Decolonizing Rationality

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Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to consider the status of Canada's national identity. Chapter one will outline why I believe that this exposition requires placing Indigenous identity in conversation with European identity to identify the state's history of favouring settler identity. The state's unyielding adherence to settler ideals subjugates the original inhabitants of Turtle Island[1], therefore restricting Indigenous identity formation. I will begin by considering Winthrop Bell's "The Idea of a Nation" to demonstrate how Indigenous identity displacement negatively impacts the development of Canada's national identity as one that is unable to empower one of its key constituents. Bell asserts that the ideal Canadian state can surmount cultural differences reflecting a mixed and interconnected society. I agree with this conclusion and his assertion that we have not yet achieved this ideal national character – although I credit Canada's shortcoming to its failure to empower Indigenous identity. My stake in this argument can be attributed to my Mi'kmaq ancestry. I grew up in Fort Folly First Nation, a small reserve in New Brunswick, Canada. Throughout my childhood I had access to cultural teachings that were designed to empower youth, cultivating a strong sense of self and what it means to be Mi'kmaw. I also learned that Indigenous accounts of creation differ from European accounts, and I believe that the value we interpret from these retellings provides insight toward Indigenous and settler identities respectively. To depict this, I will first recount Thomas King's creation of Turtle Island as he presents in *The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative*. Then, I will illustrate how Indigenous accounts of creation depict similar values across communities by considering King's account alongside Stephen Augustine's retelling of "The Mi'kmaw Creation Story." I chose to compare Augustine's storytelling with King's since Augustine and I share Mi'kmaq ancestry,

[1] Turtle Island refers to the continent of North America. See "Turtle Island" entry in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*.

making his teachings in line with those that have informed my worldview. Contrasting both stories, I will turn to King's account of Genesis and how it has historically been utilized to create a schism between Indigenous and settler identity. Considering Indigenous creation alongside settler creation (Genesis) is an effective means of placing Indigenous creation in conversation with Canada's national identity. This is to draw attention to the values portrayed throughout accounts of Indigenous creation that lack recognition in the whole of Canadian society.

Chapter two serves to outline some facets of Indigenous identity. This is done by explaining the medicine wheel teachings, the significance of the oral tradition and native languages, as well as through the talking circle teachings. Further, I will outline the previously sidestepped topic of the role of nature in Indigenous identity. I will discuss the sweat lodge ceremony as an example of how the role of nature impacts the creation of sacred lodges. Elucidating facets of Indigenous identity allows us to consider the historical backdrop of Canada's history of oppressing Indigenous identity. This subsection of chapter two demonstrates Canada's history of colonialism. This is primarily addressed through Bob Joseph's *21 Things you may not know About the Indian Act: Helping Canadians Make Reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples a Reality*. Utilizing Joseph's findings, I will outline how the Indian Act is a form of colonial law. I will then consider Canada's history of subjugating Indigenous identity by discussing the Indian Act's permittance of the Christian renaming of Indigenous peoples, the creation of reserves, the state's encouragement of enfranchisement, and the residential school system. The topics listed present examples of the state's adherence to colonial law through the legislation of the Indian Act as well as the lasting impacts of the state's endorsement of colonial law on Indigenous identity formation.

Continuing my philosophical journey into adulthood, I became enthralled with Hegel's system of totality[2] which is designed to show modern individuals what it means to be rational human beings. The focus of chapter three will be Hegel's state as the necessary means toward individual edification through state citizenship and the development of *Geist*. I will begin outlining Hegel's state by describing how it denies the history of America's Indigenous population as Alison Stone outlines in "Hegel and Colonialism." I believe it is important to consider Hegel's state in conversation with Canada's national identity since in denying the history of the Americas Indigenous populations, the Hegelian state implicitly denies Canadian history by devaluing the shared history of Turtle Island. Accordingly, Hegel's delineation of the development of *Geist* has implications for the Canadian state insofar as Indigenous colonization is a means toward extending freedom to Canada's Indigenous population. This stands against what I have previously asserted as Canada's ideal national character. This is why it is important to outline Hegel's state considering his delineation of the role of family, civil society, and the state as he presents in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.

Chapter four will address the limitations of Hegel's state, which I argue become more apparent upon considering the role of the rabble. The rabble represents the marginalized group of Hegel's state that he misinterprets as 'other' and therefore fails to identify as a key constituent of state citizens' identity formation. I believe Hegel's missed insight concerning the necessary emergence of the rabble calls into question the ethicality of Hegel's state. I will draw on Frank Ruda's *Hegel's Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel's Philosophy of Right* to describe the significance of the rabble. After defining the rabble, I will outline what differentiates the poor and the rabble so as not to conflate the two. While both occur at the level of civil society, poverty

[2] Hegel's totality provides an account for how the whole preserves the contents of each sublated stage. Sublation is necessary for the development of *Geist* in the state, as will be outlined throughout chapter three.

is merely a precondition for the rabble's emergence but does not equate to the rabble. I will also outline the poor rabble in comparison to the rich rabble to flag their differential treatment. While the rich rabble does run the risk of becoming poor rabble, the poor rabble is barred from the luxury that the rich rabble persists in. Therefore, the poor rabble is the only true rabble. I will draw on Slavoj Žižek's *Less Than Nothing* to depict the poor rabble as the necessary antagonism of the state. Considering Žižek's analysis alongside Ruda's consideration of the rabble, I will demonstrate Hegel's missed insight concerning the subjective and universal character of the rabble. As such, I will show how the rabble class stands for the Absolute Negativity of the state. I argue that Hegel's mischaracterization of the rabble is a failure occurring at the level of civil society that inherently reflects the state's overall ethicality and the type of freedom the state endorses.

Chapter five will consider the state's limitations and possibilities. Beginning with the Hegelian state, I will continue to draw on Žižek's analysis of the rabble to assert how it is key in the state's identity formation through its mirroring of the state's universality by lack of recognition in the social whole. I believe recognizing the necessary emergence of the rabble draws attention to the state's limited character. Paradoxically, without acknowledging the Absolute Negativity of the rabble, the universality achieved in Hegel's state emerges as pure particularity since self-consciousness remains unable to identify with its constituent elements. Our concluding remarks on the Hegelian state allow us to consider how the Canadian state and the Hegelian state are alike insofar as both states fail to acknowledge key constituents of identity formation, which call into question the purported universality of each state. While Hegel's state cannot move beyond its mischaracterization of the rabble since the rabble's emergence is necessary, I believe the Canadian state can progress beyond its previous mischaracterization of

Indigenous peoples to ameliorate the development of Canada's national identity. The Canadian state faces similar limitations to the Hegelian state further due to its history of colonialism, however, I will argue that decolonization efforts are a means toward developing Canada's ideal character as envisioned by Bell. I will outline that to ameliorate Indigenous and settler relations in Canada, citizens must first work toward eradicating national violence such as perpetuating the myth of the vanishing Indian. This myth deludes the persistent Indigenous presence across Turtle Island and invalidates Indigenous history, and therefore must be expunged from the Canadian narrative. I will outline how the goal of ameliorating Indigenous and settler relations is not to permanently displace settler identity but to reconsider ways that settler identity has suppressed Indigenous identity in the past to rectify these relationships moving forward. I believe that moving forward, empowering Indigenous and settler identities alike will require embracing movements such as Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization efforts. The goal of Two-Eyed Seeing is to consider Indigenous and settler worldviews when it comes to decision-making. This inherently involves decolonization efforts as it requires reconsidering the values that inform the state's legislative history. I will outline Willie Ermine's "The Space of Ethical Engagement" to provide an example of the utility of Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization efforts in the Canadian legal system. I believe the development of the ideal Canadian state as outlined by Bell relies on the implementation of movements such as Two-Eyed seeing and decolonization as a means for the state to validate Indigenous history and empower Indigenous identity. In this way, the Canadian state stands against the Hegelian state insofar as it relies on decolonization to rectify the national identity, while Hegel's state relies on colonization for the state's purported universality.

Chapter 1: Considering Canada's National Identity

"Indigenous Peoples are already there, at the core of our civilization. That is our reality. Our challenge is to learn how to recognize what we have trained ourselves not to see" (Saul 35)

This chapter seeks to assert the value of acknowledging Indigenous history alongside Canada's history. I will argue that Canada's history plays a role in shaping its national identity and further that the state's historical rejection of Indigenous identity limits the development of Canada's national identity. This becomes evident upon analyzing Canada's national identity and how it is largely representative of settler ideology. The direct result of the state's adherence to settler ideology is the suppression and mythologizing of Indigenous spiritual narratives in favour of settler religious narratives. This chapter will analyze creation from an Indigenous and settler perspective to address the key differences in values portrayed in each. Cherokee writer Thomas King undertakes an explanation of the two creation stories that he argues inform Canada's history. By outlining Indigenous and settler creation, King's voice contributes to the discussion of Canada's national identity by placing Indigenous creation in conversation with settler creation. To demonstrate the significance of Indigenous accounts of creation, we will discuss Canada's history of invalidating Indigenous history. To do this, we will first identify what constitutes the Canadian national identity from the perspective of Canadian philosopher Winthrop Bell. Bell's voice is significant in outlining Canada's national identity as in his delineation, he asserts that the peak of our identity would be to thrive off complex relations amongst various cultures. While he did not anticipate the needs of Canada's Indigenous population in his outline of Canada's national identity, I will demonstrate that Bell's interpretation of a diverse, interconnected society requires that the state empower Indigenous

identity. I believe that Bell's outline of the ideal Canadian identity is a unique contribution to Canadian philosophy as Bell studied under both Josiah Royce and Edmund Husserl. This makes Bell well-suited to interpret the status of Canada's national identity as he proves to be well-versed in the philosophy of experience considering his close ties to Royce's idealism and Husserl's phenomenology[3]. Next, to address Canada's history of mythologizing Indigenous spiritual narratives, I will consider accounts of Indigenous creation and assess their insights toward Indigenous identity. Here, I begin with King's telling of "The Woman Who Fell From the Sky." This creation story demonstrates that across Turtle Island, Indigenous creation reflects harmonious principles that govern Indigenous Peoples, such as an interconnectedness between individual and environment. We further see this in Augustine's account of the Mi'kmaw creation story. I will draw on Augustine's account of Mi'kmaw creation as I am familiar with this account of history through my Mi'kmaq ancestry. Augustine's contribution is beneficial alongside King's since it helps us pinpoint the similarities that remain across differing accounts of creation while providing further insight into what informs Indigenous identity. King and Augustine can both be understood as combatting the invalidation of Indigenous history through re-telling accounts of Indigenous creation. King goes further, however, explaining that settler creation, Genesis, limits the state's effectiveness in maintaining multiple cultural identities. In line with King's sentiment to demonstrate that Canada's national identity depicts an unyielding adherence to settler ideology, I will argue that as a result, Canada has historically rejected Indigenous identity. Mi'kmaw writer Marie Battiste furthers this thought in her discussion of the *British North American Act* as the dichotomous structure at the base of the Canadian constitution. Through her discussion, Battiste addresses how Canada's Indigenous population is barred from recognition in

[3] See Editors Introduction of "The Idea of a Nation." (Edited by Ian Angus, 2012). Pages 35-37.

Canada's national identity through differential treatment. This is consistent with Jason Bell and Matthew Dinen's interpretation of the ideal Canadian state as having a notable lack of Indigenous representation as presented in "Friendship in Canadian Philosophy and the End of Reparations: A Reflection on Winthrop Bell's Philosophy." They conclude that failure to acknowledge Canada's Indigenous population will only impede the nation if this dismissal fails to present itself as an opportunity for Canada to develop its ideal character. Therefore, although Bell sidesteps a discussion of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, his assertion of Canada's unique and complex character requires incorporating the Indigenous worldview as presented through King's re-telling of the creation of Turtle Island and Augustine's account of Mi'kma'ki[4] origins. Canadian writer John Ralston Saul goes further than considering Indigenous and settler creation alongside one another in *A Fair Country: Telling the Truths About Canada,* where he places Indigenous identity in conversation with Canada's national identity. Bell's account of Canada's national identity will thus be juxtaposed with Saul's account of how Canada is a Métis nation, considering King and Augustine's creation stories to demonstrate how Canada's national identity can be ameliorated through repairing Indigenous relations. Reparations begin with embracing the legitimacy of Indigenous creation as conveyed initially through oral tradition since they are integral to any description of Canada's national identity.

Canada's National Identity – Winthrop Bell

Bell addresses the ways Canada may fail to support its citizens through a lack of recognition of the whole of Canada's national identity. In his lecture "Canadian Problems and Possibilities," Bell discusses the essence of what it means to be a nation and what this means in

[4] The Mi'kma'ki refers to the Maritime provinces of NB, NS, NL, and P.E.I and includes regions in Quebec and Maine – original home to the Mi'kmaq of Canada. Otherwise known as the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq People.

terms of defining Canada's national identity. In the editor's introduction of "The Idea of a Nation," Angus says of the lecture that:

> Bell describes the essence of the nation as an organic spiritual unity that grows or develops, and is thus not a product of will, and which becomes a unity by surmounting its parts. This unity is instantiated in a given nation by tradition. The particular character of a nation's tradition gives it a tendency to act in one way rather than another. (Angus 34)

Accordingly, the essence of a nation is contingent upon the identities that merit recognition in the eyes of the state. The ideal Canadian state would surmount cultural differences to embrace a positive national identity that impacts its citizens' quality of life. In Present-day Canada, however, this is not the case due to Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity. Considering that a nation's tradition gives it a tendency to act in a certain manner, narratives that inform the state that exclude Indigenous identity depict the limitations of the state. The state's shortcoming is its inability to surmount the narratives that inform the state's key constituent identities, which I will further identify as Indigenous and settler. Angus' summary of Bell's argument inadvertently depicts that Canada's Indigenous population should not be sidestepped in any discussion of the Canadian national identity since he identifies tradition as representative of the character of a nation. Insofar as history is a key factor, Canadian history cannot be understood apart from Indigenous history since Canada exists on the colonized land of Indigenous Peoples. Accordingly, Indigenous Peoples should be empowered through their citizenship and sustained in culture and language as the state must uphold the mixing of identities in Canada. This is true insofar as Angus explains how "Bell's analysis assumes without

discussion that it is the government's right and duty to oversee the mixture that will become the Canadian people" (41). In summary, it is the government's responsibility to ensure equal recognition for all individuals participating in the whole of Canadian society. However, to date, the government has been neglectful in such a role as Angus further notes that Canadian identity does not yet demonstrate harmonious transcendence beyond ideology[5] toward equality for its citizens as, "Bell assumes that for Canada to be a nation it must be a people and that to be a people is to be a certain kind of *unity*. Since Canadians were not originally a people, such a people can only be created by a *mixture*" (42). I believe that Canada's failure to embrace the mixture of identities that contributes toward the development of its national identity can be attributed to the fact that the Canadian state has yet to empower one of the two key identities present in its formation –Indigenous. By identifying with settler identity rather than embracing the mixture present upon Canada's creation, Canada's national identity becomes skewed toward settler ideology. Consequently, Indigeneity is suppressed in the national identity – resulting in a nationality that defends the rights and beliefs of some citizens, but not all. Mi'kmaw writer Battiste notes the divide between Indigenous and European worldviews in "Indigenous Knowledge: Foundations for First Nations," where she notes that "For as long as Europeans have sought to colonize Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous knowledge has been understood as being in binary opposition to 'scientific,' 'western,' 'Eurocentric,' or 'modern' knowledge" (2). The opposition she characterizes has historically resulted in the invalidation of Indigenous spiritual narratives in favour of settler religious narratives which I argue impacts Canada's national

[5] Ideology here refers to the state's unyielding adherence to the settler narrative as the sole informant of Canada's national identity. Such an ideology invalidates the role of Indigenous Peoples in Canada's history. Clinging to ideology in this instance, limits the state's role in mixing identities as settler ideology promotes a particular national character that rejects Indigenous identity.

identity. Bell foreshadows Canada's limited national identity when he asserts "Canada is not yet a fully developed nation … But as far as one can see, she is growing towards one" (57), demonstrating that he does not believe Canada has achieved the peak of its spiritual development. Keep in mind that Bell made this claim in 1916, but I think the conclusion remains true present-day. According to Bell, Canada had the potential to develop toward its ideal national character but had not yet been successful in doing so. I believe that Bell's 1916 assertion that Canada is in its national moment of *becoming* can be elaborated as unsuccessful due to the state's rejection of Indigenous history and therefore, identity. At this time of Bell's lecture, Indigenous Peoples were not considered in discussions of what it meant to be Canadian as Indigenous values were not compatible with Canada's meta-narrative established with the 1867 Constitution. This is problematic as to a large extent Indigenous Peoples laid the foundation for Canada's formation. The consideration of Indigenous People's contribution toward Canada's national identity has not changed much since the time of Bell's discussion. Accordingly, Canada's shortcomings can be directly attributed to the antagonistic foundation of the Canadian identity – one that embraces settler ideology and accounts of creation while rejecting Indigenous influence and history. As Bell addresses our limited national identity between 1915 and 1916, it is essential to note that in his articulation: "there is no mention of native people at all, or of the fact that Canada is a settler society based upon the dispossession of prior peoples. The problematic relation to native people inside and outside Canada had not yet become an issue, for Bell no less than for other writers of the time" (Angus 41). I believe the failure to include a discussion of Indigenous Peoples in Bell's lecture is symbolic of the ramifications of the narrative that informs the *British North American Act* that continues to impact Canadian society today. In the contrast between Indigenous and settler rights throughout Canada's history,

Indigenous sovereignty is subjugated to settler sovereignty. Accordingly, Canada cannot be considered the ideal Canadian state that maintains the particularity and sovereignty of its people. Canada cannot be considered a nation in its full fruition. Upon discussing the possible shortcomings of a nation, Bell warns that: "Avowedly, nationalistic propaganda in schools, etc., leads only to ignorance, self-satisfaction, unfairness and, fortunately or unfortunately, almost the only national characteristics capable of creation or development by propaganda are national prejudices and national conceit" (56-57). In this warning, it seems he is critiquing a state that can become blinded by entrenching itself in a particular narrative. While there should be no specific pedagogy that emerges from the Canadian nation, there is due to Canada's history of colonialism. The state's pedagogy here refers to the preferred means of conveying knowledge through teaching and the promotion of specific values which in this case includes an expectation of the superiority of inherited settler ideology. Canada must address the settler-informed pedagogy of our state by elaborating on the impact of settler colonialism and its exclusionary principles. However, this can only be done upon recognizing inequality within the state and the historical invalidation of Indigenous history. Battiste demonstrates how Bell's concerns about a one-sided national identity materialize through the shortcomings of the Canadian nation when she writes:

> If Indigenous knowledge and pedagogy are to be integrated effectively into the national and provincial curricula, educators must be made aware of the existing interpretative monopoly of Eurocentric education and learn how the fundamental political processes of Canada have been laced with racism. (5-6)

Here Battiste is providing a critique of Canada by addressing the nation's insufficiency in maintaining Indigenous identity. She characterizes the state's limitation as a failure to engage with Indigenous pedagogy in favour of Eurocentric education. We see that through its narrowminded ideological alignment, Canada fails to develop into its ideal national identity. In noting this, Battiste argues that the Canadian identity is largely symbolic of colonial and settler ideals. Because of this adherence Indigenous knowledge is considered 'other' to the truth and delegitimized. To rectify this, we must first be aware that this is a problem for empowering Indigenous Peoples. Failure to address the dominance of European education and how it impacts Indigenous youth in our education systems is one way in which we fail to empower Indigenous Peoples through their own pedagogy. This has clear ramifications for Canada's capacity to be considered the ideal Canadian nation. To move toward embracing the complex character of a nation, Canada must be able to decolonize and harmonize the 'oppositional' identities that reside within its borders. To make this move, Canada will have to make conscious efforts toward decolonization by recognizing its entrenched ideologies stemming from the *British North American Act* and the historical events that preceded its passing. Bell and Battiste agree that as a nation it is Canada's responsibility to not only sustain but empower the identity of its inhabitants by providing a harmonious structure that allows individuality to flourish without being restricted. However, a nation can only thrive if it can continually rise above its ingrained narrative to incorporate the various cultures. This is a direct problem for Canada as it has not been able to see beyond its colonial roots when it comes to the treatment of Indigenous Peoples since confederation. To outline the two narratives that inform the Canadian state and in part characterize Canada's national identity, we must turn to two accounts of creation: that of settler and Indigenous.

Creation of Turtle Island – Thomas King

Canada became a self-governing nation in 1867 upon the legislation of the *British North American Act*. This fact is important as it establishes an origin story for the Canadian national identity. To elaborate and provide a warning about the insincerity of this legislation Battiste explains that "the *British North American Act*, as the first constitution of Canada, created a dual system of education and health, one for provincial citizens and one for First Nations" (52). Here she is drawing our attention to the dichotomy at the root of the Canadian national identity between Indigenous and settler identities in terms of their differential treatment regarding education and health. This, however, is only one example of the division established between settler and Indigenous identity throughout the history of Canada. This is pertinent to Bell's discussion of Canada's national identity as he notes the potential development of Canada's ideal character rests upon its ability to surmount identity differences. Accordingly, the differential treatment of Indigenous Peoples is problematic for the development of Canada in that it hinders our ability to describe ourselves as part of the whole. Saul flags the state's limit by noting its historical failure to acknowledge how Indigenous history impacts Canadian history. He explains that when the state established sovereignty:

> this was the first time that a colony of any of the European empires had managed to extricate itself from the grip of the empire through negotiations, not war. Confederation was thus a cutting-edge initiative. Down the same path, cleared and laid out by Canada, more than a hundred colonies would follow over the next century. This new non-violent approach was and remains a remarkable tribute to the intelligence and the sophistication

> of the Fathers of Confederation. It was the first international illustration of the tough Canadian *middle way*, with its Aboriginal origins. (252)

Saul is flagging the impact that Indigenous pedagogy has had on Canadian history, as he attributes the success of confederation to the learned negotiation tactics of Indigenous Peoples. While Indigenous history informs the history of Canada, Indigenous narratives are often overshadowed by settler narratives. Cherokee writer Thomas King expresses his concern for the secularization of Indigenous narratives through an exposition of two origin stories that inform Canada's national identity: Indigenous and settler. In this discussion King is directly addressing the duality at the base of Canadian identity, pointing toward the same lack of recognition that Saul notes above. King focuses on the state's invalidation of spiritual narratives that provide insight toward Indigenous identity by illustrating how settler identity is exclusionary of Indigenous through a discussion of the importance of origin stories. Notably, while outlining the two narratives that should equally inform the state, King asserts the oral tradition's significance in Indigenous culture. He begins this discussion by claiming that "stories not only *contribute* to our sense of who we are – stories *are who we are*" (McCall 13) and insofar as they contribute toward our identity, "stories are wondrous things. And they are dangerous" (King 9) so we must pay special attention to what stories are endorsed by the state. Indigenous creation stories are often dismissed due to their reliance on oral transmission. Such a dismissal devalues the history preserved through the oral tradition, including Indigenous accounts of creation. King goes on to explain two creation stories. First, of Indigenous Peoples across Turtle Island. Second, of Genesis, as depicted in the King James Version of the Bible. Our discussion will begin with the former to demonstrate the values upheld through Indigenous creation accounts. I am personally

familiar with the story of "The Woman Who Fell From The Sky" and every time a storyteller shares the story, they embellish the details according to personal preference and knowledge of the audience. One constant in the narrative, however, is that there is a girl who falls from the sky onto the back of a turtle. King pays special attention to describing the reaction of the sea creatures to the woman (known as Charm in this telling) falling into what will soon be earth, but is, for now, a world made up entirely of water:

> The Ducks, who have great eyesight, could see that Charm weighed in at about 150 pounds. And the beavers, who have a head for physics and math, knew that she was coming in fast ... And the Whales knew from many years of study that water does not compress, while the Dolphins could tell anyone who asked that while it won't compress, water will displace … [soon] all the water birds flew up and formed a net with their bodies, and, as Charm came streaking down, the birds caught her, broke her fall, and brought her gently to the surface of the water. (14-15)

Here King characterizes the sea creatures beyond their natural capabilities by voicing the unique intelligence of each. King's description emphasizes how the sea creatures cooperate to determine how to safely navigate Charm's fall. After falling through the sky and being placed on a turtle in the middle of the ocean, Charm cultivates a relationship with the turtle, the surrounding sea creatures, and the physical environment. The mutual relationship between all of earth's inhabitants is expanded when Charm has twins on the turtle's back. In anticipation of the human population tripling, Charm requests mud so she can perform magic to create land. Since mud could only be found at the bottom of the ocean, Charm could not retrieve it herself and so, "one

by one all the water animals tried to find the mud at the bottom of the ocean, and all of them failed until the only animal left was Otter" (17). Here we see Charm's clear companionship with the sea creatures as they aid her in finding mud, which is required to expand habitability beyond the back of a turtle. This is significant as the sea creatures do not benefit from retrieving mud and expanding the land, nor did they benefit from saving Charm from falling into the ocean. This indicates that they act out of respect for all that is living regardless of genus or species. After all the animals tried to help Charm reach the mud at the bottom of the ocean, the otter was successful. King describes that to create land:

> Charm set the lump of mud on the back of the Turtle, and she sang and she danced, and the animals sang and danced with her, and very slowly the lump of mud began to grow. It grew and grew and grew into a world, part water, part mud. That was a good trick, said the water animals. But now there's not enough room for all of us in the water. Some of us are going to have to live on land. (18)

Here the sea creature's reaction to the expansion of land is of significant value. Rather than protest as the population consists entirely of sea creatures with the exclusion of Charm and her unborn children, they decide to adapt to the new circumstance. This reflects the value of strength through adaptability for both Charm and the sea creatures. Before land can be created and expanded, however, Charm gives birth to twins on the back of the turtle. Charm's twins are introduced as "One light, one dark. One right-handed, one left-handed" (18). This description is intentional as the twins are described to appear as opposites both externally and in their function as "The right-handed Twin created summer. The left-handed Twin created winter. The right-

handed Twin created sunshine. The left-handed Twin created shadows" (20). King's insistence in providing this description is to demonstrate that since none of the characters in the narrative sought to identify the distinct nature of the twins, they were not perceived as opposites but rather complementary. Following the impartial characterization of the twins, mixing their external functions proves to be useful as they ultimately aid in creating a habitable world alongside their mother and the inhabitants of earth. Due to the premise of the creation of turtle island insofar as King gives voice to both humans and creatures, he notes that: "you're probably wondering how in the world I expect you to believe any of this, given the fact that we live in a predominantly scientific, capitalistic, Judeo-Christian world governed by physical laws, economic imperatives, and spiritual precepts" (12). Here he draws attention to Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity through the invalidation of spiritual narratives. Adherence to settler-informed narratives devalues stories such Charm's on the basis that it has been historically preserved through the oral tradition and gives voice to all inhabitants of the earth, and is therefore not human-oriented[6]. Through this account of the creation of Turtle Island, we see the clear companionship between land and inhabitants of the land – not just citizens. We see deep respect for all inhabitants of earth conveyed in this creation story as without the partnership of Charm and the sea creatures, land could not have been created or sustained beyond the back of the turtle. The name Turtle Island however is a tribute to the recognition of all relations present on earth – between individuals, land, and inhabitants of the land regardless of classification. Considering the relationship between Charm, her twins whom she may share her story with, the sea creatures and

[6] Accounts of creation may differ in narration across Indigenous communities (First Nations, Métis, and Inuit) but all depict that creation is not centered around the human subject. Addressing the validity of Indigenous accounts of creation that are *not* human-oriented is an obstacle for settler ideologies since settler origins dismiss the role of nature as sacred.

now land creatures, and the natural environment, we see that Indigenous creation values collaboration and respect amongst all of creation and promotes strength through adaptability.

Mi'kmaw Creation – Stephen Augustine

While the creation of Turtle Island applies to the entirety of the continent of North America, which includes Canada but extends beyond it – we can turn to local accounts of Mi'kmaw creation to further address the role of Indigenous history in Canada. Through a discussion of Augustine's telling of the Mi'kmaw creation story, we can effectively pinpoint similar themes as outlined in King's account of the creation of Turtle Island. Both narratives provide a significant contribution to any discussion of Canada's national identity as they stand against the mythologizing of Indigenous spiritual narratives. Indigenous accounts of creation are often sidestepped since the oral tradition unsettles the state's adherence to the written word. Accordingly, Augustine describes that:

> Mi'kmaw humanities are not comparable to Eurocentric concepts of humanities: the basic world view of Indigenous Peoples in North America is not grounded in the same historical experiences as the European cultures that came here to our territories. (18)

Here he is indicating that historical experiences inform the development of a nation, placing further value on the total consideration of Indigenous history as it both informs and stands apart from Canadian history. One way to validate Indigenous accounts of creation is to engage with them. To do this we will explore how Augustine's account creation informs readers of Indigenous values by describing the origin of the Mi'kmaq in the Mi'kma'ki. He explains that

"Before the *l'nu'k*[7] were created, there were three spiritual entities that were here in *wskitqamu*, our world: Kisu'lkw[8], Niskam[9] and Wskitqamu[10]" (19). The emergence of l'nu'k in the Mi'kma'ki relies on the collaboration of the three spiritual entities listed above. Augustine defines their significance further when he explains that "after the introduction of Christianity to the Mi'kmaq, Kisu'lkw became known as God" (19). This first addresses how religious narratives devalue Indigenous accounts of creation by assuming Kisu'lkw is equivalent to God. It is important to note however that while Kisu'lkw may be considered equivalent to God through a Christian interpretation of Mi'kmaw spiritual entities, this does not mean that we can or should define Kisul'kw in the same terms. For example, Kisu'lkw may not be understood as a transcendent being, rather "Kisu'lkw is the Great Spirit or Giver of Life" (19). The role of Kisu'lkw in creation will be elaborated further through a retelling of Augustine's account of Mi'kmaw creation. The next key spiritual figure noted is Niskam, and Augustine explains that "Niskam, is a Mi'kmaq word used to refer to the sun in a spiritual context, and because we honour and respect our grandfathers, *nijkamij*, we call the sun our grandfather" (19). Niskam also represents the role of ancestry and inheritance in Indigenous culture as Augustine further notes:

> Our Elders tell us that the Grandfather Sun gave us our shadow, *mijijaqmijk*, and our shadows are the images of our ancestors following us around all day, protecting and guiding our spirits. In this way we are attached to our ancestors who have died and gone

[7] L'nu'k refers to Mi'kmaq (plural) in the Mi'kmaw language. As opposed to L'nu which refers to one Mi'kmaw (singular).
[8] Mi'kmaw for 'we have been created.' See Stephen Augustine's "Mi'kmaw creation story" in *Visioning a Mi'kmaw Humanities: Indigenizing the Academy* (Edited by Marie Battiste, 2016). Page 19.
[9] Mi'kmaw for the sun in a spiritual context. Ibid, 19.
[10] Mother Earth.

> to the land of the shadows and spirits, we are attached to them by our feet and through our blood. (20)

Here we see the relationship between individual and ancestry through not only blood relations but additionally as connected through spirit. The wisdom that the sun provides guides the reader toward understanding how the history of Indigenous Peoples plays a role in shaping the identity of an individual insofar as past and present are always linked through shadow and spirit. The final key figure in Mi'kmaw creation is Wskitqamu, who "is our Mother Earth" (20). These entities collaboratively lay the foundation for the creation of the first L'nu, Kluskap. Here it is important to note that again that creation is not a solitary act but rather relies on the cooperation of three distinct entities. In Augustine's retelling of Mi'kmaw creation, he elaborates on how these three spiritual entities cooperatively created life on earth:

> *Kisu'lkw* caused three bolts of lightning to hit upon the surface of Wskitqamu [Mother Earth] – and Kluskap was created. This lightning shook the earth and a shape of a person formed with the help of all that was part of the earth plants, animals, birds, fish, air, fire, water, and soil. The person's head was in the direction of the rising sun and his arms were outstretched, one to the north and the other to the south – constituting the four cardinal directions. (20)

Upon the first bolt of lightning, Kluskap was created. After the first bolt, however, Kluskap is not yet granted the autonomy of personhood since he remains body-less. After the second bolt of lightning hit the surface of Mother Earth, Kluskap is awarded the body of a person but still is not

granted the freedom to walk the earth. This is because during the period where Kluskap is gifted a body and senses, he is provided with the opportunity to "learn from his Mother Earth by listening, looking, smelling, eating, drinking, and speaking from his heart" (21). Here we see the passivity that is required to navigate through the complexity of life on Mother Earth. What Kluskap must do is *listen* and *reflect* on what lies on the surface of Mother Earth so that one day he may thrive on the surface himself. After Kluskap has cultivated a relationship with Mother Earth through receptive learning and connects with her through his senses, the third lightning bolt strikes the surface of the earth and gives him the ability to roam freely on the face of Mother Earth. Upon the third bolt, Kluskap stood up. Notably:

> after he got up [he] gave thanks to Kisu'lkw for his life. He thanked Niskam, Grandfather Sun, for giving him his shadow which he could now see following him around. He gave thanks to Wskitqamu, Mother Earth, for giving up parts of herself for his creation. (21)

Here Kluskap takes note of how creation is collaborative and thanks the three spiritual entities for his existence. Each play a significant role in his creation, Kisu'lkw for providing the bolts of lightning that created his body, Niskam to show him the resilience of Indigenous ancestry in its ability to remain with him beyond physical existence, and Wskitwamu for unselfishly providing Kluskap with the materials to be created. Noting that Kluskap's first instinct upon creation is to give thanks to the spirits indicates that Indigenous People respect every aspect of creation that sustains the creation of life across the Mi'kma'ki. Augustine notes that thanks to Kisu'lkw, Wskitqamu, and Niskam, "Kluskap had become a *wskijinu*, a surface-dwelling being. The last part of the word *wskijinu*, '*inu'* refers to indigenous people as 'people of the earth,' Mother

Earth, and so we call ourselves Ilnu" (21). Through this creation narrative we see how self-identification using Indigenous languages provides insight toward Indigenous identity that is not readily apparent through an English telling of the story. There is value in Indigenous languages since externally appointed terms for Indigenous Peoples such as First Nations, Aboriginals, Indigenous Peoples, 'Indians,' etc., do not reflect Indigenous values. These descriptions imposed upon Indigenous Peoples after settler contact mischaracterizes our initial definition of ourselves – as L'nu owing our existence to Kisu'lkw, Niskam, and Wskitqamu. Attempts to comprehend Indigenous identity require understanding the importance of Indigenous languages, transmitted orally from generation to generation. This becomes more apparent through Augustine's telling of Mi'kmaw creation with the introduction of Kluskap's grandmother and nephew. Augustine describes the grandmother's role in creation through her introduction:

> 'I am Nukami, your grandmother. I was brought into Wskitwamuk to guide and teach you how to survive. I owe my existence to this rock on the ground. Early this morning *kikpewisk*, dew, formed over this rock and with the help of Kisu'lkw and Niskam, Wskitqamu brought me into existence as an old woman already wise and knowledgeable.' (22)

Here we are first introduced to familial relations and their necessary contribution toward navigating life on Mother Earth. Elders hold key roles as knowledge keepers in Indigenous culture. Accordingly, after meeting Nukami, she "taught Kluskap everything he needed to know to survive" (23). Therefore, the three great spirits allowed Kluskap to respect his Elders and benefit from their knowledge through the creation of Nukami. Her role also invokes the

importance of the oral tradition as Nukami shares her knowledge with Kluskap through speech. Augustine's account of Mi'kmaw creation also includes the voice of youth through the introduction of Kluskap's Netawasum[11]. His creation, like that of Nukami through the contribution of Mother Earth in the form of dew, evokes a reliance on Mother Nature for permitting his being. Augustine describes his creation in that:

> foam was blown on the shore picking up seaweed, driftwood, pebbles and sand, fish scales, bones, leaves, and every part of Mother Earth, Wskitwamu, and with the help of Kisu'lkw and Niskam gave me a body of a young man, strong and able to help you and Nukami. (23)

This inherent connection with Mother Earth is consistent across all accounts of Indigenous creation. We encountered it first through King's description of how Charm and her twins collaborate with the environment to create a harmonious existence between people and creatures alike. The important addition in both accounts of creation, King and Augustine's, demonstrates Indigenous values of connectivity between both people and land. While we know Indigenous connectivity extends beyond the person, Canadian author and Aboriginal history advocate John Friesen elaborates on Indigenous People's strong relationship with the land in *Aboriginal Spirituality and Biblical Theology: Closer Than you Think*. Here he writes, "The First Nations of North America see themselves as part of a great chain of existence that includes all aspects of creation; all elements in this natural chain are interrelated and interdependent" (Friesen 60). This does not however take away from the individual contribution toward the whole of what makes up

[11] Nephew, sister's son. See Stephen Augustine's "Mi'kmaw creation story" in *Visioning a Mi'kmaw Humanities: Indigenizing the Academy* (Edited by Marie Battiste, 2016). Page 23.

Mother Earth as individuals serve to promote the balancing of nature. Nukami serves this role of promoting balance by guiding youth toward progress in cultivating and surviving on the land. Nukami's shared wisdom will have an impact on later youth as "Kluskap realized that young people have the gift of eyes to look at the adults as role models so he has to make sure he has left a legacy of survival for the future generations" (Augustine 23). The only way to leave this legacy is to rely on the teaching of Nukami and to share those teachings with Netawansum. At the time of creation, the transmission of teachings from one generation to another was rooted in the oral tradition. Friesen elaborates on the oral tradition of Indigenous Peoples across North America when he states:

> The oral tradition was not only a means by which to transmit cultural knowledge to succeeding generations, it was a way of preserving and interpreting truth for a specific time and place, as well as for mediating elaborate ritualistic processes. (113)

This is precisely why the Indigenous oral tradition should be embraced in the Canadian narrative as it accurately reflects the values maintained throughout Indigenous history. Augustine effectively maintains the importance of oral tradition as a link between generations to transmit Mi'kmaw values and traditions through his account of Mi'kmaw creation. Ultimately, however, the overall message of Mi'kmaw creation is that we should have respect for what permits our existence. We see this at the end of this creation story as in order to honour our presence as one of the seven original families in the Mi'kma'ki, the Mi'kmaq gather with the other original families "to give thanks to their place in creation. This giving involves ceremonies. It is a method of negotiating our survival on Mother Earth, Wksitqamu" (Augustine 25). Augustine then

explains the significance of the fire, sweat lodge, tobacco ceremonies, and sweet grass harvesting.[12] Some of these traditions, as well as their cultural value, will be outlined in the next chapter. For now, we will focus on the significance of Indigenous creation in terms of its capacity to reflect Indigenous principles key to the identity formation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada as well as in Canada's national identity writ large. These values have been suppressed by the Canadian state as early as confederation as "Aboriginal religious narratives have often been labelled 'myths' by outsiders, but they are based on no less astute observations of nature than their European-derived counterparts" (Friesen 99). While Friesen uses the term 'religious' narratives in discussing Indigenous spirituality, it is important to consider how Indigenous Peoples are only deemed religious *post* contact. I would rather assert that Indigenous spiritual narratives are mythologized in comparison to religious narratives[13]. To re-iterate Augustine's initial sentiment that Mi'kmaw humanities are not comparable to European humanities, this fact limits the reception of Indigenous creation based on its history of oral transmission and based on contents that stand in opposition to settler religious narratives. We will next consider why Indigenous creation is not acknowledged as informing Canada's history by addressing the key values it opposes as presented through the dominant narrative that informs the Canadian state: Genesis.

King's Genesis

As we have drawn some parallels between the creation of Turtle Island as explained by King and Mi'kmaw creation as described by Augustine, there is value in exploring the narrative

[12] See Stephen Augustine's "Mi'kmaw creation story" in *Visioning a Mi'kmaw Humanities: Indigenizing the Academy* (Edited by Marie Battiste, 2016). Pages 25-27.
[13] It would be appropriate to discuss religious narratives in relation to Indigenous Peoples if we were discussing post-contact assimilation where Indigenous Peoples were pushed to identify as Christians. For the context of creation stories however, these narratives are spiritual in nature.

that overshadows these accounts of creation in Canada's history. While King and Augustine's accounts reflect similar principles such as the importance of oral tradition, cultivating a relationship with Mother Earth and her inhabitants, and generational ties, Genesis provides a very different account of the beginning of time. In his brief description of Genesis, King describes the fall of Adam and humanity's ultimate desire to reconcile Adam and Eve's lost connection with the one transcendent God. In Genesis, he paraphrases that:

> In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, let there be light, and there was light. (King 21)

Here we see that creation invokes one transcendent being, God. This differs from accounts of Indigenous creation as they depict a series of collaborative efforts amongst spiritual entities. Considering the creation of Turtle Island and Mi'kmaw creation alongside Genesis, it becomes clear why King is insistent in flagging his frustration that we live in a state that clings to the European narrative of Genesis. By describing these two creation stories, King asserts that the Canadian national identity is entrenched in a colonial ideology[14] that unnecessarily excludes Indigenous identity. Through these two accounts, King asserts his frustration that when considering the two narratives alongside one another we are presented with the choices of "a world in which creation is a solitary, individual act [Genesis] or a world in which creation is a

[14] Colonial ideology refers to a specific set of values that inform the state and promote the subjugation and colonization of the original inhabitants of colonized nations. Canada's colonial ideology can be understood as a means of imposing settler religion and values, which includes the suppression of Indigenous Peoples through the denial and mythologizing of Indigenous accounts of creation. It is important to note how religion is only one possible branch of colonialism and is not synonymous with colonialism.

shared activity [Indigenous Creation]" (24). This is a problem for King insofar as, "if we believe one story to be sacred, we must see the other as secular" (24). This is a narrow-minded conclusion to draw based on the contents of either story as insisting on dichotomic structures will not bridge the gap between recognition of settler and Indigenous identity in Canada. Such a harsh distinction will only drive the separation further by invalidating Indigenous history. We are led to believe as individuals in society that "If we see the world through Adam's eyes, we are necessarily blind to the world that Charm and the Twins and the animals help to create." (25). Such a dichotomous treatment of two significant accounts of creation that inform the Canadian national identity depicts a larger flaw in the Canadian state: an unyielding adherence to the settler narrative. The misrepresentation and relegation of Indigenous identity in Canada's national identity demonstrates one of the ways the pedagogy of the state is entrenched in the narrative of an exclusionary Genesis. The repercussions of such an adherence to an exclusionary meta-narrative of Christianity show that Canada's national identity as established in 1867 is exclusionary of Indigenous identity. King warns of such consequences when he argues that stories are dangerous. I believe we can verify this claim as stories can perpetuate a limited national identity that favours settlers over Indigenous narratives. So, while as citizens we are led to believe that we must choose between which account of creation rings true, Indigenous or settler, we are completely overseeing the middle way that contributed to Canada's confederation: that there can be legitimacy to each without devaluing either. I favour accounts of Indigenous origin since they appropriately describe the significance of collaboration in creation, a collaboration that extends beyond the self toward the environment. As King explains, "In Genesis, all creative power is vested in a single deity who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. The universe begins with his thought, and it is through his actions and only his

actions that it comes into being" (24). This is a less appealing account of creation as it belittles the role of nature presented across accounts of Indigenous creation and becomes a barrier toward promoting Indigenous spirituality as it does not give voice to anyone other than one transcendent being. This stands in stark contrast to accounts of Indigenous creation which pays respect to every aspect of creation and do not invoke an exclusionary hierarchy of creation. Accordingly, when King explains the importance of origin stories, he calls for individuals to re-evaluate the principles they adhere to in order to pinpoint personal allegiances and how they inform the state's ideological apparatus. Upon consideration of Canadian origin stories that led to the nation's birth, King warns that the Canadian government is informed by an exclusively colonial pedagogy that invalidates oppositional narratives. King addresses the shortcoming of Genesis in comparison to accounts of Indigenous creation as it promotes an exclusionary state. He argues this through his thought experiment:

> What if the creation story in Genesis had featured a flawed deity who was understanding and sympathetic rather than autocratic and rigid? Someone who, in the process of creation, found herself lost from time to time and in need of advice, someone who was willing to accept a little help with the more difficult decisions? (27)

If Genesis portrayed a flawed deity, it could not be understood as God. Still, King's point is that due to the state's unyielding adherence to the narrative of Genesis, Indigenous accounts of creation are misperceived as fiction. He notes that if Genesis were more like Indigenous accounts of creation, perhaps Indigenous values such as strength through adaptability would be substantiated as informing Canada's history. Here he is speaking of Charm's character, which

relies on the guidance of the sea creatures to navigate life on the back of a turtle before the creation of land. This sentiment is also consistent with Augustine's account of Mi'kmaw creation as Kluskap owes his existence to Kisu'lkw, Niskam, and Wskitwamu. After being granted freedom, he is aided in life on Mother Earth through the subsequent creation of Nukami and Netawansum. Kluskap is strengthened through his various relations, not hindered. There is power in connectivity, and strength in adaptability. Further, the spiritual entities evoked in Augustine's account of creation show no sign of being transcendent and separate from creation – hence why Kisu'lkw is not equivalent to the Christian God. Both stories depict individuals who become empowered through a network of connectivity. Nothing about Indigenous creation is solitary – plants, animals, and people all have a part to play. This is why our account of creation is often not taken into account in considering the national identity of Canada. Subsequently, Canada's national identity is skewed toward preferring settler ideology – particularly informed by Genesis as it is rooted in scripture rather than in oral tradition. Saul explains this when he notes that:

> The classic modern monolithic nation-state has been built around the written word. This is the tool for defining meaning, narrowing meaning and asserting power. It allows public discourse to be tightened in an insular manner around definitions of loyalty to one language or the singular mythology of the state or to the one religion or race. (125)

This is largely why Indigenous accounts of creation have not been considered in their full legitimacy as they do not conform to the written word. This is one of the setbacks of the Canadian state that limits the development of Canada's national identity since adherence to the

written word devalues oral traditions as embraced in Indigenous cultures. This in turn delegitimizes accounts of Indigenous history. My primary concern with the invalidation of Indigenous history is that it denies Indigenous People's recognition in Canada's national identity. Insofar as Bell's description of the development of Canada's national identity is consistent with the need to repair relations with Indigenous Peoples in Canada, we will next address how Indigenous and settler accounts of creation contribute toward the state's potential to produce a national identity that not only harbours a multitude of cultural identities but empowers their persistence through citizenship.

Indigenous Creation in Conversation with National Identity

There is value in discussing King and Augustine's accounts of Indigenous creation alongside Bell's description of Canada's national identity. I believe that the lack of Indigenous presence in the Canadian narrative is what accounts for the state's unyielding adherence to settler narratives. The consequence of this is Canada's inability to support and empower Indigenous identity. Adherence to a specific narrative voiced by a certain group of peoples – settlers – is inconsistent with Bell's account of what an ideal Canadian national identity could reflect. Bell believes that "A nation is a living organism, as truly as any plant or individual animal" (Bell 56) more specifically, a living organism that can sustain change and find strength through adaptability. Canada has the duty of empowering its citizens, which includes Indigenous Peoples. This duty stems from its Charter of Rights and freedoms and more recently through its commitment to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People's Act. Canada's responsibility to its citizens requires that the state recognize the legitimacy of both oral and written word and acknowledge the authenticity of both Indigenous and settler accounts of creation. To only value the written word is to reject the history of Indigenous Peoples in Canada

and serves to limit the development of Canada's national identity. If a nation remains static and unable to identify with its roots, it cannot be considered a living organism per Bell's description. Bell and Dinen discuss limitations that may impede the state's development in "Friendship in Canadian Philosophy and the End of Reparations: A Reflection on Winthrop Bell's Philosophy of Canada" where they explain:

> If Canada were to become a nation – and Bell expected it would if it were not crushed under the weight of materialism or imperialism – it would be by creating a new culture, one that would involve Anglophone, Francophone, Jewish, Slavic, Scandinavian, and other cultural elements, including, implicitly, Indigenous cultures. (411)

Accordingly, if we do find the Canadian state limits Indigenous identity by suppressing Indigenous spiritual narratives rather than validating them, this failure can be attributed to the state's inability to harbour a multitude of cultural identities. This is to say that by properly informing the Canadian national identity, a constructive pedagogy will not shrink in the face of adversity. Rather, it will grow through harmony by surmounting its mixed parts rather than through the exclusion of identities that stand against the mixing of cultures. After identifying the "erasure of indigenous peoples" (422) present in Bell's account of what constitutes a nation, Bell and Dinen further note that "If the problem with 'nations' is precisely their inability to countenance self-scrutiny, the idea of the Canadian nation Bell shares is exemplary in its need for, and practice of, self-examination and interpretation" (422). I interpret this passage as indicating the need for Canada to recognize the authenticity of Indigenous creation by Bell's account of what *should* constitute the Canadian national identity, insofar as Indigenous history

plays a role in the formation of Canada. The mixing of cultural identities can only positively impact the development of Canada's national identity if longstanding narratives are challenged, deconstructed, and reconsidered from a new perspective. For example, by embracing the rationality of the oral tradition and the cultural significance of orally transmitted stories. To address the importance of Indigenous Peoples in the creation of Canada, Saul notes:

> When I dig around in the roots of how we imagine ourselves, how we govern, how we live together in communities – how we treat one another when we are not being stupid – what I find is deeply Aboriginal. (3)

This extends to describe the importance of legitimating accounts of Indigenous creation as they contribute to Canada's history. Recognizing accounts of Indigenous creation in the Canadian narrative would demonstrate that Canada can create a constructive national identity that encompasses what have been historically perceived to be oppositional identities. For our purposes, this depicts the value of placing Indigenous identity in conversation with Canada's national identity since a truly successful national identity would progress to embrace various cultures such as Anglophone, Francophone, Slavic, etc., as noted by Bell and Dinen. To reach such a point however we must address the impact of the state's adherence to a particular account of creation. King describes the importance of critically confronting the *why* behind narratives we believe to be all-encompassing and true. Why do we perceive one narrative as informative and the other as fiction? Answering this question involves recognizing that: "Aboriginal legends are unique. . . They convey a vast range of cultural knowledge, incorporating folkways, values, beliefs, and the fundamental metaphysical presuppositions that determine the ground of a

particular cultural pattern" (Friesen 113). By relegating accounts of Indigenous creation to fiction, aspects of Indigenous history are misconstrued. King addresses his frustration with the dismissal of Indigenous spiritual narratives in favour of settler religious narratives when he notes the oppositional dichotomy present throughout Canada's history. He explains "dichotomy [is] the elemental structure of Western society. And cranky old Jacques Derrida notwithstanding, we do love our dichotomies" (25). King pinpoints dichotomy as the elemental structure of Western society due to settlers' unyielding adherence to Judeo-Christian heritage and the forced imposition of the values of this heritage on colonized peoples. In reiterating his frustration with the Western tendency to continually misperceiving cultural differences as dichotomous, King is expressing that insofar as settler narratives inform the Canadian state, Canada misperceives Indigenous and Settler identity as oppositional. This is a mischaracterization stemming from confederation that has not been reconciled to this day. Throughout Bell's discussion of Canada's national identity, he makes no explicit mention of Indigenous Peoples. Bell and Dinen later elaborate that:

> the significant absence of Indigenous Peoples might speak to the unfinished character of the Canadian essence Bell describes, one blind to its own racist colonialism … Indigenous Peoples *should* be included in any serious discussion of his description of the philosophy of Canada. (410)

I believe here is where reconsidering the accounts of creation that inform the state proves to be useful as through this task, we can challenge settler ideologies and their impact in terms of limiting the development of Canada's national identity. Saul expresses frustration with the

limited conception of Canadian identity that has been put forth throughout Canadian history. He argues:

> in this process of examining our Western inheritance, and vaunting it, there is scarcely a nod, let alone a meaningful nod, in the direction of First Nations, the Métis, the Inuit. There is no intellectual ethical or emotional engagement with what their place might be at the core of our civilization. (4)

He too flags the shortcomings of the Canadian state in its inability to acknowledge the historical significance of Indigenous values and traditions, such as that of orally transmitting history. Like Bell and Dinen, Saul attributes Canada's limited character to its colonial history and differential treatment of Indigenous Peoples. Saul further describes that the root of the problem in Canada's capacity to assert its national identity is that "We have not yet developed a broad Canadian view that re-establishes Aboriginals in their full and central place" (34). This ultimately accounts for Canada's shortcomings as he further argues, "the ability of a civilization to survive and grow lies in its ability to describe itself" (21) which relies on the ability to identify with all its constituent parts. This is consistent with how Bell's ideal national character lies in its ability to identify with the histories that inform its development. This invokes the past, present, and future as Canada not only needs to recognize the Indigenous roots present throughout Canadian history but needs to assert the impact Indigenous Peoples had on Canada's emergence as a nation and how this impacts our ability to describe ourselves as Canadians today. This is why King calls for his readers to challenge the narratives they find themselves entrenched in since this is something we must do on a personal and national scale to recognize the authenticity of Indigenous accounts of

creation and traditions. Bell and Dinen reiterate Bell's account of what may account for the shortcoming of a nation when they note that:

> If the problem with 'nations' is precisely their inability to countenance self-scrutiny, the idea of the Canadian nation Bell shares is exemplary in its need for and practice of, self-examination and interpretation. (422)

This is akin to King's call to challenge entrenched narratives that inform the ideological apparatus of the state. If the state's strength lies in its ability to reflect on its shortcomings, the Canadian state is limited in achieving a constructive national identity insofar as it fails to recognize the role of Indigenous history in Canadian history.

Conclusion

After analyzing Canadian accounts of our national identity – or lack thereof – we can acknowledge the role of Indigenous history across Turtle Island and the Mi'kma'ki. Bell provides an early account of what constitutes Canada's national identity. Through this account, we can identify how Indigenous Peoples suffer differential treatment within the present conception of Canada's national identity. Consequently, the Canadian state is exclusionary toward Indigenous identity – and therefore our national identity is prejudiced toward settler principles. We traced the origins of this shift by first focusing on two creation stories that inform Canada's national identity: Indigenous and settler. King's recount of the Indigenous creation story "The Woman Who Fell From the Sky" addresses the entirety of Turtle Island to demonstrate how Indigenous culture is deemed secular and relegated to 'other' since it does not align with the narrative of Genesis. Augustine contributes to this conversation with his local

account of Mi'kmaw Creation which reflects much of the same values as King's creation story. They share themes of interconnectedness, respect for Mother Earth, generational ties, and the historical and cultural significance of embracing oral tradition. Through Genesis, we can pinpoint how the Canadian state is entrenched in a colonial ideology that unnecessarily excludes Indigenous narratives and in turn identity. Such a conception of Canada's history creates an exclusionary ideological apparatus that is representative of the state's shortcomings which hinder the development of our national identity. While Bell asserts that our national identity would flourish with our ability to recognize and empower all its constituent parts, he sidesteps a discussion of Indigenous Peoples in Canada. This however does not change the fact that Bell's discussion is pertinent in considering the role of Indigenous Peoples in Canada today. His outline of an ideal Canadian national identity depicts a mixed and interconnected society as reflected through Indigenous accounts of creation that values strength through adaptability as addressed by King and Augustine. To embrace their teachings, we must consider how these two accounts of creation inform Canada's national identity. Placing Bell in conversation with King and Augustine is an effective way to demonstrate how Indigenous creation is overshadowed by settler accounts of history. Describing the two creation stories, we can effectively assert how Canada's national identity has historically been limited by its inability to validate Indigenous history. Embracing Indigenous history begins with addressing entrenched narratives and acknowledging the legitimacy of Indigenous origin stories as conveyed through oral tradition since they are central to any description of Canada's national identity.

To further our discussion of Canada's national identity, we must first provide an outline of Indigenous identity. This outline will elaborate on some of the values pinpointed throughout King and Augustine's accounts of creation such as the significance of the oral tradition. This

places accounts of Indigenous creation as well as an outline of values depicted through language, traditional symbols, and ceremonies in conversation with Canada's national identity. Indigenous identity cannot be fully delineated in any written context, but a meaningful way to begin to understand it is by example of the medicine wheel teachings. The medicine wheel teachings promote balance between the spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental aspects of creation and thus provide critical insight toward Indigenous identity. The elements of the medicine wheel are present in Augustine's account of creation and are later symbolized as a circle with four colours to efficiently promote the transmission of its fundamental values to those unfamiliar with Indigenous accounts of creation. A brief outline of Indigenous identity will expand on the oral tradition and the significance of Indigenous languages in preserving cultural values and histories. It will also elaborate on the role of Elders in Indigenous communities who carry on the oral tradition, effectively maintaining and transmitting cultural values. Another facet of Indigenous identity will be introduced through a discussion of traditional practices such as talking circles which promote equal appreciation for every community member through speech and spirit. Finally, to inform Indigenous identity, we can draw and expand on elements presented through King and Augustine's account of creation that convey Indigenous connectivity with nature. This will be useful in exploring how the role of nature informs ceremonial elements such as the construction of traditional sweat lodges to promote individual and community purification through the choice materials of willow poles. While I have noted that a nation can only thrive if it can continually rise above its ingrained narrative to incorporate various cultures, it follows that Canada's national identity can benefit from empowering Indigenous identity only after understanding the various vital components that contribute toward its delineation.

Chapter 2: Indigenous Identity

"Aboriginal philosophy is key to Aboriginals being confident about who they are. But it is just as important to other Canadians having a sense of who we are" (Saul 75)

By discussing accounts of Indigenous creation, we can discern values that are key elements of Indigenous identity. Indigenous identity stands apart from Canadian identity as it predates confederation. Therefore some, if not most, of Canada's Indigenous population consider themselves to be North American rather than Canadian as the original inhabitants of Turtle Island. Therefore, Indigenous Identity is limited through a Canadian conception as Indigeneity exceeds the bounds of Canada. This is why King's creation story refers to the creation of Turtle Island – North America – rather than Canada. Augustine's creation story, on the other hand, describes a specific region of what is now Canada, but similarly the values it conveys exceed the geographical grounds of the Mi'kma'ki and extend across Turtle Island. We will here explore various facets of Indigenous identity as informed by creation stories and further by describing key elements that inform Indigenous worldviews such as traditional symbols and ceremonies. It is important to note that such a topic could never be exhausted. Still, nevertheless, there is significant value in outlining an identity that has been largely overshadowed throughout the brief history of Canada to address what's at stake in the invalidation of Indigenous history that bars Indigenous people's recognition in Canada's national identity.

Indigenous Peoples are North American rather than Canadian. This accounts for why our creation stories range from the creation of the Mi'kma'ki to the creation of Turtle Island. There is value for Canadians in acknowledging and empowering facets of Indigenous identity as the creation of Canada stems from Indigenous values and therefore includes Indigenous history. This

means that turning away from the origins of Canada only further confuses the Canadian national identity by denying the Indigenous population recognition in the whole of Canada's history. Describing Canada's history of the colonization of Indigenous Peoples serves to demonstrate how Canada's historical experiences inform the limited development of Canada's national identity. To avoid a narrow-minded account of Canadian national identity that excludes Indigenous Peoples, we will first outline Indigenous identity through a description of the Medicine Wheel teachings to illustrate key values pertaining to spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental wellbeing. Next, we will expand upon the significance of the oral tradition in Indigenous culture beyond the retelling of creation stories to include a discussion of the importance of Indigenous languages and how they inform identity formation. After understanding the significance of oral tradition and Indigenous languages, I will assert the importance of communication through speech and spirit through a discussion of Talking Circles, which reflect aspects of First Nation Pedagogy. The example of the Talking Circle shows equal appreciation for every individual within the community. Specific community members also play key roles in Indigenous identity formation such as Elders who are praised for their learned wisdom. They are the community members who promote Indigenous values through the retelling of creation stories, as demonstrated through the example of King and Augustine. Elders also convey the importance of Indigenous connectivity to every aspect of creation. Understanding how Indigenous Peoples value every aspect of creation is key in understanding the various facets of Indigenous identity formation and could not be transmitted without an Elders knowledge keeping. Acknowledging the significance of the natural environment allows for a more in-depth discussion of ceremonies such as the sweat lodge ceremony, which is carefully constructed with willow trees to depict aspects of birth and re-birth. Discussing Indigenous creation was only the

first step toward placing Indigenous identity in conversation with Canada's national identity. Expanding on aspects of Indigenous identity will include discussing the Medicine Wheel teachings, the significance of the oral tradition and Indigenous languages, as well as specific ceremonies and community roles noted above. I believe that considering these aspects of Indigenous identity alongside an account of the historical backdrop of settler colonization demonstrates how we can attribute any uncertainty within the Canadian national identity to Canada's failure to empower its Indigenous population. An exposition of Indigenous identity draws attention to Canada's history of colonialism and works toward combatting the invalidation of Indigenous history by expanding on what is at stake in overcoming colonialism.

The Medicine Wheel Teachings

The Medicine Wheel teachings are an example of Indigenous pedagogy that has been largely invalidated throughout Canada's history since it is a traditional symbol that depicts core Indigenous values. In its most simplistic description, the medicine wheel contains four colours: white, yellow, red, and black. The four colours also stand for the four directions of north, east, south, and west. This outline will focus on the significance of the four colours and directions. We encountered our first description of the elements of the medicine wheel in Augustine's account of creation where he notes that:

> [Kluskap] followed the path of Niskam toward the west, the setting sun. Later, he decided to travel south until the earth became red and narrow and he could see water on both sides, in the east and in the west. Having spent some time in the south, he decided to travel up north to the land of white, the land of ice and snow. It was too cold for him so he decided to go back to the east where he owed his creation. (21)

From Augustine's description, we can deduce that the medicine wheel described in his account of creation places red in the southern position, black in the western position where the sun sets into darkness, white in the northern position, and yellow in the eastern position by process of elimination. This is an account I am familiar with as it has Mi'kmaw roots however it is important to note that, "There are many versions of medicine wheel teachings. These teachings vary from one community to another but there are some foundational concepts that are similar between the various medicine wheel teachings" (Manitowabi 13). The similarities between accounts of the medicine wheel such as the four colours and directions will be the focus of our discussion since whether communities describe the wheel according to the prior outline or not has no impact on the key values it portrays about Indigenous culture and therefore has no direct impact on the medicine wheel pedagogy. By medicine wheel pedagogy I mean the values portrayed through the medicine wheel teachings such as multi-faceted levels of understanding the world around us and our role as occupants. More specifically, the medicine wheel pedagogy shows us that the four colours also represent four interdependent aspects that are key toward comprehending Indigenous identity: spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental balance. Starting our exposition with the eastern position on the medicine wheel, Susan Manitowabi notes that "The teachings from the east remind us that all life is spirit (the wind, earth, fire, and water – all those things that are alive with energy and movement)" (14). Here we see Indigenous pedagogy as previously reflected through accounts of creation in that it seeks to promote that spirit is present across all of creation. Further, since the sun rises in the east, this position represents the morning – hence why I find yellow sitting in the eastern position of the medicine wheel suitable in terms of geographical descriptors. This indicates that Indigenous pedagogy as relayed through

the medicine wheel teachings also includes physical descriptors which take on deeper symbolism, such as the sun rising symbolizing birth and renewal. This outline is consistent with Augustine's account of creation since Kluskap owes his creation to the east. We then shift from spring to summer moving south, which is red on the medicine wheel for our purposes. While the east depicts a spiritual awakening through the birth of Kluskap, "The summer and youth are represented in the southern direction" (14). Here we see that summer represents both adolescence and emotional well-being as Manitowabi further indicates that individuals in this stage are confronted with questions such as "*Who am I? Where do I come from?* (14) since "Youth are in the wandering stage of life – wandering and wondering about life" (14). This portion of the medicine wheel signifies a time of change where an individual must seek help outside of oneself to advance in all aspects of the wheel (spiritually, emotionally, physically, and mentally). While all aspects of the medicine wheel are interrelated, the south is significant for adolescence insofar as it demonstrates:

> Youth often search for those people that can provide that nurturance such as Elders. They are starved for the teachings, especially those teachings that provide meaning and purpose. (14)

Here we see the value in the Elders' teachings through their ability to guide youth toward a balanced life. The medicine wheel pedagogy encourages youth to seek out Elders for their wisdom and for Elders to nurture Indigenous youth, portraying that community members rely on one another for identity formation. This section of the medicine wheel exhibits that the care of an Elder and the values shared through oral teachings as well as cultural practices will effectively

shape youth into balanced individuals, which starts with providing emotional support for the youth who is experiencing a transitional period in life. Next, we encounter the teachings of the western position on the wheel which is black. Here we see the transition from adolescence to adulthood/death. Death here does not strictly mean deceased as in Indigenous culture "Death comes in many forms – the end of our physical journey and crossing back into the spirit world; the setting sun and end of the day; or recognition that as old thoughts and feelings die, new ones emerge" (15). Accordingly, the medicine wheel pedagogy informs us that the physical journey of life does not take up the entirety of one's existence as our place in the world exceeds the physical sense to include the spirit world. Upon considering the teachings of the western position, we can conclude that the west represents the sun setting on the physical portion of life. Seasonally, the west depicts autumn, which encapsulates the end of a leaf's physical journey before it blossoms again in the spring – the medicine wheel portrays that considering the same resurgence of life is also applicable to individuals. To embrace this is to acknowledge the validity of the spirit world. Finally, the northern position of the medicine wheel is white and stands for mental balance and wellbeing. Manitowabi explains that:

> Winter is represented in the north – it is a time for rest for the earth. It is also a time of reflection – on being a child, a youth and an adult. Elders, pipe carriers and the lodge keepers, reside in the north. Their teachings help us to embrace all aspects of our beings so that we can feel and experience the fullness of life. Wisdom also resides in the north. (15)

In noting that wisdom resides in the north, it becomes clear that the medicine wheel pedagogy promotes that Elders are the most suitable community members to guide the development of Indigenous identity. Insofar as the north depicts the values of mental balance, to achieve this balance includes accepting teachings from the wisdom of our Elders. Manitowabi further flags reflection on the stages of life as integral to the wisdom of an individual. Since Elders take up the role of promoting the interconnectedness of every aspect of creation, they help "describe various aspects of life, both seen and unseen" (13) in terms of describing how to balance spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental wellbeing. They therefore preserve and transmit medicine wheel pedagogy. Elders are also tasked with carrying on Indigenous spirituality by teaching that:

> Aboriginal people view the earth as their Mother and the animals as their spiritual kin. There is an interconnectedness between all living things and we are all part of a greater whole which is called life. Aboriginal worldview is expressed through the symbol of the circle. (10)

The symbolism of a circle serves to promote interconnectivity between community members and every aspect of creation. The shape of the medicine wheel is an important aspect to keep in mind when considering how Indigenous individuals see themselves in relation to the whole. While in this portion I focused on the medicine wheel primarily in terms of how it relates to the stages of life as well as some key values it demonstrates such as spiritual and physical journeys, identity formation, and an Elder's role in society, there are other accounts of the medicine wheel that expand to include a more in-depth discussion of the medicinal herbs associated with the four directions. As for my understanding of which four ceremonial plants are depicted in the

Mi'kmaq medicine wheel, they are: sage, sweet grass, tobacco, and cedar. Other accounts also include animals alongside the four directions, however similarly to plants and the placement of colours on the medicine wheel, the animals vary based on community conceptions of the wheel. Each medicine wheel will provide insight into the pedagogy of a specific community, so while plants and animals may differ throughout, the symbolism of a circle and the four coloured directions encompassing the land remains a constant reminder of Indigenous presence across Turtle Island and specifically here in the Mi'kma'ki. Discussing the medicine wheel teachings and the insight they provide toward Indigenous identity is important as they have been largely undervalued throughout Canada's history, impacting Canada's ability to identify Indigenous history as concurrent and informing of its own.

Oral Tradition and Language

It is important to consider how colonization limits the formation of Canada's national identity. Chelsea Vowel explains in *Indigenous Writes: A Guide to First Nations, Métis & Inuit Issues in Canada* that "Canadian as a national identity did not exist until hundreds of years after contact" (15) and therefore there is value in examining Indigenous identity as it both predates and informs Canadian identity. Further, acknowledging and empowering Indigenous identity may be crucial for promoting a positive national identity as Bell previously describes Canada's ideal national identity as one that can rise above ingrained narratives. In Canada, this would require overcoming its history of colonial oppression which has encouraged the invalidation of Indigenous history. Saul asserts Canada's need to validate Indigenous history when he writes "the citizenry as a whole, we show signs of uncertainty and frustration, as if we feel ourselves adrift … At the core of these difficulties is our incapacity to accept who we are" (XVI). Here he is drawing the link between colonialism and Canada's confused citizenry, placing Indigenous

identity in conversation with Canada's national identity by addressing their shared history. While Saul speaks of Canada as a Métis nation in the context of his book *A Fair Country: Telling Truths About Canada*, I believe he pushes us toward understanding that uncertainty within the Canadian national identity may be attributed to its failure to empower its Indigenous population. Reading and drawing values from Indigenous accounts of creation was a means to explore Indigenous identity across Turtle Island, while here we will provide a more in-depth account of the oral tradition to acknowledge the importance of Indigenous history in Canadian history. Friesen explains that "Aboriginal peoples lived according to the oral tradition … the written having grown out of the oral as a vital part of the natural progression of human civilization" (112). Here he notes that oral tradition paved the way for the written word. This means that for Canada, while the emergence of the written word may mark societal progress, this does not devalue the teachings transmitted through the oral tradition in Indigenous cultures. Acknowledging the importance of the oral tradition allows us to understand that the use of native languages such as the Mi'kmaw language provides a historical link from past to present. Indigenous languages are integral to the oral tradition as Tim Bernard notes by the example of the Mi'kmaw language in *Kekina'muek: Learning About the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia*:

> The Creator gave the Mi'kmaq their language to help them share knowledge and to survive. For this reason, they see their language as holy. The sacred knowledge within the Mi'kmaw language provides wisdom and understanding. It focuses on the processes of gaining knowledge, on the action or verbs, and not on the nouns or collecting material goods. (51)

Studying the Mi'kmaw language provides insight into what the Mi'kmaq consider useful and worthy of oral transmission, which includes but is not limited to accounts of creation, knowledge of the land such as medicinal uses of native plants, and the values of strength and adaptability. This sentiment extends beyond the Mi'kmaq to include all Indigenous languages as Saul writes, "If we can embrace a language that expresses that story, we will feel a great release, we will discover a remarkable power to act and do so in such a way that we will feel we are true to ourselves" (XVI). While I cannot provide a full account of Indigenous languages across North America, the fact remains that our spiritual narratives depict values that provide key insights toward Indigenous identity and pedagogy as shown through the example of the medicine wheel teachings. Stories, as conveyed through Indigenous languages, hold more depth than can be transmitted through English narrations, as native languages embrace the complexity of Indigenous identity. They better illustrate the values of Indigenous Peoples. While it is true that, "before contact almost all social knowledge, including [spiritual] traditions and rituals that informed the Aboriginal Peoples and shaped their identities, was carried and conveyed to the next generation by oral means" (Friesen 9) this does not displace the value of the oral tradition in contemporary Indigenous cultures as it remains a prevalent means toward understanding Indigenous identity. It is not only the task of Indigenous Peoples to embrace the legitimacy of the oral tradition. If the state wants to empower Indigenous identity, then embracing the oral tradition's legitimacy and validating Indigenous history is a means toward achieving this goal.

Talking Circle Teachings

The main example I will provide to demonstrate the oral tradition and its relation to pedagogy is that of talking circles. To discuss the significance of the oral tradition and its role in talking ceremonies I will first re-assert Friesen's sentiment that: "The fact that the oral tradition

did not feature written forms should in no way be construed to suggest that its structures were any less complex nor its spiritual and moral impact any less significant (113). Here he is noting that if we are to acknowledge the validity of oral tradition, we must discern that embracing the oral tradition is a means of combating the invalidation of Indigenous identity. Talking circles are an expression of Indigenous identity that invoke elements of communal participation. The use of speech is a connecting factor for Indigenous Peoples, as is shown through the example of a talking circle. Within a talking circle, "Participants are able to speak openly on matters that otherwise would be private. The talking circle is completely confidential and all participants honor its sacred nature" (Bernard 53). This promotes equality amongst the members participating as each member of the circle has time to confide in the group. The pedagogy of the talking circle includes sharing through voice and spirit to be acknowledged by other members of the circle. This promotes trust in other members and a sense of connectivity amongst everyone in the circle. In terms of how a talking circle functions, "When the leader is finished speaking, the sacred symbol is passed to the next person who can then speak directly to the members of the circle. The circle is a form of societal healing" (53). Bernard is here explaining that the circle begins when a sacred item, like a hand-carved piece, is passed clockwise along the circle's participants. The name 'talking circle' may be misleading for the common reader as there is no pressure for each member to verbally share their thoughts, but each participant holds the sacred item and passes it to the next member after finishing their turn by verbalizing Msit No'kmaq[15]. The reasoning behind this is that not every member of the circle wants to vocalize their grievances, thoughts, and prayers, and that is okay. The presence of the other members and the invocation of all of our relations relates to us all through spirit. This indicates that while vocalization is

[15] All my relations

important in a talking circle, it is not solely necessary for connectivity amongst individuals as spiritual presence is a manner of speech and therefore a means of connectivity as well. For example, in the last talking circle I attended I chose to speak and share my thoughts, while my brother did not. Even though he did not share his thoughts with the group, every member of the group was connected by holding the sacred symbol. The use of a sacred item allows for the expression of spiritual connectivity since every spirit interacts with the item before passing it clockwise. Each participant is equally acknowledged and empowered through societal healing in a talking circle. I mention 'equally' here as amongst onlookers of Indigenous cultures it may seem that Elder voices are paramount. This is true, but not in such a way that devalues other members of the community. While we embrace the oral tradition to instill values such as respecting our Elders, it is important to consider how without Indigenous youth, Elders would be unable to share their wisdom, including the tradition of talking circles. Accordingly, Elders are key toward understanding Indigenous pedagogy as their role is to educate community members. In short, "Elders are respected for their life history, experiences and wisdom and have reached a point in their lives where they are able to share their gifts and knowledge with others" (Manitowabi 93). By this description, it is evident that Elders are created through community participation, and they are empowered individuals who enlighten the youth through their teachings, just as their Elders did for them. Through the guidance of Elders, we see how identity formation is an interconnected network of physical and spiritual communication through the passing on of traditions such as talking circles. By the example of talking circles, Indigenous identity invokes Msit No'kmaq (all my relations) in both the physical and spiritual sense of the phrase, noting that Indigenous identity extends beyond distinct personhood.

Connection with Creation – Nature

Nature is a key aspect of Indigenous identity that has yet to be discussed at length. Sidestepping this discussion has been intentional as this component of Indigenous identity seems to be what is largely overshadowed by colonial ideology. As depicted through both accounts of Indigenous creation, acknowledging connectivity with the land and *all* its inhabitants – human or not – is key to embracing Indigenous identity formation. This is because spirit is abundant and present across all of creation. It is here important to note that the phrase Msit No'kmaq extends beyond the self *and* the other, to include the environment. For Mi'kmaw culture, there are various instances in which you would say "Msit No'kmaq" which include but are not limited to participating in talking circles and leaving a sweat lodge. This is significant as through this utterance; Indigenous ceremonies continually embrace not only aspects of ourselves and others but our interdependent existence with every aspect of creation. This aspect of Indigenous identity is often overshadowed since settlers did not travel to Turtle Island to learn. As a result:

> The Europeans did not understand the ways of the Mi'kmaq and they were inaccurately portrayed as barbarians and savages. For example, the Mi'kmaw belief that animals and trees had a spirit was seen as a sin to Roman Catholics. The Mi'kmaq concept that the land was shared by all and owned by none, was seen as backward to the Europeans. (Bernard 53)

Connectivity with the land extends beyond the Mi'kmaq as all Indigenous Peoples were promoting a way of life contrary to the narrative of dominating the land that Europeans had

already established. Canada's history thus includes an unyielding adherence to European values that consequently rejected Indigenous identity. Bernard explains that:

> Before contact, Mi'kmaq enjoyed the land, living in harmony with nature and sharing the bounty among community members. They had no concept of land ownership, property deeds, or boundary lines. The land belonged to all living things and Mother Nature was her keeper. (70)

This indicates of Indigenous identity that we do not identify with the land because we were here first, but because the creator granted us this land to sustain Indigenous Peoples. The conditions of thriving across Turtle Island as portrayed in King's account of creation include acknowledging that Mother Earth does not belong to us, but we share it amongst all of creation. Simply put, this explains why in the Indigenous culture we recognize that "all living things are connected" (69) since creation is not of people, but of the land and all of its inhabitants. Every aspect of creation is significant in a discussion of Indigenous identity, and for this reason, such a topic could never be exhausted. To expand on Indigenous People's relationship with Mother Earth, Bernard explains that Indigenous Peoples do not only acknowledge the need to respect nature, but they also act accordingly giving thanks for the gifts that Mother Earth provides[16]. The custom of offering tobacco upon picking sweetgrass or utilizing every part of an animal that gives its life for the sustenance of Indigenous Peoples is important in considering Indigenous

[16] "Because they believe all things are part of nature and must be respected, the Mi'kmaq give thanks when they use part of nature for their own needs … when they cut down a tree, or dig up plant roots for medicine, or kill an animal for food, there are certain rituals they must follow to pay the proper respect" (50). See *Kekina'muek: Learning About the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia*.

identity. Indigenous Peoples value human connectivity, but equal value is also placed in the work of spirit throughout creation. As Saul eloquently writes:

> The Aboriginal idea of society as a great circle works here, it is a mechanism of inclusion that absorbs new members, adjusting as it does so. It explains how we function. It explains why we seek balance rather than clarity. That balance is not a stand-alone human talent. It works because the circle is imagined as being one with the place. (280)

The metaphor of an ever-enlarging circle also extends to include our previous discussion of the medicine wheel, which contains elements of individual character, community participation, medicinal herbs, animals, and connectivity with spirit and land through the four directions. While Europeans initially perceived Indigenous Peoples as lacking rational capacity, they were misguided by their intentions to conquer the land rather than understand its inner workings. Consequently, settlers fail to empower Indigenous identity due to strict adherence to a colonial mindset that disregards nature as key toward identity formation.

Role of Nature in Ceremony: Sweat Lodge Ceremony

A sweat lodge ceremony is a good example of a facet of Indigenous culture that is better understood after acknowledging the role the environment plays in Indigenous identity formation. In its simplest explanation, “The sweat lodge has room for four to 12 people. They sit in a circle around a central dugout where preheated rocks create heat and steam for the ceremony” (Bernard 52). While the customs of the ceremony are significant, explaining the role of the firekeeper and the number of rocks that are placed into the dugout is not the purpose of this section. I would like to highlight that when it comes to constructing the lodge, there are specific materials we use as

they are symbolic of birth and death. Friesen explains this when he notes that “the sweat lodge itself represents the womb. The willow poles form the structure … Willow is also deemed to have the power of resurrection which is proven by the fact that it dies and is reborn” (76). It is important to discuss the sweat lodge only after asserting the role of nature in Indigenous identity as without acknowledging its role, we could not address the choice of willow poles to support the structure of the sweat lodge. The choice of willow is symbolic in that willow has restorative properties and the ability to persist through life and death, which depicts strength through resilience and connectivity. Resilience can be attributed to the willow tree since it can regrow from a clipping, meaning through death it can rise again. This brings us back to understanding that Indigenous life extends beyond physical death as death is only another step in one's journey. The use of willow tree poles is important for promoting values of community connectivity since a sweat is a ceremony where “Within the lodge the individual becomes part of the body of something alive and very powerful” (76). During the ceremony, one becomes part of the whole of the sweat lodge, including the structure of willow poles that supports the lodge. Previously Friesen noted the lodge represents the womb. This statement becomes evident upon considering that the entrance is “always facing toward the east” (Bernard 52). If we recall Augustine’s account of the creation of the Mi’kma’ki, the east is where Kluskap owes his existence and therefore the symbolism of an east-facing door represents the beginning of life or rebirth. Birth and re-birth are represented both through the lodge’s willow structure and through the construction of an east-facing entrance. While we have accounted for the role of life in the sweat lodge ceremony, we can account for death insofar as “Symbolic death is enacted by the individual who enters the sweat-lodge, and symbolically buries old unclean thoughts and is reborn by regeneration of the ceremony” (Friesen 76). Without acknowledging the specific use

of willow, these observations remain null. This is why recognizing the role of Mother Earth and every aspect of creation is key toward empowering Indigenous identity as it extends to include the land and informs ceremonial elements such as the construction of a sweat lodge. Failure to embrace the role of Mother Earth in Indigenous identity results in Canada's inability to recognize the validity of cultural ceremonies such as the sweat lodge ceremony. A sweat lodge ceremony can be understood as "a place of spiritual communication and cleansing" (Bernard 52) by those who comprehend the significance of not only the ceremony but the carefully chosen materials used in the construction lodge. The significance of ceremonies such as this one has been devalued throughout Canada's invalidation of Indigenous history. A further delineation of Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity will thus be our next topic of conversation as a means to provide a historical backdrop for the colonization of Indigenous Peoples.

While we have above recognized some aspects of native culture that inform Indigenous identity, there is value in addressing the ways this identity is suppressed by Canada's history which exhibits an unyielding adherence to the Judeo-Christian narrative. This will be done in the following exposition of the historical backdrop of Canada's historical rejection of Indigenous identity after confederation and upon the legislation of colonial law such as the Indian Act. The consequence of invalidating Indigenous history leads to the barring of Indigenous identity in Canada's national identity. This is shown through the state's disregard for the medicine wheel teachings, devaluing the significance of oral tradition and Indigenous languages, and the dismissal of connection with every aspect of creation which ultimately results in the misunderstanding of ceremonial elements of Indigenous culture. The outcome of this is the dismissal of multiple aspects that inform Indigenous identity formation. Such an invalidation has

lasting impacts on the Indigenous population and depicts that Canada's national identity is skewed toward settler values; making it unable to empower its original Indigenous inhabitants.

A. Historical Backdrop

"To maintain Canada's national identity and the activities that support it, Indigenous people have to be pushed to the figurative and literal fringes and rendered invisible" (Hanrahan 69)

This section will focus on describing Canada's history which includes acknowledging the colonization of Indigenous Peoples to demonstrate how Canada's historical experiences inform the development of its national identity. Notably, much of the racism that Indigenous Peoples face in Canada stems from confederation and the legislation of the Indian Act. The Indian Act is an example of how Indigenous identity is displaced in the Canadian national identity to uphold settler values and is therefore an example of colonial law. By addressing the Indian Act as a form of colonial law that resists Indigenous identity, I seek to identify the historical link from colonialism to the renaming of Indigenous Peoples, the creation of reserves, the enfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples, and the establishment of residential schools. To demonstrate how Canada's national identity is representative of settler values and displacing of Indigenous identity, we will first discuss the Indian Act and its ramifications by acknowledging the nature of its legislation as colonial in how it identifies Indigenous Peoples as 'other' to settlers. This is problematic since as long as Canada thrives off the subjugation of Indigenous Peoples, Canada's national identity will fall short of empowering Indigenous identity. I have previously noted that Indigenous Peoples largely identify as residents of Turtle Island rather than Canadian, it is here important to note that this does not mean that Canada has no obligation to empower its Indigenous population. Canadian national identity should strive to incorporate Indigenous

identity and history as it predates and influences Canada's history. Before we can discuss the means toward ameliorating Indigenous and settler relations and explain how Canada can empower Indigenous identity, we must first understand how this identity has been resisted throughout Canada's history by the state's endorsement of colonial law such as the Indian Act. By discussing the impacts of the Indian Act including the renaming of Indigenous Peoples, the creation of reserves, enfranchisement, and the history of residential schools, we can trace how Canada's history of colonialism impacts its presently flawed national character.

The Indian Act as Colonial Law

John A. Macdonald was the first prime minister of Canada. The significance of noting this is that he was central to confederation and later approved the passing legislation of the Indian Act. Saul notes that "A new school of historians emerged from 1867 determined to treat confederation as a brand-new beginning designed to make up for past failures" (158) to indicate that Macdonald treated confederation as a fresh start for Canada as a nation, one that he could mould through legislation to fit the conforms of the settler ideology that informed his worldview. In doing so, he disregarded the Indigenous presence and history on Turtle Island that contributed to the emergence of Canada. This disregard led to the legislation of colonial law such as the Indian Act. To understand how much of the racism that Indigenous Peoples face in Canada stems from the legislation of the Indian Act that originated under Macdonald's leadership, it is important to consider that, "'Indian' in the context of the *Indian Act* is a status Indian. One of the many actions of the Act was the definition of a segment of society based on genetics" (Joseph 11). Previously, differential treatment based on race was unprecedented in Indigenous culture, however, race distinctions form the basis of the constitution under Macdonald's leadership. In this way, the Indian Act serves to colonize Indigenous Peoples by separating Indigenous status

from identity. The creation of status Indians forced Indigenous Peoples to meet settler standards to be recognized as Indigenous by the state. To further our understanding of Canada's colonialism, Saul notes that "Colonialism is a denial of the reality of self in favour of an imaginary special position inside the mythology of someone else's empire. That special position can never exist because empires have their own purpose" (19). In Canada we see colonialism take the shape of favouring settler ideologies without acknowledging the strong Indigenous presence that thrived across Turtle Island pre-confederation. The disregarding of Indigenous history and the differential treatment of Indigenous Peoples based on genetics is problematic for the formation of Canada's national identity since it limits the Indigenous populations ability to identify with the whole of Canadian society. The reality of Canada's history is that Indigenous Peoples were here first, and confederation was successful without war due to the Indigenous influence on early settlers. Recognizing would require the state to acknowledge that Canada's history of colonialism impacts both Indigenous and settler identities. In turn, considering legislation such as the Indian Act is relevant to contemporary conversations about Canada's national identity as Joseph argues:

> it is critical that non-Indigenous Canadians be aware of how deeply the *Indian Act* penetrated, controlled, and continues to control, most aspects of the lives of First Nations. It is an instrument of oppression. If true reconciliation between Indigenous Peoples, the federal government, and non-Indigenous Canadians is going to be achieved, an understanding of how the *Indian Act* – despite its many amendments and modifications – continues to direct the lives of First Nations and constrains the opportunities for First Nations and Canadians alike is essential. (4)

Here Joseph is rightly asserting that we can accurately describe Canada as a colonial state insofar as it has from its beginning to present-day rejected Indigenous identity by endorsing the Indian Act. Canada's non-Indigenous population must consider the effects this has on Canada's national character. In order to do this, Battiste urges readers to:

> Imagine the consequence of a power ideology that positions one group as superior and gives away First Nations peoples' lands and resources that invites churches and other administrative agents to inhabit their homeland, while negating their very existence and finally removing them from the Canadian landscape to lands no one wants … thrust into a society that does not want them to show too much success or too much Indian identity, losing their connections to their land, family, and community. (23)

Here she is listing some direct consequences of the Indian Act and the treatment of Indigenous Peoples in Canada that hinder the development of Canada's national identity. Settlers must be aware of Canada's history of colonialism to understand the ways the state has previously rejected Indigenous identity and how this reflects Canada's limited national identity. Next, we will consider some specific ramifications of the Indian Act and how its legislators knowingly and strategically inhibit Indigenous identity formation in Canada. Each topic serves as another example of how Canada's historical experiences limit the development of its national character by rejecting Indigenous identity.

Christian Re-naming

As I have previously noted, there is power in language and its tie to culture and identity for Indigenous Peoples. Accordingly, before the legislation of colonial law like the Indian Act "Indians had neither a Christian name nor a surname. They had hereditary names, spirit names, family names, clan names, animal names, or nicknames" (Joseph 35). This however did not last long after contact when settlers found it hard to record the number of Indigenous Peoples belonging to each community. One means of colonization thus included Indian registration and identification which involved the renaming of Indigenous individuals. Joseph explains that "The federal government's *Indian Act* policies during the 19th century were primarily concerned with assimilation. One aspect of the assimilation process was the renaming of the entire population for the purpose of registering Indians" (35). Here he draws attention to Canada's history of colonization. In the process of legally renaming Indigenous individuals, Indigenous languages are devalued, and self-identification is hindered. The act of renaming also shows the state's active resistance toward Indigenous identity by stripping Indigenous individuals of titles earned through lived experiences. This means that "None of the great heritage, symbolism, or tradition associated with names was recorded, recognized, or respected during the renaming process" (35). Joseph acknowledges that with a name comes the pride of the journey one has endured thus far in life. The act of denying Indigenous Peoples the right to self-identify according to their own cultural norms is an example of how the Indian Act is colonial law. In this example, colonial law is encouraged by renaming Indigenous individuals to Christian names. During the process of renaming "Indian agents on the west coast of Canada often used biblical names from different religious denominations, repeating them as they worked their way through their jurisdiction" (36). This example provides context for the thoughtlessness behind the renaming of Indigenous

individuals. Canada's history shows us that in an attempt to assimilate the Indigenous population into Canadian society, the Indian Act took the pride out of Indigenous self-identification through the renaming of Indigenous individuals for the sake of registering status Indians. Such a narrow-minded approach to Indigenous naming hinders the expression of Indigenous identity. This example only begins to describe Canada's history of resisting aspects of Indigenous identity.

Creation of Reserves

The Indian Act not only permitted the renaming of Indigenous individuals but also allowed settlers to displace Indigenous identity and allocate communities to reserve lands. This displacement impacted Indigenous identity both physically through geographical relocation and spiritually by denying Indigenous Peoples access to land that holds generations of Indigenous history. This in turn reflects the state's denial of Indigenous history to colonize Indigenous land. The entirety of Turtle Island was home to the Indigenous population pre-contact, however, this fact is overshadowed by the Canadian narrative that settlers founded Canada and had every right to claim the land. The rejection of Indigenous history is often overlooked in Canada's history as Maura Hanrahan notes:

> Part of the fabric of Canadian national identity is the notion that contemporary (non-Indigenous) Canadians now own the land, with a sense of Indigenous Peoples placed firmly in the non-threatening past. There is virtually no concept of Indigenous displacement. (82)

This is one way the Canadian state perpetuates the myth of progress by failing to acknowledge the injustices of the past. This denial of history deludes the reality of Canada's colonization of

Indigenous Peoples. This has direct consequences on Canada's national identity insofar as it adheres to a false account of history that excludes Indigenous displacement. Indigenous displacement was and is real, and reserves are only one example of how the Canadian state embraced colonialism through the invalidation of Indigenous identity. Insofar as the Canadian state was able to displace Indigenous people onto reserve lands from 1876 onward, there is value in understanding exactly what a First Nations Reservation is. Joseph describes that:

> A reserve is a tract of land set aside under the *Indian Act* and treaty agreements for the exclusive use of an Indian band … In reality, reserves were created as a means of containing and controlling Indians while providing European settlers full access to the fish and game, waster, timber, and mineral resources that had formerly sustained Indian life and culture. (24)

Reserves were not created for the preservation of Indigenous culture and values; they were a means of subjugating Indigenous Peoples and pushing them to the margins of a society they initially founded. Settlers benefited off the displacement of Indigenous Peoples as Joseph notes how relocating the Indigenous population on reserve lands effectively limited their access to resources. He flags that a motive behind the creation of reserves was to increase the resources settlers had access to. Limiting Indigenous access to the land is a form of oppression insofar as nature plays a key role in Indigenous identity formation as an important aspect of creation. Not only did the Indian Act allow settlers to displace Canada's Indigenous population, but it also gave the state the authority to dictate how Indigenous reservations were governed. Because the state's officials were unfamiliar with Indigenous history:

> The federal government did not recognize that each Nation had its own style of governance with specialized skills, tools, authority, and capacity developed over centuries. Imposing European-style elections was designed for assimilation – to remake traditional cultures in the image of colonizers. (16)

Consequently, the Canadian state rejected Indigenous identity to gain access to Indigenous land and to assimilate Indigenous people through colonization. The infusion of the state's pedagogy into Indigenous styles of governance is an example of how throughout Canada's history, colonial law has perpetuated the subjugation of Indigenous peoples.

Enfranchisement

Enfranchisement is one way the Canadian state attempted to reduce the population of Indigenous people which reflects Canada's history of colonialism. Enfranchisement is the term used to describe the act of an Indigenous person giving up their status, which includes band membership and access to reserve lands. Enfranchisement was "designed with the goal of reducing the number of people who identified as status Indians" (Joseph 11). Considering this goal of enfranchisement, we can discern that enfranchisement as endorsed by Canadian law is a rejection of Indigenous identity and therefore an instance of colonial injustice in Canada's history. Vowel further explains of enfranchisement that:

> enfranchisement was the often non-consensual process through which federal recognition of Indians was withdrawn. With that withdrawal of recognition came an end of constitutional responsibility. Enfranchisement was a concrete way to assimilate

> Indigenous Peoples out of legislative existence, extinguish their rights, and solidify colonial control over the lands and resources. (28)

The state's encouraging of Indigenous individuals to revoke their Indian status and assimilate into mainstream society was a rejection of Indigenous identity by minimizing the number of status Indians to slowly erode Indigenous culture. Vowel notes that another goal of enfranchisement is claiming the property of enfranchised individuals. This further characterizes the Indian Act as an example of colonial law since it enforced the colonization of Indigenous Peoples for land gain. While the nature of enfranchisement was initially voluntary, Joseph describes how later "When it became apparent that Indians were not taking up enfranchisement as expected, the government ramped up its efforts with the 1880 amendment to the *Indian Act*, which required compulsory enfranchisement for anyone who obtained a degree or became a clergyman" (29). This amendment was a means to keep Indigenous Peoples uneducated by European standards insofar as for an Indigenous person to be recognized as a degree-holder they must first revoke their Indigenous status. Further, this amendment was a means to strip Indigenous Peoples of cultural values and infuse the doctrine of Christianity into Indigenous spirituality by promoting the pursuit of a religious role outside of the Indigenous spiritual community. Canada's history of supporting enfranchisement includes further amendments to speed up assimilation, "In 1920, the *Indian Act* was amended and compulsory enfranchisement was again included. The 'fitness' of an Indian (male or female) over the age of 21 to become enfranchised was to be decided by a board of examiners" (29-30). This reflects Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity by colonial standards since the enfranchisement of an Indigenous individual was dependent upon settler consideration. This is troubling since as we have noted,

the state's goal was to reduce the number of Indigenous Peoples and actively encouraged enfranchisement. The history of Canada's forced enfranchisement continues to prove to be a rejection of Indigenous identity, as Joseph notes:

> Later, enfranchisement was extended to include Indians who joined the military. Indian veterans returning from World War II found that while they may have fought for their country, they had lost their Indian status in the process and had no home to return to. (30)

Even though Indigenous Peoples fought for this land, they returned to a country that stripped Indigenous veterans of their identity. From the state's perspective, enfranchisement allowed Indigenous occupants to peacefully assimilate into society and gain rights as an individual rather than be considered a ward of the state. Yet, from the Indigenous perspective, enfranchisement severed relational ties, and cultural opportunities, and further denied Indigenous people access to the land that they considered home. Until 1951 Indigenous Peoples listed on the Indian role were considered 'other' to settlers. Before this, the only way to be recognized as an individual in society was to revoke one's Indigenous identity as Joseph explains:

> 'status Indians' were not considered 'people' according to Canadian laws and did not become 'people' until the *Indian Act* was revised in 1951… Prior to 1951, the *Indian Act* defined a 'person' as 'an individual other than Indian.' (27)

This draws attention to the complexity of settler and Indigenous relations insofar as throughout Canada's history, colonial law has created a deep divide between Indigenous and settler identity.

The state's endorsement of the Indian Act and its amendments such as enfranchisement show how throughout Canada's history, settler identity has been valued over Indigenous identity. Enfranchisement provides an example of the impacts of colonial law in that it intentionally hindered the development of Indigenous identity. Our next discussion will outline the impacts of colonial law on Indigenous identity formation pertaining to the residential school system.

Residential School System

Another example of Canada's colonization of Indigenous Peoples is the creation of the residential school system. The assimilation of Indigenous Peoples through the creation of residential schools was an intentional means to be rid of Indigenous culture altogether. John A. Macdonald describes of the creation of residential schools that "The great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the other inhabitants of the Dominion as speedily as they are fit to change" (171). As early as 1887, Macdonald made the intention of residential schools clear: to reject Indigenous identity and to root out Indigenous culture so the state can rid itself of what Macdonald referred to as the 'Indian problem.' Consistent with Macdonald's outline of the goal in establishing residential schools, the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission describe that:

> The residential school system was based on an assumption that European civilization and Christian religions were superior to Aboriginal culture, which was seen as being savage and brutal. Government officials also were insistent that children be discouraged – and often prohibited – from speaking their own language. (4)

Here we can draw the link between Macdonald's entrenched colonialism and Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity. The government actively resisted Indigenous identity formation by denying the value of Indigenous culture, resulting in the schism between Indigenous identity and settler identity. Canada's history of residential schools that embrace the pedagogy of the Christian religion shows us that the state's history includes favouring religious ideologies over Indigenous ideas. I have previously identified the state's failure to address the dominance of European education and how it impacts Indigenous youth as one way the state fails to empower Indigenous identity. This failure serves as an example of Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity by endorsing the religious colonization of Indigenous youth. Joseph explains that "Residential schools brought immeasurable human suffering to the First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Peoples, the effects of which continue to reverberate through generations of families and many communities" (53). Attending a residential school was a means for an Indigenous child to assimilate into society through religious education which involved rejecting facets of Indigenous identity including language, culture, and familial ties. Attendance in residential schools was not initially mandatory for every Indigenous child, which changed in 1920 when "the [Indian] Act was amended to combat ongoing frustration over low attendance by making it compulsory for status Indian children to attend residential schools" (Battiste 56). Through the example of amendments to the Indian Act including compulsory clauses to increase the attendance at residential schools, we see the state's frustration that they could not root our centuries of empowered identity. While the attempts of amending the Act failed to eradicate Indigenous Peoples from Canada, they reflect the anti-historical intentions of settler colonization: to act as if Indigenous Peoples were not here *first* and that there is no place for Indigenous identity in Canada. The creation of residential schools not only opposed Indigenous identity, but its leaders

did not respect the youth being forcefully educated. The conditions of residential schools were terrible in terms of cleanliness, the treatment of Indigenous youth, and culturally damning in terms of barring students' access to their language and community. With that being said:

> It is estimated that 6,000 of the 15,000 children who attended the schools between the 1870s and 1996 either died or disappeared. The numbers are not precise because no one kept accurate records: not the schools, the churches that managed the schools, or the Indian agents. (Joseph 53)

Considering how Indigenous people were not considered individuals until 30 years after compulsory attendance for residential schools was implemented – or until after enfranchisement, it seems that records were not kept as Indigenous identity was not valued. Macdonald made it clear that Indigenous children attended school to eradicate their Indigenous worldview, so the prospect of Indigenous children being mistreated was temporary until they assimilated into mainstream society. Assimilating is a means of escaping the authority of the Indian Act, but it necessarily includes that an individual revokes one's Indigenous status and turns against their Indigenous identity in the process. By endorsing assimilation, Macdonald as a spokesperson for the state enforced the amendments of the Indian Act that provide insight toward his unyielding adherence to an now outdated settler ideology that rejected Indigenous identity. The number of children who died at the hands of forced assimilation is relevant, but it will never be accurate because records were not kept. Failure to record the number of children who died or disappeared in the residential school system is an example of how Canada denies its own history by intentionally failing to record it. It follows that Canada's history of forced assimilation links the

history of residential schools to Canada's history of colonialism. Specifically, the religious colonization of Canada's early Indigenous population.

Ramifications of the Residential School System

By directing colonization efforts at Indigenous youth through the creation of the residential school system, the state intentionally instilled fear and shame into the students forced to attend. These efforts affect the pride and identity formation of future generations of Indigenous youth. Canada's history of colonialism has negatively impacted every aspect of Indigenous life by devaluing the importance of oral tradition, ceremonies, Indigenous connectivity with Mother Earth, and more. Joseph notes that "when children returned home for a visit or finished school, they frequently felt alien in their families because they had been taught that their language, culture, and traditions were evil" (65). This was an intentional goal of the state as Indigenous identity was considered 'other' to settler identity. This means that making Indigenous youth feel alienated in their own community was a sign that the residential school system was effective in stripping youth of their Indigenous worldview. Youth were forced to embrace the religious pedagogy of residential schools as there were consequences for rejecting colonization and speaking their native language which "ranged from relatively mild practices of washing their mouths out with soap to the inconceivable punishment of piercing of their tongues with sewing needles" (65). Indigenous youth did not want to revoke their culture yet were forced to since they were afraid of what would happen if they failed to do so. This also explains why students at the schools were limited community visits and family contact to stunt personal development as previously noted, the community plays a large part in identity formation. Considering the medicine wheel pedagogy, the youth ought to seek out Elders in times of emotional duress. There were no Elders in residential schools to convey their learned wisdom,

and the system was created to ensure that youth would not engage with Elders when they returned to their communities. The youth had been taught by religious leaders at residential schools that an Elder's wisdom was secular and misinformed. What settlers failed to acknowledge was that the teachings of Elders are invaluable since they reflect both Indigenous *and* Canadian history. Aside from cutting ties between youth and community, the colonization of Indigenous Peoples enforced through the residential school system instilled fear in the youth to ensure that "when residential school survivors became parents, they taught their children English so that they would not suffer the same punishments when they were taken off to residential schools" (66). Indigenous Peoples feared for the next generation of youth so to alleviate further suffering at the hands of the state, survivors taught their children the language of the colonizers. This way, Indigenous youth would no longer be perceived as 'savage and brutal' by embracing their native tongue. Consequently, this reduced the number of Indigenous Peoples speaking native languages. As we have previously discussed the significance of the native languages and the oral tradition in Indigenous identity formation, Joseph further indicates that:

> In oral societies, when the words are gone, so are the histories, the value systems, the spiritual, ecological knowledge, the worldviews, the stories and the songs. It is an irreplicable loss. The loss of a language severs the connection between a people and their culture. (66-67)

The dismissal of the oral tradition through the legislation of the Indian Act depicts how Indigenous identity and history is rejected in Canada's history. The perpetual invalidation of Indigenous history and therefore identity impacts Canada's national character insofar as

Indigenous history plays a key role in defining the history of Canada. Saul writes that "No country escapes the tensions set in place with its creation. The negative forces do come sweeping back from time to time. To deal with them you must be able to identify them as such" (226). This indicates that the schism between Indigenous and settler identity created upon the colonization of Indigenous Peoples and legislation of colonial law is a tension that must be addressed to properly inform Canada's national identity. As it currently stands, Indigenous identity is barred recognition in Canada's national identity by the continual perpetuation of colonial law. It follows that addressing the tension between Indigenous and settler identity will help us better understand Canada's national identity by validating Indigenous history alongside settler history to place Indigenous identity in conversation with Canada's national identity.

Conclusion

Canada's history of colonialism stands against Bell's former outline of the ideal Canadian national identity that can embrace a mixing of identities. Since historical experiences inform the development of a nation, the colonial law of the Indian act depicts the states inflexible adherence to settler ideology through the colonization of Indigenous Peoples. This shows that Bell's ideal Canadian national identity has yet to be achieved since there has not been a mixing of Indigenous and settler identity but rather an outright rejection of Indigenous identity throughout Canada's history. We can trace the historical link from colonialism to the rejection of Indigenous identity upon considering the lasting impacts of the Indian Act as a form of colonial law. Insofar as turning away from the origins of Canada only further confuses Canada's national identity, there is a need to acknowledge the Indian Act as a piece of legislation that perpetuates the subjugation of Indigenous Peoples in present-day Canada. Historically, the Indian Act has been a means of invalidating Indigenous identity in favour of settler identity by baring the Indigenous population

representation in Canada's national identity. Understanding the invalidation of Indigenous identity perpetuated by colonial law allows us to expand on how Canada's historical experiences inform the development of Canada's presently limited national identity. While Indigenous Peoples are ultimately residents of Turtle Island rather than self-identifying Canadians, this does not permit Canada to forgo empowering Indigenous history since it informs Canada's history and therefore impacts its national identity. Achieving a national character that is akin to Bell's description begins with validating Indigenous identity and history as a means of empowering Indigenous identity. The state's history of colonialism by the example of the ramifications of the legislation of the Indian Act and subsequently the Christian renaming of Indigenous Peoples, displacement of Indigenous Peoples onto reserve land, enfranchisement, as well as the residential school system all exhibit Canada's history of rejecting Indigenous identity by demonstrating Canada's history of an unyielding adherence to settler ideology. Addressing Canada's history of colonialism informs later discussions on how to decolonize Canada's national identity and empower Indigenous identity alongside settler identity.

Inability to deal with the schism between settler and Indigenous identity perpetuated by Canada's history of colonialism, the Canadian state remains unable to identify Indigenous history and in turn identity as informing its national character. Like the Canadian state, the Hegelian state's denial of key constituents that inform identity formation reflect the state's overall limitations. I believe it is important to consider the ethicality of Hegel's state since the development of *Geist* relies on the colonization of Indigenous Peoples. Therefore, the Hegelian state stands against the ideal Canadian state as it implicitly denies Indigenous history to extend freedom to Indigenous Peoples through European colonization. While I have noted that the Canadian state denies its Indigenous population recognition in Canada's national identity, I will

argue that the Hegelian state denies the role of the rabble in identity formation which negatively impacts the freedom achieved through state citizenship. Both states thrive off the subjugation of an unrecognized group, which calls into question the purported universality of each. The failure of the Canadian and Hegelian states both occur at the level of recognition. To characterize the shortcomings of the Hegelian state, we will proceed with delineating identity formation through state citizenship as Hegel articulates throughout *Elements of the Philosophy of Right.*

Chapter 3: Hegel's State

I have previously outlined the link between Canada's history of colonization and how it perpetuates the subjugation of Indigenous Peoples. It is important to consider next how Hegel's history of colonialism reflects the exclusionary freedom achieved through state citizenship. This is significant as for Hegel, history is the movement whereby *Geist*[17] comes to know itself. In *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* Hegel describes that the modern state, specifically of 19th century Germany, is the highest development of *Geist* that has been realized through social arrangements. For Hegel, the limitation of the human condition is that individuals are particular, while *Geist* is universal. This means that the task for *Geist* is to move from universal to be actualized through material particularities. *PR*[18] outlines how *Geist* unfolds in the modern state. To demonstrate this, this section will outline the relationship between individual and state to address the relation between particular and universal. Before outlining Hegel's state, I will draw on Alison Stone's "Hegel and Colonialism" to establish the link between the Hegelian state and colonialism. Stone's contribution is important as it will serve later discussions of the limitations of Hegel's state by pinpointing its exclusionary premise. Next, I will outline Hegel's discussion of family, civil society, and the state to demonstrate how the state provides a means toward self-actualization. The state allows the individual to transcend their particularity toward universality by the process of *sublation*. Accordingly, the freedom achieved in Hegel's state hinges on the efficacy of *sublation*, which will be elaborated on throughout the chapter. It is important to note that for Hegel, the shift from finite to infinite is paradoxically antagonistic. As such, he is wary of the *type* of freedom that this transition generates for citizens of the state. Positive freedom will free an individual from internal restraints, while negative freedom marks a limited freedom from

[17] Spirit
[18] PR: *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

external agents or authoritative powers as demonstrated by the example of an atomistic individual. Positive freedom is characteristic of the relationship between individual and state as it delineates the necessary development of the state and its duty toward its subjects. Conversely, individuals who fail to recognize the state's key role in edifying its citizens achieve limited freedom. To outline positive freedom and its capacity to facilitate the shift from finite to infinite, we will first describe the family as the role that individual is born into and later departs. Second, I will outline how Hegel defines the passage from being a family member to an individual in civil society. The civil society serves as an intermediary between the family and the state; thus, between the particular and universal. Finally, I will cover Hegel's description of the state. While the state sublates particularity into universality, it does so in such a way that preserves particularity *within* the universal. Correspondingly, the state embodies positive freedom for the members of civil society. Accordingly, the following exposition will serve to demonstrate what constitutes individuality and universality according to Hegel, and how their relationship is interdependent in that it relies on organic unity. This will be done through an analysis of the individual's role in the family, civil society, and the state after pinpointing the colonial presence behind Hegel's characterization of the development of *Geist*.

Necessary Colonization in Hegel's State

To place Hegel's state in conversation with the Canadian state we will draw parallels between their mutual endorsement of colonialism. Notably, Hegel encourages colonization as a necessary means toward the development of *Geist*, to achieve freedom through participation in the state. In "Hegel and Colonialism," Stone outlines Hegel's justification for colonization. She first explains that by her account, colonialism is "the system of European political economic dominance over the rest of the world which began to form when Columbus and others arrives in

North and South America" (Stone 247). Since the 19th-century German state provides an example of the highest development of *Geist* that has been realized through social arrangements, it follows that according to Hegel "no equivalent progress to freedom and equality had occurred outside the West" (249). Hegel's state thus proves to be similar to the Canadian state in that the Hegelian state denies the unfolding of history outside of the West. Therefore, Hegel encourages the conquests of colonizers like Columbus since Hegel believes him to be "motivated by the 'outward' urging of spirit to know its own earth and convert non-European natives to Christianity" (253). Accordingly, the grounds of colonization are validated since Columbus encouraged the development of *Geist* upon non-European civilizations. Stone expands on Hegel's defence of colonialism when she writes that his:

> defence is that colonialism benefits most those who fare worst under it – colonized peoples – by civilizing and bringing them freedom that they cannot access without passing through colonial subjugation. For Hegel, colonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand. (257)

This indicates that the identity that is developed through citizenship in Hegel's state is representative of the West and excludes non-Europeans who have yet to face colonial subjugation. Accordingly, non-European rationality is denied in Hegel's outline of freedom. Like Canada, Hegel denies the history of Indigenous Peoples as Stone explains:

> with indigenous Americans: America is new and young because it had no history until the Europeans arrived. These claims do not mean that indigenous Americans cannot be

> educated; they can. But given their native ignorance of freedom, they cannot educate themselves but must be educated by Europeans, which requires that they first be subjugated to European control. (256-257)

Denying the history of America's Indigenous population implicitly denies Canadian history by denying the shared history of Turtle Island. Accordingly, Hegel's delineation of *Geist* has implications for the Canadian state insofar as Indigenous colonization is a means toward extending freedom to Canada's Indigenous population. Hegel's state endorses religious colonialism since it finds its Concept through Christianity in Europe. As Wood indicates, "Human beings have not always known themselves as persons and subjects. These conceptions, according to Hegel, are historically quite recent. They are products of European culture, deriving from the traditions of Greek ethical life and Christian spirituality" (Wood XVII). This is religious colonialism since reconsidering the universality of the state outside the confines of European inheritance would be counterintuitive to the development of *Geist*. This means that Hegel's state stands against the mixing of identities that we see in Canada's ideal character since his state relies on Eurocentrism that denies Indigenous historicity. Before expanding on Hegel's limitations beyond his adherence to colonialism, we will first outline his articulation of the development of *Geist*, characterizing the relationship between particular and universal.

Family

Hegel is opposed to the merely atomistic individual. This is because external freedom is achieved when an individual turns inward to find universality rather than engaging with another consciousness. When an individual embraces external freedom, the universal they identify with

is negative in that it is only the semblance of the universal[19]. Therefore, the development of *Geist* in history notes that individuals are born into units, rather than identified in their first moment as atomistic individuals. We gather this through Hegel's description of the family; the first group that individuals take membership in. Of the family Hegel explains:

> the disposition [appropriate to the family] is to have self-consciousness of one's individuality *within this unity* as essentially which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as in independent person [*eine Person für sich]* but as a *member*. (PR§ 158, 199)

This demonstrates that individuals cannot yet comprehend or identify with the Spirit underlying their essence in the first moment of belonging to a family. They cannot do so as the role of son or daughter in the family unit is implicitly subjugated to that of the parent; primarily father[20]. Consequently, the subject has not yet recognized their subjectivity beyond their participation in the family unit. The family represents unity through kinship rather than through rationality. Therefore, any individuality garnered through family participation exclusively will be one-sided and mischaracterized. To cling to a rudimentary unity as exhibited through family would prohibit an individual from transcending their particularity toward the universal freedom achieved through the development of *Geist*. Adhering to membership of the family will restrict the individual's progression toward the necessary antagonism of difference in civil society. This shift is required toward recognizing the self in others, beyond kinship. Sean Sayers notes of

[19] Any failure to reconcile individuality and universality will later be characterised as "Negative Freedom"
[20] See PR §166A where Hegel describes that "Women may have insights [*Einfälle*], taste, and delicacy, but they do not possess the ideal." Here he is demonstrating women's limited rational capacity toward attaining the Absolute.

Hegel's description of personhood that "People are related to each other in such a way that they can achieve their ends only by simultaneously satisfying those of others" (90). This cannot be achieved solely through family membership, as the family does not seek to extend beyond its members. Further, because what counts as satisfaction changes throughout the unfolding of *Geist* in history, therefore what counts as satisfying familial needs differs from satisfying needs at the level of civil society and again at the level of state. This also accounts for why the atomistic individual fails to achieve freedom, since they withdraw from societal relations – failing to satisfy the needs of others at *any* level of the state. Hegel argues as much when he explains one way the family completes its responsibilities toward its members is through "the *bringing up* of children and the dissolution of the family" (PR§160, 200). The dissolution of the family is what necessitates individuals entering civil society. Again, this shift away from family is a necessary intermediary step toward self-actualization. The union of a family is not universal and cannot last indefinitely due to death, divorce, or the child outgrowing the family unit. So, while membership in the family is an important unity for childhood and adolescence, an individual gains recognition as autonomous subjects only upon entering civil society in adulthood after the dissolution of the family unit. Autonomy is granted in civil society as an individual can confront universality through difference for the first time by providing for and engaging with other consciousness outside of familial interest. Such autonomy is not granted through participation in the family as Hegel writes "it is in fact the identity of the family which consciousness regards as the primary, divine, and obligating factor" (*PR* §181A, 219). This is a stage that is necessarily succeeded since being a member of a family is vastly different from being an individual participating in civil society. To be a member of a family illustrates the constrained subjectivity produced through kinship and the need to surmount familial bonds, while to be an individual in

civil society is to gain personhood through difference, which will be established next. To be a member of a family is a necessary stage toward the freedom. However, this stage is necessarily surmounted.

Civil Society

As previously noted, civil society is an intermediary stage between the particular and the universal. Like in the family unit, members of civil society may have authoritative power, but it should not impede the development of one's Spirit. Hegel writes of individuals in civil society that "through its reference to others, the particular end takes on the form of universality, and gains satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of others" (PR§ 182, 220). Here, satisfaction is achieved through participation in duty as permitted upon entering civil society. Duty is key to attaining rationality. Further, every individual has an equal opportunity to provide for their personhood and contribute toward that of others in civil society. Accordingly, no individual has more of a right to duty than any other. The family was unable to provide its members means to gain recognition through providing for others in society as it lacked difference and duty. Further, it lacked corporation. As Simon Lumsden writes:

> The individual as member of a corporation becomes increasingly aware of her contribution to the whole and that the whole provides the structure in which her self-realization is possible. This is why Hegel describes the corporations as 'assuming the role of a second family for its members.[21] (184)

[21] See also *PR* 253.

The corporation can here be understood as the livelihood of individuality through duty. Hegel explains that a corporation is similar to the family in that "The *family* is the first *ethical* root of the state; the *corporation* is the second, and it is based in civil society" (PR §255, 272). Here he is explaining that individuals partake in universality upon entering corporations. However, it is important to note that "Ethical life is accordingly the *concept of freedom which has become the existing [vorhandenen] world and the nature of self-consciousness*" (PR§ 142, 189) and such freedom can only be achieved in the state through the ethical root of corporations as present only in civil society. This does not take value away from membership in family as it is the first ethical root necessary for individuality to flourish before the emergence of corporations in civil society. In civil society, corporations act as a second family for the individual in such a way that demonstrates the relationship between individual and universal. By this I mean that there are various ways humans come together to form groups that allow individuals to transcend their own particularity toward universality. Family as a form of common life was the first example of this, and corporation the next. Universality is achieved through corporate membership so long as the corporation does not fall. Since groups, including the family by the example of divorce or death, may rise and fall. Accordingly, corporations permit universality through participation at the level of civil society insofar as the state structures remain the same and the same social order continues. This is because the development of *Geist* relies on the state's stability. Charlotte Baumann explains the relationship between particular and universal at the level of civil society when she writes "Human beings are universal in the sense that they see themselves as part of the community and enact this knowledge by participating in communal affairs and law making" (64). Such participation is facilitated through the emergence of corporations in civil society and

the designation of duties to the individuals within it. Shannon Hoff expands on the significance of corporations when she writes:

> When we participate in such collectives or groups, we in some sense take on the identity of the group as such and live in and through it, even if we do not recognize ourselves as doing so; the identity of the group is not merely an addition to our identities as individuals, but transforms them. (Hoff 110)

Here we see how individuality and universality play complementary roles. I draw this conclusion as individuals seek out a corporation to participate in unity, something larger than themselves. Further, as Hoff indicates, corporations impact one's identity formation by allowing individual to partake in the ethical unity of corporations. Therefore, participation in groups such as corporations encourage the unfolding of *Geist* at the level of civil society.

Individuality is required to uphold the sanctions of civil society, while universality in the form of duty is necessary to orient individuals toward self-actualization. Hegel elucidates the relation between individual and duty in civil society when he writes, "Although particularity and universality have become separated in civil society, they are nevertheless bound up and conditioned by each other" (PR§ 184A, 221). Baumann echoes Hegel's initial sentiment when she later writes that "The most rational social order is the one where not only individuals have to abide by the standards of their roles and social norms, but inversely those roles are shaped by and negotiated between social groups" (75). This means that in civil society, the particular and the universal are codependent in a mutually beneficial manner. The rationality of civil society – through its participation in the state – is what directs individuals toward freedom, or the

Absolute. Individuals benefit from civil societies' participation in the state. Hegel re-asserts the complementary relationship between individual and civil society when he describes that "Civil society must protect its members and defend their rights, just as the individual [*der Einzelne*] owes a duty to the rights of civil society" (PR§ 238A, 263). So here we see that the needs of civil society benefit both the individual and universal through duty. Accordingly, an individual who exists and acts for the sake of their subjectivity and abstains from duty and societal connection will not achieve self-actualization. Such an abstaining will lead to alienation rather than edification. Hoff echoes this sentiment when she warns of the atomistic individual that:

> When the atomic, isolated self becomes the most substantial thing or the linchpin of all meaning, and when the occasion for the expression of independence is taking possession, then the self is essentially opposed to social continuity and interaction with others… The community here is merely a collection of parts, a random multiplicity; it has no logic of its own, and persons have no reason to identify with it. (51)

Here she explains how the only means toward rational edification is through participation in civil society and recognition of self through others. Isolation and abstaining from civil society will limit an individual to subjectivity, barring them from ethical life. As previously indicated, Hegel is opposed to the atomic individual. Therefore, Hegel's account for individuality as depicted through civil society is truly an account for *all individuality*, meaning universality, albeit in the representation of an intermediary stage between family and state. Royce accurately describes the complex nature of the relationship between particular and universal in Hegel's philosophy when he writes in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* that:

> The true universal of the whole world is, then, the divine *Idee*, or "all-enfolding" nature of things, the true genus *within* which all individual facts fall. This universal is no abstraction at all, but a perfectly *concrete* whole, since the facts are, one and all, not mere examples of it, but are embraced in it, are brought forth but its moments, and exist only in relation to one another and to it. It is the vine; they, the individuals, are the branches. (224)

Here Royce notes how the universal of ethical life moves from the realm of pure universal ideals to be realized through the contingent existence of human individuals within a social group. Universality is then attained upon *sublation* of civil society to the state. As I believe that the freedom achieved in Hegel's state hinges on the efficacy of Hegelian *sublation*, I will here provide an outline for *sublation*. First, we must consider totality. Totality is the entirety of sublated stages considered as a whole. For Hegel, the state is the totality of ethical life which includes the *sublation* of its various parts while preserving the integrity of each. For example, the totality of a fruit tree is the entire life process of a fruit tree, from seed to tree to flower to seed again. *Sublation* in this instance considers that each moment of the tree's development (seed, tree, flower, seed) is unified by the concrete universal we identify as a tree. Accordingly, *sublation* exemplifies how the totality relates to its parts *as* the process through parts. In the state, *sublation* notes how individuals relate to the universal through the development of *Geist* toward self-actualization. *Sublation* denotes when something has been negated in such a way that preserves the results of the cancellation, for example, the state sublates civil society in such a way that maintains the individual character of its citizens. This allows citizens to achieve

freedom in the state, but this freedom depends on the successful *sublation* of civil society into the state. With that being said, for an individual to withhold participation in civil society would be akin to cutting a single branch off a tree. The tree will generate a scar over the incision but will otherwise thrive. At the same time, the individual branch will rot as it is denied recognition in the tree's totality, limiting the effectivity of *sublation*. As demonstrated through the remaining scar on the tree after the branch is detached, removal from the tree impacts the tree; however, the impact is more severe for the branch than the tree. In "The Insignificance of Individuals" John Lachs depicts a similar analogy when he argues:

> the work of spirit is impossible without concrete empirical process. But that is like maintaining the essentiality of cells for the body. Of course cells are necessary constituents of the organism. Nevertheless, no particular cell is necessary, and hence any cell is dispensable. The peculiarity of individuals is precisely that they occupy the centres of their worlds. From its own standpoint, none of them is dispensable. (79)

Lachs observes that while the body will function without a particular cell present, this does not mean that this specific cell is meaningless. On the contrary, when considering Hegel's idealism as rooted in consciousness[22], we can conclude that the participation or exclusion of each cell is central to the very fabric of their reality. Consequently, every cell is essential. In terms of individuals participation and upholding duties in civil society, each individual is necessary as their existence constitutes their reality. This is true insofar as consciousness exists within a

[22] Idealism for Hegel indicates that the world is a reflection of the mind insofar as the universal is realized through its particular unfolding in history. This indicates that the totality of one's existence relies on their contingent character, making all reality *essential* reality.

network; through an appeal to other consciousness (Royce 208). This appeal however can only be recognized after the shift from family to civil society. As previously noted, being a member of a family does not provide the means for upholding duty and therefore individual transferring participation from the family toward civil society is key. An individual must turn away from the family to experience other consciousness beyond kinship by exploring the role of corporatizing in civil society. Consciousness beyond familial bond presents difference rather than sameness. Therefore, civil society is characterized by difference on the basis that individual consciousness supersedes kinship through its ties to *all consciousness,* not just *some* consciousness[23]. This means that the shift from restricting familial bonds to autonomous individuality in civil society is marked by difference insofar as individuality is tied to universality not through kinship but through duty and sustaining one's livelihood and that of others in civil society.

The State

Moving our discussion toward the state, it is first important to delineate what is distinct of the state in comparison to civil society. As we recognize that the shift from family to civil society necessarily entails a shift from member to individual, the transition from civil society to state is a shift from difference toward harmony. Here in the state, the difference between finite consciousness is transcended as Baumann explains:

> the aims of the state and its rationality consist in nothing but uniting individuals in an organic social system to the effect that different social groups or 'organs' are related in a mutually beneficial manner. The universal good is certainly more than the mass of particular interests, but this 'more' only consists in the systematic and harmonious organization of those

[23] In the next chapter, this will serve as an argument against the efficacy of Hegelian *sublation* as it proves unable to sublate the rabble – and therefore unable to reconcile differing consciousness'.

> interests, which as such elevates them into parts of a system Hegel considers rational. (Baumann 72)

As the state is the rational progression from civil society, it is where national sovereignty is achieved. This sovereignty is extended toward the individuals who constitute the state's existence, allowing them access to universality through particularity. There would be no need for the state if individuals did not first belong as members of the family, only to move beyond such membership upon entering civil society. Further, if civil society did not harbour differences to test individuality, there would be no link between family participation and the state. Thus, without transitioning through the family and civil society toward the state an individual would have no cognisant link between particular and universal. The state is an advancement of civil society as Hegel notes, "The state is an organism, i.e. the development of the Idea in its differences" (*PR* §269, 290) but clearly it could not function without the precedent of individual participation in civil society. By noting the state is an organism, Hegel is referring to how the self-consciousness must relate to its Concept through the development of *Geist* and is therefore describing the totality of life. Since the state is an organism, everyone must act in accordance with the whole. As Lumsden articulates:

> Being part of a whole and seeing one's worth and dignity bestowed by one's place in that whole are central to the transition to the state. The important element in acknowledging the state as a rational and essential feature of freedom is that the members of the corporations understand that there is a wide variety of views and organizations in civil society. The status

> and security of any single organization is only possible because of the laws and institutions of the state. (180-81)

As he explains, the state intends to rationally harmonize the needs of the corporations and organizations presented in civil society. It follows that participation in the state ensures the standing of the sanctions in civil society. Without the state's *sublation* of civil society, the sanctions of civil society will fail to identify with the state's concept which hinders the development of *Geist*. As individuality is a network of consciousness; individual self-consciousness needs to move beyond the realm of difference to recognize the harmony in difference. The state is what ultimately supports this network in ways that civil society fails to do; through unifying differences and allowing individuals to attain freedom by sublating civil society. Lumsden also flags how laws are central toward any description of the state. Hoff expands on the role of law when she describes that for Hegel, when a law acts in accordance with the state's Concept:

> The law that protects the person does not demand that he inhabit a particular life sphere and exercise a particular kind of participation in it; rather, it enshrines his capacity to freely determine these things on his own. (40)

Here we see how law is another expression of freedom for individuals of the state. Hoff explains that when the law acts in accordance with the state's Concept, it provides freedom for its citizens. The efficacy of law is important to consider in regard to the Hegelian state as he notes that "The individual attains his right only by becoming the citizen of a good state" (*PR* §153A,

196). It follows that a rational state will provide laws that do not infringe on the rights of its citizens since the state is meant to provide a means for actualization that is not available at the level of civil society or family. Accordingly, Hegel defines the directedness of family and civil society toward the state when he writes:

> Everything depends on the unity of the universal and the particular within the state … The determinations of the will of the individual acquire an objective existence through the state, and it is only through the state that they attain their truth and actualization. (PR§ 261A, 285)

In this way, he outlines the development of *Geist* by outlining the interconnectedness between individual and universal. He also draws attention to how the state's actualization of freedom hinges on the efficacy of *sublation* to reconcile individual and particular. If an individual embraces their participation in the state's universal character, they will be granted self-actualization upon the *sublation* of civil society. This differs from family and civil society as participation in these stages was a means *toward* self-actualization; transitioning toward true universality[24] is not attainable before the state engages with individuality. Hegel provides a characterization of his state: "The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom, and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual. The state is the spirit which is present in the world and which *consciously* realizes itself" (PR§ 258A, 279). Here we can expand on Hegel's organism metaphor by noting how he articulates the state as the totality of the development of *Geist*. This indicates that the actualization of freedom is dependent on the

[24] As opposed to the universal as negative as shown by example of atomistic individual – which misidentifies the semblance of universal as true universality.

state's constituent parts and how they relate to the state's Concept. The state relies on organic relationships insofar as it requires a connection between parts but does not require that all parts be immediately connected. Hegel further writes that through the state's *sublation* "Individuals as a mass are themselves spiritual natures, and they therefore embody a dual moment, namely the extreme of *individuality* [*Einzelheit*] which knows and wills *for itself*, and the extreme of *universality*" (PR§ 264, 287). Here he denotes that embodying this dual moment is the peak of *Geist's* development, and therefore demonstrates how a properly oriented will can achieve freedom through state citizenship. Notably, without a properly oriented will, individuals will limit personal growth by hindering the movement of logical thinking toward its self-comprehension.

Positive and Negative Freedom

Hegel anticipates a discussion of the properly oriented individual will when he outlines the type of freedom the state should ensure for its citizens. He is very explicit that, "The Christian religion, however, is the religion of freedom – although it may come about that this freedom is perverted into unfreedom under the influence of superstition" (*PR* §270, 303) where he alludes to the concept of positive and negative freedom. Positive freedom is what Hegel anticipates the state generates for its citizens as it endows them with the ability to rationalize the Absolute Spirit[25]. Of individual's participation in the state, Baumann notes that "Individuals, while being the matter of state regulations, also have a form for Hegel, namely given distinctions and interests. To a large extent, the rational state is nothing but the organic interrelation of those interests" (76). Positive freedom thus entails that an individual maintains their particularity upon *sublation* into the universal, as granted through the state. The rationality achieved through

[25] Spirit as it has come to understand itself through embodying the dual moment of particular and universal upon the state's *sublation* of civil society.

positive freedom depends on the organic unity of citizen and state. Citizen and state, or particular and universal, are thus mutually interdependent within the Absolute. Hegel describes the two types of freedom further when he writes:

> there are always two possible viewpoints in the ethical realm: either one starts from substantiality, or one proceeds atomistically and moves upward from the basis of individuality [*Einzelheit*]. This latter viewpoint excludes spirit, because it leads only to an aggregation, whereas spirit is not something individual [*nichts Einzelnes*] but the unity of the individual and the universal. (PR§ 156A, 157)

The former description that embraces spirit is representative of positive freedom. Positive freedom serves to represent the mutually reciprocal relationship between individual and state, and thus it depicts a properly oriented spirit. In positive freedom, the *sublation* of particularity into the state is not a restriction but a rationalization that individuality constitutes universality within the state. Thus, the relationship between citizens and the state both creates and demonstrates the relation between particular and universal where one could not subsist without the existence of the other. Baumann outlines this relationship when she explains:

> The particular aspect of individuals involves their ability to distinguish themselves from society, their awareness of being an individual, in the end: someone unique or 'singular', completely and incompatibly different from anyone else. The universal aspect involves the individual's awareness that society or whatever surrounds her is also a constitutive element of herself. (63)

In this description, we see the universal as an extension of individuality through rational processing that requires self-consciousness be aware of this unity. Negative freedom however would perceive the universal aspect, or the state, to be what imposes restrictions on individuality. This view is what Hegel describes as moving outward from a narrowly individualistic perspective. It follows that negative freedom is freedom from external restraints such as the sanctions of the state is ultimately not freedom at all but a self-imposed restriction toward attaining positive freedom. Negative freedom depicts a misguided will and reflects ones limited character insofar as the development of *Geist* is intended to alleviate the shortcomings of one's self-consciousness in relation to the whole. For negative freedom to seek liberation from external agents is short-sighted as external agents of the state are truly a means toward self-actualization insofar as consciousness is an appeal to other consciousness'. Conversely, positive freedom seeks liberation from internal agents such as greed or selfishness – therefore positive freedom does not breed atomic individuality as negative freedom does. To be liberated from internal restraints is to embrace the unfolding of *Geist* and attain rationality through the state. To be released from your duty to others as depicted through civil society and the state is to turn away from the self and embrace negative freedom inadvertently. For this very reason, Royce argues that "There is no such thing for Hegel as a merely individual object of thought existent all alone for itself. The total world of all interrelated individuals is all that exists. The universal is therefore realized in this totality of individual life" (224-25). An individual must move beyond their particularity to comprehend the concrete universal, which is not possible with a selfish will. An individual on the path toward negative freedom perceives the *sublation* of individuality into universality as a loss of personhood. However, it is quite the opposite as participation in the state

is required to achieve enlightened particularity. Because of this, in ethical life, Hegel notes that "A binding duty can appear as a *limitation* … The individual, however, finds his *liberation* in duty … In duty, the individual liberates himself so as to attain substantial freedom" (PR§ 149, 192). So, while entering the state and adhering to the laws through duty may appear to be a restriction to personhood, it enhances it. The state Hegel endorses allows the individual to partake in positive freedom. With that being said, Hegel's outline of the development of *Geist* and how it characterizes the state is able to concretize universality provides a useful account for identity formation through state citizenship.

Conclusion

This exposition demonstrates what constitutes individuality and universality through analyzing individual participation in the family, civil society, and the state. Outlining the development of *Geist* shows us how identity is participatory in nature – whether it be as a member of a family or through upholding duties in civil society. In an individual's first role as a member of a family unit, personhood is placed into an inferior position as self-consciousness does not yet exist for itself. Here, the individual is unable to grasp the Spirit underlying their essence as the family orientation guides their rationality. This stage necessarily dissolves for the individual to enter civil society. This dissolution is necessary as membership in the family is limiting as the individual in this subjugated position cannot surmount familial bonds toward the development of *Geist*. Within the family unit, rationality is suppressed as it remains untested and sheltered from difference. Thus, to exit family bonds and enter civil society is to gain personhood through difference as an individual is faced with a consciousness other than their own. Civil society is the steppingstone between family and state, and ultimately between universal and particular. The rationality of civil society, through its participation in the state, is

what directs individuals toward positive freedom. Therefore although the state seems to supplant civil society, it only augments the sanctions within civil society such as corporations. The state facilitates an individual's transcendent character through the *sublation* of individual into civil society, and then the *sublation* of civil society into the state. Hegel's rational state embodies positive freedom as it allows individuals to move beyond internal restraints toward the universal will; or Absolute Spirit. This freedom allows an individual to recognize that individuality constitutes universality under the right conditions and government. An individual may only achieve negative freedom in the state if they fail to recognize the depth and value of connectivity between every citizen in the state. This narrow-minded approach to individuality will lead an individual to act out of self-interest to avoid external restraints. Since external sanctions are what permit the transfiguration of individual identity, negative freedom is limiting insofar as it causes an individual to turn away from aligning their individuality with that of other citizens in the state. Since Hegel believes the nature of reality to be an appeal to other consciousness, the *sublation* of civil society allows self-consciousness to embrace the dual moment of particular and universal. Such a rationalization can only be achieved through positive freedom. This is done first, through membership in the family unit. Second, through participation in civil society, and finally, in the state where particular and universal are reconciled through *sublation*.

I have previously alluded to how the Hegelian state's denial of key constituents that permit the development of *Geist* reflects the state's overall limitations. While I have noted the Canadian state denies its Indigenous population recognition in Canada's national identity, I will argue that the Hegelian state denies the role of the rabble in identity formation which negatively impacts the freedom achieved through state citizenship. To do this, I will first define the rabble as outlined by Hegel and elaborated on by Ruda. This exposition will serve to illustrate how

Hegel's state thrives off the necessary subjugation of the rabble class. While this is a problem for Hegel at the level of civil society, it reflects the limited freedom available to individuals through state citizenship. The next chapter will demonstrate how Hegel's missed insight concerning the rabble class impacts the freedom achieved through the state's *sublation* of civil society. I will ultimately characterize Hegel's failure as occurring at the level of *sublation* by showing the rabble as the excess of civil society that the Hegelian state fails to sublate. Insofar as *sublation* is the process whereby particular and universal are reconciled, the rabble reflects a failure at the level of *sublation* since it achieves universality through its indignant character. The next chapter will elaborate on how the rabble's identity forms by being excluded from recognition in the Hegelian state. An exposition of the rabble will be useful as a means to call into question the purported universality of the Hegelian state.

Chapter 4: Hegel's Rabble

"In his short remarks on the rabble, Hegel offers all the resources that we need in order to trace the failure of his own 'political philosophy' and its conception of the state" – (Ruda 4)

In Hegel's outline of freedom achieved through state citizenship, he depicts the relationship between particular and universal by accounting for how citizens in civil society require the state's *sublation* to reconcile particular and universal. We will now turn to the previously sidestepped topic of the rabble. An analysis of the rabble will provide evidence to support the claim that the Hegelian state achieves limited freedom through the necessary exclusion of the rabble class. The rabble is thus the material representation of the state's failure to subsume all subjects. This is true insofar as the rabble emerges at the level of civil society, which requires state *sublation* to reconcile universal with particular. Accordingly, through Hegel's mischaracterization of the rabble as outlined in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* we can conclude that the rabble class is the necessary antagonism permitting the emergence of the state. To demonstrate this, we will first describe the rabble as Hegel scarcely characterizes it. Hegel disregards the rabble as a class since the rabble in his outline lack citizenship through their withdrawal from civil society and as a result, presumably withdraw from subjectivity. Frank Ruda throughout *Hegel's Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel's Philosophy of Right* continually opposes Hegel's dismissal of the rabble's persistence as a subject. To adequately demonstrate the rabble's standing, we will describe the rabble alongside the poor and how poverty is only a precondition for the rabble, and therefore not all who are poor become a rabble. This analysis will also argue that Hegel mischaracterizes the rabble as he fails to recognize their authenticity as 'other' to the state, as Absolute Negativity. Hegel's initial conception of the relationship between

the rabble and the state is limited insofar as Hegel relegates the rabble not even to the 'other' of the state, ultimately denouncing the rabble's subjectivity. In doing so he fails to acknowledge the rabble as the necessary antagonism that drives the emergence of the state. Therefore, his inability to deal with the rabble at the level of civil society hinders the state's purported universality. We will consider the indignant character of the rabble alongside their refusal to abide by civil society to conclude that the rabble calls into question the state's universality. Hegel's limitation concerning the rabble is foreshadowed through the existence of two types of rabble: the rich and the poor. Not only are the rabble mischaracterized throughout Hegel's outline of ethical life, the rich rabble and the poor rabble also suffer from differential treatment. The rich rabble depicts how upper-class gamblers utilize their monetary status to concede from ethical life without being genuinely barred from ethicality until they fall from rich rabble status to poor rabble status. While the rich rabble does run the risk of becoming poor rabble, the poor rabble is barred from the luxury that the rich rabble persists in. Our analysis will focus on the poor rabble as they are the antagonism of the state. In *Less Than Nothing* Žižek addresses Hegel's missed insight of the rabble. He ultimately claims that Hegel is not Hegelian enough by failing to recognize the subjectivity and universality of the rabble. Hegel fails to recognize the necessity of the rabble generated at the level of civil society, reflecting the limited freedom achieved in Hegel's state. Therefore, rather than embracing positive freedom, Hegel's state embodies a negative and exclusionary freedom for its citizens.

The Rabble

To address the rabble as the necessary antagonism of the state, we will first define it as Hegel characterizes it in relation to civil society and in turn the state. Recall how "The individual attains his right only by becoming the citizen of a good state" (PR§ 153A, 266). To attain rights

and ultimately freedom necessarily accompanies being a citizen of a good state, i.e., such a state allows positive freedom for its citizens. This is how Hegel characterizes the relationship between particular and universal, through being a citizen in civil society which is sublated by the state. Through final participation in the state, an individual attains right through the duties provided in civil society, granting access to the emergence of a good state that administers positive freedom. There are however limitations on who is considered a citizen of the state. The rabble falls outside the class of citizens as Hegel explains "the rabble do not have sufficient honour to gain their livelihood through their own work, yet claim that they have a right to receive their livelihood" (PR§ 244, 266). The rabble thus abstains from participation in civil society and is therefore barred from access to universality through the state. Ruda expands on the status of the rabble as he notes, "Atomization, alienation, unbinding, disintegration. These are the characteristics of the rabble" (37), depicting the rabble as lacking citizenship[26] and therefore lacking recognition from the state. Hegel would characterize the rabble as nonentities or as "a mere unstructured mass whose mass-likeness gives the reason that it decays into mere aggregate of particularities (150) making them nonentities as they exist outside of the ethical realm of the state. It seems that Hegel's brief assessment of the rabble's role leads to his ultimate mischaracterization of their necessary participation in the state. Hegel does not devote much space to characterizing the rabble as they presumably do not participate in the state through their abstaining from civil society, indicating that the rabble lacks subjectivity and universality. To address the subjectivity of the rabble, however, we can turn toward writers such as Zachary Tavlin, who argues that "If

[26] Ruda believes the rabble to lack both de jure and de facto citizenship. While Hegel disregards that the rabble maintain subjectivity through their withdrawal from state citizenship, it follows that the rabble in his analysis lacks de jure citizenship but *not* de facto citizenship. Insofar as Hegel does not perceive the rabble as worthy of recognition, his description indicates that they are not entitled to state citizenship. I believe Hegel's limited insight toward the rabble pertains to his failure to acknowledge the rabbles lack of de facto citizenship.

civil society is based on the activity of mutual recognition among its members, the rabble is that body which is denied recognition (and thus, the rabble has a distinct subjective position)" (283). Here we see the rabble as 'other' to civil society – garnering subjectivity through its denied recognition. This is key to keep in mind as rabble now stands for those who maintain a subjective position *outside* of civil society – something unforeseen in Hegel's initial analysis. Ruda draws attention to Hegel's mischaracterization when he writes:

> Not to be a person means not to realize one's freedom, to be unfree, a-social and thus to have no rights and no duties. For freedom as realized is always embedded into the intersubjective relations that enable this realization in the first place, but only becomes effective through property relations. To fall out of these relations signifies to fall out of freedom and therefore not to have enough content to bear the weight of subjectivity. (128)

Here Ruda outlines that to exist outside of the realm of civil society according to Hegel means to forgo one's access to freedom. This also seems to be the location of the rabbles de jure and de facto statelessness for Ruda. Without individual participation in civil society through property-owning, cooperation, and estate membership, the rabble withdraws from subjectivity completely. This means that for the rabble to fall out of civil society, they must first belong to one. As I have noted, since the rabble emerges at the level of civil society they can only be understood as a product of withdrawing from these relations. This is consistent with our earlier analysis that the rabble are excluded from being recognized as individuals insofar as individuality for Hegel consists of a network of connections between members of civil society that become sublated in

the state. Ruda asserts that the rabble maintain their subjective character through their exclusion from the state when he explains that:

> the rabble is in a state of affective indignation at the state and outraged at the existing order, and this leads it to claim a right to subsist without labouring, which marks a moment of absolute unbinding from the concepts of spheres of right, from the social bonds. (174)

While this passage may place the rabble in line with Hegel's public opinion, insofar as Hegel denies the authenticity of rabble as subject, the indignant character of the rabble cannot be considered along the lines of Hegel's public opinion[27]. Ruda elaborates on how the rabble maintains its subjectivity since "The indignation is directed at the state, the order, the world, as it is. Indignation is therefore for Hegel an *anti-statist* force, because it is literally an *a-social* subjective attitude" (174). While such indignation for Hegel clearly posits that the rabble lack character, Ruda draws attention in his analysis to the fact that the rabble constitutes what can be considered the antagonism of the citizen class. The rabble opposes the citizen class through their exclusion and subsequent resentment of the state. This means that while Hegel characterizes the rabble as a defect of civil society (PR§ 244A) and reduces them to nonentities – the rabble at the very least maintains subjectivity through their indignant character. Regardless of if the rabble is to be considered particular or not, by definition, they are exempted from Hegel's sentiment that

[27] *PR* §318 "Public opinion therefore deserves to be *respected* as well as *despised* – despised for its concrete consciousness and expression, and respected for its essential basis, which appears in that concrete consciousness only in a more or less obscure manner" (355). As previously indicated, Hegel denies the concrete consciousness of the rabble and therefore they are excluded from characterizations of public opinion.

"Civil society must protect its members and defend their rights, just as the individual [*der Einzelne*] owes a duty to the rights of civil society" (PR§ 238A, 263) as the rabble withdraw from their duties in civil society. Since the rabble abstains from civil society, civil society is exempted from safeguarding the rights of the rabble. Consequently, the rabble does not fall under the care of civil society and does not attain universality as achieved through the state's *sublation* of civil society. While Hegel could not anticipate the subjective character of the rabble, it is important next to address what differentiates the subjective character of the poor and the rabble to avoid conflating one with the other.

Poverty vs. Rabble

While the rabble does not fall under the care of civil society, they do have a unique relation to civil society. To demonstrate this, we must here assert the distinction between the poor of civil society, and the rabble. It is important to compare and contrast poverty and the emergence of the rabble since they differ insofar as "poverty is only the necessary condition of a more fundamental problem that Hegel addresses under the name, 'rabble'" (Ruda 4). While the rabble is barred from ethical life, the poor in civil society are stripped of the benefits of participation in society but are still considered part of ethical life. Hegel writes of the disadvantaged individuals affected by poverty when he notes that "they are more or less deprived of all the advantages of society, such as the ability to acquire skills and education in general, as well as the administration of justice, health care, and often even the consolation of religion" (*PR*§ 241, 265). This description makes it easy to conflate the poor with the rabble, as both groups hold inferior social status and benefits to property owners in civil society. In Žižek's analysis of the rabble, he indicates that:

> Hegel is of course aware that objective poverty is not enough to generate a rabble: this objective poverty must be subjectivized, changed into a 'disposition of the mind;' experienced as a radical injustice on account of which the subject feels no duty or obligation towards society. (434)

Here it becomes clear that while the rabble does emerge from impoverished conditions, they also suffer from what can be described as a temperament of resentment directed toward the state. Such resentment also accounts for the indignation of the rabble, as the poor are not subject to indignation on the grounds that, unlike the rabble, they have not completely withdrawn from civil society. Matt Whitt makes a similar claim when he argues of the rabble-mentality that "Hegel variously characterizes [the rabble] as a combination of shamelessness, laziness, viciousness, dishonour, incivility, idleness, lawlessness, malevolence, and hatred. Above all, the rabble is indignant. Its indignation is a "necessary" consequence of its exclusion" (262). This means that rabble are not citizens, while individuals suffering from poverty are. This statement further indicates that indignation is what distinguishes the poor from the rabble. Accordingly, it is still the duty of civil society to uphold the rights of those suffering from poverty as they maintain citizen status. The same cannot be said of the rabble as their resentment of the state places the rabble as 'other' on the grounds of their indignant character. This is a clear distinction between the poor of civil society and the rabble. When Hegel characterizes the difference between individuals in the state of poverty and the rabble, he asserts that "Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government" (PR§ 244A, 266). To note that the disposition experienced by the rabble is the product of an inward movement

distinguishes that it harbours subjectivity at its core. Therefore, the poor and the rabble differ since the poor lack withdrawal from civil society and a disdain of the state. According to Hegel's conception, this further indicates the rabble has an internal limitation that disallows them to partake in any form of universality. For the rabble, this results in intentional and directed hatred toward the state and its institutions. Where the poor differ is they do not withhold but develop on reliance on civil society to ameliorate their impoverished conditions. Whitt rightly argues that in accepting their subjugated position in society and relying on citizenship, "the poor are effectively locked out of a virtuous circle: *if* they were members of corporations, they could develop their skill, rectitude, and social standing, but *because* they lack these altogether, they are not likely to gain membership" (266). This vicious cycle is what may ultimately result in an individual's shift from poor to rabble. Continually being wronged at the level of civil society necessitates the emergence of what Whitt previously referred to as rabble-mentality. It is important to explore the rabble mentality to understand what generates the shift from poor to rabble. Ruda reiterates this when he writes that "One has to investigate the rabble-attitude in order to understand how the rabble is able to make itself" (100) and he further notes that attitude "concerns in a fundamental way the (inner core of the) subject – as subject within the state" (101). This clearly demonstrates that the difference between the poor in civil society and the rabble can be attributed to a difference in attitude. Recalling the vicious cycle that the poor in civil society find themselves in, waiting for membership and recognition through duty that they are unlikely to receive, the emergence of the rabble should come as no surprise. In exiting societal relations, the rabble gains an understanding of their mistreatment. Accordingly, Ruda elaborates on the indignant character of the rabble:

> The rabble feels indignant about the excessive and counternatural effects of the economic movement of society because in them it becomes clear that the legal entitlement of everyone's existence can only be upheld on condition of the constant deprivation of rights of a huge mass of impoverished individuals, which becomes visible retroactively. (36)

The paradoxical implication of this explanation is that the rabble only recognizes their subjugation retroactively – after unbinding from civil society. This is paradoxical as those who suffer from indignation have no means of addressing the state's ethical failure as they are no longer considered part of ethical life. Essentially, the rabble does not have rights and realizing the injustice of the state after withdrawing citizenship leaves them voiceless. The rabble loses recognition in the eyes of the state; therefore, their cries of indignation have no implicit impact on the state. This is why Ruda is justified in his distinction between the poor and the rabble where he notes that the rabble is "the poor who apart from their property have also lost their honour to earn their own subsistence through labouring, their participation in an estate, and moreover, their insight into the rational whole of the organically structured state" (35). So, while the rabble emerges from poverty at the level of civil society, not all poor individuals are likely to become rabble. By Hegel's account, the poor remain critical to the integral structure of civil society since they are considered part of the state's organic unity. Still, they risk becoming members of the rabble class and are therefore barred from participating in ethical life altogether. Whitt notes that what Hegel did not account for the consideration that "the presence of the rabble can be interpreted as evidence that the development of ethical life is not yet finished . . . the actualization of universal freedom remains incomplete" (Whitt 262) insofar as his analysis does

not grant subjectivity or attempt to universalize the rabble. We further see Hegel's short-sighted characterization of the rabble when we consider the differential treatment of the poor and the rich rabble.

Poor Rabble and Rich Rabble

As we have differentiated between the poor and the rabble, there is further distinction to be made between the two types of rabble: the poor and the rich. The rich rabble consists of upper-class individuals who thrive off their monetary status while abstaining from societal duties. The poor rabble are individuals who are treated disproportionately in comparison to the rich rabble. It is first important to address how there can be a rabble that emerges from richness as we have previously noted that the rabble emerges from poverty. Ruda explains that "There is always a path from gambling and luxury to poverty but no path from poverty to luxury" (42). This means that the rich rabble is unique insofar as they may become rabble without first experiencing poverty. As Žižek notes, Just as the poor rabble do not partake in societal duties yet demand the care of civil society:

> the excessive wealthy are thus also a species of the rabble in the sense that they violate the rules of (or exclude themselves from) the sphere of duties and freedoms: they not only demand from society to provide for their subsistence without work, they are *de facto* provided for such a life. (XVI)

With that being said, one way we can affirm Whitt's previous sentiment that the rabble represents an unethical state for Hegel is by addressing the failed logic behind the differing characterization of the rich and poor rabble. The rich rabble maintains their preferential treatment

through their social standing. However, it is important to note how as a result of its upper-class status, the rich rabble "misperceives itself as sovereign" (Ruda 37) and "Therefore it understands itself to be beyond the (existing) right, because it assumes that it stands above right as such; or: it stands outside (existing) right because it thinks of itself is the only valid right … because he conceives himself as the sole absolute" (38). This accounts for how the rich rabble withdraws from duties, as they misperceive their character to be sovereign. The rich rabble, therefore, withdraws from ethical life and misperceives their particularity as a sovereign existence. The individuals who constitute the rich rabble ultimately fail to account for how they fall outside the sphere of civil society – which is why their sovereignty is an illusion. Despite the fact that the rich rabble stands outside of existing rights supported through participation in civil society, the rich rabble and poor rabble nevertheless suffer discriminatory treatment. Notably, the rich rabble also discriminates within the bounds of civil society. Consequently, as per Hegel's characterization of the rich and poor rabble:

> rich rabble relates to the poor like a 'god relates to an animal.' The rich rabble assigns the standpoint of the absolute to himself, of the absolute instance of right that transcends everything, a god-like position because it stands above everything (concrete, legal, institutional) due to the power that derives from wealth. (Ruda 53)

While it is clear the rich rabble are guided by particularity and greed, it is nonetheless true that the rich rabble maintains a superior position to the poor rabble – and even the poor in civil society. This is clear as they gain power through wealth while the poor in civil society are stuck in a vicious cycle of societal neglect. And while the rich rabble has a chance of becoming a poor

rabble, the poor rabble cannot become a rich rabble as Hegel's civil society limits the social stratification of the lower class. This reflects that Hegel's account of the development of *Geist* toward reconciling the particular and universal is limited insofar as the Hegelian state is unable to reconcile the excess poverty in civil society to prevent the emergence of the rabble. I also believe that this limitation draws attention to Hegel's awareness of the dynamics of civil society's inability to handle the excess of *poverty* as Hegel notes "The important question is how poverty can be remedied is one which agitates and torments modem societies especially" (PR§ 244, 266). Ruda further explain of the poor and rich rabble that "*Only the poor rabble is rabble in the full sense of the word* because it is the absolute unbinding from right and duty" (67) as the rich rabble persists while withholding from duty. This means that while the rich rabble benefit from the inequity in civil society, the poor rabble are barred from its privileges and ultimately from historicity. As a result of the poor rabble's discriminatory exclusion from civil society, it embodies an indignant character and resentment for the state. In this resentment, "*The poor rabble declares therefore a right without a right that is valid only for him but nonetheless (latently) for anyone*. To put it differently: the poor rabble addresses a right as its right that is merely particular and nonetheless at the same time latently universal" (65). In declaring a right without a right, the poor rabble embraces the character of universality as it speaks against the state – formerly considered the peak of ethical life and freedom. The rich rabble does not embody such an indignant character as they are not completely barred from ethical life. While the state does not recognize or identify with the rabble, the rabble recognizes the unethical character of the state. This, however, is truer of the poor rabble than the rich rabble. That said, there is value in questioning whether the poor rabble has access to subjectivity and universality *through* its rabble status. Although Hegel does not recognize the rabble as capable of harbouring

universality, we have sufficiently articulated how Hegel's insight toward the rabble is limited insofar as the rich and poor rabble get differential treatment. Ruda sets the stage for challenging Hegel's characterization of the rabble when he writes:

> the position of the poor rabble is unique in Hegel's philosophy because it makes a point of indistinguishability and impossibility of categorization for which Hegel does not know any solution. One has to clearly state what this means: the problem that the poor rabble displays exceeds Hegel's conceptual and philosophical categorization. (64)

If Ruda is correct and the problem of the rabble exceeds Hegel's categories, then it is no surprise that he failed to account for their subjectivity. Insofar as Hegel's categories limit his understanding of the rabble character, there is value in exploring whether these same categories bar Hegel from recognizing the rabble's subjective *and* universal character.

Hegel's Missed Insight À La Žižek

As previously characterized, according to Hegel, the rabble stands apart from the ethical life of the state as they withhold from duties in civil society. This means that "because its members lack capital and employment, the rabble is not an organized estate or class. But a disordered crowd – an unstructured multitude that grows within the ethical community but remains excluded from its unity" (Whitt 262). However, due to Hegel's limited consideration of the rabble, later thinkers such as Žižek and Ruda can supplement Hegel's initial characterization by providing an account of rabble subjectivity and universality. In doing so, both Ruda and Žižek sufficiently prove that members of the rabble are not a disordered crowd but rather a class of subjects. In *Less Than Nothing,* Žižek clarifies the relationship between subject and substance,

which leads to comprehending the rabble's subjective and ultimately universal character. From his elucidation, Žižek concludes that "universality and particularity immediately co-exist" (365) indicating that subject and substance have both a dependent and independent relationship. He asserts that for subject and substance to coexist, they must overcome an illusory antagonism. Žižek ultimately argues that "illusion is necessary, that it is inherent to truth . . . epistemologically and ontologically, the process has to begin with error, and truth can only emerge second, as a repeated error, as it were" (380). I am drawing attention to this aspect of the relationship between substance and subject and in turn objectivity since it seems that this aspect, of a necessary illusionary antagonism, is similarly present in the relationship between the rabble state, and civil society as I have previously indicated. By this, I mean that the rabble is considered 'other' to the state in such a way that necessitates the emergence of the state. I draw this conclusion as Žižek argues, "It is not only that every identity is always thwarted, fragile, fictitious; identity itself is stricto sensu the mark of its opposite, of its own lack, of the fact that the entity asserted as self-identical lacks full identity" (386). If identity is the mark of its opposite, then it follows that the state marks a realm of freedom *and* unfreedom via its relation to its 'other', the rabble. Further, we can assert that the rabble is the necessary antagonism of the state, otherwise known as the paradox that proves the universality of the state. As Ruda asserts, "Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* from a certain moment on – the moment of his possible emergence – is constantly haunted by the rabble without being able to interrupt the logic of this infestation that traverses all of its domains" (49). Unlike Žižek's analysis, Hegel is unable to identify with the inheritance of the state as owing its existence to the subjugated rabble class. We know this as Hegel's "description of the rabble represent the permanently failing attempts to comprehend and grasp the (poor) rabble" (Ruda 49). This is why Ruda choicely depicts the rabble *haunting* the

state, as it is only to be understood retroactively – after recognizing the state's attempts to eradicate the rabble's particularity. The state is unable to identify with or even recognize the substance and subjectivity of the rabble, and therefore according to Žižek:

> a universality arises "for itself" only through or at the site of a *thwarted particularity* [Absolute Negativity]. Universality inscribes itself into a particular identity as its inability to fully become itself: I am a universal subject insofar as I cannot realize myself in my particular identity — this is why the modern universal subject is by definition 'out of joint', lacking its proper place in the social edifice. (362)

Here we see that the development of *Geist* enacted in the modern state depicts an interdependent relationship between the rabble and the state. Through this, we also see Hegel's missed insight, that his conception of the state thrives off the necessity of the illusory antagonism of the rabble. As Žižek describes it, here "Hegel makes an error (measured by his own standards): he does not venture the obvious thesis that, as such, the rabble should immediately stand for the universality of society. As excluded, lacking recognition of its particular position, the rabble is the universal as such" (433). The rabble are barred from recognizing their own subjectivity through their a-social status however this limitation is precisely what allows their subjectivity to emerge. The rabble then can be understood as the illusory antagonism as the state does not recognize their subjective – or universal – character. In turn, the state provides the rabble with the illusory antagonism necessary for the emergence of the rabble *class*. From the viewpoint of the rabble, this casts the state as the illusionary antagonism required for their subjective persistence outside the bounds of civil society. Further, as the passage notes, universality arises from barred

subjectivity, which ascribes subjectivity *and* universality to the rabble. To further characterize the clear antagonistic relation between the rabble and the state, Žižek writes, "Every universality that arises, that is posited 'as such', bears witness to a scar in some particularity, " and remains forever linked to this scar" (362). The rabble is this scar to which the state remains linked, since:

> The rabble appears on the level of the in and for itself but as the peculiar – absolute – negation of all determinations. At the same time it is clear that everyone is latently poor and therefore latently rabble and therefore, the rabble seems to mark something which lies in a peculiar way 'prior' to the singular and universal realizations of freedom – although the peculiar, logical 'priority' can only be revealed retroactively. (Ruda 95)

The universality arising from participation in civil society and *sublation* through the state not only bears witness to but also partakes in rabble latency. Accordingly, the members of civil society are linked to the rabble through their rabble latency. Despite this participation, members of civil society understand the injustice toward the rabble only retroactively; after the injustice has been addressed and reincorporated into the state's corpus and a new rabble attitude has emerged. This is because "under the name of the 'rabble' the Hegelian philosophy is confronted with a logic of (a different) politics which bursts through the philosophical frame of its description" (168). As a result, citizens of the state can only understand rabble-mentality retroactively as the rabble exists outside the realm of the state's considerations. On the other hand, the rabble can only address the unethicality of the state through its very exclusion from its corpus. Therefore, Hegel's description ultimately mischaracterizes the rabble. Žižek flags

Hegel's limitation insofar as he fails to account for both the subjectivity and universal character of the rabble. Ultimately, Hegel fails to address that:

> the rabble is produced necessarily, as part of the social process of the (re)production of wealth, it is society itself which denies it the right to participate in the social universe of freedoms and rights-it is denied the right to have rights, *for the "right without right" is effectively a meta-right or reflexive right, a universal right to have rights, to be in a position to act as a free autonomous subject*. (Žižek 435)

Žižek's insight places the origins of the rabble in civil society and draws attention to the subjective and universal character of the rabble as being necessarily produced and subjugated by society. The rabble here are being pushed into a state of meta-right, which means that through the state's lack of recognition and in turn injustice, the rabble rise toward a state of universality. Through this the poor rabble attain right *outside* the realm of ethical life – something that Hegel could not account for as he advocates on behalf of the state. Further, they attain access to universality through their barred subjectivity. As Hegel fails to account for the autonomy of the rabble subject, the necessary character of the rabble becomes an injustice at the level of the state. I believe this insofar as we can now interpret that subscribing to the freedom of the state as a citizen means accepting the limitations of freedom – that they do not extend to every member of society and thrive off this inequity. This accounts for the scar-like character of the rabble since it both stands against and accounts for the freedom achieved in the state without citizen status. The state can further be considered the underlying scar of the rabble as their emergence is coterminous. Accordingly, the rabble account for the state's futurity through their participation in

meta-rights i.e., universality and addressing the unethicality of the state. Tavlin, who praises Žižek's analysis of the rabble, writes that:

> Žižek speaks generally here but he nonetheless provides the tools for a political translation: The antagonism that is nothing but the incompleteness of the political discursive space (or substance) precedes the reification of a symbolically excluded class, a 'rabble' or proletariat, which then (after the fact) haunts the state as its symptom which must be dealt with. (286)

This accounts for future iterations of the state as the rabble point toward defects in society which must be ameliorated to ensure the welfare of its citizens. This analysis points toward the plasticity of the Hegelian dialectic as it plays out in the state simply because the rabble symptomatically illustrates what societal issues the state needs to rectify. In this way, the rabble is what necessitates the state's need to undergo self-reflection continually. The state then needs the rabble, to attain recognition through *other* and to reconsider the ethicality of the laws governing the state. This is why Tavlin describes the rabble as "the antagonism of the modern Hegelian state, which runs across its entire field and provides a point of access for further sublation" (285). Since the state represents a deficit in the freedom attained in the state, it is limited and requires improvement. The fact that the rabble provides a point of access for further *sublation* calls into question the state's purported universality as it indicates that the state has yet to be act in accordance with its Concept, contrary to Hegel's initial assessment.

Failure of Civil Society; Reflection of the State's Efficacy

Due to the injustice that emerges with the rabble at the level of civil society; Hegel's state grants a limited and exclusionary freedom to its citizens. Hegel pinpoints that civil society is responsible for the formation of the rabble when he notes that, "despite an *excess of wealth*, civil society is *not wealthy enough* – i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble" (PR§ 245, 267). This indicates that while the rabble emerges as a symptom of civil society, civil society is not wealthy enough to prevent their occurrence. The rabble are thus necessarily occurring. Through this passage, it becomes evident that "Hegel holds that poverty and the rabble mentality are systematically products of civil society, but he does not pretend that civil society has any remedy for the ills it creates" (Wood XXII). Herein lies the failure of civil society, that it necessitates the emergence of the rabble without recourse. This failure ultimately reflects the limited freedom achieved through *sublation* into the state. This is true insofar as the rabble both garner subjectivity and universality through the state's very denial of their sustenance. This is precisely why Ruda claims that:

> In the indignant voice of the rabble, civil society does not hear anything but the counternatural voice that it itself generates. The rabble becomes the counternatural entity which unbinds civil society and from its perspective appears as a counternatural indignation. (36)

In this way, the emergence of the rabble can be attributed to civil society. While the rabble are barred from the ethical life of citizenship, their dismemberment allows them to have an ethical impact on the state. The rabble as 'other' to the state represents the indignant class and through

this remains unfree – allowing citizens of the state to participate in the state's limited freedom. The rabble then challenges the ethicality of the state by materially representing the state's administration of unfreedom to subjects. Ruda argues that "if society is the existence of legal relations and these produce at the same time a wrong, these legal relations are nothing but illegal relations; this is why the rabble opposes the existing circumstances and articulates a right which goes against existing rights" (132). Accordingly, Hegel writes of a state that presents limited freedom that is exclusionary toward the rabble as substance and subject. Ruda explains why Hegel mischaracterizes the rabble at the level of civil society results in the rabble taking on a new meaning when considered at the level of the state when he writes that "the Hegelian 'political philosophy' is a philosophy of the state that has to cope with poverty from the state's perspective" (10). Here he is addressing that Hegel characterizes the rabble as an artifact of civil society but that it must be dealt with at the state level. As we have noted, the state cannot provide a solution for the rabble or even recognize the rabble as a subject until a new rabble class has emerged. Now consider Hegel's sentiment:

> it is the self-awareness of individuals which constitutes the actuality of the state, and its stability consists in the identity of the two aspects in question [particular and universal]. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an insecure footing. (PR§ 265, 287)

As our assessment has addressed, the subjective ends of the rabble as expelled from civil society and subsequently the state depict a larger problem with the freedom achieved through state citizenship. This freedom must be considered limited as it necessarily excludes the rabble class. As Whitt notes, "the state's promise of actualized freedom can only be sustained in relation to a mass of internal 'outsiders' to whom that freedom does not extend" (257). First, Whitt addresses that the state's freedom is limited at the expense of the subjects who constitute the rabble. Second, he notes that the rabble are notably *internal outsiders* to the state, flagging the rabble as an internal problem. So while the state may perceive rabble as external, their existence lies internal to the state. Consequently, the rabble can be understood as necessarily accompanying the state's ethical life by both: standing in opposition to it *and* being expelled from its freedom. This means the rabble can justly be considered the necessary antagonism as the state through participation and abstaining. In this way, Ruda is correct in his assertion that "*The state is nothing without the subjects; the subjects are nothing without the state*" (107). It is important to note that this sentiment reigns true whether the state recognizes the subjectivity of the rabble or not. Whitt is also correct in his analysis that "As society's unintegrated remainder, the rabble embodies a moment of unsatisfied need, unmediated Negativity, and unactualized freedom. This suggests that the work of universal history is not yet done" (263). The rabble class thus contributes to the continual 'success' of the state while materially representing the aspect of society that is discontent. As per Hegel's description, a state that does not ensure the happiness of its citizens in terms of welfare and subjective ends is an unsatisfactory state. The fact that the state relies on the necessary antagonism of the rabble points toward a much deeper problem that the state has not reached a point where it has achieved freedom *writ large*. This is a larger problem for Hegel in modernity as present state affairs thrive off inequity – thus providing

limited freedom for individuals in civil society. Consequently, Hegel's state depicts negative freedom rather than positive freedom.

Conclusion

In short, Hegel's mischaracterization of ethical life can be attributed to his shallow analysis of the rabble – as excluded from the state rather than participatory in its formation. His initial description of the rabble as lacking subjectivity and universality has drawn the attention of scholars such as Ruda and Žižek to address the limited freedom achieved through Hegel's state. Ultimately, Hegel misperceives the rabble as nonentities when they truly necessitate the emergence of the state. This is true insofar as the state necessarily thrives off the exclusion of the rabble class. Hegel describes this as barring the rabble from subjectivity however this very exclusion is what allows the rabble's subjective character to persist outside the bounds of civil society. To properly describe the complexity of the rabble, there is value in understanding it first, how Hegel sees it as described above – lacking subjectivity, barred from ethical life. Through addressing the difference between the poor and the rabble, we can pinpoint which subjects civil society is responsible for – the poor but not the rabble. This results in the rabble attitude of indignation, as a result of an injustice produced by civil society. The selective administration of justice that generates poverty and the rabble that emerges in civil society fundamentally represents the state's limited freedom. This is evident through Hegel's mischaracterization of the poor and the rich rabble. The rich rabble consists of upper-class individuals who thrive off their monetary status while abstaining from societal duties. The poor rabble are individuals who are treated disproportionately in comparison to the rich rabble. Due to their differential treatment, only the poor rabble are truly considered 'other' to the state and in turn, only the poor rabble depict the state's limited freedom. While rabble are a symptom of the modern state, they emerge

specifically at the level of civil society. Where Hegel is not Hegelian enough is failing to account for how being excluded from civil society grants the rabble access to subjectivity and universality. Hegel fails to recognize the necessity of the rabble generated in civil society, reflecting the limited freedom in Hegel's state. While for the most part Hegel outlines a state throughout his conception of the relationship between particular and universal, what he sidesteps in his account depicts the unbinding of the state's ethicality. The rabble represents the need for further progression of the state and therefore need for further *sublation* which is ultimately counterintuitive to the absolute nature of the state. Correspondingly, through an analysis of the rabble as a subject it becomes apparent that rather than embracing positive freedom, Hegel's outline of the state provides its citizens access to negative, limited freedom – something familiar to citizens of the modern state.

Chapter 5: State Limitations and Possibilities

"Perhaps the other we denied and feared was actually the possibility of becoming something more complex, and integral part of that other" – (Saul 6)

Rabble as Excess

While the rabble represents a social problem at the level of civil society for Hegel, they ultimately universalize through their othering which has an implicit impact on the morality of the state. The state grants citizens freedom through the necessary subjugation of the rabble class, and therefore the freedom the state extends is exclusionary. Žižek notes that:

> Within a given social order, a universal claim can be made only by a group that is prevented from realizing its particular identity – women thwarted in their effort to realize their feminine identity, an ethnic group prevented from asserting its identity, and so on. (362)

The rabble is prevented from being recognized as a citizen and in turn, takes on a universal character through this othering and through a shift of attitude toward the state[28]. Through his inability to reconcile the rabble at the level of civil society, Hegel's state remains unable to sublate the rabble thus granting limited freedom to its citizens. This speaks to the character of Hegel's state and the freedom that the state grants, aligning it with negative freedom. While the problem of the rabble emerges at the level of civil society, it is the state's purpose to sublate civil society permitting individual access to the state's universal character – that which presumably

[28] Not every claim within a social order is universal since some are borne out of pure particularity as shown by example of the Canadian state, which consists of claims that encourage the enfranchisement of its Indigenous population while purporting the universality of the state *through* this act.

requires no further *sublation*. The rabble, however, depicts an aspect of civil society that the state fails to sublate; the rabble is thus the excess of civil society that becomes universal through exclusion, becoming other to the state and materially representing the shortcomings of the state's failed *sublation*. The rabble further represents hope for future iterations of the state through the need to reconcile with the 'other', however, this task is cyclical. This means that while the state may be able to re-admit the rabble, a new rabble class will always emerge to take its place. As we have established, the rabble is the necessary antagonism of the state indicating that the rabble both drives the state's universality and stands for the Absolute Negativity of the state. Accordingly, Žižek notes that:

> Hegel fails to take note of how the rabble, in its very status as the destructive excess of the social totality, its "part of no-part;' is the "reflexive determination" of the totality as such, the immediate embodiment of its universality, the particular element in the guise of which the social totality encounters itself among its elements, and, as such, the key constituent of its identity. (431)

Here he establishes that the rabble is key in the state's identity formation through their mirroring of the state's universality by lack of recognition in the social whole. The Hegelian state paradoxically thrives and is limited through acknowledging the 'other' since it requires there to be an excluded group, but recognizing this excluded class draws attention to the limited character of the state. This is true insofar as the success of the Hegelian state is dependent on the emergence of the rabble class. This explains why the state cannot reconcile with the rabble without the creation of a whole new rabble class. So, while the rabble may represent hope for

future iterations of the state, they also stand for an endless repetition through the continual failure of Hegel's state to sublate and reconcile *every* iteration of the rabble class. This endless repetition reflects Hegel's inability to deal with the excess that is the rabble. Consequently, the freedom of Hegel's state is exclusionary and only representative of one account of identity; that which is mistakenly identified as *other* to the rabble. So, paradoxically, I believe Hegel's universality emerges as pure particularity since self-consciousness remains unable to identify with its own constituent elements that necessitate its development. Addressing the role of the 'other' in the form of the rabble for Hegel does not change its necessary emergence and perpetual re-emergence. Recall how Hegel's philosophy "contains elements that have real and tenacious links with colonialism, which we should not overlook" (Stone 248) and consider how this reflects the position of the rabble as an unnecessarily excluded group which is in actuality part of the key constituent of colonial identity. Considering both Hegel's history of endorsing colonialism and his mischaracterization of the rabble, we can account for two ways Hegel's state falls subject to the misidentification of one group as lesser or 'other'. It is important to consider Hegel's endorsement of colonization since it perpetuates the superiority of Eurocentrism to further the development of the colony. Stone elaborates on Hegel's view of colonization that, "the colonizers are justified in extirpating the indigenous cultures of native peoples … since those indigenous cultures embody unfreedom" (256). Through his dismissal of non-European religion and culture, Hegel fails to provide an account for identity through citizenship that can embrace the complexity of varying worldviews and accounts of identity formation. In his system, it seems easy to relegate unfit citizens to the fringes of society through poverty and the formation of the rabble. The fact that he cannot rectify the problem of the rabble at the level of civil society impacts the character of the state he endorses. Concerning the rabble, if Ruda is correct in

establishing that "The rabble makes itself… The rabble opposes the truth of the ethical community and its reality with a mere opinion" (Ruda 114) then what the rabble is truly opposing are the values established by the state and upheld at the level of civil society. Since the ethical community established in Hegel's state is exclusionary of oppositional identities then the ethicality of the community should be in question, and the position of the rabble reconsidered. Hegel is dismissive of the *other* both in the form of the rabble and additionally through his adherence to the colonial narrative, as Stone indicates:

> Hegel could and should have interpreted *all* the world's regions as taking part in gradual historical unfolding of social institutions that support freedom. Hegel does not do so because he denies that non-European peoples are conscious of freedom at all. (258)

She continues to explain why Hegel avoided drawing a conclusion that could effectively sustain uncolonized multiculturality since:

> once it is admitted that non-European peoples *are* historical[29] in principle, Hegel would also have to trace how historical advances are unfolded in those societies … *Each* continent would have its own history of progression in consciousness of freedom, rather than non-European continents merely paving the way for Europe. The several continents would have histories of freedom that run in parallel, rather than corresponding to more or less advanced phases of a single historical line that culminates in modern Europe. (260)

[29] By this Stone is pinpointing that in history, what grants the privilege of right to peoples lies in our interpretation of it. This is why Hegel "should have interpreted material as evidencing how non-European peoples *have* grasped and practised freedom, albeit imperfectly" (260).

Acknowledging this conclusion would have required Hegel to reconsider his entire philosophy, which would include drawing attention to the colonial presence behind his account of identity formation and articulation of the attainment of freedom for individuals of the state. This has further implications for Hegel's logic as he articulates the end of the dialectic as producing a positive result. Since I have demonstrated that the rabble stand for the Absolute Negativity of the state, the unfolding of *Geist* in the state does *not* produce a positive result, but rather an endless repetition of excess. Considering *PR* however, an account of history that grants rationality to non-European peoples would read much differently than the account that Hegel has established. For example, in an exposition of Indigenous identity, tying identity formation to property ownership and state participation seems absurd as the land is not something that can be owned but is an additional constituent of identity. Stone is asking us to consider the possibility that rationality does not have distinct roots in modern Europe but extends across all the continents, even if its development is imperfect, "we need to think carefully and critically about how far to take these inherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently" (265). Due to the very specific European account of identity through upholding civic duties that Hegel presents in his delineation of the relationship between particular and universal through state *sublation*, it becomes apparent with the creation of a perpetual rabble class that Hegel's state is unable to handle the excess that opposes the one central universality of the state. Addressing the nature of the rabble as excluded other aids in depicting how Hegel's state is unable to sustain multiple worldviews through the exclusion of an entire class of individuals.

I have previously argued that the Canadian state denies its Indigenous population recognition in Canada's national identity. I believe the Hegelian state acts in a similar manner by

denying the role of the rabble in identity formation. Thus, the Canadian state and the Hegelian state's failure to acknowledge key constituents of identity formation is what limits the effectivity of the states purported universality. We can draw similarities between the Hegelian state and the current trajectory of the Canadian state insofar as "To this day our national weaknesses are exposed along the fault lines Macdonald allowed to open by acting without precaution, without generosity and without attempting to imagine *the other*" (Saul 20). Failure to account for the 'other' reflects poorly on the national character of both the Hegelian state and the Canadian state. The difference between the two however is that the Canadian state can be improved by recognizing what has been misleadingly established as the 'other' of Indigenous peoples in Canada. As Saul indicates, "The single greatest failure of the Canadian experiment, so far, has been our inability to normalize – that is, to internalize consciously – the First Nations as the senior founding pillar of our civilization" (21). Unlike the Hegelian state which requires the subjugation of the rabble class and colonisation of non-Europeans, the Canadian state stands to benefit from ameliorating relations with Indigenous peoples and focusing efforts toward decolonization. In this way, Canada can thrive off complexity and multiculturality as articulated through Bell's account of the ideal Canadian Nation-State if it can acknowledge and actively work toward ameliorating relations with the vast Indigenous presence that preceded the state's emergence. As I have noted, the Hegelian and Canadian state both deny recognition to key constituents of its identity formation. This denial calls into question the purported universality of each state, questioning whether its national identity is fully developed. I believe Hegel's limitations include his inability to deal with the rabble at the level of civil society, but further his limited insights concerning the rabble call into question his ability to discern which groups should be represented in the state's universality. Canada faces a similar limitation in its inability

to validate both settler and Indigenous history as impacting Canada's national character. Hegel's voice is thus important in this conversation as the mixing of Indigenous and settler worldviews and decolonization of the Canadian state inherently involves recognising Indigenous wisdom and history as furthering the rational development of the ideal Canadian state. This stands against the Hegelian state insofar as it places the roots of rationality in modern Europe, denying the significant historicity of any identity outside of Europe. Hegel's state inherently denies the validity of Indigenous history and the unfolding of Indigenous identity as the spiritual precepts of Indigenous culture can only identify with the state's Concept *after* colonisation. Therefore, while Hegel's state could not stand to decolonize as that would be contradictory to its purpose of encouraging the development of *Geist*. Conversely, the Canadian state can grow into its ideal character *through* decolonization to validate Indigenous history and identity to reconcile with one of the key constituents informing its national character. This can be done through understanding rationality as it has developed in North America with consideration of Indigenous populations to improve Indigenous and settler relations. This will also serve to empower Indigenous identity through validating Indigenous worldviews as rational within accounts of Canadian history and futurity.

The Canadian state continually falls into a pattern of benefitting from the othering of Indigenous peoples through maintaining legal statutes such as the Indian Act as well as through mischaracterizing and displacing Indigenous identity. In this instance, the state benefits at the price of its own universality. Keeping in mind Bell's previous assertion that the peak of Canada's national identity would be to thrive off the complexity of mixing various cultures, we have addressed how this interpretation of an interconnected society is reflected in Indigenous accounts of creation. Since ideally, the Canadian state would surmount cultural differences promoting a

positive national identity, the fact that it does not impacts the quality of life of all its citizens and not just the marginalized groups. The upshot of considering the Canadian state in full fruition i.e., as universal, is that in addressing the schism between Indigenous and settler worldviews, the Canadian state has the means to progress beyond the Hegelian state which relies on colonisation and thrives off the necessary subjugation of the rabble class. Where Hegel should have considered multiple worldviews in his account of history and identity formation through state participation, the Canadian state benefits from doing so. Movements toward ameliorating Canada's national identity to empower both Indigenous and settler identities include Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization. Before exploring Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization in depth we must first address the importance of eradicating the myth of the vanishing Indian to re-consider the meaning of Canada's national character. So long as we perpetuate national myths through legislation and the establishment of dominant cultural norms the state's character will be limited in its ability to identify with its indigenous origins. Such a misconception of the root of Canada's history has resulted in settler oppression of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island. The oppression of Indigenous peoples perpetuated by the state reflects poorly on Canada's national character as it misrepresents the origins of Canada as solely settler, displacing Indigenous identity. Consequently, Canada's national identity is exclusionary toward the subjugated and misrepresented 'other', similar to Hegel's state and its treatment of the rabble. Unlike Hegel's rabble, the Canadian state can empower Indigenous identity without the creation of a new marginalised class. The goal of this exposition is not to shame settler individuals but rather to encourage the need to acknowledge Canada's significant Indigenous presence and then acting to better Indigenous and settler relations through collaborative efforts. This brings us to discussing another means of empowering Indigenous identity as put forth by Elder Albert Marshall, the

Mi'kmaw concept of Two-Eyed Seeing. This includes perceiving the world through both settler and Indigenous worldviews to create a collaborative space for both to flourish. Two-Eyed Seeing paves the way for decolonization, which includes challenging entrenched narratives to embrace the legitimacy of differing worldviews. By embracing Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization efforts, Canada can effectively empower settler and Indigenous identity alike. The Canadian state's national character can grow through recognition of settler identity as rooted in Indigenous worldviews as depicted through the establishment of confederation through negotiations – a tactic learned from Indigenous peoples. Willie Ermine in writing "The Ethical Space of Engagement" provides a good example of how to utilize Two-Eyed Seeing as it pertains to the Canadian justice system. Essentially, the state only stands to gain positive freedom for its citizens upon acknowledging the validity of Indigenous epistemology and influence throughout Canada's history. It is important to note that Two-Eyed Seeing is unique to Indigenous and settler individuals but remains crucial toward the development of Canada's national character since mixing Indigenous and settler identity requires surmounting the schism between their worldviews. As it currently stands, Canada's national identity is representative of settler ideology however such a narrow-minded conception of the history of Canada mischaracterizes its national character. Settler oppression is not merely an act of the past – but it can be rectified in the future through collaborative efforts such as Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization. Bob Joseph writes of other means toward repairing Indigenous and settler relations in *Indigenous Relations: Insights, Tips & Suggestions to Make Reconciliation a Reality* which we will address in part here. It is important to note that only after improving Indigenous and settler relations can we properly place Canada's national character with what Bell anticipated would be the highest development of its character. Achieving Canada's ideal national identity will require addressing the calls to action

as established in the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* to dispel narrow-mindedness from various branches of government and law and improve settler and Indigenous relations, validating Indigenous voices and worldviews. Again, the goal of this is not to shame settler peoples but the recognition of the unique historicity of the Canadian state as emerging *after* Indigenous sovereignty had already been established across Turtle Island. Stone previously established the need for Hegel to recognize that non-European people have the capacity to be conscious of freedom. Accepting that non-Europeans can achieve freedom without colonization requires considering that every continent has a unique path toward consciousness. This requires acknowledging that the unfolding of self-consciousness in North America will include Indigenous history, which the Canadian state is in a unique position to do, so as to encourage the development of Canada's ideal national identity.

National Violence: Myth of the Vanishing 'Indian'

Before discussing the effectiveness of Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization, we must first work toward eradicating the myth of the vanishing Indian. This is a necessary step toward re-considering Canada's national character since as long as we perpetuate national myths, the state's character will be limited in its ability to identify with its origins. Saul expresses that:

> How we might lay out a Canadian point of view that matches our reality is complicated … If we look, we will discover the First Nations, the Métis and the Inuit at its core. We have to learn how to express that reality, the reality of our history. I am not talking about a passive projection of our past, but rather about all of us learning how to imagine ourselves differently. (35)

Here he properly articulates the complexity of the Canadian experience insofar as the history of Canada is Indigenous in origin, specifically First Nations, Métis, and Inuit. Failure to acknowledge the precedent of Indigenous worldviews misconstrues Indigenous identity in Canada's national identity. Indigenous accounts of history and identity are not considered equal in comparison to settler values as noted through our previous outline of settler oppression. When considering our failure to acknowledge the Indigenous history that precedes the formation of the Canadian state, Saul argues that "we don't know what to do with the least palatable part of the settler story. We wanted the land. It belonged to someone else. We took it" (25). This shame however does not justify the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples throughout the history of Canada yet acknowledging this part of settler history is necessary for any legitimate consideration of the fully informed National character of Canada. Battiste writes of Canada's unjust treatment of Indigenous peoples that "Canada's dark secret has emerged as one that shows individual and collective complicities with the outcomes of colonization, which continues to disadvantage Aboriginal children, their communities, and their future" (65). By placing more importance on settler values and worldviews and deeming Indigenous knowledges inferior, Canada displaces Indigenous identity. The devaluing of Indigenous worldviews contributes to the creation of national myths which invalidates the continual Indigenous presence across Turtle Island. Vowel discusses the violence of national myths when she notes that through their perpetuation "We are all being denied a real identity, one based on more than colonial myths intended to create a national identity out of thin air" (Vowel 121). By placing the injustices done to Indigenous people as an artifact of the past, a dark origin to Canada's emergence, we are hindering both Indigenous and settler identity formation through misinformation. The continual oppression of Indigenous peoples takes the shape of generational trauma which affects future

generations of youth who will encounter similar identity crises so long as the Canadian state enables the erasure of Indigenous peoples[30]. Vowel further notes, "The violence that national myths commit is to delegitimize the very real pain that is the legacy of abuse and oppression" (121) to indicate that failure to acknowledge the Indigenous origin of the Canadian state is a means of invalidating Indigenous identity and worldviews as having cultural value. This impacts Canada's national character as it draws attention to the fact that Canadian citizens perpetuate myths that unnecessarily exclude and the othering of Indigenous peoples to benefit from our land, resources, etc. As quoted by Stone, Hegel promotes the myth of the vanishing Indian across North America when he writes, "Some of the tribes of North America have disappeared and some have retreated and generally declined (*HG* 192-93)" (254). As we have indicated, this is a consequence of his adherence to the European colonial narrative that permits the invalidation of what it perceives as *other*. Canada reflects similar issues to Hegel's state through its inability to acknowledge the validity of Indigenous presence. Accordingly, through the state's failure to ameliorate Indigenous and settler relations, Canadians have:

> shrink-wrapped ourselves into a very particular description of our civilization and how it came to be. We have wrapped ourselves so tight within that description that it has become a straitjacket that expresses the history of another people, a history that would have reduced a very different civilization than the one we have. (Saul XVI)

[30] Although not discussed in full, Indigenous status cards are issued based on blood quantum levels as set out by colonizers attempting to keep track of all the Indigenous tribes across Canada. From an Indigenous perspective, whether an Individual is a 6(1) or a 6(2) status Indian does not change anything about our heritage other than the fact that; "Two generations of out-marriage is all it takes to completely lose status" (Vowel 30). The creation of Indian status as maintained through the statute of the Indian Act is one means to eradicate Indigenous presence across Canada based on the colonizer premise. For a more thorough breakdown of Indigenous status and blood quantum levels as outlined in Section Six of the Indian Act, see Vowel 25-35.

Through adhering to ingrained narratives perpetuated by the state, Canada's national identity remains stagnant through its inability to reconcile with the identities at the origin of its formation. Thus, the Canadian national character is incomplete insofar as it excludes Indigenous representation so long as colonial law such as the Indian Act remain intact. We seem to be taking steps toward reconciling Indigenous and settler relations as in 2008[31] "Prime Minister Harper offers formal apology in Parliament for the Indian residential schools, in presence of Aboriginal delegates and church leaders" (Joseph 125). However, these efforts seem short-sighted as one year later "Stephen Harper spoke at the G20 meeting in 2009 and said: 'We also have no history of colonialism. So we have all of the things that many people admire about the great powers but none of the things that threaten them or bother them'" (88). Here we see a blatant disregard for recognizing the colonial injustices of Canada's past. Here we see our leaders unable to grasp the extent to which Canada's treatment of Indigenous peoples impacts its national character and Indigenous futurity. Rather than acknowledging Canada's history in such a way that makes it pertinent to the present, Canada's former Prime Minister chose to disregard his sentiment of the past. This indicates in part that Canada's national character is founded upon a myth of inclusivity and cooperation that gives no voice to Indigenous populations. Saul writes of the denial that Canada is currently suffering from that, "If we misrepresent what we are, we cannot think about ourselves in a useful way. What is useful reflection of self? One that creates the context and the self-confidence for further reflection and action" (45). While Canada suffers from misrepresenting the values that inform its emergence, our leaders willfully ignore the history of colonialism and genocide that Canada was founded upon. In denying Canada's history of

[31] Stephen Harper, 2008. Statement of apology to former students of Indian Residential Schools: https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1571589171655

colonialism one year after publicly apologizing for the residential school system and establishing the TRC, Harper proves to be embracing and perpetuating the myth of the vanishing Indian by denying the colonial premise of Canada's confederation. Rather than ignoring Canada's history of colonialism, there is value in confronting it to rectify the fact that there are currently "non-Aboriginals still struggling with the denial of their own reality, Aboriginals still struggling with the effects of profound destabilization – is a great failure of our society" (33). The state's unfair treatment of Indigenous peoples reflects poorly on any sense of nationality Canada has garnered since confederation and further depicts that Canada's national character is limited through its failure to empower Indigenous identity.

Settler Shame

The intent of accurately depicting Canada's history of colonialism is not to shame settlers and displace settler identity[32], but to embrace that Canada's national character will have to incorporate both Indigenous and settler identity to be considered a positive nation in full fruition. For this, there is a need to take the unjust treatment of Indigenous peoples of the past into account when considering the present tension between Indigenous peoples and settlers. To begin ameliorating these tensions Saul notes that attention must be drawn to the fact that, "If there is a serious problem, a lack of perspective, it lies with non-Aboriginals. Even in areas as successful as literature … our remarkable creativity seems stuck on lack of a sense of self" (99). Here Saul argues that Canadian's misrepresentation of Indigenous peoples has created a lack of sense of self, an inability for Canada's national identity to empower Indigenous identity through lack of recognition as the original inhabitants of this land. The goal of empowering Indigenous values is

[32] Displacing settler identity will occur in the process of decolonization, but it is not the *goal*. The displacing of settler identity pertains to an individual's need to re-evaluate entrenched narratives that inform one's worldview. In Hegelian terms, this displacement is the necessary, illusory antagonism to overcome before Indigenous and settler identity are reconciled through equal representation in Canada's national identity.

not to permanently displace settler identity, but to find a way that both can exist according to their own governance and worldviews. I will draw on Sarah Kizuk's "Settler Shame: A Critique of the Role of Shame in Settler-Indigenous Relationships in Canada" to discuss why shaming settler identity for its history of oppression is not the goal of decolonization efforts. Rather, the goal of empowering Indigenous identity through decolonization is to assert the significant presence of both Indigenous and settler people in what is now Canada. Kizuk argues that "In feeling settler shame, our self-conception is challenged, and we come to see ourselves as 'bad' colonial selves (162). Of settler shame, she is indicating that upon considering Canada's history, settler identity is displaced through the need to confront a version of history that has been long since denied or relegated to the past. When settlers feel shame and only perceive themselves to be what Kizuk calls the 'bad colonial self', this indicates that settler identity is misguided in believing that Canada has no history of colonialism. Kizuk further writes that:

> Settler shame desperately seeks resolution, preferring to re-establish the self as good, or worthy of pride, rather than respond to other-oriented concerns of justice. As such, settler shame maintains a settler colonial system of oppression. (162)

Here, Kizuk notes how settler shame cements the status of colonialism. She does so by establishing that settlers feeling shame rather than acting to ameliorate current relations between Indigenous and settler peoples will not improve the treatment of Indigenous peoples. What Kizuk is arguing is that it is not progressive if the means for reconciliation is to alleviate feelings of settler shame since settler Canadians need to confront themselves and see their own particularity as inhibitive of inclusivity. Take land acknowledgements for example; they seem to be a means

to alleviate shame for operating on colonized Indigenous land. This type of acknowledgement is beneficial if additionally, the institution providing the acknowledgement is willing to give the land back, donate to programs that empower Indigenous peoples, stand for injustices such as the water crisis, etc. Without action, acknowledgements serve no purpose toward empowering Indigenous identity. In this way, shame maintains the unjust treatment of Indigenous peoples as acknowledgement without action does not seek to improve settler and Indigenous relations. Accordingly, it does not improve the current state of Canada's national identity as limited by the continual oppression of Indigenous peoples. Kizuk contributes to a discussion of the impact of settler shame on Canadian identity when she notes that:

> The phenomenon of settler shame touches on our self-understanding as citizens, and thus, our self-presentation of being Canadian. Feeling ashamed of our identity as settlers can cause a confrontation between who we take ourselves to be as Canadians and what we want being a Canadian to mean. We find that we are not whom we had hoped we were: allies, socially enlightened or 'woke,' 'good Canadians.' (164)

Here she indicates that acknowledging the past is beneficial in lessening the schism between what constitutes settler and Canadian identity. A progressive future that will empower Indigenous and settlers alike requires acknowledging that in the past Canada has had a history of colonialism, assimilation, and genocide. After acknowledging, actions must be made to eradicate the misconception that settler and Indigenous relations are dichotomic to address that there is value in both settler and Indigenous worldviews. Canada has the benefit of being a nation that can surmount identity differences if it is able to reconcile the two identities at the base of its

origin – settler and Indigenous. As Bell previously argued that the peak of Canada's national identity would be to thrive off complex relations amongst various cultures, Kizuk indicates that one means to achieving this is to consider Indigenous futurities. Kizuk describes that:

> Indigenous futurities … do not demand erasure of settler peoples, nor their existence on Indigenous lands … What it does mean is that settler colonialism as a structure and its associated colonial epistemologies are to be prevented from being a possibility in the future. (173)

Indigenous futurity can only be accomplished with the help of settlers to reconsider the misguiding narratives they may find themselves entrenched in. To account for Indigenous futurities and empower Indigenous identity through the Canadian state, settlers must engage with Indigenous worldviews and validate their legitimacy as Indigenous Peoples have with settler values, customs, and lifestyles. Another means toward alleviating settler shame and progressing toward Indigenous futurity that encompasses both settler and Indigenous values are the methods of Two-Eyed Seeing and the push for decolonization. If Canada were to properly embrace these movements, Canada's Indigenous population would no longer be displaced in Canadian society. This begins with addressing the history of Canada and rectifying the wrongs of the past through acknowledgement and action, such as honouring treaties and providing equal access to water.

Two-Eyed Seeing & Decolonization

Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization are better addressed alongside one another because they are interwoven concepts. First, Two-Eyed Seeing is a Mi'kmaw concept that originated in

Eskasoni, Nova Scotia with Elder Albert Marshall. Explaining Elder Marshall's term, Bartlett writes:

> Two-Eyed Seeing is the gift of multiple perspectives treasured by many aboriginal peoples and explains that it refers to learning to see from one eye with the strengths of Indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing, and from the other eye with the strengths of Western knowledges and ways of knowing, and to using both these eyes together, for the benefit of all. (335)

The significance of this in Canada brings us back to our discussion of the dichotomy at the basis of the Canadian national identity as outlined in the *British North American Act*. To overcome these oppositional identities of settler and Indigenous, Albert is promoting cross-cultural inclusivity pertaining specifically to settler and Indigenous peoples in Canada. In doing so, he calls for both Indigenous and settlers to view the world from each other's perspectives to comprehend the ways of knowing that inform identity formation. Doing this will allow the Canadian national identity to inform settler and Indigenous epistemologies in such a way that enables it to benefit from the positive values of each. Such a collaborative system will effectively incorporate Indigeneity into Canada's national identity through the inclusion of Indigenous voices. However, to adequately achieve this Canada must make active efforts toward decolonization. Decolonization is concurrent with Two-Eyed Seeing as it involves reconsidering the needs of individuals living in Canada to create a positive living experience for both Indigenous and settler peoples. Like decolonization efforts, Indigenous voices contributing toward Two-Eyed Seeing are key as Saul notes, "Aboriginals have a pretty good idea of what

they want and how to go about getting it. It is in part about reasserting their culture and their way, in part about ensuring that they are recognized as central to the idea and existence of Canada" (Saul 99). Two-eyed Seeing is thus a key movement toward decolonizing knowledge and the standard for what is considered of value, whether it be reflective of western or Indigenous values as both hold significance in the history of Canada. In both, Indigenous voices are integral to the success of the movement. This is true of decolonization as Datta explains that:

> decolonization is a continuous process of anti-colonial struggle that honors Indigenous approaches to knowing the world, recognizing Indigenous land, Indigenous peoples, and Indigenous sovereignty – including sovereignty over the decolonization process. I argue that *decolonization* is an on-going process of becoming, unlearning, and relearning regarding who we are as a researcher and educator. (2)

Here he is noting that decolonization challenges individuals to confront the colonial ideals that inform the pedagogy of the state. Notably, he also argues that decolonization is an ongoing process as it considers Indigenous and settler futurity collaboratively. Indigenous voices are necessary for this movement to challenge ingrained colonial narratives, Indigenous epistemology must be explored in comparison to settler epistemologies to re-evaluate the current norms and progress beyond them. Decolonization pertains specifically to Indigenous relations as Tuck describes:

> When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable

> term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn't have a synonym. (3)

Here Tuck is arguing that decolonization has the purpose of challenging colonial ideals. It has a particular focus on recentering Indigenous identity in Canada – an identity that extends beyond the individual to include the environment. When Tuck argues that decolonization is not a metaphor, I believe this is true but to draw this distinction is short-sighted. I believe this as through decolonizing the Canadian state and promoting Two-Eyed Seeing, we are not only making Canada a more inclusive place for Indigenous peoples but for all subjugated identities. If Canada can empower Indigenous and settler identity it will effectively embrace the ideal National character as delineated by Bell, one capable of sustaining multiculturalism through continual progression. Although decolonization does pertain specifically to Indigenous peoples across Turtle Island, I believe its impact is widespread. This is true insofar as challenging ingrained colonial narratives will ameliorate the current state of affairs for anyone embracing a non-European set of values. As Two-Eyed Seeing encourages viewing the world from dual perspectives with inclusive intentions to ameliorate the lived experience of settler and Indigenous peoples, decolonization has the same goal for Indigenous peoples living in Canada and beyond. Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonizing efforts in Canada however reflect attempts to remedy Indigenous and settler relations to ameliorate the character of Canada's national identity – as one capable of harbouring the complexity of various identities. This is in line with Bell's description of Canada's national identity where ideally, the Canadian state can surmount cultural differences to embrace a positive national identity which impacts the quality of life of its citizens.

One example of implementing Two-Eyed Seeing as a means of embracing the decolonization of the Canadian legal system is exhibited through Willie Ermine's "The Ethical Space of Engagement." In this article, he redefines ethical space unknowingly promoting the utilization of Two-Eyed Seeing. We see this when Ermine explains:

> *The "ethical space" is formed when two societies, with disparate worldviews, are poised to engage each other. It is the thought about diverse societies and the space in between them that contributes to the development of a framework for dialogue between human communities. The ethical space of engagement proposes a framework as a way of examining the diversity and positioning of Indigenous peoples and Western society in the pursuit of a relevant discussion on Indigenous legal issues and particularly to the fragile intersection of Indigenous law and Canadian legal systems.* (193)

Here Ermine is proposing a space where Indigenous peoples and individuals of Western society can collaborate on Indigenous legal issues as they pertain to the Canadian legal system. Such a collaboration is important for the law to protect the rights of Indigenous and settlers alike. Since we have outlined how accounts of Indigenous identity may seem unorthodox, they stand apart from other accounts of identity as they embrace the historicity of Turtle Island and accordingly Indigenous legal issues must be uniquely considered. For example, consider the validity of the oral tradition to convey knowledge which is integral to understanding Indigenous identity. The previous dismissal of the oral tradition explains why in his redefining of ethical space, Ermine draws attention to the fact that "With our ethical standards in mind, we necessarily have to think about the transgression of those standards by others and how our actions may also *infringe or*

violate the spaces of others" (195). He notes this in regarding the history of Canada, previously ethical standards *have* infringed on the space of others. In pointing toward collaborative efforts in redefining ethical space between Indigenous and Western people, Ermine is promoting Two-Eyed seeing within the Canadian legal system. Further, he is arguing for decolonization since to adequately consider how ethical standards affect the *other*, there must first be an acknowledgement of the *other's* presence and consideration of what makes this group *other*. Two-Eyed Seeing alongside decolonizing provides a means to remedy the state's ingrained colonialism of the past and work with Canada's Indigenous peoples in a way that is collaborative rather than assimilative. Without considering Canada's colonization, Canada's national identity is misinformed. Accordingly, the state must address the wrongdoings of the past and collaborate in efforts such as Two-Eyed Seeing to decolonize and ameliorate Indigenous and settler relations. Movements for Indigenous voices to be heard and valued in the narrative that informs Canada's national identity have been met with ignorance which is why there is a need for decolonization through Two-Eyed Seeing to tear down the purported universality of the state's previously inherited belief systems. This involves expanding one's worldview to consider the value of others, and the ethical space of engagement through collaborative efforts is a means to progress beyond the sole consideration of settler needs. If the legal system is only informed by settler voices, then Indigenous needs will not be met. The inclusion of Indigenous voices is necessary for various reasons such as being native to Turtle Island as well as through Indigenous experiences of oppression under the jurisdiction of the state. As a result of such oppression, Ermine notes that Indigenous inclusion in discussions of ethical space is integral since "Indigenous humanity along with its experience and awareness of struggle in this country now represents a 'gaze' upon the Western world. This gaze projects from the memory of a people and

is, in essence, the continuum of a story and a history" (199). For Canada's national identity to embrace its historicity as it should, it needs to recognize the significance Indigenous presence that proceeded its emergence. This is not to shame settler identity as we have noted a more progressive approach would be to accept the Indigenous gaze and actively work toward ameliorating settler and Indigenous relations. This would allow Canada's national identity to flourish, embracing the ideal identity that Bell envisioned. Of the Indigenous gaze, Ermine indicates that:

> Currently, the situation, and very often the plight of Indigenous peoples, should act as a mirror to mainstream Canada. The conditions that Indigenous peoples find themselves in are a reflection of the governance and legal structures imposed by the dominant society. Indeed, what the mirror can teach is that it is not really about the situation of Indigenous peoples in this country, but it is about the character and honor of a nation to have created such conditions of inequity. (200)

Here Ermine is noting how Indigenous people are treated reflects Canada's national character like a mirror to the rest of the state's citizens. Since the legal system of Canada has a history of suppressing Indigenous identity, Ermine promotes Two-Eyed Seeing as it pertains to the Canadian legal system to improve settler and Indigenous relations. This in turn will empower Indigenous identity and provide a means to avoid a settler-oriented system of governance. Such a shift would positively impact Canada's national identity as inclusive rather than exclusive toward Indigenous peoples by embracing efforts to decolonize the state.

Future of the Canadian State

While Ermine provides an account for what I believe to be the utility of Two-Eyed Seeing as it pertains to the Canadian legal system, there are other means of ameliorating Indigenous and settler relations in Canada. As a nation that has the potential to thrive off the complexity of its inhabitants, Canada has the possibility to develop a positive national character by providing a means to empower Indigenous identities. Previously I have indicated some facets of Indigenous identity with reference specifically to the Mi'kmaq of Turtle Island. I have indicated how Indigenous voices are necessary to improve what informs Canada's current national identity as one that is currently exclusionary of its predecessors. One thing that is important to recognize is the multitude and complexity of these varying Indigenous voices as Joseph notes is that "We live in a multicultural society that recognizes a wide variety of cultures. However, the cultural diversity among the indigenous population is often overlooked or not realized" (Joseph 11). Here he is placing further value on Indigenous voices as they are not homogenous, so there must be multiple collaborative efforts across communities. It follows that movements such as Two-Eyed Seeing are applicable at various levels of governance such as municipal, provincial, and federal as Joseph indicates that "Recognizing the unique history, culture, and traditions of each community is a fundamental first step that Canadians can take to respect Indigenous Peoples. Take the time to get to know local Indigenous communities and those you are working with" (Joseph 16). Understanding communities at a local level will encourage the continuation of collaborative efforts at the provincial and federal levels indicating that Two-Eyed Seeing does not only benefit the two communities in collaboration, but its impacts are wide-reaching. Indigenous peoples seem to represent hope for the state's national character by providing the state with the possibility of empowering Indigenous identity. This is

significant since as established, Canada's national identity cannot be considered apart from its original Indigenous inhabitants. The only way for Canada to promote a positive national identity that empowers its citizens is to embrace what it means to be a complex nation with a unique history, effectively taking into account Indigenous needs and values. Saul notes that for Canada to begin the process of empowering Indigenous identity and its Indigenous roots, the Canadian citizen and state must accept that as a state:

> We are non-monolithic. We are not an extension of the European model. We are and always have been an experimental project. We are deeply anchored in this place because of our shaping by the Aboriginal part of us and their even deeper links to this place. (276)

He is urging Canadians to remember that Canada is an experimental project. First through becoming the first colony to achieve the uniting of the *BNA* colonies into the country of Canada using learned Indigenous negotiation tactics, something previously unprecedented. Second, considering that Canada owes its existence to the colonization of Indigenous peoples, but additionally that within Canada are various other cultural identities that seek empowerment through state participation. To become a state that embraces the complexity of multiculturalism, Indigenous presence and identity must be acknowledged in the history of Canada in such a way that considers Indigenous futurity. This includes addressing the rationality behind Indigenous accounts of creation and the values they portray to embrace the complexity of the state's history. This does not include continually embracing ingrained monolithic hierarchical values which place man above nature. To truly imagine a new way of coexistence and to provide a means to empower Indigenous identity in Canada:

> we need to release the full sense of Aboriginal philosophy. It needs to flower for indigenous purposes – that is, for indigenous society to rebuild its sense of itself. This is key to the Aboriginal pillar of our society being able to play its full role. But the rest of our society also needs this for indigenous force to be heard and understood. It can help all of us in pushing back those imported delusions that now eclipse our conscious sense of where we are and what we can do. (75)

Canada needs to engage in collaborative efforts between Canadians and Indigenous peoples, where Indigenous leaders teach, and Canadians listen. This is needed since Indigenous knowledges have been secularised through various means of assimilation throughout Canada's history. For Indigenous peoples, "To welcome *the other* was a ritual of human contact" (65). Accordingly, Indigenous peoples were willing to listen to the worldviews of colonizers, while our worldviews were deemed animism due to a lack of perspective on behalf of settlers. The time for Indigenous philosophy to flourish is now when collaborative efforts between Indigenous peoples and settlers still have the potential to rectify Canada's national character. This begins with addressing the true history of Canada to identify its history of colonization. Next, to move beyond old ways of viewing the world through collaborative efforts between settler and Indigenous peoples through implementing Two-Eyed Seeing and working toward decolonizing the Canadian state and in turn Canada's national character. Bell and Dinen encourage Canada's decolonization and suggest that:

> the end of reparations should aim at a concrete time when outcomes for First Nations and settler communities are the same on a fulsome list of statistics: educational achievement, income, unemployment rates, life span, suicide rates, drug use, wealth, pollution in the land on which the community lives, etc. When that quantitative equity is achieved, we would concretely see that we had advanced toward a greater and more fulfilling spiritual reality, one best prepared to receive many flourishing individuals. (421)

Here they encourage that for Canada's national identity to thrive, it must focus its efforts toward not only equality but equity, which means that not only should everyone be provided with the same opportunities, but consideration must be placed upon how individuals have differing circumstances. This elaboration considers Canada's mixed character in that equity requires special attention be paid to Indigenous and settler identities, they cannot be addressed as an amalgamate on the basis of equality. Exploring the examples provided in the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada* provides us with other examples of how to reconcile Indigenous and settler relations by taking Indigenous futurity into account. After Harper's apology in 2008 for the implementation of the residential school system, he established the *TRC* which includes a list of calls to action addressing the limited apparatus of the Canadian state which remains tied to colonial pedagogy. Addressing the 94 calls to action established through the TRC findings is another means toward actively decolonizing the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. Published in 2015, the TRC's calls to action include calls to improve the legacy of the residential school system through improving child welfare, education, language and culture, as well as health and justice for Indigenous students[33]. These claims seem abundant but

[33] Access to a PDF version of the TRC can be found; https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/british-columbians-our-governments/indigenous-people/aboriginal-peoples-documents/calls_to_action_english2.pdf

are a feasible means of decolonizing the state. For example, the twenty-eighth call to action under a discussion of justice is that the commission:

> call upon law schools in Canada to require all law students to take a course in Aboriginal people and the law, which includes the history of residential schools, the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal-Crown relations. This will require skills-based training in intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism. (TRC 323)

Here we see an achievable concrete way to empower Indigenous identity by demanding that legal advocates have the competency to engage with Indigenous law. While there is further mention in the TRC of equity for Indigenous peoples in the legal system, there are other sections which require addressing before Canada's national character can be restored. These sections include the church's apologies and missing children and burial information in response to the genocide of Indigenous peoples in the residential school system. The legacy of residential schools has left Indigenous peoples with trauma and disempowered Indigenous identity. Addressing the calls to action in the TRC is one means of moving forward from the dark history of Canada without mythologizing it. Collaborative efforts begin with acknowledgement and proceed with actions to ameliorate present conditions, indicating that what is left to improve Canada's national identity are active efforts toward decolonizing the state.

Conclusion

The Canadian state has the possibility to flourish as a complex nation through active reconciliation efforts such as overturning legal statutes like the Indian act as they perpetuate colonial law[34]. There are multiple avenues toward ameliorating Indigenous and settler relations in Canada but to begin this process there is a need to address national violence such as the myth of the vanishing Indian. This myth involves denying the reality of Indigenous presence in Canada. Indigenous accounts of history and identity should be considered upon a discussion of Canada's national identity since Indigenous presence predates and shapes confederation. Eradicating the myth of the vanishing Indian proves to be essential toward respectfully acknowledging Indigenous presence across Turtle Island and in Canada. Acknowledging Canada's colonial history should not be misinterpreted to shame settler peoples. Kizuk indicates that shame displaces settler identity, and by remaining in a state of shame rather than acting to ameliorate the conditions which are upheld despite this shame through legal statute, settlers are further perpetuating colonial oppression. Accordingly, the goal of acknowledging Canada's history is not to shame settlers but to find a way to empower Indigenous identity *through* acknowledging the past to inform a more progressive future. This involves engaging with Indigenous ideas and worldviews such as accounts of Indigenous creation to understand the values they convey. To empower Indigenous and settler identity the Canadian state must engage with methods such as Two-Eyed seeing and decolonization efforts. Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization both consider the importance of Indigenous futurity. Two-Eyed Seeing as coined by Elder Albert Marshall promotes cross-cultural collaboration to consider the needs and values

[34] It is important to note that means toward reparations also include the passing of bills such Bill. NO. 148, the Mi'kmaw Language Act, which supports the revitalization of the Mi'kmaw language in Nova Scotia. This "Act has effect on and after October 1, 2022." For more information, see: https://nslegislature.ca/legc/bills/64th_1st/3rd_read/b148.htm

of settler and Indigenous peoples to benefit both. This concept places importance on Indigenous voices as they are largely overshadowed by colonial ideals. Decolonization involves challenging ingrained beliefs and works toward opposing colonial systems of oppression. Both seek to recenter Indigenous identity in Canada which means re-evaluating the values that inform our systems of governance. Two-eyed seeing and decolonizing efforts in Canada necessarily include action toward ameliorating Indigenous and settler relations which will positively Canada's national identity, marking it as one capable of empowering various identities. Such an account is consistent with Bell's outline of Canada's national identity where ideally, the Canadian state could surmount cultural differences to embrace a positive national identity which impacts the quality of life of its citizens. Beyond his initial conception, it is important to include that for Canada to thrive as a nation it must reconcile Indigenous and settler relations. This includes active efforts toward implementing Two-Eyed Seeing and decolonization. In this way, the Canadian state stands against the Hegelian state insofar as it relies on decolonization to rectify the national identity, while Hegel's state relies on colonization for the state's purported universality. Willie Ermine provides the example of Two-Eyed Seeing in terms of redefining ethical space as it deals with Indigenous legal issues in the Canadian legal system. Here he promotes valuing Indigenous voices alongside those of Western society when it comes to drawing legal definitions. The ethical space is thus a space created through the collaboration of Indigenous and Western voices that inform Canada's founding epistemologies. In this article, Ermine draws attention to the Indigenous gaze which has an implicit impact on Canada's national character insofar as the gaze reflects the state's limitations. The Indigenous gaze thus acts as a mirror to the state's national character. Previously, ethical spaces have violated Indigenous rights by devaluing Indigenous worldviews, therefore Indigenous voices are

necessary for the state's national progression. Collaborative efforts of Two-Eyed Seeing work toward decolonizing the state and in turn seek to avoid a perpetually settler-oriented system of governance.

In terms of the future of Canada, there are various means toward improving settler and Indigenous relations. As a nation that can potentially thrive off the complexity of its inhabitants, Canada has the assets to develop a positive national character by providing a means to empower Indigenous identities. This involves collaborative efforts across multiple communities as this will improve local relations which will in turn impact provincial and federal legislature. Another way considering Indigenous voices would be beneficial to Canada's national identity is by acting on efforts to acknowledge the significant Indigenous presence in Canada which includes considering the findings of the TRC and responding effectively to the 94 calls to action to decolonize the state and ameliorate the treatment of Indigenous peoples.

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