FREEDOM AND THE STATE: A STUDY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY

© David B. Hickey, B.A., B.Ed.

A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education

Department of Educational Foundations
Memorial University of Newfoundland
July 1988

St. John's Newfoundland
ABSTRACT

Hegel's political and social theory has recently been given considerable attention by philosophers. But in the field of philosophy of education, little or no attention is currently being paid to this aspect of Hegel's philosophy. In educational philosophy, the trend since Hegel's death has been to represent Hegel as an enemy of individualism and an apologist for political absolutism. A close reading of Hegel's major political text, the Philosophy of Right, suggests that the "received opinion" of Hegel's political theory, held by writers in the field of education, is marred by serious misrepresentation. Rarely in the literature in education is it pointed out that individual freedom and development is the main theme of Hegel's philosophy - including and especially, Hegel's philosophy of Objective Spirit, that moment in spirit's development that is concerned with political and social behavior.

It is argued here that Hegel's theory of the state is founded upon the principle of freedom and that the aim of education in Hegel's state is the empowerment of individuals for free self- hood in an objective world built-up through self-conscious participation in quasi-independent institutions. In Hegel's state the individual participates in a consistent and coherent network of educational activities.

In the first chapter Hegel's general philosophical perspective as it relates to education is introduced and this
writer's position relative to some important concerns in Hegelian scholarship is explained. Chapter Two, Background and Context, surveys the education literature on Hegel’s social and political thought and concludes with a brief comparison to Marx on the topic of freedom. Chapter Three explicates Hegel’s theory of freedom and individuality. Chapter Four, Major Social and Political Themes in Hegel Relevant to Education, discusses the Hegelian concepts of the family, property, labor, and class, within the context of the Hegelian notion of ethical life. In Chapter Five, The Hegelian Educational Matrix, the institutions of the Police and the Corporation are analysed for their educational characteristics. Chapter Six concludes the discussion of state and education by reviewing the place of freedom in Hegel's philosophy proper.
The Philosophy of Right, by G.W.F. Hegel, consists of consecutively numbered paragraphs to which Hegel frequently appended "Remarks," and, to many of which "Additions"—derived from notes taken at Hegel's lectures—have been added. Quotations from the Philosophy of Right are identified in the text by the letters PR, followed by the paragraph number and "R" when the material cited appears in a Remark and "A" when it occurs in an Addition. Quotations from Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences are identified with the abbreviation ENC, followed by the section number.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter One - INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two - BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three - HEGEL ON FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four - MAJOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEMES IN HEGEL RELEVANT TO EDUCATION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five - THE HEGELIAN EDUCATIONAL MATRIX</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six - CONCLUSION</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aristotle, in the Politics, claims that "the legislator should make the education of the young his chief and foremost concern." Consistent with his claim, Aristotle treats the topic of education in some detail: the bulk of two books (of the eight that make up the Politics) is devoted to it. G.W.F. Hegel, whose political project might be regarded as quite similar to Aristotle's, does not, however, share Aristotle's concern with education to the same degree - or so it would appear if one judges by the number of pages expressly devoted to the topic in both the Encyclopedia and the Philosophy of Right. Such negligence comes as even more of a surprise when one considers that Hegel's political theory was developed over a period of almost thirty years.

It is with the publication of the Philosophy of Right in 1821 that Hegel's political theory is finally completed. While I do not want to criticize Hegel for an omission, I do want to attempt to finish one of the rooms in the palace that is Hegel's political philosophy. Specifically, I want to concentrate on the intersection of State and Education in the political and social thought of Hegel. My thesis is that in the Hegelian scheme of political and social institutions and behaviors, education plays an integral part. By "integral" I am suggesting that without an explication of the place and purpose of educational activity in Hegel's theory of the state,
Hegel's philosophy of education will not be clearly understood. Moreover, I want to show that Hegel's political system and his concept of freedom have been too often neglected by writers in the field of education and that, therefore, the Hegel that is portrayed in most education literature is a less than accurate portrait. Finally, besides locating Hegel, and thereby correcting mislocations of Hegel, it is also my purpose to offer Hegel's ideas as being worthy of more than just a casual acquaintance.

Following some further introductory remarks and commentary on Hegel and Hegelian philosophy, this essay will be organized as follows:

Chapter Two - BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
In this section the educational literature on Hegel is surveyed briefly.

Chapter Three - HEGEL ON FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY
Hegel's analysis of freedom and its relationship to the concept of the individual is explained in this chapter.

Chapter Four - MAJOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEMES IN HEGEL RELEVANT TO EDUCATION
In this section an overview of Hegel's theory of the state and its attendant educational philosophy is explained.

Chapter Five - THE HEGELIAN EDUCATIONAL MATRIX
This chapter describes in detail the politico-social educational network in Hegel's state in relation to the substantial content of chapters three and four above.

Chapter Six - CONCLUSION
The current renaissance in Hegelian scholarship appears to be having little impact in the field of philosophy of education. And if there is at least one credible explanation for this state of affairs - to be mentioned momentarily - it is still rather bewildering to see Hegel regularly overlooked in the literature on education. It is especially bewildering when one considers that recent educational philosophy has experienced a sort of road-to-Damascus encounter with Marxist philosophy. Naturally, with this interest in Marxism (occurring, coincidentally with the shift away from the arch-enemies of orthodox Hegelianism, continental existentialism and British empiricism) one would expect more than a passing interest in Marx's patriarch: G.W.F. Hegel. But that this has not happened, that the Hegelian renaissance has not yet had a significant effect in philosophy of education surprises no one who is familiar with the reputation of Hegel's philosophy for abstruseness and the reputation of some of his disciples for idolatry.

By no means is it being suggested here that Hegel needs to be resurrected; if this were the case, the present writer would certainly be ill-equipped to accomplish the task. In truth, there is a history of Hegelian scholarship in education, beginning with Hegel's first biographer, Rosenkranz, whose textbook in the philosophy of education is indebted to Hegel's philosophy, although not necessarily true to it. Overall, however, the literature on Hegel in the field of philosophy of education is limited and, as will be argued below, also
characterized by misunderstanding. The limitations in the educational literature on Hegel is what will concern us first.

These limitations are easily justified: Hegel's philosophy of spirit is, as he intended, all-encompassing. It is to be expected, then, that reconstructing Hegel's philosophy of education would have to do justice to all the permutations of spirit, something which, it has been argued, even Hegel couldn't accomplish. Currently, the applications of Hegel's philosophy to education have concentrated on 'Subjective Spirit', which includes anthropology, phenomenology and psychology. Considerations of 'Objective Spirit' ('spirit objectified in human institutions') have not been as common however, and, therefore, there is work still to be done with regards to education in this area. Hence, it is important that the reader understand that the starting point of the analysis in this paper is not Hegel's philosophical system broadly speaking (Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit), but his political philosophy as expressed primarily in the last book Hegel published before his death: the Philosophy of Right. (Hegel's other political writings will also need to be referred to, mainly for purposes of clarifying the meaning of selected concepts and categories in the Philosophy of Right.)

Hegel's philosophy has been compared to a symphony whose themes, once announced, are then elaborated both in the work at hand and in other works. One might question, therefore, whether it is fair to break an organic philosophy such as
Hegel's into separate parts. There is no doubt that Hegel's work, from the *Phenomenology* to the posthumously printed series of lectures, is unified as much by Hegel's style (including organization, syntax and vocabulary) as by an intrinsic relation to their author's philosophical 'mission'. Attending to this unity presents three obstacles which it is the main purpose of this introduction to surmount. These obstacles are:

1. Justification for the limitations imposed on the handling of the topic of this paper.
2. The matter of prescription vs. description.
3. Hegel's use of the term 'Bildung', usually translated to mean 'culture'.

We will discuss these obstacles separately with an aim toward clarifying our position on each. It will also be seen that each obstacle concerns a matter of some controversy in Hegelian scholarship; controversies whose solutions will, unfortunately, not be found in the brief consideration given these matters here.

1. Shlomo Avineri's *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* is a landmark study of its topic. In his preface, Avineri outlines the problem faced by a writer who tries to limit his discussion of Hegel to only one aspect of the latter's philosophy. Avineri writes:

   If he tries to trace in depth the connection between Hegel's political thought and his general philosophical system, he may find himself immersed in an explication of the systematic edifice of Hegel's philosophy without ever reaching his political theory. Alternatively, he may try to condense the general system into a tight
and concise introductory chapter which will stand very little chance of doing justice to it while at the same time being almost certainly so dense as to be more obscure than illuminating; the writer may thus raise more problems in his introductory section than he will later be able to answer adequately in the detailed discussion of Hegel's political philosophy proper.

Another distinguished commentator on Hegel's political philosophy, Z.A. Pelczynski, has written more confidently that:

Hegel's political thought can be read, understood, and appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics. Some of his assertions may seem less well-grounded than they might otherwise have been ... (yet) a solid volume of political theory and political thinking will still remain.

While others - no less distinguished - have taken issue with these sentiments, the precedent for restricting the present discussion has nevertheless been established.

In addition to ignoring Hegel's speculative metaphysics in this discussion of his political thought, the direction this paper takes falls loosely under the heading of 'Philosophy of Action' which asks of a given philosophy: "What does this philosophy demand in practice?" Specifically, what this approach means is outlined by A.S. Walton in his contribution to a collection of essays entitled Hegel's Philosophy of Action. Walton's delimitation entails two things: first, "no attempt ... to offer a detailed historical account of the development of Hegel's thought" and second, "no attempt ... to locate Hegel's social theory within the context of his philosophical system as a whole."
None of this should be taken to mean that as a result of this limited reading, Hegel's thought risks being distorted in order to fit a pre-conceived mold. To prevent this from occurring, Hegel's leading philosophical themes will be kept in the forefront throughout the discussion. The concept of freedom, for example, (one of the major themes of Hegel's 'symphony') permeates all of Hegel's philosophical work. (Indeed, Hegel's own life betrays a commitment not only to the concept but also the practice, from the planting of a 'freedom tree' with his youthful friend Schelling, to his custom of celebrating the fall of the Bastille up to the end of his life.)

The second obstacle which must be negotiated if the unity of Hegel's thought is to be respected concerns the issue of whether Hegel's political writing is prescriptive or descriptive. The origin of this problem stems from the preface to the Philosophy of Right where Hegel states: "One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy, in any case, always comes on the scene too late to give it." It has been argued, based on this statement and similar claims in the same preface, that Hegel is not trying to give advice for the future but is seeking merely to comprehend the present, the status quo. Some have even gone so far as to assert that his sole motive for the Philosophy of Right is to praise and encourage the existing, repressive Prussian state of his time. (This assertion concerning Hegel's motives has
been the subject of much scholarly discussion which, however, is not directly related to our point here.20)

There is no question that Hegel is opposed to what Ottman calls "abstract 'ought-to-be's'"21, those inadequate and ungrounded, purely formal general claims that are not responsive to concrete manifestations of reason in the world. Nevertheless, as Pelczynski states, Hegel's political theory does not differ from other major political theories and, like them, it too, among other things, "prescribes".22 In fact, Hegel believed that no political state could come up to the theory as expressed in the Philosophy of Right.23 And, moreover, it has been pointed out that Hegel's theory "contains institutions which simply did not exist in the Prussia of Hegel's time."24

Acknowledging the authority of these arguments, this analysis will be based on the assumption - for the question is still not settled among interpreters of the Philosophy of Right25 that Hegel's theory of the modern state is not merely descriptive. But, whether Hegel's flight plan for the owl of Minerva is actually intended to direct society along a particular course is another matter. Perhaps it is best to understand Hegel's theory as reformist in the most conservative sense of the term. That is, Hegel perceives philosophy as the intellectual apprehension of the real world leading to a higher reconciliation which is itself very much like an epiphany: truth, already existent in the real, can finally be unmasked, i.e., made actual, through philosophy. Only in this way should
Hegel be seen as reformist: making our quotidian existence actual by making it rational. And finally, it must be remembered that Hegel has been dead for more than a century and a half and that, since his death, the political mentalities of Western cultures have undergone changes which Hegel, obviously, could not have foreseen. Hence, only a judicious reading of Hegel's philosophy can guarantee a correct representation of his thought.

As mentioned above, Hegel does not address at length the place of education in his political and social writings. What is required, therefore, is that Hegel's principles and categories must be explicited in some detail, the 'hidden' connections exposed and derivations and extrapolations argued for. To do this, what follows relies on the scholarship of philosophers whose first 'loyalty' is to Hegel rather than to the study of education. This, in itself, will help to insure that Hegel is read and interpreted in a coherent manner due simply to the fact that there is a unity of sorts among present day commentators on Hegel. This unity is not a homogeneity, certainly, but is, rather, a type of 'negative concurrence' which is primarily the result of the agreed upon inadequacies of previous right-wing and left-wing readings of Hegel's philosophy of right.

3. The third obstacle to a coherent reading of Hegel results from his use of the term Bildung. Although generally translated as "culture," T.M. Knox, whose translation of the Philosophy of Right is the standard translation, is satisfied
to render the term as "education." Floden makes a distinction between Bildung (meaning "Maturatation") and Erziehung ("instruction with a strong element of discipline"), but bases the distinction on what this writer believes might be an incorrect reading of ENC 387. In any case, while it is true that Hegel uses Erziehung in those portions of the Philosophy of Right dealing with the education of children, the inconsistency in the use of the two words in other parts of the German text (also reflected in Knox's decision to translate either one as "education") shows that the separation of meaning is not hard and fast and, therefore, relatively insignificant as it bears upon the meaning of the term for our purposes here. Still others accept "Cultivation" and/or "Acculturation" as well as "education" as an accurate enough translation.

But because Hegel never explicitly elaborated a theory of either Bildung or education, most commentators translate the term in its broadest sense as "culture." Markus is one such commentator who has developed this notion of Bildung, declaring that of its four interconnected "meaning dimensions" education is only one. There is much to praise in Markus' contribution to an understanding of Bildung. And, although in this presentation we will follow Knox's translation, the meaning of "education" in the Philosophy of Right must in turn be understood to include what Corbett calls "the process of social interaction and socialization." Not only is this broader conception of the term in keeping with its traditional
meaning, but it also accommodates George Armstrong Kelly's situating of Hegel within the "politico-pedagogical orientation of German idealism."

It is hoped now that we have successfully maneuvered past these three obstacles to a unified reading of Hegel and can proceed to develop the argument that Hegel's political and social theories are worthy of a closer look. To conclude this chapter and as preparation for Chapter Two, we will take a brief look at the present state of "Hegel - labeling."

A recent PBS television series "From Socrates to Sartre" - which also served as a three credit college course in philosophy - presents an example of how Hegel's political philosophy is usually offered for general consumption:

It is easy to see why Hegel has been labeled a conservative by some, a reactionary by others, but never a defender of liberalism. We have seen that his political philosophy rejects the twin pillars of political liberalism: individualism and democracy.

But then contrast that with Ottman's assessment, based on a survey of current interpretations of the Philosophy of Right, and it should be easy to see why Hegel is such a difficult subject. Ottman writes:

Hegel's state was to be the constitutional state of modern political thought, which respects human and civil rights. In Hegel's modern state, man has the right to freedom and equality, regardless of his origin, his religion, or nationality, Hegel recognizes the freedom of property and person, the freedom of trade and the free choice of occupation, free access to public office, the rule of law, the respect for conscience, the open administration of justice, religious tolerance and the constitutional limitations of monarchy.
Jay Drydyk, in "Hegel's Politics: Liberal or Democratic," has analyzed this problem thoroughly. Drydyk demonstrates that for Hegel the standard by which to judge a political organization is "does it enable the people to voluntarily revise particular interests which would otherwise conflict?" Hegel was an avid observer of British politics in particular. And what watching the liberal parliamentary system there showed him was that the names and the faces in government changed but not much else. Hegel proposed a system which he thought would actually give citizens more power, in particular, the power to reconcile competing interests.\(^4\) Drydyk is able to argue convincingly that although Hegel disavowed the democrats' tactics, he still applied certain democratic standards; moreover, he applied them in a critique of liberal principles and practices ... and the essence of his critique was not that liberal principle and practice are excessively democratic but, on the contrary, that they are not democratic enough.\(^5\)

These points have not been raised to justify pinning as 'ism' on Hegel's political philosophy but to set the stage, so to speak, for a more modern appreciation of that philosophy. This is especially crucial in the field of education where the traditional Hegel is the dominant one. And, it is to these traditional views of Hegel in educational scholarship that we now direct our attention.
CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Hegel's social and political thought has not fared well at the hands of educational philosophers. While there are some important exceptions, the general tenor of most treatments of Hegel's philosophy in educational literature is negative. While looking for the cause of this situation, one soon discovers another interesting fact; namely, that the misinterpretations of Hegel actually began in Germany soon after his death and have continued up to the present. If philosophers working in the field of Hegel studies are prone to such distortion, what hope is there for educators seeking philosophical underpinnings for their ideas? Remarkably, even R.S. Peters, who has made significant contributions in the fields of philosophy proper and educational philosophy specifically, is guilty of misunderstanding Hegel. R.S. Berki shows that Peters is "not only ... not conversant with Hegel's recent commentators but he (Peters) has failed to master Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the very book he criticizes." Floden is essentially correct when she writes that "(e)ducators do not know of Hegel, or else they know of his thought through a glass, darkly." Consider, for example, that when Hegel is discussed, it is often as a philosopher who falls under the heading of idealism, that educational philosophy which stresses the spiritual harmony that is the essence of being and the final aim of education. Yet, even
authorities on the educational philosophy of idealism find it difficult to cope with Hegel's place in it. In his Modern Philosophies of Education, published in 1971, John Paul Strain makes the important point that idealism in education is based on "a special interpretation of Hegelian philosophy" but four years later, writing in the journal "Educational Theory," Strain fails to draw attention to this point, and leaves the impression that Hegel is responsible for an educational philosophy which Strain feels "continues to exist because of tradition and economic pressure." Although seemingly sympathetic towards Hegel, Donald Seckinger, in his "Response to Strain" in the same journal, while correcting Strain's "unfortunate reading of Hegel," still seems to feel that there is something 'wrong' with Hegel's "specific social views" and more than once commends those "modern American idealists" who have successfully tried to "go beyond" Hegel. Seckinger also repeats the charge that Hegel was an apologist for the Prussian nation-state.

Often the social politics of an idealist philosophy of education are equated with totalitarianism. In turn, Hegel is then characterized as having fathered "the philosophical tradition in reactionary conservatism", namely the "quasi-mystical nationalism" of fascism and national socialism. Hegel ends up being charged with espousing the doctrine that "war is the ultimate arbiter of what is right."

This sort of misrepresentation of Hegel in education has been going on at least since 1923 when Sir Percy Nunn claimed
that "the connection between the World War and Hegelianism is too close to be ignored." In the early 60's a student of education could read that "Hegel favoured thought control," and that Nietzsche, "a disciple of Hegel ... believed that in the struggle for power the weak should be destroyed to make room for the strong." As things began to get better there was still a degree of hesitation and lack of commitment toward the task of correcting the picture of Hegel in educational literature. Although Curtis, in 1958, refuted Percy Nunn's charges against Hegel, in the suggestions for further reading (Chapter 3) the reader is advised to "postpone the reading of Hegel." Texts that attempt to give a balanced picture of Hegel's thought invariably ignore or downplay the social and political aspects or fail to qualify statements which are open to the same misunderstandings we have witnessed in the past. It is to be hoped that a more exacting exposition of Hegel's social and political philosophy will help to create the atmosphere for a more judicious appraisal of Hegel's ideas on education. It will be one of our aims to show that simplistic, formulaic assessments of Hegel's theory of the state cannot but lead to the wrong-headedness that seems to be characteristic of so much educational literature.

Besides the above incidental references to Hegel in educational literature, there are three book-length studies of Hegel in English. The first two were published in 1896. Hegel as Educator, by Frederie Ludlow Luqueer, is
inconsequential. The first half of Luqueer's book is a biography of Hegel, while Part II is a selection of translations from all of Hegel's writings edited and arranged by Luqueer. Also in 1896, *Hegel's Educational Ideas* appeared, by William M. Bryant. Bryant's purpose is to present Hegel's system as a "universal scheme of education". Although Bryant does at times discuss the importance of institutions, he commits the common error of many readers of Hegel (both in education and philosophy), that of ignoring the place and purpose of what Hegel calls "Civil Society". By failing to establish this important distinction between 'State' and 'Civil Society', a mere mention of the word 'state' can conjure up visions of Germanic political absolutism. Another problem with Bryant's text, although perfectly normal for its time, is its prose. Written in a style that used to make good logical positivists reach for the seltzer, Bryant's book has really only an historical value.

Millicent Mackenzie's, *Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice*, is another matter. While Mackenzie does discuss the concept of Civil Society (which she calls "the civic community") she too often ignores it, which in turn leads to her neglect of Hegel's theory of freedom. However, much better Mackenzie's treatment is than Luqueer's and Bryant's, *Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice* is still rather dated (originally published, 1909) and flawed by what Floden calls "misplaced respect," which causes Mackenzie to treat Hegel's commencement
speeches to high school students and their parents as being on the same level as his more mature works on philosophy. While it is true that the commencement addresses do not contradict his later remarks about education—and, in fact, sometimes anticipate Hegel's later works—they will not be used as sources in this paper for two reasons. First, they do not provide a sustained and thorough attitude toward political and social issues, for they respond instead to specific educational concerns of the moment. Second, they are of more relevance to 'subjective spirit' in that they present Hegel's opinions on curriculum and achievement as they relate to only one type of educational institution, the classical gymnasium.

The few exceptions in the educational literature to the general trend of short-changing Hegelian social and political thought have not been discussed here because references will be made to them as they bear on themes covered below. The reader should be reminded that this survey of literature has not been exhaustive of all that has been written on Hegel and education. As stated earlier, most of the material on Hegel and education concentrates exclusively on Subjective Spirit whereas our concern, to repeat, is Objective Spirit, the realm of social and political philosophy.

A complete picture of the role of Hegel and Hegelian political philosophy in education would not be complete without an account of the full and part-time educators who have been influenced by Hegel. There have been many such people and,
of course, they have written much. Their contributions cannot be easily assessed and certainly not within the confines of this essay. Many of these men and women, while publicly acknowledging Hegel's philosophy, were, themselves, in the educational trenches as teachers, superintendents, members of commissions of inquiry and in the case of two, government ministers: Giovanni Gentile was Mussolini's Minister of Public Instruction during the early 1920's and W.T. Harris was the U.S. Commissioner of Education from 1889 to 1906. Philosophers and educational theorists such as T.H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet and Lord Haldane in England and W.T. Harris, Denton J. Snider, Susan E. Blow, and John Dewey in the United States were all, in varying degrees, Hegelians in their approach to the important social issues of their time. Only after grounding these writers in their time could one assess their versions of Hegel's theories. But neither would such an assessment be fair, for none of these people were merely interested in popularizing Hegel; rather, they set out to actualize the Hegelian agenda. They certainly represent an important chapter in the history of education but only one, John Dewey, has had any appreciable impact on educational theory and practice. And since Dewey's impact cannot be so easily ignored, it is his relationship to Hegel that we must now review.

Normally, John Dewey, the mature philosopher, is not regarded as an Hegelian; if anything, an ambivalent Hegelian maybe. Certainly there is Dewey's off-quoted remark that
Plato and Hegel "left a definite deposit" in his thought. But, on the other hand, it is generally accepted that Dewey abandoned what he considered an untenable idealistic metaphysics for a "Darwinian naturalism" and sought support for his political theories in analytical science. Yet John Dewey is relevant to this discussion if only because he is the best example of an educational philosopher coming to grips with the same concerns as Hegel. For Dewey, one of the major problems for mankind is balancing the principle of individual freedom with the equally important need for collective well-being. Although there was no greater champion of populist democracy, Dewey was aware of its shortcomings as well. While not afraid to accept educational institutions as agents for social control, Dewey argued forcefully that men should be not only subject to, but also "creators and controllers of their institutions."

In his critique of the abuses of capitalism, Dewey argued for an industrial democracy where economic relations would be subordinated to human relations. Dewey's ability to see society as an association of smaller associations (testimony to his 'Hegelian deposit' as will be shown later) made it possible for him to place the school firmly in the community in a practical sense that recognized the typical occupations of men. This vision of society, when stretched, has caused at least one commentator on Dewey's later writings to read him as an "anarchocommunalist."


What will be argued in the following pages is that Hegel, nearly a hundred years before John Dewey, sought also to promote the principle of individual freedom while still promoting the interests of a greater sovereign body. Both men assigned to education the task of bringing the individual 'up to' the stage upon which true citizenship could be fostered. Whether or not Hegel's theory of the state can do this is obviously one of the questions that will have to be answered below.

To highlight further the themes of this paper - freedom and individuality - and, as well, to finish the story of Hegel's relevance to the philosophy of education, it is important to introduce a key player in current educational philosophizing: Karl Marx. Now Marx, of course, wrote even less about education than Hegel. Nevertheless, in a sense, Marx, more than anything, was himself a teacher. Evidence of this need not be looked for in his motives but merely in the fact that today, in the English speaking world, alert 'students' of Marx and Marxism are more vocal, more intense, and probably, more provocative than any other single group of educational theorists.

It is too early in time to write the history of Marxian influence in education. Yet, trends are noticeable, influential texts and articles are identifiable, and, surprising to no one, critiques of the 'Critique' are already in circulation.
Marx's influence in education began to be felt as a result of work in the field of sociology, especially the sociology of knowledge. The shift to political theory took shape finally in a critique of liberalism and especially of liberal reform efforts in education. Martin Carnoy expresses it this way:

freedom of movement and individualized instruction in the classroom is not the issue ... The issue is political and economic. How do we change a society that colonizes people to accept dominated roles, roles defined by a powerful, self-perpetuating group?  

This "incompatibility" between liberal reforms and what were perceived to be the "antiegalitarian requirements" of capitalism finally led Marxian educational theorists to an analysis of the state. Unfortunately, this analysis only posed more questions. At first, the correspondences between the state and education were emphasized, leading many to assert that schools were "functional in obeying the rules of the game set out by the larger society ..." Before long, however, contradictions, especially in the welfare capitalist state, began to be emphasized and it was pointed out the "the state is not merely the hand-maiden of the dominant classes."

The issues at stake, then, were economic and political domination of one sector of society by another, and the role of education in a society (culture) that had the potential to support degrees of emancipation previously restricted only to a few but which appeared to be failing to fulfill its promise. What was recognized by very few of those who contributed to
This discussion was that these issues were not unique to Marx: they were in fact the same issues that Hegel had written about in the *Philosophy of Right* twenty-seven years before the appearance of *The Communist Manifesto*. (Marx, of course, had written on sections of the *Philosophy of Right;* his *Critique of the Philosophy of Right* was probably composed in 1843).

Henry A. Giroux is one of those who have challenged the contemporary Marxist critique of education. "Marxism and Schooling: The Limits of Radical Discourse" puts forth the thesis that

the radical educational theories that have developed primarily within the contours of a Marxist framework, while having made enormous gains in contesting conservative and liberal accounts of schooling, have outgrown their theoretical and political significance as the basis for a radical discourse.

Citing the inadequacy of such traditional Marxist categories as class, history, economism and Marx's later scientism, and attempting to go "beyond Marx," Giroux makes a telling distinction between schooling and education. Proceeding from this distinction, he outlines strategies for "radical pedagogues" to use in creating "alternate public spheres." The similarity here between the theoretical undercarriage that supports Giroux's analysis and Hegel's concept of civil society is striking. It might even be said that although Marx seems to have been finished with Hegel, Hegel is not yet finished with Marxism.

A Marxian-Hegelian convergence follows from Giroux's distinction between schooling and education. It is a myth
that schooling and education are the same, declares Giroux. 73 Education "takes place primarily outside of established institutions and spheres" where schooling occurs; "its focus is political in the broadest sense" and its aim is "human emancipation." 74 Schooling, on the other hand, is only one factor in the empowering of citizens, both individually and collectively. Giroux recognizes the importance of empowering the individual but stresses the collective much more. When he elaborates on the strategies for his radical pedagogues his overriding concern is with "social movements and groups" (p. 131); "collective struggle"; "oppressed and oppositional groups" (p. 132); "alliances and social formations"; "collective aspirations"; "community groups"; "new forms of social relations" (p. 139) and offers as a specific example, the "nationality federations" (p. 134) created in America at the turn of the century. 75

Now, the legitimacy of Giroux's critique is, at this point, an internal matter for those still concentrating on the Marxist and post-Marxist paradigms. Giroux does not invoke the name of Hegel and neither is this the place for a forced marriage. That Giroux anticipates some of the Hegelian 'architecture' as it is applied to education in this paper will be obvious in due time; and, that Hegel would challenge some of Giroux's assumptions about where education does and should occur will also be clear as the argument unfolds.
What now remains from Giroux's challenge to the Marxist analysis of education and, as well, what is especially relevant to the Marxian-Hegelian convergence is the final goal Giroux sets for his radical pedagogy: emancipation and empowerment; that is, freedom. The convergence of Marx and Hegel occurs here, but so also does the divergence between these two great thinkers begin here. Freedom has long been recognized as one of the central themes of both Marx and Hegel, but where Marx is criticized for a concept of freedom which is empty and "situation-less", Hegel is credited with a conception of freedom which is "the richest in the history of political philosophy".

P.G. Stillman develops the contrast between these two views of freedom in "Hegel's Civil Society: A Locus of Freedom":

... Marx's ideal men lack an articulated and differentiated social context in which each individual, a social being, can discover and develop his potential; they have no criteria by which to decide whether to hunt, fish; critically criticize, or follow another particular activity this morning (or at all); and they lack an appreciation of the results on the society as a whole, ongoing, and objective entity of universal individuals producing in each and all spheres of human life.

In opposition to this Marxian, asocial freedom, it is Hegel's position that freedom cannot concretely exist outside a social context. That social context, broadly speaking, in which freedom finally comes into its own is the Hegelian state. The main tenor of the criticisms of Hegelian educational philosophy to date is that freedom seems to be lacking as a result of Hegel's supposed zeal to shore up a reactionary
political ideology. Marx is naturally credited with a critique of such repressive ideologies and thus it has come about that educational philosophers have looked toward Marx and overlooked Hegel. Yet freedom is the substance and the goal of Hegel's philosophy of objective mind (PR 4), a claim which, if substantiated, should grant to that philosophy greater recognition as a source for educational philosophers. In the next section Hegel's concept of freedom is explained, with special attention given to the individual.
Hegel lays the foundation for his concept of an actualized freedom with a discussion of the will. The will is free, Hegel says, by its very nature (PR 4A) but the likely consequences of this naturally free will or 'immediate' free will are not such that Hegel is content to simply let it act unrestrained in his state. Natural or immediate will is distinguished by its arbitrariness. The individual at this stage possesses an immature will and, although capable of making choices, chooses without full knowledge. Hence, his decisions are arbitrary and are motivated by his appetites, fancies, and passions. The freedom that he associates with his immediate willfulness is abstract and is, according to Hegel, only a negative freedom. It is "the freedom of the state of nature, conceived as either the primitive pre-civilized condition of mankind ... or as a modern philosophical abstraction."\(^\text{81}\)

In keeping with the dialectical nature of Hegel’s philosophizing, the immediate, natural will and its complementary form of freedom is not to be looked upon as without value, however. It is indeed a necessary step in the process of man’s self-determination. It is, though, a one-sided form of freedom. While it allows man to free himself from restrictions, even to the point of suicide, if negative freedom is left to itself it always sees objects external to itself as outside interference
and without something more powerful to restrain it, the arbitrary will takes shape in the world as fanaticism. As Hegel says,

Only in destroying something does this negative will possess the feeling of itself as existent. Of course it imagines that it is willing some positive state of affairs, such as universal equality or universal religious life, but in fact it does not will that this shall be positively actualized, and for this reason: such actuality leads at once to a particularization of organizations and individuals alike; while it is precisely out of the annihilation of particularity and objective characterization that the self-consciousness of this negative freedom proceeds. (PR 5R)

Hence, the appearance of the natural, immediate and arbitrary will point up the capacity for freedom but truly not its realization.

Faced then with the terror of the destructive, arbitrary will, there is a tendency for man to over-restrict his natural impulses. In his lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel describes those societies which have encouraged the extinction of the natural will by promoting the customs and cultural institutions of the time. But Hegel warns against stopping at this "second nature which, put in the place of the initial, purely natural will, is the soul of custom ..." (PR 151). For, too often, a reliance upon the prescriptions of custom becomes habitual and "a man is killed by habit" (PR 151A). Still, progress is being made because here, freedom has become formalized in these customs and institutions, and hence, is for Hegel, a more mature form of freedom. It is a positive freedom in that it recognizes the importance of the nature of
duty and, through its stability, paves the way for an integration of the individual conscience (which was at the heart of negative freedom) and a public notion of 'the good' or morality. Yet it is still an incomplete concept of freedom. As Pelczynski remarks: "this kind of 'substantial' or 'positive' freedom appears compatible with all sorts of situations in which there is very little liberty as it is generally understood by liberals or democrats." 82

What is lacking, of course, in this wholesale overcoming of the arbitrary will by the objective will is a secure place for the particular, subjective freedom of the individual. This is the freedom that has come into its own in modern times (PR 124R). The dialectical movement in the direction of concrete freedom for the individual is the theme of the Philosophy of Right. In Hegel's view, this movement is the movement of a merely subjective freedom acquiring for itself a rational, objective world. In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel introduces education as the means through which concrete freedom is realized. Concrete freedom for Hegel is "self-determining universality" (PR 21). And, Hegel states explicitly that "this growth of the universality of thought is the absolute value in education ..." (PR 20). For Hegel, the universal evolves from an abstract and external universality into a concrete and absolute universality as freedom itself become concrete. In the universal, as in absolute freedom, the contradiction of objective and subjective is no longer
debilitating. The will moves toward the condition of concrete freedom dialectically. In one of its most elementary forms the free will realizes itself in the world through the securing of property. But in so doing, this immediate, subjective will may not always correspond to the immediate, subjective will of another. Conflicts result and attempts to resolve these conflicts in contract and criminal law in turn help to build-up an objective world. Initial conflict resolutions, however, fall short of realizing universal freedom; fall short that is, in expressing the universal will that an objective order must attend to. Hegel explains, for example, how criminal law, while successfully annulling crime, nevertheless fails to meet the "demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and a subjective form ..." (PR 103).

The dialectical movement of freedom continues from its embodiment in abstract right (property, contract, etc.) to a stage of development Hegel calls Morality. Here the universal becomes characterized as "the good". But the good must be actualized - enter into the affairs of men - through a particular will (PR 130). This fact severs an individual conscience from the external world and makes of the good an abstract totality, another negative freedom in need of an objective determinate (PR 141). Because it does not want to see this new form of freedom dominated by an even more overbearing objective freedom, reason seeks again for a reconciliation of the particular and the universal will, subjective and objective freedom.
Having won theoretical recognition and practical expression, the principles of individual moral autonomy and legitimate self-interest (subjective will) could not be banished from the modern world. But only if they were properly, 'organically' incorporated into the ethical, civil, and political structure of modern society (objective will) would they be fully effective, lasting and beneficial. (Gloss, Mine)

For Hegel, this synthesis of objective and subjective will takes place in the sphere of concrete existence he calls Ethical Life, specifically, in the three moments of Ethical Life: the Family, Civil Society, and the State; or, when conceived in philosophical mediation, as the unity of "a family and a nation" (PR 157).

In ethical life, it is rational freedom that prevails. As the individual lives through the institutions of family and civil society, he reflects on the constitution of the state and, in accordance with reason, must discover and/or recover his true spiritual self. He recognizes himself as a free individual only within the context of ethical life (or, as we have been calling 'ethical life' up to this point, 'the state'). The idea of freedom becomes actualized and concrete in the state and, indeed, the "genuinely organized" (PR 160A) state is the precondition for the universal rights and liberties that have been won for man in the modern era. John Plamenatz sums up the true meaning of freedom in Hegel's political ideal and why Hegel puts so much stress on the social context of freedom:

As Hegel sees it, it is only as a social and moral being that man is free, that freedom has meaning and value for him, that he achieves it or makes progress towards it. This progress is both in the individual and in mankind, for they both move gradually ... toward
freedom; though the individual cannot have greater freedom than social and cultural conditions allow. 35

And, the social and cultural conditions of concrete freedom must be the result of the self-conscious efforts of the individuals in the state. As was stated in the beginning of this section the freedom to choose is an inferior conception of freedom because along with the freedom to choose there must also be the ability and the freedom to determine the available choices. Now, absolute control over available choices is never possible and Hegel is not pretending to be able to provide this kind of moral and physical autonomy. Culture and environment are given and all acts of the will must occur against the background of nature and history. Yet, out of all the lessons to be learned from the French Revolution - and Hegel draws our attention to many of them - one that certainly was not missed by Hegel was that when men bind themselves together for a common end, the restraints of nature and history seem petty indeed. Thus for Hegel, history proves that self-conscious individuals have the ability to at least shape out of the present the conditions for a future synthesis of subjective and objective freedom.

There is certainly an element of optimism in Hegel's theory of freedom: a faith in the overall forward movement of civilization and a willingness to credit individual men and women with what progress had already been made. For Hegel it is the power of man-made laws and social institutions which
guarantees not only deliverance from the terror of the arbitrary will but also substantial and meaningful individual participation in the making of these laws and the operation of these institutions. For Hegel, arbitrary freedom cannot, by itself, lead individuals to a community; and arbitrary freedom's dialectical antithesis, objective freedom cannot insure a community of free individuals. Hegel thus founded his community on a theory of social categories that "express the basic unities of selves and world in which members of a culture can and do acknowledge one another." The social categories are ethical relationships, (not ethical rules and principles) which "offer(s) a kind of rational reconstruction of a culture, explaining what kinds of social union there must be if the culture is to recognize and embody certain abstract ideals."

Hegel's solution to the problem of freedom in the modern world is, in one word, 'participation'. The participation spoken of here is participation of an individual personality possessing free will only, in the three moments of ethical life. As will be clear in chapters three and four of this paper, participation is, for Hegel, constitutive and educative of both the individual and society. In this way, participation solves the problem of freedom. Specifically, freedom becomes concrete and rational when the abstract ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are defined realistically; that is, "in a way that makes possible the constituting of institutions that allow for as much liberty, equality, and community as human beings in the modern world
can attain."^88 Freedom translated as 'participation' assumes the existence of individuals who freely choose this freedom. Accordingly, so that 'participation' is more than a hollow, or worse, a mindless acquiescence to a prevailing power structure, the view of freedom Hegel offers needs also to be supplemented by an understanding of individuality that is in keeping with the logic that determines his analysis of freedom.

We began this presentation of the historical and philosophical context of the Hegelian theory of the state with a survey of Hegelian misinformation. Nowhere has Hegel been more misunderstood than in this area of individuality. Corbett writes:

The absence of a close analysis of Hegel's concept of the individual may explain why the critical disputes over Hegel have see-sawed to the point where, as MacIntyre has said, a philosophical neophyte would have good reason to believe that there was more than one philosopher named Hegel.89

Moreover, it is Corbett's thesis that Hegel's concept of the individual is in the liberal tradition and that it shares liberalism's fundamental problem,^90 namely the problem of individuality vs. citizenship. Corbett's criticisms of the Hegelian individual will be considered later in this paper. For now, we are interested in showing that Hegel's treatment of individuality is responsive to the spirit of our modern view of the concept.

In the same way that Hegel is interested in showing the inadequacy of immediate will and abstract freedom, so too is
he unsatisfied with an unreflective concept of the individual. For Hegel, the true existential man is a composite of three beings. R.N. Berki put it this way:

There is man the Individual, with his own private consciousness, feelings, desires, thoughts, etc. Then man the Universal — member of a legal community in whom customary morality is internalized. But between them — and all the three faces are necessary — stands man the particular being, one who is less than the ethical whole but more than the Individual in that he is something concrete, definite, positive. Particularization is absolutely necessary in life .... Thus, one is not merely an Englishman, etc. but also a writer, bricklayer, etc.  

Berki explains that particularization is how a man actualizes himself. He accomplishes this in a social environment. Without the inescapable restrictions of society, the individual is unrealized and abstract.

There is, then, a sense in which it is true to say that Hegel does not believe in the sanctity of 'the individual'. He would argue that it is "potentially evil" (PR 139) to accept the individual man "with his wants, interests, and appetites as a given or to assume that men should take themselves as they find themselves." To put this kind of faith in the conscience of the individual and thereby hope that on the foundation of society's individual consciences a free and secure political community can survive is, again, according to Hegel, too great a risk. While agreeing that true conscience "is a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate," Hegel wants it made clear that the individual, subjective conscience does not have a monopoly on the knowledge of good and evil.
What is right and obligatory is the absolutely rational element in the will's volitions ... and its form is not that of feeling or any other private (i.e. sensuous) type of knowing, but essentially that of universals determined by thought, i.e. the form of laws and principles. Conscience is therefore subject to the judgment of its truth or falsity, and when it appeals only to itself for a decision, it is directly at variance with what it wishes to be, namely the rule for a mode of conduct which is rational, absolutely valid, and universal. For this reason, the state cannot give recognition to conscience in its private form as subjective knowing, any more than science can grant validity to subjective opinion, dogmatism, and the appeal to a subjective opinion. (PR 137R)

True conscience and hence the truth of the individual requires education through interaction with other consciences. True individuality, for Hegel, is the result of education (PR 151A).

It is of crucial importance at this juncture in the argument to point out that Hegel is not proposing that human nature is in need of reform. On the contrary, for Hegel, man, the self-conscious individual, does not come into full existence unless and until he is integrated with other self-conscious men. Because he holds that "there is no self-consciousness except where there is a plurality of self-conscious beings closely involved with one another," it follows for Hegel that there is also no truth in an isolated and therefore nascent individual conscience. It is not reform that is needed, merely development. In the beginning man has only "his empty potential freedom and his impulsive and appetitive nature." Hence, a critical consideration of individualism is necessary. A compromise
between the extremes of rabid individualism (cf. PR 187R) and the repressive totalitarianism of an absolute monarch requires a full understanding of individualism. A.S. Walton demonstrates that in Hegel's political and social theory "non-individualism does not entail anti individualism." Further, he credits Hegel with providing much of the groundwork for "a conception of the individual that recognizes the constitutive importance of the social context, but that does not regard it as wholly determining." 

Hegel was aware of the difficult task of achieving this compromise.

The state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own self-hood and it is stable only when public and private ends are identical. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of the citizens. That is perfectly true. If all is not well with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, if they do not find that the state as such is the means to their satisfaction, then the footing of the state itself is insecure. (PR 265A)

Moreover, Hegel realized that the rights of the individual needed to be protected. In the introduction to this paper, the human and civil rights guaranteed in Hegel's state were enumerated in a quotation from Henning Ottman. The state, through its constitutional laws, protects these rights and provides institutions for their expression in the realm of economics, social relations, and politics. And, further, ever aware that conflict is inevitable, (PR 200 and 214A) the laws
of the state are not to be considered immutable (PR 216 and 298A).

Incorporating Hegel's concept of individuality into the concept of freedom, Melvin Leibowitz offers the following summary:

The basic elements of Hegel's freedom are:
1) that it must occur in a society, a state, in which there are universals of thought and action i.e., a constitution, laws, rules, customs, norms, ethics, etc. These must be seen to apply to all individuals, and these individuals must be regarded as having the right to accept and act on them not, finally, due to coercion, but rather by virtue of endorsement or choice; 2) the individuals must see themselves as and being capable of accepting and acting on these norms, rules, etc., or not doing so, through their own endorsement, choice or subjectivity; and 3) a congruity or concordance between 1) and 2) is achieved, such that individuals realize or become conscious that the universals in the state embody that about themselves which expresses their own natures; thus, that to act on them is to act, not out of something alien, but out of themselves. Furthermore, the state comes to recognize that its essence, as it is expressed in its universals and their organization, is to embody the choices of individuals.

For Hegel, freedom and individuality are achievements. Education is the process through which freedom, individuality, and in fact, the state are achieved, that is, made actual and concrete. A closer study of Hegel's social and political theory will locate significant thematic strains in that theory which have a direct impact upon education. In Chapter Four, these themes are explicated in anticipation of Chapter Five, in which the structural arrangements of education in Hegel's state are explained.
CHAPTER FOUR

MAJOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEMES IN HEGEL
RELEVANT TO EDUCATION

We saw in the previous section that freedom and individuality could become actual only as a concrete social context. Hegel reconciles the freedom given to man by virtue of his naturally free will with the 'moral' freedom grounded in shared customs and institutions. He located this reconciliation, what he terms rational or concrete freedom, in a realm of practical philosophical speculation he calls "Ethical Life". Ethical Life is a stage of objective mind which a) overcomes the one-sidedness of abstract freedom, and the equally unrealistic egoism of self-centered morality which "contains no criterion ... for distinguishing the ethical fulfillment of obligations from arbitrary decisions or from blatant or concealed (even from oneself) willing of evil" and b) yet preserves the right of the individual to still act in accordance with self-interest while at the same time being assured that his rights as a person are recognized by the state and that his "livelihood and welfare be treated as a right, i.e., that particular welfare as such be so treated" (PR 230). The state of objective mind that has been 'overcome' and 'yet preserved' is called by Hegel 'Morality'. The action of overcoming and yet preserving is Hegel's difficult concept of **Aufheben**.

The movement from the stage of Morality (where, we remember, subjective and objective will co-existed but were
not reconciled) to the stage of ethical life is necessary because man can only be authentic - possess himself - in a specific community of ethics. As Ludwig Siep puts it: "For Hegel, the individual is never a tabula rasa who approaches a particular community with its customs and laws and then begins to analyze them." Such introspection is impossible because the "presuppositions of such maxims as 'one should not do X'" are to be found in the heritage of that community, in its "natural, social, and legal contents or institutions." So it is that, for Hegel, man is "directly linked to the ethical order by a relation which is more like an identity than even the relation of faith or trust" (PR 147).

But the identity of the individual with the ethical order is not immediately known to the individual. That is, the ethical order embodied by the community in its laws and institutions are first perceived as "an object over against the subject, and from his point of view they are - 'are' in the highest sense of self-subsistent being" (PR 146). They become known only in thought. Not, as we have said, thought equated with introspection; rather, thinking that has universality as its object. To achieve, then, the identity of the individual with the ethical order, the progression from particularity to universality is required. And, as well, in this movement from particularity to universality the individual grows into concreteness; the identity of the individual with ethical life is the goal and the reality of the will-as-freedom (PR 23).
It is this progression that Hegel calls education: "This growth of the universality of thought is the absolute value in education" (PR 20).

The introduction of universality, the stress now put on the community in which the individual "participates as a member" obviously shifts, or as Taylor expresses it, "displaces the centre of gravity ... from the individual onto the community ..." Hegel collects the ideas presented here in Paragraph 153 of the Philosophy of Right:

The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical order, because their conviction of their freedom finds its truth in such an objective order, and it is in an ethical order that they are actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner universality ....

And in the Remark that follows this Paragraph in the Philosophy of Right Hegel affirms the connection between the education of the individual and the state: "When a father inquired about the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied: 'Make him a citizen of a state with good laws' (PR 153R).

In the unpacking of this little anecdote we find some very important ingredients of Hegel's political philosophy and philosophy of education mixed together. To begin with, by 'ethical conduct' Hegel does not mean moral education as it is usually understood by educators. This remark occurs in the introductory analysis of Hegel's treatment of ethical life. 'Ethical conduct' therefore, refers to the identity of
the individual with the ethical order, that is, the free and final product of man's development: the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity. Only the 'citizen' can be said to have achieved this reconciliation. And, furthering the elucidation, it should be noted that for Hegel, citizens are made, not born. Citizens create themselves after a difficult internal struggle between instinct and intellect (PR 151A). The 'father' as the living representative of the identity of subjectivity and objectivity (that is, universality become concrete in ethical life and its three moments: family, civil society, and state) symbolizes the instrument through which the 'son' will become a citizen/man.

Viewing the citizen as the aim of education recalls the shift from individual to community to which we drew attention earlier. The state, rooted in the family and civil society, is to be the ultimate community, concrete universality. We need, therefore, to get a clearer picture of the state and establish its relation to the individual, to freedom and to education. The order of our exposition of the three moments of ethical life will thus be 1) the state, 2) the family, 3) civil society.

The precedence the state takes over the individual must not be viewed either as a means-end relation or a superior/inferior dichotomy. If a metaphor is needed, the state should be compared to a living organism with which it shares three characteristics. Like the hand or the brain's
relation to the organism, it "is not voluntary, arbitrary or revocable"; also, it involves "development in time ... in which both (all) the parts and the whole participate"; and finally, "there is an internal - rather than external or mechanistic - relationship of parts to whole." Hence, the state and the individual come into being together.

The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through cooperation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end. (PR 260)

The state must, of course, express its will through law. It shares the same ground as the individual by virtue of the fact that it (the state) is also not above the law. Moreover, the conjunction of the law and the citizens is an organic one:

Thus a law is valid in the state inasmuch as it is ethical and it is ethical inasmuch as it is rational, and it is rational inasmuch as it expresses the interests and moral values of the people; i.e. inasmuch as it is conducive to human freedom... Accordingly, this sort of law is not static but dynamic for it remains a living expression of the will of the people.

Finally, in contrast to competing political theories, Hegel's state is neither reducible to traditional contract theories of the state nor the more modern conservative and liberal utilitarian theories of the state founded solely on the voluntary consent of "atomistic" individuals pursuing their own economic well-being.
Consistent with the metaphor of the state as an organism, it is education that sustains the state and keeps it and the individual from slipping back to a condition of unrealized formal freedom which isolates a man and leaves him but a step away from the brutality or indifference of his natural state. As Hegel says on this matter:

To have no interest except in one's formal right may be pure obstinacy, often a fitting accompaniment of a cold heart and restricted sympathies... It is uncultured people who insist most on their rights, while noble minds look on other aspects of the thing. (PR 37A)

Education in a political state founded solely on the natural rights of man is characterized by Peter Stillman as restrictive and conducive to "depoliticization". Stillman writes: "the education that does occur is either education that makes the citizen more 'Industrious and Rational,' i.e., more eager to work and better able to calculate, than he was, or education that is peripheral to life's central concerns." Hegel argues against treating education as a mere means to procuring economic success and "the pleasures and comforts of private life" (PR 187 R). He challenged the view that the end of education should be the "attainment of marketable skills." Rather, education should aim to free man from his natural self-centeredness and raise his "subjectivity to a recognition of the rationality underpinning the social institutions of society." The final purpose of education, therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still; education is the absolute transition from an
ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form. (PR 187 R)

Finally, the educational connection between the individual and the state must be such that a dialogue of sorts is possible. The equating of ‘freedom’ with ‘participation’ argued for above must be made concrete. The interaction of state and citizen in Hegel’s political theory is summarized by Moran as follows:

There is thus a mediated relationship – the state as educator raises the consciousness of its citizens through the creation of a rational legal system and the development of a new morality based on the freedom of the individual. However, the state must justify its actions to the public through rational arguments put forth in the open arena of the Estates Assemblies where “one shrewd idea devours another” (PR 315 A). 116

Of course, Hegel was not the first political philosopher to recognize the educative function of laws. Aristotle also discusses the positive relationship between the moral character of a state and its constitution and laws. 117 Also, like Hegel, Aristotle acknowledges the role of the family in education, both philosophers seeing it as an integral component in the development of the state. And, although a comparison of the educational philosophies of Aristotle and Hegel would be instructive, beginning as it would with their respective considerations of the family, it is to Hegel’s theory of the family – the first moment in ethical life – that our discussion must now move.
The Family is the first "ethical root of the state" (PR 255). For this reason, its analysis logically precedes the state. Nevertheless, according to Hegel, the modern family depends upon the prior existence of the state. It should be obvious why this is so: the three moments of ethical life exist in a unity as well as a unity-in-opposition "whose highest expression is the constitution of the state." Consequently, the family must provide the community with whatever service it can in their shared aim of actualizing freedom. Its distinctiveness lies in the fact that "it provides its members with experiences that are not available in other institutions":

for the parents, feeling, intimacy, and love; manifest and substantial community; and recognized particularity and subjectivity; for the children, all those, plus education to autonomy, reason, freedom, and culture, towards citizenship, life in civil society, and marriage.

Although the state protects the family, it should not be viewed as an instrument of the state. Its uniqueness and separateness from the other moments of ethical life can be seen in the types of bonds which exist in each sphere of ethical life. In the relationship between the individual and the state we characterized the bond as organic. And, it will be seen that the relationships between individuals in civil society are mainly contractual and/or motivated by self-interest. But in the family, Hegel makes it clear that the members are bound together by love.
Hegel gives his definition of love in an addition to the opening paragraph of the section dealing with the family in the *Philosophy of Right*:

Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as a renunciation of my independence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me. (PR 158A)

An institution based on love could not, unfortunately, be depended upon to secure the state by itself; hence, it is only one of two ethical roots of the state. Moreover, one would have to question Hegel's understanding of love if he intended the family to serve merely as an instrument for political socialization. But this is not the case in Hegel's theory of the family. "The family is a partial sector of the political world, but it cannot be reduced completely to the logic of political or economic relationships." Based as it is on feeling and sentiment, Hegel did not expect that it could satisfy all the needs of reason and concrete freedom.

Nevertheless, the educative import of the family is significant enough for Hegel to charge it with a two-fold educational task. On the one hand, the marriage partners themselves are raised to a higher level of ethical awareness. First, marriage is a public institution and participation in it transforms the private sentiment of love into something tending toward universality. (PR 161A). Second, marriage draws the individuals into the realm of moral objectivity
through the partners willingness to share their property and to share responsibility for the welfare of their children. In these ways the "basic ethical ideal becomes rooted in their consciousness and the unanimity of love, trust, and service for others which marriage requires has a lasting effect upon each partner." On the other hand, the child also benefits from the educative influence of the family. Similar to the effect of family life on the parents, the child too must be raised to a consciousness of universality. That is, the child must become what he is in truth.

"Children are potentially free and their life directly embodies nothing save potential freedom" (PR 175). It is based on this principle that Hegel charges parents to govern the behavior of the child according to

the positive aim of instilling ethical principles into him in the form of immediate feeling ... (and) the negative aim of raising children out of the instinctive, physical level on which they are originally, to the self-subsistence and freedom of personality and so to the level on which they have power to leave the natural unity of the family. (PR 175)

Hegel is not very specific on the manner in which children are educated in the family. To present an adequate picture of what is involved, it is necessary to piece together statements in the Philosophy of Right which are, as educational propositions, rather vague and at the same time are also unhappily somewhat provocative. The position that I am arguing here is that when all is said and done, the education
of children in the family is an essential but nevertheless, simple process of superintending the growth of feeling in young children.

It is the simplicity of this form of education which excludes it from the discussion of the network of educational institutions which will concern us in chapter five. Hegel, in three additions to separate paragraphs in the Philosophy of Right that present an analysis of the family, suggests that discipline producing a "feeling of subordination" must be imparted to children and that this is primarily the task of the mother who has herself been educated "who knows how? As it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge" (PR 174A, 175A, 166A). Ignoring for the moment the obvious charge of sexism, it would seem to be clear from this that the education provided within the family itself is not much different from what the common usage of the term 'rearing' suggests. It should not be forgotten, though, that Hegel nowhere even implies that this first stage of the child's education is any less necessary than later, more structured stages (cf. PR 175R).

(As regards the possibility of leveling a charge of sexism against Hegel, the reader should understand that Hegel's attitude toward women is far too complex to be discussed tangentially in a paper about education. Concerning the education of women, this issue is explicitly addressed only once in the Philosophy of Right, in an addition to section 167. Nevertheless, the
reader is reminded that none of Hegel's prescriptions about education in the Philosophy of Right directly or indirectly exclude women.)

Bernard Cullen has pointed out that since Hegel is so "desperately seeking social harmony" then it would seem reasonable to "look for that harmony in the direction of the family, as the most closely knit social unit..." But, as Cullen goes on to show, it is not possible for the modern family to discharge this function because its universality is "unreflective." And to change that, as Plato tried to do in the Republic, would violate the subjective freedom that also finds expression in love. Now, as we have seen, subjective freedom, although necessary in the dialectic of concrete freedom, is not Hegel's favorite freedom. However, it is nevertheless the case that subjective freedom is, in Hegel's own words, "the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times." It is "the right of the subject's particularity, his right to be satisfied..." (PR 124R). The family must be only a "transitory stage" therefore, and its dissolution in a "plurality of families" (PR 181) is both necessary and proper. Consequently, the individual's right to the satisfaction of his subjective freedom is actualized in the next moment of ethical life, civil society, "the achievement of the modern world..." (PR 182A).

'Civil society' is where Hegel legitimizes the rat race. While it may seem that what Hegel is doing is simply acquiescing,
to man's incorrigible selfishness, this is only half true. Its element of truth lies in the fact that the realities of nature do demand from the individual a certain degree of possessiveness. No amount of philosophizing can change that very much. Hegel uses an apt biological metaphor to describe what happens in civil society to the project he had set for man.

Here ethical life is split into its extremes and lost; the immediate unity of the family has fallen apart into a plurality. Reality here is externality, the decomposing of the concept.... (PR 117A)

Here each man is his own end and other men are the means by which the individual satisfies his "totality of wants" (PR 182). But right here, the philosopher recognizes the immanent truth of universality: if reason were not operative in this world of dog eat dog there would be at best only one dog left. Yet this is not the case, for

In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends ... there is formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. (PR 183)

Where one would expect to find chaos, we find instead a system, a proto-state, "the state based on need" (PR 183).

Hegel's concept of civil society, probably more than any other aspect of his political theory, has been the subject of much study. We cannot hope to do justice to its strengths (or its weaknesses - though in the opinion of this writer they are not significant) in a paper of this length. Schmidt's
summary is instructive for our purposes in that it draws
attention to the two principles that operate in civil society.
As Schmidt describes it, civil society

is an overly abstract and limited conception of the
state which is unable to grasp the essential attributes
of political life and instead focuses on certain
'external' aspects: the exchange of goods in a market,
under the protection of a system of civil law, with
certain welfare functions carried out by public and
private agencies (the 'police' and the
'corporations').

So, besides being an arena for economic activity per se, civil
society is also the stage wherein the individual encounters
many of the social institutions which develop freedom, among
them, educational institutions. Stillman writes:

Individuals become free ... in civil society through
their liberation from the domination of nature and
their natural being and their cultivation and
acculturation (Bildung) to a fully developed,
intellectual, universal, and objective frame of
mind.

This freedom that civil society offers to its members is
embodied first in property. Civil society transforms what for
Hegel is first the abstract right of property into the subjective
right of property and upward to the social right of property.
(PR 33A and 189). Property becomes actual as a result of labor
"in a system of interdependence in which my labor depends on
the labor of all to be productive." Work then, is a further
moment of liberation for Hegel and is directly linked with both
theoretical education and practical education (PR 197). A.W.
Vincent and Michael George have written one of the most recent
studies of Hegel and education and we have already had reason
to refer to it above. They, however, locate theoretical education in the school and place the school in a sort of limbo between the family and civil society. This directly contradicts Hegel's placing of theoretical education in civil society proper and specifically in the sections in which he discusses work and class divisions (PR 197 and 201). Hegel does not place the school in any one particular moment of ethical life. Still, it is possible to discover where precisely schooling occurs and this will be one of the tasks of the following sections of this paper.

After property and labor, and following directly from them, a further embodiment of freedom in civil society is class. It is not necessary here to discuss each of Hegel's three classes separately for they all are intended to fulfill the same purpose: growth of consciousness and social integration. To understand the purposes which Hegel sets for membership in a class it is important to remember that he did not define classes in terms of relationship to the means of production, but rather to types of work, the general skills required for its performance, and the kind of ethos or consciousness which it produces among those who perform these tasks.

This notion of class takes us beyond the consideration of mere property as the basis for class distinction and suggests that Hegel's division of classes is more of a "cultural rather than an economic" separation.

Hegel does not select for the individual the class to which he must belong (PR 206). He recognizes that there is
even a tendency - "especially in youth" - to 'chafe' at the thought of having to apply oneself in one "social position" (PR 207R). Nevertheless, to be a "somebody", Hegel insists that man must enter a class (PR 207A), though his decision as to which class and which vocation will finally rest on his own "subjective opinion" (PR 206).\textsuperscript{33}

All classes are educative in that the individual by virtue of his membership in a class, "learns ... to take into account a wider and wider range of values" and "will come not only to have a sense of solidarity with others, but will also learn to take into account the claims and desires of others in forming his own intentions and purposes."\textsuperscript{34} But to be fully educative, class membership must not be such that its effect is to emasculate the individual's future. That is to say, an "unreflective commitment" to the status quo would not be in keeping with Hegel's professed concern with the "freely determined personal goals and projects of individual subjects."\textsuperscript{35} Hegel will not be misunderstood as promoting rigid class mentalities if it is recognized, as A.S. Walton argues, that, for Hegel, a "community constitutes a medium which is drawn upon by individuals, which is a source of their obligations, and which is reconstituted through their use of it."\textsuperscript{36} Further, Hegel notes the power of education to modify the characteristics of a class and for developing in its members the "power of reflection" (PR 203R).
Up to this point in the discussion of civil society, we have claimed that property, work, and class are embodiments of freedom and, consequently, have educational aspects. Yet, because property, work, and class are concepts developed by Hegel in order to show his concern for particularity, their connection with education has been essentially private and indirect. A direct, prescriptive agency of education is to be found in Hegel's concept of the corporation and to a lesser extent, the public authority or 'police'. But, as these constitute most of the formal organization of schooling in Hegel's state, they are the subject of the next section of this paper.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE HEGELIAN EDUCATIONAL MATRIX

To be consistent with Hegel's social and political philosophy, the concepts of individuality and particularity emphasised up to now, must be brought into line with the equally important Hegelian concept of community. To stress as we have the freedom of the individual in civil society, makes of civil society a community of contingent ends only. The freedom guaranteed in such a community, Hegel says, is an incomplete freedom. As well, an education which would concentrate on supplying to individuals the ways and means for personal satisfaction only would have two consequences. First, such an education would contribute to individual isolation and alienation, and second, by failing to establish and/or reinforce the social, would put at risk the existence of the community itself. Civil society, in other words, if left to itself, is subject to a "necessity more akin to nature than to the spiritual realm of freedom." Although a community of merely private ends - an indirect community - is a necessary condition of full community, more important still is a conscious and deliberate acknowledgement of the universal ends of mankind. To bring the universal back into civil society, Hegel recognizes the need to impose controls upon civil society through the establishment of positive law (PR 209-229). But a legal system is not enough and Hegel admits that provisions must yet be made "against contingencies still lurking" in civil society (PR 188).
Now, Bernard Cullen as we have seen claims that all of Hegel's philosophy "is motivated by a desire for harmony in human experience." He further writes that Hegel's quest for harmony between the individual and the community "was prompted by what he saw as the lack of solidarity in modern, individualistic, commercial society ...." If these readings of Hegel are accurate - and there is no reason to think they are not - then we must indeed balance our earlier concentration on the individual in civil society by considering also the elements of harmony and community that Hegel expects civil society to be able to provide. It is the recognition of these disparate strains occurring in civil society that leads a writer such as Shlomo Avineri to speak of the 'paradox' of civil society:

side by side with the elements of universal strife and unending clash which are of the nature of civil society, there is according to Hegel another element inherent in it which strongly limits and inhibits self-interest and transcends what would otherwise be a universal atomism into a sphere of solidarity and mutuality.

We have discussed in earlier sections of this paper, Hegel's claim that the development of the individual can only take place in a social context, in a community of self-conscious individuals, who, through reason, have moved from particularity
to universality. As well, we have argued that Hegel bases his idea of community on a theory of social categories that formalize the relationships that individuals enter into along the way from particularity to universality. We need now to look closely at those specific relationships which are meant to fulfill the requirements of formal education in Hegel's state.

In Chapter Four of this paper, the order of the exposition of the three moments of ethical life is the state, then the family, and finally, civil society. But the theme of our discussion of the state in that same section is that the metaphor which best expresses the inter-connectedness of state and individual is the comparison of the state to a living organism. The state, in other words, does not exist external to the other moments of ethical life. It is not to be seen, as Avineri shows, as "the arbiter standing above the contending forces of civil society...." Rather, the political state is "prefigured" in the mediation that occurs in the institutions of civil society and the family. As a consequence of this very important distinction "the 'purely political' state according to Hegel is ultimately a very minimalist state." It is for these reasons that the state proper, as a "self-dependent organism" (PR 259), has very little direct impact upon the education of its members. The state, indeed, is only conscious in the minds of its citizens after they have passed through the education system itself (PR 270). Except for the educative value of the public debates in the Estates Assembly,
the state performs no overt educational function in Hegel's political theory. While the state, through a ministry of education (PR 290), will take upon itself the tasks of expressing the universal ends of education, the straight-forward administration of the educational system will be in the hands of officials more closely aligned with the institutions of civil society. Preeminent among these institutions of civil society are the "Public Authority" and the "Corporations" (PR 230-256).

The Public Authority, or as Hegel also calls it, the 'Police' is charged with the responsibility of making the state's "universal interest" overbalance the particular aims of the other institutions of civil society (PR 287). It was pointed out above that the state has very little direct impact on education. This is important to remember in order that the role of the public authority not be misunderstood. In fact, it is only because civil society "tears the individual from his family ties" and subjects him to "dependence" and "contingency" (PR 238) that an external power becomes necessary. The term itself - 'Public Authority' - has a broader application than what is meant by the word in English. Besides education, the Public Authority in Hegel's state regulate public utilities, consumer goods in "absolutely universal daily demand" (PR 236), major industries (by virtue of the fact that they respond to conditions beyond the knowledge and control of those who work for them) and public health and welfare concerns. Its
precise connection with the political state is that its authority is secured in the state’s constitution, vested in the hands of civil servants who make up the executive, and answerable, finally to the monarch at the head of the political state as well as the Estates Assemblies which themselves emerge directly from the institutions of civil society.

In the sections devoted to "the state" Hegel repeats again and again the organic nature of the hierarchical structure of the political state:

Division of labor (see Paragraph 198) occurs in the business of the executive also... (a) civil life shall be governed in a concrete manner from below where it is concrete... (b) none the less the business of government shall be divided into its abstract branches manned by special officials as different centres of administration, and further that (c) the operations of these departments shall converge again when they are directed on civil life from above.... (PR 290; cf. also, PR 295)

In the matter of education, the Public Authority guarantee the child’s "right to receive not merely any type of education but the right education in which he grows in mind and moral stature...."[46] Although cognizant of the difficulty that exists in sorting out the rights of parents from the rights of society in the matter of education, Hegel avers finally that society’s right is "paramount over the arbitrary and contingent preferences of parents ..." (PR 239). Normally, a child’s education is to be financed by his family (PR 174). Where this is not possible, the public authority takes the place of the family (PR 241).
To summarize the activity of the Public Authority in education we have noted the following points:

(1) the purpose of education being the growth of the universality of thought, it is the responsibility of the Police as an "external state" (ENC. 534) to protect against the sometimes rampant particularity of individuals and institutions in civil society;

(2) while not reaching into the actual day-to-day administration of educational activities, the Police represent the interests of the political state and the projects of the executive of which it is a part;

(3) where parents fail, for one reason or another, to fulfill their obligations in all matters of education entrusted to them (not only financial) the Public Authority take on the burden of securing the child’s transition into civil society.

The policy of affirmative action as it is practiced in some western states today shares some similarities with Hegel's notion of the Police, or public authority. 147

Lest this last statement be taken to suggest that Hegel is marshalling arguments in support of modern liberal democracies, the reader is reminded that the Philosophy of Right attacks the democratic principle of one man, one vote, and, furthermore, propounds a theory of constitutional monarchy. Moreover, Hegel recognizes the need to prevent the centralization of power in the state apparatus (PR 290A). In addition, the
executive is closely linked to the Estates Assemblies (PR 300A) and subject to the criticism which public debate encourages (PR 301R). Clearly, then the minimalist state is characteristic of Hegel's political theory. That is, civil society is still guaranteed the chance of providing individuals with the opportunity to pursue private and public ends together with the satisfaction of knowing that their achievements are the result of their own inspiration and effort as well as the means for and the sign of their own personal freedom.

Theoretically, the medium in which individual actions occur is the community; in practice, for Hegel, voluntary associations - "the second ethical root of the state" (after the family) - are the actual centres "round which the unorganized atoms of civil society revolve" (PR 255 and R). One of the major distinguishing features of Hegel's political philosophy is the emphasis given to these associations, without which the convergence of particular and universal ends cannot be accomplished. Under the general heading of 'Corporation', Hegel includes commercial, professional, religious, and municipal organizations. (A commercial 'corporation' includes both employers and employees.) Their existence, Hegel says, is guaranteed by the constitution (PR 265) and their function "is to come on the scene like a second family for (their) members" (PR 252). Thus, education, which began in the natural family, continues in these second families: corporate bodies give to life in civil society the security and other-directedness
which is essential to the development of the full personality, on the one hand; and, as well, lead individual men to consciousness of their place in the state.

The exact age at which one enters the corporate world is not specified in the Philosophy of Right. However, Hegel's aversion to "withdrawing children from the common life of everyday" (PR 153A), and his disparaging comment regarding "the play theory of education" which works against the child's natural "desire to belong to the adult world" (PR 175R) would seem to suggest that formal education under the auspices of a corporation should begin before adolescence. In the Encyclopedia (396A), Hegel discusses a condition he calls 'hypochondria' which strikes a young person who cannot easily make the transition from the ideal life of the family to the practical life of civil society. This disease, he argues, can strike anyone and is the more serious the later it is encountered. Certainly then, for Hegel, the corporation which is expressly charged with the responsibility of providing "the education requisite to fit others to become members" (PR 252) must begin to play a part in the life of the youth at an early age.

The content of the education provided by corporations takes two forms. In the first instance, this education takes the form of theoretical and practical instruction and exercise. This is what Hegel conceives of as the education of the understanding, a mental stage preceding and preparatory to pure rationality. Civil society, as we have already seen, is a moment
on the road to the state, the state being the actuality of reason and the rational. The understanding is only a "show of rationality" (PR 189) but none the less necessary. The development of the understanding reconciles the rational will (desire, caprice, etc.) with external things. This concept brings us back to Hegel's remark that the final purpose of education is "liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still" (PR 187R). Hegel specifies the objectives of theoretical and practical education thus:

The multiplicity of objects and situations which excite interest is the stage on which theoretical education develops. This education consists in possessing not only a multiplicity of ideas and facts, but also a flexibility and rapidity of mind, ability to pass from one idea to another, to grasp complex and general relations, and so on. It is education of the understanding in every way, and also the building up of language. Practical education, acquired through working, consists first in the automatically recurrent need for something to do and the habit of simply being busy; next, in the strict adaptation of one's activity according not only to the nature of the material worked on, but also, and especially, to the pleasure of other workers; and finally, in a habit, produced by this discipline, of objective activity and universally recognized aptitudes. (PR 197)

Whether the school is attached to municipal or commercial corporate organizations (something Hegel does not specify), the immediate aim of this education is to fit the individual into a social class (PR 201), whose educative characteristics were outlined in Chapter Four of this paper. Hegel makes the point clear that corporate membership allows one to enter any class for which one is qualified, including the class of civil
By not choosing to enter the class of civil servants in no way excludes the individual from participation in the universal affairs of the state, however. The significance of this fact brings us to the second form of education which corporations provide: political education in public affairs. The public character of the work of corporations (PR 255A) has a two-fold educative impact. The practical experience of managing the affairs of a corporation is one way in which its members translate what superficially appear as self-centred actions into efforts on behalf of all members of the state. That is, corporate behavior has the "social" and psychological function of re-integrating a society of atomized individuals." We see then why Hegel speaks of the corporation as the "second ethical root of the state." The second component of the two-fold educational impact of corporate activity is the growth of patriotism which Hegel defines as "the sentiment which, in the relationships of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognizes that the community is one's substantive groundwork and end" (PR 268R). Through these two educative roles the corporation mediates the particularity of civil society and the rationality of the state.

There is also a formal connection between the corporation and the political state which serves to reinforce the organic nature of Hegel's political theory. In the first place, Hegel reserves for the state proper the power to ratify the elected
leadership of corporations (PR 288). While this connection is essentially indirect, the more substantial constitutional right of corporations to elect deputies (whose election is not subject to higher ratification) to the legislative branch of the government (the Estates) where they "deliberate and decide on public affairs" (PR 309) secures for members of corporations a voice in the state proper (see especially PR 302).

The concept of the corporation as integral to the organization of a state is not a uniquely Hegelian notion. Corporatism had its origins in Roman law and, as well, was a practice of the early Catholic Church and some medieval states. Likewise, Hegel was aware of controversies surrounding the existence of corporations that occurred during his own lifetime (PR 255A and 290A). Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the developmental purposes of associations in his analysis of early American society and, finally, bringing us up to our own time and our concerns with education, John Dewey promoted "corporateness" as a natural way for humans to channel their activity. Levi makes plain the similarities in Dewey's, George Herbert Mead's, the pragmatists and Hegel's thinking on this subject:

What is at stake here is (the) insight... that the self-realization of the individual, indeed, even his self-constitution, is itself only truly possible within a concrete organization of other individuals united in the social bond.

Whether historically legitimate or not, Hegel's reliance upon the corporation to provide for full individual development
and meaningful individual activity has been all but ignored by those educational theorists who have claimed familiarity with Hegel's philosophy of education. It would seem that, as theory, Hegel's corporatism is ripe for further analysis in order to see if in fact Hegel's account of Subjective Spirit as it relates to education is also compatible with his view of the corporation. It is enough for the purpose of our argument here to claim that, as one of many institutions in which freedom and, more importantly, education for freedom, is to come into its own, the corporation is critical. By way of conclusion, we will first review the argument of the preceding chapters that freedom is indeed made actual in Hegel's state and then turn our attention to the private life of the individual.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

We have argued that Hegel's theory of the state is founded upon the principle of freedom and, further, that the aim of education is the empowerment of individuals for free selfhood in an objective world built-up through self-conscious participation in quasi-independent institutions. In a survey of these institutional arrangements in Hegel's state, we have met with a consistent and coherent network of educational activities - beginning in the family, through to the Estates Assemblies. As well, it has been claimed that Hegel shows an abiding appreciation of the need for individual latitude in the three moments of ethical life.

In Chapter Four of this paper (Major Social and Political Themes in Hegel Relevant to Education) special attention was paid to the philosophical connection of the developing individual with Hegel's theory of the state. In the fifth chapter, (The Hegelian Educational Matrix) we drew attention to the actual structures which secure this connection. Of the two institutions which serve this end - the Public Authority (or police) and the Corporation - we have held that the latter is the most influential. To conclude this paper without relating what has been said in these last chapters to the major theme announced in Chapter Three, namely, Hegel's notion of freedom, would be to misrepresent the role of these structural components in Hegel's theory.
There should be no need, however, to further justify the external machinery of Hegel's state as it pertains to education. Its legitimacy is to be found first, in the constitution of the state (PR 272-274) and, second, in the organic network of institutional interactions which Hegel includes in his theory. Yet another guarantee against tyranny and despotism is provided by Hegel's acknowledgement (albeit given grudgingly) of the rights of public opinion and freedom of public communication (PR 318-319).

More contentious than the possibility of an unfair balance of power affecting education in the operation of the political system, is the possibility of the erosion of freedom and individuality that might result from too much emphasis being placed on the 'melting' of particularity into the absolute of the state. For example, Hegel asserts that public and private ends should be "identical" (PR 205A). But it is one thing to say that the "law of reason should be shot through and through by the law of particular freedom" (PR 265A) and another thing to actually bring about this state of affairs in the life of the citizen. An education that promotes sameness and pays only lip-service to diversity would, naturally, find few adherents. And an education that dignifies duty to the "whole," at the expense of the right to self-cultivation would, at the very least, lead to a nation of more alienated than actualized citizens - a potential problem with which, it must be said, Hegel was not unacquainted. 153
Earlier in this paper (Chapter Three) reference was made to the criticisms of Peter Corbett of Hegel's theory of the individual. Corbett writes:

Not only does Hegel share a concept of the individual with the liberal tradition, but his inability to reconcile his possessive concept of the individual with his concept of citizenship shows that he shares liberalism's fundamental problem of reconciling a theory of the individual sufficiently inclusive as to insure individual rights with a theory of obligation sufficiently strong as to make a political order possible.

Now traditional criticisms of Hegel on this same question have been the opposite of Corbett's; namely, that the individual citizen is swallowed up by the state. These traditional criticisms have made much of such statements as "This substantial unity (i.e. the state)... has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state" (PR 258) and "The march of God in the world, that is what the state is" (PR 258A). Clearly then, the past century of Hegelian scholarship is not without its ironies.

One obvious solution to these contradictions is, of course, to grant each side an element of truth and then resolve the issue with a recognition of an essential tension in Hegel's political theory which, it would follow, thus allows for the possibility of at least as much individual freedom as can be expected in any state more highly organized than the state of nature. This might make Hegel's theory of the state immune to a strident attack from either direction but it would also reduce to pedantry all sincere efforts to understand, much less
promote, Hegel's - or any political theorist's - philosophy. So, rather than exploit the possibility of an unresolved tension in Hegel's theory, we will approach this issue of effective/ineffective/too effective mediation by drawing-out two specific underlying elements that we will call here the Axiom of Reason and the Theoretical Presupposition. Both elements work together to secure a reading of Hegel's educational propositions that effectively summarizes the intersection of state and individual, as well as further clarifying the position of education in the state.

Hegel's philosophy does not merely assume that reason is the unequivocal arbiter of truth for man. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to follow his argument that reason is what Hegel claims it is. We will accept this as an axiom of his political theory. Richard Schacht in "Hegel on Freedom" clarifies the importance of reason in Hegel's view of freedom thus:

A person is free for Hegel as for Kant, if and only if the 'determining ground' of his practical decisions is nothing external to reason itself. Human freedom, therefore, is to be conceived not simply in terms of the self-determination of one's actions in accordance with one's will, but rather in terms of their rational self-determination, or determination in accordance with a will the principle of which is a law of thought rather than a law of mere nature. 155

Schacht continues by showing that Hegel further argued that reason is not simply "a natural inclination" limited by one's willingness or unwillingness to universalize it, as Kant believed (according to Hegel). Rather, Hegel emphasized that
reason "can and does give rise to laws the content as well as the form of which derive from it itself." Finally, then, for Hegel, laws and institutions likewise give expression to man's inherently rational essence. In turn, these laws and institutions form the substance of a state. When an individual is able to perceive his essential being as rational and the laws and institutions of his state as springing from this same essence, his duty to his state is a duty to his essential being. Consequently, his freedom is to be found in the ends of the state which are public, i.e., his and every other citizen's ends.

Unremarked upon up to this point is the crucial presupposition that Hegel is enumerating the characteristics of a "genuinely organized" state (PR 260A). In the Philosophy of Right Hegel repeatedly draws attention to immature states (cf. 270A, 280A, 295R, 299R) and points up their failings, that is, where precisely they fall short of his deliberations of the "philosophic science of the state" (PR 258R). In the absolutely rational state that is the subject of the Philosophy of Right the dichotomy of individual and citizen is elevated into an actual unity. The engine of this mediation is, of course, reason, a process that Hegel, in another text and context calls 'the cunning of reason', whose purpose is to unite dichotomies. Not a unity, it must be seen, in which differences disappear, but, rather, a unity in which differences work toward a single end. A state that is able to achieve this unity and give place to the full freedom expected by the
individual will meet the conditions Hegel sets forth in a crucial paragraph (quoted here in its entirety) in his introduction to the state as the culminating moment of ethical life:

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the co-operation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end. The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself. (PR 260)

Implicit in this passage from the Philosophy of Right is the expectation that one of the conditions that must be fostered by an absolutely rational state is the conscious adoption of the state's ends as my own ends. As Schacht makes clear, "Hegel holds that action is truly free only if it involves self-determination that is not only rational but also self-conscious. If one's self-determination in accordance with one's rational nature does not take place consciously... it has the character of a blind and mindless necessity."157 It is only here, perhaps,
that the many statements describing the purpose and value of education made by Hegel in the *Philosophy of Right* will have their full impact:

This growth of the universality of thought is the absolute value in education. (PR 20)

Education is the art of making men ethical. It begins with pupils whose life is at an instinctive level and shows them the way to a second birth.... (PR 151A)

When a father inquired about the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied: 'Make him a citizen of a state with good laws.' (PR 153R)

The final purpose of education, therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation still; education is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form. (187R)

But this very substantiality of the state is mind knowing and willing itself after passing through the forming process of education. (PR 270)

We have maintained that the forming process of education takes place in the institutions of the family and civil society, especially in the voluntary associations of the latter. Further, it is alleged that the organic structure of the state guarantees interaction and participation by all members of the state. (As George Armstrong Kelly writes, "Hegelian politics is a healthy circulatory system and not an inert pousse-café." 158) In accordance with what we have called Hegel's axiom that true freedom entails rational self-determination, and the presupposition that Hegel is speaking of the absolutely rational
state when he speaks of the unity of particular and universal ends, we have thus observed that Hegel's theory of the state, far from 'melting' the individual into a seamless absolute, does rather develop individuality at the same time that it develops citizens.

Before concluding this chapter, there is yet the question of an individual's 'personal life' to be dealt with. By 'personal life' we refer to those matters that can be described loosely as things one does not expect to have to render unto Caesar. It is possible that the emphasis placed on the public life of the individual in the corporation may leave with the reader the mistaken impression that Hegel's political theory does not give sufficient scope to the spiritual and/or non-material concerns of the individual. The reader can be forgiven for failing to understand Hegel on this question due mainly to the fact that, as explained in the introduction of this paper, it has been our intention to present Hegel's political and social thought separate from his speculative metaphysics as a whole. That part of his philosophy that has been described up to now Hegel calls Objective Spirit, which is a middle term between Hegel's philosophy of Subjective Spirit before it and Absolute Spirit following it. Individual growth and development span all three phases of Hegel's philosophy. But rather than attempt to summarize what has here been neglected, we can return to the Philosophy of Right where Hegel does in fact write of "the right of the subjective freedom of self-
consciousness, the sphere of the inner life, which as such is not the domain of the state" (PR 270R).

The "as such" in the preceding quotation from the Philosophy of Right is not insignificant. In a footnote to the remark just quoted from, Hegel points out that "Religion, knowledge and science have as their principle a form peculiar to each and different from that of the state." He continues, however, to show that the principles of the state do have a bearing on them. They are "means to education and (a higher) mentality" but still "are in essence ends in themselves." Explicit support is made as well (in another of Hegel's notes to this remark) to the granting of civil rights to dissenting religious sects and Jews. Indeed, Heiman argues that

... the activities associated with man's corporate existence did not, in Hegel's view, obliterate all the ambitions, aspirations, and essential particularism of the individual. His corporate capacity was relevant only to his occupational, vocation (sic) and professional existence. It had nothing to do with the individual's private life, the development of his talents (artistic or otherwise), or his religious and philosophic leanings.

A reader of the Philosophy of Right will find Hegel concluding his discussion of the state with reminders of the coming into existence and the subsequent passing away of states through the course of world history (PR 344). Moreover, in the book's final paragraph, Hegel declares that the state is the essential jumping-off point from which self-consciousness attains to a still higher spiritual world (PR 360). Truly, the "inner life"
of self-consciousness should in fact preside in Hegel's state and it should be required of education to insure that it does.
NOTES


4. Avineri, Modern State, 3-4.


11. Avineri, Modern State, ix.


33. Ottman, 317.


35. Drydyk, 121.


44. Seckinger, 323.


47. O'Neill, 123.


49. Frederick Mayer, *A History of Educational Thought* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1960), 362.


53. Howard Ozman and Sam Carver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1976), 34: "Hegel... saw the individual man achieving his meaning by serving the state."


56. Bryant, 13.


58. Foden, 22.


1. regularly confuses Hegel with other so-called Hegelians;

2. unfairly associates Hegel with the following social aberrations:
   (a) Nazism (p. 39)
   (b) Anti-Semitism (p. 69)
   (c) Elitism (pp. 81-82)
   (d) the Baader-Meinhof terrorist organization (p. 166);

3. bases its reading of Hegel on the long-discredited 'Popper School' of Hegelian misinformation (see Ottman, 384).

65. Baker, 73.
67. Somjee, 83.
74. Giroux, 131-134.
75. Giroux, 133.
76. Giroux, 131.
77. Giroux, 131-134.


89. Corbett, 4.

90. Corbett, 10.


93. Plamenatz, 35.


95. Walton, 76.

96. Walton, 84:

97. Ottman, 317; see also Cordua, 45.


102. Seip, 150.

103. Seip, 143.

104. Taylor, 378.

105. Leibowitz, 108.


111. Cordua, 44-45.


115. Vincent and George, 140-141.


119. Landis, 6.


121. Avineri, Modern State, 140.

122. Landis, 5-6.

123. Vincent and George, 133.

124. Cullen, 65.

125. Avineri, Modern State, 141.


128. Min, 49.

129. Vincent and George, 135.


135. Walton, 251.

136. Walton, 251.

138. Cullen, 54.


145. See Schmidt, 490.

146. Mitias, 153.

147. Westphal, 82.


149. Heiman, 115-116.


154. Corbett, 10:

155. Schacht, 298.

156. Schacht, 302.
157. Schacht, 299.
159. Heiman, 134.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Periodicals


Dissertations


