THE TRUTH SHALL (NOT) SET YOU FREE: HEGEMONY, IDENTITY, AND HISTORY EDUCATION IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA

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The Truth Shall (not) Set You Free: Hegemony, Identity, and History Education in Yugoslavia and Rwanda

by

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Abstract:

A shared history is crucial to the formation of a national imagined community. Many post-ethnic conflict societies, such as Tito's Yugoslavia and Kagame's Rwanda, have attempted or are attempting to build new national imagined communities in order to overcome genocide. Building this community requires a new understanding of the past that is able to co-opt divisive elements of history that helped to fuel identity based violence. History education provides a mechanism for states to construct this new history amongst the next generation, ideally creating a new supra-ethnic identity in the process.

Using the theoretical framework of hegemony, and drawing lessons from 'Yugoslavism', this thesis evaluates the potential of Kagame's 'Rwandanism' project as a means of post-conflict reconciliation. Methods of disseminating narratives of the past such as *gacaca*, genocide memorialisation, *ingando*, and the public school system are discussed, highlighting the differences between official and local accounts of Rwanda's history.

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Chapter One: Introduction

The 1994 Rwandan genocide is widely perceived as one of humanity's great failures. Between 800 000 and one million Tutsis and Hutu opposed to the Hutu Power movement were murdered, predominantly within a 100 day period. Much has been written attempting to both understand the origins and dynamics of the genocide itself (of which Des Forges' *Leave none to tell the story* remains the seminal text), as well as the reconciliation process currently underway in Rwanda. One of the most important aspects to both of these bodies of literature is the role that education has had in both constructing ethnic stereotypes in Rwanda, and the current program of pursuing a universal civic Rwandan identity. It has been well established that the Rwandan education system helped to instill negative stereotypes and fear of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda in the years prior to the genocide (Des Forges 1999; Mamdani 2001). As such, the present state and conduct of the Rwandan education system has been seen as crucially important to the reconciliation process.

There is currently a significant gap in the research being performed on history education in Rwanda. While there has been limited scholarship focusing on the training of history teachers (see Freedman et al. 2011), as well as Rwandan's own views of history (see Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b; Fujii 2009), the resources used in Rwanda's classrooms have received scant attention. The most obvious reason for this is a lack of explicit historical teaching materials to study. The moratorium on history teaching has only recently been lifted, and to date there is yet to be an approved set of curricular materials. This has tended to limit analysis of history teaching in Rwanda, to the aforementioned study of teachers, as well as open-ended interviews with Rwandan children (Hilker 2011).

Omitted from the current work being done on history teaching in Rwanda is the role of the mandatory social studies curriculum for disseminating history and ethnic identity to Rwandan youth. In the absence of an official history curriculum, it is the social sciences that have been responsible for education Rwandan youth on the years prior to, as well as, the civil war and 1994 genocide. As such, the social studies curriculum is of crucial importance if we are to understand how history and ethnicity is taught to a new generation of Rwandans, a generation that will be responsible for ongoing peace and reconciliation in Rwanda. This thesis will utilize primary social studies curricula texts from the first six years of elementary school in order to examine the role of education in creating a new civic Rwandan identity in the aftermath of genocide. This new research will form part of the evidence used to address the question: Is the creation of a new, civic Rwandan identity, a viable means of post-conflict reconciliation in present day Rwanda?

Central to the new Rwandan education system is the promotion of a Rwandan identity intended to replace the previously divisive identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. While there has been limited scholarship examining the implications and effectiveness of this program (see Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b), current research has lacked a comparative framework in which to contextualize the Rwandan case. The use of a new, pan-national identity construct has been attempted in other post ethnic conflict societies, most notably Yugoslavia after the Second World War, in which 'Brotherhood and Unity' officially replaced, in many respects, Serb, Croat, and Slovene identities.[1] Using the Yugoslav case as a comparative baseline, this thesis will argue that the pan-Rwandan identity currently being promoted by the Kagame regime will likely be unable to dislodge exclusionary ethnic identities as the most salient aspect of group identity.

[1] This was later expanded to include Bosnian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian identities.

This is primarily due to a dissonance between public and private conceptions of the past, preventing the formation of an imagined community as per Anderson (1983).

In order to address the viability of a pan-Rwandan identity as an effective means of post-conflict reconciliation, this thesis will compare current efforts in Rwanda with those of the former Yugoslavia under Josip 'Broz' Tito. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda these efforts towards creating new identities had to overcome the intense inter-ethnic conflicts that preceded state formation through revolutionary struggle. Of particular interest to this study is how accounts of the past have been used in the formation of this new identity, as a collective history is integral to Anderson's conception of the nation as an imagined community. This thesis will compare the dissemination (and manipulation) of history in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda by examining the memorialisation of the past and the teaching of history in both these societies. In the case of Yugoslavia this will involve the review of secondary literature on both education and memorialisation. The examination of history teaching in Rwanda is done through a mix of primary research and secondary literature. Existing scholarship on the teaching of history through the judicial process, memorialisation, and *ingando* will be reviewed, and combined with primary research focused on the elementary social studies curricular textbooks. Using a critical theoretical lens of hegemony, this thesis contributes to the discussion of post-conflict education by assessing the viability of new identity constructions as a means of reconciliation after violent inter-ethnic conflict.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed shortly thereafter by the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda, has prompted increased scholarly interest in ethnic conflict; both its dynamics and its reconciliation. Crucial to the study of both these aspects of "ethnic" conflict is the study over ethnic identity itself, as these types of conflict can be seen as being waged over identity itself (see Moshman 2007). To date, there has been little examination over the role of identity and identity constructs in the reconciliation process after ethnic conflict. No doubt a major reason for this is the tendency to treat ethnic groups as static, assuming that these exclusionary ethnic identities remain unchanging, thus necessitating various forms of power sharing amongst ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977 being the most prominent).

Approaching ethnic conflict resolution through assumptions of static ethnic identities ignores both large bodies of literature pertaining to identity construction, including social psychological approaches such as Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Tajfel 1982); as well as critical theoretical conceptualizations, such as Benedict Anderson's oft cited imagined communities (1983). There is an implicit assumption in works such as Lijphart, as well as more recent approaches such as participation in larger organizational structures such as the EU (see Jesse and Williams 2005), that cooperation at the elite level will lead to a reduction of tension at the local level.

Rather than presenting ethnic or national groups as static, this work assumes a more fluid conceptualization of group identity, one that can be altered over time and differ in salience depending on circumstance. At the same time, certain aspects of group identity often become dominant, and are taken as a common sense measure of group belonging. In order to adequately theorize these dominant (but still possible to change) aspects of group identity, I use the concept of hegemony to examine modes of group identity in mixed societies that have experienced ethnic conflict. Using more recent conceptualizations of hegemony, as proposed by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek (2000), in which hegemony is maintained by coopting local narratives of dissent, I argue that a supra-national identity can be created that would overcome the exclusionary ethnic identities that become prevalent during periods of conflict.

In practice, this co-option of local levels of dissent must occur at the state level, as it is the state that has the greatest influence over the 'official' narrative of the past that is instrumental in the formation of a national imagined community.[2] In particular, it is the state that has the unique potential to provide a collective history through standardized education; indeed, the state is the only entity that can realistically disseminate a single version of events to its population. At the same time, it is impossible for even the most totalitarian state to completely monopolize narratives of the past, particularly when the past is rife with contentious inter-group conflict. It is for this reason that incorporating these dissenting, often ethno-centric narratives rather than attempting to utterly suppress them, is absolutely essential to the formation of stable, supranational identity. As will be demonstrated in the case of the former Yugoslavia, a failure to successfully co-opt challenges from ethno-centric narratives of the past can lead to these same narratives being a potent source of propaganda and conflict when there is a shock to the state system. It is here that hegemony is a particularly useful framework for analysis, as this co-option of local dissent by a public meta-narrative provides a means in which

[2] While Anderson (1983) points to the convergence of capitalist exchange and the printing press as the origins of an expanded imaged community, leading to the formation of modern nations, this does not adequately reflect the nature of state control and censorship in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is also worth noting that Anderson's thesis does not account for modern, standardized education practices that serve to indoctrinate youth into an idealized national community.

to theorize why certain propaganda can successfully challenge the official truth narrative of the state.[3]

The construction of a new, pan-ethnic identity has already implicitly been used in the former Yugoslavia after the Second World War, in which a greater Yugoslavism under the framework of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was promoted by the central government under Tito as a means of inter-ethnic reconciliation. This effort, however, was made impossible due to a lack of a nuanced official account of the Second World War experience, in which genocide was committed against Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, while Serbian *Chetniks* terrorized populations of Croats and Muslims simultaneously. Narratives of these events were repressed under the framework of Brotherhood and Unity, only to re-emerge as a potent propaganda tool for nationalist leaders such as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The inability of Yugoslavism to address these local, dissenting accounts of history were key to preventing Yugoslavism from becoming a hegemonic expression of group identity. Instead, local memories of the Second World War were much better expressed by exclusionary ethnic nationalism and their inherent security dilemmas, culminating in the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

The program of Rwandanism being pursued by the Kagame administration risks the same outcome as Yugoslavia before it. Rather than constructing a version of history that reflects the local memories of Rwanda's recent history (a key aspect of Anderson's imagined community), Kagame has appealed to Rwanda's pre-colonial past: one that reflects neither local memories nor present experiences. One of the key dissonances between this official and living

[3] While many point to the impact of propaganda in precipitating ethnic conflict (see Milosevic 2000), the actual link as to why propaganda would be believed is under-theorized in the current literature (Brubaker and Laitin 1998)

memory is the role of the civil war and corresponding genocide on the lives of Rwandans. Officially, there is only what Susanne Buckley-Zistel has dubbed the "RPF healing truth" (2006a), while dissenting accounts of the past are marginalized or persecuted. Rather than attempting to co-opt these dissenting narratives, the Kagame administration has tried to obliterate them; an initiative that is unlikely to be successful. This obliteration is done not only by the aforementioned persecution and marginalization, but by omitting large aspects of the past from public memory spaces such as memorials and justice proceedings such as *Gacaca*. Even more importantly, there remains scarce official discussion of the genocide amongst Rwandan youth, as the genocide receives scant attention in the Rwandan school curriculum.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first outlines the current state of the literature pertaining to both ethnic conflict resolution, and the construction of group identity more generally. This chapter will argue that the deliberate construction of group identities is best conceptualized through a critical theoretical lens of hegemony, in which a certain identity will become dominant only when it is reflected in both the private and public sphere. Chapter three will examine the process of identity construction in the former Yugoslavia. This chapter will demonstrate the crucial importance of having the official memory reflect the local one, highlighting the nature of these differences and how this history was able to be manipulated to create ethnic security dilemmas. In terms of identity construction this chapter focuses primarily on memorialisation and education.

Chapters four and five provide an in-depth examination of identity construction in Rwanda. Chapter four provides a brief overview of Rwandan identity in a historical perspective, as well as the civil war and genocide of the mid 1990s. More importantly, chapter four examines the role of identity in relation commemorating the genocide through memorialisation, as well as the role of identity in *gacaca* court proceedings. After reviewing secondary sources on Rwandan's own view of the genocide, chapter four concludes that there remains a serious dissonance between official and living memories in Rwanda.

Chapter five examines current practices of disseminating identity to Rwandan youth through both the standardized education system and *ingando* (re)-education camps. While the moratorium on history teaching in Rwanda has recently been lifted, to date there remains no standardized set of textbooks or a coherent history curriculum (Freedman et al. 2011). In order to overcome this lack of history resources, this thesis examines the social studies texts for Rwandan primary schooling. In particular, this chapter will focus on accounts of both history and identity as they appear in the social sciences. This includes obvious discussions of ethnicity (of which there are few), but also accounts of both pre and post-colonial Rwandan history, including the 1991 civil war and the genocide of 1994. Also included in this chapter is an examination of how contemporary problems of unity and reconciliation (both recurring topics in the curriculum) are presented to a new generation of Rwandan youth. These primary texts provide the closest thing to a history curriculum currently being taught to Rwandan youth, and as such, fill an important gap in contemporary studies of Rwandan education and its effects on reconciliation. In addition, this section reviews secondary literature on *igando* camps, which serve to both reintegrate former enemy combatants, and to further indoctrinate the next generation of Rwandan elites. This chapter argues that, particularly within the school curriculum, the current education program shifts discussion of identity away from the public sphere and into that of the private. Combined with the dissonance between public and private narrative discussed in chapter four, this implies an increased likelihood of private narratives of history becoming more prominent than those promoted by the Kagame administration.

Chapter six provides a comparative analysis of the two cases, highlighting the potential of a gap in the official historical record to be exploited in Rwanda, much as it was in Yugoslavia prior the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. In addition to this historical gap, this chapter also highlights the role of a strong, revolutionary leader to the peace process of both states; arguing that Kagame is similar to Tito, in that both are seen as the lynchpin of their political system. It is possible that the removal of Kagame from power may invite a re-examination of the past, and as was the case in Yugoslavia, perhaps promote the re-appearance of exclusionary ethnic narratives of the past in public discourse. This chapter concludes that much like Tito's Yugoslavism, Rwandanism is unlikely to become a hegemonic expression of group identity in Rwanda.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Considerations

Drawing lessons from Titoist Yugoslavia, this thesis seeks to answer if creating a supra-national, hegemonic identity is a viable means of reducing inter-ethnic conflict, and if so, what the likelihood is of this being an effective strategy in post-genocide Rwanda. This chapter will examine current approaches to peacebuilding and identity formation. Part one focuses on institutional and societal approaches to peacebuilding, drawing upon literature from a variety of disciplines including political science and social psychology. There is a particular focus here on the use of truth telling, be it through criminal proceedings or truth commissions, in order to review how creating truth frameworks is present in the existing literature. Part two focuses on processes of identity formation across political science, social psychology, and critical philosophy; as well as examining how identity based conflict occurs within this body of literature. This will be followed by a brief research methodology. It should also be noted that this chapter does not address the literature that deals specifically with the cases of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. This literature will instead be reviewed, where appropriate, in chapters three, four and five in order to develop the case studies used in this comparison.

Part I: Peacebuilding

Increased focus on intra-state conflict has naturally led to a heightened interest in post-conflict reconstruction within divided societies. The body of literature on this topic is vast, and contains more traditional political science approaches, along with contributions from both sociology and social psychology. This section is subdivided into literature that have a more formal approach, often characterized by a focus on institutions, retributive justice, economic development, and foreign investment; and those who examine more social aspects, such as restorative justice, truth telling, reconciliation, gender relations, and moral development.

Institutional Approaches

There is a substantial body of literature that links peacebuilding to institutions, both at the state and global level. Generally, this can be further broken down in to those who study justice and judicial institutions (Aptel 2011; Hamber 2005; Cobban 2007), and those who focus on governing structures and distribution of state powers (Lijphart 1977; Jesse and Williams 2005). Reviewing studies on justice, I will explore arguments pertaining to the International Criminal Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. These can be problematic as there is often a lack of universal framework for understanding the past and needs for justice that arise from it. In terms of governing institutions, I will primarily be reviewing power sharing arrangements such as consociationalism (Lijphart 1977), arguing that these tend to focus on accommodation at the elite level and fail to account for the local dynamics of inter-ethnic conflict.

Formal justice, in which perpetrators are held accountable for atrocities committed during conflict, is often seen as a crucial step towards eventual reconciliation (Staub 2011). In the aftermath of Yugoslav disintegration, the international community set up the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), followed by a similar International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity. As this is one of the few directly comparable (and ongoing) mechanisms of dispensing formal, judicial-oriented justice in post-conflict societies, there is considerable scholarly debate as to whether these tribunals (and later the ICC) enable or inhibit reconciliation. Those in favour point to relative representative (on a societal level) character of tribunal prosecution, noting that in post-conflict societies "... law enforcement institutions, including the peace, prosecutors, and courts, are often themselves marked by identity-based tensions or divides" (Aptel 2011: 149). To rephrase, proponents of the ICC see it as an objective mechanism to prosecute crimes against humanity, with retributive justice being essential to reconciliation.

Critics of the ICC and its tribunals suggest that this objectivity is largely a myth. The arrest of fugitives to stand trial is often a highly politicized issue, as is the definition of the conflict in question.[4] The ICC also only typically targets top-level offenders, with the implicit assumption that "...impunity rests in the hands of a few and is not socially rooted" (Hamber 2005: 210). An additional criticism is that local populations are often ignorant of ICC proceedings, with little funding provided to make the process transparent at the local level (Aptel 2011: 169). There have also been sensitivity issues raised towards the ICC, with victim's accusing that "... the judges listening most likely didn't understand what genocide is." (Cobban 2007: 2). An additional criticism (Clark 2008) is that there is little to suggest retributive justice actually promotes reconciliation. She argues that a restorative approach that reaches beyond the simple need to see perpetrators punished is a more effective means of peacebuilding. This reinforces Hamber (2005), which argues that the responsibility for genocide is socially rooted, rather than simply the acts of a few. Thus, the ICC does not have the ability to reduce the saliency of ethnic identities that were in conflict, only the power to prosecute the highest level

[4] The Rwandan genocide, for example, is defined as a "genocide against the Tutsis" (Aptel 2011: 176), effectively separating the moderate Hutu who were killed from the justice proceedings. The scope of the ICTR also would have eliminated many cases of atrocities committed by the Kagame regime, as they did not fit within the definition of race or strict timeframe set out for the proceedings (Cobban 2007).

offenders. It should also be noted that as the ICC is separate from the post-conflict state, it does not have the advantage of visibly promoting justice within the divided society.

The ICC also has the potential to reinforce, rather than reduce, exclusionary ethnic identities. Not only is there the issue of narrowly defining the complex series of events that encompass the cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, but if these identity terms are the base of the proceedings, than any court arguments must be centered around identity as such. As Hannah Arendt wrote on her experiences in Germany "If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew." (2003: 12). This polarization of identities within the ICC stands in opposition to a desalienization of exclusionary ethnic identities. As such, the ICC is not an effective institution to promote a universal civic identity that can bridge the divide between ethnic identities that were previously in conflict.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are another institutional mechanism to promote justice and healing for past atrocities. Originally created as a means of coping with the apartheid experience in South Africa, TRCs are intended to form a "social space where all experiences can be shared and validated." (Dal Secco 2008). Proponents of TRCs (Dal Secco 2008; Llewellyn 2006) argue that TRCs can lead to a redesigning of social relations, as the focus is on the victim, rather than perpetrator. This can include issues such as gender relations, which often form a particularly brutal aspect during times of inter-group conflict (see Kaufmann and Williams 2004; Weitsman 2008; de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).

Hamber (2005) is highly critical of TRCs as a tool for reconciliation, arguing that there is a lack of understanding on the part of policy-makers on group trauma on such a massive scale, and that TRCs reinforce "artificial breaks" in history, rather than examining the evolving nature of the violence over time (208). This approach, he argues, devalues historical responsibility and the complicity of bystanders (211), and thus fails to take a preventative approach for the future. This failure to address the long standing tensions that gave rise to the legitimization of violence based upon lines of identity leaves open the possibility for a return to that violence in the future.[5] In short, if a long-term view of the past is not addressed, it can remain open for nationalist manipulation in the future. While TRCs can certainly be an effective means of promoting local truths and experiences during periods of conflict, their narrow scope does not allow for the violence to be seen in the larger context that allowed the violence to occur. Thus if truth telling is to be used as a means of reconciling past violence, it must take a far broader view than is currently practiced, and better incorporate a historical framework so as to understand the evolving grievances of the conflicting parties. The scope of such a process makes TRCs at best an incomplete tool for using truth frameworks as a means of reconciliation.

Beyond the study of justice institutions, there is a substantial interest in examining power sharing institutions as a means to promote reconciliation. Arend Lijphart (1977) is perhaps the best known proponent of such power sharing arguments. Consociational democracy requires "...that the political leaders of all significant segements of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country." (Lijphart 1977: 25). This is typically achieved through a federal structure; creating a certain amount of territorial autonomy, with each group having a veto over national affairs. Horowitz (1985) is also sympathetic to this position, though he does acknowledge that political leaders to not always have to will to

[5] Consider, for example, that Serbian propaganda highlighted atrocities committed against Serbs during the Second World War, forty years before the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Isakovich 2000).

promote reconciliation (568). There is considerable support for Lijphart amongst current conflict resolution scholars (Noel 2005), though there are also some problems with this approach.

During ethnic conflict, ethnic identity becomes the most salient aspect of interpersonal relations (Moshman 2007). Thus, in order to promote reconciliation there must be a desalienization of ethnicity as a political cleavage. Consociation democracy promotes a static conception of group identity, ensuring that political discourse is centered on ethnicity (Jesse and Williams 2005: 11). Similar arguments have been made by Aitken (2007) in response to the ethnicization of politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina under Dayton, which at this point is divided into ethnic territories. Aitken convincingly argues that these types of power sharing arrangements reward, and thus promote, ethnic mobilization as a legitimate form of politics (2007: 248). This ethnicization of politics makes cooperation and reintegration more difficult. Consociation democracy also implies that an elite-level consensus will lead to a reduction of inter-group hostility, though it is unclear as to why this would be the case. Consociation also suggests a federation of relatively ethnically homogenous territories, while in practice this is not often the case, in Rwanda for example (Fujii 2009).

Jesse and Williams (2005) recognize the need to desalienize ethnicity, arguing that this is possible through membership in multilateral institutions such as the European Union. This theory holds that other group membership will allow for other political cleavages to emerge that will cut across multiple ethnicities, allowing for contact between ethnic groups and thus promoting reconciliation. This is an innovative approach as it acknowledges both the importance and fluidic nature of collective identity, however much like consociation democracy it implies that elite cooperation will cause the same at the local level.

The study of formal institutions for peacebuilding efforts suffers from two major weaknesses. The first weakness is the tendency to focus on elites, rather than on society as a whole. Those in favour of the ICC fail to address the problem of only targeting 'top' perpetrators, and fail to address the importance of bystanders and the often deep-rooted societal issues that allowed for the violence to occur. The same can be said of both proponents of consociation democracy and multi-lateral institution models of peacebuilding and accommodation, as they assume that contact and cooperation of elites will lead to the same at the local level. Consociation democracy in particular maintains static conceptions of group identity, and thus legitimizes ethnicity as the principle cleavage in political interaction in post-conflict states. TRCs manage to avoid this elite focus, though they can fail to address societal issues as they tend to focus on the period of violence itself, rather than the events and attitudes that led to it.

The second weakness in this body of literature is a total lack of focus on the formation of post-conflict identities. This seems to be based on an assumption that identities are static, rather than fluid (as will be argued in the following section). This ensures that justice proceedings and power sharing arrangements are conducted on 'ethnic' grounds. While there is mention of the need to depoliticize exclusionary ethnic identities, there is scarce mention as to how this is to be achieved, nor is there an examination of what these post-conflict identity relations would look like. This lack of focus on identity makes it difficult to establish a truth framework in which justice mechanisms do not simply reinforce past ethnic divides. The following section addresses some of these issues, particularly the need to establish a universal truth framework as a means of understanding and coping with violence. This also includes restorative justice, which focuses on reconciliation, as opposed to punishment.

Social Approaches

Rather than focus on formal institutions, a great deal of peacebuilding literature examines more social aspects, such as truth telling (outside of the more formal TRCs), restorative justice (particularly at the grassroots), and improving gender relations. Much of this literature seeks ways of dealing with massive trauma on a group scale, and promoting reconciliation within communities to ensure peaceful conflict resolution in the future.

There is a lively debate within social psychology as to the benefits of truth telling on trauma reduction and reconciliation (Dal Secco 2008; Staub 2008; Moshman 2007; Cobban 2007). What must be realized before such a discussion can take place is that reconciliation "requires acknowledgement of suffering by both sides, even when substantially unequal" (Staub 2008: 399)[6]. In cases of genocide this is especially difficult, as the victim group must acknowledge the suffering of the perpetrator. This certainly undermines aspects of the more formal TRCs, which are notoriously victim centered (Dal Secco 2008). In the context of the victim, truth telling in a friendly environment can be an effective means of dealing with severe trauma (Moshman 2007; Staub 2008, 2011). Moreover, some argue that hearing such stories allow for easier empathy on the part of perpetrators, which can promote remorse and forgiveness seeking (Staub 2008; Nadler and Shnabel 2008).

[6] This is done to acknowledge the (perceived) factors that led to violence on behalf of perpetrator groups. In Rwanda, for example, there was a real fear that there would be a return to a Tutsi dictatorship in which Hutu would be relegated to second class citizens. If the violence is to be understood (a necessity for reconciliation) than these fears need to be understood and acknowledged.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of truth telling is the narratives of perpetrator groups. From the psychological perspective of the perpetrator, it is extremely difficult to recognize the immorality of one's actions (Moshman 2007; 2004). Individuals have a psychological need to perceive themselves as moral agents (Moshman 1999, 2004). If truth telling is to contribute to reconciliation there needs to be acknowledgement of the fears of perpetrators that led them to commit acts of genocide. In Rwanda this is particularly important to understanding how genocidal ideology became accepted, as there was a very real fear of a foreign invader linked to a domestic group that had held power during a period of brutal colonial rule (Fujii 2009; Hintjens 2001).

Truth telling on the part of perpetrators can also face harsh opposition from dominant narratives of past events. In the aftermath of genocide, ethnic identities are still extremely salient, often with one group (the victor of the conflict) in a dominant position of power. This can be seen as a disincentive for perpetrator groups to narrate their version of events, as they can fear revenge from the dominant group (Cobban 2007). This also prevents reconciliation for atrocities that are inevitably committed by the victors, such as a series of massacres against former Rwandan soldiers in the Northern provinces (Waugh 2004), or Tito's massacre of Ustasha soldiers following their surrender to Allied forces (Djokic 2003). Truth telling for perpetrators is thus hampered by an internal psychological need to be perceived as a moral agent and by an external threat of reprisal from a dominant group advocating a different narrative of the past. This is a huge barrier to reconciliation.

While typically seen as instrumental in coping with trauma, truth telling on the part of victim groups is not without its own complications. As one would expect, there is often difficulty in sharing one's experience during periods of ethnic cleansing (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009; Kaufmann and Williams 2004). Such trauma often causes intense feelings of shame on the part of victims, with the mind rationalizing that there must be a (personal) reason for violence committed against them and their group (Nadler and Shnabel 2008). This can be further antagonized by having to interact with tormentors on a daily basis, as many perpetrators remain in their towns and villages. Potential benefits of truth telling are also highly dependent on the collective views of the majority.

> The question of listening would be less problematic were the speaker and the listener to share a framework that is taken for granted by both parties. However, in the case where such a framework is not shared, and one of the parties is the majority and the other is in the minority, 'listening' to the other can be a mean to oppress and exclude. Listening to the other in this sense means to position the speaker in accordance with the audience's framework for seeing the world (Sadria 2008: 55).

This need for multiple parties to express grievances, along with the need to share a framework demonstrates the importance of coming to a shared understanding of the conflict. Without this, reconciliation would be impossible. There is currently a significant gap in this literature on how this universal truth framework would be formed. The current literature either lacks concrete examples of instances of positive intergroup contact (such as Moshman 2004, 2007; as well as Sadria 2008; and Cobban 2007), or focuses on a single, small example (see Staub 2011)[7].

A final issue with truth telling can be a desire on behalf of a population to 'move on' (Humphrey 2002; Staub 2008). This is typically accompanied by a kind of forced social amnesia (Moshman 2004), with individuals being unwilling or unable to talk about the past. This is often done to spare the next generation from inheriting the conflict of the parents. Such social

[7] The case in question is a radio drama being produced in Rwanda. This will be further reviewed in chapter 4, as it focuses specifically on Rwanda.

amnesia was certainly the prevailing means of coping for the World War Two genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (Karge 2009; Troch 2010). This lack of adequately coming to terms with the past was a major factor contributing to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia during the 1990s (Hopken 1999; Karge 2009). There is a very real risk that this will occur in present Rwanda, as there is a cultural tendency to not publicly discuss difficult issues and negative feelings (Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b). To overcome this, truth telling will be and is instrumental to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Rwanda. This will inevitably include local discourses, teaching and education about the past, and symbolic discourses through memorialisation, monuments and public ceremonies.

Unlike focuses on court proceedings, trials, and punishments, restorative justice attempts to enact social reforms that positively affect victims in their communities. In many ways, restorative justice endeavours provide a means of reshaping the way in which society is organized, ideally creating a social sphere that is less conductive to violent conflict. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of violent conflict, particular those focused on identity, there tends to be a focus on retributive justice, as one side inevitably emerges as the 'winner' (Field 2007). This tends to transform restorative justice into a means of perpetuating the dominance of the regime in power. Such efforts have occurred in Rwanda with preferential funding given to Tutsi survivors of émigrés, while Hutu victims of violence are not provided similar compensation (Cobban 2007; Buckley-Zistel 2009). In order to speak of restorative justice it is first necessary to lower the salience of exclusionary identities, as this will ensure a more balanced approach that does not overly favour one particular group. Even if one side has suffered disproportionately (typically the case), there must be a fair distribution of wealth and opportunity so as not to foster future resentment.

In the aftermath of the widely publicized cases of rape and sexual torture in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia gender issues have commanded an increased focus in the peacebuilding process. This has been most notable with the classification of rape as a crime against humanity by the International Criminal Court (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). While this has at least formally acknowledged the seriousness of sexual violence, convictions by the International Tribunals for both Rwanda and Yugoslavia have been found lacking, as has the more recent Gacaca process in Rwanda (Field 2006). There is also a tendency for such issues to remain unaddressed in truth telling processes, largely due to the negative stigma attached to victims of sexual violence in many societies (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).[8]

This lack of openness about crimes and victims of sexual violence has a negative impact on the reconciliation process. As has previously been discussed, truth telling can reduce trauma on the part of victims, and can arguably increase feelings of remorse on behalf of perpetrators. Moreover, in cases of rape the potential offspring must be considered in the reconciliation process. It is often difficult for mothers to raise a child born of such an environment (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). This further undermines societal relations at the local level, as such children began to question their identity in a divided society (Moshman 2007; Staub 2008, 2011). The integration of victims of sexual violence is of critical importance, as they form perhaps the most vulnerable section of society. In Rwanda, approximately seventy percent of victims of sexual violence are HIV positive (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009). This brings further stigma, making it more difficult for them and their children to integrate back in to society. While HIV education is a priority in the school system (Rwandan Ministry of Education

[8] Women are not the only victims of sexual violence during intra-state conflict, though they are by far the most commonly victimized. Little research has been done on male victims of sexual violence, who are often reluctant to admit their stories due to societal stigma (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).

Curriculum 2011), it is an issue that people do not often discuss amongst themselves or within *Gacaca* (de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009).

A consistent theme with this body of literature is the focus on openness and justice. The former is dominated by notions of truth telling, formal or informal, as well as court processes which will uncover a sort of Platonic Truth of the past. Justice can be seen as both retributive and restorative, though it can also be largely symbolic. Memorial sites and remembrance ceremonies can provide a wide scale acknowledgement of personal suffering, serving to both potentially decrease trauma in survivors and increase empathy in perpetrators. The state has a large role to play in the erection of such monuments, as well as providing signage and interpreters at such sites. The local population also plays a role in the impact of these sites, filtering the information through their own experiences and knowledge of the past.

Interpretation of such sites is heavily influenced by one's own identity as it relates to past conflicts (Bevan 2006). It is also identity, particularly as it relates to group membership, that provides a framework of understanding for the truth telling and reconciliation mechanisms already discussed. At present there is a significant gap in the peacebuilding literature addressing the role of identity in the peacebuilding process. While several social psychologists have addressed the issue (Moshman 2007; Staub 2011), the focus has been almost exclusively on reducing the salience of particular group identities, rather than the construction of new ones. While certainly an important aspect in conflict reduction, this does not address the strategy that was pursued by Tito in Yugoslavia and is currently being advanced in Rwanda under Kagame: the construction of a new, pan-national identity that would subsume the exclusionary identities that led to conflict. The following section examines identity formation across a range of literatures.

Part II: Identity Formation and Conflict

Of central importance in the literature concerning ethnic conflict and its resolution is the concept of identity. As ethnic conflict can be considered in many ways to be a conflict over identity itself (Moshman 2007), it is vital that we review the study of identity as it pertains to inter-group violence. This section will examine the most common aspects of group identity within political science literature on ethnic conflict: primordialism and elite manipulation. I will also review conceptions of group identity in both social psychology and critical philosophy. Once linkages are made between these disparate literatures, I will turn to a discussion of hegemony and identity, followed by the impact of education on these processes.

Primordialism

Primordialism assumes that ethnicity is relatively static and enduring over time. By far the most influential scholar with this view, and indeed one of the key early figures in ethnic conflict literature, is Donald Horowitz, particularly his work *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985). Horowitz commonly likens ethnic identity to the identity of kinship, noting the similarities in discourse when referring to in-group members[9] (1985: 57). This, sometimes fictive, kinship group allows for a connection to past; a means in which the group can be categorized as a static, enduring entity, both as of a unit of study and within the minds of group members. At the same time, Horowitz acknowledges that ethnic groups can amalgamate, incorporate, divide, and

[9] The reference to in-group members as 'brothers', and distantly related groups 'cousins', for example.

proliferate (1985: 65). Groups can also maintain multiple identities of different orders, though this is primarily a territorially based (sub)-identity (66). It is unclear as to how various levels of identity become more salient over others, while identification based on territory can be problematic outside the Westphalian state system. The linkage of state, elites, and general population is also unclear within this model.

This linkage of ethnic or national identity and territory is a common theme within the ethnic conflict literature (Hale 2008). This interpretation is centered primarily on the European experience, using such cases as Castellan Spain and the Basques, Ireland, and French Canada (Waldmann 1985, 1989). Yugoslavia is also commonly researched using the territorial link to identity, though this becomes more difficult in the relatively heterogeneous Bosnia-Herzegovina. Conflict within primordialist literature typically occurs in two ways. The first is the "ancient hatreds" theory advanced by Robert Kaplan in *Balkan Ghosts* (1993). This posits that violent conflict between groups is enduring; the metaphor is one of placing a lid over boiling water that inevitably boils over. There are two main problems with this approach. The first is that it cannot account for the timing and outset of inter-ethnic violence; more telling, it cannot explain the periods of peace, which in his Balkan example far outweigh periods of conflict (Isakovic 2000; Mojzes 1994). The ancient hatred argument also fails to account for ethnic relations outside the Balkans: if applied universally one would predict consistent violent conflict amongst ethnic groups globally.[10]

A far more common approach to those who assume a relatively static conception of group identity is driven by security dilemmas, particularly in newly emergent states (Woodward

[10] Despite scholarly focus and substantial media coverage, ethnic conflict is far from a common occurrence, and warrants attention "because it is appalling, not because it is ubiquitous" (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 424)

1995; Deng 1995). National minorities feel threatened by a dominant national group achieving sole power of the state, creating a crisis for the minority group. This in turn justifies violence on behalf of the minority group, who feel that they will be absorbed by the new state (Horowitz 1985). Variants of this include Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, in which threats to identity will drive future global conflicts (1993), as well as more recent publications by Robert Kaplan focusing on ethnic groups struggle for dwindling resources (2000). There have also been limited attempts to utilize game theory to understand ethnic conflict (Hale 2008). Such studies, which normally characterize conflict as undesirable, posit that ethnic conflict is due to one group fearing annihilation at the hands of another. This makes violence the only option to proposed extermination, as any non-violent resistance would not minimize the worst possible outcome (Hale 2008). Peacebuilding amongst primordialists tends to focus on institution building, typically within democratic structures, in order to ensure ethnic cooperation (Horowitz 1985). This, as mentioned previously, only serves to foster accommodation at the elite level; tacitly assuming that either impunity rests only in the hands of leaders, or that elites will be able to secure the compliance of their respective ethnic groups.

The clash of civilizations, while interesting as a meta-narrative, is largely ineffective for explaining any particular case study. It is unclear as to the homogeneity of the supra-civilizations that Huntington proposes, and its predictive qualities remain low. Horowitz does allow for multiple layers of identity, but does not elaborate as to exactly how one (sub)-national identity can become more salient, nor does he effectively break identity from a territorial homeland. The security dilemma does provide a reasonable account of ethnic conflict, allowing for contextual factors and historical memory to shape possible outcomes. While these models tend to treat national groups as states, they do provide insight in to the fear of the Other that normally accompanies ethnic conflict. This is a theme that also often appears in elite-driven theories of national or ethnic identity.

Elites and Ethnosymbolism

Many studies of ethnic conflict (Lemarchand 1996; Gagnon 2002) highlight the roles of elites for promoting ethnic or nationalist violence between groups. Implicit in these arguments is the varying salience in which an exclusionary ethnic identity is present, and how this can be changed by nationalist leaders through the deployment of what Anthony Smith terms "Symbolic Resources" (2009). Symbolic resources are formal and informal means of reinforcing group identities such as parades, display of flags, ceremonies, and the erection of monuments (Smith 2009). Similar arguments are made by Murray Edelman (1988), who argues that these symbols constitute and reaffirm much of what we know about politics. For those using an ethnosymbolist approach to understanding group identity, ethnic belonging is enduring through time, though the meaning of that identity can change over time.

Ethnosymbolism thus attempts to strike a balance between the more monolithic modes of identity espoused by those using pirmodialism, with the more highly contextual and layered modes of identity that are commonly put forward by social psychologists (Moshman 2004, 2007; Turner and Tajfel 1982). Ethnosymbolism allows for more fluidity than primordialism in the sense that it allows for greater change *within* ethnic identities, yet at the same time it does not fully develop a theory as to why some narratives are especially more apt to activate a higher exclusionary ethnic identity compared to others. Research in this area tends to be richly contextual (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), yet few efforts have been made to compare multiple cases through a lens of elite manipulation.[11]

Much like conflict theories derived from primordialism, ethnosymbolists typically view ethnic conflict as a security dilemma. Elites, often with control of mass media, attempt to create a fear of an ethnic Other in order to redefine ethnicity as the principle cleavage in politics (Gagnon 2002; Lemarchand 1996). This typically occurs during a shock to the current power system, in which leaders attempt to maintain power. Out-groups are promoted as being simultaneously threatening and inferior to the nationalist group. This is further reinforced by what Vamik Volkan terms "hot places" (2006: 139), which are a unique symbolic resource; a place in which past atrocities against a group are committed and in which the site serves as a reminder and memorial to said atrocity. Some recent scholarship has argued the importance of these sites, both as a means of healing and as a means of retraumatization (Bevan 2006).

The chief weakness in this approach is the lack of research addressing how these ethnic mobilization efforts are internalized by the general population (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Despite claiming that the public interprets nationalist rhetoric and symbology, ethnosymbolism and elite driven narratives do not show how these are able to suppress alternative visions of national belonging. The closest to this is Malkki (1995), though this focuses on the views of victims, rather than perpetrators, and thus does not satisfactorily address the perceptions of the victims from the perspective of perpetrators. The lack of comparative studies also makes it difficult to predict when a population may seek to make nationalist reinterpretations. There is

[11] Lemarchand (1996) may be the best in this respect, comparing ethnic conflict in both Rwanada and Burundi. Gagnon (2002) does show similarities in elite discourse in both Serbia and Croatia prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, though it can be argues that this is still essentially a single case, as the rhetoric of both groups elites were in direct response to one another.

an implication in several that this is during times of crises, either national or international, though this has not been sufficiently developed. There is also little research in this field as to what rhetorical devices are more apt to change nationalist interpretations amongst the general population, though recently some scholars are attempting to integrate aspects of social psychology to bridge this gap (Jesse and Williams 2005).

Identity and Social Psychology

There is a lively debate within social psychology both on the formation of identity and the healing of trauma caused by ethnic violence. This section primarily addresses the former, with the latter being dealt with in the discussion of peacebuilding literature. Within the literature of identity formation, research tends to focus on either individual or collective identity formation, with little overlap between these two areas of research (Owens et al. 2010).

According to Rosenberg (1979) there are four sources of identity characterizations: individual identity, role-based identity, category-based identity, and group membership-based identity. Individual identity is derived from a biography of self, constituted from one's own experiences. Despite the fact that is an individual narrative it is "social and institutional in origin" (Owens et al. 2010: 479). Despite its social construction, individual identity is used as a means of differentiation from others, providing a framework for finding one's place in society. Role identity originates from one's position in relation to others as individuals. These are usually expressed as dichotomous relationships, such as student-teacher (Rosenberg 1979). Many psychologists (Serpe 1987; Thoits 2003) also suggest that one may have many role-identities, and select whichever is most important for a given situation.

Of greater importance in ethnic conflict and peacebuilding is the literature focusing on category and group based identity. Within this body of literature Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Tajfel 1982) provides the most insightful theory of categorical and collective identity. Much like role-identities, Social Identity Theory allows for multiple levels of group identity with varying degrees of salience.

> In social Identity Theory, salience is conceptualized as the impact of the situation in on self-categorizations. I might be an American in Paris, but at a Civil War re-enactment, I am a Southerner, and in the American Sociological Association, I am a professor and social psychologist. And in each of those venues, I might have a different meaning for those categorical identities, *depending on the salient out-group* at that time (Owens et al. 2010: 488- emphasis added).

Applying this to ethnic conflict scenarios, one can see how propaganda against an out group could drastically increase the salience of an exclusionary and hostile national identity categorization, which could be further used to justify violence against the out group. This emphasis on context also reaffirms much of what is purported by ethnosymbolists and others who emphasize the role of elites in deploying symbolic resources to change attitudes towards out groups. In this sense, social psychology also often favours the security dilemma as the most likely cause of intergroup conflict, though there is a tendency to focus on dehumanization and scapegoating, rather than conflicts over territory or resources (Staub 2011). This dehumanization, according to David Moshman (2004), allows for individuals to maintain their moral self-perceptions while either committing or witnessing atrocities to outgroups.

Of crucial importance, at least in terms of ethnic conflict and peacebuilding, is the degree to which an elite minority can alter the salience of multiple identities. The highly contextualized nature of identity formation has led some to believe that states have a relatively low influence on identity formation (Bishai 2004). This ignores the immense power of the state to control contextual factors within its borders; being capable of deploying far greater symbolic resources than a group of individuals. Beyond the more obvious resources of monuments and ceremony, the state often provides a standard education, providing a means in which to alter the context in which individuals mature in a given society. The link between elite and local narratives as it pertains to identity is perhaps best explained using the critical concept of hegemony, as advanced by Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000).

Critical Theory and Identity

Much like Social Identity Theory, many critical theorists emphasize the discursive nature of national identity formation (Foucault 1982-3; Gramsci 1929-35). Benedict Anderson offers perhaps the most cited and straightforward of these theories, positing that national and ethnic groups are imagined communities, created by the mass production of a common printed vernacular (1983). For Anderson, nationalism is thus a product of capitalism, and a relatively modern 'invention' in collective action. This theory applies well to the Westphalian model of the nation state, as realized in Western Europe, in which national sub-languages were suppressed in to a national meta-language (see Anderson 1983: chapter 5).[12]

Hostile nationalism, for Anderson, is a by-product of racial stereotypes built within national meta-languages that promote inferior attitudes of out-groups (Anderson 1983: chapter 7). Ethnic violence is thus violent racism on a massive scale. This is also accompanied by a heightened sense of worth on part of the in-group, what Adorno refers to as collective

[12] This was also the root of the first theories of a united Yugoslavia, as Serbs and Croats are near linguistically identical (though they use different scripts) (Dragnich 1983).

derivatives of narcissism (1967: 95). Slavoj Zizek (1993, 2008) takes a different approach to understanding inter-ethnic and nationalist violence, outlining instead the fear, rather than disdain, of the Other.

Primarily a Lacanian scholar, Zizek conceives the nation as a bond amongst individuals to the Nation-Thing, which produces the rituals that perpetuate the Nation-Thing itself (1993: 201). This is somewhat similar to Smith's use of symbolic resources to reinforce national belonging, though in Zizek's case the individual has an imagined relationship to this Nation-Thing which is in turn the source of disavowed enjoyment-jouissance as per Lacanian psychoanalysis. This is perhaps most clearly stated by Adam Finlayson:

> Racism, prejudice, xenophobia, and nationalism revolve around access to and fear of the dissolution of this Thing of enjoyment. What we fear in the Other is the Other's mode of enjoyment and the threat that they might steal our enjoyment-steal our Thing. The imagining of a theft of enjoyment functions to conceal the fact that we never had it in the first place. Instead, the Nation-Thing as enjoyment is produced by the continual *fear of its loss* (1998:155 emphasis added)

This fear in turn gives rise to the "Sacred Cause of nationalism" (Zizek 2008: 135-6), in which individuals may suppress their abhorrence of violence in defence of the Nation-Thing. Essentially, this is a security dilemma of identity, in which groups with an attachment to their particular-universal[13] will justify the use of violence against the Others. This fear of losing attachment to the source of enjoyment is especially important in the wake of inter-group violence in which more than one group exists within a territory. Each group will seek to maintain its particular-universal narrative in the face of alternatives. If there is to be peaceful relations

[13] A particular narrative of collective identity that is held to be a universal standard of belonging. Those outside of this particular are viewed as the Other, both lesser and threatening.

between multiple nation groups, a new narrative that can incorporate multiple particulars must be constructed.

Zizek's view is heavily influenced by Louis Althusser, though the latter is more explicit in the formation of subject identity. Althusser uses the example of Christian ideology, rather than ethnic or racial belonging, though the line of reasoning can certainly be applied to the latter. "...there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, Other subject ie: God" ([1971] 2000: 35). The subject identity is thus dependent on the existence of the Subject itself. Returning to Christian ideology "God is thus the Subject, and Moses and the innumerable subjects of God's people, the subject's interlocutors-interpellates: his mirrors, his reflections." ([1971] 2000: 36). The subject acts according to his need to be of the Subject itself, a form of coercion that Althusser calls the ideological State Apparatus. Applying this to ethnic identity and belonging, the subject acts in accordance with the norms associated from being within that group; a complex formation of acceptable actions derived from a shared history and collective consciousness that is socially instilled on the subject through relationships with family and society.[14] A subject's "belonging" to a particular ethnic group is thus a product of societal influences both at the elite and local level that reinforces a code of behaviour, which is itself derived from the absolute Subject; the ethnic group itself.

As Althusser is primarily concerned of class relationships, a theory of inter-group conflict is not readily accessible in his works. Instead, I would like to explore the possibility of a more universal subject formation that is possible through Althusser. The subject, for Althusser, is

[14] Bourdieu uses the concept of 'habitus' for this phenomenon, and will be discussed in greater detail below.

already born in to a category, be it religious, racial, family etc.[15] If this category were to be altered, new subjects would be categorized in to a new social existence, one that could ideally include previously conflicting identity constructs.

Judith Butler provides a link between power and subject formation, and though she is primarily concerned with an individual, sexual identity, she provides insights that can be applied to national identity categories. Butler, much like Althusser and Foucault, stresses the socialization inherent in language on subject identity formation (1997: 20). Butler, however, takes a less 'static' approach than theorists such as Gramsci, Althusser, and Horowitz, stressing that "[the] social categorizations that establish the vulnerability of the subject are themselves vulnerable to both psychic and historical change" (Butler 1997: 21). This historical contingency allows for a more fluid conception of group membership based upon current socio-historical conditions, with the subject being "derived from conditions of power that precede it, [...] though not mechanically or predictably, from prior social operations" (1997: 21).

These social operations are most effective when they are repeated or ritualized, becoming unconscious habit. For states attempting to normalize identity and behaviour "It is precisely the possibility of a repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity, the subject, but which proliferates effects that undermine the force of normalization" (Butler 1997: 93). Thus, if a state's goal is to create new identities, those identities must reflect the repetition and ritual present within a society if it is to become the most salient mode of group belonging. This will be discussed in greater detail under the concept of hegemony.

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[15] This argument is based upon the Freudian analysis of subject formation based on the "name of the Father."

Linkages

These four diverse areas of identity literature have several common themes that should be highlighted before pursuing further. First, it is important to emphasize the rather fluidic nature of identity. Ethnosymbolism, Social Identity Theory, as well as Anderson, Zizek, and Foucault, all point to the highly contextual nature of collective identity that is reinforced through interaction both with other individuals and the symbolic order in which these interactions occur. Even primordialism, which promotes more static conceptions of identity than the other reviewed theories, allows for multiple levels of group identity that can shift depending on context. Violent inter-group conflict occurs when there is a fear of the Other encroaching upon national identity, for Zizek this is a threat to national enjoyment, while Kaplan and Huntington suggest this is a strategic struggle for resources. Regardless, there is reasonable consensus amongst these literatures that conflict occurs through a security dilemma in which national identity provides the limit between competing groups. If the goal is to reduce and eliminate conflict between groups that must share space after inter-group conflict it is thus essential to redefine the boundaries of the nation in such a way so as to create a supra-national identity between said groups.

How then, do we create a supra-national identity? Horowitz is unclear on this matter, while authors such as Huntington tend to unite groups around commonalities such as religion. This could be also expressed as using shared symbolic resources, if we are to use Smith's (2009) term, which would be reinforced through elite discourse. This would include a shared mass media (an expansion of Anderson's mass printed vernacular hypothesis) as well as creating (supra)-national sites of remembrance. What this does not address is the interaction between local and elite narratives of belonging. While it is common, both amongst political theorists and social psychologists, to speak of the reiteration of identity through social interactions, this body of literature does not speak to it directly. This interaction is best explained through the concept of hegemony.

Hegemony and Identity

The concept of hegemony has been central to intense debate amongst intellectuals in recent years as a strategy of critical political engagement (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000; Hill 2007). The term is credited to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who developed an alternative set of language for discussing social domination. This language was picked up in the 1980s, principally by Robert Cox, as a conceptual framework for criticizing contemporary political structures (Rupert 2009). While most commonly employed by critical theorists on the 'left', the concept of hegemony has also gained ground in more conservative circles as a means of changing more liberal ideology (Hill 2007).

Hegemony refers to the process in which dominant groups elicit "the consent of dominated groups by articulating a political vision, an ideology, which claimed to speak for all and which resonated with beliefs widely held in popular political culture" (Rupert 2009:177). In order for this to become truly effective, the dominant (hegemonic) discourse must also absorb and retransmit alternative discourses; incorporating them in to its own projection of political and social life (Butler 2000). This absorption and rearticulation of alternatives maintain the legitimacy of the hegemonic discourse (and dominant groups). It is through this rearticulation that states such as the United States have been able to maintain the legitimacy of their system:

elites have been extremely successful in rearticulating challenges made by both the women's suffrage and civil rights movements, for example.

While hegemony is formulated by the interaction of the public and private, governments have a vast array of tools in order to shape both of these spheres. Returning to the notion of symbolic resources, the state has the ability to broadcast messages through mass media, to erect monuments of past events, and to provide standardized education for youth (the latter two being instrumental for creating shared myths of origin). This allows the state to determine the language used in public discourse, as well as influencing the language of the private; to form the discursive surface on which hegemony occurs (Mouffe 1995). This can also be done using the power of the repressive state apparatus, such as current Rwanda, in which language referring to the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy is discouraged, often alongside persecution of "inciting ethnic hatred" (Buckley-Zistel 2009, Waugh 2004).

While government wields tremendous power in the public/private discourse, it does not hold a monopoly over it. Local narratives play a large role in shaping and interpreting national discourses (Moshman 2004, 2007; Lambert 2006), and there are often competing media outlets providing alternatives to state-centric discourses.[16] Reinforcing local narratives are history as transmitted from parent and neighbour to children, and strongly reinforced by local memorials such as gravesites. In the case of the societies in question, mass graves, sites of atrocity, and their memorials can serve as testaments to the local experience and can differ greatly from official representations (Bevan 2006; Ordev 2008; Field 2007). This leads to individuals having multiple conceptions of self and group identification and in which individuals explanations of

[16] A point of increasing importance, as social media has allowed for a proliferation of alternative information outlets.

reality are continually reproduced in social interactions. The key in post-ethnic conflict societies is to ensure those exclusionary national identities do not become the most salient, marginalizing "healthier" and more inclusive modes of identity (Moshman 2007). To phrase this is more theoretical terms, there needs to be a remaking of the particular-universal, as explained in the critical theory and identity subsection, in to a universal capable of being constructed of many particulars. This in turn provides a stable, hegemonic discourse of social relations in which the exploration of alternative identities is possible.

Such an approach fits well with studies that focus on political elites manipulating public discourse in pursuit of an exclusionary nationalist agenda. Appeals by nationalist leaders tend to highlight elements of history justifying their grievances against outgroups.[17] A supra-national identity that is able to co-opt, rather than suppress or ignore, local narratives of history and identity would be able to maintain legitimacy when confronted with an alternative account of the past. Nationalist rhetoric, in the case of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was able to justify an exclusionary nationalist agenda based upon historical grievances. If these grievances are incorporated in to a larger hegemonic narrative, hostile nationalism would not be able to provide a more compelling narrative of the past, and thus would be less likely to become the most salient aspect of identity within a given population.

[17] Examples include Milosevic's appeals to genocide against Serbs during the Second World War (Oberschall 2000), while in Rwanda the government sponsored radio station RTLM provoked fears that all Tutsi were collaborators with the RPF invasion who were attempting to re-establish Tutsi dominance of Rwanda (Semujanga 2003).

Hegemonic Identity and Education

During his time in prison Gramsci devoted considerable thought to the role of education and intellectuals. Much of this was in response to the failed socialist project in Italy, and Gramsci sought to understand the entrenchment of bourgeois culture. While I am focusing on entrenched ethnic and national identities, rather than economic ones, Gramsci's conception of building new identities applies well. For Gramsci:

> The educational relationship should not be restricted to the field of strictly "scholastic" relationships [...]. This form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between [...] rulers and ruled, elites and their followers, leaders and led [...]. Every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilization (Prison Notebooks: 349-50).

Thus when we speak of education, it should not simply mean school curricula (though this will remain a strong focus), but also alternative means of creating this shared identity, such as monuments and ceremonies of remembrance. The state's ability to influence this education has already been noted, though there are some factors from the above passage that deserve further attention. The first is to simply re-emphasize that there must be a common discourse between rulers and ruled. For Gramsci this common bourgeois discourse was centered on religion, though one could make a case for an alternative shared experience depending on context.[18]

The second point to consider is the historically contingent complexities of the aggregate nations which are to form a (new) supra-national identity construct. In the case of a post-ethnic

[18] Colonialism or foreign occupation, for example, could provide a backdrop in which to frame national discourses centered on Rwanda or Yugoslavia.

conflict society in which multiple, formerly fighting, forces must coexist within the same state, this is particularly important. In the case of state such as Yugoslavia, this would entail recognizing the differences of experience between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians, and Slovenes. Their experiences would have to be reflected in state discourse if a new (Yugoslav) hegemony were to emerge.

A final point to consider is the education caused by interaction amongst individuals; that aspect of identity reproduced through social interactions. Though this was not the case for Yugoslavia, Rwandans have the ability for a much wider scale of individual social interaction through the use of the internet. This makes the suppression of alternative discourses even more difficult, if not impossible, leaving the co-option of these narratives as the preferable option.

Let us return now to formal education, the classroom, and school curricula. The classroom is a particularly important place for the formation of individual and collective identities, both because of the time invested in that space and the fact that the growth stage of adolescence is where individuals first begin making concrete decisions of their own identity (Moshman 1999). It is also in the classroom that the state, through official curricula and standardized texts, is able to foster collective civic knowledge. Classroom methodology itself also has an important róle to play, with classroom learning typically being approached in an authoritarian manner. This in turn reinforces an authoritarian culture in which individuals are unwilling to challenge authority; disencouraging active bystanders that are essential to challenge scapegoating and stereotypes (Staub 2011). Recent studies (Simpson and Daly 2005) suggest that an education that involves extensive student debate[19] can foster "emancipatory knowledge,

[19] A method that serves to both break down role-identities (see social psychology) and foster organic intellectuals that can articulate the needs of various social groups (as per Gramsci).

and the development of a rational perspective on the nature and complexity of social and political structures that represent an opportunity for the resolution of conflict" (85). This also reinforces civic engagement and democratic norms, which are seen as integral in modern peace processes (Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977). The remaking of an education system is difficult in post-conflict societies, with many teachers inevitably being products of the old order that fostered previous conflict (Staub 2011). Combined with an often devastated infrastructure, this makes a new education system difficult, yet vital, to implement.

A final point to consider is the importance of reproducing identity through daily social interactions; making identity "common sense" as Gramsci would claim. For Gramsci, this common sense was a deliberate production of the dominant Bourgeois social order. Here I wish to make a slight departure from 'classic' Gramsci and instead adopt the term "habitus" from Bourdieu (1980). Habitus is the deeply held set of cultural and societal norms and values that are reinforced through history and persuade individuals to act in a 'correct' manner (Levinson 2011). This ensures that the past is always present in the minds of group members;

> It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought, and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their consistency over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms (Bourdieu 1980: 55).

In order to create the hegemonic identity, it is crucial to change the existing habitus within formerly competing ethnic groups; creating a new system of 'correctness'. This in itself should, theoretically, be able to change if groups can come to a new understanding of their own history in such a way that it can align with previously held, and continually reproducing, social experiences. For this education, in the Gramscian sense, is vital. As Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000) have argued, state discourse must successfully co-opt local narratives to create hegemonic discourse. Habitus provides an ideal theoretical concept for examining these local narratives. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the case of Yugoslavia provides an excellent example of competing official and local narratives of the nation, and how the inability of official truth frameworks to reflect local experience can undermine the imagined community that forms the basis of any (supra)-national identity.

Chapter Three: Identity in the former Yugoslavia

The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has generated intense scholarly interest compared to other violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Much of this interest is likely due to the geographic location of the conflict, situated within Europe, but with a history far enough removed from the Western European experience to be thought of as the Other; an untamed region where barbarism simmers beneath the surface. This was certainly the view put forth by Robert Kaplan in his book *Balkan Ghosts* (1993), as well as through western mainstream media during the bloody cycle of atrocity in Bosnia. Such views find their intellectual justification in David Horowitz (1985), who argues that nations are primordial and essentially unchanging. This thesis proposes that nations are essentially extended kinship groups, noting that the in-group language used to refer to members of the same nation is similar to the language used to refer to family members (1985: 57).

Horowitz's approach, underpinned by primordialism, fails to consider the long periods of peaceful and relatively peaceful coexistence of the peoples of the Balkans. Indeed, there is a far greater history of cooperation than conflict, particularly amongst Serbs and Croats (Mojzes 1994; Isakovich 2000)[20]. Conflicts in the Balkans prior to the outbreak of the First World War were typically caused by the expansion of regional powers through the Balkan peninsula, particularly the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires (Mojzes 1994; Isakovich 2000). Leading up to and during the First World War, the Balkan nations fought for their independence from the great empires of their time, eventually being consolidated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by the victorious Triple Alliance. This arrangement favoured the Serbs, who in spite of an elected

[20] A prime example of this is the mutual defence of the *Krajina* region, in present day Bosnia-Herzegovina, against Ottoman expansion until the 16th century (Mojzes 1994).

legislature, maintained control of the monarchy. This arrangement caused friction amongst the Croat community, who aspired to independent statehood during the war (Cipek 2003).

Both King Alexander and Josip Broz Tito[21] pursued programs of national unity and supra-national nation building, with varying degrees of success. Alexander pursued what was largely a top-down, centralized nation building agenda; attempting to consolidate Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes into a unitary nation using predominantly Serbian genesis myths (the Battle of Kosovo Plain, for example). This legitimized suspicions of Serbian expansionist ambitions that emerged in Croatia under Hapsburg rule. Tito's attempts at nation building better acknowledged local narratives across Yugoslavia by re-imagining Yugoslavia as a supra-national identity that allowed for the "flourishing of individual 'national cultures'" (Wachtel 1998: 131). This included acknowledging artistic and military contributions from the constituent Yugoslav nations in both education and in public memorials and monuments.

Unfortunately, Tito and the Communist Party were never able to successfully co-opt and incorporate narratives of the Second World War in to the official Yugoslav narrative. This is most striking within the history curriculum and at the former concentration camp at Jasenovac, where the Yugoslav state pointedly avoided addressing the legacy of the concentration camp operated by the *Ustasha* during the Second World War. Myths of Yugoslav origin, such as Njegos's *Mountain Wreath*[22] could also be interpreted as a hostile nationalist, rather than supra-national, piece of Yugoslav identity. The disconnect between the public truth narrative put forth by the state and that of local, private narratives of remembrance prevented the supra-national

[21] Alexander ruled the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929 until his assassination in 1934, while Tito ruled from 1945 until 1980, though in 1974 he was essentially reduced to a figurehead due to constitutional changes empowering provinces over the central government (Mojzes 1994).

[22] This epic poem, written by Njegos, is widely considered the classic of Serbian and Montenegrin literature.

Yugoslav identity from becoming the hegemonic expression of group identity on the Balkan Peninsula. This contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, as this public truth narrative could not effectively challenge the emerging exclusionary nationalist discourse emerging from the Yugoslav provinces.

This chapter will review efforts to create a Yugoslav nation, examining both the interwar and communist period. The latter is of particular importance, as it is this period that had to reconcile ethnic identities that had previously been in violent conflict. This will provide a basis to compare nation building efforts in present day Rwanda that will be examined in chapter four. This chapter is divided chronologically, providing a brief summary of nation building efforts in the first Yugoslavia, followed by a more in depth exploration of nation building under Tito. Ultimately, this chapter concludes that new narratives of national identity in Yugoslavia were not able to successfully co-opt the narratives of ethnic violence from the Second World War period, due to a lack of acknowledgement of atrocities committed by Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalists against one another. This prevented the formation of a hegemonic[23] narrative of national Yugoslav identity, which in turn allowed for exclusionary ethnic narratives to successfully challenge the Yugoslavism.

The First Yugoslavia: Three peoples or one?

During the interwar period the fledgling Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a state of many nations, with a cadre of elites attempting to fashion them into one. A major intellectual reason for uniting these different national groups was the commonality of language,

[23] Following the work of Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000) outlined in Chapter one.

with the vast majority of regional languages belonging to the Stokavian dialect with a 94% linguistic similarity (Pupavac 2003). Such linguistic similarities could, if we are to use the availability of common language literature as a crucial tool in nation building (Anderson 1983), provide an effective means of creating a unified Yugoslav national identity.[24] Indeed, language was the one obvious and tangible unifying factor, as there were otherwise differences in religion[25], education, alphabet[26], and class structure (Dragnich 1983).

The "Yugoslav state embarked on the task of nation-building with one solid symbol of state power- Prince Regent Alexander- all else was provisional" (Dragnich 1983: 14). One of his first acts was to appoint an all-party cabinet headed by Stojan Protic, a Serbian radical, despite all other political party recommending Nikola Pasic was the ideal candidate for the position (Dragnich 1983). Alexander's appointment of a Serb radical despite over wishes of both Croat and Slovene representatives reinforced long held suspicions of Serbia's desire to dominate the region.

Prior to the First World War the Hapsburgs deliberately sowed seeds of mistrust amongst northern Slavs towards the Serbs in the south (Dragnich 1983). As this mistrust was still circulating in popular discourse amongst those in the north, it was reinforced by events at

[24] Leading up to the First World War, ethnologists considered language to be a defining feature of national groups (Dragnich 1983). As Serbs and Croats shared a common language, elites of both ethnic groups argued that they were essentially one large national entity. This was later expanded by Bennedict Anderson (1983), who argued that a mass print common language can provide a universal framework of understanding culture and history.

[25] Serbs typically considered themselves to be Orthodox Christians, with the Serbian Orthodox Church having a long standing nationalist presence (Mojzes 1994). Croats and Slovenes are typically Roman Catholic, while a number of Serbs and Croats converted to Islam during Ottoman occupation. This population of Muslims (later termed 'Bosniaks') were considered either Serbs or Croats by members of those groups respectively (Isakovich 2000)

[26] Serbs and Macedonians use the Cyrillic alphabet (a product of Byzantine expansion, along with Orthodox Christianity), while Croats and Slovenes use the Latin script. This undermines the unified print of Anderson, as despite the similarities in the language itself; there is not a unified script in which to print.

the top level of government. Returning to the position outlined by Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000), that hegemony requires the discourse emitted by those in power to reflect the discourse at the local level, distrust of Serbs became a hegemonic ideal amongst many in the Croat community. This certainly goes a long way in explaining the popular resistance to Serbian power amongst members of the Croat peasant community, many of whom were largely ignorant to the workings of power in the new Yugoslav state (Dragnich 1983). The leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, was especially vocal in opposition to the concentration of power in Belgrade (Mojzes 1994).

In June 1928, within an increasingly dysfunctional legislature, Radic, along with his brother and two deputies, was shot and killed by a Serbian radical within parliament. By 1929 the conflict within parliament had grown to such intensity that King Alexander declared the country to be an absolute monarchy (Mojzes 1994), and dissolved the elected legislature. At the same time, Alexander abolished the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and instead changed the name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This action further reinforced Croat discourses of Serbian dominance, and further increased aspirations for independence, or at the very least, a decentralization of power (Djokic 2003). It is this desire for independence that provided what Zizek has referred to as a "Sacred Cause" (2008: 135-6), a means in which individuals can overcome their normal aversion to violence and atrocity in pursuit of radical change. It is precisely this Sacred Cause that allowed the majority of the Croat populace to turn a blind eye to the atrocities committed by the *Ustasha* regime during the Second World War.[27]

[27] Of which the concentration camp at Jasenovac is the most obvious example.

As Yugoslavia was transformed from democracy to autocracy, the nature of the national discourse was equally mutated. Prior to and during the early years of unification, Serbs and Croats were considered two tribes of the same nation (Djokic 2003; Dragnich 1983). This view was also held by dissenters such as Radic (Djokic 2003), who argued for greater Croatian autonomy *within* the Yugoslav state. During the democratic period national sub-divisions were tolerated within government, with many of the political parties being drawn across ethnic lines (Djokic 2003; Mojzes 1994). The new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, however, would tolerate no such divisions, and instead promoted a unitary Yugoslav identity that overrode previous Serb, Croat, and Slovene identities (Wachtel 1998). In effect, Alexander attempted to abolish sub-national identities, which only resulted in further entrenching ethnic positions and ethnic mobilization (Dragnich 1983; Djokic 2003).

Despite the claims that national sub-identities no longer were a part of the Yugoslav identity, many academics (e.g. Djokic 2003; Dragnich 1983; Isakovic 2000; Mojzes 1994) agree that the Yugoslav vision presented by Alexander was decidedly Serbian in character[28]. State history textbooks emphasized the Serbian struggle against the Ottoman's, particularly the 1389 battle of Kosovo Plain, as well as emphasizing the role of Serbia in the First World War (Troch 2010). Taken together with a Serbian monarch and the abolishment of national sub-identities, the messages emanating from Belgrade reinforced the already sown seeds of mistrust of Serb aspirations of domination. Distrust and fear of Serbian dominance became an entrenched, hegemonic ideal amongst the Croat populace. This elevated Croatian desires of nationhood and independence to that of a Sacred Cause.

[28] According to Wachtel and Markovic (2008) there was limited success with new textbook editions that grouped subjects thematically, rather than ethnically. However subjects such as history were still constructed primarily of Serbian narratives.

Despite the assassination of King Alexander in 1934 by Vlado Chernovemski, the Yugoslav state continued with its Serbian-driven narrative under the guise of a supra-national Yugoslav identity (Troch 2010). This new government continued to face stiff resistance in Croatia, with minor armed skirmishes breaking out between dissenters and the central government in Belgrade (Grandits and Promitizer 2000). It is difficult to predict the final outcome of these minor skirmishes, as the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941 carved the region in to approximately ten political entities, and the Nazi puppet Independent State of Croatia provided the first, if superficial, opportunity for Croatian independence in centuries.

Taken in the context of the continued drive in Croatia for more autonomy, followed by independence, we may conclude that nation building efforts in the first Yugoslavia were a failure. By concentrating power in Belgrade, along with establishing a Serbian monarch and Serb-centered education curriculum, Alexander reinforced and entrenched fears of Serbian dominance amongst the Croat community. This suspicion of Serbian dominance became hegemonic[29], with few viable alternatives challenging this mistrust. This in turn elevated Croat nationalism to that of a Sacred Cause, allowing the Croat people to accept the massive violence that would occur to the Serb population in the Independent State of Croatia.

[29] In which the actions of the state (Serb-centric history, Serbian dictatorship) reinforced long-held rumours of Serbia's ambition to dominate the region. In short, a harmonization of local and state discourse.

The Second World War: *Chetniks, Ustasha, and Partisans*

After briefly considering aligning with the Axis powers, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia declared itself in favour of the Allies and was promptly invaded by German and Italian forces in 1941. The Italians and Germans divided Yugoslavia in to ten zones under their respective spheres of influence, with an Independent State of Croatia established within the Italian sphere. This state was ruled by a movement known as the *Ustasha*, a Croat fascist nationalist movement under Ante Pavelic. Under Pavelic, and with support from the Axis powers, the Independent State of Croatia began a campaign of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Roma and other 'undesirables' (Grandits and Promitzer 2001). Working alongside the *Ustasha* were SS divisions recruited from amongst the Muslim communities, as they were seen as Croats by the *Ustasha* (Grandits and Promitzer 2001). Numbers killed during the genocide in Croatia remain disputed, with claims ranging from 60,000-800,000[30] (Grandits and Promitzer 2000).

The axis invasion triggered a three sided civil war within Yugoslavia. The *Chetniks* (Serb royalists), *Partisans (*multi-ethnic communists under Tito), and *Ustasha* combined to make the former Yugoslavia perhaps the most brutal battleground of the war. Each side regularly committed atrocities against the civilian populations, and each habitually made and broke alliances with the others in attempt to gain supremacy in the conflict (Isakovic 2000). As Allied forces pushed east, Tito was eventually successful in gaining control of all of Yugoslavia. A large number of *Ustasha* surrendered to incoming Allied forces rather than confront the *Partisans*.

[30] One of the chief propaganda tools used by both Tudjman and Milosevic leading up to Yugoslav disintegration was to make claim and counterclaim to the number of deaths each nation group suffered during the war. The concentration camp at Jasenovac was one of the chief grievances that Milosevic later exploited to increase ethnic nationalism (Oberschall 2000).

The Allies turned them over to Tito, who had them massacred and their bodies thrown in ditches (Isakovic 2000; Grandits and Promitzer 2001).

With this cycle of atrocity in the background Tito began to transform Yugoslavia in to a communist society. Along with attempting to create a classless society, Tito attempted to overcome the World War Two legacy of genocide. It is precisely this period of nation building that is of particular importance, as there were both major changes to the global and domestic political systems, as well as periods of massive ethnically-based violence that had to be overcome. This created what Moshman (2007) has referred to as an identity moratorium, in which old identities have the potential to be broken down and new ones formed.

Tito and Nation Building: Brotherhood and Unity?

Despite (unacknowledged) massacres of the opposition, Tito found himself in a position in which to unite Yugoslav society. The *Partisan* movement was multi-national, and while Serbs were the majority, Tito himself was Croat.[31] This national combination allowed for enhanced legitimacy and reinforced the new political discourse of Brotherhood and Unity. The Yugoslav communist party itself was unique in the sense that it was also decidedly nationalist in scope (Jovic 2003), and those in Yugoslavia enjoyed (limitedly) more freedoms than those in the Soviet Union. More importantly, unlike its Soviet counterpoint, Yugoslav communism did not seek to outright abolish national or religious identities amongst the populace (Jovic 2003; Kechmanovic 2001).

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[31] While Tito was in fact half-Croat and half-Slovene, he is often referred to as a Croat. This is likely due to the fact that in the former Yugoslavia, ethnicity was inherited from the father (see Mojzes 1994; Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000)

Working within a discursive formation of a national hegemonic identity, whereas hegemony is achieved by a harmonization of local and elite narratives, this refusal to outright abandon or abolish old identities was crucial to the formation of a new Yugoslav identity. To put this in more theoretical terms, this new Universal Yugoslavism was initially successful specifically *because* its universality was constructed as an aggregate of particulars, rather than a monolithic entity; its hegemonic potential existed precisely in its encapsulation of possible sub-identities within the context of a supra-national identity without disavowing the existence of the former. In short, it allowed for Serb, Croat, Slovene, and (later) Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Muslim (Bosniak) identities to exist within the larger framework of a Yugoslav identity. While this universality was eventually destroyed by its inability to successfully integrate the Second World War experience in to national discourses, the initial desire by the population to 'move on' was echoed by those in power, allowing Yugoslavism to reintegrate national groups without threatening group identities (Oberschall 2007; Lilly 1997).

Many point to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia as proof that the Yugoslav identity was a failure (Kaplan 1993). This is certainly an understandable position to take in light of the intense identity defined violence during the state's dissolution, but it fails to consider that relations between various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia just prior to the outbreak of violence showed little tension, and were noticeably less than in many western European states (Gagnon 2004: 35-43). Even more telling are the responses of the Bosnian 1989 census, in which "81.6 percent agreed with the statement that 'I am Yugoslav and cannot give priority to feeling of some other belonging.'" (Gagnon 2004: 41). The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to explaining the degree of success that the idea of Yugoslavism had by examining education and memorial practices. This section will also explain the inherent weaknesses of these programs that allowed national identities to quickly become the most salient during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. Eventually national(ist) narratives were able to challenge the hegemony of universal Yugoslavism and it is the nature of this challenge (and the failure of the existing hegemonic order to incorporate it) that led to the violent destruction of the Other for the (national) Sacred Cause.

Education in Titoist Yugoslavia

In the initial aftermath of the Second World War common curricula were developed for use in Yugoslav schools, though the teaching of history was left primarily in the hands of the various republics. "[T]here is good reason to suspect that children educated in various Yugoslav republics would not have had an identical view of the vital question of what their country had been like before the communist era." (Wachtel and Markovic 2008: 206). Views on the interwar Yugoslav state would have differed greatly depending on one's birthplace, with what became the Croatian republic having a generally negative experience during interwar Yugoslavia (Mojzes 1994). This lack of a unified conception of history certainly undermined any notion of Yugoslavs being a nation in themselves, at least in the sense of an imagined community with a common past moving forward through history, as both Anderson (1983) and Smith (2009) conceptualize the nation. A unified history was also undermined by the banning of the majority of interwar Yugoslav literature, such as that produced by Crnjanski, Ujevic, Vinaver, and Ducic (Wachtel 1998: 138).

Compounding the difficulty of using a school curriculum for nation building was the high degree of censorship enforced by the Yugoslav Communist Party. The chief goal of the education system itself was to "[create] *loyalty* and identification through the idea of self-managed socialism... in all textbooks from elementary language books up to high school history texts" (Hopken 1997: 84, emphasis added). This concept of loyalty is extremely important in this particular case, as loyalty to the regime was strongly linked to loyalty to Tito directly (Suppan 2003; Gow 1997). This would be a major factor in undermining the legitimacy of the communist regime after the death of Tito in 1980. This crisis of legitimacy, made much more potent by the collapse of the communist system within the greater framework of global politics, provided an ideal backdrop for nationalist leaders to reshape the discourse of Yugoslav identity.[32]

Educating loyalty to the regime meant a dual indoctrination towards party loyalty and loyalty to the system of state socialism writ large. This in turn meant that both had to be perceived as natural and legitimate by the populace if communist Brotherhood and Unity was to be an acceptable basis for hegemonic group identity (Staub 2008). Such a discourse would naturally have to fit the past into its narrative, explaining previous ethnic relations and coming to terms with the identity based violence that was prominent during the Second World War. This was not an easy task.

In the eyes of its members, the nation itself moves organically through time (Smith 2009)[33]. As such, a shared (or at least sufficiently narrow in scope) version of history needs to be established within the eyes of members, and this history must resonate through both the private and public spheres (Lambert 2006: 21). Thus the state (public) discourses must reflect, to at least some extent, the local (private) experience if the national idea is to become hegemonic.

[32] This is what David Moshman refers to as a 'moratorium' in identity, in which old identifiers break down and new ones are sought out (1999).

[33] In by which each member of the nation in question believes to have both a shred historical experience, as well as a shared future going forwards.

Brotherhood and Unity, at least superficially, acknowledged that the various nations of the Balkans each had their own unique historical legacy. This was an absolutely necessary approach to nation building; different regions of the state had their own architectural legacies[34], artists, and local traditions. Such was the folly of Alexander and the first Yugoslavia. Each of the various Yugoslav republics had a large role in creating their curriculums, provided they adhered to the rules of the Communist Party on subjects and what (not) to include within the education system (Hopken 1999; Jelavich 2003).

The most striking omission from Yugoslav history was any legacy of conflict between the various Balkan nations (Hopken 1997). While there were certainly long periods of peaceful coexistence, particularly mutual defence of the frontier regions against the Ottoman Empire, the end of the First Yugoslavia was not without violence, and the Second World War saw appalling violence, ethnic cleansing and atrocities between groups in the Balkans. Many scholars (Gagnon 2004; Dragovic-Soso 2002; Hopken 1997) have blamed this historical legacy at least in part for the wars of the 1990s.

According to the history curriculum, nationalist confrontations in the past were depicted as "bourgeois class conflicts" (Hopken 1997: 91). The Yugoslav history curriculum labelled the Second World War as a battle for national liberation, "presenting the Partisans as 'revolutionaries' and 'liberators' and all other forces as 'counterrevolutionaries' and 'fascists'" (Dragovic-Soso 2002: 100). The communist regime also "'de-ethnicised' the war, by blaming the 'bourgeoisies' of all Yugoslav nations for the crimes that had taken place and by dealing with wartime inter-ethnic conflicts only in terms of superficial reciprocity" (Dragovic-Soso 2002: 100).

[34] Serbian architecture is based on the style of the Byzantine Empire, while Croatia and Slovenia share common styles with much of Western Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a strong legacy of Ottoman architecture (Ordev 2008).

While this was certainly done to increase the perceived legitimacy of the Communist Party[35], it did not include mention of any atrocities committed by the *Partisans* in the liberation of Yugoslavia,[36] nor did it detail the involvement of Croatian nationalists in the *Ustasha* regime, or discuss the Bosnian Muslim SS divisions that carried out ethnic cleansing on behalf of the occupying powers (Jelavach 2003). The history curriculum itself varied across Yugoslavia. In Croatia, for example, the history curriculum included:

> Old Yugoslavia and its founding. Our peoples during the First World War, their struggles for freedom from foreign yokes, their unification as the only path to independence, and the construction of a unified state; the dissasitisfaction of the masses with the monarchical and centralized state order (the Vidovdan Constitution); the struggle of the Croatian and other oppressed peoples, the excitation of national and religious hatred by the ruling classes; the murder in the parliament [of Stjepan Radic] and the institution of dictatorship (*nastavni plan i program za osnovne skole narodne republici Hrvatskoj*[37] 1947: 35, cited in Wachtel 1998: 136)

The above passage is a reasonably detailed description as to how the first Yugoslavia, and the dissolution of parliament, would be taught to students when compared to other republic curricula guidelines, such as that of Serbia. In the Serbian republic, teachers were instructed to deal with "the founding of Yugoslavia [...] Yugoslavia from 1918-1941" (*nastavni plan i program za osnovne skole*[38] 1947: 13, cited in Wachtel 1998: 136). The Bosnian curriculum was a compromise between these two, though much like the others, its treatment of history ceased in 1941. It is also crucial here that when there was a discussion of inter-ethnic conflict, the blame was placed solely on elites; failing to address the wider social causes. It should also be noted

[35] It is worth reiterating here that this system itself was almost totally linked to Tito (Hopken 1997; Gow 1997).

[36] Making this even more difficult, many of the hyper-nationalist Serb *Chetniks* joined the *Partisans*. Many of these fighters had committed acts of ethnic cleansing and extermination against non-Serbs earlier in the war (Isakovic 2000).

[37] Curriculum for Primary Schools, National Republic of Croatia

[38] Curriculum for Primary Schools (Serbia)

that in this curriculum, the only group that could have been oppressing the Croats and other peoples would have been the Serbs (reinforcing the earlier rumours of Serbia's desire to dominate the region).

It is common for states to prescribe themselves as moral agents, working on the "right" side of history (Bishai 2004). This becomes problematic in states such as Yugoslavia in which atrocities were committed by forces that must now take command of the state itself. If the state cannot co-opt alternative discourses than it risks an alternative account of private narratives challenging and overthrowing the current hegemon (Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000). Rather than attempt to incorporate this narrative, the Tito regime dismissed national conflicts as products of the old order, while the only state sponsored narratives of local involvement in the Second World War simply asserted that "all nations had traitors" (Hopken 1997: 92). This fails to co-opt the obvious nationalist intent of the violence in Yugoslavia, particularly by the Independent State of Croatia. The lack of a nuanced discussion of the Second World War within the history curriculum ensured that the state had no official rebuttal for the nationalist rhetoric centered on this period that emerged prior to the dissolution of the Yugoslav state.

The debates as to what to include in the school curriculum took on new importance in the early 1980s during the renewed academic debates of the national question. During this time the Yugoslav system was in a state of shock. The death of Tito in May 1980 left the system without its lynchpin, so much so that the Party did not initially admit his passing. While this was occurring, there were calls within (particularly the Serbian) intelligentsia calling for a re-examination of the national question, along with disputed claims over the Second World War experience (Dragovic-Soso 2002). Such scholarship also raised questions as to what would now be included as part of school history curriculums (Wachtel and Markovic 2008). Despite numerous amendments and five separate curriculum proposals the effort at education reform ultimately failed, largely due to ethnocentric views of what should be taught (Wachtel and Markovic 2008).

How then, should identity creation through education be assessed in the former Yugoslavia? The system certainly created some sense of supra-national identity, as evidenced by survey data from 1989 (Gagnon 2004: 35-43). The system did acknowledge difference between the various Yugoslav nations, which paid lip service to the discourse surrounding the memories of the Second World War. This in turn made Brotherhood and Unity more palatable; it avoided the superimposing of a Yugoslav identity over the entire populace, as was the case with Alexander. This allowed for the exploration of alternative modes of identity, which allows for a more fluid and healthy conception of self and group identity (Moshman 1999; 2007).

The weakness of this system, and its ultimate undoing, was that it was unable to co-opt the ethno-nationalist challenge during a period of national crisis and transition. Reducing inter-ethnic violence as a product of Bourgeois capitalism did not reflect the local experience and narratives; narratives that could ultimately be passed to subsequent generations. Furthermore, framing the capitalism as the external and threatening Other became difficult, particularly during a period of proposed economic reforms that were particularly strong in Croatia and Slovenia (Gagnon 2004). This desire for economic reform further undermined a system that was in a state of crisis following the death of Tito. State discourse placed Tito as a lynchpin of state legitimacy, and his death created a void in state discourse that nationalist leaders were able to fill.

The events of the Second World War, particularly within the Independent State of Croatia, were also instrumental to the failure of the Yugoslav project. The lack of an in depth curriculum dealing with the legacy of this period made it easy to challenge government narratives of past atrocities. The idea that "all nations had traitors" is certainly true, yet it does not address the scale of the violence towards targeted groups, particularly Serbs at the hand of the *Ustasha* and Bosniaks at the hands of Serbian *Chetniks*. The greatest contestation was over the concentration camp of Jasenovac, with nationalist leaders and academics creating wildly different images and statistics as to the events and casualties that occurred there. Local discourses, particularly those of Serbs who had been victimized, were more closely aligned with the discourse of Milosevic and a newly emergent radical nationalist intelligentsia (Cohen 2001). This allowed for an alternative discourse to successfully challenge the hegemony of state narrative, effectively replacing a supra-national identity with an ethnocentric one. The discourse surrounding Jasenovac highlights the importance of incorporating past events in to state narratives, as "bits of the past will always live on and successful political projects are those that manage to graft the new onto the old without serious discontinuities" (Schopflin 2006: 22). Jasenovac "probably would not have contributed to the climate of hatred so strongly had the topic been dealt with in a reasonable manner in schools during the Tito era" (Hopken 1997: 93).

The Mountain Wreath: A case study of national disagreement

While the state certainly did not officially address the nationalist question within the school system directly, it at times emerged controversially within language studies. Of particular note is the Njegos's masterpiece *Gorski vijenac (Mountain Wreath)*, perhaps the most famous and influential piece of Montenegrin literature. It was first used as a pan-Yugoslav piece of literature by King Alexander, despite the fact that it had been used "as a central building block of exclusively Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century." (Wachtel 1998: 101). In order to circumnavigate this, textbooks only included passages of the poem, highlighting those that presented a more pan-Yugoslav identity.[39] Textbooks also highlighted underlying themes in the work of Njegos, rather than the full text itself, particularly unifying factors of struggle against tyranny (Wachtel 1998).[40] While resistance to this sort of cultural assimilation was less overt than that in the political arena, there were still fears that this teaching constituted an attempt to Serbianize the other people of Yugoslavia (Wachtel 1998).

Interestingly, Tito and the Communist Party also celebrated Njegos as the great artist of the Yugoslav peoples. This was reaffirmed and celebrated in 1947, in which state-wide celebrations were held for the 100th anniversary of the *Mountain Wreath* (Wachtel 2004). The chief problem with this would be to break the legacy of Njegos away from the interwar period.

Under Tito, the fact that Njegos was Montenegrin was stressed heavily. It was thought that "Since the main lines of cleavage in interwar Yugoslavia had been between Serbs and Croats, it would have been unwise to promote a Serb or Croat as national writer." (Wachtel 2004: 141). *Mountain Wreath* was also a genuinely popular work, and was often referred to in publications in postwar Yugoslavia (Brkljacic 2004). The *Mountain Wreath* deals primarily with resistance to the Ottoman domination of the Balkan Peninsula during the 19th century. Like Alexander, Tito proclaimed this resistance to authority to be the central trait of this. Unlike

[39] Though it should be noted that the *Mountain Wreath* often preaches fratricidal bloodletting, particularly against Muslims, who are seen as instruments of Ottoman domination.
[40] It is somewhat ironic that Alexander promoted struggle against tyranny as a unifying Yugoslav trait, yet also dissolved the elected legislature in favour of royal dictatorship.

Alexander however, *Mountain Wreath* was framed as a source of inspiration for the *Partisans* in their own resistance to occupying (and collaborating) forces (Wachtel 1998, 2004). This firmly linked the resistance movement to the struggle for freedom from Ottoman oppression. One cannot help but observe that the Muslim community was the target of the most violence both in what was the epic of Yugoslav literature and in the wars that would destroy Yugoslavia.

Initially the *Mountain Wreath* generated little debate or controversy amongst Party intellectuals and teachers. This is largely in part due to its wide circulation throughout Yugoslavia, as well as a lack of coherent national curriculum (Wachtel 2004; Hopken 1997). *Mountain Wreath* did, however, become a source of controversy in 1984 during a summit on Yugoslav education. Several teachers raised complaints that *Mountain Wreath* presented a hostile nationalist, rather than pan-Yugoslav, view of the Balkan Peninsula. They expressed that their students had interpreted the work as such, and that it undermined the principle of Brotherhood and Unity (Wachtel 1998, 2004). In this way, the *Mountain Wreath* provided another means of reinforcing narratives that dealt with exclusionary ethnic identities, and moreover, promoted violence against members of out-groups in order to achieve national liberation. This narrative strongly reinforces that of the Second World War, providing an additional justification for highly salient ethnic identities despite the state's pan-Yugoslav intentions. Rather than attempt to provide additional materials for the interpretation of Njegos, or recommend alterations to the teaching of the subject, the Party simply declared than if any students were to interpret the text as such it was due to incompetence on the part of educators (Wachtel 2004).

The *Mountain Wreath* was ultimately problematic due to various interpretations of the text that were possible. As Moshman (1999) has argued, identity can only be fully realized through the exploration of alternatives. Using *Mountain Wreath* as a signifier of identity allowed both national and pan-national interpretations. An individual's selection of these two competing signifiers of national identity thus becomes highly contingent upon local narratives of the past and the identify discourses that are reinforced through day to day activity. That students would interpret what was presented to them as a pan-national author as a source of hostile nationalism certainly suggests that the former was not the dominant mode of socially reinforced group identity at the time of the education summit. In short, interpretations of *Mountain Wreath* would be contingent upon local experiences and interactions, not on the explanations provided by state discourses (through teachers and textbooks).

Post-Titoist Literature and the Re-emergence of Memory

While *Mountain Wreath* is by far the most documented case of potentially dividing literature, by the early 1980s, new books began to surface that challenged the assumptions that the *Partisans* were both the only agents of national liberation, and that that inter-ethnic violence during the Second World War equally shared across the Balkans. Of this body of literature, *Anatema*, written by Vojislav Lubarda, is perhaps the most interesting.

Anatema is an autobiographical novel that was published in 1982, and documents the persecution of the author after an exerpt of his unpublished novel *Gordo posrtanje* appeared in a Sarajevo journal in 1969 (during which time accounts of the past were heavily censured, keeping with the theme of Brotherhood and Unity). The published excerpt detailed the massacre of Serbs by a Muslim SS division during the Second World War in Eastern Bosnia. The excerpt then describes a massacre committed by a Serbian unit of *Partisans* in retaliation (Dragovic-Soso 2002: 104). Not only did Lubarda describe these massacres (which he personally witnessed) in great detail, he also provided the names of several prominent Bosnians that took part in the massacres, some of which had obtained a high rank in the post-war bureaucracy. He also outlines the resistance by former *Chetniks*, who resented his portrayal of the movement as a "vengeful horde" (Dragovic-Soso 2002: 105).

The majority of *Anatema* deals with the author's experience after this excerpt was published. It speaks to his 10 years of continued movement and harassment, and his near arrest and imprisonment. He was also banned from publication for 10 years, as his work was against the principles of Brotherhood and Unity (Dragovic-SoSo 2004: 105). *Anatema* thus not only exposed the gap in the historical narrative, highlighting the role of former perpetrators of atrocity in what was contemporary Yugoslav society, but also drew attention to the Tito regime's efforts to maintain that gap. While *Anatema* was amongst the first, and arguably most important, works in exposing the gap in the historical narrative and bringing that knowledge to a wide audience, authors such as Radulovic and Draskovic also made significant popular contributions.

The discourse that emerged just prior to and during Yugoslav disintegration clearly demonstrate how Yugoslavism did not adequately co-opt narratives from the Second World War. Nationalist propaganda by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic often referred to Croats as *Ustasha* (Milosevic 2000), bent on eradicating all Serbs to form a new, independent Croatia.[41] Croatian President Tudjman, in a similar approach to nationalist discourse, labelled the Serbs as a "bearded Chetnik horde" (Milosevic 2000: 113). These terms, emerging from the Second World War experience, should have been countered by a more inclusive Yugoslav-centered narrative. Unfortunately, the *Ustasha* and *Chetnik* labels were far more aligned with the local Second World War experience than with Yugoslavism.

Beyond the education system, the past can be taught through practices of remembrance and memorialisation. Ideally these coincide with what is taught in schools, providing supporting discourses and underlying the validity of each other. Monuments themselves are also physical reminders of a certain past, as are more mundane sites such as cemeteries and places of worship. All of these contribute to creating a link between past and present.

Creating memory through Sites of Remembrance

Sites of remembrance are amongst the most powerful symbolic resources that can be harnessed by a national group(s). Some of the most importance of these are museums and memorials to the past, though local grave, battle, and religious sites certainly qualify as well. These sites are "cache[s] of historical memory, evidence that a given community's presence extends into the past and legitimizing it in the present and on to the future" (Bevan 2006: 8). Along with education and local practices of remembrance, these sites help to unify national groups; forming them in to an organic collective moving forwards through history.

[41] This propaganda was reinforced by that nationalist rhetoric of Tudjman, as well as the reinstatement of state symbols from the Independent State of Croatia.

There has been limited empirical research on the effects of national symbols on group consciousness and national identity (Butz 2009). Those who are exposed to national symbols on a daily basis have a much stronger national identification than those without such exposure (Butz and Plant 2009). Thus symbols of national identity are one means in which a state can create social cohesion in a divided society, though like other means of discourse, if it is to become hegemonic, it must reflect local experiences as well as supra-national ones. This section seeks to address what sort of symbolic resources were deployed by Tito's communists, and how these symbolic resources reflected the local experience.

In addition to the use of *Mountain Wreath*, the tomb of Njegos was used in an attempt to create a monument of Yugoslav cultural unity. Design began in the 1950s under Ivan Mestrovich, possibly the closest thing Yugoslavia had to a "national artist" (Wachtel 2004: 143). Completed in 1971, the tomb of Njegos was an ideal symbol of south Slav unity. Designed using architectural components of Byzantine, Ottoman, and West European heritage, with each component facing the region in which the respective styles were present, the tomb of Njegos was a perfectly designed Universal of Particulars. Rather than attempting to either superimpose a national image upon the past or reinterpret existing styles, this tomb was built as a monument to all major national groups. Despite the fact that Njegos was Montenegrin, and that his writings were often divisive, this physical symbol of what was presented as a national figure reflected the diversity of Yugoslavia without favouring one interpretation. Unfortunately, this was one of the few monuments that could be said to adequately reflect local realities as well as Brotherhood and Unity.

Virtually all states build memorials to past military action, be they success or failures, Yugoslavia being no exception. These monuments, erected to show the triumph of the *Partisans* over the Axis powers and local collaborators, were to provide additional legitimacy to communist rule. The scale of this undertaking was particularly impressive, with "barely a village in the former Yugoslavia that did not have its local war memorial, either in the form of the favourite figurative soldier with a weapon in his hand, a more artistic abstract solution or at least small commemorative plaques." (Karge 2009: 51). The difficulty of such monuments was the commemoration of the dead that were not aligned with the *Partisan* movement. A common means of achieving this was to have commemorations honouring the local dead in the war; making them more sombre, as opposed to sanguine and liberating as the Party initially intended (Karge 2009). This reinforced a strong local connection to the Second World War, rather than the pan-Yugoslav narrative favoured by the Party in both state memorial celebrations and in the education system (Hopken 1999).

Much like within the history curriculum, the concentration camp at Jasenovac was a difficult site to commemorate while maintaining an ethnically neutral discourse of internal collaborators during the War; if *Ustasha* atrocities were mentioned, *Chetnik* ones would be as well (Karge 2009). There was no Serbian 'equivalent' of Jasenovac.[42] Rather than address the extent of *Ustasha* activity at Jasenovac, state remembrance ceremonies the perpetrators "were overwhelmingly given the labels of 'aggressor', 'occupying force' and 'degenerate individuals' or even the completely abstract term, 'enemy'." (Karge 2009: 55).

[42] While there was concentration camps in other areas of Yugoslavia during the Second World War, Jasenovac was the only one in which mass killings were done without the supervision of Nazi Germany.

While the state promoted a strategy of silence towards Jasenovac, by the early 1950s there was a steady stream of mourners visiting the village at Jasenovac, and the local branch of the Communist Party lobbied for a memorial to be built (Karge 2009). These efforts were initially met with silence from Belgrade, with later state discourses proclaiming that any memorial would have to be a federal initiative (Karge 2009). This initiative never meaningfully took place under the centralized nation-building efforts of the Titoist period, leaving the memorialisation of Jasenovac outside the public discourse of the state. This did not, however, prevent local practices and ceremonies of remembrance from occurring at Jasenovac. Initially organized by survivors of Jasenovac, the anniversary of Yugoslav liberation saw over 10,000 people come to Jasenovac to commemorate those killed in the camp (Karge 2009). This is perhaps the most obvious disconnect between public and private discourse in state memorials in communist Yugoslavia. The large number of individuals visiting Jasenovac clearly demonstrates that there was a strong local, private narrative dealing with the events of Jasenovac specifically, and the Second World War period more generally. The numbers visiting Jasenovac also indicate that state narratives of the Second World War, in which all nationalities suffered (and collaborated) equally could not reach the level of hegemony needed to create a supra-national identity.

Yugoslav Nation Building

Despite two different attempts at nation building in the former Yugoslavia, a pan-Yugoslav identity never became a hegemonic expression of group identity. There are several reasons for this, but an overarching trend is a disconnect between local and federal narratives of group identity, particularly as it pertains to a shared historical experience. It is precisely this dissonance of narrative that prevented a supra-national Yugoslav identity from becoming hegemonic, as state discourse must co-opt local narratives to have a stable hegemony (Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 2000).

Under Alexander, state discourse was overly Serb oriented. Interpretations of local history overly favoured Serb myths of origin, drawing particular focus to events such as the battle for Kosovo Plain. The predominance of what were seen as Serbian narratives reinforced myths of Serbian aspirations for dominance of the region that had been circulated during Hapsburg rule of northern Yugoslavia. This narrative was further reinforced by the dissolution of parliament and the declaration of royal dictatorship under Alexander. Rather than promoting a pan-Yugoslav culture, the appearance that Alexander was attempting to 'Serbianize' the population provoked nationalist backlash, particularly within Croatia. Rather than attempt to co-opt this Croat nationalism, Alexander (and his successors) attempted to effectively abolish it, in the process making it stronger, elevating it to a Sacred Cause that allowed provided justification for acts of genocide that would later be committed in the independent State of Croatia.

These atrocities had to later be reconciled with the narrative of Brotherhood and Unity under Tito after the Second World War. While attempts were made to form a common history, as per the theories of nationalism advanced by Anderson (1983) and Smith (2009), they were never able to fully co-opt narratives of the Second World War while maintaining the semblance of equal guilt and suffering across all national groups. This absence of history is noticeable within the education curriculum, despite that each constituent state had a great deal of freedom over textbook curricula. The same can be said of national monuments to the Second World War, which were not able to satisfactorily address the issue of local collaborators. This is especially evident at the former concentration camp at Jasenovac, in which thousands of people regularly went to mourn the loss of family, yet no state memorial was built until after over a decade of lobbying by the local population. This demonstrated a clear disconnect between private and public narratives, and inevitably contributed to the power that Jasenovac would later have amongst nationalist leaders in both Serbia and Croatia.

Despite these obvious failures, there were also some very real successes in nation building in Tito`s Yugoslavia. The decentralized nature of the education system allowed for the exploration of local histories and narratives, though they did not touch on the contentious Second World War or national question. This in turn allowed for a state discourse that better reflected the local historical experience, while simultaneously providing a greater Yugoslav context. The same could be said of the tomb of Njegos, which was perhaps the most obvious purely Yugoslav monument constructed under Tito. It's incorporation of different architectural elements ideally reflected the difference in Yugoslav society. Unfortunately the same could not be said of the work of Njegos, which could be easily interpreted as a work of exclusionary nationalism despite state insistence that it was pro-Yugoslav.

One of the greatest weaknesses of this system was the way in which it relied upon Tito as a lynchpin of national unity. While instilling loyalty to the regime was certainly a necessity in the post Second World War period, the focus on the leadership created a crisis of legitimacy at the time of his death; a legitimacy that was later filled by hostile nationalism. Despite all of this, the 81% of people that identified themselves foremost as Yugoslav suggests a fairly high level of successful state identity creation. It was not able to fully co-opt nationalist sentiment, largely due to a crisis of legitimacy upon the death of Tito and a failure to address the legacy of the Second World War.

The Yugoslav case offers an intriguing comparative case for what is currently happening in terms of identity construction in post-genocide Rwanda. The most important element to be noted is a historical 'gap' that fails to address the most contentious issues of conflict in the region's history; namely the intense inter-ethnic violence that immediately proceeded the unifying regime (Tito and communism in this case). It is this very gap in history that was later exploited by nationalist figures in order to maintain their own legitimacy, creating ethnic security dilemmas in the process. It is also important to note the degree to which the system itself was linked to a charismatic figure, the removal of whom set the stage for the aforementioned exploitation of history. These themes will again emerge in the following two chapters. Chapter four will provide a brief history of Rwanda, and review identity creation through justice proceedings and memorialisation, while chapter five will examine identity and education in post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapter Four: History, Identity, Genocide, and Justice in Rwanda

Much like the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the 1994 Rwandan genocide has been the subject of intense scholarly interest. Much of this research has focused on the causes and dynamics of the civil war and corresponding genocide (see Des Forges 1999; Fujii 2009), though there are also significant studies of Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction, particularly the implementation of the locally led *gacaca* court system (Burnet 2009; Cobban 2007). Implicit in this body of literature is the need to establish a universal truth framework through which the events of the genocide can be understood and ideally agreed upon by the Rwandan populace. This chapter will expand the research on creating a universal truth framework for the purposes of forming a hegemonic Rwandan civic identity by examining how this truth narrative is taught to Rwandans through both *gacaca* trials and memorialisation practices. In doing so, this chapter will demonstrate that there is a dissonance between the government sponsored truth narrative and the local perception of both history and the genocide that will in turn prevent the establishment of a hegemonic Rwandan civic identity.

This chapter will be divided in to three sections. The first section briefly examines Rwandan identity in a historical perspective, arguing that pre-colonial ethnic identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were more fluid conceptions of identity than most scholarship suggests. The second section provides a brief examination of the colonial and immediate post-colonial period that led to the civil war and eventual genocide of 1994. The third section will examine the construction of a civic identity in post-genocide Rwanda through memorialisation and *gacaca* courts, as these are crucial tools of the state for disseminating their version of the past amongst Rwandans.

Pre-Colonial Identity in Rwanda

To date there is little consensus on the origin of Rwanda's three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (Semujanga 2003; Newbury 2009). Conceptions of Rwandan identity in a historical perspective tend to focus on either a static conception of group belonging, in which Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa migrated to Rwanda in different time periods, bringing with them their traditional modes of cultivation;[43] or assume a more fluidic set of identities in which there was a high degree of cross-cutting between ethnic, clan, and regional identities. There is also a third view, encouraged by the current Rwandan administration, that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were colonial inventions to divide Rwandan society. As will be discussed later, the migratory explanation for Rwanda's three ethnic groups was accepted by European powers and later institutionalized under colonial rule.

The so called Hamitic Hypothesis advanced by European colonizers (first Germany, followed by Belgium after the First World War) held that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa arrived separately in Rwanda in different migratory waves. The Hutu were believed to originate from sub-Saharan Africa, sharing common ancestry with other Negroid races of the continent (Mamdani 2001). The Tutsi were believed to have originated in Ethiopia; the so-called lost children of Ham[44], who were related to the Caucasian European colonizers. Combined with the scientific racism of the colonial period, this led to Tutsi being considered 'more' European; closer to the master race and thus genetically superior than the Hutu (Mamdani 2001). The fact that those in administrative

[43] Hutu are typically seen as farmers, while Tutsis are normally seen as raisers of cattle. The Twa (numbering approximately 1% of Rwanda's population) are normally viewed as excluded from mainstream society, and survive mainly through hunting.
[44] The eldest of the three sons of Noah

positions were often considered Tutsi further reinforced this supposed superiority of Tutsi, as it was believed they were better suited to rule (Mamdani 2001).

More recent scholarship on pre-colonial Rwanda has focused on the complexity of group membership prior to the arrival and institutionalization of ethnic identities. Refuting the Hamitic hypothesis, African historians (most notably David Newbury) suggests that the key evidence used by Europeans to support static ethnic identities (clans) historically include members of multiple ethnic groups (2009). As clans are typically extended kinship groups, the presence of both Hutu and Tutsi within a single kinship group contradicts the notion that they are fully separate ethnicities. Making matters more complicated is that historically speaking each 'ethnic' category contained members from virtually all the clans in pre-colonial Rwanda (Newbury 2009). Newbury theorizes that identity in pre-colonial Rwanda, to the extent that it can still be seen today, is based on the degree to which the highly centralized Rwandan royal court had penetrated the region (2009). The ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi still existed, but more was more similar to a caste system, albeit one with increased social mobility. More interestingly, there are regions of Rwanda, particularly in the west near Lake Kivu, which had no record of separate Hutu or Tutsi. At the same time, it is essential to note that in most regions Hutu and Tutsi were at the least semi-meaningful categories, particularly amongst the ruling elites, which consisted primarily of Tutsi (Semujanga 2003).

A third view, and one that is encouraged by the Kagame regime, is that Hutu and Tutsi referred not to ethnicity, but to profession (similar to the caste argument). This posits that Hutu and Tutsi lived together in harmony, and were/are the same people with a unified language, set of traditions, and culture (Buckley-Zistel 2009). Due to these commonalities, the government promotes the idea that the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi were inventions of European colonizers in an effort to divide and rule Rwandan society. To date, the terms Hutu and Tutsi do not appear in the national museum, thus delegitimizing these terms when conceptualizing Rwandan history (Buckley-Zistel 2009).

This section demonstrates that the historical origins ethnicity is still strongly debated within Rwanda. It is important to grasp this complexity and disagreement, as it is this pre-colonial period that the current government uses to justify its program of pan-Rwandanism. Ethnicity changed significantly with the arrival of Europeans, particularly the Belgians following the First World War. This would have disastrous consequences when Rwanda was finally decolonized.

Colonialism, Tutsi Rule, and the Institutionalization of Identity

While the full history of Rwanda under colonialism is far beyond the scope of this work, there are a few points that must be made in order to properly contextualize the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion and subsequent genocide. By the time Rwanda began to be colonized by Germany at the turn of the century, Rwanda already had a large and complex centralized state structure. The Germans were followed shortly thereafter, assuming power after Germany's defeat at the end of the First World War. Both sought to rule Rwanda with "the least cost and most profit" (Des Forges 1999: 34). Belgium in particular began dismantling some of the more complex pre-colonial state structures, re-dividing the country into chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms of similar size. Most importantly, Belgium implemented a divide and rule strategy in which Tutsi would hold top government and administrative positions, sacking Hutu leaders and banning Hutu children from higher education (Des Forges 1999). This education discrimination in particular ensured that only Tutsi could reach the highest positions of influence within the state system. One of the most enduring legacies, and one that would have disastrous effects during 1994, was the issue of ethnic identity cards in 1931. These would be used more than 60 years later to identify and murder ethnic Tutsi at roadblocks across the country.

Belgian occupation of Rwanda was brutal, even by colonial standards. The centralization of power eliminated any leverage of the peasantry, the vast majority of which were Hutu (Mamdani 2001). This allowed for local and regional chiefs to brutally exploit the peasantry through forced labour, whipping those that did not comply. While a judiciary was in place, this tended to overwhelmingly support the elites, rather than the peasants, who suffered terribly as a result (Des Forges 1999). In addition, throughout both German and Belgian administration famine devastated large swathes of the Rwandan population, forcing many to flee to Uganda and the Congo (Mamdani 2001).

During the 1940s, King Rudahigwa began instituting land reforms in Rwanda. While the majority of power and wealth remained in the hands of Tutsi elites, Hutu were granted more political and economic freedom in Rwandan society. This would eventually lead to increased demands by emerging Hutu elites for control over Rwandan society. These demands cumulated in the Rwandan revolution of 1959.

Hutu Power, Civil War, Genocide

The 1959 revolution was fought as a dual emancipation from both 'Hamitic' invaders (Tutsi elites) and the Belgian colonizers. Interestingly, Belgium supported the Hutu majority during the revolution, making for a relatively easy victory for the Hutu revolutionaries (Des Forges 1999). The following year, Rwanda –Urundi was officially split into the modern states of Rwanda and Burundi, with the former voting overwhelmingly to become a republic (Mamdani 2001). At least 150 000 Tutsi were exiled into neighbouring countries. These exiles would stage frequent raids on Rwanda in the coming years, many of which were met by anti-Tutsi violence in Rwanda in which sometimes thousands were killed, though this was not nearly as widespread or coordinated as the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999). The descendents of these exiles would later form a large part of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

The Rwandan republic essentially reversed ethnic discrimination in Rwanda. Tutsi were denied access to power through state institutions, as well as to education. Moreover, the education system itself portrayed Tutsi as foreign invaders (as per the Hamitic hypothesis), who had in the recent past subjugated the Hutu majority. This led to a prevalent anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda that would continue up to and during the civil war and subsequent genocide (Des Forges 1999).

An ongoing problem for the Hutu-led republic was the presence of a massive number of predominantly Tutsi refugees in neighbouring Uganda and the Congo. As an already densely populated, geographically small state, there was a reluctance to allow for the return of refugees and expatriates back into Rwandan society. In 1973 Juvenal Habyarimana launched a successful military coup, partially in response to genocide of Hutu in neighbouring Burundi in 1972 (Des

Forges 1999)[45]. Habyarimana installed his own PERMEHUTU party to power, where it would remain until his assassination and the following victory of the RPF. Initially this regime was highly successful, and Rwanda boasted one of the stronger economies in central Africa (Mamdani 2001). This began to unravel in the late 1980s, as global coffee prices plummeted, a structural adjustment program was imposed by the IMF, and the RPF invaded in 1990.

On October 1 1990 the RPF launched an invasion of Rwanda from neighbouring Uganda, and received material support from the Ugandan state (Mamdani 2001). This initial attack allowed the Habyarimana regime to portray itself as the party of national defense, strengthening its grip on the country. By the end of November of the same year, the RPF was scattered and disorganized, having been pushed back by the Rwandan army. At around the same time, Paul Kagame halted his military training in the United States and returned to assume control of the RPF (Magdami 2001).

The effect this war would have in fueling the 1994 genocide cannot be underestimated. It caused widespread food shortages due to destruction of infrastructure, and displaced one in seven Rwandan nationals (Mamdani 2001). This further fueled anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda, which was also being promoted by the national radio station RTLM.[46] In August of 1993 both parties signed the Arusha Accord to implement a unity government, though fighting continued after the agreement was signed (Des Forges 1999).

While there was anti-Tutsi violence during the civil war, it escalated dramatically following the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. To date it is unclear who

[45] This genocide stoked very real fears of atrocities that would potentially be committed by the RPF during the civil war, which further fueled anti-Tutsi propaganda.
[46] This station continued to broadcast hate propaganda throughout the civil war and genocide, calling for an extermination of *inkenzi* (cockroaches – a derogative slang for Tutsi).

fired the rocket that downed the President's plane; at the time both the RPF and the PERMEHUTU party blamed each other for the event (Melvern 2006). Immediately after the downing of the President's plane, the genocide started in earnest, with government troops corralling Tutsi and Hutu moderates to be killed by militias associated with the main political parties in Rwanda (of which the *interhamwe* was both the most infamous and numerous). This genocide was clearly not the result of random acts of a rogue militia; roadblocks were organized strategically throughout the country, and those with Tutsi identity cards were murdered, often with low-tech equipment such as machetes. This continued until the fall of Kigali to the RPF on July 4 of the same year. It is estimated that between 800 000 and 1 000 000 Rwandans were killed as a direct result of the genocide (Melvern 2006), most of which was during a 100 day period.

The fall of Kigali led to a massive displacement of Rwandan Hutu, many of whom feared reprisal from the RPF. Thousands fled to neighbouring Zaire, and were pursued in the coming years by the RPF. It is estimated that 200 000 Hutu disappeared in 1996 in Zaire due to Rwandan army (the former RPF) massacres (Cobban 2007). There were also large numbers of both revenge killings and summary executions of accused genocidaires, with single accusations often proving sufficient grounds for extrajudicial justice (Melvern 2006). In addition, over half of all Rwandan children became orphans as a result of the civil war, genocide, and subsequent consolidation of Rwanda by the RPF (Field 2007). In an effort to reconcile Rwandans following the genocide, Kagame is attempted to forge a new Rwandan identity to overwrite the previously divisive ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi.

Kagame and Rwandanism

The idea that history is written by the victors has been used to the point of cliché, though it remains a valuable reference point, particularly in discussions of ethnic or national belonging. Indeed, "if nations are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983), then historical narratives are key to shaping how communities understand themselves" (Freedman et al 2011: 298). This subsection will briefly outline the official version of Rwandan history as espoused by the Kagame regime.

According to the current regime, pre-colonial Rwanda witnessed harmony between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa with the actual division of the three groups being based upon wealth. Indeed, the only inequality in Rwanda acknowledged by the Kagame regime prior to colonialism was that between peasants and the royal courts (Buckly-Zistel 2009: 34). This dichotomy, in which Hutu and Tutsi are both equally subjugated by a royal court (rather than alternatively subjugating each other), is crucial to current efforts at creating a civic identity. It is thus this pre-colonial period that is seen as the "golden age of civilization" (Lambert 2006: 24) by the Kagame regime; a reference point in which Tutsi and Hutu were not markers for identity based violence and discrimination.

This "golden age" is contrasted with both the colonial legacy, in which first the Germans, then Belgians, institutionalized identity to rule Rwandan society. According to the official account, it is the Europeans who are responsible for the former state of ethnicity within Rwanda. What is striking in this account is the lack of emphasis placed on both Hutu and Tutsi individuals for the racial politics of the past century, thus absolving members of both groups from responsibility (Buckley-Zistel 2009: 36). Such a framework positions both Hutu and Tutsi as being equally victimized by Europeans, thus creating a common framework of suffering intended to unite, rather than divide, Rwandans.

In terms of the 1990 civil war and genocide in 1994, the official narrative places the blame squarely with the Habyarimana regime, focusing on the continuation of racial politics and the denial of refugees' rights to return to their homeland (Buckley-Zistel 2009). This is not a surprising strategy, given that the new regime must create a historical narrative that provides itself with legitimacy, but it should be mentioned that it is highly unlikely that Rwandans have forgotten that it was Kagame who invaded Rwanda with a refugee army prior to the commencement of the genocide.

The most controversial aspect of this official narrative, particularly in practice, is the current role of ethnicity within Rwandan public discourse. Currently, the terms Hutu and Tutsi are strongly discouraged, often with the threat of persecution for propagating "genocide ideology" (Cobban 2007). References to Hutu and Tutsi do not appear in national museums or public addresses (Buckley-Zistel 2009), nor are they mentioned at all within history or social science curriculums. Even as it pertains to the genocide, the government focuses on a victim/perpetrator dichotomy, rather than an ethnic one.[47]

The following subsections will review the implementation of this official truth narrative, including *gacaca, ingando,* memorialisation of the genocide, and the new education system. The establishment of this truth framework, dubbed the "RPF healing truth" by Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006a, 2006b), is to form the basis of a civic Rwandan identity that can ideally overwrite the exclusionary ethnic identities that allowed the genocide to take place.

[47] While this may seem, at face value, to acknowledge the suffering by both groups during the civil war, many scholars (see Cobban 2007) have concluded that it is only Tutsi who fall under this 'victim' label.

Gacaca

The aftermath of the 1994 genocide left Rwanda to face an unprecedented task of peacebuilding and reconciliation. The RPF, now in power, was left with a state severely lacking in basic services, including a depleted justice department where the vast majority of judges had either fled, been killed, or were implicated in the genocide (Waugh 2004). In addition, there was such wide-spread participation in the genocide that imprisoning or apprehending all perpetrators was logistically impossible. Rwandan prisons were unable to cope with the massive amount of accused, and the decimation of the judiciary had many inmates waiting years in unsafely crowded prisons without trial (Cobban 2007). While there are no statistics currently available, it is estimated that a large number of Rwandans died in prison, further complicating the reconciliation process (Cobban 2007). The UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for trying the architects of genocide, but this did little to alleviate the strain on the justice system, as it focused only on the highest levels of leadership that were responsible for the genocide. In addition, there was reluctance on the part of the Kagame regime to fully cooperate with the ICC; in order to maintain perceived legitimacy only 'Hutu crimes' were seen as acceptable to prosecute (Aptel 2011: 158).

In order to address the massive amount of perpetrators, as well as to provide a framework for truth-telling similar to that in the Truth and Reconciliation commissions implemented in other societies, the Kagame regime instituted a system of local *gacaca* court trials to hear local experiences and punish low-level perpetrators of genocide, as well as to attempt to reintegrate former perpetrators and victims into the same society. Like many new practices pursued by the Kagame regime, *gacaca* can trace its origins back to village-level justice in pre-colonial time, in which grievances are moderated by a selection of village elders. Current *gacaca* judges are given brief training and are tasked with prosecuting and sentencing the lower level offenders that comprise the bulk of the crimes related to genocide. Top perpetrators, those who were responsible for organizing the genocide, are tried separately by the state (Waughh2004), which is the only body capable of death sentencing. The utility of *gacaca* both as a means of truth telling and as a means of reconciliation has been the subject of intense debate amongst peacebuilding scholars, though it provides (in addition to *ingando*) a space in which ethnicity is discussed, though not always openly (Eltringham 2011).

To briefly summarize, participation in *gacaca* is encouraged amongst all Rwandans, and in the case of many participants, a condition of release if they were previously arrested on crimes related to the genocide (Waugh 2004). A typical *gacaca* proceeding involves testimony from both the accused as well as victims in a public forum, in which as many people as possible are encouraged to attend. This is ostensibly done to promote community-level healing and understanding. Restitution is typically financial or labour related, as in many cases jail time has already been served prior to *gacaca* (Waugh 2004).

The *gacaca* program has been criticized for how it deals with identity and truth frameworks, particularly among victims. In terms of identity, *gacaca* risks reinforcing, rather than reducing, exclusionary ethnic identities. As ethnic identity was the most salient group identifier during the genocide, accounts from this period are conducted in 'ethnic terms' (Eltringham 2011). Much like Arendt's observation that "if one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew" (2003: 12), victims of identity based violence must define said violence in identity-based (ethnic) terms. Thus *gacaca,* one of the few forums where ethnic identity can be discussed, can only consider identity within the specific timeframe and events of the civil war and corresponding genocide (rather than the decades and events leading to it). This helps to ensure that ethnic affiliations remain exclusionary; contradicting the public narrative of pan-Rwandanism.

In addition to reinforcing past ethnic divisions by only discussing ethnicity in the context of recent violence, there have been severe criticisms as to what is considered acceptable accounts of the past (Burnet 2009; Cobban 2007). Those who testify of suffering caused by the RPF, both during and after the war, risk persecution, often on the charge of 'inciting genocide ideology' (Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b). Moreover, the label of 'victim' is understood to apply only to Tutsi victims of violence, leaving no room for the experience of both 'moderate' Hutu who were murdered during the genocide, as well as those who had been victimized by the RPF during or after the war (Burnet 2009).

Finally, there utility of *gacaca* to foster reconciliation at the local level has been heavily criticized (Field 2007; Burnet 2009). In addition to the aforementioned bias of what crimes are 'fit' for *gacaca*, those who testify are often subject to both retraumatization and potentially continued persecution within the community. As discussed in chapter two, there is little consensus on the impact of truth telling itself on reconciliation and trauma reduction. In the Rwandan case this debate also must consider the context in which the truth is told. In Rwanda both victims and perpetrators must live together at the local level, and as Tutsi remain an ethnic minority, victims are often outnumbered by their former tormentors. Testifying against often prominent members of the community can lead to increased threats and isolation from community life, increasing feelings of victimization. Thus *gacaca* can, in many cases, further entrench divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, as Tutsi who continue to make up a minority can be further ostracized, and Hutu often do not have a forum to share their experiences. *Gacaca* thus works against the government`s stated goals of national unity, and reinforces ethnic divisionism, rather than pan-Rwandanism. This furthers the divide between the public narratives of Rwandanism, as Hutu concerns and grievances are relegated to the private sphere.

Memorials and Memory Spaces in Rwanda

As discussed in the previous two chapters, memorialisation provides a key link to past events. Moreover, 'official' monuments that are constructed by states are done so to reflect the official version of history; one that can often conflict with local memories of the past. This subsection will review memorialisation of the 1994 genocide and civil war, and will discuss both 'official' centralized monuments, and those erected by the local population. This section will demonstrate that the current administration is only willing to accommodate memorialisation that fits the official truth framework of the Kagame regime, and that these official monuments are meant to stifle, rather than encourage, debates about the past.

There are six official genocide memorials within Rwanda, located at Bisesero, Kigali, Murambi, Ntarama, Nyamata, and Nyarabuye. Though these make up a small fraction of the memorial sites scattered across the country, it is these that are the 'main' sites, and the ones that are maintained by state authorities. As such, it is in these sites where the official version of history is the most evident. The most obvious aspect of these memorialisation sites, particularly when compared to other memorials for mass atrocity, is the macabre manner in which the sites are presented. Human remains are commonly displayed, either laid out and preserved, or left where they fell amongst church pews (Meirhenrich 2011). The purpose of such a visceral display seems to be to overwhelm any possible discussion of past events. As Andrew Blum wrote in 1995 for the *New York Times* "The odor exempted us from the need for imagination. It relieved us of the need for understanding" (quoted in Meirhenrich 2011: 288).

It has been argued that memorialisation in Rwanda is a means to an end, particularly by some segments of formerly exiled Tutsi elites, as it provides justification for government action to the international community (Meirhenrich 2011). Legitimacy is maintained in this sense by enforcing a continued comparison to the Habyarimana regime that preceded it. This presents a clear dichotomy between past and present, with the former being linked to genocide. "By remembering the past in a very particular, macabre manner, these memories facilitate a forgetting of the present" (Meirhenrich 2011: 289).

Much like in Titoist Yugoslavia following the Second World War, the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide saw a proliferation of small, locally-produced memorials that fell outside government control. There are estimated to be thousands of such sites around Rwanda (Meirhenrich 2011), and these generally differ from the 'official' sites in that there is typically far less display of human remains; even those that feature remains tend to present them far less conspicuously. This is likely due to the Rwandan preference for home burial (Burnet 2009). The denial of proper burial for those killed at major memorial sites is a cause of tension between the government and survivor groups, as it prevents a sense of closure, and keeps the wounds of the genocide fresh for those who lost family members.

In March of 2007, the Rwandan government established the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide. One of the goals of this commission is to "plan and coordinate all activities aimed at memorializing the 1994 genocide" (Article 4[4], Organic Law No. 09/2007). This has placed an emphasis on 'official' sites, often leaving local monuments and sites of memory in a state of disrepair. As these unofficial monuments begin to disappear, the only memorials to the genocide that will remain in Rwanda are the ones that propagate the 'official' truth of the genocide. This has led to criticisms that memorial sites in Rwanda are for Tutsis only (Field 2007). Many places in Rwanda have also been subject to renaming, in an effort to "protect survivors from remembering where their relatives died" (Thomson 2011: 333). This is another example of how the official truth narrative fails to identify and co-opt local memories and narratives of the past. If the Rwandan official truth cannot successfully co-opt these localized narratives of the past, establishing a hegemonic identity centered on pan-Rwandanism will be impossible to achieve.

Private Narratives of the Past in Rwanda

The previous sections have shown government strategies for propagating the 'official' truth about Rwanda's past and the 1994 genocide. This section will examine research that has focused on narratives of the civil war, genocide, and current administration that fall outside of this official truth. Unless these differences are addressed, it will be impossible to form a national imagined community (as per Anderson 1983); and the establishment of a hegemonic Rwandan identity will prove impossible.

The bulk of research conducted on local narratives of the past in Rwanda has focused on open ended interviews with victims, perpetrators, and bystanders (see Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b; Thomson 2011; Fujii 2009; Field 2007). What is immediately evident across these various research undertakings is the variety of means in which Rwandans remember the past, particularly the civil war and subsequent genocide.

Fujii (2009) demonstrates that most Rwandans do not fall neatly into categories of 'victim', 'perpetrator', and 'bystander' throughout the genocide. Indeed, most fall into multiple categories depending on circumstances surrounding their involvement (factors such as intra-group pressure and the threat of violence against them played a large role in popular participation during the genocide). This undermines the current administration's dichotomy of victim/perpetrator, which is understood amongst Rwandans to be code for Tutsi/Hutu, respectively (Burnet 2009: 89). This in turn denies Hutu victims, of both the Hutu Power movement and of the RPF, a space in which their accounts of the past can be shared. In effect, this forces a silence upon Hutu victims, a silence which is often interpreted by Tutsi survivors as threatening (Field 2006). In this sense, the insistence on viewing the genocide through the dichotomous lens of victim/perpetrator prevents the formation of a hegemonic Rwandanism by denying a place for Hutu-driven narratives in the meta-narrative of the state. Such a problem also exists for Tutsi who grew up outside of Rwanda and have now returned, as they do not fall neatly into the category of 'victim[48]'.

It has also been noted that Hutu and Tutsi identities still have "considerable force in the discursive terrain of popular perceptions, interactions, and memory" (Field 2006: 212). The

[48] The fact that 'victim' has become synonymous with 'Tutsi' has led to accusations of ethnic favouritism, as benefits for victims often extend to Tutsi who were not in Rwanda during the genocide (Burnet 2009).

difference is that these terms have now been pushed into solely the private sphere of discourse within Rwanda. In informal settings, such as a village bar, there are now code words for when someone of a minority ethnicity (usually Tutsi) enters the bar, which is now a sign to stop speaking publicly of ethnicity (Fujii 2009). Ethnicity is now usually now discussed only in the presence of one's own ethnic group for fear of persecution (Thomson 2011), as even mention of Hutu and Tutsi provides possible ground for charges of "divisiveness" of "promoting genocide ideology" (Buckley-Zistel 2009). It is also interesting to note that the language used to describe the past has a tendency to vary across ethnic groups. Hutu often speak of 'the war', while Tutsi tend to favour 'the genocide' (Fujii 2009).

The overwhelming consensus amongst those who have conducted interviews in Rwanda is that the terms Hutu and Tutsi still have tremendous resonance amongst the population. While this is hardly surprising, given the vastly increased salience of ethnicity during the civil war and genocide, it significantly undermines the current regimes efforts at forging a hegemonic Rwandan identity. Unless the Kagame administration can find a way in which to co-opt local narratives of ethnicity and the past, the creation of a civic Rwandanism that overrides previous ethnic divisions will be impossible.

Identity in Rwanda

Hutu and Tutsi originated as fluid expressions of belonging that cross cut other modes of identity, such as region and clan, and were not the primary group identity in pre-colonial Rwanda. Indeed, it is doubtful that these terms originally referred to 'ethnicity' at all, at least as we define it today. The arrival of European colonizers, who did not fully grasp the complexity of pre-colonial Rwanda's state structures or modes of belonging entrenched ethnicity as the key divider of Rwandan society, empowering Tutsi rule by proxy at the expense of the Hutu majority. This was justified by a combination of biblical myths of Ham and the scientific racism prevalent in Europe at the time that constructed Tutsi as a superior race that migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia. Tutsi were, according to Europeans, the natural rulers of Rwanda. This myth was propagated throughout the Rwandan state, with widespread discrimination preventing Hutu from influencing state processes.

During the period of African de-colonization, the Hutu majority successfully overthrew the Tutsi dominated state. Thousands of Tutsi fled to neighbouring Uganda and the Congo, forming large refugee communities. The system of discrimination in Rwanda was then effectively inverted under Hutu majority rule, with Tutsi being largely denied access to state powers. The education system in this period constructed Tutsi as foreign invaders that had oppressed the Hutu; a view that was supported by memories of the colonial period.

The invasion by the RPF, a military group consisting primarily of Tutsi who grew up in the refugee camps , further entrenched the notion that Tutsi were foreign invaders who sought to dominate the Hutu. This, increasing food scarcity, population displacement, inciting propaganda, and the assassination of President Habyarimana, paved the way an orchestrated campaign of genocide that is estimated to have killed 800 000 Rwandans, the majority of whom were Tutsi. There were also widespread reports of revenge killings and, massacres by the RPF, though many of these massacres occurred within Zaire, rather than Rwanda itself.

After assuming power, Kagame and the RPF have been attempting to forge a new civic Rwandan identity to override the previous divisions of Hutu and Tutsi. To this end, the terms

Hutu and Tutsi no longer appear in public discourse, including the school system and memorial sites. The only places that these terms are allowed is within either *gacaca* courts or *ingando* camps, with the latter being established explicitly to remove this dichotomous thinking from former perpetrators. Rather than remove the labels of Tutsi and Hutu from the Rwandan consciousness, these reforms have effectively transferred any discussion of history and ethnicity to the private sphere; public discussion of these issues can lead to persecution for propagating genocide ideology. The increased emphasis on control of the historical narrative by the Kagame administration, particularly in recent years, has denied the opportunity to co-opt local narratives of history and ethnicity, effectively denying any chance of a pan-Rwandan identity from becoming a hegemonic expression of group belonging in Rwanda.

In addition to justice mechanisms and memorialisation practices, the Kagame administration has created a new school curriculum to disseminate its version of history to Rwandan youth. This curriculum, along with government *ingando* (re)education camps, provide the two pillars of history indoctrination to the next generation of Rwandans; the generation that will be integral to a future free of identity based violence and conflict. The following chapter will provide an in-depth examination of the Rwandan education system, as well as a review of the secondary literature on *ingando*.

Chapter Five: Teaching History and Identity in Post-Genocide Rwanda

The previous chapter examined both the history of Rwanda and the official truth narrative of the Kagame regime for promoting reconciliation. This chapter will examine how this truth narrative is presented to Rwandan youth, through both the social studies curriculum and *ingando* re-education camps. . In reviewing primary school textbooks, as well as secondary literature on *ingando*, this chapter will argue that the education system does not construct a view of ethnicity or the past that will be able to co-opt ethnocentric narratives of history and ethnicity.

Oh, the Humanities!: History and Social Studies Education in Rwanda

Following the victory of Kagame and the RPF, a moratorium was placed on history teaching in the aftermath of the genocide. At the time this was essential, as pre-genocide Rwandan history enforced strict ethnic divisions and propagated the belief that Tutsis were foreigners from Ethiopia who had ruled and exploited the Hutu majority (Mamdani 2001). There was also (and continues to be) a severe shortage of qualified educators, as many were either banned from teaching for espousing what was termed "genocide ideology", or fled following the genocide (Freedman et al. 2011). Education in the years following the genocide was fragmented at best, with a national education strategy not established until 2003 (MINEDUC 2012). While the moratorium on history teaching has been officially lifted, to date there are no standard texts that have been approved for use by the Rwandan government, making any consistent analysis of history teaching across different schools and districts beyond the scope of this study.

In order to analyse how history is disseminated to Rwandan youth I will examine the first six years of social studies texts that have been approved for teaching by the Rwandan Ministry of Education (MINEDUC). While obviously not addressing the full range of material that an actual history class would offer, social studies texts include historical material, such as Rwandan government prior to and during colonialism. Unlike many other education systems, there is no single set of official curricular textbooks in circulation. Rather than rely on a single publisher, the Rwandan school system relies upon three separate publishers for each level text.[49] Each text published must be approved by MINEDUC before it enters circulation. Despite the difference in publishing houses, the actual contents of the texts are near-identical, reflecting the standard education curriculum of Rwanda.[50] While Rwanda offers nine years of free education (6 primary, 3 secondary), the primary years have a higher enrolment, with official government enrolment at 97 percent for boys and 98 percent for girls (MINEDUC 2012). As such, these years see the most widespread propagation of the official government truth narrative through the education system. In reviewing these texts, I look specifically at how the past is transmitted to a new generation of Rwandans, particularly as it pertains to identity, the civil war and genocide, and issues of ethnicity in Rwanda's past. I will also examine how the curriculum deals with unity amongst Rwandans, as this is an ongoing theme throughout the elementary curriculum texts. This analysis will demonstrate that the curriculum, as currently constructed, does little to address the issue of identity; leaving open the possibility for local, alternative accounts of the past to challenge the narrative presented through the government's social studies curriculum. The curricular texts will be reviewed chronologically, as this provides a better framework for

[49] Levels 1-3 use texts published by Macmillan, Pearson, and Longhorn. Levels 4-6 use texts published my Macmillan, Longhorn, and INR-Pitambra.
[50] The texts published by INR-Pitamba were unavailable at the time of this study, and as such, are not factored into this analysis.

how concepts such as identity, peace, and unity are taught over time as a student advances through the education system.

The early years of primary education (grades 1-3) contain virtually no reference whatsoever to the genocide or identity (see appendix 1 for a full range of school resources used in this section). This is not particularly surprising, given the age of the pupils; though it should be noted that in each year there are units dedicated to such subjects as "keeping the peace", "factors of disharmony in the sector", and "harmony in the family and in class". The terms 'unity' and 'harmony' in particular appear regularly, both in the earlier grades, as well as the later elementary levels that will be examined below. An interesting feature in the discussions of such topics of unity, harmony, and peace is the role of leaders in maintaining these ideals.

Each school text has at least one unit dedicated to leadership, and leadership itself is often the first attribute mentioned when promoting factors that lead to harmony. From an early age students are taught that "leaders are people who show others what to do" (Pupils' book for grade 1: 83), and that "we do what they [leaders] tell us to do" (Pupils' book for grade 2: 58). This continues in units such as "Promoting Unity, Cooperation and Development" in which the first factor mentioned is that "leaders should solve conflicts fairly" (Pupils' book for grade 3: 162). While this obviously does not relate to the formation of identity per se, it is interesting in the sense that the genocide has often been blamed on poor leadership and undue deference to authority (Buckley-Zistel 2009). It would seem that the current curriculum encourages a similar obedience and deference to leadership, rather than its stated goals of providing a more democratic classroom experience (as per Freedman et al. 2011).

While the first three grades do not address Rwanda's history, a number of images depict events that seem to be quite similar to the sort of violence seen during the civil war. As early as the first grade, social studies texts contain images such as armed men with machetes looting property (Pupils' book for grade 1: 34). An even stronger image link to the civil war appears in the second grade, with a mob of armed men burning a village (Pupils' book for grade 2: 74). The only caption given to understand this image is: "Some people in the community fight with dangerous weapons. They hurt each other. Others destroy people's property. This causes other people to suffer" (Pupils' book for grade 2: 74). It is this lack of framework for understanding that is particularly troubling in the elementary curriculum. By not providing an adequate framework within the text itself, the burden of explanation must fall to either the educator (which, as will be discussed in the following subsection, is at best problematic), or to the private sphere. Both of these have the potential of providing knowledge frameworks that exist outside the official truth narrative that is supposed to be advanced through the education curriculum. This would in turn undermine the narrative of genocide when it is eventually taught (briefly) in the sixth grade. While these first three years do not deal with history, this changes in the fourth grade.

What is perhaps most striking in the approved social studies texts, starting in the fourth grade, is a seeming gap in the historical timeline that omits much of the colonial period, the post-colonial Hutu power years, and the genocide itself. This is most glaring during the fourth level of primary, in which there is a unit dedicated to "Things everyone can do to maintain peace in the district" (Primary Social Studies 4: Unit 14). This unit outlines peace as "progress towards justice and mutual respect among the people of our district [...] people must keep the peace by doing the right things and by helping others to resolve their conflicts" (Primary Social Studies 4:

61). The unit goes on to outline that often the most appropriate means of helping others is to appeal to the authorities, particularly community leaders and councils. It should be noted that this very deference to authority is seen as one of the primary reasons for the genocide, and is a tendency that peace workers in Rwanda are currently trying to break (see Staub 2011).

This unit is followed by a discussion of "factors of harmony and disharmony in the district" (Primary Social Studies 4: Unit 15). Across both units 14 and 15 there is no mention of genocide or stereotyping whatsoever. This certainly seems a bizarre omission when it comes to factors of disharmony in particular. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of these two units is the way in which discussions of the genocide are passed from the school system to the community. Unit 14 closes with: "ask your family if they know of any quarrels between communities. Try to find out how they were solved" (Primary Social Studies 4: 64). Such an assignment encourages for narratives about the genocide to be disseminated outside of the government's own truth narrative. At the same time, if this locally produced account of community conflict (possibly including genocide), differs from the government's own truth narrative, it is discouraged or even prosecuted as an act of division if espoused in the public sphere (Buckley-Zistel 2009). This trend continues across MINEDUC approved curricular texts.

The term genocide appears far more prominently in the fifth grade, though at no point is there an explanation of the genocide itself (Comprehensive Social Studies 5). Genocide is typically mentioned in terms of genocide memorials, which are community assets that allow students to learn from the past. In addition, genocide appears once in the unit "gender in our province", wherein "The genocide led to the death of many people. Many women were left as single parents. They had to take up responsibility over their families" (Comprehensive Social

Studies 5: 144). Much like the aforementioned violent images, there is very little in terms of frameworks for understanding. Again, this passes discussion of the genocide to the private sphere, in which narratives have the potential to greatly differ from the official truth framework.

Much like the preceding grades, there is a large number of violent images, many reflecting events that occurred during the genocide, that lack more than a sentence of explanation or context. This includes images of both child rape and torture, both of which occurred with relative frequency during the genocide (Des Forges 1999). Once again, the curriculum speaks of issues that were prevalent during the genocide, but does not provide a framework for contextualizing and understanding these concepts and images. In terms of history, the fifth grade focuses on traditional (pre-colonial) beliefs and government structures, particularly the King (Mwami). This part of history is romanticized, and is presented as all people living in harmony. It does not mention the terms Hutu or Tutsi, nor does it extend to the colonial period (Comprehensive Social Studies 5).

The final year of primary schooling, grade six, has a much larger focus on history than the preceding grades. In addition to an extended focus on pre-colonial Rwanda, it introduces a more detailed examination of colonialism, and more importantly, has a unit dedicated to the Rwandan genocide. According to the curriculum, in "about 1000AD, the Bahutu and Batutsi joined the pygmies. The Bahutu were cultivators and the Batutsi were cattle keepers. Both were Bantu groups that migrated from Central Africa" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 44). This is the first mention in the curriculum of the origins of both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. This is an obvious refutation of the (now disproven) Hamitic hypothesis regarding the origins of Rwandans. It is also interesting to note that the above quote is the only instance in which Hutu and Tutsi are mentioned in pre-colonial history. They are both presented as identical, other than their economic activity, ostensibly giving both equal claim to present day Rwanda. There is no mention whatsoever of conflict in pre-colonial Rwanda, nor is there mention of ethnic identity and administration (the Mwami being Tutsi, for example). Taken together, it is obvious that this period in time is being used as a "golden age of civilization" (Lambert 2006: 24); a reference point in which Hutu and Tutsi peacefully coexisted without foreign influence or dominance.

According to the texts, "The Belgians created division between the people of Rwanda. They introduced an identity card which had the person's tribe on it. People were then categorized as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 67). It is also telling that the section entitled "Colonisation of Rwanda" begins with a definition of the term conflict. Again, it would appear that the goal of the curriculum is to place the blame for divisionism solely on colonial powers. In fact, the only mention of Hutu exploitation is that "The two [administrative] systems were used by the Tutsi to exploit the Hutu. This was unfair yet all people should be treated fairly" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 76). Even the aftermath of colonialism, in which independent Rwanda emerges, glosses over issues of race, saying only that "many Tutsi were killed" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 80-1). It should also be noted here the language used to describe the suffering of Hutu and Tutsi across colonialism. It is the Hutu that were exploited "unfairly", whereas Tutsi were outright "killed". This reinforces the post-genocide narrative that the Tutsi are the true victims of Rwandan history.

In total there is one unit that deals exclusively with genocide, "Topic 9: Genocide in Rwanda" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 82-9). What is immediately apparent in this section is a general lack of information or discussion. A total of five pages is dedicated to the Rwandan genocide (compared to the 10+ pages each dedicated to pre-colonial Rwanda and colonialism), only two of which deal with causes of the genocide itself. The causes of the genocide are listed as: historical hatred, colonialism, Christianity, bad governance, death of President Habyarimana, the press, failure of UN peacekeepers, and outside forces (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 83-4). What is interesting to note here is the relative lack of responsibility placed on Rwandans themselves for carrying out the genocide. There is also no mention of the RPF invasion occurring prior to the genocide. According to the social studies curriculum, the genocide "came to an end after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the Forces Armies Rwandaises (FAR). The RPF established a government of national unity. The new government was able to stop the killings" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 85). In this sense it is the RPF, and by extension Kagame, that 'saved' Rwanda from the genocide. Unsurprisingly, there is no mention of wrongdoing on the part of the RPF. After the genocide the "government discourages the use of tribe (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) as political identities" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 86). Perhaps more telling, is the lack of review questions dedicated to the genocide itself. The only questions that are asked of students is "what is genocide?" and "apart from the Rwanda genocide, name two other genocide that have taken place in the world" (Comprehensive Social Studies 6: 129). This demonstrates the lack of discussion of genocide that still prevails in present day Rwanda.

While the lack of reference to race, at least until the 6th grade, has obviously been implemented so as to eliminate a racially dichotomous view of Rwandan society, the curriculum's deferral of major problems of divisiveness in the community to the private sphere provides an opportunity for community conflicts to be framed in these very terms outside the classroom. This has the potential to create two competing truth narratives in the minds of Rwandan youth, with local accounts of racial distinction likely forming a more compelling account of the origins of tensions and discord within a given community. While the government eventually tackles this history directly (through *ingando*), there is little account of race or group belonging in the most important years of adolescent identity formation (as per Moshman 1999).

Until the sixth grade, the only mentions of the genocide lack any sort of framework for actual understanding. It is mentioned only as a reason why there are so many orphans in Rwanda, and also that it has increased the role of women as "so many men were killed in the genocide" (Primary Social Studies 4: 103). It is striking how little attention is paid to the genocide in this respect, with teachers or parents having to fill the gaps in this knowledge if asked. This is in itself highly problematic, as there have been repeated instances of teachers explaining the genocide essentially through Hutu power propaganda (Freedman et al. 2011), as well as many teachers being afraid of broaching the subject at all due to strict censorship and the fear of termination and/or prosecution (Freedman et al. 2011). Such a limited mention of the genocide also fails to acknowledge any suffering beyond the men killed, such as the practice of mass rape, that has been detailed earlier in this chapter. This leaves large gaps in the historical consciousness that can only be filled by local practices of remembering, which many have noted is outside the scope of the official truth narrative (see Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b; Burnet 2009). The main instance in which the government's take on the origins of genocide appears in the social studies is the assertion that "bad leadership and feelings of inequality can lead to discontent and violence" (Primary Social Studies 4: 104).

While this lack of meaningful detail appears to be a transparent attempt by the Kagame administration to prevent nuanced discussion of the genocide within the Rwandan school system, it is important to consider the development stages of children as it pertains to political socialization. As was noted by Piaget and Weil (1951) in their study of Swiss children's attitudes to their homeland, young children (between four and seven) have difficulty conceptualizing themselves as having multiple, overlapping identities.[51] This is largely dues to young children's inability to grasp abstract concepts such as "society" or "government" beyond their immediate surroundings (Piaget and Weil 1951; Patrick 1977: 200). The inability of young children to simultaneously hold multiple levels of identity makes the absence of ethnic identity concepts such as Hutu and Tutsi far less conspicuous in the early years of the Rwandan education system.

Generally speaking, the attention paid to ethnic identity corresponds well with the development level of the children to whom the material is being presented. The early grades (1-4) focus on harmony and the importance of peace at the more localized village and district level, emphasising the reason for quarrels between individuals. This reflects the inability of young children to think abstractly of society beyond their immediate surroundings. The introduction to the concept of genocide through the school system also emphasises this local connection, with the curriculum initially focusing on genocide memorials. In doing so, this stresses that the genocide was also a local event (though the teaching of what, specifically, occurred at any given locale would still occur in the private sphere largely independent of state control). Children at this age largely conform to their environment (Piaget and Weil 1951: 564-6), which would undermine any simple (due to age level), comprehensive account of the genocide.

The shift in ability for children to conceptualize politics beyond the local level greatly accelerates around ages 10-11, with children now able to recognize the collective ideals that underpin the nation (Piaget and Weil 1951). In addition, by the age of thirteen, children begin to

[51] In the case of this Swiss study, the two identities were territorially bound; children had a difficult time conceptualizing themselves as both Swiss and Genovese (Piaget and Weil 1951: 564).

gain the ability to "perform complex mental operations about political phenomenon" (Patrick 1977: 200). The corresponding grade levels on Rwandan Lower Primary (grades five and six) reflect this change in cognitive ability, particularly in the sixth grade. As was discussed earlier, the sixth grade provides a (brief) description of the genocide, making note of wider contributing factors such as the effects of colonialism. It is this level that could begin to foster a nuanced narrative of the genocide in the classroom, though as was noted earlier, a mere five pages is dedicated to this subject. It is likely that this would be addressed when the history curriculum is finally implemented, though as of this writing this is simply speculation. Taken together, it is difficult to make a definitive claim on the teaching of history through the social sciences curriculum. The absence of nuanced information reflects the cognitive ability of young children and is in itself not a cause of concern. While the absence of a nuanced description of both racial identity, history, and the genocide is somewhat conspicuous in the sixth grade, this is not markedly different than in Western societies. Indeed, the previously discussed lack of accountability prescribed to Rwandans themselves is fairly typical of both societies in general and public education systems more specifically.

> [...] a residue of opinion and interpretation flattering to that nation, and less so to others involved, is likely to persist for decades, if not centuries. Some self-criticism may arise, but it is likely to be overshadowed and outlived by rationalizations [...] of the host population. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency more evident than in a nation's education system, where instruction and materials criticizing [...] are routinely outnumbered by those portraying a more noble past (Hoskin 1991: 200).

Thus, while there are certainly appeals to a more "noble" past (pre-colonial Rwanda), this is not markedly different from other cases.[52] It is still, however, somewhat troubling that Rwandan history and the identity question remain so undeveloped in the later primary years of

[52] The 1991 Hoskin study cited above focuses on perceptions of immigrants in Western democracies.

the education curriculum, given how often the teaching of history is cited as one of the major contributing factors to the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999; Mamdani 2001).

History Teaching and the development of History Teachers

As mentioned previously, the moratorium on the teaching of history in Rwanda has recently been lifted, and though there are currently no standardized texts in circulation, teachers are expected to teach the subject to Rwanda's youth, particularly in the secondary curriculum (MINEDUC 2012). In order to both examine and assist in the creation of this new history curriculum and teaching resources (yet to be released), a study was conducted by the Human Rights Center at University of California, Berkeley between 2001-2003 (Freedman et al 2004, 2011). This study was conducted through workshops including educational stakeholders, such as government officials, teachers, and students.

What emerges as a striking, and indeed disturbing trend for the purpose of constructing a pan-Rwandan civic identity, is the extent to which the 'official truth narrative' is disputed amongst educators. According to this study "46 percent of the interviewed education stakeholders expressed beliefs about the origin of ethnicity in Rwanda that was inconsistent with the official narrative" (Freedman et al. 2011). This in turn leads many teachers to avoid teaching about history and ethnicity within the classroom, thus relegating the dissemination of history to the private, rather than public, sphere.

Perhaps even more disconcerting is the number of teachers who believe that ethnicity should not be discussed at all within the classroom. 67 percent of teachers believed that ethnicity should be ignored in schools (Freedman et al. 2011). This would include discussions of the colonial period and the institutionalization of ethnicity, thus ignoring a critical framework for understanding the 1994 civil war and genocide. According to this study:

> Fear of discussing ethnicity in the classroom derived from at least two concerns. First, some teachers accepted the idea promoted by the government that continuing to focus on ethnicity could reignite violent, destructive conflict in Rwanda. This concern remains one of the formidable barriers to restoring the teaching of history. Second, our interviewees and participants were wary of possible negative consequences that might accompany speaking freely about ethnicity. Even in our 2001-3 interviews and focus groups, people said that they talked about ethnicity only when they were with members of their own ethnic groups whom they felt they could trust (Freedman et al. 2011: 307).

The second response here is particularly ominous for the creating of hegemonic identity. It shows a clear divide between the 'official' history and the 'living' history that is discussed privately.

One of the goals of the Berkeley study (and indeed one of the stated goals of the Rwandan government for education) was the development of more inclusive, "democratic" teaching methods, in which discussion and debate – framing history as a collection of choices and perspectives rather than a strict timeline of events. This would ostensibly imply a free discussion of ethnicity as it pertains to both history and self-identification. If practiced this would allow for a stronger civic Rwandan identity, as it would allow for the negotiation of ethnicity, rather than a divide between ethnicity in public and in private. Unfortunately "...emphasis on openness and individual choice, democratic classrooms, and primary source review, may have become unpalatable for a government increasingly focused on control" (Freedman et al. 2011: 309).

Ingando

In addition to the official education curriculum, Rwanda also makes use of *ingando* camps to reintegrate and indoctrinate segments of the population. *Ingando* are at least superficially based on a tribal gathering of the same name, convened to discuss mutual problems and their solutions between Rwandan villages and clans in pre-colonial Rwanda (Mgbako 2005). *Ingando* serves two purposes for the Kagame regime: indoctrinating Rwandan elites (such as *gacaca* judges and students) and reintegrating former combatants (as well as prostitutes and orphans) back into the community (Thomson 2011). Each of these goals is done in separate *ingando* camps, the former consisting primarily of university graduates, grooming them to occupy high level positions; while the latter consists of Hutu ex-combatants. As *ingando* remains a severely understudied aspect of reconciliation in Rwanda (Thomson 2011), there is little material available for review. As such, this subsection will focus solely on the reintegration of ex-combatants through *ingando*.

Typically lasting for approximately 12 weeks, *ingando* reintegration camps focus on truth telling and re-teaching history to former combatants, orphans, and prostitutes (Thomson 2011). These camps are under constant armed military guard, and participants are forced to remain attentive and subdued (Thomson 2011). The lessons combine the official view of history, as already discussed, with lessons promoting the value of truth telling, essentially preparing ex-combatants for *gacaca*. Susan Thomson, who was forced to attend *ingando* while pursuing her doctoral fieldwork notes that:

> In romanticizing the historical past and presuming that all Hutu need to be re-educated, the policy produces two broad simplifications: all Tutsi (whether they were in Rwanda during the genocide or not) are innocent victims or "survivors" and

all Hutu (whether they participated in the genocide or not) are guilty perpetrators (2011: 333)

Also explicit in the re-education process is that the hatred Hutu feel towards Tutsi is the "root of the Rwandan disease" that led to the genocide.

This process, in which all Hutu are deemed to be responsible, further entrenches ethnic divisionism, as it discounts any narrative of Hutu suffering that does not fit the official truth framework. Moreover, the assumption of Hutu guilt also serves to remove Hutu from wielding power, as crimes of genocide can be used to revoke the right to vote (Thomson 2011). The overwhelming impression of Thomson is that *ingando* is used to promote silence on behalf of the Hutu population. An *ingando* participant is noted to have remarked to Thomson "alert the outside world about how being Hutu is a crime in the new Rwanda" (2011: 336). *Ingando* serves to aid in effectively moving Hutu experiences away from the public sphere, as they can only be perpetrators, rather than victims. In relegating Hutu experience to the private sphere, the Kagame regime prevents the potential of pan-Rwandanism from becoming the hegemonic expression of group identity.

Teaching Identity

Despite the lifted moratorium on history, the actual study of the past in Rwanda is still quite thin. There is little attention paid to history throughout the social studies curriculum, the government instead choosing to focus on broad concepts such as unity, harmony, and cooperation. Teachings of the past tend to focus on a romanticized pre-colonial legacy in which Rwandans lived in harmony. While this may or may not be accurate, it does not reflect the more recent history of ethnic domination and subjugation, both in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda. There is little nuanced discussion of either ethnicity or the civil war and corresponding genocide, with a mere five pages being dedicated to the genocide itself. Such a lack of discussion in the classroom, combined with an unwillingness on the part of educators to teach about the past, risks shifting the discussion of history outside the public sphere and into that of the private. This has the potential to allow conflicting views of the past to overcome the official narrative of the Kagame regime, making it unlikely that the regime will succeed in creating a new, hegemonic Rwandan identity.

Ingando camps also fail to take into account local perspectives on the genocide, instead focusing on promoting silence amongst Hutu ex-combatants and promoting loyalty to the current regime. For *ingando* participants, particularly ex-combatants, this disavows their experience from the official narrative, further relegating any discussion of the past to the private sphere. Much like the structure of the education system, this relegation of the past to the private sphere makes the creation of a hegemony, in which the public narrative can co-opt the private, impossible.

Chapter Six: Comparisons and Conclusions

The previous three chapters have examined the construction of supra-ethnic identities in both the former Yugoslavia and present day Rwanda. Using the Yugoslav case as a framework for analysing present day Rwanda, this chapter will assess the potential of Kagame's Rwandanism of becoming a hegemonic expression of group identity, and the viability of this program in preventing future inter-ethnic conflict. This chapter will first review the concept of hegemonic identity, followed by a brief overview of identity construction in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In assessing the construction of identity in Rwanda, this chapter will argue that Rwandanism is unlikely to become a hegemonic expression of group identity, and as such, is not an effective tool for post-conflict reconciliation in Rwanda.

Hegemonic Identity

As was discussed in chapter two, in many ways, ethnic conflict is a battle over identity itself (Moshman 2007). Despite the prominence of literature dealing with ethnic identity in conflict (of which Horowitz (1985) remains the paradigmatic work), the role of identity in peacebuilding has not been readily explored. A key reason for this under-theorization is the tendency, especially in political science, to conceptualize identities as static and primordial – equating ethnicity with a territorial-bound identity (Lijphart (1977), for example). Such a static conception of identity ignores a wealth of research done by both social psychologists and critical theorists, who argue that identity is a fluid and socially contingent construct, and as such, can change over time.[53]

Key to this social construction of identity is the role of history, both locally produced and created by the dominant power structure. These in themselves are products of socio-historical conditions, with the individual being "derived from conditions of power that precede it, [...] though not mechanically or predictably, from prior social operations" (Butler 1997: 21). Despite the prominence of theories emphasizing the socially contingent aspects of group identity, there is scarce work on the role of the state in constructing identities through its role in defining social interactions. The concept of hegemony provides a theoretical framework that can be used to assess the role of the state in helping to shape and form the identities of its citizens.

Initially coined by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, hegemony refers to the process in which dominant groups elicit "the consent of dominated groups by articulating a political vision, an ideology, which claimed to speak for all and which resonated with beliefs widely held in popular political culture" (Rupert 2009:177). Such an interpretation of hegemony is also held by some of the most prominent contemporary critical theorists, such as Butler, Laclau, and Zizek, who argue that a stable hegemony is only possible if the dominant group manages to co-opt counter-narratives to the hegemonic narrative of power (2000). Thus, a stable hegemony can only be achieved if the public sphere if able to successfully incorporate the narratives of the private. Using Benedict Anderson's conception of the nation as an 'imagined community' (1983), in which the nation is constructed by articulating a shared history and collection of experiences in the minds of group members, a stable hegemony (as it pertains to a national or

[53] In psychology, see Owens et al (2010); while in critical theory see Butler (1997); Althusser (1971).

ethnic identity), requires articulations of the past in the public sphere (standard education, memorialisation etc.) to be able to incorporate local, living memory, if it is to become the most salient aspect of group identity.

Identity Construction in Yugoslavia

The construction of a pan-national Yugoslav identity can be broken into two phases. The first, from 1919-1939, occurred primarily under Serbian autocracy, though there was an early period of (relatively) democratic rule. During this period, the national identities of Croats, Slovenes, and to a lesser extent Serbs, were discouraged by the new Yugoslav state (Dragnich 1983). These identities were relegated to tribal affiliation, which provoked backlash across the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (and later Yugoslavia).

Yugoslavism, in the first Yugoslav state, was driven primarily from Serbian myths of national origin, such as the battle for Kosovo Plain. The Serbian character of the state was also reinforced at the highest administrative levels, both by the appointment of the Serbian radical Stojan Protic as Prime Minister, against the recommendation of the elected assembly, and later by the declaration of autocracy by Serbian King Alexander in 1929. Rather than creating a Yugoslavia that was constructed as an aggregate of the constituent nations, the first Yugoslavia reinforced long-held fears of Serbian aspirations for dominance dating back to Hapsburg control over northern Yugoslavia (Djokic 2003). This fear of Serbian dominance, originating at the local level and reinforced by a Serb-centric public narrative, increased the salience of exclusionary nationalist identities at the expense of a greater, supra-national, Yugoslav identity. It is this very fear of Serb dominance that enabled the hyper-nationalist Croat *Ustasha* government to pursue a program of genocide during the Second World War in the Axis puppet Independent State of Croatia.

While the *Ustasha* carried out a deliberate genocide against Serbs, Jews, homosexuals, and Roma, the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia disintegrated into a three sided civil war between the *Ustasha,* Serb royalist *Chetniks*, and the multi-ethnic communist *Partisans* under Tito. Each side committed atrocities against one another, with the *Partisans* emerging victorious. Much like Alexander, Tito and the Communist Party pursued a program of Yugoslav nation building, this time under the slogan of 'Brotherhood and Unity'.

Tito's nation building efforts were far more extensive than those of King Alexander. Rather than attempting to reduce previous ethnic affiliation to simple tribal divisions, 'Brotherhood and Unity' aimed at creating a Yugoslavism that was constructed of all Yugoslav national groups (originally Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – though this later was expanded to Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnians). This allowance of national differences is most evident in monuments such as the tomb of Njegos, which contained different traditional architectural styles[54], each facing a constituent republic (Wachtel 1998). This emphasis on a Yugoslav identity constructed of constituent nations is also evident in the school curriculum, in which students of all national groups would be taught some of the more prominent works from other Yugoslav nations. Efforts at creating a Yugoslavism based on constituent nations was also evident in war memorials, as the tendency was to commemorate all those who died in the liberation of Yugoslavia (Karge 2009). It was, however, this particular narrative of the past (all

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[54] As mentioned in chapter two, Serb architecture is primarily Byzantine in origin. Croat and Slovene architecture is based upon that of Western Europe, while Bosnia has a strong Ottoman legacy.

sides suffered equally at the hands of foreign invaders) that would become an insurmountable obstacle in the years leading up to Yugoslav disintegration.

As discussed previously, nations are "imagined communities" bound together by a shared understanding of the past and their own origins (Anderson 1983). It is this shared history that was problematic for the Yugoslav regime, as it had to account for differences in myths of national origin (such as the aforementioned Battle of Kosovo Plain), as well as different experiences both during the first Yugoslavia and the Second World War. This was partially resolved by the aforementioned inclusion of prominent works across Yugoslav nations, but these efforts completely failed to address a *Yugoslav* origin, particularly one that would include interwar Yugoslavia. Yugoslav national origin was taught as a communist class struggle against foreign occupation and the bourgeois social order (Hopken 1999). In order to further this narrative, the bulk of interwar Yugoslav literature was banned, preventing any sense of continuity in a Yugoslav nation, while also disavowing alternative accounts of the origin of the Yugoslav state.

Of even greater importance, particularly concerning the later violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, was the way in which the Communist Party dealt with the Second World War experience. As mentioned earlier, crimes committed during the war were treated with equivalency, in the sense that "all nations had traitors" (Hopken 1997: 92). In addition, by framing the conflict as a struggle for national liberation, pitting the *partisans* against 'counterrevolutionaries', the state failed to address the ethnicized nature of violence. This is particularly evident in the treatment of the *Ustasha* who portrayed both as foreign invaders, thus absolving the complacency of the Croat population. This official version of history clashed with local memories of the Second World War.

As was discussed in chapter three, this difference in public and private narratives is especially obvious in the case of the Jasenovac camp in the former Independent State of Croatia. The concentration camp, which saw the extermination of an unknown number of Serbs (estimates range from 100 000 – 1 000 000) became a powerful symbol for both Croat and Serb nationalists as Yugoslavia began to break apart. During the Titoist era, there was no memorial commissioned for the site, despite the obvious significance of the camp for the many survivors and their families. The memorial was only constructed after power had been de-centralized to the constituent republics. The only effort at commemoration was done locally, and informal vigils were held at the site each year (Karge 2009). Despite the obvious want and need of the public for this memory space, no effort was made by the centralized state apparatus to provide one. This shows a very clear disconnect between the public memory discourses with that of the private. It is this disconnect that prevented the establishment of a supra-national imagined community that could promote Yugoslavism as a hegemonic mode of group belonging.

Finally, this lack of account for the past prevented the greater Yugoslav narrative from being able to co-opt the rise of nationalism following the death of Tito in 1980. Crucial to the nationalist questions being asked within each republic was the extent of suffering each nation endured during the Second World War; the genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia was particularly contentious (Mojzes 1994). This fixture on the past was also evident in the nationalist propaganda used by leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman. Upon the reintroduction of symbols closely resembling those in the Independent State of Croatia, the state controlled media within Serbia labelled Croats as *Ustasha*, while the Croat media portrayed Serbs as a "bearded Chetnik horde" (Milosevic 2000). There was no pan-Yugoslav narrative that provided a satisfactory explanation of the Second World War, which allowed these exclusionary nationalist discourses to better reflect and co-opt local narratives, providing an ideal setting for the ethnic cleansing that would occur during Yugoslav disintegration.

Identity Construction in Rwanda

Identity in Rwanda has been constructed differently than in Yugoslavia. Theoretically at least, it should be easier to construct a universal identity in Rwanda, as both Hutu and Tutsi share a similar history, territory, language, and customs. Indeed, as was discussed in chapter four, historically speaking it was economic activity, not 'ethnicity', that marked the difference of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in pre-colonial Rwanda. The arrival of Europeans, most notably the Belgians following the First World War, formally institutionalized identity, marking Tutsis as the natural rulers of Rwanda.

This 'naturalization' of Tutsi dominance in Rwanda was based on a combination of scientific racism and biblical adherence known as the Hamitic hypothesis. According to this hypothesis the Hutu were descendents of South and West African Negroids, who arrived in Rwanda prior to the Tutsi. The Tutsi, according to this myth, arrived later from Ethiopia, and were members of the Hamites – a racial group more closely linked to the Europeans. This, in the minds of the colonialists, made Tutsi the genetically superior race and the obvious rulers of Rwanda. The Hamitic hypothesis became part of the Rwandan education system, and Hutu were barred from high level administrative positions. Thus, in Rwanda youth were taught that the

Tutsi were a superior race that had essentially taken Rwanda from the Hutu. This was further reinforced at the administrative level, which was dominated by Tutsi, while Hutu faced a low ceiling for upward mobility.

Rwandan independence in 1962 reversed the ethnic discrimination in Rwanda, with Tutsi now barred from higher education and administrative positions. Many Tutsi also fled to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, where they would remain until the RPF invasion in 1990. The Hamitic hypothesis still dominated discourses of identity in post-colonial Rwanda, with Tutsi again being constructed as foreign invaders that had oppressed the Hutu majority. Such a view had a wide resonance amongst the population, as Tutsi dominance was a hallmark of the colonial period. There was also sporadic violence against Tutsi during this period, though it was not on the scale, both in terms of the violence itself and the organization of the violence, as during the 1994 genocide (Des Forges 1999).

The RPF invasion triggered an increase in anti-Tutsi sentiment across Rwanda, culminating in the 1994 genocide. There are a few factors here that are important to note. First, the RPF invasion itself reinforced the previously discussed Hamitic hypothesis; Tutsi in this case were a literal invading force seeking to gain control of the Hutu dominated Rwandan state. It has been documented (see Des Forges 1999) that popular participation in the genocide increased in areas being approached by the RPF. Second, despite the fact that Hutu Power militias focused primarily on Tutsis, many Hutu who opposed the regime or supported the Arusha Accord were also targeted. Finally, and crucial to later reconciliation, the RPF also carried out smaller number of revenge killings, and also pursued and massacred a significant number[55] of Hutu in the Democratic Republic of Congo following the conclusion of the Rwandan civil war (Cobban 2007). Following the conclusion of the civil war, the now victorious RPF, and its leader Paul Kagame, embarked on a new nation building effort in Rwanda, attempting to create a civic Rwandan identity to replace the old labels of Hutu and Tutsi.

In order to construct this new identity, and to disseminate a new version of history, the Kagame regime has relied upon *gacaca* courts, memorials dedicated to the genocide, *ingando* camps, and a new education system. Both *gacaca* and genocide memorials deal exclusively with the events of the civil war, with the greatest emphasis on the genocide of 1994. *Gacaca* should, theoretically at least, provide the most ideal forum in which to debate issues of history and ethnicity in Rwanda, though the actual practice of this debate has received significant criticism (see Cobban 2007; Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 2006b). Central to this criticism is the belief, amongst both participating Rwandans and many in the academic community, that *gacaca* is designed only to persecute 'Hutu crimes'. Grievances against the RPF are either ignored or strictly discouraged, with said victims being subject to further persecution due to "promoting genocide ideology" (Buckley-Zistel 2009).

As the only public forum in which ethnicity can be discussed (and even then, not freely), *gacaca* has a tendency to promote, rather than discourage, exclusionary ethnic identities. The trials are temporal, focusing only on the genocide itself, and as such force participants to express grievances, relate events, and defend themselves through ethnocentric discourse. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt (2003), if one is attacked as a Tutsi, one must defend oneself as a Tutsi. In the same sense, Hutu accused of crimes, or expressing grievances, must also define

[55] Some estimate this to be as many as 200 000 (Cobban 2007).

their defense or grievance using these ethnic terms. This ensures that the only discussion of ethnicity is not only done in exclusionary terms, but also in hierarchal ones, as Hutu grievances are not considered to be as important as those of Tutsi.[56] This has effectively shifted discussions of ethnicity from the public sphere to that of the private, as there is no public space in which ethnicity can be freely debated. This has promoted a silence of ethnic debates, particularly amongst Hutu, which in turn has fueled distrust and fear, a silence that is sometimes viewed as threatening to survivors of the genocide (Field 2007). The memorialisation of the genocide has also been accused of discouraging nuanced discussion of the events of the genocide, with an emphasis on the macabre, literally shocking audiences to the extent that debate of the events and issues surrounding the genocide is unthinkable (Meirhenrich 2011).

Rather than addressing the 1990-94 period, both *ingando* and the social studies curriculum take a more long term view of Rwanda's past and origins of ethnic identity. While it is currently difficult, if not impossible, to comprehensively review *ingando* within this work, the limited amount of current scholarship (see Thomson 2011; Mgbako 2005) certainly suggests that the main purpose of the program is to silence opposition and instill loyalty to the RPF, and by extension, President Paul Kagame. This is a hardly surprising phenomenon. The current literature only focuses on re-integration *ingando* camps that are used to integrate past combatants into Rwandan society (Thomson 2011). As such, it is hardly surprising that the chief purpose is not history education (though ethnicity is still presented as a colonial fabrication). The second type of *ingando*, which appears to be used to indoctrinate future Rwandan elites has not received adequate scholarship, though the contents of such camps, especially as they relate

[56] Recall that in order for reconciliation there must be an "acknowledgement of suffering by both sides, even when substantially unequal" (Staub 2008: 399).

to both history and ethnicity, is of crucial importance to those interested in the teaching of history and ethnicity in Rwanda.

While the moratorium on history teaching in Rwanda has recently been lifted, there is no definitive curriculum or curricular resources available on the subject as of this writing. Those attempting to study or influence the current teaching of history in Rwanda have typically done so through workshops with Rwandan teachers (Freedman et al. 2011), or through interviews with Rwandan adults (Buckley-Zistel 2009; Fujii 2009) or youth (Hilker 2011). In order to provide a more comprehensive view of how history is currently being taught in Rwandan schools, this work has focused on the contents of the social studies curriculum for the first six years of primary education in Rwanda. The social studies are the only standardized format in which history and the question of ethnicity is taught to the next generation of Rwandans, and as such, provide the closest thing to a fully developed history curriculum for those researching the teaching of history in Rwanda.

As was discussed in greater detail in chapter five, there is a stunning lack of a framework for understanding the genocide in Rwanda, as well as the issue of ethnicity more generally. Indeed, much like the aforementioned *gacaca* trials, the social studies curriculum effectively shifts the debate of ethnicity to the private sphere, undermining any sort of coherent vision about Rwanda's past. Violent images in texts, eerily reminiscent of 1994, persist from the earliest grade levels, with little to no framework for understanding *why* these events exist and have existed. Even when the genocide is referenced (usually in the context of the number of orphans/disabled, though also in regard to genocide memorials) there is no mention whatsoever of the civil war and genocide itself. The only time in which the genocide is dealt with directly is at the sixth level, and even then there is only five pages dedicated to the civil war and genocide. The RPF is portrayed as the saviours of Rwanda, and it is implied that they overthrew the previous regime primarily to stop the genocide (Comprehensive Social Studies 6). Such an account obviously differs greatly from the living memory of Rwandans who experienced the genocide, as the majority of the killings occurred years after the RPF first invaded. In addition, killings had a tendency to escalate in areas where there was high RPF activity (Des Forges 1999). The combination of a lack of information about the civil war and genocide, combined with the differences in the public/private discourses of remembrance, seriously undermines the current government's attempts to create a universal framework for understanding the history of Rwanda as it relates to the genocide. Without this shared understanding of history, it is impossible to create a new identity construct that encompasses the 'old' identities of Hutu and Tutsi (as per Anderson 1983).

Drawing Comparisons

While there are some obvious major differences between Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there are some significant parallels in their approaches to creating a new identity as a means of peacebuilding after severe inter-ethnic conflict. This subsection will be further divided into two major themes. The first will examine the role of leadership in promoting new identities, comparing the roles of both Tito and Kagame in this respect. The second theme to be examined will be the use of history to create a new imagined community, as per Anderson (1983). This subsection will also examine the omissions from the curriculum, and how these omissions effect the construction of new identities. After reviewing these two themes, this subsection will assess the likelihood of Rwandanism becoming a hegemonic expression of group identity that can further peacebuilding in Rwanda, as well as offering some concluding remarks.

Leader or Lynchpin?

Common in nation-building efforts in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda is the extent to which popular revolutionary leaders dominated state level discourse. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that both were military leaders that came to power after winning a prolonged civil war. Both Tito and Kagame also ended periods of extreme violence in their societies (though both were obviously also a part of that violence). It is this link of leadership to national unity, and new pan-national identity, that has the potential to be problematic once there is a change in leadership.

Looking at the case of Yugoslavia, many scholars have noted that the federal state system was strongly linked to Tito himself (Gow 1997). In the first few decades Tito served as the literal dictator, forming an almost Stalin-like cult of personality, while in the later years, though he was stripped of much of his formal powers, he was still the formal guarantor of Yugoslav peace and security (Gow 1997). Tito was deemed so important to the functioning of the state that his death was suppressed by members of the Communist Party immediately after he died (Gagnon 2002). While ethnic nationalism certainly existed before Tito's death (the devolution of power to the constituent republics, for example), it was only after his death that leaders such as Tudjman and Milosevic resorted to nationalist security dilemmas to maintain their grip on their respective republics. The death of Tito increased calls for reforms within the state – including increased citizen control and democratic reform, threatening the power base of 'old guard' leaders such as Milosevic (see Gagnon 2002).

Despite formally being considered a democracy, Rwandanism, and Rwandan leadership in general, is strongly linked to Paul Kagame. As discussed in chapter four, Kagame has effectively controlled the Rwandan presidency since 1995, winning re-election with such unlikely vote tallies as 95 percent (Longman and Rutagengwa 2004)[57]. As noted earlier, Kagame also presents his Presidency as one of reconciliation, with opposing parties and leaders often being charged with divisionism, or promoting genocide ideology (Buckley-Zistel 2009). In presenting his leadership in this manner, Kagame risks framing 'ethnic politics', broadly speaking, as the natural alternative to his administration. This risks a scenario similar to that of Yugoslavia, where the death of the figurehead of 'Brotherhood and Unity' resulted in the death of this ideal, and a reassertion of exclusionary nationalist politics.

Kagame's removal from power, be it through death, election, or other means, risks arguably more than that of Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito, despite being half-Slovene and half-Croat, presented himself both during and after the Second World War, as a Yugoslav. This was consistent with the ideology of the *Partisans* who were a multi-ethnic force and later incorporated elements of the Serbian resistance as well. This allowed for 'Brotherhood and Unity' to be well represented at the highest level of administration, rather than being viewed as a Croat controlling the various national republics. Kagame, by contrast, is unlikely to be able to foster a similar image. Despite titles such as the "father of orphans", it is difficult to view the RPF as anything other than a Tutsi army. While the goal of the Kagame administration is to

[57] This vote tally was from the 2003 Rwandan elections, held on August 25, 2003.

introduce a new Rwandan identity, one cannot help but note that such a process would take several generations, and by linking this new identity so strongly with one particular individual there runs substantive risk of it collapsing once Kagame is removed from power. It should also be noted that it was a leadership void (the assassination of Habyarimana), that directly preceded the genocide. In order for Rwandanism to be an effective means of coping with conflict in the future, it needs to be reflected in the private sphere, as well as through the public sphere dominated by Kagame. The following two subsections will review why the Rwandanism being taught is unlikely to be able to co-opt these private discourses.

Minding the Gap: Identity, History, and Collective Amnesia

Much like the approach to leadership, the education systems of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda are strikingly similar in their approaches to teaching a new form of collective identity. Both have, either implicitly or explicitly, linked their revolutionary struggles to removing bad leadership and foreign influence. This has allowed both to frame their new identity constructs as being part of a golden age of their civilizations; an integral aspect to creating a universal conception of an imagined community. Of ar greater importance, especially as it pertains to creating a hegemonic expression of identity, both Yugoslavia and Rwanda have omitted large parts of the historical record, particularly those periods that have seen large scale inter-ethnic violence. Significantly in both cases, this violence was a recent occurrence that exists in living memory, rather than an element of the distant past, which is often the case in terms of a civilization golden age. Also, in both cases the period omitted was the same period that gave rise to, and ostensibly legitimizes, the post-conflict regime.

In Titoist Yugoslavia, the so-called golden age of civilization was implicit, in the sense that it was an undefined past in which (initially) Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lived peacefully in the region free from foreign occupation. The Titoist regime was in a sense a rediscovery of this golden age, with Yugoslavia being a state won through revolutionary struggle. It was also this foreign occupation and influence that was the root of ethnic violence in the past, with this violence being constructed as a by-product of bourgeois leaders and fascist invaders (Dragovic-Soso 2002). Unsurprisingly, the nature of the Yugoslav struggle was reduced to one of class, rather than one of identity or territory. This is particularly significant, as under the framework of Brotherhood and unity, the constituent nations were allowed to exist, albeit subordinated to the greater Yugoslav framework.

In teaching this golden age, the Communist Party devolved much of the curriculum to the constituent republics. This led to a somewhat fragmented account for the past, and it has been observed that "[...] children educated in various Yugoslav republics would not have had an identical view of the vital question of what their country had been like before the communist era" (Wachtel and Markovic 2008: 206). The Second World War struggle for "national liberation" was not discussed in detail, particularly inter-ethnic violence and genocide in the Independent State of Croatia. Even interwar Yugoslav literature was banned, preventing any sense of continuity of a Yugoslav nation.[58] This was not initially problematic, as there was a genuine desire in behalf of Yugoslav society to 'move on' following the Second World War (Oberschall 2007; Lilly 1997).

[58] Recall that the nation, according to Anderson (1983), moves as a unit through time. This break in history prevents such a perception.

This gap however, encompassing both interwar and Second World War Yugoslavia, was instrumental in the proliferation of ethnic nationalism and victim mentality after the death of Tito. This process began in Slovenia, with the Writer's Association calling for even greater national control over the school curriculum, while Serbia began to demand increased control over the autonomous region of Kosovo, citing the need to protect the Serbian minority (Dragovic-SoSo 2003). As this so called 'national question' began to dominate the intelligentsia, it was picked up by nationalist leaders such as Tudjman and Milosevic, who invoked ethnic security dilemmas centered on the Second World War experience to demobilize the population and maintain their grip on their respective republics (see Gagnon 2002).

As was discussed in greater detail in chapter three, it was precisely this gap in history that was the source of the most inflammatory rhetoric from Belgrade and Zagreb. Serb-controlled media labelled Croats as *Ustasha*, while Croat media responded by labelling Serbs as *chetniks*. The label of *Ustasha* was also reinforced at the local level in Croatia, as symbols used in the Independent State of Croatia began to reappear. Debate also centered on the Jasenovac camp, with both Serbs and Croats creating exaggerated figures to advance their own exclusionary nationalist agendas (Cohen 2001). The massacre of Croats by the *Partisan* provided yet more opportunity for disagreements over past ethnic conflict to dominate the Yugoslav consciousness. Both sides constructed themselves as victims of a monstrous Other, and the very period used to position their victimhood was the same that had been omitted from state-sanctioned discourse. In this sense, the gap in history that could not be accounted for under the framework of Yugoslavism was filled by exclusionary nationalist narratives. This successfully challenged the hegemony of the Yugoslav narrative, fueling inter-ethnic security dilemmas in the process.

Rwanda has embarked on a similar approach to establishing a so-called golden age of civilization. While Yugoslavia framed the civil war itself as a war of liberation, Rwanda has also uses liberation as a theme, though in this sense from a divisive colonial legacy. Throughout both ceremonies (*gacaca, ingando*) and the school curriculum, present day Rwanda is more strongly linked to the pre-colonial period than to the colonial/independence periods. Within the school curriculum there is an emphasis on pre-colonial life and state structures, while colonialism and independent Rwanda receive scarce attention (only appearing in any detail in the sixth grade). This period is portrayed as one of harmony. Much like in Titoist Yugoslavia, this golden age is potentially problematic as it is greatly removed from the living memory of Rwanda. This makes it difficult to accept such a narrative, and even this idea of a peaceful pre-colonial record is disputed by historians (see Newbury 2009). This is a prime example of how the government's narrative of the past does not reflect the reality faced by everyday Rwandans.

Much like Yugoslavia before it, Kagame's Rwanda runs a serious risk of being unable to account for competing narratives of the civil war, genocide, and consolidation of the country. As was discussed in detail in the previous two chapters, there remains scarce education on the civil war and genocide in Rwanda (5 pages in the current social studies curriculum), and there is no mention of the role of the RPF in these events other than as the group that halted the genocide (Comprehensive Social Studies 6). Moreover, the discouragement of ethnic labels such as Tutsi and Hutu serve to prevent a discussion of these identities in the public sphere, relegating them to the private. This is also consistent with national memorials and museums, which focus on the macabre, without an interpretive framework for understanding (Meirhenrich 2011). The only public venues in which the past can be discussed is through the heavily controlled forums of *gacaca* and *ingando*. *Gacaca* has been widely criticized for only focusing on "Hutu Crimes"

(Cobban 2007), while *ingando* has been criticized for promoting silence and loyalty to the regime, rather than a re-teaching of the past and reconciliation (Thomson 2011).

Moreover, the focus of *gacaca* trials on the genocide itself reinforces thinking of identity in the recent, living, past as ethnically dichotomous, as opposed to the new, official Rwandan identity. This is because, as was noted earlier, when dealing with identity-based violence, victims (and perpetrators) are prone to describe this violence in identity-based terms. Rather than encouraging citizens to think of themselves as Rwandan, these trials reinforce the old Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy. Combined with the tendency to focus on Hutu crimes, this process ignores the narratives of the Hutu majority population, and any security dilemmas (caused by the RPF invasion, amongst others) that had factored into the genocide.

Taken together, Rwanda has the very real risk of transferring all discussion of ethnicity to the private sphere (especially considering that *Gacaca* trials are winding down and will end in the reasonably near future). This very lack of a public forum for ethnicity is the greatest challenge to the government's current attempts at creating a hegemonic Rwandan identity. Unless the state can alter its narrative of the past, and ethnicity more generally, it will be unable to co-opt local narratives to secure the salience of Rwandanism amongst the population. This risks a return to an ethnically dichotomous society, particularly if there is a shock to the current system (as occurred with the assassination of Habyarimana).

Rethinking Rwandanism

While identity is seen as an integral aspect of ethnic conflict (see Moshman 1999), it is a vastly unexplored concept in terms of peacebuilding and reconciliation. In order to theorize how identity shapes peacebuilding and reconciliation, this work has used a framework of hegemony advanced by Butler, Laclau, and Zizek (2000) to understand the negotiation of identity between publically and privately driven narratives of the past (in the tradition of Benedict Anderson's imagined communities (1983)). Using the case of Titoist Yugoslavia as a baseline, this thesis has explored the potential for Rwandanism to become a hegemonic identity in post-genocide Rwanda.

This thesis has attempted to address the question: Is the creation of a new, civic Rwandan identity, a viable means of post-conflict reconciliation in present day Rwanda? In order to answer this question, the program of 'Brotherhood and Unity' pursued in the former Yugoslavia by the communist regime under Tito has been used as a comparison. Conceptualizing group identity as an operation of hegemony, chapter two argued that in order to create a new supra-national group identity, said identity would have to be constructed from an aggregate of the previously exclusionary ethnic identities. Using Benedict Anderson's theory of the nation being an "imagined community" (1983), in which national groups are brought into being by a common conception of their own origins (history), this thesis has argued that a supra-national identity must be able to integrate competing narratives of the past into a cohesive whole. In effective terms, this means the state must be able to create an 'official' account of history that can successfully co-opt alternative accounts present in the living memory of those at the local level, which in turn are reproduced outside of state control (unlike, for example, memorialisation and standardized education).

In Yugoslavia, as was demonstrated in chapter three, attempts at creating a new, Yugoslav, identity under the framework of "Brotherhood and Unity" were ultimately unsuccessful. Despite attempts at integrating different accounts of history in the education system, as well as by creating supra-national monuments (such as the tomb of Njegos) the Yugoslav project ultimately failed due to the gap in official memory that encompassed severe inter-ethnic violence during the Second World War. After a shock to the system (the death of Tito and increased demands for reform), nationalist leaders used narratives centered on the past to demonize other ethnic groups and create ethnic security dilemmas that culminated in the bloody dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Despite standardized education and memorials, there was never an official account that could challenge or co-opt the narratives of ethnic divisionism, particularly surrounding the genocide in the Independent State of Croatia at the Jasenovac camp.

In the case of Rwanda, this thesis has argued that the program of Rwandanism being pursued by the Kagame administration is unlikely to become a hegemonic expression of group identity. 'Official' accounts of history and ethnicity, disseminated in the public sphere through means of genocide memorialisation, *gacaca* courts, *ingando* camps and a new education curriculum have portrayed ethnicity as a colonial construction designed to divide the Rwandan people. The reduction of ethnic affiliation to a divisive colonial legacy may be "true" in a broad sense, but this does not reduce the salience of ethnic identity in Rwanda, an unsurprising phenomenon considering the long promotion of ethnic divisionism under first the Belgians, and later in independent Rwanda. The genocide itself only further entrenched the salience of ethnic identity, though it remains conspicuously absent from public discourse. The only public forums in which identity can be discussed (*gacaca* in particular) is in direct reference to the genocide, ensuring the divisiveness of ethnic identities in Rwanda. Moreover, there is a general lack of education about history, identity, and the genocide in contemporary Rwanda. Despite the lifting on the history moratorium, there remain no standard texts in Rwanda after over a decade of reconstruction. In addition, teachers have been reluctant to teach history or identity in Rwanda, for either fear of creating hostility, or of persecution by the Kagame administration. In order to overcome this lack of available history teaching materials, this work has made the primary social studies textbooks a principle point of examination, providing additional insights into the teaching of history to Rwandan youth.

In reviewing the current social studies curriculum (as this is the closest subject to history), it is immediately apparent that there is not sufficient attention paid to the past, particularly the extremely contentious recent past of the civil war and corresponding genocide. Many of the questions relating to conflict and conflict resolution are effectively passed to the private sphere, denying students a standardized framework for viewing the past (an essential part of Anderson's imagined community). The origins of Hutu and Tutsi scarcely appear at all, and not until the sixth grade is identity or genocide given any significant attention. The primary historical focus is evidently the pre-colonial period; a time in which Hutu, Tutsi, and twa lived harmoniously in Rwanda. While this ostensibly done to promote reconciliation amongst Rwandan's, this idealized pre-colonial past is far removed from the living history experienced by Rwandans, and as such, lacks the ability to co-opt the divisive history and perceived origins of ethnicity instilled in the past hundred years; a conception of history (based on the Hamitic hypothesis discussed in chapter four), that has only been reinforced by the RPF invasion in 1991. Given the emphasis that the Kagame administration has placed on creating this new Rwandan identity based on an alternative view the historical origins of Hutu and Tutsi, is striking how seldom ethnicity appears within Rwandan schools. As was established through the examination of primary social studies texts in chapter five, scant attention is focused on the teaching of the genocide in Rwanda, with a mere five pages dedicated to this topic over the first six years of schooling. Ethnicity is passed off as a vestigial trait of the Belgian colonizers, ignoring the importance of ethnicity in the lives of contemporary Rwandans. Much like *gacaca* trials, genocide memorials, and *ingando* camps, the Rwandan education system has served to shift the discussion of ethnicity from the public sphere to that of the private, increasing the risk that there will be a proliferation of historical narratives that will fall outside of the "official" version of history advanced by Kagame and the RPF. If these privately reproduced accounts of history cannot be integrated into this official narrative, any hegemonic project centered on a universal civic Rwandanism will be unsuccessful.

Much like what occurred in Yugoslavia following the death of Tito, Rwanda risks a return of exclusionary ethnic narratives after the lynchpin figure (Kagame) is eventually removed from power. The lack of government narrative explaining the RPF's role in violence both during and after the genocide provides an important historical gap that could be readily filled by ethnic nationalism once there is a loosening of state control. Given Rwanda's divisive past, it is unlikely that a new, hegemonic identity will be established before Kagame is removed from power.

Concluding Remarks

In many ways, ethnic conflict is a conflict over identity itself (Moshman 2007). As such, reconciling these conflicting identities is crucial to any attempt at peacebuilding in divided societies. In order to accomplish this goal, both Titoist Yugoslavia and present day Rwanda have embarked on a program of national identity construction, attempting to merge previously conflicting identities into multi-ethnic Yugoslav and Rwandan identities, respectively. Assuming that the nation itself is an imagined community based upon the perception of a shared history (as per Anderson 1983), the critical theoretical concept of hegemony provides an ideal lens in which to evaluate the potential of such a supra-national identity construction project. In order to maintain its dominant status, the hegemonic narrative of society must be able to co-opt dissenting narratives, preventing them from supplanting the hegemon as the "common sense" account of society and societal relations (Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 2000). In cases of national identity, this means that the hegemonic narrative, that which is often promoted by the state through use of the ideological state apparatus (education, memorialisation etc.) must be able to reflect the locally produced "living" memories and perceptions of history that are reproduced independently of state control if it to have any success at supplanting the exclusionary identities that were previously in conflict. While other works have highlighted the importance of coming to a shared view of the past (see Staub 2008; Field 2007), this work is the first to do so using a framework that can assess the potential of that shared view of the past supplanting previous historical narratives of division.

Using Tito's program of 'Brotherhood and Unity' as a comparative case to assess if the creation of a new, civic Rwandan identity, is a viable means of post-conflict reconciliation in present day Rwanda, this thesis has argued that the current program of Rwandanism is unlikely to replace the old labels of Hutu and Tutsi as the dominant expression of group identity in Rwanda. Much like Yugoslavia before it, the lack of official framework for understanding past violence is likely to shift debates of history and ethnicity solely to the private sphere, where it is impossible for them to be incorporated into the official truth narrative of the RPF regime, thus preventing the establishment of a hegemonic form of group identity. This shifting of the discussion of ethnicity to the private sphere has already been noted in the literature focused on *gacaca*, memorialisation, and *ingando* (see chapters four and five). This work has established that this trend also exists within the Rwandan education system, as the social studies (the only medium through which Rwandan history is currently being taught) also lacks any sort of nuanced discussion of ethnicity or the genocide. Indeed, the only aspect of the past approached in detail is that of pre-colonial Rwanda, a past that exists so far from the living memory of Rwandans that it is unlikely to form the basis of a new shared civic identity.

This work is important to those interested in the study of post-conflict reconciliation for several reasons. In terms of Rwanda specifically, and in the absence of a developed history curriculum, this work is the first to examine social studies curricular materials as a means of teaching history to Rwandan youth. This is of crucial importance to those studying the politics of memory, history, and identity in Rwanda, and fills this important gap in the study of history education. This work is also useful in the sense that it provides the first real comparative case for using supra-national identity construction as a means of reconciliation. Current comparative works have largely focused on one aspect of the reconciliation process (see chapter two), while this work brings together truth telling, memorialisation, and education in comparative perspective.

While the focus of this particular work is on communist Yugoslavia and contemporary Rwanda, the general framework of analysis (hegemony and the re-articulation of private narratives into that of the public) could be applied to other cases as well. Obviously each case is unique, with different historically contingent circumstances affecting individuals' conception of the past. At the same time, the identification of gaps in the 'official' history events that can later be exploited to fuel ethnic security dilemmas is important to the understanding of propaganda and its effects on inciting violence. Interestingly enough, the notion of using a wider, more nuanced account of history to promote reconciliation has been sought by disadvantaged groups in other, non-ethnic conflict situations, such as recent requests for an in-depth examination of aboriginal residential schools within various provincial history curriculums in Canada (CBC Feb 23, 2012). Indeed, using history as a means of understanding and reconciliation applies to far more than just cases of serious inter-ethnic conflict.

The examination of the social studies curriculum has expanded the current literature on history teaching in Rwanda, though there are still several limits to this research that need to be addressed. Most importantly, this work was done without conducting interviews within Rwanda itself. In order to fully develop how Rwandan youth view history, history teaching, and ethnicity (both currently and historically), this work would have greatly benefitted from extended interviews with Rwandan youth, ideally across multiple provinces, as well as with educational shareholders. In addition, textbooks from the publisher INR-Pitambra were unavailable for this project, though judging by the consistency amongst other textbooks from multiple publishers at the same grade level, this is unlikely to be a major shortcoming.

There are still many issues of Kagame's Rwandanism project that need additional scholarly attention. Foremost of these is the need for an in-depth study of the history curriculum itself, once it has been fully established and made available. Also important to the study of reconciliation efforts in Rwanda is the role of *ingando* camps. There is currently a large gap on this particular topic, with much of the research being limited to personal experience (see Thomson 2011). In particular, the *ingando* camps that appear to be used to indoctrinate the next generation of Rwandan elites need further scholarly attention, as it is the attendees of these camps that will play a large role in the future direction of Rwanda. Despite the scholarly interest that Rwanda has generated since the 1994 genocide, there remains significant streams of research that remain understudied, a fact that needs to be remedied if we are to understand both the process of reconciliation in divided societies, as well as the deliberate construction of new national identities.

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Appendix 1: List of Reviewed Curricular Texts

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