SCOTTISH MERCHANTS IN
THE NEWFOUNDLAND TRADE, 1800-1835:
A COLONIAL COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION

by

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ABSTRACT

A distinctive Scottish merchant community survived into this century and trace elements of their presence are still manifest today. This community had deep roots. Regular Scottish trade with Newfoundland extends back to the American War of Independence, and particularly its aftermath. The lucrative Scottish traffic in tobacco with the southern colonies was arrested during the war and some Clyde merchants redirected their trade to British North America, supplying goods to the garrisons and to the British cod fishery. This fishery was by then long established in eastern Newfoundland. Scottish trade expanded during the Napoleonic wars as Newfoundland came to dominate the salt cod markets. Prices for fish increased dramatically early in the nineteenth century and Scottish merchants were lured to St. John's and its outports to manage the trade. Like the vast majority of other British merchants they did not settle permanently, at least not initially, but as residency in Newfoundland expanded during and after the Napoleonic Wars Scottish merchants transferred their headquarters to St. John's and established a permanent community there.

This thesis examines the origins and growth of Scottish trade with St. John's during the transition from
a temporary to a permanent resident merchant community between c. 1780 and 1835. It focuses on the emergence of Greenock as a leading supply centre for Newfoundland early in the nineteenth century, and its subsequent decline as other ports dislodged British and Irish ports from a long-standing trade by the 1830s. Most of the supplies sent to Newfoundland by Scottish merchants were sent on Scottish ships and cod and cod oil were carried to the markets on these vessels. This thesis reconstructs the spatial patterns of Scottish shipping in the North Atlantic, from the initial tentative and mainly shuttle voyages between the Clyde and St. John's in the eighteenth century to more elaborate multilateral routes, integrating three or more distinct and widely scattered areas around the Atlantic into the trading network in the 1830s.

The transition from a temporary to a resident merchant society was a slow process. Initially the Scottish mercantile presence at St. John's comprised largely young unmarried male clerks or agents for Clyde houses, living over stores on the waterfront, serving out terms of apprenticeship. Typically these men returned to the homeland, joined the parent company as junior partners or set up as merchants on their own account. After around 1815, however, they began to settle in St. John's. They brought out their families, built dwelling houses and expanded their premises on the waterfront. Scots registered more and more vessels in St. John's throughout the 1820s and 1830s as their residency
increased. From 1779 to 1835, close to forty Scottish firms were established. At their peak in 1814 there were twelve companies operating, controlling one-seventh of the total Newfoundland trade. They dealt with English and Irish planters and their servants in the outbuildings through a network of Scottish and other agents, advancing them supplies in the spring on a promise of their fish in the fall. They also dealt extensively with other merchants, traders and artisans in St. John's. In this they were typical of large St. John's cod merchants but they did not have the advantage of English and Irish merchants in Newfoundland who could trade with their fellow countrymen.

The Scots in Newfoundland did not fish. They were never more than a tiny minority and focused almost entirely on international trade. But by 1835 they were a potent mercantile force in the Newfoundland trade.

The data for this thesis come from a wide range of archival sources. Lloyd's Register of Shipping and St. John's ship registers were used to reconstruct the patterns of shipping and a profile of Scottish shipowners in the cod trade. Newspapers, government correspondence, court records, vital statistics, wills and business records provided a rich store of information on the merchant community through the early nineteenth century.
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Chapter I

THE MERCHANT COMMUNITY. AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRADE:

APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE

Over the past two decades or more a substantial literature has emerged in history and in historical geography on the origins and growth of central places and their hinterlands in North America. Explanations for the growth of central places have taken different forms. Economic historians, for example, have been concerned primarily with measuring the growth of the urban or regional economy (North 1966, Taylor 1967, Price 1974, Crowther 1976, Lindstrom 1978). For the most part these scholars neglect human initiative, particularly the social and cultural context of individual or community entrepreneurship, as a factor in the growth of central places. The more specialized school of business history has been keenly aware of the importance of entrepreneurship in shaping the growth of new places. Early scholarship examined the colonial merchant, especially in America, (eg. Harrington 1935, Bailyn 1955, Schlesinger 1957, Bruchey 1966). These studies analyzed the merchant community as an economic and political force in the conduct of overseas trade and in the formation of service centres. Historians,
have examined single merchant houses (e.g. Davison 1964; Baxter 1965), specific ethnic merchant communities (e.g. Soltow, 1959, Devine 1975), and merchant communities in certain ports and regions (Papenfuse 1975, Sutherland 1978). Studies such as these have contributed greatly to our understanding of the economic and social structure of mercantile trade. Few, if any of these, however, focus on the spatial aspects of trade, and even when geographical patterns are discussed they are sweeping in scale and are rarely mapped (e.g. Doerflinger 1983).

The historical geographer’s concerns are the spatial expressions and landscape manifestations of the rural/urban economy, especially with reference to settlement form (e.g. Vance 1970). These themes have been often discussed in the context of central place theory (Christaller 1966, Lemon 1967, Borchert 1967, Ward 1971). This theory proposes that centrality of location is the best strategy for serving a market. It uses this concept to explain settlement location (Boyce 1974: 100). Vance (1970) maintains, however, that central-place theory can only be applied in a closed, land-locked trading system such as feudal Europe, and that even there it is too rigid since it neglects mercantile factors such as wholesaling. It is argued that central-place theory is an inadequate model for explaining settlement in places like North America which have been so strongly influenced from outside. He suggests an alternative theory of settlement where the sources of changes were often external to the
developing colonial area. This "mercantile model of settlement" stresses the importance of emerging colonial Atlantic port centres and the role of seasonal and wholesaling trade within the retailing system. It also shows the influence of entrepreneurial tradition, expertise and individual initiative upon the settlement/trading system. The model describes the process of wholesaling as it originally took place in the North American context. Long distance commodity trade linked producers of finished goods in the Old World with newly developing staple producing centres in America. The gradual maturation and development of trading links and settlement patterns is the central aspect of this model.

Vance's notions have yet to be followed up seriously by historical geographers. Meinig (1976), like Vance, produced an interesting model of transatlantic connections, but both of their examples emphasize the emergence of inland agrarian economies. Empirical studies adhere to this approach. Earle (1975), for example, examined the evolution of All Hallow's Parish in Maryland as a port settlement and stressed Old World control of economic activity. The impact of British merchant capitalism on the settlement and agrarian development in the region was emphasized. Despite the importance of the eastern seaboard and ports, historical geographers are only now beginning to consider them using Vance's and Meinig's models.
Newfoundland: The Historical Geography of Trade

Although it is the oldest staple economy established by Europeans in North America, the migratory and subsequent sedentary fishery in the north-western Atlantic are largely ignored in the continental models and in much of the general empirical literature. This of course reflects the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of the North American frontier and the geographer's traditional concern with the cultural landscape. Only the colonial ports of eastern North America and the fishing settlements of the northeast retained firm links with a Maritime world. Here the merchant held sway, transporting supplies from overseas, collecting cod and other staple resources in exchange and shipping these overseas.

There are few areas in colonial North America where the merchants' role in the historical geography of settlement is more significant than in Newfoundland. Throughout most of Newfoundland's history its people have relied upon the fisheries and overseas trade. As the merchants and planters of St. John's put it in 1822, "... with the single exception of fish, we import everything we eat and drink, everything we wear and everything we use; even our houses are imported from other countries, or at least the materials from which they are composed. Merchants and the conduct of overseas trade, therefore, are fundamental to understanding the early
Maritime economy and society of Newfoundland. The merchants provided the commercial framework within which production and consumption took place. They brought to the fishermen the articles they needed in return for fish which they carried to market.

Both historians and historical geographers have examined the Newfoundland merchant community, its role in the formation of settlement and the manner in which the merchants conducted overseas trade. These studies have concentrated mainly on the Old World origins of trade in a transatlantic migratory fishery, specifically England (Matthews 1968, Cell 1969, Handcock 1979, Davies 1980), Jersey (Ommer 1979), France (La Morandière 1962, Brière 1978), Spain (Barkham 1977), America (Head 1976), and Ireland (Mannion 1980). Only Greenock, Liverpool, Hamburg and the Canadian ports, all of them important in the trade, have not been examined. A few scholars have investigated the role of merchants in specific outport settings: Handcock (1977, 1979) and Thornton (1977, 1979), for example, have examined the influence of merchants in the peopling of Trinity Bay and the Strait of Belle Isle respectively and there are historical-geographical studies by Ommer (1979) on the Jersey fishery in Gaspe and Mannion (1977) on trade and settlement in western Newfoundland. Chang (1975), a historian, has considered the role of the Dartmouth firm of Newmans in the cod fishery on the south coast. Much of this literature attempts to show the human dimension in the formation of
settlement and the development of mercantile trade by examining the initial inflow of people, subsequent population growth, settlement expansion and the geographic forms of trade by ethnic or cultural groups. Ryan (1983) has been the only scholar to deal with the marketing of cod; his study concentrates on the nineteenth century Iberian market.

Among the major lacunae in the historical literature on Newfoundland is an analysis of the port of St. John's and particularly the role of the merchant community there. The merchant community witnessed rapid growth after 1800. Only recently have import and export values, population changes, occupational and ethnic composition begun to be quantified for the nineteenth century (Mannion, 1987). Previous research focused on the merchants' political role (Matthews 1968, 1977, Smith 1968, Baker 1982). There are no studies of the St. John's merchant community comparable to those produced for Halifax (Sutherland 1976, 1978); Saint John (Acheson 1979), Montreal (Dechêne 1974), or even Louisbourg (Boisher 1975, Moore 1979).

When one considers that St. John's had emerged as Newfoundland's primary centre before 1800-and increased its hegemony subsequently, this neglect becomes more remarkable. Scholars have concentrated on detailed studies of rural Newfoundland and have largely ignored St. John's. Such basic questions as the social and ethnic origins of the resident merchant community, the spatial dimensions of their operations and the organization of their trade remain unanswered.
The Scottish Impact on the Geography of Trade

Some scholars have noted that the Scots formed an important part of the St. John's merchant community (Innis 1939: 282-290; Matthews 1968: 428-432; MacMillan 1972: 52-54). As yet, however, there has been no detailed study of them. By contrast a considerable literature exists on the Scottish merchant influence in the West Indies, along the American seaboard, in Quebec and in the Maritimes.

Scottish merchants played an important role in colonial North American commerce in the eighteenth century. They brought goods, capital and expertise from the Clyde region of Scotland and took staples in exchange from colonial producers who possessed little capital of their own. Foodstuffs, notably salt meats, bread and butter, textiles, leather goods, iron implements and glass were loaded on ships at different centres along the Clyde and transported across the Atlantic to colonial ports where they were exchanged for tobacco, sugar, cotton, fur, fish, and in the nineteenth century, timber and wheat.

Scottish colonial trade began early in the eighteenth century. By the 1720s, there was a significant Scottish merchant community involved in the tobacco trade of Virginia and Maryland (Price, 1954; Devine, 1975, 1977). Tobacco alone represented 40 percent of all Scottish imports in 1762. Glasgow merchants were heavily involved in the West Indies trades by the mid-eighteenth century. They were established
in Tobago, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitt's, St. Vincent, and Dominica. Sugar, rum, molasses and cotton from these islands totalled 22 percent of all Scottish imports in 1790. Exports of provisions, finished cloth and iron products to these places accounted for 26 percent of the Scottish total (Devine, 1978).

This Scottish trading empire stretched northwards to embrace the Middle Colonies, New England, but particularly British North America. Halifax attracted Scottish entrepreneurs during and especially after the American Revolution, as London's trade there faded (MacMillan, 1972; Sutherland 1983). William Forsythe, for example, established at Halifax by 1784, and he imported goods from his Greenock partners Robertson and Hunter to supply the British garrison and the cod fishery. His trade network stretched from Saint John to the Gaspe and westwards to Newfoundland. There was a small Scottish merchant community in Saint John by 1800. Lesser centres such as St. Andrews, Pictou, Charlottetown and Miramichi, became foci for Clyde commerce shortly thereafter (Buggey, 1983). Trade with the Maritimes focused initially on supplies to the British military and to the fisheries; it was, however, a relatively modest business until the rise of timber after the turn of the century.

At least eleven firms were engaged in Quebec traffic in the late eighteenth century. Textiles, construction tools and food dominated the flow inwards in exchange for timber,
fur, potash and grain. Scots penetrated deep into the western interior of Canada with the North West Company and Scots clerks and agents comprised over half of the management of this far-flung fur trading region. They came from a wide variety of places in Scotland.

Early in the nineteenth century Scottish merchants switched their focus to the burgeoning timber trade in the St. Lawrence river system, but particularly in northern New Brunswick. The Glasgow house of Gilmour, Rankin, for example, entered the Miramichi in 1812. Few Scottish houses matched their scale in colonial trading. By the 1830s, they were loading over 100 vessels annually with timber for British ports, employing over 1,000 men and supplying an even greater number of independent loggers in the forests of New Brunswick (Wynn, 1981). Later in the nineteenth century, Scottish merchants played an important role in the development of the traffic in grain from Upper Canada (McCalla, 1972).

Scotland's entry into the trade came relatively late in the long history of European involvement in the cod fishery of the northwestern Atlantic. There is a report of Scottish involvement in Newfoundland as early as 1704, but this was very insignificant, probably representing a few goods shipped to Newfoundland from Scotland on speculation. The rise of Scottish trade to Newfoundland occurred during and after the American Revolution, but particularly during the Napoleonic wars. The value of Scotland's exports to Newfoundland barely
exceeded £700 in 1771, soared to over £17,000 in 1776 and stabilized around £11,000 per annum at the close of the American Revolution. In 1786, only five Scottish firms were involved in the Newfoundland trade.

Any measure of overseas trade must be seen within the context of shipping, since all goods, technology and people were carried on ships across the Atlantic. In the late 1790s the number of vessels involved in the Greenock trade rose sharply (Figure 1:1). There were an average of 14 vessels per annum voyaging to Newfoundland from Scotland between 1785 and 1794. This increased to 20 between 1795-1799, and 37 between 1799-1805. The average for 1806-1810 was 49, and in 1811-1815 it reached 53 vessels.

The rise in the number of vessels trading between Scotland and Newfoundland up until 1814 reflects in part the general prosperity enjoyed by Newfoundland during the Napoleonic wars (Ryan 1971: 35). Newfoundland controlled much of the world salt cod market. After an unprecedented peak in the trade in 1814, prices of fish fell and economic depression set in. The average number of Scottish vessels trading to Newfoundland as measured by Lloyds was down to 32 in the 1817-1820 period and 24 for the 1821-1825 period. This decrease after the war was part of a more general decline in shipping between the British Isles and Newfoundland. The insolvency of seven Scottish-Newfoundland companies however, contributed greatly to the decline. Among them, the bankrupt
Number of Vessels Engaged in the Scottish - Newfoundland Trade, 1777 - 1827

Number of Vessels

- Lloyds Registry of Shipping
- 1793 Report of the Trade and Fishery to Newfoundland
- Gaps in solid line indicate no data available

Figure 1:1

Source: M.H.G., Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1777-1827; P.A.N.L., Third Report from the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the State of Trade to Newfoundland, 1793.
Crawfords firm owed over 100,000 pounds to creditors and was the largest insolvency to that point in Newfoundland history.  

A slight recovery did occur by 1820, and additionally, sweeping changes occurred in the spatial patterns of Newfoundland overseas trade. Scottish merchants began to run their operations more directly from St. John's, where supply and market information was more accurate. There was a movement away from a dependence upon Greenock for decision-making and as a supply source. North American ports increasingly replaced Greenock after 1820. Thus although Scots continued as a strong force in Newfoundland after the 1817 depression, albeit in a restructured fashion, Greenock was of diminishing importance.

Thesis Objectives

The growth of Scottish trade to Newfoundland shows that Scottish merchants played an increasingly important role in the Newfoundland economy throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This thesis will probe the development of this trade in a spatial way to gain a fuller understanding of the part played by Scottish merchants. By analyzing ships and the routes they sailed, the importance of the vessel to the merchant will be explored. The significance of various supply and market locations which were used by Scots will indicate the degree of difference from general
Newfoundland trade patterns.

The main focus of this thesis is the geography of trade by the Scottish merchant community. This trade is analyzed by chapters focusing on shipping, the composition of cargoes and a single firm study at three points in time, i.e. c.1780, 1810 and 1830. This allows the change in trade over time to be examined in order to discover the degree to which the Scottish merchant community developed their trade. Another chapter traces the St. John's merchant community as it grew and changed with regards to such features as property, firm size and structure, local vessel registration, and wholesaling within St. John's and its hinterland. The spatial changes which occurred as the Scottish merchant community in St. John's evolved from the initial tentative contact of the late 1700s to a relatively stable resident merchant community in the mid 1830s are central to this thesis.
NOTES

1 Public Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (hereafter PANL), Colonial Office Correspondence (hereafter CO 194), Vol. 65, E-1-2, May 6, 1822.


4 Maritime History Group Archives (hereafter MHG). The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping for the Year 1786, London H.L. Galabin (Reprinted by Gregg Press Limited, Holland); PANL, British Government Records, GB5 #2, Third Report from the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the State of Trade to Newfoundland 1793.

5 Most of the data for this figure came from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, a survey of vessels published annually. This source reveals all vessels listed as Greenock (home port) and Newfoundland (port of destination). Comparison to the 1793 Report on the Fishery and Trade suggests Lloyd’s to be a reasonably accurate account of vessels engaged in the Newfoundland-Scottish trade. Although little used as a source by historians, Lloyd’s does provide an annual survey of vessels. For Newfoundland there is no other quantitative source apart from Lloyd’s List of Voyages that can be used through time for comparative purposes. Unfortunately, the Clyde ports are listed only sporadically in Lloyd’s List, especially after 1800.

6 PANL, Records of the Surrogate Court, GNS/1/A/1, Abstract of General Statement of the Estate of Crawford’s and Company, May 30, 1818.
Chapter II

SHIPS AND SHIPPING

Newfoundland was historically part of the larger North American colonial seaboard settlements with their dependence on ships, and any analysis of Newfoundland shipping, or the contribution of the Scots, must from the outset be set in a larger geographical context. The evolution of the Newfoundland economy in the early nineteenth century was greatly affected by ship transportation. The connection Newfoundland had with the rest of the North Atlantic rim depended entirely on the sea. As an island off northeastern North America, fishing and overseas trade were its lifeblood. Fish was the sole reason for its growth into an important trade area, linking it with ports in the British Isles, Southern Europe, the West Indies, and the mainland. All fish exported from Newfoundland was carried in ships as were all imported supplies. To understand this trade one must understand the role of ships within the trade.

Despite the importance of ships and shipping in the colonies there is as yet only a small literature and most of it of recent vintage. The role of ships in British North American trade was studied by Bailyn (1959). He attempted an analytical review of shipping. Fleet size, ownership and investment patterns were studied for Massachusetts State.
using computer technology. He found that Massachusetts merchants were using mostly New England built vessels as early as 1698, but they were only half the size of the vessels which were built in England. This reflected a New England shipbuilding scene geared primarily to the coastal and North American trades.

Shephard and Walton (1972) also produced a detailed study of the shipping economy in colonial North America. They showed the importance of distribution costs in affecting trading patterns by analyzing the freighting and marketing of commodities. Their study revealed that regular trade patterns were desirable, since they resulted in improved flows of economic information and reduced time spent in port. The costs associated with shipping were seen as an important factor in determining trade patterns. They found that shipping patterns were primarily shuttle runs because they were more economical.

Recent work by Doerflinger (1983) on the role of ships in Colonial Philadelphia is very revealing. He divides the trade into provisions and dry goods. Dry goods traders were less dependent upon shipping, since the goods were lower in bulk and higher in value than those moved by provisions merchants. The latter almost always owned vessels. Some merchants never owned a ship, and most one vessel only. Larger merchants were able to trade on a broad geographical scale; smaller ones were forced to specialize on one or two trading
areas, since they could not afford vessels. This confirms Shephard and Walton's finding that the complexities of overseas trade resulted in a highly organized system restricted to specific locations for economic reasons.

This chapter will apply some of the concepts which were found in shipping studies by Bailyn, Shephard and Walton and by Doerflinger to the Scots in Newfoundland. It will discuss vessel size and origin, the spatial patterns of voyages, the relationship between commodity types and ship ownership, and the link between the number of vessels owned and the degree of geographical specialization. The development of Scottish trade to Newfoundland should reflect a maturation in the geographical patterns of shipping. This chapter will highlight this maturation.

Newfoundland Shipping Patterns

Newfoundland shipping patterns were different from Philadelphia's. Most firms in colonial Philadelphia handled vessel traffic from only one of the following areas: the West Indies, Great Britain, Southern Europe or the North American coast; whereas Newfoundland merchants traded with at least two different regions. The patterns for Patrick Morris, a prominent Irish-Newfoundland merchant in the early 1800s, shows a concentration on Irish-Newfoundland-British North American areas (Mannion, 1986). While initially a provisions importer and exporter, he diversified his trade, taking
passengers and carrying building materials and fishing supplies. Most of the vessels bound for Newfoundland from Ireland in the early 1800s were owned by West Country merchants (Mannion, 1980). These vessels left the West Country in early spring partially loaded with passengers and goods such as cloth and fishing supplies. Irish ports such as Waterford and Cork were often the next stop before Newfoundland. In Ireland, salted provisions and more passengers were obtained. The vessels would then sail to Newfoundland for the spring fishery. These vessels sometimes proceeded to market in Southern Europe in summer and often returned for a second cargo.

Numerous Scottish vessels departed Greenock for Newfoundland in the spring as well, but their route was usually to the north of Ireland. These vessels cleared for a Southern European market or the West Indies after discharging provisions and shop goods in St. John's. Unlike the West Country and Irish merchants, Scots rarely transported passengers except for a handful of Scottish professionals. Some vessels returned to Newfoundland in the summer for another cargo of fish for Southern Europe. A trickle of vessels entered from Greenock and Liverpool with supplies over the summer, but most waited until the fall to replenish spring supplies. Vessels quite often arrived with a few goods and a full ballast load of salt, coal or bricks, since their main demand was for return cargoes of salt cod for Southern Europe. If dispatched early in the fall, vessels could squeeze in another round trip to
market in Iberia or the Caribbean. ¹

The Beginnings of Scottish Shipping 1781-1791

Initially, Scottish shipping to Newfoundland was sporadic. There is no record of Scottish shipping to Newfoundland in Lloyds List before 1781, apart from one vessel which arrived from Ayr in 1773. ² Clearly Lloyds List is not a comprehensive source for Scottish trade at this time since Scottish exports amounted to £17,000 in 1776. ³ Between 1781-1791 Lloyds List reports 74 vessels departing Greenock for Newfoundland. These vessels were 'sack ships,' many of them shuttling back and forth between the Clyde and St. John's with supplies. Merchants from Scotland were involved in supplying the St. John's garrison and the Newfoundland fishery. It was not until after the American Revolution that Scots ventured into the fish markets, and even then the volume of trade was small. Only 13 vessels cleared St. John's for Southern Europe between 1781-1791. Between 1790-1810 the market for Newfoundland cod in Southern Europe expanded dramatically, largely because of the Napoleonic wars which tied up the French fishery and created a greater need for protein rich food to feed the European armies. Scots entered this fish trade in force.
Scottish Shipping Patterns: 1810

In 1810 the Scottish merchant trade system was based almost entirely around Greenock, St. John's and Southern Europe. Seventy-two of 99 single voyages from or to Newfoundland included Greenock or Southern Europe (Figure 2:1). Although the Scots concentrated on three regions, including Newfoundland, like Morris did, they were rarely using North America as part of their trade. They preferred instead to use Old World centres for both supplies and markets.

Sailings between three ports in succession by one vessel reveal the close connections between the three prominent centres of Scottish-Newfoundland trade. Twelve vessels which brought supplies from Greenock to Newfoundland also carried cod off to the Southern European market. Eleven of these vessels returned to St. John's and nine of them carried another cargo of fish to Southern Europe. This shows that many vessels did not venture beyond these three areas.

There were only a few vessels which could be considered exceptional in their voyage patterns in 1810. Only six sailed to more than three regions (Figure 2:2). It will be shown later that these exceptional voyages increased by the 1830s. The Hawk and Arthur Owen were the only vessels which used more than one European supply port, indicating that vessels were closely aligned to specific suppliers. Fox Packet used the West Indies and South America as fish markets and Lavinia used the West Indies and Southern Europe.
Scottish Merchants, St. John's
Patterns of Trade, 1810

Figure 2:1

Source: P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Shipping Records, 1810.
Figure 2:2

Source: P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Shipping Records, 1810.
L'Industrie and Magnet both made side trips to British North America while their owner, Thomas Boag prepared fish to send to Southern Europe. Boag had two of his three vessels involved in British North America trade. Only one other Scottish firm, Shannon, Livingston and Company, were trading in British North America at this time. These six vessels represent the exception to Scottish shipping patterns in 1810. Most vessels stuck to established shuttle patterns hinging upon Newfoundland, but the addition of Southern Europe in this shuttle was a major difference from the pre-Napoleonic era.

Merchants were increasingly looking to a variety of regions for cargoes, although their individual vessels followed fairly restricted patterns. In 1818, the first year for which information exists for ownership of cargoes, six Scottish merchants owned cargoes from various regions (Table 2:1). This table shows that when one merchant's fleet is looked at as a whole, the location of that merchant's trade was quite dispersed. Only Cunningham and Bell traded to just one supply and one market area. The other merchants made contact with several market and supply regions, and three companies traded with six other regions besides Newfoundland. Although their individual vessels were tracing consistent and simple patterns around the North Atlantic, these houses, which were the largest, were handling trade in diverse corners of the northern North Atlantic. Individual ships kept their movements restricted,
TABLE 2:1

The Diversity of Trade Locations of Scottish Merchants: 1818

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cunningham, Bell</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart and Rennie</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Boag</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baine, Johnston</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P.A.N.L., Royal Gazette, August–December, 1818.
since familiarity with a limited number of regions was a
more efficient use of transportation. However, individual
merchants sent different vessels to other regions to capitalize
on more geographically dispersed trade opportunities.

Scottish Shipping Patterns: 1833

The shipping patterns for Scottish-Newfoundland traders
had changed remarkably by 1833. The Greenock-Newfoundland-
Southern Europe trade accounted for just over half of all
connections in 1833. Although Greenock itself did increase
its share of the market destination for vessels, most of the
change was accounted for by North American and South American
ports. This meant a threefold increase in the vessels using
these western ports. Only 14 percent had sailed to western
ports in 1810, but 38 percent sailed there in 1833 (Figure 2:3).

The Greenock-St. John's-Southern Europe route was still
the most heavily travelled in 1833; yet St. John's-Scottish
trade was more firmly integrated into the North American
trading system. Ten vessels made the Greenock-St. John's-
Southern Europe run, but only five of the nine that returned
to St. John's made a second trip. Vessels were sailing to
the West Indies, South America or Greenock with their second
or third cargo. Shuttle runs to British North America and
the United States were also increasing.

Scottish-Newfoundland vessels were more flexible by
1833. They were not restricted to the Greenock-St. John's-
SCOTTISH MERCHANTS; ST. JOHNS
PATTERNS OF TRADE, 1833

Figure 2:3

Source: P.A.N.L., Royal Gazette, 1833.
Southern Europe trade route. Nine vessels used more than three ports in their trade by this year and four of them travelled to five separate ports (Figure 2:4). The Mary, The Gulinare and The Norval made triangular trips from Newfoundland to the West Indies and then across the Atlantic to Greenock. This reveals that vessels were less in need of direction from Greenock and a little from St. John's. This shift to St. John's is also reflected by voyages along the coast of North America since some vessels used American ports more so than European. The Meteor, Waterwitch, Annandale and Douglastown all used five regions and were expertly dispatched. Their owners were well informed about conditions in a variety of regions. The Annandale carried exports to four markets and the Douglastown sailed to three markets. The Waterwitch used three different supply regions. Vessel movement had been less developed in 1810, but this was very different in 1833.

Vessel Size and Ship Activity

Although there was flexibility, large and small ships were generally used for different purposes. Ships engaged in long distance trading were usually larger (Bailyn 1959), whereas coastal and short voyages were handled by smaller vessels (Sutherland 1976). In order to determine sizes for Scottish-Newfoundland vessels, two sources were used. Lloyds Register and the St. John's Shipping Register extant from 1818...
SCOTTISH VESSELS, TRADE CIRCuits, 1833

Figure 2:4

Source: P.A.N.L., Royal Gazette, 1833
onwards record all vessels newly registered in St. John's. 6

Most Scottish-Newfoundland vessels found in Lloyd's were larger than those in the St. John's Registry. The average size of ships listed with Lloyd's was 165 tons and 60 percent of vessels were between 100 and 200 tons. Another 25 percent were even larger. By contrast, Scottish ships registered at St. John's averaged 72 tons and more than 80 percent were under 100 tons. The larger vessels were used primarily for transatlantic voyages. By contrast, the smaller ships, registered at St. John's were commonly employed in coastal trade, 7 sealing, 8 and the Labrador fishery. 9

Scots began to participate in local activities most heavily in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Scottish merchants had registered only 32 vessels locally between 1820-1825, and 37 between 1825-30. 10 They registered almost twice this number in the next five years, when 71 new vessels were registered by Scottish merchants. Up to 1825, most new vessels were registered to-companies with senior partners in Greenock. Eighty-five percent of vessels registered in the next decade were owned by merchants based in St. John's. Local activities and shorter voyages by merchants who were based in St. John's, not Greenock, were partially displacing the long distance trans-Atlantic trade of the earlier period.

James Fergus and Company represents an excellent example of a Scottish Company who registered solely at
St. John's. His trading profile shows that he traded mainly along the British North American coast and the United States. His vessels averaged 66 tons and like other merchants who owned small vessels, he relied upon merchants with larger vessels to bring goods from across the Atlantic. Hunters and Company, by contrast, had mostly large, foreign-going vessels and did not register them in St. John's. Their average vessel size was 194 tons; — three times larger than the average vessel owned by James Fergus. Hunters needed larger vessels for trade with South America, the British Islés and Southern Europe.

Scottish merchants used mainly Scottish captains for the vessels listed under Lloyds. Almost 80 percent were Scots and the remainder were English and Irish. By contrast, only 27 percent of the St. John's registered vessels were commanded by Scottish captains. The reason for this is likely linked to the availability of Irish, English and native born masters who were qualified and familiar with the geography of coastal Newfoundland. One cannot help but speculate, however, that the use of Irish and English captains was related to a desire to have close links with the predominantly Irish-English clientele of Newfoundland. English and Irish captains would have kinship and friendship bonds with Newfoundland fishermen which would be useful for business transactions.

The vessels which Scots used were built mostly in British North America and Scotland. It is possible that some
vessels passed through several merchants hands from various places before Scots received them. Nonetheless, 29 percent were built in British North America and 28 percent in Scotland. Fifteen percent were American built and eight percent were English built. The remaining 15 percent came from Europe, the West Indies, and as prizes. The relative importance of these sources did not change significantly through time. From the late 1700s through to the 1830s Scotland and British North America were equally important sources for Scottish merchant vessels.

**Vessel Chartering**

To understand more fully the patterns of Scottish shipping, one must consider the degree to which Scots chartered vessels or space on vessels. Lang, Baine and Company, a Scottish firm from Greenock, established a small Newfoundland Company. This firm was too small in scale to own vessels in its first few years of operation, between 1806 and 1811. Lang, Baine and Company was almost always able to find space on vessels bound for St. John's from Greenock, and this made it easy for the firm to ship supplies. Problems arose in St. John's however, when the company's agents or partners readied cargoes of fish or oil for market. Since fish was bulky in relation to its value, merchants usually shipped whole loads on their own account. If merchants wished to ship fish or oil to market, they
almost always were forced to charter entire vessels. Information on chartering of vessels exists for August-December of 1818 and 1835. These data represent over half the Scottish vessel activity in these years. In 1818, 22 of the 35 vessels (63 percent) carrying cargoes for Scots were not owned by them. In 1835, 27 of the 35 vessels, or 73 percent with cargoes consigned to Scots were non-Scottish. In 1818, 18 of the 31 vessels (58 percent) Scots used to carry Newfoundland produce to market belonged to other owners. In 1835, 58 vessels carried exports for Scottish merchants and 40 (70 percent) were non-Scottish vessels. In the fall a large number of vessels were needed to haul cargoes of fish to market. The demand was much higher than the available supply of Scottish vessels, so many were chartered from other ship owners.

It is quite evident that this demand for extra vessels was seasonal. In 1833, three-fourths of advertisements placed by Scots were in the months between January and July; since their vessels were less active at this time they actively sought to hire them out to other merchants. Lang, Baine and Company's correspondence for 1806-1811 shows that they were constantly looking for vessels in the fall months. This autumn demand for extra vessels varied considerably with individual merchants. For example, in the fall of 1818 two of the top Scottish-Newfoundland merchant ship owners - Stewart and Rennie, and Thomas Boag and Company - rarely
chartered other merchants' vessels. The largest merchant ship owners, Hunters and Company chartered the majority of their ships in the same period. In 1835, the two largest ship owners - McBride and Kerr, and Baine, Johnston and Company - chartered a greater number of vessels than they owned. Third and fourth ranking owners - James Stewart and Company and Rennie, Stuart and Company - by contrast, made greater use of their own vessels. In both 1818 and 1835, all the smaller merchant shipowners, those with five or less vessels, chartered vessels from other merchants more than they used their own.

Although the pattern for the Scottish-Newfoundland merchant community as a whole is indicative of the seasonal need and the overall demand for vessels, all merchants did not fit this pattern. All Scottish merchants depended upon ships to transport goods but some merchants were more interested in investing in shipping than others. Merchants were individuals with varying ideas about the best way to obtain profit from overseas trade.

Conclusions

Scottish shipping to Newfoundland went through a number of stages as Scottish trade matured between the 1780s and 1830s. Original contact was replaced over 50 years by a well-developed shipping network which reflected St. John's based decision making.
Initial Scottish-Newfoundland shipping was tentative. Vessels shuttled back and forth from Scotland to St. John's with cargoes which were of a speculative nature. Shipowners very likely had little idea of the society in Newfoundland and had no intention of settling or even visiting the island. Their intent was to seek out profit by shipping the occasional cargo to Newfoundland and they did not invest at all in the island's economy. Hence the pattern reflected simple two way flows with few diverging voyages to other ports.

Thirty years later the trade was much more involved. Greenock was still the merchant headquarters, but vessels were proceeding to Southern Europe with fish after calling into St. John's. Scottish merchants were committing agents to St. John's so they could direct shipping to the most appropriate market in Southern Europe. They were also sufficiently involved in the local economy in 1810 to be able to sell European supplies and obtain staples for export in return. However, North America was rarely used as a part of the trade network. The Scots were not integrating into the North American trading system.

By the middle of the 1830s, the Greenock-Newfoundland-Southern Europe connection had greatly diminished. A three-fold increase in the use of western ports was recorded. The North American trading system was now a major part of the Scottish-Newfoundland shipping connection. British North America, the West Indies, South America and the United States
had emerged as alternatives to Old World supply and market centres. Firms which had once organized shipping from Greenock were now making decisions from counting houses in St. John's. A concomitant rise in local activities such as sealing, coasting and the Labrador fishery was evident. The St. John's vessel registry was booming in the late 1820s and 1830s, with most new Scottish vessels being registered to merchants who were now based solely in St. John's.
Chapter II

NOTES

1 P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Micro #351.5, B-1-4. Shipping Records, 1810. This pattern was the most typical of Scottish vessels by 1810.


4 PANL, Governor Duckworth Papers, Micro #351.5, B-1-4, Shipping Records, 1810.

5 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, January-December, 1833.


7 PANL, Public Ledger, Micro A-7-1, reel #4, June 19, 1832; May 24, 1833.

8 Ibid., reel #2, May 15, 1829.

9 Ibid., reel #2, Aug. 25, 1829, May 11, 1830; Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, October 2, 1833.

10 M.H.G., Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, Vol. 472-512, 2-5-2-1 to 2-5-2-11, 2-6-1-9, St. John's, January 1818 - December 1835.

11 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, #3, January 1829 - December 1833.

PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, September-December, 1835.

These figures were compiled with the assistance of unpublished lists of English and Irish surnames common to Newfoundland. For English surnames, see Matthews, Keith "A Who's Who of Families Engaged in the Newfoundland Trade", Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University. Irish surnames came from List of Irish Immigrants' Surnames, Newfoundland. John Mannion. In possession of the author.


PANL, Mercantile Journal, micro A-7-5, reel #1, August-December, 1818; Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, August-December, 1835.
Chapter III

THE COMPOSITION OF CARGOES

The Newfoundland economy of the early nineteenth century was almost totally dependent upon cod production and its ancillary trades. Cod was the means by which individuals obtained a large part of their food, drink, clothing and technology. It was used to pay for goods which were imported from different and often distant areas around the North Atlantic. No attempt has been made to date, to investigate the role of Scottish merchants in either the provisioning process or the marketing of Newfoundland cod. Scots, like other merchant groups, took fish and oil in payment for supplies given on credit. They also used bills of exchange. Although little has been done on the Scots, some work on the background of the Island's supply trades has been undertaken for France (La Morandière 1962, Briere 1978), the English West Country (Matthews 1968, Handcock 1981), Southern Ireland (Mannion 1980), Jersey (Ommer 1980), and America (Head 1976). Apart from Ryan's work (1982), little has been written on Newfoundland markets in the early nineteenth century.

This chapter examines the part played by Scottish merchants and their vessels in the Newfoundland trade at
differing time periods as their trade developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Very rarely did West Country or other outside merchants come into the Scottish-dominated Clyde so the focus is on the composition of cargoes carried by Scottish ships and the changing importance of Greenock and the Clyde both as a source of supplies for the fishery and as a market for Newfoundland produce. This will allow for a comparison to the general Newfoundland import and export trade and for an analysis of the typicality of the Scottish-Newfoundland trade within the broader Newfoundland context.

Scottish Exports to Newfoundland - 1771-1785

Food, drink, textiles and other manufactured goods dominated the Clyde-Newfoundland trade. From their inception the Scottish merchants in St. John's were fully engaged in importing and distributing these commodities around the coast. Table 3:1 reveals that industrial goods such as cloth, clothes and manufactures comprised 40 percent of Scottish exports to Newfoundland. This was at a time when industrial production was in its infancy in Scotland but was increasing rapidly. As early as 1770, a slitting mill was erected "for the manufacturing of ... spades, nails ... anchors and every kind of species of ironware". (Devine 1976: 6). Stoneware, earthenware, bricks and bottles could be obtained at various potteries, glassworks, brickworks and bottleworks which
### Table 3:1

**Scottish Exports to Newfoundland 1771-1785**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Value in Pounds</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>10,834</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>4,329</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>8,695</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuit</td>
<td>11,059</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>3,644</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oatmeal</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,728</strong></td>
<td><strong>35%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Drink**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drink</th>
<th>Value in Pounds</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rum</td>
<td>5,068</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wine</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ale</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,123</strong></td>
<td><strong>8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Tobacco    | 4,573           | 3%         |
| Soap and Candles | 3,664 | 3% |
| Clothes    | 4,874           | 4%         |
| Cloth      | 26,232          | 20%        |
| Leather    | 11,892          | 9%         |
| Iron       | 2,830           | 2%         |
| Coals      | 640             | 1%         |
| Fish Technology | 8,210 | 6% |
| Manufactures | 10,051         | 8%         |
| **Total Value** | **112,807**  |            |

produced these goods in the Clyde (Devine 1976: 4). The proportion of Scottish industrial exports in the 1771-1785 period was much higher than the average for St. John's in 1771-1772. Clothing accounted for less than five percent of all goods imported into St. John's at that time, and fishing technology only 10 percent. This suggests that Scots specialized to some extent in manufactured goods even prior to the Industrial Revolution.

Food and drink comprised 45 percent of Scottish exports by value. As in Ireland, pork, bread and butter were the stalwarts of the Clyde-Newfoundland trade, and Scots obtained most of these salt provisions there. Produce such as rum and sugar were re-exported through Clyde ports, a reflection of Scotland's extensive network of trade in the southern colonies. Bread and flour comprised 30 percent of St. John's total imports in 1771-1772. Almost all breadstuffs for Newfoundland came from the United States up until the American Revolution. The fact that imports dropped off is evident from American vessel entrances. These entrances dropped off from 175 in 1774 to 3 in 1776 (Head 1976: 198). British ports, including those in the Clyde, emerged as alternative sources of breadstuffs during and after the war. Between 1771-1785, biscuit, flour and oatmeal made up 12 percent of the Scottish total. Salt, which made up 8 percent of all St. John's imports in 1771-1772, was conspicuously absent from Scottish exports to Newfoundland. In contrast to the southwest English ports,
Scotland did not have a vigorous direct trade with France and Iberia, the main source for Newfoundland salt.

By the close of the American Revolution the Scottish trade to Newfoundland was solidly in place. Scottish exports averaged over £11,000 annually and Scots were replacing some other merchants, particularly those of the West Country. John Reeves' report sums up the changes in Newfoundland trade in 1793:

"We know that the place of these decayed towns has been supplied by Adventurers from other parts of His Majesty's dominions; Glasgow is one; Waterford is another; from both of these towns there are very successful trades carried on, sufficient to raise the envy of Dartmouth, and make them apprehend that they shall no longer enjoy an exclusive trade to Newfoundland."

The Scottish Food Trade in 1810

Table 3:2 reveals that pork, bread and butter comprised over 80 percent of the commodities which could be assigned values exported from Greenock to St. John’s in 1810. This represents eight merchants and fifteen vessels. Since bread, pork, butter, rum and molasses accounted for over half of the sales of Walter Baine (a typical small-scale Scots merchant) in St. John’s in 1810, the importance of these goods is quite clear. Greenock pork exports represented about 39 percent of the Clyde exports to St. John’s and one-eighth of the total pork exports from the United Kingdom to Newfoundland in 1810. Most of the pork exported from Greenock came from
Table 3.2

St. John's Imports from Greenock 1810

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>T. Value</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>2031 Barrels</td>
<td>13,282</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>151 Tons</td>
<td>8,456</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>719 Cwts</td>
<td>5,041</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>148 Cwts</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coals</td>
<td>1273.5 Tons</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>170.3 Cwts</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>780 h.h.</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>19409 Pounds</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum</td>
<td>1609 Gallons</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>315 Barrels</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>43.5 Barrels</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oatmeal</td>
<td>40 Cwts</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles and soap</td>
<td>918 Boxes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,052.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Shipping Records, October, 1809-October, 1811.

Northern Irish ports. Between 1819 and 1830, for example, four Scottish merchant companies - McBride and Kerr, Cunningham, Bell and Company, Stewart and Rennie, and Baine, Johnston and Company - purchased Irish pork and shipped it aboard vessels clearing Greenock for St. John's. The proximity and close trading links between Greenock and the ports of Belfast, Newry and Derry, among others, are evident from merchant correspondence. Merchants in Greenock tended to order goods to be shipped by coastal boat from Northern Ireland in early spring and early fall for shipment overseas. By contrast, the west country merchants called into southern Irish ports on their way out and back from Newfoundland.
Bread comprised 25 percent of exports from Greenock to St. John's, which was one-fifth of the United Kingdom exports to Newfoundland. Scottish people preferred their bread made from oatmeal or barley (Thomas 1982: 331), but Newfoundland bread was made from wheat. Cultivation of grains expanded between 1807 and 1815 (Hamilton 1966: 61), since demand increased during the Napoleonic wars. Wheat prices rose from 43 shillings per quarter in 1792 to 119 shillings in 1801, and finally to 126 shillings by 1812 (Thomas, 1982: 337). Exports of flour and oatmeal were less than one percent of the total. It is clear that Newfoundland absorbed only a tiny fraction of Scottish cereal production and this overwhelmingly as bread or biscuit. Instead, Scots and other St. John's merchants turned to America for bread-stuffs whenever politics allowed. The patterns revealed by Mannion (1980) for Waterford suggest that Newfoundland demanded food such as bread which was ready to eat more than semi-processed produce such as flour.

Butter ranked third in value as far as Scottish food-stuff exports to Newfoundland were concerned. It represented 15 percent of Clyde-Newfoundland exports and it accounted for 8 percent of the United Kingdom butter exports to Newfoundland. Both Ayreshire and Ireland contributed to Scottish butter exports for Newfoundland. Rum, sugar and tobacco together represented 5 percent of Greenock exports to St. John's. All three products were part of the Scottish colonial re-export trade. Since there were strong connections
with America and the West Indies from the early eighteenth century, these goods were readily available in Greenock.

Greenock provided a wide variety of industrial products for Newfoundland in 1810. Table 3.3 shows the different categories and types of articles which were recorded. It is not possible to establish the value of these commodities or even their volume but they were significant. As yet there is no quantitative study of the value of manufactures imported to Newfoundland, but it is known that shop goods and sundry finished products represented about one-quarter of Walter Baines' sales at St. John's in 1810, and these goods had been worth about 40 percent of Scottish exports up until the close of the American Revolution.

Greenock's role as a supplier of finished products to Newfoundland has not been studied, but its role as an industrial producer can be gleaned from secondary sources. Scottish merchants trading to Newfoundland were able to capitalize on industrial advances taking place in the Glasgow region at this time.

Textile manufacturing was the largest industrial sector in Scotland (Devine 1976: 8). By 1810 there were 120 steam-spinning mills in Western Scotland and over 150,000 people were employed in the cotton industry alone. (Slaven 1975: 91). All of the textile products which Scots shipped to St. John's were produced in the West Scotland region by the late
Table 3:3

St. John's Finished Product Imports From Greenock: 1810

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>shirts, ribbons, cotton and worsted, hose, thread, handkerchiefs, apparel, mattresses, haberdashery, upholstery, shoes, Irish and British linen, cotton, woolens, silk, crepe, muslin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Products</td>
<td>nails, shot, gunpowder, flint, spades, iron, copper, lead, tinware, stoneware, earthenware, bricks, lime, freestone, glass, bottles, kettles, pots, ovens, stoves, grates, hearth-stones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Equipment</td>
<td>sail cloth, twines, lines, cordage, grapnels, anchors, weights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>clocks, hardware, paper, stationery, furniture, snuff, seeds, fruit trees, linseed oil, paint, varnish, whiting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Shipping Records, 1810.

eighteenth century (Butt 1977: 116-117). Maritime industries such as sailcloth manufacturing and ropeworks were important for the Newfoundland trade (Devine 1976: 4). Metal products could be obtained from any of seven iron works which were operating by 1800.

Southwest England and Jersey, the older, traditional source areas for Newfoundland merchants, still depended upon cottage production. Handspun clothes and other products were undersold by mass-produced articles from the Mersey and the Clyde. Industrial advancement enabled these regions to become
major centres not just for Newfoundland, but for much of the North Atlantic trade in finished products.

Scottish Merchants and St. John's Imports: 1810

Scots did not obtain all their Newfoundland goods from Greenock. Certain commodities could be purchased more advantageously in other ports. Scottish merchants considered quality, price, convenience and tradition when deciding where to purchase goods.

The strategies of Lang, Baine and Company in 1810, reflect typical Scottish mercantile patterns of procuring supplies for the Newfoundland trade. They obtained over 70% of their goods in Greenock, its hinterland and the industrial Clyde. Their headquarters were located in Greenock, a convenient place to get goods. Almost 20% of their commodities were purchased in Liverpool, Greenock's main rival in the Newfoundland trade. The two ports were also keen competitors in supplying industrial goods, while Greenock served as the ocean outlet for industrial Glasgow, Liverpool was the port for much of Northern England. Lang, Baine and Company capitalized on this rivalry, purchasing goods at Liverpool when prices were more favorable. The firm used Dartmouth and Teignmouth for supplies of quality fishing equipment. Since the East India Company had a monopoly on the sale of tea in 1810, Lang-Baine had to purchase this product in London.
An analysis of shipping patterns of ships owned by Scottish merchants and deployed in the Newfoundland trade in 1810 reveals that the Scots were associated with six major trading areas around the North Atlantic. Figure 3:1 shows that Greenock was the most important supply port used by the Scottish-Newfoundland fleet in 1810. Thirteen of the commodities shipped to Newfoundland by the Scottish fleet can be calculated by value. These goods were worth £42,000, 63 percent of which was supplied by Greenock. Over 70 percent of these commodities comprised pork, bread, flour and butter. Greenock supplied three-quarters of the pork and nearly all the bread and butter for the Scottish-Newfoundland merchants. Flour was obtained cheaply and in abundance from both Canada and the United States. By 1804 Canada supplied 26 percent of the total island imports by all merchants and the United States provided 37 percent.

Both coal and salt were important materials for cargoes crossing the Atlantic. Salt was crucial to the fishery and coal was used in heating. Salt, comprising one-fifth of the quantifiable exports by value, provided one of the few return cargoes for ships selling fish in Southern Europe. Salt was also useful for ships clearing Liverpool for Newfoundland to ballast down loads before stowing lightweight manufactured goods (Head, 1976, 100-137; Hyde 1971, 200). Coals were used for the same purpose by vessels clearing Greenock. Almost all other goods were exclusively obtained from Greenock.
GOODS IMPORTED BY SCOTTISH MERCHANTS IN ST. JOHNS, 1810

Source: P.A.N.L., Governor Duckworth Papers, Shipping Records, 1810.

Figure 3:1

G0'0S IMPRTED BY SClOTTISH MERCHANTS IN ST. JOHNS, 1810
The Scottish Merchant Supply Trade in the 1830s

The pattern of Greenock dominance did not remain constant after 1810. Quantifiable data on the volume and values of Scottish exports to Newfoundland between 1810 and 1833 permits the analysis of the changing patterns of trade. Greenock had sent 74 percent of the pork, butter, bread and flour which the Scottish fleet carried to Newfoundland in 1810; by 1831 this contribution had fallen to roughly 33 percent (Figure 3:2). Greenock still supplied most of the butter, but New York was now the major source of pork and flour for the Scottish merchant community in St. John's. Trade restrictions with northern Europe were dropped in the late 1820s and Hamburg became a main source of bread. British North America was not the major source of any of these products, but provided the second largest share of butter and flour. New York and Hamburg also contributed butter in quantity.

Great Britain was unable to sustain her overseas provisions trade since she could not even supply the needs of her own expanding population (Thomas 1982, 333). As early as 1803, merchants were complaining that European prices for provisions were nearly double the American price. By 1826, it was clear that Ireland would no longer sustain a substantial trade in provisions with Newfoundland. In that year, merchants complained that Irish sources, "... have long been unable to supply the demand for the colonies, except at unbearable prices."
FOOD IMPORTED BY SCOTTISH MERCHANTS IN ST. JOHNS, 1831

Source: P.A.N.L., Newfoundlander, 1830-1835; Public Ledger, 1830-1835; Royal Gazette, 1830-1835.

Figure 3:2
The growth and prosperity of other areas throughout the northern North Atlantic influenced the Scottish choice of source areas for provisions as much as the decline of the Greenock-Irish-St. John's food trade. With the exception of the post-war depression of 1816 and 1817, the North American economic system experienced rapid growth between 1810 and 1830. Agriculture expanded, providing cheap grains and livestock products (Cochrane 1979). Apart from the 1803 embargo and the 1812-1813 war, the United States was becoming an increasingly important source of foodstuffs for Newfoundland. When possible, Scots obtained licences to import provisions from the United States. Boston and New York continued to be important sources of pork, butter and flour. Scots used Halifax and Quebec as sources for these products, since Halifax was a bustling entrepot for U.S. goods and Quebec was able to produce agricultural products independently (Sutherland 1976, 26; Ouellet 1980, 668). Newfoundland merchants focused on Hamburg and to a lesser extent Dantzig and Copenhagen as a source for meat, but especially for breadstuffs. Despite the distance, prices were very reasonable and Greenock vessels often proceeded there before they crossed the Atlantic to St. John's.25

** Manufactured Goods in the 1830s **

The volume and value of manufactured goods cannot be measured with any more precision for the 1830s than they could be for 1810. Nevertheless it is clear that several changes
had taken place. Greenock continued to provide the most
diverse range and usually the largest volume of almost every
type of manufactured product, but Newfoundland Scots no
longer procured all their industrial products there. An
extensive assortment of goods such as metal products and
cloth were sent from Liverpool and its industrial hinterland.
Smaller cargoes of this type of goods were received from
Bristol, London and Newcastle.

The Cod Export Trade

Exports on Scottish ships from St. John's were almost
without exception dried codfish and oil processed from cod
livers or seal fat. Seal pelts and timber products such as
staves, scantling and board made up a small amount compared
to cod and oil. Southern Europe was by far the most important
cod market in 1810 with exports of just over 100,000 quintals
being carried there by the Scottish Fleet. 26 (Figure 3:3). This
was 27 percent of the total Newfoundland exports to
Southern Europe and comprised 85 percent of the total cod
carried by the Scottish fleet. In the same year only 53 percent
of the total Newfoundland export trade in cod went to Southern
Europe. 27 By contrast, the total Newfoundland export trade
to British Europe and the West Indies was 41 percent, but the
proportion of Scottish cod to these places was only 14 percent.
Thus the Scots were more heavily involved in Southern Europe
than were other merchant groups.
Newfoundland Fish Exports in 1810 and 1831.
Total Exports and Scottish Fleet Exports

Quintals (x 10,000)

Key:
- South America
- United States
- British North America
- West Indies
- British Europe
- Southern Europe


Figure 3:3
In 1810, the Scottish fleet carried over 680 tons of oil to market, around eight percent of the total exports of oil from Newfoundland. Oil was a valuable item of export, comprising 22 percent of the total value of Scottish exports. Oil markets for the Scottish fleet were firmly based in British Europe. This is primarily due to the fact that industrializing economies there required cod oil to light lamps, lubricate machinery and tan hides. It is not too surprising therefore, that 76 percent of the oil exported in Scottish bottoms was destined for Greenock and another 10 percent for Port Glasgow. The remaining 14 percent was divided between Liverpool and New Ross, Ireland.

When fish and oil exports are combined, the importance of British Europe is fairly considerable. While Southern Europe was the leading market taking 66 percent of the £84,000 worth of exports, 17 percent was delivered to the British Isles. Scottish exports of fish and oil represented at least 14 percent of the total exports of these goods from Newfoundland.

Wartime activity created a boom in the Newfoundland economy. The French were displaced temporarily from the fishery and European armies demanded fish for provisions. This opened up large fish markets in Southern Europe in the first decade of the century. Fish prices peaked in 1813, but a general economic depression arrived with the signing of peace in 1814 and markets for oil and dried cod were greatly affected (Head 1976, 236-7). Protectionist duties
plagued the Iberian trade and the drop in fish prices ex-
acerbated the problem (Innis 1954, 307).

By 1818, the Newfoundland economy was beginning to
show signs of stability. The value of fish exports by Scottish
merchants in just four months of this year totalled £44,000. In
the fall months of 1818, Southern Europe took almost 66 per-
cent of the cod exported and half of this went to Spain,
(Figure 3.4). At this point duties and prices were not
sufficient enough to limit this region as a market area.
Neither Italy nor Portugal could match the exports of fish to
Spain at this time. Although Scottish merchants were beginning
to complain publicly about the high duties placed on rum
imported from the sugar cane regions, the West Indies and
South America comprised 24 and 14 percent of the total fish
trade. 'Duty on rum imported to Newfoundland hindered re-
export until 1829, when St. John's was declared a free ware-
housing port.

By 1831, total exports of codfish from Newfoundland by
all merchants were slightly greater than they were in 1810. (Figure 3.3). However, the total exports by the Scottish
fleet were 60 percent less than what they exported in 1810.
This is partially explained by the fact that Scots were
chartering a greater proportion of vessels from other merchants.
They chartered 18 in 1818, but this rose to 40 in 1835. Scots
were more heavily involved in the oil trade by this time.
Scottish vessels carried almost one-fifth of all the oil
exported from Newfoundland in 1831. This was over twice as
FISH EXPORTED BY SCOTTISH MERCHANTS
AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1818

Source: "P.A.N.L., Mercantile Journal, 1818"
much as in 1810. Ninety-three percent of the oil carried by Scots went to Greenock and Liverpool, with Greenock receiving roughly two-thirds.

Consignment data for the fall of 1835 provides a much better opportunity to examine Scottish Newfoundland exports, since it provides information on all vessels used in the trade. 71 percent of codfish exports by Scots in this period went to Southern Europe. It is interesting to note that almost all of this went to Portugal and none to Spain (Figure 3:5). 34 Spanish duties on Newfoundland codfish created almost a prohibition in the trade there by 1831; according to the Newfoundland Commercial Society's annual report 35 (Ryan, 1983a: 23) Portugal had replaced Spain as the main export market for Newfoundland cod exported by Scots. South America took 27 percent of Scottish exports in this year.

Conclusions

The Scottish merchant community which entered the trade to Newfoundland in the 1770s dealt with trade in a much different fashion from the Scottish merchant community of the 1830s. A much more sophisticated commercial system was evident in the latter period. A study of the composition of cargoes and their origin/destination in each time period (ie. 1770, 1810 and 1830) reinforces the conclusions regarding shipping patterns found in Chapter Two.
FISH EXPORTED BY SCOTTISH MERCHANTS
AUGUST–DECEMBER, 1835

Source: P.A.N.L., Royal Gazette, 1835.

Figure 315
The cargoes shipped from Scotland in the 1770s and early 1780s reflected the sporadic nature of the trade. Vessels were unloading surplus cargoes of Scottish industrial products and some food and drink products picked up mainly from Ireland. The cargoes did not have all the goods which Newfoundland needed, lacking such essentials as salt. This indicates the underdeveloped nature of the Scottish-Newfoundland trade. Shipping information reveals that these vessels returned to Scotland with small cargoes of fish and oil or sometimes empty. Southern Europe was not a destination for Scottish traders who ventured to Newfoundland in this early period.

By the middle period of this study (1810), Scottish merchants were more heavily involved in the Newfoundland trade and the destination of their cargoes clearly reflects this. They shipped one-quarter of all the fish sent to Southern Europe in 1810 from Newfoundland. This was remarkable progress for a group of merchants who had sent no fish there thirty years earlier. Like the 1770s, industrial products were an important part of their trade but the composition of cargoes from Scotland was now more of a reflection of the needs of the Newfoundland society. Newfoundland demanded salted provisions which were ready to eat and if Scots were to adequately provision the fishery they had to supply these goods. Foodstuffs, mostly imported from Ireland, made up three-fourths of Scottish merchants' exports. Seventy percent of all the
Scottish merchants' exports to Newfoundland were funnelled through Greenock, indicating the grip which this port held over the Scottish trade in 1810.

By the end of the period (1835), Greenock's control had greatly diminished and a general dispersal of trade locations was evident for supplies and fish products. The fact that Scots drew on a much more diversified range of ports for supplies and markets by the 1830s suggests that St. John's had increasingly integrated into the North American trading system. New York was now the major source of pork and flour for Scottish merchants and British North America provided them with the second largest share of butter and flour. Similarly, South America was a growing destination for fish. Decisions were now being made in St. John's regarding trade. A resident Scottish merchant community was on the rise in St. John's.
Chapter III

NOTES

1. PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #3, #4, May 10, 1831, Nov. 8, 1833, Nov. 21, 1834.


4. PANL British Government Records, GB5 #2, Third Report from the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the State of Trade to Newfoundland, 1793.


8. PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, June 24, 1819; Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #2, #4, May 25, 1830, January 25, 1833, September 18, 1833.


11. PANL, Registry of Passes, GN/2/1/A, Volume 25, August 20, 1814.

13. PANL, Royal Gazette, Micro A-7-3, reel #2, June 24, 1819; Public Ledger micro A-7-1, reel #4, January 25, 1833.

14. PANL, Governor Duckworth Papers. Micro #351.5, B-1-4, Shipping Records, October, 1809 - October, 1811.


20. MHG, The Lloyds Register of Shipping for the Years 1800-1832, London, H.L. Galabin (Reprinted by Gregg Press Limited), Holland; MHG, Transcripts of Registers of Colonial Shipping, BJ 107, Vol. 472-512, 2-5-2-1 to 2-5-2-11, 2-6-1-9, St. John's, January 1818-December 1835; PANL, Newfoundlander, micro A-8-4, reel #1, #2, #3, 1830-1835; Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #2, #3, #4, #5, 1830-1835; Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, #3, 1830-1835.


22. Ibid., Volume 72, January 20, 1826.


24. PANL, Royal Gazette, Micro A-7-3, reel #2, #3, 1818-20, 1822, 1828.
25 PANL, CO 194, Volume 78, E-1-2, April 22, 1829; Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, January-December 1828; Times micro A-8-1, reel #2, Oct. 11, 1843.

26 MHG, The Lloyds Register of Shipping for the Years 1800-1832, London. H.L. Galabia (Reprinted by Gregg Press Limited, Holland); PANL, Governor Duckworth Papers, micro 351.5, B-1-4, Shipping Records, October 1809-October 1811.


28 Ibid., 1969.


30 PANL, Mercantile Journal, micro A-7-5, reel #1, August-December, 1818; Ryan, Shannon "Abstract of CO 194 Statistics," unpublished manuscript, Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University, 1969.

31 PANL, CO 194, Vol. 78, E-1-2, April 22, 1829.

32 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, #3, January-December, 1831.

33 Ryan, Shannon "Abstract of CO 194 Statistics," unpublished manuscript; Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University, 1969.

34 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, August-December, 1835.

35 PANL, Public Ledger micro A-7-1, reel #3, August 5, 1831.
Chapter IV

THE SCOTTISH MERCHANT IN ST. JOHN'S

By the time the Scots began to establish mercantile premises there, St. John's had emerged as the main centre for collecting Newfoundland produce for export overseas. Moreover, most goods imported after 1800 came through this port where they were reassorted and distributed around the island. By 1811, for example, over three-fourths of all shipping to and from Newfoundland passed through the narrows at St. John's (Mannion, 1983:3). The town's population comprised around 11,000 at this time, one-third the total population of the colony (Ryan, 1980: 41; MacKinnon, 1981, 12). It was the largest port in Newfoundland and one of the leading central places in Atlantic Canada. Newfoundland's population moreover, was heavily concentrated in the districts nearby, particularly Conception Bay. With its commodious harbor and its central location on the British shore, together with advantages related to its role as an administrative and military centre, St. John's was an attractive location for merchants intent on the supply trade.

This chapter will explore the changing structure of the St. John's-Scottish merchant community. It will trace the growth in the number of firms from the 1790s to the peak
in 1814 and document the changes resulting from the economic crash of 1816. The transformation of the typical firm from a Scottish branch plant to a more localized Newfoundland operation will also be studied.

Scottish Company Structure

Between 1794 and 1835 there were 37 different companies formed by various Scottish merchants at St. John's. In 1794, there were six firms in the trade, four of whom had been established for over 10 years (Table 4:1). Most of these merchants were single with no children, but all had several servants. Servants tended to be male and at least one servant per merchant household would be a youngster who would run errands and perform light jobs. There would also be a group of laborers for stevedoring, a clerk and/or storekeeper, accountant and shop assistant. Normally one-quarter of these servants were Irish, the rest English and Scottish.

James MacBraire of St. John's wrote to his partner, James Henderson in Falkirk in 1805, describing the personnel required for their St. John's business:

"I can't do without a clerk, a boy in the shop, a man about the wharf and a house servant - this is the lowest establishment possible. We are now short one person in the counting house, and a cooper to do the business with satisfaction, those people must have wages, and be maintained, and occasionally we have to employ perhaps 10 to 12 labourers about fish."


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year Entered Trade</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Servants</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Reed</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart &amp; Rennie</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Cormack</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Robertson</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John, Bell</td>
<td>1789</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Thomson</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P.A.N.L., Nominal Census of St. John's, 1795.
Life for these employees was very different from that in Scotland. Clerks were expected to work long hours at a variety of tasks for low wages for several years. MacBraire's description of St. John's mercantile life indicates the work that awaited a new recruit from Scotland.

"I find that a son of Mr. Russels is coming here to serve us for three years, ... he may be a very good young man, but he will find our business very different from the business at Grangemouth, here he must work hard and not have his choice of employment, for he must assist in every department rough and smooth, so that he will be much disappointed if he flatters himself that he is to live at his ease, he will be writing to his friends lamentable tales of his sufferings; this trade has not a charm, nor can any part of the world be more disgusting to a stranger. I shall use Mr. Russel's son as if he was my own, but he cannot expect to be idle, he shall learn industry, and not fopping while he is with me. There is a circumstance much in his favor."  

The late 1790s and early 1800s was a period in which partnerships dominated the Scottish-Newfoundland trade (Table 4:2). The prosperity of the Napoleonic Wars, together with the transformation of the fishery from a migratory venture to a fishery controlled by residents created considerable opportunities for merchants. Fish markets were expanding and increased amounts of supplies were needed to provision the residents. Scots were better able to carry out trade by partnerships and five of the six merchant wholesalers with the waterfront premises at St. John's in 1794 had partners in Greenock.
### TABLE 4:2

**The Formation of Scottish-St. John's Mercantile Firms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1779</th>
<th>1785</th>
<th>1791</th>
<th>1797</th>
<th>1803</th>
<th>1809</th>
<th>1815</th>
<th>1821</th>
<th>1827</th>
<th>1833</th>
<th>1835</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Reed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stuart &amp; Rennie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander Cormack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunters and Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cunningham; Bell and Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew, Thomson and Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Thomson &amp; Boucher) (A. Boucher) (Boucher Huie &amp; Reid) &amp; Reid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crawford &amp; Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macbraire &amp; Henderson</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Boag</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Baine, Johnston and Co.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>James Stewart</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **1785**: (Reed and Patten)
- **1821**: I
- **1827**: (Peter Henderson & Bland)
- **1833**: John Boyd
- **1835**: I
Partnerships tended to be larger concerns involving the merging or pooling of capital. They possessed more vessels, clerks and servants than most single proprietors and all physical aspects of their operations, whether it be buildings, wharves or ships were generally larger, to accommodate the higher volume of business. Large operations required a great deal of energy to run because of the scale of their trade. Merchants had to maintain both the bookkeeping and letter writing as well as the general management of shipping and receiving goods at a much greater frequency. MacBraire, for instance, found these duties to be extremely difficult to manage. "I find that the outdoor business and the counting house is actually more than I can attend to, and it is requisite that I should occasionally go home, therefore some confidential person should be left here, in charge of the property."\(^6\) Partnerships relied less on agents, since they could place an owner in both Scotland and St. John's. Three-fourths of the Scottish partnerships did this. Some larger houses like Crawfords also placed a third partner in the market area rather than the normal broker. When Crawford's son got married he moved to Iberia. Like the great Dartmouth firm Newmans, the Crawfords were able to control a share of the market by their presence there.\(^7\)

Baine, Johnston and Company's St. John's property shows the scale of a large firm's premises. In 1818, they owned a shop, counting house, retail store with loft for dry
goods and frost free cellars below; a fish store with a loft which could hold 10,000 quintals; a linhay store; a coopers shop; a salt store capable of holding 900 hogsheads; and a large dwelling house with five bedrooms, parlour, kitchen and five servants' rooms. Although wharves are not mentioned in this document, it is known that they possessed at least two.

Wharves provided the firm with plenty of space to handle the goods which they bought and sold. Wharf space was crucial to mercantile operations. Large vessels were able to have goods loaded and unloaded directly from warehouses built on wharves. Baine, Johnston and Company owned at least five vessels at this time and traded heavily in foreign ports. Most firms had only one vessel, but a few had as many vessels as Baines. Baine, Johnston and Company had agents in Lisbon, Dartmouth, and Liverpool and the senior partner lived in Greenock, where most finished goods were obtained.

The sole proprietors consisted of merchant owners who had no partners and who usually possessed little capital of their own. Some owners resided in St. John's for the fishing season from early May to late September, others year-round. They normally employed a clerk or two, a few laboring servants, some family labor and agents overseas. Those who returned to Scotland in the fall would handle their own ordering of spring supplies.
William Kydd is a good example of a small-scale proprietor operating out of St. John's. His waterside premises, which included a commodious wharf and store, was shared with two other merchants. He also owned other properties including three shops, four houses and several vacant lots which he leased. Kydd possessed five vessels in the late 1820s and early 1830s. They were used to exploit the Labrador fishery and the seal fishery as well as to distribute supplies and collect fish in the outports. Kydd had dealings with planters and traders in Conception Bay, Trinity, Bonavista, the Southern Shore and Burin and he also dealt with traders who operated a coastal network. He employed servants to assist in the loading and unloading of vessels and related tasks. Kydd employed a Scottish clerk named Richard Rendle who, like Kydd himself, rose from clerk to merchant. Kydd owned only one foreign going vessel. The "Piscator" sometimes made trips to New Ross and Liverpool with cargoes of fish, but he relied heavily upon others to obtain goods in European ports such as Greenock and also to market much of his fish. Kydd's small-scale trans-Atlantic operations were compensated for by a specialization in local Newfoundland activities.

By 1809, there were eight Scottish merchant partnerships with premises insured in St. John's and two others with no property insured (Figure 4:1). Four of the six original companies which had been there in 1794 remained: Cunningham,
Figure 4.1


Scottish Mercantile
Premises: St. John’s, 1809

St. John’s Harbour

Crawford & Henderson

Cunningham, Bell

Waller, Forbes

Robert, Millet

Thorn & Neale

Waller, Forbes
Bell and Company, Stewart and Rennie and R. Robertson (now Hunters) and A. Thomson (now A. Boucher). Of the eight companies which had properties insured, their total value was 23,000 pounds. There was a wide variety in the value of waterside premises. Cunningham, Bell and Company had their premises insured for 10,000 pounds, the highest in St. John's; two others, MacBraire and Henderson and Stewart and Rennie, were over 5,000 pounds. The Scots were better insured than other merchants in 1809, implying they possessed more valuable property, had more capital, and followed safer business procedures. They owned only 10 of the 68 wharves recorded at this time.

Prosperity in the Newfoundland trade lured more entrepreneurs and by 1814 there were 12 Scottish partnerships with operations at St. John's. This was the largest number of Scottish firms in Newfoundland to this point. However, prosperity was short-lived. The crash in fish prices in 1816 and the ensuing depression brought on by peace and poor markets, created major structural changes in companies trading to Newfoundland (Ryan 1980, 42). Table shows this upheaval clearly, with seven Scottish companies ruined and four more withdrawing from trade. The business failures which occurred reflect the general instability in the cod economy.

Crawfords are a prime example of this instability. They were one of the largest companies in the trade with partners in Spain, Port Glasgow and St. John's. They lost most heavily,
having over-extended their business during the previous period of prosperity. The 1816 depression sent them into bankruptcy. They owed over 20,000 pounds to seven Scottish Newfoundland companies and a few hundred pounds to an English merchant. Claims from Scotland to the amount of over 113,000 pounds were made to the Port Glasgow branch.18 Crawford's failure was the largest bankruptcy case of the period. It was used by Patrick Morris and Samuel Carson - two leading local government lobbyists as an example of how the colony was being exploited by the mother country. They claimed that it was foreign firms like Crawfords that hindered Newfoundland's economic development since they funnelled huge sums of money out of the colony.19

This depression shook the Scottish merchant community. Only Stewart and Rennie, and Hunters remained from the 1794 group of merchants. Henderson and Bland and the firm Baine Johnston and Company were the only others with long-established connections in the trade. Three sole proprietorships were formed by merchants breaking away from partnerships to go on their own account. No doubt seeing a vacuum left by the seven insolvencies, John Boyd and James Stewart, who had been in partnerships, and William Kydd, went on their own account.20

In the late 1820s and early 1830s, changes were taking place in the organization of Scottish companies at St. John's. It is not clear if this was a uniquely Scottish trend or whether it extended to English and Irish firms. Sole proprietors were on the increase and all eight who had
entered the trade since the depression gained experience as clerks or partners before going on their own. This experience was helpful in their new role. Post depression Newfoundland offered a different set of opportunities for all merchants. Trade with the West Indies, British North America and the United States expanded, while fish exports to Spain declined and increased to Portugal. Industrialization was in full swing in the Greenock–Glasgow region.

A new tradition of small-scale specialized operations based totally at St. John's was emerging. James Fergus, Alexander MacGregor, M. Stewart and Stewart and Cheetham, for example, were trading almost entirely with British North America and specializing in auctions. John Thomson sold imported goods almost exclusively on commission for European merchants and Perchard and Boag were commission merchants and auctioneers.

It was mainly after 1830, when St. John's was more populous and becoming more of a regional entrepôt that auctions became a major mode of selling imported goods. In 1833, for example, Scots placed 40 advertisements in local newspapers for goods to be sold by public auctions and 65 for quick sale at specific prices. It was mostly these small-scale specialized merchants who favored auctions. They sold livestock, fresh food, ships and lumber from the Maritimes and America, goods from the West Indies and industrial commodities from Greenock. Perchard and Boag and James Fergus together
accounted for almost half of the auctions in 1833. They seem to have been interested in the rapid sale of goods, if the number of advertisements is any measure. The role of auctions is not clear, so it is difficult to assess the overall impact of this form of commerce.

Merchants in the 1830s were responding to the demands of a local society which could now afford a wide array of finished goods. It is important to remember also that they were acting as agents for an industrialized European society which was mass producing goods. St. John's and the Newfoundland population had grown considerably from the pre-1815 level. There were now 11,000 people in St. John's and over 30,000 in all of Newfoundland. Increased numbers meant a chance for more specific mercantile functions to exist. St. John's was like several other Atlantic Canada ports (ie. Saint John and Halifax), acting as a regional entrepôt; a strategy developed earlier in New England by Boston and New York merchants.

Scottish Merchant Wholesalers and Their Clientele: St. John's

The ultimate destination of the goods which Scots sold in Newfoundland poses an interesting question. The surviving record of commercial writs is far from comprehensive, but it does indicate the types of transactions which took place and the variety of people whom Scots dealt with. Table 4.3 shows
### TABLE 4:3

St. John's Customers of Scottish Merchants 1800-1835

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>(36 Scots, 31 English, 11 Irish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(7 Scots, 6 English, 8 Irish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coopers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auctioneers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonecutters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoemakers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Innkeepers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailmakers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boatkeepers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 168

Source: P.A.N.L., Supreme Court Minutes, 1800-1835.
168 court cases between Scottish merchants and their St. John's customers whose occupations were recorded between 1800 and 1835. Almost half of the cases were with other merchants. Thirty-six of these merchants were Scottish, thirty-one were English, and eleven Irish. The writs involving English and Irish were issued for much smaller amounts than the Scottish ones, suggesting a larger volume of business with fellow Scots. Twenty-five of the writs with English and Irish merchants were for less than £45, compared to fourteen Scottish writs for less than this sum. The seventeen remaining writs with English and Irish merchants were worth an average of £208, whereas the twelve remaining Scottish writs were worth an average of £1748. The ten other Scottish cases reflect Scots chosen as trustees for other Scots, but amounts owed were not given.

It is possible to get a glimpse of the type of trade and a sampling of the various types of customers with which Scottish merchants dealt. It is not possible however, to view this sample in any quantitative fashion. Scottish merchant transactions often took the form of goods being sold from one merchant to another. Cunningham, Bell and Company, for instance, sold West Indies produce worth over £1000 to Crawfords, to Hunters and to the Liverpool firm of Attwood and Haynes in 1816. Large importers like Cunningham, Bell and Company could undercut smaller importers because of their volume of trade. Some firms found it expedient to purchase
from companies like Cunningham and Bell which specialized in certain products. Others were small concerns who bought goods at the wharves in St. John's, rather than involving themselves in the costly shipping trade. A variety of other occupational groups were purchasing goods from Scots at St. John's. Retail shopkeepers, traders and fishermen seem to have been the most frequent, but cooper's, butchers, tailors, publicans and farmers, a cross-section of St. John's society were all involved. As St. John's grew, the occupational structure of its inhabitants diversified, so that specialized trades such as doctors, attorneys, government officials, and military personnel emerged. This growing population demanded consumer goods and Scottish merchants competed with other merchants to supply them.

### Scottish Merchant Wholesalers and Their Clientele:

#### The Outports

Major trading centres that acted as wholesalers needed a hinterland to facilitate the exchange of goods. In Vance's mercantile model, hinterlands sprung up around major port centres or entrepôts because of wholesaling. Wholesalers in the entrepôt sent manufactured goods to the hinterland to be exchanged for raw materials. The expansion of entrepôts in the New World was fuelled by a growth in trade between merchant wholesalers and wholesalers and retailers in the hinterland.
As a regional entrepot for Newfoundland, St. John's was involved in this wholesaling process. Scottish merchants made up a significant portion of those merchants who followed this trading pattern with the hinterland. Scots extended their trade with the outports throughout the early 1800s (Figure 4:2). Court disputes with individuals who were unable to pay their debts reveal a sampling of the locations of both outport traders or retailers and fishermen or planters who dealt with St. John's based Scottish merchants. It should be noted, however, that these writs are only a fraction of the total wholesale trade. They represent only those outport customers who could not pay their debts. Many factors affected who these people were, where they came from and when they had business difficulties. Factors as diverse as bad weather, international crises, poor fishing conditions or human elements could all have prevented customers from paying for supplies. This sample may not be geographically or temporally accurate so conclusions derived from it must be viewed with this in mind.

Two-thirds of the outport dealers and traders (in this sample) who dealt with Scottish wholesalers were Scots themselves. To the northward, St. John's Scots had dealings with Scottish traders such as William Alexander of Bonavista, John Thomson of Catalina, and Archibald Graham of Trinity in the 1820s and 1830s. In Conception Bay, Thomas Stevenson and Company, Robert Johnston, Peter MacPherson and Willis and
SCOTTISH MERCANTILE CLIENTELE, 1800–1835

Source: P.A.N.L., Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, 1800–1835.

Figure 4.2
Campbell all dealt extensively with St. John's Scots in the 1810s. To the south Fergus and Glen were Scottish traders based at Bay Bulls in 1827. The other traders whom Scots dealt with to the south were not Scottish. Graham Little, an Irish Protestant trader from Longford and William Jackson of Topsham, Devon at Trepassey, Sweetmans of Wexford, a major Catholic firm at Placentia and the Protestant Samuel Kough of Ross, based in Maresheen, all had dealings with the Scots. Many of these outport merchants and traders owned coastal schooners in which they travelled to St. John's to pick up supplies in the early spring. As the St. John's-Scottish merchants began to register an increasing number of coastal schooners, however, their contact with the outports probably increased.

After being caught and cured, the fish were brought to St. John's to pay for goods obtained earlier in the season. Only rarely did ships proceed with cargoes of fish directly from the outharbors to market. The outport men who form this sample did not have enough capital or their volume of trade was too small to deal directly with the European supply centres. It was more convenient for them to deal through St. John's. St. John's wholesalers could concentrate upon the provisions trade and marketing fish while outport dealers managed most of the direct contact with planters and fishermen.

The high concentration of clients in the Conception Bay-Southern Shore vicinity reflects the short distance from
St. John's and the fact that the heaviest concentration of population was there. Planters who resided there were close enough to travel to St. John's in their own boats. They were able to bargain for cheaper supplies by going direct to the merchant wholesalers and bypassing the outport dealer. \(^{33}\)

This required a certain amount of initiative on the part of the merchant if he wished to lure such people to his stores. MacBraire described this practice as follows:

"I can't avoid entertaining those from outports, that I may expect will deal with me, and masters of vessels which come here surely will expect a plate at our table, and when we pay 12d. for every 16 ounces of fresh meat, with all our economy we find our expenses unavoidable." \(^{34}\)

Scottish merchant wholesalers sometimes established bases of their own in the outharbors (Figure 4:3) \(^{35}\). These bases were either retail outlets which took fish in payment, or fishing stations from which several planters operated, or both. Baine, Johnston and Company set up a store at Port de Grave and they later opened one at Cupids. Miller and Fergus had a similar operation in Bay Bulls. Fishing establishments, which were often obtained when planters or outport merchants could not pay their debts, allowed Scots to extend their hold on the fish trade. Their presence in the outports also meant that more planters and fishermen could deal with them for supplies.

A pattern of increasing merchant wholesaling contact with outports is typical of the mercantile model established
SCOTTISH MERCHANT OUTPORT BASES,
RETAIL OUTLETS AND FISHING STATIONS, 1800-1835

Source: P.A.W.L., Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, 1800-1835; Royal Gazette, 1812-1820; M.H.G., Baine, Johnston Papers.

Figure 4:3
by Vance. Most of the writs with merchants close to St. John's were for the earlier part of the 1800s and the writs issued to merchants in the far northern bays were in the 1820s and 1830s. This suggests that Scots probably penetrated the more distant bays later. The volume of trade cannot be measured, but this sample indicates the direction of Scottish-St. John's outport trade. The sample shows that Scottish merchants based in St. John's had a hinterland and they were actively involved in wholesaling.

The Scottish Merchant Community

The Scots were an ethnocentric merchant community. John Bland and Richard Perchard were the only non-Scots who formed partnerships with Scots. Twenty-six of the thirty clerks and agents which could be identified were Scottish. Over half of these entered trade as merchants later on. Agents were motivated by the possibility of being offered shares in the company. Walter MacAllister, Charles McCallum, William Johnston, John McGibbon, and Archibald Kerr were all offered shares after serving as agents. James MacBraire describes a typical offer which would be made to a worthy agent and the reason why he felt it important to provide such an incentive:

"I have written to Mr. James Fergus (who is a cousin of Mrs. Russels and carried on business for some time in Halifax) to come here as an assistant — he is to come by the next conveyance. I am to give him one hundred a year for the two succeeding years, and for the next five years, he is to have
one-eighth part of the Trade, and in the event of the business being left wholly to his management, he is to have one hundred a year from the Trade besides his one-eighth, the Trade is to pay 5 percent for all monies advanced by either party and for all property actually employed in the Trade... I have a perfect knowledge of Mr. Fergus' principles, and know of no man better suited to our purpose... it will at a future day be of service to our Boys, by having a person to assist in the management of it who has an interest in its success, which is the object I have in view..." 37

Within the Scottish merchant community marriage patterns reflected an ethnic bias. Of the nineteen marriages of Scottish merchants which were recorded in St. John's, eleven were with Scots and eight were with English and Irish Protestants. 38 Most other Scottish merchants probably were married in Scotland to Scottish women. However, local sources were used to record marriages and these data miss many of the Scottish marriages. Like all merchants, the Scots used marriages to form and cement partnerships. For example, Richard Reed's family connections were closely related to business. He was probably the earliest Scot to set up business in St. John's. He came to Newfoundland in 1779 and by 1794 operated a partnership with Thomas Patten. 39 Reed's family connections with Patten are unclear, but Reed's four sisters married Scottish merchants. 40 His sister Elizabeth married Alexander Boucher who formed a partnership with his brother-in-law between 1810 and 1814. Boucher withdrew in 1814 and Patrick Hume, who had been a clerk for Cunningham and Bell,
married Sarah, another of Reed's sisters and became Reed's partner until circa 1817. Reed left Newfoundland for Demerara, but his sisters remained in Newfoundland. James Fergus, Elizabeth's second husband joined James Ewing, the husband of another sister, Mary, to form a company. Thomas Glen married a fourth Reed sister, Jane, and was later in partnership with James Fergus at Bay Bulls. This intricate family grouping is just one example of family business connections.

The relationship between marriage and business has been established for Scots in other areas (Devine, 1975) and for English (Handcock, 1979) and Irish (Mannion, 1980) merchants in Newfoundland. The uncertainties of long distance trade made it important to create partnerships which involved a trusting and stable relationship. Ethnicity and kinship were important for Scottish-Newfoundland merchants. Only two firms allowed non-Scottish partners and almost every company hired only Scottish clerks and foreign-going captains. Marriage within the ethnic group was yet another means to strengthen the existing bonds of ethnicity.

Conclusions

The first Scottish firms to actually occupy space along the waterfront in St. John's were few and their intentions were mainly to comply with decision-makers back in Scotland. In 1794 there were only six Scottish firms in Newfoundland. Partners from all of these firms were single with no families.
They hired several workers to assist with duties about the wharf such as loading-and-unloading vessels and had an assistant clerk to help with mercantile matters. Vessels were dispatched by senior partners in Greenock who controlled their movement and the scale of the trade.

By the mid-point of the study (1810), the Scottish merchant community in St. John's had grown in both size and scale. There were twice as many Scottish firms with bases in St. John's in 1814 as in 1754. Of these 12 firms, all had partners in Greenock, but it was clear that more was happening on the St. John's waterfront. Premises were much more extensive, and Scots were better insured than their English and Irish counterparts. Firms often had more physical property, such as Baine and Johnston's extensive premises.

Merchants also employed more personnel to deal with the higher volume of trade.

After the depression of 1816 a transformation in the make-up of Scottish companies was noticeable. A new tradition of sole proprietorships was emerging. Bankruptcies and company splits in the depression period left a substantial vacancy in the trade. New firms, formed almost entirely by men who had been clerks or agents in the pre-depression era, filled the mercantile void. These firms were often small-scale with no partners back in Greenock. They began to replace the Old World trading system with more localized activity, such as the Labrador fishery, auctions, sealing, and the coasting trade to British North America.
These activities required smaller vessels and thus a smaller investment. They were activities which could be managed much more easily from St. John's than from Greenock.

Scottish commercial interaction was largely ethnocentric. A network of outport dealers, two-thirds of whom were Scots, relied upon St. John's-Scottish wholesalers to finance and organize their trans-Atlantic trade. It is likely that this system, or at least the Scottish link of it, developed at the latter part of the period, once a group of reliable Scottish outport dealers had been trained. The three Scottish outport dealers from the far northern bays, for instance, operated in the 1820s and 1830s, after they gained experience and capital as clerks for St. John's firms. Ethnicity clearly played a role in the development of commercial relationships amongst Scots in nineteenth century St. John's. Clerks, foreign going captains, marriages and outport transactions all reflected a desire to maintain a Scottish ethnic flavour in commerce.
Chapter IV

NOTES

1. PANL, C0 194, Volume 61, E-1-2, November 15, 1811.

2. PANL, GN 1/13/4 (1795) Nominal Census of St. John's; PANL, Newfoundland Probate Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, August 4, 1803; PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, December 16, December 23, 1805; December 30, 1816; November 5, November 10, 1821; MHG, Baine, Johnston Papers, File 27-A-1, Lang Baine and Company Letterbook, 1806-1811, Baine to Thomas Patten, St. John's, November 2, 1806; PANL, Royal Gazette Micro A-7-3, reel #1, #2, #3, November 30, 1813; May 12, 1814; July 16, 1816; June 10, July 8, 1817; January 1, March 6, December 1, 1818; December 13, 1819, July 27, 1820; October 12, November 17, 1829; September 6, 1830; July 5, 1834; PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-3, reel #2, January 12, 1828; September 8, 1829; PANL, St. John's Marriage Register, VS #26E, 1828.

3. PANL, GN 1/13/4 (1795), Nominal Census of St. John's.

4. PANL, MacBraire Papers, p. 3/B/22, File 20, James MacBraire to James Henderson, July 15, 1805.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #1, June 16, 1815.

8. PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, August 14, 1818.

10 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, June 10, 1819.

11 MHG, Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, vols. 494, 496, 507, 2-5-2-6, 2-5-2-7, 2-5-2-10, St. John's 1827, 1828, 1835; PANL Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes GN 5/2/A/1, January 22, 1831; PANL, Times, micro A-8-1, reel #1, September 11, 1833.

12 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, November 2, 1816; March 30, 1820; July 4, 1823; June 20, August 7, 1827.

13 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, May 2, 1832.

14 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, March 30, 1818; PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #1, May 20, 1828.


16 Although MacBraire was probably Ulster-Scottish, his partner, James Henderson was a Falkirk merchant.

17 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, April 22, October 25, November 4, November 9, 1816; October 23, October 25, October 30, 1817.

18 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, March 6, 1818.

19 Patrick Morris, "Arguments to Prove the Policy and Necessity of granting to Newfoundland Constitutional Government" (London: A. Hancock, Printer, 1828).

20 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, March 30, 1818.

21 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, October 25, 1802; April 27, 1804; December 9, 1811; November 10, 1814; January 29, 1817; March 30, November 8.
December 9, 1818; November 18, 1819; October 12, 1820; February 19, 1821; September 15, 1823; May 19, 1828; May 26, June 15, 1829; October 10, October 12, October 31, November 6, 1833; MHG, Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, vols 475, 477, 489, 491, 502, 512; 2-5-2-2, 2-6-1-9, 2-5-2-6, 2-5-29, St. John's, June 2, March 21, 1819; March 9, 1820; November 26, 1825; May 20, 1826; November 4, 1831; January 19, 1835.

22 PANL, Newfoundland, micro A-8-4, reel #2, March 28, 1833; PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #4, March 26, May 31, July 2, September 6, 1833; PANL Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, May 28, June 11, July 2, 1833; PANL Times, micro A-8-1, reel #1, April 17, August 14, September 11, 1833.

23 PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #4, January 11, February 15, 22, 26, April 12, May 28, July 9, November 8, 1833; PANL Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, August 27, 1833; PANL Times, micro A-8-1, reel #1, February 13, 1833.

24 PANL, Newfoundland, micro A-8-4, reel #2, January-December, 1833; PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #4, January-December 1833; PANL Royal Gazette, micro A-8-1, reel #1, January-December, 1833.

25 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, 1800-1835.

26 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, October 25, 1816; October 23, 1817.

27 Ibid., 1800-1835.

28 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, December, 1820; MHG Thomas Lang Papers, micro 5-3-5-6, March 24, 1825; PANL Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, May 10, 1831.

29 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #1, December 22, 1814; August 31, 1815; PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/1/A/1, April 29, May 3, May 30, 1816.

30 PANL, Public Ledger, micro A-7-1, reel #1, November 21, 1827; PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, December 12, 1827.
This newspaper article refers to a precedent setting court case where a firm illegally sends fish to market directly from an out-harbour. It indicates this to be rare.
Chapter V

LANG, BAINÉ AND COMPANY: 1806-1835

Scottish merchants remained largely outside the realm of regular commerce to Newfoundland for much of the eighteenth century and operated in a fashion which was somewhat different from their English and Irish rivals. Up until c. 1800, most Scots owned only one or two vessels and did little more than shuttle goods across the Atlantic from Greenock. This was at a time when English and Irish merchants, some with as many as 30 ships, were heavily involved in the Southern European fish trade, and the passenger and supply trades to Britain and Ireland (Handcock 1979; Matthews, 1983). Scots owned little property in Newfoundland, preferring instead to rent premises from English merchants. These Scottish merchants were largely outnumbered by the English and Irish and their volume of trade was minor.

Over the course of the early 1800s, however, Scots entered the Newfoundland trade in force and in many ways became indiscernible from English and Irish merchants. Their trade locations began to conform to traditional Newfoundland patterns. Like the English, they developed an export market to Southern Europe. By 1810, the Scots were sending more
fish more than the average Newfoundland merchant. The Scottish home port of Greenock became a major port in the Newfoundland trade by 1813, with trade comparable in volume to Waterford, London and Liverpool. Greenock however, remained the domain of Scottish merchants, unlike other British Isles ports which were open to all ethnic groups. Scottish firms were growing in scale at this time. Property along the St. John's waterfront, now owned by Scots, was insured at a rate comparable and even higher than English and Irish properties.

By 1832, three Scots ranked as major merchant shipowners with over 15 vessels. The relatively small proportion of Scots in the general Newfoundland population forced the Scots to do business with English and Irish fishermen, yet they used Scots as dealers and agents more frequently than they used other ethnic groups. Scottish merchants recruited mainly fellow countrymen to their fold as clerks and foreign-going captains. Both positions were training grounds for merchants and outport dealers; assuring a uniquely Scottish flavour to their commercial operations.

In any one year during the period between 1794 and 1835 there were between four and twelve Scottish merchant companies working out of St. John's. The size of their operations and volume of trade varied, but their business strategies were similar. Virtually all were intent on making a profit from selling goods in exchange for fish. The study
of a single firm allows the analysis of some of the factors; social and economic, underlying the formation of the Scottish merchant community in St. John's. Ledgers and letter books of Lang, Baine and Company in Greenock, and Walter Baine and Company in St. John's for example, contain a rich store of information on the sources of company capital, the nature of communications, the role of good management, and the importance of marriage and kinship in the development of a firm. They represent small companies which initially were different from most English and Irish companies but gradually became more typical. At their inception they were small and dealt mainly with Greenock. By the 1830s they were a major firm, trading to areas such as Southern Europe and the United States, like other Newfoundland merchants. Therefore, a study of this firm provides a chance to view the changes in a Scottish firm as it gradually developed throughout the time period.

The Origins of Lang Baine: 1806-1810

Little is known of the social background of most of the Scottish merchants who were involved in the Newfoundland trade, but fortunately some sources on the Lang, Baine families are extant. Several members of Lang's family were shipowners in late eighteenth century Greenock, including James, a merchant, Samuel, a cooper, and Robert and Thomas, mariners. Thomas was a sea captain for Robert Dunmore in
1781 and like some captains, graduated to trading on his own account. This was common for West Country merchants (Matthews, 1968), and at least one other Scottish-Newfoundland trader, William Punton, rose through similar ranks.

In 1806, Thomas Lang joined Walter Baine of Greenock to form the Greenock firm Lang, Baine and Company. Little is known of Baine's background, but he came from a fairly well-to-do family. His father was sufficiently well-to-do to back his son's venture with £1,000 in 1806. His brother Robert was a banker in Greenock, and his sister married Andrew Ramsey, a wealthy Greenock merchant, likely a relative of Hugh Ramsey, who was one of Baine's captains from 1816-1820.

Thomas Lang and Walter Baine formed a Newfoundland partnership with Thomas Patten of Stirling which they called Patten, Baine and Company. This company handled the Newfoundland end of their operations. Patten had formed a partnership with Richard Reed at St. John's sometime after 1794. Reed himself had been there since 1779. Lang and Baine remained in Greenock in charge of the parent company, organizing shipments from Greenock to St. John's, marketing return cargoes of cod and oil and also took care of finances. Thomas Patten became a resident partner in St. John's, handling the warehousing and sale of imported goods and the collection of fish and oil for export.
The Marketing of Fish and Oil

The firm was initially small by Greenock standards. Baine wrote to Patten in St. John's in 1808: "It must be considered also that our establishment is far smaller and that we do less business than any one of them. . . all the other Scotch houses are wealthy with the exception of one . . ." The small capital which they possessed meant that property was also limited. They rented premises from Robert Newman and Company, a wealthy Dartmouth house in St. John's and apart from one vessel, lost in 1806, did not own ships until 1811. Fish collected in Newfoundland was carried to market in other vessels, if they could be chartered, and was also consigned to Scottish-West Indies merchant shipowners. Lang, Baine and Company were well suited for arranging West Indies deals, since many firms from there had parent companies in Greenock. Scottish houses like Fullerton and Oliverson, or McKenzie and Company in Demerara, John Foster in Trinidad and Oughterson in Barbados, all took consignments of fish from Patten, Baine and Company. John Hamilton and Company had provided part security when Lang, Baine and Company entered trade and he used the firm as a source of fish for his West Indies branch. Vessels that sailed for Southern Europe with Patten, Baine and Company's fish, used Noble and Hunt in Oporto, a branch of Newmans of Dartmouth and St. John's, Cunningham, Bell and Company's
correspondents in Cadiz, Mahon and Pinson, or Parker and Finnie in Lisbon.11

Lang, Baine and Company handled the marketing of fish and oil in Greenock themselves. In 1810 they sold 44 tons of oil and 90 tons of cod fish in Scotland. Advertisements were placed in the Glasgow and Greenock papers in early January for oil to be sold at £40 per ton and fish at £17 per ton. The oil was completely sold by January 20th.12 Twelve Glasgow buyers took £1347 worth of fish and oil partly through Lang, Baine's broker Francis Blaikie. Goods were shipped there by one of five small "Lighter" operators whom Lang, Baine dealt with.13 Three Paisley buyers purchased £429 worth of Newfoundland produce, which reached them by land in carts.14 Three Leith firms purchased £295 worth of cod fish and two Falkirk firms took £138 worth of Newfoundland produce. The remainder was probably sold in Greenock.

Fish was much more difficult to sell than oil, which resulted in limited importations in the years following. Oil, on the other hand, became an increasingly valuable export for Scottish-Newfoundland merchants. The relatively early start which Lang, Baine and Company had in the Glasgow market would serve them well in years to come.

Most of the vessels which the company chartered came from the Clyde ports of Ayre, Irvine, Saltcoats, Port Glasgow and Greenock. These vessels were usually loaded with local coal or Liverpool salt and dispatched to St. John's for a
cargo of fish. Most of the finished goods and food stuffs which Lang, Baine and Company sent to St. John's from Greenock went in small lots in vessels which belonged to other Scottish merchants. The value of these shipments could range from as low as £50 to over £10,000 and could be a few barrels of meat or an extensive range of foodstuffs, clothing and tools.

William Johnston: The Emergence of a Partner

Lang, Baine and Company depended upon the performance of their St. John's firm for commercial expansion and success. The St. John's base was crucial since Newfoundland was the source of production and it was there that information on market conditions was most accurate. St. John's was also the place to judge the demand for supplies, and the prices of both fish and supplies were largely determined there. Patten was not as competent as Lang and Baine would have liked. He neglected correspondence with his Greenock partners and was reprimanded by Baine in 1808 for allowing debts in St. John's to increase. His house expenses were in Lang's view, too high, mainly because of drinking. In March, 1808 Baine wrote, "We have been told by numerous friends of your impropriety in the management of our business..." As a result, Baine hired William Johnston as an agent and sailed with him to St. John's to oversee matters himself. By early
1809, Patten retired from the firm and Johnston, now the sole Newfoundland Agent, continued on Lang, Baine's account. He was soon offered a one-third share in the concern, which he accepted.

Johnston was a capable manager and the firm grew under his direction (Figure 5:1). He increased the sale of supplies and the collection of fish. He eliminated bad debts and greatly reduced labor costs in 1810. Store goods sales rose from less than £14,000 in 1809 to over £26,000 in 1811. Fish exports rose from 18,000 quintals in 1809 to over 30,000 quintals in both 1810 and 1811.

Johnston established good relations with planters and dealers in the St. John's-Conception Bay-Southern Shore area. Between 1810 and 1818 he had dealings with at least 50 Newfoundland planters, half of whom were from Conception Bay. Some were English, but most were Irish. The Scots with whom Johnston dealt were all men who had clerked for the firm previously and were now independent traders. Robert Johnston established a small firm on his own account in Harbour Grace and Peter MacPherson opened a store in Port de Grave. John Boyd did the same in St. John's and James Munn went on his own in Fermeuse. William Johnston supplied a good proportion of their goods.

Johnston was diligent in corresponding with his Greenock partners regarding the amount of fish collected, local prices
Walter Baine and Co.
Commercial Expansion, 1809 – 1816

British Pounds (£1000)

Sales of Pumps Goods in拍about

Goods Exported to Foreign/Total

Period of British


Figure 5:1
and availability of supplies, as well as his knowledge of the state of markets. When vessels arrived in St. John's with supplies on Walter Baine's account, Johnston dispatched them in a fast and efficient manner. The firm in Greenock praised him for this efficiency. John Hamilton, for example, used the company consistently, as did Francis Garden, a prominent West India merchant, until his insolvency. Their satisfaction with Johnston's management skills was essential.

Johnston brought family connections to the firm which were helpful with business in Great Britain. James, William's brother, was a partner in Harris and Johnston of Liverpool who became Lang, Baine's Liverpool agent. This connection became increasingly important as goods were funnelled here from industrial centres like Leeds and Manchester for shipment to Newfoundland in the 1820s and 1830s. It was also an alternate market for oil. Lang, Baine's Dartmouth agent was Robert Harris, likely related to Harris of Liverpool. Connections such as this, based on kinship, were a means by which the difficulties and uncertainties of long distance trade could be overcome.

Company Expansion

From humble beginnings, Lang, Baine and Company expanded rapidly. Figure 5:1 reveals that goods which they exported to Newfoundland increased from £4,000 in 1809 to almost £40,000 in 1813. The total exports of Richard Fogarty,
(a leading Waterford pork merchant) in the three-year period 1811-1813, were £45,000, only slightly above the exports of Lang, Baine in 1813 alone (Mannion 1980). In the early years of Lang, Baine's involvement in Newfoundland, about 70 percent of their exports came from Greenock and they were mostly in part shipments consigned to various shipowners trading with St. John's. 

In 1811, Lang, Baine and Company invested their profits by purchasing the brig Mercury. Not owning a vessel had sometimes meant great difficulties in sending fish to market. In 1810 for instance, they were forced to sell two-thirds of their fish to shipowners or charterers in St. John's at reduced prices. In 1811, however, they sold half the fish collected on the island and exported the remainder. A year later they exported 70 percent themselves.

Demerara dominated the market destination for Scottish dry cod, and the West Indies were also significant. Lang, Baine's connections with Greenock-West Indies firms partially account for the dominance of this area over the traditional Southern Europe market.

The Norval became the firm's second deep sea trading vessel in 1814. An A-1 brig of 197 tons burthen, the Norval was valued at £4,800. This was to be a valuable purchase since she plied the Atlantic until the late 1830s.

The harbour of Port de Grave in Conception Bay was established as a branch of the Newfoundland operation in 1812, when Robert Johnston, their senior clerk began a store for
them there. The shore fishery in Conception Bay was enjoying good years and Port de Grave was ideally situated to serve planters and fishermen. This branch helped facilitate an increase in store good sales of 30 percent and a doubling of fish collections in 1812. Whereas two clerks had been sufficient in 1810, five were needed in 1812. Profit soared to over £15,000 in 1813, a substantial amount by Newfoundland standards. Between 1780 and 1801, for example, there was only one year when the profits of Robert Newman and Company, a wealthy Dartmouth house, exceeded this level (Chang 1975: 106). Lang, Baine and Company in Greenock recorded a £7,500 profit in 1813 and the next year it was £12,000. The firm’s assets were on par with those of John Slade, a prominent Poole merchant who operated on the northeast coast of Newfoundland in the 1780s and was considered a major merchant (Handcock 1983: 714).

The Role of Credit

Credit arrangements were a vital part of all aspects of the Newfoundland trade. Unless merchants could secure credit, no goods could be supplied by them. Lang, Baine’s credit was tied closely to arrangements with suppliers. They relied heavily upon the three to six month delay between the time goods were received and the time they were paid for.

In 1810, Lang, Baine shipped about 40 percent of their supplies to Newfoundland over three weeks, starting in mid-March. With the exception of London tea merchants, all suppliers gave Lang, Baine several months to pay for goods.
Dartmouth and Liverpool merchants acted as agents for suppliers in their ports and Lang, Baine received three months to make payments for goods received. This was considerably shorter than the six, seven or even eight months credit which Scots received from Glasgow suppliers. Unless prices were very high, Scots could do better purchasing in Glasgow, since this allowed them time to sell their goods to fishermen in spring and receive fish and oil in payment for these goods before Glasgow suppliers' bills were payable.

Three thousand quintals of fish were sold in Demerara in May of 1810 for £1,450. Local sales of fish augmented the firm's capital and sufficient funds were available to pay for spring supplies by the fall. Their strategy hinged upon keeping spring supply purchases below the value of early fish collections. Fall shipments from Greenock were not payable until February or March of the next year. By then payment could be made by the sales of fall fish.

Baine, Johnston and Company: The Later Years

Walter Baine and Company, like all Newfoundland firms, experienced considerable difficulty in the period between 1815 and 1817. They lost a considerable amount of money to planters and merchants who were unable to pay their debts. They lost over £2,800 in 1815 and 1816, for instance. A loss of £2,100 was recorded on the Greenock business in 1815 and it barely managed to break even in 1816. Most Newfoundland firms lost
heavily in 1816. Several firms, such as Crawfords and Cunningham, whom Baine had referred to as wealthy in 1807, were now insolvent, leaving new opportunities in the trade for those who survived.

The Baine firm escaped bankruptcy and emerged from the depression relatively strong. In 1818, the firm, by this time called Baine, Johnston and Company, obtained the extensive premises formerly owned by Cunningham, Bell and Company. They erected a fireproof store there by that fall. They ranked third amongst Scottish fish exporters that fall, sending three vessels to Southern Europe and two to the West Indies. The firm now acted as agents for the West of Scotland Insurance Company. They intensified dealings with St. John’s traders. A number of shopkeepers – mostly Scots – set up in St. John’s and were retailers for Baine, Johnston and Company. Gaden and Scott, Archibald Currie, and William Cullen were among them.

Outport trade was primarily concentrated in Conception Bay and the southern shore, but they did some business as far south as Burin. They were also a major supplier of William Alexander, a Scottish merchant in Bonavista. New partners joined the company. William Johnston was now a senior partner in St. John’s, but he returned to Greenock each winter to help Thomas Lang and Walter Baine with matters there. He left two Newfoundland partners to manage business in St. John’s. John Boyd, now a part owner, managed the St. John’s business and John Boyd and John Black shared the other quarter. By 1821, Boyd left Baine, Johnston to trade on his own account.
He was replaced by William Tarbet. Tarbet later married Rachel McKie, the daughter of Peter McKie, a Scot, was the St. John's customs collector.43

William Tarbet moved to Liverpool in the late 1820s to open another branch of Baine, Johnston.44 Liverpool was a strategic centre for the Newfoundland supply trade, sending more vessels to St. John's than any other port in 1830. It was natural for an expanding firm like Baine, Johnston to place a partner there, rather than an agent.

A certain degree of the firm's success was related to good management at sea. Between 1818 and 1835, they registered 25 new vessels in St. John's. This was more than any other Scottish firm except McBride and Kerr.45 William Punton joined them in 1820, and proved to be a remarkable master. He was by far the most active captain of all the Scottish-Newfoundland firms. Employed for 13 years, in the last five, when sources are most comprehensive, he made at least 27 long distance voyages. He entered St. John's in every month except April. His courageous efforts earned him recognition in the St. John's paper for an extraordinary 20-day crossing in early March.46 His sailings took him to Greenock, Liverpool, Hamburg, St. John's, Barbados and Brazil, but most frequently he shunted back and forth from Oporto to St. John's.47 Connections gained in this capacity served him well when he formed a partnership with John Munn in Harbour Grace.48 Munn, a clerk, had also learned his trade while employed for Baine, Johnston.
Thomas Lang, Walter Baine and William Tarbet withdrew from the trade at the close of the 1830 season.\textsuperscript{49} By the fall of 1831, Walter Baine rejoined Johnston and the firm was now called Baine and Johnston in Greenock and Baine, Johnston and Company in St. John's.\textsuperscript{50} The following year, William's nephew, James Johnston Grieve, became involved in the firm and together with his brother Walter, would become the next generation of Baine, Johnston's personnel when William died in 1837.\textsuperscript{51}

In the early years, Lang, Baine and Company had coordinated three-fourths of the firm's supply trade through Greenock. By the 1830s, North American ports were dominating the supply trade. Boston and New York were both more significant than Greenock. James Johnston Grieve attempted to solidify new world connections by visiting merchants in American ports and by marrying into the influential Halifax family of Andrew Richardson, Esquire.\textsuperscript{52}

Baine, Johnston and Company had grown considerably since 1818. They ranked first out of ten Scottish merchants exporting cargoes of fish in the fall of 1835. One-fifth of the 55 vessels with Scottish-owned cargoes leaving St. John's were Baine, Johnston's.\textsuperscript{53} They now owned extensive waterside premises and at least ten vessels.\textsuperscript{54} They were now a major merchant wholesaling company.
Conclusions

Lang, Baine and Company is representative of the Scottish-St. John's merchant community and its experience is very similar to the change which occurred in the Scottish-merchant community as a whole in the period under investigation.

Like the community of Scottish merchants, Lang Baine was initially small and tentative in its Newfoundland venture. As they became more familiar with Newfoundland, the Scots' trade diversified and their commitment to residency strengthened. With diversification came growth, and with growth came permanence.

Initially, Lang Baine and Company probably made contact with Newfoundland through a speculative cargo of goods sent there by Lang's father. Although they arrived later than the Scottish merchant pioneers in St. John's, their experience was similar. They invested only modestly—renting premises from another firm—to keep costs down. They formed a loose alliance with an entrepreneur named Patten to carry out their business and they did not attend to the Newfoundland business personally. Their contact was so tentative that they did not even engage vessels of their own in the trade, relying instead on space in others' vessels or charters.

By the 1810s they began to see the value in more firmly committing themselves to Newfoundland and the changes which they underwent reflect this. First of all, the need for the
presence of a strong partner in St. John's was evident, so they placed William Johnston there. The importance of St. John's as a centre for supply and market information for the trade was noted. They set up independent traders who had been clerks for them, indicating their desire to have a network of such men to facilitate a more lasting trade. Outport branches such as that set up in Port-de-Grave were characteristic of a firm that was expanding its hold on the trade.

As Lang, Baines' residency on the island continued, so did their diversification and their desire for permanency. By 1818, they possessed massive premises. There were also two partners who overwintered in Newfoundland by this time; one in St. John's and one in Port-de-Grave. Outport trade, although still strongest in the Conception Bay - Southern shore area, was expanding to Burin and Bonavista. Scottish, as well as English and Irish shopkeepers were increasingly capitalized by Lang, Baine. The opening of a Liverpool branch in the 1820s, the high degree of new vessel registries in the St. John's area (25 from 1818-1835), and an emphasis on North American supply areas such as Halifax, Boston and New York, are all indications of the changing nature of their trade. Like the Scottish merchant community in general, Baine, Johnston were diversifying their mercantile operations in the 1830s. They were part of a maturing merchant trading system which was probably as Newfoundland-based as it was Scottish.
Chapter V

NOTES


2 This information was kindly provided by Michael Moss, Archivist, University of Glasgow, from unpublished records in his possession.

3 MHG, Thomas Lang Papers, Micro 5-3-5-6, March 5, 1818.

4 MHG, Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, Volume 512, 2-6-1-9, December 29, 1835.


6 PANL, Registry of Wills, Volume 2, A/9/2, Walter Baine, 1848.


9 Ibid., Baine to Oughterson, Barbados, April 4, 1807; Baine to Foster, Trinidad, July 4, 1808; Baine to Oliverson, Demerara, March 15, 1810.

10 Ibid., Baine to John Hamilton, Glasgow, September 1, 1806.

11 Ibid., Baine to Mahon, Pinson, Lisbon, September 22, 1808; Baine to Noble, Hunt, Cadiz, Sept. 22, 1808; Baine to William Johnston, St. John's, August 1, 1810.


15. *Ibid.*, Baine to William Stewart, Aire, September 15, 1808; Baine to William Thompson, Saltcoats, September 22, September 29, 1808, August 27, 1810; Baine to James Duncan, Greenock, September 11, 1809, Baine to John Davidson, August 17, 1810.


17. MHG, Baine Johnston Papers, File 27-A-1, Lang, Baine Letterbook, 1806-1811, Baine to Thomas Patten, St. John's, March 7, 1808.

18. *Ibid.*, Baine to Thomas Patten, St. John's, March 14, 1808.


23. PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN5/2/A/1, 1800-1835.


26. Ibid., Baine to William Johnston, St. John's, June 21, 1810.

27. Ibid., Baine to Francis Garden, Glasgow, June 12, 1810.

28. Ibid., Baine to James Johnston, Liverpool, May 10, 1810.


30. Ibid., Accounts of Lang, Baine, 1811.


32. Ibid., Accounts of Walter Baine, 1814.

33. MHG, Baine Johnston Papers, File 27-A-1, Lang, Baine Letterbook, 1806-1811, Baine to Harris, Johnston, Dartmouth, May 19, 1810; Baine to Joseph Grudy, Bridgeport, June 25, 1810; Baine to Robert Harris, June 29, 1810.

34. Ibid., Baine to Haddow and Scott, Glasgow, October 30, 1810; Baine to John Moffat Jr., Glasgow, February 14, 1811, Baine to H. Hardie and Co., Glasgow, March 17, 1811.


36. Ibid., Baine to William Johnston, St. John's, July 14, August 1, 1810; Baine to Francis, Garden and Sons, Glasgow, December 21, 1810.

37. PANL, Royal Gazette, Micro A-7-3, reel #2, October 7, 1818.
38 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, August-December, 1818.

39 Ibid., reel #2, #3, May 10, 1826, November 12, 1832; PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN 5/2/A/1, March 18, June 5, 1822; April 12, 1832; June 30, 1834.

40 PANL, Newfoundland Supreme Court Minutes, GN5/2/A/1, 1818-1835; PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, #3, May 10, 1831.


42 MHG, Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, Volume 472, 2-5-2-1, October 23, 1818.

43 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, May 25, 1825.

44 Ibid., April 13, 1831.

45 MHG, Transcripts of Registries of Colonial Shipping, BT 107, vols. 472-512, 2-5-2-1 to 2-5-2-11, 2-6-1-9, St. John’s, January 1818-December 1835.

46 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #2, March 12, 1822.

47 Ibid., January 1829-December 1833.


49 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, April 13, 1831.

50 Ibid., August 8, 1831.

51 PANL, Times, micro A-8-1, reel #1, June 19, 1833.

52 Ibid., Dec. 3, 1832; June 19, 1833.

53 PANL, Royal Gazette, micro A-7-3, reel #3, September-December, 1835.
Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although closer to the Clyde and close also to the lanes of Scottish colonial commerce, Newfoundland remained outside the realm of regular Scottish trading across the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. As early as 1703, Scottish merchants attempted to exploit what was overwhelmingly a southwestern English and French cod fishery, but with little success. Over much of the eighteenth century, trade between Scotland and Newfoundland was sporadic. Between 1764-1771, Scottish exports to Newfoundland averaged a mere £985, a trifling when compared to the traffic in tobacco with the Tidewater or the West Indian sugar trade. But over the next decade or more trade with Newfoundland expanded. In 1776, the value of Scottish exports to Newfoundland exceeded £17,000, part of a British response, as in Halifax, to the outbreak of war with revolutionary America. The American war temporarily disrupted the Scottish tobacco trade, but disrupted also the flow of provisions; notably breadstuffs from American ports to Newfoundland (Head, 1976). British fishermen still had to be fed and the increased garrison presence in British North America needed supplies. War time demand was a major stimulus to Scottish trade with British North America,
particularly to St. John's and Halifax. Between 1776-1783, the Newfoundland and to a lesser extent, Nova Scotian cod fisheries; the trade in ship's timber, and the British garrison trade, emerged as alternatives to southern tobacco.

Although Scottish exports to Newfoundland fluctuated annually, their values averaged over £10,000 between 1776-1785. Textile products, foodstuffs and miscellaneous shop goods previously reserved for the Chesapeake were now sent there. Indeed some Clyde merchant houses engaged in tobacco trading may have transferred to the cod fishery. No fewer than 14 of the merchant surnames entering the Newfoundland trade occur earlier as merchants in the Tidewater.

There were half a dozen firms in Newfoundland by 1786. In 1792, Scotland had 13 vessels engaged there, slightly more than Liverpool, but paltry when compared to Exeter and its outports in South Devon with 43 ships, Poole with 65, and Dartmouth with a massive 85 vessels.

The Napoleonic wars represent something of a watershed in Scottish-Newfoundland commerce as they did in the Newfoundland trade generally. The migratory fisheries prosecuted from southwest England on the banks and in by-boat virtually collapsed and fishermen resident in Newfoundland came to dominate the fishery. Settlement expanded rapidly and as the price of fish soared in the European marketplace, British merchants once again reacted to the rising demand for supplies. Using the safer shipping lanes north of Ireland
during the war with France, the Clyde merchants responded quickly to the new conditions. Between 1799-1805, Scottish merchants employed about 40 vessels in the Newfoundland trade, and this increased to an average of 50 vessels in the next five years. Greenock was now one of the leading British ports; it accounted for 14 percent of traffic to St. John's in 1813 at the apogee of the salt cod trade.

With the arrival of peace in 1815, the prices of fish fell and economic depression followed. Seven Greenock companies were ruined, five continued, and two new Greenock companies entered the trade. By 1820, the Scottish cod fleet had been halved. However, Scots were registering an increasing number of vessels in St. John's and developing trade with mainland ports. Between 1820-1825, Scots registered 32 vessels in St. John's, 37 in the next five years, and 71 between 1831-1835. The transition from a transient to a permanent Scottish merchant community in St. John's was now virtually complete and the port had engrossed much of the island's trade.

Virtually from its inception, the Newfoundland trade was conducted largely along triangular lines. Cell has shown how the fleet from the West Country departed England in spring with supplies for Newfoundland, collected cod and proceeded to Southern Europe where it was exchanged for fruit, wine and other Mediterranean luxuries for the British market. Each landfall and each exchange of goods added to the value of the cargo and did not demand extensive cash investments in the mother region. This cod trading triangle persisted to the
1850s and has attracted the attention of both historians and historical geographers.

Initially, Scottish shipping to Newfoundland was characterized by shuttles back and forth between Greenock and St. John's. Very few Scottish vessels cleared St. John's for Southern Europe before the Napoleonic wars. At this time Scottish-Newfoundland trade was simplistic. Throughout this period, however, Southern Europe became increasingly part of the Scottish trade as the demand for fish expanded. The line of trade between Southern Europe and the Clyde was tenuous; however, in contrast to the fleets from the West Country or Jersey described by Innis and Head and in detail by O'Mmer. Scottish ships usually returned to St. John's from Iberia for a second cargo, much like the Clyde vessels returning from France to Virginia for a second load of tobacco. Only six of thirty-nine vessels digressed from this trade network in 1810, mostly by supplementing regular voyages with side voyages to British North America or the West Indies. All Scottish firms, however, were trading outside the Greenock-Newfoundland-Southern European network, purchasing supplies from vessels visiting the mainland and West Indies ports. This diversification of trade routes increased through the 1820s. It was part of the growing integration of Newfoundland's trade with a rapidly expanding continent.

By 1833, the traditional lines of trade accounted for only half the voyages conducted by Scottish vessels.
Management of the fleet was now largely based in St. John's, not Greenock. Southern Europe was still important, but vessels were more likely to proceed to the West Indies or South America with one or two cargoes of cod and to mainland ports for supplies. Some Scottish vessels did not even cross the Atlantic. Greenock was still important however, as a market for train oil, and as a source for some supplies and of young clerks. Mannion's map of the shipping routes prosecuted by the St. John's and Waterford merchant Patrick Morris has many parallels with the Scottish strategy between 1815-1835. Like Morris, Scots clung to tradition, using their home port of Greenock, as he used Waterford, as a source of supplies and a market for cod oil. Both Morris and the Scots developed a shuttle trade with mainland ports. However, the Scots differed from Morris in their inclusion of the West Indies and South America in their shuttle trade and their greater use of Southern Europe. This pattern of mercantile adaptation to a colonial setting conforms to the sequences proposed by geographers such as Vance and Meinig: trade focuses initially between motherland and colony, then entrepôts emerge in New World harbours, an endogenous traffic emerges but traditional trans-Atlantic ties, albeit diminished, persist.

One of the central problems of the cod trade was the securing of ships to freight goods over vast distances around the Atlantic. Like all merchants, the Scots adopted a mix of
strategies to meet this challenge. Most owned at least one ocean-going vessel, many had two or more. Ownership of vessels permitted flexibility in an uncertain trade where timing of arrivals and departures were critical to profits. Small merchants just beginning often used other merchants' vessels to ship goods out of Greenock. Lang, Baine sent small quantities of goods to St. John's and paid the freight, and they also spent a great deal of time searching for suitable vessels to charter. Almost every Scottish merchant needed to charter extra vessels for carrying fish to market. Because they owned no vessels in 1810, Lang, Baine were forced to sell two-thirds of their fish in St. John's at reduced prices. Acquisition of their own vessel by 1812 made it possible for them to ship 70 percent abroad in that year at better prices.

Considering its strategic location in relation to Scottish colonial commerce, it is not immediately apparent why Scottish merchants did not establish regular trade with Newfoundland earlier in the eighteenth century. The extensive supply trade to the tobacco and sugar plantations may have fully occupied Clyde entrepreneurs who were expanding rapidly after 1740. It stimulated Scottish production and raised the economy to the threshold of industrialization by 1776 (Devine, 1977). The Newfoundland trade was small, compared to the Tidewater, somewhat more specialized, and England had long dominated it. The Scottish
export trade to America was disrupted with the American war. Scots now looked to Newfoundland and other British North American ports for alternative markets. Surprisingly, little has been written on the composition of cargoes to the southern plantations, but the needs of cod fishermen differed considerably from tobacco and sugar planters. Cloth, clothes, manufactures, notably glass, earthenware and hardware, comprised 40 percent of Scottish exports to Newfoundland between 1771-1785, slightly less than food and drink. From its inception, Scottish trade with Newfoundland followed traditional lines. Most Scottish textiles were produced locally by craftsmen in their own homes. Grain was converted to biscuit in rural mills and village bakeries in Scotland. Clyde merchants, like West Country counterparts, depended mainly on Irish ports for salt meat and butter, leading staples in the supply trade. Rum and sugar from the West Indies were re-exported from Scotland with a small amount of fruit and wine from the cod market areas in Southern Europe. Of all the major staples required to conduct a fishery, only salt was missing from the Clyde inventory.

Data on the composition of cargoes outwards between 1785-1810 are few, but there is little evidence of change. Pork was still important, accounting for 39 percent of Clyde commerce with Newfoundland. It represented one-eighth of all the pork exports from Britain to Newfoundland at this time. The North American mainland supplied most of the island's bread and flour, but Scots still obtained most of their
breadstuffs from Greenock. Bread was the focus of Walter Baine's Greenock trade, accounting for half of his exports compared to 20 percent for manufactured goods. Baine's supplies were gathered from a fairly broad range of Clyde ports including Greenock, Glasgow, Paisley, Falkirk, Stirling and Ayr.

By 1827, Greenock's contribution to the food trade to Newfoundland had greatly diminished. Greenock now sent only one-third of the pork sent at the peak of trade. Hamburg and Liverpool alone sent five to six times more provisions to Newfoundland after 1825. Quebec and New York sent two to three times Greenock's contribution. The shift to mainland sources was part of a growing continental integration as food production increased. Ports from Quebec to Philadelphia competed to supply the fishery. Greenock's role as a food supplier declined, part of a general British and Irish collapse. Food was needed to feed the burgeoning urban population of the Clyde and American sources were drawn upon for Newfoundland.

Most Scottish merchants were wholesalers, selling imported goods to other merchants and shopkeepers in St. John's and in the outports. Many of their merchant clients were fellow Scots, but they traded extensively with the English and the Irish in the town. Single sales ranged in value from over £1,000, particularly to other Scots, to £200 or less. Shopkeepers, publicans, dealers and artisans such as coopers,
tailors, blacksmiths and shoemakers were all customers of Scottish merchants, buying goods for further manufacture and/or resale.

There was considerable Scottish trading with the outports as St. John's expanded its hegemony during and after the Napoleonic Wars. Scots outport customers were heavily concentrated in the populous Avalon, especially in Conception Bay and the Southern Shore. A number of planters and fishermen in these areas travelled to St. John's in their own boats to trade directly with Scottish merchant wholesalers, bypassing the outport dealer.

There were major clusterings of Scottish dealers on the north shore of Conception Bay and the Bonavista Peninsula, but few elsewhere. Scots were not as strong in the more distant regions. They did not dislodge the hegemony of Poole in Trinity Bay and northwards, or of the English in the Burin Peninsula and west.

Unlike English and Irish merchants, the Scottish merchants could not draw upon fellow countrymen to supply them with fish. Few if any Scots ever fished, and the Greenock merchants depended on planters of English and Irish extraction. Scots in some other colonies traded with fellow Scots, or relied on Scottish labor. Buggey has noted the strength of ethnic ties in the Scottish trade at Pictou and Devine has pointed to the link between Scottish merchants and Scottish planters in the West Indies. Irish merchants in Newfoundland traded along ethnic lines, but the Scots, like
the English, operated at a scale that transcended ethnic ties.

Scots dealt with English and Irish agents in most large outports. They financed small operations by extending supplies on credit for an entire fishing season. Goods were distributed from St. John's in early spring and outport dealers extended credit to individual fishermen and planters. These men caught and cured the fish and sold it to the out-port traders who shipped it to Scots in St. John's for transhipment to market.

From their wharves in St. John's, Scots exported 13 percent of all Newfoundland fish in 1810. Newfoundland sent half of all its cod exports to Southern Europe. The Scots sent disproportionately more. The vast bulk of cod oil handled by Scots went to the Clyde, a convenient home cargo allowing easy remittances to company headquarters. Scottish cod exports to the Caribbean and South America doubled between 1810 and 1831. Norwegian competition and tariffs discouraged trade with Spain. Portugal now accounted for most of the Southern European market. Oil exports to Greenock doubled and represented a major proportion of Scottish exports in the 1830s. As elsewhere in the British Isles, it was the only cargo homeward from Newfoundland, although passengers were important in the return royages to Ireland and England.
Merchants entering the Newfoundland trade could draw on a century of tradition in colonial commerce. The Scots had developed a sophisticated system of financing this traffic through local banks. There were three banks in Glasgow alone by 1780 (Soltow, 1959). The Newfoundland merchants also borrowed money from private sources, especially from fellow merchants, industrialists, artisans, and professionals. Walter Baine's father proved helpful in Lang, Baine's early business dealings and his brother Robert, a banker in Greenock, provided capital for the partnership.

Short-term credit arrangements in the Newfoundland trade were largely facilitated by suppliers of goods. Glasgow clothiers, ironmongers and others had to wait at least six months for payment on products advanced. This interim was crucial for small firms to continue trading. Lang, Baine shipped 40 percent of their goods in mid-March, 1810, and had until November to pay for them. Their strategy was to keep supply purchases below the value of estimated summer fish catches, so that suppliers in Glasgow and the surrounding area could be paid when these catches were sold in Southern Europe. Merchants paid for their supplies in bills of exchange or in cash. Bills were obtained either by selling goods to other merchants - or from earnings on fish exports. They were the most efficient means to cover time between sales to customers and payments to suppliers. Scottish
branches in St. John's drew bills of exchange on parent houses in Greenock. These bills were circulated within the general merchant and planter community in Newfoundland.

Most merchants came from the middle stratum of Scottish society. They were sons of merchants, landowners, well-to-do farmers or professionals. Scots in the cod and other colonial trades recruited young men to serve as clerks overseas. If they proved worthy, they were sometimes given shares in the firms as an incentive. At least 15 Scots who came to Newfoundland as clerks became merchants. Merchants also began as sea captains. Between 1773-1791, Captains Hunter, Cunningham, Crawford, Kerr, Sinclair, Stevenson, Black, Boyd, Boag and Bell were all involved in the shipping trade to Newfoundland. All of these surnames were names of merchants who later formed companies in St. John's. Matthews and Handcock have shown that many English merchants were sea captains. By contrast, the Irish did not have a rich sea-going tradition, and were more likely to begin their trading careers as clerks. Scottish merchants were drawn from both the captain and the clerk route.

Marriage to a merchant's daughter was another way of entering trade. Young men with capital or expertise could become mercantile partners through a strategic marriage. Patrick Huie, for instance, became a partner with Richard Reed after marrying Reed's sister Sarah. Almost all partnerships were based on such marriages, resulting in a trading
community of extended families with a distinct ethnic flavour. Few Scots married exogamously, or recruited non-Scots to their fold.

All merchants were thoroughly colonial in their attitude to Newfoundland. Scottish firms there were branch plants of Greenock companies. Few, if any, settled. Only one Scottish trader in 1794, for instance, was married with family and the family resided in Scotland. Their goal was to return to Scotland permanently as senior partners. All but one of these merchants did this. They usually married late in life, after they had achieved some measure of financial security through their stint in St. John's. Typically they were replaced by younger clerks or agents recruited in the Clyde. Life for these clerks was raw on the mercantile frontier. Most were very young, with only an elementary education. They were apprenticed to a house on low wages for the first few years. Few of the amenities of the industrializing society of the Clyde merchant community were present, even in St. John's, the largest central place. They usually had living accommodation over the merchant store in the company of barrelled provisions, salt and fish. There were no merchant villas or town houses, no family, no kin, few fellow countrymen to keep them company, no school, church, formal social institution or ethnic society. They were expected to work from dawn to dusk and into the night during seasonal work peaks in spring, summer and fall. But
the rewards for such an arduous regimen were considerable. William Johnston of Lang, Baine earned £90 a year as a senior clerk. Such a man soon entered trade on his own account. Johnston rose from senior clerk to partner in just two years, and remained a member of the firm for twenty-seven years as it grew into the most powerful Scottish company.

 Merchants were slow to settle and invest in the development of St. John's. Whereas the southern colonial landscape was covered with tobacco plantations and large dwelling Houses capitalized or built by Scots, Newfoundland's landscape was often little more than flakes, wharves, and fish stores. Premises in St. John's were rarely worth over £1,000. By 1809, however, the Scottish commitment to St. John's was more noticeable. Out of the 68 wharves in 1809, 10 were Scottish, and their insurance values were high relative to English and Irish premises. Cunninghams, insured for £10,000, was the leading house in St. John's. James MacBraire ranked second at £6,400. Only five other premises were insured at over £5,000, one of which was Scottish.

In 1810, all but two firms were controlled by Greenock merchants who never set foot in Newfoundland. Profits were funnelled back to the Clyde. Lang, Baine's Greenock assets in 1814, for instance, were close to £70,000; those in Newfoundland were slightly over half this amount. The exact
degree to which Scots invested back in Scotland is difficult to determine. Tobacco and sugar merchants were heavy investors in land, industry and banking (Devine, 1976). The cod merchants followed suit, but at not nearly so grand a scale. James Stewart, James Hunter, William Johnston and James MacBraire, all early Scottish merchants in St. John's, retired to their Scottish country mansions with considerable fortunes.

The colonial nature of Scottish trade was transformed with the economic depression and recovery in the decade after 1815. Increasingly Scottish merchants acquired tenements in St. John's for rental income. Stuart and Rennie leased a house to a Scottish surgeon in 1834, for instance, and William Kydd rented a number of smaller properties for £70 a year. Scots, some merchants, owned farms and cottages in the countryside around St. John's (Mackinnon, 1981). Scots were now living in substantial dwelling houses sometimes built of stone in Scottish styles. Increasingly, premises were owned by their occupiers, not leased from English proprietors as in the early years of the nineteenth century. Up to 1825, most new vessels were owned by the typical branch plant company with partners in both Greenock and St. John's. In the next decade 85 percent of all vessels employed were owned locally by a resident Scottish merchant community. St. John's, originally a tenuous colonial centre for Scottish merchants, had become
a permanent and important trade location for them by the
1830s.

In contrast to tobacco lords, cod firms were initially
small. Biographies of a number of Newfoundland merchants
show that the largest houses such as Newmans and Lesters
had 15-30 vessels, but most owned just a few. Leading Scots
had five vessels in 1810. In 1812, Walter Baine and Company
shipped almost 18,000 quintals of cod to market. Few
merchants in Newfoundland exported this amount. Lang, Baine
and Company were shipping £40,000 worth of supplies into
St. John's by 1813, three times that of Richard Fogarty,
considered a leading merchant in the thriving Waterford-
St. John's trade. Some Scots accumulated massive debts.
Crawfords and Company, for example, owed almost £120,000 to
Scottish creditors at the time of their insolvency in 1817,
and half of this had been amassed since 1815. Lang, Baine
and Company who had owned two vessels worth £4,700 in total
in 1812, were much more substantial twenty years later. They
were much more substantial twenty years later. They were
one of three Scottish firms which each possessed fifteen
vessels by 1832. Together with McBride and Kerr and James
Stewart and Company, they were major shipowners, among the
ranks of Newfoundland's largest merchants.

Mercantile settlement was inordinately slow to develop.
It was not until 1842 that the Scottish community in
St. John's was large enough to support a Presbyterian church.
The Scottish contribution to the Newfoundland economy grew after this time, with McBride, Hunters and McLea all lasting past 1850, and J. and W. Stewart until 1887. Walter Grieve and Company, a spin off of Baine, Johnston, were the largest fish exporters in Newfoundland at this time. Baine, Johnston continued to export fish until after the second World War, and, with a handful of other Scottish firms, are active in St. John's trade to this day.

Historical geographers have been slow to study the mercantile world. Vance's work has not been followed up by geographers in Atlantic Canada, apart from Handcock; Mannion, Ommer and Wynn. The student of the mercantile world must rely for the most part upon historians for an understanding of the dimension's of Scottish colonial commerce. Yet geographers have much to offer. North Atlantic spatial links are critical in understanding merchant trade. Study of ship movements through time allows for the reconstruction of trade patterns on an intimate level, and sheds light upon market and supply linkages.

There is still much to be done before the full story of Scottish enterprise across the Atlantic is properly understood. Many topics which are dealt with by Devine for the tobacco and West India trades remain unanswered for the cod trade. Were the social origins of the merchants much different from the tobacco merchants? Did they invest in
land and industry in Scotland, or in other trades. Were Scottish operations much different from English or Irish merchants? How did Liverpool differ from Greenock? Did English and Irish merchants use similar cod markets as the Scots? Did they invest as heavily in shipping? How much of the Scottish trade was with the outports? Why were they so successful? How close were connections with Quebec, Halifax and other Scottish merchant strongholds? How important were the Clyde merchants to the development of Newfoundland and British North American export trades and what impact did these trades have upon the development of Greenock, Port Glasgow, and Glasgow? Only detailed investigation of Scottish based primary sources will answer these questions.
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