'FISH AND OIL DON'T MIX'
POWER RELATIONS AT THE BULL ARM CONSTRUCTION SITE, TRINITY BAY, NEWFOUNDLAND

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by

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to answer the underlying question of the extent to which social actors are constrained to act and think in the ways they do. More specifically, this research examines how a multinational oil corporation negotiated with local residents of Trinity Bay, Newfoundland, in such a manner that the interests of fishing men and women in protecting their culture and way of life were effectively masked by the industry. These negotiations resulted in the omitting of fishers' grievances from the agenda, the inadequate articulation of fishers' intrinsic interests and the exclusion of women's issues from the negotiation process. Underlying this empirical investigation is a theoretical analysis of social power, in particular the three-dimensional perspective advanced by Steven Lukes. The analysis is based mainly on 78 interviews with fishers and plant labourers, company and government officials, community leaders and other local residents.

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Abbreviations

BAACC - Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee

CNOPB - Canada Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board

EIS - Environmental Impact Statement

EPP - Environmental Protection Plan

FFAWU - Fishermen Food and Allied Workers

HEAP - Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel

GBS - Gravity-Based Structure

ISER - Institute of Social and Economic Research

HMDC - Hibernia Management and Development Company Limited

NODECO - Newfoundland Offshore Development Constructors

PASSB - PCL-Aker Stord-Steen-Becker

Chapter 1

FISH AND OIL DON'T MIX?

"Eli's house is over around the point," the oldtimer said as he gestured toward the turn in the gravel road lying ahead. "You'll have no trouble finding it; it's the only house out there." As I drove past I politely thanked him, but felt unsure of what exactly he meant by 'the point.' Having arrived at this rather ambiguous location and feeling uncertain of my role as a researcher, I was greeted with waving arms and friendly faces - which quickly dispelled any previous apprehension I may have had about the project I was soon to embark upon. As I made my way toward this husky man in faded blue coveralls who was standing at the end of the pathway, my well rehearsed introduction was cut short. "You must be the one from town," he stated, "who's come out to talk to the fishermen about the oil project. Well girl, you couldn't have picked a finer day."

Eli, a local inshore fisher for more than thirty-five years, began the interview process before I could barely explain the purpose of my research. By the time we had arrived in the kitchen I had already been informed of the poor harvest in the fishery from the previous year, local politics, and, of course, the weather. According to some local traditions and

Newfoundland culture, introductory greetings are often coupled with a discussion of the day's forecast and speculation of what may possibly be in store. Inside the freshly painted kitchen Eli's wife smiled cheerfully but, for the most part, remained silent except for her initial comment on the calm of the sea. As she peered out through the large window overlooking the bay of Bull Arm, the tranquillity and still of this confined body of water appeared inspiring. (At that moment I knew I had stumbled onto an aspect of social life that was incredibly meaningful, and far beyond what I had previously conceived.) For all but a few seconds there was silence between us when Eli turned toward me, lightly shaking his head and stated, "Isn't she beautiful..."

"Well girl, come and sit down and make yourself at home." On that cue Eli's wife hurried about placing coffee and homemade tea biscuits on the table. Next to the Carnation milk she placed a large white mug with black writing which read, "Father." Beside it sat an eloquent china tea cup and saucer with a small floral print. There was little question who this was intended for as such utensils are most frequently used for people considered as 'company' or who are 'not one of your own.' As I made my way toward the day bed, I could see brightly crocheted, covered cushions evenly arranged at one end. Behind me on the wall, hung a spoon collection carved in wood in the shape of the island of Newfoundland. Eli sat in

the chair next to the wood stove and was soon accompanied by the household cat. Eli's wife, Florence, joining us and sitting across the table, offered me her homemade biscuits and jam, a symbol of her household labour. Beside her on the wall I could see a small wooden placque. Although I could not make out the fine print, the bold lettering read "FISHERMENS' PRAYER." This soon became a familiar sight in many fishing homes that I visited later that same year. As I nestled back on the day bed and listening attentively to Eli, who required little probing from me, I felt grateful to them both, for they not only welcomed me into their home, but more importantly, into their lives.

"All along," Eli began, "we were led to believe that the GBS (Gravity-Based Structure) was to be built over in Come By Chance... up there by Adam's Head. Then one day last Spring we hears that its going to be built here...out there in Great Mosquito Cove." Eli gestured toward the undeveloped countryside that lay across Bull Arm. Great Mosquito Cove, for the most part, is barren and uninhabited. It is most frequented by residents of Sunnyside and the 'odd' fisher wishing to make use of the Cove's few scattered trout ponds. "When Mobil first came out here to tell us about the project," Eli continued, "they told us not to worry... I can hear them now telling us that Mobil is going to take care of the fishermen." As Eli proceeded to recall past events, he would strike the arm of

the chair each time he mentioned Mobil's name. "What they're doing is taking away our livelihood. This time next year it will be all over...we won't be able to fish out there no more."

Eli, now standing, gazes out through the kitchen window which overlooks Bull Arm. He physically maps out in front of him the sea space that Mobil requires for development, stating in an extraordinarily solemn voice, "...they're making this their exclusion area." As Eli began to visualize the full impact of Mobil's intentions, he queried about his own well being and that of his fellow fishers. "I don't know what's going to happen to me and some of the other fishermen further up the Arm...we've been fishing out there for a long time...long before Mobil ever came out here." It was difficult to imagine that the serenity and calm of Bull Arm would soon be transformed and the land adjacent to it reconstructed, adding little more than another chapter to Newfoundland's tainted history of attempted industrial development. As Eli carried on with his oral history of where he and his brother fished, he provided detailed accounts of the fishing crew, the gear they utilized and the species they caught from nearby waters. He concluded his brief narrative with a reflection upon more immediate concerns, emphasising the uncertainty that he and other fishers were experiencing; "No my dear," he stated rather gruffly, "there's no amount of compensation that

can give us back what we are going to lose." Although the bay of Bull Arm separates Great Mosquito Cove from the town of Sunnyside, any development taking place in or around the Cove will inevitably have repercussions for fishers and the communities they support. As Mobil Oil began to negotiate with local inshore fishers over matters of access and control of Bull Arm, the discussion focuses on the manner in which the oil industry will manage the sea space. Consequently, negotiations are structured in such a way that issues of the project's environmental implications or fishers' interests are not brought forth. In other words, these issues seldom reach the agenda, adding further to Mobil's control over the bargaining process.

"I don't know what's going to become of it all...," uttered Eli as he returned to his seat by the wood stove. "We don't have any say in what's going on... Mobil is going to do whatever they want and there's nothing you or I can do about it." After a brief pause, Eli carried on, stating, "Sure we've seen it all before...it wasn't all that long ago when they built the refinery over there" - Eli gestured across the bay toward the oil refinery in Come By Chance. "Those boats (project vessels) never stayed in no traffic lane...you ask some of the fishermen over in Arnold's Cove what happened to their gear and their nets...some of them still haven't been compensated to this day."

Eli continued to recall similar past events such as the 'Red Herring Scare' in Long Harbour during the 1960s, which caused the closure of the local fishery for that season. Fishers' experiences of domination by outside interests characterize much of their troubled history. In spite of their seemingly fatalistic outlook, fishers understand something of power and exploitation and how they work together to maintain inequality. "What is it going to be like when it's all over...five years from now? They can't tell us what state the fishery will be in, nobody can tell us...and then what? ...where will Mobil be when it's all over and there's nothing left to our fishery... No my dear," Eli continued, "as the old feller said... 'fish and oil, they don't mix'" (September, 1990).

1.1 The Research Problem

The history of Newfoundland, particularly of the outport region, is a history of its fisheries. The fishing grounds were, at one time, the main reason for settlement and provided many with employment. While present (1993) day employment prospects in the fishery are indeed dismal as indicated by the recent cod fishery closure, the industry, prior to this moratorium, continued to be the main source of employment and family income for many coastal communities. Even though it is difficult to speculate on the duration and impact of the cod

moratorium, the fishery will, at some point, come into conflict with the oil sector as it is the only local industry to compete directly with petroleum development. As House pointed out, the fishing industry is particularly crucial and, as will become evident, particularly vulnerable to offshore activity (House, 1986:1).

Hibernia, Canada's largest oilfield, was the sixtieth well drilled in the Newfoundland offshore. Discovered in 1979 by Chevron Canada, the Hibernia well is located on the Grand Banks east-southeast of the capital city, St. John's. While more than a decade of federal-provincial jurisdictional dispute over ownership of the offshore resource has delayed development of the Hibernia oilfield, this issue was formally resolved through the signing of the Atlantic Accord in 1985. (The Accord recognized joint management through a Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board [CNOBP].) The Hibernia Agreement signed on September, 14, 1990, marked the beginning of a new oil era for the province of Newfoundland as it led the way for the second phase of petroleum activity, onshore construction. The Hibernia field will be exploited by pumping crude oil from a gravity-based concrete platform built in Great Mosquito Cove, a deep-water inlet in Bull Arm, Trinity Bay. Onshore construction will last roughly five years, although delays continue to slow down the process, the most serious being the withdrawal of one of the oil companies, Gulf

Oil. (A more detailed discussion will follow in chapter two. A chronology of dates and events leading up to this period is outlined in Appendix A.)

The decision to pursue petroleum development off the coast of Newfoundland initiated much concern among local fishers about the likely effects of an offshore oil industry upon established industries and communities. Prior to the cod fishery moratorium, the social and economic well-being of fishers in Trinity Bay was heavily dependent upon their continued success in an insecure and unstable occupation. Consequently, fishers and the communities they support were vulnerable to any change in the natural environment that affected the harvesting of sea resources. Even though fishers demonstrate great "adaptive resilience" to changing fishery patterns, there are certain limitations beyond which their adaptive strategies will fail (Heber, 1986:172). Onshore development in Great Mosquito Cove placed new demands upon fishers as it threatened to undermine fish harvesting in Bull Arm. Moreover, employment in local community fish plants was heavily dependent upon the catch from local crews, and without access to fish, employment opportunities for women greatly were diminished. This may well prove to be beyond the adaptive resilience of most inshore fishers and plant laborers.

As the communities of Trinity-Placentia Bay prepared to enter into the construction phase of petroleum development,

the plight of local inshore fishers and their control over traditional fishing grounds became increasingly more precarious. To resolve this rather contentious issue between the fishery, on the one hand, and the oil sector, on the other, Mobil Oil sought to negotiate the managing of the sea space by arguing for the feasibility of co-existence between both sectors. While these discussions led to an agreement known as the 'Fisheries Code of Practice,' much of the negotiation process focused on the oil industry's intention to regulate Bull Arm. It is this negotiation and the effects of onshore development that are the focus of this thesis. It is argued that these negotiations have entailed the exclusion of fishers' grievances from the agenda, the inadequate representation of fishers' intrinsic interests and the elimination of women's issues from the negotiation process. This potential conflict between the fishery and the oil industry is fundamentally one over territory, a conflict over access and control of the bay of Bull Arm. As House (1981) pointed out, when the interests of the oil industry conflict, or are incompatible, with those of the local economy, it is the interests of the oil sector that override.

Local fishers are, for the most part, economically, socially and politically weak, which restricts their negotiations with a more powerful multinational oil corporation. The inequalities that exist between the fishery and oil sector are

fundamentally differences between economic and political strength; hence, a difference between strong (oil) and weak (fish) commodity sectors (House, 1986:133,134; 1985:223; Marchak, 1986).

How do we explain these patterns of social relationships? Under such conditions of inequality one would intuitively expect to find conflict or strife; yet, one finds acceptance, or, as Gaventa (1980) states, 'quiescence.' The inequalities that exist between local fishers and the oil industry seem not to provoke challenge or observable struggle. How is this social inequality maintained? What is there about this relationship that prevents, or more importantly, suppresses either fishers' issues from being articulated and their grievances from being expressed or their interests from being identified? Why do people acquiesce in situations of injustice or inequality? Under such conditions of disparity, the reaction of the oppressed, according to Lukes (1974), may be seen as a function of power relations. Lack of overt conflict does not indicate consensus, or some form of social cohesion, but rather a form of social control. Power serves, therefore, to maintain and reinforce the prevailing inequality. Moreover, social patterns of power and powerlessness may help explain how fishers come to see their own oppression as legitimate.

Power, argued C. W. Mills (1959), enables one to manage and manipulate the agreement of others. Yet, authority, he

stated, is power "justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient" (Mills, 1959:40-41). More recently, Gaventa (1980), whose research has been heavily influenced by the work of Steven Lukes (1974), espoused similar views in suggesting that power operates to develop and maintain consensus among the powerless. This proposed research is essentially a study in the exercise of power: how power relationships were maintained over time and subsequently challenged when the field of power was altered. How do we then explain Mobil's securing of fishers' compliance for the control of Bull Arm, while suppressing or averting any form of resistance? Why have women employed in the processing sector not been represented in the negotiation process? Under such conditions of glaring inequality, why have those most affected not sought restitution? This analysis will help explain the social patterns that exist in situations of inequality where the response or silence of the oppressed is seen as a function of power relations, relations which encourage inaction and quiescence among those more vulnerable. According to Lukes, the object of inquiry becomes not one of "political activity," but, rather, one of "political inactivity" (Lukes, 1974: 42).

The nonresistance or acquiescence of Trinity Bay fishers is not unfamiliar to Newfoundland. Inshore fishers have, for the most part, a long troubled history, much of which is characterized by domination and exploitation by more powerful

groups. This research will subsequently provide an alternative account to help explain these patterns of power relations. Moreover, it will help foster a more thorough understanding of the politics of inequality and the strategies used in maintaining the 'quiescence phenomenon' (Gaventa, 1980). Finally, this thesis will challenge the previous assumptions that oil development in Newfoundland will have no serious negative consequences for the fishing industry or that they can be mitigated by a financial compensation program (Canning, 1986; House, 1985; NORDCO, 1981, 1984).

1.2 The Research Site

The 36 communities that comprise the region of Trinity-Placentia Bay are scattered along a 35 km isthmus that joins the Avalon Peninsula to the main part of the island Newfoundland. While some field observation took place in the larger impact area, the focal point for most of my work was in the fishing settlements situated in Trinity Bay. The fishery impact area has been defined as those communities which fish from Bull Arm waters. They include Sunnyside, Chance Cove, Bellevue and, to a lesser degree, Norman's Cove (NODECO, 1991). Sunnyside and Chance Cove are located along Bull Arm, whereas Bellevue and Norman's Cove are further outside the Arm in an area known as Tickle Bay.

1.3 Relevant Literature

This thesis is a study of power relations under conditions of rapid economic growth, in particular, the impacts onshore development will have on established residents. Therefore, I shall begin with a review of two bodies of literature, that on boom towns and fishery/oil interaction and conflict.

Writing over several decades, social scientists have become increasingly interested in patterns of growth in non-metropolitan areas. More recently, attention has focused on the consequences of large-scale energy resource development in obscure and peripheral regions, which adds to a long tradition of academic interest on the social effects of urbanization (Greider and Krannich, 1985). Although this body of literature has become increasingly more controversial as heightened public awareness has increased social and environmental sensitivities, it has nonetheless provided social scientists with an area of research that has considerable policy significance (Krannich, 1981). The sociological literature that has resulted from much of this work, or "boomtown" studies as it is more commonly known, has shown considerable variation. Social scientists have, for the most part, used the community impact model of the boomtown to explain the social and economic consequences of energy related development. Similar to other classic scholars in community sociology (Simmel, 1950; Wirth, 1938), much of the present body of literature

tends to embrace what Wilkinson and his associates call the "social disruption thesis." Social disorganization and personal malaise occur as small towns experience a transition from a previously homogenous stable society to one more typical of urban dwelling (Greider and Krannich, 1985:51). Moreover, early findings in boomtown literature suggest that social change, brought about by industrialization, has resulted in a weakening of social support mechanisms (Finsterbusch, 1982) coupled with a deterioration in community services (Murdock and Leistritz, 1979) and adherence to behavioral norms (Dixon, 1978).

As Greider and Krannich argue - in citing Bender (1978): "Such changes have long been assumed to result in higher levels of individualization, social isolation, alienation, and anomie, the consequences of which include a less integrated society, greater levels of social pathology such as crime, suicide, and mental illness, and, in general, social disorganization" (Greider and Krannich, 1985:53). These findings tend to characterize much of the earlier literature about boomtown communities, while adding further support to the social disruption thesis. These descriptions, however, which document social life in rural communities, have been met with sharp criticism. In the early 1980s Wilkinson and his colleagues provided an exceedingly critical review of boomtown literature. They argued that "undocumented assertions" were fre-

quently used to add credence to the social disruption thesis (Wilkinson et al., 1982: 278). As a result, Wilkinson et al.'s critique initiated much controversy with counter criticism and rebuttals of similar breadth (Albrecht, 1982; Finsterbusch, 1982; Freudenburg, 1982; Gale, 1982; Gold, 1982). Murdock and Lustritz argue that they have "selectively" chosen quotations from the impact literature and in so doing have used them out of context (Murdock and Lustritz, 1982: 351). Gold argues that their critique of the literature is a "misrepresentation of the facts..." (Gold, 1982: 352). Wilkinson et al. have based their findings, according to Gold, on a rather narrow scope of perceived social problems. Moreover, their reliance on statistical measures and secondary sources has resulted in their failure to account for how actors perceive their social world. Meanwhile, Albrecht suggests that the literature fails to present evidence to support the position that such impacts do not occur (Albrecht,1982: 298), a conclusion that Finsterbusch (1982) also reached.

While conclusive arguments cannot be drawn from this debate, research has demonstrated that energy related development has produced a wide variety of social, economic and environmental impacts upon those who live within the affected region. Despite popular themes of unmanaged growth and social disruption, residents from non-metropolitan areas overwhelmingly support future development. According to Maurer

and Napier (1981) these findings continue to hold true in spite of evidence to suggest that costs and benefits incurred are not equally distributed among rural dwellers. Moreover, they argue that factors of age, education, gender, occupation and income level are directly related to who will benefit from rural development.

The basic mechanism underlying the boomtown scenario is that rapid growth occurs as residents move into the community to take advantage of employment and economic opportunities provided by energy related industries. Social scientists, concerned with sudden demographic change in rural energy communities, have focused primarily on issues relating to criminality, community services and infrastructure, and interpersonal relationships. In particular, the literature centring on issues of crime and victimization has been more thoroughly examined. Research findings which indicate increases in crime rates are based heavily upon secondary sources and case studies. While existing data tend to refute the argument that crime rates increase as communities experience rapid growth (Krannich et al., 1985; Wilkinson et al., 1982), there does seem to be evidence to support the claim that fear of crime increases among rural dwellers even when no apparent increase in the crime rate has occurred (Freudenburg, 1986; Greider and Krannich, 1985; Krannich et al., 1985). On the other hand, as communities experience the phase-out stage

of development, characterized by a decline in the population, so too, does residents' fear of crime subside (Krannich et al., 1989).

One of the earliest changes in rapid growth communities is the deterioration of the community infrastructure. Sudden demographic changes in isolated remote regions have the potential to overwhelm both private and public services by disabling, in many cases, the ability of the community to cope effectively with such demands (Dixon, 1978; Gramling and Brabant, 1986; Gramling and Freudenburg, 1990; Molnar and Smith, 1982; Murdock and Schriner,1978; 1979). The existing evidence to support these claims, however, is mixed. If measured in terms of service-to-population ratio the findings tend to support the social disruption hypothesis. On the other hand, if measured in terms of how residents perceive the condition of public services the data illustrate far less disruption, and in some cases, a substantial improvement to the community (Greider and Krannich, 1985; Krannich, 1981).

Traditional theories of urbanization and its subsequent impact on interpersonal relationships have been incorporated into the boomtown literature. It has been argued that as newcomers move into stable homogenous communities, primary relationships are substituted by more formal types of interaction. This eventually results in a deterioration of informal support mechanisms and leads to experiences of alienation and

anomie (Freudenburg, 1982). Such changes, it has been argued, may result in a weakening of friendship patterns and social support mechanisms that once operated to integrate the community as a whole (Freudenburg, 1984). Consistent with previous arguments, however, the data tend to be ambiguous, supporting as well as refuting the social disruption hypothesis. Earlier studies illustrate a weakening in friendship patterns coupled with increases in psychological stress (Finsterbusch, 1982), divorce rates (Murdock and Lustritz, 1979) and mental health difficulties (Dixon, 1978; Weisz, 1979). More recent research, however, provides contrary evidence leading to the conclusion that rapid growth may broaden residents' "range of opportunities" for seeking social support (Greider and Krannich, 1985: 67). Moreover, the role of family and friends is seen as crucial in mitigating disruption (England and Albrecht, 1984; Kennedy and Mehra, 1985). Overall, these findings indicate that adaptation occurs as communities undergo demographic change.

By comparison, the literature available on the North Sea experience and social problems arising from oil related development is sparse and poorly documented. During the 1980 International Conference on Oil and Environment, Stenstavold commented on the inadequate monitoring of the socio-economic environment (Cake, 1986). Writing over the past decade, however, social scientists have attempted to address these

gaps in the literature, while adding to our present understanding of energy resource development. According to House (1985), research has demonstrated a causal relationship between increased rates of crime and oil activity, particularly in the regions of Shetland, Peterhead and Lochcarron, Scotland. Moreover, the literature has illustrated that as oil activity decreases, especially onshore development, so too have rates of crime, as was evident in the Shetland experience (Lapsley, 1981; Liang, 1976; Moore, 1981). Research completed in Stavanger, Norway, however, indicates that crime rates not only increased in impact regions, but also in non-impact regions of similar size (Stangeland, 1983). Thus, Stangeland's findings dispute oil development as a causal factor in explaining increased crime rates.

While crime is the most frequently identified social problem that prospective residents of energy affected regions articulate, alcohol consumption probably constitutes the second most serious problem (House, 1985). Research conducted in Peterhead and the Cromarty Firth region of Scotland during the 1970s indicates that excessive alcohol consumption was the primary form of recreation among workcamp oil employees (Cake, 1986).

Although social problems related to crime and alcohol consumption are problematic for both communities and residents, together they create added disruption upon family life.

According to House, these problems "plague many oil families, both among newcomers and locals" (House, 1985:218). Despite the extent to which research findings are often unsystematic and fragmented, the data do illustrate a consistent pattern of increased family problems among employees in the petroleum industry.

A significant portion of the research literature on social impacts of energy-related activity suggests that social disruption increases during periods of industrial development. Yet, despite claims that much of this research lacks systematic data, is often fragmented and methodologically weak, evidence continues to support the initial argument (Albrecht, 1982; Cake, 1986; Wilkinson et al., 1982). A large part of this literature, moreover, provides a descriptive account of social impacts while evading theoretical explanations. In addition to these limitations, one of the more significant deficiencies in the literature is the lack of comparative and longitudinal studies. Many of the cited sources focus on short-term impacts of not more than two to three years in relatively small geographic locations. Moreover, social scientists tend to focus on a select few research areas for investigation. Subsequently, researchers define social problems which exclude certain groups within the population, particularly women, youth and low income earners.

Although the oil industry has brought welcomed employment and economic prosperity to regions in Norway, Scotland and Atlantic Canada, it has also created conflicts with preexisting industries. During the early years of oil development in the British sector of the North Sea, government's ignorance of the functioning of petroleum industries, combined with Britain's desire for rapid development, led the way for unrestricted growth. Lack of state interference and legislation to control oil activity continued in the United Kingdom throughout much of the 1960s and early 1970s (House, 1986). It was not until the mid-1970s that the British government adopted stricter regulations to monitor petroleum development. Norway, by comparison, with its tighter government regulations of industry and a more secure national economy, was better able to control oil development from its beginning (House, 1986). Surprisingly, however, both sectors of the North Sea began oil exploration and production without consideration of the impacts upon the fishery and the communities they support.

Today, the North Sea is one of the world's major oil producing regions. In the United Kingdom oil has had a significant impact on the domestic economy (Mackey, 1986:22). Economic factors have contributed further to the oil industry's political influence in government policy-making and regulation. The Scottish fishing industry, by comparison, is

politically weak and consequently disadvantaged in its ability to influence government legislation. This has been clearly demonstrated by the British authorities' laissez-faire approach in dealing with the conflict between the fishery and oil sectors.

Offshore petroleum activity has, for the most part, taken place off Scotland with oil discoveries located primarily in the northern area of the North Sea. Agricultural and fishing communities most affected by oil development were located in Orkney and the Shetland Islands (McNicoll, 1986; Mackey, 1986). Not surprisingly, therefore, safeguarding the fishery became an important concern among rural residents, although its significance at the national level was largely dismissed (Mackey, 1986).

The Norwegian government, by contrast, assumes greater responsibility for the protection of its fishery. Government legislation has also been more progressive by enacting controls and restricting activities of the petroleum companies. In addition, the fishery contributes substantially more to the Norwegian national economy than it does in the U.K., thus aiding fishers in influencing government policy (Andersen, 1986). Moreover, local fishers constitute a much stronger lobbying group in the political sphere by comparison to their British counterpart. Therefore, as problems developed

between the two sectors, government intervened with tighter legislation (Andersen, 1986).

Even though fisheries groups, particularly the Norwegian Fishermen's Association, have become more influential in the making of petroleum policy, the early 1970s were characteristic of much of their struggle to gain an effective voice. When the interests of the fishery and petroleum industry collide, the fisheries sector, argues Andersen, is "integrated into the decision-making process in such a way that the institutional conditions for articulating its interests are good" (Andersen, 1986:83). The Shetland Fishermen's Association, on the other hand, has had greater difficulty in successful negotiation. As argued by Goodlad, effective political organization representing fishers' interests must take place during the initial oil development stage (1986:71). While earlier compensation agreements with fisners proved to be advantageous for the oil sector, it was at the expense of local fishers' interests.

Consistent with much of the literature on western energy development, many of these studies focus extensively on data collection and not necessarily on theoretical explanation. This problem of divorcing theory from data is not unfamiliar in the social sciences, as Merton (1957) among others recognized more than twenty years ago. The analysis of the North Sea primarily entails a descriptive account of the interaction

between fish and oil industries. While much of the material is rich with data, it lacks rigorous interpretation and theoretical explanation.

The final critique of the literature relevant to the present discussion pertains to an often neglected area in sociological discourse - issues of gender relations. Although the literature defines the fishery in terms of both harvesting and processing sectors, the impacts of oil development on the processing industry are excluded, which often has implications for women. The literature fails to identify the strict gender division of labour in the fishery where men primarily harvest the catch and women complete its processing. The assumption implicit in these studies suggests further that not only are "fishermen's" experiences representative of both men and women, but more importantly, they illustrate the invisibility of women in the fishery. Omissions in the literature are also apparent in discussions of compensation claims. Women who no longer are employed in the processing sector due to plant closures are absent from these studies; either women are excluded from compensation schemes or the literature has failed to account for these women's experiences.

The fishery on the east coast of Canada, particularly in Nova Scotia, has experienced similar problems to those of the North Sea. According to Heber (1986), research

findings suggest that five percent of fishers have experienced conflicts with the oil industry. While this figure does not indicate a significant degree of disruption, Heber argues that loss of fishing grounds will probably have the most serious repercussions for fishers in Atlantic Canada. Consistent with the research findings of Mackey, Heber claims further that fishers are "poorly organized to take any effective part in the development planning for the offshore" and subsequently have little influence in government policy making (Heber, 1986: 175).

The extent to which petroleum development has affected the fishing industry and subsequently caused irreversible damage cannot, at this time, be determined, if at all. Are fishers catching less fish due to loss of access to fishing grounds or because of depleting fish stocks? Research findings dealing with these issues are at best ambiguous (House, 1986:132). While the Norwegian government appears more committed to protecting the fishery during the oil era, British authorities remain uncertain of the adverse effects of oil activity on the fishery. Yet despite the significance of these issues, they do not focus attention on the more fundamental issues of the structural inequality that exists between the two industries (House, 1986). The main difference, according to House, is between "weak and strong commodity sectors" (House, 1986:133).

Off the east coast of Canada, the island of Newfoundland and mainland Labrador, offshore petroleum activity has been taking place since the early 1960s. Exploration for oil and gas off the coast of Labrador has threatened to disrupt local residents, argues House, by upsetting their traditional economic base and life-style (House, 1981:434). House attempts to explain Labradorians' experiences with oil-related development through the marxist concept of alienation. In so doing, he applies both its objective and subjective meaning. Objectively, suggests House, Labradorians have little to no control over petroleum exploration. And as such, decisions relating to the pace at which development will proceed, the location of company operations, employment opportunities and impacts upon the environment are removed from the decision-making process of local residents (House, 1981:448). Subjectively, Labradorians "feel their own powerlessness," contributing further to what House called their "fatalistic resignation" (House, 1981:448).

Their alienation, both subjective and objetive, is argued from a larger theoretical framework of dependency theory. Dependency theorists most often employ the term to describe the social relations that exist between capitalist countries, or regions within countries, within an international system of production and exchange. The more powerful countries are those which have access to key resources (capital, technological

innovation and skilled labour), resources on which hinterland and peripheral regions greatly depend (House, 1981:435). The pattern that soon results is one of exploitation and underdevelopment. However, House contends that this pattern of development can be reversed through government initiative. Moreover, he suggests that Newfoundland and Labrador's offshore industry can become one of 'dependent development,' where the local society reaps some of the economic benefits.

Previous studies of rural attitudes toward onshore construction in the region of Trinity-Placentia Bay, indicate that residents of the area favoured the development of the Hibernia project (Fuchs and Cake, 1986). While the costs and benefits of onshore activity will not be equally distributed among the rural population, their attitudes toward the industrial project continue to be supportive. As Maurer and Napier found, residents of rural communities which have "little or no industrial base have been shown to be overwhelmingly favourable toward industrial development" (Maurer and Napier, 1981: 101). Moreover, large-scale industrial projects are often viewed as a means for employment opportunities despite their short-term nature. While Fuchs and Cake's findings indicate support for onshore development, closer examination of the studied population reveals certain sub-groups who view the project with greater apprehension. To varying degrees, the inshore fishers of Trinity-Placentia Bay

feel sceptical and uncertain about how the onshore development will affect their livelihood.

While Fuchs and Cake do not elaborate on these findings, House (1985) attempts to provide an explanation to account for the relationship between the fishing and the oil industries. He suggests that the unequal relationship that exists between the two industries is primarily a conflict between strong and weak commodity sectors (House, 1985:223). Oil, he argues, constitutes a strong staple commodity where no suitable substitutes exist and where its producers exert strong control over world market prices. Fish, on the other hand, comprises a weak staple commodity which is easily substituted and where its producers have little control over world prices (House, 1985:223). The underlying problem that House identifies is the difference between the two industry's economic and political bargaining power.

House's analysis of unequal power relations between the fishing and oil sectors does not extend beyond a discussion of staple commodities. While his analysis focuses on the differences between the industries in terms of their political and economic strength, it does not consider how the industries work together. What is the outcome of these social relations? Does this unequal power relationship help explain why fishers come to see the strength of the oil industry as legitimate? What are fishers' 'real' interests? Similar to many other

social scientists, House's analysis stops short of these questions.

To a large degree, social reality in energy-related regions has been explained through a macro-level approach. Much of this research is heavily influenced by marxist analysis common in the 1970s. Social phenomena, according to this perspective, are explained from a larger structural context of how society is organized; and, in the case of the fishing and oil industries, how social inequality is maintained. This perspective attempts to uncover the necessary causal links that exist between social phenomena. According to Keat and Urry, this goal is accomplished by "acquiring knowledge of the underlying structures and mechanisms" which are not readily available through sense data (1982: 5). On the other hand, social scientists interested in fishery and oil interaction have seldom employed qualitative analysis or carried out research at the micro-level. On the occasion that field work has been adopted, explanation for social reality has primarily been descriptive. Researchers tend to describe social life, while evading explanation of why social phenomena exist, or why certain patterns of relationships take the particular form that they do.

The boomtown literature, by comparison, is heavily embedded in what C.W. Mills (1959) referred to as 'abstracted empiricism.' Much of this literature relies extensively on

survey research methodology. The logic which guides much of this work is understood by an epistemological doctrine that assumes social phenomena to be 'true' by their observable, measurable and testable characteristics - a tradition that is similarly used in the study of natural science. What is not available through direct observation is considered unscientific and, therefore, secondary to any sociological investigation. This approach, however, has been heavily criticized by many marxists. They argue that social reality is known only through a rather surface level of analysis. Moreover, such a perspective fails to uncover the hidden or underlying structures, which help account for social phenomena that are not readily available through the senses. Giddens, too, has been critical of this approach. Any social science, he argues, that adopts a similar "epistemology and ambition" to that of the natural sciences restricts further our understanding of the human condition (Giddens, 1976:14).

Although there is little feminist scholarship available to account for women's experiences with energy development (but see Baird, 1985 and Porter, 1985), much has been written criticizing survey methodology. A predominant theme in much of the literature identifies the negative outcome of what Jayaratne and Stewart call "professional obsessiveness with scientific objectivity," which has often implied quantitative analysis (1991: 98). Their criticisms have, for the most part,

focused around the exclusion of subjectively oriented knowledge. Leaving the subject outside of social science, they claim, also implies that it is left unexamined. Subsequently, many aspects of women's lives have not been captured in the traditional practice of social science research.

Subjectivists, more specifically, have difficulty with the world being viewed as some kind of object of inquiry that denies the presence of the social actor (Johnson et al., 1984). From this perspective, the subjectivist social researcher, unlike many marxists and empiricists, is actively involved in interpreting events. The literature available on energy-related development is seldom informed by a subjectivist orientation. It fails to consider how actors perceive their social world and to account for their experiences. Moreover, it neglects to focus on explicitly fundamental questions, or what Alexander (1987) calls presuppositions, focusing around the nature of action. For example, Alexander asks, "are actors rational or nonrational" (1987: 10)?

This research will subsequently provide an alternative explanation to that which has been previously provided in much of the literature. Social science research addressing these issues, as well as limitations, will contribute significantly to our present understanding of the social relations between powerful groups and powerless people. Moreover, this work will add to the literature on Newfoundland's offshore development

by encompassing an analysis to account for the implications of resource exploitation upon inshore fishers and plant labourers. This alone will contribute substantially to areas of social research thought to be in need of further study. In particular, the impacts of petroleum development on women in the fishery and, more generally, the implications of development upon indigenous industries. This study, therefore, will attempt to go beyond previous accounts of social life in energy resource communities to explain the social patterns of power and powerlessness, and how the powerful operate to maintain the status quo so that actors' 'real' interests are not made visible. While this research is of relevance for Newfoundlanders employed in the harvesting and processing sectors, it will, nonetheless, have far reaching implications for marginalized groups living in peripheral regions elsewhere in advanced industrialized societies.

1.4 Theoretical Perspective

As a preliminary to further analysis, it is necessary to specify how power will be understood in this thesis. This section, therefore, will map out more thoroughly the theoretical perspective applied in this work.

The concept of power continues to be one of the more controversial and debated concepts in the social sciences. Contrasting views of the nature of power are found in the

'consensus' and 'conflict' models of explanation. Intellectually, much of its history stems from the work of Max Weber. Weber claims that power is 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1978: 53). Betrand Russell defines power as "the production of intended effects" (Russell, 1986: 19). Similarly, Robert Dahl views power as the ability to control another's behaviour. He suggests that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957: 215).

Both Weber and Dahl focus on the idea of "power over" (Lukes, 1986:3), a conceptualization that Hannah Arendt rejects as misconceived. Power, she argues, should not be viewed as 'who rules whom,' but rather it should focus upon political institutions as "manifestations and materializations of power." Power is "not the property of an individual," it "corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert" (Arendt, 1970: 44). Talcott Parsons, in agreement with Arendt, also rejects the Weberian approach to power. Moreover, he suggests that power has the capacity to achieve communal ends:

> Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a

> presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions - whatever the actual agency of that enforcement. (Parsons, 1967: 308).

While these attempts to define power are by no means conclusive, they do illustrate the diversity and breadth of sociological theorising. Social scientists have, for the most part, their own theories of knowledge or epistemologies which guide much of their explanation of social phenomena. Yet some would argue that this diversity creates fragmentation in the discipline as it fails to reconcile agency and structure (Johnson et al., 1984). Social scientists, like all other philosophers of knowledge, have long debated questions of truth, claims to knowledge and the nature of the social world. Social scientists, in other words, share little agreement on whether power is intentional, or structural, or if in fact it is both. Existing perspectives, moreover, fall short in treating systematically the contradictory views of power. As a result, much controversy continues to surround present debates as it remains a highly contested and often problematic concept.

This research will attempt to go beyond conventional explanations to provide a more thorough and critical approach. Through this proposed study, then, I intend to explain power relations by taking into account the subjectivist strategy and, by so doing, incorporate into the analysis a notion of agency. This research, moreover, will attempt systematically

to link together agency and structure, which is essential, I contend, for any explanation of the social world. We know that actors produce structures, while at the same time they are both constricted and enabled by the range of actions available to them. The actor is never tied to any particular response, but rather acts according to his or her culture, history and past struggles: "Social and cultural life," wrote Sinclair (1990), "is constructed by people who face immediate constraints and are influenced by the past" (Sinclair, 1990: 31). Every situation and similarly every structure "is potentially liberating and destructive, emancipating and limiting" (Knuttila, 1992: 23).

When we attempt to explain the social world by looking at both agency and structure, we engage in some of the great themes of classical social theory: they encompass questions of free-will and determinism, interpretation and explanation. A crucial aspect of this thesis is to provide a sociological account which considers both the notion of human agency and structural analysis. Although action and structure often appear in sociological discourse as antinomies, Giddens would argue that such a connection is indeed possible (Giddens, 1979). Essentially, for Giddens, what is required is an account of the human agent which considers the "conditions and consequences of action." Structure is then introduced as some how entangling both those consequences and conditions (Gidd-

ens, 1979: 49). The approach taken in this research can be summed up best by Marx and Engels when he wrote: "People make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx and Engles, 1962: 247).

Among the more prominent social theorists of power relations, the work of Steven Lukes (1974) stands out as it challenges many previous accounts and interpretations. His work allows for an analysis which takes into account questions relating to agency and structure or interpretation and explanation. While his theory is useful in explaining the acquiescence of fishermen and plant women, when applied it falls short in certain areas, in particular its discussion of the social relations of gender. The existing applications of Lukes' theory, consistent with many other theorists, treats issues of gender as unproblematic where women continue to be invisible or hidden in the analysis. This thesis, however, will attempt to correct this omission by providing an account of women's experiences in the fishery.

The concept of power, according to Lukes, can be understood best by sketching out what he referred to as three conceptual maps, or a three dimensional approach. Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby and Richard Merelam, to name but a few, employ

the 'pluralist' view of power which, according to Lukes, comprises the one-dimensional approach. Authors in the pluralist tradition focus on behaviour in the making of key decisions over which there is observable conflict of (subjective) interests (Lukes, 1974: 12). Moreover, pluralists argue that interests are essentially policy preferences - any conflict of interest is, therefore, a conflict of preference (Lukes, 1974: 14). Thus, Polsby (1963: 3) states that:

> One can conceive of "power"... as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specified future events. This can be envisaged most easily in a decision-making situation.

Polsby later pointed out that power may be studied by examining those who participate, gain, lose, and prevail in decision-making. Any direct conflict between actors, he argued, can be seen as a situation most closely resembling an "'experimental test' of their abilities to affect actual outcomes" (Polsby, 1963: 4).

The pluralist approach thus limits itself to a traditional causal mode of explanation, where participation in decision making constitutes observable data. As Dahl stated, their "actions were then tabulated as individual 'successes' or 'defeats.'" The participants with the greatest proportion of success out of the total number of successes were then considered to be the most influential" (Dahl, 1961: 336).

The pluralist approach, however, came under attack for concentrating solely upon observable participation in decision making. Its critics, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970), reject this view as being rather narrow and restrictive. Power, they argue, has "two faces." The first is that examined by Dahl and his fellow associates in that power is reflected in concrete decision making. However, they argue that power is also exercised when:

> A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:4).

The crucial point of their argument is that power exists when actors, either consciously or unconsciously, construct barriers to the voicing of policy conflicts. Although the writings of E.E. Schattschneider in his book, **The Semi-Sovereign People** (1960), are now rather dated, much of his work, nonetheless, contains the theoretical underpinnings of two-dimensional power as evidenced in much of the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Crenson (1971).[1] As Schattschneider argued:

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[1] A detailed study of how U.S. towns, Gary and East Chicago, have failed to make a political issue of their air pollution problems. See Crenson (1971) for details.

> All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out (1960: 71).

The two-dimensional view of power, therefore, entails examining both decision making and non-decision making. Bachrach and Baratz (1970:39) define a decision as "a choice among alternative modes of action." A non-decision, on the other hand, is "a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 44). They write:

> Nondecision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 44).

Although Bachrach and Baratz extend their argument beyond the pluralists to examine non-decision making, they do share some similarities, namely the emphasis on actual observed behaviour. Pluralists contend that power in decision making is evidenced only when there is conflict. Bachrach and Baratz, however, suggest that, while this is true, power is also evident in cases of non-decision making. They conclude that in the absence of any conflict, overt or covert, one is left to assume that consensus exists and non-decision making would,

therefore, be impossible (Lukes, 1974: 19). The conflict that they identify as necessary is between the interests of those involved in decision making and those excluded from a hearing within the public realm.

Lukes has, in turn, criticized this view for being too behaviouristic and for its insistence that for power to occur, there must exist observable conflict and grievances (overt conflict). Alternatively, Lukes suggests a more comprehensive approach, a three-dimensional view, which encompasses the first two dimensions, while allowing for consideration of less visible ways that potential issues are kept out of the political process. Power, Lukes argued, may be exercised in the absence of observable conflict and grievances. Barrett referred to this hidden aspect of power as the "capacity to impose stability," to maintain the status quo (1984:183). Lukes asks, "Is it not the supreme exercise of power to avert conflict and grievance by influencing, shaping and determining the perceptions and preferences of others" (Lukes, 1986:669)? The three dimensional approach illustrates how power is subsequently used to "preempt manifest conflict" by shaping perceptions of non-conflict (Gaventa, 1980:13). Luke's definition of power states:

> That A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests (Lukes, 1974:34).

The exercise of power is not only evident under conditions when A prevails in the resolution of key issues, or when B is prevented from expressing grievances, but also through B's conception of the issues. While three-dimensional power may not be accompanied necessarily by observed conflict (although it may have been averted) there must exist 'latent conflict' - in other words, "a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude (Lukes, 1974: 24-25). "Can we always assume," asks Lukes, "that the victims of injustice and inequality would, but for the exercise of power, strive for justice and equality" (1974: 46). Lukes continues to state that we need to "justify that B would have acted differently" if not for A, and to specify the means or processes by which A prevented B from doing so (1974: 41-42).

As Lukes and other social scientists point out, this perspective is not without some difficulty. According to the logic guiding three-dimensional power, actors are often unaware of their real interests. To claim that these actors' "political consciousness" becomes "stunted" denies them any notion of agency as well as contradicts the presupposition of subjectivism which, Lukes would argue, underlies this theory of power. If we state that human beings have interests of which they are not conscious we are suggesting that their interpretation of the social world as some form of dialogue

over the meaning of events and objects, similar to what Giddens (1976) referred to as a "set of reproduced practices," is not necessarily the same as the meaning others, such as Lukes, would provide. The consequence of the subjectivist strategy makes clear these unresolved tensions to preserve actors as agents. A purely interpretive or subjectivist sociology, I would argue, has become increasingly more problematic. While the concept of real interests raises difficulty for theories of social action and the preservation of actors as agents, it is also troublesome for the social scientist.

Three-dimensional power presupposes that the researcher knows best the real interests of actors and, therefore, assumes a rather privileged as well as difficult position. Much has been written on the concept of real interests, although little consensus has been reached on whether or not it is possible to know the real and objective interests of others (Benton, 1981,1982; Connolly, 1972; Hindess, 1982; Knight and Willmott, 1982). Essentially, the concept is founded upon a value standpoint which contributes to much of the dispute and controversy. As Lukes himself would agree, "different conceptions of what interests *are* are associated with different moral and political positions" (Lukes, 1974: 34). Yet, some social scientists have attempted to provide an alternative to 'real interests' by suggesting that we focus

upon the actors' 'objectives' (Benton, 1981), while others have attempted to side step the issue by qualifying their statements about actors' interests. For example, in Crenson's study of air pollution in Gary and East Chicago, he argues the 'real interests' of citizens by suggesting that 'all things being equal,' the residents of Gary would prefer not to be poisoned by dirty air (Crenson, 1971). Connolly, on the other hand, goes one step further by focusing on the results of specific policies. He states:

> Policy x is more in A's interest than policy y if A, were he to experience the *results* of both x and y, would *choose* x as the result he would rather have for himself (1972: 472).

While Connolly provides what he suggests "as a first approximation" in resolving the difficulties of 'real interests,' his definition is highly speculative and relies on the results of policy not on the attitude toward the policy itself (Connolly, 471). The perspective that I take to my own work, however, is that we cannot know indisputably actors' real interests. Having said this, I will qualify the concept real interests with quotations and will often substitute 'stated interests' for 'real interests' where others may not. Although this problem remains unresolved, this thesis does not ultimately stand on a notion of real interests, but rather on its success as a study in the exercise of power.

Lukes' radical view of power masks a number of additional difficult issues. Perhaps the most serious of these is the question of gender. Similar to many other theories of power, gender relations continue to be unexplored in this work, concealing womens' experiences which often contribute to their marginalized positions. This issue became particularly clear in an empirical case study of the Appalachian Valley. John Gaventa, a student of Steven Lukes, attempted to explain the power relations between Appalachian miners and a multinational energy corporation by focusing exclusively on the experiences of men. While this strategy may well have been unintentional, the outcome exposes a number of critical problems relating to Lukes' theory. To begin, Gaventa, and Lukes for that matter, define the arenas in which people participate as 'political arenas.' What are the implications of these political arenas for women? Do women face additional barriers or obstacles to participating in the 'public' sphere? These questions are not raised by Lukes and contribute to some of the problems found in Gaventa's case study.

Gaventa's research points to other difficulties relating to Lukes' theory, especially the ethnographic base of his study. Gaventa, early on in his work discusses briefly the region where his research took place. Yet, he fails to provide, in any systematic way, an account of the social environment. Moreover, he neglects to consider the power

structures in place prior to the arrival of the multinational corporation. For social scientists to comprehend the experiences of the non-elite they must take into account the pre-existing power structures which help shape peoples' perceptions.

And, finally, ethical considerations present some difficulty in Lukes' theory. Although Lukes himself did not do an empirical study, the social scientist interested in adopting this perspective must consider the implications of doing social science research. Quite clearly, Lukes' theory of power implies a value judgement on what constitutes social inequality. What obligations, if any, does the social scientist have in acting upon injustices to help bring about more equitable conditions? If for instance the social scientist assumes the role of 'activist as ethnographer,' is he or she, in fact, engaging in social research or is it something quite different?

In adopting the three-dimensional perspective, I will examine the power relations in which fishers and plant workers were embedded such that their interests in preserving their life style and employment were poorly protected, and in some cases not even expressed, during the construction phase of onshore development.

1.5 Research Methodology

From the theory put forward by Lukes there are several means by which power mechanisms can be identified. More specifically, Lukes suggests that an analysis of power relations must demonstrate the "relevant counterfactual" illustrating that without A's power, B would both think and act differently (Lukes, 1974: 41). Although identifying hidden or invisible power structures is not without its difficulties, the social scientist can rely upon various modes of inquiry and methodologies to inform her, as in this case, of the various power mechanisms taking place. It is critical to this study that the mechanisms which operate to neutralize potential conflict be made visible. In so doing, one can identify the social relations of power which prevail during these encounters.

A qualitative approach is most suitable for this analysis. The social scientist, in other words, is fortunate as she can observe particular patterns of relationships and social processes in their natural habitat. This allows the social scientist to explain better the forces causing the phenomena in question and to identify the causal networks shaping such phenomena. What events, attitudes, perceptions and policies help shape these relationships? How do these forces interact to bring about the social relationship under investigation?

Observation and in-depth interviewing are two crucial techniques employed in qualitative research. They comprise

essentially the core of my field research carried out in Trinity-Placentia Bay. The early stages of field work, dating back to September, 1990, entailed primarily participant observation in the communities of Sunnyside, Arnold's Cove and Come By Chance, which constitute the main socio-economic impact area in the region. During this initial period of field work much of my role as a social scientist is described best, according to Babbie, as the participant-as-observer (Babbie, 1989: 265). Interaction with nonactors and nonleaders was crucial as it allowed me to probe and understand more fully peoples' attitudes, perceptions and conditions and to understand whether or not their experiences had been shaped by power relations. In addition, I attended, assuming the role of observer-as-participant, local community meetings where issues critical to local residents more generally, and fishers and plant labourers in particular, were considered. Here, observations were made to confirm how patterns of power and powerlessness exclude key issues from arising and prevent actors from acting. Moreover, the mechanisms which operate to neutralize contradiction or potential conflict became evident as actors began to negotiate. In total, 27 meetings were attended: three monitoring meetings organized by ISER Offshore (discussed in later chapters) from Memorial University of Newfoundland; fourteen local community meetings comprising the Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee, representatives from

both the provincial government and Mobil Oil; and ten local community meetings with the Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee. In addition, two years and five months of minutes were consulted.

The core of this study, however, rests on semi-structured interviews with fishers engaged in fish harvesting in the Bull Arm region of Trinity Bay, Newfoundland. A snowball sample was taken of 25 fishers from the communities of Sunnyside, Arnold's Cove, Bellevue and Norman's Cove. (From this sample nine fishers were interviewed twice, once during the negotiation process of the compensation agreement and the second time following the signing of the contract.) This sample, moreover, includes all the skippers from the four communities who were involved with the negotiations with the oil company. In addition, eight fish plant workers were interviewed, four of them twice, (once during the negotiation period followed by a second interview after the agreement was signed). The interview process itself is critical as it allows one to consider the subjective effects of power relations. Do fishers and plant labourers feel powerless? Are their perceptions shaped by power relations? What are the social forces that help shape participation patterns of the relatively powerless? Are these social forces the same for men and women? If not, how are they different and what impact, if any, does this difference have for fishers and plant labourers?

Interviews (32 in all) were also held with community leaders who occupy local positions of mayor, community supervisor, government administrator and local committee representatives. These key informants are by virtue of their positions closely linked to institutional and decision making bodies in the community. More importantly, they are informed of the issues concerning development strategies and are instrumental in their implementation. Concurrently, meetings were held with representatives of the provincial Department of Environment and Lands, the Hibernia Management Development Company (HMDC), Newfoundland Offshore Development Construction (NODECO), the Fishermen Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAWU), Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board and PCL-Aker Stord-Steen-Becker. These interviews have enabled information to be gathered on how the interests of fishers and plant labourers were managed and considered by the oil company, its main contractor and the provincial government.

Finally, secondary sources were examined, in particular the 'Fisheries Code of Practice,' which outlines the fishers' compensation program. More generally, impact assessment reports and environmental protection plans will be incorporated into the analysis as they illustrate clearly what groups were represented during the negotiations and whose 'real' interests were being served.

In the remaining chapters, two through six, I provide an account of the impact of rapid economic growth on local residents.

Chapters two and three provide a context for the thesis. Chapter two is essentially an overview of the history of the offshore petroleum sector in the province of Newfoundland since its beginning, whereas chapter three presents a description of the research area in Trinity Bay and the structure of the local fishery. Chapter four examines fishers' and plant labourers' early experiences with the oil company and how power relations were first established in the region. Chapter five then addresses how patterns of prevalence once established are, in fact, enduring despite the many inequalities occurring in Bull Arm. The second part of this chapter, the collapse of consent, examines what happened after Gulf Oil pulled out of the Hibernia project in February of 1992. And finally, chapter six, the conclusion and summary, will provide an overview of the analysis and arguments raised in this work. These arguments, moreover, tell us much about what future research should be conducted in both theoretical and empirical areas. To conclude, I will draw on the relevance of this thesis for a discussion of agency and structure and how I have attempted to reconcile them into a coherent argument.

Chapter 2

'Hibernia means dignity; dignity for all Newfoundlanders' The History of the Offshore Oil Industry in Newfoundland

You could hear the clinking of tumblers as fellow Tories raised their glasses to commemorate one another and their leader, Brian Peckford, for having 'taken on the feds' in the jurisdictional dispute over the management of offshore resources. Tory mania, or Peckfordism, as some would call it, was at its peak (Johnstone, 1986). Peckford's vibrant manner had successfully replaced the old style politics from the Smallwood era, enjoyed by so many Newfoundlanders. His enthusiasm and often candid articulation were welcomed by many, contributing further to a sense of pride among local people that had been shattered during the previous Liberal government's term in office. The government spared no expense for this lavish affair as more than 500 staunch Conservatives gathered from all regions of the province to witness the signing of what was later to be recognized as Peckford's greatest accomplishment, the Atlantic Accord. The Tory party, enjoying the majority of seats in the House of Assembly at this time, hosted one of the more exorbitant events surrounding the saga of the oil industry in Newfoundland. As Peckford assumed his position in front of the stage, Conservatives

steadfast in their faith applauded with such vigour that one could almost feel their exhilaration. "Today marks a watershed in the development of Newfoundland," Peckford proclaimed. "It signals a dramatic turning point in the history of this place. The document being signed here today on offshore mineral resources is tangible evidence of that fact" (Peckford, 1985).

This chapter will provide a context in which one can understand more fully the power relations between fishers and the oil industry by setting out the history of the offshore petroleum sector in the province of Newfoundland. In other words, I will discuss the salient events and processes which led up to the present day situation primarily through descriptive detail of Newfoundland's experiences with the petroleum sector. While the focus of this chapter lies predominantly with various stages of oil development in the industry and the subsequent passing of state legislation, I will, nonetheless, attempt to make clear the structural apparatus in place. In order to comprehend fully the experiences of actors, including how they perceive resource development, one must recognize the larger macro structures that help shape people's experiences.

2.1 Understanding Development

As Canada's youngest province, Newfoundland and Labrador, entered into Confederation in 1949, little was known of the vast petroleum resource that lay buried beneath the sea.

Newfoundland's economy, at the time of union, was based on the staples of fish, forest products, and, to a far lesser extent, minerals. Central among these was, of course, the fishery. Yet, exploitation of these staple commodities did not bring about economic growth as promised by political leaders during their quest for election to public office. Poor management and state policies including ineffective, if not controversial, development strategies left the province in a highly precarious state, where it still remains on the periphery of an advanced industrialized society. According to dependency theorists, Newfoundland fell quickly into the classic pattern of underdevelopment (Archibald, 1971; House, 1985; Matthews, 1983), a theory popularized in the late 1960s by A. G. Frank (1967) and his colleagues to explain the predominant experience of Latin America. Maritime scholars in general, and regional social scientists in particular, have borrowed, and since modified, these explanations to account for development patterns in Newfoundland by arguing that it is not only underdeveloped, but dependent both economically and politically (House, 1985; 1981). Underdevelopment, argues House (1981), occurs within a dependent region in that dominant centre economies exploit the resources of dependent peripheries (House, 1981: 435-436). These resources are, for the most part, exploited in a dynamic way by an external dominant economy that receives most of the financial rewards. This

history has strongly shaped the direction of offshore petroleum development in Newfoundland since the first exploration permits were issued in 1963. And, it is within this social historical context of the development issues that perplex Newfoundland society that one must understand future resource development.

The position taken by both provincial and federal governments to rely upon multinational corporations to develop the oil fields off the coast of Newfoundland may further constrain economic development in the province. As House (1985) points out, most, if not all, of these multinational corporations have their main office located outside of Canada. The ramifications this will have, according to House (1985), are that Newfoundland, at best, could hope to attain some form of dependent development (House, 1985: 102). The risk, of course, is that development of offshore oil will follow a path similar to that in other resource sectors such as the mining industry or hydro-electricity.[1] The difference between these two development paths, dependent development and underdevelopment, is, however, critical. Underdevelopment, on the one hand, will mean that most financial benefits will go to outside companies, while local people enjoy short-term employment opportunities and some business gains. The implica-

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[1] See House (1985) for a more thorough discussion of these events.

tions of this development path is that oil, in the long-term, will not be "used as a vehicle for development" (House, 1985: 103). Dependent development, on the other hand, would presuppose that some revenues from offshore oil would, in turn, be reinvested in the province. Moreover, local residents would participate more fully in offshore activity by acquiring the needed skills through some kind of partnership with the oil companies, thus enabling them to compete in the market. Although exploitation[2] does seem to characterize many oil companies' interactions with other places, both inside Canada and elsewhere, until more recently, House (1985; 1981) suggests that petroleum industries have employed strategies of "incorporation" since establishing operations in Newfoundland (House,1985: 119; 1981: 436). Incorporation implies the "inclusion of peripheral people in the master institutions of a larger society" (House, 1981: 436). (Incorporation, however, applies only to the island of Newfoundland and excludes Labrador, which shares features of exploitation not unlike oil development in the Third World [House, 1981: 119]) According to House (1985; 1981), oil companies have attempted to establish a new image of good corporate citizenship. Moreover, he suggests that these multinational oil corporations in general, and Mobil Oil in particular, have dramatically

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[2] Exploitation in the sense of the extraction of the value of resources.

altered their relationship with host nations and have demonstrated further an interest in establishing some form of positive public relations with local communities.

While this may be true, one must bear in mind that oil companies act not in the interests of society, except insofar as those interests are compatible with their own, but rather in the interests that are more consistent with the philosophy of corporate growth and profit (House, 1985; Marchak, 1979). Multinational corporations, moreover, utilize human labour and technologies as resources. As Marchak (1979) points out, these resources are most often managed by corporations so that technology, labour, and knowledge become harnesses to corporate growth and not social welfare (Marchak, 1979: 12). According to Giddens (1979), resources are the "media through which power is exercised, and structures of domination reproduced" (Giddens, 1979: 91). Viewed in this way, power is not conceptualized as a resource, but rather it comes to be understood as the "capacity to determine conditions of existence" for large portions of the social world (Marchak, 1979: 15). The exercise of power by multinational corporations, therefore, is not an example of an 'act,' but more a routine and regularized phenomena (Giddens, 1979: 91).

2.2 Exploration: 1963 - 1990

Exploration off the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador began in 1966 with the first well drilled on the Grand Banks. By the end of the decade one additional well had been drilled followed by a rapid increase by the 1970s, which saw the total number of wells drilled expand to 62 - 40 on the Grand Banks, 17 off the coast of Labrador and 5 off the northeast coast of Newfoundland (House, 1985: 104; Shrimpton and Storey, 1991: 2). This increased pace of exploration quickly brought Newfoundland onto centre stage as a major location for the international petroleum industry. By the mid-1970s 11 oil companies, including five of the Canadian subsidiaries of the seven sisters had established themselves as operators in the province. (The seven sisters include Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, Imperial and BP (House, 1985: 104).) It was at the peak of this exploratory activity that Newfoundland began to promote its claim of jurisdictional control over offshore resources which resulted in the need for all oil companies to obtain both provincial and federal permits. Newfoundlanders, unfortunately, benefitted little from seismic and drilling activity during much of this period as most economic benefits were secured by foreign vessels and their crews. This pattern, however, did not persist long after 1976 when Brian Peckford was appointed provincial Minister of Mines and Energy under the new Conservative administration.

Although the Liberal government was defeated in 1971, no substantial change was evident in petroleum policies or over jurisdictional claims until Peckford assumed his position as Energy Minister. The true change in power, therefore, was between Smallwood and Peckford, with Moores (the first Conservative premier to follow Smallwood) acting as a transitional figure. The new "Peckford movement," House argued, sought to restructure economic development policies around provincial control over resource industries (House, 1985: 43-44). This new era of resource management was best illustrated in the 1977 'Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas.' While these guidelines, today, have no legal standing under the Atlantic Accord, they remained significant until 1983 as oil companies operating in the province agreed to abide by them to that date. More importantly, however, this legislation assisted Newfoundlanders in both obtaining employment and generating local business activity. Newfoundland firms expanded into business ventures in the areas of supply boats and light fabrication as well as witnessing an increase in hiring of local residents. Until the mid 1980s the offshore work force was comprised entirely of men with the overwhelming majority of the crew coming from the urban centre of St. John's (Fuchs et al.,1981). By 1985, however, women had gained greater access, albeit marginally, to offshore employment

where they represented 1.7 percent of the Newfoundland offshore labour force (Anger et al.,1985: 85).

Not long after the 1977 provincial legislation, the federal government under P. E. Trudeau sought to introduce its own national energy policy similar to the more "interventionist" strategy previously adopted by the Newfoundland government (Johnstone, 1986). While the energy policy promoted energy self sufficiency, Canadian ownership coupled with increasing business and employment opportunities, the preservation of the social and biophysical environment, and Petro-Canada as an active partner in all development, it, nonetheless, crippled relations between Ottawa and the province. The new 'national policy', passed by the House of Commons in 1981, was seen by local officials as another attempt by the federal government to assert control over offshore resources.

Although there was a temporary slowdown in exploration and seismic activity, instigated by the oil industry, in retaliation against the 1977 provincial legislation, activity was soon underway as energy prices increased combined with federal government incentives to encourage frontier drilling. Probably the most significant factor influencing further exploratory work, however, was the discovery of the Hibernia P-15 well on the Grand Banks in 1979. Hibernia, Canada's largest oil field (House, 1985), quickly brought Newfoundland into the offshore arena as a central player. Located 315 km east-southeast of

the capital city, St. John's, the oilfield was initially thought to contain more than a billion barrels of oil. Further investigation, however, estimates the recoverable reserves to be between 525 and 650 million barrels (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991: 7). The discovery well brought with it, moreover, a "flurry of speculative activity" in the St. John's region which caused housing prices to escalate coupled with an increased demand for rental units (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991: 6; Shrimpton, 1986). The added demand for office space also became apparent in the St. John's area and encouraged the subsequent construction of new buildings in the downtown region. This scurry of development, however, was not without its costs as the availability of lower income residential units diminished, causing many to seek subsidized housing (Shrimpton, 1986: 94). By 1980 and 1981 development started to lag as the national recession and delayed offshore activity started to show their effects.

Nineteen seventy-nine also saw a change of leadership in the Conservative government. After eight years in public office, Frank Moores resigned as premier of the province and was successfully replaced by the former Minister of Mines and Energy, A. Brian Peckford. During much of the early years of the Peckford era, offshore oil and gas development became a prominent issue for political debate. Not long after the initial Hibernia discovery, settling the offshore jurisdiction

claim began to take prominence as developing the oil field would be further delayed without some form of settlement. Much of the early 1980s, therefore, was marked by federal and provincial disputes over the rightful ownership of the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore. A resolution of this rather contentious issue was reached in March, 1984, when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled unanimously in Ottawa's favour by granting jurisdictional control to the federal government (House, 1985: 60).

Peckford, however, was not content with the Supreme Court ruling as he, and his associates, set out on a national campaign across Canada arguing for "a fair deal." Negotiations with the federal government culminated with a response from, then Leader of the Opposition, Brian Mulroney, recognizing joint management of offshore resources with Newfoundland being the principal beneficiary of the wealth from oil and gas off its shores (House, 1985: 60). Finally, one year after the Supreme Court decision a federal-provincial agreement establishing the rules for offshore development was concluded with both levels of government signing the document, known as The Atlantic Accord, on the eleventh day of February, 1985. After six long years of ardent debate, the signing of the Accord brought an end to the conflict between Ottawa and the province.

Since the Hibernia discovery in 1979, numerous reports and studies have been submitted to both federal and provincial governments. Shortly after the signing of the Accord, in February, 1985, Mobil Oil presented an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to a joint federal-provincial panel as required under the Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Assessment Act (1980) (EIS, 1985). Following this report public hearings were held in the Fall of 1985, when Newfoundlanders were able to voice their concerns pertaining to further development of the Hibernia field. After 11 days of hearings that included 66 oral presentations and 90 written documents, the panel submitted in December, 1985, their evaluation of the project along with 50 recommendations for consideration before proceeding to the next phase of development (HEAP, 1985). Concurrently, Mobil submitted for approaval by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOBP) a report on the Benefits Plans, which was accepted in June, 1986 (CNOBP, 1990).

After the Board's consideration of the recommendations from the panel and the Benefits and Development Plans, which are not open to public review, the Board gave its approval for the continued development of the Hibernia Project. By July, 1988, the approval was formalized and the Statement of Principles signed by the government of Canada, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the oroponent (CNOBP,

1990: 8). Two years later in September, 1990, the Hibernia Development Project agreement was signed by both orders of government and the project consortium. Over the following few weeks, federal Members of Parliament and Senators alike debated the Hibernia Project Act, Bill C-44. On October, 29, 1990 the Bill received its third and final reading. The signing of the 1990 agreement also brought with it the final epilogue to the exploration phase of the Hibernia oil field, when the consortium of oil companies (comprising Chevron, Petro-Canada, Mobil and, before its withdrawal, Gulf) formed the Hibernia Management Development Company (HMDC), which assumed responsibility for the construction and operation of the Hibernia facilities (CNOBP, 1990).

2.3 Development Phase: 1990 to the Present

Although the signing of the agreement to develop the Hibernia oil field in the Fall of 1990 demonstrates a commitment by the primary operator, Mobil Oil, to pursue development off the east coast, the agreement was not without its costs. In terms of financial support the federal government has agreed to pay 25 percent of the project's construction costs (up to maximum of $1.04 billion) and will, in addition, provide loan guarantees for 40 percent of these costs (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991: 10). As articulated by a senior official at the signing ceremony, the primary interest of the federal government in

agreeing to these conditions was to assist the province in overcoming regional disparity.

The second phase of activity, the onshore construction, is the stage in which maximum social and economic impacts occur, particularly for those communities that lie within the impact region (House, 1985). While the construction phase for any oil field does not usually exceed five years, it is followed by an extended production stage during which hydrocarbons are extracted from beneath the sea. The most recent estimates of the life of the Hibernia field suggest that it will produce for a period of 18 years (CNOBP, 1990), with peak production occurring in the fourth year of development (House, 1985).

During the early stages of planning for the construction phase, a floating production system was the preferred technological design as it would be more easily manoeuvred away from potentially damaging icebergs (House, 1985: 12). Since the initial development stages, however, Mobil has planned for a fixed concrete platform, the Gravity-Based Structure (GBS). Local politicians argued in support of the GBS design as it would create substantial employment opportunities for Newfoundlanders. This stage, then, will comprise the constructing of the GBS as well as the topside facilities for the production platform (Shrimpton and Storey, 1991: 7). Immediately following the 1990 agreement to develop the Hibernia field, it

was announced that NODECO (Newfoundland Offshore Development Corporation) was the successful contractor with full responsibility for development of the construction site. The development site itself encompasses 100 square km and will require $200 million, at the minimum, to develop.

Early discussions of the construction phase focused around the possibility of onshore development taking place in Adam's Head, Placentia Bay. Since that time the proponent has chosen an alternate location on the opposite side of the Isthmus of Avalon in Great Mosquito Cove, Bull Arm, Trinity Bay (CNOBP, 1990:24). The new site is close to Adam's Head with a distance of 12 km separating the two locations. More importantly, however, Great Mosquito Cove in Bull Arm remains within the same socio-economic impact area of Trinity-Placentia Bay. The decision to relocate the construction project to alternate grounds was due primarily to the increased water depth for the drydock location. Deeper water in Trinity Bay extends nearer to shore operations and thus time spent transporting materials would be reduced (CNOBP, 1990: 24). Secondly, and for purposes of this research, more importantly, Trinity Bay was chosen for onshore construction as it would cause less disruption to the inshore fishery - the fishery in Placentia Bay supports approximately 400 fishing men and women.

Although the change in location from Adam's Head to Great Mosquito Cove will not show much variation in the socio-economic milieu, the biophysical environment (including the fishery) is entirely different. The Environmental Impact Statement Mobil submitted to the provincial government in 1985 made clear the potential impacts on the natural environment in Placentia Bay. The report, however, did not include a discussion of Trinity Bay and the likely implications development would have on the biophysical environment in that area. Moreover, the construction of the GBS in Bull Arm was exempt from the application of the Newfoundland Environmental Assessment Act due to the added costs and time required for assessment (Department of Environment and Lands, 1990). In its place, the provincial government accepted the recommendations made in 1985 by the Federal-Provincial Review Panel. One of these recommendations states that any environmental disturbance resulting from the onshore development phase "may be reduced to an acceptable level or eliminated by the application of mitigation measures" (Department of Environment and Lands, 1990). The government, however, did require the project proponent to submit an Interim Environmental Protection Plan for the first 180 days of onshore development in Great Mosquito Cove. While the government claims that "public interest would best be served" by adopting this strategy, the inshore fishers of Trinity Bay do not share the government's

same optimism. As expressed by one fisher from Bellevue: "Its no good to do all these studies now when they're started to build over there. The damage to the fishery will already be done...and then what, what will Mobil do then for the fishermen?"

The 12 years that separated the Hibernia discovery and its development allowed for a thorough assessment of the potential impacts related to this stage of activity and designing of appropriate management strategies to counter any unforeseeable problems that may arise. While one could argue that both time and money were well spent on assessment and developing management approaches, the present government and main contractor (NODECO) have been slow to implement the management tools available to them. Almost two years after the project commenced, there was still no formal process through which all three parties, the government, the community and the industry, could collectively resolve issues. Regrettably, Newfoundland's opportunity to both optimize and control the effects of onshore development may be lost through lack of commitment to impact management.

In February, 1992, the Hibernia project experienced another ill-fated turn of events when Gulf oil announced it was withdrawing. Uncertainty was abound as rumours circulated throughout the province of the possible new investors in the troubled project. By early Spring there was much talk of

foreign interest as government officials tried to remain optimistic. Yet, the construction site in Great Mosquito Cove was experiencing massive lay-offs followed by a reduction in staff at both HMDC and NODECO offices. Until a new partner could be found, the provincial government agreed to support the project for a six month period. As Japanese investors soon lost interest in the Hibernia project, rumours of Texaco as a possible new partner quickly surfaced. Local people, however, had little faith in either the provincial government's ability to find a new partner or in Texaco's supposed interest in joining the project. Texaco confirmed many of these uncertainties when it announced in early January of 1993 that it would not invest in the Hibernia project. As one of the local mayors claimed, Texaco's decision has:

> had no affect on the people at all. They couldn't care less if the Hibernia went ahead or not. I can't see one person in the community being bothered. It's like watching a house fire in Detroit, it has little affect on us here. Maybe this community has hardened to this sort of thing because of the refinery. It's opened now and will stay open God willing, but it was closed for some 13 years. We survived it alright, people around here are used to these sorts of things happening.

By mid January of 1993, however, new partners were found for the Hibernia project; Murphy Oil from El Dorado, Arkansas and the federal government had agreed to invest 6.5 percent and 8.5 percent respectively. To make up the additional 10 percent of Gulf's share - which was originally 25 percent - both Chevron and Mobil Oil invested a further five percent

each. The new consortium as of January 15, 1993 consisted of the following: Chevron Canada Resources - 21.87 percent; Chevron-Hibernia - 5 percent; Mobil Oil - 28.12 percent; Mobil-Canada Hibernia - 5 percent; Murphy Oil - 6.5 percent; Petro Canada - 25 percent; and the federal government (The Canada Hibernia Corporation) - 8.5 percent.

Construction at the Bull Arm site quickly returned to its earlier level of activity prior to Gulf Oil's withdrawal as employment rates started to increase steadily. By late May of 1993, the first concrete for the gravity-based structure was poured. To mark this rather symbolic occasion a heavily publicised ceremony took place in Great Mosquito Cove where both provincial and federal politicians once more reaffirmed their belief in the project. While Hibernia is considered by many provincial politicians as a catalyst for economic development, elsewhere in Canada it is seen as a giant make work project. The 'dignity' that Hibernia was to bring to Newfoundlanders has slowly disappeared and, in its place one finds much pessimism and doubt. At the time of writing this thesis peoples' attitudes remain unchanged and controversy about hiring practices is today the main concern for local residents. By late May of 1993, people's frustrations about lack of local employment opportunities had resulted in demonstrations and protest outside the construction site. In defense of the protestors, one of the local mayors argued

that: "People don't care what job they do or how much they're going to get paid, all they want is work. ...Where is the justice to this?"

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the petroleum industry in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador since the first exploratory permits were issued in the early 1960s. To understand fully how the province will experience offshore development, it is necessary, I contend, to map out Newfoundland's former development path as it provides a context in which one can understand present events. Newfoundland's tainted history of past resource development has helped shaped much of the present day situation. Social scientists, and politicians alike, therefore, would do well to be sensitive to past histories, cultures and regional struggles. While the remaining portion of the chapter is concerned primarily with a descriptive account of how the offshore industry proceeded in the province, it does, nonetheless, illustrate the larger structure in which the oil industry exists and which subsequently helps to shape its future.

Chapter 3

'Out here in these parts'
The Research Setting

In the distance you could see a trail of grey smog indicating that the turn-off for Sunnyside was near. The Come By Chance oil refinery had become my land mark over the past two and a half years sine I first set out on this project back in the Fall of 1990. It is now early March of 1993, and my field work is drawing to a close. This will be one of the last field trips I make across the Trans Canada Highway to Trinity-Placentia Bay - the impact region where onshore development is taking place. Just beyond the small wooded area past the sign for Southern Harbour lies a small body of water where men and women ice fish during much of the winter. This is the time of year, however, when the ice is still frozen on the rocks; ice formations hang from these cliffs and on the rare occasion when the sun shines through the clouds these icicles seem to glisten. While few trees grow in this barren part of the island, there are certain favourite places where you can see men and young boys labouring together as they haul timber from the woods. Wildlife is also plentiful in these parts where moose crossings are an all too familiar occurrence.

Turning off the main highway and into the town of Sunnyside I make my way to the town council office for one last interview. As I enter the community I can see Elwood's boat tied up at the government wharf where it has been sitting for several months. The wharf seems to be a favourite spot for local youth to skate and play their much loved sport of ice hockey.

The community seems quiet, but not unusually so, with only the odd person strolling "in around da' road." The narrow bay of Bull Arm is frozen and for a brief moment seems almost serene. I recall the first year I came out to Sunnyside, when you could look across the narrow Arm and see it filled with many small fishing vessels. The sun rises over this bay each morning casting an almost orange tinge between the sky and tree tops. The early morning tranquillity is soon lost, however, by the sounds of development coming from Great Mosquito Cove.

The old dirt road that leads to the municipal office is a much slower drive as the pot holes and mounds in the road demand that one proceed with caution. The drive up the slope is rather slow and intentional as I take in some of the last familiar sights. Just beyond the old tattered fishing stage, there are several old wooden boats that lie abandoned on the bank. Further along on the opposite side of the road, you can see the Whalen's many lobster pots stacked one on top of the

other and leaning against the old skipper's shed. Looking out over the village from the top of the hill I could smell fumes from the oil refinery which quickly reminded me of the industrial pollution that already exists in these rural parts. As I began to approach the newly renovated building, I started to wonder what Bull Arm would look like five years later. How will it have changed; how will fishers and their families survive? Maybe Eli was right after all, perhaps 'fish and oil don't mix.'

This chapter provides a description of the social and economic environment where onshore development is taking place. Moreover, attention focuses on the fishery and how it is organized in these rural communities. The research includes, however, only those fishers who harvest the catch within the immediate impact area of Bull Arm, Trinity Bay. Those that fish beyond Bull Arm or in other bodies of water are not included in this work.

3.1 Trinity-Placentia Bay

Situated on the southeast coast of the island of Newfoundland and approximately 165 km west from the capital city of St. John's, are the many small villages, bays, harbours and inlets where much of my field work took place (see map 3.1). More than 30 settlements are situated on this narrow rocky isthmus which joins the Avalon Peninsula to the main part of the

3.1 Trinity-Placentia Bay, Newfoundland



Source: Environmental Protection Plan by NODECO, St. John's (1991: Vol.1)

island. To the northeast lies Trinity Bay and to the south-west, Placentia Bay. The small towns dispersed among the many shores and coves are distinct from one another with their own histories, folklore and geographic boundaries. Many of these settlements, however, are small with populations often fewer than 700. Six thousand households make up the impact area for onshore development and include those communities which are dispersed in between Long Harbour and Clarenville. They are, in other words, the settlements which fall within a 50 km radius of the Great Mosquito Cove construction site.

The land along this rocky isthmus is poor and unsuitable for cultivation. Much of the area is barren where the soil has little ability to sustain some form of permanent pasture. As a result, few trees grow, particularly in and around Bull Arm, as the rock is buried thinly under a layer of soil (NODECO, 1991). The climate in the area is harsh; the winds are high and the fog and drizzle, at times, seem unrelenting. Unlike Placentia Bay, Trinity Bay freezes over every year from mid January to March, where offshore pack-ice covers much of the Bay. Yet, despite the stark physical features, people have settled along these shores for hundreds of years.[1] Histori-

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[1] Archaeological digs in the communities of Arnold's Cove and Sunnyside have uncovered some evidence of Dorset and perhaps Beothic pre-European habitation. More specifically, historical data suggest that Great Mosquito Cove was used from as early as 1500 years ago.

cally, those living in the numerous villages survived by combining an inshore cod fishery with subsistence activity.

3.2 The Socio-economic Environment

Rural communities similar to those found in Trinity-Placentia Bay are the areas most often affected by resource exploitation. These settlements are usually politically weak and poorly organized to take an effective part in the planning for industrial development. As the history of this area shows, Trinity-Placentia Bay is no exception where attempts to industrialize and stimulate economic growth have been initiated without much success.

The people who live in these rather barren parts of the island have had to bear the impact of various failed development projects and government policies implemented over the past several decades. An oil refinery in Come By Chance has reopened after a thirteen year closure and is once again experiencing difficulty.[2] While the refinery brings much needed employment to the area, the residents must endure the fumes and stench which linger over neighbouring communities in exchange for local jobs. Further along the isthmus in the town

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2 The Provincial Refining Company (PRC) oil refinery in Come By Chance was constructed in 1971 and began operations in 1973. In 1976, however, the plant closed and did not begin operations again until 1991. See Felt and Carter (1980) for details.

of Long Harbour, other environmental effects resulting from improper regulation and development controls have persisted. Ponds are still heavily laden with contaminants from the town's phosphorous plant after its most recent closure. Yet, in spite of the many environmental impacts the residents of Long Harbour have experienced, the most significant being the 'Red Herring Scare' in the 1960s,[3] residents have been faced more recently with the possibility of hosting another potentially hazardous project - an incinerator to burn American garbage. But as one of the members of the town council stated, "Now that the plant has closed people will accept just about anything at all if it means they'll get their stamps."

While many of the past development policies of the former liberal and conservative governments have failed to bring about any long-term economic growth, many unanticipated social ramifications of development still remain today. The town of Arnold's Cove, a fishing settlement with fewer than 35 families in the early 1960s, was identified as a 'growth centre' under the Smallwood government's controversial 'resettlement' program. By 1967, however, it had become the

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3 In 1969 contaminants from the Erco Phosphorous plant in Long Harbour spilled into the ocean where it contaminated various fish habitat, particularly herring. The result, however, was that the fishery had to be closed for three months until the level of pollution in the sea had returned to acceptable standards. See Legge (1982) for a discussion of the social, economic and environmental impacts of the ERCO Phosphorous plant.

place of residence for more than 200 families.[4] Local townspeople today continue to speak of their family homes being floated on barges across the bay from Tack's Beach and Kingwell and from Woody Island to Spencer's Cove, to name but a few. Although more than fifteen years have passed since the resettlement program was first introduced, many still refer to their home community as the place in which they were born. "We go back to Woody Island every year," commented the school's vice principal, "and when I retire in the next few years we'll be going back for good... there's no place like it."

Yet, in different ways, the many small inlets, coves and harbours are rich with "social vitality," custom and tradition (Matthews, 1976). Most of these communities, for example, have a communal place where locals gather to participate in idle chatter and community gossip. In some settlements the common meeting space is the general store, while in other nearby towns it is the post office or government wharf. The youth, on the other hand, congregate in a different space where they tend to cluster together in greater numbers. Similar to many other rural outports in Newfoundland, men and women in these communities engage in gender specific activities. For the most part, men hunt moose, caribou and other small game, haul wood

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4 For a more detailed discussion of the resettlement program see Ralph Matthews (1983), **The Creation of Regional Dependency.**

and build their own home in conjunction with neighbours and other male kin. Women, on the other hand, make their own bread and preserves, care for children, make crafts, pick berries, fish recreationally and maintain a tidy home, which for many is a source of great pride.

In many of these small villages, it is common to find family members living alongside one another. While this seems to be a custom practised primarily by male kin, women, on the other hand, often marry into their husband's communities where they then live in close proximity to their new partners' families. As Davis (1983) points out, social change in the traditional Newfoundland outport has not caused disintegration or some form of social malaise as many scholars at one time thought. Instead, Davis argues that "cultural homogeneity and the integrity of the family has been maintained" (Davis, 1983: 3). Yet, some local residents in Trinity Bay spoke of how certain customs and traditions of the past were seldom practised today. According to Pearl, an elderly women from Sunnyside: "You don't see no mummers like you used to at one time. At Christmas you always had mummers coming to your door."[5] Just beyond Bull Arm, in Bellevue, a fisher described how social relations have changed within the community as he

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[5] Mummering means to participate in group activities (which normally include song and dance), while dressed in disguise. The custom most often takes place around Christmas time.

recalled how fishers years ago would labour together with others in providing assistance to local fishing crews. He stated:

> People are more independent now... Years ago if you had to get your boat out of the water you had the whole community to help. But not now, you can get it done yourself because we got the technology to do it... Lifestyles and attitudes are changing. The old ways of doing things was best, but we are gradually fading away from it... This is all changing in my life time. It's one of the disadvantages of progress.

3.3 The Main Impact Area

The socio-economic impact area for onshore development is those communities which fall within a 5 km radius of the Great Mosquito Cove construction site - they include Arnold's Cove, Sunnyside and Come By Chance. Arnold's Cove is the largest of the three settlements with a population of 1,106, a relatively small decrease since 1986 when the census reported 1,117 inhabitants. Sunnyside and Come By Chance are much smaller communities with populations of 622 and 296 respectively (see Table 3.1 for details). Whereas Sunnyside's population had decreased (-1.9 percent change from 1986), Come By Chance had experienced considerable growth of 11.3 percent since 1986. Much of this increase, however, can be attributed to the reopening of the Come By Chance oil refinery.

TABLE 1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSTRUCTION IMPACT AREA

	Arnold's Cove	Come-by-Chance	Sunnyside	Nfld.
Population				
1986	1117	266	634	568,350
1991	1106	296	622	568,474
% change 1981-86	-0.6	-21.1	-9.8	0.1
% change 1986-91	-1.0	11.3	-1.9	0
Incomes				
Median income: men	$14,316	$12,777	$13,408	$13,721
Median income: women	$7,553	$8,610	$6,220	$7,471
Composition of Income				
% Employment	65.4	67.3	68.1	73.4
% Gov't. transfer	25.2	25.6	30.9	21.2
% Other income	5.5	7.1	1.0	5.4
Education and Labour Force				
<G9 education as % of pop. 15 and over	37.2	25.6	33.3	26.6
Labour force participation: men	74.4	71.4	67.7	70.2
Unemployment rate: men	19.4	33.3	19.0	24.6
Labour force participation rate: women	46.2	55.6	50.9	48.4
Unemployment rate: women	23.3	10.0	14.8	27.1

Source: Statistics Canada, *Profiles. Newfoundland: Part 2* Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1988; Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Newfoundland - Part A.* Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992.

If one considers the larger surrounding impact area, with the exception of Clarenville which experienced a population growth of 3.5 percent, the demographic trend in the region indicates an overall decline. While population changes do vary between communities, the town of Long Harbour experienced the most significant decrease as census data report a change of -16.7 percent (Statistics Canada, 1992). One would credit the change to the recent closure of the town's phosphorous plant.

In addition to varying demographic patterns, incomes for men and women in the impact area are low, unemployment is high and 36.1 percent of residents 15 and older have attained an education level less than grade nine - which is poor even in comparison to the Newfoundland average of 26.6 percent. Occupational choices for men and women in the area are few and much of the work is temporary or seasonal. Table 3.2 provides an occupational distribution by gender that illustrates manual work as the most common occupation for both men and women. Particularly in the case of women, manual work is predominantly fish plant labour. However, one would expect the percentage employed in manual work to decrease with the advent of the cod moratorium - cod is an important species for fish plant operations.

TABLE 2: OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE BY GENDER FOR THE IMPACT AREA, 1986

	Men		Women	
Occupations	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Man. & Prof.	110	18.5	60	16.9
Clerical	30	5.0	65	18.3
Sales	20	3.4	15	4.2
Service	15	2.5	45	12.7
Manual	215	36.1	130	36.6
Primary	100	16.8	30	8.5
Other	105	17.6	10	2.8
Total	595	100	355	100

Source: Statistics Canada, *Profiles. Newfoundland: Part 2*. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1988.

Those with primary occupations are fishers. Fishing, for the most part, is a male occupation which includes 16.8 percent of the male labour force in the impact area. While 8.5 percent of women are employed in the primary sector, they fish only in those communities situated along Placentia Bay (Arnold's Cove and Come By Chance). Construction of the GBS, however, is expected to alter significantly the occupational structure in the area during the five year life of the project. Yet, changes in local residents' socio-economic status are not anticipated; local men and women are excluded from most employment and training opportunities as the

construction phase is governed by a labour agreement encompassing 14 unions.

While more peripheral communities to the north and south of the main impact area show similar patterns and characteristics, exceptions do occur. For example, the unemployment rate for the town of Clarenville was 16.6 percent in 1986, whereas Chapel Arm had an unemployment rate of 46.7 percent (Statistics Canada, 1988). Clarenville, moreover, the largest urban centre in the impact area, has a population greater than 3,000 (Statistics Canada, 1992). Due to its size and the range of services it can provide, Clarenville is expected to receive many of the project benefits, particularly in comparison to other smaller communities. Yet, perhaps the most significant difference today among these many small settlements is the fishery. Fishers all along Trinity Bay fished for northern cod; the moratorium announced last July of 1992 affects those who harvest and process the catch in these waters. Although fishers in Placentia Bay argue that their fishery too is poor, they do not fish for northern cod and, therefore, have not experienced the same disruption. In many of these outports the fishery is the economic mainstay of the community. The long-term social and economic impacts of the present crisis in the fishery, however, have yet to be realized. The experiences of a fish plant worker from Chance Cove, however, provide some

indication about what the costs of the moratorium will be. She commented:

> The day Crosbie announced the moratorium, my dear it was just like someone had died in the community. I felt lonely for the first time... It didn't feel like we were living in Chance Cove any more; like we were strangers in out own community. People couldn't believe it happened. I mean we knew the fishery was bad, but we didn't expect it to close especially after all the fishermen had geared up for the season.

3.4 Impact on the Fishery

The fishing communities that will experience direct impacts from onshore development, however, are those settlements situated along the shores of Trinity Bay, particularly Sunnyside, Chance Cove and Bellevue, and to a much lesser degree Norman's Cove. As these communities comprise the main fishery impact region they were the focal point for the field research. With the exception of those who operate one offshore fishing vessel, these fishers form part of the Newfoundland inshore fleet (see map 3.2).

In 1989, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans reported a total of 137 fishers, of whom 81 were considered full-time, from the villages of Sunnyside, Chance Cove and Bellevue.[6] Although Norman's Cove is a much larger fishing community than those reported above, only 16 fishers are affected by onshore

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6 All fisheries data were supplied by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans as reported in the Environmental Protection Plan (NODECO,1991: vol. 4).

3.2 Vessel Traffic Lane and Fisheries Exclusion Zone



Source: Environmental Protection Plan by NODECO, St. John's (1991: Vol.4)

activity. The inshore fishery in Bull Arm is an all male fishery. Yet, elsewhere in the province women have been more visible in fish harvesting (Nadel-Klein and Davis, 1988), particularly in Placentia Bay where more than 50 women fish. Fishing crews are, for the most part, organized along male kinship and friendship lines and consist of roughly two to three men in vessels that are mainly under 35 feet. Fishers, moreover, spoke about the transfer of knowledge about the resource and industry from one generation to the next. "We learned about the grounds from our father who learned from his father." Invariably, some changes have occurred as evidenced in the more recent development of the draw of fishing berths.

> Mid-February you draw the berths. That works very good. We started that because people from other places would come on our berths... It seems now that there is a break down in that tradition... The respect for people's space is gone.

With the exception of Chance Cove, all those who fish in Bull Arm today draw their berths each year.

The inshore crews fish from small open boats and almost exclusively in the bay of Bull Arm. Vessels leave the shore early each morning and return by late afternoon. The fishery in Trinity Bay is seasonal and operates from May to October each year. During normal fishing periods, activity would peak in June and July due to large landings of caplin. Cod, caplin and squid (when they are running) have been the most important species; mackerel, herring, salmon, lumpfish, turbot and

lobster have also been commercially important since 1979. Fish landings in these three villages from 1979 to 1989 averaged 3,250 tons valued at $863,000. Although fishers make use of a wide range of technologies, traps, for the most part, produce roughly half the landed value.[7]

The inshore fishery is a low investment fishery where the profit is often minimal. Fishing incomes vary in Trinity Bay with personal earnings ranging between $6,000 to $42,000 annually.[8] The Sunnyside fishery, situated in the bottom of the bay, is a small scale fishery. In comparison to other fishing villages in Trinity Bay, Sunnyside crews have invested little in the industry; they continue to fish from small wooden boats with a minimal amount of gear and technology. Many neighbouring fishers, moreover, do not consider Sunnyside fishers as legitimate fishers or what they articulate as "real fishermen."

> They're not what we considers real fishermen... The fishing in Sunnyside is different from us. They have 1 or 2 cod traps, but here there are men with 8 and 9 cod traps... Sunnyside fishermen have about $20-$30,000 of gear and in Norman's Cove we has up to $100,000 and in some case $200,000 worth of gear.

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7 Fishers in Bull Arm utilize a variety of fishing gear and technology including the following: cod traps, gillnets, trawls, capelin traps, lobster pots, jiggers, purse seine, herring nets and bar seine.

8 Personal communication with the fishery consultant from HMDC during the winter of 1990.

Similar statements were also made by plant workers as evidenced in the following comment from Sara: "Sunnyside Fishermen are not fishermen...there's just a handful of them trying to catch a few fish that's all." While Sunnyside fishers have neither much invested in the fishery nor received much of a return for their efforts, they are no less committed to the fishery than others in nearby communities. "I got me a license to fish," said one of the Sunnyside fishers, "and I'm going to use it until someone takes it from me."

The only fish processor in the fishery impact area operates a seasonal freezer plant in Chance Cove and employs about 55 people, with a double shift during the caplin season. Smith's Seafoods is the local community fish plant where only Chance Cove fishers are permitted to land their catch. The plant first opened in the early 1970s and initially employed the wives of local fishers. Much has changed since then; yet, its day to day operations continue to be performed primarily by women in a non-unionized setting. "The plant takes in everybody... Now when it started off first it was mainly fishermen's wives, but not so much now." For the most part, Smith's Seafoods will be the only plant in the area to experience direct impacts from onshore development in Great Mosquito Cove. While this view is not shared by HMDC, both plant labourers and fishers alike recognize the uncertainty ahead for those dependent on processing incomes. Similar to

many other rural fish plant operations in the province, processing work in Chance Cove very clearly means jobs for local people more generally, and in particular jobs for rural women. "Where else are we going to get jobs," Nellie responded when asked how important the plant was for the local community? "You take the plant out of Chance Cove and you got nothing," commented another. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that only members of fishing households recognized the importance of the local plant. As articulated by one of the shopkeepers in the town: "without the plant, Chance Cove would be a ghost town."

The construction of the GBS in Great Mosquito Cove has had and will continue to have serious implications for those who depend on the fishery due to the conflicting demands on Bull Arm waters. To manage and regulate Bull Arm better, HMDC produced a set of guidelines which include the details of an exclusion zone in the immediate area of Great Mosquito Cove, a formal traffic lane and a compensation package for fishers to cover any losses incurred. The exclusion zone affects primarily the fishers from Sunnyside, while the traffic lane affects those from the more distant settlements of Chance Cove, Bellevue and Norman's Cove. The compensation agreement was worked out primarily by fishers themselves - the fisher's union, the FFAWU, did little more than sign a preliminary agreement between HMDC and the inshore fishers in the winter

of 1990. The document is significant, however, as it sets precedent in offshore fishery relations; it marks the first time such an agreement had been put in place prior to any loss or damage.

The philosophy of compensation has an implicit assumption that oil industries have the right to disrupt as long as they have the desire and ability to compensate for any loss. While compensation does counteract any loss to individuals, it does not consider the disruption to the social and natural environments over the long-term. The details of the compensation agreement state that fishers' earnings would not be allowed to fall below the average of the previous five years. There was no compensation, however, for plant workers, mainly women, who process the catch. The implication to be drawn from this is that the costs of the fishery interference fall disproportionately on women employed in the fishery.

As the analysis which follows will show, the compensation arrangement between fishers and the oil industry failed to protect fishers' long-term interests and neglected the concerns of plant workers altogether.

Chapter 4

'Well, by' she's gone'
The Shaping of Power Relations

> You go for a walk now down by the harbour and you'll see fishermen with faces on down to here (as she gestured down toward her waist line.)...oh, they're right sad looking they are complaining that they've lost **'their way of life.'** No mistake they've lost their way of life. They're sitting home now on their fat fannies collecting their moratorium...if you or I lost our jobs we wouldn't be getting no hand out from the government...we'd be out there looking for another job just like everybody else... Yes girl, much craves more (December, 1992).

Newfoundlanders have long depended on the harvest from the sea as the basis of their way of life in a region where alternatives have been few. Even though fish stocks have declined the fishery nonetheless provides a livelihood for many coastal people. All too often, however, inaccurate assumptions are made about the career aspirations of fishers: for example, that they are somehow unmotivated to find employment away from a deteriorating fishery. While I do not wish to romanticize the fishery in general, and fishers in particular, I find it difficult to accept the argument that fishers only fish as a last resort. Moreover, the findings of this research indicate contradictory assumptions about fishing practices in Trinity Bay and the way of life it has come to define.

> If you don't fish it's hard to understand what it means to say it's in your blood, but it is...You got to understand that way of life...it's completely different from any other kind of job I know. By trade I'm a school teacher. But I left it to go fishing with my brother Joe and we have been fishing ever since. It's who I am I suppose, a fisherman...

If indeed fishers' intrinsic interests do lie in the preservation of fishing as a way of life, how is it that they willingly entered into an agreement with the oil industry (HMDC) where their interests were left unprotected? Why did fishers sign an agreement with HMDC that permitted further destruction to their fishery and livelihood, to their way of life? Why was there no opposition, no protest to what people thought was a blatant injustice? Why has the discourse about Hibernia never accounted for plant labourers' grievances? How is it that fishers and plant labourers came to tolerate and subsequently accept this form of inequality, where 'inaction upon injustice' is somehow seen as legitimate? This chapter will begin to explore the quiescence phenomenon by attempting to provide explanations for these questions.

I will begin this chapter by examining in some detail fishers' early perceptions of onshore development as they shed light on what they perceived to be their 'real' interests before the advent of the oil industry. To understand how fishers' perceptions were shaped or their "political consciousness stunted" (Crenson, 1971) so that they came to accept the legitimacy of the oil industry, we must first comprehend what these early experiences were and the meanings they held for inshore fishers themselves. For Lukes, this meant identifying the "relevant counterfactuals" - what

fishers would have done, in other words, were it not for the alleged exercise of power (Lukes, 1974: 46).

This analysis will be followed by an account of two-dimensional power. More specifically, it will consider the arena where fishery interests were to be managed. This will entail an examination of a three party group comprising the oil industry, the provincial government[1] and a local group organized to represent the impact area (the Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee better known as B.A.A.C.C.). This section will illustrate well Bachrach and Baratz's (1970) notion of power's 'second face' (or two-dimensional power) and how power can be wielded over deprived groups such as those employed in the harvesting and processing sectors. According to this perspective it is not only necessarily a question of who loses or wins in the struggle, but who "determines the agenda of struggle" (Parenti, 1970: 501-30). A further relevant aspect of two dimensional power will be used to consider the less visible facets of the fishery. In particular, this section will address the experiences of women employed in the processing sector and how their grievances were managed by the oil industry.

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[1] In a more detailed and comprehensive study the role of the provincial government would be considered. However, government officials in the present context were non-actors and remained largely invisible during the negotiations between HMDC and the inshore fishers.

The final section of the chapter will show how fishers' perceptions were, in fact, shaped during the course of negotiations with the oil industry so that their 'real' interests were masked by short-term economic gain. This analysis will help reveal the mechanisms of social power and how they were used to both shape and contain conflict. While much of these data will be explained according to the perspective put forth by Lukes and his notion of three-dimensional power, the interconnections of these mechanisms are indeed evident in this analysis and add further to our understanding of this social phenomenon. In other words, the three dimensions of power must be understood and viewed as "interrelated in the totality of their impact" (Gaventa, 1980: 20).

As this research is a study over time, this chapter will commence with the onset of onshore development in September, 1990, and carry through until the agreement between fishers and HMDC was reached in March, 1991.[2] (The date, March, 1991 is rather arbitrary; the majority of fishers had, by this time, signed their contract with HMDC. While fishers in Norman's Cove did not enter into the agreement until much later, they were guided by the same principles previously arranged with other inshore fishers.) The subsequent chapter

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2 The data used in this chapter were collected between September of 1990 to March of 1991, unless otherwise stated.

will address the events which occurred after March, 1991 and again after Gulf Oil pulled out in February, 1992.

4.1 The Initial Encounter

4.1.1 Understanding the 'Counterfactual'

The long awaited announcement made in the Fall of 1990 to pursue development of the Hibernia oil field brought with it a feeling of excitement and exhilaration, sentiments that Newfoundlanders, today, seldom experience. Trinity-Placentia Bay, the region to host the onshore phase, was in a flurry as residents were bustling about with anticipations of prosperity and wealth. They had, in their estimation, much to celebrate as development clearly meant opportunities for local people where alternatives have, over the years, worn thin. Residents from the surrounding impact region all the way from Long Harbour to Deep Bight were optimistic about their future. Hibernia, and Mobil Oil in particular, promised to bring benefits and growth to the local communities. "It's like being on cloud nine," uttered the mayor from Arnold's Cove, "every council meeting there is something new, a new plan for the town." Yet amid all the optimism, some reservations and uncertainty lay festering. While it would be misleading to use the term homogeneity to define the inshore fishers from Trinity Bay, they did, nonetheless, share similar concerns

about onshore development and what it could potentially mean for their social and economic survival.

The oil industry's presence has, over the years, been well known in Trinity-Placentia Bay as the industry sought early on to establish working relations with the local communities. This is not an uncommon practice among oil conglomerates as Wills illustrates in the Brent discovery off Shetland. Wills maps out how Shell, the oil consortium responsible for development, interacted with the local community by sending "smooth-talking public relations men round the village halls" with slides and various other paraphernalia, assuring local people of full consultation and cooperative working relations (Wills, 1991: 8). Even though Mobil was clearly visible in the region, it was not perceived to be by the fishers of Trinity Bay. According to one of the town clerks:

> Fishermen are like that. They are their own people, they stick together. ...when they thought Mobil wasn't going to interfere with them, they wanted nothing to do with meetings or committees.

Previous interactions between the oil and fishing sectors involved only those who fished in Placentia Bay waters - the site first chosen for the onshore phase of development. Not surprisingly, therefore, Trinity Bay fishers did not participate, nor did they wish to, in these discussions as they assumed that onshore development would not directly implicate

them or their way of life. Moreover, fishers were poorly informed about the process of assessment that had taken place over the previous 10 years. For example, they were unaware of the reports and findings contained in the EIS (Environmental Impact Statement), the HEAP (Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel) and Decision 86 documents that were crucial in protecting both the environmental and fishery interests.

> (When) we heard Bull Arm was going to be the site we had no information...We didn't want any really because we weren't going to be affected.

The decision, then, to relocate the onshore project from Placentia waters to Trinity Bay - the other side of the isthmus - left the fishers in nearby communities in a rather precarious state. Fishers experienced considerable torment about the possible threat to their way of life as they have come to know it. Onshore development "...is going to take away our livelihoods" was a comment many articulated. All along, fishers were led to believe that onshore construction would not affect their harvesting of sea resources, thus making negotiations with them unwarranted. Yet, the inshore fishers found themselves immersed in a complex set of social relations - with a multinational oil company - where they were plagued by their ignorance. The powerful and in this case a multinational oil conglomerate, often construe this ignorance as "ineffective opposition" (Barnes, 1988: 98).

While town councils and development associations in the region were busy planning future development ventures hoping to enhance some kind of economic growth, the inshore fishers situated along Bull Arm were left pondering their own future prospects. They were, in every respect, ignorant of the development project and how they would best manage their interests. Some of their apprehensions are indeed apparent in the following comments from Isaac, an older, illiterate fisher from Sunnyside. Isaac fishes with his neighbour, a father and son in a small open boat, mainly in the bottom of the bay of Bull Arm:

> I started fishing with my father when I was nine years old and I have fished all my life...I don't know how to do anything else.

As the interview continued, Isaac, rather solemnly, would interject with his own feelings of despair as he reflected upon what was soon to take place. Looking out towards Bull Arm, Isaac, shaking his head, would utter: "Well by' she's gone..." Isaac continued during the interview to repeat the same observations of how "she's gone," thereby disclosing much about the cultural significance of fishing in Trinity Bay. Isaac's experience, however, not only makes visible the importance of fishing as a way of life, but, as well, the possible risk of environment annihilation. "We don't want you poisoning our waters," stated one of the fishers belonging to

Isaac's crew as he recalled past conversations with Mobil Oil during one of their community visits.

Fishing is, indeed, important for many along the shores of Trinity Bay as it defines, in some cases, who these men are. To understand fishers 'real' interests attention must be focused on how they, themselves, define the meaning of fishing and the significance it holds for them. It is not, as some would argue, only a means of income or 'earning one's keep,' but it, in fact, means considerably more to those who engage in the harvesting of fish. Alonzo, a young skipper from Norman's Cove, started fishing with his father and uncles:

> Long before I finished school, I'd go out with Dad every chance I could get. The teachers tried to convince me to go on to university after I finished school because I finished with honours and all, but I didn't want to go. I want to fish...I enjoy being out on the water...This is what we knew growing up...and we learned it all from our father...Dad always did good in the fishery and when he died a couple of years ago we just carried on...Earl (Alonzo's brother) and me.

Alonzo and Earl did well in the fishery as their father had done before them. By comparison, the earnings of Sunnyside fishers are considerably less than other fishing communities further along the Arm. Yet, in spite of low incomes, they still share many similar sentiments toward the meaning of fishing and what it means for them to be a 'fisherman':

> (Fishing) is all I've ever known. All our life we fished together. We here in Sunnyside never got a whole hell lot of fish, but we made a living. We kept the wolf from the door... Me and me brother had a full-time job at the refinery some years back now...and we saw our boats up in

> the shed...and then seeing the boys out in the Arm. Harry, me brother said, 'I don't think I can stay all summer on land.' I liked it alright at the refinery, but it's what you gets used to. So not long after that, Harry and me quits the refinery and goes back at the fish...Fishing is important to Sunnyside. Yes my dear, it is important to the community...Sunnyside was always a fishing community. No one ever starved to death.

We cannot view fish harvesting as a 'thing-like' phenomenon occurring in Great Mosquito Cove, independent of varying interpretations; it is, as subjectivists would argue, these interpretations. Fishers do socially construct their worlds. Their actions, moreover, largely depend on how they interpret the conditions in which they find themselves. Understanding fishers' experiences, therefore, compels the subjectivist social scientist to replicate actors' interpretations of their social world in a way that is consistent with the intentions and reasons of fishers themselves. This is similar to what Giddens refers to as the "double hermeneutic":

> The conceptual schemes of the social sciences therefore express a double hermeneutic, relating both to the entering and grasping of the frames of meaning involved in the production of social life by lay actors, and reconstituting these new frames of meaning involved in technical conceptual schemes (Giddens, 1976: 79).

Fishers did not, to be sure, welcome the coming of Mobil Oil - in the Fall of 1990 Mobil Oil in conjunction with the other partners formed the Hibernia Management Development and Company (HMDC). Their early perceptions about the onshore project, however, tell us much about their attitudes toward

development prior to any oil conglomerate imposing itself on them. To this end, an argument can be made that fishers' early perceptions do, in fact, reveal their 'real' interests,' even if they do not articulate them as such or remain incognizant of them. Fishers' early experiences shed light on the apprehensions they felt development would have on their livelihood, where their way of life would become threatened and the havoc created in the natural environment all but inevitable.

Mildred, a fisherman's wife who married into the community of Chance Cove was visibly troubled by the development soon to take place in Great Mosquito Cove:

> My life solely depends on the fishery... In five or six years time there won't be no fishery with this Hibernia project here.

Mildred continued to discuss how development would hurt various habitats and the implications this would have for their economic survival: "Caplin pays your bills," she claimed, "and without it Albert may as well hang up his hat." Other accounts include that of Chester, a fisher from Bellevue who has lived in the community all his life and fished for more than twenty years with one other neighbour - except for the caplin season when their crew takes on a third member. Chester's experiences are indeed informative as he played an essential role in all negotiations between HMDC and Bellevue fishers:

> We had a lot of questions about pollution... Just a little bit of leakage over there could pollute our Arm. Fishermen aren't going to allow them (HMDC) to come in and take over...I told them you got to treat the fishermen right because one day the fishermen will respond...They're taking a lot of freedom away from the fishermen. They say they're not doing it... There's no way we can be out there working together, that is prime gill net ground. The opportunity to go over there is now gone...it was a beautiful place down there.

Other fishers from Bellevue articulated similar concerns, evidenced in the account of Thomas, one of four brothers who are considered, by many in the community, to be the 'fishermen of Bellevue.' "There were rumours they were negotiating over there" - referring to when Mobil Oil was considering changing location from Adam's Head to Bull Arm. The decision to relocate:

> was pretty short notice. We had a lot of concerns about them coming. We never before had boats coming out here in our Arm. So to bring the project here is a lot for the fishermen. ...Fishermen are being displaced. We don't know how much traffic will be in those lanes. If fishermen take their gear and move somewhere else it will infringe on the other fellow. (As the conversation continued Thomas discussed the environmental concerns which were crucial for the local fishers.) We're after addressing that (environmental issues) a few times now. It seems like the environmental effects...they are not taking it serious... This was something we mention all the time...but it seems like they never gave us no straight answers... They're all the time making excuses. ...We're worried about the under water blasting...they said blasting didn't affect the fish in Norway.

Situations which prevent others, in this case the inshore fishers, from "engaging in the process of inquiry" (Freire, 1970: 73) where limits are placed upon their access to information are a "valuable resource," Barnes would argue, in

shaping their subordination (Barnes,1988: 102). To alienate fishers, then, "from their own decision-making is to change them into objects" (Freire,1970: 73).

As the negotiations between the fishery and oil industry continued throughout the winter of 1991, much confusion about the project lingered on as fishers began to grapple with their scarce information.

> When Mobil first came out here, they told us we could get jobs on the site cause we wouldn't be able to fish. Now they're telling us we can't get jobs because of the unions...but if I takes another job while they're building I'm going to lose my license to fish. And then when it's all over in five years I got nothing.

Fishers wanting employment alternatives with the Hibernia project felt "hard done by" as HMDC did not, in their estimation, live up to what they had promised.

As onshore development proceeded, HMDC, along with local Fishermen's Committees, began to develop and later implement the procedures that fishers were to adhere to during the development phase. These negotiations, later formalized in the document 'Fisheries Code of Practice,' permitted some concerns to be brought to the fore, although fishers had, for the most part, little control over how the negotiation process was structured.[3] Some of the principles that HMDC was trying to

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[3] The FFAWU (Fishermen Food and Allied Workers Union) was, for the most part, uninvolved in negotiating the Fisheries Code of Practice. This was largely due to fishers' own request to negotiate the compensation program on their own. The role of the FFAWU, therefore, was minimal.

put forward was that fishers were to continue to fish where they could during the period of onshore construction. Without insisting that fishers continue to harvest the catch where possible, HMDC felt that most, if not all, would no longer engage actively in the fishery. As one HMDC representative stated, "Fishermen don't have much incentive to work...fishermen only fish for stamps." For some fishers, HMDC's strategy meant that they would have to relocate to other fishing grounds in other regions of the bay, which troubled many:

> It's all bad enough that they're over there doing this, but now they're telling us where to fish...It's out there in this part (Derwin pointed to the bottom of the Arm) that I fish and I don't want Mobil or anyone else telling me that I got to go outside the Arm. If Mobil are going to make this the 'exclusion area' then they compensate us for this here.

Still other fishers were clearly not interested in compensation schemes:

> I don't want no handout from Mobil Oil. ...a handout to do what, to sit home and do nothing.

More significant, was a comment stated by one of the more elderly fishers who drew attention to the dynamic occurring between fishers from different communities:

> I don't want to be fishing out there with the crews from Chance Cove or Chapel's Arm and I can assure you they don't want us. What Mobil Oil is doing is going to cause fights between the fishermen, cause if there's any fish out there to be caught they don't want us taking them.

Rapid social change in Great Mosquito Cove has undoubtedly altered the degree of control and autonomy fishers had, at one time, exercised over their own livelihood. Onshore development in and around the cove has restricted not only where fishers may pursue the harvesting of fish, but it has also curtailed their control over the environment itself. They are, moreover, alienated by the process where they no longer are the creators of their own history (Johnson et al., 1984: 123-24). In this context, alienation can be understood as being embedded in the social and economic arrangements of industrial capitalism, and not in individual deficiencies.

Although my data suggest that fishers both knew and understood their intrinsic interests in the preservation of the fishery as a way of life, as did the mountaineers in Gaventa's study, they nonetheless agreed to enter into a contractual arrangement with HMDC which contradicted those interests. Can we, then, assert that what seems to be a case of consensus among fishers was, in fact, imposed? According to Antonio Gramsci:

> ...the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes - when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in 'normal times' - that is when its conduct is not dependent and auton-

> omous, but submissive and subordinate (Gramsci, 1971: 327).

In similar fashion, I argue that fishers accepted the vision of their interests that was put to them by a dominant social group.

4.1.2 Fishers' Acquiescence

While the data illustrate fishers' apprehension toward the proposed development, these perceptions, nonetheless, changed so that fishers were neither tormented by nor articulated such apprehensions. What we, then, find in a relatively short period of time is evidence indicating support for the onshore project. Fishers came to trust HMDC, as evidenced by their lack of legal consultation when it came time to sign their individual contracts with the oil industry. The term "good faith" was used by many to describe their experience. During a dialogue between a couple of fishers from Chance Cove, one of the skippers stated: "We thought HMDC was acting in good faith when we signed that agreement." Jack, agreeing with his friend and neighbouring fisher, continued stating:

> The way Mobil Oil went was to go back five years and take your average of those earnings... When we signed that contract, we thought what we were signing was pretty good... Yes, John Banks (Project Manager for HMDC) used to come out on the first of it. The way he put it, and he knew we always fished out there, they weren't going to bully us. They were responsible people and we could work together...

Trust, as Freire (1970: 80) defines it, is essentially "contingent on the evidence which one party provides the others of his true, concrete intensions"; it breaks down when one particular party fails to act accordingly. In other words, to articulate one thing and act differently will not encourage a trusting relationship. While the fishers did, in fact, trust the oil company, they did not question, nor did they seek evidence to support their perception of HMDC's true intentions. Instead, fishers fully accepted as legitimate the actions and practices of key HMDC players.

During the winter of 1991, fishers entered into the contractual arrangement under the belief that HMDC was operating fairly and that their long-term interests were protected. "We took their word for it," commented Alonzo, a fisher from Norman's Cove. The "people were happy" with the final negotiations. Even the attitudes fishers held concerning environmental risks that were, according to fishers, "very big on everybody's mind," had changed to approval, "they assured us that nothing would be done," that is, to the environment. Other fishers explained how Paula White (the Environmental Supervisor for HMDC) "seemed to really care about what the fishermen had to say...They treated us good..." Some fishers, further along the bottom of the Bay, felt that "we've never had it so good," and that the Hibernia project was "the best thing that has happened out here in a long while." Fishers'

wants and preferences became a product of a system that distorted their 'real' or stated interests. Chester, whose early experiences with HMDC centred around the 'loss of freedom' fishers would encounter as development proceeded, later spoke of the oil industry's 'generosity' in establishing the compensation program:

> I couldn't see how much more generous they could be than they were...the compensation is set up so that the fisherman is not worse off than he was previously.

Similarly, Rayment's initial opposition in accepting 'hand-outs' from the industry was a year and a half later replaced with rather contradictory statements: "...compensation was good, the fishermen were pleased. ...Mobil had negotiated fairly." The oil company's extensive generosity had few restrictions as they continued to graciously accommodate fishery committee members throughout the negotiation period. A young fisher from Norman's Cove recalled the process well:

> Some meetings we had were in town..they (HMDC) bought all our meals, paid for our gas. Even out here they would pay for everything...Yes by' Sam (fishery consultant hired by HMDC) and them were good.

Fishers' vulnerability combined with the effective exercise of leadership over the negotiation process allowed the dominant elite to shape the elite's own legitimacy, to bring about their own consensus (Gaventa, 1980). Due consideration of this issue is crucial as it allows one to examine more closely

other emerging social processes which reshaped what were once fishers' grievances.

Fishers had, according to Freire's rather emotive term, become willing participants in a 'culture of silence,' where fishers no longer articulated their interests in preserving their culture and way of life (Freire, 1970). Negotiations between fishers and the oil conglomerate had been channelled rather abruptly in a certain direction, a direction that considered only financial compensation.

4.2 Power's Second Face

4.2.1 The Political Arena

Under what conditions and against what obstacles did fishers acquiesce, when their 'real' interests have been shown to lie in the preservation of the fishery and its associated way of life? Do we, in fact, consider fishers' willingness to sign the agreement with the oil industry to be a form of consensus? According to the pluralists, fishers would indeed have acted upon any recognized grievance as the political system is structured in such a way as to allow issues to be brought forth, either through representative leaders or through their own participation. Non-participation, then, or fishers' inaction would not be considered a political issue. The difficulty with this approach, however, is not only that it is restrictive, but that it depicts an image of the political

system that is based upon some notion of equality. As Dahl puts it:

> ...a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum (Dahl, 1961: 92).

This approach, however, fails to consider two crucial arguments as suggested by Bachrach and Baratz. First, the pluralist view is weak as it fails to account for the fact that power is often "exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 6). Secondly, pluralists such as Dahl and Polsby provide no criteria for how we are to discriminate between important and unimportant issues that arise in the political forum (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992). Bachrach and Baratz, in fact, question the very concept of power and if it can be understood as only that which is "reflected in concrete decisions" or circumstances "bearing directly upon their making" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 7). If issues are indeed prevented from arising, so too are people prevented from acting. (The study of power, therefore, must focus on who gets what, how and when they get it, and who gets left out.) When this alternative view of power is applied to groups such as the inshore fishers of Trinity Bay, explanations for quiescence and social inequalities are understood differently. These explanations, I might add, are significantly different from those found in the one-dimensional view or

the pluralist perspective and add considerably to our understanding of power relations.

Power is exercised, according to the two-dimensional approach, not only upon individuals within a decision-making process, but also towards the exclusion of certain issues and participants altogether. The question that comes to the fore, then, is how were fishery issues and grievances managed within the political arena? Were fishery issues, in fact, considered or were they relegated to what Bachrach and Baratz called non-issues? Do community political institutions reflect the issues of the people or do they help shape the nature of these issues? This section will examine the political arena and how local residents' interests were managed.

The community political arena established to manage as well as articulate the interests of local people in the Trinity-Placentia Bay area is a three partied group[4] first organized in the Fall of 1991. The new organization comprised two branches of the provincial government (the Department of Environment and Lands and the Department of Mines and Energy), the petroleum industry and the B.A.A.C.C. group (the Bull Arm Area Coordinating Committee), a local committee representing the impact region. The mandate of the new organization was

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[4] The three partied group which contains industry, government and the local community never had a formal name. Throughout this thesis I will refer to the group the same way other party members have.

essentially to act as a single umbrella group managing the interests of the local impact area with respect to three specific issue areas: a) to enhance local employment opportunities, b) to encourage and promote local business ventures and c) to articulate and monitor fishery related issues. As a three partied system they came together monthly, a formalized agenda circulated a week in advance, followed by an independent meeting of solely B.A.A.C.C. members to continue discussions or address other pertinent issues in a more private forum. Other local committees have either been replaced, dismantled or, as in the case of the 'Concrete Platform Advisory Committee,' continue to operate in some rather vague capacity. For local residents, the new structure meant an immediate link to government as well as to the oil consortium - although this objective was seldom realized as it was originally conceived.

In theory, control over the agenda was not an authoritarian process, but rather one in which maximum participation by all governing bodies was encouraged. Ideally, all parties would submit to the Chair of the B.A.A.C.C. group issues to be brought forth during the next formal meeting, where the issues would then appear on the agenda. Yet, this process seldom materialized. B.A.A.C.C.'s employee, and long time committee member, for the most part, constructed the agenda in agreement with HMDC and independent from other committee members. In

spite of what appeared to be a democratic process, the end result reveals the suppression of certain key issues and the promotion of others. As Crenson points out, the various demands that rise to some significance within a community political system, in other words its key political issues, are often decided by the polity itself (Crenson, 1971). By the same token, issues that fail to enter the arena may have been "consigned to political oblivion" by the actions of those within political institutions (Crenson, 1971: 17). For example, the system may not, in fact, be 'penetrable,' as the pluralists believe it to be, where some issues are concerned, and issues like the Trinity Bay fishery can end up becoming non-issues. According to one of the former mayors from the region, the formation of the B.A.A.C.C. group was shaped by the powerholders and subsequently served to reinforce their (the oil company's) position.

> I was Mayor at the time and I didn't even know the committee (meaning B.A.A.C.C.) was being formed, it was done in private... The few people that formed it are brown nosers... Mobil knew who they wanted on that committee...they are the ones that say 'yes Mr. Albee,' 'no Mr. Albee.' As the conversation continued, the former mayor went on to discuss further how the B.A.A.C.C. group has too easily supported HMDC without questioning their actions. "The information Centre located in NODECO's office. That should be off the site. That Information Centre is not there to represent Mobil... It's like sending the fox to take care of the chicken... The original idea to have the group was a good one...but the way it was formed was wrong from the beginning.

Attendance at these meetings - with the three partied committee - study of the minutes and interviews with local B.A.A.C.C. representatives show the key issues of the region to be such things as employment opportunities for local people and the promoting of small business adventures. Although a fishery representative to articulate grievances was a member on the committee, his attendance was, at best, sporadic. In fact, on the rare occasion that the fishery representative did attend, issues pertaining to the local inshore fishery were never articulated, nor were they on the agenda. Issues raised by the local committee in general, and the fishery representative in particular, were framed in such a way as to encourage a positive reception by the oil industry. Often, the issues raised were consistent with the inclinations of the corporate elite, which would serve to eliminate some issues altogether, such as those surrounding the inshore fishery. Understanding this form of nonparticipation, however, is crucial to our understanding of power relations.

More often than not, responsibility for inaction or nonparticipation has been explained by arguments looking at individual deficiencies such as poor educational levels or low incomes or other socio-economic criteria. All too often, inaction becomes equated with apathy. In trying to account for nonparticipation of deprived groups, Schattschneider argued:

> There is a better explanation. Absenteeism reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants. It is not necessarily true that people with the greatest needs participate in politics most actively - whoever decides what the game is about also decides who gets in the game (Schattschneider, 1960: 105).

According to HMDC's fishery consultant, employed to negotiate with the fishers, fishery-related issues did not need to be addressed by the committee: "there's no reason for these things (issues) to be brought up...everything is working out well the way we're doing it. The fishermen are happy, HMDC is happy, it's just not necessary." Fishery interests were as Schattschneider (1960: 71) stated, "organized out" of the political agenda. In fact, the oil industry's approach in their negotiations allowed them considerable control over fishers and the issues that would appear on the agenda and subsequently be addressed by the committee.

It would be misleading, therefore, to assume fishers' silence surrounding their interests to be a form of consensus. In fact, few fishers at this time were aware of the three partied committee in place and that their interests were supposed to be represented during these meetings. A young, well educated fisher from Bellevue, who later left the fishery to take employment elsewhere with the Hibernia project, stated:

> Up until I came here, I didn't even know it existed (referring to B.A.A.C.C.). ...like existing for us

(fishers). We didn't know the fundamental purpose of the committee (January, 1993).

Fishers from the neighbouring community of Chance Cove had similar experiences, for example: "never even knew it was there, it's no good for us." Even when fishers became aware of the group's mandate, they continued to express similar sentiments: "Never knew nothing about it, nobody ever told us that" fishers could voice their concerns. "They'd be of no use to us anyway," he continued, "people gets on those committees for themselves, that's all." Although fishers did not initially comprehend the role of the committee, the same cannot be said about the oil industry as it played a critical part in making sure fishers had as little information as possible. To maintain the limited knowledge of the powerless, argues Barnes, "the flow of information to subordinates should be relentlessly interdicted, filtered and distorted" (Barnes, 1988: 101).[5]

In spite of the apparent lack of understanding of the political process in place, fishery-related matters were articulated on one occasion. Oddly enough, however, the statement was expressed by the Environmental Supervisor for HMDC, Paula White, after a meeting was adjourned. As a result, the issue was never entered into the official minutes or

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5 In subsequent chapters I will discuss in more detail how information was controlled by the oil industry.

subsequent documents arriving from those minutes. White's comment itself did not, however, address the concerns of local fishers, but was rather a reference alluding to the preliminary agreement reached between the oil consortium and the inshore fishers of Trinity Bay. In fact, White's comment was the only time fishery-related issues were mentioned throughout the period in question - September, 1990-March, 1991. According to Bachrach and Baratz, any analysis of power must comprise an examination of what actually constitutes both decision making and nondecision making. In other words, they are reexamining what actually comprises a political issue. Viewed in this way, fishery-related issues fall into the category of 'nondecision-making.'

As Crenson pointed out in his study of the dirty air issue in Gary and East Chicago, political institutions have something similar to an "inarticulate ideology." An ideology that encourages a rather "selective perception and articulation" of social issues -and a certain 'political climate' thus develops (Crenson, 1971: 23) - in short, what Bachrach and Baratz called a 'mobilization of bias.' In this context, it is easy to see how certain kinds of social phenomena get left off the agenda. The visible issues that do, in fact, make the agenda, are also those that are 'relatively safe,' although they may not necessarily be the most important. The end result, therefore, is that the political apparatus serves to

protect the interests of the company, in this case HMDC. As Crenson noted the object of inquiry is not "political activity but political inactivity" (Crenson, 1971: 23).

The findings suggest that whereas business, employment and industrial development are topics of much local concern, the issues affecting the fishery tend to be neglected. What seemed to be occurring was that the prominence of one issue was associated with the suppression of others. In other words, local employment and business interests not only dominated the agenda, but silenced debate on the issues of water pollution and environmental damage, to name but two. Similar findings were noted by Crenson in his research on the dirty air issue, where a "negative association between the air pollution and economic development issues" was found as testimony to the competition that exists between political issues (Crenson, 1971: 165). As Crenson pointed out, a political organization that consigns itself to one specific kind of issue has the potential to commit itself to an entire spectrum of similar issues, while, at the same time, minimizing its ability to address other more antagonistic concerns.

Crenson's research, however, called attention to the issues themselves where he organized them into one of two categories: issues that are either 'collective' or 'specific.' Collective issues, Crenson believed, could be best thought of as matters such as air and water pollution, issues that affect

the collective good. Specific issues, on the other hand, were seen as those that affect individual good such as business or employment opportunities. This means, then, that issues that are either collective or specific tend to cluster together so that the community's political agenda is less likely to contain both kinds of political concerns. Instead, one finds a general bias towards issues that are either relatively collective or those that are relatively specific.

Similar arguments to those made by Crenson can be made for the case of Trinity Bay. Specific issues encouraged the proliferation of other similar kinds of issues, while collective concerns were kept latent. For example, local business opportunities soon led into issues around the selling of crafts or other cottage industry goods. Conversely, collective issues remained off the agenda and somehow took on a 'hidden' status. While it would be wrong to suggest that the labour market is not a collective concern, the way in which the community organization defined employment relegated it to the category of specific issues. Employment within the political arena was considered as only those positions that were created by onshore development; the areas of work previously established, on the other hand, such as the fishery were not

included in their definition.[6] The items on the political agenda, therefore, neither encourage the scope of political discussions to include all aspects of the labour market nor to contain collective as well as specific issues. Instead, the political agenda encourages the scope of debate to develop along a certain path (Crenson, 1971: 71).

Throughout much of this time period some of Mobil's central players, along with NODECO officials, were highly visible on the local committee, never sending representatives as a substitute. Their presence, so it seemed, went hand in hand with their "generosity" as they donated a large amount to the startup of the B.A.A.C.C. group. At every meeting, there appeared on the agenda an added contribution from either HMDC or NODECO. Yet, as Eipper shows, HMDC behaved in Trinity-Placentia Bay as Gulf did in Bantry Bay. The financial contributions, Eipper argued, were often a ploy the industry used to silence potentially sensitive issues (Eipper, 1989). In other words, the power holding group develops a series of practices which reinforce the acquiescence of local people. What may first appear as genuine support for the B.A.A.C.C. group is nothing more than the deploying of various myths to maintain the status quo: for example, the myth of the charity

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6 In the North Sea, particularly Scotland, the impact of offshore development on established industries has been more serious. See Blackadder (1986) for a full Discussion.

and generosity of the corporate elite. As Freire points out, the powerholder is "fostering selective good deeds" which, in turn, reinforce people's belief that the elite somehow "promote the advancement of the people" (Freire, 1970: 135-36). The response, then, of local residents is compliance - their gesture of appreciation or gratitude for the donations received. To be sure, the donations secured from the oil company did, in fact, help camouflage key issues, while at the same time they served to contain any potential criticism. As one of the local mayors argued:

> That committee is not going to be able to do nothing they've already demonstrated that... Their too busy trying to keep Mobil and the rest of them happy. If you asks me, it's like being in bed with the industry (December, 1992).

4.2.2 The 'Non-issue' of Women

While fishers may, in fact, sit on the periphery of any debate or discussion taking place about onshore development, the women employed in the processing sector have virtually been excluded from the discussion altogether. To correct this omission an empirical analysis will make visible the most significant non-issue surrounding the managing of fishery interests, the issue of fish plant labourers.

Although women might not say so publicly, interviews with fish plant workers revealed their apprehension about the likely impacts onshore development would have on the plant,

especially the possibility that it would lead to their loss of employment. "If we lost the plant it would be like a clap of thunder that hit and split it all open... We'd be in some state, my dear, don't know what would happen to us." There was a long pause between sentences when Vera looked up and said: "the fishermen depends upon that too." The agreement reached between the inshore fishers and the oil industry acknowledges the contributions of 'visibly' rewarded male fishers engaged in the harvesting sector. Women, on the other hand, who contribute to the 'invisible' work in the processing sector were largely ignored throughout the negotiation process. Naomi, the wife of a local fisher, was one of the first women to be hired at Smith's Seafoods. Since then, she has been employed in a number of different capacities until today she has the position of floor lady. She was visibly tormented by the little attention paid by HMDC toward the issues of plant labourers. She stated:

> If the fishermen can't put their nets out, they're not going to get any fish, and if that's the case, it is going to affect us too. ... but as far as they're concerned the plant isn't going to be affected.

Naomi's neighbour, Sophie, the wife of a local skipper expressed similar thoughts:

> Yes, the plant workers wanted compensation. We thought we would be affected...but the plant was excluded from the negotiations. Now we let it go for awhile...we didn't do too much on the first of it... After Joe (Sophie's husband) would come from a meeting with HMDC I'd ask him if anybody said anything about the plant...I kept saying

> to Joe, well, you're being compensated so what happens to us? ...I think Joe was the first one to mention it to Paula White...She didn't want to meet with us, but she had some pressure put on her so they sent out Dave Day (HMDC representative), Stewart Ryan (NODECO representative) and Paula White. She was really hostile...She said she didn't see how we would be affected so she didn't offer us any compensation. They said if anything did happen then later we would get something...it was a 'wait and see' thing.

Despite fishers' reluctance to articulate or include in their negotiations with HMDC, the issue of compensation for the plant workers, they did, in effect, express in private the view that compensation should have been extended to the processing plant and that negotiations between the two sectors should not have been segregated. "They wanted to negotiate with the plant separate," commented one of the fishers negotiating with HMDC. "They wanted to keep it two separate issues...but they should have been involved with our agreement." HMDC was insistent, fishers stated, on keeping the issues of the plant out of the negotiations. "They told us that they would deal with the plant after the fishermen had reached their agreement."

By the time the plant workers had arranged a meeting with HMDC the fishers from the Cove had already settled their compensation package with the oil industry. According to one of the plant women, "they only agreed to come out 'cause we threatened them that we would go to the media." Although

reluctant, Paula White along with other key Mobil players did agree to meet with plant workers in the local church basement:

> They came out showing us big pictures of Hibernia and what it was going to look like and so on... Finally, we told her we didn't want to see pictures and that turned her right off...It was a waste of time to talk to her. They had their minds made up before they ever came out here.

One of the central plant organizers for the meeting later expressed how she wished: "the hell they didn't come out. We didn't get anything settled. It don't make sense to me. They told us that the plant wouldn't be affected... Everything was in an uproar when they said we weren't going to get nothing." According to another plant worker:

> Paula White came out for two meetings...her response was that we were not affected directly, so there would be no compensation... Her attitude was you guys do what I want. She listened, but it was going in one ear and out the other... We depend on the local catch and if the men have nothing then we have nothing. If the boats were coming in on the traffic lanes fishermen would be reimbursed for that day cause they couldn't fish, but we lost a day's pay for that.

For some, the plant provides the only form of household income either because both parties are dependent upon wages generated from processing labour or plant incomes comprise the sole means of household support. George and his partner Myrtle have lived in Chance Cove all their lives and have worked at the plant for close to fifteen years. Their economic survival is solely dependent upon their earnings from the processing

plant. "It's like she (Paula White) wasn't interested in plant workers at all," said George:

> They only came out as a formality thing. They had no intentions of getting us anything...It was like talking to the wall it was...They did nothing but say, 'you kiss my ass'... (George is now standing and appears visibly troubled by the issues. As he leaves the room he asserts rather boisterously): We should have been negotiated with.

In his absence, Myrtle tried desperately to excuse her husband's behaviour arguing that HMDC's lack of interest in negotiating with fish plant workers left him quite distraught. This is not difficult to comprehend when one looks at the world from where George stands. The economic survival of the O'Brian household is contingent upon the two incomes from the processing plant. HMDC's unwillingness to protect fish plant workers' incomes creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and, in George's case, anxiety. Not long after his abrupt departure, he returns to the discussion calmer and more composed. As he enters the living room Myrtle remains silent. Without acknowledging his own absence, George continues the conversation as if time had not interrupted the dialogue.

> There is so much bureaucracy in all this, it's hopeless. We have to want so long to get anything done...it makes no sense. It's pointless to talk about it any more, nothing is going to get done. What use is it any more in just going over it and over it. Mobil can do whatever the fuck they want and not Wells not nobody is going to say fuck all to them. They don't no more care about what happens to the plant workers; as far as we're concerned we are nothing more than dirt under their feet. It's all a game to them.

Although plant workers, as they said, felt "put out" by Mobil's response, they did initially attempt to pursue some kind of negotiation with the industry. After their first rather unsuccessful meeting, some of the women formed a small committee where they continued correspondence with HMDC's Environmental Supervisor. "She (Paula White) did write a letter back," said one of the women, saying "that the traffic lanes weren't going to be used and if they were they would come out again... We weren't going to get anything from them anyway, so we left it." These non-decisions are really decisions of a kind which serve to prevent a certain course of action. Much of HMDC's behaviour resembles that which Harold Lasswell (1950) called 'politics of prevention' where the oil industry was successful in keeping the issues of the plant off the community agenda with fishers' negotiations and away from the attention of the B.A.A.C.C. group.

The Newfoundland fishery is, for the most part, defined by both the harvesting and processing sectors. Yet, financial compensation from the oil industry extends only to those who harvest the catch. The implications we can draw from this indicate the costs of onshore development will fall disproportionately on women employed in the processing sector. According to one of the plant women:

> If we were unionized we would have been on the compensation. She (Paula White) wouldn't have gotten away with it... Who did we have to fight for us as plant workers?

> We were really upset about it...There was a lot of hostility. Negotiations with the fishermen were stretched out for a couple of months. Joe (her spouse) and them really had a fight on their hands. But why are we any different, the men got their compensation?

Fish plant women, in fact, were poorly organized to take any effective part in planning for onshore development which contributed to their minimal influence in negotiating successfully for compensation. In addition, the plant's non-unionized status restricted further women's ability to seek compensation through collective action. "If we had a union we figure we would have had more," was a frequently uttered comment by many of the women. The economic survival of the plant, where many of these women work, is contingent upon the catch from local crews. Without access to sea resources in and around Bull Arm, the fishers from the Cove will experience a considerable reduction in their overall catch. A reduced harvest could seriously jeopardise the security of the plant and future employment prospects for these women. As stated by one of the local fishers:

> If Mobil puts that traffic lane through the Arm the fishermen from the area are going to lose 50 percent of their catch and if that happens there's a good chance the plant won't open next year.

While this particular fisher was hesitant to state the necessity of the second income, his spouse, a plant labourer, continued the conversation. "If the plant don't open, then I don't know what we're going to do when my stamps runs out."

Never during the period, albeit brief, in which plant workers attempted to negotiate with the oil industry did HMDC acknowledge the impact onshore development would have on the processing sector. They attempted, when questioned, to counteract the statement by suggesting that they were providing a "community" bonus to all fishing communities, thereby compensating, so they argued, for women's lost wages. Committee members, on the other hand, from the provincial government and the B.A.A.C.C. group - who each comprise a segment of the three partied system in place to manage the interests of the fishery - were entirely unaware of the fish plant's existence. The only segment of the organization that was informed fully about the issues of the plant was, in fact, the oil industry. Dahl's view, then, that all groups can "make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision-making" does not actually hold true (Dahl, 1956: 137).

Both sides of the Atlantic are similar where issues surrounding the neglect of fish plant workers are concerned. As Blackadder pointed out, Shetland experienced a considerable number of fish plant closures during the 1970s when Scotland began to exploit, more rigorously, offshore resources (Blackadder, 1986: 51). Yet, the literature would suggest that the problems experienced by fish plant workers are, in fact, non-issues. In other words, the literature has failed to account for plant workers' experiences of offshore development as well

as having ignored the question of whether compensation was extended to the processing sector. Other parallels, events illustrating community power, can be seen in Parenti's work on lower-strata black Americans who attempt to influence decisions from 'the bottom up' (Parenti, 1970). "There exists," Parenti argued, "the world of the rulers and the world of the ruled" and "blacks find themselves inhabiting the second" (Parenti, 1970: 519).

To assert that the women from the cove or (as in the case of Parenti's study) that black Americans have a potential power that would succeed were they to choose to use it is the same as saying that their non-participation is simply a matter of choice. Such an argument dismisses the fact that the ability to act to or to "convert potentiality into actuality" is in itself a form of power (Parenti, 1970: 527). In other words, the successful exercise of any potential power requires certain preceding resources in order to act. Contrary to the pluralist arguments as suggested by Dahl and Polsby, the practices of the political system do not ensure that all groups will have access to decision making arenas.

The two-dimensional view of power adds much to our understanding as it incorporates into the analysis questions of control over the agenda and the ways in which certain issues are kept out of the political process. Yet, as Lukes would suggest, in trying to account for all the potentially

invisible issues we create a rather false picture of the practices of groups, individuals, organizations and institutions and how they succeed in preventing key issues from arising in the political process. It is crucial, therefore, to discriminate between decisions, choices made consciously by individuals where alternatives exist, and the bias of the system, which can be 'mobilized' or restructured in certain ways that are not individually chosen or consciously intended (Lukes, 1974: 21). For Bachrach and Baratz their "main concern is not whether the defenders of the status quo use their power consciously, but rather if and how they exercise it and what effects it has on the political process and other actors within the system" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 50).

For Lukes, the bias of the system is not merely maintained by "a series of individually chosen acts," but more significantly "by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour" of institutions, groups or organizations "which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction" (Lukes, 1974: 21-22). To this end, the power to control the agenda and prevent certain grievances from being articulated cannot be understood adequately unless it is seen as a function of "collective forces" and/or "social arrangements" (Lukes, 1974: 22). To argue differently, as do Bachrach and Baratz, one runs the risk of analysis that suffers from methodological individualism.

The theoretical accounts provided in both the one-dimensional and two-dimensional views of power do not, in fact, go far enough to explain why fishers wilfully entered into a contractual arrangement with HMDC. While the argument put forth by Bachrach and Baratz makes visible previously hidden aspects of power relations, it accepts as genuine what appears to be widespread acquiescence. Despite the crucial difference between the one and two-dimensional view, there exists a significant characteristic in both analyses, the emphasis on observable conflict, either overt or covert. Fishers and plant labourers' acceptance of HMDC's development plan during the onshore phase, then, does not suggest conflict or strife. Fishers' stated preferences, moreover, indicate their actual interests where silence on any issue is understood as some form of consent.

4.3 Shaping Perceptions

What may, in effect, appear to be quiescence need not imply consensus, but rather it may indicate a situation of domination and control. In the A-B scheme used in the present power analysis, A might not only exercise power over B in resolving key issues or by preventing B from articulating those issues, but also through shaping B's understanding of those issues altogether. As Lukes succinctly put it, power not only exists when A is successful in getting B to do what A wants, but also

in how A shapes, influences and determines the very nature of B's wants (Lukes, 1974: 22). Power is most effectively exercised, thought Lukes, when it is wielded against others in such a way as to prevent them from having any recognized grievance in circumstances where people's wants and preferences have been shaped or disguised so that they accept the order of things as natural. The three-dimensional view of power is useful as it sheds light on how fishers' came to understand their interests and why they supported the actions of HMDC. This approach examines the perceptions fishers have about the conflict and subsequently links those perceptions to power processes.

4.3.1 Negotiating with HMDC

During the Fall of 1990 the key issues surrounding onshore development, as fishers themselves professed, could be seen as falling into one of three areas: the demise of fishers' culture and way of life; environmental destruction; and a threat to fishers' individual livelihood (Ottenheimer, 1990). Yet, the situation in which fishers later found themselves (entering into a contractual arrangement with HMDC) had little bearing on either protecting their way of life or the natural resource. Interaction between the two sectors was constructed so that negotiations focused predominately around loss of income and not around issues relating to environmental

concerns or cultural practices. This was by no means unintentional, but rather a deliberate and thoughtfully calculated means to achieve certain ends, the suppression and containment of conflict. When fishers later reflected back upon the negotiation process, they recognized not only the insufficient amount of time given to issues concerning the natural environment and their way of life, but more importantly, how HMDC would approach the very subject matter. "In the meetings this would come up from time to time," commented Alonzo[7], "...but there should have been more meetings on that." Albert's account of the negotiations, however, reveals more clearly the oil industry's intention to both silence and redirect fishers' concerns. "They would brush it off," commented Albert, "they would say that we have an environmental protection plan to take care of that." Other fishers, however, spoke of the oil industry's promises as evidenced in Jack's remark: "she guaranteed us that nothing would happen." Comments such as these, served to silence any further discussion, while allowing attention to focus around the issue of financial compensation. As uttered by one of the fishers from Bellevue:

> They were coming right at us asking what can we do for you. They kept on their toes constantly giving to the fishermen... It shocked us at first the way they were giving us the money (February, 1993).

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[7] Data from Alonzo and Albert are from the winter of 1993.

What we see taking place is the process through which fishers' 'real' interests were being twisted and disguised in such a way as to shape the nature of their preferences around issues of short-term economic gain. In other words, HMDC's agenda during negotiations successfully suppressed fishers' 'real' interests where fishers themselves began to articulate issues around matters of compensation, neutralizing any overt conflict. Evidence, then, suggests that the prior consensus to sign the agreement with the oil industry had been a manipulated one.

As stated previously, fishers knew little of the development planning that took place over the previous ten years, which contributed further to their own powerlessness. Fishers' subordinate position from the beginning allowed the oil industry to dominate the structure of the negotiation process where HMDC initiated most meetings and the nature of the discussion to follow. According to one of the fishers from Bellevue:

> Paula and Sam and them had agendas which they took to all the fishermen from Sunnyside, Bellevue, Chance Cove and further on.

Moreover, fishers were dependent on HMDC, while they may not have been cognizant of it, to become informed about the onshore project, which further limited the knowledge they obtained. For example, fishers were uninformed of the recommendations outlined by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore

Petroleum Board (1986) which stated that a comprehensive policy to compensate for any loss or damage to fishery interests should be in place before the project commences (CNOPB, 1986: 96). Fishers experienced this as the oil industry 'hurrying' and not necessarily as a government requirement before the onset of development. "They were in some big hurry to get the deal signed" uttered one of the skippers involved in the negotiations.

For the most part, fishers were unaware of the extent to which they lacked critical information about the onshore project. One of the skippers reflecting back on the negotiation process commented on how HMDC provided information to fishers rather selectively. He stated, "everything is on a need to know basis"[8] which illustrates how HMDC sought to control the information process. Similarly, Shell's handling of the Brent discovery off Shetland reveals much resemblance with Mobil as the company released information only as it suited it: in particular, Shell kept the discovery of the oil well secret for roughly one year, which set the pattern for further oil development in Shetland. Effective domination, to be sure, entails that the powerless "should possess so much knowledge and no more" (Barnes, 1988: 101). The result of this strategy is that the dominant shape the consciousness of the

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[8] Data are from December of 1992.

subordinate, which, in turn, determines how the powerless, in this case fishers, understand reality.

4.3.2 'Divide and Rule'[9]

The oil industry was successful not only in their control over the agenda during the negotiation period, but also in how they effectively managed to splinter the population of fishers from Trinity Bay. These men did not negotiate with HMDC as a group of fishers from the region as such, but were divided by the oil industry along community boundaries. In other words, fishers were not united during their negotiations, instead settlements stood as distinct communities, or as in the case of Norman's Cove, fragments of a community. "The way we negotiated was wrong," commented one of the fishers from Bellevue:

> we would have been better off if we worked together...not negotiating community by community. It was the best thing for HMDC and they knew what they were doing... Yes, it was like divide and conquer.

Fishers entered into discussions with HMDC as small and poorly organized individual fishing communities. They were, moreover, ignorant of how other fishers in neighbouring communities, fishers who would experience similar impacts from onshore development, had acted or attempted to act with the

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9 Data in this section come from the winter of 1992 until March, 1993.

oil company. As Barnes points out, "the powerless will find that they do not know what others, similarly powerless, are about to do or likely to do" (Barnes, 1988: 98). Fishers' actions were, then, hindered by their own lack of understanding of what had taken place with other fishers. "If we stuck together," argued one of the skippers, "and we all knew what the other community was doing then maybe things would be different." Fishers' lack of information coupled with their inexperience in dealing with multinational corporations immobilized them, where they were, in effect, unable to make the most of their potential to act. As Earl, a fisher from Norman's Cove who attempted to find out about other fishers' experiences with HMDC, states:

> This is what Sam and them wanted was to divide us up...So after when they started going community by community I went down to a meeting in Sunnyside the fishermen were having with Mobil and they (referring to Mobil) asked me to leave... But this is what Paula White and them wants is to divide the fishermen.

As the powerholder begins to impose itself upon the subordinate population, it is essential, wrote Freire, to divide the powerless and keep them divided in order to remain in power. Unification is an ingredient the dominant cannot afford as it would "undoubtedly signify a serious threat to their own hegemony" (Freire, 1970: 141). Any means of setting limits on fishers actions, preventing them from either acting collectively or gaining knowledge about their own situation,

is considered crucial to securing corporate power. As one of the more senior skippers commented:

> They drove that wedge in between us bit by bit until the fishermen started to ask for their own meetings. It was Sunnyside fishermen that first went off on their own, and when that happened all the fishermen's committees wanted their own meeting... At the time we didn't think much of it.

Similar comments were made by other fishers further along the mouth of the Arm, as evidenced by Windzell:

> Mobil wanted to do community by community...It was better for them to have the fishermen divided up, then, to have to negotiate with all of us as one big group... Ivan Johnson (fisher from Placentia Bay responsible for past negotiations with Mobil) told us that we were better off sticking together because as a group we could be a lot stronger.

Although HMDC is now, according to most fishers, held responsible for dividing the inshore crews, at the time of negotiations, fishers blamed one another. With divisions along community boundaries and where animosity between fishers flourished, the process itself had became established, or perhaps more appropriately, self propelling. The following comment illustrates fishers' apprehensions and how they were directed mainly toward the fishers from the town of Sunnyside.

> Sunnyside fishermen thinks that if they negotiates on their own, they're going to get more then if they stay with the rest of us... Lord Jesus you can't tell them nothing. That crowd's different... They don't make nothing at the fishery anyhow; they're not what we calls true fishermen.

The strategy of 'divide and rule,' as mapped out by Barnes (1988) and Freire (1970) in addition to many other social

scientists, has proven to be an effective form of domination, where it has constrained concerted action on the part of the fishers as well as their access to crucial information, thus, illustrating power in the second and third dimensions. Stated differently, fishers unarticulated grievances reveal the two-dimensional view; three-dimensional power, on the other hand, is seen operating in the mechanisms employed by HMDC to neutralize recognition of any grievance.

4.3.3 Appearance and Promise

Appearance and promise, crucial components for petroleum developers on both sides of the Atlantic, went hand-in-hand throughout much of the early period of onshore development. To be sure, key Mobil players in the industry were highly visible in the local area where they participated in and attended many community events. Often, on request they would visit certain settlements to meet with various groups and townspeople to address any concerns residents might have. They were certain to attend themselves, never sending representatives in their place. By 1993, however, the situation was quite different: many central Mobil players had in fact left Newfoundland to return to the U.S. As Wills suggested, they made reassuring promises that all would be well, while playing "down the impact of the impending development" (Wills, 1991: 8). Similar accounts could be heard in Trinity Bay where one of the local

mayors claimed: "We were told that benefits would go back to the local community. My dear, it was promises, promises, promises."

Other community leaders, speaking more critically of the oil project, suggested that Mobil Oil officials had planned their strategies in order to effectively influence and manipulate the local people. The following comment illustrates well how three-dimensional power was operating during this period of development.

> We in this area have been shafted, shafted, shafted...Gerry Ablee, John Banks and Catherine Small (key Mobil players) came out here a number of years ago and led us by the nose...They were highly trained and they knew exactly what they were doing. The sad thing is we didn't know what they were doing... You'd ask them a question and they were programmed to answer...they knew what to say... The people in this area were led down the garden path and never knew no better. When they first came out they promised us everything. They came out to all our meetings and were really friendly to all the people....We even gave them a big dinner one year up in the town hall...that was a mistake....We should have demanded our rights up front and if they didn't like it well take the project somewhere else... Later on we were criticized for being negative because we were asking questions and we were ostracized for it... You got to give them credit for being smart (November, 1992).

Fishers too spoke critically of how things have changed since the early days of onshore activity. "At first when they were coming out they would bend over backwards, but now it is completely different...hindsight is a great thing." Another fisher along the Arm expressed similar sentiments:

> on the first of it they were coming out all the time and asking what we wanted done; telling us we could call them

> if we had any questions. And now, my dear, they don't come handy... As soon as that deal was signed that was it, they didn't come out no more (January, 1993).

During the early negotiations with fishers, HMDC worked hard and successfully to earn fishers' trust and eventual support. The oil company was applauded for its efforts and willingness to participate in rural cultural practices. "She (Paula White) even went out fishing with some of the boys...," was a frequently uttered remark by local fishers. Moreover, the oil industry's generosity, by way of gift giving to certain individuals crucial to successful negotiations, brought the company much acceptance where it demonstrated, to fishers, the industry's sincerity and desire to help local people. For example, the chairperson of the fishermen's committee in Sunnyside had his telephone installed by the oil company and his mother, Winnie, received flowers from Paula White. Winnie continues to speak fondly of Paula White, although she has not seen her since the fishers signed their agreement more than two years ago. Despite what has since happened to the fishers' compensation with HMDC, Winnie is certain that the oil companies involved with the development of the Hibernia field would not act in such a way as to harm the local fishers:

> My dear, they've been here to my house when they've been out to see Clarence (Winnie's son and chair of fishermen's committee)... And I can tell you right now that Paula White and John Banks are good people... I know they cares about the fishermen out here; I know they do...

> They listened to what we had to say and they did right by the fishermen... Every time Clarence had to go to town for a meeting they took care of all of his expenses... They've been good to us I guarantee you (December, 1992).

One rather effective and convincing approach many powerholders adopt is to manipulate others, in this case the inshore fishers, by encouraging the belief that they are being helped. According to Freire, manipulation is effective as it serves the 'conquest.' "The oppressors are the ones," he wrote, who act upon others "to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a reality which must remain untouched" (Freire, 1970: 83). In other words, powerholders try to make others conform to their objectives. Systematic acts of generosity, including the industry's offer of financial compensation to fishers coupled with community bonuses and individual donations, served to manipulate and reshape fishers' perceptions. For Freire, a parallel can be made with various other social programs as they "act as anaesthetic, distracting the oppressed from the true causes of their problems" and from creative decisions to subsequently change their situation (Freire, 1970: 147).

4.3.4 Linguistic Symbols

Mobil's strategy to camouflage fishers' 'real' interests was often implemented in rather indeterminate ways. Industry consultants and representatives used language like 'co-

existence' to describe how the two sectors would interact throughout the onshore phase of Hibernia. As argued by the industry's Environmental Coordinator, "there's no reason why the Arm can't be used for regular fishing activity. I don't see why the fishermen and the industry can't co-exist." To be sure, some fishers began to adopt the language themselves to describe their perceptions of how the two sectors would work together. "I think co-existence between Mobil and the fishermen is possible; we can work along side one another," commented one of the fishers from Chance Cove.

As fishers began to reflect back on their interaction with HMDC during the period of negotiations, their understanding of what took place became considerably different. As argued by one of the skippers from Norman's Cove, co-existence:

> Well it's great on paper. We're told you do this or you won't get compensation. If that's co-existence than I suppose we're co-existing... They like to say that we can all work together, but the truth of the matter is, is that we got to do what they want or else we get nothing (February, 1993).

Symbols, or more generally the discourse of Mobil, have worked to generate consensus. 'Co-existence,' and other related terms such as 'spin-offs,' have been used effectively by the industry to help shape fishers' perceptions and the nature of their 'real' interests. As expressed by one of the local fishers during a discussion about employment opportun-

ities stemming from the Hibernia project: "I already got one son in Ontario and that's enough...maybe the girls will get something here once them spin-offs happen." Other phrases were adopted by the industry to describe their interaction with fishers during the negotiation period. These phrases were taken up by fishers themselves; for example, both HMDC officials and fishers would cite HMDC's commitment to "take care of the fishermen." In the introduction of this thesis Eli's account shows similar experiences: "I can hear them now telling us that Mobil is going to take care of the fishermen." Similarly, HMDC's phrase, "in good faith," was used to describe how the industry negotiated with fishers. Oddly enough, fishers continued to use these phrases to disclose the conditions under which they entered into the contractual arrangement with HMDC. According to one of the fishers from Chance Cove: "Fishermen signed that agreement in good faith, they aren't going to settle for less."

If we argue that linguistic symbols do, in fact, express and help shape consciousness, then these terms and phrases must be considered more than mere words and their use more than just coincidence. For these symbols, I contend, were imposed upon a subordinate population, a group that later adopted the values of corporate developers. In citing de Beauvoir, Freire writes: the interests of the powerholders rest with "changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not

the situation which oppresses them," and the more the subordinate adapt to their condition the more likely the domination will continue (Freire, 1970: 60). Linguistic symbols did, in fact, help to mould the consciousness of subordinate others, or more specifically, inshore fishers. Moreover, linguistic patterns, similar to those developed in Trinity Bay, could be seen in the Appalachian Valley [illegible] the industrial powerholders imposed their value system upon miner-mountaineers. Perhaps the best example of this was the way in which names of streets, mines and schools from the existing culture were replaced with those from the new order (Gaventa, 1980: 66). Whether we call it a "direct appropriation of local culture" (Gaventa, 1980) or simply "cultural invasion" (Freire, 1970), the end result is the same. The powerholders intrude upon local culture, imposing their dominant view of the world. In this social phenomenon, the dominant are the "authors of, and actors in, the process" where they objectify those invaded (Freire, 1970: 150). These forms of domination entail either physical or overt practices, or methods of camouflage and disguise so that the dominant take the appearance of a helping friend.

4.3.5 Powerlessness

There is, finally, one other process of shaping fishers consciousness which derives from their continued interaction

with powerholders, that is, a developed sense of powerlessness. Among many subordinate populations, Gaventa suggests, there exists a certain apathy or fatalism which initially seems to preclude any kind of action. As Gaventa illustrated in the case of miners working in the Appalachian coal camp, a sense of powerlessness may emerge "as an adaptive response to the exploitative situation" (Gaventa, 1980: 92). Stated differently, the more the non-elite adopt the roles imposed on them, the more probable it is that they will adjust to their situation as it is, and to the fragmented view of reality which subsequently follows (Freire, 1970: 60).

According to one of the local fishers' accounts of the dialogue that took place between the men in his crew: "the fishermen were saying we are like a mouse against an elephant...they're too big for us; they're a big oil company." Other, more marginal fishers in the bottom of the Arm expressed comparable sentiments: "I just wanted her signed, we were afraid we wouldn't get nothing...." Similarly, Mueller's work is about groups which "cannot articulate their interests or perceive social conflict. Since they have been socialized into compliance, so to speak, they accept the definitions of political reality as offered by dominant groups, classes or government institutions" (Mueller, 1973: 9). Elsewhere in Newfoundland, Leyton observed social patterns among miners, suffering from the debilitating Black Lung disease, which

coincided with some of the fishers' rather fatalistic outlook on reality.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have begun to explore the quiescence phenomenon by first mapping out fishers' 'real' interests: in other words, how fishers would have acted or thought were it not for the power of the oil consortium. Understanding the relevant counterfactual is crucial in order for the observer to comprehend the social processes which later emerged. It is not merely an observation of changes in fishers' perceptions, but rather an understanding of the relations of social power which helped shape those perceptions. To understand how fisher' interests were, in fact, camouflaged I began the analysis by looking in detail at the less visible aspects of power, in particular the two-dimensional view articulated by Bachrach and Baratz (1970). Their argument reveals how certain issues became non-issues and were consequently organized out of the political arena. Empirical evidence, moreover, uncovered less visible aspects of the fishery, women in the processing sector, thus illustrating how plant workers interests were neglected by the oil company.

The final section of this chapter deals specifically with how HMDC effectively managed to camouflage the interests of fishers where they willingly entered into the agreement with

HMDC. I have identified in this section the means by which one could observe how peoples' choices were moulded. Regardless of whether attitudes are shaped through the use of symbols, myths, promises, manipulation, or some form of choice among alternatives presented to fishers in a power situation, the impacts are the same. Perceptions are turned away from their 'real' interests to acceptance of the ways, values and practices of the dominant order, in other words, to become voluntary participants in a culture of silence.

What kept the issues from arising in the arena of local politics? What prevented fishers and plant labourers from recognizing the social inequities surrounding them? Chapter five will address these questions illustrating first, how patterns of power endure over time and second, what happens when consensus breaks down and there is a change in the field of power.

Chapter 5

'We Never Knew No Better'
Maintaining Control and the Collapse of Consent

> We didn't understand much about the oil industry on the first of it. So they (HMDC) came out meeting after meeting... We tried to get something in place to protect us; we tried to get a traffic lane that wouldn't adversely affect the fishermen in the area. We had to get compensation in some way for that... The compensation was like this. They (HMDC) came back to us; they arranged a five year base for every fisherman... The fishermen were satisfied with this. Last year was the first year the program started and...overall it was a good year. HMDC was pleased with it; fishermen were happy with the system (December, 1992).

One of the greatest barriers to overcoming social inequities is the realization of one's subordinate position: the "opp ressive reality," wrote Freire, "absorbs those within it," where it obscures peoples' perceptions of the social world (Freire, 1970: 561). All too often, the subordinate remain in situations which further their exploitation as well as stunt or impede their consciousness. Power furthers the creation of power and once power relations are enacted they become increasingly self-propelling (Gaventa, 1980: 256). While the inshore fisher's experience, as indicated above, does not illustrate directly exploitation or some misuse of power, his social reality is, nonetheless, shaped by and exists in a concrete situation of domination and control. To comprehend why people, in this case the inshore fishers and plant

labourers, do not challenge or protest against such domination one must understand the complexity of power relationships. This chapter will explain how the silence surrounding the issues of fishers and plant labourers was maintained and thus endured, in other words, how quiescence in the face of inequality persisted. The data for this chapter will focus on two different time periods. The first period is between March, 1991 and February, 1992; the second, is the period after Gulf Oil pulled out of the HIbernia project, from February, 1992, to March of 1993 when the last data were collected. These data, moreover, will show the conditions under which the status quo was maintained, where fishers' 'real' interests were left unprotected and fish plant labourers' grievances neglected. Empirical evidence will illustrate that neither fishers nor plant workers understood the consequences of their actions, especially how their long-term interests would be affected.

I will begin this chapter by examining more closely the terms and conditions outlined in the agreement fisher's signed with HMDC. In particular, attention will focus on certain principles contained in the contract as they help to explain why fishers' acquiesced under such conditions. An account of the onshore activity that took place during the summer of 1991 will follow with emphasis placed on its impact on the environment, in particular on the inshore fishery. In doing so, my

data will reveal HMDC's use of power in the third-dimension where it served to strengthen quiescence among fishers. By the third section, more direct forms of social power become evident; HMDC officials used threats in order to gain fishers' compliance as well as to redirect issues in the public arena of the B.A.A.C.C. meetings.

The analysis will then lead into a discussion of how fishery interests were managed in a more public forum. More specifically, I will show how fishers' and plant labourers' interests were considered in different arenas: in particular, the B.A.A.C.C. group, Monitoring Meetings which were organized by the 'Offshore' component of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, and The Atlantic Planners Conference held in Clarenville, Newfoundland during the Fall of 1991.

A discussion which focuses specifically on the issues surrounding plant labourers, particularly women employed in the fish plant, will follow. While plant women did, in fact, see the inequality between their own negotiation process with HMDC and male fishers, many of whom are their husbands, they were ultimately unable to act. One of the shortcomings of Lukes' perspective is that it does not consider gender relations or how power relationships may indeed be different for men and women. The data provided in this section, therefore, will contribute further to our understanding of the

basis of social power as it relates to questions of gender relations.

The last section of this chapter focuses on the collapse of consent. In other words, what happened when Gulf Oil announced it was withdrawing from the Hibernia project. Although this portion of the chapter is brief, much of the evidence demonstrating aspects of three-dimensional power throughout the thesis, comes from data collected during this period.

5.1 The Fisheries Compensation Program

By March, 1991, most fishers who fished in Bull Arm, Trinity Bay had entered wilfully into a contractual agreement with the oil company, HMDC. To be sure, the majority of fishers, if not all, were pleased with and demonstrated much support for the compensation program in place. "Fishermen figured we got a pretty good deal, we got what we could the way we went about it." A skipper in a nearby community uttered similar remarks: "we in Chance Cove got 100 percent in favour of the deal we got..." More significantly, though, fishers came to understand the terms of the agreement as a form of protection against any potential disruption or negative impact they might experience during onshore development. As one of the Bellevue fishers claimed: "I can hear Paula White's voice ringing in my ears, telling us we have a guaranteed income." Unfortunately,

fishers, at the time of signing, were neither sufficiently aware of the full implications and subsequent repercussions of the compensation program they had supported. It was not until much later, after Gulf Oil pulled out of the Hibernia project in February 1992, that fishers came to understand the full impacts of their actions.

Much secrecy surrounded the negotiation period during the late Fall and early winter of 1991. As more fishers began to settle their contracts with the oil industry, little was said in the nearby communities about the actual agreement. In fact, few members of non-fishing households knew much about the arrangement made between the two groups. To be sure, this was not coincidental, but rather a deliberate attempt by the oil industry to control the extent to which information about the program became available to other members of the community - thereby containing any overt challenge or related conflict. "Yes, we were told to keep this to ourselves," commented Alonzo. The message being conveyed by HMDC was for fishers not to share with others specifics about the negotiation process. On the occasion when the former mayor of Sunnyside tried to attend one of the meetings between the oil industry and fishers, he was asked by the group to leave, when, in fact, he had been initially invited to take part by the local chair of the fishermen's committee.

> They asked me to come along to a meeting they were having with Mobil. So I did; I went on up to the hall... And soon as I got through the door they turns around and asks me to leave... Mobil don't want nobody involved with the negotiations...they got the fishermen convinced that they can do it themselves. I gave up trying to tell them (fishers) different (February, 1991).

Unfortunately, many of the community leaders and committee members, who should have been made aware of the compensation program, blamed the inshore fishers themselves for fostering the secrecy surrounding the negotiation period. All too often, comments are made that "fishermen are like that...they're not cooperative, they're a secretive bunch." Or, alternatively, comments suggest that fishers behaviour is somehow inherent: "it's in their nature" -such comments are little more than local folklore and unsubstantiated myths. Far more accurate, however, was the extent to which fishers were passively complying with HMDC's subtle tactics of control. As one of the skippers from Norman's Cove began to reflect back on this early period he commented:

> You know we're not suppose to be talking to you about what's going on...They told us we're not allowed to be saying anything to you...I don't mind telling you about what's going on, but I don't want my name being used in any of this...Lord only knows what would happen if they found out. I'm telling you there's gonna be a lot of fishermen that aren't gonna want to talk to you about what's going on with Mobil.

The fishery consultant hired by HMDC to negotiate with fishers was also influential in gaining consent, while, in turn, fostering further the notion of secrecy. From time to

time, some fishers would directly quote the consultant as he reassured them continuously that the program would protect them from any direct conflict with the oil company. "I did trust them at first," stated Albert:

> When they came out first they were good to us, telling us we would work together and everything would be fine...Jesus, I can hear Sam saying there's no way you are going to be worse off, it's not possible...When we signed that deal we believed them and what they were saying...I really trusted them.

Albert's comment indicates how three-dimensional power was operating when fishers signed their contracts where their interests and the industry's were treated as one and the same.

From his research in the North Sea, Wills, too, makes an interesting argument about confidentiality and how the petroleum industry operates making use of such a strategy. For example, in the case of Shell and the Brent discovery off Shetland, Wills states, there should be "no private deals and no secret committees...or the developers will bind the representatives hand and foot with commercial confidentiality" (Wills, 1991: 56).

Not surprisingly, though, fishers believed that they could themselves negotiate with HMDC. Moreover, they believed the final agreement reached with the industry was, indeed, in their 'real' interests. Yet, closer examination of the document reveals certain factors which do not protect fishers' interests. In particular, clause number 6.0 states that:

> Continuation of the Program is dependent upon Company's continuation of the GBS construction project. Company may terminate or suspend all or any part of the Program upon termination or suspension of the GBS project and upon written notice to Fisherman... Company shall not be liable for damages or loss of anticipated profits on account of such termination.

In other words, clause 6.0 allowed the Company to suspend the agreement with fishers for an indefinite amount of time following Gulf Oil's pull out of the Hibernia project - roughly eleven months after fishers first signed their contracts. HMDC, at the time of signing, neither elaborated on the meaning of the clause, nor made fishers aware throughout negotiations of the consequences for fishers if there were a work slowdown or stoppage. Under these conditions not only is the compensation program suspended, but also, more importantly, fishers still lose access to traditional fishing grounds where any damage incurred as a result of onshore development becomes the sole responsibility of individual fishers.

> When they suspended our compensation last February we told them we wanted back our fishing grounds, but they said they didn't have to...we had signed that agreement and they were following what was said... They had no intensions of honouring that agreement right from day one. Their biggest concern all along was to get us to sign it...and then they turns around and suspends it... I'd just as soon see them leave..."

By preventing community leaders and other committee members from gaining access to the conditions set out in the agreement, HMDC safeguarded their own interests. As fishers reflect back on this time period, they recall how they first

came to understand the terms in the agreement. As one of the fishers from Norman's Cove stated:

> If we only knew from the start... we didn't know that clause was there because we certainly wouldn't have signed it if we did... If we had our time back we would have taken it to a lawyer to look over before we agreed to anything... but we truly thought that Mobil was acting in good faith...now we know it was all a 'put on' to get us to sign.

Other fishers in the neighbouring community of Chance Cove uttered similar comments:

> It's the way it's worded...When we were signing it they never told us that was there, and in the preliminary agreement that was signed in St. John's at Christmas time (Dec.1990) that clause wasn't in it. They put that in after when they came back with the individual contracts-... Nobody understood what that meant. You see it says GBS construction and to us it's all the same. Now if the wording had to say site work that would have been different you see... They asked us if anybody had any questions but we never said nothing because we thought it was the same as what we agreed to... If they had to tell us what that meant then we wouldn't have signed it... But we didn't know..."

Fishers, moreover, later came to understand the behaviour of the oil industry as intentional: "they put a few words in there so they could get out of it whenever they want." One of the fishers' wives interpreted the interaction between the two sectors as the powerful negotiating with the powerless. "They are some of the smartest people in the world," she stated, "and they can word things anyway they want. And here they are negotiating with just a bunch of fishermen." It was not until Gulf Oil withdrew from the Hibernia project that fishers came to understand the actions of HMDC more clearly, where fishers

themselves understood and saw how three-dimensional power was operating. "First going on Sam was best kind to work with," claimed one of the fishers negotiating for Chance Cove crews:

> They would invite us into town and they would pay for everything, our transportation, our meals, everything. We didn't have to spend a dime. Even when they would come out, sometimes we would have a few beers and they paid for it all. We thought it was all on the up and up... Now we know that they just wanted us to sign...They don't care about the fishermen; they care about lining their pockets that's all.

Wills, too, points out similarities in the documents and statements compiled by Shell during the development phase of offshore oil in Shetland. They are, he wrote, "a master at words. These people have word engineers as well as pipeline engineers" (Wills, 1991: 56).

While HMDC did not specify fully the implications of the precise wording contained in section 6.0 of the agreement, they did, most certainly, clarify the meaning found in section 8.0 of the contract. For it states:

> Fisherman agrees that all public relations matters arising out of or in connection with the Program shall be the sole responsibility of Company and will cooperate with Company in making such announcements.

Introducing this clause into the agreement not only ensured a certain level of compliance among fishers, but served as well to control the flow of information about the program. 'Public relations matters' became a convenient term which, in practice, meant that fishers had to relinquish their right of freedom of speech. This applied to all situations, including

the Fisheries Broadcast, a local radio program for and about fishers and their experiences. As stated by one of the fishers: "Fishermen's Broadcast called and wanted me to give an interview, so I called Paula White. She didn't want me to do it and said that she would handle this."

To be sure, fishers did not have prior knowledge of the company's intention to introduce clause 8.0 into the agreement. According to one of the skippers from Chance Cove:

> The preliminary contract signed in St. John's did not have the clause about the media. But when they came out to get fishermen to sign the individual contract they put the part in on the media. (When asked how he felt about HMDC's actions, Clarence's response was typical of many other fishers.) You see, we trusted them.

Jacob, one of the younger fishers from Bellevue, was one of the few who articulated some concern at the time of signing the contract regarding clause 8.0. He stated:

> I didn't like one thing in the agreement and that was that we weren't allowed to talk to the media about it... They didn't want no bad publicity."

Although Jacob did, in fact, sign the contract in exchange for his right to free speech, he did so as a conscious decision whereby he saw no alternative to act otherwise. In other words, there existed a constrained sense of agency, a position, therefore, which separated him from his remaining cohort.

For the most part, fishers did not question the actions taken by the company as they had begun to unconditionally

accept the passive role inflicted on them. "The invaders mold," wrote Freire, and "those they invade are molded" (Freire, 1970: 150). Like 'cultural invasion,' the subordinate began to respond to the powerholders' values, standards and practices. Under these conditions one can easily understand how the non-elite could be led into "an unauthentic type of organization" (Freire, 1970: 145). What we see, then, taking place in Trinity Bay throughout much of this time period is how the patterns of power and powerlessness persisted and continued over time.

5.2 Environmental Issues

The agreement fishers signed, which forms part of the document called Fisheries Code of Practice, permits Mobil Oil to pursue development in Great Mosquito Cove, development that entails the reshaping of the landscape by blasting away sections of the Cove as well as creating an exclusion zone and traffic lane which occupies prime fishing grounds. This activity was, for the most part, scheduled to take place during the Spring and summer of 1991 when fishers would, under normal circumstances, begin the years' first harvest. This section will show how power relations were, in fact, enduring, as fishers' perceptions continued to be shaped by HMDC and where their long-term interests were neither secured nor protected by the industry.

Before marine construction began in the Spring of 1991, Great Mosquito Cove was designated as a fisheries exclusion zone (EPP, 1991). Onshore construction scheduled during this time, however, was not only limited to marine activity, but as well entailed developing the Cove as a construction site that would facilitate both GBS and topsides fabrication. As stated earlier, Great Mosquito Cove was barren land which contained little more than a few trout ponds, small wildlife and the odd summer cabin inhabited mainly by neighbouring fishers. Onshore construction in and around the Cove would preserve little of this environment and way of life and, therefore, render its social importance as insignificant for both fishing and non-fishing households alike.

As development proceeded in Bull Arm, fisher's witnessed the destruction of the Cove's scattered trout ponds, which now accommodate parking space between two office buildings. The mother of a local fisher, who at one time 'made' fish with her mother in the household production of salt fish, commented on how they would, many years ago, travel by "steam" to the Cove where they would fish from the ponds.

> Oh my dear, it's some spot over there... We still goes over every summer and goes trouting...and the trout are as big as salmons. There's nothing like them. ...it's our own little paradise over there. (April, 1991)"

Two years later, however Pearl stated how she missed not being able to return to Mosquito Cove "to go trouting" in the ponds

located across the bay. She was saddened, not only by the fact that she could no longer enter or fish in the Cove, but more importantly, that the trout ponds had now disappeared; they were 'filled in' to accommodate the development of the GBS.

The loss of the trout ponds, however, seems to evoke a different sensitivity and understanding today, than it did two years ago. "Paula assured me that they would save the fish," claimed Pearl, as she began to recall the conversation she had with Paula White during the Spring of 1991. Yet, saving a few hundred trout cannot replace the social and environmental significance of the ponds situated in and around the Cove. What is indeed significant is how HMDC twisted the information which helped shape the perceptions of residents, particularly fishers and their families, and, therefore, managed to contain any conflict that might have arisen over the issue of environmental sabotage - thus illustrating power in the third-dimension. HMDC, and Paula White in particular, discussed the filling in of the trout ponds as if HMDC were acting in an environmentally sensitive fashion and used this example, moreover, as an expression of their environmental consciousness. HMDC representatives discussed how they would take care of the fish and relocate them to a separate body of water. What they neglected to mention, however, was the fact that a few hundred trout are in themselves insignificant when one considers the loss of natural habitat.

Apart from Pearl's experiences, there was silence among the inshore fishers concerning the environmental destruction occurring in Great Mosquito Cove. It was not until after Gulf's pull-out that fishers along the Arm came to reiterate perceptions they had stated before the onset of onshore development. As one of the Bellevue fishers stated: "We were so easily pushed over last year." Other nearby fishers made similar comments: "I would prefer they never came out," remarked Chester, "they're tearing up the land over there...and that was worth a million dollars to go over there and catch a few trout."

Development of Great Mosquito Cove further devastated the land and sea as underwater blasting began to reshape the physical landscape. The debris floating in the Arm and on the seabed during the summer of 1991 was overwhelming - even for those working with the oil company. According to one of the locally hired industry employees: "There was a lot of debris. When you start blasting with all those trees and sticks, well, you can imagine. It was a mess." While under water blasting did indeed contribute to many debris problems, its impact was negligible in comparison to the effect it was having on the natural habitat, in particular, on the herring and mackerel fishing grounds. Yet, fishers said little about the technology being employed by the oil industry. In fact, fishers looked toward HMDC as the experts, as being more knowledgable about

such matters, because they were, in their own words, "just fishermen." Manipulation, or as Freire would state, oppressive action, is most successful when the subordinate believe in and internalize the myth about their own inferiority and thus render supremacy to the dominant group (Freire, 1970: 136).

To be sure, fishers in Trinity Bay were neither familiar with the blasting procedures nor cognizant about alternative technologies. While some would - and did - blame fishers for their own ignorance or complacent views, a more thorough explanation would go beyond these superficial accounts to examine the conditions under which fishers passively complied with the oil industry's practices - in other words, to explain acquiescence by focusing on how the dominant successfully shaped the participation patterns of the subordinate, moulding their consciousness in such a way that their demands and expectations became compatible with those of the dominant class. Fishers were unaware of the alternate technology available for underwater blasting. This technology, while more costly, would have decreased the impact of blasting on fish habitat. According to Earle Johnson - the prime negotiator for fishers in Placentia Bay during the time when Adam's Head was thought to be the site for onshore development - HMDC was well aware of alternate methods because fishers in Placentia had insisted on other techniques if development were to continue in their Bay:

> If the project had to have stayed here we would have had more control put on the blasting. Underwater blasting is devastating to any fish within five miles... We wanted air walls which are like pipes which allow the air pressure to be controlled.

Yet, when questioned, HMDC maintained:

> There will still be a fishery when we are gone. The habitat will have changed, but not one that will preclude a fishery. We have documented evidence of the fish killed from blasting. Some fishery people say that you have to multiply that by X percent by the fish you don't see, but I don't care if you multiply it by 50 or 100 percent it still wasn't significant.

The industry's approach, however, has changed little over the years as Wills, too, confirms in his research in the North Sea (Wills, 1991). Offshore development continues, Wills argued, to have a 'monitoring' perspective when it comes to issues surrounding the environment. In other words, it observes and records various catastrophes without necessarily taking any kind of action. As one of the members of the HMDC management team claimed: "Whenever you do monitoring and you see a change, what are you going to do about it? If it means more money, things may not necessarily change." For example, the appearance of whales in Bull Arm during the Spring of 1991 was not anticipated by HMDC. Their response to this issue was simply:

> The blasting probably gave them a headache or something, but life goes on. Our focus until the whales showed up was monitoring the numbers of fish kills... Blasting will affect animals but it is not catastrophic.

The environmental impacts of onshore development were, at the time, known by the industry to have devastating consequences for not only marine life, but also for the natural habitat - consequences which would result in permanent environmental damage. Yet, there was no outcry, no protest by fishers to stop further annihilation of the environment, an issue, that was of crucial importance for fishers less than a year before. Despite fishers' experiences of debris on the seabed, blasting wire in their nets and the loss of a way of life, there continued a lingering silence. As fishers later began to reflect back over this time period they understood what had taken place somewhat differently. While they spoke hesitantly, they nonetheless spoke publicly for the first time of the damage done to their gear and nets. Other fishers spoke of the rattling of house windows with every underwater blast:

> The windows used to shake here, so what do you suppose it's doing to the fish... We don't know; you'd have to be a scientist to know. But you can imagine that if the windows are shaking in Bellevue what is happening under the water in Bull Arm.

Another neighbouring fisher stated, "we certainly took their word for it," when asked why nothing was questioned or said to HMDC when environmental destruction was at its peak. Data gathered from local fishers suggest something quite different than passive compliance; they imply that previous consent had been manipulated.

What fishers, at one time, were opposed to had now little, if any, bearing upon their lives. Their social worlds had become, for the most part, an interaction between two non-competing sectors, the powerful and the powerless and where the non-elite saw as legitimate not only the actions of the dominant, but acceptance of their own subordination. We can define the oil industry's legitimacy, then, as that of a powerholder who maintains an "acknowledged right to command" and the subordinate "an acknowledged right to obey." It is the 'source' and not the 'content' of a comma nd that grants it legitimacy "and induces willing compliance on the part of the person to whom it is addressed" (Wrong, 1979: 49).

5.3 Sanctions and the Use of Threats

By mid-winter of 1991, most fishers situated along the Arm had negotiated and settled their compensation agreements with the oil industry, that is, all fishers apart from the crews in Norman's Cove. Their early negotiations with the industry, as they recall, were similar to other fishers in the Bay. Yet, the conditions under which they entered into the agreement were considerably different. According to the skipper negotiating for Norman's Cove, the crews were presented with their individual documents and "finally Sam (fishery consultant hired by HMDC) said sign it or you get nothing." While anger was expressed individually, it did not translate into some

form of concerted action or organized protest. To be sure, Norman's Cove fishers were small in numbers, comprising only five crews with roughly three men per vessel. Moreover, they had little experience in dealing with large multinational corporations. Under these circumstances, fishers saw few alternatives and consequently signed their individual contracts, suppressing any further discussion.

The experiences of Norman's Cove fishers reflect power in the second dimension. The typology of power, as argued by Bachrach and Baratz, takes into consideration concepts such as coercion and force, to name only two, as strategies employed in non-decision making. Coercion, they argue, is defined as when A secures the compliance of B "by threat of deprivation" where there is dissension over a certain course of action (Lukes, 1974: 17). For the fishers of Norman's Cove, 'threat of deprivation' quite simply meant the potential loss of compensation. And, to this end, the power mechanisms employed by HMDC were effective in squashing any grievance or voiced opposition.

While fishers were aware of the direct connection between their inaction and the possible risk of sanctions, they were, however, unaware of the "indirect connection by which their compliant behaviour [fed] into the social order," helping to sustain the cycle of constraint and sanctioning that governed them (Barnes, 1988: 101). Threat of sanctions is not an

unfamiliar strategy as both states and multinational corporations employ them use to bring about some form of compliance worldwide. In his work on the Appalachian Valley, Gaventa illustrates how the elite used coercive measures to quell any opposition; miners' articulated grievances would render them both unemployed and homeless (Gaventa, 1980). Parenti, too, reveals similar findings from his work on community power in Newark. He states that fear of eviction among the poor black helped to explain their inaction on social inequities (Parenti, 1970).

Although seldom would any opposition be articulated within the political arena, it would be false, nonetheless, to suggest that resistance never occurred. Yet, on the rare occasion when the odd issue did get raised, threats proved to be an effective mechanism to silence any protest or grievance residents might have. For example, during a rather heated discussion in one of the B.A.A.C.C. meetings, the representative on the committee articulating the interests of employment for youth insisted, unusually, on an issue being addressed. On this particular occasion, the youth representative was insistent that the subject be confronted. The project manager for HMDC, John Banks, demonstrated how effective the company was in controlling the B.A.A.C.C. as he adamantly stated: "If this is what you people want, then we'll pack up and leave and take the project elsewhere." Silence immediately followed his

comment as the committee member voicing opposition remained still and the meeting was redirected toward other 'safer' issues. As Gaventa suggested, it is not the actual use of coercion that reinforces non-challenge among the subordinate, but rather the constant threat that it might be exercised (Gaventa, 1980).

5.4 The Public Forum

Once power relations have been established where routines of non-challenge emerge, little action is demanded on the part of the powerholder to maintain the relationship. In other words, patterns of prevalence in the decision making arena allow power to be exercised more easily over the agenda itself. The pattern set by the B.A.A.C.C. group illustrates the case in point; a challenge to the status quo was prevented or blocked "by the power which surrounds and protects the beneficiaries of the inequalities" (Gaventa, 1980: 252). As will be documented later, two-dimensional power continued to be operative in situations where key issues remained off the agenda and grievances of the subordinate suppressed; two-dimensional power thus addresses the obstacles that prevent grievances from emerging into overt conflict (within the organization).

To be sure, fishery interests as well as environmental matters continued as non-issues in spite of the development and subsequent destruction occurring in the Cove. The issues

that were articulated, on the other hand, continued to be around matters of employment and local business opportunities - otherwise thought of as the relatively 'safe' or specific issues. Moreover, HMDC officials would attempt, on occasion, to reinforce not only their image of corporate consciousness, but more importantly the perceptions of committee members toward development in Bull Arm. For example, John Banks, the Project manager for HMDC, articulated this position during one of the meetings: "We're here to work together...we want to be a part of the community." B.A.A.C.C. members, however, never questioned the underlying intent associated with such a comment. On the contrary, committee members continued to think highly of oil company officials and spoke often of the kindness and generosity received from HMDC members since they first arrived in the region.

During much of the early spring and summer of 1991, B.A.-A.C.C. members, in addition to other community leaders, were waiting in anticipation for benefits of onshore development to trickle down, so to speak, to individual communities in the area. The inshore fishers, by comparison, were thought of by many on the committee as 'taken care of' as fishers had negotiated with HMDC a compensation plan for those affected by onshore development. Consequently, little debate surrounded either environmental and harvesting issues or concerns pertaining to the processing sector. In fact, the B.A.A.C.C.

newsletter, an information pamphlet distributed quarterly to 6,000 households within the impact region, neglected throughout the entire period of field observation to account for and document fishery related issues. Not surprisingly, the interests that were represented reflected business persons in the area and made reference to the successful contracts awarded coupled with present employment statistics of local residents. As suggested by the member of B.A.A.C.C. primarily responsible for writing the newsletter:

> No, I never mentioned the fishermen's compensation package in the newsletter. To tell you the truth, I never even thought of it. It wasn't all that long ago that a fishermen's representative started to attend those meeting on a regular basis... Oake (fishery representative on B.A.A.C.C) only ever came to three or four meetings...

Patterning specific information into the newsletter, while other details remain hidden, allows "the gatekeeping" of information to remain a prerogative of certain committee members. "By shaping certain information into the communication flows and shaping certain other information out, the gatekeeping capacity could combine with the responsive capacity to **isolate, contain** and **redirect** the conflict" (Gaventa, 1980: 106). By excluding certain information from the newsletter, knowledge concerning fishers' and plant labourers' situations was never made available to other residents of the impact region.

Other community forums or organizations also neglected fishery interests. For example, the intent of the **Monitoring Meetings**, organized by the Offshore component of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (Memorial University), was to monitor and collect data on specific areas of the social and economic environment as indicated by B.A.A.C.C. members, the industry, government and social scientists.[1] While more than thirty different areas of monitoring were identified, fishery issues did not enter into the discussion - again, illustrating two-dimensional power. In fact, when issues related to the plant did arise, such as gender relations, they were debated in terms of pre-defined social problems frequently used by those involved in monitoring resource development (Cake, 1986: 3). For example, gender was discussed in terms of monitoring prostitution and increased pregnancy rates among single women, whereas monitoring women's employment status at the fish plant or employment opportunities for women in non-traditional areas of work never entered into the deliberation. As Gaventa so

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1 ISER Offshore saw its role primarily around issues of social and economic impact research and monitoring which, for them, did not take into account fishery interests. Moreover, ISER Offshore social scientists were employed by HMDC to carry out the socio-economic impact research on the onshore construction project. This may help to explain why there was little criticism of the Hibernia Project from the university in general and ISER Offshore in particular.

clearly points out, what happens as a result of institutional or organizational neglect must be considered as a form of power (Gaventa, 1980).

Probably the most direct or blatant domination of fishery interests was evidenced at a conference in Clarenville, Newfoundland in the early Fall 1991 - the first Fall, after the compensation program was in place. While the conference in general addressed community impacts of onshore development, HMDC's fishery consultant spoke on the fishery compensation program, in particular. He stated:

> The program was a big success... If the fishermen in Trinity Bay were not happy with the compensation program in place, without a doubt it would have been in 'The Packet' by now. (The Packet is the local newspaper.)

In other words, lack of overt conflict somehow implies consensus. The consultant's comment also gives the impression that if fishers were not happy with the program they were free to go to the media and report their experience. The reality of the fishers predicament, however, was that they were not permitted to disclose to the media information about the compensation program. As stated previously, such violations would result in the termination of their individual agreements. When fishers signed their contracts with HMDC they gave up their right of freedom of speech. Moreover, the issues of plant workers were excluded from the discussion as if the plant did not exist. By ignoring the concerns of the process-

ing sector, their issues and grievances, as Schattschneider (1960) stated, "became organized out" of the process. To be sure, HMDC was aware of the plant but the lack of articulation of plant workers' interests meant that they could be ignored. While it would be wrong to suggest that people could not have inquired about other aspects of the program, they did not, through no fault of their own, but because of the way in which information was controlled throughout the project to prevent others from knowing what all the issues were in the first place.

5.5 Patriarchal Social Relations

While the inshore fishers' stated interests were disguised or camouflaged so that the interests of HMDC and fishers appeared as one and the same, plant workers' concerns were neglected throughout this research period. Plant workers, moreover, came to see their position as inevitable, if not natural or legitimate. Fish plant labourers did, to be sure, see the inequality between HMDC's negotiations with fishers and their own situation; yet, they were unable to act. How do we account for women's silence? What are the barriers or obstacles which blocked women's effective action and public participation? This section will attempt to explain these questions by looking at the experiences of plant women and the position they have come to occupy within the household structure. For

the most part, women's non-challenge was a result of their own consent to a secondary role or subordinate status as women. Many plant women had come to accept their inferior position as the natural order of things where men both dominate and govern. In explaining gender inequality, feminist theories of Marxism[2] and radical feminist[3] positions are useful. For Walby, this combination is considered as a 'dual-systems' theory (1990: 5), while for others, such as myself, the synthesis of these two theoretical positions is referred to as a 'capitalist-patriarchal' system. In other words, we can explain women's acceptance of their subordinate position by looking at the capitalist-patriarchal social structure which both organizes private and public spheres. As Walby put it, patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women (Walby, 1990: 20).

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2 A Marxist feminist analysis explains gender inequality (or men's control over women) as a by-product of how capital dominates over labour. As Walby argues, "Class relations and the economic exploitation of one class by another are the central features of the social structure, and these determine the nature of gender relations" (1990: 4). See also Barrett (1980) and Hartmann (1979).

3 The system of domination where men as a group control women as a group (and are the main beneficiaries of the subordination of women) is called patriarchy. This system of domination, unlike Marxist feminists, is not viewed as a by-product of capitalism. See also Firestone (1974) and Rich (1980).

The men and women who live in Chance Cove where the plant is located adopt well defined traditional gender roles, which illustrate for them appropriate definitions of masculinity and femininity. This becomes increasingly apparent when one sees how some of the plant workers interpret the perspective of their male partners as more legitimate and a form of knowledge superior to their own. When asked for their opinion, often women would refer to what their husbands thought about a particular issue and would devalue their own perspective as meaningless. A telling example is Winnie[4], a long-term fish plant employee from the Cove. During the course of the interview Winnie's husband returns for lunch. Winnie quickly removes herself from her chair at the head of the table and begins to attend to matters in the kitchen. Roy, on the other hand, takes his place - at the head of the table - and begins to engage in conversation about the Hibernia project. Winnie, for the most part, is silent, while her husband speaks of his experience with HMDC. He does not mention the issues surrounding the fish plant until his attention is drawn to the topic. At this point, Winnie contributes to the conversation. This time, however, the confidence she has in her own voice is not visible. Her opening remark demonstrates this, as she states: "What do I know; I'm only a women." Another account

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4 The data used in describing Winnie's experiences were collected in October, 1990.

which illustrates women's acceptance of their subordinate position is the comment from Lillian, a plant worker for more than fifteen years, who claimed her spouse could articulate best her experiences with HMDC:

> Girl I don't know nothing about that. Fred is the best one to talk to... I wouldn't know what to be saying to you. But Fred now, he can tell you what went on.

Similar comments were also made by Sara as she persistently referred to what her husband, Eugene, thought:

> Now Eugene thinks that Paula White and them didn't treat the fish plant workers right when they came out for the meeting.

Eugene, meanwhile, along with all the other fishers did not attend the meeting with HMDC. Yet, probably the most significant portion of the interview with Sara was her description of what she calls women's 'place' in life":

> I don't think it's my place to go out fishing. I don't care what nobody says I don't think it's my place... The men here have never allowed no women to go fishing and they never will...not to be a true fishermen that is... I don't think there's any such thing as a bonafide fisherwomen. How can there be? I can't see no women out there hauling up those nets. My dear, I'm just as tough as the next one, but I wouldn't be able to do that. It's okay if they wants to work in the plant or something like that, but not to be going out in the boats. My place is here... I'm a fisherman's wife and proud of it. The men does good here in the fishery and its because they're all capable strong men... It wouldn't be the same if women were fishing.

Other women spoke, too, of their reluctance to pursue any attempt at negotiation with HMDC as it would lead to some familial disruption, causing their male partners difficulty in

the community. Erma, a fish plant worker and married to Jack, a local inshore fisher, ventured on a number of occasions to influence her husband to discuss the issue of compensation for fish plant workers with the fishermen's committee. After several rather unsuccessful attempts, however, Jack was reluctant to continue this endeavour as it would jeopardize his own reputation in the community and the reputation of his wife:

> If I kept on them about the compensation for the plant workers, my dear, I'd be called the biggest kind of trouble-maker this side of the Cove... It's not right what's happening. If the fishermen in Chance Cove are going to be affected, then we are too... It's pointless trying to tell them that. I don't think they (fishermen) really cares about the plant... They're not doing anything for us. They're over there causing the biggest kind of racket...and they're getting it all for themselves... You wait and see, we'll end up with nothing.

Most women, however, felt that the absence of a union was significant in explaining why the compensation program was not extended to plant workers. "...if we had a union we figure we would have had more." Another women spoke at some length:

> We should have all been one negotiating this (meaning all the plant workers and fishers from Chance Cove). But what's happened is that the fishermen have gone off and fought for themselves and the plant workers have got to fight for their own selves... You see, a lot of the older fishermen around here won't let women on the fishermen's committee... They don't think women belongs in the fishery. As far as they're concerned, that's all the plant is, is a bunch of women working to get a few stamps; so they haven't got to bother with us... I think it would have been different if the plant was more like some of the other ones around...and the fellows would have kicked up more of a fuss (November, 1990).

Asked specifically if she meant that the plant negotiations for fish plant workers would have been more successful if more men worked there, she replied:

> Yes, I think it has a lot to do with it. The fishermen wouldn't have ignored us the way they did. They (meaning male plant workers) would have had more to say about it.

Male fishers, not surprisingly, were quick to verify the accounts given by plant women as evidenced in the comment made by Jerome:

> The women don't fish in Chance Cove. We don't let them... Women can't fish and that's all there is to it. Some of them work at the plant, you don't mind that...

Similar patterns indicating gender inequality could also be found within the household where women assume prime responsibility for unpaid domestic labour. Consistent with the research findings of Sinclair and Felt (1992), responsibility for domestic work fell primarily upon women. When women were asked specifically about who does what chore within the household, they spoke at length about the sphere of life they knew well. They were not, to be sure, bitter or at all resentful about the uneven division of domestic labour, but rather accepted this role as if it were somehow intrinsic to their nature:

> Now don't get me wrong, Joe is as good as gold, but it's like talking to the wall to get he to do something around here. (When I asked Marian who did the housework when she was working at the plant, she responded in some detail.) Well it sure wasn't Joe. The girls do a fair bit, but I usually get my work done before I goes to the plant or

> when I comes home... In the summer time Sundays are no day of rest around here. If I didn't bake bread on Sunday morning we wouldn't have none for the week... I knows a lot of women that has to do most of their cleaning and that on Sundays... (I asked Marian about whose responsibility it was to make dinner especially when she was working at the plant.) Now Joe can cook himself a pork chop or something if I takes it out for him. But if I don't have something ready for his dinner before I go to work, then he'll go over to the take-out and get something... But I suppose girl that's what I do, I takes care of the cooking and cleaning and looked after the youngsters when they were small. You see Joe never had to do none of that stuff growing up, his mother did it all for him. And sure even now, she thinks it awful if I don't have Joe's dinner ready before I goes to work... I don't be bothering any more to get Joe to help me with my work. He does good at the fishing and that's all I care about...the rest of it don't matter, I can do it.

A similar account was also provided by Erma:

> Well I does my bit of work before I go in... I really have to work around my shifts. It's not too bad though... (When I asked if her husband shared the responsibility for housework, Erma laughed and stated): Now if I asks him he'll give me a hand doing something, but you got to get him in the right mood. Now he might get himself a slice of bologna or something, he won't starve. But for as far as making himself a cooked dinner, no my dear, he couldn't be bothered. I suppose I don't really encourage him to. He makes a big enough mess as it is without getting him to make more.

Women, too, understood what was considered as acceptable arenas of paid work for them. While most expressed an interest in obtaining work with the Hibernia project, seldom did they articulate an interest in non-traditional areas of work. All, with the exception of one plant worker, stated that they would prefer work in housekeeping and kitchen duties - even when other areas of work were more highly paid. Yet, for some plant women employment outside of the home or fish plant is not an

alternative - even when they express an interest in working elsewhere - as they themselves comment on how their husbands do not want them seeking wage employment. According to Sara:

> Before the fishery closed I was happy being a fish plant worker, but now I would like a job on the Hibernia. They make good money working in the kitchen and making beds and that. I think they're getting something like $17.00 an hour... But now Eugene, he don't want me working; he may have to do something for himself that's all.

While women did see the inequality between their experiences of negotiation with HMDC and that of their husbands, they did not understand the patriarchal social relations which allow them to accept their subordinate position. Along with economic and political power, most theories that address issues of gender inequality also put considerable emphasis on ideological domination - that is, the ideas, beliefs, practices and cultural values of one group over another (Smith,1987) For Smith, women's lives have been outside or subordinate to what she calls the ruling apparatus or relations of ruling, which is "that familiar complex of management, government administration, professions and intelligentsia." (Smith, 1987: 108). The relations of ruling, then, help to make visible the complex social processes of how class, gender and ideology intersect.

Elsewhere in Newfoundland, rural outports are experiencing considerable social change, particularly in the area of household relations. According to Davis, the southwest coast

of the island illustrates such change as she claims that "the rigid division of labour which once characterized the traditional life is rapidly ceasing to exist" (Davis, 1983: 26). Alternatively, Sinclair and Felt did not find similar patterns occurring in the Great Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland. Their research findings, however, show greater consistency with the present work in that "macro cultural changes underway in the region" have not significantly eroded the gender division of labour found in traditional household organizations (Sinclair and Felt, 1992: 56).[5]

5.6 The Collapse of Consent

Seventeen months after onshore development began, Gulf Oil announced that it was withdrawing from the Hibernia project. Within weeks of this announcement massive layoffs occurred as a work slowdown period soon became evident. Although operations at the site never came to an end, certain areas of construction, particularly the GBS, came to a close until new investors could be found. As stated previously, the impact of Gulf's decision to pull out resulted in the termination of the fisheries compensation program. The 'culture of silence' HMDC had maintained was now broken. This section of the chapter

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5 Other social scientists, however, such as Neis (1988) and Porter (1985; 1991) have also illustrated significant changing roles for women in outport Newfoundland.

will focus on the events which followed Gulf's withdrawal. In particular, the data will illustrate how fishers came to understand their past actions and inactions as a consequence of HMDC's power and domination. As stated by one of the skippers from Bellevue involved in the negotiation process with HMDC:

> Reflecting back on it they were a wolf in sheep[s] clothing. We were all ignorant...they suckered us into it.

Similar comments were also made by a fisher from Chance Cove. He claimed:

> The contract was only made up by a bunch of fishermen... They were like Dr. Jeckel and Mr. Hyde. They knew what they were doing all along. The thing was we didn't know what they were doing until it was too late. We were so easily pushed over last year.

These data, similar to the accounts of fishers documented throughout the various chapters, tell us much about how fishers initially interpreted HMDC's actions during the early stages of negotiation and help to validate the three-dimensional perspective put forth in this thesis. A skipper from Norman's Cove provided further insight into the situation as he reflected back over the early events and HMDC's arrival:

> They never gave the fishermen no notice. All of a sudden one day they say they're changing locations and there they are on your back door. We didn't have time to plan nothing... Looking back on it I don't think that should have been allowed. We should have had more time to prepare... They should have had to do those same studies that they did over there in Adam's Head that year. They did nothing over here until it was too late, but I figure that's what Mobil wanted all along.

Loss of compensation and traditional fishing grounds further exacerbated fishers' precarious state. Following Gulf's withdrawal, HMDC suspended fisher's compensation program, with the exception of Sunnyside fishers who continued to be compensated, while refusing to relinquish control over Bull Arm. According to HMDC officials, fishers willingly entered into a contractual arrangement which permitted the company to suspend their individual agreements without the onus on the company to compensate for any loss of fishing ground or damage resulting from onshore activity. Fishers were neither cognizant of the true translation of section 6.0 of their contract nor did they believe that HMDC would intentionally act in such a way as to leave their interests unprotected. As stated earlier in this chapter, the exact wording of the terms and conditions set out in the contract allowed HMDC to discontinue the program in the case of a work slowdown or stoppage involving the GBS construction:

> When we signed that contract we thought what we were signing was pretty good...and that's what they used against us, the wording of it. They said GBS.

Fishers spoke of their experiences the day HMDC suspended their contracts:

> It seemed that at the beginning they couldn't do enough for us. If we had to go to town for a meeting they would pay for all our expenses, take us to dinner...doing it all they were. And when Gulf pulled out they calls us up to a meeting in Bull Arm, not saying a word to us. She got her lawyers to do all the talking for her...tells us that the compensation is suspended and that we would go

> back on it when things started up again...I couldn't believe it...She wouldn't even answer our questions. She would turn to her lawyers and ask them to answer the question for her...They wouldn't even talk to us about it. After they finished telling us the compensation was suspended they told us to leave and they would be in contact. We tried writing letters to the government and we took the contract to the union to have their lawyers look into it...but nothing ever came of it. The contract they say is legal.

It is not surprising, then, that under these conditions fishers soon began to reflect back over their experiences and reinterpret the past somewhat differently. The trust and good will that many fishers experienced toward HMDC had now been replaced by much bitterness and resentment. Fishers spoke of how they wished the company had never come to the region as the credibility of the company had now been called into question. A more elderly fisher from Sunnyside spoke of his experience with HMDC and "the lies" that were initially conveyed to him and his crew:

> When Sam and he first came out they told us a bunch of lies. He tried to get as much for the company as he could. Hibernia is not good for the local people. It's for the merchants not the general people. They tried telling us there would be all kinds of benefits, but we haven't seen none of that yet. And girl, we never will.

While few fishers questioned the decision to change the location for onshore development from Adam's Head to Bull Arm, some, primarily skippers of vessels, later felt that the justification for relocating the construction project was in part due to their ignorance:

> I think the reason they changed the location of the site was because of the fishermen in Placentia Bay. They were organized and they weren't going to let Mobil take advantage of them. Mobil wouldn't have been able to do what ever they wanted over there I can asure you... I'm not the first person who thinks that's the reason why they changed sites. They knew if they came over here we would be unprepared to deal with them. All along it was the Placentia Bay fishermen that were involved with Hibernia we didn't know a thing about it... Mobil took advantage of our ignorance and now were're paying the price for it.

The most anguish fishers experienced, however, was over the fact that HMDC was under no legal obligation to return their fishing grounds:

> If we're not allowed in there well then compensate me for not going in there. Great Mosquito Cove is one of the best places for herring and mackeral in Trinity Bay... With all the blasting that went on over there the migration patterns could be fucked up for good...

A fisher from the neighbouring town spoke of utter disgust over the way in which HMDC has treated the inshore fishers and their crews:

> We thought that any changes made to that agreement would be negotiated between the fishermen and Mobil and that if it were to be cancelled for any reason well then all deals were off. And that includes the right to our fishing grounds. We couldn't believe they weren't going to give us back Great Mosquito Cove. My dear what they've done is 'out and out' disgusting.

Tensions between fishers from different communities, moreover, strengthened during this period as Sunnyside fishers were not subjected to the same contract terminations. These sources of perceived inequality create a social situation in which fishers feel they are being treated unfairly. The fact that

some fishers still receive compensation and not others continues to be a source of tremendous conflict:

> What we didn't like is that they kept Sunnyside in the agreement and not us. Sunnyside may be closer to Great Mosquito Cove but that don't mean we don't fish there as much as them...But you see Sam and them thought we made the same as the fishermen in Sunnyside. They're not real fishermen down there, they don't make no money in the fishery...Keeping them on the compensation program is not costing them nothing...

Tensions continue to exist between different groups of fishers that either receive compensation or have had it suspended: "and now these fishermen that don't have compensation don't talk with the fishermen that do."

Although fishers expressed much anger toward HMDC when they spoke of organized struggle, it did not, however, manifest itself in some form of collective action. For example, the skippers negotiating with HMDC for Norman's Cove crews had this to say when there was an increased possibility of Texaco joining the Hibernia project:

> Fishermen want the same compensation that they had. This time we know better and if they don't negotiate with fishermen in good faith then we would be satisfied to go down and block her off.

Unfortunately, it took Gulf Oil pulling out of the Hibernia project for fishery issues to reach the community political agenda. Until HMDC suspended the fisheries compensation program, B.A.A.C.C. members had neither seen nor discussed the actual terms set out in the agreement. While B.A.A.C.C.'s efforts to have the program reinstated were unsuccessful,

fishers' issues around compensation matters did, nonetheless, reach the community agenda. Yet, any correspondence that existed between HMDC and the B.A.A.C.C. group ended soon after it had begun as HMDC asserted that the program for fishers would be reinstated after a new partner was found for the Hibernia project.

Feeling somewhat paralysed, fishers' sense of powerlessness began to grow stronger as they became further alienated by HMDC. Contact with the company became less frequent as most fishers adopted a 'wait and see' approach. "There's not much we can do; we just have to wait and see what happens" (March, 1992) Nearly a year later, the same fisher commented on how the contact with HMDC was now nonexistent. "I haven't seen tell of her (Paula White) since the day she called us out to the NODECO office to tell us the program was suspended."

As fishers began to prepare for that year's Spring harvest, many crews made plans to relocate their gear outside of Bull Arm away from onshore activity. All additional expenses as a result of relocation now became the sole responsibility of individual fishers; unlike before, when HMDC guaranteed fishers a base income regardless if they fished outside the Arm or not. Compounding the already dubious situation, the northern cod fishery was closed in July of that year, as a result of further depletion and deterioration of

the fish stocks. This closure had serious repercussions for many dependent on ocean resources in Trinity Bay. "When you close the fishery down here you close a big percentage of your fishing," commented one of the fishers from Chance Cove. "Yes, when John Crosbie (former federal Minister of Fisheries) closed the fishery that put another wrench in it."

Although Sunnyside fishers continued to receive compensation from HMDC, they were, nonetheless, anxious about their own futures. Some fishers during the interview refused to discuss matters related to the oil company or offshore oil in fear of HMDC's retaliation. In other words, fear not only kept fishers compliant, but also silent. "Now we can talk about the fishery here in the Arm," said Issac, "you can ask all kinds of question, just not about Mobil Oil that's all."

Throughout much of the Fall and early winter of 1992 gossip and rumour were at a peak as local residents speculated as to whether or not Texaco would join the oil consortium. Not long after Texaco's decision not to join the Hibernia project a new partner was found in the early winter of 1993. Murphy Oil from El Dorado, Arkanas and the Canadian federal government would absorb the remaining shares. Although the project was scheduled to proceed without further delay, there was much scepticism in the area as local people had become suspicious of the company and questioned their many promises:

> We were told back then to expect a big impact...the end result has been a big disappointment. We were hoping for a certain amount of development that never came through. We pushed here in Arnold's Cove for a commercial/industrial park. We had a lot of lead up time to get ready for the project and when the project slowed down well, it was a disappointment. We were hoping for more than just residential growth, we thought that there would be economic growth too...We were really hoping for big things. The project lost a lot of credibility when Gulf pulled out... There's a whole new stigma to Hibernia now.

By January of 1993, the construction site at Great Mosquito Cove had returned to its normal schedule as employment rates started to increase once more and new contracts were awarded to local firms and businesses around the province. Yet, for the fishers in Trinity Bay, little had changed. For the most part, fishers waited in anticipation for either their contracts to be reinstated or for HMDC to reschedule negotiations. While the company may have been slow to instigate communication with fishers, issues of compensation were, nonetheless, being addressed in the B.A.A.C.C. group. For the second time, B.B.A.A.C. intervened on fishers' behalf when they reminded HMDC of their earlier commitment to resume compensation to fishers after a partner to replace Gulf Oil had been found. Fishers issues were, for the first time, officially on the community agenda where questions and concerns around the harvesting sector were debated at length. More important, however, was the fact that the discussion served as an impetus for further examination of fishery issues; the

committee started to question and called for a review of its own mandate:

> Perhaps what we need to do as a committee is to review our mandate. Part of our agenda is to represent the fishermen and we haven't been doing that. Why didn't we see the compensation agreement before the fishermen signed it. We can't do our job properly if all we do is act after the fact... As a committee we need to sit down and discuss what our objectives are and then take this back to the local people in the area.

In spite of the existence of fishers' issues on the community agenda, only those issues that concerned the men engaged in the harvesting sectorwere discussed; women in the processing plant continued to be invisible and their experiences unaccounted for. It was through the actions of this observer, assuming the role of a participant in the committee, that the issues of plant women became articulated in the B.A.-A.C.C. organization and entered the official record. Despite HMDC's extraordinary strength, in Trinity Bay, it has not been altogether effective in shaping universal acquiescence. As Freire points out, when individuals begin to analyze their own world they "become aware of their prior, distorted perceptions and thereby come to have a new perception of that reality" (Freire, 1970: 107). For Freire, this would lead to some kind of praxis - defined as process of critical reflection and action. While fishers did attempt to take action, their efforts to organize were effective only within community boundaries. As stated by one of the skippers from Bellevue:

"If we could get the other fishermen on side we would be a lot stronger in fighting this together. We would look united... The problem though is getting them on side." The end result of the skippers' attempt to organize Trinity Bay fishers was not entirely without success as Bellevue fishers sought legal action in early February of 1993.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at how the patterns of power and powerlessness endured over time. More specifically, it has focused on the events which unfolded between two different periods: March, 1991 to February, 1992, and after Gulf Oil pulled out of the Hibernia project until March of 1993. Empirical evidence continued to demostrate acquiescence among fishers and plant labourers in spite of the social inequities and destruction happening in Great Mosquito Cove. Lack of participation over time can contribute to one's accepting and adopting the role of non-challenge where one fails to acquire the necessary resources of political action - these resources being skills, consciousness, organization. Routines of non-challenge, then, require little action on the part of the powerholder for power relations to endure. This has been made evident in the five sub-sections discussed in this chapter.

I began this discussion by looking more closely at the document fishers signed with HMDC as it illustrates clearly

how fishers' interests were left unprotected by the industry. Fishers were neither cognizant of nor aware of the full implications contained in the terms of agreement. And as such, they remained ignorant of the terms set out in the agreement until Gulf Oil pulled out, causing the fishers' compensation program to be suspended and Great Mosquito Cove to remain under the control of HMDC. Fishers later came to understand how they were, so to speak, victims of three-dimensional power or as Eipper suggested "victims of hegemony" (Eipper, 1989). Fishers, to be sure, understood the actions of HMDC representatives as being intentionally manipulative and deceiving. Comments such as "we were some green back then," and "we must have been some soft" tell us much about how consensus was, in fact, manipulated. Moreover, fishers came to interpret the negotiation process as a deliberate scheme to get fishers to enter into a contractual arrangement.

Three-dimensional power could also be seen as the mechanism neutralizing conflict as HMDC pursued onshore development that further devastated the natural environment, in particular, how company officials discussed the filling in of trout ponds in Great Mosquito Cove. HMDC representatives provided information in such a way as to distort people's perceptions of what was actually taking place, while at the same time attempting to reinforce their image of environmental sensitivities - illustrating power in the third dimension. The

second environmental atrocity committed by HMDC during this time deals with the underwater blasting practices. Fishers were, through no fault of their own, unaware of the technologies available for such procedures. The oil industry, on the other hand, was aware of other methods, but employed the most efficient and cost effective method without any regard for its impact upon the environment. Fishers, moreover, had come to trust the oil company to protect their interests. Yet, when HMDC's practices were questioned they refused to acknowledge as significant the number of fish kills from blasting, which rendered invalid fishers' knowledge.

Power in the second dimension was seen operating where threats and coercive measures were used in order to secure Norman's Cove fishers' acceptance of the agreement. According to Bachrach and Baratz, 'threat of deprivation' secures the gaining of compliance. Threats to cancel onshore development were also employed by HMDC officials when strong opposition was voiced in a public forum. On the rare occasion when grievances were articulated threats proved to be an effective strategy to silence any protest. Residents in general, and fishers in particular, did not understand how their compliance actually fed into the system that served to dominate and further exploit them.

Power relations also endured in the various community forums where we see operating together aspects of both two and

three-dimensional power: particularly, in the arenas of the B.A.A.C.C. group, Monitoring Meetings and the Atlantic Planners Conference. Similarly, power relations in the household - relations originating in a capitalist-patriarchal social structure - led women to adopt a subordinate status in which they accepted as legitimate their inferior position as if it was somehow inherent in their gender.

The last section of this chapter illustrates how fishers themselves came to understand HMDC's control and to recognize that the previous consensus was manipulated. If we can draw some general conclusions, they must be that the silence of fishers should not be understood as consent about their condition or inherent within their social or cultural circumstances. For if we look more closely, discontent is indeed present, but it continues, for the time being at least, to lay festering where it remains contained.

Chapter 6

'We must have been some soft'
Conclusion and Summary

Close to a decade ago Doug House, a social scientist with expertise in the area of the petroleum industry, wrote that offshore oil and gas "promises to bring a new and welcome affluence to Newfoundland" (House, 1985: 1). He claimed that development of the offshore resource would stimulate the economy, while reducing unemployment and underemployment, and curb the out-migration rate of the province's youth. It has been more than two years since onshore development first began in Great Mosquito Cove: yet, House's acclamation of oil development has had little significance in the rural outports of Trinity-Placentia Bay. To be sure, much has happened since HMDC first arrived, back in the Fall of 1990; many hopes for a brighter future have been destroyed and people's dreams of prosperity have now dwindled. The excitement that many local residents once shared has since been replaced with frustration and much disappointment. Some residents have, more recently, expressed a desire to see the project leave the region as it is a constant reminder and torment of unfulfilled promises. "If Hibernia left I'd feel relieved," commented one of the local mayors. "If it's not there you don't expect nothing... There are so many people depressed and tormented about this

that it's sickening." Fishers, too, now feel a certain animosity toward the company as they were, in their opinion, "treated wrong" by the industry. "I wish the Christ they never came out here..."

The experiences of fishing men and women in Trinity Bay and their encounter with the oil industry have added significantly to our present understanding of hydrocarbon development. More specifically, some of the areas of weakness in the literature - evidenced by its failure to account for and explain theoretically the experiences of those involved in the fishery, in particular the experiences of women in the processing sector - have been addressed. For the most part, the boomtown research coming from the U.S. has relied heavily on quantitative data where social scientists drew, almost exclusively, upon the social disruption thesis. The literature from the North Sea, on the other hand, while it focused on how the two sectors (fishery and oil) co-existed, did so in such a way that it failed to account for why the interaction took the form that it did. Closer to home, Canadian studies in general, and regional studies in particular, have been varied; data have either been descriptive in nature and quantitatively measured or dependent upon marxian interpretations where theories of development and underdevelopment predominate.

This present work, in contrast, has attempted to **explain** the social relationship between fishers and the oil industry,

by detailing **why** the pattern took the particular structure that it did. On a much broader level, however, this research has sought to answer the question: in what ways and to what extent are social actors constrained to act and think in the ways they do. This research has been essentially a study in the exercise of power where it examines the conditions under which social inequality was maintained. More specifically, it has investigated how a multi-national oil corporation negotiated with local residents in such a way that the interests of fishing men and women in preserving their culture and way of life were effectively masked by the industry. I have argued that the relationship between the oil and fishing sectors encompasses an underlying power structure. Empirical evidence supports the argument that the consensus of fishers and plant labourers is neither intrinsic in their culture nor in their condition, but rather stems from the effective wielding of power, particularly evidenced in the two and three-dimensional views. The Data, moreover, show how corporate power successfully managed to shape itself, bringing about its own legitimacy.

"Power is the capacity to decide, to act with discretion" (Ottenheimer and Sinclair, 1993: 25) and to have access to necessary resources that can be exercised when necessary in order to secure that discretionary power. HMDC did, in fact, use discretionary power, in addition to financial resources

and skilled personnel to help bring about its desired objectives. To the extent that HMDC did provide some monetary compensation to the fishers engaged in harvesting in Bull Arm, the amount was minimal by comparison to the total cost of onshore construction. Invariably, the power held by HMDC far outweighed the power of local men and women. At the time of writing this thesis, little has changed for the inshore fishers and plant labourers situated along the bay of Bull Arm as they continue to live without compensation of some form and remain deprived of traditional fishing grounds.

Although the choices fishers and plant labourers made seem to contradict their stated interests, there was no outcry, no voiced opposition to the injustice occurring in Trinity Bay. As onshore development began, there was quietly taking place the structuring of inequalities that was later to have a significant impact upon the lives of fishers and plant labourers dependent upon sea resources in Bull Arm. In other words, their wants and needs became a product of a system that twisted and reshaped their 'real' interests.

Under what conditions and against what obstacles did fishers enter wilfully into a contractual arrangement with HMDC? In answering this question, I have relied upon the perspectives advanced by Bachrach and Barartz (1970) and Lukes (1974) to explain quiescence through the perspectives of both two and three-dimensional power. To understand fully the

conditions under which fishers' perceptions were camouflaged, an examination of the community political arena was undertaken. It was revealed that the forum, in fact, contributed to quiescence by blocking certain key issues from ever reaching the agenda. For Bachrach and Baratz (two-dimensional view), power is exercised not only over people within the decision-making process, but also, more significantly, by restricting various kinds of issues and participants altogether.

The three partied forum in place, in other words, had an agenda which suppressed certain issues and promoted others. For example, 'specific' issues as in local employment and business opportunities predominated in this arena, while other 'collective' issues were squashed as evidenced in the suppression of fishery matters and environmental concerns. As certain issues came to dominate the agenda, they reinforced the appearance of other similar kinds of issues. The end result made visible a community agenda that did not comprise a random sample of both kinds of political concerns.

If we look more closely, however, we can see other more subtle forms of manipulation taking place. In particular, the fishery consultant hired by HMDC to negotiate a compensation package with fishers did so in such a way as to discourage them from raising issues with the B.A.A.C.C. group. In fact, few fishers during this early period were informed of the existence of the committee to manage their interests, which

illustrates the extent to which information was controlled throughout early negotiations. Meanwhile, within the community political arena itself, HMDC and the main contractor for the GBS were busy making rather generous donations to the B.A.A.-C.C. group, thus allowing issues surrounding the fishery to remain unspoken within the community political arena. Probably the most significant issue left concealed throughout this process was the plight of fish plant workers. Women comprise the majority of labourers in Chance Cove's fish plant and for many they are the spouses of male fishers from the Cove. While they, too, felt that onshore development would disrupt plant operations, their interests were left unconsidered by the oil industry, the B.A.A.C.C. group and fishers themselves.

In this analysis I have rejected the pluralist argument by suggesting that the political system is, in fact, impenetrable. Fishers and plant labourers did not, to be sure, find a spokesperson in the political arena. Yet, to claim that fishers acceptance of the compensation arrangement indicates some form of consensus is unsatisfactory and dismisses one of the most insidious uses of power; that is, the power to shape people's understanding of issues so that they are prevented from being cognizant of any recognizable grievance. Empirical evidence, thus, revealed five key areas where three-dimensional power could be seen operating.

Crucial to the oil industry's securing and maintaining power was the setting in which negotiations between the two sectors took place (making visible the structuring of power and powerlessness which not only disguised fishers' perceptions, but also helped shape HMDC's own legitimacy). Fishers, from the beginning, were ignorant of much of the early planning phase for onshore development. This lack of knowledge increased their vulnerability and dependence, if only for information, on the oil company. Fishers' subordinate status, moreover, allowed HMDC to structure the negotiations by setting the agenda, which excluded fishers' long-term interests and plant workers' grievances. Alternatively, the negotiation process focused around compensation and financial arrangements; in other words, it masked fishers' long-term interests with short-term economic gain.

A central part of HMDC's structuring of the negotiation process was to divide the inshore fishers according to their residential community. Although this is by no means a new strategy, it is one that continues to be effective as fishers all along Bull Arm began to distrust other neighbouring fishing crews. By dividing fishers, the flow of information between equally powerless groups of fishers in nearby settlements was consequently blocked, which prevented any attempt, on their part, to organize collectively. Local residents, and fishers in particular, wilfully accepted HMDC's strategy as

they had come to trust the oil company whose actions they saw as legitimate. The many promises of employment and prosperity, coupled with the company's increasing visibility in individual communities, played an essential part in shaping and distorting fishers' perceptions. Fishers spoke of how company officials would visit their communities where they not only participated in rural life, but would also make large donations to various groups and in some cases engaged in individual gift giving.

Linguistic symbols, too, became an essential part in shaping fishers' perceptions; HMDC representatives would use a particular vocabulary (including co-existence, spin-offs and good faith to name but a few of the terms) to describe the relationship between the two sectors. Although these terms do not in themselves imply some form of cultural invasion, we cannot view them as simply words when fishers themselves began to adopt them to describe their experience with the oil industry. These terms, I might add, were not originally a part of fishers' linguistic culture, yet they were significant, nonetheless, in helping to mold their consciousness.

In addition to the more direct methods employed by HMDC, there exists an indirect means by which power alters political conceptions. It can be viewed as a three-dimensional effect, which stems from the powerlessness experienced in the other dimensions: in other words, a relationship where a continued

interaction between the elite and the subordinate results in a sense of increased vulnerability of the latter. This indirect mechanism of power's third dimension essentially entailed fishers' adaptation to a state of being without power so that a developed sense of powerlessness emerged. This manifested itself as apathy or fatalism and consequently hindered fishers' efforts to act collectively or to engage in some form of inquiry. Dialogue between people or groups cannot take place in a milieu where hopelessness exists; if people expect little from their efforts, their struggle will be bureaucratic and insincere, wearisome and without effect (Freire, 1970).

These early negotiations between fishers and HMDC officials set the pattern for any further interaction and debate that was to take place at a later time. Whether intentional or not, the outcome of the company's actions was the same, that is, to change the consciousness of fishers and not the situation which dominated and exploited them. As fishers were manipulated into adapting to their situation, the more easily could they be controlled. For this kind of cultural invasion to succeed, those invaded must believe, as they did, in their own intrinsic subordination where they accept a rather static view of the social world. In spite of the many inequities brought about by onshore development, there appeared in a rather brief period of time a consensus

among fishers to accept the industrial inequalities. I have argued, however, that the basis of consensus was not some form of choice, but rather an exercise of power by HMDC to obtain it. Power not only shaped fishers' choices; it also allowed them to believe that a choice was, in fact, made.

That fishers accepted the terms and conditions set out in their contract with HMDC, an arrangement that neither considered nor protected their long-term interests, provides evidence to support the claim being made. The secrecy surrounding the negotiation process, as well as the damaging contents in the agreement, allowed HMDC to protect its own interests, while managing to suppress any overt conflict. Over time, fishers' lack of action or participation reinforced their acceptance of the role of non-challenge, which, in turn, demanded little action on the part of the powerholder to maintain. The result is that fishers failed to obtain the skills and resources necessary for some form of political action. Once HMDC had successfully managed to shape its own legitimacy by conditioning fishers into compliance, so to speak, sustaining their own superior position was not difficult.

The shaping of consensus meant that HMDC's actions would go unchallenged. As onshore development proceeded, fishers neither questioned the oil company's practices nor objected to the passive role inflicted on them. Their silence or acquies-

cence persisted throughout the Spring and summer of 1991 in spite of the many inequalities, in particular, the environmental impacts which devastated much of the natural habitat around the Cove seemed to no longer instigate dispute. (These issues were, at one time, of fundamental importance for fishers in maintaining and protecting their way of life.)

More coercive means, aspects of two-dimensional power, were also used to secure compliance among fishers as well as members of the B.A.A.C.C. group. On the rare occasion when local residents would probe further for information, the use of threats reinforced HMDC's power position. Yet, it was not the company's actual use of coercion that reinforced acquiescence among fishers or other local residents, but the constant threat that it might be used. In addition to the use of threats and sanctions to contain conflict, other aspects of two-dimensional power continued to operate as the onshore phase developed. In particular, public forums ranging from the B.A.A.C.C. group and Monitoring Meetings to the Atlantic Planners conference pertaining to onshore activity continued to discuss and debate issues in a rather specific manner. Stated differently, barriers to participation continued to exist for subordinate groups where their grievances were never voiced or opposition raised. Routines of non-challenge, demonstrated by fishers' lack of participation over time

within the decision making arena, allowed power to be wielded more easily over the agenda itself.

I have argued that what appeared to be fishers' ignorance or acquiescence was, in fact, a result of the social, economic and political domination of which they were victims. Instead of being encouraged to know and understand their reality, fishers were directly and indirectly submerged in a situation where critical reflection and response were all but impossible. By distorting and controlling the flow of information HMDC managed to restrict and contain fishers' own limited knowledge. These restrictions, moreover, prevented fishers from acting, either from engaging in some form of inquiry with other subordinates about their particular situation, or from establishing co-operative interactions with neighbouring crews where their ability to organize collectively might potentially have been strengthened.

As the analysis indicates, HMDC was able to achieve this objective in a number of ways. For example, fishers were divided by residential community during the negotiation period where any discussion or debate remained, for the most part, undisclosed. Fishers, too, spoke of how they were not permitted to speak freely about the compensation program in place and pointed to section 8.0 of their contracts which prevented them from dealing with any so called 'public relations' matters. The non-disclosure of fishery related issues was

particularly evident in the community organization of the B.A.A.C.C group where certain information was shaped into the communication channel, while other information was shaped out. Perhaps the most visible indication of the neglect toward fishery issues was noted in the B.A.A.C.C. newsletter which failed to contain any reference, criticism or grievance of fishers and plant labourers in the region - illustrating power in the third dimension. Similar patterns were also noted in the Monitoring Meetings and at the local planners conference where the actual distorting and misconstruing of facts was observed. The means by which HMDC set limits upon local fishers' knowledge and restrictions upon their ability to acquire information was, therefore, a useful and effective resource in furthering their subordination.

Whereas the 'real' interests of fishers were being twisted and disguised in some way by HMDC officials, plant labourers' interests were undoubtedly thought of as insignificant because they remained dismissed and unaccounted for. The fish plant workers, while unaware of their interests as women subordinated to men, were cognizant, nonetheless, of their interests as plant workers, yet remained powerless to act on those interests. In this particular case, second and third dimensional power were operating simultaneously. I have suggested that power relations in the household, resulting from capitalist-patriarchal social relations, provide some

explanation for women's silence; women, in particular plant workers, saw their subordinate status as legitimate and somehow intrinsic in their gender.

The central argument in this work focuses around how social inequality was maintained. Examination of this subject matter explored more precisely how power relations were shaped and subsequently maintained over time. Yet more salient was analysis which focused on specific time periods when events relevant to the shaping of power were discussed. For example, in the first time period between September, 1990 and March, 1991, we see how power relations were first established in Trinity Bay, whereas the periods which followed (March, 1991 to February, 1992 and February, 1992 to March, 1993), illustrated how prevailing patterns were maintained in the region until Gulf Oil pulled out of the Hibernia project, thereby causing the field of power to change. As Gaventa illustrates in his concluding argument, one cannot understand sufficiently power relationships within a community "simply by observation at a given point in time" (Gaventa, 1980: 256). For these relationships are constantly being shaped and reworked where social power is seen to be both enduring and, at times, contested.

Much of the supporting evidence I provide for explaining fishers' and plant labourers' perceptions, argued as products of both two and three-dimensional power, derives from more

recent data where fishers' and plant labourers' reflect back over their experiences and interactions with HMDC. In other words, when Gulf Oil pulled out of the project, the field of power altered significantly; and fishers, for the first time, came to see how their interests were left unprotected by the oil company.

In this concluding section, I shall try to place some of the issues discussed earlier in this thesis in the context of an overall analysis of the current prospects for a social theory on power relations. This thesis has pointed to a number of limitations found within two and three-dimensional power and at this juncture I will take up these issues in more detail. As I have argued previously in chapter one, the two-dimensional view of power comprises a significant improvement over the pluralist or one-dimensional view; it brings into the analysis consideration and questions of control over the political agenda and how certain issues are consequently prevented from entering into the political process. While this is a major advance in our understanding of the conditions that effectively block and constrain the social actor from finding representation in the political arena, it is, nonetheless, deficient in several ways. For example, this view of power restrains the analysis of the various arenas of struggle by simplifying the conditions in which such struggles or conflicts take place. Moreover, the two-dimensional view implies

that once the barriers or obstacles to the political arena are removed, politically invisible actors will no longer be excluded from the process, but rather they will participate equally where their grievances are both recognized and articulated. On purely theoretically ground, this view of power seems to hold merit; on a more practical or applied basis, however, it is weak and subject to much criticism. Within the context of the harvesting sector, fishery issues did eventually reach the community political agenda; yet fishers' efforts to participate continued to be constrained and shaped by the powerholder. Their participation in the community political arena neither brought an end to the inequality in Great Mosquito Cove nor to the reinstating of their contracts.

Whereas two-dimensional power concentrates on the community political arena as the site in which struggles take place, the three-dimensional view takes a much broader focus where it addresses other 'social forces' and 'social arrangements.' More to the point, three-dimensional power examines the perceptions the subordinate hold about potential conflict, and links those perceptions to power processes. Theorists who support the three-dimensional view often point to the limitations found within the second dimensional approach and suggest that we can explain these deficiencies through a radical view, more specifically, the perspective espoused by Steven Lukes

(1974). In its allied form, however, it too falls short in explaining the actions, choices and preferences of the social actor. Although I have alluded to this previously in chapter four, it is worth reiterating.

To conceptualize power from the position of 'power over' or an exercise in power is to dodge the critical issue of power resources. The realization of any act of power, so to speak, demands access to key or antecedent resources. "As one needs capital to make capital," wrote Parenti, "one needs power to use power" (Parenti, 1970: 527). Three-dimensional power, however, fails to engage rigorously with this argument. Alternatively, it explains why actors make the choices they do, choices which may not reflect their interests, as a result of the elites' ability to shape their very wants and preferences so that they, in fact, think a choice was made. But does this perspective actually go far enough to help explain what is currently taking place in Trinity Bay? As fishers became cognizant of their subordinate position one would intuitively expect to find some form of struggle or conflict. Yet, the contention fishers expressed did not translate into or serve as an impetus for them to organize or act collectively. Lukes' radical view of power, moreover, does not lend itself to a discussion that extends beyond the three-dimensional approach to ask why fishers did not attempt some form of collective action.

For the fishers of Trinity Bay, the situation more closely resembles one of "cumulative inequalities" (Parenti, 1970: 527). If fishers, and plant labourers too for that matter, had the material resources to act differently, they would not have been in the subordinate position to begin with and they would have less need to organize against grievances. Future developments in the theory of social power, however, could benefit from an analysis which considers in more depth the question of power resources and the conditions under which subordinate groups effectively organize. Korpi's argument that we must proceed by understanding first the bases of social power, rather than the exercise of power, may be a useful starting point for future theoretical analysis (Korpi, 1985: 31).

This thesis is essentially a study of power relationships. While I map out the conditions under which power relations exist, and examine how they are patterned and maintained, the research only lightly touches the surface of what requires further empirical and theoretical investigation. Future inquiry needs to focus around questions connecting the social movement literature more closely to the study of power. Given the power relationships that have been found, how does protest emerge? What is the impetus for some form of praxis - defined as the process of critical reflection and action? Why did the growing unrest among fishers remain latent? Did the

social policies in place affect men and women differently? And does this then suggest that the conditions for change or some form of collective action are the same for men and women? If not, why are they different, how are they different? In what arenas, then, do we see women participating?

While this study did not inquire systematically into the relationship between participation and consciousness, such analysis would add substantially to our present understanding. What shapes political consciousness or one's participation, and how are consciousness and participation interrelated? Even as fishers became more critical of the actions of HMDC when the silence, so to speak, was broken, fishers' demands and efforts to redress the issues continued to be poorly articulated and only partially developed. How do we explain this phenomena?

More specifically, future research would benefit from a social history of fishers and plant labourers where one could show how historically patterns of power and dominance have helped shape the apparent 'consensus' of today. This would help shed light on fishers' past experiences and whether their present circumstance is the result of 'choice' or whether it has been shaped by power relations. While the present work provides an initial attempt to understand relationships of power, it would undoubtedly benefit from comparative research, particularly with communities, like those found in the North

Sea, that share similar experiences. In many of these rural societies women do not actively participate in fish harvesting. They do, however, cluster around fish processing, an area of study that has been neglected. Womens' experiences with onshore development, more generally, have been absent in much of the oil literature. Consequently, we know little about how they participate in this industry, or conversely, about the barriers and obstacles that block their effective participation.

In conclusion, it might be useful to comment briefly about the bearing of the ideas brought forth in this thesis upon discussions over agency and structure. This thesis has shown the constraints and limitations placed upon the social actor as he or she attempts to make choices about various courses of action. The social world can only be understood properly as a dialectic of agency and structure. From the view advanced by Lukes (1977), this dialectic is comprehended as "as a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits..." (Lukes, 1977: 29). An analysis which focuses solely on a one-sided argument of actors without structural constraints or power structures without agents, or fails to consider how they are entwined, is unsatisfactory and neglects to engage in a full systematic account of how social life is reproduced and transformed. In sum, a social theory

that fails to maintain an ever present dialectic of agency and structure cannot warrant serious attention.

Appendix A

Date	Event
1963	Federal Government issues exploration permits for the waters off the east coast of Canada. By 1965, 100 million acres were granted for exploration.
1965	Mobil Oil is granted an exploration permit.
	The provincial government, under the liberal leadership of J.R. Smallwood, passed the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act. Beneath the sea surface, a plaque is placed claiming offshore jurisdiction for the province of Newfoundland.
1967	Supreme court of Canada rules that British Columbia does not own sub-sea resources off its coast.
1973	The Offshore Petroleum Industrial Advisory Council is established by former Premier Frank Moores. The responsibility of the council is to investigate the requirements and consequences of offshore oil development. By the mid 1970s, however, the council had become inactive due to the decline in exploration activity.
1977	The provincial government passes the Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas which not only outlines policies pertaining to petroleum development but also establishes provincial claim to the offshore.
	The provincial government establishes new crown corporation, Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Ltd. The corporation is responsible for managing offshore areas which the provincial government claims to be the property of the province.
1978	Renewal permits issued to Mobil, Gulf and Petro-Canada.
1979	The Hibernia P-15 discovery well is drilled offshore Newfoundland.
	Prime Minister J. Clark makes assurances that offshore resources off Newfoundland will be treated as if they were on land.
1980	The Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Assessment Act is passed in the House of Assembly.
	The provincial government sets up the Offshore Petroleum Impact Committee which includes five sub-committees:

education and training; fisheries and environment; social and cultural; and financial impact.

January — The Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Directorate is set up by the Newfoundland government and reports directly to the Minister of Mines and Energy. The responsibility of the Directorate was to ensure that the principles of the Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas were implemented.

March — The Hibernia Development Project is referred to FEARO by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

July — FEARO issues Mobil with specific guidelines for the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement.

1981

December — The federal government passes legislation, bill C-48, which specified a national energy policy. Most importantly, however, it stated the federal government's ownership of offshore resources.

1982

February — Ocean Ranger, a semisubmersible drill rig, capsizes and sinks.

April — The EIS is drafted by Mobil for the Hibernia Development Project.

May — Ownership of the offshore resource found off Newfoundland is referred to the Supreme Court of Canada by Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau.

October — Both the federal and provincial governments agree to refer the ownership issue of the offshore to the courts.

1983

February — The Newfoundland Supreme Court Appeal Division rules against Newfoundland's ownership claim. The Supreme Court of Canada agrees to hear the federal claim.

August — Update of EIS is undertaken by Mobil.

1984

March — The Supreme Court of Canada rules that the subsea resources found off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador belongs to Canada.

1985

February — The Atlantic Accord is signed by both orders of government.

March — A joint federal-provincial panel, Hibernia Environmental Assessment Panel, is set up to review the Hibernia Development Project.

May — Mobil submits to HEAP the Environmental Impact Statement for the Hibernia Development Project. HEAP is to oversee a public review of the Hibernia Development Project EIS.

June — HEAP holds twelve public information sessions held around the province.

August — Mobil submits updated EIS to HEAP outlining the preferred mode of development in addition to highlighting the aspects which differed from the first EIS released.

HEAP requested additional information on matters ranging from work camps to sea bed stability. Both federal and provincial government departments were also asked to respond to issues pertaining to their responsibilities.

September — Mobil submits a Supplementary Information volume of the EIS.

October — Public hearings held which included 66 oral and 90 written submissions.

CNOBP declares the Hibernia oil field to be a significant discovery.

December — HEAP presents its report to the government with 50 recommendations. The panel identified numerous ways in which economic benefits would increase and environmental disruptions and social impacts be kept to a minimum.

1986

January — The Hibernia onshore project is exempt from an EIS procedure. In its place, an Environmental Protection Plan of the first 180 days of activity is implemented.

February — The provincial Justice Minister reactivates the Offshore Petroleum Impact Committee/Social and Cultural Committee.

March — The Hibernia Construction Sites Environmental Management Committee (HCSEMC) is set up by the provincial government.

June — (Decision 86:01) The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board approves both the Hibernia Development Plan and the Hibernia Benefits Plan subject to a number of conditions.

August — The departments of Health and Social Services and the Community Services Council all prepare proposals for oil impact monitoring.

The Offshore Fund Resource Policy Committee/Cabinet Secretariat accepts six different proposals for a Placentia Bay impact monitoring system.

1987

May — Offshore Development Fund/Social and Cultural oil Impact Committee commissions a study to develop parameters necessary to assess oil impact monitoring.

1988

June — Both the federal government and the provincial government sign the Hibernia Agreement.

Offshore Petroleum Impact Committee is officially terminated.

HCSEMC is restructured to become the province's 'single window' and impact monitoring agency. Moreover, only government officials can sit on the committee. ROIMA's (Rural Oil Impact Monitoring Agency) legitimacy as representing all the interest groups in the impact area is now questioned.

July — The Statement of Principles is signed by both government and industry.

Fall — HCSEMC begins to formulate the criteria for assembling an EPP for the Placentia Bay, Adam's Head area.

Winter — Mobil and the ROIMA group negotiate to provide funds for fisheries impact research.

1989

March — GBS bidders complete EPP's for the Adam's Head site.

July — HCSEMC Technical Working Group reviews all the EPP's completed by each GBS bidder.

September — Mobil announces that the site for onshore development has changed from Adam's Head, Placentia Bay to Great Mosquito Cove, Bull Arm, Trinity Bay.

1990

January — The CNOPB declares the Hibernia field to be a commercial discovery.

February — The two bidders for the GBS prepare EPP's for the Great Mosquito Cove site in Trinity Bay.

A 25 year production licence is issued to the Hibernia consortium by CNOPB.

June — The Offshore Development Act is passed in the House of Assembly.

August — The CNOPB gives a conditional approval to the oil consortiums Development Plan Update.

September — The Hibernia Agreement is signed. Newfoundland Offshore Development Corporation (NODECO) receive the contract to build the GBS.

Fishers begin negotiations with HMDC.

The consortium of oil companies (Chevron, Gulf, Petro-Canada and Mobil) involved in developing the Hibernia field form the Hibernia Management Development Company (HMDC). HMDC assumes responsibility for the construction and operation of the Hibernia oil field.

October — The construction of the road from the Trans Canada Highway to Great Mosquito Cove is started by McNamara Constructions.

Bill C-44, The Hibernia Project Act, receives its third and final reading in the Senate.

Fall — The ROIMA group is officially dissolved and the Bull Arm Coordinating Committee (BAACC) is formed. BAACC's mandate is to represent the impact area around issues relating to the fishery, business opportunities and employment.

December — A rough road is completed to Great Mosquito Cove. Additional work will be completed in the Spring of 1991. Dredging of the Cove is under way.

A preliminary agreement is reached between fishers of Trinity Bay and HMDC.

1991

Spring — Marine construction activity begins in Great Mosquito Cove. The exclusion zone and safety area in Bull Arm is now in place.

August — The Bull Arm construction site is completed.

1992

February — Gulf announces that it is withdrawing from the Hibernia project.

Work slow down takes place at the construction site and is followed by numerous layoffs.

HMDC suspend fishers' compensation program.

The provincial government agrees to fund the Hibernia project for six months until a new partner could be found.

1993

January — Murphy Oil from El Dorado, Arkansas and the federal government agree to invest in the Hibernia project. Both Chevron and Mobil invest as well an additional five percent. The new consortium consists of the following: Chevron, Petro-Canada, Mobil, Murphy Oil, the federal government.

May — The first concrete was poured for the GBS in a highly publicised event at the Bull Arm site.

Local residents protest outside of the Bull Arm construction site due to lack of local employment opportunities available.

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