

## OBJECTIVE REASON AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS

### *The Metaphysical Foundations of Political Theories*

Plato allied passion with reason against appetite.<sup>1</sup> He thus accorded reason considerably greater authority than is expressed in the strategic conception of rationality characteristic of broadly utilitarian thought. Within this narrower, instrumentalist conception, reason devises the means to ends set by individual desire and justifies action insofar as it promotes these aims. It does not attempt to evaluate the ends. The alternative view, by contrast, tries to distinguish a class of rational ends and thereby ascribes to reason a normative rather than merely strategic function. In so doing it presupposes the existence of standards independent of individual desires by which these desires can be assessed, and in this sense it considers some reasons for action as objective rather than subjective.

If such rational ends may be called needs in distinction from simple wants or interests, their objective validity creates a prima facie case for saying that anyone's needs should be satisfied. The standards which demarcate objective from merely subjective reasons for action are unhappily difficult to identify, however, and political theories, such as socialism, which are concerned to justify collective efforts to satisfy human needs founder in this obscurity unless they can provide an adequate account of objective rationality. The chief criterion of adequacy is a satisfactory answer to an alternative—liberal or Kantian—account of objective rationality which includes no distinctive theory of needs.<sup>2</sup>

Kant's requirement of respect for persons represents a particularly clear recognition of the importance of formulating an account of objective rationality. Respect is an attitude we have toward persons we regard as our equals or superiors, and it is therefore rationally justified only if its objects are one's peers or betters. Respect for persons in general, furthermore, assigns to everyone equal human worth, and lack of such respect indicates failure to recognize the equal value of persons as persons. These truisms cannot be expressed within a utilitarian account of reason and evaluation. The statement of equality which justifies the claim that human beings warrant respect is not a statement of strategy and therefore cannot, on utilitarian grounds, provide a reason for action. If reference to equality does provide a reason for treating persons with respect, therefore, then while utility is unquestionably one important criterion of value, utilitarianism—the theory that

utility is the sole such criterion—is false. Nonutilitarian reasons for action must be identified.

The categorical imperative which summarizes Kant's notion of respect for persons serves this function, but it only abstracts from "the distinction between mere interestedness and disinterestedness."<sup>3</sup> As a formal principle it says nothing about the adequacy of our aims or about ends which are necessary or worthwhile rather than simply legitimate. It provides a characterization of objective reason, for it establishes tests which individual ends must pass in order to be legitimate; but, since these tests require little more than consistency and generalizability, the resultant morality is inherently permissive and compatible with almost any individual end and any social distribution. Yet even opponents must acknowledge the conspicuous advantage of Kant's view, which is simply that if no formal characterization and justification of respect is possible it is difficult to see how respect can be justified at all. Effective socialist critics of subjective rationality, such as Max Horkheimer, offer nothing by way of substantive conceptions of objective rationality,<sup>4</sup> and human capacities frequently cited as reasons for respect do not seem to supply what is needed. While various observable features of persons—such as self-consciousness and the ability to make decisions—help define the scope of respectful behavior, possession of such qualities does not logically establish the claims of respect. They do not constitute that equality which makes us worthy of respect, so that if there are objective reasons for moral attitudes and beliefs these reasons cannot be identified with natural facts about human beings.

Such reasons require an adequate metaphysics of persons. Then but only then is it possible to maintain that to lack respect for others is a failure to recognize the full reality of persons. In order to be objectively grounded, respect must be based in reality, and if no observable facts can provide this foundation it must be sought in metaphysics. Even a formal criterion of objectivity requires such a basis, since in the absence of some reference to human nature any nontrivial principle of action will appear arbitrary. The obligation to treat others as ends-in-themselves is baffling unless we suppose that something about persons makes them inherently valuable; the view that we should act only on universalizable maxims is empty unless we assume that there are important similarities among all human beings. Use of the word "metaphysics" is not, then, intended to bring the notion of objective rationality into disrepute. It emphasizes that any account of the matter must tie reasons to the recognition of reality while acknowledging that empirical facts cannot constitute this reality. The issue is rather: Does an adequate metaphysics of persons entail formal criteria of objective rationality, or does a correct account of human nature lead to a stronger sense of objectivity?

*Subjective Rationality*

The need for metaphysical inquiry is evident from the fact that instrumental or utilitarian accounts of rationality preclude any significant theory of human nature. Instrumental considerations exclude not only rational respect but any restrictions upon possible or permissible ends whatsoever, for in limiting reason to the examination of strategies they eschew reference to human nature in any sense which defines restrictions upon what it is appropriate for a human being to aim at. It is true that utilitarians commonly agree that it is rational to promote certain ends which one does not have—ends which one will acquire only in the future—but this agreement marks a lapse. The justification of “impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life”<sup>5</sup> rests upon the assumption that persons have an integrated conception of their lives, so that ends which one will acquire only later are nevertheless seen as one’s own and demand the attention of reason in the present. But while future ends do justify the means, reference to the temporal integration of individuals does not provide the strategic reasons required by utilitarian criteria of evaluation. Personal integration warrants prudence, just as human equality warrants respect, but the former evaluation no more appeals to utility than does the latter. It appeals to the nature of persons in a way that utilitarianism cannot consistently accommodate.<sup>6</sup>

Although utilitarianism cannot give either individual coherence or human equality a justifying role, it has, of course, the deep commitment to equality expressed in the law of diminishing marginal utilities. By regarding utility as the sole criterion of value, moreover, it rejects any reason for preferring one person’s utility to another’s, and in this important respect also it considers each person equally. But because taking each person’s interests equally into account is fully compatible with determining that some persons’ interests must be sacrificed for the sake of others’, the equality in question has nothing to do with respect for persons as ends in themselves. When equality is construed along any natural dimension, whether that be individual utility or any more or less measurable property of persons, the needs of certain individuals may be disregarded. No naturalistic view can specify a sort of equality which, in characterizing persons in general, gives to each certain inviolable rights. Such equality can be identified only within a metaphysical theory which, in distinguishing human beings from things we may use for our own purposes, provides the foundation for objective practical reason.

*Objective Rationality: Formalist Accounts*

The formal criteria of objective rationality characteristic of broadly Kantian views are consequences of an individualist metaphysics. Such a

metaphysics is one which regards individual interests as authoritative in the sense that one can properly have an interest in anything whatsoever. Individual autonomy is defined by the logical possibility of wanting anything, hence in one's interests being independent of any factual considerations sufficient to determine the attitudes required of rational persons.<sup>7</sup> If there are any objective criteria by which individual interests can be evaluated, they must, on such a view, evidently be formal. Since, furthermore, objective reasons include moral reasons, it seems clear that individualism of this kind precludes there being any necessary content to moral reasons. The content of morality must come from contingent facts about us—that we dislike pain, desire health, require food in order to live, etc.—which in conjunction with formal considerations effectively exclude acceptance of certain moral views. It is only together with our own desire to prosper that principles of universalizability, reversability and the like, prevent us from adopting maxims which include indifference to the plight of others.

The element of accident in such accounts is philosophically disturbing, and it has implications which call into question the adequacy of the metaphysics of formalism. The most important of these implications is the poverty of the individualist conception of persons so clearly manifested in the problem of alienation. Recent works by Thomas Nagel and Robert Nozick illustrate this problem nicely.

Nagel argues that altruism “depend[s] on a formal feature of practical reason which has a metaphysical explanation.” Altruism is a rational requirement on action, analogous to prudence and deriving from

... a formal principle which can be specified without mentioning the interests of others at all . . . . The principle underlying altruism will require, in other words, that all reasons be construable as expressing objective rather than subjective values . . . . [A]ltruism (or its parent principle) depends on full recognition of the reality of other persons.<sup>8</sup>

Nagel makes the case for objective values as follows: We dislike feeling pain however caused, but when it is caused by another person we can also resent it. Such an attitude is reasonable only when the negative value of pain is regarded as objective: it is the pain that is important rather than the identity of the sufferer. For in resenting another's action we suppose that he had reason not to perform it, and the supposition is defensible only when the disvalue is assigned to the pain rather than to our own distress. If subjective experience alone gave reasons for action, then one person's pain would not give another any reason to desist. Rational resentment thus assigns objectivity to certain reasons for action and thereby implies that these reasons are reasons for anyone.

This reasoning, even if valid, does not entail that objective reasons must be understood in terms of formal principles, but such an interpretation can be devised. In resenting pain done to us, hence in supposing that there was objective reason not to inflict it, we assume that others could equally legitimately resent our causing pain to them. To feel resentment, therefore, is, if we are rational, to acknowledge the universalizability of our own dislike of pain. And it is thus to regard pain as a reason for action which is not tied to the interests of particular persons, that is, to view the reason impersonally. The objectivity of reasons is thus plausibly defined by the formal principles of universality and impersonality.

This interpretation of objective reasons can be explained and our commitment to these principles accounted for by our recognition of others and ourselves as persons. Seen simply as a person (rather than as a particular person), one lacks any special status or importance, so that to recognize oneself as a person is to discern the need for an impersonal point of view from which any interest, no matter whose it happens to be, is seen to have an equal *prima facie* claim to satisfaction. Since, moreover, each person has his own distinctive body of interests and dislikes having them interfered with, the universalization of this dislike is entirely understandable when persons are seen without regard to who they are or what particular interests they have. In recognizing that we are equally persons, then, we acknowledge the objective value of noninterference and see that respect for human beings is required by each one's being a distinct individual with his own life to lead.<sup>9</sup>

Much the same sort of account of the identification of objective reasons, their formal interpretation, and their metaphysical explanation is given by Robert Nozick, who describes

. . . a promising sketch of an argument from moral form to moral content: the form of morality includes *F* (moral side constraints); the best explanation of morality's being *F* is *p* (a strong statement of the distinctness of individuals); and from *p* follows a particular moral content, namely, the libertarian constraint.<sup>10</sup>

Moral reasons differ formally from instrumental ones because of the differences between persons and instruments. We may do what we like with instruments, but our actions must be constrained when they have to do with other persons. We may not simply do as we please when that would mean interference with another, since to do so would be to disregard the fact of the other's independent existence. Recognizing what a person is thus involves awareness that subjective reasons are not always sufficient to give rational justification to action; and the formal distinction between subjective reasons and moral ones together with such recognition impose specific restrictions upon what one may rationally do.

These two formalist conceptions of objective rationality are importantly different. Nagel's principles of universality and impersonality entail the absence of any special status to particular agents: the fact that an interest is one's own confers no special right to act upon it. Nozick's account, though, by viewing moral reasons as ones which include constraints upon the pursuit of the interests of a self, endorses just such a right: unless an action threatens the distinctness of persons, subjective reasons are sufficient to justify it. Whereas for Nagel rational persons act only for objective reasons, subjective rationality is at the heart of Nozick's libertarian view, and objective considerations apply only in certain cases.<sup>11</sup> This difference is reflected in the extreme poverty of Nozick's conception of persons, although the basic similarity between the theories becomes clear from a like weakness in Nagel's theory.

The ostensible legitimacy of subjective reasons—the view that one has a right to do what one wants—entails that we may do with our body and labor as we choose. Hence, for Nozick as for Locke, we have rights which make of these our property: the right to use them as we wish, the right to grant and to refuse other persons their use, the right to transfer these rights to others. These rights define the limits of other person's legitimate actions. No one may break my arm or assign me a job without my permission. Since, however, I have the right to transfer such rights, I may offer my labor for sale or permit another to break my arm. Any right may be put on the market, and anyone may come to own any right. There are, in other words, no inalienable rights—one's property cannot be taken away but it may be freely transferred—so that it is possible to make oneself a resource for others and allow others to determine how one's life is to be led. We can thus deny our own humanity. If (as Nozick maintains) the distinctness of persons implies a prohibition on sacrificing one person to benefit others, then in waiving this prohibition in our own case (as Nozick allows), we negate our distinctness as persons. Of course, it is sometimes in order to ask that someone sacrifice us for another person, but that is our decision. And it is also in order to submit to a way of life in which others have the right to sacrifice us for what we consider a higher cause. But to give a person the right to sacrifice us for reasons private to that person is to have given up our separate existence. The moral side constraints explained by the distinctness of persons are, therefore, unacceptably weak. They are not backed up by a metaphysics of persons which succeeds in defining ends-in-themselves in distinction from other things. They could not be, given the conception of subjective rationality at the core of Nozick's theory.

Of course, if we do not own everything that is our own—if body and labor are not private but only personal property—this problem does not arise,

since one need not then be said to have essential rights which could nevertheless be alienated. There is on this assumption no unlimited right to use one's labor as a means to acquiring something extrinsic to the self—such as wealth or pleasure. It might therefore be suggested on Nozick's behalf that the distinctness of persons entails a constraint upon exchanging rights as well as on trespassing upon them; that not only must one avoid sacrificing others for one's own ends, but also that one must avoid sacrificing oneself for something essentially non-human. But this option is closed. Since Nozick does not conceive of human nature as defined by ends which stand in need of justification, nothing is non-human. Human beings are simply formulators of life-plans, beings who construct systems of ends for themselves. Accordingly, there can be no definition of a human end except in terms of the plans people actually adopt, and the concept of a human end defines no human needs, no ends constitutive of humanity.

Nagel's encounter with the problem of estrangement is more explicit. He characterizes imprudence as a form of temporal dissociation: it is a failure to take those precautions for the future which are appropriate in virtue of our conception of ourselves as temporally extended beings. Egoism, analogously, is a form of dissociation from other persons: it is a failure to have that concern for the interests of others which is justified by "a conception of oneself as identical with a particular, impersonally specifiable inhabitant of the world, among others of a similar nature."<sup>12</sup> While these characterizations are plausible, the justification of prudence and respect they assert is vanishingly thin. Certain conceptions of self and others do support the respective attitudes, but the conceptions are themselves unsupported. As in the case of rational resentment, prudence and respect assign objectivity to certain of our reasons for action but there is no independent justification of the assignment. On what grounds do we maintain the self conception we have rather than, say, viewing persons as series of momentary selves each indifferent to earlier and later members of the series? On none at all. On a formalist view no facts require us to identify any future interests as our own and none, therefore, prohibit us from neglecting the future. So long as one never regrets his negligence there are only question-begging grounds for regarding one's conception of things as defective. No identifiable facts of human nature preclude such alienation, and the edifice of objective rationality remains suspended in air.

The egoist, likewise, may be rationally unassailable, so long as he never suffers guilt, resentment, or indignation. If one does not operate with the concept of right action these emotions include, then there is indeed dissociation from other persons; but there are no grounds for saying that this condition represents a mistake. More particularly, we cannot defend imputations of deficiency or irrationality by saying that egoists fail to perceive the full reality

of other persons; for we have no criterion of reality apart from the ability of such metaphysical claims to explain our acceptance of certain principles. One who did not accept them could, therefore, with equal right reject those claims. Nagel's account, in other words, provides no distinction between altruistic and prudential attitudes and the realities which are supposed to justify the attitudes. The conceptions of persons which define altruism and prudence cause those who have these attitudes to regard those who do not as irrational or deficient, but no evidence exists for saying that egoists fail to recognize reality as opposed to saying that it is actually altruists who go wrong in subscribing to an inflated ontology of persons. The reality of other persons and later selves, in short, is a projection of altruism and prudence, respectively: Nagel's metaphysics presuppose his attitudes rather than justifying them. In this crucial respect his formalist, individualist view fails to identify a class of objective reasons for action.

*Objective Rationality: A Factual Account*

The formalist tradition rightly emphasizes the distinctness and integrity of individual persons but provides little foundation for these qualities. Any objectivist alternative to formalism will seek to unite abstract ideals with actual human existence by founding basic features of human nature upon a reality independent of individual attitudes. A socialist alternative will not, of course, appeal to the law of God or to any of the obscure sources of natural law characteristic of the classical tradition. Instead of attempting to identify natural, theological, or formal criteria of moral rationality, such an account will seek to describe adequate social tests for such attitudes as resentment and respect. In doing so it will provide an account of characteristic human needs stronger than any available within formalist theories.

A need is something we ought to pursue either because it is the rational means to a desired end or because the thing is itself a rational end. Given their rational element, needs, unlike wants, are objective in this sense: we may be mistaken about what we need in a way that we cannot be mistaken about what we want, and we can need something without knowing it, whereas we cannot in the same respect want something without knowing it. Since a formalist view supposes that ends cannot be assessed at bottom by any factual standard, it must view all needs as instrumental: human needs can be identified only as the conditions necessary for satisfying whatever we may want. The primary goods identified by John Rawls are needs of this sort. Having a use whatever a person's plan of life, they are things that any rational man wants if he wants anything.<sup>13</sup> When, however, we add to considerations about instrumental necessities the social considerations which confirm moral attitudes, instances of the second class of needs can be identified.



The social facts required to justify respect for persons in general have become evident with the decay of authoritarian modes of existence. Persons engulfed in tradition accept great differences of rank and authority; but when structures of conventional inequality are broken down and there are no longer conventional superiors, there can only be social equals. So long as the decline of authoritarian institutions does not lead to complete atomization and crush all capacity for indignation and guilt, there remains a network of social relationships which, in the absence of any relevant superiorities, includes equality. Existing social relationships thus warrant the demand by each for the respect of all, and the claim that each person is equally worthy of consideration has the status of a factual statement.

If human beings are in fact equal then there are severe restrictions upon the dimension of freedom which is defined by the logical possibility of wanting anything whatever. When critics of liberalism characterize such freedom as caprice and unrestraint, they indicate that certain interests will not stand up to examination in the light of reality. If there are facts which justify moral attitudes and determine which things are worthy of such attitudes then we are no more free to determine what is valuable than we are free to decide what to believe about empirical reality. In particular the facts may render unjustifiable the estrangement from self and others that any consistent formalist view must permit. Such estrangement will doubtless occur, but its existence will not represent a consistent though unfortunate expression of freedom; rather it will reflect ignorance of an aspect of reality—the nature of persons. The theoretical solution to the problem of alienation is then clear: substitute factual for formal criteria of evaluation.

Since such a substitution constitutes a radical change in the theory of value upon which the interpretation of objective rationality is based, it represents a profound difference in views. Even the formalist must acknowledge that the factual interpretation defines a conception of individuals stronger than any possible within his account. In particular, the factual account says that if persons properly act in accordance with facts of human nature and existence we cannot simply be followers of self-devised, predetermined plans of life. The strength of the second conception of persons is indicated, moreover, not only by the resistance of objective observers to forms of dissociation but also by the way in which this conception is defended. On both views the existence of rational attitudes gives structure to the self; both accounts speak of attitudes having reasons which locate us in relation to future times and other persons. As noted above, however, so long as such reasons are thought to be constituted by formal principles operating upon whatever desires one has, conceptions of persons expressed by such principles are presuppositions of our attitudes and are not confirmable by reasons we have for them. But on a factual account of objective reasons the conception of persons characteristic

of prudence and respect can be regarded as confirmed. The conviction of human equality sustains the attitude of respect, but the fact of equality shows that this conception is correct. The factual account lacks the circularity of the formalist one.

The theories differ in their understanding of the requirements of respect as well. Formalist views tend to provide modest defenses for significant human rights. On the assumption that all of us desire to live our own lives and that willing an end includes willing the means, formalist conceptions of moral objectivity can entail that we have "reasons to seek the social, economic, and political conditions which make such pursuits possible, not only for oneself but for others."<sup>14</sup> Since inequalities in such conditions impair one's ability to pursue one's goals, such reasons support material equality. Of course, they do not do so without qualification because of the pervasive element of competition in our civilization. In a competitive economy individuals have an objective reason to secure financial gains which overrides the claims of equality. The important point, however, is not the extent of equality required by this view of objective reason but its measure, which is material welfare. The measure employed by the factual view is quite different. It is the family of goods defined by moral attitudes and by others structurally analogous to them—such as fear, love, pity and pride.

Such attitudes include as essential parts both beliefs and desires (hence the alliance between reason and passion observed by Plato). The relevant belief, if correct, justifies the attitude. Thus a person who is afraid wants safety, and his fear is justified to the extent that the characteristic belief in the presence of danger is correct. But if the fear is justified so too is the desire constitutive of it. This explains the human need for security and distinguishes it from objects of the primitive desires which are not amenable to rational justification. Since it is the fact that one is in danger which justifies fear and the desire for security, those subjective states make valid claims only when there are objective perils, and the objectivity of peril establishes security as something we need.

We have needs such as security when the desires characteristic of our attitudes are justified, and the objects of those desires are what we need. Thus, pity is the desire to comfort beings we believe to be suffering unduly, so that pitiers who rightly so believe need to extend comfort to such sufferers. Likewise, one who rightly loves views his beloved as somehow excellent and justifiably wants to advance that person's aims, so that the well-being of the loved one is something needed by the lover. And feeling pride is justified by accomplishments which justify the desire for recognition and establish recognition as one of the things the agent needs.

These needs are not instrumental, since the reasons which justify the corresponding attitudes and desires do not comprise means to ends. One does

not want security in order to achieve freedom from fear, and one's desire for recognition must be understood in terms of the belief in accomplishment which sustains the attitude of pride, not in terms of some further end. This is the way to understand Marx's distinction between labor as a mere means to life and labor as the prime necessity of life.<sup>15</sup> All animals need to work in order to sustain their existence, but only beings whose achievements warrant recognition need work which is significant accomplishment.

The rational ends of recognition and security do not mark mankind as essentially vainglorious or pusillanimous, nor do they mean that human well-being requires inveterate cautiousness and public repute. What we need is the recognition which comes from genuine accomplishment; the good opinions of others do not alone constitute what is needed. Since, moreover, unwarranted recognition has nothing to do with matters worthy of pride, the need for recognition is coupled with the desire, warranted by one's limitations, not to be esteemed without reason. Humility no less than pride is a justifiable attitude. Similarly, courage is as justifiable as fear, since if the value of security is proven by danger, the value of risk is equally proven by the value of the thing to be gained thereby. Our rational attitudes are many, and all have a place in life. To elevate any of the needs they define into a paramount ideal of humanity or to denigrate others as unworthy of mankind is to misrepresent what we are.

The needs we understand in terms of various attitudes and emotions are objective in a sense far more important than are any instrumental necessities. Since they derive from desires which are justified by facts, they define a sense in which human striving should conform to a reality independent of it. Many of the great preoccupations of humanity refer to such noninstrumental necessities of life—danger to security, achievement to recognition, suffering to kindness, and, of course, equality to justice. Since the conviction of equality characterizes the attitude of respect, and since the fact of equality justifies the attitude, the desire to act justly which is characteristic of respect refers to the need to be just.

Understanding justice as a need of this kind explains the fact that rational respect for persons does not entail particular emphasis upon material equality. Marx criticized the "vulgar socialism" which presents "socialism as turning principally on distribution."<sup>16</sup> While one reason for his indifference to problems of distribution is an assumption of abundance in socialist society, more basic is the relative unimportance of materialistic motivations—the satisfaction of wants which, because unjustifiable, do not contribute to our essential being. Given the greater importance of rational ends, questions of equality apply basically to justifiable desires and to considerations of material welfare primarily as conditions of the former. In short, human equality warrants the desire to be just, and justice requires the equal satisfac-

tion of rational ends rather than any particular pattern in the distribution of things.

To recognize that human beings are equal is to see that respect for persons is warranted and to desire that everyone's needs be equally met. When they are not met and social arrangements favor some over others the structure of human relations is distorted and one rightly feels dissatisfied. A satisfying and realistic ordering of human affairs is one in which social structures reflect the objective equality of human beings. Once factual rather than formal standards of objective reason are identified we can recognize that the achievement of a human environment requires moving beyond a morality of wants to a morality of needs and to a conception of human nature defined not by individual life-plans but by the social relationships and structure of needs within which such plans are made.

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#### NOTES

1. Plato, *The Republic*, F. M. Cornford, ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941) p. 138.
2. Cf. Robert Nozick's response to Bernard Williams's "The Idea of Equality" in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 233–34.
3. Harry Jaffa, *The Conditions of Freedom* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975), p. 4.
4. Cf. Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), esp. pp. 92–127.
5. Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 381.
6. Cf. Evan Simpson, "Socialist Justice," *Ethics*, 87 (1976): 1–17.
7. Thus R. M. Hare: "It is, indeed, in the logical possibility of wanting *anything* (neutrally described) that the 'freedom' which is alluded to in my title essentially consists." *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 110.
8. Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 82 and p. 88.
9. See Nagel, p. 129 and p. 134. See also John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," in P. Laslett and W. C. Runciman, *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, series 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 147–48.
10. Nozick, p. 34.
11. Hence Nozick rejects Nagel's principles of impersonality and universality, pp. 278–79.
12. Nagel, p. 100.

13. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 62.
14. Nagel, p. 130.
15. Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 10.
16. Marx, p. 11.

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