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ABSTRACT

It is generally accepted that the words of a sentence are linked together by different dependency relations. Some words are said to be heads and others, modifiers. The primary objective of this study is to analyse the nature of the dependency relations within the fundamental French noun phrase.

The work comprises four main parts. The first chapter is a comparison of two opposing views on syntax: constituency and dependency. These two models are evaluated to see if there are things the linguist can describe or explain with one but not the other. In the remaining chapters, a dependency approach is adopted for the analysis of the dependency relations linking the French noun phrase.

Chapter Two investigates the fundamental nature of dependency relations and studies the underlying system which gives rise to the parts of speech. The notion of incidence is introduced and is shown to be the basic mechanism involved in dependency structure. The special status of the noun is explained in terms of its binary nature: the fact that it incorporates both the mental referent and the lexeme which names that referent.

The relation between article (or definer) and substantive is then studied in detail in Chapter Three. Whereas tradition has the article dependent on the substantive, it is argued in this chapter that the article is in fact the head element in the noun phrase. Finally, in
Chapter Four, the adjective-substantive relation is analysed. Particular emphasis is put on the problems of adjective position in French. It is shown that adjective position is related to the binary nature of the noun and that it is the French solution to a general problem.
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CHAPTER ONE

1. Different views on syntax: constituency vs. dependency

1.1 Introduction

In analysing the grammatical relations that link the elements of the French noun phrase, we will adopt a dependency approach. This chapter, therefore, represents the notion of grammatical dependency and does so by comparing it to an opposing view on syntax, that of constituency. It is not our intention to study the details of specific grammars (for example, the Transformational Generative model based on constituency promoted by Noam Chomsky and modern American structuralists, or Richard Hudson’s Word Grammar whose syntactic component relies on the general notion of dependency). Consequently, for the purpose of this study, we will consider those aspects of such grammars which illustrate the possibilities and the limits of these two notions, noting, in particular, if there is anything one can say in one model but not in the other. Interesting comparisons can be found, for example, in Matthews (1981), and in Hudson (1980a) and (1984). This chapter includes remarks from their work as well as from other recent literature that presents constituency and dependency as opposing views on syntax, arguing the merits of one over the other, debating the need to combine the two for a truly effective tool for describing language.
1.2 Constituency

This model of syntactic description, based on the part-whole relation, has been widely used in American linguistics, stemming from the influence of Bloomfield (1933:160ff, 209ff). The Bloomfield tradition was followed and developed by well-known linguists such as Bloch, Wells, Harris, Hockett, Pike, Lamb, and Chomsky (see Postal 1964). Constituency analysis was preferred because constituents are directly observable – dependency relations, on the other hand, are not. Bloomfield is considered as the first to have formulated immediate constituency analysis, which was subsequently adopted by Harris and then his student Chomsky, whose Transformational Generative Grammar is seen as an extension of Bloomfield's earlier work.

According to Matthews, "in the crudest form of a constituency model, a unit 'a' is related to a neighbouring unit 'b' solely by their placement within a larger unit 'c'" (1981:73). There is no indication of exactly how these elements are related. A group of two or more words considered as a whole is called a phrase or 'syntagm' and the composing units of that syntagm are its 'constituents'. The constituents that immediately make up a given syntagm are its 'immediate constituents'.

When a linguist analyses a construction, such as a sentence, using a constituency model, he divides this construction into a hierarchy of units. The sentence is
divided into phrases, its immediate constituents, and each of these phrases may then be divided into its own immediate constituents. In this manner, units higher up in this hierarchy are broken down into smaller units and these smaller units may or may not be divided further, depending on whether or not they are considered as being ultimate (Bloomfield 1933:161) or terminal units (which in general are individual words).

The notion of constituency led to the development of what are called Constituent Structure or Phrase Structure Grammars which use Phrase Structure rules (in their 'base component') to show the possible compositions of the different phrasal categories (e.g. the possible combinations of immediate constituents that can make up the noun phrase (NP)) and the order in which these constituents may occur in the phrase.

This sort of grammar is the basis of generative grammars such as Noam Chomsky’s Transformational Generative Grammar (1957, 1965, 1982, 1986), which by setting up a limited number of rules aims to produce all the possible sentences of a given language (and at the same time shows which constructions are not grammatical).

Such a Phrase Structure Grammar would have, for example, a Phrase Structure rule which specifies that a sentence (S) can be composed of an NP followed by a verb phrase (VP):

\[ S \rightarrow NP + VP \]
Supposing that this rule specifies the only possible expansion of $S$, it also implies which constructions are not possible sentences (hence the claim that such a grammar can 'generate' the set of all possible sentences of the language in question).

In the Phrase Structure Rules for English, we would find also a rule that an NP can be composed of a determiner (Det) followed by a noun (N):

$$\text{NP} \rightarrow \text{Det} + \text{N}$$

There would equally be a rule indicating the possible immediate constituents of the verb phrase and their temporal order:

$$\text{VP} \rightarrow \text{V} + \text{NP}$$

An NP can also have in its composition a prepositional phrase (PP) (as in "the house by the river") so the rule showing the expansion of NP must include the phrasal category PP:

$$\text{NP} \rightarrow \text{Det} + \text{N} + \text{PP}$$

A PP in turn is composed of a preposition (P) followed by an NP:

$$\text{PP} \rightarrow \text{P} + \text{NP}$$

These last two rules, then, are recursive. Because of the inclusion of a PP in the composition of an NP and, likewise, an NP in the composition of a PP, there is the possibility of infinite embedding of one in the other.

These rules would allow the construction of a sentence such as the following: The police shot the burglar.
Immediate constituent analysis has been presented in different ways by different linguists (see, for example, Paillet and Dugas 1982). In recent years, constituent structure has been shown using brackets with labels and 'tree diagrams' or 'phrase markers'. The constituent structure of the above example can be shown notationally with brackets and labels (without the lexical elements) as:

$$S[ \text{NP[ Det N ]NP} \text{ VP[ V NP[ Det N ]NP ]VP }]S$$

or diagramatically in the following phrase marker:

```
   S
   /\  \
  NP  VP
  /\   /\ \
 Det N V NP
  \   \o  \\
  the police shot the burglar
```

The line linking the to Det shows that this word belongs to the class 'determiner'. (In the lexicon of a Phrase Structure Grammar the would be entered as a determiner). Likewise, the tree structure shows that police is a 'noun'; that these two terminal nodes are linked to form a larger syntagm under a higher node which as a whole is classified as a 'noun phrase', the police; and that the order of the two immediate constituents of this NP is determiner first and noun second. In Phrase Structure Grammar, then, one refers to the category of the phrase as a
whole (the burglar is classed as an NP since it can be replaced by an N - e.g. John), the class of the immediate constituents of this phrase (the burglar is composed of a determiner and a noun), and the relative order of these immediate constituents within the phrase (Det before N).

One important characteristic of a Phrase Structure Grammar is the way in which one determines what can constitute a phrase or syntagm. One of the devices used is the test of substitution, where, in general, if a string of words can be replaced by a single word, then it is treated as a whole, as a unit on its own in the structure of the sentence. For example, the police could be replaced by they, and the burglar, by him.

From the above example, we see that terminal units or nodes are joined together by higher nodes which in turn are combined under even higher nodes. Eventually, we reach the top of the hierarchy, S, which ultimately joins up all the words or units of the construction (S -> NP + VP).

It should be clear that in this sort of analysis, the emphasis is put on the relation between the immediate constituents of each syntagm and their relative order. In fact, any two 'nodes' in the hierarchy are related either by 'precedence' or 'dominance'. In the above example, the NP the police precedes the VP node because it occurs to the left of this node in the phrase marker. It also precedes V, the second NP, and this NP's Det and N. It 'immediately
precedes' the VP and the V since it is to the immediate left of each of these nodes.

Whereas precedence is indicated in phrase markers simply by the relative order in the diagram, dominance is shown by the lines running between the different nodes. In the above example, the node VP dominates the NP the burglar since it is higher in the hierarchy and is connected to this NP by a line. In fact, the VP 'immediately dominates' this NP because it is the next highest node in the tree above NP. Likewise, VP immediately dominates V, but simply dominates the Det and N of the burglar since there is another node (NP) intervening between them. In the relation of immediate dominance, one also refers to 'mother' nodes, 'daughter' nodes, and 'sister' nodes. In the above example, the S node is the mother of the NP the police since it immediately dominates it, and for this very reason, this NP is a daughter of S. Since this NP and the VP node are both immediately dominated by S, they are said to be sister constituents.

This notion of constituency can be (and indeed, has been) used to describe structurally the ambiguity of such sentences as the following, provided by Matthews (1981):

Leave the meat in the kitchen.

In a constituent analysis, the ambiguity of this sentence can be shown by the fact that the string the meat in the kitchen can be assigned two different phrase markers - one for each interpretation. The interpretation with the
noun phrase the meat (considered as a whole since it can be replaced by it) understood as the direct object, and with the prepositional phrase in the kitchen (considered as a whole since it can be replaced by there) understood as an adverbial will have the following constituent structure:

The three units V, NP, and PP are immediate constituents of VP, all at the same level in the hierarchy of constituents. We should note that the Phrase Structure rule for the expansion of S (as given on page 4) requires a slight modification in order to allow for the absence of a subject NP in the imperative. It should be clear that our aim is not to give complete and precise rules for English, but rather to illustrate how the notion of constituency is used in Phrase Structure Grammar.

In the second interpretation, the direct object is understood as being the entire string in question, with the PP in the kitchen serving as an adjective to the NP the meat. This is illustrated graphically in the following phrase marker:
This analysis indicates that in this construction, obviously different from the previous one, NP the meat and PP in the kitchen are immediate constituents of a larger NP in the hierarchy which in turn, with its 'sister' V, is immediately dominated by VP. In other words, constituency structure shows that the syntagms V leave, NP the meat and PP in the kitchen are at the same level (are sister constituents) under the domination of the ultimate node S in the adverbial analysis. However, in the second analysis, NP the meat and PP in the kitchen are joined together by a higher node NP which in turn is joined as a single unit or syntagm to V under VP.

1.3 Dependency

Whereas it is the notion of constituency that is central to modern American linguistics, the European
tradition makes wide use of a notion which is relatively simple, that of dependency. In general, it appears that proponents of constituent structure are not familiar with dependency theory. Richard Hudson points out that although it is generally thought that constituency "is part of our long grammatical tradition" (1984:94), evidence shows that in fact it did not exist until the late nineteenth century and was later borrowed by Leonard Bloomfield to become the backbone of modern American linguistics. John Hewson points out that the Bloomfieldians did not accept the notion of dependency of one element on another because this dependency is not directly observable, whereas the proximity of one word to another is directly observable (1988:1).

Otto Jespersen may be considered as one of the twentieth century pioneers of dependency grammar. In The Philosophy of Grammar (1924:96ff), he uses the terms primary, secondary and tertiary to refer to what would now be considered as the different levels of dependency in the chain of relations. For example in extremely hot weather (Jespersen 1924:96) the noun weather is the primary; the adjective hot is the secondary; and the adverb extremely, the tertiary.

Lucien Tesnière may be considered one of the first to elaborate a theory of dependency grammar. He uses the terms régissant and subordonné for head and modifier and his use of stemmas as diagrams indicating the hierarchy of dependency relations was and still is a big influence on the
direction of European linguistics, especially in Germany, in much the same way as Leonard Bloomfield and immediate constituent analysis was in American linguistics. The following is an example of one of Tesnière's (1959:15) stemmas, indicating his view of the hierarchy of elements in the dependency structure:

```
    chante
   /    \
ami    chanson
 /  \
mon   cette  jolie
   /    \
  vieil   fort
```

Mon vieil ami chante cette fort jolie chanson.

In any given dependency structure, there is typically one word on which all the other words of the sentence ultimately depend. This element may be referred to as the pivot. We may note here that Tesnière believed that the verb was the pivot or the anchor of the sentence, "le régissant qui commande tous les subordonnés de la phrase... le noeud des noeuds ou noeud central" (1959:15) - a position which has not been accepted by all syntacticians in dependency grammar. For Jespersen as well as for Gustave Guillaume (1973a, 1985), for example, the verb was not the pivot of the sentence. Since a verb can be modified by a tertiary, that is by an adverb, Jespersen’s conclusion was that the verb must be a secondary (1924:100). Hudson (1980a:189) certainly sees the verb as the head of dependency structure, but he does entertain the possibility of the subject noun or pronoun as being the head of the
verb, citing evidence such as verb agreement (1980a:190). In any case, this particular question is beyond the scope of the present project, since the construction to be studied is the French noun phrase.

Today, in most of the dependency literature written in English, the terms head and modifier are used to indicate the two terms of a dependency relation - and one says that the modifier depends on the head. Hudson, whose Word Grammar (1984) has its syntax based on the notion of dependency, uses these terms in his work on dependency grammar but does not like the fact that they traditionally refer to groups of words such as the noun phrase. He argues (1984:94) that a grammar does not need to make reference to word groups (i.e. higher nodes in immediate constituent analysis).

Hudson (1980a:191) claims that all the words of a sentence enter into dependency relations: nouns, articles, adjectives, prepositions, etc. In skillfully carved ornaments, for example, skillfully (a modifier) is said to depend on carved (its head) and at the same time, carved (modifier) depends on ornaments (its head).

Immediate constituent analysis, founded on the part-whole relation, uses substitution tests and the like to identify syntagms and their constituents. Analysis based on the notion of dependency, on the other hand, draws on "the part-part relation of a 'modifier' to its 'head'" (Hudson 1980a:179) and considers constructions "in terms of a
subordination of one element to another" (Matthews 1981:78). Hudson gives the following definition of a dependency relation between two words: "A depends on B if A contributes to the semantic structure of B: in some cases this will mean that A and B are interdependent, since each contributes to the other’s semantic structure." (1980a:181). This definition, then, indicates how the direction of a dependency relation may be determined — i.e. which elements are the modifiers and which are the heads.

Veyrenc believes that in a dependency grammar, one has to distinguish two types of relation: (1) "dépendance au sens strict" — the relation between a syntagm (e.g. l’inscription des candidats) and its environment; and (2) "dominance" — the relations which link the elements of the syntagm (1980:49). In a dependency grammar, we study not only the internal dependency structure of the noun phrase, for example, but also the relations that a noun phrase may have with its environment. For Veyrenc, with this definition of dependency (in the broad sense), we have two criteria for determining the head of a dependency relation:

"Premier critère. Dans un couple AB, le terme dominé est celui qui peut être soit éliminé, soit soumis à des variations de forme sans qu’une telle opération entraîne jamais de modification sur son partenaire de couple.

"Deuxième critère. Dans un couple AB, le terme dominant est celui qui commande, en fonction des variations
formelles dont il peut être porteur, la relation du couple avec son environnement" (Veyrenc 1980:49).

For Hudson, dependency relations are at work in different parts of language: in morphology - for example in adjective agreement; in syntax - word order; in semantics - he claims that modifiers provide "fillers" for the semantic "slots" of their heads. He claims that at each level, we have the same basic notion of dependency at work and that consequently we need a definition of dependency to cover all uses of this notion (1980a:188ff).

Hudson notes that we can identify the head as opposed to its modifiers since it "provides the link between the modifier and the rest of the sentence, rather than vice versa." (1984:77). In general, dependency is an asymmetrical relation (the modifier depends on the head) and consequently, the modifier has different properties which are determined relative to the head - for example, in a configurational syntax, the position of the modifier is determined by that of the head. In John bought a red car, the position of the adjective red is determined by that of its head, the noun car - and not vice versa. In French we find another example of a modifier whose properties are determined relative to its head: the adjective agrees in number and gender with its head noun - and not vice versa.

In much of the recent literature on dependency grammar, the different dependencies in a construction are shown using horizontal arcs to link co-occurring words. Arrow-heads on
these arcs show the direction of the dependency - i.e. which element depends on the other, which is the modifier and which is the head. Assuming for now that the verb is at the top of the dependency structure of a given sentence and does not depend on any other element in the sentence and that all other words generally depend on some head, our previous example might be shown to have the following dependency structure:

![Diagram of dependency structure for "The police shot the burglar." showing the direction of the dependency relation from the modifier to the head.]

(Note that the determiners here are shown to depend on the head noun. By 1984, Hudson, for example, takes the position that the noun depends on the determiner. The direction of this dependency relation will be discussed in a later chapter.)

The arrows in the dependency diagrams we use run from the subordinate element (dependent or modifier) to the head. We note, however, that Hudson (1984) and Matthews (1981) have the arrow going from the head to the dependents. It is, in our mind, more logical for the modifier to 'point to' the element on which it depends, instead of the other way around.

For a dependency analysis, we can start from the pivot of the sentence and follow the different dependency chains from there. As Hudson notes, we can see that the dependency structure for this sentence defines "a number of dependency
chains, whose links are made up from simple dependency pairs" (1984:79).

These relations can also be shown in tree diagrams, "where successive dependents are linked to successively lower nodes" (Matthews (1981:79)). For example:

The Police shot the burglar.

We have already seen that the ambiguity of Matthews' sentence (Leave the meat in the kitchen) can be described in immediate constituent analysis by indicating the differences between the respective constituent structures. In a dependency grammar, on the other hand, we can account for this ambiguity by indicating the differences between the dependency structures of the two interpretations. If in the kitchen is considered as an adverbial, we have the following dependency structure, where we can identify two dependency chains starting from the verb: one leading to the object and its modifier; the other to the preposition and its modifiers:

Leave the meat in the kitchen.

(Again, we assume for now that the verb is the pivot of the sentence.) Both meat and in are directly dependent on the verb leave which is their head and which depends on no other element of the sentence.
In the other analysis (with the meat in the kitchen considered as the direct object, a syntagm on its own in the constituent analysis) this is the chain of dependencies:

```
Leave the meat in the kitchen.
```

where only meat is directly dependent on the verb and the prepositional phrase depends on meat. We end up with a different hierarchy of dependency relations. Leave is shown to be at the top of this hierarchy (the element that depends on no other element); meat, which depends on the verb, is in turn the head of the first instance of the determiner the and as well as the preposition in, and so on.

The notion of dependency has been used to formulate a model of grammar which includes a set of rules (dependency rules) stating the possible dependency relations different types of elements (noun, verb, etc.) can have and the direction of these dependencies. We need a rule for example to state that in the article-noun relation the noun is head and the article is the modifier (assuming again for now, following Hudson (1980a:189) and Matthews (1981:79), that the article depends on the noun). Matthews (1981:81-82) uses a notation of the early 1960's to illustrate how this rule can be formalized:

\[ N (\text{Art}, \ast) \]

N outside the parentheses indicates that the noun is the head in this dependency relation and \( \ast \) indicates its position relative to the subordinate Art. Another rule
would state that a verb can be the head of a noun which follows it:

$$V(*, N)$$

So that these two rules do not generate an ungrammatical string (such as * The leave kitchen), there must also be a condition indicating that a subordinate element cannot be separated from its head by another head further up in the dependency chain. There would also be rules stating that a verb can occur without a head and another that an article occurs without dependents. For the interpretation of Matthews' sentence that puts the meat in the kitchen together as a whole to be the object of the verb, the rule showing the dependents of the noun must be expanded to allow a preposition to modify a head noun:

$$N\ (\text{Art, } *, P)$$

In addition to this rule stating that a preposition can depend on a noun, we need another rule stating that a P can in turn be the head of another noun that follows it, as in in the kitchen:

$$P(*, N)$$

(There would obviously be other dependency rules needed but for our present purposes, we have no reason to push this illustration any further.)

It should be clear from these last two rules that in such a dependency grammar, N and P are recursive, as are NP and PP in a Phrase Structure grammar. As in Phrase Structure Grammar, such rules not only indicate which
dependency relations are possible, but they also imply what
is not a grammatical dependency relation. Again, with a
finite set of possible dependency relations between
different elements, such a dependency grammar can generate
an infinite number of sentences (as does a generative Phrase
Structure Grammar) - the set of all possible sentences of a
given language.

It is worth noting here, in anticipation of discussion
to follow in this chapter, that if Tesnière (1959:22,23) is
right in his claim that languages tend to prefer a
particular temporal order for the elements of their
dependency relations (e.g. modifier before head), then we do
not need rules like the above to specify that order for each
individual construction. Instead, a single generalisation
(for example, the modifier always precedes its head) might
take care of word order for most constructions in a given
language. Given such a generalisation on word order, we
would only need to know the direction of the particular
dependency relations - i.e. which element is the head and
which is the modifier.

1.4 Similarities and differences

Over the past few decades, it has been argued by some
linguists that these two models of grammar are at least
"weakly equivalent" since they will generate the same set of
grammatical constructions. They would be considered to be
"strongly equivalent" if there were nothing we could say in
one that we could not say just as effectively in the other. If it could be shown that they are not strongly equivalent, and if the possibility existed to describe something more effectively in one of these models than in the other, then this model would be stronger. On the other hand, if it could be shown that in each model there are descriptions that are not possible in the other, then the linguist would probably need to use both models in linguistic descriptions.

Robinson suggests that these two notions are strongly equivalent: "it is ... easily shown that for every structure-free DG there is a strongly equivalent structure-free Phrase Structure Grammar ... and that for every structure-free Phrase Structure Grammar there is a systematically corresponding structure-free DG" (1970:263). In this case, one might think that it doesn't matter which model of grammar is used in one's description of language, and Hudson believes that this partly explains why proponents of constituency structure have generally neglected dependency structure.

As Robinson (1970) did before him, Hudson points out that "the general connection between dependency structure and constituency structure is that a constituent can be defined as some word plus all the words depending on it, either directly or indirectly ..." (1984:92) and as a result, "any dependency diagram may be converted into a constituency diagram by a mechanical procedure which involves trivial reorganisation of the nodes and branches
..." (1980a:180). The following is his example of how the constituent structure can be mechanically derived from the dependency structure:

![Diagram of dependency structure for "The cat sat on the mat." (1984:92)]

(It should be remembered here that Hudson (1984) now considers the article to be the head of the noun phrase.)

Yet, Hudson does not believe that these two notions are strongly equivalent and points out various differences between them:

- constituency alone cannot (at least not without the X-bar convention) distinguish between head and modifier but dependency structure of course shows the direction of the dependency relation - i.e. which element depends on the other. The development of the X-bar convention shows clearly that this information is necessary.

- constituent structure, on the other hand, has the added feature (which a pure dependency model does not have) of higher nodes treating groups of words as units. Hudson argues however that these extra nodes are not necessary.

- constituency cannot show that a word can depend on two different words ("modifier-sharing"). In Hudson's example, John seems to like syntax (1984:93), John is in two different dependency relations: one with seems and another
with like. (Again we note that for Hudson, the verb is at the head of the dependency structure of the sentence.)

Matthews also believes that these two models are not strongly equivalent. He shows that a dependency tree cannot be derived from a constituent tree and that although in some cases constituency structure can be determined from the dependency structure, this is not always possible (contrary to what Robinson and Hudson believe): "... in any example where a controller has two or more dependents there might, in principle, be a hierarchy of syntagms which [some mechanical] procedure could not derive" (1981:86). For example, in the noun phrase the meat in the kitchen we cannot tell from the dependency structure how the constituent structure would make its divisions between immediate constituents: [(the meat) [in the kitchen]] or [(the [meat in the kitchen])]. It can be shown, though, that this problem can be resolved if we make a distinction between the noun phrase and the phrasal noun (see Hewson forthcoming) which is everything between and including the article or determiner and the so-called head noun. It will be shown in Chapters Two and Three that the determiner is the head element of the phrasal noun, and then in Chapter Four that the phrasal noun can have post-modifiers to form a larger noun phrase.

The question we might ask at this point is whether this sort of information is needed in the analysis, because if it is needed, then it is necessary to make reference to
constituent structure. In Matthews' account, there are things one can say in a dependency grammar but not in a constituency grammar, and vice versa. If these things are important to the study of language, one needs to make reference to both - i.e. combine both models.

Matthews gives an example of how this could be accomplished by having "the dependency relations holding in a larger construction ...operative for the controlling terms in any smaller constructions" (1981:89). Consequently, the word group consisting of head and dependent(s) could be treated as a single unit. In this way, rules such as $S \rightarrow V\ NP$ and $NP \rightarrow \text{Det} N$ (indicating both constituency and dependency) would give the sentence *Leave the meat* the following combined dependency structure and constituency structure:

$$s \Rightarrow V\ [\text{leave}] V\ NP\ [\text{Det} \text{the}] \text{Det} \text{N[meat]} N\ ]NP\ ]s$$

It should be noted that for Matthews (1981) the determiner is seen as a dependent element.

The idea of combining constituency and dependency for a model of grammar has been adopted by many linguists. Jespersen, for one, not only referred to the relations of subordination existing between elements of a construction, he also saw a need to recognise larger, more complex units (constituents) because he found that in certain constructions there is a dependency relation between a word and an entire group of words acting as a unit. "Word groups
consisting of two or more words, the mutual relation of which may be of the most different character, in many instances occupy the same rank as a single word... a word group (just as much as a single word) may be a primary or an adjunct or a subjunct ... the group, whether primary, secondary, or tertiary, may itself contain elements standing to one another in the relation of subordination indicated by the three ranks. The rank of the group is one thing, the rank within the group another." (1924:102). He referred to sentences such as We met the kind old Archbishop of Canterbury, where there is a need to treat the word group the kind old Archbishop of Canterbury as a whole, which he considers to be the primary in the verb-object relation. In other words, in his account the verb depends on or modifies the object (as well as the subject) - the opposite of what many of his successors have claimed.

Lucien Tesnière also saw that dependency relations sometimes have the effect of producing word groups. He noted that "tout régissant qui commande un ou plusieurs subordonnés forme ... un noeud" (1959:14) and defines this "noeud" as "l'ensemble constitué par le régissant et par tous les surbordonnés qui ... dépendent de lui ...". Tesnière notes that this definition requires that all dependents (or "surbordonnés") within a given syntagm (or "noeud") must follow the head (or "régissant") - i.e. must not be separated from the head element. For example, in the sentence "Mon vieil ami chante cette jolie chanson", ami is
a head which forms a syntagm with its dependents or subordinates mon and vieil. Consequently, if the subject of this sentence (i.e. the noun phrase mon vieil ami) then becomes the object of another sentence, as in "Cette jolie chanson charme mon vieil ami", we must move the (subordinate) adjectives with the noun ami on which they depend.

For Hudson, "the question is not whether in some sense a group of words may behave syntactically like a single word" (1980a:180). He takes the stand that without referring to the notion of constituency, even a dependency grammar can formulate rules which traditionally make use of notions such as the noun phrase (and other word groups that behave as units). However, he disagrees with the need to combine these two notions and claims that there is no need for the notion of constituency in addition to dependency (a position which is contrary to the one he took in his work on Daughter-Dependency Grammar (1976)). In his account, the information provided by a dependency grammar (but not by a constituency model - i.e. the direction of the dependency relations) is necessary in order for the linguist to be able to adequately describe certain aspects of language (see below for examples). Furthermore, he claims that the speaker of a given language has "to be able to recognise the dependency relations in an abstract structural representation, and to be able to decide which of the elements concerned is head and which is modifier" and that
"pure constituency ... would not give the user enough information to do so, and would therefore not provide the basis for a satisfactory grammar" (1980a:182).

Hudson gives several arguments in favour of this position and the following pages provide a review of some of them. In many of these arguments, he refers to different linguistic phenomena which can easily be explained by a dependency grammar but not by a pure constituency grammar.

The notion of dependency has been used to make general statements about languages concerning word order. Tesnière suggested two major classes of language: those which position the modifier before the head and those that have the opposite order ("langues descendantes ou centrifuges" as opposed to "langues montantes ou centripètes" (1959:22,23). (It has been argued since, though, that many languages do not fit into either of these two types: see Greenberg (1963), Tomlin (1986) and a review of Tomlin by Ashby (1988).) Hudson takes up this point, noting that "one could say, quite simply, that in Japanese modifiers precede their heads, whereas in Welsh they follow them. Having stated these facts just once, for all constructions, there is no need to add information about word-order in the rules dealing with the structures concerned" (1984:105). If indeed in a given language one order is more common than the other, this generalisation is a valuable piece of information to be formulated in the grammar. Without it (i.e. in a pure constituency model) the grammar would have
to formulate separate rules to take care of the order in individual constructions. If there is no dominant order of modifier relative to its head in a given language, this does not imply that there are no dependency relations but that the direction of the dependency relations does not determine word order in that language.

Hudson provides evidence indicating (as we have already noted above) that not only is there a tendency for languages to prefer a particular order of modifier relative to head, but in addition, a modifier's general position in a sentence depends on that of its head, rather than vice versa, and modifiers are kept as close as possible to their heads. (Again, we note that this is the case in configurational languages but not in languages such as Latin.) He rejects claims, therefore, that constituency but not dependency provides information allowing us to formulate rules of word order. For Hudson, "word-order tends to respect the integrity of the units defined by dependency structure (i.e. the units consisting of a head plus its modifiers)", just as in Phrase Structure Grammar it tends to respect the composition of the constituent - i.e. elements of a syntagm are usually kept together (1984:98). (We may note here that although Hudson refers to the unit formed by the head and its modifier(s), he still maintains that higher nodes as such are not needed).

Hudson gives an example of how a rule for word order (in a configurational language) can be provided in a
dependency grammar: "the modifiers of a head should not be separated from it by any other items except other modifiers of the same head" - and, we might add, their dependents (1980a:192). This is in fact the "adjacency principle", formulated by Robinson as:

"... if A depends directly on B and some element C intervenes between them (in linear order of string), then C depends directly on A or on B or on some other intervening element" (1970:260). Hudson later divides this principle into two simpler principles:

"Simple adjacency principle: A modifier must not be separated from its head by anything except other modifiers of the same head."

"Priority to bottom principle: the adjacency requirements of a word A take priority over those of any other word which is higher than A in the same dependency chain." (1984:99)

One very convincing argument that Hudson provides for the necessity of dependency is that "whenever the inflectional form of a word is determined by the properties of another word, the two words concerned are always in a modifier-head relation ... and ... the form of the modifier is determined by the properties of the head, rather than vice versa. For example, adjectives show concord with their head-nouns ..." (1980a:185). If this statement is valid then it should be evidence that the finite main verb does indeed depend on the subject. It should be pointed out,
however, that this is just a rule of thumb, as will be illustrated in the discussion on the determiner-noun relationship in Chapter Two.

Hudson's argument therefore is that if and only if we make reference to dependency relations can we take care of such morphological processes as adjective agreement. A dependency grammar would provide a general rule such as: "when the form of one word is determined by the properties of another word, it is never necessary to specify what the latter is, since it will always be the first word's head" (1980a:186). Of course the generality of this rule is reduced if it turns out that the determiner is in fact the head in its relation with the noun, a position which Hudson indeed adopts in (1984:90).

Another advantage of dependency over constituency can be found in the problem involved with predicative adjectives whose subject can be either the subject or the object of the verb (for example, "She seems nice" and "He made her angry") but not the object of a prepositional phrase. Hudson compares how a dependency model and a constituency model would account for the difference in grammaticality of the following two sentences which contain the predicative adjective green (1984:96):

- "John loaded the hay into the wagon green".
- * "John loaded the wagon with hay green".

He claims that a dependency grammar can account for this by making the generalisation that "the subject of a predicative
adjective whose head is some verb V is some other modifier of V. In a phrase-structure analysis, on the other hand, it is more complicated: the subject of a predicative adjective P is either the noun-phrase which is the sister of the verb-phrase containing P, or another noun-phrase which is sister of P itself” (Hudson 1984:96).

This refusal of a need for constituency analysis led Hudson (1980a) to the conclusion that syntax only needs to make reference to words or classes of words and dependency structure. Consequently he has proposed a model of grammar which appears to give most of the power to the lexicon. This claim that constituency is not at all necessary is obviously a controversial one and has received criticism from linguists such as Osten Dahl (1980) and P.S. Hietaranta (1981).

In agreement with Hudson, Dahl believes that "the introduction of the notion of a constituent into dependency theory does not involve any new apparatus except that provided by ordinary set theory (a constituent may be regarded as a group of words that are all dependent on one and the same node)" (1980:485). In other words, he too treats dependency as the fundamental relation in sentence structure. However, contrary to Hudson (1980a), he argues that we do need to make reference to higher nodes and constituent structure in addition to dependency relations in order to arrive at a correct analysis of certain constructions. Dahl claims that in noun phrases such as
ordinary French house, the word group French house forms a constituent which is modified by the adjective ordinary: "... this Phrase denotes something which is ordinary among French houses rather than a house which is ordinary and in addition French" (1980:486). If this is correct, then there is a grammatical relation between a single word and a group of words acting as a constituent - a need to recognise groups of words as single units (i.e. the higher nodes of a constituent analysis).

In his reply, Hudson suggests that Dahl's evidence does not justify the need to recognise higher nodes (in this example a higher node combining French and house as a unit). He takes as a counter example a small French house (1980b:500) which can have two interpretations: something that is small for a French house - i.e. as in an ordinary French house; or something that is a house, small and French). He suggests allowing modifiers to be applied in different ways: the adjective nearest to the head noun could be applied first and then the other, giving the meaning in this case, that a small French house is small for a French house; or both modifiers could be applied at the same time, and in this case they would have the same status in the meaning of the whole - i.e. we would have a house which is small and French.

Dahl and Hietaranta both argue that idioms such as red tape, hot dog and hot potato require the use of higher nodes since these word groups must be treated as units - "their
meanings are not predictable from the meanings of their constituents" (Dahl 1980:487). Hietaranta (1981:514) claims that the adjective is just as important as the noun to the meaning of such expressions and that Hudson (1980a) was wrong to say that the semantic structure of the whole is found in the (head) noun.

In his reply to Hietaranta, Hudson (1981) counters that these idioms can be treated in his "panlexicalism" in much the same manner as ordinary noun phrases such as blue hat, whose meaning is specified in the structure of the head hat, and includes the property 'hat' and the property 'blue'. Likewise, the properties of red tape would be located in the semantic structure of the noun tape. Obviously, the meaning of this expression is not simply the combination of the property 'red' added to the property 'tape'. However, Hudson claims that the lexicon (which is the base of his grammar) will indicate that tape can have this idiomatic meaning only if it is modified by red. In this manner, Hudson is able to maintain: (1) that the entries in the "panlexicon" are individual words, but, as in the case of idioms, an entry can refer to more than one word; (2) that in this case, we do not need to recognise anything beyond the structure of the individual words and the dependency structure of the sentence; (3) that reference is attributed to the head noun alone and not some higher node representing the noun phrase as a whole.
Hudson provides an interesting piece of evidence from Swahili to support attribution of reference to the head noun. In Swahili, the definiteness of the object of a verb is not shown as a determiner in the noun phrase but in the presence or absence of a clitic on the verb. "In such cases, the principle of compositionality falls down, since the referential part of the meaning of the noun-phrase is not a function of the meaning of its parts. Consequently, the reference might just as well be assigned to the noun head as to a postulated noun-phrase node." (1980b:497).

In fact, Hudson goes on to say that idioms can be used as evidence of the necessity to make reference to dependency structure. It is needed to explain why in English, "there are no idioms consisting of an object and a prepositional phrase but not involving the verb on which they both depend, whereas there are plenty of examples of idioms in which the constant parts are the verb and one of its following modifiers (kick the bucket, send X to Coventry, etc.). The general principle seems to be that the constant part of an idiom always includes the word in whose structure the meaning of the whole is located" (i.e. the head) (Hudson 1981:518).

Dahl provides one piece of evidence in favour of higher nodes and a constituency analysis (in addition to the fundamental dependency structure) which Hudson cannot refute - the case of conjoined noun phrases. If we do not recognise higher nodes, then it is not possible to treat two
or more conjoined noun phrases as a whole. He points out that this is indeed necessary because in order for a subject-verb agreement rule to work in English when the subject is a conjoined noun phrase, we have to refer to the properties of the whole (conjoined) noun phrase since these cannot be reduced to the properties of one of the nouns in the coordinate structure: *John and Mary sing but not *John and Mary sings (Dahl 1980:487).

Indeed, Hudson (1980b and 1984) accepts the fact that coordinate structures are not dependency structures and do require the use of constituent analysis (even rejecting the possibility that in *John and Mary, for example, and could be the head with the two nouns modifying it). At the same time, he suggests that this is in fact the only exception (i.e. we can recognise coordinate structures as the only construction needing constituent structure) and that dependency takes care of everything else. He maintains, therefore, that apart from coordinate structures, the syntax does not need to recognise any element longer than the single word. He notes that constituent structure is necessary here because "there is no head word in a coordinate structure, whereas our treatment of the other cases raised by Dahl has rested heavily on treating the head-word as the bearer of the information which might otherwise be located on a higher node" (1980b:497).

Although the case of coordinate structures breaks down Hudson's claim (1980a) that a grammar does not need to make
reference to constituent structure in addition to the needed dependency structure, he denies that this might be an indication of a general need for Phrase Structure Grammar. In fact, he uses certain kinds of coordinate structures to reinforce his evidence showing the fundamental need for dependency. There is, for example, the case of gapping, as in John invited Mary and Bill, Sue (1984:212), where there must be reference to the head of the first conjunct (i.e. in Hudson’s grammar, the verb invited). Although this sort of construction requires the use of constituent structure in his otherwise pure dependency approach, Hudson claims that his grammar can treat it more effectively than a Phrase Structure Grammar because in the latter, there is conflict between what is considered as standard constituent structure and the incomplete constituent that occurs in gapping. As this is the only place in Hudson’s grammar (1984) where constituency is required, there is no such conflict.

1.5 Constituency improved

Different attempts have been made over the past years to overcome some of the shortcomings of a pure constituency approach to grammar and in several of these cases the change to the theory brought it closer to dependency theory. In recent work in Transformational Generative Grammar, it has been suggested that PS rules are not necessary to provide for the object of a verb, for example, because the verb will command an object (via subcategorization). In other words,
generativists have begun to recognise this fundamental property of language - even if they see it as commanding rather than dependency. Chomsky himself admits that these ideas have already been discussed in dependency grammar: "The representations that appear at the various levels are those that can be projected from semantic properties of lexical items". He notes that "the conception is, in this regard, not unlike the dependency-grammar approach to syntactic structure ... although the generative principles here are considerably different" (1986:93).

Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980) propose the use of an index to link NP's and verbs which are sisters. Hudson explains that this "would presumably be exactly equivalent to a dependency arrow" (1984:94), hence opening up the possibility of indicating modifier-sharing and giving Phrase Structure Grammar much of the same power as provided by dependency. This sort of innovation in the constituency approach leads Hudson to believe that at least some of the extra features of Phrase Structure Grammar are indeed not needed (for example, the use of higher nodes) and that Phrase Structure Grammar is in fact becoming a dependency grammar.

Another innovation to Phrase Structure Grammar is the X-bar convention, introduced by Chomsky in his article "Remarks on nominalisation" (1970). One of the reasons for the introduction of X-bar syntax was, apparently, to slacken the restrictions on the possible types of categories allowed
by the base component. Before the introduction of this convention, it was felt that the two types of categories permitted (lexical and phrasal categories: for example, N and NP) were not sufficient. In other words, there was a need for intermediate categories higher in the hierarchy than the lexical item (e.g. the noun) but lower than the phrasal category (e.g. the noun phrase). With Phrase Structure Grammar as it was, one could refer only to the noun and the noun phrase.

Evidence for positing intermediate categories was found in constructions such as this very tall girl, which, without X-bar, has this phrase marker (Radford 1981:92):

```
NP
  Det  AP  N
    this  ADV  a  girl
        very  tall
```

The problem with this analysis was that the string very tall girl cannot be treated as a unit, a single constituent - it is (with the determiner this) part of a larger constituent (NP), but does not form a whole on its own. Yet this string can be conjoined with a string of similar composition: This very tall girl and very short girl are getting married. It can also be the antecedent of the pronoun one: I like this very tall girl and that one, being the equivalent of I like this very tall girl and that very tall girl (Radford 1981:92). Indeed, these two conditions are often used in
constituent analysis to show that a given string is a constituent.

On the other hand, very tall girl could not be treated as an NP since it cannot occur in exactly the same environments as regular NP’s with determiners. We can say, for example, This very tall girl is my friend but not * Very tall girl is my friend (Radford 1981:93). Nor could it be treated as a simple noun. The conclusion, therefore, in this framework, was to recognise an intermediate node between N and NP and the X-bar convention was adopted to allow such an analysis.

In this model, any given lexical category X may have several phrasal expansions (bar projections). Given the lexical category noun, for example, we could have N (with no bars = a noun), N’ single bar, N” double bar, and so on. Radford notes that "one way of looking at the difference between Phrase Structure Syntax and X-bar Syntax is that Phrase Structure Syntax is a restricted version of X-bar Syntax which imposes the condition that the maximum number of bar-projections of any category is 1 (because in Phrase Structure Syntax there is one and only one phrasal projection of any given category)" (1981:94).

In an X-bar analysis, therefore, Radford’s example has the following constituent structure:
(Note that girl has to be an N' single bar. One reason is that it too can be replaced by the pronoun one - i.e. Radford's sentence I like this very tall girl and that one can mean I like this very tall girl and that girl).

Likewise, the noun student has a different status in a student of physics and a student with long hair. In the former, student is an N but in the latter it is an N' single bar. According to X-bar syntacticians, this explains why, for example, we cannot replace student with the pronoun one in this student of physics (i.e. * this one of physics) but we can in this student with long hair (i.e. this one with long hair).

Hewson suggests that Chomsky, who dealt only with constituents in the early days of Phrase Structure Grammar, introduced X-bar syntax "... pour distinguer un support grammatical des éléments qui le modifient" (1988:1). Indeed, Chomsky decided "to use the symbol X for a phrase containing X as its head" (Chomsky 1970:210). Paillet and Dugas point out that although it had long been recognised that any NP, for example, must contain an N (which even Harris called the head), "... the form of phrase structure rules in the Standard Theory could not predict that the one
obligatory category to the right of a base rule would be the head" (1982:181). With this new convention, it became possible in constituent analysis to impose a condition on Phrase Structure rules:
\[ X^n \rightarrow \ldots X^m \ldots \] (where \( m=n \), or \( n-1 \)) (Radford 1981:104).

In other words, any X phrase having \( n \) bars must have as its head some constituent of the same category X which has \( n \) or \( n-1 \) bars, regardless of what, if anything, follows or precedes the head.

The introduction of X-bar into constituent analysis is seen by proponents of dependency theory as an indication that the importance of dependency structure is being recognised, even if it is in an indirect way. Hudson claims that the arrival of X-bar provides further evidence that higher nodes are not needed "because the syntactic features on the head have to be just the same as those on the phrasal node, so the latter cannot be used to carry extra features. The only information which distinguishes the higher nodes from their respective head nodes is carried by the number of bars \ldots" (1984:93).

1.6 Guillaume's incidence

Earlier in this chapter it was noted that the literature on dependency grammar does not seem to be well noticed in the American tradition of linguistics. It may not be surprising, then, that the theoretical framework proposed by Gustave Guillaume has had relatively little
direct influence on the shape of modern linguistic theory. Yet, by discovering the system constituted by the word, Guillaume, with his mentalist approach, was able to develop a theory of grammar which is essentially a dependency grammar, founded on the fundamental notion of incidence.

In the following chapters, we will attempt to show that the dependency relations that link the different elements of the French noun phrase - for example, between the adjective and the substantive - are more obvious once we understand the precise nature of these elements. Hewson (1986) remarks that whereas Jespersen had difficulty defining a primary (for example, the noun in a noun phrase), Guillaume's insight into the system of the word puts us in the right direction. Jones notes that in Guillaumian theory, "every major grammatical system ... is organized in a dynamic framework that can be defined according to a basic contrast or a sub-conscious and unmeditated relationship of a necessarily elementary nature" (1980:114).

In our attempt to show the nature of the dependency relations that exist between the elements of the French noun phrase, we will study the notion of incidence in more detail. The aim of the next chapter is mainly to illustrate the system that creates the different parts of speech that make up the French noun phrase. In this manner we will be able to see more clearly what indeed accounts for the differences between these parts of speech and for the
fundamental dependency relations that link them to form the noun phrase.
CHAPTER TWO

2. The fundamental dependency relations of the noun phrase

2.1 The fundamental nature of dependency relations

In his *System in Child Language*, R. M. Jones remarks that the theory of linguistics adopted by Gustave Guillaume and his followers is based on the belief that the mechanics of grammar are organised by a very coherent and logical system and this system of language is shaped by "very elementary, indeed unconscious but meaningful contrasts" (Jones 1970:xvi). He goes on to say that Guillaumian linguistics "suggests that the way language is organised is not according to certain purely "linguistic" or accidental principles, but according to simple intuitions of relationship that have to be taken for granted in daily life and which a child learns very quickly: e.g. absence/presence (place): person ..." (Jones 1970:xix).

This attitude towards the nature of language is also found in the work of other contemporary linguists. Hudson for example, claims that "language is a mental phenomenon - a kind of knowledge, plus the exploitation of this knowledge in behaviour" (1984:31) and that "this theory generalizes beyond language, and allows us to analyse language structure as a particular case of knowledge structure" (1984:37). He goes on to say that "the semantic structures ... are not only similar to general conceptual structures, but they are
instances of such structures" (1984:38). In other words, the structures that we find in language are not unique to language but are also found elsewhere in the experiential world. For example, the dependency relation between a head and its modifier can be compared to the relation that exists between many co-occurring things of the physical world.

Hudson notes that "dependency relations are common outside language, in much the same sense as they have when applied to language. For example, a dustbin depends on a house in much the same way as an adjective depends on a noun (you do not expect a dustbin without a house, and the dustbin is located in relation to a house, not vice versa)" (Hudson 1984:38). We might say then that the mental processes that underly the construction of language - although they seem hidden deep in the mind and therefore not directly observable - are not extremely complicated but, on the contrary, are based on a system of elementary contrasts or dichotomies.

2.2 The systemic nature of the word

Before we begin an analysis of the system underlying the fundamental dependency relations of the French noun phrase, we should first examine the systemic nature of the word, and of the parts of speech, as seen by Gustave Guillaume.

Guillaume divided the parts of speech into two groups: "prédicatives" and "non prédicatives" (1982:130-1). A
further distinction is made between the parts of speech that are categorized in space (the noun) and those categorized in time (the verb).

The predicative parts of speech are the substantive, the adjective, the adverb and the verb. They have in common the presence of lexical content which is derived from the perception of our experiences. Theoretically, since it is quite easy to add new nouns, adjectives, etc. to the lexicon, they constitute an open-ended set. The non predicative parts of speech are the pronoun, the article, the preposition and the conjunction. Whereas the predicative parts of speech are easily defined, the non predicative parts of speech do not lend themselves to notional definition and, theoretically, they make up a finite set. As Valin points out, this absence of lexical content is seen from the fact that dictionaries offer very little to indicate the notional substance of articles, pronouns, etc. (1981:28). Moignet notes that "les parties du discours prédicatives ne sont pas, elles, adossées à l'expérience du hors-moi. Leur matière notionnelle, tout entière tirée du moi pensant, n'est faite que de ce que la pensée a pu saisir des conditions de son propre fonctionnement" (1981:13).

The traditional distinction between noun and adjective is somewhat modified in this account. Guillaume uses the terms adjective and substantive, which together make up the part of speech called the noun. He claims that what
distinguishes the adjective and the substantive is the mechanism of incidence (1984:119). Indeed, there are many linguists who make this distinction between noun and substantive, and consider the broader category of noun to include both substantives and adjectives (for example, Jespersen 1924:72 and Hudson 1980a:195). In much of the discussion that follows, what is often called the noun will be referred to as the substantive. As we see the similarities and the differences between the adjective and the substantive, it should become clear why we need the three terms: noun, substantive, and adjective.

2.3 What is a dependency relation?

Most people will agree that there is some sort of dependency relation between the words we use to express our thoughts. It is generally accepted that in the noun phrase, the adjective depends on what is traditionally called the noun and the adverb depends on the adjective. As we mentioned earlier, Jespersen, for example, saw that a tertiary (e.g. adverb) is subordinate to a secondary (e.g. adjective), which in turn is subordinate to a primary (e.g. substantive). But what does it mean for one word to modify or to depend on another? What is the system that is at work at the subconscious level of language giving rise to what many linguists call a dependency relation? The reason Jespersen and his successors could not determine what in fact distinguishes a primary from a secondary, was that they
had not discovered the mechanism that Guillaume called incidence. In particular, they had not seen what Guillaume called the internal incidence of the substantive.

2.4. The langue / discours dichotomy

Even though most prominent linguists know very little if anything of it, the notion of incidence, discovered by Guillaume, was a major breakthrough in linguistics. It is this process of language that explains, for example, the fundamental difference between the substantive and the adjective.

In order to have a good understanding of the mechanism of incidence, it is necessary to consider Guillaume's fundamental distinction between the two different levels of language: langue (tongue) and discours (discourse). This dichotomy appears at the surface to be the same as the more familiar formula proposed at the turn of the century by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Cours de linguistique générale: langage = langue + parole (1916:36-39). However, Guillaume realised that de Saussure's formula was not fully complete. In the Guillaumian model, speech (= parole) is replaced by a different notion, discourse. For Guillaume, parole, in the sense of "the spoken word" or speech sounds, exists at both levels, in tongue as well as in discourse: in tongue, we have virtual, non-physical speech sounds, and in discourse, actualised, physical speech sounds.
Whereas tongue is a permanent entity, discourse is momentary. Tongue is an underlying system (in fact a system of systems) that is constantly available to provide us with the mechanisms, the means to shape our perceptions and ideas as the momentary need occurs to express them to someone else, or even just to clarify these ideas in our own mind. Tongue constitutes the permanent possibility of creation (of words, for example) and discourse is the actual, temporary creation (of these words) in the act of language - it is what results when tongue is used.

2.5 The genesis of the word: unit of tongue

In Guillaume's theory, the word is a unit of potentiality constructed at the level of tongue. The word is the unit of tongue whereas the sentence is the unit of discourse: "...on exprime à partir du représenté. Le représenté, c'est la langue, les actes de représentation qui la constituent et qui chacun y sont représentés par une unité de puissance dénommée MOT. L'exprimé, c'est le discours, les actes d'expression qui le constituent et qui, chacun en l'état fini, ont pour terme une unité d'effet qualifiée." (Guillaume 1973a:154). Gérard Moignet notes that "la genèse linguistique est d'abord une genèse de noms, par généralisation des données de l'expérience" (1981:xi). It is not difficult to see the logic of such a position, especially if we consider that a child learns the names of the objects of his or her experiences - i.e. learns words -
long before being able to put words together to form a complete sentence.

It is thanks to Guillaume’s insight into the systemic nature of the word that we are able to explain the processes of tongue that are at play in the dependency relations linking the elements of the French noun phrase. In Guillaumian linguistics, the construction of the word in tongue involves different mental operations or processes which give rise to the different systems of the word. Guillaume shows us that construction of the word is based on a fundamental process that involves particularisation followed by universalisation. For Guillaumian, this mental operation is the most fundamental of the mind’s activities.

In his lecture of February 19, 1942, Guillaume explains that the operation he elsewhere called particularisation is an operation of discrimination whereby the mind abstracts a particular idea or experience from the universal - i.e. of all the perceived experiences or ideas, the mind ‘zooms in on’ the one in question, bringing it out from the mass of what is thinkable, to individualise it (1973a:192). The second process is an opposing operation of categorisation, seen as the mirror image of the first operation. The individuality obtained in the first operation is maintained, but now, as the mind moves back towards the universal, the notion acquires a general categorisation which results in the part of speech.
These two operations are also referred to as "idéogénèse" and "morphogénèse" (see, for example, Moignet 1981:29). The first operation, ideogenesis, gives rise to the concept, the particular notional content of the word. In the second operation, morphogenesis, the grammatical features of that concept are determined.

In the construction of the word in a language such as English or French, the mental activities and operations of tongue are intercepted in order to give shape to our ideas and perceptions. Guillaume believes that the distinct nature of any word constructed by tongue depends on the point at which these two mental movements are intercepted or interrupted - i.e. either earlier or later in the operation. It was this technique, which Guillaume called "linguistique de position" (1973a:185), that led him to discover the systemic nature of the word.

Throughout his work, Guillaume referred to this basic movement of thought as the "tenseur binaire radical", which for him represents a universal mechanism in the structure of language (1982:77). For Guillaume, in all language activity, in all languages, this relation is always in play: "celle du très grand qu'est l'universel et du très petit qu'est le singulier" (1982:77). The "tenseur" can be illustrated as follows:
In languages like French, this fundamental mechanism represents the natural movement of the mind which seizes a particular notion and then generalizes it as a part of speech (Guillaume 1982:78).

In this theory, then, the notional content of the word (which we might also refer to as the "notional significate" (Jones 1970:206) or the "lexical meaning" (Guillaume 1984:125)) is determined by zeroing in from the universality of the whole lexicon to a singular, particular item - i.e. the choice of a single lexical item. It is in the conclusion of the second movement, universalisation, as the mind moves from the particular in the direction of the general, that the word is categorized as a part of speech, obtaining its "formal significate" or "grammatical meaning" (Jones 1970:206 and Guillaume 1982:125). Here, the roles or functions of the word are determined - i.e. the grammatical relations it can have in the sentence. This is where the distinction is made between noun and verb, for example. The verb has a temporal categorisation whereas the noun does not, but rather is categorised in space. A noun like enseignement and the corresponding verb enseigner have the same notional significate but differ in their formal significate.
2.6 Incidence and the parts of speech: adjective and substantive

In addition to being categorised in time or in space, the intended use of a word is determined by other processes as well. For Guillaume, incidence is a property which plays a big role in determining the category of words. It is the property which distinguishes between an adjective and a substantive. We have already seen that the creation of a substantive or an adjective, for example, is made possible by the processes available in tongue. Guillaume insists on the fact that for the different elements that result from the act of language, there are different underlying processes of tongue: "Il n'y a pas de substantif: il y a dans la langue une substantivation plus ou moins tôt interceptée. Il n'y a pas d'adjectif, il y a une adjectivation plus ou moins avancée en elle-même au moment où l'esprit la saisit. Il n'y a pas de mot, il y a une genèse extraordinairement compliquée du mot, une lexigénèse" (1973a:224). Incidence is one of the processes, perhaps the main process, which leads to substantivisation and adjectivisation.

Incidence is seen as a form of predication. The adjective is such that it is always incident to a substantive - i.e. it is said of a substantive (in une chaise rouge, rouge is incident to, is said of chaise). This incidence of one word to another is referred to as "external incidence". A substantive, on the other hand, has
"Internal incidence" - it is incident to itself. Guillaume explains: "Quand je dis: la marche me fatigue, marche est un sémantème qui n'est pas dit d'un autre sémantème, représenté par un nom ou un pronom, mais qui est dit de lui-même, livrant ainsi tout à la fois l'apport d'une signification et le support de la signification apportée" (Guillaume 1973a:204). In other words, a substantive such as chaise is not said of some other word in the speech chain, but is said of that which is conveyed by chaise. (For the rest of this study we will use import as the translation of Guillaume's "apport" - see Guillaume 1984:120ff).

2.7 The analysis of incidence: import and support

What exactly is it that constitutes the grammatical support and the notional import that is incident to it? In other words, what is the precise nature of this mechanism? Guillaume notes in his lecture of June 4, 1948 (series C): "It is the grammatical person, ultimately, that forms the support for the meaningful import of the word. A word contains the notion of logical person only insofar as the imported meaning contains reference to a support. It is the reference to a support which gives the word logical person. In other words, the logical person is present in the substantive, and can be considered absent in the adjective... we are dealing with a term which provides for a relation between an import and a support, and the presence of the support entails the presence of person" (1984:122).
Both the adjective and the substantive carry meaning, a lexical content, but for the adjective, this meaning may be said of many different supports, all varying by nature. The adjective bleu can be said of anything from a shirt to a chair to the sky. Guillaume explains that this is a result of the fact that the adjective alone has no indication of its support, or, in other words, of person. The substantive, on the other hand, does indicate the support of the imported meaning: grammatical person is contained in the substantive. The imported meaning of the substantive, therefore, has a more limited application, compared to that of the adjective. This is because the notional content of a substantive like chaise can be said only of what can be considered as some kind of chair.

Guillaume's explanation of this fundamental mechanism of language is very abstract, leaving the question open for clarification. Some of those who followed Guillaume's train of thought, for example Roch Valin and John Hewson, have taken up Guillaume's abstract notion of incidence and have succeeded in applying it in a more concrete manner, clarifying what in fact are the import and the support in the process of incidence. Such work has led to a better understanding of what the 'internal incidence of the substantive' really means.

Valin (1988) concludes that many linguistic phenomena are based on the mechanism of incidence. He claims that the two most general parameters of tongue are the notions of
import and support "... sans la présence desquelles, dans l'inconscient de la pensée en instance de langage, ce n'est pas seulement la production de tout discours qui devient impossible - puisque parler c'est, par nécessité, dire quelque chose (apport) de quelqu'un ou de quelque chose (support) - mais aussi la réalisation, sous les espèces d'une langue, des moyens en permanence offerts au sujet parlant de satisfaire à tout moment à cette condition impérative. Ce sont en effet les deux mêmes fonctions [prédicatives inverses] d'apport et de support qui commandent le jeu des incidences auxquelles les parties du discours doivent d'être le mécanisme efficace de construction de la phrase ..." (Valin 1988:14).

2.8 Import and support: lexeme and referent

Hewson explains that in order to understand the internal incidence of the substantive, we must first establish a theory of language reference since it is the referent that constitutes the support in the substantive to which the lexical import is incident. According to Hewson, then, the internal incidence of the substantive makes it the interface between language and the experiential world: "il contient, à titre de support interne, un élément de la perception ou de la mémoire, auquel sera imposé, comme une sorte d'étiquette, un apport lexical" (1988:4). The substantive is created, then, from the union, within the
same word, of a **lexeme** (the **import**) and a **referent** (the **support** for the lexeme).

The referent is an essential element if we wish to talk about our experiences, about someone or something. In order to talk about a book on the table, for example, we first have some mental perception of that book. According to Hewson, the physical entity, the "external referent" that we can see and feel "must first become a percept, or internal referent, a mental referent before it can be incorporated into the structure of a noun and so become a linguistic element, thereby making the noun the interface between language and the world of experience as perceived by the speaker" (forthcoming:7). We see then that the structure of the substantive is binary, having two essential elements: the referent and the lexeme.

Of course, the referent needed in the act of language can also be a memory or even something imagined. The point here is that we must have some sort of mental image of the object of our speech before we can actually talk about it. Once this perception is realised in our minds, we can attach to the mental referent the stored linguistic label or name (i.e. lexeme) that best predicates it. When we say that the construction of the substantive is based on internal incidence, it means that both the lexeme and the referent which is characterised by the lexeme are represented or incorporated within the same word. Valin notes that having internal incidence means that the substantive belongs to the
category of notions that indicate in advance the "nature" of the thing or person of which they are said (1981:42).

The lexical import of an adjective, on the other hand, characterises an element which is external to the adjective, namely, the substantive. Hewson sums up the fundamental difference between the substantive (which he refers to in this instance as noun) and the adjective: "the noun, in short, as a linguistic element, incorporates that which it characterizes; the normal epithet adjective, on the other hand, does not incorporate that which it characterizes; the incidence of the adjective is external" (forthcoming:7). As Hewson points out, this binary nature of the substantive is the basis of several grammatical contrasts in the French noun phrase: number - the singular/plural contrast in the substantive; the definite/indefinite contrast marked by the article system; the distinction between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives (1988:4).

Hewson illustrates how the substantive is a linguistic element of binary structure in the following diagram (1988:4):

```
lexème
↓
référent
```
The arrow shows the direction of this fundamental dependency relation - the internal incidence of lexeme to referent.

2.9 More on the substantive / adjective distinction

When we wish to speak of someone or something, there is typically a single external referent and, consequently, one internal, mental referent - for example, (un) vieux livre. In the act of language, several lexemes may be required to fulfill the needs of discourse - in our example, the lexemes VIEUX and LIVRE are used to say what is needed to represent the perceived referent. Now these lexemes end up playing different roles in relation to the referent and to each other - these relations are categorised in the parts of speech: adjective and substantive.

We might represent the dependency relation between the adjective vieux and the substantive livre in the following diagram:

(Note that the arrow linking the two lexemes suggests that one is dependent on the other. In this case, this is in fact true. It will be shown in Chapter Four that the binary structure of the French noun allows for the lexeme of the adjective to be incident either to the lexeme of the
substantive or to its referent - the mechanism underlying the distinction between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives.)

It is the notion of incidence that explains what is at work when in discourse an adjective seems to have been used as a substantive, or vice versa. Again we are reminded of Guillaume's stand that in tongue, there is no substantive, there is just a process of substantivisation, a process whereby both a lexeme and its grammatical support, the referent, are incorporated within the same word. Likewise, there is no adjective, there is just a process of adjectivisation whereby the lexeme is not united with its referent within the same word, but rather is made incident to the substantive that represents that referent.

Consider for example the word beau, which is usually used as an adjective. In the adjectival use, the word beau carries only the imported meaning and in no way in itself identifies the referent, the person, for example, which is the object of discourse. Consequently, the adjective can be said of many different things, it can be incident to numerous referents: un beau travail, un beau livre, un beau paysage, un homme beau, etc. (Guillaume 1973a:206). In Guillaume's account; it is also possible that the imported meaning of beau finds an internal grammatical support. Such is the case when we say that the adjective is being used as a substantive, as in le beau est un second visage du vrai (Guillaume 1973a:206). The word beau, normally used as an
adjective, has been substantivised. According to Guillaume, the lexical import of *beau* is no longer incident to some linguistically external support. Consequently, it is given internal incidence. For Guillaume, the lexeme is made incident to the very idea it conveys.

2.10 Adverb: primary vs. secondary external incidence

In general, external incidence refers to any relation where a lexeme, not united within the same word with the referent, must depend on some other word. Now, to distinguish between the adjective and the adverb, which is traditionally said to modify the adjective, Guillaume had to distinguish two different types of external incidence: primary and secondary. The adjective (Jespersen's secondary) has, in Guillaume's terms, an import which finds its grammatical support in the substantive - this is primary external incidence. The import of the adverb (Jespersen's tertiary), on the other hand, has its grammatical support in the adjective, in an element engaged in primary external incidence - this is secondary external incidence.

2.11 Article

The next point to be discussed in this chapter is perhaps the one which will be the most controversial, namely the direction of the dependency relation between the article and the substantive. For the moment, we will consider only the articles *le*, *la*, *les* (definite) and *un*, *une*
(indefinite), which, according to Moignet, make up the fundamental elements of the general article system (1981:132). The discussion of the partitive articles, as well as the other determiners or definers of the noun phrase such as the so-called possessive and the demonstrative adjectives, will be taken up in Chapter Three. For the present, we wish only to introduce the fundamental mechanisms of the article to show its relation to the substantive, its general role in the makeup of the French noun phrase.

Traditionally, the article is said to depend on the head noun in the noun phrase, and the very convincing argument for this is that the French article agrees in number and gender with this noun. Many linguists of the dependency grammar persuasion have claimed that in a dependency relation, it is the dependent element, the modifier that agrees with the head. A further argument is that in a dependency relation the head is the essential element - i.e. it can not be dropped whereas the dependent modifiers can be dropped with no resulting ungrammaticality. In other words, it is argued that we can find the substantive without an article, but the article cannot occur without the substantive (at least not in English). Consequently, the article has generally been considered as having adjectival qualities - i.e. a dependent element in the noun phrase, just as the adverb and adjective are ultimately dependent on the substantive.
This view, however, is not the one shared by all linguists. Guillaume, for one, saw the article as being the head of the French noun phrase. He claims that "the article is not adjectival with regard to the noun; it does not indicate any of its qualities. In fact, the agreement between article and noun is the reverse of that between adjective and noun because it is not the article which is said of the noun, but the noun which is said of the article" (1984:127). This position that the article is not a dependent element in the noun phrase was taken not only by those who were inspired by Guillaume's works, but also by others who apparently are not familiar with the Guillaumian theory of language. Richard Hudson, for example, in (1980a), saw the article as a dependent element, but had changed his position by the time he wrote his Word Grammar, where he admits the controversial nature of his stand by stating the heading of that section as a question: "Determiners as heads?" (1984:90).

For Guillaume, the system of the article offers a lot of information on the general nature of language. We noted earlier that the article is considered as a non predicative part of speech. At the same time, the article is categorised, like the substantive, in space (Guillaume 1982:131,135). For this reason, Guillaume claims that it belongs to the noun system and refers to the category "nom-article" (which occurs in a special relation with the "nom-substantif") (1973c:40). In fact, Guillaume considers the
article as a 'dematerialized' noun - i.e. it has the grammatical form of the noun but is void of the notional content found in the substantive.

As Jones remarks: "Guillaume suggests that the system of the article - like all other basic grammatical systems - is realized on the basis of a mental contrast of something that is sensed in the analysis of the universe; and this grammatical system of the article is grasped in the framework of dynamic contrast universal (the general) / singular or particular (the individual). In such a mechanism of contrast, Guillaume insists that the mind is dynamically engaged in a movement between the two extremes of the universal and the singular, the necessary limits of this movement" (Jones 1980:115).

It follows, therefore, that the article results in the same movement of the mind as does the substantive, i.e. a movement involving the binary tensor, a movement from the universal to the particular and then from the particular to the universal:

\[
\begin{align*}
U_1 & \rightarrow S_1 | S_2 & U_2 \\
\text{(particularising)} & \quad \text{(generalising)}
\end{align*}
\]

In order to understand the Guillaumian theory on the article, then, we need to understand how the system of the noun works - not only in tongue, but also in discourse (Jones 1980:130).
We recall that in the first tension, the lexical meaning of the noun is selected and in the second movement or tension, that of universalisation, the grammatical meaning is determined (i.e. the notions of gender, number, person, etc.). The article, then, is a result of this same mental process. What distinguishes between the "article-nom" and the "substantif-nom" is that whereas the formal indications of the nominal category are maintained in the genesis of the article, the notional substance, the lexical meaning of the substantive is absent. In the article, this substance is replaced by either the first tension (i.e. a notion of particularisation) or the second (i.e. a notion of generalisation).

In tongue, the noun is a system which has an "extensive potentiality" (Jones 1980:116). This range of meanings that a noun can have must be limited in actual discourse to the single meaning or effect needed for the moment. In Guillaumian theory, it is the article that determines the discursive effect of the noun being used - it is said to "actualize" the noun. According to Jones, "it is this actualization of the substantive's range in tongue to a particular extensity in discourse which is declared by the article" (1980:116).

In Guillaume's positional linguistics, if the operation, which is displayed as the radical binary tensor, is suspended or intercepted in the movement of particularization, we have the indefinite article:
interception in the opposing operation of universalisation results in the use of the definite article. The French article, then, is seen not just as a word but as a system and the different positions within that system are represented in the act of language by a different word: *le*, *la*, *un*, etc. - each of which, due to its position in the system, has a different "effet de sens" (Moignet 1981:134).

Valin suggests that the role of the article is to close the process of substantivisation: "... non seulement les articles *un* et *le* ... n'ajoutent aucune spécification notionnelle intéressant la "nature" de ce dont parle un substantif donné, ... il n'est non plus ajouté aucune détermination formelle qui ne soit déjà involue dans la définition même du substantif. ... l'article ne met en cause que la seule réalité de l'incidence interne dont il a grammaticalement pour fonction de spécifier deux modalités de réalisation: soit sous mouvement particularisateur (article *un*), soit sous mouvement généralisateur (article *le* et ses dérivés)" (1981:39).

In Valin's account, the article is the determiner that actualises the most general formal property of the substantive, its internal incidence (a 'potential' of tongue that has to be 'actualised' in discourse). The work of the article, in the very close grammatical relation it has with the substantive, is not to add some notional or lexical content to what the substantive itself signifies (as does the adjective), but to specify the nature of the internal
incidence of the substantive. The article is: "... un complément formel venant spécifier, par fonction propre, les conditions dans lesquelles se réalise l’incidence interne dont le substantif est en langue puissancièrement porteur et à laquelle il doit, comme substantif, sa spécificité grammaticale ..." (Valin 1981:43).

We recall that in tongue the notional substance, the lexical content of the substantive announces the nature of the support to which it is incident - and this phenomenon is unique to this part of speech. In discourse, depending on the particular, momentary situation and needs, there may be great variation of the mental image one has of the support, of the referent we might say. It may be broad and general or narrow and particular, and to varying degrees. The article system, therefore, is a solution to this variation.

When we use the article, the notional import of the substantive ultimately becomes incident to a formal support which tongue has established as a separate word - a pronominal element. According to Guillaume, the substantive is in fact adjectivised in the creation of the noun phrase. This leads him to propose the following: "la maison = la / qui est / maison" (see Moignet 1981:130).

Since the article is a materialisation of person, which is unique to the noun category, it assumes the formal categories of the substantive: its gender, number and case. The article, void of the notional content of the substantive, does not inherently have number or gender - the
article simply represents one of the two tensions of the binary tensor and these have no gender. In his lecture of March 7, 1957, Guillaume notes that "... the article declares a number and a gender that are not related to its own contents and that call for the contents which it does not have - the contents belonging to the noun announced by the article" (1984:128).

For Guillaume, the function of the article, therefore, is to 'announce' a substantive by taking on its formal categories as well as defining the degree of particularity or generality of the mental referent, as momentarily needed by discourse. The article is a formal substantive which receives the qualification of the notional substantive it anticipates. It follows that this part of speech is the grammatical support for the incidence of the substantive. Moignet notes that in discourse, the article symbolises the very nature of the substantive - namely, person: "il l'évoque anticipativement, ou la fournit là où elle n'existe pas" (1981:22). It is in this respect that we can say that it is the substantive that is said of the article and not vice versa. The article represents the referent of which the lexical meaning of the substantive is predicated.

Moignet notes as well that it is this status of the article, which is ultimately to be the "form" of the substantive, that allows for the process of substantivization to be applied to practically any part of speech - a good many of which eventually become internalized
as permanent substantives of tongue: le beau, le savoir, le bien, le pour et le contre, le rendez-vous (Moignet 1981:130). Moignet points out that this mechanism even allows for the momentary substantivization of words which we might ordinarily find it difficult to consider as substantives: "le piquant de l'aventure est que ...". It is in this way that practically any notion, any lexeme can be united with a formal support allowing it to be used in discourse as a substantive.

2.12 The fundamental dependency relations of the French NP

We will leave further discussion of the system of the article until the following chapter, where we will further clarify the status of the article as a part of speech, and discuss the differences between the articles presented here and the other definers of the noun phrase. In the following paragraphs, we will conclude this chapter by giving an overview of the relations linking the elements of a simple noun phrase of the type: article + adverb + adjective + substantive. Our example is borrowed from Valin: un très gros chat (1981:27).

Valin (1981) explains that the linear order of the elements that make up the French noun phrase is exactly the opposite of the temporal order of their notional genesis. Hewson points out this is justified by the fact that it is the lexeme of the substantive that determines the gender of the article and not vice versa (1986:7). Since the French
article carries all the grammatical marks of the substantive, it indicates the end of the grammaticalisation of that lexeme.

In other words, when we wish to talk about somebody or something and when the needs of discourse call for the creation of a noun phrase, the first notion to be established is the lexeme that names the perceived person or thing (the referent) that is to be spoken of. The result of this naming, this union of lexical import and grammatical support (the mental referent) is, as we have already seen, the creation of the substantive, marked by its internal incidence. Once this internal incidence of the substantive is set in motion, further predication is possible. Consequently, an adjective may become incident to the substantive, and an adverb may become incident to that adjective.

Taking Roch Valin's example *un très gros chat*, we see that the adverb *très* is incident to (is said of) the adjective *gros* which in turn is incident to the substantive *chat*. The three levels of incidence can be illustrated as follows:
The notional genesis of this noun phrase starts with a percept or a memory, the mental referent to which the lexeme CHAT is applied. At this stage, in Valin’s account, the internal incidence that makes the substantive is a potentiality. In his words, "le programme opératif propre - à savoir le mécanisme de l’incidence interne - est pour l’instant laissé en suspens, c’est-à-dire maintenu à l’état d’incidence puissancielle" (1981:47).

Once the support system is mentally established, the requirements of discourse may or may not call for an adjective to modify the substantive; if so, the adjective itself may in turn need to be modified. Let us assume for the moment that the momentary needs of discourse do not call for the use of an adjective to say what it is one wants to say about the referent. In this case, the article is brought into play - "ce qui aura pour effet de décaler d’une position, dans le dispositif de visée, l’élément [chat] qui se trouve ainsi pouvoir venir prendre place dans le champ de visée de [le]" (Valin 1981:47). This is how Valin explains the discrepancies between linear order and structural order.
in the French noun phrase (or at least in the type of NP being discussed here): the notions established earlier are pushed ahead by those that follow them in the notional genesis of the noun phrase.

It is the article which brings the construction of such a noun phrase to its completion. It is not until the article is applied that the internal incidence of the substantive, which has until this point remained "incidence puissancielle", can be resolved or formalized. The substantive is established as having formal incidence to the article.

Given this perspective, in un gros chat, the application of the notional import of the adjective must take place before the process of substantivisation is closed by the article. For Valin, if the adjective is not to be modified by an adverb, then the primary external incidence of adjective to substantive is established. On the other hand, if an adverb is to be applied, this incidence is left suspended until the secondary external incidence of the adverb to the adjective is established. In other words, once the incidence of adjective to substantive is put into motion, the incidence of adverb to adjective is opened up, forming the unit très gros. According to Valin, "l'incidence de 'gros' à 'chat' ... ne pourra survenir qu'une fois réalisée celle de 'très' à 'gros', puisqu'il s'agit d'un traitement de ce dernier" (1981:59).
Intuitively, we can see that *très* and *gros* go together notionally to be said of *chat* and that this group of words *très gros chat*, is in the mind of the language user a unit which can finally be specified for discourse by the appropriate article (or other definer), bringing an end to the process of substantivisation. The result in discourse is the noun phrase (or phrasal noun, as we will call it later) *un très gros chat*, which has the following structure (Valin 1981:38):

We can also illustrate this dependency structure with a tree diagram:

Now that we have examined the system underlying the fundamental dependency relations of the French noun phrase, we can study some aspects of these relations in more detail.
CHAPTER THREE

3. Definer and substantive

3.1 Introduction: definers as heads

Having examined the fundamental system of the article (the definite and indefinite articles), our next task is to study the other definers of the French noun phrase - the other words that complete the process of substantivisation. We will show that the basic system provided by the articles un, une, le, la, les is supplemented by the partitive articles and the so-called demonstrative adjectives and possessive adjectives (just to mention the major categories). Before we begin to compare these other definers to the fundamental articles, we will discuss the part of speech traditionally called the article and why it must be considered as the head of the noun phrase.

In his article entitled "Determiners as Heads", Hewson (forthcoming) indicates that through the past few decades, many linguists have been involved in discussion concerning the status of the deteminer. Using examples from several languages, Hewson shows that the articles and the other determiners are in fact pronouns and always act as the head of the noun phrase.

As early as 1949, Guillaume suggests that what are traditionally called articles, demonstrative adjectives, and possessive adjectives are in fact pronouns. He
distinguishes between two kinds of pronouns: suppletive, which in discourse stand in place of a noun - for example, il, je, tu, le, me, lui; and completive, which must be used with a noun - the articles, demonstratives ce, cet, cette, ces and possessives mon, ton, son, etc. (Guillaume 1973b:74).

We have already seen in Chapter Two that Guillaume sees the article as belonging to the noun system, forming a complement with the substantive. One argument in favour of the analysis of the articles as pronouns is that the definite articles (completive pronouns) can also be used as suppletive pronouns - the direct object pronouns le, la, les. It is the view of some linguists that there is no convincing reason to treat the latter as pronouns while considering the use of these same words with a noun as articles dependent on that noun. Hewson (forthcoming:1) notes that this point of view has been promoted by scholars from differing schools of thought (for example, Yvon 1948-50 and 1957, and Hudson 1984). Hudson points out that Postal (1966) and Sommerstein (1972) provide evidence that the, which always occurs with a noun, is an allomorph of he, she, it, they, which never occur with a lexical noun (1984:91). It appears that Guillaume, in fact, was one of the first to present this distinction.

For Guillaume, the difference between the completive pronouns (for example, the article le) and the suppletive pronouns (for example, the subject il or the object le) is
found in the mechanism of incidence. The completive pronouns participate in the internal incidence of the noun - the article, as we saw in the previous chapter, closes the process of substantivisation by determining the "extension" (i.e. the degree of particularity or generality) of the referent. The suppletive pronouns, on the other hand, can be used only when this process has already been completed - they are used to refer to an internal incidence that has already been resolved (Guillaume 1982:55).

As we have already seen, the substantive is the part of speech that indicates, by itself, the nature of its own support - i.e. the person or thing of which it is said: "homme aura pour support un être de la nature homme" (Guillaume 1982:54). This is what we refer to as the internal incidence of the substantive. In Guillaume's account, the internal incidence of the substantive is a "fait de discours" as well as a "fait de langue": "l'incidence, dans le substantif, est fait de langue en ce que dès l'apport, par l'apport même, la nature du support est annoncée. Apporter l'idée 'homme', c'est annoncer un support que cette notion implique, un support qui, en discours, ne sortira pas de ce que connote en langue le mot homme ..." (1982:61).

However, as we noted in the previous chapter, this is "incidence puissancielle" - in tongue, the internal incidence of the substantive is not complete in that the import can not in itself determine the "extension" that must
be established for the support, an extension that must suit the momentary needs of discourse. In other words, the import of the substantive intrinsically subsumes the potential supports to which it may be incident but it is only in discourse that the actual support is determined - and this is done by the intervention of the article, or some other determiner. As Guillaume notes: "le mot homme apporte avec lui la faculté, la liberté de prendre le support qu’il se destine et implique, sous des conditions d’extension formelle allant de la plus étroite particularisation à la plus large généralisation. Et c’est pour déterminer dans le discours l’extension attribuée au support, c’est-à-dire à la personne, qu’a été inventé le pronom spécial qu’est l’article" (1982:54).

This state of affairs is exemplified a little later in Guillaume’s lecture of January 14, 1949: "c’est dans le discours que je saurai si l’apport ‘homme’ sera, de par la visée du discours, incident à l’espèce-homme: l’homme est mortel, ou incident à un individu-homme: un homme entra, l’homme entra" (Guillaume 1982:62). The function of the suppletive pronouns, on the other hand, is to economise on this process of incidence. Instead of recreating an internal incidence already created in discourse, one uses a suppletive pronoun to refer back to that element.

We mentioned in the previous chapter that Hudson too argues that the determiner is head of the noun phrase. He classifies the following as determiners of English: "...
quantifiers (all, every, three, etc.); articles (a, the, some); and various other words such as this and which" (1984:90), all of which are the head of the noun phrase in which they occur and not the modifier, as tradition has assumed.

Although the definite and indefinite articles in English can not be used as suppletive pronouns, determiners like all, three, some, this and which can, as Hudson notes, be used in the sentence in positions that are considered to be reserved for nouns. It follows that they should be considered as nouns (or pronouns). He claims that there is no reason to treat these words in this usage as pronouns and then classify them as adjectives when they are used with a noun. In other words, why treat the word some as a pronoun in some have already finished but as an adjective in some students have already finished?

It might be argued that the minimal lexical content of determiners is evidence that they are not heads but rather modifiers. Hudson notes, however, that "the lack of lexical content in determiners is irrelevant, because there is no general requirement for heads to have more lexical-type meaning than their modifiers" (1984:91). He also uses the "principle of adjacency" to argue for the treatment of the determiner as head. This principle claims that the only element that can be placed between a modifier and its head is another modifier of the same head. "This analysis explains why the determiner is always before any adjectival
or other modifiers: if the lexical noun modifies the
determiner, then its own modifiers must not be separated
from it by the determiner" (Hudson 1984:91).

Hewson uses examples from different languages (Italian,
Portuguese, Spanish and Classical Greek) to provide evidence
that "articles may operate as pronouns that are modified by
other elements to form an NP" (forthcoming:5). It can be
shown that in many languages, determiners are used in noun
phrases where there is obviously no head noun on which the
determiner is dependent. In Hewson's Portuguese example "A
educação portuguesa, como a da maioria dos países
europeus..." (Hewson forthcoming:3), the feminine definite
singular a occurs with the noun educação and then with a
prepositional phrase da maioria.... In the second noun
phrase, the article is obviously modified by the following
prepositional phrase and is therefore the head of that NP.
If this is so, then there is no reason to treat the same
word as a dependent modifier of the noun in the first NP.
The most logical explanation is that the word a is head in
each NP.

3.2 Possessives and demonstratives as heads

Hewson (forthcoming) also uses the distinction made in
Romance languages between strong and weak possessives as
evidence that determiners are heads and not modifiers. The
strong possessives are used with an article and are
adjectival in nature - for example, in Italian, il mio
libro; the weak possessives are determiners and therefore are not used with an article - for example, in French *mon livre*. Hewson argues that *mon* in *mon livre* is a possessive pronoun, the head element of the NP, and not a possessive adjective, "because of a contrast with the strong forms, which are unquestionably possessive adjectives" (Hewson forthcoming:4). In the Italian example given above, the adjectival nature of the possessive *mio* can be seen from the fact that it is preceded by the article *il*, whereas in French, it is impossible to use the weak *mon* with an article.

We can add to Hewson's evidence the fact that it is possible to have in French an NP consisting only of a weak possessive and an adjective: *mon petit, mon vieux, mon pauvre, ma blonde*, etc. We saw in the previous chapter that it is ultimately the system of the article (and now we should say the system of the definer or the determiner) that allows the substantivisation of practically any lexeme, whether it be adjective, verb or even preposition (*le beau, le pour, le contre, un aller simple*). This is due to the fact that the article represents the referent of the noun phrase and therefore is the head.

The parallel between the construction with the weak possessives and that with the article suggests that the possessives belong to the same general system and play the same role in the French noun phrase as do the articles. In other words it is *mon* that allows the substantivisation of
petit. The lexical meaning of petit is said of the referent that is formalised in the determiner mon.

Valin (1981) and Moignet (1981) have also followed the insights of Guillaume, declaring that both the demonstratives (ce, cet, cette, ces) and the possessives (mon, ma, mes, etc.), which exclude the use of the definite and indefinite articles, are in fact, like the articles, actualisers of the noun. We have seen in our study of the articles that their basic function is to specify whether the substantive is to be actualised at some point along either a movement of particularisation or a movement of generalisation. The definite and indefinite articles are unique in that they mark the most general formalisation of the substantive - that is, they mark the substantive's internal incidence, the fundamental mechanism proper to this part of speech.

Valin (1981:39) notes that the demonstratives and the possessives in question are like the articles in that they add basically no notional specification concerning the "nature" of the substantive. Valin explains, however, that unlike the demonstratives and possessives, the articles do not add any formal determination or modification not already established grammatically in the definition of the substantive. The demonstratives and possessives, on the other hand, qualify the substantive by means of some spatial reference that the substantive can not itself convey, not
even with the assistance of a definite or indefinite article.

Moignet explains that in comparison to the possibilities offered by the definite and indefinite articles, the demonstratives and possessives cover only a part of the range of the movement represented by the second half of the binary tensor. Their use indicates that this movement of generalisation has been intercepted at an early stage. "Ils ont, l'un et l'autre, une extension sémantique moindre que celle de l'article d'extensité et ne correspondent qu'à une partie du domaine du seul article extensif le, plus précisément, à la partie initiale où il ne va pas loin en direction de la généralité. En effet, ces articles portent dans leur sémantèse un élément qui arrête en son cours la cinèse de généralisation" (Moignet 1981:147).

Moignet goes on to point out that the demonstratives are like the definite article in that they require a previous particularisation of the substantive and present the notion as a possession of the mind at the moment of discourse. The demonstrative though remains within the scope of the particular: "... il réfère le substantif, soit à une certaine situation spatiale en rapport avec l'espace du locuteur (valeur déictique, traduction linguistique du geste qui montre), soit à une situation contextuelle subsistant à la conscience (valeur anaphorique, de rappel mémoriel d'un élément de l'énoncé)" (Moignet 1981:148).
Of course there are other special uses of the demonstratives - for example, "c'est un de ces aventuriers" (Moignet 1981:148). Moignet notes that in this sort of usage there is a particularisation of the notional content of the substantive with un and then a slight generalisation with ces. This is the so-called demonstrative of notoriety.

According to Moignet, the possessives too imply an anterior particularisation. Because of their reference to an element in the system of person, the possessives maintain a sense of the particular which also corresponds to an early interception of the movement of generalisation (the second tension of the binary tensor). As Moignet notes, mon chapeau can be paraphrased, for the purpose of illustration, as "le chapeau mien" or "le chapeau qui se définit par rapport à moi" but not as "un chapeau mien" (1981:148).

Another piece of evidence presented by Moignet to indicate the affinity of the demonstratives and possessives with the definite article is the fact that they are compatible with the partitive de - for example, "il boit de cette eau"; "il mange de ses fruits" (1981:148). Moignet notes that unlike the definite article though, they are not excluded in a negative sentence: "je ne mange pas de ce pain-là"; "je ne boirai pas de ton eau".

3.3 More on articles

For Guillaume, the indefinite and definite articles make up the fundamental article system in French. This
article system is supplemented by the partitive article and the so-called zero article, as well as by the demonstratives and possessives.

Guillaume sees the indefinite / definite distinction as being abstracted from the system of number (1985:107). In Chapter Two, we saw that in Guillaume's analysis, the indefinite / definite distinction is based on the binary tensor which is centered on the numerical singular (1) (1985:63):

In tongue, these two fundamental articles represent two contrasting positions: the two tensions of the binary tensor. In other words, in tongue, the indefinite un represents the entire tension I - i.e. the mental movement from the universal towards the particular or singular, a movement which results in a particularisation of the notion conveyed by the noun. The definite le, on the other hand, represents the entire tension II - i.e. the movement away from the particular and towards the general or universal, a movement resulting in a generalisation of the notion.
conveyed by the noun. Guillaume also refers to the
generalising movement of the tension II symbolised by le as
a movement of "extension". The particularisation symbolised
by un is referred to as a movement of "anti-extension"
(Guillaume 1985:40). Whereas the definite article is
extensive, the indefinite is an anti-extensive article.

This is the system in tongue. Depending on the
particular effect momentarily required by discourse, one of
the two tensions must be intercepted at some distance, small
or great, from the numerical singular (1). The effect
obtained in discourse depends, then, not only on the
particular tension intercepted, but also on the distance
taken from the singular. It is in this respect that the
indefinite and definite articles may result in the same
effet or meaning in discourse. For this reason it has been
argued (for example, Forsgren 1978:21 and Moignet 1981:147)
that the traditional terms definite article and indefinite
article are not appropriate. Both may have a definite as
well as an indefinite meaning.

Consider Guillaume's examples (1985:65):

"Un homme doit apprendre de bonne heure à modérer ses
passions."

"L'homme doit apprendre de bonne heure à modérer ses
passions."

In both examples, the notion 'homme' is extremely
generalised, to the point where these two sentences are
almost synonymous, except for a slight nuance. This nuance
is a consequence of the fact that the indefinite article results from the interception of a particularising movement whereas the definite article is obtained from the interception of a generalising movement. The similarity in meaning is a result of the possibility the system offers for intercepting these two mental movements either early or late in their progression.

In the first example, with the indefinite article (un homme), the generalising effect is obtained as a result of an interception very early in tension I - i.e. at the very beginning of the movement from the general towards the particular or singular. This same effect is obtained with the definite article (l'homme) as a result of an interception taken very late in tension II - i.e. late in the movement away from the particular and towards the general. We might illustrate this as follows:

The same effect of generalisation, then, is caused by the distance taken relative to the singular or particular. The slight difference in meaning, on the other hand, stems from the contrastive nature of the two different movements being intercepted.
Moignet suggests that the general system of the fundamental articles can be described by referring to four main interceptions of the binary tensor, two in each tension (1981:133). This can be illustrated as follows:

Positions (1) and (4) are those we just explained, those which result in a generalising effect in discourse. They can be exemplified again in the following sentences (Moignet 1981:133):

"Un enfant est toujours l'ouvrage de sa mère."

"L'enfant est toujours l'ouvrage de sa mère."

Moignet notes that: "... une certaine orientation part.pularisante est perceptible dans la première phrase, qui est totalement absente de la seconde. Une nuance d'ordre stylistique est décelable entre les deux aphorismes" (1981:133).

The effect in discourse resulting from interceptions (2) and (3) is quite different. With interception (2), we have the introductory usage of the indefinite article as in: "Un agneau se désaltèrât ..." (Moignet 1981:133). Moignet explains that in this example, there is an individualised image of the notion conveyed by the substantive. With interception (3), on the other hand, the result is the
anaphoric use of the definite article as in: "Sire, répondez l'agneau ...".

Of course, not all instances of these two articles are the result of one of the four main interceptions. Moignet points out that there are many possible interceptions (an infinite number, we might say) between (1) and (2), as well as between (3) and (4). He explains, for example, that the use of the definite article results in a less general view of the notion represented by the substantive if that substantive is modified (1981:134): "L'enfant de notre temps est souvent trop gâté".

3.4 Definite / indefinite and the binary structure of the substantive

Hewson (1988 and forthcoming) explains this same phenomenon in terms of the binary structure of the substantive - i.e. the fact that the substantive incorporates both a lexeme and a mental referent (see Chapter Two). It can be shown that the distinction between the introductory usage of the indefinite and the anaphoric usage of the definite article is based on the contrast between lexeme and referent.

Indefinite reference results from the very creation of the substantive whereby a lexeme - a label or name - is applied to a percept, a perceived element of the experiential world. In other words, we start with the mental referent - the mental image of the person, thing or
idea of which we wish to say something - and we look for a label for it, the lexeme that best suits the particular needs of discourse. This activity of assigning a label or a name to a mental referent - which together are incorporated in the substantive - gives us the indefinite reference, and the use of the indefinite article. Hewson illustrates this act of naming in the following figure (1988:6):

\[
\text{percept} \rightarrow \text{lexème}
\]

Now that the label has been attached to the mental referent, it is possible later to use this same label to identify the original referent. The result is the anaphoric reference that is obtained in French with the definite article. Hewson illustrates the use of the lexeme to retrieve the referent to which it has already been applied as follows (1988:6):

\[
\text{lexème} \rightarrow \text{percept}
\]

This distinction between the definite and indefinite is well exemplified by Hewson (forthcoming:8): "so it is that the sentence 'Choose a card' means 'Choose whatever could be labelled by the lexeme card". And likewise, 'Turn the card over' means 'Turn over that which you have just identified as a card'..."

Hewson notes that in order to use the definite article and have its anaphoric reference, it is not necessary that the previous application of the lexeme be explicit. On the contrary, it can be implicit. Something that is in sight
can be considered as implicitly labelled - for example, "Passez-moi le sucre, s'il vous plait" (Hewson 1988:7).

The act of labelling may also be made implicit by the situation, by association. For example, if one is talking about a certain house, one could speak of "le jardin, le garage, la porte". Also, those elements of the experiential world which are common to us all and which are labelled at the beginning as the child learns his language may from then on be considered as already labelled for use in anaphoric reference: "la lune, le soleil, les étoiles" (Hewson 1988:7).

3.5 The partitive article

In the Guillaumian model, the partitive article too is explained in terms of the binary tensor. This subsystem of the article system includes not only the singular du and de la, but also the plural des, which is traditionally referred to as the indefinite plural - i.e. the plural of un - and for that reason, is often not considered as a partitive. These partitive articles are a combination of the word de and what Guillaume refers to as the 'extensive' articles - i.e. the definite le, la, and les. In Guillaume's account, these three combinations make up an article which, although secondary in relation to the fundamental definite articles, expresses a single process of tongue.
In Guillaume's analysis, the word *de*, when combined with the definite articles to form the partitive, is no longer a preposition. It has lost all its prepositional qualities and now belongs to the category of article. Its role in the system of the partitive is to reverse the movement represented by the definite article - i.e. the movement of generalisation. For Guillaume, when one uses the partitive, there is necessarily a balance established as the "extension" corresponding to the definite articles is suspended by the reverse movement of "anti-extension" represented by *de* (Guillaume 1985:105). *De*, then, reverses the movement of generalisation, the movement away from the singular that we have in tension II of the binary tensor. The partitive article, therefore, belongs to the same tension as the definite article, and we can illustrate this as follows:

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

Now Guillaume's model of the French article system can be expanded (Guillaume 1985:118):
This mental system accounts for the difference between, for example, the definite and the partitive in: "L'eau est un liquide" and "boire de l'eau". Guillaume notes that in this example: "... l'article le a pour effet d'étendre l'image eau à un champ d'extension très vaste, développé au voisinage immédiat de l'universel et embrassant tout ce que le mot eau est capable de couvrir" (1985:113). We might say then that in this usage of the definite article, the relatively late interception of the second tension has the effect in discourse of giving a very general image of the notion conveyed by the noun eau.

Now, the momentary needs of discourse do not always call for such an extension of the notional content of the noun. Guillaume explains: "... Il arrive souvent que la visée de discours est de produire une extension restreinte, ne sortant pas des limites appartenant à une certaine quantité. C'est pour obtenir cette extension quantitative plus ou moins restreinte que l'on fait appel à l'inverseur de. ... Le substantif eau, entraîné par l'article le jusqu'à
un champ d'extension très vaste avec lequel il se
confondrait dimensionnellement, est retiré de ce champ
d'extension par le mouvement inversif et récessif de
l'inverseur de, et, de ce retrait, il résulte qu'il prend
figure, par rapport au champ d'extension envisagé, d'une
image plus étroite qui n'en saurait couvrir qu'une partie et
apparaît ainsi, comparativement, en constituer une
représentation partitive" (Guillaume 1985:113).

Guillaume suggests that with the definite article in
the above example, the idea of quantity is absent because
the movement of generalisation has been allowed to sweep the
notion 'eau' off towards the universal, leaving any idea of
quantity far behind. The idea of a 'certain quantity'
obtained with the partitive article, on the other hand,
results from the operation which reverses the movement of
generalisation, turning the idea 'eau' back towards a more
'narrow' image of itself.

Just as the mental movement of tension II can be
suspended at a smaller or greater distance from the central
singular (1) in the application of the definite, so too can
the "anti-extensive" movement back towards the singular,
brought on by the "inverseur" de, be interrupted earlier or
later in its progression. A relatively early interception
will result in the idea of a larger quantity while a later
interception, resulting in a position closer to the
singular, will leave the impression of a smaller quantity.
For Guillaume, the plural *des* is a result of the same mechanism that is involved in the singular partitive articles. He believes that *des* is felt to be the plural of the indefinite article because although the partitive and indefinite articles are formed in different tensions of the binary tensor, the "psycho-mécanisme" is identical for both of them: "L'article *un* symbolise un mouvement d'anti-extension; l'article *des* symbolise, lui, un mouvement d'extension inverse, c'est-à-dire une extension changée inversement en son contraire, autrement dit, une anti-extension" (Guillaume 1985:121).

In his lecture of February 15, 1946, Guillaume explains that in modern French there is no morphological plural of *un* (which did exist in old French in the form *uns*) because whereas the plural is by nature an "extension", the indefinite article is essentially the symbol of a movement of "anti-extension", a movement that takes the notion conveyed by the noun towards the singular (1). It is because of this conflict that any such plural would have to result from the part of the system represented by tension II (Guillaume 1985:102).

In his different lectures on the partitive, Guillaume insists that the word *de* has no prepositional value when it is used to form the partitive article. Underlying the single form of discourse *de*, there are in tongue two different processes. In fact Guillaume suggests that there are two different categories: preposition and article. With
the partitive, the function of **de** is totally that of the
"inverseur" of the movement of generalisation represented by
the definite article. The potential of **de** in this case to
function as a preposition is reduced to zero. For Guillaume
this is an essential condition for the formation and use of
the partitive article. If the prepositional nature of **de** is
even minimally maintained - i.e. if this word is to any
extent engaged in the category of preposition - the
formation of the partitive article is not possible
(Guillaume 1985:125,128).

This analysis suggests that the nature of **de** is such
that as the potential value as preposition increases, the
potential as article is proportionally decreased. It is
only when the potential of **de** as a preposition has been
completely reduced to zero that this word can be combined
with **le** to form the partitive. In this case, **de** is
completely engaged in the category of article, reversing the
movement of generalisation in tension II.

Guillaume uses this account of the word **de** to explain,
for example, why the partitive can not be used following the
preposition **de**. In some cases where one might expect the
partitive, or when the sense of the partitive is found, the
actual formation of the partitive is not possible - i.e. the
combination of the "inverseur d'extension" **de** with the
"article d'extension" **le**. For example, one would say
"manger du pain" but "vivre de pain" (Guillaume 1985:121).
The nature of the word **de** as presented above explains why
this is so. Since the verb *manger* is transitive, it takes a
direct object without the need for a preposition to
establish the relation or link between them. In other
words, as Guillaume points out, one can simply say "manger
quelque chose" (1985:124). Now, since the underlying *de* in
"manger du pain" is not engaged, as it potentially could be,
in the category of preposition, it can be employed, within
the system of the article, as the reverser of the
generalising movement symbolised by *le*. The formation of
the partitive *du*, therefore, is possible.

Things are different, however, with "vivre *de* pain".
In this case, the verb is intransitive - *vivre* needs a
preposition to link it to its object. Whereas one says
"manger quelque chose", the corresponding construction with
the verb *vivre* requires the use of a preposition: "vivre *de*
quelque chose" (Guillaume 1985:124). Now, since *de*
functions as a preposition in "vivre *de* pain", it does not
meet the requirement of tongue for the formation of the
partitive *du*. Guillaume explains: "Dans l'exemple en
question: *vivre de pain*, le mot grammatical *de* recouvre,
mettons pour concrétiser les choses, *de* préposition et *
*d'inverseur d'extension. Or pour équilibrer l'extension
liée à l'article *le*, il faut, nous le savons, non pas un
inverseur d'extension valant *de*, mais un inverseur
d'extension valant 1, un inverseur entier, parfait au double
point de vue qualitatif et quantitatif. Cette perfection de
l' inverseur faisant défaut dans l'exemple cité: *vivre de*
pain, l'article du devient *in so facto* une impossibilité" (1985:124-125).

It should be noted that the idea or the meaning of the partitive is present in both examples, but the formation of this article is impossible after the preposition de. This can be seen, as Guillaume points out, if we use a different preposition having more or less the same meaning in this construction, a preposition which does not contract with the definite article. In "vivre de pain", one could replace de with *avec* and maintain approximately the same general meaning. In this case, one would say with the partitive article: "vivre avec du pain" (Guillaume 1985:131). For Guillaume, this shows that the article in question is the partitive article, whose formation is possible after prepositions such as *avec*, but not after de.

Guillaume compares this example to "souffrir du pain" (1985:130) which does not involve the partitive du but rather the contraction in discourse of the preposition de and the article le. This becomes obvious if we use the preposition *par* to obtain a paraphrase: "souffrir par le pain". Guillaume notes that the general idea here is "le pain mauvais me fait souffrir"; "souffrir du pain" is the equivalent of "souffrir par le pain" and not "souffrir par du pain". The word de in "souffrir du pain" and in "vivre de pain" is engaged in the function of preposition. The reason we have du in the first but only de in the second is that in the first, the article we are dealing with is simply
the definite article *le*, which is contracted with the preposition *de*. On the other hand, although "vivre de pain", as we just illustrated, involves the partitive article, the formation of the partitive *du* is not possible since *vivre* requires the preposition *de* with its object (as also does *souffrir* in this case).

This insight explains as well the difference between:

"Nous avons vécu *des* provisions que vous nous aviez laissées" and "Nous avons vécu *de* provisions que vous nous aviez laissées" (Guillaume 1985:132). In the first case, we are dealing with the definite article contracted with the preposition *de* ("We lived of the supplies you had left us"). Guillaume points out that this is the same as saying: "Nous avons vécu grâce *aux* provisions - ou avec *les* provisions - que ...". In the second example ("We lived off (some) supplies you had left us"), we have the meaning of the partitive article. This article can not be formed, though, since it is preceded by the preposition *de*, which is required by the intransitive verb. The equivalent with another preposition is: "Nous avons vécu grâce à *des* provisions - ou avec *des* provisions - que ...".

The next problem to be discussed in this chapter is what is sometimes referred to as "zero article" - i.e. the case where the substantive occurs without a determiner, as in *perdre patience* (see Guillaume 1985:143-144 and 151ff).
3.6 Zero article

We have so far only considered the French articles or
definers which have a physical form. There are certain
contexts, however, where the actualisation of the
substantive is carried out without recourse to an article or
other determiner. In such cases we are dealing with what
many linguists refer to as the "zero article" (see, for
example, Guillaume 1919, 1973c, 1985; Hewson 1972; Moignet

In tongue, any given substantive represents a very
general idea, its signifycate is a potential one. When that
substantive is actually used in discourse, it usually
conveys a more specific idea, specific to the momentary
needs of discourse, specific to the referent in question.
This might be one of many actual significates covered by the
general, potential signifycate found in tongue. In the act
of language, as the speaker passes from tongue to discourse,
there is, then, passage from the general idea of the
substantive to the more real, specific idea required by
discourse.

Guillaume (1919:21) and Hewson (1972:76) claim that an
article is not used with a substantive when discourse calls
for a signifycate which does not differ in scope from the
general, potential signifycate that the substantive bears in
tongue. Guillaume points out that the type of substantives
that tend to be used without a definer are those which
involve the least possibility of variation in meaning in the passage from tongue to discourse.

Hewson notes that zero article "is ... the almost universal usage with the proper noun, except in those cases where a restriction in the full sense is intended ..." (1972:76) - the exception to this near universal being Greek. Hewson goes on to say that "the bare unqualified noun (article zero) calls into play all the potential values together; in those cases where such an actual signifyce is sought for, the noun with article zero will be satisfactory, but in cases where a more restricted sense is required, the articles or other definers will be used". A little further, Hewson explains: "In Modern French all nouns except the names of people require an article or other definer unless the signifyce in view is felt to remain in the realm of pure notion, lacking any reality exterior to the mind; the article is, in this way, not only a definer, but also an instrument of actualization. The threshold between use and non-use of article lies between the presentation of the notion as something real and its presentation as pure idea" (1972:77).

In his attempt to account for the zero article in such a way that it fits into the general system of the article, Guillaume (1973c) and (1985) saw this phenomenon as the effect of the creation in French of a third tension added to tensions I and II of the binary tensor. For Guillaume, then, the zero article represents this tension III which
takes over where the tension II ends—i.e. it carries the notion from the general or the abstract represented by the latest interception of tension II and takes it towards the concrete, thus transgressing the abstract (1973c:181 and 1985:152ff).

Guillaume's tension III is somewhat difficult to accept and one could easily get the impression that he arrived at this conclusion in order to maintain the symmetrical, binary nature of the article system as he saw it. In his lecture of March 15, 1946 (1985:143), Guillaume pointed out that the fundamental system of the article represented by the anti-extensive tension I and the extensive tension II is perfectly symmetrical. The indefinite, definite and partitive articles are, in Guillaume's scheme of things, all accounted for by the symmetrical binary tensor. Yet this system is not well balanced since there is only one article (the indefinite) produced by the first part of the system but two (the definite and the partitive) by the second. Guillaume suggests, therefore, that to compensate for this imbalance, there is the mental creation of a third tension which takes its position in French after tensions I and II. In this way, a certain symmetry is maintained as tension II with its two articles has on either side a tension having just one article. Consequently, instead of having the unbalanced system:
Guillaume (1985:143) proposes the following:

\[ \text{Tension I} \rightarrow \text{Tension II} \rightarrow \text{Tension III} \]

\( ( \text{article unique}) \rightarrow ( \text{deux articles}) \rightarrow ( \text{article unique}) \)

For Guillaume, then, article zero represents the mental movement found in tension III. As such, this article is felt to be primarily in opposition with the definite article. In this account, the zero article is used when discourse requires the mind to extend beyond the limits of tension II, to transgress the idea of the purely general and abstract which is obtained when the mental movement symbolised by tension II is suspended at its broadest limit. Having gone beyond the limits of tension II and transcended the abstract, the zero article is "trans-extensive" and "trans-abstract", reversing the abstract obtained at the limit of tension II, and resulting in a more concrete and narrow image of the signifcat in question. Guillaume adds that this image obtained in tension III is concrete in a special way: "... un concret spéciaal, puisqu'il est un traitement de l'abstrait acquis et dépassé" (1985:160).

Furthermore, Guillaume claims that, as in tensions I and II, tension III may be intercepted early or late in its progression resulting in a more abstract or a more concrete image of the signifcat.

Following this analysis, Guillaume suggests that the difference between "perdre la raison" with the definite
article and "perdre patience" with zero article (1985:152ff) is to be explained by the difference between tension II and tension III. With the definite article in "perdre la raison", the movement represented by tension II is intercepted very late in its progression, at its outer limit. The result is a very general image of the notion raison - we have the abstract, the faculty of reason.

In the second example, on the other hand, tension II is transcended, and as a result, we do not have the general image of patience, we are not dealing with the faculty of patience. In "perdre patience", in Guillaume's account, one is now in tension III. The mind has begun to descend from the extreme degree of abstractness found at the upper limit of tension II and is now in tension III, which gives a more narrow, concrete perspective. Guillaume explains: "Ainsi le mot patience ... est un mot redescendu des hauteurs de l'abstrait - où il signifie la faculté d'être patient - à une position momentanée, étroite et concrète, où il ne recouvre plus que l'idée d'un mouvement passager d'impatience, ne mettant pas en cause la conservation dans la personne de la faculté que le mot patience désigne" (1985:162). Interceptions of this tension III, then, will result in a more or less concrete image of an abstract notion. According to Guillaume, in the expression perdre patience, the faculty of patience is not considered to be lost, but there is felt to be a momentary loss in that faculty.
We can see that Guillaume was on to something but did not seem to be able to clarify the problem. It is somewhat surprising that he did not realise that the notion of a tension III added to the justifiable tensions I and II was not only unjustifiable but also unnecessary in an account of the psycho-mechanics of zero article within the framework of his positional linguistics.

The difference between the "physical" articles of tensions I and II (indefinite, definite and partitive) on the one hand and zero article on the other — and Guillaume did indeed see this — the difference lies in the fact that the former are actualisers of the substantive but the latter is not. This is the fundamental distinction and we do not require the introduction of a supplementary tension III to explain the mental process at work when a substantive is used without an article. For this reason, finding it difficult to accept Guillaume's account of zero article, we turn instead to proposals made by others, who reject the idea of a tension III but use his insights into the article system to explain the use of the substantive without an article. (We should note though, with Moignet (1981:141), that Guillaume did not seem to make reference to the idea of a tension III after he presented it in 1945-46.)

If we expand on the approach presented in Hewson's recent articles, and mentioned earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Two, we might say that zero article is used whenever the intentions of discourse do not require the
substantive to be actualised with internal incidence. This implies that instead of having a word incorporating a lexeme (the notional import) and a mental referent (the grammatical support to which the lexeme is internally incident), the result is a lexeme which must find support in some exterior element. In this light, we can illustrate graphically the different compositions of the substantives in the expressions *perdre la raison* and *perdre patience*. For *raison* we have:

```
RAISON
(lexème)
```

```
raison
(référent)
```

*patience*, however, would be represented as follows:

```
patience
(lexème)
```

In constructions of the type *perdre patience*, the word *patience*, usually referred to as a substantive, does not have an internal mental referent. Just as an adjective can be substantivised by having an internal mental referent incorporated with the lexeme, it also happens that a substantive changes category where the internal mental referent is absent. It was argued in Chapter Two that in French, the referent which is the support of the lexeme of the substantive is ultimately formalised in the article (or in some other definer such as the demonstratives or
possessives). The absence of a definer in the noun phrase indicates that the referent has not been formalised in this manner. Moignet (1981:140) suggests, this may be because the intentions of discourse do not require that the referent be formalised, but rather that it be left as a virtual element; or it may be that the substantive is decategorised due to the absence of an internal mental referent and therefore has external incidence.

The only possible dependency structure in examples such as perdre patience is that of the substantive to the verb. The lexeme PATIENCE is in external incidence (secondary) to the lexeme PERDRE. This dependency structure can be shown graphically as:

```
   PATIENCE  PERDRE
      (lexème)      (lexème)
```

Consequently, this can be considered as a compound - a verb composed of two lexemes. The arguments in favour of an analysis of such constructions as compound verbs are even more convincing with examples such as avoir faim, avoir peur, faire attention, etc. (Moignet 1981:144,145). Moignet notes that in such cases the verb is much more formal than notional - the notional content of avoir in avoir faim is minimal compared to "full" verbs such as oraindre. In such compound verbs the notional content is, for the most part, provided by the substantive, while the verb supplies the formal content of the compound.
Although he did not present things in this way, but rather saw this as the result of tension III decategorising the substantive, Guillaume too saw that in parler politique, for example, there is formation of a compound verb - and he notes that this is a common phenomenon in French (1985:170). Hudson too refers to the process of compounding in certain dependency relations (1984:87-89).

As is pointed out by Moignet, the possibility of having the adverb très intensify the substantive in avoir très faim or faire très attention is evidence that these substantives are decategorised and are in an adverbial type of external incidence to the verbal element (1981:145).

The substantive is also decategorised because of the absence of an internal mental referent when it is used with the copula être as attribute of the subject. In sentences such as Pierre est professeur (Moignet 1981:145), the substantive professeur functions as an adjective and is ultimately incident to the subject noun by means of the copula. Moignet notes that if the attributive substantive is used with an article it does not have the same function as it does with zero article. We can also see that in this case, the dependency relations are different. In Pierre est le professeur de géographie humaine de l'Université, there is interdependence as professeur is incident to Pierre and vice versa. In Moignet's terms, the effect is not one of qualification, which we get in Pierre est professeur, but of indentification. Note that one could just as easily say Le
professeur de géographie... est Pierre - which is not possible with the attributive usage and zero article. Moignet believes that the same distinction is found in constructions with apposition: Pierre, professeur de géographie, ... versus Pierre, le professeur de géographie humaine de l'Université, ... (1981:145).

There are many instances where the substantive, void of an internal mental referent, is adjectivised and, as an epithet, is in primary external incidence to another substantive - for example, la tarte maison, une phrase type, and in compounds such as un homme-grenouille (Moignet 1981:146).

Moignet notes that, in Old French, it was quite common for the referent - or in his terms "la personne substantive" - not to be formalised for discourse. He explains that there are many remnants of this phenomenon in current French and that in these cases "... le substantif était maintenu dans l'avant du processus de particularisation + généralisation quand il s'agissait de l'évoquer au maximum de la généralité, dans un état de discours proche de la virtualité qui est celle du substantif en langue" (1981:140). According to Moignet, in the early stages of the development of the indefinite and definite articles, their use and meaning were restricted to cases where tensions I and II were intercepted near the threshold which is the singular (1) (i.e. Moignet's interceptions (2) and (3) - see above). In other words, at that time, these
articles gave only a narrow, particularized image of the
substantive and had not yet developed the potential to give
a general view of the substantive. The latter usage, then,
was reserved for zero article. According to Moignet, what
was very common in Old French can still be found today in
proverbs such as "Pierre qui roule n'amasse pas mousse" and
in certain expressions such as "blanc comme neige"
(1981:140).

3.7 Other functions of zero article

Moignet suggests that, in many cases, zero article is
used after a preposition when the actualisation of the
substantive offered by the preposition is sufficient
(1981:142). Also, when substantives are presented in a list
and are felt to go together to make up a whole, there may be
just one article indicating the collective referent common
to all these elements - for example, les nom, prénom et
qualité.

Proper nouns such as people's names usually occur with
zero article because, as a result of the very nature of such
nouns, the referent involved is already sufficiently defined
without the need of an article. Moignet suggests that in
examples where a proper noun is used with an article, for
example, le Dupont, it means that the name is taken to
represent a certain type and often has pejorative
connotations (1981:143). He also notes that for much the
same reason that proper nouns usually occur with zero
article, the substantive is often bare in constructions referred to as apostrophe - for example, meunier, tu dors. In such constructions, the situation itself defines the referent, especially where the substantive is used in a second person situation.

3.8 Zero article vs. partitive

All French grammar books tell us that in negative constructions, one must use de instead of du, de la, des (and also instead of un and une). For example, one would say "il mange du pain" but "il ne mange pas de pain". In his lecture of March 22, 1946, Guillaume explains why the partitive article is impossible in a negative construction. He claims that this is because the "inversaur" de is not complete and therefore the conditions for the formation of the partitive are not met - i.e. only when the movement of generalisation symbolised by le is reversed by a perfect, complete "inversaur". In his terms, de in such constructions is incomplete as "inversaur" because of the fact that a negation is also by nature an expression of quantity - a negative quantity - and therefore shares with the word de in the "saisie partitive" (1985:146). Since de is in such cases incomplete as "inversaur", its potential as preposition has not been completely reduced to zero and therefore it can not be employed within the article system. Consequently, the formation of the partitive is not possible and de functions in such constructions as a preposition.
In his lectures of the following two weeks, Guillaume modifies his analysis of the partitive as it interacts with the negative. In his lectures of March 29 and April 5, Guillaume suggests that the word *de*, which is incomplete as an "inverseur d'extension" due to the negation, regains the required state of completeness from the zero article. He claims, then, that there are two types of partitive: the one formed when *de* reverses the movement of generalisation in tension II - i.e. *du*; and the second resulting when *de*, incomplete as "inverseur d'extension", because of a negative for example, can not form the partitive by reversing the generalisation of *le* and instead meets the zero article (in the tension III which we have already rejected) and forms a partitive with it - a partitive represented simply by the article *de*.

Moignet argues that in such negative constructions, the partitive is not possible simply because there is no movement of generalisation for *de* to reverse, implying that this is essential for the use of the partitive. For Moignet, the article used in negative sentences such as *Je ne mange pas de pain* is in fact the zero article. He claims: "la particule *de* signifie ici un refus d'actualiser la notion substantivale, une retenue dans le plan virtuel, c'est-à-dire ... le contraire de ce que signifie l'article. Il est bien inverseur, mais ce qu'il inverse, en conformité avec ce que demande la négativation, c'est le mouvement qui
tend à actualiser tout substantif dans le passage de la langue au discours" (1981:137).

We will not deliberate too long on whether the article in these negative constructions is a special type of partitive as Guillaume suggests, or if, as Moignet argues, it is not a partitive but simply the article zero with the particle de as an indicator of non actualisation of the substantive. It should be clear, however, that the zero article is necessarily involved in such negative constructions. In a negative sentence like Je ne mange pas de pain, it is only logical to assume that the absence of pain implies the absence of the referent which is required for the use of an article or definer. And the absence of the referent requires, as we have already argued, the use of zero article.

Guillaume (1985:145) explains that negation has no effect on the use of the definite article because, in Je n'aime pas le pain for example, the article le indicates that the notion pain is taken to the limits of the movement of generalisation and as a result there is no idea at all of quantity - the notion of quantity being left behind by that movement of generalisation. Guillaume states: "Dans l'exemple précité, pain est envisagé qualitativement, pour sa nature (son goût naturel). Il n'est fait état mentalement d'aucune saisie de quantité" (1985:145).

With the indefinite article, on the other hand, the negative does have an effect. We might say that this is
because the indefinite article *un* is the symbol of the movement towards the numerical singular (I). Unlike the definite which represents movement away from the singular, the indefinite does take on a quantitative aspect in sentences such as *je veux un livre*. Given the analysis presented above, it follows that the negative of such a sentence would be *je ne veux pas de livre* (Guillaume 1985:157). The absence of a book indicates necessarily the absence of a referent for the lexeme *livre* and consequently the article used is the zero article. Moignet might say that the particle *de* simply represents the non actualisation of the substantive.

Now, in certain contexts, it is also possible to say *je ne veux pas un livre* (Guillaume 1985:157). Before we attempt to explain the difference between these last two examples, it should be noted that, according to Guillaume, it is not usually possible to have *un* co-occur with the "inverseur" *de* because they are incompatible - *de*, apart from its potential as a preposition, is meant only to reverse the movement of extension in *le* and can not reverse what is already the anti-extensive movement of *un*. Consequently, there is only the choice between *je ne veux pas de livre* and *je ne veux pas un livre*. (Note that in sentences such as *Je ne veux pas d'un livre*, the combination *d'un* is possible since, according to Guillaume’s analysis, *de* is engaged as a preposition. The meaning that results
from this usage is different from that of the examples studied in this paragraph).

There is a difference of meaning, a certain nuance, between these two sentences and Guillaume suggests that this results from the fact that with the definite article, one is in tension I but with zero article, one is in tension III - each tension of course brings on a different meaning. Even though we do not accept the idea of a tension III, it appears that Guillaume was on the right track. It can be argued instead, following the analysis presented so far, that whereas in *Je ne veux pas un livre* the representation is from tension I, in *Je ne veux pas de livre*, there is no question of tensions I or II (or III for that matter) - the mental activity involved in these tensions is not in question. This is because the substantive is in fact not actualised, hence the difference in meaning. Guillaume explains: "la négation retenue en tension I n'est pas totale, et elle sous-entend un vouloir positif complémentaire" (1985:158). The sentence *je ne veux pas un livre*, then, means that "I do not want a book but I do want something else". We might say that in such a case, what is denied with the negative is the lexeme, not the referent (cf. *ce ne sont pas des livres, ce sont des cahiers*). With zero article in *je ne veux pas de livre*, however, the negation is complete and there is no suggestion of anything positive, of wanting something other than a book. In this case, it is the referent which is denied.
3.9 Conclusion

Given our view of the system of the noun, its binary structure and the role of the definer in the process of substantivisation, we can conclude, with Hewson, that "in any combination of Det + N each part of the combination represents one of the two essential elements of the noun: Det represents the referent, and N represents the lexeme" (forthcoming:9). It follows that this is a relation of interdependence: both are essential and cannot be separated - i.e. one cannot be moved without the other.

There are of course other definers of the French noun that we have not studied in this chapter. They include words which can be used as adjective as well as definer - for example: the cardinal numbers ("trois hommes sont arrivés", "les trois hommes qui sont arrivés"); quelques ("quelques amis", "les quelques livres (que je possède)"); tout ("tout homme est mortel", "toute la classe"); etc. (see, for example, Forsgren 1978:29). Used without an article, these words function as actualiser of the noun in the same manner as the other definers we have analysed.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. Adjective and substantive

4.1 Introduction

To begin this chapter let us recall some of the fundamental similarities and differences between the adjective and the substantive. Moignet notes: "L'adjectif est un nom au même titre que le substantif: il dénomme, en effet, les données de l'expérience. La différence, fondamentale, est que ce qu'il dénomme n'est pas destiné à s'appliquer qu'à ce qu'il évoque, mais au contraire est voué à se porter sur une autre donnée de l'expérience" (1981:42). We saw in Chapter Two that the basic difference between the adjective and the substantive corresponds to the distinction between external incidence and internal incidence.

Our objective now is to illustrate the explanatory value of the framework presented in the previous chapters with respect to different problems concerning the adjective-substantive relation. In particular, we claim that it is ultimately the binary nature of the substantive that allows for pre-position and post-position of the adjective in French, often with a difference in meaning, effect, or interpretation between the two positions. We will also suggest that adjective position is the French solution to a general problem.
In order to account for the apparent problems posed by adjective position, it is necessary to analyse the precise nature of the mechanism of incidence as it occurs between adjective and substantive. Later in the chapter, we will attempt to demonstrate that the external incidence of adjective to substantive can be of two types. The adjective may have as support one or the other of the two elements incorporated into the substantive: the lexeme or the referent. It is in general the support that determines adjective position in French.

4.2 The semantic and syntactic problems of the adjective

In Chapter Two, we discussed in general terms the nature of the relation between the adjective and the substantive it modifies. It is generally accepted that the adjective is dependent on the substantive (see, for example, Jespersen 1924:96ff, Guillaume 1973a:205ff, Waugh 1977:81-83, Hudson 1984:77). Even by intuition alone, it is quite evident that the adjective modifies the substantive and not vice versa: it is the adjective that is said of the substantive. Some argue that adjective agreement indicates its status as a secondary. It is also argued that the adjective is the dependent element since in any dependency relation it is the subordinate element and not the head that can be omitted. Furthermore, the modifier, the dependent element is said to have a broader extension or range: substantives can only be said of that which is conveyed by
the lexeme whereas the adjective can in general be said of many different notions.

If the direction of the adjective-substantive dependency relation is not controversial, there are however several aspects of the interaction between adjective and substantive which continue to be the topic of much discussion. Much has been written on this problem and although the approaches and the terminology often differ, we find that many of the descriptions and explanations make similar predictions.

4.3 Adjective position

Indeed, adjective position does appear to be rather complicated and it is therefore not surprising that it would be the subject of much debate. In the following paragraphs we will consider the apparent problems involved with the adjective and how they have been treated by linguists and grammarians during this century. Later, it should become clear that in order to account for these problems one has to consider the dependency structures involved at the level of tongue.

In French, it is possible for the adjective either to precede or to follow the noun it modifies. However, it appears that post-position is most predominant. For Tesnière (1959), it is normal for French to have mostly post-position since it belongs to the group of languages that tend to put the modifier after the modified ("ordre
centrifuge") (Tesnière 1959, qu. Waugh 1977:32). Greenberg (1963) also notes this tendency. He suggests that the preference of the order noun-adjective is due to the "general tendency for comment to follow topic" (qu. Waugh 1977:34).

When there is an opposition between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives, there is often a difference in meaning, interpretation, or effect (un simple homme / un homme simple). It is also claimed that some adjectives may be used in either position with no change in meaning (see Delomier 1980:12). There are suggestions that this may be due to the syntactic environment. The 'normal' position of the adjective may be affected by other determiners of the adjective or of the noun. Delomier (1980:13) notes for example that if the adjective is preceded by an adverb of manner then the group adverb + adjective is normally post-posed. Therefore, one would say une belle femme but une femme délicieusement belle.

Since in modern French the adjective is usually post-posed, it is said to have a more expressive value when it is used in pre-position. It has been suggested that the adjective may be pre-posed for poetic and stylistic reasons (see, for example, Waugh 1977:32).

The work done on the French adjective during this century has been surveyed, for example, in Waugh (1977) and Delomier (1980). In his chapter on the adjective, Wilmet
notes that there have been four main approaches to the problem of adjective position (1986:133-134):

1. *semantic*: the pre-posed adjective and the substantive are seen as forming a unitary concept (*un savant amoureux* = "un expert en amour"). This order also leads to a change in the primary meaning of the adjective (*un ancien moulin* = "désaffecté"). In some instances, the result is metaphoric (*un grand homme* = "de génie").

With the post-posed adjective, on the other hand, the adjective and the substantive are maintained in two separate conceptual spheres (*un amoureux savant* = "un amoureux double d’un expert en une matière x, y, ou z"). This order also maintains the primary meaning of the adjective (*un moulin ancien* = "vieux"; *un homme grand* = "de haute taille").

2. *stylistic*: the pre-posed adjective is more affective than intellectual, especially for those adjectives that are normally post-posed. It is also said to belong to a more formal, even literary register of language.

Wilmet (1986:133) notes that those who believe adjective position to be a stylistic problem have also claimed that the post-posed adjective belongs to a neutral, familiar level of language. Furthermore, the length of the adjective in relation to the noun is said to influence the position of that adjective. For example, polysyllabic adjectives usually follow shorter nouns.

3. *idealistic*: according to Wilmet (1986:133), the tendency to post-pose adjectives in French is said to be
opposed by the esthetic values of certain groups as well as
by contact with Germanic languages such as English (where
the adjective is always pre-posed). On the other hand, the
prescriptive ideals of grammarians and the tendency for
scientific and intellectual adjectives to become more and
more familiar sustain a preference for the post-posed
adjective.

(4) philosophical: Wilmet (1986:134) points out that
the pre-posed adjective is believed to have a more
sensational effect as the comment precedes the theme (un
joli chant; un mauvais rhume). Post-posing the adjective,
however, is seen as the more rational manner of presenting
the theme before the comment.

4.4 Post-position vs. pre-position: semantic independence

The task of the linguist is to find one underlying
principle which could account for the apparent complexities
involved with the French adjective. In the search for that
single underlying principle, one can not help but focus on
one particular notion which seems to be accepted by most
linguists and grammarians. Many scholars point to the
semantic unit formed by the pre-posed adjective and the
substantive. The pre-posed adjective is said to lose its
autonomy as it often retains only a part of its full meaning
and in many cases has a figurative meaning. However, the
post-posed adjective maintains its semantic independence.
Grevisse writes: "l'adjectif épithète se place avant le nom
lorsque, sans être entrée dans la syntaxe figée, la combinaison adjectif + nom est très fortement sentie comme une unité de pensée: il y a alors un seul accent d'intensité. Mais lorsque la combinaison du nom et de l'adjectif n'est pas sentie comme une seule unité de pensée et que chacun de ces mots est frappé d'un accent d'intensité, l'adjectif épithète se place après le nom; toutefois il peut le précéder s'il a beaucoup de force affective" (Grevisse 1980:432-433).

As early as the turn of the century, Clédat (1901) provides some convincing descriptions of the problem of adjective position. He distinguishes between two types of adjectives.

On the one hand there are adjectives which add a characteristic or differentiating detail of form, colour, structure, etc. to the noun. These are unessential, circumstantial qualities added to the idea expressed by the noun. Such adjectives are usually post-posed and instead of becoming integrated into the idea expressed by the substantive, these unessential qualities are simply added to it.

On the other hand, certain adjectives simply amplify or limit the notion expressed by the noun, somewhat like an augmentative or diminutive suffixe. These add essential qualities to the idea expressed by the noun. "Ces qualités essentielles se présentent à notre esprit en même temps que l'idée de l'objet auquel nous les appliquons, et ne font
qu’un avec cette idée" (Clédat 1901, qu. Waugh 1977:15). These adjectives, which tend to be pre-posed, are felt to form a unit with the substantive.

Clédat deals with certain exceptions to his rules by claiming that "certain circumstantial adjectives may be so close in meaning to the adjectives expressing essential qualities that they can be placed before the noun as well as after it (e.g., une belle promenade, une promenade belle)" (qu. Waugh 1977:16).

Clédat also claims that other adjectives "expressing subjective qualities can be placed before the noun; since these qualities are subjective they may be united with the idea given by noun as one concept, in the mind of the speaker (e.g. une émouvante aventure)" (qu. Waugh 1977:16).

Clédat also deals with adjectives for which position is indifferent - i.e. the meaning does not change with a change in position. There is apparently no difference in meaning perceived between de troubantes images and des images troubantes. This is not to say however that there is no difference between the two positions. With the post-posed adjective the ideas expressed by the noun and the adjective are felt to maintain their individual, distinct meanings. However, one tends to perceive the idea of the pre-posed adjective as being integrated with that of the substantive. Waugh points out that "if one wants to emphasize either of the two ideas or both of them, the adjective must follow the noun" (1977:17).
Much of the description presented by Clédat has been echoed by other linguists throughout the century. Shortly after Clédat's studies, in 1909, Bally (1951) too suggests that the noun and post-posed adjective represent two separate entities. Bally also claims that the pre-posed adjective may have a "valeur affective" whereas the post-posed adjective results in a "valeur intellectuelle, déterminée, définitionnelle" (qu. Waugh 1977:18).

Damourette and Pichon (1911-1930) argue that the post-posed adjective complements the idea expressed by the substantive but does not modify it as does the pre-posed adjective. The latter is in a relation of intimate unity with the noun: the pre-posed adjective "exprimant une qualité substantivale combine le sémième de l'adjectif avec celui du substantif, pour former une nouvelle entité substantielle qui ... prend ... une existence indépendante" (Damourette and Pichon, qu. Delomier 1980:9). The post-posed adjective is said to add a permanent quality to the substantive without modifying the substance, the idea expressed by the substantive. Furthermore, the post-posed adjective, unlike the pre-posed, is also said to maintain all its adjectival qualities (Damourette and Pichon 1911-1930, qu. Waugh 1977:24 and Delomier 1980:7).

In Guiraud's account, when the adjective is in its normal position - i.e. post-posed - it has a specifying value, determining the individual named by the substantive. When the same adjective is pre-posed, it has a more generic
nature and determines the naming lexical category. Therefore, "un homme grand est un individu grand; un grand homme est un individu dans lequel l'humanité est grande" (Guiraud 1967, qu. Waugh 1977:31). Consequently, the pre-posed adjective has an adverbial value - as can be attested by many other examples: un grand seigneur = un seigneur avec grandeur; un simple soldat = simplement soldat.

A similar approach is found in the Grammaire Larousse du Français contemporain: "Ainsi, quand on parle d'un horrible individu, on modifie, en la qualifiant, la notion d'un individu, puis on applique cette nouvelle notion à la personne qu'on a en vue; quand on parle d'un individu horrible, on se contente d'appliquer la qualité d'"horrible" à tel individu pris isolément: la notion d'"individu" reste intacte" (Chevalier et al. 1964, qu. Waugh 1977:31). The pre-posed epithet is felt to be combined with the substantive so as to form a global but more precise designation of the object in question. The post-posed adjective, on the other hand, maintains its independence and indicates a distinctive quality of the object (qu. Delomier 1980:15).

Tesnière too shows that the pre-posed adjective tends to form a unit with the substantive: "Dans le cas d'ordre centripète un brave homme, une bonne femme, on constate que l'adjectif tend plus ou moins à s'agglutiner avec le substantif subséquent pour former un nouveau substantif, qui est un véritable substantif composé" (Tesnière 1959, qu.
Waugh 1977:32). Furthermore, if the adjective is post-posed, the meaning of substantive+adjective is the sum of the meanings of each element. With the pre-posed adjective however the group takes on a new meaning which no longer resembles the sum of the meanings of the elements concerned (Tesnière 1959, qu. Waugh 1977:32). It follows that in *un vieil ami*, it is the friendship which is old, whereas in *un ami vieux*, it is the friend himself that is old. Tesnière adds that with the pre-posed adjective in this example, there is also the idea of tenderness and affection, whereas with the post-posed adjective there is more objectivity and less affection.

Waugh (1977) provides a very thorough and revealing study of adjective position. She avoids considerations of stylistic variation and deals only with those cases where a difference in position brings on an observable difference in meaning. Waugh claims to consider "the problem of adjective position from the point of view, not of the given parole, but of all possible parole: that is, from the point of view of langue, the systematization of all possible parole. Since we are not dealing with particular substantives and particular adjectives but with all substantives and all adjectives and any possible combinations thereof, it becomes clear that the object of the analysis in this case is the two combinations [adjective + substantive] and [substantive + adjective]" (Waugh 1977:50).
According to Waugh, pre-position and post-position are in paradigmatic opposition. The paradigmatic choice between pre-position and post-position is, theoretically, operative to all possible combinations of substantive and adjective. Arguing that "for every invariant of form there will be an invariant of meaning" (Waugh:1977:150), and with the support of numerous examples of minimal pairs, Waugh points out that the difference in meaning is the same for all adjectives. Taking the opposition furieux menteur / menteur furieux, she claims that the post-posed adjective qualifies the individual as a person, whereas the pre-posed adjective qualifies him in his capacity as a liar. She notices that "... the lexical meaning of the given adjective in pre-position seems to be much more dependent on the lexical meaning of the substantive with which it is associated than is the case when the adjective is post-posed ... in post-position the adjective qualifies the individual as a person in general" (Waugh 1977:88).

Waugh points out that the post-posed adjective simply modifies a substantive. However, with the pre-posed adjective, there is the added feature that the meaning of the substantive is presupposed. She concludes that the adjective, whether pre-posed or post-posed, always has the same semantic value. However, superimposed on this constant meaning of the adjective is a distinctive feature: "deixis of the lexical content" (Waugh 1977:95). The pre-posed adjective is always marked for this feature. On the other
hand, the post-posed adjective is not necessarily marked for this feature, although it is possible.

For Waugh, it is not the linguistic meaning of the adjective that changes according to position: there is rather a difference in interpretation of the adjective resulting from a change in the "coordinates of the modification situation" (Waugh 1977:92). The difference of interpretation between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives in minimal pairs such as un simple soldat / un soldat simple is based on the "presumed existence of two invariants: an invariant for the lexical meaning of the adjective and an invariant for the meaning in word order. The total meaning of a given group AS/SA is seen as a resultant of these two invariants" (Waugh 1977, qu. Forsgren 1983:231).

The adjective simple, therefore, has an inherent, invariant meaning and the difference of effect observed in parole is "due to the invariant meaning of pre-position, which is marked for 'deixis of the lexical content', i.e. a dependency on the nominal lexeme modified by the adjective" (Waugh, qu. Forsgren 1983:231). Post-position being the unmarked position for this feature, the notion expressed by the post-posed adjective is simply added to the noun. There is no dependency on or pre-supposition of the lexical content of the noun: "in post-position the only thing presupposed by the adjective is that there is a substantive to be modified in the context: in pre-position, on the contrary, there is also a pre-supposition of a specific
lexical content in this substantive: 'the soldier is simple in his quality as a soldier'" (Waugh, qu. Forsgren 1983:231).

One of the more interesting structural studies is that of Forsgren (1978). In his functional analysis of 5,000 examples taken from newspapers, Forsgren attempts to determine the influence of different elements of the noun phrase on the position of the adjective. He studies the formal and semantic characteristics of the substantive, the definer and the adjective to try to determine if the position of the adjective is influenced by factors of a semantic and/or syntactic nature. In fact, he concludes that the syntactic environment of the substantive does indeed determine adjective position - i.e. the presence of a pre-positional or epithetical complement, the presence of an adverb, the presence of another adjective, the proximity of a negation, prefixes, suffixes, etc. He also considers the function of the noun phrase and whether there is reduction of meaning of the adjective (Forsgren 1978, qu. Delomier 1980:19).

According to Forsgren, there is a strong link between adjective position and the nature of the definer of the substantive as well as the function of the noun phrase. He considers for example whether the substantive is actualised - i.e. with or without an article or other definer. Then, if there is a definer, Forsgren considers whether the
substantive is presented as being something already known or unknown - i.e. which definer is used.

Forsgren concludes that the pre-posed adjective is less frequent with the indefinite article un than with the definite le. The grammatical function of the noun also appears to influence adjective position. Subject nouns are favourable to pre-position of the adjective. If the noun has an attributive function, the adjective tends to be pre-posed more readily if the noun phrase is actualised by the definite le than by the indefinite un. Adjective pre-position is favoured if the noun phrase has an appositive function. In direct object noun phrases, the pre-posed adjective is common only with the definer de / des (Forsgren 1978, qu. Delomier 1980:19).

4.5 Adjective position and the Guillaumian tradition

Since the explanations proposed in this study are in large part an extension of the traditional Guillaumian approach, will now give a brief account of how Guillaume deals with adjective position. In the following pages we will consider how Guillaume and his followers attempt to explain that the post-posed adjective indicates "la manière d'être de la chose" whereas the pre-posed adjective shows "la manière d'être la chose" (see Moignet 1981:46 and Vachon-L'Heureux 1984:45).

In order to understand Guillaume's explanation of the difference between pre-posed and post-posed adjective, we
must recall the distinction he makes between two different linguistic elements: the word and the mechanisms or processes which allow for the creation or formation of words. Consequently, we must recognise the substantive and the process of substantivisation, the adjective and the process of adjectivisation.

For Guillaume, an adjective may become incident to either the process of substantivisation or the resulting substantive. It is felt that the pre-posed adjective is incident to substantivisation still in progress (in the first tension of the binary tensor, "idéogénèse"). The post-posed adjective, on the other hand, finds its support in the substantive itself. In this case, the process of substantivisation has been completed, both the "idéogénèse" and the "morphogénèse" (see Moignet 1981:45-46).

It is therefore with reference to the binary tensor and to interceptions of the mental activities it represents that Guillaume describes the relation between substantive and adjective at the level of tongue. The first tension is seen as pre-resultative: this is substantivisation in process. The second tension is post-resultative: this is substantivisation carried out to completion. In each of the tensions there is the possibility of one or more interceptions. Vachon-L'Heureux notes: "il s'agit toujours du point d'incidence de l'adjectif dans le temps opératif de la substantivation: c'est ce point qui déciderait et de la
place et du sens de l'adjectif" (1984:48). She illustrates this with the following figure:

For Guillaume, the different interceptions are responsible for the variation observed in the substantive-adjective relation. "Ce mécanisme est présenté comme une possession permanente de la pensée qui permet à la qualification de se réaliser avec une grande variabilité selon son incidence dans le temps opératif de la substantivation" (Vachon-L'Heureux 1984:48).

Moignet notes that the post-posed adjective, applied at the point where the process of substantivisation is completed, usually has a specifying effect (le code civil/le code penal) although it may also have a descriptive and appreciative effect (une nuit sereine, un festin royal). He adds: "De toute manière, la qualification est résultative et le syntagme correspond à l'addition de deux sémantèses dont chacune est un entier de signification en discours" (Moignet 1981:46).

The pre-posed adjective, on the other hand, applied to a substantivisation in progress, contributes to the ideogenesis of the substantive and forms a semantic unit with it. "C'est l'ensemble sémantique de l'adjectif et du substantif qui produit le substantif de discours, un entier de signification et un seul. Cf. un grand garçon, qui dit
'la façon grande d’être un garçon’" (Moignet 1981:46). Moignet explains that since it modifies an operation or process, the pre-posed adjective has an adverbial value. "l’adjectif ... devient une sorte de catégoriseur préalable de la notion du substantif. La sémantèse de garçon se définit dans le cadre de la catégorie de la grandeur" (Moignet 1981:46).

The difference between the two mechanisms corresponding to post-position and pre-position are illustrated as follows (Moignet 1981:46):

### Postposition de l’adjectif

![Diagram of postposition de l’adjectif](image)

With the post-posed adjective, there are two complete, separate, independent notions. With the pre-posed adjective, on the other hand, the notional content of the adjective is believed to blend with that of the substantive to form a single unit of notional content.
One must remember too that the adjective as well as the substantive has its own ideogenesis. Moignet claims that "un adjectif postposé se présente avec sa propre sémantèse achevée, ayant atteint le degré maximal de particularisation auquel elle puisse accéder. Un adjectif antéposé livre des états subduits, plus abstraits, moins pléniers de sa sémantèse" (Moignet 1981:46). Consequently, the effect or interpretation of the combination substantive-adjective (or adjective-substantive) depends on the point at which the adjective is applied.

In the traditional Guillaumean analysis, there are theoretically four types of incidence between adjective and substantive corresponding to four points of interception of the process of substantivisation. Three of these are represented by pre-position and the fourth corresponds to post-position.

Post-position corresponds to the application of the adjective at a point where the process of substantivisation is completed. At this interception, in the notional genesis of the noun phrase, the ideogenesis of both the adjective and the substantive is complete (as is the morphogenesis). Consequently, both adjective and substantive are felt to represent two independent notions, with the adjective specifying the substantive.

The three types of adjective pre-position correspond to three possible points of interception of the process of substantivisation. These are relatively early or late along
the process of ideogenesis (see Moignet 1981:47 and Vachon-
L’Heureux 1984:48,51):

In the first interception (1), early in the ideogenesis of the substantive, "l’adjectif contribue puissamment à l’élaboration de la sémantèse de l’ensemble. Il peut arriver même qu’il en fournisse l’élément principal. Ainsi un grand homme, une jeune fille" (Moignet 1981:47). In this case, the adjective itself is in the early stages of its ideogenesis and qualifies the ideogenesis of the substantive which is also in its early stages. Moignet points out that the association of adjective and substantive may be so close that the ideogenesis results in a lexicalisation, a compound noun: une sage-femme, un grand-père, un bonhomme, etc.

With the second interception (2), the adjective is applied at a point where the ideogenesis of both the adjective and the substantive are already half completed (see Vachon-L’Heureux 1984:50 and Moignet 1981:47). Moignet notes: "l’adjectif, classificateur, évoque préjudiciellement dans quel cadre sémantique s’effectue la substantivation, mais sans que sa sémantèse soit intiment [sic] intégrée". The adjective is in this way adverbialised and qualifies the operation of substantivisation in process: un grand fumeur = "un qui fume grandement". For Moignet, this approach also
explains why some adjectives normally post-posed are said to have a figurative meaning when in pre-position: les vertes années, de noirs soucis, un pâle voyou: "L'adjectif antéposé, étant subduit par rapport à la valeur qu'il a en post-position, peut n'en retenir que des connotations métaphoriques ou impressives" (1981:47).

With the third interception (3), taking place very late in the ideogenesis of the substantive, practically at its completion, the notional content of the adjective is nearly identical to that obtained in post-position - the ideogenesis of both the adjective and the substantive is near completion. Moignet points out that "il y a coïncidence des phases conclusives des deux idéogénèses, l'adjectivale et la substantivale" (1981:48). Vachon-L'Heureux notes that in this case "nous avons ... la perte d'un quantum de résultativité d'adjectivation - c'est l'adjectif antéposé, sans changement de sens évident, une variation formelle ..." (1984:50). There is no apparent difference in meaning between une éclatante victoire and une victoire éclatante. However, with the pre-posed adjective there is felt to be an expressive effect. Moignet claims that un repas excellent means the same thing as un excellent repas but the notion expressed by the adjective is highlighted by pre-position: "c'est dans le cadre de l'excellence qu'est située la notion de 'repas'..." (1981:48).
For Moignet, the difference between a median interception (2) and a late interception (3) is the underlying difference between the two uses of *vert* in *les vertes années* and *le vert laurier*. With the latter example, the late interception does not modify the ideogenesis of the substantive - the adjective in this case simply highlights one of the constitutive elements of this ideogenesis - i.e. some inherent quality in the notional content of the substantive. A *laurier* is naturally *vert* and the pre-posed adjective allows one to expressively highlight this inherent quality.

Moignet suggests that the possibility for a given adjective to occur in any of the four types depends on the nature of that adjective, on its meaning. Certain adjectives express very general ideas while others are very specific. The former, because of their generality, are applicable to a wide range of substantives - *bon, grand*, etc.; the latter, on the other hand, are applicable to a very limited number of substantives - especially technical adjectives such as *emphytéotique*, which can be said only of *bail* or *loUAGE* (Moignet 1981:44). The more extensive and the less comprehensive the adjective, the more likely it is to be used in all four categories. Therefore, common adjectives such as *grand* are used in all four. However, technical adjectives like *emphytéotique* are suited only to post-position: "les *grands* hommes reposent au Panthéon" (saisie 1); "Pierre est un *grand* fumeur" (saisie 2);
"Jacques est déjà un grand garçon" (saisie 3); "Jean est un homme grand" (saisie 4); "c’est un bâil emphytéotique" (saisie 4) (Moignet 1981:49).

Likewise, the degree of generality of the substantive is felt to have a certain effect on the type of adjective it will accept as modifier. Moignet points out that any adjective may modify a substantive having a general notional content: i.e. a substantive such as "nature, caractère, qualité, qui ne fait que matérialiser le support théorique de tout adjectif, développer notionnellement l'idée d'un adjectif: le caractère exceptionnel de cette mesure..." (Moignet 1981:45).

Vachon-L'Héureux too suggests that the nature of the substantive as well as that of the adjective are decisive in the relation between adjective and substantive: "S'il y a rapport de non-attirance soit pour le substantif-procès, soit pour le substantif-résultat, l'adjectif aura une place fixe. Si, au contraire, ce rapport en est un d'attirance et pour le substantif-procès et pour le substantif-résultat, l'adjectif aura une place mobile" (1984:50).

Some linguists influenced by the Guillaumian tradition have moved away from this approach to the problem of adjective position. Again we see that a lot of progress has been made thanks to Gustave Guillaume's insight. However, the traditional Guillaumian account is felt by many to be too powerful and complex. If there can be three interceptions made by the pre-posed adjective, then why not
a fourth or a fifth? Some of those who have learned from Guillaume's work have consequently attempted to give a more simple, more concrete account of adjective position in modern French.

In the following paragraphs, we will examine how the system presented in Chapters Two and Three can explain the apparent problems posed by the French adjective. We will investigate the binary nature of the substantive in order to illustrate the mechanism, the mental process which allows for the differences between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives in French - in particular, that the pre-posed adjective is said to lose its semantic autonomy to form a unit with the substantive whereas the post-posed adjective maintains its independence.

4.6 Adjective position and the binary nature of the substantive

In Chapter Two, we determined that the substantive is an element of binary structure. It is a word which incorporates a lexeme and a mental referent. Now, the substantive is unique in this respect. The adjective too has a lexeme, but it does not incorporate the referent with it. In this respect, the lexeme of the substantive is not different from that of the adjective. Both lexemes are predicated of some person, thing, idea, memory, etc. which has become the mental referent, the grammatical support for these lexemes. The substantive, however, has been given the
special function of representing this referent, which, as we saw in Chapter Three, is actualised in discourse in the form of a definer. It is for this reason that we say that adjectives are said of substantives and not vice versa.

It is necessary at this point to recall a position taken in Chapter Two. This idea, adopted by Valin (1981) and followed by Hewson (1986 and 1988), concerns the genesis of the elements of the phrasal noun (i.e. all elements from the definer to the substantive). The order in which the different elements occur in discourse is in fact the opposite of the order in which they arise in the genesis of the phrasal noun. Hewson notes: "... on commence la genèse du syntagme par le choix du lexème, puisque c'est le lexème qui détermine le genre de l'article, et non pas l'inverse. En français surtout c'est l'article qui porte toutes les marques grammaticales du substantif, marquant ainsi l'achèvement de la grammaticalisation du lexème. Si un adjectif intervient avant l'achèvement de la grammaticalisation du substantif, nécessairement cet adjectif se rapportera uniquement au lexème déjà déterminé et non pas aux éléments grammaticaux, tels la personne, non encore déterminés... " (Hewson 1988:9).

In un grand homme, one begins with the genesis of the lexeme HOMME. This is followed by the lexeme GRAND and finally, to actualize the whole, the article UN, which represents the referent. The article, which bears all the
grammatical marks of the substantive, marks the closure of the grammaticalization of the phrasal noun.

If in the notional genesis of the noun phrase an adjective is applied before the incorporation of the referent, this adjective must be applied to the lexeme of the substantive: there is nothing else for it to modify. We suggest that this is the case for the pre-posed adjective in French. Since the grammaticalisation of the substantive is not at this point completed, the different grammatical elements such as person are not yet present - more precisely, the referent has not yet been called into play. The pre-posed adjective then, in French, modifies the lexeme, the notional signficate of the substantive.

Things are different, however, if the adjective is post-posed. In un homme grand, the adjective is applied after the grammaticalisation of the substantive has been carried out. In other words, in such a noun phrase with a post-posed adjective, there is first genesis of the phrasal noun (in this case, un homme) and this is followed by the application of the post-posed adjective. For the present example, one begins with the lexeme HOMME which is followed by the article UN. At this point in the genesis of the noun phrase, the referent has been actualised. Therefore, the adjective is in a position to be applied either to the lexeme of the substantive or the referent.

If this explanation is accurate, then it is the binary nature of the substantive that accounts for the fundamental
difference in French between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives. The pre-posed adjective indicates that the lexeme of the adjective is incident to the lexeme of the substantive - it finds its grammatical support in another lexeme. The post-position of the adjective, on the other hand, usually indicates that the lexeme of the adjective is incident to the referent. However, with the post-posed adjective, the adjective may be incident to either the lexeme or the referent of the substantive - both are available to it. If the lexeme of the post-posed adjective indeed modifies the lexeme of the substantive, then the effect is not perceived to be very different from that produced by a pre-posed adjective. In any case the position of the adjective in French normally is used to differentiate two structurally different relations between the adjective and the substantive.

With this view of the incidence between adjective and substantive, we are now in a much better position to account for the differences of effect between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives. We can now justify the claim that the pre-posed adjective forms a notional unit with the substantive whereas the post-posed adjective specifies the substantive and is said to maintain semantic autonomy.

The pre-posed adjective, modifying the lexeme of the substantive, has an appositive value. The post-posed adjective, on the other hand, is incident to the referent of the substantive and, consequently, has a restrictive value.
(Hewson 1986:4). For any given substantive, the lexeme is necessarily of a singular nature. The referent, on the other hand, is by nature variable - i.e. the lexeme CHAPEAU can be used to designate a multitude of different hats, or referents. It follows that an adjective may be post-posed in order to distinguish or identify the appropriate referent from all the other referents which could be possibly identified by the lexeme - hence the restrictive value of the post-posed adjective.

It is not difficult to find examples to illustrate this phenomenon. In votre charmante fille, the pre-posed adjective necessarily modifies the lexeme, the notion of FILLE - the referent has not yet been actualised when the pre-posed adjective is applied. The effect obtained with the appositive adjective in this case is that of a compliment. Even if you have several daughters, nothing is suggested against the others. The pre-posed adjective modifies the lexeme of the substantive so that together they form a single element of notional content.

However, if one says votre fille charmante, one singles out the referent, that one daughter who has a charm the others do not have. We can illustrate the structural difference between pre-posed and post-posed adjectives as follows (Hewson 1986:5):
This analysis can also explain why *un écrivain méchant* must be *une personne méchante* — the lexemes ECRIVAIN and PERSONNE represent the same person, the same referent. It follows that the lexeme of the post-posed adjective modifies the same referent in each noun phrase, even though it occurs with two different substantives. This can be illustrated as follows (Hewson 1986:6):
One must remember that any one referent, any one person for example, may be designated (and often is) by different labels or lexemes. This writer may be a person who is also a husband, a father, a runner, a teacher, etc. No matter what substantive is used to refer to that person, a post-posed adjective will have basically the same effect since it is saying something about the same referent, about the person himself and not about the notional content of the substantive écrivain or personne or professeur, etc.

On the other hand, in un méchant écrivain, it is the lexeme ECRIVAIN which is modified (and the term modified is appropriate here since the notion 'écrivain' is indeed literally modified). Consequently, the speaker is referring to a person who writes bad material. This is not necessarily un méchant homme in the same way that un écrivain méchant must be une personne méchante. This is quite possibly a good man who writes bad material.

As we have already seen, if the referent is not yet actualised when the pre-posed adjective is applied, it follows that it can only modify the lexeme, the notional content of the substantive. On the one hand, the lexeme MECHANT is saying something about the notional content of the lexeme ECRIVAIN in un méchant écrivain. On the other hand, the same lexeme MECHANT modifies the lexeme HOMME in un méchant homme. With the notion of the pre-posed adjective modifying the notional content of the substantive in this way, there is a sort of fusion of the two notions to
form a single element of notional content. Since the referent is not yet established at the point of application of the adjective, *un méchant écrivain* and *un méchant homme* may very well not be applicable to the same person.

Normally the lexemes *ECRIVAIN* and *HOMME* could be used to designate the same referent ("*cet homme est un écrivain*"). However, with the pre-posed adjective, the notional content of the substantives may be modified to such an extent that the combination *MECHANT ECRIVAIN* may no longer be applicable to the same referent designated by *MECHANT HOMME*. It is important to realise that with a pre-posed adjective, the combination adjective+substantive works as a unit, as a single label. These are two lexemes working together to designate some referent. Therefore, just as the labels *étudiant* and *professeur* might not be applicable to the same referent, the 'package notion' resulting from *MECHANT ECRIVAIN* might not be suitable to designate the same referent as designated by *MECHANT HOMME*. *Un écrivain méchant* is necessarily *une personne méchante* when one is talking about the same referent. However, *un méchant écrivain* is not necessarily *une méchante personne* because in this case the adjective modifies the lexeme of the substantive and not the referent. Hewson illustrates this as follows (1986:6):
Likewise, for *un curieux animal*, it is the notional content represented by the lexeme ANIMAL which is modified by the pre-posed adjective. We saw in Chapter Two that within the fundamental phrasal noun *un très gros chat*, the secondary external incidence between TRES and GROS results in some sort of unit which is then applied to the substantive to form an even larger unit. Up to this point in the notional genesis of the phrasal noun, before the article is applied, the referent is not yet called into play. The dependencies are between lexemes, whereby one notional significate modifies another. We might say that this relationship of incidence between the lexeme of the adjective and that of the substantive is comparable to that between adverb and adjective or even between adverb and verb. It is a case of one notion being modified by another. With the pre-posed adjective, there is a fusion or compounding of notions in order to ultimately label some referent in discourse. Therefore just as Guillaume would equate *la maison* with "la / qui est / maison" (see Moignet
We might equate *un curieux animal* with "une entité qui est curieusement animal" (Hewson 1986:5).

On the other hand, with *un animal curieux*, the idea conveyed by the post-posed adjective is attributed to the referent - i.e. to the actual animal itself. *Un animal curieux*, then, is normally an animal that exhibits curiosity. Again it does not matter which label or lexeme one uses to designate this entity (i.e. the referent), the attribution of the post-posed adjective remains the same. Whether one uses the lexeme ANIMAL, BÊTE, or VACHE, the effect of the post-posed adjective is the same.

If our account is accurate, we are now able to provide a more definitive explanation for the descriptions offered in the past. Consider for example those found in Waugh (1977). As we saw earlier, Waugh believes that the difference in meaning between pre-position and post-position is the same for all adjectives. She notices that the meaning of the pre-posed adjective will depend on the meaning of the substantive much more than will that of the post-posed adjective. For the pair *furieux menteur* / *menteur furieux*, she notes that the post-posed adjective qualifies the individual as a person, whereas the pre-posed adjective qualifies him in his capacity as a liar.

Such examples and descriptions are quite compatible with the analysis given in this chapter. In *un furieux menteur*, the pre-posed adjective necessarily modifies the lexeme of the substantive, creating a label composed of two
lexemes. Consequently, the person being named is not simply a liar, but, as Waugh (1977:87) indicates, a compulsive, terrible liar. However, when the adjective is post-posed, as in un menteur furieux, it is in a position to qualify the referent already named by the substantive. As a result, both lexemes, the substantive and the adjective, maintain their individual autonomy: the speaker is saying that the person identified is a liar and is also angry.

There are, of course, examples which appear to complicate our approach. We will consider, for example, the adjective gros in un propriétaire gros, un gros propriétaire, and une grosse femme. On examination of the first two examples alone, there does not appear to be a problem. The post-posed adjective qualifies the referent, the person: the person named by the substantive is a proprietor and is also fat. In the second example, the pre-posed adjective modifies the notional content of the lexeme PROPRIETAIRE: the person identified is a proprietor in a big way, a big landlord. The problem arises as we move to the third example where the pre-posed adjective seems to have the same effect or interpretation as the post-posed adjective in the first example: une grosse femme is a heavy woman.

We offer a two part explanation for this problem. First of all, there is a fourth example which completes the pattern: une femme grosse. Now, in this case the adjective has a different, technical meaning: pregnant. As with other
technical adjectives, grosse is said of the referent named by the substantive and is therefore post-posed. When one says une femme grosse, one identifies a person who is a woman and is also pregnant. Consequently, for pragmatic reasons, it is not possible to use the post-posed adjective in this case to obtain the same effect as in un propriétaire gros.

Furthermore, substantives such as femme are very common and general in nature and the predominant feature is 'person'. It follows that a pre-posed adjective will have an effect on these substantives similar to the effect of post-posed adjectives on more complicated substantives (for example, in un menteur furieux where furieux is said of the person and not of his capacity as a liar). In other words, when the pre-posed adjective modifies the notional content of the lexeme FEMME, it can modify the principal feature 'person'. Une grosse femme is "a person in a big way" in much the same way as un gros propriétaire is "a proprietor in a big way".

4.7 Objections to this approach

In a very recent article, Hervé Curat (1989) proposes a theory somewhat similar to that presented in this chapter, although there are some fundamental differences. In Curat’s account, the difference between pre-posed and post-posed adjective corresponds to a difference in the order in which the incidence relations are set up. With a post-posed
adjective (un homme pauvre), the relation determiner-
substantive precedes the relation substantive-adjective.
With a pre-posed adjective however, (un pauvre homme), the
relation adjective-substantive precedes the relation
determiner-substantive (Curat 1989:2,10).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{un pauvre homme} \\
\text{un homme pauvre}
\end{array}
\]

In other words, in un pauvre homme the pre-posed
adjective pauvre is incident to the substantive homme before
the latter becomes incident to the article un. In un homme
pauvre, the substantive has become incident to the article
first and then the post-posed adjective becomes incident to
the substantive.

The post-posed adjective becomes incident to a
substantive which is already incident to the referent
represented by the determiner - i.e. the substantive has
already played its role of naming. Consequently, the post-
posed adjective is said of the referent rather than of the
notional content of the substantive. Curat writes: "Il faut
donc prévoir que l'adjectif post-posé livrera l'impression
sémantique de traiter du référent que nommee le substantif
plutôt que de traiter le concept que nommee le référent.
L'adjectif antéposé au contraire est prévisionnellement
incident à un substantif qui n'a pas encore été construit,
c'est-à-dire qui n'a pas encore délimité une classe
conceptuelle par laquelle définir tout ou partie du référent
que le locuteur a déjà en vue" (Curat 1989:12). It follows, according to Curat, that the pre-posed adjective will be felt to modify the definition that the substantive gives of the referent and not the referent itself.

Curat's approach is in this respect basically the same as that proposed in this Chapter. It follows from the explanations we have given in the preceding pages that incidences are established within the phrasal noun first. Furthermore, within the phrasal noun, the pre-posed adjective is necessarily made incident to the substantive before the referent is actualised. We also saw that the post-posed adjective can be applied only after the substantive is made incident to the referent represented by the definer.

Both accounts will apparently make the same semantic predictions. Curat explains that une forte odeur is "une odeur fortement perçue. C'est donc quelque chose qui est fortement, intensément, puissamment odeur" (1989:12). In une odeur forte, forte does not qualify the degree to which the referent is an odor. "Forte dit plutôt que cette odeur a, outre la caractéristique qu'elle est une odeur, celle d'être musquée, agressive, etc, mais cette caractéristique ne la rend pas plus ou moins odeur".

Likewise, la nouvelle voiture can be paraphrased as "la qui est 'nouvelle voiture' dans la situation de référence" (Curat 1989:13). La voiture nouvelle, on the other hand, with post-posed adjective, would be paraphrased as "la
voiture qui est nouvelle dans la situation". According to Curat, since it qualifies the substantive which has already named the referent, the post-posed adjective has the same semantic effect as an attributive. The pre-posed adjective on the other hand gives the impression of an adverbialisation: une ancienne église is "un bâtiment qui était anciennement une église".

However, Curat disagrees with some of the essential points of the account presented in this chapter. First and foremost, Curat does not accept the position that the genetic order of the elements of the French phrasal noun is the reverse of the order in which these elements appear in discourse. Curat believes that the order of words in discourse corresponds to their genetic order. He insists that in the act of language, one always begins with the referent: the referent is necessarily the first element to be represented in the genesis of any noun phrase. Consequently, since the determiner represents the referent or the theme of the noun phrase (which indeed has been the central idea in our thesis) and as the substantive merely identifies or names that referent, the determiner must be considered as the first element in the genesis of the noun phrase. He argues for example that in une nouvelle voiture, "le référent en situation dont nouvelle voiture est dit [est] nécessairement représenté avant que nouvelle voiture ne soit construit, ce qui confirme la thèse que le
déterminant, parce qu'il représente le référent, est premier en génèse" (Curat 1989:14).

The apparent logic of this argument becomes questionable when one considers the case of languages such as Norwegian, Bulgarian and Rumanian which have post-posed determiners (see Hewson 1972:13). If there is no difference between the genetic order in which the elements of the noun phrase are established and the order in which they occur in discourse, and if the determiner (which represents the referent) must be established first, then how would one account for these post-posed articles?

Curat claims that a theory which posits the same order in genesis as in discourse is much more simple and economical "puisqu'elle ne suppose aucune acrobatie cérébrale chez le locuteur" or "chez l'auditeur" (Curat 1989:8). He goes on to argue that "... il est bien plus simple, ayant posé que la place des mots dépend de l'ordre dans lesquels ils sont pensés, d'attribuer tel effet de sens d'un mot ... au contexte génétique lui-même plutôt qu'à tel ou tel support particulier" (1989:15). He argues that if genetic order does not correspond to word order in discourse, then the speaker (and the listener who has to decode the message) must be able to suspend these operations and reverse them. If indeed the referent and, consequently, the determiner must be established first, then certainly for languages such as Rumanian, Bulgarian and Norwegian the
genetic order must be different from the word order found in discourse.

Moreover, one might wonder if Curat is not himself in infraction of his own rule of simplicity and economy. In his account, are there not mental acrobatics involved in noun phrases with a pre-posed adjective? If in un pauvre homme, the determiner is represented first before pauvre homme is constructed; if then the incidence between adjective and substantive is established; and if finally the substantive is made incident to the determiner, is there not suspension of these mental operations and reversal of directions? That is, the speaker must first link pauvre to homme and then back up to allow the substantive to become incident to the determiner? This suggests that the speaker puts the determiner on hold and then comes back to it later to complete the structure of dependencies.

It appears, therefore, that either way involves mental juggling of some sort. However, there is evidence to support the approach we have taken in our analysis - i.e. that the lexeme of the substantive is established before the determiner. One argument comes from gender agreement in French articles: the gender of the article agrees with that of the substantive. Therefore, the speaker does not have all the grammatical information needed to establish the determiner until the substantive is selected.

It follows that the determiner is that last element established in the phrasal noun. That is not to say,
however, that the speaker does not begin with the referent. We might point out here that there appears to be some misunderstanding in Curat's criticisms. Hewson claims: "il y a nécessairement un ordre naturel des deux fonctions [du nom]: on ne peut pas référer sans avoir préalablement nommé" (Hewson 1988:78). Curat, on the other hand, argues that "on ne peut pas nommer sans avoir préalablement référé" (1989:7).

To clarify this matter, we might reiterate the position taken in the previous chapters. It was argued that one necessarily starts with the percept which is the object of discourse, one of a multitude of percepts. With that percept in mind one chooses, from all the available labels, the one which is appropriate for that percept with the given intentions of discourse. In other words, as Curat argues, the mental referent is the first to be present in the mind. However, the first function to be carried out in the act of language is to name that percept or mental referent. We have already seen that the determiner cannot be established until this naming is done. Therefore, the referent (represented by the determiner) cannot be incorporated into the phrasal noun until the lexeme of the substantive is first established. The determiner marks the incorporation of the referent, not its existence.

Curat also rejects the notion that adjective position is related to the nature of the incidences involved. We have indicated in the previous pages that the position of
the adjective depends on its support - lexeme or referent. Curat, as we have just seen, claims that it is a question of the order of incidences. He objects to the hypothesis of two different supports available for the adjective on the grounds that it is ad hoc, that this is a new theoretical apparatus which is not needed elsewhere in tongue. He claims that such a theory is unnecessarily complex: "si des éléments différents dans le substantif, sémantème et personne, peuvent être support d'incidence cela veut dire qu'on a deux mécanismes d'incidence, matérielle et formelle, qu'on doit donc voir jouer partout en syntaxe, avec la même conséquence: alternance de place. Non vérifié" (Curat 1989:15).

We suggest that this mechanism is at play elsewhere in syntax, but not necessarily with a difference in word order. One such example is provided by the two types of relative clause: restrictive and non restrictive. The restrictive relative clause, like the post-posed adjective, is said of the referent: la jeune fille qui habitait en face ... The non restrictive relative clause, on the other hand, modifies the lexeme of the substantive and, consequently, has an appositive value similar to that of the pre-posed adjective: la jeune fille, qui habitait en face, ...

Now, if this is a distinct and unique phenomenon, it is because of the unique nature of the substantive: its binarity. It is the substantive and the substantive only that incorporates both the lexeme and the referent even if
these two are represented by two different words: the referent, by the determiner and the lexeme, by the substantive.

Furthermore, we have seen examples where the substantive is not incident to a referent but rather to another lexeme: perdre patience. In other words, substantives, as well as adjectives, may become incident to one of two potential supports: a referent or a lexeme. Certainly, for the substantive, the primary function is to name the referent: un homme. Likewise, the primary role of the adjective is to say something of the substantive — it may refer to the referent already named by the substantive (post-posed adjective) or modify the naming lexeme itself (pre-posed adjective). However, the adjective can also be used to name the referent: un gros.

Curat also seems to misunderstand Hewson when he says that Hewson wrongly believes the referent, the support of the substantive, to be morphologically present in the substantive itself. For Curat, "les deux fonctions de référence et de dénomination sont assumées dans le syntagme nominal par des mots distincts" (1989:7). He argues that the substantive names while the determiner represents the referent.

Now, this is basically the same position taken in Hewson (1988) and in this thesis. We have argued that the noun incorporates both the referent and the lexeme which names that referent. However these two elements are
represented by two separate words: the determiner and the substantive. We have to see the noun as consisting of these two parts, with the determiner representing the referent and the substantive representing the lexeme which names that referent. Hewson points out that "in any combination of Det + N each part of the combination represents one of the two essential elements of the noun: Det represents the referent, and N represents the lexeme" (Hewson forthcoming:9).

Therefore, there is necessarily a relation of interdependence between the determiner and the substantive. They are inseparable: if one is moved the other must follow. They form the unit which we refer to as the phrasal noun (which may include pre-posed adjectives: le pauvre homme).

4.8 The French solution to a general problem

It is important for the linguist to distinguish between syntactic structure and syntactic order. Word order is not syntactic structure. Word order is simply one of many possible ways to indicate a particular underlying syntactic structure. In French, the position of the adjective marks the different dependency relations between the adjective and the substantive. In other languages, these same underlying syntactic differences may be marked in a different manner. In English, for example, one can distinguish between un pauvre homme and un homme pauvre by means of intonation. Where French pre-poses the adjective, English puts the accent on the substantive: the poor MAN. Where French post-
poses the adjective, English puts the stress on the adjective: *the POOR man*.

The same phenomenon exists in German, for example, between *ein guter WEIN* (un bon vin) and *ein GUTER Wein* (un vin bon). Seiler (1960) suggests that "in un bon vin (like ein guter WEIN) one abstracts a subset of 'good wines' from an overall set - all good things... This is 'Charakterisierung'. In un vin bon (like ein GUTER Wein) one abstracts a subset of 'good wines' from an overall set - all types of wine... This is 'Spezifikation'" (Seiler 1960, qu. Waugh 1977:30).

We have in German, English and French the same underlying syntactic structures. The contrasting dependency relations are the same, but each language has its own way to mark them. Adjective position in French is just one solution to a general linguistic problem. In French, a preposed adjective joins with the substantive in the naming function. The post-posed adjective, on the other hand, is said of the referent already named by the substantive.
5. Conclusion

It should be clear from the discussion in the preceding chapters that knowledge of dependency structure is essential in an analysis of the French noun phrase. We have considered dependency relations at a very abstract level of language: the underlying level of tongue. The evidence leads us to believe that the superficial complexities of discourse hide a relatively simple system. It is in fact a system of systems: the system of the word; the system of the parts of speech; the mechanism of incidence, internal and external; etc. These systems provide the foundation for dependency structure.

For the different dependency relations within the French noun phrase in particular, we believe that the most fundamental concept involved is the binarity of the substantive - i.e. the fact that the substantive incorporates both the referent identified by the noun phrase and the lexeme which names that referent. All elements of the noun phrase (at least all those discussed) are ultimately incident to (or dependent on) the referent, although this may be by means of another lexeme. We saw that it is not enough to say that the adjective is dependent on the substantive. In fact, evidence leads us to believe that there are in this case two possible dependency relations.
It is difficult to imagine how a purely constituency approach could account for the problems dealt with in this study. Even with the X-bar convention, which would allow for the recognition of a head, it would be difficult, in a constituent analysis, to provide explanations of a semantic nature. It should be clear that in order to provide adequate explanations of at least some of the problems studied here, the linguist has to be able to relate syntactic and semantic structures. With a dependency type grammar, the relationship between semantic structure and syntactic structure can easily be shown— for example, the relationship between meaning and word order for the French adjective. Meaning and syntax are kept separate in the constituent analysis. Furthermore, if the constituent is the minimal unit, how would one account for the binary nature of the noun, for the fact that the adjective has two possible supports?

It is quite obvious that many aspects of the French noun phrase have not been examined. There are certainly other types of dependency relations within the NP which are of interest to the linguist. We have not studied, for example, the role and status of the preposition within the noun phrase. The prepositions à and de especially provide us with many questions to answer. What are the dependency structures of noun phrases such as: *ce salaud de professeur* and *une brosse à dents*. 
The nom + de + nom construction alone has inspired much debate (see, for example, Moody 1973 and 1980, Kleiber 1985, Noailly-Le Bihan 1985). In this study, we have not considered the nature of the dependency relations involved in noun phrases such as un portrait de femme. Would we find that femme is incident to de, which in turn might be dependent on portrait (or even un)? Furthermore, how does un portrait de femme differ from le portrait d’une femme? We could say that in the former, femme, without a definer of its own, does not have its own referent actualised and that by means of de, it is adjectivised to modify the lexeme PORTRAIT. As for le portrait d’une femme, the referent for femme has evidently been actualised and, consequently, we are dealing with a full noun. Could it be shown that (d’une) femme is incident to that very referent named by portrait? Would our approach provide a satisfactory explanation of the fact that in un toit de maison rouge the adjective rouge necessarily refers to toit, whereas in le toit d’une maison rouge the same adjective is said of maison?

Certainly the list of unanswered questions does not stop there. Nevertheless, we have been able to illustrate the fundamental dependency relations within the French noun phrase. We have seen that all elements are ultimately dependent on the referent, which is normally represented by an article or some other definer. The substantive normally names that referent and is consequently incident to the
definer. The adjective is said of the substantive. However, it may modify the lexeme or it may be incident to the referent named by that lexeme. This structural difference is marked in French by adjective position. Finally, it was also seen that adverbs in the noun phrase are incident to an adjective. This is incidence of one lexeme to another – the lexeme of the adverb modifies the lexeme of the adjective. Consequently, the notional content of an adjective such as *gros* is modified by the meaning of the adverb *très*.
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