Objective Realities and Subjective Perceptions: A Multi-level Analysis of Immigration Attitudes in Canada

by
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A Thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts Political Science

Department of Political Science
Memorial University of Newfoundland

January 2025

St. John's Newfoundland and Labrador

Abstract

Despite Canada's long-standing reputation for welcoming immigrants and strong public support for multiculturalism, increasing polarization exists among Canadians regarding acceptable immigration levels, especially with recent record-high admissions. While existing Canadian scholarship has focused on national trends and macroeconomic factors, my thesis examined the interplay of regional objective economic conditions and subjective national and personal economic perceptions in shaping Canadians' immigration attitudes.

Using data from the 2021 Canadian Election Study, the analysis showed that negative provincial economic performance (notably lower GDP growth rates) and negative perceptions of national and personal economic conditions were associated with less favorable views on immigration in Canada. Perceived job threats from immigrants also emerged as a strong predictor of these negative attitudes.

These findings are consistent with the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective and the Labor Market Competition Theory. While the results related to objective economic markers align with existing research, this thesis contributes to the literature by highlighting the significant role of subjective economic perceptions in shaping Canadians' immigration views.

***Keywords*:** Immigration attitudes, Canada, public opinion, economic perceptions, Regional economics, Sociotropic Threats, Labor Market Competition, Canadian Election Study, Quantitative analysis, GDP, Unemployment

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the support I have received over the course of writing my thesis. First, I would like to thank the Memorial University of Newfoundland School of Graduate Studies for their generous financial support. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to explore my research question at Memorial University and would not have been able to do so without the funding provided.

Second, I would like to express my utmost appreciation for my supervisor, Prof. Scott Matthews. His esteemed guidance and support, particularly in statistical analysis and interpretations, enabled me to complete this project. I am incredibly thankful for his invaluable feedback and the generous amount of time he dedicated to supporting my work. His mentorship not only guided me through this thesis but also fostered my growth as an early researcher.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their unfailing support and encouragement throughout the process. Thank you to everyone. I could not have succeeded without all of you.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

For the past 50 years, Canada has established a global reputation for welcoming immigrants and valuing multiculturalism. As of 2022, the country is home to 8.3 million immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2022a). This makes it one of the leading destinations for immigrants in the advanced world and highlights ongoing commitment to welcoming newcomers (Triadafilopoulos, 2021, 2022). The country's ability to accept a significant number of immigrants each year is attributed to its unique cultural heritage, which values diversity as an integral part of Canadian identity (Reitz, 2014; Russell, 2017; Winter, 2014). Despite this strong foundation of multiculturalism, Canada's prolonged exposure to diverse groups of immigrants has led to a wide range of public opinion toward immigration.

Most Canadian scholars find that, at large, Canada's support for immigration is high, relative to its comparators (Banting & Soroka, 2020; Banting, 2010; Besco, 2021; Soroka & Roberton, 2010; Triadafilopoulos, 2021; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011). These studies also note that this support has grown significantly over the past decades. At the same time, others report a growing division among native-born Canadians regarding what is deemed an appropriate level of immigration in society (Bilodeau et al., 2012; Donnelly, 2017, 2021). This evolving context signals an emerging divide in public opinion on desired immigration levels in the country, as exists elsewhere in advanced democracies.

Across all advanced democracies, changes in public attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic diversity have been recognized as an influential factor in shaping immigration rules and political priorities (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Thielemann and Schade, 2016). Studies find that these attitudinal changes also affect the real-life experiences of immigrants and their integration (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Morgan, 2017; Safdar et al., 2023). Being one of the leading hosts and providers of citizenship to immigrants among OECD countries in 2022 (OECD, 2023), is Canada an exception in this regard?

Some studies find Canada to be an exception to this trend, given its long-standing commitment to multiculturalism and elite consensus on that policy approach (Triadafilopoulos, 2021). The emerging polarization in Canadians' immigration views presents a different picture, however. For instance, Canada recently welcomed a record number of 431,645 immigrants in a single year (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2023). Simultaneously, a 2023 Environics Institute Survey shows a sharp rise (44%) in Canadians who believe there are too many immigrants (Neuman, 2023). This division is particularly notable, given the record number of immigrants welcomed recently.

Given this context, a plethora of scholarly work has examined almost every aspect of immigration attitudes in the Canadian context. Prominent Canada-specific studies widely acknowledge the role of macroeconomic factors, such as GDP and unemployment rates, in shaping immigration attitudes (Banting & Soroka, 2020; Gravelle, 2018; Harell et al., 2012; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2008). These studies also seem to concur that Canadians' attitudes toward immigration are influenced by the same broader factors, e.g., economic considerations, as elsewhere in the advanced world.

However, almost all Canadian scholarship either focuses on national-level trends or cross-country comparisons, overlooking the details of regional variations in immigration attitudes. Additionally, most of this scholarship has paid relatively little attention to the complex interplay between objective regional economic conditions and subjective national and personal economic perceptions in shaping Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. In this context, the central question motivating my thesis is: How do objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants?

With this question in mind, my thesis analyzes the often overlooked role of subjective economic perceptions, recognizing that individuals' financial fears, coupled with regional and

national economic conditions, can interact to sway immigration attitudes significantly. Through this analysis, this thesis hopes to contribute to the existing literature by examining how objective and subjective economic factors interact to influence Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants across different provinces and at the national level in 2021.

The remainder of this chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis. It starts by providing a potential justification for the focus of this study and ends with a listing of the limitations of the research and suggested directions for future research.

1.1. Justifying the study's focus

Regarded as "small worlds," studies have shown that Canada's regions are not only diverse with unique contexts but are markedly distinguished by their distinct histories, cultures, and economic situations, among others (Bilodeau et al., 2012). The country's immigration backdrop has experienced significant changes over the recent decade. The number of total immigrants in Canada, for example, has risen from 6.8 million in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2011) to over 8.3 million by 2022 (Statistics Canada, 2022). This reflects not just an increase in absolute numbers but a potential shift in the social and economic impact of immigration across all regions.

These changes in immigration patterns have coincided with shifts in Canada's immigration policy setting. The country has witnessed a considerable decentralization of immigration authority to provinces in recent decades (Paquet, 2014; Paquet, 2019). This decentralization, exemplified through initiatives like the Provincial Nominee Programs, allows regions to tailor immigration policies to their specific economic needs and demographic challenges (Baglay, 2012). Furthermore, the economic diversification across provinces, with different levels of reliance on sectors like technology, natural resources, and manufacturing (Bossé, 2023), can influence social perceptions of the value immigrants bring to a particular

region. These aspects necessitate examining how regional economic realities and national economic perceptions influence Canadians' views on immigration.

Beyond economic considerations, the different historical and cultural contexts of Canadian provinces, including varying levels of exposure to and interaction with immigrants, could play a pivotal role in shaping individuals' immigration attitudes (Bilodeau et al., 2012). Therefore, analyzing the interplay between regional economic conditions and immigration attitudes can provide valuable insights into the dynamics of public opinion. Simultaneously, considering national-level economic perceptions is essential to understand how broader economic trends and fears shape Canadians' views on immigration.

1.2. Theorizing the Relationship

My thesis draws on three prominent theoretical models to explore the relationship between objective economic conditions, subjective economic perceptions, and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. These models help to understand how these aspects interact to shape public opinion on immigration in Canada.

The Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective posits that people's views on immigration are shaped by their feelings about immigrants' effects on the overall economy. When individuals perceive the economy as struggling, they may become more concerned about competition for jobs and limited resources, leading them to ask for reduced immigration levels. Similarly, the Fiscal Burden hypothesis and Welfare Chauvinism suggest that native-born individuals may oppose immigration due to concerns about the potential strain immigrants place on public finances and social programs. In particular, the former focuses on the belief that immigrants may use more public services than they contribute to taxes. In contrast, the latter posits that welfare services should be limited to native-born citizens.

Relatedly, the Labor Market Competition Theory suggests that native-born citizens may perceive immigrants as direct competitors in the labor market, leading to fears of job

displacement and wage depression. These concerns may be stronger among lower-skilled native-born workers who feel more directly threatened by job competition from immigrant labor. These models collectively informed my hypotheses and provided a framework for understanding the complex relationships examined in this study.

1.3. My thesis statement

Given the evolving context of Canadian public opinion on immigration and drawing on the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective and Labor Market Competition Theory, I hypothesize that objective regional economic conditions and subjective national and personal economic perceptions will be positively associated with Canadians' attitudes toward immigration, with concerns about job market competition playing a particularly salient role. Put differently, when conditions or perceptions are poor, attitudes toward immigration should be relatively more negative.

1.4. Data and Methods

I relied on data from the 2021 Canadian Election Study (CES) to investigate the relationship between objective economic conditions, subjective economic perceptions, and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants in 2021. The CES is a comprehensive survey that captures Canadians' views on various topics, including immigration. The survey was conducted in two waves – during and after the Canadian federal election in 2021 – and included Canadian citizens or permanent residents aged 18 or older nationwide. Permanent residents, however, were excluded from answering voting-related questions. My analysis focused on the following key variables derived from the CES dataset:

- Views toward immigrants: This variable measured Canadians' views on the desired level of immigration to the country in 2021.
- Immigrant job-threat perceptions: This variable captured CES respondents' perceptions of whether immigrants take jobs away from other Canadians.

- National economic perceptions: This variable assessed CES participants' views on the performance of the Canadian economy in 2020.
- Personal financial perceptions: This variable evaluated Canadians' valuation of their personal financial circumstances in 2020.
- Annual provincial real GDP growth rates: Using data from Statistics Canada, this variable categorized Canadian provinces based on their real GDP growth rates in 2021.
- Provincial annual unemployment rates: This variable classified provinces according to their seasonally adjusted annual unemployment rates in 2021, using data from Statistics Canada.
- Control variables such as age, gender, education, income, employment status, region of residence, and party affiliations are also included in the analysis to account for potential confounding factors.

I employed a quantitative analysis using crosstabulations to examine the relationships between the variables listed above. All variables were recoded to meet the analytical requirements of crosstabulation and to simplify my analysis outputs. These statistical techniques are well-suited for exploring associations between categorical and ordinal variables. The strength and direction of the observed relationships were evaluated using Gamma statistics, and statistical significance was assessed using the Chi-Square test of independence. Lastly, my analysis is driven by the assumption of the 'recursive model of causation,' where one factor in the hypothesized associations influences another only in a single direction. However, the thesis acknowledges the potential for reciprocal causation in the real world, which is a key limitation of the causal deductions one can draw from the crosstabulation analysis.

1.5. Thesis Hypotheses

My thesis was guided by five hypotheses designed to explore the relationship between regional objective economic conditions, subjective national and personal economic perceptions, and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. The hypotheses are as follows:

1. Canadians living in provinces with (a) lower real annual GDP growth and (b) higher unemployment rates in 2021 will be more likely to express the view that Canada should admit fewer immigrants.
2. People who perceive that (a) Canada's economy has gotten worse over the past year and/or who perceive their (b) personal financial situation has gotten worse will hold more negative views toward immigrants.
3. People who perceive that immigrants take jobs away from Canadians will express a greater desire for Canada to admit fewer immigrants.
4. Canadians with more negative (a) national and (b) personal economic perceptions will perceive greater job market threats from immigrants.
5. Canadians residing in provinces with (a) higher annual real GDP growth level(s) and (b) lower unemployment level(s) will have more positive perceptions of (c) the national economy and (d) personal financial situations compared to those in provinces with lower GDP growth levels and higher unemployment rates.

1.6. Summary of Findings

The findings of my thesis are mostly consistent with the hypothesized relationships and have theoretical implications for understanding immigration attitudes in Canada. The crosstabulation analysis reveals that higher provincial GDP growth rates were generally linked to more positive views toward immigrants, while higher unemployment rates were weakly associated with less favorable views. Furthermore, Canadians' perceptions of the national

economy and their personal economic situations were strongly related to their views on immigration, with negative perceptions leading to less favorable views.

Additionally, respondents who perceived higher job threats from immigrants were significantly more likely to express negative views toward immigration and desire reduced immigration levels. This association was particularly strong and remained statistically significant after controlling for various potential control variables. All of the associations remained statistically significant with varying strength levels even after controlling for various potential confounding variables, including gender, income brackets, employment status, education levels, party affiliation, region, and age groups.

Overall, the results largely support the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective, which suggests that individuals' views on immigration are shaped by their perceptions of immigrants' effect on the overall economy rather than just their personal finances. The findings also support the Labor Market Competition Theory, which posits that people may view immigrants as competitors in the labor market, leading to fears of job displacement and wage depression.

1.7. Limitations and Future Research

This thesis has several limitations that should be acknowledged. The use of crosstabulation analysis as the main analytical approach, while appropriate for examining bivariate relationships, limits the ability to draw definitive conclusions about causal relationships found in this research. Future research could use more advanced statistical techniques, like regression analysis, to explore causal relationships in the context of stronger statistical control. Additionally, future research could explore the interplay between Canadians' perceptions of the national economy and their personal finances, as well as the influence of cultural values and national identity on immigration attitudes.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The social and economic effects of immigrants on the countries they move to have been subject to extensive empirical scrutiny. Scholars from various fields have proposed a range of reasons behind complex and often differing views on immigration within advanced democracies (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). This research shows that immigration attitudes are dynamic, differing across time, countries, and context, and are additionally shaped by factors such as a given country's immigration policies, political situation, and historical experiences.

Given this complexity, my thesis explores the factors swaying Canadians' attitudes towards immigrants. I focus particularly on how real-world economic conditions and personal and national economic perceptions, as well as concerns about job competition, shape these views. In view of this focus, the literature review below largely focuses on studies involving quantitative methods from across the world. It also includes quantitative studies specifically examining Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants wherever available too.

While focusing on quantitative studies on the relationship between the economy and immigration attitudes, I also include articles on non-economic aspects to recognize my topic's complexity. These studies, particularly in section 2.2.3, offer valuable context and insights that overlap with the economic aspects analyzed here. Thus, non-economic perspectives enrich the broader discussion on immigration attitudes. Despite the inclusion of these standpoints, it is worth acknowledging here that this literature review is centered on the economic determinants of immigration attitudes.

Within the broader theme of 'economic determinants,' previous scholarship mostly focuses on economic factors that can shape native-born populations' attitudes toward

immigrants. Empirical studies, in this context, suggest that economic concerns regarding immigrants/immigration operate at two levels: micro and macro (Banting & Soroka, 2020).

At the micro level, these concerns focus on how individuals perceive immigrants impacting their own financial well-being. The hypothesis is that people may oppose immigration if they believe it leads to fewer job opportunities, competition for limited services, or higher taxes. Similarly, at the macro level, the literature reviewed looks at how immigration affects the broader economy, especially its impact on growth and unemployment. It offers mixed findings on these macro-level impacts detailed in section 2.2.1. In essence, while micro-level concerns focus on the perceived impact of immigrants or immigration on individuals' financial well-being, macro-level concerns extend to the perceived effects on the national economy of a receiving country as a whole.

Building on the above theoretical lenses, this chapter examines the economic determinants of immigration attitudes in greater detail. It begins by delving into macro-level perspectives on these determinants of immigration attitudes (Section 2.2). This exploration includes the influence of sociotropic economic threats, the interplay between objective economic conditions and subjective perceptions, cultural threat perceptions, and a focused discussion of Canadian perspectives on the impact of macroeconomic factors. The chapter then transitions to a micro-level perspective, examining how immigration's perceived economic impact on native-born individuals, particularly concerning labor market competition and fiscal concerns, shapes their attitudes (Section 2.3). This section also includes a review of Canadian research on perceived labor market competition. Finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of the key findings and a discussion of their implications for future research (Section 2.4).

2.2. Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration: The Economic Determinants

Following the literature reviewed, this section divides the economic determinants of immigration attitudes into two sub-themes: economic self-interests (micro-level) and macroeconomic impacts (macro-level). The following sections will delve into each of these sub-themes. I will begin with a detailed exploration of the macro-level impacts of immigration, drawing on studies from around the world and integrating Canada-specific research wherever available.

2.2.1. Macro-level Impacts: The Sociotropic Economic Threats

Broadly termed as "sociotropic economic threat" in the literature, the conception has gained much scholarly attention in the advanced world. It theorizes that native-born citizens are much more concerned about how immigration affects the overall national economy than its direct impact on their personal welfare (Banting & Soroka, 2020, p. 824). So, worsening national economic conditions could result in stronger hostility towards immigrants among the native-born population, even among those who do not feel their personal material welfare is threatened by immigration. The expectation is that, during macroeconomic downturns, the increased number of unemployed individuals and those fearing unemployment leads to less welcoming attitudes toward immigrants, who are perceived as competitors for jobs and resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Fussell, 2014).

In this regard, one of the classic studies comes from Quillian (1995). Using survey data from the 1988 Eurobarometer survey for twelve European countries, he found that a one percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate was associated with a 0.22 increase in anti-immigrant prejudice (on a scale of 0 to 1), as shown in Table 1 of his study (Quillian, 1995, p. 598). Similarly, using longitudinal data from the European Social Survey (2002-2017), Heizmann and Huth (2021, pp. 68, 69) investigated the relationship between

macroeconomic conditions and the perception of immigrants as an economic threat in 26 European countries. The study found that a 1% increase in the national unemployment rate led to a 1.04-point increase in the perceived economic threat of immigrants, while a 1% increase in GDP per capita led to a 1.787-point decrease in this perceived threat.

Moreover, Ruist (2016) also utilized longitudinal data from the European Social Survey (2002-2012) to assess the link between economic growth and immigration attitudes in 23 European states. The paper largely measured attitudes to immigration by using survey questions that asked people about their overall perception of whether immigration was good or bad for the country. The article found that a one standard deviation increase in real GDP per capita growth rate led to a 0.20 standard deviation shift towards more positive attitudes in the sample countries (p.130).

These studies, along with considerable other empirical evidence from across the Western world, confirm that prejudice, antagonism, and negative views towards immigrants are closely tied to a given country's overall macroeconomic conditions (Billiet et al., 2014; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013; Fussell, 2014; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017; Hopkins, 2010; Kuntz et al., 2017; Pichler, 2010; Semyonov et al., 2008; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

Relatedly, the rate and perceived flow of immigrants is also linked with how native-born people view immigrants (Alesina et al., 2022; Blinder, 2015; Semyonov et al., 2008). Recent research confirms that a stable immigrant population is less likely to worry native-born individuals. A sudden surge in immigration numbers, however, can lead to more negative views of immigrants (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998, 2008; Dražanová & Gonnot, 2023), as does perceptions that immigrants inversely affect the national economy when perceived less desirable in economic terms, such as job prospects.

While all of these studies relying on observational data have identified correlations between economic conditions and immigration attitudes, Solodoch's (2021) experimental study offers more compelling evidence for a causal relationship. The author shows that Dutch citizens' 'sociotropic concerns' are the key source of their immigration attitudes. In his experiment, Solodoch (2021) presented Dutch citizens with hypothetical profiles of prospective immigrants, varying in attributes such as job prospects, cultural familiarity, and country of origin. When asked to rate the admissibility of these individuals, participants were 38 percentage points less likely to admit those perceived as having 'no job prospects' compared to those with clear employment prospects (Solodoch, 2021, p.1020). The experiment also included an ingroup treatment where respondents were presented with an applicant from their own country of origin. This allowed the researcher to examine the role of ingroup bias in immigration attitudes. Though the studies cited here highlight a dynamic link between economic realities and immigration attitudes, this relationship is further complicated by the fact that native-born individuals' perceptions of the economy may not always align with real-word economic realities. The following section will probe into this complexity by looking at the impact of subjective perceptions in forming immigration attitudes.

2.2.2. The Link Between Objective Economic Conditions and Subjective Economic Perceptions

The overall economic situation in a province, especially factors like GDP growth and unemployment rate, strongly influences how people there view both the national economy and their own finances. Literature suggests that people living in areas with strong economies and low unemployment rates tend to have a more positive outlook on the overall economy (Diener et al., 2013; Easterlin et al., 2010). To illustrate, Chugaiev (2023, p. 102), in an investigation of 43 economies between 2002 and 2021 using World Development Indicators data from the World Bank, found that a one percentage point increase in GDP per capita growth can lead to

a 0.6 to 1.4 percentage point increase in the share of people who held a positive view of their national economy. The author also reports that a similar increase in the unemployment rate can decrease this share by 0.4 to 1.1 percentage points (Chugaiev, 2023, p. 102). The connection between real and perceived economic conditions is further supported by Lee et al. (2023), who, using World Values Survey data from 60 countries, observed that higher unemployment rates are associated with lower financial satisfaction scores globally.

Furthermore, economic instability with slow growth levels and high unemployment may also lead to anxiety and pessimism among people (French & Vigne, 2019; Koczan, 2022). It is important to note that anxiety, pessimism, and related feelings are subjective, as the authors also pointed out, so people might feel worse off even if their actual income has not changed.

Research in Canada further confirms the influence of economic conditions on individuals' perceptions. For example, Anderson (2020) found that changes in national unemployment rates significantly affect how Canadians view the national economy, suggesting they are sensitive to economic shifts. Furthering this, Anderson and Roy (2011) also showed that even local unemployment rates can impact people's views of the national economy, highlighting the importance of regional economic conditions.

While it is clear that the economy affects individuals' economic perceptions, this impact is not the same for everyone. How real-world economic changes affect individuals' financial satisfaction can vary based on factors like age, gender, income, and education (Fraile & Pardos-Prado, 2014; Lee et al., 2023). Moreover, individual characteristics like political affiliations and knowledge also play a role in how people perceive the economy (Anderson, 2020; Duch & Palmer, 2002). This highlights the need to consider individual circumstances when studying the link between the economy and citizens' feelings about it.

Further emphasizing the importance of subjective feelings, Polacko et al. (2024) highlight the importance of subjective economic insecurity in shaping political attitudes, particularly

towards immigration in Canada. They argue and provide evidence of the idea that self-reported feelings of insecurity may better capture the underlying calculation of risk and fear related to economic conditions than objective measures. This suggests that it is not just the actual economic conditions but also individuals' perceptions of their economic well-being and future prospects that can influence their views on immigration.

Research with Canadian social workers further highlights that negative attitudes toward immigrants can be influenced by factors beyond economic conditions. For instance, Bhuyan et al. (2024) recently found that social workers who identified as conservative or had limited contact with immigrants were more likely to perceive non-status immigrants as potential criminal threats or burdens on the healthcare system. This suggests that the interplay between economic perceptions and immigration attitudes can be further moderated by individuals' political ideologies and daily experiences.

Finally, though economic conditions undoubtedly influence perceptions, as detailed in the section above, it is crucial to recognize that these perceptions are not only shaped by objective economic indicators and subjective feelings. The literature suggests that cultural anxieties can intertwine with economic concerns, particularly during periods of economic hardship (McLaren & Johnson, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Semyonov et al., 2008). When native-born people experience financial insecurity or perceive a decline in the national economy, they may be more prone to perceiving immigrants as a threat to their cultural identity and social cohesion (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 2015). This interplay, detailed in the next section, can lead to more negative attitudes towards immigrants, even in the absence of personal economic troubles.

2.2.3. Cultural Threat and Attitudes Toward Immigrants

In addition to economic aspects influencing individuals' perceptions, studies suggest that cultural concerns can also play an important role in shaping immigration attitudes. The concept

of ‘cultural threat’ posits that native-born individuals may worry that an influx of immigrants with differing cultural backgrounds could negatively impact their cultural identity and social cohesion (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). This perceived threat to cultural integrity can interact with economic concerns, particularly during times of economic uncertainty, leading to more negative views of immigrants and their being regarded as competitors for resources and opportunities (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004).

The Social Identity Theory, developed by Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel and Turner (2001), provides a theoretical lens for understanding this phenomenon. The theory suggests that individuals categorize themselves and others into social groups, leading to an “us” versus “them” mentality. This categorization can influence how people perceive and evaluate members of out-groups, potentially leading to prejudice and bias. The literature reviewed suggests that cultural concerns can indeed be a remarkable determinant of people’s views toward immigration policy and immigrants themselves (Fussell, 2014).

It is, thus, no wonder why the idea of ‘cultural threat’ has gained significant scholarly attention, particularly in relation to the models of economic self-interest detailed in section 2.3.1. Empirical studies from across the developed world have supported the idea that cultural threat perceptions can indeed meaningfully shape attitudes toward immigrants. Among one of the earliest studies, McLaren and Johnson (2007), for example, utilizing the 2003 British Social Attitudes Survey, inspected the factors influencing anti-immigration views in Britain. They found that symbolic threats, particularly those related to fears about the loss of ‘British customs and traditions,’ were consequential predictors of negative attitudes toward immigration. Specifically, 54% of respondents agreed that it was impossible for people who do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British, signifying a strong concern about keeping cultural distinctiveness (p. 721).

In another study, Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015) investigated the impacts of perceived cultural and material threats on immigration attitudes across 20 European countries using data from the 2002 European Social Survey. Using multilevel structural equation modeling, they found that perceived cultural threat significantly increased preferences for immigrants of the same race and hostility towards immigrants from outside the EU, particularly those from poorer countries.

These studies, along with numerous other observational studies, collectively suggest that individuals who perceive a significant cultural threat from immigrants are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward them and support restrictive immigration policies (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2012; Brader et al., 2008; Card et al., 2012; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Davidov et al., 2008; de Vries et al., 2013; Lahav, 2004; Mangum, 2019; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Scheepers et al., 2002; Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Furthermore, the intensity of these cultural threat feelings can be particularly noticeable among older individuals, who might be more resistant to cultural change (Crocetti et al., 2021; Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008; Kustov et al., 2021). Empirical studies show that attitudes toward immigrants tend to remain relatively stable throughout adulthood, suggesting that early-life socialization and generational experiences play a crucial role in shaping these attitudes (Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019, 2023; Visser & Krosnick, 1998).

Beyond the observational research, experimental studies have further strengthened the evidence of a causal link between cultural threat perceptions and negative attitudes toward immigrants (Brader et al., 2008; Newman et al., 2012). By directing exposure to information about cultural differences or cues related to cultural threats, these studies have shown that cultural threat creates a stronger anti-immigrant response than an experimental stimulation of economic threats (Sniderman et al., 2004). While offering a more subtle understanding of the

complex link between cultural concerns and immigration attitudes, the experimental evidence has supplemented the results of observational studies discussed above.

2.2.3.1. Canadian Perspectives on Cultural Threat and Its Limitations

In the Canadian context, Gravelle (2018) and Soroka and Roberton (2010) found that the perception of cultural threat, particularly the belief that immigrants do not adopt Canadian values, is a significant predictor of 'restrictionist' attitudes toward immigration and less support for accepting refugees. This is also shown in the study of Banting & Soroka (2020, p. 832), who, using Environics Focus Canada surveys for the last three decades, found that the "concerns about adopting Canadian values" were negatively correlated with the support for immigration in Canada.

The manifestation of cultural threat concerns can vary across regions, however, as not all Canadians are alike. In Quebec, for instance, concerns about the preservation of the French language and culture have been linked to stricter views on immigration (Harell et al., 2012; Lambert & Curtis, 1983; Turgeon & Bilodeau, 2014). Bilodeau et al. (2020, p. 38), for example, found a positive relationship between Quebecers' attachment to their province and their support for limits on minority religious symbols, partially highlighting a link between cultural concerns and views on immigration. . Further, this suggests that concerns about cultural integration and the potential impact of immigration on regional or linguistic identities remain important factors swaying public opinion on immigration in Canada, which often interacts with economic concerns to shape overall attitudes.

It is important to report that the cultural threat hypothesis has its limitations, however. Some scholars argue that it is challenging to separate cultural fears from economic concerns, as they often intertwine and influence attitudes toward immigrants in complex ways (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; McLaren, 2002; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004). Moreover, many studies on cultural threat rely on self-reported data, which can be

subject to 'social desirability' bias and may not fully capture the causal motivations behind attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

2.2.4. Canadian Perspectives: The Impact of Macroeconomic Factors

Canada-specific studies align broadly with global trends and confirm that overall economic conditions strongly influence Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. More specifically, empirical studies find that macroeconomic indicators are key factors in explaining the drivers of Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. These indicators include unemployment rates, GDP, and immigration rates (Harell et al., 2012; Palmer, 1996; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes et al., 2008). To illustrate, Banting and Soroka (2020, p. 829) found that increases in unemployment were associated with reduced support for immigration in Canada. Moreover, their study also showed that the belief in the economic benefits of immigration was positively correlated with support for immigration (p. 832).

Furthermore, provincial-level analysis of macroeconomic determinants within Canada also aligns with the global trend observed specifically for unemployment rates. This is documented in a study by Bilodeau et al. (2012) found a statistically significant difference in attitudes toward immigrants between provinces with high and low unemployment rates. Specifically, the study found a 7-point difference in the desire to reduce immigration between provinces with the highest and lowest unemployment, with those in high-unemployment provinces showed a preference for reduced immigration ranging from 10.9% to 18.4% (p. 594).

These Canadian findings align with the economic perspective of the Labor Market Competition Hypothesis, which is discussed later in section 2.3.1. This hypothesis suggests that people's feelings about immigration often change depending on how well the economy is doing. When times are good, support for immigration goes up. But when there is an economic crisis, support tends to drop, sometimes quite a bit (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Esipova et al., 2015; Ruist, 2016; Stevenson, 2001). In Canada, similar trends are documented by Esses

et al. (2021) and Newbold et al. (2021). Collectively, these findings suggest that Canadians' economic perceptions are not formed in a vacuum but are swayed by both national and local economic realities.

2.2.5. Debates and Limitations of Macroeconomic Economic Explanations

Despite enjoying relatively higher empirical support than research on individual determinants of attitudes toward immigrants (section 2.3 below), the findings of studies concerned with the macroeconomic impacts of immigration are not without controversy. Quillian's (1995) pioneering analysis reported above, for example, was soon followed by various contributions (e.g., Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Sides and Citrin, 2007). The findings from this later research, however, present a mix of statistically significant outcomes; some align with the theoretical expectation that a given country's overall macroeconomic conditions drive what its citizens think about immigrants, while others contradict the idea. Semyonov et al. (2006), for instance, noticed that in 1988, a higher GDP per capita was unexpectedly linked to more negative attitudes toward immigration. Conversely, the later studies by Semyonov et al. (2008) and Schneider (2008) showed that higher GDP per capita indeed correlated with less negative, more theoretically expected attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (i.e., good economic times shape good public perceptions of immigration).

In a related study, Meuleman et al. (2009) examined the evolution of immigration attitudes from 2002 to 2007 across 17 European states. The authors found that rises in unemployment correlate with rising demands for anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies. The study, however, did not find evidence of any effect of changes in GDP per capita on attitudes. Similarly, one of the earlier analyses by Sides and Citrin (2007) also confirmed that variation across states and the predictors of anti-immigrant views are unrelated to contextual factors, such as the overall state of a country's economy. Given these inconsistencies, some

scholars, such as Ruist (2016), point out that many of the statistical estimates reported in the studies exploring the macroeconomic impacts of immigrants do not consistently reach statistical significance in any direction as observed. Moreover, a majority of studies conducted in this area are cross-sectional, which, for many experts, limits their explanatory power and leaves room for many unanswered questions (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Meuleman et al., 2018).

In view of the literature discussed above, its limitations, and to further explore the complex relationship between economic conditions and attitudes towards immigrants in Canada, the present study hypothesizes that:

> H-1: Canadians living in provinces with (a) lower real annual GDP growth and (b) higher unemployment rates in 2021 will be more likely to express the view that Canada should admit fewer immigrants.
>
> H-2: People who perceive that (a) Canada's economy has gotten worse over the past year and/or who perceive their (b) personal financial situation has gotten worse will hold more negative views toward immigrants.
>
> H-5: Canadians residing in provinces with (a) higher annual real GDP growth level(s) and (b) lower unemployment level(s) will have more positive perceptions of (c) the national economy and (d) their personal financial situation compared to those in provinces with lower GDP growth levels and higher unemployment rates.

To fully support my hypotheses and appreciate the intellectual diversity of previous literature on factors driving native-born individuals' attitudes towards immigrants, the next section strives to detail what is known as the 'models of economic self-interest' of individuals' immigration attitudes in the industrialized world (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

2.3. Immigration and Native-Born Individuals: The Models of Economic Self-Interest

While empirical evidence mostly negates the direct economic threat immigrants pose to native-born citizens' financial well-being, perceived job competition, nonetheless, plays an influential role in forming public attitudes toward immigrants. Previous research examining how economic self-interest influences individuals' attitudes toward immigration typically focuses on two main areas: the competition in the job market (discussed below) and the perceived financial burden (outlined in section 2.3.2) that immigrants may place on the host country's limited resources.

2.3.1. Perceived Labor Market Competition and Attitudes Toward Immigrants

The literature on economic self-interest models is informed by the Labor Market Competition Theory, which, in turn, is concerned with the question of how immigrants affect the income of those born in the receiving country (Borjas, 1987). One of the foundational concepts within this theory is the 'Factor Proportion Model,' which has been extensively tested by empirical studies. This model suggests that the introduction of a significant number of either low-skilled or high-skilled labor through immigration reduces the wages of native-born workers with similar skill levels (Borjas, 1995, 1999), while potentially boosting the wages of the native-born workforce at the opposite end of the skill spectrum (Borjas, 1995).

Contrary to this theoretical expectation, researchers analyzing the labor-market effects of immigration empirically show that the hypothesized effects are minimal in most and positive in some cases. For instance, Dustmann et al. (2013, p. 160), in their research on the U.K. labor market, found that immigration between 1997 and 2005 had a small positive effect on the average wages of native-born workers, particularly those in higher wage percentiles. Their study showed that an inflow of immigrants equal to 1% of the native population led to a 0.6% increase in wages at the median and a 0.4% increase at the 90^{th} percentile of the wage

distribution. Ottaviano and Peri (2012, p. 190) also found that immigration to the United States from 1990 to 2006 had a small positive effect on the average wages of native-born workers. Moreover, Card (2005), using observational data from different US-based sources, further illustrates the minimal labor market effects. He found that from 1980 to 2000, the share of immigrants within the population of US cities doubled from 9.5% to 18%, while the overall fraction of high school dropouts in urban areas decreased from 24.3% to 17.7% (p. F130). There was also minimal correlation between the wage gap and the share of immigrant dropouts in the local labor market. His regression models further confirm no significant link (coefficient: 0.013, standard error: 0.003) between the relative supply of high school dropouts and their relative wages and a small negative impact (coefficient: 0.006, standard error: 0.009) of relative supply on relative employment (p. F310).

The findings from these and numerous other observational and experimental studies challenge the anticipated negative impacts of immigration on personal wages and employment opportunities of native-born workers (Citrin et al., 1995; Dustmann et al., 2005; Dustmann et al., 2008; Edo, 2019; Haaland & Roth, 2020; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Jeannet, 2018; Malhotra et al., 2013; Valentino et al., 2019).

In fact, the idea that native-born citizens fear over job market competition shapes their immigration preferences has been regarded as "a zombie theory" (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, p. 241). A most recent meta-analysis by Dražanová et al. (2024) covering 144 empirical studies concerned with individual-level factors, such as job competition, that are hypothesized to drive anti-immigrant attitudes seems to concur with this view of the literature. It further supports the idea that the hypothesized link between such factors and anti-immigrant attitudes is weak.

Experimental studies further cast doubt on the theoretical expectations of the labor market competition theory. Hainmueller et al. (2015) surveyed employees in 12 different industries

across the United States to consider the impact of job market fears on immigration attitudes. They found that support for both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration increased with the skill level of American workers, measured via their educational attainments. For instance, 32% of respondents with graduate degrees favored increased low-skilled immigration, compared to just 9% of those with less than a high school education (p.199). Similarly, 53% of survey participants with graduate degrees supported increased high-skilled immigration, while only 16% with less than a high school education did so (p.199). The study also found that the preference for high-skilled over low-skilled immigrants was consistent across all skill levels of American workers, further challenging the competition-based account of attitudes toward immigrants (p. 204).

It is important to recognize that some studies, although few in absolute numbers, do find statistically significant results that support the predictions of the 'Factor Proportion Model,' proposed under the theory Gerber et al. (2017, p. 163), for example, found that high-skilled immigrants were perceived as a greater labor market threat by low-skilled respondents compared to high-skilled respondents. Furthermore, after controlling for 'sociotropic economic' and cultural fears, the authors show that respondents who believed low-skilled immigration would negatively affect household finances were more likely to oppose increased immigration.

Relatedly, a surge in immigration rate, especially low-skilled immigrant workers, might also increase the perceived risk of direct job competition among native-born populations with low skill levels in states receiving immigrants, consequently increasing negative views toward immigration, as documented by previous studies (Gerber et al., 2017; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Margalit, 2019; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Schneider, 2008). These findings, nonetheless, are not even across the developed world receiving immigrants.

2.3.2. Canadian Research on Perceived Labor Market Competition

Research from Canada mirrors the broader debate surrounding the 'zombie theory' of labor market competition, with articles offering mixed perspectives on the link between immigration attitudes and concerns about job competition. The earliest Canadian study by Schissel et al. (1989), for instance, found a small but statistically meaningful positive effect of the unemployment rate on attitudes toward immigrants. Similarly, the study by Harell et al. (2012) also suggests that the perceived job status of immigrants does not strongly influence attitudes when it is known. On the other hand, Gravelle (2018) finds that the perception of job competition from immigrants remains a significant predictor of 'restrictionist' attitudes in Canada. This finding offers some evidence in favor of the 'zombie theory' by showing that perceived job competition, even if not rooted in reality, can still shape attitudes towards immigration. This raises the question of whether this perceived threat is the same across all segments of the native-born population or if factors like education or income play a moderating role.

The literature reviewed suggests that the intensity of perceived job threat actually differs across different segments of native-born citizens. Studies from Canada (Côté & Erickson, 2009; Schissel et al., 1989) and elsewhere suggest that people with higher education tend to be more open to immigrants, possibly because they are less worried about job competition or have more positive views about diversity (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Scheepers et al., 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Schneider, 2008; Velásquez & Eger, 2022). This highlights the role of education in shaping perceptions of immigration and emphasizes that worries about labor market impact may be more noticeable among those with lower levels of education.

2.3.3. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Empirical Evidence and Debates

Beyond labor market concerns, another way economic self-interest can shape attitudes toward immigration is through concerns about its fiscal impact. According to this perspective, the public is often guided by the idea that immigrants place an extra burden on the host country's welfare system (Blau, 1984; Borjas, 1994). Thus, in cases where the welfare system is redistributive, the fear of tax burden created by immigration would fall on native-born citizens, thereby initiating greater distress among locals and eventually fueling negative attitudes towards immigration (Dustmann et al., 2005; Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Rowthorn, 2008). Empirical research on this topic offers mixed findings, however.

One of the initial empirical studies assessing this perspective came from the U.S., where Blau (1984) used the Survey of Income and Education (1976) dataset offered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Blau, after accounting for age, education, and income, found that immigrant families were less likely to depend on welfare than native-born families. More precisely, the projected welfare payments for immigrant families headed by men were 59% lower than those for similar native-born families (p. 237). Similarly, the welfare payments for immigrant families headed by women were also 57% lower than those for comparable native-born families (p. 237).

Conversely, drawing on the British Social Attitudes Survey (1983-1990), Dustmann and Preston (2007, p. 16) showed that fears about the fiscal burden of immigrants, particularly on the welfare system, can shape negative attitudes, regardless of immigrants' actual welfare usage. They reported that 31% of respondents who believed that the 'unemployed' people in Britain have a good standard of living were opposed to more immigration. In contrast, only 15% of those who believed that the unemployed have a lousy standard of living were opposed This finding suggests that British citizens who perceived the unemployed as having a good standard of living may have been more sensitive to the idea of their taxes supporting the

unemployed through welfare programs, which contributed to the feeling that immigrants were unfairly benefiting from the system. This perception of unfairness could have fueled resentment and, consequently, opposition to immigration, even if immigrants' actual welfare usage was low.

More recently and from a wider geographical context, Christl et al. (2022), using the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (2015) data from the European Union, found that the average immigrant contributed 208 euros, while the average native-born citizen had a net fiscal impact of -476 euros (p. 376). When the paper accounted for age, however, it found that the net financial support of immigrants is lower than that of the native Europeans, with extra-EU immigrants contributing the least, -2,594 euros (p. 377).

Despite its simplicity, these varied findings highlight the ongoing debate surrounding the fiscal impact of immigrants. Many studies, in this regard, find negligible or no evidence of a significant fiscal impact (Boeri, 2010; Dustmann & Frattini, 2014; Hennessey & Hagen-Zanker, 2020; Tingley, 2013; Vargas-Silva, 2015). Moreover, the literature also suggests that various factors such as the host country's socio-economic conditions, the skill level of the immigrants themselves, and the ease of entering into the job market make it difficult to generalize immigrants' impact on public finances (Hennessey & Hagen-Zanker, 2020; Javdani, 2020). To illustrate, a meta-analysis of 72 studies conducted by Hennessey and Hagen-Zanker (2020), for instance, reached a conclusion that "the overall net fiscal impact of immigration is minimal; this holds true in both high, low, and middle-income countries" (p. 24).

In addition to the observational research, in one of the classic experimental studies in this stream of research, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) test the idea of fiscal burden in the U.S. The authors used a survey experiment where they randomly assigned respondents to two groups and presented each group with a question about immigration, with one group asked about high-skilled immigrants and the other about low-skilled immigrants. They hypothesized

that if native-born Americans' opposition to immigration is based on the financial cost of immigrants, then wealthier Americans in U.S. states with higher fiscal exposure should be 'more opposed' to lower-skilled immigrants compared to those in other states. However, their findings showed the opposite: wealthy Americans in states with greater financial exposure were more likely to 'support' immigration than those in other states. Canadian perspectives explored next are broadly in line with both the observation and experimental findings discussed above.

2.3.3.1. Immigration and Fiscal Burden: Some Insights from Canada

Whether immigrants financially affect Canada has also received attention from Canadian scholars. In an initial study, Baker and Benjamin (1995) explored this link using Statistics Canada-provided datasets for the 1986 and 1991 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 1986 and 1990 Household Income, Facilities and Equipment Surveys. Overall, their findings showed that immigrants were between 3 and 21 percentage points less likely to draw unemployment insurance benefits (p. 659), and between 6 and 17 percentage points less likely to receive social assistance (p. 665). Moreover, the findings also showed that immigrants were slightly more likely to receive rent subsidies when arriving in Canada but less likely to receive them as they integrated into the host society (p. 671). This finding of minimal financial impact was also supported by Javdani and Pendakur (2014), who analyzed the 2006 Canadian Census and found that the net fiscal transfer from Canadian-born individuals to immigrants was negligible, averaging around $500 per year per immigrant.

In contrast to these studies, a report by Grady and Grubel (2015) challenged these findings, claiming that the 'fiscal burden' of recent immigrants arriving in Canada was significant, amounting to $5,329 per person in 2010. They further asserted that "the total fiscal burden has risen from $16 to $24 billion in 2005, to $20 to $28 billion in 2010, to $27 to $35 billion in 2014" (p. 3).

The findings of these Fraser Institute authors were recently challenged by Kapsalis (2021), who concluded that:

> the fiscal burden is significant only in the case of refugees and sponsored immigrants. By contrast, economic immigrants actually pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits. This is an important finding because economic immigrants are selected primarily on economic grounds, whereas refugees and sponsored immigrants are accepted primarily on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (p. 170).

While furthering the trend in the broader literature, the findings of Kapsalis (2021) are also confirmed by recent OECD figures showing that immigrants' contributions are more than governments spend on them in the OECD countries (Matos, 2021). These different findings clearly show the importance of considering different immigrant classes and methodologies when assessing fiscal impact. More importantly, they raise the question of why negative attitudes toward immigrants are still persistent among native-born individuals despite the evidence pointing to the contrary. The idea of 'Welfare Chauvinism' offers some parts of the answers.

2.3.3.2. Welfare Chauvinism: Attitudes and Perceptions

As highlighted above, empirical evidence suggests a negligible fiscal impact of immigration. Instead, it is argued that the perception that immigrants' burden public finances is explained by the idea of 'Welfare Chauvinism.' According to Andersen and Bjørklund (1990), welfare chauvinism is the belief "that welfare services should be restricted to our own" (p. 212). In practice, this perspective manifests when immigrants are perceived to receive more or equal benefits from public services, such as education and healthcare, in proportion to the taxes they pay (Alesina et al., 2022; Esipova et al., 2015). The idea propagated here is that immigrants have not always been part of the tax system since the beginning, as native-born individuals most often are. So, this situation could be seen from native-born individuals'

perspective as adding stress to the public finances to which they contribute, possibly leading to higher taxes or reduced welfare or per capita government transfers for them (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). So, native-born people might perceive immigrants as a drain on the public welfare system and, therefore, may harbor negative views toward them.

The idea, initially introduced by Andersen and Bjørklund (1990), has received widespread scholarly attention since 1990 (Koning, 2022). Broadly, the literature shows that it is a complex phenomenon with diverse causes and consequences. In relation to immigration attitudes, empirical studies reveal that 'welfare chauvinism' can indeed manifest in discriminatory views and practices affecting immigrants. One of the first comparative studies, by Schmitt and Teney (2019), for example, examined immigrants' inclusion into general social protection across 27 rich democracies. Using comparative indicators from the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the study showed that there was a significant difference in the inclusiveness of access to social protection for immigrants across countries. More interestingly, it found that left-wing governments were particularly unwilling to open general social protection schemes to immigrants (p. 9).

Similarly, Careja et al. (2015) explored how immigrants were treated in the UK and Denmark. Their article found that immigrants not only had limited access to certain benefits, but the amount they received had also been reduced by legislation in two countries. They exemplify that Denmark has significantly reduced the amount of money given to recognized asylum seekers. The country had also introduced a limit on social aid and child allowance for such groups. Beyond these two studies, a significant body of knowledge shows a link between welfare chauvinism, discriminatory practices, and controlled access to social benefits for immigrants across the developed world (Crepaz & Damron, 2009; Eick & Larsen, 2021; Harris & Römer, 2023; Keskinen et al., 2016; Soysal, 2012).

Similar patterns of biases in social programs are evident in the Canadian context despite a general support for such programs. Although Banting (2010) found that Canadians support social programs regardless of ethnic diversity, a later study by Koning and Banting (2013) concluded that immigrants faced direct, indirect, and informal exclusion from five welfare programs they analyzed: pensions, health care, child benefits, employment insurance, and social assistance. Adding to this, Banting and Koning (2017) found that temporary immigrants also experience exclusion from various welfare programs, including unemployment benefits and social assistance, challenging the idea that Canada fully guarantees the social rights of all immigrants.

Notwithstanding the methods employed, the unit of analysis, and geographic focus, a vast majority of studies reveal a key finding: that economic self-interest models alone do not adequately explain the complex factors that shape anti-immigrant attitudes in the developed world (Dražanová et al., 2024). This aligns with broader research suggesting that factors beyond simple economic concerns, such as education and cultural values (discussed in previous sections), also play a significant role in shaping attitudes toward immigrants (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Ersanilli & Präg, 2021; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Jeannet, 2018).

In light of the literature discussed above, this study aims to test the following additional hypotheses:

> H-3: People across Canada who perceive that immigrants take jobs away from Canadians will express a greater desire for Canada to admit fewer immigrants.
>
> H-4: Canadians with more negative (a) national and (b) personal economic perceptions will perceive higher job market threats from immigrants than their counterparts.

Together with other three hypotheses outline in section 2.2, the study hopes to offer a detailed look at factors shaping immigration views in Canada.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on the 'economic determinants' of immigration attitudes in advanced democracies. The scholarship detailed above suggests that economic concerns about immigrants operate at two levels: macro and micro. The effects of macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth, unemployment rates, and immigration rates, are explained by 'Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective.' This model suggests that these macroeconomic factors can significantly influence public attitudes towards immigrants. Although there is a dynamic link between real-world economic conditions and immigration attitudes, the studies discussed above show that this relationship is not only complex but is also swayed by different aspects, including cultural fears and individual-level perceptions. Moreover, the literature also highlights that the sociotropic economic threat perspective alone does not satisfactorily explain anti-immigrant attitudes.

At the micro level, previous scholarship has focused on how native-born individuals perceive the impact of immigrants on their financial well-being, particularly in terms of labor market competition and fiscal burden. The findings on the job market effects of immigrants are mixed, with some studies showing minimal or no negative impact on native-born workers' wages, while others suggest a significant negative impact. Similarly, the empirical research on the fiscal impact of immigration also offers diverse findings, with some studies showing a negative impact and others showing a negligible or even positive impact. In a nutshell, the literature reviewed in this chapter highlights the complex interaction of economic realities, subjective economic perceptions, and individual-level concerns in shaping attitudes toward immigrants.

This study aims to contribute to this ongoing discussion by examining how these factors interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants at the regional and national levels. It addresses the question: How do objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants? While acknowledging the complex and subtle nature of immigration attitudes, the study adopts both a regional and national focus to capture the different economic ground-realities and immigration views across Canada. This dual lens is particularly vital given that existing Canadian scholarship generally neglects the role of subjective perceptions in immigration attitudes and cursorily focuses on reginal-level variations. Thus, by examining regional and national differences in immigration attitudes, this study hopes to provide a detailed understanding of the factors that shape Canadians' views on immigration.

Chapter 3: Understanding Immigration Attitudes

Canada has long been recognized for its welcoming stance toward immigrants and commitment to multiculturalism. Recent trends, however, suggest a growing divide in public opinion regarding desired immigration levels (Bilodeau et al., 2012; Donnelly, 2021). This polarization is particularly unusual given that Canada recently welcomed a record number of 431,645 immigrants in a single year (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2023). Despite this, a 2023 Environics Institute Survey shows a sharp rise (44%) in Canadians believing there are too many immigrants (Neuman, 2023). This changing backdrop signals a growing divide in public opinion on desired immigration levels and, more importantly, emphasizes the need for a richer understanding of the factors that shape Canadians' immigration attitudes at both regional and national levels.

In this context, the central question motivating my research is: How do objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants? To address this, I draw on prominent theoretical models that explain divergences and diversities in public opinion on immigration, including the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective, Labor Market Competition Theory, and the Fiscal Burden Model, among others..

The chapter is organized as follows: The first section explores the two primary paradigms that frame the study of immigration attitudes: the Political Economy Approach (PEA) and the Socio-Psychological Approach (SPA). The second section then probes into specific theoretical models to explain how economic conditions and perceptions shape individuals' attitudes toward immigrants. The last section concludes by highlighting the complex interplay of these factors and their implications for understanding public opinion on immigration in Canada.

3.1. Paradigms of Immigration Attitudes

3.1.1. The Political Economy Approach

The PEA, driven by a formal economic approach, the Factor Proportions Model, suggests that native-born citizens' attitudes toward immigration and immigrants are mainly influenced by their own financial well-being. The Labor Market Competition hypothesis, a foundation of this approach, theorizes that an influx of immigrants, particularly low-skilled ones, can lead to decreased wages and job opportunities for native-born workers in similar fields (Borjas, 1987; Gerber et al., 2017; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Similarly, two additional key ideas that fall under this approach are the concept of fiscal burden and welfare chauvinism. Broadly, these hypotheses further assert that immigrants may strain public resources, potentially leading to higher taxes and lower social benefits for the native-born population (Blau, 1984; Borjas, 1994; Hanson et al., 2007).

The PEA also includes the concept of Sociotropic Economic Threat, where native-born citizens pay attention to the overall economic impact of immigration and immigrants on their society. The core idea is that the native population may oppose immigration if they believe it burdens the national economy as a whole (Citrin et al., 1997; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Moreover, the preference for high-skilled immigrants, often perceived as 'net contributors' to the overall economy, further emphasizes the role of sociotropic economic evaluations in shaping immigration attitudes (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007).

As discussed in Chapter 2 above (sections 2.2. and 2.3), the direct economic impact of immigration and immigrants on native-born individuals' wages and jobs remains debated. Accordingly, the SPA highlights the importance of considering non-economic features. It emphasizes considering how perceptions of broader societal and cultural impacts of immigration can shape attitudes, even in the absence of purely economic concerns and factors.

3.1.2. The Socio-Psychological Approach

The SPA offers a complementary perspective to the PEA, shifting the focus from purely personal financial gains or losses to group-related attitudes and symbols in shaping immigration attitudes (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). It suggests that factors such as cultural values, national identity, and perceived threats to social cohesion can influence individuals' views about immigrants.

Even though economic concerns and socio-psychological factors can operate independently, they often intersect and support each other. Economic downturns or personal financial struggles, for example, can intensify concerns about cultural preservation or fears about the strain on social services. This, in turn, leads to less favorable views of immigrants (McLaren, 2002, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2006). This complex and dynamic interplay of attitude formation, where economic and socio-cultural concerns interlink, is further complicated by the potential 'endogeneity' between economic worries and anti-immigrant sentiments (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Negative feelings about the economy might not only lead to more restrictive views on immigration but could also be reinforced by such views. This bidirectional link adds another layer of complexity to understanding the aspects that drive public attitudes toward immigration across Western democracies hosting immigrants.

In the context of my study, which largely focuses on the economic basis of immigration attitudes, the SPA serves as a reminder that economic concerns do not operate in isolation. While my hypotheses primarily examine the impact of objective economic realities and subjective economic perceptions, it is vital to acknowledge the potential influence of cultural concerns and other socio-psychological factors that may interact with economic fears to shape Canadians' views about immigrants. Thus, the concept of 'cultural threat,' discussed in section 2.2.3 of the last chapter, highlights how perceived threats to cultural identity and social

cohesion can interact with economic aspects and contribute to negative attitudes toward immigrants (Gravelle, 2018).

3.2. Theoretical Models

While rooted in both the PEA and SPA, the models summarized below are interrelated and mutually informative. Collectively, they offer a more comprehensive understanding of the complex elements that shape public attitudes toward immigrants.

3.2.1. The Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective

The Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective suggests that people's views on immigration are shaped by how they think immigrants affect the overall economy of their country or region, rather than just their own personal finances (Banting & Soroka, 2020; Citrin et al., 1997; Sides & Citrin, 2007). When the economy is struggling, with high unemployment or low growth rates, people tend to become more worried about competition for jobs and limited public resources. This can make them feel threatened and blame immigrants, and as a result, ask to limit the number of immigrants.

This has been observed in many Western countries, where economic downturns often coincide with increased anti-immigrant sentiments (Quillian, 1995). Moreover, the perception of economic threat can be intertwined with concerns about cultural preservation and social cohesion, particularly during times of economic hardship when concerns about resource scarcity and market competition may be intensified (McLaren, 2002, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2006). The relationship between economic anxieties and cultural concerns can increase negative attitudes toward immigrants, even in the absence of concrete evidence of their economic impact. It can also be further amplified by the media, which often highlights the potential burden on public services during economic downturns, strengthening sociotropic threat fears and influencing public opinion (Abrajano et al., 2017; Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2021; Goerres et al., 2020).

As Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) emphasized, the feeling of economic threat alone, even if empirical evidence of economic threat is lacking, is sufficient to influence attitudes towards immigrants/immigration. A recent meta-analysis by Dražanová et al. (2024) further supports this idea, revealing that socio-tropic economic evaluations of immigrants' impact on the host country tend to be more powerful than native-borns' fears about their own economic prospects when it comes to immigration attitude formation. These findings, combined with the potential interaction of economic fears, cultural concerns, and media influence, highlight the complexity of sociotropic threats and its profound role in influencing the formation of immigration attitudes.

Shifting from a macro-level view to a more specific focus on welfare services and tax burdens, the Fiscal Burden Hypothesis and Welfare Chauvinism, discussed below, offer further insights into the economic dimensions and how they relate to shaping attitudes toward immigrants.

3.2.2. The Fiscal Burden Hypothesis and Welfare Chauvinism

The fiscal burden hypothesis, a specific manifestation of the Sociotropic Economic Perspective, proposes that native-born individuals may oppose immigrants and immigration due to concerns about the potential stress immigrants could place on public finances and social welfare programs. This concern arises from the belief that immigrants might utilize more public services, like healthcare and education, than they contribute through taxes, potentially leading to higher taxes or reduced benefits for native-born citizens (Blau, 1984; Borjas, 1994; Hanson et al., 2007).

This deepens further, as explained by the idea of welfare chauvinism, when the native population believes that welfare services should only be limited to locals (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). The opposition to immigration based on these two hypotheses can originate from two different motivations: a desire to protect public finance and ensure its efficient use or

a more nativist feeling favoring the allocation of welfare resources primarily to in-group members (Dinesen & Hjorth, 2020).

Altogether, these concerns perhaps lead to a preference for highly skilled immigrants who are perceived as contributing more economically and are less likely to burden public resources compared to lower-skilled immigrants across the countries receiving immigrants (Bansak et al., 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Donnelly, 2017; Ford & Mellon, 2020; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015; Naumann et al., 2018; Paquet, 2015; Wright et al., 2016). The preference for high-skilled immigrants reflects a sociotropic economic evaluation, as it prioritizes the overall economic benefit to the host society.

In essence, the sociotropic economic threat perspective, involving both general economic anxieties and the specific fiscal burden and welfare chauvinism hypotheses, provides a crucial lens for understanding how Canadians' perceptions of the broader national economic conditions may shape their attitudes toward immigrants. The theoretical lenses offered by the sociotropic threat perspective directly align with my hypotheses 1, 2, and 5.

Hypothesis 1 posits that individuals living in provinces with less favorable economic conditions (lower real annual GDP growth and higher unemployment rates) will perceive a greater threat to the overall economy, leading them to ask for reduced immigration levels in Canada. Similarly, hypothesis 2 suggests that Canadians who perceive the national economy or their personal financial situation as worsening will be more likely to view immigrants as a threat to the overall economic well-being. Thus, it is expected of such respondents to advocate for reduced a number of immigrants.

Hypothesis 5 further explores this perspective by examining the link between provincial-level economic conditions and individuals' perceptions of the Canadian economy and their personal financial situations. The hypothesis anticipates that individuals living in provinces

with better economic conditions will hold more positive views, potentially translating into more favorable attitudes toward immigrants or vice versa.

The fiscal burden and welfare chauvinism hypotheses, on the other hand, are partially relevant to my hypotheses 3 and 4, which test the link between national economic perceptions and the perceived job market threat arising from the presence of immigrants. The hypothesis predicts that people with negative national and personal economic perceptions will be more likely to perceive immigrants as a burden, leading to increased concerns about job competition. By exploring the relationship between real-world economic realities and subjective economic perceptions, this study aims to shed light on the complex subtleties underlying public opinion on immigration in Canada, both at regional and national levels.

Though the overall sociotropic economic threat perspective offers a valuable basis for understanding the link between economic conditions, perceptions, and immigration attitudes, it is important to recognize its limitations. The impact of economic aspects may vary across native populations due to differences in education, income, and past interaction experiences. Moreover, cultural values and political beliefs can also play a meaningful role in shaping people's immigration attitudes, potentially relating to economic concerns.

Beyond these, it is also important to consider the possibility of reverse causality, where negative attitudes toward immigrants may contribute to feelings of economic threat. Finally, operationalizing both objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions presents challenges that could influence the observed relationships, too. Despite these and other foreseeable limitations, the sociotropic perspective, I believe, is still an essential lens for understanding the complicated dynamics underlying Canadian public opinion about immigrants. This brings us to the perspective offered by market competition theory detailed below.

3.2.3. The Labor Market Competition Theory

This theory suggests that native-born citizens of countries hosting immigrants may perceive them as direct competitors in the labor market. The perception can lead to fears of job displacement and wage depression (Borjas, 1987, 1995, 1999). Moreover, the theory states that these concerns are often stronger among lower-skilled native workers who may feel more directly threatened by job competition from immigrant labor, especially in sectors where immigrants are overrepresented (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).

The theory further suggests that the perceived threat can translate into negative attitudes toward immigrants, as individuals prioritize their own financial well-being and job security. This can be especially true during times of economic hardship (high unemployment rates, etc.) when perceived competition for jobs from immigrants is more noticeable. In essence, individuals who believe that immigrants are taking jobs away from native-born citizens or driving down wages are more likely to express less favorable views toward immigrants.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that job threat is not just about actual job competition. Even when immigrants do not really affect the job market much, the perceived threat of competition arising from their presence can still significantly influence attitudes (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Moreover, the theory also proposes that native-borns worry more about immigrants who have skills similar to them. Thus, it is not that they dislike all immigrants but rather those they see as directly competing for the same jobs (Dinesen & Hjorth, 2020).

The ideas offered by the labor market competition theory align particularly well with H-3 and H-4 of my study. H-3 directly explores the relationship between perceived job competition from immigrants and the desire for reduced immigration levels across Canada. H-4 investigates how economic fears at the national and personal levels might reinforce perceptions of job market threats from immigrants.

While the Labor Market Competition Theory offers valuable insights into the potential link between economic concerns and attitudes toward immigration, it is essential to acknowledge its limitations. As noted in chapter two, the theory primarily focuses on perceived job threats, which may not always align with immigrants' actual labor market impact. Moreover, the mixed findings in both the Canadian and global context suggest that other factors, beyond simply labor market concerns, likely influence attitudes toward immigration.

Given these limitations, this study strives to provide a balanced perspective on the economic determinants of attitudes toward immigrants in Canada. The inclusion of control variables related to respondents' characteristics and contextual factors could help to account for some of these complexities and account for the diverse influences that shape public opinion on immigration at the regional and national levels in Canada.

3.3. Conclusion

The sections above have strived to detail a theoretical framework for understanding the complex nature of attitude formation towards immigrants and immigration. The framework, drawing insights primarily from the political economy and socio-psychological perspectives, emphasizes the dynamic relationship of economic conditions, subjective perceptions, and individual beliefs in shaping public opinion regarding immigrants.

The Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective theorizes that individuals' concerns about the overall economic impact of immigrants, rather than just their personal financial well-being, play a crucial role in shaping their attitudes. This perspective suggests that when native-born citizens perceive the overall economy to be declining or experience personal financial pressures, they may view immigrants as a potential burden on resources or a source of competition for jobs, etc., leading to less favorable attitudes towards immigration.

The fiscal burden and welfare chauvinism hypotheses, specific manifestations of this perspective, specifically address the potential burden immigrants might place on publicly

available resources, potentially fueling concerns about increased taxes and reduced social benefits for native-born people. The Labor Market Competition Theory, on the other hand, provides a complementary angle to this understanding by focusing on the perceived job threats, displacement, and wage depression arising from immigration. It suggests that individuals who perceive a higher level of job market competition from immigrants will be more likely to desire reduced immigration levels in countries hosting immigrants.

The theoretical models presented above have various implications for my analysis. In essence, the models collectively offer highly desirable lenses for understanding how economic realities and subjective economic perceptions, both at the individual and societal levels, intersect with concerns about job competition, resource allocation, and welfare benefits distribution to shape Canadians' attitudes towards immigrants. My hypotheses, grounded in these theoretical perspectives, summarize for empirical study the complex relationships predicted by these frameworks. The hypotheses aim to contribute to a more balanced understanding of the aspects that influence public opinion on immigration in Canada.

It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that the theoretical models discussed above, while offering valuable insights, do not operate in isolation. The interplay between, for example, economic concerns and perceptions of pressure on welfare services adds complexity to the formation of immigration attitudes. My analysis, while broadly driven by the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective and the Labor Market Competition Theory, recognizes the potential influence of these additional factors. The inclusion of control variables related to individual characteristics, age, gender, regions, and political affiliations, among others, in the analysis aims to capture some of the complexities introduced by many factors in immigration attitudes.

Chapter 4: Methods and Data

This chapter outlines the research design and data analysis method used to explore the relationships between real-world economic conditions, subjective economic perceptions, and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants in 2021. It details the specific survey data used, the selection and recoding of variables, and the analytical approach chosen to test my hypotheses.

To begin with, I relied on data from the 2021 Canadian Election Study (CES) to analyze the relationships hypothesized in Chapter Two. The CES is the most comprehensive political attitude survey that captures Canadians' views on various topics, including immigration (Polacko et al., 2024). The survey was executed in two waves – during and after the Canadian federal election 2021. It included Canadian citizens or permanent residents aged 18 or older nationwide (Stephenson et al., 2023). However, permanent residents were excluded from answering voting-related questions, such as, the intention to vote on a voting day[1]

4.1. CES Sampling and Data Collection

The CES 2021 employed a 'stratified sampling' approach based on regions and engaged an online sample of 20,968 Canadians from the Leger Opinion Panel (Stephenson et al., 2023). It aimed for a sample that mirrored the regional distribution of the Canadian population (Atlantic: 7%, Quebec: 23%, Ontario: 38%, West: 32%), while also implementing quotas to ensure a balanced representation of respondents across genders (50% men, 50% women) and age groups (18-34: 28%, 35-54: 33%, 55+: 39%) within each region.

Furthermore, the CES 2021 survey also utilized language quotas to ensure reasonable representation of French-speaking Canadians, mainly in Quebec (80% French, 20% English) and Atlantic Canada (10% French). The survey was disseminated online via the Qualtrics platform in English and French. The Post-Election Survey (PES) had a 72% return rate (15,069

[1] The survey excluded permanent residents from this question: "cps21_v_likely On election day, are you... Certain to vote (1), Likely to vote (2), Unlikely to vote (3), Certain not to vote (4), I am not eligible to vote (5), I already voted (by mail, advance poll, etc.) (6), Don't know/ Prefer not to answer (7)."

out of 20,968 respondents). In contrast, the Campaign Period Survey (CPS) had 19,009 high-quality observations, excluding observations with incomplete responses, duplicates, speeding behavior, straight-lining patterns, and mismatches between postal codes and provinces (Stephenson et al., 2023).

4.2. Variables and Recoding

4.2.1. Dependent variables

My analysis focuses on several key variables derived from the CPS and PES waves of the CES 2021 dataset.

1. **Views toward immigrants**

The main dependent variable of the study is views toward immigrants, which measures Canadians' views on the desired level of immigration to the country in 2021. As a principal indicator of these attitudes, it is central to this study. This study examines how objective economic conditions, perceptions, and perceived job threats influence this variable to understand public attitudes toward immigration in Canada. Furthermore, the variable also plays an essential role in exploring the complex interaction between economic conditions, economic perceptions, and attitudes toward immigration. Specifically, it allows me to examine whether negative economic experiences, both personal and national, translate into more restrictive immigration preferences and whether these economic fears contribute to the perception of immigrants as an economic threat. Finally, analyzing this variable helps me to explore the specific influence of economic conditions and perceptions on Canadians' preferences for immigration levels.

To measure this variable, I use the following CES question: "Do you think Canada should admit: More immigrants, Fewer immigrants, About the same number of immigrants as now, Don't know/Prefer not to answer." The variable was recoded into three response categories: "1. Fewer," "2. Same as now," and "3. More," with the "Don't know" category excluded from

the final analysis in order to focus on those with expressed attitudes on immigration levels. This recoding was essential as it facilitated the production of manageable crosstab outputs and helped streamline interpretations of the findings.

The distribution of responses (Table 4.3-A) shows diverse views on immigration among survey participants. While the largest group, 39.8%, preferred to maintain current immigration levels, about 34.3% favored decreased immigration, signifying concern about immigrant numbers among a notable percentage of CES respondents in 2021. A smaller group, 20.1%, supported the idea that Canada needed more immigrants. This relatively low support for increasing immigration may reflect concerns related to economic factors. Overall, the distribution pattern shows a tendency toward maintaining current numbers of immigrants or reducing those numbers. This division of opinion emphasizes the need to investigate the factors, including real-world economic conditions and perceptions thereof, that contribute to these different views, which is a central aim of my analysis.

4.2.2. Variables with dual roles

The following variables play a dual role in my analysis, acting, at different times, as both independent and dependent variables in the testing of my five hypotheses:

1. **Immigrant job threat perceptions**

Similar to the primary dependent variable above, this variable captured CES respondents' perceptions of whether immigrants took jobs away from other Canadians. The survey question asked participants to show their level of agreement with the statement "Immigrants take jobs away from other Canadians*"* on a 5-point scale (Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). The variable was recoded into: "1. Low," "2. Medium," and "3. High" threat response categories, where:

- The 'Low' threat category includes "strongly disagree' and somewhat disagree" responses;

- The ‘Medium’ category corresponds to “neither agree nor disagree”; and
- The ‘High’ job threat category combines “Somewhat agree’ and strongly agree” responses.

This recoding aimed to clarify the relationship between job threat perceptions and views toward immigrants.

Table 4.3-B shows the distribution of this variable. Although a majority of 56.6% perceived a low threat, a notable segment voiced concerns about immigrants taking jobs away from Canadians. About 23.4% reported a high level of job threat, with an additional 17.5% perceiving a moderate threat. This distribution shows a clear trend, with most CES participants perceiving a low threat, while the decreasing proportions report high and moderate levels of job threat. The 23.4% of respondents perceiving high threat suggests that concerns about job competition from immigrants were ubiquitous among an important minority of CES respondents. The presence of these concerns, even if not held by a majority, suggest that perceived job threat may be an important factor influencing immigration attitudes.

Besides its distribution and recoding, this variable serves as a dependent variable in H-4, which scrutinizes the relationship between economic perceptions and perceived job threats from immigrants, and as an independent variable in H-3, which investigates its influence on attitudes toward immigration.

2. National economic perceptions

This variable assessed CES participants’ views on the performance of the Canadian economy in 2020. Specifically, CES 2021 asked: “Over the past year, has Canada’s economy... Got better, Stayed about the same, Got worse, Don’t know, Prefer not to answer.” It was recoded as: “1. Worsened,” “2. Unchanged,” and “3. Improved,” removing the “Don’t know” category to include only responses that express a clear view of the overall economic situation.

This recoding aligns with my analysis outputs, as it facilitated getting a better picture of the link between Canadians' economic perceptions and their immigration views.

As shown in Table 4.3-C, a majority of 64.5% of CES 2021 respondents had a gloomy view of the national economy, believing it had worsened. Only a small portion, 6.8%, felt it had improved. This negative outlook likely reflects the challenges of COVID-19, which was ongoing when the survey was conducted. The overall distribution is skewed toward a negative view of the national economy, with the highest numbers of respondents believing it had worsened and fewer reporting no change or improvement. This negative outlook of the economy hints at a scenario of fear and insecurity, which could add to less favorable views toward immigrants. This potential association is investigated in H-4. Moreover, the strong negative skew also highlights the importance of examining this variable's link with real-world economic conditions at both national and regional levels, as hypothesized and tested under H-2 and H-5. Hence, crosstabulation analysis will be used to explore how this negativity connects to things like personal finances and individuals' gender, among others.

It is important to report that this variable serves as a dependent variable in H-5, where its relationship with real-world economic conditions is tested. It also functions as an independent variable in H-2 and 4, where it is hypothesized to influence views regarding immigrants and perceived job threat, respectively.

3. Personal financial perceptions

This variable measures Canadians' evaluation of their personal financial conditions in 2020. The question CES 2021 asked was: "Over the past year, has your financial situation: Got better, Stayed about the same, Got worse, Don't know/Prefer not to answer." Similar to other variables above, this was also recoded into three categories: "1. Worsened," "2. Unchanged," and "3. Improved," excluding the "Don't know" category. This recoding improved the clarity

of crosstab outputs by only focusing on definitive evaluations of CES respondents' personal financial situations, so improving the interpretability of my overall analysis.

Despite the generally negative view of the national economy, CES participants were more positive about their personal finances (Table 4.3-D). Over half, 55.1%, reported that their finances had remained unchanged, about 28.1% felt they had worsened, and only 15.7% felt improvements in personal financial conditions. Unlike national economic perceptions, this distribution pattern reveals a generally stable outlook, with most respondents reporting unchanged personal finances. The fact that a larger number of CES respondents reported worsened national economic conditions (64.5%) than worsened personal finances (28.1%) suggests a disconnect between personal and national economic perceptions, which may have important implications for understanding individuals' attitudes toward immigrants.

This difference in personal and national economic perceptions could influence how economic factors shape immigration views (H-2 and H-4), and it highlights the need to test the relationship between these perceptions and real-world economic conditions (H-5). It also reflects a range of aspects, such as individual circumstances and local economic realities, which may influence CES respondents' attitudes. Thus, crosstabulation analysis will be used to explore whether this apparent difference relates to Canadians' immigration views and variables like employment status and region of residence. This variable is a dependent variable in H-5 and an independent variable in H-2 and H-4.

4.2.3. Independent variables

In addition to the variables with a dual role detailed above, my analysis also includes the following independent variables.

1. **Annual provincial real GDP growth rates**

In my crosstabs, this variable acts as an ordinal variable that categorizes Canadian provinces based on their real GDP growth rates in 2021. The data for this was obtained from

Statistics Canada's 'Provincial and territorial economic accounts' data reported in the 'Daily Bulletin' for 2021 (Statistics Canada, 2022b). This variable, originally measured at the scale level, was matched with CES participants' province in the CES SPSS dataset file and recoded into an ordinal variable with three categories: "1. Low," "2. Medium," and "3. High" GDP growth provinces. The cut-points for this ordinal grouping are based on the actual real annual GDP growth rates that each province had in 2021.

Table 4.1 below details the recoding completed. It is also pertinent to note that I only applied crosstabulation as a main analytical approach in my analysis, so it was necessary to transform both scale variables into ordinal ones to facilitate the examination of their link with the ordinal dependent variables of my study.

Table 4.1: Provincial categorization based on real annual GDP growth rates, 2021

GDP growth category	Province name(s)	GDP growth rate(s) in %
Low		
	Manitoba	1.8
	Newfoundland and Labrador	0.6
	Saskatchewan	-0.9
Medium		
	Alberta	4.8
	New Brunswick	5.9
	Ontario	5.2
High		
	British Columbia	6.1
	Nova Scotia	6.2
	Prince Edward Island	7.9
	Quebec	6.0

Source: Statistics Canada 2021

Other than recoding, Table 4.3-E shows that a majority of CES respondents, 51.8%, lived in provinces that had experienced medium GDP growth rates in 2021. A considerable proportion, 40.1%, resided in provinces with high growth, while a smaller percentage,8.1%, were residents of provinces experiencing low growth. The distribution here shows a clear

pattern: the majority of CES respondents were based in provinces with medium GDP growth, followed by high growth and then low growth, respectively. As before, the univariate distribution highlights the potential for provincial economic conditions to influence individuals' views about immigrants, an association that will be examined in detail through the crosstab analysis of H-1 and H-5.

2. Provincial annual unemployment rates

This is also an ordinal variable. It classifies provinces according to their seasonally adjusted annual unemployment rates in 2021. The unemployment data is also sourced from Statistics Canada's 'labor force characteristics, monthly, seasonally adjusted and trend-cycle' (Statistics Canada, 2021). This variable was also transformed into an ordinal variable, while matching with CES respondents' province in the CES SPSS file. Like the GDP growth variable above, the transformation grouped provinces into "1. Low," "2. Medium," and "3. High" unemployment provinces, where the provincial unemployment status is based on actual annual unemployment rates for 2021. The Table below documents recoding choices for this variable.

The distribution of respondents across provincial unemployment levels (Table 4.3-F) shows that 52.3% of CES participants resided in provinces with medium unemployment rates in 2021. A large minority of 43.6% lived in provinces with low unemployment, and only a small percentage (4.1%) reported living in provinces with high unemployment. As can be seen from the Table, this distribution is skewed toward low- and medium-unemployment provinces, with a relatively small percentage of CES respondents reporting living in provinces with high unemployment levels.

Table 4.2: Provincial categorization based on seasonally adjusted annual unemployment rates, 2021

Unemployment category	Province name(s)	Unemployment rate(s) in %
Low		
	Quebec	6.11
	Manitoba	6.43
	British Columbia	6.53
	Saskatchewan	6.53
Medium		
	Ontario	8.13
	Alberta	8.47
	Nova Scotia	8.58
High		
	Newfoundland and Labrador	13.09
	Prince Edward Island	9.93
	New Brunswick	9.16

Source: Statistics Canada 2021

This may limit crosstabulation's ability to detect subtle links between unemployment and attitudes toward immigrants. Nevertheless, the variable is essential to test how objective economic conditions at the provincial level (H-1) may influence Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants.

4.3. Univariate Distribution of Key Variables

Table 4.3 (A-F) below documents combined descriptive statistics of all key variable operationalized in my thesis, excluding those used as control variables.

Table 4.3 A to F: Univariate distribution of main variables in CES 2021

Variable name(s)	Variable role	Response categories	Frequency	Percentage
A. Views toward immigrants	Dependent variable	1. Fewer	6520	34.3
		2. Same as now	7561	39.8
		3. More	3822	20.1
		Valid responses	17902	94.3
		Missing	1089	5.7
		Total	18992	100.0
B. Immigrant job threat perceptions	Dual role	1. Low	7697	56.6
		2. Moderate	2373	17.5
		3. High	3188	23.4
		Valid responses	13258	97.5
		Missing	336	2.5
		Total	13593	100.0
C. National economy perceptions	Dual role	1. Worsened	12244	64.5
		2. Unchanged	3949	20.8
		3. Improved	1288	6.8
		Valid responses	17480	92.0
		Missing	1512	8.0
		Total	18992	100.0
D. Personal financial perceptions	Dual role	1. Worsened	5330	28.1
		2. Unchanged	10465	55.1
		3. Improved	2973	15.7
		Valid responses	18768	98.8
		Missing	223	1.2
		Total	18992	100.0
E. Annual provincial real GDP growth rates	Independent variable	1. Low	1531	8.1
		2. Medium	9836	51.8
		3. High	7625	40.1
		Total	18992	100.0
F. Annual provincial unemployment rates	Independent variable	1. Low	8273	43.6
		2. Medium	9936	52.3
		3. High	782	4.1
		Total	18992	100.0

Source: CES 2021

4.3.1. Control variables

In order to rule out that the hypothesized associations are confounded, and that highly relevant aspects are accounted for, I included various control variables in my crosstabulations. It is important to note at the outset that the control variables were selected based on their potential to influence attitudes toward immigrants either directly or indirectly. A detailed discussion of the possible confounding influence of these variables and the rationale for their inclusion is presented in Chapters 5 and 6 before addressing the effect of each control variable on the associations tested. The specific control variables, their measurement, and univariate distribution are as follows:

1. Age

This is a continuous variable and provides CES respondents' age in years. The variable was transformed into an ordinal variable comprising the following age groups for the purpose of producing manageable crosstabulation: Young Adults (18-34), Middle-aged Adults (35-54), and Older Adults (55+). As documented in Table 4.4-A, the largest percentage of CES respondents (40.8%) are in the Older Adults category (55+). Middle-aged Adults (35-54) comprised 31.9% of the sample, while Young Adults (18-34) made up 27.3%. The distribution pattern across age groups is relatively balanced, with a slightly higher percentage of older respondents. This is likely due to the CES's use of sampling quotas to balance the sample on age, as noted in section 5.1 above. Irrespective of this, the grouping of ages allows my analysis to track possible cohort differences in attitudes towards immigrants.

2. Gender

This categorical variable differentiates between male, female, and other gender identities of the CES participants. To simplify my analysis outputs and given the small number of respondents identifying with other gender identities (approximately 60 observations), these responses were included in the female identity category. As for the frequency distribution,

51.6% of the respondents identify as female (Table 4.4-B), while 48.4% identify as male. Like age groups, the distribution of this variable is also balanced between female and male respondents. This is because of the CES's use of sampling quotas to ensure gender representation. The near-equal division of gender suggests that the CES sample is illustrative of the Canadian population in terms of gender, which is important for generalizing the findings.

3. Education level

The original CES variable measured the highest level of education attained by Canadians, ranging from "1. No schooling" to "12. Don't know/ Prefer not to answer." To get manageable crosstabulation outputs and improve interpretability, the original 12 response categories were recoded into three ordinal education levels as follows:

- "1. Low" includes: "No schooling, Some elementary school, Completed elementary school, Some secondary school, Completed secondary school."
- "2. Medium" involves: "Some technical/community college, Completed technical/community college, Some university."
- "3. High education" encompasses: "Completed university, Master's degree, Professional degree or doctorate."

The last response category, "12. Don't know", was excluded from the analysis; this omitted only 29 observations.

In terms of the variable's frequency distribution (Table 4.3-C), there is a remarkable contrast in the educational attainment of respondents: over two-thirds (68.4%) fall into the 'Medium' category. Whereas about 25.4% of Canadians had attained a 'High' level of education, those with a 'Low' level of education represented only a small minority, 6%. This trend is heavily skewed toward the 'Medium' education category, with a smaller percentage in 'High' and an even smaller minority in 'Low' education levels. It is likely that this distribution

has implications for how educational attainment interacts with economic factors to shape immigration attitudes—an aspect that will become apparent in crosstab analysis.

4. Income

CES 2021 measured the income of respondents using two variables. The first variable, named "cps21_income_number," captured the total household income figure reported by participants for 2020. The second variable, named "cps21_income_cat," captured broad income categories. I initially attempted to use data from both variables, but upon examining frequency distribution for "cps21_income_cat," I found that 94.3% of the observations were marked as 'system missing values. This high proportion of missing data is likely due to most respondents providing their exact income wile answering the 'cps21_income_number' question. Therefore, I focused my analysis on the cps21_income_number variable.

To facilitate analysis and interpretation, I recoded this continuous income variable into an ordinal variable with three categories: "1. Low," "Medium," and "High" income bracket. To figure out the cut-off points for these categories, I used the Percentiles command in SPSS to identify the precise income values corresponding to the 33.33rd and 66.67th percentiles. This approach divides the income variable into three roughly equal-sized income groups. The distribution based on these cut-off points is as follows:

- 'Low' income: Comprises respondents who reported having a household income below $44,000.
- 'Medium' income: Comprises household with income between $44,001 and $85,000.
- 'High' income: Contains participants reporting owning income above $85,001.

Cases with missing income data (coded as '-99' in the CES) were excluded from the final analysis, leading to the omission of 589 cases.

In contrast to education levels, the CES participants are relatively equally distributed across the three income brackets, as shown in Table 4.4-D. The largest group (33.5%) fall into the

'Low' income group, followed closely by the 'Medium' income category (33.2%) and the 'High' income group (33.3%). The reasonably even division of income shows that the CES sample captured a variety of economic conditions, which are important in my two-variable crosstabs for exploring the link between income and attitudes towards immigrants.

5. Employment status

This ordinal variable captured Canadians' current employment statuses, ranging from "1 Working for pay full-time" to "13. Don't know/ Prefer not to answer." It was recoded as "1. Inactive," "2. Unemployed," and "3. Employed.", where:

- 'Inactive' respondents correspond to "Retired, Student, Caring for a family, and "Disabled."
- 'Unemployed' participants comprise those who identified as "Unemployed/looking for work."
- 'Employed' CES participants refer to those who identified themselves as "Working for pay full-time, Working for pay part-time, Self-employed (with or without employees, Student and working for pay, Caring for family and working for pay, and Retired and working for pay."

The "Other" and "Don't know/Prefer not to answer" categories were excluded from the analysis. This excluded 535 cases and ensured that the remaining categories accurately reflect meaningful employment statuses relevant to my analysis and associations explored in this study. Table 4.4-E shows that most, 55.4%, of CES respondents were 'employed,' 37% were 'inactive,' and 4.8% were 'unemployed'. This distribution is broadly in line with the Canadian labor force participation rate of 65%. The number of 'inactive' respondents in the CES sample could be due to my recoding, which includes students, retirees, and those caring for family in this category.

6. Region of residence

This categorical variable originally identified the province of CES respondents. Following CES 2021, I coded it into regions as follows: "1. Atlantic, 2. Ontario, 3. Quebec, 4. West." Since one of my hypotheses, H-1, tested for regional variations of immigration views, this recoding was essential for facilitating this testing. It excluded three territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon) with only 47 valid observations and focused on only ten Canadian provinces.

As shown in Table 4.4-F, Ontario had the highest number of CES respondents in the sample (38.4%), followed by the West (31.3%), Quebec (23.5%), and the Atlantic (6.8%). This uneven distribution reflects the CES 2021's use of sampling quotas (section 5.1), which ensured regional representation based on population. Regardless of this, this regional categorization allows me to explore whether the relationships I test vary across different regions, therefore ensuring that any observed association effects are not simply due to regional differences.

7. Party affiliations

Respondents party affiliation was measured using the original CES 2021: "In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a: Liberal (1), Conservative (2), NDP (3), Bloc Québécois (4), Green (5), Another party (please specify) (6):, of these (7), Don't know/ Prefer not to answer (8)." The variable was also recoded to simplify analysis outputs to include: "1. Conservatives" including only "Conservatives." And "2. Non-Conservatives" groups "Liberals, NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and Greens." The recoding excluded three responses, "Another party, None of these, and Don't know/ Prefer not to answer," from the final analysis.

As for the distribution of this variable, it is clear from Table 4.4-G that 52.8% of CES respondents are classified as 'Non-Conservatives,' while 24.2% are 'Conservatives.' This unequal distribution reflects the recoding strategy I employed to investigate specific theoretical

expectations regarding Conservatives that they are more likely (than other partisans) to oppose immigration and also are likely to believe the economy is performing poorly, especially when non-conservations are leading government. This recoding also helped simplify my analysis outputs. However, it may mask nuances within the 'Non-Conservative' partisan group, which includes a diverse range of political affiliations.

4.4. Univariate Distribution of Control Variables

The Table below shows univariate distribution of all control variables use in the analysis. The key distribution figures are discussed in the description of control variables detailed above.

Table 4.4 A to H: Univariate distribution of control variables in CES 2021

Variable Name(s)	Response categories	Frequency	Percent
A. Age groups	1. Young Adults (18-34)	5183	27.3
	2. Middle-aged Adults (35-54)	6057	31.9
	3. Older Adults (55+)	7751	40.8
	Valid responses	18992	100
	Excluded	0	0.0
	Total	18992	100
B. Gender	1. Male	9195	48.4
	2. Female	9797	51.6
	Valid responses	18992	100.0
	Missing	0	0.0
	Total	18992	100.0
C. Education levels	1. Low education	1144	6.0
	2. Medium education	12997	68.4
	3. High education	4822	25.4
	Valid responses	18963	99.8
	Missing	29	0.2
	Total	18992	100.0
D. Income groups	1. Low income	6368	33.5
	2. Medium income	6307	33.2
	3. High income	6317	33.3
	Valid responses	18992	100.0
	Missing	0	0.0
	Total	18992	100.0

E. Employment statuses	1. Inactive		7024	37.0
	2. Unemployed		913	4.8
	3. Employed		10520	55.4
	Valid responses		18457	97.2
	Missing		535	2.8
	Total		18992	100.0
F. Region(s) of residence	1. Atlantic		1298	6.8
	2. Ontario		7291	38.4
	3. Quebec		4455	23.5
	4. West		5948	31.3
	Valid responses		18992	100
	Missing		0	0.0
	Total		18992	100.0
G. Party affiliation(s)	1. Conservatives		4603	24.2
	2. Non-Conservatives		10030	52.8
	Valid responses		14633	77.0
	Missing		4359	23.0
	Total	18992		100.0

Source: CES 2021

4.5. CES Survey Weights

To make sure that my results accurately reflect the broader Canadian population, I used survey weights provided by the CES 2021 dataset. Specifically, I used high-quality weights for both CPS and the PES waves. These weights adjust CES sample data to align with the Canadian population distribution based on region, gender, age, and education level, as detailed by CES (Stephenson et al., 2023). When running the final crosstabulations, the survey weights were applied to all variables, including controls. By including the weights variables from both CES waves, I hope the generalizability of my crosstab is improved, as doing so mitigates potential data errors arising from sampling and response errors, if any.

4.6. Analytical Approach

To test my hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two, I used crosstabulation analysis. This statistical technique is well-suited for exploring relationships between categorical and ordinal variables (Healey et al., 2019). Initially, I examined two-way crosstabs to assess the

hypothesized associations between the independent and dependent variables. Following the initial analysis, I introduced various control variables, such as age and party identification of CES respondents, into the analysis to account for potential confounding factors and assess whether the initial associations observed remained consistent or were influenced by other factors.

I used SPSS Statistics version 29 to conduct these analyses. This tool is commonly used across Social Sciences and other disciplines for statistical analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2021). Moreover, the strength and direction of the observed relationships were evaluated using Gamma statistics and the statistical significance was assessed using the Chi-Square test of independence.

Beyond the statistical aspects, my analysis is driven by the assumption of the 'recursive model of causation' (Mouchart and Russo, 2011), where I assume that one factor in my hypothesized associations influences another only in a single direction. I hypothesize, for example, that perceptions about the overall Canadian economy impact views regarding immigrants, but not the other way around. This assumption aligns well with the idea of "unidirectional causation" commonly used in drawing causal inference, where a cause precedes its outcome, and there are no "feedback loops" swaying the cause itself (Illari & Williamson, 2011, p. 586).

While such an assumption helps simplify the interpretation of my crosstab findings, I must acknowledge that this might not always be the case in the real world, where multiple aspects can interact and influence each other simultaneously. A prime example in this regard is the potential interaction between attitudes toward immigrants and perceptions of job competition. Individuals who do not like immigration for some non-economic reason might say that immigrants are taking jobs away to justify their feelings. This potential for 'reciprocal causation' is a key limitation of the causal deductions one can draw from my crosstabs.

This aligns with Blinder's (2015, p. 96) observation that "pre-existing attitudes toward immigrants" can shape "perceptions of who immigrants are," suggesting that attitudes and perceptions can influence each other. This highlights an important area for future research, which could use more high-level statistical techniques to analyze how multiple aspects interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. .

Chapter 5: Objective Economic Conditions and Attitudes Toward Immigration

As established in the last three chapters, understanding public attitudes toward immigration is vital in a diverse and evolving society like Canada. While various factors influence these attitudes, actual economic performance often plays a notable role. This chapter scrutinizes the relationship between objective economic conditions and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants, focusing specifically on the impact of regional economic indicators.

In this context, H-1 anticipates that Canadians living in provinces with (a) lower real annual GDP growth and (b) higher unemployment rates in 2021 will be more likely to express the view that Canada should admit fewer immigrants. To explore this hypothesis, I analyze the hypothesized correlation by using two-way and layered crosstabulation.

Beyond assessing the direct impact of provincial objective economic conditions on immigration attitudes, this chapter also analyzes whether these conditions interact to shape CES respondents' National Economic Perceptions (NEPs) and Personal Economic Perceptions (PEPs)[2]. Thus, H-5 proposes that Canadians living in provinces with stronger economic performance (higher GDP growth and lower unemployment rates) will have more positive NEPs, PEPs, and vice-versa. To test this hypothesis, I will also use crosstabulation. This analysis will help reveal the interconnectedness between real-world economic realities, subjective national and personal economic perceptions, and attitudes toward immigration among Canadians in 2021.

The chapter below will first establish the bivariate relationships between regional economic indicators and attitudes toward immigration, then examine how these objective conditions influence subjective NEPs and PEPs. Finally, I will incorporate controls for confounding

[2] The NEPs include Canadians' assessments of the overall state of the national economy, while PEPs reflect their views on their own financial well-being in 2020. Both are measured using original CES questions detailed in Section 5.2.2. of Chapter 4 on Data and Methods.

factors to isolate the specific impact of both objective and subjective economic factors on Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants.

5.1. Effects of Real Annual Provincial GDP Growth Levels on Immigration Attitudes

Sections 5.1 and 5.2 deal with H-1, which hypothesizes that provincial GDP growth rates and unemployment levels are linked with attitudes toward immigrants. Dealing with the first component, Table 5.1 below shows the bivariate relationship between provincial GDP growth levels in 2021 and Canadians' views on the desired level of immigration to the country. As shown in the Table, there appears to be a positive and moderate association between provincial GDP growth rates and CES respondents' views toward immigrants. This is indicated by a statistically significant Gamma value of 0.139, $p < 0.001$. As provincial GDP growth levels increase from low to high, Table 5.1 shows a general trend of decreasing preference for 'fewer' immigrants and a slight increase in preference of Canadians asking for 'more' immigrants. This pattern signifies a decline of nearly 12 percentage points in the preference for 'fewer' immigrants.

Table 5.1 Views toward immigrants by annual provincial real GDP growth levels, 2021

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	43.5	39	31.8
	(616)	(3606)	(2298)
2. Same as now	38	41.9	43.5
	(538)	(3878)	(3145)
3. More	18.5	19.1	24.8
	(262)	(1769)	(1791)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 17903**
Gamma: 0.139	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 154.273	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Looking closer, in provinces where real GDP growth rates were 'Low,' 43.5% of Canadians expressed a desire for fewer immigrants. This percentage decreases slightly to 39% in provinces where GDP growth levels were 'Moderate' and further declines to 31.8% in provinces experiencing 'High' GDP growth rates. This trend suggests that CES survey respondents living in provinces with stronger economies, as measured by real GDP growth levels, were less likely to express a desire for the reduced number of immigrants.

In contrast, the percentage of CES respondents who wanted 'More' immigrants shows a slight increase as provincial economic performance improves. Where provincial GDP growth levels were 'Low,' only 18.5% of Canadians in these provinces favored increased immigration. This figure climbs a little to 19.1% for those in provinces with 'Moderate' growth and further edges up to 24.8% in provinces with 'High' GDP growth levels. While this increase is not as noticeable as the decline observed for the 'Fewer' response category above, it nonetheless hints at a potential link between provincial economic conditions and an openness to immigration.

Lastly, these findings suggest a nuanced relationship between provincial economic conditions in 2021 and Canadians' views regarding immigrants. While a statistically significant positive association exists, the actual shifts in preferences are relatively modest. The findings emphasize a complex relationship between economic factors and attitudes towards immigrants, perhaps suggesting that a multitude of factors shape Canadians' opinions on this issue.

5.1.1. Introducing a Potential Confounder — Income Groups

The income brackets are included as a control variable in this analysis because these are potentially related to both regional economic performance and individuals' income, a significant predictor of immigration attitudes. In particular, individuals with lower incomes may regard immigrants as economic competitors and thus express more negative views toward them (Esses et al., 2010; Küpper et al., 2010). However, this relationship can be complex and influenced by other factors, such as individuals' education, social background, or personal

experiences with immigrants. Conversely, those with higher incomes might be more welcoming of immigrants, seeing them as contributors to economic growth and diversity (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010).

Moreover, studies also show a strong correlation between provincial economic performance and income levels, as stronger provincial economies tend to generate higher incomes through various channels, such as increased job creation, higher wages, and greater business investment (Shearmur & Polèse, 2007). For instance, provinces with stronger economic performance, as measured by higher per capita GDP growth levels, may experience greater job creation and wage increases, leading to higher income levels for residents.

This is supported by Di Matteo et al. (2016), who found that resource-intensive provinces, particularly those in Western Canada, experienced higher real per capita GDP growth rates from 2010 to 2014, leading to increased personal income levels in those provinces. Although this study focused on a specific type of province and time period, which may limit its broad applicability, it nonetheless suggests that objective economic conditions at the provincial level can directly impact the financial well-being of people. Specifically, these findings indicate that stronger provincial economies can lead to higher incomes, which in turn can influence individuals' perceptions of the overall provincial economy, as those with higher incomes tend to have more positive views (Diener et al., 2013).

Therefore, it is important to control for income when analyzing the link between provincial economic performance and immigration attitudes, as failing to do so could lead to a spurious association. This is because the observed relationship between regional economic performance and attitudes toward immigrants might actually be driven by the influence of income on both economic perceptions and attitudes toward immigration. Thus, by including income as a control variable, the analysis aims to account for its potential confounding effects

and more accurately isolate the impact of provincial economic conditions on CES survey respondents' attitudes toward immigrants.

A controlled analysis with income groups was conducted. Detailed results, including controlled crosstabulations, are presented in the Tables 5.1.1 A-C in the appendices. The analysis reveals that the positive association between provincial real GDP growth and favorable views toward immigrants (observed in Table 5.1) persists even after controlling for respondents' income, although with a diminished effect size. Specifically, the Gamma values for low, medium, and high-income respondents are 0.161, 0.123, and 0.134, respectively, all statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). This suggests that although the association between provincial economic conditions and views on immigrants remains, income acts as a partial confounder, explaining some of the differences in attitudes.

5.2. Effects of Annual Provincial Unemployment Levels on Immigration Attitudes

Documenting the findings of the second indicator of H-1, Table 5.2 reveals the relationship between provincial annual unemployment levels in 2021 and CES respondents' views towards immigrants. The Chi-Square value of 74.659, $p < .001$, shows a statistically significant link between the two variables. The Gamma value of -0.099, however, suggests that this association is practically negligible and negative. Broadly, in line with the theoretical expectations of H-1, this pattern shows that as unemployment levels increase, there is a slight tendency for Canadians to express a higher preference for 'fewer' immigrants.

Looking at the results for the 'fewer' response category more closely, it can be seen from Table 5.2 that in 'Low' unemployment provinces, 33.6% of CES survey participants asked for 'fewer' immigrants. This percentage increases slightly to 38.6% in provinces with 'Moderate' but edges only to 38.8% in provinces having 'High' unemployment levels. This pattern implies that higher unemployment levels were weakly associated with attitudes toward immigration levels in 2021.

Table 5.2: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual unemployment levels, 2021

Provincial unemployment level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	33.6	38.6	38.8
	(2625)	(3615)	(280)
2. Same as now	42.5	42	41.7
	(3324)	(3936)	(301)
3. More	23.9	19.3	19.4
	(1871)	(1810)	(140)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 17902**
Gamma: -0.099	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 74.659	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Conversely, the percentage of CES survey respondents who favored 'More' immigrants showed a slight decreasing trend as provincial unemployment levels climbed. This is clear from the Table, as in provinces with 'Low' unemployment levels, 23.9% of respondents supported increased immigration. This number dips to 19.3% in provinces with 'Moderate' unemployment and a bit to 19.4% in those who had experienced 'High' unemployment levels. The pattern here suggests a potential, although weak, link between higher provincial unemployment levels and a reduced preference for increased immigration levels. Therefore, furthering theoretical support for H-1 reported here.

While broadly mirroring the results of Table 5.1, the findings offered by Table 5.2 suggest a nuanced correlation between provincial unemployment levels in 2021 and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. Although the statistically significant Chi-Square value shows a non-random association, the weak and negative Gamma value suggests that the actual shifts in preferences are relatively small. Higher provincial unemployment rates appear to be linked to a slightly increased preference for 'fewer' immigrants and a slight decrease in support for

'more' immigrants. These changes are not sizable, however, and highlight the complex relationship between various factors influencing Canadians' opinions regarding immigrants.

5.2.1. Controlling for Employment Status

The employment status of individuals, which can be influenced by provincial economic performance, has emerged as a significant factor influencing attitudes toward immigrants. The local economy may play a role in shaping attitudes towards immigration, potentially through the availability of jobs and concerns about labor market competition (Peter & Übelmesser, 2023). When jobs are limited, individuals may view immigrants as competitors, potentially leading to more negative attitudes. For example, research by Dehdari (2022) reveals that the impact of layoffs on anti-immigrant views is heightened in areas with a higher proportion of low-skilled workers, suggesting a link between job insecurity and negative views towards immigrants. This link is further emphasized by Cohen (2018) and Haaland and Roth (2020), who highlight that economic insecurity, particularly the perceived threat to job opportunities, often fuels anti-immigrant attitudes. Although this link may be influenced by regional aspects, such as existing levels of immigration or the main industries in a region, the underlying relationship between economic insecurity and anti-immigrant sentiment is well-established.

Furthermore, regional economic performance can influence the overall economic conditions of a province, particularly the unemployment rate (Bilodeau et al., 2012). Stronger provincial economies tend to have lower unemployment rates, while weaker economies often experience higher unemployment, making it more difficult for people to find and maintain jobs (Elhorst, 2003). This, in turn, can meaningfully influence citizens' employment status and their sense of economic security. As Kayran (2024) highlights, the relative socio-economic risks and worries individuals face within their province, compared to others, can shape their views on immigration distinctively. Thus, living in a province with a higher unemployment rate may not only increase the likelihood of being unemployed or facing job insecurity but also contribute

to a sense of relative poverty, thereby potentially promoting a sense of job competition and negative attitudes towards immigrants.

These studies collectively highlight the importance of considering the employment status of CES survey respondents when analyzing their attitudes toward immigrants. Therefore, by accounting for individual-level employment difference, the analysis hopes to accurately assess the unique impact of broader provincial economic conditions on Canadians' attitudes toward immigration.

As presented in Tables 5.2.1 A-C in the appendices, the findings of the controlled analysis reveal that the original negative association between provincial unemployment levels and favorable views toward immigration observed in Table 5.2 becomes less pronounced when controlling for employment status. More precisely, the Gamma values for inactive, unemployed, and employed CES survey respondents are -0.138, -0.129, and -0.082, respectively. All three Gamma values are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$), indicating weak negative associations. The association appears to be slightly weaker for the unemployed group, however. These findings suggest that the initial relationship found in Table 5.2 between unemployment levels and Canadians' immigration views might be partially attributed to their employment statuses.

Regardless of the slight variations in strength and direction of the associations with potential confounders, the findings discussed above collectively confirm a statistically valid relationship between regional economic performance and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. This raises the question of whether these regional economic realities were also influencing how respondents perceived the overall state of the national economy and their personal financial situations in 2021. Addressing this question is crucial for understanding the complex interplay between objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions in shaping immigration attitudes, a central focus of my research question. With

this in mind, the subsequent analysis of H-5 will examine how provincial objective economic indicators shaped respondents' subjective economic perceptions.

5.3. Provincial GDP Growth Rates: Tracing Effects on Respondents National Economy Perceptions

This section, along with Section 5.4, focuses on H-5, which posits that Canadians residing in provinces with (a) higher annual real GDP growth level(s) and (b) lower unemployment level(s) will have more positive perceptions of (c) the national economy and (d) personal financial situations compared to those in provinces with lower GDP growth levels and higher unemployment rates. Almost contrary to these theoretical expectations, Table 5.3 shows that there is a very weak but statistically meaningful relationship between CES respondents' perceptions of the national economy and levels of their provincial GDP growth in 2021.

Table 5.3 Relationship between respondents' national economic perceptions and provincial annual real GDP growth levels, 2021

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Worsened	74.1	70.4	68.8
	(1028)	(6371)	(4846)
2. Unchanged	20.7	22.5	23.1
	(287)	(2036)	(1626)
3. Improved	5.2	7.1	8.1
	(72)	(643)	(573)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 17482**
Gamma: 0.057	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 23.406	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

This is reflected by the Gamma value of 0.057 ($p < 0.001$) and a Chi-Square value of 23.406 ($p < 0.001$). As GDP growth levels switch from 'Low' to 'High,' the percentage of

Canadians perceiving that the national economy had 'Worsened' in 2020 decreases slightly by 5.3 percentage points. A similar pattern, with a small change (almost 3 percentage points), is also observable for respondents' perceiving improvement in the national economy. Although these minor changes are statistically significant, the small Gamma value suggests that the practical impact of the provincial GDP growth on the economic perceptions of respondents is rather very weak. Given the weak strength of this association, no further testing was undertaken as it is assumed that the association observed above may very well exist but could be practically negligible and presumably will not be statistically meaningful. Next, I test if there is an association between provincial GDP growth rates and perceptions of personal finances.

5.4.The Effects of Provincial GDP Growth Levels on Individuals Personal Financial Perceptions

Unlike Table 5.3, Table 5.4 below reveals a moderate and positive relationship between Canadians' perceived personal economic situations and their provinces' real GDP growth levels in 2021. The Gamma value of 0.135 ($p < 0.001$) confirms this link.

Table 5.4 Respondents' personal financial perceptions and provincial annual real GDP growth levels, 2021

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Worsened	31.2	31.7	23.6
	(471)	(3074)	(1785)
2. Unchanged	57.3	53.3	58.7
	(867)	(5169)	(4430)
3. Improved	11.5	15.1	17.7
	(174)	(1463)	(1336)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 18769**
Gamma: 0.135	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 161.795	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

It can be seen from the Table above that as provincial real-world economic conditions change from 'low' to 'high,' the percentage of CES survey participants who perceived that their personal finances had 'worsened' (declined) in 2020 decrease slightly, with a noticeable 7.5 percentage point difference between the two GDP groups. More precisely, Table 5.4 shows that in provinces where economies were performing negatively (had lower levels of real GDP growth), 31.2% of respondents living in these provinces perceived that their personal finances had worsened in 2020. This figure increases a little to only 31.7% in provinces where economic performance was 'moderate' and declines a bit further to reach 23.6% in provinces that had experienced higher economic growth rates in 2021.

This pattern suggests that negative provincial economic conditions were perhaps a key reason why a significant percentage, 31.2%, of CES participants perceived that their personal finances had gotten worse in 2020. Given the limits natural to this analysis, this trend merits a deep dive into exploring its true causes and systematically assessing moderating factors, if any, a task that cannot be accomplished by the basic analysis conducted here.

In contrast to low-growth provinces, respondents home to regions with 'high' GDP growth rates reported improved personal finances, where a clear increase, although small in statistical terms, can be seen as economic performance experienced an upward trajectory. In particular, when CES respondents were living in 'low' growth provinces, about 11.5% seemed to have believed that their personal finances had 'improved.' This percentage increased slightly to 15.1% for those who were part of provinces with 'moderate' and further to 17.7% in provinces with 'high' real GDP growth levels.

This pattern shows an increase of 6.2 percentage points between respondents who reported declining personal finances and those who perceived that they were doing well financially in 2020. These statistics, once again, provide further support to the second component of H-5. They suggest that as respondents' provincial economic conditions

improved, there was a greater tendency among Canadians to feel that their personal finances were also improving. This association is further assessed by introducing various control variables, as detailed below.

5.4.1. Gender

Previous empirical studies in the field of public opinion and immigration have regularly identified gender as a significant factor influencing attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies (Ersanilli & Präg, 2021; Haaland & Roth, 2020; Valentino et al., 2019). This analysis also anticipates that gender is likely related to regional economic performance due to differences in labor market participation. This is because differences in labor force participation rates between genders can influence the overall productivity and skill composition of provinces' workforce, impacting its economic output and growth.

Provinces with specific industries may attract a higher proportion of one gender, influencing overall economic performance. The types of industries prevalent in a province can influence its gender balance and subsequently affect economic performance. For example, Drolet (2020, p. 4) found that in 2018, 30.6% of newly hired men were in trades, transport, and equipment operator occupations, highlighting a tendency for provinces with economies reliant on these sectors, such as Alberta and Saskatchewan, to have a higher proportion of men in the workforce. Conversely, 35% of newly hired women were in sales and service occupations, while another 17.9% were in non-professional business and finance occupations, suggesting provinces with larger service sectors may have a higher proportion of women (p. 4).

This gender-based distribution of the workforce can influence provincial economic performance in a number of ways. The concentration of men in resource-based industries, for example, can lead to higher average wages and contribute to overall economic growth. However, it can also limit economic opportunities for women in those regions. On the other hand, a greater proportion of women in service sectors, such as healthcare and education, can

provide greater stability and contribute to a more diversified economy, as these sectors are less susceptible to economic fluctuations.

Furthermore, according to Statistics Canada (2023), the labor force participation rate for females is 61.6%, significantly lower than for males, 69.7%, across Canada. This gap differs regionally. Alberta has a larger gap (65% for females vs. 74.3% for males) compared to provinces like Newfoundland and Labrador, where the gap is smaller (55.2% for females vs. 60.5% for males). These differences in labor force participation rates may further contribute to the differing gender distributions across provinces, with provinces having a larger gap tend to have a higher proportion of men. Alberta, for instance, with its historically strong, resource-based economy, has a higher proportion of men in its labor force compared to provinces like New Brunswick, which has a more balanced gender distribution (Moyser, 2017).

Such differences, which are perhaps influenced by gender roles and experiences, could influence attitudes toward immigrants. Men, for example, due to their concentration in certain sectors, may face greater job insecurity compared to women. This could lead to differing perspectives on immigration, as individuals with more stable employment may view immigrants more favorably due to perceived economic benefits, while those facing greater job insecurity might express more negative attitudes, possibly stemming from concerns about labor market competition.

This aligns with Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun's (2011) study from San Diego, which found that men's concerns about the economic impact of immigration are often linked to their perceptions of labor market competition and the potential for downward pressure on wages. This finding highlights the potential for gender to confound the relationship between provincial economic performance and immigration attitudes, as men and women in similar economic circumstances may still hold differing views regarding immigrants due to their distinct labor market experiences.

Furthermore, it is important to consider that gender is not only a factor influencing attitudes but is also potentially correlated with objective economic performance. Some studies suggest that regions with a higher proportion of women in the labor force may benefit from greater diversity in skills and perspectives, leading to increased innovation and productivity (OECD, 2020). Additionally, a more balanced gender distribution in the workforce can contribute to greater economic equality and social well-being within a region. Therefore, controlling for gender in this analysis is crucial to avoid confounding the relationship between regional economic performance and Canadians' immigration attitudes.

Tables 5.4.1 (A-B) in the appendices provide a detailed breakdown of the relationship between CES respondents' personal economic perceptions and provincial GDP growth rates observed in Table 5.4, controlling for gender. It is clear from the Table that even after introducing the confounding variable, the relationship is moderate and significant for both genders. This is confirmed by the Gamma values for Males (Gamma = 0.143, $p < 0.000$) and Female respondents (Gamma = 0.110, $p < 0.000$), respectively.

5.4.2. Income

As noted in section 5.1.1 above, income is a significant confounder in relation to immigration attitudes, so it was also used as a control here. Similar to the overall relationship trend observed in Table 5.4, the findings of this variable are also statistically significant. Specifically, the original association between provincial GDP growth rates and respondents' personal finances persists with moderate levels of strength across all income groups. The Gamma values for each income bracket, as shown by Tables 5.4.2 (A-C) in the appendices, are as follows:

- Low income: Gamma = 0.113$p < 0.000$,
- Medium income: Gamma = 0.166, $p < 0.000$, and
- High income: Gamma = 0.146, $p < 0.000$.

5.4.3. Employment status

While the rationale for including the employment status of CES survey participants detailed in section 5.2.1 remains the same, the results of employment status as a control variable remain broadly consistent with the original association documented by Table 5.4. In particular, the original association exists only for inactive and employed Canadians and is both very weak and non-significant for unemployed Canadians as shown by the Tables 5.4.3 (A-C) in the appendices. Specific trends of each employment status are as follows:

- Inactive respondents: Gamma = 0.119 ($p < 0.000$),
- Unemployed Canadians: Gamma = -0.096 ($p = 0.108$), and
- Employed Canadians: Gamma = 0.142 ($p < 0.000$).

Despite within-group differences, altogether, the above patterns show the moderate level(s) of the original relationship found in Table 5.5, therefore confirming that the observed association is not spurious. The strength of the association does differ across employment statuses, presumably showing that the employment status of CES respondents alone may not have any strong influence on the overall association in question.

5.4.4. Education levels

Research consistently identifies education as a key factor shaping immigration attitudes in developed economies. Empirical studies from Canada and other advanced democracies invariably show that more educated individuals generally express more positive views toward immigration (Dražanová et al., 2024; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Côté & Erickson, 2009). This connection is attributed to both economic and cultural factors. For instance, education may promote a better understanding of how immigration can contribute to economic growth by filling labor shortages, contributing to innovation, or expanding consumer markets. This could reduce the perception of immigrants as an economic threat and may foster more favorable views toward immigration. Additionally, some studies show that increased exposure to diverse

perspectives through education can also foster greater cultural understanding and promote tolerance among people (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). This individual-level understanding can lead to greater public support for pro-immigration policies at the regional level, which in turn can attract skilled workers who may contribute to increasing economic growth.

Beyond individuals, higher education levels within a province can directly contribute to improved economic performance. A more educated workforce attracts high-skilled industries by providing qualified workers with specialized skills and knowledge. Higher education institutions often serve as hubs for research and development, generating new ideas and technologies. This promotes innovation and businesses, eventually driving economic growth. Moreover, education could also enhance productivity by equipping workers with problem-solving and critical-thinking abilities. These skills are essential for adapting to technological advancements and ensuring a competitive economy. This is supported by Bertoletti et al. (2022), who find that the quality and activities of higher education institutions significantly impact regional economic output in Europe. For instance, they highlight that institutions with excellent teaching performance generate a highly qualified workforce, leading to larger effects on regional economies.

This impact of higher education on regional economic performance is further evident in Canada. For example, Ontario and British Columbia, with 70% and 63% of their population having tertiary education (Statistics Canada, 2024), are consistently ranked as top-performing provinces in terms of real annual GDP growth rates in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2022b). Thus, the improved economic performance, driven by education, can create a more positive environment where citizens are less likely to view immigrants as an economic threat and more likely to support policies that attract skilled workers and contribute to further economic development.

Furthermore, Margalit (2019) suggests that education levels can influence individuals' perceptions through various channels. Specifically, higher education may be associated with greater economic literacy, enabling a more nuanced understanding of complex economic issues, including the potential impacts of immigrants. Additionally, education can influence individuals' socio-economic statuses and job security, which could further shape their economic outlook. These individual perceptions, formed by education, can collectively promote economic openness and flexibility within a region. This can lead to greater support for policies that encourage investment and immigration, ultimately adding to stronger economic performance. The positive economic environment, in turn, could influence individual perceptions and attitudes toward economic policies related to immigration, potentially leading to even greater support for pro-immigration policies.

Thus, individuals with higher education may be more likely to recognize the potential benefits of immigrants for economic growth and innovation (Card et al., 2012), while people with lower education levels might be more prone to fears of economic competition (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019). Given these potential influences of education on both economic perceptions and immigration attitudes, controlling for education levels is crucial to isolate the specific impact of education on attitudes toward immigrants, separating it from other factors that may influence both economic perceptions and views on immigration.

Tables 5.4.4 (A-C) in the appendices offer detailed statistical outputs, and as can be seen, the overall pattern of education as a confounding variable is positive and moderate, confirming the overall original association. Key statistics are as follows:

- Low education levels: Gamma = 0.094 ($p = 0.047$);
- Medium education levels: Gamma = (0.156, $p < 0.000$);
- High education levels: Gamma = 0.108, ($p < 0.000$).

These findings reflect the moderate level of association found in Table 5.4, and it can be ruled out that the original link is not spurious, though slight differences are apparent within each response category of the confounding variable.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter examined the relationship between objective economic conditions and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants, focusing on the impacts of provincial GDP growth and unemployment rates for 2021. The analysis revealed a complex connection between these economic indicators and views on immigration.

Generally, higher provincial GDP growth rates were moderately associated with more favorable views toward immigration, while higher unemployment rates were weakly linked to less favorable views. These associations were statistically significant and remain so, even after controlling for potential confounders. However, the effect sizes differed as they emerged across sections 5.1 to 5.4, suggesting that real-world economic realities play a role but are not the only determinant of Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants.

The crosstab analysis also revealed that provincial GDP growth rates were associated with respondents' perceptions of NEPs and PEPs. In particular, there was a moderate positive link between GDP growth rates and PEPs, implying that positive economic conditions may have contributed to a more positive outlook, which could have indirectly influenced attitudes toward immigration.

The crosstabulation controlled for several potential confounding variables, including income, employment status, gender, and education levels. Broadly, the associations between economic conditions and immigration attitudes remained statistically significant after these controls, signifying that the observed relationships are not only attributable to these confounding factors.

These findings collectively confirm a statistically valid relationship between regional economic performance and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. However, the analysis also revealed that these objective economic realities also influenced how Canadians perceived the overall state of the NEPs and PEPs. Understanding these subjective perceptions is crucial for a more thorough understanding of how economic aspects shape immigration attitudes, which is a central focus of my research question. The next chapter delves deeper into how these subjective perceptions directly influenced respondents' views toward immigrants, further clarifying the complex interplay of objective and subjective economic factors in shaping public opinion on immigration in Canada.

Chapter 6: The Role of Subjective Economic Perceptions in Shaping Immigration Attitudes

As emerged in Chapter 5, real-world economic indicators provide valuable insights into how overall economic conditions affect immigration attitudes. However, they may not fully capture how individuals experience and interpret these conditions in everyday life. Subjective perceptions of the economy can influence the attitudes and behaviors of individuals, including their views regarding immigrants, as emerged in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter Two. Incorporating perception-based measures, therefore, allows for a more detailed understanding of the specific aspects that act together to shape individuals' immigration attitudes.

Broadening the focus of my analysis to the national level, H-4 predicts that Canadians with more (a) negative National Economic Perceptions (NEPs) and (b) negative Personal Economic Perceptions (PEPs) will perceive higher job threats from immigrants than their counterparts. NEPs include CES survey respondents' assessments of the overall state of the national economy, while PEPs reflect their views on their own financial well-being in 2020. Relatedly, H-2 proposes that negative views toward immigrants are influenced by individuals (a) negative NEPs and (b) negative PEPs.

This chapter explores the role of these subjective economic perceptions in shaping attitudes toward immigrants. I will report the findings of H-4 and H-2 by analyzing potential associations between negative NEPs and PEPs and attitudes toward immigrants. In doing so, the analysis hopes to add to the existing Canadian literature, which has largely overlooked both NEPs' and PEPs' role in immigration attitudes.

6.1. National Economic Perceptions and Immigrant Job Threats

In line with the theoretical expectations of H-4 (a), Table 6.1 shows a statistically significant, moderate, and negative relationship between CES respondents' perceived job threat from immigrants and views about the overall state of the Canadian economy. This is

reflected by the Gamma value of -0.265 ($p < 0.001$) and the Chi-Square value of 257.084 ($p < 0.001$). As respondents' NEPs shift from 'Worsened to 'Improved,' the percentage of Canadians perceiving 'low' levels of job threats from immigrants increases significantly, with a 21.1 percentage point difference between these two economic perception levels.

Table 6.1: Respondents' national economy perceptions and immigrant job threat perceptions, 2021

National economy perceptions	**1. Worsened**	**2. Unchanged**	**3. Improved**
1. Low	53.3	64.7	74.4
	(4570	(1813)	(672)
2. Moderate	18.5	17.5	11.7
	(1590)	(490)	(106)
3. High	28.2	17.8	13.8
	(2415)	(498)	(125)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 12279**
Gamma: -0.265	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 257.084	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

More specifically, when the economy was perceived as 'Worsened,' 53.3% of CES survey participants perceived low job threats from immigrants. As shown by the Table above, this figure grows to 64.7% when economic conditions were perceived as 'Unchanged,' and further climbs to 74.4% when national economic conditions were regarded as 'Improved' by individuals. This trend reveals that negative NEPs held by Canadians were perhaps a key factor contributing to job threat perceptions they perceived from immigrants in 2021. Further advanced-level statistical analysis checking the mediating effect of this trend is needed, however, to establish a causal relationship, as crosstabulation alone cannot confirm causality in this case.

Conversely, the percentage of CES PES respondents who felt 'High' levels of immigrant job threat indicate rather a declining threat pattern where a notable decline can be observed as NEPs change from 'Worsened' to 'Improved' levels. When the national economic situations were deemed as 'Worsened,' 28.2% of respondents seemed to have perceived 'High' level job market threats or competition from immigrants. This percentage declines to 17.8% for those who regarded NEPs as 'Unchanged' and further to 13.8% for those who perceived and reported these as 'Improved.'

This pattern signifies a significant decline of 14.3 percentage points between Canadians who felt that the national economy was performing insufficiently in 2020 and those who perceived that it had performed well, experiencing high growth throughout 2020. This trend provides additional support for H-4 (a) while revealing that negative NEPs significantly influenced individuals' job threat perceptions arising from the presence of immigrants in 2021. The overall association pattern was tested for robustness, and findings with control variables are reported below.

6.1.1. Gender

The results of the crosstabs with gender identity as a control variable confirm that the original link between respondents' negative NEPs and perceived job threats from immigrants is statistically meaningful and negative for both Males (Chi-Square: 138.535, $p < .001$, Gamma = -0.257) and Females (Chi-Square = 101.604, $p < .001$, Gamma = -0.257). Tables 6.1.1 (A-B) in the appendices provide the detailed test results. The pattern provides evidence against a spurious relationship and offers overall support for H-4 (a).

6.1.2. Income

The findings of income as a control variable are presented in Tables 6.1.2 (A-C) in the appendices. As can be seen from the Tables, the analysis outcomes show a consistent pattern across all income groups: the initial negative relationship between Canadians' NEPs and

immigrant job threat perceptions remains moderate and statistically significant. This is quantified by the Chi-Square values, which are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for all income groups, revealing that the observed relationship is unlikely due to chance. The Gamma values for each income group are as follows:

- Low-income respondents: Gamma = -0.186, $p < .001$.
- Middle-income Canadians: Gamma = -0.283, $p < .001$.
- High-income Canadians: Gamma = : -0.279, $p < .001$.

It is worth noting that the relationship, while persistent across all income groups, appears to be slightly weaker among low-income group (Gamma = -0.186) compared to middle- and high-income brackets. This observed difference in the strength of the association could indicate that other factors beyond perceptions of the national economy may be influencing how low-income Canadians perceive job threats related to immigration. This finding requires further investigation to understand the factors contributing to this difference, as my analysis primarily descriptive.

6.1.3. Employment status

While broadly mirroring the results of other control variables reported above, the analysis of the employment status of CES survey respondents also indicates a consistent and statistically negative relationship between Canadians' NEPs and job threats perceived from immigrants across all employment statuses, as documented in Tables 6.1.3 (A-C) in the appendices. The Chi-Square values are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for all employment groups (Inactive, Unemployed, and Employed), showing that the observed association is unlikely due to a random chance. The strength of the relationship, as revealed by Gamma values, differs slightly across employment status, however, as shown below:

- Inactive Canadians: Gamma = -0.374, $p < .001$.
- Unemployed Canadians: Gamma = -0.182, $p < .001$.

- Employed Canadians: Gamma = -0.207, p < .001.

Interestingly, the strength of the observed link, as indicated by the Gamma values above, appears to be strong and significantly higher among 'Inactive' CES respondents than their counters parts. Although these differences in Gamma values merit further research, they do not markedly change the overall relationship pattern observed in Table 6.1.

6.1.4. Education levels

Respondents' perceived job threat from immigrants appear to be influenced by their negative NEPs, regardless of education levels, as shown by Tables 6.1.4 (A-C) in the appendices. Those with lower education who saw the economy as weak felt more threatened. This trend exists across all education levels, but the link is weakest for those with low education (Gamma = -0.055, p = 0.408). Despite varying strengths of association (medium education Gamma = -0.259, high education Gamma = -0.232), the relationship is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) and negative across all education levels, broadly reflecting the original crosstab results shown in Table 6.1. Therefore, it can be deduced from the analysis of H-4 (a) that Canadians' negative NEPs were indeed associated with job threats they perceived from immigrants. The perceived job threats were also associated with how they viewed immigrants in 2021 (H-2) is explored in the next section.

6.2. Effects of National Economic Perceptions on Attitudes Toward Immigrants

As hypothesized under H-2 (a), Table 6.2 shows a strong and positive association (Gamma 0.347, $p < 0.001$) between CES respondents' negative NEPs and their negative views toward immigrants. As perceptions of the economy shift from negative (worsened) to positive (improved), the percentage of Canadians desiring 'fewer' immigrants decreases significantly, showing a 24-percentage point decline. More specifically, when the economy is perceived as 'worsened,' 43.3% of Canadians wanted fewer immigrants. This percentage drops to 23.7%

when the economy was perceived as 'unchanged,' and further declines to 19.4% when it was deemed as 'improved' by the respondents.

Table 6.2: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions

National economy perception(s)	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	43.3	23.7	19.4
	(5063)	(902)	(244)
2. Same as now	39.3	49.4	43.7
	(4592)	(1880)	(550)
3. More	17.4	26.9	37
	(2032)	(1025)	(466)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N= 16754**
Gamma: 0.347	Gamma approx. sig. 0.000		
Chi square: 773.575	P-value: 0.000		

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Conversely, the percentage of CES survey respondents who wanted 'more' immigrants also increases significantly as economic perceptions improve. Only 17.4% of respondents wanted 'more' immigrants when the economy was considered as 'worsened.' This figure increases to 26.9% for those who viewed the economy as 'unchanged' and further to 37% for those who perceived it as 'improved.' This trend signifies a notable increase of almost 20 percentage points between Canadians who perceived the economy as the worst and those who saw it as in the best conditions.

The overall pattern supports the theoretical expectations of H-2 (a) and suggests that negative economic perceptions were a key driver of anti-immigrant attitudes among Canadians in 2021. These results also suggest that improved perceptions of the national economy were associated with a greater tendency to favor more immigrants and a lower inclination to prefer fewer.

In comparing the findings of H-2's first indicator with those of H-1, it is evident that the relationship between negative NEPs and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants differs

depending on whether a subjective measure or an objective indicator is used. Specifically, the H-1 analysis shows a moderate but statistically significant link between GDP growth and immigration attitudes (Gamma = 0.139, $p < 0.001$). This link, however, is weaker than that found in H-2 (a). The H-2 (a) analysis, which focuses on the negative NEPs of respondents, reveals a stronger positive association (Gamma = 0.347, $p < 0.001$).

These results suggest that subjective perceptions may have played a more prominent role in shaping immigration attitudes than objective indicators. However, it is important to acknowledge that the two indicators capture different aspects of economic reality. Subjective perceptions mirror respondents' lived experiences and interpretations, which can be swayed by numerous factors, while objective indicators like GDP growth provide a broader macroeconomic outlook. Given the distinct nature of these indicators, directly comparing the strength of these observed associations may not be suitable. The observed difference in Gamma values, however, highlights the importance of considering both NEPs and objective economic aspects when examining the complex relationship between economic perceptions and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants.

Having noted this and to check the robustness of the association found in Table 6.1, I performed various crosstabulations accounting for confounding variables, and the results are as follows.

6.2.1. Party identities

Party affiliation as a control variable is included in this analysis due to the well-documented link between political beliefs and attitudes toward economic policy and immigrants in North America (Brooks et al., 2016). Studies show distinct partisan divides on these issues. Conservatives tend to express more negative views toward immigrants and voice strong concerns about government spending and the economic impact of immigration (Indelicato et al., 2023). Conversely, those on the left generally show greater openness to both

government actions and immigration (Brooks et al., 2016; Jost et al., 2009; Massey & Pren, 2012).

Research also shows that individuals may adjust their views on immigration to align with their party's position (Harteveld et al., 2017), particularly when those parties hold strong positions on the issue. This highlights the potential for party cues to shape individuals' opinions on different issues. Furthermore, immigration is naturally a complex issue, often intertwined with economic, cultural, and security concerns, as noted in Chapter Two, so it often generates diverse and conflicting views within the population (Hellwig & Kweon, 2016). Within this complex context, party affiliation and cues can provide lenses for people to form and update views, especially among those who are more politically aware (Hellwig & Kweon, 2016).

Thus, by controlling for party identification, especially the difference between conservatives and non-conservatives, the analysis aims to separate the effect of economic views on attitudes toward immigrants. This is important to make sure that the basic crosstab findings are not confounded by existing political views that are known to affect both economic and immigration opinions (Schmidt-Catran & Czymara, 2023).

Even after controlling for party affiliation, Tables 6.2.1 (A-B) show a statistically significant and positive association between NEP and immigration attitudes. This holds true for both Conservatives (Chi-Square = 91.000, $p < .001$, Gamma = 0.265) and Non-Conservatives (Chi-Square = 216.619, $p < .001$, Gamma = 0.229). Despite the minimal observed differences in immigration attitudes between Conservatives and Non-Conservatives, the positive association originally identified in the crosstab analysis (Table 6.2) remains consistent within each party group. These findings provide evidence against a spurious relationship, suggesting that there is a strong relationship between respondents' negative NEPs and negative immigration attitudes, even when accounting for party identification. This further

strengthens the theoretical support for H-2 (a) while signifying that the association is not solely dependent on political identity. Next, I turn to regions and assess if the same can be observed.

6.2.2. Regions

Canada's unique approach to immigration, where provinces have a considerable level of control and say in immigration matters (Paquet, 2019), means that individuals' views regarding immigrants can differ from region to region. This is because each Canadian region has unique economic needs, different economic diversification levels, and a diverse immigration context and history (Bossé, 2023; Paquet, 2014). This is directly relevant to my analysis because the provinces included in this study show significant variation in economic performance, as measured by real GDP growth in 2021. For instance, Prince Edward Island experienced the highest growth rate at 7.9%, while Saskatchewan experienced a decline, with a growth rate of -0.9% (Statistics Canada, 2022b).

This represents a considerable range in economic performance across the provinces. These economic differences are likely to influence regional attitudes towards immigrants. Provinces with stronger economic growth, such as Prince Edward Island and British Columbia, might have a greater demand for overseas labor and, therefore, view immigrants more favorably as a source of skilled workers and a boost to economic activity. Conversely, people in provinces with weaker economic growth, such as Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador, might experience higher unemployment rates and concerns about job competition, potentially leading to less favorable views on immigration.

Furthermore, Canadian provinces' historical and cultural contexts also contribute to regional differences in attitudes toward immigrants. The Prairie Provinces, for instance, which experienced significant immigration during their settlement in the early 1900s, might have a more positive view of immigration due to their history of settling newcomers (Paquet, 2014). In contrast, the Atlantic provinces, which have historically received fewer immigrants, might

have less familiarity with immigration and potentially more mixed attitudes (Edmonston, 2016). Additionally, the concentration of immigrants in large cities areas, such as Toronto (46.6%), Vancouver (41.8%), and Calgary (31.5%), has created diverse urban landscapes, presumably prompting more accepting attitudes in those cities than Drummondville (3.8%) or Saguenay (1.3%), respectively (Statistics Canada, 2022c).

In view of the real-world economic realities and historical nuances, controlling for regional differences becomes mandatory to isolate the effect of Canadians' economic evaluations on their immigration views and avoid attributing regional differences to economic factors alone, as observed in Table 6.2.

With this in mind, and after controlling for regions, once again, the relationship between respondents' negative NEPs and attitudes toward immigrants remains broadly consistent across different regions of the country. As documented by Tables 6.2.2 (A-B), every region shows a statistically significant and positive association between perceptions of an improving national economy and a greater openness to increasing the number of immigrants ($p < 0.001$ for all regions). The strength of this relationship, as measured by Gamma values, varies slightly across regions, with values of 0.398 in the Atlantic region, 0.377 in Ontario, and 0.365 in the West.

Notwithstanding this overall trend, the association in Quebec (Gamma = 0.276) appears to be somewhat moderate compared to other regions. Despite the apparent difference, these results suggest that although negative NEPs influenced Canadians' negative immigration attitudes, the differences in the strength of the association across regions show that other factors (that fall beyond the scope of this analysis) might also have been at play at the time of the CES survey in 2021.

6.2.3. Age

The addition of CES survey respondents' ages categorized into three different groups as a control variable is necessary because of the persistent nature of individuals' attitudes toward

immigrants and immigration, which form during early life stages (Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008; Kustov et al., 2021). Individuals coming of age in different socio-political and economic settings develop unique worldviews, leading to 'generational' differences in immigration attitudes, as highlighted by Coenders and Scheepers (2008). Dražanová et al. (2024) further show that the negative relationship between age and pro-immigration attitudes is a cohort effect and that it reflects generational differences in socialization and values rather than changes within individuals over time.

Similarly, age may also be linked with different economic experiences and perspectives, and these experiences are often tied to regional economic performance. For instance, younger people are more likely to migrate to regions with increasing technology sectors or strong service industries, which are often associated with higher economic growth and indicators like employment rates and average wages. Conversely, older workers may be concentrated in regions with more established industries like manufacturing or agriculture, which might be experiencing slower growth or decline (International Organization for Migration, 2020). This concentration of age groups within specific sectors can, therefore, influence regional economic performance.

Furthermore, different age groups are affected by distinct real-world economic realities, shaping their overall economic viewpoints, and varying experiences can influence their perceptions of overall economic performance and future economic outlook (De Vries et al., 2018). Younger workers entering the job market during economic decline, for example, may experience long periods of underemployment and depressed wages, shaping their long-term economic outlook and potentially influencing their views on immigrants as competition in the job market. Older workers nearing retirement, on the other hand, may be more vulnerable to economic downturns due to potential losses in savings and investments. These different

economic scenarios may influence individuals' perceptions of the overall economic performance and their expectations for the future economic outlook.

Because age influences both regional economic performance (through the types of industries that attract different age groups) and individual economic experiences (which can shape immigration attitudes), it is crucial to control for age to isolate the true effect of regional economic performance on immigration attitudes. Including age groups as a control variable thus helps ensure that the observed link between respondents' economic evaluations and immigration views is not merely a spurious correlation driven by generational differences.

With age groups introduced as a confounder, the relationship between individuals' negative NEPs and views toward immigrants, as initially presented in Table 6.2, remains constant for all age groups. The Chi-square values are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for all ages, as shown in Tables 6.2.3 (A to C) in the appendices. These results once again indicate that the association between the two variables is not due to chance and is present independent of age. However, the strength of this association, as indicated by Gamma values, differs slightly across age groups:

- Young Canadians (18-34): Gamma = 0.271, $p< 0.001$;
- Middle-aged Canadians (35-54): Gamma = 0.375, $p< 0.001$;
- Older Canadians (55+): Gamma = 0.378, $p< 0.001$).

The moderate relationship observed among young Canadians (Gamma = 0.271) merits further analysis to understand the aspects contributing to this difference, including potential differences in social experiences and economic circumstances of this group.

6.2.4. Education levels

The results of education levels as a confounder show that respondents who felt good about the economy in 2021 were more open to immigrants, while those who felt that the economy was struggling were more restrictive of immigration. This pattern holds true across

education levels and supports the original crosstab results, as established by the statistically significant Gamma and Chi-square values ($p < 0.001$) documented in Tables 6.2.4 (A-C) in the appendices.

However, the strength of the relationship between negative NEPs and views about immigrants, as indicated by the Gamma values, is not uniform across education levels. Those with less formal education (Gamma = 0.414) seem to be more swayed by the economy when forming their opinions regarding immigrants compared to those with medium (Gamma = 0.335) or high (Gamma = 0.270) levels of education, although the relationship remains statistically significant and positive for all education categories.

The notable difference in Gamma values might be due to a few things. One possibility is that respondents with higher education might have more knowledge about how the economy works. Consequently, they are less likely to blame immigration for economic problems, and their views regarding immigrants may remain more stable even when the economy experiences changes, especially negative trajectories. Additionally, education can affect individuals' social and cultural views. People with more education might be more open to different cultures and less likely to see immigrants as a threat. This could partially explain why their views on immigration are often less tied to how the economy is doing. Finally, education can lead to better jobs and more financial security. This might make people less worried about competition from immigrants, so their views on immigration do not change much, even if the economy is not performing well in terms of GDP growth. In short, the varying impact of economic perceptions on immigration attitudes across education levels may be due to a combination of factors: increased economic literacy, greater cultural openness, and better job security associated with higher education.

While the focus above is on the effects of respondents' negative NEPs, it is equally crucial to explore if individuals' negative PEPs (H-4b) were associated with job threats they perceived from immigrants and if a similar overall relationship holds for these perceptions.

6.3. Personal Economic Perceptions and Perceived Job Threat from Immigrants

Supporting the theoretical expectations of H-4(b), Table 6.3 reveals a moderate and negative association between CES respondents' PEPs and job threats/competition they perceived from immigrants in 2021. The Chi-Square of 351.393 ($p< 0.000$) and Gamma value of -0.247 ($p<0.001$) confirm this relationship.

As Canadians' PEPs change from the view of 'worsened' (negative) to 'Improved' (positive), the percentage of individuals feeling a 'low' level of job competition from immigrants increases reasonably, where a 24-percentage point difference between these two personal financial situations is observable. Specifically, Table 6.3 indicates that when personal economic circumstances were perceived negatively, 47.7% of CES survey respondents reported 'low' job threats from immigrants. This figure rises to 59.2% when Canadians perceived their personal finances as 'unchanged,' and further increases to 71.7% for those who felt that they were doing well financially in 2020. This pattern implies that Canadians' negative PEPs were perhaps a key reason why they perceived immigrants took jobs away from them. Owing much to the limits of this analysis, this trend warrants a deep dive into the causes, something that cannot be accomplished by the basic analysis conducted here.

Table 6.3: Respondents' personal financial perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, 2021

Personal financial perception(s)	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved

1. Low	47.7	59.2	71.7
	(1688)	(4451)	(1502)
2. Moderate	20.2	18.7	10.7
	(714)	(1403)	(224)
3. High	32.1	22.1	17.6
	(1135)	(1660)	(368)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 13145**
Gamma: -0.247	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 351.393	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

In contrast to 'low' job threats, the percentages of PES respondents' perceiving a 'high' level of job competition from immigrants show rather a declining threat pattern where a clear decline can be seen as respondents' PEPs transition from negative to positive. Specifically, when PEPs were regarded as 'Worsened,' 32.1% of PES participants seemed to have perceived a 'High' level of job competition from immigrants. This percentage declines to 22.1% for respondents who perceived that their finances were 'Unchanged' and further to 17.6% for Canadians who perceived these as 'Improved.'

This trend shows a significant decline of 14.5 percentage points between Canadians who reported having negative personal finances in 2020 and those who perceived that they were doing well. These statistics provide further support to H-4 (b) while showing that negative PEPs greatly influenced Canadians' job threat perceptions from immigrants. The results also show that as respondents' PEPs improve, there is a greater tendency among Canadians to feel less threatened by immigrants in the job market.

Similar to section 6.2 above, the following control variables were introduced to see whether the overall relationship observed in Table 6.3 is spurious. Results are almost the same and reported briefly below. Detailed Tables were not prepared for the control variables as they

are almost the same as the ones reported for H-4 (a) in the appendices. However, statistics summary Tables 6.3.1 to 6.3.4 are provided in the appendices.

6.3.1. Gender and income levels

As shown by summary Table 6.3.1 in the appendices, a statistically significant link exists between PES respondents' personal financial perceptions and job threats perceived from immigrants across both genders ($p < 0.000$). The strength of this relationship is somewhat similar for both genders. Nonetheless, the results confirm the overall relationship pattern originally observed in Table 6.3 and that the relationship is not spurious.

Similarly, Table 6.3.2 in the appendices summarizes key statistics about respondents' income levels and job threats they perceived from immigrants. Almost similar to gender, the findings show a consistent pattern across all income brackets: the negative relationship between Canadians' job threat and their personal financial perceptions remains moderate, negative, and statistically significant, with p values below 0.001 thresholds for all income groups. While ruling out any spurious association prospects, this pattern again lends further theoretical support to H-4(b).

6.3.2. Employment status and education levels

While mirroring the overall trends of other confounders details above, both employment status and education levels seem to have played an important role in how Canadians perceived job threats from immigrants and their financial conditions in 2021. CES respondents reported having 'worsened' personal financial situations in 2020 were more likely to perceive immigrants as a source of high job threat than those with 'improved' personal economic situations. This pattern is shown by summary Table 6.3.3 in the appendices for all employment groups. Regardless of this, the original association found in Table 6.3 persists, and it seems to be non-spurious, too.

A similar pattern emerges for almost all education levels, with the p-value less than 0.001 for most groups (Table 6.3.4 in the appendices). CES respondents with low education levels (Gamma= 0.046, p = 0.193) show no statistically meaningful relationship between personal finances and perceived job threats from immigrants. Contrary to this, Canadians with medium (Gamma= -0.244) or high education levels (Gamma= -0.219) indicate statistically significant associations. Hence, what emerges clearly from these controls is that the original pattern documented in Table 6.3 broadly persists, signifying further theoretical support for overall H-4. With these broad trends in mind, the next section explores whether respondents' negative PEPs were also associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants, as hypothesized in H-2(b).

6.4. Effects of Personal Financial Perceptions on Immigration Attitudes

Table 6.4 shows a statistically moderate and positive relationship (Gamma = 0.251 ($p < .001$) between Canadians' PEPs and attitudes toward immigrants. Similar to Table 6.3, discussed in the last section, it reveals a clear pattern. As respondents' negative PEPs improve, the desire for 'fewer' immigrants reduces significantly, showing a decline of almost 23 percentage points. More precisely, almost half, 48.5%, of Canadians who felt their finances had 'worsened' asked that Canada should admit 'fewer' immigrants. This figure drops by 15 percentage points for those who perceived their finances were the same (33.3%) in 2020 and further drops to another 7.5 percentage points for those whose finances had improved (25.8%). These trends offer moderate support for H-2 (b), showing that perceptions of better personal financial conditions are linked to more positive views towards immigrants across Canada.

Table 6.4: Respondents' views toward immigrants by personal economic perceptions

Personal economic perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved

1. Fewer	48.5	33.3	25.8
	(2419)	(3315)	(735)
2. Same as now	35.4	45.4	43
	(1768)	(4517)	(1224)
3. More	16.1	21.3	31.2
	(801)	(2116)	(890)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 17785**
Gamma: 0.251	Gamma approx. sig. 0.000		
Chi square: 588.499	P-value: 0.000		

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Besides CES respondents who wanted 'fewer' immigrants, the percentage of individuals asking for 'more' immigrants also shows a similar pattern, and the desire for Canada to admit more immigrants increases meaningfully. When people perceived that their economic situation had 'worsened,' only 16.1% wanted 'more' immigrants. This percentage climbs to 21.3% for those perceiving it had 'unchanged' and further to 31.2% for those who believed it had 'improved' in 2020. This pattern signifies a notable increase of 15 percentage points between respondents who perceived their economic situation in the worst and those who saw it in the best conditions, further supporting H-2 (a) theoretically. Based on these trends, it may be deduced that Canadians with positive PEPs were more likely to ask for more immigrants and held positive views toward immigrants in 2021.

As before, this association was tested with various control variables to rule out the passivity and ensure that it was not spurious. To avoid the repetition of detailed crosstab results reported for confounders in section 6.2, the sections below briefly examine the association observed in Table 6.4 and assess whether it holds or disappears across different control variables. In doing so, the section only points to major trends. Summary Tables for only key statistics are made available in the appendices, as indicated individually in each section.

Detailed crosstabulation Tables, however, are not provided as they are almost the same as the ones provided for H-2(a) (appendices Tables 6.2.1 to 6.2.4), the NEPs component of the H-2.

6.4.1. Regions

Canadians' views about immigrants vary depending on where they lived in 2021. Table 6.4.1 in the appendices shows a statistically significant relationship between CES survey respondents' PEPs and views regarding immigrants across all regions ($p < 0.000$). The strength of this association differs, however. In all regions, respondents were less likely to ask for 'fewer' immigrants when they perceived doing well financially reported as 'improved' personal finances. The relationship statistics by region are as follows:

- Ontario (Gamma = 0.274)
- West (Gamma = 0.244),
- Atlantic (Gamma = 0.235).

In Quebec, however, this association is not strong comparatively, as indicated by the Gamma value of 0.191. Irrespective of these differences, the overall association observed in the original test persists with different magnitudes.

6.4.2. Party identities

All Canadian voters covered by the CES CPS survey wave tend to favor 'more' immigrants (Table 6.4.2 in the appendices) when they perceive doing well financially ($p < 0.001$). However, there are some differences, and surprisingly, this link is strongest among Conservative supporters (Gamma = 0.315). A statistically moderate relationship (Gamma = 0.203) is observed among Canadians who identified themselves as non-conservatives, too, showing that the pattern observed in Table 6.4 does indeed hold for all major party identities.

The stronger relationship observed among Conservative supporters may seem unexpected, given that Conservatives are sometimes perceived as being more restrictive of immigrants. It is possible, however, that when Conservative supporters feel financially secure,

they are more open to the idea of immigrants contributing to a thriving economy. Nevertheless, more research is needed to explore in detail the relationship of factors underlying this link, as a two-way crosstab is insufficient to establish statistically valid causation for the observed relationship. Irrespective of these differences, the findings confirm that the original relationship being explored is not spurious.

6.4.3. Age and education levels

Relatedly, both age and education levels also play an important role in how Canadians viewed immigrants in 2021. The overall trends are similar to those observed in section 6.2 above. As people get older, they are likely to favor 'more' immigrants, given that they believe their economic situation has 'improved' in 2020. This pattern is reflected by a strong statistical Chi-Square value ($p < 0.001$), as summarized in Table 6.4.3 in the appendices for all age groups. Notably, the association is strongest for older Canadians (Gamma = 0.300), followed by middle-aged adults (Gamma = 0.24) and then younger Canadians (Gamma = 0.181), individually.

A rather similar pattern emerges for all education levels (Table 6.4.4 in the appendices), where the p-value across the board is significant at 0.001 thresholds for all CES respondents. It is perhaps safe to assume that the original association found in Table 6.4 is not due to random chance.

It is clear from the findings discussed in this chapter that both NEPs and PEPs were considerably associated with CES survey respondents' job threat perceptions, which, in turn, seem to have influenced their views toward immigrants in 2021. It is not clear, however, if there is also a direct association between job threats respondents perceived from immigrants and their immigration views. The section below deals with this aspect and reports key findings.

6.5. Effects of Labor Market Competition on Attitudes Toward Immigrants

Beyond H-2 and H-4's findings reported above, H-3 of the study posited and tested the possibility that respondents who perceived that immigrants take jobs away from Canadians will express a greater desire for Canada to admit fewer immigrants. In line with this expectation, Table 6.5 below shows a very strong negative relationship between Canadians' job threat perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants. This is reflected by the Gamma value of -0.775 ($p < 0.001$). As the job threat perceptions switch from 'low' to 'high,' the percentage of CES respondents asking Canada to admit fewer immigrants increases significantly, with a 65.3 percentage point difference between the two perception levels.

Table 6.5: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant-induced job threat perceptions

Immigrant job threat perception(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	14.6	47.4	79.9
	(1067)	(1030)	(2478)
2. Same as now	53.5	46.2	16.7
	(3921)	(1004)	(518)
3. More	31.9	6.4	3.4
	(2341)	(140)	(106)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 12605**
Gamma: -0.775	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 4458.482	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Specifically, when job threats were perceived as 'low,' about 14.6% of Canadians wanted fewer immigrants. This figure grows to 47.5% when these were perceived as 'moderate,' and further climbs to almost 80% when regarded as 'high' by the respondents. This trend suggests that negative job threat perceptions may be a key factor contributing to the desire for reduced

immigration among Canadians. Further advance-level statistical analysis is needed, however, to establish a causal association.

In contrast, the percentage of CES respondents who wanted 'more' immigrants also reveal a similar job threat pattern: a significant decline as perceived job threats grow from a 'low' to a 'high' threat threshold. When job threats were deemed as 'low,' almost 32% of CES participants wanted 'more' immigrants. This percentage declines to 6.4% for individuals who perceived 'moderate' and further to 3.4% for those who noticed 'high' threats. This pattern signifies a significant decline of 28.5 percentage points between Canadians who perceived job threats as low and those who regarded these as high. This pattern, while broadly mirroring the trend observed for Canadians wanting 'fewer' immigrants, provides additional support for H-3 that negative job threat perceptions significantly influence attitudes toward immigrants in Canada.

It can be drawn from the results reported in Table 6.5 that as CES respondents' perceived job threat from immigrants decreases, there is a greater tendency among Canadians to favor 'more' and a lower inclination to prefer 'fewer' immigrants. This overall pattern is further tested to evaluate if it holds when introducing common confounders used so far in the analysis. The results of crosstabulation with control variables are briefly detailed below.

6.5.1. Gender

The crosstab findings with gender as a confounder confirm that the relationship between immigrant-induced job threat and respondents' immigration attitudes is statistically significant and negative for both Males (Gamma = -0.753) and Females (Gamma = -0.796). As can be seen from Tables 6.5.1 (A-B) in the appendices, the negative association observed in the basic crosstabulation persists within each gender identity category. This perhaps suggests that the hypothesized relationship may not entirely be due to differences in gender identification. Thus,

providing evidence against a spurious relationship, and reflecting the original association observed in Table 6.5.

6.5.2. Income

The results of income as a control variable, presented in Tables 6.5.2 (A-C) in the appendices, reveal a consistent trend across all income groups. The negative relationship between Canadians' perceived job threats from immigrants and the desire for fewer immigrants remains strong and statistically significant. This is specified by these Gamma values:

- Low-income Canadians: Gamma = -0.765, $p < .001$.
- Middle-income Canadians: Gamma = -0.760, $p < .001$.
- High-income Canadians: Gamma = -0.805, $p < .001$.

These findings provide additional support for H-3, showing that job threat perceptions play a significant role in shaping attitudes toward immigrants, even when controlling for Canadians' income in 2021. Having said so, it is integral to recognize that, as with any two-variable crosstab analysis, the findings cannot establish causality. Therefore, additional analysis is needed to determine whether job threat perceptions directly caused negative attitudes toward immigrants among Canadian voters and to further explore the potential moderating role of income, if any, in this context.

6.5.3. Employment status

When introducing CES respondents' employment status as a control variable, the crosstab shows a consistent strong and negative relationship between individuals' job threat perceptions and views toward immigrants across all employment statuses, as documented in Tables 6.5.3 (A-C) in the appendices. The Chi-Square values are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for all employment groups (Inactive, Unemployed, and Employed), signifying that the observed association is unlikely due to chance. The strength of the relationship differs slightly across employment statuses:

- Inactive Canadians: Gamma = -0.790, $p < .001$.
- Unemployed Canadians: Gamma = -0.765, $p < .001$.
- Employed Canadians: Gamma = -0.764, $p < .001$.

Briefly, the crosstab results show that the original relationship between the two variables tested exists even after controlling for different employment groups, thereby providing further support for H-3.

6.5.4. Education levels

The results for education levels as a control variable suggest that respondents' attitudes toward immigrants were influenced by job threat perceptions, regardless of education levels analyzed ($p < 0.001$ for all education levels). Respondents who perceived that immigrants do not take jobs away from Canadians were more open to immigration, while those who felt that immigrants competed for jobs with fellow Canadians were more restrictive of them, as shown by Tables 6.5.4 (A-C) in the appendices. Thus, the overall association remains statistically significant and negative for all education levels, aligning with the original crosstab results documented in Table 6.5.

6.6. Conclusion

The analysis above scrutinized the role of subjective economic perceptions in shaping Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants in 2021. It focused on the impacts of respondents' perceptions of the national economy and their personal economic situations. As per the theoretical expectations of H-2 and H-4, the crosstab results show a clear and consistent relationship between negative economic perceptions and negative views toward immigrants in Canada.

Canadians who reported having negative perceptions of the national economy or their personal finances in 2021 were more likely to perceive higher job threats from immigrants and express negative views toward immigration. These associations were statistically significant

and remained so even after controlling for various potential control variables, including gender, income brackets, employment status, education level, party affiliation, region, and age groups.

The findings of this chapter suggest that subjective economic perceptions play a crucial role in shaping Canadians' views on immigration. When individuals perceived the economy to be performing insufficiently or felt that their personal financial situation was insecure, they were more likely to view immigrants as an economic threat and expressed less favorable views toward immigration. This is likely due to a combination of factors as emerged in Chapter 2, including concerns about job competition, strain on public resources, and the potential for immigrants to depress wages. However, given the limits inherent to crosstabulation, I cannot be sure if these factors were actually in play at the time of the CES survey, so I am merely speculating about the causal chain here.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis has explored the complex interaction between economic conditions and Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. The central research question guiding my thesis was: How do objective economic conditions and subjective economic perceptions interact to shape Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants? This question was informed by an extensive focus on objective economic indicators in Canadian scholarship on the subject matter and by the evolving Canadian public opinion on immigration. Thus, the primary objective of my research was to examine the ways in which both regional objective economic indicators and subjective national and personal economic perceptions influenced Canadians' views toward immigrants in 2021.

The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 revealed several key findings regarding the relationship between economic conditions, perceptions, and attitudes toward immigration. Specifically, chapter 5 showed that objective economic conditions, specifically provincial real GDP growth rates and unemployment levels, were statistically associated with Canadians' attitudes toward immigration. Higher provincial GDP growth rates were generally linked to more positive views toward immigrants, while higher unemployment rates were weakly associated with less favorable views. These associations remained statistically significant even after controlling for various potential control variables, including income groups, employment status, gender, and education levels of CES respondents. Although primarily driven by crosstabulation analysis, these findings are consistent with the mainstream Canadian research reported by Banting and Soroka (2020); Bilodeau et al. (2012) and Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011), among others.

Chapter 6, on the other hand, revealed that subjective economic perceptions, namely Canadians' perceptions of the national economy and their personal economic situations, were strongly associated with their views on immigration. Negative NEPs and PEPs were significantly associated with a greater desire for Canada to admit fewer immigrants and a

higher likelihood of perceiving job market threats from immigrants. These associations also remained statistically significant even after controlling for various potential confounding variables, including gender, income brackets, employment status, education levels, party affiliation, region, and age groups. These findings add to the existing Canadian scholarship on the subject and, as such, are novel.

The analysis also highlighted the vital role of perceived job threats from immigrants in shaping Canadians' attitudes toward immigration. Respondents who perceived higher job threats from immigrants were significantly more likely to express negative views toward immigration and desire reduced immigration levels. This association was particularly strong and remained statistically significant after controlling for various potential control variables. Although statistically meaningful, this finding contradicts the findings of some of the experimental Canadian studies on the subject Harell et al. (2012) but is aligned with those based on observational data (Gravelle, 2018).

These results collectively address the central research question by revealing the complex relationship between objective economic conditions, subjective economic perceptions, and perceived job threats in shaping Canadians' attitudes toward immigrants. Objective economic conditions, while significantly associated with immigration attitudes, do not fully explain the variation in Canadians' views. Subjective economic perceptions, particularly negative NEPs and PEPs, play a crucial role in shaping respondents' views on immigration, often by influencing their perceptions of job threats from immigrants, as emerged in Chapter 6.

The findings of this thesis have important theoretical implications for understanding immigration attitudes. The results largely support the Sociotropic Economic Threat Perspective, which suggests that individuals' views on immigration are shaped by their perceptions of how immigrants affect the overall economy rather than just their personal finances. The findings also support the Labor Market Competition Theory, which posits that

people may view immigrants as competitors in the labor market, leading to fears of job displacement and wage depression.

Limitations and Future Research

My thesis has several limitations that should be acknowledged. The use of crosstabulation analysis as a main analytical approach, while appropriate for examining bivariate relationships, limits the ability to draw definitive conclusions about causal relationships found in this research. Therefore, future research could use more advanced statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, to explore the causal pathways between economic conditions, perceptions, and immigration attitudes. Additionally, future research could also examine the interplay between Canadians NEPs, PEPs, cultural values, national identity, and their immigration attitudes.

Appendices

Table 5.1.1-A: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual real GDP growth levels, controlled for income groups

Low-income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	52.1	43.3	36.4
	(265)	(1267)	(873)
2. Same as now	33.2	39.9	40.4
	(169)	(1168)	(968)
3. More	14.7	16.8	23.3
	(75)	(490)	(558)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 5833**
Gamma: 0.161	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 71.792	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.1.1-B: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual real GDP growth levels, controlled for income group

Medium income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	41.2	39.5	31.6
	(200)	(1216)	(767)
2. Same as now	39	41.2	45.
	(189)	(1267)	(1093)
3. More	19.8	19.3	23.4
	(96)	(592)	(569)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 5989**
Gamma: 0.123	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 44.765	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.1.1-C: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual real GDP growth levels, controlled for income groups

High income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	35.6	34.5	27.4
	(150)	(1123)	(659)
2. Same as now	42.8	44.4	45
	(180)	(1443)	(1083)
3. More	21.6	21.1	27.6
	(91)	(687)	(664)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 6080**
Gamma: 0.134	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 50.017	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.2.1-A: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual unemployment levels, controlled for employment status

Inactive respondents

Provincial unemployment level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Medium**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	29.6	37.7	35.8
	(817)	(1360)	(103)
2. Same as now	43.4	42.1	39.2
	(1197)	(1520)	(113)
3. More	27	20.2	25
	(745)	(729)	(72)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 6656**
Gamma: -0.138	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 62.856	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.2.1-B: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual unemployment levels, controlled for employment status

Unemployed respondents

Provincial unemployment level(s)	1. Low	2. Medium	3. High
1. Fewer	38.7	42.3	56.5
	(113)	(211)	(26)
2. Same as now	42.8	43.1	37
	(125)	(215)	(17)
3. More	18.5	14.6	6.5
	(54)	(73)	(3)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 837**
Gamma: -0.129	Gamma approx. sig.	0.023	
Chi Square: 7.772	P-value:	0.100	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.2.1-C: Views toward immigrants by provincial annual unemployment levels, controlled for employment status

Employed respondents

Provincial unemployment level(s)	1. Low	2. Medium	3. High
1. Fewer	34.8	38.8	38.9
	(1586)	(1950)	(144)
2. Same as now	42.1	41.8	43.5
	(1920)	(2100)	(161)
3. More	23.1	19.4	17.6
	(1052)	(972)	(65)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N =9950**
Gamma: -0.082	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 29.101	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies

Table 5.4.1-A: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for Males

Male respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	30.1	28.7	20.8
	(201)	(1278)	(830)
2. Unchanged	57.6	53.9	59.6
	(385)	(2399)	(2383)
3. Improved	12.3	17.4	19.6
	(82)	(775)	(785)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 9118
Gamma: 0.143	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 90.214	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.1-B: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for Females

Female respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	31.8	34	26.8
	(266)	(1775)	(949)
2. Unchanged	57.3	52.8	57.7
	(480)	(2757)	(2040)
3. Improved	10.9	13.1	15.5
	(91)	(685)	(549)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 9592
Gamma: 0.110	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 59.399	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.2-A: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for low-income respondents

Low-income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	40.2	43.1	34.6
	(226)	(1353)	(873)
2. Unchanged	51.1	47.2	54.1
	(287)	(1483)	(1364)
3. Improved	8.7	9.7	11.3
	(49)	(306)	(285)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 6226
Gamma: 0.113	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 43.473	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.2-B: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for middle income respondents

Middle income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	34.8	31.7	22.1
	(177)	(1013)	(563)
2. Unchanged	55.7	53.9	62.2
	(283)	(1721)	(1587)
3. Improved	9.4	14.4	15.7
	(48)	(460)	(401)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 6253
Gamma: 0.166	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 85.168	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.2-C: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for incomes levels

High income respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	15.4	21	14.1
	(68)	(708)	(349)
2. Unchanged	67.3	58.3	59.7
	(297)	(1965)	(1479)
3. Improved	17.2	20.7	26.2
	(76)	(697)	(650)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 6289
Gamma: 0.146	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 70.805	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.3-A: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for inactive respondents

Inactive respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	30.3	29.5	22.2
	(178)	(1103)	(584)
2. Unchanged	61.7	59.3	66.7
	(362)	(2215)	(1757)
3. Improved	8	11.2	11.1
	(47)	(417)	(292)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 6955
Gamma: 0.119	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 52.620	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.3-B: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for unemployment respondents

Unemployed respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	50	62.2	62.5
	(53)	(326)	(165)
2. Unchanged	41.5	33.8	32.6
	(44)	(177)	(86)
3. Improved	8.5	4	4.9
	(9)	(21)	(13)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 894
Gamma: -0.096	Gamma approx. sig.	0.108	
Chi Square: 7.897	P-value:	0.095	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.3-C: Relationship between Canadians' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for employed respondents

Employed respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	28.6	29.7	21.5
	(226)	(1548)	(949)
2. Unchanged	56.9	51.1	55.7
	(450)	(2665)	(2460)
3. Improved	14.5	19.2	22.8
	(115)	(1001)	(1009)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 10423
Gamma: 0.142	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 104.742	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.4-A: Relationship between respondents' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for low education respondents

Low education respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	30.6	41	30.3
	(33)	(219)	(147)
2. Unchanged	58.3	49.3	59.4
	(63)	(263)	(288)
3. Improved	11.1	9.7	10.3
	(12)	(52)	(50)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 1127
Gamma: 0.094	Gamma approx. sig.	0.047	
Chi Square: 14.327	P-value:	0.006	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.4-B: Relationship between respondents' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for medium education respondents

Medium education respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Worsened	34.1	34.8	25.3
	(381)	(2250)	(1328)
2. Unchanged	56.4	52.1	58.8
	(631)	(3372)	(3086)
3. Improved	9.5	13.1	15.9
	(106)	(849)	(836)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 12839
Gamma: 0.156	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 146.128	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 5.4.4-C: Relationship between respondents' personal financial perceptions and provincial real GDP growth levels, controlled for high education respondents

High education respondents

Provincial GDP growth level(s)	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Worsened	19.5	22.3	16.9
	(55)	(600)	(304)
2. Unchanged	61	56.9	58.3
	(172)	(1531)	(1052)
3. Improved	19.5	20.9	24.8
	(55)	(562)	(448)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 4779**
Gamma: 0.108	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 25.556	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.1-A: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for Male respondents

Male respondents

National economy perceptions	**1. Worsened**	**2. Unchanged**	**3. Improved**
1. Low	54.7	65.5	75.4
	(2157)	(1043)	(475)
2. Moderate	20.2	18.2	11
	(797)	(289)	(69)
3. High	25.1	16.3	13.7
	(992)	(260)	(86)

Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N** = 6168
Gamma: -0.257	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 138.535	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.1-B: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for Female respondents

Female respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	52	63.7	72.1
	(2390)	(767)	(196)
2. Moderate	17.2	16.7	13.6
	(792)	(201)	(37)
3. High	30.8	19.7	14.3
	(1417)	(237)	(39)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N** = 6076
Gamma: -0.257	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 101.604	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.2-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for Low-income respondents

Low-income respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	46	56.6	59
	(1324)	(452)	(125)
2. Moderate	21.8	20.8	13.7
	(627)	(166)	(29)
3. High	32.2	22.7	27.4
	(927)	(181)	(58)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 3889**
Gamma: -0.186	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 44.712	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.2-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for middle income respondents

Middle income respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	52.7	64.7	75.2
	(1514)	(631)	(209)
2. Moderate	18.2	17.8	13.3
	(522)	(174)	(37)
3. High	29.1	17.4	11.5
	(837)	(170)	(32)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 4126
Gamma: -0.283	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 100.656	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.2-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for high income respondents

High income respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
	61.3	71	81.8
	(1732)	(730)	(337)
	15.6	14.7	9.7
	(441)	(151)	(40)
	23.1	14.3	8.5
	(651)	(147)	(35)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 4264
Gamma: -0.279	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 95.381	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.3-A: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for inactive respondents

Inactive respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	53.7	71.3	78.5
	(1747)	(717)	(256)
2. Moderate	19.6	15.9	12
	(639)	(160)	(39)
3. High	26.7	12.7	9.5
	(867)	(128)	(31)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N** = 4584
Gamma: -0.374	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 167.942	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.3-B: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for unemployed respondents

Unemployed respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	40.1	49.2	50
	(169)	(62)	(12)
2. Moderate	22.6	26.2	16.7
	(95)	(33)	(4)
3. High	37.3	24.6	33.3
	(157)	(31)	(8)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 571**
Gamma: -0.182	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 7.756	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.3-C: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for employed respondents

Employed respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	54.9	62.4	74
	(2563)	(1010)	(399)
2. Moderate	17	17.4	10.4
	(793)	(281)	(56)
3. High	28.1	20.2	15.6
	(1309)	(327)	(84)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 6822**
Gamma: -0.207	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 101.098	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.4-A: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for low education respondents

Low education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	33.1	46	14.6
	(174)	(64)	(7)
2. Moderate	21.5	25.9	14.6
	(113)	(36)	(7)
3. High	45.4	28.1	70.8
	(239)	(39)	(34)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 713**
Gamma: -0.055	Gamma approx. sig.	0.408	
Chi Square: 29.679	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.4-B: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for medium education respondents

Medium education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	50.1	60.3	74.1
	(3026)	(1073)	(364)
2. Moderate	19.6	19.4	14.7
	(1182)	(346)	(72)
3. High	30.4	20.3	11.2
	(1836)	(361)	(55)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 8315**
Gamma: -0.259	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 173.474	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.1.4-C: Respondents' national economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for high education respondents

High education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Low	68.5	76.5	83.1
	(1367)	(672)	(301)
2. Moderate	14.7	12.3	7.2
	(294)	(108)	(26)
3. High	16.7	11.2	9.7
	(334)	(98)	(35)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 3235**
Gamma: -0.232	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 45.580	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.2.1-A: Respondents' view toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for party identification

Party identity	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
Conservatives	91.000	0.000	0.265	0.000	4350
Non-Conservatives	216.619	0.000	0.229	0.000	8994

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.1-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for federal-level party identifications

Party identities	National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Conservatives	1. Fewer	55.1	40.9	30.5
		(1959)	(254)	(53)
	2. Same as now	34.5	48.3	47.1
		(1227)	(300)	(82)
	3. More	10.4	10.8	22.4
2. Non-Conservatives		(369)	(67)	(39)
	1. Fewer	30.2	18.9	16.4
		(1649)	(495)	(149)
	2. Same as now	44.8	49.2	42.4
		(2445)	(1291)	(386)
	3. More	25	31.9	41.2
		(1368)	(836)	(375)

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.2.2-A: Respondents' view toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for regions

Regions	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Atlantic	75.755	0.000	0.398	0.0000	1125
2. Ontario	361.654	0.000	0.377	0.0000	6388
3. Quebec	114.523	0.000	0.276	0.0000	4027
4. West	255.707	0.000	0.365	0.0000	5214

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.2-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for regions

Regions	National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Atlantic	1. Fewer	45.6	20.9	14.3
		(355)	(58)	(10)
	2. Same as now	36.9	53.4	47.1
		(287)	(148)	(33)
	3. More	17.5	25.6	38.6
		(136)	(71)	(27)
2. Ontario				
	1. Fewer	46.1	24.8	18.7
		(2007)	(384)	(90)
	2. Same as now	38.6	50.7	44.8
		(1682)	(786)	(216)
	3. More	15.3	24.5	36.5
		(667)	(380)	(176)
3. Quebec				
	1. Fewer	35.7	21.5	20.9
		(1024)	(180)	(67)
	2. Same as now	42.4	46.8	38.4
		(1216)	(392)	(123)
	3. More	21.9	31.7	40.6
		(629)	(266)	(130)
4. West				
	1. Fewer	45.5	24.5	19.8
		(1676)	(280)	(77)
	2. Same as now	38.2	48.5	46
		(1407)	(554)	(179)
	3. More	16.3	27	34.2
		(600)	(308)	(133)

Source: CES 2021
Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.2.3-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for Young Adults (18-34)

18-34 respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	36.6	21.2	19.7
	(1134)	(184)	(62)
2. Same as now	40.9	48.6	41.1
	(1267)	(421)	(129)
3. More	22.5	30.2	39.2
	(698)	(262)	(123)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 4280
Gamma: 0.271	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 117.211	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.3-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for Middle-aged Adults (35-54)

35-54 respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	50.1	28	22.3
	(1896)	(346)	(84)
2. Same as now	35.9	50.2	43.4
	(1359)	(620)	(163)
3. More	14	21.8	34.3
	(530)	(269)	(129)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 5396
Gamma: 0.375	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 296.587	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.3-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for Older Adults (55+)

55+ respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	42.3	21.8	17.3
	(2033)	(372)	(99)
2. Same as now	40.9	49.2	45.2
	(1966)	(838)	(258)
3. More	16.7	29	37.5
	(804)	(494)	(214)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 7078
Gamma: 0.378	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 390.683	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.4-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for low education level

Low education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	62	37	46.7
	(467)	(74)	(21)
2. Same as now	30.1	39.5	26.7
	(227)	(79)	(12)
3. More	7.8	23.5	26.7
	(59)	(47)	(12)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 998
Gamma: 0.414	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 64.660	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.4-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for medium education level

Medium education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	46.1	27	20.4
	(3822)	(655)	(138)
2. Same as now	38.2	49.7	47
	(3168)	(1205)	(318)
3. More	15.6	23.3	32.5
	(1295)	(565)	(220)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 11386
Gamma: 0.335	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 447.223	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.2.4-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by national economic perceptions, controlled for high education level

High education respondents

National economy perceptions	1. Worsened	2. Unchanged	3. Improved
1. Fewer	28.9	14.7	15.6
	(760)	(173)	(84)
2. Same as now	45.4	50.3	40.9
	(1197)	(594)	(220)
3. More	25.7	35	43.5
	(677)	(413)	(234)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 4352
Gamma: 0.270	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 151.657	P-value:	0.000	

Summary table 6.3.1: Respondents' personal economic perceptions and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for gender

Gender	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Male	156.912	0.000	-0.238	0.000	6440
2. Female	200.569	0.000	-0.250	0.000	6667

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.3.2: Respondents' personal economic situations and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for income groups

Income groups	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Sample N
1. Low	88.342	0.000	-0.192	0.000	4289
2. Medium	93.272	0.000	-0.216	0.000	4380
3. High	99.342	0.000	-0.235	0.000	4476

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.3.3: Respondents' personal economic situations and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for employment status

Employment statuses	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Inactive	163.721	0.000	-0.302	0.000	4910
2. Unemployed	14.838	0.005	-0.125	0.051	621
3. Employed	171.91	0.000	-0.227	0.000	7260

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.3.4: Respondents' personal economic situations and immigrant job threat feelings, controlled for education levels

Education level(s)	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Low	6.079	0.193	0.046	0.425	752
2. Medium	241.892	0.000	-0.244	0.000	8944
3. High	58.349	0.000	-0.219	0.000	3435

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.4.1: Respondents' view toward immigrants by individual economic perceptions, controlled for regions

Province	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Atlantic	42.108	0.000	0.235	0.000	1199
2. Ontario	264.650	0.000	0.274	0.000	6828
3. Quebec	72.400	0.000	0.191	0.000	4256
4. West	187.669	0.000	0.244	0.000	5500

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.4.2: Respondents' view toward immigrants by individual economic perceptions, controlled for party identity

Party identity	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
1. Conservatives	195.850	0.000	0.315	0.000	4419
2. Non-Conservatives	230.359	0.000	0.203	0.000	9621

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.4.3: Respondents' view toward immigrants by personal/individual economic perceptions, controlled for age groups

Age groups	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
Young Adults (18-34)	110.899	0.000	0.181	0.000	4742
Middle-aged Adults (35-54)	183.976	0.000	0.240	0.000	5657
Older Adults (55+)	309.974	0.000	0.300	0.000	7386

Source: CES 2021

Summary table 6.4.4: Respondents' view toward immigrants by personal/individual economic perceptions, controlled for education levels

Education levels	Chi-Square Value	Chi-Square Sig. (2-sided)	Gamma Value	Approx. Sig.	Valid N
Low	26.208b	0.000	0.188	0.000	1035
Medium	352.049b	0.000	0.241	0.000	12136
High	94.545b	0.000	0.176	0.000	4595

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.5.1-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant-induced job threat perceptions, controlled for Male respondents

Male respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	14.7	47.4	78.3
	(550)	(548)	(1062)
2. Same as now	51.6	45.4	17.6
	(1926)	(524)	(239)
3. More	33.6	7.2	4.1
	(1255)	(83)	(55)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 6242**
Gamma: -0.753	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 2033.134	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.1-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant-induced job threat perceptions, controlled for Female respondents

Female respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	14.3	47.3	81.1
	(512)	(482)	(1416)
2. Same as now	55.5	47.1	16
	(1995)	(480)	(279)
3. More	30.2	5.6	2.9
	(1086)	(57)	(51)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 6362**
Gamma: -0.796	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 2413.186	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.2-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for low-income respondents

Low-income respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	13.4	49.2	79.7
	(274)	(405)	(959)
2. Same as now	54.9	43.4	16
	(1121)	(357)	(193)
3. More	31.7	7.4	4.2
	(646)	(61)	(51)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 4067**
Gamma: -0.765	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 1501.044	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.2-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for middle income respondents

Middle income respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	16.1	43.7	81.5
	(386)	(319)	(860)
2. Same as now	52.8	49.2	14.8
	(1266)	(359)	(156)
3. More	31.1	7.1	3.7
	(747)	(52)	(39)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N = 4184**
Gamma: -0.760	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 1454.439	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.2-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for high income respondents

High income respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	14.1	49.4	78.1
	(406)	(307)	(659)
2. Same as now	53.1	46.4	20
	(1534)	(288)	(169)
3. More	32.8	4.2	1.9
	(948)	(26)	(16)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N = 4353
Gamma: -0.805	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 1463.988	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.3-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for inactive respondents

Inactive respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	13.3	44.6	80.6
	(376)	(370)	(858)
2. Same as now	52.2	48.4	16.7
	(1474)	(402)	(178)
3. More	34.4	7	2.7
	(972)	(58)	(29)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N=4717
Gamma: -0.790	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 1744.485	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.3-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for unemployed respondents

Unemployed respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	12.3	43.5	82.9
	(34)	(57)	(155)
2. Same as now	61.6	43.5	15
	(170)	(57)	(28)
3. More	26.1	13	2.1
	(72)	(17)	(4)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N=594
Gamma: -0.765	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 232.278	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.3-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for employed respondents

Employed respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	15.6	49.2	78.9
	(638)	(552)	(1377)
2. Same as now	53.5	45.1	17.1
	(2187)	(506)	(299)
3. More	30.9	5.8	4
	(1264)	(65)	(70)

Statistical tests	Significance levels		Valid N=6958
Gamma: -0.764	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 2336.388	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Table 6.5.4-A: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for low education respondents

Low education respondents

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	24.2	53.5	87.6
	(62)	(84)	(255)
2. Same as now	49.6	35.7	9.6
	(127)	(56)	(28)
3. More	26.2	10.8	2.7
	(67)	(17)	(8)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Vaid N=704**
Gamma: -0.742	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 229.358	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.4-B: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled medium education respondents

Respondents with medium education level

Immigrant job threat perceptions	1. Low	2. Moderate	3. High
1. Fewer	15.8%	48.8%	80.6%
	734	772	1882
2. Same as now	54.8%	46.0%	16.4%
	2549	727	382
3. More	29.4%	5.2%	3.1%
	1367	83	72
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N=8568**
Gamma: -0.773	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 3013.130	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 6.5.4-C: Respondents' views toward immigrants by immigrant job threat perceptions, controlled for high education respondents

Respondents with high education level

Immigrant job threat perceptions	**1. Low**	**2. Moderate**	**3. High**
1. Fewer	11.1	40	71.4
	(269)	(173)	(337)
2. Same as now	51.4	51	22.9
	(1243)	(221)	(108)
3. More	37.5	9	5.7
	(906)	(39)	(27)
Statistical tests	**Significance levels**		**Valid N=3323**
Gamma: -0.745	Gamma approx. sig.	0.000	
Chi Square: 945.119	P-value:	0.000	

Source: CES 2021

Note: The numbers in parentheses are cell frequencies.

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