COLONIALISM IN TRANSITION:
SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF RULE AND
COLLABORATION IN NIGERIA, 1900–51

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G. UGOCHUKWU NWOKELI
Colonialism in Transition:
Shifting Foundations of Rule and Collaboration in Nigeria, 1900-51

by

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

Department of History
Memorial University of Newfoundland
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Newfoundland
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DEDICATION

In memory of my late father
Chief Godwin Ukobasi Nwokeji
who, as my brother once said,
"left a legacy of dedication and perseverance."
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the circumstances which produced and sustained the colonial state in Nigeria in the period 1900-1951. It explains the manner and means by which various indigenous and expatriate groups confronted and accommodated one another. It joins issues with the consensus amongst historians which holds that the participation of indigenous elements in colonial rule was a function of the state's want of administrative and financial resources from Europe. It argues alternatively that their participation was essential -- resources or not. Colonialism was thus not foreign rule per se but primarily class domination. Up until the Second World War this domination was effected through a class alliance between the traditional elite and British expatriates. The post-war years witnessed a transition to the alliance between the modernizing elite and expatriates. This thesis explains this transition. This analysis is made in the context of the "collaborative nexus" (CN). This formulation refers to a set of relationships in which individuals and collectivities, African and European, interacted with the colonial state in a situation of co-operation and conflict based mainly on access to the means of production and surpluses.
Okuko a neghi echei onye boro ya onu n'adunmili?

Literally translated, this Igbo saying would refer to the animal kingdom. In reality, however, it is a wise counsel that the prudent person does not show ingratitude to those who helped him/her when in dire need.

Having completed this work I wish to mention individuals (and organizations) who should share any of this work’s credit, but none of its shortcomings. Tribute goes to the entire members of my large family. In special measure, my mother, Christiana Nwokeji, has been a source of encouragement. My sister, Mrs. Georgina Umanakwe sheltered and fed me during my trip to London. Another, Mrs. May Okafor, took care of me during much of my stay in Lagos. The Bavingtons (Bill, Grace, Dean and Beth) have served me as family here in St. John’s.

A number of scholars have helped in various ways, but I can mention only a few. My former teacher, Dr. Ben Hemen, of the University of Port Harcourt, has continued to show appreciable interest in my direction. In his characteristic good nature he was willing to help in every possible way when I met him again in London during the course of this research in the Fall of 1992. A similar tribute is due another former teacher, Dr. Sola Akinrinade of the History department of the
University of life. I have since had useful exchanges with a former supervisor, Ayo Amale of the international relations department of the same university, on the subject of the Nigerian political economy. Dr. Patrick Idoye (Greensboro, NC) suggested some relevant sources. The second chapter of this thesis is indistinguishable from a section of the paper which Dr. A.G. Adebayo (Marietta, GA) gave me an opportunity to write by inviting me to participate in a conference panel.

Two scholars I have not had the opportunity of meeting helped through the intermediary of my supervisor. By suggesting that I examine the PRO file series CO 537, Professor John Flint, lately of Dalhousie University, saved me valuable time in London. By delivering a critique on an earlier seminar paper, Professor Mark Graesser of the political science department of this university (Memorial) challenged me to clarify my conceptualizations.

The help I received from the staff of the underlisted resource centers was invaluable in the preparation of this work: Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan; the Public Record Office, England; the British Museum; libraries at the Universities of Ibadan and Lagos and the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. This list will not be complete without acknowledging the support of the staff of the Queen Elizabeth II Library of this university.

Graduate work in Memorial University has been a salutary experience. The debts of gratitude of an international
student are many. The School of Graduate studies provided a fellowship for two years running as well as a grant which helped me defray the cost of my research trip. Joan Butler has through patience and work-processing skills made readable the discrepant manuscript that now constitutes this thesis. The head of department Professor Andy den Otter has more than once bailed me out of financial embarrassment by giving me an opportunity to participate in his own private research. I also appreciate the kindness of Beverly Maher and the rest of the department’s staff. The same goes for fellow graduate students and the history faculty whose comments at seminars over the last two years have reflected in this work. In this connection, I wish to mention especially Professor Gerhard Bassler and Dr. Linda Kealey.

Finally, I must record my deep appreciation to the support which my supervisor, Dr. Chris Youé, has rendered me throughout the duration of this programme. He has helped a foreign student cope with a different environment offering transit accommodation on arrival, departure and return. His prompt and thorough attention to every chapter, and prodding has enabled me to complete this work as early as I have been able to make it. To the best of my ability I have carried out corrections and made clarifications.
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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>African Continental Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Colonial Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD&amp;W</td>
<td>Colonial Development and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Collaborating Nexus</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LegCo</td>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>Native Administration, Ibadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBBWA</td>
<td>National Bank of British West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCBBWA</td>
<td>National Congress of British West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later National Congress for Nigerian Citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFFU</td>
<td>Nigerian Farmers' Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNNDP</td>
<td>Nigerian National Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNFD</td>
<td>Nigerian National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNFL</td>
<td>Nigerian National Federation of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUT</td>
<td>Nigerian Union of Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWRF</td>
<td>Nigerian War Relief Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYM</td>
<td>Nigerian Youth Movement</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record office</td>
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</table>
RNC  Royal Niger Company
RWAFF Royal West Africa Frontier Force
RWU  Railway Workers’ Union
SoFS  Secretary of State
TUC  Trades Union Congress
UAC  United Africa Company
UNAMAG Amalgamated Union of UAC African Workers
WACB  West African Currency Board
WACCB West African Cocoa Control Board
WANS  West African National Secretariat
WAPB  West African Produce Control Board
WASU  West African Students’ Union
YPC  Youth Protest Committee
ZIK  Azikiwe
ZM  Zikist Movement
CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of Study

This thesis explores the complex interactions between elements of the indigenous society and expatriate (mainly British) population in Nigeria in the period 1900-1951. It examines the circumstances which produced the colonial state, the dynamics of the operation of that institution, and the process of decolonization which culminated in the emergence of sovereign Nigeria in 1960. This work will seek to explain the manner and means by which various indigenous and expatriate groups sought accommodation with, and confronted, one another. It will challenge the wisdom in both liberal and radical camps of Africanist scholarship -- defined as the study of Africa -- which emphasizes that colonialism was foreign rule. It will also challenge the consensus that some Africans were recruited as collaborators (in Nigeria initially during "indirect rule") because of the scarcity of resources -- human and financial -- at the disposal of colonial administrators.

There are three or four reasons why a study of this kind can contribute to the understanding of social change in Nigeria as well as shed some light on the study of colonialism generally. In the first place, a formulation on collaboration -- one broad enough to account for interactions at the national and trans-national levels, and specific enough to reckon with group and individual actions as is presently
proposed -- is overdue. Secondly, there is a dearth of literature which deals with collaboration as its central problematic, and which explicitly defines the scope of the concept and its antithesis, conflict. Furthermore, the undue emphasis on the "foreign rule" element of colonialism and the reduction of indigenes' participation as incidental to Europe's want of adequate resources not only obscures the class character of colonialism, but also necessarily renders Africa as a passive and pitiable recipient of foreign dynamic. This is still the case -- notwithstanding ready protestations to the contrary. Finally, such a re-evaluation of colonialism is relevant to the understanding of the contemporary African crisis: why the end of "colonialism" has failed to affect the people's condition. So ethereal were the changes which attended independence in Nigerian society and so involved were indigenous elements in colonial rule that a US based Nigerian historian, Felix Ekechi, who was investigating the Mboni British clash of early 20th century could not be given interviews in the 1970s. These sceptical indigenes of his own original society in the south-east suspected him to be a government agent. The fact that Professor Ekechi is not a government agent does not detract from the presence of those indigenes who refused to separate the post-colonial from the

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colonial structures of (trans-national) alliances. Their insight is more profound than what can be found in much academic material on the subject. Calls for the reappraisal of familiar but inefficacious orthodoxies have however been made.2

It is necessary to explain the choice of the temporal focus of this study -- 1900 to 1951. 1900 is generally recognized as the beginning of the colonial period in West Africa,1 and it was indeed in that year that Britain declared the entire area today known as Nigeria as colony and protectorate. The analysis stops in 1951 because it was in that year that the various interests involved -- trans-national, expatriate, and indigenous -- accepted the principle of decolonization, understood to mean, simply, the dissolution of the colonial state. Accordingly, the Macpherson Constitution of that year enshrined the principle of independence.

1.2 Argument

One must ... examine each society's own initiatives, at various times and in various ways, to establish a congruent relationship between its own social dynamic and the global context affecting it. Such initiatives stem from a complex dialectic


between "resistance" and "collaboration" that can be understood only through a detailed analysis of the class alliances and contradictions that mark their history.4

Five major arguments are offered in this study.

a) Far from being a function of the dearth of resources on the part of the colonial state, indigenous groups' participation in colonialism was essential because the expatriate elements could not dispense with them -- resources or not. Absence of collaborators in Nigeria, even where it was not a deterrent to British invasion, could not have permitted the invaders to stay, or even to claim spheres of influence against rival European powers. Suffix it to say that without the co-participation of Nigerians there would not have been what is referred to as "colonial rule." Indigenous and outsiders were both responsible for the phenomenon.

b) As a corollary to the above, colonialism is first and foremost class domination and is defined by the individuals or group's access, or exclusion from access, to the means of production and/or surplus whether they be Europeans or Africans. The question of it being foreign rule is therefore secondary, debatable and even misleading. The colonized at any given time was not the Nigerian indigene per se, but those people within Nigeria who lacked access to the means of production and/or surplus.

c) That certain individuals or groups lacked access to the means of production and/or surplus, to that extent would they be opposed to colonialism. The extent of commitment or opposition was determined by the chasm between ambition and what was realized.

d) Every individual or collectivity within a colonial situation therefore was both a potential collaborator and a potential non-collaborator -- the choice to be made rested on the perception of self-interest. Collaboration is thus not a moral question. Collaborators operated within the raison d'être of their employment; the expatriate existed because of the indigenous co-participant, and vice versa.

e) Colonial collaboration had a definite gender slant. The presence of male-dominated sections of the indigenous community whose co-participation was essential to the equally male-dominated expatriates resulted in an unprecedented level of gender marginalization and exploitation. In this sense, patriarchy was a rallying force for collaboration. Suffice it to say that colonialism was to some extent a mechanism for the reproduction of male privilege. Because of their intensified exclusion from access to the means of production and/or surplus, women were an especially restive section of the colonial population in Nigeria.

The above arguments can be summarized and anchored. There were individuals and groups from outside the area that later became Nigeria (mainly from Britain) who sought to
exploit the country economically but were confronted with the essential reality of the participation of certain indigenes in that regard. There were indigenous elements who saw in the expatriate presence an opportunity to consolidate and/or expand existing hegemonies, and those who saw this presence as their chance either to liberate themselves from these hegemonies or constitute new ones. There were groups indigenous and expatriates -- who were marginalized in the new dispensation and who used the means at their disposal to resist the system. At the center of these relations was the colonial state which was protected, controlled, defended or subverted -- depending on where one's perceived interests could best be served.

1.3 Conceptual Concerns, Perspective and Methodology

Methodology is as important as the subject matter itself. It is therefore pertinent to explain the methodology and perspective that guide this study. The danger of not so doing -- since every intellectual endeavour relates to some kind of philosophy -- lies in the fact that an analyst's philosophy remains implicit and unconscious. In this case s/he ultimately becomes a victim of "the worst philosophies" since these are uncriticized. The perspective adopted in this work is political economy taken to mean, broadly, the

\footnote{Temu & Swai, \textit{Historians and Africanist History}, p. 12.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
distribution of wealth and power. This perspective takes as its principal referents issues of social class formation, contradictions and reproduction.

The rationale for adopting this perspective derives from the recognized fact that the questions as to "who gets what, when, where, and how -- and who gets left out?" are basic to African politics. This is the more so because the surpluses so extracted do not really exist but are themselves the creation of the political economy. To give due weight to both economic necessity and the human agency is therefore the crux of historical analysis. This work is Marxist, in a general sense. Even then and notwithstanding that "to be a respectable Africanist [i.e.] a scholar whose interest ... is focused on Africa, one must be a Marxist," and the fact that Marxist theory is history's most essential tool, it is important to recognize that this "should not be a substitute

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5. Berman & Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, pp. 3-4.
for writing history."

Any colonial history, if it is to transcend "the horizon of the existing social order," should start from a theoretical position which refuses to accept the actions of the dominant colonial classes as their own evaluation, but should not induce an uncritical rejection of the achievements of the period since these, however inadequate, must provide the foundations for the next generation.¹

The primary sources for this work come mainly from the Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan (NAN) and the British Public Record Office (PRO). However, as important as these are, this research did not begin and end in these places. This is because of the imperfections of conventional historical evidence and the well recognized danger in relying exclusively on archival sources.² Moreover, some potentially relevant materials are either retained by the appropriate government department, promised to be released in 50 years, have been "destroyed by statute," or just could not be accounted for. These inadequacies preclude a thorough-going empirical approach in the presentation of this work. With that approach, hardly any general arguments can be sustained as there will likely be found some contradictory evidence

¹Ibid.


somewhere in the mass of imperial documents, apart from the obvious problem of misinterpretation. There is therefore a compelling need to prune down the multiplicity of variables in order to make the analysis more manageable. This need calls for the employment of theory. It has been pointed out that data analysis based on theory "can provide further explanations to existing historical interpretations." On the other hand, undue theorization leads to "epistemological paralysis [which] inhibits any engagement with empirical material." To anticipate any of these traps the approach adopted in this study is "critical theory." Its relevance is acknowledged. In order to avoid its alleged "dangerous ahistoricism," "theoretical insights [will be] woven into the texture of historical and political arguments." It may therefore better be referred to as "critical historical theory."

None of the existing theoretical frameworks lends itself to ready application in the context of the arguments already


16 Temu & Swai, Historians and Africanist History, p. 12.


18 Youngs, ibid.

put forward above. The formulation offered here is the "Collaborative Nexus" (henceforth "the CN" or "the nexus"). It is meant to account for the activities of the various sections of the colonial population, the colonial state and other states, and how these affected the colonial situation. It refers to a set of relationships in which sections of the indigenous and expatriate populations, capital and other [imperialist] states interacted with the colonial state in a situation of co-operation and conflict. Individuals and collectivities fell in and out of this relationship in which participation was both preconditioned and rewarded mainly by access to the means of production and/or surplus according to their own perception of their interests. Theoretically, the colonizer or the colonized at any given time was not the European or the African per se, but is determinable by access, or lack of access to the means of production and/or surplus. Racism and ethnicity are recognized as important factors of social relations in the colonial situation. Nevertheless, within the political economy they mainly serve the functional role of inclusion to and exclusion from the collaborative nexus. In Nigeria, independence came in 1960 when the interests of the colonial constituents -- whether inside or outside the nexus -- had

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My supervisor, Chris Youé as Graduate Co-ordinator, suggested this term to me for the title of my departmental seminar in the winter of 1992. He is not, however, to be held responsible for how I have subsequently defined and applied the term.
coalesced in the dissolution of the colonial state. The 1951 Macpherson Constitution crystallized this stage by enshrining the principle of independence.

The collaborative nexus (CN) is historical. Rather than fill evidence into a preconceived theory, the CN -- to borrow words from Cain and Hopkins on their concept of "gentlemanly capitalism" -- "took shape as a means of bringing coherence to a large body of evidence which would not fit into existing ways of approaching" colonial history.

As a concept, the CN is dynamic. Apart from its only constant constituent, the colonial state, the participation of other constituents of the nexus is not static. Yet the participation of [some of] these was necessary for the functioning of the system. As a phenomenon, it is heterogenous in character by the fact of its multiple constitution.

The concept is broad enough to account for the activities of other states whose policies and actions affected, and are affected by, the people within the colonial situation. At the same time, the CN is specific enough to reckon with the micro-level of a national (colonial) political economy. For example, the poor worker who "blacklegged" against a strike

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"22. Ibid.
for the improvement of his wages, and the occasional agitator who shunned all bribes from the state -- these are explained by perception or calculation of self-interest. To identify and analyze the specific conditions under which these interests were consummated in the Nigerian colonial conjuncture is the central task of this enterprise.

Finally, the CN does not set out to prove any point for Africa, or for Europe for that matter. Its elaboration and application in the Nigerian situation exposes the exploitative tendencies of colonialism. It does so in order to move from "the obsessively concentrated gaze from the palace, secretariat or the state house" and lay bare the conditions of production and reproduction of dominated sections. The CN is not ethnocentric because it recognizes the conditions under which Europeans were themselves colonized within Africa as the experience of German interests during the two world wars clearly illustrates. These interests which were otherwise active in the exploitation of other people were themselves exploited in the said periods.

It is pertinent to distinguish the CN from the patron-client model for which it might be mistaken. This model presents a hierarchical structure, a pyramid of individuals and networks of patrons and clients with the patron with greatest power placed at the apex, and "subordinate clients

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jostling for the favour of their patrons. On the other hand, the CN characterizes power relationships dialectically. Rather than seeing the exploited people as passive and helpless victims of their oppressors or "non-persons" who do not figure in the calculations of patrons (as the patron-client model would have it), it recognizes their dynamism. They were not only reckoned with throughout the colonial period, they also exacted concessions from the state. In other words, both those within the nexus and those outside of it (the exploited classes) were making input into state policies in a synthesis.

Furthermore, the patron-client model tends to see conflict only among clients in the same strata who are at one another's throat in their struggle to attract the patron's attention. The CN recognizes intra-strata struggle, but sees real conflict in the inter-strata one, i.e., the one between the oppressors and the oppressed.

Still, unlike in the patron-client formulation in which clients must identify with their patrons for the purposes of mere survival, the CN characterizes relations of opportunism aimed at extending the frontiers of accumulation.

Finally, the patron-client model reckons only with a structure of individuals (patrons and their clients) and says

"For the theoretical exposition of this model see Amsbury, "Patron-Client Structure,"; and for its application to the Nigerian colonial conjuncture, see Gavin Williams, State and Society in Nigeria (Idanre, Nigeria: Afrographika Publishers, 1980)."
little about the categories and institutions, for example, the state, etc., which these individuals represent and upon which the CN is anchored.

It has been found prudent to exercise caution in the use of terms, especially those which relate to social classes. Indeed, the search for class categories which are expected to act in given ways at all times has created problems in social analysis generally and African studies particularly. These problems derive mainly from an inclination of various tendencies to superimpose Eurocentric social categories on African contexts. Unless these terms are employed in their specific historical manifestations as has recently been proposed for the "peasantry," these terms are best not used. In this study the term "traditional elite" will be used to refer to the old ruling class of Nigeria, i.e., those who are sometimes referred to as "natural rulers." The adjective "traditional" has nothing to do with whether or not this class was dynamic, or was receptive to change. The term "modernizing elite" will be used to refer to that class of Nigerians which generally had Western education and which has

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variously been referred to as the "middle class," "bourgeoisie," "petty-bourgeoisie," "nationalists," "nationalist elite," etc. This term is preferred because this group's politics and economics have a "modernization" bias.

Every chapter in this work will reckon, in varying degrees, with the arguments already outlined in 1.2 (above). They will also analyze in some detail the strategies employed by various groups -- in and out of the nexus, African and European -- either to consolidate or to improve their placing in the political economy. An attempt will also be made throughout to explain the choice of these strategies. The chapters that follow have, as far as practicable, been arranged in chronological order.

Each takes up a theme which, in the opinion of this writer, was of particular significance to the period which it addresses. Each chapter is intended, as far as possible, to be self-contained. For this reason occasional repetitions may be accommodated. Chapter two is first and foremost a review of the literature on collaboration. Focusing on the 1900-39 period, it attempts by a comparative analysis of various colonial systems which operated in Africa to establish the centrality of the phenomenon of collaboration in a colonial situation. A comparative approach helps to cancel out the wisdom which holds that it was scarcity of resources -- finance and personnel -- which made expatriates to co-opt Africans in colonial rule. The historical reality shows
clearly that it was the poorer European countries like Portugal and Belgium which made determined but ultimately failed attempts at "direct" colonization as it was the richer ones like Britain and France which promoted forms of "indirect" rule.

Chapter three examines the relations of power between expatriate and indigenous factions of the colonial ruling class in Nigeria between 1900 and 1940 on the one hand. On the other hand, it examines these relations as they occurred between the ruling classes and the subordinate groups. By subjecting the state concept to critical analysis "indirect" rule which purportedly operated in Nigeria is shown to be the superstructural component of a distinct socio-economic formation, viz, the colonial mode of production. The point stressed in this chapter is that indirect rule took shape from the interaction of social forces -- expatriate and indigenous, within and outside of the ruling classes -- and not as defined by the expatriates. Attention is also drawn to the accumulative base of the traditional elite as well as the struggles of the oppressed classes.

The Colonial Development and Welfare CD&W programme during 1940-45 is the subject of chapter four. This chapter contends that no significant reforms were carried out or even intended by this programme. Rather, the programme was intended on the one hand as an integral part of Britain's Second World War plans and, on the other a device with which
to win the long-standing power struggle against the traditional elite. As a war-time strategic element its aim was both secure the support of colonial peoples through the welfare propaganda and to gain a firmer control of indigenous resources through pretexts to reform. These pretexts were virtually abandoned as from 1943 because of Britain’s unwillingness to grant the kind of concessions which indigenous social forces were demanding in earnest. Expatriates could afford to do this because Britain’s strategic position had since improved with the entry of the USSR and the USA into the war. Governor Arthur Richards was carefully selected to consummate this policy. As a device for overcoming the traditional elite this programme was successful. This was because the latter’s class commitment to Britain’s success in the war compelled them to defer to the expatriates in what they misleadingly understood to be a temporary power concession. However, their enthusiastic and ruthless drive for the exactions which the expatriates demanded led to a loss of the traditional elite’s prestige and authority. This result in turn undermined the expatriates’ power which was built on collaboration with the chiefs. This chapter also pays considerable attention to real human sufferings and struggles during this period when a welfare programme was supposed to be in place.

Chapter five focuses on the crises which characterized the post-war period. These crises crystallized in the
widespread rejection of the expatriate state and further assaults on the traditional elite. This period, 1945-50 was one of reaction and yet one of change. It opened with a rigid, coercive and intransigent posture of a desperate expatriate state and ended with the introduction of reforms towards its eventual resolution. This was a period when the modernizing elite gained center stage. In chapter six it is argued that the modernizing elite and the common people who thy led in the struggle against the expatriate had divergent conceptions of the post-colonial order. Chapter seven is the last and concluding chapter. It attempts to examine systematically the expatriate state's response to crises in the post-war period especially between 1949 and 1951. This chapter concludes that decolonization -- conceptualized simply as the dissolution of the colonial state -- cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of the cut-and-dry schema of either collaboration or non-collaboration.

Collaboration -- defined as "an active policy of cooperation and compromise," is widely recognized as a key aspect of colonialism. In fact, most writers on colonialism have had something to say about collaboration, though there are important exceptions. Collaboration was so important during colonialism that to some writers decolonization became inevitable when Europeans in Africa failed to find indigenous collaborators, and to others it was considered crucial for


decolonization. Nevertheless, relatively few have made it their central theme. These, however, fall outside the frame of the present work dealing as they do either with European intrusion or decolonization. Collaboration during colonialism, what Crawford Young calls the period of institutionalization, therefore remains largely unproblematicized. For our purpose this chapter will review the material basis of colonial wars, challenge the resource scarcity notion of collaboration, and question the ideas of direct and indirect rule.

2.1 The Robinson Theory Considered

Ronald Robinson’s theory on collaboration deserves some consideration for being, perhaps, the only general theory on Foundations,” p. 138.


According to Robinson, the working of imperialism at every stage was determined by the collaborative nexus between the evolving European power and the respective Afro-Asian groups. The transition from one phase of imperialism to another was a function of the need of either to reinforce a crumbling collaborative system or to forge a new one. Colonial imperialism, for instance arose out of a need for a more direct intervention on the part of the imperial power in order to forge a collaborative system more favourable to its interests. Consequently, the indigenous collaborators determined the organization and character of colonial rule because, in any case, their interests had to be taken into account.  

Robinson was motivated by a need to challenge what he called the "old" theories -- liberal and radical alike -- to non-dialectically characterize power relationships in a manner which suggests that sections of the indigenous populations were picked as collaborators at the leisure of the colonial state. In his classic assertion: "Domination is only practicable in so far as alien power is translated into terms of indigenous political economy." Beneath ideologies,

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10Ibid.

11Robinson, ibid, p. 119.
political rituals, and what Robinson himself teasingly referred to as "serried panoplies,"
when the inner workings of this translation process is unravelled the resulting domination will exhibit more of a class than alien character. Nevertheless he stresses the centrality of collaboration in a manner that is worth reproducing in some detail:

Without the voluntary or enforced co-operation of [the] governing elites [of the non-European world], economic resources would not be transferred, strategic interests protected or xenophobic reaction and traditional resistance to change contained. Nor without indigenous collaboration, when the time came for it, could Europeans have conquered and ruled their non-Europeans empires. From the outset that rule was continuously resisted; just as continuously native mediation was needed to avert resistance or hold it down. ... China and Japan ... provided no such collaborators as India and so, significantly, could not be brought under the yoke.  

Robinson captures an essential fact by observing that the constitution of alliances between indigenous sections and expatriates marked the phases of these transnational relationships. In other words, the nature of indigenous collaborators defined the charter of colonialism at any given time. Nevertheless, by referring ultimately to the expatriates' choice of indigenous collaborators whom he characterizes as "involuntary partners" of European

12Ibid., p. 120.
13Ibid.
imperialism -- Robinson, like Kilson and many others, conceptualizes collaboration as a function of European dynamic. Moreover, Robinson, like Crawford Young, focuses only on transnational dimensions of collaboration -- a relation between Europeans and Africans. These writers do not recognize its class character, i.e., as a gang-up between some Europeans and some Africans for the domination and exploitation of the rest of the population of the "colonial situation."

Also, like Kilson Robinson claims that the British depended heavily on mediation as opposed to the French who often resorted to coercion -- a characteristic of a continental country with a large conscript army. There is no doubt that the French (and other European invaders for that

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16See Kilson, "African Political Change."

matter) employed a lot of brutality. Nevertheless, memories of British invasion (often attended by heavy bombardment, arson and looting) are still remembered in those African communities that came in contact with the former. In short, colonial wars were marked by atrocities not employed in "civilized" wars.

2.2 Prelude to Gang-up: The Colonial Wars

More ought to be known about the part which Africans themselves played both in assisting and opposing foreign

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invaders. After all, colonial wars were people's wars. Indigenous African elites, nevertheless, saw the foreign invasions from the lenses of their own specific interests. Therefore, associating their resistance with nationalism is tantamount to ascribing to them "a motive and sense of purpose they would have had difficulty recognizing." Even those who resisted European invasions employed collaborationist strategies as well. It is in any case extremely doubtful as one British expatriate officer Tilby is quoted to have said with respect to the rulers of the Niger delta that "most of them [the rulers] would have sold the kingdoms and their subjects for a few bottles of bad gin, and would have thrown in their own souls to clinch the bargain."

This view can be debunked without appearing to sympathize with these rulers. Contrary to the bad gin fable, these rulers were shrewd bargainers who were after well articulated, strategic but selfish interests. To appreciate this point, it


24 Hopkins, ibid, p. 135.


is important to note first of all that many a colonial conflict was brought about by conflicting trading policies between indigenous rulers and Europeans. The Niger delta city-states in which trade furnished the material basis of political power provide us with instances of how trading relations and conditions affected and were affected by political conflict as well as generating collaboration and conflict between and among rival local politicians on the one hand, and between these and Europeans on the other. Hopkins writes that trade depressions heightened these internal and external pressures, as these politician-traders, always with a nose for where their interests could best be served, scrambled for shares in the trade with expatriates. Expatriates, on their part cashed in on such situations to offer low prices for African produce and to charge more for manufactures.  

Tilby's statement is a simplistic reading of a complex situation in which the dramatis personae themselves were making tactical concessions with an aim of achieving long-term, strategic advantages. When it suited it, the ruling class of Afikpo in southeastern Nigeria had no qualms in repudiating a treaty it had previously entered into with the British even though it had received a bribe "amount of £250 in 1898 and again in 1899" from the Royal Niger Company which had

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27 For these disputes see for instance Hopkins, An Economic History, pp. 147-8.
offered the "gifts" in order to secure Afikpo's support against the Aro.\textsuperscript{28} The Portuguese propped up Chinsinge of Makenga but lost control of him as he became militarily anti-Portuguese, a result of internal pressure.\textsuperscript{29} The Baule rulers in Equatorial Africa entered into alliance with the French in order to circumvent their trading rivals, the Dyula. These rulers, however, reneged on agreements with expatriates whenever local traders grew disenchanted with any particular arrangement.\textsuperscript{30} For Nana of Itsekiri (in the Niger delta) whose father and himself had made their fortune from middleman operations to undermine this base by giving up the slave trade -- which contradicted expatriate interests -- was to defeat his essence. He preferred war with the British.\textsuperscript{31} The public execution of elements of the Aro ruling class at the conclusion of the Aro expedition of 1901-02 which was meant to intimidate other Igbo ruling classes was of no effect.\textsuperscript{32} Neither spectacular executions nor bad gin for that matter had proved capable of turning African ruling classes away from their agenda.


\textsuperscript{29} A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, p. 189.


\textsuperscript{32} Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 111.
The Isaacmans have identified the conditions under which sections of the indigenous population could collaborate -- all hinged on cold calculation of self interest.

In addition to a desperate desire to avoid European conquest of the homeland, the principal incentives to collaborate were: (1) to protect one's primordial group against encroachments by an historical enemy; (2) to enable a segment of the political elite to regain or reinforce its privileged political position; or (3) to increase one's economic status with the new colonial order.\footnote{A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, \textit{The Tradition}, p. 149.}

This last micro-political consideration is extended (albeit unwittingly) by Sir Michael Howard. According to him, some indigenes fought for expatriate military forces because service with the armies of the white man gave unquestioned status and security. It gave, at its lowest, "a licence to loot." It provided pay, which ultimately enabled the native soldier to establish himself as an independent trader. It provided food for him and his family -- military service could indeed be ... a form of famine relief.\footnote{M. Howard, "Colonial Wars and European Wars," in de Moor & Wesseling (eds.), \textit{Imperialism and War}, p. 222.}

For Sir Michael, however, this tendency was but one of the manifestations of the socially disruptive consequences of European wars on indigenous "victims" -- i.e., taking these collaborators as victims. He does not in this comparison between European and colonial wars even reckon with this tendency in the wider context of collaboration. Consequently, he does not reckon with it as an element in these wars European or colonial -- neither does he seem to recognize its
obviously class forming character.

Attractive salaries for indigenous soldiers was a necessary concession on the part of the expatriates. In fact, there was a deliberate policy to pay these mercenaries well in order to retain their services, avoid mutiny, and to attract young and ambitious indigenes to the ranks of expatriate forces. Major Heneker who commanded the British Afikpo-Abakaliki expedition of 1902 is quoted to have reported that it was essential to pay these mercenaries handsomely in the expectation that they would, "form a nucleus in each tribe of men experienced in the white men's ways, and having been well treated, their influence in our favour, and tends greatly to establish confidence in us."¹³ Many fringe groups who readily offered mercenary services¹⁶ (considered as the most important reason for the collapse of indigenous resistance¹⁷) -- be they runaway slaves in West Africa or the achikunda in the Zambezi -- had genuine grievances against the indigenous political economies. (The restiveness of the marginalized but ambitious sections of the indigenous populations had expressed itself in different forms prior to the colonial wars. In the Niger delta for instance, this had taken the form of a direct


challenge against "constituted" authorities."

Collaboration is therefore a necessary consequence of a certain system of social relations. This at once emphasizes the dynamic character of the individual and the primacy of objective conditions. Africans and Europeans in collaboration used each other to attain certain goals (the expatriate existed because of the indigenous collaborator and vice versa), aware of what to expect with regard to gains and concessions. For example, even though poor Barotseland itself was not good enough for economic exploitation, forging a collaborative system there could and did enable the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to reach other target areas. While this alliance provided the company with much desired political stability in the area, it enabled King Lewanika to retain his suzerainty which had been threatened by both internal and external interests. He thus accumulated "political resources."

The above incident was not exceptional. In short, alliance with Europeans served the purpose of buttressing precarious indigenous regimes in many places which then

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continued to enjoy and extend their privileges. Furthermore, ruling classes with expansionist ambitions seized the opportunity of European presence to effect their desires. The resistance of the Meli of Moshi was eventually broken when the ambitious Merealle of Marungu, intent on dominating the Kilimanjaro area, joined forces with the invading Germans. After the rout of Moshi, Merealle became the paramount chief in the whole area.

In some other places still, ambitious individuals at the corridors of power saw European presence as an opportunity to rise to the helm. Indeed, what is usually referred to as political disputes within the traditional oligarchies were

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intra-class struggles defined in economic terms. Those who successfully utilized the opportunity of expatriate presence in entrenching themselves eventually controlled state apparatuses like the courts, and the distribution of amenities with which they sought to silence their rivals.

The neglect of the material basis of collaboration is also manifest in the military outcomes of colonial wars. Centralized African polities fell more easily than accephalous ones, for example, the Herero, the Igbo and the Nandi. The relative efficacy of guerilla tactics which the latter groups were disposed to employ, and the fact of the absence of a central authority competent to make war or negotiate peace on behalf of the whole people, have been advanced to explain

46A.E. Afigbo, "Patterns of Igbo Resistance to British Conquest," Tarikh, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1973). Another scholar has observed Igbo wars differently; that the whole Igbo rallied to the Aro whose invasion they saw as an assault against the Igbo "nation." See Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 105. While Afigbo’s statement is far from complete, Nwabara’s must be seen as an exaggeration. Far from rallying in defence of "the Igbo nation," the opportunistic Igbo ruling classes supported the Aro or the British according to their perception of their interests. The reference to the defence of an Igbo nation is typical of the 1960s historiography which was under pressure not only to romanticize the heroism of pre-colonial African peoples, but also to produce indigenous nationalism. Nwabara’s assertion comes from British Public Records; and his conclusion might have reflected a failure to read in-between the lines of despatches written by self-justifying military officers who could exaggerate their field achievements, or who might have reasons to make excuses for their field setbacks.
this trend. The most important reason however is the fact that
the centralized polities, relative to non-centralized ones,
operated more severe exploitative systems as a result of
which three problems could arise for them when threatened by
external aggression. (1) The oppressed people within these
societies would see the threat as an opportunity to get rid of
the parasitic class (doing otherwise by supporting the ruling
class did not, however, promise to eliminate oppression);
(2) the ruling classes of weaker neighbouring polities could
ally with the invading forces as a way of freeing themselves
from vassalage (when they were not enamoured by the
invaders they would prefer staying neutral to laying down
their lives in defence of the overlord); and (3) the
hierarchial structure of centralized societies and enormous
opportunities for accumulation attainable at the helm of power
often gave rise to power struggles in the course of which the
involving factions could employ the foreign invaders to good
use. It is important to observe that ruling classes of weaker
neighbours did not as a rule support the invader. In fact,

48 A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition.
49 A good example were the Obegu and other Igbo communities
who allied with the British against the Aro. See Nwabara,
50 The Sena in the Zambezi Valley during the Barue-
Portuguese confrontation of 1902 provides an interesting case.
See A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, pp. 66 and
189.
they tended to support him only when his chances of victory looked good. 51

Foreign threats could be a unifying factor when there was evidence that all the groups within a society stood to lose in the event of the invader's victory. For instance, Italy's defeat in Adowa in 1896 has been attributed primarily to the closing of ranks among Ethiopian military factions on the one hand, and between them and the peasantry on the other. Both groups had seen a sample of the Italian style in Eritrea. The peasants particularly were aware that even though they paid tributes to the ras, the latter never confiscated their land as was the case in Italy's settler colonization in Eritrea. 52

Even though the superiority of expatriate maxim guns is pretty obvious it was African mercenaries who translated this superiority into a fact. In other words, it is not clear how many indigenous societies the European adventurers would have attacked without the encouraging presence of collaborators or potential collaborators. Maxim guns are effective in achieving military victories, but to rule an entire people, without the support of sections of that population who benefit from such rule, is an entirely different matter. As Lonsdale observes:

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51For example when in 1902 the British and Afrikpo forces had reached what looked like a stalemate, the neighbouring Uwana who had collaborated with the British became nervous. See Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 114.

"if conquest shapes societies, even conquered peoples can force changes in the forms which states take, so leading, to some extent, their captor’s captive." After conquest the Europeans had no real choice but to team up with some indigenes. Crude force was often out of the question for it was obvious that it was not only expensive but also counterproductive. The ruling classes on both sides realized that collaborative power is much more superior to non-collaborative power.

2.3 Scarcity of Resources and Collaboration

There can be no doubt that expatriates heavily depended on indigenous collaborators as the latter depended on them. Expatriate administrators could neglect them only at their own peril. One senior French colonial officer (France is purported to have governed "directly") wrote from retirement that

The Commandant of the circle is not truly a commander except insofar as he can understand the chiefs and get a hearing from them. If his authority is to be effective he has to work through the chiefs, in daily contact with them. ... I had at least once lost my authority."

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"Lonsdale, "The Conquest State of Kenya," p. 120.


It is therefore a surprise that it should be so widespread in colonial literature that indigenes were co-opted because expatriates did not have human and financial resources from Europe sufficient to govern directly. It is said that, the British devised "indirect rule" as a way of coping with this constraint. This implies that they could have ruled without indigenous collaborators had they had adequate numbers of personnel and funding. Going by this view, collaboration therefore resulted from expatriates' recruitment drive. Such a view fails to capture the essential dynamic of the African participants and the essential nature of the compromise that collaboration entailed.

In the entire literature covered for this work only Ikime sees the resource scarcity notion as merely "another reason" for the co-option of the traditional elites. However, in his scheme the chief reason was the expatriates' realization of the crucial role which Islam played in the life of northern Nigerians about whose experience he wrote. Ikime totally overlooks the material basis of collaboration. Hence the impression that the ruling classes in northern Nigeria collaborated merely because their religion was safeguarded. Furthermore, even though this explanation tells us something about northern Nigerian society, it tells us little about collaboration generally and indirect rule in particular.

because it cannot explain the necessity of these phenomena in non-Islamic areas. Ikime's formulation presents collaboration as an appendage of alien rule rather than as an integral part of colonialism which, as this paper contends, is not foreign rule per se.

The logical outcome of the resource scarcity theory would have been a situation where wealthier European powers would have attempted to govern "directly" and the less wealthy ones "indirectly." Historical evidence, however, correlates negatively within this logical extension. The involvement of Portugal, a poor European country, provides us with an excellent example. The Portuguese attempted "direct colonization" not because they had more resources than the British who were purported to have practised "indirect rule." The Portuguese were hard pressed to concede impressive largesse to indigenous collaborators since they needed to rake more from Africa. The Isaacmans report that, unable to mobilize sufficient numbers of bureaucrats from Portugal, the Portuguese Crown opted to woo Portuguese expatriates in Southern Africa with offers of land appropriated from indigenes, cash bonuses and titles of nobility in order to enlist their services in this attempt at "direct colonization." The prazo system which resulted was to all

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58 For Portugal's centuries-old economic problems see, for example, W. Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), pp. 13-36.

intents and purposes feudalistic. Minter, on his part, writes that Portuguese expatriates even made pretences to African thrones.\footnote{Minter, Portuguese Africa, p. 19.} The aim was a blanket exclusion of Africans from the collaborative nexus.

This objective was far from attained. Groups of indigenous collaborators -- the achuanga, achikunda, mukazambo, samacoa, etc. -- still emerged. Even though these cadres are said to have been, like indigenous collaborators in the Congo, of subaltern status,\footnote{A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, pp. 82-3. For the Congo where Belgians were involved see Crawford Young, "Background to Independence," Transition, Vol. 5, No. 25, 1966, pp. 34-40.} the indispensability of collaboration prevailed as it also did in those places where Spain\footnote{See J.D. Harboron, "Spain in Africa," Current History, Vol. 26, No. 152 (1954), pp. 218-9.} and Italy\footnote{H.R. Rudin, "Italy in North Africa," Ibid., p. 222; M.H. McCartney, "Young Italy -- Old Africa," pp. 802-10.} (non-wealthy European countries) were involved. Furthermore, the fact that in its centuries-old involvement Portugal suffered some of the worst military defeats among European powers in Africa is attributable mainly to the unpopularity of its methods even among potential collaborators. This was also responsible for the popularity of armed struggle in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Portugal failed to witness a situation of "law and order" --
considered essential for colonial exploitation -- because its expatriates elicited indignation from potential collaborators. And so, despite the different methods of exaction and oppression, Portugal does not feature in the league of European countries which are said to have made wealth from Africa.

The Portuguese, in pursuit of their scheme of exclusion, embarked on a peculiar method of evangelization which was geared towards the "stealing" of the souls of African traditional elites via pious Christian ideologies. This met with remarkable failure and latter proselytizers would realize that Christianity took no roots in those areas. The relevance of this evangelization tendency to this discussion consists in the inseparability of Portugal's missionary activity and its commerce, and the control of both by the state. According to Ryder, Portugal's missionary activity "was intensely nationalistic in character -- directed and manned


"Early in the 17th century an Itsekiri prince and Portuguese trained theologian unsuccessfully attempted to promote Christianity among his subjects in the delta area of today's Nigeria. Similarly in the late 19th century "the decision of Agonglo, King of Dahomey ... to embrace Christianity climaxed his unpopularity: a woman in his palace assassinated him." See E.A. Ayandele, "Traditional Rulers and Missionaries in Pre-Colonial West Africa," Tarikh, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1969), pp. 23-4. Portuguese attempts to control the royal succession process in Barue in today's Mozambique through Christian rituals were also a failure. See A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition, p. 3.
almost exclusively by the Portuguese, and linked closely to the political and economic interests of that nation. It failed mainly because of obvious disjunctures that existed between the gospel and the objectives of the Portuguese state which involved various frauds and slave trading. There were also attempts at miscegenation and directed Portuguese settlement in rural areas. A system of penal colonization was instituted whereby Portuguese convicts were sent to Africa in lieu of imprisonment.67

On its part, Belgium, no richer than Britain, mustered the largest expatriate bureaucracy in the Congo (numbering 10,000),68 whereas in c. 1929 "British Africa," 50 times the size of England had a "white population no greater than Cambridge."69 British expatriate administrators in Africa numbered a paltry 1,390 in 1947 and 1,782 ten years after. They numbered 1,794 and 2,362 in the whole British Empire during the corresponding periods.70 Scarce resources in


France and lower level of development, relative to Britain, were constraints on the implementation of the assimilationist policy "-- French terminology for collaboration.

2.4 "Direct" or "Indirect" Rule?

Beyond scarcity of resources other reasons are sometimes advanced for the "indirect rule" version of collaboration as complementary, if not subsidiary to the former. The question that indirect rule resulted in societies which had merely been "pacified" thereby maintaining intact indigenous instruments of political authority (mostly in territories of British involvement), and direct rule resulted in those which had been crushed (mostly the French were involved) does not address why the British chose to pacify and the French to crush. Besides, the impression that comes out is that where pacification took place indirect rule was not only inevitable but desirable, and vice versa for those who were crushed.

Apart from relating to the "superposition of one political structure over another," the concept of indirect

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7Yansané, "Decolonization, Dependency," p. 6. Yansané however subscribes to the wisdom that collaboration was necessitated by scarcity of expatriate resources.


7Rubin & Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics, p. 42.
rule is a downright negation of terms. No wonder that it has been observed that in concrete experience the distinction of "indirect rule" vis à vis "direct rule" withers into nothingness. In the final analysis it was the character of the personalities -- indigenous and expatriates which decided who controlled affairs in a particular area. Furthermore, both Britain and France, it is said, employed both "direct" and "indirect" rule as occasion demanded. Suret-Canale points out that the traditional elites were at the center of the feudal system upon which colonialism was 


based in areas of French involvement in Equatorial and West Africa. This class continued to be very influential up to the end of the colonial era to the extent that it was instrumental to the acceptance of French "association" in these areas in 1958 except in Guinea where Sekou Toure's loi cadre government had legislated it out of existence the previous year." It is not only possible to demonstrate the "indirect" nature of "direct" rule as Suret-Canale has done, but also to argue for the "direct" nature of "indirect" rule as Tibenderana has done for northern Nigeria" said to be indirect rule's "original home," it's "ideal laboratory.""!

Governor Delavignette of France observed poignantly that Africa was "creating a regime proper to itself ... political theory did not enter into it at all."" Subscribing to the

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"Jean Suret-Canale, "The End of Chieftaincy in Guinea," in Klein & Johnson, ibid., pp. 370-401. However Suret-Canale draws attention to the fact that the traditional institutions in Guinea had long entered a process of decay and popularly rejected to the extent that even Toure and his Parti Democratique de Guine had to do what they did, and could not rejuvenate it even if they had wanted.


artificial dichotomy between "direct" and "indirect" rule arises from explanations which derive from analyses of the superstructure, precisely from the vantage point of political ritual and bureaucratic practice, without any attempt to relate these to the mechanisms of exaction and sharing of surpluses which constituted the raison d'être of colonialism. Whether the system was designated direct or indirect rule, in African territories, the functional role of indigenous collaborators within the political economy, their manner of accumulation and means of reproduction -- be they archetypes, emirs, akídej or chiefs -- were similar. It is necessary to sketch these mechanisms as a demonstration of the joint venture nature of colonialism and a background for anti-colonial resistance.

That the indigenous rulers enjoyed more power during the colonial period than they had done in the pre-colonial is widely acknowledged in the historiography. Not only this, they actually gained wider territorial areas of jurisdiction as did the Alafin of Óṣu, Awujale of Íjebu Óde, Alájé of Ìbòòkòtò and Óṣemọwẹ of Òndo. Their economic base was mainly derived from fines, tributes, and taxes (much of which they routinely kept). They jealously guarded their "right" to tax and dispose of tax monies throughout the colonial period and they


organized the recruitment of forced labour for carrying out different public projects and for the service of their expatriate partners. This was the case in all colonial systems. For instance, in Nyamwezi the role of the paramount chiefs of the "indirect rule" era was to all intents and purposes identical with that of the akidas (of the German time) before them even though the former was touted to represent traditional institutions. In Mozambique, the chiefs, mambo and nfumu annually received bribes of specified amounts of cloth in order to support the Portuguese prazeros and indigenous ahuanga in forcibly buying up surplus produce from farmers (inhumucamza) at rock bottom prices. The chiefs who resented this practice did so because they had the biggest farms and would thus lose most. In Buganda in the late years of the 19th and early years of the 20th centuries, the chiefs took the advantage of expatriate presence to seize control of all land and set themselves up as capitalist farmers.

Colonial collaboration entailed a pool of power resources for the attainment of the self interest of the collaborating

p. 124.


parties. While it called for concessions/compromise, rewards were many and far-reaching. The people who lost out were those who were outside the nexus at any given time. These were those who had cause to protest and did protest against the colonial order. Even those within the nexus would employ different methods, including conflict, in order to advance their interests.
CHAPTER 3:

THE STATE AND "INDIRECT RULE" IN NIGERIA, 1900-1940:
CRISIS OF ADMINISTRATION OR
ADMINISTRATION OF SURPLUSES?

The year 1900 witnessed the first direct administrative involvement of the British government in Nigeria beyond Lagos which had become a crown colony 29 years earlier. In that year Britain succeeded the corporatist-bureaucratic quasi state(s) of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) and claimed henceforth to have jurisdiction over the whole area today known as Nigeria.¹ This chapter's analysis stops at 1940 for two principal reasons. First, the Second World War had consequences for Nigerian society which deserve separate consideration in subsequent chapters. Second, it was in 1940 that the colonial state signalled a new approach to the political economy through the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) scheme. (This matter will be addressed in the next chapter.) Before this time development and welfare schemes were virtually non-existent.²


²Although the Colonial Development Act of 1929 had established a development fund, but towards the solution of British unemployment problem during the depression years Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald admitted as much on the occasion of the second reading of the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill in 1940. Hansard, Vol. 361/HC DEB/5s/21 May 1940/Col. 45.
implication of this approach for Nigeria has not received focused and detailed treatment -- a deficiency which this chapter does not however pretend to ameliorate -- but can be gleaned from parts of existing work.¹

The birth of one single Nigerian state with a strong British expatriate administrative content, set in motion significant transformations in the Nigerian society. The socio-economic system that resulted was, however, neither wholly European/capitalist nor African/non-capitalist, but a synthesis of the two systems. This development left in its throes a capitalism perceived to be not capitalistic enough,

not bourgeois enough, peasantries not peasant enough and a proletariat not proletarian enough. Indeed, "the new imperialism did not operate in a vacuum but within the packed arena of ongoing African society." Far from being an indication of "the very success of [colonialism's] hegemonic project," "this synthesis has been ably demonstrated to be a reflection of severe constraints which capital could not overcome in Africa."

The political system which resulted from this contact -- where Africans and Europeans ran the state -- has gone down in history as "indirect rule" or "native administration." Rather than see this system also as a result of severe constraints which expatriate administrators could not overcome, African studies have narrowly explained it in terms of the need of these administrators to co-opt some Africans because they lacked sufficient numbers of personnel and funding from Europe. This view has been shown to be false in the previous chapter. However, writers on Nigerian political history, while generally subscribing to the resource scarcity wisdom,

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tend to characterize native administration merely as a crisis of administration. Because African studies leave the political level so "vacant and unarticulated to the economic level," the two historical processes of syncretic capitalism and syncretic political system (an intermesh of British administrative values and those of respective Nigerian communities) has remained largely uncaptured.

This chapter will demonstrate that the "indirect" rule notion reflected and indigene/expatriate synthesis occurring at the level of the superstructure. This process occurred with and related to the capitalist/non-capitalist synthesis at the substructure. The distorted economy and indirect rule were respectively the material conditions and social production relations which together constituted what is better referred to as the colonial mode of production.\(^7\)

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\(^9\)In using this time Bade Onimode reduces indigenous collaborators as mere "agents" of the expatriates and so does not find it necessary to explore their own accumulative activities. This is where our ideas about the concept diverge. See Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment, pp. 36-37.
In arguing this matter this chapter will also further the contention that colonialism in Nigeria was a joint venture between British expatriates and certain elements of the indigenous society, at this period prominently the traditional rulers. An examination of the extent of the latter's power and accumulative base -- in short their functional role in the political economy -- currently shrouded in ambiguity -- would reveal them neither as auxiliaries nor unwilling partners of the expatriates in the domination of the subject classes. Also to be addressed is the widespread allegation in colonial literature that the common people's resistance against this oppression was directionless until after the Second World War when the modernizing elite purportedly translated the former's grievances into concrete action. Also to be addressed is the allegation that the modernizing elite were in this period ciphers and "copy cats" of British culture who were suddenly woken up from their stupor by certain extraneous and local forces which attended the war. In the course of addressing these matters it is appropriate to begin by understanding the nature of the state -- the colonial state in particular.

3.1 Critique of the State: State Theory and the Colonial State

A combination of considerations warrant a critical discussion on the state. In the first place, the state is central to the CN. As a concept, it is central to social analysis generally. And, as a historical phenomenon, it
played a central role in colonial Nigeria. As will be shown below, this standpoint is not necessarily one and the same with the state-centric position of the central state. Furthermore, given that Africa is considered very relevant to contemporary conceptualizations of state -- conceptualizations which, nevertheless, are biased in favour of pre- and post-colonial states\(^\text{10}\) -- it is extremely compelling to apply these discussions to the reality of the African colonial state. Finally, even though the standard periodization of African history in terms of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods is not a theoretical necessity,\(^\text{11}\) it was nevertheless the time between the institution of a variant of the state and its dissolution that delimits the so-called colonial period as the imposition of another marks off the "post-colonial" period. A brief discourse on state theory is thus necessary to understanding the capabilities and limitations of the Nigerian colonial state.

There is no doubt that conceptualizing the state has stretched the capacities of social science.\(^\text{12}\) To some scholars the state concept is so unintelligible that it is:


\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 137.

best declared a non-concept. To others, however, it is "a concept too many" which needs to be disaggregated. Apart from pure agnostics who, confronted by state's complexity, end up saying actually nothing about its nature, composition, character and role, opinion is polarized between the state-centric tendency to characterize an omnipresent and omnipotent state, and the society-centered one which de-emphasizes state power and posits that society controls the state.


Both of the above views have been justifiably criticized. In their quintessence, both are inaccurate for Africa and they impede any "clear and consistent generalization about state power." Since the state is only partially autonomous from society, a dynamic interpretation in which private and societal interests, on the one hand, and the state on the other, affect each other in a dialectic has been called for. Even avowed neo-statists acknowledge that any useful definition of state must be based on human beings with breath and blood who run the state rather than on "institutional arrangements." State's action thus refers in the final analysis to human action, its interests are human interests. And if "individuals are [themselves] the vehicles


18Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power in Africa," p. 27.

19Ibid.


of power [and] not its point of articulation,"22 i.e., every individual has power resources, then state power is also human power. In short, the state results from a pool of (human) power resources around a bureaucracy which pretends to oversee the society as a whole as well as claims to have exclusive jurisdiction over the territory corresponding to that society. Its primary function, according to Skocpol, consists in the extraction of resources from society and their deployment to creating and supporting coercive organizations.23 Give and take a few Idi Amins of this world, it does not resort to subtle ways and compromise merely out of choice, or as a matter of course, but mainly because the application of force is fraught with severe limitations. Power does not derive from physical force alone.24 When it apparently serves the interests of the subordinate classes, state action is, according to Berman and Lonsdale, geared towards the renovation of the "structures of domination and accumulation."25 In sum, even though the state is "an active


23 Theda Skocpol cited by Almond, "Return of the State," p. 869.


agent of the political process" -- indeed "a key historical actor" -- below its tough postures is a soft underbelly. It can be disobeyed" and outwitted.

Consistent with the above assumptions, two considerations will be paramount in establishing the specific character of the colonial state. First, given that power is predicated only partly on force, there is a need to sort out precisely what those pillars of power were in colonial Nigeria. (To do this one must go beyond "the visible instruments of colonial authority." Second, given the constraints on state power, the limitations of the colonial state -- widely characterized as an inferior state -- a compromise state must be palpable.


30P. Skalnik (ed.), Outwitting the State (New Brunswick [USA]: Transaction, 1989).


Could an exclusively expatriate manned colonial state embark on the modification of the indigenous mode of production which Karl Marx has presented as one of the "possibilities" open to a foreign conqueror?

The conquering nation subjects the conquered nation to its own mode of production... or it allows the old mode to remain and is content with tribute... or interaction takes place, a synthesis."

In Africa, it was the last possibility which prevailed in all cases. This resulted not because it was the preferred option of Europeans, but because they were unable to do otherwise. Synthesis resulted from the inability of the colonial state to overcome special constraints."

It follows therefore from the foregoing that the colonial state was not thoroughly subservient to expatriate capital because it just could not be. This is because, on the one


"Iliffe, ibid.


hand, it must cater for the demands of indigenous collaborators who joined with expatriate administrators to actually constitute it, and whose interests were not identical with those of capital. On the other hand, it did all that it could to help capital. (The whims of colonial servicemen, however limited, plus the opinions of the metropolitan public, however remote, also had an ontology of their own.) It certainly did enough for capital to play the over pampered child. In May 1937, for instance, the United Africa Company (UAC) wrote the Colonial Secretary, Ormsby-Gore to complain of “unmerited disadvantage from which British Colonial produce suffers in the French markets.” Both the Colonial Office (CO) and the Nigerian Government were agreed that they lacked the means to act upon this complaint. Fundamentally, the state had to reckon with pressures from the dominated masses; whose sustained large-scale, violent and direct confrontation would be provoked by untempered exploitation, and whose interests were virtually antithetical to those of expatriate capital. Hopkins has observed that colonial economic policy favoured commercial (as opposed to industrial) capital - a bias which reflected the class background of colonial

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\(^7\)Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan (henceforth NA1)/CS1/33/224: Secretary of State to Governor of Nigeria, 31 May 1937.

\(^8\)Ibid.
officers." It also reflected the necessity to avoid the social consequence of industrialization. "Change was both essential and dangerous." Industrialization would erode the basis of traditional allegiance which sustained chiefly power upon which colonialism at this time depended.

Even then the state could not pursue the preferred promotion of commercial activities unfettered. In 1908 it had to turn down Lever Brothers' request for agricultural land which it needed for purposes of plantation agriculture. Discounting the economistic explanation that this action was premised on the calculation of not subsidizing Europeans to produce cash crops when Africans had been doing that so well, it was because coercion -- land alienation in particular -- would be counterproductive. Refusing Lever Brothers' land concession was not necessarily a better economic calculation than having it, a British company, reinvest its

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S. Berry, Fathers Work for their Sons: Accumulation, Mobility, and Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 23.

As Berry also points out. Ibid.

"The reversal of earlier visions for land reform was an acceptance of the limits of colonial power." Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, p. 59.
profits and perforce monopolize the export market. Such a tendency to characterize an omnipresent and infallible colonial state assumes that it could not ignore profit motive in making necessary concessions such as this one. It was this concessionary approach which made it necessary for the state to refer the company to negotiate directly with landowners themselves.

It was not only the exploitation of common Nigerians which was masked with various ideologies -- "indirect rule," "development," "civilizing mission" and the like. British expatriate officials strove hard to conceal their political weaknesses and put up appearances -- what Kirk Greene has aptly referred to as the "steel helmet." Expatriate governors were concerned to an extraordinary extent with the pomp and circumstance of high office. ... He combined executive leadership with ceremonial primacy, like an eighteenth century monarch. [These] and intense preoccupation with the formalities of social precedence helped to make colonial rule visible. [These] were meant to overcome the indigenous people at a time when the physical power of the colonial state was weak.

This colonial game lasted with official expatriate presence in Nigeria. Virtually every concession Nigerian masses won was anxiously covered up by the face-saving, defensive bluff, "do

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not take this [concession] as a sign of weakness" from expatriate impostors.

3.2 The Political Economy of Native Administration

The state was forced into an alliance with local chiefs as the only reliable guarantors of labour, which in turn dictated the terms on which colonialism operated.\(^4\)

This is only part of the story.

It was pointed out in the previous chapter how upon winning battlefront encounters European expatriates did not have a viable option apart from working together with powerful sections of the indigenous population. As was also pointed out, if expatriates depended on the traditional rulers, the latter also depended on the expatriate to maintain and widen their powers and, in many cases, territorial areas of jurisdiction. This power is unreflected in standard administrative ladders. In some instances, ambitious individuals close to seats of traditional power seized on the opportunity of expatriate presence to rise to the helm. An interesting case was Obaseki, a minor chief in Benin who after British defeat of the Benin monarch in 1892 became the de facto head of the kingdom until his death in 1920.\(^5\) In the south-eastern part, among the Ibibio, the Igbo, etc., where

\(^{4}\) Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, p. 11.

there existed what early political anthropologists referred to as "stateless societies," British expatriates coopted certain imposters who had had little to do with traditional rule as "warrant chiefs." The concessions which these collaborators exacted from expatriates involved "opportunities for accumulation on the basis of regular production and exchange relations. As a result, their position had to be established on a class basis within the political economy." The state provided avenues to access to the means of production and surplus. Those desiring state patronage found it effective to associate with the traditional elite. This network of patronage resulted in a network of identification which furnished the collaborative nexus that sustained the fledgling colonial state in this period. Nevertheless, neither the chiefs nor expatriates were comfortable with the others' power.

The state's claim to rule is a pretense because its tendency to allocate power to functionaries through practice and fiat while disempowering non-functionaries is only partially successful. In the case of the colonial state the expatriate and traditional elite who manned it did not even have clearly defined functions in the indirect rule


\[49\] Berman & Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*, p. 137.

\[50\] Berry, *Fathers Work*, p. 9.
dispensation. The starting point of the analysis of state behaviour and the dialectics of power relationships should begin with an appreciation of what the *dramatis personae* understood themselves to be doing. It is significant how expatriate governors so fragrantly contradicted one another. In 1934 Governor Donald Cameron circulated a voluminous memorandum among expatriate administrators. In its preface he complained:

> It seems to me that after thirty years of the practice of indirect administration in this country it be no more necessary for me to prepare a Memorandum on the detailed functions of a Native Administration than it is necessary for me to prepare such a Memorandum on the detailed functions of a Government department."

Of course, this elusive quest for the meaning of native administration antedated his tenure and, even though he made a spirited attempt at clarification,\(^5\) survived it. His predecessors and successors alike shared these concerns and frustrations, and these must be read beyond mere routine gubernatorial policy pronouncements. More than being just "a pseudo-problem,"\(^6\) "indirect rule" must be viewed as an

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\(^{1}\)NA1/MN/C2: *The Principles of Native Administration and their Application*, 1934.

\(^{2}\)According to him, "the time is past when this system can be regarded as a sacred and mysterious art ... understood only by a chosen few," *ibid.*, p. 1.

outstanding problem of expatriate official presence in Nigeria, nay Africa. In addition it was not a preferred system of "administrative convenience" at all. For example, in mid-1930s, Governor Cameron underscored this point when he reminded the official expatriate corps in Nigeria that "it is quite impossible for us to administer the country directly ... even if we quadrupled the number we now employ" without collaborating with the chiefs. Otherwise, the influence of a political officer "becomes a mere drop in the bucket and is lost in the mass."\textsuperscript{54}

Fredrick Lugard himself, initially British High Commissioner to Northern Nigeria (soon to become Governor general of amalgamated Nigeria), doyen of indirect rule, wrote in his \textit{Dual Mandate},

\begin{quote}
The British Empire ... has only one mission - for liberty and self-development on no standardized lines, so that all may feel that their interests and religion are safe under the British flag. Such [an aim] can be best secured to the native population by leaving them free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement, under the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the administration.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

There is little need to dwell on the above statement because it has been demonstrated that Lugard’s treatise was an \textit{ex post}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54}NA1/MN/C2: \textit{The Principles of Native Administration and their Application}, 1934, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{55}F. Lugard, \textit{The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa} (Frank Cass, [1921] 1952), p. 94.
\end{itemize}
facto rationalization of a (non-) system of exploitation and -- rather than a formative influence -- the course which social processes had already taken."

On his part Governor Bernard Bourdillon in 1937 thought that it was unnecessary to define the NA since that would give the impression that one was dealing with a static society. His operational alternative was nevertheless ambiguous. He told his subordinates in 1937 that (1) there were no specific duties which the central government must assign to the NAs; and (2) there was no class of duties which the government could not assign them. (The only firm statement in his pronouncement was that customs, posts, marines, the military, ports, telegraphs, and railways must be reserved for the central government.) He went on himself to dismiss the "agent of the governor" syndrome about the NA.

I was tempted for a time to accept ... the expression "Agent of the Governor," which had been used by both Sir Percy Girouard and Lord Lugard .... in the case of a mere agent both the power and the right are derived from the appointer to the agent. In the case of a Nigerian Native Authority ... while the right to enforce obedience is wholly derived from the Government, the power to do so is partly so derived and partly inherent."

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"Berry, Fathers Work, p. 23.

"NAL/MN/B3: Appointment of Revenue and Duties between the Central Government and Native Authorities, 1939, pp. 6-7.

"Ibid., p. 5. Emphases are Bourdillon’s."
The reference to "power" and "right" is crucial to understanding the colonial power equation and blights the conclusion that while real power lay with the expatriates, legitimacy lay with the traditional elite. Witness Bourdillon's reference to "right" (which in this context approximates to the ill-defined term legitimacy!) which he claimed for himself, and his recognition that power was shared. This is even only the expatriate version, the claim of a pretender. Of course the expatriates did not have any "right" to constitute a government in Nigeria. The chiefs had a more credible claim to this "right." As for power, they did not need to share it with the expatriates in order to rule they had been ruling before British intervention. The relevance of the expatriate factor is that it both enabled and compelled the chiefs to rule in a particular way. The British had demonstrated an ability to win a war but they lacked the power to rule.

In the following year, Bourdillon found that the prevailing system had been "unfortunately" characterized as indirect rule. He delivered a critique on Haudard for implying that the expatriates had no obligation to the traditional rulers by not making explicit whether we were under any legal or moral obligation to uphold the authority of the Emirs of the North.

... The question is in a sense academic, for any attempt now to reverse existing policy would be manifest folly. But it is not altogether unimportant, for the assumption that such an obligation existed has more than once led to the appearance of the dangerous fallacy that the maintenance of the authority of [the] indigenous institutions is an end in itself and not merely a means to the good government of the people. Neither history nor theory provides any justification for this view. Historically, we adopted the policy because no other was practicable. Theoretically, we justify its continuance partly on that ground, but mainly because we believe that it is the best ... I would myself add a third justification, namely that by no other policy could we have secured that wholehearted loyalty to the British Empire, which I have, during the last four years, seen abundant evidence."\(^1\)

On the one hand the governor seems to have said that the system was faulty enough -- and from its inception for that matter -- but just regrettably could not be replaced. On the other hand, he seems to have said that the policy was sound and desirable as he claimed to have experienced and which, given a few reforms here and there, had a long future. If the governor himself so indulged in double-speak or was so obviously confused, it is left for the reader to imagine the dilemma and uncertainty with which his subordinates coped daily in their dealings with indigenous chiefs and other social forces. These expatriates were not an autonomous ruling class. "Indirect rule," a misnomer, was not a policy matter.

One suspects that the expatriates tried to break this

\(^1\)NAL/MN/B4A: Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria, 1939, p. 2. Emphases added.
impasse -- to attain leverage in the undeclared power tussle with the chiefs -- through social engineering which was couched in the nebulous phrase: "political evolution." This remained a mere hope however. *The Principles of Native Administration and their Application* of 1934 alluded to the NA as "an instrument which is being carefully and patiently fashioned for our purpose." In fact, Cameron rationalized this quiet hope as follows "many ideal states have been devised by theorists ... but the only true political development proceeds from within by evolution."

Expatriates were particularly concerned that the autocratic tendencies of the chiefs would elicit violent reactions from the people which would undermine their presence. Progressively therefore they came to appreciate the need for a chief to be acceptable to the people. This crisis management intensified as colonial protests (this will be given some consideration below) signalled the transformation which was occurring in the political economy. Everyday city populations increased, though in trickles, and more people entered for membership of the modernizing elite. Cameron found it necessary to advise traditional rulers that it was in their best interest to abandon ritualistic practices and their oppressive ways if they hoped to enjoy the support of this

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63Ibid., p. 33.
class, and to avoid a social explosion.

If there is an attempt to keep the people back and
the Native Administration is consequently not so
framed and constituted as to progress on modern
times alongside the Central Government of which it
is but a part, but one of the instruments of that
Central Government, then, naturally, the natives
will ... eventually refuse to "stay put." 64

In general, chiefs did not quibble with these demands for
superficial reforms if these (1) would not seriously
jeopardize their accumulative activities; (2) were not at
variance with the morality to which they themselves
subscribed; or (3) they were convinced that these were
necessary for the maintenance of their position in the long
run. When it was in their interest they even initiated such
reforms. For instance, by the time Cameron wrote his "Benin
Minute" of 1934 to Benin Oba-elect, appealing to the latter
that it was necessary to incorporate the modernizing elite,
both he and Alake of Abeokuta were already "desirous that the
educated elements of their people should be represented on
their councils." 65

There was a dichotomy between expatriate legislation and
the real power of the traditional elite, between the
conventional administrative leaders and the functional

64 Ibid., p. 12.

"The governor had written the Oba-elect, inter alia: "The
Oba-elect must trust me when I say, again, that I am doing all
this in order to strengthen his position; so that the policy
of ruling a people through their Oba may continue and endure,
gathering strength through the years to come." Cited in,
Ibid., pp. 11-2. The governor might rather have written so
that expatriate presence "may continue and endure."
position of chiefs. The chiefs enjoyed de facto protection from accountability and this was informed by their indispensability in the colonial order. The chiefs' misdemeanour "should be made the occasion of guarded rebuke," not punishment, the expatriates were once reminded by their boss. Any attempt at punishment must be made only as "an absolute necessity" -- "when no other course is possible." Even this, they were told, was counterproductive because a successor chief may turn out to be as irritable or more. Besides, unless such a chief was exiled, his presence after deposition would surely be a rallying force of opposition against expatriates.66

The Aseyin of Iseyin in Oyo Division, Oyo Province in the south-west was one such case. He had been disgruntled since 1916 when one Yerokun, a court messenger, in support of Resident Ross usurped effective powers from him.67 With the support of the Alafin, who politically ruled Iseyin from Oyo, Yerokun had constituted himself into Alafin's principal adviser (Aije) over the head of the Aseyin.68 By 1942 Yerokun, "a Mohamedan," had already amassed enough wealth to be able to single-handedly finance the building of ten mosques.

66Ibid., pp. 28-31.

67Ironically this overzealous court messenger became even more powerful after Captain Ross had successfully persuaded an irate crowd to save the former's life during the Iseyin uprising of 1916. NA1/Oyo Prof 6/15/C5/28 Acting D.O. Oyo to Resident Oyo Province 20 September 1932.

68Ibid: Blenkinsop to Resident Oyo Province.
in Iseyin'' -- by implication extending his influence.

For some time, the Aseyin and his supporters had been struggling to win back power. By April 1929 the Alafin and Senior Resident Captain Ross were in agreement that a dossier be compiled in order to incriminate the Aseyin for his removal." When in January 1932 a showdown was reported imminent between the Aseyin and Yerokun factions," Administrative Officer Blenkinsop was deployed to Iseyin to study the quarrel (without giving away his mission). His principal point of reference was to estimate the strength of Yerokun’s followership. (He was also to check how the palm plantations were doing.)" Blenkinsop, while reporting that there was no immediate cause for alarm, took care to remind his boss that the root cause of the problem lay in Yerokun’s pretensions." The insecure expatriates and their indigenous partners had in October 1928 also acted in undue haste when the Alafin and the resident had arranged the detention of Aseyin’s bashorun (commander-in-chief)." The ensuing search of the house of Bashorun Jagun revealed no excessive

``Ibid.
``NAI/Oyo Prof 6/15/C5/28: Senior Resident to D.O., 4 April 1929.
quantities of ammunition." Some informants had told the
D.O. that Jagun was stocking up on bullets (and assembling all
Iseyin hunters) for killing Yerokun, and then go on "to know
what to do with the N.A. and Government People."

Margery Perham has written that "native chiefs had
clearly defined duties and acknowledged status and equality
with the British officials." Granting the matter of
equality, like the expatriate officials, these chiefs did not
have clearly defined duties, neither had the expatriates
themselves. In theory the governor constituted the NAs and
beneficiary chiefs supported and took advantage of them as the
Yerokun case indicates. In practice, however, the governor
could not appoint these chiefs entirely to his preference.
Who emerged was the person who had sufficient clout and desire
to make that position a reality in the face of internal
pressures. Governors let these forces guide their policies.
This implicit compromise lay at the core of power dialectics
that regulated relations between the two major factions that
made up colonial Nigerian ruling class. "The Government
therefore only interferes to suppress that which is repugnant
to European ideas of justice and morality for example
poison ordeals, the more objectionable forms of witchcraft,

"Ibid: Resident to D.O., 5 October 1928.
"Cited by J. Bowie, The Imperial Achievement: The Rise
and Transformation of the British Empire (Middlesex: Penguin,
the killing of twins, or of dependents at the death of a chief.\textsuperscript{10} This was like flogging a dead horse, for in these matters general Nigerian public opinion was already strongly weighted against the chiefs. These practices were equally repugnant to Nigerian ideas of justice and morality. This was the key to the chiefs' vulnerability in such matters. Again, in theory people could report their chiefs to the appropriate expatriate official. In practice, even the warrant chiefs of "the petty Native Administrations of the Southern Provinces,"\textsuperscript{11}"often imprisoned their opponents before the latter had a chance to hatch such plans -- as a contemporary warrant chief Obiukwu Nze told the historian Adiele Afigbo years after.\textsuperscript{12} The Emir of Kano who had some two million people in his province, among his wide powers, concentrated on the more tangible ones of taxation and deciding land disputes. "Through family ties the emir knew much better than the Europeans what was going on in the province."\textsuperscript{13}

The presence of whites in the technical services [which the Europeans controlled] did not adversely affect the emir's power. Indeed, it is likely that

\textsuperscript{10}NA1/MN/C2: The Principles of Native Administration, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{11}Cameron's words. ibid., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{12}Transcribed in Afigbo The Warrant Chiefs, Appendix, p. 309.

many Africans perceived white technicians as working for him. 

Alafin Siyambola Ladugbolu treated expatriate residents in Oyo Province as his subordinates. Apparently expatriates' attempt to reclaim some influence for themselves in Oyo after the departure of Resident Captain Ross did not make much headway. Oyo division expatriate resident had cause to inform his administrative officer, Mr. Blenkinsop, in January 1932, that he had explained "carefully at some length," that the duty of the resident was "to enforce the laws of Nigeria and to advise the Alafin and his chiefs," and that this was in Alafin's best interests. Apart from the above inter-war examples, in the pre-First World War, when expatriate influence is said to have been sorely limited, the traditional elite were "the effective governors of African political, and economic life."

Ibid.

J.A. Atanda, "Indirect Rule in Yorubaland," p. 22.

NAL/Oyo Prof. 615/C5/28: Resident Oyo Division to Administrative Officer.


Killingray, ibid.
If the NA system suited the expatriate and indigenous factions which ran the colonial state, it was a disaster for the common people. The well-being of the colonial, ruling classes in an inverse relationship translated into the suffering of the common men and women on whose surpluses the parasitic class depended. In the pre-colonial period, the masses had shouldered the burden of only one set of ruling classes. In the colonial period, this burden at least doubled, not only with the appearance of foreign co-participants (an expanded collaborative nexus), but also the fact of the expanded accumulative base of the original oppressors. To give just two examples: the expatriates got too demanding on tax monies and embarked on a regular upward tax assessment in the north and emirs raised taxes in order not to eliminate their own income.

In densely populated Benin a paramount chief’s "entitlements" included five yams from every house and one goat from every group of ten houses annually. They also commandeered to themselves maidens and other people’s wives.

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"Igbafe, "Indirect Rule in Benin," pp. 31-32."
Slavery was to continue into the 20th century because of expatriate lack of will to offend their slave-owning allies: the traditional elite." Furthermore, even though pre-colonial Nigerian societies were patriarchal, many of them had mechanisms which allowed women to acquire sometimes significant social, political and material power. During the colonial period, however, these mechanisms were checkmated by an interplay of forces which included state policy, colonial jurisprudence, the educational system, capitalism, religious bodies, the nationalist movement, and the changing patterns of property relations and the household." The collaborative system of this period specifically circumvented those indigenous structures which emphasized women's role. Concessions which resulted from women activism alone were absorbed into male privilege.

Given this general situation of super exploitation, protests against oppression were bound to intensify in the colonial period. These were mainly expressed in the


90See for instance, Jane Parpart, "Women and the State in Africa," in Rothchild & Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance, pp. 208-30. This writer, however, disagrees with Parpart's view that gender is not class related. Otherwise, gender becomes a biological instead of a social category. As has recently been argued, give and take some necessary reconceptualizations, gender analysis "can be incorporated into existing modes of analyses without too many ruffles." Linzi Manicom, "Ruling Relations: Rethinking State and Gender in South African History," Journal of African History, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1992), p. 443.
activities of the small holding farmers, youths, women, workers and other city migrants. What were the dialectics of their interaction with other social forces, and how did these oppressed classes respond to unfavourable conditions?

In south-east, during headcounts by chiefs, usually for purposes of taxation, it was usually rumoured that the counts were aimed at ascertaining the number of able bodied men in order to send in an appropriate number of soldiers for their slaughter. Usually those who escaped those counts reneged on tax payment. Methods of traditional social mobilization were breaking down because the youths held the traditional elite who controlled these in deep suspicion. For instance, again in parts of the south-east, the youths ceased to answer to the gong since they were not sure for what sinister state project they would be drafted to work. Forced labour was rampant and, as it took roots in Agbor (in west Niger Ibgo in the South) the youths complained in 1906 that "this is a

"The major social forces in mind for this period are: the expatriate administrative corps; the traditional elite; a small group of modernizing elite; expatriate non-administrative interest; a small proletariat, and the peasants.


"See ibid., p. 310.

"In March 1921, for instance, charges were preferred on certain indigenes of Oyo Province for refusing to perform the "essential services" of acting as carriers and peddlers for expatriates as well as repairing Native Court houses. NAI/Oyo Prof 6115/C13/28: Ag. Sec Southern Provinces to Resident Oyo.
bad work that our fathers make us do." "Virtually everywhere the youths took their fate in their own hands. The Ekemeku movement, also in the communities of west Niger Iaro, served this purpose as it had served them (before British encroachment) against Benin imperialism. From the 1890s up to early 1910s this group waged a guerilla war against expatriate interests. " Everywhere many youths left for the cities as an escape from rural elders. " This development threatened the stability of the colonial order." Needless to say that these "rural refugees" -- to borrow Colin Murray's term"}


did not find any peace in the cities. Their discontent took express forms in organized and unorganized labour, and other forms of protest.

Peasant protests also occurred in different parts of the country. Sara Berry has however pointed out, meaningfully, that these protests did not signify a natural peasant inclination "to protect their way of life" in order to stay put in the countryside. Her study of the cocoa belt in the south-west (which furnished part of the world cocoa market) led her to conclude that, far from being satisfied with their condition, these peasants never saw their work as a natural and permanent condition, but merely an avenue for occupational, social and geographical mobility. Their protests were directed against exploitative social conditions. This point is important as a qualification of the widespread view that Nigerians entered into the money economy reluctantly.

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102 Berry, Fathers Work, p. 4.
in response to governmental fiscal measures and the operations of capital generally. As Berry again points out in another work, what Africans did was that they struggled to take advantage of new conditions.  

These protests have been treated randomly and undifferentially with regard to origins of their leadership, their varying scale and sustenance, urban or rural, because these concerns are of little material relevance. These "occurred during the colonial period and thus were offensive in character."  

There is therefore no point writing off these movements as syncretic, backward-looking, passive and lacking no clear purpose when they do not appear to have articulated an alternative political economy.  

British expatriates themselves similarly treated work-to-rule and sabotage measures employed by Nigerian workers (including conscript labourers) -- be it in the Jos tin mines or elsewhere. Rather than see these actions as issues of principle, they dismissed them as innate laziness.

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103 Berry, "Hegemony on a Shoestring," pp. 127 ff.

104 A. Isaacman with B. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 190-99. On this point the Isaacmans made a general point even though their focus is Mozambique.


106 Osoba, "The Development of Trade Unionism," p. 188.
Tomu and Swai have argued, cogently, that the people who participated in these movements had no doubt what their goals and strategies were. The problem is, according to them, scholars' failure to transcend their bourgeois perceptions -- values which have little in common with ordinary people's ideas about reality and states of being. If these suffering people employed superstitious methods it was in order

to transcend the given order of things [in order] to undertake the Promethean task of storming the heavens. Such radicals want to return to the fundamentals of society and to explain it from a new perspective. ... Such is the creative potential of the oppressed classes in the course of making their own history .... The constraints placed on them by the ruling classes reinforces this tendency to distort reality. 107

Indeed, these movements were not as simplistic as they have been depicted even when matched to "modern" ones. The Aba women uprising of 1929-30 provides us with a clear example. Aba is located in the south-east palm oil producing belt of Nigeria which was by far the largest supplier of palm produce to the world market. The women who were at the center of the tedious production function within this industry -- employing rudimentary technology -- had begun to feel the pang of the world depression. 108 Furthermore, their age-sets and


other social groups had been completely blocked off from mainstream politics since colonial rule. Along with all these were the corruption of the NAs and the unpopularity of the warrant chiefs. Above all, it was the warrant chiefs who were spearheading the move to impose direct taxation on these women at this critical economic period.109 There had been an uprising in April 1925 in the Calabar Province one of the provinces involved again in 1929-30. On that occasion women protested against the application of Rule No. 7 of 1924 under the Markets Ordinance which required them to pay tolls for their market stalls. At that time the women believed (the authorities said it was a rumour) that they would soon be charged for the use of public conveniences.110

The 1928-29 incident surpassed all earlier uprisings in both geographical spread and intensity. As the warrant chiefs embarked on a regular tax assessment exercise in their respective localities in November 1929 "great crowds of

109 A reading of the primary documents indicates to the writer that a plan was actually in the offing to tax these women. Also Obiukwu Nze, himself a warrant chief at the time, later said that such a plan was in the offing. See Aligher, The Warrant Chiefs, p. 312. There is really no substantial reason to get into this matter of technical detail - if not because the tendency to dismiss the Abo tax question as a mere rumour tends to reinforce the thinking that the uprising was an impulsive action.

110 NA1/MN/L1, "Memorandum as to the Origin and Causes of the Recent Disturbances in the Owerri and Calabar Provinces" (prepared by C.T. Lawrence, 1930), pp. 12-13.
women in Aba, Calabar, Opobo and Owerri areas started a demonstration that aimed to destroy everything that they could associate with the colonial state.

This incident is often erroneously presented as an impulsive action triggered off by a census count. At the time emergency pollster Emeruwa had the scuffle with Nwanyereuwa (the woman who was the first to be interviewed but who resisted), an event which triggered off the uprising, a meeting of women was way in progress deliberating the tax question. Through sending of palm leaves of solidarity the women were able to mobilize others near and far, summoning them to the Oloko Square. They went first to protest outside the Niger Pastorate where Emeruwa worked, thence to the court of the warrant chief Okugo where they demanded that the tax plan be revoked. On November 26 a deputation of the women visited the District Headquarters to complain about Nwanyereuwa’s assault. The District Officer would not act for the ostensible reason that he was waiting for a police report. By the next day women representatives from such far areas as Aba, Bende, Ikom Ekpene and Owerri had assembled at Oloko and would not disperse until the government came out with a categorical statement that women would not be taxed. The expatriate official obliged them. The women further insisted on the arrest and trial of Okugo, and this was carried after

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initial hesitation. The suspicious women marched to witness the trial of Okugo who was found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment, and Emeerwa for three months.\[10\]

There seems to be no strong basis to doubt, as Gailey has done, that the women knew "what impelled them toward revolt." In the first place, by the time of the event, when the first count was attempted, the rejection of the tax had become a social agenda. Secondly, the manner by which the women articulated their demands did not suggest a "riot." Above all, they succeeded in killing the tax plan. Also, significantly, in the midst of the uprising on 4 December, women were still organized when they gathered at Umuahia to deliberate dwindling world produce prices.\[11\] Nwabara reports that

the women acted like a militia. Once they gathered, leaders emerged, and orders were promptly obeyed. Funds were raised by the different women's organizations for feeding, and supplemented by the supply of food from the women of each town they passed through. Their discipline in terms of acting together was a surprise to the government.\[12\]

Though at the expense of thirty-two (an official count) of their own, the women were not only able to stop the tax, they

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\[11\]Gailey, The Road to Aba, p. 97.

\[12\]NA1/MN/L1.

*\[13\]Nwabara, "Ibo Land," p. 233.*
also forced the state to implement reforms, and to sacrifice one of its own. The enforced trial and imprisonment of Okunu and the ensuing buck passing between the expatriate and their indigenous partners deepened the distrust within their coalition as each side scrambled to vindicate itself before the people. The expatriates cashed in on this situation to draw level with the more domineering chiefs. As a contemporary warrant chief put it, when "this wicked plot [to tax women] was discovered the white men shifted the blame to the warrant chiefs [spreading] the false story that the riot was caused by the fact that the chiefs oppressed the people." Pretending then to act on common people's behalf expatriates jettisoned those chiefs "who had already got a firm grasp" on the state.\(^{116}\) This was expatriate politics, and the chiefs were for a time outmaneuvered.

The chiefs too had their own politics, also posturing as champions of the masses and passed on to women blame for the woes of the indigenous people whose conscience the chiefs now postured to represent. "If the women had not risen we would have started ruling ourselves earlier than we did. It was this that frightened the white man."\(^{117}\) This could or could not have happened. What is certain, however, is that either way, common people would still have suffered. The chiefs also seemed to have been determined after the Aba incident to

\(^{116}\) See Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs, pp. 312 f.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., p. 313.
implicate the expatriates in the process of putting a gloss on their own activities. Before long this tactic was already hurting the expatriate arm of the nexus -- this was dangerous. In 1934 Governor Cameron gave the following instruction to his subordinates:

It is believed to be the habit of some Native Authorities to cloak all orders in the form of a Government instruction, partly the better to ensure observance and partly to evade the odium for an exacting order. It is apparent that this tendency will be accentuated if the Native Authorities are frequently induced to issue orders which they do not appreciate and to which they are possibly at heart opposed. Where it is unavoidable that the Administration should obtain the issue of particular orders Administrative Officers should seek to persuade the Native Authorities to take the necessary steps, refraining as long as possible from giving them direct instructions.\(^{118}\)

This could not have impressed chiefs who had reasons for their approach -- reasons which the new expatriate approach does not address. Who should accept responsibility in the case of an outburst? It is significant to note that in the power struggle internal to the collaborative nexus, the protagonists acted on the principle that power depended on the people. As political anthropologist Claessen points out, the exercise of power is contingent upon the other side.\(^{119}\)

These "riots" and the fear of their occurrence also caused some strain within the highest levels of the expatriate faction of the colonial ruling class. In what must have been

\(^{118}\)NA1/MN/C2, p. 25.

a rare moment of his gubernatorial tenure, Bourdillon received in 1937 a rebuke from Colonial Secretary Ormsby Gore following a strike action by Enugu coal miners. The British Minister, blaming the governor for negligence, told him that this strike was justified and warned that he was not prepared to defend the latter at home on this matter.\textsuperscript{120} Flint has suggested that Lugard’s recall in 1918 was actually a dismissal\textsuperscript{121} a move which was likely necessitated by an anxiety that Lugard’s excesses\textsuperscript{122} would elicit indigenous backlash.

In modern history the term “riots” is ruling classes’ designation for those mass actions which do not conform to establishment norms. This is why the term carries with it the odium of actions which are both unnecessary and necessarily cataclysmic, irrespective of the stark historical reality that many a “riot” has proved both necessary and effective. In the period under study it was the terminology employed in their attempt to downplay protests which were legitimate. These protests not only yielded some concessions but, fundamentally, as has been shown above, they imposed severe strains on the collaborative nexus, between expatriates and the traditional elite, and within themselves. These strains combined with

\textsuperscript{120}NA1/CS01/33/224: S. of S. To Nigerian Government dated 13 May 1937, despatch No. 656.


\textsuperscript{122}For these excesses see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 297-307.
pressures from other social forces to enforce a re-ordering of the nexus. One of these social forces was the modernizing elite. It is important to consider their role even if only because they would soon be members of the ruling class.

3.4 Modernizing Elite: Ruling Class in the Waiting

By successfully discrediting the traditional elite upon whom their own power was hinged the expatriates undermined themselves and created a "vacuum" which the modernizing elite were quick to fill. Rather than just walk into a vacuum, the modernizing elite worked hard in placing themselves into reckoning. This class is usually stereotyped as a group of grovelling men who had accepted expatriate presence as a natural order in the period before the Second World War. Consequently their activity is said to have become "nationalist" from 1945, when "the younger men with the essential African dynamic" allegedly came to the scene. These younger men seem to be even much more severe in their criticism of their contemporaries. Mokwugo Okoye, a post-


Second World War ex-service man, populist and Sikhist socialist, wrote years after independence.

The few intellectuals who dotted the cities were still luxuriating in the phantasmagoria of a dead Victorian world, sincerely enamoured of British achievements and living in an ivory tower. ... [They] were of course constitutionalists who had but hazy ideas about the logic of power.\textsuperscript{17}

Some of the activities of these men lend some credence to this view. When in 1923 Herbert Macaulay, the anglicised civil engineer and grandson of the first Nigerian bishop, formed his Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the first political party -- one of the aims stated was "to secure the ... welfare of the people of Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial Commonwealth."\textsuperscript{17}

A closer examination of the modernizing elite's approach to survival, however, would reveal a multifaceted strategy not readily noticeable to the casual observer. This strategy was in any case informed by their awareness of their numerical inferiority. Their relationship with other social forces was equivocal. What was consistent in their methods was that these were geared towards self-reproduction, expansion and ascendancy. The state was, however, not enthusiastic about their best efforts. Among the severe challenges with which they had to cope was racial discrimination encased in hard


stereotypes of legitimation -- in reality expatriates' device for limiting the membership of the collaborative nexus. This excluded them from the privileges of the middle class.\textsuperscript{178} They often found themselves under a European boss, not necessarily that the other was better qualified, but simply because he was white. When they got jobs commensurate with their qualifications they were paid lower salaries than European equals. This was justified officially with three reasons which, according to Njoku, were "as racist as they were naive." Government arguments were as follows: (1) to pay Nigerians high salaries would "detribalize" them and upset traditional social cohesion; (2) even when a Nigerian had a high qualification s/he lacked the moral discipline to hold a responsible post; and (3) Europeans needed higher pay in order to be able to enjoy the lifestyle to which they were accustomed.\textsuperscript{179} The modernizing elite were expected to behave like the British in order to be allowed a small niche in the political economy -- a requirement significantly not expected of the chiefs.\textsuperscript{180}

Rather than help this class to expand, the expatriates

\textsuperscript{178}See for instance, G. Williams, \textit{State and Society in Nigeria}, p. 29.


\textsuperscript{180}This inference is drawn from the Mozambican experience. See Raul Honwana, \textit{The Life History of Raul Honwana} edited with an introduction by Allen Isaacman (Boulder & London, 1988), p. 106.
preferred to recruit fresh cadres from their British home in order to boost their numbers in their overall strategy of overwhelming the chiefs and completely dominating the political economy. When for instance, in 1936, the British Red Cross donated some capital fund to Nigeria, Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore used it to establish a scholarship scheme, not for Nigerians, but "for the higher education of distressed descendants of deceased European public officers or other Europeans who rendered valuable service to Nigeria." The purported "valuable service" could not have been more valuable than the act of a British minister channelling Nigeria's money to British purposes. Certainly Ormsby-Gore did not suppose that the British Red Cross was financing the British imperialist project.

Another instance of development of British manpower with money meant for Nigeria was the case of the colonial Veterinary Scholarship established in 1930-31 for the purpose of training veterinarians for Nigeria. Its endowment fund was supported by "free grants" from the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) in the sums of £600, £1,470 and £2,080 respectively for the years 1930-31, 1931-32, and 1932-33. The Nigerian

11NAI/CS01/33/223: Secretary of State despatch No. 309, October 1936.

12NAI/OS/A21: "Correspondence Regarding Assistance from Colonial Development Fund Toward Certain Schemes." See Secretary of State to Governor, 21 March 1930; Secretary of State to Governor, 24 March 1930; Secretary of State to Governor, 9 August 1930; Secretary of State to Governor, 15 September 1930.
government, on its part, contributed £325 for 1930-31 alone. (Its contribution was expected to increase in subsequent years.) However, the scholarship fund account which reached Nigeria in September 1930 shows that only young Britons had benefitted from the award. This is illustrative of the method by which British cadets were recruited to advise Nigerians on how to keep supplying world market demand for palm produce, peanuts and cocoa.

It is in the light of such occurrences that one must assess the modernizing elite. Somebody might want to argue that Nigerians were not in a position to benefit from such scholarship schemes. But then this event happened in 1930, not 1900. Assuming that this was so, what grassroots educational programmes had been vigorously pursued to enable indigenous cadres to take advantage of this kind of opportunity? Historians who have searched for answers have found none. Instead they submit that there was a marked reluctance on the part of expatriates regarding the education question which was raised incessantly by the modernizing elite --- educational programmes from which younger ones like Mokwugo Okoye were to benefit.

111Ibid., "Miscellaneous (ii)", Secretary of State to Nigerian Governor, 15 September 1930.

The modernizing elite in their drive to boost their numbers even established private schools which the authorities tried to drive out through stringent regulations. At the same time expatriates also continually demanded higher qualifications from civil servants. For example, early in 1936 a civil service circular required clerical recruits to enter the service no more as "second-class clerks" but as "third-class clerks" by 1 April. Not only this, those who had already entered the service as second-class clerks would be demoted to third class if they were not confirmed by 1 April. In a few years, according to the circular, minimum qualification would be raised to class IV middle certificate. With immediate effect, however, somebody with this qualification would be considered when one with class V or VI certificate was not around.\footnote{\textsuperscript{13}}

When aspirants had acquired the available meagre education, some struggled abroad in search of higher diplomas. Tradition has it that Nnamdi Azikiwe, the man who would later dominate independence agitation, smuggled himself into a ship bound for America in the late 1920s. He was to reappear in the mid 1930s, in spite of the expatriates, with a string of degrees. What is at issue here, but hardly appreciated, is that this was a struggle for ascendancy between the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{13}Osoba & Fajana, \textit{ibid.}}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{13}NA1/PR/G1, "Revision of Salaries of African Staff," Circular No. 1/1936, MP No. 28 28715P, 2 January 1936.}
modernizing elites and the expatriates. At this time the traditional elite, as has been noted, had a favourable placing in the political economy. They had enough money to send their sons -- hardly daughters\footnote{There are a few exceptions, however, for example Judith Atta, daughter of Ohinoyi of Ebira in today's Kogi State in central Nigeria. She is a top-flight diplomat of long standing.} -- to choice British schools.

By making these observations one is not attempting to rehabilitate the modernizing elite. There can be no doubt that they did not put up a gallant fight. They did not champion the cause of the masses. They were too anglicized to cohere with common men and women in a common cause. This urban elite did not try hard to forge an alliance with the masses, perhaps calculatedly. City masses were only just forming and not yet strong enough to be relied upon at this time in the outstanding big showdown with the expatriate-traditional elite coalition at the center of the prevailing collaborative nexus. They were far away from the peasants. They limited themselves to constitutional demands and carefully trying to impress on these masses that they were as capable of ruling as the expatriates. As Okoye correctly observes, since this elite was bent on "vote-catching" they saw no need to look beyond Lagos where, only with Calabar, the elective principle had been operative since the Clifford Constitution of 1922.\footnote{Okoye, \textit{Storms of the Niger}, pp. 71-2.} This was self-centered, and not
inept politics as their critics are wont to posit.

Apart from haranguing the state to improve and expand educational facilities (in fact in 1920 they demanded the establishment of a West African university through the National Congress of British West Africa [NCBWA]), as Lawal reports, they prevailed on the expatriates to start some form of industrialization.\textsuperscript{13} Success in this area was markedly limited -- expatriates saw clearly that large scale proletarianization necessarily attendant on industrialization would work in favour of this class. The only serious industrial activity at this time was mining.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, their attempt in 1938 to secure a raise in the salaries of Africans "holding superior appointments" to 75% of European equivalents failed. The "minority report" of the three Nigerian members of a seven-man panel could not offset the "majority report" by four Europeans who recommended that Africans' salaries be fixed and not be made relative to Europeans' ones.\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless,

\begin{quote}
\textit{it was not unusual for the Imperialists to cajole...}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{13}A.A. Lawal, "Industrialization as Tokenism," in Falola (ed.), \textit{Britain and Nigeria}, pp. 114-5.


\textsuperscript{15}The indigenous members of the panel were K.O. Moore (1st Lagos Member); C.C. Adeniyi-Jones (2nd Lagos Member); Assistant Accountant of the Medical Department; and President of the Nigerian Civil Service Union. NAI/PR/33, "Salaries of African Officers Holding Superior Appointments," Sessional Paper, No. 10 of 1938.
\end{footnotes}
them with titles, business concessions or direct
bribes or with scholarships and promotions to their
kin, and so the Great Game went on till the end of
Second World War. However, their influence among
the people was considerable and the government
thought it good politics to conciliate them by the
instituting of an enfeebled legislative council a
few years after the Congress delegation to
London. 142

Despite the pejorative tone of the above statement, it is easy
to see that the modernizing elite achieved class power
incrementally with time. Their agitation articulated on the
platform of NMDP and from 1938 mainly under the umbrella of
the Nigerian Youth movement (NYM) even earned them the title
of radicals form the "imperialists" and indigenous
"reactionary critics." 141 A number of them actually probed
very deep into the capitalist world. These included Obasa as
shareholder of the British Bank for West Africa and the West
African Marketing Board143; the Dantatas of Kano "who are now
possibly the wealthiest merchants and industrialists in
tropical Africa" 144; and L.P. Ojukwu who assembled an awesome
haulage business. 145 They often started off as produce
inspectors, agents, employees of the mercantile firms,

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142 Okoye, Storms on the Niger, pp. 70-71.
141 See ibid., p. 71.
143 NAI reference temporarily mislaid.
144 Iliffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism, p. 3.
145 G.U. Nwokeji, "Ojukwu's Leadership and the Nigerian
Civil War: An Analysis of the Role of the Individual in
History," paper presented at the CAAS Annual Conference,
Montréal, May 1992; F. Forsyth, Emeka (Ibadan: Spectrum,
middlemen, wholesalers, distributors and land speculators. After carefully analysing the chiefs' role in neutralizing the NCBWA the modernizing elite even attempted, with some success, to co-opt the former in their struggle against the expatriates. The NNDP forged such an alliance with the deposed Oba of Lagos - the Obi which won the reinstatement of the Oba who had been ostracized since 1925.

The traditional elite had come to reckon with the dynamism of the modernizing elite. Governor BoundilJon reported from an experience of a nation wide tour in the late 1930s that

The Native Authorities are almost always anxious to obtain the advice of the more highly educated and more widely experienced members, and in a good many cases councils constituted on a traditional basis have co-opted educated persons not traditionally entitled to a seat.

At this time the modernizing elite generally did not assail the chieftaincy, not because they were enamoured by the latter. They were only being prudent.

3.5 Contradictions: Dual or Synthetic Political Economy?

This chapter has argued that expatriate presence in

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Nigeria in the period under consideration brought about a synthesis of indigenous and European political forms rather than dualities. This crystallized through a process of interaction between collaboration and conflict seen as the superstructural complement of the synthesis in the substructure which Cooper, and Berman and Lonsdale have analyzed in detail. Berman and Lonsdale do in fact make reference to a "political expression of the dual mandate" which helps to analytically articulate the superstructure to the substructure. However, their acceptance of the wisdom that scarcity of European personnel and funding necessitated collaboration (rather than what had to be -- resources or not) characterizes power relationships non-dialectically and leaves the stigma of duality at the political level. These conclusions are drawn often with little reference to the chiefs' functional role and accumulative base. The problem thus created is one of articulating a synthesized substructure to a dual superstructure. In short, this is the result of conceptualizing colonialism as foreign rule rather than a joint venture. The prevailing contradictions in the political economy: between capitalist and non-capitalist forms, Nigerian and British politics/administrative norms, and between cooperation and conflict in the course of time caused a reconstitution of the prevailing collaborative nexus.

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These contradictions were played out through the vehicle of the human agency. In this connection, it is important to note that

The task of social analysis is complicated by the fact that the course of social transformation is never determined by the strategies of a single group but arises from struggles among many.\(^{151}\)

Roughly the following six social forces could easily be discerned for the period under study: (1) the traditional elite; (2) the expatriate administrative corps; (3) expatriate non-administrative interests (these include non-African persons involved in business, missionary work and other non-official professions.); (4) a fledgling city-based modernizing elite; (5) small groups of city masses (proletarians or otherwise who lacked access to surpluses); and (6) the rural based agricultural producers. These categories related to one another equivocally.

Among these groups only the expatriate administrators, the urban-based modernizing elite (concentrated in the south) and European non-administrators were organized on a national scale. The traditional elite were hardly concerned beyond their immediate domains. These domains varied considerably in size from a few square kilometres to tens, and from a few hundred inhabitants to two million as was the case in Kano. Even though the traditional elite wielded real power and accumulated far more surpluses than any European in these

\(^{151}\)Berry, *Fathers Work*, p.6.
domains; on a national scale, i.e., in the framework of Nigeria, they suffered a political disadvantage to the expatriate governor in Lagos. This is confusing. If there was any one ruler of the whole Nigeria, it was the governor who in turn (through his representatives -- Residents, DOs, etc.) suffered a disadvantage to the chiefs in the respective domains in which the latter mainly focused their ambition. They did not envy expatriate pretensions at the center. Where their paths crossed was in the struggle for domains.

On the part of the expatriates it was with the modernizing elite that paths crossed, not only at the center but also in the technical and bureaucratic services. In spite of these contradictions, the expatriates were flattered that this elite were copying their ways,\textsuperscript{153} and the latter on their part owed their origin and relevance to the expatriate influence in the political economy. The equivocal relationship between expatriate administrators and non-administrators has already been alluded to in the discussion of state’s relations with capital. It may be added that at the non-economic level the state debarred Christian missionary proselytization in the core Islamic areas through an agreement between the expatriates and the emirs. Also "the freedom of the slave population was to be sacrificed to the interests of Britain’s slave-owning allies" until well into the 20th century.

\textsuperscript{153}Wallerstein, \textit{Africa: The Politics}, p. 153.
This equivocal relationship is also salient between the expatriate administrators on the one hand and the peasantry and city masses on the other. The expatriates desired them to remain in their position as commodity producers. At the same time expatriates desired them to become proletarians and, as proletarians emerged, they worried that this process was eroding "traditional social cohesion." In a recent study, Cowen and Shenton have shown that the non-granting of credit to Africans was a deliberate intention of the state (and not of bankers as is commonly held) in order to preserve the "African community." This it pursued by promoting rural cooperatives and by not legally recognizing private land ownership. As a result, Africans could not present land as collateral. The expatriates desired common people's support in their power struggle with the chiefs and at the same time desired their continued loyalty to the chiefs which was in reality a necessary condition for their exploitation. On the other hand, not enamoured by expatriate activities, the masses (peasantry and city masses) protested against these in many forms and at the same time utilized expatriate presence in their struggle against the chiefs.

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The contradictions internal to the collaborative nexus, between the traditional elite and expatriate administrators require to be carefully underlined. These, coupled with pressures from other social forces and the need to respond to them impinged upon colonial state's (to borrow Chazan's words) "degree of stateness," i.e., capacity to substantiate pretensions. This is affected by compromises which are in turn determined by the configuration of alliances in the conjuncture. It is therefore important to underline the strength which sustained the collaborative nexus during this period. That orders should come from the mouth of the traditional elite, rather than expatriates, was informed by the fact that the people would not generally obey the latter. And because the burden of oppression had intensified (resulting from expatriate presence and the traditional elite's increased power and exacting tendency) the people would not likely obey the chiefs draconian orders either. As has been pointed out, traditional means of social mobilization were breaking down because the people generally held these chiefs in deep distrust. Towards dealing with this problem, expatriates came in to augment the chiefs' capability for coercion. The expatriate coercive factor, in turn, was built on constabularies made up indigenous mercenaries and sustained by the activities of the chiefs. This was the collaborative power upon which the state relied. Only reforms which social

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pressures made absolutely necessary were embarked upon. The expatriates (and the chiefs) did not quite realize that as effective as collaborative power was, it was built on fragile foundations susceptible to changing interests, calculations and relative power of social forces outside the nexus as well as being influenced by extraneous forces. To them the stage was set for long presence in Nigeria. As the process of synthesis proceeded at the substructure the corresponding political level had to keep apace and accommodate the real products of the system.
The major purpose of this chapter is to examine the implications of the Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) programme for Nigeria between 1940 and 1945. This empire-wide programme officially came into being from the passage of an act of the British parliament in May 1940. In conception it was intended to broaden the range of operations of the slim and ineffective Colonial Development Fund (CDF) which had been created by the Colonial Development Act of 1929. Unlike the CDF which was aimed at ameliorating unemployment in Britain, the CDWA was also intended to introduce welfare schemes -- pledging to increase the CDF amount (which in its best year never made the million pound mark) by five-fold. The act also stressed a shift towards representative type government and a greater incorporation of the modernizing elite.

Before 1940 the object of colonial economic policy had been simply the avoidance of annual balance of payment deficits. In those days of "colonial self-sufficiency" the

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general notion that the colonies should service the economic requirements of Britain was particularly pronounced during the world depression. The implications of this economic doctrine for Nigeria is outside the purview of this chapter. Suffice it to say that from its inception in 1929 to the outbreak of war Nigeria received £250,000 from the CDF. The introduction of CD&W reforms with economic, political and social ramifications undoubtedly signalled a significant shift in policy. In fact, the intended reforms are said to have been novel and far-reaching as well as so beneficial to the colonies that the CD&W Act has been referred to as the "first unselfish act in British imperial history."

Three simple and interrelated questions must be asked at this juncture: (1) Why were these reforms introduced in the first place?; (2) Why at this particular point in time?; and (3) how genuine really was the implementation of the reforms in the war years? In addressing these questions, due cognisance will be given to how existing literature has addressed them. Secondly it will be shown how the particular manner in which the programme was implemented enabled the expatriates to take complete control of the Nigerian political


economy for the first time and the implication which this
development had for the prevalent collaborative nexus. In
particular this chapter will show how this drive for hegemony,
of primarily overcoming the power competition from the
traditional elite, while at the same time depending on the
latter for severe war exactions from the people, ruined the
power of the traditional elite which had furnished expatriate
power in a symbiosis. This development in effect undermined
the collaborative power base of the state and exposed official
expatriates to pressures from Nigerian social forces which the
former sought to address through an increased application of
coercion.

4.1 The Historiographical Context

These questions have received varying degrees of
attention. With regard to the first question, there is a
consensus among historians that comprehensive reforms were
overdue. Scholars' attitude to the second question, i.e., why
enact the act at that particular time (1940)?, is more
complicated, if not confusing. While most scholars agree that
CD&W was connected to Britain's war requirements, they
correctly acknowledge that questions of policy reappraisal
were already being asked before the outbreak of war. In
varying degrees of explicitness, opinion seems to favour the
scenario that the imperial government speeded up, for war
purposes, a plan for colonial reform which was already on the
drawing board. There are however scholars who clearly indicate that, far from representing origins of policy reform, development discussions at the Colonial Office (CO) were nothing more than a response to both domestic and colonial pressures. In support of this view, Lee and Petter point out that just before the war the CO had indicated an awareness that the effective operation of capitalism in the colonies required some sort of welfare or, at least propaganda about welfare. Even though their work is on war and development policy, they eschew the debate on whether or not the war or the expectation of it brought about or speeded up the CO. While equally eschewing this debate, Flint, on the other hand, puts forward a divergent hypothesis to the effect that the CO had been articulating a genuine development policy (since 1938 at the latest) which included an attempt to stimulate nationalism in the colonies. The CO has since been


9The most (possibly the only) obvious expression of this view is J.E. Flint, "Planned Decolonization and its Failure in British Africa," African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 328 (1983), pp. 389-411.
revealed to have been in opposition to reforms at this time. Following the West Indian protests of 1937-38 which Flint suggests led to reform thinking (and which in fact rendered any such reforms most un-altruistic), senior CO officials argued against the appointment of a royal commission of inquiry because they expected such an inquiry to come up with reform proposals. In their view such proposals would "raise hopes doomed from the outset to disappointment: and the consequences in the long run might be most unfortunate.""10 This conservative mindset blights any suggestions that the dynamic for reforms emanated from the CO.

The attempt to bridge the rather unbridgeable gulf between the two above views is particularly confusing. Robert Pearce has in at least three different publications agreed that a policy for colonial reform/decolonization became discernible only well into the postwar years (in 1947), and that reforms of 1939/40 were adopted as an ideological requirement of the war against Germany."11 On the other hand, he also argues that the emergence of nationalism was "prejudged" and has warned (merely on the ground that Bourdillon's request for urgent reforms in 1939 tallied with


some similar opinion in London) against the thinking that the
Second World War was instrumental to the CD&W. Indeed, the
impression one gets in debates of British imperial history is
that on virtually every issue in which there are facts there
are also counter-facts in the mass of colonial archives. In
such preoccupations important questions relating to the
origins and failure or success of policies invariably crowd
out the equally important issue of their social impact on the
lives of colonial peoples -- impact which interacted with
their own inputs into those policies in tandem.

The third question, i.e., how genuine was the
implementation of reforms in the war years?, has rarely been
asked. The reason for this may be speculated: that (1) it is
taken for granted that development and welfare took place
anyway, or (2) wartime was particularly inauspicious for
implementing development and welfare schemes and so no serious
reforms were feasible. By assuming that development and
welfare could not have taken place, the second speculation
deservedly cancels out the first. But because this second
notion is not usually raised in an explicit and systematic
manner, it allows the first assumption to thrive. Pearce, who
deserves some credit for focusing on the operation of the
Nigerian colonial economy during the war, has portrayed the
colonial state as equally devoted to the tasks of colonial
exploitation, and the pursuit of welfare and development.

(assuming that he fully accepts the first) -- rather than pretensions to the second being made as the way of achieving the other.

Unfortunately, those who provide evidence clearly that development and welfare did not happen in this period whether, from the point of policy or of implementation, have done so briefly on their way to arguing other matters. In the particular case of Nigeria which is the focus of this chapter, it was contemporary nationalists who questioned the relationship between the CD&W programme and the reality of its operation. However, populist polemic and their particular class interests heavily influenced the key questions which they asked. One present-day scholar, Njoku, who has investigated the severity of war burden on Nigerians paints the picture of their heroic input to allied war effort with

"Ibid.


little reference to why different sections of the population exhibited varying degrees of enthusiasm. Like many other commentators he tends to have balanced this contribution with whether or not the British appreciated it by acknowledgment and by responding to political and economic demands. The differential impact of, and differential contribution to, the war by different sections of the population have not been sufficiently highlighted. Those who have analyzed the experiences of particular marginalized groups, women in particular, like Njoku above, tend to be oblivious of the supposed operation of the CD&W during wartime. This is understandable only to the extent that the effect of the programme was hardly felt in this period of particular hardship for common Nigerians. Meredith is therefore justified in enclosing the term "development" in quotation marks in his discussion of war-time marketing controls in West Africa. The CD&W in its economic, political and social ramifications in Nigeria has not been satisfactorily investigated. Pearce's focus on the Nigerian economy during


18Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing."
the war is from the policy angle (at the expense of social conditions in Nigeria) and does not explicitly interrogate the CD&W programme. Furthermore, save for a few exceptions, the Second World War period has not been analyzed as a distinct phase of Nigerian history but rather as a mere interregnum.

This writer shares with John Darwin the idea that any study of British imperial policy must reckon with Britain's external policy as a whole. For this reason this chapter will argue primarily (with the Nigerian experience) that the CD&W and constitutional reforms of the Second World war era were inseparable from Britain's war mobilization. Suggestions to this effect have certainly been made, but these are often times conjectural, abstract, unsustained, sometimes

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19 Pearce, "The Colonial Economy."


incoherent and have always been presented as an aside. In particular, this chapter will show the manner in which a supposed period of reform (political, economic and otherwise) turned out to be one of severe economic hardship, and political retrogression and repression. Furthermore, attitudes towards the war by different sections of the population differed remarkably, and in a manner which testifies to the contradictions inherent in the CD&W and ensured the failure of the programme's ultimate goal of perpetuating British expatriate official presence in Nigeria. These contradictions also were instrumental to the de facto rustication from the collaborative nexus of the traditional elite who underpinned the colonial system. This resulted not so much from the social forces which attended the war. The fundamental impetus was the chiefs' role in the ruthless exactions which they made on the common citizenry. Before dealing with the crystallization of the CD&W in Nigeria during the Second World War it is important to begin by establishing the connection between that programme and the war.

4.2 CD&W and War

On the second reading of the CD&W bill on 21 May 1940 the Secretary of State for the Colonies (until a few days before) Malcolm MacDonald declared inter alia

... the proposals for assistance towards Colonial development which are contained in this Bill were not devised after the war had begun. They are not a bribe or a reward for the Colonies' support in
this supreme crisis. They were conceived long before the war. ... They are a part of the normal peace-time development of our Colonial policy, and if we had not been engaged in war, the Government would still have been introducing this legislation in the present session of Parliament.23

MacDonald's statement was a masterpiece. It perfectly suited the mood of parliamentarians who might have genuine interest in colonial development and welfare. Its apparent altruism was even reinforced by the fact that he made it from his newly assigned health portfolio in order to see through the passage of a bill that was dear to his heart and, indeed, the British state to which he was performing a great patriotic duty.

Nevertheless, it contained important contradictions and inconsistencies. He told his parliamentary colleagues that it was time to contribute to the colonies for a change and not just take away from them as he confessed the CDF had done. However, by stressing that the figures of £500,000 (for research) and £5 million for development and welfare were maximum figures which need not be attained during war, not even in peacetime,24 he was driving home the great political benefits of such a programme. At the same time, he assured them that really this programme would not impinge upon British finances. Because this speech was not only targeted at parliamentarians, he informed "the great Colonial audience outside this House that we shall work towards these figures as

24Ibid., Cols 45-46.
far as and as fast as the exigencies of these unhappy times permit." The outstanding question is: why press this bill now in the midst of urgent war matters if he so knew that war was likely to hamper the implementation of the programme? (Predictably, the CO was to claim in 1945 that war had prevented it from implementing a scheme which it had so carefully worked out before 1940."") MacDonald, in his effort to impress the "great colonial audience" how the British state cared for their welfare and development gave virtually all credit to the Chancellor of Exchequer" who the former had in fact managed to impress only with those arguments that bothered on war exigency. And in this modest fashion he even used the phrase: "If this Bill goes through Parliament ..." whereas he had since 30 April anticipated its passage by informing all the colonial governors, a copy of which Bourdillon in Lagos duly received. Official historian, D.J. Morgan, reports that.

The Secretary of State felt that there could be nothing more impressive than to come out a month or six weeks after the declaration of war with a rather big Colonial development policy. It would impress the Colonies; ... rob our enemies of their

25Ibid., Col. 46. Emphasis is added.
27Ibid., Col. 45.
29Hansard, Vol. 361/HC DEB/5s/21 May 1940/Col. 48.
30NA1/CS01/33/239, 30 April 1939.
arguments that we neglected our Colonial Empire and were not fit to have it; and it would impress public opinion at home and neutral countries.\footnote{116}

This MacDonald, who was quoted on good authority as having told the Oxford Summer School of Colonial Administrators in 1938 that self-government would, depending on the state of territories, take generations or even centuries,\footnote{117} cannot be credited with pioneering any far-reaching reforms. The same goes for the Colonial Office where senior functionaries were opposed to even investing marketing board surpluses in the colonies. "[A]s far as they were concerned, accumulation was everything."\footnote{118} One can therefore agree with Porter and Stockwell that the CD\&W was aimed in part at warding off "anti-colonial pressures for change when the war was over."\footnote{119} MacDonald's speech was the high point of a propaganda offensive which can only be appreciated by a look, even if brief, at Britain's international relations.

Recent work of diplomatic historiography leads one to hold that Britain was virtually sure that it would fight a war against Germany since the mid-1930s and had been arranging elaborate plans for propaganda both at home and abroad. For


\footnote{117}Quoted by Bourdillon, \textit{Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria}, 1939, paragraph 6, NA1/MN/B4A.

\footnote{118}Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing," p. 78.

\footnote{119}Porter & Stockwell, \textit{British Imperial Policy, Vol. 1}, p. 20.
this Chamberlain earned the reference, "first prime minister to employ news management in a large scale." As early as 1938 a spokesman for the yet-to-be established Ministry of Information (MOI) was already predicting that propaganda activities "might prove to be scarcely less important than the fighting services." In Africa, particularly, Britain had been trying to cope with German designs. In this diplomatic activity Britain was willing to pay Germany off with some of these territories which MacDonald claimed now in his speech to be one of their "trustees."

Archival evidence lends weight to these assertions in the Nigerian case both for pre- and war-time periods. By 1937 a Propaganda Unit was already on an "experimental tour," serving meals to school children in Lagos. Bourdillon saw "great

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36 Ibid.; Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, p. 17. For detail see Ekoko, ibid.

37 Hansard Vol. 361/HC DEB/55/21 May 1940.
potentialities" in this scheme. In March 1939 the Colonial Secretary instructed Bourdillon on the need to encourage more subscriptions to the Empire Survey Review and reminded him about an earlier instruction that this imperial organ be produced in less technical language for the purposes of wider readership. Hardly had the war started when the governor instructed that African members of the Legislative Council be consulted more frequently because of the war with Germany.

Simultaneous with the preparation of the CD&W bill Bourdillon received his own copy of MacDonald's instruction to all colonial governors that the latter saw to the reception of special broadcast programmes which had been arranged with the BBC. MOI had proposed that the programmes and appropriate wave lengths be advertised seven days in advance of each broadcast and that the programmes be mimeographed and circulated to the local press since "the scheme is regarded as of the first importance." By January 1940 Bourdillon was making further arrangement for "a new radio distribution

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40NA1/CS01/33/224: Bourdillon to Secretary of State, 7 May 1937.

41NA1/CS01/33/234: Secretary of State to Governor, 16 March 1939.

42NA1/MN/B4A, Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria, paragraph 23.

43NA1/CS01/33/239: Secretary of State to Governor, 4 May 1940.

44Ibid., memo from the CO to BBC.
service for 250 listeners." These are indications that deliberate opinion moulding had long been in progress. This reflected the awareness of governors of British policy position about which the Colonial Secretary routinely furnished them. This included information on pre-war parliamentary proceedings regarding the colonial question in which Chamberlain reported on his historic Munich negotiations with Hitler and fielded questions; the need to preserve strategic raw materials; the need to stop carrying British mail to West Africa in German vessels; and contracts for the production of gas masks. Not surprisingly therefore pretences to serious reform correlated closely with Britain's overall strategic agenda -- pretences which were virtually abandoned when the entry of the US and Soviet Union into war indicated even to the non-strategist that Germany would lose the war.

Since there is little material evidence as to the operation of the CD&W during this period one may begin its

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45 Quoted in NA1/CS01/33/241: Crown Agents for the Colonies to Nigerian government, 3 December 1940.

46 NA1/CS01/33/232: Secretary of State to Governor, 23 November 1938.

47 NA1/CS01/33/234: Secretary of State report to Parliament, 16 May 1937.


49 Ibid., "Certification Mark For Respirators Giving Protection against Poison Gases Used in War."
assessment by reviewing the official account which was prepared towards the end of the war. The fact that it is an official statement could not mask the transparent bankruptcy of the programme, and it was significantly entitled Preliminary Statement on Development Planning in Nigeria.\(^a\) It also shows that from the onset the programme was intended to be post-war reconstruction measure with possibilities for the British economy. After the enactment of the CD&W Act and simultaneous deployment of "information officers," the strategy took the forms of labour and constitutional negotiations, and involved a series of delay tactics which involved endless memoranda, feasibility studies and redundant committees.

According to the document, "it was not until 1943 that the subject was again brought up for serious consideration," a delay it blamed on "the general situation in Africa at the time."\(^b\) (It is not clear how the battle of El Alamein, for instance, could have hampered development work in Nigeria.) In that year an Advisory Committee on Economic Development and Social Welfare was established simultaneously with Development Committees in the provinces. A Development Branch in the Secretariat was established as "it soon became apparent" that a country of Nigeria's size and population required a larger


\(^b\)Ibid., p. 1.
organization. As this soon again proved inadequate a still larger branch was established towards the end of 1944 under a Development Secretary with adequate supporting staff." At the same time "a smaller Central Development Board" replaced the original Advisory Committee.52

The document then proudly announced that development in Nigeria had undergone "four main phases" between 1943 and early 1945: (1) the feasibility studies; (2) "rough outline plan" with which the Development Secretary and Director of Public works went for discussions with the CO; (3) eight weeks of discussion which led to the estimation of £35 million to £40 million of expenditure funds for a ten-year plan starting 1945-56 and ending 1955-56 (£1,990,000 was also disbursed immediately early in 1945 for the provision of portable water in the rural areas up until 1950-51); and (4) the completion and integration of existing schemes to be further "broken into a series of regional, provincial, and village projects." The ten-year development plan which followed envisaged schemes for road development, rural and urban water supplies, extension of telecommunications, electrical and hydro-electric development, a building programme, anti-malaria measures in the Lagos area, education, health-care, agriculture, veterinary and forestry.53

Not surprisingly, this litany of committees did not

52Ibid., pr. 1-2.

53For details see ibid., pp. 6-13.
command the respect of the modernizing elite during war-time. Neither did common Nigerians feel the impact of the programme in any positive way. Even after the war Obafemi Awolowo criticized the ten-year development plan pointing out that the CD&W Fund of £120 million worked out £2 per head of the colonial population and that, when distributed over the ten-year period of the plan, it would come to 4s. per head.4\text{4}\text{4}

Colonial reform was aimed principally at co-opting the civil-liberties demanding modernizing elite who had for sometime been perceived to be of increasing importance in society.4\text{4}\text{4}\text{4} For sure expatriates could no more afford to ignore them, certainly not during this dreadful war. If they were promised economic development and political reforms along the lines they had been agitating they could be counted upon to invest their energies and resources (including many newspapers which they published) in the mobilization of the citizenry who were promised welfare schemes. At first this proved effective when the leading members of this class identified themselves expressly with Britain's war objectives. Macaulay and Azikiwe made various public statements to this effect with the latter calling for "concrete action in


\text{4}\text{4}\text{4}\text{4}\text{4} This is reflected in the memoranda of colonial governors. See NA1/MN/C2: \textit{The Principles of Native Administration and their Application}, 1934, pp. 11-12; NA1/MN/B4A: \textit{Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria}, 1939, p. 7.
collaboration" with allied war efforts. However, they soon realized that their expectations for supporting this war their vision of equally concrete action in the expansion and development of educational facilities, promotion of indigenous enterprise and above all those political reforms that would give them substantial say in the political economy in order to crack the expatriate-traditional elite nexus unfavourable to their interests -- were not forthcoming. The artificiality of the CD&W and emptiness of expatriate propaganda became all too obvious.

In spite of the Nigerian Press Regulations of 1940, the modernizing elite then made common cause with labour (which it must be said had never really been persuaded by reform promises), and with Nigerian business. They sneered at Allied war aims, mobilized their press and organized public rallies against the continued presence of British expatriates in Nigeria. They also sought to eliminate the influence of the traditional elite who underpinned this presence. In 1942 K.O. Mbadiwe published his *British and Axis Aims in Africa*. In this book he dismissed as arrant propaganda the declared

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56 For detail see Njoku, "Contributions," p. 167.

57 Apparently the Press Regulations had not been received with equanimity. In December 1940 on the Floor of the British House of Commons Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies George Hall answered at the instance of Mr. Sorensen who had a keen interest on West African affairs that Governor Bourdillon had denied knowledge of any "protests, proceedings or official inquiries" regarding these Regulations. See NA1/CS01/33/240, "Extract from Official Report 4th December 1940," Secretary of State to Governor, 8 December 1940.
yearly amount $1,000,000 of the CD&W Fund and a separate allocation for research. According to Mbadiwe, this amount, if it was for real, would be gulped in the salaries of sure-to-come British cadets. He accused expatriates of fiscal incompetence calling attention to the violation of two principal tenets of public finance, viz, ability of people to pay, and benefits accruing to them from paying. He also criticized the governor who "paid himself," more than $30,000 yearly basic salary. Azikiwe on his part started publishing a series of severely critical of editorial comments in his network of newspapers. He compiled these editorials in a book Political Blueprint of Nigeria in 1943. In the preface of that book he declared that this war "is not our choice and we were dragooned into it, willy-nilly." Azikiwe’s blueprint envisaged a phased withdrawal of official expatriates from Nigeria. It also envisaged a decisive containment of the traditional elite. In the near future "most chieftaincies would have become historic objects fit for study in museums and libraries devoted to ethnological and ethnographic studies."

Expatriates hardly expected these developments. These were serious enough and had to be tackled. Their response was barely coherent: an awkward combination of propaganda,

"See Mbadiwe, British and Axis Aims in Africa.

"Azikiwe, Political Blueprint of Nigeria.

Ibid., p. 22.
concessionary and coercive measures embodied in the Local Defence Regulations. Expatriates seemed however to have appreciated the need to refurbish their propaganda machinery. Cranborne underlined this shift away from crude propaganda in April 1942 when he commenced the practice of sending Empire, the monthly journal of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, to colonial governments. It was hoped that this material might "assist [information officers] to anticipate the trend of comment which may appear in certain sections of the local press." He took care to stress that its contents be not used directly for propaganda purposes. In the previous year "a Lady Welfare Officer" had been employed for work at the tumultuous government colliery at Emigú following the recommendation of the Wormal Report. Strike actions in 1941 and 1942 had compelled the state to grant a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to workers in 1942. By late 1942 a scheme of "welfare for colonial students" in Britain was being put together with Oliver Stanley himself emphasizing its importance. To connect West African students personally with social activities and

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61 NAI/CS01/33/242: Cranborne to Nigerian government, 17 April 1942.

62 The officer was Mrs. Skeates. See NAI/CS01/17/241: Moyne to Nigerian government, 27 February 1941.

individuals in Britain figured prominently in the proposal.\textsuperscript{64}

Since these students were members of the vocal West African Student's Union (WASU) it is not difficult to see that this scheme was geared towards making them amenable to British views. However Mr. Sorensen's suggestion a year later to Stanley on the floor of the House of Commons to introduce an industrial training scheme in Britain for young West Africans\textsuperscript{65} -- something more like CD&W -- does not seem to have been taken seriously.

These tokenistic concessions were carried to the political sphere in an attempt to recover the support of the modernizing elite. Consideration was given to the establishment of Regional Councils in 1942. These would be strictly legislative bodies which would discuss and pass resolutions on any matters of their choice as recommendations to the governor. Their functional role really would be to allow the governor to follow the trend of public opinion.\textsuperscript{66} Also proposed were provincial and lower councils which would in addition to serving as advisory councils to the development and welfare committees, "form the basis for 'election' to the Regional Council."\textsuperscript{67}

In making these proposals Governor

\textsuperscript{64}NAI/CS02/33/243: Oliver Stanley to Alan Burns, 9 December 1942.

\textsuperscript{65}Hansard, Vol. 395/HC DEB/5s/15 December 1943/Col. 1537.

\textsuperscript{66}NAI/NC/A2: A Further Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria, 1942, pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{67}Ibid., p. 5.
Bourdillon asked his subordinates to suffer a change of heart in their divisive schemes for the country. According to him the idea of inciting and encouraging northerners on the path of isolationism in order to alienate them from the "journalist politician" of the south, "the type of young politician who expresses himself in the columns of the local press," was sorely outdated and was not "practical politics." After unsuccessful past proposals for the inclusion of the modernizing elite in the Executive Council by Graeme Thomson in 1930 and Bourdillon in 1939, two Nigerians were suddenly admitted for the first time in 1943.

It must be pointed out that these governors did not make these recommendations based merely on love for reform but in response to real internal pressures to which the London-based CO officials were not sensitive. Bourdillon had pointed out with resignation in 1939:

> It has been our almost invariable practice in the past to postpone political advances of this nature to the last possible moment, only yielding when the pressure becomes too strong to resist. The inevitable result is that what would have been regarded ... as an act of far-sighted generosity, is in the end regarded as a miserable surrender; the unofficial member, from the start, feels that he is an unwelcome intruder, and consequently looks:

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68 Bourdillon believed that such attitude in which even expatriate administrative officers clamoured to represent the north in the central Legislative Council in the absence of English-speaking northerners would serve to perpetuate the northerners in their condition and ensure their domination by the south: see ibid., pp. 3-4.

upon himself as a critic rather than an adviser, an opponent rather than a colleague. It may be said with truth that there is as yet in Nigeria no demand at all for unofficial representation. I agree, but there is very much indeed to be said for making the concession before the demand arises.70

The CO failed once more to hear in good time and so failed in their effort to pocket the modernizing elite. In 1943 indigenes were finally admitted to the Executive Council. In the same year arrangements were concluded for a constitutional conference between the West African editors and CO. In that conference the editors led by Azikiwe earned the chagrin of the expatriates by proposing a timetable for self-government.71

4.3 The Reality of CD&W at the Grassroots and the Decline of the Chieftaincy

To understand the common people's conditions of daily existence in this period it is pertinent to first of all outline the macro-economic context within which they operated. To start with, the war began in a year which had bleak economic prospects for Nigeria. In the years 1938-39 the initial rise in commodity prices after the world depression turned out to be a misleading indicator as prices soon nose-
dived. Unexpected shortfalls from receipts mainly from customs, mining and the West African Currency Board led in March 1939 to proposals to impose tax on companies' income for the first time and to up personal income tax from 1% to 1½%.

As an open economy, Nigeria's trade with the United Kingdom had been on the rise since the Imperial preferences of 1919 and import quotas had ensured that the UK supplied Nigeria more than half of its imports and bought the lion share of its exports.

Therefore, the British government, in recognition of the importance of the imperial trade, tried to consolidate this favourable trend and perpetuate colonialism via the establishment of the Empire Marketing Board in 1937. The idea of marketing boards marked a clear convergence for the first time of economic and political strands of colonial policy as well as gained wider currency with the establishment of the West African Cocoa Control Board (WACCB). Producer prices dropped. But the colonial undersecretary Hall insisted that producers were enjoying "reasonable standards of

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74 Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, Vol. 1, p. 17.

75 Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing," p. 80.
living" and were grateful to the British government which was offering to buy cocoa at a loss.\textsuperscript{76} The WACCB was replaced in 1942 by the West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB).\textsuperscript{77} By 1944 the WAPCB bought up cocoa, copra, benniseed, ginger, groundnuts and palm oil and kernels.\textsuperscript{78} Under-Secretary of State George Hall found it unnecessary that producers of these commodities be represented in these boards. According to him, producers’ interests were not at stake since their prices had been fixed. He went on to claim that the London-based board had three CO officials who were competent to deal with "native matters," and that the Nigerian government had responded to Secretary of State’s invitation and had sent a representative in the person of a former chief provincial commissioner.\textsuperscript{79}

The Nigerian colonial state later in 1948 retrospectively explained that producer prices were "at a level which would

\textsuperscript{76}Hall was responding to Creech Jones who called his attention to widespread disaffection of West African producers. NAI/CS01/33/241: Extract from Official Report of 18th December 1940: West Africa (Cocoa).

\textsuperscript{77}This idea was originally to buy West African produce and keep the surpluses in war-time and then to institutionalize it in the post-war period. Later on, among senior CO officials, interest in the role these boards would play in decolonization was keen and surpassed considerations of "either the mechanics of price stabilization or the overall impact the boards were likely to have in the colonial economies." See Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing," pp. 78-81.

\textsuperscript{78}See NAL/CS01/33/246: Oliver Stanley to Nigerian governor, 12 May 1944.

\textsuperscript{79}Hall had been taken to task on this matter by Mr. Sorensen in August 1940. NAI/CS01/33/240: "Extracts from Official Report of 4th December 1940: West Africa, Cocoa Crop."
serve to ensure maximum production and at the same time avoid, as far as possible domestic inflation [since] money payments in the territories concerned had become wholly disproportionate to the supply of consumer goods. Because of the need to white-wash the board at a point when more bulk purchases were being proposed this statement did not address the root cause of war-time inflation. The stage for inflation was set by the restriction of imports from the non-sterling hard currency countries. Imports from the soft currency countries alone were unable to furnish the domestic market at a time when British imports came in trickles because of a change in emphasis towards British war needs. This was part of the link which the marketing boards had with import restrictions. Underpayment of producers could be rationalized on the basis of inflation control. Inflation was only a secondary concern. After all, nothing could have caused inflation as the export of cassava, Nigeria’s most basic staple, from 1941-43 when it appeared that war would disrupt routes of traditional British supplies of cassava starch from


81Colonial Secretary Stanley on 14 December 1943 reminded Mr. Rostron Duckworth (who wanted to see producer income reflected in West African demand for Lancashire textiles) that only limited qualities could be supplied. Hansard, Vol. 395/HC DEB/58/14 December 1943/Col. 1412.
Java and Brazil.\textsuperscript{82}

These measures had far-reaching impact on Nigerians. This was more so because, even though more money was generated from internal than external trade, in times of commodity glut and/or political difficulty (as in war), an open economy like Nigeria was nevertheless characterized by export income elasticity of demand.\textsuperscript{83} The manner by which these policies marginalized Nigerian middlemen and aspiring entrepreneurs in favour of British capital can be found in existing literature.\textsuperscript{84} The common people of course suffered even more severely.

What operated instead as CD&W (or in place of it) were harsh macroeconomic measures and forms of direct exaction. These were not only aimed at achieving war aims but also expatriate attempts to gain complete control of the political economy for the first time over the traditional elite with whom they had engaged in a long-standing power tussle.\textsuperscript{85} This attempt was largely successful because of the traditional elite's decision to temporarily defer to the expatriate over


\textsuperscript{83}For theoretical and historical discussions on open economies see Hopkins, \textit{An Economic History of West Africa}, pp. 168-186.

\textsuperscript{84}See especially A.O. Olorunfemi, "Effects of War-Time Trade Controls," pp. 677-87. See also Meredith, "State Controlled Marketing"; Pearce, "Colonial Economy."

\textsuperscript{85}See Chapter 3 above.
war measures -- if not for anything else so that Britain would win this war. Their special class interest in this war rested on the uncertainty which Axis victory would have on their position, or even possibilities of any outcomes invalidating British presence in Nigeria. They were aware that this presence sustained their lately widened powers and accumulative base. These would otherwise be undermined by the activities and interests of the modernizing elite, urban workers and dwellers, and the now super-exploited and restive peasants. The contradiction in their position was twofold. First, they perceived their deference to the expatriates as temporary whereas the latter saw this as a permanent fact. Secondly, the traditional elite was singularly yearning for the preservation of the status quo when other indigenous social forces were yearning for change. It is in this context that "contributions" to the war effort should be understood.

It is worth emphasizing up front that the generality of Nigerians did not contribute or support the war out of their own volition. The class which did, the traditional elite, did so unflinchingly for the reasons already outlined and not out of any sentimental consideration as has been suggested. Their support was grounded upon self-interest. Towards this end, they invested their energies, staked their prestige, and even contributed directly from their accumulated surpluses.

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Thus at the launch of the Nigerian War Relief Fund (NWRF) in 1939, while the governor donated £250, Olubadan of Ibadan donated £500. Ibadan chiefs authorized a monthly deduction of £28 from their salaries. By 1945 the Emir of Kano had donated £3,000. It must be admitted that different sections of the indigenous population made cash and other contributions. However, as Njoku’s account shows, the lower income groups were made to do so through a combination of blackmail, intimidation and blatant falsehood on the part of state operators.

To the traditional elite, however, investing huge sums of money in the war was wise business. Otherwise it was a manageable misadventure for, in the last analysis, it came from the sweat of the peasantry. The real loss was that in their ceaseless drive for requisitions, role in military conscription and forced labour, enforcement of price controls on the peasantry and other oppressive measures, they stretched much of the dignity associated with their offices. In Abeokuta Alake Ademola II’s unpopularity climaxed during the war “as a result of over-enthusiastic interpretation of the colonial government’s orders regarding requisition of food.” Women particularly bore the brunt of his operations triggering off a spate of resistance by the Abeokute Women’s

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It must be noted that this fund took Bourdillon less than two weeks after the beginning of hostilities to propose. For a detailed account of the operations of the NWRF see ibid.

Ibid.
Union which eventually forced the Alake from office in 1948.89

A near parallel process occurred in neighbouring Ijebu-Ode. Like the Abeokuta incident, it demonstrates the extent to which the traditional elite was committed to the war and its willingness to apply coercion and intimidation in order to exact resources from the people towards war requirements. It also demonstrates the consequent decline in the prestige of the traditional elite. As a result of state-imposed price control, women garri producers had withdrawn from the open market into black market activities where they could sell for favourable prices. Up until the last months of 1944 these peasant women had largely ignored an order issued by the NA requiring them to sell their product only at the Ijebu-Ode market and no other place. Worried District Officer, I.W.E. Dods complained to the Awujale (King of Ijebu Ode who was the Native Authority) reminding the latter of the prohibition order of April 1943.90 Dods' real intention was to induce the Awujale to implement this order in order to pre-empt the women from withdrawing totally from the market in the event of an impending further reduction of the controlled maximum price. After this order pegged garri price at 5s 6d per 100

89See Johnson, "Grassroots Organizing," pp. 148 54.
90NA1/Ije Prof 1/2648 x Vol. 3. D.O. to Awujale.
lbs. bag and 3d per olodo\(^1\) on 24 November 1944,\(^2\) the women withdrew totally from the market. Many stopped production and those who continued sold in the black market.\(^3\) Awujale summoned a meeting of the women where he entreated them to return to the market. The women bluntly told their king that they would not do so and might instead turn to other activities since garri production would not be worth its hassles at this controlled price.\(^4\) The expatriate officer who was present, seeing that the women had rejected his offer of 3½d per olodo but instead demanded a 4d price, threatened to unleash state coercive resources. The cajoled women said yes. However, the expatriate officer did not have any illusions about this affirmation. He was aware and worried that only some women from only three villages had bothered to attend Awujale's meeting.\(^5\) As he was planning to search the women's homes and confiscate their garri,\(^6\) his superior, the Resident, was requesting the Ibadan based Western Provinces Secretary to permit him to raise the controlled price to 7s 7d

\(^1\)This writer is not sure of the exact size of an olodo but estimates it to contain about 5 lbs. of garri.

\(^2\)See NA1/Ije Prof 1/2648 x Vol. 3. Acting Resident, Ijebu Province to Secretary Western Provinces 29 December 1944.

\(^3\)Ibid., D.O. to Resident, 28 December 1944.

\(^4\)Ibid.

\(^5\)When he made his offer the D.O. dutifully informed the women not to take that as a "sign of weakness." See ibid.

\(^6\)Ibid.
However, the "Control of Prices of Garri Order (No. 2) 1945" reflected only an increase of ½d on the plato while leaving the bag price at 5s 6d."

It is not very clear why this was so." In any case the war was coming to an end when the anti-exploitation struggle would shift to other grounds.

It is however important to observe that the Ajujale's natural aura and coercive presence had rubbed off. This development marked the ironical cycle -- contradictions which characterized expatriate presence in Nigeria. In their bid to consolidate themselves (this war was a colonial war) expatriates relied more heavily on the traditional elite. However, in fulfilling this role the traditional elite lost its power due to overuse. This development eroded the basis of collaborative power and exposed the expatriate faction of state to crisis fuelled by domestic pressures. In 1942 the Emir of Ilorin reclining in his cosy throne, told visiting Governor Bourdillon that his people were prospering, their

97In order to impress his boss the resident while making this request, boasted that he would use force if the women should refuse to accept the offer. NA1/Ije Prof 1/2548 x Vol. 3. Acting Resident, Ijebu Province to Sec. Western Provinces, 29 December 1944.


99Dods referred to "a better attended meeting." Awujale and himself held with the women on 3 January 1945. According to him, Awujale told the women to go back to the market "as he did not wish to see drastic measures taken against them. He spoke very well." Dods also claimed that he told the women that that would be their last chance to put their product to the market. See ibid., D.O. to Resident.
only problem being that Lancashire cloth was becoming dear\textsuperscript{100} -- emir's problem or the people's problem? For the emir to still think like that in this period of severe hardship for the common masses the decay of the chieftaincy was already evident.

The desperate state drive for direct exactions also helped to intensify the pressure. The attempt to raise personal income tax in Ilesha in 1941 from 6s to 7s led to serious "disturbances" for which 34 people were jailed for various terms. Expatriates made spirited attempts to deny that there was an increase in taxation because to accept would signify a failure of policy. Thus the Secretary of the Western Provinces maintained that this was not an increase; that tax had been 7s since 1937.\textsuperscript{101} The questions that arise are (1) why did it take them so long to implement a 1937 tax rate in Ilesha?; (2) how come the \( \frac{3}{5} \) percentage increase which had actually been made in 1939 had not been implemented at Ilesha? There was a lot of inconsistency in this denial. In any case, it was only a public show since the Lagos based Chief Secretary to Government had on 8 May instructed the Western Provinces Secretary just before the tax raise to do so at Ilesha "as a compulsory contribution to the Win-the-War

\textsuperscript{100}Pearce, "Colonial Economy," p. 278.

\textsuperscript{101}NA1/39 421/S1: Sec. Western Provinces to Chief Secretary, 28 May 1941.
A few days later the governor had ordered that Ibadan people be threatened that their income tax would be raised if they did not increase their contribution to the Winthe-War Fund. Against the precepts of English Common Law, many Nigerians who could not, or refused on principle, to pay, were prosecuted on criminal charges, found guilty and jailed at a time of supposed operation of a colonial development and welfare programme.

The severe exactions, disruption of peoples' means of livelihood and family life which attended the war had multiplier social effects in the society. One of these was the spate of vandalism which the poorly-disciplined conscripts of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) meted on the civil population. The colonial state tried hard to conceal these incidents. About 110,000 Nigerian young men were rendered economically unproductive when they were conscripted into this force and some were sent for combat and support duties in scenes of military action in Africa and Asia. Many remained behind in Nigeria and were engaged in reserve duties. Underpaid and sometimes rendered idle, these soldiers constituted a nuisance to society especially from 1943.

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102 Ibid. Chief Secretary to Secretary Western Provinces, 8 May 1941. Emphasis added.

103 See NA1/39 421/S1: Sec. Western Provinces to Chief Secretary, 6 September 1941. The said governor's minute had been written on 13 May.

104 Ibid., William Geary (solicitor) to Secretary of State, 1 September 1940.
of the most serious of such incidents was soldiers' attack on Fulani market people at Kumo in Gombe Division in the north — on 30 March 1940. The resultant clash left two civilians and three soldiers dead. On 30 November 1944 a group of soldiers descended on a passenger train at Lefenwa station at Abeokuta in the south-west, beat up the passengers and vandalized their luggage. One woman dropped dead as a result but the coroner returned a verdict that the woman died of "natural causes." It is worthy of note at this juncture that these incidents bore a pattern in which women seemed to have been most susceptible. One soldier, Ali Lokoja, had early in November 1943 kicked a pregnant woman in the stomach and hit her husband in an attempt to rob her yams at the Jatau market near Auchi. He was sentenced and publicly whipped. This stern measure which was aimed to serve as a deterrent to other tendentious soldiers was sorely belated and ineffective.

Unfortunately, except for those who might have witnessed this incident, soldiers in other parts of the country could

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105 NA1/41837: Resident, Bauchi to Secretary, Northern Provinces, 4 April 1944.

106 Ibid: General Manager, Railways to Chief Secretary to Government, and Secretary, Western Provinces, 18 December 1944.

107 See Ibid: General Manager, Railways to Chief Secretary to Government, and Secretary, Western Provinces, 25 January 1945.

not have known of it. This is because following an earlier incident in Aba in the south-east on the morning of 18 October 1943 the colonial authorities, in their attempt to conceal the crisis from the public, had invoked the draconian Press Regulations of 1940 and prohibited the newspapers from reporting any such incidents. In that incident, irate market people of Eke Oha market had attacked a soldier who had attempted to steal cigarettes. Sixty to one hundred soldiers joined the fray from their neighbouring barracks and began to loot the market of food. The reaction of the Aba civil population to this wanton provocation demonstrates clearly how impatient people had grown to different sorts of exaction and intimidation. They beat up the soldiers, looted the factories and refused to disband. Reporting such incidents was henceforth banned because state operators did not perhaps like it that The Nigerian Herald reported that Major Tee who was commanding the troops, the Senior Superintendent of Police, and who they referred to as "our energetic Native Authority" were seen personally pacifying the people.

This preoccupation with not showing "a sign of weakness" did not help matters. The climax was reached on 31 December 1943 -- barely two months after the Ali Lokoja incident. --

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109 See ibid.: Secretary, Owerri Province to Chief Secretary to Government, 27 November 1943.

110 Ibid.

111 See The Nigerian Herald enclosed in ibid.
when 30 soldiers in Jos attacked the expatriate Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, the District Officer and a police detachment when they tried to arrest three soldiers who had beaten up the NA police.\textsuperscript{112}

The attempt at forging collaboration by means of social engineering had failed. The law of collaboration required real concession in terms of resources (but which were not forthcoming in the circumstances) which boardroom plans and ideology could only complement, not substitute. And so even though schoolchildren could be made to sing homilies on the NWRF as it was made the regular subject of Sunday church services\textsuperscript{113} the reality of hardship was too compelling.

4.4 Governor Richards and Reversal of "Reforms"

The arrival of Arthur Richards as governor in 1943 signified a change of policy. It must be pointed out, however, that changes had already begun during Bourdillon’s regime which had come to an end earlier that year. For example, Bourdillon who had expressed sympathy for workers’ grievances,\textsuperscript{114} suddenly turned against workers. Thus about

\textsuperscript{112}NA1/41837: Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary to Government, 4 January 1944.

\textsuperscript{113}Njoku, "Contributions to War Efforts," p. 167.

\textsuperscript{114}When, for instance, in September 1941 the Railway authorities locked out Michael Imoudu, the president of the Railway Workers’ Union (RWU) and workers of the Mechanical Workshop, "Bourdillon castigated the railway authorities for the mindless lock-out of workers" while addressing the protesting workers at the Race Course. He also assured them
December 1942 he requested from the Colonial Secretary wider disciplinary powers for the railways' general manager. The Colonial Secretary reminded the governor that he himself already had such powers which the latter could delegate to the general manager. Thus on 23 January Imoudu, president of the Railway Workers' Union (RWU) was dismissed, allegedly for misconduct and insubordination. That day also marked the beginning of two and a half years of detention, even though the Colonial Secretary would claim on the floor of the British House of Commons in December 1943 that he had been released.

Since Richards assumed office in 1943 he "firmly and consistently refused to entertain all workers' request for a review of the COLA in spite of the phenomenal rise of the cost of living index." In order to "divide and rule" the workers their outstanding concessions (which included discarding retrenchment measures of the previous decade) would be immediately implemented. Furthermore, Bourdillon acceded to workers' request that Mr. Wilson, the expatriate Chief Mechanical Engineer be removed. See Osoba, "The Development of Trade Unionism," pp. 197-98.

In Oliver Stanley's reply to Bourdillon's request that the railways' general manager be empowered to dismiss African staff with salary not exceeding £400, the Colonial Secretary wondered why the governor was making such a request since he himself had the power to dismiss all pensionable staff -- a power he could easily delegate to the general manager. See NA1/CS01/3/244: Secretary of State to Governor, 1 January 1943.


Oliver Stanley was responding to a question from a critical Mr. Sorensen. See Hansard, Vol. 395/HC OHR/56/7 December 1943/Col.s 792-93.
he even granted an additional "local allowance" to "officials in the Intermediate and Superior Grades of the Civil Service" to take effect from 1 April 1944. This and similar measures would lead to a general strike in February 1945. As if to annoy the modernizing elite Richards, a committed "Lugardian," made his total bias towards the traditional elite very clear. This crystallized in his constitutional proposals of 1945 which aimed to rejuvenate the native administration system.

Insinuations abound in Nigerian constitutional historiography which suggest that Richards' actions were merely a function of his temperamental nature. Placed in their historical context, Richards' actions seem to be perfectly in accord with British colonial policy of the period. They were a measured response to internal developments which threatened this policy.

There are two major ways in which a distressed state


11When Richards had produced a draft of this document he even gave it to Lugard to vet. See Flint, "Governors versus Colonial Office."

responds to societal pressure: reconciliation... coercion. State operators weigh the political environment before deciding on the course of action to emphasize. Sufficient it to say that societal pressures determine the nature of state's response. When confronted with crisis generated by the failure of the CD&W social engineering scheme the Nigerian colonial state leaned the more towards coercion. This trend that had become clearly discernible by 1943. The choice of this particular course was both a preference and compulsion. It was a preference because strategic developments in the war might have encouraged the expatriates to prefer a measure of coercion in order to silence the indigenous social forces, especially the modernizing elite. It was compulsion because the traditional elite's loss of influence rendered the state a true expatriate state and its expatriate functionaries susceptible to danger which intensified application of coercion could serve to ameliorate.

By 1942 both the United States and the Soviet Union had joined the war against the Axis powers. Even though the war had yet to be decided, it did not require the skills of a strategist to confidently project the direction of its fate. At this time the expatriates might have calculated that the support of the urban-based modernizing elite was not worth the range of concessions which their incorporation demanded. As pointed out in the previous chapter, unlike the traditional elite partners of the expatriates whose interests rarely
transcended their domains, the modernizing elites aspired to share in those exclusive expatriate preserves as the administrative and technical services. As a matter of fact they had even begun to ask for a complete take-over of those realms as well as political control. Azikiwe who would lead West African editors to ask for independence in 1943 expressed this tendency clearly earlier that year.

Nigeria yearns for a share in the new world order ... Deny Nigeria these opportunities, and you arraign yourself at the bar of international opinion, to determine whether the spirit behind the weapons of this cataclysmic way of life, and whether this appalling destruction of human life is worth the sacrifice and penalty. 122

This was only a sample of what Azikiwe and other members of the modernizing elite published regularly in many newspapers. This was only just the beginning of such calls.

It is reasonable to suggest that Richards posting to, and actions in, Nigeria were directed as a response to these developments. Far from being a psycho-analytic problematic,123 the Richards factor must be viewed in strategic terms. Of course, he was temperamental. Whitehall knew this. In fact Richards had a reputation of falling out with the modernizing elites of Jamaica. Scholars may today hold that his Jamaican record "reflected unfavourably on his

122 N. Azikiwe, Political Blueprint of Nigeria, p. 73.
capacity to deal effectively with colonial nationalists," or discover that his colleagues knew him as an "old sinister" who "was as angular as his handwriting was blunt." It would seem that from the point of view of the Colonial Office, these traits were precisely Richards' strong points. His posting to Nigeria was clearly a promotion in colonial service terms. One might even stop and ponder on why he appeared in Jamaica in the first instance from his Fijian base in 1938, a critical year in the West Indies. Was Richards an "anti-riot" proconsul? It should also be noted that Richards received staunch support from London in his schemes in Nigeria. Not least, his "Lugardian" constitutional proposals were carried within half an hour of debate in the British parliament.

The choice of Richards for Nigeria at the time was in fact a deliberate departure from serious pretentions to CD&W reforms. Bourdillon, whom he replaced, was the only reformist governor Nigeria ever had. Even though, as has been noted

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124 Coleman, Nigeria, p. 275.


above, the repressive policy had become noticeable towards the end of his governorship, a number of his activities in Nigeria did not make him a natural choice for the execution of the new policy. Just before the war in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary he had "blasted the established notions of financial self-sufficiency and damned the Colonial Development Act."\textsuperscript{126} When he proposed to promote the establishment of an indigenous flour mill in Kano in 1940 -- committing British capital to Nigerian development in this period of CD&W -- the economic adviser at the Colonial Office minuted ominously that "what the Governor is proposing is directly opposite to the principles on which we have been working for a hundred years."\textsuperscript{127} The Colonial Office may not have loved this governor who would tell the Colonial Secretary bluntly that policies were "narrow and shortsighted" and that "His Majesty's Government ... has often paid lip service to our obligations."\textsuperscript{128} While chastizing his subordinates who perceived the modernizing elite as devils, Bourdillon asked in 1942: "Do not the pages of Hansard themselves afford numerous instances of crude thinking, gross ignorance, and self-interest?"\textsuperscript{129} In short, Bourdillon was a critic of the

\textsuperscript{126}Constantine, \textit{The Making}, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{127}Cited by Pearce, "Colonial Economy," p. 280. Emphasis is added.

\textsuperscript{128}See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 279 and 290 (note 123).

\textsuperscript{129}NA1/NC/A2: \textit{A Further Memorandum}, October 1942.
imperial establishment. At 60 he was retired for old age in 1943. This was a contrast from Richards who got "the unusual reward for a career colonial servant of a barony" in 1947 when he had to be retired to make way for the incorporation of the modernizing elite.

The imperial policy of reaction of the Richards era would come face to face with the coalition of the modernizing elite and the masses. The clash between the state and this coalition was the crucible which marked the next phase, 1945-50.

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132 See CO850/185/17: Luke to Bourdillon, 9 September 1943. He was awarded pension of £752 per annum. See CO 850/185/17; Treasury to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 August 1943.


CHAPTER 5
CRISSES:
EXPATRIATE STATE UNDER PRESSURE, 1945-50

The period 1945-50 was one of intense crises in Nigeria. This was a time when the traditional elite had lost much of its power. As has been pointed out in chapter four, this was, in part, due to the power concessions they had made to the expatriates who in the post-war years endeavoured to consolidate their power. It was also, in part, due to the activities of the indigenous social forces -- the modernizing elite, the masses and women -- who for various reasons, and in varying degrees, had viewed the traditional elite as an anachronistic class. With the power of its indigenous faction thus reduced, the state became really expatriate with the British officials exercising more power than before. As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the mechanism which crystallized expatriate power was war-time Colonial Development Welfare (CD&W) Programme. Coleman sees the implication of the resultant statism as rendering the state susceptible to all economic grievances which had not been the case in the days of "laissez faire."\(^1\)

In the immediate post-war years colonialism not only became foreign rule but in fact appeared to be so. Lacking in effective collaborative power the expatriate state was exposed to pressures from the expanding indigenous social forces of

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mainly the modernizing elite and urban workers. This struggle against an expatriate state naturally found sympathy also among rural dwellers. The vanguard of this movement at this time was the National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) which was formed in 1944. The period was critical. This was a period of reaction and yet one of change.

The major issue at stake was the basis of official expatriate presence in Nigeria. Yet it was during this period that political independence or, better, official expatriate withdrawal became irrevocable. The racial problem was brought to the fore and made an official agenda. The friction between the traditional elite and the modernizing elite was played out and resolved in the latter's favour. Radical protest gained center stage, yet Nigeria lost an opportunity to lay the foundations for an egalitarian society. This was a time of unprecedented unity among Nigerians and yet one in which "regionalism" -- which has proved to be an antithetical to unity -- became entrenched in Nigerian geopolitics. (Little more will be said on this particular matter because it has received considerable attention.\(^2\) The most dramatic of these dramatic turns was that the state, which started off the period with a most rigid and intransigent stance on the

modernizing elite was making significant concessions to that
class by the end of the period. The general purpose of this
chapter is to explain these changes.

5.1 Background to Crisis

With the luxury of hindsight one might be tempted to hold
that the changes that occurred as from 1948 had been intended
by the CD&W Acts of 1940 and 1945. The British did not plan
to relinquish their hold on Nigeria before or immediately
after the Second World War.³ "Before 1948 the British
government did not anticipate that a united and independent
Nigeria would emerge for a very, very long time."⁴ No wonder
contemporary Nigerian critics of the colonial system "regarded
1945 as a year of further extension and consolidation of
British imperial power, rather than a year marking the
commencement of imperial withdrawal."⁵

There is little basis, as is rife in Nigerian
constitutional historiography, to suppose that this
development had much to do with the personality of Sir Arthur

³See R.D. Pearce, "The Colonial Office and Planned
(1984), pp. 389-411; The Turning Point in Africa (London:
Frank Cass, 1982). This writer's disagreement with Pearce,
particularly his metrocentric tendency, has however been noted
in the previous chapter.

⁴Coleman, Nigeria, p. 321.

⁵Ibid., p. 283.
Richards who became governor in 1943." As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Richards' factor is best understood in the context of the British imperial programme which at the time aimed at getting a firmer grip on the Nigerian political economy. As has also been suggested in chapter four this tendency became increasingly pronounced during wartime as the British strategic position improved. This writer disagrees with Pearce who tends to suggest that this change came by the grace of Colonial Officials. Like Coleman this chapter will argue that it was the Nigerian social forces which enforced the change that occurred in the course of this period. Unlike the latter and others, however, this writer will eschew ascribing an extraordinary relevance to what Coleman himself has rather crudely termed "the Western impact." Of course, this writer recognizes the significance of external elements.


8Coleman, Nigeria, p. 409.

9Ibid, part 2.
In spite of this, this chapter will focus on the more important role of indigenous social forces. The dialectical linkage between these and external forces is a major problematic for the final chapter.

It is necessary to sketch the currents — latent and manifest — that shaped state policy in this period. The most noticeable of these and which little was done to conceal was repression. After all, in this Cold War climate cracking down on agitators might not outrage international opinion if these agitators could be labelled "communists." The war had barely ended when Richards decided that it was time to "go for zik." This reign of terror was executed in an unbridled fashion until the end of Richards' governorship. Even though there was a marked difference in his successor's (Macpherson) approach which now recognized the need to incorporate the modernizing elite, this particular strand of policy was retained. As Macpherson departed for Lagos in 1947, his last instruction from the Colonial Secretary Creech Jones was: "You have to be tough for the next five years -- I mean physically."1

In this period the system of central bulk purchase of export produce in which producers were paid below world market price was intensified. By 1948 virtually all export produce

1"Pearce, "Governors, Nationalists," p. 298.
had been brought under controlled marketing. This was when oil palm produce, groundnuts, and related oilseeds as well as cotton were controlled.13 (The decision on cotton had been made by March 1946. However, because the US Congress was still deliberating on a loan to Britain it was feared that an early announcement of such policy might jeopardize the loan request.)14 The import of this policy is best appreciated when it is borne in mind, as Meredith points out, that the Nigerian government which had a distinct tradition of low producer prices decided that it was undesirable for producers to enjoy the post-war boom. They should therefore be paid a low price since experience after the First World War had shown that higher prices made them irresponsible and caused inflation.15

The anti-inflation consideration was really brought about by scarcity of imports in Nigeria. This scarcity was in turn brought about by the continuation of the policy which specified that importation would be made only to Nigeria from Britain and the non-hard currency countries in an attempt to


shor up Britain’s hard currency reserves." As one secret political intelligence report put it:

any person or firm can import to Nigeria anything that he can buy in the United Kingdom, the export to Nigeria is permitted by the Board of Trade ... In general, it may be said that as the direction of the export drive in the United Kingdom becomes more effective, exports to hard currency areas will increase and imports of luxury goods to the Colonies will be correspondingly reduced.\(^{16}\)

Importation to Nigeria from the UK was guided by the rather selfish policy that "the Colonies ... only get the surplus that the United Kingdom does not want."\(^{17}\) Thus limited to the stretched UK market, cotton materials, for instance, were reported to be in acute shortage in all four West African territories by the end of 1946.\(^ {18}\) By making this point one is not primarily interested in the desirability or otherwise of imports from the UK. The purpose is to stress that (1) Nigeria received mere crumbs from the UK market; (2) this situation precluded variety and adequate supplies of consumer goods as well as competitive prices; and (3) low producer prices were intended to benefit neither the producers nor the Nigerian economy but that of the UK.

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\(^{17}\)Ibid.

\(^{18}\)CO 537/1515: Brief for the Secretary of State (henceforth S. of S.), 11 December 1946.
Apart from the above macro-economic measures, the state saw and interpreted labour disputes in political terms. Yet it was at pains to urge Nigerian workers to "separate" their economic grievances from the political dispensation. The fact that the state had unmasked sympathy for the expatriate firms which employed a significant portion of the workforce was not lost on the workers. In short, the British at this time still regarded Nigeria as an inalienable booty. This point will become clearer in the NCNC's protest against the "obnoxious ordinances" as considered below.

Expatriate intentions to usurp all powers were crystallized in the Richards Constitution which came into effect in March 1945. Only a few elements of this constitution which have direct bearing on the collaborative nexus will be considered here.\(^\text{19}\) This document, as Sklar has observed, have reflected "a dilemma in British colonial thought" -- an awkward attempt to combine the autocracy of the native administration with electoral concessions to the modernizing elite.\(^\text{20}\) However, together with what the modernizing elite succinctly termed the "obnoxious ordinances" the constitution was meant to marginalize both the latter and the traditional elite. These measures were clearly retrogressive in every respect. As Flint put it, Richards'\

\(^{19}\)For detailed critique of this constitution see Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 271-84; Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 64-81; Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office."

\(^{20}\)Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 59.
original proposals (which remained largely unaltered) "were conservative in the extreme, shifted the position considerably backwards ... and represented a distinct movement towards the 'Lugardian position'."21

In the first place, indigenous Nigerian opinion was not consulted in any way. When Richards finally presented the draft constitution before the Legislative Council (consisting of official and handpicked "unofficial" members) in March 1945, he "urged quick approval in order that the constitution might be considered by [the British] Parliament before the general election in June."22 In Parliament the document was approved in merely half an hour of consideration.23 The constitution's authoritarian bias was hardly veiled. It confined the electoral principle to Lagos and Calabar as had been the case since 1922.24 The new constitution not only excluded all Nigerians outside the two towns from representation, the £50 per annum property-defined franchise

21 Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office," p. 133.

22 Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 275-76.


In fact Richards' original intention was even to scrap representation, to disenfranchise the already small electorate. This provision appeared after minor vetting at the Colonial Office. See Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office," pp. 134, 135 and 139. The overriding consideration for the review (much of which was merely stylistic) was, as Flint himself puts it, a fear of the responses of the Labour Party and Nigerian nationalists [see p. 140]. Yet he still insists that the dynamic for reform lay in the Colonial Office.
also excluded an overwhelming majority of Nigerians even in the two places. Regionalism, which this constitution enshrined, may today be regarded as a political advance. The suitability or otherwise of this arrangement is a debate in itself. What has direct relevance to this chapter is the intention behind the scheme. For some time expatriates had encouraged, instigated and supported the autarkic attitudes of northerners. While warning his subordinates against the dangers of this tendency, Governor Bourdillon had in 1942 demonstrated that that was the surest road to disunity in Nigeria. The significance of this point is that the expatriates knew how to encourage divisive tendency in the country, and that some were already doing just that in the north. According to Bourdillon, part of this scheme was to block out the southern modernizing elite from the north where it should be noted the autocracy of the NA system had prevented an early emergence of this class. However, as Bourdillon (who saw this as "bad politics") was soon removed, the way was cleared for these officers.


26 An offshoot of this policy of aloofness from southerners was the emergence of Sabongaris (strangers' quarters) where southerners were required to reside in northern cities away from the city centers which were reserved for northern indigenes.


28 Ibid.
The contrary seems to have been the general disposition of Bourdillon’s successor, Richards. In his constitutional proposals, the latter specifically envisaged changes based on elective representation for the east and west but not the north. In short, before the impending recognition of the modernizing elite the divisive structures had to be put in place first. Coleman, who sees divide and rule as realism which political practitioners employ from time to time, reviews the general atmosphere of British imperial thinking in the period preceding the constitution.

The fear of creating an "unofficial" majority in the Legislative Council of Nigeria was heightened by the fact that devolution of power to the majority in order to balance power with responsibility would place centrally-minded nationalists over traditional leaders of the native authority system. ... Nigerian officialdom thus had to find a political formula that would not only meet these problems but would also anticipate the ultimate political destiny of Nigeria.

This worked because it tallied with the agenda of certain indigenous social forces. The traditional elite sympathized with a scheme that would check the influence of the modernizing elite. As has been stated in chapter three, the former’s power, influence and interests were mainly based in the domains. They were naturally averse to any alternative scheme like a centralizing arrangement which would further diminish their influence. Most importantly, the scheme worked

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7 Flint, "Governor versus Colonial Office," pp. 133-34.
8 Coleman, Nigeria, p. 272.
because the less influential sections of the modernizing elite found in this arrangement an avenue to influence which they previously lacked. Among the glaring contradictions of the constitution was the conception of the chiefs of the rejuvenated NAs as "unofficial" (indigenous) majorities of the regional and central legislatures.

If this constitution boosted the power of the traditional elite it was only in relation to other indigenous social forces. Aside from emphasizing the autocratic powers of the governor, the constitution was introduced concurrently with four retrogressive ordinances which undercut the powers of the traditional elite in favour of the former. The Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs (Amendment) Ordinance reaffirmed the governor's power to appoint and depose chiefs. Control over Nigerian land and all minerals was vested more firmly in the "Crown" respectively through the Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance and the Minerals Ordinance. And the Public Works Acquisition Ordinance empowered the government to acquire land for public purposes.

Even though the provisions of these ordinances were not entirely novel, they were aimed at "a more thorough application of the principle of trusteeship."\(^3\) When the NCNC delegation went to London to protest against the constitution and the ordinances in 1947 Colonial Office officials made quite a show of "revealing" the ignorance of

\(^3\)See ibid., pp. 282-84.
the delegation which should have known that the Crown meant the Nigerian government. In the immediate post-war circumstances the NCNC protest could have been motivated by "genuine apprehension or ... simple desire to alarm the people [of Nigeria]," linkable to "the idea of a rapacious and exploitative imperialism progressively asserting its control over African minerals and lands." It is not this writer's intention to go into the legalistic or technical implication of the term "Crown." It is noteworthy here, however, that while the term could refer to the Nigerian government, nothing -- technical or substantial -- precluded it from meaning the British government. NCNC's fears were thus justified. It was only by the express interpretation of the term as applied to those ordinances which the delegation necessitated, could it be guaranteed that "Crown" referred to the Nigerian government.

As a matter of fact, the action and thinking of Colonial Office officials lent weight to these fears. It was suggested at a point that the NCNC should be told that Britain, "a civilized state," should rule Nigeria so far as it acquired the latter ahead of other "civilized" states (according to international law!). The "Crown's right to administer Nigeria

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35Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 282-83.
36See the entire CO 537/3555/30658/12.
does not derive from the treaties at all but from [that] right" recognized by international law." However, political expedients did not allow the crude presentation of the British case as espoused in this document. It had nevertheless been decided to place the "onus of further argument" on the NCNC delegation. And so the delegation was told that it had made a mistake by referring to Nigeria as a "Protected State" since there was never anything like a "state of Nigeria." The right term should be "colonial protectorate." The delegation's argument was therefore considered "irrelevant" since it was unable to pinpoint which out of the 400-odd treaties with the Nigerian chiefs it was referring to. Further, it was claimed that the NAs controlled their own affairs, and that in the event of inconsistent claims between them and the colonial administration regarding any treaty a de facto position would be arrived at by "mutual consent." 2

5.2 Further Assaults on the Chieftaincy

As these measures (the constitution and the ordinances)

3CO 537/3555: unsigned memo, 19 February 1948. A reading of the follow-up to this memo indicates that it emanated from the governor's office in Lagos.


4This statement had been prepared a year earlier when Azikiwe had written in his column in the West African Pilot "Inside Stuff" that "British interference in our internal affairs is 'by way of foreign jurisdiction merely and not by way of territorial sovereignty' which is ours by right." See, ibid: Nigerian Legal Adviser to CO, 16 January 1947. Also see S. of S.'s instruction signed by Cypher.
were aimed at the further absorption of the country's wealth and traditional elite's power in favour of the expatriates, they violated a cardinal principle of collaboration -- compromise. They were therefore bound to be shortlived. As some scholars have pointed out, the concurrent enactment of the constitution and the ordinances was fortuitous to the NCNC, the major indigenous political movement of the period. This was because while the constitution was mainly an attack on the modernizing elite, the ordinances reduced the traditional elite to the stature of figure heads. The modernizing elite adopted an uncompromising stance against these measures. Not surprisingly the traditional elite was divided over them. While many of them hailed the constitution, none is on record as having approved of the ordinances. In spite of their differences, a common ground of grievance thus emerged between the modernizing elite and the chiefs. It made things easier for the sections of the modernizing elite to secure and consolidate political bases in the regions. It is also significant that after winning the three available Lagos seats of the Legislative Council by the NCNC/Nigerian Democratic Party (NDP) alliance it was the

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38Coleman, Nigeria, p. 282-284; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 59.

19The Oba of Benin, for instance, is quoted as having commented that the constitution was "without mincing words, the best that Nigeria can have at the present moment." Cited by Coleman, ibid., p. 280. See also Olusanya, "Constitutional Developments," p. 527.
traditional elite members of that coalition, Chief Amedu Tijani and Chief Olayemi Aluko, who spearheaded the move to boycott the council until the repugnant constitution had been amended.\(^{40}\)

The above case does not signify that all traditional rulers had abandoned the expatriates or that a community of interests between them and other indigenous social forces had been consummated. Not even the emergence of the Yoruba Egbe Omo Oduduwa and Ibo State Union in this period could ensure this. According to Sklar, both ethnic societies were created by members of the modernizing elite and "certain far-sighted chiefs -- who perceived that the locus of economic and political power was not local but regional and national."\(^{41}\) And so, in spite of these developments, it was during this period that the rivalry between the two groups came to a head.

Similarly, the unpopularity of the traditional elite which had intensified during the Second World War climaxed. Once in February 1948, the Alake of Abeokuta had barred his Achille's heel since the war, Mrs Fumilayo Ransome-Kuti, from a meeting. In turn, Mrs Kuti and her women followers prevented the traditional ruler, the Resident and the District Officer from coming out after that meeting. However, the

\(^{40}\)This conclusion is drawn from Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, p. 62.

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 72.
police later dispersed the protesters. The Alake's debauchery and maladministration had become so transparent that his fellow chiefs and expatriates could no more stick out their neck for him. In his long reign he had made tremendous wealth. He was a big landowner. He owned houses in various parts of Abeokuta. As a usurer he took his clients' houses as security collateral. He even made himself "corner" of English salt "and cut out the local market." In the face of political defeat he expressed disappointment that those whom he had "assisted" in their financial difficulties (his victims) had not shown any gratitude. In June 1948, the government thought it wise to advise him to leave the scene temporarily. From his Jos exile he bribed influential Ogbon i chiefs in order that they would not demand him to abdicate upon his return. Undaunted and encouraged by the Alake's unpopularity, they still asked him to abdicate. The Alake had to sign the instrument of abdication on 20 September. This was not published immediately because the expatriates still hoped that the mediation of Ooni of Ife would save the beleaguered King. According to a secret political intelligence report, the Ooni intervened because he and other chiefs were aware that it [was] only under British rule that a Yoruba chief's tenure of office has assumed any

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42 CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Political Intelligence Reports, West Africa, Nigeria (Possum No. 24), March-April 1948.

43 See ibid., Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

44 This information is derived from ibid.
degree of permanency: in the good old days, the people's loss of confidence in a chief ... was tactfully conveyed to him by a gift of parrot eggs and his suicide followed hard upon it. "

This is clearly illustrative of how British involvement in Nigeria led to unprecedented dictatorship and insensitivity of the traditional elite to the conditions and views of the local populations. It also explains the people's dissatisfaction with the chieftaincies and the colonial system in general. The failure of the Ooni, reputed to be the spiritual head of the Yorubas in his mediatory role, is illustrative of the decline of the chieftancy. In the aftermath of Alake's fall, the "women's flat rate tax" which Mrs Kuti and her party had agitated against was abolished. " The Alake had left a huge gap in the coffers of the Abeokuta NA. Early in 1949 it was reported that not even "certain minor increases in other taxation" and a ten per cent cut in expenditure could save that NA's budget from a yearly deficit of over £10,000. "

A near similar development was concurrently unfolding in neighbouring Ibadan which requires some consideration. In this case the battle line was drawn between the Nigerian

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46 CO 537/2649: ibid (Possum No. 27). It is however inaccurate to claim as this report has done that in the pre-colonial period a chief's suicide "usually occurred about three years of his reign." Actually, many remained sufficiently acceptable to their people to allow them a long reign.

46 CO 537/2679/14355/6, part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No.3, 14 January 1949.

47 CO 537/2679/14355/6 Part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No.3, 14 January 1949.
Farmers' Union (NFU) and the Maiyegun Society on the one hand and the Olubadan of Ibadan on the other. This case typifies what one may call a petty-bourgeoisie struggling for self-expression against an anachronistic order. In 1948, the government decided to address the menace of the swollen shoot disease in cocoa. It thought that the most effective way of doing this was to have all diseased trees cut down. This gave the members of these societies, many of whom were absentee landlords, an opportunity to square with the state and its marketing board. As middlemen, the members of these societies offered higher prices to smaller cocoa producers in their drive to outbid the government-favoured Association of Nigerian Co-operative Exporters. They seem to have been popular among the farmers.

By mid-1948, the government had not fulfilled its demand of increasing cocoa price to £165 a ton at par with US price. The NFU and the Maiyegun Society together with smaller farmers would not allow trees to be cut unless this condition plus a ten shilling compensation for each tree cut had been met. In addition, they threatened to hold up cocoa supplies by October if these conditions were not met. They physically resisted the cutting of their trees by government labourers. They were so determined that the Olubadan and his council, seeing that

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49CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
49 Ibid.
trouble was underway, suspended the tree cutting exercise." A delegation of pressmen and farmers were sent to the Gold Coast (obviously sponsored by the state) to witness how successful tree cutting was taking place there. Their campaign upon their return and the persuasion of Awolowo, the lawyer of the Maiyegun society, as well as a compensation of 2 shillings and six pence could only split the society. A faction led by Mustapha Alli and the NPU led by Akeredolu-Ale did not budge.

The state and its sympathizers unnecessarily portrayed this incident as having resulted from farmers' ignorance. The issue was rather one of principle. The members of these societies and the farmers that followed them were not averse to the idea of cutting sick trees. They were simply asking for sufficient remission for their trees. A compensation of 10 shillings was not too much to demand from the state whose marketing board had underpaid producers for years. Apart from this, the state had become so monstrous and untrustworthy that its policies were understandably treated with scepticism.

However, these groups' opposition to the Olubadan undermined the authority of the monarch. They had even passed a vote of no confidence on the king. These activities

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55Ibid., Possum No. 26, August-September 1948.

56Mustapha Alli, who was the society's treasurer, actually accused the president Latorera of selling out. See ibid., Possum No. 27, 1948.

57CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May July 1948.
which caused ripples within the state,\textsuperscript{51} were characteristic of widespread grievances against the state. There was also popular disenchantment against traditional rulers in Benin, Ijebu and Ondo.\textsuperscript{54} Agitations in Ijebu Province, for instance, made ostensibly against taxation, were in fact the people's calculated move to cause their rulers to abdicate.\textsuperscript{55} These protests were instrumental in the abolition of the NA system in the west in 1949. In the east it had become moribund for many years. Even in the north described as indirect rule's "original home,"\textsuperscript{56} and "ideal laboratory,"\textsuperscript{57} the emergent modernizing elite had become impatient with this "occult science."\textsuperscript{58}

It was Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the man who would become Nigeria's first prime minister, who first voiced this long restrained discontent in the Northern House of Assembly in

\textsuperscript{51}This issue figured prominently in the secret political intelligence summaries of this period as one of the serious threats to state security. See the preceding three notes.

\textsuperscript{54}CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 26, August-September 1948.

\textsuperscript{55}CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary; West African Intelligence Summary No. 3, 14 January 1949.

\textsuperscript{56}L.P. Mair, 	extit{Native Politics in Africa} (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 188.

\textsuperscript{57}Don Taylor, 	extit{The British in Africa} (London: Robert Hale, 1962), p. 91.

1950. He condemned in strong terms the despotism and corruption which were associated with the system. He wondered why a system should be in place when ordinary people were ignorant of the rights, powers, duties and obligations of its functionaries. This system "has outlived its usefulness so long that it now constitutes the chief barrier to our progress." He declared further

We cannot afford to stagnate; we must go forward. This I maintain is quite impossible with the present machinery of government and the sooner this is recognized and admitted, the sooner we shall take our place unhampered by the legacy of an age that is past. 59

It is easy to agree with Ahmadu Bello that this was the most important speech to emanate from the Northern House of Assembly. 60 But this was made in moving a motion for the reform of the NA in order to accommodate the modernizing elite. 61

5.3 Expatriate State Challenged

To fully appreciate the state's response to crisis it is imperative to consider the activities of the vehicles through which Nigerians challenged that expatriate state in this period. For the purposes of this chapter only the major

59 The test of this speech is transcribed in Clark, A Right Honourable, pp. 136-44.


61 See Abubakar's speech. A Right Honourable, p. 140.
movements will be considered: the NCNC, the Zikist Movement and the trade unions which were either dominated or influenced by the Zikists. The NCNC will only just be mentioned here because something has been said about it already and it has featured regularly in existing literature. It was an expression of what Kilson calls the "elite-mass nexus." Discrimination against Nigerian business, the marginalization of the modernizing elite in employment, poor work conditions and pay, and underpayment of peasant producers for export produce were only some of the grievances which drew different sections of the population closer.

It was easy for the modernizing elite to convince the masses that the way out of these difficulties lay in the expulsion of the expatriate state. From 1944, when it was formed after "a call from the youth," the NCNC attracted the newer breed of the modernizing elite and initially city masses. By the end of the war its influence had penetrated the countryside. As a congress it accepted membership from organizations rather than from individuals. It attracted labour, ethnic, sports, students and other associations. Most people favoured this group at this time over the evanescent


"The spur for the formation of this congress was the initiative taken by members of the Nigerian Union of Students who prevailed on Azikiwe and some other prominent members of the modernizing elite. See Coleman, Nigeria, p. 264."
Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) because the former articulated a case for the urgent rustication of official expatriates from the country. Many of these grievances were articulated through the media of Azikiwe’s group of newspapers.

It must not be forgotten that added to these grievances was racial discrimination. To say that Azikiwe deliberately fomented racial conflict is characteristic of a Colonial Office noted for its double standards and tendency to personalize crucial issues in an attempt to trivialize them. What he and his colleagues did was merely to exploit the actual existence of real racial discrimination (and all other forms of oppression) which became increasingly pronounced during Richards’ reactionary era.

The racial matter was brought to a head by the Bristol Hotel incident. This involved discrimination against a visiting black Colonial Official in February 1947. Flint has already studied this in some detail.\textsuperscript{64} Ivor Cummings was a high ranking official of the Colonial Office Welfare Department.\textsuperscript{65} Cummings, a black Briton on tour of Nigeria with J.L. Keith, head of the Colonial Office Welfare


\textsuperscript{65}Flint describes him as "a Principal in the Colonial Office Welfare Department, and assistant to its head." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86. The \textit{West African Pilot} of 27 February 1947 described him as the "Director of Colonial Scholars." See CO 537/1917/11501/12: Colour Discrimination in Nigeria.
Department, was refused a pre-booked lodging at the posh Bristol Hotel in Lagos. The hotel's Greek manager had told Cummings at the desk that "I have no objection to Africans living here, but the Europeans object." A group of the modernizing elite who had gone to the hotel to receive the visiting officials witnessed this event to their chagrin. The Daily Service of 28 February called for a declaration of policy against racial discrimination. The Pilot was characteristically forceful. It editorialized that the Bristol Hotel affair should serve to show the foreigners in our midst the depth of the feelings of the Africans over the idea of Jim Crowism which had long existed here. The fight against the Greek man, we dare warn, is to be but the beginning of a long struggle to exterminate the horrible practice of colour discrimination completely in this country. We are not under any illusion as to what the nature of the struggle will be. ... this land of Nigeria is the land of the black man. ... The blackman's hater in the blackman's land must be sent packing.

The "Colonial Students of Newcastle" and the WASU wrote to the Colonial Secretary expressing their indignation with the latter and calling for the expulsion of the hotel's manager. Azikiwe, according to Governor Richards, "sent

"See Daily Service, 28 February 1947 attached to ibid.
"The West African Pilot, 28 February 1947, attached to ibid. Emphasis is added.
"Ibid: Colonial Students of Newcastle.
"Ibid: WASU to S. of S.
telegrams to various places outside Nigeria." The ensuing ripples and embarrassments led eventually to a state declaration against racism. Richards did this while addressing the first meeting of the Legislative Council under the new constitution."

This policy statement does not, however, indicate an overriding concern against racial discrimination. Richards' regime in fact sanctioned it. When Keith and Cummings first arrived in Nigeria, they were quartered separately: Keith (a white) in the home of a European officer of the Nigerian Education Department, and Cummings in the home of Dr. Abayomi, "a well known African medical practitioner." This drama unfolded because upon their return from a tour of the provinces, one Stooke in charge of government lodging had been prevailed upon by Keith to quarter him and Cummings together since separating them from each other hindered their work."

Furthermore, Richards, who ignored the Colonial Secretary's advice to apologize to Cummings," was rather more concerned that the press and Azikiwe's reaction had prevented Cummings and Keith from exercising "discretion" over

\[71\text{Ibid: Richards to Lloyd, 28 February 1947.}\]

\[72\text{Reuters news despatch enclosed in ibid.}\]

\[73\text{See ibid: Richards to Lloyd, 28 February 1947.}\]

\[74\text{See ibid.}\]

\[75\text{See ibid: Lloyd to Richards, 9 April 1947.}\]
the incident." Rather, he advised that if Cummings felt aggrieved he should institute a civil action against the establishment. The determination of such a case in Cummings' favour, according to Richards, would lead to his considering whether or not to withdraw the hotel's license." Even then, the anachronistic governor informed the Colonial Secretary that

If such facts were established, however, I should not feel justified in making Deportation Order under Section 6 (b) of Chapter 158 against the proprietor, thus depriving him of his means of livelihood."

Keith, himself, while noting that Nigerians were using the incident as "a stick to beat the Nigerian Government," managed to chip in that "the Government were not as helpful as they might have been." And Sabben-Clare at the Colonial Office could not "understand why somebody high up in Nigeria did not insist on putting Mr. Cummings up after the incident." Even the Colonial Office's reaction seems to have been influenced mainly by the calculation that racial discrimination was "making for the embitterment of the more

educated coloured people."

This line of thinking influenced the racial relations policy that followed. Much fuss was made at the Colonial Office about Cummings’ bourgeois background. Sympathies were more for a discriminated "gentleman" than for a discriminated blackman. The hypocrisy of the whole thing lay in the fact that, even though racial discrimination had been in existence, only the Cummings’ affair was considered to be issue enough as it seems to be the only such recorded incident in the Public Record files. Even Richards’ declaration on racial integration before the Legislative Council could not in practice have been effective because of its bourgeois bias. According to him,

Divisions which have their origin in different social and economic standards are inevitable but divisions based on race where the social and economic standards are equal cannot be supported. … Present accommodation, formerly reserved for Europeans, will in future be open to patients of any race whose social and economic standards are similar and who are able to pay. … I have taken these few examples and I have spoken frankly. I trust gentlemen that you will accept my assurances in the spirit in which they have been offered. It takes two sides to make a friendly co-operation.

The impression one derives from the whole affair is that the British saw that the racial factor could and was a common

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81Ibid: Lloyd’s minute for Sabben-Clare’s attention, 22 March 1947.

82Ibid: Reuters news despatch. Emphasis is added. "Richards did not mention a European club at Ikeja in his address to the LegCo." Ibid: Lloyd’s minute for Sabben-Clare’s attention, 22 March 1947.
ground for unified action among indigenes, and moreso, between
the bickering factions of the modernizing elites. They
therefore hurried to arrest the trend by emphasizing the class
incorporation of the latter. Going by Richards' statement,
there is little doubt as to the connection between racism and
class in a country where the overwhelming majority of
indigenes were sapped and exploited with Europeans feeding fat
on their sweat and resources. The so-called policy on racial
integration had by-passed the greater majority! It however
"marked the beginning of a long series of government
concessions" 81 -- to the modernizing elite.

5.4 Militant Protest

No account of post-war agitation in Nigeria can afford to
bypass the Zikist Movement. Its activities are well-known and
have recently been the subject of a PhD dissertation. 84 The
movement clearly articulated an alternative to constitutional
demands which had bogged down the political parties dominated
by the modernizing elite. Even though its detractors in the
colonial state described its members as "irresponsible young

81 Coleman, Nigeria, p. 293.

84 E.E.G. Iweriebor, "Radical Nationalism in Nigeria: The
Zikist Movement and the Struggle for Liberation, 1945-1950,"
PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1990. Also see T. Abdul-
Naheem and A. Olukoshi, "The Left in Nigerian Politics and the
Struggle for Socialism," Review of African Political Economy,
No. 37 (1986), pp. 64-80; Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 296-302;
Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 97-100; Olusanya, The
Second World War, pp. 112-23; Sklar, Nigerian Political
Parties, pp. 72-83.
as long as it existed the movement remained a potential instrument for liberation struggle in Nigeria. Its emergence in 1945 epitomized contradictions of not only expatriate presence in Nigeria but also of the nationalist movement itself. The movement was composed of "angry young men of post-war Nigeria," who conceptualized NCNC's clarion call for the overthrow of the colonial government in idealistic terms. They had different ideological persuasions: socialists, communists, nihilists, populists and downright opportunists. They were a mixed grill of more politically conscious ex-servicemen, middle and junior ranking workers of both the civil and public services, journalists and similar occupations. In the main, they were educated but of the non-university type, all young in their twenties and imbued with forceful eloquence. Above all, they were unanimous in their rejection of ethnic politics which they saw as a negative invention of expatriates and their indigenous allies. Before the leftists among them became impatient with Azikiwe's gradualist approach they believed that he embodied non-ethnic politics and should be encouraged. However, Azikiwe himself had nothing to do with the formation of the movement; it was

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85 CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, West Africa, Summary No. 3, 14 January 1949.

86 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 72.

87 See Abdul-Raheem and Olukoshi, "The Left in Nigerian Politics"; Coleman, Nigeria, p. 296.
founded by Kola Balogun." In short their "patriotic idealism ... could not be reconciled with the tribalistic and self-seeking tendencies of the middle class nationalists to whom they looked for leadership." As one of its leaders, Mokwugo Okoye, a 24-year-old ex-serviceman once pronounced from the dock in March 1950: "We are products of historical processes and not miscreants of society ...."

The Zikist movement was militantly active throughout the five years of its existence between 16 February 1945 and 13 April 1950 when it was banned.

The irony of the colonial situation was that the movement's first major clash with the state occurred towards the end of 1948 when the latter had begun to introduce reforms. This irony also helped to nail the movement as the modernizing elite opted for co-optation to the state which these reforms entailed. More than any other indigenous groups, Zikists saw clearly the diversionary intent of these reforms. They "were not impressed by nor content with the reforms of 1948."  

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"CO 537/3649/47272/2/A, J.O. Okeiyi (Secretary, Kano Branch of the Zikist Movement) to Resident, Kano, 11 September 1948.

"Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 72.


"See Nigeria Gazette, Vol. 37, No. 21, 13 April 1950. CO 537/5807/30824: Nigeria, the Zikist Movement.

"Coleman, Nigeria, p. 296.
It was also in this year that the incongruence in ideologies between the movement and Azikiwe crystallized. This is not to suggest that Azikiwe himself was completely enamoured by these reforms. Specifically, his major gripe with the reforms was not one of principle as such but the state's calculation to undermine and infinitesimalize his influence and deny him the credit he felt was his. Zik was particularly piqued that he had been sidetracked in the selection of the Constitutional Conference delegation. A reflective secret official report calculated that

Zik may have given past cause to those [most likely elements of state] who lobbied against him, but they little know what political damage they have done. If Zik's hard work had been acknowledged and if he had been selected to go to the Conference and after all, he had a good claim to a place as the representative of an important section of public opinion -- he might have modified his opposition to Government. Now, if he has not exactly been driven, he has at least been presented with the excuse ...”

Not surprisingly, his attitude to the reforms was not likely to be one and the same with that of the movement even though both shared the idea that the British were playing one ethnic group against the other. He was unwilling to go as far as the movement would go in dealing with the state. Besides, there were behind-the-scenes discussions between Zik and highly placed state officials featuring both the stick and carrot. This is a study for the next chapter.

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93 CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Political Intelligence Reports, West Africa, Nigeria, Secret No. 24, March April 1949.
The first major rumbling of Zikists' deviation from Azikiwe occurred soon after the "Accra riots." The Zikists admired the action of the Gold Coasters. In their view, the leadership of the Gold Coasters believed in action as opposed to the Nigerian leadership which just talked too much. Through Azikiwe's group of newspapers which they seem to have dominated, they mounted a propaganda campaign to the effect that the Accra incident had rendered self-government imminent in the Gold Coast. By this they were telling Nigerians that violent action was the most effective means of expelling the expatriates. This campaign was credible to many Nigerians. It is necessary to quote a secret intelligence report in some detail because it not only shows the efforts of the Zikists but also gives an insight into the general existential conditions in the country.

Interest in the ["Accra riots"] might have waned were it not for the fact that certain elements mostly connected with the NCNC began to use the prevalent economic ills to stir trouble. The main planks in the propaganda platform were the price paid to farmers for cocoa compared with the price obtained for it overseas; conditional sales and the black market, believed to be organized by Europeans, for their own profit; the high price of imported goods arbitrarily fixed by Government for the benefit of Europeans; the belief that the UAC and Government are hand in glove in exploiting Africans and, of course, the iniquities of the AWAM. Attempts were made to make the people believe that only boycott and rioting could these evils be remedied.93

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95 CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 24.
However, because of the colonial state's tendency to personalize issues and to think that Azikiwe and the movement were indistinguishable, its secret intelligence dismissed this as a sign of trouble. They based their calculation on the fact that Azikiwe had envisaged that self-government would materialize in 15 years time. What's more, the state believed that Zikists as "irresponsible young men" had "negligible personal following." The futility of this view is best discussed below while discussing the general impact of their movement. The movement through one of its national officers Osita Agwuna made "A Call for Revolution." Its national president Mallam Raji Abdullah called for "positive action." He declared:

I hate the Union Jack with all my heart because it divides the people wherever it goes ... it is a symbol of persecution and domination, a symbol of exploitation and brutality ... We have passed the age of petition ... This is the age of action -- plain, blunt and positive action.

This was a call on Nigerians to flout the authority of the expatriate state, to stop paying taxes to the government since it would be used in their further subjugation. They were advised instead to pay their taxes to the NCNC. Agwuna and

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96 See CO 537/3659/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

97 CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence, West African Intelligence Summary No. 3, 14 January 1949.

98 CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 27.

99 Cited by Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 98.
Abdallah and other Zikists were arrested. The Zikist headquarters then directed all regional organizers to focus the masses' (mainly workers and market women) attention "towards one common central danger -- the British Government." By December 1948, unless Zikists on trial had been released, mercantile houses, prisons, post offices and police barracks should be attacked and police rifles seized. Meanwhile the Zikists had prevailed on the NCNC emergency "national cabinet" meeting in December at Kaduna to endorse "action on the line of the instructions" of the proposed "positive action." Zikists on trial declared that a revolution had begun in Nigeria and that the government would be overthrown by force.

Azikiwe's fence-sitting posture was partly responsible for the non-attainment of Zikists' final objective. The more immediate cause would seem to have been the permeation of their ranks by government agents. Zikists themselves seemed to have realized this. Hence the reported formation of a National Youth Liberation Movement. Its object was secret but the state did not entertain any illusions as to what its character would be. It felt concerned because the new movement was being spearheaded by the more radical elements

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100 CO 537/3557/30767: Arrests on Sedition Charges and Nigerian Political Situation, Unsigned Zikist Circular, 11 November 1948.

(which it described as the "more extreme and irresponsible . . .
of the Zikist Movement, the anti-Pakistan Movement and the
Yoruba Federal Union.")

... it is clear from the title and from the
individuals associated with it that the members
fancy themselves as a "terrorist" party. ... this
new society is potentially dangerous and may form a
focal point around which the extremist elements can
gather (because it arose from a cleavage between the)
less immoderate and the more extreme elements
of the Zikist and kindred movements.¹⁰²

It would seem, however, that radical Zikists paid more
attention to rejuvenating their movement and taking a firmer
control of it than forming a new one. It was this time that
the radical unionist Nduka Eze, a young man in his early
twenties and gifted with exceptional organizational ability,
took over the acting presidency of the movement. The
ascendancy of Eze resulted in the fusion of the labour
movement and the Zikist Movement at that time (1948) when the
major union body, the Trades Union Congress (TUC)
disaffiliated from the NCNC. This is not the first time the
Zikist Movement and labour would be acting in concert. In
this critical year, 1948, labour was fusing with the Zikist
Movement itself under the double influence of Eze whom secret
intelligence reports described as "an avowed Communist."¹⁰³
At the time Eze, a prominent Zikist, had been the president of
the largest single union, the Amalgamated Union of UAC African

¹⁰¹Ibid.
¹⁰³CO 537/364947272/2/A: Possum No. 27, 1948.
Workers' Union (UNAMAG), which he had formed. Because of his disagreement with the TUC's move he formed the Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL). By this move Eze, who was also a member of the NCNC Cabinet, accomplished his dream since 1946 of "linking the labour movement to the Zikist Movement for revolutionary action."\(^{104}\)

This development affected the state's response to the Enugu miner's incident of 1949. On that occasion 29 miners were shot dead and many others wounded. This triggered a flurry of events. It greatly embarrassed the state and presented it with a set of challenges. This incident also led to a national coalition (if temporary) of different factions of the modernizing elite, labour and other indigenous forces. This coalition resulted in the National Emergency Committee (NEC). The Zikists had instigated the miners not to allow certain cases of mining explosives to be removed from the stores for if they were removed the colliery management would feel free to renego on the arrears of payment due to them, and even sack them. In reality, however, the Zikists needed those explosives for a showdown. The fact that 30 cases of those explosives had been stolen already\(^{105}\) scared state operators.

The incident provided Zikists with further reasons to organize mass violent protests in Aba, Onitisha and Port

\(^{104}\)For detail see Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, p. 76.

\(^{105}\)Coleman, *Nigeria*, p. 299.
In their national conference held in Kaduna in December 1949 the Zikists passed a vote of "no confidence in the British Government which has become destructive to the ends for which governments of people are instituted."\textsuperscript{106} They also resolved to, among other things, withhold tax payment from government but instead to pay tax to national organizations in order "to paralyse Britain's economy"; institute a military training programme for young Nigerians\textsuperscript{107}; and "to carry out reprisals bordering on assassination of British officers viz, Commissioners, Residents, Governor, Chief Secretary and so on."\textsuperscript{108} Settlement with Britain was predicated on conditions which in fact not only amounted to immediate expatriate withdrawal but also to payment of compensation for past misdeeds.\textsuperscript{109} The crackdown on the movement which followed and which pre-empted the consummation of their plans should not detract from the impact of the movement in the struggle against the expatriate state. It was by far the most impressive demonstration of the will for self-determination and it had succeeded in exposing the contradictions of expatriate presence and the methods of the modernizing elite. The movement left some important

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106}Cited by Iweriebor, "Radical Nationalism," p. 386.
\item \textsuperscript{107}Ibid., p. 388.
\item \textsuperscript{108}The plan also included the destruction of all "storage centers, Government Houses, Government departments and so on." Cited in \textit{ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{109}See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 386-87.
\end{itemize}
legacies which need to be reviewed briefly.

5.5 The Legacy of Militant Protest

In the first place, the movement refused to recognize the legitimacy of the expatriate state. To this end it was the resolve of its members not to plead before any law court but instead to use the occasion of each prosecution to espouse the overthrow of the expatriate regime. In this respect, their general secretary Mokwugo Okoye once described the government realistically as the "uninvited, unwanted and unwelcome government" in a marathon address of a court characteristic of Zikists on trial.\(^{110}\) It was their view as Abdallah announced in a 90 minute address from the dock in 1948, that the matter was a case between Britain and Nigeria.\(^{111}\) Okoye wondered why it was necessary for the state to search Zikists' houses in order to discover that they were committed to its overthrow.\(^{112}\) These were fundamental questions which the hackneyed propaganda of the colonial state had tried to avoid all along. Who should be judge and who should be plaintiff? was their central question.

Furthermore, credit for the flashes of activism and people orientation of the NCNC must go to this movement. In

\(^{110}\)Cited in ibid., p. 401.

\(^{111}\)See Reuters news despatch, 23 March 1950 in CO 537/5807/30824.

\(^{112}\)Iweriebor, "Radical Nationalism," p. 401.
large measure, the movement was the conscience of that party. Its members were instrumental to the success of NCNC’s national tour of 1947 which was aimed at securing grassroots support against the Richards constitution and the obnoxious ordinances. During this tour the NCNC received petitions from Nigerians which was a demonstrative repudiation of the legitimacy which the expatriate state claimed. Their stance also influenced the constitution of the NCNC national cabinet.

The politicization and militancy of the labour movement during this period cannot be extricated from the activities of this movement. Even domestic servants were mobilized to demand for improvement in their work conditions and remunerations with some success. Just after the "Accra riots" Nigerian radicals came closer to a revolution than they actually realized. State operators knew that

The trouble-makers certainly managed to put Lagos on edge [and] ex-servicemen were prompted by the general feeling of unrest to become very vocal over their grievances. For some days the tension was such that a small incident might have led to an explosion.

Unknown to Nigerians, a march which would have triggered off violent incidents had begun by the soldiers of the Base Ordinance at Yaba, Lagos, in mid-March. Only the timely intervention of the District Commander who appealed to them to withdraw saved the day. A secret intelligence report

113See CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 24, 1948.

114Ibid.
attributed this incident to the publicity given to these soldier's grievances in Zik's press.\textsuperscript{115}

An interesting aspect of Zikist activities is the cracks which they were causing within the organs of state. Throughout 1948 secret intelligence reports carried police commissioner's fears that Zikist propaganda was undermining the morale of his men.\textsuperscript{116} Even the government-owned \textit{Daily Times} felt compelled occasionally to publish editorials criticizing the colonial establishment. On one occasion on 22 August 1950, after the paper had published "Doing the Right Thing on Time," its editor sent in an apology to the colonial secretary. As a measure of the pressure the editor had enclosed a letter from a Nigerian employee, W. Ladipo, who had sharply criticized the pro-British editorial policy of the paper.\textsuperscript{117}

The ban of the Zikist Movement and the arrest of its members caused Britain some diplomatic embarrassment, if by default. Some newspapers had reported instead of the ban of the NCNC and arrest and imprisonment of Azikiwe. According to

\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{116}Zikists were in the habit of passing couched advice that all those close to the colonial state should defect in time in order not to be punished as traitors. See for example, CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 27, 1948; CO 537/3557/30767: Arrests on Sedition Charges, December 1948; CO 537/2679/14355/6 part 3: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 3, West African Intelligence No. 3, 1949.

\textsuperscript{117}See CO 537/5792/30647/1: West Africa, Nigeria, Labour, Strikes and Disturbances, Freeman to S. of S.
a highly critical Amsterdam News, these measures constituted "threats to international peace, incite to riot and bloodshed and are, in effect, an invitation to Moscow to intervene."\textsuperscript{118} This left the British diplomatic staff in Washington scrambling for the facts of the matter.\textsuperscript{119} The Colonial Secretary had to query the governor over such things as why the house of the vice-president of Railway Staff Union was searched while he was away, and why he and the secretary were transferred to the Achapa Station.\textsuperscript{120} Even Richards' dictatorship was under intense pressure from radical agitation. For example, by December 1946, his and other West African governments had impressed on the Colonial Office that if the West African governments did not get sufficient allocations of clothing they would find it difficult to appreciate the emphasis which London placed on produce production and supply.\textsuperscript{121} Finally, it is well known that

\textsuperscript{118}Amsterdam News, 29 April 1950 in CO 537/5807/30824.

\textsuperscript{119}CO 537/5807/30824, Colonial Attaché (Washington) to S. of S., 22 April 1950; Colonial Attaché to S. of S., 26 April 1950. The colonial establishment banked on Zik's planned lecture tour of the US at the invitation of L.D. Reddick of Atlanta University. See Governor to S. of S., 26 April 1950. Zik, however, was not enthusiastic in carrying out the expatriates' own propaganda for them. He turned down the offer of the lecture for personal reasons. See Governor to S. of S., 30 April 1950.

\textsuperscript{120}CO 537/5807/30824, S. of S. to Governor, 30 April 1950.

\textsuperscript{121}Senior CO officials agreed that demands for produce (especially oilseeds) desperately needed in the metropolis would seem to lack seriousness if this warning was not heeded. CO 537/1414/19128: Miscellaneous Cabinet Papers. Top Secret. Brief for S. of S., 11 December 1946.
political and economic concessions, especially from 1948 onwards, were made in order to undercut the influence of the militants whom the state regarded as "extremists."
CHAPTER 6:
CONTRADICTIONS OF NATIONALISM, 1945-51

The Macpherson constitution of 1951 underpinned the political concession which the British expatriates had begun to make to the modernizing elite. It was formulated under the atmosphere of pretences to official neutrality and non-interference, and ostensible grassroots consultations.¹ After characteristic bickerings at the Ibadan constitutional conference of January 1950, British officials, the traditional elite and regional factions of the modernizing elite hammered out proposals that gave rise to the subject constitution. This exercise was marked by arrangement of compromises among the various elitist groups concerned.² Even the Native Administrations in the north were accommodated and virtually given a new lease of life.³ This constitution was an elite deal. The franchise was property-defined thereby excluding multitudes of Nigerians from constitutional political participation. The British clung religiously to their curious logic that separate regional development was the surest road to Nigerian unity. Needless to say the constitution exhibited that regional bias. One of the fallouts of this "unity" policy was the disenfranchisement of southerners living in the


²Thomas Hodgkin cited by ibid., pp. 127-27.

³See Ezera, Ibid., p. 132.
north. The British had however agreed to the principle of independence but tactfully reneged on a time-table. They were biding their time. The new constitution consequently did not have a definite life span -- it would be determined by the ferment of the political current. This was, briefly, the genesis to Nigerian independence which was celebrated on 1 October 1960. The rest is history. It suffices to note, however, the recognized fact that the ascendancy of an elite to whom sovereignty meant privilege rendered the withdrawal of the expatriates meaningless to the toiling masses. This is testimony to the failure of nationalism.

6.1 Prologomena to Understanding Nationalist Contradictions

To understand the contradictions and bankruptcy of Nigerian nationalism one has first to understand that it was born out of crises. Indeed, crises are an integral part of every society. They expose both the dynamics and inherent contradictions in society. However, they

are by nature both unstructured and complex. As such, they give full scope to the interplay of power and personality, factionalism and ethnicity, as they expose individuals to conflicting


pressures. Furthermore, it is during periods of [crises] that the constraints of institutional norms, patterns and modes of action are subjected to searing stresses.6

This chapter proceeds by offering two principal caveats on the context and focus of its analysis. The first is on the term "nationalism" and the second is on the focus of Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik).

(A) The use of the term "nationalism" will be eschewed in this essay because its usage in modern African political history certainly has a Eurocentric ring. It seems that a movement is deemed nationalist when it is considered to be (1) non-"tribal"; (2) party political; (3) led or dominated by Western educated elites agitating for constitutional reform. The second reason for objecting to this term is that in all its possible definitions it is not one and the same with the struggle for emancipation. Indeed, historically it is antithetical to the latter. It has revealed itself as a construct employed by ambitious ruling classes, or aspiring ones, in subjugating, subordinating and assimilating other peoples to the cultural, linguistic and other values of the hegemonic classes. It suffices for the present to point out that the term is far from precise for the purposes of class analysis. As Idahosa points out, functionally, nationalism

de-emphasizes social classes and even denies their reality. It if ever finds its way in these pages it is because of its sheer omnipresence in the literature and the blurry class differentiation extant in Nigerian society.

(B) If this chapter focuses on Azikiwe (Zik) it is because he was the single most controversial individual in Nigeria from the Second World War to independence. His activities attracted continued spotlight from the colonial state with which he was in disagreement. As a result, a researcher in Nigerian political history of the period is saddled with Azikiwe's ubiquitousness in public records. Moreover, he symbolized the ambiguity of the phenomenon of nationalism. In the heydays of state reaction

Something of a personal vendetta developed between Richards and Azikiwe: they personified the struggle between colonialism and nationalism at the time when both sides were willing to take part in the contest.

Finally, Zik was for a long time the link between the left and right in Nigerian politics, a development that had far-reaching implication for liberation struggle in Nigeria.

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6.2 **Ideological Bankruptcy**

The bankruptcy of Nigerian nationalism is clearly revealed in the *Daily Comet*'s 1948 editorial response to Creech Jones' Ibadan sermon against "communism."

We are not interested in communism; we are not even interested in socialism; we are not interested in social democracy; we are not interested in capitalism; we are not interested in fascism; we are interested in "freedom-ism."

One is here by no means inferring that the modernizing elite should have copied any particular ready-made model. For "freedomism" or whatever to be socially relevant it had to be demonstrated how it could be adapted to the specificities of the Nigerian condition. Otherwise, it would become an avenue for the freedom of the elite and an instrument which they could use to promote communism, capitalism, fascism or whatever. Considered thus, "freedomism" amounts to opportunism. This resulted mainly from the result of oppression of a colonial system which by excluding a cross section of the indigenous population created the illusion of identity of interests among them.

The major weakness of the Zikist Movement relates to that of the entire Nigerian nationalist movement. It was the ideological incompatibilities of its membership. "Most of [them were] blacklists and Azikiwe die-hards who were awed by the charisma of the man and were unconditionally loyal to

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*CO 537/2678/4355/6: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, West African Political Intelligence Summary, No. 2, 14 December 1948.*
him." The philosophy of Zikism itself is irredentism. Yet, according to its author, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, it espouses non-violent action. This is contradictory.

The most important weakness of the movement however was its utter neglect of domestic class contradictions and their possession of, at best, a hazy idea about cross-national class alliances. Even though socialism was its overriding ideological flavour, it defined the problem of colonialism simplistically as one between Nigerians and the British, and between Africa and imperialism (as received from the Western left). Save for occasional references to "imperialist agents" or isolated concern with when and whether Zik was going right or left, the movement unwittingly and falsely cast imperialism as incomprehensible. By failing to recognize that what imperialism had was what it could not do without -- partners as opposed to mere agents -- the left failed to locate the internal pillars of imperialism whose containment translates to the containment of imperialism. Partnership gives essence to a relationship in the sense which agency does not. Without partnership, the relationship is incomplete. Simply put,


11See Ezera, Constitutional Developments, pp. 97-98; Coleman, Nigeria, p. 297; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 73.

12See Sklar, ibid.
without internal partners there is no imperialism. Taking sides, either with imperialism or the dominated classes, is influenced primarily by one’s class location and, among the modernizing elite, strategies of accumulation. Moreover, partnership embodies both co-operation and conflict in a way that an agency does not. It is best to illustrate this contention with Azikiwe’s connection with the masses and the left.

6.3 Azikiwe, the Left, Nationalism and the State

Coleman’s observation is worth quoting in some detail in order to highlight the general trend of indigenous opinion during this period.

Realizing that there was little likelihood that he would be called upon to assume responsibility for the policies he advocated, and driven by an intense resentment against alien rule, Azikiwe used his press to exploit all the grievances that came to his attention. He became the watchdog of African rights, and any African from the lowliest messenger to the wealthiest trader, resident anywhere in Nigeria, could secure immediate front-page publicity on any complaint against the government or against Europeans. Administrative officers, even in the remotest districts, were frequently pressed by urgent wires from ... headquarters, requesting inquiries into allegations of "brutal and inhuman" treatment, discrimination, or denial of rights which appeared daily in the columns of Zik’s papers.\(^\text{13}\)

It is not clear however whether Azikiwe’s attitude was informed by any serious doubt on his part that he would lose the race for the state house. This was certainly not the case

\(^{13}\)J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background, p. 289.
in this period 1945-50 before the heyday of regional politics which reduced his NCNC to merely one of three major parties. The point here is that he symbolized Nigerian nationalism and all the contradictions that go with that notion. When these contradictions have been pin-pointed, Azikiwe's tortured ambivalence\(^4\) will also come to perspective.

Zik disliked the expatriate presence in Nigeria from the bottom of his heart. The expatriates knew this and equally disliked him. However, Nigerian social forces had mobilized in a manner in which neither Zik nor the expatriates could completely overcome or do without the other -- though this was precisely each side's set objective. Azikiwe's major obstacles were the resources of state power in favour of the expatriates and the activities of his own indigenous colleagues who were pitched against him in the struggle for post-colonial state power. On the other hand, the expatriate's obstacle was the crest of popularity which Zik enjoyed. These obstacles were interrelated: state's methods were Zik's obstacles and Zik's methods were state's obstacles. His indigenous rivals, though like Zik uncompromisingly committed to indigenous rule, would not stop short at collaborating with the expatriate state in a joint effort to undermine Zik. When the state calculated on weakening the modernizing elite through regionalism (a move that helped to

diminish Zik’s influence) sections of that elite existed which calculated that regionalism was the route to their own class advancement. It is in this context that one may view the *Egbe Omo Odudua.* The expatriate state relished these developments. A secret intelligence report noted in a particularly racist analysis:

the more responsible citizens are Yorubas ... they are not inclined to exert themselves to put an end to [ethnic hatred]. The reason is that they genuinely believe that Azikiwe’s methods are detrimental to the country’s interest and they feel that, doubtful as their methods are, if the Yoruba faction is successful in its attempt to eliminate Zik as a political force, the way will be open to usher in a new era of progress in co-operation with Government. In the 1947-48 period a state secret organ reported with satisfaction that “crowds of people” disapproved of the anti-ethnicity rally which the Youth Protest Committee (YPC) organized and “were [even] critical of government for allowing it on the grounds that it was indirectly encouraging hooliganism.” It must be noted that these “crowds of people” were, like the members of the YPC, discontented with colonial exploitation. They were impelled to disapprove of such a rally, at least in part, by the presence of a faction

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15 In 1948, a secret intelligence report recorded that *Egbe’s raison d’etre* was “to combat the ‘Ibo menace’ and to break Azikiwe.” CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 24, 1948. Also see *ibid:* Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

16 CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

of the modernizing elite which espoused the ethnic ideology "as the most effective means of propagating nationalism among the peasantry." Some northerners (obviously NCNC sympathizers) were quoted as having claimed that they had seen a letter which Governor Macpherson had written the northern leaders of opinion advising them to unite with the Yorubas against the Igbos. Even though the fact that expatriates relished the events was not in doubt, the governor could hardly be expected to be that explicit. However, no official refutation seems to have been offered.

Zik calculated that the state was deliberately promoting ethnic sentiments. In fact, it would be naive not to see that a colonialism in crisis would be tempted to cash in on divisive ethnic quarrels in the scramble for advantages. His major worry was that the state’s mediation in the same ethnic squabbles was boosting the governor’s influence.

These developments no doubt took their toll on the struggle against the expatriate state. In 1948, for instance, a secret report marvelled at the alleged apathy that greeted the publication of the report of the commission of inquiry into Accra "riots": "the politicians of Lagos have been too pre-occupied with their own feuds with each other to find much

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18See Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 83.

19See CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 26, August - September 1948.

20Ibid.
space in their papers for anything else." However, with immense personal and group following garnered over the years, Zik's sheer personal presence, chain of newspapers, flirtation with labour and radical groups, increasing reliance on the Ibo State Union (and not least the staunch support of the Igbo ethnic group), and international standing, he was more than a mere noise maker who could easily be pushed aside. In the face of this, expatriate strategy was in the main built around reducing Zik to a manageable size and incorporating him at the time when his bargaining position would have diminished. Part of the game was to try to demoralize him by giving him the impression that he did not really matter and could be bypassed.

It was not only the ethnic factor which was used for this purpose. There were diplomatic efforts. Upon Zik's visit to the USA late in 1949, where his utterances turned out not to be "couched in conciliatory or friendly terms," the Colonial Office had instructed the British diplomatic staff in Washington to watch him. The ensuing diplomatic effort succeeded in reducing what would have been a "formal meeting" of State Department officials "for Zik's benefit" to "an

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21CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 26, August-September 1948.

informal gathering of half a dozen." Furthermore, by the co-ordination of the Foreign Office, a document was prepared for distribution to British government's representatives throughout the world. The material read that even though Zik had considerable personal influence he had no authority to represent the wishes of the Nigerian people. It also read that certain elements recently combined to form a National Emergency Committee, to which Azikiwe does not belong. ... The majority of the responsible leaders of Nigerian public opinion dissociate themselves entirely from his leadership and are steadily cooperating with the British Government.\(^{24}\)

At the end of his visit a Colonial Office source assured the British Embassy in Washington that Zik did not appear to have made much impact in America. There was no cause for alarm "unless of course he makes another visit to the States!"\(^{25}\)

Even though these efforts were aimed at disparaging Zik, that he was the subject of such efforts did in fact confirm not only his stature but also the fact that he was considered an obstacle by the expatriates. As a matter of fact, the secret intelligence summaries throughout that critical year of 1948, had calculated that should Zik go left there would be

\(^{23}\)British Embassy Officials quibbled with the State Department’s failure to inform the mission of their meeting with Zik beforehand. However, it learned of it through "timely background information." \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{24}\)This document was prepared as INTEL No. 12, 13 January 1950. See CO 537/5807/30824: The Zikist Movement, 1950-51.

trouble in Nigeria. The big question then is: Why did Zik not go left in an effort to overcome his class rivals and his expatriate foes?

The answer to this question is to be located in his deep-seated class interests, class values or a personal trait which eschewed violent action, and expatriates' deliberate effort (often bordering on blackmail) to bring him to the fold. The fact that he was an ambitious businessman informed his choice of tactics and tainted his activism. Furthermore, his accumulative ambitions were not likely to thrive under the kind of political economy which the left articulated. Zik's eternal contradiction is that even thus compromised, he struggled throughout against being an expatriate stooge. A full swing to any direction -- left or right -- may have led him to his big dream of making the state house. Either way would, however, require some commitment from him. He embarked on a rather herculean task of eating all his cake and still having it. In January 1950, for instance, the Daily Worker warned Nigerian radicals to beware of Zik because he was dangerously swaying right following his flirtation with the

Oxford Group.27

The result of this approach was ambiguous. For example, even when Azikiwe had contracted a truce with his foes the understanding soon gave way to distrust. Zikist reporters whom he had flooded his newspapers with, ever radical and unaware of the behind-the-scenes deals, would soon publish offensive material. They constituted a time bomb. The very method which placed him into reckoning was isolating him from his class colleagues and potential partners. Azikiwe's ambivalent relationship to the left has already received too much attention in the foregoing to require further elaboration. It suffices to say that he flirted with the left in an effort to gain advantages in his intra-class struggle against indigenous and foreign elements.

When on tour of America in December 1949 Zik warned for the umpteenth time that African decolonization may take the form of "guerilla warfare after the fashion of Palestine."28 He really did not mean one word of it. Even state officials

27Zik agreed that he socialized with the Oxford Group and argued, rather irrelevantly, "But we also attended a rally by the Communist Party previously, at which I spoke and we commingled with Communists." In reply, the paper reaffirmed its stand that Zik's fraternization with the Oxford Group "can be regarded as other than harmful to the cause of Nigerian independence." It quoted Zik's words to the Associated Press following o:. his meeting with the Group: "I would be prepared to modify my demands for complete independence if the British Government were to change its attitude." See Daily Worker, 5 January 1950 attached to CO 537/5807/30824: The Zikist Movement, 1950.

who read such remarks (made incessantly in the previous year) as his attempt merely to recover the confidence of the left, feared that "he will be carried away by the flood which he himself is in danger of letting loose."29

Zik seemed to have made such remarks for effect after disillusioning experiences with the state. Towards the end of his visit to the US and the UK in 1949-50 Zik was particularly grieved. He was disappointed with the outcomes of that trip. Moreover, he was very bitter that the Gold Coast government had refused him a landing in Accra on his way to America.30 It is in the latter context that his threat of a guerilla war would be understood.31 When he gave an interview to a freelance journalist on his way back in London which the latter turned into the Colonial Office, Zik had made his


30 At that time too he was disappointed with the political situation at home. One of his worries was what he perceived to be northern intransigence at the on-going Ibadan constitutional conference. For Zik's grievances of this moment see CO 537/5807/30824: The Zikist Movement, Cohen to Macpherson, 31 January 1950.

31 During this visit Zik also rebuffed offers of assistance from British diplomatic staff. See ibid, British Embassy, Washington to Galsworthy, 2 January 1950. During his visit to the British Information Services he avoided any political discussions and confined himself to personal and business matters, education and welfare of Nigerian students in the US. Ibid., Memorandum to Controller of British Information Services, 20 January 1950. He made a series of verbal attacks on British colonialism which were given prominence in the American press. See for instance, Washington News, attached to ibid, P.S. Stevens to A.N. Galsworthy, 9 January 1950. Also see Washington Post, 27 December 1949. The latter described him as "the most feared opponent of colonial imperialism in West Africa."
point. It does not matter much whether or not the journalist thought that he was betraying Zik or whether Zik used him -- with or without his acquiescence -- that interview was an element in his scare tactics. Zik "revealed" to the journalist that he was planning to organize a general strike in Nigeria and massive literacy and indoctrination campaigns as the most effective means of expelling the intransigent expatriate government. He would not "reveal" the date for the proposed strike action since latest experiences in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast had shown that doing so would spur the government to take pre-emptive measures. To effect these plans, according to the report, he had arranged for two young Canadian journalists of communist persuasion to join his newspapers. According to him, this was "the sort of practical assistance Communists could and did offer 'oppressed people'.'" Zik's opportunism came out clearly when he chipped in that he was still studying the best approach to Nigerian freedom whether "extreme left, center or right." In simple terms, Zik was saying that the issue was not one of principle. He was not only opportunistic but left the expatriates in no doubt that he was. The Colonial Office seemed to have taken Zik seriously since this period coincided with an abrupt effort to co-opt him. This development will be given some attention at the appropriate juncture below.

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See CO 537/5807/30824, Scorey to Gorsuch. The interview was said to have been given on 1 February 1950.
Expatriates too had their own scare tactics for Zik. Part of these was directed at his business ambitions in what was a cynical exploitation of the precarious financial state of the Zik Group. As a business outfit this group was perennially engaged in a deadly struggle against bankruptcy. By late 1947 Zik's newspapers were reported to be so insolvent as to be on the verge of collapse. Financial collapse would have surely severely affected his political activities. As Zik struggled to avert disaster, a report was making the rounds which intimated that a take-over of the government owned Daily Times by the London-based Daily Mirror was imminent. Zik concluded that such a development at that time would mean business failure. Should the Mirror implement the reported plan of investing £1.5 million in the Daily Times, that would lure away his best technicians and editors. Zik called on his workers to remain firm. For demonstrative effect, a $14,000 press arrived for his papers from the US which may well have been a "gift" from Leventis.

Whether Zik had fallen for a set-up (as this writer is

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33CO 537/3556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 1948; CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

34His response included a plan to establish a "Continental Bank" which would enable him to save his newspapers and even expand them as well as to square with the Yoruba-controlled National Bank. See CO 527/3556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 1948.

35See ibid; CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.

36Ibid.
inclined to suggest) or not, if this was a "gift" from Leventis, the transaction had the potential of compromising him to Leventis -- a corporate outfit which cannot be expected to want to finance a "communist" project. It would also render him a sitting duck for future blackmail by the expatriates. This is because the state never took the Mirror affair seriously. It never regarded the Mirror as the sort of "home" outfit to "publish a responsible newspaper in Nigeria."

It was said that Mirror's editorial policy favoured the publication of just any story that sold. It was this same Mirror which later in 1950 published the unsavoury Fitzgerald Report (which followed the inquiry into the shooting of Enugu Miners in 1949) as the Colonial Office and the Nigerian government were busily planning to distort the context of the report and to stage-manage its release. The government actually had other plans for the dissemination of its propaganda. It already had been negotiating with Reuters for news supply in the calculation that "if the newspapers were provided with reliable news they would have less space to

37 See Co 537/3556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 1948.

This report leaked to the Mirror and the Colonial Office was unable to trace the source. See CO 537/5794/30647/1C/4A: African Annexe. Strikes and Disturbances. Coal Dispute. Commission of Enquiry. Distribution and Printing Report, 1950.

The manipulations are well recorded in CO 537/5795/30647/1C/4d part 1, Nigeria. Strikes and Disturbances, 1950.
devote to twaddle."\textsuperscript{40} There were also plans aimed at counteracting the Zik Press, especially in the east. Here a plan was already being made to establish a regional government newspaper under the editorship of the government public relations officer himself.\textsuperscript{41}

Zik’s political activities were hardly distinguishable from his drive for capital. This quest for capital could be read in his pronouncements during his foreign trips. At a meeting he had with State Department officials during his visit to the US in late 1949, Zik strove hard to learn every possible thing about the Point Four aid and urged them in vain to send the money directly to Nigeria and not through the British government.\textsuperscript{42} In his effort to attract capital, he strove hard to exploit Western anti-communist sentiments of the Cold war era. On his way home, in London, he made no secret of his disillusion with his lack of business success in the US. He invited Americans to move in and exploit Nigeria’s mineral wealth and by so doing to “reinforce Nigerians’ demand for freedom.”\textsuperscript{43} He did not demonstrate how American capital would lead to freedom in Nigeria. If such investments had

\textsuperscript{40}CO 537/3556/30727: Political Summaries No. 23, 1938.

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{42}CO 537/5807/30824, British Embassy, Washington to Galsworthy, 2 January 1950. He had already announced it to the press prior to the meeting. See \textit{ibid.}, \textit{Washington Post}, 27 December 1949.

\textsuperscript{43}See \textit{ibid.}, Scorey to Gorsuch.
taken place Zik would have most certainly got directorships. This statement may also have been made to induce a pre-emptive infusion of British capital. Failure to attract British and US capital, according to him, would mean that he would embark upon a public appeal for funds and try to raise shares subscriptions. Already by 1948 Zik had accumulated some £5,000 in subscriptions from relatives and friends "in order to enable us to establish a financial structure which can help to develop our country." This was the genesis of African Continental Bank (ACB). This Zik whose business interests, particularly his connection with the ACB, nearly rocked his career in the mid 1950s, was not one to sanction, let alone lead, a thorough liberation struggle.

Business interests aside, there were other reasons for Zik's decision not to go left. Among these were "trepidation with which he [viewed] any prospect of danger to his own skin and his well known lack of enthusiasm for landing himself in gaol." Zik in fact needed not to have worried about arrests and detention. The state actually strove hard to avoid such a clash which would likely have resolved in Zik's

Ibid.

See Zik to Blankson transcribed in Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 168 (see note).

Among the many published works which deal with the ACB scandal Richard Sklar, ibid., pp. 143-89, seems to be the most detailed.

CO 537/3549/47272/2/A: Secret No. 24.
favour. It feared that such harassment would further popularize Zik and drive him to violent action. As Macpherson stated this policy, "Since I assumed office it has been a cardinal point of my policy not to drive Dr. Azikiwe into violent opposition, or to give him martyrdom." 48

This attitude was deliberately withheld from Zik however. It was crucial that he did not know that he had de facto immunity. From 1948, at the latest, when the policy of incorporating the modernizing elite had crystallized he was persuaded, advised and cajoled in occasional surreptitious meetings with senior expatriate officials who had grown impatient with his fence-sitting methods to declare a stand. After his first meeting with Zik just before the Zikist action of tax boycott in December 1948, the Acting Chief Secretary to Government, A.W.L. Savage, found that the former was caught between "throwing in his lot with the extremists and openly opposing them." 49 This was a hard choice for Zik who was concerned about not losing their support. 50 At the end of his second meeting with Zik, Savage recommended that Zik "could play a major part in the progress to self-government in Nigeria but much depended on the line he took in the immediate


49CO 537/3557/20767, Governor to S. of S. Top Secret. 26 December 1948.

50See ibid.
The ensuing dialogue not only shows the deliberate attempt made by the British to cultivate collaborators but also their determination to exploit ethnic and class divisions for that purpose. At the second meeting between the two men Zik dissociated himself from the "seditious" speeches attributed to the Zikist Movement. Savage believed Zik was not part of them but he was demanding a public denial. In return he offered a proposal.

I suggested to him that it was imperative, if he had an honesty of purpose which I believed he had and a belief in the good will and good faith of the Nigerian and British Government, to cut away from these extremists and accept the hand of friendship of the moderates whom I knew were only waiting for such an opportunity.\(^{52}\)

Savage observed extravagantly that the government was willing to meet force with force. He advised Zik that it was not too late to reconcile with the "large number of moderates in the professional classes, who while anxious for self-government, were not prepared to link themselves with the extremists."\(^{51}\)

Zik wondered why his "appeals for collaboration" at the meeting of the Legislative Council in Kaduna (March 1948) were unheeded. Savage replied that

he was mistrusted legitimately by LegCo members as at the very time he was seeking their friendship his press was being delivered at Kaduna violently attacking the members and particularly the

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\(^{51}\)CO 537/3557/30767, Memo by Acting Chief Secretary.

\(^{52}\)Ibid., Memo by Acting Chief Secretary. Emphases are added.

\(^{51}\)Ibid.
northerners.\textsuperscript{54}

By accepting this olive branch, Zik did some damage to his ambition. This is because this man who had such a plan as nationalizing all banks "when freedom comes"\textsuperscript{55} was hardly the perfect candidate on whom to entrust British interests.

But he was not a pushover. His brushes with the state after this period occurred when each side perceived a deviation from this pact. It had already been pointed out that refusal of his landing in the Gold Coast influenced Zik's renewed threats of guerilla war in early 1950. And later after the promulgation of the Macpherson constitution of 1951, Zik's newspapers criticized that document and its alleged hidden agenda most severely.\textsuperscript{56} At the same time the Gold Coast governor had been sceptical of Zik's intention to visit that country in the first instance. Moreover, the British imperial government was not likely to be enamoured by a colonial conducting a separate diplomacy as Zik's visit to, and activities in, the US indicated. However, the expatriate state and its London patron knew that it was unwise to encourage the presence of an important opposition at a time when decolonization must happen. By 1950 they were ready to tolerate Zik and bring him into the fold. For some time too

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55}See Sklar, \textit{Nigerian Political Parties}, p. 168 (see note).

\textsuperscript{56}See Ezera, \textit{Constitutional Developments}, pp. 128-29.
it was becoming clear that Zik might be ready to play ball. These developments are best highlighted by quoting in some detail a memorandum which one Shenton Thomas prepared for the Colonial Office in January 1950.

Coussey told me that through various contacts made in England Zik is said to have come to the conclusion that moderation was better for Nigeria than violence and that indeed he had suffered a change of heart. That on his way from Lagos to U.S.A. he had been refused permission to land in the Gold Coast and was very sore about his, but that the C.O. had written him a mollifying letter. If there was any truth in this -- and Coussey himself could not say -- it might be well to let Zik land in the Gold Coast on his way back to Lagos, and to see Nkrumah and others. It would be a pity if Zik’s sourness revived before he reached Lagos: he has much influence in Nigeria, and events there are carefully studied in the Gold Coast. Coussey himself is leaving at once to Accra: he asked me therefore if I could find out the truth of the above and the C.O. know. The Oxford Group (Dr. Sturdy) could tell me.

I saw Dr. Sturdy yesterday and had an hour’s talk. He confirmed Zik’s change of heart. He had made peace with his potential rivals in Nigeria and had assisted in securing the election of one of them to a post to which he himself might have aspired. He liked and trusted the Governor. Nkrumah was believed to have confidence in him.

The question is whether in all circumstances the Governor of the Gold Coast should be apprised of the facts so that he may consider the propriety of allowing Zik to see Nkrumah on his way back to Lagos, which is understood to be soon.57

However, Zik politely turned down a Colonial Office offer to visit the Gold Coast (at government expense) on a

57CO 537/5807/30824, Memo by Shenton Thomas, 12 January 1950.
chartered aircraft. Whether this rebuff was a result of fear for his personal safety or a reluctance to collaborate is known only to Zik himself.

Whatever may have been the case, it is appropriate to agree with Olusanya that "The Nigerian political leaders ... wanted independence to come on 'a platter of gold'. To their discredit they betrayed the young people, the ex-servicemen and market women." This was what nationalism sought to mask.

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"This meeting was held with Cohen on 31 January 1950. Not wanting to accept the offer Zik said that the Dove aircraft was unsafe since it was single-engined. Corrected that it had plural engines, "he then said that as a member of the Legislative Council he had felt doubtful about putting the Nigerian Government to this expense." See ibid, Cohen to Governor.

"Olusanya, The Second World War, p. 127."
CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has explored the question of collaboration in colonial Nigeria in the period 1900-51. With empirical examples an attempt has been made to characterize the interaction of social forces, changing configuration of alliances, shifting bases of rule and changing imperial doctrines throughout the period. This exercise has involved the examination of power relationships within and among controllers of state on the one hand, and between them and the ruled on the other. In the opinion of this writer, aside from the specific contentions and points of each chapter, this work has firmly established that the wisdom that indigenes were co-opted as functionaries of the colonial state because of expatriates' lack of resources from Europe can now be discarded. Secondly, the notion that colonialism was per se foreign rule has at least been demonstrated to be debatable.

These two questions are so interlinked that one cannot say that local collaborators were indispensable and that collaboration was built on compromise, and still insist that colonialism was foreign rule. If this is a mistake, African studies have made it too often and too consistently, implicitly and explicitly. By this, one is referring to the more advanced version of the historiography which acknowledges the indispensability of collaboration in the first place. The overriding intention has been to take the debate on European
presence in Africa beyond merely asserting the "African factor" at all costs. This has been pursued by the political economy approach built around a theoretical perspective which insists that power relationships in human affairs are of necessity dialectical.

One has not taken these pains in order to write history merely for history's sake. Historians at least acknowledge that the purpose of history is to illuminate the present and serve as a basis for those who might venture into prognoses. The concern here is with Nigeria's post-colonial crises of mass poverty, blatant inequality, corruption, gross abuse of power, ethnicity, and so forth. These are not a state of nature, neither were they entirely manufactured. They are the products of interests, conflict and compromise. Radical scholarship has firmly established that independence did not bring with it any structural changes but only change from the white to black faces in the state house. However, this writer understands the latter as key actors: rather than being agents of foreigners; they are partners. The economist Nafziger points out that in the first two decades of independence Nigeria's reputation as the fastest growing African economy coincided with an upward swing in poverty rate.¹ Developments of this kind are obvious to the rural majority and the poor.

From their point of view government is government and there is

little need to distinguish between the "colonial" and the "post-colonial" state. The contemporary relevance of the study of colonial collaboration lies therefore in the establishment of linkages between "colonial" and "post-colonial" social relations. One will be permitting a grave elision in this analysis if one did not systematically account for the state's response to the post-war crises. The rest of this chapter is devoted to the description of that aspect.

7.1 Expatriate State Responds to Crises

Some of the state's response to the crises of post-war Nigeria have inevitably been anticipated in the foregoing. These were in part responses to specific crises. There was also the strategy of weakening the modernizing elite through the exploitation of extant factionalism within that class. It also involved the isolation of the radical elements. What follows is a review of the syndicated state response to these crises. These responses can be broadly categorized as reforms and coercion.

A) Reforms: These reforms were generally geared towards a strategic expatriate withdrawal and were intended as a viable option to armed conflict with restive indigenous groups. The reforms became discernible in 1948. Much of

Nigerian constitutional historiography acknowledges that the decision to reform crystallized in the retirement of Governor Richards in 1947. Richards had to go because his reactionary inclination did not dispose him to execute these reforms with the alacrity which they demanded. Furthermore, he had identified himself so much with the old policies that having him implement the radically new ones would make Nigerians feel a sense of victory and would amount to a loss of face on the part of the expatriates. For this reason his express desire to secure an extension of tenure was ignored. The reforms that followed may be broadly categorized into political and economic planks.

Richards’ successor, Sir John Macpherson, virtually dramatized the policy turn-around. While addressing the Legislative Council in August 1948 he declared that so much "progress" had been made under the Richards constitution (only one year of its operation!) that there was an urgent need to

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See for example, Coleman, Nigeria, p. 309; Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 85.

move forward. The result was the Macpherson constitution which has been briefly reviewed in chapter six above.

These reforms had a strong propaganda overtone. They were mainly targeted at the modernizing elite. Starting with Governor Richards' race relations "reform," these reforms were class oriented. It must be noted that this elite had emerged against the will of the expatriates and they had since the war period been asking the expatriates to go. As has been noted in chapter five, the expatriates' first impulse was to suppress them. Because this elite had convinced the masses that foreign presence was the biggest obstacle to progress, they had become so formidable that they could not be crushed or ignored in any circumstances. Expatriate strategy therefore had to accommodate this class. Programmes of co-option were put in place. In this connection, there was a deliberate attempt to influence the further development of this class and their future reproduction through a programme of indoctrination of young aspirants. This was aimed both as a way of prolonging expatriate presence and securing their interests in a post-colonial situation. Thus elaborate educational, political and social programmes -- formal and informal -- were planned and implemented. In December 1947 Sir Charles J. Jefferies of the Colonial Office prepared a lengthy memorandum titled, "The Political Significance of

\[5\text{See Coleman, Nigeria, p. 311; Olusanya, The Second World War, p. 130.}\]
African Students in Great Britain." This document read in part that

In many ways the appearance of this class [the modernizing elite] has upset our calculations and disturbed the even tenor of political development among the slow moving masses ... There is a real need for a policy of co-operation with this class. It will be an increasingly important element in the population ... and the time would seem ripe for a review of policy on two vital matters: (1) the incorporation of this class in a realistic way in the social, political and economic scheme; (2) the education of this class for their high calling as leaders and eventually rulers of their own people. ... They will be moreover one of the most important vehicles of culture and thought between the Western world and Africa. What [they] learn in this country is therefore of the vital importance to the future of Africa generally and the future relations between British Colonial Governments in Africa and their peoples. ... The proper political training of this class is, therefore, of the utmost importance. It is not sufficient to teach them civics in their African schools before they come to a British university and rely on finding a professional niche for them on their return to teach them good citizenship if we let them run intellectually wild during the important formative years at an English university.

Sir Charles calculated that care should be taken to conceal the propaganda intent of this programme. In this respect, he proposed the establishment of an informal committee under his chairmanship. "In view of the nature of its task, it is considered that the group's deliberations be confidential,

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purely informal, and without terms of reference. In the committee's second meeting the "political problem" of the colonial students was identified. It was decided that these students generally picked up anti-British feelings at home before their arrival in the UK. According to it, this tendency was even exacerbated during their sojourn due to racial prejudice and other distasteful experiences they encountered in the UK. Consequently, they tended to become adherents of the communist gospel. This was considered dangerous since

Communism appears to know all the answers and to offer a simple, positive and dynamic approach which inevitably appeals to the inexperienced enthusiasm of young people. Official statements of policy, which have to be guarded and realistic, do not carry the same appeal. The special difficulty of colonial students is that they are not also subject to the corrective home and social influences which help British young people to preserve a sense of balance.

The trend of thought of colonial students had been

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7Ibid.

8Individuals from the following organizations accepted this invitation: London School of Economics (two invitations); the Fabian Colonial Bureau; Oxford University, Institute of Colonial Studies (Magery Perham); Colonial Bureau of the Victorian League; the Workers Educational Organization; the Council of the Church Training Colleges; Dorset County Council Education Committee; the Colonial Service Course (Cambridge). See CO 537/2573.

9Ibid: Colonial Students' Political Problem (Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Informal Committee), 2 March 1948.
confirmed a few weeks earlier during the Fabian Colonial Bureau conference of January 1948. One Colonial Office official reported that the Colonial Secretary was in attendance for part of the time [of the conference] and he stopped a bucketful of bolshie stuff from some of the Colonials present. He was distinctly stirred up about it, and a few sentences I had with him was full of "something must be done about it", etc. From this conference the Colonial Office realized the gulf that existed between the thoughts of the Fabian Colonial Bureau ("British sympathizers") and the colonial students. It concluded that

We have to reckon with the effect of 3261 Colonial students in this country becoming impregnated with this attitude. If the majority of them leave this country hostile to us, rather than allies, then they are not merely a handicap but may easily wreck all our best efforts.

The informal committee was then expected to take action. On this basis the informal committee mapped out what it labelled after military parlance as "lines of counter-attack." This would involve an intensive public relations activity featuring the "refutation of extravagant Communist claims [and] positive statement of our aims and justification of our

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10CO 537/2574/11020/30/2: Students -- General Welfare. Student Welfare and Information (Political Attitudes of Students), Elliot to Keith, 13 February 1948. Elliot urged an urgent, high level action to deal with this situation.

11Ibid., Note on Conclusions to be Drawn from the Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference at Pasture Wood 17-18 January 1948.

12See ibid., Lloyd to Rees-Williams, 19 February 1948.
methods in the Colonies. Ceylon provides a most valuable practical illustration." It was decided that potential students would be "counter-influence(d)" right at home before they arrived at the UK. However, "it is no good our making an effort to put them straight if they are going to be treated as 'niggers' when they come." For this reason British ministers would be encouraged to denounce racial discrimination in strong terms and stress their concern for the "advancement" of colonial people. Everything possible should be done to break down racial barriers and encourage British hospitality to colonial students. Arrangements would be made for British authorities, Colonial Office staff on leave, and "responsible visitors from the Colonies" to give these students pep talks on British way of life. The students would be encouraged to observe the workings of Parliament, local authorities, the Colonial Office and other government departments. Also it was planned to encourage joint activities between colonial students and Colonial Office probationers at Oxford, Cambridge and London. These measures were the recommendations of the Colonial Office after

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13 CO 537/2573, Colonial Students' Political Problem (Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Informal Committee), 2 March 1948.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
the Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference. The informal committee soon drew a memorandum calling for anti-racist legislations. It was stressed in all instances that employment must be found for those students in their home countries immediately on graduation. Significantly, Littlewood of the Colonial Service Course, while accepting the invitation to participate in the informal committee had complained about the acquisitive proclivities of most of the student aspirants to this class. It would seem, however, that his colleagues and imperial schemers considered what was the source of his fears instead as the vital opening with which to come to terms with this class.

This element tallied with the programme of Africanization of the political, bureaucratic and military top posts which began in earnest in the late 1940s. With this development the modernizing elite came increasingly to control vital national resources. Also attention began to be given to the yearnings of the commercial section of the modernizing elite. For instance, the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board guaranteed loans from the Bank of British West Africa for its agents the Ibandan Traders' Association Ltd up to the sum of £7,000, and

16See CO 537/2574/11020/30/2: See Rees-Williams to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 16 February 1948.

17See CO 537/2573; "Colour Discrimination in the United Kingdom."

18See ibid., Minutes of the 2nd Meeting.

19See ibid., Littlewood to Blackburne, 6 February 1948.
the Ijesha Trading and Transport Co Ltd up to £5,000. At a time when the commercial firms were struggling to secure guarantees for their interest, the state thought that the most effective means of achieving this was to court the friendship of the modernizing elite. For instance, when in 1948 the governor expected that the Nigerian LegCo members would oppose the UAC should that firm ask for huge royalties on mines. It was thought wise to advise the company to bait the LegCo members with the promise of "a trust fund which would be devoted eg (sic) to University College endowments, development schemes for workers in industry, etc." This advice seems to have had some impact. Thus the UAC, which had chosen to employ a propaganda manager (Mr N'Wman) rather than grant a small pay rise to workers, suddenly began to institute scholarship schemes for the children of African workers. The aim of these scholarships, as reported in December 1948, was to ensure for the recipients "the educational opportunities necessary to fit them to play a worthy part in their country's development." These concessions were aimed at attracting as many of the modernizing elite as possible into collaboration. In this


21CO 537/2678/4355/6: General Colonial Political Intelligence Summaries No. 2, December 1948.

22Ibid.
same process the ranks of the "extremist" or "communist" elements among them would be depleted. Thus weakened, the radical elements could more easily be contained. Their containment was perceived as a matter of first priority. This was because in the reality of compulsory imperial withdrawal, having "communist" successors to post-colonial state power might not be a viable option. It was already obvious from their manifesto that they could not be relied upon to guarantee expatriate interests. The post-colonial state must not fall into their hands. For this reason, as the accumulative instincts of sections of this elite were being attended to, the coercive approach of the immediate post-war period years was retained and, as from 1948, even rejuvenated. It is now necessary to review the security measures which were taken towards this end.

B) Coercive Measures: Part of these security measures was the preparation of secret political intelligence reports (a source of information for this and some earlier chapters of this work). These seem to have been started in late 1947. Coded "POSSUM," their tone reflected the mood and biases of the expatriates. Even though they were sometimes petty and given to trivia, these reports covered many subjects. Hardly anything was considered too trivial to be left unreported or unanalyzed. Colonial Office officials, desperate for incisive analyses of developments in the colonies, incessantly demanded higher standards. These demands were made for more
information early in 1948. Later that year it was found that the reports were too bulky and sometimes disjointed. As one official observed:

My own personal belief is, however, that to produce a summary that is coherent, reasonably well proportioned and above all readable, it is necessary to proceed by a process of digestion and synthesis, and not simply to paste bits of geographical information or regional summaries together.

These reports generally were no doubt informative. For instance, in August-September period of 1948 one of these reports confidently (and correctly) predicted the failure of the All West African National Congress proposed to convene in October. The major reason for the anticipated failure, according to another report, was that Azikiwe would be in support of the movement only as long as the West African National Secretariat (WANS) served his purpose. He would certainly quit if it meant playing a second fiddle since he would take nothing less than the leadership.

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24 CO 537/2677/14355/6: General: Colonial Political Intelligence Summaries "West African Political Intelligence Summary I" Secret Memo, 10 November 1948. See minute by Trafford Smith.

25 Ibid., minute by Seel.

26 Ibid., Possum No. 26, August-September 1948.

27 The expressed aims of the WANS were "the complete liquidation of the Colonial System," and the unification all British, French, Spanish and Portuguese West African territories plus Liberia. See CO 537/3556/30727: Political
However, the reports sometimes exhibited striking ignorance. This may be illustrated with what it reported about the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. A series of these reports throughout 1948 reported correctly the chief aim of the Egbe, but carried on to say over and over that its problem was that it lacked any outstanding leader. On one such occasion it suggested that H.O. Davies was likely to emerge as its leader.\textsuperscript{28} It missed Awolowo, the moving spirit of that society. Awolowo was mentioned a few times but either as the lawyer of the Maiyegun society\textsuperscript{29} or as "one of the leaders of the Egbe."\textsuperscript{30}

There were trivia as well. Apart from the habitual mudslinging and name callings of Nigerians in the reports, their authors exhibited a cynical sense of humour. For example, after NCNC's National Assembly meetings in Kaduna in 1948 one of the reports ridiculed the Assembly's decisions; that "the only concrete decision arrived at was that whatever else the plan [on industrialization] might contain, it must make provision for the manufacture of gin."\textsuperscript{31} Needless to mention that there were personality attacks as well. These

\begin{itemize}
\item Summaries No. 23, 1948. It must be reported that the page 8 of this report was missing from the relevant PRO file.
\item \textsuperscript{28}CO 537/3649/47272/2/A: Political Intelligence Reports. West Africa, Nigeria. Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Ibid. Possum No. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{30}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{31}Ibid. Secret No. 24, 1948, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
bordered on deliberate misrepresentations. Probably for his vocal condemnation of the expatriates’ designs in Nigeria, K.O. Mbadiwe was described as not having paid attention to his studies while in the US, but “dabbled into politics” eventually managing to earn a BSc in economics. For his commitment to workers’ cause, Michael Imoudu was described as “the unbalanced labour leader” who “emerged from retirement” to steer the TUC off a conciliatory path. For the same reason Chris Edgal, the secretary of the Sapele branch of UNAMAC was said to have been “irresponsible and a provoker of trouble for trouble’s sake.” One S.A. George was described as “the paid undersecretary who everyone knows would cheerfully sell anything to anybody for a small price.”

The rejuvenation of the coercive element of the state gave some priority to the police. In the consideration of the Colonial Secretary (in 1948) “many problems … now confront them in the police and security sphere.” For this reason a police adviser was appointed for West Africa in the person of:

32Ibid., Possum No. 24, 1948.
33Ibid., Possum No. 25, May-July 1948.
34Ibid., Possum No. 24, 1948.
36Ibid., Possum No. 24, March-April 1948.
of one W.B. Johnson. This officer would advise the Colonial Secretary on "Colonial Police work generally and [maintain] contact with Police authorities in [Britain]." His terms of reference were, in part:

- to provide advice to Colonial Governments and Commissioners of Police regarding the best up-to-date methods of improving the efficiency of their forces;
- to advise the Secretary of State and Colonial Governments on the organization in Colonial territories for collecting, collating and disseminating intelligence of all kinds.\(^3\)\(^8\)

To underline the importance of this office, the Secretary of State wanted the officer to report to him directly on technical matters.\(^3\)\(^9\)

Mr. Johnson made a tour of the West African territories early in 1949. The purpose of his trip was to assess the effectiveness of the police \textit{vis a vis} a potential eruption of a crisis. "In most cases the general condition of the Forces as Mr. Johnson found them is so seriously defective, having regard to the security problems which may arise at any moment."\(^4\)\(^0\)

The police adviser's report was a source of consternation in Colonial Office circles.\(^4\)\(^1\) They were particularly worried

\(^3\)\(^8\)Ibid.

\(^3\)\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^4\)\(^0\)CO 537/5783/30173/1: Report of Police Adviser on His Visit to Nigeria. See "Extract from Minute from Mr. G.F. Seel to Sir Thomas Lloyd," 29 April 1949.

\(^4\)\(^1\)Mr. Johnson expressed serious reservations on the conditions of service of policemen. He found in Nigeria that policemen and their officers (European and African) were
about Nigeria and the Gold Coast which were "passing through a difficult phase politically." It was decided that those deficiencies likely to impinge upon policemen’s morale must be treated with despatch. The attempt to deal with these problems reflected the contradictions facing colonialism at the time, superciliousness of solutions, and the desperation and confusion of colonial functionaries. Of the steps to be taken the supply of kits surprisingly received the highest priority. It was not until September 1949 when the kits had finally been supplied that the Colonial Office men began to address the issue of overwork. The belated supply

overworked. As he put it, a situation whereby the rank and file had no days off except annual leaves and days in lieu of public holidays was "manifestly unfair." He decried the general inefficiency of the force which had led to frequent and unnecessary remands, backlog of cases and so forth. Ibid., Police Adviser’s report to Governor through Chief Secretary, 19 April 1949.

The police adviser recommended the improvement of the conditions of service of policemen. He even thought that policemen’s wives deserved much better kitchens than they had got since those were where they spent "of necessity, most of their time. Some kitchens I saw resembled a 'Black Hole of Calcutta'." For this Johnson recommended the employment of a permanent police architect. Ibid. Mr. Johnson also recommended the expansion of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the police undercover arm. According to him, one way of speedily achieving this objective was to establish regular detective training courses in Nigeria to serve the entire West African territories.

Ibid., Lloyd to Calder, 10 May 1949. Secret.

See CO 537/5783/30173," Extract from Minute from Mr. G.P. Seel to Sir Thomas Lloyd," 27 April 1949; unidentified signature to Gorsuch; Gorsuch to Foot; Gorsuch to Foot, 20 May 1949.

See ibid., Gorsuch to Foot, 28 September 1949.
of the much desired kits was the product of an industrial crisis in Britain itself. As a matter of fact, there had been "labour troubles in the spinning trade." 46

The Nigerian government's response to London's insistence that the former reduced the working hours of policemen reveals the dilemma of the colonial state. The state was caught between injecting substantial funds into the force and just making do with an inefficient force and risking its consequences. As Governor Macpherson kept saying, there was no money. 47 The Chief Secretary echoed the governor's argument. 48 As London pointed out repeatedly, efficiency itself was contingent upon some period of rest for policemen. 49 It was not until July 1950 that the Nigerian government was able to report on a tame proposal to decrease a policeman's work week from seven days to six. The Cash

46 Ibid., unidentified signature to Gorsuch.

His argument ran as follows: Giving policemen a day off, as London had requested, would require the employment of additional 420 men at the estimated recurrent cost of £47,500 per annum plus additional capital expenditure for barracks accommodation. Claiming that hours of duty was not a source of grievance among policemen, the governor warned that it would be wrong "to give to members of a disciplined and armed force the impression that they were only expected to work a specified number of hours." After all, these men were satisfied with the HArragin salary award which catapulted a 3rd class constable's salary from £27-3-30 to £66-3-72. In the opinion of the governor, the recommended employment of a resident architect for the police was unnecessary. CO 537/5783, Governor to S. of S., 28 September 1949.

47 Ibid., Foot to Gorsuch, 2 November 1949.

48 Ibid., Vilee, Johnson and Gorsuch to Foot, 29 November 1949; Vilee, Johnson and Gorsuch to Foot, 7 February 1950.
crunch would not allow for an increase in personnel. Meanwhile the police commissioner bitterly complained to the inspector general that the government had ruled that "not a penny more for the 1951-52 Estimates than for the last two years" would be allowed.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, T. Farly Smith to Vile, 11 July 1950.}

London had not really entirely depended on the cash-strapped Nigerian government and its police force to deal with possible insurrection in Nigeria. It had broader plans. By November 1948 when the Colonial Secretary appointed his police adviser, Security Liaison Officer Colonel Stephens (appointed earlier in that year) had concluded a tour of West Africa.\footnote{Consequently, he was "annoyed" that he was unable to sponsor two African commissioned officers with sufficient experience to attend the 1951 Ryton police course. See Commissioner to Inspector General, 28 November 1950.} Colonel Stephens reported that the "general position in West Africa [was] favourable to political intrigues ... particularly in Gold Coast and Nigeria."\footnote{See CO 537/2677/14355/6: General: Colonial Political Intelligence Summaries. "West African Political Intelligence Summary I," 10 November 1948.} He was however satisfied that British forces based in Bigradta, a small

\footnote{According Stephens, a handful of young intellectuals existed who had received "communist" training in the UK and USSR, would seek to give communist interpretation to political developments and embarrass colonial governments at the slightest opportunity. However, no communist party existed as yet in Africa. See CO 537/4384/14662: Capacity of Security Forces to Deal with Possible Disturbances in East and West Africa and Cyprus. "Note on the Likelihood of Disturbances in West and East Africa and Cyprus: and the Capacity of Security Forces to Deal with them."}
Sierra Leone based naval squadron and some eight battalions of the RWAFF based in the entire West African territories were adequate to deal with any fracas. One interesting aspect of Col. Stephens' tour is that he also visited the neighbouring French and Belgian colonies where he entered into agreement with the colonial authorities for the exchange of intelligence information.

The state's combination of conciliatory and coercive responses from late 1947 has a direct relevance to the collaborative nexus. As can be deduced from this work, the era of the expatriate state was particularly tumultuous and short-lived. The state's decision to compromise some of its power to indigenous groups from late 1947 underscored the centrality of collaboration. The simultaneous application of coercive and reform measures shows that collaboration does not preclude conflict. In other words, like cooperation, conflict is an integral part of collaboration. Therefore, seeing decolonization in terms of either collaboration (often misleadingly equated with unbridled co-operation), or non-collaboration as one encounters often in the literature is both theoretically unfeasible and historically inapplicable.

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54 He gave a breakdown of the force stationed in Nigeria as follows: 111 European officers and nine European non-commissioned officers (NCOs); 1,334 indigenous NCOs and 4,450 other ranks. See ibid.

55 CO 537/2677/14355/6, "West African Political Intelligence Summary I," 10 November 1948.
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