okay, so what we've attempted to do is secure a minimum of ten percent of the total number of licences per year that would go to non-residents and be made available through outfitters (interview, June 13, 1990).

From this comment it seems clear the department of development and tourism was making demands on the wildlife division to increase the amount of non-resident licences available to outfitters. This assertion is supported by the comments of the former chief biologist who told me the wildlife division received pressure from above to produce more licences (interview, July 25, 1990). It also seems clear from the former hunting and fishing development officer's comments that the wildlife division was not cooperating as the department of

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8 From the above table, it seems that the department of development was unable to secure the 10% of licences it sought. This may have been caused by opposition from within the wildlife division, or may have been symptomatic of the overall period of licence reductions. However, it is interesting to consider that as resident licence quotas were cut, the non-resident quotas edged closer to the 10% the department of development was seeking.
development might have liked; the wildlife division's first priority was resident hunters. This is supported by the so-called "Walters' Wildlife Policy" which the division operates under. Two points of this policy are to regulate wildlife surpluses for "the use of the people" and "to provide wildlife...for the recreational needs of the people" (Mercer et al., 1988:5). This conflict between the demands of the department of development and the wildlife division's priorities will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. For now it is enough for the reader to be aware of this rift.

As mentioned above, both government and vested interest groups wanted to expand the non-resident hunt. That is, they needed more big game licences for tourist entrepreneurs to sell to non-resident hunters. The problem facing government was that only a fixed amount of animals could be allocated for culling without jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. Due to budget reductions and the imprecise nature of wildlife science, the exact size of big game herds was not known. That is, big game managers were unsure as to exactly how many animals there were, or how many were being lost to poachers. Thus, government faced a dilemma: how could non-resident licence allocations be increased without jeopardizing stocks? Where were the animals needed to
immediately expand the non-resident hunt to be found? One way was to implement programs to increase herds. However, this would have been a long term solution and would not have produced the necessary animals quickly enough. The figures in table 5.1 and the other numbers on non-resident moose licence allocations suggest that in order to promptly increase non-resident licence allocations (or at least maintain them at existing levels) government may have reduced resident allocations and shifted these licences to non-resident hunters. The figures in table 5.1 suggest that from 1980 - 1983 resident big game quotas were reduced by approximately 2000, while that same period saw non-resident quotas increase. Reducing quotas to residents was politically dangerous and produced complaints (discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7), as seen in letters to the editor and the formation of hunter’s groups. However, government did not publicly state it was reducing resident quotas and increasing (or maintaining) non-resident quotas; it blamed the reduction in resident allocations on illegal hunting and declared "war" on poachers.

It is possible to suggest that the "war" on poaching had two main effects. First, it may have reduced the number of animals "lost" to poachers. While government and wildlife managers were unsure exactly how many
animals were taken by poachers, every extra animal meant another potential licence sale. A second effect of the "war" was that it provided government with a scapegoat for its reduction of resident quotas. Government decreased the number of resident big game licences, publicly stating this was done to help stocks recover from rampant poaching by residents. There was no mention of the increases and very minor reductions in non-resident quotas (or of poaching by non-residents). That is, the "war" was perhaps an attempt to quiet unhappy resident hunters. As mentioned, the number of resident hunters was steadily increasing. That is, there was an increasing resident demand for big game licences, at the same time that the non-resident hunt was being expanded. A "war" on poaching helped distract attention away from the sleight of hand that accompanied the expansion of the non-resident big game hunt.

The Wildlife Division: 1982-84

The wildlife division published a highly significant document in this stage, namely an Annual Report for the fiscal year 1981-82. Released in September 1983, it was important because it was the first Annual Report produced by the division since the late 1960's (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:164). The publication of this document perhaps suggested an increased team effort by wildlife
personnel in the early stages of the poaching war, demonstrat- ing a more efficient and vigorous approach. However, the budget cuts discussed in the previous chapter continued to adversely affect the division. That is, tension existed between the stated policies and the practical realities of wildlife management in the early 1980's.

For example, the Budget estimate for the division for 1982-83 was 4.5 million dollars (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982c:176). The following year, 1983-84, the estimates were reduced to 4.1 million dollars (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983b:186). In 1984-85, the division’s budget was estimated at 4.3 million dollars (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1984b:284). This was a slight increase from the previous year, but was still less than 1982-83. These budget reductions were referred to in the division’s 1983-84 Annual Report:

This year despite all the shortcomings of economic slumps, etc., we have provided a service to the public that has excelled in many areas of endeavour and considering the resources at hand, our performance in some areas during the fiscal year 1983-84 was considered far advanced over previous years....Our greatest problem now with moose management is to provide necessary management data in order to manipulate populations. With annual decreasing aircraft budgets, we are forced to rely heavily on trend statistics from hunter reports and lower mandible collections (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1984a:2).

Budget reductions continued to affect the running of the
division. Cuts in funding meant it that it was becoming more and more difficult to determine exactly what was happening with animal populations and more difficult to protect game and fight a "war" against poachers. Small budget increases like the one in 1984 did little to alleviate the strain under which the division was operating.

Despite these budget cuts, the different sections of the division were the source of many initiatives during the war. For example, the decision to reduce licence quotas was based on the estimates produced by the division's biologists (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:136). The protection branch intensified its efforts in this stage. For example, the number of investigations carried out in 1982-83 was increased from the previous year in all regions except Labrador (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:157). The protection branch also enlarged

9 As discussed above, the wildlife division's counting/estimating of the big game herds was hampered by decreasing budgets for aircraft time. The division was increasingly being forced to rely on data gathered from hunters for estimating populations. For example, successful hunters are required to return the lower jawbone of the animal for lab analysis. Similarly, all licenced hunters are required to submit a return (attached to the big game licence) indicating the number of days hunted, the area hunted, the number and sex of animals seen. However, this instrument may be misleading as a hunter may have a licence for a remote area on the south-west coast and may kill an animal on the Avalon Peninsula and then lie when filling in the licence return.
its public relations program, making 484 speaking engagements in 1982-83 compared with 431 in 1981-82 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:163). Another initiative announced was the proposed hiring of additional protection staff from monies raised from the new five dollar application fee for big game licences (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:178).10

The information and education section also magnified its efforts. In 1982-83, nine news items and three major articles were prepared for release (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:164). This section was also involved in the preparation of the Annual Report (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:164) and in two public surveys; the Statistics Canada survey, referred to in chapter four, on the value of wildlife, and a study by a Memorial University graduate student prepared specifically for the wildlife division, and dealing solely with this province.

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10 The last major expansion of the protection staff had reportedly occurred in 1975 (The Evening Telegram, January 25, 1983). This was supported by the comments of the eastern region protection supervisor who told me the "protection branch really came into its own" in the late 1970's (Interview, June 13, 1990). Research found that there was no increase in protection staff in the mid-1980's. In fact from 1983 to 1990 the numbers of protection staff decreased from 45 to 36 officers (WPO's, 1990:30).
Other steps taken by the information and education branch demonstrate its importance. For example, there were advancements made in the hunter education program. The hunter education co-ordinator produced an important book in this period, *The Newfoundland and Labrador Hunter Education Manual* (1983) in student and instructor editions. It was the responsibility of the hunter education branch to serve volunteer instructors and provide them with the necessary support to deliver the hunter education course (Simms, 1984:2). The information and education section also prepared a brochure for the Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council titled *Caring For Our Special Places*. However, the most significant product of the information and education section in stage two was Operation SPORT (Stop Poaching Report Today). This 24 hour anonymous phone line to report poachers was begun on the island’s west coast in October 1983, and as mentioned above, made available to all residents of the province by

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11 Hill’s (1984) study, was an attempt to increase the division’s knowledge of public perceptions and opinions toward wildlife, wildlife-related issues and how the attitudes of demographic and activity groups differed (Hill, 1984:iii). Significantly, the study found that 80% of respondents thought poaching was common in this province and it also recommended increased public education programs.
fall 1984 (Simms, 1984:5). The chief of education told me that this program was his idea, and a pamphlet explaining it was produced by the information and education section. Clearly, this branch of the wildlife division had begun to show the influence it exerted in the realm of the poaching issue.

CLAIMS-MAKERS IN STAGE TWO
The description of the "war" on poaching given above focuses mainly on state initiatives. However, as in the first stage, there was considerable non-state activity. The main point of this section is, first, to highlight changes in the way poaching and poachers were typified and, second, to examine the opposition to government programs which arose in this period. Five categories of claims-makers are outlined: provincial government Ministers; wildlife officials; media personnel; private groups; and finally, opponents of government. The majority of these claims-makers had been active in stage one, but some new ones emerged in this stage. Two of the most outspoken claims-makers from stage one were co-opted by government in this stage.

There were two Ministers responsible for wildlife who made claims in this period. One was Len Simms, who had been the wildlife Minister at the end of stage one
Simms was highly active in this stage, holding news conferences and writing at least three letters to the editor concerning wildlife management (see for example: The Evening Telegram, February 17, 1983; March 29, 1983; April 6, 1984). In late 1984, a Ministerial change occurred and the new Minister of wildlife, Tom Rideout, made allegations about poaching (see for example The Evening Telegram, November 20, 1984). The Minister of development also continued to operate as a claims-maker. Additionally, members of the opposition party pressed poaching arguments. Many wildlife officials also made poaching claims from mid-1982 to 1984, for example, the Deputy Minister of culture, recreation and youth, the director of the wildlife division, the chief protection officer, and the chief of information and education. The eastern region protection supervisor became visibly active as a claims-maker, as did the hunter education co-ordinator with the release of The Hunter Education Manual (1983).

The media and interest groups played a key role in this phase of the war. The Telegram maintained its strong anti-poaching stance in its editorials, articles and columns (see for example The Evening Telegram, September 18, 1982; March 12, 1983; May 15, 1984). The other St. John's newspaper publishing at that time, also covered
the poaching "war" (see for example The Daily News, September 18, 1982). The print media not only reported what was happening in the war, but became one of the main battlegrounds. The importance of the media in the creation of an issue is made clear in Lippert's (1990) work on how satanism became an issue in Canada. He argues that the media act both as a claims-maker and a forum for other claims-makers (Lippert, 1990:420). Similarly, Hasson's (1987) work on the "war" waged against unemployment insurance fraud by the Canadian Government also shows the importance of the media in a government led war. Hasson (1987) argues that government waged a media campaign which shaped opinions about unemployment insurance fraud (Hasson, 1987:632).

A variety of interest groups pressed arguments concerning wildlife and poaching from mid-1982 until 1984, for example, the Wilderness Society, the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, the Tuckamore Club, the Gander Rod and Gun Club, the Canadian Wildlife Federation, the Tors Cove Outdoors Club and the Salmonier Wilderness Association (see for example The Evening Telegram, December 17 and December 31, 1983: SPAWNER, 1982-84; Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985; and The Evening Telegram, April 23,
At least two new groups were formed in this period. One was the Avalon Hunters Association, established in May 1983. This group lobbied to have slugs banned and small game seasons shortened to help control poaching. This group tried to rally other groups and grabbed media attention (see for example The Evening Telegram, May 4 and May 14, 1983). The same year a Regional Newfoundland Salmon Council was formed by a union between the Salmon Preservation Association and the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland. This Regional Council was part of a larger organization, the Atlantic Salmon Federation, which was also established in 1983.

The main concern of this group was Atlantic salmon and one of its main functions was the promotion of conservation measures (SPAWNER, 1984:15). It is important to point out that the new claims-makers who became vocal in this stage were groups representing sportsmen. Obviously sportsmen would support any efforts to erase something which threatens their activities, in this case poaching. Other studies of wildlife conservation make clear that sportsmen are against poaching or any threat to the future of hunting (see for example; Ives’ (1988) study of poaching in Maine; or Reiger’s (1986) work on American sportsmen and the origins of conservation).
Ritzer (1986) writes that through co-optation groups are absorbed into the structure of an organization to avert threats to the organization's structure. Ritzer (1986:11) goes on to suggest that opposition can be silenced or greatly reduced by putting claims-making critics on the team, thereby making them share the burden of responsibility for decisions and increasing their stake in supporting the organization rather than opposing it. This process could be seen at work in this stage when two important claims-makers from stage one were drawn into government. The first was the president of the Tuckamore Club, Dr. Barry May, who was appointed to the Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council. Significantly, this Council had direct links to the wildlife division, as the chief of information and education was a member of the Council (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1981b:141) and the wildlands biologist its Executive Secretary (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:154). The other person co-opted by government was the founding president of the Salmon Preservation Association and the editor of the SPAWER. As mentioned above, he became hunting and fishing development officer in October, 1984 (interview: June 13, 1990). Both these men had, from 1979 until mid-1982, called on government to address the poaching problem. These appointments were perhaps a move to silence these highly vocal agitators.
Claims About Poaching

Some claims were unchanged from stage one. For example public cooperation was still called for by the Minister (see for example Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5487); by wildlife officials (The Evening Telegram, October 6, 1983); and by columnists (The Evening Telegram, March 12, 1983). However, as mentioned, stage two saw a reported intensification of violence and brutality on the part of poachers. Claims indicated there was a deterioration of law and order in the countryside.

However, one significant change in the nature of claims about poaching was that poaching was now claimed to be carried out for black market sale, often by organized groups of poachers. That is, it seemed to be getting more dangerous in the countryside as a new type of poacher emerged. For example, both Wildlife Ministers made claims of this kind (see for example: The Evening Telegram, January 25, 1983; November 20, 1984). Media columnists made similar claims. One wrote that while poachers came from "all walks of life" they shared the characteristics of greed and stupidity. This man went on to claim that poachers were selling meat and killed whenever they ran "short of beer money" (The Evening Telegram, March 12, 1983). Interest groups, like the
Wildlife Federation also claimed poaching was being carried out for economic returns (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985b:1). The President of the Gander Rod and Gun Club claimed that poachers on the Gander River were very clever and were using highly sophisticated gear to supply local restaurants with salmon (The Evening Telegram, September 25, 1982). Other claims-makers raised the idea that poachers were operating in gangs or crowds. For example, the Minister made such a claim (The Evening Telegram, November 20, 1984) as did an Opposition MHA (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5479). Such claims suggested that poachers were now organized and contributed to the atmosphere of potential danger.

Claims were also made which suggested that poachers were reacting violently and that enforcement agents were under attack. Recall that violent examples had been used in the previous stage to support claims and grab people's attention. Hall et al. (1979) assert that linking crime to violence increases the visibility of the crime in question:

Violence represents a basic violation of the person; the greatest personal crime is 'murder', bettered only by the murder of a law-enforcement agent...Violence is also the ultimate crime against property and against the state. It represents a fundamental rupture in the social order. The use of violence marks the distinction between those who are fundamentally
of society and those who are outside it...Violence thus constitutes a critical threshold in society; all acts, especially criminal ones, which transgress that boundary, are, by definition, worthy of news attention (Hall et al., 1979:68).

Claims-makers in this second stage linked violence to their poaching claims. For example, when the Wildlife Act amendments were being debated in the House of Assembly, the leader of the opposition party talked about the:

...attacks and assaults that are being made on the wildlife officers in this province......the next thing a wildlife officer will be risking his life to enforce the laws of this Province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983b:5246-5250).

The Telegram covered this violence against enforcement agents. It reported the Eastern Region Protection Supervisor's claims that a man had been charged with assaulting a WPO after allegedly trying to avoid a roadblock manned by a two-man night patrol (The Evening Telegram, October 6, 1983). An essay written by the executive vice-president of the Canadian Wildlife Federation claimed that poachers were "In many instances prone to use violence to avoid detection and apprehension" (The Evening Telegram, February 12, 1983). A Salmon Preservation Association editorial discussed the need for improved equipment for river guardians, who, it was suggested, faced "potentially deadly encounters with desperate men" (SPAWNER, 1983:3). Similarly, the Telegram outdoors columnist wrote how the "lawmen were outnumbered and outlasted by the outlaw..." (The Evening Telegram, 183
Poaching had undergone a definitional transformation as the issue moved from stage one to two. In the previous chapter, poaching was defined by claims-makers as being widespread and socially acceptable. In this second stage, claims argued that poaching had gone beyond socially accepted subsistence poaching. This change in the definition of the problem is understandable. Both Spector and Kitsuse (1977:148), and Ritzer (1986:11), assert such a transformation occurs when a problem moves from stage one to stage two. Claims-makers in this stage began to characterize the poaching problem in a new way, which Best’s (1989:xx) work on typification helps us to understand. Best (1989) defines typification as:

...an integral part of social problems construction. Claims-makers inevitably characterize problems in particular ways: They emphasize some aspects and not others; they promote specific orientations; and they focus on particular causes and advocate particular solutions (Best, 1989:xxi).

Claims-makers had begun to narrow the focus of the problem; poaching was now defined as market poaching. Poachers were claimed to be sophisticated and violent. Poaching was being typified in a new way. Given the

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12 It is significant to note the continued use of western metaphors. Recall the previously mentioned distinction between "three-wheeled cowboys" and old-fashioned hunters.
nature of poaching, one might suspect that when these novel claims about poaching were made against the backdrop of an increasingly dangerous outdoors, that people would rally behind government efforts to eradicate the problem and increase tourist benefits from the outdoors. This did occur in some instances, as seen in the formation of the Avalon Hunters Association and the Regional Salmon Council. However, not everyone supported government, as will now be seen.

**Opposition Claims**

As discussed above, the provincial government had a broad base of support to draw on in its "war" efforts. However, a "war" implies that there are two sides; the allies and the enemy; good guys and bad guys, if you will. As mentioned, government Ministers, wildlife officials, media personnel, and interest group representatives made similar claims about the nature and extent of poaching and how to ameliorate it. These four categories of claims-makers might be considered the allies in this war. A "war" implies that an enemy has been recognized and is under attack. Who was the enemy in the poaching war? Poachers of course, but also those people who did not see big game as a sporting resource and wilderness as something special to be preserved; in short, the scattered population of Newfoundland, who often opposed
the establishment of wildlife reserves and who did not obey the game laws or sporting code of ethics. The "war" on poaching was partly an effort to address this opposition, change attitudes and mobilize support. In addition to opposition from the general public, government may have faced resistance from the protection branch of the wildlife division. This section may not have supported the contention that poaching was the factor limiting big game herd growth. The recently retired director of the division told me that for the protection staff to have agreed with such an assertion would have been equivalent to them saying "we're not doing our job" (interview, May 8, 1991). Disagreements between protection staff and research and management staff (i.e. biologists) becomes important in stage four and are discussed at more length in chapter seven. For now it is sufficient for the reader to know that the protection staff may have felt threatened by accusations that poaching was rampant.

An example of the public opposition facing government arose in late 1982 over an ecological reserve proposed for the watershed of Western Arm Brook on the north west coast of the Great Northern Peninsula. The federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council were
in favour of the reserve, whereas area residents, through their local Development Association, opposed it (The Evening Telegram, December 23, 1982). More opposition to government emerged in this period from the ranks of All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV’s) owners who feared loss of outdoor freedoms and access to the countryside. Some of these ATV owners were considering forming an association (The Evening Telegram, February 19, 1983). As mentioned above, some people had linked poachers to ATV’s. It is significant, therefore, that at least some ATV owners reacted against such charges and mobilized. Opposition also appeared in unsporting behaviour such as the snaring of moose or the setting of traps to maim rabbit hounds discussed above.

Opposition to government was also expressed through letters to the editor. One such letter, a copy of which had been addressed to the Minister responsible for wildlife, opposed the proposed Bay Du Nord Wilderness Area. This letter claimed that "a few high profile personalities" would be given "carte blanche" use of the area (The Evening Telegram, September 28, 1983). Other letters to the editor called for the curtailment of non-

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13 Ecological reserves and ATV use are used simply as examples of opposition to government policy concerning wildland management. Both issues could be analyzed individually, however, space constraints prevent this.
resident sport hunting so that the licences could be distributed to residents (The Evening Telegram, October 8, 1982); or that the licence reductions implemented as part of the "war" on poaching were unjust and punished innocent hunters (The Evening Telegram, March 5, 1984). Another letter claimed moose quotas were too high and were an example of "wildlife mismanagement" (The Evening Telegram, March 26, 1984). Significantly, one newspaper editorial also opposed government's expansion of sport hunting. It argued that non-resident hunting should be cancelled "so that whatever licences are taken up with this can be allocated instead to people who need meat on the table" (The Daily News, September 18, 1982). It was claimed that the licencing quota system did consider the food gathering activities of outport families. Ironically, this editorial appeared on the same day that "war" was declared on poachers. Clearly, a large body of people opposed government’s actions. This is significant and would lead government to attempt to undermine and weaken opposition.

ANALYSIS OF THE "WAR" ON POACHING

In this section the state’s tactics in the "war" are discussed. It is argued that the "war" efforts consisted of a combination of coercive maneuvers and more subtle consent generating tactics.
Hunter Education
As discussed above, the establishment of an information and education branch of the wildlife division was highly important with regard to poaching becoming an issue (i.e. "war" being declared). If we consider the crime wave that was thought to be occurring in the province’s countryside at this time and the poaching "war" that was being fought, a picture of chaos, lawlessness, lack of sportsmanship and struggle emerges. This conflict saw the state and its allies (the media and interest groups) pitted against poachers and those people who opposed new regulations and policies governing wildlife and wildlands.

As made clear above, one of the conclusions reached by the majority of claims-makers in the first stage was the need for an education program. The reported escalation of violence and disorder in this second stage added weight to claims about the necessity of hunter education. The expansion of the hunter education program perhaps stemmed from those first stage claims. That is, the tactics grew out of what was seen as the problem. The education program aimed to teach what the Telegram columnist asserted Newfoundlanders’ had lost—sportsmanship (The Evening Telegram, October 22, 1983).
It was also a means to weaken opposition, control people's actions on the countryside and regulate the taking of game.

The purpose of the *Hunter Education Manual* (1983) released in this second stage was:

...to put afield safer, more responsible and knowledgeable hunters. Hunter Education programs contribute to a greater awareness and enjoyment of wildlife resources, an improved conservation ethic, a greater understanding of wildlife management issues and an appreciation of the role the hunter has to play in these issues (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:3).

It is significant that this Manual mentioned the "conservation ethic." Ethics are standards of conduct and moral judgement. They imply a sense of right or wrong. The second section of the Manual, "Hunter Ethics," discussed the importance of following both the written and unwritten hunting laws. It began with a quote from famous conservationist Aldo Leopold:

> A peculiar virtue in wildlife ethics is that the hunter ordinarily has no gallery to applaud or disapprove of his conduct. Whatever his acts, they are dictated by his own conscience, rather than by a mob of onlookers. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this fact (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:7).

The Manual also discussed how understanding big game management, game laws and sporting codes was as important as safe handling of firearms. It stated that the hunter "must develop a code which will make him a good hunter.
This code can be called a hunter's ethics" ((Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:7). The Manual listed six rules "which should be part of the hunter's code of ethics."

These included obeying game laws, supporting conservation efforts and acquiring the skills to ensure "clean sportsmanlike kills" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:7). The Manual went on to state:

To be a safe and ethical hunter, you must observe all game laws... Those who break game laws are criminals. A true sportsman obeys the unwritten or moral laws as well as the written ones... The true sportsman will take only the game he will use even if it is less than the bag limit... A true sportsman has not lost his respect... A hunter with a firm code of ethics would report poachers and even be willing to testify in court because he knows how important it is to obey laws and to preserve wildlife and the environment. Slob hunters... don't care how or what they shoot... They have created a problem for the true sportsman by presenting an image of the "hunter" that has stirred a lot of emotions. Anti-hunting feelings... have been growing. It is now up to the true sportsmen to present the correct picture of the hunter (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983c:7-8).

Clearly, the Manual was an effort to influence hunters' behaviour. Specifically, it might be viewed as an effort to get hunters to police themselves and regulate hunting behaviour. The ethical hunter portrayed in this book starkly contrasted with the new breed of "cowboy"/poacher said to be roaming the province’s countryside.

The importance of this hunter education program to the state's "war" efforts cannot be overstated. Some
points make clear the importance of hunter education. First, the wildlife division was being adversely affected by budget reductions. For example, aircraft time was decreasing. Aircraft time was (and is) important for both counting and patrolling the herds. Second, given the impossibility of effectively policing a scattered human population over the vast land mass of the province, the government’s interest in big game as an economic resource, the existence of interest groups sharing government’s view, and widespread resident opposition make clear why education had become important to government. Since there were so few WPO’s, people had to be taught to obey the game laws and regulate the behaviour of other hunters.

The effectiveness of the education program was ensured in some cases because hunters as a group are open to manipulation. Hunters want to be able to continue their activities. Lund (1980) argues that the benefits that sportsmen "derive from game are directly proportional to its abundance" (Lund, 1980:109). That is, hunters want an abundance of game. If hunters are faced with reductions in licences quotas, if these reductions are blamed on poachers, and if the state is educating hunters about the "proper" way to behave when hunting, one might expect hunters to rally behind government. This
happened in this second stage(150,52),(757,974) with the Avalon Hunters Association. As discussed, this group lobbied government to ban certain types of ammunition (i.e. slugs) and shorten seasons (The Evening Telegram, May 14, 1983). Other hunter groups, such as the Canadian Wildlife Federation, also called for more education (The Evening Telegram, February 12, 1983).

Carnoy’s (1984) discussion of the Gramscian concept of hegemony is useful for analyzing the state run hunter education program. Drawing on the works of Marx, Gramsci developed a view of the state which he defined as:

...the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (in Carnoy, 1984:65).

Thus, for Gramsci, the state acts in a manner which helps perpetuate the existing class structure. Marx’s concept of bourgeois hegemony became one of the central themes in Gramsci’s view of capitalist society (Carnoy, 1984:66).

Carnoy (1984) writes that hegemony, to Gramsci, "meant the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes" (Carnoy, 1984:66). Carnoy goes on to write that hegemony, as put forth by Gramsci, has two meanings:

...first, it is a process in civil society
whereby a fraction of the dominant class exercises control through its moral and intellectual leadership over other allied fractions of the dominant class...

Second it is the relationship between the dominant and the dominated classes. Hegemony involves the successful attempts of the dominant class to use its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all-inclusive and universal, and to shape the interests and needs of subordinate groups (Carnoy, 1984:70).

So for Gramsci, dominant class control was maintained through the shaping of the interests and needs of subordinate classes. The state is an apparatus of bourgeois control and shapes the consciousness of the dominated (Carnoy, 1984:76). Gramsci wrote that "The entire function of the state has been transformed; the state has become an educator" (in Carnoy, 1984:74).

If we view the poaching "war" as an expression of class struggle in the province, then Gramsci's concept of hegemony is highly useful. Big game and wildlands had become economic commodities to those involved in the outdoor tourist industry; both the state and private entrepreneurs. The increasing control and regulation of these commodities by the state was largely opposed by residents of the province. A class conflict over wildlife resources emerged. Since the state was a bourgeois state, it acted to maintain the dominance and control of the leading classes. It did this through a combination of coercion and consent. One means to get the consent of
resident hunters was to educate them to behave properly. That is, the state attempted to shape the consciousness of hunters and undermine opposition to policies regarding wildlife. This would have made policing more effective, as more ethical hunters went afield, thus decreasing poaching and providing more animals for allocation to non-residents.

A fundamental Marxist concept is that the state does not represent the common good but is the political expression of class structures found in production (Carnoy, 1984:47). The state is "...an essential means of class domination in capitalist society" (Carnoy, 1984:47). Another fundamental Marxist concept is that "the state in bourgeois society is the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie" (Carnoy, 1984:50). The lack of clarity in Marx’s work on the extent to which the state is an instrument of dominant class rule led Marxists to present several arguments why the state should be thought of as a ruling class instrument. First, personnel of the state tend to belong to the same dominant class in

14 The precise extent to which the state acts on behalf of the bourgeoisie is much debated. The roots of this debate lie in the works of Marx, who oscillated in his writings between crude instrumentalism to a more subtle view of the state being relatively autonomous from class rule (see for example: Jessop, 1982; Held et al., 1983; or Knuttolia, 1987).
society. Secondly, the state is dominated by the economic power of the capitalist class, and finally, given the state’s position in the capitalist mode of production, it cannot be anything but a class state (Carnoy, 1984:52).

Due to the conflict and controversy found in class societies, some form of repression is necessary. The state assumes this role, taking over a primary function of society, law enforcement (Knuttilia, 1981: 98-99). Laws are enacted by states to serve certain purposes for certain groups. Laws define what is acceptable and unacceptable in society. Criminal law, in effect if not in intent, serves upper class interests (Thio, 1983:76). The rule of law is at the heart of bourgeois culture; law is the elaboration of the necessities of bourgeois civilization backed with the immense physical force of the state (Corrigan and Sayer, 1981:40). Modern justice procedures are the legitimated practices of moral and political control, which develop in response to class conflicts spawned by the domination and exploitation of one class by another (Sumner, 1982:10). The law serves capital, regulating class conflicts.

Sporting organizations and the state
Lund’s (1980) work on American game laws argues that the United States federal government cooperated with the
separate states to facilitate their sport goals: "...historically the federal government has actively furthered the cause of sport" (Lund, 1980:81). That is, a close relationship exists between government and sporting organizations. This argument is supported by the Guidelines for Wildlife Policy in Canada which stated that greater involvement by private groups and non-government organizations was necessary for effective conservation (Canada, 1983:9). It is also important to consider the social composition of these sporting groups. Reiger's (1986) work on the conservation movement in America, argues that:

...conservation...began as an upper class effort...American sportsmen, those who hunted and fished for pleasure rather than commerce or necessity were the real spearhead of conservation (Reiger, 1986:21).

Ives (1988:283-285), in his work on the game laws of Maine, supports Reiger's assertion, while Altherr's (1978:7) study of the development of the American-Hunter Naturalist movement makes a similar argument. As mentioned, those interested in wildlife conservation viewed hunting as a recreational activity. In Newfoundland, by 1982, sportsmen's organizations, such as the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland, called for increased protection and conservation education. At the same time such groups were connected to and called for the expansion of the outdoor
tourism industry based on wildlife resources. If we consider such groups in light of Reiger's (1986) work, then they might be described as middle class organizations. Near the end of the 1980's a working class hunters' group emerged (discussed in chapter seven). Significantly, this group, despite being highly vocal, was virtually ignored by government. The province's game laws are now examined, because they reflect the coercive dimension of the state's strategy.
Laws and Wildlife Resources

Game laws are administered by the state, but the state is not a neutral mediator of class conflict. While laws are a tool of class dominance and oppression, they cannot be seen as a simple ruling class instrument, as Thompson's (1975) work on poaching laws in eighteenth century England makes clear:

If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually being just (Thompson, 1975:263).

That is, laws must appear equal and just, in order to maintain the existing societal order. In so doing, laws serve the dominant classes.

The revision of the Wildlife Act was the state initiative of this second stage and of the entire "war" on poaching. Other work on wildlife laws suggests that these laws serve the wealthy powerful segments of society (see for example: Ives, 1988; Carter, 1980; or Hay, 1975). As discussed above, key state actors were often directly connected to some of the most vocal interest groups agitating about poaching. Some of these groups had connections to the outdoor tourism industry. Obviously,
the groups who claimed more protection was needed for big game had vested interests in that game. Sportsmen and outfitters both had interests in decreasing poaching and increasing herds. Both groups were able to influence the state through the connections of various agents.

What is highly significant about the legislative changes enacted during the period mid-1982 to 1984 was that there were actually two amendments to the Wildlife Act, Bill No. 4 and Bill No. 70 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5239 and 5262). Bill No. 70 was the much publicized amendment which increased the severity of penalties for big game poaching. The other, less publicized amendment to the Wildlife Act was Bill No. 4 which was introduced in the House of Assembly by the Minister of Wildlife:

There is, at the present time, Mr. Speaker, no provision in the Wildlife Act for the issue and service of summonses by Wildlife Officers. This is presently covered under the Summary Jurisdiction Act of the Department of Justice, but because it is often difficult to conclude cases against non-residents and so on where prosecution action is desirable, we felt that it would be desirable to have the situation cleared up and have it included in our own act so that there would be no doubt about it whatsoever (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5239-5241).

The Minister continued to discuss Bill No. 4, relating how it provided for the "forfeiture of items that have been seized in cases where the person who is summoned
resides outside the province" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b, 1982:5241). The Minister also discussed the number of non-residents charged with poaching:

The precise numbers, incidently, as to the number of non-residents prosecuted are not readily available but we do not think there are very many cases involved... More violations by non-residents are detected (my emphasis) but many of them are relatively innocuous and are first offenses (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5242).

This quote is significant since it demonstrates that there were non-residents charged with poaching. This claim, like Bill No. 4, received little publicity during the "war" on poaching.

Bill No. 70 was significant since it was the basis of the "war" and greatly increased the penalties for poaching. Bill No. 4 was significant in that it once more demonstrates that government was increasing control and regulation of non-resident tourist hunting in the early 1980’s. Of course, Bill No. 4 also fit in with the stated motives of the "war." More importantly perhaps, Bill No. 4 was significant for the lack of press coverage it received; it was reported in The Evening Telegram, November 20, 1982 but in a small column with the relatively placid headline "Wildlife Act made stronger."

The Minister’s statement that more non-resident violators were apprehended was highly significant, since this claim was not pressed often in the "war" on poaching. Some did
make such claims, for example, the Telegram's Outdoors columnist claimed non-residents from Germany and Italy only took the antlers and very little meat off animals (The Evening Telegram, September 25, 1982). However, the vast majority of claims about poachers focused on resident poachers.

Ives' (1988) work on the poaching "war" in Maine demonstrates how game laws were used to transform wildlife resources into a sporting resource. Ives writes that by 1883, tough new game laws had been enacted and the means for effective enforcement of these laws provided. Some sportsmen and outfitters opposed the intrusive new regulations. However, the brunt of the new laws fell on local hunters who were of the opinion that these laws "favored the rich at the expense of the poor" (Ives, 1988:67-68). Ives went on to argue that the harsh new game laws:

...marked the end of the old days and old ways in the woods of Maine...and while there would be still plenty of resistance and growling, the shape of things to come was clear. The future belonged to the sportsman, be he from Maine or from away, and the thrust of the legislation would be to guarantee him a quarry. To put it another way, game was to be thought of less as a crop to be harvested than as an attraction to hunters, who would, of course spend considerable money for the chance to pursue it (Ives, 1988:73).

Ives is arguing that both resident and non-resident
The amendments to the Wildlife Act in Newfoundland in 1982, signalled a move toward a new era in recreational hunting in the province. The state had taken a renewed interest in the outdoor tourism industry and sport hunting by residents. As discussed in chapter three, game had been defined as a sporting/tourist resource by the end of the nineteenth century. However, in rediscovering game as an economic commodity and in attempting to increase recreational sport hunting, the state faced opposition from many residents.

While some sporting organizations and groups actively lobbied government to address the poaching problem and expand sport hunting, many also opposed licence cuts, wilderness reserves, new legislation and expansion of the non-resident hunt. Therefore, the state
implemented an education program to shape resident hunters' attitudes and actions. Stage two in the natural history of poaching ended in December 1984, and it is fitting that just prior to this, Operation SPORT had been implemented on a province-wide basis. At the end of stage two, sport hunting had been established as the only form of acceptable hunting in the province. Hunting was now fully transformed into a recreational activity for both non-resident and resident sportsmen. This second stage in the natural history of poaching might be summarized briefly in two words: coercion (in the form of harsh new game laws) and consent (in the shape of new education programs).

SUMMARY
The second stage in the natural history of poaching lasted from September, 1982 until the end of 1984. It is not a coincidence that the "war" on poaching occurred at a time when the government had taken a renewed interest in outdoor tourism and when organizations of sportsmen and tourist entrepreneurs called for increased protection and more licences. It is also significant that the wildlife division was called on to wage a "war" on poaching at a time when it was suffering from decreasing operating budgets.
This stage witnessed the redefinition of poaching and concluded with the establishment and province-wide implementation of Operation SPORT. Ritzer (1986:12) writes that stage two culminates with the establishment of some institutionalized means for dealing with the problem of poaching or at least complaints about the problem. In this case Operation SPORT was that institutionalized means. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:150) assert that when institutions, such as Operation SPORT, are created, a social problem cannot disappear so easily.

Stage two is complete when complaints about a problem become routinized and the problem becomes domesticated. The implementation of Operation SPORT saw bumper stickers and wallet sized information cards produced in the sportsman's color, bright orange. The anti-poaching program was moved into the everyday world of traffic jams and people's pockets. The program was widespread. Government could point to Operation SPORT and claim "we are doing something about poaching; place your complaints here." As well, the anonymous phone line might be an example of government's recognition of the impossibility of effectively policing wildlife and an effort to get the public to shoulder the burden of enforcing game laws.

Hunters, through the education program, were trained how to behave; the anonymous phone line made it possible for the same hunters to report poachers. The next chapt
examines stage three in the natural history of poaching which encompassed the years 1985 to early 1987.
CHAPTER SIX
STAGE THREE: BUREAUCRATIZATION AND REACTION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the period from 1985 to mid-June 1987. No new definition of poachers or poaching emerged in this third stage. The poaching issue seemed to get lost in 1985-1986. For example, media coverage of the issue contracted in 1985 and 1986 and then expanded vigorously in early 1987. At this time it was reported that the atrocious, brutal behaviour of poachers had returned. Often these reports were accompanied by large photographs (The Evening Telegram, February 28, 1987; The Packet, March 18, 1987; The Evening Telegram, March 18, 1987).¹

Spector and Kitsuse (1977:152) assert that stage three activities are concerned "with organizational procedures and methods of dealing with clients and their complaints." Stage three activities see claims made against the agency

¹ Van Dijk's (1988:281) analysis of news reporting argues that photo coverage of an event shows its importance. Van Dijk (1988:281) goes on to suggest that it is important to consider the size of photos and what they portray. In this case the photos were large and often depicted the remains of big game animals left by poachers. For example, at least four pictures appeared in the Telegram which showed the fetuses the slain animals had been carrying; three of these depicted WPO's holding up the unborn animals (The Evening Telegram, February 28; March 14, 18 and 28, 1987). The reports of February 28 and March 18 appeared on pages 4 and 3 respectively, suggesting the news potential accorded the stories by the editor. Significantly, The Packet in Clarendon ran two pictures of animals' remains on its front page on March 18, 1987.
or agencies responsible for dealing with the imputed conditions. Claims in this stage are not concerned with the imputed conditions themselves, but with the state's handling of the problem (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:152). Ritzer (1986) presents the same argument, while Nelson (1984) uses a variant of it in her discussion of "approaches to agenda setting" (Nelson, 1984:22-23).

As in the previous chapter, however, the data on the poaching issue do not perfectly fit this third stage. There were claims made about the poaching problem in stage three by various groups and individuals across the island (SPAWNER, 1985; The Evening Telegram, September 21, 1985; October 5, 1985; September 27, 1986; The Western Star, February 10, 1987; The Sunday Express, March 22, 1987; The Packet, March 18, 1987). Thus Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) third stage is, at first glance, problematic when applied to the data on poaching. As mentioned above, the events that take place in the real world are often confused and jumbled. Such incidents cannot simply be fitted into perfectly neat stages.

Although claims were made about poaching at this time, the focus of this chapter is the claims that were directed against the handling of the problem because:

...the important and distinctive feature of stage 3 social problems, then, is that the
claims are not concerned directly with the imputed conditions asserted in stage 1. Rather, the claims are made against the organizations established to ameliorate, eliminate, and otherwise change these conditions (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:152).

This stage witnessed much claims-making against the bureaucratic handling of the poaching problem; for example, by media columnists (The Sunday Express, March 22, 1987). Such claims will be discussed in detail below.

It is important to remember that in the previous two stages, key state actors had been some of the most vocal claims-makers. It is appropriate, therefore, that in this stage WPO’s mobilized, reacting against the way the “war” was being fought and run. Complaints were lodged against the bureaucratic handling of the poaching problem from within as well as from outside the state. Complaints were also levelled at the state’s management of the outdoor tourist industry. In many cases claims-makers who opposed the expansion of outdoor tourism had previously been allied with the state against poaching. Obviously, there had been claims against the handling of the outfitting industry before this stage, as outlined in previous chapters. However, in this stage, opposition claims took on a new form as resistance was widespread and often organized. As government’s intentions in the area of wildlife resources became clear, resistance increased. Following from this,
claims directed against both the handling of the poaching problem and the outdoor tourism industry will be examined. Before beginning this analysis, a brief sketch of the wildlife division and outdoor tourism is presented to frame the argument.

The Wildlife Division and the Outdoor Tourism Industry

The wildlife division produced several documents in 1985, despite operating under continued budget reductions (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a, 1985b and 1985c). These budgetary problems and their adverse side-effects were acknowledged in the Green Paper on Hunting (1985). Another example of the effects of budget cuts on wildlife management and protection was seen in WPO's participation in a strike with other government employees to protest wage restraint (The Evening Telegram, September 26, 1986). By the end of this third stage in May, 1987 WPO's became the most vocal and publicly visible wildlife division claim-makers.

At the same time the wildlife division was suffering these cuts, the development of the outdoor tourist industry continued. As in other stages, a variety of non-state actors and groups pressed claims concerning the benefits of outdoor tourism. For example, the Salmon Preservation Association, the Wilderness Society and the Telegram's
outdoors columnist all pressed such claims (SPAWNER, 1985; The Evening Telegram, January 19 and March 16, 1985).

Government also continued to expand this industry, as seen clearly in the release of the Discussion Paper on Commercial Hunting and Fishing Camps in the Province of Newfoundland (Earles et al., 1987). This paper was prepared by the primary government departments which dealt with the outfitting industry (forest resources and lands; culture, recreation and youth and tourism). It discussed many options to increase the efficiency and benefits of the industry. The Paper on Camps stated that:

the challenge to government is to find a balance between protecting the economic viability of the outfitting industry and meeting the resident demand for wildlife resources (Earles et al., 1987:1).

Significantly, the document was tabled in the House of Assembly by Len Simms, who as Minister of Wildlife had declared "war" on poaching in 1982. Simms, by 1987, was Minister of forest resources and lands, the department which initiated this document (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:14). It may not be mere coincidence that the same man who had declared "war" on poaching was Minister of the department responsible for the preparation and tabling of this policy paper on the outfitting industry. The document was significant for two reasons; first, it demonstrated that government was highly interested in wildlife resources for
tourism and, second, it generated considerable controversy around the outdoor tourist industry.

Simms invited public discussion on the Paper on Camps, suggesting it was prepared for public consumption. However, the former provincial hunting and fishing development officer suggested the Paper on Camps was not intended for public comment. He told me that the:

...discussion paper on the outfitting industry created a lot of furor among some of the media who perceived it as being a threat to the average person who wanted to go out in the woods...it was simply a discussion paper, with several options. The problem was, what do we do about this? These are some possible options, and it listed four or five. One might have been privatize lands. Didn't mean it was going to happen, just a topic for discussion. Originally, it was designed for people in the outdoor industry; charter aircraft people, outfitters, guides, really not for general consumption (interview, June 13, 1990).

This quote is important, since it highlights the public opposition which arose against the Paper on Camps.

The comments of the former wildlife division director supported the former hunting and fishing officer's claims. The retired director was one of the authors of the Paper on Camps and, when interviewed, he distinguished between a "white paper" and a "green paper." He defined the latter as one prepared for public discussion. He stated that he thought the Paper on Camps was a "white paper, which is used to formulate policy action" (interview, May 8, 1991).
When interviewed, the former director stated that the *Paper on Camps* was not the result of any outside influence; government agencies dealing with the outfitting industry got together in an attempt to better organize the regulations concerning the industry. The former director asserted that the *Paper on Camps* was an attempt to rationalize the inadequacies of these varying regulations. He reported that his input to the *Paper on Camps* may have been influenced by outside interests, like outfitters, collectively or individually making representations to him, but the document originated from within government (interview, May 8, 1991). One might wonder why the Minister’s actions and statements contradicted these two high ranking bureaucrats? I was unable to answer this question. However, given the intense public reaction the *Paper on Camps* generated, the contradiction between their comments is significant. Having outlined the background context, stage three claims are now analyzed.

**COMPLAINTS AGAINST OUTDOOR TOURISM AND POACHING**

**Opposition to Outdoor Tourism**

Resistance to government’s continued expansion of the outdoor tourism industry took on a new form in this stage. Government’s policy paper on the outfitting industry generated widespread concern and angry reaction among
individual residents, interest groups, the news media and government agencies.

There were cases of opposition which resembled those claims made in stage two. For example, residents of the province continued to oppose moves to preserve wild areas. However, in this stage organized groups and former allies of government began to oppose the expansion of the outdoor tourism industry. For example, the President of the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland reportedly claimed that a tourist resort (Governor’s Park) being established on the Salmonier River might negatively impact on salmon, since only a small buffer zone was proposed between the river and the resort. Significantly, the

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2 An example of this was the controversy generated around the Main River, on the south-eastern edge of the Great Northern Peninsula. In early 1985 the Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, the Wilderness Society, the Tuckamore Club, and the Salmon Preservation Association all made claims about the potential outdoor tourism benefits that might be realized by keeping this river free from logging (see for example: The Evening Telegram, February 6, 1985; February 9, 1985; April 22, 1985). Residents accused the groups of wanting to save the river for their own interests. Significantly, the Vice President of the Salmon Preservation Association admitted to having a fishing camp in the area (The Evening Telegram, April 22, 1985), again showing a connection between interest group and the outdoor tourist industry.
Telegram's outdoors columnist shared such worries (The Evening Telegram, June 1, 1985).³

Grounds, Warrants and Conclusions

Grounds are the socially constructed, basic facts which serve as the foundation of an argument (Best, 1987:104). Grounds consist of definitions, examples and numeric estimates. As mentioned above, some claims-makers did press the benefits of outdoor tourism; however, considerable opposition arose against the outdoor tourism industry in this stage. A variety of claims-makers complained that an expanding outdoor tourism industry would endanger residents' traditional hunting and fishing rights, and that resources which belonged to residents were being given to non-residents through outfitters. Similar claims had been expressed in stage two. However, they took on an increased vigour in this stage.

For example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation's response to the wildlife division's Green Paper on Hunting (1985) claimed that:

³ It is important to point out that claims-makers were concerned with the adverse side-effects of the proposed tourist lodge and not tourist development per se. However, it still exemplifies the tensions surrounding the expansion of outdoor tourism.
...non-residents bring a certain amount of new dollars to the province but not enough to justify an increase in non-residents licences...Our Federation is cognizant of the fact that outfitters depend on tourists for part of their income. However, we strongly recommend that no more outfitters be licenced or no more camps be approved due to the fact that we are dealing with a finite resource. A resource that belongs first to the people. No one guaranteed the outfitters a right to acquire a certain number of licences (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985a:2).

Clearly, the Wildlife Federation opposed increasing licence quotas for non-residents. This group asserted that outfitting was not so beneficial to the province’s economy that residents should suffer as a result. The Wildlife Federation not only defined the domain of the problem of outdoor tourism, but also gave an assessment of the problem’s extent. That is, this was an orientation statement (Best, 1987: 105). It was claimed all residents suffered as their resources were sold to non-residents.

The Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation also prepared a detailed response to the Paper on Camps (1987) in which it again questioned the economic viability of the outfitting industry, arguing that it generated very little 'new money' within the province (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1987: 1). This Wildlife Federation document also claimed that the "Newfoundland outfitting system is a mess," and that "a culling out of poor operators should immediately take place" (Newfoundland and
Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1987:6-8). The Wildlife Federation claimed that all non-resident moose and caribou hunting on the island be cancelled (my emphasis) and that only bear hunts be permitted on the island (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1987:6-7). The Federation's proposal argued that no special land tenure benefits be given to outfitters since the land belonged to "all Newfoundlanders" (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1987:4).

Claims-makers within the state apparatus also opposed expanding the outdoor tourism industry. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the former provincial hunting and fishing development officer stated that non-resident hunting was last on the wildlife division's priority list. He also said that the department of development's attempt to secure more non-resident big game licences was "a real, ah, real touchy thing with the wildlife division" (interview, June 13, 1990). That is, the former hunting and fishing development officer's comments suggest that the wildlife division was recalcitrant in allocating more non-resident big game licences. Support for this assertion can be inferred from the above mentioned "Walters' Wildlife Policy" which the wildlife division operates under. Two points of this policy are to regulate wildlife surpluses for "the use of the people" and "to
provide wildlife...for the recreational needs of the people" (Mercer et al.,1988:5).

The turbulence of the relationship between wildlife and development was made clear by the treasurer of the Labrador Outfitters Association who stated that there is "not much spirit of cooperation between them" (different departments). She went on to describe the relationship between the different departments as a catch twenty-two situation (interview, August 15, 1990). In a presentation to the provincial government the Labrador Outfitters Association discussed the opposition they faced from within government:

If we (Labrador Outfitters) could pass an objective comment in support of the Newfoundland Outfitting industry, it does appear that there are bureaucrats within the governmental structure who are unwilling to open additional licences even in areas where biologists have determined the region could support an increased licence quota! The same holds true for Labrador where it was determined we could support a moose hunt in the southern fly-out zones (where very little resident pressure exists), yet somebody in government blocks this progress (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:23).

The Labrador Outfitters clearly believed there were some state officials who were against an expanded non-resident hunt.

More opposition against the expansion of the outdoor tourism industry came from the media. For example, in a
column titled "Hunting, Fishing Rights Endangered?" the Telegram's outdoor columnist, Power, argued:

...the outfitters appear to be looking for concessions that are routine in other parts of the world...if these concessions are granted, there could follow a radical change in what we have been used to in Newfoundland and Labrador for centuries, and that's the right to hunt and fish where we please, within the regulations of course...They (outfitters) want their investments protected "either in the form of long term title and/or resident access to their hunting and fishing areas" (The Evening Telegram, March 21, 1987).

Power claimed outfitters were attempting to gain land ownership rights. He then quoted a passage from page 22 of the Paper on Camps to support his argument that outfitters were trying to gain private ownership of land:

The public of Newfoundland has always enjoyed virtually unrestricted access to hunting and fishing areas. Conflicts, however, arise when residents and non-residents compete for the same resource in the same area. Outfitters find this particularly difficult. For example, paying clients are quick to question why they must pay substantially more to wait in line for a fishing spot. As a result, suggestions have been made that outfitters should be given exclusive fishing and/or hunting rights to defined areas (The Evening Telegram, March 21, 1987).

Power concluded this column by stating private ownership or leasing might be the answer to poaching, and he warned readers to be prepared for the day it might become reality. That is, this writer defined the problem in the same manner as the Wildlife Federation and those government bureaucrats who opposed a burgeoning outfitting industry: loss of residents' rights. Significantly, just two years previous
to the release of the *Paper on Camps*, this same writer had called for increased tourism based on wildlife resources like brown trout and black bear. He now strongly opposed the outfitting industry, exemplifying how a former ally of government was alienated by policy proposals on the outfitting industry.

Opposition to expanding outdoor tourism was also found in letters to the editor concerning the *Paper on Camps*. One letter titled "Recreation freedoms under attack," claimed that Newfoundlanders' freedom to hunt and fish were "under bureaucratic attack" by the policy considerations discussed in the *Paper on Camps* (*The Evening Telegram*, April 10, 1987). The writer argued that:

This document suggests that (a) most of our best salmon rivers or parts thereof be reserved for outfitters catering to American and European tourists in the hope of earning more money. Locals would be driven from these rivers by the outfitters owning these leases; (b) prime caribou and moose hunting areas would likewise be controlled by commercial camp owners and your access to even pick a handful of berries would be forbidden. Your present right to catch a trout in our ponds and lakes would be controlled and your rights sold to vested outside interests, along with...rights to shorelines and lakefronts (*The Evening Telegram*, April 10, 1987).

A similar letter, "Betraying our heritage" asserted that "The options outlined in (the *Paper on Camps*)...are a direct reflection of influence by vested interests and an imminent threat to our freedoms and heritage" (*The Evening
Telegram, May 28, 1987). This writer went on to describe the "nefarious acts contemplated" by the Paper on Camps. Yet another letter, "Getting the shaft," claimed government was planning to give prime hunting and fishing areas to outfitters, and that "government wants to look after Mr. Non-Resident" (The Evening Telegram, May 16, 1987). Another letter titled "Our heritage is not for sale," charged government was covering up its attempts at altering existing public use of crown lands and waters (The Evening Telegram, May 25, 1987). This sample of letters exemplifies some of the public opposition to the government policy paper and shows that people perceived the paper as some sort of plot on the part of outfitters and government, a plot which they claimed would result in loss of residents’ rights.4

The opposition claims outlined above, all defined the problem with a growing outfitting industry in the same

4 Statements about "our heritage" and "our resources" can be placed in the context of a decade-long campaign by Premier Brian Peckford on the issue of control of resources. The development plan Managing All Our Resources (1980) exemplifies this. Another example is the battle Peckford fought against the Federal government over control of the oil fields off Newfoundland’s coast. Peckford and his government linked the issue of ‘rights to resources’ to Newfoundland’s sense of identity. However, in the case of wildlife resources it seems government ran into its own rhetoric. Government wanted to divert wildlife resources to non-residents, while residents perhaps took the rhetoric of control and rights to resources seriously. Paine (1981) provides a good overview of Peckford’s rhetoric.
manner; residents' loss of rights. Such claims had been pressed in stage two, but on a much lesser scale. Claims-makers now argued that the side effects of increased outfitting were potentially far-reaching. All residents were labelled as potential victims of increasing privatization of land and wildlife resources. This is a type of definition Best (1987:108) calls a range claim; residents were portrayed as potential victims of an expanded outfitting industry. In making such an argument, claims-makers could make everyone in the audience feel they had a vested interest in the problem. Given the opposition against the outfitting industry discussed in stage two, such claims, when pressed by credible sources, like the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, or a well-known media columnist, would be highly effective in mobilizing popular support.

Heightened awareness and prevention were conclusions outlined by Best (1987:112) and both can be seen in the claims opposing the expansion and management of the outfitting industry. The conclusions, or calls for action, reached by claims-makers like the Wildlife Federation were quite abrupt; cancellation of all non-resident sport hunting on the island. In this way, it was argued, loss of residents' rights would be prevented. The activities of groups like the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Feder-
ation, and media personnel raised awareness of the problems they believed were associated with an expanded outfitting industry.

These conclusions were based on several warrants. As stated above, warrants act as bridges between grounds and conclusions, and justify the drawing of conclusions from the grounds. In warrants, values most often come into play (Best, 1987:108-109). Some of the warrants found in claims against the expansion of the outfitting industry were the value of resources, historical continuity, and rights and freedoms. Claims-makers argued that residents contributed more to the economy in pursuit of wildlife and hence should not lose rights to non-residents (such as the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation claims outlined above). As well, claims-makers asserted that residents' rights of use and access to land, water and wildlife resources were consistent with past policies (for example the Telegram's columnist and letter writers discussed above). Other claims-makers argued that privatizing lands and waters would infringe on the rights and freedoms of residents (again see the Telegram's columnist or letter writers discussed above).

However, not all the claims voiced in this stage about the outdoor tourism industry opposed its expansion. Some
complained about the handling of the industry, but called for its cultivation. For example, the Labrador Outfitters claimed that the Labrador outfitting industry was an economically important segment of the tourism sector, which generated much revenue, created many jobs and was one of the potential "keys to ending the current economic condition of the province" (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:1-13). The Labrador Outfitters made many claims concerning government's management of the outfitting industry. They claimed outfitters had to struggle with "confusing regulations;" that crown land regulations and watershed rights needed amending to favour outfitters better; that there was a lack of coordination between various government departments; that one department should handle inspections of camps; and that all non-residents be legally bound to use an outfitter above the 52nd parallel, virtually all but southern Labrador (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:1-13).

Obviously, this group had much to gain from a growing outfitting industry and made claims which would ultimately benefit their businesses. However, the Labrador Outfitters were aware of residents resentment toward outfitters and their clients. The Outfitters made this clear in their response to the Paper on Camps (1987), writing that they were "cautious...in suggesting anything in terms of solutions that would cause irritation to the resident"
(Labrador Outfitters, 1987:3). They went on to stress that "the Labrador Outfitters are unanimous as to NO RIGHTS BEING TAKEN AWAY FROM THE RESIDENT" (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:29). This submission was prepared by the Labrador Outfitters for submission to government, not for public release. Outfitters recognized the conflict between themselves and residents, yet stressed they did not want to lessen residents' rights. This seemingly refutes the claims made by the media, groups and individuals of outfitters plotting with government to privatize waters and lands. Clearly, outfitters would benefit from private ownership of resources and may have tried to smooth things over by emphasizing they wanted no loss of resident rights. However, outfitters calls for "exclusive rights to their watershed areas" (Labrador Outfitters, 1987: 33) seemingly contradicts this because residents would stand to lose rights of access if watersheds were privatized. This supports the way the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation defined the problem of an expanding outfitting industry.

Other claims-makers in this period also supported an expansion of the outdoor tourist industry, but pressed complaints about its management. For example, the President of the Atlantic Salmon Federation, Lee Wulff, claimed that sport salmon angling generated huge amounts of money when
compared with the commercial fishery, and he called for the salmon to be made a game fish by the Canadian government:

There is no reason not to list the Atlantic Salmon as a game fish because we have given animals such as moose, caribou, bear, and deer game status, which means they cannot be hunted for commercial sale—so why can't the same be done for salmon (The Evening Telegram, July 27, 1985).

While this claim was directed at the government of Canada and concerned salmon, it is significant for this research, since sport angling is an important part of the outfitting industry in Newfoundland. Wulff went on to claim that protecting salmon from poachers would always be a problem, unless private ownership of river sections was allowed.\(^5\) It is also significant to note that Wulff had worked with the government of Newfoundland in the 1940's, promoting the country's wildlife resources and had also owned an outfitting operation.

Other claims-makers also pressed the benefits of outdoor tourism, but complained the industry was being

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\(^5\) Riparian and leasehold rights had existed in Newfoundland until the 1860's. The private ownership of river sections was raised in 1950 in a study of the potential of the tourism industry (Overton, 1991:24). Private ownership of river sections was re-addressed in 1987 in the Discussion Paper on Commercial Hunting and Fishing Camps. In 1990, it would once more arise in proposed legislative changes, discussed in chapter seven. Again this supported the way the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation defined the problem of expanded outfitting; loss of residents' rights.
improperly run. For example the Wilderness Society, in one of its columns, claimed that:

Newfoundland has such a wealth of outdoor opportunities that American and Canadian tourists should be coming here in droves...the spinoffs of an enhanced tourism industry include more employment and broader awareness of our rich wilderness heritage (The Evening Telegram, January 19, 1985).

It is important to point out that the writer of this particular column had owned and operated an outdoor tourism company since 1984. He would go on to be awarded the Governor General’s Award for Conservation at the annual meeting of the Tourism Association of Canada in 1991 (The Telegram Sunday, May 14, 1991). This again highlights the maintenance of links between the outdoor tourist industry and interest groups.

The caribou and black bear biologist with the wildlife division also pressed many claims in this period about the potential benefits of an expanded black bear hunt (see for example: The Evening Telegram, May 24, 1986). However, outfitters were apparently slow to capitalize on this hunt. For example, during the 1984 spring bear hunting season only four licences were sold to non-residents (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985c: 6). In an effort to popularize bear hunting, which he claimed could be very beneficial for tourism, the bear biologist enlisted the help of a black bear outfitter from the United States to address two
meetings of this province’s outfitters. At that time, the Telegram’s outdoors columnist reported that the black bear biologist had been:

...spearheading a campaign to have the black bear elevated to genuine big-game status in Newfoundland and Labrador but so far hasn’t been able to convince the commercial outfitters to actively promote black bear hunting. Most of them still consider bears nothing more than nuisance animals or vermin, mostly because of their eating habits, which includes an occasional...meal at a dump (The Evening Telegram, May 4, 1985).

This writer claimed that outfitters were less than interested in the bear as a sport animal and had to be convinced of its value. Obviously, this biologist had an interest in an expanded bear hunt, since bears were his responsibility. However, his efforts are an example of a person who was not pleased with the way this part of the outdoor tourist sector was being run.

As shown, there were a variety of claims-makers who supported the expansion of the outdoor tourism industry, but who also complained about the way the industry was being managed. Often, these pro-outfitting claims-makers argued that outdoor tourism was economically viable and highly important to the province’s economy and that land regulations needed amending to allow outfitters private ownership. Some pro-outfitting claims-makers suggested that privatizing resources and legally binding non-residents to hire outfitters would make wildlife law enforcement more
efficient. For these pro-outfitting claims-makers, the problem was often defined as one of unfair competition from local people, complicated in part by outdated land policies. Using the warrant of the value of the outfitting industry, pro-outfitting claims-makers often claimed that outfitting could provide jobs, a huge influx of money spending tourists, and thus serve as an economic motor. Based on such warrants, pro-outfitting claims-makers concluded that new social control policies were needed, in which land regulations would be amended to allow outfitters private ownership of tracts of the countryside, including land bordering freshwater bodies of water. Having outlined the claims pressed against the handling of the outfitting industry, an examination of claims made concerning the management of the poaching problem is now presented.

Complaints About the Handling of the Poaching Problem

Wildlife division employees, media personnel and interest groups all reacted against the manner in which the poaching problem was being dealt with. These claims-makers all defined the problem as a lack of resources. For example, in the *Green Paper on Hunting* (1985) the research and management section of the wildlife division stated that:

...information required to improve habitat and increase available food supplies, to harvest animals in a way to make the best of their breeding potential and to understand natural losses and poaching is far from adequate (my emphasis)....At present we do not have the funds
to either adequately determine the size of our moose and caribou populations, or address the important questions about habitat, reproduction, and natural losses. Meanwhile the increased demand for hunting, loss of habitat to roads, industrial projects and certain logging activities are all putting new stresses on our big game populations at a time when money to manage them is becoming scarce. Big game research is very expensive..." (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a:3).

That is, wildlife biologists, through this *Green Paper*, stated they were under-funded to carry out their work properly. It is significant to note that it was claimed (admitted) that the division’s understanding of poaching was "far from adequate." Similarly, the division’s moose biologist wrote that the 1985 internal report on moose poaching he prepared was:

...prompted by wildlife division concern for losses of moose and caribou, and no apparent means to gauge how many animals were actually taken illegally. As well, field staff expressed opinions about specific infractions, but again no actual numbers were available for these losses (Oosenbrug, 1985:1).

This biologist’s claim that there were "no apparent means to gauge" how much poaching was occurring was highly significant, since it highlights the dilemmas biologists faced in estimating the amount and effects of poaching. As mentioned, Spector and Kitsuse (1977:152) assert stage three claims are not concerned directly with the imputed conditions of stage one; therefore, the claims of these biologists clearly fit this definition.

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These biologist's claims are also significant when considered in light of the very specific claims made in stages one and two, concerning the adverse effects of poaching. At that time, specific, one-way arguments were presented which suggested that biologists had a good idea of how much poaching was occurring and its effects on herd growth. However, by the mid-1980's, wildlife biologists were admitting they were unable to gauge how many animals were lost to poachers. As suggested above, wildlife biologists never possessed the means to assess accurately the extent and effect of poaching on big game herds, yet they went along with government's anti-poaching campaign in the early 1980's. Why did biologists make simplistic and apparently inaccurate statements regarding poaching in the early 1980's? Why did they not challenge the naive views and simplistic arguments presented by government officials earlier in the decade? Perhaps wildlife biologists were prepared to go along with the "war" on poaching while they thought it would lead to a strengthening of the wildlife division. That is, wildlife staff may have believed the rhetoric espoused by government Ministers in the early stages of the "war" that the more men, money and equipment would be pumped into wildlife management. However, by the mid-1980's it was apparent that this would not happen. Funding was decreasing and they were asked to do more with
less. All the "war" on poaching meant for wildlife biologists was more work and increased aggravation.

Similarly, WPO's also pressed complaints against the manner in which the poaching "war" was being conducted. However, poaching had become a part of a larger set of issues for WPO's. This became evident at the end of this stage, when they made a representation to government in May, 1987 after an annual meeting (WPO's, 1990:2). A WPO who was involved in this representation told me the 1987 meeting raised the same concerns as the 1990 brief: officer safety, equipment, manpower and salaries. He also stated that the Protection Officers Association, established in stage four in October 1988, was "two years in the making." That is, the Association was being set up in 1986, the same year that WPO's were on strike. This is clearly another example of WPO's dissatisfaction. Obviously, the division's protection staff was not happy with the way government was conducting the "war"; they were dissatisfied with the resources they were given to control poaching. Like wildlife biologists, WPO's were asked to do more with less. Significantly, the "war" made WPO's jobs more dangerous. When it became clear that wildlife protection was not high on government's priority list, WPO's militancy increased.
Both St. John’s newspapers publishing in the mid-1980’s, also made claims concerning the way the poaching problem was being handled. The majority of this media coverage defined the problem as a lack of resources, which added to and strengthened the claims of wildlife biologists and WFO’s. For example, a Telegram editorial claimed that the number of WFO’s in Labrador was inadequate to catch many poachers (The Evening Telegram, April 22, 1987). Similarly, the outdoors columnist with the Telegram when writing about poaching by users of All-Terrain Vehicles claimed that "effective policing is just about impossible" (The Evening Telegram, February 28, 1987). A month later this same man made more explicit claims:

These lawbreakers must be stopped somehow but it’s impossible with less than 50 wildlife protection officers on the island and only nine in Labrador responsible for more than 150,000 square miles of territory.

We need more wildlife protection officers, and we were supposed to get them for paying a yearly $5 fee to apply for a big game licence. Has anyone seen them yet? (The Evening Telegram, March 14, 1987).

Other newspaper writers made similar claims regarding the inadequacy of wildlife protection efforts. For example, the outdoor columnist with the Sunday Express wrote that:

Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to apprehend more than a small percentage of these poachers.

The wildlife division cannot afford enough protection officers, and the necessarily limited number of helicopter patrols by wildlife and police detect only a few of the many violations. It would require a veritable army of wardens,
and a fleet of aerial observers to do the job properly.

Newfoundland cannot afford the level of protection it needs.

But neither can we afford the level of losses now being perpetrated on our wildlife. They cannot stand up to this kind of human predation and deliberate slaughter.

So what, then, is the answer? The telephone is an obvious one (The Sunday Express, March 22, 1987).

Thus, both these writers claimed there were too few WPO’s to address the poaching problem. As mentioned, media coverage of poaching influenced WPO’s. The claims made by these writers supported and reaffirmed WPO’s arguments that they were under-funded and furthered the dissatisfaction of protection officers at this time.

Interest groups also complained that enforcement was inadequate. The Mealy Mountains Conservation Committee (MMCC) argued that Labrador was a haven for poachers because game laws were not enforced (The Evening Telegram, April 21, 1987). The chairman of the MMCC, had been the president of the Goose Bay Rod and Gun Club, active in stage one. The chairman claimed that government did not provide the necessary protection for wildlife in Labrador and he described the provincial game laws as "absurd". When interviewed in August 1990, he told me that there are very few WPO’s in Labrador and that helicopters are needed for patrols, but funding is not available to buy the expensive air time (interview, August 17, 1990). This man also
claimed that the lack of wildlife protection in Labrador was due to politics:

...politics is a big factor...Labrador has no political clout in the House of Assembly, as it only has four M.H.A.'s. Wildlife resources have got to suffer (interview, August 17, 1990).

He was vehement that Labrador and its wildlife resources are losing out in an unfair political game.

Other interest groups also claimed that the poaching problem was being improperly handled, including the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, the Labrador Outfitters and the Newfoundland Natural History Society. The latter group, in a letter to the Minister responsible for wildlife, argued that continuing the ban on Sunday hunting would "give needed strength to the often difficult positions of the provincial wildlife officers" (Montevaghi, 1987:146). While the focus of this claim was on continuing the ban on Sunday hunting, the "difficult position" of WPO's alluded to, suggests that this group thought WPO's had a less than easy time in attempting to enforce the Wildlife Act. In contrast, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation was quite explicit and abrupt in suggesting that the poaching problem was being improperly handled. In a letter to the Canadian Wildlife Service (dated 1987, 11, 01) the president of the Wildlife Federation claimed that enforcement of the Migratory Birds Convention Act was inadequate, and seabirds were being
improperly managed and protected in Newfoundland. Similarly, in their response to wildlife’s Green Paper on Hunting (1985) the Wildlife Federation claimed more protection officers were necessary, as was better training of existing officers and increased protection efforts (Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, 1985a:4-5). Labrador Outfitters claimed that their "enforcement needs were not being met" and suggested several alternatives to government to improve enforcement (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:16 and 36).

Individuals also made claims concerning the handling of the poaching problem. One letter to the editor claimed that the Minister responsible for wildlife was "playing into the hands of poachers by increasing quotas and extending open seasons" (The Evening Telegram, April 16, 1987). A man from a small community on the Bay de Verde Peninsula wanted to organize a volunteer wildlife officers' corps to prevent the destruction of wildlife in the area (The Evening Telegram, February 28, 1987). Implicit in this offer was the notion that wildlife was unable to protect big game animals.

As seen in the claims pressed against the state’s handling of the poaching "war," the majority of claim-makers defined the problem as one of inadequate resources.
A variety of individuals and groups claimed there were too few WPO's, supported by too few government dollars, chasing too many poachers. Best (1987:112-113) found three main conclusions in the claims surrounding the missing children problem, which are also evident in complaints against the handling of the poaching issue in stage three. These conclusions, or calls for action, suggested by claims-makers varied considerably. For example, the Express's outdoors columnist helped increase public awareness and encouraged the public to help stop poaching by getting involved through Operation SPORT.

Some claims-makers emphasized the importance of preventing poaching, while others called for new social control policies. For example, the Telegram's outdoor columnist and the Mealy Mountains Conservation Committee called for hiring more WPO's; still others suggested volunteer wardens as a possible solution to poaching (the man from the Bay de Verde Peninsula made such a claim); others, like the Labrador Outfitters, suggested legally binding non-residents to hire outfitters would make enforcement more effective. These varied conclusions were based on different warrants. Perhaps the primary warrant used to justify the calls for action was the value of wildlife. Claims-makers often stressed the intrinsic and monetary value of big game resources. Another important
warrant used was the "blameless victim." Pictures of the
dead fetuses and discarded heads of big game animals
reportedly killed by poachers supported calls for action to
protect "defenseless animals" from "slaughter" (Best,

Thus, by April/May 1987, there was considerable
claims-making activity concerning both government's
handling of the poaching problem and its management of the
outdoor tourism industry. Complaints concerning poaching
tended to argue that government could not afford the level
of protection needed and that WPO's were under-funded,
understaffed and inadequately equipped to do their jobs.
Similarly, biologists claimed they were ill-equipped to do
the work assigned them. At the same time, the management of
the outdoor tourism industry was reacted against by a
variety of claims-makers. Many individuals and groups
opposed the expansion of this industry, while some suppor-
ters of the industry suggested it was being improperly
managed. The provincial government at this time faced a
危机; not only was there widespread opposition to the
expanding outdoor tourism industry, but many of its former
allies had been alienated by the policy paper on outfit-
ting. At the same time, government was inundated with
claims that the poaching problem was being improperly
handled. Significantly, WPO’s became increasingly militant in this period.

The mobilization of WPO’s in this period, specifically the representation made to government in May, 1987, marks the conclusion of stage three. As outlined in the initial discussion of the natural history model, stage three activities are said to generate an air of distrust of governmental procedures and a lack of confidence in the institutions responsible for the management of the problem (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:153; Ritzer, 1986:13). The outcome of the third stage in the natural history of poaching saw disillusioned and alienated WPO’s, mobilize, and begin protesting against the way in which the poaching "war" was being handled and the manner in which the wildlife division was being run. This is the beginning of the fourth stage in the natural history of poaching.

SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the third stage in the natural history of poaching. It has been suggested that the poaching issue seemed to get lost in this stage, as the true intentions of government became clear and generated opposition. It has been argued that the state’s handling of both the poaching problem and the outdoor tourism industry were the focus of complaints. The most significant event of
this stage was the increasing visibility of WPO's and their subsequent mobilization as a united group. The next chapter will discuss the fourth stage in the natural history of poaching, focusing on the formation of three new groups, including a WPO's Association and an umbrella organization for interest groups.
CHAPTER SEVEN
STAGE FOUR: REEMERGENCE OF MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the fourth stage in the natural history of poaching, which commenced in June, 1987 and is still unfolding. The focus of the analysis is the formation of three new lobby groups and their attempts to create alternative solutions to the imputed problem. The poaching data fit well in this stage of Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) natural history model. This stage saw a renewal of interest in the poaching problem, continuing from the trend begun at the end of stage three. As mentioned in chapter two, stage four occurs when some group(s) become disillusioned with government rules and regulations and begin to base their activities on the notion that "it is no longer possible to work within the system" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:153). Three new claims-making groups became involved during this stage and focused their activities on developing new procedures for handling the problem. Stage four did not have to occur; problems develop unevenly and movement from one stage to another is highly problematic (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:142). Stage four might have been averted if, for example, government had hired more WPO's and
given them a raise. This did not happen.

Spector and Kitsuse (1977) assert that stage four problems may develop in two directions, both of which see groups base their activities on the notion that it is pointless to work within the existing system. One might be characterized as "value-oriented," the other as "interest-oriented" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154). Value-oriented claims-making groups seek to establish alternative institutions to benefit all society, while interest-oriented groups want to enact changes which will chiefly benefit members of their group. This characterization of fourth stage claims-makers will be used to investigate the activities of the three groups established in this stage. Before commencing this analysis, media coverage of stage four is briefly considered.

Key Events and Issues from Media Coverage
As discussed in chapter six, the first five months of 1987 saw an marked increase in media coverage of the poaching issue throughout the province. This increased coverage was maintained during the rest of 1987 and into the last years of the decade.¹ Three significant events

¹ For example, two front page stories concerning poaching appeared in the Telegram on November 28, 1987 and November 5, 1988; two Telegram editorials concerning poaching appeared on March 19 and December 6, 1988. In 1989 at least 10 articles which dealt with poaching were
were discovered in media coverage of the issue. First, poaching underwent a definitional change. Poachers reportedly had become even more violent and dangerous. Poaching was still reported to be occurring for illegal sale. However, it was posited that poacher's reactions had been transformed. For example, the *Telegram* reported that:

...the docile reaction of poachers may be changing and that has some wildlife officers concerned (*The Evening Telegram*, March 19, 1988).

Similarly, the *Herald's* outdoor columnist claimed that a new type of poaching, "deer-jacking," using a spotlight to hunt at night, had come to Newfoundland (*The Newfoundland Herald*, November 17, 1990).

Related to this changed reaction of poachers was the second important point of this stage, the formation of three new interest groups. The Wildlife Officer's Association was established in October, 1988. This Association run in the *Telegram*. The following year (1990) saw at least 39 reports, editorials or columns concerning poaching appear in the *Telegram*. Poaching was big news in other newspapers across the province in 1990: *The Western star* in Corner Brook had at least 5 pieces concerning poaching. *The Packet* in Clarenville had a front page story on poaching on April 3, 1990. *The Sunday Express* reported that Newfoundland's WPO's were the most assaulted in Canada and that Fisheries Officers had been armed (November 4 and May 27, 1990). *The Labradorian* reported that poaching violations had increased by 70 percent (August 14, 1990).
subsequently became very vocal and received much media coverage (see for example: The Evening Telegram, November 5, 1988 or The Evening Telegram, August 23, 1990). The other new groups which entered the "war" were the Salmonid Fishery Council of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Newfoundland and Labrador Hunters Rights Association (HRA), which were formally established in February, 1989, and November, 1989 respectively (Salmonid Council, 1989; The Evening Telegram, November 11, 1989). The Council is a province-wide umbrella organization for all conservation/interest groups and by May 1, 1990 the Wildlife Federation and both Outfitters Associations had become affiliate members of it (interview, June 27, 1990). The Hunters Rights Association was led by a man convicted of a poaching offence, hunting on Sunday. This group presented itself as a working class organization and lobbied to have hunting on Sundays legalized, arguing that no Sunday hunting discriminated against the person who worked 6 days a week (see for example: The Evening Telegram, November 11, 1989).

The third significant element found in media coverage of this final stage was co-operative enforcement. This type of wildlife protection and enforcement involved different government agencies, including the federal department of fisheries and oceans,
the RCMP, the Canadian Wildlife Service, the provincial wildlife division, and private interest groups working together to fight poaching. For example, one newspaper headline read "Co-operative enforcement helped curtail illegal hunting last year" (The Northern Pen, January 10, 1990). It was also reported that:

Co-operative enforcement work by wildlife and fisheries officers, along with increased public assistance, were responsible for curtailing illegal hunting activities in 1989...Last year saw the wildlife division take a different approach to its work. Special teams of enforcement staff from the wildlife division and the department of fisheries and oceans were placed in various locations (The Northern Pen, January 10, 1990).

Co-operative enforcement was also discussed by the Telegram’s outdoor columnist:

Last year, Jack Marshall and Leinus Fitzpatrick of fisheries and oceans gulf region, Clarence Maloney, western region wildlife enforcement supervisor, and RCMP and RNC (Royal Newfoundland Constabulary) officials, got their heads together and formulated a blitz plan to combat poaching in the western area. The mostly undercover patrols worked admirably, for both fish and wildlife protection, resulting in a 40 percent increase in charges over the previous year (The Evening Telegram, April 14, 1990).

Having briefly outlined the contours and main points of this stage in the natural history of poaching, it is important to consider briefly the broader provincial context during this period.
This stage saw a continuation of the budget cuts present throughout the "war." An example was the RCMP's removal, in early 1989, of its 55 migratory bird coordinators from Atlantic Canada. This was detrimental to migratory bird protection, since RCMP officers had been laying up to ninety percent of migratory bird charges in the Atlantic provinces (Eastern Woods and Waters, 1989 spring). The RCMP does have a Federal Enforcement Section which is responsible for migratory bird protection, however, a Corporal with this section told me that migratory birds are now a secondary concern and little work is done by it (interview, July 19, 1990). These cuts affected WPO's since they would now be forced to fill this void left by the RCMP.

It seems likely that budget reductions contributed to the increased co-operation between various government enforcement agencies which emerged by 1990. Interviews conducted from May to August, 1990 with wildlife, RCMP, department of fisheries and oceans, and Canadian Wildlife Service personnel found that these agencies work together to enforce the various fish and game statutes within the province. The idea of joint federal-provincial enforcement had been raised as a policy consideration in the provincial government's policy paper on outfitting (Earles et al., 1987). Given that all government
enforcement agencies were suffering budget cuts and that more enforcement was being called for, it is not surprising that various government agencies began to work together to prevent poaching. It is significant to note, however, that much of this co-operative enforcement work was just public relations. For example, one of the regional wildlife supervisors and two WPO’s, in separate interviews, told me that the close relationship reported in the media between wildlife and fisheries was, in the words of one WPO, "more of a publicity thing."

The period from 1987 to 1991 also witnessed continued efforts to expand the outdoor tourism industry. A significant example of government’s efforts to promote the province’s outdoors was the creation of a new position with the department of development, manager of outdoor product development. This position is an enlargement of the former hunting and fishing development officer position (interview, July 23, 1990).² Another significant example of government’s interest in outdoor tourism was exemplified by its Economic Recovery Commission publicly recognizing outdoor adventure tourism as one of eight development sectors. Both the chairman of the Recovery Commission and one of its directors made

² It is significant to note that the first person appointed to this position was the former hunter education coordinator with the Wildlife Division.
claims reported in the local media concerning the benefits of outdoor tourism (see for example: The Evening Telegram, September 25, 1990; February 4, 1991). The recognition of outdoor adventure tourism as a development sector by the Economic Recovery Commission demonstrates the importance placed on outdoor tourism. The comments of the manager of outdoor product development support this line of reasoning. He told me that hunting and fishing outfitters generate the largest per capita tourism revenue, as the person who comes here to hunt or fish spends more on a per capita basis than any other tourist. He went on to tell me "that’s why government is so anxious to increase that sector as there’s potential for so much revenue to be generated" (interview, July 23, 1990).

At least two highly significant pieces of tourist-related legislation were also introduced in the period 1987-1991. One dealt specifically with non-resident tourist anglers and the other with the province’s Lands Act. Both had been raised as policy considerations in the Discussion Paper on Camps (1987). In May, 1990 new Guide/Fishing regulations were introduced at a press conference by the Ministers of development, and environment and lands. The new regulations stipulated that:

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A non-resident shall not hunt, take or kill big game in any part of the province without employing and being accompanied by a licenced guide...Within the island portion of the province and South of 52 degrees north latitude in Labrador a non-resident shall not angle in any waters set out in schedule 1 of the Newfoundland Fishery Regulations or any other waters more than 800 metres from a provincial highway unless accompanied by a licenced guide or a direct relative who is a resident. North of 52 degrees north latitude (all Labrador except the southern-most portion) a non-resident shall not angle for any species of fish in any inland waters without engaging the services of an outfitter...(Newfoundland and Labrador, 1990:281).

These amendments would benefit those involved in the outdoor tourist industry, since in most cases non-residents were now legally bound to hire an outfitter or guide. The manager of outdoor product development stated that the new Guide Regulations were an effort to control tourists arriving in Newfoundland self-contained and fishing without a guide (interview, July 23, 1990). Thus it seems plausible to suggest that the new Guide Regulations were partly an effort to make non-residents spend money within the province. Another explanation might be that government recognized it could not adequately protect resources and tried to involve the private sector. For example, groups such as the Salmonid Council and the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation had been complaining about non-residents using canning facilities to remove large quantities of trout.
A second significant piece of legislation emerged in 1990. Bill 53 was "An Act to Revise and Consolidate the Law Respecting Crown Lands, Public Lands, and Other Lands of the province," and it generated much public controversy. For example, in January and February, 1990 at least 27 pieces, not including letters to the editor, dealing with the proposed amendments appeared in the Telegram. A clause in this proposed revision would have given government the power to grant title to lands adjacent to rivers and ponds within the province.

The proposal was widely opposed in a way that resembled the opposition against the outfitting industry discussed in the previous chapter. This reaction defined the problem as one of loss of residents' rights and specified that these legislative amendments were the result of outfitters lobbying. For example, the leader of the Opposition party described Bill 53 as "the Outfitters Bill," stating publicly that it was obviously government's response to lobbying by the province's outfitters (The Evening Telegram, February 18, 1990). Another example of the opposition to Bill 53 is found in an editorial:

That is what we will see in Newfoundland if this provision of Bill 53 is not thrown out: riverbanks leased out to entrepreneurs and accessible only to people who are prepared to pay (The Evening Telegram, January 29, 1990).
When asked about the subject, the *Telegram's* outdoor columnist stated that "people who are setting up hunting camps, want buffer zones to protect them from locals" (interview, May 14, 1990). Having outlined the background context, the examination of stage four in the natural history of poaching continues with special attention to the three new interest groups established in this period.

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3 Other opponents included the St. John's Rod and Gun Club; the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation; the Hunter's Rights Association; the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland; the wildlife division's black bear and caribou biologist; and many individuals (see for example: *The Evening Telegram*, February 7; 8; 9; 10; 20; 21; 1990). Public opposition was such that government established a resource legislation review committee to receive public input on the bill. At hearings in Corner Brook and Goose Bay representatives of both Outfitters Associations denied having lobbied for private ownership of land around waterways (see for example: *The Evening Telegram*, March 7, 1990).
THE WILDLIFE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

A New Lobby Group Enters the "War"

This fourth stage witnessed the continued growth of WPO’s dissatisfaction, as seen clearly in the establishment of the WPO’s Association in October, 1988 (interview, June 29, 1990). The formation of this Association was highly significant, since WPO’s are the "front line troops" in the "war" against poaching. Wildlife officers are responsible for apprehending poachers and the fact these men formed an Association to collectively represent themselves exemplifies their dissatisfaction. The formation of this group was a logical outflow from the events outlined in the previous three stages, as WPO’s grew successively more discontented with their work situations and their placement within the wildlife division.

As mentioned above, stage four social problems can develop in either value-oriented or interest-oriented directions (Spector and Kitsuse (1977:154). It is important to consider whether the WPO’s Association was (and is) a value-oriented group or an interest-oriented group. When discussing these two concepts, Spector and Kitsuse argued that:

The alternative institutions created by value-oriented social problems seek to establish those institutions, not only for their members, but for society at large. The primary concern
of interest-oriented activity is to create a viable solution for the members of the group, requiring only a negative relation to the established system, that is, to be allowed to pursue, without hassle or harassment, their own solution... A successful value-oriented group would establish its program as the institutional form and, thus radically transform the existing system. In contrast, a successful interest-oriented group would remain apart, always vulnerable to the possibility of the revocation of tolerance or indifference on the part of the established system that is a condition of maintaining the alternative (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154).

It follows that the WPO’s Association was an interest-oriented group. One need not look too closely to see that the changes called for by the WPO’s Association would chiefly benefit its members. Certainly WPO’s might argue that policy alterations were needed so that they could perform their duties better and hence serve the public more efficiently. Yet, these modifications would most certainly provide solutions to the perceived problems of Association members.

The comments of a WPO who was heavily involved in the formation of the Association supports the assertion that it was an interest group. This officer claimed that WPO’s needed the Association to lobby government for changes to serve and protect wildlife better, and to protect themselves (Telephone Interview, April 11, 1991). He stated that it would be unlikely for a single WPO to get a meeting with the Minister and Deputy Minister.
However, the Association’s Executive can. The Association is not a bargaining unit, since WPO’s are part of the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees. The Association is a lobby group and tries to get action on issues like manpower, sidearms and communication systems. This officer’s comments also make clear that forming an Association was an attempt by WPO’s to increase their power.

As mentioned above, the power of a claims-making group depends on monetary support, social status, knowledge, organization and skills (Ritzer, 1986:9). The WPO’s Association could draw on the status of their positions as wildlife officers and on their union for support and skills. For example, the skills and resources of the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees were used to prepare and submit to government the previously mentioned Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Protection Officers in Newfoundland and Labrador Presented by the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (WPO’s, 1990). By establishing an Association, WPO’s increased their power and presented a united voice on their collective concerns. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:143) assert that the larger a group’s membership, the more effective will be its claims-making activities. Thus, by uniting, WPO’s increased their claims-making
An example of the power of this group was seen in the media coverage it received. Spector and Kitsuse (1977) suggest that the handling of the press and other media affect the success of a claim. The WPO's Association was able to hold media attention throughout this stage. For example, in November, 1988 the Telegram gave front page coverage to the claims of the first President of the WPO’s Association under the large headline "Wildlife officers want firearms" (The Evening Telegram, November 5, 1988). At least three other front page stories concerning the claims of WPO’s were run by the Telegram (The Evening Telegram, August 23 and 31; and September 1, 1990). In addition, at least five Telegram editorials in this period dealt with WPO’s (The Evening Telegram, March 19 and December 6, 1988; July 27; August 31, 1990 and September 28, 1991). Also, one full page and one half page report on the training of WPO’s by the local police force were also published (The Evening Telegram, January 29 and February 4, 1991). Maintaining

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4 Media coverage may not equal power, however, it is important to consider that not all groups receive concentrated media coverage. If a group can attract and hold the attention of news reporters, it has the ability to reach a broad audience with claims and is less easily forgotten. As well, WPO’s had a close relationship with at least one columnist, ensuring it had a channel to the public.
its presence in the media allowed the WPO's to reach a broad audience with their claims and keep their issues "hot." As well, the ability to access the media may have increased the leverage of the WPO's in dealing with government. Government may have been constrained by the threat of WPO's "going public" with their claims.

In addition, WPO's claims were supported by three prominent local outdoor writers (The Evening Telegram, December 17, 1988; The Newfoundland Herald, September 22, 1990; The Sunday Express, November 13, 1988). The Telegram's outdoors columnist in particular was highly supportive. For example, his columns carried headlines like "Wildlife officers need protection" (The Evening Telegram, December 17, 1988), or, "Wildlife Officers' Complaints Legitimate: Dig a little Deeper, Mr. Premier" (The Evening Telegram, September 29, 1990). When this writer was interviewed, he stated that he has "a great relationship with the field people" (WPO's) and that he "knows most of them personally" (interview, May 14, 1990). This close relationship certainly made pressing claims easier for the WPO's Association.

The period 1987-1991 also witnessed other maneuvers by WPO's. For example, they made at least two representations to government, one in May, 1989 and the
another in November, 1989 (WPO's, 1990:1-2). In August-September, 1990 the WPO's Association went public with their complaints. At that time the newly elected president grabbed media attention by making claims concerning the poor work situations of WPO's (The Evening Telegram, August 23 and 31, 1990). When discussing the actions of the president, one officer advised that "we were backed into a corner, you've got to fight when you're in that situation" (interview, April 11, 1991). Another significant move undertaken by WPO's was the presentation to government, in late November 1990, of the previously mentioned brief dealing with their concerns (WPO's, 1990). Having outlined the major initiatives undertaken by WPO's in this period, a more careful analysis of their claims will now be presented.

WPO's Claims
Throughout the four chapters dealing with the "war" on poaching, it has been argued that WPO's became progressively more frustrated and alienated with their work situations. The claims made by the WPO's Association demonstrate their growing discontent and support this argument. Definitions are one form of grounds; the basic facts of an argument (Best, 1987:104). In this case the basic facts of the argument were claimed to be that fewer and fewer WPO's were facing more and more potentially
dangerous situations. As mentioned above, the president of the WPO’s Association received front page coverage in November, 1988 with his claims that protection officers needed sidearms and an increase in numbers to protect themselves and the province’s wildlife. The Association President was quoted as stating:

We need to protect officers from potentially dangerous situations...there are frequent encounters with poachers who are either armed with a firearm or a knife...We would like to see an increase in numbers. We are going to research this. There is a long way to go to properly address poaching in vast areas (The Evening Telegram, November 5, 1988).

This quote highlights the definition used throughout this stage in claims-making by the WPO’s Association; WPO’s, working alone, faced potentially dangerous encounters and hence needed firearms to protect themselves.

This same definition was used in the brief presented to government in November, 1990:

Although there has been drastic increases in licence quotas and the length of hunting seasons, it is alarming to note that the rate of wildlife officers is reducing year by year (WPO’s, 1990:30).

This document went on to claim that Newfoundland and Labrador’s WPO’s were the most assaulted of all Canada’s wildlife enforcement agents. This claim was based on a 1987 study, titled Conservation Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1987. This report concluded that:

The nationwide (Canada) assault rate was 5.1%
in 1987. This means that one of every 19 officers was assaulted. Newfoundland had the highest rate of assault with 19.4% (WPO’s, 1990:51-54).

The claim regarding the assault rate against WPO’s was based on "official statistics" and was an effort to persuade people that the WPO’s plight was indeed serious. Best’s work on the missing children problem argues that official numbers play a central role in claims-making and that these numbers need careful examination since they may be just guesses, or based on inaccurate research (Best, 1989:22-24). Similarly, Leyton et al.’s (1992) work on fear of violence asserts that groups and individuals use official statistics in an uncritical manner to support their arguments. Therefore, social scientists must be cautious in their acceptance of such claims (Leyton et al., 1992:16-18).

This claim that understaffed WPO’s were facing increasing danger might also be considered an orientation statement, as the problem’s domain was specified and some assessment of the problem given (Best, 1987:102-103). The problem was identified as a combination of fewer WPO’s facing increasing hunting activity. This definition may have been based on the reported emergence of a new type of poacher. Poachers were now claimed to be technologically advanced, more vicious and more apt to
Examples are another type of ground. Two examples in particular supported WPO’s complaints that conditions were becoming more dangerous and that poachers’ reactions had changed. One report dealt with an attack upon an unarmed warden in Nova Scotia. The appearance of this story was significant, in light of the claims for sidearms made at this time by Newfoundland’s WPO’s Association (The Evening Telegram, December 5, 1988). Another important example appeared in November, 1989 when it was reported that a game warden in Quebec had been killed at night by a suspected poacher (The Sunday Express, November 5, 1989; The Evening Telegram, October 31, 1989). While both reports dealt with incidents on mainland Canada, they contributed to the atmosphere of danger and the potentially violent situations faced by game wardens in this province. Both examples could be pointed to by the WPO’s Association to justify its position that more men and sidearms were needed. Both reports confirmed that the "docile reaction of poachers" had changed.
supported the notion that WPO's jobs had become more dangerous (The Packet, April 3, 1990; The Evening Telegram, February, 16 and April 19, 1991). The apparent disintegration of law and order and the reported escalation of violence against WPO's not only supported their claims and gave them the basis for more claims, but also helped frame the discussion of poachers and poaching. Interviews conducted in summer, 1990 revealed that WPO's do believe they are potential victims. For example, an eastern region WPO, when questioned about the issue of sidearms, stated that:

...Ninety percent of the people encountered in a protection officer's work in the field have firearms. On a good many occasions people encountered have been drinking, or are drinking. A high percentage of people are doing something illegal, more times than not the officer is alone. Often people who are caught poaching are not interested in giving up a new truck (interview, June 14, 1990).

Similarly, a central region WPO said that:

...there's one wildlife officer per district, under the muzzle of a firearm all the time. You're doing it alone, one man on his own in high risk situations... Hypothetically supposing two Wildlife protection officers were on patrol together, and they cite someone for a violation. What if buddy's a bit on the psycho side or in a cult? What do you do if he starts shooting? You need some sort of protection... (interview, July, 29, 1990).

These comments demonstrate the apprehension of WPO's concerning working alone. Higher fines affected WPO's by increasing the stakes in the "war." Also, WPO's opinions may have been shaped by media coverage of the poaching
war; i.e. a reported change in poacher’s reaction may have influenced those men responsible for enforcing game laws. Such claims were perhaps a logical extension of the third stage claims concerning the insufficient number of WPO’s within the province. It is significant to note the link between drinking, cults, illegal behaviour and poaching. These might be considered "associated evils," which Best (1987:105) defines as a type of warrant.

Best’s (1987) analysis of the missing children problem shows that claims-makers argued children were abducted or later fell prey to "child abusers, sex offenders, pimps, pornographers, drug dealers, organized criminals, and satanists" (Best, 1987:110). Similarly, Lippert’s (1990) study of satanism in Canada found that satanism was often linked to "crimes such as vicious child sexual abuse or murder" (Lippert, 1990:430). Hall et al.’s (1979) examination of the mugging problem in Britain argued that the mugging label was imported from the United States along with a variety of "social themes" which reflected the "crisis of U.S. society" (Hall et al., 1979:19-20). As mentioned in this chapter, WPO’s often linked poaching to drinking, cults and illegal behaviours. Interviews and media searches revealed that other "evils" were also associated with the poaching problem by WPO’s. For example, a central region WPO
linked poachers to the dumping of garbage (interview, July 29, 1990). A western region WPO reported that a poacher confessed that he "made more money at the moose (i.e. selling moose illegally) than he did at the dope" (i.e. selling illegal drugs) (interview, June 30, 1990). The idea that poaching was now being carried out mainly for sale was supported by all WPO's interviewed.

Another associated evil linked to poaching was unemployment. An eastern region WPO stated that "Now a different bunch are poaching... they're lazy, ten weeks on, forty-two off and they see moose as beer money" (interview, September 14, 1989). Unemployment was linked to poaching by the majority of the protection officers interviewed. This was not an entirely new argument, it had been used at earlier points in the war. However, these claims were now being used by WPO's as warrants to justify their calls for more men and better equipment. Gusfield (1989) writes that criminals and "other objects of problems" are portrayed as deplorable, troubled, dangerous and "endlessly dramatic and interesting" (Gusfield, 1989:434). That is, not only are criminal types dangerous, but they are also newsworthy. This certainly must have helped WPO's push their claims. Hasson's (1987) study of the "war" against unemployment insurance fraud waged by the Canadian government showed
how unemployment insurance claimants have been regarded as potential criminals (Hasson, 1987:632). By linking poaching to unemployed persons, WPO’s specified an enemy which would likely gather widespread support from the public.

The other warrant found in WPO’S claims was what Best (1987) called deficient policies. Newfoundland and Labrador’s WPO’S Association claimed that existing policies were inappropriate and inadequate – there were too few men, equipment was inadequate and officer’s safety was threatened. It was also claimed that WPO’s were taken advantage of by the existing system of payment for overtime hours worked (WPO’s, 1990:39). When combined with the claim that Newfoundland and Labrador’s WPO’s had the lowest maximum salary of any Canadian wildlife agents (WPO’s, 1990:38), one can see that the stage was set for WPO’s to question the inadequacy of existing policies.

Other "deficient policy" warrants pressed by WPO’s focused on the rift within the division between the protection and the research and management sections. For example, the President of the WPO Association publicly blamed the division’s biologists for the lack of action WPO’s complaints had received up to that point:

The wildlife division is run mostly by biologists who have no knowledge of what’s involved
in law enforcement... and this is just one of the reasons our concerns have not been addressed (The Evening Telegram, August 23, 1990).

The comments of a central region WPO highlight the rift between enforcement and research:

There are two branches in the division; research and management and protection and enforcement. Protection and enforcement have to take the crap out in the field and they're involved in stuff other people could take care of like road kills or nuisance animals (interview, July 19, 1990).

It seems clear that, by 1990, WPO's were not at all happy with the policies concerning the running of the division.

Two of the three conclusions outlined by Best (1987) are found in claims made by the WPO's Association. These are the conclusions of awareness and social control policies. Obviously awareness of the issues and concerns of field officers was raised considerably in the period 1987-1991. Increased media coverage in this stage most certainly raised awareness of the dissatisfaction of WPO's. Front page articles, editorials, full page reports accompanied by photographs of WPO's receiving self-defence training and support from prominent local outdoor writers helped increase public awareness of the work situations of WPO's in this province (see for example: The Evening Telegram, November 5, 1988; July 27, 1990; February 4, 1991; December 17, 1988; The Newfoundland
The other conclusion reached by WPO’s concerns what Best (1987) calls social control policies. Two of the most significant were that sidearms were needed and that officers be transferred to the justice department since they enforce laws. The call for firearms and a transfer to the justice department were attempts to create or establish alternative solutions for their perceived problems. This fits Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) definition of stage four complaints, which they suggested, “challenge the legitimacy of established institutions and their procedures for processing claims” (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:153).

By publicly stating through their Association President that firearms and other protective equipment like handcuffs and night sticks were needed, WPO’s were offering a new solution to the poaching problem. When one considers that the provincial police force, the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary, does not carry sidearms, then the force of this claim was further heightened. Similarly, by asking to be moved to the justice department...

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5 Other conclusions were that more men and better equipment be provided. However, such claims were not particularly new or peculiar to this stage.
department because law enforcement was not understood by biologists in charge of the wildlife division, WPO's were offering another new answer to the problem of poaching. Offering this suggestion publicly demonstrates that the officers perceived they lacked respect and were misunderstood within the division.

It is useful to consider WPO's conclusions in light of Becker's (1989) point that enforcement agents must justify the existence of their position and win the respect of those people with whom they deal (Becker, 1989:24). Similarly, Clark and Dear (1984) argued that the establishment of the forerunner of the American Psychiatric Association in 1884:

...should be regarded as an effort to establish professional prerogative. The status of medicine in contemporary America was rather low, and psychiatrists were more concerned to maintain a separate identity. Hence, they laid emphasis on a broad range of physical, mental and moral factors in the etiology of moral illness (Clark and Dear, 1984:71).

Clark and Dear also argued that a primary goal of any agency was its own survival: "Agencies tend to develop a life and interest of their own, in which questions of status and reproduction dominate" (Clark and Dear, 1984:60). If one considers the position of WPO's in Newfoundland and Labrador by 1990, it might be posited that they were trying to carve out their niche within the division. Throughout the thesis, it has been shown that
WPO's lacked the power and prestige of the biologists, the scientific experts and advisors to the Minister. Facing continued budget cuts, increasing workloads and reported increases in violent reactions from poachers, WPO's may have been trying to increase their status within the division. The words of a central region WPO support this conclusion:

Wildlife is the twelfth department in Government, after eight you're forgotten. I can appreciate the importance of medicare, but I'm a human resource and I'm not treated like it (interview, July 19, 1990).

By 1990, WPO's had enough; perceiving themselves to be backed into a corner, they struck out publicly at their tormentors. An examination of the activities of the Salmonid Council is now presented.

THE SALMONID FISHERY COUNCIL
Coalition of Conservation Groups
The Salmonid Fishery Council was established in February, 1989. It was originally an alliance of three salmon interest groups; the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland (SPAWN), the Environment Resource Management Agency (ERMA), and the Salmon Association of Eastern Newfoundland (SAEN), based in western, central and eastern Newfoundland respectively. The Council's main interest was representing the province's recreational fishermen. However, as discussed in previous
chapters, groups like the Salmon Preservation Association also made claims concerning big game, for example the call for the recreation of the Ranger Force. Similarly, in this fourth stage of the natural history of poaching, the Salmonid Council became involved in the "war" on big game poaching and became an ally of government.

In addition to allying with government, the Salmonid Council was linked to the Atlantic Salmon Federation, which was itself linked to the outdoor tourist industry. With its establishment in 1989, the Council became the provincial representative of the Salmon Federation, and the President of the Council became a member of the Board of Directors of the Federation (Salmonid Council, 1989). As mentioned in chapter four, the Atlantic Salmon Federation was set up in 1983, and the Salmon Preservation Association and the Salmon Association had allied at that time to act as its Regional Council in this province. The Salmon Preservation Association had links to the outfitting industry. In 1985, the President of the Atlantic Salmon Federation (Lee Wulff) had claimed that privatizing rivers would curb poaching.

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6 While the Council has links to outfitting, this does not imply that the perceptions, motives and agendas of all outfitters and the Council are always the same. It is reasonable to think that disagreements and tensions must exist on some issues. For example, perhaps Wulff may have alienated some with his call for privatizing rivers.
As detailed above, he had worked for the Newfoundland government in the 1940’s, promoting outdoor tourist opportunities. By June, 1990, the founding president of the Salmon Preservation Association, who was also the former hunting and fishing development officer for Newfoundland, had become the Salmon Federation’s regional co-ordinator for Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nova Scotia. Clearly, the Salmonid Council was linked to outfitting interests through its membership in the Salmon Federation.

By May 1, 1990 the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, and both the Labrador and the Newfoundland Outfitters Associations had become affiliate members of the Council (Salmonid Council, 1990a). This coalition of various private groups was explained by the current President of the Salmonid Council:

...I got educated fairly quickly and found that SPAWN was a regional organization, but like SPAWN there were organizations like SAEN on the east coast (of Newfoundland, ERMA in central (Newfoundland), the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation, the Outfitters. There was a lot of common denominator issues that needed to be addressed provincially okay? And we were not going to succeed unless we united ourselves together as one umbrella provincial group, to become a powerful and strong enough lobby group to get a directional change from federal and provincial government officials...if things are going to be managed politically, we will become politically involved, by using the numbers game, by using the 26,000 licenced anglers on this island (interview, June 27, 1990).
It is clear that the Salmonid Council fits the definition of a fourth stage group as outlined by Spector and Kitsuse (1977). Sportsmen united to try a new approach to getting their claims heard.

The alliance of the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation and both Outfitters Associations with the three largest salmon interest groups in the province was highly significant. As discussed in chapter six, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation had argued that all moose and caribou outfitting on the island be cancelled. It also opposed the proposed revisions to the province’s Lands Act. Apparently, former opponents became allies on the issue of sportfishing at least. The executive director of the Wildlife Federation claimed that he was assured by the Outfitters Associations that they were not attempting to get special privileges within the province (interview, August 5, 1990). It might be suggested that the Wildlife Federation’s affiliation with the Salmonid Council was a move to silence and weaken this critic of the outfitting industry; i.e. drawing the Federation into the Council was perhaps a move to co-opt this group. Significantly, the Salmonid Council was silent in the Bill 53 debate, despite the fact that recreational anglers apparently had the most to lose by waterways being privatized. The fact that both Outfitters
Associations are members of the Council suggests that the Salmonid Council was (and is) an interest-oriented group. The alternative solutions suggested by the Salmonid Council in this fourth stage would chiefly benefit its members. Obviously, outfitters would also benefit highly from an increasing sport fishery.

The power of a group depends on monetary support, social status, knowledge, organization and skills (Ritzer, 1986:20). The Salmonid Council had the most monetary support of any group active in the war, due in part to its membership in the Atlantic Salmon Federation. For example, in May, 1990 the Salmonid Council released a $32,000 study, prepared by a consulting firm, on the current economic benefits of the Atlantic salmon fishery (Gardener Pinfold, 1990). The current resource advisor of the Salmon Council stated that the funding for this study came from the Atlantic Salmon Federation (interview, July 10, 1990). The ability of an interest group to have such a costly document prepared demonstrates its power.

It is also important to consider the membership of these groups. The President of the Atlantic Salmon Federation in 1990 was a former justice Minister with the government of New Brunswick (interview, June 13, 1990). As mentioned above, the first President of the Atlantic
Salmon Federation was Lee Wulff, professional sportsman and former outdoor tourist promotional officer for Newfoundland. Having such individuals as President increased the prestige and political connections of both the Atlantic Salmon Federation and the Salmonid Council and thus added to their power. The Salmonid Council also held a certain amount of status due to the nature and size of its membership. While this group had a diverse membership, it included well educated individuals and members of the business community. The label "sports fishermen" also suggested that the members of this group were ethical sportsmen. Of the three new groups established, the Salmonid Council had the most status. Its link to the Atlantic Salmon Federation also increased its prestige.

Another example of the Salmonid Council's power is the joint campaign against poaching it launched in June, 1990 with the Atlantic Salmon Federation. The launching of this campaign also adds support to the assertion that the Salmonid Council was an interest-oriented group. This campaign saw the placement of almost full page advertisements in newspapers (*The Evening Telegram*, June 19, 1990) and the release of posters titled "Poachers are stealing your heritage." The launching of this campaign received media attention (*The Evening Telegram* June 4, 1990) and
demonstrates the resources and organization on which the Salmonid Council could draw. The Council was adept at handling the media and used press releases effectively to inform the media of its actions. Also, the Salmonid Council was connected to the media through the outdoor writer of The Newfoundland Herald. This was the same man who was the Atlantic Salmon Federation’s regional co-ordinator for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the former provincial hunting and fishing development officer and the founding President of SPAWN.

A final example of the influence and power of this group comes from the comments of the President of the Salmonid Council regarding the Dial-A-Poacher program for salmon on the province’s west coast:

We fought to get the money for Dial-A-Poacher here, while DFO (pause) that’s something you can put in your report. Nobody knew about that. The Gulf Region (western Newfoundland and southern Labrador) lost the money for Dial-A-Poacher program, we had to lobby heavy in Ottawa to get it back because we felt it was that important...the most significant thing you could have on the go and they were prepared to shut it down because they didn’t have the money...(Interview, June 27, 1990).

The President went on to state that the Council is politically connected and that "one phone call will get phones ringing in Ottawa and Confederation Building." The resource advisor to the Council corroborated the President’s comments, regarding the phone line. Having
outlined the background of the Salmonid Council, a brief analysis of its claims and its involvement in the "war" on poaching will now be presented.

**Salmonid Council Claims**

The Salmonid Council made a variety of claims. Many of them understandably focused on the Atlantic salmon. However, as mentioned, the group also made claims which concerned big game and various wildlife law enforcement agencies. For example, the Council's joint campaign against poaching with the Atlantic Salmon Federation certainly helped increase the visibility of poaching in general. Salmonid Council claims-makers defined the problem as one of inadequate state resources facing a large amount of market poaching. However, the main focus of these claims was the Atlantic salmon and as such did not really affect wildlife. Similarly, the examples and estimates of extent used by the Salmonid Council were directed mainly at salmon and shall not be discussed. However, the warrants and conclusions presented by the Salmonid Council concerned the provincial wildlife

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7 For example, the President of the Salmonid Council told me "there's not adequate money for enforcement" (Interview June 27, 1990). The Salmon Federation regional co-ordinator for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia stated "there's a jurisdictional problem" which makes effective enforcement hard (Interview, June 13, 1990). Like others, the Salmonid Council claimed that poaching was occurring for profit (see for example: The Sunday Express, January 28, 1990).
division, specifically WPO’s. These conclusions shall now be examined.

Warrants act as bridges between the basic facts of the argument and the calls for action (Best, 1987:108). At least three of the warrants outlined by Best were found in the claims of the Salmonid Council. One was what Best called deficient policies. This stemmed from the manner in which Council claims-makers defined the problem. For example, a Salmonid Council document stressed that "inadequate enforcement does exist" (Salmonid Council, 1990b:3). Best (1987:111) argues that by insisting current procedures and policies are inadequate, claims-makers present a warrant for change. Salmonid Council claims-makers defined the problem and presented a warrant for action. This warrant was important because the Salmonid Council called for wildlife to take control of enforcing inland fishery laws, using arguments made by the Salmon Preservation Association to support its claims (Salmonid Council, 1990c; SPAWN, 1989).

Another warrant found in Salmonid Council claims was the notion of historical continuity and maintaining past links. For example, a Salmonid Council document stated "immediate action has to be taken to protect the
remaining stock and restore our rivers to historical levels" (Salmonid Council, 1990b:3). A similar warrant in that same document stated "The future of sportfishing in Newfoundland and Labrador is in our own hands" (Salmonid Council, 1990b:10). Such appeals were attempts to mobilize support by suggesting that a part of our past was in danger of being lost; similar warrants had been pressed in stage one around the province's caribou. This warrant emphasized the need to change policy to preserve links with the past and prevent the possible extinction of the salmon. It also set up another warrant based on the value of the sport salmon fishery.

Salmonid Council claims-makers also stressed the value and potential economic benefits of sport salmon fishing to the province. For example, the President of the Council was quoted as stating:

Poachers are stealing our heritage. They are not only taking opportunities from their own pockets, but from the pockets of other people, from businesses, from the sport fishery and from the commercial fishermen, and it's time they were stopped (The Western Star, April 16, 1990).

The same warrant was presented in the Council's Economic Statement on Salmon (1990) which concluded that:

...greater use of the Atlantic salmon resource by the recreational fishery would be of economic advantage for Newfoundland and Labrador...the Atlantic salmon could support a highly desirable type of sustainable development, much of which would occur in the
form of small scale enterprise in the rural areas of the province (Gardener Pinfold, 1990:36-38).

The Council also used an unpublished 1988 study by the department of fisheries and oceans to argue that 38% of non-resident anglers would not return to the province because of poor angling. It also argued that non-resident spending was down in 1988 from 1985 by at least 7 million dollars (Salmonid Council, 1990d). The Council claimed that:

Properly managed, the Atlantic Salmon resource has excellent potential for the creation of a significant addition to the tourism industry of Newfoundland and Labrador (Salmonid Council, 1990d:12).

A warrant for action on salmon poaching was presented based on the potential benefits of an expanded sport fishery and the regaining of recent losses in tourist traffic.

The Salmonid Council presented many conclusions or calls for action (Best, 1987:112). An obvious one was the heightened awareness created around the issue of poaching. Media coverage, poster campaigns and the presentation of professionally prepared economic statements to government certainly raised awareness of the issue. The Salmonid Council also suggested many conclusions which Best might consider social control policies. One was to re-create the Newfoundland Ranger
A similar conclusion had been called for in stage one by the Salmon Preservation Association. The Council also called for auxiliary forces to be set up in which government agencies and interest groups would work together to combat poaching. For example, a newspaper on the island’s west coast reported that the "Salmon council (was) ‘enthused’ by joint enforcement plans" and that the president of the Salmonid Council claimed cooperation between government agencies, private conservation groups and the media could help stop poachers (The Western Star, April 16, 1990). The Salmon Preservation Association concluded that developing the recreational fishery would not only benefit the economy, but would also control poaching as the presence of anglers and guides would deter poachers (see for example: The Western Star, April 16, 1990).

Another significant conclusion arrived at by the Council was its call for the closure of the commercial salmon fishery and a shift to a sport-only salmon fishery. This call for action was based on the warrant of the value of a "recreational" salmon as opposed to a commercially taken salmon. Such a conclusion is highly significant when one considers who would benefit most from the implementation of such a conclusion. This conclusion makes it abundantly clear that the Salmonid
Council was an interest-oriented group, seeking solutions which would benefit its members most. A closure of the commercial salmon fishery and a shift to a recreational/sport only fishery would benefit sport anglers and those involved in the sport angling business. That would include outfitters, guides, and operators of charter aircraft to name but a few. It is significant to note that the Council, when discussing the move to a sport only fishery, suggested that "The west coast of Newfoundland could offer the best immediate potential for recreational salmon fishing expansion..." (Salmonid Council, 1990d). It is significant to consider the comments of the western region wildlife supervisor, that the west coast of Newfoundland is home to a high percentage of the province’s outfitters (interview, June 29, 1990).

The Council presented itself and its claims in such a manner that it would seem to be working for the good of all the province’s residents. However, a closer analysis reveals otherwise. The links between this group and the outfitting industry and its calls for increased outfitting demonstrate this group’s alternative solutions would benefit those involved in the outdoor tourist industry. Having completed examining the activities of the Salmonid Council, an investigation of the third new
interest group is presented.

THE HUNTERS RIGHTS ASSOCIATION

The Sunday Hunting Lobby

The Newfoundland and Labrador Hunters Rights Association (HRA) was established in November, 1989. This group lobbied government to abolish the ban on hunting on Sundays. Its formation received much media attention and the group was able to maintain its media presence throughout the stage (The Evening Telegram, September 3 and November 11, 1989; The Sunday Express, November 5, 1989; January 20, 1990; October 13, 1990; April 28, 1991).

This group is a prime example of a fourth stage claims-maker. Its leader, Mr. Rice was convicted of hunting on a Sunday in 1985. That is, he was a convicted poacher. Rice had appealed his conviction, which resulted in hunting on Sunday being permitted for a period. The Crown then appealed and won, resulting in the return to no hunting on Sundays (The Evening Telegram, September 3, 1989; August 10, 1990). The fact this man had been fighting since 1985 to have Sunday hunting legalized shows this issue was not new. Similarly, interest groups like the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation (NLWF) claimed to have been lobbying for Sunday hunting
for fifteen years (The Evening Telegram, November 11, 1989). The Newfoundland Natural History Society opposed legalizing Sunday hunting and had maintained such a stance for some time (The Osprey, December, 1987:145-146). Clearly, prior to 1989, there had been activity around the issue of Sunday hunting. Thus, the formation in November, 1989 of the HRA shows that the leaders of this group had enough of government's handling of the issue. They rejected official responses to the Sunday hunting issue and organized to try to have alternative solutions implemented.

This Hunters Rights Association was an interest-oriented group. An inspection of their claims shows that primarily hunters and members of the Association would benefit from the alternative solutions suggested. The main concern of an interest-oriented group is "to create a viable solution for members of the group..to be allowed to pursue, without hassle or harassment, their own solutions" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154). Clearly the Hunters Rights Association was lobbying to have policy implemented which would benefit its membership. The Newfoundland Natural History Society opposed the Hunters Association for this reason, claiming that lifting the ban on Sunday hunting discriminated against bird-watchers, berry-pickers, canoeists and even some hunters,
who had but one day a week to enjoy a day in the wilderness free from the sound of gunfire (Montevecchi, 1987: 145-146; or Montevecchi, 1990).

It is important to consider the power of the Hunters Rights Association. The group received much media attention, and Mr. Rice had his picture appear in the news at least five times during this fourth stage (The Evening Telegram, September 3; November 11; December 2, 1989; January 20 and September 24, 1990). Rice also wrote a half-page article in which he told "his story" (The Evening Telegram, September 3, 1989). He pressed his claims on television and radio programs in debates with the Minister responsible for wildlife and a member of the Natural History Society. Rice and other leaders of the organization circulated petitions, reportedly collecting over 20,000 names (The Evening Telegram, January 20, 1990). Public meetings, which were well attended, were organized. In addition, the group solicited support through the placing of advertisements in the newspapers. These advertisements informed readers that donations could be made to a trust fund set up with a local law firm (The Evening Telegram, September 8, 1989). The group was also able to gather much support from various other sources. For example, the Telegram's outdoor columnist, the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation (NLWF)
and various individuals in letters to the editor all supported the Hunters Association (The Evening Telegram, November 11, 1989; October 13, 1990; NLWF, 1990; The Evening Telegram, October 16, 1990; The Sunday Telegram, October 22, 1989). The wildlife division’s hunter education co-ordinator publicly claimed there was no reason in terms of hunting accidents to continue the ban on Sunday hunting (The Sunday Express, November 5, 1989).

Clearly, the Hunters Rights Association was able to gain access to the media and mobilize support from individuals and groups. The support of the Wildlife Federation was significant, since it represented all Rod and Gun Clubs in Newfoundland and had a large membership, organization and resources to draw on. The Hunters Rights Association must have had access to some resources, since it was able to place advertisements in the newspapers and hire a law firm to handle donations. The combination of the above factors exemplifies the power of this Hunters group. However, the group was not successful (to date) in having its agenda established.

The power of this group may have been offset by its lack of credibility. The leader of the group was a convicted poacher. Additionally, the group presented itself as a "working man’s" organization and appeared rough
around the edges. This contrasted greatly with its opponents, like the Newfoundland Natural History Society, who were articulate and well educated and many of whose members were university professors. The difference in their claims was great (see Natural History Society claims in *The Osprey*, December, 1987; Hunters Rights claims in *The Evening Telegram*, April 8, 1991). The Hunters Rights Association’s lack of credibility may perhaps be seen in Mr. Rice’s claim that the Premier flatly refused to meet with him (*The Evening Telegram*, April 8, 1991). It is interesting to consider that a past president of the Natural History Society told me that for a lobby group to be effective, it must not be "too outrageously boisterous or too radical." He went on to say that groups must be constructive in their criticism of government. If a group makes government mad, then it can lose its credibility and influence (interview, July 30, 1990). If we apply this comment to the Hunters Rights Association, we can see that this group was a "thorn in the side" of government. It also vehemently opposed government’s proposed amendments to the province’s Lands Act in 1990. That is, the Hunters Rights Association may have undermined itself by being too coarse, too loud and too unruly. These attributes can be seen in their claims.
Claims of the Hunters Rights Association

This group and its supporters typically defined the problem of Sunday hunting as one of working class people being discriminated against. This domain statement identified the problem and set its boundaries (Best, 1987:104). The leader of the Hunters Rights group argued that the ban on Sunday hunting was a carry over from English class-based game laws and that men and women who worked all week only had one day to hunt, Saturdays (The Evening Telegram, September 3, 1989). Similarly, the Telegram's outdoor columnist claimed that the ban on Sunday hunting "deprives the working Joe of a chance of filling his licence" (interview, May, 14, 1990). This writer claimed that a licenced big game hunter, who travels all the way to a remote area of the province, may see no game except on a Sunday. Despite being entirely isolated, this person is legally bound not to shoot the animal because it is Sunday. He wrote that a person who shoots a moose or caribou on a Sunday is "treated no differently than a run-of-the mill poacher" (The Evening Telegram, November 11, 1989). Similarly, the executive director of the Wildlife Federation claimed that hunters were "getting the dirty end of the stick" by not being permitted to hunt for recreation on the one day that it
was possible for many to do so (The Evening Telegram, April 8, 1991). Significantly, these claims support the discussion in chapter five that game laws are class laws.

Having defined the problem as one of class bias and discrimination, Hunters Rights claims-makers and their allies used various warrants to support their calls to legalize Sunday hunting. One such warrant was what Best (1987) referred to as rights and freedoms. Best suggests that claims-making about government policy often involves such warrants (Best, 1987:112). In this particular case, claims-makers who supported the Hunters Rights Association maintained that the ban on Sunday hunting violated the individual rights of hunters who only had weekends off. For example, the executive director of the Wildlife Federation made such a claim (The Evening Telegram, September 14, 1990).

Another warrant pressed by pro-Sunday hunting claims-makers involved the value of recreational hunting activity to the province. The leader of the Hunters Rights group, the executive director of the Wildlife Federation, the Telegram’s outdoor columnist and various individuals who wrote letters to the editor all used this warrant. Typically, they claimed that hunting on Sunday should be legalized, since hunters spent large sums of
money, and allowing an additional day to hunt would generate extra revenue (see for example: *The Evening Telegram*, September 3, 1989; September 14, 1990; November 11, 1989; October 22, 1989 and October 6, 1990). A final warrant found in pro-Sunday hunting claims was that existing policies were inadequate, outdated and in need of amendment. By arguing that existing government policy regarding Sunday hunting was inappropriate, claims-makers presented a warrant for change; hunting on Sunday should be allowed. Having outlined the maneuvers of these three new groups, the outcome of their actions by September, 1991 is presented.

STAGE FOUR TO SEPTEMBER, 1991

The WPO's Association

Spector and Kitsuse (1977) suggest that a frequent outcome of stage four social problems activities is co-optation. The first President of the WPO's Association was co-opted in August, 1990 when he was made acting chief of wildlife protection. The former chief had retired in 1989. The promotion of this man may have been an attempt to silence an outspoken critic and may also have been a more general effort to appease WPO's by promoting a field officer, since the previous chief of protection had been an ex-RCMP Officer.
Promoting the head of the WPO’s Association may have been an attempt to undermine this organization’s effective and vigorous complaining. It is useful to consider Ritzer’s (1986) discussion of co-optation:

The strategy is based on the principle, "let’s not try to lick them, let’s get them to join us." Often, opposition can be silenced or greatly reduced by putting the critics on the team, thus making them share the burden of responsibility for decisions and increasing their stake in supporting the organization rather than opposing it (Ritzer, 1986:11).

The promotion of this WPO could be seen as an attempt to deflate the efforts of the WPO’s Association. This move was not entirely effective, since the next president of the WPO’s Association went public almost immediately with claims concerning the inadequacy of existing safety measures and the need to arm officers (see for example: The Evening Telegram, August 23, 1990). He also pressed these claims on the local CBC television news program "Here and Now" (August 23, 1990).

Government’s response to this man’s claims was quick and harsh; the man was reprimanded. The officer in question was called to a meeting with the Deputy Minister responsible for wildlife and was effectively silenced. It is significant to note that the man who reportedly arranged this meeting was the Assistant Deputy Minister who was a former wildlife biologist (The Evening
Telegram, August 31, 1990). His involvement in this action may have added weight to WPO's belief and resentment that "biologists were running the division."
The President of the WPO's Association was accompanied to the meeting by 21 of his fellow WPO's, who ignored orders not to attend. This reprimand was effective because the president of the Association publicly stated that he was afraid to comment further for fear of losing his job. The President of the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees, the union which represents WPO's, was quoted as saying that further comments by the officer in question could lead to his dismissal (The Evening Telegram, August 31, 1990). This action silenced the president of the Association, but it did not prevent the union from preparing and presenting the Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Protection Officers in Newfoundland and Labrador in November, 1990. This brief may have been instrumental in the implementation of a Royal Newfoundland Constabulary-led training program for WPO's carried out in early 1991. Significantly, the acting chief of protection publicly made claims concerning the need for sidearms in early 1991, demonstrating that his promotion had not entirely silenced him.
The Hunters Rights Association

As discussed, co-optation is a frequent outcome of stage four social problems. However, co-optation has not occurred yet with the Hunters Association. It might be reasonable to suggest that in presenting itself as a rough and tumble, down to earth, blue collar organization, the Hunters Rights Association undermined itself and deflated its influence and respectability. This is seen in the absolute refusal of the Premier to meet with group leaders. This perhaps demonstrates the lack of respect awarded this group. It is significant to consider that this group's presentation of itself as a working class organization contrasted with the sporting ethic taught by government's now entrenched hunter education program. The Hunters group did not fit the ideal of the sportsman and his code of conduct being taught by the government. Despite having the support of the Wildlife Federation, the Hunters Rights Association has been unsuccessful to date in getting its conclusions implemented. By April, 1991, Mr. Rice publicly threatened to stop his lobbying efforts if he did not get more support from hunters (*The Evening Telegram*, April 28, 1991). This is a signal perhaps that this group is beginning to lose energy.
The Salmonid Council

Several of the conclusions called for by the Salmonid Council had been implemented by September, 1991. The most significant was the new form of wildlife law enforcement which emerged. Labelled "co-operative enforcement" it saw different agencies and groups collaborate against poaching. Significantly, the Salmonid council and its affiliate, the Salmon Preservation Association, both called for this practice. Additionally, these groups had also called to be involved in law enforcement. The involvement of private groups in the "war" was not an entirely new idea, but this cooperative enforcement was. The involvement of an interest group, which has such strong links to the outfitting industry, in wildlife management and protection is significant. The acting chief of fisheries and oceans protection branch in western Newfoundland verified the above newspaper report and told me that the Salmon Preservation Association for the Waters of Newfoundland approached fisheries and

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8 This may be part of the typical pattern of privatization. In this case government agencies dealing with wildlife resources suffer continued budget reductions, which make it practically impossible for them to do their jobs. This in turn helps create and contributes to public dissatisfaction. A solution to the problem, in this case inadequate wildlife protection, is offered which involves getting private industry to do what was formerly done by government agencies. Private industry clearly stands to gain from such an arrangement.
oceans to establish an auxiliary force. He stated that a committee had been formed and that discussions would begin in fall, 1990 to examine the project's feasibility (interview, June 28, 1990). The increased role of interest groups in the war was covered by the print media:

Officials from federal fisheries, the provincial wildlife department and RCMP will combine forces to fight poaching in the main troubled areas as the need arises and there will be volunteer help from members of groups such as SPAWN (The Western Star, April 17, 1990).

Movements to establish an auxiliary force were highlighted in the following newspaper headline "DFO hoping auxiliary force can be set up in western region" (The Western Star, March 20, 1990). The article discussed the formation of the committee to develop plans in which the general public could take a greater role in protection efforts in the upcoming sportfishing season. While this effort was directed at sportfishing, it was significant because it was part of the joint DFO-Wildlife-RCMP-Salmonid Council alliance. The article reported that:

The committee is made up of Fitzpatrick, representing the gulf region office of the department of fisheries and oceans, regional supervisor Clarence Maloney of the provincial wildlife division office in Pasadena, Supt. Gord Butt of the RCMP's west coast subdivision, and Tom Humphrey, president of the Salmonid Council of Newfoundland and Labrador and a member of its local affiliate, the Salmon
Association for the Waters of Newfoundland (The Western Star, March 20, 1990).

This quote not only highlights the implementation of the co-operative law enforcement model, but also the co-optation of the Salmonid Council’s President. Co-optation is a frequent outcome of stage four, as an attempt is made to silence vocal critics by absorbing them, insulating them from their groups and reducing their future effectiveness (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:154). That is, state agencies may have tried to silence the Salmonid Council’s president by involving him more in management issues.

SUMMARY

It was decided to conclude analysis of this stage in September, 1991. However, events continue to unfold, suggesting that this stage is not yet complete. This chapter has outlined the continued expansion of the outdoor tourist industry and the reported escalation of the poaching issue. This chapter has tried to make clear the links between outdoor tourism and the poaching issue. Also examined was the release, by both levels of government, of some of the responsibility for wildlife protection to private groups. In many cases these groups had direct links to the outfitting industry. At the same time, the province’s WPO’s increased their actions in an attempt to better their work situations.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS

The Natural History of Poaching

In this thesis I have examined the "war" that was fought against big game poachers in Newfoundland in the 1980's. Specifically, I have used Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four stage natural history model, in conjunction with Best's (1987) analysis of rhetoric, to argue that the "war" on poaching had little to do with actual illegal hunting. Rather, I have suggested that the state in Newfoundland declared "war" on poachers in 1982 because it had taken a renewed interest in promoting the province's outdoors for tourism. Part of this planned growth in outdoor tourism involved the expansion of non-resident big game hunting. I contend that poaching was made an issue (i.e. "war" was declared on it) in 1982 not because it was suddenly "discovered," not because of an escalation in poaching incidents, but because the state in Newfoundland needed extra big game licences to sell to non-resident hunters.

Chapter one of the thesis did several things. It introduced the topic, stated the research problem, provided an overview of the thesis, identified the theoretical framework, discussed the significance of the work and outlined the research methods employed. Chapter two reviewed the literature on the natural history model, focusing on Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) four stage variant
of it and Best’s (1987) analysis of rhetoric. The third chapter provided background information on the province, its inhabitants and the historical use of wildlife resources. I argued that by the early twentieth century in Newfoundland, wildlife had become an important part of a fledgling tourist industry and game laws benefited those involved in this industry at the expense of residents. However, the residents of the province continued to use wildlife as food resources and often broke the game laws. The population, scattered over a vast physical landscape, combined with readily available animals and a lack of wardens, made effective enforcement of the game laws hard. Clearly, poaching had existed long before 1982 in Newfoundland.

In chapters four through seven, I analyzed the poaching problem using the natural history framework to assemble the data and guide analysis. Each stage of Spector and Kitsuse’s natural history model was assigned a chapter, and following their guidelines, each chapter focused on slightly different aspects of the poaching problem and the outdoor tourist industry. At each stage I also used Best’s framework to analyze the rhetoric of claims-makers around both the poaching issue and outdoor tourism. In the first stage of the natural history of poaching, chapter four, I demonstrated that by 1980, the Newfoundland government had
taken a renewed interest in outdoor tourism. It was not a coincidence that claims which argued poaching was a problem arose at the same time. Significantly, such complaints often originated from sources intimately tied to the outdoor tourist industry. I have also made clear that the wildlife division was unsure about how much poaching was actually occurring and what the effects of this poaching on big game populations might be. Significantly, biologists believed caribou populations were generally increasing by 1980 and that moose herds were experiencing only a slight decline. Research found that factors other than illegal hunting, such as over-browsing and disease, played a part in past herd declines. At the same time, crucial changes were occurring within the wildlife division, which played a major role in the "war" being declared. For example, an information and education branch was added in 1980. I have argued that not only was this branch of the wildlife division given the mandate of informing the public about wildlife conservation, it also had to demonstrate its worth and carve out a niche for itself within the realm of wildlife management. It was in a suitable position to both agitate and support claims about poaching. At the same time there was a growing body of wildlife interest groups in the province which also made claims about poaching and the benefits of outdoor tourism. This combination of factors
resulted in controversy and heightened awareness about the poaching issue.

I have argued that the second stage in the natural history of poaching lasted from September, 1982 until the end of 1984. Poaching was redefined as claims-makers argued that it was being carried out for black-market sale. Harsh new penalties for poaching were enacted and it has been argued that these laws are best seen as class laws, i.e. serving the interests of certain classes; specifically, state supported tourist entrepreneurs and middle class sporting organizations. Significantly, big game outfitters had received a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 1982. That is, the expansion of the non-resident hunt was slated to begin the same year "war" was declared on poachers. I drew heavily on Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony to analyze the "war." I suggest the "war" can be summarized in two words; consent and coercion. I assert that stage two culminated with the establishment, and province-wide implementation in October, 1984 of Operation SPORT. This was an anonymous telephone system for reporting poachers.

Stage three in poaching’s natural history began in 1985 and lasted until May, 1987. It witnessed the state’s handling of the poaching problem and the outdoor tourism industry resisted by residents and organized groups. I
argued that as the intentions of government became clear (i.e. that it was not trying to win the "war," and was only interested in expanding the lucrative non-resident hunt) opposition was generated. Claims-makers typically argued that resources to police wildlife laws were inadequate and that expanding outdoor tourism threatened residents. Significantly, wildlife officers became increasingly militant, reacting against persistent budget cuts and the whole way the wildlife division was structured and run. This militancy and dissatisfaction continued to increase toward the end of the decade, exemplified by the establishment, in stage four, of the Wildlife Protection Officer’s Association. Significantly, this increasing militancy of officers was accompanied by a parallel escalation in the poaching issue.

In the final stage, chapter seven, I outlined the continued growth of the outdoor tourist industry and the reported escalation of the poaching issue. I argued that this stage began in June, 1987 and is currently still unfolding. I chose to end analysis in September, 1991. Once again, this stage saw poaching redefined, as claims-makers argued that poachers were more apt to react aggressively against wildlife agents. Stage four analysis focused on three new lobby groups and their attempts to create alternative solutions to the imputed problems. The Wildlife
Officer's Association presented a united voice on the concerns of wildlife officers. The Hunters' Rights Association was a working class hunters organization, led by a convicted poacher, which wanted Sunday hunting legalized. Despite creating much controversy this group was virtually ignored by government. Finally, the Salmonid Council was a province-wide umbrella organization for all types of organizations, including sporting groups and outfitters. Not only was it linked to the outfitting industry, but it also called for new policies which would benefit outfitters. The Salmonid Council lobbied for and was granted a more active role in wildlife management and protection, due in part to persistent budget cuts to state agencies. These cuts forced various enforcement agencies to rely on help from non-state groups and increase the level of cooperation between themselves.

How and Why did Poaching Become An Issue in 1982?

I have argued that the emergence of poaching as an issue in Newfoundland was inextricably linked to government's desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry. That is, "war" was declared on poaching in the early 1980's largely due to the fact that the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador had taken a renewed interest in promoting the province's outdoors as a tourist commodity. An integral part of this revived interest in promoting the "sportsman's
"war" was declared on poaching because of an escalation in poaching incidents, but because government wanted to expand non-resident big game hunting. The poaching issue was created to divert attention from the politically explosive issue of the expansion of non-resident hunting. This assertion is supported by the work of Spector and Kitsuse (1977:155) who suggest that governments may attempt to create one problem in order to draw attention away from another. They go on to assert that governments may make claims concerning problems and play a major part in the definition process.

More support for my argument that "war" was declared on poachers in 1982 as part of a move to expand non-resident big game hunting is the fact that there are no indications poaching actually worsened in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In fact, research revealed that the government agency responsible for managing and protecting big game populations was unsure of both how much poaching was actually occurring and its effects on animal populations. I have asserted that poaching did not emerge as an issue in 1982 because of an escalation in poaching incidents. I believe that the catalyst in the creation of the poaching issue was the provincial government’s renewed interest in outdoor tourism.
While I have argued that the provincial government was the "primary definer" of the poaching issue, a variety of private interest groups also played a major role in the "war." These groups typically described themselves as "conservation groups." However, I suggest that they are better seen as interest groups, whose main concern was the potential economic returns wildlife resources could generate. These groups lobbied government to ameliorate poaching and expand outdoor tourism. There was a consistent link between claims concerning the resources lost to poachers and the potential benefits of outdoor tourism. I have examined at least three of these interest groups in detail, demonstrating two main things. First, actors were often members of more than one group, creating an informal inter-group network. Secondly, I traced out the links between interest groups and the state, the tourist industry and the news media. For example, one group I focused on had a membership which included outfitters. This was a clear link between "conservation group" and outdoor tourist industry. This same group was politically connected and had access to the print media; thus it was in a good position to make claims, "get heard" and get action on its agenda. Ritzer (1986:9) suggests that the power of a claims-making group depends on monetary support, social status, knowledge, organization and skills. I considered the extent to which these characteristics were applicable to the groups.
examined, demonstrating that certain groups occupied power positions and thus had a better chance to successfully press their claims.

Both government and these vested interest groups wanted to expand the non-resident hunt. The problem facing government was that only a fixed amount of animals could be allocated for culling without jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. I have shown that constant budget reductions beginning in the early 1980's and the imprecision of wildlife biology combined to make estimates of big game herds very uncertain. Biologists' estimates showed that caribou populations had been expanding from the late 1960's and this trend was thought to be continuing into the early 1980's. It was believed that moose were experiencing a slight decline by the late 1970's. Outfitters had been awarded a five year guarantee on moose licences beginning in 1982 and I contend that this presented government with a major problem; how could non-resident licence allocations be increased without jeopardizing stocks? Where were the extra animals needed to immediately expand the non-resident hunt to be found? I have argued that in order to promptly increase non-resident licence allocations, government reduced resident allocations and shifted these licences to non-resident hunters. Such action was obviously politically explosive and I have suggested that government blamed the
reduction in resident allocations on illegal hunting and declared "war" on poachers.

I have suggested that the "war" on poaching had two primary effects. First, it may have reduced the number of animals "lost" to poachers. While government and wildlife managers were unsure exactly how many animals were taken by poachers, every extra animal meant another potential non-resident licence sale. A second, and perhaps more important effect of the "war" was that it provided government with both a scapegoat and a smokescreen for its reduction of resident quotas. Government decreased the number of resident big game licences, publicly stating this was done to help stocks recover from rampant poaching by residents. There was no mention of the subsequent redirection of these licences to non-residents (or of poaching by non-residents). It is important to remember that this redirection of licences was occurring at a time when resident demand for big game licences was increasing. The "war" on poaching helped distract attention away from the sleight of hand that accompanied the expansion of the non-resident big game hunt. Poachers were blamed for the cut in resident big game licences, while the drama of the "war" diverted attention away from the expansion of the non-resident hunt. I have argued that poaching is what Nelson (1984:27) calls a "valence issue;" it "elicits a single, strong, fairly
uniform response and does not have an adversarial quality." In declaring "war" on poaching the government of Newfoundland set itself up as the "good guy" fighting those terrible poachers. Fighting an enemy such as poachers was likely to alienate very few people or groups. It was not until the mid-1980's, when government's true intentions became clear, that opposition emerged to its handling of the poaching "war" and its' expansion of outdoor tourism.

I have presented much evidence to support my argument that the expansion of the non-resident hunt was the main reason behind the declaration of "war" on poaching. Perhaps the primary piece of evidence was the very nature of the "war." The 1980's was a period of fiscal restraint and I have shown that the state in Newfoundland did not have the resources necessary to fight or win a "war." In fact, while certain steps were taken, for example the wildlife act amendments, government did not really try to win the "war." The wildlife division was deprived of the resources needed for adequately counting or protecting big game herds dispersed over large wilderness areas. The government's declaration of "war" raised the expectations of both wildlife agents and hunters. I have suggested that both wildlife biologists and WPO's were at first willing to go along with the "campaign" against poaching because they believed government's rhetoric that the wildlife division
was to be given priority status and receive increased funding. However, by the late 1980's, it was evident that government was not going to divert extra money into wildlife, despite the fact the wildlife division was being called on to do more work. Both biologists and wildlife officers expressed their dissatisfaction with government's steadily diminishing efforts to combat poaching. Therefore, I have suggested that the "war" was really a phantom "war," which government did not really try to win.

I have also argued that the news media played a crucial role in making and sustaining the poaching issue. I have asserted that news reports on poaching were not (are not) unbiased, "fact" based accounts reflecting the reality of poaching. My work supports Lippert's (1990:420) contention that newspapers act both as forum for claim-makers and as a source of claims. For example, reporters often unquestioningly accepted the claims of key actors as "the truth" about poaching and then presented this as news to the public. Similarly, editorials and columns made claims of their own, which shaped perceptions about poaching and outdoor tourism, and thus contributed to the duping of the Newfoundland public. Reliance on, and acceptance of, the statements of official sources by media personnel framed the poaching issue in a particular manner and set the boundaries for further debate around poaching.
In doing this, the local media contributed to the creation of the poaching issue and thus helped government maintain its' smokescreen and cloak its expansion of outdoor tourism. Additionally, I have argued that newspapers are guided by certain world-views which affected what "news" got reported about poaching. For example, I have suggested that The Evening Telegram is guided by a pro-conservation philosophy, which influences what gets said about poaching, what sources get heard by media personnel and if pictures will accompany the story.

I paid particular attention to the role of media columnists in the "war" on poaching. I utilized Becker's (1989) concept of the "crusading reformer" to argue that column writers were the source of many inflammatory claims which contributed greatly to the definition and maintenance of the poaching issue. These columns were often accompanied by large photographs of wildlife agents and the remains of poached big game animals. I have argued that these columns helped to create a feeling that wildlife herds were
threatened by dangerous poachers, while only a few embattled wildlife officers stood between the poachers and the destruction of the herds.

It is not surprising that newspaper columnists presented this picture, given that they were hunters, members of hunting interest groups and promoters of hunting. For example, columnists with *The Evening Telegram* were hunters and members of interest groups, while the columnist with *The Newfoundland Herald* was the government agent responsible for developing the outdoor tourist industry. It follows from this that access to the media was not an equal opportunity arena. Certain groups and individuals were in better positions to get heard and get their viewpoints presented. For example, I have documented interest groups which not only had links to columnists, but also had their own columns, or in some cases magazines. Clearly, such groups have the potential to reach a broad audience and influence many people.

Despite being highly critical of the news media and the role they played in making poaching an issue, I utilized media coverage of the poaching "war" to help frame the study. That is, I may have seemed to contradict myself. However, I tried, where ever possible, to use other sources to support, or in some cases question, media coverage.
Also, since I was aware of the problematic nature of news reports, I attempted to be cautious in my handling of them.

Implications for Understanding Policy Formation

This analysis of the "war" on poaching provides insight into the political process and agenda setting. That is, it contributes to our understanding of the political process, the state, and the relationship between policy and interests. I have argued poaching was put on the political agenda to act as a diversion for the state's expansion of the outdoor tourism sector. The provincial government of Newfoundland provided a climate suitable for outdoor tourism's growth, and responded favourably to the lobbying of tourist entrepreneurs. Some groups were able to "get heard," some were not in the early stages of the "war." I have argued that outfitters and groups of "right thinking" sportsmen were able to "get heard."

Two groups which had difficulty getting government to listen to them and act on their claims were the Wildlife Protection Officers' Association and the Hunters Rights Association. I argued that wildlife officer's claims received little action, because the 1980's was a decade of fiscal restraint for the Newfoundland government. That is, the state could not afford to expand the protection staff
and replace old equipment. Related to this lack of funds was the expansion of wildlife education programs. In 1980 an intensive public awareness campaign was begun concerning wildlife conservation. A part of this was a new hunter education program. Hunter education was looked to by government as a means to train hunters to obey the game laws and behave like "sportsmen." If hunters could be taught to adhere to the game laws, then fewer WPO's would be needed. I have argued such education programs were a means to generate consent. These were accompanied by coercive maneuvers; namely, harsh game laws. That is, the government used education programs and wildlife act revisions to manipulate hunters, much like a donkey is trained with a carrot and a stick. If the donkey does not follow the carrot, it is hit with the stick. That is, the combination of harsh new laws and intensive training gave the government a means to circumvent its inability to increase wildlife protection in other ways. The Wildlife Protection Officers' never had a chance of getting heard. Similarly, I have argued that the working class hunters had too few resources to be successful.

Another important political implication of my thesis is that it shows that public attitudes and perceptions about poaching were shaped and molded by government's campaign. The public were informed that poaching was a
serious problem and that government was going to "crack down" on it. I have argued that both of these claims were false. Government was unsure how much poaching was occurring and it did not try to win the "war." That is, I am suggesting that the government of Newfoundland misled the public regarding its intentions for wildlife resources, their management, use and protection. This is significant when we consider that residents stand to lose rights of access to wilderness areas and wildlife resources if government continues to expand outdoor tourism. For example, in chapter seven, I outlined proposed changes to the province's lands act which would have allowed government to grant private ownership of land around lakes and rivers. One possible implication of this legislative amendment was that outfitters would have been able to apply for land rights to waterways around their camps and thus control access to those areas. Since residents compete with outfitters' clients, it is reasonable to suggest that residents would be denied access to areas near outfitters' camps.

Not only did government mislead the public of the province about the "war" on poaching, but it also misled the employees of the wildlife division. These people were called on to do more work with less resources. Government made promises it could not and perhaps had no intention of
keeping to WPO’s and biologists regarding funding increases. Like the resident hunters of the province, WPO’s jobs became more dangerous because of the "war." That is, government’s campaign of untruths had very real effects. Of course, those convicted of poaching after the new game laws were introduced cannot be forgotten. People were (and are) punished very harshly as a result of the wildlife act amendments of 1982. Can harsh penalties be justified when we know that wildlife conservation was not the driving force behind the revisions of the wildlife act?

Studying Social Problems

My thesis suggests that the natural history model as put forth by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), and Best’s (1987) analysis of rhetoric are good tools with which to analyze social problems. The so-called "social constructionist" viewpoint is an appropriate and effective one for critically examining how and why social problems emerge. My thesis lends support to Blumer’s (1971:301) assertion that a social problem does not exist for a society unless it is recognized. Like Lippert’s (1990:436) work on satanism, my work on the poaching offensive "reveals how social problems can emerge, grow, and become legitimated quite apart from conditions of objective reality." Additionally, my work supports Kitsuse and Spector’s (1977:155) suggestion that government’s may attempt to create one problem to divert
attention from another. Finally, my thesis also lends supports to Best’s (1987) assertion that claims-makers’ rhetoric be carefully examined in order to understand claims-makers attempts to persuade.

In this case poaching was identified as a problem because government needed a smokescreen to hide its politically dangerous expansion of outdoor tourism. Poaching had been occurring in Newfoundland since the first game laws were enacted in the mid-1800’s. The 1980’s was one period in which illegal hunting was singled out as a problem. However, I have argued that the identification of poaching as a problem in 1982 in Newfoundland was not brought on by concern with wildlife resources. Instead I have argued that "war" was declared on poaching because the government of Newfoundland wished to expand outdoor tourism, a specific component of which was non-resident big game hunting. That is, I contend that a "war" on poaching helped government meet its agenda of expanding outdoor tourism.

The four stages of Spector and Kitsuse’s (1977) natural history model were a good way to assemble data and at the same time acted as a guide for analysis. However, I did encounter some problems with the natural history model. One major difficulty was that it is hard to fit the often
tangled, confused events of the social world into four neat stages. For example, I often had to make arbitrary decisions on where to start and end analysis of the stages. Similarly, I often had data which did not fit the specifications of the model. For example, in stage two (chapter five), the poaching data not only did not fit the model, but seemingly refuted it.

Spector and Kitsuse (1977:148) suggest that stage two begins with "official" acknowledgement of the problem, which contrasts with stage one activities which are "almost entirely unofficial." Both of these assertions were problematic when applied to the "war" on poaching. Spector and Kitsuse (1977) seem to assume original problem definition will come from sources outside the state and that in stage two state agencies will take action in the area of problem. I documented how stage one saw many state actors make claims about poaching. That is, claims-making originated from within the state in stage one. The poaching problem was acknowledged prior to stage two. Similarly, Kitsuse and Spector also seem to assume that no prior legislation existed in the area of the imputed problem. Obviously, laws regulating wildlife had existed long before 1982 in Newfoundland. That is, poaching had been "officially" acknowledged prior to September, 1982 and the declaration of "war." Difficulties with the model also
arose in stage three (chapter six). However, I tried to be flexible and creative with my use of the model and avoided becoming bound by the rigidity of the four stages. As Spector and Kitsuse (1977:158) point out, the model is hypothetical.

A final comment on the natural history model concerns my decision to end analysis in September, 1991. How and when does analysis end? What happens after stage four? How and why do issues die? Do they die? Are they maintained? If so, how? Future work might be done on this facet of the model. Also, it would be beneficial to attempt to increase the predictive nature of the model. At present it is fine for describing past events, however, its ability to make suggestions and predictions about the future are limited. Using the critiques outlined in chapter two, it might be possible to rework Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) model to enhance its research potential.

Political and Practical Implications
The 1980's was a period of fiscal restraint for the government of Newfoundland. That is, the state in Newfoundland did not have the resources necessary to fight, let alone win, a "war" on poaching. Therefore, I have suggested that the campaign against poaching be thought of as a phantom "war."
In fact, the provincial wildlife division may now be in a worse position to protect wildlife than when the "war" began. Fieldwork was conducted from May to September, 1990 and most wildlife personnel interviewed complained about lack of manpower, old equipment and being overworked. This was especially true of the WPO’s who are responsible for enforcing the wildlife act, protecting wildlife and apprehending poachers. While such claims might be expected from individuals with so many occupational woes, observations made during fieldwork showed that WPO’s do seem to lack new equipment, such as trucks, boats and radios. With the exception of the regional office in Pasadena, the other wildlife regional offices appeared shabby, run-down and neglected. Significantly, from 1983 to 1990 there was a steady decrease in the number of wildlife protection staff. In that same period, the number of resident and non-resident big game hunters going afield has been increasing. Additionally, the expansion of the non-resident hunt has been accompanied by new regulations, such as the guide regulations discussed in chapter seven, which have increased the duties of WPO’s. That is, we are witnessing a scene in which fewer and fewer wildlife officers are being asked to do more and more work. When we combine the large patrol areas and decreasing aircraft budgets with the increasing level of hunting activity, it seems reasonable to suggest that wildlife protection has to be suffering.
Similarly, it is reasonable to suggest that the management and counting of big game herds is no better now than when "war" was declared. For example, the former chief biologist told me that the wildlife division had eight full-time biologists in 1957 and that in 1990 it had ten (interview, July 25, 1990). As detailed throughout the thesis, consistent budgets reductions, especially in flying time, have made the job of counting herds harder and more speculative.

Another important implication concerning wildlife protection is the co-operative law enforcement program discussed in chapter seven. This law enforcement model is based on higher involvement by private groups and individuals in wildlife protection and enforcement. It is important to be critical of such a program for many reasons, primarily because many private "conservation" groups have vested interests in game resources. Some might argue that since groups, such as outfitters, rely on wildlife resources for their livelihood they will be sure to protect the resource well. This logic was used, for example, by the president of the Atlantic Salmon Federation in 1985 when he claimed salmon poaching would always be a problem unless private ownership of river sections was allowed (see chapter six). Similarly, the western region wildlife protection supervisor stated that it was unlikely for
outfitters to poach since "animals are the goose which lays the golden egg for outfitters" (interview, June 29, 1990). He implied that because outfitters have an economic interest in wildlife resources they are above breaking game laws.

However, there are problems associated with involving interest groups in wildlife protection, particularly when these groups are outfitters or have links to the outfitting industry. We must remember that first and foremost outfitters are capitalists. They are involved in a business venture to make money. Some may argue that outfitters are concerned with conserving game stocks for long term use. However, capitalists may also want quick profits. Capitalists have historically respected no resource or people; they manipulate and use both to increase profits. Why should we expect things to be different at any time? Any "good capitalists" concerned with resource maintenance are likely to be devoured by competitors. Any concern expressed by outfitters for game populations is made on purely an economic basis.

Outfitting is big business with big economic returns at stake. Outfitters will do just about anything to realize profits. The outfitter who can deliver trophy animals will get more money, more clients and more prestige. Is it
appropriate for wildlife protection and enforcement to be carried out by private citizens and groups which have vested interests in wildlife resources? How well protected will the resources be? Will only economically important species be given priority? Will only areas around outfitters' camps be patrolled? Who will have access to resources? Who will decide who has access to resources?

It is significant to examine the case of residents when considering co-operative enforcement. Resident sportsmen compete with outfitters' clients for wildlife resources. They do this by hunting in areas near outfitters' camps and thus take resources which the outfitters' clients are paying handsomely to pursue. Often, outfitters' clients want to experience a "wilderness trip" and residents interfere with this by their mere presence. One way to solve this problem is, of course, private ownership of land and waterways, thus allowing outfitters to control who has access to their areas. If outfitters and other vested interest groups are highly involved in wildlife management and protection, they may be in a position to influence government policy. I have shown that outfitters have in the past decade been highly successful in getting government to listen to them. As entrepreneurs with vested interests to protect, it seems reasonable to suggest that outfitters would try to undermine all competi-
tion, including residents. For example, Bill 53 (discussed in chapter seven) may have resulted from lobbying by outfitters for tighter control over resources. Of course, it has been suggested that the "war" on poaching might be seen as government's way to fulfill the licence allocations promised to outfitters.

Suggestions for Future Research
In this study of the "war" on poaching, several questions arose which I was unable to answer. Future research might investigate some of these. For example, where exactly did agitation about poaching first originate in the late 1970's and early 1980's? It is clear that a considerable amount came from sources within the state. However, I was unable to pinpoint precisely the source of poaching claims. Future work might try to discover the exact source of poaching claims in order to support or refute my thesis. Another issue future work might investigate is why the media virtually ignored the revisions to the wildlife act (Bill No. 4) to do with the non-resident hunt and focused intently on the increases in penalties for poaching (Bill No. 70)? The answer to this question can provide important information into how journalists pick newsworthy topics and how issues are created and maintained. Another question I have left unanswered is whether the Paper on Commercial Camps (Earles et al., 1987) was an internal policy paper ('white
paper’) or a public discussion paper (‘green paper’). The answer to this question can provide valuable insights into the political process and the management of the outfitting industry. Was this document an internal policy paper that got leaked to the public? If so, who leaked it and why? Was the leak a result of resistance/opposition to expanding the non-resident hunt and accompanying loss of residents’ rights? This can also provide insight into how the state works and of the rifts and fractures within the structure of the state. For example, I have detailed how the mandates of the wildlife division and the department of development differed, causing tension and pressure in the expansion of the non-resident hunt. Future research might investigate this rift between departments and consider how it affects policy setting. What department wins out and why? What factors influence which department wins in a struggle over conflicting mandates? Such questions are highly important given the structure of our government. A similar research topic is the rift within the wildlife division between the research/management and protection/enforcement staff.

Another research question stemming from my thesis is whether or not unemployed people do poach more often? This is an important question because being unemployed was often linked to poaching by WPO’s, media personnel and interest groups. Such perceptions may influence wildlife policing
efforts. Future work might investigate if such notions affect wildlife law enforcement? Are wildlife patrols concentrated in areas known to have higher rates of unemployment? Are certain groups or classes identified for intensive wildlife work? Who influences such decisions? More research might consider attempting to determine if the unemployed do poach more often. In an economically depressed province such as Newfoundland and Labrador, might not the poor poach to increase their standard of living and "get by?" That is, is poaching a necessity for Newfoundland’s unemployed? Is black market sale of illegally taken game a common occurrence? If it is, how important is it to those involved in this black market trade? If it is not, how have such notions arisen and how do they persist? From where did these claims originate?

A final question arising from my thesis is how and when does the poaching issue die? Or will it die? Will it be maintained? It might be interesting to consider what happens with the poaching issue into the 1990’s. Will it continue to escalate, peak and then subside? Or will it follow a more gently undulating path? One WPO stated that a problem the division will have to focus on in the future is meat leaving the province. Perhaps this will emerge as the "new type of 1990’s poaching problem." Will poaching be redefined in the future? Does the above comment foreshadow
a new definition of the poaching problem for the near future? It seems likely that enforcement agencies, such as the division's protection arm, will continue to experience reduced budgets. The training program for wildlife officers implemented in early 1991, may pacify field officers for some time, but it seems unlikely that this will satisfy calls for more men, better equipment and sidearms. Given the harsh reprimand the Association's president received in September, 1991, it might be suggested that resentment is still smoldering within the wildlife officers ranks. Also given the prominent place that the outdoors seems to hold in government's development plans for the future, it might be suggested that the guardians of wildlife may demand better treatment from their employer, thus keeping the poaching issue alive. Also, other high profile groups, such as the Salmonid Council, will help to keep the poaching problem "in the news."

Other questions future work might examine include: do reported escalations in poaching continue to be accompanied by moves to increase outdoor tourism? Will outdoor tourism prove to be as economically beneficial as some claim it will? How beneficial is outdoor tourism? Does the money generated get dispersed equally throughout the province's regions? Or is it concentrated in certain areas? Are there great economic impacts among residents? For example, how
many, and what types of jobs are created? Do only a handful of tourist entrepreneurs reap the benefits of an expanded outdoor tourist industry? In whose interest does the state seem to rule when enacting outdoor tourist legislation? What problems are associated with expanded outdoor tourism? Will residents suffer loss of rights if outdoor tourism is expanded? Will residents continue to oppose moves to expand outdoor tourism and preserve and privatize wildlands? Do increasing amounts of visitors put more pressure on both wildlife and wildlands? For example, the more people who walk along a path through a grassy meadow, the more the path gets beaten down, the greater the likelihood that garbage will be left behind and that wildlife will be disturbed. This does not seem like wildlife conservation. However, such an outcome is not surprising in light of my argument that governments' "war" on poaching was not motivated by humanitarian concern with wildlife stocks. I have shown that "war" was declared on poaching because it fit with governments' desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry.
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