

**BORDER INSECURITIES AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE ECOWAS: THE  
CASE OF GHANA**

**By**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Regional and sub-regional bodies are established to achieve specific objectives necessitated by the region's needs. However, these regional bodies and their instruments are sometimes thwarted by problems that make it difficult for the realization of their objectives. These problems or challenges affect member countries of the region or sub-region that deleteriously affects the regional or sub-regional body or organization. The study sought to examine how insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede Ghana's implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. As the ECOWAS envisions a borderless West Africa that is feasible through the de-securitization of borders, member countries are securitizing their borders due to intractable border-related crimes in the sub-region. The study relied on secondary data, which comprised a review of existing literature on Ghana's border security, the government of Ghana and ECOWAS documents, Acts of Parliament on border-related issues, books, and articles related to border securities. The insecurities at the borders of Ghana are theorized using the securitization theory to identify how insecurities that pose a threat, danger, harm, and menace warrant speech acts by securitizing actors in dealing with the insecurities. The study made some intriguing revelations which include; the establishment that insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS, and Ghana, through its state capacity securitizes its border-related issues through the enactment of laws. The study also revealed that securitization of borders affects the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. It was revealed that as Ghana securitizes its borders, it strengthens or tightens its border laws thereby closing its borders to its immediate neighbors and the member states of the ECOWAS. This contradicts the objective of the ECOWAS treaty.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States

**AU:** African Union

**AfCFTA:** Africa Continental Free Trade Area

**EU:** European Union

**ASEAN:** Association of Southeast Asian Nations

**UN:** United Nations

**USA:** United States of America

**IRCA:** Immigration Reform and Control Act

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**WACB:** West African Currency Board

**WACRI:** West African Cocoa Research Institute

**WAA:** West African Airways

**NCBWA:** National Congress of British West Africa

**UNECA:** United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

**WMD:** Weapons of Mass Destruction

**WAPIS:** West African Police Information System

**JBP:** Joint Border Program



**ECCAS:** Economic Community of Central African States

**ADB:** African Development Bank

**ENBIC:** ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card

**WAFU:** West Africa Football Union

**WAUG:** West Africa Universities Games

**IMCPD:** International Migration Centre for Policy Development

**IOM:** International Organization for Migration

**STIs:** Sexually Transmitted Infections

**HIV:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus

**AIDS:** Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

**INL:** International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

**SALW:** Small Arms and Light Weapons

**GI-TOC:** Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crimes

**IMO:** International Maritime Organization

**GMA:** Ghana Maritime Authority

**GAF:** Ghana Armed Forces

**NPA:** National Plan of Action

**BGU:** Border Guard Unit

**CEPS:** Customs Excise and Preventive Service

**GRA:** Ghana Revenue Authority

**PNDC:** Provisional National Defense Council

**NACOB:** Narcotics Control Board

**NACOC:** Narcotics Control Commission

**UNODC:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**UK:** United Kingdom

**KIA:** Kotoka International Airport

**KAIPTC:** Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

**UNPoA:** United Nations Programme of Action

**NMSTWG:** National Maritime Security Technical Working Group

**MP:** Member of Parliament

**BPU:** Border Patrol Unit

**GIS:** Ghana Immigration Service

**MOFARI:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Although the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) aims to promote economic integration and interdependence through the free movement of goods and people, it is being pulled back by problems of insecurities in West Africa and Africa in general. According to Opanike, Aduloju, & Adenipekun (2015), a recent integration scheme of ECOWAS includes the liberalization of trade, the free movement of people, and the promotion of harmonized fiscal and monetary policies among others. This integration scheme will function well through de-securitization in the West African sub-region. According to Buzan et al. (1998), de-securitization entails taking issues out of emergency context and positioning them within the context of normal bargaining processes within the political sphere. This will mean the lessening of rules and regulations meant to deal with security issues or emergencies in the West African region to allow the free movement of goods and people and the promotion of integration as envisaged by the ECOWAS. Inadvertently, the cross-border movement of goods and services has become difficult to initiate by the West African countries due to the severity of the insecurities member countries face at their borders.

According to Andreas (2003), limitations to the accessibility of borders of countries are not new, notwithstanding countries opening up their borders to their neighbors for economic or political reasons. These limitations mostly come in the form of closed barriers and imposed tariffs to protect local industries among others. In this case, the purpose of the ECOWAS is already up against the long-standing possibility of countries to limit access to their borders as identified by Andreas

(2003). The presence of justifiable reasons like insecurities at the borders of countries, gives countries reasons to limit access to their borders even if openness is for the greater good. A daunting snag that ties into the insecurities at the borders of African countries is the recent resurgence of coups in West Africa and Africa at large. Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba ousted the President of Burkina Faso, Roch Kabore, in a military takeover in January 2022. The President of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was detained on July 2023 which was followed by a declaration of his head of guard as the new President of Niger. Similarly, military juntas ousted the Presidents of Chad, Guinea, and Mali in April 2021, September 2021, and August 2020 respectively. These military takeovers in West Africa and Central Africa significantly affect relations among African countries; especially in terms of security.

The recent coups in Africa have seen the ECOWAS and African Union (AU) threatening the use of military interventions to restore Democracy. This has been met with a response by the military juntas to counter the military intervention with military action should it happen. This has led to further closure of borders among African countries with a security quagmire that can lead to war among African countries, and deleteriously affect trade liberalization and the free movement of goods and services on the African continent. This affirms the assertion by Chigozie & Oyinmiebi (2022), that the recent coups in West Africa have a deleterious security and economic implication on the ECOWAS.

One of the propelling factors of the limitation of the liberalization of trade and the free movement of goods and services of the ECOWAS is security-related issues at the borders of West African countries. The strict examination and screening of documents, goods, and people still takes place at the borders of West African countries, which is good for record-keeping and security purposes, but in some instances, borders are closed to other West African countries because of insecurities

posed by the porous nature of West African borders (Adaawen, 2017). Ghana, as a key member of the ECOWAS and the host of the headquarters of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), is expected to serve as the blueprint for the liberalization of trade and free movement of people, but its security at the borders is equally critical. Cross-border crimes that bedevil Ghana include child trafficking, transportation of illegal drugs, and arms among others (Nii Nortey Addo, 2008; Sosuh, 2011; Taylor, 2002).

### **1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM**

The porosity of borders among African countries makes it easily permeable to crimes (Okumu, 2011). The acknowledgment of the porosity at the borders and its accompanying insecurities is what is making African Heads of State put in place measures that are meant to strengthen security at their borders. These measures are meant to tackle insecurities but inadvertently impede the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS protocol. Several studies, including Opanike, Aduloju, & Adenipekun (2015), Adaawen (2017), Teye, Awumbila & Nikoi (2019), and Aniche (2022) among others have looked extensively at the impediments hindering the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol with some focusing on Ghana and Nigeria. However, there is a need to examine Ghana's security at the borders and the implementation of the ECOWAS protocol. It is base on this, the study sought to answer the central question; ***“How have insecurities at the borders of Ghana impeded the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty?”***

According to Agyei & Clotney (2007:10), “the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 to among other things encourage, foster and accelerate the economic and social development of the Member States in order to improve the living standards of their people”. Members of the ECOWAS can reap the benefits of the objectives and targets of

the organization if it is smoothly implemented (Bamfo, 2013). Unfortunately, being met with an impediment of border insecurities is a huge snag against the core objective of the organization.

## **1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The overarching objective of the study is to examine how insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede Ghana's implementation of the ECOWAS treaty.

### ***Specific Objectives***

- a. Examine the various security threats at the borders of Ghana.
- b. Examine how the security threats and their securitization impede the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty.

## **1.4 METHODOLOGY**

The study is based on the analysis of secondary data, which comprises a review of existing literature on Ghana's border security in relation to the objective of the ECOWAS treaty. Data for the study is drawn from reports on security-related issues at the borders of Ghana, the government of Ghana and ECOWAS documents, Parliamentary Hansards on border-related issues, books, and articles related to border securities in Ghana and the ECOWAS.

## **1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The study is not only addressing academics but also policymakers on the issue of insecurities at the borders of Ghana and how it is impeding the implementation of international instruments like the ECOWAS treaty. It is significant to note here that even though West African countries will do everything to implement the ECOWAS protocol, they will not compromise on their security. In order not to leave good and well-drafted protocols to rest on dusty shelves, such studies must be conducted to address the snags that impede the successful implementation of the ECOWAS

protocol and other international instruments. The significance of this study is also embedded in the ubiquity of border-related crimes or transnational crimes and their impact on international organizations like the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as identified by the likes of Skleparis (2018) and Emmers (2003).

## **1.6 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS**

The study is grouped into five (5) chapters with Chapter One comprising the background to the study, statement of the research problem (within which the research question is embedded), objectives of the study, methodology, significance of the study, and organization of chapters. Chapter One, as the gateway to the study, lays the foundation for the exposition on border insecurities and their impact on the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty by laying the background for the study's central question and the rubrics for its navigation to the realization of the study's objectives. Chapter Two entails an exposition of the Securitization theory in relation to the border insecurities of Ghana and its impact on the ECOWAS. Chapter two provides a theoretical understanding of the study and places the study in the ongoing dialogue within the subject matter of security and international agreements. Chapter Three gives a breakdown of the ECOWAS (formation, membership, and its Protocols). This chapter presents the development and evolution of the ECOWAS treaty for a better understanding of the justifications for its adoption. This lays a strong foundation for comprehending how insecurities at Ghana's borders affect the realization of the objectives or projected dreams of the ECOWAS treaty. Chapter four covers Ghana's Border Insecurities and their Impact on The ECOWAS Treaty. This Chapter presents a discussion of the actual security issues in Ghana and how they affect the ECOWAS through the lens of securitization theory. Chapter five, as the concluding chapter, entails a summary of the

study, conclusion, and recommendations. This chapter presents a synopsis of the entire study and projections for the future.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **SECURITIZATION THEORY**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents the theory of securitization in relation to the relevance of security to countries with its lens focused on border security and its implications for the national or internal security of countries. It also presents how security, especially at the borders can significantly affect foreign relations and the implementation or realization of international agreements or instruments. It begins with a general exposition on securitization theory and links it to the relevance, and impact or implications on international relations; specifically, achieving the goals and targets of international organizations.

#### **2.2 SECURITIZATION THEORY**

According to Waever (1993), security in its entirety connotes being safe and free from threat. Waever (1993) and Eroukhmanoff (2017) in their exposition on securitization theory, identified security to go beyond its “traditional” connotation of security, which is fixated on the threat and defense of the State. According to Eroukhmanoff (2017), issues are not alarming, threatening, and dangerous in and of themselves, but the pronouncement of these issues as such makes them security issues. Security, in this sense according to Emmers (2003), Taureck (2006) and Baele & Thomson (2017) is a “Speech Act”. Waever (1993) advocated for the security of people in place of the security of the State, be it individual security or international collective security.

Securitization theory assumes that national security policies are byproducts of careful deliberations of politicians and decision-makers (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). In light of this assumption, the security issue must be flagged as urgent and labeled as ‘dangerous’, ‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, and

‘alarming’ (Patomaki, 2015). Eroukhmanoff (2017:1) argues that “calling immigration a ‘threat to national security’, for instance, shifts immigration from a low-priority political concern to a high-priority issue that requires action, such as securing borders”. Similarly, Taureck (2006:2) argues that;

By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object’s survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. For security, this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction. That is the meaning of security.

As Taureck (2006) avers, securitization theory assumes that for an issue to qualify as a national security issue, it must draw the attention of a securitizing actor. Wilkinson (2015:34) states that “the securitizing actor is the person or persons who ‘speaks’ security by producing the narrative that seeks to portray an issue as warranting special measures to ensure its continued survival”. The securitizing actor may be the leader or representative of a State or country (Politicians or Diplomats), or a community (Wilkinson, 2015). The securitizing actor has the social and institutional power to move the issue ‘beyond politics’. In this case, security issues do not exist in and of themselves but they must be described as such by a securitizing actor to be threatening, dangerous, and alarming among others. Securitization theory also assumes that there is a referent object that is threatened and demands special measures for the continuous existence of the referent object (Wilkinson, 2015). The securitizing actor upon acting on their referent object, also has a targeted audience. Wilkinson (2015:34) avers “the audience is the target recipient of the securitizing actor’s threat narrative”.

According to the Copenhagen School of thought on securitization, aside from the aforementioned assumptions of securitization, there are also functional actors and facilitating conditions as major

components of securitization theory. According to Wilkinson (2015), a functional actor is any actor other than the securitizing actor who can significantly influence security narratives. Quintessential examples of functional actors include the media, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations among others. The facilitating conditions on the other hand are the circumstances or conditions under which the speech act of a securitizing actor thrives. The facilitating conditions are further divided into internal and external conditions. The internal conditions are based on the fact that the acts are in line with the established grammar of security, that is, an existing threat, and point of no return among others. The external facilitating condition entails the securitizing actor possessing the necessary capacity and authority concerning the existential threat (Wilkinson, 2015).

The definition of security by Waeber (1993), Taureck (2006), and Eroukhmanoff (2017) qualifies any issue to be defined as a security issue. Kolodziej (2005:1) postulates, “Security is a complex and contested notion – heavily laden with emotion and deeply held values”. This confirms how difficult it is to conceptualize a security issue. To avoid this snag, Taureck (2006) and Buzan et al. (1998) identified three criteria for securitization, namely; identification of existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules. Therefore, a security issue must be worrisome, as it impedes or is likely to hinder the natural flow of life. It must also warrant actions that are likely to supersede binding rules, agreements, and instruments (emergency action) and must warrant a securitizing actor to convince an audience of the need to go beyond binding rules, agreements, and instruments (Taureck, 2006). Taureck (2006) describes securitization theory as an analytical tool for analyzing security-related issues.

## **2.3 SECURITIZATION THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Waever (1993), Eroukmanoff (2017), Baele & Thomson (2017), and Taureck (2006) among others have acknowledged the relevance and contribution of securitization to international relations. Areas of international relations that have featured the most in the works of these scholars include immigration, cyber-security, and global health among others. Another essential area of international security identified by Kolodziej (2005) is boundaries or borders. This is a controversial aspect of international relations, especially in the realm of international security. Border issues or boundary-related issues have caused intractable wars among states. A quintessential example is the intractable Israeli-Palestinian war. As there are several twists to the root cause of the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the armistice agreement in 1949 that awarded Israel considerably more territory than it was awarded under the United Nations (UN) 1947 votes is believed to be making the conflict intractable (McGreal, 2023).

Interestingly, border-related issues and immigration-related issues are correlated as immigrants make use of borders (Hanson, Robertson & Spilimbergo, 2002; Rosenblum, 2012). Most countries, if not all, have security policies targeted at their borders and immigration. This is because no country is willing to make its border porous to warrant the entry of illegal immigrants or even legal immigrants without proper record keeping. According to Rosenblum & Hipsman (2016), the United States of America (USA) has invested over \$250 billion in its border security and immigration enforcement as part of its efforts in dealing with border and immigration-related issues since the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). In addition, the advent of the Corona Virus Disease (2019) and its accompanying difficulties depict the relevance of securitization theory to the international system. In the shortest space of time, through speech act by securitizing actors of countries, the virus had been described as threatening, alarming, and

dangerous. This called for security measures to prevent the spread of the virus across borders and within countries. An essential security measure, very debilitating but necessary was the closure of borders and measures that superseded binding rules, instruments, and agreements. This is not different from international instruments or agreements. Countries are likely to ignore commitments to International Organizations like the ECOWAS, UN, and AU among others for security purposes. According to Lutmar, Carneiro & Mitchell (2016), issues of security present a higher cost of complying with international agreements. Lutmar, Carneiro & Mitchell (2016:562) argue that, “Russia’s lack of compliance with agreements signed with Ukraine settling their land borders, for example, was driven by its heightened security threats as NATO increased cooperation with Ukraine”.

The non-compliance of Russia to the agreement signed with Ukraine on land borders on the justification of threats from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the later invasion of Ukraine manifest how securitization theory links to borders. In 1997, The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was signed. This treaty was based on several principles including the inviolability of existing borders and the respect for territorial integrity. Despite the binding nature of this agreement, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Also, Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 with a major justification for this action by the leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, being the threat posed by NATO’s expansion along Russia’s western border. According to Treisman (2016), the annexation of Crimea was also meant to deter Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. The description of activities around the borders of Russia as threatening and the need to securitize as openly announced by Putin warranted deliberations within the decision-making unit of Russia which led to the annexation of Crimea and the brutal invasion

of Ukraine. This action by the Russian leader moved the threat out of mundane concerns to top security issues that led to the total negligence of international law and legally binding agreements.

#### **2.4 SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ECOWAS**

The ECOWAS according to Agyei & Clottey (2007) was formed to foster economic interdependence among West African countries through the opening of borders for easy passage of goods and services. The signing and ratification of the ECOWAS treaty signifies the commitment to the objective of the ECOWAS. Committing to the ECOWAS treaty implies lessening security (de-securitization) at the borders of West African countries to foster integration and interdependence. This would include the opening of borders for the free movement of people, and goods. In essence, issues of security (border) as explained by Hansen (2012) should not be the subject matter of lengthy discussions, but rather, the focus should be on normal politics like public policy and allocation of resources. As identified by Skleparis (2018), the SYRIZA-led coalition government of Greece de-securitized the tightened border control, migration, and asylum policies of the Greek–Turkish land border as a remedy to the immigration and asylum problems facing the EU at the time.

However, the de-securitization of border policies and regulations of ECOWAS member countries for the realization of the objective of the ECOWAS is a difficult discussion to bring forth. The borders of member countries have been closed to each other for reasons ranging from countries harboring dissidents to military takeovers (Botchway & Hlovor, 2022; Hagberg & Tengan, 2000). The reasons, in one way or the other, were identified by the leaders of some ECOWAS member countries as threatening and have led to the conceptualization of border security beyond normal politics to the promulgation of stringent and emergency measures that sometimes contradicts the objectives of the ECOWAS. Ghana on several occasions has closed her borders to her immediate

neighbors without consulting relevant state institutions as a result of actions and circumstances defined by securitizing actors (Presidents of Ghana) as threatening the peace and security of Ghana. In 1961, the borderless agreement signed between Ghana and Burkina Faso collapsed and it led to the closure of borders between Ghana and Burkina after a failed bomb assassination attempt on the life of President Nkrumah (Hagberg & Tengan, 2000). In January 1976, Ghana's relations with Togo and Cote D'Ivoire became sour as the first President of the Fourth Republic of Ghana accused Togo and Cote D'Ivoire of harboring armed Ghanaian dissidents who were described as threats to the security of Ghana (Botchway & Hlovor, 2022). This was met with nerve-racking measures including the immediate closure of borders with Togo and Cote D'Ivoire without considering efforts made to promote economic integration with these countries.

A major impasse to the objective of the ECOWAS in ages is the intractable coups in the ECOWAS region. The consequences of the coups in the sub-region have seriously threatened the security of ECOWAS member countries; significantly affecting border relations. This has warranted emergency measures by securitizing actors of member countries to protect their borders. The securitizing actors of the West African countries in response to the threats of coups and its aftermath ramifications sometimes redefine the security at their borders and move the border-related security issue beyond commitments to regional integration and socio-economic development. An important example is the warning from the Niger military leader, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, to the ECOWAS on the usage of military intervention and the further closure of borders to other ECOWAS member countries. The securitization of this situation can be realized on both sides; such that the ECOWAS had its conceptualization of security within the sub-region and, Niger and the other military-led West African countries had their

conceptualization of security in the region. Each side of the divide has its securitizing actors, made use of speech acts, and prioritized their security over all other political issues.

The ECOWAS believed the presence of military-led governments in West Africa and Africa at large is threatening the existence and consolidation of democracy in the region (Taylor, 2023). It is therefore not surprising the ECOWAS threatened the usage of military intervention in restoring democracy in Niger and the other military juntas. Equally, the military juntas reciprocally defined the actions of the ECOWAS as alarming and threatening. This justifies the culmination of efforts of the military juntas against the ECOWAS and it was declared by the military leaders that any attack on Niger would be considered an attack on Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Taylor, 2023).

The security issues in the West African region continue to have daunting implications for the realization of the objectives of the ECOWAS. As the ECOWAS identifies the coups and other security issues in the sub-region as alarming, threatening, and dangerous, the ECOWAS moves beyond negotiations to the threat of using military actions. The threat of using military actions by the ECOWAS is a manifestation of how serious the threat of a coup is to the realization of its objectives of a borderless West Africa with socio-economic development.

## **2.5 THE USE OF SECURITIZATION IN UNDERSTANDING GHANA'S BORDER-RELATED ISSUES AMIDST ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ECOWAS**

The relevance of securitization in unpacking Ghana's border-related issues and how it affects the realization of the objectives of the ECOWAS begins with the identification of specific border-related issues (human trafficking, illicit drug smuggling, and piracy among others) and how they have been construed as threats. This is in tune with the argument by Waever (1993), Taureck (2006), and Eroukhmanoff (2017) that securitization begins with the identification of an existential threat to a referent object. Securitization theory is further used to explain how securitizing actors



of Ghana have adopted stringent measures, including emergency actions in dealing with the existential threats. This lays the platform for the discussion on how the adopted measures and emergency measures closes up the borders of Ghana and impedes the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty.

The description of the border-related issues that threaten the territorial sovereignty (referent object) of Ghana warrants the promulgation of special measures in the form of policies, programs, and laws to securitize these issues. Securitization further helped to explain how securitizing actors of Ghana have prioritized these issues by promulgating laws and programs through State institutions together with functional actors like the UN, AU, and IOM among others in securitizing these issues. The securitizing actors as identified by Emmers (2003:423) are “the heads of state and government as well as their foreign ministers and ministers of interior/home affairs”. Securitization theory then helps in projecting how the prioritization of the border-related issues of Ghana impedes the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty despite the efforts by the ECOWAS in dealing with these same issues. Border-related issues or transnational crimes are not unique to Ghana and the ECOWAS, the ASEAN equally faces the threats of border-related crimes and has promulgated measures to securitize its borders (Emmers, 2003).

Securitization in the case of this study is used as a double-edged sword in its explanation of the border-related issues of Ghana and the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. The border-related security issues identified as human trafficking, and smuggling of illicit goods and drugs among others are threatening the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty on the one hand and the securitization of these issues by Ghana and other West African countries is impeding the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty on the other hand. The border-related issues are making it difficult for countries to open up their borders to neighboring countries thereby affecting the aim

of the ECOWAS to integrate and ensure economic interdependence in the sub-region. The measures put in place to deal with these threats also strengthen the borders of member countries thereby making it difficult to integrate. The border-related issues negatively affect the ECOWAS and its member countries directly while the securitization through laws and stringent border regulations affects the ECOWAS's objective of integration. The ECOWAS in and of itself has taken several measures through its governing bodies to organize programs and liaise with member countries to securitize these border-related security issues.

## **2.6 CONCLUSION**

Securitization theory's relevance and strength to this study is subsumed in its exposition on how security-related issues are defined and conceptualized to gain relevance to the subordination of other relevant issues like international agreements and instruments. It also projects how the security of countries is hardly compromised. Other theories like neoliberalism could have been adopted by the study to explain the objectives of ECOWAS and the expected commitment of Ghana but securitization theory provides an exquisite framework for the explanation of security-related issues at the borders of Ghana in relation to the realization of the objectives of the ECOWAS.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE ECOWAS TREATY (REVISED-1993)**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents the ECOWAS treaty, its history, and formation. It also presents the objectives of the ECOWAS in connection with the ECOWAS's meetings, and conferences on border relations among member countries. The Chapter also presents Ghana-ECOWAS relations on open borders, and the recent events in West Africa and their implications on ECOWAS and border relations. The successes and weaknesses of the ECOWAS treaty are also expounded in this chapter. This chapter serves as the basis for establishing how insecurities at the borders of West African countries, specifically Ghana, impede the realization of the objectives of the ECOWAS treaty. This lays a good foundation for further discussion on how specific security threats at the borders of Ghana hinder the realization of the aim of the ECOWAS.

#### **3.2 HISTORY AND FORMATION OF THE ECOWAS**

The West African sub-region before the formation of the ECOWAS emerged from states, kingdoms, and groups of people with diverse colonial experiences and individual values that separate them from each other (Agbonkhese & Adekola, 2014). The sub-region in contemporary times is known for its three official languages spoken by countries that make up the region because of the region's colonial experiences. These languages are English, French, and Portuguese. Despite the official languages, the area also had myriad local languages that cannot be quantified. Some of these local languages cut across the national borders of the West African countries. A quintessential example is the Ewe language, spoken by the Volta region of Ghana and in some

parts of Togo. Despite the diversities that existed at the time among the West African Countries, some shared values and practices served as the baseline for integration within the sub-region.

According to Agbonkhese & Adekola (2014) and Boafo-Arthur (2009), the idea of regional integration in West Africa can be traced back to the colonial era within the sub-region when the colonialists introduced several cooperative arrangements and institutions between West African countries. Some of these arrangements and institutions identified by Agbonkhese & Adekola (2014) and Boafo-Arthur (2009) include the West African Currency Board (WACB), the West African Cocoa Research Institute (WACRI), and the West African Airways (WAA) among others. Nworah (1974) in contrast to Agbonkhese & Adekola (2014) and Boafo-Arthur (2009), argued that the integrative strand in Africa was the initiative of educated Africans. Africans who have tasted integration and cooperation from their education outside the Africa region. The National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) for instance was formed in 1917 by educated West Africans. According to Eluwa (1971), the NCBWA was formed as a nationalist movement with the political objective of uniting the colonies of British West Africa (namely; Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia. The NCBWA was exclusively led by educated Africans (Eluwa, 1971). The efforts of cooperation and integration in the West African region at the time were meant to address the problems facing the sub-region. Despite the political issues that bedeviled the sub-region at the time, there were also economic problems that equally warranted a cooperative and integrative effort in the region.

According to Agbonkhese & Adekola (2014), West African countries settled on the establishment of a common regional market after their reliance on Import Substitution Industrialization as a way of economic development had failed due to declining commodity prices and their inaccessibility to foreign markets. The establishment of the common regional market in West Africa was elevated

by the 1974 declaration by the UN of the New International Economic Order, which was hinged on regional economic cooperation among developing countries as the blueprint for the socio-economic development of developing countries (Agbonkhese & Adekola, 2014; Boafo-Arthur, 2009). White's (1975:547) exposition on the 1974 Declaration by the UN as the New International Economic Order asserts that;

Those parts of the documents which can be categorized as concerned with the expansion of world trade are aimed at securing for the developing countries a greater share of the world market. Among the rights listed are the right to engage in international trade free from discrimination on the basis of differences in political, economic, and social systems with freedom to choose the forms of organization of its foreign economic relations. A call is also made for the dismantling of obstacles to trade and for securing additional benefits for trade of developing nations so as to achieve a substantial increase in foreign exchange earnings and the development of their economies. For this purpose, there should be an extension, improvement, and enlargement of the system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences to developing nations and more favorable treatment of trade with such nations.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) had embarked on numerous meetings for economic cooperation in various parts of Africa including ministerial meetings held in Niamey in 1966, Accra in 1967, and Monrovia in 1968. The advent of the 1974 Declaration revitalized the efforts of regional cooperation in West Africa. Subsequent cooperation initiatives and collaborative efforts of West African leaders, and UNECA led to the formation of the ECOWAS on 28<sup>th</sup> May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria.

### **3.2.1 The ECOWAS treaty (Revised)**

The ECOWAS treaty was originally signed by the then sixteen member states in 1975 and revised in 1993. The then sixteen member states that signed the treaty were; Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. It is essential to note that Mauritania left the ECOWAS in 2000 and joined as an associate member in August 2017. The ECOWAS treaty came

into force on June 10, 1975, when seven member states ratified the treaty. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015), ratification is an expression of the commitment of a country to be legally bound by a pact or an agreement. The Community became operational two years after the signing and ratification of the treaty. The first Executive Secretary in the name of Dr. Diaby Quattara from Cote d'Ivoire was appointed in early 1977. Also, in early November of 1976, the first protocols of the treaty were signed and decisions were made to domicile the headquarters of the ECOWAS secretariat in Lagos and the Headquarters of the ECOWAS fund in Lome. The ECOWAS treaty is made up of a preamble, which serves as the gateway to the treaty, and twenty-two (22) Chapters. The twenty-two Chapter is comprised of ninety-six articles.

Several institutions are established by the ECOWAS to foresee the realization of the objectives and aims of the ECOWAS. These include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Community Parliament, the Economic and Social Council, the Community Court of Justice, the Executive Secretariat, the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation, and Development; Specialized Technical Commissions; and, any other institution that may be established by the Authority. Article 7 outlines the authority of the Heads of State and Government, including its composition and functions. The Authority of Heads of States in this case shall be the supreme institution of the community and shall be responsible for the general steering of the affairs of the community including general policies and programs of the community.

The ECOWAS treaty has evolved since its inception. Several protocols have been adopted to aid and fast-track the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS treaty. On 22nd April 1978, the Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted in Lagos, Nigeria. The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense was also adopted on 29<sup>th</sup> May 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The

Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was also adopted on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 2001. On 10<sup>th</sup> December 1999, the ECOWAS member states adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the Mechanism) at Lome in Togo. Protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment was also adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Dakar on 29 May 1979 among other declarations like the Declaration of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States which was adopted on July 6, 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense and the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security are specifically fashioned out to deal with insecurities and issues of boundaries in the West African sub-region. These two protocols are expected to be the bedrock for the consolidation of the other protocols which are directly hinged on the objective of the ECOWAS like the Protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, and The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance among others.

### **3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE ECOWAS**

The motive behind establishing the ECOWAS is embedded in the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS as clearly outlined in Chapter II (Article 3) of the ECOWAS revised treaty. The aims and objectives of the ECOWAS project are the justification for the treaty's adoption, signing, and ratification. It presents a synopsis of the entire twenty-two chapters containing ninety-six articles. Every chapter or article indicates how the aims and objectives of the treaty are going to be realized or contribute to the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS. The ECOWAS treaty unequivocally states its aim and objective as:

The aims of the Community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations-among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent (ECOWAS Treaty,1993).

To ensure the materialization of the promotion of cooperation and integration in West Africa for the socio-economic development of the sub-region, the treaty further outlines provisions that will aid in the realization of the integration and collaboration between West African countries. These strategies that add up to the objectives include harmonizing and coordinating national policies and advancing integrated programs that cut across every aspect of West African countries including agriculture, food, natural resources, protection of the environment, trade, and transportation among others. This strategy is well explained in Chapters 4, 5, 6, & 7 of the ECOWAS revised treaty.

The ECOWAS seeks to establish and promote the establishment of joint production enterprises and more importantly a common market. The aims of the ECOWAS are hinged on the broader idea of trade liberalization through the abolition of customs duties levied on imports and exports. The main target of this aim is to establish a free trade area in West Africa to facilitate the free movement of people and goods within the sub-region. This aim is further expatiated in detail in Chapter 8 of the ECOWAS treaty.

The ECOWAS also aimed at the establishment of an economic and monetary union. The rubrics for establishing and operating the economic and monetary union can be found in chapter 9 of the ECOWAS treaty. The overarching objective of building a borderless West Africa that cooperates on every aspect of socio-economic development is further broken down into the aim of cooperating in terms of immigration and most importantly, security of borders. The security of borders in and of itself can be described as the oil that greases the cooperation and integration aimed by the ECOWAS. The advent of insecurity then becomes a recipe for the collapse of integration and



cooperation. Rosenblum, Bjelopera & Finklea (2013) admit that the management, prevention, and control of border threats are extremely difficult as they group border threats into actors and goods. According to Rosenblum, Bjelopera & Finklea (2013), threat actors are potential terrorists, transnational criminals, and illegal migrants or individuals whose presence in a country negatively affects the security of the country and the threatening goods include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), illegal drugs and other contraband, counterfeit products, and any other illegal good. These threats to borders have a direct impact on border security. There are also indirect threats that affect border security and immigration as the by-product of certain activities. A typical example is political instability or coup d'état.

### **3.4 ECOWAS MEETINGS, CONFERENCES, AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER ISSUES OF BORDERS**

As the ECOWAS aims to build a borderless West Africa, efforts through meetings, conferences, and negotiations have been at the core of their activities in dealing with insecurities and border-related issues that suppresses the objective of the ECOWAS. Over the past five years, several meetings, conferences, and negotiations have been organized by the ECOWAS to improve border relations and the accompanying security threats in the sub-region. The table below gives a snapshot of press releases of the ECOWAS meetings, conferences, and negotiations on security and border relations.

**Table 1.0 ECOWAS Press Release on Meetings, Conferences, and Negotiations**

<i>Date</i>	<i>ECOWAS Press Release on Meetings, Conferences, and Negotiations</i>
15 Feb, 2024	ECOWAS finalizes architectural and engineering designs for the new ultra-modern joint border post to be constructed at the Jendema-Bo waterside border between Sierra Leone and Liberia
08 Feb, 2024	Extra-Ordinary Ministerial Session of The ECOWAS Mediation And Security Council Holds In Abuja.
25 Nov, 2023	ECOWAS Holds 39th Ordinary Meeting of Mediation and Security Council at Ambassadorial Level
08 Nov, 2023	Construction of Border Bridge over Cavalla River between the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and Republic of Liberia at Proлло border including Approach Roads.
22 Sep, 2023	ECOWAS Sensitizes Immigration Officers and Trans-Border Commercial Drivers on the Biometric ID Card in The Gambia
17May, 2023	Sierra Leone And Liberia Hand Over Sites To The ECOWAS Commission For The Detailed Engineering Design & Construction Of A Joint Border Post At The Jendema-Bo Waterside Border
08 Dec, 2022	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Focal Point Directorates Examine New Response Strategies to Emerging Security Threats in West Africa

04 Nov, 2022	ECOWAS Commission Charges Focal Persons to Leverage APP-IV Agreement in Consolidating Peace and Security Interventions
03 Oct, 2022	ECOWAS trains port stakeholders on Maritime and Port Safety and Security standards in West Africa
28 Jul, 2022	Agriculture & Food Security
19 Oct, 2021	ECOWAS Strengthens Its Security Architecture With The Inauguration Of The West African Police Information System (WAPIS) Centre In Gambia.
03 Jun, 2021	Implementation of ECOWAS cross-border cooperation program: Member States' focal points hold discussions on free movement and regional funding mechanism
27 May, 2021	Nigeria strengthens its security architecture with the inauguration of the WAPIS centre
18 May, 2021	ECOWAS: Sierra Leone and Liberia identify land for the Construction of a Joint Border Post to facilitate cross-border trade and the free movement of persons and goods along the Dakar-Abidjan Corridor
15 Dec, 2019	43rd Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council Opens
06 Nov, 2019	ECOWAS Commission Interfaces with Member States' Ambassadors on Peace and Security

11 Sep, 2019	ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to Meet on Terrorism in the Region
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The ECOWAS's strides towards achieving its objectives have featured significantly in its activities over the years. All these strides are directed towards promoting cooperation and integration for socio-economic development within the West African region. In the quest for the materialization of these strides, the ECOWAS is equally striving to find the balance between strengthening security within the sub-region and promoting cooperation and integration for socio-economic development (Aning, 2013; Omeje, 2014). The activities of the ECOWAS in operationalizing this goal have seen the ECOWAS working on building a borderless West Africa through its Joint Border Program (JBP) and working on dealing with insecurities through its Mediation and Security Council, and Conflict Prevention Focal Point Directorates among others.

In 2018, the ECOWAS in collaboration with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The meeting between the ECOWAS and the ECCAS hinged on the threat of trans-border terrorism in both sub-regions and the need to find immediate solutions as it threatens the realization of their objectives. The ECOWAS Commission in 2019 also held a meeting with the ambassadors of ECOWAS member states on the need to strengthen security through the conduct of peaceful elections by member states within the sub-region. This came after the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council advised on the need to look at the broader picture of security within African societies.

In the attempt to strengthen security in the sub-region, the ECOWAS has organized meetings and programs on building a borderless West Africa. In 2021, the ECOWAS secured land in both Sierra Leone and Liberia for the construction of a joint border for the free movement of goods and people with the final architectural and engineering design for the border completed in 2024. The joint border between Sierra Leone and Liberia is designed to inculcate the exchange of information between both countries for the facilitation of trade and the free movement of people. The joint border posts of Sierra Leone and Liberia are part of a broader project for the establishment of the Abidjan-Dakar corridor road for data sharing and free trade. As a result, Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia received funding from the African Development Bank (ADB) in 2023 for the construction of a border bridge over the Cavalla River between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia at the Prolo border.

In addition to the construction of the Joint Border Posts, ECOWAS has embarked on sensitization of border and immigration officers. In September 2023, the ECOWAS Commission through the Directorate of Free Movement of Persons & Migration commenced the sensitization of immigration officers, customs officers, trans-border commercial drivers, and any other stakeholder on the usage and relevance of the ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card (ENBIC) for the promotion of free movement of people and goods. “The use of ENBIC, intended to improve the free movement of people, goods and services, has been adopted as a valid travel document in the ECOWAS region, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau” (Seňko, 2023:22). According to Senko (2023), a major justification for the adoption of the ENBIC was to combat human trafficking by strengthening the security architecture and data management of the borders of West African countries.

### **3.4.1 Ghana-ECOWAS Relations On Open Borders**

Ghana's commitment to the objective of the ECOWAS according to Boafo-Arthur (2009) has been more socio-economic than political. Ghana, as a major player in the formation of the ECOWAS has made major strides in the building of a borderless West Africa (Boafo-Arthur, 2009). Ghana has hosted myriad meetings and continues to host annual meetings of the ECOWAS. All heads of State of Ghana in the fourth republic, except the Late President Fiifi Atta Mills, have served as Chairpersons of the ECOWAS. This has come with major policies and programs in loosening (de-securitizing) Ghana's borders for the promotion of trade and integration in the sub-region.

In 2009, the name of the foreign ministry in Ghana was changed from Ministry of foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MOFARI). This accentuates the significance of regional integration as Ghana's major foreign policy objective since independence (Ministry Of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, 2024). The Ministry later introduced the ECOWAS passport in replacement of the Ghanaian passport. This was congruent with the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment (Adepoju, Boulton & Levin, 2010). Also, the National Identification Authority of Ghana introduced the Ghana ECOWAS card (Ghana card) in fulfillment of the ECOWAS National Biometric Identity Card (ENBIC) for the promotion of free movement of people and goods. In June 2023, Ghana, through its Ministry of Communications and Digitalization rolled out the "Free Roaming initiative" to foster integration among ECOWAS member countries for the promotion of trade (Ministry of Information, 2024). The "free Roaming Initiative" eliminates international charges on Internet Service within the sub-region. The Initiative currently works between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Ministers from Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo together with the

ECOWAS Commission are also working on a six (6) dual carriage road from Abidjan to Lagos for the promotion of free movement of goods and services.

These project Ghana's position on the building of a borderless West Africa in fulfillment of the objective of the ECOWAS. As Ghana seeks to open up its borders, it is met with threats that warrant the closure of borders. These threats are not unique to Ghana but the West African region as a whole. The ECOWAS is equally making strides to strengthen security in the sub-region for the promotion of integration and socio-economic development. Despite these strides, several events unfolding in West Africa interfere with the ECOWAS's efforts to realize its goals. Current events coupled with intractable threats to security in the sub-region continue to threaten the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS.

### **3.5 THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EVENTS IN WEST AFRICA ON THE BORDERS OF ECOWAS MEMBER COUNTRIES**

The ECOWAS sub-region and Central Africa have witnessed several military coups that jeopardize the socio-economic development of the sub-region and the African continent as a whole. A coup d'état is the forceful seizure of political power usually from a democratically elected leader (Miller, 2011; Bell, 2016). Coups d'état could easily be described as an obsolete act of obtaining power and with the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal democracy, it was expected to die a natural death (Bell, 2016). Unfortunately, West Africa and some parts of the African continent still face this menace in contemporary times. Chigozie & Oyinmiebi (2022) describe West Africa as the epicenter of coups d'état in Africa.

In July 2023, the President of Niger, President Mohamed Bazoum, was held captive in his palace by members of his presidential guards. The coup plotters declared a seizure of power on National Television for reasons including insecurities in Niger and bad governance from the captured

President. Abdourahamane Tiani, the head of the presidential guard was later declared as the New Head of State of Niger. Also, in January 2022, Burkina Faso's army toppled the government of President Roch Kabore on claims that he had failed to fight terrorism in Burkina Faso. Interestingly, but daunting to democracy and development, the military leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba, who toppled President Roch Kabore's government in January 2022, was ousted by Captain Ibrahim Traore in a second coup on claims of immorality in the military. In September 2021, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya (Special Forces Commander of Guinea) toppled the government of President Alpha Conde after President Conde amended the Constitution of Guinea to prolong his stay in power. Powell, Lasley & Schiel (2016) argue that a major cause of coups is the circumvention of constitutional limitations by sitting Presidents. The government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was ousted by a group of coup plotters led by Colonel Assimi Goita. The coup was followed by several controversies including anti-government protests based on corruption, and issues of transition to democratic governance among others.

The implications of these events in West Africa have a significant trickle-down effect on the ECOWAS and border relations among West African countries. Firstly, the assumption of power by military juntas automatically leads to the suspension of constitutions and commitments to international agreements. According to Gathii (2018), military juntas upon assumption of power suspend the constitution and set up a transitional body for restoring constitutional rule. The Military juntas in West Africa are at constant loggerheads with the ECOWAS on issues of transitioning to democratic governance. This mostly leads to the abrogation of every agreement or commitment signed by the previous government, including agreements on free trade and free movement of people within the sub-region. Secondly, the ECOWAS with immediate effect suspends the military junta from the ECOWAS. By implication, ECOWAS member countries are



not expected to trade with military juntas in the sub-region. This leads to the closure of borders between military juntas and democratic West African countries. A more daunting aspect of the recent coups in West Africa is the deliberate withdrawal of the membership of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. It is worth noting that these countries are an integral part of the integration process and ECOWAS programs. Therefore, their withdrawal from the ECOWAS affects the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty and its related protocols together with border relations with member countries.

### **3.6 SUCCESSES OF THE ECOWAS**

A key achievement of the ECOWAS has been the establishment and the existence of the ‘Single Passport’ for ECOWAS member countries. Osolase (2017) asserts that the adoption of a single passport for ECOWAS member countries is meant to promote and smoothen the integration and interdependence of West African countries. It is also meant to promote free trade among West African countries. The majority of the ECOWAS members have changed their passports to suit and implement the single passport initiative. Ghana for instance did not only implement the single passport policy but went ahead to issue a national ECOWAS identity card popularly known as the “Ghana card”.

Another success story of the ECOWAS has been its ability to bring together French-speaking (Francophone) West African countries and English-speaking (Anglophone) West African countries as well as Portuguese-speaking (Lusophone) West African countries. Nwangwu, Enyiazu, Nwagwu & Ezeibe (2019) described the ECOWAS as the only integration scheme that transcends all colonial boundaries. The ECOWAS can easily be described as a significant example of a diversified economic community in the region and the world at large (Nwangwu, Enyiazu, Nwagwu & Ezeibe, 2019).

A unique achievement of the ECOWAS is the promotion of sports through the establishment of the West Africa Football Union (WAFU) and West Africa Universities Games (WAUG). The efforts by the ECOWAS to promote cooperation and integration in the sub-region have reflected in sports, especially, in the contemporary WAFU Nations Cup. The West Africa Universities Game was born out of a conference for universities in West Africa in 1964 and the first game was held in 1965 in Ibadan, Nigeria. Sport is an effective way of bringing people with diverse backgrounds together. Agergaard & la Cour (2012) argue that politicians and institutions interested in integration strategically resort to sporting activities as an easier means of integration. The target of the ECOWAS in building a borderless West Africa did not only encompass political and economic institutions but also identified sports as a recreational way of integrating West African countries for the attainment of its ultimate goal.

### **3.7 CHALLENGES TO ECOWAS**

A major challenge that has bedeviled the ECOWAS since its inception has been the existence of military juntas and autocracies (Sesay, 2020; Adepoju, Boulton & Levin, 2010). Some member States during the signing of the ECOWAS treaty were operating autocracies and military juntas. “Governments like Dawda Jawara of the Gambia, William Tolbert of Liberia, Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire; Sekou Toure of Guinea, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Mathieu Kerekou of Benin were all dictators operating an authoritarian and dictatorial system of governance, and as well hounding down oppositional and progressive voices, and other vibrant party political systems” (Osolase, 2017:2). The ECOWAS in its current dispensation is struggling with issues of coups, military juntas, and autocracies. Dauntingly, democratically elected governments have been toppled in Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali between the period of 2020 and 2023. The effort by the ECOWAS to restore democracy in these countries has led to the withdrawal of Mali, Niger

and Burkina Faso from the ECOWAS. The reasons outlined for the withdrawal include the failure of the ECOWAS to help in the fight against terrorism and insecurities in these countries, and the imposition of inhumane, illegitimate sanctions on these countries. The strategies adopted by the ECOWAS in restoring democracy in Gambia in 2017 after Yahya Jammeh lost the December 2016 elections backfired when the ECOWAS tried reapplying it in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali (Hartmann, 2017; Mills, 2022). Democracy has been described by the ECOWAS treaty to be the backbone of the integration and interdependence in the West African region. Unfortunately, democratizing West African countries keeps reverting to autocracy on issues of corruption, poverty, terrorism, and bad governance.

The lack of political will among member countries is a major impediment to the realization of the goals of ECOWAS. The realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS rests heavily on the implementation of the treaty by the member states. The member states lack the utmost political will for the implementation of the treaty (Osolase, 2017). According to Osolase (2017:3), “For decades since after its formation, so many member states of ECOWAS have totally refused to execute or put into effect the various Acts and Decisions of the regional organization. This is because they lack the political will to pull through in carrying out or putting into operation the Acts and Protocols which they have signatories appended to.” According to Ogbonna, Aluko & Awuah (2013), most ECOWAS member states lack the political will for the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty because they pursue a divergent foreign policy that has no basis in the realization of the objective of the ECOWAS.

A recurring challenge to the ECOWAS treaty has been the weak economies of its member countries. Internally, there are economic challenges facing the member countries of ECOWAS. The economic crises in the member countries suppress the openness of member countries in

submitting to the idea of interdependence through free trade and the free movement of people within the sub-region. This is because most West African countries are focused on their internal issues of bringing their economies to life and improving the lives of their citizens rather than committing to regional needs and goals. In short, most West African countries do not feel ready to integrate. Also, this impedes member countries from contributing their quota to the growth of the community through payment of dues and other financial commitments to the community.

Nwangwu, Enyiazu, Nwagwu & Ezeibe (2019:123) assert that

From an economic point of view, West Africa has generally remained poor. Although 5% of the world's population live in West Africa, its shares of world's total GDP and total exports is less than 1%. Twelve out of the fifteen ECOWAS member-states are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In the UNDP's development index, the bottom ten countries have consistently come from Sub-Saharan Africa out of which four are ECOWAS member-states. This is not unconnected to the fact that the region comprises mainly primary and, in most cases, single-commodity producer countries which consume what they do not produce. The narrowing or elimination of the gap between production and consumption is required to enable the Community and its citizens break from the maze of exogenous dependency for the basic necessities of life.

As outlined by Nwangwu, Enyiazu, Nwagwu & Ezeibe (2019), most West African countries have more pressing internal economic issues on their shoulder that inhibit them from committing to the aims and objectives of the community. This has been a major blow to the growth and development of the community.

Wars and insecurities are taking over the actual aim and objective of ECOWAS. Insecurities in the ECOWAS bloc and beyond impede the integration and interdependence agenda of the sub-regional bloc. ECOWAS is very focused on security issues as a result of the numerous security problems in the sub-region rather than promoting free trade and free movement of people within the sub-regional bloc. The aims and objectives of the ECOWAS cannot be realized in the realms of insecurities but the security issues in the sub-region and the region at large are intractable and

recurring with no end in sight. Yabi (2010:6) avers that “established in 1975 originally as a regional organization to essentially promote the economic integration of the fifteen Member States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been gradually transformed, under the pressure of political events, into an organization also responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crisis which were undermining peace and security within the community space”. In essence, the ECOWAS would have chopped more successes if it is solely focused on regional integration and economic interdependence.

### **3.8 CONCLUSION**

The history surrounding the formation of the ECOWAS together with its established aims and objectives presents a clear roadmap and blueprint for the promotion of integration and cooperation that will birth socio-economic development. The accompanying protocols, meetings, and conferences of the ECOWAS in the realm of an insecurity-free community present a perfect socio-economically developed West Africa. Inadvertently, the projected picture that warranted and informed the formation of the ECOWAS treaty is bedeviled with insecurities. More importantly, insecurities at the borders of member countries, greatly limit the opening up of borders of member countries which is the gateway to the realization and implementation of the provisions and articles in the ECOWAS treaty. The drift from socio-economic development and interdependence of the ECOWAS to an organization currently focused on security is based on the relevance of security in attaining its objective of integration. It is therefore no startling that most activities of the ECOWAS have been on insecurities in the sub-region as they directly and indirectly impact border securities of member countries. It has reflected in how insecurities at the borders of Ghana have influenced its commitment to the ECOWAS treaty.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **BORDER INSECURITIES IN GHANA AND ITS IMPACT ON ECOWAS**

#### **4.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents the specific border-related issues that have confronted Ghana in its commitment to the ECOWAS treaty. The specific border-related issues are analyzed using securitization theory. This is to establish how border-related crimes or issues that serve as threats to the security of Ghana influence policies, programs, and institutions in the promulgation of security measures in dealing with the issues. Also, the measures or programs that emanate from the securitization of these threats or border-related issues are analyzed to show how they impede the implementation of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS treaty in building an integrated and interdependent West Africa.

#### **4.1 BORDER SECURITY ISSUES IN GHANA**

According to the International Migration Centre for Policy Development (IMCPD), Ghana is a destination for irregular migration from countries in Africa and the world at large. Awumbila, Benneh, Teye & Atiim (2014) aver that Ghana is among the West African countries that receive the highest number of immigrants. In the realm of irregular migration, several security-related issues are encountered at or through Ghana's borders. According to Mensah (2023) and Kandilige, Teye, Talleraas & Gopsill (2023), the porous nature coupled with numerous illegal routes that characterize Ghana's borders is threatening the peaceful atmosphere of Ghana. The arousal of existential threats as explained by Waeber (1993), Taureck (2006), and Eroukhmanoff (2017), forces the hands of securitizing actors to sanction measures or emergency actions to tackle the threat. The most disturbing border security issues identified at the borders of Ghana as recognized

by the International Migration Centre for Policy Development include trafficking in persons (Human Trafficking), smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other contraband goods, and piracy among others (Nii Nortey Addo, 2008; Sosuh, 2011; Taylor, 2002).

The major borders of Ghana include the Elubo Central Command Border Post, the border or boundary between Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire; The Aflao Border, the main eastern border or boundary between Ghana and Togo; The ECOWAS border, which also borders Ghana and Togo; the Bawku Border, the boundary between Ghana and Burkina Faso (See fig. 1.0 below). Several unapproved routes characterize these main border posts. These unapproved routes make it easier for the perpetuation of border-related crimes and transnational criminal activities. These border-related crimes or trans-border crimes threaten the security of Ghana. The existence of border towns also makes it difficult to seal these unapproved routes. The border towns sometimes serve as the channel for easy smuggling of weapons, and human trafficking because of their easy and unregulated access to both countries. Nugent (2012) argues that border towns are towns that are directly located on or close to the boundaries of countries, and either were in existence before the demarcation of the country or are heavily dependent on the boundary for their existence. Some of the border towns in Ghana are Wurinyanga, Nakpanduri, Bunkpurugu, Wawjawga, Kilingg, Nkanta, Breniasi, Agbome, Aflao, Bawku, and Denu among others. In Ghana, some houses are directly built on the boundaries (See fig. 2.0 below). Comically, people tease that some Ghanaians in the Volta region who live in border towns have their bedrooms in Ghana and their kitchens in Togo or vice versa.



Fig. 1.0 A Map of Ghana’s Boundaries and Border Town

Source: Images of Alamy





Fig. 2.0 Aerial Picture of Ghana’s Border with Burkina Faso and A Border Town

Source: US Department of State Geographer

## 4.2 HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The Human Trafficking Act of Ghana (Act 694, 2005) defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, trading or receipt of persons within or across national borders by the use of threats, force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or exploitation of vulnerability; or giving or receiving payments and benefits to achieve consent”. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Ghana, human trafficking in Ghana caught the eyes of the international community in 2002 after the release of the findings of research on children who were forced into labor in the Ghanaian fishing industry. This period marked the gateway to measures meant to curb human trafficking as a threat to the security of Ghana. As West African countries are integrating and progressing towards interdependence, criminal activities also connect on several levels in the sub-region. In Ghana,

local human trafficking networks connect with sub-regional networks (International Organization for Migration-Ghana, 2013). This assertion by the International Organization for Migration-Ghana (2013) is in congruence with Lawrence's (2010) argument that the Ghanaian human trafficking network is part of a sub-regional and global human trafficking network. Aradau (2004b) argues that human trafficking falls within the spectrum of humanitarian problems and at the same time securitization discursive regime. The securitization aspect of this humanitarian problem according to Aradau (2004b) has become necessary because of new dangers and threats that characterize human trafficking.

According to Wenngren (2011), the trafficking of humans in Ghana involves a significant number of children between the ages of seven and seventeen who are trafficked to neighboring countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Gambia, and Nigeria for forced labor. Wenngren (2011) further argues that some of the girls among these children are also sometimes trafficked to the Middle East and Europe for prostitution and other domestic work. These children are used as a cheaper source of labor and may not receive any form of payment. They are exploited and abused physically and sometimes sexually (Wenngren, 2011). These children are also denied their basic human rights like the right to education and the right to dignity.

Documented areas of cases of human trafficking include fishing, illegal mining (galamsey), cocoa farming, commercial sex industry, domestic work, and street begging or hawking. The International Organization for Migration-Ghana (2013:2) asserts that "Volta Region, Lenta community and Zabzugu-Tatale District have been identified as source areas for trafficked children and adults". Also, Burkinabe Children are trafficked into Ghana to live with 'Mallams' who end up being sexually assaulted (IOM, 2013). According to Koroma & Gueye (2013), human trafficking problems cut across all the West African countries.

#### **4.2.1 Causes of Human Trafficking In Ghana**

A major cause of human trafficking identified by Lawrence (2010) and Wenngren (2011) is the lack of education and ignorance. Wenngren (2011) argues that most Ghanaian parents are uneducated and therefore do not value education that much to see their wards or children in school. Some parents see it more beneficial to see their children engaging in profitable ventures and businesses rather than going to school. It is against this background, Wenngren (2011) views lack of education to be in congruence with ignorance in the argument on the causes of human trafficking in Ghana. Some uneducated parents ignorantly and indirectly sell their children into foreign lands with the idea of helping them secure jobs or make a living for themselves. Inadvertently, the free movement of people promoted by the ECOWAS in its quest to promote integration and cooperation makes it easy for human traffickers to transport children and adults across the region and into other regions of the world.

Poverty, according to Motseki & Mofokeng (2022), Lawrence (2010), and Wenngren (2011) is a major factor to consider in the discussion on the causes of human trafficking in Ghana and Africa at large. All West African countries including Ghana are developing countries with high poverty rates. According to Owusi & Yankson (2007) and Debrah (2013), poverty is a social phenomenon that cuts deep into the structures of the Ghanaian society. According to the Multidimensional Poverty Index (2023; 2), “24.6 percent of the population in Ghana (8,089 people in 2021) is multidimensionally poor while an additional 20.1 percent is classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (6,598 people in 2021)”. There is also a high unemployment rate, which is fueling human trafficking in Ghana and West Africa because of the poverty it leaves Africans. Ghanaian youth and even children are easily wooed and lured by human traffickers with the promise of getting them jobs and a better life outside Ghana or even the African region. The joy of getting a job or

making ends meet makes people surrender themselves willingly to be trafficked and even push parents to offer their children to be trafficked (Wenngren, 2011). As the borders of West African countries are being opened up for free trade and free movement of people, the trafficking of human beings becomes difficult to deal with.

Another cause of human trafficking according to Wenngren (2011) is the “culture of sending” among Ghanaians and most African societies. Ghanaian societies, mainly parents have an ingrained culture of sending their children and even younger siblings to live and work with other family members, friends, and strangers. This is very popular during school breaks. This is a traditional behavior among Ghanaians that is seen to be socially welcomed but indirectly promotes human trafficking (Wenngren, 2011; Sertich & Heemskerk, 2011). Wenngren (2011;40) argues that “the system of the extended family has with modernity developed into a harmful practice, where the purpose of care-taking has been substituted for exploitation”.

The above-elaborated causes of human trafficking serve as the fueling factors of the threat posed by human trafficking to the security of Ghana. Successful elimination of these factors of lack of education and ignorance, poverty, and the culture of sending will create the facilitating condition for a prolific securitization of human trafficking as a threat to the security of Ghana. This is because the emergency measures put in place by securitizing actors and functional actors are likely to succeed in the absence of these factors.

#### **4.2.2 Threats of Human Trafficking**

Human trafficking promotes the spread and transfer of Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) like HIV/AIDS, Syphilis, and Hepatitis B among others. Young girls and even boys who are trafficked into Ghana and out of Ghana are mostly used for sexual exploits like prostitution. According to Sertich & Heemskerk (2011), there are about 120 brothels in Accra alone which are made up of

trafficked young girls from areas within Ghana and the West African region. These young girls and boys engage in both protected and unprotected sexual activities for commercial purposes. This easily leads to the spread of STIs in Ghana and the West African region thereby adding up to the already existing problems of poverty, and civil wars confronting the sub-region. About 354,927 people are living with HIV in Ghana with an estimated rise of up to 16,574 new infections in 2022 (World Health Organization, 2023). This threatens the public health system of Ghana with an accompanying financial implication on the government's budget.

In addition, human trafficking promotes human rights abuses including child labor. Sanchez & Stark (2014:20) argue that “force, fraud, and coercion are the methods used by traffickers to commit the crime of human trafficking”. Human trafficking victims are mostly threatened with injury or death if the victim refuses to comply with the traffickers' demands. The victims are mostly handicapped because the traffickers in most instances take away all of their victims' travel documents. “Traffickers use isolation to manipulate victims, making them psychologically vulnerable due to lack of a support system” (Sanchez & Stark, 2014:20).

Some traffickers also make use of illegal routes within the ECOWAS sub-region to escape security officers. This in itself is a serious security breach and sometimes leads to the shooting of traffickers and their victims. Due to the dangerous nature of their voyage, some victims lose their lives, and others are severely injured. In 2005, 44 illegal Ghanaian migrants were massacred in Gambia when traveling to Europe for greener pastures. Later in 2009, after the Gambian Truth and Reconciliation Committee revealed that the 44 Ghanaians were killed under the command of former President Yahya Jammeh, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa (Member of Parliament for North Tongu) together with majority of his colleague MPs called for immediate investigations into the massacre. The MPs described the confessions by the Gambian soldiers conceding to killing the 44 Ghanaians as

a matter of utmost significance that cannot be taken lightly (Parliament of Ghana News, 2019). The traffickers even murder some of their victims when they slow them down or do not comply with their commands. Some die from extreme weather conditions and attacks from dangerous and poisonous animals. Bariagaber (2023:256) argues that “aside from death, rape, and disappearances, the list of migrant hardships and abuses includes dehydration and hunger, lack of medical care, sexual molestation, and physical violence at the hands of smugglers, traffickers, and desert bandits”.

#### **4.3 SMUGGLING OF ILLEGAL DRUGS**

Tagziria, Ane & de Lugo (2024) argue that the trade in illegal substances has a crucial implication for society. In terms of border-related crimes in Ghana, Tagziria, Ane & de Lugo (2024) argue that between 2021 and 2023, the trade in illegal drugs like cocaine in Ghana expanded due to the porous nature and mismanagement of Ghana’s borders. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) identified Ghana as a transit and destination for illegal drugs transported from several parts of the world including West African countries.

According to Aning & Pokoo (2014) and Bernstein (1999), Ghana and the West African region serve as a major transit and repackaging hub for illegal drugs like cocaine and heroin. These illegal drugs according to Aning & Pokoo (2014) and Bernstein (1999) originate from Latin American and Asian producing areas and transcend the borders of Africa and European markets. Drug trafficking in the view of Aning & Pokoo (2014) gained prominence in the mid-2000s as a result of robust U.S. anti-narcotics strategies that shifted the Latin American drug syndicates to focus on the African continent as a way of penetrating the European market.

The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) acknowledged corruption, insufficient resources, and porous borders as the fueling factors for border-related crimes while focusing on the smuggling of illegal drugs. According to Appiahene-Gyamfi (2016), the trade in illicit drugs in Ghana goes back in time to periods before independence and it has grown and spread its tentacles through West Africa to Europe, Southern America, and other parts of the world with Ghana serving as one of the epicenters. Thachuk (2007) argues that the threat of illicit drug smuggling and trafficking transcend the borders of countries. Illicit drug smuggling and trafficking is a transnational threat (Thachuk, 2007).

#### **4.3.1 Threats Posed By Illegal Drug Smuggling and Trafficking**

Aning & Pokoo (2014) argue that a major danger posed by illegal drug smuggling or trafficking is the associated acquisitive crimes by illegal drug users as a result of the serious behavioral changes the illegal drugs cause. Illegal drugs like cocaine, and heroin among others according to Aning & Pokoo (2014) sometimes lead to unacceptable behaviors in society like aggression and violence. These behavioral changes have serious security implications. The Minister of Interior for Ghana and MP for Ayawaso Central, Hon. Henry Quartey, acknowledged the threats of illicit drug smuggling and abuse to the security of Ghana and the West African region (Ministry of the Interior, 2024). In a speech delivered by the Honorable Minister and Member of Parliament at the launch of the 2024 World Drug Report in Accra, Hon. Quartey called for an immediate intensification of efforts in combating the problem of drug smuggling and its abuse in the sub-region (Ministry of the Interior, 2024). Some individuals induce themselves with these drugs to instigate violence and even wars.

It is therefore not surprising efforts are being made to abrogate its production, trafficking, and sale in every region of the world. The porous nature of the borders in West Africa makes it easy for the

trafficking of these dangerous illegal drugs. The same porous nature of the West African borders is what is making it lucrative and attractive to Latin American drug networks to bring their drug businesses to the West African region as identified by Aning & Pokoo (2014) and Bernstein (1999). The more drug trafficking activities thrive on the West African continent, the more violent activities also thrive on the continent; hence the intractable wars on the African continent. It is worth noting that the root causes of most of the violence (war) may not be because of drug trafficking and its usage on the continent. Still, the unexplainable tragedies and behaviors of violent perpetrators can be attributed to the usage of illegal drugs.

Devlin & Henry (2008) argue that the smuggling and trafficking of illegal drugs increase the usage of illicit drugs, which causes health implications. These health implications include respiratory and cardiovascular complications. According to Devlin & Henry (2008:1), the “smoking of crack cocaine (which vaporizes at 187°C) can lead to thermal injury of the pharynx and airways, which may be severe”. Cocaine is also a major cause of chest pains that are linked to heart diseases. Hon. George Kwame Aboagye (MP for Asene/Akroso/Manso) in a submission on the floor of the Parliament of Ghana in 2017 described drug smuggling and drug abuse as a “national threatening canker” (Parliament of Ghana, 2017). The MP urged the Speaker of Parliament to fight the threatening canker of illicit drug smuggling and abuse with all seriousness as it causes the spread of STIs (Parliament of Ghana, 2017). Aning & Pokoo (2014) argue that a spillover effect of illicit drug trafficking and smuggling is the increment in sexually transmitted diseases like HIV/AIDS. The STIs spread through the use of shared needles and other sharp objects used in administering illicit drugs.

Adeyanju (2020) argues that the most devastating effect or threat in contemporary times posed by illicit drug smuggling or trafficking is the destruction or compromise of already weakened



institutions and symbols that protect statehood. Drug traffickers can penetrate the highest levels of military commands and install favorite politicians into office through the financing of elections (Adeyanju, 2020:74). Drug traffickers have penetrated deep into the structures of government such that state apparatus cannot even fight the operations of drug traffickers. According to Adeyanju (2020), drug traffickers are building an environment that makes it easy for drug trafficking to thrive.

#### **4.4 SMUGGLING AND TRADE IN ARMS**

According to Nzeako & Rilwan (2021:166) “managing the Smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has become one of the most urgent security and developmental challenges in Africa in recent times”. Although Africa is not known for the manufacturing of sophisticated weapons like nuclear warheads, its production of small arms and the numerous conflicts on the continent is disheartening. According to Aning (2005:3), “Although craft small arms production is present throughout West Africa, Ghana’s long-standing and socially embedded gun-making tradition makes it a country of particular concern”. One of Ghana’s most cherished ancient professions that is passed on from generation to generation is “Blacksmith”. These professionals are highly valued due to the ornaments and other basic household wares they make from metals and other valuable resources like gold, bronze, and bauxite among others. They were also highly valued in ancient times because of their unique roles in battles by producing weapons such as swords, spears, arrowheads, and guns.

Unfortunately, the blacksmith’s craft (Gunsmith) in the production of “local” guns in Ghana is still at play with next to few measures to regular it. This forms a major basis in the trade of arms through smuggling within the West African region and the whole of Africa. Aning (2005:3) argues that “Guns ‘made in Ghana’ are now known regionally for their competitive prices, their effectiveness,

and their accessibility, thus raising concerns that they might one day represent a significant source of weaponry for armed groups”.

Insecurity in Ghana and instability in Togo, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire, has resulted in higher prices—which holds trans-national implications for Ghanaian production. In these countries, customers not only import Ghanaian craft guns, but also invite gunsmiths to teach their craft to others. Under the rubric of skills transfer, manufacturers are thus able to evade the scrutiny of Ghanaian security forces. Gunsmiths credit this tactic with raising their income, while simultaneously reducing the need for bribery and the likelihood of arrest (Aning, 2005:6).

Inadvertently, the guns made in Ghana are widely accepted for their reliability, and accessibility by hunters and even criminals. Aning (2005) revealed that current gunsmiths in the West African region can produce sophisticated AK-47 assault rifles aside from pistols, shotguns, and the traditional hunting guns they are known to produce. The disheartening aspect of this argument is that these weapons are not produced to serve as ornaments, but sold to merchants and middlemen across the West African sub-region for violence and other atrocious activities. They are transported through the borders of West African countries and even patronized by top politicians to support their political agendas through violent and dubious means. This calls for stringent and immediate measures to securitize the threats posed by the production, and smuggling of these weapons across the borders of West Africa. Hon. Ambrose Dery (Former Minister for the Interior) in a speech at the inauguration of the Governing Board of the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons asserts that the threat of illicit arms smuggling and its implications on the security of Ghana is a priority for the President and drastic measure will be adopted to fight arm smuggling and proliferation (Ministry of the Interior, 2021).

#### **4.4.1 Threats of Arms Smuggling and Trade in Ghana**

Wegener (2011:5), in his exposition on Ghana’s small arms and light weapons issues argues that “compared to many of its sub-Saharan counterparts where massive post-conflict stockpiles

continue to sow death and devastation, a new influx of illicit small arms is at the core of Ghana's small arms challenge today". The smuggling and trade in arms illegally is believed to be the fueling factor in the intractable wars in the Northern region of Ghana and several parts of the West African sub-region. The Northern regions of Ghana have seen most of Ghana's civil wars. It is therefore not surprising that Aning (2005) identified the northern regions of Ghana as part of the regions with the utmost gunsmith skills. The gunsmith skill is not unique to Ghana but spread across the West African region, thereby promoting the trade and smuggling of arms.

According to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crimes (GI-TOC, 2023), a predominant increase in firearms and small weapons from Burkina Faso has significantly made the violence in Bawku (Border town) more deadly and bloodier. The Bawku conflict is an inter-ethnic conflict between the people of Kusasi and Mamprusi on chieftaincy issues in Ghana (Victor, 2021). The conflict according to Victor (2021) started as late as 1931 and is still ongoing with several renewed clashes between the two ethnic groups. The importation of small arms from Burkina Faso is believed to have led to an increase in casualties to the tune of 260 in the Bawku area, unlike the earlier version of the conflict that did not see the presence of small arms (GI-TOC, 2023).

The smuggling and trade in arms promote armed robbery in Ghana and terrorist activities in Africa at large. The nagging question about gun possession by armed robbers and other criminals on the African continent has been "Where do these criminals acquire their weapons?" Guns produced by gunsmiths cannot singlehandedly answer this question but to some extent give meaning to the source of this weaponry for criminal activities. Nowak & Gsell (2018) acknowledged that locally manufactured weapons are a major source of weapons for armed actors. These armed actors do not only include armed robbers but also terrorists. This poses a major threat to the national security

of Ghana through armed robbery, organized crime, and the constant fear of terrorism. These, according to Beri (2000) negatively affect socio-economic development. This threat warrants robust security measures to securitize the threats posed by arms smuggling and trafficking thereby making it difficult for the ECOWAS to de-securitize for the promotion of cooperation and integration.

#### **4.5 PIRACY**

In most instances, Ghana's boundary with the sea (Gulf of Guinea) is ignored when discussing Ghana's boundaries and its related security issues. The focus is mainly on the land borders but piracy is a big issue when it comes to transnational crimes or border-related crimes. According to Ofosu-Boateng (2018), there is a rising number of piracy attacks off the Gulf of Guinea and the coast of Ghana. The modes of operation of these piracy attacks include violence, the use of guns, and speedboats. Ofosu-Boateng (2018) asserts that piracy in the seawaters of Ghana affects other West African countries and the international community.

Koroma & Gueye (2013) argue that piracy off the West African coast of countries like Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, and Benin among others threatens the security of these countries. According to Mejia Jr, Cariou & Wolff (2012), piracy poses a significant threat to trade among countries. Mejia Jr, Cariou & Wolff (2012) explained piracy to mean the hijacking and robbing of trade ships.

By 2009, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reported 46 incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and 47 in 2010. 25 of the reported attacks in 2010 occurred off the coast of Nigeria, six off the coast of Ghana, five off the coast of Cameroon, four off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire, three off the coast of Democratic Republic of Congo, and one off the coast of Liberia. In 2011 there was dramatic increase to 64 incidents. 21 of the attacks occurred off the coast of the Republic of Benin, while 14 attacks took place off the coast of Nigeria. Togo experienced seven attacks and Ghana had two (Koroma & Gueye, 2013:41).

It is surprising to read and learn of such numbers of piracy in contemporary times. Piracy is assumed to be an ancient act. However, the reality is that it is still happening and massively impacting trade in West Africa where the ECOWAS is striving for economic interdependence. When discussing border security in Ghana, the focus is mainly on the military and the immigration service as they are expected to defend the borders of Ghana. Lest is said of the Navy or Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA). According to a report by the Africa Defence Forum (2023), there was a pirate attack in Takoradi in Ghana which is a harbor town. Even though the attack was unsuccessful, it once again reiterated the existence of piracy and its dangers on Ghana's maritime activities. Inadvertently, piracy is happening and Ghana's seawater remains open to these threats.

#### **4.5.1 The Threats of Piracy and Its Implications on Ghana and the West African Region**

Ofori-Boateng (2018) argues that maritime piracy negatively affects global economic development. The growing maritime piracies at the shores of Ghana and other West African countries is affecting trade among West African countries, and West African countries' trade with the international community. To skip piracy attacks, some ships have to re-route their shipments and trips; therefore taking longer times before reaching their destinations (Ofori-Boateng, 2018). This leads to economic loss for shipping companies and discourages them from engaging in trading activities in the sub-region. This is because the international community, including West African countries, would willingly trade on safe and peaceful seaways than piracy or robbery-prone seaways.

Also, piracy or robbery at sea sometimes leads to the injury of crew members and the death of some crew members (Ofori-Boateng, 2018). As pirates make use of violence and weapons in hijacking cargo ships, their activities sometimes intentionally and unintentionally, lead to the death and injury of some of the crewmembers of the cargo ship, the navy or coast guards, and even the

pirates (criminals) themselves. This jeopardizes the efforts of the ECOWAS in its quest to establish a common market for West African countries through the promotion of integration and cooperation. In the light of these threats, the Ghana Maritime Authority, and the Ghana Navy planned in 2021 to take the fight against piracy to the pirates directly as they seek to collaborate with Nigeria in the fight against piracy (Ghana Maritime Authority, 2021). This is because the West African countries, notwithstanding their economies, will have to spend more time and resources dealing with these problems than de-securitizing their coastal policies and rules for the achievement of the objectives of the ECOWAS. Equally, the ECOWAS is spending more resources on dealing with these problems rather than focusing solely on the achievement of its objectives.

#### **4.6 SECURITIZATION OF GHANA'S BORDER-RELATED ISSUES**

The border-related issues or crimes such as human trafficking, smuggling of illegal drugs and goods, smuggling and trade in arms, and piracy among others threaten the security of Ghana. In this case, the sovereign state of Ghana (national sovereignty and territorial integrity) is the referent object threatened by border-related crimes or issues. Security is an indispensable aspect of every country. Countries will do everything possible to reduce, and more importantly, eliminate every threat to their security. It is not surprising that Waever (1993) defined security in the realm of being safe and free from threat. As a result, countries make national security policies or put in place measures to deal with these threats. According to Eroukhmanoff (2017), securitization assumes that national security policies are the by-product of careful discussion of measures in dealing with dangerous, menacing, and alarming security threats. Patomaki (2015) and Taureck (2006) argue that for an issue to qualify as a national security threat or issue, it must catch the attention of the securitizing actor. According to Emmers (2003:423), “the securitizing actors are

the heads of state and government as well as their foreign ministers and ministers of interior/home affairs”. The securitizing actors in collaboration with functional actors use their social and institutional powers to move the security threat beyond politics to warrant urgent and drastic measures in dealing with the threat (Wilkinson, 2015).

The border-related threatening issues of Ghana in the likes of human trafficking, smuggling of drugs, smuggling of arms, and piracy among others have drawn the attention of securitizing actors in Ghana and functional actors across the world. Functional actors have also influenced the discourse around the securitization of these threats in Ghana. Securitizing actors in Ghana through institutions like the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), and the defense ministry among others put in place several measures to deal with these menaces. Also, functional actors through the likes of the IOM, UN, AU, and ECOWAS in terms of their efforts in influencing measures for dealing with the security threats in Ghana. The measures or policies are meant to distinctly tackle a specific border-related issue like human trafficking, smuggling of drugs, smuggling and trade in arms, and piracy among others. These policies and measures are products of the Speech Act as they emanate from careful deliberations with security experts and policymakers (Securitizing actors and functional actors).

#### **4.6.1 Securitization of Human Trafficking In Ghana**

In June 2017, as a measure to securitize human trafficking, the government of Ghana through the Labour Department, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration placed a ban on the issuance of visas to Ghanaian domestic workers seeking to travel to the Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). Prior to the ban, the government of Ghana initiated a framework known as Visa-20 to regulate the migration of domestic workers to the Gulf States. The accompanying threats of human trafficking to the Gulf

States led to the ban on the framework. This measure became necessary after migration to the Gulf States was identified to be fueling human trafficking with a series of videos attesting to the abuse of trafficked Ghanaians. This act by the government of Ghana was in congruence with the grammar of security as explained by Wilkinson (2015) on internal facilitating conditions of securitization. The threat of human trafficking moved this issue beyond politics to the issuance of the ban that halted the activities of legally registered and licensed recruitment agencies in Ghana. Kandilige, Teye, Vargas-Silva & Godin (2022:3) aver that “the ban on the issuance of the specific visa category for domestic work in the Gulf State (visa-20) and the freeze on new licenses were geared towards safeguarding the rights of Ghanaian domestic workers in the Gulf States”.

The Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection of Ghana in March 2022 adopted the National Plan of Action for the Elimination of Human Trafficking in Ghana from 2022 to 2026. The National Plan of Action for the Elimination of Human Trafficking in Ghana is designed as a framework to provide a collaborative approach to combating human trafficking in Ghana based on comprehensive recommendations from stakeholders (Semordzi, 2018). This National Action Plan (NPA) 2022-2026 succeeds NPA 2017-2021 which shares similar values in terms of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership in combating human trafficking in Ghana. Ghana in its efforts to eliminate the threat of human trafficking and beef up its security in that aspect, adopted the Human Trafficking Act in 2005 (ACT 694). The Act touches on essential areas in human trafficking like prohibition and offenses related to trafficking, Complaints and arrests, rescue, rehabilitation and reintegration, and the establishment of a human trafficking fund among others. The security threats of human trafficking have moved beyond a law and order approach to a security approach that involves a collaborative effort of securitizing and functional actors. It is



against this transition Aradau (2004b) examines the connection between human trafficking as a security threat and a humanitarian problem.

Ghana has collaborated with several functional actors like the UN, ECOWAS, AU, and individual countries like the United States of America in dealing with human trafficking in Ghana. In 2023, the United States Department of State reported on Ghana's human trafficking fight. It recommended some strategies for fighting human trafficking in Ghana as it identified Ghana as a "TIER 2" in the securitization and fight against human trafficking. The International Organization for Migration (UN Migration Agency in Ghana) in the year 2018 supported Ghana with the Trafficking in Persons Information System (TIPIS) Donation to the Government of Ghana to help combat human trafficking. In July 2023, Ghana hosted the 15th ANNUAL ECOWAS Review Meeting for Trafficking In Person. This meeting of ECOWAS in Ghana was meant to review the implementation of measures put in place to securitize human trafficking in Ghana and other West African countries.

#### **4.6.2 Securitization of the Smuggling of Illegal Drugs in Ghana**

The Border Patrol Unit of Ghana has embarked on robust measures to fight drug smuggling and trafficking. The Border Patrol Unit under the Ghana Immigration Service has been consolidated over time to include the usage of weapons and embarking on military training to combat drug smuggling at the borders of Ghana. The number of the Unit has increased over time to ensure that maximum security is provided at the borders of Ghana. Between the period of 2006 and 2008, the workforce of the unit had increased from a hundred and fifty (150) to eight hundred (800) workforce. Aside from the Border Patrol Unit of the Ghana Immigration Service, there is also the Border Guard Unit (BGU). The Border Guard Unit is a national security and paramilitary unit of the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority

(GRA) and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). The Border Guard Unit was established in October 1964 with one of its primary objectives being the prevention of drug smuggling. All these measures are reflections of the internal facilitating condition of securitization which acknowledges a strong wording for securitization as expatiated by Wilkinson (2015).

As a speech act, the Deputy Minister for Interior in Ghana, Hon. Naana Eyiah in her speech during the unveiling of a newly renovated border post (Namoo border post) on May 29, 2024, in the Upper West Region of Ghana emphasized the relevance of strengthening border security. According to the Deputy Minister, strong borders are an indispensable recipe for maintaining national security and preventing border-related crimes. The Deputy Interior Minister's speech is an embodiment of authority and capacity to deal with existential threats in congruence with the external facilitating conditions identified by Wilkinson (2015). Interestingly, the newly renovated border post was funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Government of the United States of America. This project is part of a bigger project of strengthening borders between Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo in the fight against narcotics.

The United States Department of State under its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) (functional actor) is collaborating with the Government of Ghana (securitizing actor) to combat drug trafficking in West Africa. In 1990, after the realization of the threats and dangerous nature of the smuggling of illegal drugs in Ghana, the Narcotics Drugs (Control, Enforcement, and Sanctions) Law, 1990/PNDC Act 236 in 1990 (PNDC Law 236) was enacted (Kumah-Abiwu, 2023). The Provisional National Defense Council Law (PNDC Law) 236 further establishes the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) now known as Narcotics Control Commission (NACOC), Act 1019. The NACOC (Act 1019) was established with the idea of being the central coordinating body for battling the intractable threatening, alarming, and dangerous

dimensions of illicit drug trafficking in Ghana; taking into account its regional and global implications (Kumah-Abiwu, 2023).

The Narcotics Control Board in its attempt to deal with the threats of drug trafficking in Ghana and its securitization has collaborated with international entities (functional actors). This is because the threats posed by drug smuggling have moved beyond mere law and order issues. These international entities include Operation Westbridge with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs of the United Kingdom and International collaborations with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Shukor's (2007) publication on Operation Westbridge expressed that the authorities of Ghana approached the United Kingdom (UK) government to extend a helping hand in the fight against cocaine smuggling in Ghana. The operation saw an investment of about £250,000 in the first year for the fight against drug smuggling and the apprehension of about £62m worth of cocaine at the Kotoka International Airport (KIA), Ghana.

#### **4.6.3 Securitization of Smuggling and Trade in Arms**

In October 2021, Prof Kwesi Aning, the Director of Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) called out for a careful response to the challenges and proliferation of small arms in Ghana and the West African region.

According to Prof Kwesi Aning,

Statistics from Ghana's National Small Arms Commission indicate that there are more than 1.2 million unregistered firearms and light weapons in circulation in Ghana. This is apart from the millions of sophisticated weapons imported into the country by criminal gangs through unapproved channels (KAIPTC, 2021).

This is a functional actor calling out for the need to securitize the challenges caused by small arms smuggling in Ghana and the West African region. The medium, KAIPTC, is an institution for

deliberating on security issues and training security experts. This goes a long way to influence security decisions on border-related issues in Ghana and the West African region as a whole.

In 2007, Ghana adopted the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons through an Act of Parliament (Act 736) (Wegener, 2011). The National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons was established to advise on the issue and possession of small arms and light weapons (particularly the control of their illegal proliferation; production, trade, transfer, and cross-boundary movement which leads to their easy availability, accessibility, misuse and the fueling of crime) and to provide for related matters (Wegener, 2011). One of the essential objectives of the Commission is to “improve Government commitment to international protocols and conventions on small arms and light weapons, and their incorporation into national agenda”. In light of this, the Commission is mandated to domesticate and implement the provisions of the ECOWAS Convention, United Nations Firearms Protocol, UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) & other International Instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

The securitization of small arms and weapons at the national level, sub-regional level, regional level, and global levels projects how threatening, alarming, menacing, and dangerous the smuggling or trafficking of arms can be. It is interesting to note that ECOWAS, which was established to promote economic integration and interdependence, has adopted a convention (ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials) to securitize this menace. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and other Related Materials was adopted in June 2006 to prohibit the transfer of small arms within the ECOWAS region unless a permit has been obtained from the ECOWAS Secretariat. The Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and other Related Materials provide a blueprint for dealing with small arms and ammunition issues

in the sub-region. The Commission of ECOWAS has also been organizing annual meetings to assess the convention's implementation.

#### **4.6.4 Securitization of Piracy**

The Ghana Maritime Authority was established in 2002 by Act 630. Also, Ghana adopted the Ghana Maritime Security Act in 2004 (Act 675). Interestingly, both the Ghana Maritime Authority and Ghana Maritime Security Acts were amended in 2011 to Act 825 and Act 824 respectively. These two Acts of Parliament function as two-in-one entities as they are both meant to ensure smooth sailing activities and protect the safety and security of the sea and its transport activities. The targeted audience of this securitization measure is users of the Gulf of Guinea (territorial seawaters of Ghana) which includes captains of ships, crewmembers, and business entities that make use of the territorial seawaters of Ghana.

Nelson (2012) argues that the nature of the threats posed by piracy and maritime terrorism warrants a collaborative effort in the securitization of these threats; be it locally, regionally, or globally. The Ghana Maritime Authority collaborates with other regional and international maritime bodies in securitizing Ghana's maritime industry. Some of the international bodies include the National Maritime Security Technical Working Group (NMSTWG); which is aimed at building a comprehensive maritime strategy, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); which in the year 2015 collaborated with Ghana on the West and Central Africa Maritime Security project to develop a national maritime strategy. The objective of the meeting held between the International Maritime Organization on the West and Central Africa Maritime Security project was to build a maritime strategy to deal with piracy and armed robbery at sea.

Areas of interest highlighted by the Maritime Strategy of Ghana include income generation, and instituting proper mechanisms for strengthening maritime security. Ghana's maritime strategy also

aims at strengthening the framework for an effective governing of the maritime sector. The maritime strategy of Ghana therefore establishes a National Maritime Council which is chaired by the Vice President of the Republic of Ghana with the mandate of deliberating on issues of governance and policy directives. It also establishes a national maritime steering group which is chaired by a national coordinator for dialogues and policy actions across the country. Although the successes of the maritime strategy of Ghana cannot be quantified at the moment, it has provided a blueprint for the government of the maritime sector in Ghana.

Hon. Alexander Afenyo-Markin, a Member of Parliament (MP) of Ghana and a Member of the Committee on Defense and Interior in his address to the regional parliament of the ECOWAS described piracy as an emerging threat to the security of Ghana's Maritime Authority. The MP was calling on regional bodies to strengthen their security in the fight against piracy in the sub-region. The speech by the MP was geared towards the need for functional actors to shape the security measures of member countries of the African region in fighting piracy. The speech by the MP and the call for securitization in the sub-region against piracy reflects the external facilitating conditions identified by Wilkinson (2015) to depict securitizing actor's possession of capacity and authority in dealing with threats.

#### **4.7 THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITIZATION OF GHANA'S BORDER-RELATED ISSUES ON THE ECOWAS**

The measures put in place in dealing with Ghana's border-related issues affect the realization of the objective of the ECOWAS. A critical review of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS treaty projects a borderless West Africa which can be achieved through the lessening of stringent border regulations (de-securitization) to ensure economic integration and interdependence (Kandilige, Teye, Talleraas & Gopsill, 2023). Ghana's adoption of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) under the

Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and the further adoption of the Border Guard Unit (BGU) under the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) depicts Ghana's commitment to strengthening its borders against the threats of border-related crimes or issues. Measures adopted to consolidate these security institutions at the borders of Ghana make it difficult to build a borderless West Africa. For instance, the increment of the workforce of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) from a hundred and fifty to eight hundred signifies a drastic effort that does not only securitize Ghana's borders but closes them to other West African countries. The increment in the workforce also comes with sophisticated military training. This confirms the unwillingness of Ghana to freely open its borders for socio-economic development and interdependence as proclaimed by the ECOWAS.

As Ghana and other West African countries put in place internal laws and try to incorporate international laws in dealing with border-related issues, they are indirectly putting in place measures to strengthen their borders which indirectly close their borders or makes it difficult to freely and completely open up its borders to the ECOWAS member countries. For the realization of the aim of establishing a common market for the West African region, West African countries must open up their borders to their neighbors and integrate national policies to promote cooperation for socio-economic development. It is worth noting that for Ghana to succumb completely to the ECOWAS treaty, Ghana must de-securitize its policies and programs meant to tackle its border-related issues or insecurity in terms of human trafficking, smuggling of arms, smuggling of drugs, and piracy among others; and this is next to impossible if not impossible to do. The ECOWAS as a body is even struggling with insecurities in the sub-region including coups and border-related insecurities (Chigozie, & Oyinmiebi, 2022).

The enactment of laws on human trafficking in Ghana and the stringent measures put in place to help deal with the threats means Ghana is not ready to freely open up its border to the ECOWAS

community. A robust and well-regulated border in Ghana would have made it easy for Ghana to integrate and cooperate economically with the ECOWAS community. Unfortunately, young girls and boys are illegally trafficked in and out of Ghana and are coerced into child labor, and sex trade among others. The opening up of Ghana's border to the ECOWAS community will then mean welcoming new border-related insecurities or issues and the worsening of existing border-related insecurities. Philip & Uwa (2022) proposed that West African countries with weak institutions and poor border management will be faced with many daring issues that surpass the benefits of the integration and interdependence of borderless West Africa proposed by the ECOWAS treaty.

Also, Ghana's commitment to the ECOWAS is heavily restricted by the insecurities caused by the sale and usage of illicit drugs in Ghana. As Ghana is fighting this canker through the Narcotics Control Commission among other national laws and international laws, it will be extremely difficult for Ghana to open up its borders to the ECOWAS community, as the borders are the major channels of transporting these illicit drugs in and out of Ghana. Dias & Freire (2022) in their exposition on the European Union and border management argue that the quest to securitize can lead to insecurities. Taking a cue from the argument by Dias & Freire (2022), the provisions in the ECOWAS meant to promote socio-economic development in the sub-region to ensure the security of food and other necessities through interconnectedness can equally cause security problems for member countries.

The securitization of Ghana's borders to deal with the smuggling and sale of arms is also adding to the issues that limit the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. The ECOWAS itself is fighting the transportation and trade of arms within the region as ECOWAS has identified it to impede its operations in the sub-region. As all member states of the ECOWAS have not completely succumbed to the ECOWAS in fighting this problem through the complete domestication of its



treaty and protocols, any other instrument or law adopted to curb the smuggling and trade in arms strengthens their borders and makes it difficult to integrate and trade freely among member states.

The further securitization of maritime borders makes it even harder. As Ghana tries to fight piracy and armed robbery on its coast and territorial waters, it becomes vigilant and not willing to open its seawaters easily to facilitate trade among member countries. Ghana's maritime laws in and of themselves are not meant to impede the smooth implementation and achievement of the ECOWAS treaty as Ghana even sometimes collaborates with the ECOWAS in coming up with such laws. The daring truth in this sense is that Ghana is prioritizing its security ahead of the collective security of all other countries within the sub-region. This is necessary to protect Ghana's sovereignty. As Ghana is prioritizing its security, it is indirectly making it difficult to promote integration and economic interdependence, which characterizes the ECOWAS treaty.

#### **4.8 CONCLUSION**

The border-related security issues of Ghana identified as human trafficking, smuggling of arms, smuggling and trade in illicit drugs, and piracy among others are not unique to Ghana but also threaten the rest of the West African countries and the world at large. These border-related security issues are serious such that they cannot easily be ignored or downplayed to ensure de-securitization. Despite several collaborative efforts with the ECOWAS, the UN, and other international organizations in dealing with these border-related issues, Ghana has enacted laws and mounted institutions to fight these threats. The laws and institutions meant to deal with these issues sometimes refer to the ECOWAS treaty and other international instruments signaling Ghana's commitment to fight these issues collaboratively. Unfortunately, the porous nature of Ghana's border in addition to poor management of Ghana's borders fuels these problems and makes it difficult for Ghana to open its borders completely to other West African countries to the fulfillment

of the ECOWAS treaty. The securitization of Ghana's border-related issues dauntingly limits Ghana's commitment to the ECOWAS treaty.

De-securitization as expatiated by Aradau (2004a) and Waever (1993) to involve the extenuation or elimination of securitizing measures as a way of dealing with security threats can be argued to project the objective of the ECOWAS amidst border-related issues. Inadvertently, downgrading security threats so that they do not identify as threats to a referent object will not be viable in the case of the border-related issues of Ghana. The elimination of the securitizing processes and measures of Ghana in dealing with these threats will mean the escalation of human trafficking, illicit drug smuggling, and arms smuggling. This will lead to an increase in crimes and conflict on the African continent beyond the control of African leaders. The ECOWAS will not survive under such conditions and can even lead to its collapse.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

#### **5.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents the summary, recommendations, and conclusion of the work done on border insecurities as an impediment to the ECOWAS treaty; looking specifically at Ghana. The headquarters of the African Continental Free Trade Area is located in Ghana, which is in congruence with the aim and objective of the ECOWAS treaty in ensuring the promotion of cooperation and integration on the African continent through the establishment of a common market. Despite the quest to integrate and promote interdependence, the insecurities at the borders of member countries like Ghana impede the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS.

#### **5.1 SUMMARY**

The study sought to examine how insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede Ghana's implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. In the examination of this overarching objective of the study, the study made use of secondary data, which comprised a review of existing literature on Ghana's border security, the government of Ghana and ECOWAS documents, Acts of Parliament on border-related issues, books, and articles related to border securities in Ghana and the ECOWAS. The insecurities at the borders of Ghana are theorized using the securitization theory to identify how insecurities that pose threat, danger, harm, and menace among others warrant speech acts by securitizing actors in dealing with the insecurities.

As the main document under study, the history and formation of the ECOWAS treaty were presented in relation to its meetings and conferences. The successes and weaknesses of the ECOWAS were also expatiated. Also, the specific border-related issues of Ghana including,

human trafficking, smuggling of arms, and trade in illicit drugs among others were explained to pave the way for the analysis of how the securitization of the insecurities impedes the implementation of the provisions outlined in the ECOWAS treaty. As the insecurities in and of themselves already impede the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty.

### **5.1.1 Summary of findings of the study**

The study made some intriguing revelations which include; the establishment that insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS. Building upon this revelation by the study, it was established that Ghana, through its state capacity securitizes its border-related issues through the enactment of laws that sometimes refer to the ECOWAS treaty and other international instruments. The study also revealed that securitization of border insecurities through the enactment of national laws affects the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty. It was revealed that as Ghana securitizes its border-related crimes or issues, it strengthens or tightens its border laws thereby closing its borders to its immediate neighbors and the member states of the ECOWAS. This contradicts the objective of the ECOWAS treaty in creating a borderless West Africa through integration and interdependence for the promotion of socio-economic development.

## **5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Taking a cue from the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made for the consideration of policymakers in Ghana, West Africa, and Africa at large, the ECOWAS Commission and other structures of the ECOWAS, and security experts in general.

- Ghana and all member states of the ECOWAS must domesticate the ECOWAS treaty in its entirety. According to Igwe (2015), domestication of international agreements entails the absorption of the details of the agreement or their reflection in national laws. Nyarko

(2016) argues that the domestication of international laws or agreements or instruments makes it easier for their successful implementation or usage. The first step of member states towards the realization of the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS is the domestication of the ECOWAS treaty.

- There must be a careful deliberation of the ECOWAS treaty and any other relevant instrument at the time of need by securitizing actors when promulgating or formulating laws that securitize threatening and alarming issues like border-related crimes. This is essential to prevent the promulgation of laws that inhibit or contradict the provisions of the ECOWAS treaty. Ghana, on any day, will prioritize its security ahead of any other commitment but careful deliberation of the ECOWAS treaty and any other instrument being used will help extenuate the problems of impeding the realization of agreed goals.
- Ghana and her securitizing actors must collaborate with the structures and heads of the ECOWAS in the fight against human trafficking, smuggling of drugs and arms, and piracy among other border-related issues in Ghana. This is necessary because the border-related crimes or issues that impede the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty are not alien to the other member states of the ECOWAS. Therefore, a collaborative effort by member States together with the mother body in the fight against these alarming, threatening, and dangerous security issues will mean creating a conducive environment for the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty and its related protocols.

### **5.3 CONCLUSION**

The ECOWAS treaty was adopted in 1975 and revised in 1993. It was adopted to promote socio-economic development among West African countries through economic integration and interdependence. This connotes the creation of a borderless West Africa. Inadvertently, West

African countries especially Ghana (which serves as the hub of economic integration as Ghana harbors the headquarters of the African Continental Free Trade Area) are bedeviled with serious insecurities at their borders which demand securitization and makes it difficult to de-securitize for the realization of the aims of the ECOWAS. It is against this backdrop the study sought to assess how the insecurities at the borders of Ghana impede the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty.

The several measures that were identified as the enactment of laws through Acts of Parliament and the promulgation of security strategies and programs with national and international organizations impede the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS treaty as they tighten the borders of member states. It is therefore not surprising the ECOWAS itself has spent most of its resources fighting insecurities in the sub-region. The securitization of the border-related issues that cripple the implementation of the ECOWAS treaty must be based on careful deliberations by all stakeholders to prevent the promulgation of decisions that conflict with the aims and objectives of the ECOWAS.

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