THE SOUTH AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS:
SOCIAL CRISIS AND STATE POLICY

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES

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KIRK DAVID HELLiKER
THE SOUTH AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS:
SOCIAL CRISIS AND STATE POLICY

BY

© Kirk David Helliker, B.A., B.A.(Honours)

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This thesis focuses on recent developments in the Black residential areas or townships in the urban areas of White South Africa. More than anything else, these developments are marked by crisis and by attempts on the part of those in power to deal with crisis. During the past decade there has been an intensification of political struggle by township residents. Important here was the 1976-7 'Soweto Revolt', in which thousands of residents literally took to the streets on an unprecedented scale to express their anger with apartheid and to mobilise against it. This immersed the townships and their administration in a deep crisis. It also highlighted underlying economic problems for residents. To counteract this, there has been a rethinking and reworking of existing township policies. The major force behind this has been big business. The new policies involve continuing repression and racial domination, but also a process of reform and deracialisation. The official intention is to defuse the struggles of residents by co-opting them within a framework of liberal capitalism. But there are many limitations to the successful implementation of this 'new deal'. These include resistance from conservative Whites, the ongoing struggles of urban Blacks, and policy contradictions. It is argued that crisis in the townships is likely to continue throughout the 1980s.
All this is situated within a wider empirical and theoretical context through discussions of the political economy of contemporary South Africa and the recent debate within South African studies about economy and society. In both cases, certain unresolved issues are raised which are then taken up in the conclusion to the thesis. It is argued that reform is indeed a significant process in South Africa requiring sustained inquiry. And it is shown that a sensitivity to human volition in social change, and in particular to the agency, consciousness and interests of state officials within the realm of state theory, is important.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFCWU African Food and Canning Workers' Union
ANC African National Congress
ASSOCOM Association of Chambers of Commerce
AZAPO African Peoples' Organisation
BAD Department of Bantu Administration and Development
BCDB Black Community Development Bill
BCM Black Consciousness Movement
BCP Black Community-Programmes
BLAA Black Local Authorities Act
BPA Black Parents' Association
BPC Black Peoples' Convention
CCD Department of Cooperation and Development
CC Community Council
COSAS Congress of South African Students
FCI Federated Chamber of Industries
FOSATU Federation of South African Trade Unions
NAFCOC National African Federated Chambers of Commerce
NUSAS National Union of South African Students
OMSBPB Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill
PAC Pan African Congress
PC President's Council
PBECO Port Elizabeth Black Community Organisation
SAAWU South African Allied Workers' Union
SASM South African Students' Movement
SASO South African Students' Organisation
SBDC Small Business Development Corporation
SSRC Soweto Students' Representative Council
SWAPO South West African Peoples' Organisation
UBC Urban Bantu Council
UCHSA Urban Councils' Association of South Africa
WRAB West Rand Administration Board
INTRODUCTION

Throughout this century South African state policy has been characterized by racial domination and repression designed to subjugate and exploit the Black population. This has generated intense social conflicts between those in power and those opposed to the racial order. South Africa is now undergoing rapid social change which could profoundly alter the social system. This social system and these conflicts and changes require sustained sociological analysis.

This thesis is a sociological study of recent developments in the Black residential areas or townships in the urban areas of White South Africa. More than anything else, these developments are marked by crisis and by attempts on the part of political and economic leaders to deal with crisis. I will deal with this in three interrelated stages. First of all, I will discuss the emergence and development of crisis in the townships, most clearly manifested during the 1976-7 nation-wide revolt by students and other residents. Secondly, I will describe and analyse changes in township policy as a response to crisis. This involves a process of reform and deracialisation. Thirdly, in going beyond state policy into the sphere of policy implementation, I will assess the barriers to the successful application of the policy.

All this needs to be situated within a wider empirical and theoretical context. This will be provided in Part One by a discussion of the political economy of contemporary South
Africa and by a review of the recent debate within South African studies about economy and society. In both cases, certain unresolved issues will be raised. In the conclusion to the study, the contribution of the analysis of township crisis and policy to the resolution of these issues will be discussed.

My academic interest in recent township developments stems from my involvement from February to June 1982 in a two-year research project on contemporary township policies. This project has been undertaken by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (Rhodes University, South Africa). In-depth interviews were conducted with state officials responsible for township administration, and quantitative data on a wide range of township policy issues was collected from them. Besides this fieldwork, the thesis is based on a thorough search and qualitative analysis of relevant primary documents and secondary literature. The primary documents comprise government commission reports, legislation, and annual reports of state departments. The secondary works include accounts of current township issues.

Note on terminology—The Black population in South Africa includes Africans, Indians and Coloureds. Throughout this thesis the term 'Blacks' refers to 'Africans', and 'Black Africans' is used when necessary to distinguish them from the other Black groups.
PART ONE - THE CONTEXT

Introduction

Part One of the thesis seeks to situate the main concerns of the thesis within their wider theoretical and empirical context. The first chapter reviews and discusses the contemporary debate within South African studies about economy and society. It examines the liberal and Marxist perspectives and ends by raising a number of unresolved theoretical issues. These are touched on by the investigation of township crisis and policy in Part Two, and are discussed in the conclusion of the thesis.

The second chapter locates contemporary township developments within the wider political economy of South Africa. Over the past decade South Africa has become immersed in crisis. Political and economic leaders have wasted no time in attempting to deal with this. Their overall response, known as 'total strategy', is occurring on many fronts. This involves continuing racial domination and repression, but also a process of reform and deracialisation. While the reform move is clear for all to see, its importance is debatable. The analysis of the new township policy in Part Two provides some basis for a discussion of the significance of current reformism in South Africa in the conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter One: Economy and Society in South Africa: The Contemporary Debate

Introduction

During the past decade an important debate has emerged within South African studies about economy and society, and in particular about the relationship between economic growth and racial domination. It is a debate between what are referred to as the liberal and the Marxist perspectives. The liberal perspective implied an inherent incompatibility between capitalist growth and the system of racial domination. It saw this system as originating from outside the economy and as largely dysfunctional to it. From the Marxist viewpoint, however, the development of racial domination is seen as having significant links to capitalism and as beneficial to economic growth. This chapter will review and discuss this debate. The more important theoretical differences, and the different versions of South Africa's historical development will be examined and discussed, and a number of unresolved theoretical issues will then be raised.
Different theoretical perspectives: liberal and Marxist

This debate is part of a wider sociological debate about social and economic development. The liberal perspective shared many of the assumptions of conventional modernisation theory, including an optimistic view of the impact of capitalism on traditional societies, while the Marxist work is another assertion of the 'development of underdevelopment' idea.

The liberal perspective was dominant within South African studies for much of the post-World War II period. (1) It saw capitalism and racial domination as very different and incompatible, and believed that capitalist growth would undermine the racial system. As a liberal economic approach it tended to conceive the social system in terms of the "sociological framework of neo-classical economics". (2) The capitalist economy was conceived as a functional system in benefitting all its participants, and South African society was conceptualised in dualist terms, with the economy, free enterprise and industrial imperatives on the one hand, and the polity, political intervention and the state on the other. "State intervention in the economy in the form of racial discrimination was seen as a dysfunctional intrusion upon the economy. Segregation and apartheid were seen as archaic obstacles which "distorted the working of the economy" and "slowed down economic development in South Africa". (3) The racial order was portrayed as an
irrational system in conflict with the economy, obstructing
the workings of the economy's rational imperatives which,
if left alone, would lead to economic and social
development for all South Africans.

But this liberal conception of the economic system did not
offer an explanation for the emergence and development of
racial domination. It merely excluded capitalism as a
possible cause. Here the traditional approach made
recourse to some type of idealist explanation. As Doxey
declared: "The underlying fear of the subordination of the
white group to the non-white majority, and the debasement
of the civilized modern way of life, has resulted in an
attitude of mind among many whites, expressed most clearly
by official policy over the last ten years...". (4) Or,
as an earlier liberal writer put it, "the Native problem
is, in terms of the underlying psychological realities, a
problem in the mind of the white man since it is the
problem created and constituted by the race attitudes and
colour prejudices...". (5) Thus, 'an attitude of mind',
'race attitudes' and 'traditional prejudices', all of which
were seen as irrational forces, were presented as
explanations for the existence of the South African racial
order. This is not to deny that some liberals did
perceive certain racial policies as deriving in part from
the economy. (6) Nevertheless, the main explanatory focus
was on the subjective attitudes of the White population,
with specific emphases on ideology, racism, nationalism,
culture and ethnicity.

One example of this has been the theory of social and cultural pluralism. (7) As one such theorist stated: "Theories of the plural society or of pluralism stress the cleavages, or discontinuities, between sections differentiated by race, ethnicity, religion or culture... Racial difference... comes to have significance... as it is elaborated in systems of differential political incorporation, economic stratification and racial segregation." (8) Plural societies are marked by cultural diversity and conflict, and the maintenance of political power by a cultural minority occurs through domination and coercion. South African society, with political domination by a White minority, was thus defined and analysed in this way by many liberal writers. (9)

The general liberal theme, therefore, was that of a rational 'colour blind' economy at loggerheads with an archaic and irrational racial polity, and that the imperatives of modernisation would undermine and eventually eliminate the racial order. Thus, according to Horwitz, "the South African economy is inescapably integrated in the pursuit of productivity. Economic rationality urges the polity forward beyond its ideology." (10) And O'Dowd argued that South Africa would become a welfare state by the early 21st century. (11) For these liberals the sheer irrationality of the racial system could not withstand the continuing move towards economic
rationality and growth.

But this move might, it was acknowledged, be resisted. Some liberals spoke of the "enduring nature of plural divisions", and thus saw a "high probability of violence in the process of political change." (12) Economic growth would undermine racial domination, but would not necessarily eradicate it. Its maintenance was understood as resulting from irrational white political forces able and willing to resist the economy's imperatives for the sake of the continuing benefits of domination.

Despite various specific differences, much of the earlier work on South Africa shared a general liberal approach, according to which the racial system originated from outside the economy and was a dysfunctional intrusion upon it. In describing South African society and history, its focus was on racial groups, attitudes and conflicts. As Doxey argued, "it is the colour problem which...pervades and indeed dominates all important issues in South Africa—political, economic, cultural and social." (13) Its explanations emphasised the social and cultural pluralism of South African society.

The Marxist perspective emerged in the early 1970s, reflecting in part the revitalisation of Marxist sociology in Europe and elsewhere during the 1960s. (14) More specifically, it emerged as a reaction to the inadequacies of the liberal view of the South African economy and of the origin and maintenance of racial domination. (15) What
especially stimulated a new questioning of the traditional perspective was the 1960s period of both rapid economic growth and intensified racial domination. Thus Johnstone, in an article on the 1960s economic boom, raised the whole paradox of increasing 'White prosperity' and continuing 'White supremacy'. (16) And as Legassick put it: "At the crudest and most obvious level of criticism of this [liberal] theory, it is clear that South African economic growth since 1948 has preceded apace...while at the same time the system of racial discrimination has grown more effective and pervasive." (17) Was the racial system therefore really dysfunctional to the capitalist economy? Had it merely emerged in response to irrational White racism? These were the kinds of questions raised by the earlier Marxist work, and answering them led to a general rethinking of development in South Africa, and to the elaboration of a radically different interpretation of this.

The new focus was on class relations rather than on race relations, and in particular on capitalist exploitation and on the conflicts generated by it. The new work argued against the liberal notion of an inherent separation of and conflict between the economy and the polity, and between economic-growth and racial domination. Instead, it conceived the racial order, in both form and function, as a system of class domination based on capitalist exploitation. This was particularly useful in securing a cheap Black labour force. More than anyone else, property-
owners were seen as responsible for the emergence and elaboration of racial domination. (18) What was thus emphasised was the functionality of certain political and racial arrangements for the capital accumulation process and for specific class interests. (19)

Thus, on the 1960s boom, Johnstone's analysis concluded that "the relation between capitalist development, apartheid policies, and the core structure of white supremacy was essentially collaborative." (20) Similarly, Wolpe argued that apartheid could best be understood as "the mechanism specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialisation, of maintaining a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour-force..." (21)

In arguing for the likely persistence of racial domination, the Marxist approach drew on underdevelopment theory. (22) Following Frank's premise that "economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin", the origin and development of the 'archaic' racial order was seen in the context of capitalist development. (23) The pluralist kind of explanation was thus rejected as inadequate. Wolpe argued that this explanation only "amounts to a redescription of the original facts in different words." (24) The pluralist account is thus tautological in merely redescribing and redefining the racial system in terms of cultural diversity, differential political incorporation and White domination and
coercion. This hardly amounts to an explanation of the racial order.

The Marxist perspective has by now established a major and legitimate place in South African studies, although a major historical synthesis has yet to be provided. (25) Its emphasis has been on class analysis. It has shown the importance of capitalist exploitation and of class conflict and domination in South Africa's historical development. More than anything else, according to this view, racial domination was fundamental in ensuring a continual supply of super-exploited Black labour. The liberal work had argued that "social classes in the Marxist sense of the relationship to the means of production... are not meaningful social realities" in South Africa, and that the different racial groups and the relationships between them were the significant reality. (26) While not denying the shaping of experience and consciousness by the racial order, the new work challenged the tendency of the liberal approach of beginning and ending in the sphere of racial consciousness, and of failing to grasp the underlying class basis of South African society. (27)

2 Different versions of development in South Africa

Not surprisingly, given their different theoretical orientations, the two perspectives have interpreted South African history in quite different ways.
For the pre-capitalist period, the liberal work noted the expansion of White political power through frontier wars and the dispossession of land, with many Blacks forced to become labourers on White-owned farms; and it emphasised the importance of this in the formation of 20th century White racism. In moving into the interior of the country and establishing farms there, Afrikaners had a "long history of physical and spiritual isolation from the development of [humanitarian] European thought in the 18th and 19th centuries." (28) This, along with the master-servant relationships on the farms, the harsh geographical environment, and the frontier life generally, created an attitude of mind which was "to imprint itself indelibly upon the country's political, social and economic structure for the first hundred years of...industrial life." (29) Marxist writers, while focusing on many of the land and labour issues raised by the liberals, have interpreted these early developments as representing the specific form which racial domination took in the pre-industrial period when "the merchants governed in...alliance with colonial farmers". (30) With White colonialism came the formation of a merchant class and its extraction of surplus from Black peasants. On the White-owned farms, extra-economic forms of coercion, including pass and vagrancy laws, were used to ensure large surpluses. Thus began the underdevelopment of the indigenous mode of production. (31) Those peasants who were able to cope with and resist White
colonialism by producing goods for the expanding market, soon went into decline. They undermined the position of White farmers on the market, and various repressive measures were successfully used to counteract this. (32) The discovery of gold near the end of the 19th century resulted in the steady emergence of productive capitalist enterprises over the next few decades. According to the liberal approach, this economic growth should have benefitted all the racial groups. And, for some liberals, this apparently was the case: "Only by the exercise of strict economy, careful costing, sound labour management [etc.],... has the gold-mining industry grown and prospered as it has done. In this, gold-mining has set a standard for all industry in South Africa." (33) Liberal writers did take note of the forms of racial domination which revolved around the early gold mining industry. (34) But in wanting to explain why the emerging capitalist economy failed to benefit all South Africans, they stressed the economic dysfunctionality of this domination. For the liberal work, the most significant racial measure was the 'job colour bar', elaborated by the 'irrational' White workers. As Doxey stated, this "must be regarded as the ultimate expression of... the traditional prejudices of white South Africans." (35) It has thus taken "an enormous toll in industrial and administrative efficiency" by hindering economic growth. (36) Resistance to its implementation on the part
of property-owners was emphasised.

For some liberals, the migrant labour system and the associated compound, influx control and Reserve systems have been "the cause of most of the economic, social and political problems which beset our community." (37) Imposed on employers for political and ideological reasons, this system's economic dysfunctions included high labour turnover, the inability of Black workers to acquire skills, the waste of potential labour and inadequate labour mobility. (38) It is said to be "contrary to any principle of economic rationality in a capitalist system of production." (39)

In examining the early gold industry, the Marxist work stressed the role of the mining companies in borrowing and elaborating on the forms of racial domination utilised, as a means of class domination, by White farmers. With the high cost structure of mining, the racial measures were shown to be vital in securing a super-exploited Black workforce, thereby reducing costs and ensuring a high rate of profit. These racial measures, which included the pass laws, the compound system and the wage fixation system, were referred to as the 'exploitation colour bars' of the mining companies. (40) The super-exploitation of workers occurred through political control. As Mare has argued: "To organise was, and is difficult... workers return to 'homelands' after fixed periods; control is easily maintained in the hostels and compounds of mines and..."
industry; enforced ethnic separation leads to antagonisms and divisions; the threat of eviction from parts of their own country hangs over workers permanently. "(41) The new work also emphasised the economic role of the segregation and migrant labour systems in ensuring cheap labour costs. It was thus shown how Black migrants have historically been paid wages well below the value of their labour on the assumption that agricultural production by their families in the Reserves covered the difference. "(42) Liberals have tended to totally neglect all this because of their free market conception of the economy.

It is the 'exploitation colour bars' of property-owners rather than the 'job colour bars' of White workers that the Marxist work has seen as the most significant form of racial domination on the mines. But even then, the 'job colour bars' have been interpreted in a new way. Instead of resulting from the 'irrationality' of workers, these have been used as protective mechanisms made necessary by the structural insecurity of White labour in the face of potential and real Black upward mobility. (43) The racist attitudes of White workers are thus understood in terms of class analysis. (44)

With rapid economic growth during the 1930s and 1940s the traditional perspective argued that the policy of segregation was being undermined. In support of this, it emphasised the calls by industrialists for a more stable and permanent Black work force and for a phasing out of
the use of migrant labour. The United Party held the reigns of power then, and, in representing these property owners, the struggle between 'rational economics' and 'irrational politics' was swinging in their favour. However, the 1948 National Party election victory meant that the "champions of traditional white prejudice", notably Afrikaner farmers and workers, grabbed political power, thus starting South Africa along the apartheid road. (45). The apartheid policies were "a direct reaction to the new conditions arising from industrialisation. It was industrialisation, the growth of towns associated with it, and the movement of Africans to meet the labour needs of the expanding towns and industries which led to the enunciation of this policy as a political doctrine and to the attempt to impose separation between white and black in all spheres." (46) Apartheid was thereby conceived as a watershed in South African history, arising in response to "revers[ing] a process of economic integration which was providing 'mutual benefit in interdependence". (47) The result during the 1950s and 1960s was an intensification of racial segregation and domination in the economic, political and social spheres, including the emergence of grand apartheid or the homeland system. All this, according to the liberal view, severely restricted economic growth. De Kiewiet thus concluded that apartheid was "a mental toy, operating outside history and economics" and "at war with the laws of economics". (48) Yet this
begged the question of why the 1960s was a period of both sustained economic growth and intensifying racial domination.

The Marxist work argued that state legislation and repression during the 1920s inflicted an important defeat on the White and Black strata of the militant working class. On this basis, the South African economy entered "the 'golden period' of accumulation during the 1930s". (49)

The expanding economy thus did not benefit all its participants. Some Marxists claim that the segregation policies reflected a power alliance between 'gold'(mining companies) and 'maize'(farmers). (50) In examining the 1930s and 1940s the focus has been on a variety of processes, including the changing form of capital accumulation on the White-owned farms, the further deterioration of Reserve agricultural production stemming from the increasing dominance of the capitalist mode of production, and conflicts between groups of property-owners about the desired form of racial domination. (51)

Flowing from this the liberal view of the 1948 National Party victory has been reinterpreted. Rather than a watershed in South African history, apartheid represented the introduction of new (but not entirely new) forms of racial domination in securing the reproduction of capitalism. Different emphases are apparent here. These include the need to deal with the deterioration of Reserve agricultural production and with the intensification of
urban Black struggles, enhancing the changing capital accumulation process in manufacturing, and overcoming the White farmers' severe labour shortages. (52) While conflicts between property-owners did exist, these are downplayed. Thus the conflict between manufacturing and agricultural property-owners over the influx control and migrant labour systems merely focused on the desired size of the reserve army of labour in the urban areas. (53) Furthermore, while the important role of White farmers and White labour is acknowledged, this is explained in class terms.

In analysing the 1950s and 1960s the new work has shown the functionality of apartheid policies in stimulating the capital accumulation process and in disorganising the struggles of Blacks. Amongst other things, the tightening of influx control solved the farm labour shortages, further residential segregation enhanced political control, and state security legislation and repression crushed the popular struggles of the 1950s. All this enabled the South African economy to enter 'the golden period of accumulation during the 1960s'.

3 Some unresolved theoretical issues

The Marxist perspective provides a useful basis for understanding South African society and history. Its emphasis on class analysis and capitalist exploitation gives new and important insights into the system of racial
domination. However, there are a number of unresolved issues. Of particular importance to this thesis are debates about social change and about the state. These are ongoing concerns both within Marxist sociology and within sociological theory more generally.

It is said that the South African Marxist perspective is characterized by "a vigorous, critical and open debate". (54) This is however somewhat questionable. First of all, the perspective has focused in large part on the areas of political economy and class analysis where, with its materialist orientation, it is strongest. There have been only limited efforts to consider the more traditionally liberal concerns, including culture, nationalism and ethnicity. (55) Secondly, the perspective has been shaped by a specific approach. This is marked by structuralist and functionalist tendencies which quite often result in economic reductionism and determinism. (56) A fuller understanding of South African society would seem to require theoretical moves which take us beyond these restrictions.

There is an overemphasis in the literature on the structuralist tendency in Marx's class analysis. As the liberal Adam has argued: "While their revelations of the structural forces in motion are indeed appealing, at the same time they are unsatisfactory in grasping the full picture of group behavior...[by] usually ignoring the subjective reality." (57) Too often the role of human
agency and volition in social change is downplayed. Thus, a reading of Wolpe's analysis of the deterioration of Reserve agricultural production and the emergence of the migrant labour system may result in the conclusion that these occurred with a structural necessity and inevitability. (58) Sometimes the Althusserian conception of history as 'a process without a subject' or the Poulantziàn view of humans as 'bearers of structures' enters into their analyses.

Fortunately, there are theorists who allow us to redress these and other problems. Important here is the work of the British historian, E. P. Thompson, with his emphasis on the voluntarist tendency in Marx's analysis and on "the human dimension". (59) The notion of human experience is central to his approach. He does not wish to negate structural analysis, as many of his critics maintain. (60) Rather, he argues that structure is the mere starting point for analysis. This shapes human experience, which then exerts pressure on social consciousness. (61) He goes on to say that "consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms; embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms." (62) Experience is thus 'handled' in the culture and consciousness of humans. This involves the conscious and creative formation of, amongst other groups, trade unions, community organisations and religious movements.

With his stress on human agency, Thompson questions a
common usage of the concept of hegemony which implies "an all embracing domination upon the ruled...reaching down to the very threshold of their experience and implanting within their minds at birth categories of subordination which they are powerless to correct...". (63) He argues for 'a history from below' in emphasizing the role of the 'ruled' in profoundly shaping history and society. Much of the South African Marxist work focuses on the role of the White classes in the emergence and development of racial domination and on how this is imposed on Blacks. (64) Marks and Rathbone, in discussing the "impact of Althusserian structuralism" on South African studies, attempt to counteract this view. They thus argue, for instance, that the migrant labour system was "as much a response to the resistance of African social formations to full proletarianisation as any thought-through scheme by mine-magnates to cheapen costs." (65) A sensitivity to the voluntarist tendency and to the human agency of the 'ruled' has been a consistent feature of the work of van Onselen, who has written on early Rhodesian and Witwatersrand social history. (66) Thompson is concerned not only with overtly political forms of resistance, but also with covert and more cultural forms. (67) This is taken up by Genovese on 'slave' societies' when he argues that while American slaves did not mount large rebellions and armed resistance, they did not "meekly submit" either: "The heroism of the blacks
against slavery was largely the heroism of individual action and of collective cultural effort for 'sheer survival...". And this, he says, did involve "resistance to racial oppression". (68) In the South African context, Coplan has looked at the complexities of Black music in early Kimberley, and argues that as a form of political expression, this represented a strategy for coping with the harsh and uncertain township environment. (69) These should be seen as significant forms of struggle by oppressed Blacks.

Thompson also provides an understanding of the distinction between 'essence' (content) and 'appearance' (form), without resorting to the notion of false-consciousness. He argues that the attitudes and aspirations of people are "valid in terms of their own experiences". (70) This is based on the idea of the 'handling' of experiences. It is thus inadequate to argue that "it is a mark of false consciousness on the part of the supposed tribesmen, who subscribe to [tribal] ideology that is inconsistent with their material base." (71) Van Onselen and Phimister are able to show, in analysing a specific 'faction fight' amongst Black workers in Bulawayo in 1929, that while this took an ethnic form, it was "primarily a manifestation of intra-class conflict". (72) In examining South Africa, it is important to demonstrate the validity of racial forms of consciousness.

Many of the problems already discussed are also relevant
when looking at the South African Marxist approach to state theory. The most telling criticism is that provided by Burawoy, when he argues that Marxist sociology generally and the South African literature specifically "never directly deal[] with the state per se but infer[] attributes of the state through an account of its effects." This results from analysing the state "in terms of its 'functions'- legitimation and accumulation, preservation of the cohesion of the entire social formation, ... etc. There is no theory of how the state comes to perform those functions, produce those effects." (73) Most Marxist state theory focuses on the relationship between state and society. This involves examining the structural context within which the state operates, the various class inputs into the state, and the outcome in the form of policies. While all this is important, what is usually offered is functionalism. Specific policies are explained in terms of their functions, which is clearly teleological. (74) We are presented with a theory of the state's role in benefitting the capitalist class or in providing for the reproduction of capitalism, rather than a theory of the state itself. This would involve a sensitivity to the internal dynamics of the state, or to what Burawoy calls the "production of politics". (75) It would help in furthering our understanding of the formation of specific state policies.

Wolpe, in an article criticising much of the Marxist work,
calls for a sustained analysis of the actual workings of
the South African state as a set of relations and as a
site of struggle. (76) In this, he largely follows
Poulantzas' notion of internal contradictions between
state apparatuses and branches which directly reflect
conflicts within the capitalist class. (77) While this is
important in conceiving policy formation as marked by
conflicts and compromises, there is an omission of human
agency such that state officials become passive instruments
of the capitalist class or of structural constraints.
Miliband's overall instrumentalist approach, in which state
officials become direct agents of members of the capitalist
class because they all share similar class backgrounds and
ideological inclinations is largely inadequate, but he does
raise an important point in going beyond this
instrumentalism. (78) He thus maintains that state elites
perceive their role in the 'national interest', and "if
they defend capitalist interests, it is because they find
it easy to equate that defence with the 'national
interest'." (79) This would incorporate a notion of state
autonomy, and, more significantly, would involve looking
at the interests, consciousness and human agency of state
officials as part of the 'production of politics'. (80) De
Villiers has attempted to do this in examining the
Johannesburg Municipality's own perceived need for social
stability during the 1940s in agitating for policy changes
similar to those adopted by the National...
Party. (81)

While officials do act under structural constraints and are subject to class demands, this does not necessarily imply that they perceive their role in terms of pursuing capitalist class interests. Their own interests may be merely compatible with the maintenance of capitalism. And different officials may have different specific interests, partially reflecting their position and role in the state. This independent action of officials stems in part from certain resources controlled by them, including expert technical knowledge and 'administrative secrets'. (82)

These are thus some important theoretical issues within South African studies and within the Marxist debate about South Africa which still require investigation and clarification. I have suggested that a fuller understanding of South African society and history would involve a focus on the historical tendency in Marx's analysis, and on the production of politics, notably the interests and consciousness of state officials, in state theory. The analysis of township crisis and policy will attempt to illustrate this.
Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the contemporary debate within South African studies, and has argued for the general usefulness of the Marxist perspective in understanding South African society and history. However, it was shown that there are a number of important unresolved issues which require clarification through further investigation and analysis.

Most of the major Marxist works have focused on early periods in South African history, and very few on contemporary events. Developments in contemporary South Africa raise important questions about the adequacy of the Marxist approach. Wolpe ended his early 1970s article thinking about "whether capitalism still has space (or time) for reform in South Africa...". (83) Since then, political and economic leaders, in the face of a deep crisis, have called and pushed for some degree of reform. It is thus no longer a question of the possibility of reform.

But where does this leave us with regard to the present debate? According to some liberals, the Marxist perspective has all along implied that racial domination will forever be a feature of South African capitalism. (84) Thus do present developments invalidate the Marxist and vindicate the liberal perspective? While Marxists have somewhat overstressed the functionality of the racial order for South African capitalism, the answer to this question would seem to be 'no'. The Marxist approach does not rest
or fall on a particular thesis about the relationship between economic growth and racial domination. Rather, it is mainly concerned with providing insights into South African society on the basis of class analysis. And contemporary developments cannot be understood without reference to class issues.

The liberal work stressed the economic forces for social change, notably the rational imperatives of industrialisation. But if these were actually responsible for the reform initiative, then this process should have occurred during the 1960s period of rapid economic growth. Thus it does not explain why reform should take place now. The Marxist work is more useful in conceiving the economic forces as the intensifying contradictions of a capitalist economy based upon apartheid which now act as barriers to the capital accumulation process. Some degree of reform therefore becomes important. The Marxist perspective is also sensitive to the political forces at work. Over the past few years there has been a dramatic intensification of struggle by Blacks. A reformist response to political struggles cannot merely be seen in terms of a new willingness on the part of Whites to forsake some of their racist attitudes and aspects of White supremacy, as many liberals would claim. Rather, we must be aware of the class forces operating within the White population and of the class basis for reformism.
These issues may now become clearer as we go on to discuss the contemporary South African political economy.
Chapter Two- The Contemporary Crisis and 'Total Strategy'

Introduction

South Africa was marked by rapid economic growth and social stability during the 1960s. The oppressed Blacks were engaged in only limited overt resistance against the intensifying apartheid repressive machine. The possibility of crisis sweeping across the country during the 1970s thus seemed remote. Yet, more than anything else, it is crisis and the attempts by those in power to deal with crisis which define the dynamics of South African society over the past decade. In the words of a Cape Town folksinger: "It's come to Crossroads, where are you gonna go from here?" (1) It is clear that the struggle in South Africa has entered a new phase, with both the White and Black classes in conscious motion. This is the focus of this chapter.

First of all, I will identify and analyse the crisis. And secondly, I will discuss the contemporary South African state policies known as 'total strategy' as a response to the crisis.
The contemporary crisis in South Africa has interrelated economic, political and ideological aspects. All of these will be discussed. However, it will be shown that the political component, involving the intensification of struggles by Blacks, is the most important in explaining the emergence of 'total strategy'.

a) Economic

"There are good grounds for the statement that the RSA is probably in the most severe...economic crisis that it has ever known." (2)

Since the early 1960s there has been a rapidly increasing transition to monopoly production in South Africa. The monopoly sector is marked by a high concentration and centralisation of capital. (3) According to Harry Oppenheimer, head of the Anglo-American Corporation, this reflects "a process, still actively continuing, of a change-over from a labour-intensive, low wage, low-productivity economic system- typical of industrial development in its earliest stages- to the capital-intensive, high wage, high-productivity system which characterizes the advanced industrialized countries." (4)

Backed by massive foreign investment throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the South African economy experienced a high growth rate, exceeding 8% in many years. The intensification of racial domination benefitted the capital
accumulation process overall. But, the racial nature of the
economy did raise certain problems. These included a
skilled labour shortage, rising Black unemployment, the
limited size of the local consumer market, high inflation,
and a balance-of-payments deficit. While the economic
crisis which emerged in the early 1970s was linked to the
international recession, these problems are now, to
differing degrees, structural barriers hindering capital
accumulation. Essentially it is a crisis of profitability.
The extension of monopoly production, "whilst involving"
the progressive deskilling and increasing subordination of
manual labour, on the one hand, also involves the creation
of a minority of specialised supervisory and mental wage-
earning places; on the other", including skilled positions.
(5) Because of the relatively small size of the White
population, and the job colour bar and racial education
system hindering Black advancement, the production sphere
experienced large labour shortages in these occupations. (6)
Political and economic leaders attempted to counteract this
by encouraging White immigration and by floating the colour
bar. (7) The latter process occurred when

"White workers receive wage/salary increases and
promotions to higher (usually supervisory) positions in
the labour hierarchy in exchange for allowing Blacks
to perform certain work or occupy certain positions
previously restricted to Whites only. The former work
position is, however, simultaneously fragmented,
reclassified or "diluted" in such a way that Blacks
are brought in to perform newly mechanised manual
functions at lower wage rates." (8)

The racial division of labour was thus maintained. While
this process was somewhat costly and inefficient, it did not restrict capital accumulation considering the economic boom conditions. But with increasing capital-intensity opening up more supervisory and skilled positions in the face of profitability problems in the mid-1970s, employers soon began searching for other measures to combat the shortages. These will be discussed later.

Black unemployment (including the underemployed) in South Africa rose from 1.24 million in 1960 to 1.6 million in 1970, and further to 2.3 million in 1977. (9) It is important to recognise the structural as well as the cyclical nature of this unemployment, for even during the booming 1960s it increased. How is this to-be explained? As Marx noted: "With the growth of the total capital [constant and variable capital], its variable constituent or the labour incorporated in it, also does increase, but in a constantly diminishing proportion." (10) In other words, while the absolute number of workers may increase, relative to the rise in constant capital the numbers employed actually decrease. (11) The present increase in constant capital in the South African economy reflects increasing capital-intensity in the monopoly sector. (12) In 1970 Prime Minister J. B. Vorster stated that one of "the greatest dangers confronting South Africa is...mass unemployment...". (13) This was echoed a decade later by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce when it said that "growing black unemployment is a very serious threat to the
future peace and prosperity of this country..." (14)

Black unemployment has always been a source of social instability in the urban areas. This was particularly true during the 1940s when unemployment, in the context of rapid Black urbanisation, fueled the intensive political struggles of urban residents. During the 1960s the state's response to unemployment involved displacing it to the homelands through the relocation of Blacks.

The main local market for products in South Africa has historically been White consumers. But this became increasingly 'saturated' by the early 1970s. This problem, plus the limited Black purchasing power emanating from exploitation and low wages, restricted the ability of big business to utilise economies of scale. Rising capital-intensity permitted an increase in the amount of commodities produced. However, the two limiting factors combined to impede the sale of products, thus restricting the realisation of profits and the further transition to monopoly production. This has compelled "manufacturers and dealers to intensify their search for new markets" both within South Africa and abroad. (15)

The chief economist of Sanbank, Louis Geldenhuys, has recently stated that inflation has "already filtered so deeply into the system that it has become partly institutionalised and I have to sound a note of warning that the attainment of a substantially reduced inflation rate will be accompanied by painful adjustments." (16) The
inflation rate has risen since the 1960s, reaching between 13 and 18% throughout most of the 1970s. This was mainly due to monopoly pricing, which gave high rates of profit to big business. (17) While increasing inflation hindered the search for new markets, it also made South Africa relatively uncompetitive on the international market considering the lower inflation rates of its major trading partners.

This had a detrimental effect on its balance-of-payments, which showed a deficit during the late 1970s. Over the years South Africa's main exports have been agricultural products and minerals, notably gold. With the manufacturing sector producing mainly wage or consumer goods, South Africa's dependency on imports as a source of capital equipment has been quite pronounced. (18) The increasing capital requirements of big business and the falling gold price have worsened the balance-of-payments picture.

Though a complete analysis of the contemporary economic crisis has yet to be provided, the indices discussed are revealing. The various barriers contributed to the emergence of crisis and now hinder the recovery from it. The real growth in the gross domestic product decreased from 7.6% in 1974 to a mere 0.1% in 1977, rising again to 7.9% in 1979 but tailing off since. While the post-1977 fluctuations largely reflect the rise and fall in the gold price, it is important to again stress the structural nature of the crisis. Thus, even if the late 1970s gold
price increase "eliminated some of the symptoms of crisis and [gave] an undoubted boost to accumulation...[it did] not really touch the underlying causes of the economy's...paralysis." (19) To glance at the business section of any South African newspaper is to read such headlines as 'gloomy economic picture forecast' and 'skilled labour shortage worsening'. This crisis sets structural limits to the state's response to the overall crisis. In other words, the economic crisis defines "the context within which total strategy has emerged rather than giving rise to that strategy itself." (20)

b) Political and ideological

"Today, blacks throughout South Africa are organising their collective might against the system in a way that has not been seen for many years. School boycotts, worker strikes, bus boycotts, township insurrection—all these...forms of resistance are happening in South Africa today." (21) "There is a general tendency for young Africans to be anti-free enterprise." (22)

Over the past decade there has been a tremendous intensification of struggle by Blacks, particularly in the urban areas. This defines the political aspect of the crisis. However, this aspect also refers to the erosion of White rule in countries bordering on South Africa, to international pressure against apartheid, and to the intensification of activities by the military wings of the
African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO). The ideological crisis refers not only to the continuing illegitimacy of racial domination in the eyes of Blacks, but also to their increasing tendency to perceive this domination in class terms.

During the 1960s the mobilisation of Blacks against apartheid was minimal. The number of Black African workers involved in strike action thus averaged less than 2,000 per annum. (23) But this suddenly changed. In 1971-2 nearly 20,000 Ovambo workers in Namibia withdrew their labour in opposition to the migrant labour system. In early 1973 about 30,000 Durban workers came out on strike demanding higher wages and better working conditions in one of the largest demonstrations of worker power in South African history. These and other strikes led the Standard Bank to remark in April 1973 that "the days are past when employers could bargain with Bantu workers from a position of unchallenged strength." (24) Over the next few years, despite "the many obstacles in their way— the barriers created within the industrial legislation, the obstructionist tactics by management, the general lack of information and the tremendous difficulties in organising the unorganised— viable trade unions representing African workers began springing up throughout the country." (25) Between 1974-6 about 106,000 Black African workers were involved in 899 strikes. (26) In some cases, these focused on disputes
over worker representation in industry, with workers demanding that employers recognise their independently established unions. (27)

Then in June 1976, the students of Soweto township began their revolt. This soon engulfed the entire country, including the homelands, lasting in some places until early 1978. While the immediate issue was the forced imposition of Afrikaans in the schools, the opposition of students became directed towards the entire ambit of apartheid policy. Adults, as both parents and workers, became involved in the struggles, including rent increase protests, opposition to local Black government bodies, and work stayaways. The short-term response of the state to the revolt was sheer repression. Confrontations between residents and police occurred time and time again, and there was massive destruction of property in the townships. Hundreds of Blacks were killed, injured and detained. The scale, scope and intensity of the revolt, known simply as 'Soweto', is unique in South African history. More than anything else, it was responsible for the emergence of political crisis in the late 1970s. (28)

Since 'Soweto' the commitment of Blacks to the liberation struggle has increased, as reflected in the dramatic growth in workplace and township organisation and mobilisation. The Federation of South African Trade Unions(FOSATU), the South African Allied Workers' Union(SAAWU), the African Food and Canning Workers' Union(AFCWU) and other unions are
now household names to most Blacks. The number of Black trade-union members increased from 240,454 in 1975 to 472,953 in 1980. (29) Parallel to this development was an intensification of workers' struggles. In 1980 there was "a massive eruption of worker militancy in a growing number of large-scale strikes, disrupting production and triggering off labour unrest throughout the country." (30) This has continued on into 1983. Strike action has occurred around a wide range of issues, including trade union rights, wages, working conditions, pensions and other 'benefits', and unfair dismissals. (31) In the townships, residents have organised themselves into housing action committees, civic organisations and student bodies, some of which have nation-wide connections and/or membership. Struggles have focused on, amongst other things, increases in bus fares and house rents, and the education system. In some cases, notably in Cape Town in 1980, these issues have been taken up simultaneously. (32) Africans, Coloureds and Indians have shown much unity in the struggles.

The intensification of struggle by Blacks had occurred to such an extent that Rear Admiral Edwards of the South African Defence Force was heard to say in early 1978: "Time is running out—time has run out... I don't think we have five years to play with." (33) But this statement, especially from a leading military figure, also refers to other aspects of the political crisis. The 1977 Defence White Paper thus said that "developments in Africa and elsewhere have today
For nearly two decades South Africa has illegally occupied Namibia. SWAPO has attempted to overcome this South African colonialism through military struggle. Since 1975 Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have all achieved political independence. Bordering on South Africa, the leaders of these countries are committed to the overthrow of the apartheid regime. With Angolan independence, SWAPO was provided a more secure base for its military operations into Namibia and has subsequently intensified its attacks. Likewise the ANC now operates from Mozambique. Recent ANC activities have occurred throughout South Africa, involving attacks on police stations, railway lines and office buildings, and on the Koeberg nuclear plant and state-owned oil industry. Besides all this, international political pressure on South Africa has increased, emanating from the United Nations, Western governments, various anti-apartheid movements, and some multinationals. South Africa has thus become subjected to a wide range of political struggles and campaigns.

In all the struggles internal to South Africa, Blacks have expressed and shown their opposition to racial domination. But there has also developed, amongst more and more of the Black population, an awareness of a more fundamental injustice in South Africa in the form of class...
domination. This involves a rejection of South African capitalism per se, rather than merely its racial aspect. This is the most significant element of apartheid’s present illegitimacy. It was very limited during ‘Soweto’, but has grown since. As a leader of the General and Allied Workers’ Union said in 1981: ‘The exploiter is a common enemy. The workers’ unions must come together to counter the ‘master’ through strength.” (37)

It should now be clear that the economic and political leaders in South Africa are faced with a severe crisis. There are structural barriers to further capital accumulation, the intensifying political struggles of oppressed Blacks, and the increasing illegitimacy of all forms of domination in South Africa. Further study would be able to identify the complex interactions between the different elements of the crisis. But it is now time to explore the response of those in power to the crisis. While the economic crisis provides the broad limits to possible responses, ‘total strategy’ emerged more directly from the political crisis.

2. ‘Total strategy’ (38)

‘Total strategy’ is the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere,
but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure." (1977 Defence White Paper) (39)

Government and state leaders have constantly referred to the 'total onslaught' that South Africa is now facing: "We already exist in political, economic, ideological and military circumstances usually associated with a state of war." (40). This onslaught, or crisis as I have called it, is officially seen to require a 'total strategy'. This section will describe and analyse this strategy in the context of crisis.

In 1976 Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-American argued:

"Those of us who believe that private enterprise is the system best calculated to widen the areas of individual choice to open up new opportunities and raise the standard of living have to show very clearly that this private enterprise system is not something that bears the label 'for whites only'. In South Africa we need, for our security and for our development, a real unity in the country to resist events such as we have seen taking place in Angola, but it is surely intensely illogical to ask a lot of black people to stand together with whites in order to oppose Communist aggression if, at the same time, by law and custom they are excluded from most of the benefits which are conferred by the free enterprise system." (41)

This statement captures many of the 'national aims' of the strategy which involve ensuring the maintenance of South African capitalism. The 'specific policies' should be mainly understood in this context. These policies include the establishment of the President's Council and its constitutional proposals, the 'constellation of states' idea, the Witsah and Riskert Commissions' recommendations and subsequent industrial and township legislation,
increased military activity, commissions dealing with the mass media and security measures, the dismantling of petty apartheid, and state restructuring. While there is continuing racial domination and repression, a process of reform and deracialisation is also occurring.

a) President's Council

The President's Council deals with the future constitutional arrangements for Whites, Coloureds and Indians at the national level. Based on the findings of a cabinet committee appointed in 1976 to investigate this issue, the South African Constitutional Bill was submitted to parliament in 1979. These separate parliaments (for Whites, Coloureds and Indians) were to be formed, with the White parliament dominating the formulation and passing of legislation. Black Africans were excluded from this dispensation. (42) Because of widespread opposition emanating from many liberal quarters, the Bill was referred to a parliamentary select committee for inquiry. This was soon converted into the Schlebusch Commission, incorporating members from all the White political parties and headed by the Minister of Justice and Police.

The Commission submitted its interim report in May 1980. It recommended, amongst other things, the creation of a President's Council (PC) consisting of White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese members. (43) This was to perform an advisory role in formulating constitutional proposals. In
the Commission's minority report, the liberal Progressive Federal Party members rejected the PC because it excluded Black African representation, and they refused to sit on it. A separate advisory council for Black Africans was to be established, which the PC could consult, but this idea was soon scrapped. The Commission negated the introduction of a 'one-person one-vote' system as this would lead to "serious conflict among population groups" and thus would not provide for "peaceful co-existence in the Republic". (44)

In May 1982 the PC submitted its initial major recommendations. These included an end to all-White rule in parliament, a racially mixed non-parliamentary cabinet executive, and an all powerful executive state president. (45) The government rejected the complete separation between parliament and cabinet, and stressed the importance of a White majority in the three-chamber parliament. Nevertheless, its general approach flows from the PC guidelines. This has now become part of the statute books.

In arguing for the granting of national political rights to Coloureds and Indians, Prime Minister P. W. Botha declared: "If we as Nationalists and as Afrikaners were in a position where we did not have the vote and could not choose our leaders, would we be satisfied... Must I estrange these people or must I take them with me so the country's security can be maintained." (46)
b) 'Constellation of states'

Since 1979 the South-African government has spoken of the introduction of 'a constellation of states' and of 'regional development axes' throughout southern Africa. A 1980 BENC report said: "A solution to the problem of race relations in South Africa does not lie in the creation of a number of separate economies, but rather in economic cooperation and a system of separate political sovereignties (homelands)." (47) There are no intentions whatsoever to do away with homeland political structures and the restriction of Black voting rights to this realm. There is however a proposed shift towards regional economic development, which would involve de-emphasising homeland consolidation and the notion of separate and viable homeland economies. (48) This process is still in its preliminary stages.

Just as important is regional cooperation with other southern African countries, all of which would form part of the constellation. According to a senior South African state official: "The economies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe depend so heavily on us that we are even prepared to help Maputo or Salisbury improve their direct road and rail links; this is in our interest." (49) Increased trade with these countries is seen as essential in expanding South Africa's consumer market. But it also attempts to limit the willingness of these countries to harbour ANC guerillas. (50)
c) Wiehahn

Both the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions focused mainly on the urban Black African population. Their terms of references and recommendations are complementary and interrelated. As the Wiehahn Commission chairperson said: "Our job wouldn't have been done without this other Commission. We will be working very closely with it." (51)

The Riekert Commission dealt with township issues and Wiehahn considered the industrial scene. Two of Wiehahn's major recommendations concerned the racial division of labour and the Black trade union movement. (52)

"On the issue of unions, the Commission argued that the state should officially recognise Black trade unions rather than ban them outright. It presented thirteen reasons for this, including: "African unions are not subject to the 'protective and stabilising' elements of the system, or to discipline and control; in fact, they enjoy greater freedom than registered unions in that they could participate in party politics and could use their funds for any purposes which they saw fit." (53) Similarly, Fanie Botha, the Minister of Manpower Utilization, stated: "Black trade unions can no longer be permitted to operate outside the law... The whole idea...has been to bring black trade unions under control." (54) This recommendation was accepted by the government and the law was subsequently defacialised. State registration of Black unions thus became possible through the 1979 Industrial Conciliation
Amendment Act. This permitted the involvement of these unions in the bargaining process associated with the industrial council system. (55). However, general and racially mixed unions could not register. And, once registered, there were to be strict controls over union finances, political activities and industrial relations training.

Trade union reaction to all this was mixed. Many White unions considered Wiehahn a "slap in the face". (56) Lucy Mvubelo of the Black 'parallel' National Union of Clothing Workers said "our dream has come true". (57) But most Black unions were skeptical in conceiving registration as a more sophisticated form of state control. Nevertheless, besides the parallel unions, POSATU and other independent unions have registered. (58) SAAWU, AFCWU and others have not done so. (59)

In response to amongst other things, the advances made by the unregistered Black unions in having some employers unofficially recognise them, the 1979 Act was amended by the 1981 Labour Relations Act. These unions now became obliged to submit copies of their constitutions to the industrial registrar plus details of their members, branches and finances. And registered unions became subjected to further controls.

The independent unions have experienced widespread police repression, including detentions and bannings, and the
disruption of strike activity. In September 1980 a document issued by an East London security police officer was given to local employers outlining measures to "break the power of SAANU/unregistered black unions and to normalise labour unrest." (50) In 1981, 300 union leaders and workers were detained. The introduction of the 1982 Intimidation Act has resulted in further police harassment of union members.

The Wiehahn Commission showed great concern about the skilled labour shortage. To overcome this, it argued for the progressive elimination of the racial division of labour and for an increased emphasis on the skills training of Black workers. The encouragement of public and private training institutions is reflected in provisions of the 1979 In-Service Training Act and the 1981 Manpower Training Act. The floating colour bar was seen by Wiehahn as inadequate in lessening the impact of the labour shortage. It thus recommended that statutory, job reservation and closed shop agreements be abolished to permit Black advancement. This was incorporated into the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act.

The state is therefore attempting to enhance capital restructuring. It is argued that "the crisis of profitability has forced the [monopoly] capitalist class in South Africa to restructure capitalist production at a higher organic composition of capital", or capital-intensity. (61) This implies the further utilisation of economies of scale, rising labour productivity, and
increased skilled labour requirements. (62) Economies of scale require expansions in the consumer market. Big business is thus stressing the importance of increasing the purchasing power of Blacks and their 'subsistence package'. Wiehahn is consistent with this move as skilled Black workers will obtain higher wages. However, the high inflation rate hinders it. (63)

d) Riekert

The Riekert Commission is central to the urban component of total strategy. It was appointed in August 1977 and submitted its report in 1979. Its terms of reference concerned the investigation of township and influx control matters in so far as these related to the economic utilisation of manpower. In its recommendations, the Commission stressed the need to improve the living conditions and employment opportunities of township residents, and to limit Black urbanisation through intensified influx control.

These were accepted in the Government White Paper on Riekert, and some have since been implemented. Included here are increased fines on employers for employing those Blacks illegally in the urban areas, private sector involvement in the township housing process, and improvements for Black traders. Further recommendations have been incorporated into recently drafted legislation. Also important are the 1977 Act which provided for the establishment of Community
Councills in the townships and thus for some form of local Black government, and the introduction of the 99-year leasehold scheme. (64) Many of these are reformist policy changes.

All this has occurred in the context of the intensification of political struggle by township residents. Political and economic leaders have stressed the importance of township policy changes in ensuring a stable and contented Black urban population.

e) The military

Over the past decade there has been a dramatic build-up of the South African military machine. According to Prime Minister Botha, "the country is being thrown to an increasing degree on its own resources in order to ensure survival." (65) Because of the 1963 voluntary and the 1977 mandatory arms embargoes on South Africa, a massive military-industrial complex has developed. In 1964 the parastatal ARMSCOR was formed for controlling armaments production. It now oversees nine nationalised manufacturing subsidiaries with over 1,000 private sector contractors also involved. (66)

Perhaps the best indicator of the build-up is the increased defence budget, rising from R44 million in 1960 to R472 million in 1973, and then to R1,972 million in 1979. (67) South Africa's military manpower then stood at 494,000, including a standing operational force of 180,000. (68)
military has been deployed in Namibia for some time now in countering SWAPO. In 1975-6 it launched large-scale attacks into Angola in unsuccessfully attempting to prevent the MPLA forces from attaining political power. Since then, raids into Angola, and into Mozambique and Lesotho to destroy ANC bases, have become increasingly common. (69) The Defence Force is also establishing a military zone along South Africa's borders to limit ANC infiltration.

But the military is also involved in a 'hearts-and-minds' campaign in Namibia and South Africa in order to win over the Black population. The Defence Force has stressed "the application of a well co-ordinated combination of assistance designed to improve the living conditions of the population, and raise its cultural levels... [it is essentially aimed at reaching the population, thus making it more receptive to psychological action." (70) There has thus been much troop involvement in agricultural development schemes, technical schools and physical education programs. As Brigadier C. J. Lloyd of the Natal Command said: "Wherever we have a LP (local population) in our border or rural areas we will have to secure their loyalty, goodwill and cooperation against the insurgents." (71)

f) Commissions on security legislation and the mass media

Besides Wiehahn and Riekert, two other recent commissions are important. These are the 1981 Steyn Commission on the mass media and the 1982 Rabie Commission on security
legislation. Both stress aspects of the political crisis of
direct concern to the military.

Appointed in 1980, the Steyn Commission concluded: "We are
facing great dangers...which require of our...media
community far greater responsibility of action and
circumspection of utterance..." (72) It expressed concern
about the reporting of military activities, guerrilla
incursions, riots and strikes, all of which created a
feeling of political instability amongst Whites. Further
controls on newspapers were thus seen as necessary. These
included the establishment of a statutory register of
journalists from which they could be struck for
unprofessional conduct, and the restructuring of newspaper
shareholdings so that no single person or organisation,
particularly those representing the liberal opposition,
could own more than 1% of a newspaper's shares. (73) Many
of its major recommendations were incorporated into the
1982 Registration of Newspapers Amendment Bill.

The Rabie Commission argued that in the light of "terrorism
and sabotage [and other subversive activities] committed in
the Republic during the past few years, [and] the likelihood
that these activities will continue to increase in the
foreseeable future,...the measures it recommends are
necessitated by the exigencies of the situation in which
the Republic finds itself." (74) Its recommendations did
not differ significantly from provisions in existing
security legislation, including the banning of individuals
and groups, and detention without trial. On the basis of its findings, the Commission proposed three new bills—the Intimidation Bill, the Internal Security Bill dealing with such acts as sabotage and terrorism, and the Protection of Information Bill providing for "the protection of information in cases where disclosure could be prejudicial to the interest or security of the State." (75) It seems clear that the Steyn and Rabie Commissions are complementary.

g) Petty apartheid

Since the mid-1970s the government has slowly and selectively abolished some aspects of petty apartheid or racial discrimination at the strictly social level. The 'Whites only' signs have been removed from, amongst other things, hotels, libraries, theatres, restaurants, buses and sporting facilities. The authorities usually retain strict control over the granting of open amenities through a permit system. In many cases the facilities now open are restricted to 'middle class' Blacks who can afford them. (76)

h) State, government and National Party restructuring

The total strategy initiative and its implementation must be understood in relation to the restructuring of the state, government and National Party.

It is important to recognise the shifting class base of Afrikaner nationalism and of specifically the National Party. Historically, the Party has been very sensitive to
the interests of White workers, elements of the middle class, and farmers. The apartheid policies which emerged in the 1950s, including the tightening of influx control and the outright repression of Black workers, primarily served these interests. However, increasingly during the last two decades Afrikaner big business has expanded through the intervention of the state. This involved "the unification of 'English', 'Afrikaans' and 'foreign' monopoly capitalist interests, and the result of this process is currently leading to a reconstitution of the basis of the National Party...". (77) It has been convincingly shown that the Party is becoming more capitalist-based. (78) Power struggles within the Party, resulting in verligtes (liberals) gaining victory over verkramptes (conservatives), were important in this process. This permits an understanding of the National Party's willingness to pursue a strategy which has been actively pushed by big business.

The implementation of total strategy, notably in its reformist aspects, required restructuring within the state. Evidence suggests that throughout the 1970s military leaders recognised the need for winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Black population through reform, as indicated in Defence White Papers. (79) What followed was a process of struggle within the state apparatuses, with the advocates of total strategy increasingly obtaining command. Under Prime Minister Vorster, national security was the primary responsibility of the verkrampte Bureau of State.
Security. Now however the military has predominance. (80) The State Security Council, merely performing an advisory role before and now occupied by senior military officers, is "perhaps the most influential decision-taking political institution in the country and is the main forum for formulating and planning the implementation of...total strategy." (81) The implementation of the strategy takes place through state interdepartmental committees under the control of the Security Council.

The executive functions of the cabinet have been taken over by cabinet committees, which were reduced from 40 to 5 in September 1979. (82) Since their members need not come from parliament, Prime Minister Botha has appointed many military and business representatives supportive of total strategy. Centralisation and rationalisation of the state bureaucracy are also occurring. This is undertaken by the Public Service Commission comprised mainly of business leaders. State departments were recently reduced from 40 to 22. Considering the obvious importance of the bureaucracy in implementing the strategy, any potential resistance by officials can be circumvented through this process.

Power struggles within the National Party and the state have thus ensured that those holding the reigns of power are more receptive to total strategy. Its smooth implementation will be potentially guaranteed through centralisation and rationalisation within both the government and state.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the contemporary crisis in South Africa and the 'total strategy' response to it. This strategy has been actively pursued and supported by big business. In many ways it attempts to ensure the reproduction of South African capitalism. While reformulations of policy are occurring on many fronts, it is important not to overestimate the functionality of the strategy in successfully dealing with the crisis. There are many limitations. Resistance to its implementation abounds within the White population, and, as briefly indicated, Blacks continue to intensify their struggles, sometimes confronting the strategy head-on. All this will receive greater attention in Part Two of the thesis when discussing the township crisis and policy.

Total strategy involves continuing repression, but also reform and deracialisation. Its repressive elements include the maintenance of the homeland system, increased military activities, the detention and banning of political activists, and the continuing emphasis on influx control. Reformism includes the new constitutional proposals, the state registration of Black unions, the granting of more powers to local Black government, and the erosion of petty apartheid. While the existence of these two aspects of the strategy are undisputable, differing interpretations are possible. Some writers, in emphasising continuing repression, have questioned the importance of the reform
process in arguing that apartheid essentially remains unaltered. Thus does reformism represent a significant shift in apartheid policies? Part Two will hopefully provide answers to this and related questions.
Conclusion to Part One

The first part of this study has provided a wider context in which to locate township crisis and policy in contemporary South Africa.

I began by reviewing the debate within South African studies about economy and society. It was argued and shown that the Marxist approach, with its emphasis on class conflict and capitalist exploitation, provides a useful basis for understanding South African society. But certain theoretical problems were identified. The discussion and analysis of the contemporary township crisis and policy in Part Two will hopefully contribute to the resolution of these issues.

I then went on to examine the wider political economy in contemporary South Africa. This sought to show the emergence and development of crisis in South Africa and the attempts by those holding the reins of power to deal with this through 'total strategy'. While this strategy has both repressive and reformist aspects, the actual significance of these aspects is debatable. The discussion of township developments will hopefully clarify this. And it is to these recent developments that we now turn.
PART TWO - TOWNSHIP CRISIS AND POLICY

Introduction

South Africa is in a state of severe crisis. About this there is no doubt. Economic problems abound, and the struggles of the oppressed Blacks are intensifying. Meanwhile, political and economic leaders are involved in a ferment of activity in formulating a political program capable of counteracting these and other tendencies. All this is nowhere more true than in the urban areas in White South Africa, the economic heartland of the country. It is here where most Black workers are employed, where "the machine of the white economy is waiting for the black hands to turn its wheels." (1) And it is here where all Blacks are forced to live in segregated residential areas called townships situated on the outskirts of towns and cities.

Part Two of the thesis will focus more specifically on recent township developments. These will be dealt with in three interrelated stages. Chapter three examines the social crisis in the townships. Chapter four describes and analyses the contemporary township policy as a response to this crisis. Chapter five assesses the extent to which the policy can be and is being implemented in the face of struggle.

While overt resistance and struggle by township residents was limited during the 1960s, the 1970s became a different story. With the emergence of the Black Consciousness
Movement and the resurgence of worker action, the tide slowly began to turn. But it was the events of 1976-7 which vividly showed those in power that all was not right on the township front. These were the years of the 'Soweto' revolt during which residents throughout the country literally took to the streets on an unprecedented scale to express their anger and discontent with prevailing state policy and action. The townships simply exploded. This immersed the townships and their administration in deep crisis. Chapter three will discuss and analyse the various aspects of the social crisis.

The courage and creativity of the 'Soweto' residents were initially met by the brutality of the police. But it soon became clear to some sections of the White population that the magnitude of the township crisis also required action of a more formative and creative kind. Initiated and lead by big business and verligte National Party leaders, but incorporating others, a substantial rethinking and reworking of the prevailing township policy is now occurring at a feverish pace. Changes, but also continuities, are evident in both the legislative and institutional frameworks. In many ways the emphasis is on deracialisation and reform, and on moving away from the historically repressive township policy in giving Blacks 'a new deal'. Chapter four will discuss the emerging contemporary township policy. It will be shown that the policy can be usefully seen as an attempt to secure the conditions for the reproduction of South
African capitalism.

But analysis must not stop here. To do so would involve remaining in the sphere of state policy. This would imply that the policy is and will be automatically and unproblematically implemented, and that it is an adequate response to crisis. In moving into the sphere of state practice, a different and most revealing picture emerges. From this vantage point it soon becomes clear that the road from policy formation to implementation is fraught with many difficulties. Ongoing Black struggle, White resistance and policy contradictions all hinder the policy’s potential success. On this basis, Chapter five will demonstrate that the policy is anything but a ‘total strategy’ at the level of state practice, and that social crisis in the townships is likely to continue throughout the 1980s.
Chapter Three - Crisis

Introduction

The contemporary crisis in the townships has three dimensions. There are economic problems concerning the inadequacy of township living conditions. The intensification of residents' struggles, most clearly exemplified by the 'Soweto' revolt, indicates the existence of a political crisis. And there is a more politically radical and confrontationist consciousness amongst residents. All these go some way in explaining the emergence and development of the present township policy. But it will be stressed that the political crisis is the most important: "Most ruling classes have been wise enough to know...that particular ideological struggles can be quite as dangerous as economic ones, [but] that no challenge need to be taken seriously unless it presents itself...on the terrain of politics." (1)
1 Political and ideological crises

During the 1960s there was a near dearth of overt political organisation and struggle in the townships. But the 1970s was a different story. With the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960s the tide began to turn. This culminated in the 1976-'Soweto' revolt. Beginning in the Johannesburg township of Soweto, it engulfed townships throughout the country. More than anything else, this revolt is responsible for the present political crisis. (2) In discussing the Black Consciousness Movement and 'Soweto', it is important to explore the consciousness which developed amongst residents in the process of struggle. This will permit an understanding of the specific form of apartheid illegitimacy, and, thus of the ideological crisis for those in power.

a) The Black Consciousness Movement

Throughout the 1960s South Africa was characterized by rapid economic growth, intensifying racial domination, and political stability. The mass mobilisation and concerted struggles of Black residents during the 1950s had been ruthlessly crushed by the state, resulting in the Sharpeville massacre and the bannings of the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC). (3) The apartheid system under the direction of Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd was slowly but apparently inevitably on its way to full implementation in the face of limited resistance. Yet this soon
changed. And the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), despite many limitations, was in large part responsible for this. Its leaders sought successfully to reawaken the spirit of Black resistance.

The BCM formally began in 1968 with the founding of the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) by Black university students. This followed their withdrawal from the White-dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Steve Biko, the first president of SASO, wrote in 1970: "In adopting the line of a nonracial approach, the [White] liberals...are claiming a 'monopoly' on intelligence and moral judgment' and setting the pattern and pace for the realization of the black man's aspirations..." (4) Increasingly throughout the 1960s Black students questioned the nature and extent of White liberal commitment to Black liberation, and the strategic usefulness of participation in White organisations. At its 1970 conference, SASO declared: "The emancipation of Black people in this country depends on the role that Black people themselves are prepared to play..." (5) The call was for separate Black organisations, as reflected in the slogan 'Black man, you are on your own'.

The students and other BCM adherents had a particular conception of the prevailing Black 'state of mind'. Again, quoting Biko: 'The type of black man we have today has lost his manhood... He looks with awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the 'inevitable'
position'... All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave and ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity." (6) For him and others, Black people no longer had the confidence and willingness to engage in struggle against the apartheid system. The slogan became 'the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed'.

SASO was responsible for the formation of the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) in 1972. Based in the townships, this incorporated cultural, religious, educational and welfare organisations with adult membership. By establishing about 40 branches, BPC leaders sought to become a national-wide organisation in order to 'formulate, apply and implement the principles and philosophies of Black Consciousness'. They argued that political liberation was dependent on first achieving psychological emancipation. In attempting to 'instill a sense of self-reliance and initiative in our people', the BPC established the Black Community Programmes (BCP). Its projects included health clinics, literacy programs, cooperative building schemes, and small-scale businesses. The Black Allied Workers' Union was formed to instill confidence in workers and to create solidarity amongst them.

Christianity was accused by BCM members of contributing to psychological oppression. According to a Black Catholic priest: "We have accepted Christ, who has been brought by
the white man. But we do not accept what the white man says about Christ. "We are going to find out for ourselves what Christ has to say to us." (7) Black theology, in depicting Christ as 'a fighting god not a passive god', blossomed during the 1960s and strongly influenced the students. But so did theatrical and poetry groups in their reinterpretation of Black culture and history. In the words of the People's Experimental Theatre, it is important to "bring to the attention of the Blackman the role of the many heroic leaders who had sacrificed their lives in their striving for the realization of the aspirations of their people." (8) Black culture came to mean 'freedom on our part to innovate without recourse to White values'. All this was directed towards reestablishing Black identity and pride, as expressed in the use of the term 'Black' rather than 'non-White' and in the slogan 'Black is beautiful'.

It is true that the BCM "concentrated more on propagating ideas than on initiating concrete action." (9) Its only directly political campaigns were undertaken by SASO members. These included the 1972 May Revolt against university administration harassment of SASO, and the 1974 'Viva Frelimo' rally in support of the Mozambique liberation movement. Nevertheless, it is not useful to label the BCM's emphasis on psychological emancipation as an idealist conception of liberation in neglecting that "concrete struggles generally provide the best vehicles for advancing mass political consciousness." (10) And its
predominantly cultural activities were not necessarily misguided for failing to strike at the apartheid system where it hurts most. Given the structural context and the experiences of especially the students, these were valid and important forms of philosophy and resistance at the time.

Black university students attempted to rekindle the fire of political resistance. At first they formed their own organisations. (77) But, with an openly political stance at a time of unrestrained state repression, these quickly went into decline. With the implementation of the homeland system, Black students attending White universities were transferred to homeland 'bush colleges' far away from the volatile White urban areas. Turning to NUSAS as a platform for political expression was thwarted by its eventual banning on Black campuses in 1967. And, in attending NUSAS conferences held at White universities, Black students were subjected to various forms of liberal paternalism and racial discrimination.

These experiences of frustration and discontent with White organisations led the students to conceive separate organisation as the most useful basis for discussion and mobilisation. They thus consciously and creatively formed SASO. They denied that this promoted apartheid, as only separation and not subjugation was involved. By constituting themselves as racial subjects, the students attempted to repoliticise racial identification as the
basis for progressive social change. (12) In this, the term 'Black' became associated with Black Africans, Indians and Coloureds, thus potentially uniting all oppressed South Africans.

In their September 1970 newsletter, SASO thus stated that the term 'Black' "must be seen in its right context... Adopting a collective, positive outlook leads to the creation of a broader base... It helps us to recognise the fact that we have one common enemy... Make sure that in looking around for somebody to kick at, choose the [White] fellow who is sitting on your neck." (13) This approach also polarised the struggle in South Africa by defining the enemy ('non-Blacks') more clearly. The distinction between nonracial and orthodox Black nationalism is relevant here. (14) The first, represented historically by the ANC, favours "alliances with antiapartheid whites" in the liberation struggle, and strives for a multiracial democracy. (15) In contrast, the BCM orthodox variety proposes a "winner-take-all" society under Black majority rule. If anything, the BCM confrontationist philosophy enhanced the fear and insecurity of Whites for their political future. In the words of the Minister of Justice and Police, "Black consciousness gives way to Black power. This is a negative attitude, and destructive." It does not have "a healthy respect for the nationalism of other people. Black power sees only a Black mass situation in South Africa." (16)
But why did the BCM call for psychological emancipation rather than direct political action? Its members were only too well aware of the state's concerted efforts to destroy all overtly political movements. Many were in their young teens when the ANC and PAC were banned, while others experienced or remembered the police response to the early 1960s student organisations. The general secretary of BPC, Drake Koka, thus said in 1973: "We are aware that they can shove us in gaol at any time... That is why we are... a movement of introspection...". (17) The Thompsonian notion of 'options under pressure' is thus useful. (18) Given the fact of massive state repression, psychological and cultural forms of struggle were the most valid options. And given minimal political mobilisation, the description of Blacks as 'bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity' was in some ways accurate. Thus their emphasis on introspection and on the recovery of morale was important. All this did involve resistance against apartheid: 'We were not so clear about how to show our anger and resentment in a clear political way. But we certainly expressed ourselves indirectly in things like poetry reading and so on." (19)

The BCM was mainly confined to 'marginal' or 'middle class' Blacks. Emerging on the university campuses, it was taken up, for differing reasons by, amongst others, ministers, nurses and traders. Sam Motsuenyane, president of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC),
therefore stated: "All of us ought...to be thankful for the new day of Black Consciousness... Something should be done to curb the steady flow of Black profits and investments into White areas. It is the Black people themselves who must take steps towards solving this problem." (20) This was consistent with the BCM emphasis on Black economic development and self-reliance.

It also conformed with the reformist character of the BCM. BCM members negated class analysis and expressed support for capitalism. The conflict in South Africa was conceived in racial terms. (21) However, for reasons which remain unclear, some BCM people were beginning to argue for class analysis. In July 1976, SASO president Biliza Mji declared: "If Black Consciousness must survive as a viable philosophy and continue to articulate the aspirations of the masses of the people, it must start interpreting our situation from an economic and class point of view...". (22) Despite the limited popularity of this approach, the BCM also polarised the conflict by the nature of its constituency. In South Africa, 'middle class' Blacks historically have been susceptible to state co-option. With limited Black resistance in the 1960s, BCM leaders saw this as an increasing possibility. (23) They thus agitated against involvement in all apartheid political bodies. This served to repoliticise these Blacks and to potentially maintain them within the fold of the liberation movement as oppressed South Africans. Co-option would be
made that much more difficult.

The BCM also influenced Black secondary school students through the formation of notably the South African Students' Movement (SASM). (24) While not a direct off-shoot of SASO, T. Motapanyane of SASM said that they were preaching Black consciousness as a "useful tool to sensitize students who were not as politically aware as they should have been."

(25) SASM, especially in Soweto township, organised and led much of the 'Soweto' revolt. Though difficult to show fully, it does appear that the BCM philosophy helped to create a climate of confrontation and sacrifice, and was a "catalyst[5 of the ferment among black youth which broke into open rebellion in June 1976...". (26)

The BCM did not directly or significantly change urban Black policy. But its implications for township crisis and the emerging policy should not be underestimated. It polarised the conflict in the country, repoliticised many 'marginal' Blacks; and, most importantly; started the townships along the road to deep political crisis. The destination was 'Soweto'.

b) 'Soweto'

June 16, 1976 is a day which all South Africans will remember for a long time: 'At 8:15 am on Wednesday, June 16, it was the turn of Soweto's sons [and daughters]...and the tactics of the new generation were different and devastating, exploding into the bloodiest and most vicious
day of rioting and death since Sharpeville...". (27) For most oppressed Blacks, it is already commemorated as Heroes' Day, as the day on which students streamed into the streets in the struggle against apartheid. But it was only the first day in a long and bitter struggle now known as the 1976-7 'Soweto' revolt, or simply 'Soweto'. The revolt reached varying intensities, and took many forms, including school boycotts, worker stayaways, and house rent protests. The courage, creativity and energy of the students, who led most of the struggles, was met by police repression. On June 18, Prime Minister Vorster stated that "This government will not be intimidated, and instructions have been given to maintain law and order at all costs."

(28) Hundreds of residents were slain and thousands injured, while many others fell victim to police detention. But there soon emerged a realisation amongst many Whites that the revolt was not merely the work of "political agitators and tsotsi elements", and that repression alone was an insufficient response. (29) Although 'Soweto' did not topple the apartheid regime, it did establish "a widespread conviction, particularly within the ruling class, that the struggle had 'entered a new phase' and that as a consequence of this struggle, 'the days of Apartheid were clearly numbered'." (30) The reasons for this widespread conviction" will soon become clear. (31)

The revolt began in Soweto, the township near Johannesburg and the largest in the country. Here, students began to
mobilise against the use of the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction in Black secondary schools. Since 1955 it has been government policy that subjects in these schools be taught in English and Afrikaans on a 50:50 basis. However, it was not until 1974–5 that this was forcibly imposed. Asked if he had consulted Blacks on this issue, Punt Janson, deputy minister of the Department of Bantu Education, said: "No, I have not consulted them and I am not going to consult them." (32) The result was numerous appeals and protests from Black parents and teachers' organisations, but all to no avail. Meanwhile, students began to show their discontent with sporadic school boycotts in Soweto and other townships during the first half of 1976. On June 14, Leonard Mosala of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council said that, as parents, "we have failed to help [our children] in their struggle for change in schools. They are now angry and prepared to fight and we are afraid that the situation may become chaotic at any time." (33)

Two days later, on June 16, a peaceful protest organised by SASM took place. Carrying hastily constructed signs reading 'Afrikaans is oppressor's language' and 'Afrikaans stinks', thousands of secondary and primary school students began to converge at the Orlando Stadium in Soweto. A leader of the march was heard to say: "Please brothers and sisters I plead with you, remain cool and calm. A report has just been received to say the police are coming. We do not know what they are after, after all we are not fighting." (34) The
police arrived in force, armed with sub-machine guns, rifles, batons and teargas: "The first shot was fired before the children started throwing stones. Then absolute chaos broke out", with student rioting occurring for the rest of the day. (35) At day's end, the official death toll was already 25.

This was to set the tone of the revolt for some time as confrontations between the police and students soon engulfed the entire country. By the end of August, townships near the major cities of Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth had all witnessed student anger and hostility, with only Durban remaining surprisingly quiet. The following report is not atypical:

"There were very few days in August in which the press did not carry stories of incidents of the Revolt in the main townships of the Eastern Cape: fires at schools, libraries, [township] administration buildings, bottlestores and beerhalls; marches, boycotts, songs, roadblocks and confrontations with riot police. The dead, the injured, and the closing of all schools—all these items appeared." (36)

In the Port Elizabeth townships, 33 people were slain on August 17-8. And perhaps so as to reassure the White population and other 'law-abiding citizens' that law and order would not be undermined, Brigadier Kriel of the local riot police claimed that all would soon be quiet on the South African front: "The violence is the final throes of the unrest that has disrupted South Africa for nearly two months." (37)

The students and others were soon to paint a different
picture, as confrontations continued during the rest of 1976, and more sporadically in 1977. Few areas of the country were spared. In smaller townships, including KwaThemba (Springs) and Sibongile (Dundee), administration offices, beerhalls and buses were attacked and burnt in October. In many White rural areas, grazing land and sugar and pine plantations were set alight in September. And in the homelands, the Transkeian Prime Minister's official car was set on fire in July, while in August the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly was destroyed. By the end of 1977, over 1000 people were dead; most killed by police bullets.

In many ways, the revolt is unprecedented in South African history. This is true despite Prime Minister Vorster's remark to a rally of supporters in late August that "I have seen bigger crises." (38) Pitched street battles of the kind and on the scale witnessed in 1976-7, with all their death, destruction and police violence, were new in South Africa. Yet the revolt was much more than just 'war'. And it became immediately and starkly clear that Afrikaans was not the only issue, as the hostility and energy of the residents became directed towards the whole ambit of apartheid policies.

On July 5 (1977), the imposition of Afrikaans in the schools was dropped. This was a significant victory for the students. But they struggled on. The entire Bantu Education system historically has been rejected by residents, and this was no different amongst the 'Soweto' students: "It's aimed at our
suppression. It doesn't give us an opportunity to prove ourselves, as white education does. There are no proper facilities. The classes are overcrowded. The courses ignore our views of history. These, and other objections, were voiced time and time again. Throughout the country students boycotted classes and exams between June 1976 and early 1978, and made far-reaching demands on the government for changes in Black education.

But the students did not stop here, and they went beyond strictly educational issues in their demands and struggles. This was of course dramatically clear from the very beginning in their sustained attacks on all buildings symbolising government and White oppression. Thus, even during these seemingly spontaneous acts of sheer anger, their behavior was anything but spasmodic. In the words of the banned Winnie Mandela, "It has got nothing to do with vandalism...it is black anger against white domination." However, the student leadership, particularly in Soweto, soon realised the need for a more coherent and effective strategy in furthering the struggle against apartheid. This involved widening the scope of the revolt: in terms of the political and economic issues raised, the institutions confronted, and the power base of the students in the townships. It is to these tactics, which emerged during the course of struggle and which were most crystallized in Soweto, that we now turn.

According to T. Mashinini of the Soweto Students
Representative Council (SSRC), the successor to SASM: "We had realised we have gone [sic] as far as we could, and it was now important that we strike at the industrial structure of South Africa." (41) By mid-September, three major work stayaways or political strikes had taken place. This tactic was used extensively by the ANC and Black trade unions during the 1950s, and there is evidence to suggest that the 1976 strikes were combined SSRC-ANC efforts. In a July ANC leaflet it was said that because the protests (in June) were largely confined to the locations, damage to the economy, the heart of white power, was limited— the struggle must be taken into the cities, the factories, the mines." (42) The students recognised the dependence of the South African economy on Black labour and the need to forge some form of student-worker alliance. Despite some conflict, parents had already given substantial support to their children in the school boycotts. They were now to be called upon as workers.

The first strike took place on August 4-6. To be confined to the Soweto and Alexandra townships, the students initiated a leafletting campaign urging workers to remain home. But it seems that many students used strong-arm methods in preventing buses, taxis and cars from leaving for Johannesburg. Some were heard shouting, 'city-bound cars belong to betrayers who want to take a backseat during the struggle.' (43) Although its 'damage to the economy' was probably limited, the strike was a success in obtaining
the support of workers and in demonstrating worker strength. However, conflicts amongst residents soon emerged.

Spurred on by its initial success, the SSRC called for another work boycott for the August 23-5 period. This time little coercion was used. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce reported that "the stayaway hit industrialists, retailers and insurance companies. Either nobody turned up on the black staff, or considerable numbers stayed away." (44) Smaller townships near Johannesburg were also involved. Meanwhile, in an attempt at creating divisions amongst Soweto residents, police officials had already announced that, without fear of prosecution, 'law-abiding' residents could and should take action to protect themselves against the 'agitators'. This agitation culminated in a 'Zulu impi rampage' aided and abetted by the police. With police protection, migrants from the Mzimhlope and other hostels began, on August 24, a 'rampage' against local residents which lasted two weeks and resulted in 70 deaths. Isolated from local residents in hostel compounds and experiencing extreme work insecurity due to their temporary urban status, the migrants' support for the first two stayaways was in fact quite limited. But the students quickly realised their failure to consider the special problems of these workers. After a few meetings, peace was restored with the migrants, who then showed strong support for the third strike.
This became the most successful boycott. Not only did workers from Soweto and other Transvaal townships show massive support over the September 13-5 period, but, for the first time, Cape Townians followed suit. About 200,000 Cape Town workers stayed home. Significantly, most were Coloureds, thus reinforcing an alliance which had already emerged and developed amongst students. However, a SSRC call for a five-day strike in November was a failure. Increasingly throughout the boycott, employers took a harsher stance by firing workers and docking wages. In an October 19 circular to its member companies, the Transvaal Chamber of Industries said that employers' "feelings today can be stated as being 'No Work, No Pay'." There was another circular issued to workers. Entitled 'Keep your job and ignore the agitators', it warned that "there are many black people who do not have jobs and who could easily take your place." (45) These employer moves were important in the fourth call going largely unheeded. Workers could not be expected to continuously clear the factories, offices and stores when no immediate victories were in sight. It would also loosen the student-worker alliance by antagonising and alienating workers. No further strikes were called.

But the students had little time for rest, as there were other oppressive aspects of township administration and life which soon received their focused attention. Important here were struggles around the Urban Bantu Council system, house
rent increases, and the sale of beer and liquor.
Throughout this century illegally operating premises, called shebeens, have sold liquor and beer to township residents. According to a November SSRC statement, these were "a cause of unhappiness in the black man's life... Futures have been wrecked by the operation of these shebeens... Nothing good has ever come out of them... Hundreds of our colleagues have become delinquents, beggars or orphans as shebeen kings and queens [owners] have become capitalists... We cannot longer tolerate seeing our fathers' pay-packets emptied in shebeens." (46) Opposition to state-operated beerhalls and liquor stores had already been expressed by their widespread destruction. Amongst other motives, this action stemmed from the use of beer and liquor profits, initially emanating from Black 'pay-packets', in subsidising township development. But with the emergence of boycotts of shebeens, it soon became clear that an important issue was liquor per se, particularly in its effects on political consciousness. As Cape Town students put it: "We believe shebeens have got to be stopped now and for good because they are undermining the Black man and destroying his soul." (47)
In August and September wall slogans appeared in Soweto reading 'less liquor, more education' and 'we want more schools, not beerhalls'. With stayaways and other protests occurring then, concerted student efforts at initiating shebeen(and beerhall) boycotts only began in mid-October. These were largely confined to Soweto and the Cape Town
townships. Success was clearly dependent on cooperation from residents in general and from shebeen-owners in particular. In Soweto, the students called for the closure of shebeens from mid-October until after the Christmas season. The Shebeen Owners' Association responded positively: "We sympathise with and support them in their struggle." (48) However, after only two weeks, shebeens began to reopen, with owners arguing that their livelihood was at stake. Cape Town students sought permanent closure of the shebeens. On October 11, some 3,000 students marched through the Guguletu and Nyanga townships, raiding shebeens and confiscating liquor. Support from the owners was less extensive than in Soweto. And attempts to incorporate migrants into the boycott involved much friction, resulting in the deaths of over 30 people in Nyanga in December. Although liquor was an important form of relaxation for migrants from oppressive working and living conditions, evidence points to police involvement in this migrant 'rampage'. (49) Over the Christmas season in Soweto, the shebeens were again closed. The boycotts were successful in obtaining a substantial measure of residents' support. As a Cape Town 'regular drinker' said: "What the kids are doing is right. They have to force a ban on shebeens because we lacked the will to do so." (50)

The Soweto boycott formed part of a more general program during Christmas to mourn those slain, detained or bereaved
in the preceding months. All Christmas festivities and shopping were to be avoided. And while Black traders were asked to reduce their store hours, a complete boycott was placed on White-owned stores. The Soweto Traders' Association soon appealed to the SSRC for a lifting of the restriction on them, arguing that it inconvenienced their customers. They were probably also concerned about their reduced profits. The SSRC accepted their request. The traders however showed strong support for the White store boycott for reasons which the SSRC made clear: "We are determined that there shall be no buying from White shops... We shall buy from our shops." (51) With other aspects of the mourning period, it is difficult to gauge residents' support for this boycott. It did have some effect. The South African Furniture Traders' Association thus reported a 40% decline in retail trade compared to December 1975. (52) The SSRC did not apparently conceive the boycott in the same way as the stayaways, that is, as a strategy for mobilising and showing the strength of their parents, not as workers, but as consumers. This did not go unnoticed though by some White traders: "Soweto people are really showing what they can do. One can't ignore the buying power of a million people and it's really hitting us hard." (53)

Except for ongoing protests dealing with Bantu Education, the students were relatively quiet during the first few months of 1977. But this was soon to change. In late April the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) announced that
house rents in its townships would increase from May 1st. (54) The official reason for this move was the loss of revenue resulting from the destruction of beerhalls over the past nine months. Beerhall profits were a major source of WRAB finance. It soon became known to Soweto residents that the Soweto Urban Bantu Council (UBC), a Black government body created by the apartheid state, had approved the rent increases without informing them. This was to provide the basis for further student mobilisation against township policy.

On April 23 a large public meeting was held in Soweto. Those present resolved not to pay the new rent rates, and they called for the suspension of the UBC. Four days later a demonstration, organised by the SSRC and involving thousands of students occurred, ending in a march on the Council's chamber. Many confrontations between the students and police took place there. The increased rates were temporarily withheld.

By June 1976 UBCs throughout the country were in disrepute amongst residents. The SSRC stated that UBC members "have consistently been used by the authorities to oppress their own people." (55) During the revolt UBC offices were burnt to the ground and houses of members were attacked. From the very beginning, senior state officials used the UBCs in attempting to defuse the struggles. Changes in policy, including the dropping of the Afrikaans imposition and the reintroduction of the home-ownership scheme, were presented
to residents as significant victories won by UBC members in
hard negotiation. (56) The intended implication was that
the UBC system was an adequate political platform for
fulfilling the needs and aspirations of residents.

But residents did not buy this. After more agitation from
the SSRC, most Soweto UBC members resigned in early June
1977. The UBC was immediately suspended by WRAB, and other
UBCs collapsed in the following weeks. The councillors
realised that whatever legitimacy and power they once had
was now gone. Meanwhile, the SSRC had increased its respect
amongst residents due to its successful rents campaign. It
now called upon Soweto residents to replace the UBC with a
more representative and independent body. This resulted in
the formation of the Soweto Local Authority Interim
Committee, or simply, the Committee of Ten. In some ways
this body replaced the Black Parents' Association (BPA),
which, while useful in protecting the student leadership by
presenting their educational demands to the authorities, was
not representative of all residents. However, the Committee
of Ten consisted largely of 'middle class' Blacks.

On July 26 it made public a blue-print for the future of
Soweto. This involved the election of a fully autonomous
Soweto council with the same status of the Johannesburg
City Council. To quote Dr. M. H. Motlana, chairperson of
the Committee: "The time has come for us to manage our own
affairs." (57) Although this implied an acceptance of
residential segregation, it was rejected by the
government. In late 1976 state officials were already referring to the replacement of UBCs by the Community Council system, allowing councillors increased powers and duties. (58) Most UBC members responded positively to this idea. But the SSRC, in opposing Black collaboration in all apartheid political bodies, took a different stand: "What the UBC people forget is that the black man is past the stage of accepting meaningless concessions. We do not want to be in charge of roads and rubbish. We want real and meaningful power to run our lives outside the system of apartheid." (59)

This was what the entire revolt was about. It was a concerted effort by residents to move beyond the system of apartheid, or at least to further the struggle against it. All aspects of apartheid were denounced. And the anger, energy and creativity of residents across the country became expressed in a wide range of activities and tactics, making it clear to those in power that all was not right in the townships. This was made all the more vivid to Whites when thousands of students streamed from the nearby but isolated townships to hold marches in the main streets of Johannesburg and Cape Town for a few days in September 1976.

The students were at the forefront of the revolt. Influenced by the BCM, they stated time and time again that when we were born we found our fathers struggling under the yoke of oppression... We, the youth of South Africa, reject the subservient heritage that has been handed down to
us... We cannot accept, as our fathers did, the whole system of apartheid." (50) But the students did attempt to incorporate other residents into the struggle. In the early stages of the revolt, groups such as the BPA in Soweto and the Lagunya Action Committee in the Cape Town townships were formed to give support to the students. The BPA provided legal, medical and financial assistance, and was involved in arranging funerals. Without these and other forms of support, the eventual scope and duration of the revolt would not have been possible.

While widespread support amongst residents for the struggle was evident, the township population is clearly not a homogeneous mass of people. The degree of involvement varied, as did the reasons for entering specific campaigns. Many conflicts arose, between permanent residents and migrants, between workers and students, between students and 'middle class' Blacks such as traders and UBC members, and amongst the students themselves. Moreover, no attempt was made to deal with the specific problems of unemployed workers and youth.

The revolt did focus on issues concerning both political oppression and economic exploitation. The link between these was primarily based on an understanding of the conflict in South Africa in racial terms. This is not surprising given that the experiences of Blacks are largely shaped by racial domination. There is evidence however to suggest the emergence of class analysis amongst some residents. In
an August 1976 leaflet entitled 'The black students message to their beloved parents', education was described as a means to obtain "a more efficient black labour force to be exploited by those in power." It went on to say that South Africa "has been built by the blood, sweat and broken bodies of the oppressed and exploited Black workers,... The power for change lies with the workers." (61)

The immediate response of those in power to the revolt was to crush it, to use sheer repression to defuse the struggles and to disorganise those involved. This took different forms. Police violence and the manipulation of UBC members and migrant workers have already been mentioned. Another tactic was to call on the illegally existing makgotla vigilante groups to aid the police in apprehending those people responsible for the destruction and burning of buildings. The makgotla were the main topic of discussion at a late July 1976 meeting between, amongst others, the Minister of Justice and Police and Soweto 'leaders', including UBC members. Afterwards, S. Manthata of the UBC declared: "Mr. Kruger said the government wanted to give us the power to deal with juvenile delinquency and handle similar such matters." (62) In the context of the revolt, this clearly meant legalising the makgotla in order to curb political unrest. Many makgotla leaders did not want any part of it.

Detentions and bannings were partially responsible for relative calm returning to the townships in early 1978. The
SSRC leadership changed hands five times. And, on October 19 (1977), 18 organisations, including the SSRC, BPA and SASO, were banned, while hundreds of people were detained. The Minister of Justice and Police said that "this action clearly indicates that we are determined to stop any disruption of law and order totally." (63) But many Whites soon realised that in preventing further 'disruptions', possibly another 'Soweto', repression alone would not provide the answer. The Prime Minister, calling on Whites to "fasten your seatbelts" in his New Year speech at the end of 1976, obviously felt that continuing urban unrest would be the future scenario: "The storm has not struck yet. We are only experiencing the whirlwinds that go before it." (64) Because the revolt was so wide in scope, incorporated so many residents, and revealed so many underlying problems of apartheid, calls for a more creative response were soon heard. This in fact began to slowly emerge during the course of 'Soweto', and has involved an attempt at reforming the township policy.

c) Other struggles

In early 1976 Leslie Sehume of the Committee for Fairness in Sport said that "the black revolt in South Africa is already underway as was evident in a spate of strikes, boycotts, crime, unrest among students, agitation over urban home ownership and freehold rights, and protest over the medium of instruction in schools...". (65) During the
late 1960s and early 1970s struggles were occurring in both the workplaces and townships. The BCM, which was primarily based in the townships and which incorporated 'marginal' Blacks, has already been discussed. The Black working class also reemerged as a significant force for social change.

'Soweto' was by no means the start of township political protests by the working class in the 1970s. Residents were already immersed in struggles against the UBC system, and against house rent and bus fare increases. Bus boycotts, used as a weapon to resist fare increases, illustrate this. Short boycotts at the Hammarsdale and Völkersrust townships in 1972-3 were soon followed by longer and larger ones. Beginning in December 1974 and lasting for six weeks, a boycott by Mdantsane workers was successful in having the proposed 50 to 100% fare increases suspended. Another victory marked the October 1975 boycott by about 30,000 Madadeni and Osizweni workers. There violent clashes occurred, with beerhalls and vehicles destroyed and at least two Blacks killed. A similar number of workers took part in an early 1976 KwaThamba boycott. (66)

As discussed in Chapter two, most areas of the country had been affected by the strike wave by 1975. This had an indirect influence on the emergence of the township crisis and policy. In many cases, including in 90% of the 1973 Durban strikes, workers' demands centred on wage increases. The low wages paid to Black workers made it extremely
difficult for households to make ends meet. As a Frame Group textile industry worker, on strike put it: "Although I make blankets for Mr. Philip Frame, I can't afford to buy blankets for my children." (67) The early 1970s strike action and wage demands clearly expressed the bitterness and discontent of workers and their families, as township residents, in attempting to fulfill basic family requirements.

These other struggles did not however reach the scale or depth necessary to mobilise those holding the reigns of power to consider and to make significant changes in township policy. For this we had to wait for 'Soweto'.

2 Economic problems

I have noted the intensification of political struggle by township residents and their developing political consciousness. 'Soweto' plunged the townships into crisis, necessitating creative and important changes in the township policy. However, 'Soweto' and the other struggles did not just reflect the influence of the BCM and the current illegitimacy of apartheid. They also revealed underlying economic problems experienced by residents. These problems did not cause 'Soweto', but they certainly stimulated residents in joining the students in struggle. Nor is the new township policy a direct response to these problems, for it was only when they worked themselves out onto the political terrain that they began to receive the full
attention of political and economic leaders.

In many ways economic problems have been central to township life throughout this century. These include low wages paid to Black workers, insufficient state township expenditure, and inadequate living conditions, notably housing. All these are interrelated and essentially deal with the standard of living of township residents. While this has varied historically, it has consistently been below the poverty line. This has stemmed from the super-exploitation of Black workers by property-owners, the government's treatment of residents as temporary urban sojourners, and the policy of township financial self-sufficiency when and where possible. All this will be briefly explored for the early 1970s.

Many of the economic problems derive from the wider economic crisis, particularly inflation and unemployment. Not only did the developing and deepening structural crisis in the economy adversely affect many Black residents, but they also had to contend with the recession which began in late 1974 and which only ended after 'Soweto'.

Unemployment and underemployment amongst Black workers increased. By 1977 the figure for South Africa as a whole was 2.3 million, with about 400,000 in the urban areas. (68) The rate of job growth actually declined due to the recession:

"Whereas between October 1973 and October 1974 the number of Africans gaining (new) jobs in manufacturing
industry averaged 2,850 per month, in the subsequent eighteen months it fell to 1,230. In construction, the number of Africans employed in the second quarter of 1976 was actually lower than in the same period of 1975. By 1976 it was reported that 60,000 semi- and unskilled African building workers had been laid off during the year. Construction (3.2%) and commerce (1.8%) both showed a net decline in African employment in 1976 compared with the previous year... (69)

As well, many industries temporarily closed their workplaces or introduced short-time work.

Average gross Black earnings increased, from R39.59 to R106.13 per month between 1970 and 1976. (70) The cost of living, or the inflation rate, also rose dramatically.

In 1976 alone, food price increases included maize products and cooking oil (18%), sugar and coffee (17%), tea (16%), margarine (15%), and milk (8%). (71) The evidence suggests however that real Black earnings did increase. (72) A decline in the real growth of earnings only emerged in late 1976. While it is true that "any attempt to link the wage effects of the economic recession with the outbreak of violence in the middle of the year should be viewed with caution", it is also true that most residents nevertheless lived in the midst of poverty. (73) For instance, a July 1976 study in Soweto indicated that a monthly budget for a family consisting of two adults, two children and a toddler, and including only the bare essentials, was R145. It concluded that

"R145 is higher than the average family income. Many families have only a single wage coming in. A man would be lucky to clear R120 a month, and a woman—a large proportion of whom are domestics—would be unlikely to exceed R70 a month. In addition, many
African families are supporting more than three children. Many are also supporting other relatives who need the money to avoid starvation." (74) Rising unemployment hindered attempts by many families to reach or stay near the 'breadline'.

This leads us onto township living conditions, which probably deteriorated in the years preceding 'Soweto'. As L. Mosala of the Soweto UBC said in May 1976, "the quality of the services the people are getting - road maintenance, lighting, and so on - has gone down." (75) This is most clearly true for housing. Here provision was down and shortages were up. In Soweto alone, the backlog increased from 14,250 in 1973 to 22,131 in 1976. (76) By the end of 1977 the family housing shortage for all the townships was 141,000. (77) This resulted in part from limited provision in the face of an expanding population. Thus a study revealed that "in 10 urban areas with a total population of 2.78 million Africans the population doubled between 1971 and 1975, whereas the stock of houses grew by only 15% (20,350 houses) ...". (78) The number of dwellings erected with finance from the Department of Community Development decreased from 14,569 in 1967-8 to 7,835 in 1975-6. (79)

All this can be partially explained in terms of the temporary Black sojourner policy. This includes the urban relocation policy which focuses township construction and development in the homelands to the detriment of townships in White South Africa. (80) But it also stemmed from sheer financial problems, particularly after the introduction of
Administration Boards in 1972-3. The problems encountered by Board officials are aptly summed up by J. C. K. Erasmus, chairperson of the Cape Midlands Board, in his 1973-4 budget speech:

"The combined expenditure of all our centres indicate a deficit of more than a quarter of a million rand for the current calendar year. Our consolidated income will approximate ten million rand but it is quite obvious that we shall have no money except for bare necessities. There is, however, a shocking dearth of services, even basic essential services, in most of the urban Bantu residential areas now coming under our control. A huge backlog of urgent capital and revenue projects must be considered and the additional interest and redemption charges, plus rising costs, makes it obvious that our present financial resources are totally inadequate to fill even a portion of the voids." (81)

Administration Boards were expected to be financially self-sufficient in their township operations and duties. Revenue for current expenditure was restricted to beer and liquor profits, employer labour levies, and house rents. Capital projects were primarily financed by Department of Community Development loans. The Boards were able to maintain a surplus on their current account during the first half of the 1970s. This increased from R17.3 million in 1973-4 to R35.3 million in 1975-6. (82) However, more than anything else, it derived from limited expenditure on the townships. And if it were not for beer and especially liquor sales, many Boards would have shown an overall deficit. (83) These sales consistently contributed to over 50% of current revenue, and to nearly the entire surplus attributed to the Boards. It was the housing account which created major problems, reaching a deficit of R11.4 million
This resulted from low Black worker wages, as house rents had to be set accordingly. Erasmus thus stressed in the same speech: "It is not our function to agitate for higher average wages but I do consider it our duty to insist that willing, productive workers, who are legally resident in our townships, should be remunerated on a scale devised not only to keep body and soul together, but also to provide at least basic amenities." (85) While employers showed little intention to raise wages in response to this and other suggestions, they were forced to pay higher levy rates. Their total contribution nearly quadrupled between 1973-6 and was used for township development. Beer and liquor profits were used similarly. And, in 1975, Boards became entitled to retain a greater percentage of liquor profits. (86) While all this helped, it was insufficient. Boards were soon forced to turn to their other main source of revenue, namely house rents. There were widespread increases beginning in 1974-5. In many cases these were substantial, reaching up to 100% in the Cape Peninsula and East Rand Board townships in early 1976. (87) This, and more general inflation, hit many residents very hard. Obtaining finance for capital projects, notably housing schemes, also became increasingly difficult. In 1975 WRAB received only R10 million from the Department of Community Development after a request for R100 million. (88) Many Boards turned to bridging capital and to external loans from private
It seems clear then that many economic problems existed in the townships before the outbreak of 'Soweto', and that some of these worsened during the early 1970s, thus adding to the hardships, sufferings and hostility of most residents.
Conclusion

In May 1976 Mannie Mulder of WRAB was quite confident in saying that "the broad masses of Soweto are perfectly content, perfectly happy... Black-white relationships at present are as happy as can be." (90) Soweto residents were soon to disprove this. In fact, residents throughout the country took to the streets in 1976-7 on an unprecedented scale to express their opposition to the apartheid system and to struggle against it. This they did on many fronts, throwing the townships and their administration into deep social crisis.

The mobilisation of residents highlighted underlying township problems. But it also starkly raised many questions about apartheid legitimacy. Any legitimacy once attached to "Bantu Education," the UBCs, the Administration Boards and the influx control system was now gone. As Vic Leibbrandt, former chief commissioner for the northern Transvaal, said about influx control: "The recent riots in Soweto and other urban areas illustrate the hatred that the African has for influx control and pass-law regulations. This can be gathered from the fact that the first buildings to be destroyed were the Bantu Administration Board offices where these regulations are enforced." (91) While the various economic problems contributed to the willingness of residents to become involved in the revolt, Blacks nevertheless mobilised in the context of a popular consensus about the illegitimacy of apartheid. This was
primarily based on a racial consciousness. All this requires attention when attempting to understand the emergence and development of the revolt. But it is now time to focus our attention on something else, on the slowly but surely emerging contemporary township policy, and on the political agenda of big business and other reformists.
Chapter Four - Policy

Introduction

Urban Blacks are forced to live in segregated residential areas called townships. Throughout this century the South African state has formulated and implemented policies, collectively known as the township policy, specifically applicable to these Black residents. Since 'Soweto' the policy has undergone changes in both its statutory and institutional frameworks. These include the issues of housing provision, commercial and industrial activity, local government, labour and population mobility, and finance.

By identifying general and specific aims of the policy, it will be shown how the present political work of those in power; involving repression and reform, attempts to deal with the township social crisis. Prior to all this, a historical overview of the township policy will be presented. This will provide a historical context for the contemporary policy and will help in assessing its significant features.
1 Earlier township policies

Urban Black policy in South Africa has a long history. During this century it has been continuously reformulated in attempting to deal with the 'township question' in the face of changes in the South African political economy. However, throughout it has been marked by racial domination and repression. White Municipalities were responsible for its implementation until the emergence of state-created Administration Boards in the early 1970s. This section will provide a general overview of the more important historical developments in township policy.

a) Municipalities

Capitalist development in South Africa in the late 19th century resulted in many Black households losing partial or total access to tribal land. In response, they sought employment in the urban areas. Some men became migrants on the mines. Families settled in Municipal locations or on any available land. Unemployment was widespread. Government commissions were soon appointed to investigate location conditions. The 1914 Tuberculosis Commission concluded that housing was "a disgrace, and the majority are quite unfit for human habitation." Legislation was enacted to deal with these and other urban problems.

The most important was the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. This formed the basis of location or township policy during the pre-apartheid era. Its provisions were based on the
approach of the 1922 Stallard Commission, which stated: "The Native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister." (3) Urban Blacks were considered and treated as temporary sojourners, with continuous residence dependent on the availability of employment. The migrant labour system, providing mining companies and other employers with a source of cheap labour, was well suited to this. (4) The Act however did not provide "the machinery for any systematic control over African influx into the urban areas." (5) The application of its influx control provisions was at the request of a specific Municipality. By 1932, only eleven had done so. (5) Municipalities had the authority to ensure that Black men reported their urban entry, to compel employers to register their workers, and to endorse out (i.e. expel) unemployed Blacks. (7) Influx control also involved limiting the size of the Black family population in order to lessen the need for housing provision.

The Act provided for the clearing of squatter camps and slums. And it permitted Municipalities to force all Blacks to live in townships. Freehold rights, implying the urban permanence of Blacks, were withheld. The Act placed "the responsibility for the provision of housing for the urban African population...squarely on the [White] local authorities." (8) Under the 1920 Housing Act, Municipalities could receive
state loans for financing housing schemes. These were provided at economic rates of interest, and were paid back by means of residents' rent payments.

Municipalities had two other potential sources of finance for township development and maintenance. First of all, a Native Revenue Account was established to separate Black and White local income and expenditure. Many Municipalities took advantage of possible subsidisation from the General (White) Revenue Account. Secondly, they were given an official monopoly in the production and sale of sorghum beer in the townships. Few Municipalities implemented this, except in Natal where it already existed. (9)

Black urban influx continued unabated. The urban population increased by 94% between 1923 and 1936. (10) The influx originated from both White-owned farms and Reserve areas. Farmers were losing their labour supply because of the higher wages in the urban manufacturing centres. And deteriorating Reserve agricultural production forced people to seek a living elsewhere. (11) The government became very concerned about this, and thus the influx control system was tightened. Beginning in 1930, Municipalities could refuse Black women entry into urban areas if accommodation was unavailable. From 1937 Reserve Blacks were given only 14 days to find urban employment, after which, if unsuccessful, they had to return to the Reserve.
Throughout this period the Municipalities' provision of family housing was exceedingly limited. (12) This resulted from the state's temporary sojourners policy, which gave Municipalities little incentive to construct housing, and from inadequate finances. In 1937 all Municipalities were forced to adopt the beer monopoly, with the ensuing profits used for financing housing schemes. (13) Many thus lessened their dependence on subsidisation from the General Revenue Account. And, in 1934, the state initiated a sub-economic housing loan program. By 1944, 34,695 houses had been built on this basis.

During the 1940s the urban problems deepened. Large-scale influx continued, and squatter camps emerged throughout the country. Intensive Black struggle, in both the workplaces and townships, including squatter movements, occurred. For different reasons, farmers and Municipalities agitated for the tightening of influx control. In gaining power in 1948, the National Party sought to overcome these and other problems.

In many ways its policy was aimed at "freezing the number of 'detribalised' Africans in the urban areas; preventing the further townward migration of families, and removing 'surplus' Africans from the towns...". (14) The 1945 Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, amending the 1923 Act, was already in the statute books. Its Section 10 provision permitted the governor-general to set out certain conditions for Black entry into a specific urban area on request from
the Municipality. In the late 1940s many Transvaal towns, including Johannesburg and Pretoria, did so. (15) But, in passing the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act, the National Party significantly altered the 1945 Act. The 1952 Act laid down the conditions governing Black urban residence as known today. (16) Blacks with or obtaining Section 10(1)(a), (b) or (c) rights, while given some degree of urban permanence, were still to be considered as temporary residents. Migrants became classified as Section 10(1)(d) workers, still entering and remaining in urban areas on a temporary basis. They could however acquire Section 10(1)(b) rights. All others were illegal residents. This was immediately applied to all urban areas, and was the new basis for influx control. (17) To aid in this endeavour, the 1952 Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act rationalised the pass system in providing Black men with a single reference book containing all the relevant personal information. This was extended to women by the late 1950s.

Urban influx was further restricted by the establishment of regional labour bureaux in White rural areas and local labour bureaux in the urban areas. All urban workers were required to register at the local bureaux. And rural Blacks generally could not seek work in the urban areas. In the 1950s thousands of urban Blacks were relocated to the rural areas in overcoming the farm labour shortage. Even 'permanent' residents were liable to be endorsed out as
'idles and undesirables'. (18) Influx control convictions increased significantly from 232,420 in 1951 to 413,639 in 1959. (19)

The revamped influx control system clearly benefitted farmers. In fact, their labour problems became the official justification for influx control. Urban employers' labour requirements however were not jeopardised. (20) The National Party's approach helped the Municipalities as well: "The influx of Africans into urban areas was also a source of dissatisfaction and anxiety for municipal administrators, as it was they who had to supply facilities for the rapidly increasing urban population." (21)

Other, more direct measures, aided the Municipalities in dealing with the housing shortages. First of all, the 1952 Native Services Levy Act forced those employers who did not provide their workers with accommodation to make a monthly financial contribution for the provision of, amongst other things, water, sanitation and roads. By January 1957, £7 million had been collected. (22) Secondly, while not an entirely new idea, site-and-service schemes were introduced in 1953. With essential services provided by the Municipalities, Blacks could construct their own houses using state funds. This was intended as a temporary solution to the housing problem, but, in many cases, the shacks were never replaced. (23) Thirdly, economic housing loans were again emphasised. In differing ways, these actions attempted to increase housing provision
by reducing the need for state finance. Between 1948 and 1963, 248,297 dwellings were built. (24) The housing situation did improve. And a 30-year home-ownership scheme considered as consistent with the temporary sojourner policy was introduced. The 1950 Group Areas Act reinstated the policy of residential segregation and Black residence in townships.

During the 1960s the official justification for influx control and other measures was directly related to the homeland policy. The political and possibly the residential future of Blacks was to be increasingly linked to the homelands. The tightening of influx control, the relocation of Blacks to the homelands, and the expansion of the migrant labour system all potentially limited the size of the 'permanent' Black population. This reasserted the Stallard principle of urban residence dependent on employment. And it was occurring in the context of the structural changes in the economy resulting in rising Black unemployment.

The 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act made it more difficult for the dependents of Section 10 men to remain in urban areas. They now had to prove the legality of their original entry. Furthermore, a near total embargo on any further entry was imposed. The 1963 Bantu Labour Regulations prevented the further acquisition of Section 10(1)(b) rights by migrants in restricting their contracts to a maximum of one year. Relocation from the urban areas became more and
more entrenched in the policy of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), the body with overall responsibility for Black affairs. Its General Circular (No. 25 of 1967) stressed the importance of resettling to the homelands Blacks who were "superfluous in the labour market", including "the aged, the unfit, widows [and] women with dependent children...". (25) A more efficient network of labour bureaux was also established in the homelands. Blacks now had to register at tribal labour bureaux and were only permitted to leave the homeland once recruited. In terms of General Circular No. 27 of 1967, Municipalities now required the permission of BAD before embarking on new housing schemes: "The Department had to be satisfied that (i) such new developments (particularly family housing) were imperative and that (ii) it was not possible to provide such accommodation in an adjacent black homeland." (26) The result was the disestablishment of many townships and the relocation of their residents to newly constructed homeland towns. In the process they lost their Section 10 rights. Workers began to commute daily to their work in White South Africa. State finance became increasingly directed to housing construction in the homelands. And the homeownership scheme was discontinued from January 1, 1968. State financing of Black housing on an economic basis continued. But many Municipalities found it increasingly difficult to obtain loans for capital projects. In 1962 the prohibition on the sale of liquor to Blacks was lifted
and Municipalities were granted a township monopoly. (27) Twenty per cent of profits could be retained by them for, amongst other things, the provision of recreational and welfare services. The rest was handed over to BAD. Huge beer and liquor profits during the 1960s lessened the importance of increased rents and General Revenue Account subsidisation as bases for Municipality finance. (28) In the early 1970s about 20 (out of about 450) Municipalities were involved in subsidisation. (29) This was still contrary to state policy which increasingly emphasised township financial self-sufficiency. And, it was also a political liability considering the Municipalities' responsibilities to White taxpayers.

Having looked at the Municipalities' township policies dealing with housing provision, Black movement (notably influx control), and finance, we may go on to take note of the related issues of local government and of commercial and industrial activities.

Historically Blacks have been prevented from establishing business enterprises other than small commercial ventures in the townships. Industry was totally prohibited. This served to "protect the interests of white capital" by limiting competition. (30) The 1923 Act did allow for the licensing of Black traders by the Municipalities. But limitations on the development of their operations abounded, including problems in obtaining credit and loans, and the confinement of their activities to the townships and to the
sale of bare necessities. Some expansion did however occur in the pre-apartheid era.

The National Party soon imposed further restrictions. Important here was a 1963 BAD circular. This prevented the formation of Black partnerships, companies, wholesale businesses and financial institutions. And it restricted a trader's operation to one business on one small site. (31) Furthermore, as with other residents, the temporary urban status of traders was reaffirmed: "Once they had acquired sufficient capital and experience, they were expected to move their businesses to the homelands." (32) All this curbed the growth potential of Black traders. The African Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1955, constantly agitated for the lifting of these and other restrictions.

Black township government had its origins in the 1923 Act, which provided for the formation of Natiye Advisory Boards. Their members were either elected or nominated. They had no legislative or executive powers, and "as the name indicates, the bodies were limited to giving advice on matters affecting their communities." (33) During the 1940s and 1950s residents showed their disapproval of the Boards through boycott campaigns. The 1961 Urban Bantu Councils Act was passed to replace the Boards with UBCs. On Ministerial approval, certain executive functions could be allocated to them. To be exercised on behalf of the Municipalities, these included the removal of unlawful residents, the allocation of church and school sites, and
the control of a community guard for law and order. By 1977 there were only 23 UBCs in operation, while over 200 Boards still existed. (34) At the first meeting of the Soweto UBC in March 1968, the deputy minister of BAd stressed "the temporariness of the urban communities, warned against any attempt to use the UBCs for political purposes, and stressed that they must operate within the framework of government policy." (35). Few executive powers were in practice given to the Councils. And residents showed much contempt for them. They became known as 'Useless Boys Clubs'.

Certain general tendencies are apparent in the township policy as implemented by the Municipalities. Influx control was intensified, various financial and other measures were used to deal with the housing problem; restrictions on trading operations increased, and very limited forms of local government were granted to residents. In all this, the temporary status of urban Blacks was emphasised. The introduction of Administration Boards represented a significant change in the institutional framework of the policy.

b) Administration Boards

In 1965 the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into Control Measures was appointed to investigate the influx control system. (36) Its 1967 report indicated the inadequacy of this system for two reasons. First of all, Municipalities had a large degree of autonomy and were not
subject to strict central state control. There were widespread complaints about many Municipalities being dominated by the liberal United Party through town and city councils. In 1971, a National Party leader spoke of the Johannesburg Municipality as "thwarting the country's policy" by inadequately controlling Black urbanisation. (37) Secondly, the Section 10 residential qualifications, in increasing the attractiveness of urban areas for rural Blacks, undermined influx control.

In a draft bill circulated to Municipalities in 1968, BAD provided for the removal of influx control implementation from them. "Labour boards, under the direct control of BAD, would assume responsibility, while Municipalities would maintain their other township duties, including housing provision. The bill was withdrawn after much criticism. Dividing influx control and housing matters between two bodies would have undermined influx control, as regulating the extent of housing provision was essential to it. The Bantu Affairs Administration Board Bill was circulated in 1969 and became legislation in 1971. For reasons already discussed, J. C. Erasmus of the Cape Midlands Administration Board was largely correct in arguing that the Act was designed "not to create a new policy but to implement the existing policy more efficiently." (38) It appears that this pressure for increased efficiency emanated mainly from within the state, notably BAD, and thus it is inadequate to argue that "the Boards rose essentially from the demands of
capital...". (39)

The Act resulted in the creation of 22 Administration Boards, each having jurisdiction over a specific geographical region, usually comprising both urban and rural areas, in White South Africa. (40) All Boards became responsible for more than one township. The Municipalities lost all their duties except for the provision of public transport, health and other services such as water and electricity. Boards are normally expected to financially reimburse Municipalities for the provision of these services.

BAD has near total control over Board operations. (41) Board members are all appointed by the Minister of BAD, and include one or more representatives of agriculture and industry or commerce, and one or more full-time state employees. (42) Chief commissioners, the senior regional BAD officials, are usually the state representatives, and they provide a major channel of communication between BAD and Board members. (43) Only the Minister, and not Board members, is empowered to make regulations under the relevant legislation. (44) Further control is exercised by authorising Boards' annual budgets, and by approving housing schemes. Members must operate within the general directives and guidelines issued by BAD. With members appointed and with no Black representation, it is thus true that, as a Board official said, those responsible for black urban affairs "will no longer be affected by local political
pressures and will be in the advantaged position of having to serve only one master." (45)

The relationship between a Board and its staff is similar to that between a city council and a Municipality. Board members hire and issue instructions to their staff. The senior staff consists of a chief director and departmental directors. The departments usually comprise administration, finances, technical services, manpower and community services. Most directors once held positions in Municipal Black affairs. All are White males, and the vast majority are Afrikaners. (46) They oversee both White and Black staff.

Administration Boards took over the assets and liabilities of Municipalities. But the 1971 Act did not provide them with any new revenue sources. (47) Without General Revenue Account subsidisation, Boards were left with beer and liquor profits, house rents, employer levies, and central state and other loans as their main income bases. (48) In 1971, the deputy minister of BAD argued that existing sources were "sufficient for administration boards to perform their duties adequately without recourse to the state for additional assistance." (49) The township economic problems discussed in Chapter three showed otherwise. The policy of township financial self-sufficiency thus soon proved inadequate.

Boards operated within the same statutory framework as did the Municipalities. Their regions were actually created
with the idea of promoting "homeland-oriented administration". (50) Most shared a boundary with one or more homeland, thus facilitating urban removals to the homelands and housing construction in them. The Boards also became responsible for the operation of urban aid centres. Provided for in the 1964 Bantu Labour Act, the first was only established in 1971. By early 1975 there were 19 centres. Officially, these were formed to limit criminal procedures against influx control offenders by giving each one "the opportunity to get his affairs in order." (51) In 1975, 221,537 Blacks were referred to these centres for this supposed purpose. Yet 61,242 of them were endorsed out to the homelands, while another 97,939 were sent to trial. It has in fact been suggested that aid centre inquiry is "very often used...to obtain evidence which is forwarded in as part of the State's case." (52)

The 1967 Interdepartmental Committee argued that Section 10 rights "had the effect of bottling up unemployed labour in prescribed [urban] areas with the result that labour bureaux in neighbouring towns which were short of labour had to import contract labour." (53) Because Section 10 rights were not transferable between urban areas, "permanent" residents in labour surplus areas would not live and work in labour shortage areas, thus enhancing unemployment amongst Section 10 Blacks. It is here where the most significant statutory change in policy under the Boards is found. The 1971 Act retained Section 10 rights, and
permitted increased labour mobility for those Blacks holding their. These people became "qualified to reside and to work" in any urban area within their specific Board/region without fear of losing their rights for the area in which these were originally obtained. (54)

The introduction of Administration Boards thus did not result in any major overall change in the statutory framework of the township policy. Except for a further emphasis on township financial self-sufficiency and on influx control (including the use of aid centres), and potentially improved labour mobility for Section 10 Blacks, nothing much changed. Racial domination and repression continued to be the hallmarks of the policy. What did emerge however were state bodies responsible for policy implementation which were less responsive to local pressures and more authoritarian in nature. This helps to explain why there was so much anger and hostility amongst residents during 'Soweto', and why the township policy was confronted and mobilised against in all its aspects.

2. The contemporary policy.

Since the mid-1970s, notably after the 'Soweto' revolt, political and economic leaders have attempted to alter the prevailing township policy. Rethinking and reformulation is occurring at an astounding pace. But the elaboration of the new policy is not complete. It is still in the process of formation, and, as with most government policy, it is
being "constructed out of accelerations and breakings, about-turns, hesitations and changes of course." (55) The leaders are moving fast but delicately, hoping to ensure that they always step on safe and secure ground. In many ways, however, a coherent political project is emerging. Important changes from earlier township policies are discernible. But the contemporary policy also represents an elaboration and intensification of certain earlier trends.

This policy will be discussed in interrelated stages. First of all, its general aims will be identified. These attempt to, amongst other things, secure the reproduction of South African capitalism. Secondly, the Riasker Commission, which is at the forefront of the policy, will be discussed. Thirdly, there will be a discussion of the policy in relation to housing, finance, commercial and industrial activity, local government, and population and labour mobility. This will involve looking at the various measures formulated to fulfill specific aims within these areas of township policy. Because the policy is in its early stages, many measures merely designate the direction in which policy is probably taking, rather than official policy as found in the statute books. In identifying specific aims, I will assess the ways in which the policy attempts to deal with the social crisis in the townships. Finally, an overview of the emergence and development of the policy in relation to the efforts and demands of big business will be
presented.

a) **General aims**

In an analysis of the historical development of the homeland system, it has been argued that "the Bantustan strategy of class polarisation has to be distinguished from the [earlier] Reserve strategy of class leveling." (56) Over the past two decades, the government has encouraged the development of Black classes, notably capitalists, a middle class, a working class and rich 'peasants', in the homelands. (57)

A similar strategy, I would argue, is now being pursued in the White urban areas through the new township policy. The policy can thus be seen as an attempt to stratify the urban Black population along class lines. This involves the emergence of a well-defined Section 10 'middle class' and labour aristocracy (including their families), who are to be co-opted within the framework of South African capitalism, and a down-trodden underprivileged stratum of the Black working class comprised of migrants and illegals. Central to this is the creation of economic and political divisions within the working class. In some ways earlier township policies did provide for some class stratification, but this was not their intended or at least their main aim. In fact, much class leveling occurred during the 1960s. Class stratification is now part and parcel of township policy. Any stratification which has emerged from past policies is
now receiving the full attention of those in power for the purpose of fuller elaboration.

In a 1976 memorandum to the Prime Minister, the Transvaal Chamber of Industries, pointing to the "simmering discontent of the urbanised blacks" in the wake of 'Soweto', said:

"The thought most basic to our submission is the need to ensure a stable, contented urbanized black community in our metropolitan and industrialised areas." (58) All the major business organisations and many government and state leaders have recently stressed the importance of defusing the political struggles of urban Black residents. In the words of G. de V. Morrison, deputy minister of the Department of Cooperation and Development (CAD): "If we regard him (the Black) as a potential ally, then it is very important that we create a dispensation for him which will make it worth his while to stand on our side against threats from outside." (59) Much of the new township policy is directed towards creating this dispensation for Section 10 residents or 'insiders'. In order to prevent them from siding with the so-called 'outside threats', invariably referred to as Marxism or Communism, these residents are to receive a large dose of liberal capitalism. Thus the Minister of CAD, P. G. Koornhof, says "we are trying to implement a free-market system..." (60) Considering the prevalence of racial domination, this will obviously involve much deracialisation and reform. But those in power are painting a less rosy picture for urban migrants.
and illegals. These Blacks or 'outsiders' are to continue taking the pills with the strong repressive flavour. Thus "laagers are going to be erected around the towns to keep the outsiders out." (61) They are to be increasingly located in the homelands. All this is consistent with overcoming the economic structural barriers discussed in Chapter two.

How many Blacks are we talking about here? In 1980 the total Black population in South Africa was 15.9 million, of which 9.5 million lived in the White areas. (62) Urban Blacks numbered 5.3 million. These included about 3.5 million Section 10 people, about 1 million migrants, and about 0.8 million illegals. (63) The new township deal is thus directed towards a small minority, only 22%, of the overall Black population. Even then, co-opting 3.5 million Blacks who have been accustomed to racial domination and repression appears to be a monumental task. This however did not stop the Riekert Commission from proposing such an approach!

b) The Riekert Commission

The name Riekert is synonymous with the contemporary township policy. (64) The Commission was appointed in August 1977 to investigate a wide range of existing legislation and administrative practices insofar as these related "directly or indirectly to any economic aspect of the utilisation of [primarily Black] manpower." (65) It
sought to provide for better utilisation by recommending policy changes involving modernisation and reform. (66) Much of its report deals with the labour bureau system, influx control and labour mobility. However, the other concerns of this thesis, notably housing, also receive attention.

According to the Commission, "the political factors" underlying the relevant legislation were outside its scope of inquiry. (67) It thus presented itself as apolitical, as "standing apart from both the State and classes in society, willing to lend an impartial ear to any of the parties at odds with each other." (68) This is perhaps true of most commissions. Yet it is deceiving. Riekert is profoundly political. The statutory and institutional frameworks it investigated subject the Black population to various forms of political control.

Riekert does not challenge the policy of creating 'independent' homelands. But hardly is "any consideration given to the problems of labour utilisation in these peripheral areas." (69) Its main concern is with improving labour utilisation in the modern sector of the South African economy located in the White urban areas. The homelands are considered only insofar as changes in their labour bureau system may achieve this goal. The consequences of the Riekert recommendations for people presently living in the homelands and for those relocated in the future may be devastating, adding to the already widespread conditions of
unemployment, poverty, starvation and misery. All this is completely ignored by the Commission.

Yet many sections of the White population responded positively to its report. This is particularly true of liberal circles, including big business. The Rand Daily Mail newspaper said that Riekert "symbolized a new hope of racial progress." (70) The government is labelled the culprit for not accepting, in its White Paper, some of the Riekert Report's recommendations. In many ways the report does fulfill liberal wishes. The Commission constantly argues for the lessening of racial discrimination and, in certain cases, this is followed through. However, even for the modern economic sector, Riekert should not be seen as a ray of sunshine. What is involved here is "the replacement of crude racial discrimination against black South Africans by more sophisticated techniques of control." (71)

Control, co-option, division and disorganisation of urban Blacks, all these are central to Riekert. Throughout, the Commission stresses the importance of "strengthening the position of the established Black communities" in the townships, and of "affording them new and much wider opportunities for decision-making on and participation in their own development...". (72) The emphasis is on so-called township 'community development' and on the urban Blacks' own increased role in this. According to a Wiehahn Commission member and assistant to Riekert, this is "in the interest of political and economic stability, the
support of the free enterprise system by Blacks, and economic growth and development." (73) This political program of co-option has become the main contemporary official justification for influx control. Thus Riekkert argues that regulating Black urbanisation is "an absolute essential social security measure." (74) Inadequate regulation "gives rise to numerous social costs and social and other problems for the established community in prescribed areas." (75) In other words, ensuring a 'stable, contented urbanised black community' depends on the maintenance and tightening of influx control over 'outsiders'. The general aims of the present policy are thus clearly discernible in Riekkert's recommendations. In fact, the Commission is largely responsible for giving coherence to the emerging policy.

The Commission proposed that, to allow for the implementation of its recommendations, specific legislation be drafted amending and consolidating existing acts. Suggested were an Employment and Training Act and a Black Community Development Act. In 1980, three bills, "primarily intended to give effect to the accepted recommendations of the Riekkert Commission", were drafted by CAD officials. (76) These bills were eventually withdrawn, reappearing in 1982 in somewhat altered form. Besides the drafting of this and other legislation, the establishment of commissions, mainly to take over where Riekkert left off, has occurred at an amazing pace.
c) **Specific policies and aims**

Going on now to discuss the contemporary policy in more detail, we will see the various specific policy reformulations by political and economic leaders in response to crisis.

Significant changes from earlier policies, at least for "insiders", are already evident. As S. N. Mandy of Anglo-American Insurance Holdings argues: "The whole situation has undergone a fundamental shift and very promising change since the Government has acknowledged the permanence of the Black urban population." (77) While the extent of this acknowledgement is debatable, it is consistent with the move towards township community development and provides a necessary foundation for it. Important here are reformist policies concerning housing, local government, commercial and industrial activity, labour mobility, and finance. However, so far, the political project does not totally exclude Section 10 Blacks from the realm of racial domination. And this is the name of the game for 'outsiders'. A discussion of the influx control policy, as an intensification of earlier trends, will make this clear.

i) **Housing**

The government is now committed to substantially improving township living conditions for Section 10 residents. Housing is particularly important. As Anton Rupert, chairperson of the Urban Foundation, put it: "Housing and
its related facilities...represent the basis of family life and the real foundation of a settled middle-class society."

(78) The most significant changes concern the nature of housing provision, including the issue of home-ownership which has special significance. The overall aim is to increase Black urban security in order to limit future political unrest. The 1982 Viljoen Committee on housing made this abundantly clear when arguing for "a stable and vibrant urban community which has a vested interest in the maintenance of peace and good order." (79)

The Riskert Commission, the 1980 Browne Committee, and notably the Viljoen Committee all deal with Black housing problems. (80) By early 1982 the government could already refer to the existence of a "total strategy for black housing". (81) Viljoen aptly sums up this approach when it recommends:

"the creation of an effective and responsive housing process, in which the individual Black households, the Black community, the private sector at large and the public sector are all involved and inter-relate and play out their respective roles to the maximum extent possible...An environment and attitude must be created in which all sectors are motivated to devote all resources, whether capital, labour, expertise, 'sweet equity' or entrepreneurial vitality..." (82)

The Committee argues that historically the state has dealt inadequately with the housing problems, and has actually contributed to them. Any possible solution thus requires active private sector involvement, as defined widely. The government's recognition of this implies a major reversal in policy.
The first indication of a rethinking in township housing policy occurred before the 'Soweto' revolt. This merely involved the reintroduction of the 30-year home-ownership scheme. By 1975, only 29.9% of township housing was so occupied. (83) In January 1976 BAD issued a general circular to Administration Boards calling for its immediate implementation. Initially only Section 10 Blacks who possessed or acquired homeland citizenship could participate, but this clause was later dropped. The right of occupation was also extended for an 'indefinite period'. Prospective homeowners could obtain loans from their employer or Board. But direct loans from building societies and banks were not immediately forthcoming due to their unwillingness to use the leases as "security for mortgages". (84) Mr. P. Scales, head of the United Building Society, in stressing the importance of more adequate schemes in combating the influence of communism, labelled the present one as "completely cynical". (85)

A new scheme soon emerged to provide Blacks with greater security of tenure and to encourage involvement by financial institutions. In November 1978, after much pressure from the Urban Foundation and building societies, the 99-year leasehold scheme thus became operative. (86) Financial institutions were more eager to provide loans under this scheme. There has been much controversy however about the required qualifications. Whether children born after their ethnic homeland achieves 'independence' are
permitted to inherit a house remains unclear. One of the stumbling blocks to its implementation has been the surveying of sites. There have been many delays. To lower costs and to save time, surveying is now occurring *en masse* rather than individually. By August 1981, there were 123,147 sites available. (87) The advantages of such a scheme have not gone unnoticed by big business. For Mr. Justice Jan Steyn, executive director of the Urban Foundation, these include "social stability arising from security and pride of ownership" and "the confirmation of private enterprise values amongst Blacks". (88)

The government still refuses to grant freehold or property rights to urban Blacks. Meanwhile, big business continues to agitate for it. In seeing it as "one of the cornerstones of the free market system", the Urban Foundation argues that it constitutes "the single most significant form of confirmation of a 'new dispensation' and...would have a marked impact on the 'stability' of the people in question." (89) But the government is concerned about another though related 'marked impact'. Freehold would give Blacks an inalienable right to permanent urban residence which even reformist political leaders do not wish to contemplate. There are however some moves amongst state officials for the introduction of freehold. Here economic reasons prevail. A Board director thus says that property rates provide an in-built source of revenue, and that without this the financial weaknesses of the Boards...
will continue. (90) The Browne Committee argues similarly in stating that these rates could produce about 50% of the required township current income by 1989/90. (91)

The more general political project involves confronting the housing shortages in the townships as well as the inadequacy of the existing housing stock. (92) Concerted efforts by both the public and private sectors are seen as required. Only this, according to the acting chairperson of the East Rand Board, can "possibly offer a degree of success in solving the immense complexities of Black housing." (93) Stimulating private sector involvement is consistent with the continuing adoption of the principle of township financial self-sufficiency and seeks to, amongst other things, limit the need for state expenditure. Solving the 'immense complexities' are said to be "beyond the financial resources of the Government...". (94) The end result will see state activity in the housing process confined to the financing of land purchases, the provision of infrastructure, and the construction of "low-cost housing for low income groups, and social housing such as old-age homes...". (95) This comprises a move towards the development of a private housing market. The intended measures, which will involve both the formal business sector and Black residents themselves, will now be examined.

At the forefront of business intervention in the housing process is the Urban Foundation. This was formed in November 1976 at the 'Businessmen's Conference on the
on the Quality of Life in Urban Communities. The directors of the Foundation read "like a Who's Who of South African financial, mining and industrial capital."

(96) A fund was established to which employers could contribute. By February 1981, 276 companies had made pledges or provided money to an amount of R33 million. In wanting to "promote peaceful structural reform" in South Africa, it began calling for changes in the housing policy. (97)

The Riekert Commission recommended that the business sector "should be permitted to finance housing schemes in Black residential areas on a business basis and to develop them for allocation in accordance with the leasehold system."

(98) This was accepted by the government. (99) Many companies and other private institutions are now directly involved in the financing and construction of township housing. And, in "accelerating the housing action for Blacks", the Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act (1981) permits building societies and private developers, including employers, to acquire leasehold rights. (100)

This was incorporated into the 1982 Black Communities Development Bill. (101) According to the Viljoen Committee, it enables "the developer or employer to mobilise the necessary loan finance." (102) Houses may then be allocated to Blacks on a leasehold basis. By 1981 the Urban Foundation had spent R5.5 million on housing projects. (103) Companies such as IBM, Shell Oil and Anglo-American are
now involved in Soweto. The Department of Community Development has gone so far as to announce, in December 1982, that state-owned land will be sold to the private sector for Black housing purposes in the near future. (104)

Riekert also argued for a reemphasis on site-and-service schemes, with sites allocated on a leasehold basis. (105) This generated much conflict between state officials. The Department of Community Development, responsible for funding, argued that this would result in lower housing standards and possibly slums, and that, in the words of the Cape Midlands Board chairperson, it is "no permanent solution to the housing shortage." (106) CAD argued otherwise in promoting such alternative housing action. In September 1981 the cabinet adopted the CAD site-and-service approach. (107) The Boards are to provide the necessary services such as sewerage, water and drainage. Schemes have been initiated at, amongst other places, Ketheleng (Germiston) and Khutsong (Carletonville), both with Urban Foundation involvement. The Viljoen Committee, sensitive to incorporating Black residents into the housing process, argued that "the upgrading and extension of existing houses is probably the most effective and efficient way of expanding the total housing stock..." as this maximises the participation of residents. (108) This involvement, whether in site-and-service schemes or in upgrading houses, has implications for maintaining 'peace and order' in the townships, as it engages Blacks "more meaningfully with
their dwellings and thus enhances feelings of social responsibility..." (109)

The financial implication of private sector involvement, including both business and residents, has already been noted. It is here where the Administration Boards show great concern. Both Board members and directors are generally supportive of the new housing policies, and are partially responsible for their emergence. (110) The chairperson of the East Cape Board encapsulates the reasons for this in saying that "every effort should be made to sell houses either to private persons or possibly employers in order to minimise the Board's housing maintenance requirements." (111) Policies which lessen the Boards' control of the housing stock and which thus limit their financial responsibilities in the face of large housing account deficits are receiving the support of Boards. The financing and construction of housing by business, leasehold systems, and site-and-service schemes all allow for this. The development of a private housing market in the townships is a long-term objective. In the meantime, central state loans and subsidisation are seen as necessary in dealing with the housing shortages. In fact, in April 1979, the Department of Community Development reintroduced sub-economic housing loans. This enables Boards to pay back loans at lower rates of interest, thus requiring them to extract less house rent from residents. Viljoen argues that housing financed or constructed by the private sector
should also be liable to state subsidisation. (112) The same rates of subsidisation should apply to both public and private sector housing so as to not hinder the development of the private market.

Two other issues require mention. First of all, Riekert recommended the provision of a greater variety of housing, including "the establishment of residential areas with larger erven [sites] for the higher income groups." (113) While already government policy, a renewed emphasis is apparent. Thus the West Rand Board intends to develop 4,000 leasehold sites in the Soweto area for 'upper income' families, at a cost of between R10,000 and R30,000 each, as well as 10,000 to 15,000 in other townships for 'lower income' tenants and buyers at half the cost. (114) This is a very blatant attempt at class stratification within the Section 10 population, as a "class" approach to housing is said to be "imperative". (115)

Secondly, both private and state organisations, notably the National Building Research Institute, are involved in systematic research aimed at reducing the cost of housing construction. The Browne Committee recommends that this be continued. (116) This is particularly directed towards housing for 'lower income' Blacks. Core housing, in which a core consisting of a few rooms is built with additions provided by the occupant, has emanated from this research and is now being implemented on a minor scale. Considering, as P. Kotze, Minister of Community Development notes, that
Building costs have increased at a higher rate than state housing expenditure over the past few years, this research is obviously important. (117)

While many reformist housing policies are being formulated and slowly implemented, the government continues to pursue the repressive policy of urban relocation. (118) At least 50 of the approximately 300 townships in South Africa are now being disestablished or will be in the near future. (119) This has important implications for housing provision in these townships. All family housing is 'frozen'. The North Transvaal Board, which plans to relocate Blacks from all 8 of its townships, has not built any family housing since its formation ten years ago. (120) Thus any move towards a private housing market is negated from the start. Moreover, leasehold rights are disallowed. Associated with this policy is the continuing involvement by most Boards in capital projects, usually on an agency basis, in the homelands. During the 1981-2 financial year, one Board was engaged in projects costing R6.95 million in Kangwane homeland, while it only spent R5.4 million in its own area. (121) For residents in these townships then, little 'community development' will be forthcoming. In fact, these Blacks are to soon find themselves living in the homelands, thus losing their Section 10 rights. A similar situation prevails in the Coloured Labour Preference Policy region, which includes the entire West Cape Board area, and parts of the North Cape and East Cape Board areas. Here, despite opposition from within
the Boards, CAD refuses to grant leasehold rights to Blacks. (122) While housing is not totally frozen, provision is fairly limited.

These then represent the significant moves on the housing front. There are economic, political and ideological issues involved in the reform policies. First of all, active private sector involvement is seen as essential, particularly by state officials, given the enormous financial problems involved in dealing with the housing backlog. Secondly, big business stresses the importance of ensuring 'peace and order' and of co-opting Blacks. And thirdly, urban Blacks, with the emergence of a private housing market, are to witness the advantages of liberal capitalist policies and express support for them.

ii) **Labour bureaux and mobility**

The Riekert Commission recommended reorganising the urban labour bureau system and increasing the geographical mobility of Section 10 workers. This involves changes directly affecting about 1.5 million working 'insiders', or 52% of the 1982 registered Black urban work force. (123) Riekert argued that Section 26 of the 1971 Administration Board Act did not significantly enhance labour mobility between urban areas. (124) In fact, it reached a similar conclusion to the 1967 Interdepartmental Committee in stating that "the Black population in rural cities and towns seems to have dammed up...". (125) Meanwhile, migrants continued
to obtain employment in the major industrial centres. This contributed to unemployment amongst Section 10 workers. To maximise the economic utilisation of these workers, the Commission recommended that mobility across Board boundaries now be allowed. It argued that housing shortages hindered mobility, and thus an unintended consequence of the new housing policy would be increased geographical movement.

Inter-Board mobility was incorporated into the 1980 Black Labour Regulations. (126) However, there are ambiguities. Riekert suggested that mobility be subject to the availability of local labour and suitable accommodation. But the Regulations appear to exclude the labour clause. Board manpower directors provide differing interpretations. (127) Movement also apparently depends on the permission of both the labour bureau and the chief commissioner's office. (128) If so, then 'insiders' become Section 10(1)(d) workers in the receiving Board area. Whether they may take their families with them and whether the definition of suitable accommodation includes family housing is thus unclear. If not, then this accommodation would be limited to hostels, and, as a Board director argues, to family housing in a homeland once citizenship is acquired. (129) This would lessen the potential advantages to Section 10 Blacks of labour mobility.

Riekert also recommended that 'insiders' be granted greater freedom of movement within their own Board area. It argued that they should be given "a standing authorisation by
means of an endorsement made once only in travel documents [passbooks] so that they may change employers without reporting to a labour bureau, but subject to the normal registration procedures to be observed by the employer." (130) Workers would thus be given a 'standing workseeker's permit.' The 1980 Regulations, in implementing this recommendation, are again ambiguous. While Riekert argued that employers should still be required to register a new worker's labour contract at the bureau, this is unclear in the Regulations. (131) There is certainly a lack of consensus amongst Board directors. (132) In 1982 CAD nullified this and the other mobility regulation for the Coloured Labour Preference Policy region. (133)

The labour bureau system itself is also undergoing changes. (134) Important here is Riekert's recommendation that certain duties performed by CAD should be transferred, when and where possible, to other state departments, which would then administer these on behalf of all the legally defined races. A 1980 document from the Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM) to the cabinet thus said that "the present system of African labour bureaux should be terminated, and that official employment services should be established for all race groups under one government department." (135) This was provided for in the 1981 Guidance and Placement Act. The employment services were transferred to the Department of Manpower Utilisation. These are directed towards 'insiders', and involve
providing information on work opportunities and placing workers in appropriate employment. Board staff continue however to fulfill these duties on an agency basis, with the Department providing funds. (136) Influx control implementation, directed towards 'outsiders', remains the responsibility of CAD. According to a Board director, the Department of Manpower Utilisation insisted on separate offices for performing the employment and influx control functions, even if the same officials were involved. (137) The Department did not want to be seen as linked with the influx control issue. Board directors opposed the idea, primarily because proper coordination between the degree of unemployment amongst 'insiders' and the urban entry of migrants was required. Nevertheless, the creation of a dual labour bureau system, one for 'insiders' and the other for 'outsiders', is becoming increasingly clear.

These changes have certain implications for the social crisis. Urban Black unemployment, an aspect of the wider economic crisis, is to be lessened by giving Section 10 workers increased mobility and greater employment opportunities, thereby limiting the use of migrants. And, at least for mobility within their own Board area, 'insiders' are to become immersed in a free labour market. With registration on their part no longer required, their only contact with bureaux, now as guidance and placement centres, will be on a voluntary basis. This, and decreasing unemployment, are to serve as bases for political co-option
in the form of Section 10 workers' support for liberal capitalism.

iii) Commercial and industrial infrastructure

In July 1979 the Minister of CAD told the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC) that "by 1982 the black businessman would have arrived in South Africa and taken his rightful place in the economy." (138) Significant moves by both the government and big business are presently occurring to provide for the expansion of trading operations and for the introduction of industrial enterprises in the townships. While policy changes in housing provision and labour mobility directly affect all Section 10 residents, these changes on the business front are intended to benefit elements of the Black 'middle class'. This involves class stratification within the Section 10 population.

In 1975, after many years of agitation from NAFCOC, the government announced that the trading restrictions imposed in the early 1960s would be lifted. However, nothing immediately materialised. In fact, from May 1976 applicants for trading sites now required homeland citizenship certificates. It was only in the midst of 'Soweto' that things began to happen. By the end of the 1970s changes included an increase in the size of business premises, the removal of the homeland citizenship requirement, permission to operate more than one business and to sell most if not all kinds of products, and the ability to form partnerships and
financial institutions. In some ways this reformism went beyond the mere reintroduction of previous trading rights. And other more controversial measures soon followed.

The Riskert Commission supported the removal of these legal impediments and called for further changes. (139) An important issue was White business involvement in the townships. The government, in its White Paper, recognised the need to develop "viable business centres" in the townships, and stressed the use of "the capital, expertise and initiative of non-Blacks" in this. (140) While NAFCCOC, in principle, supports this, it has shown some uneasiness. Black businesspeople are "faced with the inherent dilemma of their racially defined situation: lacking capital, technical expertise and size, they cannot afford the complete freedom to operate for which they yearn if this is going to bring them into direct competition with white business...". (141) NAFCCOC, although pushing a 'free enterprise' approach, thus fears that White business involvement may undermine Black trading operations. Economic and notably political leaders are sensitive to this. Given that the White consumer market is becoming saturated and the Blacks' share of the national income is increasing, further tapping of the Black market by White business is essential. But this should not be at the expense of the political strategy of co-option. In dealing with this problem, the Minister of CAD announced, in late 1979, that White/Black business partnerships in which Blacks hold a
A 51% share would be permitted. (142) NAFCC was at first apprehensive about this as Blacks could possibly be used as 'fronts' for White businesses. It now adopts a more positive line.

At the November 1979 Carleton Conference, the Prime Minister called on big business to stimulate the development of small Black businesses. This resulted in the formation of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in late 1980. Its aims include the financing of small business by providing shares and loan capital. By February 1981, R128 million had been raised, mostly from the private sector. (143) The formation of the African Bank of South Africa and a National Insurance Company (for Blacks) has also been useful in mobilising finances. The leasehold scheme is relevant as well. As the Urban Foundation stated: "The banks are reluctant to lend money to Black businessmen as they normally do not have sufficient security collateral. The introduction of the 99 year lease...has helped to overcome part of this problem by allowing property to be mortgaged." (144) The 1981 Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act allows big business to become directly involved in developing business sites on a leasehold basis. A Centre for Developing Business was also established in 1976 by South African Breweries. It is attached to the Business School at the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), and, with funding by the Urban Foundation and big corporations, it provides Black businesspeople with
with the necessary business expertise.

Much expansion has been forthcoming, primarily in Soweto. In March 1980 the R250,000 Black Chain shopping complex was opened in Diepkloof, Soweto. More recently, SODEV Developments, a Black-White partnership company, has announced the construction of a R30 million complex in Jabulani, Soweto. (145) The political implications of these and other developments have not gone unnoticed by Black traders. Richard Mapanya, a Soweto trader, argues that all this will give rise to a class of people who will serve as a "bulwark to any political uprising in this country." (146) The head of NAFCOO pulls no punches either in saying that "I cannot see how Blacks can develop a love for Capitalism if they are not allowed to become capitalists themselves..." (147) Active involvement by traders in their own co-option is thus clear.

There are also reformulations of policy concerning the beer and liquor trade. In September 1981 the government announced its decision to legalise shebeens. (148) This followed continuous appeals from the Soweto Taverners Association and the recently formed National Tavern Association. However, the legalisation of shebeens located inside residential buildings would not be possible. This would rule out most of the existing shebeens. Businesspeople who have a basis for accumulation in a trading operation would be more able to obtain funds for a license and for constructing a legal shebeen. (149) Meanwhile, illegally
operating shebeens would be subject to continued police harassment.

There has been much talk of transferring the Administration Boards' control of beer and liquor to private enterprise. The cabinet met in May 1982 to discuss this issue. The government has accepted in principle the transfer of the sale of liquor. And, at least in Soweto, Blacks may now apply for trading licenses. South African Breweries has offered to take over the bottling and distribution of beer. Presumably the Boards, or Black traders would be responsible for selling it. However, as a Board director noted, this move towards free enterprise would involve replacing one monopoly with another. (150) In 1982 it was decided that from April 1983, Boards would retain only a 51% share in beer profits. (151) These changes have been strongly resisted by Board directors. While not necessarily opposed to the free enterprise approach, they are insistent that if implemented, then alternative sources of revenue should be forthcoming. (152) Considering the importance of beer profits to the Boards, a director has gone so far as to say that these are as vital to the national interest as ARMSCOR and armaments production. (153)

Government leaders are now also concerned about stimulating the development of industry in the townships, albeit on a minor scale. The SEDC has been at the forefront of this in its construction of industrial parks. The first park, Orlando West I (Soweto), was built at a cost of R1 million
and became operative in April 1981. There are about 50 entrepreneurs involved in such enterprises as gate manufacturing, upholstery, and textile and clothing manufacturing. Three other parks, Orlando West II and one each in Dobsonville and Embeni, have been recently completed. (154) This has important financial implications. Considering that "the viability of a local authority is largely determined by the economic viability of the local community", the Browne Committee thus recommended that there should be concerted efforts to plan "the economic basis of local communities for Black people, with due regard to the key role played by primary activating industries and institutions in determining the general level of economic activity...". (155) This was reinstated by the Crosser Working Group investigating local authority finance. (156)

There are thus economic and political issues involved in the move towards free enterprise in the commercial and industrial spheres. Industrial development in particular, by providing a strong basis for increasing local government revenue, would help in overcoming the township economic problems. The new trading policies are directed towards promoting Black businesspeople as a conservative 'bulwark' by giving them a stronger base for capital accumulation.

iv) Local government.

Flowing from the President Council's recommendations, the present constitutional proposals do not indicate any
incorporation of the Black population into the national power structure in South Africa. As Prime Minister Vorster declared in 1977: "If people expect...that I must assimilate him [the urban Black] into the White man's politics, I say to you that I am not prepared to do that...". (157) However, there have been changes on the township front. With the recognition of the permanency of urban Blacks has come talk of the gradual formation of Black Municipalities. Thus Prime Minister Botha said in 1982 that "we need these people (Blacks) in our industries. They have become part of our economy and there is no doubt that we cannot ignore them. That is why Government is going out of its way...to develop a form of self-government in these urban areas and to give them greater responsibility...". (158) This is a slow but important process.

In October 1976 the Minister of BBD, M. C. Botha, in the midst of the 'Soweto' revolt, spoke of "a revision of the present system of Urban Bantu Councils and a replacement of the existing system of advisory committees." (159) This culminated in the passing of the 1977 Community Councils Act allowing for the establishment of Community Councils (CCs) in the townships. According to Riékert, the Act provided for "the creation of responsible independent bodies with meaningful executive powers, which could function and develop alongside administration boards." (160) After consulting the local Advisory Board or Bantu Council,
and the relevant Administration Board; the Minister of CAD could provide for the establishment of a CC within a specific township. (161) Each CC was to be divided into wards for election purposes. Voters and candidates for election were to be residents in the area and were to have the "prescribed qualifications". (162) By the end of 1981, 228 CCs had been established. (163) There were 1546 community councillors. (164) However, for many frozen townships, including in the entire North Transvaal Board area, CCs were not introduced. (165) The Minister could nominate persons if wards remained empty after elections. As it turned out, over 60% of the wards were uncontested in the first round of CC elections. (166) In many cases, bye-elections were called. If deemed to be in "the public interest", the Minister could also dissolve a CC. (167) Subject to the discretion and direction of the Minister, Section 5(1)(a) of the 1977 Act provides a list of powers and duties which could be exercised and performed by a CC. These include, amongst other things, promoting community development and the moral and social welfare of residents; allocating and administering school, trading and church sites and the letting of houses and buildings; and preventing the unlawful occupation of land and buildings. In addition to these powers and duties, others are also possible, including managing a "community guard", developing school sport facilities, and advising the Minister on the making of specific regulations. (168) The specific
Administration Board would thus have some of its township responsibilities withdrawn. This is laid out in agreements entered into between the Board and Council. (169) The Minister however has the final say, and based on certain criteria, annually reviews the transfer of powers. Most if not all CCs have the Section 5(1)(a) powers, while some also have the additional ones. Many Boards in fact have a two-phase approach to CCs. The important criteria are normally whether a CC has its own staff and the extent of its powers. (170) Fifteen CCs have their own staff, while others have Board officials at their disposal. The funds of CCs primarily derive from amounts received by virtue of their powers and duties. The Act did not provide any new sources of township financing.

The CC system is a response to the political crisis. It is an attempt to defuse the residents' struggles by taking them off the streets and incorporating them into bodies over which the government would have greater control. Ministerial control of CCs is near total. Only the Minister of CAD is empowered to make regulations. And the powers and duties of a CC may be withdrawn. For residents, popular participation in the administration of the townships is supposedly enhanced by the democratic election of councillors. But given Ministerial control and the limited powers granted to councillors, one can understand the view expressed by a Mlungisi resident that CCs are "puppet bodies set up to create the appearance of self-rule in the
urban areas." (171) However, the system was also intended to create divisions amongst urban Blacks. As a resident told Evaton councillors: "Those whites are just using you to oppress us." (172) Thus CCs became responsible for raising and collecting service charges, and for house evictions. While diverting attention away from the Boards, this increases conflict between residents. A former West Rand Board director thus says that CCs must "consider matters and take the rap if things go wrong." (173) A similar tactic is evident with the formation of community guards for "the maintenance of law and order" and "the preservation of the safety of inhabitants". (174) Regulations providing for their establishment were drafted in 1979. Subordinate to the South African police, these guards would be allowed to carry knobkerries (large sticks) and "more lethal weapons". (175) According to F. J. le Roux, a National Party M.P., this gives a Black community the "opportunity" to "control itself" and to "discipline itself". (176)

The Riekert Commission paid little direct attention to the CC system, and recommended that the provisions of the 1977 Act be incorporated into the proposed Black Community Development Act. (177) The eventual outcome was the 1980 Local Government Bill, one of the three Bills which were eventually scrapped. This Bill does not differ significantly from the 1977 Act. It provided for the establishment of town and village councils. (178) Every CC
would become a village council unless the Minister decided that it should have town council status. The powers and duties of a village council are similar to those of a CC. But a town council could potentially entirely replace an Administration Board in its township operations. (179) This was consistent with the increasing emphasis within government circles on granting townships full municipal status. But criticisms of the Bill soon emerged, notably from big business. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce thus argued that the conferring of powers onto the councils was still subject to the Minister's discretion. (180) And it said that greater attention must be given to expanding the financial resources of councils if these are to become viable entities. It also suggested that the 1980 Law on Co-operation and Development Amendment Bill, which deals with the future role of Boards, should permit Black representation on the Boards: "If the system of black local government is to succeed, the elected councils must be seen to be fully involved in responsible decision-making." (181)

These and other criticisms from private sector bodies resulted in the redrafting of the Bill. This took shape in the form of the 1982 Black Local Authorities Bill, which, according to CAD, allows CCs to become "fully-fledged local authorities". (182) It was referred to a Parliamentary Select Committee for inquiry. In its evidence to the Committee, the Urban Foundation stressed the importance of giving councils adequate finances and autonomy from CAD. It
saw these two factors as the major weaknesses of the Bill. (183) As M. B. Kumalo, a community councillor, said in support of the Foundation's submission, "whatever Local Government Structure is created it must be perceived by the Black Community as being autonomous and financially viable."

(184) The Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) repeatedly emphasised the need to incorporate Blacks onto the Boards. This was not explicitly provided for in the 1982 Black Communities Development Bill. (185) A director of the FCI, J. F. Roux, argued that representation on the Boards would make Blacks believe that "there is scope for them... to be in a position to decide on their own issues." (186) There is thus much concern for providing a strong basis for the legitimacy and economic viability of councils.

After the redrafting of the Black Local Authorities Bill by the Select Committee, it became law in July 1982. The Act provides for the establishment of town and village councils, and advisory committees. (187) Only town councils will receive municipal status. The discretionary powers of the Minister have been lessened. And, significantly, councils have been granted freehold rights. (188) According to the Financial Mail, all this is "to a large extent a triumph of progressive renewal over reactionary elements in government's thinking on the position of urban blacks...". (189)

But there is now even talk of establishing some kind of multi-racial local government. Important here is the...
notion of a "functionally dual system of authorities", as formulated by two committees of the President's Council. (190) Each racially-based local government would be responsible for the provision of "soft" or "community sensitive" services, including housing, schools, community halls, swimming baths and parks. Services best provided on economies of scale, or "hard" services, comprising electricity, water supply, drainage and transport, would become the responsibility of a metropolitan or service corporation. Each local authority would be represented on this corporation. The main concern is with limiting the duplication of functions by different bodies, thus lessening the demand for finance.

The moves in the black local government sphere raise questions about the future of Administration Boards. The government has made it clear that the development of councils is dependent on certain criteria. As the Wiehahn commissioner van der Merwe argues, "It would not only be undesirable, but indeed irresponsible to entrust a particular Community Council with functions [of Boards] if it has neither the finance nor the administrative infrastructure to execute such functions satisfactorily." (191) These and other issues have led to much conflict between councillors and Board directors and officials. Councillors are dissatisfied with the extent and pace of the transfer of powers to them. Yet there is an unwillingness on their part to increase the service charges.
paid by residents. In some cases, Boards have approached the Minister of CAD to force increases through. (192) Balancing the housing account is seen by directors as essential in achieving economic viability. Some Board directors also argue that CC members are unqualified to take over many of the township duties. (193) And there has been in many cases an imprecise delineation of powers between Boards and CCs. The Urban Foundation is particularly sensitive to these problems. In its memorandum to the Select Committee, it presented a specific program for the near future which outlines the proposed duties of Councils and Boards, and it suggested a legislative framework for this. (194) This is based on the general approach contained in the 1980 Laws on Co-operation and Development Amendment Bill that Boards, under the new name of Development Boards, should "plan, co-ordinate, promote and carry out the development of the Black community in its administration area with a view to such communities ultimate self-determination on local government level." (195) Whether Boards will be completely phased out in the long-term future is unclear.

v) Finances

The issue of finances has received much attention by both political and economic leaders. Developing an adequate financial base is seen as vital in overcoming the township economic problems and in providing for community
development. Already three important committees have been established to deal with this issue, and have submitted their reports. These are the 1980 Browne Committee, the 1981 Barrie Committee, and the 1982 Croeser Working Group. Yet a coherent financial policy has so far not emerged. Riekert recommended that the state should "initiate purposeful programmes of action in order to recover more and more of the cost of services from the Black communities themselves." (196) This continuing emphasis on township financial self-sufficiency was accepted by the government. (197) But the specific nature of this is undergoing changes. And there are moves to go beyond it.

The Browne Committee was appointed in early 1976 to examine local authority finances. But it was only subsequently asked to look at Board and CC finances. The government never released a white paper. According to a Board director, this was because the Browne proposals were unworkable. (198) Its main recommendations involved the introduction of freehold rights and central state subsidisation of certain township services. These went against current government thinking. The Barrie Committee also did not receive a favourable response. (199) The Croeser Working Group was appointed in November 1980 to deal with the inadequacies of the Browne Report. This is an ongoing group which has now split into sub-working groups for the purpose of further inquiry. Its 1982 report emphasised the importance of finding additional revenue
sources for township financing. (200)

Additional sources are vital given the changes in the Boards' traditional financial base. Three of their main revenue sources are now in jeopardy. The 1977 Liquor Act gave Boards the opportunity to retain 100% of liquor profits as from the 1981/2 financial year. But they are currently in the process of possibly losing their beer and liquor monopolies. Riekert argued that employer levies, for a number of reasons, should be gradually phased out. (201) These have not been increased since 1980. (202) Housing loans from the Department of Community Development may also be phased out with the increasing stress on private sector funding. But state subsidisation may continue for sometime. As a Board director argues, the Department of Manpower Utilisation's funding of labour bureau operation represents a move away from financial self-sufficiency. (203) And, in calling for "a programme for the purposeful elimination of accumulated backlogs and relative disparities...", the Presidents Council's committees envisage a reemphasis on state subsidisation until the township economic problems are overcome. (204) The continuing importance of service charges and, more generally, house rent, seems to be the least controversial financial source.

There is one reasonably clear indication of the type of additional sources de Boer might consider. The Grosskopf Committee argued for "the concept of a metropolitan area with a single shared tax base..." The justification for this
is that the value of industrial and commercial property, on which rates are levied, depends largely on the availability of Black labour and purchasing power." (205) Income from this source, which is elsewhere referred to as "neutral income", should be distributed to all the racial local authorities on an equitable basis. (206) The Department of Treasury has apparently advocated such a scheme. (207)

vi) Urban residence and influx control.

It is now time to turn to the issues of urban residence and influx control. These are central to the aims of the emerging policy. The Riskert Commission recommended the retention of Section 10 rights. It argued that Section 10 Blacks attached "particularly great value" to these rights. (208) Amongst other advantages, these gave Blacks access to family housing and accorded them preference in the allocation of employment. Scrapping Section 10 would thus cause deep resentment. At the same time, these rights gave rise to "great antagonisms" amongst outsiders, who were treated as 'second-class' Blacks in the urban areas. (209) Section 10 was to provide the basis for continuing control over Black urbanisation, which, according to the government, was "in the interests of the established and new residents in the Black urban residential areas...". (210) It was also to become an important foundation for the new emphasis on community development and class stratification.
Riekert suggested that the 72 hour provision limiting the length of stay in an urban area for Blacks without Section 10(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) rights should be dropped. It argued that this was overtly discriminatory in nature as it only applied to Blacks, thus doing "great harm to South Africa's image", and that it led to arrests "which seriously disturb relations between population groups". (211) Notably, it resulted in passbook checks on the streets by the police in search for illegals. This was a source of irritation and harassment for insiders. Riekert maintained that influx control should be linked "only with the availability of work and approved housing." (212) These have always been important mechanisms regulating Black urbanisation and residence. Implementation would now however involve intensified house searches for illegals and increased fines on employers for employing illegals. In its White Paper, the government argued that the 72 hour provision would be scrapped only if these two forms of control proved effective. In the meantime, efforts would be made to "avoid its adverse effects". (213) In some of the larger urban centres, the 72 hour limitation was temporarily dropped in order to witness the consequences. In the case of Bloemfontein, this had little or no effect because the provision was never really enforced in the first place. This stemmed from the difficulties the Board had in obtaining court decisions in its favour. (214) There is meanwhile no intention whatsoever to do away with the pass system. All Blacks,
including insiders, would still have to carry passbooks.

Riekert recommended that Section 29 of the 1945 Urban Areas Act, allowing for the removal of 'idles and undesirables' amongst insiders, be repealed. (215) Again, this was seen as discriminatory. The Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1971, which is applicable to Whites and Indians, should be extended to cover Black Africans as well. (216) Riekert suggested that its application to Black Africans should lay "far greater stress on the idea of rehabilitation rather than of removal." (217) It is well known that those removed are sent to farm colonies where they provide a source of cheap labour. (218) The government said that the 1971 Act had so far been mainly applied to persons addicted to drugs or alcohol, rather than to "criminals and vagrants". While, in principle, the recommendation was accepted, concern was shown for ensuring that Section 29 cases could be dealt with under the Act. (219) The implications are that insiders would still be susceptible to consideration as 'idles and undesirables', but that the procedure for dealing with them, apparently in the form of rehabilitation centres, would change.

This raises the question of the future role of aid centres. Riekert responded positively to their operation, and argued that they should be used more extensively. All Blacks charged with contravening the control measures should thus first be referred to a centre. In 1981-2, 125,752 were so
referred, of which 68,092 were sent to court. (220) Most of those kept out of court were Section 10 people who had failed to prove their urban status at the time of arrest. Riekert maintained however that if the housing and workplace controls proved effective in preventing 'illegal' urbanisation, then aid centres should be gradually abolished. Insiders would still have their rehabilitation centres.

Giving preferential treatment to insiders on the urban labour market was important to Riekert. This would involve increasing their employment opportunities by limiting the use of migrants and illegals. Enhancing the labour mobility of Section 10 Blacks, which has already been discussed, would aid in this endeavour. But also essential would be overcoming employers' preferences for employing illegals. Employers were in fact seen by Riekert as the main culprits in the unlawful employment of Blacks. Illegals had no bargaining power and could easily be exploited through the payment of exceedingly low wages. Boards strongly adopted this view. Thus the chairperson of the Cape Midlands Board spoke of illegals as being "aided and abetted by unscrupulous employers who would seek to exploit the position by obtaining cheap labour...". (221) This undermined influx control, and according to Riekert, was not "in the interests of the established Black community in urban areas...". (222) It hindered any attempt at township community development. The presence of illegals annually
cost the West Cape Board an extra R2 million, which was not recoverable. (223) This issue is of great concern to the Boards. Influx control in general is considered an "essential function" given the effects "uncontrolled influx has on unemployment, squatting, public health and other socio-economic aspects." (224).

Riekert argued that illegals should not be subject to fines, but only to endorsement out. (225) The government rejected this because fines and other such penalties deterred Blacks from illegally entering urban areas. (226) And CAD wasted no time in increasing the fines on employers, from R100 to R500 for a first offence. For the four-month period previous to its implementation on October 31, 1979, employers were allowed to register their illegal workers, but only as migrants. This was dependent on the worker having legally approved accommodation and having been employed for at least one year. This moratorium was a state attempt to gain control over illegals. (227) Thousands of illegal workers were dismissed by employers. Up to then, according to the Black Sash, the "only saving factor" was the "total inefficiency of the system". (228)

Over the past few years state officials have put much effort into dealing with the illegals issue, notably in and around Cape Town. Many women and children have left the Transkei homeland illegally in order to live in Cape Town with their migrant breadwinners. Squatter camps emerged at Modderdam, Unibel and Warkgenot. These were ruthlessly demolished by
the West Cape Board. (229) Amendments in 1980 to the Illegal Squatting Act have in fact increased the state's power to engage in such activities. Brigadier J. H. van der Westhuizen of the Board said that influx onto Cape Town resulted in "unemployment, ever-growing squatter camps and the most unhygienic conditions. The legal black inhabitants of this area have to be protected against this avalanche, which can only result in untold misery." (230) The history of the Crossroads camp is well known. (231) In September 1979, 75% of the 24,000 residents were considered by CAD as "totally and unacceptably illegal" and were to be repatriated to the Transkei or Ciskei "in due course". (232) Others would qualify for resettlement in the New Crossroads.

Limiting the movement of outsiders to the urban areas is also dependent on changes in the homelands. The Riekert Commission spent much time on investigating the homeland labour bureau system and the recruitment of migrant workers. The existing tribal labour bureau system was seen as inefficient and inadequate. Riekert thus recommended the formation of "labour assembly centres", situated near the homeland borders and managed by the Boards. (233) This was incorporated into the 1980 Labour Regulations. The result would be stricter controls over the recruitment of migrants.

What seems to be emerging is an hierarchical urban labour market. As a Drakensberg Board labour official said, "the local bureau must first endeavour to meet the employment
needs of the city's [Pietermaritzburg] three urban townships before it may, by way of requisition, introduce labour from the adjacent homeland areas...". (234) This is not entirely new. But an increased emphasis is evident. A Board director thus spoke of the following labour priority list: first insiders, then rural Blacks, residents of the nearby Bophuthatswana homeland, residents from other homelands, and finally foreign Blacks. (235)

In this hierarchy, frontier commuters occupy an ambiguous position between insiders and outsiders. The size of the commuter work force has expanded considerably over the past 15 years, primarily because of the urban relocation policy. By 1982 there were approximately 600,000 commuters, amounting to 20.5% of the total registered urban Black work force. (236) Living in the homelands these workers do not have Section 10 rights. However, they are treated, for work purposes, as 'administrative Section 10 Blacks' by most Boards. (237) In other words, unlike migrants, their contracts are not restricted to one year and do not have to be processed through the chief commissioner's office. In this sense, they have equal access to the urban labour market with 'legal Section 10 Blacks' or insiders. However, there are differences. Commuters are thus required to register at their homeland town labour bureau, and they are not permitted any labour mobility within Board areas or between them.

The 1980 Black Community Development Bill (BCDB) represented one of the initial attempts by the government to incorporate
many of the Riekert recommendations dealing with urban residence and influx control into legislation. It was for this reason the most controversial of the three 1980 Bills. The BCDB departed from Riekert in doing away with Section 10 rights and by tightening the restrictions on Black permanency in the urban areas. It abolished the 72 hour provision and extended the length of stay to 30 days, with influx control being increasingly enforced by controls over employment and accommodation. Those permitted to remain in an urban area for extended periods would include Blacks with Section 10(1) (a), (b) or (c) rights at the commencement of the Act and/or lessees of a house or holders of a right of leasehold. (238) But no further qualifications under Section 10 would be permitted. Eventually, all people other than lessees or leaseholders would be required to have approved accommodation and regular employment in order to remain in an urban area. (239) The urban residence of dependents would be subject to their breadwinner having approved accommodation.

The Bill was heavily criticised by liberal reformists. It was seen as initiating a harsher system which would lessen the security of insiders. As the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce said, "blacks will view this as a serious diminution of rights...". (240) Wide discretionary powers are given to the Minister of CAD and his officials. Thus, regular employment is defined as "bona fide employment to the extent and subject to the conditions prescribed by the
Minister", while approved accommodation means "accommodation approved by a competent [local] authority". (241) How these powers are exercised would greatly influence the qualifications necessary for residence. The BCDDB did not repeal Section 29, even though it indicates that this may be done away with in the near future. (242) Furthermore, insiders would still be subject to passbook checks and intimidation. For these and other reasons the Bill was eventually scrapped. Nevertheless, many Riiekert recommendations, including intensified house searches and fines on insiders for accommodating illegals, increased employer fines, and those already contained in the 1980 Labour Regulations, were incorporated into the Bill.

The Grosskopf Committee was appointed to reformulate the 1980 Bills to make them more consistent with the approach contained in the Riiekert Report and the Government White Paper. (243) The Committee argued for the maintenance of Section 10 rights, with permanent residence not depending on continued access to employment and housing. Section 10(1)(b) would be slightly altered by allowing those with only five years of continuous employment to acquire urban residence. In going beyond the provisions of Section 10, Grosskopf recommended that all Blacks with the necessary skills and experience to acquire an adequate family income be given permanency with their dependents. (244) Thus, it envisaged a widening of the definition of permanent resident. Meanwhile, it supported the increased fines on
employers, and said that housing illegals should be considered as a breach of leasehold title. (245)

Those responsible for the drafting of the 1982 Bill dealing with urban residence and influx control obviously ignored the recommendations of Grosskopf. The 1982 Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill does not differ significantly from the 1980 BCDE. (246) The Bill's definition of "permanent urban resident" includes: (i) a South African citizen who has legally lived in an urban area for at least ten years, or (ii) a South African citizen or citizen of an 'independent' homeland who had Section 10(1)(a) or (b) rights at the commencement of the Act, or who is a leaseholder, or who was born in an urban area of parents both of whom are permanent residents. (247) Dependents of permanent residents may stay in an urban area. However, Section 10 rights are abolished and cannot be acquired in the future. Section 3(i) states that a Black must have "approved accommodation", and the authority granted by a designated officer in order to remain in an urban area. While Section 4(i) stipulates that permanent residents and their dependents are automatically granted this authority, they still require approved accommodation. This goes further than the 1980 BCDE in that Section 10 people without this accommodation on the commencement of the Act would automatically lose their so-called permanent status. (248)

Furthermore, Section 29 concerning 'idles and undesirables'
has yet to be repealed. And insiders would still be subject to pass checks on the street. (249) There is a further tightening of influx control involving an increase in employers' fines to R5000. (250) As well, the Minister of CAD may declare that a "state of unemployment" exists in a particular urban area, and may then prevent any further migrant entry. (251) The Bill was referred to a Parliamentary Select Committee where it has been criticised by big business. In its written evidence to the Committee, the FCI expressed deep concern about, amongst other things, the dependence of permanent residence on approved housing, and the harassment of insiders through pass checks. (252) It is highly unlikely that the Bill will be passed in its present form.

The current official thinking on Section 10 rights is further complicated by the homelands issue. According to the Minister of the Department of Plural Relations in 1976: "Section 10... will possibly not need to be repealed because the nations [homelands] concept will overshadow it... No black person will eventually qualify in terms of Section 10 because they will all be aliens...". (253) Four homelands are now politically 'independent'. The 1978 Black Laws Amendment Act, when read in conjunction with the 'independence' conferring statutes, effectively prevents children born in an urban area after the 'independence' of their respective homeland from acquiring Section 10(1)(a) rights. (254) As the Witwatersrand chief commissioner has
stated: "Whereas, in the past people born and bred in Johannesburg were assured of getting a reference book, this will not be the case anymore." (255) Children would only be allowed to stay with their parents with written permission from CAD. To what extent this forms part of government policy on Black urban residence is unclear.

Another ambiguous issue is the future implementation of influx control. Even solid reformists accept the importance of some form of influx control. But which state body should be responsible for its implementation has raised much controversy. As Helen Suzman of the Progressive Federal Party declared: "On the question of influx control, everybody seems to admit that it is a very unpopular law and everybody seems to want to retain it however, but to give somebody else the unpleasant task of implementing it." (256) Some, including R. Tucker of the Urban Foundation, argue that influx control in the urban areas should be handled by the Department of Justice and Police as it is a matter of law and order. (257) There has also been talk of the Department of Foreign Affairs regulating the movement of Blacks from the homelands to White South Africa as this involves relations between supposedly independent countries.

(258) At present, CAD continues to have overall responsibility.

Finally, it is important to mention recent court cases which work against attempts to intensify influx control. The first concerns the granting of Section 10(1)(c) rights. In
order to qualify for this, a person must ordinarily reside with a Section 10(1)(a) or (b) person. Since a 1963 court decision, the official interpretation of this has been lawfully ordinarily resides. In terms of the 1968 Residential Regulations this meant that a person required a lodger's permit to remain in an urban area and to qualify for Section 10(1)(c) rights. Yet obtaining this permit required the possession of Section 10 rights. For a number of reasons, but primarily because it conflicted with the 1945 Urban Areas Act, this regulation was ruled invalid in a Cape Appeals Court in 1980. This is known as the Komani judgment. (259) It will affect "the large numbers of wives and children who have refused to be separated from their Section 10-qualified men and have continued to live with them, although 'illegally'." (260) No overall figures are available. In the West Cape Board area approximately 12,000 families would qualify for housing and permanent rights because of Komani. (261)

The second case concerns Section 10(1)(b) rights. The 1968 Labour Regulations were introduced to, amongst other things, prevent migrant workers from obtaining Section 10(1)(b) rights. However, in August 1981, the Rand Supreme Court ruled that this move was invalid because it conflicted with the intentions of Section 10 of the 1945 Act. This is the now famous Rikhotso judgment. The judge also argued that a continuous period of work, which is one of the qualifications for Section 10(1)(b) rights, is "not broken by temporary
absence due to illness or injury, or by occasional departures for some legitimate purpose unconnected with a change of work." (262) Thus returning temporarily to a homeland after the completion of a one year contract and then taking up work with the same urban employer, as many migrants do, constitutes continuous employment. For these reasons, the court ruled that migrants could obtain Section 10(1)(b) rights, and could thus potentially have their families living with them. A similar decision was made in May 1982 by the Cape Supreme Court. (263) There is reason to believe that this will effect over 10% of the urban migrant work force. (264) A Board director went so far as to say that three new Bowetos would result because of the increased demand for family housing. (265) Government leaders have clearly recognised the implications of these court decisions in undermining any attempt at intensifying influx control. Initially, Minister Koornhof of CAD said his department would accept the decisions. But the Rikhoto judgment was appealed, resulting in a May 1983 court ruling in favour of Rikhoto. (266) And, in October 1982, Koornhof, at the Cape National Party Congress, stated that the government would soon introduce legislation to deal with the court cases. Many Boards ignored the Komani judgment, such that more cases became necessary to deal with the grievances of specific Blacks. (267) At the July 1981 Mhlongo case, the judge voiced his "extreme displeasure" at the West Rand Board's failure to implement the
The discussion of Riekert's recommendations dealing with urban permanence and influx control highlights two main approaches. First of all, there is an attempt to enhance the security and permanence of Section 10 Blacks. This is seen as essential in providing for township community development. Secondly, there is the tightening of influx control. This is also important for the move towards community development and for political co-option of insiders. In their entirety, these two approaches provide the basis for class stratification and for the deepening of economic, political and ideological divisions between the Black working class. Some recommendations, notably those concerning influx control, have already been incorporated into legislation. Others have yet to see the light of day.

d) The 'Soweto' crisis and business pressures for change

The emergence and development of the contemporary township policy must be understood in relation to the concerted efforts and demands of various social classes in both the Black and White urban populations. It is primarily a response to the township crisis, notably 'Soweto', and the political struggles of residents. But the actual formulation of policy and specific changes in it required the active intervention of Whites. And verligte reformists have not been alone in carrying out this political
work. More than any other White social class, business, in particular large corporations, has argued and pushed for changes.

This is not unprecedented in South African history. During the 1940s business called for a more permanent and stable urban Black work force, and for a deemphasis on influx control. This reflected the increasing transition to capital-intensive production, including the need for more semiskilled and skilled Black labour, and urban political instability. But, with the election victory in 1948, National Party leaders adopted an alternative and more regressive political project which served the immediate interests of other White classes, notably farmers and workers. A recent study argues that business merely accommodated itself to the government's apartheid policies during the 1950s. (269) But this overplays the conflicts between government and business. In 1955 the FCi thus reinforced the official view that "undesirable residents" in the urban areas should be endorsed out so that migrants "ready, able and willing to take up employment" should have the chance to do so. (270) There was also broad agreement that migrants should be used in certain industries, including construction, steel and iron, and in work requiring low skill levels.

With the Sharpeville massacre and the state of emergency in the early 1960s, the voice of business for changes in the township policy could be heard again. The FCi reiterated
its position on the "permanency of the completely urbanised Natives". (271) "ASSOCOM called for freehold title and greater geographical mobility for Blacks. The government did not react favourably to these and other demands. With the return to overall political stability, business became more but not totally complacent. Structural changes in the economy towards increasing capital-intensity and the resurgence of worker action in the early 1970s resulted in continual business agitation for a more permanent urban Black population.

But it was 'Soweto' which stimulated business to renew and re-emphasise its demands, and on a scale never seen before. The 1976 Transvaal Chamber of Industries memorandum to the Prime Minister advocated

"better transport, urgent attention to the vast backlog of township amenities, urgent review of discriminatory laws, . . . phasing in of free and compulsory education, provision of adequate finance to eliminate the vast housing backlog, greater power for Urban Bantu Councils, and elevation of townships to full municipal status." (272)

And Basil Hersov, chairperson of the Anglovaal mining corporation, referring to the "growing feeling of crisis" in South Africa, stressed that "our Group is ready to co-operate with other businesses and government authorities" in improving township quality of life. (273) Throughout, the emphasis has been on township 'reform for 'insiders'. The attitude of business to 'outsiders' is more ambiguous. There are certainly few if any calls for the elimination of influx control. In fact, Harry Oppenheimer of the
Anglo-American Corporation has said that he does not foresee "a time when migrant labour, particularly in the gold mining industry, can be completely phased out." (274) Further Black urbanisation is seen by business as inevitable. This should be regulated rather than completely halted. If possible, influx control, in the words of ASSOCOM, should be "motivated by proper consideration and compassion for the welfare of family life and the dignity of the individual." (275) Business has thus consistently denounced the more overtly repressive aspects of influx control implementation, notably state action against squatters.

At first, with the verleghete Vorster in charge, the National Party did not respond positively to what was seen as business meddling in political affairs. But with the power struggle in the Party ending in victory for the verligtes, the government became more receptive to changes in township policy. The recent Good Hope and Carleton conferences, at which government and business representatives met, bear testimony to this. But it would be mistaken to see complete consensus between business and National Party verligtes. Business is concerned about the still limited nature of reform and about the slow speed at which it is being carried out. And continuing repression is also worrisome.

More than anything else, business wishes to ensure the reproduction of South African capitalism. But its
representatives realise that the old racialised capitalism can no longer guarantee continuing economic and political stability. Only a move towards a more liberal capitalism will permit this. As the liberal Johannesburg Star put it, "private enterprise, good honest capitalism that is open to all, is the most useful tool we have to bring about social reform and a non-coercive mutual dependency in South Africa." (276)
Conclusion

The township policy is undergoing changes on a wide range of fronts in order to find a solution to the current crisis. In the eyes of verligte National Party leaders and big business, the emerging policy is a means of securing stability through the further class stratification of the urban Black population.

'Insiders' are to supposedly benefit from this. Their permanent urban status has now been officially recognised. Their economic problems, especially housing, are to be reduced in the hope of ensuring a solid foundation for political co-option. Other policies, such as those dealing with local government and trading, have more direct political aims in guaranteeing 'peace and order'. There is a clear attempt to defuse the political struggles of residents. As the Grosskopf Committee said: "What we are trying to achieve is a settled and contented workforce striving to improve its qualifications and standard of living." (277) Class divisions amongst 'insiders', particularly between workers and some 'middle class' elements, are also being encouraged. 'Outsiders' are being told however to expect less in the future than the little they already have. These Blacks are increasingly to become an underprivileged stratum of the Black working class.

The policy is also directed towards dealing with aspects of
the wider economic crisis. Unemployment amongst 'insiders' is to be decreased by further removals of the unemployed, notably 'outsiders', to the homelands. The freer flow of skilled labour throughout urban White South Africa is to result from enhancing the mobility of Section 10 workers. And the near saturation of the White consumer market is to be met by, amongst other things, plans to increasingly provide townships with electricity in order to widen the 'subsistence package' of Black residents through their buying of electrical appliances, thereby expanding the Black consumer market.
Chapter Five—Conflicts and Contradictions

Introduction

The contemporary policy has emerged in response to the township crisis. And it attempts to deal with this on many fronts. This involves overcoming township economic problems and defusing residents' struggles. While all this is important and informative in itself, the story does not end here. It is essential to move from the sphere of state policy to that of state practice. This will involve identifying the many barriers to the successful implementation of the policy. These include White resistance, ongoing Black struggles, and policy contradictions. It will become apparent that we must not overestimate the coherence and functionality of the township policy. Most importantly, it will be argued that crisis in the townships will likely continue throughout the 1980s.
White resistance

Many conflicts and struggles currently exist within the White population. While some sections, notably big business, are engaged in promoting and supporting 'total strategy' and its application in the townships, others are adopting a more conservative approach. In arguing that apartheid is all or nothing, many of these Whites believe that "the systematic removal of discriminatory measures and other 'trash' programmes for improving the quality of life must inevitably lead to the removal of the final form of discrimination—political discrimination." (1) In their eyes, there are only two possible future scenarios for South Africa, either preserving the status quo, which they prefer, or Black majority rule. Because most reformist moves are seen as eventually resulting in the end of White political domination, these are being resisted by the conservatives. Who are these Whites? Most important are state officials, workers in the private sector, and small business. For varying reasons, they perceive the township policy as undermining their economic and political future. This opposition has worked itself into the political party sphere, with the Hersigte Nationale Party, the Conservative Party and certain National Party verkramptes strongly resisting the National Party verligtes in their reform push.

It has been argued that, in the wake of 'Soweto', state officials have maintained "their commitment to the
essentials of the racial framework and the continuity of the state racial apparatus." (2) Resistance by CAD and Board officials is specially important because of their involvement in both the formation and implementation of the township policy. However, the nature and extent of their opposition does vary.

Over the years a vast state bureaucracy has developed in order to implement a maze of laws and regulations dealing specifically with the Black urban population. During the 1950s the Department of Native Affairs was considered as 'a state within a state' under the direction of H. F. Verwoerd. With the emergence of the homeland system in the 1960s, Verwoerd linked the political and residential future of urban Blacks with the homelands. But officials in his department argued that Section 10 rights, by increasing the attractiveness of urban areas, undermined influx control and gave Blacks a claim to permanent urban residence. (3) They thus wanted to see the repeal of Section 10. Urban residence should rather be strictly linked to employment and accommodation with these dependent on the possession of homeland citizenship. (4) The 1967 Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Control Measures, which was headed by the deputy secretary of BAD, attempted to do just this. While its call for the scrapping of Section 10 did not become official policy, the introduction of Administration Boards in 1971 did give BAD officials more powers over influx control implementation. And urban relocation, the
restriction of migrant contracts to one year, and other policies, did limit the size of the Section 10 population. Further departmental initiatives, notably the 1974 Meyer and the 1975 Vermeulen Committees, both of which called for the amendment of Section 10, went unheeded by the government. (5) Immersed in the Verwoerdian vision of linking urban Blacks with the homelands, these officials became increasingly in conflict with official government thinking.

A South African cabinet minister recently said: "A Minister can never know all the laws and is dependent on his senior civil servants for guidance. If they come into conflict with each other on personal or policy issues they can complicate his task enormously. They can slow down the implementation of policy initiatives they dislike...." (6) CAD officials are intimately familiar with the legal framework and how the system works. Under the verligte Koornhof, their involvement to varying degrees in the formulation and interpretation of policy has been used to hinder township reform moves. Koornhof has gone so far as to label his officials as "tortoises". (7)

The 1980 Black Community Development Bill and the 1982 Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which "reflect[ed] departmental thinking only", are good cases in point. (8) Against the wishes of the Riskert Commission, the government and the Minister of CAD, officials drafted a hardline and repressive 1980 Bill in
providing for the repeal of Section 10 rights. This would increase the insecurity and impermanence of the very Blacks, the verligtes and others hope to co-opt. The Bill was scrapped. And since the government's intention was to have all three 1980 bills passed during the same parliamentary session, the other two closely related but less offensive bills were also withdrawn. The 1982 Bill however included similar provisions. It led to widespread complaints about CAD obstructionism. The Johannesburg Star said that if this was true, and it seemed likely, then the CAD "culprits", in sabotaging Koornhof's 'new deal', should be "brought to book for ripping apart the delicate fabric of South Africa's race relations." (9) To many reformists, these "closet Verwoerdians" should not be tolerated. (10)

But CAD opposition to the new township policy began before this. Officials attempted to block one of the first 'new deal' policies, namely the 99-year leasehold scheme. As drafted by them, the relevant bill attached strict qualifications for acquiring leasehold rights and provided for a lease of limited duration. It was only after much pressure from notably big business that this was altered. CAD officials also attempted to link some of the emerging policies to the possession of homeland citizenship. These included the 30-year home-ownership scheme and the granting of trading sites. This was eventually overturned. But CAD continues to emphasis the urban-homeland connection. In its 1981-2 annual report, CAD states:
"An essential element in the development of the National States towards self-determination is the steady maintenance and strengthening of ties between these States and their citizens who live in the White area of the Republic of South Africa. To further this aim, 175 representative councils of the National States have been established in the White urban areas." (11) 

CAD officials strongly support the more repressive aspects of the new policy, notably state intervention in the labour market in the form of influx control. (12) This is of course an important part of the homeland link. But it is also seen by many officials as essential in protecting the interests of insiders. (13) It has even been said that "the policy of the Department is to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of those [urban] areas." (14) A somewhat reformist line thus becomes evident. However, the degree of this commitment is questionable considering the attempted scrapping of Section 10 and the emphasis on the homeland link. It is also unclear as to what extent this policy represents a purposeful program of political co-option and class stratification or merely reflects officials' own perceived need for urban social stability in the face of political crisis.

Once legislation is passed, CAD officials have other opportunities to express their distaste. Many township policy changes have in fact occurred by means of "administrative legislation". (15) Some officials are permitted to make regulations, and they provide interpretations of legislation which are then passed onto
Administration Boards.

It is argued that Board officials are "like old dogs which do not easily learn new tricks." (16) In other words, these officials are likely to show opposition to the reform process. But here we must distinguish between Board members and directors in the upper echelons, and officials in the lower echelons of the Board apparatuses. Those in the upper echelons are more receptive to change. Chapter four indicates much support from them for many of the reform initiatives. And it has in fact been shown that many Board leaders were calling for a Riekert-type dispensation in the early 1970s and that "pressures for a partial reform of the system were building up within the vast bureaucracy controlling urban black administration before the outbreak of widespread urban unrest...". (17)

Most Board directors have always argued for the protection of insiders from urban influx. Uncontrolled urbanisation would lead to squatter camps, health hazards and unemployment, and to a drain on Board finances. This however did not translate into concerted efforts to improve township quality of life. But now with the emergence of political crisis such efforts are considered important in ensuring social stability in the townships. This is not usually conceived as a process of class stratification. Yet it is a move consistent with that of the leading reformists.

But conflicts do arise. Important here is the issue of
finances, which leading Board officials see as essential in dealing with the township economic problems and with political instability. Because beer and liquor profits are said to be "the basis of our funds for amenities and facilities", there is resistance to the possible removal of the Board monopolies. (18) Board directors are opposed to the gradual phasing out of employer levies because of the services Boards provide for employers. (19) A Board director suggests, however, that employer contributions could be collected by other more indirect means of taxation. (20) They also stress the importance of continued Community Development housing loans because of "the harmful effect, any curtailment of such allocations may have." (21) All this is of great concern to directors. They want to be assured of alternative financial resources if the existing ones become obsolete. Much of the incoherence and hesitancy in the present financial policy results from resistance originating from within the Boards.

Officials in the lower echelons of the Boards, particularly Labour officers dealing directly with influx control, are well known for treating Blacks with "extreme arrogance, obstructiveness, rudeness and authoritarianism." (22) In many cases, they have shown great reluctance in granting Section 10 rights. These have had to be fought for, including through court action. Labour officers obviously wield tremendous power over township residents. If they
so wish, they can undermine reform decisions emanating from outside or inside the Boards. And they have done so. It has been noted that West Rand Board officials now refuse "all applications for Section 10(1)(a) or (b) applications [sic]... on the grounds that 'there is a new law' or 'there are no more qualifications' or 'we do not take affidavits any more'...". (23) These and other Board officials argue for continuing influx control. In this, they see an expanded role for themselves. Any concern which they have for Section 10 Blacks is usually merely a justification for influx control and for the associated bureaucracy, rather than a strategy of class stratification. (24)

White opposition to the township policy emerges from other quarters. During the first two decades of this century White workers consistently agitated for various forms of racial domination in the workplace. (25) They were largely successful in this. But mining companies, in order to ensure continuing profitability, soon initiated programs replacing White workers with cheaper Black labour. The White workers revolted. In coming to power in 1924, the Pact Government, with the support of White workers and other White classes, reinforced the job colour bar protecting White labour. Since then, White workers have aligned themselves with the whole system of racial domination under successive National Party governments. They have been a faithful support base holding much political clout. But this has recently changed. Dealing with the economic
crisis has required increasing Black advancement into skilled labour positions. This was recommended by the Wiehahn Commission and accepted by the government. The restructuring of the National Party support base is important here. With its now more capitalist-class orientation, the Party is more willing to implement policies detrimental to White workers. White labour reacted angrily to Wiehahn. Consistent with Black labour advancement is the drive for a more permanent and stable urban Black population. The new township policy is thus rejected because of White workers' concern about their political future. Greater Black permanency, more powers for local Black government, and other policies, are seen as providing the basis for the downfall of White supremacy. Their opposition has been expressed in increasing support for the Hersigte Nationale Party and the Conservative Party.

Small business has also been threatened by these changes. Industrial employers operating on a small scale have been historically dependent on supplies of cheap Black labour. For them, "the great fear is that a transition to a more settled labour force, and to the higher wage bill this implies, would spell an end to their profitability." (26)

Small commercial operators have a similar phobia. This results in part from the possibility that Black traders may be allowed to expand into the central business districts in White cities and towns. In any case the expansion of township trading operations may decrease Black consumers'
purchases at many White-owned stores.
These White opposition forces, with the possible exception
of Board members and directors, comprise part of the 'right-
wing backlash' to total strategy. These Whites would prefer
to see the township policy unaltered, or at least few if any
changes in the direction of reform. While they make up only
a small minority of the White polity, their political power
must not be underestimated. The last federal election and
more recent bye-elections demonstrate this. With each
reform move the political divisions within the National
Party and the White polity have deepened. And National
Party verligtes are very concerned about losing more of
their support base.
While the backlash has restricted the scope and speed of the
reform initiative, the verligtes and others are nevertheless
aware that they must push on. Informing the conservatives
that neither their immediate interests nor the 'national
interest' are jeopardised by reform has not lessened the
agitation and resistance from these Whites. Other measures
to counteract this resistance are thus taking place.
Notably, reorganisation of the state bureaucracy, including
CAD, serves to 'weed out' those officials hindering the
implementation of reform. If all this means a shift
towards greater authoritarianism then that is the price to
be paid. As Lieutenant-General J. R. Dutton, Defence Force
chief of staff operations said in 1978,
"the application of total strategy would appear to
favour a system of unified command, joint central planning, decentralised execution and sustained vertical and horizontal organisation... Conventional organisations in democratic systems do not as a rule lend themselves to these procedures. Therefore, organisational changes or adaptations would appear to be imperative." (27)

This process is consistent with other developments already mentioned, including the emergence of an all powerful executive state president and the involvement of the State Security Council, consisting of many military officers, in policy formation and implementation. It is a paradoxical process of 'liberal authoritarianism' in which the success of total strategy, notably in its liberal reformist aspects, is seen to require a more authoritarian and undemocratic national power structure.

2 Black struggles

Much of the energy and attention of reformists has focused on the political divisions within the White population. Yet this is but one form of resistance with which they have had to contend. What worries them even more are the ongoing struggles of township residents. 'Soweto' was crucial in the emergence of the township crisis, but it was only the beginning. Since then, the concerted efforts of residents have deepened the crisis. And even political leaders seemed to be aware of this possibility. Thus the Minister of Justice and Police said that, when he banned the BCM groups, 'I knew these organisations would not fade away. They are always there, busy reorganising and moving.'
These and other groups have emerged over the past few years, immersing themselves in struggle on a wide range of issues. In many ways the new township policy is being confronted head-on. In the words of the publicity-secretary of the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO):

"Government is trying to come forward with reforms. It's going out of its way to impose a leadership (local government) which fits into its racial policy. It's also pumping in a lot of money into black communities in the form of schools, road improvements, electricity and telephones... We say government is hoping to buy off the people through these moves. Our response is that it can never succeed in railroading the people's liberation movement." (29)

Clearly, the success of the policy is heavily dependent on obtaining the support of the very residents the reformists hope to co-opt. So far there has only been limited success.

A renewed nation-wide uprising has not occurred since "Soweto". But there has been much violence and confrontation with police, notably in Cape Town during 1980. The more recent struggles differ from "Soweto" and actually go beyond it. As a former EPC activist put it: "Soweto was good, it taught us many things, but it could have been better, more powerful. Now, we see we must organize ourselves into a strong force, a more disciplined force." (30) Much time has been spent on doing just this, on establishing and developing launching pads for engaging in specific struggles. Residents have learnt much from past struggles and from their own experiences of
struggle. There is now a clearer conception of a boycott or protest as a strategy for achieving particular goals. There is also a growing awareness of the importance of linking township and workplace struggles. And of special significance is the increasing tendency to conceive conflict in South Africa not only in racial terms but also in class terms. This is occurring at the very same time at which reformists are attempting to restructure the 'dominant' ideology so as to ensure the support of the urban oppressed for South African capitalism. This politicisation serves to deepen the ideological crisis for those in power. It is important to note however that these tendencies vary in terms of specific townships, organisations and struggles.

The emerging township policy has been resisted and attacked on nearly all fronts. It is perceived by most residents as not leading to any significant social change, and as not being in their interests to support. This is no more truer than with the CC system. The first CC election took place in November 1977 and attracted a poll of about 25%. (31) According to CAD, in the 198 CC elections held by March 1980, the average poll was 41.9%. (32) By 1982, only 24% of the contested wards had more than a 50% turnout, while 36% had a poll between 31-50%, and 40% were less than 31%. (33) David Mabehali, the 'mayor' of Soweto, received a grand total of 97 votes in a 1978 election. It should be remembered that the majority of CC seats went uncontested. In themselves, election results do not give a complete
indication of the support for the CC system and its degree of legitimacy. Even for those who voted it soon became clear that 'a vote for the CC is a vote for apartheid'.

During or after elections civic organisations were formed throughout the country to act 'as alternatives to CCs in expressing the grievances of residents and in mobilising them. More legitimate and democratic organisations, rather than 'puppet bodies', were desired by most residents. In providing only limited powers to Councils, and then only within the framework of apartheid, the system was rejected for not providing the basis for altering the balance of power in the townships.

Many CCs became involved in the demolition of illegal housing, notably backyard shacks. The Soweto CC, in early 1982, began a campaign which would eventually result in the eviction of more than 23,000 backyard tenant families, many of whom are on the official housing waiting list. (34) This is another point of conflict. Many CCs became responsible for the allocation of housing. Considering the size of the waiting lists, most applicants have been unable to acquire approved housing. The CCs' power of allocating trading sites and licences has in many cases attracted councillors with trading ambitions. (35) The implications of this are captured by a Katlehong township resident in saying that 'All we see is that the councillors get richer—they
become owners of shops and garages in the township. It is they who benefit, not us." (36). The use of community guards by some CCs, including Thebehali's All National Guard, widespread corruption, and the large allowances paid to many councillors, have also generated opposition. (37) But most importantly, residents perceive their local economic and political problems as ultimately national issues. As Motlana of the Committee of Ten says: "As long as the government finds it impossible to accommodate the majority of its citizens in whatever political dispensation it talks about (at the national level), black local authorities will be rejected with the contempt they deserve." (38) This is a fundamental weakness of the reform move.

Community councillors are keenly aware of their near total lack of legitimacy. This they attach to, amongst other things, their limited powers and their inability to improve township quality of life. The Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA), which incorporates most of the CCs, was formed in 1978 to increase the legitimacy and political credibility of CCs in the townships and to provide a more powerful base for social change. This is a reformist organisation which opposes open confrontation with the government. But it has called for both a common South African citizenship and freehold title. (39). CAD refuses to recognise it, and some Boards, in condemning its often political statements, have established regional CC mouthpieces in order to undermine its influence. (40)
UCASA leadership argues that it is possible to work within the CCs in attempting to move beyond the apartheid system. Thus B. Zondani of the Grahamstown CC says that even though "the government is using us as stooges...people are defeating their own cause by being against government appointed bodies" given the bannings of more representative bodies. He speaks of 'infiltrating' the CC system. (41)

This raises questions about the motives of councillors in engaging in this system. Many argue that the only difference between them and those opposing the system is one of strategy in achieving progressive social change. They thus maintain that their intentions do not coincide with the government's project of co-option in introducing the system. But most residents are much more aware of the structural constraints built into the CC policy, and of its potential for political co-option. It is seen as an attempt at 'railroading the liberation struggle'. Most councillors are actually 'middle class' elements, including traders (20%), clerks (17%) and teachers (16%). (42) Many 'middle class' Blacks are readily available for co-option. They show concern for their own specific and immediate interests. But even with its call for political reform, UCASA is attempting to set the pace and tone of the struggle against apartheid, going so far as to argue that it should be officially recognised as the major body representing urban Blacks.
The 1982 Black Local Authorities Act (BLAA) attempts to counteract the negative responses of residents to the CC system. It potentially provides for the granting of full municipal status to some townships. Councillors reacted positively to this. And, according to Soweto's Thebehali: "I am convinced that when we have elections in terms of the BLAA there is going to be increased participation and we are going to have people that we never thought of offering themselves as candidates." (43) But given the government's continuing acceptance of residential and national political segregation, the new councils are likely to go the same way as the old ones.

Residents have also mobilised against the initiative to rejuvenate township living conditions. Private enterprise involvement in housing provision has been criticised by some for attempting to make apartheid and oppression more comfortable. A young Soweto resident spoke of the Urban Foundation as "trying to tart-up the existing system. We want that system to be changed for something more just." (44)

Similarly, at its July 1977 conference, SASO accused the Foundation of wanting to create a Black 'middle class' which "would be a buffer zone between the exploited masses and the exploitative machinery of this country." (45) In many ways these are the stated aims of the Foundation.

While residents clearly desire an improvement in housing, they would rather see this occur outside the framework of apartheid and the new township policy. This is particularly
true of the continuing policy of financial self-sufficiency. Despite opposition from some CCOs, this policy has led to widespread service charge increases over the past few years. It has also contributed to CCO illegitimacy because of their involvement in ratifying the increases and in announcing them to residents. Councillors are quite aware of this. As S. Kgama of the Dobsonville CC said in 1979: "The...council accepted the unpleasant duty to ask the public to contribute to the rejuvenation of Dobsonville... The council realises that this places a heavy burden on the average householder." (46) Residents have used varying methods to resist the increases, including demonstrations and protests, petitions to CAD, supreme court action, and refusals to make the payments. (47) In Soweto the cry became "Asinayo" (We have no money). As one resident put it: "It makes no difference what the increase is for. The increase is going to leave me R6.00 [per month] poorer." (48) A petition spoke of low wages, the high cost of living and unemployment as making it near impossible to afford the increases. (49) Considering that township reform is being met with strong opposition, it is not surprising that this is also true for continuing repression. House evictions, the carrying of passbooks, urban relocation and other measures continue to aggravate and anger 'insiders'. This is sometimes expressed in organisational form, as with the resistance by East London residents to their removal to Mdantsane in the Ciskei. It also provides a basis for solidarity between
'insiders' and 'outsiders'. The ongoing illegal movement of Blacks from the homelands to the urban areas is another form of resistance to repression, notably influx control. In most cases this is an individual or family act of defiance. While difficult to gauge the extent of this, what seems clear is that, whether for family or work purposes, it continues unabated. Recent squatter camps, including Crossroads (Cape Town), 'Soweto-by-the-Sea' (Port Elizabeth) and those around Durban, are testimony to this. And so is the state's intention to further increase employers' fines to R5,000.

The enforcing out of individual influx control offenders goes on. But more dramatic and public are the clearing of squatter camps. Here the Board officials and police do not spare their tear gas, dogs, guns and batons: "They came with long guns like a Piet Retief marching army." (50)

The squatters refuse to move. The illegals demand the right to stay in the urban area, and both legals and illegals demand access to proper housing. In some cases they march on the Board offices. The Nyanga (Cape Town) squatters went further in occupying a downtown church and initiating a hunger strike. Officials have consistently attempted to divide the squatters, primarily by offering permanent accommodation to the legals but not to the illegals. While this is usually resisted, it does sometimes have its intended consequence.
Cape Town has actually been the centre of much struggle over recent years. In May 1979 a consumer boycott of the Fatti's and Moni's bread company was launched after management dismissed most of its Belleville plant workforce. Workers included Coloureds and Black Africans, comprising mainly migrants. With massive national and local support, including from the Western Province African Chamber of Commerce, and the Western Cape Traders' Association, which suspended its sale of the company's bread, the boycott was successful. As the company president said: "The boycott could have had a serious effect [on profits] if we had allowed it to linger on. There is no doubt that these boycotts can be effective." (51)

The workers' demands were met, including the requirement that the migrants' contracts be renewed before ending the boycott. If anything, this boycott indicated the potential for solidarity between most if not all township residents.

In the 1980 red meat boycott in Cape Town, widespread support was also forthcoming. There was an overwhelming response to a fund established for striking workers. Throughout, Black African butchers closed their shops, and they were greatly annoyed when Coloured butchers did so for only three days. (52) Similar action took place in Port Elizabeth with the support of Ford Company workers by the Port Elizabeth Black Community Organisation (PEBCO). PEBCO was initially formed in October 1979 to deal with rent increases and with the removals from Walmer township. But
with strikes at Ford because of, amongst other reasons, the dismissal of PEBCO leader Thomazile Botha, PEBCO immersed itself in workplace issues. It became "the instrument for creating an awareness of sympathy for the strikers among the community as a whole...", resulting in a strike fund and management's difficulties in obtaining scab labour. (53)

Other more strictly consumer boycotts soon followed, including those concerning Hulett sugar products, Coca-Cola soft drinks, and Wilson-Rowntree sweet products. (54)

All this reflects increasing concerted efforts by residents to link workplace and township issues and struggles, and to incorporate all residents in popular action. Workers, including both 'insiders' and migrants, 'middle class' elements, and the unemployed, have at times expressed solidarity in one or another township-based struggle. These tendencies became dramatically evident during 1980. This year brought on the largest round of struggle since 'Soweto'. Cape Town residents were simultaneously involved in protests and boycotts around house rent and bus fare increases, the red meat boycott, a stayaway (June 16), and a schools boycott. Meanwhile, workers' strike action continues and intensifies. (55) One of the issues here is the state's decision to allow for the registration of Black trade unions. This has created much debate within the progressive trade union movement, with some unions, notably those attached to FOSATU, deciding albeit hesitantly to partake in the industrial council system, and others deciding to boycott.
It. (56) This reform move is generally seen as less potentially co-optive than the CC system in the townships. However, in both the workplaces and townships, Blacks have had to assess the nature and extent of reformist state-created bodies, and then respond accordingly.

Perhaps on a larger scale than 'Soweto', schools were boycotted throughout the country in 1980. (57) Black African, Coloured and Indian students were all involved. Soweto was however very quiet. Again, there was destruction of property and confrontation with the police, reaching a climax on June 17 with the death of about 50 Coloureds in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town. But there were many differences between the 1976-7 and 1980 boycotts, notably in Cape Town. Here students merely boycotted classes, and many met on the schoolgrounds to engage in political discussion and to provide a basis for mobilisation.

Furthermore, they showed that a boycott is "a tactic and not a principle; that short term demands must be linked to long term goals and vice versa; and that the struggle is a worker struggle against exploitation and political oppression to which students can contribute." (58)

The last point is important. In the words of the Cape Town students:

"Our parents, the workers, are...strong. They have power. We, the students cannot shake the government in the same way. We have got to link up our struggle with the struggle of the black workers. Our parents have got to understand that we will not be 'educated' and 'trained' to become slaves in apartheid-capitalist society." (59)
The students received strong support from their parents and teachers. But they also recognised the importance of joining more strictly worker struggles. They thus became immersed in the rent protests and in the bus and consumer boycotts. More and more it is becoming clear that a class consciousness is developing amongst residents. The responses of many township organisations to the liberal capitalist solutions to the present crisis illustrate this. The reform process is somewhat limited in both nature and extent. If this continues to be the case in the near future, then the scope and depth of the class consciousness will probably increase. If reform is seen by urban Blacks as not providing solutions to the many problems they face, then they will increasingly search for political alternatives.

The extent of class 'sentiments' amongst township residents at present is difficult to assess. One thing which is clear however is that, while there has been much solidarity in struggle, divisions have surfaced. The new trading policy is, despite minor disputes, receiving the support of those to whom it is directed. NAFCO has in fact agitated for the lessening of trading restrictions for some time. And it supports the conservative South African Black Alliance which comprises organisations involved in apartheid institutions. Yet, as with all Blacks, its members still have to live in townships, take out homeland citizenship and carry passbooks. This continues to irritate NAFCO.
leaders. (60) This potentially serves as a basis for Black solidarity. The involvement of traders in consumer boycotts has already been noted. And Sam Motsuenyane, president of NAPCOC, has called for 'one person, one vote' and for the release of jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela. He has even said that he would rather be a "free jackal scrounging for a living in the wilds than a well-fed dog chained at his master's whim." (61) But such positions need to be carefully scrutinised. These may merely involve an attempt at not alienating residents from NAPCOC's own specific political project, and to gain support for the reform process.

Most residents are adopting an alternative approach. To varying degrees this involves a rejection of reform. This is certainly true of working class residents as reflected in their various struggles. But many elements of the 'middle class' are also following this line. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS), a non-racial body formed in June 1979 and representing school students, played a part in the 1980 schools boycott. At its 1982 national congress entitled 'Student-Worker Action', speakers stressed the centrality of the workers' struggle in social change. (62) With the banning of SASO in 1977, the Azanian Students' Organisation was formed in November 1979 to mobilise university students. Following COSAS and going beyond SASO, it also adopts a fairly consistent class approach. In condemning both Black and White liberalism and exploitation,
its leader, Joe Phahla, argues that "racism is just a secondary manifestation of the primary problem—the exploitation of person by person." (63) But a strong BCM still exists, although it has undergone important changes. Representing a wide range of 'middle class' groups, AZAPO was established in April 1978. It has consistently supported and become involved in direct political action in the townships. It has also initiated this, including a rent increase protest in Tembisa township in March 1981.

While this and other BC groups still hold to Black organisational exclusivity, there is a rather vague and sometimes ambiguous anti-capitalism position emerging. This partially reflects conflicts within the movement about the racial and/or class nature of the struggle in South Africa. (64)

Both working class and 'middle class' organisations operating outside state-created institutions have borne the brunt of police repression. The detention and banning of their leaders have been common occurrences. The state is now less likely to tolerate groups which reject the reform move. It is thus true that "concessions" for those who accept the reforms accompany increased repression for those who remain outside the reforms. Hence movement towards liberal reform are paradoxically often associated with simultaneously increased repression." (65) But this has not tempered the energy and commitment to fundamental social change amongst these residents. In fact, the scale
and intensity of the recent struggles indicate the continuance of the political crisis in the townships. But these also reveal ongoing township economic problems.

According to a Wiehahn commissioner,

"Without economic growth and development...the [Riekert] Report and the White Paper will do very little if anything to improve the position of a great many workers in South Africa. In fact, under conditions of unemployment, underemployment and poverty the expectations raised by the Report and White Paper, will tend to turn sour and to be replaced by feelings of disillusionment, frustration and anger." (66)

Although the South African economy has for now moved out of its recent recessionary phase and has renewed growth, this has not led to any significant economic development for urban Blacks. The many aspects of the economic structural crisis remain. The ongoing struggles in the workplaces and townships do indicate much 'disillusionment, frustration and anger' amongst residents. But to what extent this has resulted from the reformists' inability to meet the "greater expectations for socio-political freedom amongst 'industrialised' Blacks" induced by the reform process is questionable. (67) For one thing, most 'insiders' soon recognised the reform move as profoundly limited in not meeting many of their political demands.

Recent struggles in the workplaces, many of which focus on wage issues, highlight continuing economic problems for workers and their families. A 1980 analysis "strongly" suggests that "Black incomes have declined more or less constantly in real terms since 1976." (68) This has led to
more township households living below the 'breadline'. (69)
And certainly the vast majority of residents in some
Eastern Cape townships were keenly aware that their
household's financial position did not improve, and more
than likely deteriorated, during the 1977-80 period. (70)
But there are also other more strictly township economic
problems which indicate that the attempt at stimulating
community development has, so far, achieved little if any
success. In his 1982/3 budget speech, the chairperson of
the East Rand Board said that "The provision of adequate
housing in the fourteen Black townships in the Board's area
remains a most formidable task...". (71) This is the case
throughout urban White South Africa. (72) The Riekert
Commission had estimated that, considering the expected
provision of 83,851 houses by the Boards in the 1978-82
period, the housing shortage would only decrease from
141,000 in 1977 to 132,011 in 1982. (73) Even then the
Viljoen Committee argued that the 1981 backlog was 168,000
units. The provision of these would cost about R1.7
billion. (74) Many Boards have experienced difficulties in
obtaining Department of Community Development housing
loans. (75) And from June 1976 to March 1981 the private
sector erected only 2,949 houses for urban Blacks. (76) By
1982, nearly 20% of 'insiders' were still living as
lodgers. (77)

Finance continues to be a serious problem for the Boards.
The Southern Orange Free State Board chairperson said his
Board was facing "a crisis of existence" during 1982/3 because of inadequate financial resources. (78) A key issue here is continuing deficits on the Boards' housing accounts. Thus the Port Natal Board lost R4.5 million on housing in the 1981/2 financial year, and was expecting a further loss of between R6.5 and R7.0 million in 1982/3. (79) This mainly results from the Boards' inability to reach economic tariffs on the service charges. As the Southern Orange Free State Board chairperson put it: "the Administration Board cannot increase service charges strictly in accordance to financial demands and has to observe the ability of Blacks to pay increased tariffs, the possibility of political unrest [sic] and the normal fear by Community Councils to antagonise their voters in the event of drastic increases;...". (80) The struggles by residents have been important in limiting service charge increases and thus in hindering the move towards financial self-sufficiency.

The ongoing housing shortages have created major problems in allowing for labour mobility of 'insiders' across Board boundaries. This movement is in part dependent on the availability of approved accommodation. Most Board directors said that few if any Blacks had moved into their Board area for work purposes, and that this was due to the housing backlogs. (81)

Finally, the leasehold scheme should be mentioned. By March 31, 1982 there were only 1890 rights of leasehold and 756 provisional grants of leasehold registered. (82) In
some Board areas there are none. (83) Many Board directors said that it was too expensive for most residents. (84) In the West Rand Board area a minimum deposit of R5,400 is required to become involved in the scheme. (85) Thus most Boards are pushing the 30-year home-ownership scheme instead. (86)

The struggles of residents thus continue to immerse the townships in crisis, with the reformist policies in many cases being directly confronted and mobilised against. These struggles highlight ongoing economic problems in the townships.

3 Policy contradictions

White resistance and ongoing Black struggles are important barriers to the successful implementation of the township policy. Another barrier lies in the contradictions internal to the policy itself.

The Ribbert Commission largely ignored the homelands in its analyses and recommendations. Labour links between White urban South Africa and the homelands are quite extensive, with migrant workers forming a large portion of the Black urban work force. Migrant remittances in fact make a substantial contribution to homeland national incomes. (87). Limiting the urban economy's dependence on migrants and erecting barriers around the cities and towns to prevent the entry of illegals may help in co-opting insiders, but the effects on many homeland Blacks could be
devastating. This is particularly true given the government's few efforts to improve homeland economic conditions. Sprawling squatter communities already exist along homeland borders near Pretoria and Durban. And employment opportunities for 'outsiders' are becoming progressively few and far between. Already in late 1978 migrant labour was no longer being recruited in many KwaZulu homeland districts. (88)

This raises two points. First of all, structural unemployment is not being solved through changes in the economy. Rather, it is merely being displaced to the homelands. There is a strong possibility that, given present policies, the political struggles of oppressed Blacks in the homelands will intensify in the near future. This also poses a threat to the maintenance of 'peace and order' throughout all of South Africa. Secondly, deepening impoverishment in the homelands is largely responsible for continuing illegal urban influx and for the failure of most illegals to leave the urban area once convicted. A former Modderdam resident, who returned voluntarily to the township, sums this up: "When I got there things were tough for me because the place is dry, and there are no jobs, it is just impossible for a human being to live under those conditions. So I only stayed for two months in Thornhill, and after that I felt I couldn't take it any longer, and I forced my way back to Cape Town." (89) For her and others, the fear of arrest is not a sufficient deterrent in
preventing illegal influx.

Irrespective of the success of the new influx control system in curbing urban movement, this and other repressive measures still pose problems for building a more stable and contented urban community of insiders. There are thus conflicts between the reformist and repressive aspects of the township policy. Co-opting insiders implies removing them from the realm of repression. But, all Blacks are still required to carry passbooks. And, the government has yet to fully commit itself to the dropping of the 72 hour provision which results in the checking of passes on the streets. But even if it is scrapped, and control becomes increasingly located at the place of residence, there will still be, in the words of the FCI, "unnecessary harassment of innocent permanent urban residents" resulting from night-time raids on township houses. (90) If found housing illegals, insiders could be subject to fines and imprisonment. Further repression of insiders has also resulted from their unwillingness to become incorporated into the reform process. Their organisations and struggles have been subjected to widespread police harassment. These and other repressive policies and actions hinder the attempt at co-opting insiders.

There are also problems for political co-option emanating from the financial policy, particularly the emphasis on township self-sufficiency. This limits the possibility of community development in the townships. But it also means
that residents, through increased service charges, must pay for their own co-option. So far this has not washed down very well with residents. And it has implications for the legitimacy of local Black government bodies. The Belfast of the Soweto CC said that his council's first budget was "a new deal budget designed to build up a strong, beautiful city, independent of the whims and decisions of other authorities." (91) But this would have involved the doubling of house rents over a period of one year. In this way, councils are hamstrung. Providing for township community development is essential in increasing the legitimacy of councils, but this is counteracted by attempting to do so through increased service charges.

Enhancing the powers of councils is also seen as important for legitimacy. This could possibly occur by giving them control over the development and maintenance of housing. But given critical housing shortages, this raises problems.

As the Urban Foundation notes pessimistically: "One would therefore place a Black local authority, ... elected and therefore responsible to its local constituents in the almost impossible position of being responsible for housing." (92) This would only deepen the rejection of CCs by residents. And so would the handling of influx control by CCs. Administration Boards continue to be responsible for this, and thus it creates problems of legitimacy for them. As a Board director notes, there is a conflict between the Boards' new found role of
community development and that of influx control implementation. (93) In criticising the 1980 BCDB, the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce thus said that "if the development boards are to perform their functions properly some other organ of the Central Government should administer the influx control provisions." (94)

Finally, increased private sector involvement in the housing process is now seen as essential in dealing with the housing crisis. Yet whether this involves houses built by the formal private sector or by residents themselves, a major drawback arises. An emerging private housing market will potentially undermine influx control, which requires strict state control over housing development and allocation. Thus, while overcoming the housing shortage is important in providing for community development, this may be at the expense of the regulation of Black urbanisation. (95)

Therefore although the policy has a certain degree of coherence, it also has a number of inconsistencies and contradictions. In most cases, political and economic leaders are aware of these, and are in the process of attempting to iron them out.
Conclusion

It would be a mistake to go so far as to say that the contemporary township policy is a complete failure in dealing with the township crisis. Certainly there are immense problems to overcome, not the least of which is its rejection by most township residents. The Financial Mail makes an important point when it says that "the key question is whether structural and other material improvements will be enough to satisfy Sowetans [and other residents] who are already champing at the bit for the right of political expression beyond the confines of the homelands." (96)

But the reformists are keenly aware of these and other problems, and they are not prepared to sit back and watch the policy dissolve into ruins. For them, too much is at stake to do so. The policy is not fully developed, and reformulations have already occurred. What the reformists will 'pull out of the bag' over the next few years is not entirely clear. What seems clear however is that the bag is already too big for the conservatives, is too small for the residents, and is somewhat disorganised internally. Rearranging the contents will not be enough. At the expense of further White backlashes, the reformists will probably develop the nerve to push on. It is a risky business, but in the end they realise that it is their only salvation.

In the meantime, the crisis continues. Residents appear to be involved in a never-ending process of struggle. Everything seems to indicate that the policy has little
chance for success, and that the crisis is likely to continue throughout the 1980s.
Conclusion to Part Two

Township development in contemporary South Africa is marked by deep crisis and by attempts on the part of those in power to deal with crisis. This slowly began to emerge in the early 1970s, and reached a climax when residents throughout the country took to the streets during the 'Soweto' revolt to struggle against apartheid township policies. Political and economic leaders, in the hope of defusing the township struggles, are engaged in a process of rethinking and reworking existing policies. This has involved continued repression but also reform. At present, the possibility of the successful implementation of the new policy looks bleak. In immersing themselves in ongoing struggles, residents have provided a scenario of continuing township crisis in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSIONS

In Part One of this study I identified certain theoretical and empirical issues which required further attention and clarification in South African studies and in the Marxist approach to South Africa. I raised theoretical problems about the state and about social change. And on a more empirical level I raised the question of how reformism in South Africa should be interpreted. The thesis then examined and analysed township crisis and policy. This has by no means resolved these issues. It has, hopefully, contributed in some way to their resolution, while also showing the importance of giving further attention to them.

In Chapter one I expressed concern about a strong structuralist tendency in Marxist analyses of South Africa. Based on the approach of E. P. Thompson in particular, I argued that, while not wanting to deny the relevance of structural analyses, an emphasis on human agency is equally, if not more important in elucidating the nature of social change. In this study a structural context, notably the township economic problems and the barriers hindering the capital accumulation process, was provided. This gave a partial but certainly not a complete insight into the scope and depth of the current township crisis. In themselves, these structural conditions did not give rise to the emerging township policy. For this I had to turn to a focus on the human volition of both the Black and White social classes. It was the concerted struggles of the
oppressed Blacks which immersed the townships in deep crisis. And it was the active intervention of big business which contributed to a rethinking and reformulation of township policies.

The important role of the 'dominated' classes in shaping history and society has become quite clear in this study. The Black Consciousness Movement and the 'Soweto' revolt, involving much energy and commitment on the part of urban Blacks, placed township crisis on the South African agenda in the late 1970s. More than anything else, these struggles are responsible for the far-reaching changes now occurring in township policy. These changes are thus not simply being 'imposed' on township residents by the White classes. Rather, it is perhaps more correct to argue that some form and degree of reform was 'imposed' on political and economic leaders through the struggles of insiders. These struggles are now also important barriers to the successful implementation of the policy, and thus township developments will continue to be profoundly shaped by the conscious efforts of residents.

Other Thompsonian concerns are also useful in understanding the emergence and development of urban resistance in contemporary South Africa. Important here are the themes of cultural struggle, the validity of social consciousness, and the 'handling' of experience. I emphasised these themes in dealing with the BCM. I was able to show how Black university students 'handled' their experiences of
dissatisfaction and frustration with White liberal organisations in consciously and creatively forming SASO. Although the BCM was not overtly-political, its cultural and psychological forms of struggle were vital in rekindling the spirit of resistance in the 1970s. Also, in the face of widespread state repression, the BCM philosophy of introspection was 'valid'. All this provided useful insights into the dynamics of the BCM. And a more complete understanding of 'Soweto' would require an even fuller pursuit of this theoretical approach. Thus the notion of experience could be more fully explored in my discussion of 'Soweto' as a significant mediating factor between township economic problems and the political revolt. While my analysis did not imply that residents immediately and directly responded to economic problems in engaging in struggle, there is nevertheless a whole realm of township experiences in all their complexity within which the revolt arose. By elucidating the specific dynamics of these experiences, it would be possible to show more fully the reasons for the form and extent of involvement in 'Soweto' by residents from different walks of life.

In Chapter one I also raised problems in South African Marxist state theory. The most significant criticism was the near total omission of the 'production of politics', and, within this, the failure to consider the human agency, interests and consciousness of state officials. I suggested that moving beyond this limitation would be useful in
analyses of South Africa. The discussion of the new township policy illustrates this point.

It was shown that the policy cannot merely be seen as a capitalist-class project, even though big business has played a major role in its formation. Many leading Administration Board officials have expressed strong support for many aspects of the reform process, and there is some evidence to suggest that they have been in part responsible for its emergence. Unlike big business and verligte reformists however, Board officials do not perceive the policy as a political project aimed at ensuring the maintenance of the 'free enterprise' system in South Africa. Rather, they have their own specific interests in guaranteeing social stability in the townships. This results in part from the many pressures and expectations placed on them by the government and CAD to ensure township community development in the face of crisis. They are acutely aware of these. I placed emphasis on their recognition of the severe financial barriers, notably stemming from losses on the housing account, which hinder their attempts at dealing with the township economic problems. This is one of the reasons for their opting to support or oppose specific reformist policies. Thus, in supporting the new housing policy which involves increased private sector involvement, leading Board figures recognise its implications in lessening their financial burden. In this and other reformist policies then, the interests of
officials are merely compatible with the broader political plan to secure the maintenance of South African capitalism. But not all state officials have adopted this approach to the township policy. CAD officials have constantly hindered attempts at constructing reformist policies through the drafting of hardline legislation and other measures. And those in the lower echelons of the Board apparatuses, notably labour officers, have resisted policy implementation, and will likely continue to do so in the future. The specific reasons for these conservative positions require further clarification through more empirical work. However, it has become clear that an adequate understanding of policy formation and of the limits to the successful implementation of the township policy require an emphasis not only on the relation between state and society, but also on the human agency and consciousness of state officials.

Considering that different state officials responsible for urban Black administration are pursuing different courses of action, the existence of intense conflicts within the state becomes a possibility. Already leading Board officials have expressed their dismay about the official mandate to improve township economic conditions while CAD refuses to provide them with sufficient financial resources to do so. Identifying further sources of conflict and how these shape policy formation and implementation requires further clarification in order to gain more insights into
the 'production of politics' in contemporary South Africa. The thesis is also concerned with the more empirical question of how to interpret reformism in South Africa. Throughout this century the South African state's policies, including those directed towards the Black townships, have been marked by racial domination and repression. But now a reformist process involving deracialisation is occurring. While this process is clear for all to see, its actual significance is open to question. Some writers have concluded that it is largely unimportant because it does not involve a fundamental change in apartheid. Thus the Centre of African Studies maintains that "the process of restructuring going on in South Africa at present can in no way be regarded as a process of dismantling of the machinery of apartheid." (1) Similarly, Seidman, in arguing that "the heart of the apartheid system...lies in influx control, passes, resettlement and migrant labour", refers to the recent changes as 'facelift apartheid'. (2) Reform is seen as limited in scope and extent. The 'new dispensation' is therefore conceived as a fraudulent ploy by economic and political leaders to co-opt some oppressed Blacks into a slightly altered political framework. (3) Though raising some valid points, this approach, I would argue, underestimates the significance of the reform move. (4) The discussion of the township policy has hopefully shown this.

It is true that township reform is co-optive in intent and
is only partial and certainly not total at present. It is precisely for these reasons that most Black residents are opposing it and thus hindering its success. But all this does not necessarily imply that reform is insignificant and unworthy of serious inquiry.

The fact that any township reform should take place at all is significant in itself, for this is unprecedented in South African history. It thus raises important questions about contemporary South Africa and about future township developments. Reform is occurring in the face of possibly the deepest township crisis ever. Those holding the reigns of power are keenly aware that repression alone is an inadequate response to the crisis. Considering the sheer intensity of residents' struggles and the structural changes in the economy requiring a more permanent urban Black workforce, some degree of reform is seen as essential in ensuring political and economic stability. The reform process thus indicates that the balance of power in the townships has recently shifted in favour of the Black residents. Through co-option, reform is intended by those in power to reassert their dominance in the townships.

So far the reform process is limited in nature and extent. It is confined to 'insiders' and even here reformists are hesitant about pushing too far. The continuing repression of 'outsiders' also subjects insiders to various forms of control and oppression. But political and economic leaders, in recognising the depth of the crisis, are feverishly
working behind the scenes in formulating new and more extensive reformist policies. Already, the recognition of insiders as permanent residents, the granting of some townships full municipal status in the future, and the development of a private housing market represent fundamental shifts in official policy. It is thus inadequate to rule out by definition the possibility of substantial reform. If successfully implemented, reform could quite likely become the wave of the future for insiders, thus resulting in important social changes in the townships.

But most residents have for now rejected reform due to its co-optive intent. Their responses may however change in the future if those in power offer new and more appealing reforms. On the industrial scene, some progressive Black trade unions have become involved in the state registration policy because this is seen as providing some basis for furthering the struggle of Black workers. Thus reform is conceived as co-optive in intent, but not necessarily in effect. With, for example, the granting of greater powers and duties to local Black government, there may come a time when residents decide to use this platform for similar purposes. Township reform would then be turned against those in power in having consequence other than those officially designed and by further altering the balance of power.

Thus reform should be understood as a serious attempt by
political and economic leaders to deal with a very serious crisis. The responses of residents to it will significantly shape future township developments.

The precise form of future township developments in South Africa is of course open to speculation at this time. I have suggested that reform is an ongoing process and that crisis will continue throughout the 1980s. But everything is in a state of flux. This is also true for South African society as a whole. The White and Black classes are in conscious motion in formulating and developing their political agendas. It is likely that the intense social conflicts now occurring will profoundly alter the South African social system over the next decade.
FOOTNOTES

PART ONE

Chapter One


3. Robertson (1957:66) and van der Horst (1965:136), respectively.


6. See, for example, Robertson (1957:36) on the 1913 Land Act.


12. Kuper (1974:257). These liberals, including Kantor and Kenny (1976), have criticised the economic determinism of much of the earlier work.


14. There were earlier writings which emphasised class analysis. These included E. Roux's Time Longer Than Rope (1964) and H. J. Simon and R. E. Simon's Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (1968).


19. Whereas the liberal work spoke of economic growth and industrialisation, the Marxist approach conceptualised the South African economy in terms of the capital accumulation process.


22. Based on theories of imperialism, classical Marxism, by stressing the inevitable elimination of 'archaic' social relations, failed to explain the persistence of racial domination. See: Brady (1975).
23. Frank (1967:9). See Greenberg (1980:18–22) on this. The Marxist approach was also influenced by Blumer's work on industrialisation and race relations, as he argued that "industrialisation conforms to the alignment and code of the racial order" (1965:245) with only limited dysfunctionality to the economy. This raised the issue of compatibility between the economy and racial domination.


25. This has been accomplished by the liberal perspective in the form of the Oxford History of South Africa (volume I, 1969; volume II, 1974). The second volume was subjected to Marxist criticisms by Atmore and Westlake (1972) and Marks (1972).


31. The Marxist work deemphasised the influence of frontier life in explaining the development of 20th century White racism. "This has prompted some recent liberal works to do the same."


34. The following liberal arguments are applicable to their analyses of both the mining and manufacturing industries.


36. van den Berghe (1965:196).

37. Hôbart Houghton (1964:79). The migrant labour system has been the major form of labour utilisation on the mines, and less so in manufacturing.

38. Some liberal writers, including van den Berghe (1965:192–3), argued that mining companies actively participated in the elaboration of the migrant labour system. It was seen as especially dysfunctional to manufacturing property-owners.


41. Mars (1980:45).

42. Wolpe (1972).

43. See Johnstone (1976) and Davies (1979a).

44. The Marxist work has downplayed the dysfunctionality of the job colour-bases, arguing their hindrance to the capital accumulation process has been minimal.


46. van der Horst (1965:102).

47. Robertson (1957:33).


49. Innes and Plaut (1978:5).
51. See Morris(1977), Wolpe(1972) and Lacey(1981), respectively.
52. See Wolpe(1972), Legassick(1974a;1974b) and Davies et al(1976), respectively.
56. This has been a problem with most Marxist works on the 'race question', as shown by Genovese(1971) and Gabriel and Ben-Tovim(1976).
60. See Johnson(1978), Anderson(1980) and Hall(1981). Thompson clearly distinguishes between Marx's structuralist tendency, which he incorporates into analysis, and structuralism, which he strongly opposes.
64. See, for example, Davies et al(1976) and Greenberg(1980).
68. Coplan(1982).
75. Wolpe(1980). In the literature there has been much debate between those, including Davies et al(1976) and Kaplan(1979b), who locate South African state policies in the context of conflicts between property-owners, and those, including Innes and Plaut(1978) and Innes (1979), who emphasise capital-labour conflicts. The focus of the debate is almost entirely on the relation between state and society.
78. Ibid., p.148.
79. See Hill(1981:24-1) on this.
Chapter Two

1. While referring specifically to the recent Crossroads 'squatter camp' near Cape Town and the uncertain future of its residents, the lyrics have wider applicability.
2. Wassenaar(1977:14), who is head of the Sanlam Corporation, RSA designates the Republic of South Africa.
3. The concentration of capital refers to the domination by fewer firms within a specific economic sector, while centralisation refers to the interpenetration of firms based in different sectors. See Legassick(1974:270) for these developments in South Africa.
6. Similar shortages occurred in the commercial sphere and in state apparatuses. See Davies(1979b:183-4) for various estimates of the labour shortages, including that of 1,448,000 white-collar employees by 1990.
7. See Davies(1979b) for the measures used to counteract the shortages in other economic sectors.
9. This is based on the work by C. Simkins. See Mars(1980:21). Legassick and Innes(1977:452) provide other estimates generally compatible with Simkin's figures.
10. Marx(1979:589). In rather crude terms, constant capital refers to machinery, and variable capital to labour.
12. This is true for the manufacturing, agricultural and mining sectors.
18. According to Humphrey(1977:141), the imports of capital equipment increased from 31.8% of the import total in 1958 to 41.5% in 1969.
22. 'Worried capitalist', as quoted in O'Meara (1982:4).
26. Ibid., p.21.
27. During the first half of the 1970s both the government and employers attempted to organise Black African workers into works and liaison committees with exceedingly limited bargaining powers. By the end of 1977, there were 302 works and 2,626 liaison committees 'representing' about 764,000 workers.
28. 'Soweto' will receive fuller attention in chapter three.
29. These figures include Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians.
31. For a statistical overview of recent trade union developments see Miller (1982), and for a more analytical account see Luckhardt and Wall (1981). The South African Labour Bulletin is also useful.
32. Work in Progress is an important source of information on township organisation and struggle.
34. Quoted in International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1980:3).
35. Through various measures the South African government attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the coming into power of socialist 'governments' in these countries. See Callinicos (1981) on its initiatives with regard to Zimbabwean independence.
36. See various editions of Work in Progress.
42. See Seidman (1980:33-5) and South African Institute of Race Relations (1980:4-5).
43. This was incorporated into the provisions of the 1980 Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act.
45. The Star (International Airmail Weekly), May 15, 1982.
46. Ibid., May 22, 1982.
50. Prime Minister Vorster's earlier attempts at detente with other southern African countries can also be seen in this light.


52. Luckhardt and Wall (1981) provide an excellent overview of the Commission's main findings and recommendations.


55. Wiehahn recommended the inclusion of migrant workers in registered unions, but this was excluded in the 1979 Act. Ministerial proclamation subsequently allowed for it.


57. Quoted in Luckhardt and Wall (1981:71). Parallel unions are organised under the wing of White unions.

58. See SASPU National, September 1981, for an interview with Joe Foster of POSATU. Independent unions are not controlled by White unions.

59. See Miller (1982) for a recent list of registered and unregistered unions.


62. See Saul and Gelb (1981:26-30) for a more sophisticated analysis. Davies (1979b) argues that, considering the militancy of the Black trade unions, increasing profitability through more explicit measures of exploitation was ruled out by economic and political leaders.

63. Clearly the skilled labour shortage has implications for Black education. The 1979 Education and Training Act thus emphasised the importance of technical training for Black students. However, few substantial changes have occurred in the Bantu Education system. The De Lange Commission was formed in 1980 with the aim of "establishing principles for an education policy which would allow for the realisation of the potential of all inhabitants of South Africa, promote economic growth, and improve the quality of life of all inhabitants." Quoted in South African Institute of Race Relations (1982:338). The government rejected many of the Commission's more liberal recommendations and, thus, the official commitment to the educational system remains.

64. The Riekert Commission and recent township policy changes will be fully discussed in Chapter four.


66. The seconding of John Maree of the Barlow Rand Corporation in May 1979 to ARMSCOR reflects strategic links between the military and industry.
67. These figures exclude military expenditure undertaken by other state departments. For 1981-2, the South African Institute of Race Relations (1982:58) gives a figure of R2,455 million. 1R is worth about 1$q(Can.).
68. Throughout South Africa, the Defence Force has established local civil defence organisations and commando units. The role of the police forces should also not be underestimated, considering their role in combating internal revolts such as 'Soweto'.
70. Defence Force handbook, as quoted in International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1980:51).
71. Throughout such things as television, military propaganda and military parades, the government is also attempting to install a patriotic war attitude amongst the White population.
72. Quoted in Mare'(1980:31).
74. Justice M. T. Steyn previously headed the 1980 Commission of Inquiry into the Reporting of Security Matters, which argued that press freedom should not be used to "denigrate, weaken or undermine" the state and especially the security forces. See South African Institute of Race Relations (1981:288-90).
75. Quoted in Anon. (1982a:2).
76. The Star (International Airmail Weekly), May 29, 1982.
77. For an overview of developments see Saidman (1980:26-31) and recent editions of the South African Institute of Race Relations' Surveys.
78. Moss (1980:5), his emphasis.
79. A useful analysis of this is found in O'Meara (1982). See also Adam and Glicomee (1979).
80. See International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1980). Given the military's history of involvement in Namibia, this is perhaps not surprising.
82. One of these is 'the State Security Council.'
PART TWO

Introduction


Chapter Three

2. Township struggles since 'Soweto' will be discussed in Chapter five.
3. At Sharpeville township near Vereeniging, 69 Blacks involved in a peaceful demonstration in March 1960 were shot and killed by the police. Over one hundred were injured.
5. 'Fear-' an important determinant in South African politics' in SASO Newsletter, September 1971, as quoted in Gerhart (1978:254).
10. These included the African Students' Union of South Africa and the African Students' Association.
11. See Saul (1979) for a discussion of the politicisation of ethnic identification in the context of Africa.
17. This notion is used by Raymond Williams. See Wood (1982).
18. T. Motapanyane, secondary school student leader, as quoted in Hirson (1979:103).
20. This does not imply that 'marginal' or 'middle class' Blacks are, by definition, reformists. Because both these and working class Blacks experience their political domination in mainly racial terms, they have been historically reformist in outlook.
23. This and other student organisations were involved in, amongst other things, 'conscientisation' picnics, drama, poetry and religious discussions.
33. Quoted in Kane-Berman (1981:14). Urban Bantu Councils are local black government bodies now largely defunct. See Chapter four.
34. Quoted in Hirson (1979:181).
35. Reporter S. Nzima of The World newspaper, as quoted in Counter-Information Services (n.d.; 8).
37. Quoted in Counter-Information Services (n.d.; 16).
40. Quoted in Hirson (1979:3).
41. Quoted in Counter-Information Services (n.d.; 22).
42. Quoted in Brooks and Brickhill (1980:206).
44. Counter-Information Services (n.d.; 22).
45. Quoted in Kane-Berman (1981:115-6).
46. Ibid., p. 20.
47. Quoted in Brooks and Brickhill (1980:142).
49. See Hirson (1979:265-7) for a statement by the Ministers Fraternal of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga.
50. Quoted in Counter-Information Services (n.d.; 57).
52. This was probably partially due to the recession.
53. A trader situated near the main Johannesburg railway station, as quoted in Kane-Berman (1981:123).
54. The nature and role of Administration Boards, which are the direct representatives of the central state in the townships, will be discussed in Chapter four.
56. The home-ownership scheme will be discussed in Chapter four.
58. The Community Council system will be discussed in Chapter four.
60. A 16-year-old Cape Town girl, as quoted in Kane-Berman (1981:125-6).
64. Quoted in Brooks and Brickhill (1980:343).
65. Quoted in Hirson (1979:166).
68. Findings by P. J. van der Merwe indicate that about 16% of Black unemployment is found in the urban areas of White South Africa. 16% of the total Black unemployment figure of 12.3 million is 368,000. See Mare(1980:21).
70. Keenan(1981a:4). These are national figures which exclude agriculture and domestic services. In part, the increases resulted from worker strike action.
71. Counter-Information Services(n.d.:45).
74. Counter-Information Services(n.d.:45).
77. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the utilisation of Manpower(excluding the legislation administered by the Departments of Labour and Mines),(1979:paras. 3.616 and 3.617); hereafter referred to as the Riukert Report.
79. Riukert Report(1979:Table 3.48).
80. See Chapter four. Malan and Hattingh(1976) and Creecy(1981) provide statistical information on the increasing expenditure on homeland towns and on the number of houses built in them.
81. Quoted in Humphries(1982b:3).
82. Riukert Report(1979:Table 3.22).
83. Ibid.,Table 3.23. At the same time, the growth rate in beer sales declined considerably between 1970-9.
84. Ibid.
86. From July 1976, boards could retain 80% rather than only 20% of the liquor profits, the rest going to the central state.
87. See Brooks and Brickhill(1980:175-7) on these and other increases.
89. See Humphries(1982b) for an overview of the Cape Midlands Board's financial situation, and Kraak(1981) for that of the Peninsula Board.
91. Ibid., p.19.
92. The Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and elsewhere from June 16, 1976 to February 28, 1977 was appointed to investigate 'Soweto'. In its 1980 report, it argued that township economic problems and township administration illegitimacy contributed to the emergence and development of the revolt. It reacted favourably to the handling of the revolt by the police. See Morris(1981:94-8).
Chapter Four

7. State regulation of the movement of Blacks began in the 18th century, thus well before the 1923 Act.
16. The Section 10 provisions of the 1952 Act amended those in the 1945 Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. Section 10 became to read in part:

"(1) No Bantu shall remain for more than seventy-two hours in a prescribed area unless he produces proof in the manner prescribed that—
(a) he has, since birth, resided continuously in such area; or
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer for a period of not less than ten years or has lawfully resided continuously in such area for a period of not less than fifteen years, and has thereafter continued to reside in such area and is not employed outside such area...; or
(c) such Bantu is the wife, unmarried daughter or son...of any Bantu mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection and...ordinarily resides with that Bantu in such area...."

17. Unless stated otherwise, Section 10 rights will throughout the thesis refer only to Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) rights.
18. In terms of Section 29 of the 1945 Act, an 'idle' person includes "any person between the age of 15 and 60 years who is capable of being employed, but who is not employed and who for a period or periods of not less than 122 days in all during the preceding 12 months was not lawfully employed...". See the Riekert Report (1979:para. 3.216).
23. de Villiers(1979a).
34. ENSO(1980:Table 1).
40. Black Affairs Administration Act(No. 45 of 1971). The number of Boards was subsequently reduced to 14.
41. Through a legalistic analysis of the 1971 Act, Crowe(1983) shows that Ministerial control of the Boards is all pervasive.
42. Section 3 of the 1971 Act. During parliamentary debate on the 1971 Bill, the liberal opposition parties called for Black representation on the Boards.
44. Section 22(1) of the 1971 Act.
46. This is based on research data from 13 of the 14 Boards. In total, there are just under 100 directors. There was a 85% response to the questionnaires. 76% of the directors have a Municipal background and 93% are Afrikaners.
47. Sections 12 and 13 of the 1971 Act.
48. The house rent is in fact divided into three parts:
(a) the house rental which is used to offset the Department of Community Development housing loans plus, amongst other things, a small sum for repairs and maintenance based on original building costs;
(b) the site rent which covers the cost of land purchases, access roads, stormwater drainage, health and ambulance services; and
(c) the service charge which is used for electricity, water supply, sewerage, refuse removal and other services. See Kane-Serman(1980:1-2).
49. In 1972 the employer levies became based on the Contributions in respect of the Black Labour Act.
52. Sher (1982:15).
54. Section 26 of the 1971 Act.
57. Innes and O'Meara (1975).
60. August 1982. Quoted in the Federated Chamber of Industries' written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:14). CAD has overall responsibility for Black affairs, and thus is the new name for BAD.
62. Census results. See Smit and Kok (1981:Table 1).
63. The total urban Black population (1980 Census) was derived from Central Statistical Services, Office of the Prime Minister (1980). Section 10 figures were either given directly by the Boards or are based on other information supplied using various statistical procedures. Most individual Board figures are for 1982. The migrant total includes 500,000 workers registered at labour bureaux and 200,000 unregistered workers (mainly migrants) recruited and employed by mines affiliated to the Chamber of Mines. This is based on CAD's D60 537 forms completed by each Board and on information found in the Riepert Report (1979:para. 3.164, Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5). The other residents are illegals. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Finances of Local Authorities in South Africa (1980:114), hereafter called the Browne Report, gives a 1977 estimate of 586,000 illegals.
64. Useful summaries of the Report can be found in Cooper and Ensor (1979) and Wages Committee (n.d.).
66. Ibid., para. 1.8.
67. Ibid., para. 1.9(o).
68. Hindson (1980a:8).
69. Mattrass (1979:75).
70. Quoted in Wages Committee (n.d.:4).
73. van der Merwe (1979:45). See also J. Kruger, director of Manpower Administration and Development of the Drakensberg Administration Board (n.d.:1).
74. Riepert Report (1979:para. 4.204(f)).
75. Ibid., para. 4.152(a).
76. Department of Coopetation and Development (Legislative Programme 1981), hereafter referred to as CAD (1980).
77. Mandy (1981:1). 
78. Quoted in Saul and Gelb (1981:69). The Urban Foundation, a big business organisation, will be discussed later.
79. Committee to Investigate Private Sector Involvement in Resolving the Housing Backlog in Soweto (Report), (1982:70), hereafter referred to as the Viljoen Report.
80. More recently, there has been the appointment of the Steyn Committee of Inquiry into the Financing of Black Housing.
83. Smit and Booyzen (1977:15).
86. This was provided for in the 1978 Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act.
89. Urban Foundation written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:40). See also the Federated Chamber of Industries oral evidence to this Committee (1982b:45) and the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce memorandum (1980).
90. Interview with Board director, September 1982.
92. According to A. v B. Rabie (1981:5) of the West Rand Board, 90% of Soweto housing requires upgrading.
94. Port Natal Administration Board submission to the Rieke rt Commission (n.d.:74).
95. The Minister of CAD, as quoted in South African Institute of Race Relations (1982:244).
98. Rieke rt Report (1979:para. 5.136(b)).
101. Section 10(1)(b) of the 1982 Black Communities Development Bill.
113. Riekert Report (1979: para. 5.136(g)(i)).
118. The Riekert Commission (1979:para. 4.369(a)) recommended this, and it was accepted in the Riekert White Paper (1979:11).
119. This is a conservative estimate based on information collected from ten of the fourteen Boards.
120. Interview with Board director, September 1982.
121. Ibid.
123. The total registered urban Black work force was 2.9 million in 1982. This is based on DSU 537 and other statistical forms, and on information supplied in the Riekert Report (1979: Table 3.5). Based on the same statistical forms and on an estimate of the number of Orange River Board working insiders, the total number of working insiders was 1.5 million.
124. Riekert Report (1979:para. 4.387). This is also indicated by interviews with manpower directors of the Boards, 1982.
127. Interviews with Board directors, 1982.
128. Interview with Board director, April 1982.
129. Ibid.
130. Riekert Report (1979:para. 4.105(1)).

134. In 1979 there were 398 urban labour bureaux.


137. Interview with Board director, April 1982.


139. Riskert Report (1979:para. 4.232 and 5.27). See also the Port Natal Administration Board submission to the Riskert Commission (n.d.:51), where it is said that there are "no reasons" for restrictions on Black trading in the townships.


145. Financial Mail (Supplement), March 25, 1983.


147. Ibid., p.64.


150. Interview with Board director, July 1982.

151. Southern Orange Free State Board 1982/3 Revenue and Expenditure and Capital Estimates, p.2. It is unclear where the 49\% of profits would go and for what use.

152. Interviews with Board directors, 1982.

153. Interview with Board director, December 1982.


158. Quoted in Federated Chamber of Industries written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:17).


162. Section 3 of the 1977 Act.

163. GD(A1982:12).

164. Based on fieldwork information obtained from the Boards.

165. Interview with Board director, September 1982.

166. Based on information on 1314 of the total 1564 wards.


168. Section 5(1)(b) to (o) of the 1977 Act.
169. See, for example, the Memorandum of Agreement made and entered into by and between the Administration Board Highveld and the Community Council Witbank (December 2, 1980).

170. Interviews with Board directors, 1982.


172. Ibid., p.17.

173. Ibid., p.15.

174. Section 8(1)(4) and (1) of the 1977 Act.


178. Section 3 of the 1980 Local Government Bill.

179. Section 22(1) of the 1980 Bill.


181. Ibid.


183. Urban Foundation written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982a:3).

184. M. B. Kumalo's written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982a:34).

185. Section 38 of the 1982 Black Communities Development Bill may however allow for this.

186. Federated Chamber of Industries oral evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:40).

187. Sections 2 and 5 of the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act.

188. Section 23(1)(c) of the 1982 Act.


191. van der Merwe (1979:39).

192. Interviews with Board directors, April and September 1982, and January 1983.


194. Urban Foundation written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b).

195. Section 10 of the 1980 Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Bill.

196. Riekerdt Report (1979:para. 4.342(b)).


198. Interview with Board director, April 1982.

199. The Barrie Committee was appointed in March 1980. I have been unable to obtain a copy of its report.


201. Riekerdt Report (1979: paras. 4.341 and 4.342(a)).


203. Interview with Board director, January 1983.


207. Interview with Board director, January 1983.

209. Ibid., para. 4.187.
211. Riekert Report (1979: para. 4.204(h)).
212. Ibid., para. 4.205(a).
214. Interview with Board director, June 1982.
215. Riekert Report (1979: para. 4.244(a)).
216. A similar law exists for Coloureds.
221. Kaap-Middellandse Bantoesake-Administrasieraad
Begrotingsrede: Boekjaar 1977/78, p.42.
222. Riekert Report (1979: para. 4.214(a)).
223. Interview with Board director, May 1982.
224. Kaap-Middellandse Bantoesake-Administrasieraad
Begrotingsrede 1979/80, p.5.
227. This moratorium was not applicable in the Coloured
Labour Preference region.
233. Riekert Report (1979: para. 4.44(c)).
235. Interview with Board director, July 1982.
236. Most of the individual Board figures for the size
of the urban commuter work force are based on
information directly supplied by the
Boards.
237. Interviews with Board directors, 1982.
238. Sections 31(2) and (4)(a) of the 1980 Black Community
Development Bill.
239. Occupation by leasehold would be considered as approved
accommodation.
241. Sections 37(1)(e)(i) and (vii) of the 1980 BCDB.
242. Section 65 of the 1980 BCDB. CAD (1980:11) said that
Section 29 would be subject to "temporary continuation".
243. The Committee's report was mainly written by an Urban
Foundation representative.
245. Ibid., pp. 24-6.
246. Chapter 5 of the 1980 BCDB was excluded from the 1982
Black Communities Development Bill to form the Bill
under discussion, while the 1980 Laws on Cooperation and
Development Amendment Bill was incorporated into the
1982 Black Communities Development Bill.
247. Sections 1(xxiii) and 6(1) of the 1982 Orderly
Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (OMSBPB).
The qualifications for permanent residence are tremendously complicated. See Duncan (1982a; 1982b) on this.

Section 42 of the 1982 OMSBP.
Section 43(1)(b) and (4)(b) of the 1982 OMSBP.
Section 44 of the 1982 OMSBP.
Federated Chamber of Industries written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b: 21-2).
Quoted in Mares (1980: 17).
Dugard (1980).
Quoted in Seidman (1980: 51).
Interview with Board director, July 1982.
It is named after the person in whose favour the decision was made. See Komani No v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area (Appellate Division), March 6, 1980.
Financial Mail, August 29, 1980.
Interview with Board director, May 1982.
Quoted in Cape Times, August 23, 1981.
Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) Case No. 3490/82 in the matter between T. S. Boo and Western Cape Administration Board.
This is based on estimates by some Boards and on confidential information reportedly in the hands of the Urban Foundation.
Interview with Board director, December 1982.
Cape Times, August 24, 1981.
Greenberg (1980).
Quoted in Kaplan (1979a: 7).
Quoted in Greenberg (1980: 202).
Kane-Berman (1981: 155).
Quoted in Brooks and Brickhill (1980: 296).
Quoted in Seidman (1980: 12).
Quoted in Kane-Berman (1981: 162).
The Star (International Airmail Weekly), October 12, 1982.
Chapter Five


2. Greenberg (1980:402). As will be shown, this is perhaps too sweeping an argument.


4. Ibid., p.173.

5. See the Riskert Report (1979:paras. 4.194 and 4.195) for brief summaries of the committee reports.


20. Interview with Board director, July 1982.


25. See Johnstone (1976) and Davies (1979a).


29. Quoted in Financial Mail (Supplement), March 25, 1983.


33. This is based on research data from 432 of the 505 known contested wards.

34. The Star (International Airmail Weekly), May 22, 1982.

35. Interviews with Board directors, June, November and December 1982.


37. Large allowances are particularly true in the larger townships, with many councillors receiving over R1000 per year. In 1981, Thebehali of the Soweto GC received R13,800. Most councillors obtained less than R400 per year. See South African Institute of Race Relations
38. Quoted in *Financial Mail* (Supplement), March 25, 1983.
40. Interview with Board director, September 1982.
42. This is based on research data from 75.2% of the 1546 total wards.
43. Quoted in *Financial Mail* (Supplement), March 25, 1983.
49. Large bus fare increases throughout urban South Africa have also created financial problems for residents.
54. See various editions of *Work in Progress* for discussions on consumer boycotts.
55. See Chapter two.
56. See various editions of the South African Labour Bulletin for debates on the registration issue.
60. *Financial Mail* (Supplement), March 25, 1983.
62. *Spiked* (Vol 1, No 2) (n.d.).
66. van der Merwe (1979:41).
67. Federated Chamber of Industries written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:13).
73. Riskert Report (1979: Table 3.49).
75. Interviews with Board directors, May and July 1982.
77. This is based mainly on the CAD ISC15 statistical forms, with most individual Board figures pertaining to 1982. The figures range from 4% in the Port Natal Board area to 43% in the East Cape Board area.
79. Interview with Board director, April 1982.
81. Interviews with Board directors, April, September and December 1982, and January 1983.
82. CAD (1982:73).
83. Interviews with Board directors, April, July and December 1982.
84. Interviews with Board directors, April, June, September and December 1982.
86. Interviews with Board directors, April, June, September and December 1982.
90. Federated Chamber of Industries written submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee (1982b:21-2).
91. Quoted in Kane-Berman (1980:2).
93. Interview with Board director, September 1982.
96. Financial Mail (Supplement), March 25, 1983.

CONCLUSIONS

3. This type of argument has also been common when examining the development of homelands and their political 'independence'. As Molteno (1977:15) has argued, "Opponents of the National Party have tended to feel that they have adequately disposed of the Government's Bantustan policy once they have pointed to its fraudulent aspect. That done, they seem to have considered it unnecessary to proceed with further theoretical analysis. This has resulted in the Bantustan strategy not really being taken seriously..."
Three main sources of information were used in the thesis. There is fieldwork data based on my involvement in a research project on township policy. And a thorough search of relevant primary documents and secondary literature was also undertaken.

1 Fieldwork Data

From February to June 1982 I was employed as a research officer at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (Rhodes University, South Africa). I worked with two other researchers, Professor S. B. Bekker and Mr. R. Humphries, on a two-year project dealing with Administration Boards. This involved, amongst other things, travelling to and collecting information at the head offices of the Boards. The fieldwork took place between April 1982 and January 1983. Thirteen of the fourteen Boards were covered, with one Board denying the research team access. In-depth informal interviews about the Boards' present role in the townships and rural areas were conducted with directors of the various Board departments. A wide range of quantitative data, including information on urban residential status, housing and the Community Council system, was also collected. Other Board documents, such as annual chairperson's reports and financial statements, were obtained as well. Those used in the thesis are mentioned in the list of primary documents. All the fieldwork
information has been deposited with the Institute for
Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University,
Grahamstown, South Africa.

2 Primary Documents

a) Government commissions of inquiry (reports, evidence and
white papers)

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation
affecting the utilisation of Manpower (excluding the
legislation administered by the Departments of Labour

White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Legislation affecting the utilisation of Manpower
(excluding the legislation administered by the
Departments of Labour and Mines), WP T-1979.

Committee on Legislation Concerning Black Community

Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Finances of
Local Authorities in South Africa (Volume 1: Text),

Committee to Investigate Private Sector Involvement in
Resolving the Housing Backlog in Soweto (Report),
RP 14/1982.

Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the
Constitutional Committee of the President's Council on
Local and Regional Management Systems in the Republic

Report of the Crosser Working Group on the report of the
Committee of Inquiry into the Finances of Local

Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution (on Black
Local Authorities Bill), (SC 10-82), Report, Proceedings
and Evidence, 1982a.

Second and Third Reports of the Select Committee on the
Constitution (on Black Communities Development Bill and
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill),
(SC 10A-82), Reports, Proceedings and Evidence, 1982b.

b) Annual reports and publications of state departments

Kaap-Middellandse Bantoevake-Administrasieraad
Begrotingsrede: Boekjaar 1977/78.


East Rand Administration Board 1979/80 Budget Speech.

Department of Cooperation and Development (Legislative Programme 1981), background and explanatory information relating to three Bills to be published in the Gazette by the Department of Cooperation and Development for public comment, 1980.

Port Natal Administration Board submission to the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the utilisation of Manpower (excluding the legislation administered by the Departments of Labour and Mines), n.d.

Administrasieraad vir die Oos-Kaapgebied-Begrotingsrede, 1982/83.

Southern Orange Free State Board 1982/83 Revenue and Expenditure and Capital Estimates.

East Rand Administration Board 1982/83 Budget Speech.


c) Laws, bills and regulations

Bantu(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No 25 of 1945).
Black Affairs Administration Act (No 45 of 1971).
Community Councils Act (No 125 of 1977).
Black Community Development Bill, Government Gazette, October 31, 1980 (vol 184, no 7282).
Black Communities Development Bill (as read a first time), B112-'82.
Black Local Authorities Bill (as amended by Select Committee), B60 and GOA-'82.
Black Local Authorities Act (No 102 of 1982), Government Gazette, July 7, 1982 (vol 205, no 8293).
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (as read a first time), B113-'82.

d) Miscellaneous

Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce memorandum on the proposed amendments to legislation affecting Blacks, 1980.

Central Statistical Services (Office of the Prime Minister), Population Census 1980- Sample Tabulation, Geographical Distribution of the Population (Report No 02-80-01), 1980.

Komani No v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area (Appellate Division), 1980.

Urban Foundation (Transvaal Region), the Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Bill, the Black Community Development Bill, the Local Government Bill and their likely effect on black business development in urban areas, 1980.

Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division), Case No 3490/82 in the matter between T. S. Booi and Western Cape Administration Board.

Memorandum of Agreement made and entered into by and between the Administration Board Highveld and the Community Council Witbank, December 2, 1980.

3 Secondary Literature


Black Sash (Natal Coastal Region Advice Office), 'Annual report (covering the period from March 2nd 1981 to February 26th 1982)', 1982.


Counter-Information Services, Black South Africa Explodes, London, Counter-Information Services, n.d.


Erasmus, J. C. K., 'The role of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards in the implementation of the policy of separate development', BANTU, March 1975.


Kane-Berman, J., Soweto, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1981.


Koch, K., 'The new Marxist theory of the state or the rediscovery of the limitations of a structural-functionalist paradigm', *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, vol. 16, no 1, 1980.


Wages Comm., Riskert- Don't Worry Everything's Okay, Cape Town, University of Cape Town Wages Comm., n.d.


4 Other Sources

Afrika, Johannesburg, Research and Information Project of South Africa.

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*Cape Times*, Cape Town.

*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Department of Information.

*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg.

*Globe and Mail*, Toronto.

*Grahamstown Voice*, Grahamstown, Delta.

*Grassroots*, Cape Town, Grassroots Publication Trust.

*Johannesburg Sunday Times*, Johannesburg.
Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg.
SASPU National, Johannesburg, South African Students' Press Union.
Spiked, Cape Town, Students for Social Democracy.
The Star (International Airmail Weekly), Johannesburg.
To The Point, Johannesburg.
Work in Progress, Johannesburg, editorial collective.