Mobilizing Feminism: A Feminist Policy Analysis of Canada's Commitment to the Women,

Peace and Security Agenda

by © Katia Maxwell-Campagna (Thesis) submitted

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Table of Contents

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. It also aims to assess whether Canada's commitment to WPS reproduces or challenges race, gender, and sexuality norms globally, and if it is influenced by hegemonic masculine and heteropatriarchal norms in international relations. To do so, I conducted a feminist critical discourse analysis using a set of questions adapted from Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) Feminist Policy Analysis Framework. More specifically, I analyzed how feminism is mobilized in three policy documents–Canada's *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022;* Canada's *Feminist International Assistance Policy* (FIAP) Action Area Six: Peace and Security; Canada's Defence Policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged;* and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. Through this analysis, I found that Canada's commitment reflects a neoliberal feminist framework that promotes the empowerment of women and girls as a means for improved economic development and stable peace processes. While it does display a kind of feminism, it does not utilize a transformative approach that feminist theorists have theorized and recommended, which I also endorse in this thesis. I conclude by suggesting that the Government of Canada should work towards integrating the recommendations of feminist scholars to include gender perspectives in policymaking that encourage a more intersectional feminist approach.

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Provehito in Altum

List of Figures and Tables

Acronyms

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CIRNAC – Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada

CNAP-WPS – Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security

DND – Department of National Defence

FFP – Feminist Foreign Policy

FIAP – Feminist International Assistance Policy

GAC – Global Affairs Canada

GBA+ – Gender-Based Analysis Plus

LGBTQ2I+ – Lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer, 2-spirited and intersex +

2SLGBTQQIA+ - 2-Spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and asexual plus

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police

UNSCR 1325 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

WAGE – Women and Gender Equality Canada (formerly known as Status of Women)

WPS – Women, Peace and Security

1. Introduction

"Because it's 2015" – Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

I remember 2015 fondly; for me, it was a year of transition to new opportunities and challenges. I had just graduated high school, begun my undergraduate degree and voted in my first-ever election. In truth, I only knew a little about Canadian party politics but was excited to be a part of a big change. And so, I was. Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party beat the reigning Conservatives, bringing a new era to Canadian politics. In particular, the incoming government's stated commitment to feminism sparked my interest, and Trudeau's "Because it's 2015" quote was seared into my brain. The quote came from Trudeau's response to his decision to include more women in his cabinet to create gender parity. The 2015 moment marked the beginning of the explicit inclusion of feminism in policies, particularly international policies. As a leader, Justin Trudeau has made it clear that he considers himself a feminist, for example, by stating as much at a UN conference early in his tenure and through his policy initiatives.

One such policy initiative involves Canada's commitment to the global Women, Peace and Security[1] (WPS) agenda, outlined in United Nations Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR1325+[2]). UNSCR 1325+ is a global commitment that reaffirms "the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and

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[1] The Women, Peace and Security agenda does not use an Oxford comma. Throughout this thesis I have followed this rule despite using the Oxford comma elsewhere.

[2] UNSCR 1325+ constitutes nine additional resolutions: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), 2493 (2019) (Aroussi, 2017, p. 29; PeaceWomen, n.d.).

promotion of peace and security" (Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women [OSAGI], n.p). In October 2000, following a decade fraught with global violence and peace talks, Canada, among other UN nation-states, signed on to UNSCR 1325+. Like many other signatories, Canada would mark its commitment by creating National Action Plans, the first released in 2010 under Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the second in 2017 under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. In that same year, the Trudeau government also announced a new Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) aimed at helping "the poorest and most vulnerable, and support[ing] fragile states," and bolstering its commitment to the WPS agenda (Global Affairs Canada [GAC], n.p). The commitment towards Women, Peace and Security is so important that it forms the heart of Canada's feminist foreign policy (Global Affairs Canada [GAC], n.p).

The more I learned about feminist theory, the more I realized how naïve I was to think that making headlines and calling something feminist meant making tangible differences in practice. Beyond making statements, what does it mean to have a feminist commitment? Furthermore, why are feminist commitments enacted primarily in foreign policy spheres? These questions, among many others, guided my interest in better understanding how feminist theory is employed in policy commitments. In this thesis, I interrogate how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. To do so, I conduct a feminist discourse analysis to assess how feminism is mobilized in the agenda's primary documents. My secondary research question asks whether Canada's commitment to WPS reproduces or challenges race, gender, and sexuality norms globally, and if it is influenced by hegemonic masculine and heteropatriarchal norms in international relations. In addressing the above questions, I consider how Canada's commitment might translate domestically and

internationally. I argue that while the WPS commitment is primarily a foreign policy pursuit, it

has implications in the domestic sphere.

There are three primary documents that, together, constitute the landscape of Canada's

commitment to Women, Peace and Security. These are *Canada's National Action Plan on*

Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 (NAP-WPS 2017-2022), Canada's Defence Policy

Strong, Secure, Engaged (Defence Policy)*,* and Canada's *Feminist International Assistance*

Policy (FIAP). Additionally, the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations[3] (Elsie

Initiative) is also part of the commitment but is an initiative rather than a policy document and is

not exclusive to Canada. However, the initiative is led by Canada and is an important part of the

framework. To answer my research questions, I conducted a feminist policy analysis using

feminist critical discourse analysis to analyze these documents. I primarily analyze Action Area

6: Peace and Security in the FIAP because that is the section that aligns most closely with the

WPS agenda.

I use Canada's first NAP-WPS 2011-2016 for additional context when analyzing the

current NAP-WPS. However, it is not included in the formal analysis. The first NAP was

implemented under the previous Conservative Government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper

and has no claim to being feminist. Additionally, in their analysis of documents and speeches,

including the NAP 2011-2016, under the Conservative government, Rebecca Tiessan and

Krystel Carrier (2015) noted a discursive shift between "gender equality" to "equality between

men and women" along with other discursive shifts to remove any references to non-binary

gender (Tiessan & Carrier, 2015, p. 106). I also do not include the yearly progress reports for the

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[3] The Elsie Initiative is named after Elizabeth "Elsie" Muriel Gregory MacGill who was the first woman to graduate
in electrical engineering in Canada and the first woman to earn a master's degree in aeronautical engineering (1929).
She was an advocate for women and girls serving as commissioner on the Royal Commission on the Status of
Women in Canada (Elsie Initiative).

NAP-WPS 2017-2022 in my formal analysis, as I focus on the policies that were produced in 2017.

Figure 1 demonstrates the WPS landscape, where the big yellow bubble represents the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, the central document of Canada's WPS agenda. The smaller pink bubble represents FIAP, while the slightly smaller blue bubble represents the Defence Policy. Both of these are connected to the yellow bubble, as they are both mentioned in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. The FIAP and the Defence Policy are close together because the Defence Policy references the "International Assistance Policy" but does not refer to it by its full name (Defence Policy, p. 7). Outside of the central three is the Elsie Initiative, which is not mentioned in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 but which I argue is relevant to the WPS agenda.

Figure 1

Canada's Women, Peace and Security Landscape

National Action Plan on Women,
Peace and Security 2017-2022

Feminist
International
Assistance Policy

Strong, Secure,
Engaged, Defence
Policy

Elsie Initiative
for Women in
Peace
Operations

The *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* 2017-2022 (NAP-WPS 2017-2022) defines Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. It highlights Canada's goals at home and abroad, strongly emphasizing the latter. It reinforces Canada's commitment to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls and recognizes the importance of engaging women and girls and civil society at all levels of implementation. As outlined in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, "Lead partners for the Action Plan are Global Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)" (p. 1). Supporting these lead actors are "Public Safety Canada (PS),

Status of Women Canada (SWC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Department of Justice" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 1). SWC is now Women and Gender Equality (WAGE).

Strong, Secured, Engaged (Defence Policy) is Canada's Defence Policy and outlines Canada's defence goals and priorities over ten years from 2017 to 2027. Based on its title, the Defence Policy signifies that Canada is strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world. To expand, "Strong at Home" references Canada's sovereignty and well-defended territory by the Canadian Armed Forces, which also assists at home during natural disasters or other emergencies (p. 14). "Secure in North America" focuses on Canada's relationship with the United States and security through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Lastly, "Engaged in the World" emphasizes Canada's role in the international system and maintaining peace and order through peacekeeping operations and participation in international institutions (Defence Policy, p. 14). Canada's Defence Policy explores everything from procurement, defence spending, and military operations to support for military families. The key stakeholder in the Defence Policy is the Canadian Armed Forces, which comprises the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

The *Feminist International Assistance Policy* (FIAP) is the leading document in Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy. The FIAP centres on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls throughout the world (p. vii) and comprises six key Action Areas.[4] In this thesis, I analyze Action Area 6 on Peace and Security, as it is the section directly related to Canada's WPS commitment. This document links peace and security to sustainable development,

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[4] Action area 1 (core): Gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; Action area 2: Human dignity; Action area 3: Growth that works for everyone; Action area 4: Environment and climate action; Action area 5: Inclusive governance; and Action area 6: Peace and security.

sustainable peace, and state building (FIAP, p. 58), and by implementing a "whole of government"[5] WPS agenda, the Canadian Government intends to ensure that women are fully involved in peacebuilding processes (FIAP, p. 58). Canada's leading actor in this sector is the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations is a part of Canada's commitment to the WPS in that it aims to increase the meaningful participation of women in UN peace operations (Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, n.d.). The Initiative is not a policy per se but a five-year initiative led by Global Affairs Canada. Initially set to end in 2022, it has been extended for five years until 2027. Canada's military is not the lead of the Initiative, but Canada as a whole is considered a global leader for launching the Elsie Initiative. The goal of the Initiative is not just to increase the number of women in peace operations but to increase the meaningful participation of women overall. In other words, by extending beyond different levels of rank, non-traditional roles, and positions of authority.

My research is particularly salient in light of how Canada, in general, and the Trudeau Government in particular, are touted as being feminist. The quote in the epigraph is one of Trudeau's famous quotes and sets the tone for the kind of leadership many expected to see. Nine years later (at the time of writing), PM Trudeau is still appointing women to key political positions, particularly positions international in scope. For instance, Trudeau appointed Anita Ananda as Minister of National Defence from 2021-2023, along with Mélanie Joly as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chrystia Freeland as Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. In theory, appointing women to key positions has the potential to move feminist commitments forward. For instance, in Sweden, the feminist foreign policy commitment is primarily attributed

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[5] A whole of government approach is one that engages multiple government departments.

to Margot Wallström, the then-Foreign Minister from 2014 to 2019 (Aggestam, Bergman & Kronsell, 2018, p. 24). I explore this phenomenon further in my analysis and discussion where I question the common assumptions that public statements about a policy are representative of the content and impact of that policy. As mentioned above, it is easy to say something is feminist, but it is challenging to implement without a framework or concrete outline.

In my analysis, I note a disconnect between how the government speaks about feminism and how it applies feminism in its commitments. I note that formal policy documents cannot be taken at face value, and instead, they must be interrogated critically, and particularly with a feminist lens. Simply because something is referred to as "feminist" does not necessarily mean that it is feminist, hence the reasons for my study. I argue that the type of feminism mobilized in the WPS commitment is one that is neoliberal feminism, and for Canada to move forward, it must embrace a feminism that seeks to transform discriminatory systems that presently exclude marginalized sectors of society. In particular, I explore in detail why it is imperative to include the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as a central institution responsible for implementing the WPS agenda.

In what follows, I establish a context for understanding the multifaceted evolution of Canada's WPS commitments, including some past and present peacekeeping and military engagements. More specifically, I provide background information for understanding the importance of Canada's commitment and what controversies may impede its success.

Background

In this section, I explore key events that led to the creation of UNSCR 1325+, specifically by looking at two major violent events in the 1990s: the Bosnian War and the Rwandan

Genocide. I follow up with additional context on the peacekeeping-related controversies that came out of the conflicts in the 1990s, focusing on Canada and its recent military past. This section provides a contextual background for the importance of UNSCR 1325+ and Canada's commitment to it.

At the turn of the century in 2000, the United Nations Security Council came together to create the resolution on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), also known as United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. UNSCR 1325 details four key pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery and "reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security" (OSAGI, n.p.). The resolution also raises the issue of violence towards women in conflict, advocating for "the increased protection of women and girls during war, [and] the appointment of more women to UN peacekeeping operations" (Jansson & Eduards, 2016, p. 591). Prior to UNSCR 1325, organizations and women's groups were working hard to include women in peacebuilding frameworks. For instance, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Plan for Action presented at the Fourth World Conference on Women outlined a commitment to empowering women and girls, particularly within the context of development, peace, and equality. The political violence of the 1990s pushed it into the light, identifying women's inclusion as an important step to take to build and maintain peace processes. Since 2000, UNSCR 1325+ has undergone transformations and additions, hence the + that now follows UNSCR 1325.

The 1990s

The 1990s were fraught with violence and war, highlighting an increased need for global security processes, but also for the protection and safety of women and girls in conflict zones. The Rwandan Civil War and the conflicts in the Balkans following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia brought international attention to the use of sexual violence, specifically rape, as a weapon of war (Sitkin et al., 2019, p. 219).

The Rwandan Civil War unfolded from 1990 to 1994. Violence towards the Tutsis escalated rapidly over 100 days in 1994. Weitsman (2008) notes that approximately 75% of the Tutsi nation was wiped out after years of campaigns and propaganda against them (p. 572). Specifically, propaganda was directed toward killing and eradicating Tutsi women, and the violence reflected this (Weitsman, 2008, p. 573). Mass rape was a significant tactic during the conflict, with Weitsman estimating that 90% of the remaining women and girls were sexually assaulted and that later approximately 10,000 babies were born from this violence (Weitsman, 2008, p. 574). Similar to the former Yugoslavia, the goal was to eradicate Tutsi women by forcing them to carry children of different ethnicities.

The Bosnian War for Independence from 1992 to 1995 was a multi-ethnic and religious conflict comprising primarily three large ethnic groups: Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats (Snyder et al., 2006). These ethnic groups are also divided by religion, resulting in divisive conflict between Christian Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims (Todorova, 2011, p. 6).

The Bosnian war was characterized by egregious violence and a gendered war campaign. Throughout the conflict, thousands of women were raped due to state-sanctioned rape camps. Of those thousands, approximately 30,000 women were forcefully impregnated (Daniel-Wrabetz, 2007, p. 24; Rose, 2017). While not all rapes were accounted for, as many women did not come

forward to share their experiences, it is estimated that between 25,000 and 50,000 women were raped throughout this conflict (Snyder et al., 2006, p. 189). Snyder et al. (2019) note that using rape was systematic and a strategy to inflict ethnic cleansing on Bosnian Muslims. While the use of rape was violent and traumatic, it was paired with forced impregnations that aimed to breed Serbian children, assuming that the identity of the child would be passed down from the father, in this case, the rapist (Snyder et al., 2019, p. 190).

Gendered violence was not only targeted toward women but was also prominent in the Srebrenica Massacre. The Massacre occurred in the United Nations safety zone of Srebrenica, where more than 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed (Weitsman, 2008, p. 569). The men and boys were intentionally separated from the women and children and were targeted during one of the most salient events of the Bosnian genocide.

The horrors of the violence inflicted in Bosnia Herzegovina led to the immediate creation of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. Shortly after the creation of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created. In 1997, the ICTR created a unit to address gender issues. Still, the most pivotal outcome for both of these historical events was in 2000, only a few months before the signing of the resolution on Women, Peace and Security: the first significant trial at the ICTY dealing with sexual violence towards women during the conflict took place, with sexual enslavement being deemed a crime against humanity (ICTY, n.p.).

The violence during these two conflicts does not stand alone but rather highlights the need for a framework to protect and engage with women in peace operations, which was becoming inescapably evident in this period.

Peacekeeping Context

The gendered violence that shook the 1990s was also tied to controversies concerning United Nations peacekeepers and sex trafficking. United Nations Peacekeeping (n.d.) noted that the 1990s were a difficult time as peacekeepers were not entering post-conflict zones but stepping into the middle of places where "there was no peace to keep." Moreover, some peacekeepers undermined peace, engaging in the exploitation and sex trafficking of women in conflict zones, even the ones they are stationed to protect. For instance, in 1999, a whistleblower named Kathryn Bolkovac came forward with accusations that during the Bosnian war, women were being taken to brothels to service UN peacekeeping personnel (Bell et al., 2018, p. 643). Diana Koester (2020) explained that the NATO-led multinational peacekeeping troops, the Implementation Force, deployed in Bosnia raised new security concerns around sex trafficking and forced prostitution of Ukrainian, Romanian, and Moldovan women and girls (p. 2). Koester's study concluded that it is necessary to understand how peacekeeping is gendered and how it perpetuates gender norms.

Bell et al. (2018) thoroughly studied the relationship between peacekeeping efforts and human trafficking in various states, concluding that there is a higher probability of human trafficking in a state where UN peacekeepers are located. The existence of brothels outside of military bases and camps is not uncommon in post-conflict settings. Moreover, as Koester (2020) notes, their existence highlights gender norms in action, with peacekeepers disregarding prohibitions on payment for sex and behaving in traditionally "masculine" ways, exhibiting the "boys will be boys" mentality (p. 2). Bell et al. (2018) note that although the UN prohibits paid sex, the UN should articulate a more specific difference between so-called consensual, non-

coercive paid sex and the prostitution, coercion and exploitation of trafficked individuals (p. 653). As a result, the effects of peacekeeping are potentially undermined by issues caused by suspected sex trafficking in post-conflict environments.

Canadian Controversies

Canada participated in the peacekeeping efforts of the 1990s and earlier and is not free from controversy, especially concerning the actions of the Canadian Armed Forces. In this section, I explore Canada's role in Somalia between 1992 and 1993, namely the Somalia Affair, and the evolution of controversies within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), including the current sexual misconduct scandal. The Canadian controversies provide a critical context for understanding better the CAF's role in Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, especially since, as previously noted, the CAF is one of the key partners in implementing the WPS agenda.

Somalia Affair

As civil war broke out in Somalia in the early 1990s, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), specifically the now-disbanded Canadian Airborne Regiment, was involved in one of Canada's most significant military scandals, the Somalia Affair.

The Affair follows the death of a young Somali man named Shidane Arone, who "had been beaten, allegedly raped, and tortured to death by soldiers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment" (Razack, 2000, p. 127). While other incidents did occur in which Somali men were wrongfully killed, the death of Shidane Arone marks the turning point for 'Canadian innocence' as his final pleas were "Canada, Canada" (Razack, 2000, p. 143). Though often ignored in Canadian history,

this incident remains a small glimpse into the attitudes, power dynamics, and toxic masculinity within the military, as well as the colonial servitude imposed by Canadian soldiers on foreign states in the Global South. Arone's final words alone are cause for concern suggesting his shock that Canada could allow this to happen. Upon their return to Canada, the Airborne Regiment was disbanded, and in the late 1990s, the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia was created (Razack, 2000, p. 127). Razack (2000) points to masculinity and whiteness when discussing the Somalia Affair. As identified by Canadian soldiers, Canada's place in Somalia was not welcome and, in turn, created a dynamic where Canadian soldiers felt they had to save Somalis from themselves (Razack, 2000, pp. 137-138). The Canadian soldiers portrayed toxic masculinity in the way they behaved and how they perceived Somalian culture (Razack, 2000, pp. 140-141). The violence can also be characterized as misogynistic and entrenched in the emasculation of men, as sexual violence was a common tactic (p. 139). Razack (2000) points out that the inquiry was inherently flawed as it avoided the use of terms such as racism or colonialism and instead aimed to reframe Canada as an innocent state with an anomalous problem in the culture of the now-disbanded Airborne Regiment (p. 145).

The soldiers responsible for the crimes in Somalia faced little consequences, and as Razack notes, the two who received the most severe punishment were the two soldiers who were Indigenous[6] (Razack, 2000, p. 140). The Somalia Affair encapsulated a multitude of issues concerning masculinity and whiteness in peacekeeping missions, the relationship between colonialism and imperialism and Canada's reputation as a "good" natured state. As well, it highlighted how the military courts, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and the Department of

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[6] These two CAF soldiers were charged with torture and murder, Master Cpl. Clayton Matchee was found unfit to stand trial and Pvt. Kyle Brown was found guilty of manslaughter and torture and the killing of Arone (Amad, 2018, n.p.; Farnsworth, 1994, n.p.). Seven others were charged and later acquitted, the majority of the lesser charges were for negligent performance of duty (Farnsworth, 1994, n.p.)

National Defence (DND) were quick to "resolve" what had happened and terminated all inquiries. The role of these military institutions in covering up controversies within their respective organizations is relevant to my work on Canada's commitment to WPS, as these same institutions play a significant role in the implementation of WPS and are currently involved in the ongoing investigations into sexual misconduct in the military.

Razack's (2000) main arguments concern the national mythologies of white nation-states and the narrative of innocence accompanying them (p. 128). In the Somalian case, the predominantly white troops saw themselves as colonizers, and as Razack describes, they drew on the national mythology that they represent the nation and that people of colour fall outside the nation (p. 129). In this instance, the troops were not within the Canadian borders, but their racism ultimately demonstrated that they saw Somali civilians as less than and deserving of colonial rule. Therefore, the soldiers involved in the Somalia Affair, and peacekeeping in general, demonstrate the everyday racism that exists within Canada, the viewing of people of colour as outside of the nation. Canada has a long and ongoing history of colonialism within its borders, specifically the forced removal and genocide of Indigenous peoples. Additionally, the Somalia Affair occurred during the planning phases leading up to UNSCR 1325, which Canada later signed. Contradictorily, the Canadian military was heavily embroiled in a scandal relating to what we now call toxic masculinity among its troops while also furthering efforts to promote gender equality and protect women and girls in conflict settings. The Somalia Affair also coincided with the beginnings of a sexual misconduct scandal within the Canadian military. While the Somalia Affair was being investigated, the first story about rape within the military was released, and in response to both scandals, the government created a bill that effectively took sexual misconduct out of civilian courts (Smith, 2021, n.p.). This would ultimately only

exacerbate the issue of rape within the ranks of the military and make it challenging to address until it received national attention in 2014.

Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces

Sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has reached a renewed boiling point since 2014. *Maclean's* published an investigation in early 2014, shedding light on the culture of sexual violence in the CAF. The publication, which is now nearly a decade old, noted that every day five individuals in the military are sexually assaulted by fellow members of the CAF (Mercier & Castonguay, 2014, n.p.). The sexual violence pervasive in the military is supported by a military justice system and environment that breeds gendered violence (Mercier & Castonguay, 2014, n.p.; Arbour, 2022).

In 2015, Justice Marie Deschamps conducted an "External Review Into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces." She broadly concluded that there was "an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGBTQ members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault" (p. i). The report, now dubbed the Deschamps Report (2015), reinforced the importance of a cultural and organizational change that does not merely reinforce the overused phrase "zero tolerance" (p. i). Justice Deschamps (2015) also noted that additional training on prohibited sexual conduct has not impacted the situation (p. vi). Since the publication of the external review, training has been highlighted as the method of addressing the issue. Operation HONOUR is the now-disbanded CAF mission to prevent and address sexual misconduct within its ranks (Government of Canada). It was put in place by then Chief of the Defence[7] Staff, General Jonathon Vance, and

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[7] Chief of the Defence Staff is the top military commander or the head of the CAF.

shortly after was dubbed "Hop on Her," a play on "Op HONOUR," by members of the CAF, demonstrating both a need for intervention and a lack of seriousness from within the military (Smith, 2021, n.p.).

In 2016, seven former members of the CAF began a class action lawsuit against the CAF and DND. More than 20,000 people came forward with claims, and the Federal Court signed off on a settlement of $900 million (CBC News, 2023). The CAF published *The Path to Dignity and Respect: The Canadian Armed Forces Sexual Misconduct Response Strategy* (the Path) in 2020 to reinforce the commitments made in Operation HONOUR and to create a long-term approach to ending sexual misconduct. It is important to note that the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time of the publication, Retired General Jonathon Vance, has since been found guilty of obstruction of justice in a case related to allegations of sexual misconduct (Burke & Brewster, 2021, n.p.). Vance is not the only senior member of the military forced into retirement; the number has now increased to thirteen.

In late 2021, following the federal election, Anita Anand was appointed as the first woman of colour and second female Minister of National Defence and was tasked with focusing on various systemic issues related to the CAF. For instance, she was tasked with "working to eliminate all sources of anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racism, LGBTQ2 prejudice, gender bias and white supremacy in the CAF" and also consulting with survivors of sexual harassment from within the ranks of the CAF to transform the nature of the CAF (Office of the Prime Minister, 2021, n.p.). Following the suggestions in this tasking, Justice Louise Arbour released a set of recommendations in May 2022, building on the Deschamps Report, aimed at "examining the institutional shortcomings and structural impediments that have allowed this state of affairs to remain uncorrected" (Arbour, 2022, p. 9).

The background context laid out above is important to keep in mind throughout this thesis because it sheds light on the many layers of Canada's commitment to WPS. The violence in the 1990s accelerated the need for a resolution that focuses on women and girls in peace operations and peacekeeping. Twenty-three years later, Canada is still readily committed to the WPS initiative, but it must also reconcile the impact of the controversies in the 1990s and ongoing concerns with the military. The Canadian controversies are relevant because they centre on the Canadian military, a key player in implementing the WPS commitment. Understanding the controversies and what they have exposed about the military as an institution is, in part, why I am seeking to understand how feminism is mobilized in Canada's feminist commitment to WPS.

Literature Review

In the following section, I explore key texts within the literature concerning Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. This includes, but is not limited to, literature on UNSCR 1325+, how it came to be, how states engage with it and some of the main criticisms from academics in the field. I include literature on gender mainstreaming, feminist international relations, and Canada's feminist foreign policy. In the Canadian context, much research has focused on the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and the kinds of feminism that it commits to, while there is not as much literature that brings in the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 and Canada's commitment to WPS writ large. Therefore, my research will help address this gap and extend the literature on Canada's feminist foreign policy to include a focus on commitments made to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. More precisely, I outline the definition of "feminism" as used in Canada's WPS commitment, arguing that it falls in line with what other scholars have noted as neoliberal feminism. A neoliberal

feminist commitment has an individualist perspective that does little to challenge the gender binary and reproduces colonial power dynamics; it ultimately places the burden on women and girls through means of "empowerment" to solve global systemic issues. Instead, I suggest engaging a broader feminism with a more critical perspective that both brings in intersectionality and challenges discriminatory practices that work to silo women and girls and further marginalize them.

I organize the sections by major themes and categories of study, beginning with UNSCR 1325+ to understand its development and the literature on National Action Plans. I then look at the literature on engaging women in matters of peace and security through a feminist international relations lens, including women in peace and security settings and gender mainstreaming. I end by looking at Canada's reputation and its WPS commitments, particularly how feminist foreign policy is implemented, as well as the criticisms and connection to the already established feminist commitment, the FIAP. I also include literature that proposes what a feminist commitment should look like.

United Nations Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

As mentioned above, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Plan for Action presented at the Fourth World Conference on Women is cited as a precursor to the drafting of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, as UNSCR 1325+ is directly informed by it (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 6; Olsson & Gizelis, 2013, p. 426). The Beijing Declaration and Plan for Action outlined a commitment to empowering women and girls, particularly within the context of development, peace, and equality. The raison d'être of the UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR

1325+) is to include women in peace operations, peace talks, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and more.

As part of the declaration of commitment to the WPS agenda, the UN Secretary-General requested that states create National Action Plans to demonstrate the steps and approaches they would take to enforce the WPS agenda (True, 2016, p. 308). Implementing NAPs is not the only way to demonstrate commitment to the WPS agenda, but they are common. Arguing along these lines, in "Rethinking National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security," edited by Sahla Aroussi (2017), contributors discuss how nation-states implement their WPS agenda through NAPs. A state's NAP can also demonstrate the kind of commitment and approaches it takes. Laura J. Shepherd (2016) found that state NAPs can be framed as outward-facing, meaning they are foreign policy focused, and inward-facing, meaning they have a domestic focus (p. 325). In her study of six countries' NAPs, Shepherd (2016) found that foreign policy-based, outward-facing NAPs encouraged making war safer for women instead of focusing on demilitarizing strategies; they aimed for higher proportions of women in their militaries and in international peace and security missions (p. 325). In Shepherd's (2016) own words, "The perpetuation of the assumption that WPS principles and objectives relate to extra-territorial peace and security governance for each of the states analyzed… leads to the construction of these militarised states, with their outward-facing NAPs, as experts on the WPS agenda and champions of its principles" (p. 333). While Shepherd's study did not include Canada's NAP, she did analyze the NAPs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, all of whom share similar values. Shepherd's (2016) argument draws attention to the idea that problems happen "elsewhere," but the solutions can be found "here" (p. 325). Similarly, contributors to Aroussi's (2017) "Rethinking National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security" contributors discuss how

20

states often direct their NAPs to be a part of their *foreign* policy goals, thus framing the WPS

agenda as outward-facing, far away from home, and in conflict-stricken areas (p. 33). Moreover,

Aisling Swaine (2017) notes that NAPs have become the direct response to the WPS agenda and

need to be critically analyzed (p. 8). In Canada, this would direct security policies toward

populations outside the state where they are participating in foreign intervention. I consider

Shepherd's (2016) conclusions and Aroussi's (2017) work in my analysis as they draw attention

to thematic elements of NAPs that can be applied to Canada. I consider how the orientation of

Canada's NAP, that is to say, whether it is outward or inward-facing, influences the way that the

commitment is enacted and, ultimately, how feminism is mobilized within the commitment.

While there are several reasons why states turn to NAPs as the primary method of

implementation, Jacqui True (2016) raises an interesting conclusion: a state is more likely to

adopt an NAP if a woman is in a position of power (p. 319). While I mentioned the influence of

Justin Trudeau's feminist politics in 2015, I also mentioned his appointment of women in key

positions related to foreign affairs, for starters, the appointment of Chrystia Freeland as Minister

of Foreign Affairs from 2017 to 2019. Freeland played an essential role in promoting the

Feminist International Assistance Policy and feminist foreign policy early in their launch in

2017. True (2016) concludes that additional factors for adopting feminist policies include

whether a state has signed on to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the degree of state democracy (p. 319). It can

also be demonstrated through a state's international commitments, such as membership in the

United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other international

organizations.

Engaging Women in Women, Peace and Security

Cynthia Enloe (2014) famously asked the question, "Where are the women?" in her quest to better understand or "make feminist sense" of international politics (pp. 16-35). "Where are the women?" is meant to signal a more profound question of the role of women in international politics and gender more broadly. Enloe's (2014) question is not intended necessarily as a solution to international politics but rather a challenge to traditional narratives of international relations. It is also not necessarily a literal question intended to quantify the number of women involved in international politics. However, it is meant to highlight the complex relationship between gender and power in international relations. "Where are the women?" is meant to raise questions about how international politics shape and move women's lives and vice versa. In the following section, I explore the engagement of women in international relations, from the inclusion of women in the "add-women-and-stir" approach to more concrete policy measures like gender mainstreaming.

The most obvious solution to the lack of women engaged visibly in politics, such as in political roles, peace processes, and the like, is to include more women. Liberal feminism touts the notion that gender equality is achieved when women are afforded the same opportunities as men (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2016, pp. 182-183). However, is adding women really enough? Critics of liberal feminism and neoliberalism argue that including more women and relying on them to solve significant international relations and political issues, such as ending poverty, is unfair (Eisenstein, 2017, p. 37). Using gender equality and the inclusion of women instrumentally, for instance, as a reason for pursuing military intervention (Swiss, 2012, p. 141) is more about national interests than attempting to solve matters of gender equality.

Nonetheless, adding women appears to have an impact, albeit not necessarily positive. For example, in her piece on wartime rape, Meredith Loken (2017) notes that it is commonly argued that when women are involved in armed groups, there is a lower likelihood of violence (p. 61). As Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic (2019) notes, "It is frequently assumed that women, who give life and are perpetually associated with motherhood, should not take life, and are best suited for caring responsibilities in the military" (p. 420). This ultimately perpetuates the myth that women are better suited to peacekeeping because they are inherently more peaceful. In fact, Loken (2017) claims that it is a misconception that when women participate in armed conflict, sexual violence is less likely to occur (p. 61). She argues that this position does not consider how women can become fighters and engage in violent acts.

Loken's (2017) work aligns with what Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2015) note: "Violent women are violent people, who, like all people, violent or not, live in a gendered world" (p. 2). Violent women have acted outside of prescribed gender roles and thus are separated from the mainstream discourse of their gender (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2015, p. 8). When women behave in violent ways, especially when they are uniformed soldiers, such as in the case of the prison scandals in Abu Ghraib, it confuses the notion of women as being inherently peaceful and, thus, better peacekeepers. Sjoberg and Gentry (2015) also note that women's violence is entwined with masculinities. In the case of Abu Ghraib, Sjoberg and Gentry (2015) note that the United States leaned into domination through masculinity by ultimately framing the scandal as Iraqi men being "beat by a girl" (p. 19). In the case of the Rwandan genocide, in 2007, the first woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, was convicted of incitement to rape as a crime against humanity at the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). In sum, the role of women in peacekeeping and in conflict in general cannot be reduced to gendered stereotypes. I consider

these critiques in my analysis with respect to the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and more broadly as Canada aims to include more women in the military, where their place will not just be as a beacon of peace.

While UNSCR 1325+ raises important issues concerning women, peace and security, it has also been criticized by feminist scholars for essentializing women and the role they play in peace processes. They argue that much of the language in WPS frameworks, including UNSCR 1325+, is about how women have the inherent ability to be generators of peace (Jansson & Eduards, 2016; Tiessan & Swan, 2018; Achilleos-Sarll, 2018, p. 41). Rebecca Jensen (2021) defines this as benevolent sexism, "the belief that women are intrinsically more caring than men" (p. 103). Jensen (2021) goes on to argue that benevolent sexism is often a part of the essentialist argument "for greater participation of women in the military on the grounds that they are intrinsically better suited for peacekeeping and stabilization missions" (p. 103). While Jensen's (2021) use of benevolent sexism is applied in the context of the Canadian military, it heavily intertwines with discourses about WPS, especially since Canada's military is a part of the global commitment to WPS. Nicola Pratt (2013) assesses UNSCR 1325+ through a postcolonial feminist lens and argues that the transformative ability of UNSCR 1325+ is undermined by reinscribing racial and sexual norms and contributes to enabling the "war on terror" (p. 780). In other words, focusing on the gender aspects of UNSCR 1325+ obscures how racial and sexual hierarchies are being reinforced, therefore upholding hegemonic security discourses (Pratt, 2013, p. 780). Pratt's work is beneficial for my research as it provides an important perspective on the interaction between hegemonic security discourses and the implementation of the WPS framework. Additionally, it helps to answer my sub question about the reproduction of racial and sexual norms globally.

Another criticism of WPS, which stems directly from the UNSCR 1325+ resolution, is the oversimplification of sexual violence in Security Council resolutions. Georgina Holmes (2017) notes that the framing of sexual violence has oversimplified the victimization of women and girls in war, mainly because it sidelines the victimization of men and boys (p. 406). It also reinforces beliefs that women are neither active participants in conflict nor capable of change independently (Holmes, 2017, p. 406). Holmes' (2017) piece focuses on the contributions to the WPS agenda by Commonwealth states, and her conclusion notes that including more women in peacekeeping also requires increasing support from heads of government and mainstreaming tactics (pp. 416-417). I consider Holmes' (2017) argument because it can be applied to Canada, as it is a Commonwealth state aiming to achieve greater representation of female uniformed officers. Additionally, I consider how Canada's WPS commitment frames the participation of women and girls in peacebuilding settings to determine whether it sidelines men and boys and other gender-diverse people.

Including women in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and international politics more broadly is arguably a good thing. Women should be a part of these spheres because of their role as members of civil society. However, as the above scholars demonstrate, adding women cannot be the only solution to solving major global issues. The idea of including women in already existing patriarchal and masculine structures without challenging how these gender hierarchies contribute to the marginalization of women in the first place is commonly referred to as the "add-women-and-stir" approach. Another approach to engaging with women and encouraging gender equality at the policy level is through gender mainstreaming practices.

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming is a policy tool that ensures that policymaking is more equitable by assessing the impacts on men and women (Johnstone & Momani, 2022, p. 248). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325+ on Women, Peace and Security includes gender mainstreaming in its resolution. UNSCR 1325+ encourages the inclusion of gender perspectives in all levels of peace and security efforts, making it an essential component of the resolution (OSAGI, n.p). Canada's NAP-WPS 2017-2022 defines gender mainstreaming as the "means to ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities" at all phases of policymaking decisions (p. 18). The premise is quite simple: include conversations concerning gender at all levels of the policy-making process. The breakthrough of gender mainstreaming is lauded as a progressive tool or a "new equality strategy" (Squires, 2005, p. 367). In its early days, gender mainstreaming was a tool used primarily to advance women's issues, a niche focus aimed at improving gender equality through women's empowerment in policymaking decisions (Parpart, 2014, p. 383). General criticisms of gender mainstreaming include that its focus on gender as synonymous with "women's issues" is not inclusive (Eveline & Bacchi, 2005, p. 498). Feminist scholars understand that it is crucial to consider how men and masculinities, as well as those outside of the gender binary, are shaped by policies (Eveline & Bacchi, 2005).

In Canada, gender mainstreaming has been on the federal government's radar since the mid-1990s (Paterson, 2010, p. 397). In 1995, Canada signed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which outlined the commitment to implement gender-based analysis through government agencies and departments (Johnstone & Momani, 2022, p. 252). Five years later, Canada signed onto UNSCR 1325+ on Women, Peace and Security, which, among other

things, reaffirms the commitment to including gender perspectives in peace and security efforts (OSAGI, n.p). Canada's gender mainstreaming strategy is Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+). Spearheaded by the former Status of Women Canada (SWC), gender-based analysis (GBA) was initially a bureaucratic tool implemented by SWC (Scala & Paterson, 2017, p. 431). GBA underwent a significant transformation in 2011 to include a more intersectional lens in the framework, and it is now called gender-based analysis plus (GBA+), where the + is meant to consider how gender interacts with varying identity factors (Scala & Paterson, 2017, p. 432).

Feminist scholars have criticized GBA and its later evolution, GBA+, for their inability to properly investigate how policies impact diverse groups of people (Paterson, 2010; Scala & Paterson, 2018). For instance, Olena Hankivsky and Linda Mussell's (2018) study on intersectionality and GBA+ highlighted that the addition of the "+" maintained gender at the centre of the analysis. Therefore, the intersecting identities listed as part of the + are understood as being in addition to, separate from, and following the considerations of sex and gender (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018, p. 308). Since GBA+ is a tool that is used in federal departments in Canada as the primary gender mainstreaming strategy, federal public servants are responsible for implementing it and may need assistance in doing so in their day-to-day work. Francesca Scala and Stephanie Paterson (2017) argue that implementing GBA+ is constrained by bureaucratic discourses (p. 428). Paterson (2010) refers to the individuals who are responsible for implementing GBA (+) as "gender experts," those who are "given authority to analyse, monitor and suggest interventions based on 'expert analysis'" (Paterson, 2010, p. 397). The issue with gender experts is that they are responsible for weaving gender into existing policy frameworks, often not addressing the underlying power hierarchies already embedded within these frameworks. Thus, GBA+ cannot interrogate the starting points of those policies, such as

accountability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness (Paterson, 2010, p. 405). Similarly, as Scala and Paterson (2017) note, some workers have issues with the feminist aspect of GBA+. Therefore, gender experts change the framing to make it digestible to other employees who do not understand it (Scala & Paterson, 2017, p. 434). While the employees are well-intentioned in trying to implement GBA+, this is a side effect of the "gender expert" problem, as employees are moulding and adapting GBA+ to mean something different than was initially intended, distorting its transformative potential.

In addition to the challenges at the individual worker level, GBA+ also encounters challenges depending on which department is responsible for implementing it. In their study of gender mainstreaming in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Department of National Defence (DND), Rachael Johnstone and Bessma Momani (2022) found that the implementation of GBA+ is only integrationist, meaning that it is integrating into an already existing system, rather than being substantially transformative (pp. 265-267). Johnstone and Momani (2022) also found that the CAF and the DND rolled out the GBA+ approach too quickly, most likely in response to the government's feminist commitments towards gender equality and to the results of the Deschamps Report in 2015 (pp. 266-267). Therefore, the quick roll-out did not allow for the necessary measures to make GBA+ a transformative tool. The criticisms of GBA+ and, in particular, Johnstone and Momani's (2022) study are helpful for understanding the development of Canada's commitment to WPS and the institutional restraints that exist from its implementation. I explore these restraints further in my analysis of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and Canada's Defence Policy, particularly by understanding how the constraints of effectively implementing GBA+ in the CAF and DND translate into preventing the commitment to WPS from being feminist.

Gender mainstreaming is often referenced in feminist academic literature as having "transformative potential" (Parpart, 2014; Squires, 2005; Paterson, 2010; Scala & Paterson, 2017); however, after nearly two and a half decades of gender mainstreaming in Canada, GBA+ continues to hit the roadblock of prioritizing gender over other intersecting identities. However, Hankivsky and Mussell (2018) conclude that GBA+ is a good beginning and intermediary step toward a more inclusive mainstreaming strategy (p. 312). Although my analysis aims to understand the character of Canada's feminist commitment to WPS, I hope to explore additional solutions to make GBA+ a more effective tool.

Canada's Feminist Commitments

As I explored the literature to include in this section on Canada's reputation and feminist foreign policy, I started by browsing through a course syllabus on Canadian Foreign Policy from my alma mater. Interestingly, the syllabus had only one week dedicated to feminist foreign policy. I experienced a flashback, a well-known occurrence in political science, of the "one week" dedicated to feminism and feminist theory. I had this experience in a number of courses related to international relations. While it is possible to do research outside of class, the paucity of information on feminist foreign policy in the syllabi creates and reinforces a divide between feminist theory, international relations, and feminist policies. It makes it seem as though studying gendered perspectives is not as important as the mainstream theories and dismisses these approaches. I felt this disconnect during my undergraduate degree, and I continue to feel it outside academia, in government workplaces and policies, where feminism is referenced in international policies, such as feminist foreign policy, without explaining what it means to be "feminist." To understand this disconnect and make sense of what a feminist commitment is

meant to look like, I explore in this section literature on Canada's reputation and feminist foreign policy. To reiterate what I stated in my introduction, Canada's commitment to WPS is described by GAC as being the heart of Canada's feminist foreign policy.

Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda in 2017 did not emerge without context. In the background section and the first section of the literature review, I explored why a resolution on Women, Peace and Security was necessary. Much of this commitment concerns establishing and maintaining peace and supporting peacekeeping. Canada has long been involved in peacekeeping missions. It prides itself on peacekeeping involvement to the point that David Jefferess (2009) describes it as a "mythological sign within the Canadian national imagery" (p. 709). Jefferess (2009) describes this mythological sign as, in part, Canada's ability to pick and choose instances of Canadian peacekeeping that positively reflect on the state and not on the problematic side of peacekeeping (i.e., the Somalia Affair) (pp. 710-711). Canada, therefore, relies on nostalgia for the positive contributions or the "help" they have provided, to the point where peacekeeping has now become a part of Canadian identity. Jefferess (2009) describes this as the tradition and longing that has led to a global understanding of Canada as a protector (p. 725).

Canadian federal leaders extend this myth beyond peacekeeping towards Canada as "an international citizen and human rights leader" (Midzain-Gobin & Smith, 2020, p. 485). Liam Midzain-Gobin and Heather A. Smith (2020) focus on the myth of Canada as a non-colonial power, pointing out the various times that Canadian federal leaders have used this point to reinforce Canada's docile and friendly position in the international system. For instance, Prime Minister Stephen Harper referred to Canada as a north star that can guide other states in his 2007 Speech from the Throne, and Justin Trudeau in 2013 and later in 2016 noted that Canada could help other states because it does not have the baggage of a colonial past (Midzain-Gobin &

Smith, 2020, pp. 482-485). Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) argue that by distancing itself from its colonial past and reinforcing the friendly image, Canada is perpetuating a myth based on claims that support "a particular kind of Canada: an inspirational Canada, but also a Canada that obfuscates and denies the realities for Indigenous Peoples within contemporary Canadian borders" (p. 486).

Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) conclude by raising important points on the harms of mythmaking, such as the erasure of historical events and the effects this has on the Canadian image (p. 491). In addition, Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) argue that the myth-making process should not be confused with nation branding, which is rooted in neoliberal economic marketing strategies. I consider the work on Canada's peacekeeping reputation and the concerns of national mythmaking throughout my thesis. In my analysis section and discussion, I return to this point as I analyze the images and "Canadian Values" within the policy documents.

Thus, Canada's reputation is tied to its peacekeeping commitments and its connection to feminism and feminist policies. Following Sweden, Canada adopted a feminist foreign policy, and as I mentioned in my introduction, there is currently no tangible policy framework for the FFP. Swedish FFP scholars Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond (2016) state that adopting an "f-word" policy discursively elevates it from a "broadly consensual orientation of gender mainstreaming toward more controversial politics, and specifically toward those that explicitly seek to renegotiate and challenge power hierarchies and gendered institutions that hitherto defined global institutions and foreign and security studies" (p. 323). In other words, a feminist policy takes gender mainstreaming to the next level, from beyond focusing on including gender perspectives in policies to focusing on challenging built-in systems of oppression and power hierarchies. Feminist policies, in this sense, challenge traditional approaches informed by

Eurocentric white male perspectives. For Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond (2016), feminist foreign policy is informed by UNSCR 1325+ and, therefore, on women, peace and security "as a normative framework for foreign and security policies" (p. 324).

Canada's feminist foreign policy is most recognized by the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), and much of the literature on feminist commitments centres on the FIAP. One major criticism of the FIAP is its limited commitment to intersectionality, which Corinne L. Mason (2019) argues is used as a buzzword and is poorly defined throughout the FIAP (pp. 211-213). Mason (2019) concludes that the use of intersectionality becomes flattened and reduces transformative potential by turning it into a buzzword or fuzzword, "a catchy and convenient way of referencing knowledge of and commitment to contemporary feminism, but one that reduces a complex theory and history to a soundbite" (p. 215). The intersectional component is linked to the policy through the GBA+ lens employed throughout the policy (Mason, 2019, pp. 210-211). In their study on the kinds of feminism and intersectionality in the FIAP, Sam E. Morton, Judyannet Muchiri, and Liam Swiss (2020) conclude that the FIAP fails to incorporate an intersectional approach and instead adopts a mainstream liberal feminist approach that prefaces the empowerment of women and girls in "poor and developing countries" (p. 347). Further, Morton et al. (2020) note that the FIAP focuses on women as a largely homogenous category and prioritizes economic and political participation over recognizing individuals' different experiences (pp. 342-347). Similarly to Mason (2019), Morton et al. (2020) point out that the term feminism is used throughout the document as though it is a collectively understood term, without understanding the complexities that feminism has to offer (p. 347). These points concerning feminism as being reduced to a soundbite and a collectively understood idea are important for developing my research question. While these studies were conducted in

32

reference to the FIAP, I find them particularly useful for developing my analysis of the role of feminism in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda more broadly.

In addition to criticisms of the use of intersectionality, the FIAP has been critically analyzed for its limited transformative potential and reinforcement of neoliberal capitalist frameworks. Laura Parisi's (2020) study noted the limited transformative potential of FIAP. Her study highlighted instead how the focus on gender equality connects Canadian foreign policy with neoliberal capitalist growth and expansion (p. 177). Parisi (2020) argues that there is not much that is "new" to the FIAP's commitments, and instead, it reinforces the inclusion of women for economic gains over the inclusion of women for transformative change (p. 177). Ultimately, the FIAP relies on neoliberal feminism, but as Parisi (2020) states, the use of feminism in these policies is powerful symbolically and bringing gender back onto the development agendas is important for any initiatives in the future (pp. 177-178). Similarly, in their study on the perspective of feminism in the FIAP from NGO staff members in East and Southern Africa, Sheila Rao and Rebecca Tiessan (2020) note that the brand of feminism is liberal feminism, and it is used instrumentally to maintain empowerment of women and girls within structures of inequalities (p. 358). Rao and Tiessan (2020) argue that it is important that the FIAP engage with organizations and frameworks that offer diverse perspectives to increase the emphasis on intersectional considerations (p. 365).

Intersectional feminism, coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), helps to explain how the convergence of different identity markers can result in the oppression and marginalization of people. Policies often do not consider the impacts on the intersection of power and identity markers and, therefore, should be informed by an intersectional lens. I consider the contributions towards understanding the feminist character of the FIAP as the only officially named feminist

policy throughout my analysis of the WPS commitment. The studies help put a wedge in the door to understanding how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. In my discourse analysis, I primarily look at Action Area 6 on Peace and Security in the FIAP, which is only one section within the larger document. The research done on the FIAP helps me better situate my work in the well-established fields of security studies and Canadian foreign policy.

In "Queering Women, Peace and Security," Jamie J. Hagen (2016) highlights the heteronormativity of the international framework on WPS. Queering WPS concerns paying close attention to how language is used. Hagen notes that with the rigidity of the current WPS system, many identities do not fit within the given binaries of man/woman (p. 313). This is pertinent to how I define feminism in the context of Canada's commitment to WPS. More specifically, I consider Hagen's argument when I analyze the use of "women" throughout my discourse analysis to understand if there are any instances where varying gender identities are mentioned. "Gender" and "women" are often used interchangeably, and focusing on what these terms mean helps unpack my sub-questions concerning the reproduction of traditional gender norms. Further, Hagen's work highlights a need to focus on the influences of heteronormativity within the policy framework and how this may be detrimental to the success of a "feminist" commitment.

These sources show us a better picture of what constitutes a feminist commitment and what should not be the focus of a feminist commitment. The most common criticism of the FIAP is the limited transformative potential and reliance on neoliberal feminist frameworks. It is not enough to add women to the approach; instead, it is necessary to challenge the systems of power that prevent transformation from happening. A feminist approach should also be focused on intersectionality. I consider this in my discussion section by applying the criticisms of the GBA+

34

framework and its application in the policy documents to better understand how the intersectional lens can be improved.

One element that was not common in the literature on the FIAP that I consider necessary for a feminist commitment is challenging the gender binary. Laura Sjoberg (2013) argues that feminist theorizing and, thus, policy documents should not conflate gender with women but rather understand how femininities and masculinities, genders and genderings are at play in global politics (p. 45). A feminist commitment should also collaborate with a queer commitment, which focuses on the heteronormative aspects of WPS, assessing how policy decisions might impact gender non-conforming individuals or those who experience homophobia and transphobia (Hagen, 2016, p. 322). Much of the WPS commitment focuses on women, as the title states, when there is much to be considered in engaging men and gender non-conforming individuals in the commitment. I consider this throughout my thesis as the term "women" is used throughout the documents. Additionally, I consider the definition of "gender equality" in my analysis to understand better if it reflects a broader category than being synonymous with women.

Thesis Outline

In the following chapters, I seek to understand how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. I first explore my theoretical framework, where I look at theories related to feminism, liberal and neoliberal feminism, gendered power relations, Canadian nation-branding, and homogenization and essentialism. The theoretical framework provides a foundation to assist in my analysis of the selected policy documents. Following the theoretical framework, I then move into my methods and methodologies. Here, I outline feminist critical discourse analysis and the questions in my adapted and revised version of Beverly A.

35

McPhail's (2003) Feminist Policy Analysis Framework. The adapted framework consists of questions organized into four categories: values, power analysis, language, and material/symbolic reform. I then move into my analysis chapter, where I "do" the analysis using the Feminist Policy Analysis Framework as my guide. In that chapter, through analyzing both the texts and the images, I note how the use of the "empowerment" of women and girls is consistent with a neoliberal feminist approach to feminist public policy. I also note that there is a strong domestic component that must be addressed in Canada's WPS commitment, as gender equality and feminism are lauded as Canadian "values" in Canada's commitment. Observing the connection between the images used in the texts and the discourse and symbolism represented in the WPS commitment, I explore how these images assist me in noticing who Canada engages with and how this dynamic looks. I do so, for instance, by demonstrating the visual representation of a white saviour narrative with white (often female) CAF officers and non-white women and girls from varying (unidentified) backgrounds.

I subsequently follow with my discussion chapter to go further in-depth into my observations. I argue that Canada's commitment to WPS is one that embraces a neoliberal strand of feminism, which ultimately limits its transformative potential, thus reproducing the gender binary and reinforcing an individualist perspective that makes women and girls responsible for large-scale global change. I argue that Canada's commitment should instead focus on engaging a more inclusive feminism that would challenge the heteronormative, colonial, and racist norms and practices that currently define global interventions. Additionally, I argue that taking this inclusive approach would allow Canada to better understand its role in international settings, which would in turn help to oversee the impact of the state's actions abroad and at home. More specifically, I insist on the importance of evaluating the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in

the implementation of a feminist WPS commitment, noting how its central role is, at present, in conflict with the demands of a feminist commitment. Therefore, I stress that the Government of Canada must reconcile the ongoing scandals and systemic issues within the military to fulfil any wish for a truly feminist commitment.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this thesis, I assess how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. I am also looking at whether the commitment reproduces or challenges race, gender, and sexuality norms globally and if it is influenced by hegemonic masculinity and hetero-patriarchal norms. However, before diving into my analysis of Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda, it is essential to establish the key themes and theoretical concepts I use therein. As outlined in my literature review, there is significant information on Canada's feminist commitments through its investment in feminist foreign policy. In my thesis, I am looking explicitly at the engagements for the WPS commitments, and therefore, I have selected a variety of research for my theoretical framework so that I can supplement what has already been noted by other scholars and contribute and extend the literature on WPS in Canada.

In what follows, I seek to understand the role of gendered power relations, from heterosexuality to hegemonic masculinity, to understand better how they are a part of Canadian institutions. I begin by understanding gender and women, as women are invoked frequently throughout the policy commitments. I also explore the concepts of liberalism and neoliberal feminism, particularly how liberal feminism can be co-opted by neoliberal feminism. I then assess themes of nation branding, whiteness, homogenization, essentialism, and colonial discourses. In the process, I put forward that Canada's commitment to WPS must be analyzed through a postcolonial feminist lens because, as Columba Achilleos-Sarll (2018) notes, we cannot truly study foreign policy without scrutinizing colonial legacies and intersecting oppressions (p. 36). By this, I mean that it is crucial to rigorously analyze the colonial and imperial impulses that are present in the WPS commitment because they have both international

and domestic implications. Moreover, Canada's commitment to WPS takes an international

approach and is cited as the heart of Canada's feminist foreign policy (GAC).

Gendered Power Relations

In the introduction to Living a Feminist Life, Sara Ahmed (2017) asks: "Where did

feminism come to you?" (p. 4). As I mentioned in my introductory chapter, 2015 was an

important year for myself and the Canadian government. While I had considered myself a

feminist prior to attending university, my engagement with feminism formally began through

taking a course called "Women, Gender and Feminism: An Introduction" during my first year.

That course prompted me to change my degree and switch institutions to focus on politics and

gender. The more I learned about feminist theory, the more I understood how gendered

perspectives can be applied to nearly everything that can be studied, such as political institutions,

policy, war, and development.

Feminist theory is difficult to encapsulate because it has many layers and guiding

frameworks. For this reason, I turn to a number of different feminist theorists to further establish

what a feminist commitment should encapsulate and also what feminism may already be a part

of the commitment to WPS. As referenced in my literature review, a feminist commitment seeks

to be intersectional, challenge the gender binary and heteronormativity and focus on the

inclusion of gender not as an economic gain but as a transformative approach. It is challenging

not to reproduce the gender binary, given that "women" are traditionally at the centre of feminist

policies, as exemplified in the *Women*, Peace and Security Agenda. But who are included in the

category "women"? Sara Ahmed (2017) notes that women refer "to all those who travel under

the sign *women*" (pp. 14-15). So as not to exclude the experiences of trans women, Ahmed

clarifies that to travel under the sign "women" does not necessarily mean being assigned 'female' at birth (Ahmed, 2017, pp. 14-15). Further to this, feminist scholars insist that women are not a homogenous group with the same experiences. For example, Judith Butler (2006) notes that the term "women" is non-exhaustive because, like gender, it does not consistently share the same meaning throughout history and because gender intersects with several other identity factors such as race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality (pp. 5-6). Sex and gender are not one and the same; assuming that sex is the prescribed biological dichotomy and gender is culturally constructed, then there is no reason for gender to be restricted or to mirror the typical sex binary of male and female (Butler, 2006, pp. 5-6). Therefore, there is no requirement for masculinity and femininity to be affiliated directly with men and women or males and females, respectively. In short, the terms women and gender have broad socially constructed meanings, and Ahmed's and Butler's respective work helps to assess how women and gender are defined in the policy documents I have selected. Understanding how women and gender are defined is important because the terms work to establish who the commitment is for and who benefits from it as I explore further in my methodology.

Gendered power relations and the gender binary are further reinforced by what Adrienne Rich (2003) refers to as heterosexuality as a political institution (p. 17). Essentially, heterosexuality exists as an institution that is imposed on society from our earliest memories, and it is compulsory because women (or men, for that matter) are not given the choice to behave in any other way. In her piece, Rich (2003) points to Catherine A. MacKinnon's studies on sexual harassment in the workplace where she notes that women in the workplace often have to "endure sexual harassment to keep their jobs and learn to behave in a complaisantly and ingratiatingly heterosexual manner because they discover this is their true qualification for employment,

whatever the job description" (p. 21). The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), one of the lead institutions implementing the WPS commitment, has recently been criticized for its rampant sexual misconduct and "underlying sexualized culture" that is hostile to women and members of the 2SLGBTQQIA+ community (Deschamps, 2015, p. i). I consider how the military, the CAF, institutionalizes heterosexuality in my analysis, as the CAF is such a large part of the WPS commitment. From a heteronormative standpoint, lesbian existence stands outside what it means to be a woman because, in Rich's (2003) words, it is seen as a "scale ranging from deviant to abhorrent or simply rendered invisible" (p. 13). Similarly, women are often ostracized because they do not perform as women are expected to, for instance, women who are considered to be 'spinsters' and do not marry (Carroll, 2012, pp. 12-15) or women who are violent (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2015, p. 8). Therefore, it is important to consider how heterosexuality influences institutions, for instance, the Canadian government, to understand better if heteronormative power relations restrain the policies pertaining to the WPS commitment. Though Rich's piece focuses on lesbian existence, her discussion of heterosexuality is important in understanding gendered power relations embedded in institutions like the military, which are historically male-dominated.

Most important to understanding how gender is tied into power hierarchies is through studying masculinities, particularly hegemonic masculinity. That is, understanding the influences of hegemonic masculinity on gendered power relations and policy implementation more broadly helps to understand the bigger picture of implementing the WPS agenda. Somewhat ironically, by simply being the default perspective, men and masculinities are often left out of the gender equality discussions. As Cynthia Enloe (2014) explains, "Many governments still look like men's clubs," and it is easy to overlook men, specifically white men, in photographs of global

41

politics because, for so long, they have been the default (p. 30). In other words, men's

experiences are the norm. For instance, the global resolution is not men, peace and security

because it is women who are not considered to be a part of peacemaking processes. Ultimately,

the purpose of noting gender hierarchies is to understand what assumptions are being made about

gender to create more meaningful policies and actions (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 192).

Hegemonic Masculinity

Raewynn Connell and James Messerschmidt (2005) assert that hegemonic masculinity in a

particular culture "embodie[s] the currently honoured way of being a man, it require[s] all other

men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimate[s] the global

subordination of women to men" (p. 832). Hegemonic masculinity is not the only version of

masculinity but it is the most dominant, it can be characterized most typically by heterosexuality,

whiteness, and men as head of households (nuclear family dynamics) for instance (Connell &

Messerschmidt, 2005). However, hegemonic masculinity does not depict a certain type of man,

but rather "a way that men position themselves through discursive practices" (Connell &

Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 841). It is not necessarily achieved through violent means but rather

through "ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion" and it is also not

exclusive to individuals (i.e. it is reflected in institutions) (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.

832). Hegemonic masculinity uses a Gramscian understanding of hegemony, which can be

understood as accepting dominant values as "common sense" (Evans, 2005, p. 41). Ultimately,

this allows norms, certain sets of ideas and beliefs that are not necessarily encoded in law, to

become a part of the values of the state (Evans, 2005, p. 42). A particular version of masculinity

becomes a normative part of the state and its institutions and goes unchallenged because

42

hegemony cannot be brought into existence through coercion but rather through consensus (Coutinho & Sette-Camara, 2012, p. 75). Further, applying hegemonic masculinity to history demonstrates how it merged with colonialism and reinforced colonial gender hierarchies (Connell, 2016, pp. 314-315).

Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) point out that the military as an institution often embodies hegemonic masculinity (pp. 834-835). Steins (2000) explains further that the military demonstrates norms of being powerful, competitive, rational, forceful, and strong (p. 40), relying on traditional preconceived ideas of masculinity. I argue in my analysis and discussion how hegemonic masculinity constrains the possibility of a feminist WPS commitment.

Militarism

Feminist theorist Cynthia Enloe is one of the leading theorists discussing gendered militarism over the past four decades. For Enloe (2000), militarism is everywhere, hiding in plain sight. It is not only associated with the military and wartime but is the intention to reinforce pro-militaristic ideals in society. Laura J. Shepherd (2016) notes that "militarism is a belief system, a way of thinking about political issues that structure society's understanding of violence through a prism of acceptance of the use of force and the valorisation of military institutions and approaches, including hierarchical organization of social and political life" (p. 325). For Enloe (2000), militarism can be as simple as branding a can of soup with images of Star Wars satellites, military recruitment in high school gymnasiums, and action movies depicting strong soldiers fighting for their country (pp. 14-37; Steins, 2013, p. 41). Militarism is not just about joining the military but embedding this belief system into society to the point where it becomes normalized and goes unquestioned. As citizens and consumers, we often do not question the military's role

in our everyday lives, which makes its presence hegemonic. Canada does not have the same level of militarism as the United States and is by no means a global hegemon, but symbols of militarism are prevalent in Canadian society. These symbols can include the media from the United States, as Canada consumes American media, such as Star Wars, Top Gun, and the Marvel movies. Additionally, it includes military institutions for kids such as cadets, the normalization of flags commemorating Canada's role in peacekeeping throughout downtown Ottawa, commercials for the CAF on television and social media, and air shows for sporting events and Canada Day. As a personal anecdote, growing up, I attended a bring-your-kid-to-work-day event with my father, who worked as a civilian for National Defence (DND). The entire day took place at the cadet range and consisted of military-esque activities such as shooting air rifles, military physical fitness tests, and watching a cannon go off. Even my father was surprised at all the events, especially given that a "regular" day at the office would never involve such activities. Enloe notes that militarism requires many decisions before it exists, as it is not a natural societal formation. In her conclusion, Enloe (2000) makes an important comment that applies to militarism in Canada as it pertains to the ongoing sexual misconduct scandal: some decisions integral to militarizing women are decisions of omission, such as "senior officers' decision to turn a blind eye to their male subordinates' acts of sexual harassment of female colleagues" (p. 225). In my analysis, I unpack how the military's role as a significant contributor to the WPS agenda is influenced by and perpetuates hegemonic masculinity.

The concept of militarism brings attention to how more military presence within the WPS framework and increased societal expectations of military support, that is, troops on the ground and military humanitarian aid, could be detrimental to the success of any state's commitment to WPS, feminist or otherwise. Therefore, integrating the military into Canada's commitment to

WPS may well present challenges to any feminist agenda, given the notions of gender, heteronormativity and hegemonic masculinity that the military represents.

Liberal Feminism

Feminism does not exist as one singular theory but is shaped by and theorized from different viewpoints. In this section, I focus on liberal feminism because states often deploy liberal feminism instrumentally in their feminist policies. Most broadly, liberal feminism challenges mainstream liberal theories by addressing the exclusions "in liberal democracy's proclamation of universal equality" (Rottenberg, 2014, p. 419). Women's rights movements and feminists have consistently challenged the public-private dichotomy, where women were often relegated to the so-called 'private' sphere of familial relations and reproduction and men to the so-called 'public' sphere of business and politics, to encourage more women to join public office or, in general, be granted the same opportunities as men. Liberal feminism in the international arena concerns the subordinate position of women in global politics and seeks to remove obstacles to achieving the same rights and opportunities granted to men (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2016, p. 182). Often, liberal feminism seeks to include women in political positions to increase representation and offer a different perspective to policy-making. The concept of women's rights as human rights emerged from liberal feminist practice in the 1990s, most notably from Hillary Clinton's address to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (Bunch, 2018, pp. 22-23; UN News, 2024, np.), with the goal of bridging the gap and bringing gender equality to an often masculine-dominated sphere.

In short, liberal feminism has pushed women's rights as human rights into the mainstream human rights discourses. As touched upon in my introductory chapter, this ultimately contributed

to the development of UNSCR 1325+ on Women, Peace and Security in the international sphere. However, feminist scholars like Charlotte Bunch (2018) have critiqued the use of women's rights in government policies as being no more than lip service to the obligation to the rights of women (p. 24). Bunch (1990) also expressed this criticism well before the development of the 2017 WPS commitment, and it is something I consider in my analysis, especially given that Canada's reputation is tied to this commitment. States have gone to war and have participated in foreign intervention ostensibly to protect the rights of women and girls. It is essential to consider whether Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda offers genuine support for gender equality or is a disguise or cover for alternate intentions. These alternate intentions are its ability to participate in foreign intervention on the basis of women's rights and gender equality (Rankin, 2012, p. 264).

In Canada, including women in political positions to improve policy-making has never been more evident than in the case of Anita Anand, the second woman Minister of National Defence and the first woman of colour to occupy the position. Anand was appointed to the position in light of the controversies surrounding the treatment of women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Upon entering her position, PM Trudeau directed Anand through her mandate letter[8] to take on the ongoing sexual misconduct controversies in the military. In 2021, Anand became responsible for "tak[ing] action to transform the culture of the CAF [Canadian Armed Forces], rebuild trust and build a healthy, safe and inclusive workplace, free from harassment, discrimination and violence" (Office of the Prime Minister, 2021, n.p.). Anand was handed a near-impossible task: to transform an institution that in the past would have excluded her solely based on her identity.

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[8] "Mandate letters outline the objectives that each minister will work to accomplish, as well as the pressing challenges they will address in their role" (Office of the Prime Minister).

As mentioned in my literature review, the raison d'être of the UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325+) is to include women in peace operations, peace talks, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and more. UNSCR 1325+ stresses the importance of equal participation, a hallmark of liberal feminism. Therefore, in my analysis, I consider how Canada's commitment to WPS mobilizes this strand of liberal feminism.

Neoliberal Feminism

With the emergence of liberal feminism in international politics came the inevitable influences from neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is defined as " a dominant political rationality that moves to and from the management of the state to the inner workings of the subject, normatively constructing and interpellating individuals as entrepreneurial actors" (Rottenberg, 2014, p. 420). In other words, neoliberalism heavily values individual and personal gains. Financial institutions and state decisions reinforce the intersection of feminism and neoliberalism by focusing on "women" as the subject of entrepreneurial success. Rottenberg (2014) describes this as a feminist subject who is "oriented towards optimizing her resources through incessant calculation, personal initiative and innovation" (p. 422). Hester Eisenstein (2017) notes that the move towards neoliberalism, from mainstream liberal feminism, is the idea that governments are not responsible for the general welfare of the population and, in turn, have made it individuals' responsibility (p. 37). Therefore, when something goes wrong, if individuals are susceptible to crime and poverty, it is the responsibility of the individuals instead of the government and society (Eisenstein, 2017, p. 37). States and financial institutions use neoliberal feminism as a means of gaining credibility.

An example of neoliberal feminism in action is the World Bank's (WB) approach to gender, which Elisabeth Prügl (2015) notes has the motto "gender equality is smart economics" in the WB Gender Action Plan (see also Wilson 2015). Smart economics is based on the idea that women are hard-working individuals who can be more productive than their male counterparts, using "additional income more productively than men would" (Wilson, 2015, p. 807). The idea is that including women and girls in potential economic opportunities will help reduce poverty (Prügl, 2015, p. 618). Sylvia Chant and Caroline Sweetman (2012) define "smart economics" as the current interest in "'investing' in women and girls for more effective development outcomes" (p. 518). However, by focusing on women and girls, the initiatives are effectively forgetting men and boys, which not only perpetuates the gender binary but also focuses solely on individuals (Eisenstein, 2017, p. 42).

At face value, "gender equality as smart economics" seems like a genuine commitment to help solve global crises affecting diverse groups; however, it has been criticized for multiple reasons. On the one hand, it essentializes women as different from men, assuming that they will be more likely to invest their savings in improving life for their families, while at the same time assuming "that women will perform just like the standard rational economic actor in the market," which otherwise describes men (Prügl, 2015, p. 619). These contradictory assumptions conflate two very different experiences of women and girls, creating a challenging gendered paradox for them to overcome. Chant and Sweetman (2012) also note that it is difficult to understand whether the investment is intended to promote gender equality or to invest in potentially cheaper labour (p. 521). Pascale Dangoisse and Gabriela Perdomo (2021) highlight these criticisms and note that the concept of "smart economics," in effect, frames women as an untapped resource and perpetuates a neoliberal narrative (p. 426). Finally, while it may attempt to support the

empowerment of women, neoliberal feminism "retains ideological commitments to rationalism, heteronormativity, and genderless economic structures" (Prügl, 2015, p. 619), commitments that ultimately detract from any of the potential good it may cause.

Stemming from smart economics, "smart peacekeeping" encourages more women to take part in peace operations because "it is the right thing to do" (Chant & Sweetman, 2012, p. 420). The main argument for the increased presence of women in armed conflict and peace negotiations is not only because it is important to have alternate perspectives from the standard norm but also because women, understood as a homogenized category, are deemed inherently more peaceful, kind, gentle, and less abusive (Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2019, p. 407). In this sense, women as a distinct category are expected to behave in the most stereotypical way attributed to their gender, which unintentionally or otherwise homogenizes and essentializes their experiences. Essentializing women as peaceful, caring, and motherly has been criticized by scholars such as Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2015), who argue that not all women are necessarily good. Also, "smart peacekeeping" does little to consider how joining peace operations and organizations may be difficult for women who are ostracized and made unsafe by the institutions that purportedly want them (i.e., the military). At best, it is a band-aid solution that does not address systemic barriers such as sexism and racism that prevent women from joining such institutions in the first place.

I apply the criticisms of smart economics and smart peacekeeping in my analysis when reviewing the commitment to include more women in the CAF and peacekeeping missions. I also note that while WPS is often understood as an outward-facing, global commitment, Canada continues to face challenges in promoting women in its armed forces, as evidenced by the recent sexual harassment scandals.

49

National Branding & White Innocence

The great white North, the "peaceful frontier," and the friendly neighbour in the North are common names given to Canada (Woolford & Benvenuto, 2015, p. 375). Canada has a positive reputation internationally and is seen as a tolerant multicultural state (Midzain-Gobin, 2020, p. 479). These descriptors, which Canada prides itself on, carry the undertones of whiteness and innocence. I experienced this firsthand when I lived in the United Kingdom. When I told people I was from Canada, they often apologized for mistaking me for an American or noted how nice it must be to be from a great country. In response, I often brought attention to Canada's colonial legacies, which shocked most of my international friends. While I do not deny the positive experiences I have been afforded as a white person in Canada, they serve as a reminder of why it is critical to move beyond the trope of niceness and understand what nation branding means, what it disguises, and why it impacts how Canada engages with policy commitments. As such, it is necessary to interrogate what Canada's behaviour and/or standing as a nation-state tells us about its WPS commitment. In this section, I explore theories of nation branding and white innocence in relation to the Canadian state. I apply these theories to understand further how Canada's WPS commitment is shaped by gender norms and how it is perceived internationally and domestically.

L. Pauline Rankin (2012) notes that nation branding is a subtle form of nationalism framed in a more progressive way (p. 259). Canadian identity and branding are established by and reflect so-called Canadian values, which, according to the Department of National Defence, include "inclusion, compassion, accountable governance, and respect for diversity and human rights" and gender equality (Defence Policy, p. 61). Moreover, Canadian civility and innocence are disguised under the middle power placement that Canada has as the friendly neighbour to the

north–as not a superpower on the international stage but also not a state devoid of power. As a signatory to United Nations Resolution 1325+ and a member of the UN, G20, G7, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada actively participates in the international community and engages with these so-called liberal institutions. One of the important elements of liberal institutionalism is that states who engage in such institutions are considered more likely to be at peace (Russett, 2016, p. 69). That is, participating in international institutions gives the impression that a state is collaborative and, therefore, more peaceful. These states are thought to know how to achieve peace and, thereby, to be in a better position to "help" other states become more peaceful. This subsequently creates a dichotomy between a state that knows how to achieve peace and one that requires peace.

Phrases such as 'the great white north' invoke the vast northern area of the country and the icy temperatures Canada is known for, but this is not the only meaning of this phrase. In effect, the great 'white' north denotes a territory that has been stolen and co-opted for the Canadian government's use and the wilderness that Canada prides itself on (Baldwin et al., 2011, p. 1). Secondly, and more importantly, 'white' also refers to the whiteness of the people who live in Canada and their patriarchal white ascendency within the state (Baldwin et al., 2011, p. 1). The legacies of colonialism, hegemonic masculinity and whiteness, therefore, shape Canadian identity.

In her study of the Somalia Affair and Canadian peacekeeping forces, Sherene Razack (2000) brought together national mythologies of whiteness and colonialism. In this case, Razack theorized that the soldiers who went to Somalia acted as colonizers, seeing bodies of colour that needed civilizing and saving (p. 128).

Sahla Aroussi (2017) raises a related point: Western states are participating in a form of imperialism through their stature as predominantly white states, intervening against men in 'brown' states (p. 30). This echoes the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2005), who wrote about the phenomenon of sati reform, which is the British colonial intervention in India towards the ritual of Sati and, quite specifically, "white men are saving brown women from brown men" (p. 478). This example is one of many that highlights a purported colonial need to intervene in foreign states based on preconceived racial and gendered issues. It is thus important to approach Canada's WPS commitment with a critical postcolonial lens to understand the intentions of the commitment better. It is also important to critically analyze Canada, given its international reputation for being a "nice" or "good" state.

I am particularly interested in how these theories help to unpack Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda–especially since earlier studies of Canadian national branding (Rankin, 2012) have noted the discrepancy between the use of gender equality as a Canadian value in international policies and a failure to apply the idea domestically.

Homogenization & Essentialism

Understanding whether the policies I have selected homogenize and essentialize women and culture more broadly is important for understanding how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. As mentioned, Canada's commitment is a large part of its feminist foreign policy. As a result, a large portion of it is external-facing, meaning it is intended for use abroad and outside Canada. That said, critical domestic elements shape the nature of Canada's commitment, which I discuss further below. In this section, I draw on Chandra Talpade Mohanty's (1988) influential piece "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial

Discourses" and Uma Narayan's (2000) work on the essentialization of cultures. I apply the work on homogenization and essentialism to better understand how women are framed in the selected policy documents and to better understand who the WPS commitment is targeting. For instance, I evaluate if the documents identify women as diverse actors with varying experiences or if they reduce women to a single group needing empowerment.

Mohanty (1988) draws attention to how Western feminist scholars have established a monolithic, homogenized entity, the "third world woman." The stereotype of the third world woman, as applied by Western feminist scholars, carries the assumption that women in the third world all have the same desires and life experiences and also share a common oppression and thus are a "powerless" group and victims of particular socio-economic systems (p. 338). Similarly, Uma Narayan's (2000) piece on the essentialist package picture of cultures flags how essentialism represents cultures as if "they were entities that exist neatly and distinct and separate in the world" (p. 1084). Narayan (2000) further explains that individuals are assigned to these cultures by those outside without a second thought. This problematic turn homogenizes cultural experiences and does not interrogate the "historical and political processes by which particular values or practices have come to be deemed central components of a particular culture (Narayan, 2000, p. 1085). From this, Narayan (2000) argues that feminist engagement should be attentive to something she calls "selective labelling . . . whereby those with social power conveniently designate certain changes in values and practices as consonant with cultural preservation and others as cultural loss or betrayal" (p. 1085). In my analysis, I pair Mohanty's with Narayan's insights into how cultures and the perception of women in 'other' places become homogenized. For instance, I want to understand whether using images and texts in the WPS policy documents under examination denotes a homogenized Other or third-world woman.

Moreover, the Western feminist construction of the "oppressed third world woman" denotes a paternalistic view of women in the third world (Mohanty, 1988, pp. 351-352). As Wilson (2015) and Rottenberg (2014) note, this is one way in which neoliberal practices and discourses on gender are racialized. Wilson (2015) points out that in gender and development discourses, the "entrepreneurial female subjects," or the subjects of development frameworks, are represented alongside constructions of the "third world woman" (p. 807). Rottenberg (2014) criticizes Sheryl Sandberg's book *Lean In*[9] specifically and neoliberal feminism generally for perpetuating the dynamic of the "liberated West in opposition to the subjugated rest" (p. 422). Neoliberal discourses then help to shape the illusion of the "third world woman" as a helpless "other" in need of saving. The representation of women in these hegemonic discourses is, therefore, an arbitrary relation employed by particular cultures, particularly those in the West (Mohanty, 1988, p. 334). I note this as being of particular importance as I analyze the discourses within the WPS framework.

The framing of so-called third world women by Western feminist scholars and policymakers as "powerless" entities in need of saving is all too common and is rarely put under fire as a reiteration of colonial discourse. The homogenization of women and cultures is not only problematic because it creates a paternalistic divide between the so-called first world and the third world, or the Global North and the Global South, but also because it perpetuates a geopolitical separation. Anna M. Agathangelou and Heather M. Turcotte (2010) highlight the asymmetrical power relationship between states in the Global North and Global South. For instance, the protection and promotion of women's rights as human rights for women and girls in

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[9] Sheryl Sandberg is the former Chief Operating Officer of Facebook and penned *Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead,* a self-declared feminist manifesto aimed at helping women climb the corporate ladder and manage a work-life balance.

the "third world" perpetuate the myth that states in the "first world," in this case, Canada, are territories that protect rights (Agathangelou & Turcotte, 2010, p. 45). What ultimately ends up happening is that this geopolitical segregation reinforces power dynamics that control, regulate, and exploit other geopolitical bodies, be that states, people, or subjects in the field of international relations (IR) (Agathangelou, 2010, p. 48).

Considerations and theorizations about homogenization and essentialism are important for my understanding of how the WPS policies either reproduce or counter these very narratives. Therefore, I analyze the policies for overt colonial language or less explicit representation, for instance, through images and inferences. I am, therefore, able to assess how the discourses can shape and frame the way Canada sees the Global South and how Canada is seen in relation to the Global South.

Postcolonial theory is important for this reason as it helps to interrogate the intentions of the Canadian nation-state at home and abroad. Further to this point, postcolonial theory also helps interrogate the complex relations of past, present, and future policies as they may demonstrate a hypocritical stance on gender equality, especially concerning issues at home, such as the issue of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, Girls, and Two-Spirit People (MMIWG2S). Liam Midzain-Gobin and Heather A. Smith (2020) highlight that Canada has a habit of leaning into its self-image as a non-colonial power and a tolerant, multicultural society (p. 480). Deconstructing this image through the questions outlined in my methodology chapter helps to shed light on how Canada presents its commitment to the WPS agenda. Creating and maintaining this type of self-image is important because it helps to give legitimacy to Canada's behaviour internationally. As Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) point out, perpetuating the myth of Canada as a non-colonial power "allows political elites to claim moral superiority in the world

or express outrage at practices elsewhere" (p. 492). Further, in my analysis, I assess how the discourse works to frame the commitment, that is, how the images and words on the page come through under postcolonial feminist scrutiny.

To summarize, the focus of my theoretical framework broadly includes understanding gendered power relations, liberal and neoliberal feminism, and postcolonial feminist thinking. I draw on the works of many scholars to better understand how all of these theoretical components come together in the WPS commitment in order to answer my research question and support my analysis and discussion. I use my theoretical framework as a basis to underpin my forthcoming analysis. In the following chapter, I explore my methods and methodology, where I use feminist critical discourse analysis and feminist policy analysis to analyze my selected policy documents and the Elsie Initiative. I outline my adapted and Revised Policy Analysis Framework, which includes a series of questions under four categories—values, power analysis, language, and symbolic/material reform—that I use in my forthcoming analysis.

3. Methods and Methodological Framework

In the previous chapter, I noted some theories that will help to guide my forthcoming analysis, such as militarism, criticisms of neoliberal feminism, and postcolonial feminist theory. Since I am addressing how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda, I employ a feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) to consider what kind of feminist rhetoric is used throughout the documents. I chose to do an FCDA because it is the most useful tool to analyze the relations between discourses and social constructions. A feminist analysis, more specifically, looks at how gendered perspectives are entrenched in power asymmetries that become "common sense" in certain communities and social contexts (Lazar, 2018, p. 372). Ultimately, these gendered hierarchies go unchallenged, and a feminist perspective offers a more precise lens to uncover, decode, and challenge these norms or commonly shared ideas. Traditional CDA, while critical, does not have a feminist lens and as such is not informed by the ongoing work of feminist scholars. Because I am not assessing these policies at face value, feminist critical discourse analysis is the most useful method of analysis to uncover the "deeper" meanings of the texts. I pair that with policy analysis, which is often considered a neutral method of study; however, it does not always consider complexities that exist within societal structures and, as such, defaults to benefitting patriarchal societies (McPhail, 2003, p. 43). For instance, for a long period, policy analysis did not consider how gender, existing as a part of everyday societal structures, impacts the development of policies (McPhail, 2003, p.47). Therefore, I adopt the feminist policy analysis that has developed since the early 2000s, which includes a focus on gender mainstreaming as an active part of Canadian policymaking. As I mentioned in the introduction, Canada employs a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) gender mainstreaming

approach to develop and implement policies. Nevertheless, GBA+ has its own constraints and continues to grapple with incorporating a truly intersectional lens.

With this in mind, the chapter is organized as follows. I first explore my two primary methodologies, the Feminist Policy Analysis Framework (FPAF) and feminist Critical Discourse Analysis (FCDA). I draw on Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) work on FPAF and Heather Kanenberg, Roberta L. Leal, and Stephen "Arch" Erich's (2019) revised FPAF, along with Michelle M. Lazar's (2007; 2018) work on FCDA. I also briefly describe frequency analysis as part of my section on FCDA as it is also a form of textual analysis. I combine elements of qualitative and quantitative research to support the development of my discourse analysis. The purpose of studying discourse is to reveal the meaning of various forms of texts, from formal written texts to TV programs and advertisements (Halperin & Heath, 2012, pp. 310-311). In other words, I assess how the policy documents are produced within a social framework and if they reflect common beliefs and ideologies. By analyzing the discourse, I am better able to understand what beliefs and ideologies are represented through the texts. Therefore, studying the discourses in the WPS commitment will help me to understand how it mobilizes feminism. Here, I look to each category in my adapted Feminist Policy Analysis Framework to understand which indicators I will use to analyze the texts. I outline my methods of analysis and research design in the second part of this chapter.

Methodology

The following section investigates how I will apply Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) Feminist Policy Analysis Framework. As this piece is from the early 2000s, I am using Heather Kanenberg, Roberta L. Leal, and Stephen "Arch" Erich's (2019) revised approach, which

includes intersectionality. To ensure that the framework applies more directly to my research, I have modified the framework and included additional questions. Additionally, I pair the framework with feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) to answer my research questions better and see the bigger picture of Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda.

Feminist Policy Analysis Framework

A feminist policy analysis framework, as outlined in Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) influential piece "A Feminist Policy Analysis Framework," seeks to apply a set of questions to analyze how gender is understood in policies by "determining the policy's impact primarily on women, and also on men" (p. 40). While McPhail's framework assesses the impact on both women and men, the main goal of McPhail's framework of questions is for it to be used "to understand the ramifications for women with a goal to ending the sexist oppression of women" (p. 40). McPhail's work comes from the field of social work, but she notes that the Feminist Policy Framework can be used in other disciplines to conduct policy analysis. Gender and women have not always been analyzed in policy frameworks, an omission that has, in turn, led to the creation of gendered lenses for policy frameworks. McPhail (2003) explains the initial lack of focus on gender by reference to the fact that men were often the ones creating policies, and the inclusion of women emerged only when more women joined the field (p. 42). This is not necessarily the case anymore, as feminist policy analysis is more well-established, and gender mainstreaming is often used in policy development, specifically in Canada.

McPhail's (2003) feminist policy framework consists of thirteen categories, each with a series of corresponding questions. The questions work as a thematic guide to critically analyze the policy in question. The questions are intentionally broad to include the viewpoints of various

feminist schools of thought. McPhail (2003) notes that including varied feminist perspectives enriches "the policy analysis and illuminate(s) the contradictions inherent in all policy" (p. 47). Heather Kanenberg, Roberta L. Leal, and Stephen "Arch" Erich (2020) propose a revised version of McPhail's original framework by focusing more on intersectionality. The revised "Feminist Intersectional Policy Analysis" proposes an additional category of analysis on intersectionality and offers additional supporting questions to the existing categories. The analysis is still mainly focused on social work, but as with McPhail's original framework, it can be applied to various disciplines.

I use the revised version of McPhail's Framework as the basis for my adapted analysis framework. Both the original and the revised frameworks are included as appendices at the end of this document. In Table 1, I have outlined the categories and questions I use in the analysis. McPhail's (2003) approach is quite dated and reinforces the gender binary because of its focus on including women in policy frameworks. For this reason, I drew on my theoretical framework, and I included and created additional questions that are more specific to the analysis of the WPS agenda. I formatted the questions into four different categories. As I mentioned previously, the original framework constituted thirteen categories, with the idea that not every category would apply to a given topic. I did not include all of the original categories as they did not apply to my research and because some questions were repetitive.

McPhail (2003) described the meaning of each category of questions in her Feminist Policy Analysis Framework. The first category is values. Here the question is primarily about feminist values and whether or not they are present in the documents. For McPhail (2003), these feminist values included the elimination of false dichotomies, the reconceptualization of power, renaming or redefining policies to reflect women's reality, and acknowledging that the personal is political

(p. 45). Because McPhail's piece is not as recent as the policy documents, I propose an additional point, that instead of policies reflecting women's reality, they address the deeper gendered hierarchies that underpin the policy. This could reflect the experience of women as a diverse group and those who are gender non-binary. The questions in this section are similar to my research question, but it is more about the values that exist within the commitment rather than the commitment as a whole. For this reason, I opted to include a question about Canadian values, as they are an important part of the conversation. Additionally, I want to understand if Canadian values reflect feminist values within these policy documents.

The second category covers a wide range of questions, all related to power. As McPhail (2003) notes, "questions concerning who ha[s] the power to define the problem, propose the solution, and defeat the policy must be asked and answered" (p. 54). The questions in this section explore themes of representation, visibility, empowerment, and influence of systems of power. These questions allow me to further explore how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to WPS because they identify the core elements of Canada's policy commitments. By this, I mean that these questions help unpack the ideological assumptions underpinning Canada's commitments and provide reasons for why Canada engages with WPS in certain ways. The questions about systems of power are excellent guides to answering my research sub questions related to the reproduction of race and gender norms.

The third category, language, brings attention to the kind of language used in the policies, which goes hand in hand with my feminist critical discourse analysis. It is quite straightforward but important for understanding how language shapes the meaning and intention of the policy. McPhail (2003) notes that language can be used to obscure the gendered nature of a policy, for instance, sidelining gender when it is necessary to help explain specific experiences (p. 52).

61

McPhail's work is nearly twenty years old, and the evolution of language and understanding of gender identities has changed. For this reason, I have modified her questions to be more current and in line with my research topic. McPhail (2003) was quite concerned with women being ungendered in policy language and argued that sometimes gender neutral language could "hide the reality of the gendered nature of both the problem representation and resulting public policy" (p.52). At the same time, specifying only one gender in a policy, for instance "women," also omits the experiences of gender non-binary folks. Additionally, language and discourses can transform meaning and bring attention to something that is not immediately apparent. For instance, I include a question inspired by Mohanty's (1988) critique of the "Third World Woman" as a singular monolithic subject (p. 333). Part of Mohanty's (1988) argument is that Western feminists have created the "third world woman" by reducing women's experiences and colonizing "the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the third world" (p. 334). Therefore, it is important to consider whether the term "woman" in the policies also reflects the diverse experiences of women. The inclusion of this question is important for assessing whether Canada, as a Western "feminist" state reproduces a third world Woman narrative.

The fourth and final section is about symbolic and material policies. McPhail's (2003) category of symbolic versus material reform is meant to challenge the policy's intention. She notes that symbolic reform occurs when a policy is designed to reinforce a certain image versus solving a specific problem (p. 53). Symbolic policies typically do not have a lot of resources behind them and are usually meant to benefit the policymakers whereas material policies typically have stronger implementation, funding, and resources (McPhail, 2003, p. 53). However, this dichotomy does not necessarily mean that symbolic = bad and material = good, as McPhail

(2003) notes; in some instances, a symbolic policy may be beneficial in opening doors to more

concrete policies (p. 53). I opted to include this category of questions because it is interesting to

think about a policy as being symbolic and provides a fruitful discussion about what it means to

be (seen as) a "good state." To clarify, what I mean is that the symbolic vs. material discussion

highlights when policies are simply for "image-making" rather than for "problem-solving"

(McPhail, 2003, p. 53). This set of questions has the ability to peel back the layers and examine

Canada's intention with the WPS commitment.

Table 1

Revised Feminist Policy Analysis Framework, adapted from McPhail (2003)

A. Values
1) Do feminist values undergird the policy? Which feminism, which values?
2) What values are made apparent in the policy? Does the policy use and define "Canadian" values?
3) Does the policy have a domestic application? If so, how is it framed? Where is the value placed?
B. Power Analysis
1) Who does the policy work to empower? Does it consider varying race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, and ability/disability identities?
a) What does empowerment mean within the context of the policy?
b) Does the policy refer to women as investments?

2) Who has the power to define the problem? What are competing representations of the problem?

3) How are systems of power and inequality (racism, classism, colonialism, cisnormativity, heterosexism, hegemonic masculinity) used in the policy to control or oppress those who occupy different social locations?

C. Language

1) Does any special treatment of women cause unintended or restrictive consequences?

2) Is there acknowledgement of multiple identities (race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability) in the language of the policy?

3) To what extent does the language in the policy posture women abroad as a homogenized entity, otherwise known as the "Third-World Woman"?

4) How is gender equality defined in the policy? Who is included?

5) Where are the policy silences? Are there groups made invisible based on their race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, and ability/disability identities within the policy?

D. Material/Symbolic Reform

1) Is the policy merely symbolic, or does it come with provisions for funding, enforcement, and evaluation?

2) What is the strength of the authority of the agency administering the policy? Does it highlight the state's global cooperation and good-natured behaviour?

3) Are there any foreseeable contradictions preventing the policy from being anything more than symbolic?

4) Does the policy aim to frame the state in a particular way?

Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis

Textual analysis is useful for analyzing policy documents or political texts because it helps identify the deeper meaning presented within the documents. I chose discourse analysis as the primary method for analyzing my selected policy documents because a discourse analysis ties together the words within a text to the cultural surroundings or society in general (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 310). Discourses, as explained by Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath (2012), "consist of an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is produced and reproduced in a particular historical situation" (p. 309). Discourses can, therefore, give legitimacy to specific institutions and social practices (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 309) and emphasize what kinds of hegemonic power relations influence society at large (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 64). Since I am analyzing how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda, and I am looking at this commitment in light of the post-2015 moment, a study of contemporary discourses pertaining specifically to gender is the most useful methodology in responding to my research question.

In addition to studying discourses, I apply a brief content analysis to provide additional context to my study as I evaluate more than one policy document. Content analysis, as suggested in the name, evaluates the content directly in the text and assesses meaning and motives within the texts (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 310). I utilize frequency analysis as part of content analysis to examine the frequency of certain terms across all documents. The purpose of this kind of

65

analysis is to demonstrate–with as little bias as possible–what is present in the documents (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 318), in this case, selecting the frequency of keywords related to my study. I conducted the frequency analysis at the beginning of my analysis to establish context and to better understand the terms that are used throughout the documents. Here, qualitative research methods help to support my overarching qualitative study by supporting how the frequency of terms, such as "feminism," must also be analyzed discursively. Though, as I mentioned above, feminist critical discourse analysis is my primary method and takes up the bulk of the analysis along with the adapted Feminist Policy Analysis Framework.

The method of discourse analysis that I use is feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA), a subcategory of critical discourse analysis (CDA) theories. The goal of CDA is "to raise critical consciousness about the discursive dimensions of social problems involving discrimination, disadvantage, and dominance with the aim of contributing to broader emancipatory projects" (Lazar, 2018, p. 372). CDA is unique because it encompasses more than written and spoken language; it includes images and visual semiotics, or the relationship between the images and texts (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 62). Thus, CDA allows for a more enriching analysis that looks at all discursive aspects of the documents. CDA draws on Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony in that it focuses on being critical of naturalized, normalized, and hegemonic categories, for instance, binary categories (Lazar, 2007, pp. 147-148). The key is that society does not largely question these normalized categories, as they are considered normal or collectively understood as common sense. Within binary categories, terms slip and become glued to other binaries, ultimately conflating their meaning, for instance, when the term women becomes synonymous with feminism and men with non-feminism (Gannon & Davies, 2012,

n.p.). This slippage can reinforce a given binary, in this case, societal understandings of the gender binary.

Norman Fairclough (2018) is one of the prominent theorists of CDA and suggests that its success is due to its ability to assess and critique social life in an effort to improve it (p.13). Fairclough argues that there is an influence between social structures and discourse, i.e., that one shapes the other and vice versa (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 67). Discourse manifests in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions, meaning that it contributes to shaping and reshaping them and reflects them (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 62). Within this dialectical relationship, attention is drawn to how language contributes to the reproduction of social identities and social relations, for instance, how gender exists within a set of identities (Lazar, 2018, p. 374). Fairclough (2018) describes dialectical reasoning as "a way of reasoning from critique of discourse to what should be done to change existing reality, by way of explanation of relations between discourse and other components of reality" (p. 13). This implies a hierarchy of discourses or an unequal power relationship between those who create the discourses and those impacted by discourses (Fairclough, 2018). In other words, powerful public groups control discourses (Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 313).

Feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) offers a more nuanced approach to CDA that focuses on how the "gender ideologies that entrench power asymmetries become 'common sense' in particular communities and discourse contexts, and how they may be challenged" (Lazar, 2018, p. 372). FCDA is informed by current and developing critical feminist thought, which includes queer, postcolonial, and intersectional theories (Lazar, 2018, p. 373). The emphasis on studying gender ideology is particularly important in my research as I am assessing whether gender, race, and sexuality norms are being reproduced within these documents. As

analyzed with the tools of FCDA, gender ideology emphasizes a hierarchy between sex differences. That is not to say that feminists believe in binary separation, but that it is the common sense understanding, as described by Lazar (2018, p. 373). The common sense understanding of gender is the gendered stereotypes that are a part of everyday life and are reproduced through social life and in discourse from that social life (Lazar, 2018, p. 373). One of the main reasons for doing a CDA is its focus on being critical of society, that is, its transformative potential is to interrogate that which is political and mainstream. More specifically, through applying FCDA, gender power relations and hierarchies become more apparent. As part of my analysis, my aim is to understand what kinds of feminism(s) are being reproduced in the documents by understanding how feminism is mobilized within the selected policy documents. As such, FCDA is ideal for my research as I assess what gender discourses dominate and if they reproduce inequalities. For instance, I assess how feminism, as presented in the documents, treats "gender" and "women" and what that tells me about the use of feminism broadly across the selected policy documents. Further, a feminist approach to CDA highlights how gender is political and can demystify the relationships between gender, power, and ideology in discourse (Lazar, 2007, p. 144).

Michelle M. Lazar (2018) outlines six interrelated principles of FCDA (pp. 373-375). The first principle is the ideological characteristic of gender which is focused on the binary understanding that divides two groups hierarchically. Essentially, gender is divided into a hierarchical binary category based on the "presumed naturalness of sexual difference," and it is seen as a commonly understood phenomenon or a "common sense" hegemonic binary (p. 373). Even while feminist theorists work to move beyond the binary, the "common sense" structure is reproduced by institutions and by people in their everyday lives (p. 373). Therefore, the

ideological characteristic of gender can be discursively analyzed to understand what it is reproducing and how it exists in relation to other social and cultural identity factors. The second principle is power, where Lazar (2018) suggests two conceptions that have been important to FCDA. The first form of power is through patriarchy or a hegemonic masculine power system. Lazar (2018) notes that patriarchy should not be viewed as a monolithic system of power as it intersects with other systems, such as colonialism, heteronormativity, capitalism, and neoliberalism, a key point for my sub questions (p. 373). The second form of power stems from Michel Foucault's understanding of power "as widely dispersed and operating intimately and diffusely" (p. 373). This form of power is categorized as normalized power, which stems from disciplinary systems and prescriptive technologies, in other words it is a power that is everywhere and normalized in society (p. 373). The third principle of FCDA is the constitutive view of discourse which Lazar (2018) notes as being connected to how language and other forms of semiosis reproduce and maintain social identities (p. 374). The fourth principle Lazar (2018) outlines is critical reflexivity as practice, which is especially important to consider for my research (p. 374). Critical reflexivity is important to ensure that we, or myself in this thesis, do not inadvertently reproduce or reconstruct systems of power. Though I try to remain free of bias, this is challenging because of my experiences as a white, cisgender female scholar; therefore, I may interpret the results of my analysis differently than someone else who would conduct the research. Additionally, Lazar (2018) notes that critical reflexivity can also be used when individuals or organizations use progressive feminist stances for non-feminist means, ultimately working against feminist politics in the process (p. 374). Lazar's (2018) fifth principle is analytical activism, which strives for a socially just society where "ways of doing" and "becoming" are socially inclusive (p. 374). Finally, in an effort to understand varying gender

ideologies, transnationalism allows us to consider the different gendered experiences worldwide and not classify them as all the same (Lazar, 2018, p. 375).

CDA is important to feminist scholars as it has critical components, but with the addition of feminism, it implies the use and understanding of feminist epistemologies within CDA (Lazar, 2018, p. 372). FCDA acknowledges a connection between gender ideologies, power, and discourse development that can determine, shape, and reproduce already existing norms. This dynamic is present beyond the words on the page, which are underpinned and supported by dominating discourses in social life and civil society. I am doing this work because it is important to interrogate how the WPS documents under review mobilize feminism, given that they exist within a hegemonic masculine and patriarchal society. This is why I apply these methodologies to my approach, as they guide me in unpacking the discourses.

Methods and Research Design

To conduct my FCDA, I selected four core documents related to Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Figure 2

Canada's Women, Peace and Security Landscape

As demonstrated in Figure 2, the most important document is Canada's second National

Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022, which outlines Canada's WPS

commitment outright. The large yellow bubble is the focal point of the diagram with overlapping

bubbles for the documents that the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 has referenced. The small blue bubble

represents Canada's Defence Policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, which has a strong relationship

with the WPS commitments since both the Department of National Defence (DND) and the

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are two of lead actors on the WPS commitments. The blue

bubble is smaller because the section on WPS within the document is smaller than it is in

Canada's *Feminist International Assistance Policy* (FIAP), represented by the pink bubble. The

FIAP has a dedicated section specifically to WPS via Action Area 6 on Peace and Security.

Though I only look at one aspect of this development policy, the FIAP is the backbone of the

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) and the only current document with the term feminism in the title. The last document is an initiative, not a policy document, and it is the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. The separation of the purple bubble from the others indicates that it is not mentioned in the other policy documents, but it is particularly important to study this initiative because it demonstrates how Canada acts on its commitment to WPS through global partnerships and funding. Finally, I have the first National Action Plan 2011-2016 on hand to use as a control, as this document was not curated with a feminist lens, nor does it claim to be a feminist policy. Notably, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 has three official yearly progress reports. I did not include the progress reports as part of my analysis because my goal was to assess the commitment as it was outlined in 2017. Additionally, each department that is a part of the commitment has a progress report and together, for reasons of sheer volume, these documents are beyond the scope of this thesis. By selecting the documents described here, I can better understand how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda.

As a starting point in my analysis, I establish the context in which these documents were written. This includes assessing whether specific ministers were designated as responsible in the documents. For my analysis, I chose to do manual coding by highlighting both virtual and physical copies of the texts for both the frequency analysis and the rest of the feminist critical discourse analysis. I then coded and highlighted specific passages, words, and images related to feminism, intersectionality, gender equality, and colonialism. I started broadly with these indicators to establish how frequently they are used to understand better what this tells me about the documents on their own and comparatively. While the indicators are quite broad, they do relate directly to my research question, assessing how feminism is mobilized in the WPS the commitment.

In my analysis, I follow the sequence of my adapted Feminist Policy Analysis Framework as explained above to examine the documents vis-a-vis values, power, language, and ending with material/symbolic reform. For the category dedicated to values, I code for precisely that. Specifically, I code for Canadian values to better understand how the state sees itself. Over the course of my analysis, I recognized that some documents establish feminism as a core Canadian value, so in addition to "Canadian values," I also reviewed "feminist agenda," "feminist values," and "feminist approaches." This is particularly relevant to my main research question, assessing how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. Additionally, I also looked at domestic impacts in this section, and therefore focused on terms such as "at home," "domestic," "in Canada," and "Indigenous women and girls." As with Canadian values, I noticed a trend with "at home" and the use of personal pronouns such as "our" and "we" and also included these observations in my analysis.

The category of power is more complex because it has a variety of questions, and there are various ways that power is understood. For the questions concerning empowerment, I not only coded for empowerment, but I also looked at indicators that note how the commitment is "smart," "the right thing to do," and a good "investment." McPhail (2003) notes that pining for equality within policy frameworks can both be a gain and a loss for women, as the "other" group in the dichotomy of men and women. In short, there is a possibility that through equality discourse, women lose out (p. 48). I am interested in how gender equality is employed within the documents and if it reproduces the gender binary. In other words, even when gender equality is part of the policy framework, it can favour making women appear "equal" to men without addressing systemic barriers that may prevent women from experiencing equity. I want to problematize this thinking further and apply it to the inclusion of other identities within the scope

73

of gender equality, understanding who is referred to in the term gender equality and if it goes beyond the binary of man and woman.

In language, I code for inferred wording on gender equality, women and identities. For instance, I focus on how the term "women" is used throughout each document. I do not highlight the frequency of the term "women" but rather in what context it is used. This is often signified by what follows the term women, for instance, "women and men," "women as peacekeepers," "women abroad," and "women and girls." I aim to understand who is included in the definition of gender equality and whether "women" in Women, Peace and Security is exclusive to cisgender women. This is important because it more broadly determines who is the focus of Canada's commitment. With the example of "women abroad," I apply Chandra T. Mohanty's (1988) theorization of the third-world woman to explore if and how the use of "abroad" signifies women who require saving, which would imply that there is an inherent colonial approach to Canada's commitment. As McPhail (2003) notes, within policy frameworks, women are often ascribed specific characteristics, such as "feminine qualities" of care and nurturing, which ultimately work to regulate and contain them (p. 49). I also look for what the documents are not telling us. In other words, I code for silences, which is more challenging since the references are not in the text. For this reason, I look for the kinds of terms pushed to the margins in popular discourse and I refer back to my frequency analysis terms to better understand what is missing. Here I code for terms related to gender-diverse people and any allusions or variations of 2SLGBTQQIA+ people. Often the acronym changes from document to document, so I searched by references to LGBT, as this is the core part of the acronym.

In the section on symbolic/material reform, I focused on the use of images in the text and code for themes related to military excellence, military prowess, leadership, and recognition of

wrongdoing. Since all of the documents I have selected are public government documents, I can assume that they are put together with caution and intention and with the awareness that anyone of any background or belief system can read them. Therefore, any silences or images used within the documents, whether intentional or not, are subject to my analysis. Examples include looking at when images of women are used in Canada's Defence Policy or what kinds of images are used in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. I focus on what kinds of images are being used, who is in them, and their relationship to the other people or objects in the images. I also look at what captions are used with the images, if any.

While I analyze these terms, I pay attention to where they are situated; for instance, the Defence Policy comprises several different sections, so I examine where and when there is a concentration of discourse centring on women and gender equality. I do this because I am first and foremost assessing how feminism is mobilized in the documents, but I am also interrogating how gender norms are reproduced and how the gender binary may be reinforced through these documents. Peace and security are gendered, to begin with, as noted by many feminist security studies scholars, and, thus, these documents are likely not free from gendered assumptions and gendered power relations. This is further corroborated by the current social context for these documents: the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) face criticisms and several sexual misconduct allegations and lawsuits. It is also crucial as it demonstrates how parts of this commitment are reflected in real life, as this is an ongoing situation. My analysis touches on this by focusing on how the documents address and reconcile the relationship between a typically masculine institution, such as the military, and the goal of commitment to WPS.

In the following chapter, I begin my analysis by applying the information that I have laid out in my methods and methodology. In other words, I apply my adapted and Revised Feminist Policy Analysis Framework to assess the three policy documents and the Elsie Initiative to better understand how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. I refer to this as "doing the analysis" because I bring together the questions in my Framework and the texts, and images from my selected policy documents to make sense of my research question. I save my discussion for the final chapter before my conclusion, to allow for ample room to explore of my analysis.

4. Doing the Analysis

In what follows, I analyze how feminism is mobilized in Canada's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. Additionally, I look to understand how Canada's commitment is influenced by hegemonic masculinity and heteropatriarchal norms and, relatedly, reproduces or challenges race, gender, and sexuality norms globally. As explained in the previous chapter, I conduct a feminist policy analysis by applying an adapted version of Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) Feminist Policy Analysis Framework and by doing a feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) of the WPS agenda as laid out in the following documents and initiatives: Canada's *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 (*NAP-WPS), Canada's Defence Policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged,* Canada's *Feminist International Assistance Policy's* (FIAP) Action Area 6: Peace and Security, and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. I use Canada's first NAP-WPS 2011-2016 as a control to compare the current NAP-WPS 2017-2022, though the former is not subject to my formal analysis. Notably, the first NAP-WPS made no claim to being feminist and was released under the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, while the other documents were all released under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. During the Harper years, there was a systemic shift towards removing the term "gender equality" and replacing it with "equality between men and women" (Tiessan & Carrier, 2015, p. 95), ultimately erasing any other identities that do not fall into the silos of men and women. Since the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 is the primary government document dedicated to the WPS agenda, it takes up the bulk of my analysis.

To organize this chapter, I first begin by providing contextual information about Canada's commitment to the WPS Agenda, for instance, which ministers are involved, the key actors, and a preliminary frequency analysis of key terms. I then respond to the questions set out in each

category of my adapted Feminist Policy Analysis Framework: values, power analysis, language, symbolic/material reform. In the following chapter, my discussion, I identify common themes present across the documents to assess how these themes constitute a feminist approach. Moreover, the WPS agenda is a global commitment that Canada has been a signatory to since 2000, but in both of Canada's national action plans it is framed mainly as a foreign policy pursuit with a few domestic components. However, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 does indicate that the WPS Agenda has an internal or domestic element, and for this reason, I have included the domestic component as a reasonable point of analysis in my thesis. With this in mind, I look at how both the international and the domestic are discussed in these documents and how their respective issues are woven into Canada's commitment.

Context

Before diving into my formal analysis, I want to establish some key context of the WPS agenda in Canada. In this section, I discuss the frequency of commonly used terms in my selected documents. I also consider the key partners involved in Canada's commitment along with the ministers responsible for signing the policy documents. As with the rest of my analysis, to complete the frequency analysis, I coded by hand, scanning through digital and physical copies of the policy documents.

To collect some preliminary information, I scanned the selected documents for key terms, such as feminism, intersectionality, gender equality, 2SLGBTQQIA+, and colonialism.[10]

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[10] As soon as I began coding, I realized that my selection of terms would only be fruitful if I expanded my focus to include the terms and their various permutations. For instance, while there were no mentions of the term intersectionality per se in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, there were four references to the concept when I changed how I coded for instance, "intersecting forms of marginalization" (p. 1), "women and girls face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination" (p.4), " Indigenous women and girls in particular face intersecting discrimination and violence based on gender, race, socioeconomic status and other identity factors, as well as underlying historic

Assessing the frequency of terms used reveals more clearly the connections between the policy

documents and initiatives. To be clear, I do not think that a higher frequency of the word

feminism, for example, necessarily means that a document is *more feminist*. In Table 2, I

included the names of the documents as the columns with the indicators as the rows. I have also

included the ministers responsible for the documents as a footnote to Table 2.

Table 2

Frequency of Terms

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causes" (p. 4), "recognizing that inequalities exist along intersectional lines" (p. 8). By doing this, I began to
uncover how the discourse was shaped beyond the frequency of terms.

Code:	National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 (NAP-WPS 2017-2022)[11]	Defence Policy, Strong Secure Engaged (Defence Policy)[12]	Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP)[13]	Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (Elsie Initiative)	National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2011-2016
Feminism/Feminist	18	2	38	0	0
Intersectionality	4	0	2	0	0

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[11] Ministers supporting the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 included The Hon. Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Honourable Maryam Monsef, Minister of Status of Women; The Hon. Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie; The Honourable Ahmed D. Hussen, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship; The Honourable Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence; The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada; and The Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

[12] The Defence Policy is supported by the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and an Advisory Panel which includes The Honourable Louise Arbour, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and a member of the Advisory Board of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court; General (Retired) Raymond R. Henault, former Chief of the Defence Staff and past Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; The Honourable Bill Graham, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Minister of National Defence; and Margaret Purdy, former Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Security and Intelligence) in the Privy Council Office and former Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence.

[13] The FIAP is supported by The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Honourable Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie.

Gender Equality	27	10	72	1	1[14]
2SLGBTQQIA+	0	0	0	0	0
Colonial	3	0	0	0	0

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[14] The NAP 2011-2016 refers to gender equality once and it is not within the context of the government's initiatives. Instead it refers to equality of men and women a total of five times. I opted to count the reference as one as it does not meet the definition of gender equality in the NAP 2017-2022, which includes gender-diverse people (p. 18).

The results in the table reaffirm what I suggested above, that the frequency of terms does not necessarily indicate how feminism is mobilized within the commitment. Nonetheless, the frequency of the terms helps provide preliminary information on the policy documents. It helps to establish, at first glance, what can be expected from the documents and what Canada is emphasizing throughout the documents. For instance, it is unsurprising that the FIAP, the only document explicitly feminist in its title, has the highest number of references to feminism and gender equality.

Additionally, while disappointing, it is not surprising that the documents avoid specific terms such as colonialism; Canada has long struggled with acknowledging its colonial past. For example, Prime Minister Harper never formally acknowledged colonialism, and the conversation only began to shift with the election of Justin Trudeau. Prime Minister Harper did offer an apology on behalf of the Government of Canada to all survivors of the residential schools, but he omitted using the term "colonialism" in his speech. This might be read as an example of what Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) describe as Harper engaging in "the act of timestamping which absolves the Canadian people from the colonialism of the past" (p. 488). In 2017, PM Trudeau acknowledged the "legacy of colonialism in Canada" in a speech to Canadians (Midzain-Gobin & Smith, 2020, p. 489), the same year the government released the documents under review in this thesis, demonstrating that openly discussing Canada's colonial past was a newer phenomenon. Midzain-Gobin and Smith (2020) note that at the time, compared to the previous government, these comments were seen as revolutionary (p. 489). The relative novelty of explicit government acknowledgement of colonialism may explain why there are so few references to colonialism in the selected documents.

It is interesting to note how the terms are used. In the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, "feminist" is used in reference to the FIAP, to "Canada's feminist approach," to "feminist foreign policy," and to "Canada's feminist agenda." Similarly, the FIAP, the only document with feminism in the title, contains a variety of references, including in Minister Freeland's opening letter, which states that feminism is a Canadian value:

> It is worth reminding ourselves why we step up—why we devote time and resources to foreign policy, trade, defence and development: Canadians are safer and more prosperous when more of the world shares our values. Those values include feminism and the promotion of the rights of women and girls. (FIAP, p. i)

In this quote, it is clear that Minister Freeland is attributing feminism to being a part of Canada's values. When she states, "when more of the world shares our values," Minister Freeland is speaking to Canada's goal of spreading its values with the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, the Defence Policy's references to feminism come only in Minister Freeland's opening letter and in a small section on the commitment to UNSCR 1325+ (p. 55) in relation to Canada's "feminist approach to international policy." The Elsie Initiative has no references to feminism whatsoever. While it is unsurprising that the FIAP has the highest frequency of the term feminism, there are other trends that stand out. Firstly, Minister Freeland uses the term "feminist foreign policy" in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, the FIAP, and the Defence Policy.[15] My second observation concerns the lack of references in the Elsie Initiative. The Elsie Initiative is led by Canada and seems to be an area to promote feminist foreign policy and commitments to feminism more generally, and yet it does not explicitly mention feminism. I explore this observation further in my discussion. Similar to feminism and related terms, the notion of gender

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[15] Minister Harjit Sajjan signed the letter in the opening of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 that references feminist foreign policy, but did not include it in his opening letter in the Defence Policy, as Minister Freeland did.

equality is applied in a few different contexts. The most prominent instances in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 are gender equality followed by "the empowerment of women and girls" and the "human rights of women and girls." Within the FIAP's seventy-two references to gender equality, a large portion are in reference to "the empowerment of women and girls," explicitly highlighting an increasing focus on one gender, couched within a binary understanding of gender at that. In Action Area 6 on Peace and Security, gender equality is framed as being achieved through the advancement of women's rights. For instance, it states, "Peacebuilding and statebuilding in the aftermath of conflict provide important opportunities for advancing women's rights and gender equality" (FIAP, p. 58) and "Though much has been done to promote gender equality in the Canadian Armed Forces, more work is needed to ensure that Canada's military reflects and respects the needs of the women it employs and serves" (FIAP, p. 60). While these references do not speak explicitly to the empowerment of women and girls, they do provide insight into how gender equality is defined, which I explore below. In the Defence Policy, gender equality is used to characterize enhancing the military and its efforts to recruit women and represent Canada. One passage states, for example, "The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to gender equality and providing a work environment where women are welcomed, supported and respected" (Defence Policy, p. 21). This passage reflects the quote from the FIAP, reinforcing that gender equality in the CAF is achieved by making it safer for women. These examples of focusing on women and girls and gender equality, as achieved through the advancement of women's rights, point to a clear distinction of women placed in a binary position to men in Canada's WPS commitment.

To reiterate, the frequency of a term does not necessarily tell us anything concrete about the discourses used in the policy, but it can highlight certain absences, a fact that I explore

84

further throughout the discussion. For example, the documents contain no references whatsoever to LGBTQ2I+ or related acronyms save for one reference in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 to "gender-diverse people" (p. 13) in the section on the use of GBA + to analyze the impacts of the WPS commitment. The frequency, or lack thereof, of colonial and related terms is similar; the main usage of such terms in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 is about Canada's "own challenges" and has a domestic implication which I explore in the discussion.

The Women, Peace and Security commitment is intended specifically for women, according to the UNSCR1325+. Women are written all across the commitment, in the title, in the images used in the documents, and in the policies themselves. The policies speak to women as the primary actors but make scarce explicit mention of men. The commitments even go as far as to refer to women and girls instead of women and children, reinforcing "women" as binary to men. Now you might be thinking, why does it matter if a policy about women includes men? Or you may be wondering why it is necessary to include men in a space that was initially intended to make space for women. The reality is that men are part of the equation, and in this policy, they are most often silent referents. As Cynthia Enloe (2014) notes, the important question "Where are the men?" highlights how they often go unnoticed, partially because they are the norm or standard referent. I think about that as I assess the commitment. For instance, the Defence Policy states, "We need a military that looks like Canada. In particular, we are committed to attracting, recruiting and retaining more women in the Canadian Armed Forces across all ranks and promoting women into senior leadership positions" (p. 21). The subtext is that men are already part of the CAF and thus diversifying requires including more women. As well, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 engages "men and boys" as actors but does not explain their role beyond "partners of transformative change" (p. 8). Focusing on women as opposition or in addition to men echoes

the "add-women-and-stir" approach that does not challenge gender hierarchies or systems of power (Eisenstein, 2017; Sjoberg, 2015). Part of the difficulty with going beyond an "add-women-and-stir" approach is due to how the WPS commitment is implemented across federal departments.

Key Partners

The WPS agenda is implemented through various partners and actors. Understanding who these actors are helps to demystify how Canada implements the WPS commitment (I list the key partners in Figure 3). The most important are those mentioned in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, which has four lead partners and four supporting partners. The lead partners for the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 include the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the Department of National Defence (DND), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (NAP-WPS, p. 11). The secondary partners include Public Safety Canada (PSC), Status of Women Canada (now Women and Gender Equality Canada [WAGE]), Immigration and Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), and the Department of Justice (NAP-WPS, p. 11). The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 states that the supporting partners "mainly focus on domestic policy programs, but they also work on issues of global importance" (p. 11). Interestingly, the lead partners—typically associated with policing, diplomacy, and conflict within Canada and abroad—are framed as the core implementers of the WPS agenda. In contrast, those who deal with civilians are framed as secondary partners, which are more important to domestic policies and programs. The lead actors involved in the WPS highlight how Canada's commitment is primarily in the foreign policy sphere with a strong lens on military and police involvement.

Figure 3

NAP-WPS 2017-2022 Partners

Values

     The set of questions from my methodology concerning values is at the crux of my research question. As a reminder, these are the questions I use to guide my analysis: do feminist values undergird the policy? Which feminism, which values?; What values are made apparent in the policy? Does the policy use and define "Canadian" values?; Does the policy have a domestic application? If so, how is it framed? Where is the value placed? However, in this section, I not only focus on my research question, but I also look at what values are made apparent in the policy and how the policy documents define Canadian values. I also take this opportunity to understand the framing of the WPS commitment by analyzing the domestic versus international

approach to understand where the priority is placed. By this, I mean that I am evaluating where

Canada places the emphasis on the WPS commitment.

Canadian Values

The WPS commitment is filled with references to Canadian values and, more specifically,

feminism and gender equality *as* Canadian values. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate

how gender equality and feminism are touted as Canadian values. Interestingly, the NAP-WPS

2017-2022 does not make explicit reference to the term "values" but it does make reference to

Canada's feminist agenda and feminist approach. The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 is not the only

document comprising the WPS commitment, the Defence Policy, and the FIAP work to fill the

values gap. In the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, Canada characterizes its feminist agenda as prioritizing

"gender equality and the rights of women and girls" and recognizing "the role of civil society in

advancing, promoting and protecting human rights" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 8). The feminist

approach is further described as "challenging the normalization of harmful gender relations" and

"based on the understanding that addressing root causes of gender inequality requires the

transformation of power relations associated with discrimination, coercion and violence in

Canada and abroad" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 8). Notably, the feminist approach includes the

Defence Policy and its focus on diversifying the CAF by including more women in the Forces

and the other lead partners to the WPS commitment, such as the RCMP (NAP-WPS 2017-2022,

p. 9). Within this feminist agenda and feminist approach, Canada does not explain *how* it

challenges harmful gender relations or addresses the root causes of gender inequality.

Where the NAP-WPS 2017-2023 does not explicitly mention Canadian values, the

Defence Policy, on the other hand, frequently mentions them. According to the policy, Canada

aims to share its values abroad and in turn hopes that these values will be well received. The Defence Policy states on more than one occasion that Canada aims to "promote" its values abroad (p. 7, 11, 33, 41, 59, 86, 89). More specifically, the executive summary highlights this point by noting that the members of the CAF "work tirelessly to defend Canada and promote Canadian values and interests abroad" (Defence Policy, p. 11), referencing outright that there is an external element to CAF commitments and that Canadian values are to be defended and promoted abroad. Though the Defence Policy does not mention Canada's "feminist agenda" or "feminist approach" as the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 does, it does include gender equality as one of the core values by stating:

> Canadian international engagement will be guided by the core Canadian values of inclusion, compassion, accountable governance, and respect for diversity and human rights. The goal of gender equality permeates all of these core values. These values are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and international law. (p. 61)

So, while the Defence Policy does not explicitly state that it is feminist, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 refers to the Defence Policy as a part of the feminist approach (p. 9), therefore implying its part in Canada's overall WPS commitment and feminist foreign policy. The connection between the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the Defence Policy is challenging to understand, but the connection becomes clearer when looking at the FIAP as well.

As previously mentioned, the FIAP opens with a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, that states,

> It is worth reminding ourselves why we step up—why we devote time and resources to foreign policy, trade, defence and development: Canadians are safer and more prosperous

when more of the world shares our values. *Those values include feminism and the*

promotion of the rights of women and girls [emphasis added]. (p. i)

Here Minister Freeland is specifically outlying that Canada's values include feminism and

promoting the rights of women and girls. Similarly, Marie-Claude Bibeau, the then Minister of

International Development and la Francophonie, states in her opening letter that the policy

reflects Canadian values and that "we [Canada] must passionately defend the rights of women

and girls so they can participate fully in society" (p. ii).

By putting together these three policy documents, it is clear that Canada engages gender

equality and the promotion of women and girls as part of its core Canadian values. However,

despite the mention of gender equality and feminism, it does not clearly outline how or why

these are Canadian values. Including gender equality and the promotion of the rights of women

and girls as Canadian values emulates a neoliberal feminist framework because gender equality

is being used instrumentally as a value (to be protected and promoted) rather than as a concrete

action. I also think of Midzain-Gobin and Smith's (2020) piece on national mythmaking and how

perpetuating these values in the policy commitment reinforces Canada's position as a "good"

global leader, which ultimately reinforces its global image. The references to Canadian values

are typically followed by references to spreading them or sharing them in a wider capacity which

is something Canada is proud of.

"Our" Home on Native Land[16]

A general observation I made when reviewing all of the policies, apart from the Elsie

Initiative, is the use of personal pronouns "us" and "we" along with the possessive phrase "our

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[16] The original lyric in Canada's national anthem is "home and native land," but there have been recent discussions
about changing it to "on." I use this line as a double meaning, to refer to Canada's identity and the domestic

own." The pronouns and possessive denote a sense of ownership in the documents, sounding as though they are speaking to the reader. Enloe (2014) notes that a nation framed as "us" puts a premium on belonging but also has a strong potential to be exclusivist (p. 61). I sense this from the use of "our" and "we." They convey a sense of inclusion and familiarity to the reader: Canada's challenges are shared by all, and we will work through them together. However, this sentiment may not apply to everyone reading the document and especially not to those who are not represented in the document.

Seeing the pronouns throughout the document makes it easier to notice when they are absent. For instance, Operation HONOUR is mentioned in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 with no allusions to ownership: "Operation HONOUR is the name of the Canadian Armed Forces mission to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour from the Canadian military" (p. 13). Instead, later in the document, Operation HONOUR is mentioned for its improvements to the CAF using personal pronouns by stating, "… we should lead by example" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 14). However, the ownership is immediately followed by a paragraph that refers to CAF members as "their" and "they"-- and not "us" and "we." More specifically, it states, "To ensure that CAF members are best able to execute their duties in peace operations, they are provided pre-deployment training on human rights, protection of civilians, WPS, conflict-related sexual violence, child protection, sexual exploitation and abuse, and human trafficking" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 14). In a short space, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 "others" the CAF when referring to the controversies it faces. The change in pronouns appears to be a way of moving away from controversy while still mentioning them in the document. It also notes the CAF as a separate institution, despite all of the references to how "we" should behave, the CAF has its own set of

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implications of the WPS commitment. The change in lyric is an allusion to colonialism by referring to Canada's home "on" native (Indigenous) land.

regulations and rules to follow. I find that framing the CAF as an "other" within this context separates it from the general population or those who read the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and suggests that the problems that plague the military are not also broader problems in Canada.

The emphasis on "our" challenges is exemplified further in a crucial section of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 titled "Canada's Own Challenges: Learning from Our Experience." Here, Canada importantly notes the challenges Indigenous women and girls face, particularly "intersecting discrimination and violence based on gender, race, socioeconomic status and other identity factors…the legacy of colonialism and the devastation caused by the residential school system" (p. 4). The section closes out with a final reference, "Globally, in the context of this Action Plan, Canada's learning experience with the consequences of colonialism and the continued challenges faced by First Nations, Inuit, and Métis will help improve Canada's capacity to respond to challenges faced by women and girls abroad" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 5). The quote demonstrates that addressing the legacies of colonialism better equips Canada to respond to challenges abroad and emphasizes the value this has for the WPS commitment. The idea is that Canada will ultimately apply the lessons learned from the challenges Indigenous women and girls face domestically to its international WPS commitment. That said, there is little mention of how the WPS commitment will support Indigenous women and girls in Canada. Most notable is that Indigenous women and girls are also left out of the narrative of "empowering women and girls" that is drizzled throughout the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. While it is a largely international commitment, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 uses Indigenous women and girls instrumentally to reflect on the wrongdoings of the state while simultaneously suggesting that these wrongdoings have been rectified. Biskupski-Mujanovic (2019) notes that this ultimately insinuates that Canada is still only targeting problems outside of Canada and, in effect, framing

itself as "'Canada the good' and obscures histories of violence, including the continued marginalization of Indigenous peoples, newcomers and women" (p. 413). The narrative of the empowerment of women and girls is strongly supported in the international space and sidelines the need for it with respect to Indigenous women and girls. Simply because Canada mentions the violence towards Indigenous women and girls does not absolve Canada from the role it must play in addressing the systemic racism and gender-based violence within Canada.

Another significant mention of Canada's internal challenges is the block quote from PM Trudeau's address to the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly:

> Canada is built on the ancestral land of Indigenous peoples—but regrettably, it's also a country that came into being without the meaningful participation of those who were there first... For Indigenous peoples in Canada, the experience was mostly one of humiliation, neglect, and abuse. Of a government that … sought to … eradicate their distinct languages and cultures, and to impose colonial traditions and ways of life. … And for many Indigenous peoples, this lack of respect for their rights persists to this day. (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 5)

The original speech given by Trudeau, in its entirety (not included in the NAP-WPS document), paints a somewhat different picture. Between each ellipsis, the speech expands on more specific details of how Indigenous peoples were not respected and honoured through treaties. Further, the speech notes that "early colonial relationships were not about strength through diversity." However, the shortened version of the NAP-WPS leaves out the mention of the Government's role in denying Indigenous governments laws and dignity. Trudeau uses intense language to describe what the Government has done. Words such as "discarded," "rejected," "robbed," "failure," and "shame" are pointedly left out of the excerpt in the NAP-WPS.

While it is still necessary to problematize Trudeau's speech, it is notable that the intentionally removed language conveys a more vital message that should have remained part of the speech. The removal of the intensity of the original quote is what I argue is an intentional policy silence. Biskupski-Mujanovic (2019) frames this perfectly as "Canada . . . acknowledging bits and pieces of its own injustices and historical violence only when it can benefit from doing so" (p. 413). Trudeau's original speech paints a particular perspective of Canada as he discusses the wrongdoings of the state. Using this quote in its entirety could come off as too negative from the perspective of those who drafted the document, skewing the image of Canada within this Action Plan. Alternatively, using fragments of the speech allows the Government to address the concerns related to Indigenous women and girls but not have to go into detail about addressing these concerns.

Power Analysis

In the following section, I explore the power dynamics within the WPS commitment. The questions I use as a guide are as follows: 1) Who does the policy work to empower? Does it consider varying race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, and ability/disability identities? What does empowerment mean within the context of the policy? Does the policy refer to women as investments?; 2) Who has the power to define the problem? What are competing representations of the problem? 3) How are systems of power and inequality (racism, classism, colonialism, cisnormativity, heterosexism, hegemonic masculinity) used in the policy to control or oppress those who occupy different social locations? I explore how the "problem" is defined and understood within the WPS commitment. The problem, here, refers to what the policy

addresses, i.e. the goal of Canada's commitment to the WPS commitment. The Government of

Canada has the power to define the problem. The government has the political power to

influence and determine (McPhail, 2003, p. 54) how the WPS commitment is implemented by

Canada. Moreover, the problem can be defined by what it encompasses below the surface, for

instance, I assess how the "problem" in turn creates further issues, such as the reproduction of

the gender binary.

Empowering Women and Girls

  In its policy commitments to WPS, the Government of Canada generally defines the

problem to be addressed as the disempowerment of women in various contexts. The government

focuses on increasing gender equality and empowering women and girls in peacebuilding

processes, situations of poverty, and state instability. While the problem is broadly defined as an

issue of gender equality, the various policy documents provide more specifics on the problem at

hand. The problem identified in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 specifically is the lack of gender

equality, protection, and inclusion of women and girls in peace processes. The proposed solution

is to fight for gender equality and empower women and girls to build lasting peace. It is

important to note that the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the WPS commitment in general emphasize

women's role in solving the "problem," and in doing so, the documents have put women in a

binary to men. For Canada, women are at the centre of solving the problem, as seen in this

opening letter from all of the ministers:

  We must see women as survivors, not victims, of conflicts; women can lead us from

  conflicts and prevent conflicts. The stories of women in conflict situations are both

heartbreaking and inspirational. We must harness their resilience, their determination and

their innovative solutions to end conflict. (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. i)

The FIAP also takes this stance in highlighting how the inclusion of women and girls is not only

a solution to the problem of conflict but also an indicator of lasting peace and is a strong

predictor of a state's peacefulness (pp. 57-58). The FIAP is also concerned with other problems,

such as eradicating poverty and one way to do this is to address inequality and empower women

and girls (p. ii). Action Area 1 (the core) of the FIAP centres "Gender Equality and the

Empowerment of Women and Girls." Interestingly, in Action Area 6 there is only one explicit

mention of the empowerment of women and girls, but it is in reference to the "strategic

interventions" necessary to achieve the empowerment of women and girls (p. 58). In response to

the necessary strategic interventions, the FIAP goes on to explain how Canada will support

women in peacebuilding processes and also how the Canadian military will demonstrate

leadership in gender issues to set a positive example (p. 60). Ultimately the FIAP is focused on

supporting women and girls to achieve peace. On the other hand, the Defence Policy is less overt

in its references to empowerment and primarily does so in relation to women and economic

development, i.e., "In Africa… providing training, supporting development and empowering

women and girls" (p. 92).

> The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 defines women's and girls' empowerment as
>
> women and girls taking control over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills
>
> and developing self-reliance. Policies and programs can support these processes. Women
>
> and girls can be empowered, for instance, by establishing conditions in which women can
>
> decide about the use of resources and income (economic empowerment); have access to

good quality education (social empowerment) and can participate in political life (political

empowerment). (p. 20)

This quote highlights how women and girls can regain their power through empowerment. In this

sense, Canada both explicitly supports empowerment and sees itself as responsible for

encouraging it. This is further exemplified by "investments" to support empowerment. For

instance, the following quotes demonstrate Canada's support for investments in women and girls

and highlight how Canada "knows" this is the right thing to do. Both excerpts are from the

"Context for Action" section of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022:

> Canada knows that, given the opportunity, women and girls can play vital roles in
>
> establishing and maintaining peace. Women's active participation in conflict prevention,
>
> resolution and post-conflict state building in particular presents unique and pivotal
>
> opportunities to create gender transformative solutions—and, ultimately, more inclusive,
>
> gender equal and peaceful societies. (p. 2)

> Canada knows that investing in gender equality and the rights of women and girls is the
>
> most effective way to reduce poverty and inequality and to prevent conflict and achieve
>
> peace. (p. 4)

The above excerpts and the assumption that including women results in more sustainable

peace processes also amount to what some theorists call the "smart approach." Sylvia Chant and

Caroline Sweetman (2012) theorize this notion of "smart" politics as akin to "smart economics,"

or "'investing' in women and girls for more effective development outcomes" (p. 518). The

notion of smart peacekeeping, as described by Biskupski-Mujanovic (2019), promotes the

inclusion of women in peacekeeping processes because it is the inherent "right thing to do."

However, this smart approach implies that when institutions are no longer capable of fulfilling their duties, it is the responsibility of women to step up and fill the gap (Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2019, p. 406). This narrative is common in development spaces because it shifts the onus of solving development issues from the state towards individuals, such as women. The "right thing to do" and the "smart thing to do" narratives reflect the neoliberal feminist approach of achieving equality by empowering women and girls to take individual responsibility. The following three examples from the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, the FIAP, and the Elsie Initiative demonstrate verbatim how the WPS commitment exhibits the "smart" approach to investing in women and girls:

> Canada's approach to international assistance is based on evidence that advancing gender equality is *both the right and the smart thing to do* [emphasis added]: Giving everyone the same opportunities in life helps reduce poverty and increase economic growth and increases stability world-wide, including for Canadians. (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 16)

> Investing in women and girls is *the right thing to do and the smart way* [emphasis added] to reduce poverty and inequality. (FIAP, p. 1)

> Increasing the meaningful participation of women in UN peace operations is *the right thing to do*, *as well as the smart thing to do* [emphasis added]. (Elsie Initiative, np.)

These passages, and their greater meaning within the WPS commitment, omit any suggestions about how Canada is challenging global systems that ensure that women are not equal (for instance, a nation-state's sociocultural norms). They also do not offer any concrete

action from Canada nor any protection for those who work under precarious circumstances. By focusing on the empowerment of women and girls as the "solution" to the problem of poverty (FIAP), meaningful participation in peace operations, and state instability, the burden is therefore placed on women and girls instead of on the state, who would otherwise have to provide the appropriate resources and address structural inequalities.

The Elsie Initiative does not reference empowerment, but the initiative's purpose is to increase women's meaningful participation in peace operations. Canada participates in the Elsie Initiative by working collaboratively with other nation-states to address the barriers that prevent women from joining peace operations. It seeks to achieve gender parity in peace operations while also focusing on the meaningful element, for instance, of women occupying positions in non-traditional roles or positions of authority (Elsie Initiative, n.p.). While it does not explicitly mention empowerment, the goal of the Elsie Initiative is to increase women's participation in peace operations. As seen in my analysis of empowerment, Canada views increasing gender equality as contingent on the participation of women and girls. Therefore, the problem, as defined in the WPS commitment, is also met with a challenge in feminist theory, as it reproduces the gender binary. The commitment to empowering women and girls to achieve gender equality may be an example of what Bunch (2018) describes as lip service rather than genuine support for gender equality. I explore this further in my discussion in connection to the section on language and policy silences.

Competing Representations of the Problem

As the Government of Canada is the lead on the WPS commitment and has outlined how it will solve the problem, it has also effectively controlled the narrative of how the problem is

represented. Take, for instance, the focus on including women in peace processes as an indicator of a state's peacefulness as described in the FIAP (p. 58). While it is true that engaging more women is bound to encourage peace processes due to the inclusion of multiple perspectives and experiences, what happens when potential agents of peace, for instance, the military, resist the inclusion of women? What happens when systems of power (colonialism, racism, sexism, etc.) continue to reproduce inequalities, regardless of who is at the helm or in the ranks? In other words, will adding women be enough?

In the section on WPS, the Defence Policy first mentions "The Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy" which is aimed at raising awareness of issues related to diversity in the CAF among CAF personnel (p. 85). Since this document's publication in 2017, the CAF has developed another document to address issues concerning diversity, inclusion, and misconduct toward women, titled "The Path to Dignity and Respect: The Canadian Armed Forces Strategy to Address Sexual Misconduct" (The Path, 2020). The Path contains the information gathered during Operation HONOUR as well as previous reports related to sexual misconduct in the CAF. It is important to note that The Path is not the first attempt at addressing the issue of sexual misconduct in the military. As noted at the beginning of the document, the first public reports of the problem of sexual misconduct came to light in 1998 (The Path, 2020, p. 6). As such, sexual misconduct is described as a "wicked problem," which is explained in the document as follows: "There is rarely an obvious end point where the presenting problem is solved, and there are no quick tests for solutions or their outcomes, due mainly to the fact that every wicked problem is unique and a symptom of another" (The Path, 2020, p. 7). Phrasing sexual misconduct as a wicked problem throughout the document is fascinating considering that the term "systemic" is never used as it was in the 2015 Deschamps report. It is clear that the CAF is aware that there is

a need for change in institutional culture and power structures. However, the CAF appears indisposed to adequately use the advice provided (i.e. from the Deschamps Report and Justice Arbour's Report) as an institution and/or incapable of finding the root cause.

As an institution, the CAF handles issues internally, as it has its own court and justice system. Together with the support of the government, the issue of sexual misconduct in the CAF is able to fall under the radar of the general public. As Justice Louise Arbour points out in the 2022 "Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces," this crisis is an ongoing systemic issue that goes beyond a few "bad apples." In her report, Justice Arbour found that the issue of sexual misconduct in the military

> Combines abuse of power, antiquated practices unsuited to a more diversified workplace, the glorification of masculinity as the only acceptable operational standard for CAF members, and the continued unwillingness to let women in particular, as well as members of the LGBTQ2+ community, visible minorities and equity-seeking groups occupy their proper place in the military. (p. 14)

With these words, Arbour demonstrates that the CAF is not equipped to handle issues of sexual misconduct, nor are they prepared to address the culture they have cultivated. Therefore, it is challenging to solve a problem by using the problem to solve it.

Additionally, as seen in my analysis of Canadian values above and the use of images within the policy documents below, Canada's peacekeeping projects or the encouragement of peacebuilding processes abroad are influenced by colonial representations of the state. The images have contributed to an understanding of "where" the empowerment of women and girls is necessary, highlighted by white female CAF officers in spaces with marginalized "others," as

seen in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the FIAP Action Area 6. The narrative is that "other" women abroad, in unknown locations, require assistance on how to be peaceful, which is learned and guided by white women CAF officers in particular. In other words, while the government aims to define the problem in one way, focusing on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, there are additional problems that it is addressing covertly. Therefore, the issues of engaging women in the military and repairing the national image through policy commitments are additional problems that are covertly being addressed.

All this to say, the ideological assumptions and systems of power, such as racism, colonialism, and sexism, underpin the representation of the problem. Even as the Canadian military is facing concerns about the safety of women in the CAF and the ongoing sexual misconduct scandal, Canada reinforces its "national goodness" image by framing itself as a peaceful state with the knowledge of how to make other states peaceful. Nevertheless, the question remains: if Canada is experiencing challenges towards retaining and recruiting women into the CAF and including women is an indicator of a state's peacefulness, can Canada be the authority on what it means to be a peaceful state? Moreover, it raises questions about whether Canada is capable of implementing a truly feminist commitment when there are ongoing issues targeting women and gender-diverse people in the military, the WPS commitment's lead actor.

Language

Analyzing the language, or rather the discourse, in the policy commitment is the main goal of my thesis as it will help understand how feminism is mobilized, or not, in the policy commitment. In this section, I look at language as it relates to women's experiences, particularly the reproduction of the gender binary through that language. For this, I use the following

questions as a guide: 1) Does any special treatment of women cause unintended or restrictive consequences? 2) Is there acknowledgement of multiple identities (race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability) in the language of the policy? 3) To what extent does the language in the policy posture women abroad as a homogenized entity, otherwise known as the "Third-World Woman"? 4) How is gender equality defined in the policy? Who is included? I also take the opportunity to explore how gender equality is defined, especially given that the first NAP-WPS 2010-2016 considered gender equality to be binary-based equality between men and women. Additionally, I use this opportunity to explore the policy silences in the commitment, using the following question as a guide: where are the policy silences? Are there groups made invisible based on their race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, and ability/disability identities within the policy? I code for a variety of terms related to how the language in the document presents the term women, for instance, "women and men," "women as peacekeepers," "women abroad," and "women and girls." As part of the discursive framework of the documents, the images also convey messages about gendered norms and expectations, especially concerning "women abroad."

My observations of the use of "women" and "gender equality" in the documents are twofold. Firstly, I found that most references to gender equality included women. In other words, they appear to be making women and gender synonymous instead of conceptualizing "women" as a subcategory of gender, which would be a more inclusive approach. For instance, the Defence Policy states, "The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to gender equality and providing a work environment where women are welcomed, supported and respected" (p. 21). In

the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 opening, gender equality and empowering women and girls are introduced together: "Canada is committed to gender equality, to empowering women and girls around the world and to promoting their human rights and well-being" (p. 1). By omitting the word "and" after gender equality, in this instance, the document is also equating gender equality with the empowerment of women and girls. That said, in the definition section at the end of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, there is a more comprehensive definition which notes the equal rights, responsibility, and opportunities for women, men and gender-diverse people (p. 18). The definition itself marks a change from the language used in the 2011-2016 NAP-WPS that omitted gender equality completely; however, it is one of the few references to gender-diverse people.

My second observation is related to Cynthia Enloe's (2014) question, "Where are the men?" (p. 30). While women are quite visible in the policies, partly because of the commitment to support WPS, this question also brings attention to the phenomenon of men being the default. In other words, men are the standard within the policy and are thus not explicitly positioned as an actor. The Defence Policy explicitly discusses including more women in senior leadership roles and attracting and retaining more women in the forces (p. 21). Still, it makes little to no mention of the contributions by men, perhaps because men are already in senior leadership positions and comprise most of the CAF. In fact, in the Defence Policy, there are many references to "women" because sections outline how the CAF will support women. At the same time, there are no mentions of how men's behaviour will be evaluated and changed to support the inclusion of women. Men benefit from the patriarchy and the institutions that uphold it. Enloe (2014) argues that when we explicitly consider men and what it means to be manly, it becomes easier to understand how masculinities shape behaviour and institutions (p. 31). As a result, the focus on

women in the Defence Policy reads more about including women in existing structures and frameworks instead of creating organizational change to engage gender-diverse individuals.

The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the FIAP both refer to "men and boys" as partners in transformative change to be included in the peacebuilding processes (p. 8) and to participate in achieving gender equality (FIAP, p. 10). In the executive summary, the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 brings attention to men and boys by stating, "Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy requires engaging men and boys alongside women and girls, as agents and beneficiaries of change in peace and gender equality" (p. 1). Nonetheless, the gender binary is reinforced by noting men and boys alongside women and girls within the conversation about gender equality. While the engagement of men and boys is an important aspect of the WPS commitment, it limits their role to solving major issues like gender-based violence (p. 8), instead of reinforcing the multitude of gendered impacts during war. Also, framing the issue as men and boys and women and girls leaves out gender-diverse people, who also face unique challenges during conflict. However, including them within the documents opens the door to the conversation of their absence. The Elsie Initiative, on the other hand, omits the inclusion of men and boys and maintains a sole focus on women in peace operations.

Images as Discourse

In the following section, I review some of the key images used in the policy documents, which demonstrate some of how they homogenize cultures and experiences. My analysis of the images in this section is supported by the theories on homogenization and essentialism mentioned in my theoretical framework. More specifically, I use Mohanty's critique of the use of women as a category of analysis to understand how hegemonic discourses homogenize

experiences. For Mohanty (1988), women as a category of analysis is important because often, in

Western feminist discourses, "women [in the third world] are characterized as a singular group

on the basis of a shared oppression" (p. 337). Therefore, I consider how the homogenization of

women is represented in the images used throughout the WPS commitment. I take the images

below at face value by assessing who is in the images, where the images are located within the

policy documents, and what the image conveys to me, the viewer. I aim to understand if the

images work as a form of discourse depicting specific beliefs or understood norms. Below, I

include select images from the policy documents to illustrate this point.

Figure 4

NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 5

Canada's stance on women as peacemakers is demonstrated through the images used in the

documents. In the NAP-WPS above the heading "Women as Peacemakers" is an image of a

white CAF soldier holding a Black child in her arms in a tight embrace (p. 5) (see Figure 4).

More specifically, the image centres on what appears to be a white female CAF soldier in a green

military uniform with a Canadian flag on the sleeve holding a small Black child in a secure

embrace, with one arm supporting the child's head and the other supporting their body. In the image's background is a second Black person cropped at the shoulders. Whether intentional or not, this image portrays a white saviour narrative about Canada, where white women in the CAF offer protection and comfort to a marginalized "other," effectively depicting a white woman soldier/Black child narrative. The symbol of the white soldier holding the Black child is also indicative of how women are seen as helpers, particularly in development contexts. The heading implies that women, or the white woman in the image, are the peacemakers. This contributes to the white saviour narrative of "good whites," those who share their resources and are there to "help" (Heron, 2007, p. 97). Additionally, as Sherene Razack (2000) concludes, the military as an institution in which the woman in the image represents reflects and reproduces white innocence, hegemonic masculinity, and colonization of the non-white "other."

Figure 5

NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 7

Figure 5 depicts what appears to be a group of Black women seated together facing the same direction. The women all have shaved heads and wear brightly coloured traditional clothing in reds, purples, blues, and black and white, adorned with beaded necklaces, bangles, and long

earrings. The focal point is a woman in red counting or flipping through what appears to be small papers or money while the two women next to her look on. Figure 5 appears under the subheading "The Global Agenda for Women, Peace and Security" (p. 6) and on the same page as "The Global Agenda for Women, Peace and Security and the Sustainable Development Goals" (p. 7).

Figure 6

NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 11

Figure 6 depicts what appears to be a group of Black women seated together, looking up towards or at something or someone. The women are dressed in headscarves and long sleeves with their mouths slightly ajar as if they were speaking. The women appear happy and engaged as two of them on the left side of the image are smiling. One woman in the middle is wearing a matching pale blue button-down and cap. The blue button-down has an emblem on the shoulders, often seen in policing-type uniforms. She is also holding a notepad, indicating that this may be a learning setting; she appears to be engaged and interested. Figure 6 appears under the subheading "The New Action Plan: Clear, Committed, Strong" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 11). Combining the various subheadings with the specific images in Figures 5 and 6 draws attention to how the

NAP-WPS 2017-2022 frames the WPS initiative. For instance, it is telling that the document juxtaposes the representations of the "Global Agenda" through the image of a group of women of colour in Figure 5 and "Women as Peacemakers" by a white CAF soldier in Figure 4. The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 effectively demonstrates the link between white peacekeepers and Black and Brown women as the recipients of "help." Furthermore, by including Figures 5 and 6, without captions or any indicators of where the women are from, lean into the imagery of the third-world woman. Mohanty (1988) describes the third-world woman as a monolithic entity of women who all share the same needs and desires created by Western feminists (pp. 351-352). In this case, the third-world woman stereotype is being upheld by Canada as the Western feminist and the creator of the policy documents.

Figure 7

FIAP, p. 56

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The images in the FIAP Action Area 6, notably Figure 7, which is the cover of "Action Area 6: Peace and Security" (p. 56), continue to elaborate the narrative of people of colour in the Global South as recipients/targets of the WPS agenda. Figure 7 features a Brown man

surrounded by three young girls with his hand over his heart in a gesture interpreted as gratefulness, graciousness, honesty, or appreciation. The three young girls are dressed in matching outfits, two in purple and one in pink, with a picture of Hello Kitty on the front of their shirts. Together, they are seated in front of what appears to be a fabric backdrop. Based on the body language in the image, we can assume that this is a young family, so while the photograph includes a man, the inclusion of the young girls points to protection, given that the image is located on the cover of Action Area 6 Peace and Security (p. 56). The image and the placement in the FIAP depict a connection between peace and security and ideas of gratefulness and generosity towards Canada. My interpretation stems from the fact that the image is used as the cover for the FIAP Action Area 6 and because the section follows by describing Canada's commitments, including to "promote stabilization, maintain security in conflict zones, and encourage women and girls to be active participants in peacebuilding" (FIAP, p. 59). I find that the image indicates the kinds of people whom Canada plans to help by supporting peace and security. Ultimately, these images also tie together with Canada's good natured image as a friendly international actor.

Figure 8

Defence Policy, p. 24

Figure 8 is a strategically located image in the Defence Policy (p. 24). Figure 8 depicts a group of Black civilians engaging with a Black CAF officer. The image's focal point is an older Black woman dressed in blue stripes who is seated and appears to look concerned and engaged as she grabs onto the forearm of a Black CAF soldier, identified by her green military uniform and a cropped portion of the Canadian flag on her sleeve. While the older woman holds her forearm, the officer rests her hand on the older woman's lap, engaging the two together as the centre of the image. The image is directly above the "GBA+ Gender-Based Analysis Plus" section. The GBA+ section highlights its intended purpose as a lens to ensure policies "assess the potential impacts of policies, programs, services, and other initiatives on diverse groups of people, taking into account gender and a range of other identity factors," whether for the development and execution of defence policies or programs and services for CAF personnel (Defence Policy, p. 24). The placement of the image is interesting, given that GBA+ is a gender mainstreaming policy lens typically used in the creation of Canadian policy documents and initiatives. In the Defence Policy, GBA+ is described as a tool that helps implement various CAF operations, but it would be interesting to know how GBA+ was applied in creating the Defence Policy. The image supports the outward application of GBA+ because it shows a Black CAF officer in action, depicting CAF diversity, instead of an image that shows CAF personnel working together to understand the impacts of policies on various groups of people. While on

111

one hand this image demonstrates progressive transition, it also speaks more to how GBA+ is implemented. Based on Johnstone and Momani's (2022) research on the implementation of GBA+ at DND, the Defence Policy may not have been developed with a thorough GBA+ lens. Johnstone and Momani (2022) note that GBA+ began being implemented in 2016 with a purely integrationist approach, meaning that it is applying GBA+ to already existing frameworks (p. 253), and the Defence Policy was released in 2017. In summary, the image reflects an outward application of GBA+ instead of highlighting how GBA+ was used in the development of the Defence Policy itself.

Reflecting on Narayan's (2000) work on packaging cultures "perfectly" and Mohanty's (1988) "Under Western Eyes," I cannot help but notice that there are no descriptions of the images nor any references to who is in them in all of the policy documents. In these images, there is a clear divide between Canada, represented by a CAF soldier identified by a Canadian flag, and nameless, unidentified Black and Brown women, man, and children. Including information on who these people are and where they are from would have given them more agency in the documents. This is also reminiscent of Enloe's (2014) claim that to make feminist sense of international politics, we have to understand and extend a genuine curiosity to women's lives, in this case, the women's lives in the images. Explaining the images would also enrich the policy documents, bringing together Canada's global WPS commitments with the historical and varying cultures they engage with and giving purpose to them.

Policy Silences

The policy silences are quite loud and constitute unfortunate omissions in the WPS commitment. I have already mentioned the somewhat ironic invisibility of men, both

discursively within the policies and, more generally, in the WPS framework. The central policy silence I focus on here is the absence of any references to 2SLGBTQQIA+ identities. One of the guiding questions asks if there is inequality between cisgender and transgender or nonbinary individuals, and the answer is yes. In my frequency analysis at the beginning of this chapter, I noted no specific mentions of the acronym in any of the policy commitments. There is one reference to "gender-diverse people" in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, which is the closest the policy framework comes to mentioning different gender identities beyond a man–woman binary. This phenomenon reflects Jamie J. Hagen's (2016) statement that LGBTQ omissions are a result of heteronormative assumptions in the framing of the WPS agenda (p. 313).

The reason I find this to be an omission and not an aspect that was forgotten by accident is because of Justin Trudeau's and the Liberal's continued vocalized support for 2SLGBTQQIA+ rights. For instance, in June 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau raised the pride flag for the first time on Parliament Hill (Tasker, 2016, n.p.). Further, on the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia in 2016, Trudeau proposed new legislation to give "full protection" to transgender people (Lewis, 2016, n.p.). For this reason, I turned to the yearly progress reports for the NAP-WPS 2017-202 to see if there was any evolution in considering 2SLGBTQQIA+ rights. Progress reports can be more descriptive because they look at the implementation over one year instead of establishing a five-year framework like the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. In summary, the progress reports increasingly mention 2SLGBTQQIA+ people at varying levels. For instance, the report from 2017-2018 mentioned "LBTQ2" persons, specifically within the context of creating opportunities to advance the WPS agenda domestically (Government of Canada, n.p.). By not including any references throughout the policy documents, however, it seems the government is playing it safe and attempting to be largely uncontroversial

with its omissions. It could be challenging to include 2SLGBTQQIA+ identities in international policies because the rights of 2SLGBTQQIA+ people are still not supported around the world and often not in places where foreign intervention and peacebuilding take place. On the one hand, it seems likely that the omission is meant to avoid stirring the pot or challenging gender relations in other states, but on the other hand, Canada needs to embrace what it represents fully.

Material/Symbolic Reform

In this section, I focus on whether the policy commitment is symbolic and/or material. The purpose of analyzing the material versus the symbolic aspects of the policy is to understand what kinds of commitments it possesses. In McPhail's (2003) piece, she notes that symbolic policies often do not have material backing, such as spending, but are not necessarily harmful if they bring issues into the public eye (p. 53). Additionally, assessing the type of commitment allows for a discussion that highlights when policies are simply for "image-making" rather than for "problem-solving" (McPhail, 2003, p. 53). I use the following questions to guide my analysis: 1) Is the policy merely symbolic, or does it come with provisions for funding, enforcement, and evaluation? 2) What is the strength of the authority of the agency administering the policy? Does it highlight the state's global cooperation and good-natured behaviour? 3) Are there any foreseeable contradictions preventing the policy from being anything more than symbolic? 4) Does the policy aim to frame the state in a particular way? I also analyze images in the policy documents to understand better how the visuals may respond to the questions.

As stated in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, Canada's feminist commitment to the WPS agenda is funded primarily through investments made by the Government of Canada and, more specifically, the federal department Global Affairs Canada (GAC):

The Government of Canada's feminist commitment is evident in many recent

announcements, including: $650-million commitment to sexual and reproductive health

and rights; $150 million in funding for local women's organizations; and the publication of

the Chief of the Defence Staff's directive on UNSCR 1325 that calls for the

implementation of the resolution across the Canadian Armed Forces, including in planning

and deployment activities. (p. 9)

The government, often referred to as just Canada, is also listed as a feminist donor in the FIAP

(p. 71) because of its many investments in and targets towards gender equality. Canada is also

the largest donor to the Elsie Fund, which was created as a fund for UN member states to

contribute to for the benefit of the Elsie Initiative.

In this sense, Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda is not only broadly symbolic

because it does provide funding for initiatives. The challenging aspect is that the departments

and stakeholders are responsible for following up and enforcing the commitment. I chose not to

evaluate the funding amounts spread across each department and initiative as this would go

beyond the scope of my immediate research topic of understanding how feminism is mobilized

in the WPS commitment. Additionally, it could be a separate research topic given that it would

require access to more documents to understand the specifics of the funding. In the following

section, I explore what Canada's leadership and military excellence symbolize for Canada

through its commitment to the WPS agenda.

Leadership and Military Excellence

The Government of Canada is responsible for implementing the WPS commitment, and the

policies and lead partners of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 are essential for increasing its authority.

Engaging with the military is no small feat and being at the centre of the WPS commitment has made the military highly visible. This section explores how military excellence, leadership, and prowess symbolize Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. Part of my analysis is to understand better how the military is framed within the commitment, especially amidst the ongoing sexual misconduct scandal. In the opening for its commitments to the new Defence Policy, the Defence Policy states, "Canada must have a responsive and capable military. As an instrument of national power, the military is an important and unique capability that the Government of Canada can use to advance national interests, promote Canadian values, and demonstrate leadership in the world" (p. 59). The key phrase "national power" is important here because it reflects Canada's global position as a middle power. The section explains how the CAF will be ready to protect Canadians, willing to collaborate with allies, and make "concrete contributions to Canada's role as a responsible actor" (Defence Policy, p. 61). The Defence Policy is thus contributing to the nation-branding of Canada as a strong militarized actor ready to defend the state and "vulnerable populations" in the world.

Canada's military is not the lead in the Elsie Initiative, but Canada, as in the Government of Canada, is. Canada demonstrated global leadership in WPS by launching the Elsie Initiative. In the Elsie Initiative, Canada is described as a collaborative actor who "is working with partners across the UN system – with members, think tanks and civil society – to identify how best to increase the meaningful participation of women in peace operations" (Else Initiative, n.p.). Canada's collaboration with the Elsie Initiative reinforces its position as a friendly, active player in the international system.

The challenging part of understanding Canada's leadership, particularly exercised through the military, is reconciling that leadership with the current challenges the military is facing

related to sexual misconduct, as mentioned in my introductory chapter. Since 2021, thirteen senior members of the CAF have been investigated on allegations of sexual misconduct and have been forced into retirement (Burke & Brewster, 2021, n.p.). The thirteen members are senior officials; some have formerly served as the Chief of the Defence Staff. The thirteen demonstrate that the issue is systemic at all levels of the military and even includes individuals charged with solving the problem.

Under the subheading "Canada's Military Experience, Gender Equality in Action," the FIAP states, "Among our allies, the Canadian Armed Forces are regarded as leaders on gender issues in the military" (p. 61). The section describes how women participate meaningfully in the CAF and makes little to no mention of the current issues that many women in the CAF are facing concerning the sexual misconduct scandal. It is not necessarily surprising given that the document is focused primarily on development and has an international scope. By not addressing the Deschamps Report, the External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, nor Operation HONOUR (the mission to prevent sexual misconduct from happening within CAF ranks), the FIAP avoids the conclusion that there are any problems in the military, focusing instead on how it is an outward facing initiative.

Similarly, the following quote from then Minister of Defence Harjit Sajjan in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 is presented in a bold blue square contrasted with white writing: "The continued operational excellence of our military also requires that it reflect Canada in all its diversity, that it be inclusive, and that it provides at all times and in all ranks a respectful environment for women" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 10). On the one hand, together, these quotes reinforce the CAF's credibility as a vital institution supporting the WPS commitment. The quote from Minister Sajjan himself reflects the beliefs that the ministers share. Granted, the quote can also be seen as

117

strategic political posturing since it is on the same page as "The New Action Plan: Clear, Committed, Strong" (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 10). On the other hand, using this quote and making it a more prominent focal point than Operation HONOUR demonstrates a profound lack of attention to the importance of the Deschamps report.

Images as Symbols

In this section, I analyze how Canada represents itself by depicting the military in select images. I included the images used in the covers of all WPS policy documents. For the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, I looked at all of the images in the document. For the Defence Policy, I focused on the images that clearly showed people without heavy uniforms or artillery. I chose to be selective for the Defence Policy because the entire document is not committed to the WPS agenda, and since it is primarily about defence, it is filled with images of military paraphernalia. Additionally, I included photos with identifying features of the individuals because, with the military, there are plenty of images in full camouflage. For the FIAP, I only focused on the images in Action Area 6. From the results, I can draw some conclusions related to how the documents mobilize race. In Table 2, to understand better how the images are organized within the policy documents, I categorized them by the number of images featuring people of colour, images featuring white people, and images featuring both. I chose to look at these aspects of the images because of how Canada portrays itself, as the military is engaged in the images, but also how they engage with civilians. I aim to draw a connection between the images used and the narratives of whiteness and the state, particularly how this connects to supporting the empowerment of women and girls in the WPS commitment.

Table 3

Images Found in WPS Commitment by Document

Images	NAP-WPS 2017-2022	Defence Policy	FIAP: Action Area 6	Elsie Initiative
Images featuring people of colour	5	5	5	n.a
Images featuring white people	1	32	1	n.a
Images featuring both people of colour and white people	1	10	0	n.a
Total number of images, including without people	8	102	6	n.a

The NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the FIAP have few images of white people. Figure 4, as seen in the *Discourse* category above, is the only image within the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 that showcases a white woman. The image is of a white CAF soldier embracing a small Black child. I included the total number of images to demonstrate how they are proportionally represented within the documents. In my section "Images as Discourse," I look at three of the images from the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 (see Figures 4, 5, and 6).

Figure 9

FIAP, p. 60

The FIAP showcases six images in Action Area 6 on Peace and Security. One of those six images is Figure 9, under the subheading "Canada's Military Experience: Gender Equality in Action" (p. 60). Figure 9 depicts a group of CAF soldiers standing together in what appears to be a crescent shape. At the edge of the image, where the focus is clear, is a white woman with blond hair and camouflage paint smeared on her face. The image paired with the heading brings back the idea that gender equality is synonymous with women and, further, that gender equality is synonymous with *white* women. Not incidentally, this same image in the FIAP is used on the front cover of the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. The prominent use of the same image in the two documents is important for the kind of image Canada is trying to portray, especially when compared to the Defence Policy. From a pessimistic point of view, it gives the impression that there were no other images to use, and therefore, it had to be used twice. Perhaps it is the opposite and has ulterior significance, but it is difficult to tell without any captions on the images.

Figure 10

Defence Policy, p. 92

The Defence Policy is much larger and contains more images than the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and FIAP's Action Area 6 combined. Granted, the Defence Policy does not miss the opportunity to showcase the white female CAF officer/non-white other using Figure 10. It also demonstrates the white CAF officer/non-white other dynamic in Figures 11 and 12.

Figure 10 depicts two female CAF officers, one with blond hair and sunglasses on her head and one with brown hair, wearing an army green bucket hat. The women are identified by their military green uniforms and the Canadian flag emblem on the sleeve of the latter's jacket. The two are engaged with a Black African woman who is wearing a deep blue head scarf and a pale blue shirt. The blond soldier is taking notes while seemingly listening to and engaging with the Black woman. We can assume that she is African due to the text that surrounds the image. The following paragraph is under Figure 10:

In Africa, the Defence team will work within an integrated whole-of-government approach

to advance Canada's objectives, notably by contributing to peace and security through re-

engaging in United Nations peace operations, providing training, supporting development

and empowering women and girls. Our approach to Africa will seek to make tangible

contributions to the stability necessary to advance Sustainable Development Goals and

create the conditions for peace (p. 92).

Therefore, this placement is important because it visually depicts how the two women, as

members of the Defence team, are working to support the empowerment of women and girls.

Importantly, this quote also speaks to development and connects development and empowering

women and girls. As discussed earlier in my analysis and theoretical framework, empowering

women and girls in development spheres is often associated with neoliberal "smart" approaches.

In "smart" approaches, women are used instrumentally and as individuals to solve major issues

such as resolving conflict or ending poverty (Chant & Sweetman, 2012; Dangoisse & Perdomo,

2021).

Figure 11

Defence Policy, p. 54

Figure 12

Defence Policy, p. 89

Figure 11 and Figure 12 also demonstrate the narrative of white soldiers in parallel with

children of colour. Figure 11 depicts what appears to be a white male CAF officer wearing a blue

beret, a widely used symbol of United Nations peacekeeping, and a green military uniform. He has a Canadian flag emblem on his sleeve and a red poppy on his chest, which affiliate him with Canada. He is holding what appears to be a small Black child while a group of happy Black children surround him, embracing him. The image radiates positive energy, with the soldier and the children smiling together. Interestingly, the image is located in the Defence Policy under the heading "Weapons Proliferation" and to the left of "The Changing Nature of Peace Operations" (p. 54).

Similarly, Figure 12 depicts two white soldiers taking a selfie with a group of young Black girls (Defence Policy, p. 89). The Defence Policy identifies the CAF's two members with the heading "Global Defence Engagement," despite the fact that they are not wearing the usual green military outfits seen in the other images (p. 89). The CAF's two members are wearing blue button-downs and black baseball caps with gold writing. The young girls all appear to be wearing matching blue dresses with red trim, white socks, and black ballet flats. The setting is unclear, but since the girls are all wearing the same outfit, it could be a school or a facility for girls.

The images are seemingly neutral, if not innocent and benign. At least, that is how they come across: soldiers smiling with children having a good time. As viewers, we do not know when the images were taken or the context, but they represent a positive relationship between children and the CAF at face value. From their placement within the policy, these images reinscribe an aspect of Canada's national mythology—that people of colour exist outside of the Canadian state (Razack, 2000, p. 129). Additionally, because they demonstrate a positive relationship, they portray Canada as a "good" country and a peaceful frontier (Woolford &

124

Benvenuto, 2015, p. 375). In association with their respective Defence Policy pages, Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate international commitments. Figure 11 is placed within the context of weapons proliferation and peacekeeping, and Figure 12 is within global defence. The images are not so neutral but represent the CAF as kind, wholesome, and protective, all of which reflect the dynamic between the colonizer and the "other."

Figure 13

Defence Policy, p. 23

Since the Defence Policy is a much larger policy document, it portrays female soldiers of colour, albeit most often under headings related to gender and diversity, as is the case in Figure 13 (p. 23). Together with Figure 8 from the section of my thesis, "Images as Discourse," the images are found in the first chapter of the Defence Policy called "Well-supported, Diverse, Resilient People and Families" (p. 19). Figure 13 depicts two members of the CAF who appear to be women. Both women are in uniform, and the woman on the left appears to be a visible minority, while the woman on the right is less clear. The women appear to be engaged in a

medical assessment where the woman on the left listens to a stethoscope while the woman on the right has her arm in a blood pressure cuff. Figure 13 is located on page 23 of the Defence Policy, and to its left is the heading "Leveraging Canada's Diversity," and directly under the image is "Women in the Canadian Armed Forces" (p. 23). While there is a clear association between the images of women of colour and conversations around gender, diversity, and inclusion, it is also significant that the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and the FIAP Action Area 6 could have used images of female officers of colour but did not. This further reinforces that there is a deliberate separation between white female CAF officers, CAF soldiers of colour and the bodies of colour outside the state (Razack, 2000). Moreover, the policy document depicts female CAF soldiers of colour within discussions of diversity and inclusion and white female CAF soldiers engaged in missions with non-white others. Additionally, it demonstrates that the CAF is capable of diversity but chose not to demonstrate it in any other conversation outside of "diversity and inclusion."

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have analyzed the NAP-WPS 2017-2022, the FIAP, the Defence Policy, and the Elsie Initiative to understand how Canada mobilizes feminism in its commitment to the WPS agenda. I conducted a feminist policy analysis by doing a feminist critical discourse analysis and applying an adapted version of Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) feminist policy analysis framework. I focused on four main categories: values, power analysis, language, and material/ symbolic reform. In the following chapter, I explore my findings in greater detail in light of the material presented in my introduction, theoretical framework, and methodologies and research design.

5. Discussion of Key Findings

To begin my discussion, I am reimagining my earlier diagram on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) landscape. I created the original diagram to demonstrate how I saw the connections between the policy documents (see p. 5 of the "Introduction"). In this reimagined 2.0 version, I demonstrate how my perspective of the documents has changed. The difference is significant but not overly dramatic. I have reversed the sizes of the FIAP (pink) and the Defence Policy (blue) as my analysis demonstrated that the Defence Policy and the military, more broadly, have a more significant role to play in the WPS commitment than the entirety of the FIAP. More specifically, I found that FIAP's Action Area 6: Peace and Security did not offer as much detail and information on Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda as either the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 or the Defence Policy. Based on my analysis, this is a result of the increased role the military plays in implementing the WPS agenda, which I did not fully realize at the beginning of this project. I also reduced the size of the purple bubble for the Elsie Initiative because it became clear that the initiative is built differently than the policies. The Elsie Initiative, though a commitment led by Canada, is an initiative that does not have much in the way of a national document. That is not to say that it does not contribute to Canada's WPS commitment, but that the Elsie Initiative is implemented through government programs and initiatives and, therefore, does not share similarities with the other policy documents (e.g. it has no images). Including the Elsie Initiative as part of my analysis was not as fruitful as I first anticipated, and as we can see, it did not contribute much to my analysis.

Figure 14

Revised Landscape on Women, Peace and Security

In what follows, I summarize my responses to my research questions before elaborating on the key themes that emerged through my feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) and fully responding to the questions outlined in my adapted Feminist Policy Analysis Framework (FPAF). While undertaking my FCDA, I found overlapping themes across the different categories of my adapted FPAF. For instance, analyzing the images in the documents from two different angles–language and symbolism– produced similar outcomes.

Interpretations and Summary of Key Findings

Let us begin by addressing the primary research question: how is feminism mobilized in the policy documents that comprise Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda? For starters, we might begin to answer this by asking whether Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda is feminist. The short answer to the latter question is yes and no. It sounds confusing because it *is* confusing. Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda does exhibit a type of feminism, which I argue is somewhat limited to liberal and neoliberal feminism. For all of its references to feminism and feminist foreign policy, the policies themselves fall short of what I consider truly feminist. In other words, the policies do not thoroughly interrogate what it means to be feminist, do not include intersectional lenses, nor challenge the gender binary.

My secondary research question asks whether the policies reproduce race, gender, and sexuality norms globally and if they are influenced by hegemonic masculinity and heteropatriarchal norms. The answer to this question is yes, it does. In a sense, it feels like the WPS commitment is an arm's length from feminism; the definitions provided in the annexes of the policies and the descriptions of the Gender-Based Analysis+ (GBA+) framework offer hope and a stronger commitment, but at present, a truly feminist WPS agenda remains aspirational and not actual. I explore my responses in further detail below.

The WPS framework commits heavily to women's rights as human rights and supports these rights as fundamental to Canada's feminist agenda. It demonstrates commitments to gender equality, which, along with the protection and promotion of women's rights, are tenets of liberal feminism. Moreover, Canada's commitment to gender equality within the policy framework leans heavily on supporting women's rights. In other words, the policy falls short when it comes to intersectionality or its attention to any identities outside of or in addition to being a woman.

This is interesting, given that women's rights movements have acknowledged that women are different and face varying oppressions based on race, class, sexual orientation, age, and other factors (Bunch, 2018, p. 25). As many feminist scholars have noted, studying gender is not synonymous with women and suggesting so limits the transformative potential of the given study (See literature review section "Engaging Women in Women, Peace and Security"). The most prominent example of the focus on women through the lens of gender equality is in the references made to increasing the number of women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in order to increase gender equality. Not only does this reproduce the gender binary, but it also does not acknowledge the systems of power that exist within the military that prevent women and other gender-diverse people from joining.

The WPS commitment's original intention is quickly co-opted by neoliberal feminism. Neoliberal feminism is a brand of feminism that primarily financial institutions and governments support to advance the belief that supporting women and girls is the solution to ending poverty and underdevelopment (Eisenstein, 2017, pp. 35-36). Neoliberal feminism places the onus on the individuals instead of the state or the institutions to improve economic conditions, essentially moving away from responsibility. Hester Eisenstein (2017) notes that this kind of feminism is common in development spaces, where she states that "we are told the key to creating wealth and producing social justice is the 'empowering' of individual women" (p. 37). The focus on the empowerment of women and girls as a "smart" investment and the "right thing to do" brings attention to the misconception that women just need to take part in society to solve poverty, income inequality, and in the case of the WPS framework, sustainable peace. It is not quite that simple, and it does not consider the lives and needs of real-life women who are faced with complex crises (Chant & Sweetman, 2012, p. 521). As Sylvia Chant and Caroline Sweetman

(2012) note, "relying on female populations even to guarantee business as usual, let alone transform the world, demands super-human sacrifices in terms of time, labour, energy, and other resources" (p. 521). The aspect of these decisions being "smart" comes from the idea that increasing women's representation in peace processes is more about improving security outcomes than it is about achieving gender equality (Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2019, p. 407). The way that the empowerment of women and girls works in this policy commitment reflects what Cornwall and Rivas (2012) have noted as "making women work for development, rather than making development work for their equality and empowerment" (p. 398). Encouraging and empowering women and girls to join in peace-building processes without clear guidelines of how it will be monitored and without consideration of how that might be received does not guarantee success in the long term. The language reinforces it as the "right thing to do," but in actuality, it is the right thing to do for Canada to demonstrate that it is a strong international player capable of exerting its values in other states.

Post-conflict settings and peacebuilding processes are not necessarily free of violence or discrimination based on gendered hierarchies, which makes it difficult to speak broadly about encouraging women to join where they may not be welcomed or feel safe. This is what renders the language of "investing in" problematic. Women are essentialized (for instance, as peacemakers) both with respect to joining the CAF as per the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 and for encouraging women in conflict/post-conflict settings to join peace processes, as per the Elsie Initiative. At worst, the WPS commitment delivers a weak take on liberal feminism (by merely including women), and at best, it showcases how neoliberalism has taken over to deliver a neoliberal feminist commitment (by using women's inclusion and empowerment instrumentally without providing state support). Cornwall and Rivas (2012) raise the important point that in the

131

development sphere, states are often framed as "donors" and "recipients" and that the emphasis on extreme poverty, in policies or elsewhere, allows the wealthier states to neglect social justice and relative poverty within their own borders (p. 400). With this thinking in mind, Canada also seeks to encourage the number of women in peacebuilding processes while neglecting the issues at home within the CAF. This phenomenon is reflected in the policy commitments that limit conversations to the international sphere and do not consider how the WPS domestic engagement is equally important.

The secondary part of my research question concerning race, gender, hegemonic masculinity, and heteronormativity flows from my primary research question about assessing Canada's WPS commitment vis-a-vis feminism. Through my discourse analysis, it quickly became apparent that Canada's performance as an engaged global actor was being reflected through the policy documents. This is not a surprising finding, as these are national policies. However, the emphasis on Canadian values aligned with the images depicting white soldiers with Black women and children represents a narrative of Canada as a white saviour state, reproducing a colonial dynamic. Through my analysis, I found images of children and members of the CAF smiling together, that, without any additional context, portray the CAF as a positive presence.

Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda, as examined through these policy documents, sheds light on Canada's difficult relationship as a "good-natured" state internationally and the challenges in the domestic sphere. It also demonstrates how Canada's national mythology of whiteness and underlying systems of racism are perpetuated throughout the commitment. Even when discussing colonization within the documents, for instance, using PM Trudeau's speech at the United Nations (NAP-WPS 2017-2022, p. 5), Canada distances itself from its colonial past

and present. Liam Midzain-Gobin and Heather A. Smith (2020) argue that by moving away from its colonial legacies, Canada is able to promote itself as a non-colonial power and appeal to Canadians and non-Canadians alike that it is a good international citizen (p.485). Additionally, the continued discourse on Canadian values within the documents, particularly the Defence Policy, raises a red flag on the nature of Canada's commitments. Heather Smith and Tari Ajadi (2020) argue that values discourses are colonial and imperial, mainly because they draw on assumptions about who will benefit from Canadian values abroad and because they work to manage the world outside of Canada (p. 378). This is particularly true because of how the CAF sees itself–as working "tirelessly to defend Canada and promote Canadian values and interests abroad" (Defence Policy, p. 11). Incorporating this image into the policy commitment opens the door for Canada to intervene in another state on behalf of gender equality, which is one example of the many ways states have justified engaging in conflict.

Ultimately, this creates a contradictory image built on multiple layers. Firstly, Canada's attempt to help build peace processes and provide aid abroad relies on the lessons learned from the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada, as per the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 (pp. 4-5). The experiences of Indigenous women and girls are instrumentalized within the national policy without giving any recommendations to increasing security domestically, particularly for Indigenous women and girls.

Secondly, Canada's international engagement struggles to move beyond the "innocent" narrative of helping or intervening in foreign lands. The images of white female soldiers in the policy documents reinforce an underlying understanding of the race and gender dynamics in the CAF's engagement abroad. The dynamic of paralleling white female CAF soldiers, represented by the Canadian flags on their uniforms with the unnamed women of colour, demonstrates where

133

the values of the CAF lie. As Razack (2000) notes in her piece on the violence of peacekeepers in Somalia, the military creates a space where military men (and in this case, women) reproduce a colonial narrative where bodies of colour lie outside what is conceptualized as the nation and the white men (and in this case women) become normative citizens (p. 129).

The Defence Policy speaks to increased diversity in the CAF but the images of white CAF soldiers with civilians support the narrative that white women are the ones who intervene abroad and represent the state. Additionally, the Defence Policy speaks to diversity and inclusion and mandatory "diversity training" (p. 23) across all areas of professional development. Even within the sections on diversity and inclusion, the Defence Policy highlights the increased focus on recruiting more women in the CAF (p. 12), while there is no other mention of targeted recruitment. Diversity training is a positive outcome for the CAF, but unfortunately, it is not the first time that the CAF has provided training following an incident (in this case, the emergence of sexual misconduct in the military). In the 1990s, following the Somalia Affair and increased sexual misconduct cases, the military instituted the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) training (Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2022, p. 151). Ultimately, this training, and those that followed after, failed at solving the problem, as Justice Marie Deschamps outlined in her 2015 External Review into the CAF (pp. vi-vii). In Justice Louise Arbour's Comprehensive Review (2022), she noted that the crisis in the CAF concerning sexual misconduct revealed a more complex and subtle culture that is hostile towards women, members of the LGBTQ2 community, visible minorities and equity-seeking groups (p. 14). The language in the Defence Policy concerning diversity is similar to the discussions of women in the CAF. It draws on aspects of diversity as an untapped resource that needs to be "leveraged" in order to enhance military operational effectiveness (Defence, Policy, p. 23). With all this in mind, it is difficult for

Canada to truly mobilize a feminist approach when the primary actor in the WPS commitment, the CAF, is currently facing these challenges. It is necessary that the CAF take the appropriate approaches, for instance, by accepting Justice Arbour's recommendations, in order to transform at an institutional level.

Thirdly, while Canada uses images of white female CAF officers in the images in the policy documents, the CAF still represents a hostile environment for women and gender-diverse people. Increasing the number of women in the CAF is one of the major goals in Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. In large part, the commitment to increasing the number of women in the CAF was made without acknowledging the very real harm that women face day to day in the CAF. Aside from promoting more women to leadership positions, as per the NAP-WPS annual review 2019-2020, there seems to be no suggestion of the need for underlying cultural or systemic organizational change throughout the WPS commitment. However, Rebecca Jensen (2021) notes that increasing the participation of women meaningfully, as in normalizing the roles women take and improving how sexual harassment is reported by encouraging transparent harm-free approaches, could be a starting avenue for cultural change in the CAF. I argue that it is tricky and troublesome to encourage women and 2SLGBTQQIA+ people to join an institution that does not willingly accept them.

In 2021, Minister Anand, along with the current Chief of the Defence Staff, Wayne Eyre, and Jody Thomas, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, issued a formal apology to victims of sexual misconduct. Biskupski-Mujanovic (2022) notes that while the apology received some positive reactions, the apology also highlighted that the survivor community is not homogenous, for instance, it uses vague language of misconduct based on sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation (p. 148). Instead, Biskupski-Mujanovic (2022) argues that the language should

have been more focused, explaining that the majority of victims are women, some are men, and some belong to other groups, for instance, those who identify as LGBTQI+ and all suffer in different ways (p. 148). Perhaps change is possible with the new enforcement measures implemented along with the full implementation of Justice Arbour's (2022) forty-eight recommendations, which include, but are not limited to, abolishing the definition of sexual misconduct in the Defense Administration Order and Directive, removing *Criminal Code* sexual offences from CAF jurisdiction, modifying the recruitment phase to increase the probationary period of new hires, and implementing the full list of the Deschamps recommendations (pp. 309-316).

The long answer to my research question is, therefore, that Canada's commitment to WPS is not really feminist. I find it challenging to frame this as a hard no because there are elements that demonstrate promise. Indeed, there are actions that can be taken to improve the current situation and to use it as a stepping stone to embrace a feminist commitment fully. For starters, reorienting the GBA+ gender mainstreaming framework to be more inclusive and intersectional would provide a stronger base for the creation of future policies. Gender mainstreaming has transformative potential, but it requires consistent application across all departments and initiatives, including future iterations of the WPS policies. Secondly, Canada should move away from tasking the military as a primary lead actor for the implementation of the WPS agenda. The military as an institution, as evidenced by the two extensive reviews into sexual misconduct in the CAF, is not well equipped to lead a feminist WPS commitment.

Nevertheless, as it stands, the policies that were created in 2017 do not explicitly define what would constitute a feminist commitment to WPS. Similarly to what other scholars have noted in studies done on the FIAP, feminism in these documents comes with no definition and

little enforcement power (Morton et al., 2020; Parisi, 2020). Frequently mentioning feminism also does not increase its credibility but using the term without providing a definition or a concrete commitment also does not give it much credibility. Additionally, the commitment to WPS should be consistent across all documents. While the frequency of terms does not determine if a commitment is feminist, it is telling when one document (the Defence Policy) refers to the FIAP as simply "the International Assistance Policy" (p. 7). Additionally, engaging all of the ministers on the same initiative would not only demonstrate solidarity with the feminist commitment, but help reinforce the obligations across all departments. In turn, this would help address the problems identified by Scala and Paterson (2017) and Johnstone and Momani (2022) related to GBA+, that it was rolled out too quickly and inconsistently across departments and ensure that the WPS commitment is implemented consistently. Like the critiques of the FIAP as outlined in my literature review, the WPS commitment is unable to apply an intersectional lens to its policy commitments and stays only in the realm of gender, specifically finding itself stuck within the gender binary. Focusing solely on women in the policy commitment also highlights the need for the proper application of a GBA+ framework that can adequately integrate intersectionality.

Additionally, a commitment that presents gender equality as being nearly synonymous with women and girls and only referring to them as opposites to "men and boys" reinforces women in a binary position towards men. Canada's first NAP-WPS 2011-2016 was criticized for its lack of references to gender equality and its focus on "gender equality between men and women" (Tiessan & Carrier, 2015p. 95). And while the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 is far more developed, it risks perpetuating the same mistakes as the first NAP-WPS 2011-2016. Canada's commitment struggles to engage with the experiences of gender-diverse people or address the

ways that peace operations and conflict impact men and boys and members of the

2SLGBTQQIA+ community. One of the biggest challenges of my analysis was identifying that

the commitment reinforces the gender binary while also not reinforcing it myself in noting this

exclusionary element. This is in part because the document focuses heavily on women and

specifically on the empowerment of women. To make certain of its inclusivity in using *women* as

part of the WPS commitment, the government should ensure that "women" refers to all those

who travel under the sign "women" (Ahmed, 2017, p. 14). This would go a long way in ensuring

that it is practicing inclusive policymaking and not replicating traditional gender norms of

femininity (in opposition to masculinity). The government cannot easily change the original

Resolution 1325+ on Women, Peace and Security, but it can adjust the way it is implemented

within Canada and as part of the foreign policy commitments to garner meaningful change.

Limitations

　　While I have learned quite a bit from my study, I must also acknowledge the limitations in

my research. For one, it is difficult to remain unbiased when interpreting language and themes

within a document. My lived experiences as a white cisgender woman affect my ability to

interpret and understand fully the results of this study. I try to remain conscious of my own

biases, but it is important to acknowledge that if another person had done the same study, they

may have drawn different conclusions. For one, while doing my analysis of Canada's language

of "us" and "we," I noted my instinct to identify with the "we." However, the more I analyzed,

the more I was able to distance myself and question why I felt this way and how someone else

might feel differently. This limitation is also in part due to the type of study I conducted. Since I

chose a qualitative method of analysis, much of the interpretations are based on theories and

literature, but also on my own interpretations. My biases may influence these interpretations even if I try to remain objective.

Secondly, another limitation concerns the study focusing primarily on the policy documents that existed in 2017 and not on the other supports for implementation of the WPS agenda. By this, I mean that answering the question in grander terms would require having all of the documents, reports, projects, and initiatives contained in the WPS agenda. This is both outside the scope of my thesis project and also because certain documents are internal government documents that are not as readily available. Additional documents and reports would help to establish more details on whether feminism is mobilized in the commitment. For instance, the Elsie Initiative provided fewer contributions in my analysis largely because it is an initiative and not a policy framework. Global Affairs Canada, the leading department for the Elsie Initiative, is constantly engaged in implementing the initiative on a more case-by-case basis. As well, since the CAF is a major partner to NATO and of course the WPS agenda, there are likely many more active military-run programs that are representative of implementation in action. Simultaneously, my study intentionally focused on the broad policy frameworks published in 2017.

Another factor to consider is the close relationship between feminist foreign policy (FFP) and Women, Peace and Security. I began my study by first looking at the WPS as the heart of Canada's FFP, but from there I learned that there are internal and domestic implications. The FFP and the WPS commitment are heavily linked, making it challenging to look at one without the other. Assessing the WPS commitment within the FFP framework limits its understanding to be a foreign-only commitment. While I tried to separate the two, I have concluded that the WPS commitment remains outwardly facing due to its deep connection with the feminist foreign

policy. However, foreign policies still have a domestic component, where a commitment like WPS would be suitable. National security should include security for those living within state borders.

In retrospect, an additional approach to answering the question of Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda would be to look at the federal departments involved with the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. Each department that is involved has an implementation plan. A study of all these plans, specifically, could shed light on the various ways that WPS is (supposed to be) implemented across all of the federal departments implicated. For instance, comparing the Women and Gender Equality's (WAGE) implementation plan versus the Department of National Defence's (DND) implementation plan. Ultimately, many different approaches could be taken to further this study outside the confines of a master's thesis.

6. Conclusion

To summarize, this thesis aims to assess how Canada mobilizes feminism in its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. My secondary research question also sought to understand if the commitment reproduced or challenged race and gender norms within hegemonic and heteronormative frameworks. To do this, I conducted a feminist discourse analysis (FCDA) and used a revised and adapted version of Beverly A. McPhail's (2003) Feminist Policy Analysis Framework (FPAF) to guide my analysis. I selected Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022 (NAP-WPS 2017-2022) as my main document for analysis, along with Canada's Defence Policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (Defence Policy), Action Area 6: Peace and Security from Canada's *Feminist International Assistance Policy* (FIAP), and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (Elsie Initiative). I selected these policies because, in Canada, the WPS agenda is at the heart of Canada's feminist foreign policy. Ultimately, the WPS agenda is a commitment that pre-exists Canada's feminist foreign policy, but under the Trudeau Government, the WPS and FFP have become folded together, making one difficult to extract from the other. In the end, it seems that Canada's feminist foreign policy is at the heart of the WPS agenda. In this section, I summarize my key research findings and set them in the context of the literature. I then explore future recommendations and further areas of study.

The answer to my research question reflects in part what many scholars have indicated about the FIAP (Morton et al., 2020; Parisi 2020; Mason, 2019). That is, the feminist commitment reflects a liberal, I argue neoliberal, feminist framework with little transformative power. As I noted in my introduction, feminist commitments related to foreign policy, international relations, and security studies are well established. Because the FIAP is often the

sole reference point for Canada's feminist policies, there are fewer studies that have looked at the Defence Policy with a feminist framework in mind. Thus, the various studies on the use of feminism in the FIAP set the first stepping stone in my analysis. Instead of looking at how the FIAP is feminist, I look instead at how the FIAP, as part of the WPS commitment, fits into a broader narrative of feminist commitments. Additionally, including Canada's NAP-WPS 2017-2022 as a point of analysis with the other documents provided a clearer framework for how the WPS agenda is implemented in Canada.

My contributions to the literature on WPS in Canada and feminist policies seek to extend the broader literature on Canada's feminist foreign policy to include more focus on the commitments made to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Through analyzing Canada's much-lauded "feminist" policy, I found that the kind of feminism used in the foreign policy spaces in Canada is neoliberal feminism as described by many scholars. In the process, I argue that this neoliberal feminism, one that is individualist and reinforces the patriarchal status quo, does little to support or broaden Canada's feminist commitments and, in actuality, limits Canada's move towards truly feminist policies. I argue that Canada should instead employ a feminism that is not limited to neoliberal perspectives so that it is better able to support women and gender-diverse people in conflict zones, all the while building a platform to address systemic misogyny and colonial violence at home. My overall goal is not to criticize the policies to the point of obsoletion but rather to challenge their design and implementation in order to improve Canada's overall commitment to the WPS agenda and to embrace intersectional feminist practices. My contributions can be further divided into two major sections.

Firstly, I shed light on Canada's WPS commitment as it is implemented through two policies and one initiative. When I conducted my literature review, I found that there was a large

body of literature on Canada's feminist foreign policy, but not nearly as much on Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda. Therefore, reviewing the central documents of the WPS commitment offers an additional perspective to the broader foreign policy and WPS literature. As I noted in my discussion chapter, the FIAP's Action Area 6 on Peace and Security contributes less towards the WPS commitment than I previously thought. This is likely due in part to the fact that it is a piece of a much larger document that does not heavily focus on WPS. Further, the FIAP is often referenced in the feminist foreign policy literature due to its outward focus on international assistance. The Defence Policy, however, contributes more towards the WPS commitment because the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are one of the lead partners in implementing the WPS agenda. I found that the Elsie Initiative did not contribute much to my overall research project, but as I suggested in the discussion chapter, this is likely due to how the initiative is enacted, as it is not a policy document.

My second contribution is to the broader literature on narratives of Canada's inability to reconcile an image of a good-natured state with the controversies and issues happening at home. For this, I look at the hypocrisy of how the military, as a key actor in the WPS commitment, commits and encourages more women and gender-diverse people to join the CAF while investigations into a culture of systemic abuse are simultaneously unfolding. I argue that for Canada to progress and build a stronger WPS commitment, it must be open to new and more nuanced narratives of the state's past and present role in the international system, along with a re-examination of the role of the institutions it employs to engage in said international system (e.g. the Canadian Armed Forces, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

The commitments in the WPS agenda repeatedly mention empowering women and girls as the "right" and "smart" thing to do, reinforcing the investment component to gender equality for

143

Canada. While these commitments, with respect to WPS, are a step in the right direction, they are limited because they are not fully adopting an intersectional lens and understanding how systems of power function and work together to create instability and prevent peace. The effectiveness of GBA+ is limited because it is not fully employed due to the constraints mentioned by scholars: it has limited transformative potential and does not embrace a fully intersectional approach (Scala & Paterson, 2017; Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018). Additionally, Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda is one that reflects Canadian values that are heavily influenced by white saviour narratives, as represented in the images and national myths of being "good" and the friendly neighbour in the north. While the WPS agenda aims to promote peace, it does so by focusing on empowering women and girls and essentializes the experiences of women, particularly women in the Global South and in post-conflict settings.

The policies also struggle to reconcile Canada's image internationally with the realities at the domestic level, both as they pertain to the lessons learned from the experiences of Indigenous women and girls and the ongoing sexual misconduct in the military. The approach to WPS largely takes place in the foreign policy sphere, drawing attention to my point in the introduction about how states use feminist policy frameworks for international, outward-facing policies to address problems abroad, in places requiring assistance, rather than turning inwardly and addressing domestic concerns (Shephard, 2016). In the Canadian context, the WPS agenda is folded together with feminist foreign policy, which is therefore making it difficult to separate the two. I found this to be one of the biggest challenges of my research. Global Affairs Canada notes that WPS is at the heart of Canada's FFP, but in reality, it seems that FFP is at the heart of the WPS agenda. By keeping the WPS agenda and the commitment to UNSCR 1325+ in the foreign policy sphere, Canada is doing a disservice to its ability to apply WPS at home and is solidifying

144

its position that it is an "external" "outward-facing" promoter of the WPS agenda. Ultimately, Canada struggles to implement a truly feminist commitment to WPS.

While it is challenging to have a feminist policy, there is continuous room for improvement in developing what already exists and in using it as a stepping stone to a brighter future. The Government of Canada (the government) needs to take the time to assess how incorporating women and girls into policy commitments is problematic and does not address systemic issues related to race and gender hierarchies. One way to do this is by revisiting Canada's core approach to gender mainstreaming, GBA+, and moving beyond focusing solely on intersectionality and instead to understand better how inequities are intrinsically related to one another (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018, p. 312).

The government should also take the time to explain and understand how the domestic application of WPS is relevant. The original resolution UNSCR 1325+ is intended for application in post-conflict settings and peacebuilding. However, people who exist in these settings are not the only ones in need of support and "empowerment." In future iterations of the policy framework, the government should continue to expand on the domestic application of WPS and consider bringing the secondary actors, for instance, WAGE, to be primary actors and reconsider the roles of the RCMP, CAF, and DND as primary actors. In doing so, Canada will be better positioned to confront the saviour narrative currently in the policy frameworks and move away from simply including women in peace operations. Security of every individual and collective matters, whether their current reality is what is understood as a post-conflict setting or not.

To better reflect their words, the government should also implement concrete measures to support their "feminist" commitments. The policies continually reproduce the gender binary,

which presented a challenge as I conducted my analysis. A revised GBA+ lens would help to counter this issue and would open the door to a wider array of perspectives. Greater consideration of the needs of 2SLGBTQQIA+ people in the WPS commitment would help to move from a "women"-focused commitment to a gender inclusive one. Additionally, all the instances where PM Trudeau speaks up for the rights of women and girls and members of the 2SLGBTQQIA+ community should be followed up with concrete actions that do more than simply speak to the issues they face. One positive example from June 2023 is the Government of Canada's partnership with Rainbow Railroad, a non-profit organization that helps resettle LGBTQIA+[17] victims of persecution in Canada. The partnership is intended for Rainbow Railroad to refer refugees through the Government-Assisted Refugees Program (Rainbow Railroad, 2023, n.p.). This is one avenue for supporting 2SLGBTQQIA+ people worldwide and demonstrates Canada's support for 2SLGBTQQIA+ rights internationally. As I noted in my analysis, this commitment was missing from the WPS policies despite the government's continued verbal support for 2SLGBTQQIA+ rights. Hopefully, the new partnership will also spark a change in perception and the inclusion of 2SLGBTQQIA+ rights in Canada's WPS framework.

Analyzing Canada's commitment to the WPS agenda is a major project, and various avenues remain for further study. One avenue to understand the practical implementation of the WPS commitment would be a case study of a current or recent conflict that engages the deployment of Canada's WPS agenda, such as the recent Ukraine-Russia conflict. In this study, one could assess how the developments within the policy documents play out in a real-time situation, for instance, by evaluating how Canada engages WPS in the Ukraine crisis. Another

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[17] Rainbow Railroad uses this acronym.

avenue of interest would be comparing the WPS commitment across the different departments included in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022. Each department involved in the NAP-WPS 2017-2022 has a departmental implementation plan that could be used as part of a comparative analysis. This type of study might shed light on how the government changes the narrative depending on the department engaged in the commitment.

I have outlined my thoughts on how the Government of Canada can improve the implementation of the WPS commitment in Canada and different approaches for further study. It is difficult to implement a feminist policy commitment, and it is also challenging to satisfy all the demands that it presents. Ultimately, I conclude that there is still space for Canada to refine its feminist commitments and challenge gender norms globally. Canada's feminist commitments are not perfect, but they are steps towards a brighter future, one where Canada feels proud to push the barriers of what it means to be feminist.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Beverly A. McPhail's Feminist Policy Analysis Framework (2003, pp. 55-58)

A. Values 1. Do feminist values undergird the policy? Which feminism, which values? 2. Are value conflicts involved in the problem representations either between different feminist perspectives or between feminist and mainstream values?
B. State-Market Control 1. Are women's unpaid labor and work of caring considered and valued or taken for granted? 2. Does the policy contain elements of social control of women? 3. Does the policy replace the patriarchal male with the patriarchal state? 4. How does the policy mediate gender relationships between the state, market, and family? For instance, does the policy increase women's dependence upon the state or men?
C. Multiple Identities 1. How does gender in this policy interact with race/ethnicity, sexual identity, class, religion, national origin, disability or other identity categories? 2. Are white, middle-class, heterosexual women the assumed standard for all women? 3. Does the policy address the multiple identities of women? The multiple oppressions a single woman may face?
D. Equality 1. Does the policy achieve gender equality? Are there equality of results or disparate impacts?

2. Does the policy treat people differently in order to treat them equally well? Does the policy consider gender differences in order to create more equality?

3. If the positions of women and men were reversed, would this policy be acceptable to men?

E. Special Treatment/Protection

1. Does any special treatment of women cause unintended or restrictive consequences?

2. Is there an implicit or explicit double standard?

3. Does being labeled different and special cause a backlash that can be used to constrain rather than to liberate women?

F. Gender Neutrality

1. Does presumed gender neutrality hide the reality of the gendered

nature of the problem or solution?

G. Context

1. Are women clearly visible in the policy? Does the policy take into account the historical, legal, social, cultural, and political contexts of women's lives and lived experiences both now and in the past?

2. Is the policy defined as a traditional "women's issue," i.e., "pink policy?" How is a policy that is not traditionally defined as a "women's issue" still a "women's issue?"

3. Is the male experience used as a standard? Are results extrapolated from male experience and then applied to women?

4. Have the programs, policies, methodologies, assumptions, and theories been examined for male bias?

5. Is women's biology treated as normal rather than as an exception to a male-defined norm?

H. Language

1. Does the language infer male dominance or female invisibility?

2. Are gendered expectations and language encoded in the policy?

I. Equality/Rights and Care/Responsibility

1. Is there a balance of rights and responsibilities for women and men in this policy?

2. Does the policy sustain the pattern of men being viewed as public actors and women as private actors, or does the policy challenge this dichotomization?

3. Does the policy bring men, corporations, and the government into caring and responsible roles? Is responsibility pushed uphill and redistributed?

4. Does the policy pit the needs of women against the needs of their fetus or children?

5. Are women penalized for either their roles as wives, mothers or caregivers or their refusal to adopt these roles?

J. Material/Symbolic Reforms

1. Is the policy merely symbolic or does it come with teeth? Are there provisions for funding, enforcement, and evaluation?

2. Are interest groups involved in overseeing the policy implementation?

3. Is litigation possible to refine and expand the law's interpretation?

4. What is the strength of authority of the agency administering the policy?

5. Is there room to transform a symbolic reform into a material reform? How?

K. Role Change and Role Equity

1. Is the goal of the policy role equity or role change?

2. Does the type of change proposed affect the chance of successful passage?

L. Power Analysis

1. Are women involved in making, shaping, and implementation of the policy? In which ways were they involved? How were they included or excluded? Were the representatives of women selected by women?

2. Does the policy work to empower women?

3. Who has the power to define the problem? What are competing representations?

4. How does this policy affect the balance of power? Are there winners and losers? Is a win-win solution a possibility?

M. Other

1. Is the social construction of the problem recognized? What are alternate representations of the problem?

2. Does this policy constitute backlash for previous women's policy gains?

3. How does feminist scholarship inform the issue?

4. What women's organizations were involved in the policy formulation and implementation? Was there consensus or disagreement?

5. Where are the policy silences? What are the problems for women

that are denied the status of problem by others? What policy is not being proposed, discussed, and implemented?

6. How does the policy compare to similar policies transnationally?

Are there alternative models that we can both learn from and borrow from?

7. Does the policy blame, stigmatize, regulate, or punish women?

Appendix B

Kanenberg, Leal, & Erich The Intersectional Feminist Policy Analysis Framework* (2020, pp. 13-16)

Intersectional Identities

A. How do *diverse and intersecting identities such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability, interact with other identity categories?*

B. Are white, middle-class, able-bodied, cisgender, heterosexual women the assumed standard for all women?

C. How are systems of power and inequality (racism, classism, colonialism, cisnormativity, heterosexism) used to control or oppress those who occupy different social locations?

D. Does the policy address the multiple identities of women? The multiple oppressions an individual woman may face?

State-Market Control

A. Does the policy oppress women who experience multiple levels of inequality due to their identity by creating a double bind for women with regard to the issue of labor? Are women limited and/or constrained in their participation in the labor market due to the policy (e.g., eligibility criteria, benefits, geographic limitations, wait lists)?

B. Is the unpaid and/or underpaid labor and work of caring provided *by vulnerable groups considered* and valued or taken for granted? *Is there wage theft or subordination of workers transpiring?*

C. Does the policy contain elements of social control of *cisgender women, transgender women, nonbinary individuals, migrants? Are there other social locations of women that result in social control of their identity due to devaluing or creating of additional inequalities?*

D. Does the policy replace the patriarchal male with patriarchal state?

E. How does the policy mediate gender relationships between the state, market, and family? For instance, does the policy increase *different groups of women's* dependence on the state or men? *If so, which women (race, ethnicity, class, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability, and more) are impacted most?*

F. *What is the policy's view of women as charity recipients vs. worker-citizens? Paying special attention to women's identities along lines of race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability, or other identity categories.*

Equality

A. Does the policy achieve gender equality? *Is there equality of results or disparate impacts? Is there inequality between cisgender and transgender or nonbinary individuals?*

B. Does the policy treat people differently in order to treat them equally well? Does the policy consider *gender differences and resultant discrimination based upon race, ethnicity, sexual*

identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status,

migration status, carceral status, ability/disability in order to create more equality?

C. If the positions of women and men were reversed, would this policy be acceptable to men?

Special Treatment/Protection

A. Does any special treatment of women *and those who occupy different social locations*

(race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, etc.) cause unintended or restrictive consequences?

B. Is there an implicit or explicit double standard *regulating the lives of women who represent*

varied race, ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national

origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability identities?

C. Does being labeled different and special cause a backlash that can be used to constrain

rather than to liberate women?

Gender Neutrality

A. Does presumed gender neutrality hide the reality of the gendered nature of the problem or

solution?

Context

A. Are women clearly visible in the policy?

B. Does the policy consider the historical, legal, social, cultural, and political contexts of

women's lives and lived experiences both now and in the past?

C. Does the policy make an "essential woman" visible (white, able-bodied, cisgender, and

privileged) while leaving others in shadow? Coming out of theories of essentialism where

'essence' forms ideas around entire categories and becomes a way of making problematic

blanket statements.

D. Is the white, cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied male experience used as a standard? Are

results extrapolated from male experience and then applied to women? *How are the specifics*

of a variety of women's experiences centered to inform the policy (i.e. how are the

intersections of a woman's identity brought to light in the policy?)?

E. Have the programs, policies, methodologies, assumptions, and theories been examined for

bias *at the intersections of gender race/ethnicity, sexual identity, cis-privilege, gender*

identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status,

carceral status, ability/disability identity?

F. Is women's biology treated as normal rather than as an exception to a male-defined norm? *Is*

womanhood not defined in biology? Are transgender women treated as equal to cisgender

women?

Language

A. Does the language infer *white, cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied* male dominance or

female invisibility?

B. Are gendered expectations and language encoded in the policy? *Are those expectations*

present cisnormative?

C. Is there acknowledgement of multiple identities (race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender

identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status,

carceral status, ability/disability) present in the language of the policy?

Equity/Rights and Care/Responsibility

A. Is there a balance of rights and responsibilities for women and men in this policy? *How are multiply marginalized groups rights and responsibilities acknowledged in the policy?*

B. Does the policy sustain the pattern of men being viewed as public actors and women as private actors or does the policy challenge this dichotomization? *Are there groups made invisible based on their race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability identities within the policy?*

C. Are women penalized for either their role as wives, mothers, or caregivers or their refusal to adopt these roles?

D. Does the policy pit the needs of women against the needs of their fetus or child(ren)? *Does the policy address the needs of certain women but not others? Are certain fetuses/children valorized while others are deemed punishable?*

E. Does the policy oppress women by creating double binds for women with regard to physical and psychological well-being?

a. Does the policy limit and or restrict women's access to healthcare and behavioral healthcare?

b. Do women experience restrictions to their children's access to healthcare and behavioral healthcare and/or restrictions to access to healthcare and behavioral healthcare for their families as a result of the policy?

c. Are there other social, economic, logistic, or environmental forces specifically related to the policy that create a double bind for women related to physical and psychological well-being?

Material/Symbolic Reform

A. Is the policy merely symbolic or does it come with provisions for funding, enforcement, and evaluation?

B. Are *special* interest groups involved in overseeing the policy implementation? *How do those in power over the policy implementation get to their position (hired, government appointment, etc.)? Do those with power represent a diversity of perspectives and identities?*

C. Is litigation possible to refine and expand the law's interpretation?

D. What is the strength of authority of the agency administrating the policy?

E. Is there room to transform a symbolic reform into a material reform? How?

Role Change and Role Equality

A. Is the goal of the policy role equity or role change?

B. Does the type of change proposed affect the chance of successful passage?

C. Does the policy impact women's economic autonomy as a step toward equality? Does it pay special attention to the differences of women along their race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, and ability/disability identities?

Power Analysis

A. Are women *representing diversity along race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability identities* involved in making, shaping, and implementing the policy?

B. Does the policy work to empower women *of varying race/ethnicity, sexual identity, gender identity/expression, class, religion, national origin, documentation status, migration status, carceral status, ability/disability identities?*

C. Who has the power to define the problem? What are competing representations of the problem?

D. How does this policy affect the balance of power? Are there winners and losers? Is a win-win solution a possibility?

Other

A. Is the social construction of the problem recognized? What are alternate representations of the problem?

B. Does this policy constitute backlash for previous policy *gains for multiply marginalized groups?*

C. How does *intersectional* feminist scholarship inform the issue?

D. What organizations representing women of color and women with differing identities were involved in the policy formulation and implementation? Was there consensus or disagreement?

E. Where are the policy silences? What are the problems for *women of color, women with disabilities, immigrant women, formerly incarcerated women, queer women, trans women, and more that are denied the status of problem by others?* What policy is not being proposed, discussed, and implemented?

F. How does the policy compare *to similar transnational policies?* Are there alternative models that can be learned from and borrowed from?

G. Does the policy blame, stigmatize, regulate, or punish women? Or does it specifically *blame, stigmatize, regulate or punish, marginalized groups of women such as poor, queer, trans, undocumented, incarcerated, and/or abused women of color?*
* Intersectionality is woven throughout McPhail's original Feminist Policy Analysis Framework using *italicized font.*