PLAYING FOR PRIVILEGE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY
OF PLAY IN A SUMMER CAMP

ZELDA RUTH COHEN

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S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

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PLAYING FOR PRIVILEGE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY

OF PLAY IN A SUMMER CAMP

by

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of the requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this thesis is to elucidate the ways in which play is utilized by young people to manipulate and alter social structures.

Fieldwork for this study was conducted in a summer camp in the Haliburton Highlands region of Ontario during the summer of 1979. The camp accepted campers between the ages of approximately 6 and 17, while the counsellors' ages ranged from 16 to 23 years. Research was focussed specifically upon the play of two age groups within the camp, the intermediate girls (aged 10 to 14 years) and the senior campers (aged 15 to 17 years).

The camp was structured in the form of an egalitarian community. No camper received extra privileges and all campers were treated similarly regardless of their age. Counsellors, by virtue of their position in the camp, enjoyed a number of rights and privileges which were withheld from campers.

Various forms of conflict arose between senior campers and counsellors, resulting from the fact that these campers were often the same age or older than the staff members. The counsellors' freedom to regulate their own hours and to smoke were perhaps the most pronounced causes of conflict. When campers endeavoured to share these privileges, it was often their age mates on staff who attempted to enforce the camp rules and stop campers from enjoying these restricted privileges. Senior campers dealt with these restrictions by creating their own 'private' areas on the camp grounds. During daily free time activities, as well as each night, campers would move into the 'bush', in groups or

alone, to free themselves from their counsellors' almost constant supervision. The privacy the bush afforded these campers gave them the opportunity to, for example, smoke and/or be with members of the opposite sex. At the same time as the campers were enjoying these 'illicit' privileges, the free time of staff members was interrupted, since they would have to search for the missing campers. In this way senior campers could not only enjoy the same privileges as their age mates on staff, but also interrupt the staff members' free time activities. Hence, campers, by forcing counsellors into nightly games of 'hide and seek', could invert the camp's power structure, taking rights for themselves while removing them from staff members, and thereby momentarily exert control over the counsellors and the camp.

The intermediate girls did not share the senior campers' above-mentioned problems. For this group, the egalitarian nature of the camp, which demanded that they share their friendship equally with all their cabin mates, was a problem. Although strong cliques formed within cabin groups, counsellors attempted to maintain equality among all their campers. During periods of free play however, clique members were able to emphasize their popularity and camaraderie by supporting each other and ostracizing non-members. In this way clique members could reinforce and emphasize their self-images as popular and powerful individuals by forcing outsiders into a position of unpopularity and powerlessness.

Although the senior campers and the intermediate girls were contesting for different types of power and/or recognition, both groups used play as the arena for the contest. Both groups also required the presence and/or participation of non-members in order for their messages

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to be communicated. In this way much of the play of the intermediate and senior campers was concerned with 'presenting' their ideas to an audience.

In sum, the present study supports the contention that play can be utilized to alter social systems (Sutton-Smith 1972:17; Turner 1974). This study also illustrates that the potential freedoms inherent in play are as available to young people as they are to adults, suggesting therefore, that young people have the capacity to recognize and alter binding social structures.

CONDITIONS OF FIELDWORK

Fieldwork for this study was conducted at Camp Meotick, a summer camp located in the Haliburton Highland region of Ontario. The physical layout of the camp (see map) is identified here by subjectively dividing it into 4 areas: 1) the activity area, comprised of the waterfront and corral areas and the archery and riflery ranges; 2) the cleared recreation area, bounded by the dining hall, the chalet (staff lounge) and the 'tripping' or storage building; 3) the girls' cabin area; and finally, 4) the boys' cabin area. Those areas not utilized officially by the camp remained lightly forested and were known by campers and staff as the 'bush'. Although the bush was designated as 'out of bounds' by the camp administration, many campers were attracted to the bush for the seclusion it offered. In order to insure the safety of the campers, as well as to maintain control, regular patrols of the bush were performed by staff members. Nevertheless, campers commonly entered the bush in order to enjoy some privacy and/or freedom from camp rules. The bush then was, in general, an area of unstructured, 'illegal' activities. The term 'bush' in this study refers to the lightly forested physical space within the camp, while the term 'bush activities' designates not only those activities which occurred in the bush but, in a metaphorical sense, refers to activities performed counter to camp rules, no matter where they may have taken place.

Ethnographic material was collected over a two month period at Camp Meotick. Unstructured interviews were conducted with a cross-section of the camper and staff populations; structured and taped interviews were conducted with the Intermediate girls' cabin groups (aged 10

to 14) both collectively and individually throughout the camp session. Data were gathered through daily participant-observation of the Intermediate female campers. Because of the nature of the campers' bush activities direct observation was generally impossible. However, such activities were occasionally observed directly. Conversations with campers and staff members regarding the bush activities were recorded whenever possible. Reports of conversations and activities by campers and staff were noted whenever such data were available. Finally, a questionnaire was sent to staff members approximately two months after the camp session was concluded.

CAMP NEOTICK

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years anthropologists have begun to recognize that childhood and adolescence are important and rich areas for investigation. Although some anthropologists in the past have chosen to observe and write about children and adolescents, their studies have often been largely concerned with elucidating the nature of adult life. Admittedly, this is a viable perspective, since children and adolescents are indeed developing members of the wider adult society. Nevertheless, this narrow approach manages to view children and adolescents only as developing adults, rather than considering the early life stages as viable entities for study in themselves.

Characteristically, anthropologists have tended to

> . . . see the child as continually assimilating
> or learning and responding to the adult, having
> little autonomy, contributing nothing to social
> values or behaviour except the latent outpour-
> ings of earlier acquired experience . . . rather
> than inhabiting a self-regulating autonomous
> world . . . (Hardman 1973:87).

This biased outlook is reflected in early studies of children's play. Until recently children were rarely considered to be in command of their play behaviour. Such early investigations often concluded that children's play was the result of some innate and/or subconscious drive. Unlike the play of adults, which has long been considered 're-creative,' the play of children was thought generally to be the product of unconscious drives aimed at preparing the child for adult life.

This outlook, however, is rapidly changing. Contemporary students of play are now discovering that there are aspects of young people's

play which reflect more than the pressure of unconscious drives and enculturating forces.

This study is concerned with the play of two 'adolescent' groups at a summer camp in the Haliburton Highlands region of Ontario.

Camp Meotick was devoted to offering its campers a full inventory of summer recreation activities, including swimming, sailing, waterskiing, canoeing, kayaking, horseback riding, Arts and Crafts, riflery, and archery. Campers also went on hiking and canoeing trips, played sports and games, and took part in special events. In exchange for these opportunities campers had to abide by a set of strict rules aimed at ensuring their safety and minimizing the supervisory requirements of staff members.

Although these rules did not affect, to any great degree, the behaviour patterns of the younger campers, they strongly affected the freedom of the senior campers (aged 15-17) and the intermediate girls (aged 10-14).

The senior campers who, by virtue of their age, enjoyed relative autonomy prior to the camp, lost many of their rights for the duration of the camp session. The removal of these rights by enforcement of strict rules and regulations was made more difficult by the fact that the ages of these campers often approached or even exceeded the ages of staff members.

Unlike the senior campers, the intermediate girls' lifestyles did not change dramatically upon entrance to Camp Meotick. Comparability in the ages of campers and staff members was not a problem that the intermediate girls encountered. However, the administration's desire that all campers be treated and treat each other with equal

friendship seemed to be a difficulty for some of the members of this group. The camp did not discourage the formation of strong friendships, though the staff and administration members attempted to prevent the formation of cliques and popularity hierarchies. Many of the girls, however, seemed to feel the need to advertise their friendships in order to provide them with a sense of importance.

Thus, the social structure of Camp Meotick, in terms of its rules and ideals, had differential effects upon these two camper groups. Over the two month period of my participant observation at the camp, I witnessed subtle attempts by these two groups of campers to manipulate and alter the camp structure. It was in the realm of play that these campers were most successful at gaining the freedom that they desired from the camp structure.

This study, then, describes and analyzes the play of campers who were largely concerned with regaining 'withheld' rights and privileges. The creation of a 'bush' area by the senior campers, and the clique and group performances by the intermediate girls' cabins, are two major foci of this study. The creation of these play forms by campers illustrates that play can be a device for communication within, as well as for manipulation of, a reigning social structure. The ability of individuals of this age group to achieve subtle transformations of a social structure serves to exemplify that the 're-creative' aspect of play is as available and applicable to adolescents (and, from my observations, I would include children) as it is to adults. By viewing the play of children and adolescents without the biasing theoretical frameworks commonly used in the past, anthropologists will discover that children, like adults, use play both as a vehicle for communication and as an

arena for the institution of social change.

The thesis is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 is largely a critical analysis of past research in the field of play, and serves to introduce the various theoretical frameworks used in this investigation.

Chapter 2 deals with the important influences of Camp Meotick's rules and regulations on the campers. This discussion further functions to illustrate that, regardless of age, all campers were defined as children, while all staff members, again regardless of age, were defined as adults. This artificial or subjective dichotomy between 'children' and 'adults' of the same ages obviously placed the older campers in an uncomfortable situation. This, and other problems encountered by campers, as a result of the social structure of Camp Meotick, are introduced in this chapter.

The context of the camp and the campers' lifestyles are related to similar elements, external to the camp, in Chapter 3. Unlike wider society, where children and adolescents are perceived as constantly growing toward adulthood, the 'children' in the camp situation were not perceived as being in such a transition. Theoretically, the camp structure could not allow for the recognition of achieved statuses while also maintaining its strict authority over campers. Ascribed statuses of campers and staff members were seen by the camp as static through-out the course of the camp session. This chapter concludes by intro-ducing play as an option available to the campers to alter, in subtle ways, the social structure of Camp Meotick, and thereby regain privi-leges which had been removed.

Chapter 4 is a presentation of the relevant data collected at Camp Meotick. These data are described under three separate subheadings:

1) 'Absenting Activities'; 2) 'Cliquing Behaviour'; and, 3) 'Bush Activities'. Absenting activities refer to the first 'playful' attempts by campers symbolically and physically to remove themselves from certain camp situations. These absenting activities were seen as the initial steps taken by campers to overcome the camp structure. Cliquing behaviour was a reaction particularly evident among the intermediate girls. The formation of such tightly knit groups and the consequent creation of 'outsiders' within the cabin groups are preliminarily analysed in this section. The creation of an area of their own in the bush by senior campers, as a means of escape from camp rules and from staff members, is described in the section entitled 'Bush Activities'. The senior camper's 'playful' attempts to acquire some degree of power over counsellors and to regain lost privileges is also described in this section.

In Chapter 5 the specific ways in which campers utilized play in order to manipulate the camp structure are analysed. Certain of the theories introduced in Chapter 1 are applied to these data. The play forms of the campers are viewed in the light of Clifford Geertz's (1971) analysis of the Balinese cockfight. Using the concepts of text and context, the campers activities are seen as a "story" which the participants tell themselves about themselves (Geertz 1971:26). Further analytic tools are drawn from the dramaturgical approach (cf. Turner 1974b and Messinger 1970), in which players are viewed as actors who present and 'stage' performances for the benefit of an audience. Finally, the ways in which the campers and staff members' contested (Farrer 1979) for superiority are investigated, and the campers' successes at altering the camp's social structure are presented. The concluding remarks are presented in summary form at the end of the text.

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH

Interest in the causes, qualities and ramifications of play is not new. People have considered play as a subject for study, or at least curiosity, for centuries. Serious scientific and specifically anthropological attention to play, however, has been more recent. Reports of various forms of play and games by early travellers illustrated both the universal and varied forms that play could take. However, because of their unstructured observational methods, these reports were often biased, and led some to the concept that play was simply and only a "game activity" (Schwartzman 1976:14). The basis of this concept can be traced to

> . . . the early ethnographers' interest in
> 'reporting only the spectacular, conspicuous
> and ritualized events of "primitive" societies.
> Formalized games, complete with elaborate rule
> structures . . . would obviously appear to the
> ethnographer as more conspicuous and spectacular
> than non-structured play activities (Ibid. 1976a:15).

Insofar as these descriptions of play and games were biased, they led some scientists to compose strict and narrow views of the meanings and attributes of play, if they considered play at all. However, not all scientists perceived play in such narrow terms. Play was accepted by some as a wide category of behaviour, which, if studied, could provide insights into other cultural forms and even Culture itself.

Interest in play and games had first to go through a series of stages
before it was to become a serious subject of anthropological interest
and interpretation.

Herbert Spencer in his work, Principles of Psychology (1873),
had posited one of the earliest theories of play. Edmund Tylor, how-
ever, is usually regarded as the first anthropologist to suggest that
the study of play and games might be a useful vehicle for the discovery
of anthropological 'facts' (Tylor 1879). Unlike Spencer, who along with
Schiller (1875) proposed a general theory of play as being the result of
surplus energy, Tylor was interested in finding a possible tool for the
explanation and understanding of other cultural phenomena. For this
reason Tylor suggested that even ". . . a matter so trifling as a game"
could be significant for anthropologists (Tylor 1879:129). With this
interest in games now one focus of anthropology, the theories and per-
spectives by which games were explained shifted with the prevailing
anthropological attitudes of the time. Little was discovered about
games that did not substantiate already-outlined theories, perhaps
because, as Miller (1974:38) has suggested, a prevailing theoretical
perspective ". . . largely (and often unconsciously) determines which
data we will be able to perceive and which data we will blind ourselves
to." In its initial stages the anthropological study of play was
modelled on Tylor's and others'

> . . . concern with the collection and compilation
> of ethnographic facts with the expectation that
> some day (and in some way) these facts would lead
> to theoretical generalizations . . . (Schwartzman
> 1978:66).

Little emphasis was put on theoretical interpretations in these
initial collections beyond the explanation that games might be considered

to be survivals of earlier cultural practices (Newell 1883; Gomme 1894, 1898). Lady A.B. Gomme, for instance, suggested that the children's singing game 'Here We Come Gathering Nuts in May' was in fact a cultural survival. "Through all the games I have seen played [the idea of conquering and capturing] seems to run, and it exactly accords with the concept of marriage by capture" (Gomme 1894:431).

With the strengthening of the Evolutionist school of anthropology the wider concept of 'play' as opposed to the narrow investigation of games was introduced into the literature. The perspective which this school followed remains one of the most prevalent ways of looking at play today (Schwartzman 1976a:11).

The basic metaphor underlying evolutionist thought was the comparison between man's history and the structure and processes revealed in the "successive [strata of] geological formations" (Morgan 1964:422). Morgan explained in Ancient Society that

> The latest investigations respecting the early condition of the human race are tending to the conclusion that mankind commenced their career at the bottom of the scale and worked their way up from savagery to civilization through the slow accumulation of experimental knowledge (1964:11).

Through the perspective of this theory Morgan conceptualized early man:

> The inferiority of savage man in the mental and moral scale, undeveloped, inexperienced, and held down by low animal appetites and passions, though reluctantly recognized, is, nevertheless, substantially demonstrated by the remains of ancient art . . . by his cave life in certain areas, and by his osteological remains. It is still further illustrated by the present condition of tribes of savages in a low state of development, left . . . as monuments of the past . . . All these conclusions are involved in the proposition . . . that mankind commenced

their career at the bottom of the scale
(1964:42).

The concept of movement from lower to higher orders of development coloured much, if not all, of anthropological thought. By perceiving the savage at the opposite extreme to the more civilized man and the child as the lower order of the adult, a comparison of the savage and the child would be almost inevitable. In the search for information about the history of mankind, the child, given the preconceived similarity of growth with the savage, would appear to be a valuable key. Indeed anthropologists in the 19th century and even today find the easy comparison too attractive to ignore. Unable to perform direct studies of early man ". . . we shall do as the biologists do and turn to the ontogenesis of these notions. There are children all around us" (Piaget 1970:13).

This framework, however, did not go unquestioned. Anthropologists have been taken to task for their unjust treatment of primitive man. "The apparent similarities between the primitive and the child, so often noted, may be deceitful. We must not make use of them save cautiously and with certain reservations" (Levy-Bruhl 1965:16). This 'disrespect' biased reports of 'primitive' men and their cultures and presented a picture of the savage as

> . . . undeveloped . . . Many of them . . . are
> dormant, like a bud before it has unfolded . . .
> Credulous as a child he is put off from the
> solution of a merely speculative question by a
> tale that chimes with his previous ideas, though
> it may transcend his actual experience. Hence,
> many a deduction, many an induction, to us plain
> and obvious has been retarded, or never reached
> at all: he is still a savage (Hartland 1909-1910:
> 256).

However, the protection that the primitive has recently been

given from these fabricated concepts has not been similarly offered to the child.

Like the evolutionist approach itself, which emphasized the unilinear movement from savagery to civilization, the child was and is often seen only as a developing adult. This comparison of child and savage is as illustrative of the evolutionists' concept of childhood as it is of their idea of savagery. Where the savage was "sketched as a polar extreme to more civilized man" (Voget 1975:182), the child was seen as the polar opposite of the adult. Each effort which the child undertook was considered to be preparation for adult life. While play for an adult is seen as re-creative or as an opportunity for release ". . . from everyday social demands and obligations" (Stone 1971:6), for the child play was and is often considered to be one example of the step-by-step accumulation of knowledge and skill readying the child for his/her entrance into the world of adult roles and responsibilities.

G. Stanley Hall (1904) originated this evolutionary perspective of children's play by postulating that children pass through a series of play stages before reaching maturity. Such stages, according to Hall, correspond to and recapitulate ". . . the culture stages in the development of races" (Hall, paraphrased in Gilmore 1971: 313).

> I regard play as the motor habits or spirit of
> the past of the race persisting in the present
> . . . The best index and guide to the stated
> activities of adults in past ages is found in
> the instinctive, untaught and non-imitative
> plays of children . . . Thus we rehearse the
> activities of our ancestors, back we know not
> how far, and repeat their life work in summative
> and adumbrated ways. It is reminiscent, albeit
> unconsciously of our line of descent (Hall 1904:
> 202).

Two basic ideas are posited in Hall's work: that children's mental growth passes through a series of traceable and predictable stages and that the growth of an individual human organism recapitulates the growth of the 'race'. These two fundamental statements set the groundwork for much of the writing on play at the time. Indeed, the postulated stages of mental growth are still commonly accepted, in various forms today.

Expansions of Hall's theories continued to make up a large part of the literature on play well into the twentieth century. Appleton (1910) studied the play of both 'primitive' adults and of children, and suggested that play was a response to the individual's need and/or desire ". . . for growth to a stage at which the instinct [in the form of mastery of skills for adult life] can operate" (Appleton, cited in Gilmore 1971:314). Mabel Reaney's (1916) theory more closely resembled the theories of Hall. Like Hall, she suggested that the 'play periods' or stages through which children pass correspond to the evolutionary stages through which man himself has passed. Hall's pre-exercise theory of play which saw children and/or young animals' play as rehearsal and preparation for adult life was echoed by Carl Groos (1898, 1908), George H. Mead (cf. 1934), Britt and Janus (1941), Beach (in animals, 1945), and others.

Perhaps the most widely known theories to be ushered in by Hall's work were the psychological and psychoanalytic growth theories of Freud, Piaget, and Erikson. Because the theories of these three scholars are so extensive, only their discussions of play will be out- lined here.

The writings of Sigmund Freud heralded the birth of the psycho-

analytic tradition and effectively " . . . illuminated every aspect of human behavior" (Bock 1980:31).

One of Freud's best known teachings is the psychosexual develop-ment of the child through the pregenital, latency, and finally, the genital stages. The pregenital period begins at birth when "the pleasures of the newborn child center on its oral zone (the lips and mouth)" (Freud, paraphrased in Bock 1980:34). Later the anal zone replaces the oral zone as the center of pleasure and conflict, and finally ". . . pleasure becomes centered in the genital zone" (Ibid.: 34). At the age of five the child enters a period of latency which lasts until puberty when the genital stage reappears.

Freud's theories of play fall into the category of cathartic theories which had been proposed as early as Aristotle. Freud's play theories contain two recurring themes. First, play behaviour serves to enable the child to act out and repeat problem situations that the child has encountered. This repetition, in playful form, allows the child the opportunity to master these problems. Secondly, by mastering play "the child projects his own anxious or hostile feelings onto other individuals or objects" (Freud, paraphrased in Schwartzman 1978:145).

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud analyzed his grandson's odd playing habits. Whenever the boy's mother would leave him he would take

> . . . any small objects he could get hold of and
> [throw] them away from him into a corner, under
> the bed and so on . . . . I eventually realized
> that [this] was a game and that the only use he
> made of his toys was to play "gone" with them.
> One day . . . the child had a wooden reel with a
> piece of string tied around it . . . What he did
> was to hold the reel by the string and very skill-
> fully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot

so that it disappeared . . . . He then pulled
the reel out of the cot again by the string
and hailed its reappearance . . . . This, then,
was the complete game - disappearance and
return (1920:33-34).

Freud believed that by creating and occupying himself with this
game the child was able to compensate for his mother's absence. "In
his game . . . . the little boy has his mother by a string. He makes her
go away, even throws her away, and then makes her come back at his
pleasure" (Freud, paraphrased in Erikson 1963:217).

An an elaborator of Freudian theory, Erik Erikson is known for
his use of and expansions of Freudian theory. Erikson suggested that
Freud's psychosexual stages be enlarged to include his own schema of
stages.

Of importance here however, are Erikson's discussions of play.
For Erikson "Play . . . is a function of the ego, an attempt to synchro-
nize the bodily and the social processes with the self" (Erikson 1963:
211). Play then, is a process which aids the ego in overcoming problems
and insecurities. Erikson believed that play therapy could help the
individual eliminate his/her own problems, "for to 'play it out' is the
most natural self-healing measure childhood affords" (Ibid.:222).

In the child's initial stage of play development the body is the
focus and the object of play. Erikson calls this "autocosmic" play and says
". . . . it begins before we notice it as play and consists at first in the
exploration by repetition of sensual perceptions, of kinesthetic sensa-
tions, of vocalization etc." (Ibid.:220). During the second stage the
child plays with persons and things and it is here that the child may
later return when ". . . . he needs to overhaul his ego" (Ibid.:221).
Finally, at nursery school age the child begins to enter the "macro-

sphere'. Initially, the elements that make up this world are " . . .
treated as things, are inspected, run into or forced to be 'horsie'"
(Erikson 1963;221). The child quickly learns that different types of
play are acceptable only in different spheres. He therefore continues
to exploit the autocosmic sphere and/or microsphere. Thus, the child
learns at this stage what play he should perform by himself and " . . .
what content can be shared with others and forced upon them" (Ibid.;221).

Jean Piaget, like Freud and Erikson, divided children's develop-
ment into stages. Accompanying each developmental stage is a particular
play behaviour. These play behaviours result from the cognitive stages
through which children pass in their movement from " . . . an egocentric
and phenomenalistic viewpoint to an adult's objective and rationalistic
outlook" (Piaget, paraphrased in Gilmore 1971:316).

Cognition, for Piaget, is divided into two basic processes, both
of which are always present though not necessarily in a state of
equilibrium at any given time. One mode, accommodation, is " . . . that
process whereby the child (or any organism) modifies his/her own mental
set in response to external demands" (Piaget, paraphrased in Schwartzman
1978:52). Conversely, assimilation is " . . . that process whereby the
child incorporates elements of the external world into his or her own
schemata" (Ibid.;52). When a state of equilibrium between these two
modes is achieved an organism is said to be in a "properly intelligent
adaptation" (Piaget 1962:5). It is however, the fluctuation between
the predominance of one process over the other that Piaget uses to
discern more playful and less playful behaviours. Because of the con-
stant presence of both the accommodation and assimilation processes it
is the degree of play rather than the existence of play which varies.

Three further divisions of Piaget's schema may be delineated given the possibility of primacy of one process over the other or equilibrium between the two. Three states, intelligence, imitation, and play, result from the dynamic interplay between processes.

> If every act of intelligence is an equilibrium
> between assimilation and accommodation, while
> imitation is a continuation of accommodation
> for its own sake, it may be said . . . that play
> is essentially assimilation or the primacy of
> assimilation over accommodation (Piaget 1962:87).

Play, therefore, for Piaget is the remodelling of reality to fit one's own forms of thought. Because even the possible forms of thought vary throughout the organism's development, so, too, do the forms of play. During the earliest cognitive stage or sensorimotor period, play is characteristically repetitive in nature. "Early in a child's life any newly mastered motor ability will be performed over and over in different contexts . . . No new learning takes place during such behavior, and there is every evidence of pleasure from the child" (Piaget, paraphrased in Gilmore 1971:317).

Symbolic play becomes apparent in the second cognitive or pre-operational stage of development. In this period the child becomes capable of substituting one thing for another, thereby creating a ludic symbol. As the child progresses through this stage, make-believe or sociodramatic play becomes possible. Operational representative activity, the third stage, is characterized by the ". . . transformation of symbolic games into constructional games in which the object constructed symbolizes the object it represents through direct correspondence analogous to that of drawing" (Piaget 1962:288). This stage signals the child's interest in games with rules.

Piaget, in an earlier study developed a three stage schema for rule conceptualization by children. In the first stage children accept rules as interesting but unimportant. Children in the second stage accept rules as immutable and sacred truths and finally, in the third stage of autonomy, rules are considered to be the product of social consensus and, therefore, may be altered by "enlisting general opinion" (Piaget 1965:28).

The concepts and theories of these early writers are still widely accepted. Applications of these ideas, such as Erikson's play therapy, remain useful to psychologists and therapists today. Many studies have attempted to build upon the writings of these authors and discover new forms of play therapy (cf. Murphy 1956). However, assumptions upon which these writers have based their theories may, in fact, illustrate incomplete understanding of childhood play on the part of the researchers.

The evolutionary theorists all built their ideas upon the assumption that the child is an incomplete adult. Children are seen as striving for adulthood and much, if not all that they do, both prepares them for adult life and reflects their need for preparation. Play is divided into two separate streams, that of the adult and that of the child. Adults play to free themselves from the constraints and pressures of their role as adults. Adult play is recreative. But children play to prepare themselves for adulthood, to master reality, or to fulfill some biological need.

Though he too fits this description, Erikson makes the point well when he suggests the way in which theorists perceive childhood play:

> . . . .to be tolerant of the child's play the
> adult must invent theories which show either
> that childhood play is really work - or that
> it does not count. The most popular theory
> and the easiest on the observer is that the
> child is nobody yet . . . that childhood is
> neither here nor there (Erikson 1963:214).

However, childhood itself is, for the theorist, merely a memory

and ". . . now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face . . ."

(1 Corinthians 13:10-12). The distance from childhood may indeed

"engender forgetfulness" (Mann 1924) and make it hard to remember child-

hood things. Relegating children's play to an unimportant or even

merely instinctual level may cause the theorist to overlook some impor-

tant attributes of childhood play and even of childhood itself. As play

has become a more acceptable anthropological endeavour and as children

have become their own informants new theories of play have arisen.

These theories may show that childhood play is not so different from

adult play. Given the new freer perspective the suggestion arises that

children do not simply advance ". . . forward to new stages of mastery"

(Erikson 1963:222), but, like adults, they step ". . . sideward into

another reality" (Ibid 1968:222).

Before we turn to these new theories of childhood play it is

necessary to investigate what theorists consider play to be.

One of the most difficult obstacles that a student of play

encounters is the formulation of a sufficient definition for the term.

Many difficulties impede the construction of a definition, not the least

of which are the multi-faceted use of the work as noun, verb, and

adjective, etc. and the nebulous nature of the concept itself. A

definition, though,

> . . . to be scientifically workable . . . must
> be precise, but play is an abstract and global

> sort of behavior, one that eludes precision. In
> the past, play has been a thing to be inferred,
> not the sort of behavior that elicits clear agree-
> ment with respect to its presence or absence
> (Gilmore 1971:312).

To find a precise definition the student must cut away all the extraneous attributes of play and find the nucleus of the concept. This, though, seems to be an almost impossible task, for the nucleus itself appears to be a matter of individual opinion.

Because of the very abstract nature of play, scientists who attempt to formulate an adequate definition generally weave it around their own personal theories and perspectives of the concept, thereby qualifying its use by persons with differing perspectives.

Another, perhaps more serious problem involved in this approach to a definition of play is implied in a statement by Miller. Where a definition becomes or includes a theoretical perspective one must keep in mind that

> A theory is a myth: that is, an organized system
> of symbols which map and unify a field of confusing
> events. Theories can be manipulated at will while
> data cannot, though theory largely (and often uncon-
> sciously) determines which data we will be able to
> perceive and which data we will blind ourselves to
> (1974:38).

Hence, by formulating a working definition of play which is at once theoretical and therefore biased it becomes possible, if not likely, that one will limit the examples and/or the observations to the parameters of the theory.

In attempting to avoid this difficulty scientists often satisfy the need for a definition by substituting a list of characteristics of play for a precise definition of the concept.

In order to avoid this problem I present here only two

descriptions of play, both of which illustrate the above-mentioned problems and are, therefore, limited in scope. Not all these characteristics are relevant at all times. Indeed, not all of these characteristics relate directly to the play in the summer camp. They are offered here as an example of the various characteristics commonly used to describe play and as an illustration of the difficulties involved in forming an adequate definition.

Helen Schwartzman attempts a precise definition of play though she does, perhaps unconsciously, reveal her primary interest in the make-believe aspect of play. Play, to Schwartzman

> . . . is an orientation or framing and defining
> context that players adopt toward something (an
> object, a person, a role, an activity, an event,
> etc.), which produces a text characterized by
> allusion (not distortion or illusion) trans-
> formation (not preservation), and "purported
> imitation" of the object, person, role, etc.
> (1978:330).

Unlike Schwartzman, Johan Huizinga chooses to define the term play by outlining a series of characteristics in lieu of a formal definition. Nevertheless, his definition does not suffer for lack of precision nor does it reveal an underlying or biasing perspective. His definition, though it describes play rather than defining it, gives the reader a useful indication of the overall concept. According to Huizinga, by

> Summing up the formal characteristics of play we
> might call it a free activity standing quite
> consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not
> serious' but at the same time absorbing the player
> intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected
> with no material interest, and no profit can be
> gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper
> boundaries of time and space according to fixed
> rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the
> formation of social groupings which tend to surround

themselves with secrecy to stress their difference
from the common world by disguise or other means
(1950:13).

Following Huizinga's example, many authors have outlined various
characteristics of play. Because of the agreement between writers
regarding play's essential attributes it is possible to accept their
descriptions as reasonable base lines or maps (Miller 1974:36) from
which to view the data. However, notwithstanding this overall harmony,
a quick catalogue of their proposed descriptions reveals the great
difficulties theorists have encountered in arriving at a final consensus
on play's full meaning. Play is commonly considered to be a voluntary
activity (Huizinga 1950; Caillois 1961; Norbeck 1974a,1974b; Sutton-Smith
1976), bounded in time and/or space (Huizinga 1950; Sutton-Smith 1976;
Norbeck 1974; Goffman 1961,1974; Handelman 1977; Schwartzman 1976,1978),
governed by rules (Huizinga 1950; Caillois 1961; Miller 1973; Goffman
1971, 1974; Handelman 1977), means rather than goal oriented (Huizinga
1950; Miller 1973; Handelman 1977), emotionally charged (Huizinga 1950;
Caillois 1961; Csikszentmihalyi 1971,1975; Norbeck 1974; Sutton-Smith
1976), and uncertain and unproductive (Huizinga 1950; Caillois 1961).
Play is viewed as offering a sense of freedom and autonomy
(Csikszentmihalyi 1971,1975; Miller 1973; Handelman 1977), and as having
make-believe, novel and/or transcendental qualities (Huizinga 1950;
Caillois 1961; Csikszentmihalyi 1971,1975; Norbeck 1974; Handelman 1977;
Schwartzman 1976,1978).

In recent years the study of the play of both adults and children
has become a more acceptable and respectable anthropological endeavour.
Like the subject area itself, recent scholars have been more playful and
imaginative in their analyses. At the same time, an awareness of the

myriad of possible explanations for play has led a number of authors to take one specific play event and present for it numerous different analyses. Such presentations not only remind students of play of the multifaceted nature of the subject but also attempt to add to our basic understanding of play itself. It is hoped that by thinking, from many perspectives, about ". . . one small play episode, concepts and distinctions will emerge that could lead to a clearer and more extensive definition of play" (Gilmore 1971:312).

In his review of the history of the study of play in anthropology, J. Gilmore (1971) defines a single play event which he then analyzes from the perspectives of the different schools of thought. Helen Schwartzman employs a similar technique in her discussion of the "four major perspectives for the study of children's make-believe (symbolic, socio-dramatic) play" (1976b:198). Although both authors are working toward different ends, Gilmore to present an historical study and Schwartzman to introduce her 'sideways' perspective of children's play, both illustrate the variety of possible and acceptable conclusions that can be drawn from one play episode.

Gilmore presents a simple play event for analysis: ". . . a young child takes a piece of cloth and, as it the cloth were human, makes it "go to sleep" " (Gilmore 1971:312). The 'surplus energy theory' of Spencer (1873) and Schiller (1875), wherein an organism's excess energy is necessarily dissipated through play, is illustrated in terms of this play event. In this case, "making a cloth "go to sleep" would be seen as essentially unpredictable and meaningless behaviour, pushed into being by the automatic production of unneeded energy" (Gilmore 1971:313). The opposite, deficit of energy theory, wherein play is a vehicle which

replenishes energy, explains that the player makes the cloth go to sleep because he/she is ". . . physically too fatigued to do anything else" (Gilmore 1971:313). Where play is considered to be the result of emerging instincts, this same play event becomes ". . . the first stirrings of a parental instinct" (Ibid.:313). Hall's (1904) recapitulation theory, wherein play becomes a vehicle for dissipating "primitive and unnecessary instinctual skills carried over by heredity," perceives this play event as merely an illustration of a "vestigial primitive behavior" (Gilmore 1971:313-314). Finally, the cathartic theory supports yet another interpretation of this singular event. Gilmore explains:

> There is a certain degree of psychic pain caused the
> young child when he is told to go to sleep, for the
> child wishes both to comply and to remain awake.
> Further the child does not want to feel he must sub-
> mit to adult demands. Thus, the sleep play of our
> example occurs as a cathartic, wish-impelled
> response to his lingering psychic pain (1971:321).

Aside from the numerous ways in which one simple play event can be analysed, one thing should be noted in Gilmore's work. In no instance is the child considered to be in control of his desire to play. Rather, the play is presented as an act which the child is impelled, by un-conscious drives, to perform.

These theories, too, can only be considered hypotheses for they are only indirectly testable. Moreover, because the player is implicitly described as being unconsciously driven to this play activity his useful-ness as an informant regarding his own actions is negated.

Schwartzman offers a play episode wherein the players are very much in control of their play. This control itself becomes one major perspective from which to view play. In order to elucidate her dis-cussion of the four commonly employed theories or 'metaphors' for play,

the day care play episode is quoted at length.

> Thomas, Paul and Karen are playing in the block corner. Sonia . . . asks if she can play with Thomas and Paul. They emphatically say, "No!" Karen says: "Yes! She can. I know, you marry me (pointing to Thomas) and Sonia can marry Paul." Thomas and Paul respond again: "No!" Karen replies: "O.K. I'll marry her and you can marry each other." Thomas and Paul respond reluctantly: "O.K. She can play." Karen says to Sonia: "We'll be nurses and you sleep in the tent." . . . Karen explains to Sonia where the boat, tent, water and alligators are. Linda comes in from playing in the outside yard. She immediately comes over to the block corner and falls in the designated "water" area and screams: "Help! something is biting my legs!". The group responds to Linda's action and then Karen announces that "Captain Paul is dead!" At this point Thomas acts very upset and says forcefully (directing his statement to Paul and Karen) "You guys never know what to do!". [Karen and Sonia leave the group.] Thomas, Paul and Linda shift their discussion to talk of 'angels, wings and heaven'. At this point Thomas (with very agitated body movements) falls to the ground saying "I'm dead." Linda declares that "Thomas is an angel." Paul now begins to fight [sic] and states his desire to return to the original boat play theme. Linda responds by saying: "Well, I guess it was all just a dream." The boat play theme is resumed (1976b:199-200).

The first metaphor that Schwartzman utilizes is perhaps the most commonly accepted view of children's play. This 'upwards' perspective treats play as ". . . imitation of, and hence, preparation for, adult activities" (Schwartzman 1976b:200). From this point of view the play episode is considered to be an example of role practice. Herein, the discussion of female occupational roles ("We'll be nurses") and acceptable and unacceptable marriage partners are utilized as illustrations.

The second metaphor, the inward/outward perspective views play as projection. "Adopting this projection perspective play would specifically be interpreted as a place for children to 'work out' or 'act out' intra-psychic frustrations, anxieties and hostilities" (Ibid.: 1976b:201). In this case the discussions of death and Thomas'

uneasiness with the topic is the focus.

Thirdly, the backward view, wherein play is considered to be a game activity and where "games are viewed as reversals or inversions of cultural systems" is presented (Schwartzman 1976b:198). Here Karen's inversion of marriage rules and the ". . . whimsicality by which they move in and out of these roles, and thereby shift the play theme would be seen not as a reflection or imitation of adult life but rather as a challenge to, or mocking and inversion of, appropriate adult role behavior" (ibid.:201).

Within these three frameworks only fragmentary examples taken from the play episode are considered important and therefore discussed. The entire play event and the movements and shifts within it are not investigated. However, Schwartzman's final perspective, her own 'side-ways' view considers the entire episode. Based on Geertz's (1971:26) discussion of the Balinese cockfight as "a story the players tell them-selves about themselves," Schwartzman's sideways perspective considers the communication, the forms of communication and the reasons for the communication in a given play event. In this way, conflicts, strategies, functions, opinions, etc., all become important to the analysis. As well, and most importantly, unlike Gilmore's examples or Schwartzman's first three perspectives, the players are considered to be an integral part of their play. Play, then, from this perspective, is not a thing that the player does but an activity that the player defines and is involved in.

Her sideways perspective, or play as text, relies upon a thorough knowledge, by the observer, of the social context of the players. In Schwartzman's example it is necessary to know that the play is taking

place in a day care centre as well as that, "Thomas and Paul almost always play together as a dyad – with Thomas generally dominating Paul. However, one would also have to know that Linda was the dominant child in the day care centre" (Schwartzman 1976b:201).

After spending one and a half years as a participant observer in the day care centre Schwartzman had observed nine types of statements that the children would commonly employ in their play: (1) formation statements; (2) connection statements; (3) rejection statements; (4) disconnection statements; (5) maintenance statements; (6) definition statements; (7) acceptance statements; (8) counterdefinition statements; and, (9) reformulation or disintegration statements (Ibid.:237). These statements may be utilized by the players to maintain or change the play episode. It should be noted that Schwartzman is implying that the children are in control of the play and that part of the play itself is not only the manipulation of ideas but also manipulation of the players. Because of the length of Schwartzman's analysis, only sections will be cited.

> Before [Sonia] is able to move into this [play]
> area she uses a request-entrance technique: "Can
> I play with you?", and she is . . . rejected by
> Thomas and Paul. However, Karen, who wishes to
> bring (or connect) Sonia into the play group,
> responds to this by defining a possible activity
> (marriage). . . This suggestion is again rejected
> by Thomas and Paul. Karen then employs . . . a
> trick whereby she reformulates her original
> proposition which . . . she most likely knew to
> be an unfavorable marriage alternative, "I'll
> marry her and you marry each other." . . . This
> trick or reformulation was attempted by Karen
> expecting a rejection of her proposal but an
> acceptance into the play group (Ibid.:202).

With this Sonia is accepted into the play group and the play area is transformed into a lake. Linda, entering the play area, jumps

into the water and says, "Help! something is biting my legs!" thus
employing

> . . . a dominance strategy by defining an activity
> (keeping the boat play theme) . . . The group re-
> sponds to this action . . . and then Karen (who
> occasionally has difficulty accepting Linda's
> dominant leader' role) responds with a counter-
> definition: "Captain Paul is dead!" . . . It should
> be noted that Thomas and Paul, Karen and Linda all
> have attempted to define activities for the group
> to engage in. Thomas . . . responds to this
> potentially chaotic situation by saying, "You guys
> never know what to do!" implying that the group
> will not be able to continue if everyone is
> defining activities (Schwartzman 1976b:202).

The play theme now turns to talk of death. Paul makes it clear

that he is unhappy with this topic. Linda, who is becoming the group's

leader, responds to Paul's restlessness and further strengthens her

dominant position. She does this by explaining that the death sequence

was merely a dream, thereby enabling the players to resume the original

boat theme (Ibid. :203).

Schwartzman's analysis illustrates a number of valuable

assumptions which had previously been ignored by authors. In this play

situation Schwartzman recognizes the children as controlling factors in

the play sequence. Their awareness and command of the play episode is

exemplified by their manipulations of it. It is not sufficient for them

to merely change themes, or even players, at will. Rather, they follow

a 'rule' oriented procedure for the shifts. First, a potential player

must gain admission into the play group by, in some way, winning

acceptance. Secondly, the themes cannot simply be altered unless some

explanation or excuse is made for the change. Although the players are

unhappy with the subject of 'angels, wings and heaven,' they must wait

until one player finds a method and a reason to return to the old theme

of 'boats and water.' The shift must then be made in accordance with the 'social' rules of the play. In this case Linda, the dominant member of the group, suggests that the talk of death was merely a dream. General consensus with that statement allows the more favourable play theme to be resumed.

It must be noted here that Jean Piaget has suggested that these pre-school aged children should accept rules as "absolute, immutable and sacred" (Schwartzman 1978:51). However, these children appear to be illustrating their own autonomous (age 9-10) view of the malleability of rules of procedure. Given the evolution of the play themes, from boats to death, the children should not be able to negate the existence of the death sequence, if they are following the game's rules. This is illustrated by the fact that, although Paul is restless and unhappy in the situation, he is unable to remove himself from it. However, when Linda suggests an avenue of escape by employing a new rule (as yet unintroduced), the old theme can be resurrected. Unlike a counter-definition statement, wherein a new theme is introduced, Linda reformulates the play by negating the importance (and therefore, the confining effect) of the death sequence. Through mutual, though unspoken consensus, the boat theme is promptly resumed. Although Piaget discusses the rule conceptualizing stages of childhood from the point of view of 'games' it must be admitted that this make-believe play is in itself a type of game with discernable rules. That the players were able to transform the game by creating or utilizing variations of the rules is evidence for the fact that Piaget's stages of rule conceptualization are, at the least, not applicable to all play situations. Moreover, children are, in fact, capable of changing the rules if they are not

being served well by them.

The fact that, in Schwartzman's example, the play sequence is finally analyzed in its entirety is of importance. It is, of course, possible to prove any theory by focussing on events that support it and ignoring those which do not.

Schwartzman exemplifies the 'backwards' or inverting view of children's play by pointing out the inversion of marital rules in Karen's suggestion that she marry Sonia. However, the non-reversal of occupation roles in Karen's suggestion that she and Sonia be nurses is simply ignored. In order to gain a fuller understanding of play and thereby formulate theories which are viable, it is necessary to enlist all the information in a given episode, rather than merely supportive excerpts from it.

Schwartzman's recognition of the players' control and manipulation of the play and the players leads us to the understanding that there is more at stake to the players than mere enjoyment. Schwartzman follows Ehrmann's (1968) suggestion that ". . . players become not only the subjects but also the objects, or the "stakes", of their "game." That is, in the creating of specific make-believe play events the players, as subjects of these events, are able to interpret and comment on their relationships to each other . . . as the object of their play" (Schwartzman 1976:198).

The children's play can, as well, be viewed from the point of view of a power struggle, a play within a play, or, as Claire Farrer (1979) suggests, a 'contesting' event. Because the subject will be employed at length elsewhere, only a brief discussion will be presented here.

Contesting, Farrer points out, is not a contest. Rather, contesting ". . . refers to the act of struggling for superiority or victory between or among adversaries" (Farrer 1979:1). By way of example, Farrer suggests that;

> If you and I are playing cowboys and Indians, we will play within the rules that allow shooting at each other with 'our imaginarily' real weapons, hiding so as to attack from ambush, and — and this is where contesting begins — negotiating for our own scenario to be the one followed for the remainder of our play (Ibid.:8).

Clearly, Schwartzman's example of play is also an example of what Claire Farrer means by the term contesting. The subtle plot shifts, their longevity, and their initiators, correspond to Farrer's concept of what occurs in metaplay. Karen's suggestion of marriage is rejected but she does control the situation by 'tricking' Thomas and Paul into admitting Sonia to the play group. Linda's quick and easy entrance into the play group alters the dominance hierarchy as she ". . . immediately employs a dominance strategy by defining an activity" (Schwartzman 1976b:202). Karen, who, as Schwartzman explains, often has difficulty accepting Linda's dominance, attempts to remove Linda from her leadership role by contesting Karen's suggestion and thereby 'leading' the group back to the original play theme.

The children in Schwartzman's example were indeed contesting for a dominant position in the play group. As a result, Schwartzman's sideways perspective reveals yet another attribute of play. Play becomes an arena wherein players may fight among themselves (in a playful manner) for power. For,

> In contesting we are adversaries who push at the boundaries to gain control of the situation, define it as we see fit, and hence accrue to our-

selves, power, glory, points, satisfaction, or
whatever we are playing for (Farrer 1979:17).

Contesting may have a more far-reaching effect than simply altering the

play episode in which it occurs. This idea will be developed at length

in a later chapter. This contesting, in a playful atmosphere, may serve

to communicate to the players, as well as to an audience, an underlying

discontent with the status quo.

In recent years the discussion of play and its attributes has

become more refined. Authors are no longer satisfied with discussing

play holistically. Rather, they are focussing on the elements which

make up play. Discussions of the problems of text versus context

(cf. Goffman 1961,1974; Bateson 1972; Geertz 1973; Miller 1973,1974;

Sutton-Smith 1976), of play boundaries (cf. Huizinga 1950; Sutton-Smith

1971; Turner 1974), of dramaturgical elements (cf. Goffman 1956;

Messinger 1970; Manning 1973; Turner 1974b; Boyd 1976), and of manipula-

tion of, or freedom from, social constraints (cf. Sutton-Smith 1972,

1976; Schwartzman 1973,1978; Garvey 1974; Turner 1974,1974b), have be-

come foci for students of play. Because these concepts are integral to

the understanding of the various forms of camp play, they will be

presented in later chapters.

With an understanding of the history of the study of play we

shall now turn to a discussion of play among campers at Camp Meotick.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL SETTING

> The smaller boys were known by the generic title
> of "littluns". The decrease in size, from Ralph
> down, was gradual, . . . though there was a
> dubious region inhabited by Simon and Robert and
> Maurice . . .
> .Lord of the Flies, p.74.

Any person attending Camp Meotick, or virtually any other summer
camp, falls into one of two categories. The individual is either a
staff member or a camper. Though sub-divisions exist, these are the two
basic categories of camp life, and an individual's identity and life-
style at camp is dependent upon inclusion in one of these two categories.

There are, of course, implicit differences in these categories.
A staff member is generally older than the campers and is a paid
employee of the camp. The camper, on the other hand, is generally
younger than the staff members and must be considered to be a paying
customer of the camp. The staff member, because he is an employee, is
given a salary along with certain privileges and rights in exchange for
his/her services. The camper, on the other hand, becomes, to a degree,
the responsibility of the camp, and is therefore under its supervision
for the duration of his/her stay.

A simple rule of thumb divided campers from staff at Camp
Meotick. The staff, because they were in a position of authority and

responsibility, were considered to be adults, or at least, young adults. The campers, because they fell into the category of 'campers' (with the implication that they were younger) were considered to be children. In the majority of cases this distinction was easily maintained. Since few middle-aged or older adults resided at camp, the 16 to 23 year old staff members became the camp's 'men and women.' The staff's ascribed authority over the campers took the form of a 'parental' relationship. However, because the ages of some of the senior campers approached or exceeded the ages of some staff members, the adult-child distinction was often indistinct. Such a situation obviously engenders many problems, and is consequently one of the main foci of this thesis. These problems, and the camper's playful attempts at overcoming them, will be discussed at length in succeeding chapters.

Camp Meotick had a total population of approximately 300 campers over a two month period. The camping period was divided into four two-week sessions. A camper could attend for as little as two weeks or as long as two months. Because of this the camper population fluctuated between 140 campers (70 girls; 70 boys) during the July 14-28 session, and approximately 50 during the final two-week session. The ages of the campers varied between 6 and 17 years for girls, and 7 to 17 years for boys. Campers came to Camp Meotick mainly from Ontario, but also from Quebec, the Northwest Territories, the U.S., Mexico, and Argentina.

All campers were placed in a cabin group at the outset of their stay. Each cabin was supervised by at least one staff member who lived with and supervised a cabin group. There were sixteen cabin groups, eight for each sex, during the two-week period with the largest camper population. Ideally eight campers would be in one cabin; however, when

the population dropped, unnecessary cabins would be discontinued and campers would be moved into other cabin groups.

Three divisions were made in the social structure of the cabins, though these divisions were only used for the organization of camp activity lists. The junior division was comprised of the two Chippewa (male and female) and the two Cree cabins. The youngest group, the Chippewa, contained campers from the ages of 6 to 10. The Cree campers were approximately 10 to 12 years of age. The intermediate section was comprised of campers from the ages of 10 to 14 years and was divided into the Abenakie, Algonquin, Seneca, and Oneida cabins. The senior division, made up of the Iroquois and Leader cabins, contained campers aged 15 to 17 years of age. The senior group also contained the Counsellors In-Training (CITs) and, for the first two weeks, the CITs lived with the Leader girls and under the supervision of the Leader girl's counsellor. When space elsewhere allowed, the CITs shared a cabin with a number of different staff members, though they were not under their supervision.

Though this threefold division existed, it was not utilized to any great degree. Campers of any age were simply campers, a term equivalent to children. Though individual staff members commented on the maturity of some campers and the immaturity of others, the basic division between camper and staff was considered to be the difference between child and adult.

The categorization of campers as children may have primarily been an attempt by the staff and administration to simplify an otherwise difficult distinction. The staff members, with responsibility for, and authority over, the campers were of the same general age range. The

youngest counsellors were approximately 16. In terms of education, maturity, and even legal rights, they could not be considered to be more 'grown up' than all of the campers. Indeed, at Camp Meotick, an interesting paradox existed. Some of the counsellors were the same age or even younger than the campers over whom they had authority. Yet the staff, by virtue of their employment in the camp, had the rights and responsibilities of adults. Where campers were described as 'boys and girls,' counsellors were described as 'men and women.'

The definition of camper as child may have existed at Camp Meotick, at other camps, in past years but was, in any event, formally introduced (or reintroduced) during the pre-camp training week.

The staff (counsellors and instructors) arrived at Camp Meotick a week before the campers. During this pre-camp week the staff members were expected to get to know one another, the camp and its facilities, and to take part in training sessions. These sessions took the form of first-aid lectures and demonstrations at the one extreme, and participation in games and sports of various types at the other extreme. Included in this pre-camp session were a variety of lectures and discussions on camp rules, campers, and camp life. Perhaps because the staff members had not yet met the campers and were, as yet, unaware of which cabin group they would be supervising, the term 'camper' and the definition of the term were accepted as general descriptions of all campers no matter what their age. During pre-camp lectures the administrative staff used the terms camper and child interchangeably. It was suggested, perhaps inadvertently, during these lectures that "the camper is a child . . .", and that between camper and counsellor there existed ". . . as marked a distinction as between child and adult" (from

counsellor interviews).

That the staff accepted this definition of the term 'camper' is not surprising. The term does conjure up images of young children at play. As well, the staff spent the pre-camp week learning the roles and responsibilities that they would assume when the campers arrived. The staff were to take on many roles, not the least of which were "advisors and leaders" - the symbols of maturity and authority, "glorified baby-sitters," "teachers," "parents," and "guardians" (from counsellor interviews). Given this concept of their purpose at camp, they assumed the campers would require such services. Since services such as baby-sitting or 'parenting' are not required by mature individuals, but by children, there grew the expectation that the campers would be, regard-less of their age, immature.

Even long after the campers arrived and it had become apparent that some were close in age or even older than some staff members, the 'camper' definition and camp regulations did not change to ack-nowledge this group of campers. Staff members still considered campers to be "kids." This included CITs - "children who were there to have fun" (from counsellors interviews). Counsellors continued to consider themselves to be more mature than the campers in terms of an adult-child relationship.

Although some allowances were made by the camp administration for age differences between campers, none were apparent between campers and staff. For the most part the campers were considered to be one group, separate from the staff. One set of regulations pertained to the whole of the camper population with no distinctions made on the basis of age. The staff, on the other hand, shared a different set of rules,

some pertaining to their jobs and many outlining their privileges.

Some of the rules were defined before the camp session began and were stated explicitly to the staff and campers. Other rules developed during the summer. It is necessary to point out that many of these rules were for organizational and safety reasons. It is not suggested that these rules were created to separate the staff from the campers or discriminate against older members of the camper population. Rules were necessary for the campers and staff alike. And, because counselling was a job for the staff, some special privileges were even expected. As one counsellor explained,

> Camp was camper oriented, they had to have fun.
> Staff activities (i.e. sport) were neglected to
> a certain extent because we always had to think
> of the campers.

Although the rules were meant to provide for the campers' safety and the camp's convenience, the different sets of rules for the campers and staff did create and/or exacerbate existing problems.

From the perspective of the staff, the rules of Camp Meotick may be divided into three categories. Each staff rule or privilege had a corresponding rule for campers. By viewing the rules in this fashion it will be possible to see the division between campers' and staff rights at Camp Meotick.

The first category, job related rules, refers to those rules that explained when and how the staff could take time off from their duties. What they were expected to do while they were on duty cannot be considered a rule as it entailed their job responsibilities. Those responsibilities have been discussed elsewhere. The staff members could take one day off per week, and it was only during their days off that they could leave the camp grounds (unless they were taking campers

on a canoe trip or cookout). The 'day' off began the night before and continued until the following evening, at which time they resumed their duties.

During their six days on duty "cabin counsellors may leave their campers under the supervision of the duty counsellor during rest period and after the campers are put to bed, providing that everything is under control."[1] Unlike the staff, the campers could never leave the camp grounds (unless they were on a cookout or an 'overnight'). On or off camp grounds, campers had to be under constant supervision.

The second category concerns in-camp boundaries. Whereas the staff were barred from the 'tripping' room and the third floor of the chalet (where the camp owner lived), "the laundry room, the tripping room, the corral area, the staff cabins, the rifle range, the arts and crafts room, the chalet and the waterfront area are all out of bounds for all campers except when accompanied by a staff member." Also, "the tool room, the kitchen and the pumphouse are always out of bounds for all campers." As well as this, the rules state that "only staff members should put garbage in the garbage bins."

The final category outlines staff privileges while on the camp grounds. The staff were provided with a lounge area and kitchen on the second floor of the chalet. Whenever they were not working "the second floor belonged to the staff." The campers were not allowed on the second floor unless they were waiting to see the nurse, and even then they had to wait in the kitchen area. However, because some campers visited the chalet to see the nurse, all the campers had access to information about

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[1] All quotes regarding rules are taken from Camp Meotick regulations.

the chalet lounge. The refrigerator in the lounge often contained left-over food which the staff was free to eat. Staff members could also partake of the snack and tuck shop with the campers. Campers, on the other hand, were limited to meals, snack and tuck shop, and at each the amount they could eat or buy was strictly limited.

Staff members were required to vacate the chalet lounge by 11:00 p.m. every night, though, provided they were quiet and their campers were causing no problems, they could stay out as long as they desired. The campers, however, had designated bed times and, although these were not strictly enforced, the campers had to be in their cabins by the stated times.

Because the camp telephone was for business purposes, staff members could make or receive personal calls only after 8:00 p.m. or on Sundays. No camper was allowed to use the phone unless he had explained the reason and received permission from the camp owner.

The staff members were allowed to use the camp facilities during unscheduled times once they had informed and/or received permission from the proper staff member. Campers were allowed to use camp facilities only during their scheduled period and only with supervision.

Tea and coffee were available to the staff at meals and in the chalet lounge. Campers, including CITs, were not allowed to drink tea or coffee.

On occasion, the staff would be allowed to have a party after the campers were put to bed. Although these parties were supposed to be in secret, the campers were always aware of their existence. Food was provided by the camp owner. On one occasion the staff was treated to a corn roast, and on another to fresh vegetables and cheese. At no time

were these items served at meals, and therefore the campers never got
such treats. Although the camp would have special events and parties
for the campers these would include staff members as well.

One of the most problematic rules, for many of the campers, was
the smoking restriction. Staff members were expected to confiscate
cigarettes found on a camper. Though they were supposed to be returned
when the camper left they were, most often, smoked by the staff members.
In previous years, I was told, the administration had attempted to make
allowances for smokers among the senior camper population by providing
them with a smoking area. This privilege had been withheld during the
1979 summer session because of problems with younger campers smoking the
cigarette butts left around the area. Rather than providing campers
with a more secluded smoking area (such as the counsellors had) the
administration attempted to enforce a 'no smoking' policy for campers.
Staff members were allowed to smoke only in the chalet 'smoking area'
or in private. Because the chalet smoking area was on a screened porch
in full view of the playing field, all the campers could easily see the
staff smoking.

These rules generally describe the different lifestyles of staff
and campers at Camp Meotick. Other rules may have existed, though they
were not explicitly stated and, in some cases, rules may have been
invoked for short periods. However, from the description it is easy to
see the restrictions under which all campers, regardless of their age,
lived.

Even the CITs who, as mentioned previously, were considered to
be staff and campers at the same time, shared none of the privileges of
the staff. Their dual identity placed them in an ambiguous position

within the camp structure. Though they shared none of the staff
privileges, they were often given staff responsibilities. However, when
these responsibilities brought them into contact with campers, their
directives would often be ignored, because they were, in practice, only
campers.

        The perceived distinction between campers and staff members was
exemplified in a conversation between a counsellor and the programme
director. During the first camp session the counsellor of one of the
older boys' cabins remarked that he was surprised by the lack of
maturity of his campers, yet felt that they would be able to handle,
and should be given, more responsibility. The programme director,
accepting the statements without question, gave what can be considered
to be the 'administrative' or formal answer to the problem of older
campers. He explained that "basically these kids couldn't be expected
to be as mature as they should." These older campers, he said, would
not have been sent to camp if they had been mature individuals, able to
make their own recreation and direct their own free time. Yet, it was
known that many of these campers were sent to Camp Meotick to better
their English, learn outdoor skills, and even to give their parents and
foster parents a vacation from them. The programme director's statement
carried the implication that the older campers were sent to camp because
they were immature and/or slow. For this reason they were expected to
act like children, and were treated accordingly. Because they were con-
sidered to be immature, responsibility was withheld from them.

        A month later, in a conversation with me, this subject was again
raised. This time the programme director revealed the paradox in the
camp's policy of withholding responsibility from campers because of their

perceived immaturity. He pointed to one of the older campers running nearby and said, "Take Sean, when he's given something to do – some responsibility – he can really get into it and involved and be good. However, when he's not given these things, he's a problem and makes alot of trouble." Thus, the programme director admitted that Sean was capable of mature behaviour and enjoyed being given responsibility. Yet he also realized that the camp structure prevented this maturity from emerging. By withholding the opportunity for responsible, mature behaviour, the campers were made to appear immature and irresponsible. As a consequence, such a negative preconception of campers was accepted as realistic by the staff and administration from year to year.

The distinction between campers and counsellors created by Camp Meotick's social structure was not a problem for all the people attending the camp. Older counsellors and younger campers readily accepted the distinction. However, for those campers who were the same age as the young counsellors, differential treatment was problematic. Although these individuals easily accepted the staff members' rights to such things as days off, the differential privilege system within the camp, including, for instance, the regulations pertaining to smoking, was a source of frustration to them.

Small allowances were made for age differences within the camper groups. For example, the seniors could stay up one hour later than the juniors and a half hour later than the intermediates. Overnight canoe trips varied in length depending upon the age of the camper group. Very little else suggested a planned acknowledgement of the variations between campers' ages. During the pre-camp session, games were taught which were thought to be suitable for all campers. Yet, when the older

groups were instructed to play certain 'childish' games, 50 percent of them walked away angrily stating, for example, that "This is a stupid game; this is for kids."

Unlike the staff and administrative bodies of the camp, the campers placed a great deal of emphasis on a person's age. From the outset of their stay at camp, campers enlisted the knowledge of a person's age as an important source of information. On the basis of a person's age expectations were made and conclusions were drawn.

Because one's age defined what cabin one would be placed in and hence who one would live and usually interact with, the knowledge of a person's age was, initially, more important than their names. On the first day of camp many campers introduced themselves by stating their ages rather than their names, or began conversations with the question: "How old are you?" In one case a young boy walked up to a group of four boys, obviously of different ages. Addressing only one, he asked his age. The boy replied that he was ten years old, and the questioner stated, "Then you'll probably be in my cabin. I'm eleven." These two then remained together and talked while the other boys wandered off. The conversation progressed to scenery and camp life, and only then were names exchanged. Many of the conversations between young campers during the first day of camp began in this manner. The conversations continued, for the most part, only if the ages were similar.

When camp life became more settled and people began to become more familiar with others, the knowledge of a person's age took on different meanings. People began to ask my age or ask me to guess how old I thought that they were. In these cases personality traits and appearance seemed important. When I told people my age they replied,

"I thought so" or "I could tell." When one staff member guessed
correctly, she explained, "I figured by the way you act." This became
a common game and campers and staff alike were proud when I guessed that
they were older than they actually were.

Though this guessing game was common for the younger campers and
some staff members, there was one group wherein revealing information
about one's age presented a special problem.

The younger counsellors, for obvious reasons, did not want their
ages to be common knowledge. However, because of the popularity of the
guessing game, virtually everyone's age was known or estimated. The
older campers began to note the dissimilar treatment of staff members
and campers who were of the same age. Campers and counsellors of the
same age did not share the same lifestyle within the camp. Whereas out-
side the camp these people would be mates and peers, within the camp the
distinction 'staff member' or 'camper' overrode the similarity in age,
and hence one's defined lifestyle. In the camp one's rights and
privileges did not depend upon age but upon position. In many cases
counsellors had specialized skills and were therefore employed as
instructors. However, many of the younger counsellors had no special-
ized skills and were employed simply as supervisors for the campers,
having spent time as campers themselves. To say that this bothered the
campers would be an understatement. In fact, this similarity in age
and distinction on the basis of position was a source of antagonism be-
tween the two groups, and for this reason "there developed . . . with
the older kids a sort of 'us and them' attitude to counsellors"(from
counsellor interviews). Although one of the counsellors pointed out
that certain rebellious pranks were aimed at the administration and

their rules, she also suggested that they were rebelling against those rules which prevented them from enjoying the same privileges as their age mates on staff.

A week after camp began one of the Leader girls related a dream from the previous night. The symbolic meaning of this dream may relate directly to the above-mentioned problem. It should be pointed out that Kim was one of the oldest campers and a smoker. The dream took place less than a week before her 17th birthday. Hence, although she was older than some of the counsellors, important privileges, including smoking, were withheld from her because she was a camper.

In her dream, Kim explained, she and a friend were confronted by a group of girls who were slightly older. Because of the age difference the girls refused to let Kim and her friend into their group, claiming that they wouldn't be capable of "keeping up." Kim insisted that she was capable of doing anything that they could do. The girls decided to put her through a series of tests. Although she did not specify the types of tests, she explained that they got progressively more difficult and that the test givers were cheating to make sure that Kim and her friend failed. Nevertheless, she and her friend passed the tests with no trouble. Eventually it was Kim's turn to give the tests and she too cheated by making them progressively more difficult. By the end of her dream, Kim and her friend had proved that they were capable of the same things as the older girls - even though the older girls had tried to trick them into believing that they were too young.

Given the context in which this dream took place, and the para-doxical distinctions that had been made between Kim and her age mates on staff, her dream indicated at least a minor preoccupation with such

matters. Being forced to live with people her own age, yet being unable
to enjoy the same privileges and rights, was a problem for Kim. She was
angered by the fact that she couldn't smoke while at camp and that she
was not free to do as she pleased. That she perceived the distinction
made between herself and staff members as unfair and fabricated is
suggested in her dream as well as by her actions. Though, in her dream,
she had proven to herself that she was as capable as the other girls,
it was not clear whether she was then allowed to join the imaginary
group. Of major importance however, was her perception that people
were trying to 'trick' her into believing that she was not equal with
them. The argument can certainly be made that this was how she felt
about her life at camp and, although she did not communicate this to me
in words, she did so by the way she presented her dream to me.

Sheila, Kim's foster sister and also a Leader girl, was con-
tinually confronted by a similar problem. Sheila smoked and did so
freely at home. However, when she arrived at Camp Meotick her ciga-
rettes were taken away from her. Whenever she was talking with some-
one who smoked, whether or not they were smoking at the time, she would
state her predicament. "At my age," she would say, "it's stupid that
they won't let me smoke. I smoke at home. Everybody knows that. Why
don't you give me a drag. I smoke at home."

On one occasion Sheila, the camp laundress, and I were sitting,
talking. Maureen and I were smoking. Sheila again began her story.
"I'm old enough to smoke. They let me smoke at home. Maureen, nobody's
here, give me a drag." Maureen said that she couldn't do that because
"it's against the rules for you to smoke. I'll get in trouble."
Maureen however, agreed with Sheila that the rules were unfair and asked

Sheila how old she was. They discovered that, in fact, Sheila was older than Maureen and they both commented on how absurd the situation was. In the end, Sheila got a "drag" from Maureen's cigarette.

Thus in practice, and effectively emphasized in the dual set of rules and regulations, the camp was divided into two distinct groups - campers and staff. Although this distinction was well defined in both theoretical and practical terms, many attempts were made, by the older campers, to erase or obscure this distinction. And, in many cases, this was done by 'illegally' partaking in staff privileges, thereby interfering with the staff's free time. As will be discussed later, this interference took the form of playful rule breaking which was, at least partially, meant to communicate the older campers' dissatisfaction with the status quo at Camp Meotick.

CHAPTER III

TEXT AND CONTEXT

Anthropology, broadly defined, is the study of man. However, it is not merely individuals or groups that become the focus of investigation. Rather, anthropologists

> . . . consider the acts of individuals not in
> isolation but as members of society and call the
> sum total of these modes of behavior "culture"
> (Firth 1939:18).

Anthropology differs from other social sciences in that it attempts to ". . . interpret the world of the native through the eyes of the native" (Voget 1975:328). Franz Boas taught that a valid interpretation of the myriad of existing social phenomena ". . . is possible only when derived from a relevant context" (Ibid.:329). The discovery of this context has necessitated the use of fieldwork and, more specifically, participant observation on the part of the anthropologist. It is only through this type of investigation that the perceptions of the native rather than the perceptions of the anthropologist can be realized. The context of the native's life is his culture and society. Therefore, an understanding of any individual or group is accessible only through an investigation of the social and/or cultural context in which they live.

More recently, anthropologists, and specifically students of play, have rediscovered the importance of the idea of context and

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included with it the idea of text. Like psychologists who explain the
occurrence of optical illusion through the interaction of 'figure' and
'ground,' anthropologists are realizing that an event is understandable
only through consideration of the underlying context. Failure to attend
to the context of any event will lead to misunderstanding. In the areas
of play and learning which ". . . are multi-leveled phenomena, analyses
of texts (of the content of specific interactions) that do not consider
context are invariably inaccurate" (Schwartzman 1978:218).

Clifford Geertz (1971) employed the ideas of text and context as
interpretive tools in his discussion of the Balinese cockfight. By
considering the cockfight (text) from the perspective of the Balinese
society and culture (context), Geertz is able to elucidate a 'novel'
interpretation of the event. He explains:

> What sets the cockfight apart from the ordinary
> course of life, lifts it from the realm of everyday
> practical affairs, and surrounds it with an aura of
> enlarged importance is not, as functionalist soci-
> ology would have it, that it reinforces status
> discriminations . . . but that it provides a meta-
> social commentary upon the whole matter of assorting
> human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks and then
> organizing the major part of collective existence
> around that assortment. Its function, if you want
> to call it that, is interpretive; it is a Balinese
> reading of Balinese experiences; a story they tell
> themselves about themselves (Geertz 1971:26).

Reemphasizing statements made by Boas 85 years earlier, Geertz
concludes his discussion of the Balinese cockfight by reminding anthro-
pologists of their main task:

> The culture of a people [he says] is an ensemble of
> texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist
> strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom
> they properly belong . . . to regard such forms as
> "saying something of something," and saying it to
> somebody, is at least to open up the possibility of
> an analysis which attends to their substance rather

than to reductive formulas professing to account for them (Geertz 1971:29).

Helen Schwartzman, in her discussion of children's play (see Chapter I) remarks that

. . . it was postulated that children's pretend play could be analyzed as a text in which players act as both the subjects and the objects of their jointly created play event. Therefore, in play texts, the players as subjects of these events are able to interpret and comment on their relationships to each other (as these are developed in specific social contexts like a day-care center) as the object of their play (1978:232-236).

Hence, by analysing a play episode as a text within a given context, play may be recognized as something more than merely a ". . . wastebasket category of behavior" (Gilmore 1971:311). Play and play events become an arena for the transmission of information and ideas. This information may take the form of a ". . . commentary on . . . [the] larger sociocultural context" within which the play event takes place (Schwartzman 1978:227). As Brian Sutton-Smith suggests, play may be an important source for cultural innovations:

The normative structure represents the working equilibrium, the anti-structure represents the latent system of potential alternatives from which novelty will arise when contingencies in the norma- tive system require it. We might more correctly call this second system the proto-structural system because it is the precursor of innovative normative forms. It is the source of new culture (Sutton- Smith 1972:18-19).

No matter how complicated the information offered in a play event may become, it is necessary to recognize that what is occurring is, at its simplest level, play.

Gregory Bateson commented on the need for this awareness after observing monkeys at the zoo.

> I saw two young monkeys playing, i.e., engaged in
> an interactive sequence of which the unit actions
> or signals were similar to but not the same as
> those of combat. It was evident, even to the human
> observer, that the sequence as a whole was not
> combat, and evident to the human observer that to
> the participant monkeys this was "not combat."
>
> Now this phenomenon, play, could only occur if the
> participant organisms were capable of some degree
> of meta-communication, i.e., of exchanging signals
> which would carry the message "this is play"
> (Bateson 1972:179).

The message, 'this is play,' 'frames' the event and thereby
defines it as play. As Bateson explains, within this frame or context,
"The playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be
denoted by the bite" (Ibid.:180). Bateson observes that the nip, since
it is framed within a playful context, is non-serious and non-threaten-
ing. However, it may nevertheless transmit information at the meta-
communicative level. I would propose that the playful nip may suggest
the same grave consequences as the non-playful bite. Information
regarding the play opponent's capabilities under serious conditions may,
for instance, be transmitted under playful conditions. It is possible
to widen this scope to say that, in a play fighting situation, the
players may gain information about their own capabilities, about
strategies, as well as myriad of other factors which might be useful
and even necessary in a non-playful situation. As Suzanne Chevalier-
Skolnikoff explains,

> There is . . . evidence that primate play functions
> as a learning situation for the development of
> sublimation of aggression, for the development of
> dominance and submission, for the development of
> "sociability," and for cultural transmission
> (1974:21).

The transmission of information and the learning that takes
place in play is often interpreted as preparation for adult life

(cf. Groos 1898; Mitchell 1912; Pycraft 1912; in animals; Malinowski 1922,1944; Mead 1928,1930; Stone 1971; in humans). However, whether or not the principle purpose of play is training for adult life is not the issue here. What is important, and what is implied in these theories, is that, in play, information is transmitted. Hence, play is a form of communication. This communication may range from the simple framing message 'this is play,' to a more complex assortment of ideas and paradigms. The information too, may be relevant only to the play situation, or may have reference to the more serious sides of life.

Briggs (1975) addresses this serious side of play in her discussion of 'serious joking' among the Inuit. In a serious joke a non-playful message may be conveyed within a playful frame. In this way the serious nature of the message, although disguised, is nevertheless available to the audience. Briggs suggests that a number of intentions and safeguards are present in such playful interactions. Briggs provides an example in her explanation of the joking statement, 'Let's Get Married'. This statement creates the opportunity for information to be gathered, but also protects the questionner from the serious implications of his message. Briggs suggests a number of possible interpretations, including:

> The words express the serious wish: 'I want you to
> marry me' . . . the other's reaction to the wish
> is . . . tested: 'Are you willing?' The very
> expression of the wish gives the other the oppor-
> tunity to say yes . . . At the same time, if the
> reaction is negative, the joking tone allows the
> joker to deny to both parties, self and other, that
> the wish existed: 'I was joking.' [and] if the
> recipient of the joke has made the mistake of
> replying with a serious negative, the joker's tone
> can be used to humiliate the other for the rejection:
> 'Can't you recognize a joke? Did you foolishly
> imagine I was not joking?' (1975:32).

Briggs comments that such joking messages are ". . . not played in isolation from other social exchanges, but, rather, in contexts which permit elaboration - and thus checking - of the various aspects of the total message . . ." (1975:34).

In Briggs' example the questioner is protected from the serious implications of the text (Let's get married) by the context of the question (play). This returns us to the main point - interpretation of the text, by the audience, or by the anthropologist, depends upon a recognition and an understanding of the context of the interaction. In a play context, multi-leveled communication may occur: yet, because it takes place within a playful context, the serious implications are disguised. They are nevertheless present.

Context, however, need not refer only to abstract notions such as play. It may be found in other, equally important, phenomena. Once again, in Briggs' example, it is fundamental to one's understanding of this exchange to realize that the joking questioner had once, quite seriously, asked to marry the person with whom he later jokes. Hence, contextual information may be found in the backgrounds of the persons involved in the interaction. Another type of context is illustrated in Helen Schwartzman's studies (1976,1978) (see Chapter 1). Her investigation was conducted ". . . in a day-care center located in a low-income, multi-ethnic community in Chicago. The researcher spent 1½ years working as a participant observer in this context' . . ." (1978: 232). Hence, context may constitute a geographic, economic and/or social setting. In essence, context may include any elements in a situation which are considered by the analyst to bear upon the meaning of the text. The event itself, in whatever form, becomes the text. Like the

figure-ground interaction of optical illusions, each is affected by the presence of the other.

Hence, context may take many forms simultaneously. Some may be of greater importance than others in interpreting the texts. And, one context may exist within another. This was the case at the summer camp wherein my fieldwork took place. We will turn now to a discussion of the various contexts which comprised life at Camp Meotick.

The major context for analysis of the play data presented here is the camp. Related to this, and forming a secondary context, is the camper population. In order to provide a viable analysis it is necessary to consider the examples of play and related performances (text) as taking place within these contexts (i.e. in a camp by campers).

In order later to form an interpretation of the play that takes place at Camp Meotick, I shall first discuss what a camp is. A summer camp in general, and Camp Meotick in particular, is set apart from the mundane world, being sharply bounded in both time and space. Although a camp owner may be involved in his business year-round, the camp it-self is operative for only two months during the summer. A camper may remain at Camp Meotick for the entire two month period, or for any number of two week sessions. However, once the individual enters the camp, he is under the camp's supervision until he leaves.

The camp itself was comprised of a clearly-defined space. This accessibility of various areas of the camp was itself regulated. Although Camp Meotick is 70 acres in size, only certain areas were available to campers, and those only at specific times. Though the campers might go on fieldtrips taking them off camp grounds, they were always under the supervision of at least one staff member. In this way, although the

campers were at times off camp property, their activities were always supervised by the camp through its representatives.

Within the camp the family was replaced by a cabin group comprised of age mates. Outside the camp these age mates might form a peer or other casual class group within a school; but within the camp their relationships were much more intensive. Not only did cabin mates, unlike classmates, live and interact together 24 hours a day, but campers spent more hours at camp in an eight-week camp session than they spent in school during an entire year.

The usual parent and teacher authority figures were replaced in camp by the counsellors. These staff members lived with and supervised the campers continually throughout their stay. When a cabin counsellor was absent another staff member would substitute as supervisor for that period of time. Ideally, at no time during his/her presence at camp was a camper to be left unsupervised. Were a camper to be found missing from his/her designated place a search was begun. Under certain circumstances (such as a camper missing from the waterfront area) the search was immediate and serious. This occurred only once during the 1979 season. Two campers wandered away from the swimming area without informing the staff member in charge. During the regular 'buddy checks' their absence was discovered. The water was immediately cleared of campers and any nearby staff searched the area. When this proved fruitless an alarm was sounded warning the camp of an emergency. According to a prearranged policy all campers were gathered together, heads were counted and staff members searched the camp grounds. Shortly thereafter the missing campers were discovered and, after a lecture about cooperation with camp rules in such emergencies, allowed to return to

their activities.

Not all discoveries of missing campers were treated in this extreme fashion. Often campers would wander off into the bush at night. Searches conducted in these instances were often non-serious and did not involve the entire camp. Often too, such searches took on a playful connotation and proved to be a source of entertainment for staff members. This will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

As mentioned earlier, the staff members at Camp Meotick were often the same age or younger than some campers. Nevertheless, within the structure of camp these staff members held a position of authority over the campers and were considered to be adults. Campers, on the other hand, were defined as children no matter what their age.

The literature available from Camp Meotick boasts that "Children grow up more than a little at camp." It may have been the case that campers returned home more 'mature' for their experiences at camp. However, during the summer session itself the organizational structure had little room to acknowledge growth. As well, the camp attempted to ". . . keep childhood and adolescence in perspective and [did not] push youngsters beyond their years" (camp literature).

It has been discussed elsewhere that responsibility was withheld from the campers because they were not deemed to be mature. Ironically, the camp authorities expressed the ideal of fostering maturity in campers but often defeated this purpose by not acknowledging the campers' potential to be autonomous individuals. The older campers, however, knew that there was only a superficial distinction between themselves and their age mates on staff. In order to maintain the authority of staff members, older campers had to be considered to be

different from counsellors. By defining and treating them as children (or immature beings) this self-protective distinction could be maintained and the authority of the staff members, no matter what their age, upheld.

Hence, the definitions that characterized these individuals in the mundane world were manipulated and altered in the camp setting.

Ideally at Camp Meotick staff members treated all campers equally, giving no special privileges or preferential treatment to individuals. By subscribing to an egalitarian model it was possible for the staff and administration to maintain further the ascribed definitions given campers by permitting little open acknowledgement of individual differences. This egalitarian structure also had the desired effect of solidifying cabin ties by insisting that individual campers work as a team. All-cabin activities were preferred over activities occupying only a few cabin members, and though the latter occurred, such activities were not considered desirable.

The American Camping Association emphasizes the importance of providing a democratic, group-oriented structure in a camp. It is explained that such a setting will provide campers with the "ability to co-operate and think of others" and encourage "a sense of social understanding and responsibility" as well as "an understanding of the worth of every individual." Ideally, the camping situation was egalitarian, but of course in practical terms maintenance of this equality was not always possible. Individuals' personalities, talents, appearances, manners, or special characteristics fostered feelings of liking and dislike among both campers and staff. Although privileges were not to be distributed on this basis it often occurred that those campers who were

most popular would be treated differently from those who were not popu-
lar. Campers themselves would often undermine the desired equality of
cabin mates by ostracizing unpopular members, hinting at their unpopu-
larity, and/or forming tight cliques which created distinctions between
cabin members. Such occurrences were, from my observations, most common
among the Algonquin and Abenakie cabin girls (age 10-14) and most
pronounced during times of free play. This will be discussed in more
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

The campers' daily lives were regulated by a strict series of
rules and regulations. These rules and the variance between those
governing staff and campers were discussed at length in Chapter 2. It
should be apparent, given the special rules, strict nature of constant
supervision, treatment of all campers as children, attempts to maintain
the equality of all campers, and the presence of young authority
figures, that life at camp was markedly different from life at home.

Outside camp, within the milieu of the home and school, these
individuals encounter a large number of possible friends. Classmates,
schoolmates, and age mates in the neighbourhood are available for social
interaction. As the individual gets older and is able to wander
further from home this social network enlarges. Different friends, too,
may form different groups; thus the individual may belong to a number of
peer groups comprised of different individuals. Parents may, for what-
ever reasons, restrict the individual's choice of friends - but, even
if this is the case, the individuals may seek out whom they please,
even if it is against their parents' wishes.

At camp the number of possible friends was limited. Although
the camp had a large population, the camper interacted most intensively

with his/her cabin mates. In this way, although a camper may have had
friends in other cabins he/she had few opportunities to see them
throughout the day. Hence, at camp, individuals most readily available
for close relationships were contained in the cabin group. These cabin
mates had been selected by the camp administration on the basis of age
with the hope that this similarity would encourage the formation of
friendships. The same age categorization may well define an individual's
classmates in school, but, within the class there are a greater number
of choices and, if no friend can be found, other avenues are still open
for locating peers.[1]

Hence, a child in the home and school milieu may have a rela-
tively large selection of friends, whereas at the camp this number was
limited, for all practical purposes, to cabin mates. At home, the
individual is usually free to choose his own friends. Conversely, at
camp, friends were, by and large, chosen by the administration of the
camp.

The structure and rigidity of rules varies between the home and
camp. The large number of campers attending Camp Meotick made necessary
a stringent set of regulations. Although these rules were, for the most
part, meant to ensure campers' safety, they also effectively illustrated
the differences between the home and camp settings. Because the rules

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[1] Gump, et. al. (1963:183) come to the opposite conclusion in their
comparison of the home and the camp. They say,

> The total number of theoretically possible associates at
> home was obviously much larger than at camp. However, the
> number and kind of reasonably likely associates at home was
> severely restricted by the style of living in the home
> community.

However, it is important to note that they take only the home setting
rather than the home and school settings into account.

at Camp Meotick have been discussed elsewhere it will suffice to
discuss them in general terms here.

Perhaps one of the most outstanding features of the camp was the
constant supervision of campers. Privacy was both practically and
ideologically undesirable in the camp. The communal living structure
provided the campers with an opportunity to learn the camp's ideals:
"understanding," "responsibility," and "co-operation" (from camp
literature). The constant supervision, while fostering the possibility
of these ideals being learned, also provided staff and administration
with a knowledge of the exact whereabouts of all campers.

The limiting of free time was linked closely to the constant
supervision. Free time in a camp situation would be problematic as
supervision of all campers would be impossible. Structured activities
and designated areas controlled the campers' movements and in this way,
theoretically, the possibility of mischief (or more serious misbe-
haviour) was averted.

Either consciously or unconsciously, the structure of the camp
had been set up in such a way that the counsellors constituted a buffer
group between the administration and the campers. The administrative
sector of the camp defined its rules and lifestyles. It was nonetheless
removed from the camper population and concerned itself primarily with
managerial duties. Counsellors, conversely, although controlled by the
administrative sector, were in constant contact with the campers and
regulated their behaviour. The rules composed by the administration
were enforced by the staff members. In this way the camper population
was insulated from the governing bodies by a sector which was, at
once, "superordinate" and "subordinate" (Simmel 1950:206).

The rules enforced by the staff were thus strengthened in that they could not easily be changed. Staff members had neither the right nor the power to change rules and could not do so without jeopardizing their jobs. Consequently, campers could not negotiate regulations with the staff, and those in a position to do so were not easily accessible to the campers.

Restrictions were further strengthened by the desire on the part of the administration to avoid preferential treatment of one camper over another. That one camper or cabin group should, however momentarily, get a rule changed for his or their benefit would create inequality among the campers. Thus a rule would have to be changed for the entire population or it could not be changed at all. Hence, if Kim or Sheila were to gain the right to smoke, large sections of the camp might demand the same right. Age-related privileges could not be extended as they would favour some members of one cabin group while excluding others. Obversely, cabin groups could not be the defining factor as some campers might occupy a 'lower' cabin group yet be older than those in 'higher' groups.

Thus for Kim and/or Sheila to gain the right to smoke would entail a rather radical policy change at Camp Meotick. However, even minor rules proved difficult to modify. On one occasion the Senior boys' cabin returned from an 'overnight' a few hours earlier than expected. Rather than being back in time for dinner they arrived in time for lunch. Because they were unexpected they were not allowed to attend lunch with the rest of the camp. Even when they offered to eat what remained of the food from their trip, and simply sit in the dining hall with the rest of the campers, this was not permitted. Thus they had to

remain outside the dining hall while eating their lunch. Negotiation of rules at Camp Meotick was virtually impossible.

The freedom to negotiate rules in the home may be strictly controlled by the parent. The structure of the home environment, unlike the camp, may, however, allow for communication between the rule-making parent and the subordinate child. Furthermore, unlike the camp environment wherein age is not a delineating factor, the home environment may recognize the importance of age.

> At every stage of development, the parent is con-
> fronted with decisions concerning how much control
> he should attempt to exercise, how much autonomy he
> should grant. In the early years we have noted
> that parental power is very high and that it may be
> exercised either through the use of superior
> strength or through direct control of the child's
> environment. As the child matures, less and less
> of this physical and social environment is under
> the direct surveillance or control of the parents.
> (Clausen 1968:172-173).

The school environment also differs radically from the camp setting. Although school experience is commonly considered to be important to the individual's development, the effects of the intensive lifestyle of the camp should not be underrated. As mentioned earlier, an individual spends more time in an eight-week camp session than is spent in a year of school. The school may be considered more important due to its rigidly institutionalized nature and emphasis on the development of skills for adult life. Camp Meotick, on the other hand, claims that:

> Whether it is attitudes or skills, morals or facts
> that are learned, the whole climate of camp is favour-
> able to things sinking in and being retained. There
> aren't any achievement tests or any curriculum that
> has to be covered by the end of the season. Every-
> thing comes under the heading of fun (from camp
> literature).

Fun, however, and learning through play, are not considered to be strictly oriented toward education. The camp is a playground, a vacation, and therefore can have little to do with the serious side of life. As Erikson has suggested, the adult, work-oriented world does not consider play — and especially children's play — to be conducive to the preparation of the child for adult responsibilities. He explains that

> The play of the child . . . poses a problem: whoever does not work shall not play. Therefore, to be tolerant of the child's play the adult must invent theories which show either that childhood play is really work — or that it does not count (1963:214).

Camp and school differ in that the school is a future-oriented, preparatory situation whereas the camp is concerned with the individual's present state (while hoping that some skills will continue to be useful at a later stage of life).

> The overall juxtaposition of school life with adult society is defined ". . . in terms of "preparation" for adulthood. The roles which are institutionally allocated to school children of various grades and ages are definitely preparatory; i.e., they are evaluated mainly in terms of their contribution to some future status, and do not constitute ends in themselves . . . (Eisenstadt 1956:164).

Camp, on the other hand, as a type of 'youth group' attempts to provide the individual with a situation ". . . . in which the dignity of his current dispositions and values will be affirmed . . ." (Ibid.:166).

This leads us to an important consideration of childhood in our society, and to a further distinction between the individual in camp and the individual in the home and school.

The school, as a preparatory institution, suggests society's implicit and underlying view of childhood:

In our society youth follows a childhood much of

> which is spent in a formal school system which
> balances the right to an education with the
> obligation for parents and children to avail them-
> selves of it . . . [By] the time the latter are
> fourteen they will have had to learn to spend a good
> part of the day for a good part of the year in the
> continuous presence of their contemporaries, faced
> by a rather special selection of adults, their
> teachers. They will have been asked to devote them-
> selves rather single-mindedly to the enterprise of
> learning and being tested (Naegele 1965:47).

Children in our society are being continually trained for their roles in later life. Only in retrospect does childhood seem a time unto itself. During childhood and adolescence we speed the individual through, train him for the future and push him toward adult life. If he does not show an eagerness to be thus speeded we label him a 'problem child'. If he shows a talent for meeting our expectations we reward him with the label of 'young man'.

Childhood is a time of training, of expectations. Adolescence is still more demanding. The adolescent individual is looked down upon if he escapes back into the world of childhood, and yet is considered overbearing if he jumps ahead into the world of adults.

We define childhood and adolescence as important times of our lives and then hurry people through them, pushing them forward or back as we deem fit. Childhood, as illustrated by the education system, is a period of training for later things, preparation for a time to come. It is only when we see that it is behind us that we are allowed, and even expected, to mourn its passing.

Childhood and adolescence, then, are times of paradox. We are expected to grow up, but not too hurriedly, to be children, but not to be childish. Erikson (1963b:10) suggests this paradox when he states "In no other stage of the life cycle . . . are the promise of finding

oneself and the threat of losing oneself so closely allied."

Hence, the school is designed to lead and prepare the child, step by step, to take a responsible position in the adult world, to imbue him with a set of values and ethics which are important to that world. The camp's aim is to "keep childhood and adolescence in perspective" (from camp literature) and to acknowledge and serve the non-adult time of life. While maintaining the philosophy of preparing the child for adult life the camp also provides the individual with tools useful and enjoyable to his childhood or adolescence. Thus the camp may be considered to be not just a vacation from the home and school, but a vacation from the intensively adult-oriented world. This provides us with a further possible explanation for the definition of campers as children. By treating them this way it is possible to offer them freedom from adult life and expectations, to bestow upon them the rare opportunity to allow immaturity and childhood to master society's desire to 'grow them up'.

Hence, in our society, youth

> is a period of intermission between earlier freedoms
> (or so they now appear) and subsequent responsi-
> bilities and commitments. It is a last hesitation
> before certain rather serious commitments . . .
> (Naegele 1963:33).

Children are trained to grow, and adolescents, having grown, await acceptance into the adult world, while society further grooms them. This time of waiting constitutes a marginal period, a time "between being a child and being a grownup" (Kohlberg 1971:600). In Victor Turner's terms, the adolescent, not child, not adult, is in a period 'betwixt and between', when he is "neither this nor that, and yet is both" (Turner 1972:341).

Adolescence can and has been defined as a liminal period in a person's life (cf. Mayer 1970). Removing the sacred and ritual elements commonly associated with liminality we find that adolescents, like ritual subjects, are in a

> period . . . of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo
> which has few of the attributes of either the
> preceding [childhood] or subsequent [adult] . . .
> social statuses or cultural states [Turner 1974:
> 57].

Within the camp the individual's state ceases to be ambiguous. The gradual social movement from infancy through childhood and adolescence to adulthood is abruptly halted. Where the individual outside the camp was neither a growing child nor a full adult, in the camp he is a child, no more, no less. Whereas outside he hovered between two categories, unable to be rightfully subsumed by either, inside he is defined. While outside he was constantly moving through an ambiguous state, away from childhood toward adulthood, in the camp he is momentarily static.

It is convenient to pause here and return to the discussion of context in order to clarify a problem of perspectives.

Since the adolescent was in a liminal situation in the mundane world we might expect to find him in a non-liminal state in the camp. That is to say, if a non-liminal state is, as Turner describes, ". . . a relatively fixed or stable condition . . ." (1972:338), then the movement from ambiguity to fixed definition (which corresponds with the movement from the mundane world to the camp) suggests removal from a liminal to a non-liminal situation. However, this would be to follow the convention that movements between liminal and non-liminal situations are to be described from the perspective of the observer rather than the individual involved.

While avoiding certain problems inherent in rapid changes of perspective, such discussions create their own difficulties. One means of avoiding these obstacles is to view these movements from the perspective of the individual involved rather than the stationary observer.

For the adolescent whose normal (i.e. non-liminal) state is ambiguity and transition, entrance into a state with fixed definitions will seem to be a transition to a liminal setting. To state this differently, what is defined by the individual as liminal is dependent upon what he considers to be non-liminal. Turner briefly attempted to resolve this problem of perspectives when he explained:

> Crudely put, the liminality of the strong is weakness - of the weak, strength. Or again, the liminality of wealth and nobility is poverty and pauperism - of poverty, ostentation and pseudohierarchy (Turner 1969: 200).

Adopting this view, we may consider the adolescents in the camp to be liminal personae. In short, they are in an "interstructural situation" (Ibid. 1972:339). The camp may also be considered liminal as a result of the varying structures which it provides. The campers, by virtue of their presence in the camp, are correspondingly different from their contemporaries in the outside world.

Although the concept of liminality is commonly associated with rites of passage in pre-industrial societies, its application to the camp situation currently under investigation is equally valid. This conceptual framework will constitute the basis for the formulation of finer inferences concerning the camp and its members.

To begin with, the summer vacation may be considered to corre-spond to the liminal phase in a rite of passage moving a student from one school year to the next. Because the student will have somewhat

different obligations, expectations, and roles in a higher grade, the summer vacation becomes the period 'betwixt and between' the separation and aggregation into school grades. This vacation also marks the "transition from the old to the new year" for the student and can, therefore, be likened to calendrical rites or change of season rites (Van Gennep 1960:178).

Although the summer vacation is itself a transitional period, the summer camp is a liminal space within that period. The summer vacation for the non-camper is a leisure-oriented (liminoid) time during which the student can rest from schoolwork and enjoy the summer season, free from the pressures of education. For the camper, however, the summer continues to be a time of education. This education differs from that which he receives from school, mainly in that it is closely allied with play.

The chief activity of the non-camper during the summer vacation may or may not be play. For the camper play is a means to education and is therefore an obligation. While the non-camper chooses to play and perhaps to learn, the camper is obliged both to play and to learn. As Turner (1974:74) has said, "Optation pervades the liminoid phenomenon, obligation the liminal."

By perceiving the campers as being in a liminal situation, the various attributes of the camp take on a deeper meaning. It is not necessary, perhaps not even valid, to view the camp as an initiation rite; the individual is not redefined in any manner that is notably different from his non-camper peers. Nor is the camper in a ritual or sacred situation while he is in the camp. However, the camp itself provides a liminal-like setting, wherein the camper shares similar

experiences with the novice or initiand in traditional societies. These similarities might suggest that the camp is a liminoid (leisure) rather than a liminal setting. Yet this is not an acceptable premise. Turner (1974:67) states, "True leisure exists only when it complements or rewards work." In this way the summer vacation becomes a liminoid setting rewarding the work done during the school year. But in the summer camp play and work become basically the same thing and do not therefore complement one another. The campers in effect work while they play and play while they work. The swimming, canoeing, riding, water skiing, sailing, and kayaking provided at the camp were carried out within the framework of fun and play, though they were serious lessons and not leisure activities. Asked if the campers played or worked during lessons, the usual reply of camp members was, ". . . lessons are both work and play." Turner has stated, "in the liminal phases . . . . work and play are hardly distinguishable"(1974:66).

The obligation to learn through play entails working at play. The inability to divide these two activities points us to a liminal rather than a liminoid situation. The camp was not a leisure situation and the camper did not perform leisurely activities. Although they were not ritually oriented the campers were nonetheless in a liminal situation demanding rather than asking for their participation.

Many elements of the camp can be seen as liminal though they may not be as marked as in ritual situations reported from folk societies. This may be because the camp, considered as an institution, lacks the ramifications for the larger society inherent in a rite of passage.

The movement from the familiar home and neighbourhood settings

into the bounded space of the camp corresponds to the " . . . physical separation of the ritual subjects from the rest of society" (Turner 1974: 58). This movement into a new environment also prevents the individual from enjoying the ". . . normal social interactions within the village and household" (Ibid.:58). In the camp the individual, unlike the initiate, was not prevented from communicating with his friends and family although their access was limited. The camper could write letters, but visits by friends and parents were discouraged and the telephone could be used only with special permission.

The camper was separated from the normal social world and took his place within the structure of the camp. The structure itself varied from the mundane world in that it was based upon age rather than family ties, communal rather than individual lifestyles. The normal authority figures were replaced with counsellors, who may have in fact been age mates. The normal definitions which relate to the individual in the mundane world were altered in the camp. The adolescent camper became a child (the adult side of adolescence having been set aside) and the adolescent counsellor became an adult (a suppression of the child-like side of adolescence). Normal status differentiations possible in the larger environment were replaced with the categorical equality of all campers. Preferential treatment was not allowed and status differences were ignored as much as possible. Similarly, in the liminal episode of rites of passage,

> . . . the ritual subjects . . . undergo a "leveling"
> process in which signs of their preliminal status
> are destroyed and signs of their liminal non-status
> are applied (Ibid.:59).

This leveling process was heightened by the strict nature of

the rules at Camp Meotick (discussed in Chapter 2). These, although not as severe as in some initiation rites (see Turner 1974:73) were nonetheless strict and aimed at a rigid control of the campers.

In compensation for this strict lifestyle liminal personae " . . . acquire a special kind of freedom" (Turner 1974:59). As VanGennep explains,

> During the novitiate, the young people can steal
> and pillage at will pr feed and adorn themselves
> at the expense of the community.
> . . . In Liberia, . . . theft does not seem to be
> regarded as a misdemeanor for the novices, for,
> under the guidance of their teachers, they make
> nocturnal attacks against the villages of the
> neighbourhood and . . . steal . . . Similarly,
> in the Bismark Archipelago the members of the
> Duk-Duk and the Ingiet may, during . . . Initiation
> . . . steal and pillage in the houses and plan-
> tations as much as they wish . . . . (1960:114-115).

Of course campers were not allowed such unbridled freedom. How-ever they did perform 'raids' on other cabins and jokingly (or sometimes seriously) vandalize the cabins and belongings of other campers. Such raids were not encouraged by counsellors or administration, but, unless they were of a serious nature, the raids were tolerated. Such raiding was, in fact, expected by the campers and they entered camp prepared for these inevitable occurrences. I can think of no other explanation for the fact that a ten-year-old camper could 'magically' produce cans of shaving creme from his suitcase when someone suggested they go on a raid.

The very nature of the camp brings to mind liminal situations and tribal societies. The cabins were named after Indian tribes (an apparent tradition among camps) and campfires and pow-wows were common.

Newcomers to Camp Meotick arrived at a pier across the lake

from the camp. There they said good-bye to their parents (despite the
fact that parents could come across the lake with their children) and
took the short boat ride from the pier to the camp. Similarly, when
the campers left, they were returned to the pier to meet their parents.
Parents did not drive onto the camp grounds to pick them up. This
space interposed between leaving the parents and entering the camp can
be likened to the period of separation in a rite of passage. Conversely,
when the campers left the camp the boat ride may have corresponded to
the period of re-aggregation. During these times the individual moved
between one definition and another, and one authority and another. While
entering, the individual was not yet a camper, although he/she was no
longer just a son or daughter. On departure he/she moved away from this
definition and resumed the role of son/daughter.

Whether or not the individual was redefined on his re-entrance
to the mundane world is difficult to ascertain and not germane to the
present discussion. The camp was not a collective initiation rite.
Whether individuals, campers, or parents might remark a change after the
camping experience would be a matter of personal perception.

Our society does not have, need, or perhaps even want collective
initiation rites for its children. The primary reason for this may well
be that while a small number of definitions is sufficient for members
of pre-industrial societies, the number of possible roles, occupations
and positions in our society is large, and progression through them
appears to be of a more fluid nature. One strictly defined threshold
between child and adult does not alter an individual's other roles in
our society. He may, for instance, remain a student well into his
adult life, put off marriage and fatherhood until late in life and/or

change jobs or positions throughout his life. An individual in our society, then, exists in a number of roles simultaneously. A change in one of his roles may not fundamentally alter any other. By contrast, in pre-industrial societies the crossing of the threshold from child to adult may well redefine all roles, and hence an individual's entire life. The summer camp does not exactly correspond to the rites of passage in traditional societies. However, it does appear to be an urban-industrial liminal episode. This liminality may not be as severe as in traditional cases, and perhaps it could not be. The severity of the symbols and lifestyles of traditional novitiates may stem from the importance of the rite to the entire society (Turner 1972:341-342). The ramifications, for our society, of a child going to a summer camp are small if they exist at all. For a novitiate, however, the whole society is involved either practically or symbolically in his movement into the adult sphere. As Howitt explains, in the initiation of the Kurnai,

> The intention of all that is done at this ceremony
> is to make a momentous change in the boy's life; the
> past is to be cut off from him by a gulf which he
> can never re-pass. His connection with his mother
> as her child is broken off, and he becomes henceforth
> attached to the men. All the sports and games of his
> boyhood are to be abandoned with the severance of the
> old domestic ties between himself and his mother and
> sisters. He is now to be a man, instructed in and
> sensible of the duties which devolve upon him as a
> member of the Muring community (1904:532).

Although the summer camp is not as strict as the liminal episode in some rites of passage it nevertheless presents a strict and unyielding atmosphere to those individuals who attend. By looking at the camp from the perspective of a liminal setting we will better be able to understand the anti-structural play of the campers and the reasons for such play. That is, to return to the original theme of this

chapter, by clarifying the context of the campers' lifestyle, the campers' free play will stand out in greater relief.

By describing the camp as liminal rather than liminoid we can now recognize the liminoid (optional play) of the camp as context within context. It is into this liminoid setting that the campers, as constrained individuals, may go to relieve the pressures of the camp's restrictions. As Brian Sutton-Smith suggests,

> We may be disorderly in games [read: play] either
> because we have an overdose of order and want to
> let off steam, or because we have something to
> learn through being disorderly (1973:17).

The campers at Camp Meotick, I would suggest, not only created the liminoid settings (to act as spaces within the liminal setting) to let off steam but (to extrapolate from Sutton-Smith's statement) to display rather than just learn about their discomfort with the status-quo.

Here again we find Victor Turner suggesting this possibility:

> What interests me most about Sutton-Smith's formu-
> lations is that he sees liminal and liminoid situ-
> ations as the settings in which new symbols,
> models and paradigms arise - as the seedbeds of
> cultural creativity in fact. These new symbols
> and constructions then feed back into the "central
> economic and politico-legal domains and arenas,"
> supplying them with goals, aspirations, incentives,
> structural models and raisons d'etre (1974:60).

Existing in the liminal setting of the camp, the adolescents are 'forced to think.' Liminality may be partly described as a "stage of reflection" (Turner 1972:345). The campers are forced to think about themselves and more specifically about their needs and wants. Their own creation of liminoid settings in the camp gives them the opportunity not only to claim what they may perceive as withheld rights, but also to

communicate to authorities within the camp (representing the larger society) their desire for these rights. While the camp structure allows them to be only a part of what they are (i.e. children), in the liminoid setting of the bush they can better perceive that they 'really' are (children/adults).

With this understanding of the liminal attributes and liminoid possibilities of Camp Medtick we can now review the data.

CHAPTER IV

OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Three types of activities will be discussed in this chapter. Each of these activities constituted a reaction to some manifestation of the camp structure and each of these activities occurred during periods of unstructured (free time) activity or periods of loosely structured (play) activities.

First, absenting activities occurred, for the most part, early in the campers' stay at Camp Meotick. Illustrations of three different kinds of absenting activity are offered. Each was observed or reported during the first week of the 1979 summer session. The first of these illustrations, labeled here 'exploratory absenting activities,' led eventually to 'bush activities,' which are discussed later. The second and third illustrations suggest that although the camp attempted to maintain an egalitarian ethos, not all campers felt that they experienced equal treatment with others.

The second type of activity presented, 'cliquing behaviour,' was practised mainly by the Abenakie and Algonquin girls. The egalitarian ethos of the camp, requiring that all campers be treated and treat each other equally, was overcome by cliquing behaviour. By forming tightly knit groups, certain campers also defined 'outsiders.' This division in the cabin groups, though not endorsed or reinforced by the adminis-

tration and staff, offered the clique members the possibility of preferential treatment - if not by counsellors, then by clique members.

The final type of activity that will be discussed is 'bush activities.' These activities were performed mainly after dark and primarily by the senior campers. The bush itself was a forested area of the camp, although activities of this type did not necessarily take place there. By entering the bush campers could, for example, smoke and/or enjoy privacy with members of the opposite sex. Generally, while campers were in the bush, they were free of the camp regulations and could experience a degree of autonomy.

A. Absenting activities[1]

The atmosphere at Camp Meotick during the first few days of the 1979 summer session was one of relative confusion and disorganization. Campers were attempting to become familiar with the camp setting and routine and acquainted with the people who would share their lives for the next few weeks. Counsellors, suddenly confronted with a large group of individuals, tried to become comfortable with their new roles as supervisors, and to reconcile preconceptions formed during the pre-camp week with the reality of the actual campers.

Organized recreation activities could not begin until all the campers had had their swimming abilities estimated. Consequently, those campers who were not immediately being tested were left without specific

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[1] Those activities wherein a group member separates him/herself from the group and the occupation of the group where the group is acting as a unit. Goffman approaches this idea in his concept of 'dis-attention,' defined as "the withdrawal of all attention and awareness" from a focussed activity (1972:202).

activities to occupy their time. To avoid the possible chaos that might
ensue, campers were taken on tours, instructed to organize their cabins,
and brought to the playing field to play games.

During the pre-camp session, staff members were taught a large
number of games to be used during free time activities. No attempt was
made to determine which age groups might best be suited to individual
games. Rather, it was implied that any cabin group, regardless of age,
would enjoy any game. As a result, when Sarah (a young counsellor) came
to the playing field with two groups of campers (aged 12-14) she did not
reflect much upon her selection of a game. Consequently, campers were
learning, even at this early stage of camp life, that their age was a
factor which was rarely considered.

The game Sarah chose for these campers was 'Ladder Run'. Pairs
of campers sat opposite one another in a double row down the playing
field. The players' legs were extended to touch their partners' feet.
Each pair of participants was given a number. When it was called,
partners raced each other down the middle of the 'ladder,' around the
perimeter of the line and back to their original positions. Another
number was called and the game continued. There were no winners or
losers in this game. Players simply ran when their number was called,
then waited until they were called upon again.

When Sarah had explained the game and the campers were properly
seated, they began to complain. ("This is stupid," "What a dumb game,"
"That's all?") Sarah, paying no heed to their complaints, called
out a number. The first pair ran through the course and resumed their
original position. The campers again began to complain and Sarah called
out another number. This time the pair arose and began to walk through

the outstretched legs of the campers. When they reached the end of the line, one player turned to continue the game, albeit slowly, while the other began to walk away from the group. On noticing that her partner was not continuing, the girl stopped and began to follow. Everyone watched silently as the two girls walked perhaps 30 feet away, glanced back, and then sat down with their backs to the group. Sarah, striving to ignore this interruption and to maintain control, began calling out numbers in rapid succession. Some campers proceeded with the game, but others wandered away in the direction of the first two girls, although no one ventured further away from the group than the first two. Complaints then began in earnest, with people shouting, "this is stupid," and "I hate this." In the confusion, the numbers of pairs who had already wandered away were called. Other individuals soon left their partners to join the new group, which was sitting with their backs to the game. Eventually fully half the players had wandered away, leaving large gaps in the 'ladder'; the remaining campers continued to play. At no time did Sarah interrupt the game to reprimand the non-players, although she repeatedly glanced at them to make sure that they did not wander out of her sight.

It appears, from this activity, that the campers were learning that there were available ways to protest against activities which they did not enjoy. This initial stage constituted a period of 'testing', a careful probing of the boundaries of authority to discover the ways in which they could exercise their own prerogatives. In Claire Farrer's (1976:10) terminology, the campers who absented themselves from the game were contesting, pushing ". . . at the boundaries to gain control of the situation . . ." At the same time, they were learning how much

control they could gain; and, hence what forms their 'contesting' could take. By walking only a short distance from the group, the absenting camper was beginning to carefully 'map out' the boundaries of camp structure.

I was struck by the fact that as the game deteriorated no camper wandered further away from the group than had the first pair of protesters. It seemed that the later protesters were depending on the first girls for definitions and parameters. These girls had, in effect, defined a new boundary for the group without being reprimanded by Sarah. To go further than this boundary would constitute a new contest, and create a new and possibly 'illegal' boundary. One boundary had already been discovered. And for the time being that imaginary limit was respected. Later, other contests would widen this boundary, but for the moment it seemed that the initial contest would suffice.

A second type of absenting activity was utilized by campers to gain staff members' attention. Here boundaries were not simply pushed, but were blatantly exceeded. This, of course, required the staff members to follow the camper(s), thereby creating an opportunity for the camper(s) to communicate their personal grievances. This type of absenting activity, unlike the example above, employed neither exploratory strategies nor even contests. However, similar to the aforementioned example of an absenting activity, this latter form did incorporate a mode of communication, suggesting to the bystanders that there was something wrong.

Diane, the Cree girls' (aged 10-12) counsellor, said one day that it might interest me to know that one of her campers had been acting strangely. For the first few days of camp Tanya had gotten along

a position in the back row of the volleyball team and avoid the ball, or play by herself, completely ignoring the group. Again, when comments were made about the game or the play got boisterous, she would keep silent. I noticed too that she rarely looked at the other girls and often, indoors and out, wore a sun visor pulled low over her eyes. Marion communicated silently, but effectively, that she was unhappy both with her cabin mates and with the camp in general. Her absenting activity was performed silently and was a mental, rather than a physical removal from the group.

These examples illustrate three different types of absenting activities utilized by campers at Camp Meotick. Marion, although she broke no camp boundaries in her absenting activities, nevertheless created a personal boundary between herself and her cabin mates. Her aloofness separated her from the group, while simultaneously drawing attention to that separation. She broke no camp rules (boundaries) in this separation and thereby left her counsellors no opportunity to bring her back forcibly into the group.

We might label Marion's actions as 'inward' absenting activities. She remained a member of the cabin group, though not an active member.

Tanya, on the other hand, employed the camp boundaries in her absenting activity. By walking both away from the group and out of Diane's sight, Tanya was able to draw immediate attention to herself and communicate her unhappiness to her cabin mates and her counsellor. Instead of simply remaining aloof (as Marion had done) or stating that she didn't want to play, Tanya broke the rules of the camp. By crossing a boundary Tanya made it necessary for Diane to question her. In this way, Tanya was required to tell Diane what was troubling her rather than

well with her cabin mates. Then, one day, she began to avoid them and keep, instead, to herself. Whenever the group walked together, she lagged behind. She refused to take part in their play. On one occasion, as the cabin group prepared for a game of British Bulldog, Tanya absented herself from the group and began walking toward the cabin. As Diane could not allow Tanya to go off by herself, and was, in any case, concerned about her, she followed. Tanya explained that she didn't feel like playing; Diane insisted that whether or not she played, she had to remain with the group.

Diane later took Tanya aside and asked her what the trouble was. After a few minutes, Tanya explained that she was uncomfortable with her cabin mates, and in particular with one girl's attempts to become the leader of the group. This bothered Tanya and made her uncomfortable. As a result, she had avoided her cabin mates.

A similar technique was used by Marion, an Abenakie girl, to express unhappiness with her cabin mates. Marion's actions seemed to parallel Goffman's (1972:202) concept of 'disattention', although they also serve here as examples of absenting activities. While Marion did not physically remove herself from the group her message was as clear as Tanya's.

I had, on a number of occasions - upon joining the Abenakie girls for a game of volleyball or an Arts and Crafts activity - noticed Marion keeping very much to herself. During Arts and Crafts she sat by herself. Whether she was at another table or simply facing away from the group, she was obviously a great social distance away. During conversations she would ignore her cabin mates. When jokes were told, she would not laugh. Similarly, on the playing field, she would either take

volunteering the information. To simply confront Diane with a complaint
about a particular camper might well have been more difficult for Tanya
than 'tricking' Diane into forcing Tanya to admit her complaint. This
strategy protected Tanya from having voluntarily to blame a cabin mate
for her unhappiness.

Tanya, therefore, employed an 'outward' absenting activity. By
completely withdrawing from the group she was able to communicate her
unhappiness to the authority in the group and thereby make a solution
to her problem possible.

The two campers who initially absented themselves from the game
of 'Ladder Run' were neither breaking a boundary, as Tanya had done, nor
creating a personal one, as Marion had done. Rather, these girls and
the campers who followed them were pushing at boundaries, and, in
effect, testing them. We might, therefore, term this strategy
'exploratory' absenting activity. Since no boundaries were broken by
these campers, no action was taken on the part of the counsellor.

Exploration implies discovery; and, in fact, these campers were
discovering possible avenues of escape from the camp structure and
demands. Soon afterwards campers discovered the bush and began to treat
that area of the bush as their own. This 'bush activity' will be dis-
cussed in detail later.

None of these girls made any comment while leaving the group and
yet each nevertheless communicated with the other campers and counsellors.
Where involvement is expected, lack of involvement stands out. When
these campers refused to remain with the group and share their activi-
ties they were clearly transmitting a message. Marion and Tanya, by
simply refusing to become involved, were clearly expressing unhappiness

with their respective cabin groups. The two campers who initially left the game were silently protesting. Their movement away from their groups made all aware of their unhappiness. Whether steps were taken to bring them back in, as in Tanya's case, or they were left by themselves, their behaviour clearly communicated their message. An attendant hope or expectation may have been that others would react to it.

As Goffman explains:

> Involvement is an interlocking obligation. Should one participant fail to maintain perscribed attention, other participants are likely to become alive to this fact and perforce involved in considering what the delict means and what should be done about it (1974:346).

A further consideration of these activities leads us to the notion of structure and anti-structure (Turner 1974 ,1974b; Sutton-Smith 1972). Since this will be considered in detail later it will be discussed only briefly here.

Turner defines structure as ". . . normative . . . with its role sets, statuses, jural rights and duties, and so on" (1974:60). Anti-structure, on the other hand, is the dissolution of the structure (Ibid.: 60) and ". . . represents the latent system of potential alternatives . . ." (Sutton-Smith 1972:18).

The structure at Camp Meotick was represented by the camp rules, with the boundaries defined by the activity and activity areas in which the campers were involved at a given time. Anti-structural activities are thus those activities which are performed outside of boundaries and which, therefore, entail a breach of camp rules.

Marion's strategy for dealing with her unhappiness at camp did not entail the employment of anti-structural devices. Unlike Tanya, she did not attempt to enlist the aid of her counsellor, and, unlike

Sarah's campers, she did not openly protest. Rather, Marion remained within the structural realm of Camp Meotick. She broke no rules, disrupted no activities, but remained on the periphery of the cabin group. Her involvement was sufficient only to avoid censure. Marion was coping with a situation she did not like. However, unlike Sarah's campers, or Tanya, she made no attempt either to change the situation or to have it changed for her.

On the surface it may appear that Tanya was utilizing a anti-structural mechanism to communicate her grievance, while the two girls who left the game, yet broke no rules, remained within the camp structure. However, on closer inspection it becomes clear that the situation is more complicated than this.

Tanya did utilize anti-structural devices to get Diane's attention. Once this was accomplished, and Tanya had explained her problem, she returned voluntarily to the cabin group. The two campers who moved away from the gaming group were exploring the possibilities of activities in the anti-structural realm. Within the week, these campers and other like them moved into the bush and out of the staff's sight when they wanted to disengage from an activity. The bush was clearly an anti-structural area at Camp Meotick.

Hence, although Tanya did move outside the camp structure she did so only momentarily, and then only because, in her eyes, the structure of the cabin group was changing unfavourably. By breaking camp rules, Tanya was able to communicate her feelings about the structure of the cabin group. Once this was accomplished she returned to the normative structure of Camp Meotick. The two campers who left the game were making an initial transition into the anti-structural world within the camp.

Although they were compelled by the nature of camp life to adhere to
camp rules, they were discovering the potential of the anti-structural
realm for escape from these rules.

B. Cliquing

> . . . they are all under pressure to find a "best-
> friend," and to find her quickly . . . Ideally a
> girl's best friend will reflect her status or
> improve it. At least she must provide security --
> someone whose warm, preferably unpimpled hand can
> be counted on when partners are called for . . .
> There will be divorces . . . separations . . .
> partner swaps, but these will be handled within
> the group. No girl who is "in" will risk a general
> reshuffling that may leave her "out."
>
> Pandora, p.142

The Oxford Dictionary defines a clique as a "small, exclusive
party, set, [or] coterie." However, as this definition does not give a
sufficient picture of a clique, a further discussion is wanted.

A time element is not made explicit in the above definition.
Yet commonsense indicates that individuals who form a group only once,
and then only momentarily, are not cliquing. Hence, we must first add
to this definition the notion of duration over time.

The exclusiveness of the clique suggests that membership alone
does not define the clique. If a cabin group were to form into a
cohesive gathering of individuals interacting voluntarily for the du-
ration of the camp, they would still not constitute a clique. This is
because the membership of the cabin group is not the product of the
group itself, but of the camp. Thus the cabin group itself does not
define group boundaries, although it may certainly accept them.

To become a clique, a group must form external boundaries. That is, there must exist a ". . . constitutional, psychological or spatial distinction between members and nonmembers . . ." (Berne 1963:238). For a clique, explicit exclusion of the nonmembers is essential. Within the cabin group, where membership has been defined by persons outside the group, a clique may form which comprises only a portion of the cabin's actual membership. In this way, some cabin members are also members of the clique, while some cabin members remain outside.

The necessary cohesion of the clique is supported by these outsiders. The outsiders' existence defines the boundaries of the clique and raises the status of the clique members, because clique members are chosen, liked and supported where outsiders are not (Ibid.:238). The outsiders, especially members of the same cabin group, also provide the clique with an audience upon which performances by clique members can be focussed. These performances serve to heighten the status of clique members (at least amongst themselves) by illustrating their popularity and acceptance. By excluding and ignoring (or, more specifically, pretending to ignore) outsiders, the members have a constant basis for comparing themselves with those who have been excluded. This captive audience of outsiders must sit quietly while the clique interacts. If outsiders attempt to enter the group, even simply by laughing with them, they are often rebuffed and/or ignored. Outsiders can, of course, form their own group, but in the eyes of the clique members they do this only because they have been excluded from the 'better' group. Therefore, these outsiders are considered to have united because they are all unwanted and jealous.

Factors involved in the decision as to who is and who is not a

member allow a we/they distinction to evolve. Self-attributed differences become essential to the clique, confirming members and defining nonmembers. The possession of characteristics warranting membership, and outsiders' supposed lack of these characteristics (though these characteristics may never be precisely defined), is a means of status for clique members.

> The "intimate" character of certain relations seems . . . to derive from the individual's inclination to consider that which distinguishes him from others, that which is individual in a qualitative sense, as the core, value, and chief matter of his existence . . . The same phenomena can be noted in regard to groups. They, too, easily make their specific content, that is shared only by the members, not by outsiders, their center and real fulfillment (Simmel 1950:126).

Status, in turn, in order to be continually reinforced, requires not only cohesion between clique members but cohesion of clique members against outsiders. Therefore, clique performances take place for the benefit not only of the members but of nonmembers as well. By continually reminding the outsider that she is not in the clique, members remind themselves that they are.

In the camp these performances generally took place only when the cabin group was not under the strict control of the counsellor. During periods when staff members were in direct control of the cabin group they were forced to act as a unit. The counsellor was controlling the group, attempting to maintain the equality of all the campers, as well as possibly preventing the formation of small coteries within the larger population.

However, when the group was able to act autonomously, with little or no control on the part of the staff members, cliques could form and reform. Although control and supervision were major aspects of the

counsellors' jobs, complete control was impossible, both practically
and ideologically. Numerous opportunities existed for the campers to
act on their own. During free time activities, play periods, and even,
to a degree, lessons, the campers were free to act as they wished (pro-
viding of course that their actions did not interfere with the ongoing
activity). For instance, during water skiing lessons only two campers
were able to ski at any given time. The instructors' attention was
necessarily on those campers who were skiing rather than on those who
remained on the dock. Similarly, during riding lessons, riflery, or
archery, not all campers were involved at all times. Since these activi-
ties were dangerous, boisterous activity on the periphery of the formal
action was not tolerated. This did not make cliquing behaviour
impossible, however; this behaviour may be as subtle as a gathering of
members quietly whispering among themselves with outsiders close by
though uninvolved.

During periods of relative freedom (of which there were many)
the clique had a myriad opportunities to perform. While teams were being
chosen for formal games the clique could perform by choosing its own
members and ostracizing outsiders, making them wait patiently to be
chosen. During games the clique members could control the play, and
during free time activities talk, initiate games, etc. amongst them-
selves. At these times it was considered desirable, if not crucial,
that outsiders be present - though uninvolved.

Helen Schwartzman recognized this performing characteristic,
although she did not label it as such. As she explained (concerning
the children in the day care center),

> . . . the invitation to play . . . was not always
> extended to everyone in the immediate vicinity

of the initiator. In fact, the very statement,
"Let's play house," with eyes and body focused
in the direction of a specific child or group can
itself be a tactic used to exclude and/or offend
another child or group, as well as an attempt to
engage a particular child (Schwartzman 1978:238).

Where equality is expected, even demanded, little freedom is
left to the individual to choose his or her own friends. In the camp
individuals were presented to each other with the expectation that they
would be friends and share equally in their time and affection. How-
ever, people did not always get along equally with all of their cabin
mates. Some became close friends; others did not become friends at all.

The two cabin groups, Abenakie and Algonquin, shared one large
cabin. A line of lockers down the middle of the building acted as a
partition physically separating the two groups. The campers shared the
same washroom facilities and were generally free to wander throughout
the entire cabin. The size of the cabin allowed even quiet conversation
to be heard throughout the building. The two cabin groups were separated
in age by, on the average, only one year. Consequently, they often
accompanied one another on field trips, etc. Friendships between the
cabin groups were common, and the shared activities and accommodations
provided many opportunities for interaction.

I did not actually observe the formation of the clique in the
Abenakie and Algonquin cabins, but I was able to observe a number of
activities by the clique as well as the adoption of one new member.

The clique was initially centered around the strong friendship
of two Algonquin girls. Laurie and Pat had known each other for a
number of years and had requested that they be put in the same cabin.
In the camp, the pair's physical proximity to each other seemed to be an
essential aspect of their relationship. During activities they always

remained together, chose each other as partners or sat together. They would only rarely be separated, even for short periods of time.

Although all the Algonquin girls described their cabin mates as friends, Pat and Laurie's relationship was obviously more intense. In the psychological literature friendship is often defined on the basis of the individuals' observable desire to be physically close rather than by their verbal descriptions of one another (Hartup 1975:11). Friends are defined as ". . . individuals who wish to effect proximity with each other even though there is no immediately compelling biological or social pressure to do so (Ibid.:11). Using this definition it was obvious that Pat and Laurie had a 'closer' friendship with each other than with their cabin mates.

On one occasion Pat was asked to return the soccer ball to the storage area after a game. The storage room was only a short distance from the playing field and Pat started to run towards it. When Laurie noticed Pat running she followed, calling back to their counsellor, "I'll help her." The counsellor, perturbed by the two girls unwillingness to be apart, called out sarcastically, "Yeah, you help her carry it." Looking at me, she explained, "They are never apart."

Laurie and Pat's relationship corresponded to what Georg Simmel has called Zweierverbindung or "union of two." The constant association rested, according to Simmel, on their need to maintain the existence of the dyad (1950:126). "The social structure here rests immediately on the one and on the other of the two, and the secession of either would destroy the whole" (Simmel 1950:123). In a larger group, separation is possible because their union created an "objective unit" over and above the members (Ibid.:127). This supra-individual structure aids in

maintaining the group's existence even when members are separated. However, in the dyad, this supra-individual structure does not evolve. The dyad is dependant upon continued interaction and intimacy between its members for its existence.

Two days after the soccer game I was again with the Algonquin girls playing volleyball. During the game Pat and Laurie remained close together, whispering comments to one another, then glancing around the group to see if anyone overheard.

After the game the girls had a free period. Donna, a camper who was relatively unpopular within the group (as illustrated, for instance, in the fact that she was always chosen last for teams and often had difficulty finding partners for activities), said that she wished to go swimming. Unable to find a partner, she returned to the volleyball game. A few minutes later she again stated her desire to go swimming and was again ignored. She then said she was going back to the cabin and began to walk away after seeing that no-one was going to accompany her. I called after and said that I would be her partner so that she could go swimming.

Once on the dock, Donna explained to me that it wasn't fair that no-one would come swimming with her. When Laurie and Pat arrived on the dock in their bathing suits Donna was openly upset, saying to me, "You see. I knew they'd come. Why wouldn't they come with me? I knew it. They wanted to go swimming too."

Pat and Laurie reclined on the dock close to Donna and me, though they didn't acknowledge our presence. We both overheard Laurie say "Let's go in" and Pat reply that she didn't want to swim. Since my presence in street clothes only allowed Donna to get onto the dock but

not into the water, she leaned over to Pat and Laurie and suggested that we switch buddies, thereby allowing Laurie and herself to swim. Laurie, seemingly open to this idea, looked to Pat, who quietly said, "No, I don't feel like swimming." Donna restated her idea and Laurie again looked at Pat, apparently seeking permission to be Donna's partner while swimming. This time Laurie looked down at her towel, then raised her eyes to look at Pat. Pat, without looking at Laurie, shook her head indicating "no." Laurie rolled over on her towel and said simply, "I don't want to swim."

For Laurie to have become partners with Donna even for a short period of time would have entailed the momentary dissolution of the dyad, and the isolation of Pat. To have paired with Donna would have been even more destructive, as Donna was unpopular in the cabin group as a whole and not well liked by either Pat or Laurie. Partnerships, even short ones, suggest friendship. For Laurie to leave Pat's side and be close to Donna might have communicated an improper message to other campers on the dock - that Pat and Laurie liked and included Donna in their group. Physical proximity consolidated the dyad for Laurie and Pat and to any onlookers. Maintenance of the dyad necessarily overrode any one member's desires.

To look at it another way, Donna had tried to open the boundary surrounding Pat and Laurie (and defining their friendship). This intrusion made it necessary for Pat and Laurie to prevent Donna from usurping a place in the group.

As we continued to sit on the dock Pat and Laurie began to talk. Donna, unable to hear them clearly, and wishing to be included, asked them to repeat what they had said. When this occured Pat and Laurie

looked away, ignoring Donna and pretending not to hear, then continued their conversation. When they laughed, Donna laughed, whether or not the comment was audible. Even their sarcastic acknowledgements of Donna's presence were accepted by Donna as invitations to join the pair. She tried several times to move closer to the two girls. Laurie and Pat shifted their position in order to keep Donna out and then continued with their conversation. By moving completely away from Donna, Pat and Laurie could have ostracized her. By remaining close they were able to pretend to ignore her, while also savouring her desire to enter the conversation. Donna's efforts simply reinforced their sense of popularity and attractiveness. At the same time Pat and Laurie were able to enhance the exclusivity of their dyad by communicating that Donna was not desired as a member of their group. Donna, forced into the role of a spectator desirous of acceptance and inclusion, strengthened rather than weakened Pat and Laurie's dyad by making it the center of her attention, thus giving the two friends the power to invite or ostracize. Pat and Laurie could also be considered to have illustrated that while equality and sharing may have been important ideals within the camp, some campers could simply not be considered their equals.

On the third day of camp the Abenakie and Algonquin girls spent the day together off the camp property. This cookout seemed to confirm the categories of clique members and nonmembers.

This cliquing behaviour was disavowed by the girls. When questioned, they cited all of their cabin mates as friends. However, clues that this was not true were revealed in various ways in these discussions and behaviour. When asked if they preferred to pick their own partners for activities (or have them chosen by a counsellor, many

girls replied in a vein similar to the following:

> Usually I like to pick my own partner. If [my counsellor] put me with someone I didn't like, I wouldn't enjoy it . . . 'cause I don't necessarily, actually love everyone in my cabin. Alot of them I like pretty well, but there's a couple of them that aren't my most favorite person in the world.

The girls also spoke of protecting their cabin mates from the hurt that accompanies being left out, or picked last for a team.

> If I'm picked last it'd mean I wasn't liked as much as they like the other people . . . I'd pick the person who'd be picked last . . . I'd pick them first. It would probably make them feel better. It would make me feel better too. You know. Because it's happened to me before. So I'd know exactly how they felt and what they were thinking about and what they'd be thinking just about themselves. I'd feel sympathetic towards them and I'd probably pick them.

Yet in practice the same girls were always chosen last for teams. They were naturally aware of this nonverbal statement of unpopularity and the hurt feelings associated with being chosen last or lacking a partner, and spoke of avoiding it. In practice choosing team members was a popularity rating system. Being chosen first or being captain meant that you were "liked, people like you, that's why they want you." Being chosen last meant that "nobody really wants me on their team, they just have to take me 'cause they have to."

Hence, to define the clique and its members it is more revealing to study their behaviour within the group rather than their own characterization of that behaviour. This strategy is commonly referred to in studies of friendship, play and formation of dominance hierarchies (cf. Parten 1929; Omark 1975; Hartup 1975; Lewis 1975).

During the first week of camp the Abenakie and Algonquin cabins

joined for the Wednesday hike and cookout. The girls, their counsellors, and I took the 15-minute pontoon ride across the lake to the nearest town and then hiked the three kilometres to our picnic site. During the day the campers were free to roam about the area, swim, sunbathe, etc.

Pat and Laurie remained together most of the day and they and another camper, Valerie, explored much of the area in the afternoon. Upon discovering something Valerie ran back to the remaining campers calling loudly for Ellen, saying, "Come and see this. Ellen, c'mon, we're exploring." In the background Pat and Laurie called for Valerie to hurry back with Ellen. All four girls ran off, though they remained in sight of the group. They wandered about shouting and laughing while the remaining 14 campers sat quietly sunbathing. On the return hike the four girls remained together away from the rest of the campers. We often had to stop to wait for them to catch up or shout to them to slow down. Once at the pier we discovered that we were early and would have to wait a half hour for the boat ride back to camp. As we sat on the dock, Laurie, Pat, Valerie, and Ellen repeatedly left the group and wandered around, laughing loudly or whispering. When asked by their counsellor what they were doing they would reveal one or two gum wrappers which they said they wanted to throw away, and run off again. They repeated this activity a number of times and stopped only when the boat arrived to return us to the camp.

On the boat the girls separated, with Donna alone at the bow and Pat, Laurie, Valerie and Ellen together at the stern. Another camper had also seated herself there, leaving room for only three girls behind her. Valerie had to sit beside this camper and was thus removed from her friends.

It had been a relatively long day with much activity and a long hike. Most campers sat quietly during the boat ride, making little if any conversation. Pat, Laurie, Valerie, and Ellen, however, continued to be active, laughing, shouting, and whispering. The other camper sat between the girls without taking part in the conversation. Rather, Ellen leaned over her to whisper to Valerie, totally ignoring the girl's presence.

Throughout the day I was continually struck by the noise that these four friends made. Even when the other fourteen campers were playing and talking the four girls could be heard. Their whispers, while unintelligible, were as disruptive as their shouting, due to the sudden absence of noise.

The invitation to Ellen to join them in exploration, calculated to inform all the campers of this activity yet bar them from joining it, was reminiscent of Schwartzman's description of certain types of play invitations. Such invitations, she says, can be ". . . used to exclude and/or offend another child or group, as well as an attempt to engage a particular child" (1978:238). The invitation at once summoned Ellen to join and served to advertise the girls' activities. The excited shouting and laughing continually communicated to the uninvited what fun and excitement they were missing. On the dock and in the boat the clique members continued to attract attention and bar the inclusion of others. The loud noises and even the quiet whispers drew everyone's attention to the girls yet the conversation delivered in whispers remained a mystery.

The content of the whispers, the reasons for the laughter and excitement, and even the discoveries made at the picnic area were known only to the four girls. These secrets, advertised with loud shouts,

gave the clique members 'power' over the 'outsiders.' Pushed into the role of an audience, the fourteen campers could only wonder about the content of the conversations at the same time as being made aware of their omission from the group.

For those privy to the secret, the knowledge became a source of power:

> . . . [The] exclusion of all outsiders makes for a
> . . . strong feeling of possession . . . Moreover –
> since the others are excluded from possession . . .
> the converse suggests itself . . . namely, that what
> is denied to many must have special value.
>
> Inner property of the most heterogenous kinds . . .
> attains a characteristic value . . . through . . .
> secrecy, in which the contentual significance of what
> is concealed recedes . . . before the simple fact that
> others know nothing about it (Simmel 1950:332).

Aware that a secret exists, but unaware of its content, those on the outside were tricked into attending to the owners of the secret:

> This fact involves the contradiction that what recedes
> before the consciousness of the others and is hidden
> from them, is . . . emphasized in their consciousness
> . . . It may be thus appropriate to show that, al-
> though apparently the sociological counter-pole of
> secrecy, adornment has, in fact, a societal signifi-
> cance with a structure analogous to that of secrecy
> itself (Ibid.:337-338).

The clique was not a secret society by definition (Ibid.:345). Its continuation was not dependent upon maintenance of the secret. How- ever, it did utilize the 'secret' as an adorning aspect.

The secrecy of their actions, countered by their loud advertise- ment, made the clique the center of attention. This in turn separated them from the group, by physical and social distance as well as by the discriminatory nature of membership.

The clique's play performances throughout the day were clearly

enjoyable for the members. However, they also drew attention to the group and tempted outsiders with enjoyment and camaraderie. Outsiders, while attracted to the group, were also made aware that they would not be allowed to join in the fun.

In the egalitarian camp, where all were supposed to share equally, the clique was able to set itself apart. The noisy performances drew attention to the group, thereby setting it apart. The attractiveness of the clique and the difficulty of entrance, once the boundaries were closed (Berne 1963:238), illustrated that the clique members were not equal to the outsiders and they need not share their friendship liberally.

Kathy, the 'overnight trip' supervisor, noticed that the canoe trips away from the camp tended to solidify the group, giving cabin mates the uninterrupted opportunity to become familiar with each other. It was also on such trips that outsiders would be confirmed as such and cliques would solidify. Two examples of this became apparent to me. One was the development of a permanent outsider. The other was the movement of a camper from a peripheral position in the group to a position in the clique.

Ruth, an Algonquin girl, was described by her counsellors as the "classical example of an outsider." Ruth arrived at camp at the beginning of the second session. Unlike the other new Algonquin campers she did not become an active member of the group. She explained, "I'm not popular because I don't follow the group. I'm just like - myself. I don't follow the herd . . . I just say to heck with it."

Unlike the other Algonquin campers, she was more discriminating in her ideas about friendship. The other girls, she said,

> . . . don't really know the difference between
> acquaintances and friends. Like, most people say,
> "She's my best friend" or "my friend" when she
> really isn't. I know . . . I've learned. People
> sometimes run off. That's not a friend. Like,
> sometimes they're nice and sometimes they're mean.
> That's an acquaintance. Some people stay with you
> and they're nice . . . They're a friend.

On the cabin group's overnight Ruth remained by herself. During meals she collected her food and then moved outside of the group to eat. She turned down most invitations to play and generally spoke to only one of her cabin mates. When she returned to the camp she found herself permanently ostracized from the group. Even her counsellor, who before the trip had tried to involve her in activities, now ostracized her. Once, when some campers had been teasing and hitting her, she

> . . . just ran off because it hurt so much. I went
> back to the cabin and there was one of the [Abenakie]
> counsellors. She was really nice and talked to me
> about it. Then my counsellor came in . . . She said,
> "Aren't you coming to supper" and I said "no." And
> she just went off. That wasn't really nice. I didn't
> think that was fair because a counsellor is supposed
> to help you . . . but she didn't pay any attention to
> me.

Like Tanya, Ruth may have removed herself from the cabin group on these occasions in order to get her counsellor's attention. When she went back to the cabin after being teased she expected her counsellor to talk with her. When she didn't, Ruth decided that her counsellor must not have been her friend because "a friend helps you if you need it."

Unlike Ruth, who was relegated to a peripheral position in the cabin group, Sylvia was adopted into the clique on the overnight trip. Her counsellor remarked on their return,

> . . . when she got out of the camp, Sylvia changed —
> she came out of her shell. She was really quiet
> before. Nobody paid much attention to her. But she
> was different. She's got a great sense of humour.
> Everybody loves her.

Sylvia, who had often been left out of the group, returned to the camp as one of the group's most popular members. Before the trip when teams were chosen she had often been avoided until the end. During volleyball games, if she missed the ball, Pat and Laurie often laughed at her. On the trip their attitudes changed and she was adopted as a clique member. When they returned to the camp Pat and Laurie insisted that Sylvia change beds to be near them. She began to be chosen first when teams were drawn up, and any whispering that occurred between clique members now included Sylvia.

Sylvia's newly won popularity not only made her more attractive to Laurie and Pat but made her absorption into the clique a matter of strategic importance. Sylvia's membership in their coterie was essential in order to prevent a rival clique from coalescing around her, and/or in order to strengthen their own clique. Thus, Laurie and Pat's insistence that Sylvia remain physically near them was as illustrative of her tactical importance to the clique as it was of her personal congeniality.

The clique was a separate part of the Algonquin girls' cabin. Cabin members who were not in the clique were used as the main audience for clique performances. However, as the time at camp drew to a close all-cabin performances were given, using the rest of the camp as the audience. The clique itself remained intact during cabin activities, but during all-camp activities the Algonquin cabin presented itself as one cohesive group. At evening campfires they would interrupt the activities by suddenly rising to break into song. Unlike other cabins, all the Algonquin girls wore the same type of costume to the final dance. On the morning of the final day the girls arrived at breakfast in their night-clothes and led the camp in song. None of these activities

had been planned. Consequently, when the girls began their performances by suddenly standing when all were sitting, and by arriving at breakfast arm in arm in their pyjamas, the entire camp's attention was focussed on them. Their different clothing, movement to the center of the campfire ring, loud comments and laughter, etc. separated them socially from the rest of the campers. Like the clique outsiders, the other campers were placed into the position of audience while the Algonquin girls illustrated their group's solidarity and mutual enjoyment.

Hence, the division between the 'group' and the audience is dependent upon the definition of, and the boundaries around the group. For the clique, the boundaries encompassed only members. Those who were excluded socially, yet were physically present became the audience. For the cabin group, performances took place when the whole camp or sections of the camp were gathered together, thereby forming a possible audience for group performances. Similarly, the out-group raised the status of the in-group members by being attracted to them, yet unable to participate in their play activities. The importance of the audience for play performances will be discussed further.

C. Bush activities

The area of Camp Meotick which might correctly be considered 'bush' or 'woods' was a relatively small proportion of the camp property. Although bush activities ordinarily did take place in an actual isolated or forested area, it is convenient to extend the category to include any activity which took place in a space which was considered out of bounds for at least one of the persons involved, when the activity was performed without the consent or knowledge of a staff member, or

when it was simply against the rules.

Since bush activities did usually take place in areas that were relatively isolated from the camp population, counsellors were often required to make a conscious effort to find the campers involved. Members of the administration rarely went into the bush to find campers, leaving that to counsellors.

In general, bush activities were performed by older campers (e.g., Iroquois and Leader cabin groups). The reason for this was that the bush was simply not as accessible to younger campers. The younger campers were often more closely supervised than the seniors, given two counsellors rather than one. Also, younger campers' earlier bedtimes gave them less free time than their elders, making it more difficult for them to sneak away from staff members.

On the other hand, the older campers had more opportunity to move into the bush, and apparently more reason. In order to have a cigarette, or to be alone with a girlfriend or boyfriend, campers had to hide from their supervisors. Other, less obvious lures also drew the campers into the bush. As discussed earlier, the older campers were often as old, or older than, staff members. They were, however, unable to share the same privileges as their age mates on staff. In the late evenings when staff members were enjoying these privileges in the chalet the campers had the opportunity to move into the bush. In the bush they could enjoy some of the privileges withheld from them in the camp. Smoking, joining boyfriends or girlfriends, or even just being alone were possibilities only in the bush. What is more, while campers were in the bush, staff members' free time privileges were interrupted. Often six or seven counsellors were forced to go searching for missing campers.

In this way, campers in the bush could not only gain privileges normally withheld from them but also interrupt the staff's privileges. Hence, while in the bush, campers could invert the normal structure of the camp, placing themselves momentarily in the positions of privilege and power while staff members lost their privileged positions. The bush thus represented a space in the camp wherein campers could at once escape the normal structure and rules of the camp and replace them with their own. Further, campers could communicate their dissatisfaction with the camp structure, by causing counsellors to question and discuss what occurred in the bush and the reasons for it.

As mentioned previously, bush activities took place at any time of the day or night, and did not necessarily occur in bush areas. During the late morning and early afternoon the cabin areas were usually unoccupied. Unlike other staff members (who had to supervise activities), I was free to roam the campgrounds. On occasion, when I wandered through the cabin areas I would find campers smoking, talking, sunbathing, etc. When asked where they were supposed to be they would tell me, adding something like ". . . but I didn't feel like it so I'm not going." When told to go and join their cabin group they often walked away. Upon later speaking to their counsellors I would find they had not, in fact, rejoined their groups.

On two occasions I happened upon the same camper, once with a cabin mate and once with a male camper, sitting on her cabin steps smoking. Both times the campers concealed their cigarettes when I arrived. When I explained that they were not allowed to smoke and that I should, according to the rules, confiscate their cigarettes, they claimed that they had not been smoking. Once the girl pointed to the

cigarette butts on the ground and said, "These, oh, they're not mine."
When I indicated the trail of smoke coming from beneath the stairs she
said, "You can't prove it's mine," and simply walked away.

I was unable to discuss these activities with these or any other
campers I caught in the bush, since my presence invariably ended the
bush activity. Also, campers feared to admit to smoking in fear of
having their cigarettes taken away or being watched more closely in the
future.

The absence of campers from their cabin groups would cause their
counsellors to look for them. The campers mentioned above avoided this
by telling their counsellor that they had to return to the cabin and
would meet the group at the activity area. Having explained this they
would take their time and often meet the group at the next, more enjoy-
able activity. However, campers did not always bother to excuse them-
selves in this fashion; it was often necessary for counsellors to search
for persons inexplicably absent.

Dorothy, one of the younger counsellors, recounted such an
incident. One of her campers had not arrived for the canoeing lesson
and she had gone to find her. Eventually she discovered the camper
behind the boys' washroom, sharing a cigarette with another camper. The
counsellor asked her where she was supposed to be and directed her to go
there. As far as the smoking was concerned, Dorothy explained that she
knew the camper smoked, was allowed to smoke at home, and understood
that the camper felt it unfair to be prevented from smoking at the camp.
She knew, she said, that a lot of the campers were in a similar position
("After all I was a camper here too") and that that was one of the
reasons they went into the bush. Asked what the other reasons were, she

explained,

> . . . to rebel . . . . Oh, not against me. Well,
> not really. 'Cause I don't make the rules. They're
> rebelling against [the people who make the rules]
> . . . 'cause they don't think all the rules are
> fair . . .

Bush activities occurred more commonly at night than during day-
light. In the late evenings the campers were not as thoroughly super-
vised. Then most counsellors were in the chalet. A 'duty counsellor'
would patrol the camp grounds in the evenings, periodically checking
cabins for missing campers and wandering through the bush seeking them.
This, it was felt, would prevent the campers from wandering away from
their cabins, from smoking, from meeting boyfriends or girlfriends, and
from being too noisy. However, the preventive patrol was not effective,
and each night many campers were discovered missing from their cabins.
On occasion they would be caught by the duty counsellor or a staff
member as they wandered back. More often campers would be noticed to be
missing and the 'swat patrol' would search the grounds. The 'swat
patrol,' named by staff members, was a group of counsellors who searched
the bush for missing campers. This was, for them, a form of entertain-
ment, conceived as an imagined 'prison break' with the campers as in-
mates and the staff as prison guards. The grounds were "swept" with
"floodlights" (flashlights) and campers, when discovered, were sent back
to their "cellblocks."

The younger counsellors usually constituted the swat patrol. In
order not to lose the control they wielded over similarly aged campers,
young staff members had to enforce the camp structure, with its arbi-
trary distinctions between young staff and senior camper, more strenu-
ously than their older colleagues. This, as well as the "excitement

of the chase," may have drawn young staff members into the swat patrol.

To my knowledge the campers did not know about this prison theme or that the staff members sometimes enjoyed these activities. While patrols were rarely successful at finding campers in the bush, the noise of the search sent most campers back to their cabins to avoid being caught.

Not all searches were considered fun, and often staff members would complain about having to leave the chalet to find missing campers.

Discoveries of campers in the bush were most often made by individual staff members. Sometimes campers would quietly return to their cabins, embarrassed at being caught. Sometimes they would not hide their activities, but rather exaggerate them. Camp rules and legal rights prevented staff members from searching campers' luggage. Cigarettes could be confiscated only when campers were caught with them. To avoid this, campers took only one or two cigarettes with them into the bush, leaving the rest safely in their luggage. Similarly, the rules prevented counsellors from punishing campers in any way. Disciplinary action was taken only by the administration of the camp when complaints were made to them. Only cases of serious violence or ongoing problems were reported. Hence, campers could get away with a great deal of 'mischievous' behaviour before reports were made, and even when campers were reported as being troublesome action was rarely taken.[1]

With the knowledge of their relative safety from punishment campers would often 'taunt' staff members when they were discovered in the bush. Exaggerated stories of their activities would be recounted or

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[1] Only one camper was "expelled" during the 1979 session. The reasons for this were not detailed. I was told simply that he was a "problem."

arguments would ensue with campers refusing to return to their cabins.

Two male and two female campers (14 years old) discovered walking through the bush were asked where they were going by the camp nurse. One male camper, Brian, explained that they were on the way to his cabin. The nurse asked if they intended to take the girls to the cabin too. Noting her concern about the campers' intentions, Brian scoffed, "Oh, don't worry. We've been in the bush. We'll have some work for you in nine months."[2]

On another occasion I overheard an argument between a number of campers and a counsellor concerning smoking. The camper caught smoking was sitting in front of my cabin and was aware of, yet unconcerned by, my presence. This illustrates that all campers did not 'hide' in the bush and were well aware of the possibility of being discovered. Similarly, campers were often caught smoking on the back steps of their cabins and would not stop when a counsellor appeared.

Walking back to his cabin, which was nearby, Norm discovered Rose sitting by herself, smoking.

> Norm: "Give me your cigarette."
> Rose: "Why?"
> Norm: "'Cause you're not allowed to smoke,"
> Rose: "So."

At this point Mike (Norm's camper and Rose's friend) having overheard, came running up, shouting to Rose, "Don't give him your fucking cigarette. Ignore him. He's a jerk anyway." Mike continued to shout at Norm, trying to engage him in a fight, to which Norm calmly replied, "I can't. You know I can't. I'm a counsellor." As Mike continued to taunt Norm a third camper arrived, shouting at Mike, "He's

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[2] This incident was reported and the two male campers had a day's privileges withheld.

your elder. You don't call him a fucker. You don't call him names."
Mike, ignoring this intrusion, continued to yell at Norm. The argument
continued in this way until Norm's campers in a nearby cabin began
shouting and running into the bush. Norm ended the argument by walking
back to his cabin to quiet his campers. For the next few days, Norm
complained that he could not control his cabin group. The evening's
argument, and Norm's inability to control it (or stop Rose from smoking)
had made his campers aware of the staff's inability to compel unruly
campers to behave without breaking the rules and possibly losing their
jobs.

Although some campers were often open about their activities in
the bush, others would hide from passing counsellors, hoping not to be
seen. If caught they would explain that they were going to the washroom
or to the nurse; when the counsellor left, they would return to their
activities. Campers going on raids would often use these excuses in the
hope that they wouldn't be stopped.

However, campers did not always go into the bush to smoke or
meet girlfriends or boyfriends. Sometimes campers would be caught "just
sitting there in the bush, doing nothing . . . All alone." When asked
why, the counsellors explained ". . . to break rules. To make us look
for them."

Bush activity was "the main topic of conversation" among the
staff members in the chalet. Discoveries of campers in the bush on
previous nights would be discussed and reasons for these bush activities
would be suggested. The most common explanation, one supported by the
campers' comments, was that campers

> . . . wanted to rebel against camp policies and felt
> that this was a fair way to gain attention by disobeying

> one of the camp's 'taboos.' [The older campers]
> left the cabin in order to rebel against the
> strictly set up rules of their age group.

For the most part staff members were aware of the innocent
nature of bush activities; however, among the staff,

> . . . rumours would sky-rocket. [People said]
> girls were being raped. Rumours though. Most of
> the cases of kids in the bush involved kids
> smoking. With the counsellors it seemed to be a
> great source of scandal . . . and gossip. It was
> humorous.

The campers' bush activities were clearly a source of entertainment to
staff members. Long, sometimes serious and often humorous discussions, and
the 'swat patrol', all illustrated the staff's enjoyment of the challenge
of finding missing campers. It was a game of "cat and mouse," "hide and
seek" for staff and campers combined.

> They don't want to be caught. I suppose. But
> they know we're going to look. We always do. I
> mean, they go out to have a smoke, but they know
> we're coming. They like it. The challenge maybe.
> They can show off to their friends.

The Camp Meotick Carnival featured a 'marriage booth' designed
and run by the Leader girls and their counsellor. The booth offered
24 hour marriages for couples, consisting of a ceremony, a marriage
license, and a kiss. The girls and their counsellor jokingly advertised
a 'honeymoon package' comprising an hour in the bush for the newlyweds.
As an aside, it is interesting to note the occurrences surrounding the
proposed marriage booth.

The planned marriage booth was announced and described at lunch
one day prior to the carnival to give the campers the time to consider
possible mates. The conversation in the dining hall turned immediately
to this topic, with campers shouting to each other about who they would
like to marry, and who should marry whom. Proposals were made and talk

of the honeymoon in the bush continued throughout the meal; it seemed everyone had plans to marry. Yet the next day when the marriage booth opened no campers attempted to get married. Proposals made the day before in play suddenly took on the connotation of commitment. Campers were able to joke about whom they liked and whom they wished to accompany them in the bush. However, with the actuality of the marriage booth the playful proposals became relatively serious.

The discussion of the marriage and the honeymoon took place in a liminoid setting and merely suggested serious attraction between the two individuals. These were, as Briggs (1975:31) describes, 'serious jokes.' The proposals carried the implicit message of attraction, though such messages were disguised by the playful nature of the interaction. Play and the serious message could not be distinguished, and thus individuals making the proposals were protected from the more serious implications of their statements. Both audience and the participants were forced by the nature of the proposal to ". . . thread their way among meanings, 'real' and 'make-believe' . . ." unable to distinguish between them (Ibid.:31).

However, the reality of the marriage booth altered the play frame into one of a more serious nature. Where a proposal suggested attraction, marriage implied the reality of union. The proposal was made in a liminoid setting and the possible messages involved in the proposal were confined to that setting. The serious messages could not be removed from the playful setting for serious consideration, for the defense "I was only joking," was immediately available. The marriage, though still occurring in a playful mode, was a commitment, and, hence, of a more serious nature than the proposal. The serious message involved

in the marriage could be taken out of the playful context to stand by
itself as a statement of attraction between campers, leaving them with
a weakened defense. That is to say, the proposal and the implicit
statements involved in the proposal were locked into the liminoid setting.
They could not be removed from it without weakening their viability in
a serious mode. Conversely, the implicit statements involved in the
marriage could be removed intact from the liminoid setting, leaving the
camper open to derision from other campers. Campers could openly
propose marriage; they could not actually 'marry' when the opportunity
presented itself.

Although bush activities were, in general, acknowledged and
accepted by staff members, the existence of the bush was problematic
for them.

A paradoxical situation existed at Camp Meotick. Whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, the campers' bush activities underlined this
paradox. In the bush the campers could reverse the structure of the
camp, making themselves the momentary holders of power and removing
power and privilege form the staff members. At the same time, the bush
activities revealed the staff's real lack of power over the campers.
While staff members, by definition of their jobs, were given power over
the campers, the rules of the camp prevented them from exercising this
power. This will be clarified more fully as these bush activities are
discussed.

The bush was an area of Camp Meotick used by the campers to free
themselves from the structural restraints of the camp rules. As such,
it was antistructural (Turner 1974; Sutton-Smith 1972). Whereas the
camp was an area of highly structured and obligatory play, the bush was

an area of free and optional play. In the bush, as in the cliques, the campers 'played' with the camp structure, altering it to their liking, disposing of or ignoring those rules and/or activities which displeased them. The campers while in the bush 'played' with the staff, drawing them out of the chalet for a 'game' of hide and seek. The campers 'played off' (contested with) staff members by attempting to invert the apparent power structure, illustrate the real structure, define the desired structure and test the viability of all these structures. These various structural manipulations served to communicate campers' opinions about camp by forcing the staff and, through them, the administration to witness these bush activities. This is not to say that all campers or staff were aware of these manipulations. On the surface the campers moved into the bush merely for a cigarette or to be alone. However, bush activities also contained more complex behaviours and ramifications.

Because the bush represented an area free from the highly structured camp situation, it constituted a space which was at once part of the camp yet removed from it. The camp's liminal nature (illustrated in its highly structured sets of rules, definitions, and obligations) was offset by the bush's freedom. The campers could please themselves in the bush, defining their activities according to their desires rather than the desires of administration, staff, or outside world (represented by these bodies of authority).

At the same time, camp functionaries constantly infringed upon the bush, defining it as 'out of bounds' and sending representatives in to bring the campers back into the normal structure.

As camp representatives entered the bush the two structures clashed. Each of these modes, structure and antistructure, contra-

distinguished each other. In the Hegelian sense it was a clash of thesis (structure) and antithesis (antistructure), yet, because one was stronger than the other, the outcome was neither a synthesis, nor, as Marx would have it, a revolution. What did occur was a clarification of the two opposing forces, revealing much about the camp structure.

The campers went into the bush because they wished, for example, to smoke. The normal structure did not allow this. This restriction was further complicated by the fact that while privileges were withheld from them their age mates on staff had no such restrictions.

The discriminatory nature of this 'privilege' structure made the bush that much more attractive to campers. When a camper smoked he/she stole that right from a staff member. By moving out of the camp structure the camper forced the counsellor, as representative of that structure, to move in pursuit.

On those evenings when staff members enjoyed extra privileges, such as the corn roast, the bush activities by campers would increase. On these nights campers were not reacting directly to increased freedom, for theoretically there was none. All camp rules remained in effect, with the duty counsellor checking the grounds and counsellors called away to find and/or quiet the campers. They were reacting to the privileges which the staff were receiving, taking privileges for themselves, as well as depriving the counsellors by disrupting their parties.

By usurping the staff members' free time the camper gained both privilege and power. While in the bush, he was able to define the staff's activities. This power to define the structure suggests Farrer's (1979) concept of contesting. The campers drew the staff away from their activities, pushed them into a complicated game of hide and seek, and/or

vied for power. This contesting could be seen in individual episodes
of bush activities as well as in the whole gamut of bush activities.

The contest could end immediately upon the entrance of a staff
member. "They were silent and simply obeyed [the order to return to
their cabins], no excuses, no explanations or anything." Hence, in such
situations the contesting ended with one move -, the staff member's
order. The campers returned to their cabin and thereby acknowledged
staff members' authority. However, the bush activity and the contesting
were often drawn out while the camper and staff confronted one another.

Norm, Rose and Mike were clearly contesting as they argued in
front of my cabin. Norm's intrusion into the bush began the 'contest-
ing'. His opening 'move' (Farrer 1979), "Give me your cigarette" was
countered by Rose's question, "Why?" Norm's opening bid (order) had
not been accepted. Rose, as her move, demanded justification for
Norm's request. Norm then strengthened his position by quoting camp
rules, thereby invisibly reinforcing himself with the camp structure:
"'Cause you're not allowed to smoke." Rose continued to block Norm's
demands by rejecting this justification: "So." The two were interrupted
by Mike at this point. Presumably, had the contesting continued, Norm
would have had to alter his strategy completely as Rose continued to
question his initial demand. Were this interaction to constitute the
entire contesting, Rose would have won. Though she was, in fact, break-
ing a rule, she would not acknowledge the importance of the rule,
destroying Norm's attempted line of reasoning.

However, Mike arrived at this point and the contesting became
one between Norm and Mike. Mike began with an insult addressed to Rose
though aimed at Norm: "Keep your. . . cigarette, he's a jerk." Mike

then tried to engage Norm in a fight. Norm could not accept the challenge. "I can't. You know I can't. I'm a counsellor." Although a new camper attempted to enter the contesting at this point, he was ignored, and the interaction continued between Mike and Norm. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Mike was attempting to draw Norm outside of his role as counsellor. For Norm to have entered a fight, he would have first had to step outside of his role as counsellor, thereby releasing Mike from his role as camper. If this were accomplished Norm would have negated his authority in this situation, leaving him unable to stop Rose from smoking and/or order Mike back to his cabin. The two campers, perhaps inadvertently, had boxed Norm into a contradictory situation (Watzlawick 1967:217).[1] Possible choices existed for Norm's next 'move' in the contesting. Yet, ". . . in the face of a contradictory injunction, one chooses one and loses. . ." (Ibid.:217). Norm could stop only one of the two campers. To stop Rose from smoking would have produced further antagonistic behaviour from Mike. To fight with Mike would entail losing his counsellor's authority over Rose, as Norm would no longer be merely a counsellor. One avenue remained open to Norm, and he took it. Yet he discovered that even this was inadequate. Norm remained inactive in the contesting, leaving Rose to smoke and Mike to urge a fight. Norm's inability to act in this situation, witnessed by his cabin group, released them from his authority as he seemed, at this time, to have none. The following few days Norm could not control his campers. In the contesting between Norm, Rose and Mike, Norm had

[1] This situation cannot be labelled a double bind or paradoxical episode. As Watzlawick, et. al. (1967) explains, a paradoxical or double bind situation allows no action to be taken by the 'victim' for he has been ordered not to do what he has been ordered to do. Hence, action is impossible.

lost and, for his cabin group, Norm's authority had been destroyed.

The bush, then, was antistructural, denying and inverting the camp rules. Contesting occurred when staff members entered the bush armed with camp rules and attempted to order campers back into the camp structure. Since in the bush these rules did not always apply, reference to them by staff members was an inadequate strategy. When campers caught in the bush returned quickly to their cabins after staff members arrived, it was because they recognized and acknowledged camp rules and structure. These campers perceived themselves as breaking real rules and therefore, by extrapolation, it can be inferred that they accepted the validity of the rules and the authority of the counsellors.

Those campers who remained in the bush after they had been approached by staff members did so because they did not acknowledge the importance of the rules or the staff members' authority to enforce them. For them, the bush was at once part of the camp yet apart from the camp. It was their own creation. When the antistructural participant (the camper in the bush) and the structural participant (the counsellor in the bush) met, the contest began. In the end the camp structure was always victorious, for the camper had eventually to return. However, the counsellor was not always personally victorious. The 'contesting' was not between the camper and the camp, for each was dependent upon the other. The contesting was between the camper and the counsellor. The question was not "will the camper return to the camp?", but "who will decide when the camper will return to the camp?"

Closer inspection reveals that this contest had even more ramifications. Campers' presence in the bush communicated to the staff and administration that the campers were, in some way, displeased. The

campers went into the bush to do something they could not do in the camp
(smoke, meet a boyfriend or girlfriend, be alone, etc.) or to avoid doing
something that they did not wish to do. The staff and administration
were forced by these bush activities to be aware of this dissatisfaction.

The constant discussion of bush activities by the staff members
transformed the bush into a stage. The encounters between staff members
and campers in the bush became presentations and debates. Each side
presented arguments evincing their desires. Even the simple "So"
stated by Rose was a complicated presentation implying her acknowledge-
ment of the existence of the rules and her apathy about their binding
nature. The camper and the staff member, each receiving their defi-
nition and potential from the administration of the camp, attempted in
these contestings to clarify their positions relative to these defi-
nitions and possibilities. The camper wanted his/her definition
broadened, the staff member wanted his/her and the campers' definitions
maintained. The counsellor, exercising authority given to him by the
camp, tried to bring the campers out of the bush. The camper, enjoying
otherwise restricted privileges, wanted to stay in the bush (or to have
these privileges in the camp). These contestings clarified the other-
wise unspoken or implied statements. Each participant argued for his or
her side. The contestings were texts, with the camp structure, on the
one hand, and the antistructure, on the other hand, forming the under-
lying context. It was because the bush and the camp interfered with
each other that the contesting took place. In these contestings, the
camper and his antistructural refuge vied for momentary superiority
with the counsellor and his structural environment. Superiority could
only be momentary for either participant; the camper had to return

to the camp, yet the bush was always available for escape. The confron-
tation between two realms - in the form of interaction between camper
and staff - commented on the participants' perceptions of the camp and
their places within it. The contests were, in Geertz's terms,

> . . . a metasocial commentary upon the whole matter
> of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical
> ranks and then organizing the major part of collective
> existence around this assortment. Its function . . .
> is interpretive; it is . . . a story they tell them-
> selves about themselves (1971:26).

These stories contained myriad messages about the camp and the
people in it. Some were personal and presented individuals' like and
dislikes. Many overtly and covertly described and commented on the camp
situation for both campers and staff members.

The situation revealed in these contestings, when viewed
diachronically, was that for the older campers and younger staff the
camp structure rested upon a paradox. The camp could maintain age mates
on staff and as campers only so long as this paradox survived.

Within the camp structure the older camper was in a somewhat
paradoxical situation. Whereas outside the camp this individual was
partly an adult and partly a child, in the camp he or she was allowed
to be only a child.

In a true double bind or paradoxical situation an individual is
forced to comply with two orders ". . . and one of these denies the
other" (Bateson 1972b:208). In the camp the camper was defined as a
child for the duration of his stay, yet expected to be mature about this
definition.

The programme director explained of Sean,

> When he's given something to do - some responsibility
> he can really get into it, and involved, and be good.
> However, when he is not given these things, he's a

problem and makes a lot of trouble.

Similarly, after a camper was hurt in a baseball game and was taken, crying, to the nurse, she was admonished.("Big girls don't cry. You're a big girl. Come here, you cry-baby.")

The older campers at Camp Meotick were in a liminal situation where they were both child and adult, yet neither. They were doubly bound. If they acted like children they were told to grow up, yet they were denied outlets to exhibit mature behaviour.

In a true double bind or paradoxical situation the individual has no recourse for action, for

> . . . the recipient of the [double] message is
> prevented from stepping outside the frame set by
> this message, either by metacommunicating
> (commenting) about it or by withdrawing
> (Watzlawick 1967:212).

However, unlike a pure double bind situation, at Camp Meotick there existed the possibility of withdrawal. By moving into the bush the camper could avoid this paradoxical definition. At the same time by stepping outside of the camp the camper could more clearly see his paradoxical existence in the camp, for ". . . in order to see the paradigm . . . it is necessary to shift out of it . . ." (Farrer 1980:18).

In one sense the bush was a release mechanism for these older campers. The antistructural nature of the bush and the possible freedoms inherent therein provided campers with a respite from the camp structure and their paradoxical situation within it.

In a wider sense the bush released the campers from their paradoxical definition. In the bush the camper was a whole individual - adult-cum-child. And, aside from the lack of control over campers in the bush, this release from paradox, possible in the bush, presented a

.new problem to the camp.

The authority of staff members, especially those whose ages overlapped with the campers, was dependent upon the continued perception of the campers as children. By maintaining that older campers were "not as mature as they should [be]" the distinction between older camper and younger staff member was supportable. The staff member had authority over older campers only as long as the campers admitted and acknowledged a difference between themselves and staff members. The camp allowed the possibility of this distinction by suspending, for the duration of the camp, the adult side of the older camper and the child-like side of the younger staff member.

In the 'bush contestings' the staff members won only when the campers admitted the counsellors' right to make them leave the bush. The staff members lost when the camper involved recognized his equality with the staff member and denied the very distinction which gave the counsellor authority. In the bush the counsellors' authority was revealed to be empty, an authority based upon a non-existent distinction. The older camper and counsellor were equal. Campers recognized this, whether consciously or unconsciously, and fought for their right to share the staff's privileges. The staff member, needing to sustain this distinction to do his job, presented his argument to the camper using rules and regulations which were invalid in the bush, since they were based upon a distinction that had been negated.

The destruction of the paradox which confined the camper created a new paradox which confined the counsellor.

Counsellors' continued authority over campers was dependent upon the campers' belief that the authority was real. The counsellor was

supposed to keep campers from smoking, but he could not confiscate the cigarettes in their suitcases. He was supposed to take cigarettes away from campers if they were caught with them, but he could not force them, bodily, to give them up. He could only ask for them. The camper then decided whether or not to comply. If he/she considered the staff member to have authority, then the camper gave the cigarettes up, for the demand was perceived to have been an order. If the camper perceived the counsellor as having no authority the demand was merely a request.

Similarly, if a staff member ordered a camper to leave the bush the camper decided whether or not he would concede. The staff member could not physically remove him from the bush.

Hence, the staff member's authority was dependent upon the admission of that authority by the camper. That admission was dependent upon the camper believing that the counsellor had a right to that authority; this in turn hinged upon the camper's belief that the staff member was more mature than he/she. The bush revealed the paradoxical definition of the campers. As in Kim's dream (see Chapter 2) the trick was revealed for what it was. The older camper and the counsellor were no different. They had the same rights and abilities. The camper had been 'tricked' into believing that they were different, that one was stronger and/or more mature than the other. Where the camper was bound in a paradox in the camp the counsellor was bound in a paradox in the bush.

In the bush the campers were not only free of camp structure but had the power to alter it. In the antistructural realm of the bush campers engaged the staff in a playful competition. The outcome of the

competition was known by all beforehand: the camper would return to the camp. However, until the camper did this, the competition continued. This play began with the camper leaving the camp. He might seriously want to avoid being caught in the bush yet he knew that the staff members must look for him. He knew the confrontation was likely. He could, upon being caught, end the competition immediately. The contesting ". . . can be over in a matter of minutes, as when a contesting bid is unaccepted or when one player concedes after only a move or two" (Farrer 1980:1), or can continue for any length of time. The playfulness of these bush activities for the campers lay in the opportunity to take privileges which were actually available to neither. For campers and staff the playfulness consisted of apparently manipulated power, when in reality the only power was in the hands of the administration. Each was aware of the other's lack of power. Hence, the players were

> . . . adversaries in collusion who push at the boundaries [camp rules] to gain momentary control of the situation . . . and hence accrue to . . . [themselves] power, glory points, satisfaction or for whatever . . . [they] are playing (Ibid.:17).

The play carried with it the potential for changing the camp as a whole. The campers communicated ideas and desires that were not fulfilled in the camp as it existed. The staff members realized that they needed more authority if they were to do their jobs efficiently. Though these competitions brought about no changes in the camp structure, they communicated to the campers and staff, and through them to the administration, that changes were wanted. These 'contestings' clarified these desires.

The play was at once serious and non-serious. Players called for changes they knew would not be made. The outcome of the game was

unimportant, since neither camper nor counsellor could claim a permanent victory. As in all play, it was the means to the end, not the end, which was most important.

The potentially serious nature of these three play forms in no way detracted from their playful nature:". . . for some play can be very serious indeed" (Huizinga 1950:5). What set this play apart from the more organized play at Camp Meotick was that it had been created by the campers themselves. In this way it may be considered as fulfilling some personal needs that were left unfulfilled in the camp.

The absenting activities, the clique behaviour, and the bush activities were free forms of play. They at once commented upon camp life and had the potential to release individuals from the structures which bound them. My next step will be to show how the play activities manipulate and comment upon the structures.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

Play and leisure, as periods of respite from ". . . everyday
social demands and obligations" (Stone 1971:182), offer participants a
number of freedoms from the reigning social structure. During leisure
time one is presented with ". . . two types of freedom, "freedom-from"
and "freedom-to" . . ." (Turner 1974:68). Leisure and play represent
freedom from the structural obligations of everyday social life. More
importantly, for our purposes, leisure and play offer freedom ". . . to
transcend social structural limitations . . ." (Ibid.:68). This
freedom makes it possible for participants to communicate their ideas
and feelings in order either to manipulate or comment on the social
structure which surrounds them.

In the highly structured camp, with its attention to strict
supervision of campers, periods of leisure and play corresponded to a
loosened control over campers by counsellors. Specifically, freedom
from strict control occurred during 'free time' activities (formal and
informal games, free swim, between activities, etc.) and during rest
periods (after lunch, after dinner, and after evening activities).
During lessons it was necessary for staff members to maintain control
over their campers and to keep the campers' attention focussed on the
activity. Conversely, during games, campers were 'playing' and were,

therefore, free to participate in the game according to their desires and abilities. Although counsellors were present during games, the campers, providing they did not disrupt the game, were free from staff sanctioning. During leisure periods the campers escaped this social structure. This was due largely to the absence of staff members and/or to their diminished attention.

If we consider periods of relaxation from the highly structured camp routine and lifestyle as spaces in the social structure we obtain a clearer understanding of their potential. The play taking place during games offered a small series of spaces; during leisure, one relatively long space was offered - though this too may have been broken up into smaller spaces by the interference of staff members. These spaces represented periods of opportunity for individuals to act outside of the confines of the normal structure. Games were spaces, for the camp structure was momentarily put aside to allow the structure of the game to govern the actions of the players. In the camp the egalitarian ethic was displaced to allow competition leading to a distinction between winners and losers. With the end of the game the egalitarian ethic was again instituted, with the winners and losers returning to equal status.

These spaces were the liminoid periods in the camp structure (Turner 1974). They began as small opportunities (choosing teams, strategies, partners, etc.) which might be enlarged to incorporate personal desires rather than merely to serve the activity. It was in these liminoid spaces that absenting, clique, and bush activities became possibilities. These liminoid spaces were the areas of potential in the camp structure. When manipulated by the campers to serve their own rather than merely structural purposes, they became the ". . . settings

in which new symbols, models and paradigms arise - [they are] the seed-beds of cultural creativity . . ." (Turner 1974:60). As such they could be used to support the structure or to create the antistructure. These liminoid spaces were, for the campers, areas of pure potential: they, not the counsellor, defined what came next.

Leisure and play, the liminoid sphere of modern life, is separated from the utilitarian, work-a-day world. As such it is considered to be a non-serious and playful setting, free from mundane restrictions (Ibid.:85). However, activities within the liminoid setting may become serious. The liminoid setting itself is an area of pure potential. The nature of activity in the liminoid space is dependent upon what one chooses to do within it and/or how one chooses to manipulate it. Liminoid spheres may be used for 'neutral' activities - play, relaxation or leisure - or they may be used for more serious matters; but the liminoid sphere itself is, metaphorically, simply a 'stage'. The participant is both playwright and actor.

The potential of this liminoid sphere lies in the fact that it is an area of freedom and option rather than one of obligation (Ibid.). Liminoid spheres may thus contain an ample array of phenomena, ranging from inactivity to the production of

> . . .social critiques or even revolutionary mani-
> festoes . . . exposing the injustices, inefficiencies,
> and immoralities of the mainstream economic and
> political structures and organizations (Ibid.:86).

However, it must be realized that even these 'serious' activities originate in a non-work, non-utilitarian, playful domain wherein one is free of the mundane social structure. This freedom offers the individual a clearer perception, a "crow's-eye-view" (Bateson 1979:12) of that social structure, for ". . . in order to see the paradigm one

must shift out of it" (Farrer 1980:18).

The possibility of myriad forms of activity arise in the liminoid domain. These activities remain innocuous until they interfere with the social structure. They are considered dangerous only when they violate structural norms, or when they are considered to have the potential to violate structural norms. Consequently, before they become dangerous these activities must be noticed and understood by persons within the structure who wish to maintain the status quo.

In a camp setting we are hardly likely to find revolutions or even revolution-in-the-making. Control of Camp Meotick's campers was virtually complete - confirmed not only by the camp structure, but by the larger social structure. To eat, sleep comfortably, and to use camp facilities, the campers had to conform to the rules. Serious breaches of camp ethics would lead to expulsion, not revolution. Yet even expulsion from the camp was not an available avenue for escape. Campers (and their parents) were clients of the camp who exchanged a fee for a service. The camp, as a business, could not expell campers without a strong reason. Campers who asked parents to let them leave Camp Meotick rarely gained this permission since money had been exchanged, plans made, etc. Hence expulsion, whether at the insistence of the camper or the administration, was a rarity.

However, the liminoid sphere of Camp Meotick was exploited by campers to allow the fulfillment of personal desires and expectations. The older campers could smoke and be alone. The Abenakie and Algonquin girls could choose close friends. On the private level, these liminoid spheres proffered opportunities for personal inclinations to exist within the community-oriented camp. However, because the camp was a

public domain other individuals were almost always present at, or on the periphery of these liminoid activities. In the camp these 'outsiders' were also exploited, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, in liminoid activities. Campers could convey to them their personal desires and needs and thereby suggest what changes should be made in the camp structure. Campers could also use outsiders to buttress their activities and raise their status.

The utilization of outsiders as mediators to communicate griev-ances to the governing body of the camp naturally entailed that these mediating individuals have contact with the rule-making body. Thus mediators were staff members. Other campers could not viably be enlisted as messengers. They could however serve to support - voluntarily or forcibly - the actions of the liminoid actors.

Liminoid activities had a number of ramifications at Camp Meotick. Whether or not the liminoid actors were aware of all of them at all times is a moot point; however, because outsiders were always available to the liminoid actors, their enlistment was always a possibility.

Clique, other group activities, and the 'outward absenting activities' were all similar in that their complete success was dependent on manipulation of outsiders. They were forced and even tricked into the role of audience, usually with little or no opportunity for actual inclusion.

The bush activities and the 'exploratory' absenting activities did not necessitate that an audience be present for their successful completion. However, because of the communal nature of the camp, campers were often present on the periphery of the action. More importantly,

since these activities took place in an antistructural realm, staff members were required by the camp structure to interfere with and try to end them. However, invocation of camp rules was not always a sufficient inducement. Campers and staff members would often argue, contest, bargain, or negotiate to bring the activity to its end.

The audience composed of staff members was of a different nature than those involved in the clique and group activities, since counsellors who were present at bush activities participated in the action by 'contesting' with campers (Farrer 1979,1980). The bush activities and the 'contestings' were usually reported to the rest of the staff members at a later time. Hence, the audience of the bush activities did not need to be present for the activity to be successful or to be known. Extrapolating from the work of social psychologists studying bargaining situations, it is suggested that

> . . . an audience may either be physically present or
> absent from the site of a bargaining encounter
> (although, in the latter case, still psychologically
> present in the mind(s) of one or more of the
> bargainers). Psychological presence pertains when
> it is supposed by a bargainer that, even though the
> proceedings may not actually be witnessed, the events
> that transpire and the performance of the bargainers
> will eventually become known to an audience (Rubin
> 1975:43).

These two kinds of disruptive behaviour, each manipulating the camp structure when the opportunity arose, effectively communicated the actors' ideas and/or desires to the audience. The clique and group performed in order to strengthen their boundaries and raise their status. Actors, including the counsellors, used bush activities to gain rights or maintain the status quo - and perhaps unconsciously to comment on the structure of the camp and their place in it - through 'contestings.'

Hence, the liminoid sphere at Camp Meotick was employed for relaxation and play as well as for more serious purposes. Because these activities took place during periods of free play, their serious nature was camouflaged. Similarly, in the bush, staff members were more concerned about retrieving campers than listening to their comments. Nevertheless, campers' criticisms were communicated.

Those liminoid responses which have been described may be viewed as performances and presentations. Through these dramaturgical activities campers were able to alter the camp structure to suit their own needs and wants. These behaviours consisted of a number of variables. They were clearly liminoid, since they not only took place within a liminoid sphere but were themselves play activities. This may not at once be easily recognizable, for what play is - what constitutes the 'playful' - is an elusive concept. But if we accept that the behaviours concerned took place in a liminoid (playful) sphere, were enjoyable to the actors, and were representative of freedom and option rather than obligation, then we may confidently label them as playful activities. They were also communicative performances, or, in other words, dramaturgic presentations. The campers performed activities they desired to perform, in the manner in which they desired to perform them. And, because an audience was always present, physically or psychologically, these performances were witnessed. Ideas were necessarily presented, for ". . . all behaviour in an interactional situation has message value, i.e., is communication . . ." (Watzlawick 1967:48). The presentational value of these activities stemmed from the fact that they were performed in front of 'others' and that they presented ideas, attitudes, personal characteristics, etc. to 'others.'

Attempts to control and/or manipulate were also a factor in these activities. The desired control may have been over the audience, the interactants, the situation, the self, or any combination of these. The fact that these performances took place in the liminoid sphere of Camp Meotick is important. The campers, existing in a situation wherein they had little control over themselves or others, could use play and the freedom it offered as an opportunity to exert control. This could be either permanent (i.e., existing outside the liminoid sphere as well as in it), or momentary (confined to the liminoid sphere). As Garvey points out, one ". . . intrinsically satisfying feature of play, which is present for each participant, is the feature of control" (1974:179). Similarly, campers, specifically campers in the bush, were able through activities and 'contestings' to comment on the very 'control' which instigated their movement into the bush. That is, in the bush activities and contestings campers were able to control the staff's activities, illustrate the nature of the staff members' control over them, and comment on the nature of control in the camp. Again it was the liminoid sphere which afforded this possibility. Although it pertains to children playing with children, Schwartzman's observation is relevant here. She says:

> In play, specific attempts at control and commentaries on the more general idea of control, are "displayed" because children are able to act as both the subjects and the objects of their play (1978:243).

Play activities, through the freedom they offered, allowed campers to play, perform, comment, and control at the same time as they fulfilled personal needs or desires.

Just as the two groups (intermediate girls and senior campers) were different, their liminoid activities varied. The camp structure and the control it imposed over campers had a differing effect on the

two groups. The intermediate girls' lifestyles were less severely
affected by the camp structure.' Outside of the camp their lifestyles
were more strictly supervised by their parents. All the girls told me
that they and their parents felt they were still too young to date.
Although they showed an interest in male campers it was more often
spoken of than displayed. Perhaps what affected them most in the camp
structure was the camp's desire that they befriend all their cabin
mates impartially. Though there was little open hostility between the
girls, there were clear preferences. This was certainly to be expected,
although the camp structure, through the counsellors, attempted to make
it difficult for hierarchies of popularity to form.

The seniors encountered far more difficulties in the camp.
Rights that they had enjoyed in their home environment (to privacy,
autonomy, the right to date and smoke, etc.) were taken away in the
camp. These problems were compounded by the existence of age mates on
staff who did not suffer these restrictions. Aggravation of these
problems arose from the fact that it was often the ages mates on staff
who saw to it that these restrictions were enforced.

The formation of cliques and preferences in what is supposed to'
be an egalitarian setting is neither surprising, nor essentially
problematic. For instance,

> In all classroom contexts, teachers are clearly
> demarcated as the authority figure(s). They, in
> turn, frequently define all children as equal . . .
> However, it is often clear to everyone involved that
> some children are more equal than others, and this
> is evidenced by the peer group hierarchies that
> invariably develop in these contexts . . . Neverthe-
> less, the "pretense" of equality is maintained in
> the classroom by the teacher(s), while the "reality"
> of the hierarchy is reflected only in the "pretense"
> of play, where children are in control (Schwartzman
> 1978:245).

Similarly, the counsellors' presence prevented the hierarchy or the clique from dominating the group. The Abenakie and Algonquin counsellors would often choose team membership themselves or appoint a less popular girl as captain. Even the admonishing of Pat, Laurie, Valerie, and Ellen on the hike back from the picnic served to equalize the campers. Waiting for the four girls to catch up to the group or having them wait was not an absolute necessity as they were always within sight. However, forcing them to walk with the group symbolically diminished the social distance between the clique and outsiders. They could, and did, maintain the social distance by whispering, laughing, and ignoring the others. But by lessening the physical distance the counsellors were able to suggest that there existed a complete group rather than subgroups.

The counsellors were not always able to support even the appearance of equality in their cabin groups. Girls were often free to separate or give the appearance of separating from the group. As mentioned earlier, this was made possible through performances and through the formation of outsiders who were forced into the role of audience. These performances may be likened to the 'social dramas' which Turner (1974b) describes, though these 'dramas' were not as dangerous to the status quo as were those of which he speaks. It would be more useful to view these presentations, not as confrontations, but as performances aimed at strengthening the clique members' identities and raising their statuses.

All the girls in the Abenakie and Algonquin cabins wanted to be liked by their cabin mates. Ruth, though she would not "follow the herd", wanted to be liked and accepted in the cabin group and was

disappointed that she was not popular. Yet it seemed being liked and accepted was not enough for the clique members.

> It is not enough only to establish an identity for
> one's self; it must be established for others at
> the same time. Identities are announced by those
> who appropriate them and placed by others. Identi-
> ties must always be validated in this manner to
> have reality in social interaction (Stone 1971:12).

Hence, the clique members presented their popularity to the out-
siders to validate it. The clique members presented themselves to out-
siders as jovial, interesting, interested, fun-loving, and loyal indi-
viduals. At the same time they did not offer these attributes of them-
selves to the whole cabin population. Perhaps they felt themselves to be
"too good" to offer themselves freely (or, obversely, that outsiders were
not good enough), or that their complete friendship had to be earned, or
that they (unlike the outsiders) could pick and choose their friends and
be immediately accepted. It would be possible to list an unlimited
number of motives here, though these few will suffice. In order to
present these attributes, the clique members had to gain the outsiders'
attention. This was accomplished by setting themselves apart from the
other girls. In this way the clique members could indicate that they
were not merely one of the crowd (though it was a small crowd). Any
actor, to be successful, must not only draw attention to himself but
place himself in such a position that he is easily seen (Hall 1969:125;
Goffman 1974:124). When Pat, Laurie, Valerie, and Ellen explored the
picnic area and walked to and from the dock their activities could
easily be seen by the fourteen other campers. When they walked behind
or in front of the group they were equally accessible to the eye. The
eye-catching nature of such separation is highlighted when one 'makes an
entrance.' Although it may have been happenstance that Laurie and Pat

came to the dock later than Donna, though she had repeatedly asked people to accompany her, they were immediately sighted by Donna and their entrance elicited critical comments from her. This too may have been coincidental. Nonetheless, it exaggerated the separateness of the Laura-Pat dyad. Similarly, when the Algonquin girls decided to have their own pyjama breakfast, they entered the dining hall after all the other campers had gone in. Their entrance focussed attention on their appearance and added to the effect that they wished to make.

Once a clique is in an easily observable position it becomes necessary to gain and hold outsiders' attention. Pat, Laurie, Valerie, and Ellen laughed and spoke loudly, and often whispered, though this often seemed unnecessary. Removed from the group while they were exploring, shouting and whispering was equally needless: they were in easy hearing distance of each other and the other campers were distant. Though Pat and Laurie did not wish to include Donna in their conversation on the dock they did not move away. Rather they encouraged (if I may analyse their motives) Donna to listen to their conversation though they did not allow her to join. The Algonquin girls, during their 'group performances' sang louder than, and interrupted, other people.

At the same time as attention was being gained and inclusion denied, these girls were attempting a selective presentation of the attractive aspects of their groups and personalities. They got along well with each other and enjoyed themselves. When disagreements arose, as when Pat did not want Laurie to swim with Donna, these were carried out quietly and privately. Only the most attractive side of the individuals and the groups were presented for public attention.

The individuals in the clique and the group presented and

advertised their popularity, their attractiveness, and their ideal
selves, aiming to make an impression upon others. Their perceptions of
themselves were not only known to themselves but reinforced through the
utilization and manipulation of others. The time and trouble that the
girls took to accomplish this illustrates the importance they attributed
to their public identities. Much of their play and enjoyment revolved
around presenting and maintaining this identity. Like the children in
the day care centre, these girls were, it appears,

> . . . very much concerned with issues of control,
> dominance and manipulation . . . and their play
> was both a reflection and interpretation of these
> concerns. It was, in fact, a commentary on their
> own particular interaction styles . . . (Schwartzman
> 1978:243).

Whether or not these girls are still children, it is possible to des-
cribe their activities in these 'identity performances' as what Jeanne
Cannizzo (1979), in ethnology, defines as the "politics of childhood,"
and Sylvia Fraser (1976:158), in literature, defines as "playground
society." As Cannizzo explains, the politics of childhood and, I would
add, of female adolescence ". . . are the politics of identity" (1979:5).

The performances of these clique and group members and the
resultant manipulated reactions of the audience at once served to
buttress the members' identities and acted as commentaries on the nature
of the egalitarian ethic in the camp (and, by extrapolation, in the
wider society).

The bush activities and the 'contestings' that often followed
were far more serious forms of play than the clique performances. Like
the clique and group behaviours they took place in the liminoid sphere,
however, the campers who took part in bush activities were clearly
breaking camp rules, while the clique members were illustrating an ethic

which varied from one of the camp's ideals (an ideal which was recognized as unenforceable). The bush actors were utilizing the liminoid sphere of Camp Meotick for behaviour which was 'illegal' in the camp, altering the liminoid sphere into one which was antistructural.

The bush activities, like the clique and group performances, contained the possibilities of play, control, and comment. However, the control and commentative attributes of the bush activities were secondary to the activity itself. Unlike the clique and group performances, bush activity did not require manipulation or control of audience for its complete success. The senior campers moved into the bush to have a cigarette or be alone - that is, to have some freedom from the camp structure and its representatives. That these activities interrupted the staff's free time may have been a satisfying outcome to the campers: it was, nevertheless, only an indirect outcome of their activities. The campers' initial objective was to have a cigarette, be alone, or whatever their main desire. Interference by counsellors altered these activities from self-centered to camp-centered.

Because of the campers' presence in the bush, as well as the 'illegality' of their activities, the bush activities were dangerous to the status quo at Camp Meotick. The very presence of campers in the bush communicated some desire which the camp was not fulfilling and therefore some dissatisfaction with the camp. Left alone, the campers would have voluntarily returned to the camp. But they were breaking rules while in the bush and it was recognized that their activities could have been far more serious than merely smoking a cigarette. Hence staff and administration members agreed that these bush activities ought to be ended or at least controlled. The counsellors' search of the

bush, whether done seriously or playfully (as with the 'swat patrol'),
set the 'stage' for confrontation and conflict between counsellors and
campers and, through them, the camp structure and antistructure. Here
we approach what Victor Turner (1974b) has called 'social drama'. This
concept seems a useful analysing technique in this situation.

As mentioned earlier the movement toward utilization of the bush
began on the first day of the camp session. Sarah's choice of a game,
suggesting as it did the campers' definition and the treatment of all
campers as children, led to an 'exploratory' absenting activity by two
campers. As previously suggested, the two campers were, even at this
early stage, exploring the possible avenues of escape from the confining
camp structure, and making the initial movements into the bush. These
girls and the activity they engaged in helped to define the situation
and the possibilities that existed for escaping from it. They were
involved in a

> . . . process in which the individual explores the
> behaviour possibilities of a situation, marking out
> particularly the limitation which the situation
> imposes upon his behavior, with the final result
> that the individual forms an attitude toward the
> situation, or, more exactly, in the situation
> (Waller 1970:162).

Because all behaviour is communication, these two girls and the
campers who followed them out of the game were commenting on the nature
of camp life. The final result of this exploratory episode was that the
campers learned that they could escape the camp structure - they could,
in fact, maintain some autonomy over themselves.

I am not sure how soon after this episode the senior campers
entered the bush. By the end of the first week of camp it had become a
major topic of conversation among staff members. I am not aware of any

other 'exploratory' absenting activities, though I am sure that others
must have occurred. Indeed, all the bush activities were exploratory.
Even Sheila, in her attempts to convince counsellors to give her a
cigarette, or a 'drag' of their cigarette, was exploring the possi-
bilities of overcoming a situation which to her was confining. These
attempts eventually led to resolutions, whether with the consent of the
counsellors (as when Sheila convinced Maureen to give her a cigarette)
or without the consent of the counsellors (in bush activities). These
exploratory activities served to 'map' the possible avenues of escape
from camp restrictions. They were dynamic, in that as well as releasing
the camper from the structure during the absenting activity itself, they
informed campers about the likelihood of escape in the future. These
campers were like, as Goffman suggests,

> . . . those who are suffered as participants in a
> social occasion, who, as is said, "test the limits,"
> that is, initiate a minor situational delinquency
> and then progressively increase its scope until
> adults must intercede to protect the affair they
> expect to continue to be involved in (1974:423).

The final outcome of these explorations was the discovery (or
rediscovery) and utilization of the bush. I am aware of no camper who
went one step further and left the camp property. Thus, exploratory
activities were relatively harmless in themselves however, viewed
diachronically they accumulated, setting the stage for the bush activi-
ties and the 'contestings' which resulted (Gulliver 1971).

As has been previously mentioned, the campers entered the bush
to fulfill some personal desire which was not possible in the camp
structure. This entailed a breach ". . . of regular, norm-governed
social relations" and was the first phase of what Victor Turner (1974b:38)

calls 'social drama.'

Once in the bush the camper brought the camp into a 'critical situation' (Turner 1974b:39). Rules had been and were being broken; the camp had lost some control over its campers. This necessitated that attempts be made to bring the campers back under the camp's control. Although the campers' objectives in the bush were to fulfill personal desires they were aware that their absence (or the absence of any camper) would bring staff members into the bush. The possibility of confrontation was always present. Hence, the campers, perhaps only interested in having a cigarette, knew that they were performing their activities in a 'illegal', antistructural realm, and that this would necessitate that ". . . certain adjustive and redressive "mechanisms" . . . [be] brought into operation"(Ibid.:39).

This was the phase of the social drama which/brought counsellor and camper, structure and antistructure, into face to face confrontation. It was here that 'contesting' occurred, and it was in this phase that, as described in Chapter 4, the reality of camp life, of campers' and counsellors' control and autonomy could be brought into full view. As Turner explains,

> It is in this redressive phase that both pragmatic
> techniques and symbolic action reach their fullest
> expression. For the society, group, community,
> association or whatever may be the social unit, is
> here at its most "self-conscious" and may attain
> the clarity of someone fighting in a corner for
> his life (1974:39).

This was the critical period in the bush activity. It was here that camper and counsellor fought for control. Turner's analysis of this type of episode is more concerned with the structure of social drama than with the individual's involvement. For this we can turn to

the dramaturgical approach for analysis.

It has been suggested earlier that the camp structure differenti-
ately affected age mates among the camper and staff populations. Where
all these individuals outside the camp were in a life stage betwixt and
between adulthood and childhood, in the camp this definition was
altered. The adult nature of the senior camper was suspended leaving
him/her in the role of a child; the child-like side of the counsellor
was suspended to allow him/her to take the role of the adult. Focussing
momentarily on the (male) camper we can see that his true character was
constrained within the camp structure. Once he entered the bush,
leaving the structural realm of Camp Meotick, he was freed from this
suspension, and became once again his "natural" self (Messinger 1970:
691). If another camper confronted this individual in the bush, no
'dramatic' change took place. Either camper might use his presence in
the bush to raise his status (with the other camper acting as an
audience and/or representing a 'psychological' audience) by illustrating
that he was not concerned about the ramifications of breaking rules.
However, this was not a necessary outcome of two campers meeting in the
bush. In the face of another camper the individual did not, for
instance, hide his cigarette. However, when the camper was confronted
by a staff member a 'dramatic' change did take place for a number of
reasons. First, the staff member, playing the role of adult and
authority figure, necessarily only recognized the child-like side of the
camper. Even if the counsellor acknowledged the maturity and rights of
the camper to do his/her job the counsellor had to bring the camper
back into the camp structure, and thereby back into the role of child.
Hence, the camper was confronted with an individual who, though in

reality his peer, had to reinstate the differences between them to do
his/her job efficiently. The camper, in such a situation, had two
options: he could return immediately to the camp structure and his/her
child status, or he could remain in the bush and attempt to prevent his
rights there from being alienated.

When the latter option was chosen the 'stage' was set for the
heretofore innocuous confrontation to become ". . . one of those turning
points or moments of suspense, when a true state of affairs is revealed
. . ." (Turner 1974b:39). The confrontation was not simply between
camper and counsellor. The camper, and perhaps the counsellor, was
coming face to face with a dilemma. His dual nature, at once a product
of the camp and of the 'real' world was revealed. This confrontation
between the 'real' self and the self fabricated by the camp sharpened
the confrontation between camper and counsellor, for the camper's
'natural' self was at stake.

> . . . under some circumstances in everyday life the
> actor becomes, is, or is made aware of a actual or
> potential discrepancy between his "real" and his
> "projected" selves, between his "self" and his
> "character". . . as he consciously orients himself to
> narrow, sustain, or widen this discrepancy and thereby
> achieves a sense of "playing a role," or "managing a
> character," he is "on" . . . (Messinger 1970:690).

The camper in the bush was not playing a 'role'. He was being
his 'natural' self. The counsellor, on the other hand, was continuing
a role which he had adopted upon entrance to the camp, and which was
appropriate only to the camp. The camper's 'natural' self was not only
inappropriate to the camp but potentially undermined the camp structure.

This created a problem for the camper. He must to truly win the
confrontation, make the staff member aware of both the camper and the
counsellor's 'real' selves. He must 'stage' his real self and project

it to the staff member. He must that is, manipulate the counsellor's
impression of him, for

> . . . others' "impressions" determine the ways they
> will act toward the actor. Thus whether the actor
> self-consciously takes account of these "impressions"
> or not, whether or not he is even aware that he is
> creating an "impression," such "impressions" are
> demonstrably relevant to the fate of such interaction
> as the actor enters (Messinger 1970:695).

Messinger speaks of actors being "on" and "off". When ". . .
one is "on", the activities come to be regarded as "performances,"
other persons as an "audience""(Ibid.:691). Conversely, one is "off"
when one is being one's 'natural' self (Ibid.:691). However, in the
camp, the camper's 'natural' self had been altered. In the eyes of
staff and administration, the senior campers, no matter how they might
try to prove otherwise, were "not as mature as they should [be]."
Consequently, to the staff and administration the campers were
'naturally' immature. Though the campers might have attempted within
the camp structure to reveal their 'natural' selves, it would not have
been recognized by the staff and administration. The programme
director, for instance, accepted the "problem" side of Sean's nature as
being his true nature.

> Take Sean, when he's given something to do - some
> responsibility, he can really get into it and
> involved and be good. However, when he's not given
> these things he's a problem and makes a lot of
> trouble.

Hence, the campers were faced with a paradoxical situation. No
matter how hard they tried to illustrate their maturity, it was not
recognized by the staff or administration. In the liminoid sphere of
the bush, however, where campers were free of camp restrictions, the
opportunity arose to illustrate their 'true' natures. Of course, the

paradox continued in the bush. To the staff, the very fact that the campers were in the bush and were breaking rules implied irresponsibility. Still, the opportunity existed for the 'presentation' of the campers' 'real' selves as they perceived them to be. Other campers in the bush would recognize the campers' 'natural' selves. They could, that is, be "off" (Messinger 1970:691). However, in the presence of a staff member the campers were forced, if they wished to be victorious in the confrontation, to 'present' their 'real' selves, and their 'natural' similarity with their age mates on staff. Rose's statement "So", made to Norm during their confrontation, questioned the reasoning behind the "no smoking" rule. She was not merely refusing to give Norm her cigarette but was questioning the rule itself, and the reason for the rule. The nature of the situation, one of conflict, did not allow Rose to explain her reasoning fully. Sheila, however, did have that chance. At every opportunity she presented her case. The logic being irrefutable, she often won.

> Sheila: "I'm old enough to smoke. They let me smoke at home. Maureen, nobody's here, give me a drag."
> Maureen: "I can't do that. It's against the rules for you to smoke . . . I suppose it's not really fair though. How old are you?"

They discover that Sheila is, in fact, older than Maureen.

> Sheila: "See."
> Maureen: "That's dumb. This is really stupid. You're older than me, and you can't . . . Here."

Similarly, Dorothy's camper, who repeatedly left the cabin group, was able to make Dorothy see the contradictory nature of the situation. Dorothy, only a year older than her camper, finally admitted,

> Look, I know you smoke. And, I know you're allowed
> to smoke at home. I can't make you stop. It's not
> fair to try. But I'll get into trouble. Look,
> there's a more appropriate time and place to smoke.
> Not behind the boys' washroom. Okay?

These admissions by counsellors of the contradictory situation

occurred in the liminoid sphere. It was here that the campers were able

to reveal the true situation and their frustrations within it.

The presence of an audience – whether it was one physically

present or simply the ever-present psychological audience – made these

confrontations more important. They made camper victories more satisfy-

ing to the camper; and, conversely, staff defeats more problematic to the

staff. The knowledge that somewhere there was an audience transformed

the confrontation into ". . . a kind of 'theater' in which a show was

'staged'". (Messinger 1970:689). To the audience, the camper was not

only presenting his own argument, but representing all the other senior

campers. Similarly, the counsellor was representing all counsellors.

His as well as their authority over campers was at stake.

> To allow oneself to be intimidated, particularly by
> someone who does not have the right to expect
> deferential behavior, is (when the resistance is not
> seen as suicidal or useless) to suffer a loss of
> social face, and, hence, to self-esteem; . . . the
> culturally defined way of maintaining self-esteem in
> the face of attempted intimidation is to engage in a
> contest for supremacy vis-a-vis the power to
> intimidate or minimally, to resist intimidation
> (Rubin 1975:43).

Of course, neither counsellor(s) nor camper(s) could win these

confrontations. The victory, if it came, was momentary. The camper

would return to the bush; the counsellor would come to find the camper.

Dorothy might allow her camper to have a cigarette now and then.

Sheila might convince a counsellor to "give me a drag." Campers might

find opportunities to be alone or meet boy/girlfriends in the camp. For campers who were not pleased with some aspect of camp life, the 'bush' was always available.

The confrontations, though often serious and always revealing were games. Confrontation was not the desired outcome of the campers' bush activities, though everyone involved was aware of its inevitability. Each confrontation created the potential for communication between staff members and campers. Each side could argue their own point of view. Campers could try to free themselves, however momentarily, from the rigid camp structure. Counsellors could attempt to maintain control. However, no serious outcomes would result: no changes in the camp structure would be made. It was all play.

CONCLUSIONS

The present research has been concerned with the subject of young people's play as a mode of communication and, more importantly, as a device for initiating minor social-structural alterations. Data for this investigation were gathered from the play activities and interactions of two groups - staff members and campers - at a children's summer camp in Central Ontario. Emphasis was placed primarily on two of the camper groups - the intermediate girls and the senior campers.

Perhaps the foremost significance of this study is that it has shown that adolescents, as well as adults, are capable of manipulating social structures through play. At the outset of this thesis it was illustrated that anthropological studies have typically neglected to recognize the potential of pre-adult play in this area. Early studies often concluded that young people's play was largely a means of enculturation. The data which investigators considered tended to reinforce their premises. Working with the 'text and context' approach of Geertz (1971) and others, the play data in this study have been viewed as a story the players tell themselves about themselves (Geertz 1971:26). In this way the campers were viewed as 'actors' whose interchanges with counsellors and campers were aimed at manipulating and altering the ostensibly rigid social structure of Camp Meotick. Through play the campers were able to overstep the limitations placed on their freedom and regain privileges which they had enjoyed outside of the camp. The thesis shows that although no major changes were made in the camp's social structure, campers were able to clarify their desires and retrieve withheld privileges by utilizing the freedoms offered in the

play sphere.

A corollary of this concept is that the liminoid sphere contained the potential for altering the camp's social structure. Thus, the data presented in this thesis further substantiate the suggestion that liminoid realms are ". . . the settings in which new symbols, models, and paradigms arise . . . the seedbeds of cultural creativity . . ." (Turner 1974:60). A number of additional insights stemming from the above conclusions are possible.

In the initial chapter of this thesis it was shown that early ethnographers rarely viewed children as being in control of, or fully understanding, their play activities. This 'etic' approach negated the possibility of using young people as their own informants. The 'emic' approach adopted in this study has allowed the campers and staff members to act as informants, explaining and clarifying their perceptions of the camp. Without the insights which their explanations made possible, much valuable information would have been lost. It is therefore suggested that when studying play, simple observation techniques are not only inadequate, but potentially biasing. It is only by respecting and acknowledging young people's perceptions of themselves and their situations that a full understanding of the reasons for and ramifications of play will be accessible to anthropologists.

The concept of liminality, used by Victor Turner (1969) to study small-scale folk societies in Africa has been shown to be equally applicable to one area of urban-industrial society. By removing the ritualistic orientation commonly associated with studies of liminality this theoretical framework will prove invaluable to studies of other areas in urban-industrial societies.

Two major elements of the camp were not fully investigated in the emic perspective in this thesis. Investigations of the play of young campers and staff members, undertaken with a similar perspective as this study, may shed further light upon the nature of young people's play.

In this thesis Camp Meotick has been presented not as a society or subculture but as a highly structured organization. Many such entities are as easily accessible to the anthropologist, and may in the future prove very informative.

Numerous other highly-structured small-scale social situations may constitute fertile ground for students of children's play. Summer camps are, after all only one of the seemingly countless organizations attended by young people.

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