


THE NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE, 1935-1950

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MARILYN TUCK





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THE NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE, 1935-1950

by

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ABSTRACT

A new broom sweeps clean. In 1934 and 1935 the British-controlled Commission of Government swept aside relics of Newfoundland's political past and created new administrative structures that were impartial, efficient and economical. The Newfoundland Ranger Force was one of these creations. The Force comprised a total of 204 men in its 15 years of existence, varying in size from 31 Rangers in 1935 to 79 in 1946. This small and elite force was originally intended as a forest ranger service or group of game wardens to develop revenue-producing fur farms in the vast uninhabited interior of the Island. But it evolved into a police ranger force with wide-ranging administrative duties designed to improve government services in the outports.

The purpose of the Ranger Force changed in response to other developments in the government. Commission of Government reformed most aspects of Newfoundland's administration in the hopes of eliminating dependence on political patronage in an impoverished and traditional society. Reforms in the fisheries and customs departments improved the sources of government revenue and professionalization of the civil service itself rationalized its administration as much as society would tolerate. Reorganization of the law enforcement agencies spread government control and services beyond the capital of St. John's to the outports. In the spring of 1934 Commission of Government reorganized the existing police force, the Newfoundland Constabulary, and restricted it to the more heavily populated areas and industrial centres such as the Avalon Peninsula, Corner Brook and Grand Falls. In the fall the Commission agreed that there should be a ranger service as recommended

in the Amulree Report. This group of game wardens was supposed to regulate the government beaver farms in the centre of the island. Training the first members of such a Force was begun in the summer of 1935. In the meantime, however, the Commission had increased the duties of magistrates in the rural districts by designating them administrative agents of all government departments. When the magistrates failed to meet this challenge to perform the functions of district officers, Commission of Government turned to the Ranger Force in the spring of 1937. Rangers became administrators and the Force reached the zenith of its power. In the next three or four years the Rangers established a reputation for dependability, honesty and efficiency comparable to that of the North-West Mounted Police in Canada.

Then came World War Two and the defence bases. Thousands of Americans and Canadians injected unprecedented amounts of money into a struggling economy. The presence of "foreigners" in a small population that had had to adjust to very few immigrants was both stimulating and traumatic for Newfoundland society. The Ranger Force had to meet the challenge of an erosion in traditional values. In some areas the Force had to assume more police duties, and in general the Ranger Force grew to resemble the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in rural parts of Canada such as northern Ontario. The Rangers managed to keep pace with the higher quality of government services, but government expectations and control of the Rangers became uncomfortably strict. Government regulations now could be enforced because of improved communications, and Rangers who had been trained to be extremely independent and make their own decisions in the field disliked the unaccustomed supervision. In 1947 the Ranger Force assumed a new role when the Rangers reported on

the outport reactions to the form of government of their country. The referendum which was to follow held out two possibilities for the Rangers--either their continuation under Commission of Government or a changed role under another form of government. The latter happened when Newfoundland voted to confederate with Canada in 1949: in 1950 the Newfoundland Ranger Force amalgamated with the RCMP. The Ranger Force ceased to exist as an independent organization and the Rangers shed their blue serge uniforms and emerged in scarlet tunics.

PREFACE

The evolution of an idea is fascinating, but describing the different stages of development often is difficult. Chronological and thematic approaches must be combined to produce an analytical narrative. Another requirement is that the story be put in context. This is the story of the Newfoundland Ranger Force and the context is the Commission of Government period in Newfoundland's history. The Rangers were the multi-purpose administrative agents of the Commission and worked for every government department, doing anything that the Commission requested. It has been necessary therefore to show how the Rangers interacted with other government officials. I also have attempted to show why such a Force was necessary, and specifically what it did.

In a summary fashion, Chapter 1 deals with the impression Newfoundland presented to those interested in the struggling dominion in the 1920s. The sombre picture that emerges does much to explain why the Amulree Commissioners felt that major administrative reforms were needed in Newfoundland. The first part of Chapter 2 briefly describes the instruments of these changes and is followed, in the same chapter, by an analysis of simultaneous developments in the fishery, customs and police departments that influenced the functions of the Ranger Force. This description necessitated a thematic approach and a departure from a strict narrative or chronological framework. Chapter 3 provides a digression into material that I found both fascinating and amusing--how Commission of Government justified the Ranger Force to the Dominions Office by concocting a scheme that most Rangers never knew about. This chapter also describes how this plan, and related schemes were financed.

Chapter 4 is actually the heart of the thesis and describes the development of the District Commissioner system of administration in which the Rangers did the actual work of District Commissioners or District Officers. Chapter 5 and 6, dealing with the institutional development of the Ranger Force from the beginning of its duties in outpost detachments in the fall of 1935 until its end as an independent organization in August, 1950 when it joined the RCMP, lend themselves to narration. Important and interesting as this growth is, it often lacks much of the intrigue surrounding the method of police reorganization mentioned in Chapter 2, or the incredibility of the beaver farm scheme described in Chapter 3. The history of the Ranger Force is not only a record of events through a specific time, but also a demonstration of the accidental and almost unbelievable evolution of an idea.

Half the material used for this thesis is not new. But combining it to provide a background for the activities of Commission of Government and its principal agents, the Newfoundland Rangers is, hopefully, a fresh approach. From different vantage points, a number of academics and politicians have analyzed Newfoundland from 1920 to 1950.¹ Most historians have presented the economic facts quite clearly and accurately. But even the British Commissioners realized that Newfoundland was more than an economic basket-case. The Commission's so-called economic reforms--aid to the fishery through a system of fishery advances, the development of beaver farms and a new revenue-producing industry, and even improvements to the standard of administration by the creation of the multi-purpose Ranger Force--were all designed to restore morale, not to save money. The combination of the economic and social approaches to produce a well-balanced history of this period was rare. And after reading social and noneconomic analyses of these 15 unusual years,² I

felt that an important part of Commission of Government had not been described: how did the Commission actually function at the day-to-day administrative level? Unexpectedly I discovered that the Ranger Force was responsible for the daily administration of most of Newfoundland and Labrador. The Rangers emerged as the key men in Commission of Government's adaptation of the British imperial method of administering a dependency, the district commissioner system. The full implications of this administrative pattern emerged only after I had sketched in simultaneous developments that at first seemed unrelated to the Ranger Force. In other words, the Ranger Force as an institution has had to be put in context.

Two former Rangers have written thorough and solid accounts of the development of the Ranger Force as an organization. In 1951, Ian Glendinning published an article in the RCMP Quarterly which also is available in booklet form; then in 1968, Dorman Foster wrote a two-part serial for the Grand Falls Advertiser. However, both viewed the Ranger Force as an almost autonomous institution, and neither attempted to place the Force in a broader context by showing its importance to the administrative reforms of Commission of Government and the Commission's reconstruction programme.

My principal sources have been the Dominions Office files and Commission of Government's departmental records. Copies of the DO 35s are available on microfilm at Memorial University's Centre for Newfoundland Studies, but understandably have discouraged most researchers. The DO 35s are not well indexed and events of 1934 might be next to those of 1938. There probably was a system of records management, but I never managed to break the code. Commission of Government files, on deposit at the Provincial Archives, are the most complete source in Newfoundland

for the period from 1934 to 1949. Many researchers, however, have bypassed both these local sources in favour of the relevant documents in the Public Records Office in London, England. Interview tapes made by the Ranger Association in the summer of 1978 added another dimension to this study and proved very useful at times to fill some of the gaps left in the framework constructed from documents. Several detachment diaries loaned to me by the Secretary of the Ranger Association contained unusually valuable details which, when placed together, allowed me to paint a verbal picture of the everyday life of the Rangers. The same was true of the few remaining Ranger reports, also located in the Provincial Archives. (Most Ranger files were destroyed routinely by the RCMP in 1955.)

My thanks are due to all those who helped and encouraged me, and particularly to my thesis adviser, Dr. J.K. Miller, for his direction and advice. I am grateful to Dr. Stuart Pierson for his keen insights and his educated sense of curiosity. Other members of the history department at Memorial University read some of my preliminary work and asked pertinent questions which helped to direct further research. Dr. J.A. Tague deserves acknowledgement for originally suggesting the topic. A number of former Rangers, especially Norm Crane, provided invaluable information. Thanks also are due to Bobbie Robertson of the Newfoundland Historical Society and to the staffs of the Centre for Newfoundland Studies, the Provincial Archives and Memorial University Library. I sincerely appreciate the assistance of all those who contributed to this thesis.

My graduate studies have been financed in part by an Alice E. Wilson Fellowship from the Canadian Federation of University Women and a Memorial University Graduate Student Bursary. My family has provided another form of support and learned the principles of tolerance and

individual survival in the process. My husband took time from his own research at the Public Archives in Ottawa to obtain material related to the Ranger Force from the private papers of R.B. Bennett, C.D. Howe and C.A. Magrath. I also am grateful for his unfailing encouragement and willingness to assume extra household duties while I wrote.

FOOTNOTES

¹ David Alexander, "Literacy and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Newfoundland," Acadiensis (Autumn, 1980); William J. Browne, Eighty-Four Years a Newfoundlander, vol. 1, 1897-1949 (St. John's, Newfoundland: W.J. Browne); H.A. Cuff, "The Commission of Government in Newfoundland: A Preliminary Survey" (M.A. thesis, Acadia University, 1959); James Hiller and Peter Neary, eds., Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980); R.A. MacKay, ed., Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946); Elizabeth Russell Miller, The Life and Times of Ted Russell (St. John's, Newfoundland: Jespersen Press, 1981); Peter Neary, The Political Economy of Newfoundland, 1929-1972 (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1973); S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Susan McCorquodale, "Public Administration in Newfoundland during Commission of Government: A Question of Political Development" (Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 1973); Ian McDonald, "W.F. Coaker and the Fishermen's Protective Union in Newfoundland Politics, 1908-1925" (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971), [hereafter cited as "FPU"]; Joseph R. Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 2 vols. (Scarborough, Ontario: The New American Library, 1975).

² See Cuff, "Commission of Government in Newfoundland," and McCorquodale, "Public Administration in Newfoundland."

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CHAPTER 1

A DECADE OF INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT

To explain why the Newfoundland Ranger Force was created in 1935 to provide day-to-day administration in rural Newfoundland and Labrador, it is necessary to look at the Newfoundland of the 1920s. The Force was a significant innovation, and was clearly designed to fill a perceived deficiency and need. At long last, Newfoundland came to grips with the problem of providing government to a scattered population, in the hope that imaginative policies conscientiously applied could stimulate local self-reliance and provide a better life for those who lived beyond the urban centres. Recognition of the problem and the need was not sudden, but the crisis in which Newfoundland found itself in the early 1930s brought it into high relief and forced action.

Newfoundland emerged from the First World War with a heavy burden of debt caused in part by the war itself, and in part by railway expenditures dating back to the 1890s. Persistent deficits during the 1920s had to be financed by external borrowing. This situation could only last so long as there were willing lenders. Following the 1929 crash, loans became increasingly difficult to raise until, in 1932-33, the country faced bankruptcy. The crisis caused a thorough and gloomy examination of Newfoundland's past and present. Newfoundlanders themselves had to find an explanation for their plight, and so did those who were called upon to provide financial assistance. The British government, having refused to allow Newfoundland to default, appointed a Royal Commission which, in 1933, provided a coherent (if controversial)

analysis of this country's ills and recommendations for their alleviation. The report of the Royal Commission, popularly known as the Amulree Report, was roundly critical not only of the political leadership but also of the whole structure of government and recommended a thorough overhaul. It found government to be inefficient, in some respects incompetent, and overly centralized. The country was, in its view, undergoverned.¹ It was a fair comment.

The government in St. John's represented the interests of only a small minority of the population--the merchants and professionals, most of whom resided in the capital. More than three-quarters of the population--all the fishermen, loggers and miners who lived in the outports or the small inland settlements of Newfoundland and Labrador--were virtually ignored, except at election time.

There was no formal local government in the outports. The residents of each settlement did not elect local councils which could have provided basic services such as running water to each home and sewer lines to replace the night carts. No development funds were raised locally for improvements such as wharves or roads. Because there was no local government, there also were no recognized organizations through which a group of residents could present a reasonable request for financial assistance. Instead, individuals in rural Newfoundland expected the central government to look after them by way of the seldom-seen district member of the House of Assembly. The MHA often was the sole link between the fishermen and the central government. But in many cases, the member visited his district only when he could hand out public works money from the central government.

The Commissioners also noticed that the structure of the central government was incomplete. There were glaring deficiencies in the

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administration of the vital areas of education, health, natural resources, customs, census statistics and justice. Until 1920, there had been no Department of Education, and only a year later was a Normal School established to train teachers for the lower academic levels.² Education was not compulsory and the illiteracy rate was high. Until 1924, there was no university or other post-secondary institution to train administrators or a skilled labour force. There was no Department of Health, and the provision of medical services for the outports fell to unqualified people in the office of the Colonial Secretary.³ Forest management was minimal and usually the responsibility of privately owned pulp and paper companies. Breaches of the wildlife laws were frequent because of inadequate staff.⁴ The Customs Department was not well organized.⁵ Leading merchants defied or ignored government regulations concerning the fishery, negating attempts to introduce an element of co-operation in that industry.⁶ The Justice Department was understaffed for reasons other than insufficient money: it spent as much as \$30,000 a year contracting work out and retained only one or two lawyers on staff. Two of the most obvious weaknesses in the central government were its casual approach to the source of most of its operating revenue, the customs duties, and its inadequate regulation of the major industry, the fishery.⁷ Government departments, when they existed, often were very loosely administered because there was no consistent system of record-keeping or of financial control. Each government department made decisions on the basis of political returns, not financial need, and many fundamental social and economic policies were not developed for the outports as a result.

The provision of public services in the outports was largely in the hands of part-timers and nonprofessionals. Among these were 27

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MHAs,⁸ about 80 customs collectors,⁹ 84 outpost police,¹⁰ 25 magistrates,¹¹ perhaps 1,000 teachers and 500 clergymen, about 100 doctors and nurses,¹² maybe 800 postmasters,¹³ a few game wardens and forestry officials, and miscellaneous other local officials. There were not enough government officials of any sort to go around, in other words, and perhaps 1,000 outpost merchants were pressed into service to help about 100 government officers in the distribution of relief.¹⁴ As well, some of the customs men and relieving officers and ¹⁵ of the MHAs were in St. John's and on the Avalon Peninsula.¹⁵ Altogether, several thousand people--perhaps two in each outpost--provided some type of government service. Most had no special training, and the quality of the service bore a direct relation to its remuneration. A member of the Fish and Game Board reported that all the Newfoundland government could afford to pay its wardens was \$100 for four months, and "you can imagine the kind of men we can get for that."¹⁶ The 25 stipendiary magistrates in the outposts could act only as Justices of the Peace because they had no legal training. It also was customary for government employees to be permanent inhabitants of the communities they served.¹⁷ On the other hand, some local residents probably would have been on relief rolls if the government had not given them part-time jobs as customs men, game wardens, police constables, postmasters (and in more than 60 per cent of the outposts in 1934, postmistresses). Each official received perhaps \$100 a year, or enough to keep his family from starving. This income often was supplemented in unusual ways. For instance, the Chief Customs Officer and the man who reported a case of smuggling routinely divided three-quarters of the proceeds between them, and only one-quarter was credited to the Newfoundland government.¹⁸ The Newfoundland Constabulary supported its widows' fund with one-third

of its police fines, while the remainder was split between the government and the informer.¹⁹ To keep a professional man in some of the isolated outports, it often was necessary to permit him to combine the salary of a magistrate with that of a district medical officer.²⁰ For the most part, rural Newfoundland had to depend upon a local hierarchy of political appointees for the administration of daily affairs. These people knew that they probably would lose their positions if the party they supported was ousted at the next election. Without the prospect of continuity, these people had little motivation to perform well. Since they also worked at routine jobs that did little more than maintain a community at its low level, the government decided to do some housecleaning.

Outport constables were typical of government representatives in these settlements: they merely maintained a form of social control for the Justice Department. But only one in approximately 15 communities had a constable, and he had to perform general duties for the whole area. One of his most important tasks was to help the pulp and paper companies protect the timber stands and fight any fires with a volunteer fire brigade he had mustered.²¹ Another of his general duties was to assist in the distribution of relief. In other words, the Newfoundland Constabulary in the 1920s definitely was not a modern police force.

Such deficiencies as these were by no means the only factors that the Royal Commissioners used to explain Newfoundland's condition. They pointed as well to the prevalence of patronage and sectarianism, low standards of political morality, and the backward and vulnerable state of the economy. They tended to place less emphasis on the last of these factors than on the others, which was certainly to distort the actuality.

The economic and financial condition of inter-war Newfoundland was not the fault of the politicians alone, sleazy as some of them were.

Although Newfoundland's economy had started to decline in the 1920s, all appeared well. The widespread use of patronage masked many underlying problems, acting as a tranquilizer. The very nature of the social structure of Newfoundland encouraged nepotism and the spoils system: the country was characterized by a complex network of kinship ties, traditional relationships and long-term personal friendships. Almost every politician was expected to give his supporters government jobs and public money. Patronage oiled the political machine sufficiently to keep it running and satisfied the immediate wants of the population.

In the early twenties post-war depression intensified normal greed and selfishness, in addition to reducing spending power. The result was unscrupulous and self-serving public deals at all levels. Politicians, merchants and fishermen all encountered difficulties after the war: many of their responses contributed to Newfoundland's bankruptcy. While one reason for the form of these responses was the nature of the society, a more fundamental explanation for these difficulties was the nature of the economy. Newfoundland had a traditional maritime economy, based on foreign trade and the export of fish, wood products and minerals, with fish still predominating.²² As fish prices declined in the twenties, per capita incomes shrank, the fishermen could afford fewer imports and the government received less income from customs duties. With few direct taxes, customs duties accounted for 60 to 70 per cent of the government's operating revenue. At the same time, more Newfoundlanders were unemployed and in desperate need of government relief in order to survive. For the government, decreased income and

increased expenditure resulted in a steady annual increase in the public debt. Under these circumstances a politician had only a slight chance of running a government honestly, efficiently and successfully.

Sir Richard Squires was not just any politician. For more than half a decade, he was prime minister of a dominion that was small, underpopulated, underdeveloped and never affluent. He was clever, but forced by circumstances to forget his scruples. He was daring: at a time when other potential leaders were ready to give up, Squires believed that industrial development was the answer to the problems he knew existed and had to be solved. In 1919, the people of Newfoundland had chosen him as their leader. For five years, Squires managed to stay in power because there was no administrative structure which might have controlled the politicians and made them accountable to the electorate. On the other hand, there was no system to make the electorate responsible to the politicians either. Because the politicians were expected to dispense public funds to win approval and votes, the people contributed as much as their leaders to the political climate.

Squires also helped his supporters in the fishing communities in orthodox ways. His government reduced the sales tax and removed the duty from many of the supplies needed in the fishery.²³ The disclosure of his indiscriminate use of money from the liquor department, however, brought about his downfall in 1923.²⁴ The Hollis Walker enquiry into the affairs of the Squires' government showed that the prime minister had financed part of his 1923 election campaign with \$43,000 contributed by Bell Island mining interests.²⁵ Dr. Campbell, his Minister of Agriculture and Mines, had spent public funds allocated for the administration of the government for partisan purposes. Campbell also had used relief money to pay some personal election expenses as well as to buy

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votes, in this case, with unfortunate results for his party.²⁶

In the long run, Squires and Campbell emerged virtually unscathed from these incidents: no court in Newfoundland would convict Squires, and Campbell was simply forgotten for a few years.²⁷ The use of patronage to win an election was considered almost essential both by the politicians and the electorate. Obviously, Squires delivered what the people wanted, even though many of his methods of operating were questionable, some were unethical and others were illegal. But Squires was a man to watch. He was unscrupulous, persuasive, daring and clever. His opponents felt that this combination of abilities and characteristics could undermine any government and any change that he did not institute.

The Hollis Walker enquiry of 1924 revealed the extent of government corruption and led to Squires' resignation in July. After a period of political upheaval and confusion, Walter Monroe formed a businessman's government which lasted from 1924 to 1928. This administration seemed to serve its own class interests. Monroe repealed the income tax paid by approximately 2,000 merchants, government employees and assorted professionals, and made up some of the deficit in government revenue by increasing customs duties on imports for the fishery paid by about 50,000 fishermen. As well, Monroe introduced protective economic measures to stimulate the growth of local industries such as his own cordage company and his finance minister's margarine company.²⁸ The Monroe government passed some progressive legislation too. It repealed prohibition and gave the vote to women over 25 years of age.²⁹ In 1927, the Buchans mine was started and further development took place at the Corner Brook mill. The government reduced the salaries of MHAs.³⁰ But the overall record of the Monroe administration was not impressive.³¹

In 1928, economic conditions seemed to be improving, and Newfoundland responded by re-electing Squires. One of the first actions of the new government was to restore the income tax, a move that was psychologically astute but economically insignificant.³² Equally popular, and equally insignificant for different reasons, was Squires' promise of a job for every man who wanted to work.³³ It was not long before this promise was nullified by events beyond the control of any Newfoundlander--the onset of the great depression. Even worse, the fishery failed for two successive years, 1930 and 1931. Finally, in February, 1932, Squires and Campbell were again charged with corruption.³⁴ Citizens with more morals than money took action into their own hands. Led by prominent businessmen, a large group marched on the Colonial Building determined to force a complete enquiry into government corruption. The government stalled and the people rioted. Squires escaped with his life, and wisely left the political arena.

During Squires' second term as prime minister, two ideas to improve the administration of the government were publicized. Both appeared in the report of the Royal Commission and both eventually affected the Ranger Force.

In 1930, the Finance Minister, Major Peter Cashin, had commented on one of the administrative problems resulting from the isolation of the outports. In his budget speech, Cashin observed that there were too many minor and part-time outport officials, and that money could be saved by consolidating the jobs and providing a single salary. It was a sensible suggestion, but impractical: as Cashin himself said, "We cannot eject faithful public servants."³⁵

A second and more important proposal to improve the administration of some of Newfoundland's resources was made three years later and

involved the creation of a forest ranger service of woods constables and river wardens.³⁶ This emanated from the report of the Consolidation Commission established by Prime Minister Squires in 1929 to revise and improve Newfoundland statutes. The Commission announced its findings in 1933 during the tenure of Prime Minister F.C. Alderdice. This report, written by Brian Dunfield of the Justice Department, recommended that the government facilitate the development of a fur industry in Newfoundland by establishing five game reserves in the interior and creating a small force of uniformed and disciplined wardens to regulate them. One of the drawbacks of the proposed ranger service was that the wardens who were to protect the fish and game were also to guide tourists to the locations where the most fish and game could be caught. For reasons of economy, only the 30 woods constables would be permanent government employees, the 60 river wardens being seasonal employees like the entire game and forestry service in 1933. This was not likely to lead to efficiency. Though the forest ranger service was to have the appearance and discipline of police, it was to be controlled by the Department of Lands and Fisheries, the forerunner of the Department of Natural Resources. The major economy measures of the report, however, reduced its value except as an idea.

Neither Cashin's recommendation nor Dunfield's proposal were implemented. Cashin's suggestion would have been a rational solution in a different society. Dunfield's proposal was not accepted because it would have cost too much money and entailed the elimination of many part-time positions for the unskilled in favour of the creation of a few full-time positions for the skilled and disciplined. Acting on either idea would have cost any politician votes.

Social considerations and patronage politics were important factors in administrative decisions in the 1920s. The Newfoundland government, as a result, was ineffective, unbusinesslike and expensive. But the ordinary Newfoundlander was not concerned: the government was irrelevant except as a source of handouts. Besides, the government was in St. John's, not in the outports.

FOOTNOTES

¹PAC, Magrath Papers, MG30, E82, vol. 8, file 39, Memorandum Re Newfoundland (Private), C.A. Magrath, May, 1934, p. 3; *Ibid.*, Magrath to Amulree, August 18, 1933.

²PANL, GN 14/304.2 (1936/37), Statistical Reports, p. 69. Before 1920, prospective teachers either went abroad for special education or received training on the job.

³Browne, p. 199; see Alexander, "Literacy."

⁴PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 18, Protection of Game Board, June 12, 1933; DO 114/59, NF 1006, Alderdice to Dominions Office, January 5, 9, 10, 1934.

⁵McCorquodale, pp. 190-193.

⁶Ian McDonald, "Coaker, the Reformer: A Brief Biography and Introduction," 1975, p. 48.

⁷DO 35/296, 300, 301, R. Gushue, Chairman, Newfoundland Fisheries Board to N.L. Macpherson, Assistant Secretary for Fisheries, Department of Natural Resources, October 15, 1936.

⁸PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 8, file 39, Memorandum Re Newfoundland (second draft), C.A. Magrath, April 13, 1933, p. 5; PANL, GN 14/304.2 (1935), Statistical Reports, p. 19.

⁹PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 16, file 13, Royal Commission on Newfoundland, Department of Customs, March 24, 1933.

¹⁰In February, 1932, there were only 40 police for approximately 240,000 people in the outports (DO 35/420 . . . 462, secret telegram no. 3, Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, February, 1932). Six months later, the number of constables was increased to 66 (DO 35/420 . . . 462, Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary, August, 1932). Justice Minister L.E. Emerson later described these outport constables as "the typical village policemen so frequently pilloried by comedy" (PANL, S2-5-1/F8, J.31-41, Emerson to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941).

¹¹DO 114/59, N1038/10, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, April 29, 1935.

¹²Newfoundland Royal Commission 1933 Report, 593, 594 [hereafter cited as Amulree Report].

¹³PANL, GN 14/304.2 (1935), Statistical Reports, 238.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 229; PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 16, file 38, Royal Commission on Newfoundland, H.J. Brownrigg, April 7, 1933; DO 35/495, Dominions Office to Treasury, June 2, 1934. Relief or government assistance was necessary to bring the fisherman's annual income up to subsistence level.

15PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 8, file 39, Memorandum Re Newfoundland (second draft), C.A. Magrath, April, 1933, p. 5.

16Ibid., vol. 18, file 106, Royal Commission on Newfoundland, W.E. Wood, Protection of Game Board, June 12, 1933.

17DO 114/58, N1038/10, despatch no. 350, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, April 29, 1935.

18DO 114/58, Treasury to Newfoundland Government, February 18, 1933; see R. Burton Deane, Mounted Police Life in Canada (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1937), p. 99.

19Interview with John Lawlor, former Chief of Newfoundland Constabulary (1972-76), September 5, 1978; Arthur Fox, The Newfoundland Constabulary (Newfoundland: Robinson Blackmore Printing and Publishing Ltd., 1971), p. 79.

20PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 12, file 10, "Department of Justice Report," pp. 13-20.

21Interview with John Lawlor, October 12, 1978.

22David Alexander, "Newfoundland's Traditional Economy and Development to 1934," in Hiller and Neary, p. 32.

23McDonald, "FPU," p. 315.

24R.M. Elliott, "Newfoundland Politics in the 1920s: The Genesis and Significance of the Hollis Walter Enquiry," in Hiller and Neary; Frederick W. Rowe, A History of Newfoundland and Labrador (Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), p. 379.

25McDonald, "FPU," p. 319.

26Ibid., pp. 308-319; Browne, pp. 114-120.

27McDonald, "FPU," p. 323; Elliott, p. 195.

28Browne, p. 144; McDonald, "FPU," pp. 334-335; Elliott, p. 196.

29Rowe, p. 382; Browne, pp. 142-143.

30Browne, pp. 148, 155-156.

31J.R. Smallwood, The New Newfoundland (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 191; St John Chadwick, Newfoundland, Island into Province (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 131.

32In 1933, the total revenue from this source was \$824,488. PANL, GN 14/304.2 (1935), Statistical Reports, p. 81; Browne, p. 168; Neary, p. 20.

33Browne, p. 176.

³⁴ Neary, p. 21; Browne, p. 193.

³⁵ CNS, Newfoundland, Journal of House of Assembly (1930) [Cashin's Budget Speech], p. 256.

³⁶ PANL, GN 1/3A, 116/33; Consolidation Commission Report, February 16, 1933.

CHAPTER 2

POLICE REORGANIZATION IN THE EARLY DAYS OF COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT

In the spring of 1933, the Newfoundland government presented a brief to the Royal Commission. Brian Dunfield, Secretary of Justice, described how Newfoundland could develop a fur industry and how the fur-bearing animals could be protected by a Ranger Force.¹ Dunfield's scheme was limited in scope, proposing only that a revenue-producing fur industry be established in Newfoundland, protected by a force of game wardens. However, the Commissioners were so impressed with this proposal that they advocated its immediate establishment. They recognized that Newfoundland needed both "a short range policy to relieve existing distress [and] a long range policy to ensure . . . that similar distresses would not recur periodically in the future."² The fur propagation scheme and the establishment of a new industry would create employment and revenue, and thus would form part of both objectives. The game warden force which, the report stated, should be formed with the advice of the RCMP and placed "under enlightened leadership"--could in time become an instrument of the efficient administration of which the colony stood in need. It might, the report said, eventually assume all public work and act as the representative of all government departments.³

The report of the Royal Commission also recommended the creation of a development force "to execute . . . a constructive forward policy designed to . . . promote efficient and impartial administration . . . to encourage the conservation and development of the national resources

on sound lines and to provide for new outlets for the growing population." The Commission realized that "such machinery could not be created without a modification of the existing constitution."⁴ The major recommendation of the Amulree Report, therefore, was the suspension of the Newfoundland constitution and the establishment of government by a commission composed of three men from the United Kingdom and three from Newfoundland, headed by a voting governor. All Commissioners were to be appointed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and were to be removable by him.⁵ The Newfoundland Commissioners were to control the Departments of Health and Welfare, Justice, and Home Affairs and Education. These portfolios included responsibility for relief, pensions, the hospital system, health and welfare services, the police, liquor control, labour and education. The British Commissioners were to share the key Departments of Natural Resources, Finance, and Public Utilities. These encompassed the fishery, forestry, agriculture and mines, finance, customs and excise, income tax, the postal service, public works, the railway, the hotel and the steamship service.⁶ In short, Newfoundlanders were to look after social services, while the British controlled finance, communications and economic development. The British were well aware that control of the finances meant virtual control of all government activities.⁷ All financial decisions had to be approved by the British Treasury which had a reputation for not spending money on experimental policies.⁸ In addition, the Dominions Secretary could stop any decision regardless of content, as all Acts contemplated by Commission of Government had to pass through the Dominions Office.⁹ The Dominions Secretary also expected the Governor of Newfoundland "to keep him fully informed of the main activities of the administration and of the political and economic situation in the Island."¹⁰

Yet Newfoundland was not just another department in the British government. Legally and constitutionally, British control of Newfoundland was incomplete, since there was no mechanism by which the British government could amend or initiate legislation. Had there been, then the Commission's full executive and legislative powers would have been meaningless.¹¹ Nevertheless, control of finances meant that the Treasury could influence the development of almost any policy, by allowing or withholding funds. The result in practice was a tendency to stifle innovative ideas. The Commission never had enough money to carry through the radical reforms envisaged by the Amulree Report.

Commission of Government

Commission of Government took over on February 16, 1934. The three British appointees, all career bureaucrats, were Sir John Hope Simpson, Thomas Lodge and E.N.R. Trentham. At 66, Hope Simpson had already spent more than 40 years as a civil servant, the first 25 of them in the Indian Civil Service. His experience and capabilities more than compensated for his age. In the eight years immediately prior to becoming Commissioner for Natural Resources, he had administered relief projects in Athens and China. Lodge had entered the Home Civil Service at the age of 23 and served there for at least 10 years. He was 14 years younger than Hope Simpson, had less experience as a civil servant, but seems to have been more forceful, and certainly had stronger opinions. Lodge was neither a politician nor a diplomat. Trentham had joined the British Board of Education when he was 25 years old and was appointed to the Treasury six years later. For more than 10 years, he had served as a Treasury official until being sent to Newfoundland in 1932 to institute a form of treasury control.¹² Though associated with

politics all their lives, these men were essentially administrators, with all the strengths and failings of that type. They believed in honest, efficient and economical management, but had little time or taste for the compromises and the deals that governing a country demands. Nor did they see the need for consulting the public all the time. Used to wielding power behind the curtain provided by politicians, they found themselves uncomfortably in the spotlight.

By contrast, the Newfoundland Commissioners were all ex-politicians who had lost faith in the efficacy of the democratic process in Newfoundland and were glad to find safe berths. No leadership was to be expected from such conservatives as F.C. Alderdice and J.C. Puddester, both businessmen, or W.R. Howley, a lawyer. For several reasons, Alderdice should not have been a member of the Commission. Firstly, he was in poor health and died within two years of becoming a Commissioner, and secondly, he was in conflict of interest, being director of the only company in Newfoundland that sold fishermen's supplies, from which the government received almost three-quarters of its operating revenue, in the form of customs duties.¹³ One of Puddester's recent positions had been manager of The Daily News. Governor Anderson told the Dominions Office that Puddester was "probably seventy-five percent honest and can be kept in check."¹⁴ Howley had built up a profitable legal practice in the 1920s which included defending leading politicians and entrepreneurs. He also had been a candidate in the 1928 election, losing to Dr. Campbell. In general, the Newfoundland Commissioners soon learned to let their British counterparts take the lead and set the tone. Even had they wished to do otherwise, they had little choice in the matter. They were in a minority, held junior portfolios and represented a bankrupt dominion.

Few will deny though that the Commissioners were well-intentioned administrators, even though they might not have been as capable and imaginative as future generations have wished. Working on the assumption that "the provision of a higher standard of administration was an essential preliminary to any real development or progress,"¹⁵ the Commissioners tried to implement the recommendations of the Amulree Report, and even to introduce a long-range reconstruction policy. Commission of Government attempted to effect administrative reforms for social reasons--to increase the efficiency of the administrative machinery in order to raise the standard of living of the population, most of whom were fishermen.

Lodge put the problem in perspective when he commented that the dole of six cents a day "is not on a low scale in comparison with the general standard of living in the island."¹⁶ Because a fisherman could make almost as much by falling back on government relief as by fishing, he had little incentive to fish. To alter this relationship, the Commission had to improve the central government and establish an administrative structure in the outports. It was severely hampered by lack of money and resistance to change in Newfoundland. The Amulree Commissioners had anticipated this and had recommended short courses at the Bay Bulls' Fisheries Research Laboratory for teachers and clergymen already in the outports. These community leaders might provide training in first aid, hygiene, navigation, practical agriculture and domestic science. In general, they might encourage the growth of home industries in connection with the fishery.¹⁷

Some Administrative Reforms

Among the earliest activities of Commission of Government were reform of the administration of the fisheries and the collection of revenue, both fundamental and vital areas of concern. From there, the Commission moved to consider reorganization of the police force and the provision of more efficient administration in the rural areas of the 'colony'.¹⁸

The Amulree Report had recommended the immediate institution of "a scheme for the reorganisation of the fishery" claiming that "the fisheries were and must remain the basis on which the Island's economic structure rests" and that "rehabilitation of the fisheries on a paying basis [was] essential . . . to the recovery of the Island." The Amulree Commissioners praised the work done at the Bay Bulls' Research Station, but added that fishery research alone "cannot . . . give full results so long as the administrative services of the Government are inefficient and the industry itself remains unorganised."¹⁹ As a practical step, they recommended lowering the cost to the fishermen of supplies essential to the fishery. This included gasoline rebates for the fishermen.²⁰ Emphasis also was placed on the need for improved techniques in curing and culling, and for fish storage in some outports. A Fisheries Advisory Board was proposed to market fish and fish products on a co-operative basis.²¹

The objectives of efficiency and organization were to be achieved through the Report's very specific recommendation for a district fishery system consisting of a Chief Fishery Officer and 11 district assistants.²² The district fishery officers were to be responsible for government inspection of fish premises and report on local conditions to

the Chief Fishery Officer at the Bay Bulls' Research Station.²³ This recommendation was implemented by June, 1934.²⁴ The former fisheries inspector, John T. Cheeseman, was appointed Chief Fishery Officer and the coastline of the island was divided into eight areas.²⁵

The District Fishery Officers spent most of their first year organizing and administering a scheme of fishery advances²⁶ which, the Commission stated, was part of its larger plan for the rehabilitation of Newfoundland. The Commissioners hoped that money distributed through this scheme would enable fishermen to avoid a credit relationship with merchants, promote self-respect, and reduce the numbers looking for able-bodied relief.²⁷ But because the fishermen proved to be unwilling to take money or supplies from the government, the Commission came to the conclusion that the expense involved was not warranted, and did not offer fishery advances the next year.²⁸

More immediately useful, perhaps, were administrative and legislative improvements in the customs department. Early in May, 1934, Governor Anderson informed the Dominions Secretary that he wanted to recruit "a more active and intelligent type of official" for the outposts to keep records of customs business and to prevent smuggling.²⁹ A year before, Sir Wilfred Grenfell had told Commission of Government that he had had "enough experience in forty years with the Newfoundland customs officials to know that some of them were first-class crooks."³⁰ The British Treasury was of a similar opinion: one of their staff informed the Dominions Office that "the whole business is really one of window dressing . . . and frankly I should like a prettier window."³¹ The Commission decided that it had to make new laws to reduce the oppressive tariff duties, then find strong-willed and impartial officials

to enforce them.³² In 1936, however, the government's economic report indicated how difficult it was to institute changes in a society that habitually accepted patronage and money from questionable sources. This report contained the following social commentary:

In two of the outports where changes have been made in outport personnel, the general public have resented attempts to enforce the Customs laws, and the Customs officials have encountered a social boycott which does not make their life an easy one. There can be little wonder that outport officials in the past took the line of least resistance and chose to ignore many of the provisions of the laws they were called upon to enforce.

Despite cases such as this, Commission of Government reported that it had almost reformed the customs service by June, 1935.³³

Police Reorganization

Customs officials were important government officials in their locations, but it was as vital for the Commission to have an efficient and reliable police presence in rural areas. As matters stood, there were not enough men in the Newfoundland Constabulary to police the island, let alone Labrador, where no government officials were stationed at all, on a permanent basis. In 1933-34, the Constabulary could scarcely be considered a police force for the whole island. More than half the 170 men in the Constabulary³⁴ served in St. John's and on the Avalon Peninsula which had a total population of 40,000. About 85 men policed the remainder of the colony's 250,000 people. In November, 1933, Stephenville had been reluctantly refused another constable. At that time, the Justice Department admitted that there were still large areas "without any police protection whatever."³⁵ Labrador, with a population of 4,500, was such an area. In early May, 1934, the Hudsons Bay Company complained about the lack of police at Hopedale, Hebron and Nain. The Justice Department contended that there were "no men to spare for

these distant posts."³⁶ Hope Simpson was not convinced by arguments of this sort and curtly told Justice Commissioner Howley that fewer constables would be required "if the police were properly trained and thoroughly efficient."³⁷ In defence of his Force, Inspector General C.H. Hutchings claimed that since Commission of Government had taken over, the duties of his small Force had increased "in all directions."³⁸ The Constabulary was expected to perform duties for which it had not been trained, and which its members--often "irresponsible and in many cases, unreliable officials" according to Hutchings himself³⁹--could not perform. Hope Simpson's tart response was that the Justice Department should make plans for change.⁴⁰ In reply, the department pointed out that there was a shortage of money and men, but resurrected Dunfield's plans to expand the Constabulary--plans that had been formulated and discussed in 1933, months before presentation to the Amulree Commissioners.⁴¹ Originally, Dunfield had wanted a 110-man police force, but the Justice Department settled for a 20-man extern force modelled on the RCMP for duty outside St. John's.⁴²

The press got wind of this proposal. Newspapers all across Canada reported that Newfoundland was considering the formation of a new police force similar to the RCMP.⁴³ The Commission was forced to act. Within a week of receiving the first letter of application for the new Force,⁴⁴ the Justice Department telegraphed Canadian Justice Minister Hugh Guthrie asking for information about the RCMP. Guthrie replied the same day, saying that he had asked Commissioner J.H. MacBrien of the RCMP to co-operate fully.⁴⁵ On June 2, MacBrien sent Howley the material requested less than a week earlier. This included the duties of the RCMP, the rates of pay, the last annual report, and the enabling legislation

(the RCMP Act) which had created the Canadian force.⁴⁶ This information was passed from Howley to Hope Simpson some time in June, 1934.⁴⁷

Howley obviously envisaged the extern force as an extension of the Constabulary under the control of the Department of Justice.⁴⁸ Hope Simpson, however, had other ideas, arguing that an extern force should be formed and used in the ways suggested by the Amulree Report. This implied control by the Department of Natural Resources. Hope Simpson got his way. The Commission decided that the Constabulary would become a purely urban force doing the work for which it was best suited. The reorganization of the Constabulary got under way on August 9, with the compulsory retirement of C.H. Hutchings, its head. A former politician, Hutchings had failed to reorganize and expand the Constabulary to the outports, and had to go.⁴⁹ The Constabulary was henceforth to be confined to the urban areas of Newfoundland and former Superintendent P.J. O'Neill became the first Chief of the reformed force.⁵⁰ With Scotland Yard training, O'Neill approximated the type of police chief the Commission wanted--a military officer.⁵¹ The Commission then began to consider plans for its own force to administer the outports. The idea of a ranger force, under Natural Resources, was approved at its August 10 meeting.⁵²

First, however, the Commission had to improve the situation in Labrador, a territory that was outside the interests of the Constabulary and the immediate jurisdiction of any proposed extern or ranger force. In September, 1934, a special police force was sent to Labrador "for the prime purpose of distributing relief and to look after the welfare of the natives generally."⁵³ Eight members of the Constabulary were stationed at Battle Harbour, Cartwright, Hebron, Hopedale and Nain.

This was purely a temporary measure, until the new force took over.⁵⁴

In September, the Commission began serious work on organizing a ranger force. Since the rural areas of Newfoundland were similar to Canada's Northwest Territories, Hope Simpson went to Canada to find out from Commissioner MacBrien how the RCMP functioned in the Canadian northwest, and how a similar force could be established in Newfoundland and Labrador.⁵⁵ With the help of this information, Hope Simpson presented a detailed plan to the Commission at its fiftieth meeting on October 12, 1934.⁵⁶ The proposed Ranger Force would consist of 75 men. There would be three divisions--one for southern Newfoundland, another for northern Newfoundland, and a separate division for Labrador. Southern Newfoundland would have 8 detachments and 23 men--3 sergeants, 3 corporals and 17 rangers. Five of these men would be on staff at the headquarters for southern Newfoundland at Port aux Basques. In northern Newfoundland there would be 9 detachments and 23 men--3 sergeants, 2 corporals and 18 rangers. Five of these men would remain at the headquarters for northern Newfoundland at Morris Arm. Labrador would have 5 detachments and 11 men--1 sergeant and 10 rangers. One man (the sergeant) would operate the Labrador headquarters at Cartwright. All detachments in Newfoundland and Labrador were to be two-man posts, and each of the two divisional headquarters in Newfoundland was to have an inspector on staff, as well as being a regular detachment with 1 corporal and 3 rangers.

The main headquarters for the entire Ranger Force was originally scheduled to be at Grand Falls which Hope Simpson said would be most central.⁵⁷ Howley pointed out, however, that Grand Falls also would be the most expensive and accommodation would be practically impossible to obtain.⁵⁸ Hope Simpson's second choice, Whitbourne, met the

Commission's requirements, being within reach of the railway and outside St. John's. Because the Whitbourne-Markland area already was the site of government activity,⁵⁹ the Commission agreed that Whitbourne should become the central headquarters for the Ranger Force, to be staffed by a chief ranger, a sergeant, a corporal and five rangers.⁶⁰ Within a week, Governor Anderson relayed Hope Simpson's proposal to the Dominions Office, commenting that it was too late to organize a Ranger Force in 1934, but that plans were being made for the spring.⁶¹

The process of making these plans proved more difficult than expected. Howley objected to control by the Department of Natural Resources of a Ranger Force with police powers. He tried to protect the position and strength of the Constabulary. Howley already had voiced his opposition to Hope Simpson's plan to take the best men from the Constabulary to form the nucleus of a Ranger service,⁶² and Dunfield had explained why this should not be done:⁶³ the regular police force then would be left without qualified men for promotion to the senior ranks. By the middle of January, 1935, however, the Justice Department admitted defeat: it told an applicant that all questions concerning the Ranger Force should be directed to the Department of Natural Resources.⁶⁴ A survey of outport police requested by Dunfield in February, 1935 verified Hope Simpson's decision. Results of the survey showed that there were only 84 constables in all the outports and that more than a third of these had been community residents for 10 to 15 years. Both the Chief of Police and the Secretary of Justice realized that the effectiveness of a local law enforcement officer was considerably reduced if he had to bend to pressures from relatives, neighbours and friends. Chief O'Neill recommended that outport policemen should be transferred every three years, but added that "funds for

transfer have always been lacking.⁶⁵ Records indicate, however, that the Constabulary had always managed to find money for such things as uniforms and other superficial items.⁶⁶ Dunfield simply suggested leaving the matter for the moment because the problem would cease to exist when the Ranger Force replaced the outport Constabulary.⁶⁷ The Commission now had enough facts to support its suspicions about the operations of the Newfoundland Constabulary. Hope Simpson, aware that the administration of the outports was crucial to the rehabilitation of the whole country, began to implement his plans for a Ranger Force to patrol outlying districts systematically and report to the Commission on a regular basis. Such a Ranger Force would be responsible to the Department of Natural Resources which would be able to exercise general direction over the activities of the Rangers. Hope Simpson realized that some supervision was necessary because the Justice Department had had very little control over--or even contact with--its outport constables. Naturally, Howley disagreed with Hope Simpson. While Howley had accepted the broad outlines of the recommendation for a Ranger Force, he had objected strenuously to Hope Simpson's firm intention to control it. Thus, the plans for a Ranger Force that emerged in late February, 1935 had been revised partly to suit the opposing interests of Hope Simpson and Howley, and partly for reasons of practicality and economy. Also, the plans were influenced by unexpected developments in other government policies.

9

FOOTNOTES

¹ This brief was an elaboration of the Consolidation Commission report which Dunfield had written earlier in the year. Copies of both are in the Magrath Papers at the Public Archives of Canada (vol. 13, file 5), indicating a connection between the two documents and supporting Dunfield's claim that he was 'father of the Ranger Force'.

² PANL, S2-7-1/FH, Report of the Co-operative Division of the Department of Natural Resources, April 10, 1944.

³ Amulree Report, 484, 619, 620, 621.

⁴ Ibid., 548, 550.

⁵ CNS, Britain, Parliamentary Debates (December 12, 1933).

⁶ McCorquodale, p. 114.

⁷ Amulree Report, 147.

⁸ W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. 2, Problems of Economic Policy, part 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 268; Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 (New York: Longman Group Ltd., 1975), p. 278.

⁹ CNS, Britain, Parliamentary Debates (December 12, 1933).

¹⁰ DO 35/494, 495, Dominions Office to Governor of Newfoundland, February 2, 1934; DO 35/505, 506, K515, Hope Simpson to Clutterbuck, February 28, 1935.

¹¹ PANL, GN 1/8/2, 1934-36, N.R. 38-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 12, 1935.

¹² McCorquodale, pp. 389-394; PAC, Bennett Papers, N201 (1930-31), Newfoundland film no. 140, vol. 5, J169080, Jackson Dodds, General Manager, Bank of Montreal to R.B. Bennett, September 16, 1932.

¹³ PANL, GN 14/304.2 (1935), Statistical Reports, p. 91.

¹⁴ Noel, p. 222; see DO 114/59, NF. 1006, first Dominions Office meeting with Newfoundland Government, January 5, 1934.

¹⁵ D.J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, vol. 1, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), p. 83.

¹⁶ Thomas Lodge, "Newfoundland To-day," Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, XIV, 5 (1935), 64.

17 Amulree Report, 384.

18 The Commission completely reorganized the civil service, but the introduction of professional administrative standards in St. John's had little immediate effect in the outposts. Also, the Newfoundland civil service was not unusual: mediocrity and incompetence were also rewarded in the Canadian civil service which was said to be "completely incapable of running the affairs of an aspiring nation." J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 26.

19 Amulree Report, 246, 304, 347-356, 362, 634(13).

20 DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36; DO 35/494, 495, Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, April 12, 1935.

21 Amulree Report, 352-358; DO 35/499, Newfoundland Government Policy Commission, February 19, 1935; DO 114/59, N1002/86, despatch no. 178, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, March 28, 1936; Ibid., N1002/87, despatch no. 184, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, April 13, 1936.

22 Amulree Report, 358.

23 Ibid., 380, 383, 634 (14a).

24 DO 35/495, Dominions Office to Treasury, June 2, 1934.

25 Who's Who In and From Newfoundland, 1937 (3rd edition), p. 178; DO 35/495, Dominions Office to Treasury, June 2, 1934.

26 DO 35/490, 491, Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, September 20, 1934; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.46, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 5, 1934.

27 DO 35/495, Dominions Office to Treasury, June 2, 1934; DO 35/490, 491, Government of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, September 20, 1934.

28 PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.40-35/36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 27, 1935; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.43(a)-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 26, 1936; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.84-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, September 22, 1936.

29 DO 114/59, telegram no. 88, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, April 17, 1935.

30 PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.57, Sir Wilfred Grenfell to Commission of Government, May 25, 1934.

31 DO 35/494, 495, Treasury to Dominions Office, May 9, 1935.

32 DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates for year ending June 30, 1934; DO 35/494, 495, Colonial Office on Revision of Newfoundland Tariff, November 10, 1934; DO 35/490, 491, Press Communiqué after 91st meeting of Commission of Government, June 13, 1935.

33 PANL, GN 1/8/2, NR 40-35/36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 27, 1935.

34 This is a conservative estimate of the number of men in the Constabulary, based on the Governor's correspondence, Justice Department files, and letters to the Bank of Montreal which was not so directly involved in police administration. Commission of Government, on the other hand, had listed 285 men in the Constabulary in 1934. PANL, GN 1/3A, 621/33, Governor Anderson to Dominions Secretary Thomas, September, 1933; PAC, Bennett Papers, N201 (1930-31), Newfoundland, vol. 5, J.168996(36), 40; PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 12, file 10, "Department of Justice Report," February 21, 1933; PANL, S4-3-1, J.46 (Papers re Police), Dunfield's memo, May 14, 1934.

35 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Minister of Justice to Rev. P.F. Adams, Stephenville, November 14, 1933.

36 Ibid., District Manager, Labrador District Office, Hudsons Bay Co. to W.R. Howley, Commissioner for Justice, May 3, 1934; Ibid., comments of Justice Department [Dunfield] on letter, n.d.

37 PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.48, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 9, 1934.

38 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Dunfield's comment on letter from Hudsons Bay Co. to Justice Department, May 3, 1934; PANL, S4-3-1, J.42, Inspector General Hutchings to Commissioner for Justice, May 9, 1934.

39 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Hutchings to Howley, May 12, 1934.

40 PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.48, Hope Simpson to Howley, May 9, 1934.

41 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Hutchings to Howley, May 12, 1934; Ibid., Dunfield (memo), May 14, 1934; PANL, S2-5-1/F8, J.31-'41, Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941.

42 PANL, S4-3-1, J.46, Dunfield's plan for reorganization of the Constabulary, May 14, 1934; Fox, p. 119.

43 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, T.E. Stenhouse, Constable, RCMP, Cadomin, Alberta to "The Government of Newfoundland," June 5, 1934; Ibid., C. Wilmott Maddison to the Commissioners, Dominion of Newfoundland, June 6, 1934; Ibid., Commissioner for Justice to RCMP Commissioner MacBrien, June 13, 1934.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Commissioner for Justice to Loyal L. Reid, May 22, 1934.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Howley to Canadian Justice Minister Guthrie, May 28, 1934; Ibid., Guthrie to Howley, May 28, 1934.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Hutchings to Howley, May 12, 1934; Ibid., MacBrien to Howley, June 2, 1934.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Hope Simpson to Howley, June 18, 1935.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Howley to Hutchings, May 11, 1934; Ibid., Dunfield (memo), May 14, 1934.

⁴⁹ PANL, Justice Department files, Box 76-1, Hutchings to Howley, May 21, 1934.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Hutchings to Howley, May 21, August 10, 1934; DO 114/59, N1057/1, telegram no. 295, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, August 14, 1934; DO 35/490, 491, Commission of Government Report, 1934, section 35.

⁵¹ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.48, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 9, 1934; PANL, S4-4-1/FL, no. 86, Governor Anderson to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, August 14, 1934.

⁵² McCorquodale, p. 324.

⁵³ Fox, p. 118; DO 35/490, 491, Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, September 20, 1934; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.87, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, September 1, 1934; PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140 [Labrador Police], Police Chief O'Neill to Commissioner for Justice, September 11, 12, 17, 1934.

⁵⁴ The significance of the special treatment given to Labrador is that until Commission of Government, Labrador had been ignored. The area had no police, no government representatives and the people had no vote. See DO 35/490, 491, Commission of Government Report, 1934.

⁵⁵ PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941; DO 114/59, N1062B/1, despatch no. 342, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, March 2, 1935.

⁵⁶ PANL, S2-5-1/F1, N.R.101, Hope Simpson to Commission of Government, October 8, 1934.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ PANL, S2-5-1/F1, J.88 (notes on N.R.101), Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government, October 16, 1934.

59 Lady Anderson's service guild had been established there to relieve destitution on the South Coast. Markland was the site of a government-sponsored land settlement. The Sir Robert Bond property at Whitbourne had a model farm which the Commission's Department of Agriculture planned to develop. See DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36; PANL; GN 1/8/2, N.R.69-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 26, 1936.

60 PANL, S2-5-1/F1, N.R.101, Hope Simpson to Commission of Government, October 8, 1934.

61 Ibid., Newfoundland no. 129, Anderson to Thomas, October 13, 1934.

62 Ibid., J.88 (notes on N.R.101), Howley to Commission of Government, October 16, 1934.

63 PANL, S4-3-1, J.46, Dunfield to Commissioner for Justice, May 14, 1934.

64 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Attorney General of Newfoundland to Maynard Black, RCMP, St. John, N.B., January 16, 1935.

65 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1 (summary of outport police), Secretary for Justice to Chief of Police, February 15, 1935; Ibid., summarized report, Secretary for Justice Dunfield, February 19, 1935.

66 DO 35/495, Department of Justice Estimates for financial year ending June 30, 1934.

67 PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Dunfield's summarized report of outport police, February 19, 1935.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES AND FUNDING:

how Commission of Government paid for a Ranger Force to protect the beaver colony found on the Markland land settlement.

The first of the Commission's economic development policies was a land settlement scheme, and its second was a plan to establish beaver farms across the island. Both schemes were experimental projects, both were started at Markland, both required money, both were unplanned, and the success of both largely depended on one man, Hope Simpson. This Commissioner also was able to use the second scheme to satisfy the Dominions Office that a Ranger Force had to be established, if only to protect the beaver. How funding for all this was obtained during the Depression reveals the flexible nature of British colonial administration and the effectiveness of an intelligent bureaucrat with well-placed friends. Hope Simpson saw what had to be done and then approached the right people to achieve his goal. It also shows some of the problems encountered by the Commission--the difficulty of obtaining the necessary financial backing for any policy, and the close connection between a depressed economy and maladministration.

The Commission adapted to Newfoundland policies which had been developed elsewhere to deal with problems created by the Depression.¹ In particular, it recognized that state action was needed within the framework of a long-range development plan to stimulate the economy. Its problem was chronic shortage of funds, exacerbated by the reluctance of the British Treasury to spend money and the requirement that every

expense had to be justified by what it would save. Thus, Hope Simpson quickly learned that he had to circumvent this rigid system and obtain outside loans for his development plans.

Land Settlements: 'A Second String to their Bow'

The land settlement or colonization scheme was one of the very first projects of Commission of Government. This plan fitted in well with British colonial policy. When proposing the establishment of a fund for colonial development in the 1920s, the British statesman L.S. Amery had said that "the direct settlement of men on the land . . . must be the foundation of any policy of economic regeneration in the Empire."² Lodge, in 1934, while admitting that Newfoundland was not an ideal place for farming, yet prophesied that agriculture would be her "salvation,"³ despite C.A. McGrath's warning that farming in the colony would never be profitable.⁴ The governments of Austria, Bulgaria, Britain, America and Canada provided examples of the organized development of subsistence farming to relieve some of the unemployment problems of the Depression.⁵

In Newfoundland, however, the government did not originate the land colony scheme. In the spring of 1934, a group of St. John's citizens conceived a plan to get a few of the unemployed in their city off relief by returning them to the land where they would live by farming.⁶ The future trustees took their plans to Commission of Government and asked for a year's relief maintenance for 10 families.⁶ Markland, the site the trustees selected for their experiment, was about one mile south of the Bond property at Whitbourne.⁷

The trustees justified asking the government for financial assistance by maintaining that the success of the Markland land settlement would be "a contribution to the restoration of the whole country."⁸ For several months, however, the St. John's philanthropists did not get government backing and had to pay for Markland themselves. In July, Lodge, impressed with the rehabilitative value of the land settlement, won the support of Hope Simpson who told the Commission and the Dominions Office that the Newfoundland fishermen needed "a second string to their bow."⁹ He felt that a combination of occupations was required because the income from three months' fishing could not be expected to maintain a family for 12 months.¹⁰ As a result, Hope Simpson went to England in the summer of 1934 to obtain a loan from the Colonial Development Fund to finance the further development of Markland and the expansion of the programme to include other land settlements based on the Markland model.¹¹

The Colonial Development Fund had been proposed in 1922 by L.S. Amery "to finance developmental enterprises of Dominion governments."¹² It was established by the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which "provided small loans and grants to the dependent Empire, under carefully circumscribed conditions." During the 11 years the original Colonial Development Fund existed, spending was severely restricted both by the attitude of the British Treasury and by the guidelines of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee. The CDAC

would not consider any economically unsound schemes, anything which was so immediately remunerative that the private sector should undertake it, or anything which colonial governments could or should finance on their own.¹³

Social welfare projects were not to be financed by the Colonial Development Fund.¹⁴ This included anything connected with Newfoundland's most serious problem, unemployment. Despite all these restrictions, £8.8 million was disbursed to the colonies between 1929 and 1940.¹⁵ Of this amount, more than £500,000 was spent before the middle of November, 1936 on development projects in Newfoundland.¹⁶

Commission of Government ran into a lot of bureaucratic red tape in its efforts to get development money. This wrangling was first noticeable in connection with the land settlement scheme. Early in the game, the British government made the strict rules that were to hamper the Commission for years. Hope Simpson also determined his tactics in response to this illiberality. He personally persuaded the CDAC to loan the Commission money to start its land colony scheme. But the method of financing had been debated by the Commission, the Dominions Office and the governor. The Dominions Office had told the Commission that loans should be obtained from the CDF for "schemes started or contemplated by the Commission which are of a development nature [not failing] within the normal administration of the Island."¹⁷ Lodge and Hope Simpson had disagreed. For practical reasons, they felt that the land settlement scheme should be financed initially by the Newfoundland government. They wanted to save time, and argued that development schemes did not form "a proper object of expenditure for Colonial Development Fund advances." In June, 1934, the Dominions Office compromised and informed the Treasury that the Newfoundland government would provide the initial financing for the land colonies, but if the scheme should prove successful, the Commission might consider applying for a CDF loan.¹⁸ In contrast, the governor said that a CDF loan

should pay the capital cost or initial expense of a development project, but that the annual operating costs might be regarded as "rightly chargeable to general revenue."¹⁹ The result of all this bargaining was that the British government did what it wanted anyway: it found the money for development schemes that met with its approval from the least sensitive sources. Since channelling a financial appeal to the Colonial Development Fund was a wiser political decision than directly asking the British Treasury for financial assistance, even though the ultimate source of all the money was the same--the Treasury--the Dominions Office decided to by-pass parliament and insist that CDF loans start all the Commission's experimental schemes which it thought might improve the economy and the administration of Newfoundland. But this ambivalence about the role of the Colonial Development Fund meant that there were few dependable sources of development capital for the re-organization of Newfoundland's administrative structures until a new and more liberal Colonial Development Act came into effect in 1940.²⁰

In 1934 and 1935, however, the Commission was forced to admit that a planned and co-ordinated programme was impossible and too expensive, largely because of the attitude of the British Treasury which, in turn, controlled the Colonial Development Fund. This undesirable situation meant that only immediate action would satisfy the British parliament and only ad hoc measures were possible. The Commission realized it could not increase taxes that already were counter-productive,²¹ and that it was highly unlikely that Newfoundland could generate enough revenue even if new sources of wealth were found. Therefore, Hope Simpson had little choice but apply to the CDAC for a loan to launch the Commission's land settlement scheme.

In February, 1935, the Dominions Office approved the CDF loan for £100,000.²² In the spring, agricultural representatives made preliminary land surveys in poverty-stricken areas designated by the Commission as those most in need of rehabilitation.²³ Because field-workers were still being trained in Canada,²⁴ the first agricultural representatives were magistrates, teachers, and after their Force was established, rangers. As a result of the surveys, the government established four more land settlements by the summer of 1936, and the scheme was expanded before the Commission had enough information about its economic feasibility. Although Lodge and the Markland trustees claimed that "what had begun as a philanthropic effort by a few men was developing into an experiment which affected the basis of the social reorganization of the country,"²⁵ it was obvious that Markland had become a government project for social and political reasons that had almost nothing to do with this claim. Time also proved that the land settlements were of limited economic value. They neither altered the colony's social structure to any great extent, nor did they solve its unemployment problem. Land settlements were more important as symbols of a different type of society and of the Commission's willingness to experiment.²⁶ And by accident, the Markland land settlement showed the possibilities of developing beaver farms in Newfoundland, necessitating a Ranger Force.

Beaver Farms: 'A Bust from the Beginning'

This accident was the discovery in the summer of 1934 of a beaver colony at Markland.²⁷ A few months later, a St. John's newspaper reported that the Commission proposed to establish game reserves in several sections of the country.²⁸ At the time, Hope Simpson was fully

occupied preparing and presenting his plans for a Ranger Force to the Commission and thus was unable to inform the Dominions Office of this development for several weeks.²⁹ In the meantime, however, members of his department devised the beaver farm scheme, a most bizarre plan which Hope Simpson used as further justification for creating a Ranger Force. The idea of beaver reserves had been central to Dunfield's fur propagation scheme, which he had presented to the Amulree Commissioners in 1933. The result had been that the Amulree Report had recommended that the government devise a scheme for "the proper utilisation and propagation of fur-bearing animals," including a Ranger Force to protect them. The Report naively had suggested that "the interior of Newfoundland might eventually be transformed into a vast fur farm"³⁰ because the Commissioners had been told that 80 per cent of the country would support "nothing save fur-bearing animals."³¹ Hope Simpson saw his chance: the discovery of beaver was exactly what he needed to justify creating the Ranger Force he wanted. After some deliberation, he decided that a financial appeal would be most effective. He diplomatically said that the establishment of game reserves would provide a new source of employment for large numbers of men, and that "the initial expense would be more than repaid by the returns." He added that "one of the unexploited resources of this country and a very valuable resource is the beaver."³² To provide for better forest management and game preservation, the Commission was given authority at almost the same time to make four temporary appointments to the forestry and game warden service, in expectations that in the following year the new Ranger Force would assume some of the game warden duties,³³ and presumably make further appointments unnecessary.

Hope Simpson encountered some difficulty in arranging the initial financing for the beaver farm scheme. In November, 1934, he calculated that he would need \$12,000 to establish four beaver farms across the island and 'transplant' 300 beaver from the breeding and distributing centre at Markland.³⁴ Since he could not expect any help from the Colonial Development Fund before the following spring, he tried to find the money in the annual estimates for his department. After searching for two months, he was forced to admit failure:³⁵ his estimates were already as low as possible. In January, therefore, he applied to the CDF for a low interest loan of £4,500 for the establishment of the beaver reserves, and Governor Anderson sent 12 copies of the application to the Dominions Secretary. Hope Simpson mentioned the need for game wardens to protect these beaver farms but neglected to estimate the cost of creating such a force. Governor Anderson noted this is a covering telegram to the Dominions Secretary. The CDF loan was already being processed and the £3,000 credited to the Bank of Montreal in London³⁶ did not cover the cost of game wardens. In April, the Treasury approved a loan of \$35,000 from its own funds to start the Ranger Force to protect the beaver and other wildlife. As with all development schemes except the Markland land settlement, annual operating expenses were to be met from general revenue. The Department of Natural Resources informed the Dominions Office that this new ranger service "would assist materially in the protection of the Island's game resources" as well as in the administration of the proposed beaver farm scheme.³⁷ But the description of this forest ranger service in the Dominions Office files is the same as that of the police ranger force outlined in correspondence between the Newfoundland government and the Dominions

Office.³⁸ Hope Simpson seems to have found a way around the intransigence of the British Treasury and established a Ranger Force that he could develop in the direction that he realized was needed in Newfoundland.

Hope Simpson had thrown up an effective smokescreen which thoroughly confused Treasury officials and extracted far more money than might have been made available otherwise. To begin with, the purpose of the beaver farm scheme never was made entirely clear. But it did sound convincing. The Ranger Force was said to be an integral part of that scheme as it was presented to the Dominions Office by the Commission in January, 1935. Apparently no one in the Dominions Office noticed that the plan to include the Ranger Force in the attempt to develop a fur industry in Newfoundland was both impractical and absurd. The Rangers were to be a protective force for the beaver farms, yet the Commission appointed more than 80 game wardens in May, 1935 as well. One must conclude that the entire beaver farm scheme was not considered seriously and that the Commission never intended the Ranger Force to be a group of game wardens. While the Dominions Office may have believed in 1934 or 1935 that the plan to develop a fur industry in Newfoundland was a good business deal, actually it required too great an investment at the beginning, with nothing but expenses for the first five years. Considerably more than \$50,000 would have to be spent in those years and nothing would be received. After five years, an estimated \$20,000 could be realized annually from the sale of 4,000 beaver skins at \$5 a pelt.³⁹ With luck, the beaver farm scheme might have shown a profit after nine years of operation, if the ranger service salaries were excluded. Obviously, the Commission expected the Rangers

to do a lot more than enforce game regulations. In fact, the Commission indicated that establishing a game reserve, a related land settlement, and a Ranger Force were only the beginnings of an attempt to effect an extensive reconstruction programme for which the government would need a rural administrative force. In February, Hope Simpson informed the Dominions Office that the Commission wanted a \$50,000 loan from the Colonial Development Fund to buy the Sir Robert Bond property at Whitbourne because:

We propose to make Whitbourne the headquarters of the Ranger Force and the Agricultural Section of the Department [of Natural Resources], using the Bond farm as a model farm, and also to constitute Whitbourne the headquarters of the Game Preservation of the Avalon Peninsula.

As Hope Simpson said, the Bond estate was "only one item in a somewhat far-reaching plan for Whitbourne."⁴⁰ By a string of accidents, the Markland area became the functional centre of a reconstruction programme which the Ranger Force came to administer for the Department of Natural Resources. Although the beaver farm scheme had started this larger programme, leading members of the Ranger Force at their headquarters in 1935 never knew that Commission of Government once intended them to be game wardens.⁴¹ The beaver farm scheme certainly served its purpose for Commission of Government, but it was 'a bust from the beginning'.⁴²

All this intricate diplomacy showed that Hope Simpson was a master of bureaucratic wire-pulling and subterfuge. He seized any available opportunity and manipulated it to achieve the Commission's goal of getting rid of the Newfoundland problem. It was Hope Simpson, for instance, who appeared before the Colonial Development Advisory Committee to get loans for land settlements and beaver farms. It also

was Hope Simpson who realized that a corps to administer the rural areas of Newfoundland could most easily be created by exploiting the Amulree Report's recommendation for a fur industry, beaver farms, and a protective Ranger Force.⁴³

FOOTNOTES

¹ J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975); J. Joseph Rutmacher, Trial by War and Depression: 1917-1941 (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.); Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929-1931 (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1967); Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties (1930-1940) in Great Britain (London: Collins, 1967).

² Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 41.

³ DO 35/495, meeting between Lodge and officials of the Dominions Office and the Treasury, May 13, 1935; see W. Gordon Handcock, "The Origin and Development of Commission of Government Land Settlements in Newfoundland" (M.A. thesis, Memorial University, 1970), p. 6 [hereafter cited as "Land Settlements"].

⁴ PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 18, file 39, Memorandum Re Newfoundland, Private, C.A. Magrath, May, 1934.

⁵ John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1943: A New Deal Case Study (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 5; W.K. Hancock, II-I, 149-153.

⁶ St. John's Evening Telegram, May 12, 1980.

⁷ St. John's Daily News, April 28, 1934.

⁸ DO 35/495, Interim Report on Markland, December, 1934; Ibid., memorandum, Commissioner Lodge, June, 1935.

⁹ PANL, CN 1/8/2, N.R.86-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, October 28, 1936.

¹⁰ DO 35/498(2), NL020/10, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, July 26, 1934; DO 35/490, 491, Commission of Government Report, 1934; DO 35/498(2), private letter from Hope Simpson to Sir E. Harding, July 10, 1934.

¹¹ Handcock, "Land Settlements," p. 9.

¹² W.K. Hancock, II-I, 132-133.

¹³ Drummond, p. 51.

¹⁴ DO 35/498(2), Newfoundland no. 73, Governor Walwyn to Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, March 7, 1936.

¹⁵ G. Arnold, Economic Co-operation in the Commonwealth (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1967), pp. 131-132; Drummond, p. 51; Morgan, p. 58.

¹⁶ DO 35/505, 506, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, November 14, 1936.

¹⁷ DO 35/495, Treasury to Dominions Office, June 25, 1934; Ibid., Clutterbuck to Treasury, July 5, 1935; DO 114/59, N1012/38, meeting of Lodge with officials from Treasury and Dominions Office, June 8, 1934.

¹⁸ DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates (Department of Justice) for financial year ending June 30, 1934; Ibid., Commission of Government to Treasury, October 19, 1934.

¹⁹ DO 35/505, 506, Newfoundland no. 66, Anderson to Thomas, January 7, 1935; Ibid., NF 1062A, Clutterbuck to Governor of Newfoundland, January 23, 1935; Ibid., Newfoundland no. 66, Horwood to Thomas, March 2, 1935.

²⁰ Morgan, p. 80.

²¹ DO 114/59, N1012/50, telegram no. 124, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, August 6, 1934.

²² DO 114/59, N1012/42, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, July 5, 1934.

²³ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.86-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, October 28, 1936. These areas did not necessarily have much agricultural potential. The Commission's colonies of the unemployed often were suitable for little more than subsistence farming to complement another occupation such as fishing, logging or mining. See DO 35/287, Dominions Office to R.B. Ewbank, November 4, 1936.

²⁴ DO 35/498(2), N1020/19, Newfoundland no. 153, Anderson to Thomas, November 13, 1934.

²⁵ Hancock, "Land Settlements," pp. 15, 17, 18, 19; DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36; Ibid., Interim Report on Markland, December, 1934; T. Lodge, Dictatorship in Newfoundland (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1939), p. 176.

²⁶ CNS, Commission of Government Annual Report, 1935, sections 92-106; see DO 35/505, 506, Hope Simpson to Clutterbuck, February 28, 1935.

²⁷ DO 35/505, 506, Newfoundland no. 9, Anderson to Thomas, January 7, 1935.

²⁸ St. John's Evening Telegram, October 2, 1934; DO 35/505, 506, Colonial Development Advisory Committee, "Further Development Schemes," January, 1935.

²⁹ DO 35/490, 491, Minutes of 50th meeting of Commission of Government, October 12, 1934; Press Communiqué after 57th meeting of Commission of Government, November 14, 1934.

³⁰ Amulree Report, 485.

³¹ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.6-'36, Economic Report of Government of Newfoundland, January 25, 1936.

³² DO 35/505, 506, Newfoundland no. 9, Anderson to Thomas, January 7, 1935; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.120, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 9, 1934.

³³ St. John's Evening Telegram, October 12, 1934.

³⁴ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.120, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 9, 1934; DO 35/505, 506, Progress Reports for Scheme no. 344 (Beaver Farms), September 30, December 31, 1935, April 28, June 30, 1936; DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36.

³⁵ CNS, Commission of Government Annual Report, 1935, section 12.

³⁶ DO 35/505, 506, Newfoundland no. 9, Anderson to Thomas, January 7, 1935; Ibid., Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary, January 25, 1935; Ibid., Thomas to Dominions Office, July 18, 1935.

³⁷ DO 35/495, Dominions Office to Treasury, May 27, 1935; Ibid., Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36.

³⁸ DO 35/505, 506, Newfoundland no. 66, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, March 2, 1935; DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates (Department of Natural Resources), 1935-36.

³⁹ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.120, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 9, 1934; DO 35/505, 506, Colonial Development Advisory Committee to Under Secretary of State, Dominions Office, February 5, 1935; Ibid., Newfoundland no. 9, Anderson to Thomas, January 7, 1935.

⁴⁰ DO 35/505, 506, K515, Hope Simpson to Clutterbuck, February 28, 1935; DO 35/495, Commission of Government to British Government, October 19, 1934; Ibid., Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36; Ibid., Interim Report on Markland, December 1934; Lodge, p. 176.

⁴¹ Conversation with I.S. Glendinning, Ranger no. 28, September 20, 1980.

⁴² Conversation with Bobbie Robertson, Secretary, Newfoundland Historical Society, October 3, 1978. In 1935, Bobbie Robertson worked for Commission of Government and was closely associated with the Markland land settlement and the beaver farm scheme. In fact, the young Markland trustees relied on Bobbie's initiative, common-sense knowledge and experience in their philanthropic but very amateur endeavours.

⁴³ The records of the Dominions Office and Commission of Government show that Hope Simpson initiated or steered many of the administrative changes of the Commission in Newfoundland.

CHAPTER 4

THE EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA, 1935-37:

a group of game wardens become an administrative force.

A year after becoming Commissioner for Natural Resources, Hope Simpson finally had a chance to implement his ideas for the more efficient administration of the outlying regions of the colony. In the spring of 1935 Howley went on his annual leave. A suitable replacement proved difficult to find¹ and Hope Simpson soon came to the conclusion that not only could he do a better job himself, but that this could provide him with the opportunity he was looking for-- a chance to improve another Commissioner's department. Hope Simpson felt that while Howley was competent, he was also conservative, unimaginative, overly protective of the Constabulary and a threat to his plans. As acting head of the Justice Department, Hope Simpson would be responsible for everything connected with the administration of justice in the island, matters which were proving to be as important as control over finances or natural resources. Hope Simpson took the chance to reorganize completely Newfoundland's legal and administrative structures. He altered the duties of the magistrates, reorganized the police force and created a Ranger Force to establish an integrated "District Commissioner Service" similar to the method of administration Britain had used with success for more than a century to govern the dependent parts of the Empire.² Hope Simpson saw the advantages of adapting to Newfoundland a system with which he had become familiar during his years in the Indian Civil Service.

But the actual evolution of the system was unplanned.

Reform of the Magistracy and Creation of the
District Commissioner System

Hope Simpson's first efforts were directed at altering the purpose, duties, location and size of the ranger service he had outlined to the Dominions Office the previous fall. The original plan to employ these men to protect beaver farms in the interior of the island was to be scrapped, with few regrets. This had been largely a ploy anyway and had served its purpose. Instead, a revamped Ranger Force, now somewhat smaller in size, was to be made responsible for improving the administration of the coastal outposts.³ In a letter to P.A. Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office on February 28, 1935 Hope Simpson revealed how this transition could be accomplished. He would relieve the ranger service of game warden duties by appointing more temporary game supervisors to look after the beaver.⁴ He could then turn the practical management of the Force over to Dunfield who already believed that most of the administrative problems in the outposts would no longer exist "when we get the Ranger Force."⁵ Hope Simpson was confident that he could rely on Dunfield to accomplish the integration of the Ranger Force with the outpost Constabulary. While waiting for a reply from the Dominions Office to this proposal, Hope Simpson turned his attention to reform of the magistracy. This was essential to his plans for the better administration of the island. At first, the Rangers seemed not to be involved: even Hope Simpson probably was not sure yet of the exact role of the Rangers.

Over the winter--probably by January or February, 1935--Hope Simpson's ideas had all come together. His concept of an integrated

district commissioner system of administration for Newfoundland composed of magistrates and rangers was the result of personal observations in Newfoundland, suggestions made to him as Commissioner for Natural Resources, a wide knowledge of forms of administration in other countries and, equally important, considerable practical experience.

Hope Simpson had been struck on arrival in Newfoundland by the absence of local government and leadership at the settlement level.⁶ "Intelligence is not lacking," he wrote, "but there is an absence of the simplest business experience as well as any accepted leadership." The Amulree Commissioners had remarked on this as well.⁷ Dr. H.L. Paddon of Northwest River, Labrador, where the situation was even worse than on the island, had suggested independently a district commissioner system in May, 1934,⁸ and a month later, Hope Simpson recommended something similar.

He argued that since Newfoundland could not yet afford the English system of county and parish councils, the Commission should think of using the French administrative system (which in turn had inspired the British District Commissioner system).⁹ The French rural system was based on the mayor of each village reporting to a district prefect. Both men were representatives of the central government and provided links between the centre and the village.¹⁰ In the British imperial adaptation only one man--the district officer or commissioner--typically reported to the central government. In Newfoundland, however, a closer approximation to the French model was developed, at least at first.

In April, 1935, with Howley away, Hope Simpson recommended to Commission of Government that the magistrates assume a new role, that

of prefects or district officers. Herman Quinton, a young magistrate serving in the Bonne Bay area, had shown what could be accomplished by an energetic magistrate with more extensive duties and greater power. Hope Simpson realized that:

the magistracy, if properly organized, could be one of the most effective instruments of administrative work in more Departments than that of Justice. . . . Were the scope of the Magistrate's duties to be enlarged, he could become the agent of any or all Departments for the collection of information, for the application of departmental policies and for local control in departmental matters. . . . I suggest as a basis for discussion that an improved way to administer this Island would be to divide it into 6 districts, each with a Magistrate as District Officer, to whom there would be 1, 2 or 3 Assistant Magistrates, stationed at various places in the district, as subordinates.¹¹

In addition to his regular duties, the District Magistrate would act as a liaison between the Assistant Magistrates and the Commission and be responsible to the government for his entire district. Hope Simpson expected that this system of administration would provide the Commission with what it badly needed, "a machinery for maintaining touch between the outlying settlements and headquarters," and for obtaining required information on a continuing basis.¹² No longer would the government in St. John's make decisions on outpost matters without consulting local officials.¹³ Responding to local needs and using available resources, Hope Simpson imaginatively had combined the French and British administrative models in order to bring Newfoundland up to British administrative standards, fill the vacuum created by the elimination of district members and the circuits of the Supreme Court, keep the government in touch with local circumstances, and act as a substitute for local government in the outposts.¹⁴

The District Commissioner system worked in Newfoundland because the three most influential members of Commission of Government

were British civil servants with experience in running that type of administrative model. Hope Simpson, and to a lesser extent Lodge, was able to synthesize ideas from divergent sources and adapt them to Newfoundland society. He also secured money from the British Treasury to finance the coherent programme that resulted. In January, 1936, the government suggested sending "selected civil servants from Newfoundland to England for a short course in training in the Government Departments in Whitehall . . . to provide them with a greater experience of civil service methods."¹⁵ That the Commission did not achieve the administrative efficiency it sought was not for lack of will or organizational ability. There simply was not enough money. The mere establishment of the District Commissioner system was a considerable achievement.

Policy makers in the British government had always believed that Newfoundland should emulate the administrative efficiency of the British civil service. During the debate in the House of Commons on the Newfoundland Bill which implemented the recommendations of the Amulree Report, J.H. Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, patronizingly declared that "if we can only get . . . the spirit of our own Civil Service in the administration of the Island, the people themselves will be the first to appreciate our efforts." Leopold Amery, a disciple of Lord Milner, enthusiastically stated that by applying to Newfoundland Lord Milner's South African development policies of the early 1900s, Britain could recreate "the whole productive life of the country from its very foundations." In a similar vein, Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor the Exchequer, envisaged "the singularly absorbing and fascinating character" of rebuilding Newfoundland economically, politically and morally."¹⁶ Most

important, however, was the backing Hope Simpson received from P.A. Clutterbuck, a bureaucrat in the Dominions Office. Clutterbuck had become familiar with Newfoundland conditions in 1933 as secretary to the Amulree Commission and had masterminded its Report.¹⁷ He also had had direct contact with the district commissioner system: earlier, in 1927-28, he had been a member of the Donoughmore Commission which had advocated a commission system of government for Ceylon.¹⁸ Thus, in their efforts to establish a solid foundation for the administration of Newfoundland, the Commissioners could count upon support from influential statesmen and politicians in the British government and leading bureaucrats in the Dominions Office.

In the spring of 1935, Commission of Government began reforming the magistracy, an important part of its reorganization programme. On April 29, Hope Simpson, as Acting Commissioner for Justice, requested British approval to improve the magistracy because the Commission felt it needed "some better means of communication with the Outport Districts" now that there were no district MHAs. It had concluded that "a satisfactory organ of communication . . . could be developed out of the magisterial system."¹⁹ Governor Anderson simply said that the necessity for reforming the magistracy had become increasingly apparent in the past few years.²⁰

In a despatch to the Dominions Secretary on April 29, 1935 Governor Anderson outlined the Commission's plans for "a radical alteration in the position, pay, and duties" of the old Stipendiary Magistrates. The Commission recommended the institution of a new system in which each magistrate would report to the government

in respect of Natural Resource Schemes for Development, Revenue, Post Office, Relief of the Poor, Public Health and Public Works. He will thus be . . . a general

district officer or District Commissioner, responsible to the several Departments for the conduct of administrative as well as the conduct of judicial business in his District, and charged also with the duty of making reports and suggestions and of taking active measures as far as may be in his power to develop his District and promote its welfare.²¹

The Commissioners largely responsible for this recommendation, Hope Simpson and Lodge, knew that the District Officer in the colonies had to report every development in his district to the central government.

By the middle of July, the Treasury, the Dominions Office and Commission of Government had approved the Commission's plans for the magistracy and the reorganization was achieved by only slightly changing Hope Simpson's recommendations of April 9.²² Using the 1921 census, the Commission divided Newfoundland and Labrador into seven administrative districts. Each district was under the charge of a young chief magistrate with some legal training who was to act as a general representative of all government departments. Depending on the size and population of the district, each chief magistrate supervised from one to three assistants. (The Commission had budgeted for 13 assistant magistrates in the entire system.)²³ On June 13, the Commission sent a circular to all magistrates to inform them of their specific duties and their relation to other law enforcement agencies.²⁴ Although the Rangers and the Constabulary were subordinate to the magistrates, they all had a common responsibility for their districts and thus were instructed to co-operate. The Rangers and the Constabulary, however, were to report to their own superiors, not to the district magistrates or the Justice Department. When the district magistrates assumed all the responsibilities of district officers in June, 1935, Hope Simpson's District Commissioner system began to evolve.

Formation of the Ranger Force

At the same time as the Commission was reorganizing the magistracy in April, 1935, it received final approval for the Ranger Force. Hope Simpson had submitted his proposal for the 52-man Force to Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office in February, 1935, pointing out the urgency of the matter. He stressed that a Ranger Force should be established within the next few months to allow time for proper training for the following winter's duties. On March 2, W.H. Horwood, Chief Justice and Administrator of the Newfoundland government had sent an official copy of Hope Simpson's plan to the Dominions Office.²⁵

According to this plan, there would be 10 Ranger districts, 24 detachments and 52 men in Newfoundland and Labrador. This included a central headquarters. Eight Ranger districts in outport Newfoundland would be divided into 18 detachments with a total of 35 men—5 sergeants, 5 corporals and 25 rangers. Labrador would be another district with 5 detachments and 8 men—1 sergeant and 7 rangers. Headquarters at Whitbourne, the ninth Ranger division in Newfoundland, would have a staff of 9 men—a chief ranger, an inspector, a sergeant, a corporal and 5 rangers. Only two of the 52 men in the Ranger Force, the chief ranger and the inspector, would hold commissions. This scaled-down Force was only two-thirds as large as the one Hope Simpson had suggested the previous fall but the distribution of men was more practical—or in the words of the Amulree Report, more efficient and economical.²⁶

A major reason for the reduction in the size was that an accommodation had had to be reached with Howley. Howley was committed to the Constabulary and was opposed to Rangers replacing members of that police force in the outports. Moreover, Howley was a competent

lawyer who had established important political and business connections in the 1920s. In October, 1934 Hope Simpson conceded that the Ranger Force was not to replace the Constabulary on the Avalon Peninsula, in Corner Brook or Grand Falls, and there was an informal agreement not to remove Constabulary members from all the outposts. As well, the Commission had agreed with Howley that the Rangers should concentrate on the outposts and leave the industrial centres to the Constabulary. In these more heavily-populated areas, Howley insisted that "there should be a regular stationary Police Force, subject to the Chief of Police and apart from and independent of the Rangers." In Howley's estimation, the Rangers would be, for the most part, a travelling administrative Force with little time for regular police duties. He also tried to ensure that the Constabulary rather than the Rangers would assist the magistrates. He maintained that

there ought to be one regular member of the Police Force stationed with every Stipendiary Magistrate for the purpose mainly of service of Process, attending in Court, seeing to the enforcement of magisterial decisions, etc.²⁷

Howley and Hope Simpson were working at cross-purposes and it was easy to see why Hope Simpson was glad to see Howley temporarily out of the way in the spring. Ultimately, Howley's struggle was a losing one. Concerning both recruitment and duties, the Ranger Force came to take precedence over the Constabulary. Howley's police force was not eliminated, but it was recognized for what it really was--the basis for an urban police force.

Howley may not have got everything he wanted, but the British Treasury ensured that Hope Simpson did not either. For reasons of economy, even his modified proposal was watered down by the Treasury

and the Dominions Office. On April 29, 1935, the Treasury informed the Dominions Office that:

Their Lordships sanction the proposal generally, but They suggest as a precautionary measure initial recruitment should be limited to something less than the maximum of fifty-two, a reasonable margin being left for subsequent expansion up to the maximum strength should that course be found necessary after sufficient experience of the working of the Force had been gained.²⁸

Commission of Government acted in accordance with these 'suggestions'. Hope Simpson announced that upon the arrival of a drill sergeant from the RCMP, his department would begin recruiting rank-and-file members for the Ranger Force. The plan was to select 15 policemen and 5 or 10 others and begin training immediately.²⁹ On June 28, Hope Simpson told the Commission that "the question of Chief Ranger of the Ranger Force had to be decided at once" because Sergeant Major F. Anderton, the drill sergeant loaned to Newfoundland by the RCMP to set up the Ranger Force was on his way down.³⁰ The Commission then let it be known that two administrative positions were open--that of Chief Ranger and that of Inspector of the Ranger Force. There were a large number of applicants and W.J. Carew, regarded by the Commission as the head of the Newfoundland Civil Service, finally asked permission to choose the men he wanted.³¹ On July 2, the Commission announced the appointment of two officers to these positions.³² L.T. Stick, the first man to enlist in the Newfoundland Regiment in the First World War, was appointed Chief Ranger. Raymond Fraser, another war veteran who had joined the Newfoundland Regiment at the age of 16, became Inspector.³³ Both men had rushed to fight for Newfoundland, both had distinguished military careers, and both had displayed ability, loyalty and a willingness to make quick decisions without wasting time worrying about the implications.³⁴ Despite their positions, however, Commission

of Government did not seem to consider Stick or Fraser as anything but convenient figureheads. It was Anderton who organized the Ranger Force, trained the recruits at Whitbourne, and shaped the early development of the Force. A stern disciplinarian, Anderton became the epitome of economy and efficiency--exactly what Commission of Government wanted.

Rank-and-file members of the Ranger Force were not recruited until after Hope Simpson had sent his memorandum to Commission of Government at the end of June. By that time, the Commission had made most of its decisions about the general structure of the Force. The Commission recruited the first members of the Ranger Force in four ways: advertisements were placed in the St. John's newspapers, posters were put up in the St. John's police and fire stations, circulars were sent to members of the special police force in Labrador, and the recruiting message travelled by word of mouth. The first three methods were probably not as effective as a personal recommendation to Sergeant Major Anderton.

The qualifications for admission were high. Recruits had to be British subjects, have Grade XI education, be at least 5'9" tall, weigh about 180 lbs., be single men and in good health with excellent character references, preferably be between the ages of 21 and 30, be willing to sign a five-year contract and to accept posting anywhere in Newfoundland and Labrador as required by the Chief Ranger. In addition, the Chief Ranger, on orders from Commission of Government, could terminate any service contract at will.

The procedure for choosing Ranger recruits was both efficient and effective. All recruits applied to the Ranger Force headquarters and were shortlisted by the administrative staff. Applicants were

interviewed by a screening board headed by Sergeant Major Anderton who used his years of experience with the RCMP (and the North-West Mounted Police before that)³⁵ to help him decide if the applicant would be a suitable Ranger. Wisely, Anderton had some leeway in selecting future Rangers: some of the less important requirements were not strictly adhered to if the applicant seemed good Ranger material. In addition to the interview, all recruits had to take a medical examination. One out of 10 applicants passed both the interview and the medical. The dismissal rate was remarkably low once the men were in the Force, proving that Anderton had chosen well. It also showed that some of the less promising men could shape up when they had to.³⁶

It was not until September, 1935, when the first recruits were already in training, that the Commission completed the legal framework for the Ranger Force. Act #37 embodied all the decisions of the previous years and gave the Commission free reign to create the type of Ranger Force it wanted--a small hand-picked group of Newfoundlanders with a sense of responsibility, integrity and determination whom the Commission could call upon to do anything. The Ranger Act was both suitably diplomatic and purposely vague, setting the tone at the beginning by stating that "there shall be a Ranger Force for Newfoundland and its Dependencies which shall be known as the Newfoundland Rangers." The Act gave the Commission discretionary power to decide, without reference to the Dominions Office, what government department should control the Force. The Commissioner in charge of the Force was then empowered to decide such routine matters as uniforms and side-arms. Of more consequence, he determined the nature of the training programme.³⁷

The 29 recruits in the first group went through a three or four months' training course based on the RCMP training manual as interpreted by Anderton. The first few months' training was conducted under canvas until permanent barracks were built at Whitbourne in late September. The daily routine was:

6:30	- reveille
6:30-7:30	- physical exercise
7:30	- breakfast
8:00-10:00	- manual exercise in full uniform (drill)
10	- 15 minute break
10:15-12:00	- lectures
12:00	- dinner
2:00-4:00	- lectures
4:00-5:00	- manual or physical exercise
10:00	- lights out. ³⁸

Physical exercise was plain hard work designed to increase the endurance and strength that Dunfield had predicted would be necessary,³⁹ whereas manual exercise was marching, drilling and instruction in the use of weapons. Lectures varied according to government requirements, and might consist of routine instructions in game supervision, relief distribution and recording census data. Technical experts and Commission of Government officials lectured on specialized fields of knowledge such as agriculture, forensic medicine and social welfare policies.⁴⁰ At the end of the training course, Ranger recruits were tested on their comprehension of these lectures.⁴¹ Rangers also had to take a St. John Ambulance first-aid course from a local doctor.⁴² In general, the recruits learned some of the duties of the government departments to which they were responsible. They were told quite matter-of-factly to be prepared to do any job that came along and were warned that they must never lose their sense of discipline.⁴³ The Rangers were indoctrinated with regimental pride, an esprit de corps and a sense of responsibility that turned most of them into dependable workaholics with a limited sense of humour but considerable

understanding of human nature. Most responded well to the challenge and felt that this semi-military training prepared them well for future administrative duties.⁴⁴

Evolution of the District Commissioner System

In the spring of 1935 when Commission of Government established the Ranger Force and reorganized the magistracy, each magistrate was expected to perform most of the administrative tasks that a district officer would. Although these duties were specified in a lengthy circular in June, 1935, the magistrates did not seem to notice and report in detail what the Commission wanted.⁴⁵ The government summarized this circular in its 1935 economic report, making the point that financial stringency determined what could be done. The Commission explained that "in the absence of definite schemes for local economic development . . . the economic work of the magistracy has therefore taken the form of reporting." In January, 1936, magistrates were instructed

to make a survey of their districts . . . and report [to Commission of Government] upon each settlement visited . . . , its economic situation, its methods in and facilities for the fisheries, its timber resources, its lands and cattle, and the possibilities from the point of view of agriculture, its fuel supply . . . , the public works and buildings of the settlement, the nature and state of repair and the cost of necessary repairs, their suitability for the purpose . . . , the health, sanitation and water supply [of each settlement], the extent and distribution of public relief.

The magistrates also were asked to comment on "the activities of departments such as Customs, Post Office, Education or Railway," and were "encouraged to put forward schemes for the betterment of their districts."⁴⁶ These instructions for more detailed reports were repeated later in the year when the Commission asked agricultural

representatives to evaluate the resources and prospects of selected areas.⁴⁷

Brian Dunfield was an important man in Commission of Government's plans and was used by the Commission where he was most needed. For years, he had drafted much of the government legislation.⁴⁸ Working for the Justice Department in June, 1936, Dunfield prepared "a set of imaginary or specimen reports, as an illustration of the system of reporting" to be used by the magistrates when surveying their districts.⁴⁹ Later in the same year, Dunfield was transferred to the Department of Natural Resources where he would be better able to prepare and execute "large numbers of regional schemes of reconstruction."⁵⁰ The Commission was putting into effect its plans to improve the administration of the outlying districts.

In the first two years, Commission of Government thought it had a suitable 'organ of communication' in the reformed magisterial service. In October, 1935, Howley had stated that he was impressed "even at this early stage, with the apparent value and great possibilities of the work of the new magisterial system."⁵¹ In January of the following year, the Commission had reported that this reorganized system was "already proving itself capable of very valuable work, and it is hoped that, with continuous assistance from headquarters, a satisfactory measure of all-round efficiency will be attained."⁵² The Commission also felt that, in the magistracy, it had found the machinery to carry out its 'constructive forward policy' of reconstruction recommended in the Amulree Report.

However, Commission of Government was less optimistic a little more than a year later. Their secretary, W.J. Carew, had informed them that he "was under the impression when the Magistrates were

created that one of the functions of these officials would be to send confidential reports from time to time as to the political feeling within their respective jurisdictions," but that in March, 1937, "the Government is almost entirely out of touch with local opinion." Re-iterating what the Dominions Office had said a few months before, Carew added that

it would be difficult for a Government official to get anything like a true reflection of opinion himself, but he might arrange to have sources of information within each community in his district which would keep him informed from time to time of the people's reaction to Government policy.⁵³

Carew and the Dominions Office seem to have realized that most of the outposts were small communities whose inhabitants were unwilling to give any more than the minimum of information to a government they did not trust.

It was clear by the spring of 1937 that the district magistrates either could not or would not perform all the functions expected of district commissioners as outlined in 1935 and 1936. Sometimes the magistrate made the rounds of his district no more than once a year, and then only to clear up a backlog of court cases. A government official later commented that the magistrates had concerned themselves with court work soon after their appointments.⁵⁴ One magistrate admitted his dislike of the police duties and social work that were part of the functions of a district officer. He said that magistrates should not "have to take so active a part in law enforcement."⁵⁵ Some magistrates found it difficult to form relationships with fishermen, loggers and miners, men whose interests they seldom shared. More crucial to Commission of Government may have been their unwillingness to accept a challenge. For example, a former magistrate recalled in

later years that in 1935 or 1936 the Commission had asked him to organize the entire west coast: he rather wistfully remarked, "I don't know why I didn't,"⁵⁶ as if he realized that he had let slip an important opportunity.

Whatever the reasons, the magistrates in 1937 were not fulfilling the major functions of the district officers. Their reports to the Commission contained ideas for the improvement of their districts, but seldom details indicating familiarity with the people or much information about the economy of the individual outposts to show that they had visited these settlements.⁵⁷ As a result of this lack of detailed information, the Commission had to turn to other government officials for assistance. These were the Rangers.

The Amulree Report had suggested in 1933 that the Ranger Force could eventually take over all public work and act as representatives of all government departments. In the spring of 1935, Hope Simpson had officially placed the Rangers at the disposal of all departments, and by October, the first recruits were trained and ready for detachment duty in the outposts. Commission of Government thus had its district officers, in 1935, in the Rangers, but they did not assume this role in full until 1937.⁵⁸ Like many of the Commission's policies, the evolution of its administrative system for the outposts had happened in a haphazard, almost accidental way.

FOOTNOTES

¹DO 114/59, N1004/33, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, January 22, 1935; Ibid., N1004/34, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, January 27, 1935; Ibid., N1004/36, Dominions Office to Newfoundland Government, March 4, 1935.

²DO 35/502, Clutterbuck to Treasury, May 17, 1935.

³DO 35/505, 506, K515, Hope Simpson to Clutterbuck, February 28, 1935.

⁴Ibid.; D035/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36.

⁵DO 35/490, 491, 87th meeting of Commission of Government, May 28, 1935; PANL, Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Dunfield's comment on summary of outport police, February 19, 1935.

⁶PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.40-35/36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 27, 1935.

⁷DO 114/58, despatch no. 177, Commission of Government to British House of Commons, December 12, 1933.

⁸PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.76, Dr. H.L. Paddon to Secretary of Agriculture, May 2, 1934.

⁹Sir Anton Bertram, The Colonial Service (London: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 63-68.

¹⁰PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.69, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 26, 1934.

¹¹PANL, S4-3-1, J.130 (Papers re Police), Hope Simpson, Acting Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government, April 9, 1935; see PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.40-35/36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 27, 1935 for a further explanation of the development of Newfoundland, district by district.

¹²Ibid., PANL, S4-3-1, J.130, Acting Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, April 9, 1935.

¹³DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36.

¹⁴PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.6-'36, Economic Report of Government of Newfoundland, January 25, 1936; DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶CNS, Britain, Parliamentary Debates (December 7, 14, 1933).

¹⁷PAC, Magrath Papers, vol. 8, file 39, Re The Newfoundland Royal Commission, C.A. Magrath, August, 1942; DO 35/274, 286, H.F. Gurney, H.M. Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland to P.A. Clutterbuck, September 28, 1933.

18 Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, 1795-1932 (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1964), pp. 268-271.

19 DO 114/59, NI038/10, despatch no. 350, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, April 29, 1935; PANL, Justice Department files, Box 56-2, Secretary for Justice to Private Secretary, Government House, April 27, 1935.

20 Ibid., Anderson to Thomas, April 29, 1935.

21 Ibid.; see Commission of Government Annual Report, 1935, section 11, pp. 5-6.

22 DO 35/490, 491, Press Communiqué after 92nd meeting of Commission of Government, July 2, 1935; Ibid., Press Communiqué after 95th meeting of Commission of Government, July 17, 1935; St. John's Evening Telegram, June 21, 1935.

23 DO 114/59; NI038/10, despatch no. 350, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, April 29, 1935.

24 PANL, S4-3-1, J.130c, Circular no. 73, June 13, 1935; PANL, Justice Department files, Box 56-2; Circular to Magistrates, no. 74.

25 DO 35/505, 506, Hope Simpson to Clutterbuck, February 28, 1935.

26 PANL, S2-5-1/F4, N.R.101a, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, February 23, 1935 [including draft despatch to Secretary of State].

27 PANL, S2-5-1/F1, J.88, Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government, October 16, 1934.

28 DO 35/505, 506, Treasury to Dominions Office, April 29, 1935.

29 DO 35/495, Newfoundland Estimates, 1935-36; see DO 35/490, 491, Press Communiqué after 87th meeting of Commission of Government, May 7, 1935.

30 PANL, S2-5-1/F2, N.R.101b, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 28, 1935.

31 The Commissioners saw in Carew something of a rarity--a Newfoundlander deeply involved in politics who was diplomatic, honest, powerful, well-connected, and a survivor: he had been secretary to a number of Newfoundland Prime Ministers. DO 35/495, Newfoundland Government to Dominions Office, May 28, 1934; DO 35/274, 286, W.E. Stavert to Newfoundland Government, December, 1933.

32 St. John's Evening Telegram, July 3, 1935; PANL, S2-5-1/F2, N.R.101b, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 28, 1935.

33 Ibid.

³⁴ DO 35/490, 491, Press Communiqué after 93rd meeting of Commission of Government, July 2, 1935.

³⁵ RCMP file, Anderton's obituary, n.p., January, 1975.

³⁶ Ranger interview tape no. 29B, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158.

³⁷ PANL, S2-5-1/F1, Act #37, section 17, September 2, 1935.
The uniform chosen for the Newfoundland Ranger Force was similar to that of the RCMP in style but not in colour. "The service dress was khaki tunic, khaki whipcord breeches with brown stripe, brown Sam Brown belt and side-arms (.38 colt), brown field boots . . . and khaki cap. The dress uniform was of blue serge, long trousers with a narrow red stripe down the side and red piping around the edge of the blue cap." Sub. Inspr. I.S. Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force, 1935-1950" (reprinted from RCMP Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3, January; 1951), p. 2.

³⁸ Ranger interview tape no. 31A, Ronald Peet, Ranger no. 27.

³⁹ PANL, S4-3-1, J.46, Dunfield (memo), May 14, 1934.

⁴⁰ Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Rangers," p. 2.

⁴¹ Norman Crane, Ranger no. 95, "The Newfoundland Rangers," Newfoundland Historical Society lecture, March 25, 1982.

⁴² Ranger interview tape no. 14A, Ferdinand Davis, Ranger no. 118.

⁴³ A St. John's newspaper [September 30, 1935].

⁴⁴ Ranger interview tape no. 29A, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158.

⁴⁵ PANL, GN 1/8/2. N.R.6-'36, Economic Report of Government of Newfoundland, January 25, 1936. More important perhaps, Howley noted that the magistrates were being asked to report specific details of more value to the Department of Natural Resources than to the Department of Justice. PANL, S4-3-1, J.130j, Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government, November 2, 1935.

⁴⁶ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.6-'36, Economic Report of Government of Newfoundland, January 25, 1936.

⁴⁷ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.86-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, October 28, 1936.

⁴⁸ PANL, Justice Department files, Box 56-1, Governor Walwyn to Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, April 5, 1937; PANL, S4-4-1/FD, Newfoundland no. 54, Horwood to MacDonald, March 8, 1938.

⁴⁹ PANL, S4-3-1, J.130c, Howley to Commission of Government, June 18, 1935.

⁵⁰ DO 114/59, N1081/8, telegram no. 145, Commission of Government to Dominions Office, December 5, 1936.

⁵¹ PANL, S4-3-1, J.130h, Howley to Commission of Government, October 26, 1935.

⁵² PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.6-'36, Economic Report of the Government of Newfoundland, January 25, 1936.

⁵³ PANL, S2-5-1, N.R.23-'37, Carew to Ewbank, March 9, 1937.

⁵⁴ Interview with J.G. Channing, Registrar, Department of Natural Resources (1935-1940), April 11, 1979.

⁵⁵ Miller, pp. 64, 80.

⁵⁶ Interview with Max Lane, former Magistrate, May 9, 1980.

⁵⁷ PANL, S4-3-1, J.130j, Magistrates Reports, December 2, 1935.

⁵⁸ PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.48, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 9, 1935; PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.162, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 14, 1935.

CHAPTER 5

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RANGER FORCE

The Rangers, 1935-40

In December, 1935, the Commission announced that it intended "to transfer police control of certain parts of the country to the Ranger Force."¹ In most cases, when the Ranger arrived for duty, the Constabulary left.² There were some exceptions: constables were not withdrawn from those outposts, on the South Coast especially, where relief distribution was their main duty. Their local knowledge about relief problems, accumulated over the years, was too valuable.³

The first Ranger recruits were sent to Labrador and northern Newfoundland in October and November, 1935. Since the Force still was not at full strength, it was not possible to set up all the posts as originally intended and only the more important areas were selected.⁴ In October, nine men went north to build and open eight coastal detachments at Battle Harbour, Cartwright, Forteau, Hopedale, Nain, Northwest River and Port Hope Simpson. (Because of the onset of winter, the post at Hebron could not be built until the following spring.)⁵ Material to build all the Labrador detachments had preceded the Rangers.⁶ By mid-November, 15 Rangers had been sent to 10 detachments in northern Newfoundland. These posts were located at Bonne Bay, Deer Lake, Glenwood, Harbour Deep, Port Saunders, St. Anthony, Springdale, Twillingate and Westport (White Bay). Five Rangers, the two commissioned officers (Stick and Fraser) and the

training officer (Anderton) directed the Force from headquarters at Whitbourne.⁷

At the beginning, the Ranger Force had several minor problems that were either corrected or tolerated. Although the legislation which created the Force had been thorough, several months or even years elapsed before some of its provisions were effected, and some were never carried out. Act #37 had provided for a Benefit Trust Fund, for instance, and such a fund was established eight months later following guidelines prepared by the Justice Department.⁸ The Ranger Act also had recommended that a Reserve be established to temporarily replace Rangers when they had to escort mental patients or criminals from their outport districts to St. John's, when they were sick or absent on annual leave, or to allow them to take a refresher course. In May, 1937, almost two years later, Governor Walwyn pleaded with the Dominion's Secretary for a small back-up force to relieve the Rangers during these brief periods of overwork, holidays or retraining.⁹ In this case, the request was denied. When a Ranger from a one-man detachment was unable to perform his duties for any reason, a Ranger from the nearest detachment took over his area for 10 days to two weeks, or the Chief Ranger sent out a fully qualified Ranger on the clerical staff at headquarters.¹⁰

As this suggests, the Ranger Force had a chronic problem--lack of manpower. It was the policy of the Commission, whenever necessary and possible, to expand the area controlled by the Ranger Force until it could patrol most of rural Newfoundland and Labrador. It accomplished this either by training new Rangers, or by spreading the men it already had a little thinner. An example of the first method of expansion was the addition of 22 recruits in the summer of

1936. Six of these men were former Constabulary members, and all were "appointed on probation for the period of their training, which lasts about three months."¹¹ This enabled the Force to open 18 new detachments, mainly in southern and central Newfoundland.¹² By the fall of 1936, there were new Ranger posts at Badger, Belleoram, Burgeo, Harbour Breton, Lamaline, Marystown, Port aux Basques, Port au Port, Rencontre West, Rose Blanche, St. Alban's, St. George's and St. Lawrence. Fifteen were one-man detachments. There were two Rangers at each of the remaining posts because these three were headquarters for all detachments in their divisions. For instance, the two Rangers at Port aux Basques supervised five detachments in the southern division; those at Grand Bank were responsible for six other detachments on the Burin Peninsula, also part of the southern division. In Labrador, Cartwright was the divisional headquarters for seven other detachments. The sergeant from each divisional headquarters inspected all Ranger detachments in his area at random to make sure that spit-and-polish standards were maintained. The Inspector at Whitbourne seldom visited those detachments not on the railway line. Ranger strength in May, 1937 was 52 men in 38 detachments.¹³ It had taken the Ranger Force a year and a half to reach full strength.

The Ranger Force expanded its jurisdiction in another way in the year between the fall of 1936 and 1937. In 1936, the 22 recruits left Whitbourne to take up outpost duties and no new Rangers were trained for a year. In the interval, the Ranger Force used the men it already had to open three one-man detachments at Englee, LaScie and Lewisporte. By the middle of July, 1937, the Ranger Force consisted of 56 men and 38 detachments, but 6 of these Rangers were recruits at Whitbourne. Three detachments had been closed between

May and July, and it appears that the Chief Ranger transferred Rangers on the clerical staff at headquarters to detachments because of sheer necessity. The 50 Rangers in the outposts were distributed in districts or divisions in a manner very similar to Hope Simpson's original proposal of October, 1934.

Commission of Government appointed a new Chief Ranger whenever it decided it could operate the Force more economically or efficiently through someone else. L.T. Stick was the first casualty. In March, 1936, the Commission had requested and accepted his resignation. The government accused Stick of not treating his men well enough and of charging items of clothing to a government account. Anderton became Acting Chief Ranger, held two jobs and received one salary.¹⁴ After he had retired on pension from the RCMP, he became Chief Ranger.¹⁵ The Commission showed that economy was to determine the constitution and operation of the Ranger Force at all times.

At the end of 1938, the Ranger Force had 57 men on active duty in 36 detachments.¹⁶ Two Rangers were on leave and another was in the course of being transferred, bringing the number of Rangers up to 60. Theoretically there had been a return to the centralized system, with control, supervision and memos coming from one headquarters at Whitbourne. In practice, however, extra Rangers still manned the divisional headquarters of the previous year. For instance, Port aux Basques now had 3 Rangers, while there were 2 men at Grand Bank, 4 at Deer Lake and 2 at Cartwright. (Extra Rangers had been stationed at Deer Lake because of a lumberman's strike on the West Coast in 1937.)¹⁷ Two new detachments--at Bay L'Argent and Jackson's Arm--had been opened, but four detachments had been closed, and the strength of the Force was increased by the addition of three Rangers in a year

and a half. The increase was in response to an earlier request for more men because of new duties, new detachments and "the need for a reserve of trained men."¹⁸ Although the number of Rangers was increased, the Chief Ranger chose to use the additional men in more essential ways than as a Ranger reserve. Actually, the well-trained clerical staff at headquarters made a reserve unnecessary. At this time, headquarters staff consisted of four Rangers, a Staff Sergeant and a Quartermaster Sergeant, the Chief Ranger and the Inspector in charge of the Force.¹⁹

In March, 1939, Chief Ranger Anderton retired and went back to Canada.²⁰ He had come to Newfoundland four years earlier to organize and train the Ranger Force in one year.²¹ But at the end of that time, Hope Simpson asked for an extension of Anderton's service as he felt there was no one in Newfoundland qualified to replace him.²² Anderton was not entirely happy in Newfoundland, as he indicated in 1935 and 1936. In October, 1935, he remarked that

it is very distressing to note many poverty stricken cases which are existant here [around Whitbourne] and I am sorry to say that very little is done for them by the Government through lack of facilities and abuse of regulations. We now own twenty chickens, and not for egg production, but for the purpose of food, as it's still impossible to get meat unless ordered two weeks in advance.

Anderton also hinted at a personality conflict with the officers of the Force which made his work even more difficult. As well, he mentioned that "news from Canada is so scarce,"²³ summing it all up by saying "we shall be quite ready to return to Canada when our duty is finished here."²⁴ But Anderton stayed in Newfoundland until the spring of 1939. When he resigned from the Ranger Force, he personally selected his successor, RCMP Staff Sergeant E.W. Greenley.²⁵ On

November 15, 1939, Anthony Eden approved Greenley's provisional appointment as Chief Ranger.²⁶ Greenley lasted less than a year, resigning on June 3, 1940.²⁷ One report says "he drank himself right out of the Force,"²⁸ and S.W. Horrall, RCMP historian, has wondered why Greenley was ever chosen for an administrative position: most of his 20 years with the RCMP, from 1919 to 1939, had been spent doing clerical work.²⁹

In 1939, the strength of the Ranger Force increased again to 63 men in 40 detachments.³⁰ Three Rangers staffed a new Criminal Investigation Bureau at Whitbourne. Three new detachments were opened in Newfoundland--at the Newfoundland Airport in Gander, Point Leamington and Stephenville Crossing. Port Hope Simpson was reopened.

In 1940, the Ranger Force reaped some of the first material benefits of wartime prosperity. Money was available to build new detachments and purchase three patrol craft or floating detachments. These patrol craft were always stationed where they were most needed. In 1940, one was at Battle Harbour, another at Cartwright and the third on the Burin Peninsula.³¹ A practical divisional system was implemented, with the area patrolled by the Rangers divided up according to geographical considerations of the coastline. New detachments were opened at Tomkins in the Codroy Valley, Cox's Cove, Howley and Petite Forte. The Englee detachment was relocated in Roddington. Headquarters staff at Whitbourne was reduced to two Rangers, a Quartermaster Sergeant and an Acting Chief Ranger. Three recruits were in training. In this redistribution, the outpost detachments were improved, if anything, while the headquarters' staff was reduced to the bare minimum. In 1940, the Ranger Force consisted of 60 men in 47 detachments, which included the patrol craft.³²

Duties, Patrols and Reports

Every department of government compiled a list of duties to be performed by the Rangers, necessitating patrols of the districts and reports to the Commission listing the findings. These duties varied from detachment to detachment in response to the local situation and also evolved according to government policy. Because every Ranger had to sign a contract to serve at least five years in the Force, and because the Commission transferred members of the Ranger Force every two years or less, other than in a few exceptional cases, most men, during the course of their careers in the Rangers had to enforce new or different government regulations in more than one detachment. Also, duties varied as did detachments. For instance, the presence of a customs port of entry, a mining or logging camp, a paper mill, or one of the many sawmills altered the social composition and economic base of the district, and the duties the Rangers had to perform as a result. A land settlement, a co-operative society, a fish plant or bait depot also changed the nature of the Rangers' duties. While a Ranger had to be prepared to adapt to different circumstances, there was an underlying current of sameness in the first five years of the Force's existence: almost every Ranger could expect to spend half to three-quarters of his time investigating relief applicants, distributing relief and organizing work projects to make government assistance less essential. As a consequence, the Ranger often supervised labour on relief projects such as the building and repair of public works. Some of the materials for these projects were supplied on government account, but rough timber was cut locally and all work was done by free labour.³³ The Ranger and the magistrate decided which members of a community's able-bodied unemployed would form this free labour force

because Commission of Government wanted "some other agency than the police"³⁴ to reduce the relief rolls, first on the northern peninsula, then in all districts across the island. The distribution of relief to the able-bodied unemployed was a problem that the Commission tried to eliminate in the spring of 1935 by forbidding it.³⁵ After the end of May, the Commission still allowed the Rangers to hand 'sick-poor' relief recipients the equivalent of six cents a day, but Rangers had to beg permission to issue half-rations to the starving. On the South Coast in particular, Rangers compassionately ignored the case-hardened Commissioner.³⁶

While the Rangers were responsible for all the duties previously performed by the Newfoundland Constabulary, they also administered all matters related to relief for the Department of Public Health and Welfare and the Department of Public Utilities, as well as a number of other duties peculiar to a fishing economy. Although the Newfoundland Rangers was an administrative Force performing the majority of its duties for the Department of Natural Resources, the Justice Department had originally viewed the Rangers as primarily a police force like the modern RCMP, as they thought the Amulree Report had recommended. They had hoped to have control over the Force in Newfoundland, and felt that only in the frontier atmosphere of Labrador where the population was predominately Indian and Eskimo was an all-purpose Force like the Rangers justified.³⁷ But the Force had not developed along the lines of a modern police force like the RCMP in industrial Canada. Instead, in Newfoundland, as much as in Labrador, the Ranger Force had developed a multi-faceted character more like that of the Northwest Mounted Police which had patrolled the Canadian West around 1900.³⁸ A complete breakdown of duties performed for the Commission

clearly shows this. For the Department of Natural Resources, Rangers regulated sawmills, logging camps and game reserves. Rangers acted as official game wardens only when necessary but could be asked at any time to enforce wildlife regulations and issue licences. In all resource industries, Rangers saw that government standards were maintained. Related to this, Rangers checked canoe trails and salmon rivers in the wildlife sanctuaries for the Tourist Board. Rangers worked for the Department of Public Utilities inspecting and issuing radio and drivers' licences and, with the magistrates, heading the local roads' committees. In fact, a former magistrate has said that on the West Coast, "We were the roads' committee."³⁹ For the Department of Finance, Rangers collected income tax and, in the absence of customs officers, customs duties. They checked the accuracy of weights and measures in local stores.⁴⁰ For the Department of Home Affairs and Education, Rangers sometimes inspected rural schools, if the section of the department responsible for the school inspection system the Commission had set up did not cover all schools in the district. Members of the Ranger Force spent as little as 15 or 20 per cent of their time performing duties for the Justice Department, reporting on criminal offences, accidental deaths and fires, registering firearms and doing fire patrol. From the beginning, the Commissioners had felt that ignorance of the law was a major problem in Newfoundland.⁴¹ As a result of this, combined with the nature of the society, the Rangers did more preventive and educational work than criminal detection. Police work was always a minor part of the Force's duties. In 1936, R.W. Ewbank, Hope Simpson's successor as Commissioner for Natural Resources, said:

The primary duties of the Rangers are in connection with work under this Department and . . . their police duties are comparatively secondary.⁴²

In the same year, a St. John's newspaper reported that 48 per cent of the Rangers' duties had to do with the Department of Natural Resources; 35 per cent were on behalf of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, while only 17 per cent of their undertakings were connected in any way with the Justice Department.⁴³ L.E. Emerson, Newfoundland's Justice Minister in 1941, correctly noted that the Department of Natural Resources which paid for the Force "gets less benefit from it than does the Department of Public Health and Welfare."⁴⁴ But the Justice Department which was contending that it should control the Rangers, had even less claim on the Force, according to that argument. At all times, the primary responsibility of the Ranger Force was to the Department of Natural Resources which paid it. The Force also sent reports to the American State Department in Washington in connection with the International Ice Patrol and to the Canadian Entomological Laboratory in Ottawa.⁴⁵

In May, 1937, Governor Walwyn summarized for the Dominions Secretary the many valuable functions of the Ranger Force:

In addition to ordinary police duties, the Rangers are required to perform duties as Relief Officers, Game Wardens, Customs Officers, Collectors of fishery licence fees, exporters' and travellers' licences, radio tax, income tax, etc., to attend to vital statistics, to act as Wreck and Salvage Commissioners, and generally to represent the various Departments of Government. . . . During the past year their duties as Relief Officers have been particularly heavy.⁴⁶

Unwittingly, Walwyn had confirmed that the Ranger Force which the Commission once had claimed was a game warden force actually had assumed administrative duties similar to those of a frontier police force. In 1941, Commissioner for Natural Resources J.H. Corvin proudly claimed that "the Rangers are now, to all intents and purposes,

executive officers for all district duties, other than the duties assigned to the magistrates and certain technical field men of various Departments."⁴⁷ The list of duties was long and impressive, but Newfoundland before the Second World War was not developed enough to make the enforcement of government regulations too onerous. For instance, there were only a few logging camps, game reserves or tourist attractions, and not many schools to inspect or radios or cars to licence: there was little income tax to collect from the outport fishermen, and weights and measures usually were checked only once a month or once a year. The Ranger usually could fit enough hunting or fishing into his schedule to make a formal holiday unnecessary.

In the performance of their duties, Rangers made patrols of their districts once a month, unobtrusively gathering information about the social and economic life of every settlement. The absence of a routine dictated by the Commission increased the attractiveness of these arduous and sometimes dangerous patrols. The Rangers liked these treks for the simple reason that they could make them at any time during the month. The Commission ordered that a patrol of the entire district must be made each month, but let the Ranger decide exactly when he would visit the settlements.

The mode of transportation varied, but the general rule was to use anything available. This might vary from boats and hiking in the summer to dogteams and snowshoes in the winter. Some Rangers travelled on the railway sectionmen's little cars. The Commission gave motorcycles to some Rangers already on duty in outport detachments, then either thought it unnecessary or too expensive to train the Rangers in their use. At the beginning of World War Two, the Commission provided three patrol craft which the Rangers used in their

customs preventive work. Two of these floating detachments were never replaced when they ceased to operate for one reason or another. At one time, there were two horses in the Force. But the Ranger Force, never had much equipment. In 1949, for example, the Force had 3 motor cars, 7 motorcycles and 6 small boats.⁴⁸ There is little reason to believe that the Commission ever supplied the Rangers with many transportation facilities. One Ranger on the South Coast pleaded several times for a car to catch smugglers from St. Pierre et Miquelon: in desperation, he said that even a paddlebike would do.⁴⁹

While discharging their obligations to Commission of Government, the Rangers acted as a deterrent: more important, they answered a social need.⁵⁰ The presence of the Rangers in the districts was both a stabilizing influence and a reassurance to the fishermen and their families. The following newspaper account, somewhat mellowed by age because it was written 18 years after the end of the Force, expresses the popular feeling toward the Rangers and shows the importance of the patrols:

In continuing to grow and expand, the Force gradually began to build a reputation around itself and in most areas the Rangers were the only representatives of Government and many requests were made of their services, some of which would require the wisdom of Solomon to solve. Many residents in the rural areas, most of whom were honest, hard working fishermen, loggers or farmers liked nothing better than to be met on the 'fish flakes' or 'Stages', in the fields or woods during the morning and wished the time of day by an almost complete stranger, who at times addressed them as 'Aunt Mary' or 'Uncle John'. In later years, many residents often referred to members as 'My or Our Ranger' and on one occasion, a young boy, seeing a member approach for the first time, said "Dad, look at the strange man coming up the road," and the reply was "Son, that is not a man, that is a Ranger."⁵¹

This report may not be as far-fetched as it seems. A man who had grown up in a Newfoundland settlement recalled that some mothers used to threaten to invoke 'the Ranger' if their children misbehaved.⁵²

In less than five years the Ranger Force had earned a high reputation in another area. The St. John's Evening Telegram had reported in 1939 that "the Newfoundland Rangers are a sort of super-police force which does a great deal of useful-administrative and protective work in remote parts of the country."⁵³

Newspapers seldom reported hostile reactions to the Ranger Force, however. The Fishermens-Workers Tribune was an exception. It argued that the Ranger Force was an expensive experiment, costing as much as \$100,000 a year, and should be abolished immediately.⁵⁴ The government took no action. The Commission's policy concerning the Ranger Force had been decided by January or February, 1935, even before the Force was established, and newspaper comments did little to change it.⁵⁵

Every month, each Ranger was required to submit detailed reports to Commission of Government on all activities in his district.⁵⁶ These reports represented the product of his duties, combined with his patrols, and were coloured by personal observations and biases. These reports were based on daily records or detachment diaries which remained in the detachment building from year to year to provide a continuing record of activities in the district.⁵⁷ There were four types of reports—crime, patrol, general condition and miscellaneous.⁵⁸ The general condition reports, submitted both monthly and semi-annually, were the most valuable and often contained patrol and crime information.

In his reports the Ranger noted the social and economic conditions in each settlement.⁵⁹ He gave details about the fisheries and stated whether men were employed in the mines, the fishery, agriculture, woods operations or sawmills. The Ranger reported on the type of public works such as roads, public buildings or wharves being

constructed in an area and how many men were employed in this way. He noted the frequency with which coastal boats and private motor vessels called at designated outports, the nature of their cargoes and the amount of shipping from an area. The Ranger assisted the customs officer at all times and assumed all customs work when the officer was temporarily absent. The Ranger listed the number of patrols he had made for each department and the number of miles covered. He included an account of revenue collected from licences for radios, motor vehicles and hunting permits. A large part of each report detailed the amount of relief distributed, the reasons and the recipients. Separate crime reports were sent to the Chief Ranger who relayed them to the Justice Department. Census data also was recorded on a separate form for the Department of Public Health and Welfare.⁶⁰ (Commission of Government had systematized the gathering of such statistics and had chosen the Rangers after its earlier suggestion of having the postmasters and postmistresses do this proved too unpopular.) One of the most notable features of these reports was the attention paid to minute details and the absence of many general recommendations.⁶¹ Most recorded the hard data or the practical information that was the essential basis of government policy.⁶² Very few Rangers, however, had any idea of that policy or even were aware that they were enforcing legislation that was part of a general reconstruction plan.

Copies of every Ranger report were first sent to the Chief Ranger at the central headquarters of the Force where all reports were read and channelled to the proper government departments. The Commissioner for Natural Resources said that officials in his department "digested and indexed" its reports "so that we can have at any time a resumé of all reports on any one subject." Hope Simpson felt that

this was important "if the value of these reports is not to be lost." He also indicated how these reports were to be used by Commission of Government:

The collection of these reports gives us a vivid picture . . . of conditions in any one area and . . . we can get properly arranged information when we are considering a policy governing any particular area, or indeed governing the whole island.⁶³

Many of the Commission's decisions concerning the direction of development were based on facts Hope Simpson and Lodge gleaned from their filed copies of the Ranger reports, supplemented by the more general reports from the magistrates and other government representatives in the districts.⁶⁴ Although few government departments handled Ranger reports as systematically as did the Departments of Natural Resources and Public Utilities, J.H. Gorvin claimed that these reports often "formed the only connected record of events in the outports" possessed by any government department.⁶⁵

One of the functions of a police force of any kind is to act as an intelligence agency for government. However, the functions of such an agency vary according to the society in which it operates. For example, the Ranger Force, legally a police force, did little spying or surveillance work until the Second World War. In this respect, it resembled the WMP which also had relied on its reputation, close personal contacts and systematic patrols to maintain law and order. Goodwill and sharing the interests and hardships of the society enabled the Rangers to play a preventive role and act as informal agents of social control. Rangers prevented most anti-social behaviour from becoming criminal acts necessitating the use of the slow-moving court system. Another result was that the rate of conviction was unusually high: since there often were no jails, the Ranger usually did not

bother bringing a mere suspect to trial. Until 1940, intelligence work in Newfoundland consisted mainly of evaluating recipients of government relief and gathering social information. As such, it had a socio-economic purpose closely related to Commission of Government's plans to rehabilitate the country. In the fall of 1934, the Commission had indicated that the goal of its economic reforms was social improvement. The scheme of fishery advances was "directed to re-establish the morale and self-respect" of Newfoundlanders, for instance, and the land settlements and beaver farms were not economic propositions either.

P.D.H. Dunn said that the Ranger Force had not been established to save money.⁶⁶ Nor had it been created to solve crime. Even with its high rate of unemployment until 1940 or 1941, Newfoundland was a peaceful, law-abiding society that had no need for a large and modern police force. Ranger reports verified that the amount of crime in Newfoundland was negligible.⁶⁷ Only once in the pre-war period were the Rangers called upon to pacify labour disputants. The occasion was a loggers' strike at Deer Lake and Corner Brook in May, 1937. Commission of Government praised the Ranger Force for its calming influence which facilitated a settlement with the International Power and Paper Company,⁶⁸ but the Justice Department felt ignored. Anderton and the Rangers had settled the dispute without the help of the Justice Department. These facts and observations support J.H. Corvin's claim that the Rangers were not a police force like the Constabulary.⁶⁹ Because the outport fishermen were so isolated, the Ranger Force was seldom required to function as the FBI or the Mounties did in the States and Canada; and the undeveloped nature of Newfoundland influenced the operations of the Force "as the Intelligence Service of the Department of Natural Resources."⁷⁰

World War Two and the Rangers, 1941-46

The nature of the duties Commission of Government asked the Rangers to perform, the reasons for the patrols and the contents of their reports to the Commission changed after the construction of the American bases began in 1940. The destroyers-for-bases deal was the most important event of World War Two for many Newfoundlanders. This arrangement between the governments of Britain and the United States allowed the States to build three defence bases in Newfoundland in return for 50 World War One destroyers and other war materials.⁷¹ Construction of a military base at Pleasantville in St. John's and a naval base at Argentia led to a heavier concentration of population on the Avalon Peninsula. This area was outside Ranger jurisdiction but some construction workers came from the outports to live in St. John's or near Argentia for as long as the work on the bases lasted, spending the week days near the bases and returning to the outports on the weekends. Because of this type of population shift which was neither migration nor commuting, the Rangers were not able to depend on some of the more highly skilled or aggressive leaders in the outports. Nor were Argentia and St. John's, both on the Avalon Peninsula, the only work centres of this type in Newfoundland: the air base at Stephenville on the West Coast attracted many men from the surrounding area who never had had paying jobs before. When men from the American and Canadian Armed Services came, whole communities benefitted from the increased spending,⁷² and complete dependence on the fishery and the merchants ceased. Thus, many Rangers had to face different social situations and their duties changed as a result. Because of the temporary construction jobs created for approximately 20,000 Newfoundlanders at the American bases,⁷³ Newfoundland's unemployment problem was largely eliminated for a few years,

government spending on relief became minimal and the most time-consuming function of the Rangers ended. As well, the introduction into the economy of a hundred million dollars from construction alone broke the credit system.⁷⁴ Most Newfoundlanders had more cash than they had ever seen before. The fishery ceased to be the mainstay of the economy, and the co-operative movement that Commission of Government had started was put into mothballs. The close-down of the co-operatives was significant because Magistrate Quinton had predicted in 1939 that "with co-operation present . . . there is no need for either police or for magistrate."⁷⁵ The Commission's reconstruction plan for Newfoundland assumed different proportions as a result of the failure of co-operation and the triumph of materialism. Before the war, the Commission had encouraged practically any industry that would reduce dependence upon the fishery. As well, Commission of Government had started to build an administrative structure for the outports of Newfoundland. Although it had reorganized the civil service, the fishery, the customs, the police and the magistracy, and had created the Ranger Force, the Commission had been able to supply nothing more than a very minimal level of services. When money became available after 1940, the Commission could extend these services, improve the standard of living and build--not just plan--the framework of a modern society. On a more practical level, one Ranger reported "the first real improvement [in public works] in years."⁷⁶ These were some of the obvious changes brought about by the Second World War.

Since wartime prosperity also was temporary, however, there were negative aspects to most of these developments. Many of the construction workers on the American bases were laid off in 1943 or 1944, and even though several thousand Newfoundlanders became

permanent employees on the bases,⁷⁷ many others had ceased keeping their fishing gear in working condition when they found remunerative jobs,⁷⁸ could not return to fishing for a living and were forced to apply for relief. The improved communication network helped the Rangers by making travelling on inland patrols easier. But this was often offset by the increased difficulty in apprehending any undesirable characters because of the better roads and transportation. One Ranger solved this problem in an ingenious way. He claimed to have a network of people all around the bay who actually solved most of his criminal cases for him. He would contact these people by phone, give details and descriptions, see that his suspects were helped to get where he wanted them, then arrange to make an arrest at his convenience.⁷⁹ A basically law-abiding society with respect for authority made this possible.

Many Rangers were not so resourceful, nor did they have to be. Most were not directly affected by changes precipitated by the war and were not seen as policemen as a result. Consequently, Commission of Government was able to take advantage of the Ranger's good reputation and of his familiarity with the traditional Newfoundland way of life when it called upon the Force "to carry out or supervise numerous emergency activities throughout the war years." In addition to the duties already mentioned, these included national registration, relaying to the District Magistrate applications for enlistment in the Armed Forces, aircraft detection work and submarine watch.⁸⁰ National registration was combined with registration for food rationing and collection of census data, even though the purposes of the first two were quite different.⁸¹ The Rangers also had to inform Commission of Government of any shortage or irregularities in essential

food or clothing such as flour, sugar and milk, or shoes and boots.⁸² The price controls and rationing meant extra administrative duties often of a negative nature which probably blackened the popular image of the Ranger as much as his stint as relieving officer.⁸³ Because of World War Two, Commission of Government had to reassess what it wanted its Ranger Force to do, and the Rangers had to pay more attention to this form of clerical work, wartime security and modern police duties.

The introduction of American and Canadian values and money also created a new way of life which was unfamiliar to the Rangers. E.G. Machtig of the Dominions Office and Commissioner H.A. Winter recognized the presence of a new materialism in Newfoundland society and commented on its implications. Machtig said that "the establishment of the United States bases in the island has led to a demand . . . not only for the basic domestic requirements, but also to what might be termed luxury articles." Winter noted that "this prosperity . . . has also engendered more expensive tastes and already accustomed a good many people to standards of living which they may find difficult to maintain in less prosperous times."⁸⁴ A Ranger was more straightforward and less specific: he later commented that "We lost a lot of good things."⁸⁵

In addition to their special wartime duties, however, Rangers had to carry out their regular work as well as enforce new government regulations. One item of legislation in particular affected the Rangers. This was the School Attendance Act of 1942 which made it mandatory that all children up to the age of 14 go to school.⁸⁶ The Rangers became truant officers and enforced school attendance when

possible. Rangers and magistrates also lectured in schools to parents and children on the value and necessity of school attendance. Compulsory education had never been widely enforced, partly because children often suffered from malnutrition and lack of suitable clothing.⁸⁷ Enforcement measures were present, but were ineffective. In one outport alone, the Ranger had more than two dozen court cases to prove it, and this was not an isolated example.⁸⁸

Although some enforcement measures were present, manpower and community co-operation were often absent. The Ranger was aware that necessity often decreed that school-aged children help their fathers prosecute the fishery and earn money just to keep the family alive. Many Rangers also knew that their ability to perform their other functions in the small tightly-knit settlements depended upon retaining a good image by not antagonizing the fishermen unnecessarily. An example of this concerned smuggling on the South Coast. The extreme poverty mentioned by Rowe was alleviated to some extent because the Ranger and other government officials in the district knew that they had to tolerate some smuggling of food and clothing from St. Pierre.⁸⁹ The standard of living on the South Coast was already so low and relief expenditures so high that one Ranger recommended moving all the people to other areas where they could make a decent living and perhaps send their children to school.⁹⁰ The illiteracy rate on the South Coast was at least 50 per cent partly because many communities had no schools at all⁹¹ and partly because many families could not afford suitable clothing for their school-aged children. In other parts of Newfoundland, the Rangers could not always enforce school attendance for similar reasons.

During the 1940s, the Ranger Force also proved that it was available to all government departments. In December, 1941, for example, Sergeant H. Walters surveyed the wildlife conditions in Newfoundland for the Game Division of the Department of Natural Resources, and five years later became Newfoundland's Chief Game Warden. The second case of a Ranger working for the government in a capacity other than that of a regular Ranger came in July, 1942 when Sergeant W.G. Rockwood became a Government Agent for the Northern Labrador Administration (another division of the Department of Natural Resources) and administered the affairs of the northern Labrador natives for three years.⁹² There are undoubtedly more examples of Rangers being seconded to other government departments or performing unusual duties. These extra duties that the Rangers were expected to perform willingly for each and every department of Commission of Government point to the indispensable but often thankless role of the Ranger Force. Rangers at times really were expected to be the obedient servants that every report indicated they were.

Commission of Government realized that the Ranger Force must have further training in order to handle the problem of a more prosperous society. In 1942, Staff Sergeant E.L. Martin and Corporal E. Peckford were sent to the RCMP Training School at Rockcliffe, Ontario. After they returned, the Ranger Force organized a refresher course, held at headquarters in February and March of 1943. "Twelve senior NCOs and Rangers received intensive instruction in the more modern and scientific methods of crime detection."⁹³ In September, 1943, R.D. Fraser was sent to Canada and the United States to study the operations of the RCMP and the FBI.⁹⁴ In 1945, two more Rangers, Sergeants N. Forward and W. Smith were chosen to attend another RCMP

training course, this time at Regina.⁹⁵ As well as learning improved operational techniques for the Force, some Rangers were acquiring a broader outlook.

Another indication that the Ranger Force was becoming more essential to Commission of Government was the move of the Ranger Force headquarters from Whitbourne. Between the autumn of 1941 and the summer of 1942, the Ranger Force offices were relocated in St. John's where they could be closer to other government offices. At the same time, the Training Depot, the Quartermaster Stores and the Accounts Division were transferred to Kilbride, and the former headquarters at Whitbourne became an institution for juvenile offenders.⁹⁶

In 1942 when he was promoted to Inspector, Staff Sergeant E.L. Martin had the distinction of being the first officer of the Newfoundland Ranger Force commissioned from the ranks.⁹⁷ It had always been the intention of Commission of Government to have Newfoundlanders at the head of the all-Newfoundland Force.⁹⁸ When Major R.D. Fraser resigned as Chief Ranger the next year, Inspector Martin was appointed Acting Chief Ranger, and Sergeant Glendinning was given the commission of Inspector. But it was not until a year later that the government confirmed these ranks and appointed Martin Chief Ranger.

The Ranger Force did not reduce its ranks as soon as the war ended. In 1945, there were 77 Rangers and 2 officers in 44 detachments, and at the end of August, 1946, 79 Rangers manned 49 detachments. Seventy of these Rangers were on duty in outport detachments in 1946, while the remaining nine members of the Ranger Force--Rangers and officers combined--were at headquarters.⁹⁹

The Ranger Force created by Act #37 of September, 1935 had developed most of its distinctive character in its first five years.

It had increased both the area patrolled and its duties. In 1935, the Force patrolled only Labrador and northern Newfoundland, but by 1940, it had detachments scattered all across Newfoundland, except on the Avalon Peninsula. In September, 1935, Rangers had begun to replace outport constables, and by the summer of 1937, Rangers also had assumed the duties of the magistrates as district officers. After 1940, events of the Second World War largely determined the nature of the Force's duties, patrols and reports. Rangers acquired new duties because of the war, but the Commission also recognized the administrative value of the Force.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Justice Department files, Box 140-1, Rev. George Patten to Secretary for Justice, December 7, 1935.

² Conversation with Norman Crane, Ranger no. 95, November 17, 1970.

³ PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, May 10, 1937. In 1941, the Justice Department reported that only 30 outpost policemen had been replaced. PANL, S2-5-1/F8, J.31-'41, L.E. Emerson to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941.

⁴ PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941. Commission of Government's records of Ranger Force strength throughout the years are inconsistent. Sometimes the commissioned officers are included and the headquarters detachment is listed but not always. Because of this, researching local histories may be the only way to determine the presence or absence of a Ranger detachment in a particular settlement; see Appendix B, pp. 128-129.

⁵ Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force," p. 3; PANL, Justice Department files, Box 136-1/24, E.L. Martin to C.W. Powell, Justice Department, December 7, 1946.

⁶ RCMP file, Anderton to Supt. J.M. Tupper, RCMP Police, Rockcliffe, Ontario, Canada, October 4, 1935.

⁷ PANL, S2-5-1/F7, Ranger Force, 1935-36.

⁸ PANL, S2-5-1/F1, Act #37, section 16, September 2, 1935; PANL, S2-5-1/F7, N.R.30c-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 9, 1936.

⁹ PANL, S2-5-1/F1, Act #37, section 18, September 2, 1935; PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Governor Walwyn to Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, May 10, 1937.

¹⁰ Ranger interview tape no. 29A, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158; Ibid., no. 1B, Albert Mews, Ranger no. 96.

¹¹ PANL, S2-5-1/F7, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, October 10, 1936.

¹² PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35 [1936].

¹³ PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, May 10, 1937.

¹⁴ PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, March 30, 1936.

¹⁵ Ibid., MacDonald to Walwyn, June 25, 1937; PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

- 16 PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, November 30, 1938.
- 17 PANL, S2-5-1/F7, Anderton to Secretary, Department of Natural Resources, May 27, 1937.
- 18 PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, May 18, 1937.
- 19 Ibid., November 30, 1938.
- 20 Ibid., no. 128, Walwyn to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, May 15, 1939.
- 21 RCMP file, C315-40, V.A.M. Kemp, A/Supt., Adjutant to O.C., "N" Division, RCMP, Ottawa, Ontario, June 5, 1935; PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, March 30, 1936.
- 22 RCMP file, Anderton to Kemp, March 17, 1936.
- 23 RCMP file, Anderton to Tupper, October 4, 1935.
- 24 RCMP file, Anderton to Kemp, March 17, 1936.
- 25 PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Walwyn to Eden, October 14, 1939; St. John's Evening Telegram, August 14, 1939.
- 26 PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Eden to Walwyn, November 15, 1939.
- 27 PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-141, Corvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941; PANL, S2-5-1/F5, 117/29, Commission of Government to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, February 18, 1941.
- 28 Wilbert Porter, "History of the Newfoundland Rangers, 1935-1950" (History 3110 research paper), 1973, p. 9.
- 29 Letter, S.W. Horrall to M. Tuck, January 25, 1980.
- 30 J.R. Smallwood, Handbook of Newfoundland, 1940, pp. 150-151; see Appendix D, pp. 132-133.
- 31 St. John's Daily News, October 15, 1940.
- 32 J.R. Smallwood, Handbook of Newfoundland, 1941, pp. 174-175.
- 33 Conversation with Max Lane, January 13, 1982; Ranger interview tape no. 38, J. Fagan, Ranger no. 72.
- 34 PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.170, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, June 26, 1935.
- 35 St. John's Evening Telegram, May 18, 1935.
- 36 Conversation with Norman Crane, Ranger no. 95, October 13, 1980. The Commissioner in charge of relief during most of Commission of Government was J.C. Puddester, a capable Newfoundlander. As far

as the Dominions Secretary was concerned, Puddester was an ideal administrator. His primary concern seems to have been to balance his books, which he did perfectly. He also followed instructions well. As a result, he retained for almost 15 years a government appointment that was normally tenable for three years only.

37 PANL, S2-5-1/P8, J.31-'41, Emerson to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941. The RCMP not unexpectedly agreed with the Newfoundland Justice Department that the Rangers were policemen first and foremost and did not appear to realize that these men were actually members of a resource development force with only a few 'police' duties. See Appendix W, pp. 134-139.

38 The NWMP had not been used as a model for the Newfoundland Ranger Force because in 1920, the NWMP had been replaced by the RCMP. R.C. Macleod, The North-West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976); see S.W. Horraill, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police Force for the Northwest Territories," Canadian Historical Review, vol. LIII, no. 2.

39 Interview with Max Lane, May 9, 1980. The potential of the roads committees as the beginnings of local government is described in PANL, S4-3-1/FOM, Magistrate T.J. Wade to Commission of Government, November, 1942.

40 Ranger interview tape no. 14A, Ferdinand Davis, Ranger no. 118.

41 DO 35/494, 495, P.D.H. Dunn to Commissioner for Finance, January, 1936.

42 PANL, S2-5-1/P4, 149/35, Ewbank to Schwerdt, Private Secretary, Government House, December 19, 1936.

43 PANL, S2-5-1/P8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

44 Ibid., J.31-'41, L.E. Emerson to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941.

45 Ibid., N.R.2-'41, Enclosure A, J.H. Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

46 PANL, S2-5-1/P4, 149/35, Walwyn to MacDonald, May 10, 1937.

47 PANL, S2-5-1/P8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

48 RCMP file, Commissioner Wood to Canadian Minister of Justice, October 7, 1949.

49 PANL, S2-5-2, Ranger report, Lamaline (3-10-44).

50 The idea for this brief analysis of the social value of the Ranger patrols derives from an article written by Carl Betke, "Pioneers and Police on the Canadian Prairies, 1885-1914," Historical Papers 1980.

51 Grand Falls Advertiser, July 25, 1968.

52 Dr. Otto Tucker, Memorial University, March 25, 1982.

53 St. John's Evening Telegram, July 15, 1939.

54 Fishermens' Workers Tribune, September 23, 1938.

55 In 1936, Lodge summed up the Commission's views of its critics: some of them should have been doing time. DO 35/490, 491, Lodge to Labour Group of the Empire, Parliamentary Association, House of Commons, May 4, 1936.

56 Commission of Government kept a record of these Ranger reports and sent a reminder to any Ranger who had forgotten his duty.

57 Conversation with Fred Thompson, Ranger no. 62, January 26, 1979.

58 PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

59 PANL, S2-5-2, Ranger reports, 1943-44-45; Detachment diaries, Harbour Breton, 1948, 1949.

60 Ranger interview tape no. 3A, Fred Thompson, Ranger no. 62.

61 Of approximately 70 Rangers in 1944, only half a dozen made general suggestions. Of these Rangers, one later wrote a history of the Ranger Force, another bought his way out of the force and became a successful businessman, and a third joined Premier Smallwood's cabinet. They were not typical.

62 Conversation with Fred Thompson, Ranger no. 62, January 26, 1979.

63 PANL, GN 1/8/2 N.R.49-'36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, April 3, 1936. Earlier, Hope Simpson had recommended an even more thorough method of processing these reports. PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.26c-35/36, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, November 29, 1935.

64 Because the Rangers were seldom specifically mentioned in government documents, the sources for part of this analysis of the importance and filing of Ranger reports are Commission of Government statements concerning reports of its other district experts, especially the magistrates. And even in these reports, references to the Rangers are scarce.

65 PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

66 PANL, S2-5-1/F7, N.R.50-'42, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 26, 1942.

67 Ranger reports, Bay L'Argent (12-7-43), Lewisporte (12-8-44); MacKay, p. 153.

68. PANE, S2-5-1/F7, N.R.41-'37, Chief Ranger Anderton to Secretary, Department of Natural Resources, May 27, 1937.

69. PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

70. Ibid., N.R. 50-'42, P.D.H. Dunn to Commission of Government, May 26, 1942.

71. Browne, p. 269.

72. C.F. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, vol. 2, 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 361.

73. Rowe, p. 418.

74. Richard Strauss, "A Survey of Some Economic Aspects of the Presence of American Bases in Newfoundland, 1940-1945" (History 689B research paper, April 1, 1971), pp. 7, 10, 11-24 [hereafter cited as "American Bases"]; Browne, p. 270.

75. PANL, S2-7-1/FC, Radio Speech by Magistrate H.W. Quinton, May 29, 1939.

76. Ranger report, St. Lawrence (3-8-44).

77. Rowe, p. 418; Ranger report, Stephenville (9-10-44). After the war, some Newfoundlanders found employment in Canada. Peter Neary, "Canada and the Newfoundland Labour Market, 1939-49," Canadian Historical Review, LXII (December, 1981), 470-495.

78. Ranger reports, Bay L'Argent (12-7-43), Gambo (2-5-44), Glenwood (4-7-44), Marystown (3-9-43), Petit Forte (2-10-44), St. Andrews (7-6-44), St. George's (14-4-44), Stephenville Crossing (7-12-44); Miller, p. 96.

79. Ranger interview tape no. 29A, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158.

80. Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force," p. 5.

81. National registration was a wartime measure designed to provide the government with detailed information as to the age, nature, competence and distribution of the entire adult population in case the government needed people with a special skill. The policy of food rationing meant that the Rangers had to register all the population to make it possible for them to issue ration books. Information gathered for both types of registration was census data.

82. Ranger reports, Bonne Bay (28-3-44), Flowers Cove (3-4-44), Gambo (8-6-44), St. Lawrence (3-8-44).

83. Ranger interview tape no. 27A, Max Lane, former magistrate.

- ⁸⁴ Strauss, "American Bases," pp. 26, 28.
- ⁸⁵ Ranger interview tape no. 14A, Ferdinand Davis, Ranger no. 118.
- ⁸⁶ Cuff, p. 103.
- ⁸⁷ Noel, p. 270.
- ⁸⁸ Ranger reports, Gambo (4-7-44), Lamaline (1-9-44); Detachment diary, Harbour Breton, September 15, 1948.
- ⁸⁹ Conversation with Max Lane, January 13, 1982.
- ⁹⁰ Ranger report, Lamaline (3-10-44). In 1934, Commission of Government had recognized that the South Coast was "one of the most poverty-stricken districts in the island." DO 35/490, 491, Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, September 20, 1934.
- ⁹¹ PANL, S2-7-1/FC, N.R.104-'40, Report of the Co-operative Division of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Reconstruction, September 28, 1940.
- ⁹² Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force," p. 6.
- ⁹³ Ibid.
- ⁹⁴ Joseph R. Smallwood, ed., Book of Newfoundland (St. John's, Newfoundland: Newfoundland Book Publishers Ltd., 1967), IV, 571.
- ⁹⁵ Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force," p. 7.
- ⁹⁶ PANL, S2-5-1/F8, 330, Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, August 21, 1942.
- ⁹⁷ Glendinning, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force," p. 6.
- ⁹⁸ PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.
- ⁹⁹ PANL, S2-7-1/FH, n.d.

CHAPTER 6

THE END OF THE RANGER FORCE

The Rangers, as government representatives, played an important role in Newfoundland's post-war history. For almost two years after the end of the Second World War, the Rangers had no special duties. Britain had set up the National Convention in the spring of 1946, but it was not until September, 1947 that Commission of Government asked the Rangers to survey the popularity of the Commission in the outports. For the first time in almost 15 years, Newfoundlanders would vote for their choice of government. The result would have a more immediate effect on the Ranger Force than on the Newfoundland fisherman.

The National Convention

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced in December, 1945 that steps were being taken to allow Newfoundlanders to choose their own rulers. Delegates elected to a national convention would:

Consider and discuss . . . the changes that have taken place in the financial and economic situation of the Island since 1934, . . . examine the position of the country . . . and make recommendations to H.M.C. as to possible forms of future government to be put before the people at a national referendum.¹

Commission of Government passed the National Convention Act on May 21, 1946, starting the review process in Newfoundland. Forty-five representatives were elected, from which committees were appointed to study "different features of the economic and financial condition existing in Newfoundland."² This procedure was followed even though the government had detailed reports from Rangers, magistrates, agricultural

representatives, co-operative fieldworkers and district fishery officers giving the economic and financial condition in every settlement in Newfoundland and Labrador. Perhaps the ultimate purpose of the National Convention justified its existence: the Convention was to determine if Newfoundland was ready for another form of government and then recommend the form that government should take.

As representatives of Commission of Government, the Rangers assisted the National Convention. In September, 1947, the Commission asked Chief Ranger E.L. Martin to send a 'Strictly Confidential' circular to every Ranger, asking him to ascertain the attitude of the residents in his district toward the various forms of government from which Newfoundlanders might choose.³ Commission of Government sent similar circulars to the magistrates and members of the outport Constabulary.⁴ After more than 13 years of government by an appointed commission, some Newfoundlanders were wondering if they ever would have an elected government again. In 1936, there had been a request for a nominated Advisory Council, composed of Newfoundlanders, as the first logical step toward the return of Responsible Government.⁵ This request was rejected by the Dominions Secretary on the grounds that Newfoundland really wanted an elected body and would ask for that next. The British also felt that any Newfoundlanders capable of advising the Commission would be of more use outside the government where the Commission could ask for their advice when wanted. It was proposed, however, to make greater use of the magistrates and the Rangers "for the dissemination of accurate information regarding governmental activities as well as the collection of the reactions of the people toward such activities." At the same time, Britain revealed the real reason for rejecting the idea of an Advisory Council: it preferred

to govern Newfoundland through the appointed Commissioners and the experts it chose.⁶

Fortunately for the British, many Newfoundlanders had been willing to give Commission of Government a trial run for several years.⁷ World War Two had broken out after the country had experienced only five years of government by Commission and before anyone had time to organize an effective protest movement. Most people patriotically shelved thoughts of an elected Newfoundland government until after the end of the war. Beneath this veneer, however, some Newfoundlanders had harboured their resentment of Commission of Government. A symbol of this was the 1936 request for an Advisory Council. Another was an editorial which appeared in the Fishermens-Workers Tribune in 1938.⁸

The Ranger Force was the scapegoat. The editorial argued that the Force was an unnecessary expense. The real reason for this editorial, however, does not seem to have been the cost of the Force, but its control by the Department of Natural Resources.⁹ After all, the

Constabulary had cost Newfoundlanders too or three times as much every year as had the Ranger Force.¹⁰

Justice Minister L.E. Emerson seems to have felt that the Ranger Force should have reported directly to the Chief of Police (and the Justice Department) concerning actions in labour disputes, or in any police matter. But there were strong reasons for not treating the Ranger Force as an ordinary police force, as the editorial had claimed. A second police force was not needed in Newfoundland. There were only a few labour disputes and little serious crime;¹¹ the Rangers spent less than a fifth of their time working for the Justice Department, and the Commission had asked the Rangers to co-operate with the Constabulary in all police work.¹² Although the Rangers was an all-Newfoundland Force, the Justice Department felt that

it was a creature of Commission of Government and of the first Commissioner for Natural Resources. Furthermore, members of that department seem to have been jealous: L.E. Emerson somewhat admiringly had described Hope Simpson as "an imaginative and vigorous English Commissioner."¹³

At the time the Commission asked the Rangers to survey popular opinion, Newfoundlanders actually had only two choices—continuation of Commission of Government and restoration of Responsible Government. When Confederation with Canada became a popular alternative in the spring of 1948, a few Rangers seem to have realized that only a vote for Commission of Government would keep the Ranger Force alive in its existing form.¹⁴ The accuracy of the last Ranger reports depends to a large extent on how many Rangers had come to this conclusion, and this is difficult to determine.¹⁵ The extent to which the National Convention influenced the electorate also is a matter of interpretation. A British MP, John Parker, and a Canadian journalist, Wilfrid Eggleston, claimed that the Convention's main usefulness was in the field of political education,¹⁶ but at least three Rangers reported otherwise. Ranger A. Stevens of the Gambo detachment said that people listened to the National Convention on the radio for entertainment, "rather than to gain some useful information which would enlighten them as to what they really want."¹⁷ Ranger C. Matthews reported:

I am convinced that a great many people at the present time only listen to the Convention news for the pure enjoyment of listening to the humorous arguments which arise. One very influential gentleman at Englee said to me the other day, "You know Ranger, whenever I talk to anyone about the Convention, we always get a good laugh out of it, and I guess it's pretty much the same throughout the whole country." I must admit the Convention has become a medium for laughs.¹⁸

Ranger A. LeGrow of the Port aux Basques detachment reported that "the longer the National Convention lasts the bigger joke it becomes in the eyes of the public and the less interest it shows in the matter."¹⁹ One Ranger did mention the educational value of the National Convention. F.A. Davis commented that "people are disgusted with the National Convention and know what to expect if we return to Responsible Government."²⁰

The information Commission of Government wanted had to be obtained discretely, without entering into any political discussions. If there were co-operative study groups or any social clubs in the area, the Ranger could expect that people would gather there to discuss politics and other matters of local concern. In some areas, Rangers reported some difficulties in meeting the male work force.²¹ These were the dormitory settlements to which the men returned on Friday night after a week's work in the woods. Of necessity, the Ranger had to make an educated guess in these cases. Elsewhere, the Ranger benefitted from the positive feeling engendered by his regular patrols.

Replies to the government circular, sent to Ranger headquarters at the end of each month,²² are interesting for more than their opinions of the National Convention. They indicate the opinions of the Rangers just as much as those of the fishermen. Repeatedly the reader learns that the majority of the people were illiterate or indifferent as far as politics were concerned, had only a vague knowledge of any form of government, and often had no political opinions.²³ Consequently, the replies seem to show how much the Rangers, perhaps unconsciously, tried to influence Commission of Government and the British Dominions Office. As Ranger Hart of the Cartwright detachment said, "The decision of the entire Coast [of Labrador] is hinged upon a few people who may be

termed as the higher class."²⁴ A few Rangers obviously felt themselves to be members of this class, as indicated by their reports. This seems to have been a very small minority.²⁵

The opinions of the delegates to the National Convention were not the reported feelings of most fishermen in the outports. None of the National Convention delegates wanted a continuation of Commission of Government, some favoured Confederation with Canada, but the majority of the delegates were anxious to see a return to Responsible Government as it was before 1934.²⁶ In many of the outports, however, Ranger reports indicated that the choice was between continuation of Commission of Government and Confederation with Canada, with Responsible Government definitely an unpopular third.²⁷ According to these reports, many Newfoundlanders said they favoured Commission of Government because of its record of achievements, especially in the fishery,²⁸ Almost as many expressed the opinion that Confederation would be best, probably because Canada had a higher standard of living, made more welfare payments and could afford to look after those at either end of the demographic scale, the very young and the very old.²⁹ Newfoundlanders understood very well that better welfare payments would mean better food on the table. Then there were those who either did not know what they wanted or expressed a wish for the impossible. As an example of the latter, some wanted Responsible Government under British control,³⁰ while others advocated something similar--a continuation of Commission of Government with elected Newfoundlanders comprising the government.³¹ Much of their confusion is understandable: Newfoundlanders under 30 years of age had little experience with any government other than Commission of Government,³² and their elders who recalled Responsible Government as it had existed before 1934 feared merchant

rule.³³ All too often, fishermen and Rangers saw Responsible Government as "a possible meaning for Graft and Corruption in Government Circles."³⁴ The Ranger from Glenwood reported that he had heard people refer to the Responsible Government League as the Merchant Government League.³⁵ Another Ranger reported that the only type of responsible government that would have a chance also would have to offer the fishermen a solid social programme, which a Water Street merchant was not likely to advocate.³⁶ In 1944, Ted Russell had drawn a verbal caricature of Responsible Government that described what the Rangers reported four years later. Russell said that to the ordinary Newfoundlander, Responsible Government

meant the privilege of voting every four years or so for someone he had never seen before and would probably never see again. Government to him was an agency which took his money. He tried to retrieve as much of it as possible. Politicians promised to help him in his efforts, and he voted for the one who promised the most with the most convincing air.³⁷

The Ranger from Burgeo was just as critical: he reported that "I have heard the remark passed that if all the older politicians were dead, then Responsible Government would be worth more consideration."³⁸ Some of these statements undoubtedly reflected the opinions of the individual Rangers, and were somewhat biased. The Ranger in charge of the Englee detachment was probably more accurate in assessing the popular reaction of most Newfoundlanders to any form of government. He reported that:

It would be a simple matter to change the trend of the people's reasoning in favour of some other form of Government . . . the last person to spread propaganda about any one form of Government before the period for voting would succeed in turning the favour of the majority of the people to the form of Government he represented.³⁹

The leaders of the Confederation movement, and to a lesser degree the slightly disorganized campaigners for Responsible Government, realized

the value of 'having the last word', and used the daily broadcasts of the National Convention for this purpose. Advocates of Confederation also emphasized the financial benefits of joining Canada, but Commission of Government had a policy of not publicizing itself at all.⁴⁰ Ranger reports show that the daily broadcasts of the National Convention debates were well used by those in favour of Confederation, and also that the broadcasts were a major source of entertainment and not a means of political education.

Confederation and Amalgamation of the
Ranger Force with the RCMP

The people of Newfoundland and Labrador voted for their choice of government in the summer of 1948. In both Labrador and Newfoundland, members of the Ranger Force undertook a lot of routine work for the National Convention. Six Rangers were Returning Officers on the floating polling booth operated on the Labrador coast.⁴¹ In Newfoundland, Rangers helped the magistrates distribute ballot boxes and then count the votes.⁴² In the second referendum on July 2, 52.34 per cent of those who voted chose Confederation with Canada. While Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared this "a decision clear beyond all possibility of misunderstanding,"⁴³ some doubted if the results of the ballot should be accepted.⁴⁴ But this was a majority decision, both democratic and binding.

As leader of the Confederation movement in Newfoundland, J.R. Smallwood was responsible for having the Newfoundland Ranger Force 'replaced' by the RCMP and a multitude of other officials appointed by the new provincial government of which Smallwood was Premier. The extra government officials were needed because the

Mounties would not be expected to perform many of the duties of the Ranger Force such as those relating to customs, weights and measures, collection of revenue from licences, the issue of relief and the maintenance of roads.⁴⁵ After Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada on March 31, 1949, the RCMP slowly assumed the outpost police duties of the Newfoundland Ranger Force.

The men from the RCMP had almost a year and a half to become familiar with the conditions under which the Rangers had worked. Starting in the spring of 1949, the Rangers introduced these Mounties to all aspects of outpost life, which included making them familiar with the people. Knowledge of the social and economic life of the settlements was fully as important to the Mounties as awareness of their duties. But before taking over police duties in Newfoundland, the RCMP took an inventory of Ranger properties to see if any would be worth acquiring. The results revealed some of the conditions the Rangers had tolerated, and disclosed the conditions of the buildings at each Ranger detachment. In the report, only one of at least two dozen buildings was said to be in excellent condition, while 16 were fair to good, and seven were completely unsuitable. The descriptions of the seven unsuitable detachments contain an implicit criticism of the Commission. The government had over-economized and Rangers had been forced to live and work in buildings that should have been torn down--or allowed to fall down. Two comments stand out: the Lewisporte detachment buildings were used "through necessity and definitely not through choice," and Rangers continued to use the Springdale buildings "because no other quarters are available."⁴⁶ Consequently, the provincial government supplied new buildings for the RCMP in many

places. In other locations, the detachment buildings received unusual treatment--painting, scrubbing and a regular maintenance contract.

At the end of August, 1949, there were 66 Rangers in 47 detachments. Thirty-six of the Ranger posts and 45 Rangers were in Newfoundland, while 9 detachments and 11 men were in Labrador. The two commissioned officers and one Ranger who did the administrative work for the whole Force were at the head office in St. John's. There were two noncommissioned officers and six Rangers or constables at the Kilbride training depot.⁴⁷

In October, 1949, the RCMP proposed to police the province of Newfoundland as it already did in six other Canadian provinces. RCMP Commissioner Wood felt that "the total number of detachments could be drastically reduced" when his Canadian Mounties took over and restricted themselves to police work. However, Wood admitted that the Ranger Force had actually needed more detachments and men than the population warranted because it had performed many duties "not of a police nature."⁴⁸ His Mounties, on the other hand, would be a modern police force.

On July 12, 1950, Stuart Carson, Canadian Minister of Justice, and Leslie Curtis, Newfoundland's Attorney General, signed an agreement whereby the RCMP was to begin policing Newfoundland on August 1, 1950. The last list of Ranger Force detachments, made at the end of July, 1950, showed that there were 55 men in 40 detachments, and the Force still had one patrol craft operating out of Battle Harbour and run by the regular Ranger for that detachment.⁴⁹ A month later, 37 Constabulary members together with 55 Rangers became Mounties. Eight men were brought in from the RCMP.⁵⁰ Commissioner Wood seems to have forgotten his declaration that the total number of detachments and men could be reduced, because there were 100 men in the Newfoundland branch of the RCMP,⁵¹ as

opposed to 66 Rangers in August, 1949 and 79 in August, 1946 when the Force was at its strongest. Commissioner Wood also had stipulated that the Mounties would have fewer duties than the Rangers had had. The 55 Rangers changed uniforms, cut back on their workload, were demoted one rank, were put on a better pay scale and received the promise of a pension at the end of their RCMP service.⁵² Newfoundland's new police force consisted of 100 men and cost about \$140,000 a year or \$1,400 a Mountie.⁵³ These salaries were only slightly higher than the Newfoundland government had paid its Rangers. But some Rangers now regard this transfer and the end of their Force as little more than an economic transaction.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The Newfoundland Ranger Force was an integral part of Commission of Government's plans to rehabilitate the country. The Commission reformed existing institutions such as the customs service, the fishing industry, the civil service, the magistracy and the police force. But it also created a new institution--the Newfoundland Ranger Force--to tie them all together. Rangers worked for every government department and could be asked to enforce any government regulation.

The Dominions Office was informed in February, 1935 that the Ranger Force would act as game wardens to protect the beaver reserves which would turn Newfoundland into a vast fur farm and create a new revenue-producing industry. But after the Dominions Office was satisfied that Newfoundland needed a Ranger Force, the function of the Force changed. The Rangers ceased to be thought of as a group of game wardens and began to develop as Hope Simpson had always planned. In fact, after the Force extended its jurisdiction to all Newfoundland, and after the Rangers increased their duties to include those of

district officers, the Ranger Force really became a rural administrative force with police powers.

In duties, size and area patrolled, the Newfoundland Ranger Force resembled the North-West Mounted Police rather than the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as it is known today. Until 1900, however, most North American police forces had had general administrative duties which included relatively little detection of criminal activity--or modern police work.⁵⁵

Even the RCMP Commissioner admitted in 1949 that the Rangers had been much more than an ordinary police force. Although members of the Ranger Force always were told that their principal duty was the routine patrolling and policing of the districts, the Commission used the Rangers as an administrative extension of the central government in the outlying areas. Essentially, Commission of Government had modified the district system of administration found in many British colonies and had given the Rangers the duties of district officers. The Rangers were a mobile force which, helped by the magistrates and other government officials, linked the outlying areas to the central government and formed the Commission's administrative structure in the outposts. The Ranger Force provided a form of local government in these small settlements that was administratively suitable to the Commission and economically acceptable to the fishermen and loggers. Except for St. John's, there were no local governments in 1935; by the end of 1948, there were 20,⁵⁶ and 22 more were incorporated in the 1950s.⁵⁷ This indicates that Commission of Government, partly because of the example set by the Rangers, did provide training in self-government. The Rangers also effected a significant social change: they unintentionally reduced the power of the churches.

After Rangers appeared in many outposts, the inhabitants looked to secular leaders rather than to the local clergymen.⁵⁸ The friendly and reliable Ranger also improved morale and raised the Newfoundlander's self-respect, making economic rehabilitation possible. In other words, the Rangers prepared the people so that they could take advantage of the improved economic conditions which prevailed after 1940.

Most of these accomplishments of the Rangers and Commission of Government were temporarily buried by the inundation of 'Ottawa money' brought in by Confederation. The amalgamation of the Rangers and the RCMP seemed beneficial at first: the 55 Rangers who became Mounties were paid more for doing less, and a patronage pool of approximately 200 government jobs was created. But Newfoundland paid a rather high price for giving up 'its own' administrative force. Control was even farther away: RCMP headquarters were in Ottawa after 1950, whereas the offices of the Ranger Force had been in St. John's. The cost of policing Newfoundland ultimately was less important than control of that police force and Newfoundland's cultural loss was greater than any economic or political gain.

Since Confederation, some Rangers have wondered whether their Force should have joined the RCMP,⁵⁹ and one Newfoundlander even remarked that the Rangers would have found it so much easier, in the late 1970s, with all the roads and other benefits of progress.⁶⁰ But, looking back to the 1940s, this is debatable: as the economy improved, the power and independence as well as the usefulness of the Ranger Force declined. The addition of police duties in World War Two had signalled the end of the need for a general administrative force and the new requirement of a police force whose sole purpose would be to

prevent and detect crime. Would the Ranger Force have been able to maintain its high reputation after Confédération, or would a more complex society have created problems which the Force could not have solved without drastic internal changes? Even the RCMP has not been able to maintain the high standards of its early frontier days.

FOOTNOTES

¹Chadwick, p. 193.

²Browne, pp. 293-294.

³PANL, S2-5-2, Ranger reports, 1947-48.

⁴PANL, S4-4-1/file A, circulars no. 532, 565.

⁵PANL, Justice Department files, Box 56-2, Governor Walwyn to Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald [December, 1936].

⁶Ibid.

⁷St. John's Evening Telegram, March 15, 1941.

⁸The Fishermens-Workers Tribune, September 23, 1938.

⁹'Control of the Ranger Force' seems to have been an issue between the Justice Department and the Department of Natural Resources, an argument that was always simmering and usually minimized. P.D.H. Dunn presents the most logical argument for control by the Department of Natural Resources. See PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.5042, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, May 26, 1942.

¹⁰PANL, GN-1/3A, 621.33, Governor Anderson to J.H. Thomas, September, 1933; PAC, Magrath Papers, vol: 12, file 10, "Department of Justice Report," pp. 27-29.

¹¹PANL, S4-41/FD, Secret Memorandum on the Police Situation in Relation to the Possibility of Civil Disturbance, 24/6/38.

¹²PANL, Justice Department files, Box 76-1, Anderton to Secretary for Natural Resources, November 23, 1936; PANL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, Gorvin to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

¹³Ibid., J.31-'41, Emerson to Commission of Government, June 13, 1941.

¹⁴Ranger interview tape no. 11A, R.C. Richards, Ranger no. 174.

¹⁵The Rangers were known to be good storytellers, a fact that seems to have been common knowledge to almost everyone in the government but the Commissioners. The Commission commented that one Ranger report, full of 'purple prose', was 'literary'. See Ranger report, Twillingate (9-10-47).

¹⁶John Parker, MP, Newfoundland: 10th Province of Canada (London: Lincolns-Prager Ltd., 1950), p. 30; Wilfrid Eggleston, Newfoundland: The Road to Confederation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. 27.

¹⁷Ranger report, Gambo (7-11-47).

¹⁸Ranger report, Englee (13-12-47).

- 19 Ranger report, Port aux Basques (6-1-48).
- 20 Ranger report, Glenwood (7-1-48).
- 21 Ranger report, Badger (6-1-48).
- 22 Ranger report, Twillingate (7-1-48).
- 23 Ranger reports, Burgeo (6-10-47), Burin (8-10-47), Deer Lake (3-1-48), Englee (15-10-47), Gambo (7-10-47), Glenwood (2-10-47), Hermitage (31-12-48), La Scie (30-9-47), Meadows Point (10-11-47), Point Leamington (9-11-47), Port au Port (31-12-47), Port aux Basques (25-9-47), Port Saunders (30-9-47), Rose Blanche (24-10-47), St. Anthony (8-10-47), Stephenville (6-10-47), Stephenville Crossing (10-1-48), North West River (16-10-47); Even J.R. Smallwood, the leader of the Confederation movement, later said that "Our people had no notion of what Confederation was or meant. They had no conception of a federal system of Government." J.R. Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, 2 vols. (Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1975), p. 235.
- 24 Ranger reports, Cartwright (15-1-48), North West River (16-10-47), Port Hope Simpson (5-12-47).
- 25 See Ranger interview tape no. 16, Frank Mercer, Ranger no. 25. On the other hand, many magistrates seemed to be too conscious of their official positions and not as close to the fishermen as to Commission of Government. Some magisterial reports to the Commission are condescending. PANL, GN 1/8/2, N.R.8b-136, Magistrate J.B. Wornell to Commission of Government, January 27, 1936; PANL, S4-3-1/FOM, Magistrate B.V. Andrews to Commission of Government, December, 1935.
- 26 Chadwick, p. 201; Miller, p. 106.
- 27 Ranger reports, 1947-48, *passim*.
- 28 Ranger reports, Glenwood (2-10-47), Springdale (28-9-47).
- 29 St. John's Daily News, Wayfarer, April 13, 1974.
- 30 Ranger report, Springdale (4-11-47).
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ranger report, Point Leamington (9-1-48).
- 33 Ranger report, Port Saunders (30-9-47).
- 34 Ranger report, Springdale (28-9-47).
- 35 Ranger report, Glenwood (2-10-47).
- 36 Ranger report, La Scie (30-9-47).
- 37 PANL, S2-7-1/FH, Report on the Co-operative Division of the Department of Natural Resources, April 10, 1944.

- 38 Ranger report, Burgeo (6-10-47).
- 39 Ranger report; Englee (15-10-47).
- 40 Ranger report, Twillingate (7-1-48). In 1945, the Canadian High Commissioner reported that Commission of Government was "nearly moribund" after the loss of Commissioners Wilfred Woods and L.E. Emerson: P.D.H. Dunn, the most popular and effective Commissioner was slated to leave in August, 1945. PAC, C.D. Howe Papers, MG 27, III, B20, vol. 58, file 1, folder 3, J.S. Macdonald, High Commissioner for Canada to Secretary for External Affairs, July 30, 1945; Interview with J.G. Channing, April 11, 1979.
- 41 PANL, S2-7-1/FH, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, n.d.
- 42 Detachment diary, Harbour Breton, May 18, 27, 28, 29, 1949.
- 43 Canadian Department of External Affairs, An Introduction to Newfoundland: Canada's New Province (Government of Canada publication, January 1, 1950), pp. 39-40.
- 44 Chadwick, pp. 206-211.
- 45 RCMP file, Commissioner Wood to Canadian Minister of Justice, October 7, 1949.
- 46 Ibid., Newfoundland Department of Natural Resources, "Information concerning Newfoundland Ranger Force as at Aug. 31, 1949" (List of Houses Owned by Ranger Force).
- 47 Ibid., Annual Report, Chief Ranger E.L. Martin to Commissioner for Natural Resources, March 21, 1949.
- 48 Ibid., Commissioner Wood to Canadian Justice Minister, October 7, 1949.
- 49 I.S. Glendinning to M. Tuck, March 7, 1981 (enclosure: Ranger Force Detachments and Personnel as at 31-X-50).
- 50 Atlantic Advocate, November, 1973; RCMP file, Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the year ended March 31, 1951.
- 51 Ibid., Commissioner Wood to Canadian Justice Minister, August 31, 1949.
- 52 Ibid., Commissioner Wood to Canadian Justice Minister, October 7, 1949. Ranger interview tape no. 29, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158; Ibid., no. 10B, R.C. Richards, Ranger no. 174.
- 53 Interview with J.R. Smallwood, December 20, 1978.
- 54 Crane, Historical Society lecture, p. 8.
- 55 Douglas Hay, "Urban Police and Crime in the Nineteenth Century: A Survey of Current Scholarship" [1974].

56 J.C. Crosbie, "Local Government in Newfoundland," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XXII, no. 3, August, 1956, p. 340.

57 B.J. Abbott, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Supply, speech in House of Assembly, February 11, 1958; see Decks Awash, vol. 6, no. 6, September, 1977.

58 Conversation with Jim Walsh, Newfoundland Association of Public Employees, February 23, 1983.

59 Ranger interview tape no. 29B, Cyril Goodyear, Ranger no. 158.

60 Ranger interview tape no. 19B, L.G. Vey, former school principal at Burin.

All historical explanations remain . . .
subject to the possibility of alteration
as either increased knowledge or subtler
understanding suggests better explanation.

G.R. Elton, Political History, p. 150.

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- #11A, R.C. Richards, Ranger no. 174.
- #14A, Ferdinand Davis, Ranger no. 118.
- #16, Frank Mercer, Ranger no. 25.
- #19B, L.G. Vey, former school principal at Burin.
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- S2-5-1/F7

S2-5-1/F8
 S2-5-2 (1943, 1948), Ranger reports
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 S2-7-1/FH
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 S4-4-1/file A
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APPENDIX A
SECTIONS OF AMULREE REPORT

APPENDIX A

Sections of the Amulree Report contained a blueprint for the organization that was to become the Newfoundland Ranger Force.

484. . . . Newfoundland is a country admirably suited to the raising
485. of fur-bearing animals . . . [such as] beaver, otter, fox, bear, lynx, marten and muskrat. . . . We feel convinced that if the full possibilities of a fur-bearing industry could be explained to the people and a new body of wardens established under enlightened leadership, great stretches of land which at present offer no return to the community could within a few years be brought to yield substantial benefits.

490. . . . the initiation of an adequate system of protection should be undertaken without delay. The first step would be to obtain expert advice from Canada, or from some other country where conditions are similar, as to how such a system might best be set up and by what measures a revenue-producing industry might best be fostered and developed . . . the next step would be to arrange for the establishment of the new body of Game Wardens which would doubtless be required for its execution. This body might . . . be organized on similar lines to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which performs similar services in the hinterland of Canada and . . . when this stage is reached, the Commandant of the Canadian Police should be consulted with a view to the secondment of a few trained members of that force who could assist in the training of the Newfoundland body.


619. Should such a body be formed . . . to ensure the protection of
 620. the animals and to assist in the execution of any [game preservation] scheme . . . it might be practicable to assign to it other duties than those of game wardens. In the North-West territories of Canada, for instance, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police enforce all criminal and federal statutes. . . . The Force perform a considerable number of administrative duties, collect revenue for the Customs Department, the Department of the Interior and other Federal Departments, issue Game Animal and Game Bird Licences, Walrus Licences, and the Wolf and Coyote Bounty, collect Fur Export tax, Timber Dues and Income Tax, attend to Vital Statistics, investigate applications for naturalisation, assist in obtaining meteorological information, and enforce the North West Game Act and the regulations regarding dogs. They also see to the ordinances relating to scientists and explorers, and the regulations regarding the large areas known as "Preserves" which are set aside for the benefit of Indians and Eskimos. A Commissioned Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer at any detachment may hold the following appointments: Justice of the Peace, Deputy Sheriff, Coroner, Mining Recorder, Registrar of Vital Statistics, Postmaster, Collector of Customs, Commissioner for taking Affidavits, Acting Indian Agent, Officer for receiving applications for naturalisation, Collector of Income Tax, Inspector of Explosives, Game Officer, etc.

621. . . . Such a force, once organised and operating effectively, might, on the analogy of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, eventually take over all public work not only in the interior but in the out-ports as well, might collect the Customs and other revenue at all

but the most important ports, might act as the representatives of the various Departments of Government, might assist in the working of the Post Office and the Railway, and generally might undertake duties, excluding those assigned to the Magistrates and Fishery Inspectors, which are at present distributed among a number of minor officials. On this basis, the establishment of such a force would combine efficiency with economy.

APPENDIX B
MAP OF RANGER FORCE DETACHMENTS
IN DECEMBER, 1935

APPENDIX B:

NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE DETACHMENTS
in December 1935.

APPENDIX C

COMPARISON OF STRENGTH

- (1) Ranger Force and Constabulary, both in Newfoundland.
- (11) Ranger Force in Labrador and RCMP in North-West Territories.

APPENDIX C

RECENT COMPARISONS BETWEEN

- (i) the Ranger Force and the Constabulary, both in Newfoundland;
 (ii) the Ranger Force in Labrador and the RCMP in the North-West Territories.

(i)

Force	Strength	Area under jurisdiction	Population under jurisdiction	Ratio	
				Area	Population
Rangers	50	34,000 sq. miles	110,000	34 or 1 42 man to every 680 sq. miles	11 or 1 man 29 to every 2,200 per- sons
Constabulary	260 (approx.)	8,000 sq. miles	180,000	8 or 1 42 man to every 31 sq.miles	18 or 1 man 29 to every 693 per- sons

(ii)


Rangers	8	110,000 sq.miles	6,000	1 man to every 13,333 sq.miles	1 man to every 750 persons
RCMP	100	1,390,000 sq.miles	9,800	1 man to every 13,900 sq.miles	1 man to every 98 persons

Source: PARL, S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, J.H. Gorvin, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

APPENDIX D

MAP OF RANGER FORCE DETACHMENTS IN 1939

APPENDIX D: NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE
DETACHMENTS in 1939.



APPENDIX E

DUTIES OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE

- (1) According to the RCMP.
- (11) According to Commission of Government.

APPENDIX E

(1) DUTIES OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE

"Section 13 of Act No. 37 of 1935, entitled an Act respecting the Ranger Force provides that in areas where members of the Force are stationed they are required to perform all duties in relation to the preservation of the peace & prevention & detection of crime, & all offences against the Criminal & other laws of Nfld. & its dependencies; the apprehension of criminals & offenders & others who may lawfully be taken into custody; to execute all Warrants & perform all duties & services which may be lawfully executed & performed & to escort prisoners & lunatics to or from any Court, place of punishment or confinement, Asylum or other places. The Act further provides in Section 14 that members of the Nfld. Ranger Force, in addition to any powers & duties conferred or imposed by the Rangers' Act, shall have all the powers, authority, protection & privileges which members of the Nfld. Constabulary have by law.

"In addition to the duties of enforcing all criminal and statute laws, members of the Ranger Force, in their efforts to assist the Govt. & the people of Nfld., attend to many matters which normally do not receive the attention of Law-Enforcement Officers."

Source: RCMP Archives, Ottawa, Newfoundland Department of Natural Resources. File on "Information concerning Nfld. Ranger Force as at August 31st, 1949."

(11) DIVISION OF DUTIES OF THE RANGER FORCEI. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

1. Reporting upon General Conditions.
2. Protection of Salmon Rivers.
3. Protection of Game.
4. Reporting upon Logging Conditions.
5. Reporting upon Logging Camps.
6. Inspection of Sawmill Licences.
7. Collection of Sawmill Returns.
8. Collection of Sawmill Royalties.
9. Investigation into Logging Disputes.
10. Forest Fires.
11. Recruiting Newfoundland Forestry Unit.
12. Crown Lands Applications.
13. Licensing of Dogs.
14. Issuing Game and Inland Fishery Licenses.
15. Issuing Guide Licenses.
16. Issuing Permits to Burn.
17. Rabbit Canning License Inspections.
18. Ammunition Vendors' Returns.
19. Salmon Licenses Inspections.
20. Salmon Regulations Enforcement.
21. Herring License Inspections.
22. Herring Regulations Enforcement.
23. Lobster Export License Inspections.
24. Lobster Regulations Enforcement.

25. Fur Dealer's License Inspections.
26. Beaver License Issues and Inspections.

II.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

1. Issuance of Relief: (a) Able-bodied,
(b) Sick.
2. Reporting upon Relief Conditions.
3. Reporting upon Public Wells (Government).
4. Supervision of Repairs to Public Wells (Government).
5. Supervision of Relief Labour on: (a) Roads,
(b) Bridges,
(c) Wharves
(d) Government Buildings,
(e) Breakwaters.
6. Sale of Relief Cut Firewood, etc.
7. Reporting on Health Conditions.
8. Arranging Hospitalization for Sick Poor.
9. Escorting Mental Patients.

III.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

1. Reporting on Condition of: (a) Roads,
(b) Bridges,
(c) Wharves,
(d) Government Buildings,
(e) Breakwaters.
2. Supervision of Repairs to: (a) Roads,
(b) Bridges,
(c) Wharves,
(d) Government Buildings,
(e) Breakwaters.
3. Wreck Commissioners (Labrador).
4. Registration of Explosives.
5. Examinations for Driver's License.

IV.

DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMS

1. Inspection of Weights and Measures.
2. Customs Collectors, Newfoundland and Labrador.
3. Inspection Gasoline and Motor Fuel Licenses.
4. Inspection Premises - Manufacture and Sale "Near Beer".
5. Inspection Premises - Sale of Wines and Beer.
6. Assistance to Collectors re "Preventive Service".
7. Motor Cycle Patrols on Roads Burin Peninsula re Smuggling.
8. Enforcement of Immigration Regulations.
9. Applications for use "Acto".

V.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. Reporting upon Land suitable for Land Settlement.
2. Forwarding samples of soil for analysis of agricultural content.
3. Inspection of Land for Bonus.
4. Reporting upon Government Rams.
5. Reporting Upon Government Bulls.
6. Reporting upon Government Boars.
7. Reporting upon Government Stallions.

VI.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. Investigation into and reports upon all criminal offences.
2. Investigation of Accidental Deaths.
3. Reporting upon Accidental Deaths.
4. Registration of Aliens.
5. Investigation into Accidental Fires.
6. Reporting upon Accidental Fires.
7. Reporting upon Suspicious Aliens.
8. Highway Traffic Patrols.
9. Escort of Prisoners.

VII. DEPARTMENT OF POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

1. Inspection of Radio Licenses.
2. Issuance of Radio Licenses.
3. Censorship of Telegraph Messages (Labrador).

VIII. DEFENCE

1. Registration of Firearms.
2. Assistance to Magistrates re Recruiting - Navy,
- Army,
- Air Force.

IX. TOURIST BOARD

1. Reporting on Canoe and Hiking Trails.
2. Specialized Reports for Prospective Tourists (Newfoundland and Labrador).
3. Specialized Reports upon Salmon Rivers for Tourists (Newfoundland and Labrador).

X. STATE DEPARTMENT (U.S. GOVERNMENT, WASHINGTON)

1. International Ice Patrol Reports.

XI. ENTOMOLOGICAL LABORATORY (OTTAWA)

1. Forest Insect Survey.

XII. ASSESSOR OF TAXES (Rare)

1. Collection of Income Taxes (Labrador).

Source: PANL S2-5-1/F8, N.R.2-'41, J.H. Gorvin, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, January 7, 1941.

APPENDIX F
MAP OF RANGER FORCE DETACHMENTS
IN AUGUST, 1949

APPENDIX F: NEWFOUNDLAND RANGER FORCE DETACHMENTS in August 1949.



APPENDIX G
GOVERNORS, COMMISSIONERS AND
CHIEF RANGERS, 1934-50

APPENDIX O1 GOVERNORS, COMMISSIONERS AND CHIEF MANAGERS, 1934 - 1950.

1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950	D. Murray Anderson		Rusbury Malyon		Sir Gordon Macdonald	
COMMISSIONERS:						
Dept. of Home Affairs & Education	P.O. Alderdice	J.A. Winter	H.A. Winter	A.J. Walsh	H. Pottle	
Dept. of Finance	E.M.R. Trentham	J.H. Penson	Ira Wild	R.L.M. Jones		
Dept. of Public Utilities	Thomas Lodge	M. Woods	G. London	J.S. Wall		
Dept. of Public Health & Welfare	J.C. Puddester					H.W. Quinton
Dept. of Justice	M.R. Howley	L.T. Emerson	H.A. Winter		A.J. Walsh	
Dept. of Natural Resources	Sir John Eubank	J.H. Corvin	P.D.H. Dunn	W.H. Plim		
CHIEF MANAGERS:	L.T. STICK AMERSON	E.H. CHESLEY	R.J. FRASER	E.L. MARTIN		
	July 9/35	March 36	June 40	July 41		
	Feb 36	Jan 39	June 44	Aug. 31/50		

SOURCE: J.H. Smallwood, ed., Book of Newfoundland, IV, 506-599.

APPENDIX H

SUMMARY OF RANGER FORCE STRENGTH, 1935-50

APPENDIX H

SUMMARY OF RANGER FORCE STRENGTH, 1935-50

	December 1935	July 15, 1937	November 30, 1938	1939	1946	August 31, 1949	July 31, 1950
Men	31	56	61	63	79	66	55
Detachments	19	38	36	40	49	46	40
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)

- Sources:
- (1) PANL, S2-5-1/F7, Ranger Force, 1935-36; E.L. Martin to M. Tuck, February 1, 1981; I.S. Glendinning to M. Tuck, March 7, 1981.
 - (2) PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Disposition and Personnel of Newfoundland Ranger Force, July 15, 1937.
 - (3) PANL, S2-5-1/F4, 149/35, Ranger Force Detachments and Personnel as at 30-11-38.
 - (4) J.R. Smallwood, Handbook of Newfoundland, 1940, pp. 150-151.
 - (5) PANL, S2-7-1/FH, Newfoundland Ranger Force.
 - (6) RCMP file, Newfoundland Department of Natural Resources, "Information concerning Newfoundland Ranger Force as at August 31st, 1949."
 - (7) I.S. Glendinning to M. Tuck, March 7, 1981 (enclosure: Ranger Force Detachments and Personnel as at 31-7-50).

APPENDIX I

COMPARISON OF COST

- (i) Ranger Force in 1935.
- (ii) Ranger Force in 1949.
- (iii) Newfoundland Branch of RCMP in 1950.

APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF COST OF RANGER FORCE IN 1935 AND 1949 COMPARED TO
COST OF NEWFOUNDLAND BRANCH OF RCMP IN 1950
(salaries only)

	Date	No. of Men in Force	Cost per man	Total cost of Force	
Rangers:	Oct. 8, 1934	75 (authorized strength)	\$745	\$56,000	(1)
	Mar., 1935	52 (authorized strength)	770	40,000	(2)
	Dec., 1935	31 (actual strength)	645	20,000	(3)
	Aug., 1949	66 (actual strength)	1,305	86,000	(4)
Mounties:	Aug., 1950	100 (actual strength)	1,400	140,000	(5)

- Sources:
- (1) PANL, S2-5-1/F1, N.R.101, Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, October 8, 1934.
 - (2) DO 35/505, 506, Horwood to Dominions Office, March 2, 1935; PANL, S2-5-1/F4, N.R.101(a), Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government, February 23, 1935.
 - (3) An approximation, since the annual reports of the Chief Ranger are not to be found.
 - (4) RCMP file, Newfoundland Department of Natural Resources, "Information concerning Newfoundland Ranger Force as at Aug. 31st, 1949."
 - (5) Atlantic Advocate (November, 1973); Interview with J.R. Smallwood, December 20, 1978; This is St. John's, vol. 1, no. 3, January, 1974.

