An Analysis of the Discourse Topics, Discursive and Ideological Strategies in the Political Speeches of the Ousted Arab Leaders During the Arab Spring: A Critical Discourse Analysis

A Dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of

Memorial University of Newfoundland

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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February, 2025

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Abstract

This study aims at exploring how the ousted Arab leaders Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar al Qaddafi of Libya de/legitimize the Self and the Other in their political speeches during the Arab Spring via the use of discourse topics (macro-strategies), discursive strategies, and ideological strategies. In order to achieve this objective, I employ two theories of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) Discourse-Historical Approach is utilized to identify how discourse topics and the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation are used in the examined speeches to de/legitimize the Self/Other. Second, van Dijk's (1998) Ideological Square is employed to identify the ideological strategies used by the three leaders to socially include/exclude the Self/Other. These two approaches highlights that integrating the social, historical, and political contexts of these speeches also helps to better understand how the concepts of de/legitimization of the Self/Other evolved over time. The study revealed that the three leaders use the discourse topics of the harmful effects of the protests and foreign intervention to negatively represent the Other. Counting the sacrifices and offering evidence of reforms, on the other hand, are used to positively represent the Self. All three leaders rely more on the nomination strategy to positively represent the Self, while they rely more on the predication strategy to negatively represent the Other. They rely on repetition as a tool of intensification mainly to gain sympathy and support from their audience. All speeches exhibit ideological overtones which are communicated via the ideological strategies of authorization, narrativization, moral evaluation, self-victimization, comparison, blame attribution, arousing emotions, and personification. Finally, a substantial portion of CDA research has traditionally concentrated on Western democratic political environments. This research expands the domain of CDA to non-Western authoritarian environments by analyzing the

speeches of Arab leaders. During crises, these leaders employed nationalistic narratives to establish themselves as protectors of national identity and stability. This emphasis on identity construction corresponds with the extensive CDA literature regarding the interplay between language and identity, especially in contexts where identity is utilized to advance political objectives.

Dedication

To my mother's soul, who is no longer with us, and whose endless love has been the foundation of this journey

To my father, whose faith in my abilities has inspired me to strive for excellence

To my husband, whose love and encouragement in moments of weakness has been the cornerstone for this accomplishment.

To my daughter, Maria, whose laughter has given me the hope to accomplish this work.

To my sisters and brothers

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to the following people who helped me achieve my goal and make this project possible:

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Marica Cassis, for her endless support, and invaluable constructive feedback that were crucial to the success of my project. She has always stood by my side since my first year of this journey.

I am also grateful to my co-supervisor, Professor Amanda Bittner, whose expertise and exceptional commitment have substantially strengthened my research project. Her appointment as my co-supervisor has made a drastic change in my research and her feedback has enriched my research project.

I am also grateful to the supervisory committee member Professor Lucian Ashworth for his feedback and thoughtful comments on my dissertation.

I would like to extend my gratitude to the examiners Maria Mayr, Mary O'Brien, and Patricia Dold for their time, expertise, and invaluable insights in reviewing my dissertation. Their constructive feedback greatly enhanced the quality of my work.

Finally, I also extend my appreciation to my family whose endless emotional support has given me strength to overcome the hurdles of this journey.

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Chapter One-Introduction

1.1 Scope of the Study

The Arab state leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya found themselves on the brink of potential disaster when their people took to the streets demanding reform, freedom, and justice, starting in December 2010. This was the start of the Arab Spring, when protests broke out throughout the Arab World in response to economic and social problems in the region. In order to win back support of their people and to convince the audience not to believe the protestors' discourse, which demanded reform and even the resignation of their political leaders, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar al Qaddafi delivered political speeches meant to resonate with and reassure their people. Preserving their hegemony and power was the ultimate goal of these leaders, and their language reflected the type of discourse used by leaders to retain control. Goshgarian (2006: 426) maintains that "political language is a language of power. It influences government policy and actions, identifies the dominant values of the moment, and wins votes. Likewise, it is a language that is capable of making war, establishing needs of its users at a particular time. It has a reputation for being flexible and ambiguous or, worse, evasive". This thesis examines the political speeches of three ousted Arab leaders: Ben Ali, the president of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, and Muammar al Qaddafi, the president of Libya in order to show their use of discourse topics (macro strategies), discursive strategies, and ideological strategies meant to help them retain power.

The focus of this study is the political discourse of the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in the specific context of the Arab Spring and more specifically, on the final political speeches delivered by these three ousted Arab leaders. The Arab Spring uprisings, which started in December 2010, were among the most newsworthy protest events during the last decade. During that time, the entire Arab region witnessed a number of dramatic political changes due to the waves

of the Arab Spring. Almost all of the Arab countries witnessed at least some kind of public protests. In some countries, the protests were wide and violent, and ultimately led to the fall of authoritarian regimes. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya the public protests evolved into revolutions that uprooted the regimes of these countries.

The leaders of these countries (and the rest of the Arab countries) responded to these regional protests by delivering pretentious political speeches to affect public opinion in many ways. While responding to these demonstrations, Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi employ various strategies in their political speeches to persuade their people of their suggestions and conclusions concerning the protests. Each one attempts to construct a negative image of the Other and a positive image of the Self. In this present study, I illustrate and analyze how these three leaders manipulate language in their political speeches to accomplish this mission of de-legitimizing the Other and legitimizing the Self. I will also specifically examine the discourse topics (macro-strategies), and the ideological and the discursive strategies that are used to accomplish this goal. This multilayered analysis is required to better comprehend the political power and rhetoric of these three regimes (and in other Arab regimes) as these speeches were delivered in a critical era that widely affected the Arab political scene and led to lasting change.

Due to the fact that the purpose of this research is to analyze the content of these speeches, it is restricted to assessing the selected speeches as written texts rather than as spoken speeches. The focus of this study is on the textual and semantic components of the speeches rather than on paralinguistic characteristics such as tone, intonation, or delivery style. By taking into consideration these speeches in their textual form, the research draws attention to the carefully constructed language choices, discursive, and ideological strategies that reflect the intentions of the leaders and the ideological foundations upon which they operated.

The investigation of the use of discourse topics, ideological and discursive strategies in these speeches and how they are manipulated will be done through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This method investigates the manner in which language is manipulated in political discourse. In general, Discourse Analysis is a significant area of linguistics that is concerned with identifying the ideological undertones of texts whether they are spoken or written (Fairclough, 2002; van Dijk, 2006). The sophisticated version of discourse analysis, i.e. CDA, uses a wide range of "endeavors to make explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden and thereby to derive results which are of practical relevance" (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 15).

In addition, this study will invest the methodological tools offered by two CDA approaches: Reisigl's and Wodak's historical-discourse approach and van Dijk's ideological square. Depending on these two approaches, the discourse topics, the discursive and ideological strategies used by the three leaders will be traced in their political speeches by examining the use of language. Using these two CDA approaches as an analysis model for the present study, I conducted a three-layered analysis to identify high discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies employed by Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi. I chose these three leaders because all of them died after the Arab Spring, all of them were ousted by their people out of their offices, and the three countries are geographically adjacent and belong to the same geopolitical region, i.e. Arab North Africa.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although literature on the political discourse of the Arab Spring is abundant, the literature on the ideological and discursive side of this discourse needs more in-depth analysis. Most of the studies have paid more attention to the linguistic aspect of this discourse without offering deep discursive and ideological interpretations for language use in this discourse. Therefore, the present study

seeks to look at how the ideological and discursive strategies are employed by each leader to legitimize his ideology by delegitimizing the Other.

The so called Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2010 brought many changes to the political scene in the Arab world. Accordingly, these events affected the way Arab leaders use language in their speeches and the way they ideologically represent the Self and the Other through this use of language. During these times of sociopolitical instability, the leaders of the countries that witnessed fierce protests tried to adjust the way they spoke to their people especially in their last days in office. With a desire to contribute to CDA studies in the Arab World, I examine how the leaders of the countries that witnessed Arab Spring uprisings exploited different discourse topics, discursive and ideological strategies either to legitimize their power, delegitimize the protesters, or to show that they were close to their people and that their ideologies were fair and democratic. Specifically, they adjusted the discourse topics, and the range and the manner of discursive and ideological strategies in their speeches in order to entice their audience. The way discourse topics, and ideological and discursive strategies are used in the Arabic political discourse has obtained little attention from Arab discourse analysts, linguists and scholars in general. The studies that make an effort to expand the scope of the research beyond just explaining how some linguistic devices are used in the political speeches in the context of the Arab Spring are limited (see al Maani et al., 2022). Furthermore, these studies have neglected why views of the Self and the Other are created, as well as what the objectives of these perceptions are supposed to be.

To bridge the gap, I set out to examine the Arab leaders' messages as they attempted to communicate in this critical period through examining the discourse topics, ideological strategies and discursive strategies they used to construct their legitimacy. Consequently, the present study addresses this observed gap by looking at the way these topics and strategies were adopted by each

one of the leaders to build his legitimacy on the basis of delegitimizing the Other in his political speeches during the revolutions (Said, 2017). To this end, I analyze three speeches for both former presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak and one speech for al Qaddafi. The study utilizes a research design that combines Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) Discourse Historical Approach and van Dijk's (1998) ideological square, and the methods suggested by these two approaches. In line with Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009), I have identified the high discourse topics in each speech and have identified the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation to demonstrate how the Self and the Other are de/legitimized in the speeches of the three leaders. In line with van Dijk's Ideological square on the other hand, I traced the following ideological moves made by these leaders to express/emphasize information that is positive about Us; to express/emphasize information that is negative about Them; to suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them; and to suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us. These four moves represent a key ideological strategy of social inclusion of the Self and exclusion of the Other. I then investigated the strategies of those Arab leaders to implement these moves via ideological strategies that either socially included the Self and excluded the Other.

The shift that happened in the discursive and ideological strategies they employed in their speeches to address the uprisings that swept their countries is a noteworthy area for academic study because the political discourse in the context of the Arab Spring revolutions is not being investigated from an in-group and out-group ideological point of view. This is especially true in the Arab context, where no research to date has investigated the political speeches of all these three ousted Arab leaders together. This collective analysis enabled me to do a comparative analysis, so that I can uncover the similarities and differences in their strategies to de/legitimize the Self/Other. Also, this may help in revealing the shared patterns these leaders used in communicating with the

public especially because these speeches were delivered in similar situations. Also, this collective investigation can be a reference for both politicians and historians who want to understand the discursive aspect of the Arab Spring. Finally, it offers an assessment of the overall impact of the political discourse on the populations of the Arab region.

In addition, several discourse analysis studies have been conducted over the past decade to investigate many linguistic aspects of the political discourse of the Arab spring including those of Lahlali (2011), Maalej (2012, 2013), Jarraya (2013), , Ben (2013), Hatab (2013), Al-Sowaidi et al. (2017), Awwad (2016), Alduhaim (2018), Jarrah (2018), and Albawardi (2020). Nevertheless, these studies have paid little attention to examining the ideological representations of the Self and the Other in the political discourse of the Arab Spring particularly in the political speeches of the ousted Arab leaders. By examining this aspect, we understand the power dynamics and the ways they use to legitimize their rule, we reveal the mechanisms of control and repression, we reveal regional and cultural implications in authoritarian narratives, and finally we can anticipate how similar rhetorical tools can be used in future conflicts.

1.3 The aims of the Study and Research Questions

This research utilizes a dataset consisting of seven political speeches delivered by three ousted Arab Spring leaders, namely: Ben Ali (the ex-president of Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (the ex-president of Egypt), and Muammar al Qaddafi (the ex-president of Libya) during the so-called Arab Spring uprisings. These speeches were analyzed in order to identify and examine the use of specific high discourse topics (macro-strategies), discursive strategies, and ideological strategies that are used to legitimize the Self and de-legitimize the Other in the leaders' efforts to put an end to the protests that aimed at toppling their regimes, make their use of force against the protestors

legitimate, entice the support of the international community for such force, and excuse their failures. I seek to answer the following questions:

1- What are the main discourse topics (macro-strategies) that the ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi use to legitimize the Self and delegitimize the Other in their political speeches?
2- How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi discursively legitimize the Self and Delegitimize the Other in their political speeches?
3- How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi ideologically represent the Self and the Other in their political speeches?

1.5 Significance of the Study

There is broad agreement among critical discourse analysts that "discourses make ideologies observable in the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly expressed and formulated" (van Dijk, 2006b: 732). Although the ideological and discursive aspects of the English political discourse have been extensively studied in literature, the Arabic political discourse has seen a relative scarcity of similar investigations. This can be attributed to the nascence of the field of Arabic political discourse analysis compared to the maturity of English political discourse analysis. Also, the broad impact of the political discourse in the English speaking countries on international policies has led to more research on Western political discourse. Because the Arab cultural context of discourse in general (and political discourse in particular) differs from that of the English language culture (see Alduhaim, (2019), Feghali, (1997) and Rugh, (2004)), this study contributes significantly to a gap in the literature by investigating Arabic political discourse from both ideological and discursive point of views.

Furthermore, in the last three decades of the twentieth century Arab politics have revolved around its conflict with Israel and with issues in the Gulf. However, because Arab news currently dominates media, politics, and refugees' crises such as that of Syrian refugees (Al Kharusi, 2016, and Khidir, 2017), it is greatly important to conduct thorough and methodologically sound investigations of the different aspects of Arabic political discourse. The investigation of the Arabic political discourse helps in providing insights into the motives of Arab policy makers, comprehending the political and cultural dynamics of the Arab region, and revealing how narratives of history and norms of society impact current political decisions. Research on discourse related to Arab uprisings has been carried out in Critical Discourse Analysis in the last decade, including Lahlali (2011), Maalej (2012, 2013), Jarraya (2013), Ben (2013), Awwad (2016), and Albawardi (2020), who study vocabulary choices, pronoun use, speech acts use, metaphors in al Qaddafi's speech, transitivity as a means of persuasion, and rapport enhancement strategies, respectively. Most of these studies' findings emphasize when the Arab Spring state leaders use a certain linguistic device, pronoun, or metaphor, but none of these scholars have looked at how the Self and the Other have been represented ideologically and discursively in this discourse either through discourse topics (macro-strategies), or through discursive and ideological strategies. From a linguistic perspective, most of the body of literature that investigates Arabic political speeches (especially those of state leaders) focuses on linguistic use in these speeches, such as the use of pronouns, transitivity, metaphors, or euphemisms, but neglects the ideological implications of this use. These ideological implications of language serve a crucial function in identifying the political goals of leaders and how they represent the world around them. Consequently, this study makes a substantial contribution to the analysis of the political discourse in the Arab world.

From a methodological perspective, the present study is also significant. This study is the first of its kind, to the researcher's knowledge, that combines both Reisigl and Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach-DHA (which analyzes discourse topics and discursive strategies) and van Dijk's Ideological Square (that analyzes the ideological strategies employed in political discourse) to arrive at a critical analysis of the speeches of Arab leaders in this critical period. Also, my critical discourse analysis model, which I designed for this study, provides the first model to analyze an Arabic language corpus. This model can be used for understanding current political discourse in the Arab world. First, DHA offers tools for analyzing both the discourse topics and discursive strategies and shows how these two aspects of discourse are manipulated to positively present the Self and negatively present the Other. Second, van Dijk's Ideological Square offers a thorough ideological interpretation of the linguistic choices and the perspective from which the speaker a political leader in this case wants to convey a certain ideological message. With the assistance of these two CDA approaches, accompanied by a detailed analysis of the social, political, and historical contexts of the Arab Spring (as will be discussed in chapter two), I offer a contribution to help explain how the Self and the Other are ideologically presented via political discourse.

Finally, this study has practical application in the political arena. It should help politicians and government officials by providing a deeper and more objective analysis of the ousted Arab leaders' statements in this critical politico-social era that has affected and will continue to affect the socio-political scene and the political decisions of policy makers in the Arab world. For example, analyzing these speeches ideologically will help policymakers to identify issues like corruption and inequality and then suggest initiatives that align with the demands of the people. More importantly, comprehending the way the Other is viewed in the Arab Spring political discourse will help to identify marginalized groups in order to create a more cohesive society.

Furthermore, this study will be of great significance for linguists and discourse analysts, especially those who want to understand how these critical events have affected the use of language in the political discourse and how the representations of the Self and the Other through the political language have changed after these dramatic socio-political events.

1.7 Organization of the Research

This research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one includes describing the scope of the study, a statement of the problem, the aims and the questions of the study, and a discussion of the significance of the study. Chapter two addresses some essential historical and political background information on the Arab region and the most prominent historical events that shaped the geopolitics of the region in recent memory. Arab Nationalism and Islamism as predominant ideologies in the modern history of the area are discussed, including how the rise and fall of these ideologies affected the emergence of the so called Arab Spring. Providing information about the causes and the trajectory of the Arab Spring is also an aim of this chapter.

Chapter three contains a review of the related literature. First, I review the most important previous studies on de/legitimization. I then review the previous research on the Self and the Other. In this chapter, I also address the previous studies of the Arab Spring political speeches especially the speeches of Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar al Qaddafi. The chapter then addresses discourse, political discourse, and political speech and its linguistic features. I also provide a discussion of the relationship between discourse, ideology, and power as an essential concept when we address Critical Discourse analysis. I then give a thorough discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis and its main frameworks by speculating on the aims of CDA and why it should be utilized.

Chapter Four is concerned with the description of the research design, theoretical framework, the collection of the research data, and the stages of analyzing the data. Validity and reliability will also be addressed in this chapter. Chapter Five presents an in-depth analysis of the selected political speeches on a thematic level. In chapter five, the content of the speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi will be examined by identifying the main discourse topics in each speech. I will then classify these discourse topics according to the macro-strategies of Wodak et. al. (2009), namely construction, perpetuation, justification, transformation, and destruction strategies. Chapter six will address how the three presidents use the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation to achieve de/legitimization. The final stage of analysis will be addressed in chapter seven. I mainly trace the ideological moves of "emphasize Our good things, emphasize Their bad things, de-emphasize Our bad things and de-emphasize Their good things" as suggested by van Dijk (1998). Chapter eight elucidates the main findings of the research and shows how these findings align with, expand, and add to the existing literature. It also offers the limitations and the contributions of the study and recommendations for future research such as expanding the data to include speeches of the same leaders from before the Arab Spring.

The three-layered analysis in the present study reveals that the three leaders achieved the legitimization of the Self and the de-legitimization of the Other using specific discourse topics, the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation, and the social inclusion/exclusion of the Self/Other through the ideological strategies of authorization, narrativization, moral evaluation, self-victimization, comparison, blame attribution, arousing emotions, and personification. The content of the political speeches of the three leaders generally is constructed around Us and Them dichotomy whether expressed implicitly or explicitly.

Chapter Two-Historical, Political, and Social Contexts of the Study

2.1 Introduction

In the present study, I examine the way the three ousted Arab Spring leaders under discussion here use language in their political speeches during the Arab Spring uprisings. I specifically seek to find answers for how they represent the Self and the Other in their speeches through the use of specific discourse topics (then macro-strategies), discursive and ideological strategies. Self and Other representation through discourse is a socio-cognitive process as suggested by van Dijk (2006), and this process cannot be interpreted apart from comprehending the social, historical, and political contexts of the examined discourse as assumed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). For example, a biased discourse about the Other is largely influenced by the shared political attitudes and ideologies of a community which, at the same time, cannot be separated from both the social and historical basis of this community (van Dijk, 2002: 203-204).

The Arab Spring can be described as a wave of (violent and non-violent) anti-regime demonstrations, riots, and protests that swept through a number of Arab countries between late 2010 to 2012 (although there are some countries that still suffer from its ramifications up to the present time, such as Syria and Yemen) (Albert and Esther, 2022). Although these are relatively recent events, drawing conclusions about the causes and the origins of the Arab Spring cannot be isolated from the political and historical backgrounds of the Arab area in general. To comprehensively examine the political speeches of the leaders of the Arab Spring countries, a sufficient discussion of the context in which these speeches were delivered is necessary because the complicated history of the region ultimately contributed to these events. Therefore, I provide a summary of the key political events and how these events shaped the predominant ideologies of

nationalism and Islamism in the Arab region that led to the Arab Spring, discuss the main causes of the uprisings, and introduce the direct events leading to the uprisings.

2.2 Predominant Ideologies in the Arab World

The most powerful ideologies in the Arab World are Arab nationalism and the love of freedom from any form of dependency or colonization (Dawisha, 2003). However, territorial nationalism (like Syrian, Egyptian, or Jordanian nationalism rather than Arab nationalism) (Wein, 2017: 2) and Islamism have also played significant roles in shaping the track of modern Arab history. In this section, I will address Arab Nationalism and Islamism as predominant ideologies in the Arab region. Furthermore, I will outline how the ideology of Arab Nationalism emerged, succeeded, and subsequently failed, and how, ultimately, its failure had an essential role in the Arab Spring uprisings. In the context of understanding Arab Nationalism and Islamism, ideology can be simply defined as a "systems of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups" that identify how these groups organize and legitimate their actions (van Dijk, 1998: 3).

2.2.1 Arab Nationalism and the Political and Historical Events That Shaped It

In the 19th century, the Ottomans lost their bases in North Africa and Egypt, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. As a result of this decline in the power of the Ottomans, the Arabs in the Levant (Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon), Iraq and the Hijaz demanded that Istanbul grant their provinces further autonomous governance in running their own affairs. Kramer (1993: 176) states that when Turkish-speaking Muslims started to create a new identity for themselves as Turks and enforced the use of the Turkish language in Arab counties, some unrest started to emerge in the remaining Arabic-speaking provinces of the Empire. This discontent caused an Arab "awakening" and possibly the rise of Arab nationalism especially in Syria. As the 20th century got underway, this Arabism expanded to all of the main Ottoman cities where Arabic was spoken by the majority such

as in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and the Hijaz. Therefore, these Arabs began to imagine themselves as *only* being Arab, particularly when Turkification endangered their "cultural status quo" (Kramer, 1993: 176). Consequently, the idea of an Arab nation can be understood more appropriately within the German philosophical definition of nation, in which the "cultural creation" is emphasized more than other factors. The German philosophy of nation is based on the concept of *Volksgeist* which was first brought toward by the 18th century philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. *Volksgeist* means "spirit of the people" which is manifested through culture, particularly language (Brubaker, 2009). Arabs, when they imagined themselves as a nation, were concerned primarily about their Arabic language and culture, rather than their possible authority over other Arab holdings of the Ottoman Empire, which resonates with the romantic German postulation of nationhood. Other philosophies of nation such as those of the French and English, for example, postulate that political variables that are the purview of the state, rather than culture, shape and mold nations through time (Dawisha, 2003:52). The French concept of nationhood in which laws and republican values are more respected than ethnic identities (Brubaker, 2009) does not align with Arab Nationalism, which significantly emphasizes cultural identity including both language and historical consciousness.

However, the effects of colonialism influenced the development of Arab nation states. Just as the English nation is a product of the English state and the French nation is the product of the French state, the French and the English, when they divided up and drew the borders of the territories of the new Arab states after the WWI, were convinced that the political state predated the cultural nation. The colonial powers decided that there would be Iraqi, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian nations *after* these states had been created. Accordingly, the nation state in the Arab region was an imported idea from the colonial powers (Kramer, 1993, Wien, 2017).

The arbitrary boundaries that were imposed by the European powers ruined the very early seeds for the possibility for the unity of the Arabs and fragmented the region. Manduchi (2017: 8) states that the Arab countries were "forced to become states and nations", and Raymond Hinnebusch (in Fawcett, 2009: 150) argues that this fragmentation complicated nation building since there was "incongruence between state (territories) and the identities of the populace." When these boundaries were drawn by the colonial powers, they also neglected the fact that a multitude of religious and ethnic minorities existed in the region. For example, the Kurds were fragmented between Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, as were the Shiite sect, different communities of Jews, and various groups of Christians. Hinnebusch (in Fawcett, 2009: 152) therefore argues that there was a problem in using the term nation-state to describe the Arab states and it is more reasonable to use the term "territorial states" because the communities of these states do not have distinct identities.

When the dream of one Arab state was confronted with colonial imposed territories in 1920, some new Arab states-especially Iraq- attempted to emphasize the role of language and history as the unifying elements among all Arabs. The Director of General Education in King Faisal's government in Syria in 1919 (then in Iraq from 1920 to 1927) Sati' al Husri emphasized the role of education as the channel through which the cultural elements of Arab nationalism would be stressed and diffused (Dawisha, 2003; Zylberkan, 2012) in order to create a sense of identity among Arabs. This educational program, which coincided with a vacuum created by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and then the presence of the colonial powers, mainly aimed to integrate language and history into schools' curricula to create a sense of unity and belonging. al Husri's efforts in curriculum development, teacher training, and establishing schools produced a cultured and educated generation that was aware of its cultural heritage. This generation was the

cornerstone of the subsequent expansion of the nationalist views in the Arab region. In addition to a shared language and history, the Arabs had "shared threats, interests, and grievances against the 'other'-the non-Arab states and imperialism" (Fawcett, 2009: 152). Thus, the rise of Arab Nationalism was also caused- besides emphasizing the cultural elements of the one nation- by the struggle against the European imperialists whose existence in the Arab world lasted until the end of 1960s.

In the second half of the 1950s, Arab nationalism found a new enforcing factor. This was represented by Gammal Abdl Nassir who was a charismatic leader (Ullah and Khan, 2020). Dawisha (2003) and Manduchi (2017) assert that when Nassir became president of Egypt after a coup that toppled the King of Egypt, Arab Nationalism became the predominant ideology in the Arab region until 1970 because the Western threat (exemplified by the British presence in Egypt) and the existence of Zionism in Palestine facilitated Nassir's mission in propagating Arab Nationalism. Therefore, the ideology of Arab Nationalism overshadowed other identities such as Islamic identity, but did not eliminate it.

2.2.1.1 Post-Arab Revolt-1940s: Short-lived Arab Independence and British Betrayal

The first time Arabs "imagined" themselves as a separate nation was when they felt that their culture in general, and their language in particular, were threatened by the Turkification policies of the new ruling elite in the Ottoman Empire at the early beginning of the 20th century. Masters (2013: 224) states that at the beginning of the 20th century, when the young Turks took power in Istanbul, "they created a rift over the question of cultural rights for Arabic speakers", especially when the Turks refused Arab demands for autonomous rule and to keep Arabic as the official language in the Arab provinces. In response, a number of secret organizations were created by

Arab students in the diaspora, especially in Paris. The most important one was *Al-fata*, which provided the seeds of the rising Arab Nationalism (Haddad and Ochsenwald,1977). At the same time, the British contacted Sharif Husain (the Emir of Mecca) in 1915 and promised to aid the Arabs in their revolt against the Ottomans and in the establishment of the Arab kingdom in Syria if he helped them to get rid of the Ottomans in the Arab region (Wagner, 2015). The bloody persecutions committed by the Ottomans on Arab anti-Ottoman nationalists in Syria in 1915 led Sharif Husain to take a serious move and revolt against the Ottomans with the help of the British in 1916 after "exhausting all possible means for an understanding with the Ottoman government" (Haddad and Ochsenwald,1977: 244).

After the defeat of the Ottomans, Sharif Husain's son, Faysal, formed an Arab national government in Damascus. However, this government was short-lived because the British and the French completed their plot to divide Syria and Iraq between them according to the Sykes-Picot agreement. This agreement left the Arab revolutionists in shock and killed their hopes for establishing their own state. As a result, the French forces expelled King Faysal from Syria in 1920 to Iraq where he established his new kingdom (Haddad and Ochsenwald,1977). Another shock for the Arabs was the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which promised to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine in 1920. At the same time, Britain promised Husain that he would be able to establish his Arab state in Syria which included Palestine (this was clearly mentioned in Husain's first letter in 1915 to Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Egypt in that time). It appeared that Britain was giving conflicting promises to the Arabs and the Jews (Gershoni, et.al, 2006). Wagner (2015: 64) also confirms this by arguing that "British officials recognized the inherent contradiction in their promises to Zionists and Arabs between 1917 and 1919."

The newly created states, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, were put under mandatory control by Britain and France, who claimed that these newly liberated states needed to be prepared to "stand alone" (Fawcett, 2009: 26). Thus, in the post-WWI period, some Arab lands were full colonies like Aden and Algeria, protectorates like Tunisia and Morocco, mandates like Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq, or condominiums which had arrangement treaties like the Gulf states. Libya was under Italian colonial control (Gelvin, 2015). In explaining this difference, Rogan (2005) argues that the regions that became mandates were believed to have no prior experience in statehood when they first entered the international community after the First World War, according to the consensus of the peacemakers (colonizers) at Versailles. The nations of North Africa, on the other hand, had created statehood documents which were the exceptions to these other types of states, and all of them were still directly colonized in 1919. The oldest formal Arab state, Morocco, became a protectorate of France in 1912. Tunisia and Egypt were ruled by France and Great Britain respectively since the 1880s. The first Arab area subject to European colonial control (1830), Algeria, was controlled by France and never had the chance to establish independent institutions of government to the same degree as the other North African states. Consequently, since the areas of the Hijaz region of the Red Sea, Greater Syria, which includes the contemporary states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, and Iraq, were the Arab territories legally under Ottoman administration in 1914, and were not under colonial rule, they became mandates (Rogan, 2005). Accordingly, the idea of Arab nationalism was hindered by the experience of mandates that paved the way for the concept of statehood in these countries (Fawcett, 2009) because the colonizing powers could claim they did not understand statehood. Therefore, from the end of the Ottoman rule to the end of WWII, "Arab politics were primarily focused on gaining independence from

colonial rule" (ibid: 41). This formed the beginning of a new phase of Arab Nationalism which was the fight of Arab nationalists for freedom from the colonizer.

In the second half of the 1940s, most Arab countries gained independence (Jordan, Syrian, Iraq, Lebanon). This brought Arab Nationalism into confrontation with other state-based nationalisms such as Syrian nationalism, Egyptian nationalism, and Iraqi nationalism. However, the Egyptians proposed the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. The fruits of the Arab League appeared tangible when the armies of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt decided to fight the Israelis in Palestine in 1948 after the UN resolution that established the partition of Palestine between the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, the lack of coordination between the Arab armies on the ground led to their defeat by the Israelis (Dawisha, 2003). This was a result of the opposition between the interests of Arab Nationalism and territorial nationalism. Bell (2001: 174) argues that "the Arab governments all pursued their own objectives" in a reference to the division among Arabs.

12.2.1.2 1950s-1960s: Nassirist Arab Nationalist Dream and Cold War Dynamics

The defeat of 1948 was the watershed moment for the geopolitical shift that took place in the region in the 1950s. As a reaction to both this defeat and to the corruption of the monarchy that had been manipulated by the British and because of the financial pressure caused by the war with Ethiopia, in 1875 Egypt sold its shares in the Suez Canal. Letting the British interfere in the Egyptian affairs, a group of officers led by Jamal Abdel Nassir then executed a coup in Egypt that ended the monarchical regime in 1952. Maddy-Weitzman (2016: 47) argues that the regime changes in Egypt "opened up a new chapter in Egyptian history and would have profound consequences for the Arab system as a whole." After being a pro-western system for a long time, Egypt after 1956 became a republic that altered its foreign policy into a non-alignment one,

especially during the Cold War, and became a leading Arab country. However, Nassir's focus in the first three years of his rule was on reforming Egypt economically and politically. Also, the continued presence of the British (who had military presence after the Urabi revolution against the monarch in 1881) in Egypt hindered the shift to wider Arab politics. Therefore, at the beginning of his rule, Nassir's main goal was liberating the Suez Canal from British control. In 1956 Nassir nationalized the Suez Canal and transferred it from a foreign-owned company to the Egyptian government. To restore its control over the Canal, Britain, along with France and Israel, attacked Egypt, but the pressure from the US and the UN made these three powers withdraw from Egypt. Egypt gained its independence in that year.

Two major events happened in the 1950s that led Nassir to turn his attention to the wider Arab political landscape and even intervene in the local affairs of other Arab countries. First was the US intervention in the region in 1953, when the Americans sought to form an alliance with Egypt to contain the possible Soviet influence in the region, although in this Nassir refused. Nonetheless, he feared that if other Arab countries joined the US alliance, Egypt would be politically and strategically isolated from the rest of the Arab world. As a result, Nassir began propagating the cause of Arab Nationalism in which the Egyptian radio station "Voice of Arabs" and Nassir's creative speeches played a pivotal role. Dawisha (2003: 139) argues that after the western alliance threat, Nassir started to concentrate less on Egyptian affairs and shifted his ideological and political attention toward broader Arab affairs. Doing so, he found eager ears and hearts among Arabs. Nassir's main goal in this shift was to get rid of the British presence in Egypt by exploiting the anti-imperialist sentiment that prevailed in the Arab world after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

As an alternative to Egypt, in 1955 the US turned to Iraq to form the Baghdad Pact which, along with Turkey, was an extension of NATO in the Middle East region in order to contain Soviet influence (Campbell, 1972). From this point on, antagonism between Iraq (and the Hashemites) and Egypt became more serious because they had different foreign policies. Nassir used his propaganda to prevent other countries (such as Jordan) from joining the Baghdad Pact. His propaganda succeeded in enflaming all Arabs and preventing Jordan from joining the pact (Podeh, 1995).

Second, the 1956 tripartite attack on Egypt by France, Britain, and Israel marked another pivotal point in the geopolitics of the region and the expansion of the Arab Nationalist cause. Chemmar (2014) points out that this attack was a direct result of Nassir's nationalization of the Suez Canal after the US and Britain stepped back from financing the Aswan Dam. As a result, Egypt relied on the Soviets for the financing and announced an arms deal with them, which was also a response to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt was attacked fiercely by France, Britain, and Israel. However, the US asked Britain to mitigate the attacks because, as Dawisha (2003: 180) argues, it "would drag them into a possible nuclear conflict with the Soviets". From this point on, Egypt and the Arab region became a proxy battle ground for the US-Soviet Cold War. In this vein, Ucaner (2022) argues that despite his military loss, Nassir gained unprecedented support from all Arab people, and Egypt and Nassir became the symbols of Arab Nationalism. Therefore, the post-Suez Canal crisis period witnessed many inter-Arab cooperation projects and a wide anti-western sentiment. This decade witnessed the great triumphs of Arab Nationalism led by Nassir. However, the climax of Arab Nationalism happened when the Ba'thists took power in Syria and proposed unity with Egypt. Palmer (1966) argues that there were economic and political incompatibilities between Syria and Egypt. Politically, Egypt had a single-party political system while Syria's

landscape was fragmented and frequently changed). Economically, Syria had a significant capital private sector, while Egypt was a socialist country that controlled its main industries. However, despite these incompatibilities, Nassir accepted this proposal because this would be a step toward the Arab Nationalist project that he claimed. As a result, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was established (Dawisha, 2003, Haddad and Ochsenwald, 1977).

However, in 1959, a number of economic and political problems resulted from the organic unity between Egypt and Syria. Politically, Nassir neglected the Syrian Ba'athists in his administration of the UAR. Economically, Dawisha (2003) argues that the transformation of the Syrian economy into a socialist one was "the straw that broke the camel's back". Plamer (1966: 61) states that this transformation in the economy caused a significant decrease in the imports and currency restrictions that "reduced the national income by one third". As a result of these problems, a group of Syrian officers executed a coup against the UAR in 1961 ending the first and last attempt of organic unity between two Arab states (Dawisha, 2003).

Finally, in the 1960s, the dramatic event that ended the hopes of all Arabs in creating one Arab state was the sore defeat of the Arabs in their war against Israel in 1967 (Hinnebusch, 2017). The 1967 war was instigated because of the increased Israeli threat to the Jordan river. This led the armies of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan to attack Israel in 1967. However, the heavy US military support for Israel gave it the upper hand in the war and it managed to seize territories from Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. After this tragic event, Arab governments, even Egypt, shifted their attention to their internal interests and the Arab National cause was no longer as vibrant as it had been even a decade earlier. For example, Fawcett (2009) argues that, after the 1967 war, Egypt, the leader of the Arab Nationalism project, accepted economic aid from oil-states that were pro-west to overcome its losses in the war. Also, because western imperialism had ultimately ended in the

Arab region, Arab nationalists lost their standard antagonist 'other' and were forced to replace it with another, which was, of course, Israel (Fawcett, 2009).

2.2.1.3 1970s-1980s: From Egyptian Hegemony to Petro-Politics

A new order emerged in the 1970s because Arab Nationalist ideology was no longer an effective factor in the policies of the Arab states after the 1967 defeat and sudden death of Nassir. Fawcett (2009: 167) points out that in this period, "the Egyptian hegemony was replaced by an axis of the largest (Egypt), richest (Saudi Arabia), and most Pan-Arab (Syria) states, facilitated by the greater equality, hence trust between the main leaders, Sadat, Feisal, and Assad." There were two important events that occurred in this period and had a significant impact on changing the political landscape in the region. These events were the 1973 war between the Arabs (Egypt, Syria) and Israel, and the Iraq-Iran war from 1980-1989.

To begin with, the 1973 war was a result of the US-Soviet rivalry in the region because after Sadat and Assad recognized that their armies were no match for the Israeli army, they sought military aid from the Soviets (Wesselman, 1995). This war coincided with the increasing importance of Arab oil, and the awareness of the Arabs of the political and strategic power of oil both in militarization and in bargaining on Arab issues. Gelvin (2011) declares that during the 1973 war, the oil embargo on the US and the nations that supported Israel caused price hikes. It was clear to Arab oil producers that the US military support for Israel altered the scale of the war in favor of Israel. However, through the use of an oil embargo, the Arab world illustrated to the US the consequences of their unilateral support for Israel. This embargo also showed how vulnerable the American economy was and how dependent it was on Middle Eastern oil. As a result of this embargo, the US changed its policy toward the Arabs and proposed a cease-fire agreement, which started a long journey of diplomatic efforts to achieve peace between Egypt and

Israel, and a pact was finally signed in 1979. Yaqub (2015) and Manduchi (2017) argue that the oil embargo was not analyzed by Arab politicians as a revival of the Arab Nationalist cause, but rather it was interpreted as a reorientation of Arab politics toward a new center of power - the Gulf countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular.

The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel changed the political landscape in the region and this agreement had both strategic and regional influence. Strategically, Dawisha (2003: 266) argues that this agreement "took Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli conflict", neutralized "the most powerful Arab country", and closed "the book for ever on Israel's geostrategic nightmare of fighting on two fronts". Further, the US secured a promise that Egypt would not cooperate with the Soviets again. Regionally, however, this step was considered a total breach in Arab "solidarity". In response, Saddam Hussein attempted to take over the leadership role of the Arabs for Iraq when he invited the Arabs to an urgent summit to impose sanctions on Egypt immediately after the peace treaty (Maddy-Weitzman, 2016, Ismael, 1986, and Yaqub, 2016).

In addition, the Iraq-Iran war in the period between 1980 and 1989 made Iraq the most active actor in the region. After Egypt had abandoned the Arab nationalist cause by signing the peace agreement with Israel, Saddam Hussein attempted to situate himself as the defender of Arabs in his war with Iran that lasted for nine years (1980-1989) (Matuschak, 2019). He attempted to imitate Nassir's leading role in the Arab region in the 1950s and 1960s, and the support he received from the Gulf countries, the US, and Egypt confirmed his illusion. The US encouraged Iraq to launch a war against Iran and assisted it militarily in attempting to topple the new Iranian anti-American regime because - after the fall of the Shah in 1979 - the Americans lost their "policeman" in the region against the Soviets (Fawcett, 2009). The Gulf countries feared the Iranian impact on the region, so they supported Hussein in his war. Even Egypt supported Iraq,

returning to the Arab political landscape after the Arab league sanctions. So, it is clear that this cooperation was not for the sake of an all-Arab cause, but rather for the national interests and security of each country. One of the positive effects of the Iran-Iraq war was the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. In addition to its role in fostering the political and economic relations and maintaining stability, the GCC managed to establish a common market and facilitated trade, and most importantly it enhanced the collective defensive strategies adopted by its members (Gause, 2010). On the other hand, this war also led to the alliance between Iran and Syria, which Lia (2016) argues caused the latter to be increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab states. The Syrian regime chose to stand with Iran because it has territorial borders with Iraq and shares Shi'ite affiliations with the Iranian ruling elite.

2.2.1.4 1990s: The Region Had No System

The 1990s witnessed a number of events that brought much chaos to the region. The most important event was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Although the closing year of the 1980s witnessed a spirit of optimism in the Arab region - including the formation of the "Arab Cooperation council" (including Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq), the formation of the Maghreb Union (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia), and the end of the Lebanese civil war - this optimism did not last long because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an event that shocked all Arabs (Kramer, 1993 & Fawcett, 2009). Karsh and Karsh (1996) argue that this invasion terminally dispelled any ideals of Arab nationalism and eradicated the last sense of solidarity between Arabs, even on a popular level. Because of this invasion, the Arabs split between two camps: those who preferred diplomatic and peaceful solutions like Jordan, Yemen, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and those who preferred military solutions, like the Gulf countries and Egypt with the support of the US. Since the United States viewed this invasion as an infraction of the international

law and a threat to oil supplies in the world, it promoted a military solution. Consequently, the countries that were reliant on the US security guarantees (and felt threatened) advocated a military solution. On the other hand, a peaceful resolution was preferred by the countries that had strong economic relations with Iraq. Louise Fawcett declares that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exposed the frailty of earlier attempts to establish a regional order and showed that, at least for the Middle East, the end of the cold war had not lessened the region's security crisis or even the threat of armed confrontation (Fawcett, 2009: 201). Therefore, the 1990s was the point when it became clear that "state-centered identity has become much stronger and state borders less permeable than before" (Karawan, 1994). As a result, at this point, Arabs were defined by their territorial identity rather than their pan-Arab identity because of the tenuous relationship between the project of Arab nationalism and actual political realities.

The 1990s also witnessed other events that deepened the chaotic situation in the region. This included the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN, the Kurdish uprising in the northern Iraq followed by the Iraq counterinsurgency that resulted in the killing of more than 50000 people, taking advantage of the state's weakness following its defeat, Islamist opposition in Algeria (which lasted for a decade), and the deterioration of bilateral relations between Arab groups. All of this left the Arab region without a functioning system in the 1990s (Karawan, 1993: 4). Taking into account that Iraq was defeated in the 1991 war and then sanctioned by the UN, its ability to play a significant role in Arab politics or be a match for Israel or Iran was neutralized. On the other hand, Western-Arab and Israeli-Arab relations had been growing steadily (Maddy-Weitzman, 2016: 146). Both the Oslo Accords of 1993 that opened up mutual recognition between PLO and Israel, and 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty "normalized" ties with Israel (ibid), substantially changing the dynamics of the region.

2.2.1.5 2000s: Years of Destruction

The new millennium brought much change to the world in general and the Middle East in particular. The 9/11 bombings in 2001 in the US led its administration to think in a different way about the Middle East. Michael Hudson points out that "the American response to the attacks of 9/11 was encapsulated in the term 'global war on terror" (Fawcett: 2009: 31). It started with strikes on Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qa'ida and then progressed to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to democratize Iraq and disarm Saddam Hussein's regime of its alleged nuclear and biological weapons (ibid). However, the dream of a "new Iraq" that the US sought to achieve did not come true when it collided with realities there. This invasion led to a civil war in Iraq when the Shi'ites took power after the collapse of Hussein's regime and marginalized the Sunnis. Geopolitically, the new Shiite-led government turned Iraq into a pro-Iranian state, giving Iran more weight in the region and threatening Saudi Arabia. Jordan and Egypt also feared that a "Shi'ite Crescent" would emerge across Iran-Iraq-Syria and Lebanon (where the Hizbullah Shiite militant group resides) (Maddy-Weitzman, 2016). By the 2000s the Arab political systems were already exhausted from the regional and inter-wars during the 1980s and 1990s, which had led to the emergence of authoritarian regimes. These regimes utilized this state of instability in the subsequent 2000s to legitimize their long-lasting rule.

2.2.2 Islamism in the Arab World: Historical and Political Context

2.2.2.1 The Islamists Before the Arab Spring

Many scholars talk about a wave of religiosity in the Arab region in general and in Egypt in particular in the last three decades of the 20th century (Mahmood, 2011 and Schielke, 2015). Schielke (2015: 20) states that "an Islamic revival has made a scripturally oriented and conservative sense of religiosity the most powerful source of moral certainty and existential hope."

But what are the origins of this popular religiosity in the Arab world and when did it start? Indeed, it should be noted that many of the political events discussed in the previous section also influenced both the rise and the decline of Islamism in the Arab World.

When the Young Turks took power in 1908 to rule the Ottoman Empire, they announced a secularist Turkish nationalist ideology in ruling the Empire. And, in 1924, the Turkish Republicans under the leadership of Ataturk dissolved the Caliphate in Turkey, announcing the end of the role of Islam in politics and establishing the Turkish Republic. The racial policies of the Young Turks toward the Arab provinces between 1908 and 1915 led Arab intellectuals and nationalist leaders to seek separation from the Ottomans which ultimately took place after the Great Arab revolt in 1916. This showed that the opposition to the secularization policies of the Young Turks was part of the rebellion of Arabs, but that rebellion was significantly rooted in the ambition of Arabs to preserve their culture. However, the Arabs did not have independence for long because they found themselves under European control after WWI in 1918. With Islamic rule collapsed in Istanbul, Arabs found the nationalistic ideas more effective in resisting the European colonizer than being a part of a community whose rulers were Muslim Turks (Masters, 2013).

On the other hand, some Islamists attempted to oppose this secularist nationalistic wave. Dawisha (2003) argues that this was true when Hassan Al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 1928 –which later had branches in other Arab countries and constituted a main source of opposition for ruling regimes. For example, they adopted the slogan “Islam is the Solution” (Dawisha, 2003). Nonetheless, nationalism remained the prevailing ideology among populations in the Arab world until the independence of all Arab countries in the 1960s. During the nationalist period (1950s-1960s), Islamic parties were banned and Egypt during Nassir’s rule was considered a secular country. He imprisoned and tortured Islamists, and Sayd Qutb - an

Islamic writer - was executed by his regime. However, Sadat, Nassir's successor, was more moderate and released many imprisoned Islamists. Ironically, he was assassinated by a radical Islamist (although not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood). Also, during this era, nationalist regimes in Syria and Iraq banned Islamic parties because these regimes knew that the Islamists would confront their secular political systems (Anscombe, 2014).

In 1967, the devastating defeat of the Arabs in their war with Israel caused a belief that the secularist nationalist ideas were not a strong enough ideology in defending Arab lands against the Israeli enemy. As a result, there was an Islamic awakening among the Arab Muslims which Manduchi (2017) called the "Rebirth of Islam". At that time, individuals refocused their attention on a mythical past when their life was allegedly full of authentic values and free of contaminating foreign concepts, and Islamic groups strengthened their activities by recruiting new members easily (Dawisha, 2003: 278). Further, the idea of the Islamic awakening was accompanied with the increasing strategic power of oil-producing Arab countries which took up the torch of taking Islam to the realm of politics, especially through Saudi Arabia supporting the foundation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 1969.

Further, two other events significantly influenced the rise of Islam and both happened outside of the Arab region in the last two decades of the 20th century. These events confirmed the political power of Islam in international politics and affected the state of Islamism in the Arab region. The first event was the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. When Islamists took power in Iran, this gave the Islamic opposition movements in the Arab world the courage to challenge their ruling regimes because after the success of the Islamists in Iran to overthrow a powerful regime, Arab Islamists thought that other secular pro-western Arab regimes could be overthrown too. This sometimes led to bloody events like those in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s (Dawisha,

2003). In 1988, when the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria attempted to rise against Assad's regime, Syrian troops besieged the city of Hama (the headquarter of Islamist opposition in Syria). The raids on the city were brutal and many people were killed; the Islamic movement was uprooted after that time in Syria. In Algeria, the case of Islamist opposition was bloodier and more complicated because there were a number of armed Islamic groups opposing the ruling regime, and at the same time they were in conflict with each other between 1991 to 2000. The existence of multiple Islamic groups made it possible to fight the state for more than ten years during which a series of bombings, assassinations, and massacres killed more than 150,000 people. In 1997, the Islamic groups issued a cease-fire which did not receive any official acknowledgment until 1999 when Bouteflika was elected as a president, and issued the Law of Civil Reconciliation to release the imprisoned Islamists (Hafez, 2000).

A second influential event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this invasion, the West (mainly the USA) allied with the Muslims in Afghanistan and Arabs such as Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets. Fawcett (2009: 170) argues that "Islam was viewed by the West as a useful ally in the cold-war fight against communism." During this war, thousands of fighters went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. However, as Fawcett (2009: 318) states, "when many of these 'Arab Afghan' fighters returned home, they turned their attention to combating pro-American regimes," and were later viewed by the US as radical Islamists. These returning fighters constituted a wide sector of Islamic opposition to Arab regimes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, US attention was directed toward radical Islam, while also supporting Arab regimes in suppressing radical Islam. This was mainly to contain the expansion of the Iranian Revolutionary ideology in the Arab countries, especially those who had big oil reserves. This role was confirmed after 9/11 which led the US to wage two destructive wars against Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Saddam

Hussein's regime in Iraq. Both nations were accused of supporting terrorism and radical Islam. However, these events had the opposite effect, and caused a wave of religiosity among ordinary people in the Arab world (Mahmood and Mahmood, 2011). Many saw the Islamic revolution in Iran as a triumph for Islam, and both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the following two US wars on Afghanistan and Iraq as wars on Islam. However, during these decades, despite this wide wave of religiosity among people, the ruling regimes retained their secular character which they had established during the Nationalist era. Also, the West-oriented rule, which was essentially created by the US war on terror, helped suppress any Islamic-affiliated parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.

2.2.2.2 The Role of Islamic Parties in the Arab Spring.

In the few decades that preceded the Arab Spring uprisings, there was something akin to agreement by Arab people regarding the significance of having a fear of God. This religiosity was, as argued by Schielke (2015: 20), an escape from the frustration the people lived with due to economic, political, and emotional grievances, and it finally contributed to revolts in various places. As this study mainly focuses on the countries that witnessed regime breakdowns after the Arab Spring uprisings (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), I will discuss the experience of Islamic parties in the three countries, taking into account that all the regimes there were considered secular or secular-nationalist regimes.

To begin with, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt continued to be the source of governmental opposition from the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s until recent times. During the regimes of Nassir (19506-1970) and Mubarak (in 1981-2011), the Islamists experienced more repression. In relation to Mubarak's regime, for example, Hirschkind (2012: 50) states that "the Mubarak regime had staked its international legitimacy on its claim to

be acting as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus as a defender of the country's secular traditions". In Libya the ban on parties - especially the religiously affiliated parties - limited the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood and they mainly worked in exile. Third, Tunisia, the most secularist Arab country, banned the Islamic an-Nahda party from the 1990s onwards and its members also worked in exile. Ben Ali's secularist ruling party tightened authoritarian rule and repressed any opposition parties, not only the Islamists. In Yemen, the Al-Islah Islamic party worked with Saleh's ruling party because it was mainly dependent on tribal bases. The main opposition party was the Yemeni Socialist Party which coalesced with the Al-Islah party in 2006 to form an oppositional coalition against Saleh and to get as many parliament seats as possible against Saleh's radical regime that had manipulated the elections.

Shortly before the Arab Spring and in the early stages of the uprisings, the Islamists in all Arab Spring countries had limited roles. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, during the dramatic moments of the Arab spring the protesters in each Arab country that witnessed uprisings were unified because they had one common cause: the departure of their autocrats. This shared goal brought all parties, including Islamists, Secularists, Leftists, and youth, under one umbrella and all chanted "the people want to bring down the regime" (*al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*) (Brownlee, et al., 2015).

However, the Islamists decided to delay their involvement in the uprisings for a number of reasons. They were uncertain about the "ultimate outcomes" of the uprisings, including whether the regime would collapse or not. Many thought this way because they knew if they visibly participated in the uprisings, they would be the first suspects to be blamed since they were the main source of opposition for regimes long before the uprisings. Also, the calculations of the

Islamists meant that they preferred to free-ride the events, with minimum exposure to regime violence (Lynch, 2014). Quinn Mechan (in Lynch, 2014: 204) argues that this led to a situation where the non-Islamist opposition was prepared to lead demonstrations while the Islamist opposition was satisfied to watch from the sidelines as the demonstrations unfolded. When the collapse of the regimes resulted in a power vacuum, the Islamists took over "giving unusual relevance to the question of what Islam-as-politics might mean" (Anscombe, 2014: 286). Therefore, the previous discussion shows that the role of Islam in making political decisions had been suspended from the dissolution of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 until the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in some Arab countries in 2011. However, the Arab Spring gave Islamists the chance to reemerge in leadership again.

2.3 Arab Spring Causes and its Trajectory

As the previous sections have shown, the historical and political events that happened in the Arab World for over a century can be considered indirect causes for what the region has undergone in the last decade. In this section I will address the direct economic, political, and social reasons that led the populations in some Arab countries to revolt. It also addresses the situation in the Arab countries in general shortly before the Arab Spring uprisings and the trajectories of events in the three countries that finally led to the collapse of the regimes in each one. Along with the longstanding authoritarian regimes and their coercive power that was experienced against its people, popular grievances that arouse from bad economic conditions and high rates of youth unemployment and the failure of the states to guarantee a healthy democratic political system and strong civil society are considered to be direct causes for the wave of uprisings in the majority of Arab countries.

2.3.1 Causes of the Arab Spring

The societies of many countries in the Arab world have endured decades of extremely challenging economic, political, and social conditions. Salih (2013) asserts that political scholars generally agree on the combination of economic, political, and social key factors that, when brought together, led to the social explosion termed the 2011 Arab Spring, all of which were connected to the long history discussed above (Salih, 2013:186). These key factors can be summarized under three main factors: unemployment, oppression, and social injustice.

1- Unemployment

The majority of the protesters who crowded the streets in the Arab Spring were jobless young people (Flores, 2012, and Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). This can be attributed to the fact that the number of jobless people in several countries in the Arab world is the highest in the world. Mulderig (2013: 6) reports that:

> youth unemployment in the Arab world is consistently higher than youth unemployment rates of other regions. Youth unemployment in the region ranges from Yemen on the high end with 50 percent youth unemployment, to the United Arab Emirates at the low end with 12.1 percent; in all cases, the percentage of Arab youth willing but unable to find work is significantly higher than anywhere else in the world.

In Libya for example, four reasons for the high rate of unemployment are suggested by Abuhadra and Ajaali (2014:10): the increase in the population growth rate that causes an increase in the number of jobseekers, the imbalance between the market demands and the outcomes of the education system, the marginalization of the private sector by the government, and the decline of the role of the government as a job provider.

What sped up the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings is that these unprecedented rates of unemployment were coupled with the rapid increase in young populations and rising prices due to the global economic crisis (Idris, 2016). As a result, the Arab Spring regimes were unable to

find effective solutions to the problem of persistent unemployment and consequently the numbers of unemployed youth exploded.

2- Oppression and Social Injustice

The protestors marched in the streets in the Arab Spring countries advocating for social reforms, and in particular they demanded social equality and justice. For instance, in Egypt one of the most circulated chants during the uprisings in Tahrir Square was عيش، حرية، كرامة أنسانية which translates to "bread, freedom, human dignity" in English (Robbins and Jamal, 2015: 5). Lesch (2013) states that the demand for social injustice in the Arab Spring countries was the outcome of the long-standing corruption exercised by the political regimes in these countries. For example, he draws attention to the concentration of power in the hands of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt which made it easy for its officials to take the executive positions in the government. Consequently, this led some officials to abuse the power they had by selling large portions of the governmental resources such as oil and gas. Most importantly, the State of Emergency that was in place at the time allowed the government to impose many restrictions on people and gave overwhelming power to state officials and the police. As Robbins and Jamal (2015: 13) argue social equality is undermined "by giving those with greater financial means to pay bribes or those with more influential networks preferable treatment compared to those who lack such resources".

Similarly, in Libya, although al Qaddafi's regime claimed to promote social fairness, it failed when it came to protecting human rights. The high level of corruption in Libya can be attributed to the country's absence of social justice, which granted those close to the ruling elite better opportunities and lives. Ogbonnaya (2013: 112) argues that "human rights violations" and "extreme political exclusion" were the direct factors which lead to the uprisings in Libya.

Unemployment is not one of the suggested causes of the uprising in Libya because the state satisfied the unemployed people by paying for them, and they did not need to work.

When we talk about corruption in the Arab Spring countries, we should not turn a blind eye to the corruption of the leaders themselves and their families. The bad economic and political conditions in the Arab Spring countries were made worse by the corruption of the ruling families. Sarkar (2011) narrates some examples of this kind of corruption, commenting that in Egypt, for instance, the ruling class and new economic elites worked together to build riches that were inconceivable to the vast majority of the people who were subsisting on $2 per day. Similarly, in Tunisia no investment agreement was completed without paying a bribe to Ben Ali's family (Rijkers et al., 2017).

As for oppression, similar to social freedoms, the majority of political freedoms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been oppressed too. For example, in Libya, political party formation and membership in them were completely prohibited and were even considered acts of betrayal. This was true when al Qaddafi made the slogan "whoever joins political parties is a betrayer" which is "من تحزب خان" in Arabic. This slogan was repainted in green in all government buildings. al Qaddafi's catchphrase was also printed on postage stamps to repeatedly remind the people of the prohibition on political parties (Schiller, 2009: 163).

2.3.2 The Trajectory of the Uprisings and the Bios of the Three Tyrannies in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya

Due to the previously mentioned economic and sociopolitical circumstances in the Arab world, the Arab Spring uprisings started in a dramatic manner in Tunisia in December 2010. The accounts given by Toumi (2011), Fisher (2011) and Day (2011) of the tragic event that ignited the Tunisian Arab Spring are largely consistent. They all agree that the slap that the vegetable vendor, Mohamed

Bouazizi, received from the policewoman, Fedia Hamdi, and the humiliation he felt after this slap, sparked not just the Tunisian revolution but also the Arab Spring revolutions. This action was symbolic of all of the problems underlying many of these societies.

Tunisia

Tunisia is a North-African Arab Islamic country. The official language is Arabic. It was colonized by the French in the 19th century. Tunisia became independent in 1956. Its first president after independence was Habib Bourguibah who ruled Tunisia for 31 years. Because of his illness and unfitness to rule, Bourguibah was deposed by his prime minister Ben Ali in 1987 in a bloodless, peaceful coup (Ware, 1988).

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was born the fourth of eleven children in the French Tunisian port city of Sousse on September 3, 1936, to a family of modest means. When he reached school age, he studied at the Technical Institute in Sousse. However, after being jailed for joining the local resistance against the occupying French, he was expelled from the institute in secondary school and never received his professional certificate. As a result, at the age of 21, he joined the newly-formed Tunisian Army in 1958. After training in France at the Specialized School of the Armies in Saint-Cyr and the Artillery School in Chalon-sur-Marne, his then father-in-law, General Mohamad Kefi (the father of his first wife, Naima Kefi), sent him to the United States to study at the Higher Military School of Intelligence and Security in Baltimore and the Field Artillery School in Texas, United States (Murphy, 1999).

Upon his return to Tunisia, Ben Ali held a variety of positions, the first being an Army staff officer in the Military Security Administration, which he himself established in 1964. Ten years later, in 1974, Ben Ali would serve as Tunisia's military attaché to Morocco and Spain and then as the country's ambassador to Poland for four years, starting in 1984. Once he returned to Tunisia, Ben

Ali was appointed to several ministerial positions, starting as Minister of State, then Minister Plenipotentiary for Interior Affairs, and then, on April 28, 1986, Minister of the Interior. In October of 1987, Ben Ali was chosen to be Tunisia's Prime Minister by Tunisia's first president, the 84-year-old Habib Bourguiba (ibid).

Bourguiba's health had been declining since the 1970s. Taking advantage of the situation, Ben Ali had several doctors who tended to Bourguiba declare him mentally unfit to carry out his duties. Ben Ali then declared himself Head of State on November 7, 1987, in what critics and historians have come to call "a bloodless coup". Ben Ali would be elected president four times afterwards in what many called sham elections. In fact, in the early 2000s and under Ben Ali's authoritarian rule, Chapters 39 and 40 of the Tunisian Constitution, which regulated the amount of time an elected official could hold his or her position, were amended so that he could run in every election and essentially be president for life (Murphy, 1999).

However, term limits would not be the only questionable act of President Ben Ali during his rule, as his authoritarian policies began shortly after he took office. Soon, Tunisia would witness his suppression of his opposition and their political parties and the beginning of his one-party rule. Freedom of the press and the freedom to protest soon fell by the wayside under his regime. He then allowed the police apparatus to use force against his own people, giving them free reign to stop anyone who opposed his political, social, and cultural ideologies (Ghanem, 2016).

With the help of his second wife, Laila Trabelsi, whom he married in 1992 after divorcing his first wife four years earlier, Ben Ali's reign of corruption continued. Regulations were passed that protected Ben Ali's family financially, with the World Bank reporting that 25% of the private sector's profits were going into Ben Ali's pockets. Nevertheless, it would be a humble street vendor that would soon bring the powerful and corrupt Ben Ali family to its knees.

Ben Ali attempted to promote democracy. However, as Sadiki (2002) argues, political singularity and a one party rule made Ben Ali's democracy a facade democracy. Also, although Tunisia has been considered one of the most democratic Arab countries, Ben Ali's regime was known for banning Islamist movements in the country, especially the *Ennahdah* Islamic party (Louden, 2015). The repressive policies practiced by Ben Ali's regime "encouraged corruption from within the administration" especially from Ben Ali's relatives who monopolized many economic investments in Tunisia (Chomiak, et. al, 2020: 12).

The largest middle class, best-performing organized labor movement, and greatest educational system in the Arab world all exist in Tunisia (Bellin, 2013 and Maalej, 2013). However, in spite of these successes, Ben Ali's regime severely curtailed free speech and political parties (Anderson, 2011). Ben Ali built and managed the nation's international reputation as a progressive, technocratic government and a welcoming tourist destination. However, the corruption within the Ben Ali family was notably personalist and greedy.

Khatib and Lust (2014) point out that several strikes, protests, movements, and rallies took place in Tunisia and were first triggered by the country's internet restrictions like blocking websites after filtering its content as reported by a wide study carried by Open Net Initiative in 2005 in Tunisia. This inspired the youth of Tunisia to use cyberspace as a means of protesting the regime. Yet, street-based activism in Tunisia began with protests in 2002 and 2003 against the US invasion of Iraq and in favor of external causes like the Palestine Intifada (Bayat, 2011). Additionally, factory employees in Redeyef staged the first labor-based protest in 2008. Following the imprisonment of numerous protesting workers, nationwide demonstrations in favor of solidarity erupted. In May 2010 the middle class youth organized the "Tunisia in White" initiative to denounce the government's restrictions on the internet. The plan was to encourage demonstrators

to wear all white and have coffee in Tunisian cafes. Although using a non-violent protest strategy, some demonstrators engaged in conflict with the police (Khatib and Lust, 2014).

Among the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia was the first Arab country that witnessed uprisings. The government censorship on the internet was the main issue in Tunisia before the uprisings (Messaoud, 2020). However, the spark of the events was because of the brutality of the police apparatus. On December 17, 2010, 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor Tarek El-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi started work selling produce from his cart at 8 o'clock in the morning. At 10:30 a.m., the police started coming over and harassing Bouazizi, something that had become routine for the young Tunisian who was just trying to support his family. Though the facts are still unclear, witnesses reported that a female police officer, Faida Hamdi, slapped Bouazizi and spit in his face, seized his electronic scales, and then knocked his cart over before she and other officers kicked and beat him and took his cart as well (Ghanem, 2016). Then, just one hour after the police had taken away his only source of income and humiliated him in public, Bouazizi doused himself with gas and lit a match, setting himself ablaze. It would spark a revolution throughout Tunisia that would spread like wildfire to other countries in the region, igniting the Arab Spring.

Bouazizi's news spread across the country and protests swept the streets within weeks. On December 18, 2010, Sidi Bouzid saw the start of the protests, which quickly expanded to nearby towns (Fahim, 2011). The small group of protesters who gathered in front of Sidi Bouzid's municipal building to voice their displeasure over the treatment of vendors by municipal agents — which had prompted Bouazizi to set himself on fire — had spread to other Tunisian cities, where larger groups of demonstrators raised their demands to include justice, work opportunities, the resignation of public servants, and investigating corruption. Kirkpatrick (2011) states that in January 13, 2011 when the demonstrations reached Ben Ali's place of residence, Ben Ali gave a

televised statement to the demonstrators. Though he tried to calm the people with "I understand you. I understand you", the words fell on deaf ears. For the Tunisians' part, they had one word for Ben Ali – "Leave!" (Gerges, 2013). The people had had enough, and after 24 years of oppression, they toppled the Ben Ali regime. Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, where, despite the people demanding he be returned to stand trial, Ben Ali would live in exile for the next eight years until he died on September 19, 2019.

Egypt

Egypt is a North-African Arab Islamic state. Its official language is Arabic. It was colonized by two European powers: the French between 1798-1881 and the British between 1882-1956. The monarchy in Egypt was ousted in 1952 by a group of officers led by Gamal Abdel Nassir who later became the leader of Egypt (Cole, 2014). In this era, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Egypt was the leading Arab country until the 1970s. After the death of Nassir, Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. In 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Muslim militants after the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. After Sadat's assassination, Hosni Mubarak took power in 1981. He served as the fourth president of Egypt from October 14, 1981 until February 11, 2011.

Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak was born north of Cairo in the Egyptian village of Kafr Al-Musaylaha on May 4, 1928. In 1948, the 20-year-old Mubarak graduated from Military College. Two years later, in 1950, Mubarak would earn a Bachelor of Air Sciences from the Egyptian Air College. Later, during his military career, he would complete his postgraduate studies at the prestigious Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, Russia (El-Ghobashy, 2011). Mubarak was a good soldier and rose through the ranks of the Egyptian Air Force quickly. In 1964, he found himself west of Cairo in command of an air force base. Two years later, he was appointed

commander of Beni Suef Air Base during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Later that same year, Mubarak was chosen as the director of the Egyptian Air College by President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Still, it was in April 1972, only eight years into his military career, that Mubarak would receive his most important military advancement when he was promoted to Commander of the Air Force. In 1973, the October war against Israel ended in victory for the Egyptian military thanks to careful planning by Mubarak, who made the Egyptian Air Force and himself heroes in the eyes of his fellow countrymen (ibid).

Mubarak moved from a military career to a political one when President Mohamed Anwar Sadat asked him to be Vice President of the Republic on April 15, 1975. Six years later, on October 6, 1981, Sadat would be assassinated at the annual victory parade celebrating Egypt's 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal. Though he was sitting next to him, Vice President Mubarak would only suffer a minor hand wound. Eight days later, Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak would become Egypt's fourth president (Amin, 2011). Owen and Tripp (2013: 1), argue that "president Hosni Mubarak has inherited a complex legacy from the Nassir and Sadat eras". This was represented in the bunch of laws and institutions that both Nassir and Sadat left for him which facilitated his work as the head of the state. On the other hand, Sadat also left him the infamous Egyptian-Israel peace treaty with all its burdens (ibid).

Mubarak began his presidency under the idea that "the shroud has no pockets", which roughly translates to "you can't take it with you." He started his reign by releasing political prisoners and opening new dialogue with those who opposed him. Mubarak's regime was known for its reliance on the US whether in his policy alignment with the US or the economic assistance he received from the US (Goldschmidt, 2012). Similar to the Tunisian regime, Mubarak's regime was repressive and the country was ruled by one party, the National Democratic Party (Tavana,

2013). Also, thanks to his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, who amended the Egyptian Constitution so that a president had no term limits after his initial six-year term in office, Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years, oftentimes having no one running against him in the presidential elections (Ghanem, 2016).

Feeling the global squeeze to allow more parties to enter into the parliamentary elections in 2005, 88 members of the Islamic Brotherhood, along with a number of other opposition groups, became members of the Egyptian Parliament. However, this did not sit too well with the ruling party, so they soon returned to one-party rule. By 2010, security forces would not allow any opposition party members into Parliament, and officials would then obtain their positions only through what they called "inheritance". This would be the final straw for Egyptians, and after 18 days of demonstrations during the Arab Spring, protestors got what they demanded when Hosni Mubarak resigned, ending his 30-year chokehold on the country (ibid).

As in Tunisia, the decade that preceded 2011 witnessed a number of movements that paved the way for the 25 January Revolt (Khatib and Lust, 2014). In addition to supporting the causes of Iraq in 2003 and Palestine in 2002, the Egyptians used regional concerns as an excuse to organize large-scale rallies in which they voiced their discontent with the Mubarak dictatorship. However, Khatib and Lust (2014) point out that demands for political liberalization began in 2004 when Mubarak decided to run for president for a fifth time and there were suspicions that his son would succeed him. The first movement to directly criticize Mubarak was *Kefaya*. "Kefaya" literally means "enough" in Egyptian Arabic. This movement was founded in 2004 by a group of Mubarak opponents and its main cause was criticism of Mubarak's intentions to pass the presidency to his son Gamal Mubarak. It also arranged many pro-Palestinian and anti-war street marches, such as when Iraq was invaded by the US (Deniz, 2019).

In addition, on 6 April, 2008, textile workers demonstrated in El-Mahalla. This demonstration was the first labor-based demonstration in the new millennium. The demonstration was confronted by extreme police violence, an issue which infused Egyptian youth across the country. However, the downfall of autocratic dictatorship in Egypt was accelerated by a number of domestic circumstances in the period 2008-2010. The government's "neoliberal" policies, which promoted privatization and foreign investment to the detriment of small local businesses, caused prices to soar by an amount never seen before, directly affecting the working class. The "concentration of wealth" in the hands of the privileged was a result of these measures. This exacerbated the lower classes' complaints, which led them to seize any incident that would aid them in overthrowing the government (Gerges, 2013).

As for the Arab Spring uprisings, the same “spark” theory applies to the Egyptian revolt (Gerges, 2013). The spark that ignited the Egyptian revolt was the death of Khalid Said under police torture in June 2010 in Alexandria. His death outraged the Egyptians, especially the youth, who created a Facebook page under the name “We Are All Khaled Said”. This page spread the news of police brutality and coordinated for the January 25 Revolution. However, we cannot neglect the role of the events in Tunisia that hastened the ousting of Mubarak, who finally resigned on 11 February, 2011. In this regard, many political scientists argue that the Tunisian revolution inspired the populations of its neighboring countries like Egypt and Libya under what they call “the domino effect” (Mahmood, et al., 2020, and Sönmez, 2016).

Libya

Libya is a North-African Arab Islamic country. It was colonized by the Italians from 1919 to 1951 (Sullivan, 2008). In 1969, al Qaddafi assumed power by a revolutionary coup that ousted King Idris (ibid). Muammar Muhammad Abdel Salam Abu Minyar Qaddafi was born in the Tripolitania

desert city of Sirte, Libya, on June 7, 1942, to a poor Bedouin family. It was there in Sirte that he received his education, later studying in Sabha, some 630 kilometers south of Sirte, from the age of 12 to 19. It was here in his formative years that he and some colleagues, inspired by Egypt's revolutionary President Gamal Abdel Nasser, started a revolutionary movement. However, they were soon found out, and in 1961, al Qaddafi was promptly kicked out of school as a result. Nevertheless, he headed towards Benghazi, Libya, where he graduated two years later from the Benghazi Military University Academy in 1963 and left for a military training exercise in the United Kingdom, starting his military career (Vandewalle, 2012).

The military leader returned to Libya and led a bloodless coup against King Idris I on September 1, 1969, making al Qaddafi the de facto leader of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, otherwise known as the State of Libya. At first, al Qaddafi was in favor of Arab unity, likely encouraged by his relationship with Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein. Later, however, he would shift Libya's identity from an Arab-centered one to a more African-centered one. In fact, he even went so far as to dub himself the "King of Kings of Africa" (Simons, 1996).

On December 21, 1988, Pan Am flight 103 was on route from Frankfurt, Germany, to Detroit, Michigan, USA, after a stopover in London when it exploded over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 passengers and crewmembers on board the flight died along with 11 residents of Lockerbie who were killed by falling debris. After much investigation, Tunisian/Libyan Abu Agila Mohammad Mas'ud Kheir Al-Marimi and other Libyan co-conspirators were found guilty of carrying out the attack, claiming Colonel al Qaddafi, as the president was sometimes called, ordered the attack. Though al Qaddafi vehemently denied ordering the attack, he took responsibility for it and, in 2003, paid each of the victims' families compensation for the disaster (Pargeter, 2012 and Simons, 1996). On many occasions, al Qaddafi always claimed to support

and often financed revolutions, coups, and other rebellious liberation movements. However, any signs of rebellion against him and his rule were quickly ended. One example of this is when he had more than 1,230 prisoners shot and killed at Abu Salim prison. Summarizing the situation in Libya during al Qaddafi's reign, Black (2000) describes Libya as an:

> "isolated and distrusted nation, its economy strained by the cumulative effects of a depressed oil market and the UN sanctions imposed for its alleged complicity in the bombing of a Pan Am 747 over Scotland. On its western border is Tunisia—capitalistic and pro-Western. To the east is Egypt, a friend of the U.S. and the first Arab state to recognize Israel. Algeria, Libya's other neighbor on the Mediterranean, is the source of much of the Islamic extremism that threatens the Qaddafi regime." (Black, 2000)

During his reign, al Qaddafi enacted many policies that were meant to depoliticize and atomize Libyan society, and he successfully managed to undermine the pillars of power that existed in his country, including the military, religious and social structures, unions, and political parties (Khatib and Lust, 2014:78). However, the Libyan opposition was working in exile, and after the advent of internet communication the Libyans had a chance to communicate with the outside opposition because calls from outside had previously been blocked by al Qaddafi's regime. Gerges (2013) points out that there were three interconnected factors that led the Libyans to protest, taking into consideration that the repressive rule of al Qaddafi was not the direct or only trigger. First, Libya as a rentier state failed economically to achieve full employment and modernize its economy. Second, Cyrenaica's eastern part was underdeveloped and excluded from both political and economic activities. Third, the events in Egypt and Tunisia directly impacted the Libyan revolutions. Finally, it has to be noted that in early 2000s there was a shift in the Libyan-Western relations after Tony Blair's visit to Tripoli in 2004. After this visit, the sanctions on Libya were lifted and its relations with the West were normalized (Vandewalle, 2012). However, this fragile alliance did not last long with the beginning of the Arab Spring. al Qaddafi's violent response to

the protests led the Western powers to intervene in Libya against al Qaddafi's regime (Ghanem, 2016).

Shortly before the beginning of the uprisings in his country, al Qaddafi deeply criticized the Arab Spring that brought down President Ben Ali and his regime, claiming that Tunisians were in too much of a rush to get rid of him. He telephoned Hosni Mubarak, offering his support during Egypt's revolution. After Mubarak was later ousted, the writing was on the wall for al Qaddafi as the winds of revolution spread to Libya. The spark of the uprisings was when the Libyan government arrested Fathi Terbil Salwa – the lawyer appointed for the families of the victims of Abu Salim prison. In 1996, 1230 prisoners were killed in Abu Salim prison by al Qaddafi's regime and no one knows where these prisoners were buried, even today. When the families of the prisoners were told about the death of their relatives, they did not receive their bodies (Human Rights Watch report, 2006). This caused many suspicions to rise which led Human Rights Watch to investigate this incident on many occasions. The arrest of the lawyer of the prisoners' families came after a demonstration arranged by the families of the victims on 15 February 2011 in Benghazi. Also, the events in Tunisia and Egypt encouraged the Libyans to plan for the "Day of Rage" on 17 February, 2011 and major protests broke out all over Libya against al Qaddafi regime (Gerges, 2013).

The violence of the regime started on this day and the events took a different route from its neighbors. The dramatic turnabout of the events into an armed conflict distinguished the Libyan case from the previous Tunisian and Egyptian ones. During the first days of the protests, al Qaddafi reacted by delivering a lengthy speech in which he dismissed the rebels as being "drugged" and manipulated by the foreign agents, and vowed to die a martyr for Libya. By the end of the month, many major cities throughout Libya had been seized by the rebels, sparking a civil war within the

country. al Qaddafi fought back, ignoring the rules of warfare, desperate to save his reign by any means necessary (Ghanem, 2016).

Also, the regime brutality in repressing civilians and the unbalanced conflict led the International Criminal Court to issue an international warrant for al Qaddafi's arrest for crimes against humanity. He, along with his son, Saif, who was also wanted for war crimes, went into hiding. In March 2011, the international intervention led by NATO forces turned the scale in favor of the protesters. Many Libyan cities were liberated from al Qaddafi's forces, but in May 2011 Misrata (one of the biggest and most strategic cities in Libya) was liberated too, followed by Tripoli in August 2011(Oliveri, 2013). On October 20, 2011, a convoy secretly carrying al Qaddafi out of his hometown of Sirte was bombed by NATO air forces. Later, al Qaddafi was found by the Misrata rebels, hiding in a drain pipe "like a rat". He was dragged, brutally beaten, bayoneted in the buttocks, and humiliated. His life ended where it began. Nobody is sure whether it was the beatings or what some claimed later to be a gunshot that killed al Qaddafi, but his lifeless body was put on display in Sirte. Later, he was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere in the desert, thereby denying his wish to be Libya's martyr (Khatib, 2014).

2.4 The impact of Social Media on the Dynamics of the Arab Spring

When we talk about the Arab Spring we cannot ignore the role played by social media. Many scholars describe the Arab Spring uprisings as youth and social media revolutions. The demography of the Arab Spring countries (and the Arab region in general) has been characterized by its large percentage of youth. At the same time, the youth demographic had been the most influenced by the advent of the internet and social media in the societies of these countries. During the second decade of the new millennium, youth and social media potently combined together and fueled the frustration in the streets of the Arab world because social media has offered a means

through which the youth practiced pressure for more freedoms and democratization (Frangonikolopoulos, and Chapsos, 2012). In this section, I will discuss this combination and the role it played in the uprisings.

The youth and social media are connected to each other. When social media swept the Arab region in the decade leading to 2011, about 35% of its population was between 15 to 29 years old (Alshoaibi, 2019). In this vein, Anderson, (2011) argues that this demographic of Arab society rapidly and widely adopted this technology. Herrera (2014) also comments that when this technology entered into the lives of this generation, they viewed the family, state and religion in different ways because they had access to the lives of the rest of the world. She continues that when these young people were confronted by state repression, bad economic conditions, limited rights, and high rates of unemployment, they decided to move but in a different way than previous generations. The phenomenon of social media formed a new type of politics which relied on the principle of "online to offline mobilization" that is instantly connected, leaderless and works on a horizontal basis (Herrera, 2014:5). Social media played a role in widening the range of activism and mobilizing oppressed societies in the Arab region. Khatib and Lust (2014) confirm this and argue that before 2008 activism was localized and isolated but the wide use of social media after 2008 positively influenced activist movements and made them more nationwide (Khatib and Lust 2014).

With the advent of YouTube in 2006, more sophisticated tools for video broadcast were offered and online activists had a censorship-free gateway to sharing human rights abuses and police torture incidents online because films are more effective than words. The advent of Facebook offered a tool of instant broadcasting which was the most important feature of social media for revolutionaries during the Arab Spring uprisings, especially in terms of coordination.

Linda Herrera stresses this feature of social media and says that it is "well suited for politics oriented towards single-issue campaigns"; it was thus a tool that proved to be effective in the issue of Khaled Said (Herrera, 2014: 21). Although the mobilization role played by social media was apparent in both Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya and Yemen, it was the news of the events in Tunisia and Egypt that encouraged and mobilized the population, not the public opinion issues that were used to attract youth through social media in Tunisia and Egypt.

In Tunisia, censorship of the internet was one of the direct causes of the uprisings. In protest against internet censorship, the Tunisian youth activists arranged the event "Tunisia in White" which was the first event that linked the online activism with the offline one (more details in Khatib and Lust 2014: 37). However, the news circulated through social media about the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi made his issue a public opinion issue that mobilized the youth in Tunisia to revolt. As well, the issue of Khaled Said in Egypt – the young man tortured by policemen and who died in June 2010 - became a public opinion issue in which social media played an integral part in spreading rage. Alaimo (2015) and Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos (2012) describe that after the death of Khaled Said, the Facebook page "We are All Khaled Said" was created and took the role of spreading videos of torture by police in Egypt and called for many to support non-violent demonstrations in Alexandria. The number of the page subscribers increased very fast.

Brownlee et al. (2015) point out that the development of the events in Tunisia also accelerated the plans of the admins of "We Are All Khaled Said" page to call for a massive march. They chose 25th January, 2011 - a police holiday – to be the "Day of Wrath". On that day tens of thousands responded to the call of Asma Mahfouz, an April 6 movement member. This movement is considered to be the first anti-government movement in Egypt (for more information see El Sayed (2014) (Brownlee et al., 2015). In a similar vein, Lynch (2014) argues that social media also

played a role in mobilizing international support especially in the case of Libya when the protesters posted videos online about the violence used against the protesters (Lynch, 2014).

2.5 The Relationship between Arab Nationalism, Islamism, and the Arab Spring Revolt

This discussion of Arab Nationalism, Islamism, and the Arab Spring shows that all three elements are connected to each other and all led to what the Arab region has witnessed in the last decade.

First, the failure of Arab Nationalism led to the rise of Islamism, and then, the dynamics of the cold war changed the route of Islamism and played a significant role in the creation of so-called radical and militant Islam. Brownlee et al. (2015) argue that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islamic radicalism became the new target for the US leading to new geopolitical changes in the region. The US waged wars against Afghanistan and Iraq because the US claimed that these countries supported extremism and Islamic radicalism. Consequently, the regime changes in Iraq led to sectarian civil war. It also led to the marginalization of the Sunnis who constituted a new core for militant Islamic groups supported by Saudi Arabia to contain the impact of the Shi'ites in the region (Haddad, 2014).

Maddy-Weitzman (2016) also argues that, despite the "liquidation" of Bin Laden in 2011, which made many to think that Al-Qa'ida was finally diminished, Islamic extremism remerged in a different shape (ISIS) which exploited the state of chaos and disorder that grew in the Middle East during the Arab Spring uprisings. Political Islam also became prominent after the fall of authoritarian regimes in both Egypt and Tunisia. Brownlee et. al (2015) argue that when the Islamic parties were banned for a long time in many Arab countries, and while they were suppressed on the political level, these parties built wide social structures through civil activities. This structure was mobilized once the oppressing regimes were gone. When this supported the Islamists in the elections, they achieved unprecedented success.

Failed Arab Nationalism also led to the emergence of authoritarian non-democratic regimes. Dawisha (2003: 298) states that even though Arab Nationalism conformed to the German nationalist model, the idea of "individual will" was subsumed and the unity of the nation was emphasized. While they struggled against the imperial powers, the Arab nationalist leaders promised Arabs freedom. But what they meant was freedom from the colonizer, not personal freedom. This struggle during the heydays of Arab Nationalism necessitated "in the minds of most Arabs the centralization of power" and led to the emergence of authoritarian regimes (ibid: 302).

However, the charismatic character of some nationalist leaders, like Nassir, legitimized this authoritarian rule. The leaders who came after 1967 and the death of Nassir, "armed with the premises of Arab Nationalism, shared Nassir's hunger for absolute power", but lacked this charisma (Dawisha, 2003: 302). Consequently, they compensated for this by being harsher and more brutal in their rule while they used the Arab Nationalistic causes as a legitimizing tool. This was most notable, for example, in the Ba'thist ruling regimes in Syria and Iraq (ibid).

The nationalists were hostile not only to Western imperialism but also to democratic institutions. For example, multiparty politics were attacked as a western idea, especially among Ba'thist nationalists in Syria and Iraq and Nassir in Egypt. This justifies the fact that, during the years preceding the Arab Spring revolutions, the local institutions of the Arab authoritarian regimes avoided criticism because the populations of these countries were more keen to criticize the West rather than their own governments (Bartels et al., 2017: 86). In addition, the military powers that developed during the heydays of Arab Nationalism and during the Cold War became the backbone of protecting authoritarian regimes rather than state institutions (Cronin, 2013 and Wein, 2017). Finally, the lack of democracy in the oil-producing countries resulted from the fact that these countries are rentier states; that is, they are "financially independent" of their societies.

This makes them "not subjected to important pressure from below to allow for democratic participation" (Fawcett, 2009: 93).

In conclusion, the state of authoritarianism and the lack of democracy in the Arab states is a byproduct of failed Arab Nationalism. This led to diminishing democratic freedoms, entrenching power in elite hands, and promoting governance structures that prioritized stability and control over democratic ideals.

2.6 Conclusion

The CDA approaches of van Dijk (1998) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) both highlight that it is crucial to carefully consider the historical and political backgrounds that shape any political discourse. Accordingly, the historical, political, and social backgrounds of the studied event, the Arab Spring uprisings, are discussed in this chapter. These backgrounds have been discussed to specifically comprehend the choice of discourse topics (then macro-strategies), and discursive and ideological strategies used by three overthrown Arab leaders during this event. That is, their language was chosen carefully and was in keeping with their social contexts. Furthermore, as the concepts of the Self and the Other are crucial in the present study, examining the political and historical backgrounds of the Arab region will help better understand how these two concepts have evolved through time. For example, as the discussion in this chapter has shown the "Other" for Arab governments before the beginning of the 21st century was either foreign powers or the Israeli occupier, whereas after the beginning of the new millennium the "Other" started to appear from within when pro-democratic movements and then demonstrations invaded the streets of the capitals of a number of Arab countries.

In this chapter I offered a discussion of the main political and historical events that shaped the past and the current ideologies in the Arab region. I also particularly addressed the main causes

and the trajectory of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Following this review of the Arab Spring, I have emphasized the role played by social media in these demonstrations especially in mobilizing the masses and rallying people against the authoritarian regimes.

This background information is essential in enabling readers to comprehend the linguistic choices of the three leaders and the way in which they present themselves and the other in their political speeches either through deliberating specific discourse topics, or discursive and ideological strategies.

Chapter Three-Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

The correlation between politics and language is characterized by a reciprocal connection, since politics and language are intricately intertwined. Consequently, attempting to analyze any of these elements in isolation poses challenges. In Greek mythology, there was a belief that language plays a significant part in defining the political landscape, while politics, in turn, exert influence on language. Based on this assumption, the political events and acts pertaining to the political history of the Arab region and the political events that preceded the so-called Arab Spring, as examined in the preceding chapter, have been shaped by language, and reciprocally, language has shaped them. Assuming that the first step has been achieved in the previous chapter (understanding the political context of the present study), the next step is understanding the role that language plays in politics and how politicians employ language to influence the political situations in their countries, and this will be addressed in this chapter and the following chapters.

Since the present study problematizes the use of the strategies of legitimizing the Self and de-legitimizing the Other through political discourse, a considerable part of this chapter will address how these two concepts have been handled in the related literature. The themes addressed in this chapter are derived from the questions of the present study. What is shared among the three questions posed by this study are the concepts of (de)legitimization and the representation of Self and Other in the political discourse of the Arab spring, specifically, the political speeches delivered by the ousted Arab leaders during these uprisings. In this chapter, I will first discuss how these two concepts are examined in previous critical discourse studies. Then, I will focus on addressing the previous studies conducted on language use in the political speeches of the three ousted leaders in question, namely Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, and al Qaddafi of Libya. I will also

provide a brief review of the methods and the analytical frameworks used in these studies. The final section in this chapter concerns the theory of critical discourse analysis, and its pillars, namely discourse, power, and ideology, as well as the main frameworks of critical discourse analysis.

3.2 Related studies

3.2.1 Previous Research on (De)Legitimization in Political Discourse

The concept of legitimacy pertains to the widespread acceptance of acts and ideas by individuals and institutions. It is attained or not attained through a process known as legitimization- "the process by which speakers accredit or license a type of social behavior" (Reyes, 2011: 782); this is a concept which holds a central position in political discourse and has garnered much attention from scholars (van Leeuwen, 2007). In western literature there has been much research done on the strategies employed in political speeches to achieve legitimization. In this context, Wodak and van Leeuwen (1999), Chilton (2004), Van Leeuwen (2007, 2008) and Reyes (2011) have presented foundational work about legitimation and its strategies that are used in both general and political discourse.

According to Chilton (2004), legitimation establishes "the right to be obeyed" that can be conveyed via linguistic devices in discourse whether explicitly or implicitly. As for Van Leeuwen (2007), he adopts the definition of legitimization provided by Berger and Luckmann, who describe it as the process of providing explanations and justifications for the significant components of an "institutional tradition". Van Leeuwen argues that the concept of legitimation serves to provide a response, whether openly or indirectly, to the inquiries of "why", specifically "why should we engage in this action?" and "Why should we pursue this course of action in this manner?" (ibid: 93).

Van Leeuwen (2008) suggests a comprehensive framework of the types of legitimization strategies in discourse and he specifically analyzes the linguistic manifestations of legitimization in discourse. His framework consists of four major strategies of legitimization: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization, and mythopoesis. In authorization, reference is made to personal authority, authority of expertise, or authority of conformity and traditions (Van Leeuwen, 2007). In addition to its occurrence separately, these sources of authority can be vested in combination in an utterance; that is, more than one source of authority can be employed at the same time. According to Van Leeuwen (2008), in moral evaluation legitimization, reference is made to a system of values. This type of legitimation can be in the form of three possible categories: abstraction (distilling morals from practices), evaluation (evaluative adjectives attributed to actions or persons), and analogy (actions or things can be legitimized or delegitimized because it is or it is not like the activity of X). In rationalization that is instrumental or theoretical, legitimization is achieved through defining the goals, the means, and the uses of instituted social actions. Finally, in mythopoesis, the speaker in discourse uses moral or cautionary narratives to achieve legitimization. In moral narratives, Van Leeuwen (2008: 117) states that "protagonists" are incentivized for their participation in socially accepted acts or for reinstating the established order. Conversely, cautionary tales serve to communicate the potential consequences of deviating from the societal norms and practices. At the same time, Van Leeuwen (2008) states that the aforementioned strategies of legitimization are observable across many types of discourse.

In criticizing Van Leeuwen (2008), Abdi and Basarati (2018) argue that there is a significant gap (the neglect of identity construction as a legitimization strategy) in van Leeuwen's (2008) legitimization framework and this gap has limited its effectiveness in examining the ways in which identity constructs are used to legitimize discursive activities within socio-political

settings. They explain that identity constructs have the potential to empower or undermine the legitimacy of socio-political structures, social phenomena, ethnic groups, and discriminatory behaviors. Furthermore, these structures have the potential to assist authorities in regulating the discursive structure of society in accordance with overarching power-oriented macro objectives (Abdi and Basarati, 2018).

According to Reyes (2011: 782), legitimization refers to the process through which individuals grant accreditation and authorization to a certain form of social conduct. He argues that special attention is paid toward political discourse since through this kind of discourse the agenda of political leaders is legitimized and justified. Indeed, it is via these leaders' political agendas that the destiny of an entire nation can be changed or maintained. Therefore, many western scholars have investigated how political leaders attempt to legitimize their political and ideological goals through political discourse in general and political speeches in particular.

Reyes (2011) further develops what Van Leeuwen suggests about legitimization and proposes new strategies of legitimization. He identifies four categories of legitimization in political discourse, and specifically examines the use of these strategies in the political speeches of Barack Obama and George W. Bush during the two armed conflicts in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009). He assumes that politicians use these strategies to legitimize "an action or no action or an ideological position". In this particular study, Reyes (2011) contends that these two presidents employed these strategies to justify the US's military presence in these two countries.

The first strategy of legitimization Reyes (2011) proposes is legitimization through emotions in which social actors can manipulate the opinions of their listeners on a certain topic by appealing to their emotions. He explains that because our understanding of reality is greatly influenced by the relationship between emotions and behavior, the same understanding of reality

might also be distorted by emotions, so that they can be appealed to when imposing, legitimizing, or constructing specific ideas of reality as needed by social actors. The second strategy of legitimization developed by Reyes (2011) is legitimization through a hypothetical future. In this strategy, social actors hypothesize future actions, events, and problems to convince their audience. This strategy is mostly realized linguistically in discourse through the use of conditional structures like "If we do not do what the speaker proposes in the present, the past will repeat itself" (Reyes, 2011: 793).

The third strategy is legitimization through rationality. Reyes (2011: 797) argues that this strategy involves the social actors endeavoring to portray the process of taking action as one characterized by deliberate decision-making, which is preceded by careful consideration and evaluation. The speaker articulates his decision as being based on rationality. Politicians, for example, say in their speeches that they take certain decisions after considering the consequences and after a long and hard process of thinking about the problem. Fourth, Reyes (2011) proposes legitimization through voices of expertise. In this strategy, speakers make reference to someone's words or actions to back their claims and views about a certain issue. This strategy is mostly employed either by quoting or reporting someone's words using verbs like "say", "report", and "announce". Finally, the strategy of altruism is used in discourse to legitimize social actors' actions and plans by proposing these actions and plans as "beneficial to others" (Reyes, 2011: 801). Using this strategy in political discourse, politicians justify their acts by showing that their motives are altruistic by offering assistance for people and protecting them.

Having discussed the identified strategies of legitimation in literature from the viewpoints of different scholars, it is important to shed light on the recent studies that investigate legitimation in the political speeches of leaders as this is particularly relevant to this study. Recently,

legitimization (de-legitimization) techniques have been investigated from two general perspectives: the functionalist and the mentalist. It is the functionalist that scholars are interested in in the linguistic domain; the abovementioned works of Van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) are the best examples of the functionalist perspective. This perspective examines how the strategies of (de)legitimization are realized via linguistic means to unravel the relationship to language and to both power and ideology (Baldi and Franco, 2015). Following the works of these two scholars who insightfully identify clear classifications of legitimization strategies in discourse, interest in this type of research has expanded. As in many studies, since the concepts of legitimization and de-legitimization are often seen as two interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon or two sides of the same coin (Cap, 2008 and Chilton, 2004), I will discuss below the studies that investigate both legitimization and de-legitimization in political discourse and the linguistic means employed to achieve (de)legitimization. The studies below are ordered chronologically.

The studies of Koteyko and Ryazanova-Clarke (2009) and Balciunaite (2012) investigate the use of metaphors as a rhetorical tool employed by political leaders to achieve (de)legitimization. Koteyko and Ryazanova-Clarke (2009) examine how the Russian president Vladimir Putin used the metaphors of "path" and "building" in his political speeches as a linguistic device to achieve legitimation. The critical metaphor analysis of a 210,000-word corpus shows that the president deployed, for example, the metaphor of "Russia's unique path" to legitimize his popularity and to show that he is a strong leader. Further, they argue that when the speaker wants to legitimize "change" or de-legitimize the past, especially when it is related to opponents, the metaphor of the path is utilized.

Similar to this study is that of Balciunaite (2012) in which she investigate the use of metaphors in political speeches as an instrument to employ (de)legitimization. Although she does

not provide a clear justification of this assertion, Balciunaite (2012) declares that metaphors are more used to communicate legitimization rather than de-legitimization. She analyzes the political speeches of two political leaders: David Cameron of the UK and Andrius Kubilius of Lithuania. Balciunaite (2012) pays special attention to the use of the metaphors of "politics is war", "politics is building", and "politics is journey". Both leaders shared the use of the building metaphor to legitimize their new plans and political decisions. Cameron was seen as more devoted to the use of the war metaphor in his speeches than Kuilius who tended more towards the use of the journey metaphor. This difference between the two leaders in the use of metaphors is connected to the contexts in which each leader exercises his power. Furthermore, Balciunaite (2012) argues that war metaphors were used more often for delegitimizing the opponents rather than legitimizing the Self and that the opposite is true with the journey metaphor. Different conclusions on the use of the building metaphor are presented by Hellin Garcia (2013). She argues that, by investing the functional aspect of the semantic field of the word "build" to include both construction and destruction, the Spanish political leader Zapatero employed the building metaphor to both legitimize his government and its actions, and delegitimize the terrorists. He presented his government members as the "builders" and the terrorists as the "destroyers".

In addition, a number of critical discourse studies have been conducted to trace the types of legitimization strategies employed by political leaders and to examine how these strategies are linguistically constructed. These include the studies of Vaara (2014), Ross and River (2020), and Wang (2022). Vaara (2014) particularly investigates the discursive legitimization strategies and their ideological underpinnings in the discourse of legitimation struggles in the Euro zone crisis. Critical analysis of the political media discourse in Finland has shown that Finnish politicians drew on certain legitimization strategies during economic crises. They employed authorization based on

institutionalized positions and the voice of the common man to gain support from the rest of the European countries. On the other hand, to legitimize a specific rescue package, the rationalization strategy based on economic arguments was the one most frequently used in this kind of discourse. Finally, Vaara (2014) argues that moral evaluation (which is based on the value of (un)fairness) was employed for both legitimization and de-legitimization. For example, politicians attempted to legitimize a specific economic rescue package by assuming that this package was fair for a specific country, while the opponents may have used the same value to delegitimize this package because it was unfair for another country.

Utilizing Reyes's (2011) legitimization framework, Ross and Rivers (2020) examine a corpus of one thousand tweets by President Donald Trump to trace the rhetoric he used to legitimize his proposal for the border wall with Mexico. They argue that the use of nicknaming, insults, self-promotion, and calling himself a winner and his opponents losers were the main legitimization strategies employed by Trump in presenting this issue. In addition, these strategies present "a new form of political rhetoric" that diverged from both the formality and the professionalism of political discourse (ibid: 2).

Khajavi and Rasti (2020) examine the strategies used by two prominent figures in the American political sphere, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, to engage and captivate the audience during their campaign speeches in the 2012 elections. The dataset in this study includes a total of 30 speeches made by Obama, representing the Democratic party, and Mitt Romney, representing the Republican party, between 2011 and 2012. Khajavi and Rasti (2020) specifically seek to identify the strategies of (de)legitimization and the strategies of positive/negative self/other-presentation in the election campaign speeches of these two politicians. As a main strategy of (de)legitimization, Khajavi and Rasti (2020) only tackle the strategies of spatialization,

indetermination, and functionalization as techniques used by the two candidates for representing social actors. For example, when representing social actors in their speeches, Romney and Obama employed both spatialization and indetermination (when individuals are referred to by the place where they live or are simply portrayed as anonymous, respectively). On the other hand, functionalization was employed by the two politicians when individuals were identified based on their activities, or occupations. For instance, Obama used the expression "my opponent" to refer to Romney.

As for the positive/negative Self/Other-representation, Khajavi and Rasti (2020) identify a number of strategies in the examined speeches. First, legitimation through a hypothetical future was used by the two politicians when they offered both bad or good future hypotheses to threaten their audience or arouse their emotions. In addition, they find that both politicians used metaphors for either portraying a particular condition of events or depicting optimistic visions of forthcoming circumstances. Also, the idea of exceptionality was used by both politicians to cultivate public support by promoting the notion of "America's exceptionality" as the greatest nation, and one with exceptional citizenry. Finally, as a strategy to positively/negatively represent the Self/Other, both politicians used myth development strategy when they endeavored to construct narratives that bolstered their achievements. Myths often arise from a narrative structure that imparts a conceptual significance (Khajavi and Rasti, 2020).

The study concludes that Obama primarily prioritized the implementation of the concept of the "American dream", while Romney utilized a strategy centered on the negative portrayal of the Other. Khajavi and Rasti (2020) argue that this is due to the fact that Obama had previously assumed the presidency and was seeking re-election for a second term, and therefore was establishing a track record of his performance in office. Romney endeavored to compile a

comprehensive record of Obama's shortcomings in order to substantiate his argument for the incumbent's inadequacy for a second term presidency. Although this study examines both legitimization strategies and positive/negative Self/Other-representation (as the current study does) and examines a large number of political speeches, it covers a limited number of these strategies. Also, it neglects the ideological underpinning behind the use of these strategies even though the identification of these underpinnings offers reasons for why a specific political entity should be acknowledged.

Another study that employes van Leeuwen's (2008) legitimization strategies is that of Abuelwafa (2021). It is a very recent study that investigates the linguistic characteristics in US ex-president Donald Trump's speech before the incursion of his followers to the United State Capitol. The purpose of the study is to examine the discursive techniques used to legitimize the actions that ultimately resulted in the assault. The researcher mainly counts the occurrences of the four legitimization strategies suggested by van Leeuwen (2008), namely rationalization, moral legitimation, authorization, and mythopoesis. The analysis reveals that the most used legitimization strategy by Trump in this violent speech is rationalization.

Abuelwafa (2021) states that in order to substantiate the claim of electoral manipulation and vote tampering, Trump utilized a combination of theoretical and instrumental rationalization techniques. He employedmany instances of rationalization via explanation, illustrating that the media, which he referred to as "fake media", deliberately omitted showcasing his substantial base of supporters. Second, the strategy of legitimization via moral evaluation was seen to have a significant presence in the examined speech, ranking second in terms of frequency. This kind of legitimization involves considering the value system of a particular culture, a strategy that Trump

used to further his own agenda. For example, Trump used analogous descriptions to delegitimize the elections, such as when he calls them a “criminal enterprise”.

Abuelwafa (2021) finds that the category of legitimization by exercising authority ranked third in terms of occurrence frequency among the legitimization technique, with a total of 35 instances. This strategy was used by Trump with the aim of enhancing the credibility of his agenda while undermining the legitimacy of elections. This was achieved by the utilization of many subcategories of authorization, with personal authority being the most prominent among them. For example, the frequent use of the first person pronoun “I” served as evidence of legitimization via personal authorization. Finally, the strategy of legitimization through mythopoesis was addressed. The study found that this strategy was the least frequent, appearing just three times. Abuelwafa (2021) notes that Trump used a direct appeal to his followers, urging them to march towards the Capitol building as a form of protest against alleged electoral fraud. This narrative may be characterized as a moral story that effectively portrayed and narrated the actions that needed to be undertaken. This study quantitatively analyzes Trump’s speech by counting the occurrences of the four legitimization strategies without paying more attention to qualitatively reveal the ideological connotations of his use of these strategies. Good critical discourse studies comprehensively examine both the micro and macro levels of a discourse and make clear linkages between the utilization of a certain strategy and its socio-ideological meanings.

Many other studies investigate legitimization and de-legitimization in other types of discourse, such as that of Tallberg and Zürn (2019) who examine legitimization in the discourse of international organizations, and that of Björkvall and Höög (2019) who investigate legitimization in platforms of values’ texts. Bamigbade and Dalha (2020) trace legitimization strategies in Facebook discourse during the presidential elections in Nigeria, and Igwebuike and

Akoh (2022) examine (de)legitimization strategies in the radio broadcast discourse of Nnamdi Kanu.

On the other hand, legitimation in the Arabic corpora has not received much attention in literature. However, a study conducted by Said (2017) can be addressed here. Said (2017) investigates legitimization in Egyptian political discourse. She adopted van Leeuwen's (2007, 2008) legitimation framework to examine al Sisi's political speeches (the present president of Egypt). These speeches particularly presented controversial issues like the border agreement with Saudi Arabia and the subsidies cut on power bills. The legitimation strategies al Sisi employed to present these two issues in his political speeches are moral evaluation strategy, built on the values of unity and fairness and used to legitimize the economic cuts, and the strategy of rationalization, built on the argument of the utility of the decision. Said (2017) assumes that political actors used legitimation strategies of authorization (by referring to the authority of law and political men) and of rationalization (by referring to truths and facts) to legitimize more sensitive political issues like signing border agreements with a neighboring country.

3.2.2 Previous Research on Self and Other Presentation in Political Discourse

Based on the aforementioned discussion about the two phenomena of legitimization and de-legitimization, it can be inferred that the pursuit of establishing a favorable self-image is always the ultimate goal. Hence, the concepts of Self-presentation and Other-presentation have a significant correlation with the pursuit of legitimacy via discourse. Naturally, one of the most important strategic goals of politicians is to shape their perception of the Self and the Other. As a result, while examining how the Self and Other are presented in political discourse, both the function and the goal of discursive practice is essential. To put it another way, it is crucial to

consider why perceptions of the Self and Other are generated and what the intended purposes of these perceptions are, rather than simply how they are formed.

Positive self-representation and negative other-representation shed light on how knowledge can be misused to influence discourse and how powerful elites manipulate the recipients' knowledge to serve their goals and needs (van Dijk, 2011). These two key strategies primarily aim at examining language users as social actors instead of being mere individuals and frame those participants as either Us or Them (van Dijk, 2015). In addition, van Dijk (2006) assumes that the general approach of positively representing the Self and negatively representing the Other is very common in biased discourse, which highlights the facts that guard the interests of the writer or the speaker (Self), while it de-emphasizes facts that may serve the interests of the Other. Thus, the main goal of this general approach is to influence the minds of the recipients by controlling the amount and the form of knowledge passed to them via discourse. Van Dijk (2006: 373) argues that this flow of knowledge is done on many levels of discourse which include:

> 1- Macro speech acts implying Our 'good' acts and Their 'bad' acts, e.g. accusation, defence, 2- Semantic macrostructures i.e. topic selection including (De-)emphasize negative/positive topics about Us/Them, 3- Local speech acts implementing and sustaining the global ones, e.g. statements that prove accusations, 4- Local meanings Our/Their positive/negative actions, 5- Lexicon: Select positive words for Us, negative words for Them, 6- Local syntax e.g. Active vs passive sentences, nominalizations: (de)emphasize Our/Their positive/negative agency, responsibility, 7- Rhetorical figures like Hyperboles vs euphemisms for positive/negative meanings, Metonymies and metaphors emphasizing Our/Their positive/negative properties.

Moreover, van Dijk (2006) argues that these tools that make discourse manipulative are largely semantic, i.e. it is the content of the text that is manipulated. In his study, van Dijk (2006) gives examples of this type of manipulative discourse when the Prime Minister of the UK Tony Blair justified the decision of his government to join the war against Iraq. For example, Tony Blair revived the dichotomy between the democrats and the conservatives (so Us and Them) by using

words like “opportunistic” to refer to them and “unified” to refer to Us. In doing so, he implicitly cast doubt on the credibility of the opposition, and accused them of being less patriotic and backing terrorist regimes. This example insightfully explains how manipulating discourse can affect the recipients’ understanding of an event and how political speech, as a kind of public discourse, has a crucial persuasive role to play with the primary goals of persuading the public of the political actions performed and gaining the support of the public to execute any future plans.

In addition, the close relatedness between (de)legitimization and how the Self and the Other are represented in political discourse is further illustrated by Chilton (2004) who contends that negative “other” representation is one of various ways through which de-legitimization can be manifested.

> De-legitimization can manifest itself in acts of negative other-representation, acts of blaming, scape-goating, marginalizing, excluding, attacking the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. The extreme is to deny the humanness of the other. At the other end of the spectrum legitimization, usually oriented to the self, includes positive self-presentation, manifesting itself in acts of self-praise, self-apology, self-explanation, self-justification as a source of authority, reason, vision and sanity (Chilton, 2004: 47).

Wodak (2009: 9) also argues that “Positive self and negative other-presentation requires justification and legitimation strategies, as elements of ‘persuasive rhetoric’.” This explains the interconnectivity between both (de)legitimization and positive/negative Self/Other presentation.

The use of the two strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation is clearly manifested in van Dijk’s ideological square (which will be thoroughly discussed in chapter four). The speaker’s group or social community is always referred to as the Self. In situations where persuasion is required, enhancing the self-image of the speaker is the primary goal which also coincides with emphasizing negative traits of the Other. This implies that the Other

group's positive traits will be subject to the processes of mitigation and omission because the members of the out-group are perceived as enemies or opponents.

Many studies have been carried out on political discourse to unveil how the Self and the Other have been presented in political discourse. One of the earliest studies in this regard is that of Oddo (2011). Oddo (2011) claims the polarization of Us/Them as the main legitimization strategy in political speeches. He examines four political speeches of Roosevelt and George W. Bush. He specifically examined their political speeches in a call-to-arm discourse in which the Us/Them binary is needed to achieve positive self-representation and negative other-presentation to ultimately legitimize war. Oddo (2011) points out that the two presidents tended to assign positive values to the in-group members and negative values to the out-group members to legitimize the war they intend to launch. It is suggested that the violent actions of the in-group are presented positively via the use of positive lexical resources, while the violent actions of the out-group members were represented via the use of negative lexical resources. For example, the verb "fight" was used when they want to talk about Us actions whereas "attack" was used to talk about Them actions. This dichotomy was employed in this context to give war some sort of legitimacy (Oddo, 2011).

Bahaa-eddin (2007) specifically examines how the Other/enemy was created via presupposition in Bush's political speech just after the bombings of the Twin Towers in the USA. The study mainly focused on presupposition as a device for negative other-presentation. In addition to the economic function of presupposition in any utterance, Bahaa-eddin (2007) argues that implied meaning or presupposition had an ideological function. It was considered necessary to convey what was assumed to be a given or common knowledge for the listener, including the knowledge about the Other. As for Bush's speech in this study, an enemy Other was created and

an opposition was established to legitimize his war against this enemy. For example, when Bush presupposed that there was terrorism, terrorists, and extremism, he implicitly created an enemy or Other that should be fought and terminated. The presuppositions employed in Bush's speech presented a chance for the construction of a distant, apprehensive, terrorist, and uncivilized Other.

Moreover, Bahaa-eddin (2007) identifies another device used by Bush to create an evil Other. He argued that "historical transfer" was used by George W. Bush to fabricate and demonize an enemy. For example, Bin Laden was associated with dictatorial regimes like that of Hitler, while the Taliban was connected to ideologies of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. Additionally, al Qaeda was compared to the mafia, with the assertion that al Qaeda represented terrorism in a similar manner as the mafia represented organized crime. The division between the utopic Us and dystopic Them, as Bahaa-eddin (2007) refers to it, was established by two modes of operation, namely unification and fragmentation in the process of constructing the division. Unification was achieved by his frequent references to the Union, American societies, and American citizens who were "joined together". On the other hand, fragmentation was achieved via Bush's assertion about the Islamic world as one characterized by significant internal divisions. Bahaa-eddin (2007) concludes that Bush's speech managed to create bold lines between an idealized (utopic) Us and an imagined (dystopic) Them, with the former being free and just, while the latter was authoritarian, illegitimate, terroristic, and uncivilized. Bahaa-eddin's study showes that presuppositions, similar to metaphors, had the potential of stigmatizing, stereotyping, excluding, and silencing opposing viewpoints. Furthermore, presuppositions prioritized certain issues while marginalizing others, ultimately benefiting the speaker or writer. They could hinder the development of arguments, establish boundaries, and delineate ideological positions.

Similarly, Trajkova and Neshkovska (2019) assume that positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation were the ultimate goals of legitimization and de-legitimization strategies. They conducted an analysis of Trump's and Hillary Clinton's political speeches during their race to the presidency. The analysis was conducted both on the lexical-semantic level and the pragmatic level. Regarding the lexical-semantic level, during their attempts to convince the voters that they were the right candidates, Trump and Hillary Clinton both employed lexical-semantic tactics to portray the Self in a positive way while characterizing the opponents in a negative one. This deliberate approach was aimed at establishing a sharp contrast between the perceived superiority of Us as the optimal choice in the elections and the unfavorable perception of Them as an undesirable or nonexistent option (Trajkova and Neshkovska, 2019). The difference in the ideological backgrounds of both politicians made a difference in the strategies they used in defending the Self and attacking the Other. The authors argue that Trump primarily employed emotional appeals and logical reasoning to bolster his own image and criticize Hillary Clinton. In addition, he employed authoritative voice to bolster his points while undermining her credibility. In contrast, Hillary Clinton endeavored to establish her credibility primarily through appeals to reason and talking about speculative future scenarios in which she assumed the presidency and thus envisioned positive outcomes for the nation. Furthermore, she sought to undermine the legitimacy of Trump primarily by appealing to the rationality of her audience. Trajkova and Neshkovska (2019) suggeste that Trump primarily employed fear tactics to convey the potential hardships that would arise under Hillary Clinton's presidency, aiming to evoke an emotional response from the audience. Conversely, Hillary Clinton's approach centered on presenting a logical argument that questions Trump's suitability for the intended role, with the goal of persuading individuals to align with her viewpoints.

Regarding the pragmatic level, Trajkova and Neshkovska (2019) state that the utilization of "interpersonal meta-discourse markers" such as hedges, self-mentions, intensifiers, and engagement markers primarily served to enhance the speakers' ethos by establishing their credibility, authority, reliability, and honesty. Additionally, these markers contributed to the creation of pathos by actively engaging the listeners in the discourse and immediately affecting their point of view. First, hedges and intensifiers were used in discourse to convey a level of certainty regarding certain arguments. Trajkova and Neshkovska (2019) contend that the frequency of intensifiers employed by Trump surpassed that of Clinton, whereas Clinton, conversely, exhibited a greater tendency to employ hedges. This outcome indicated a clear display of heightened confidence in the assertion being made. Donald Trump employed hedges to mitigate the forcefulness of his words, particularly when he launched vehement criticism against Hillary Clinton. Second, self-mentions were indicative of the speaker's presence within the text and were typically conveyed via the use of personal pronouns and possessive adjectives. On the other hand, engagement markers served to involve the listener in the discourse. This was visible through things like the pronouns You, Your, We, and Us. The study shows that Clinton used more self-mentions and engagement markers than Trump to openly delegitimize and attack Trump's candidacy.

Akbar and Abbass (2019) examine how negatively immigrants and Syrian refugees in particular were presented in two of Donald Trump's political speeches. Ten ideological strategies were selected to be traced in the examined data. Two political speeches were selected from both the pre-presidency and post-presidency periods. The main goal of the study was to determine whether the negative presentation of the refugees was merely a strategy to persuade the voters to vote for him or whether it was motivated by a discriminating ideology that he adopted in his speeches against this group (i.e. refugees). On the topic level, Trump's focus was on tackling the

negative influence of immigrants on national security. For example, he indirectly linked the rise in the rate of crime in the U.S to the high number of immigrants. The use of the argument of criminalizing the Other spread the ideology of insecurity among the audience but at the same time suggested victimizing the Self. In addition, Trump negatively represented the Other through a number of strategies including justification, fact-checking, determinism, apprehension, and skepticism.

Arcimaviciene (2018) examines how populist discourse represented the Self and the Other through the use of metaphors. He examines the dichotomy between "the people" and "its other" as two antagonizing poles: the corrupt elite and the noble people. To test this, the political speeches of two ideologically different political leaders, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, were investigated. The study concluded that the different ideological backgrounds of the two speakers affected their use of metaphor as a (de)legitimization strategy. On one hand, Obama used the metaphors of War, Personified Relationship, and Journey to more positively represent the Self and to depict the Self as a defender of the oppressed nations in the world. His speeches were characterized by more legitimization whereby the US was seen as a moral authority that distinguished between truth and falsehood by adhering to moral universal principles and could thus cast judgment on others. On the other hand, Putin used metaphors more often to negatively represent the Other as an enemy and liar, and to challenge it. He used metaphors to establish a distinct boundary between the Self and the Other in order to foster hostility against the West. In this polarized construction of the Self and the Other, the Self was victimized while the Other was antagonized (Arcimaviciene, 2018).

In another study, Biria and Mohammadi (2012) utilize a critical discourse analytical perspective, specifically van Dijk's ideological square, to analyze George Bush's (2005) second

term and Barack Obama's (2009) first term inaugural speeches. They mainly aim at investigating how the two presidents (who had different ideological backgrounds) represented the Self and Other in their inaugural speeches. They first trace the use of the pronouns We and I as an indicator of in-group and out-group construction. Both Bush and Obama used We more frequently than I. However, the presidents used the pronoun I differently. Bush's use of the pronoun I was more frequent than Obama's use of the same pronoun. Biria and Mohammadi (2012) argue that Bush placed greater focus on himself as a person in a position of power in the USA. This might have been a result of his adherence to rigid individualistic beliefs, which set him apart from his audience. On the other hand, Obama's minimal use of the exclusive pronoun I was to show his respect for the "collectivistic values" in order to encourage collaboration and unity. As another indicator of the Self and Other construction, Biria and Mohammadi (2012) trace the use of some words that positively denote the Self and negatively denote the Other. The words freedom, America, and liberty were among the highest frequency words in Bush's speech, whereas the words nation, new, America, and generation were used with the highest frequency in Obama's speech. While both presidents emphasized the notion of Americanism, Bush's frequent use of the words freedom and liberty reflected his strategy to positively represent the Self while Obama's frequent use of words like nation and generations was devoted to creating a sense of solidarity with his people.

Finally, Ali and Khan (2021) specifically study the use of dehumanizing metaphors in Bush's political speeches as a rhetorical device to construct the enemy Other. As a tool of negatively representing the Other, the author of the study contended that metaphor played a significant role in dramatizing the threat claimed to be caused by Muslims. Ali and Khan (2021) argue that in justifying his alleged war against terrorism, Bush succeeded in convincing the world of his agenda via the use of dehumanizing metaphors. The use of such types of metaphors enabled

him to portray the Muslim world as a serious threat to the peaceful world. For example, Bush's use of the metaphors "cancer", "virus", "evil", "insect", or "monster" dehumanized the enemy Other, that is the Muslim world. Also, the repeated use of such metaphors enabled him to legitimize the "killing" of this enemy as a moral responsibility of the in-group members (i.e. the US and its allies).

Regarding the Arabic corpus, there is a scarcity in the studies that critically analyze how Self and Other are positively/negatively represented in political discourse. However, there is a single recent study conducted by al Maani et al. in 2022. al Maani et al. (2022) examine the Self and Other representation in one political speech by Bashaar al Assad, the President of Syria. They investigate the portrayal of al Assad's opponents and competing parties as Negative-Other, as well as the beliefs that were conveyed via this discourse. Additionally, this study investigates the manner in which positive self-presentation was manifested within the context of al Assad's governing party, known as the Ba'ath party, as well as among the followers of the Syrian dictatorship. The dataset under analysis in al Maani et al., (2022) is comprised of a single televised political speech delivered in the Arabic language. The study mainly traced the use of narratives, speech acts, and references as devices of positive self-representation and negative other-representation. al Maani et. al. (2022) state that the declarative speech act was the most prevalent. However, they don't provide clear reasons why this type of speech act was the most used in Al-Assad's speech. As for narratives, the study shows that al Assad used past narratives to reinforce his arguments about the existence of conspiracies against Syria. As for references, the researchers state that al Assad negatively represented the Other by using implicit references rather than explicit ones. Although this study coincides with the present study in some aspects, like the examination of positive/negative Self/Other representation, it does not tackle the discourse topics and their

ideological underpinnings. I have also still not found any scholarly works that examine these aspects in the data under investigation in the present study.

3.2.3 Previous Research on the Arab Spring Political Speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi.

Since the present study is concerned particularly with Arabic political discourse during the Arab Spring, it is beneficial to focus on how the discourse during this era has been investigated by scholars. This review is meant to better comprehend the key issues addressed by those scholars and to reach conclusions that support undertaking this study. This subsection outlines the previous studies conducted on the political speeches of the three Arab leaders who were ousted due to these events, namely Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, and al Qaddafi of Libya. The studies will be discussed chronologically and the main concerns of the studies will be highlighted. These studies have investigated the use of a number of linguistic devices on the discourse level, word level, sentence level, and/or structure level.

On the discourse level, Lahlali (2011) examines the speeches made by Ben Ali and Mubarak after the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia broke out. The comparison and contrast of these speeches' structures, vocabulary, and rhetorical devices were done through the CDA theory. To investigate how Ben Ali and Mubarak's vocabulary and discourse changed during the course of the protests, textual analysis was used. Lahlali comes to the conclusion that, as the pressure on them increased, the presidents addressed the level of discontent in each speech by shifting language use. For example, both Ben Ali and Mubarak employed the strategy of denying the real situation and focusing on suggesting reforms. In terms of differences between the two leaders, Ben Ali used Colloquial Tunisian Arabic in his last speech whereas Mubarak stayed consistent in using Modern Standard Arabic. Lahlali (2011) argues that this shift to the colloquial was intended by Ben Ali to

shorten the distance between him and his audience. In this study Lahlali's (2011) main concern is to trace the shifts that occurred in each president's speeches over the course of the events without providing insights into why these shifts happened.

On the word level, Maalej (2012) examines the use of person deixis in the last three speeches of Ben Ali. The study employs CDA and cognitive pragmatics to conduct this analysis. It focuses on the shift that happened in the use of pronouns during the Arab Spring uprisings. The study shows that there was a dramatic change in the use of pronouns between the first, second, and the last speech. In Ben Ali's first speech, the We-They relationship was constructed as a Governmental or Royal We, opposing They as a distant entity. In his second speech, the We and They relationship was a little bit different from the first speech. We occurred more frequently than in the first speech. We was still constructed as a Governmental We as opposed to the outer They who were forced more to the external periphery of the internal circle. In Ben Ali's last speech, the shift in the use of pronouns was dramatic. The opposition became between I and You, where the addressees You (i.e. the Tunisians) were brought closer to the center than in the first two speeches.

In addition to the studies above, Zouhier Maalej conducted another study on the use of pronouns in the political speeches of another Arab Spring leader. Maalej (2013) similarly examines the use of person deixis in Mubarak's last three speeches. His study demonstrates how Hosni Mubarak, the ousted president of Egypt, constructed the Egyptian revolution and what fillers he used for person deixis in his final three speeches using cognitive pragmatics concepts. Specifically, Maalej (2013) argues that, in contrast to Ben Ali, the use of person deixis in the last speech of Mubarak does not differ significantly compared to his first two speeches. He argues that Mubarak was more self-centered than Ben Ali. In Maalej (2012), the author explains that Ben Ali used the pronoun You in his speech in a progressive manner as a way of expressing his desire for proximity

to and unity with the people. Mubarak, however, only used the pronoun fifteen times in his ultimate speech, which can be seen as a late recognition of the Egyptian people's demands and even existence in Mubarak's speech. Also, the use of the pronoun We was closer to a Royal-We rather than an inclusive We in his first speech. Nevertheless, compared to the present study, Maalej (2012) and Maalej (2013) do not explain these uses of person deixis in terms of the concepts of (de)legitimization and Self and Other-representation and how the recurrent use of a certain pronoun would be justified ideologically.

On the sentence level, Jarraya (2013) examines the last political speech of Tunisia's ex-president Ben Ali. He mainly looked into persuasion in this speech. With reference to Searle's typology of Speech Act Theory, sentences were examined to determine their illocutionary force. The persuasive aspect of the usage of deictic pronouns was then investigated through a study of agency. The three Aristotelian appeals were also used to study the speech's use of diglossia. Grice's maxims (conversational maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner (Grice, 1989)) were then utilized to determine whether or not the Cooperative Principle was being maintained and whether the deviation was being made with the intention of being persuasive. According to the study's findings, a single utterance could contain many speech acts, either explicitly or implicitly, depending on the context. It also demonstrates how the speaker could express himself and criticize the addressees by the deliberate use of deictic pronouns and agency with particular illocutionary forces. The author maintains that this process was facilitated by the deliberate use of ethos, a key persuasive tactic in political discourse. Jarraya (2013), interestingly, argues that emotions were more effectively expressed in dialect than in standard Arabic, despite the fact that the use of the Tunisian dialect was considered "a deviation from the norm". He discovered that violating Grice's

maxims could successfully sway an audience. However, linguistic techniques alone cannot be used to persuade someone. It must be done in parallel with a thorough understanding of the context.

On the rhetorical level, Ben (2013) specifically examines the use of metaphors in al Qaddafi's speech during the Arab Spring. The "zoosemy" or animal metaphor is particularly discussed in this study in an attempt to explain what the use of metaphors could achieve in political discourse in these critical times (i.e. the Arab Spring uprisings). The study provides a socio-cultural explanation for why metaphorical language use in the Libyan instance failed. His contention is that a metaphor's ability to convey meaning is greatly influenced by the sociocultural setting in which it is utilized. Ben (2013) assumes that any language use that deviates from the norm is opposed. al Qaddafi overused animal metaphors and when a metaphor is overused, the audience loses the ability to understand it as a metaphor. Ben concludes that the exercise of metaphorical language depended on the interlocutors' struggle for dominance. However skillfully you choose and employ metaphors, you will encounter resistance once it is clear that you are using language to further your own agenda.

Investigating the shift that happened in the identities of four Arab leaders during the uprisings, Hatab (2013) traces the development of the various identities exercised by these four Arab leaders and examined the language resources that were used to do so. The study investigates the political speeches of the ex-presidents Ben Ali, Mubarak, al Qaddafi, and Saleh during the uprisings. The analysis in Hatab (2013) shows that there was a dramatic shift from the "semi-god leader" to the one who was desperately trying to win the support and understanding of the citizens. Personal pronouns, lexical repletion, and the use of informal Arabic mostly served as indicators of this transition.

Slogans as a part of Arabic political discourse during the Arab Spring uprisings are also examined. Al-Sowaidi et al. (2017) analyze some of the slogans that were gathered from the locations where demonstrators gathered and protested in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Slogans as a sub-genre of political discourse were collected and examined to explicate the common structures and methods that were employed to create this type of discourse using Critical Discourse Analysis. The study attempts to demonstrate the extent to which slogans could act as a medium of dispensing and consuming complaints and comments. The examination of these slogans shows that Arab Spring slogans conformed to the structures and strategies of typical political discourse at different dimensions and levels. The study concludes that Arab Spring slogans also had a number of distinctive features. The slogans were brief, avoided complexity, tended to nominalization, and/or depended mainly on metaphors and similes. Also, they could be in the form of a text, image, or in a musical chant, and served a variety of speech acts like interrogative speech act, directive speech act, and appeals. This study mainly focuses on the linguistic and stylistic functions in these slogans.

Awwad (2016) aims at examining the language realization of persuasion as a social act through discourse. The study employs an “eclectic model” in which both Aristotle’s theory of persuasion, and Halliday’s systemic functional approach were adopted. She also benefited from concepts in CDA and pragmatics. The study mainly traces the use of pronouns, presupposition, and transitivity as devices of persuasion in the speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi during the Arab Spring. Awwad (2016) finds that in terms of using the inclusive We, Ben Ali was the highest-ranking president, which suggested a dramatic change in his personality. In addition, in comparison to Ben Ali and al Qaddafi, Mubarak used the pronoun "I" far more frequently. This indicates that Mubarak placed a greater emphasis on his own selfhood, which gives the impression that he was narcissistic and self-centered. In terms of types of presuppositions, the study concludes

that in order to claim that their statements were factual, both Mubarak and Ben Ali employed "existential, lexical and structural presuppositions" (p 41) whereas al Qaddafi did not rely on these strategies.

Alduhaim (2018) also examines some of the political speeches during the Arab Spring, particularly the last speeches of Mubarak and al Qaddafi. In this study, Muammar al Qaddafi and Hosni Mubarak's speeches during the Arab Spring were examined, along with their translations presented in different modes of communication. The study begins with a comparative examination of the source texts (STs), which includes a textual and contextual analysis based on Norman Fairclough's three dimensional model and the multimodal analysis of Gunther Kress. The target texts (TTs) were then examined to look into any possible changes that happened during the translation process. In addition to the changes in the meaning that were intended from the translation process, this study suggests that there might be other changes that might have occurred during this transformation, especially since these speeches were presented in other modes of communication (as written rather than spoken) or different genres (as a newspaper article rather than a political speech) after the translation process. The study shows that, during the translation process, the type of strategies used by the translators depended on the aim of the translation and the genre of the TT. Interpreters usually chose strategies that depend on omission and summary because they might not have enough time or space, whereas translators, especially those who needed to transcribe the speeches they wanted to translate, usually tended to employ the explanation strategy through which they explained the expressions and terms of which they thought the target audience was unaware. On the other hand, selective appropriation was mostly employed if the speeches were rendered as newspapers articles where the translators selected what they wished to convey in this article to give it a specific shape.

Jarrah (2018) examines the predominant rhetorical features used by the Arab Spring ousted leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi. To accomplish this goal, a critical evaluation was conducted on the speeches of these leaders during the Arab Spring, using Austin's and Searle's Speech Act Theory as the theoretical framework of this study. After thoroughly analyzing both the linguistic inferences and the contextual inferences, that is the explicatures and implicatures, Jarrah (2018) argues that it became evident that the five speech acts, namely directive, representative, commissive, expressive, and declarations, were employed, albeit in varying frequencies. Notably, the speech act of warning, which falls under the category of Directives, was found to be the most frequently utilized in the speeches of the three leaders during these critical events. However, the study also shows that each president had his own distinct approach to engaging in verbal confrontation with demonstrators. Jarrah (2018) contends that in light of comprehending the intricate dynamics of societal structures in their countries, every leader endeavored to communicate with his constituents in a manner that was tailored to their specific needs and circumstances. For example, the rhetorical elements utilized by al Qaddafi were shaped by his autocratic rule, absolute power, and totalitarian policies. The study's findings show that the other two leaders used this speech act but in an indirect way, since they wanted to avoid provoking their constituents. For example, Mubarak's emphasis on representative and commissive speech acts might be attributed to his hopeful outlook on retaining power in that period. By employing these speech acts, Mubarak dared to accept some responsibility for the existing state of affairs while emphasizing the slogan "the rule of the people" and making promises about upcoming improvements. In contrast, Ben Ali, who likely had a sense of being unwelcome, delivered "farewell speeches" that exhibited a substantially higher degree of informality. Consequently, Ben Ali employed expressive speech act to the greatest extent (Jarrah, 2018).

Another aspect of language use was investigated by al Bawardi (2020). al Bawardi (2020) investigates the perceived sense of power experienced by two ousted Arab leaders during the Arab Spring, namely Ben Ali and Mubarak. The study utilizes the rapport management paradigm proposed by Oatey-Spencer (2008, 32 in al Bawardi, 2020), which consists of four distinct orientations: “enhancement, maintenance, neglect, and challenge”. He considers these speeches that were delivered in this critical time as "calming speeches” that mainly contained one speech act. This was refusal since the deposed presidents refused to relinquish their positions and employed various tactics to express their refusal. Taking this consideration into account, al Bawardi (2020) hypothesizes that in circumstances characterized by significant imposition, particularly when the speaker has a greater social standing than the listener, the inclination towards establishing rapport aligns with the speaker’s authority. That is, in situations when an individual has more authority, they are inclined to use a higher frequency of rapport-challenging methods within their efforts to provide soothing statements. Conversely, in situations when the speaker has less authority, they tend to use a greater number of rapport-enhancement strategies inside their speeches aimed at promoting a sense of calmness. al Bawardi (2020) argues that this hypothesis was confirmed by the results of the analysis conducted on the examined data. His research finds that in the last speeches of each president there was a notable increase in “rapport enhancement” and a decrease in “rapport challenge” in comparison to their previous speeches. For example, in his last speech, 75% of Ben Ali’s refusal strategies was for rapport enhancement and maintenance, while 60% of his refusal strategies in his first speech were for neglect. Al Bawardi (2020) explains that these elevated numerical values served as a clear indication that in his last speech, Ben Ali exhibited a diminished level of authority and a heightened degree of acquiescence towards the demonstrators’ substantial impositions and threats to his reputation. It seems that Ben Ali had

relinquished his authority and had developed a conviction that circumstances had moved beyond his ability to influence them. As for Mubarak, 55% of his refusal strategies in his first speech were for rapport neglect compared to 70% for rapport enhancement strategies in his last speech. al Bawardi (2020) explains this high percentage for rapport enhancement strategies in Mubarak's last speech as an indication of the decline of authority that he encountered during his last speech.

Finally, Alkahtani (2020) analyzes the attitude in Mubarak's speeches during the Arab Spring. The study draws on the concept of appraisal suggested by Martin and White and benefited from the Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory of Halliday as a main framework for the study. In accordance with this framework, affect, judgment, and appreciation are the three domains under which attitude is subdivided in the appraisal notion. The language techniques Mubarak utilized to reflect these domains, such as pronouns, intensity, reiteration, vocabulary choice, and metaphor, were examined in his last three speeches from 2011. Alkahtani concludes that Mubarak's attitude gradually became egocentric. The progressive increase in his use of the first-person singular pronoun revealed this egocentrism. He could have been more cognizant of, and respectful of, the demonstrators' demands instead of celebrating his prior successes, which were viewed negatively. His attitude was questioning in his first speech, assertive in the second speech, and unsympathetic in the last speech.

3.2.4 Concluding Remarks

The referenced sources in the previous sections provide a more detailed examination of the techniques used to establish the legitimacy of certain situations in relation to the Arab Spring, and how leaders created a positive image of the Self and a negative image of the Other. It also shows, among other things, that (de)legitimization and positive/negative Self/Other presentation are manifested in many linguistic, pragmatic, and rhetorical devices in political speeches. However,

when compared to the CDA studies conducted on the Arabic political discourse, the issues of (de)legitimization and positive/negative Self/Other presentation in the western political discourse have been handled better. Further, few of the discussed studies that examine the Arabic political discourse make an effort to expand the scope of the research beyond simply identifying different discursive tactics of legitimation or Self/Other-representation, as can be seen in Said (2017) and Al Maani et al. (2022).

Wodak and Meyer (2001) and van Dijk (2009) state that the primary aim of CDA studies is to analyze texts in order to expose and examine the presence of dominance, inequality, and concealed power dynamics. However, a primary obstacle faced by practitioners of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) involves establishing connections between the "micro-patterns" identified through textual analysis and the "macro-patterns" prevalent within the cultural and societal contexts in which the examined discourse exists. Additionally, CDA seeks to explore the processes through which individuals, social relationships, and values are created and portrayed as authentic. However, I have noticed that many of the reviewed studies, especially those conducted on the Arabic corpora, neglect the importance of considering these processes. It is much more important to analyze why views of the Self and the Other are created, as well as what the objectives of these perceptions are supposed to be, than it is to simply investigate how these perceptions are formed. The aforementioned studies have not placed significant attention on the discursive and ideological processes used by the ousted Arab Spring leaders. Yet, this aspect is of great importance and presents an opportunity for critical discourse analysis to be conducted. Furthermore, there is a lack of scholarly study that examines the chosen speeches in terms of ideological representations, specifically focusing on linguistic and pragmatic techniques, and how their projections relate to the concept of Self/Other social inclusion/exclusion.

To be more specific, the reviewed literature on the political speeches of the three presidents during the Arab Spring shows that there is a scarcity in the body of literature that investigates the concepts of how the ousted Arab Spring leaders attempted to make their political claims legitimate and how they represented the Self and the Other for legitimization purposes. In doing so, first, each of the three leaders attempted discursively to make their use of force against the protesters legitimate. and to entice the support of the international community for doing this. Second, they wanted to make their failure look excused, put an end to the protests that aimed at toppling their regimes, and thus ensure that they remained in power. Understanding this more fully can be achieved through an analysis of specific discourse topics (macro-strategies), discursive strategies and ideological strategies.

Finally, despite the extensive range of studies conducted on the topic of political speeches by state leaders during the Arab Spring, it is worth noting that the academic work of analyzing this discourse particularly from the standpoint of (de)legitimization and positive/negative presentation of Self/Other is rather limited in scope. This research examines these two aspects by tracing how the political leaders in this critical event used discursive strategies, ideological strategies and macro-strategies (topics selection) to achieve the previous goals. Therefore, this current study extends previous research by taking a holistic approach to the language used in these political speeches, providing a comprehensive analysis of political discourse during the Arab Spring and examining how the ousted Arab leaders used specific strategies to achieve ideological purposes.

3.5 Brief review of Methods on Legitimization, and Self and Other Representation in Political Discourse

Political speeches of leaders throughout the world have received much attention by scholars. The above sections show that previous studies employ different approaches to analyze political

speeches, such as the functional theory of political campaign discourse in both Reyes (2011) and Akbar and Abbas (2019); Critical Metaphor analysis in Koteyko and Ryzanova-Clack (2009) and Balciunaite (2012); Conceptual metaphor theory in Arcimavicene (2019); and van Leeuwen's Legitimation framework in Abdi and Basarati (2018), Varaa (2014), Ross and Rivers (2020), Khajavi and Rusti (2020), Abuelwafa (2021), and Said (2017); and finally van Dijk's ideological square in both Birai and Mohammadi (2012) and Al Maani et. al. (2022). However, most of the studies that investigate both (de)legitimization and positive/negative Self/Other-representation employed Critical Discourse Analysis as the theoretical foundation, along with other analytical methods derived from different theories. The question that arises now is why have all these studies resorted to including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as their theoretical foundation? Van Dijk (1997: 21-23) provides an answer for such question:

> If we want to explain what discourse is all about, it would be insufficient to merely analyze its internal structures, the actions being accomplished, or the cognitive operations involved in language use. We need to account for the fact that discourse as social action is being engaged in within a framework of understanding, communication and interaction which is part of broader socio-cultural structures and processes…. Critical scholars of discourse do not merely observe such linkages between discourse and social structures, but aim to be agents of change, and do so in solidarity with those who need such change most.

This quote shows that when research is intended to study the relationship between language, power, ideology, and politics, CDA is often chosen by researchers who have interest in the intersection of these ideas. Assuming the power exercised by discourse whether it is spoken or written, CDA is a tool that may be used to describe, interpret, analyze, and critique how social life is mirrored in texts. Therefore, CDA aims at looking beyond texts to examine areas such as politics, media, inequalities based on the social class, and ethnicity, women, and refugees.

On the other hand, although the Discourse-Historical Approach, one of the two CDA frameworks adopted in this study, offers very neat analysis of the techniques behind how both discourse topics and discursive strategies are employed to achieve (de)legitimization, the previous studies have not utilized the DHA framework to disentangle the ways in which (de)legitimization is achieved. More information about the ways of analysis introduced by the discourse-historical approach will be addressed in chapter three. This brief review on the methods employed in the studies that investigate (de)legitimization strategies and Self and Other representation leads us to the next section which will address the theoretical background of the present study: Critical Discourse Analysis.

3.6 Critical Discourse Analysis

This section focuses on the theoretical foundation chosen for this study, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It presents the components that have been revealed in the literature about Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) by speculating on the aims of CDA, why it is conducted and why is it critical. The rest of this section attempts to address the main pillars of CDA including Discourse, Power, and Ideology, and the main frameworks within the field of CDA.

3.6.1 What Does CDA Do?

In the 1980s, some scholars (Norman Fairclough 1989, van Dijk 1988, and Ruth Wodak 1989) built on the works of sociologists like Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Karl Marx and they built upon their concepts of "ideology" "power", and "knowledge" and integrated them in different approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis. Exploring the literature on Critical Discourse analysis, one finds various definitions and labels for this field. Wodak and Meyer (2001: 4) describe it as "a research program" or "a school of thought" while Fairclough (2001: 122) describes it as a "theory". Others describe it as "discourse analytical research" (Van Dijk 2001: 352) and "research

enterprise" (Wodak 2013: XIX). This reflects the interdisciplinary nature of CDA and its broad range of applications.

Khidir (2017: 112) argues that "the multiplicity of labels attributed to CDA can perhaps be traced back to the fact that CDA has been relatively recently introduced as a modification of its predecessor discourse analysis (DA) and there is still, as the relevant literature shows, some vagueness in relation to its uses or limitations." For the purpose of this research, I will adopt the view that CDA is a method or tool for describing, analyzing, and interpreting language use. I have defined it this way in order to prevent ambiguity that can arise from the various terms assigned to CDA.

Critical linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis are sometimes used interchangeably. However, when research is intended to study the relationship between language, power, ideology, and politics, CDA is often chosen by researchers because it aims at looking beyond texts in examining areas such as politics, media, inequalities based on the social class, ethnicity, gender, and citizenship status. Breeze (2011) comments that CDA aims at examining the social functions of language like any other critical approach by analyzing texts and doing ethnographic and conversational analysis. But what distinguishes CDA is that the relationship between language, text, discourse and power, political conflict is emphasized (ibid). Fairclough (2001b: 123) defines CDA as the "analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices". Fairclough (1995:97) summarizes the significance of CDA in that:

> It sets out to make visible through analysis, and to criticize, connections between properties of texts and social process and relations (ideological, power relations) which are generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those texts, and whose effectiveness depends upon this opacity.

The present study focuses on Critical Discourse Analysis and investigates how language is used in political discourse in an attempt to discover how socio-political context affects this use and to unmask the hidden power relations and ideologies within discourse. Rogers (2004: 6) clarifies this further:

> Critical discourse analysis explores the connection between the use of language and the social and political context in which it occurs. It explores issues such as gender, ethnicity, cultural differences, ideology and identity and how these are both constructed and reflected in texts.

Taking into consideration that Critical Discourse Analysis is the approach of this study, I will first address the criticism that this framework has received. CDA has had its validity criticized because the ideologies and the backgrounds of the researcher can be brought to their research. Wetherell et al. (2001) explain that since the researcher is responsible for collecting data, variables like gender, appearance, or social class, as well as the analysis and the interpretation that follow, the researcher's identity will be evident and cannot be separated from the research. They call this issue "reflexivity", in that the subjective nature of the political beliefs, sympathies, interests, knowledge, and views of the researcher can affect the whole process and ultimately the outcomes of the research (ibid: 16).

To avoid subjectivity and bias in CDA research, a number of strategies have been suggested. Wetherell et al. (2001) suggest "replicability" according to which "a different researcher (or researchers) should be able repeat a research project and obtain the same or similar results" (16). Another strategy is suggested by Ruth Wodak. She states that "one methodical way for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of being biased is to follow the principle of triangulation" like in the discourse historical approach (one of CDA frameworks) (Wodak, 2007:210). Triangulation is defined as "using multi-methodical designs on the basis of a variety

of empirical data as well as background information" (Meyer, 2001: 30). Through such strategy, the beliefs and views brought to the research by the researcher's preconceptions can be eliminated because in some approaches like DHA there is an attempt to "integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive events are embedded" (ibid: 65). In the present study, I will adopt the DHA approach in order to ensure objectivity.

In addition, in CDA research objectivity can be achieved through supporting verbal aspects of the discourse by including the non-verbal aspects of text like gestures, stances, images, and body language in the data analysis. Another strategy is suggested by Breeze (2011: 505) who argues that when CDA is "based on large quantities of empirical data and incorporating the use of corpus linguistic tools" the analysis would be more objective.

Another criticism that has been leveled by scholars at CDA is its transdisciplinary nature and the lack of a unified methodology (Gotlieb (1987), Widdowson (1998)). Regarding this limitation, Fairclough & Chouliaraki (1999) argue that "what is distinctive about CDA within this tradition however is that it brings critical social science and linguistics together within a single theoretical and analytical framework, setting up a dialogue between them" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 6). Furthermore, Lahlali (2003: 68) defends CDA regarding the aforementioned criticism stating that "researchers can use more than one discipline to achieve their purposes. They are not in favor of any single methodology within CDA. This is because different research questions require different research methodologies" (ibid: 68). To conclude, CDA does not rely on a single method to avoid vagueness, but rather it draws on a variety of methods to obtain a more representative picture and more objective outcomes. Furthermore, Wodak (2001) argues that the relationship between discourse, politics, and people is very complex, and in CDA, to obtain a better

comprehension of this relationship, the interdisciplinary nature of any analysis is emphasized (Wodak, 2001: 11).

3.6.2 Why is it Critical?

CDA is critical because it should be understood "as gaining distance from the data, embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection while undertaking research" (Reisigl and Wodak 2017: 87). They argue that it aims at uncovering the persuasion and manipulation that discourse does, whether implicitly or explicitly (ibid: 88). Fairclough (1993) explains that CDA is critical because it is designed to systematically examine the frequently ambiguous causal and determinative connections between "(a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes" to understand how these behaviors, occurrences and texts are ideologically formed by power and conflicts over it. It also seeks to understand how the lack of transparency in these connections between discourse and society contributes to the maintenance of power and hegemony (Fairclough, 1993: 135).

For Lahlali (2003: 48) it is critical because it looks into how discourse conceals profound links of power to inequality and how it is ideologically influenced. Consequently, the criticality of CDA resides in its aim, which mainly revolves around unraveling the hidden complicated power relations in discourse. Van Dijk (1996) confirms this by asserting that CDA's main intention is to "describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimized by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions" (Van Dijk, 1996: 84).

3.6.3 CDA Pillars

This research encompasses three fundamental components of Critical Discourse Analysis, namely Discourse, Power, and Ideology. In this section, a detailed explanation is provided for these pillars.

3.6.3.1 Discourse

Defining and discussing the term discourse is necessary in any critical study of discourse because, as asserted by van Dijk (2014: 136), "the discourse component is of course the specific and central aim" in these studies. The term "discourse" has been studied thoroughly and defined from different perspectives. The word itself is derived from the Latin word "discursus" which means "running to and from" and generally refers to "written and spoken communication" (Pitsoe and Leteska, 2013: 24). There are many definitions, but none are precise. O'Keeffe and McCarthy (2010: 270) describe the term discourse as "slippery and baggy". They justify this by stating that it is "slippery because it eludes neat definition, and baggy because it embraces a wide range of linguistic and social phenomena" (ibid: 270). Lahlali (2003) points out that the complexity of the term "discourse" stems from its multidimensional nature. Furthermore, Attar (2012) contends that this variation in defining the term discourse comes from the various disciplinary and theoretical views to which this term relates.

On one hand, some scholars like Michael Stubbs defines discourse simply as "language above the sentence or above the clause" (Stubbs, 1991: 1). On the other hand, Brown and Yule (1983) argue that discourse cannot be limited to its linguistic components but rather must include the functions served by these linguistic components. Seidel also (1985:44) shares the same conceptualization and considers discourse as "a terrain, a dynamic linguistic and, above all, semantic space in which social meanings are produced or challenged".

In the present study I will focus on definitions that hold the "critical" view of discourse which Lahlali (2003) defines as the view that sees language as a medium of investing power relations that influence identities, relations, knowledge, and beliefs (Lahlali, 2003: 16). I will start with Foucault's definition of discourse as he is considered one of the most influential theorists in

this field. Foucault declares that "discourse is a social force which has a central role in what is constructed as 'real' and therefore what is possible" (Foucault, 1972: 49). Both the perspective through which we see the world and the knowledge that we have of it are influenced and shaped by discourse (ibid). He also sees that meaning and social relations are embodied in discourse. Victor Pitsoe and Moeketsi Letseka, commenting on Foucault's conceptualization of discourse, argue that discourse determines "who can speak, when, and with what authority" (Pitsoe and Letseka, 2013: 24).

Furthermore, one of the scholars whose view about discourse is consistent with that of Foucault is Brenda K. Marshall who considers discourse as a structured system of words and utterances that cannot be evaluated individually depending on its norms, but rather as an array of acts within a social context (Marshall, 2013: 99). In a similar vein, Ruth Wodak holds the same view and sees discourse as a complicated set of linguistic acts that occur simultaneously and gradually and can be expressed within social contexts (Wodak 2001:66). All of these conceptions of discourse assume that there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social settings in that the discourses shape and affect social and political processes and, conversely, the situational and social settings influence discourses (Wodak 2001). In the same line of reasoning, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak consider discourse as "socially constituted and socially constitutive" (Reisigl, 2017 and Wodak, 2001: 89).

Fairclough, who is also considered as one of the major theorists in the field of discourse, utilizes Foucault's conceptualization of discourse and links it to social life. He precisely defines discourse as "language use, seen as a type of social practice and not merely bound to text but it may also involve analyzing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutions

and social structures" (Fairclough, 1992: 63). In this light, Fairclough regards "language use as a form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables" (ibid). He suggests that understanding language use in this vein implies that "discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of representation" (ibid). Fairclough (2001:2) considers discourses as "diverse representations of social life" meaning that people represent their life through the different ways they use language and this is what he calls "social use of language in social contexts" (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 81). He states that discourse encapsulates "the whole process of social interactions" which hints that in addition to the verbal interaction, discourse includes visual terms of language like facial expressions, head movements, and gestures, posture etc. (Fairclough, 2001a: 20).

Gee (2014: 36) contends that "situated identities, characteristic identities, ways of coordinating and getting coordinated by others, things, tools, technologies, symbol systems, places, times, acting, gesturing, thoughts and feelings" are all considered as the components of discourse. For Mills (2004: 11), discourses are produced within social contexts which are crucial to this process of production. She states that "discourse is groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted within a social context, which are determined by that social context and which contribute to the way that social context continues to exist."

The main tenets of discourse are summarized by Fairclough and Wodak (1997 in Van Dijk, 1997: 271-280) as follows:

> Discourse does ideological work, discourse is situated and historical, the link between discourse/text and society is mediated, discourse is a form of social action.

In the previous quote, Fairclough and Wodak go further to declare that both power and ideology are practiced through discourse. Wherever there are unequal relationships, ideology functions and this happens when the powerful speakers control the discourse of the non-powerful speakers resulting in unequal power relationships. Furthermore, Fairclough (2001a) states that to sustain these unequal relationships the discourse should function ideologically. He argues that the ideological power of discourse resides in showing the practices of powerful speakers as common sense. More will be addressed about the relationship of both power and ideology with discourse in the following sections.

Finally, one of the most prominent theorists in the understanding of discourse is van Dijk. He has studied discourse in light of the notions of "personal and social cognition" and "ideology". He argues that cognition is the "the necessary interface that links discourse as language use and social interaction with social situations and social structures" (Van Dijk, 2015: 472-75). He pinpoints ideology as a point where "discourse structures and social cognition" cross. For van Dijk, discourse is the means through which "ideologies are largely expressed and acquired" (Van Dijk, 2013: 121).

For the purpose of this study, my focus will be on the social-ideological meaning of discourse which is a way of using language that does not only represent people and their power and ideology but also constructs them (Fairclough, 1992: 3). For instance, the expression "Islamic" is generally good for all Muslim-Arabs, but how can it be that the same expression is to some the way to a good ruling system, yet to others is evil? The answer is in the various discourses that are employed by different speakers. This is consistent with Van Leeuwan's view of discourse since he sees discourse as a way of knowing in which social practices are represented in text. That is, discourses do more than just describe what is happening; they also assess it, give it goals, and

defend it, and these dimensions of representation have taken precedence over the description of the social activity itself (van Leeuwen, 2008: 6).

The definition of discourse that this study will rely on is Fairclough's definition in which language use is considered as a kind of "social practice" and is not only limited to texts. It also helps discover how texts, social conditions, and processes are connected to each other. In this connection both the direct situational context conditions as well as more distant conditions like those related to "institutions and social structures" (Fairclough, 2013:26). This conceptualization of discourse makes it extremely related to how power and control are exercised though it and how people, acts, and thoughts are de/legitimized through discourse too. This function served by discourse prompts critical discourse analysts to pay special attention to political discourse particularly. The following section addresses the main strategic features of this discourse and the political speech as a sub-genre of it.

Political discourse

The need to study the language use in the political contexts dates back to the times of the Greeks and the Romans. The term "political sciences" was used to refer to this study (Perloff, 2013:100). This field has witnessed continuous development throughout the years and in the late seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes introduced his elaboration on "social contract theory" which is considered the basis of the modern political philosophy (Danford, 1980). According to Claeys (2013:776) this philosophy is now considered as the base of the field of political science. Later on, many scholars introduced the notion "political language" when they linked politics to language (ibid.). Lasswell (1949), states that because of the impact that political language makes on people, scholars see it as a "language of influence" and this is why van Dijk (2006b: 362) call it "the language of power". To develop the discipline of political discourse, Schäffner and Chilton(1999) claim that, since

political discourse is considered as a complicated human activity, it is crucial to investigate it in depth. Furthermore, many scholars emphasize how important it is to study the language of politics in light of other elements which may influence it such as audience, culture, and society.

Some scholars claim that it is hard to define the political discourse because it has a wide range of meanings but others maintain that it includes any speech communicated in public regarding the political sphere. Feldman (1998) argues that the term political discourse most commonly refers to any communication held in the political field. They state that political discourse is "public communication in the subject of politics" (Feldman, 1998:5). They maintain that this language can be found in the language of television, radio, newspapers, election speech, parliamentary debates, and mass meetings (ibid: 5). This language has a political function that is to influence power.

Van Dijk (1997) argues that the context plays a decisive role in "the categorization of discourse as 'political' or not". He continues "participants and actions are the core of such contexts…that is, politicians talk politically also (or only) if they and their talk are contextualized in such communicative events such as cabinet meetings, parliamentary sessions, election campaigns, rallies, interviews with the media, bureaucratic practices, protest demonstrations, and so on." (Van Dijk, 1997: 14).

In this regard, Chilton (2004: 3) views politics as "a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it". It is also seen as a struggle for Bourdieu but for him this struggle is for imposing "the legitimate principle of vision and division" (Adler-Nissen, 2012: 84). Furthermore, Wodak (2009: 54-55) sees politics as a struggle to impose power and dominance that is needed to "put certain political and social ideas into social practice". In these struggles language is a crucial factor because each political action is

accompanied and influenced by language. On the other hand, politics are also seen as "cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty, and the like" (Chilton 2004: 1). Language is also crucial in this process of cooperation. In this regard Chilton (2004: 199) maintains that "At the heart of what we call 'politics' is the attempt to get others to 'share a common view' about what is useful–harmful, good–evil, just–unjust. Language is the only means for doing this". Accordingly, political discourse is an overall title that can be used to refer to all discourse genres used in the field of politics, and this type of discourse is employed by politicians who use manipulative and persuasive language to reach some political goals. And 'genres' as defined by Fairclough (1995) are "semiotic ways of acting and interacting such as news or job interviews, reports or editorials in newspapers, or advertisements on TV or the internet" (Fairclough, 2013: 11). This definition proposes that there are specific rules and expectations, and special social purposes for each discourse genre. This leads us to the job of critical analysts who attempt to provide an analysis of how political discourse works and to unmask how the political and ideological power is exercised within discourse and finally to reveal the implicit goals intended by politicians in their language (Dunmire, 2012). The contextual definition provided by Fairclough is also preferred by Van Djik (1997) who insists that "from our discourse analytical point of view, such a contextual definition at the same time suggests that the study of political discourse should not be limited to the structural properties of text or talk itself, but also include a systematic account of the context and its relations to discursive structures" (van Dijk, 1997: 15).

Political Speeches

Reisigl (2008: 243) defines a speech as "a structured verbal chain of coherent speech acts uttered on a special social occasion for a specific purpose by a single person, and addressed to a more or

less specific audience". He refuses the short-sighted view of seeing political speeches as mono-logical "linguistic events". He has adopted the "functional pragmatic view" that "spoken political speeches are complex realizations of conventionalized linguistic action patterns with a clear interaction structure" (ibid: 254). And that is why he defines the political speech as "an institutionally determined and institutionally embedded multipart pattern that fulfils specific social-psychological and political purposes" (ibid: 254).

Political speeches are considered a sub-genre of political discourse because it has almost the same characteristics of political discourse. What makes it different is the setting within which it happens. For example, a televised speech of a president is classified as a political speech. Although both a televised speech of a politician and a newspaper article commenting on the same speech are considered types of political discourse, the setting of these two is different. On the other hand, they both share the similar purpose of persuading the public.

Furthermore, the communicative nature of the political speeches necessitates its analysis on the phonetic, syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic levels (Schaffner, 3). This analysis is significant since political speeches have a special rhetorical nature. The communicative nature of political speeches adds much sophistication, power, and ambiguity to the language used in these speeches. These characteristics come from the fact that political speeches are rich in ideological and cultural elements. The meaning assigned to each of these elements may differ from one culture to another but they share the fact that they are used to obtain certain political aims (Woodward and Denton Jr, 2013, and Beard, 2000).

Another crucial characteristic of political speeches is that the speakers mostly tend to use "rhetorical language". Rhetoric is defined by Cockcroft et al. (2013: 4) as "the art of persuasive discourse" (p4) and by discourse they mean both written and spoken communication. They make

reference to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric , as he sees it as "the possible means of persuasion in reference to any given subject" (ibid: 4). Abdul-Raof (2006) asserts that the word rhetoric "*balaghah*" بلاغة is derived from the verb "*balagha*" بَلَغَ which means to reach or attain through one's ends. Therefore, the use of this word clarifies why rhetoric in Arabic is viewed as the art "through which the communicator penetrates the hearts and minds of his or her addressees through psychologically effective and far-reaching texts that influence the addressee's behavior" (Abdul-Raof, 2006: 92).

In politics, politicians use linguistic techniques to defend their attitudes and beliefs and ultimately to achieve this persuasion. Atkinson (2005) lists allusion, metaphor, and repetition as powerful techniques that politicians utilize in their speeches. Therefore, most politicians tend to hire speechwriters to assist them in structuring their speeches to make their words more persuasive (Reisigl, 2008: 261).

3.6.3.2 Ideology

Having provided a comprehensive discussion on the term discourse, the discussion in this section will be on the close relationship between discourse and ideology since ideology is considered a main pillar of CDA, which is the main framework of this study. Terry Eagleton in his book *Ideology* points out that "nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology". He explains this by assuming that it is not "because workers in the field are remarkable for their low intelligence, but because the term 'ideology' has a whole range of useful meanings" (Eagleton, 1991 in Cassels, 2002). Also, Schäffner (1996: 1) points out that "the notion of ideology is a fairly complex and controversial one". For communities or groups that share them, ideologies serve as compass points that guide their interests and political and social actions.

A general definition of ideology is suggested by Thomas et al. (2004: 34) who assume that "everything we know and think is in fact an ideology". Ideology for them is "any set of beliefs which, to the people who hold them, appear to be logical and 'natural" (ibid: 34). Therefore, it is difficult to question the dominant ideology in a certain culture. Thomas et al. assert "it can be a challenging task" because we question things that would sound logical to any person who believes in that ideology (ibid: 34).

In discussing the relationship between ideology and discourse, I will focus on Thompson's (1990), Fairclough's (2003), and Van Dijk's (1998) viewpoints about ideology. Thompson (1990) introduces a specialized study in which he develops a theory of ideology. For Thompson (1990: 23) ideology is "meanings in the service of power". He presents a thorough description for the modes through which ideology operates, calling them "modes of operation". He also links specific linguistic strategies to each mode of operation. The following table shows these modes of operation and the linguistic strategies associated with each one.

Table (3.1): Thompson's Modes of Operation (Thompson, 1990)

Mode of Operation of Ideology	**Linguistic Strategy**
Legitimation	Rationalization, Universalization, Narrativization
Dissimulation	Displacement, Euphemization, Tropes (Metonymy and Metaphor)
Unification	Standardization, Symbolization of Unity
Fragmentation	Differentiation, Expurgation of the Other
Reification	Naturalization, Externalization, Normalization, Passivization

The importance of these modes resides in that each of these modes provides a different way to comprehend how language and symbols might be employed to shape ideology in certain contexts.

Furthermore, Thompson's modes of operation and the strategies linked to each mode offer valuable tools to discourse analysts and help them to trace the discursive strategies that politicians use in their speeches to legitimize and justify their actions.

Fairclough and van Dijk particularly have studied the term ideology in the context of political discourse. One of the four tenets of discourse suggested by Fairclough and Wodak (1997 in Van Dijk, 1997: 271-280) is "that discourse does ideological work" and it is through discourse that individuals express their ideologies, which are, at the same time, the beliefs they have toward something. One of the best definitions that links ideology to discourse is from Fairclough (2003: 28), who defines ideologies as "representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation." Therefore, this definition emphasizes the connection between discourse and ideology.

For van Dijk, ideologies are "political or social systems of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, and have the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group." (Van Dijk, 1998: 3). He argues that the best means through which these beliefs can be justified and legitimized is via discourse. He assumes that ideologies are mostly communicated and gained through discourse, which can be oral or written, So, members of groups frequently use ideological language to justify, explain or otherwise support their behavior within their in-group (van Dijk, 2013 :121). Furthermore, van Dijk has similar perspectives to those of Fairclough and insists that discourse helps in imposing ideology. He maintains that ideology can be best viewed as the representations that social groups have about themselves and others (ibid).

Concerning the close relationship between ideology and discourse, van Dijk (2013) argues that these representations are formulated as mental models, then expressed in discourse, and that the analysis of such discourse results in "positive self-representation" and 'negative other

representation" which will be further explained in chapter four (ibid: 125). van Dijk (2011) also argues that ideologies can be obtained individually or collectively and are recreated by the social behavior of a group, particularly visible in its discourse. Conversely, discourse is controlled by group ideologies. He further argues that ideologies become observable through discourses since it is only through discourse that they can be developed and presented explicitly.

Regarding its relation to discourse, Reisigl (2017: 88) maintains that ideologies are a crucial tool for creating and sustaining imbalances in power, and are maintained via discourse. In his view, ideologies are seen as biased worldviews among the members of a certain group. This worldview consists of the cognitive models, beliefs, attitudes, and judgments of these members. To sum up, language is the medium through which the system of beliefs of a certain group (i.e. its ideology) can be constructed and expressed (Van Dijk 1998). The justification and legitimization of these system beliefs can be best achieved through discourse.

3.6.3.3 Power

Power, in its social meaning, is defined by Watts (1991) as "the potentiality the individual possesses in a social activity and social setting for relative freedom of thought and action" (1991: 54). He explains that X exerts power over Y as X influences Y in a way that is opposed to Y's first recognized interests despite the fact that Y may subsequently decide to embrace the acceptability of X's conduct (ibid: 62). Furthermore, Moore and Hendry (1982: 127) give a straightforward description for the concept of power: "the force in society that gets things done, and by studying it, we can identify who controls what, and for whose benefit." Power can range from direct physical force to the use of various persuasive techniques and strategies to affect people's will, behavior and attitudes. This is confirmed by Julie Diamond who points out that power is not only the capacity to force a person to act against his choices, but it is also the capacity to make decisions,

understand circumstances and facts, and to have these decisions embraced by others (Diamond,1996:13).

Many scholars have investigated the relationship between discourse and power. The majority of them have found that power is practiced and maintained through language. For Foucault (1980: 18), power is a quality that is shared by individuals as well as groups, and this power is enacted through "discursive practices." Similarly, Fairclough (2001) links the use of language to power. He argues that via language people can express their self-images, beliefs, status, and ideologies whether in an explicit or implicit manner (ibid: 73)

Discourse is considered among the most significant means through which (unbalanced) power relations can be practiced. The German sociologist Max Weber (in Olsen et al., 2019: 37) argues that power or *Macht* is the potential that one individual within a social community will be capable of executing his own will in the face of opposition, despite the premise that underlies this potential. According to this view, governments and influential politicians as powerful agents in a society, for example, may avail themselves of the potential of mass media in circulating information to pass (and sometimes impose) their desired thoughts and wishes throughout their society.

In terms of discourse, power is practiced and maintained by language. It shapes our behavior in general and our language performance in particular (Foucault, 1982; Diamond, 1996; Fairclough, 2001). This view is also shared by Thomas et al (2004: 11) who argue that language is the medium through which power is frequently conveyed, obtained, and performed. Conversely, Reisigl (2017: 88) point out that language is not inherently powerful; rather, it is a tool used by those in positions of power to acquire and hold power.

Regarding the types of power held by discourse, Fairclough distinguishes two kinds of power: power in discourse and power behind discourse. The former is exercised in face-to-face communication whereas the latter is found in the discourse of mass media or writing in general. The two kinds differ in production and interpretation. Fairclough (2001: 49) states that "one-sidedness" is the most visible feature of media discourse or writing in general whereas in face-to-face interactions the participants can switch between producing and interpreting texts. As well, power in mass media discourse is exercised implicitly and is hidden. Nevertheless, Lahlali (2003: 77) argues that power is often hidden in discourses. He assumes that "powerful participants often restrict and control the contributions of those who are non-powerful."

Van Dijk (1993) uses Foucault's knowledge theory and links power to those who have knowledge. He divides people into two groups. A group that can speak because they produce knowledge and a group that has to listen because they consume knowledge. He calls the first group "the elite of discourse" because they have the right to access discourse. Therefore, they have dominance over those who consume knowledge. Lahlali (2003: 79) comments that the first group's power stems from the fact that they can dominate the minds and the perceptions of others due to the knowledge they possess. Van Dijk is one of the most prominent scholars who has investigated the relatedness of power to discourse. He considers discourse as a possible means of power abuse, especially when a powerful elite uses it to influence less powerful groups and when the powerful group gains more benefits from this control. He believes that those who govern discourse have the means to regulate the attitudes, opinions and minds of people.

In terms of politics, Kramarae et al. (1984:10) argue that the notion of power and politics are so closely related that sometimes they have synonymous uses both by people in their normal life and scholars in their academic writing. Also, politicians invest power in discourse by

manipulating the language they use to serve their political goals. I agree with Ruth Wodak's view point of politicians, as she describes them as "shapers of specific public opinions and interests and as seismographs, that reflect and react to the atmospheric anticipation of changes in public opinion and to the articulation of changing interests of specific social groups and affected parties" (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005: 32). This conception of the word politician entails acceptance of the idea that politicians have influence over public opinion. George Orwell in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* also drew the attention of his readers to the fact that governments and those in control take advantage of language to obtain approval and consent for the policies they wish to execute. This means that governments invest the power they have to serve their interests. For example, governments use their power to shape the national interest by staging media events, framing particular issues, and articulating their own viewpoints (Jackson, 2005:164). In addition, Danny Schechter in his book *Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror* points out that before September 11, George W Bush's competence and legitimacy were in question. However, after the attacks President Bush made powerful statements that increased his popularity and served his political goals in gaining national and international support in his so-called war on terror (Schechter, 2003).

Sornig (1989) contends that words can be used as instruments of power and deceit in the hands of politicians, not only to alter reality but also to regulate the outlook of interlocutors toward that reality. Therefore, the relationship between power and language needs to be investigated more closely. Atawneh (2009) argues that power is reflected in language. In his study on the kind of discourse used by the conflicting Israeli and Palestinian politicians, he argues "if you are in a position of strength, you may issue threats to gain your goals, but if not, an appeal may be your only strategy" (ibid: 263). He assumes that the more powerful party (the Israelis) use more threats in their language while the weaker party (the Palestinians) uses more appeals in their language.

Finally, power and politics cannot be separated, and language is essential for the practice of both. Power is reflected in the language, and analyzing the language of politics will reveal this power. This kind of analysis is at the heart of the research tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Regarding this, Janks (1997: 329) asserts that the type of analysis that aims at comprehending how discourse is connected to power relations is referred to as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). What distinguishes CDA is that proponents of this theory investigate the extra-contextual elements that lead to the production of manipulative discourse by politicians. This assertion leads us to the next point of discussion in this chapter, establishing the frameworks of CDA.

To wrap up this section, discourses are employed to legitimize or delegitimize power. This is explained by Reisigl (2017: 89) who asserts that texts are frequently areas of social conflict because they show signs of various ideological struggles, control, and dominance. Therefore, in this study, I focus on the ways in which linguistic forms are used to express and manipulate power that is discursively exercised via the use of, for example, specific discourse topics, as well as discursive and ideological strategies exercised by specific linguistic tools, such as the use of pronouns, figures of speech, euphemistic and derogatory forms. I will end this section with Van Dijk's assertion about the close relationship between discourse, ideology, and politics. Van Dijk (2006) argues that the study of discourse, politics, and ideology is one of the most interconnected fields in social sciences. Political cognition is inherently ideologically driven, political actions are almost entirely discursive, and political beliefs are essentially propagated through discourse.

3.6.4 CDA main Frameworks

According to Young and Harrison (2004), there are three key analytical approaches of study within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). One strand of research incorporates the

contributions of Norman Fairclough (1989 and 2013) and is strongly rooted in the domain of linguistic analysis. Another line of inquiry, in which van Dijk's research plays a pivotal role, is on the examination of "socio-cognitive aspects of analysis" as well as the "macro-structure of texts". The third component encompasses the research conducted by Wodak, whereby she uses a "discourse-historical approach" (Young and Harrison, 2004: 3-4). Fairclough, van Dijk, and Wodak are widely recognized as prominent scholars who have made significant contributions to the advancement of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Their works are often cited and acknowledged in critical studies that focus on the analysis of discourse. In this section I will restrict my discussion to Norman Fairclough's framework since the other two frameworks will be thoroughly discussed in chapter four.

Norman Fairclough introduced the three dimensional model of CDA. The main premise of his approach 'discourse as social practice' is to analyze texts beyond the textual boundaries and to show that there are social and ideological factors that affect text production. In his approach, he conceptualizes the word "text" as a product and the term "discourse" as a process, and shows that the text is just one part of this process (Fairclough 1989: 24). The aim of this approach is to examine the correlation among texts, processes, and social contexts, including both the immediate situational environment and the broader institutional and social contexts (ibid: 26). He proposes a three dimensional model in which he distinguishes between three processes that are interrelated, as seen in Figure 1. The following analysis is adopted from Fairclough (1992):

1. text analysis which "can be organized under four main headings: vocabulary,'grammar', 'cohesion', and 'text structure" (ibid: 75)

2. discursive practice analysis which "involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourses according to social factors" (ibid: 78)

3. Social practice analysis which involves discussing "discourse in relation to ideology and to power, and place discourse within a view of power as hegemony, and a view of the evolution of power relations as hegemonic struggle" (ibid: 86).



Figure (3.1): Fairclough's Three Dimensional Model (adopted from Fairclough (1992: 73))

The figure shown above illustrates that every discourse works within three dimensions: text that might be a written or spoken language, processes of production, the consumption of the text (discursive practice), and the social actions (social practice). The processes of text production and consumption constitute the mediation between the text itself and the social action. The analysis of discursive practice constitutes the study of the cultural, political and social framework in which the discourse takes place. Also, the interpretation process depends on the linguistic features of the text and its nature (Fairclough, 1989). According to the parameters of this model, Fairclough

(1992) suggests three stages or procedures to carry out a critical discourse analysis. These three stages are the description of the text, its interpretation, and its explanation.

In the description stage, the focus is on the linguistic features of discourse. According to Fairclough (1989:29), description "is the stage which is concerned with formal properties of the text." He maintains that in the description stage "analysis is generally thought of as a matter of identifying and 'labelling' formal features of a text in terms of the categories of a descriptive framework" (ibid). The second stage is interpretation. Fairclough (1989) argues that in this stage, the conventions of the text are identified depending on the interpreter's common sense assumptions, beliefs, and background knowledge; this is what Fairclough (1989) calls Member Resources (MR). He notes that interpretation is generated "through a combination of what is in the text and what is 'in' the interpreter in the sense of the members' resources (MR) which the latter brings to interpretation" (ibid: 141).

In this regard, Fairclough (1989) identifies two major domains of interpretation. These are the interpretation of the text and the interpretation of the context. The interpretation of the text includes four levels: the surface of the utterance, in which the interpreter transcribes the text into recognizable utterances on paper; the meaning of the utterance, in which the interpreter assigns meaning to the utterances; the local coherence in which the interpreter makes connections between utterances "producing (where feasible) coherent interpretations of pairs and sequences of them" (ibid: 143); and the text structure and point where the interpreter works out "how a text hangs together," such as identifying the type of the text (ibid). At each level interpreters draw upon a specific part of their MR; for example, they refer to their semantic knowledge in the second level of analysis.

On the other hand, the interpretation of the context includes interpretation of both the situational context and the intertextual context. The former includes specifying "the external cues," which consist of societal and institutional social orders which help the interpreter to determine the situation type. The latter includes identifying how the current discourse connects to the previous ones, which enables the interpreter to form a common experience (Fairclough 1989: 144-145). In this stage, Fairclough (1989) argues that the situational context is the most significant factor in determining how the interpretation will be enacted. He confirms that "a text is always interpreted with some context in mind" (ibid: 151).

The third stage is explanation. For this stage, the aim is to "portray a discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them" (Fairclough, 1989: 163). This stage seeks to show how social structures (in this case power relations) determine discourse, which in turn changes or sustains social structures. Fairclough (1989) maintains that at this stage discourse should be looked at as having social determinants and social effects which should be examined at three levels of "social organization." These levels of social organization are the societal level, the institutional level, and the situational level (ibid: 163).

To round it off, each stage in Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model has the aim of examining a specific issue in discourse. The first procedure is where description focuses on examining the linguistic features of discourse like vocabulary, code-switching, the use of figures of speech, repetition, the use of pronouns, derogatory expressions. and how they are utilized by speakers to maintain their power and ideologies. On the other hand, the other two stages,

interpretation and explanation, aim at investigating how common knowledge and the social and political situation affect the speakers' tendencies in using language or discourse.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has offered a comprehensive analysis of the body of literature that investigate (de)legitimization and Self/Other representation in political discourse in general and Arabic political discourse in particular in order to place the present study within the wider field of critical discourse analysis. As the present study seeks to examine the use of discursive and ideological strategies and discourse topics in legitimizing the Self and de-legitimizing the Other in the political discourse in the context of the Arab Spring, previous studies on ousted Arab leaders' political speeches have demonstrated that the angle through which the Self and the Other are ideologically, discursively, and thematically represented has been neglected by most of the analysists. The second part of this chapter has focused on discussing the theoretical foundation of this study, Critical Discourse Analysis. The main pillars of CDA, namely discourse, political discourse, power and ideology have been discussed as well. The review has shown that there is widespread agreement on the close connections between discourse, politics, power, and ideology. Discourse represents social life and ideologies. Discourse serves as a channel through which power is exercised and ideologies are revealed. At the same time this review of the literature has revealed the importance of ideology in political discourse. Furthermore, as this study aims at investigating how language is used in political discourse and the impact of these linguistic choices on audience's minds, the review has shown that there is little attention paid to the use of discursive, ideological strategies and specific themes in the Arabic political texts. Therefore, an explanation of the method selection will be discussed in the following chapter of this study. The literature has guided me to use a variety of research methodologies to accomplish its goals, which will be covered in more

details in the following chapter. With critical discourse analysis being selected as the wider methodological umbrella under which the study will be conducted, Reisigl's and Wodak (2009) Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and van Dijk's ideological square will be employed to answer the research questions.

Chapter Four-Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The present study assesses the de/legitimization of the Self/Other by analyzing the use of specific discourse topics (macro-strategies) and discursive and ideological strategies in the political speeches delivered during the Arab Spring uprisings by three ousted Arab leaders. This chapter explains the methodology and research design as well as the theoretical framework of the present study. Here, I also delve into the specifics of the data and its collection, and assess data validity and objectivity.

4.2 Research Strategies and Design

Henn et al. (2006:46) state that research design basically involves the systematic approach or method used to structure and guide the research process. In the same vein, Creswell (2017) explains that this strategy can cover the whole research process, including conceptualizing the problem, forming the questions of the research, gathering data, analyzing data, and the interpretations and comments that follow. As for the present study, the process of examining the political speeches of Arab leaders during a transition era like the Arab Spring makes it necessary to, first, comprehend the socio-political and historical backgrounds of the studied event (this step is accomplished in chapter two). The political speeches that were delivered during the period of the Arab Spring uprisings spanning from late 2010 to 2012 are viewed as a window through which ideologies can be traced and interpreted. This justifies the selection of the political speeches delivered during this era. Therefore, in the current study I mainly pose the question of how the Self and Other were represented in theses speeches through interpreting the ideological underpinnings of this representation. To do this, I specifically examine how this can be achieved through each of the discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies. Accordingly, the strategies

followed in this research include a textual analysis of the selected speeches which mainly focus on the lexical choices, contextualization and interpretation of these selections, and finally a comparative analysis in which the patterns of similarities and differences between the three leaders are addresses and interpreted. More will be addressed in the sections of data collection, theoretical frameworks, and data analysis.

In order to assess the efforts of the leaders in the Arab Spring to de/legitimize the Self/Other, I employ a qualitative research approach to text analysis. This type of research mainly aims at understanding the text as a social product and seeing what it reflects. This is congruent with Kucukali's (2015: 57-60) argument that in political research, researchers are primarily interested in the qualitative effects of the political decisions and acts, as well as the political realities that might be created in and through the political speeches of leaders, for example. As for linguists, they are empirically interested in how linguistic structures, and rhetorical devices and other linguistic techniques are discursively used to deliver political messages to their intended listeners in order to achieve specific goals (ibid). Similarly, Klenke (2016: 11) claims that analyzing speeches of leaders using a qualitative approach "adds value to the study of leadership" since it offers "an extended, detailed description of a phenomenon" which is only achieved by qualitative methods of studying discourse.

As discussed in the previous chapter, CDA views language as not merely a medium of communication but also a kind of social practice which is shaped by power relations (Fairclough, 1989). If we link this view to the main focus of political research that mainly examines how power is practiced and legitimized, this tells us much about why CDA's main focus is political discourse, and political speeches in particular (Chilton, 2004). In the reviewed CDA studies, there appears to be a variation in the employed methods of analysis between qualitative and quantitative research.

Some scholars tend to use quantitative methods, such as Bahaa-eddin (2007), Wang (2010), and Sharififar and Rahimi (2015), while others, such as Khajavi and Rasti (2020) and Trajkova and Neshkovska (2019) employ a qualitative method only. However, Ali and Khan (2021) provide one of the studies that uses both the quantitative and qualitative methods for analysis, but they do not offer explanations for the use of the quantitative methods.

As for the present study, I integrate quantitative analysis at some points where I feel it is useful to support the findings of the qualitative analysis, as will be further explained in section 4.5 below. Regarding this method, Jensen (2002) argues that, as they complement one another, a methodology that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses yields better study results. As well, many CDA researchers emphasize how crucial it is to support qualitative research with quantitative analysis. Furthermore, Creswell (2017) maintains that it has become more common for social scientists to combine qualitative and quantitative research techniques, enabling them to use multidimensional approaches. I have already noted that in some previous critical analytical studies, where scholars support their qualitative results with some quantitative results, they have come to more accurate and convincing findings. This is notable in the studies of Maalej (2012, 2013) especially when tackling the shift in the frequency of the use of certain pronouns between the early and the late stages of the uprisings. Also, scholars such as Baker (2010) argue that including quantitative analysis in a study of ideological discourse is beneficial since it enhances and strengthens qualitative analysis rather than disregarding or substituting it. In the same vein, Haider (2019: 553) asserts that adopting quantitative analysis within a qualitative study offers the chance to have "generalizable descriptions of the investigated data" which are needed at some points in order to provide a comparatively larger distance between the analyst and the examined data to avoid bias.

To summarize, although the study's main focus is qualitative, quantitative approaches are appropriate at some points in analyzing Arab leaders' speeches because these approaches enable the interpretation of the systematic and frequent language use in these speeches. In this context, it is possible to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies in a critical analysis to identify the discourse topics, discursive and ideological strategies in addition to the linguistic devices that represent each strategy in the examined speeches.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is utilized as the wider theoretical umbrella under which the analysis in the current study is done, as discussed in the previous chapter. The theoretical framework of this study is designed to explain the intricacies of the processes of legitimization and de-legitimization in the political speeches delivered during the Arab Spring through the use of discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies. The analytical framework employed in this study is a combination of two critical discourse analysis approaches, namely Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) Discourse-Historical Approach and van Dijk's Ideological Square. First, when discourse analysts employ DHA, they have to view discourse as a "multi-faceted phenomenon" and examine discourse in light of the texts itself, as well as the extra-linguistic variables and the deeper socio-political and historical contexts. DHA focuses on two dimensions of textual analysis including macro-strategies (how discourse topics are used to represent the Self/Other), and discursive strategies (how social actors in discourse are nominated, predicated, and intensified/mitigated through language use). Second, the socio-cognitive approach (within which the ideological square is included) views discourse as a platform in which groups and intergroup interaction are formed and maintained. Accordingly, van Dijk (1998: 267) suggests that the Self and Other are polarized in discourse via four key ideological moves: emphasizing the

positivity of the Self and the negativity of the Other, and de-emphasizing the negativity of the Self and the positivity of the Other.

My rationale for selecting these two approaches is as follows. To start with, the approach developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) presents a contemporary theory in the analysis of political discourse. Secondly, the ideological square theory developed by van Dijk (1998) is mostly used by studies focusing on ideological discourse. Both political and ideological analyses are necessary to achieve the objectives of this study, because together they allow for a complete picture of these speeches. Thirdly, both approaches are closely associated with discursive strategies and legitimization instruments that pertain to sociolinguistic components of how social actors are socially included/excluded through discourse. Furthermore, bringing these two approaches together in one study results in a comprehensive analysis of the examined political speeches since both the macro and micro levels are covered in this analysis. This is ensured by the fact that Reisigl's and Wodak (2001, 2009) approach introduces tools for analyzing the discourse topics (and then macro-strategies) which constitute the macro level of the political speeches, while van Dijk's ideological square offers tools for analyzing the micro legitimating instruments through examining the employment of the two key strategies of positive presentation of the Self and negative presentation of the Other and their relevant ideological strategies and linguistic realizations. These factors make the approaches well-suited to illustrating the ideology of the three leaders.

4.3.1 Discourse historical approach by Ruth Wodak (2001, 2009)

Discourse-historical approach (DHA) views language use as a societal activity that is strongly influenced by historical context, power dynamics, and belief systems. In addition to its emphasis on the importance of the contextual understanding that is necessary for conducting this study, what

makes DHA ideal for the current study is the fact that it also offers two important tools for textual understanding of discourse, namely the investigation of discourse topics (and then macro-strategies) and the examination of discursive strategies. However, two words in this approach need to be clarified: *historical* and *discourse*. These two words constitute the core of discussion in this section.

Firstly, the use of the term *historical* imparts distinctiveness to DHA. According to Wodak (2001), the historical aspect of this approach lies in its examination of extra-linguistic social and sociological factors, the historical development of an organization or institution, and the circumstances in which it occurs. Hence, the core premise of DHA is that "the study of (oral, written, visual) language necessarily remains only a part of the whole enterprise – hence, the research must be interdisciplinary" (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 89). This suggests that when scholars employ DHA, they explore "multifaceted phenomena" in their societies (ibid: 89). Based on that, the analysis in this framework takes into account four main dimensions of context:

- the immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse
- the intertextual and inter-discursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses
- the extra-linguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation'
- the broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 93)

A comprehensive understanding of the context is already presented in chapter two.

Second, the discourse-historical approach views discourse as a sort of social practice (Wodak, 2001). Wodak (2001) also supports the suggestion that a dialectical relationship exists

between discourse and fields of action. She maintains that one aspect to consider is how situational, institutional, and social contexts play a significant role in shaping and influencing discourses. Conversely, discourses also have the ability to impact both discursive and non-discursive social and political processes and activities. In simple terms, discourses, understood as "linguistic social practices", may be thought of as shaping both non-discursive and discursive social practices, while also being shaped by them (Wodak, 2001: 66). Furthermore, Reisigl and Wodak's model describes discourse "as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as "texts", that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres." Therefore, discourse is viewed in this approach as "context-dependent" and "socially constituted and socially constitutive" (ibid). This offers significance to context as well as text for the interpretation process to be completed.

Depending on this view of discourse, in terms of textual analysis, Wodak et al. (2022) focus on two dimensions of textual analysis, namely macro-strategies and discursive strategies. Before discussing these two types of strategies I want to elaborate on what strategy means in the DHA framework. In this study, I follow Reisigl and Wodak's (2009) definition of strategy, which they see as a set of actions intended to achieve a particular goal. In defining strategy, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 32) draw on Bourdieu's conception of strategy and argue that "strategic action is oriented towards a goal but not necessarily planned to the last detail or strictly instrumentalist; strategies can also be applied automatically." Reisigl and Wodak (2001:44) offer a similar definition of strategy as "a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan." A linguistic, political, or social goal is intended to be achieved by this plan. Commenting on this, Khosravinik (2015: 107) explains that these strategies are "located at different levels of linguistic organization."

In terms of macro-strategies that are relevant to the main discourse topics tackled in any discourse, four kinds of macro-strategies are identified. Firstly, constructive strategies are used to construct and establish "a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation". Secondly, perpetuating strategies "attempt to maintain and to reproduce a threatened national identity i.e., to preserve, support and protect it." Thirdly, justification strategies are "employed primarily in relation to problematical actions or events in the past which are important in the narrative creation of national history." Fourthly, strategies of transformation are employed "to transform a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity the contours of which the speaker has already conceptualized." Finally, destructive strategies "aim at dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct" (Wodak et al., 2009: 33). As we will see when analyzing the main discourse topics in the examined political speeches, the three leaders implicitly employ these strategies through addressing certain discourse topics. For example, the three leaders tend to employ the topic of accusing the protestors of the chaos and the violence that happened in their countries as a destructive macro-strategy, or defending their own records and listing their sacrifices as construction macro-strategies.

In terms of discursive strategies, when investigating language use in any type of discourse, DHA poses five questions that guide its analysis of the dialectical link between speech and situational, institutional, and social and historical circumstances. Each of these questions is parallel to a certain discursive strategy that constitutes the guideline for the second stage of analysis in the current study. The following figure (4.1) shows each strategy and its related question.



Figure 4.1: Discursive Strategies and its Related Questions in Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) DHA approach

To trace the use of these strategies, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) list many linguistic devices through which these strategies are realized in the examined texts. The present study will focus on the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation in the examined political speeches (this selection will be justified in section 4.7). In nomination strategy, the focus will be on tracing the use of nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases as they are mostly used by the three leaders to denote/refer to the social actors and their acts in the examined texts. Regarding the predication strategy, the use of adjectives is primarily traced to isolate the various attributes contextually associated with the intended social actors, especially the protestors, the government's supporters, and the external powers. Finally, in the intensification/mitigation strategy my focus will be on how the messages of the speakers are either intensified through repetition, quasi synonymous words and expressions, or mitigated through the use of derogatory

terms like the use of animals names, metaphors, and words to lessen and underestimate the acts of the Self or the Other.

Exploiting these two aspects of textual analysis of discourse (i.e. the investigation of macro strategies and discursive strategies), I hypothesize that the three ousted Arab leaders during the Arab Spring used these two strategies to positively construct the Self and negatively construct the Other. It has to be noted that, in the context of the political speeches of the Arab Spring, the Self may refer to the leaders, their governments, and/or their supporters either from their people, allying countries, and supporting media channels. On the other hand, the Other may refer to the protestors, some western countries and even Arab countries, and opposing media channels. The practice of positively/negatively presenting the Self/Other entails the intentional employment of language either through certain discourse topics, or the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation. The positive construction of the Self may include highlighting the qualities, accomplishments, or moral superiority of the in-group members over the out-group members. This can fulfil a multitude of purposes, including but not limited to legitimizing the leaders' authority, garnering the support or sympathy of the local and national communities, bolstering their credibility, and promoting their in-group cohesion. On the other hand, the negative construction of the Other may include demonization or dehumanization of the protestors, some media channels, and western and some Arab countries, and the de-moralization of the Other. This can serve the purposes of undermining the legitimacy of the opponents, rationalizing aggressiveness, and maintaining existing power imbalances.

4.3.2 Socio-cognitive Approach Van Dijk's Ideological Square

The second CDA approach that will be adopted in this study is van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, or the ideological square. Regarding his view of CDA, van Dijk views critical discourse

analysis from a socio-cognitive perspective. This perspective assumes that social structures must be understood and represented through cognition, and these mental representations have an impact on the cognitive processes necessary for creating and interpreting discourse. The opposite relationship is also true where discourse can influence social structure by making language users perceive themselves as social actors (van Dijk, 2014: 1-2).

In van Dijk's ideological square, three dimensions are considered: society, discourse, and cognition (ideology) (van Dijk, 1998, 2001, 2006). Discourse analysis serves to interpret the linguistic aspect. On the other hand, the discourse analysis is accompanied by an analysis of the social context. Cognition, defined as "the mental processes of production and comprehension of speech" (van Dijk, 23006a: 160) mediates between society and discourse and helps figure out the relationship between discourse and society. Accordingly, van Dijk confirms that social structures and discourse structures do not directly relate to one another since producing discourse, comprehending it, and using it are all controlled by participants' mental representations (van Dijk 2014: p17). That is, without giving thought to the "mental representations" that include both socially shared representations and the personal experiences of individuals, one cannot better understand the macro-level notions like dominance and power, and the micro-level notions like discourse. To conclude, van Dijk examines the relationship between discourse and social structure through cognition and this is what distinguishes his framework from both Fairclough's and Reisigl and Wodak's frameworks.

van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach considers three forms of social representations or beliefs which include "firstly knowledge (personal, group, cultural), secondly attitudes (not in the socio-psychological understanding), and thirdly ideologies" (Meyer, 2001: 21). Our focus here is on the third component, which is ideology, because it occupies an essential place in the socio-

cognitive approach of van Dijk. Referring to this approach, the present study views the examined political speeches as inherently ideological because I hypothesize the existence of "positive Self-representation" and "negative Other-representation" in the examined data. At this point I can refer to van Dijk's definition of ideology mentioned in the previous chapter as "political or social systems of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, and that have the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group" (van Dijk, 1998: 3). To van Dijk, discourse analysis is constituted by ideological analysis since "any property of discourse that expresses, establishes, confirms or emphasizes a self-interested group opinion, perspective or position, especially in a broader socio-political context of social struggle, is a candidate for special attention in such an ideological analysis" (van Dijk, 2005:22–23).

Ideologies are constructed, expressed, and even reproduced through discourse on one hand, and on the other hand, ideologies border on all structures of discourse (written and spoken). The dominant powers that control discourse express their ideologies explicitly or implicitly in the structure of discourse (van Dijk, 2000a). Consequently, any kind of critical discourse analysis needs to be approached through the understanding of "ideological structures" exercised via discourse (van Dijk, 2000a)). Therefore, van Dijk introduces the concept of the Ideological Square. van Dijk argues that people "engage in intergroup discourse for reasons of self-presentation, self-defense, legitimation, persuasion, recruiting, and so on" (van Dijk, 1998:125). As a result, discourse serves as a platform for processes that aid in the formation and maintenance of groups as well as intergroup interaction. This discourse is often polarized between the Self versus the Other dichotomy and the aim of the ideological square is to make this dichotomy transparent. According to van Dijk (1998: 267), the ideological square consists of four main moves as shown in Figure (4.2) below:



Figure (4.2): van Dijk's (1998) Ideological Square

These four key strategies or ideological moves may happen in any discourse. van Dijk (1998: 267) explains that these moves happen "for obvious contextual reasons" that are related to the constraint of "contextual relevance." The speakers/writers select the information that serve their goals in positively presenting the Self and negatively presenting the Other (van Dijk, 2009: 267). He continues "whenever a meaning is associated with good things, it will tend to be associated with the in-group of the speaker, and all structural properties of the discourse may be brought to bear to emphasize such meanings. And the opposite will be the case for Others, Opponents, or Enemies" (van Dijk 2006b: 734). This polarization of Us and Them is reflected in all aspects of text. To achieve the aim of the ideological square in making this dichotomy between the self and the other transparent, van Dijk (2006) suggests a number of strategies or techniques through which writers/speakers express and reproduce ideologies. van Dijk (2006b) lists some of the most utilized

strategies that politicians use in their discourse to defend their ideologies and legitimize their actions. I refer to the elaborations of some scholars for some strategies. These strategies include:

1. Authorization: This strategy is achieved via mentioning the sources of authority such as organizations, people, constitution, or law. These sources of authorities are cited in discourse to support the speaker's case either to positively present the Self or negatively present the Other (ibid).

2. Comparison: To achieve this dichotomy represented by the ideological square, speakers in discourse usually tend to compare in-group members and out-group members. van Dijk (2005) maintains that in political speeches "out-groups are compared negatively, and in-groups positively" (ibid: 735). The purpose of these comparisons is to emphasize the bad things of the Other.

3. Euphemism: van Dijk defines euphemism as "a semantic move of mitigation" (ibid: 736). This mitigation of meaning is to avoid direct negative opinions about the Self and "may be explained both in ideological terms (in-group protection) as well as in contextual terms, e.g., as part of politeness conditions or other interactional rules" (ibid: 736).

4. Example/ Illustration: An effective strategy in argumentation is to provide specific instances, commonly in a form of a brief narrative, that demonstrate or enhance the credibility of a broader point advocated by the speaker. Concrete narratives are often more easily retained than abstract arguments and possess a greater emotional resonance, thereby making them more convincing in terms of argumentation (ibid: 737)

5. Metaphor: In political discourse, metaphors are mainly used to make the "abstract, complex, unfamiliar, new, or emotional meanings" more familiar and concrete. They are considered as the most persuasive semantic-rhetorical figures (ibid: 738). As a sub-category of metaphor,

personification can be defined as a literary device that describes a word by using another term that, in another context, would be a word that defines a person (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

6. Polarization Us/Them: Using this strategy, politicians in their speeches tend to divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Van Dijk maintains that this polarization is often intensified by rhetorical means by presenting a distinct contrast, wherein characteristics of Us and Them are attributed as lexical items that have opposite meanings (van Dijk, 2006: 738).

7. Victimization: Given that discourses are mostly shaped by the Us and Them dichotomy, politicians often highlight the negative aspects of Them by recounting unpleasant narratives about the Other and illustrating how these actions impact the Self (ibid: 739).

8. Moral evaluation or moral justification: Through this strategy, the speakers in political speeches construct moral standards of right and wrong that serve specific purposes. These values of right and wrong are used to create moral justification for certain actions the speakers intend to do or ask their addressees to do (Al-Rikaby, 2018).

9. Blame attribution: In this strategy groups or members are constructed as responsible for certain bad acts or behaviors. This strategy provides the addressees with fake explanations for the acts articulated in discourse as with the intention of negative presentation of the Other (Angouri and Wodak, 2014).

10. Narrativization: In narrativization, "traditions and stories which recount the past are presented as if part of a timeless and cherished tradition" (Thompson, 1990: 61) . Furthermore, according to Thompson, these traditions might be made up in an effort to forge a sense of community and connection to a past that goes beyond conflict, difference, and separation (Ferguson et al., 2009).

One or more strategies can be used in discourse to achieve one of the four ideological moves suggested by van Dijk in the ideological square theory. That is, these strategies are all

targeted to defend and account for the ideas and the social practices of the Self and to highlight and emphasize the bad nature of the Other. By tracing these strategies, my analysis in this study aims to investigate possible covert ideological moves.

Concluding Remarks on the Two Approaches

Although DHA is similar to other CDA approaches regarding the analysis of power, ideology, and discourse structure, such as Fairclough's three dimensional approach, it distinguishes itself within the greater domain of CDA by focusing and emphasizing the historical contexts as a cornerstone of the analysis process (Meyer, 2001). More interestingly, DHA frequently prioritizes the examination of the historical formation and propagation of ideologies, describing their evolution and various forms throughout history, as was thoroughly investigated in chapter 2. As for the ideological square theory by van Dijk (1998), although it aims at exposing power dynamics and ideological biases in discourse as other CDA approaches, it distinguishes itself as a unique approach within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis through its emphasis on the strategic utilization of language by investigating the ideological stance adopted by various social groups. This is achieved by identifying which ideological strategy the speaker adopts to frame the listener (Meyer, 2001).

To sum up, the current study employs Reisigl and Wodak's approach to answer the first two questions, namely: What are the main discourse topics that the three ousted Arab Spring leaders use to legitimize the Self and delegitimize the Other in their political speeches? How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders discursively legitimize the Self and delegitimize the Other in their political speeches? DHA offers tools for analyzing both the discourse topics and discursive strategies and shows how these two aspects of discourse are manipulated to positively present the

Self and negatively present the other. Finally, I will use van Dijk's theory of the ideological square to answer the third question: How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders ideologically represent the Self and the Other in their political speeches? The thorough ideological interpretation of the linguistic choices and the perspective from which the speaker (a political leader in this case) wants to convey a certain ideological message is offered within the framework of the ideological square. For example, when I say that Ben Ali used the victimization ideological strategy to negatively present the protestors and the allegedly unjustified demonstrations, he deliberately used a specific linguistic choice from the perspective of a victim rather than an authority. By employing this theory and tracing the ideological strategies suggested by van Dijk (2006), the ideological manifestations in the examined data will be uncovered and explained.

4.4 Data Collection

As the present study aims at identifying the discourse topics (then macro-strategies), ideological and discursive strategies employed by the three ousted Arab leaders in their political speeches during the Arab Spring uprisings, the data of the study will be all of the political speeches delivered by Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi after the outbreak of the uprisings in 2010/2011; there are three speeches by Mubarak, President of Egypt, three speeches by Ben Ali, President of Tunisia, and one speech by al Qaddafi, President of Libya. This study is concerned with analyzing the content of these speeches, so it is limited to examining the selected speeches as written texts rather than spoken, emphasizing their textual and semantic components over paralinguistic features such as tone, intonation, or delivery style. By considering these speeches in their written form, the study highlights the carefully crafted language choices, discursive, and ideological strategies that reflect the leaders' intentions and ideological underpinnings.

Regarding collecting data in CDA studies, most critical discourse analysts claim that there is no one-size-fits-all CDA approach for collecting and selecting discourse data (Meyer, 2001 and Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Similarly, al-Shaibani (2011) claims that there is no single method of collecting data that is considered standard in CDA. As for the two CDA approaches employed in this study, the socio-cognitive approach of Van Dijk and the discourse-historical approach of Reisigl and Wodak, both mostly rely on texts and political speeches that are extracted from online websites, media, news articles and other electronic journal publications.

In relation to my study, the data was collected in the following ways. First, the selection compromises all of the political speeches that were delivered by these three leaders during the Arab Spring uprisings. Also, they were chosen because they represent a very critical period in the Arab and even world politics. The seven speeches have similar characteristics and initially had a collective aim, namely, to engage in communication with the respective nations during a difficult time, to suppress acts of violence, and to quell the uprisings. It is essential to emphasize that all three presidents desired to maintain power and to exercise control over their respective nations. Each of the speeches had a pivotal role in determining the trajectory of the revolutions in the three nations. Furthermore, these speeches represent the last efforts of these presidents to convince the populace to halt the uprisings prior to their removal from power. Although considered repetitive by a large percentage of the population, these speeches had both negative and positive impacts on people and attracted global media coverage (Maalej, 2012). Finally, I selected these speeches by considering the importance of the similarities and differences in the subjects and issues discussed, such as civil war, foreign intervention, and the turbulent circumstances experienced by the three countries. Investigating the political discourse in this critical period gives insights into how social, historical, and political events affect the way leaders talk to their people. The present study

hypothesizes that the dramatic social and political change that accompanied the Arab Springs deeply affected the way these leaders used language.

The second step was transcribing the speeches. As the language of the original texts is in Arabic, a verified translation of the speeches was selected from different verified sources for the sake of making the speeches readable and clear for the readers. For Ben Ali's speeches, I received the permission from Zouhair Maalej (who is a Tunisian linguist) to use his translation for Ben Ali's three speeches. For Mubarak's speeches, I use both the Guardian and BBC's translations ("Hosni Mubarak's Speech", 2011 and "Egypt unrest: Full text of Hosni Mubarak's speech," 2011). Finally, for al Qaddafi's speech I got the permission from the Kuwaiti linguist Assmaa AlDuhaim to use her translation (see Appendix A). In this study, I will analyze the Arabic version of the speeches as written texts and the English translations are only provided for readability purposes for English speakers. Table (1) shows the number of speeches of each leader, the word count and the length of each speech. I used Microsoft Word to count the words in each transcribed speech to determine the average word length of the texts I am analyzing The full texts for the examined speeches along with their translations are available in Appendix A.

Table (4.1): Number of Speeches of Each Leader

President	**No. of Speeches**	**Word Counts**	**Speech Length**	**Date of Delivery**
Mubarak	3	Speech1: 1266	12 minutes	28. Jan. 2011
		Speech2:1113	11 minutes	1.Feb. 2011
		Speech3:1952	17 minutes	10.Feb. 2011
Ben Ali	3	Speech4: 851	7 minutes	28.Dec. 2010
		Speech5:1474	13 minutes	10. Jan. 2011
		Speech6:1190	9 minutes	13. Jan. 2011
al Qaddafi	1	Speech7: 7535	75 minutes	22. Feb. 2011
Total	7	15381 words	144 minutes	

The above table shows that the total number of the speeches examined is seven speeches with a total of 15381 words. Each of Ben Ali and Mubarak gave three speeches during the uprisings in their country, whereas al Qaddafi gave one official speech during the Libyan uprising, while the rest of his appearances (not discussed here) during these events were quick interviews and recorded phone calls with media. The total length of the seven speeches is 144 minutes, with al Qaddafi's speech taking more than 50% of the seven speeches' length altogether.

4.5 Stages of Analyzing the Data

In CDA, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to data analysis procedures (Meyer, 2001, Reisigl, 2009). The present study is mainly a qualitative study that relies on providing a close reading of all seven political speeches and a close re-reading of certain pieces in the political speeches that are relevant to the subject that is being investigated in each stage of the analysis. This has enabled me to accomplish a comprehensive analysis and thorough explanation. However, in some points of the analysis, I rely on quantitative analysis. For instance, I relied on counting the frequencies of some lexical items, especially when discussing the use of some pronouns and repeated words in the political speeches. For example, the times some leaders used the pronouns I and We in comparison to the pronouns You or They will be counted. The frequencies of some repeated words, expressions, or sentences in each speech are counted too. I interpret the results to show how each president took advantage of or was disadvantaged by these instruments of language. Furthermore, this quantitative analysis lays the groundwork for a thorough linguistic analysis of the speeches, as well as for highlighting specific characteristics that I then investigate in the qualitative analysis. The significance of examining certain linguistic devices' occurrences addresses the motives of the speakers (the leaders) in communicating their actual meanings. The qualitative approach seeks to provide a way of analyzing beyond the literal meaning of the words and establishing the motives

of their users. After the data collection is presented, I trace the use of each type of strategy, including the identification of the main discourse topics and classifying them into macro-strategies, discussing the use of discursive strategies, and finally showing the use of ideological strategies in line with van Dijk's ideological square as outlined in Figure (4.3) below.



Figure 4.3: Stages of Analyzing the Data

As shown in Figure (4.3), the objective of this stage is to identify the discourse topics addressed in the political speeches of the three leaders. Identifying discourse topics can facilitate the understanding of how leaders use certain themes (or arguments) in their speeches to achieve positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009) use discourse topics or "macro topics" to illustrate the general content in any kind of discourse. Their methodology states that the initial phase of a critical analysis should begin with an investigation of the text's overall discourse topics or what they call "macro-propositions". After identifying the main discourse topics in each speech, I refer to the macro-strategies suggested by Wodak et al. (2009) to identify the function of each discourse topic (construction, perpetuating, justification, transformation, or destruction), and this will facilitate the task of deciding whether these strategies are used to legitimize the Self or to de-legitimize the Other. I apply this bottom-up process to all speeches examined in this study. For example, the discourse topic of "the democratic state" that is tackled by all three leaders falls under the macro-strategy of construction since it is intended to convey a message of acceptance and solidarity, whereas the discourse topic of "the negative impacts of the protests on the country's security and stability" which is also tackled by all the three leaders falls under the macro-strategy of destruction because it is intended to demonize the protestors and ultimately to de-legitimize their demands. Finally, comparisons will be held to figure out if the leaders' speeches are either mostly constructive, destructive, transformational, or perpetuating depending on the discourse topics they tackle in their political speeches.

Stage Two- Analysis of Discursive Strategies

In the second stage of the analysis, I selected three discursive strategies of Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) approach, which consists of five discursive strategies: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and intensification/mitigation strategy. I chose to exclude the strategies of argumentation and perspectivization (framing) from analysis at this stage for two reasons. First, regarding the exclusion of the argumentation strategy, I relied on Reisigl and Wodak's perspective concerning the term "argument" and how they define it. In their definition of *Topoi*, which is translated as topics or lines of arguments according to Khosravinik (2015), Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 74-75) state that topics are "parts of argumentation schema". Therefore, the aspect of argumentation in each political speech will be tackled in the first stage of analysis, that is the main discourse topics identification stage, because when I discuss the main discourse topics in each political speech I am actually discussing the main arguments that each president uses to convince the audience of their political views. Second, perspectivization means presenting persons or acts from a specific perspective to influence how the addressees perceive information (ibid). Actually, this concept is also discussed in another stage of this study (stage three). For example, when I say that a leader used the self-victimization ideological strategy, he presented himself as a victim, or as a source of authority as in authorization ideological strategy. Therefore, the three discursive strategies that will be traced at this stage are nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation as figure (4.2) illustrates.

First, the referential/ nomination strategy is used by speakers to represent social actors either as in-group members or out-group members. To figure out how this strategy is used by each political leader in each of his speeches to de/legitimize the Self/Other, I trace and manually count all the nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases that are used to denote persons and their actions in each speech. Then, I divide these linguistic items into two groups: the linguistic items

that are used to positively construct the Self and the linguistic items that are used to negatively construct the Other. This step will help in identifying the social actors, or individuals and groups.

Second, the predication discursive strategy helps in identifying how the social actors are linguistically "predicated" with evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits (in the form of adjectives). Therefore, I trace and manually count all the adjectives that are used to positively construct the Self and negatively construct the Other. Then, I discuss the functions of this use and the purpose of the speaker of this use depending on the relevant context of the political speech.

Third, I trace the use of the strategy of intensification/mitigation. This strategy is employed to "heighten or blunt the force of certain statement". Reisigl & Wodak (2005) contend that politicians use this strategy linguistically to "qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by sharpening it or toning it down" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2005: 45). This strategy can be traced in a given speech by identifying the extent to which a proposition is uttered either to intensify the meaning or to mitigate it. I choose to trace the use of over-lexicalization (through repetition and quasi-synonymous words), metaphor, and in some cases cognate object as linguistic devices of intensification. As for mitigation, I sometimes discuss the use of euphemistic expressions and derogatory words as techniques for mitigation.

Stage Three- Analysis of Ideological Strategies

In the third stage, I employ van Dijk's (1998) ideological square theory. In this stage of analysis, I hypothesize that two major ideological techniques exist in each of the examined political speeches. These are the social inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other as they are frequently conceived in terms of oppositions of Us and Them. This opposition is achieved by the leaders by investing cultural, social and ideological elements in their speeches. Simply put, van Dijk's premise is mainly employed to address this dichotomy of Us and Them in order to uncover

the ideological representations each leader uses to emphasize the positive aspects of his group and the negative attributes of the out-group. van Dijk's ideological square (1998) assumes that the Self is socially included and the Other is socially excluded via four ideological moves namely "1- emphasizing information that is positive about Us, 2- emphasizing information that is negative about Them, 3- de-emphasizing information that is positive about Them, 4- de-emphasizing information that is negative about Us" (van Dijk 1998: 267). In addition, van Dijk (1998) suggests a number of strategies through which these ideological moves can be achieved. The purpose of this stage is to figure out which of these strategies the three leaders use to achieve the four ideological moves in each political speech and how they are used. Also, the specific function of each strategy will be discussed in relation to its context. These strategies are illustrated in Figure (4.2) above. As a final step in each stage, the general tendencies, and the similarities and differences between the leaders' use of discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies is identified and discussed.

4.6 Validity and Objectivity (Trustworthiness)

The validity of the present study is ensured by thick description (rich and contextualized description of an event (Freeman, 2014)) provided at all stages of the study. Thick description contributes to the validity of the current study in terms of contextual understanding, methodological transparency, and rich data interpretation. The nature of the present study (as a qualitative study) necessitates the reliance on thick description as a criterion of ensuring the validity of this study. According to Li (2004), one of the suggested safeguards for the trustworthiness of the qualitative research is thick description. He argues that the provision of descriptive data related to the context and methodology facilitates assessments regarding the validity of qualitative research.

The necessary context of the present study, including the political, historical, and social background information of the Arab Spring is extensively discussed in the second chapter of this study. The thorough discussion of the studied event in the current study helps the reader to understand both the environments in which the examined political speeches took place and how those spaces may have influenced the findings. On the other hand, the detailed descriptions of the historical, political, and social context surrounding the Arab Spring and the delivered political speeches help the researcher to better understand how these factors influenced the observed discursive tendencies in the examined political speeches. For example, when I discuss certain expressions that have religious connotations in al Qaddafi′s speech, for example, I certainly interpret this usage within the context of the status of Islamic movements in Libya during al Qaddafi′s reign. Consequently, the thick description of the Arab Spring generates rich and detailed data that I can use to uncover the underlying meanings of using specific discourse themes, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies in each of the examined political speeches in this study.

The detailed description of the research method, including data collection techniques, data analysis procedures and their different stages, enhances the transparency of the current study. Therefore, readers can evaluate the appropriateness of the methods used, which adds to the credibility of the findings. For example, the analytical procedures followed in this study are thoroughly discussed, starting with investigating the general content of the examined political speeches, the discursive strategies on word and sentence level, ending with the ideological strategies used in these speeches.

Third, and most importantly, the trustworthiness of the present study is ensured by the rich data interpretation which will be provided in the following chapter. Drawing on specific examples

and quotations to support my argument, I provide nuanced interpretations of the data. This is achieved by the multi-layered analysis of each political speech and discussing the linguistic realization of how the Self and Other are de/legitimized. For example, the close reading of each political speech and keeping an eye on the discourse topics to discuss the main arguments in each speech helps in interpreting the implicit goals behind the use of this specific discourse topic. This will ultimately show whether this discourse topic is used to legitimize the Self or to de-legitimize the Other. Furthermore, as in chapter 8, the findings will be accounted for by reference to the socio-political and historical backgrounds (that have been discussed in chapter 3). This will make the arguments made in this study more relatable and will strengthen the significance of the findings. Therefore, connecting micro-level linguistic and discursive analysis of the selected cases (the examined political speeches) to macro-level socio-political and historical contexts will show why the findings matter within the field and beyond, and this will be achieved when discussing the findings in chapter 8.

Finally, the fact that this study analyzes data from different viewpoints in order to achieve consistent outcomes is close to what Reisigl and Wodak (2001) state about triangulation. They argue that by adhering to triangulation, which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of CDA, critical discourse analysts can reduce the possibility of bias and prevent politicizing their work. Specifically, the discourse-historical approach incorporates as much information as possible while examining texts to avoid bias (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35). To ensure validity, the current study adheres to the strategy of triangulation by incorporating background information from different point of views such as the suggestion that the political history of the Arab region and the Middle East may have directly influenced and led to the Arab Spring, the social and economic situation in the affected countries, and international politics. Furthermore, the dynamics of the political

speeches themselves are the other source of information that demonstrate the raw data of the current study.

Chapter Five-Analysis of Discourse Topics in the Political Speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi

5.1 Introduction

The discourse topics in the texts of seven political speeches delivered by the ex-presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, and al Qaddafi of Libya during the Arab Spring will be analyzed and discussed in this chapter, where I am concerned with the first stage of analyzing the political speeches of the three leaders. I will examine the content of the speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi as written texts by identifying the main discourse topics in each speech. Then, these discourse topics will be classified according to Wodak et. al.'s (2009) macro-strategies, namely whether they are constructive, perpetuating, justification, transformation, and/or destructive. The identification of discourse topics will help in revealing how positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation are achieved through particular themes which the leaders choose to address in their speeches. It uncovers how the ousted Arab leaders attempted to manipulate the minds of their people through highlighting certain topics rather than others during the uprisings. Also, as I noticed when analyzing the speeches, in critical and crisis times like the Arab Spring uprisings, leaders may practice de/legitimization of the Self/Other such as, but not limited to, highlighting the Self's success or undermining the Other's credibility. In this chapter, for each political speech there is a table that shows the identified main discourse topics and the classification of each discourse topic to a specific macro-strategy (constructive, justification, perpetuating, transformation, and destructive).

5.2 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Ben Ali's Speech 1

President Ben Ali gave his first speech after the uprisings in his country on the 28th of December, 2010. It was the first official response to the popular protests. This speech was delivered after 12 days of protests in Tunisia's cities, which resulted in deaths, injuries, and property destruction. The

speech was aired on the official channel *Tunisia 7* and lasted for seven minutes. Ben Ali gave his speech in Modern Standard Arabic. He was sitting down, calm, and confident. Tunisians have long believed that President Ben Ali's use of Modern Standard Arabic impeded genuine dialogue with him. This is emphasized by the argument of both Lahlali (2011) and Bassiouney (2009) who assert that Ben Ali's use of the standard was always to emphasize his role as a president. I think his speech primarily targeted those who opposed him, as he aimed to create a sense of separation from those demonstrators in order to demonstrate his disapproval of their actions. Furthermore, the sentences in the speech are fairly lengthy and complex. The president condemned the "riots" and he mainly tackled the factors that he thought sparked the Tunisian revolt, such as unemployment, economic development, education, political participation and freedom. Table (5.1) below briefly provides the main discourse topics addressed in Ben Ali's speech 1. For the full text of this speech in both English and Arabic see Appendix A.

Table (5.1): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 1

Sentence No.	Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
1-4	The president is aware of the protests' causes and he regrets the bad consequences of these events blaming "some parties that do not want benefaction to their country" for these events.	Destructive
5-20	Unemployment is an international dilemma that all countries suffer from but Tunisia works hard to curb this problem that has been caused by the development of the higher education sector and the increase in the number of university graduates	Justification
21-24	Dialogue is always the principle of communication between national and social sides but it is not acceptable to exploit these events "to attain politicized goals at the expense of the national community's interests" which will influence the economic growth and the image of the country and its security.	Constructive
25-26	The government respects freedom of opinion and expression, it is keen to consolidate it in legislation and	Constructive

	practice, and it respects any position if it is done within the framework of compliance with the law and the rules of dialogue and its ethics.	
27-28	The government is keen to find solutions to meet the job demands that will continue to increase over the next few years, improve wages, income and the standard of living for all Tunisians.	Constructive
29-32	The president appreciates the difficulty of the unemployment situation and its psychological effect on its owners.	Constructive

The content of Ben Ali's first speech shows that the social actors referred to in this speech are the president himself, the government, the president's supporters, the protestors, supporting media channels, and opposing media channels. Table (5.1) demonstrates the main discourse topics and their classification according to the macro-strategies suggested by Wodak et. al. (2009). Six main discourse topics can be identified in Ben Ali's Speech 1. Among the identified discourse topics, the last four topics can be classified as constructive macro-strategies whereas the first two topics are classified as destructive and justification macro-strategies respectively. This order says a lot about Ben Ali's overall strategy in this speech. He set the floor for the upcoming positive Self construction by first emphasizing the bad consequences of the events (so blaming the protestors/the Other) and second justifying the situation of the unemployment dilemma which is caused by the high rates of higher education graduates (so not due to the negligence on the part of his government).

At this critical time and in his first appearance after the beginning of the demonstrations, Ben Ali premeditatively chooses to talk about the aforementioned topics through which he wants to achieve certain purposes. After expressing regret for the events and casting accusations at the protestors, Ben Ali shows that he and his government are aware of the direct causes of the uprisings

(i.e. unemployment). Therefore, a considerable part of his speech is about unemployment and his regime's policies in dealing with this problem. However, Ben Ali tames this topic to positively represent the Self and discredit the Other and their actions. He first claims that this problem is prevalent in all countries around the world (both developed and developing countries). Then, he connects unemployment in his country to the growth in the higher education sector. By tackling the issue of the growth in the education sector and the high number of higher education graduates, he conveys a message that the majority of Tunisians are educated and cultured and these actions of vandalism only represent a "minority" who are "ignorant". So doing, he wants to delegitimize the actions of the protestors by conveying that unemployment is prevalent in Tunisia because of the accelerating number of university graduates. This positive construction of the Self is employed to invalidate the protestors (Other) and they are acts, sway public opinion, and gain the support of his audience, including the people and the international community.

Furthermore, Ben Ali attempts to make it clear how democratic his regime is and claims that his regime "respects freedom of opinion and expression". Proclaiming this, Ben Ali conveys a message to his audience that since the protests are not expressed within the framework of law and it is just acts of vandalism, violence, and setting fires, these protests are unjustified. He also rallies the people against the protestors by asserting that these violent acts distort the image of the country. So doing, he implicitly aims to delegitimize the protests and protestors for two main reasons: to rally Tunisians around him, and to justify the use of force against the protestors for both the local and international communities.

I conclude that the main argument in Ben Ali's Speech 1 is that the acts of the protestors are unjustified since the direct cause of it (i.e. unemployment) is a problem that exists in all countries (developed or developing) and all citizens are allowed to express their opinions freely

but without harming the security of Tunisia. This strengthens my argument that Ben Ali's speech mainly aims at positively representing the Self to implicitly delegitimize the Other (i.e. the protests and the protestors). In this speech, Ben Ali follows the rule of emphasizing the positive aspects of the Self and thus exposes the negativity of the Other. Although he starts his speech by regretting the events and their bad consequences (and blaming some parties for these events), Ben Ali's Speech 1 was mostly constructive because it revolves around the positive construction of the Self.

5.3 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Ben Ali's Speech 2

Ben Ali gave this speech on the 10th of January 2011. It was his second speech after the riots. It was delivered two weeks after the first speech, and was also aired on the official channel *Tunisia 7*. Ben Ali delivered this speech in Modern Standard Arabic as usual. In contrast to the previous speech, however, the President was standing in front of a podium with the flag of Tunisia behind him. He seemed angered because of the riots and his tone of voice was louder than before, and tense. His body language was different. For example, Ben Ali pointed his finger a few times as a way of threatening the addressees, especially when he warned the "rioters" and "gangs" to apply the law. He also tapped the podium slightly while encouraging his people not to deviate from the right path. This speech was two times longer than the previous one and lasted for thirteen minutes. This may be due to the fact that the President needed more time to defend his regime and justify its acts by providing tangible examples on reforms because of the evolution of the events on the ground. He needed more time to prove to the audience that he and his government were working hard to improve all sectors. Another difference is that his reference to the events and the hands behind them was more recurrent in this speech. Seven discourse topics can be identified in this speech, as shown in Table (5.2).

Table (5.2): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 2.

Sentence No.	Main Discourse Topic	Macro-Strategy
3-6	1- Blaming "gangs", "a minority of hostile people", "rioters" and "extremist groups" who are manipulated by "hidden hands" for the bloody events, causalities, and deaths during the events.	Destructive
7-9	2- Sharing the feeling of sorrow with his people for their loss and reminding them that the law will be applied to those who caused these events.	Constructive
10-13	3- Opponents who are manipulated from abroad exploit the unemployment problem although the country spends all efforts in curbing it.	Destructive
14-22	4- Reminding his people of the programs and policies to improve education and economy to employ the increasing numbers of high education graduates and emphasizing that these policies are adopted all over the world which also suffers from unemployment.	Constructive
23-24	5- Warning those who exploit the unemployed youth and cause riots and chaos that the law will be "decisive".	Destructive
25-37	6- Responding to the people's concerns by listing reform plans and programs offered in the sectors of employment, democracy, freedom of expression through media, developing channels of communication with people and listening to their problems.	Constructive
38	7- Calling on parents to protect their sons from those "corrupt" and "extremist groups".	Destructive

The content of Ben Ali's Speech 2 shows that the Other includes the protestors (gangs, hidden hands, corrupts, rioters) and external powers, whereas the Self includes the president, his government, the Tunisian people, victims' families, and the parents of the youth. Table (5.2) above shows seven identified discourse topics in Ben Ali's Speech 2. These topics are classified evenly into constructive macro-strategies and destructive macro-strategies.

Ben Ali starts his speech with a discourse topic that has a destructive function because it emphasizes the bad consequences of the events and demonizes the protestors. This destructive discourse topic is followed by another topic (sharing his feeling of sorrow with his audience) that has a constructive function. He chooses this topic to show his solidarity and shrink the distance

between him and his supporters. What is interesting about Ben Ali's Speech 2 is that after every constructive discourse topic he reminds his audience of the negativity of the Other with another destructive discourse topic. He blames "a minority of opponents" for exploiting the unemployment issue to achieve their evil aims. Also, after reminding his audience about his government's achievements and policies in education and employment (that are adopted all over the world), Ben Ali warns those who "incited youth in schools and colleges towards chaos" that the law would be decisive.

In an attempt to convince the Tunisians of his legitimacy, the last third of Ben Ali's speech is concerned with listing new presidential decisions that are related to employment, investments, and the freedom of negotiations. He also attempts to absorb the anger and frustration of the demonstrators by responding to the people's concerns. Ben Ali is aware that the events on the ground have been elevated and that the public is boiling, so the people need more tangible evidence to be convinced. Finally, Ben Ali implicitly employs a destructive macro-strategy by calling on parents to protect their sons from the "corrupts" and "rioters". Ben Ali implicitly demonizes the protestors and de-legitimizes them. This negative presentation of the Other is devoted to defaming the protestors and mobilizing "parents" against these groups to convince them that the protestors were threatening their families.

Based on the above discussion, the thematic analysis of Ben Ali's speech 2 illustrates that this speech is divided evenly into two parts: positively presenting the Self and negatively presenting the Other. On the one hand, focusing on topics like blaming certain groups for the events in Tunisia and their exploitation of the unemployment issue is implicitly designed to distance the Self (Ben Ali and his supporters) from the Other (the protestors) and to distort their image as genuine demonstrators. In addition, in contrast to his first speech, Ben Ali in his second

speech refers many times to those who stand behind the events and after each insertion of the positivity of the Self, he reminds his audience of those who have betrayed Tunisia and "deliberately harmed the interests of the country" (Ben Ali, 10 Jan 2011). On the other hand, by emphasizing the efforts of the government and its plans for reform in sectors like employment, media, investment and education, Ben Ali attempts to prove his honest intentions for reform and change. It is also meant to prove that the government is responding to the protestors' demands and to regain the protestors' support. The evolution of the events in the two weeks that preceded this speech prompted Ben Ali to change his goal this time. In the previous speech we noticed that his speech was mostly constructive and was devoted to constructing the Self more than criticizing the Other. However, even the goal of positive construction of the Self in this speech is different from that in the previous one. In this speech, it aims at absorbing the rage of the demonstrating people.

5.4 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Ben Ali's Speech 3

President Ben Ali gave this speech in 13 January 2011. It was his last speech before he fled the country to Saudi Arabia. This speech was delivered only three days after his second speech. The speech was also aired on the official channel *Tunisia 7* and lasted for almost nine minutes. Unlike the previous speeches, Ben Ali used the vernacular or Tunisian Arabic for the first time in his political speeches before and after the start of the Arab Spring. He mixed between Modern Standard Arabic and Tunisian Arabic, but more than two thirds of his speech was in Tunisian Arabic in an attempt to appeal to a broader sector of the Tunisian people, particularly the less educated people. For the first time during his presidency, in this speech he seemed psychologically disturbed, shaky, and jolted. For example, during the sixth minute, Ben Ali stuttered while discussing officials who deliberately concealed information from him. This deviation from his usual speech patterns is noteworthy and will be discussed below. The main discourse topics of

this speech are briefly outlined in table (5.5) along with their classification according to the suggested macro-strategies.

Table (5.3): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 3

Sentence No.	Main Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
1-7	1- Emphasizing Tunisian identity and addressing all Tunisians and acknowledging their demands.	Constructive
8-12	2- Emphasizing that vandalism is not the custom of the true Tunisian entailing that those who caused chaos are not true Tunisians.	Destructive
13-16	3- Defending his individual record and expressing his sadness for not appreciating his long service for the country (during which he saved Tunisian lives).	Constructive
17-20	4- Regretting that it is insecure to send "our children" to schools and emphasizing that it is the responsibility of all Tunisians to stop those responsible for this chaos.	Destructive
21-28	5- Calling on all Tunisians to be good citizens, renounce violence and vandalism, and appreciate the efforts of the state in reform which need time to bear fruit.	Perpetuation
29-33	6- Announcing a number of presidential decisions in response to people's political demands in domains of media freedom, anti-corruption and freedom of political expression.	Constructive
34	7- Blaming his officials who made him go wrong by withholding facts.	Justification
35-37	8- Announce that there is no presidency for life to activate diversity and national dialogue for the sake of Tunisia.	Perpetuation
39-45	9- Calling on all Tunisians to protect Tunisia and be responsible for restoring its security and stability for a better future.	Perpetuation

As illustrated in Table (5.3) above, nine discourse topics are identified in Ben Ali's Speech 3. The table also shows that there is a diversity in the macro-strategies used in this speech in comparison to the previous two. Three discourse topics have a perpetuation function, three have a constructive function, two have a destructive function, and one has a justification function. This confirms the argument that there is a shift in Ben Ali's language use in his last speech.

What is interesting in the last speech of Ben Ali is the overall tone in his speech and the shift that happens to his argument. For the first time from the beginning of the protests, he acknowledges the protestors and their demands. His speech starts with "*I have understood you*" which is repeated four times. This acknowledgment entails that the protestors are viewed as partners rather than opponents. This is reinforced by shifting the blame to some state officials as in discourse topic 3, which has a destructive function. Ben Ali says "*they induced me into error concerning the size of realities. They will be accountable"* (Ben Ali, 13 Jan 2011). This shift in blame aims at justifying his failure to meet the demands of his people, and making himself close to the protestors and seeking sympathy. Therefore, I suggest that in this speech we have a new Other, the government officials who misled the president, and this is different from the other previous speeches where the Other was identified as the protestors and "the hidden hands" that manipulated them. Another discourse topic that has a destructive function is topic 4. Although this topic displays empathy and unity, Ben Ali implicitly seeks to provoke the emotion of his audience by capitalizing on their feeling of fear about their children's future and safety by using the idea of threats. This justifies why I chose to classify it as a destructive macro-strategy.

One of the discourse topics that is totally new in Ben Ali's argument in dealing with the events is his counting his sacrifices and services for the country. This topic has a constructive function and it is used by Ben Ali to legitimize the Self. This legitimization of the Self is devoted to arousing the audience's emotions to remind them that he loves his country too, so he deserves respect and dignity. Also, Ben Ali attempts to gain support from both his followers and the protestors by associating himself with the military when he talks about his service in the national army. Here he is looking for his last chance to win the hearts and minds of his audience as he

knows that the military is respected by all citizens, because it is considered as one of the nation's sacred symbols.

The discourse topics that assume the collectivization of all Tunisians under one concern, which is the stability and security of Tunisia, are topics number 1, 5, 8, 9. By the use of the expression "all of us" eleven times throughout his speech, Ben Ali seeks commonality and solidarity with his audience, including the protestors, in contrast to his previous speeches where he excluded the protestors and targeted them. In addition, there is a tone of conciliation which suggests that there is a shift in the balance of power in favor of the protestors. Finally, this speech is intriguing because its overall tone presents a good example of "we are all in the same boat" approach which has a unifying and solidarity-enhancing function" (Wodak et. al., 2009: 128). This solidarity is also enhanced by the use of Tunisian Arabic throughout 80% of the speech. Further, Ben Ali uses Tunisian Arabic in his last speech because he addresses all Tunisians, including both the educated and uneducated, and this use is for the purpose of simplification. Because he wanted his audience to understand him, he switches to the simple code of the colloquial. To conclude, in addition to the new discourse topics he tackles in his last speech, the use of Tunisian Arabic made this speech more emotive and different from the other speeches. He wants to shorten the distance between him and his people and remind his audience that he is a Tunisian too and he similarly loves his country as any Tunisian does.

5.5 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Mubarak's Speech 1

Mubarak delivered this speech on the 28th of January 2011 after four days of protests. The speech was aired on the official Egyptian channel and lasted for almost twelve minutes. Standing in front of a podium, Mubarak was confident and determined to reflect that he was denying what was happening in Tahrir Square. In this speech Mubarak confirmed that he followed up on the protests

and then denied that what was happening in Tahrir Square was a protest, since it turned out to be a "riot" rather than a right for protest. At the same time, he gave his instructions to the government and the police to give citizens the opportunity to exercise their rights in expressing their views and their demands. The overall argument in this speech was that although he valued the people's right to freedom of expression, Mubarak prioritized security and safety above activities that posed a danger to the stability of Egypt (and his regime). The whole speech can be parsed down into seven main discourse topic as shown in Table (5.4).

Table (5.4): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Mubarak's Speech 1

Sentence No.	Main Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
4-9	1- Emphasizing that the state is democratic and allows civilized demonstrations.	Constructive
10-14	2- Emphasizing that when protests turn into acts of riots and vandalism that harm the people's security and the state interests, the state would choose maintaining state security and stability over chaos that threatens national interests.	Justification (Justify the use of force)
19-26	3- Acknowledging the harm economic conditions of the citizens and their demands.	Constructive
28-29	4- Emphasizing that the evolution of these demonstrations into violent acts and the exploitation of it by certain evil actors delegitimize their demands.	Destructive
30-37	5- Calling on his people to retain the united front they had in the past to overcome the recent difficulties with new steps in democracy, curbing unemployment, developing services, standing on the side of low-income citizens.	Perpetuating
38-40	6- Emphasizing that the recent events have cast fear into the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the people and that it is anticipated to drift towards more violence and chaos.	Destructive
41-42	7- Assuming responsibility in preserving the security of Egypt and asking the government to resign	Constructive

Table (5.4) presents the main discourse topics in Mubarak's speech 1. These main topics are used by Mubarak to portray the Self as democratic and emphasize that riots and vandalism cannot be accepted as a way of expression when they negatively affect the state's security and stability. His

regime will prevent protests not because they are not democratic but because these protests will threaten the state's security and will be exploited by evil hands.

As demonstrated in Table (5.4), although the functions served by the identified topics are almost all constructive, the overall tone of Mubarak's first speech is threatening rather than promising. For example, when he says "*there is a thin line that separates freedom from chaos, and while I am completely biased towards the freedom of citizens to express their opinions, I adhere to the same extent to preserving Egypt's security and stability and not to drag it and its people down into a dangerous slide"* (Mubarak, 28th Jan. 2011), Mubarak in this insertion and many other similar insertions, argues that he denied the demonstrations not because they are not legitimate but because these demonstrations will be a path for those who hate Egypt to damage its security. In addition, Mubarak uses two discourse topics (6 & 4) that have a destructive function to negatively represent the protests and protestors. By stressing the bad consequences of the protests, Mubarak delegitimizes the protestors' demands which ultimately is aimed at preventing other people from joining the protests. At some points, as in discourse topic (2), Mubarak implicitly justifies the use of force against the demonstrators and this eventually did happen in Tahrir Square during the events.

Depending on the identified discourse topics, it is clear in his first official response towards the demonstrations that Mubarak seemed to hold the candle stick from the middle, hesitating between being democratic to please his audience or coercive under the pretext of defending homeland security. On the one hand, he conveys a message of acceptance and solidarity, displaying his understanding of the needs of his citizens. On the other hand, he tries to arouse fear among the audience by talking about the lack of security because of the demonstrations that are anticipated to be drifting into more violent events.

5.6 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Mubarak Speech 2

Mubarak delivered this speech on the 1st of February 2011. He gave his second speech only three days after his first speech and after the call of the protesting parties for a million people to come demonstrate to force the President out of office. The speech as usual was aired on the official Egyptian channel. It lasted for almost eleven minutes. In contrast to the first speech, Mubarak seemed less confident. The main discourse topics that can be identified in Mubarak's speech 2 are presented in Table (5.5) below.

Table (5.5): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Mubarak's Speech 2.

Sentence No.	Main Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
1-4	The protests turned from a sophisticated and civilized manifestation of peaceful demonstration to unfortunate confrontations driven by political forces targeting the security and stability of Egypt.	Destructive
5-6	The protests have cast fear among the overwhelming majority of the Egyptians which imposes a new reality that requires maximum care and wisdom, so forming a new government with new priorities and mandates may diffuse the protests.	Destructive
7	The president calls for dialogue between his deputy and all political forces in the country to achieve legitimate demands and restore stability and calm although there are some political forces that reject this dialogue.	Constructive
8-11	The president intends not to run for a new presidential term since he spent a long time in the service of Egypt and its people, and his first responsibility now is to restore the security and stability of Egypt.	Constructive
12-18	The president orders the Parliament to discuss some amendments in the Constitution regarding the conditions of candidacy for the presidency and determine specific periods for the presidency of the Republic, and asks the judicial authorities with investigating those responsible for the security chaos in Egypt.	Constructive

The way in which Mubarak starts his second speech is different from that of his first speech. While he nominalized the democracy of his regime in his first speech, Mubarak in his second speech nominalizes the bad consequences of the protests. As Table (5.5) shows, the first two main topics have a destructive function, in contrast to his first speech that he started by addressing a topic that had a constructive function. These two topics are addressed by the president to emphasize the negative influence of the protests, such as the state of insecurity and the lack of stability, and the fear it cast over the overwhelming majority of the citizens. Emphasizing the negative influence of the protests may affect the scale of the protests and lead some protestors to change their minds. On the other hand, the following three topics, which have a constructive function, are meant to positively represent the Self. For example, by asserting that the President does not intend to run for a new term, Mubarak pictures himself as a peaceful person who prioritizes the country's interests above his own interests. Also, his call for dialogue is employed to portray the President and his government as democratic and as defenders of national unity, in contrast to those who rejected dialogue sticking to their own agendas.

To conclude, while his focus was on being democratic in his first speech, Mubarak in his second speech shows that he prioritizes the national interests of the country, whether by calling for dialogue or not intending to run for a new term of presidency. His call for dialogue is supported by his orders to the Parliament to discuss certain amendments to the constitution, and to the judiciary authorities to continue investigating corruption. These moves are intended to strengthen the polarization between the Self and the Other that is ultimately aimed at affecting the scale of the protests.

5.7 Analysis of Discourse Topics in Mubarak's Speech 3

Mubarak delivered this speech on the 10th of February, 2011 one week after his second speech. It was his last speech as a president of Egypt. He resigned one day after his last speech. It is the longest among his last three speeches and lasted for almost seventeen minutes. This speech is described as the most emotive of his last three speeches and even of all his speeches as a president (Khdair, 2016). For example, in his last speech it was the first time Mubarak started a speech by saying "I am addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (Mubarak, 10th Feb, 2011). This was in addition to many other emotion arousing insertions throughout his speech. The writer Dina Wahba describes this speech as "the heartfelt speech" (Wahba, 2024). The whole speech can be reduced to five main discourse topics as presented in Table (5.6) below.

Table (5.6): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in Mubarak's Speech 3

Sentence No.	Main Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
1-10	1- Acknowledging the protestors' demands and admitting that there were mistakes in any political system since he does not find anything embarrassing in listening to the demands of the youth, but that it is embarrassing for him to listen to foreign dictations.	Constructive
11-13	2- Declaring that he will not run for the next presidential elections, contenting himself with what he has done for the country for more than 60 years during the years of war and peace but he will first continue to fulfill his responsibility to protect the constitution and the interests of the people until the handover of power.	Constructive
14-25	3- Suggesting a new vision to achieve the youth's demands and the required stability through responsible dialogue, which have been already started with all societal forces.	Constructive
30-33	4- Emphasizing that Egypt is going through difficult times that caused damage to Egypt's economy and international reputation which will end up in a situation where the youth	Destructive

	who called for change become the first to be affected by them.	
34-53	5- Defending his individual record and his service for Egypt, and since he understands the seriousness of the current difficult situation and prioritizes the supreme interest of Egypt, he decides to delegate his competences to the Vice President.	Constructive

Table (5.6) illustrates the main discourse topics that Mubarak addresses in his last speech. Although his speech seems in harmony with the protestors' demands, since most of the speech's topics have a constructive function, he implicitly uses these themes to negatively represent the Other. Mubarak begins his speech by acknowledging the demands of the demonstrators, approaching them by talking about their legitimate dreams, consoling the families of the martyrs, and promising them that he would hold those in charge responsible. This took up three full minutes of his speech. Although all of this seems to have a constructive function, Hosni Mubarak closes this insertion by stating that he would not submit to any foreign dictates, which indicates that he still draws borders between the in-group members and out-group members.

The following two topics also have constructive functions. By announcing his resignation and suggesting initiatives for a national dialogue, Mubarak conveys the message that he has made compromises in the interest of the country, while the other parties refuse to do so, which also evokes polarization between the Self and Other. On the other hand, although the overall tone of the speech is a constructive one, Mubarak does not miss the chance to negatively represent the Other. In discourse topic 4, Mubarak refers to the bad consequences of the current events on the economy, the international reputation, and the future of Egypt, but this time he mentions the future of the protestors themselves. As another constructive macro-strategy, Mubarak counts his record in the service of Egypt. Doing so, he emphasizes the morality of the Self in order to discredit the

Other and he stresses this by closing his insertion by saying "*it saddens me what I encounter today from some of my brother citizens*". Furthermore, by defending his individual record, Mubarak presents himself as a role model of commitment and bravery when addressing his audience. He does this in an effort to give the audience a good image of himself and to elicit a sympathetic response.

A general look at Mubarak's last speeches shows that he provides detailed information on one side of the problem while neglecting the real causes of the protests, like unemployment and economic problems. A good example of this is the constitutional amendments that get the lion's share of space in Mubarak's last speech. This strategy is used to manipulate the audience and make the protestors feel secure and to lessen their anger. Also, it is clear that Mubarak, from the first line to the last word of his last speech, calls for unity and cohesion among the audience. This war-like discourse implies the existence of an enemy that was reinforced by using words like "*one trench*", "*foreign dictations*", and "*the blood of your martyrs and wounded*". By casting this tone all over his speech, Mubarak wants to instill dread in people so they would not help the protestors since helping them would make them traitors and enemies too. This evokes the concept of in-group and out-group polarization among the audience and falsifies the credibility of the protestors.

5.8 Analysis of Discourse Topics in al Qaddafi's Speech

President al Qaddafi gave this speech on 22 February 2011. It was his first official response to the protests. This speech is considered the only official speech he delivered during the uprisings because all his later media appearances were just quick statements or were via phone calls. Al Qaddafi's speech was clearly unscripted and impromptu, as he altered topics several times. As shown in Appendix B, I have numbered this speech according to lines not sentences (as in the reset of the speeches) because the sentences are incomplete and have many repeated words. The speech

was delivered in Libyan Colloquial Arabic since this was the norm in al Qaddafi's speeches and it lasted for 75 minutes. al Qaddafi appeared in Libyan traditional garb which highlighted his tribal Libyan identity. The media described this speech as "defiant" and "confrontational" (Al Jazeera News, Feb. 2011). This can be seen in the explicitness of the accusations in al Qaddafi's speech. Oliver Miles, the former British ambassador to Libya, stated for the BBC news agency that the speech's peculiarity could be attributed to the exaggerated rhetoric, "theatrical delivery", and al Qaddafi's infuriated calls to take the streets back from his opponents. His lengthy speech addressed many topics, some of which were repeated two or three times. He spoke about the Libyan youth and how they were manipulated by foreign actors. He attacked the Islamists and blamed them for the chaos and insecurity in Libya. He also talked about himself and the glory of his ancestors at length telling stories about them and reciting poetry. The main discourse topics in al Qaddafi's speech are briefed in table (5.7).

Table (5.7): Main Discourse Topics and Macro-strategies in al Qaddafi's Speech.

Line No.	Discourse Topic	Macro-strategy
1-30	1- Al Qaddafi refers to himself as fighter, rebel, and a Bedouin but not as a president and states that Libya desires greatness and wants to be at the top of the world but that the protestors distorted its image and hindered its development.	Constructive
32-104	2- Everyone who protests against the president's authority is "drugged" and steered by foreign actors, and people have to find them and deliver them "to justice" and cleanse Libya "house by house" until all of the demonstrators have surrendered.	Destructive
295-331	3- Instability in Libya would "provide al-Qaeda a base" opening doors for extremists and international intervention.	Destructive
212-274	4- al Qaddafi cautions that he will employ severe force to suppress protests in the cities of Derna and Bayda, mentioning instances of the use of force in Russia and China when the international community remained silent, and counting a number of constitution articles that	Destructive

	criminalize those who demonstrate and stand to face off the state.	
121-181	5- The Islamists are blamed for the uprisings and they want to "establish another Afghanistan", so al Qaddafi warns that those in Bayda and Derna have established an Islamic Emirate there and their control will eventually reach Benghazi where hundreds have reportedly been killed during violent events.	Destructive
191-212	6- al Qaddafi blames America for intervening in Libya and how it tricked the youth into joining the revolution, and other Western nations for arming and spreading hallucinogenic substances in Libya in an attempt to seize control of Libya and its resources like gold and oil.	Destructive
10-14, 23-24	7- al Qaddafi is respected and loved by all Libyan tribes and cities, and he is known for his achievements for his country and he has no position to resign from.	Constructive

As table (5.7) shows, al Qaddafi's speech is mostly destructive in that he openly makes accusations against the Other (whether it be the protestors, western countries like the UK, US, and France, or the Islamists) to positively construct the Self and legitimize it. He uses discourse topics that have constructive functions only when talking about his sacrifices to Libya and the support of the Libyan tribes and his commitment to give shares of Libyan oil to them. As a constructive macro-strategy by which he promotes unification, al Qaddafi confirms on many occasions throughout his speech that he is not a president and does not have any position, but rather that he is a "*rebel and a warrior coming from a tent.*" However, sometimes he contradicts himself, as when he threatens people and gives himself the right to say that he would pardon those whom he called deceived.

From the very beginning of his speech, al Qaddafi polarizes the world between those who want glory, and those who want to relapse, those who are loyal to their country, and those who are traitors. This is evident from his distribution of roles to these two camps (i.e. in-group and out-group) by ascribing the positive achievements to his in-group members, praising them for the glory

they achieved, while ascribing bad actions that harm the country to the out-group members, blaming them for violence and destruction.

Another theme he employs to negatively represent the Other and deconstruct its identity is via exploiting the distorted image that the Islamists held in local and international communities. This image was gained after the 9/11 bombing in the US, responsibility for which was claimed by Al Qaeda (see chapter two). Using this context, al Qaddafi continues blaming the Islamists for the violence and riots happening in Libya in order to have excuses for using force against the protestors. He also attempts to reinforce this blame by citing examples from Iraq and Afghanistan where bloody events were attributed to radical Islamists. He utilizes this strategy to delegitimize the protestors, discredit their causes, and ultimately have a cover to use force in front of the international community.

In addition, the tribal nature of Libya is predominant in al Qaddafi's speech. As the tribe is a cornerstone in Libyan society and a source of power for al Qaddafi, he portrays the tribes in a good manner whether by reciting poetic verses or by narrating stories about their heroism. This serves a very particular purpose which is to win their hearts and minds since the tribes' support will increase his hopes of remaining in power. Also, he is dependent on this to make each tribe responsible for their youth and to stop them protesting against himself.

The overall theme of al Qaddafi's speech is that there is a conspiracy against the unity of Libya by the Western powers and al Qaeda but that his followers of the loyal Libyan tribes will support him to get rid of these traitors. It is clear that he is still living in the context of Western conspiracies against Libya. This context can be explained along the following lines. From 1969, when his regime seized control of Libya, al Qaddafi made many attempts to buy nuclear weapons

from China, India, and Pakistan in order to protect Libya's natural resources, especially the oil reserves. al Qaddafi's attempts were countered by the US and the international community. Also, two events were the cornerstone of the bad Libyan-Western World relations, namely the 1986 discotheque bombing in Berlin and the 1988 Lockerbie bombing in Scotland for which Libya was believed to be responsible (Pargeter, 2012). In his political speeches, al Qaddafi tries to relate some past issues with other groups to the situation in Libya during the Arab Spring in order to frame his speech. This is apparent in his speech in which he frequently criticizes the US for intervening in Libyan interests in order to control its resources. He also blames the US for deceiving the Libyan youth. However, al Qaddafi attempts to demonstrate that he would survive all of these conspiracies and he declares that he would fight until the end of his life with the support of millions of Libyans. Al Qaddafi's use of the themes of Western intervention in the current situation in Libya and the Islamists' intention to establish their Islamic Emirate can be explained as an attempt to persuade the audience of his intention to fight for Libya as he fought the Western powers in the past. Using this frame, al Qaddafi sought to deter the Libyans from joining the protests. To sum up, it can be said that al Qaddafi was employing these themes to incite the Libyans against the protestors.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at analyzing the seven political speeches of the Arab leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi, all of whom were overthrown during the Arab Spring uprisings. After this in-depth analysis of these speeches, it is important to summarize how the Other/Self is de/legitimized through macro (thematic) strategies used by these three leaders, especially since they were given under similar conditions and for similar reasons.

First, my analysis starts with the identification of the discourse topics communicated in each political speech and investigates how each leader deliberately addresses specific topics to

legitimize the Self and delegitimize the Other, and I then classify these discourse topics into the macro-strategies of construction, justification, perpetuating, and destruction. For example, to tilt the balance in their favor at the expense of the demonstrators both Ben Ali and Mubarak, using constructive strategies, attempt to show that their regimes are democratic either by claiming their respect for freedom of opinion or by pretending their acknowledgment of the demonstrators' demands. On the other hand, al Qaddafi chooses to talk about his heroism and his ancestors' glory. To delegitimize the Other as destructive strategies, the three leaders regularly tackle the bad consequences of the protests or foreign intervention to discredit the protestors and regain the audience's support.

As discussed in chapter three, "political discourse is eminently ideological" (van Dijk, 2003: 208). Ideological discourse mainly follows the pattern of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation and this general strategy functions at all levels (van Dijk, 2013: 126). In the present study, the above analysis of discourse topics in the political speeches of the ousted Arab leaders during the Arab Spring (what we previously called macro-level) shows that the three leaders employed specific discourse topics either to positively present the Self or negatively present the Other and this is employed to achieve a number of purposes. They attempted to make their use of force against the protesters legitimate, and to entice the support of the international community for doing this. Also, they wanted to make their failure look excused, put an end to the protests that aimed at toppling their regimes, and thus ensure that they remained in power. Another finding is that the choice of discourse topics in the speeches of each president is influenced by the spark of the uprising in each country. This will be further explained below.

In terms of similarities, all three leaders attempt to positively present the Self by offering tangible evidence for their audience to prove that they are good leaders. For example, Ben Ali

emphasizes the development in the education sector and offers concrete numbers of higher education graduates during his reign to positively present the Self. He cleverly exploits this issue to justify the high rates of unemployment in his country. As for Mubarak, he chooses to talk about the freedoms that his government offers to his people. However, when these freedoms endanger the security of the country, the government will suppress them. As for al Qaddafi, his topics are constructive only when talking about his sacrifices and when he has shown his respect for the Libyan tribes since he knows their status in Libyan society.

All three present the Self by counting their sacrifices in serving the country. This theme is manipulated by the three presidents to present themselves as role models and to evoke a sympathetic response from their audience. Lastly, they all tackle the theme of presidency either by announcing that they will not run for another presidential term (as in case of Ben Ali and Mubarak) or by denying the title president and insisting on being a warrior and a defender of the country (as in case of al Qaddafi). By doing this, the three leaders attempt to prove their honest intentions of reform.

To negatively present the Other, all three leaders mainly rely on two main themes that have destructive functions. First, they all emphasize the "harmful" effects of the protests whether on the country's security or the economy, either to threaten the audience of the change that the demonstrations will bring or to implicitly blame the protestors for this destruction. Second, they all, implicitly or explicitly, employ the topic of foreign intervention in steering the demonstrations and the demonstrators. The use of this discourse topic can be explained as a way to depict the protestors as traitors or distort their image as genuine demonstrators.

As for differences, there are no sharp difference among the three leaders in terms of the themes they tackle in their speeches. However, the difference is in the focus they have on a specific discourse topic; this can be explained if we refer to the spark of the uprising in each of the three countries. If we link the choice of the discourse topics of each president to the spark of the uprisings in each country, we can find a logical connection between them. As the spark of the uprising in Tunisia was the Boazizi incident, we can understand the focus of Ben Ali on the unemployment dilemma in Tunisia and trying to justify its existence and making excuses for it. As for Egypt, the concentration in Mubarak's speeches is on the freedom of expression and other claimed freedoms that his regime offered to his people. This can also be understood if we refer to the spark of the events in Egypt, which was the torture of Khaled Saed at the hands of the policemen. In Libya, the spark was the protests against al Qaddafi's regime because of the injustice experienced on some prisoners in the Abu Salim prison. Therefore, al Qaddafi in his speech focuses on the issue of protesting against the country and he defends his regime by giving many examples of protests in a number of western countries and how the systems there dealt with it. Another difference among the three leaders is that al Qaddafi is more explicit in his accusations and blame, especially his assertion that the Islamists are a main player in the protests in Libya, in comparison to Mubarak and Ben Ali who did not make clear references to any foreign parties.

Finally, if we pose the question of how the choice of discourse topic is influenced by the evolution of events in each country, we notice that at the early stages of the uprisings, both Ben Ali and Mubarak choose to tackle discourse topics that emphasize their presidential authority; they barely acknowledge the protestors and their demands. They view the protestors as a "minority" that is manipulated from outside. In the mid-stages of the uprisings, we noticed a shift in the topics tackled. The blame is more apparent, the accusations are heightened, and the bad consequences of

the events are highlighted more. Ultimately, when the uprisings escalated, both presidents show a tone of reconciliation and acknowledgement of the protestors and their demands before announcing their resignations.

Chapter Six-Analysis of Discursive Strategies in the Political Speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi

6.1 Introduction

The discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation in the seven political speeches delivered by the ex-presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, and al Qaddafi of Libya during the Arab Spring will be analyzed and discussed in this chapter. Now having discussed how the Self/Other is de/legitimized on the macro-level, seen by the choice of discourse topics identified in the previous chapter, this chapter will address how the three presidents used the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation to achieve this de/legitimization. Nomination/referential strategy relates to how speakers refer to persons, actions, and ideas using nouns, noun phrases, verbs, or verb phrases. The predication strategy involves ascription of attributes and qualities to the nominated persons, acts, and ideas using adjectives. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2009), the nomination and predication strategies are the most fundamental ones in political speeches, particularly if these speeches are delivered in times of hatred and prejudice where these two strategies are optimal for categorizing the opposing groups into Us and Them. Seen in both speech or text, the characteristics of these two camps (i.e. in-group and out-group) are frequently activated and coded to achieve this dichotomy. Finally, the intensification/mitigation strategy involves how the messages of the speakers are either intensified or mitigated in discourse using linguistic tools like over-lexicalization, including repetition and quasi-synonymous words, metaphor, cognate objects, strong lexical items, and/or euphemistic/derogatory expressions.

There are two aims of this chapter. First, I will identify the linguistic realizations (for which I provided my own translation into English) of each discursive strategy in each speech. Second, I will discuss how these linguistic tools were used by each leader to positively construct the Self

and negatively construct the Other, ultimately discussing the purposes of this positive/negative construction. These linguistic items might all be used in one speech, while in other speeches they might not be used at all. Therefore, explaining the use of each linguistic tool may differ from one speech to another. For example, the use of repetition as a tool of intensification is used more in the last speeches of Ben Ali and Mubarak in comparison to their first two speeches.

6.2 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 1.

In this section, I look at how Ben Ali employs the discursive strategies of nomination, predication and intensification/mitigation in his first speech to positively construct the Self and negatively construct the Other. Some examples of each strategy with their English translations are illustrated in Table (A) in Appendix B.

Regarding the nomination strategy, as Table (A) in Appendix B demonstrates, the analysis of Ben Ali's first speech shows that he mainly depends on nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases to refer to persons and acts. He employs these categories to positively present the Self and negatively present the Other. His use of nomination strategy can be explained as a way to create Us/Them categorization. In many places he constructs a world of a positive Us via verb phrases like " *We also **regret the damage** that those events occasioned," "we **appreciate the feeling** that any unemployed person feels," "We in Tunisia **spend all efforts** to curb it*" and noun phrases such as *"in the framework of **our constant eagerness** to guarantee all the requirements of balanced and equal growth between regions," "**dialogue as a principle and style of communication** between the national and social sides,"* and *"our emphasis on **respect of freedom of opinion and expression**."*

On the other hand, he also constructs a world of negative Them via the use of nouns and noun phrases to refer to acts and members within the out-group as *"**extremists** and **hired instigators**," "**vandalism**," "some foreign TV channels that broadcast **lies** and **deception** without investigation,"* and *"using **alarmism, incitement,** and **false accusatory** information inimical to Tunisia.*" Ben Ali hopes that by highlighting the demonstrators' negativity, the audience would hold the protesters responsible for their actions and this would deter others from joining them. The social actors contained in this categorization are the president, the government, and the president's supporters as the "Us" camp, and protestors and the claimed (anonymous) foreign supporting hands as the "Them" camp.

As for the predication strategy, in his first speech Ben Ali depends mainly on adjectives to positively present the Self and negatively present the Other. His speech is covertly and overtly laden with qualities and features attributed to the intended social actors. For example, positive attributes like *"We accomplished **outstanding** results in the area of education", "our policy of building an **educated** population", "the optimism of a **cultured** population", "the state is **keen** on providing solutions"* are used to positively represent the Self.

Further, he also uses negative attributes to describe protests and protestors such as "*It is a **negative, uncivilized** means that gives a **distorted** image of our country",* and that they use *"**desperate** solutions to draw attention".* Furthermore, Ben Ali sometimes employs analogy and comparison as techniques to create an Us/Them dichotomy. Two examples are discussed below:

"إن البطالة شغل شاغل لسائر بلدان العالم المتقدمة منها والنامية و نحن في تونس نبذل كل الجهود للحد منها و معالجة اثارها وتبعاتها"

"unemployment is the concern of developed and developing countries in the world and we in Tunisia spend all efforts to curb it and treat its effects and its repercussions especially among families without any resources"

In this example, to positively construct the Self, Ben Ali tends to make analogies between Tunisia, which is a developing country, and the rest of the world. Like many countries in the world, including developed countries, Tunisia was suffering from the increasing number of unemployed people. The message that Ben Ali wants to convey is that protesting against the government because of the high rates of unemployment is unjustified because this problem is prevalent all around the world.

لا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال رغم تفهمنا ان نقبل ركوب حالاتٍ فردية أو أي هدف أو وضــع طارئ لتحقيق مآرب ســياســوية على حســاب مصــالح المجموعة الوطنية ومكاســبها وانجازاتها وفي مقدمتها **الونام والامن والأســتقرار** كما أن لجوء أقليةٍ من المتطرفين و المحرضين المأجورين ضد مصالح بلادهم إلى **العنف والشغب في الشارع** وسيلة للتعبير امر مرفوض في دولة القانون (بن علي، كانون الاول، 2010).

We can by no means, in spite of our understanding, accept the exploitation of single individual cases, any event, or an emergent situation to attain politicized goals at the expense of the national community's interests, acquisitions, and accomplishments, at the forefront of which are ***cohesion, security, and stability****. Thus, the recourse of a minority of extremists and hired instigators against the interests of their country to* ***violence and rioting*** *in the street* (Ben Ali, December, 2010).

In the previous example, to negatively construct the Other, he contrasts the situation before the demonstration, when there was "cohesion, security, and stability", with that after the demonstrations, where violence and rioting is the state. The sharp contrast between these two periods is meant to emphasize the negative consequences of the protests and arouse the feeling of fear among the audience which in turn will lead them to reject the demands of the demonstrations.

Regarding intensification/mitigation discursive strategy, Ben Ali in his first speech employs this strategy on a number of occasions. For example, he mitigates the demonstrations and the efforts of the protestors when he uses the word "الحلول اليائسة" *"desperate solutions*" to describe the way Bouazizi protested by setting himself on fire, and the word "أقلية" *"minority*", referring to the protestors in order to show to the addressees that the number of the protestors does not represent the majority of Tunisians. In other places he uses the strategy of intensification to positively represent his acts as in "لقد تابعت **بانشغال**" "*I followed* ***with concern.***" In this example, Ben

Ali wants to convey the message that he is worried about his country and to show that the events are a threat to stability.

The above discussion of the use of discursive strategies shows that Ben Ali in his first speech uses these strategies for two main purposes. First, he uses them as a strategy of denying the existence of protests especially when he portrays the protests as isolated incidents, or when he emphasizes his government's achievements to minimize the current challenges. Second, it is used as a strategy of demonstrating authority and dominance when he talks about his responsibility to maintain security and stability.

6.3 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's speech 2

This section looks at how Ben Ali employs the discursive strategies of nomination, predication and intensification/mitigation in his second speech to positively construct the Self and negatively construct the Other. Some examples of each strategy with their English translations are illustrated in Table (B) in Appendix B. As table (B) shows, a general look at the second speech of Ben Ali shows that his reliance on the nomination strategy to collectivize the Self is indicative. On the other hand, he relies more on the predication strategy to negatively represent the Other and to socially exclude those it represents. This is clear from his frequent use of noun phrases and verb phrases to refer to the positive actions of the Self. However, his recurrent use of negative attributes is clear when he wants to refer to the actions of the Other.

To positively represent the Self, Ben Ali uses many noun phrases and verb phrases to refer to his actions (and those of his government), such as "*Our deepest regret," "sympathy," "sincere love," "work and perseverance," "progress and development," "facing challenges," "we share their pain and grief and comfort them," "we make efforts to employ," "we are proud of their increasing numbers (graduates),"* and *"we work to rise to the challenge."* This utilization of

positive nominations to refer to the Self is intended to gain support from the Tunisians at this critical time and to demonstrate solidarity with them.

In his second speech, Ben Ali, starting with his first sentence, assigns nominations that have bad connotations to both the demonstrations and the protestors. He extensively uses nouns and noun phrases to build an image of a skewed reality that the Self is good and the Other is bad. The negative establishment of the Other is achieved via his use of nouns and noun phrases to refer to the protestors' actions using words like *"Riot," "disruption," "damage," "take to the streets"*. Ben Ali also uses nouns to refer to the protestors such as *"masked gangs", "a few opponents", "spoilers" "hooligans"*, and many others.

The Other is negatively constructed to the extent that they are perceived as dangerous to the "innocent people" who are good because they do not go out to the street and who are frequently described by Ben Ali as "*sons and daughters,*" *"We console them with sincere love for all our sons and daughters, without difference"*. Such language employment in presenting a good citizen who has "suffered damage" and a bad citizen who has caused this damage seems to be an essential part of Ben Ali's nomination strategy. This dichotomy is strengthened by attributing bad qualities to the Other and their acts via the predication strategy. Ben Ali assigns qualities and characteristics like *"extremists," "deceivers," "malevolent parties," "hostile satellite channels," "desperate," "violent and bloody,"* and *"false."* All of these negative qualities are utilized to emphasize the Otherness and negatively represent it, which ultimately serves the goal of delegitimizing the Other. This can be explained as an attempt to discredit the protestors and make excuses to use force against them.

The intensification discursive strategy is also occasionally used by Ben Ali to stress the negativity of the Other, and to make it and its impact more explicit, while also nuancing his

description of the Self. For example, Ben Ali refers to the protestors as "extremists". By exaggeratedly defining the protestors this way, he intends to criminalize the protestors and the demonstrations and to depict them and their actions as illegal. In comparison, he euphemistically uses the adjective "عائلات معوزة" "*needy families*" instead of saying "عائلات فقيرة" "*poor families*" to lessen its effect and to strategically shorten the distance between him and his people. He also employs the mitigation strategy to negatively represent the other. For example, in the noun phrase "حالة يأس فردية" "*individual desperate case*", Ben Ali's employment of this noun phrase can be explained as an attempt to underestimate what Bouzizi did (when he set himself on fire after the policewoman humiliated him and broke his cart). By degrading this incident, Ben Ali is attempting to prevent the rest of the unemployed youth from being influenced by what this man did to himself. He attempts to convince the addressees that his case is just a single case that had its own special social and psychological conditions. He actually denies the reality that the percentage of unemployment in his country is the highest in the north African countries (ILO report, 2010), and attempts to underestimate the real economic problems that his people are experiencing. By manipulating language this way, new realities are constructed where the Self is represented as "civilized, "educated and cultured", whereas the Other is represented as being an "extremist" and a "deceiver" to achieve the two ends of legitimizing the Self and delegitimizing the Other.

As it is clear from the above discussion, the three discursive strategies in Ben Ali's second speech have different functions from those in his first speech. In his second speech, Ben Ali generally uses the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation for two main functions. In response to the growing opposition to his administration, Ben Ali takes a defensive stance, so he uses these strategies to redirect criticism in order to legitimize his actions.

At the same time, he seeks to pacify critics by offering assurances of improvements. Nevertheless, he keeps his authoritative tone by focusing on his responsibility to maintain stability.

6.4 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 3

By using colloquial Tunisian Arabic for the first time in his last speech, Ben Ali reaffirmed his Tunisian identity before he fled the country. He also re-affirmed the national identity of those who love Tunisia, those who have the same language and traditions. By emphasizing the common identity between him and his audience, he seeks sympathy from Tunisians. In this speech, Ben Ali is involved in a continuous process of identity construction by utilizing these strategies in his last speech. Most of the construction of this identity is accomplished via the use of the nomination strategy while the predication strategy is mainly used to attribute and predicate specific traits to the Self and the Other. Ben Ali uses inoffensive and neutral language to nominate and predicate the Self, and prejudicial and inimical language for the Other. Table (C) in Appendix B contains the counted examples on each strategy.

As shown in table (C), Ben Ali employs the nomination strategy to create an in-group of true Tunisians who did not cause "violence" and "vandalism" and an out-group of "thugs that took advantage of the circumstances" by using nouns, noun phrases and verb phrases to denote the various actions of the two groups. Through the nomination strategy he emphasizes the segregation between the in-group members and out-group members by highlighting the concept of a Tunisian. For him, "Tunisian" is a title that refers to those who adhere to Tunisian traditions and who understand the language of all Tunisians. For example, he uses sentences like "*Violence is not ours,*" and "*Devastation is not one of the habits of a Tunisian*" to confirm the distance that exists between these two groups and to determine the boundaries of the in-group by refusing the "devastation" and "violence" as actions that cannot be committed by a true Tunisian. Doing so, he

implicitly assigns these actions to the out-group or refers implicitly to the external powers that steer the protesters.

Furthermore, he employs many nominal and verbal phrases to positively represent the Self, "*efforts of all,*" "*Hand in hand for our country," "in response to your demands," "in the service of Tunisia," "justice, honesty and objectivity"* and verb phrases like "*I have understood you," "we were aggrieved," "I offered sacrifices," "we made big efforts to cure," "the support of democracy," "I will work toward protecting the Constitution," "we love Tunisia," "we must protect it," "let us all protect it," "let us all give it peace"* (Ben Ali, 2011). These noun phrases and verb phrases are employed by Ben Ali as a last attempt to gain support and sympathy from Tunisians. He wants to show the need for unity under one Tunisian cause. These linguistic units are explicitly used to socially include the Self, but at the same time they are implicitly used to create social exclusion of the Other. In addition, by pertaining to emotion-loaded nouns and noun phrases like "*Tunisia*" and *Tunisians,*" "*the language of all Tunisians,*" *"Tunisian's traditions,*" Ben Ali strengthens the attitude that the people he has highlighted must defend their country from those "*extremists*" and "*gangs*".

As for the predication discursive strategy, Table (5.10) shows that Ben Ali mainly uses the predication strategy to positively construct the Self. Linguistically, he assigns positive qualities to events, actions and persons that belong to the in-group members. For example, he uses adjectives like "*the civilized Tunisian," "the tolerant Tunisian," "my grief and pain are great," "legitimate peaceful protests," "peaceful demonstration," "framed and organized demonstration," "civilized demonstration," "its peaceful nature,"* and *"the faithful hands."* However, when assigning positive qualities to the Self, Ben Ali at the same time covertly deprives the Other of these qualities

to demonize the Other and strengthen the dichotomy between the Self and the Other. For example, when he says:

والمجال مفتوح من اليوم لحرية التعبير السياسي، ما في ذلك التظاهر السلمي، التظاهر السلمي المؤطر والمنظم، التظاهر الحضاري فلا بأس.

From today, the door is open to freedom of political expression, including peaceful, supervised, and orderly demonstrations, civilized demonstrations, we have no objections.

In the previous example, Ben Ali implies that the demonstrations that happened during the uprisings were not civilized or peaceful. As well, he implicitly blames the protestors and their supporters for the terror and vandalism caused by these demonstrations. He implicitly distances the Self from the Other even in his last speech (where he knew that he would not be back).

Thirdly, he employs the intensification strategy to positively construct the Self as well as implicitly expose the negativity of the Other. In his last speech, Ben Ali mainly relies on metaphor and repetition as tools for intensification. For example, the metaphor "ترميم جراحها" "*the repair of its wounds*" is used to implicitly exaggerate the bad consequences of the protests and blame the protestors for the hurt that Tunisia has undergone. He makes use of this metaphor to accentuate the negative outcomes of the protests.

The second linguistic tool he uses to implement the intensification strategy is repetition. In contrast to the few times he uses repetition in the first two speeches, Ben Ali uses repeated words, sentences, and phrases fourteen times in his last speech and nearly every sentence has a repeated word or phrase. For example, he repeats the sentence "I understood you" five times and "hand in hand" two times in his speech. Ben Ali uses repetition to capture people's attention and forge bonds with them. He also uses repetition particularly in his last speech to convey the idea that they should not dwell on the past but should instead prepare for a promising future that must be created together. However, repetition may not always serve the desired purpose, which in this

case is meant to bring people together and soothe the situation. This is congruous with what Kuhl and Anderson (2011) maintain. They argue that "massive, continuous repetition of the sort employed in studies of semantic situation not only fails to further improve memory, but actually reverses and eliminates the benefits that brief periods of repetition impart on long-term semantic memory" (Kuhl and Anderson 2011: 971). Therefore, the feeling of skepticism among the listeners may be increased when they listen to such repetitions.

As the above discussion shows, in his last speech, Ben Ali makes a drastic shift in his use of discursive strategies. As the events on the ground evolved to massive demonstrations demanding that Ben Ali resign, his last speech exhibits sign of desperation as he tries to regain control and reaffirm his authority. He uses the discursive strategies to reassert his dominance by utilizing a combination of both conciliation and threats. Nevertheless, the speech has a diminished level of assurance (this justifies his excessive use of repetition) compared to his two previous speeches, suggesting a declining hold on authority.

Finally, the evolution in the functions served by the discursive strategies in Ben Ali's speeches during the Arab Spring is summarized in Table (6.4) below.

Table (6.1): The Shift in the Functions Served by the Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's Speeches

Speech	**Functions of Discursive strategies**
Speech 1	Denial, Demonstrating Authority, Maintaining Security and stability.
Speech 2	Defense, Criticism Redirection, Offering Assurances.
Speech 3	Desperation, Reconciliation, Desperate attempts to regain power.

As shown in Table (6.4), the analysis shows that Ben Ali's speeches given during the Arab Spring uprisings demonstrate a noticeable progression in his use of the discursive strategies and the functions served by the positive construction of the Self and the negative construction of the Other. As his government encounters more difficult situations, Ben Ali's use of discursive strategies undergoes a transformation, transitioning from denial and showing authority, to defense and offering assurances, and ultimately to desperate attempts to regain power and reconciliation.

6.5 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 1

This section analyzes the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation in the first speech of Mubarak during the Arab Spring uprisings. This use is illustrated in Table (D) in Appendix B. As Table (D) illustrates, Hosni Mubarak employs the discursive strategies in his first speech to frame the in-group and out-group dichotomy. However, when constructing the Self and the Other, in his first speech Mubarak relies on legitimizing the Self through highlighting its positivity more than through showing the negativity of the Other (in contrast to Ben Ali's strategies in his first and second speech). Consequently, he employs these strategies to positively construct the Self and sometimes to negatively represent the Other.

First, the nomination strategy in Mubarak's speech 1 is manipulated via the use of nouns and noun phrases to distinguish his in-group from the out-group. He particularly makes use of binary classifications to achieve this distinction. For example, he makes use of the noun phrases "*the integrity of the intent and the interest of the country"* in contrast to *"the attempts of some to conjure up the wave of these demonstrations and trade slogans*." This sharp contrast between the actions of the Self and the actions of the Other in the same sentence is intended to draw bold boundaries between the two groups and to highlight the different intentions of them both. He uses

the former to portray his in-group actions as good whereas the latter is used to portray the out-group's actions as bad. Also, in order to attribute specific good traits to the members of his in-group and bad traits to his out-group, he employs binary opposites. For example, he says: "*A fine line separates **freedom** from **chaos**," "I adhere to the same extent **to preserving Egypt's security and stability**, and not to **drag it and its people into dangerous slips**,"* and *"What we seek will not be achieved by resorting to **violence**, nor will it be achieved by **chaos**, but by **national dialogue** and **sincere hard work**"* (Mubarak, 28 January, 2011). Mubarak utilizes binary opposites to identify the Other as being completely different from the Self (a divisive tactic). This use can be explained as an attempt to rally Egyptians against the protestors whom he portrays as causing harm to Egypt.

Furthermore, Mubarak achieves this distinction between the Self and the Other via verb phrases to refer to the actions of in-group and out-group members. For example, he says: *"riots **threaten** the regime and **impede** the daily life of citizens,*" in contrast to "*with awareness, work and struggle, we **preserve** what we have achieved, **build** on it, and **nurture** in our minds and consciences the future of the country,*" and "*He **takes** responsibility for this country"* (Mubarak, 28 January, 2011). This distinction can be explained as an attempt to dissuade people from joining the protests.

Second, the predication strategy is manipulated via the extensive use of inclusive pronouns. In his first speech, Mubarak positively constructed the Self via the excessive use of the pronouns I and We in contrast to You or They. For example, he uses the pronoun I 29 times and We 28 times, whereas They is used seven times only. Via this employment of pronouns, he determines the boundaries around his in-group and separates it from the out-group. This use thus neglects and almost totally excludes the existence of the Other. It also can be seen as an effort to win over the

public and unite the Egyptians behind him. He also makes use of many adjectives that positively portray the Self, such as "*a **free and democratic** Egyptian society," "preserving a **stable and secure** Egypt," "**civilized** people," "**Serious and honest** stance," "**innocent** victims," "**Peaceful** demonstration,"* and *"**wide** spaces.*" Depicting the in-group members and their actions this way not only helps Mubarak in constructing a 'good' in-group but it also allows him to strengthen the 'bad' aspect of the Other.

Lastly, Mubarak relies on repetition and metaphor as tools of an intensification/mitigation strategy. His extensive use of repetition is indicative in his first speech. For example, "chaos" is repeated six times in Mubarak's first speech. Repetition is used in this case as a tool of emphasis and persuasion. The word "chaos" was repeated to highlight the bad impact of the protests and to arouse the feeling of fear among the audience which, at the same time, can be considered a strategy to negatively represent the Other. On the other hand, he makes use of repetition to positively represent the actions of the Self. For example, the word "freedom" "حرية", "حر", "حريات" and its derivatives are repeated seven times and the noun phrase "new steps" "خطوات جديدة" is also repeated four times in the same paragraph as in the example below:

*The path of reform we have chosen is irreversible and we will move forward with **new steps** that confirm our respect for the stability of the judiciary and its rulings, **new steps** towards more democratization and more freedom for citizens, **new steps** to curb unemployment, raise the standard of living, develop services, and **new steps** to stand on the side of the poor and low-income people* (Mubarak, 28 January 2011).

إن طريق الاصلاح الذي اخترناه لا رجوع عنه اقو ارتداد الى الوراء، سنمضي عليه **بخطوات جديدة** تؤكد احترامنا لاستقرار القضاء واحكامه، **خطوات جديدة** نحو المزيد من الديمقراطية والمزيد من الحرية للمواطنين، **خطوات جديدة** لمحاصرة البطاله ورفع مستوى المعيشة وتطويرالخدمات، **وخطوات جديدة** للوقوف الى جانب الفقراءومحدودي الدخل (مبارك، 28 كانون الثاني، 2011).

The repetition in the previous example is used by Mubarak to convince the audience that his regime is democratic, open to reform, and listens to his people's demands. It can be argued that he makes

use of repetition to hammer home his point in the hopes of convincing and deterring the demonstrators from proceeding with their actions.

Another tool used for intensification is the cognate object or accusative object. The cognate object, which is called in Arabic المفعول المطلق (absolute object), is defined as "constructions in which a normally intransitive verb occurs with what appears to be a direct-object noun phrase whose head noun is the event or state nominalization of the verb" (Johns, 1988: 89). "I hit a hit" is a good example of this case. al Fahdawi defines it as an object that is mentioned after a verb in order to confirm its meaning, a statement of its number, a statement of its type, or instead of pronouncing the verb twice (al Fahdawi, 2020). Mubarak uses such constructions twice. He says: "انحزت كل الأنحياز" and "أسفت كل الأسف" which can be literally translated as "I sided all sidedness" and "I am sorry all the sorry" respectively. In Arabic, the cognate object's purposes are to emphasize the verb or to specify the kind and the number of the verb (al Fahdawi, 2020). Grammarians agree that the absolute object or the cognate object may be used for confirmation because when the speaker just says "I hit", the listener may doubt whether the speaker hit something or not. However, after you come up with a confirmed object a second time, such as saying "you hit a hit", the absolute object is used for an important reason because when you use the cognate object, you give the listener certainty and reassurance that you did what you said you would, and that you are not lying to him (ibid). Therefore, in the previous examples, it is clear that Mubarak employs cognate object constructions to add emphasis and to reinforce the message he wants to convey.

To sum up, Mubarak manipulates the use of the three discursive strategies to achieve the end of positive representation of the Self (even through negatively representing the Other) for the purpose of de/legitimizing the Self/Other. What is indicative in his speech is his reliance on

opposites and contrast between words. This can be explained as an attempt to instill fear in the audience by discussing the security risks posed by the projected escalation of protests into more violent incidents in comparison to the state of stability and peace which existed before the events. The use of discursive strategies in Mubarak's first speech illustrates that the positive construction of the Self and the negative construction of the Other achieved by these strategies are employed for two main reasons. During the early stages of the uprisings in his country, by positive construction of the Self, Mubarak establishes an image of power and control. The fear-inducing language (especially via the excessive use of opposites) gives his speech a divisive tone that is employed to discourage more opposition. On the other hand, his negative construction of the Other is employed to downplay the seriousness of the situation, depicting the demonstrations as the result of external intervention to destabilize Egypt.

6.6 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 2.

This subsection will investigate the discursive strategies that Mubarak utilized in his second speech during the uprisings. The occurrences of each strategy are traced in this speech and listed in Table (E) in Appendix B.

As table (E) shows, Mubarak's discursive strategies are mainly employed to positively construct the Self. However, he makes use of some phrases to refer to the Other, who were blamed for the events in Egypt. As for the nomination strategy, he uses phrases like *"who seeks to spread chaos," "driven and dominated by political forces," "and there are some political forces who rejected this call for dialogue," "the corrupt,"* and *"those responsible for what Egypt witnessed"* to explicitly refer to the Other and blame them for the bad consequences of the events. Also, he uses many nouns and noun phrases to refer to the actions committed by the Other. Nouns and noun phrases such as *"acts of provocation, incitement, looting, setting fires, blocking roads, assaulting*

state facilities and public and private property, and storming some diplomatic missions," "chaos," and "*terrorizing the safe*" are employed by Hosni Mubarak to negatively represent the Other and delegitimize them. To emphasize this bad aspect, create an opposition between the members of the in-group and the members of the out-group, and distinguish the Self from the Other, he utilizes binary opposites as in the following excerpt "**الاستقرار و الفوضى** بين ما الاختيار", "*choosing between chaos and stability*".

Secondly, predication is manipulated through the use of adjectives. Mubarak followed the rule that to create an evil Other, you need to emphasize that the Self is vulnerable to the unfairness of the Other. Through the use of adjectives like *"unfortunate," "painful," "difficult,"* and *"cruel,"* Mubarak portrays the actions of the Other as aggressive and threatening to the security and the future of Egyptians. On the other hand, he makes use of adjectives like *"sophisticated," "civilized," "peaceful,"* and *"legitimate"* to depict the actions of the Self as cooperative and civilized. This utilization of adjectives is intended to ascribe specific positive traits to members of his in-group and bad traits to the out-group members (i.e. demonstrators). Additionally, through this strategy of predication, he achieves the positive appraisal of the Self.

Intensification is apparent through the use of quasi-synonymous words, especially those Mubarak utilizes to refer to the recent events in Egypt. For example, he uses noun phrases like "*difficult times, stressful events, tough tests, painful days"* which are all used to portray the negativity of the protests. Also, the quasi-synonymous words "*discomfort," "anxiety,"* and *"obsessions*" in the sentence *"what hurts our hearts the most is the fear that gripped the vast majority of Egyptians, and the discomfort, anxiety, and obsessions they felt about what tomorrow would bring"* are used to refer to the bad consequences the protests caused for people. The function

of repetition here is to emphasize the bad impact of the actions of the Other (i.e. the protestors) and to persuade his in-group members to stand against them.

As illustrated in the above discussion, although Mubarak's announcement about not intending to run for a new presidential term and his promise to make constitutional reforms gives his speech a tone of reconciliation, the positive construction of the Self and negative construction of the Other achieved by the discursive strategies showed that his second speech is even more divisive. This was clear from his use of binary opposites in almost every proposition of his speech.

6.7 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 3

The discursive strategies that Mubarak utilizes in his last speech during the uprisings are investigated in this sub-section. The occurrences of each strategy are traced in this speech and listed in Table (F) in Appendix B. As Table (F) shows, Mubarak uses the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification to positively construct the Self and negatively construct the Other. As for the nomination strategy, he makes use of nouns and noun phrases like *"talk from the heart," "a father's talk to his children," "my response to your voice," "commitment," "listening to the youth of my country,"* and *"responding to it"* (which recurred frequently in Mubarak's last speech) to verify the view that the Self is democratic and open to change, in contrast to the Other who is a traitor and steered by "*foreign dictations.*" On the other hand, many nouns and noun phrases are used to negatively represent the Other. Nouns and noun phrases like *"foreign dictates," "excuses," "justifications," "fault," "embarrassment," "the outside," "foreign pressures," "the plot of the plotters," "the gloating," "followings"* and "*those who committed crimes"* are employed by Mubarak to criminalize the Other and to show that the Other is a threat to the Self and its unity and security. Through this use of negative nouns and noun phrases, he created borders between his in-group of true Egyptians who have the values of *"loyalty*

to the homeland", "sacrificing for it", and *"defending its land"* and the out-group of foreign-led traitors.

Additionally, Mubarak uses verb phrases like *"I will not be complacent," "I will be held accountable," "I pledged," "I tell you," "I declared in terms that do not tolerate controversy or interpretation," "I presented a specific vision to get out of the current crisis," "I gave my instructions," "yesterday I received the first report"* and *"I submitted a request to amend six constitutional articles"* to confirm that he is the source of authority with absolute power over all Egyptians. This use also reinforces his position as the one and only leader of the Egyptian nation and in a way conveys a message to non-state leaders who are exploiting the events to their advantage to gain power.

Mubarak continues determining the boundaries and reinforcing them via predicating positive attributes to the Self and negative attributes to the Other. He employs positive adjectives like *"innocent," "free and honest," "careful and responsible," "constructive," "correct," "honest,"* and *"conscious and civilized"* to portray the in-group members and their acts whereas negative adjectives like *"difficult," "tragic and sad," "false"* and*" foreign*" are used to represent the out-group members and their acts. This emphasis on the positive characteristics of the Self is meant to expose the negativity of the Other, who is portrayed as causing destruction and being led by foreign actors. This use can be explained as a divisive tactic even though Mubarak knows that this would be his last speech because Mubarak is still rallying Egyptians against protestors and any opposition.

As for the intensification discursive strategy, Mubarak makes use of two tools to employ this strategy. Both repetition and over-lexicalization are used to intensify a certain meaning and

emphasize it. It will be helpful in this regard to define over-lexicalization before delving into the investigation of some examples in Mubarak's speech. Over-lexicalization is defined by Machin and Mayr (2012: 37) as "a sense of over-persuasion and is normally evidence that something is problematic or of ideological contention." As for its function, Mazraani (1997: 265-7) asserts that over-lexicalization is employed in political speeches to influence audiences through the performance of "sentimental and emotional" acts.

In his last speech, Mubarak makes extensive use of over-lexicalization, especially using quasi-synonymous words. Many examples can be listed like the use of the synonyms *"intensity and decisiveness,"* "*bouncing back or turn back,*" "*Excuses and Justifications," "broad and national agreement with a large base," "Sad and Tragic Events that Hurt Our Hearts and Shook the Conscience of the Nation," "Damage and Losses,"* and *"Dispute and Rivalry."* For example, he says:

أقول لكم إن استجابتي لصوتكم و رسالتكم و مطالبكم هو التزام لا رجعة فيه، و إنني عازم كل العزم على الوفاء بما تعهدت به بكل الجدية و الصدق، و حريص كل الحرص على تنفيذه دون **ارتداد** أو **عودة للوراء** (مبارك، 2011).

I am telling you that my response to your voice, your message, and your demands is an irreversible commitment, and I am fully determined to fulfill what I pledged with all seriousness and honesty, and I am very keen to implement it without ***bouncing back or turning back*** (Mubarak, 2011)

The words "ارتداد أو عودة للوراء" (which are literally translated into English as "***bouncing back or turning back***") convey the same meaning which is without hesitation or reconsideration. In this example, Mubarak makes an effort to emphasize his point in the hopes of convincing his in-group members to trust in his plans. It is also possible to assert that repetition in this form has been employed to influence audiences through the performance of sentimental and emotional acts as in the following example:

و فضلاً عن ذلك فأنني إزاء ما فقدناه من شهداء من أبناء مصرفي أحداث **مأساوية حزينة أوجعت قلوبنا وهزت ضمير الوطن**.

In addition to that, the loss of the martyrs of the sons of Egypt ***in sad and tragic events has hurt our hearts and shaken the homeland's conscience.***

In the previous example Mubarak uses synonymous words and phrases to express his deep sorrow for the martyrs, but he implicitly uses it to stress the bad effects of the demonstrations and to blame protestors for these losses.

Furthermore, Mubarak uses repetition by repeating the same lexical item throughout his speech or in the same proposition. For example, he says:

ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر و شعبها، **ستعيش هذه الروح** فينا ما دامت مصر و دام شعبها، **ستعيش** في كل واحد من فلاحينا و عمالنا و مثقفينا، ستبقى في قلوب شيوخنا و شبابنا و أطفالنا، مسلميهم و أقباطهم، و في عقول و ضمائر من لم يولد بعد من أبنائنا.

This spirit will live *in us for as long as Egypt and its people are present,* ***this spirit will live*** *in us as long as Egypt and its people are present,* ***it will live*** *in every one of our peasants, workers and intellectuals, it will remain in the hearts of our old people, youth and children, Muslims and Copts (Christians), and in the minds and consciences of our unborn children.*

The repetition in the previous example is employed by Mubarak at the end of his speech to focus on patriotism and nationalism; these concepts are mentioned and repeated in order to impact Egyptians, whether those in Tahrir Square or his supporters. At this point of the speech, the senses of identity, unity, and belonging are utilized by Mubarak to mobilize the Egyptians to be on his side after his previous failed attempts in earlier speeches.

As the above discussion shows, there is a shift in Mubarak's use of discursive strategies in his last speech when comparing it to his first and second speeches. As the protests escalated and massive demonstrations called for his resignation, Mubarak uses the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation to show acknowledgment and acceptance, although there are some points where he uses the negative construction of the Other. Finally, the

following table (6.2) summarizes Mubarak's use of discursive strategies and the shift that happened over time in his three speeches during the Arab Spring.

Table (6.2): The Shift in the Functions Served by the Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speeches

Speech	**Functions of Discursive strategies**
Speech 1	Establishment of Power and Control, Refusal, Fear-induction, Downplaying the Situation
Speech 2	Covert Calling for Division, Overt Reconciliation
Speech 3	Acknowledgment, Acceptance, Resignation

As shown in table (6.2), as a reaction to the intensifying crisis in his country, Mubarak's use of the discursive strategies has shifted significantly over the course of his three speeches. Mubarak's use of discursive strategies demonstrates his efforts to resolve the swiftly shifting political situation, starting with denial and resistance in the early stages of the uprisings, to even more divisive tactics, and ultimately to acceptance and resignation. It is clear from the analysis above that there is an evolution in the discursive strategies in correlation with the evolution of the social and political factors during the Arab Spring era.

6.8 Analysis of Discursive Strategies in al Qaddafi's Speech

What distinguishes al Qaddafi's speech from the speeches of Mubarak and Ben Ali is the confrontational tone of his speech and his explicitness in attributing blame and accusations. For example, when referring to foreign forces that he believes to be behind the uprisings, al Qaddafi explicitly names Britain, the US, and France in his speech, while Mubarak and Ben Ali prefer

vagueness when referring to foreign agencies. Also, the excessive use of derogatory words and phrases is indicative of al Qaddafi's speech. For example, he uses many animal and nonhuman names to refer to the protestors and those who support them. The occurrences of each strategy are traced in this speech and listed in Table (G) in Appendix B. As Table (G) illustrates, al Qaddafi mainly uses three discursive strategies to negatively represent the Other. However, there are many cases where he employs them to positively construct the Self.

For the nomination (referential) strategy, al Qaddafi makes use of many nouns and noun phrases to negatively construct the Other. He represents the acts of the Other as *"Setback," "rock bottom," "side battles,"* and *"colonialism."* He also portrays the protestors using many derogatory words like *"rats," "germs," "cats,"* and *"mice"* in an attempt to show that he both despises and disdains the protestors. He also refers to the protestors as *"hired," "paid,"* and *"mercenaries"* to explicitly convey that there are foreign agents who support the protestors, and he refers to some Arab media using nouns and noun phrases like "*treason," "collusion," "reactionary,"* and *"cowardice."* He also uses verb phrases like "*betrays you," "presents your image in a way that offends every Libyan man and woman," "distort your image," "serve the devil," "want to insult you," "betrayed us," and "falsify the truth and publish pictures from many years ago"* to refer to the actions of these channels. He mainly employs these nominations to legitimize himself and deny the existence of wide demonstrations in Libya.

On the other hand, nouns and noun phrases like *"challenging Youth," "Libya wants glory," "the summit," "glory to the Libyans," "fighter, mujahid, militant, rebel from the desert from the Badia," "history of resistance, liberation, glory, revolution,"* and *"Muammar Qaddafi's tent, Muammar Qaddafi's house"* are employed by al Qaddafi to positively construct the Self. Furthermore, many verb phrases are employed in al Qaddafi's speech to construct a positive Self.

For instance, he utilizes verbs and verb phrases like *"Libya will remain at the top," "leads Africa," "leads the world," "wants freedom," "resists tyranny," "we resisted the tyranny of America," "we resisted the tyranny of NATO," "we sacrificed ourselves," "we paid dearly for it," "we built a great glory for it," "we show them how the popular revolution looked like," "we want the law to prevail,"* and *"we will prevent it from being achieved"* to portray the Self as a protector of Libya and discredit the actions of the Other. al Qaddafi's use of various nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases shows that, at least for his supporters, the Other includes the protestors, the US, European powers, and Arab traitors who are objects of hatred. Furthermore, what distinguishes his nomination strategy from other leaders during this critical time is his explicit reference to the Other.

al Qaddafi uses the names of some parties who are allegedly internationally considered terrorist groups to justify his resort to force against the protestors. He even uses expressions that represent Islamic physical appearance, in order to implicate the Islamists and distort their image. He, for example, makes use of the names of well-known fundamentalist Islamist personalities like Bin Laden, he first leader of al Qaeda, and al Zarqawi, the head of al Qaeda in Iraq. These two leaders were among the most wanted by the American leadership after the events of 9/11 because they were the most important alleged planners of these attacks. Interestingly, al Qaddafi's references to these names in particular can be explained as a deliberate effort to take advantage of Western concerns about terrorism. In doing so, he attempts be seen as a valued partner in the worldwide fight against extremism in order to gain international support.

In the predication strategy, traits and qualities are assigned to the in-group and out-group members in a manner that strengthened the dichotomy between these two groups. For the out-group, he uses many derogatory and negative adjectives. For example, al Qaddafi makes use of

adjectives like *a "sick few infiltrating cities," "strangers who have no original homeland," "paid and hired," "mercenaries," "given drugs," "bearded," "Few terrorists," "sick," "lousy followers of Al-Zarqawi," "dirty stations," "crazy, drunk children," "rioters," "gangs that do not represent one in a million of the Libyan people,"* and *"anti-democratic forces hostile to freedom."* These labels are attributed to the Other whether they were protestors, the Arab traitor media, or international powers. Such attributes were assigned to the protestors, for instance, to de-rationalize and demonize them. This de-rationalization is needed for the de-legitimization of the protestors and to justify any upcoming violent acts against them. In addition, he particularly uses some adjectives to refer to the Islamists like "*someone with a lousy beard,*" "*bearded,*" and "*al Zarqawi's lousy followers.*" Using these words, al Qaddafi refers to the Islamists with the images of whom he is attempting to alarm the Libyans by claiming that they had previously wished to harm Libya by transforming it into an Islamic state.

To polarize the situation with a bitter conflict between his supporters and his opponents, al Qaddafi also uses positive qualities to portray himself, the in-group members and their acts. He employs many adjectives such as *"A fighter, mujahid, a rebel from the tent, from the desert," "this victorious march cannot be disrupted," "honorable Libyan tribes," "Free Officers,"* and *"A deaf rock, a solid rock on which America's fleets were wrecked."* This dichotomy appeared clearly when al Qaddafi assigned *"the Free Unionist Officers" and "Free officer whose tribe gathered around him"* to his in-group members and "*terrorist few"* and "*America's agents"* to out-group members to show that each group has totally different features and serves different aims.

Repetition is the main tool that al Qaddafi uses to intensify his messages. Repetition in his speech is used either to persuade the protestors to support him or to dissuade them from carrying out their acts. For example, to emphasize his legitimacy, al Qaddafi repeats the word "الملايين"

"*millions*" to highlight the message that he was supported by millions of people whether in Libya, the African deserts or the World, as in the following examples:

أنا «معمر القذافي» قائد أممي ؛ أنا تدافع عني الملايين. أنا سنوجه نداء للملايين من الصحراء إلى الصحراء، وسنزحف أنا والملايين، لتطهير ليبيا.
I am Muammar al Qaddafi, an international leader. I'm championed by millions. I will appeal to millions from the desert to the desert, and I will march with millions, to purify Libya.

أنا معي الملايين، ومعي الله الذي نصرني على القوى العظمى الكبرى.
Millions of people are with me, and God is with me, who gave me victory over the great superpowers.

معي الملايين ليس من الداخل ؛ معي الملايين من الأمم الأخرى.
Millions are with me, not only from the inside; they are millions from other nations.

أنا أستطيع توجيه نداء إلى كل ملايين الصحراء، من الصحراء إلى الصحراء ستزحف الملايين.. الملايين تزحف ؛ ولن يستطيع أحد أن يوقفها.
I can call all the millions of deserts. From desert to desert, millions will march, Millions will march; and no one will be able to stop them.

Furthermore, al Qaddafi repeats words like *"beards," "turbans," "Ibn Laden,"* or *"al Zawahiri"* to emphasize the message that Islamists are behind the uprisings and the overall violence in Libya. He repeats the word "*beard*" five times in his speech. The repetition of such a word is used to rally the Libyans against the protestors, who are assumed by al Qaddafi to be Islamists. Therefore, this implicitly demonizes the Islamists since they are believed to have committed such violent acts and this imagery might assist al Qaddafi in legitimizing his use of force against them (since this group is claimed to be a terrorist group by the international community).

As for mitigation, al Qaddafi mitigates the protestors in two ways. First, he uses many derogatory words to disparage the protestors, especially when he uses the names of some animals in referring to the protestors. For examples he makes use of words like *rats, mice, cats,* and *lice*. Second, al Qaddafi underestimates the number of the protestors, their mental eligibility and maturity. He belittles the number of the protestors through the use of the word "*few*" and a number of synonymous expressions. For example, he says:

هم **قلة** إرهابية تريد أن تحول ليبيا إلى إمارات تبع الظواهري أو تبع بن لادن.

*They are **a few** terrorists who want to turn Libya into an UAE that follows al-Zawahiri or follows bin Laden*

هناك مجموعة **قليلة** مريضة مندسة في المدن ، تعطي الحبوب ؛ وأحيانا حتى النقود ، لهؤلاء **الشبان الصغار اليافعين**.

*There are **a few** sick people in the cities who give pills, sometimes even money, to these **young men.***

وأنتم **حفنة** على الأصابع، تُرهب بنغازي؟!

*You are a **bunch** counted on fingers, terrorizing Benghazi!!*

ماذا أصابكم ما هذا الخوف ما هذا الرعب من هذه العصابات إنها عصابات مثل الجرذان ، لا تمثل شيئا ؛ **لا تمثل واحد على المليون من الشعب الليبي** ؛ لا تساوي شيئا ، فهم **حفنة** من الشبان الذين يقلدون الذي يجري في تونس وفي مصر

*What has happened to you? What is this fear? What is this horror of these gangs? They are gangs like rats, they represent nothing, **they do not represent one in a million of the Libyan people**; they are worth nothing, they are a **handful** of young people who imitate what is happening in Tunisia and in Egypt.*

The expressions "*a few," "a handful" and "a bunch of crazy people*" are used by al Qaddafi to emphasize that the demonstrations are not a true representation of Libyan citizens but rather a small group of immature young people who have been steered by foreign actors.

Another way through which he de-rationalizes and mitigates the protestors is by questioning the protestors' mental competence, and ages. For example, he said:

عويلة صغار أعطوهم دبابات ، يجوبون بها شوارع بنغازي ، بعد أن **دوخوهم** ؛ **أسكروهم** ، **أعطوهم الحبوب** ، وعزلوهم عن أهلهم .

Young children were given tanks to ride around the streets of Benghazi after they had been drugged, intoxicated, given pills, and isolated from their families.

أأطفال مهووسون سكرانين ؛ وعندهم سلاح ورشاشات

Drunk obsessed kids who have guns and machine guns

إسحبوا **أطفالكم** من الشارع ؛ إسحبوا **أطفالكم** منهم ، فلقد أخذوا منكم **أطفالكم** ؛ يعبئونهم ؛ **يسكرونهم** ويقولون لهم (إذهبوا إلى النار لكي يموتوا أولادكم)

Take your children out of the street; take your children out of them, they have taken your children from you; mobilize them; get them drunk and say to them (go to the fire so that your children die).

بنغازي تحتضر ؛ تموت ؛ مرعوبة من الأسلحة التي في يد الأطفال الصغار

Benghazi is dying; dying; terrified by the weapons in the hands of young children.

al Qaddafi used words like "*children,*" "*drunk,*" and "*drugged*" to convey the message that the protestors are immature and unaware of their actions, and that they are pressured into committing these crimes by those who gave them drugs. This concept was also intensified via repetition. For example, al Qaddafi reiterated the words "*children," "drugs"*, and *"drunk*" twelve times, eleven times and two times respectively.

To sum it up, al Qaddafi's use of the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation is mainly employed to negatively represent the Other and delegitimize them. His use of derogatory nouns and adjectives is indicative, especially when he wanted to present an image of irrational protestors and to distort their image by attributing adjectives like "drugged" and "sick" which are repeated many times throughout his speech. This explicitness in accusations gives his speech a confrontational tone that makes it distinctive from other leaders' speeches.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter aims at analyzing seven political speeches of the Arab leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi who were overthrown during the Arab Spring uprisings. After this in-depth analysis of these speeches, it is important to summarize how the Other/Self is de/legitimized through the use of the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation in the examined political speeches, especially since they were given under similar conditions and for similar reasons.

It appears that these discursive strategies regularly portray the members of the in-group as flawless members and sometimes vulnerable victims while the members of the out-group are portrayed as a source of threat and thus become the target of accusations and blame. Regarding

the speeches of both Ben Ali and Mubarak, the evolution in the use of these discursive strategies was discussed to show how the progress of the events influenced the functions served by these strategies in each different speech. For example, there was a shift in the function served by these three discursive strategies between the first speeches and the last speeches of both Ben Ali and Mubarak. In their first speeches, these strategies were almost always used for denial and establishing authority whereas in the last speeches these strategies were used to elicit sympathy, exhibiting a lot of desperation in their speeches, particularly with the extensive use of repetition.

The analysis of discursive strategies in the speeches of the three leaders shows that they relied more on the nomination strategy to positively present the Self. Furthermore, they all employed this strategy to create Us/Them categorization. This categorization was achieved by the use of nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrase to positively nominate the Self and sometimes to negatively nominate the Other. On the other hand, it is noted that the three leaders relied more on the predication strategy to negatively represent the Other (i.e. the protestors). They used this discursive strategy extensively when they wanted to harshly criticize the protestors because the use of adjectives for descriptions was more direct and overt. As for intensification, all three leaders relied on repetition as a tool of intensification mainly to gain sympathy and support from their audience.

In terms of differences, Mubarak, for example, was distinguished in the employment of the intensification strategy. For example, his excessive use of cognate objects was indicative in his three speeches as a tool of intensification. He mainly used this tool to add emphasis and to reinforce the message he wanted to convey. In addition, to identify the Other as being completely different from the Self, Mubarak relied on binary opposites in his speeches a number of times, whereas Ben Ali and al Qaddafi did not use this tool. As for al Qaddafi, he was distinguished in his use of

explicit derogatory words and adjectives to refer to and describe the Other. His use of non-human and animal names was indicative. He mainly used this kind of language to discredit the protestors. This explicitness was not noted in either Ben Ali's or Mubarak's speeches.

Chapter Seven-Analysis of Ideological Strategies in the Political Speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi

7.1 Introduction

The ideological strategies in the seven political speeches delivered by the ex-presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, and al Qaddafi of Libya during the Arab Spring will be analyzed and discussed in this chapter. van Dijk (1998: 69) argues that the majority of ideologies have a very broad polarization schema in which Us and Them stand in opposition, asserting that there is a clash between the Self and the Other. This polarization is achieved by what van Dijk (1998) calls the 'ideological square' where the four moves of "emphasize Our good things, emphasize Their bad things, de-emphasize Our bad things and de-emphasize Their good things" are utilized to reinforce this polarization and to achieve the social inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other.

It is clear that the three leaders employ these ideological moves in their political speeches to justify specific political preferences. van Dijk (1998, 2006) suggests a number of sub-strategies through which the four ideological moves are realized and that are used to achieve social inclusion/exclusion of the Self/Other. These strategies are authorization, comparison, blame attribution, moral evaluation or justification, narrativization, (self) victimization, Us/Them polarization, metaphor, example/illustration, metaphor (personification), and euphemism. These strategies also convey the speakers' perspectives and how they frame social actors and their acts in discourse.

7.2 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Ben Ali's speech 1.

A close reading of Ben Ali's first speech shows that the dichotomy between the Self and the Other was constructed via the use of the ideological strategies of narrativization, attribution of blame, moral evaluation and self-victimization.

Firstly, Ben Ali started his speech by narrating the events of Sidi Bouzid as:

لقد تابعت بانشغال ما شهدته سيدي بو زيد من احداث خلال الأيام المنقضية. ولأن كان منطلق هذه الاحداث حالة اجتماعية نتفهم ظروفها و عواملها النفسية.

I followed with concern the events that the city of Sidi Bouzid witnessed in the last few days even though the starting point of these events was a social situation whose conditions and psychological factors we understand.

Through this narration, Ben Ali linked specific incident and its results to future needed acts. This narration was employed to prepare the ground for the way in which the police dealt with the protests in order to make these actions seem justifiable and legitimate.

Secondly, Ben Ali employs the strategy of attribution of blame as in the following excerpt:

كما نأسف لما خلفته تلك الاحداث من أضرار و أن ما انخذته من أبعاد مبالغ فيها بسبب الاستغلال السياسي لبعض الاطراف الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم و يلجأون إلى بعض التلفزات الأجنبية التي تبث الأكاذيب و المغالطات دون تحرٍ بل باعتماد التهويل و التحريض و التجني الأعلامي العدائي لتونس.

We also regret the damage that those events occasioned and the exaggerated dimensions that they took owing to their having been exploited politically by some parties that do not want benefaction to their country, and resorted to some foreign TV channels that broadcast lies and deception without investigation, using alarmism, incitement, and false accusatory information inimical to Tunisia.

To achieve the inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other, Ben Ali utilized blame attribution strategy to portray the protestors and "some parties" as guilty because they "do not want benefaction for their country".

Thirdly, he attributed some negative moral values to the protestors to justify excluding them socially. An example of this is when Ben Ali says:

كما أن لجوء أقليةٍ من **المتطرفين** و **المحرضين المأجورين** ضد مصالح بلادهم إلى العنف والشغب في الشارع وسيلة للتعبير امر مرفوض في دولة القانون.

*Thus, the recourse of a minority of **extremists** and **hired instigators** against the interests of their country to violence and rioting in the street as a means of expression, whatever its forms are, is unacceptable in a nation of rights.*

According to society order, the values of disloyalty and incitement are considered bad values. Assigning these values to the protestors distances them from the rest of society and ultimately delegitimizes their demands and acts.

Another strategy that Ben Ali uses to support the existence of social inclusion of the Self and social exclusion of the Other was by Self-victimization. For example, he says:

لا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال رغم تفهمنا ان نقبل ركوب حالاتٍ فردية أو أي هدف أو وضع طارئ لتحقيق مآرب سياسوية على حساب مصالح المجموعة الوطنية ومكاسبها وانجازاتها وفي مقدمتها الوئام والامن والأستقرار.

We can by no means, in spite of our understanding, accept the exploitation of single individual case, any event, or an emergent situation to attain politicized goals at the expense of the national community's interests, acquisitions, and accomplishments, at the forefront of which are cohesion, security, and stability.

In this example, Ben Ali intends to justify the acts of his government during the uprisings and to arouse the emotions of fear among the listeners by talking about the Self as a victim of the protests as in "*attain politicized goals at the expense of the national community's interests"*. This ideological move is implicitly employed to justify the government's acts in suppressing the protests. Ben Ali makes strategic use of these strategies in his first speech mainly to delegitimize and even demonize the Other (i.e. the protestors).

7.3 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech2

The key strategy of social inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other is used by the former president Ben Ali in his second speech to persuade the Tunisians to support him and accept the plans of reform that he mentions in this speech. To achieve this goal, Ben Ali utilizes a number of ideological strategies in his second speech, such as narrativization, blame attribution, moral evaluation, and comparison.

As in his first speech, he starts his second speech by employing the narrativization strategy. For example, he says:

أيها المواطنون أيتها المواطنات في الداخل والخارج، أتوجه اليوم إليكم على إثر ما شهدته بعض المدن والقرى بعدد من الجهات الداخلية من أحداث شغب وتشويش وأضرار بالأملاك العمومية والخاصة. أحداث عنيفة دامية أحيانا أدت إلى وفاة مدنيين وإصابة عدد من رجال الأمن قامت بها عصابات ملثمة أقدمت على الاعتداء ليلا على مؤسسات عمومية وحتى على مواطنين في منازلهم في عمل إرهابي لا يمكن السكوت عنه.

Male citizens, female citizens at home and abroad, I address you today after the rioting, disturbance, and damage to public and private property that have been witnessed by some cities and villages in some internal regions. Violent bloody events, led to the death of civilians and the injury of some policemen. Events that were performed by veiled gangs that attacked by night public institutions and even citizens in their homes in a terrorist manner that cannot be tolerated.

Narrating these events this way by focusing on the threat that such events may have on people's life and properties is strategic. This narration is offered to justify and highlight the need for violence that the police perpetrated on the protestors and to legitimize the following actions and plans the government intended to apply.

Secondly, after narrating the "*violent bloody events*", Ben Ali moves on to blame certain unknown "*hands that did not abstain from implicating our children, students and unemployed young people*" for these events (Ben Ali, 10-1-2011). Through attributing blame, he manipulates the addressees to seek support and attention, and to delegitimize the protestors and even demonize them.

Thirdly, Ben Ali's justification for social inclusion of the Self and exclusion of the Other is accomplished through the utilization of moral evaluation. In this process many attributes like "*hostile," "deceivers," "hired people," "rioters," "destroyers"* are assigned to the protestors to mobilize the public against the protestors and delegitimize them and their protests.

Finally, Ben Ali uses the strategy of pragmatic comparisons that depends on attributing blame to the Other and arousing fear in the listeners. For example, he says:

إن كل هذه السياسات والبرامج تعتبر في مستوى السياسات المعتمدة في بلدان العالم **التي تعانى كلها من البطالة فالبطالة ليست حكرا على تونس ولا تونس هي الأسوأ حالا بالنسبة إلى غيرها في هذا المجال**

All these policies and programs are considered at the level of the policies adopted in the countries of the world, ***which all suffer from unemployment***. ***Unemployment is not exclusive to Tunisia, and Tunisia is not the worst off compared to others in this field***

In the previous example, the comparison is made between Tunisia and the rest of the world in having the problem of unemployment. This strategy is used by Ben Ali to make the economic situation in Tunisia seem justifiable and to persuade the targeted audience that the actions of the protestors are unjustifiable since similar situations exist in all societies. Ben Ali also uses contrastive adjectives as in the following excerpt:

بلد موارده ذكاء أبنائه وبناته الذين راهنا عليهم دوما ومازلنا لأننا نفضل مجابهة التحديات وصعابها بشعب مثقف على الأمان الوهمي بشعب جاهل.

A country whose wealth is the intelligence of its sons and daughters on whom we have always been making a bet because we prefer to face up to challenges and difficulties with a ***cultured people rather than bet on illusory hope with an ignorant people***

Using this type of comparison, Ben Ali depicts his in-group members as "*cultured*" and the out-group members as "*ignorant,*" in order to emphasize that the actions of violence, rioting, terrorism, and extremism are related to those who are ignorant rather than cultured. Also, he strengthens the dichotomy of Us and Them and widens the distance between the two camps.

7.4 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech3.

In his last speech, Ben Ali reaches a point where he portrays the situation in Tunisia as being polarized between the members of the in-group and the out-group (the two camps of Us and Them). He uses three ideological strategies to achieve this polarization. Ben Ali depends more on emotion arousing strategies, comparison and contrast, and narrativization strategies.

Emotion arousing phrases are intentionally and extensively used by Ben Ali in his last speech. He makes use of such phrases to reinforce the existence of Us and Them polarization and

to sway public opinion at the same time, especially when these emotion arousing phrases are sometimes accompanied by phrases of blame attribution. For example:

اليد في اليد من أجل بلادنا، اليد في اليد من أجل أمان كل أولادنا

hand in hand for of our country, hand in hand for all our children's security.

ولم أقبل يوما و ما نقبلش باش تسيل قطرة دم واحدة من دماء التونسيين

Never did I one day, I will not accept one drop of blood to flow from Tunisians' blood.
The repetition of such messages in his last speech can induce emotions - sometimes emotions of fear - and lead the audience to certain actions like rallying around their leader.

Another ideological strategy employed by Ben Ali in his last speech to socially include the Self and exclude the Other is comparison and contrast. Ben Ali uses phrases like *"vandalism," "violence," "looting," "burglary," "assault," "forbidden," "disgraceful,"* and *"criminal"* to portray the actions of the Other as aggressive and against Tunisian' tradition. He compares this Other with the Self using phrases like "*Joint efforts of all," "Hand in hand for the sake of our country," "in the service of the country," "Cooperation of all,"* and *"Civilized demonstration"* to portray the acts of his in-group as cooperative and civilized. Using this contrast in depicting the Self and the Other, Ben Ali reminds his audience of the bad actions committed by the protestors and their allies in order to encourage them to refrain from supporting the protestors and to continue to support the president and his government.

Finally, Ben Ali makes use of the narrativization strategy, but in this speech the narrative is different from the previous two speeches. He makes reference to his individual record in serving Tunisia.

حزني والمي كبيران لاني مضيت أكثر من 50 سنة من عمرى في خدمة تونس في مختلف المواقع من الجيش الوطني الى المسؤوليات المختلفة و23 سنة على رأس الدولة

My sadness and pain are great because I have spent more than 50 years of my life serving Tunisia in various positions, from the national army to various responsibilities, and 23 years as a head of state.

وقدمت التضحيات و مانحبش نعددها

I made sacrifices and I do not want to enumerate them.

Ben Ali depicts himself as a magnanimous ruler who left no stone unturned in serving his country. Also, his reference to the sacrifices he made for his country can be explained as an attempt to seek sympathy from the audience and remind it that he is part of the Tunisian community.

As the above discussion shows, Ben Ali uses different ideological strategies to socially include the Self and socially exclude the Other in each speech for different purposes. Table (7.1) below summarizes this use.

Table (7.1): The Ideological Strategies used in Ben Ali's Speeches

Speech	Ideological Strategy
Speech 1	Narrativization, Blame attribution, Moral Evaluation, Self-victimization
Speech 2	Narrativization, Blame attribution, Moral Evaluation, Comparison
Speech 3	Emotion arousing, Comparison, Narrativization, Moral Evaluation

At the early stages of the events in his country, Ben Ali used narrative and blame attribution along with self-victimization to frame the protests as violent acts to justify the use of force against the protestors. As the protest escalated, Ben Ali needed comparison to justify his government's failure (regarding the unemployment dilemma) along with evaluating the out-group members according to the morals assigned by him. While he and his government were on the verge of collapse, Ben Ali, in his last speech, changed the narrative into one that lists his personal sacrifices for his country

(which is identical to that of Mubarak in his last speech) which made his last speech more emotive than the previous ones.

7.5 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 1

In his first speech, Mubarak creates an ideological representation of the in-group and out-group in which the former is overwhelmingly positive and the latter is portrayed negatively. It is possible to interpret Mubarak's in-group preference as a general strategy used for "face keeping" as described by van Dijk (van Dijk, 1998). His consistent portrayal of the Other in a bad light is yet another strategy employed for his polarization of the in-group and the out-group. Mubarak makes use of narrativization, fear-arousing statements, comparison, and authorization as ideological strategies to achieve the social inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other.

لقد تابعت أولا بأول التظاهرات و ما نادت به و ما دعت إليه و كانت تعليماتي للحكومة تشدد عليهم إتاحة الفرصة أمامها للتعبير عن أراء المواطنين و مطالبهم ثم تابعت محاولات البعض لأعتلاء موجة التظاهرات و المتاجرة بشعاراتها و أسفت كل الأسف من ضحايا أبرياء من المتظاهرين و قوات الشرطة

I closely followed the demonstrations and what they called for, and my instructions to the government stressed that they should provide the opportunity to express the opinions and demands of citizens. Then I followed the attempts of some to ride the wave of demonstrations and trade in their slogans, and I deeply felt sorry for the innocent victims of the demonstrators and police forces (Mubarak, 28th Januray, 2011).

By using narrative this way, Mubarak is attempting to influence how the demonstrations were seen. He casts himself as the guardian of Egypt's peace, claiming that these demonstrations were instigated by hidden parties that had their own agendas in attempting to sow discord. In crafting this story, Mubarak seeks to appeal to the fears of people who are afraid of insecurity and chaos in order to gain their support.

The second mechanism Mubarak utilizes in his first speech is a fear-arousing strategy. It is used by Mubarak on a number of occasions in his speech. For example, he says:

اتمسك بذات القدر بالحفاظ على أمن مصر و استقرارها و بعدم الانجراف بها و بشعبها لمنزلقات خطيرة تهدد النظام العام و السلام الاجتماعي **و لا يعلم أحد مداها و تداعياتها على حاضر الوطن ومستقبله**

I am equally committed to maintaining the security and stability of Egypt and not to get it and its people carried away to dangerous slopes that threaten public order and social peace, and ***no one knows the extent and repercussions on the present and future of the homeland***

أن شباب مصر هو أغلى ما لديها و نتطلع إليهم كي يصنعوا مستقبلها **و تربأ بهم أن يندس بينهم لنشر الفوضى و نهب الممتلكات العامة و الخاصة و أشعال الحرائق و هدم ما بنيناه**

The youth of Egypt is the most precious thing it has and we are looking towards them to make its future and ***guard them from being infiltrated by those who spread chaos, plunder public and private property, set fires and demolish what we have built.***

The strategy of arousing fear is valued as a tool of linguistic persuasion because its application can quickly influence public opinion. Such messages, designed to disseminate fear, can make people feel less secure, and repeatedly hearing fear-arousing statements can make the public hate protestors, which ultimately may lead to their de-legitimization.

Thirdly, for the purpose of attributing blame and rousing fear, Mubarak makes use of the strategy of pragmatic comparison as in the following excerpt:

علينا لأن نحاذر مما يحيط بنا من أمثلة عديدة انزلقت بالشعوب الى الفوضى والانتكاس.

We have to be careful of the many examples of countries that surround us, which have led people to chaos and relapse.

In order to warn the public that these acts are prohibited, Mubarak employs comparisons that impute accountability and feelings of hate to the Other. This comparison can also later justify any acts committed by the government towards the protestors. This comparison is also utilized by Mubarak to make his in-group members' (his government) actions seem justifiable and persuade the audience to socially exclude the out-group members because they are to be blamed for the chaos and violence in the country.

Fourth, Mubarak's ideology is also indicated by the employment of the authorization strategy. For example, he says:

إنني كرئيس للجمهورية و بمقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي **الدستور** كحكم بين السلطات أكدت مراراً و سوف أظل أن السيادة للشعب وسوف اتمسك دائما بحقي في ممارسة حرية التعبير طالما تم في إطار **الشرعية** و احترام **القانون**.

As president of the Republic and in accordance with the powers granted to me by the Constitution as an arbitrator between the authorities, I have repeatedly confirmed and will continue to assert the sovereignty of the people and I will always uphold my right to exercise freedom of expression as long as it is carried out within the framework of legality and respect for the law.

إن مصر هي أكبر دولة في منطقتها سكانا و دورا وثقلا و تأثيرا و هي دولة مؤسسات يحكمها **الدستور** و **القانون**.

*Egypt is the largest country in its region by population, role, weight and influence, and it is a state with institutions governed by the **Constitution** and **law**.*

Legitimization of the in-group members' actions is also accomplished via references to the sources of authority, like the constitution and law. Mubarak's repeated reference to these sources of authority works as a guide for the audience to socially include the Self and exclude the Other. Due to their legal need to follow such authority, his audience may frequently evaluate the propriety of their own actions and the Other's actions according to these sources of authority.

These four ideological strategies are used by Hosni Mubarak in his first speech mainly to legitimize the Self and its actions, a move that was needed in such a critical time. Mubarak needed to polish his image at the beginning more than to tarnish the image of the Other because in those difficult events he was attempting to discourage as many people as possible from joining the demonstrations.

7.6 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Mubarak Speech 2

The mechanisms of including the Self and excluding the Other Mubarak employed in his second speech are closely examined in this sub-section. I concentrate on the methods he utilizes to achieve his bias for socially including the Self and excluding the Other. In this speech, he utilizes the strategies of narrativization, self-victimization, and blame attribution.

Firstly, Mubarak makes use of narrativization to justify the upcoming aggressive actions of his government in suppressing the protestors. For example, he says:

يتعرض الوطن لأحداث عصيبة و اختبارات قاسية بدأت بشباب و مواطنين شرفاء مارسو حقهم في التظاهر السلمي تعبيراً عن همومهم و تطلعاتهم سرعان ما استغلهم من سعى لأشاعة الفوضى و اللجوء إلى العنف و المواجهة و للقفز على الشرعية الدستورية و الأنقضاض عليها.

The country is passing through difficult times and tough experiences which began with noble youths and citizens who practice their rights to peaceful demonstrations and protests, expressing their concerns and aspirations but they were quickly exploited by those who sought to spread chaos, violence, confrontation, and violated the constitutional legitimacy and to attacked it. (The Guardian Translation)

In the above excerpt, Mubarak narrates certain details about the protests and how they evolved from peaceful demonstrations into a state of chaos and violence. Through this narrativization of the events he socially excludes the group behind this evolution of the events. The exclusion of the out-group members (Other) will allow his government to use more force against the demonstrators. He employs many noun phrases like "أشاعة الفوضى", "اللجوء إلى العنف", "القفز على الشرعية", "*spreading chaos," "resorting to violence,"* and *"leaping on legitimacy"* to promote his point of view about who should be kept out of his in-group. What is interesting with this narrative is that it is identical to the one he used in his first speech; even though the events on the ground were becoming more serious, Mubarak insists on using the same ideology, demonizing the protests and discrediting legitimate demands.

Second, Self-victimization is another ideological strategy that is utilized by Mubarak to achieve the social inclusion of the Self and the exclusion of the Other. For example, he says:

نعيش معاً أياماً مؤلمة و أكثر ما يوجع قلوبنا هو الخوف الذي انتاب الأغلبية الكاسحة من المصريين و ما ساورهم من أنزعاج وقلق و هواجس حول ما سيأتي به الغد لهم ولذويهم و عائلاتهم ومستقبل و مصير بلدهم.

*We are living together painful days and the most painful thing is the fear that affected the huge majority of Egyptians and caused concern and anxiety over what tomorrow could bring them and their families and the future of their country (*The Guardian, 2 Feb, 2011*).*

By employing this strategy, he constructs an image of the Other as a main cause of the current hardships that the nation and its people experienced, which strengthens the dichotomy between the in-group as a victim and the out-group as an assailant. Additionally, self-victimization is meant to represent his in-group (especially the police) as innocent victims who were forced to commit violence (the crackdown on protestors) as a defensive need.

Thirdly, the strategy of blame attribution is extensively used by Mubarak in his second speech. He makes use of this strategy by highlighting the negativity of the protestors and the parties that support them. For example, he Mubarak says:

تحولت تلك التظاهرات من مظهر راقٍ و متحضر لممارسة حرية الرأي و التعبير إلى مواجهات مؤسفة سعت إلى التصعيد وصب الزيت على النار و استهدفت أمن الوطن و استقراره بأعمال أثارة و تحريض و سلب ونهب و اشعال للحرائق و قطع للطرقات و اعتداء على مرافق الدولة والممتلكات العامة و الخاصة و اقتحام لبعض البعثات الدلوماسية على أرض مصر.

Those protests were transformed from a noble and civilized phenomenon of practicing freedom of expression to unfortunate clashes, mobilized and controlled by political forces that wanted to escalate and worsen the situation. They targeted the nation's security and stability through acts of provocation theft and looting and setting fires and blocking roads and attacking vital installations and public and private properties and storming some diplomatic missions (The Guardian).

This focus on the bad actions caused by the protestors aims at persuading the audience to hold the protestors accountable for these bad acts, and ultimately to socially exclude them.

كما أنني أطالب السلطات الرقابية والقضائية بأن تتخذ على الفور ما يلزم من اجراءات لمواصلة ملاحقة الفاسدين و التحقيق مع المتسببين فيما شهدته مصر من انفلات أمني ومن قاموا بأعمال السلب و النهب و أشعال النيران و ترويع الآمنين.

I also demand the judicial and supervisory authorities to take immediately the necessary measures to continue pursuing outlaws and to investigate those who caused the security disarray and those who undertook acts of theft, looting and setting fires and terrorizing citizens (The Guardian).

In the above examples, the utilization of blame attribution aims at accusing individuals who led the protests, portraying them as “outlaws” in an effort to degrade their actions and distance them from society at large.

7.7 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 3

In his last speech, Mubarak employs many ideological strategies but the most apparent and influential are personification, authorization, narrativization, and moral evaluation. These strategies are mainly used to legitimize himself as a true and honest leader for the Egyptian nation.

Personification is mostly utilized in political speeches to entice the emotions of the audience (Charteris-Black, 2005). Personification is described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as a unique language phenomenon, despite the fact that it pertains to the set of "ontological metaphors". To put it more precisely, personification is the act of speaking about something that is not human (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 33). In times of conflict, sacred and highly valued items can serve as symbols of unity (Lahlali, 2021: 129). Therefore, politicians tend to personify these valued things in order to rally the audience around them in such times. And this applies to Arab Spring leaders. Mubarak in his last speech (and most of his speeches) frequently resorted to the personification of Egypt. The following examples illustrate this:

أنني إزاء ما فقدناه من شهداء **من أبناء مصر** في أحداث مأساوية حزينة أوجعت قلوبنا

I am concerned about the loss of the martyrs of the Sons of Egypt in tragic and sad events that hurt our hearts

كي تتجاوز مصر أزمتها الراهنة/

In order for Egypt to overcome its current crisis

إنني على اليقين أن مصر ستتجاوز أزمتها و ولن تنكسر أرادة شعبها ستقف على أقدامها من جديد بصدق و أخلاص أبنائها.

I am certain that Egypt will overcome its crisis and that the will of its people will not be broken. She (Egypt) will get back on her feet again with the honesty and loyalty of her people.

In the aforementioned examples, Egypt is personified and portrayed as a human that will overcome the crises it went through. It is also depicted as a mother who has sons. Mubarak employs personification of Egypt to highlight the significance of the country and its people, and to persuade the public to support him and his plans and to accept the suggested reforms. Ideologically, the

personification is utilized here to obscure the actual actor and to evoke the feelings of love and loyalty in the audience. Therefore, employing the name of Egypt in this way may make the audience believe that the protestors targeted Egypt and not the president.

Second, Mubarak utilizes the strategy of authorization in his last speech to socially include the Self and exclude the Other. He makes excessive references to the constitution, law and judicature. For example, he refers to the constitution fourteen times, to law four times, and to the judiciary seven times, and four of them are made implicitly, as in the following excerpts:

و أؤكد أنني لن أتهاون في معاقبة المتسببين بها بكل الشدة و الحزم و سأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا.
I assure you that I will not be lenient in punishing those who caused it with all severity and firmness, and I will hold accountable those who have committed crimes against our youth.

أصدرت تعليماتي بسرعة الأنتهاء من التحقيقات حول أحداث الأسبوع الماضي و أحالة نتائجها على الفور إلى النائب العام.
I have issued instructions to quickly complete the investigation into the events of last week and immediately forward its results to the prosecutor general.

Authorization is employed by Mubarak to show that his acts are right and lawful. In addition, these references offer justifications to the audience to delegitimize the protestors and socially exclude them.

Interestingly, contrary to the narrativization strategy in his first two speeches, which was used to justify his upcoming acts to deal with the protestors, Mubarak resorts to narrativization in his last speech for a different purpose. He utilizes narrativization in his last speech to narrate his own heroisms and sacrifices in serving Egypt (which is similar to that of Ben Ali in his last speech). For example, he says:

لقد كنت شاباً مثل شباب مصر الآن، عندما تعلمت شرف العسكرية المصرية و الولاء للوطن و التضحية من أجله. أفنيت عمري دفاعا عن أرضه و سيادته، شهدت حروبه بهزائمها و انتصاراتها
I was a young man like the youth of Egypt now, when I learned the honor of the Egyptian military, loyalty to the homeland and sacrifice for it. I have spent my life defending its land and its sovereignty, I have witnessed its wars with its defeats and victories
أسعد أيام حياتي يوم رفعت علم مصر فوق سيناء، واجهت الموت مرات عديدة طيارا و في أاديس أبابا و غير ذلك كثير.

The happiest day of my life was the day I raised the flag of Egypt over the Sinai, I faced death many times as a pilot, in Addis Ababa and elsewhere.

In the aforementioned examples, Mubarak recalls the times when he had raised the Egyptian flag and defended his nation. Of course, the purpose of this is to rally support for him, remind the youth of Egypt of their history, and encourage them to defend their country in a similar manner, but this time from the enemy within. The narrativization strategy in these examples is used to delegitimize the acts of the protestors and socially exclude them because through narrating his sacrifices, a comparison will be made between his good acts and the protestors' bad acts. He implicitly offers reasons for the audience to socially exclude the protestors.

Thirdly, Mubarak's justification for socially including the in-group members and excluding the out-group members is based on moral evaluation. He utilizes the strategy of moral evaluation by denying certain values which are implicitly imposed on the Other. For example, he says:

العيب كل العيب و ما لم و لن أقبله أبداً أن استمع لأملاءات أجنبية تاتي من الخارج أياً كان مصدرها و أياً كانت ذرائعها أو مبرراتها.

It is shameful and a mistake, the thing that I did not nor will accept would be listening to foreign dictates whatever may be the source or pretext

علينا جميعا تغليب المصلحة العليا للوطن و أن نضع مصر أولا فوق أي اعتبار آخر.

We all have to put the higher interest of the homeland first and put Egypt first above any other consideration.

لم أسعى يوما لسلطة أو شعبية زائفة.

I have never sought power or false popularity.

علينا أن نواصل الحوار الوطني الذي بدأناه بروح الفريق و ليس الفرقاء و بعيدا عن الخلاف و التناحر.

We must continue the national dialogue that we started in the spirit of the team, not the parties, and away from disagreement and rivalry

لم أخضع يوماً لضغوظ أجنبية أو أملاءات.

I have never been subjected to foreign pressure or dictates.

Via this use of moral evaluation, the morals claimed by Mubarak in the aforementioned examples will be transferred to public accountability. Also, his insertion of right values like "*working with team spirit"* and "*putting the higher interest of the homeland first*" is used to demoralize the Other and deprive them of these values. On the other hand, his denial of negative values like "*seeking popularity*" and "*listening to foreign dictates*" implies that the Other has them.

As the above discussion shows, Mubarak used different ideological strategies to socially include the Self and socially exclude the Other in each speech for different purposes. The following table (7.2) summarizes this use.

Table (7.2): The Ideological Strategies used in Mubarak's Speeches

Speech	Ideological Strategy
Speech 1	Narrativization, Fear-arousing, Comparison, Authorization
Speech 2	Narrativization, Self-victimization, Blame attribution
Speech 3	Metaphor (personification), Authorization, Narrativization, Moral Evaluation

At the early stages of the uprisings, the narrative, and fear-inducing strategies were necessary to frame the demonstrations to influence how the rest of the people view the events or to silence the opposition. As the demonstrations continued, Mubarak began to adopt a self-victimizing attitude and to shift responsibility to others to avoid criticism and gain support. Finally, as the demonstrations escalated into massive protests, Mubarak depended on different narratives about his sacrifices and the morals of patriotism to arouse the emotions of the audience.

7.8 Analysis of Ideological Strategies in al Qaddafi's Speech

In this section, I will critically analyze al Qaddafi's speech and interpret its ideological components in an effort to relate his language use to the social processes in context and reveal any hidden ideologies. For instance, al Qaddafi employs a variety of legitimization techniques to convince his audience to endorse his agenda and ideology. Therefore, the strategies he uses to socially include the Self and exclude the Other deserve attention and their identification will help to figure out how al Qaddafi attempts to justify and maintain his political causes.

In terms of strategies of social inclusion/exclusion of the Self/Other, four strategies are extensively used by al Qaddafi. His implicit cause of utilizing these strategies is to gather support and rally Libyans against those he describes as "*few terrorists*" who were primarily motivated by the desire to destroy the country. These strategies are self-victimization, narrativization, moral evaluation and authorization.

Firstly, al Qaddafi employs the strategy of the victimization of the Self on many occasions in his lengthy speech to justify and emphasize the disadvantages of the Other. For example, he says:

أنتم من الساحة الخضراء ، تقدمون الحقيقة التي تحاول أجهزة الخيانة والعمالة و النذالة والرجعية والجبن ، أن تغطيها وتشوه صورتكم أمام العالم . أجهزة عربية للأسف شقيقة ، تغدركم وتخونكم ؛ وتقدم صورتكم بشكل يسئ لكل ليبي وليبية

You are from the Green Square, presenting the truth that the devices of treachery, collusion, villainy, reactionary and cowardice are trying to cover up and distort your image in front of the world. Unfortunately, Arab channels betray you. Your image is presented in a way that is offensive to every Libyan, male and female (al Qaddafi, 22 Feb. 2011).

المطلوب تسليم الأسلحة فوراً التي روعت الناس. بنغازي تحتضر ؛ تموت ؛ مرعوبة من الأسلحة التي في يد الأطفال الصغار، ستموت، ليس لديها ماء ؛ ولاأكل ؛ ولا كهرباء ؛ ولا أي شيء

What is required is the immediate delivery of the weapons that terrified the people. Benghazi is dying; terrified of the weapons in the hands of little children, she will die, having no water; no food; no electricity; nor anything (al Qaddafi, 22 Feb. 2011).

In the above mentioned examples, al Qaddafi victimizes the Self to provide an excuse for the use of military force against the Other (i.e. protestors). Furthermore, mentioning the bad actions committed by the protestors and the way in which the Self was affected by these actions will influence his followers and incite them toward confrontation with the protestors. This explains al Qaddafi's recurrent calls for his followers to go out to the streets, and catch the protestors and punish them. He sometimes exaggerates the victimization of the Self to portray the Other as the major source of threat to innocent people to entice his followers to expel the protestors.

Secondly, despite the distinctive tribal nature of the Libyan community and the diminished role of law and constitution in the daily life of the Libyans, al Qaddafi, in this critical time, makes reference to the constitution and law many times in his speech. Using this strategy, al Qaddafi wants to convey the message that, despite all of this chaos, his regime was democratic and his state is a state of law. For example, he says:

نريد القانون أن يسود، نريد القانون أن يكون هو السائد.

We want the law to prevail.

ويحاولون القبض على الذي غرر بأولادنا الصغار، ويقدمواهم للمحكمة. هؤلاء عقوبتهم في القانون.

They are trying to arrest the one who deceived our young children and bring them to court. They will be punished by law.

إذا وصلت الأمور إلى حد إستخدام القوة ، سنستخدمها وفقا للقانون الدولي ووفقا للدستور الليبي و القوانين الليبية.

If matters reach the point of using force, we will use it in accordance with international law and in accordance with the Libyan constitution and Libyan laws.

al Qaddafi also lists eleven articles of the Libyan constitution that criminalize certain actions committed against the national interest and the security of Libya. al Qaddafi invokes these articles for two reasons. First, it is a warning for the protestors that they will be prosecuted for their actions, so they should desist from committing more violent actions. At the same time, it is a reassurance for his supporters that they will be safe in the state of law.

Thirdly, al Qaddafi relies on the strategy of moral evaluation to justify the exclusion of the Other and cast a distorted image of the protestors among the audience. This is achieved through making statements about good and evil, and right and wrong. For example, he says:

نحن أجدر بليبيا من تلك الجرذان وأولئك المأجورين ، من هم هؤلاء المأجورين المدفوع لهم الثمن من المخابرات الأجنبية.
We are more worthy of Libya than those rats and mercenaries. They are paid for by foreign intelligence.

لعنة الله عليهم تركوا العار لأولادهم إذا عندهم أولاد ؛ تركوا العار لعائلاتهم إذا كانت عندهم عائلات ، تركوا العار لقبائلهم إذا كانت عندهم قبائل . ولكن هؤلاء ليس عندهم قبائل ، فالقبائل الليبية ؛ قبائل شريفة ومجاهدة ومكافحة.
May the curse of God be upon them. They left shame for their children if they have children. They left shame for their families, if they had families, they left shame for their tribes, if they had tribes. But those do not have tribes, for the Libyan tribes are Honorable, and fighting tribes.

أنا أرفع من المناصب التي يتقلدها الرؤساء ، أنا مقاتل ؛ مجاهد ؛ مناضل ؛ ثائر من الخيمة من البادية.
I am higher than positions held by presidents, I am a fighter, mujahid, a rebel from the tent and from the desert.

As the aforementioned examples show, al Qaddafi attributes adjectives like "*honorable"* to the Self and "*hired*" to the Other, and the qualities of freedom and dignity are attributed to the Self while shame and disloyalty are assigned to the Other. al Qaddafi transfers these alleged morals to the accountability of his audience and he uses these values of right and wrong to construct a moral foundation for his actions, persuading his supporters that they will fight traitors whose rise threatens their security.

Fourth, al Qaddafi relies extensively on narrativization-based legitimization. His repetition of specific occurrences and political incidents within the international community serves as the foundation for this strategy. Via this narrativization, al Qaddafi links particular previous events, which he considers similar to what happened in Libya, to later required acts such as the use of force against the protestors.

لما السود تمردوا في كاليفورنيا بأمريكا ؛ وهجموا على المتاجر، نيلسون أنزل الجيش بالقوة ومسحهم. لما تمرد الطلاب في ميدان السماء في بكين بالصين، الصين مسحت الميدان بالدبابات.

When black Americans rebelled in California in America, and they attacked the stores, Nelson brought down the army by force and wiped them out. When students rebelled in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, China wiped out the square with tanks.

In the above mentioned examples, al Qaddafi narrates some demonstrations that happened in Russia, China, and the US. He actually consolidates his arguments by narrating political events and incidents of demonstrations in many parts of the world. While narrating these events, al Qaddafi emphasizes the way in which the governments of these countries dealt with these demonstrations. Doing so, he offers justification and support for his intended plans in dealing with protestors. This may make any violent actions he intended to take against the protestors legitimate ones. At the same time, he reminds his opponents, as well as his followers, that the protests happening in Libya are not justifiable since other countries like Russia, the US, and China did not allow for similar demonstrations either. He is defending his actions of suppression by saying that other members of the UN Security Council like Russia, China, and the US had used force against protestors and they were not criticized or denounced by the international community.

In addition to narrating political events and incidents of demonstrations in other parts of the world, al Qaddafi also mentions many historic narratives about his ancestors and Libyan heroes to inspire his supporters and give them a sense of justification for confrontation with protestors who threatened their security.

نحن قاومنا جبروت أمريكا، جبروت بريطانيا، الدول النووية، قاومنا جبروت حلف الأطلسي لم نستسلم و كنا نحن صامدون هنا. الآن مجموعة قليلة من الشبان المعطاه لهم الحبوب يغيرون على مراكز الشرطة هنا و هناك مثل الفئران.

We resisted the tyranny of America, the tyranny of Britain, the nuclear states, we resisted the tyranny of NATO, we did not surrender, and we were steadfast here. Now a few groups of young men given drugs are raiding police stations here and there like rats.

al Qaddafi uses such narratives to create for himself an image of a courageous military leader defending Libya for a righteous loyal cause in order to make an implicit comparison with the Other

who did the opposite. Table (7.3) below summarizes these strategies and the functions served by these strategies.

Table (7.3): The Ideological Strategies Used in al Qaddafi's Speeches

Ideological Strategy	**Function**
Self-victimization	Blaming western countries for the instability happing in his country and trying to win over supporters, al Qaddafi depicts the Self as a victim of both foreign intervention and local conspiracies.
Narrativization	Building a narrative to support his leadership and justify the use of force, al Qaddafi portrays any opposition as radicalism and presents himself as the safeguard of Libya's independence.
Moral Evaluation	Portraying opposition as immoral and dangerous to the country's welfare, al Qaddafi establishes himself as the moral judge.
Authorization	Claiming that harsh regulations (imposed by constitution) are required to preserve stability and safeguard Libyans from internal dangers, al Qaddafi uses dictatorship acts to suppress opposition.

Ultimately, using these strategies, al Qaddafi promoted his ideology and hoped to legitimize his own rule by destroying any legitimacy of the opposition and project an image of himself as a just leader protecting Libya from outside intervention and internal turmoil. The previously mentioned strategies were used as strategies to socially include the Self and exclude the Other.

7.9 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at analyzing seven political speeches of the Arab leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi who were overthrown during the Arab Spring uprisings. After this in-depth analysis of these speeches, it is important to summarize how the Other/Self is de/legitimized through ideological strategies used by these three leaders, especially since they were given under similar conditions and for similar reasons. I conclude that, when applying van Dijk's ideological square to the examined political speech, the two key strategies of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation, are achieved by the strategies of authorization, narrativization, moral evaluation, self-victimization, comparison, blame attribution, arousing emotions, and personification.

Many differences can be seen between the three leaders. While Ben Ali in his first speech relied more on narrativization to justify and pave the way for any future actions committed against the protestors, Mubarak in his first speech relied more on authorization and comparison to implicitly discredit the protestors' acts and justify his government's actions. Furthermore, Mubarak shifted in his second speech to more overt strategies like blame attribution and self-victimization to hold the Other guilty, whereas Ben Ali in his second speech kept using narrativization to justify his actions and plans. This difference in the timing of the use of these strategies between the first and the second speech can be explained by Mubarak's priority to polish his image at this time more than to tarnish the image of the Other because in those difficult times he attempted to discourage as many people as possible from joining the demonstrations rather than justifying his actions against the Other as in the case of Ben Ali.

In terms of the third and last speech for both Ben Ali and Mubarak, the two speeches were similar especially in using the strategy of narrativization, like counting their sacrifices in serving

their countries and acknowledging the protestors and their demands which were employed to arouse the emotions of the audience.

al Qaddafi used most of these strategies but his confrontational tone in using them was indicative more than the other two leaders. For example, when he employed the narrativization strategy, he directly conveyed a message to the Other that he would punish them (as in the case of narrating the demonstrations in China and Russia). If we compare al Qaddafi's use of the blame attribution strategy, for example, with that of both Ben Ali and Mubarak, we can see a significant difference between them. When al Qaddafi attributed blame to the Other, he was clear in naming the accused parties (Islamists, and Western and some Arab countries) without hesitation or evasion.

Chapter Eight-Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the primary findings related to the research questions presented in Chapter One. It presents the findings of the analysis of the seven political speeches that are examined and discussed in the chapters five, six, and seven, in which the discourse topics, discursive and ideological strategies are identified and discussed. This will be followed by the limitations of the present study, its contributions, and the recommendations for further research. The following are the research questions that this study addresses:

1- What are the discourse topics (the macro-strategies) that the ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi use to legitimize the Self and delegitimize the Other in their political speeches?

2- How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi discursively legitimize the Self and Delegitimize the Other in their political speeches?

3- How do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi ideologically represent the Self and the Other in their political speeches?

To address these inquiries, two theories of critical discourse analysis have been employed. Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) DHA model was utilized in this study to identify how high discourse topics and the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation were used in the speeches of the three leaders to de/legitimize the Self/Other. On the other hand, van Dijk's (1998) ideological square was employed to identify the ideological strategies used by the three leaders to socially include/exclude the Self/Other,

8.2 Discourse Topics (macro-strategies) in the political speeches of Arab Spring ousted Leaders

This section presents the findings regarding research question No. 1. Thus, this section will highlight the most frequent discourse topics concluded from the analysis of the seven political speeches in chapter five. It answers the question of how the Self is legitimized and the Other is delegitimized through addressing specific discourse topics. My aim was to find the most frequently occurring topics in the political speeches of the three ousted Arab leaders, namely Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi, in the context of the Arab Spring. Examples will be introduced to support the discussion of these discourse topics.

A general look at the topics covered in the speeches of the three leaders during the Arab Spring reveals that the topics raised in the speeches were brought up as a result of the change in the countries' political scene during this critical period. For example, when the leaders knew that the protests would be heightened and the revolutionary youth would not accept compromises, these leaders either acknowledged the protestors' demands or presented the concept of protecting the national interests and uniting the citizens under this umbrella.

One of the most frequent discourse topics in the speeches of the three leaders is claiming their regimes' respect for the freedom of expression through demonstrations. This is accompanied by emphasizing that the demonstrations become unjustified if they are not expressed within the framework of law. This topic is specifically employed to positively represent their regimes and give it legitimization but at the same it implicitly delegitimizes the Other. The following examples illustrate this.

وليست هناك مظاهرة سلمية يتصدى لها أحد ويضربها بالرصاص ؛مستحيل مادامت سلمية ؛ تسير من شارع إلى شارع (القذافي 22 فبراير 20011)

There is no peaceful demonstration in which anyone confronts and shoots bullets. It is impossible as long as it is peaceful; it goes from street to street. (al Qaddafi, 22 Feb. 2011).

أننا نجدد التأكيد على احترام حرية الرأي والتعبير والحرص على ترسيخها في التشريع و الممارسة ونحترم أي موقفٍ اذا ما تم في إطار الالتزام بالقانون وبقواعد الحوار وأخلاقياته (بن علي، 28 December 2010)

We reaffirm the respect for freedom of opinion and expression and the keenness to consolidate it in legislation and practice and respect any position if it is done within the framework of compliance with the law and the rules of dialogue and ethics (Ben Ali, 28th Dec. 2010).

كان ذلك واضحا في تعامل قوات الشرطة مع شبابنا فقد بادرت الى حمايتهم في بداياتها احتراما لحقهم في التظاهر السلمي طالما تم في اطار القانون (مبارك، 28 يناير، 2011)

This was evident in the way the police dealt with our youth, as they took the initiative to protect them at the beginning out of respect for their right to peaceful demonstration as long as it was carried out within the framework of the law (Mubarak, January 28, 2011).

Second, the leaders offer plans for reform to diffuse the protests and gain the support of the audience. Some offer reforms in economy and the sectors of employment, others like Mubarak focus on constitutional amendments. On the other hand, al Qaddafi makes suggestions for profiteering from oil shares as in the following example:

كل شهر خوذوا فلوس البترول وتصرفوا فيها ، فلا يضحكون عليكم الآن ويقولون لكم أين فلوس البترول (القذافي، 22 فبراير، 2011).

Every month, take the oil money and spend it. They will not laugh at you now and ask you where the oil money is (al Qaddafi, February 22, 2011).

At some point during the evolution of events, the leaders attempt to prove their honest intentions for reform and change which was meant to prove that the government is responding to the protestors' demands and to regain their support. This is particularly clear in Mubarak's and Ben Ali's speeches while in al Qaddafi's speech his focus is on the tribes since he attempts to win over the Libyan tribes by putting forward plans for them to take shares of the oil revenues.

Third, the topic of counting sacrifices and services for the country is employed by the three leaders to present themselves as role models of commitment and bravery when addressing their audience. They do this in an effort to elicit a sympathetic response especially shortly before their

resignation. Furthermore, they all emphasize their service in the military which is meant to arouse the audience's emotions and to remind them that they, the Presidents, love their countries too, and so they deserve respect and dignity.

Defending their records is accompanied by the use of collectivizing concepts which marks a shift in their last speeches. For example, Ben Ali and Mubarak begin their last speeches with expressions like "all Tunisians" and "all Egyptians" and put the topics of defending the country and protecting its national security on the table by using phrases like "one trench" by Hosni Mubarak and "Tunisia is for all of us and we have to protect her" by Ben Ali. They employ these discourse topics to seek commonality and solidarity with the audience, including the protestors, in contrast to their previous speeches where they excluded the protestors and targeted them. In addition, these topics give their speeches a tone of conciliation which suggested that there was a shift in the balance of power in favor to the protestors. This justifies their resignation one day after their last speeches. This kind of discourse suggests the existence of an enemy, whether from inside or outside.

Finally, the topic of "no presidency for life" or "presidency is not a position" was employed by all three of the leaders. Ben Ali and Mubarak express their unwillingness to run for the upcoming presidential elections whereas al Qaddafi asserts that he has no position to resign from. They all use the topic of presidency to diffuse the protests and portray the Self as a peaceful party that prioritizes the interests of the nation over personal interests.

The conclusions made in this thesis regarding the most frequently tackled discourse topics correlate with the historical and political development of the Arab region, notably the legacy of failed Arab Nationalism and subsequent authoritarian regimes, as well as the rise of opposition

movements. The examined speeches demonstrate how the ousted Arab leaders used historical narratives in the discourse topics they addressed to maintain their influence throughout the socio-political upheavals of the Arab Spring.

The leaders' focus on freedoms, reforms and sacrifices corresponds with the initiatives and appeals of the Arab nationalist regimes, especially in their tendency to justify authoritarian rule in terms of stability, reform and nationalism. This is congruent with Dawisha's (2003) assertion that as Arab Nationalist leaders overthrew colonialist, they restricted civil liberties while consolidating regime authority in order to perpetuate their rule. The recurrent use of themes such as the amendments of the constitution and economic reforms also reflects that the leaders endeavor for modernization and conforming to the demands of people.

For example, Mubarak's emphasis on constitutional reform can be placed within the wider narrative of the Arab authoritarianism that presents reformist initiatives as concessions in order to appease the opposition rather than for the democratization aims. Similarly, when the three leaders portrayed their self-sacrifices and devotion, they invoked the legacy of charismatic nationalism, whereas leaders such as Nasser brought together the nation under a common umbrella through narratives that supported centralized power.

In terms of the negative representation of the Other, the Arab leaders mainly employ two discourse topics that have destructive functions, taking into consideration that the positive representation of the Self is also implicitly meant to delegitimize the Other. First, the ousted leaders stress the bad consequences of the protests whether these be on people's life and security or on the economy and country's image. All of the three leaders employ this theme to arouse the feeling of fear among their citizens and to discredit the protestors' demands. They emphasize that riot and

vandalism are not acceptable as forms of expression when they seriously impact the security and stability of the state. For example, Ben Ali says:

هو مظهر سلبي وغير حضاري يعطي صورة مشوهه عن بلادنا تعوق إقبال المستثمرين والسواح بما ينعكس على احداثات الشغل التي نحن في حاجة اليها للحد من البطالة

Demonstrations are a negative and uncivilized manifestation that gives a distorted image of our country that hinders the turnout of investors and tourists, which impacts the job creation that we need to reduce unemployment.

Also, Hosni Mubarak says:

إن ما حدث خلال هذه التظاهرات يتجاوز ما حدث من نهب و فوضى و حرائق لمخطط أبعد من ذلك لزعزعة الأستقرار و الانقضاض على الشرعية

What happened during these demonstrations went beyond what happened in terms of looting, chaos and fires, to a plan beyond that to destabilize and attack legitimacy.

The ousted leaders employ this discourse topic to distance the Self from the Other and distort the image of the protestors as genuine protestors by emphasizing their bad acts and the bad impact on people and the country. Also, they hope that this emphasis on the negative influence of the protests may affect the scale of the protests and lead some protestors to change their minds and withdraw from the protests.

Another destructive discourse topic that the three leaders employ is the idea of foreign agency which is employed implicitly by Ben Ali and Mubarak, whereas al Qaddafi explicitly points fingers at some international powers like Britain, France, and the US. This type of discourse topics is meant to rally the audience against the protestors and portray them as traitors. It also intended to arouse the feelings of fear of external intervention in the national affairs of the country especially when it was accompanied with labels like “extremists” and “terrorism”.

The employment of these two discourse topics that have destructive functions also resonates with the historical and political landscape of the Arab region. The leaders’ portrayal of

the protestors as enemies of peace and order also corresponds to the traditional employment of oppositional dichotomies. framing the Other as destabilizing is consistent with the nationalist animosity towards dissent and democracy mentioned by Cronin (2013). By stressing bad impacts of protests to national security and economy, the leaders revived the narrative of external threats and recalled the Cold War narratives against ideological opponents.

Furthermore, this approach shows the dynamics of ideological rivalries that prevailed after Arab Nationalism or after the emergence of Islamists radical groups in the region when different groups were marginalized as in the case of the post-2003 Iraq. Authoritarian leaders had the chance to frame protestors as chaos instigators or to blame the Islamists for this chaos. Such sentiments continue to be reflected in the leaders' discourse where the protests are depicted as foreign agents and the fear of sectarian or ideological division is invoked.

8.3 The Discursive Strategies in the political speeches of Arab Spring ousted leaders.

A Discursive Strategy can be defined as any linguistic practice deliberately utilized in a specific discourse in an attempt to maximize the persuasive power of this discourse with the intention of achieving certain goals. These strategies are mainly used to achieve a certain degree of positive Self representation and negative Other representation. In each of the three leaders' political speeches, there is a clear Us and Them dichotomy. The analysis of the nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation strategies in the seven political speeches provides evidence for this tendency, which will be summarized in this section.

The analysis of these three strategies in the examined political speeches illustrates a discursive channel through which the ideological boundaries of *serving the country*, *loyalty*, *respect of freedom* serves as labels for the Self *and* are maintained against the Other. This anti-

Other rhetoric, which is founded on a basic ideology, serves as a foundation for the discursive strategies employed in the political speeches of the Arab Spring and gives it a legitimate dimension in the eye of the audience.

As for the nomination strategy, the contents of the examined speeches rely on a presupposed oppositional dichotomy between the Self and the Other as a general tendency of the three leaders. They reinforce this dichotomy via the use of nouns, noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases employed to signify the Self and the Other, specifically their actions. The Self is referred to as belonging to the "*overwhelming majority"* whereas the Other is referred to as a "*minority."* The actions of the Self are referred to as "*"sincere love," "work and perseverance," "progress and development," "facing challenges"* whereas what the Other does is referred to as *"chaos," "Riot," "disruption," "damage," "lies and deception".* The Self *"offered sacrifices," "preserve"* and *"build"* whereas the Other is said to *"threaten"* and *"impede."* The Self is legitimized by referring to its actions using positive references and the Other is referred to by using negative references. Also, the analysis shows that the construction of references to the Self and the Other is manipulated strategically, resembling an ideology in which references are interwoven with descriptions. In this construction, a demonized Other is needed to promote the political ambitions of the Self and give them legitimacy.

The predication strategy involves analyzing the features, characteristics and traits that are attributed to the Self and the Other via negative and positive qualities. The concentration of the present study is on tracing the use of positive/negative adjectives attributed to the Self/Other. As for the predication strategy in the speeches of the three leaders, their speeches are covertly and overtly laden with qualities and features attributed to the targeted social actors. The distance between the in-group and out-group created through the employment of nomination strategy is

widened further via the indicative use of positive and negative adjectives in depicting the Self and the Other. Positive qualities are assigned to events, actions and persons that belong to the in-group members. The Self is portrayed as "*civilized,*" "*educated,*" "*cultured,*" "*tolerant,*" "*peaceful,*" "*faithful,*" "*innocent,*" "*democratic,*" "*honest,*" and "*responsible*". Whilst praising the Self, the leaders subtly strip the Other of these attributes in order to vilify the Other and accentuate the contrast between the Self and the Other.

In contrast, an examination of the way the Other is represented unveils that the Other is portrayed negatively by using a range of negative qualities. This negative representation is meant to hold the Other accountable for the various bad actions and the tragedies they caused. For example, the Other is represented as *"anti-democratic," "foreign," "naïve," "sick," "dirty," "paid and hired,"* "*malevolent," "hostile," and "violent and bloody."* As a general note on the representation of the Self and the Other by the leaders, whilst Ben Ali and Mubarak depend more on positively representing the Self in order to covertly delegitimize the Other, al Qaddafi employs explicit and even derogatory negative representations of the Other to delegitimize it.

Thirdly, using the intensification/mitigation strategy, the three leaders construct and (de)legitimize the Self and the Other via a number of tools. These tools are used to intensify or mitigate the acts of the targeted social actors. The tools of the intensification/ mitigation strategy include using certain lexical items that convey the meaning of intensification or mitigation, cognate objects, over-lexicalization whether by repetition (repeating the same word, phrase, sentence, or topic) or quasi-synonymous expressions, and metaphor. A good example of mitigation via meaning is the use of the expression "حالة **يأس** فردية" "*single **desperation** case*" and "الحلول **اليائسة**" *"**desperate** solutions*". This expression is used by Ben Ali in two of his speeches to

undermine the incident of Bouzizi (who immolated himself as a way of protesting) and deter the rest of unemployed youth from being influenced by him.

As for over-lexicalization, it is the most frequently used intensification tool. Both repetition and quasi-synonymous words and expressions are used as over-lexicalization techniques. Over-lexicalization is employed by the three leaders for both catching the audience's attention and convincing them, or as an emotional plea. What is interesting about this tool is that the leaders tend to employ it more in their last speeches where they needed to be more emotional and sympathetic to influence audiences. Finally, cognate object constructions are used more frequently by Hosni Mubarak than other leaders. He uses these constructions to emphasize and enhance the point he wishes to make. Similar to repetition, Mubarak uses cognate object formations more in his last speech as he needed to be more convincing and emotional. Finally, metaphor was also used as a tool of intensification strategy. As argued before, metaphor emphasizes the aspects that are highlighted in it and obscures the aspects that fall outside of its scope. It is mainly used by the leaders at this time to stress certain aspects and hide others, depending on what is tackled in the metaphor. Consequently, this confirms the ideological function of metaphors in positive presentation of the Self and negative presentation of the Other.

According to the examination of the discursive strategies in the speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi, constructing a negative Other seems to be the key discursive strategy that each of the three leaders consistently uses in their political speeches although, ostensibly, their political speeches seek to portray the Self positively. Inside their nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation discursive strategies, every noun, noun phrase, verb, verb phrase, adjective, pronoun, metaphor, and a repeated linguistic item, have largely been utilized to create a social reality in which the in-group members are honest and loyal and the out-group members are

traitors and rioters. The Other is constructed this way to give the audience the impression that the Other is bad to the point where they pose a threat to the Self's existence.

The leaders' reliance on an opposition between the Self and the Other in using the discursive strategies of nomination and predication mirrors the dynamics of Arab authoritarian regimes that divide societies into supporters and threatening oppositions. This echoes the legacy of the Arab Nationalist movement which portrayed unity as necessary to resist imperialism but the same nationalist regimes justified power to suppress opposition (Brownlee et al., 2015, Maddy-Weitzman, 2016). Similarly, during the Arab Spring, leaders did that to centralize power that was ultimately used to discredit the opposition.

In addition, attributing positive adjectives to the Self and negative adjectives to the Other will recall the Arab regimes' discourse of nationalism or anti-Islamism. After the end of the Cold War, the negative Other was applied to fighting Islamic radicalism, as the global narrative against extremism was used by the authoritarian regimes to repress opposition movements. Finally, repeating the threats associated with protests, intensifying the meaning whether via the use of metaphors or lexical choices in speeches expand protest threats and link them to a broader sphere of instability similar to sectarian and militant one after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For this, leaders capitalized these threats and compare it with those that led to regime overthrow (like that in Iraq after 2003) to depict their governance as required to stabilize the nation's security and economy, especially the threats from Islamists.

8.4 The ideological Strategies in the political speeches of Arab Spring ousted leaders

In this section, the findings of question three will be addressed: how do the three ousted Arab Spring leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi ideologically represent the Self and the Other in

their political speeches? In terms of ideology, the political speeches of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi that have been examined in Chapter 7 include four key ideological moves that are crucial to van Dijk's (l998a) theory of ideological square: the features that are positive about the Self and negative about the Other are emphasized, and features that are negative about the Self and positive about the Other are de-emphasized. These moves are found to be parts of one whole which is the key strategy of social inclusion of the Self and exclusion of the Other. A number of ideological strategies were traced in the selected political speeches to find out how the three leaders fulfilled this end, i.e. social inclusion/exclusion of the Self/Other.

Using van Dijk's theory, it has been found that the seven political speeches of the three leaders exhibit ideological overtones which are communicated via the ideological strategies of authorization, narrativization, moral evaluation, self-victimization, comparison, blame attribution, arousing emotions, and personification. These strategies were used comparatively by the three leaders but all aim at either social inclusion of the Self or social exclusion of the Other. Through these strategies they either highlight what is positive about the Self but negative about the Other, or de-emphasize what is negative about the Self but positive about the Other. Table (8.1) below summarizes the most frequent strategies and their specific ideological functions.

Table (8.1): The Ideological Strategies in the Political Speeches of Arab Spring Ousted Leaders

The Key Strategy of Social Inclusion of the Self and exclusion of the Other by emphasizing what is positive about the Self and negative about the Other, de-emphasizing what is negative about the Self and positive about the Other	Ideological Strategy	Function in the context of the Arab Spring
	Narrativization: Present or Future events, heroisms and sacrifices in serving the country	1-giving ground and justification for future needed acts (how the state will deal with the protests) 2- rallying support, reminding the youth of their history and encouraging them to defend their country
	Self-victimization	1-arousing the emotions of fear among the listeners by talking about the Self as a victim and the Other as assailants 2-implicitly justifying the government's acts in suppressing the protests 3- constructing an image of the Other as the main cause of current hardships
	Attribution of blame	1-portraying the Other (protestors) as guilty to seek support and attention 2-holding the protestors accountable for these bad acts
	Authorization (referring to sources of authority like the constitution and law)	1-evaluating the propriety of the audience's own actions and the Other's actions according to this guide to show that his acts are right and lawful 2-offering justifications to the audience to delegitimize the protestors and socially exclude them 3-warning the protestors that they will be punished for their actions so they may be detered from committing more violent actions 3-reassuring the supporters that they will be safe in the state of law
	Moral evaluation (by making statements about the right and wrong values either by assigning it to the Other (protestors) or denying it for the Self	1-implicitly attributing blame to the Other which distances the protestors from the rest of the society. 2-transferring the alleged morals to the accountability of the audience 3-constructing a moral foundation for the speakers' actions 4-mobilizing the public against the protestors
	Personification	1-obscuring the actual actor and evoking the feelings of love and loyalty in the audience
	Comparison	1-attributing blame to the Other and arousing fear among the audience Ex: by comparing their states with neighboring states, the leaders implicitly blame the protestors for any expected chaos and vandalism and arouse the feelings of fear among the audience

Table (8.1) concludes that the key strategy of social inclusion of the Self and social exclusion of the Other is manifested by the strategies of narrativization, self-victimization, attribution of blame, authorization, moral evaluation, personification, and comparison. While all of these strategies have their ultimate aim of legitimizing the Self and delegitimizing the Other, each strategy has its own specific features and ideological functions. However, although each strategy serves a distinctive function, these strategies complement each other, exhibiting a variety of techniques for creating de/legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring. Through these strategies the three leaders frequently emphasize the characteristics that give the Other a negative image while highlighting the qualities that cast the Self in a positive image. Ultimately, all three leaders reflect their mental representations models on what they utter.

These findings can be explained within the historical and political dynamics of the Arab region. By appealing to established regional narratives, Arab leaders attempted to preserve power and influence public opinion amid crises via the use of rhetoric. For example, Arab leaders used the same authoritarian rhetoric as Arab nationalist leaders, like Nasser, who justified their absolute power by claiming it was necessary to preserve the national identity and stability of their countries. Similarly, the ousted leaders employed this strategy to legitimize their regimes as protectors of stability.

Furthermore, the leaders' moral evaluations and self-victimization, depicting themselves as protectors of the nation, correlate with the historical frames that Arab regimes used when viewing themselves as victims of foreign intervention. Post-Cold War geopolitics and U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq created a context for self-victimization discourse, as leaders sought to associate their conflicts with wider regional complaints against foreign dominance.

This is also applicable when talking about blame attribution strategy. In the same manner that Arab Nationalist leaders blamed imperial powers for problems within their own countries, the ousted leaders blamed protesters and claimed that foreign agents manipulated the youth to instigate chaos and disorder during the Arab Spring. This reinforced the concept that the state was being threatened from the outside.

8.5 Positioning the Current Study within Existing Literature

This study provides significant and novel insights that were reached through a three-layered analysis that identifies high discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies employed by the ousted Arab leaders Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi in their political speeches during the Arab Spring explaining how these strategies are employed by each leader to legitimize his ideology by delegitimizing the Other in the complicated social-political contexts of their regimes' collapse.

First, this study provides a holistic approach to understanding the political speeches of ousted Arab leaders on the thematic level, addressing both the constructive and destructive functions of discourse topics. Unlike previous studies, it underlines the multiple macro-strategies through which ousted Arab leaders sought to reconstruct themselves as reformist and empathetic leaders and the protestors as chaos instigators who were manipulated by foreign agents. They strived to defend their authority by depicting themselves as role models of commitment by addressing discourse topics such as respect for freedom of expression, strategies for economic and constitutional advancements, and their sacrifices for the nation. The topics of 'no presidency for life', and 'leadership is a duty rather than a privilege' provide another perspective with how authoritarian rulers attempted to build up their image and talk to their audience in times of crisis.

Furthermore, explaining how fear-mongering is employed via the use of destructive discourse topics is a novel contribution. This study explains how highlighting the bad consequences of the demonstrations (whether in terms of its impact on economy, social order or national image) is employed as a strategy to discredit protesters. The study showed how the use of this fallacy is a frequent means of persuasion in the Arabic political discourse during the Arab Spring. Linking this to a positive representation of the Self and negative representation of the Other (as in this study) has been insufficiently explored in previous research on Arabic corpus.

The comprehensive examination of nomination, predication, and intensification/mitigation discursive strategies in this research offers novel insights into the ways leaders construct in-group and out-group dynamics. It systematically analyzes language devices such as over-lexicalization, metaphor, repetition, and quasi-synonymous terms that leaders used to amplify their narratives or alleviate negative views. Studying these linguistic devices as tools of intensification and combining them into a cohesive analytical framework improves our comprehension of the relationship between language and ideology in political discourse.

The study offers a comprehensive analysis of the ideological strategies—namely authorization, narrativization, moral evaluation, self-victimization, and blame attribution—utilized to rationalize and sustain the acts of the regimes. These results highlight the rhetorical intricacy and ideological undertones of the leaders' speeches, providing new perspectives on how authoritarian elites tactically modify their language in reaction to sociopolitical difficulties.

The results of this thesis enhance, broaden, and correspond with current research in critical discourse analysis and political communication studies. First, the results align with Van Dijk's (2006) views about ideological polarization, highlighting the construction of in-groups and out-

groups to sustain power dynamics. The research illustrates how Arab leaders not only maintained this dichotomy but also intricately linked the favorable depiction of the Self to the de-legitimization of the Other. This twofold approach offers a profound insight into the role of language as an instrument for ideological manipulation in times of crisis.

Second, this study extends Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) framework on nomination and predication discursive strategies by thoroughly analyzing intensification and mitigation tools. The research demonstrates how leaders used lexical choices, repetition, cognate objects, and metaphors to build a compelling narrative that both validated their actions and undermined opposition. These results enhance the literature by providing empirical evidence of the adaptation of these strategies within the particular socio-political contexts of the Arab Spring.

Third, the findings also align with Wodak's (2015) "politics of fear" that examines how leaders employ fear. This is why the emphasis of the bad effects of demonstrations fits this framework – illustrating how Arab leaders deliberately cultivated fear to justify their rule. The research findings are also congruent with Chilton's (2004) investigation of moral evaluation and narrativization in political communication, providing concrete illustrations of how these strategies were employed to bolster ideological narrative.

Fourth, this research broadens the scope of the current literature on ideological discourse by including less-explored ideological strategies, especially in Arabic contexts, such as self-victimization, comparison, and personification. The emphasis on the integration of these strategies within the cultural and political contexts of the Arab Spring adds a layer of specificity to theoretical frameworks, such as Fairclough's (1989) critical discourse analysis, making them more relevant to Middle Eastern political discourse in general and Arabic political discourse in particular.

In sum, beyond adding new perspectives on the link between discourse and ideology in the contexts of political speeches of ousted Arab presidents, this study verifies and expands previous ideas. The present study emphasizes that further contextualized and comprehensive research is necessary to unravel the linguistic realization of ideologies during moments of significant socio-political transformation.

8.6 Limitations of the Study

It is inevitable for any researcher to deal with a variety of limitations during the conduct of his/her research. First, this study is limited to seven political speeches in the period December, 2010 to February, 2011 by Ben Ali (ex-president of Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (ex-president of Egypt), and al Qaddafi (ex-president of Libya). In the present study, the analysis only focused on the verbal components of the speeches mostly ignoring the non-verbal components such as body language and image. These components have been excluded because the emphasis has been on the written words that convey the main messages of the three leaders to the audience.

One of the main challenges I faced was attempting to be neutral in my position as a researcher, hence, to evaluate all sides objectively and critically. Regarding this, van Dijk (1993:270) argues that any kind of discussion that has describing data and analyzing it as a part of it, "is not and cannot be neutral". This applies to CDA that is used as an analytical approach to critically examine discourses in order to respond to the study objectives rather than making value judgments about their accuracy.

Another difficulty that I faced while transcribing the political speeches (especially that of Ben Ali's last speech and al Qaddafi's), was the obscurity of some colloquial terms in these speeches. However, I did not face the same problem with the first two speeches of Ben Ali and the

three speeches of Mubarak because they were delivered in Modern Standard Arabic. This was because of the fact that Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is widely understood across all Arab countries, while colloquial Arabic varies across Arab countries and has local informal expressions and idioms whose meanings are contextually dependent.

8.7 Contributions of the Study

The present study is the first in-depth critical analysis of these particular political speeches since I have analyzed these speeches on three levels: identification of discourse topics, discursive strategies, and ideological strategies. This three-layered analysis paves the way for more precise findings especially in divulging the ideological messages the three leaders wanted to convey. What makes this study unique is that it combines two CDA theories to provide more significant findings while the majority of the studies conducted on Arab Spring political discourse employ one theory and focus on certain linguistic use.

First, this study contributes to linguistics in providing a concise explanation of the characteristics of Arabic political discourse during this critical period (i.e. the Arab Spring), identifying the typical techniques employed by ousted Arab Spring leaders, and observing how these characteristics were utilized by them. The study also emphasizes the significance of the relationship between language and ideology and offers a comprehensive background about this relationship.

Second, the study contributes to political science. Political analysts and decision makers can benefit from the application of a similar methodology since it will allow political experts to build their arguments on evidence extracted from political texts rather than by depending on their personal diligence. In addition, the present study provides a thorough analysis of the political

environment leading up to the Arab Spring, as well as its direct and indirect causes and effects. Additionally, it offers a thorough account of the early events of the Arab Spring in each country. Deep understanding of the region's political history creates awareness of how political discourse is shaped there.

8.8 Recommendations for Future Research.

Since the scope of the present research is limited to specific leaders in a specific period of time, the most logical direction for future research is to broaden the data by including further speeches. This can be achieved in two ways. First, the data can be widened to include speeches of the same leaders before the Arab Spring and compare the same studied components in the speeches before the Arab Spring with the speeches during the Arab Spring. This will provide insights to shifts happen in the use of the examined strategies in response to evolving socio-political contexts. This also will help in tracking how Self and Other representations evolved in contexts of both stability and upheaval. Second, the data can also be expanded to include political speeches of the present leaders of the same countries. Furthermore, this study suggests that future research should extend the geographical scope of the present study to look at more Arab countries that witnessed uprisings and study the political speeches of its leaders. In addition, it might be insightful, for instance, to use the same suggested research model in the future to examine how the Self and Other are represented in another genre of the Arab Spring political discourse such as slogans circulated during the uprisings where the Self and the Other are seen from the opposite angle. Additionally, the analysis methodology used in the current study could be useful for future research that examines the discourse of media during the Arab Spring whether that be local or foreign media. It would be interesting to examine how media manipulated language during the Arab Spring and how it shapes and was shaped by the political discourse during this period. This may help in

exploring the interconnectedness between media and politics, how public opinion is influenced by this interplay, and how events are framed. It also will answer questions like how the narratives of media shaped the trajectory of the uprisings.

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Appendices

Appendix A

The Arabic and English Transcripts of Ben Ali's, Mubarak, and al Qaddafi

- **Ben Ali's Speech 1: On the 28th of December, 2010 (The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic)**

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ، ايها المواطنون و المواطنات، لقد تابعت بانشغال ما شهدته سيدي بو زيد من احداث خلال الأيام المنقضية
2. ولأن كان منطلق هذه الاحداث حالة اجتماعية نتفهم ظروفها و عواملها النفسية
3. كما نأسف لما خلفته تلك الاحداث من أضرار و أن ما انخذته من أبعاد مبالغ فيها بسبب الاستغلال السياسي لبعض الاطراف الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم و يلجأون إلى بعض التلفزات الأجنبية التي تبث الأكاذيب و المغالطات دون تحرٍ بل باعتماد التهويل و التحريض و التجني الأعلامي العدائي لتونس يدعون إلى توضيح بعض المسائل و تأكيد الحقائق لا ينبغي التغافل عنها.
4. أولا : اننا نقدر الشعور الذي ينتاب أي عاطل العمل و خصوصا عندما يطول بحثه عن الشغل و تكون ظروفه الأجتماعية صعبة و بنيته النفسية هشة مما يؤدي به غلى الحلول اليائسة ليلفت النظر الى وضعيته
5. ونحن لا ندخر جهدا لتفادي مثل هذه الحالات بالمعالجة الخصوصية الملائمة مواصلين سياستنا و برامجنا من أجل التشغيل و رعاية ضعاف الحال و الاحاطة بالاسر المعوزة لتفعيل التنمية الجهوية عبر برامج استثمارية متوالية شملت كل مناطق البلاد وكان اخرها ما قررناه في المجلس الوزاري في يوم 15 ديسمبر الجاري و ما أعلن عنه من برامج اضافية ستفوق الاعتمادات المخصصه لها ستة الالاف وخمسمائة مليون في أطار حرصنا الدائم على تأمين كل مقومات التنمية المتوازنة و المتكافئة بين الجهات و التوزيع العادل لثمارها بين الفئات
6. ثانيا: إن البطالة شغل شاغل لسائر بلدان العالم المتقدمة منها والنامية
7. و نحن في تونس نبذل كل الجهود للحد منها و معالجة اثارها وتبعاتها خصوصا بالنسبة إلى العائلات التي لا مورد لها
8. وستبذل الدولة جهودا إضافية في هذا المجال خلال المدة القادمة
9. وقد حققنا نتائج مرموقة في مجال التعليم كميا ونوعيا هي محل تقدير وتثمين من قبل الهيئات الدولية والأممية المختصة
10. فإن ذلك يجسد خيارا جوهريا ثابتا في سياستنا من أجل بناء شعب مثقف
11. و من أبرز تلك النتائج التطور الكبير لعدد خريجي مووسسات التعليم العالي المنتشرة في كل أنحاء البلاد دون استثناء والذي فاق العام الماضي مثلا ثمانين ألف متخرج
12. وهو عدد نعتز به ونتقبل التحديات التي يطرحها علينا لتشغيل هذه النسبة المرتفعه من حاملي الشهادات ضمن طالبي الشغل و ذلك عبر مختلف آليات التشغيل و برامجه و
13. رغم الصعوبات التي يطرحها هذا النوع المستجد من البطالة فإنه يبقى مصدرا للتفائل في المستقبل .
14. تفائل شعب متعلم يثابر من أجل الرقي و مزيد التقدم
15. ثالثا: لقد دأبنا منذ التغيير على تكريس الحوار مبدأً وأسلوباً للتعامل بين سائر الأطراف الوطنية والأجتماعية حول القضايا و المستجدات التي تطرح امامنا
16. و لا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال رغم تفهمنا ان نقبل ركوب حالاتٍ فردية أو أي هدف أو وضع طارئلتحقيق مآرب سياسوية على حساب مصالح المجموعة الوطنية ومكاسبها وانجازاتها وفي مقدمتها الوئام والامن والأستقرار
17. كما أن لجوء أقليةٍ من المتطرفين و المحرضين المأجورين ضد مصالح بلادهم إلى العنف والشغب في الشارع وسيلة للتعبير امر مرفوض في دولة القانون مهما كانت اشكاله هو مظهر سلبي وغير حضاري يعطي صورة مشوهه عن بلادنا تعوق إقبال المستثمرين والسواح بما ينعكس على احداثات الشغل التي نحن في حاجة اليها للحد من البطالة .
18. و سيطبق القانون على هؤلاء بكل حزم، بكل حزم
19. رابعا : اننا نجدد التأكيد على احترام حرية الرأي والتعبير والحرص على ترسيخها في التشريع و الممارسة
20. ونحترم أي موقفٍ اذا ما تم في إطار الالتزام بالقانون وبقواعد الحوار وأخلاقياته .
21. أن الدولة ساهرة على ايجاد الحلول لتلبية طلبات الشغل التي سيتواصل تزايده خلال السنوات القليلة القادمة

22. كما تعمل بالتوازي مع ذلك على مواصلة تحسين الاجور ودخل الأسر ومستوى العيش بصورة عامة لكل التونسيين والتونسيات
23. خامسا: اننا نقدر صعوبة وضع البطالة و تأثيرها النفسي على صاحبها
24. ولذلك فاننا ندعو الادارة عند تعاطيها مع الحالات الصعبة إلى تفادي أي تقصير في التواصل معها والى احكام متابعتها
25. و يتعين على كل السلط الجهوية و المحلية ان تتحمل مسؤولياتها في الانصات إلى المواطن و لتظافر جهود الجميع للتعرف على الوضعيات التي تستوجب عناية خاصة لأيجاد الحلول لها و للسعي إلى الاستجابة إلى اكثر الحالات احتياجا او التي طال انتظارها في الحصول على الشغل
26. و أننا متمسكون دوما بالبعد الاجتماعي لسياستنا التنموية حتى لا تحرم جهة أو فئة من حظها في التشغيل و الاستثمار .
27. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله و بركاته

- **Ben Ali's Speech 1: On the 28th of December, 2010 (the English Translation is adopted from Maalej (2012))**

1. In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful , Male citizens, female citizens: I followed with concern the events that the city of Sidi Bouzid witnessed in the last few days
2. even though the starting point of these events was a social situation whose conditions and psychological factors we understand.
3. We also regret the damage that those events occasioned and the exaggerated dimensions that they took owing to their having been exploited politically by some parties that do not want benefaction to their country, and resorted to some foreign TV channels that broadcast lies and deception without investigation, using alarmism, incitement, and false accusatory information inimical to Tunisia. This compels us to clarify a few issues and emphasize realities that should not be overlooked.
4. First, we respect the feeling that any unemployed person feels especially when his looking for a job lasts for some time, his social conditions are difficult, and his psychological build is fragile, which leads him to desperate solutions to draw attention to his condition.
5. We do not spare efforts to avoid these conditions through suitable specific treatment, pursue our employment policy and programs, take care of the poor and impoverished families, and activate regional development through investment programs that involved all the country's regions, the last of which was the one decided on 15 December, 2010, in a Council of Ministers as well as supplementary programs that have been announced worth more than TD6,500 Million in the framework of our constant eagerness to guarantee all the requirements of balanced and equal growth between regions and to divide its fruits equally on the different categories.
6. Second, unemployment is the concern of developed and developing countries in the world.
7. We in Tunisia spend all efforts to curb it and treat its effects and its repercussions especially among families without any resources.
8. The State will spend extra efforts in this regard during the next period.
9. We accomplished outstanding results in the area of education both quantitatively and qualitatively. This has attracted the respect and laudability of concerned international agencies
10. It constitutes a fixed central choice in our policy of building an educated population.
11. One of the most prominent results is the development of university graduates in higher education institutions that are found across the regions of the country without exception, which saw last year, for example, the graduation of over 80,000 students,
12. which is a figure that we are proud of and whose challenges we accept to employ this high rate of graduates among those applying for jobs through various employment mechanisms and programs.

13. In spite of the difficulties posed by this kind of new kind of unemployment, it remains a source of optimism in the future –
14. the optimism of an educated population perseverant in more promotion and advancement.
15. Third, we have opted since "the change" for dialogue as a principle and style of communication between the national and social sides on the issues and new events that face us.
16. We can by no means, in spite of our understanding, accept the exploitation of single individual cases, any event, or an emergent situation to attain politicized goals at the expense of the national community's interests, acquisitions, and accomplishments, at the forefront of which are cohesion, security, and stability.
17. Thus, the recourse of a minority of extremists and hired instigators against the interests of their country to violence and rioting in the street as a means of expression, whatever its forms are, is unacceptable in a nation of rights. It is a negative, uncivilized means that gives a distorted image of our country, which impedes investors and tourists' turnout, thus impacting negatively the job creations that we need in order to curb unemployment.
18. The law will be enforced on these with great resolution, with great resolution.
19. Fourth, we renew our emphasis on respect of freedom of opinion and expression, and our eagerness to adopt it in legislation and practice.
20. We respect any opinion provided that it should be expressed in the framework of commitment to the law and the rules and ethics of dialogue.
21. The state is keen on providing solutions to resolve the needs of employment, which will increase in the next few years.
22. In parallel to this, it continues improving salaries, families' incomes, and the standards of living in general for all Tunisians.
23. Fifth, we do understand the uneasy situation of unemployment and its psychological effect on the unemployed.
24. For this, we call on the administration in dealing with difficult cases to avoid any failure to communicate with them.
25. To firmly follow them up, all the regional and local powers must assume their responsibilities in listening to the citizen. The efforts of all must be coordinated to get acquainted with the situations that require special care to find solutions to them, and to endeavor to respond to the neediest cases or those who have been waiting for a job for very long.
26. We always stick to the social dimension of our developmental policy so as not to deprive one region or social category from the opportunity of employment and investment.
27. Peace and God's mercy and blessing be upon you (Maalej, 2012). (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYUN1IIabo8)

- **Ben Ali's Speech 2: On the 10th of January, 2011 (The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic)**

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
2. أيها المواطنون، أيتها المواطنات في الداخل والخارج
3. أتوجه اليوم إليكم على إثر ما شهدته بعض المدن والقرى بعدد من الجهات الداخلية من أحداث شغب وتشويش وأضرار بالأملاك العمومية والخاصة.
4. أحداث عنيفة دامية أحيانا أدت إلى وفاة مدنيين وإصابة عدد من رجال الأمن قامت بها عصابات ملثمة أقدمت على الاعتداء ليلا على مؤسسات عمومية وحتى على مواطنين في منازلهم في عمل إرهابي لا يمكن السكوت عنه.
5. أحداث وراءها أياد لم تتورع عن توريط أبنائنا من التلاميذ والشباب العاطل فيها.

6. أياد تحث على الشغب والخروج إلى الشارع بنشر شعارات اليأس الكاذبة وافتعال الأخبار الزائفة استغلت بدون أخلاق حدثا أسفنا له جميعا وحالة يأس نتفهمها كانت جدت بسيدى بوزيد منذ أسبوعين.
7. وإذ نعرب عن بالغ أسفنا للوفيات والأضرار التي نجمت عن هذه الأحداث
8. فإننا نجدد تعاطفنا مع أسر المتوفين رحمهم الله والمتضررين ونشاركهم ألمهم وحزنهم ونواسيهم صادقين الحب لكل أبنائنا وبناتنا دون فرق ولا استثناء.
9. وقد أخذت العدالة مجراها للتحقيق في ظروف وملابسات هذه الأحداث وتحديد المسؤوليات فيها.
10. أيها المواطنون ,أيتها المواطنات ،إن هذه الأحداث أعمال قلة من المناوئين الذين يغيظهم نجاح تونس بل يسوؤهم ويحير نفوسهم ما تحقق لها من تقدم ونماء تشهد به كل المؤسسات والهيئات الدولية والأممية المعروفة بالموضوعية والنزاهة.
11. لقد ركب هؤلاء المغالطون موضوع البطالة بتوظيف حالة يأس فردية مثلها يتكرر في جميع المجتمعات وفى عديد الأوضاع،
12. مناوئون مأجورون ضمائرهم على كف أطراف التطرف والإرهاب التي تسيرها من الخارج أطراف لا تكن الخير لبلد حريص على العمل والمثابرة
13. بلد موارده ذكاء أبنائه وبناته الذين راهنا عليهم دوما ومازلنا لأننا نفضل مجابهة التحديات وصعابها بشعب مثقف على الأمان الوهمي بشعب جاهل.
14. والجميع يعلم كم نبذل من جهود للتشغيل،
15. التشغيل الذي جعلنا منه دوما أوكد أولوياتنا.
16. والجميع يعلم كم هى كبيرة عنايتنا بحاملي الشهادات العليا الذين كما قلت نعتز بأعدادهم المتكاثرة ونعمل على رفع التحدي الذي تطرحه هذه الأعداد
17. لأن خياراتنا التربوية من ثوابت مشروعنا الحضاري والسياسي وإجبارية التعليم ومجانيته مبدآن لا محيد عنهما رغم ما يكلفانه من ضريبة اجتماعية واقتصادية ونشر المؤسسات الجامعية في كامل جهات البلاد دون استثناء واقع ندعمه في كل مرحلة ولن نتراجع عنه.
18. إن سياستنا التعليمية مثلها مثل سياساتنا بشأن الأسرة والمرأة والشباب والطفولة
19. وكذلك ما تبذله الدولة من جهود للإحاطة بضعاف الحال والحفاظ على القدرة الشرائية ودعم أسعار المواد الأساسية الذى يكلف الميزانية ما يفوق 1700 مليون دينار سنويا نعم 1700 مليون دينار هي من مفاخرنا.
20. ولم نتردد في تفعيلها رغم محدودية مواردنا المالية والطبيعية.
21. أيها المواطنون، أيتها المواطنات إن برنامجنا للفترة الجارية ومخطط التنمية الثاني عشر والبرنامج الخاص بتنمية الجهات الداخلية والحدودية والصحراوية السابقة كلها لتلك الأحداث وكذلك ما اعتمدناه من برامج إضافية تصب جميعها في حل مشكلة البطالة وتدعم عملنا المتواصل لتحقيق تنمية متكافئة متوازنة بين الفئات والجهات توفر الشغل وموارد الرزق وتعطى الأولوية إلى أبناء العائلات المعوزة وتخص حاملي الشهادات العليا بالبرامج الملائمة.
22. إن كل هذه السياسات والبرامج تعتبر في مستوى السياسات المعتمدة في بلدان العالم التي تعانى كلها من البطالة فالبطالة ليست حكرا على تونس ولا تونس هي الأسوأ حالا بالنسبة إلى غيرها في هذا المجال.
23. ولم يبق للمغالطين غير ركوب الحالات اليائسة وخدمة أهداف الأطراف الحاقدة والالتجاء إلى الفضائيات المعادية.
24. أيها المواطنون، أيتها المواطنات إننا نقول لكل من يعمد إلى النيل من مصالح البلاد أو يغرر بشبابنا وبأبنائنا وبناتنا في المدارس والمعاهد ويدفع بهم إلى الشغب والفوضى نقول بكل وضوح أن القانون سيكون هو الفيصل.
25. ونحن نواصل الإصغاء إلى مشاغل الجميع ونسعى إلى معالجة الوضعيات الجماعية والفردية وندعم برامجنا من أجل التشغيل والتصدي للبطالة دون المساس بجهودنا من أجل الرفع من مستوى العيش وجودة الحياة ومواصلة الزيادة في الأجور دون انقطاع من دورة تفاوضية إلى أخرى
26. وقد قررنا ما يلي :
27. أولا : مضاعفة طاقة التشغيل وإحداث موارد الرزق وتنويع ميادينها ودعمها في كل الاختصاصات خلال سنتى 2011 و2012 بمجهود إضافي هام من قبل الدولة والقطاع العمومي وبتضافر جهود القطاع الخاص والقطاع البنكي والتعاون الدولي وسائر الأطراف المعنية.

28. وذلك قصد تشغيل أكبر عدد من العاطلين عن العمل من غير حاملي الشهادات العليا وكذلك من بين فاقدي الشغل من كل الفئات والجهات..
29. وسيستوعب هذا المجهود أيضا كل حاملي الشهادات العليا الذين تجاوزت مدة بطالتهم عامين قبل موفى سنة 2012 /نعم قبل موفى 2012 وأتعهد بذلك/ وبذلك ترتفع طاقة التشغيل الجملية خلال هذه الفترة إلى 300 ألف موطن شغل جديد.
30. وكنا أذنا منذ أيام الوزير الأول بالاتصال برجال الأعمال والاجتماع بالاتحاد التونسي للصناعة والتجارة والصناعات التقليدية لحثهم على المساهمة في دعم هذه الجهود بانتداب ما يضاهى 4 بالمائة من مجموع إطارات مؤسساتهم من بين حاملي الشهادات أي ما يقارب 50 ألف انتداب جديد في الجهات.
31. وقد لبوا مشكورين دعوتنا.
32. وقد أذنا الحكومة بالمساعدة على تنفيذ هذه المبادرة ومتابعتها.
33. ثانيا : عقد ندوة وطنية يشارك فيها ممثلون عن المجالس الدستورية والأحزاب السياسية والمنظمات الوطنية ومكونات المجتمع المدنى المعنية وعدد من الجامعيين والكفاءات من مختلف القطاعات ذات الصلة وكذلك ممثلين عن الجهات لطرح ارائهم واقتراح التصورات لمزيد دفع التشغيل والمبادرة بما يستجيب للطلبات المنتظرة للشغل خلال السنوات القادمة. وستنتظم هذه الندوة خلال الشهر القادم.
34. ثالثا : إعطاء دفع جديد للإعلام الجهوي بتخصيص مساحة يومية بالتلفزة والإذاعات الوطنية لكل ولايات الجمهورية مع تكثيف شبكة الإذاعات الجهوية والصحافة المكتوبة بالولايات ودعم وحدات الإنتاج السمعية البصرية بها لتعزيز هذه النقلة النوعية وذلك بما يفسح المزيد من فضاءات التعبير عن مشاغل المواطنين وطموحاتهم ويواكب واقع الحياة بالجهات.
35. رابعا : دعوة نواب الشعب وأعضاء مجلس المستشارين والهياكل المركزية في الاحزاب السياسية الى تكثيف حضورهم بجهاتهم واتصالاتهم الدورية بالمواطنين للإصغاء إليهم والإحاطة بالحالات التي تعرض عليهم وإبلاغها إلى الجهات المعنية للسعى الى معالجتها وايجاد الحلول لها .
36. كما نجدد الدعوة في هذا الاطار الى المسؤولين الاداريين في المستويين الجهوى والمحلى الى تطوير قنوات الاحاطة بالمواطنين والاصغاء الى مشاغلهم وتيسير طرق معالجة المسائل المطروحة وتذليل العوائق التي قد تعطلها بالتعاون مع المنظمات المختلفة والنسيج الجمعياتى المختص.
37. خامسا : وعلاوة على كل المجهودات التي ستبذل للتشغيل فإنني قررت إعفاء كل مشروع جديد مشغل تفوق نسبة التأطير فيه عشرة بالمائة ويبعث في جهات التنمية الداخلية من الضريبة على الأرباح ومن مساهمة الأعراف في التغطية الاجتماعية وذلك لمدة عشر سنوات.
38. وإننا ندعو الأولياء وسائر المواطنين إلى الحفاظ على أبنائهم من هؤلاء المشاغبين والمفسدين بتكثيف الإحاطة بهم وتوعيتهم بمخاطر توظيفهم واستغلالهم من قبل هذه المجموعات المتطرفة.
39. وإنى انتهز هذه المناسبة لأجدد شكري وتقديري لأخي العزيز القائد معمر القذافى قائد الثورة الليبية للمبادرة الكريمة التي لقيت لدى شعبنا كل الارتياح بتيسير تنقل التونسيين وأعمالهم بالشقيقة ليبيا ومعاملتهم مثلهم مثل أشقائهم الليبيين وهو ما يجسم مجددا ما لمسناه دوما لديه ولدى الشعب الليبي الشقيق من صدق الأخوة وقوة المساندة.
40. أيها المواطنون، أيتها المواطنات، إن هذه الأحداث لا يمكن أن تفل من عزمنا ولا أن تنال من مكاسبنا بل يجب أن تستخلص جميع الأطراف العبرة منها وان نواصل مسيرتنا بكل ارادة وحماس لان عزة تونس ومناعتها أمانة مقدسة لدى التونسيين والتونسيات جميعا.
41. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته"

- **Ben Ali's Speech2: On the 10th of January, 2011 (the English Translation is adopted from Maalej (2012))**

1. n the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.
2. Male citizens, female citizens at home and abroad,
3. I address you today after the rioting, disturbance, and damage to public and private property that have been witnessed by some cities and villages in some internal regions.
4. Violent events, sometimes bloody, led to the death of civilians and the injury of some policemen. Events that were performed by veiled gangs that attacked by night public institutions and even citizens in their homes in a terrorist work that cannot be tolerated.
5. Events behind which are hands that did not abstain from implicating our children, students and unemployed young people.
6. Hands that urge for rioting and going into the streets, disseminating false slogans of hopelessness, and fabricating false news. They unethically exploited an event that we all regretted having taken place and a case of hopelessness, which took place in the city of Sidi Bouzid two weeks ago, and that we understand.
7. We express our deep regret about the deaths and the damage that resulted from these events,
8. we renew our sympathy with the families of the deceased, may God have mercy on them, and those who suffered damage. We partake in their pain and sorrow and give them our solace with sincere love for all of our sons and daughters without discrimination and exception.
9. Justice has been following its course to investigate the conditions and circumstances of these events and determine responsibilities.
10. Fellow citizens, these events are the acts of a minority of hostile people that are enraged by the success of Tunisia. They feel offended and puzzled by the progress and the development that are acknowledged by all the international and national institutions and organizations known for their objectivity and fairness.
11. These deceivers took advantage of unemployment, exploiting one individual case of hopelessness that can be repeated in all societies and all situations.
12. These hostile and hired people have their conscience in the hands of extremists and terrorists that manipulate them from abroad. Hands that do not want benefaction to a country eager to work and persevere.
13. A country whose wealth is the intelligence of its sons and daughters on whom we have always been making a bet because we prefer to face up to challenges and difficulties with a cultured people rather than bet on illusory hope with an ignorant people.
14. All know how many efforts we spend on employment, e
15. employment which we have made the most persistent of our priorities.
16. All know how great our care is for higher degree holders whose increasing quantities, as I said earlier one, we are proud of. We are working towards raising the challenges posed by these numbers of graduates
17. because our educational choices are constants of our project of civilization and politics. The compulsory and non-fee paying nature of education are two inalienable principles in spite of the social and economic tax that this costs us. Establishing higher education institutions across the country's regions without exception is a reality that we support at every stage, and we will not retreat from it.

18. Our educational policy is similar to our policy for family, woman, youth, childhood,
19. and all the efforts the state makes to care for the needy, preserve the purchasing power, and support the prices of the basic necessities, which costs the budget annually over TD1700 Million. Yes, TD1700 Million annually. It is something we are proud of,
20. and we will not hesitate to activate it in spite of our limited financial and natural resources.
21. Fellow citizens, our program for the current stage, the 12th developmental plan, and the previous program specific to developing the internal and the frontier and Saharan regions – all are previous to those events – and the supplementary programs adopted, all contribute to resolving unemployment and supporting our continuous work to attain sustained and balanced growth between categories and regions. They make available jobs and sources of livelihood, prioritize the sons of poor families, and allocate suitable programs for degree holders.
22. All these policies and programs are regarded as on the same level of policies adopted in the countries of the world that all suffer from unemployment. Unemployment is not a Tunisian monopoly, and Tunisia is not the worst in this connection compared to other countries.
23. What was left for deceivers was to exploit cases of hopelessness, serve the purposes of hate sides, and have recourse to inimical expressions.
24. Fellow citizens, we say to all those who deliberately harm the country's interests and imperil our youth, sons, and daughters at schools and institutes, and shove them into rioting and disturbance, we tell them clearly that the law will be the judge.
25. Yes, the law will be the judge. We continue to listen to the concerns of all, and seek to resolve collective and individual cases. We support our employment programs and combat unemployment without affecting our efforts to promote the standard of living, the quality of life, and salary rises without interruption from one negotiation to another.
26. We have decided the following:
27. First, multiplying the capacity for employment, creating sources of livelihood, varying their fields, and supporting them in all specializations during 2011-2012 through an important extra effort by the state, the public sector, the efforts of the private and banking sectors, and concerned international bodies
28. in order to employ the largest number of non-degree holding unemployed people and those who lost their jobs from all categories and regions.
29. This effort will also involve degree holders whose period of unemployment has exceeded two years before the end of 2012. Yes, before the end of 2012. And I commit myself to that. The overall employment capacity for this period will be 30,000 new jobs.
30. A few days ago, we authorized the Prime Minister to contact businessmen and meet with the Tunisian union for industry and commerce to urge them to contribute to supporting these efforts by recruiting 4% of the overall total of the cadres of their institutions from among degree holders, which equals approximately 50,000 new recruits in all regions.
31. They accepted our call, which we thank them for,
32. and we authorized the government to assist in implementing these initiatives and following them up.
33. Second, organizing a national symposium in which will participate representatives of legislative councils, political parties, national organizations, concerned components of civil society, and a number of academics and competencies from various related sectors as well as regional representatives to give their opinions and propose visions in order to push employment further and respond to expected job applications in the next few years.

34. Three, giving a new push to regional news by allocating a daily space on national TV and radio to all the governorates of the country, intensifying the broadcast of the network of regional radios and written media, and consolidating audio-visual production units to boost this qualitative leap. This would make available more space for expressing the citizens' concerns and ambitions, and keep up with the reality of life in the regions.
35. Fourth, calling on the people's representatives, members of the council of consultants, and the central structures in political parties to intensify their presence in the regions they represent and their period of communication with citizens to listen to them and care for the cases that are shown to them and inform the concerned bodies about them in order to resolve them.
36. In this framework, we renew the call to administrative officials at the regional and local levels to develop channels of care for citizens and listen to their concerns, facilitate ways of solving problems, and do away with obstacles that impede them in collaboration with various organizations and the specialized organizational tissue.
37. Fifth, on top of all the efforts that will be made for employment, I have decided to exempt each new job-creating project whose employability exceeds 10% in internal developmental regions from taxes on profit and the employers' participation in social coverage for a period of 10 years.
38. We call on parents and all citizens to protect their children from rioters and destroyers by caring for them better and raising their awareness on being used and exploited by these extremist gangs.
39. I take this opportunity to renew my thanks and respect to my dear brother, Muammar AlGaddafi, the leader of the Libyan revolution, for his kind initiative to facilitate the movement of Tunisians and their businesses in our sister Libya, which embodies anew the sincerity of brotherhood and the strength of support we have always felt in him and the Libyan brothers.
40. Fellow citizens, these events should not make our determination less strong, and will not affect our accomplishments. But all the sides must infer the moral from them, and we must continue our journey with determination and enthusiasm because the glory and invulnerability of Tunisia are a sacred trust in the hands of all Tunisians.
41. Peace and God's mercy and blessing be upon you (Maalej, 2012)

- **Ben Ali's Speech 3: On the 14th of January, 2011 The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic:**

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، أيها الشعب التونسي نكلمكم اليوم ونكلمكم لكل في تونس وخارج تونس
2. نكلمكم لغة كل التونسيين والتونسيات
3. نكلمكم لان الوضع يفرض تغيير عميق تغيير عميق وشامل
4. وأنا فهمتكم
5. فهمت الجميع البطال والمحتاج والسياسي واللي طالب مزيد من الحريات
6. فهمتكم فهمتكم الكل
7. لكن الاحداث اللي جارية اليوم في بلادنا، ما هيش متاعنا
8. والتخريب ما هوش من عادات التونسي ،التونسي المتحضر ، التونسي المتسامح
9. العنف ما هوش متاعنا ولا هو من سلوكنا ،ولا بد أن يتوقف التيار،
10. يتوقف بتكاتف جهود الجميع ، أحزاب سياسية ، منظمات وطنية، مجتمع مدني مثقفين ومواطنين،
11. اليد في اليد من أجل بلادنا، اليد في اليد من أجل أمان كل أولادنا
12. سيكون التغيير اللي أعلن عليه الان استجابة لمطالبكم اللي تفاعلنا معاها، وتالمنا لما حدث شديد الالم،
13. حزني والمي كبيران لاني مضيت أكثر من 50 سنة من عمرى في خدمة تونس في مختلف المواقع من الجيش الوطني الى المسؤوليات المختلفة و23 سنة على رأس الدولة

14. كل يوم من حياتي كان ومازال لخدمة البلاد
15. وقدمت التضحيات - وما نحبش نعددها - ولم أقبل يوما / وما نقبلش / باش تسيل قطرة دم واحدة من دماء التونسيين.
16. تالمنا لسقوط ضحايا وتضرر أشخاص وأنا نرفض أن يسقط المزيد بسبب تواصل العنف والنهب،
17. أولادنا اليوم في الدار، وموش في المدرسة،
18. وهذا حرام وعيب لان أصبحنا خائفين عليهم من عنف مجموعات سطو ونهب واعتداء على الاشخاص ،
19. وهذا اجرام موش احتجاج ، وهذا حرام.
20. والمواطنين ،كل المواطنين، لا بد أن يقفوا أمامهم
21. وأحنا أعطينا التعليمات ونعول على تعاون الجميع حتى نفرق بين هذه العصابات والمجموعات من المنحرفين الذين يستغلون الظرف ،وبين الاحتجاجات السلمية المشروعة التي لا نرى فيها مانعا.
22. وأسفي كبير، كبير جدا ، وعميق جدا ، وعميق جدا ، فكفى عنفا كفى عنفا
23. وعطيت التعليمات كذلك لوزير الداخلية ،وكررت ،واليوم نؤكد يزى من اللجوء للكرطوش الحي ، الكرطوش موش مقبول
24. ،ما عندوش مبرر الا لا قدر الله حد يحاول يفك سلاحك ويهجم عليك بالنار وغيرها ،ويجبرك على الدفاع عن النفس.
25. وأطلب من اللجنة المستقله ،أكرر المستقله ، التي ستحقق في الاحداث والتجاوزات والوفيات المأسوف عليها تحديد مسؤوليات كل الاطراف ، كل الاطراف بدون استثناء ، بكل انصاف ونزاهة وموضوعية.
26. ونستنى من كل تونسي ، اللي يساندنا واللي ما يساندناش ، باش يدعم الجهود، جهود التهدئة، والتخلي عن العنف والتخريب والافساد ، فالاصلاح لازمو الهدوء ،
27. والاحداث اللي شفناها كانت في منطلقها احتجاج على أوضاع اجتماعية ، كنا عملنا جهود كبيرة لمعالجتها، ولكن مازال أمامنا مجهود أكبر لتدارك النقائص ،
28. ولازم نعطي لانفسنا جميعا الفرصة والوقت باش تتجسم كل الاجراءات الهامة التي اتخذناها
29. وزيادة على هذا كلفت الحكومة باش نقوم بتخفيض في أسعار المواد والمرافق الاساسية والرفع في ميزانية التعويض
30. أما المطالب السياسية /وقلتلكم أنا فهمتكم/
31. وقررت الحرية الكاملة للاعلام بكل وسائلو، وعدم غلق مواقع الانترنات، ورفض اى شكل من أشكال الرقابة عليها مع الحرص على احترام أخلاقياتنا ومبادى المهنة الاعلامية
32. أما بالنسبة للجنة اللي أعلنت عليها منذ يومين للنظر في ظواهر الفساد والرشوة وأخطاء المسؤلين ،وباش تكون هذه اللجنة ستقلة /نعم باش تكون مستقله/ وسنحرص على نزاهتها وانصافها
33. والمجال مفتوح من اليوم لحرية التعبير السياسي، ما في ذلك التظاهر السلمي، التظاهر السلمي المؤطر والمنظم ،التظاهر الحضارى ، فلا بأس حزب أو منظمة يريد تنظيم تظاهرة سلمية ، يتفضل ،لكن يعلم بيها ، ويحدد وقتها ومكانها ويؤطرها ويتعاون مع الاطراف المسؤولة للمحافظة على طابعها السلمي
34. ونحب نأكد أن العديد من الامور لم تجر كيما حبيتها تكون وخصوصا في مجالي الديمقراطية والحريات وغلطوني أحيانا بحجب الحقائق وسيحاسبون
35. ولذا أجدد لكم ، وبكل وضوح ، راني باش نعمل على دعم الديمقراطية وتفعيل التعددية، نعم على دعم الديمقراطية وتفعيل التعددية.
36. وسأعمل على صون دستور البلاد واحترامه ، ونحب نكرر هنا وخلافا لما أدعاه البعض ، أني تعهدت يوم السابع من نوفمبر بأن لا رئاسة مدى الحياة لا رئاسة مدى الحياة ،
37. ولذلك فاني أجدد الشكر لكل من ناشدني للترشح لسنة 2014 ، ولكني أرفض المساس بشرط السن للترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية.
38. اننا نريد بلوغ سنة 2014 في اطار وفاق مدني فعلي وجو من الحوار الوطني وبمشاركة الاطراف الوطنية في المسؤوليات
39. تونس بلادنا الكل
40. تونس نحبوها وكل شعبها يحبها ويلزم نصونها ،
41. فلتبق ارادة شعبها بين أيديه وبين الايادى الامينة التي سيختارها لتواصل المسيرة المسيرة التي انطلقت منذ الاستقلال والتي واصلناها منذ سنة 1987
42. ولهذا سنكون لجنة وطنية تترأسها شخصية وطنية مستقلة لها المصداقية لدى كل الاطراف السياسية والاجتماعية للنظر في مراجعة المجلة الانتخابية ومجلة الصحافة وقانون الجمعيات.

43. وتقترح اللجنة التصورات المرحلية اللازمة حتى انتخابات سنة 2014 بما في ذلك امكانية فصل الانتخابات التشريعية عن الانتخابات الرئاسية
44. تونس لنا جميعا فلنحافظ عليها جميعا ومستقبلها بين ايدينا فلنؤمنه جميعا وكل واحد منا مسؤول من موقعه على اعادة أمنها واستقرارها وترميم جراحها والدخول بها في مرحلة جديدة تؤهلها أكثر لمستقبل أفضل

45. عاشت تونس عاش شعبها عاشت الجمهورية
46. و السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

- **Ben Ali's Speech3: On the 14th of January, 2011 (the English Translation is adopted from Maalej (2012))**

1. In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. People of Tunisia, I talk to you today. I talk to you all in Tunisia and abroad.
2. I talk to you in the dialectal variety of all male and female Tunisians.
3. I am talking to you now because the situation requires a deep change, yes a deep and comprehensive change.
4. I understood you.
5. Yes indeed I understood you. I understood all, the unemployed and the needy, the politician and the one who is asking for more freedom.
6. I understood you and understood all.
7. But the events that are taking place today in our country are not ours.
8. Devastation is not one of the habits of a Tunisian, the civilized Tunisian, the tolerant Tunisian.
9. Violence is not ours and is not part of our behavior, and this current must stop.
10. It will stop with the efforts of all: political parties, national organizations, civil society, cultured people and citizens,
11. hand in hand for of our country, hand in hand for our children's hopes.
12. The change that was announced today is in response to your demands that I have interacted with, and I was greatly aggrieved by what happened.
13. My sorrow and pain are tremendous because I spent more than fifty years from my life in the service of Tunisia, in different positions, in the national military and various responsibilities and 23 years as a head of state.
14. Each day of my life has been devoted to serving the country,
15. and I offered sacrifices that I will not enumerate. You all know them. Never did I one day, I will not accept one drop of blood to flow from Tunisians' blood.
16. We have been aggrieved by the fall of victims and the grievance of people. I will not accept that more will fall because of the continuous violence and plunder.
17. Our sons today are at home and not at school,
18. which is sinful and disgraceful, because we are afraid for them from the violence of groups of plunderers that plunder property and attach individuals.
19. This is a crime not a protest, and it is sinful.
20. Fellow citizens, we must face up to them.
21. We have given instructions – and we count on the collaboration of all – so that we discriminate between these gangs and groups of thugs that take advantage of the circumstances, and the legitimate peaceful protests that we do not object to.
22. My regret is indeed very big, my regret is big and very big and very deep very deep. Stop the violence, stop the violence.

23. I have also given instructions to the Minister of Interior and repeated, and today I insist: enough recourse to live ammunition. Cartridges (bullets) are not acceptable.
24. They are not justifiable. Save if someone tries to take your weapon from you, and attacks you with fire, compelling you to self-defense.
25. I demand of the independent committee, I repeat, the independent committee that will investigate the events, violations, and regrettable deaths, to determine the responsibilities of all sides, all sides without exception, in total justice, honesty, and objectivity.
26. We are expecting from each Tunisian, those who support us and those who do not, to support the efforts, the efforts of pacification and to give up on violence, destruction, and damage. Reform requires peace,
27. and the events that we witnessed were initially protests against social conditions that we made big efforts to cure. But big efforts are still ahead of us, big efforts to compensate for weaknesses.
28. We all must give ourselves the opportunity and time to embody all the important procedures that we have taken.
29. On top of that, I instructed the government and I contacted the Prime Minister to bring down the prices of basic substances and necessities: sugar, milk, bread, etc.
30. However, the political demands, I told you that I understood you. Oh yes, I understood you. I understood you.
31. I have decided full freedom of information of all means, and to refrain from shutting down Internet sites, and rejection of any form of censorship against them, enforcing respect of their ethics and the informational principles of the profession.
32. Regarding the committee that I announced two days ago to inquire into the phenomena of corruption, bribery, and the officials' errors, this committee will be independent. Yes, it will be independent. We will insist on its impartiality and fairness.
33. From today, the door is open to freedom of political expression, including peaceful, supervised, and orderly demonstrations. Civilized demonstrations, we have no objections. If a party or an organization intends to organize a peaceful demonstration, they are welcome but they should announce it, determine its time, place, and frame it, and collaborate with the responsible bodies to preserve its peaceful character.
34. We emphasize that several things did not go as we liked, in all earnestness, as we liked them to be, especially in the field of democracy and freedoms. They induced me into error, sometimes, I am not a sun that can shine on the republic, all the land. They induced me into error concerning the size of realities. They will be accountable, yes, they will be accountable.
35. So I renew to you clearly, I will work toward supporting democracy, the support of democracy, and activating plurality, the support of democracy and the activation of plurality.
36. I will work toward protecting the Constitution, the country's Constitution, and respect it. I would like to repeat here, contrary to what some have claimed, that I pledged on November 7th that there would be no presidency for life, no presidency for life.
37. For that, I renew my thanks to all those who beseeched me to be a candidate in 2014, but I object to touching the age condition to be a candidate for the presidency of the republic.
38. We want to reach 2014 in the context of effective civil cohesion, an environment of national dialogue, and the participation of the national sides in responsibilities.
39. Tunisia is the country of us all, the country of all Tunisians.

40. Tunisia, we love it, and all its people love it, and we must protect it.
41. May the determination of our people be within its hands, and within the faithful hands that it will choose to pursue the journey that started since the Independence and that we have been pursuing since 1987.
42. For that, we will form a national committee presided over by an independent national personality that is credible to all the political and social parties in order to review the electoral code, the code of journalism, the law of organizations, etc.
43. The committee will suggest the required step-by-step visions till elections in 2014, including the separation of legislative elections from presidential elections.
44. Tunisia is for all of us, so let us all protect it. Its future is in our hands, so let us all give it peace. Each one of us is responsible from his/her position for the restoration of peace to it, its stability, the repair of its wounds, and enabling it to enter a new stage that would qualify it more for a better future.
45. May Tunisia live, may its people live, may the republic live.
46. Peace and God's mercy and blessing be upon you (Maalej, 2012).

- **Mubarak's Speech 1: On the 28th January, 2011 (The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic)**

1. أيها الإخوة المواطنون
2. أتحدث اليكم في ظرف دقيق يفرض علينا جميعاً وقفة جادة وصادقة مع النفس تتوخى سلامة القصدوصالح الوطن
3. لقد تابعت اولا باول التظاهرات وما نادت به ومادعت اليه
4. كانت تعليماتي للحكومة تشدد عليهم اتاحة الفرصة امامها للتعبير عن اراء المواطنين ومطالبهم
5. ثم تابعت محاولات البعض لاعتلاء موجة تلك التظارهات والمتاجرة بشعاراتها
6. واسفت كل الاسف من ضحايا ابرياء من المتظاهرين وقوات الشرطة
7. لقد دعوت الحكومة لتنفيذ هذه التعليمات وكان ذلك واضحاً في تعامل قوات الشرطة مع شبابنا فقد بادرت الى حمايتهم في بداياتها احتراما لحقهم في التظاهرالسلمي طالما تم في اطار القانون وقبل ان تتحول هذه التظارهات لاعمال شغب تهدد النظام العام وتعيق الحياة اليومية للمواطنين
8. ان هذه التظاهرات وما شهدناه قبلها من وقفات احتجاجية خلال الاعوام القليلة الماضية ما كان لها ان تتم لولا المساحات العريضة لحرية الرأي والتعبيروالصحافة وغيرها من الحريات التي اتاحتها خطوات الاصلاح لابناء الشعب ولولا ما تشهده مصر من تفاعل غير مسبوق لقوى المجتمع.
9. انني كرئيس للجمهورية وبمقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي الدستور كحكم بين السلطات أكدت مرارا وسوف اظل ان السيادة للشعب
10. وسوف اتمسك دائما بحقي في ممارسة حرية التعبير طالما تم في اطار الشرعية واحترام القانون
11. ان خيطا رفيعا يفصل بين الحرية والفوضى
12. وانني اذ انحاز كل الانحيازلحرية المواطنين في ابداء ارائهم
13. اتمسك بذات القدر بالحفاظ على امن مصر واستقرارها وبعدم الانجراف بها وبشعبها لمنزلقات خطيرة تهدد النظام العام والسلام الاجتماعي
14. ولا يعلم احد مداها وتداعياتها على حاضر الوطن ومستقبله
15. ان مصر هي اكبردولة في منطقتها سكانا ودورا وثقلا وتأثيرا
16. وهي دولة مؤسسات يحكمها الدستور والقانون
17. وعلينا ان نحاذر مما يحيط بنا من امثلة عديدة انزلقت بالشعوب الى الفوضى والانتكاس فلا ديمقراطية حققت ولا استقرارا حفظت
18. ايها الاخوة المواطنون

19. لقد جاءت هذه المظاهرات لتعبر عن تطلعات مشروعة ولمزيد من الاسراع في جهود محاصرة البطالة وتحسين مستوى المعيشة ومكافحة الفقر والتصدي بكل حسم للفساد
20. انني اعي هذه التطلعات المشروعة للشعب واعلم جيدا قدر همومه ومعاناته
21. لم انفصل عنها يوما واعمل من اجلها كل يوم لكن مانعانيه من مشكلات ومانسعى اليه من اصلاحات لن يحققه اللجوء الى العنف ولن تصنعه الفوضى وانما يحققه ويصنعه الحوار الوطني والعمل المخلص الجاد
22. ان شباب مصر هو اغلى مالديها ونتطلع اليهم كي يصنعوا مستقبلها وتربأ بهم ان يندس بينهم لنشر الفوضى ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة واشعال الحرائق وهدم ما بنيناه
23. ان اقتناعي ثابت لا يتزعزع بمواصلة الاصلاح السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي من اجل مجتمع مصري حر وديمقراطي يحتضن قيم العصر وينفتح على العالم
24. لقد انحزت وسوف اظل للفقراء من ابناء الشعب عل الدوام مقتنعا بان الاقتصاد اكبر واخطر من ان يترك للاقتصاديين وحدهم
25. وحرصت على ضبط سياسات الحكومة للاصلاح الاقتصادي كي لا تمضي باسرع مما يحتمله ابناء الشعب او مما يزيد من معاناتهم
26. ان جهودنا لمحاصرة البطالة واتاحة المزيد من خدمات التعليم والصحة والاسكان وغيرها للشباب والمواطنين تظل رهنا بالحفاظ على مصر ستقرة وامنه
27. وطنا لشعب متحضر وعريق لا يضع مكتسباته واماله لمستقبل في مهب الريح
28. ان ماحدث خلال هذه التظاهرات يتجاوز ما حدث من نهب وفوضى وحرائق لمخطط ابعد من ذلك لزعزعة الاستقرار والانقضاض على الشرعية
29. انني اهيب بشبابنا وبكل مصري ومصرية مراعاة صالح الوطن وان يتصدوا لحماية وطنهم ومكتسباتهم فليس باشعال الحرائق والاعتداء على الممتلكات العامة والخاصة تتحقق تطلعات مصر وابنائها وانما تتحقق تلك التطلعات للمستقبل الافضل بالوعي والحوار والاجتهاد من اجل الوطن.

ايها الاخوة المواطنون

30. انني لا اتحدث اليكم اليوم كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وانما كمصري شاءت الاقدار ان يتحمل مسئولية هذا الوطن وامضى حياته من اجلة حرباً وسلاماً
31. لقد اجتزنا معا من قبل اوقاتا صعبة تغلبنا عليها عندما واجهناها كأمة واحدةوشعب واحد وعندما عرفنا طريقنا ووجهتنا وحددنا مانسعى اليه من اهداف
32. ان طريق الاصلاح الذي اخترناه لا رجوع عنه اقو ارتداد الى الوراء
33. سنمضي عليه بخطوات جديدة تؤكد احترامنا لاستقرار القضاء واحكامه
34. خطوات جديدة نحو المزيد من الديمقراطية والمزيد من الحرية للمواطنين
35. خطوات جديدة لمحاصرة البطاله ورفع مستوى المعيشة وتطويرالخدمات
36. وخطوات جديدة للوقوف الى جانب الفقراءومحدودي الدخل
37. ان خياراتنا واهدافنا هي التي ستحدد مصائرنا ومستقبلنا وليس امامنا من سبيل لتخفيفها سوى بالوعي والعمل والكفاح نحافظ على ماحققناه ونبني عليه ونرعى في عقولنا وضمائرنا مستقبل الوطن
38. ان احداث اليوم والايام القليلة الماضية القت في قلوب الاغلبية الكاسحة من ابناء الشعب الخوف على مصر ومستقبلها والتحسب من الانجراف لمزيد من العنف والفوضى والتدمير والتخريب
39. وانني متحملا مسئوليتي الاولى في الحفاظ على امن الوطن والمواطنيين لن اسمح بذلك ابدا
40. لن اسمح لهذا الخوف ان يستحوز على مواطنينا ولهذا التحسب ان يلقي بنظامه على مصيرنا ومستقبلنا
41. لقد طلبت من الحكومة التقدم باستقالتها اليوم وسوف اكلف الحكومة الجديدة اعتبارا من الغد بتكليفات واضحة ومحددة للتعامل الحاسم مع اولويات المرحلة الراهنة
42. واقول من جديد انني لن اتهاون في اتخاذ اية قرارات تحفظ لكل مصري ومصرية امنهم وامانهم وسوف ادافع عن امن مصر واستقرارها وامان شعبها فتلك هي المسئولية والامانة التي اقسمت يميناً امام الله والوطن بالمحافظة عليها
43. حفظ الله مصر وشعبها وسدد على الطريق خطانا
44. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

- **Mubarak's Speech 1: On the 28th of January, 2011 (translated by the researcher)**

1- Dear fellow citizens

2- I am speaking to you in a delicate circumstance that requires all of us to take a serious and honest stance with ourselves, seeking soundness of purpose and the interests of the nation.
3- I followed the demonstrations and what they called for
4- My instructions to the government stressed that they should be given the opportunity to express citizens' opinions and demands
5- Then I continued the attempts of some to ride the wave of these demonstrations and trade in their slogans
6- I deeply regret the innocent victims of the demonstrators and the police forces
7- I called on the government to implement these instructions, and this was clear in the police forces' dealings with our youth. They took the initiative to protect them in the beginning out of respect for their right to peaceful demonstration as long as it was done within the framework of the law and before these demonstrations turned into riots that threatened public order and hindered the daily life of citizens.
8- These demonstrations and the protests we witnessed before them during the past few years would not have taken place without the broad areas of freedom of opinion, expression, press and other freedoms that the reform steps made available to the people and without the unprecedented interaction of the forces of society that Egypt is witnessing.
9- As President of the Republic, and by virtue of the powers granted to me by the Constitution as an arbiter between the authorities, I have repeatedly affirmed and will continue to affirm that sovereignty belongs to the people.
10- I will always adhere to my right to exercise freedom of expression as long as it is done within the framework of legitimacy and respect for the law
11- There is a thin line that separates freedom from chaos
12- I fully support the freedom of citizens to express their opinions
13- I am equally committed to preserving Egypt's security and stability and not being drawn into dangerous slides that threaten public order and social peace.
14- No one knows its extent and repercussions on the nation's present and future
15- Egypt is the largest country in its region in terms of population, role, weight, and influence
16- It is a state of institutions governed by the constitution and law
17- We must beware of the many examples surrounding us that have led people into chaos and deterioration. Neither democracy has been achieved nor stability has been preserved.
18- Dear fellow citizens
19- These demonstrations came to express legitimate aspirations and to further accelerate efforts to combat unemployment, improve the standard of living, combat poverty, and decisively confront corruption.
20- I am aware of these legitimate aspirations of the people and I know very well the extent of their concerns and suffering
21- I have never separated from her and I work for her every day, but the problems we suffer from and the reforms we seek will not be achieved by resorting to violence and

will not be achieved by chaos. Rather, they will be achieved and created by national dialogue and sincere, hard work.
22- Egypt's youth are its most precious possessions, and we look to them to create its future. We do not want them to infiltrate among them to spread chaos, plunder public and private property, start fires, and demolish what we have built.
23- My conviction is firm and unshakable in continuing political, economic and social reform for the sake of a free and democratic Egyptian society that embraces the values of the era and is open to the world.
24- I have sided and will always side with the poor people, convinced that the economy is too big and dangerous to be left to economists alone.
25- I was keen to control the government's economic reform policies so that they would not proceed faster than what the people could tolerate or which would increase their suffering.
26- Our efforts to contain unemployment and provide more education, health, housing and other services to young people and citizens remain contingent on maintaining a stable and secure Egypt.
27- A homeland for a civilized and ancient people who do not put their gains and hopes for the future in vain.
28- What happened during these demonstrations goes beyond the looting, chaos, and fires to a plan beyond that to destabilize and undermine legitimacy.
29- I call on our youth and every Egyptian man and woman to respect the interests of the homeland and to stand up to protect their homeland and their gains. It is not by setting fires and attacking public and private property that the aspirations of Egypt and its people will be achieved. Rather, those aspirations for a better future will be achieved through awareness, dialogue, and diligence for the sake of the homeland.
Dear fellow citizens
30- I am not only speaking to you today as President of the Republic, but as an Egyptian who was destined to bear the responsibility of this country and who spent his life for it in war and peace.
31- We have passed together difficult times before, which we overcame when we faced them as one nation and one people, and when we knew our path and destination and determined the goals we seek.
32- The path of reform that we have chosen is irreversible and irreversible
33- We will proceed with new steps that confirm our respect for the stability of the judiciary and its rulings
34- New steps towards more democracy and more freedom for citizens
35- New steps to combat unemployment, raise the standard of living, and develop services
36- And new steps to stand by the poor and low-income people
37- Our choices and goals are what will determine our destinies and our future, and we have no way to mitigate them except through awareness, work, and struggle. We preserve what we have achieved, build on it, and nurture in our minds and consciences the future of the nation.
38- The events of today and the past few days have placed in the hearts of the vast majority of the people fear for Egypt and its future and anticipation of being drawn into more violence, chaos, destruction and sabotage.

39- I bear my primary responsibility for preserving the security of the nation and its citizens. I will never allow that.
40- I will not allow this fear to take hold of our citizens and this fear that it will impose its regime on our fate and our future.
41- I have asked the government to submit its resignation today, and I will assign the new government, starting tomorrow, with clear and specific tasks to deal decisively with the priorities of the current stage.
42- I say again that I will not be complacent in making any decisions that preserve the security and safety of every Egyptian man and woman, and I will defend Egypt's security and stability and the safety of its people, for that is the responsibility and trust that I swore an oath before God and the nation to preserve.
43- May God protect Egypt and its people and direct our steps
44- May God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you

- **Mubarak's Speech 2: on the 2nd of February, 2011 (The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic)**

1. الإخوة المواطنون، أتحدث إليكم في أوقات صعبة تمتحن مصر و شعبها و تكاد أن تنجرف بها و بهم إلى المجهول
2. يتعرض الوطن لأحداث عصيبة واختبارات قاسية بدأت بشباب ومواطنين شرفاء مارسوا حقهم في التظاهر السلمي تعبيراً عن همومهم وتطلعاتهم سرعان ما استغلهم من سعي لاشاعة الفوضي واللجوء إلي العنف والمواجهة وللقفز علي الشرعية الدستورية والانقضاض عليها
3. تحولت تلك التظاهرات من مظهر راق ومتحضر لممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير إلي مواجهات مؤسفة تحركها وتهيمن عليها قوي سياسية سعت إلي التصعيد وصب الزيت علي النار واستهدفت أمن الوطن واستقراره بأعمال اثارة وتحريض وسلب ونهب واشعال للحرائق وقطع للطرقات واعتداء علي مرافق الدولة والممتلكات العامة والخاصة واقتحام لبعض البعثات الدبلوماسية علي أرض مصر.
4. نعيش معاً أياماً مؤلمة وأكثر ما يوجع قلوبنا هو الخوف الذي انتاب الأغلبية الكاسحة من المصريين وما ساورهم من انزعاج وقلق وهواجس حول ما سيأتي به الغد لهم ولذويهم وعائلاتهم ومستقبل ومصير بلدهم.
5. إن أحداث الأيام القليلة الماضية تفرض علينا جميعاً شعباً وقيادة الاختيار ما بين الفوضي والاستقرار وتطرح أمامنا ظروفاً جديدة وواقعاً مصرياً مغايراً يتعين أن يتعامل معه الشعب وقواته المسلحة بأقصي قدر من الحكمة والحرص علي مصالح مصر وأبنائها.
6. الإخوة المواطنون، لقد بادرت لتشكيل حكومة جديدة بأولويات وتكليفات جديدة تتجاوب مع مطالب شبابنا ورسالتهم وكلفت نائب رئيس الجمهورية بالحوار مع كافة القوي السياسية حول كافة القضايا المثارة للإصلاح السياسي والديمقراطي وما يتطلبه من تعديلات دستورية وتشريعية من أجل تحقيق هذه المطالب المشروعة واستعادة الهدوء والأمن والاستقرار لكن هناك من القوي السياسية من رفض هذه الدعوة للحوار تمسكاً بأجنداتهم الخاصة ودون مراعاة للظرف الدقيق الراهن لمصر وشعبها.
7. وبالنظر لهذا الرفض لدعوتي للحوار وهي دعوة لاتزال قائمة فإنني أتوجه بحديثي اليوم مباشرة لأبناء الشعب بفلاحيه وعماله مسلميه وأقباطه شيوخه وشبابه ولكل مصري ومصرية في ريف الوطن ومدنه علي اتساع أرضه ومحافظاته.
8. إنني لم أكن يوماً طالب سلطة أو جاه ويعلم الشعب الظروف العصيبة التي تحملت فيها المسئولية وما قدمته للوطن حرباً وسلاماً كما أنني رجل من أبناء قواتنا المسلحة وليس من طبعي خيانة الأمانة أو التخلي عن الواجب والمسئولية
9. إن مسئوليتي الأولي الان هي استعادة أمن واستقرار الوطن لتحقيق الانتقال السلمي للسلطة في أجواء تحمي مصر والمصريين وتتيح تسلم المسئولية لمن يختاره الشعب في الانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة

10. وأقول بكل الصدق وبصرف النظر عن الظرف الراهن انني لم أكن أنوي الترشح لفترة رئاسية جديدة فقد قضيت ما يكفي من العمر في خدمة مصر وشعبها لكنني الان حريص كل الحرص علي أن أختتم عملي من أجل الوطن بما يضمن تسليم أمانته ورايته ومصر عزيزة منة مستقرة وبما يحفظ الشرعية ويحترم الدستور
11. أقول بعبارات واضحة إنني سأعمل خلال الأشهر المتبقية من ولايتي الحالية كي يتم اتخاذ التدابير والإجراءات المحققة للانتقال السلمي للسلطة بموجب ما يخوله لي الدستور من صلاحيات
12. إنني أدعو البرلمان بمجلسيه إلي مناقشة تعديل المادتين 76 و 77 من الدستور بما يعدل شروط الترشيح لرئاسة الجمهورية ويعتمد فترات محددة للرئاسة.
13. ولكي يتمكن البرلمان الحالي بمجلسيه من مناقشة هذه التعديلات الدستورية وما يرتبط بها من تعديلات تشريعية للقوانين المكملة للدستور وضماناً لمشاركة كافة القوي السياسية في هذه المناقشات فإنني أطالب البرلمان بالالتزام بكلمة القضاء وأحكامه في الطعون علي الانتخابات التشريعية الأخيرة دون إبطاء.
14. سوف أوالي متابعة تنفيذ الحكومة الجديدة بتكليفاتها علي نحو يحقق المطالب المشروعة للشعب وأن يأتي أداؤها معبراً عن الشعب وتطلعه للإصلاح السياسي والاقتصادي والاجتماعي ولإتاحة فرص العمل ومكافحة الفقر وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية
15. وفي ذات السياق فإنني أكلف جهاز الشرطة بالاضطلاع بدوره في خدمة الشعب وحماية المواطنين بنزاهة وشرف وأمانة وبالاحترام الكامل لحقوقهم وحرياتهم وكرامتهم.
16. كما أنني أطالب السلطات الرقابية والقضائية بأن تتخذ علي الفور ما يلزم من إجراءات لمواصلة ملاحقة الفاسدين والتحقيق مع المتسببين فيما شهدته مصر من إنفلات أمني ومن قاموا بأعمال السلب والنهب واشعال النيران وترويع ال منين.
17. ذلك هو عهدي للشعب خلال الأشهر المتبقية من ولايتي الحالية أدعو الله أن يوفقني في الوفاء به كي أختتم عطائي لمصر وشعبها بما يرضي الله والوطن وأبناءه,
18. الإخوة المواطنون ستخرج مصر من الظروف الراهنة أقوي مما كانت عليه قبلها وأكثر ثقة وتماسكاً واستقراراً.
19. سيخرج منها شعبنا وهو أكثر وعياً بما يحقق مصالحه وأكثر حرصاً علي عدم التفريط في مصيره ومستقبله.
20. إن حسني مبارك الذي يتحدث إليكم اليوم يعتز بما قضاه من سنين طويلة في خدمة مصر وشعبها إن هذا الوطن العزيز هو وطني مثلما هو وطن كل مصري ومصرية فيه عشت وحاربت من أجله ودافعت عن أرضه وسيادته ومصالحه وعلي أرضه أموت وسيحكم التاريخ علي وعلي غيري بما لنا أو علينا.
21. إن الوطن باق والأشخاص زائلون ومصر العريقة هي الخالدة أبداً تنتقل رايتها وأمانتها بين سواعد أبنائها وعلينا أن نضمن تحقيق ذلك بعزة ورفعة وكرامة جيلاً بعد جيل.
22. حفظ الله هذا الوطن وشعبه.
23. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

- **Mubarak's Speech 2: on the 2nd of February, 2011 (as translated by the Guardian, 2 Feb 2011)**
    1. I talk to you during critical times that are testing Egypt and its people which could sweep them into the unknown.
    2. The country is passing through difficult times and tough experiences which began with noble youths and citizens who practise their rights to peaceful demonstrations and protests, expressing their concerns and aspirations but they were quickly exploited by those who sought to spread chaos and violence, confrontation and to violate the constitutional legitimacy and to attack it.
    3. Those protests were transformed from a noble and civilised phenomenon of practising freedom of expression to unfortunate clashes, mobilised and controlled by political forces that wanted to escalate and worsen the situation. They targeted the nation's security and stability through acts of provocation theft and looting and setting fires and blocking roads and attacking vital installations and public and private properties and storming some diplomatic missions.

4. We are living together painful days and the most painful thing is the fear that affected the huge majority of Egyptians and caused concern and anxiety over what tomorrow could bring them and their families and the future of their country.
5. The events of the last few days require us all as a people and as a leadership to chose between chaos and stability and to set in front of us new circumstances and a new Egyptian reality which our people and armed forces must work with wisely and in the interest of Egypt and its citizens.
6. Dear brothers and citizens, I took the initiative of forming a new government with new priorities and duties that respond to the demand of our youth and their mission. I entrusted the vice president with the task of holding dialogue with all the political forces and factions about all the issues that have been raised concerning political and democratic reform and the constitutional and legislative amendments required to realise these legitimate demands and to restore law and order but there are some political forces who have refused this call to dialogue, sticking to their particular agendas without concern for the current delicate circumstances of Egypt and its people.
7. In light of this refusal to the call for dialogue and this is a call which remains standing, I direct my speech today directly to the people, its Muslims and Christians, old and young, peasants and workers, and all Egyptian men and women in the countryside and city over the whole country.
8. I have never, ever been seeking power and the people know the difficult circumstances that I shouldered my responsibility and what I offered this country in war and peace, just as I am a man from the armed forces and it is not in my nature to betray the trust or give up my responsibilities and duties.
9. My primary responsibility now is security and independence of the nation to ensure a peaceful transfer of power in circumstances that protect Egypt and the Egyptians and allow handing over responsibility to whoever the people choose in the coming presidential election.
10. I say in all honesty and regardless of the current situation that I did not intend to nominate myself for a new presidential term. I have spent enough years of my life in the service of Egypt and its people.
11. I am now absolutely determined to finish my work for the nation in a way that ensures handing over its safe-keeping and banner … preserving its legitimacy and respecting the constitution. I will work in the remaining months of my term to take the steps to ensure a peaceful transfer of power.
12. According to my constitutional powers, I call on parliament in both its houses to discuss amending article 76 and 77 of the constitution concerning the conditions on running for presidency of the republic and it sets specific a period for the presidential term.
13. In order for the current parliament in both houses to be able to discuss these constitutional amendments and the legislative amendments linked to it for laws that complement the constitution and to ensure the participation of all the political forces in these discussions, I demand parliament to adhere to the word of the judiciary and its verdicts concerning the latest cases which have been legally challenged.
14. I will entrust the new government to perform in ways that will achieve the legitimate rights of the people and that its performance should express the people and their aspirations of political, social and economic reform and to allow job opportunities and combating poverty, realizing social justice.

15. In this context, I charge the police apparatus to carry out its duty in serving the people, protecting the citizens with integrity and honour with complete respect for their rights, freedom and dignity.
16. I also demand the judicial and supervisory authorities to take immediately the necessary measures to continue pursuing outlaws and to investigate those who caused the security disarray and those who undertook acts of theft, looting and setting fires and terrorizing citizens.
17. This is my pledge to the people during the last remaining months of my current term: I ask God to help me to honor this pledge to complete my vocation to Egypt and its people in what satisfies God, the nation and its people.
18. Dear citizens, Egypt will emerge from these current circumstances stronger, more confident and unified and stable.
19. And our people will emerge with more awareness of how to achieve reconciliation and be more determined not to undermine its future and destiny.
20. Hosni Mubarak who speaks to you today is proud of the long years he spent in the service of Egypt and its people. This dear nation is my country, it is the country of all Egyptians, here I have lived and fought for its sake and I defended its land, its sovereignty and interests and on this land I will die and history will judge me and others for our merits and faults.
21. The nation remains. Visitors come and go but ancient Egypt will remain eternal, its banner and safekeeping will pass from one generation to the next. It is up to us to ensure this in pride and dignity."
22. May God protect this country and its people.
23. May God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you (The Gaurdian, 2.Feb.2011)

- **Mubarak's Speech 3: on the 10th of February, 2011 (The Speech as transcribed form www.you.tube.com in Arabic)**

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، الإخوة المواطنون، الأبناء شباب مصر وشاباتها، أتوجه بحديثي اليوم لشباب مصر بميدان التحرير وعلى اتساع أرضها، أتوجه إليكم جميعا بحديث من القلب، حديث الأب لأبنائه وبناته
2. أقول لكم إنني أعتز بكم رمزا لجيل مصري جديد يدعو إلى التغيير إلى الأفضل ويتمسك به ويحلم بالمستقبل ويصنعه
3. أقول لكم قبل كل شيء، إن دماء شهدائكم وجرحاكم لن تضيع هدرا، وأؤكد أنني لن أتهاون في معاقبة المتسببين بها بكل الشدة والحسم، وسأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا بأقصى ما تقرره أحكام القانون من عقوبات رادعة.
4. وأقول لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء إنني تألمت كل الألم من أجلهم مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي كما أوجع قلوبكم.
5. أقول لكم إن استجابتي لصوتكم ورسالتكم ومطالبكم هو التزام لا رجعة فيه،
6. وإنني عازم كل العزم على الوفاء بما تعهدت به بكل الجدية والصدق، وحريص كل الحرص على تنفيذه دون ارتداد أو عودة للوراء.
7. إن هذا الالتزام ينطلق من اقتناع أكيد بصدق ونقاء نواياكم وتحرككم، وأن مطالبكم هي مطالب عادلة ومشروعة
8. فالأخطاء واردة في أي نظام سياسي وفي أي دولة، ولكن المهم هو الاعتراف بها وتصحيحها في أسرع وقت ومحاسبة مرتكبيها.
9. وأقول لكم إنني كرئيس للجمهورية لا أجد حرجا أو غضاضة أبدا في الاستماع لشباب بلادي والتجاوب معه،
10. لكن الحرج كل الحرج، والعيب كل العيب، وما لم ولن أقبله أبدا أن أستمع لإملاءات أجنبية تأتي من الخارج، أيا كان مصدرها وأيا كانت ذرائعها أو مبرراتها.
11. الأبناء شباب مصر الإخوة المواطنون لقد أعلنت بعبارات لا تحتمل الجدل أو التأويل عدم ترشحي للانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة، مكتفيا بما قدمته من عطاء للوطن لأكثر من 60 عاما في سنوات الحرب والسلام

12. أعلنت تمسكي بذلك، وأعلنت تمسكا مماثلا وبذات القدر بالمضي في النهوض بمسؤوليتي في حماية الدستور ومصالح الشعب حتى يتم تسليم السلطة والمسؤولية لمن يختاره الناخبون في شهر سبتمبر المقبل، في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة توفر لها ضمانات الحرية والنزاهة
13. ذلك هو القسم الذي أقسمته أمام الله والوطن، وسوف أحافظ عليه حتى نبلغ بمصر وشعبها بر الأمان.
14. لقد طرحتُ رؤية محددة للخروج من الأزمة الراهنة، ولتحقيق ما دعا إليه الشباب والمواطنون، بما يحترم الشرعية الدستورية ولا يقوضها،
15. وعلى نحو يحقق استقرار مجتمعنا ومطالب أبنائه، ويطرح في ذات الوقت إطارا متفقا عليه للانتقال السلمي للسلطة من خلال حوار مسؤول بين كافة قوى المجتمع وبأقصى قدر من الصدق والشفافية
16. طرحتُ هذه الرؤية ملتزما بمسؤوليتي في الخروج بالوطن من هذه الأوقات العصيبة، وأتابع المضي في تحقيقها أولا بأول، بل ساعة بساعة، متطلعا لدعم ومساندة كل حريص على مصر وشعبها كي ننجح في تحويلها لواقع ملموس، وفق توافق وطني عريض ومتسع القاعدة، تسهر على ضمان تنفيذه قواتنا المسلحة الباسلة
17. لقد بدأنا بالفعل حوارا وطنيا بناء يضم شباب مصر الذين قادوا الدعوة إلى التغيير وكافة القوى السياسية، ولقد أسفر هذا الحوار عن توافق مبدئي في ال راء والمواقف يضع أقدامنا على بداية الطريق الصحيح للخروج من الأزمة، ويتعين مواصلته للانتقال به من الخطوط العريضة لما تم الاتفاق عليه، إلى خريطة طريق واضحة وبجدول زمني محدد
18. تمضي يوما بعد يوم على طريق الانتقال السلمي للسلطة من الان وحتى سبتمبر المقبل
19. إن هذا الحوار الوطني قد تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة دستورية تتولى دراسة التعديلات المطلوبة في الدستور وما تقتضيه من تعديلات تشريعية
20. كما تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة للمتابعة تتولى متابعة التنفيذ الأمين لما تعهدتُ به أمام الشعب
21. ولقد حرصت على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين من الشخصيات المصرية المشهود لها بالاستقلال والتجرد، ومن فقهاء القانون الدستوري ورجال القضاء.
22. وفضلا عن ذلك فإنني إزاء ما فقدناه من شهداء من أبناء مصر في أحداث مأساوية حزينة أوجعت قلوبنا وهزت ضمير الوطن
23. أصدرت تعليماتي بسرعة الانتهاء من التحقيقات حول أحداث الأسبوع الماضي، وإحالة نتائجها على الفور إلى النائب العام ليتخذ بشأنها ما يلزم من إجراءات قانونية رادعة
24. ولقد تلقيت أمس التقرير الأول بالتعديلات الدستورية ذات الأولوية المقترحة من اللجنة التي شكلتها من رجال القضاء وفقهاء القانون لدراسة التعديلات الدستورية والتشريعية المطلوبة.
25. وإنني تجاوبا مع ما تضمنه تقرير اللجنة من مقترحات، ومقتضى الصلاحيات المخولة لرئيس الجمهورية وفقا للمادة 189 من الدستور، فقد تقدمت اليوم بطلب تعديل ست مواد دستورية هي المواد 76 و77 و88 و93 و189، فضلا عن إلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور،
26. مع تأكيد الاستعداد للتقدم في وقت لاحق بطلب تعديل المواد التي تنتهي إليها هذه اللجنة الدستورية وفق ما تراه من الدواعي والمبررات.
27. وتستهدف هذه التعديلات ذات الأولوية تيسير شروط الترشيح لرئاسة الجمهورية، واعتماد عدد محدد لمدد الرئاسة تحقيقا لتداول السلطة، وتعزيز ضوابط الإشراف على الانتخابات ضمانا لحريتها ونزاهتها،
28. كما تؤكد اختصاص القضاء وحده بالفصل في صحة وعضوية أعضاء البرلمان، وتعدل شروط وإجراءات طلب تعديل الدستور.
29. أما الاقتراح بإلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور فإنه يستهدف تحقيق التوازن المطلوب بين حماية الوطن من مخاطر الإرهاب وضمان احترام الحقوق والحريات المدنية للمواطنين، بما يفتح الباب أمام إيقاف العمل بقانون الطوارئ فور استعادة الهدوء والاستقرار وتوافر الظروف المواتية لرفع حالة الطوارئ.
30. الإخوة المواطنون، إن الأولوية ال ن هي استعادة الثقة بين المصريين بعضهم البعض، والثقة في اقتصادنا وسمعتنا الدولية، والثقة في أن التغيير والتحول الذي بدأناه لا ارتداد عنه أو رجعة فيه.
31. إن مصر تجتاز أوقاتا صعبة لا يصح أن نسمح باستمرارها فيزداد ما ألحقته بنا وباقتصادنا من أضرار وخسائر يوما بعد يوم، وينتهي بمصر الأمر إلى أوضاع يصبح معها الشباب الذين دعوا إلى التغيير والإصلاح أول المتضررين منها.
32. إن اللحظة الراهنة ليست متعلقة بشخصي، ليست متعلقة بحسني مبارك، وإنما بات الأمر متعلقا بمصر في حاضرها ومستقبل أبنائها.

33. إن المصريين جميعا في خندق واحد ال ن، وعلينا أن نواصل الحوار الوطني الذي بدأناه بروح الفريق وليس الفرقاء، وبعيدا عن الخلاف والتناحر، كي تتجاوز مصر أزمتها الراهنة، ولنعيد لاقتصادنا الثقة فيه، ولمواطنينا الاطمئنان والأمان، وللشارع المصري حياته اليومية الطبيعية.
34. لقد كنت شابا مثل شباب مصر الان، عندما تعلمت شرف العسكرية المصرية والولاء للوطن والتضحية من أجله
35. أفنيت عمري دفاعا عن أرضه وسيادته،
36. شهدت حروبه بهزائمها وانتصاراتها، عشت أيام الانكسار والاحتلال وأيام العبور والنصر والتحرير
37. أسعد أيام حياتي يوم رفعت علم مصر فوق سيناء،
38. واجهت الموت مرات عديدة طيارا وفي أديس أبابا وغير ذلك كثير، لم أخضع يوما لضغوط أجنبية أو إملاءات،
39. حافظت على السلام، عملت من أجل أمن مصر واستقرارها، اجتهدت من أجل نهضتها،
40. لم أسع يوما لسلطة أو شعبية زائفة أثق أن الأغلبية الكاسحة من أبناء الشعب يعرفون من هو حسني مبارك، ويحز في نفسي ما ألاقيه اليوم من بعض بني وطني.
41. وعلى أية حال، فإنني إذ أعي خطورة المفترق الصعب الحالي، واقتناعا من جانبي بأن مصر تجتاز لحظة فارقة في تاريخها تفرض علينا جميعا تغليب المصلحة العليا للوطن، وأن نضع مصر أولا فوق أي اعتبار وكل اعتبار خر،
42. فقد رأيتُ تفويض نائب رئيس الجمهورية في اختصاصات رئيس الجمهورية على النحو الذي يحدده الدستور. إنني أعلم علم اليقين أن مصر ستتجاوز أزمتها
43. ولن تنكسر إرادة شعبها، ستقف على أقدامها من جديد بصدق وإخلاص أبنائها كل أبنائها،
44. وسترد كيد الكائدين وشماتة الشامتين.
45. سنثبت نحن المصريين قدرتنا على تحقيق مطالب الشعب بالحوار المتحضر والواعي،
46. سنثبت أننا لسنا أتباعا لأحد، ولا نأخذ تعليمات من أحد، وأن أحدا لا يصنع لنا قراراتنا سوى نبض الشارع ومطالب أبناء الوطن.
47. سنثبت ذلك بروح وعزم المصريين، وبوحدة وتماسك هذا الشعب، وبتمسكنا بعزة مصر وكرامتها وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة، فهي أساس وجودنا وجوهره لأكثر من سبعة لاف عام.
48. ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر وشعبها، ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر ودام شعبها، ستعيش في كل واحد من فلاحينا وعمالنا ومثقفينا، ستبقى في قلوب شيوخنا وشبابنا وأطفالنا، مسلميهم وأقباطهم، وفي عقول وضمائر من لم يولد بعد من أبنائنا.
49. أقول من جديد إنني عشت من أجل هذا الوطن حافظا لمسؤوليته وأمانته، وستظل مصر هي الباقية فوق الأشخاص وفوق الجميع
50. ستبقى حتى أسلم أمانتها و رايتها هي الهدف و العاية و المسؤولية و الواجب بداية العمر و مشواره و منتهاه و أرض المحيا و الممات
51. ستظل بلدا عزيزة لا يفارقني أو أفارقه حتى يواريني ترابه و ثراه
52. و ستظل شعبا كريما يبقى أبد الدهر مرفوع الرأس و الراية موفور العزة و الكرامة
53. حفظ الله مصر بلدا أمنا و رعى شعبه و سدد على الطريق خطاه

- **Mubarak's Speech3: on the 10th of February, 2011 (as translated by the BBC, 10. Feb.2011)**

1. I am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country. I am addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters.
2. I am proud of you as the new Egyptian generation calling for a change to the better, dreaming and making the future.
3. First and foremost, I am telling you that the blood of your martyrs and injured will not go in vain. I assure you that I will not relent in harshly punishing those responsible. I will hold those who persecuted our youth accountable with the maximum deterrent sentences.
4. I tell the families of those innocent victims that I suffered plenty for them, as much as they did. My heart was in pain because of what happened to them, as much as it pained their hearts.
5. I am telling you that heeding to your voice, your message and demands is an irretraceable commitment.

6. I am determined to live up to my promises with all firmness and honesty and I am totally determined to implement (them), without hesitation or reconsideration.
7. This commitment springs from a strong conviction that your intentions are honest and pure and your action. Your demands are just and legitimate demands.
8. The mistakes can be made in any political system and in any state. But, the most important is to recognise them and correct them as soon as possible and bring to account those who have committed them.
9. I am telling you that as a president I find no shame in listening to my country's youth and interacting with them.
10. The big shame and embarrassment, which I have not done and never will do, would be listening to foreign dictations whatever may be the source or pretext.
11. My sons, the youth of Egypt, brother citizens, I have unequivocally declared that I will not run for president in the next elections, satisfied with what I've offered my country in over 60 years during war and peace.
12. I declared my commitment to that, as well as my equal commitment to carrying out my responsibility in protecting the constitution and the people's interests until power and responsibility are handed over to whoever is elected in next September, following free and candid elections with guarantees of freedom and candor.
13. This is the oath I took before God and my country and one which I will keep until we take Egypt and its people to a safe harbour.
14. I have set a defined vision to come out of this crisis and to carry out what the citizens and the youth have called for in a way which would respect the constitutional legitimacy and not undermine it.
15. It will be carried out in a way that would bring stability to our society and achieve the demands of its youth, and, at the same time, propose an agreed-upon framework for a peaceful transfer of power through responsible dialogue with all factions of society and with utmost sincerity and transparency.
16. I presented this vision, committed to my responsibility in getting the nation out of these difficult times and continuing to achieve it first, hour by hour, anticipating the support and assistance of all those who are concerned about Egypt and its people, so that we succeed in transforming it (the vision) into to a tangible reality, according to a broad and national agreement with a large base, with the courageous military forces guaranteeing its implementation.
17. We have started indeed building a constructive national dialogue, including the Egyptian youths who led the calls for change, and all political forces. This dialogue has resulted in a tentative agreement of opinions and positions, putting our feet at the start of the right track to get out of the crisis and must continue to take it from the broad lines on what has been agreed upon to a clear road map and with a fixed agenda.
18. From now to next September, day after day, we'll see the peaceful transition of power.
19. This national dialogue has focused on the setting up of a constitutional committee that will look into the required amendments of the constitution and the needed legislative reforms.
20. It (the dialogue) also met about the setting up of a follow-up committee expected to follow up the sincere implementation of the promises that I have made before the people.
21. I have made sure that the composition of the two committees is made of Egyptian figures that are known for their independence and experience, experts in constitutional law and judges.

22. In addition to that, the loss of the martyrs of the sons of Egypt in sad and tragic events has hurt our hearts and shaken the homeland's conscience.
23. I immediately issued my instructions to complete the investigation about last week's events (the clashes between pro- and anti-Mubarak demonstrators) and submit its results immediately to the general prosecutor for him to take the necessary legal deterrent measures.
24. Yesterday, I got the first report on the top priority constitutional amendments proposed by the committee of justice system and law experts and that I have set up to look into the required constitutional and legislative amendments.
25. In response to the proposals in the committee's report, and in compliance with the prerogatives of the president of the republic, in conformity with Article 189 of the constitution, I have submitted a request today asking for the amendment of six constitutional clauses: 76, 77, 88, 93 and 189, in addition to the annulment of clause 179.
26. Moreover, I am asserting my readiness to submit, at a later time, an (additional) request to change any other clauses referred to me by the constitutional committee, according to the needs and justifications it sees fit.
27. These top-priority amendments aim to ease the conditions for presidential nominations, and the fixing of limited terms of presidency to ensure the rotation of power, and the strengthening of the regulations of elections oversight to guarantee their freedom and fairness.
28. It is in the judiciary's prerogative to decide about the validity and membership of MPs and amend the conditions and measures on the amendment of the constitution.
29. The proposal to delete Article 179 from the constitution aims to achieve the required balance between the protection of the nation from the dangers of terrorism and safeguarding the civil rights and freedoms of the citizens which opens the door to the lifting of the emergency law following the return of calm and stability and the presence of suitable conditions to lift the state of emergency.
30. Brother citizens, the priority now is to bring back trust between Egyptians, trust in our economy and our international reputation, and trust in protecting the change and movement that we have started from turning back or retreating.
31. Egypt is going through difficult times which it is not right for us to allow continuing, as it will continue to cause us and our economy harm and losses, day after day, which will end in circumstances which those youths who called for change and reform will become the first to be harmed by.
32. The current moment is not to do with myself, it is not to do with Hosni Mubarak, but is to do with Egypt, its present and the future of its children.
33. All Egyptians are in one trench now, and it is on us to continue the national dialogue which we have started, with a team spirit, not one of division, and far from disagreement and infighting so that we can get Egypt past its current crisis, and to restore trust in our economy, and tranquillity and peace to our citizens, and return the Egyptian street to its normal everyday life.
34. I was as young as Egypt's youth today, when I learned the Egyptian military honour, allegiance and sacrifice for my country.
35. I have spent a lifetime defending its soil and sovereignty. I witnessed its wars, with its defeats and victories.
36. I lived the days of defeat and occupation, I also lived the days of the (Suez) crossing, victory and liberation.

37. It was the happiest day of my life when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai.
38. I faced death many times as a pilot, in Addis Ababa, and numerous other times. I never succumbed to foreign pressure or dictations.
39. I kept the peace. I worked towards the stability and security of Egypt. I worked hard for its revival and for its people.
40. I never sought power or fake popularity. I trust that the overwhelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how some of my countrymen are treating me today.
41. In any case, I am completely aware of the seriousness of the current hard turn of events as I am convinced that Egypt is crossing a landmark point in its history which imposes on all of all to weigh in the higher interests of our country and to put Egypt first above any and all considerations.
42. I saw fit to delegate presidential jurisdictions to the vice-president as defined by the constitution. I am certain that Egypt will overcome its crisis.
43. The will of its people will not break. It will be back on its feet with the honesty and loyalty of its people, all its people.
44. It will return the machinations and glee of those who were gleeful and machinated against it.
45. We, Egyptians, will prove our ability to achieve the demands of the people with civilised and mature dialogue.
46. We will prove that we are no-one's servants, that we do not take instructions from anyone, and that only the demands of the citizens and the pulse of the street take our decisions.
47. We will prove all this with the spirit and tenacity of Egyptians, through the unity and cohesion of the people, and through our commitment to Egypt's dignity as well as its unique and immortal identity, for it is the essence and the base of our presence for more than 7,000 years.
48. This spirit will continue to live within us for as long as Egypt and its people are present. It will live in every one of our peasants, workers and intellectuals. It will remain in the hearts of our old men, our youth and our children, Muslims and Christians. It will remain in the minds and conscience of all those yet unborn.
49. I say again that I lived for the sake of this country, preserving its responsibility and trust. Egypt will remain above all and above everyone.
50. It will remain so until I hand over this trust and pole. This is the goal, the objective, the responsibility and the duty. It is the beginning of life, its journey, and its end.
51. It will remain a country dear to my heart. It will not part with me and I will not part with it until my passing.
52. Egypt will remain immortal with its dignified people with their heads held high.
53. May God preserve the safety of Egypt and watch over its people. May peace be upon you (The BBC, 10.2.2011).

- **al Qaddafi's Speech: On 22th of February, 2011 (the English Translation is adopted from Al Duhaim (2018))**

مساء الخير، اليوم أيها الشباب في الساحة الخضراء، وصباح الثورة الغد، أحييكم أيها الشجعان، أحييكم شباب الفاتح، شباب
القومية، شباب الفاطمية، شباب التحدي، جيل التحدي، جيل الغضب، أحييكم وأنتم تقدمون للعالم الصورة الحقيقية للشعب الليبي
الملتف حول الثورة على بكرة أبيه، أنتم من الساحة الخضراء تقدمون الحقيقة التي تحاول أجهزة الخيانة، والعمالة، والنذالة،
والرجعية، والجبن، تحاول أن تغطيها تشوه صورتكم أمام العالم، أجهزة عربية للأسف شقيقة، تغدركم وتخونكم، وتقدم صورتكم
بشكل يسئ لكل ليبي وليبية، يقولون لهم: انظروا إلى ليبيا، انظروا إلى ليبيا، لا تريد العز، لا تريد المجد، لا تريد التحرير، لا تريد
الثورة. انظروا إلى ليبيا، تريد الدروشة، تريد اللحي، تريد العمايم، انظروا إلى ليبيا، تريد الاستعمار، تريد الانتكاسة تريد الحضيض
وأنتم هنا في الساحة الخضراء، تقولون: ليبيا تريد المجد، تريد القمة، قمة العالم، ليبيا تقود القارات، آسيا، وإفريقيا، وأمريكا
اللاتينية، وحتى أوروبا، كل القارات تعقد قممها في ليبيا، هذا مجد لليبيين والليبيات، أصبح الليبي الآن يُشار له بالبنان في جميع
أنحاء العالم. بالأمس كان الليبي ليست له هوية، فعندما تقول: "ليبي" فإنك تقول عندما تقول ليبي يقولون لك ليبيا؟ ليبيريا؟ لبنان؟
ما يعرفون ليبيا. أما اليوم عندما تقول ليبيا، يقولك: آه ليبيا! القذافي! ليبيا الثورة، كل الشعوب الإفريقية تعتبر ليبيا قبلتها، وشعوب
أمريكا اللاتينية، وشعوب آسيا، وحكام العالم كلهم بقواهم الكبرى النووية، يتقاطرون على ليبيا، على بلدكم، على طرابلس، على
سرت، على بنغازي. شوهوا صورتكم في إذاعات عربية شقيقة للأسف، يخدمون الشيطان، يريدوا إهانتكم، ونحن نريد أن نرد الآن
بالفعل، فوق الأرض، في الميدان، معمر القذافي ما عنده منصب، حتى يزعل ويستقيل منه، كما فعل الرؤساء. معمر القذافى ليس
رئيس، هو قائد ثورة، والثورة تعنى التضحية دائما وأبدا حتى نهاية العمر. هذي بلادي، بلاد أجدادي وأجدادكم، غرسناها بيدنا
وسقيناها بدم أجدادنا. نحن أجدر بليبيا من – أولئك - من تلك الجرذان، وأولئك المأجورين. من هم هؤلاء المأجورين؟ المدفوع لهم
الثمن من المخابرات الأجنبية؟ لعنة الله عليهم تركوا العار لأولادهم إذا عندهم أولاد، تركوا العار لعايلاتهم إذا عندهم عيلات، تركوا
العار لقبائلهم إذا كان عندهم قبائل، ولكن هذول ما عندهم قبائل، فالقبائل الليبية، قبائل شريفة، ومجاهدة، ومكافحة، تتقاطر علي في
هذا الشهر، كل القبائل من البطنان إلى الجبل الغربي، إلى فزان، كلهم يهتفون هتاف واحد، كلهم يتحدون. تحدينا أمريكا في هذا
المكان بجبروتها وقوتها. تحدينا الدول الكبرى النووية في العالم، وانتصرنا عليها، طأطأوا رؤوسهم هنا، إيطاليا قبلت به ابن
الشهيد - شيخ الشهداء - عمر المختار، هذا مجد ما بعده مجد ليس لـ المنفه فقط، ولا للبطنان فقط، ولا لبنغازي فقط، بل لليبيين
وللعرب وللمسلمين. هذا هو المجد - الذي يريدون له - المجد الذي يريدون أن يشوهوه.
إيطاليا الإمبراطورية في ذلك الوقت تحطمت فوق الأرض الليبية بجحافلها. أنا أرفع من المناصب التي يتقلدها الرؤساء والأبهات،
أنا مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر من الخيمة، من البادية، والتحمت معي المدن، والقرى، والواحات، في ثورة تاريخية جابت الأمجاد
لليبيين، سيتمتعون بها جيلاً بعد جيل، وستبقى ليبيا في القمة، تقود إفريقيا، وتقود أمريكا اللاتينية، وتقود آسيا بل تقود العالم. لا
يمكن أن يُعطّل هذه المسيرة التاريخية الظافرة، حفنة من شذاذ الآفاق، المأجورين، من هؤلاء القطط والفئران التي تنقز من شارع
إلى شارع، ومن زنقة إلى زنقة في الظلام. أنا دافع ثمن بقائي هنا، أنا جدي عبد السلام بومنيار، أول شهيد سقط فوق الخمس
أول معركة عام 1911. أنا لا يمكن أن أسيء إلى هذه التضحية العظيمة، لا يمكن أن أترك رفاة جدي الطاهرة في المرقب أنا
سأموت معه شهيد في النهاية. ها هي رفاة والدي في الهاني، مجاهد بطل من أبطال القرضابية وتالا. وهاهو –جدي- عمي

الشيخ الساعدي في مقبرة منيدر. لا أترك هذه الرفات الطاهرة، هؤلاء المجاهدون. قال بشير السعداوي: "الحرية شجرة لا يتفيأ ظلالها، إلا من غرسها بيده وسقاها بدمه". ليبيا شجرة نحن نتفيأ ظلالها، لأننا غرسنا بيدنا وسقينا بدمنا.

نخاطبكم من هذا المكان الصامد، هذا البيت في طرابلس، الذي أغارت عليه ميه وسبعين طايرة، تقودها الدول النووية الكبرى أمريكا وبريطانيا والحلف الأطلسي. أربعين طائرة بوينج، تزود هذه الحملة بالوقود، تخطت كل القصور، وكل المنازل، وكل بيوتكم، كل بيوتكم تركتها، تبحث عن منزل معمر القذافي، لماذا؟ هل لأن معمر القذافي رئيس جمهورية؟ لو كان رئيس، -لا ما عملو له- لعاملوه مثل ما عاملوا رؤساء الدول الأخرى، ولكن لأن معمر القذافي تاريخ، مقاومة، تحرر، مجد، ثورة، وهذا اعتراف من أكبر قوه في العالم، بأن معمر القذافي هو ليس رئيس، أو ليس بشخص عادي، حتى نقتله بالسم أو نعمل ضده مظاهرة تسقطه، لما كانت القنابل هنا في هذا المكان، تدك بيتي، وأولادي تقتلهم، أين كنتم أنتم يا جرذان؟ أين كنتم أنتم يا بتوع اللحى؟ يا إللي تتشدقون في الظلام، في أحقاف درنة، وفي أحقاف الجبل الأخضر، وفي أي حقفة أخرى. أين كنتم؟ كنتم مع أمريكا، تصفقون لأسيادكم الأمريكان، عندما كان معمر القذافي وعائلته في هذا المكان تقصفهم القنابل. ميه وسبعين طائرة، تخطت الملوك، وتخطت الرؤساء، وتخطت القصور في كل الوطن العربي، وجت إلى خيمة معمر القذافي وبيت معمر القذافي. هذا مجد لا تفرط فيه ليبيا، ولا يفرط فيه الشعب الليبي، ولا الأمة العربية، ولا الأمة الإسلامية، ولا إفريقيا ولا أمريكا اللاتينية، ولا كل الشعوب التي تريد الحرية والكرامة للإنسان وتقاوم الجبروت. نحن قاومنا جبروت أمريكا، جبروت بريطانيا، الدول النووية، حلف الأطلسي قاومنا جبروته، لم نستسلم، وكنا نحن صامدون هنا. الآن مجموعة قليلة من الشبان المعطاة لهم الحبوب، يغيرون على مراكز الشرطة هنا وهناك مثل الفيران، يهاجمون ثكنة آمنة غافلة، لأننا نحن لسنا في حالة حرب، حتى نشدد الحراسة على مخازننا وعلى معسكراتنا. نحن بين أهلنا وفي أمان وسلام، وليبيا تنعم بالسلام، استغلوا هذا السلام وهذا الأمان وهذه النعمة التي فيها ليبيا، وأغاروا على بعض المعسكرات وبعض المراكز، وحرقوا الملفات التي فيها جرائمهم، وهاجموا المحاكم التي فيها ملفاتهم ومراكز الشرطة التي فيها التحقيق معهم على جرائمهم. لكن ليس لهم ذنب هالشبان، ليس لهم ذنب أبدا، هم صغار السن 16 سنة، 17، 18، أحيانا يقلدون ما يجري في تونس وما يجري في مصر، وهذا شيء عادي، وأحيانا يسمعون أن في مدينة ما في ليبيا تم شبان سطوا على محكمة، فيقولون حتى حنا نمشوا نسطوا على المحكمة التي عندنا، تقليد. قالوا: حصلوا على سلاح، حتى نحن ليش ما نحصل على سلاح! لكن هناك مجموعة قليلة، مريضة مندسة في المدن، تعطي الحبوب، وأحيان حتى النقود، لهؤلاء الشبان الصغار اليافعين، وتزج بهم في هذه المعارك الجانبية. الذين قُتلوا هم من الشرطة والجنود ومن هؤلاء الشبان، وليس من الذين يحركونهم، هم قاعدين في بيوتهم أو قاعدين في الخارج، يتمتعون بالأمان وبالراحة والمتعة، هم وأولادهم. ويحركو أولادكم ويعطوهم الحبوب، وعدو جيبوا سلاح، غيروا، احرقوا، يا أبطال، بيش يموت أولادكم، وبيش نبدا نحن نقاتل في بعضنا. عبد الفتاح يونس بطل من أبطال ثورة الفاتح العظيم، كان تحت إمرتي عندما داهمنا إذاعة بنغازي، وأعلنت البيان الأول لتحرير ليبيا -كانت محتلة في تلك اللحظة- خمس قواعد أمريكية في تلك اللحظة، لما دخل عبد الفتاح معي مدينة بنغازي، خمس قواعد أمريكية، عشرين ألف إيطالي يحتلون الأرض الليبية، من مصراته إلى ترهونة إلى صبراته، تحت السيطرة المدنية الطليانية، إلى جانب كل الدكاكين وكل الورش وكل الخدمات، وعندهم أعضاء في مجلس النواب ليبيين مرتشين. وكانت البطنان محتلة بالكامل بالقوات الأمريكية، طبرق ترزح تحت السيطرة الأمريكية الكاملة، لما احنا قمنا بدخول بنغازي، لتحريرها. لا تعرفون معسكر الفويهات الي اسمه ديغادوستا، وكان إنجليزي مية في المية. لما كنت أنا وعبد الفتاح نهاجم إذاعة بنغازي، لكي نعلن منها التحرير، ومش لنعلن منها الآن النكسة والعودة للوراء والخزي والعار. معسكر المستشفى في بنغازي، هذا كان معسكر ويفل، مكتوب اسم ويفل، ولم يتجرأ أحد على أن يشطب على كلمة ويفل. أين كنتم؟ أين كان آباءكم وأجدادكم؟ أنتم يا مرتزقة! عندما كانت خمس قواعد أمريكية فوق الأرض الليبية؟ من منكم فقص وجه

بارود؟ فجّر قنبلة واحدة. نحن ضحينا بأنفسنا، كنا نعد العدة للدخول في معركة، مع أمريكا ومع بريطانيا فوق الأرض الليبية. وأعلنت من ميدان الجلاء في طرابلس، ما لم يتحقق الجلاء، فإن القتال سيكون من شارع إلى شارع، ومن بيت إلى بيت، ضد القوات الأمريكية، ماقلتوهاش أنتم أبدا، ولا آباءكم يا شذاذ الآفاق، أين كنتم أنتم؟ تفتكرو أن ليبيا سهلة؟ ليبيا دفعنا ثمنها غاليا، وبنينا لها مجد عظيما لا يداني. نحن تركنا السلطة للشعب الليبي من عام 1977، أنا والضباط الأحرار، ولم يعد لنا أي منصب ولا أي صلاحية، ولا نصدر أي قانون ولا أي قرار، وتركنا السلطة للشعب الليبي، للمؤتمرات الشعبية واللجان الشعبية، أحسنها ما أحسنها، سقمها ما سقمها، أساء إليها ما أساء إليها، فسد ما فسد، هذه تهم الليبيين جميعا، في المستشفى، وفي المدرسة، وفي الإدارة، وفي المكتب، في السيارة، في الطيارة، في الإسكان، في الزراعة، في الصناعة، هذه كلها تدار بالليبيين اللي تحت اللجان الشعبية المصعدة من المؤتمرات الشعبية، والمؤتمرات الشعبية هي كل الشعب الليبي. انحلت مشكلة الصراع على السلطة في ليبيا نهائياً، استلمها الشعب الليبي بالكامل عام 1977. أنا وزملائي لم نعد مسؤولين عن أي شيء، إلا عن القتال عن ليبيا –بس- ومسكنا السلاح فقط. ولما غارت علينا أمريكا قاتلناها، وفرنسا في الجنوب قاتلناها، والسادات قاتلناه، وهبري قاتلناه، وهيلا سيلاسي وقاتلناه، وحتى بورقيبة، والنميري قاتلناه، وسقطت الرجعية وسقطوا عملاء الاستعمار، وسقط الاستعمار. كانت معنا بنادقنا فقط، تركنا لكم كل شيء، حتى فلوس البترول عييت وأنا أقول لكم خوذوها بيدكم، كل شهر خوذوا فلوس البترول وتصرفوا فيها، ما يضحكوش عليكم توا، ويقولو لكم وين فلوس البترول! أنتم قلتو لا، خل فلوس البترول عند الدولة، عند اللجان الشعبية، أنتم إللي صعدتم اللجان الشعبية العامة، وصعدتم اللجان الشعبية كلها، أنتم مسؤولين عنها، يضحكوا عليكم! انتم سذج إلى هذه الدرجة! بكرا، أنا أساند في السلطة الشعبية وأدعو الشعب الليبي إلى تشكيل الشعبيات الجديدة والبلديات الجديدة، حسب البرنامج الذي وضّحه لكم سيف الإسلام.

أنا أعرف أن العبيدات، الذي منهم عبد الفتاح يونس الذي أمس أطلقوا عليه النار في بنغازي ومصيره مجهول، وقالوا له أنت عبيدي شن جابك إلى بنغازي؟ ليلة الثورة كان هو يحرر معي في بنغازي، ليش ما قالوا له أنت عبيدي ما جيت إلى بنغازي! وين كنتم أنتم؟ لما كان عبد الفتاح ببندقيته يعرض نفسه للخطر! ولما كان يقاتل في السادات وإسرائيل على الحدود، لما كانوا بيجتاحونكم لما كان سيجتاحكم السادات هو وأمريكا. كان عبد الفتاح هو بطل المعارك على الحدود، وأمس يضربوه بالرصاص ومصيره مجهول، ويقولون له أنت عبيدي شن جابك إلى بنغازي، هذه آخرتها؟ هذه آخرتها يا أهل بنغازي! من أنتم؟ أبداً! هاذوم ليسوا أهل بنغازي!! أعود لأتكلم عن الشعبيات، أنا أعرف أن العبيدات في القبة، لا يريدون الانضمام إلى درنه، يديروا شعبية بروحهم، وأنا إلى جانب إرادة الشعب، فلتكن شعبية للعبيدات، شعبية للقبة، ومن غد يمكن أن يعلنوا الشعبية ويعملوا فيها السلطة الشعبية، ويطهروها ويقيمون فيها كل شيء بأنفسهم. وأعرف أن بني وليد، لا تريد الانضمام إلى مصراته، وتعتبر ضمها جبر وعسف تتحرر بني وليد. بني وليد تريد أن تشكل شعبية، حرة حسب إرادة شعبها، أولاد الرصيفة، أولاد صولة، قادرين أن يعملوا شعبية، قادرين أن يسيروا أنفسهم ولا يردون على أحد ولا يستعينوا بأحد، دردنيل طرابلس -كما قال الطلياني إن بني وليد أصبحت دردنيل طرابلس- لأنها كانت خط الدفاع المقاوم، لتوجه القوات الإيطالية إلى الجنوب. وأعرف أن ترهونة لا تريد الضم للخمس أو لمسلاتة أو ل.. حرة، أهل ترهونة أحرار، يقدروا يقيموا شعبية من بكرا، ويعملون فيها سلطة شعبية مصراتة حرة، زليتن حرة، الخمس حرة، مسلاتة حرة. ومتأكد أنه بعد هذا النداء، ستنطلق الجماهير من بكرا، وتشكل شعبيات جديدة، وأنا متوقع أن الشعبيات التي عددها الآن ثلاث وعشرين شعبية، ستصل ممكن إلى ثلاثين شعبية أو أكثر. وأعتقد أن ستتشكل بلديات للإدارة المحلية، من خمسين بلدية إلى ميه وخمسين بلدية متوقعها، لأن كل واحد يريد أن تكون له بلدية. هذا الشيء الصحيح، هذا هو الذي يخدم الإنسان، يخدم حياتنا وتاريخنا، وما يحشمناج قدام العالم، مش ياك هاك، احرق اعجله، اسرق بندقية. عيّل في بنغازي، واخذ قنابل عاطينه قواذف (ار.

بي. جي) الي ضد الدبابات، وماشي بهم في بنغازي! الرعب في بنغازي، الـ (أر. بي. جي) يا عالم في مدينة بنغازي! خشوها الأمريكان، خشوها الطليان عشان نقاتلهم! عويلة صغيرين يعطوهم دبابات يدهوروا بيهن بشوارع بنغازي، دوخوهم، سكروهم، أعطوهم الحبوب، وعزلوهم عن أهلهم. تبدا العائلات في جمع أولادها من بكرا. اخرجوا من بيوتكم، يا الي تحبون معمر القذافي رجال، نساء، بنات، أطفال، يا إلليمع معمر القذافي الثورة، مع معمر القذافي المجد، العزة لليبيا، للشعب الليبي، في القمة. والذي يريد المجد يتذكر جلاء الطليان، وجلاء الأميريكان، وجلاء الإنجليز، والنهر الصناعي العظيم، والسلطة الشعبية، وعودة النفط الذي كان تسعين في المية منه للشركات الأميريكية وأنتم عندكم عشرة في المية، والآن تسعين في المية ليكم وعشر في المية للشركة الأميريكية فقط. الذي يريد العزة، والكرامة، والمجد، أخرجوا من بيوتكم، أخرجوا من بيوتكم، أخرجوا للشوارع، أمنوا الشوارع، شدوا الجرذان، ما تخافوا منهم. نحن لم نستخدم القوة بعد، والقوة تساند الشعب الليبي. إذا وصلت الأمور إلى حد استخدام القوة، سنستخدمها، وفقا للقانون الدولي، ووفقا للدستور الليبي والقوانين الليبية. من بكرا تخرجوا ولا من هذه الليلة، كل المدن الليبية، والقرى الليبية، والواحات الليبية، التي هي تحب معمر القذافي، لأن معمر القذافي هو المجد. أنا لو عندي منصب، لو أني رئيس، لكنت لوحت الاستقالة على وجوهكم، الجراثيم هذه. لكن أنا ما عنديش منصب، ما عنديش حاجة نستقيل منها، عندي بندقيتي، أنا حنقاتل إلى آخر قطرة من دمي، ومعي الشعب الليبي.

أنا كملت عمري مانيش خايف من شيء، أنتم تواجهون صخرة صماء، صخرة صلبة تحطمت عليها أساطيل أمريكا، ما تتحطمش عليها شراذمكم أنتم؟ أخرجوا من بيوتكم وداهموهم في أوكارهم. إسحبوا أطفالكم من الشارع، إسحبوا أطفالكم منهم، خذوا منكم أطفالكم، يعبوهم، يسكروهم ويقولو لهم: عدوا للنار بيش يموتوا أولادكم. أودلاكم يموتو لأي سبب؟ لأي غرض؟ لا لشيء تدمير ليبيا، حرق ليبيا. شرطة ماتوا، أولادكم ماتوا، لكن أولادهم هم ما ماتوش، أولادهم هم ما ماتوا، أولادهم في أمريكا وفي أوروبا! ماذا أصابكم؟ ما هذا الخوف؟ ما هذا الرعب من هذه العصابات؟ عصابات مثل الجرذان، لا تمثل شيء، لا تمثل واحد من المليون من الشعب الليبي، لا تساوي شيئا، حفنة من الشبان الذين يقلدون الذي يجري في تونس وفي مصر، والذين أعطوهم الحبوب، والذين أمروهم من الداخل وقالوا لهم احرقوا، اسلبوا، اعملوا، تقليد، جرذان. من بكرا، الأمن بالشرطة وبالجيش، يفرض الأمن، من بكرا تُفتح الحواجز، أي حواجز يحب تشال، شيلوها أنتم من مدنكم، اقبضوا عليهم، طاردوهم في كل مكان، اصحوا، اخرجوا من بيوتكم. هكه تبغوا بنغازي تصبح دمار؟ هتقطع عليها الكهرباء، وهتقطع عليها الميه. من بيجيب لكم الكهرباء وميه خلاص. وهذه الجرذان يمكن أن تصل إلى البترول، وتنسف البترول، وتعودوا إلى الظلام، إلى عام 1952. شالي زرنا؟ سبحان الله، بنغازي بنيتها أنا بنفسي طوبة طوبة، وفرحانين بها ونبنوا فيها من جديد، يجيوا ليدمروها بأولادكم؟ من الذي يخطر عليه الرصاص في بنغازي، قنابل في بنغازي، حرايق في بنغازي، دبابات في شوارع بنغازي توا. هي كلها ثلاث دبابات محروقة، روّعت بنغازي. يمشوا إلى المطار، يحاولو يخّربوه، الطائرات خلاص توقفت، الطيران المدني توقف -من الطيار الي- من الطائرة التي ما زالت فتنزل في مطار بنينة؟ والسفن قالوا لا يمكن أن نزل في مطار بنغازي، لأن قالوا فيه جرذان ولما نصل يهاجموننا وياخذو الذي في السفينة. درنه أصبحت خراب، وحاكمها توا واحد، عدوا ازحفوا عليه كل العائلات، كل الجماهير في درنه، طهّر درنه. داير لحية ويقول للنسوان ما عاش يطلعن اعتبارا من اليوم، ريت النكسة؟ وقال جيبوا لي التبرعات أنا خليفة، وتبع بن لادن، وتبع الظواهري. والله باهي يحكمكم الظواهري أخرها. أنتم تبوا أمريكا تجيكم تحتلكم؟ وتعمل لكم زي أفغانستان، زي الصومال، زي الباكستان، زي العراق؟ هكي بلادنا بتولي، بتولي زي أفغانستان، يعجبكم هذا؟ باهي اطلعوا كان ما يعجبكمش. اطلعوا إلى الشوارع، سكروها كلها، وشدوهم كلهم وطاردوهم وفكوا منهم سلاحهم، واعتقلوهم وحاكموهم وسلموهم إلى الأمن. قلة قليلة، في أي مكان سمعتم فيه حركة، هم قلة، إرهابية بتحول ليبيا إلى إمارات تبع الظواهري أو تبع بن لادن، هذه أخرتها بيش تخش أمريكا، وتقول إنها لن تسمح

بأفغانستان جديدة هنا في شمال أفريقيا؟! بيجيبون لنا الاستعمار، وتصبح بلادنا قنابل.

لقد تم توزيع الضباط الوحدويين الأحرار، على كل قبايلهم ومناطقهم، بيش يقودوا هذه القبائل وهذه المناطق، ويؤمنوها ويطهروها من هذه الجردان. ويحاولون القبض على الذي غرر بأولادنا الصغار، ويقدموهم للمحكمة. هذي عقوبتهم في القانون. اسمعوا الهتافات في الشوارع بالروح بالدم نفديك ياقايدنا، أنا ما يدور في حد، هم يدورا في ليبيا. شوفوا جرايمهم في قانون العقوبات الليبي اللي من قبل الثورة:

- رفع الليبيين السلاح ضد الدولة: عقوبته الإعدام، يُعاقب بالإعدام كل ليبي رفع السلاح على ليبيا.
- دس الدسائس مع الدول الأجنبية لإثارة الحرب ضد ليبيا: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من فعل ذلك.

هذا قانون العقوبات....

- المساس بأراضي الدولة وتسهيل الحرب ضدها: يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من سهّل دخول العدو في البلاد، أو سلمهم مدن، أو حصون، أو منشآت، أو مواقع، أو موانئ. هذا العمل سيؤدي إلى تسليم هذه المواقع إلى أميريكا، لأن أميريكا لا ترضى بأن تصبح درنة ولاية تبع بن لادن، ولا البيضاء، تبع بن لادن، ولا بنغازي تبع بن لادن، ما بتسمح أميريكا أبدا.
- التسلل إلى الأماكن العسكرية: إذا استفاد العدو من ذلك الفعل، فتكون العقوبة الإعدام. الذي يتسلل إلى الأماكن العسكرية، هذوم ارتكبوا هذه الجرائم.
- يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من زوّد حكومة أجنبية، أو أحد عملائها، أو أي شخص آخر يعمل لمصلحتها على أي وجه من الوجوه، وبأية وسيلة ما يتعلق بالدفاع عن البلاد، أو أي سر مماثل له. وهاذوم أعطوا كل أسرارنا للعدو. مش ذنب الأطفال، نحكي أنا ذنب اللحى الي ورا الأطفال، الذين يضحكون عليهم، الذين سيكون مصيرهم غدا أمام المحاكم، يبكون ويرفعون أيديهم ويقولون سامحونا، ولن نسامحهم هذه المرة.
- الاعتداء على الدستور: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من شرع بالقوة أو بغيرها من الوسائل التي لا يسمح باستعمالها النظام القانوني والدستوري في تغيير الدستور أو شكل الحكم. هاذوم بيغيّرون سلطة الشعب، عقوبتهم الإعدام بحكم القانون.
- استعمال المفرقعات في ارتكاب الجريمة السابقة: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من استعمل قنابل أو آلات مفرقعة أخرى من أجل ارتكاب الجريمة، زي الذين هجموا على المخازن، عقوبتها الإعدام.

لا! أرجوكم، توقفوا لتستمعوا فيه، كلكم متحمسين، أرجوكم أن توقفوا الرمي. أرجوكم أن توقفوا الرمي، خل الناس تسمع الكلام الي أنا نقوله، لأنه كلام خطير، يبدأ من الليلة ويبدأ من بكرا، عمل آخر، غير الرصاص هذاي، الرصاص مازال ما أمرتش بيه، لما يصدر الأمر باستعمال القوة، عندئذ نكون نحن أهلها، بعدين يحرق كل شيء.

– اغتصاب قيادة عسكرية، زي ما حصل في البيضاء، زي ما حصل في بنغازي، اغتصاب قيادة عسكرية أو التمسك بها بدون حق: يعاقب بالإعدام كل من فعل ذلك.

– استعمال القوة ضد سلطات الدولة، عقوبته الإعدام، أفعال التخريب والنهب والتقتيل، يُعاقب بالإعدام كل جرايمهم التي عملوها، منذ ذلك اليوم حتى الآن، عقوبتها الإعدام في قانون العقوبات الليبي التي معمول به قبل الثورة.

– الحرب الأهلية: يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من يرتكب فعل غايته إثارة حرب أهلية في البلاد. هذا العمل سيؤدي إلى حرب أهلية، ومثلما قال لكم سيف الإسلام أمس، فإنكم نحن قبائل كلها مسلحة، وما في قبيلة تحكمها قبيلة، ولا أحد يقدر يحكمنا أبدا، لا من درنة ولا من هونولولو، نحن مسلحون ونقدر أن نتمرد زي الصومال، وتبدى ليبيا تطيح، تبوها هكه تكون؟ هذا يقود إلى الحرب الأهلية، إذا أنتم ما مسكتوهومش من الآن.

- الحرب الأهلية: يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من يرتكب فعل غايته إثارة حرب أهلية في البلاد، أو تفتيت الوحدة الوطنية. لما يديرلي درنة إمارة إسلامية، والبيضاء إمارة إسلامية، وبنغازي مش عارف ايش جمهورية، يفتت الوحدة الوطنية، عقوبته الإعدام عبث ولعب بوحدة الأوطان، يا سلام!

يلتسن، يلتسن رئيس روسيا، مجلس الدوما مجلس النواب، اعتصم في –المجلس- مجلس النواب، اعتصام بس، قال نهم اطلعوا، قالوا لا نحن محتجين، وقالوهم اطلعوا اطلعوا ما فيش، يوم، اثنين، ثلاثة، أربعة، قدام العالم يساومون فيهم اطلعوا، وقالو مانش طالعين، جابوا الدبابات ومنقولة بالإذاعة العربية، بالتلفزيون، يلتسن ودك مبنى مجلس النواب والأعضاء موجودين جوه. دكهم بالدبابات حتى طلعوا زي الفيران، والغرب لم يحتج، بل قال أنت تستعمل في عمل قانوني. اعتصام، تمرد داخل الدولة، ومش مسلح، نواب ما معشهم سلاح، بس اعتصموا في مكان ما.

الطلاب في بكين، اعتصموا في ميدان السماء، وقعدوا كم يوم، ورافعين شعار الكيتي كولا وقالوا نبغى زي أمريكا. وبعدين جا دينغ جاب لهم الدبابات، الدبابات سحتت الطلبة في الميدان، واللي قدام الدبابة مات، لين طلعت الدبابات من الجهة الأخرى، واللي حي عده، روّح وقعد لينتوا حي ومفجوع، والتي مات مات. قال لهم: وحدة الصين، أغلى من المجموعة اللي في هذا الميدان.

وحدة روسيا الاتحادية، وهيبتها، وقانونها، واحترام دستورها، وحل مشاكلها بالطرق السلمية –قالهم- أهم من كمشة النواب الذين في البرلمان، اضربهم بالدبابات –قال-، والغرب قالوا له: صح عندك حق.

الفرع الداوودي في أمريكا، أطفال، ونساء، ومعاهم مهووسون آخربين اسمهم، الفرع الداوودي مجموعة دينية متطرفة، اعتصمت في مستودع كبير داخل أمريكا، حاولوا معاهم، حاولوا معاهم ما فيش، جاب لهم كلينتون الدبابات، والغازات السامة، ودمرهم.

المدرسة التي اعتصمت في روسيا، جابوا لها الغازات السامة، وقتلوهم كلهم.

الزرقاوي، قالوا خش بعصابته، يعتبروا الزرقاوي تبع بن لادن، خش في الفلوجة. أميريكا مسحت الفلوجة بالطيران مسح، وضربت المساجد، ليش؟ قالوا احنا نقاوم في الإرهاب، وقالوا هذا مش مسجد، هذا مقر للإرهابيين، ونحن نبحث عن الزرقاوي وعصابته تحصنوا في هذه المدينة التي اسمها الفلوجة. وبالتالي احنا لازم أن ندمروها، وفتشوها بيت بيت، بالقنابل، بالطيران، ودمروها.

وما تقدر أمريكا أن تحتج على واحد زي اللي في درنة، لما أنت تدمره، لأن الأمريكان هم نفسهم عملوها. بغداد دُمرت بالكامل، ياما من مدنيين ماتوا، وعائلات ماتت، ومناسبات أفراح ضُربت، قالوا نحسبوها تجمع معادي، وعمارة قالوا فيها إرهابي دمروها على ما فيها، وسوق دمروه قالوا فيه إرهابيين اندسوا في السوق، وضربوا كل اللي في السوق. مليون، مليونين، ثلاثة، ماتوا في بغداد بالطائرات الأمريكية، لأن قالوا بنقضي على الإرهاب، بنقضي –قالوا- على حزب البعث، بنقضي على القاعدة، وبالتالي نحن أحرار نستخدمون القوة المفرطة.

غزة شفتوها الإسرائيليين ولا أحد دانهم، الأمريكان يدافعون عنهم لحد الآن، وقالوا الإسرائيليين عندهم الحق، عندهم الحق، دفاع عن النفس، يجب أن يحاصروها بالبر وبالبحر والجو، ويجب أن يدكوها بالقنابل. دبابات تسحن داخل شوارع غزة وتقتل كما تشاء.

شايفين الصومال شنو صاير فيه، تبو هكه بلادكم زي الصومال؟ زي العراق؟ نفس المجموعة اللي خرّبت هذه البلدان، هي التي دخلت إلى ليبيا الآن، هي التي تبغي أن تُلحق ليبيا بأفغانستان وبالصومال. وتبدى درنة زي الفلوجة، أو تبدى البيضاء أو بنغازي زي الفلوجة. نفس العصابة، لأنهم نفس المجموعة. من الليلة وتبدا بكرا، الشباب كل الشباب، كل الشباب مش الجرذان المرضى متاعين الحبوب، الذين أخذوهم منكم، كل الشباب، من بكرا يشكل لجان الأمن الشعبي المحلي. وهنا الآن من الليلة، يبدؤون في تخييط شعار أخضر وكتابة بالأحمر عليه لجان الأمن الشعبي المحلي وتأمن كل المدن الليبية، لين يعاد تنظيم الأمن. لأن الأمن قلنا لهم ما تقاتلوهمش، قالوا ما دمنا ما نقاتلوا، بنروحوا لبيوتنا، قلنا لهم روحوا. قالوا جاؤوا يهاجموا فينا –بيقتلوهم- يهاجمو فينا

بالرصاص، قلنا لهم لا، ما تقاوموهومش، قالوا ما دام ما فيش مقاومة احنا بنروحوا. لغاية ما يعود رجال الأمن من جديد ويأخذوا سلاحهم، ويفرضوا الأمن في الشوارع، الآن الضباط الأحرار يتوزعون على كل قبائلهم، والحمد لله كل قبيلة منها ضابط حر في ليبيا، تلتف حوله قبيلته، ومش تلتف حول عملاء أمريكا، عملاء بن لادن، اتباع الزرقاوي، المقملين.

أولادكم من بكرة، الشباب -ومش قلنا هاذوم اللي اشروهم وأخذوهم، انتهى أمرهم لين يشوفوا أولياء أمورهم شن يديروا، كان فكوهم أولياء أمورهم، وسلموهم إلى الأمن، ودربناهم، وعالجناهم من الحبوب، ممكن يطلعوا شباب صالحين. أما إذا كانوا بهذا الشكل، كل مرة يغيرون على مكان، لا، هذه... ههه... حتشوفوا نهايتها كيف!! كل النسوان اللي عندهن أولاد يطلعن بسرعة، والي عندها أخو، تطلع بسرعة، والى عندها قريبها ولا حبيبها، تطلع بسرعة. والرجال الذين عندهم أولا وعندهم..، يطلعوا بسرعة، والأمهات والأخوات والبنات، كلهن يطلعن بسرعة إلى الشوارع. اطلعوا بسرعة إلى الشوارع، سيطروا على الشوارع. أنا نقود في الثورة الشعبية، نبغي الشعب الليبي يسيطر على ليبيا، من أقصاها إلى أقصاها. أنا على رأس الثورة الشعبية، نوروهم الثورة الشعبية كيف شكلها. الثورة الشعبية هي وعي، هي عمل بناء، هي سيطرة على الأمن ،هي أمن، احترام، السلطة الشعبية، السلطة الشعبية، مؤتمرات شعبية، لجان شعبية. نروهم السلطة الشعبية كيف تكون، نروهم الثورة الشعبية كيف تكون، اطلعوا من بيوتكم اعتباراً من الآن. ومن بكرا، يتنظم الشباب أيضا في لجان الدفاع عن الثورة، الثورة تعني كل المكتسبات المادية والمعنوية، تعني المجد، تعني العزة، تعني معمر القذافي، تعني تاريخ الأجداد، الشهداء. بكرا كل الشباب، يحمل شعار لجان الدفاع عن الثورة، في كل المدن الليبية، والقرى الليبية، والواحات الليبية. وبكرا تُشكل اللجان وتلبس الشعار كله –كله- على اليد. لجان الدفاع عن المكتسبات، يعني الدفاع عن النفط الدفاع عن النهر الصناعي العظيم، الدفاع عن مشروع الإسكان العملاق، الذي تكاليفه واحد وسبعين مليار اللي يسكن ثلاث ملايين ليبي، المطارات، الموانئ، الطرق، الجسور، المكتسبات المادية. بكرا تشكل لجان من الشباب: لجان الدفاع عن المكتسبات الثورية ولجان الدفاع عن الثورة، لجان الدفاع عن الأمن الشعبي المحلي، ولجان الدفاع عن القيم الاجتماعية والآداب، وهذه حتى تشكل من حملة القرآن الذين هم مليون واحد، حملة القرآن في ليبيا وأئمة المساجد النظاف، الذي يعرفوا السنة، ويعرفوا الأصول، ويعرفوا السلفية الحقيقية. مش أقتل، أقتل اقتل، من قتل نفسا برية، كأنه قتل البشرية كلها. بكرا تتشكل منهم لجان الدفاع عن القيم الاجتماعية والآداب، تحمي الآداب في الشارع تمشي البنت، وتمشي المرأة، وحتى التي رأسها عريان، ماحدش يعاكسها، ولا أحد يخطفها زي ما يجري الآن. خطف الآن، خلاص البيوت تُنتهك حرماتها في كل المدن التي فيها هذه العصابات الناس عايشه في جحيم، لا هو جيش تحاربه بالدبابات والطائرات، وإلا لكنا استخدمنا الطائرات والدبابات والمدفعية، ولا هو ناس جبهة من الجبهات، أبدا، جرذان، زروهم من الليلة، أبدوا فيهم لين تمسكوهم.

اعتقد أن من بكرا، ستبدأ إدارة جديدة في الجماهيرية، جماهيرية جديدة، شعبيات جديدة، وبلديات جديدة، وسلطة شعبية جديدة حقيقية. أما الدستور، وما يخص الصحافة، ومنظمات المجتمع المدني وما إليه، هذه تحدث فيها لكم سيف الإسلام، وهي تخص سيف الإسلام والمحامين والقضاة والمدونين والكتاب والصحفيين والشباب الآخرين، هذه كلها تهم سيف الإسلام، وتهم هذه المجموعات، ويتفاهمون فيها مع المحامين، ومع الذين يتكلمون على الدستور. ما عندي مانع أن الشعب الليبي يعمل دستور، ويعمل قانون أساسي، يعمل مرجعية، يعمل أي نظام قانوني. نبغى القانون يسود يا ليت القانون في ليبيا، نبغى القانون أهو الساير. سلطة الشعب، تصنع القانون اللي يحترمه كل واحد، لأن أنا معمر القذافي لا عندي قصر، ولا فلوس، ولا عندي حتى مستقبلي كملته في الثورة، ما نبي شيء، كل شيء نبغيه لليبيا. نبيها تعيش في أمان، وفي عزة، وفي رخاء، يُصان بترولها والنهر الصناعي العظيم ومشروعها الإسكاني العظيم وموانئها ومطاراتها، وتُطّهر من الذين يحرقون الآن المدن. بسرعة، خلوا عندكم شجاعة، أنتم أكثر منهم، أنتم ملايين، أنت ملايين وهم مية نفر. أمسكوهم في الشوارع، وافتحوا المطارات أفتحوا الموانئ، أرجعوا السلطة

الشعبية، أرجعوا الأمن. وهاهم الضباط الأحرار متوزعون عندكم، والأمن متوزع، ووحدات الشعب المسلح جاهزة. وفي إمكانكم أن تقرروا توزيع الثروة من جديد. وأنا ما زل مُصر عليه، البترول الليبي يجب أن يكون لكل الليبيين، أنتم ما عندكم ثقة في اللجان الشعبية، خلاص، خذوا البترول في يدكم، وتصرفوا فيه. بيش ما فيش حد يقول خذيت حصتي. كل واحد ياخذ حصته، أنت بتسكر بيها حر، بتدير فيها شجرة حر، بتتصدقها حر، المهم حصتك خذيتها، وتصرف فيها كيفما تبي. وأعتقد أن سيف الإسلام سيهتم بالسفراء والصحفيين، وسيتمكنو من نشر كل الحقائق عن ليبيا، لأن ليبيا في العالم بره، ما يشوفش فيها إلا عن طريق المحطات القذرة لأشقائنا الأعزاء الذين خانونا، بدل ما ينقلوا الحقيقة، يزورا في الحقيقة، وينشرون في صور من كم سنة فاتت. والإذاعة الليبية –إذاعة الجماهيرية العظمى- هي العالم كله يجب أن يتابعها، هي التي سترد على كل شيء. حتشوف ما يُقال في الإذاعات القذرة، وترد عليه في الإذاعات الجماهيرية العظمى. ما يُقال في الإذاعات القذرة تسمعوه، شوف الإذاعات الليبية شن ترد عليه. مطارات معطلة، موانئ معطلة، الحياة توقفت، الوقود تعطل، الهواتف تعطلت، الإذاعات تعطلت. الناس خافت. شخص واحد مره أرهب واشنطن، شخص إرهابي خطير جداً، ما قدروش يمسكوه إلا بعد فترة، يداهم مدرسة يصليها ويقتل منها ويختفي، ويمشي إلى مدرسة أخرى ويختفي. المدارس خافت، والطلبة في أمريكا لم ما عاد يمشوا للمدارس، خير؟ فقالوا نمشي لأي مدرسة يقولون اعتداء على مدرسة. هو شخص واحد، توقفت المدارس، ويجي للسوق يرمي فيه إطلاقة، ويهرب يعدي لسوق آخر، وقالوا الأسواق كلها، عليها هجوم إرهابي، سكرت الأسواق الشارع نفس الشيء، هذا توا حصل. أمريكا كبدها دهرت، من هذا المجرم تبع واشنطن، خلاص فجندوا كل ما عندهم إلى أن لقوه، لقو شخص واحدا أرهبهم، وأنتم حفنة على الأصابع، تُرهب بنغازي؟ المظاهرات السلمية التي تكلم عليها العالم هذا شيء آخر، نطلع مظاهرة سلمية على شان غزة، مظاهرة سلمية على شان العراق. أما مشكل ليبي، ما نمشي للشارع، نمشي للمؤتمر الشعبي أو اللجنة الشعبية، بيش تنحل المشاكل، فيها الفلوس، وفيها القرارات، وفيها التوقيعات، وفيها الإدارة. ما نمشي للشارع، فالمشكل الليبي عند الشعب، عند المؤتمرات وعند اللجان الشعبية، ندير المظاهرة السلمية ضد قضية أخرى. ما في مظاهرة سلمية يتصدى لها أحد ويضربها بالرصاص، مستحيل، مادامت سلمية، ماشية من شارع إلى شارع. أنا نفسي قدت مظاهرات سلمية كثيرة في العهد المباد، لكن لا حرقت، لا كسرت، لا شي. الشرطة يميني ويساري، ونحن ماشين مع الشوارع، وفي الميادين، ونخطبوا إلى أن نعي وندير برقيات احتجاج ونرجعوا، ونؤيد جمال عبد الناصر، نؤيد الوحدة العربية والثورة الجزائرية ضد تفجير القنابل في الجزائر. المظاهرات السلمية شيء، والتمرد المسلح وقطع أجزاء من تراب الوطن، شيء آخر على العالم، أن يفهم أن المظاهرات السلمية شيء وعمل مشروع في الدول المضطرة للمظاهرات. الشعب الليبي غير مضطر للمظاهرات، فمشاكله تنحل في السلطة الشعبية. ولكن مظاهرات سلمية حتى لو كانت في ليبيا شيء، والتمرد المسلح اللي يجري الآن، ومحاولة فصل درنة أو فصل البيضاء أو فصل بنغازي، هذا شيء آخر. من يسمح به؟ تمرد في البرلمان بدون سلاح، ضربه يلتسن بالدبابات، وصفق له الغرب. الفرع الداوودي، تمرد في أميريكا اعتصم بدون سلاح، ضربه كلينتون بالدبابات. التمرد المسلح في الفلوجة، اعتبروه تمرد مع أن الفلوجة ماهيش أميريكية، عراقية. لكنهم قالوا لا، هذا تمرد بتاع الزرقاوي ودكوها بالطيران، فتتوها، شوفوا في بغداد، من الدك بالمدافع والطائرات، لأن فيها تمرد مسلح، وحتى التمرد غير المسلح زي في الفرع الداوودي، وفي برلمان الدوما الروسي، ضربوه بالدبابات. لما السود تمردوا في كاليفورنيا في أميريكا، وهجموا على المتاجر، نيلسون نزل الجيش بالقوة ومسحهم. لما تمرد الطلاب في ميدان السماء في بكين في الصين، الصين مسحت الميدان بالدبابات. ما فيش حد يسمح لبلاده تبدى مضحكة، ولا أن يفصل واحد مخبول، يفصل جزء من أجزائها. توا في درنه، قال لهم النسوان ما عادش يطلعن وهاتوا لي التبرعات فأنا السلطان، وكل مرة يجيبوا له واحد يذبحه، زي طريقة الزرقاوي. المظاهرات السلمية شيء، والتمرد المسلح وقطع أجزاء من الدولة شيء آخر. المطالب الداخلية، شيء، والتآمر مع الخارج شيء آخر.

عندنا مطالب داخلية نبي دستور، نبي شعبيات، نبي بلديات، نبي منظمات مجتمع مدني، عادي جداً جداً، شيء سلمي ومقبول، أما التآمر مع الخارج باسم هذه الأشياء، فهذا شيء آخر مختلف. نحن يا إخواننا نعرف بعضنا، سبحان الله! كيف أنا بنتصرف أمام شبان في الزنتان مثلا، وعيب تقولوا الزنتان خونة. معقولة الزنتان أحفاد، وأبناء أبطال وشهداء معركة الكردون، الذين داسوا بأقدامهم الحافية على العلم –البريطاني- على العلم الإيطالي، تقولوا لهم: خونة؟ هذوم أطفال من الزنتان متمردين، زي ما تمردوا في أي بقعة أخرى، متمردون على أهلهم. عيب تشوهوا الزنتان، ويا زنتان عيب يشوهوكم! عدو لأولادكم أقبضوا عليهم بالواحد، نربوهم، نعلموهم، نقروهم، نشغلوهم يطلعوا أمن، يطلعوا فنيين. لكن زي –كي- ما قال الشاعر في مناسبة بتاعت الزنتان هذه، قال: "واحد زنتاني غلط فيه شاب من بني وليد، فهو زعل وقال شعر، ردوا عليه الزنتان". تنطبق على الحاله –لأني أنا بنقول هالبيت لأنها تنطبق على الوضع الذي فيه إخوتي في الزنتان الآن. قال: "غلطة وغلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ لا هو إنساني". يعني قالوا له يا خونا يا زنتاني ما تؤاخدنا، هذا الذي غلط فيك ما هو ورفلي كبير، هذا الذي غلط فيك هو شاب صغير، "غلطة غلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ ولا هو إنساني"، مزبوط توا الشباب اللي تواما يعرفوا التاريخ، لا يعرفوا معركة الكردون. أنا أعرفها ونقدر من أجلها الزنتان، لكن هم نسيوا أمجاد آبائهم وأجدادهم. "لا هيش مقصودة ولا غلطتنا، شباب طيش من وكالة البناني"، قالوا له "هذي لا هي غلطتنا إحنا ولا شي، هذا شباب طايش من اللي ياكلوا في البانايي.. " هههههه، الجيل الجديد اللي ياكل في الموز. بالضبط الشباب اللي في الزنتان هم من هذا النوع، مش الزنتان، شفتوا واحد بشنابه؟ شفتوا واحد بعايلته، واحد براتبه، واحد بوظيفته، شفتوا واحد عنده دكان، واحد عنده مزرعة، واحد عنده مقهى، عنده مطعم، عنده حيوانات مشترك في العملية هذه؟ أبدا. من درنة مافيش ولا واحد مشترك فيها، مشتركون فيها الشباب الصغار اللي من البناني هاذوم اللي يخذوهم من أهلهم، متاعين الهلوسة. والعقوبة مش على الشبان، فحتى القانون ما ينطبقش عليهم لأن عمرهم أقل من 18. العقوبة على الذين جندوا الشبان هاذوم، وضحكوا عليهم، هم هذول اللي يجب أن تقبضوا عليهم، وتقدموهم للعدالة، قدموهم للمحاكم. أنا لوكان نمشي إلى شباب الزنتان، حيهتفون الفاتح، الفاتح، وحيقولو كل الروس فدا لراسك. أنا متأكد شباب الزنتان كلهم هتفوا. مشيت مرة لإجدابيا شباب أجدابيا مجانين من الثورة، يهتفون كل الروس فدا لراسك. إجدابيا أبناء وأحفاد أبطال وشهداء معركة الكراهب الشهيرة، حراس عمر المختار، عمر المختار اللي لي جا إلى إجدابيا، يحرسوه، مش لأنه فيوزع عليهم حواشين ولا بيعطيهم فلوس، لأنه عمر المختار. أنا لو نمشي تحرسني إجدابيا. ولو نمشي للزنتان، يحرسوني الزنتان. وأعطوني فرصة، جمعوا لي هالشبان، خلوني نتكلم معاهم، شوفوا كيف يتغيرون. عطوني فرصة، جيبوهم، خلي الزنتان يجيبوا أولادهم، أو أي مكان آخر يجيب أولادهم.

أنا نقود ثورة الشباب وأنا طالب، هذه ثورتنا، الثورة الشعبية، أنا أتمنى الثورة الشعبية، أن الشعب يستلم كل شيء. وأنا اللي قلت ديروا إذاعات في كل مكان، اللي استغلوها توا، أنا اللي دايرها الإذاعات نبغي كل منطقة تستقل على حالها داخل الجماهيرية، زي الولايات الأميريكية، في الولايات الألمانية. توا، احنا نعرف بعضنا بالاسم، سبحان الله! تونا نعرف الزنتان أولاد أبو الليل، بلهول، أولاد عيسى بن زويد بلقاسم. لو كان توا الحاج محمد الصغير العايب رحمه الله من أولاد محمد موجود، لا كان ما حصلت هذه العملية، ولكنت أتصل به على طول وأقول له عم الحاج خذ العويل هذول، وياخذهم. وكم من مرة كان وسيطا، ليش ما فيش حد كيفه؟ فيه أكيد، لكن خايفين، مساكين، الزنتان خايفين من أولادهم، باهي خلوا الشرطة والأمن يقبضون عليهم، ويربوهم، ويفهموهم ويربوهم كويس ويسلموهم ليكم. توا العبيدات توا نعرفهم، أول أمس جوني العبيدات، وانهاجوا وانقولوا : "تمنيتي في ألفين فوق جوايد، عبيدات بوشولات فيهن قائد". والنسوان يزغردن كيف بينقلبوا؟ مش معقولة بينقلبوا، أول أمس كانوا معي هنا، وفي الإذاعة قلت لهم حطوا شن كانت تقول عرب درنة لما جوني، عرب بنغازي والبيضاء والعبيدات والقبة والمنطقة كلها، لما جونيلي

أول أمس، تو، ليهم أسبوع. شن كانوا يقولوا؟ وينهم هذوم؟ وين راحوا؟ يطلعوا، ينفذوا الكلام اللي قالوه، يحترموه. أنت من أين؟ من عايلة غيث، أنت من عايلة مريم، أنت من ارفاد، أنت من امزين، عارفين بعضنا، ونشوف هذا الولد ولد من، من عائلة امزين أو من عائلة ارفاد، أو من عائلة مريم، أو من عائلة غيث، والله حالة!

لما نجي للدرسة أنت من عائلة محمد، من عائلة برغل، من عائلة عبد الجواد، من عائلة السريري أبو عوينة شلمان، شعيب، عارفين بعضنا. منو في العالم يعرفون بعضهم في هذا الشكل؟ قيادة وإلا غيرها وإلا شعب؟ ما، احنا نعرف بعض، أنت ولد فلان ولد فلان وفلان، نبدوا نقتلوا في بعضنا؟! مصراته رمضان السويحلي وسعدون السويحلي بطل معركة المشرك، شهيد معركة المشرك، يا سلام معارك قوز التيك، المعارك المجيدة هذه كلها، كيف تسيء لتاريخها؟ مش ممكن. لما نجي إلى الزاوية أنت لعائلة أبو حميرة؟ أنت لعائلة أبو زريبة؟ أنت لصلاب؟ أنت بلعزي؟ أنت ولد صقر؟ أنتم الأشراف؟ أنتم قبيلة الزاوية، أم القبائل الزاوية، أم القبائل، أنت من الرماح؟ أنت من الكورغلية، عارفين بعضنا. لو نمشي للحاسة نقول لهم أنتم خلابطة، خلبطو، أنتم شبارقة، بلقاسم؟ توا هذا الكلام اللي قلته، هذا الكلام اللي قلته، شوفوا إخوانكم العرب كيف حرفوه؟ إحدى المحطات العربية تقول: أصدر الأوامر للجيش والشرطة بالقضاء على المتمردين. تصوروا. شوفوا، أنا نقول كلام زي هذا؟ أنا طلبت من الجماهير ن تمشي تاخذ أولادها وتقبض على اللي غرروا بأولادها. لكن نهار تبدى ليبيا في خطر، ووحدتها الوطنية في خطر، وتبدأ القاعدة بالتمركز في ليبيا، حتى مجلس الأمن يؤيدني في استخدام القوة. توا عمليات قبض عادية، لكن توا تطلعوا من بيوتكم كلكم الرجال، والنساء الذين معاي، أمنوا المدن، وأمنوا الواحات، والقرى، وكذبوهم، وخلي يتفرجوا عليكم. باهي، توا اعترفوا أنهم متمردين، وقبل كانوا يقولون متظاهرين، في مظاهرات في ليبيا؟ كلها مظاهرات تأييد، باهي اللي اعترفوا بأنهم متمردين.

المطلوب تسليم الأسلحة فوراً الي روعت الناس، بنغازي تحتضر، تموت، مرعوبة من الأسلحة اللي في يد الأطفال الصغار. ستموت، ماعاندهاش ميه، ولا ماكله، ولا كهربه، ولا أي شيء. اطلعوا يا بنغازي، أنقذوا، أنقذوا يا بنغازي، أنقذوا أنفسكم، وحرروا عبد الفتاح اللي حرر بنغازي معي ليلة الثورة، وخلوا هو اللي تتفاهموا أنتم وإياه لتديروا البلد، إلى غاية أن يعود الأمن إلى نصابه، وتعود السلطة الشعبية. اعتبارا من بكرا، بكرا سيبدأ تشكيل الشعبيات الجديدة، والبلديات الجديدة، والمؤتمرات الجديدة واللجان الشعبية الجديدة، من بكرا تبدأ، وهو يساعدكم، حرروه، عيب عليكم! عصابة أنتم؟ بنغازي معقولة؟

تسليم الأسلحة فورا وإعادتها إلى الجهات التي أخذوها منها، وإلا سترعب البلاد وتسبب مجازر، أطفال مهووسون سكرانين، وعندهم سلاح ورشاشات. تسليم الأسرى من الشرطة والجيش. أي أحد قبضوا عليه، يسلموه، فورا! والقبض على المشاغبين وتسليمهم للأمن، حتى يتم تربيتهم وإعادتهم إلى رشدهم، ويمروا بفترة نقاهة حتى يبرأوا من الحبوب اللي لهم كم يوم ياخذوا فيها لأنها مضرة جدا هذي بالقلب.

إزالة كل معوقات الحياة في الشوارع، الدكاكين تُفتح، الدكاكين يجب تُفتح، الكوشك تُفتح، المطارات تُفتح، الموانئ تُفتح. لا تخربوا بلادكم بلا مبرر، ليش؟ شنو السبب؟ ما الذي دهاكم؟ هذه عين كي ما يقولوا، خلاص أنا أمنت بالعين، بلاد أمنة وتعينت. وجدنا أنفسنا في أمان، وفي رخاء، وبترولنا ومائنا، وسلام وهناء، والدنيا تحترق حولنا، نروح احنا نحرق بلادنا؟ طبعا أنا بنقولكم في النهاية، لا يمكن لأحد عاقل يسمح لبلاده أن تتمزق، أو تصبح في يد قبضة من المجانين.

عفوا، بلغوني أن الشعر اللي قلته عن الزنتان، هذاك الوقت في انقطاع فني ما سمعوشي. فسامحوني بنعاوده مرة ثانية إذا كان الإرسال ماشي كويس، قتلكم، قلتكم: واحد ورفلي، عفوا شاب شاب ورفلي غلط في واحد زنتاني، والزنتاني زعل وحسبها على ورفلة كلهم، وقال مش حنجيكم، ومانوش عاد أصحاب، ومش حنجي لبني وليد، وزعل وقالها في قصيدة شعر، ردوا عليه ورفلة قالوا له: "غلطة غلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ ولا هو إنساني". يعني قالوا له هذا شاب من الإعدادي -من مدرسة

الإعدادية- ما يعرف التاريخ، ولا يعرف معركة الكردون زي ما قلت أنا توا أن الشباب الموجودين توا، ما يعرفون أهلهم وأجدادهم، ولا يعرفوا معركة الكردون ولا المرحوم محمد الصغير العايب الذي كان يحل المشاكل في الزنتان، وكنا نعتمد عليه. قالوا له يا ولدي

ما تؤاخدنا. حتى نحن يجب أن ما نؤاخد الزنتان، وأنا ما أؤاخذهم الزنتان، الأبطال، لأن قالوا له: "يا ودلدي غلطة غلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ لا هو إنساني لاهيش مقصودة ولا غلطتنا شباب طيش من وكالة البانياني". قال هذا شباب طايش من اللي ياكلو البانياني، بتعاين الموز. قالوا الجماعة قالوا لي إن الشعر هذا، الجماعة في الزنتان ماسمعوش ، أرجو أن تعيده، وأنا عاودته على شانهم. حتى توا الشباب الموجودين في الزنتان، هم من شباب الطيش، لكن جيبوهم لي، ياريت اتجيبونهم لي بس. كل الشباب هاذوم، أنا نبيهم، أنا نبي الشباب الثائر، أنا اللي سميته جيل الغضب. معقولة شباب الفاتح يترك الأمجاد، ويضحي بها ويحرق الجماهيرية، بتاعت دولة الجماهير، علشان وجدين مقملين مسخين يتبعهم عملاء المخابرات الأجنبية والدراوشة؟ من يصدق هذا؟ لا يمكن مش ممكن شبابنا يقودهم واحد آخر. هم إذا كان ماتبعوش معمر القذافي، يبتعوا واحد معمل بلحيته؟ هههههه... مش ممكن. الشباب معنا احنا، هذول شبابنا، هذا جيل الغضب اللي أنا ربيته، وهم يهتفوا في كل مكان يقولوا: حنا جيل بناه معمر واللي يعادينا يدمر.

أخيرا يا سادة، ما لم تتحقق هذه الأشياء: تسليم الأسلحة، تسليم الأسرى، تسليم المشاغبين، القبض على الذين غرروا بأولادنا، وإزالة كل شيء، وإعادة الحياة الطبيعية للموانئ والمطارات، والطرق، والمخابز، والميه، والتموين، والمواصلات، والاتصالات، وتعود الحياة هانئة، والعائلات تقعد عايشة في أمان، وأطفالنا عايشين في أمان، ويروحوا للشارع، وللمقهى، وللملاهي، وللمطاعم ما لم يتحقق هذا، ونرى أن وحدة ليبيا تتعرض للخطر، أو إن قوى معادية للديمقراطية معادية للحرية، بتشوه الإسلام -القاعدة بالذات- نراها، إذا كان سنرى أن هذا سيتحقق، سنحول دون تحقيقه. عندئذ نقول لكم، سيعلن الزحف، سيعلن الزحف المقدس، زي مسيرة ألف ميل التي قادها ماو تسي تونغ، وحرر بها الصين إلى عند اليوم، خلاها دولة تملك القنبلة الهيدروجينية. أيوه، سنقود أنا مسيرة الزحف، وتصوروا هذا الزحف من أين يأتي، تعرفوه! ومضطرين بعدين أن نطّهر المدن، ونطّهر الشوارع، ونطّهر البيوت، ونطّهر كل شيء. اللي بيسلم نفسه نادم ومعترف بذنبه، من الذين حركوا شبابنا، أما شبابنا فسيندمون، الشباب هذول، خلهم يسلمون نفسهم وما عليهومش، حنعالجوهم، حنعالجوهم، نعالجوهم أولا الحبوب، لصحتهم لأن لهم كم يوم يأخذون الحبوب. لكن أمهاتهم يمشوا يجبنهم، ونسمحوا لهم يعدو ايجبنهم. وكان الرجال خايفين من العصابات، النسوان والبنات يعدن يأخذن خوتهن وأولادهن، ويجيبوهن للبيوت، ندربوهم، نعلموهم، احنا أهلهم، نؤهلوهم للعمل الصالح، والخدمة الصالحة، ويجيبوا دخل، ويجيبوا رواتب، ويؤمنوا البلاد، معقولة شبابنا يخربون البلاد؟ أبدأ هذا مش شبابنا! هذولا اللي وراهم، الي يقومون بالعمل هذا عاطينهم حبوب، راه، مش بإرادتهم الله أكبر! إذا لم يتحقق كل هذا، أنا بعد ذلك سنعلن الزحف، سنعلن الزحف المقدس. أيوه. أنا راه معمر القذافي قائد أممي، أنا تدافع عني الملايين. أنا سنوجه نداء للملايين من الصحراء إلى الصحراء، وسنزحف أنا والملايين، لتطهير ليبيا شبر شبر، بيت بيت، دار دار، زنقه زنقه، فرد فرد، حتى تتطهر البلد من الدنس والأنجاس، لا يمكن أن نسمح لليبيا تضيع بين أيدينا بدون مبرر، في غوط الباطل، من يسمح بهذا؟

أنا معي الملايين، ومعي الله، الذي نصرني على القوى العظمى الكبرى. معي الملايين مش من الداخل، معي الملايين من الأمم الأخرى. أنا نوجه نداء إلى كل ملايين الصحراء، من الصحراء إلى الصحراء ستزحف الملايين. الملايين تزحف، وما يقدر حد يوقفها. بسرعة! أنقذوا أنفسكم قبل أن نعطي إشارة الزحف المقدس.

الليلة زحف سلمي، الليلة زحف سلمي، من داخل المدن، من داخل القرى، من داخل الواحات، لإنقاذ أطفالنا والقبض على اللي غرروا بأطفالنا. هذه الليلة تعملوها الليلة وبكرا، تطلعوا للشوارع. أما بعدها إذا كان مافيش هذا، في زحف من الداخل، تعرفوه هذا

الزحف من أين يأتي، وبعدها في الزحف الأممي اللي أنا نقوده، لأن ليبيا تهم كل الأمم، ليبيا مثابة عالمية.
أنا قاعد هنا، ما يكذبوش عليكم! أنا نمشي إلى فنزويلا؟ والله؟!
أنا نخلي جثمان الشهيد عبد السلام بومنيار أول شهيد سقط في الخمس عام 1911، ونعدي إلى فنزويلا، والله يكتبها على التاريخ؟ نخلي المجاهد عبد السلام بومنيار في قبره في الهاني، والمجاهد الشيخ الساعدي بومنيار قبره في منيدر، والله؟ ونمشي؟ أتصدقوا؟! ها هو أول حاجة، هذي الكذبة بتاعهم، مش أمس قالوا لكم القذافي في فنزويلا؟ وهاذي أنا قاعد! هذه المحطات العربية أكبر عدو، متشمة فيكم، تبغيكم أن تدمروا النفط، وتدمروا الحرية، وتدمروا السلطة الشعبية، وتدمروا ليبيا، وما عاش تبقى ليبيا قلعة عالمية. متغاضون منكم، عشان كذا يشوهون فيكم. بارك الله فيكم يا أخوتنا في قطر. بارك الله فيكم يا أخوتنا في قطر. هذه آخرتها هذا الماء والملح اللي بيننا وبينكم؟ هذا الدم والأخوة اللي بيننا وبينكم؟ تزوروا في كل شيء علينا؟ بدل ما تكونوا معنا، تكونوا ضدنا؟ لمصلحة من؟ بالله لمصلحة من؟ قد تندمون يوم لا ينفع الندم، الذي بيته من الزجاج لا يرجم الناس بالحجارة. من أنتم؟ دقت ساعة العمل، دقت ساعة الزحف، دقت ساعة الانتصار، لا رجوع إلى الأمام. إلى الأمام. إلى الأمام. ثورة، ثورة.

Good evening, today dear youth in the Green Square, and the morning of the revolution for tomorrow. I salute you, you courageous people. I salute you, you the youth of the Fateh, the youth of the nationalism, the youth of the Fatimi, the youth of challenge, the generation of challenge, and the generation of anger. I salute you while you are presenting the true image of the Libyan people to the world, whom are surrounded by the revolution. You- in the Green Square-are presenting the truth that the agencies of traitors, agents, baseness, backwardness and cowardness are trying to cover up, and to destroy your image in front of the world. Unfortunately, it is Arab brothers' media, that are betraying and deceiving you, and present your image in a bad way that harms all Libyans men and women. They are telling them "look at Libya, look at Libya, it does not want dignity, it does not want glory, it does not want liberation, it does not want revolution. Look at Libya, it wants dervishs, it wants bearded people, it wants people with turbans, look at Libya, it wants colonization, it wants deterioration, and wants to reach the lowest point". However, you- here in the Green Square- are saying, "Libya wants glory, Libya wants to be on top, the top of the world". Libya leads the continents Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe. All the continents hold their summits here in Libya. This is a glory for Libyan men and women. Libyan people are now known all over the world, after that time when Libyan people had no identity. When you say Libyan, they ask you "Libya? Liberia? Lebanon?" They do not know Libya. However, today when you say Libya, they say "oh yeah, Libya, Algaddafi, Libya the revolution". All the African nations consider Libya their mecca, all the Latin Americans nations, and all the Asian nations. All the world leaders with their great nuclear powers, they come to Libya, to your country, to Tripoli, to Sirte, to Benghazi. They have destroyed your image, unfortunately in Arab brothers' media, they worship the devil, and they want to insult you. We want to react to this now, with an action, on the land, in the field. Mummar Algaddafi does not have a position, to be sad and resigns from it, just like the other presidents. Mummar Algaddafi is not a president, but a revolution leader. Revolution means sacrifice, always and forever, and until the end of life. This is my country, the country of my grandparents, your grandparents. We planted it with our hands, and we watered it with the blood of our grandparents. We are more worthy of Libya than those rats, and those hired people. Who are those hired people? Who are being paid by the foreign secret services? May god curse them, they have ashamed their children if they have any, they have ashamed their families, if they have any and ashamed their tribes, if they have any. However, those people have do not belong to any tribes; because Libyan tribes are honourable, fighters, and strugglers, they have all came to me this month. All those tribes from Butnan, to the Nafusa Mountains, to Fezzan, they are all

chanting the same slogan, they are all challenging. We have challenged America in this place, with its tyrant and power. We have challenged the great nuclear countries in the world, and we won and they bowed their heads here. Italy kissed the hands of the son of the martyr - Omar Mukhtar the elder martyrs- and this is a glory that there is not any other glory compared to it, and not just to the Manfah tribe, not to the Butnan only, and not for Benghazi only, but for all Libyans, Arabs and Muslims. This is glory, that they want to destroy.

Italy the empire back at that time, was destroyed on the Libyan land with all its legions. I am higher than the positions that presidents and pomps take, I am a fighter, struggler, warrior, and revolutionist, from the tent, from the desert. All the cities, villages, and oases has joined me in a historic revolution that brought glory to the Libyan people, that they would enjoy a generation after another. Libya shall remain at the top, leading Africa, Latin America, and leading Asia, but also leading the world. Nothing can stop this historic and victorious journey, not a bunch of mercenaries and hirelings who are hired by those cats and rats who are jumping from one street to another and from one alley to another, in the darkness. I paid the price for staying here, my grandfather Abdul Salam Abu Meniar, the first martyr falling over the Al Khums in the first battle in 1911.I will not insult this great sacrifice; I will not leave the pure remains of my grandfather in Murqub. I will die with him as martyr at the end. Here is the remains of my father in Hani, a fighter, one of the heroes in Ghardabiya and Tala, and here is my grandfather, my uncle Sheikh Al-Saadi in Munaydar cemetery. I do not leave those pure remains. Those are the fighters. Bashir al-Saadawi said, "Freedom is like a tree, no one can stay under its shadow but those who planted it and watered it with their own blood". Libya is a tree, we are under its shadow because we have planted it with our hands and we have watered it with our blood.

I am talking to you from this resistance place, this house in Tripoli, which was raided by one hundred and seventy planes, led by great nuclear countries, America, Britain and the NATO. Forty Boeing airplanes, providing fuel for this campaign. They passed over all the palaces, all the houses, and all your homes- all your homes they passed it- looking for Mummar Algaddafi's house. Why? Is it because Mummar Algaddafi is the president of the country? If he were a president of the country, they would have treated him like other countries presidents'. However, because Mummar Algaddafi is history, resistance, liberation, glory, revolution, and this is a confession from the greatest countries in the world, that Mummar Algaddafi is not a president, or a regular person who we can kill by poison or make a demonstration against him to have him fall. When bombs were all over this place, bombing my house, and killing my children, where have you been you rats? Where have you been you people with beards, you who are living in the dark in Derna's hill? In the Jebel Akhdar hill,

and in any other hills? Where have you been? You were with the Americans, clapping your hands to your masters, the Americans. When Mummar Algaddafi with his family were in this place, bombed by bombs. One hundred and seventy plane, passed the kings, the presidents, and the passed all the palaces in the Arab region, and came to Mummar Algaddafi's tent, and Mummar Algaddafi's house. This kind of glory that Libya will not let go, and the Libyan people will not let go, not even the Arab nation, Islamic nation, the African, the Latin American, and not any nation that wants freedom, dignity for humans, and fights the tyrant. We fought America's tyrant, Britain tyrant, and the nuclear countries. We fought the NATO's tyrant, we did not give up, and we were resisting here. Now, a small group of youth -who were given pills-, are raiding the police stations here and there like rats. Attacking a secure and oblivious barrack, because we are not in a war status, we do not need to enforce the security on our warehouses and camps. We are among our families in peace and security, and Libya is in peace. They have used this peace and this security, and the welfare Libya is living in, and they raided some camps and some centres. They burned the files that has their crimes, attacked the courts that has their files, and the police station that has the integrations upon their crimes. Nevertheless, they are not guilty; those youth they are not guilty at all, because they are young about sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen years old. Sometimes they imitate what is going on in Tunisia and what is going on in Egypt, and this is normal. Sometimes when they hear about some youths who robbed courts in a city in Libya, they will say, "Okay, we will go and rob the court in our city too". It is only imitation, "they said they got weapons, we want weapons too!" But there are few sick groups who have sneaked among us in the cities, providing pills, and sometimes even money, to those young youth, and they push them towards those side battles. Those who were killed were police officers, soldiers and those youth, and not those people who are directing them. They are sitting in their houses, or are abroad enjoying the security, safety and the pleasure for them and their children. They are directing your children, giving them pills, and they are telling them "go and bring weapons, rob and burn, you are the heroes." Thus, your children will die, and so we will fight each other. Abdul Fatah Younis is one of the heroes of the Great Fateh revolution heroes. He was under my command when we attacked Benghazi broadcasting channel and I have announced the first announcement to liberate Libya, which was occupied back then. Five American headquarters right at that moment when Abdul Fatah went right in Benghazi city me. Five American headquarters, twenty thousand Italians occupying the Libyan land, from Misrata to Tarhuna, to Sabratha, under the control of the Italian civilians. Right next to all the shops, the workshops and all the services. They had members of the parliament

in the Libyan Council of Deputies who took bribes. The Butnan was completely occupied by the American forces, and Tobruk was collapsing under the complete American occupation when we went to liberate Benghazi. You do not know the Fwehat Camp that was called and was one hundred percent English. When Abdul Fatah and I were attacking Benghazi's broadcasting channel, to announce the liberation from it. Not to announce the relapsing that is happening now, going backward, the shame and the humiliation. The "hospital" camp in Benghazi was camp Wavell, there was the name Wavell written on it, and no one dared to erase the word Wavell. Where have you been? Where have your fathers and your grandparents been? You mercenaries! When five American headquarters were on the Libyan's land? Has anyone of you shot at them? Or bombed one single bomb? We sacrificed ourselves; we were preparing ourselves to go into a battle with America and Britain on the Libyan land. I have announced from the Evacuation Square in Tripoli, that if there was no evacuation, we will start fighting from one street to another and from house to another against the American forces. You have never said that, neither your parents, you mercenaries. Where have you been, you? Do you think Libya is easy? We have paid a precious price for Libya, and built a great glory for it that no one can reach. We have left the authority to the Libyan people since 1977, the free officers and me, we no longer have any positions or any authorities, and we do not issue any laws or any resolutions. We have left the authority to the Libyan people, to the People's Congress and the People's committees. Whether it treated well or not, fixed it or not, insulted it or not, and corrupted it or not, all of this concerns all the Libyans. In the hospital, in the school, in the administration, in the office, in the car, in the airplane, in the housing, in the agricultural, and in the industry. All of those fields are run by Libyans, they are running the People's committees that belongs to the People's Congress, and those People's Congress consisted from all the Libyan people. The problem was totally solved in Libya; the fight over the authority was over when the Libyan people took entirely in 1977. My friends and me are no longer responsible for anything, expect for fighting for Libya and we hold on to our weapons only. When America raided us, we fought them, and France at the south we fought them. We fought Sadat, we fought Habre, we fought Haile Selassie, and even Bourguiba and Nimeiry we fought them. Then the backwardness has fallen, colonization agents has fallen and colonization has fallen. We only had our guns; we left everything else to you, even the money from the petroleum I am sick of telling you take it with your own hands. Each month, take the money of the petroleum and do what you want with it. Do not let them laugh at you now, and ask you where is the money of the petroleum has gone. You said, "No, let the money be for the country, with the committees". You were the ones who voted for them to be People's General

committees, and the entire People's committees, you are the one responsible for it. They are laughing at you! Are you that naïve? Tomorrow... I support the people's authority, and I ask the Libyan people to form new districts and municipals, according to the program that Saif al-Islam has explained to you. I know that the Ubaidat that Abdul Fatah Younis is part of, who was shot yesterday in Benghazi - and his fate is still unknown- was told "you are from Ubaidat, what brought you to Benghazi?". During the revolution night, he was liberating Benghazi with me. Why didn't they tell him back then you are from Ubaidat, do not come to Benghazi. Where have you been when Abdul Fatah was jeopardizing his life fighting with his gun? And when he was fighting Sadat, and Israel on the boarders when they were about to invade you? Sadat was about to invade you, him and America. Abdul Fatah was the hero of the battles on the boarders, and yesterday they were shooting him and his fate is still unknown. They told him "you are from Ubaidat? What brought you to Benghazi?" Is that it? Is that it, you people of Benghazi? Who are you? Never! They are not the people of Benghazi at all!

I will repeat this, I will talk about the districts; I know that the Ubaidat is in Al-Qubbah, they do not want to join Derna, and they want their own district. I am with what the people wants, so be it, a district to the Ubaidat, and a district to Al-Qubbah. Starting from tomorrow, they can announce the district and start the district authority. To also purify it, and make everything in there with their own hands. I know that Bani Walid does not want to join Misrata, and considers the joining as an act forceful injustice. Then Bani Walid may be liberated, Bani Walid wants to form a district, they are free, it is up to their people. The youth of Al Rusaifa, the youth of Soula, they are capable of making a district, they are capable to make their own decisions, and not to respond to anyone or take help from anyone. Dardanel of Tripoli, just like what the Italian called it, Bani Walid became Dardanel of Tripoli. This is because it was the major defence that resisted the Italian attacks that head to the south. I know that Tarhuna does not want to join the Al Khums or Msallata. They are free, the people of Tarhuna are free, and they can make their own district starting from tomorrow and make their people's authority. Misrata is free, Zliten is free, Khoms is free, and Msallata is free. I am quite sure that after this call, the people will go starting from tomorrow to form new committees. I expect that the districts (shabiyah), which are about twenty-three committee now, are going to reach about thirty committee or more. I also believe that there will be municipality for the local administration, from fifty municipality to one hundred and fifty municipality I think. Because everyone wants to have their own municipality This is the right thing. This is what helps the human being; it should serve our lives and history, and it will not make us ashamed in front of

the world, and not burning wheels, and stealing guns. A boy in Benghazi took bombs, they gave him an RPG, those anti-tank weapons, and he is walking with it in Benghazi! The horror in Benghazi! Dear world, RPG weapons are in the city of Benghazi! The Americans sneaked it in; the Italians did so we can fight them! They provided tanks to those young kids and they are running around with it in Benghazi's streets! They drove those kids crazy, made them drunk, and gave them pills. They isolated them from their families. The families should start gathering their kids, starting from tomorrow. Get out of your houses, you who love Mummar Algaddafi, men, women, girls and children, and you who are with Mummar Algaddafi the revolutionist. With Mummar Algaddafi glory and pride to Libya and to reach the top for the Libyan people. He, who wants glory, should remember the evacuation of the Italians, the evacuation of the Americans, and the evacuation of the English, the Great Man-Made River, People's authority, and the return of the oil. It was ninety percent of it for the American companies, and you only get ten percent. Now, you get ninety percent, and the American companies get only ten percent. Those who wants glory, pride and dignity should come out of their houses, get out of your houses, get out to the streets. Secure the streets, and catch the rats, do not be afraid of them. We did not use force yet; the force supports the Libyan people. If things reached the point where it is necessary to use force, we will use it according to the international law, and to the Libyan constitution and laws. Starting from tomorrow, or tonight, you get out of all the Libyan cities, villages and oases you who love Mummar Algaddafi, because Mummar Algaddafi is glory. If I have a position, if I was the president, I would have thrown the resignation to your faces, those germs. However, I do not have a position; I do not have anything to resign from. I have my gun, I shall fight until the last drop of my blood, and all the Libyan people are with me.

I have always lived my life fearless, you are facing a deaf rock, a hard rock, that America's fleets were crashed over it; wouldn't your gangs be destroyed over it too? Get out of your houses, raid them in their dens, take your kids from the streets, and take your kids from them. They took your kids, brainwashing them, making them drunk, and telling them "go to the fire", so that your kids will die. Your kids are dying, for what reason? For what purpose? Nothing, nothing but to destroy Libya, to burn Libya. Police officers have died, your kids have died, but their kids have no died, their kids have not died, their kids are in America and Europe! What happened to you? Why is this fear? Why is the horror from those gangs? Gangs like rats. They are nothing. They cannot be one in a million of the Libyan people. They are worth nothing, bunch of youth, who are imitating what is happening in Tunisia and Egypt, who were given pills, and was ordered from within to burn,

rob, do this, imitate... Rats. Starting from tomorrow, security by police and military are imposing security. Starting from tomorrow, the barriers should be lifted, any barriers should be lifted. You lift it, lift it from your cities, and catch them, chase them everywhere, wake up and get out of your houses. Is this how you want Benghazi? To be destroyed? To cut off the electricity from it? And cut off the water? Who will bring you electricity and water? That is it. Those rats can reach the petroleum, and blast the petroleum, and then you are back to the darkness, to the year 1952. What forced us to this? Oh god, Benghazi, I built it, brick by brick, we are happy with it and still building it now. They brought your kids to destroy it now! Who can think that there would be gunshots in Benghazi? Bombs in Benghazi? Fires in Benghazi? Tanks in the streets of Benghazi now? It is only three tanks that were burnt, and it mortified Benghazi. They are going to the airport, trying to sabotage it. The planes stopped, the civil aviation has stopped. Which plane would still land in Benina airport? Even ships, they said we cannot dock in Benghazi's port, because there are rats there, and when we arrive, they will attack us and take everything in our ships. Derna became a destruction and its leader now, march to him; all the families and the masses in Derna, purify Derna. The leader has a beard and he is telling the women not to go out starting from today. Did you see this setback? He said brought me donations, I am your caliph and I am with Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri! You will be governed by Al-Zawahiri at the end? Do you want America to come here and occupy you? Does to you like it did to Afghanistan? Like Somalia? Like Pakistan? Like Iraq? By doing so our country will be gone, it will be gone just like Afghanistan! You like that? Listen; get out if you do not like this. Get out to the streets, close it all, catch them, chase them, and take their weapons from the. Arrest them, sue them and hand them to the police. Very few, wherever have you heard that there is a movement, they are few terrorists who wants to turn Libya into states that follows Al-Zawahiri or Bin Laden. Is this it? To allow America to come in, and say that it will not allow another new Afghanistan here in north Africa! They will bring colonization, and our country to become a bomb.

The free officers are now distributed to all their tribes and their cities, to lead those tribes and those cities, secure it, and purify it from those rats. Try to catch those who manipulated our young youth and to hand them to the courts. Their penalties will be by law. Listen to the chanting in the streets "with the soul, with the blood, we will sacrifice for you our leader". They do not want me; they want Libya. Look at their crimes in the Libyan Penal Code, which was issued before the revolution. Libyans carrying weapons against the country, the punishment is execution. Punished with execution any Libyan who carries weapons in Libya.

To plot conspiracies with foreign countries to start war against Libya, the punishment is execution for anyone who does so.
This is Libyan Penal Code ...
To violate the country's properties, and facilitate war against it, the punishment is execution, for anyone who facilitates the access for the enemy into the country, or who hand them cities, forts, facilities, positions, or ports. This action will lead into handing those positions to America. Because America will not allow that Derna becomes a stat that follows Bin Laden, nor Al Bayda' follows Bin Laden or Benghazi follows Bin Laden. America will not never allow this.
Sneaking to military positions, if the enemy benefited from this indeed, the punishment is execution. The person who sneaks to military positions is the person who committed all those crimes.
Punished with execution any person who provided a foreign government, one of its agents, or any person that works for it by any way or by any method with anything related to the defence of the country, or any similar secrets. Those gave all our secrets to our enemies. It is not the kids fault; it is the fault of the bearded people behind those kids. They are laughing at you. Their destinies will be in courts tomorrow, they will cry and raise their hands and ask for forgiveness, but we will not forgive them this time.
Assaulting the constitution, the punishment is execution for anyone who legalized force or any other way the methods that are not allowed to be used by legal law or constitution in change the constitution or the way the governing is. Those people will change the people's authority; they will be punished with execution by law.
Using explosives in committing any of the previous crimes, the punishment is execution for anyone who have used bombs or any other bombing machines. We can see that committing a crime like brining the warehouses is punished with execution.
No please, stop, listen to me, you are all excited. Please stop shooting. Please stop shooting. Let the people listen to what I have to say because it is a very serious speech, it will start from tonight and tomorrow. Anything else rather than those bullets, I still have not ordered shooting. When I issue the order to use force, by then, the power is within your hands. By that time everything will be burnt.
The violation of a military base -similar to what happened in Al Bayda', and what happened in Benghazi- the violation of a military base or to hold in to it without rights is punished

with execution, to anyone who does that.
Using force against the country authorities, the punishment is execution. The acts of vandalism, robbing, and killing are all punished with execution. All of their crimes that they have committed, since that day and until now are all punished with execution in the Libyan law that was applicable before the revolution.
Civil war, the punishment is execution, anyone who commits an action, which aims to provoke a civil war in the country. This action now will lead to a civil war, like what Saif Al-Islam has said yesterday. He told you, we are all armed tribes, and there are not any tribe that governs another one. No one can govern us, not from Derna nor from the Honolulu. We are all armed, and we can rebel like Somalia. Libya then would starts to burn. Do you want this to happen? This will lead to civil war! Unless you hold it together starting from now.
Civil war: punishment is execution, anyone who commits an action, which aims to provoke a civil war in the country or to break the national unity. When they make Derna an Islamic state, Al Bayda' an Islamic state, and Benghazi I do not know, a republic. The national unity will break down, and this is punished with execution. Abusing and playing with the unity of the nations! Oh, Really?
Yeltsin, Yeltsin, the Russian President, the State Duma that is the state parliament. There was a strike in the State Duma, just a strike, they have asked them to get out, and they said: "no, we are striking". They have asked them to get out, get out; they did not. One day, two days, three front of the world, they are negotiating with them to get out, and they said we are not getting out. They brought the tanks, it was broadcast in the television, Yeltsin, and they demolished the State Duma while the members of parliaments are still inside. They ran over them with tanks, until they got out like rats. The west did not object to it. On the contrary, they said you are doing a legal action. Strike is considered a rebellious act in the country. It was not armed, members of the parliament with no weapons, just striking.
Students in Beijing, striking in Tiananmen Square, they stayed for few days. They have raised the Kitty Cola logo, demanding to be like America. After that, Deng came and brought the tanks for them. The tanks dragging the students in the Square, those who were in front of the tanks have died, until the tanks came from the other side. Those who were alive went away and some were alive but mortified, and whoever died, died. He told them "The unity of China is more precious than the people in that Square".
"The unity of the Russian Federation, its dignity, its law, the respect of its constitution, and solving

tits problems in the right methods, he told them, is more important that the bunch of the members of parliament. "Hit them with the tanks, and the West told him "Yes, you are right."

The Branch Davidians in America -they are children and women and they also have other obsessed people who were called the Branch Davidians- are a radical religious sect who made a strike in a big warehouse inside America. They tried with them, they tried but it was useless. Clinton brought tanks and poison gas, and he destroyed them.

The school that made a strike in Russia, they brought poison gas and killed them all.

Al-Zarqawi, they said he went with his gang, they consider him with Bin Laden, and he went to Fallujah. America erased Fallujah by aviation totally. They hit mosques, why? They said we are fighting terrorism, and they said this is not a mosque, it is a headquarter for terrorists. We are trying to locate Al-Zarqawi and his gang they are hiding in this city, which is called Fallujah. Therefore, we have to destroy it, they have searched it house by house by bombs, by aviation, and they have destroyed it. America cannot object to anyone like the one in Derna when you destroy it, because the Americans themselves did the same thing. Baghdad was completely destroyed, so many civilians have died, families died. Celebration occasions was hit, and they said we thought it was an enemy gathering. A building they said there is a terrorist inside it they destroy all of it. A shop they destroyed, they said we thought there are terrorists sneaked inside the shop. They killed everyone who were in the shop. One million, two millions, three millions have died in Baghdad by the American planes, just because they said we want to destroy terrorism. We want to destroy the Baath party as they said, we want to destroy Al-Qaida, and therefore we are free to use whatever force is needed.

Gaza, the Israelis took it over and no one condemned them, the Americans are still defending them until now. They have said the Israel's have the right, they have the right, its self-defence, they have to surround it by land and sea and air and have to bomb it, tanks all over the streets of Gaza and kills whoever it wants.

You see what is going on in Somalia; do you want your country to be like Somalia? Like Iraq? The same group that sabotaged those countries are now in Libya. They want to make Libya like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Derna becomes like Fallujah, Bayda' becomes like Fallujah, or Benghazi becomes like Fallujah. The same gang because they are the same group. We start from tonight and tomorrow, the youth all the youth, not the rats, the sick ones who are taking the pills, who took them from you. All the youth starting from tomorrow will form people local security committees. Now and from tonight, they start to sew a green logo and has a writing on it that says

the people local security committee. We secure all the Libyan cities, until the organization of security is back to order. Because we have told the security officers do not fight them, they said "since we are not fighting we want to go home". We have told them to go home, they said "they have come to attack us with bullets, they will kill us.", so we told them no, no do not fight them. They have said since we are not fighting them, then we want to go home. This is until security officers are back again and they take their weapons and impose security in the streets. Now free officers are distributed to their tribes, thank god each tribe has their own free office in Libya that are securing their tribes. They are not America's agents, Bin Laden's agents or Al-Zarqawi's followers, those people with lice.

Your children, starting from tomorrow, the youth and not the youth that we said they bought them and took them. Those, we are over with; we will see what their parents do with them. If they treated it, their parents, and handed them over we will train them, cure them from the pills they took and they might be good youth. However, if they remain like this, every time raiding a place, no! This... hehehe, you will see how this will end! All the women who have boys get out quickly, those who have brothers, get out quickly, and those who have a relative or her lover, get out quickly. The Men, who have boys, get out quickly, mothers, sisters and girls all of you get out to the streets. Get out to the streets quickly and control the streets. I lead the people's revolution. We want the Libyan people to control Libya from its west to its east. I am at the top of the people's revolution, we will show them how people's revolution is, it is the awareness, constructive work, control of security, security, respect, people's authority, people's authority and people congress and committees. Show them how people's authority can be, show them how people's revolution can be, get out of your house starting from now. Starting from tomorrow, the youth should participate also in the revolution defence committees. The revolution that means all the earnings, the finical and spiritual one. It means the glory, the pride, it means Mummar Algaddafi, and it means the history of the grandparents and martyrs. Starting from tomorrow, all the youth should carry a logo of the revolution defence committees in all the Libyan cities, the Libyan village and the Libyan oases. Tomorrow form the committees, and those logos were them all on your arms. The committees that defend your earnings, the earnings mean to defend the oil, to defend the Great-Man Made River, to defend the huge accommodation investment that costs seventy-one billion dollar and would house about three millions Libyan, the airports, the ports, the roads, the bridges and the finical earnings. Starting from tomorrow, committees will be formed from the youth, committees to defend the revolution earnings. Committees to defend the revolution, committees to defend the people local

security, committees to defend the social values and ethics. This committee will be formed from people who memorised the Quran and they are about one million individual, people who memorised the Quran in Libya, and the mosques imams the pure ones. They know the Sunnah, they know the principles, they know the true Salafiya, and not just kill and kill. Whoever killed an innocent soul it is as if he killed the entire human race. Tomorrow we will form committees to defend social values and ethics, to protect the streets. The girl is walking, the woman is walking, even if she is not wearing a headscarf, no one bothers her and no one kidnaps her like what is going on now. Kidnapping now, it is all over now. Violating houses in all the cities, those gangs are in. people are living in hell. It is not a military that you can fight them with tanks and aviation; otherwise, we could have used our planes, tanks and artilleries. It is not even people, a battlefront from the battlefronts. No, not at all, rats! Catch them from tonight; start with them until you catch them.

I think -starting from tomorrow- there will be a new management in the state of the masses, a new state of masses, new districts, new municipalities, and a new real people's authority. In regards to the constitution, and whatever is related to journalism, civil society organizations, etc., Saif Al-Islam has talked to you about it. These things are related to Saif Al-Islam, everything such as lawyers, judges, bloggers, writers, journalists and the youth, all of these issues are related to Saif Al-Islam and to those groups. They can talk about it with lawyers as well as with the people who are talking about the constitution. I do not mind if Libyans wants a constitution, main law, a reference or any law system. We want the law to prevail, we wish if there is law in Libya. We want the law to prevail. The people's authority makes the law, which is respected by everyone. Because I -Mummar Algaddafi-do not have a palace, money, not even my future. I have spent my life for the revolution and I do not want anything. I want everything for Libya. I want it to live in security, glory and prosperity. Protecting its oil, its Great Man Made River, its great accommodation investment, its ports and the airports, and to be purify it from those who are burning the cities now. Hurry up! Be brave! You are more than they are, you are millions, you are millions and they are just one hundred persons. Catch them in the streets, open the airports, open the ports, bring back the people's authority and bring back the security. Here they are, the free officers, are distributed near you. Securities are distributed and the people armed units are ready. You can decide to distribute the wealth all over again. I still insist that the Libyan petroleum must be for Libyans. You do not trust the people's committees any more, that is it then, take the oil with your own hands and do what you want with it, so that no one says, you took my share. Everyone takes his share and it is up to whether you want to make a tree of it, it is up to you. You want to donate

it; it is up to you. The important thing is that you have taken your share, and that you do whatever you want with it. I think that Saif Al-Islam will take care of the ambassadors and journalists, and then they will be able to publish all facts about Libya. Because the world abroad cannot see anything about Libya except through the dirty channels of our dear brothers who betrayed us. Whom have betrayed us instead of covering the truth, they fraud facts and publish pictures that was taken years ago. The great state of masses Libyan radio is the only one, which the whole world should follow, because it will respond to everything. It will listen to what dirty radios are saying and respond back to it. Watch how the Libyan radio will respond to what you see from these dirty radios. Airports have been suspended, ports have been suspended, life has been suspended, fuel has been suspended, phones have been suspended and radios have been suspended. People are scared. Once, a person terrorized Washington, a very dangerous terrorist. They could not catch him but after a while. He was attacking a school burns it, and kills people inside it and disappears He then goes to another school and disappears. Schools are terrified, and students in America did not go to schools. Oh why? They said when we go they say there was assault on a school. He was one person and schools were stopped. He goes to the shops, and shot a gun, and then he escapes to another shop. They said that all shops are on a terrorist attack. The streets are similar too, this has just happened now. America was so sick from that criminal in Washington. Therefore, they recruited everything they have until they found him. They found one person who have terrified them. And you, bunch of people that we can count on one hand's fingers are terrifying Benghazi? The peaceful demonstrations, which the world is talking about, is a different thing. We go out in a peaceful demonstration for Gazza, a peaceful demonstration for Iraq. However, if there is a Libyan problem, we do not go to the street, but to the people's congress or to the people's committees to solve the problems. It has the money, it has the decisions, it has the signatures and it has the administration. We do not go to the street. The Libyan problem is with the people, with the congress and the committees. We launch a peaceful demonstration for another case. No one will prevent a peaceful demonstration and shoot at it with guns, it is Impossible as long as it is peaceful and it is marching from one street to another.

I myself led many peaceful demonstrations in the last destroyed era, but I did not burn anything. I did not break anything, nothing. The police were on my right and on my left when we were walking down the street and in the squares, speaking until we get tired, and post telegraphs then we go back. We supported Gamal Abdel Nasser; we supported the Arab Unity, the Algerian revolution, and against exploding bombs in Algeria. The peaceful demonstrations are one thing, but the armed rebellion and dividing parts of the homeland is another. The world needs to understand that peaceful demonstrations

are one thing, which is considered a legal act in countries who needs to. The Libyan people do not need demonstrations, because their problems can be solved by the people's authority. However, even the peaceful demonstrations- if it is in Libya- is one thing, and the armed rebellion that is happening right now and the attempts to separate Demma, to separate Al Bayda' or to separate Benghazi is another thing.

Who would allow it? The rebellion that happened in the parliament without any weapons, was hit by Yeltsin, by tanks and the west applaud for him. The Branch Davidians rebelled in America, they demonstrated without weapons; and Clinton hit them by tanks. The armed rebellion in Fallujah, they considered it a rebellion although Fallujah is Iraqi and not American. However, they said no! This rebellion follows Al-Zarqawi, and they bombed it with aviation, they broke it into small pieces.

Look at Bagdad, the demolition by cannons and airplanes because there is an armed rebellion. Even the unarmed rebellion such as the Branch Davidians and the Russian State Duma, they were all hit by tanks. When the black people rebelled in California -in America- and attacked stores, Nelson sent the army-by force- and erased them. When the students rebelled in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in China, China has erased the square by tanks. No one would allow his country to be a joke! Or allows an insane person to separate any of its parts. Now in Derna, he told them "women are not allowed to go out, and bring me the donations because I am the Sultan", and every time they bring him someone to kill similar to Al-Zarqawi way. Peaceful demonstrations is one thing and the armed rebellion and cutting off parts of the country is another. The interior demands is one thing, and the conspiracy with exterior countries abroad is another.

We have interior demands and we need a constitution. We need districts, we need municipalities, we need a civil society organizations, it is so very normal. It is peaceful and acceptable. However, the conspiracy with foreign countries in the name of these demands is another thing. We, my brothers know each other. Oh my dear god! How will react to those young people, such as the ones in Zintan? It is shameful to say that the people of Zintan are traitors. Is it possible that Zintan, the grandchildren and sons of the heroes and martyrs of Kardon battle, who stepped on the Italian flag with their barefoot, you are saying that they are traitors? Those are merely rebellious kids from Zintan, like those who rebelled in any another parts in the country. They have rebelled against their families; it is shameful that you distort Zintan. Dear Zintan people, it is shameful that they distort your image, go to your children and catch them one by one. We shall raise them, teach them, educate them, and make them work, to be security guards and technician. However, just like the poet has said about Zintan in a similar

situation; he said "a guy from Zintan insulted a guy from Bani Walid, so he was upset and he wrote

this poem." Then the Zintan people responded to him, and this is similar to the current situation my brothers in Zintan are in, that is why I am telling you this. He said, "A mistake was made by a guy from a preparatory school, he doesn't know the history, nor he is a humanitarian." This means, my brothers in Zintan, do not mind us, this mistake is by young person and not a wise one from Werfalli. He is the one who made a mistake, a young man, and a mistake by a person from a preparatory school, he does not know the history, nor is he a humanitarian. It is true, youth now do not know their history and they do not know the Kardon battle. I know it and appreciate the Zintan people for it, but they have forgotten the glory of their fathers and their grandfathers. It is not on purpose, it is the mistake of the people who eats the "Banani"-hehehe-, which means the new generation who eats banana. Exactly, the people in Zintan are like this, and not the people from Zintan. Have you ever seen a person with a moustache? Have you seen a person with his family? With his salary? With his job? A person with his shop? With his farm? Whit his café? With his restaurant? With animals? Have you seen them participating in this? Never! No one has joined it from Derna, those who are involved are the young people who are from the banani, who have been taken from their parents, who took hallucinations pills. The punishment should not be on those youth, because even the law is not applicable to them since they are less than eighteen years old. The punishment is for those who armed those young people, and fooled them. Those people are the ones who should be arrested and handed in to the justice. Bring them to the court.

If I go to Zintan, they will chant "The Fateh, The Fateh"! They will say, "We will sacrifice all our heads for yours". I am sure that the youth of Zintan have chanted. I went once to Ajdabiya, and the youth of Ajdabiya are crazy about the revolution, and they were chanting, "We will sacrifice all our heads for yours". Ajdabiya, the sons and grandsons of the heroes and martyrs of the famous AlKaraheb battle. They are the guards of Omar Mukhtar. Omar Mukhtar when he came to Ajdabiya they guarded him. Not because he gave them houses or will give them money, but because he is Omar Mukhtar. I, if I go, Ajdabiya will guard me, and if I go to Zintan, Zintan will guard me. Give me a chance. Bring those youth to me, let me talk to them and you will see how they will change. Give me a chance, bring them! Let the Zintan bring their children, or any another place let them bring their children.

I led the revolution of the youth when I was a student. This is our revolution, the people's revolution. I wish that the people's revolution would hand everything to the people. I was the one who said we needed to have radios everywhere, the ones that they have just used now. I was the one who made those broadcastings. Because I want each town to be independent by its own in the state of the masses just like the United States of America and the German states. We know each other by name, my dear

god! We know now that Zintan, they are the sons of Abualil, Alhoul, sons of Eissa, Bin Zwaied and Belqassem. If Hajji Mohammed AlSagheer Alayeb -god's mercy is upon him is- still alive now, this thing would have never happened. If Hajji Mohammed AlSagheer Alayeb were still alive, I would have called him now and told him "Uncle Hajji, take those kids.", and he would have taken them. He was the mediator many times, why there is not anyone like him? Surely there is, but they are scared, poor ones! Zintan people are afraid of their own sons. Okay then, let the police and security forces arrest them, teach them and raise them well and then, they bring them back to you. Now, I also know the Ubaidat, they came to me the day before yesterday-the Ubaidat-, and we were reciting poetry and saying me "I wish I was with the two thousands Ubaidat knights on their horses, among them there was the fighter Posholate.", and the women were trilling. How would they turn against me? It is impossible that they turn against me. Yesterday, they were with me here, and I told them in the radio" broadcast what did Derna's people have said when they came to me, Benghazi's people, Al Bayda', the Ubaidat, AlQubbah, and the whole region." When they all came the day before yesterday in around one week ago. What did they say? Where are they? Where did they go? Let them get out and put their words into action, and to respect what they said. Where are you from? From Al-Ghaith's family, you are from Mariam's family, you are from Arfad, and you are from Amzin. We know each other; look at this boy, what family he belongs to? From Amzin family, Arfad family, Mariam family or Al Gaith family? Oh dear god...

When we come to the Aldrsah tribe, you are from Mohammad's family, Burgol's family, Abdul Aljawad's family, AlSeriry Abu Aweyna's family, Shalman, and Shoaib; we know each other. Who in the world knows each other like we do? Leadership or else or people, we know each other. You are the son of so, and the son of so and so. We started to kill each others? Misrata, Ramadan AlSuchali and Saadoun Al Suehali, the heroes of Al Mashrak battle. Al Mashrak battle martyr. Oh my god... Goz El-Teek battles, all these glorious battles, how do you insult its history? It is impossible! When we come to Zawiya, you belong to Abu Hameera family? You belong to Abu Zoraiba family? To Salab? To Belazi? You are the son of Saqer? You are the Ashraf? You are Zawiya tribe or the tribes in Zawiya? - Zawiya the mother of the tribes- you are from Al Remah? You are from Alkuarglah? We know each other. If we go to Al Hasah and we tell them, you are Khalabtah, Khlbuto, you are Shabariqah, Belqasim?

Now, this is what I have just said, this is what I have just said. Look how your brothers the Arabs have distorted it? One of the Arab channels is saying, "He issued orders to the army and the police to destroy the rebels." Can you imagine this! listen! Would I say such things? I have asked the

people to take their kids and to arrest whoever manipulated their kids. However, in the day when Libya is in danger, its national unity in danger, and Al-Qaida starts to centre in Libya, even the Security Council will support me using the force. Now it is just arresting operations, but now you go out of your houses, all of you, men and women who are with me, secure the cities, secure the oases and the villages, show them their lies, and let them watch you. See, now they have confessed that they are rebels. Before, they used to say that they are demonstrators. There are demonstrations in Libya? All of it are supporting demonstrations; well it is okay since they have admitted that they are just rebels.

What is required is that they hand in the weapons that terrorized the people. Benghazi is dying. dying, terrified from the weapons that are in the hands of children. It will die; it does not have water, food, electricity, or anything else. Go out Benghazi, save, save, Benghazi save yourselves, liberate Abdul Fatah who liberated Benghazi with me the night of the revolution. Talk to him to run the country until the security is back to order and the people's authority is back. Starting from tomorrow, start forming the new districts, new municipalities, new congresses, and new people's committees will be formed tomorrow. He will help you, so free him. Shame on you! Are you a gang? Is it possible? You are Benghazi?

Hand in the weapons immediately and return it to wherever you took it from. Otherwise, it will terrorize the country and cause massacres. Children are obsessed and drunk and they have weapons and machineguns. Hand in prisoners from both the police and the army. Anyone who they have arrested, hand him in immediately. Arrest the rebels and hand them to the security so they can be educated, bring them back to their senses, and they have to go through a recovering period to be completely healed from the pills that they were taking for few days, because it is very harmful to the heart.

To remove all life's obstacles in the streets, the stores must be opened, shops must be opened, airports must be opened, and ports must be opened. Do not destroy your country without a reason, why? What is the reason? What is wrong with you? This is an act of an eye as they say. That is it, I believe in the envious eye, a safe country and an envious eye hits it. We found ourselves in security, prosperity, our petroleum, our water, peace and bliss, and the world is burning around us. Then we go to burn our country? Of course, I am telling you at the end, that there is no one sane person who will allow his country to be ruptured or to be in the hand of maniacs.

Excuse me, they have just told me that the poetry I have just recited about Zintan was in the time when there was a technical failure and they did not hear it. Forgive me; I will have to recite it again

if the transmission is good. I said to you, I said, "a Werfalli person, -sorry- a Werfalli guy insulted a Zintan guy. The Zintan guy was upset and he was sad at all Werfalli, and told them I will not come to you, and that we are no longer friends, and he will not come to Bni Waleed. He was sad and he said that in a poem." Werfalli answered him back in a poem and said, "A mistake was made by a guy from a preparatory school, he doesn't know the history, nor he is a humanitarian." The meaning is that they told him he is a boy from preparatory school, does not know the history nor the Kardon battle. Just like I said now that the youth now do not know their families and grandparents, they do not know Kardon battle, or the late Mohammad Al Sagir Al Ayeb who used to solve the problems in Zintan, and we were relying on him. They said to him "never mind our son". Even us we should not mind the Zintan either. I do not mind Al Zintan they are heroes. They told him "it is a mistake by a guy from preparatory school; he doesn't know the history nor is he a humanitarian. It was not on purpose, and it is not our fault. A reckless young guy from banana agency." He said he is a reckless young guy from those who eat banani, which is a banana. The people said to me that people in Zintan did not hear the poem, and we hope that you say it again, and I said it again for them.

Even now the youth in Zintan are reckless, but bring them to me, I wish that they just bring them to me. All those youth, I want them and I want the rebellious youth. I have called them the generation of anger. Is it possible that AlFateh youth would leave the glory and sacrifice it and burn the state of masses? The state of the masses! For the sake of people with lice and dirty followers of foreign intelligence agents and dervishes! Who can believe that? Impossible, it is impossible that our youth would be led by someone else. If they did not follow Mummar Algaddafi they will follow one of those people with lice and beards? -Hehehe- It is not possible. Those youth are with us, they are our young people, the generation of anger that I have raised myself, and they chant everywhere and say, "We are the generation that Muammar build, and we shall destroy anyone who becomes our enemy".

Finally, gentlemen, if these things were not achieved, handing in weapons, handing in prisoners, handing the rebels, arresting the ones who manipulated our children, removing everything. And restoring the normal life to ports, airports, roads, bakeries, water, supplies, transportations and communications, life goes back to blessing, families live in safety, our children live in safety and they go to the streets, coffee shops, clubs, and restaurants. If this was not achieved, and we see that the unity of Libya is in danger or that force of anti-democratic and against freedom, that deforms Islam-especially Al-Qaida-, if we see that this will be achieved, we will stop it from happening.

Then we will tell you, the marching will be announced. The holy march will be announced; similar to the one thousand mile march, which was led by Mao Tse Tung, freed China until today, and made it a state that owns the hydrogen bomb.

Oh yea, I will lead the march. Imagine this march and where will it come from, you know it! Then we are have to purify the cities, purify the streets, purify the houses, and purify everything. Whoever surrender himself and acknowledges his guilt, among those who manipulated the youth. As for our youth, they will regret. Those youth, let them surrender themselves and not to worry. We will cure them; first, we will cure them from those pills for their health because they were taking pills every day. However, their mothers should bring them, and allow us to bring them. If the men are afraid from the gangs, women and girls should bring their brothers and children and bring them home. We will train and educate them, we are their family. We rehabilitate them for the good work and the valid services, and they will bring incomes and salaries and secure the country. Is it possible that our youth are destroying the country? Never, those are not our youth. It is those people behind them, the youth who are doing so are given pills, and they are not doing so willingly. Allah Akbar! (Dear God Almighty) If this is not achieved, I will then announce the march; I will announce the holy march. Yeah! I am Mummar Algaddafi a nationalist leader, and millions are defending me. I will call out for the millions from desert to desert, and we will march the millions and I to purify Libya, span by span, house by house, room by room, alley by alley, person by person, until the country is purified from villains and the impure people. We cannot allow Libya to slip away from our hands without justification. In the wrongdoings. Who can allow this? Millions are with me, and God is with me who helped me win over the great powers. Millions are with me -not from the inside- but from other nations. I can appeal to all the millions in the deserts. From desert to desert millions will march, millions march, no one can stop them. Save yourselves, quickly! Before we give the signal for the holy march. Tonight, it is a peaceful march -from inside- inside the cities, inside the villages, and inside the oases. To save our children and to catch those who manipulated our children. This night you do it and tomorrow, you will go out in the streets. After that, if it was not like it, there will be a march from inside; you know where this march will come from. After that, there will be a nationalized march, which will be led by me, because Libya concerns all the nations, Libya is an international refuge. I am staying here; do not let them lie to you! I go to Venezuela? Oh really? Would I leave the body of the martyr Abdulsalam Bu Meniar, the first martyr who died in Al Khums in 1911, and go to Venezuela? Oh really? It will shame me in the history! I leave the fighter Mohammad Abdulsalam Bu Meniar and his grave

in AlHani, and the fighter Al Shaik Al Saadi Bu Meniar and his grave in Munedr, oh really! And I go? Do you believe that? This is the first thing; this is their lie. Listen, they have just said to you yesterday that Algaddafi is in Venezuela, and here I am. These Arab media, are the biggest enemy, they are gloating over you. They want you to destroy the oil, to destroy the freedom, to destroy the people's authority, and to destroy Libya. By then Libya will not be a global fort. They are envious of you, which is why they are distorting you. God bless you our brothers in Qatar. God bless you our brothers in Qatar. Is that it? Is the water and salt between you and us? Is this the blood and the brotherhood between you and us? You falsify everything about us. Instead of supporting us, you are against us! For whose sake? For God sake, for whom? You may regret this in a day when remorse will be useless. Whoever lives in a glasshouse should not stone people, who are you? The work time has started, the march time has started, the victory hour has rang, and there is no going backward, go forward, go forward! Revolution! Revolution!

Appendix B

Tables of the Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's, Mubarak's, and al Qaddafi's Speeches

Table (A): Identification of Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 1.

Nomination	Positive Construction of the Self		Negative Construction of the Other	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	**- نقدر** الشعور، **نأسف لما خلفته تلك الاحداث ، نبذل كل الجهود، التأكيد على احترام حرية الرأي والتعبير، مواصلين** سياستنا و برامجنا، **حرصنا الدائم، تكريس الحوار** مبدأً وأسلوباً، **احترام حرية الرأي** والتعبير **والحرص على ترسيخها، دولة القانون** / و **سيطبق القانون** على هؤلاء بكل حزم/ **ونحترم** أي موقفٍ اذا ما تم في إطار **الالتزام بالقانون** وبقواعد الحوار وأخلاقياته	We **appreciate** the feeling, we **regret** what those events have left , **we are making all efforts**, emphasizing **respect for freedom of opinion and expression**, continuing our policy and programs, our **constant keenness**, **dedicating dialogue** as a principle and method, **respecting freedom of opinion and expression and keen to consolidate it**, **the rule of law** / and the **law will be applied to these with all firmness**/ and we **respect** any situation if it is done within the framework of compliance with the law and the rules of **dialogue and its ethics**	**يعطي صورة مشوهه** عن بلادنا **تعوق إقبال** المستثمرين والسواح، **أعمال شغب،** بعض التلفزات الأجنبية التي تبث **الأكاذيب** و **المغالطات،** بسبب **الاستغلال السياسي** لبعض الاطراف الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم، **التهويل** و **التحريض** و **التجني** الأعلامي،	It gives a **distorted image** of our country that **hinders the turnout** of investors and tourists, **riots**, broadcast **lies and deception, having been exploited politically** by some parties that do not want benefaction to their country, using **alarmism, incitement, and media false accusation**
Predication	من أجل بناء شعب **مثقف/** شعب **متعلم،** وقد حققنا **نتائج مرموقة** في مجال التعليم كميا ونوعيا، التطور **الكبير** لعدد خريجي مووسسات التعليم العالي، أن الدولة **ساهرة** على ايجاد الحلول لتلبية طلبات الشغل	In order to build a **cultured people/ educated people**, we have achieved **prestigious** results in the field of Education quantitatively and qualitatively, the **great** development of the number of graduates of higher education institutions, that the state is **vigilant** in finding solutions to meet job demands	لجوء **أقليةٍ من المتطرفين و المحرضين المأجورين** ضد مصالح بلادهم ، مما يؤدي به إلى **الحلول اليائسة** ليلفت النظر الى وضعيته، هو مظهر **سلبي وغير حضاري** يعطي صورة **مشوهه** عن بلادنا تعوق إقبال المستثمرين والسواح، الحلول **اليائسة، مآرب**	The resort of a **minority** of **extremists and paid agitators** against the interests of their country, which leads him **to desperate solutions** to draw attention to his situation, is a **negative and uncivilized** manifestation that gives a **distorted** image of our country that hinders the turnout of investors and tourists, **desperate**

			سياسوية على حساب مصالح المجموعة الوطنية	**solutions**, **political goals** at the expense of the interests of the national group
Intensification/ Mitigation	لقد تابعت **بانشغال**	I followed **with concern**	أن ما انخذته **من أبعاد مبالغٍ فيه**، كان منطلق هذه الاحداث **حالة اجتماعية** نتفهم ظروفها و عواملها النفسية، مما يؤدي به إلى **الحلول اليائسة ليلفت النظر** الى وضعيته، لجوء **أقليةٍ** من المتطرفين و المحرضين المأجورين ضد مصالح بلادهم	The exaggerated dimensions, the premise of these events was a **social situation** whose circumstances and psychological factors we understand, which leads him to **desperate solutions** to **draw attention** to his situation, resorting to a **minority of extremists and paid provocateurs** against the interests of their country

Table (B): Identification of Discursive Strategies in Ben Ali's Speech 2.

Nomination	Positive Construction of the Self		Negative Construction of the Other	
	Examples in Arabic	Examples in English	Examples in Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	**بالغ أسفنا/ تعاطف/ صادقين الحب/** حدثا **أسفنا** له جميعا وحالة يأس **نتفهمها/نجدد تعاطفنا** مع أسر المتوفين/ **نشاركهم** ألمهم وحزنهم **نواسيهم/** والجميع يعلم كم **نبذل** من جهود للتشغيل/ **نعتز** بأعدادهم المتكاثرة **ونعمل** على رفع التحدي/ واقع **ندعمه** في كل مرحلة **ولن نتراجع** عنه / **حاملي الشهادات / أخذت العدالة** مجراها / **ما تحقق لها (تونس) من تقدم و نماء /مجابهة التحديات و صعابها/ تونس**	**Our deepest regret/ sympathy/ sincere love**/ an event **we all regretted** and a state of despair **we understand/ we renew our sympathy** with the families of the deceased/ **we share their pain and grief, we comfort them**/ everyone knows **how much effort we mak**e for employment/ **we cherish** their multiplying numbers and **we work to raise the challenge**/ a reality **we support** at every stage and **we will not back down/**	**النيل** من مصالح البلاد أو **يغرر** بشبابنا و بأبنائنا وبناتنا / و **يدفع بهم إلى الشغب و الفوضى/ أحداث شغب و تشويش و إضرار** بالممتلكات العمومية والخاصة/ **الاعتداء/ عصابات** ملثمة/ **توريط أبناءنا/ الشغب و الخروج الى الشوارع/ شعارات اليأس** الكاذبة **وافتعال الاخبار الزائفة/ حالة يأس فردية/ قلة / حالة يأس من المناوئين/** هؤلاء **المشاغبين** و**المفسدين/** مخاطر **توظيفهم واستغلالهم/ يغيظهم** نجاح تونس/ **ويسوؤهم ويحير** نفوسهم/ ولم يبق	**Undermining** the interests of the country or **deceive** our youth and our sons and daughters / and **push them into riots and chaos** / **riots, confusion and damage** to public and private property / **assault** / **masked gangs** / **implicating** our sons / **rioting and taking to the streets** / **false slogans of despair and fabricating false news / A state of despair** / an

		Certificate holders / **Justice served**/ What Tunisia has achieved in terms of **progress and development**/ **Confronting challenges and their difficulties / Tunisia**	للمغالطين غير **ركوب الحالات اليائسة وخدمة أهداف الأطراف** الحاقدة **والالتجاء إلى الفضائيات المعادية**.	individual **state of despair** / a **few opponents** / these **rioters and spoilers** / the **dangers of hiring and exploiting them** / being **enraged** by the success of Tunisia / **offending and perplexing** their souls / and there is nothing left for the **deceivers but to ride the desperate situations and serve the goals of the malevolent parties** and **resort to hostile satellite channels**.
Predication	بلد **حريص/ شعب مثقف/** كم هي **كبيرة** عنايتنا/ نعتز بأعدادهم **المتكاثرة/** لتحقيق تنمية **متكافئة متوازنة/** لأن عزة تونس و مناعتها أمانة **مقدسة** /	A caring country/ educated people / How great is our care/ We are proud of their multiplying numbers/ To achieve equal and balanced development / Because Tunisia's pride and immunity is a sacred trust /	**المغالطون**/ حالة يأس **فردية**/ المجموعات **المتطرفة**/ **شعب جاهل**/ ولم يبق للمغالطين غير ركوب الحالات **اليائسة** وخدمة أهداف الأطراف **الحاقدة** والالتجاء إلى الفضائيات **المعادية**/ أحداث **عنيفة دامية** / عصابات **ملثمة**/ عمل **أرهابي**/ شعارات اليأس **الكاذبة**/	Fallacies/ Individual Desperate case/ Extremist Groups/ Ignorant People/ There is nothing left for the deceivers but to ride desperate situations and serve the goals of the malevolent parties and resort to hostile satellite channels / violent and bloody events / masked gangs / terrorist act / false slogans of despair /
Intensification/ Mitigation	العائلات **المعوزة**/	Needy families	المجموعات المتطرفة/ توريط أبناءنا/ أبعاد مبالغٍ فيها/ حالة يأس فردية / حالة اجتماعية نتفهم ظروفها و عواملها النفسية	Extremist groups/ implicating our children/Exaggerated dimensions / individual desperate case/ social condition whose circumstances

				and psychological factors we understand

Table (C): Identification of discursive strategies in Ben Ali's speech 3

Nomination	Positive Construction of the Self		Negative Construction of the Other	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	**لغة كل التونسيين والتونسيات** **عادات التونسي** **تكاتف جهود الجميع** **اليد في اليد من اجل بلادنا** **اليد في اليد من أجل امان كل ولادنا** **استجابة لمطالبكم** **حزني و ألمي كبيران** **خدمة تونس/خدمة البلاد** **قدمت التضحيات** **قطرة دم/دماء التونسيين** **تألمنا لسقوط ضحايا** **اسفي كبير** **تألمنا** لما حدث **شديد الالم** انا فهمتكم/ فهمت الكل/ فهمتكم فهمتكم انصاف ونزاهة و موضوعية	The language of all Tunisians/ Tunisian customs/ Combined efforts of all/ Hand in hand for our country/ Hand in hand for the safety of all our children/ In response to your demands/ My grief and pain are great/ Serving Tunisia/ Serving the country/ Sacrifices were made/ A drop of blood / the blood of the Tunisians/ We agonized over the casualties/ I'm so sorry/ We were deeply saddened by what happened/ I understood everyone / I understood you/ Fairness, integrity and objectivity	التخريب /العنف /العنف و النهب/ **اولادنا اليوم في الدار وموش في المدرسة/ عنف مجموعات سطو ونهب/ اعتداء على الاشخاص/ هذا اجرام/ العصابات و المجموعات من لمنحرفين/** عيب و حرام	Vandalism / Violence / Violence and looting / Our children today are at home and not at school / Violence by groups of robbery and looting / Assault on people / crime / Gangs and groups of perverts / Shameful and forbidden

Predication	التونسي **المتحضر/** التونسي **المتسامح/** التظاهر **السلمي**/ التظاهر **السلمي و المؤطر والمنظم** / التظاهر **الحضاري**/ تظاهرة **سلمية/** الايادي **الأمينة** شخصية **وطنية مستقلة** الاحداث **اللي جارية اليوم ما هيش متاعنا**	the **civilized** Tunisian / the **tolerant** Tunisian / **peaceful** demonstration / **peaceful, framed and organized** demonstration / **civilized** demonstration / **peaceful** demonstration / **safe** hands/**independent national** figure/ The events **taking place today are not ours**		
Intensification/ Mitigation	أنا فهمتكم فهمت الجميع/فهمتكم فهمتكم فهمت الكل نكلمكم اليوم ونكلمكم لكل/نكلمكم لغة التونسيين /نكلمكم لأن الوضع يفرض تغيير/الوضع يفرض تغيير تغيير عميق وشامل/انا فهمتكم فهمت الكل /فهمتكم فهمتكم الكل/وقلتلكم أنا فهمتكم اليد في اليد من أجل بلادنا/ اليد في اليد من أجل أمان اولادنا المواطنين كل المواطنين تغيير عميق تغيير عميق وشامل /**تألمنا** لما حدث **شديد الالم** /أطلب من اللجنة المستقلة، أكرر المستقلة/وباش تكون هذه اللجنة مستقلة نعم باش تكون مستقلة/التظاهر السلمي التظاهر السلمي و المؤطر /نعمل على دعم الديموقراطية وتفعيل التعددية نعم على دعم الديموقراطية وتفعيل التعددية لا رئاسة مدى الحياة لا رئاسة مدى الحياة ترميم جراحها	Ben Ali repeated some phrases and even whole sentences as a tool of intensification. “I understood you” is repeated five times “I talk to you” is repeated five times “hand in hand” is repeated two times “deep and comprehensive change” is repeated four times “independent committee” is repeated four times “no presidency for life” is repeated two times The metaphor “heal its wounds” is used for intensification.		

Table (D): Identification of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 1

Strategy	Positive Construction of the Self		Negative Construction of the Other	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	وكان ذلك واضحا في تعامل قوات الشرطة مع شبابنا فقد بادرت الى **حمايتهم** في بداياتها **احتراما لحقهم** في التظاهر السلمي/ المساحات العريضة لحرية الرأي والتعبير والصحافة/ **خطوات الاصلاح / تفاعل غير سبوق بين قوى المجتمع/ يتحمل مسؤولية هذا الوطن و امضى حياته من أجله/ اجتزنا** معا من قبل أوقاتا صعبة **تغلبنا** عليها **واجهناها** كأمة واحدة/ **سنمضي** عليه بخطوات جديدة/ **نحافظ** على ما **حققناه ونبني عليه ونرعى** في عقولنا **و** ضمائرنا مستقبل الوطن	This was evident in the police forces' dealings with our youth, as they took the initiative to **protect them** in the beginning, out of respect **for their right to peaceful demonstration**/ **The wide spaces for freedom of opinion, expression and the press**/ **steps of reform**/ An **unprecedented interaction between the forces of society**/ He **bears the responsibility** of this country and **spent his life for it** / **We passed together before** difficult times that **we overcame and faced as one nation** / We will **move towards** it with new steps / **We preserve what we have achieved and build on it and nurture** in our minds and consciences the future of the homeland	محاولات البعض **لأعتلاء موجة** تلك التظاهرات و **المتاجرة بشعاراتها/** قبل أن تتحول هذه التظاهرات **لأعمال شغب تهدد النظام العام و تعيق الحياة اليومية** للمواطنين	Attempts by some **to rise up the wave** of these demonstrations and **trade its slogans**/ Before these demonstrations turn into **riots that threaten public order and impede the daily life** of citizens
Predication	مجتمع مصري **حرو ديموقراطي**/ الحفاظ على مصر **مستقرة وامنه**/ شعب **متحضر** وقفة **جادة وصادقة**/ **ضحايا ابرياء** من المتظاهرين وقوات الشرطة/ التظاهر **السلمي**/ المساحات **العريضة** لحرية الرأي/ تفاعل **غير مسبوق**/ التطلعات **المشروعة**	**A free and democratic** Egyptian society/ preserving a **stable and secure** Egypt/ **civilized** people/ **Serious and honest** stance/i**nnocent** victims of demonstrators and police forces/ **Peaceful** demonstration/ **Wide s**paces for freedom of opinion/ **Unprecedented**	منزلقات خطيرة	**Dangerous** Slips

		interaction/ **Legitimate** aspirations		
Intensification/ Mitigation	واسفت كل الاسف **انحاز كل الانحياز**لحرية المواطنين	I am **so sorry** I **sided completely** to the freedom of citizens		

Table (E): Identification of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 2

Strategy	Positive Construction of the Other		Negative Construction of the Self	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	يوجع قلوبنا/ الأغلبية الكاسة من المصريين/ الاستقرار / الحكمة والحرص على مصالح مصر وابنائها/ الحوار/ للأصلاح السياسي و الديموقراطي/ استعادة الهدوء و الأمن والاستقرار/ دعوتي للحوار/ تحملت المسؤولية /ما قدمته للوطن حربا وسلاما/ انني رجل من ابناء قواتنا المسلحة/ مسؤوليتي الأولى استعادة أمن واستقرار الوطن/ الانتقال السلمي للسلطة/ أقول بكل الصدق/ خدمة مصر و شعبها/ الالتزام بكلمة القضاء ووأحكامه/ سوف أوالي متابعة تنفيذ الحكومة الجديدة / إتاحة فرص العمل مكافحة الفقر و تحقيق العدالة الأجتماعية/ حماية المواطنين بنزاهة و شرف و أمانة/ الأحترام الكامل لحقوقهم و حرياتهم و كرامتهم/ عهدي للشعب/ الوفاء/ عطائي لمصر وشعبها/ أكثر ثقة و تماسكاً و استقراراً/ عشت/حاربت من أجله/ و دافعت عن أرضه/ وعلى أرضه أموت	It hurts our hearts/ the vast majority of Egyptians/ stability/wisdom and concern for the interests of Egypt and its people/ dialogue/ for political and democratic reform/ restoring calm, security and stability/my call for dialogue/ I took responsibility/ what I offered to the homeland in war and peace/ I am a man from our armed forces/ My first responsibility is restoring the security and stability of the homeland/ Peaceful transfer of power/ I say with all sincerity/ Serving Egypt and its people/ Commitment to the word of the judiciary and its rulings/ I will follow up on the implementation of the new government/	أوقات صعبة تمتحن مصر/تنجرف بها/ المجهول/ احداث عصيبة/ اختبارات قاسية/ سرعان ما استغلهم من سعي لأشاعة الفوضى اللجوء الى العنف والمواجهة/ للقفز على الشرعية الدستورية و الانقضاض عليها/ تحركها وتهيمن عليها/ التصعيد وصب الزيت على النار/ أعمال اثارة و تحريض وسلب ونهب و اشعال حرائق وقطع للطرقات و اعتداء على مرافق الدولة والممتلكات العامة والخاصة و اقتحام لبعض البعثات الدبلوماسية/ الخوف /انزعاج وقلق و هواجس/ الفوضى رفض الدعوة للحوار/ تمساً بأجنداتهم الخاصة/ دون مراعاة للظرف الدقيق الراهن لمصر و شعبها/ الرفض لدعوتي للحوار/ انفلات أمني/ أعمال السلب والنهب و اشعال النيران و ترويع الآمنين/ الفاسدين/	Difficult times test Egypt/ drift into/ the unknown/ difficult events/ harsh tests/ soon exploited by those who seek to spread chaos/ Resorting to violence and confrontation/ to jump on constitutional legitimacy and attack it / move and dominate it / escalation and pouring fuel on the fire/ acts of provocation, incitement, looting, setting fires, blocking roads, assaulting state facilities and public and private property, storming some diplomatic missions / fear / Discomfort, anxiety and obsessions / chaos/ Rejecting the call for

		Provide job opportunities, combat poverty and achieve social justice/ Protect citizens With integrity, honor and honesty / full respect for their rights, freedoms and dignity/ my promise to the people / loyality / my giving to Egypt and its people / more confidence, cohesion and stability / I lived / fought for it / and defended its land / and on its land I will die	المتسببين فيما شهدته مصر/ الاختيار بين الفوضى و الاستقرار	dialogue / sticking on their own agendas / without taking into account the current delicate circumstance of Egypt and its people / rejecting my call for dialogue / lawlessness / acts of looting, setting fires and intimidating the safe / corrupt / those responsible for what Egypt witnessed / the choice between chaos and stability
Predication	حكومة **جديدة**/ تكليفات **جديدة** مطالب **مشروعة**/ لكنني الآن **حريص** كل الحرص/ مصر **عزيزة آمنه مستقرة**/ أقول بعبارات **واضحة**/ الانتقال **السلمي** للسلطة/ المطالب **المشروعة**/ مصر **العريقة هي الخالدة أبداً**	**new** government / **new** assignments/ **Legitimate** demands/ But now I am very **keen**/ Egypt is **dear, safe, and stable**/ I say in **clear** terms/ **Peaceful** transfer of power/ **Legitimate** demands/ **Ancient** Egypt is **everlasting**	مواجهات **مؤسفة**/ أيام **مؤلمة**/ ظروف **جديدة**/ و واقعا **مصريا** م**غايرا**/ احداث **عصيبة**/ اختبارات **قاسية**	**Unfortunate** confrontations/ **painful** days/ **new** conditions/ a **different Egyptian** reality/ **difficult** events/ **harsh** tests
Intensification/ Mitigation			أوقات صعبة/ أحداث عصيبة اختبارات قاسية/ أياماً مؤلمة الظرف الدقيق الراهن لمصر و شعبها/ الظرف الراهن/ ستخرج مصر من الظروف الراهنة/ خوف/ انزعاج و قلق و هواجس	Difficult times/ stressful events/ tough tests/painful days/ the current delicate circumstance for Egypt and its people/ the current circumstance/ will Egypt get out of the current circumstances/ fear/ disturbance, anxiety and obsessions

Table (F): Identification of Discursive Strategies in Mubarak's Speech 3

Strategy	Positive Construction of the Other		Negative Construction of the Self	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	**حديث من القلب/حديث الأب لأبنائه** **التغيير إلى الأفضل/ دماء شهدائكم وجرحاكم/ بكل الشدة والحزم** **عقوبات رادعة/ أعتز بكم/ لن أتهاون** **أحكام القانون/ الضحايا الأبرياء** **تألمت كل الألم/ أوجع قلبي/ استجابتي لصوتكم و رسالتكم و مطالبكم/ التزام لا رجعة فيه/ تعهدت به بكل الجدية و الصدق/ صدق و نقاء نواياكم و تحرككم/ الاعتراف بها وتصحيحها ومحاسبة مرتكبيها/ حماية الدستور و مصالح الشعب/ ضمانات الحرية و النزاهة/ بر الأمان/ رؤية محددة للخروج من الأزمة الراهنة/ يحترم الشرعية الدستورية و لا يقوضها** **على نحو يحقق استقرار مجتمعنا و مطالب أبنائه/ حوار مسؤول/ الخروج بالوطن من هذه الأوقات/ أتابع المضي/ متطلعا لدعم و مساندة كل حريص على مصر/ ننجح في تحويلها لواقع ملموس/ الدعوة الى التغيير/**	A talk from the heart/ a father's talk to his children Change for the better/ the blood of your martyrs and your wounded/ with all severity and firmness Deterrent penalties/ I am proud of you/ I will not be complacent/ Provisions of law/ innocent victims I suffered all the pain/ My heart ached/ My response to your voice, your message, and your demands/ Irreversible commitment/ I pledged it with all seriousness and honesty/ The sincerity and purity of your intentions and action/ Recognition and rectification and accountability of the perpetrators/ Protection of the constitution and the interests of the people/ Guarantees of freedom and integrity/ Safety / a specific vision to get out of the current crisis / respects constitutional legitimacy and does not undermine it In a way that achieves the stability of our society and the demands of its people/ responsible dialogue/ getting out of the homeland from these	**الاخطاء** واردة في أي نظام سياسي/ **الحرج كل الحرج/العيب كل العيب** **املاءات أجنبية/ ذرائع/مبررات** هذه **الأوقات العصيبة/ أحداث مأساويه/ أوقات صعبة/ أضرار و خسائر/ الذين أجرموا/ أوضاع يصبح معها الشباب الذين دعوا إلى التغيير و الأصلاح أول المتضررين منها/ أزمتها الراهنة/ لضغوط أجنبية أو أملاءات/ خطورة المفترق الصعب الحالي/ لحظة فارقة/** لسنا **أتباع** لأحد و لا نأخذ التعليمات من أحد/ أحدا لا يصنع لنا قراراتنا	Mistakes occur in any political system/ the embarrassment/ the shame is the whole shame/ Foreign dictates/ excuses/justifications These difficult times/ tragic events/ difficult times/ damages and losses/those who have committed crimes/ situations in which young people who called for change and reform become the first to be affected by it/ their current crisis/ foreign pressures or dictations /the danger of the current difficult crossroads/ a defining moment/ we are not followers of anyone And we do not take instructions from anyone who does not make our decisions for us

	الطريق الصحيح/خريطة طريق/ الشخصيات المصرية المشهود لها بالاستقلال و التجرد/ فقهاء القانون الدستوري و رجال القضاء/ النائب العام/ شهداء من أبناء مصر/ حماية الوطن من مخاطر الإرهاب و ضمان احترام الحقوق و الحريات المدنية للمواطنين/ استعادة الثقة بين المصريين/ الثقة في اقتصادنا و سمعتنا الدولية/ المصريين جميعا في خندق واحد/ نواصل الحوار بروح الفريق و ليس الفرقاء/ تتجاوز مصر أزمتها/ لنعيد لأقتصادنا الثقة فيه ولمواطنينا الاطمنان و الأمان/ الولاء للوطن و التضحية لأجله/ أفنيت عمري /دفاعا عن أرضه وسيادته/ رفعت علم مصر فوق سيناء/ واجهت الموت مرات عديدة/ حافظت على السلام/عملت من أجل مصر/اجتهدت من أجل نهضتها/ تغليب المصلحة العليا للوطن/مصر أولا و فوق الجميع/ ستقف على أقدامها من جديد بصدق و إخلاص أبنائها كل أبنائها/ سنثبت نحن المصريين/ وحدة وتماسك هذا الشعب/تمسكنا بعزة مصر/	times/ I continue to move forward/ looking forward to the support and backing of everyone who is keen on Egypt/ we succeed in turning it into a tangible reality/ calling for change/ The right path/ roadmap/ Egyptian personalities known for their independence and impartiality/ constitutional law jurists and judges/ attorney general/martyrs from the sons of Egypt/ protecting the country from the dangers of terrorism and ensuring respect for the rights and civil liberties of citizens/ restoring confidence among Egyptians/ confidence in Our economy and our international reputation/ Egyptians are all in one trench / We continue the dialogue/ With the spirit of the team and not the factions/ Egypt overcomes its crisis/ Let us restore confidence in our economy and our citizens reassurance and security/ Loyalty to the homeland and sacrifice for it/ I spent my life/ defending its land and sovereignty / I raised the flag of Egypt over the Sinai/ I faced death many times/ I kept the peace/ I worked from Yes, Egypt/ It worked hard for its renaissance/ The supreme interest of the nation was given priority/ Egypt first and above all/ It will stand on its feet again with the		

		sincerity and sincerity of all its children/ We Egyptians will prove/ The unity and cohesion of this people/ Our adherence to the dignity of Egypt/		
Predication	مطالب **عادلة** و **مشروعة/ الضحايا الأبرياء/** حرة و نزيهة/ رؤية محددة الانتقال السلمي للسلطة/ حوار مسؤول **حريص على مصر وشعبها/** واقع ملموس/ **توافق وطني عريض و متسع القاعدة/ القوات المسلحة الباسلة/ حوار وطني بناء/ الطريق الصحيح/ خريطة طريق واضحة** **التنفيذ الأمين/ اجراءات قانونية رادعة/ الحياة اليومية الطبيعية/ الأغلبية الكاسحة/ الحوار المتحضر و الواعي/ هويتها الفريدة و الخالدة/ حافظا لمسؤوليته و أمانته/**	**Just and legitimate** demands/ **innocent** victims / **free and fair** / **specific** vision **Peaceful** transfer of power / **responsible** dialogue **Keen o**n Egypt and its people/ **tangible** reality/ **broad national** with consensus **broad base**/ **valiant armed** forces/ **constructive national** dialogue/ **right** path/ **clear** road map **Honest** implementation/ **Deterrent legal** measures/ **Normal** daily life/ The **overwhelming** majority/ **Civilized and conscious** dialogue/ Its **unique and eternal** identity/ **Preserving** its responsibility and trust/	املاءات أجنبية/ الاوقات العصيبة/ أحداث مأساوية حزينة/ أوقات صعبة/ **ضغوط أجنبية/** سلطة أو شعبية زائفة/ المفترق الصعب/لحظة فارقة	foreign Dictations / Troubled Times / Sad Tragedies / Difficult Times / Foreign Pressure / False Authority or Popularity / Difficult Crossroads / Milestone Moment

Intensification/ Mitigation (through Over-lexicalization and repetition)	دون الشدة و الحسم/ ارتداد أو عودة للوراء/ ذرائع و مبررات/ توافق وطني عريض متسع أحداث مأساوية القاعدة/ حزينة أوجعت قلوبنا و هزت ضمير الوطن/ أضرار و خسائر/ الخلاف و التناحر ستعيش هذه الروح فينا 3 مصر(repeated for 28times) الدستور (repeated 14 times).	intensity and decisiveness/ bouncing back or turn back/ Excuses and Justification/ broad and national agreement with a large base/ Sad and Tragic Events that Hurt Our Hearts and Shook the Conscience of the Nation/ Damage and Losses/ and Dispute and Rivalry		

Table (G): Identification of Discursive Strategies in al Qaddafi's Speech

Strategy	Positive Construction of the Other		Negative Construction of the Self	
	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English	Examples In Arabic	Examples in English
Nomination	شباب التحدي/ ليبيا تريد المجد/ القمة/ مجد لليبيين/ مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر من الخيمة من البادية/ تاريخ مقاومة، تحرر، مجد، ثورة/ خيمة معمر القذافي، بيت معمر القذافي/ صامدون/ ستبقى ليبيا في القمة/ تقود أفريقيا/ تقود العالم/ تريد الحرية/ تقاوم الجبروت/ قاومنا جبروت أمريكا/ قاومنا جبروت حلف الأطلسي/ ضحينا بأنفسنا/ دفعنا ثمنها غاليا/ بنينا لها مجداً عظيماً/ نريهم الثورة الشعبية كيف شكلها/ نريد القانون أن يسود/ سنحول دون تحقيقه	Challenging Youth/ Libya Wants Glory/ The Summit/ Glory to the Libyans/ Fighter, Mujahid, striver, Revolutionary from the Tent from the Desert/ History of Resistance, Liberation, Glory, Revolution/ Muammar al Qaddafi's Tent, Muammar al Qaddafi's House/ Steadfast/ Libya Will Remain at the Top/ Leading Africa / Leads the world / Wants freedom / Resists tyranny / We resisted the tyranny of America / We resisted the tyranny of the NATO/ We sacrificed ourselves/ We paid dearly for it / We built for it a great glory / We will show them what the popular revolution looks like / We want the law to prevail / We will prevent it from being achieved	الانتكاسة/ الحضيض/ المعارك الجانبية/الاستعمار / تصفقون لأسيادكم/ الجرذان/ الجراثيم/ القطط/ الفئران/ المأجورين/ المدفوع لهم/ مرتزقة/ الخيانة/ العمالة/ الرجعية/ الجبن/ تغدركم/ تخونكم/ تقدم صورتكم بشكل يسيء لكل ليبي و ليبية/ شوهوا صورتكم/ يخدمون الشيطان/ يريدون أهانتكم/ خانونا/ يزورون الحقيقة وينشرون صور من كم سنة فاتت	Setback / rock bottom / side battles/ colonialism/ clapping for your masters / rats / germs / cats / mice / hired / paid/ mercenaries / treachery / *collusion* / reactionary/cowardice/ betraying you / betraying you/ presenting your image in a way that offends every Libyan man and woman / distorted your image / They serve the devil / They want to insult you / They betrayed us / They falsify the truth and publish pictures from many years ago
Predication	مجد **عظيم لا يدانى/ مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر** من الخيمة من البادية/ حفنة من **شذاذ الآفاق المأجورين**/ أنا ساموت	Great unparalleled glory/ fighter, Mujahid, a rebel from the tent, from the desert / A bunch of perverts and hired / I	مجموعة قليلة مريضة مندسة في المدن /شذاذ الآفاق /المأجورين المدفوع لهم / مرتزقة/المعطاه لهم الحبوب/ سذج/ عيل في	A few sick group infiltrated in the cities/ perverted horizons/ paid wage earners/ mercenaries/ they were given drugs/ naïve/ a

	طاهرا و شهيدا/ مجاهد بطل من أبطال القرضابية/ هؤلاء **المجاهدون**/ القبائل الليبية قبائل **شريفة** / هذا المكان **الصامد**/ كنا نحن **صامدون**/ الضباط **الأحرار**/ صخرة **صماء**، صخرة **صلبة** تحطمت عليها أساطيل أمريكا	will die pure and a martyr / A fighter, a hero from the Qardabiya heroes / The Libyan tribes are honorable/ This steadfast place / We were steadfast / The Free Officers / a deaf rock, a solid rock on which America's fleets crashed	بنغازي/ عويلة صغار/ واحد عامل لحية/ قلة أرهابية/ الجرذان المرضى متاعين الحبوب/ اتباع الزرقاوي المقملين/ المحطات القذرة ، الأذاعات القذرة/ متاعين الهلوسة/ طفال مهووسون سكرانين/ المشاغبين/ المجانين/ شباب الطيش/ وحدين مقملين متسخين/ عصابات لا تمثل واحد على المليون من الشعب الليبي/ واحد مقمل بلحيته/ قوى معادية للديموقراطية معادية للحرية/ الأنجاس/ المحطات العربية متشمتة فيكم/ مغتاضون منكم	child in Benghazi/ very young children/ someone with a beard/ Terrorist Few/ Sick Rats who take drugs/ The lousy Followers of Al-Zarqawi/ Dirty Stations, Dirty Radios/ those who take hallucinating drugs/ Maniacs, Drunken Children/ Hooligans/ Crazy People/ Reckless Youth/ those who are dirty and lousy/ Gangs that do not represent one in a million of the Libyan people/ someone with a beard/ Anti-democratic forces hostile to freedom Impure/ Arab stations are gloating about you/ They are angry with you
Intensification/ Mitigation			/جرذان/ فئران/ قطط/ قمل/ قلة أرهابية/ حفنة/ أطفال/عويلة صغار	/rats/ mice/ cats/ lice Terrorist few / handful Children/ little children