

Captains and Colonies: Royal Navy Service in the North Atlantic World, 1660-1739

by

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines captains of the English/British Royal Navy and their service in the North Atlantic between 1660 and 1739. The navy deployed six to twelve warships as convoy escorts and station ships to royal colonies on the American mainland and the Newfoundland fisheries. Captains sent to the New England station at Boston are examined in detail. In order to explore navy professionalization and professionalism, supplementary evidence comes from captains protecting the yearly Newfoundland convoy. Reconstructing and analysing captains' service in North America has generated little interest from historians because the scale of deployment favours the study of fleet and squadron activities after 1739. Rather than identify the captain as a state servant strictly from an operational perspective, his daily presence is examined as part of the early-modern British Atlantic Empire.

British Admiralty records provide the primary documentary evidence, especially orders and instructions and surviving captains' correspondence. Other Admiralty records such as ship lists, ships' logs, and correspondence from the Navy and Victualling Boards are also employed. Detailed examination of these under-utilized sources enhances our understanding of the daily routines of both navy and maritime communities. Ships dispatched to New England engaged in a variety of tasks, and the Admiralty controlled them through an evolving set of orders and instructions that focussed on the captain's responsibility to maintain the integrity of warship and crew. Instructions to colonial governors granting them partial operational control over warships were counterbalanced by orders to captains precluding them from endangering the ship, interfering in colonial societies, or engaging in undue opportunism while on assignment. Nevertheless, the captain's need to interact with maritime communities during day-to-day operations put him into frequent contact and conflict with other self-interested persons, in particular colonial governors and merchants.

This dissertation offers new perspectives on overseas naval service by emphasizing the considerable agency displayed by captains serving in the colonies. Encounters with contentious colonial governments, inflexible naval administrators, difficulties with resupply and repair, and even threats of incarceration demonstrate the captain's ill-defined position as an individual within a centralized imperial institution required to negotiate through a decentralized British Atlantic World.

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Preface: Definition of Terms

This dissertation examines captains and warships of the Royal Navy sent to attend on overseas colonial stations and escort convoys throughout Atlantic trade routes. As the temporal boundaries within this work encompass the years 1660 to 1739, certain terms and usage require clarification. First, the 1707 Act of Union joined the Parliament of Scotland to that of England and Wales to form Great Britain. Discussions of England and Great Britain refer to the pre- and post-1707 periods respectively. Despite its politicized nature, the terms “British” and “British Isles” may nevertheless be used in a general sense to describe events and trends spanning the entire period under consideration, or within the archipelago as a whole.

The citation of British manuscript sources employing dates from the Julian calendar conform to the conventional practice of altering the beginning of the New Year from 25 March to 1 January but leaving the day and month otherwise without adjustment. It is a reflection of the global and international context of the navy that within much correspondence for the period between 1 January and 25 March the year was often identified with a slash; thus: 15 February 1694/5. Dates taken from secondary sources are presented as printed. The spelling in quotations and references has usually been modernized although syntax and some distinctive terms are left as printed. The thorn, ampersand and similar abbreviations are extended. Thus “ye” becomes “the,” & becomes “and,” “yt” becomes “that,” “wch” becomes “which” and so forth. Every opportunity has been taken to ensure the correct spelling of formal names, although during a period of

handwritten documents containing a variety of spellings and dialects there are bound to be mistakes. A good example is Francis Wheler who worked his way up through the navy, gaining a knighthood and being made Rear Admiral in 1692.¹ In official correspondence and many letters he is referred to as “Wheeler” but in most documents and letters containing his signature he signed his own name “Wheler.”² The spelling of names of warships, spelling will correspond with reference to David Lyon’s *The Sailing Navy List*.³ Most ship names corresponding to a geographic place, peer title, or common noun have been modernized, while a few idiosyncratic examples are left as they have been spelled in the manuscripts, in particular *Warspight*.

The secretaries of various government departments played an important role in the receiving, prioritizing, cataloguing, and presentation of correspondence to their various superiors, offices, and committees. All warships on detached service addressed their correspondence directly to the Admiralty secretary, the two most important for the period 1660 to 1739 being Samuel Pepys and Josiah Burchett. With this recognition, manuscript correspondence is attributed to the body or position to which a letter was sent rather than the individual secretary, with an exception being the identification of the secretary of state during an era in which there were two. Exceptions to the established citation format occur when citing the abstracts of documents provided in the *Calendar of*

¹ David Syrett and R.L. Dinardo, *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (Aldershot: Scholar Press/Navy Records Society, 1994), 466; C.S. Knighton, “Wheler, Sir Francis (c. 1656-1694),” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29192>).

² For example: Warrant of Rear Admiral Francis Wheler to Capt. Robert Fairfax, 22 June, 1693, United Kingdom, National Maritime Museum, Fairfax Papers, MS 81/116 (D.6).

³ David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy- Built, Purchased and Captured- 1688-1860* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994).

State Papers Domestic and *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*. In these instances the citations reflect the headings employed therein, sometimes with modifications for clarity and brevity.

The abbreviation “H.M.S.” was not employed by the navy during the period under study, the nearest approximation in the manuscript sources examined for this dissertation being “H.M. Ship.” “H.M.S.” will not be employed here in an effort to stress the uniqueness of the period. Rather, ships will often be identified according to their rate, which reflected the size of the ship, the number of guns it carried, and the pay scale of the captain.⁴ Contemporaries utilized the terms “frigate” and “cruiser” to describe those smaller warships sent overseas. Although infrequently employed within the present work, “frigate” during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century meant simply any smaller warship. “Cruiser,” meanwhile, identified any warship on individual or detached duty from the main fleet. The contemporary term “guardship” is synonymous with “station ship” and refers to a ship assigned to a particular jurisdiction. The word “convoy” as a noun carried dual meaning. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, convoy referred either to the warship performing escort duty, or the collection of ships requiring escort. Contemporaries tended to employ the former meaning more than the latter, but references to both usages are found within the manuscript sources.

⁴ See Appendix 1.

Introduction

This dissertation explores captains of the English/British Royal Navy dispatched to the North American mainland and the Newfoundland fisheries from the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 to the declaration of war with Spain in 1739. These captains commanded warships deployed to escort convoys of merchant vessels or attend on various colonial stations in the western North Atlantic as part of the general trade protection service developed after 1660. This service became increasingly regular by the opening years of the Nine Years' War (1689-1697). The navy considered the dozen or so warships sent to the colonies to be deployed on detached duty (independent from fleets and squadrons), and this provides the principal method and focus employed throughout the dissertation. In order to concentrate the study even further, those captains and warships sent to the Boston-based New England station will receive detailed analysis, supplemented with specific examples from captains sent to Newfoundland. This method and focus permits the examination of a group of persons within the British Atlantic Empire/British Atlantic World left out of related investigations (except in a peripheral manner) until after the middle of the eighteenth century. At this point, the more regular appearance of Royal Navy squadrons in the region fosters analyses more familiar to historians of navy and empire. Examining individual warships on station, convoy, and other detached duties permits the study of navy captains – members of a centralized state institution – within the context of a decentralized Atlantic World/British Empire.

A recurring argument made throughout this dissertation is that the navy dealt with decentralized overseas environments – in this case the Atlantic World – through efforts to

establish organizational stability, and impede contingency, by emphasizing the captain as an individual within his corporate body. The captains' overseas service can be traced through the orders and instructions they received from the navy, as well as their responses based on surviving correspondence within the Admiralty Papers housed in the United Kingdom National Archive (formerly the Public Record Office), supplemented with numerous other sources. The growing need for overseas trade protection created opportunities for captains, who operated as part of a nascent early-modern profession, but this also left them vulnerable in the colonies where the level of support and resources that could be counted on from navy and government closer to home were frequently absent or ineffective. A study group of those captains sent to Boston, Massachusetts on the New England station between 1686 and 1739 has been created for detailed and systematic study, an approach rarely attempted for the pre-1739 period. In fact, thorough studies on colonial deployment in the period prior to the War of Jenkins' Ear have been undertaken so infrequently that it is necessary to devote considerable time and space to reconstructing and explaining the nature of convoy and station-ship deployment between 1660 and 1739.

Once the evolution of regular and routine deployment for colonial service has been charted, the dissertation provides evidence that illustrates how captains sent to New England frequently found themselves in competition for scarce resources with the governments they were sent to protect. This competition was the source of much conflict between captains and colonial governments, regardless of how each party manifested its grievances in public. These situations resulted from the sometimes fragile material balance within the Atlantic maritime world, where various groups or individuals competed for limited resources. Furthermore, the warships themselves became an

exploitable commodity to governors and governments that generally lacked access to state resources, especially formal military capabilities. In addition, the requirement that convoys and station ships spend months, and years, in and around colonial ports put captains in close contact with local maritime communities which included, of course, sailors, but also dockyard workers, persons engaged in other supporting industries ashore, those engaged in the fishing and shipping industries, and merchants seeking new customers and contacts within state networks.

This dissertation argues further that the relationship between captain and colony developed in the way that it did because of the manner in which the navy relinquished some operational control over its warships to civil governments, and relied on local merchants for repair and resupply. Because of the physical limits to naval deployment in the colonies, the navy could not simply transfer its command structure overseas, and needed the assistance of local authority to provide direction for warships. The Admiralty also desired a physical record to corroborate and correlate captains' reports as to where they travelled, what they did, how they utilized the state equipment entrusted to them, and what monies they spent maintaining their ship and its highly-trained crew.

During the period 1660 to 1739, the navy did not eliminate all difficulties encountered with its ongoing professionalization, especially regarding its officer corps. The limits to professionalizing commissioned officers, particularly regarding pay and job security, shaped the behaviour of captains as their response to problems and conflicts combined public demonstrations of duty to the state with a more subtle opportunism consistent with the strategies of other groups within a fluid British imperial context. Rather than examine these captains to determine what their deployment meant solely in

terms of imperial force, they can be included within analyses encompassing Atlantic, and even global, frameworks.

The framework in this case is the trading routes and merchant shipping that the navy was required to protect. After the Restoration, growing multilateral trade networks financed by London merchants imported staple products from the colonies and elsewhere, processed and re-exported large amounts of those staples to Europe, and used rising colonial populations as an essential market for domestic manufacture.¹ Regions without valuable staple products participated in other ways. New England, in particular, grew into a centre for shipping and shipbuilding and an entrepôt for supplying the West Indies and other areas with food and other goods.² Trade united disparate and far-flung provinces, colonies, outposts and areas of influence connected by shipping and the various Navigation Acts after 1651 to promote colonial development (or exploitation) and restrict the interference of foreign interests. The empire created by this trade network has been characterized as a commercial and maritime one, especially for the period before the American Revolution.³

¹ Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700," *Economic History Review*, new series 7 no. 2 (1954), 150-166; Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774," *Economic History Review*, new series 15 no. 2 (1962), 285-303.

² John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 91-116.

³ Elizabeth Mancke, "Negotiating an Empire: Britain and its Overseas Peripheries, c. 1550-1780," in *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820*, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 235-266; Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, "From Global Processes to Continental Strategies: The Emergence of British North America to 1783," in *Canada and the British Empire*, ed. Phillip Buckner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 22-41; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 22-25; David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490-1690* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), Ch. 8; Nicholas Canny, "The Origins of Empire: An Introduction," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 1: The Origins of Empire*, ed. Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-33; P.J. Marshall, "Introduction," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II: The Eighteenth*

0.1- Detached Deployment

The primary role of the Royal Navy during the growth of empire in the latter half of the seventeenth century remained protecting the British Isles from invasion while retaining freedom of movement in European waters.⁴ The securing of trade during both times of war and peace was the navy's second major task. Defending the waters surrounding the British Isles did play an important part of such efforts, but determined attacks on maritime trade further away required merchant ships to sail in convoy with accompanying warships. As predatory attacks could occur at any time during an overseas voyage, concerned interests discovered that trade protection needed extension to all legs of trading journeys whenever possible, especially during wartime. The Royal Navy established a regular convoy and station ship service by the Nine Years' War (1688-1697) that expanded out from the British Isles and Europe to Newfoundland, the royal colonies on mainland North America, the West Indies, and occasionally Africa, Asia, and Hudson Bay.⁵

The ships allocated for convoy and overseas duty were almost exclusively the smaller cruisers, or frigates, of the fourth, fifth, and sixth rates. Unlike the larger ships-of-the-line (battleships), their smaller size permitted the speed, manoeuvrability, and sea-keeping qualities needed for convoy duty, and they did not usually require a lay-up in

Century, ed. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-27.

⁴ Daniel A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of 'A Grand Marine Empire,'" in *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689-1815*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994), 185-223; G.E. Aylmer, "Navy, State, Trade and Empire," in Canny, ed., 467-80; N.A.M. Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1688-1783," in Marshall ed., 169-183.

⁵ I.R. Mather, "The Role of the Royal Navy in the English Atlantic Empire, 1660-1720" (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1995), 17-20; Patrick Crowhurst, *The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1977), 43-58; Sari Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), 54-64.

port during the stormy winter months.⁶ The captains of these warships formed the link between the ship and the Admiralty, especially the Navy Board (responsible for ships and their daily operation), and the Victualling Board (responsible for the provision of food). Captains also bridged the navy to imperial institutions, in particular the Board of Trade, via the various firsthand correspondence sent through the office of Admiralty secretary. Finally, captains on detached service connected both navy and empire to the North American colonies, although the degree to which they influenced colonial development during this period can be argued as peripheral. The nature of deployment to North America in these early years depended upon the navy exploiting informal and external resources and networks (such as colonial governors and merchants) in the absence of formal ones (such as overseas bases and commanding officers). Captains, in turn, exploited all available resources for their own benefit, whether toward the execution of their orders and the preservation of their ships and crews, or self-enrichment and career advancement to compensate for the navy's comparatively small rates of pay. Furthermore, as the navy was one of Britain's few centralized institutions of imperial power outside of Europe, its warships could become commodities coveted by colonial governments, requiring captains to stave off overzealous attempts to co-opt them.

Captains, as commissioned officers, formed part of a growing professional class of sailors owing their allegiance to, and obtaining employment from, the British navy and state.⁷ Government and navy, unfortunately, repeatedly stopped short of providing an

⁶ David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy- Built, Purchased and Captured- 1688-1860* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993), xii. See Appendix 1 for an outline and comparison of warship rates.

⁷ Geoffrey Holmes, *Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730* (London: George Allen

income to its captains that would have permitted easier maintenance of the gentlemanly status expected of them. This fostered a culture of opportunism among commissioned officers that continued throughout the so-called “Age of Sail.”⁸ Meanwhile, the navy increasingly dispatched its detached ships into the Atlantic and beyond, but faced the problem of controlling and commanding them as they travelled further from the British Isles. Within Europe, ships on detached duty had proximate access to proper naval bases and facilities, regional squadrons, and commanding officers. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Royal Navy had established a system of “squadron warfare” in which a series of cruising squadrons situated at strategic areas performed most non-battle fleet operations. These squadrons supported and supplemented the navy’s trade protection service with permanent patrols in the Channel, Western Approaches, Port Mahon in the Mediterranean, and Jamaica. The system required independent action from not only its squadron commanders, but also those captains within a squadron and the captains of detached warships.⁹ During the Nine Years’ War, to compensate when no obvious commander existed, the navy developed the position of Commander in Chief, given to the senior officer in any port or within any group of ships. This system was designed to create order out of the chaos of all variety of warships going in and out of port.¹⁰ As ships spread throughout the globe, however, the navy needed other methods of maintaining stability.

& Unwin, 1982), 274-87.

⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London: W.W. Norton, 2004), 522-25.

⁹ Richard Harding, *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 185.

¹⁰ John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 456-57.

To ensure the employment of navy resources to maximum benefit, the metropolitan government in London granted colonial governors partial operational control over warships within their jurisdiction. The navy, meanwhile, provided its captains with increasingly elaborate instructions that tempered any unreasonable or dangerous orders given to them by the governors. The navy took advantage of gubernatorial privilege to establish accountability among its captains through the insistence that they provide evidence on paper for all actions undertaken while distanced from the navy's daily operational command structure. Thus, even when colonial governors saw their operational control over warships reduced (in theory) during the first third of the eighteenth century, the navy continued to insist that its captains receive direction in the form of written orders and instructions from colonial governments to confirm they did indeed carry out the actions they claimed.

0.2- Method

To create a manageable study, evidence has been compiled with regard to those ships sent to the New England station at Boston, Massachusetts, representing near continuous service during both war and peace stretching out over fifty-three years between 1686 and 1739.¹¹ The transfer of local authority was always to the governor and government of Massachusetts. In addition to the twenty-four ships stationed at Boston, nine additional ships dispatched between 1692 and 1708 carried orders to guard the specialized merchant ships engaged in the mast trade at Piscataqua in New Hampshire. While not technically part of the New England station, the mast-ship escorts were expected to correspond with the authorities at Boston, convoy any additional merchant

¹¹ See Appendix Two. Due to a probable oversight, a gap in coverage occurred between 1690 and 1692.

ships ready at departure time, and occasionally cruise the coast while waiting for their charges to load.¹² Two fourth-rates and a bomb vessel joined local station ships to participate in the 1710 attack on Port Royal, while the Admiralty dispatched the sixth-rate *Squirrel* between 1711 and 1713 specifically to guard the New England fisheries off Maine and Nova Scotia.¹³ The list for New England does not include advice (packet) boats, ships that took refuge for repairs, or the ships of two squadrons (Wheler's in 1693 and Walker's in 1711) that called at Boston, although all are useful in demonstrating Boston's importance as perhaps the navy's principal haven in the Americas. Additional examples taken from the yearly Newfoundland convoy are employed in Chapter Three to study professionalism and opportunism within the navy sea officer corps, while selected evidence from other jurisdictions and regions is also incorporated where pertinent.

By its physical nature the deployment of a warship on detached service represented a transatlantic undertaking in its purest sense, as outlined by Ian K. Steele.¹⁴ Wind and current created regular and circular (if by modern standards slow) lines of communication among denizens of the Atlantic World. As trade escorts, warships obviously travelled the same routes as the merchant vessels they convoyed. If fully employed, a station ship traversed wide expanses of ocean in performing its duty, including two Atlantic crossings. New England's extensive participation in imperial

¹² For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Robert Thompson, *New Africa*, 2 Mar. 1695, United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA) Public Record Office (PRO) Admiralty (ADM) 2/17; Capt. Salmon Morrice, *Advice*, 7 July 1704, TNA PRO ADM 2/32; Capt. Thomas Riddall, *Falmouth*, 4 Aug. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 2/38.

¹³ Admiralty List, June 1710, TNA PRO ADM 8/11. The Admiralty Lists take monthly account of every ship in sea pay including its vital statistics (size, guns, officers, etc.), location, and to what duty it had been assigned.

¹⁴ Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-5. The method employed to reconstruct the voyage of the *Reserve* below is inspired by a similar reconstruction of the merchant vessel *Palm Tree*.

trade and shipping networks provide examples of particular resonance when discussing overseas trade protection.

0.3- Captain Matthew Teate and the *Reserve*

No claims to a complete and fully comprehensive history of the navy overseas will be made in the following chapters. Rather, the elaboration of several themes of service will demonstrate the considerable agency displayed by captains within an Atlantic-Imperial context. This in turn will provide the basis for a more broad revision of what is known about the role of navy captains within the Atlantic empire during an era overshadowed by the second half of the eighteenth century. In order to highlight both the agency of captains as well as the forces operating to constrain them, considerable reconstruction of the overseas service environment is required. The following examination of the deployment of Captain Matthew Teate in the fourth-rate *Reserve* serves as an illustration of how colonial service of individual captains and their warships can be reconstructed from the available manuscript source material, allowing for the type of detailed analysis that will be employed in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

On 29 January 1707, Captain Matthew Teate arrived in Portsmouth harbour to take command of the fourth-rate warship *Reserve*.¹⁵ Built in 1704 and carrying fifty-four guns with a complement of 240, *Reserve* began a journey that would last the better part of three years and take its crew from the English Channel to New England (via Iberia), the West Indies, and Nova Scotia (Acadia).¹⁶ Teate spent until spring repairing and refitting

¹⁵ Captain Matthew Teate, *Reserve*, to Admiralty, 29 Jan. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572.

¹⁶ Captain's Log, *Reserve*, 29 Jan. 1707-6 May 1710, TNA PRO ADM 51/4306; Lyon, *Sailing Navy List*, 25.

the ship.¹⁷ On 26 May 1707, Teate received orders to call in at Spithead and on 30 May directed to take in stores for a “foreign voyage.”¹⁸ Finally, on 11 June, Teate received orders to escort a mast convoy (which included other merchant ships) sailing to New England. Upon seeing the trade safely into port, *Reserve* was to remain at Boston and “attend on New England for the service of that colony and protection of her Majesty’s subjects thereabouts and therein to follow such orders as you shall receive from the governor thereof for the time being.”¹⁹

The America-bound ships combined with a southbound convoy for greater safety and arrived off Lisbon on 12 September 1707, where *Reserve* took on water before continuing its transatlantic voyage. The convoy arrived at Nantasket Road, on the edge of Boston harbour in Massachusetts, on 29 October. Teate delivered orders for returning home with the mast ships to his predecessor (Captain Charles Stucley in the fourth-rate *Deptford*) and then immediately received orders from Governor Joseph Dudley to refit and convoy New England trade to the West Indies. The convoy sailed 19 December and anchored at Barbados on 24 January 1708. Teate’s orders stipulated that the convoy was to stop at the island of Salt Tortuga (off the coast of modern Venezuela) if the merchant ship masters desired to mine salt. After resupply, the governor of Barbados recommended that *Reserve* cruise while the returning merchant ships prepared themselves, a suggestion with which Teate complied for sixteen uneventful days.²⁰

¹⁷ Captain’s Log, *Reserve*, 29 Jan.-20 Feb. and 10 Apr. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/4306; Teate to Admiralty, 24 Jan., 19 Mar., 23 Mar., 1 Apr., 6 Apr., 9 Apr., 16 June and 28 June 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572; Admiralty, Orders to Teate, 25 Apr. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/36.

¹⁸ Teate to Admiralty, 26 May and 2 June 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572.

¹⁹ Instructions to Teate, 11 June 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/36.

²⁰ Teate to Admiralty, 28 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572; Captain’s Log, *Reserve*, 7-22 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 51/4306. The log indicates greater activity than what was described to the Admiralty.

The crew of *Reserve* received no rest upon return to Boston in May of 1708 as the ship was ordered by the governor to guard the New England fishing vessels operating off Cape Sable on the coast of Nova Scotia. The remainder of the time *Reserve* spent as the New England station ship was taken up patrolling the fishing areas between Boston and Nova Scotia. *Reserve* made three trips alone during the summer and fall of 1708, reaching as far north as “Jabuchta” (Chebucto – modern Halifax) harbour but generally patrolling the waters between Cape Sable and LaHave. Some fleeting encounters with suspected French privateers and several brief confrontations between shore parties and heavily armed Mi’kmaq units along the coast of Nova Scotia represented the most intense action faced by the crew of *Reserve*.²¹

Perhaps more pressing than combat, Teate faced serious problems of repair, supply, and manning during his tenure at New England. Teate had the misfortune to arrive in New England during a time when what little that could be identified as imperial policy regarding Nova Scotia and Canada was changing. With war stagnating in Europe, the British government grew receptive to suggestions for any disruptive action against the French. Local projectors gained audiences for their schemes and plans, and by 1709 the government had agreed to sponsor military action against the French in America.²² Would-be imperialists saw these opportunities as gateways to political influence, favour, power, or as straight money-making ventures. For New Englanders, whose economy

²¹ Captain’s Log, *Reserve*, 25 June, 26 July 1708, and 11 Oct., 5-6 Sept. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 51/4306. Teate, as was typical of sea officers, referred to the area as Nova Scotia rather than Acadia.

²² J.D. Alsop, “Samuel Vetch’s ‘Canada Survey’d’: The Formation of a Colonial Strategy, 1706-1710,” *Acadiensis* 12 no. 1 (1982), 39-58; Alsop, “The Age of the Projectors: British Imperial Strategy in the North Atlantic in the War of Spanish Succession,” *Acadiensis* 21 no. 1 (1991), 30-53. The 1709 attack did not materialize, but in 1710 Port Royal was captured. *The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial and Aboriginal Constructions*, ed. John G. Reid and others (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

relied on fishing and ocean-going trade, the French privateers believed to be operating out of Port Royal remained a threat.²³ The preparations for an assault on the French exacerbated an already acute labour shortage in Boston during the latter stages of the War of the Spanish Succession. Because of higher wages offered by merchant masters for experienced seamen, coupled with the usual attrition via accidents and illness, *Reserve* was short fifty of its complement.²⁴ This meant that while *Reserve* carried enough sailors to operate the ship, not enough remained to attend the guns properly when in action. A recent Act of Parliament, meanwhile, prohibited impressment in the colonies without the expressed written consent of the colonial government.²⁵ The governor refused to allow Teate to press, not only in response to the local fear of losing valuable mariners and residents, but also because the shortage of trained seamen extended to the merchant ships and transports now being readied for a projected expedition against Port Royal and Quebec.²⁶ In a final effort, Teate requested his replacement, Captain Thomas Mathews in the fourth-rate *Chester*, loan him some sailors, as he believed *Chester* carried a large company of 320. Mathews replied that he had no orders to supply men, and therefore would not comply, perhaps realizing he faced the same fate as his colleague. Teate sailed home, his crew sickly and his ship undermanned.²⁷

²³ Donald F. Chard, "The Impact of French Privateering on New England, 1689-1713," *American Neptune* 35 no. 3 (1975), 153-65.

²⁴ Teate to Admiralty, 4 Aug., 25 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

²⁵ Dora Mae Clark, "The Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in *Essays in Colonial History, Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students*, no ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 206-07.

²⁶ Teate to Admiralty, 4 Aug. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

²⁷ Teate to Admiralty, 10 Dec. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573. Mathews had already seen service convoying mast ships to New Hampshire as captain of the *Dover* in 1706. See Appendix 2.

While it lacked the intense action with French warships that usually comprises the lore of the Royal Navy, Teate's voyage highlights important aspects of naval deployment within a young empire whose interests, even in the seventeenth century, were broad and incorporated the Indian and Pacific as well as the Atlantic Oceans.²⁸ The range of the *Reserve's* "New England" service not only led Teate to protect the West Indian trade and the east coast fishery, but also to an encounter with hostile indigenous peoples in Nova Scotia, while his inability to adequately man his vessel was a direct consequence of colonially driven plans for imperial expansion. Thus, the convoying services provided by Captain Teate and the *Reserve* were part of broader naval activities that sought to protect colonial and commercial, as well as imperial, interest. Nor was Teate alone in this expanded mandate. The developing English taste for tea with milk and sugar, for example, reflected the ability to deliver fresh dairy products at home and the importation of tea from the east and sugar from the west.²⁹ The navy was present at all stages of this seemingly simple cultural proclivity. All the same, the unification of a nascent empire and any concurrent international intrigue may not have been on the mind of Captain Teate as he fretted about how his ship was to be properly outfitted, or how to provide the correct accounting paperwork to the Admiralty lest they blame him for any cost overruns or apparent embezzlement.

0.4- Outline of Chapters

²⁸ Nicholas Canny, "Asia, the Atlantic and the Subjects of the British Monarchy," in *A Companion to Stuart Britain*, ed. Barry Coward (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 45-66.

²⁹ Angus Calder, *Revolutionary Empire: The Rise of the English Speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1782* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981), 252.

As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, overseas service raises questions regarding both the reconstruction of naval activity in the colonies based on Admiralty sources, and analysis of that activity given the state of what little work has been accomplished in this area. Therefore, this dissertation is divided into two halves: the first three chapters establish a framework for analysis while the next three examine the New England station ships and their captains specifically. The opening chapter argues that combining insights from both Atlantic and Imperial historiography provides a foundation for studying convoys and station ships with the captain as the centre of analysis. If captains are viewed for their own sake within what has been referred to as Cis-Atlantic history, much can be revealed about the workings of a centralized British institution within a decentralized environment. Cis-Atlantic history encompasses the study of a particular nation/state, region, or even institution, within the greater Atlantic world.³⁰ The navy certainly qualifies as a Cis-Atlantic institution and analyzing warship captains from this perspective allows us to examine them as individual agents working within their corporate body, rather than see them as part of a faceless imperial, or political, monolith. Naval, imperial, and British Atlantic histories offer only oblique guides to a workable context, especially as the majority of literature on the subject deals with the larger and more elaborate global conflicts following 1739. Systematic studies of deployment to the colonies prior to 1739, meanwhile, are rare, limited in scope, and/or becoming dated. This chapter will nevertheless review some of the relevant literature on navy, empire, and

³⁰ David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), 21-25.

the Atlantic World to establish a point of departure for subsequent analysis of captains' deployment.

Chapter Two provides a broad reconstruction of North Atlantic naval deployment between 1660 and 1739. Using a variety of sources (but especially the Admiralty List Books beginning in 1674), this chapter focuses on those ships sent to mainland North American venues and Newfoundland. The specific areas outlined are Newfoundland, Canso (Nova Scotia), New Hampshire, Massachusetts (the New England station), New York, Virginia (and sometimes Maryland), South Carolina, and Georgia. Several important conclusions emerge out of the chapter that are crucial for understanding those that follow. First, by the opening of the Nine Years' War the dispatching of overseas escorts had become a normal procedure, even though problems still existed, and true regularity had to wait a few more years. Second, individual warships sent to the aforementioned regions differed from the more irregular deployment of squadrons to North America in that they operated without the direction of a squadron commander or admiral. Third, although discussion as to the deployment of convoys and station ships came from a variety of sources, their captains reported to the Admiralty Board directly via the secretary's office (and also the Navy Board) and received their orders and instructions through the same route. Fourth, the navy turned over operational authority to colonial governments where necessary.

Outlining the routine of convoys and station ships demonstrates the increasing regularity and daily presence of the navy overseas. Regularity of deployment was based on a combination of available resources and identification of need. During the Restoration, for example, government rationale for determining need rested on protecting

trade concerns to Newfoundland and Virginia, and supporting gubernatorial politics in Virginia and New England. Three temporal periods of deployment can be identified: 1660-1691, 1692-1713, and 1714-1739. The first period began with the growing recognition of the need for extended naval service, but deployment was inhibited because of limited resources. The second period witnessed an era of expanded deployment resulting from the need to protect trade in the face of continuous warfare. A slight reduction in the number and size of warships characterized the last period, but changing imperial orientation is reflected in the expansion of service to new locales. Throughout the entire period 1660-1739, certain methods of operation and daily routine evolved as the navy and its personnel gained more experience, but the overall nature of detached service in the colonies remained constant. This regularity provides a base for those subsequent chapters focussing on the relationship between warships, as represented by their captains, and the colonial ports they visited.

Chapter Three explores the professionalization of the sea officer corps by employing the yearly convoy to Newfoundland between 1660 and 1715. Until the motivation and attitudes of captains are identified and explained it is more difficult to see them as individuals separate from their corporate identity, especially given the degree to which the navy held them to their written orders and instructions. Newfoundland provides excellent examples of how captains used assignments overseas for self-advancement because it did not receive a colonial government with a governor in the same fashion as the royal colonies on the mainland. The existence of a colonial government defines the relationship between captain and governor that permeates subsequent chapters. Gubernatorial interference and conflict made opportunism more

difficult, and less apparent, than in Newfoundland since captains frequently had to defend all of their activities in formal terms. Captains often required a more subtle edge when dealing with the Admiralty over colonial affairs, and this could often come across as unquestioning support for imperial policies. Examining Newfoundland permits a clearer picture of how captains operated as individuals within their institutional affiliation.

Insofar as captains used their transatlantic assignments for gain, they fit in with other groups that employed the empire for immediate benefit before returning to the European fold. Such groups offer a contrast to migrants or victims of the slave trade whose transatlantic crossing usually proved permanent. Because the profession of sea officer continued its evolution during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, aspiring gentlemen found opportunity for social advancement within the navy and the nascent middle class. Unfortunately, low pay and lack of protection against unemployment clashed with society's expectations of gentlemanly behaviour. This forced captains to use any methods (whether legal, semi-legal, or illegal) to supplement their income. Although some captains bemoaned service overseas, and their sometimes contentious relationships with local populations, others saw in the colonies ways of advancing status and income, especially for those of more humble origins or without influential patrons for whom commanding a warship would be their primary (or only) career. The Newfoundland examples present captains engaging in both self-interested activity and demonstrations of loyalty to the state (often simultaneously), and thus help to explain the system the Admiralty developed for controlling officer behaviour without raising pay or denying benefits and perquisites.

Chapter Four outlines the naval service to New England between the dispatch of the first station ship (1686) to the ship on station at the end of the study period (1739). It has two principal goals: to highlight the manner in which power was transferred from navy to colonial government, and to describe what captains and warships did while on the New England station. Transatlantic service proved to be a challenge for Admiralty planners as they contemplated how to control their warships serving at great distance from Europe. Convoys and station ships patrolled far from naval bases or commanding admirals and much latitude existed for independent thought and action. The Admiralty's solution to the operational command vacuum was to empower the governor (or when unavailable, the lieutenant governor or council) of those colonies assigned a warship to give orders and directions to navy captains while in their jurisdiction. On the surface, considerable control appears to have been meted out to those untrained in its use, especially since the position of governor in the colonies was a tenuous one with little recourse to physical power. In the end, the nature of the sea service provided balance to some degree. The policy of holding officers directly responsible for the integrity of their ship not only tempered actions relating to self-aggrandizement, but also their response to unreasonable or dangerous orders. Additionally, it would appear also that the Admiralty viewed the granting of command privileges to the governor as a way of generating the physical evidence necessary to ensure that captains carried out their instructions. The Admiralty did not want its captains to act without written authorization and initiated the transfer of authority to trace the activity of their ships. Nevertheless, as local officials usually had a better grasp of regional needs than did the Admiralty, captains were obligated to follow gubernatorial directions, so long as they did not endanger the ship or

crew. This relationship did not change despite the evolution of language within the navy's orders and instructions, in particular the removal of passages that suggested an absolute transfer of command.

Colonial governments under normal circumstances had plenty for warships to do. Although the polity of Massachusetts/New England frequently defied imperial efforts to control them, there developed a working relationship between the colony's government, navy personnel, and administrators in London to support the trade networks essential to both local and imperial growth. Reflecting the economic and strategic needs of New England, the duties of station ships included coastal defence, piracy patrols, diplomatic missions, participation in expeditions to subdue Acadia/Nova Scotia and Canada, and convoying trade during their transatlantic voyages. However, the series of duties evolving into a near permanent routine for station ships based in Boston comprised a cycle of fisheries protection off Maine and Nova Scotia, a winter convoy to Barbados with New England trade, and then a stop at the island of Salt Tortuga to procure salt for the fisheries before returning to station. This adds another dimension to New England's relationship with Northeastern North America, and elaborates the participation of captains and warships in the Atlantic world while highlighting their lack of influence on the development of the colonial interior.

Chapter Five examines in greater detail some of the ramifications of transferring operational control over warships to colonial governments. Conflict between captains and colonial officials is too frequent to be overlooked, with strife often portrayed as a philosophical divide, or clash of personality. A deeper examination of confrontation on a case-study basis suggests that while personality, politics, and philosophy naturally factor

into conflict, opportunity and the meagre resources available to colonial governors and warship captains provide a plausible explanation for turmoil, especially as the warship itself represented a resource. What on the surface could be attributed to arrogance or civil disobedience in fact had its origins in self-interest and scarcity.

Captains attempting to carry out their orders, seek enrichment, and endear themselves to the Admiralty for the purposes of professional advancement came up against governors reaching for similar goals. Conflicts with regard to manning, prizes, and ultimate authority over a warship reflect this struggle. In Chapter Five, particular attention is paid to captains who ventured ashore and found themselves incarcerated by colonial governments. Three of the four captains who suffered this fate at Boston are analyzed with detailed studies.³¹ Dispatch to the common jail represented the ultimate breakdown in the relationship between officers and colonial officials. In the end, so long as captains acted within operational parameters, they would escape direct censure from the Admiralty. More often, discussions between the Board of Trade and the Admiralty with the aim of preventing future disagreement resulted in quiet additions and clarifications to the captains' orders and instructions. Unfortunately, tighter regulations did not prevent all confrontation with colonial administrations, and this exposed captains to possible imprisonment, court martial, and civil action when they were thought to have violated colonial conventions.

Chapter Six examines captains and the problem of resupply and repair in the colonies after 1660, but especially from the beginning of the Nine Years' War to the

³¹ The fourth has been studied in detail elsewhere by this author. William R. Miles, "The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713" (M.A. Thesis: Saint Mary's University, 2000), 104-146.

beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear. Supplying warships abroad proved difficult, and this formed another layer in the relationship between captains and colonial governments, one which included local merchants. The chapter argues that a separate point of contention between captains and colonies came in the form of conflict over provisions, stores, and labour. The penurious navy came to use its supply regimen as another method of ensuring tighter control over personnel; it controlled the pay of captains in order to limit wasteful spending. Captains already faced navy offices desiring parsimony at home (in particular the Victualling Board), and serving abroad only increased the pressure to balance their accounts. Unfortunately, local economic situations sometimes made frugality difficult, and this facilitated competition between captains and colonial merchants and colonial governments who sought to manipulate or exploit the navy. The issue of supply is directly related to those of command as the navy expanded greatly those orders and instructions related to victuals and stores over the course of the period 1660-1739.

The maintenance of operational efficiency and insurance of crew safety required the navy to seek consistent access to supplies of goods and services for its warships overseas. With no permanent overseas bases in North America or the Caribbean, the supply system in the colonies evolved somewhat organically; that is to say, colonial methods of resupply were initiated first by captains and local merchants in a manner similar to those found in Europe in lieu of any other solutions or official Admiralty policy. Resupply via merchant vessels and relieving warships remained important, but could prove unreliable, and if a ship was to remain on station for extended periods of time local sources were required for food and other necessities, including seamen. As a result,

captains often faced high colonial prices caused by scarcity and merchant recognition that government money was there to be made. Favoured merchants received navy contracts as local victuallers in attempts to curtail high prices and inconsistencies in service.

Unfortunately, the navy's habit of deferring payment in an effort to juggle limited funds could cause merchants to restrict their services. Frequently, the convention of transacting all business through the ship's purser came to be modified in the colonies. Slow repayment resulted in merchants refusing to accept bills of exchange drawn on the navy unless the captain put up his personal bond against non-payment. Meanwhile, a moratorium on impressment in the colonies further restricted the ability to maintain ships at optimum levels of performance. The Victualling and Navy Boards often caught captains in a vice and punished them by refusing to clear their accounts, citing overpayment for food and other items. Some captains, meanwhile, found it difficult to accept that conditions in North America prevented the provision of services in a manner similar to those in England. In general, because captains and governments both competed for scarce resources, the processes and problems of supply mirrored those of command. Numerous examples in this chapter show the problems experienced by captains as correspondence from nearly every one sent to New England reported some problem with supply.

The adventures of Matthew Teate and the *Reserve* include the usual and mundane as well as the exotic and idiosyncratic. They incorporate the most important themes relevant to the activities of a warship on station in New England between 1686 and 1739. Teate's somewhat anticlimactic problems with manpower, for example, offer a contrast to

later press riots or attempts by some captains to circumvent their instructions.³²

Reserve's sojourn in New England is only mentioned in passing within the abstracts of the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, still a principal reference work for imperial relations. One entry catalogues the Board of Trade's congratulations to Governor Joseph Dudley for his efforts in searching after men for the navy despite the circumstances surrounding the local shortage.³³ Except for this, *Reserve* passes without much notice in the imperial record. Meanwhile, the Admiralty sources on the same subject reveal periods of hurried activity while *Reserve* traversed some of the principal crossroads of the western Atlantic portion of Britain's empire in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. How navy captains related and responded to this empire is deserving of deeper exploration and the following pages represent the beginning of such a project.

³² John Lax and William Pencak, "The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740's in Massachusetts," *Perspectives in American History* 10 (1976), 163-214.

³³ Governor Dudley to W. Popple, 10 Oct. 1707, United Kingdom, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury and others (London: His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1994, 46 Vols.), Vol. 23, no. 1135; Governor Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 Nov. 1707, 16 Feb. 1708, *ibid.*, no. 1186; Governor Crowe to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 Mar. 1708, *ibid.*, no. 1364.

Chapter 1: The British Atlantic World and the Royal Navy

From the last third of the seventeenth century through to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1713), the Royal Navy developed and maintained a regular convoy escort and station ship service which extended to various locales on the western half of the Atlantic Ocean and elsewhere during both war and peace.¹ In naval terms, the period predates the point at which navy and government contemplated any policy of maintaining permanent squadrons (ships of force collected together for a specific purpose) in western waters. Furthermore, the physical limitations of ship deployment frequently prevented squadrons overseas from receiving adequate support. In particular, the hostile environment in the Caribbean compromised the success of those ships of force that were deployed until administration and victualling improved, as they would by the mid-eighteenth century.² The historical study of naval deployment came to focus on squadrons, based on their efficient employment by the Royal Navy in the global struggles for empire. This has encouraged little research or discourse on individual (detached) warships on the periphery of empire before the outbreak of war in 1739. When such ships and their crews do appear, they frequently remain in the background, or as context to other topics such as piracy.³

¹ I. R. Mather, "The Role of the Royal Navy in the English Atlantic Empire, 1660-1720" (DPhil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1995); Sari Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), 55-63; Patrick Crowhurst, *The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1977), 45-58.

² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London: W.W. Norton, 2004), 291; Richard Harding, *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 115-16.

³ Julian Gwyn, "Poseidon's Sphere: Early Naval History in Atlantic Canada," *Acadiensis* 31 no. 1 (2001), 152-54; Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Drawing on a wide range of existing historical scholarship, this chapter discusses the relationship between navy, empire, and the British Atlantic World prior to the outbreak of war in 1739. Such a discussion is necessary because studies of overseas trade protection for the period 1660-1739 are brief, frequently of an exploratory nature, dated, or considered only within broader contexts of war and trade. While incorporating the principal works on overseas trade protection, the current essay will offer suggestions as to why North American naval activities have not received more exposure, despite the regular presence of warships by the era of the Nine Years' War. Scale is an obvious reason for the imbalance of study as the number of warships in all of the western Atlantic averaged around twelve, compared to the dozens that could be in sea pay in European waters at any time, and the up to several hundred that could be deployed globally during wartime. Chapter Two follows this discussion with a general outline and rationale of overseas deployment in order to highlight and confirm the regularity of trade protection services and their entrenchment in naval administration. This reconstruction of naval activity is needed to clarify the nature of deployment, which at times has been misrepresented or misunderstood.⁴

The subject of imperial development during the period 1660 to 1739, meanwhile, sits in the shadow of eras considered more important for British overseas settlement and development. After 1739, a more consolidated British Empire engaged in several grand struggles for control of North America and the Indian subcontinent, to retain sovereignty

University Press, 1986), 159; Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars* (London: Methuen, 2004), 149-50, *passim*; Marcus Rediker, *Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age* (London: Verso, 2004), 15-16.
⁴ Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 17-18; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 232; Admiralty Lists, 1674-1739, United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty (ADM) 8/1-20. An outline of global deployment can be found in Ch. 2, 81-82.

over the American colonies, and to resist the French Revolution. For the earlier period, only the seminal Revolution of 1688 perhaps breaks a routine of apparent stability. Yet this middle period of imperial development between the decades of early expansion and the latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed a systematic move toward imperial consolidation, and this corresponded to the increasing institutionalization of the Royal Navy within the early-modern state.⁵

The detached warships in America, the West Indies, and elsewhere merit study within imperial, colonial, and naval history because their crews maintained a continuous presence overseas during the formative stages of Britain's imperial development. Questioning and reconstructing that presence can provide insight into routines of the British imperial and maritime worlds.⁶ The navy did not intend its officers and crews to deviate from their duty while overseas, yet differences in operational environments challenged such intentions. Distance from supply sources, separation from the Admiralty's daily operational structure, and the frequent junior status of officers were factors that could cause practice to diverge from planning.⁷ The parameters of overseas

⁵ Trevor Burnard, "The British Atlantic," in *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 118-19; Richard R. Johnson, "Empire," in *A Companion to Colonial America*, ed. Daniel Vickers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 105-06; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Ch. 4; Alison Olson, *Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest Groups 1690-1790* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); P.J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c. 1750-1783* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); cf., Carla G. Pestana, *The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution 1640-1661* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁶ David Hancock, "'A Revolution in the Trade': Wine Distribution and the Development of the Infrastructure of the Atlantic Market Economy, 1703-1807," in *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, ed. John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 106. Although discussing wine, Hancock suggests that more knowledge on daily exchanges in general is needed if Atlantic World methodologies are to have any utility.

⁷ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 64-75.

naval service create an opportunity to take recent developments in naval historiography and incorporate discussion on the British Atlantic World. Many supporters of British Atlantic history claim that by transcending simplistic national and imperial contexts they have revitalized the examination of the development of people, society, and culture throughout areas touched by European oceanic expansion. When combined with naval and imperial historiographies that already assume the global nature of their subjects, the concept of the British Atlantic World can expand both dialogues, thus enabling a broader view of Royal Navy captains' activities in the chapters that follow.

1.1-Parameters of Overseas Deployment

The conflicts beginning with the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739 differed from their predecessors, and so did corresponding naval deployment. Areas of imperial interest and influence gained heightened importance within the decision-making process of the British government, fostered not the least by the considerable growth of colonies and key colonial ports.⁸ A primary cause of war in 1739 came from Spanish attempts to curb clandestine British trade and smuggling in the Caribbean and Central America.⁹ When war with Spain melded into the War of the Austrian Succession, high-profile operations, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the West Indies and Nova Scotia, signalled a more global approach to large-scale naval deployment. Expanded operations led to the

⁸ Richard Harding, "America, the War of 1739-48 and the Development of British Global Power," *Journal for Maritime Research* 6 no.1 (2004), 4; Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 55-75; Stephen J. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005), 193-203.

⁹ John B. Hattendorf, "The Struggle with France, 1690-1815," in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, ed. J.R. Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; paperback ed. 2002), 92-93; Richard Harding, *The Emergences of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy: The War of 1739-1748* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010), 15-18.

establishment of a North American squadron, while the founding of overseas bases such as Halifax, and construction of support facilities there in the 1750s, signalled the arrival of a permanent presence in force outside of the Caribbean.¹⁰ The utility and increasing maturity of such deployment overseas could be demonstrated by the successful assaults on Louisbourg in 1745 and 1758.¹¹

Despite the expansion of operations, the prevailing hazards of supply and disease still limited the overall effectiveness of squadron deployment, especially in the West Indies (notwithstanding Vice-Admiral Vernon's spectacular capture of Porto Bello in 1739).¹² Even if England/Britain had not required a large fleet in Europe to defend against invasion and support war efforts on the continent, the physical limitations to sailing warships restricted the degree to which power could be projected overseas. This improved over time, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the larger ships of the line still could not keep the sea during the winter months, and overseas resupply remained problematic.¹³ Before the middle of the eighteenth century, maintaining squadrons and fleets in continuous operation in the Mediterranean could only be accomplished with great difficulty, as witnessed by Admiral Edward Russell's stay at Cadiz during the winter of 1694-95.¹⁴ Naval administration could not provide sufficiently large numbers of warships overseas with victuals, stores, or repairs that they required to

¹⁰ Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 341-42; Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," in *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 135-40.

¹¹ A.J.B. Johnston, *Endgame 1758: The Promise, the Glory, and the Despair of Louisbourg's Last Decade* (Sydney: Cape Breton University Press, 2007), 288; Gwyn, "Royal Navy in North America," 139-40.

¹² Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 240.

¹³ John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 36.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 526-33.

remain operational, nor could colonial ports and their supporting economies, as illustrated vividly by Admiral Walker's expedition to attack Quebec in 1711.¹⁵ The Caribbean disease environment continued to ravage mass numbers of un-acclimatized soldiers and sailors, something Admiral Hosier and 3000 of his men demonstrated with their lives in 1726-27 following the blockade of Porto Bello.¹⁶

Soon, however, large groups of warships could be handled and resupplied more effectively and safely for extended periods both in and outside Europe. Such capabilities reflected not only improvements in naval administration, but also the growing ability of developing colonies to accommodate squadrons.¹⁷ The post-1739 era is well served by numerous studies of the relationship between Great Britain and its navy, both in Europe and America. These studies include as second nature globalized, public, and state-sponsored naval activity marshalled overseas with greater attentiveness and focus.¹⁸ This scholarship further recognizes the development of a British naval force with multiple capabilities, and acknowledges the relationship between empire and trade that developed out of the wars with France between 1689 and 1713.¹⁹

¹⁵ Richard Harding, "The Expeditions to Quebec, 1690 and 1711: The Evolution of British Trans-Atlantic Amphibious Power," in *Guerres Maritimes, 1688-1713*, no ed. (Vincennes: Service historique de la Marine, 1996), 206-09.

¹⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 232.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 291.

¹⁸ Some of the more recent monographs include: Clive Wilkinson, *The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004); Roger Morriss, *Naval Power and British Culture, 1750-1850: Public Trust and Government Ideology* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 2004); Margarete Lincoln, *Representing the Royal Navy: British Sea Power, 1750-1815* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002); David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998); Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775-1783* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1989); Julian Gwyn, *Ashore and Afloat: The British Navy and the Halifax Naval Yard before 1820* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004); Gwyn, *Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).

¹⁹ Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 184-85.

Yet less than a decade before 1739, minimal state resources such as naval bases, permanent supply arrangements, and command infrastructure existed abroad for travelling warships, and the initiative for military effort often came from individuals on site rather than those at the centre of government.²⁰ Although recognizing the complexities of naval warfare in the eighteenth century, many historians remain preoccupied with the fleet and squadron activity that is the basis for examining the navy, whether in Europe or abroad. This inadvertently overshadows the deployment of individual warships on detached service. The contemporary public, like later historians, regarded a successful overseas expedition as the hallmark of naval or imperial success and global expansion.²¹ The infrequency, and often dismal failure, of such operations before the middle of the eighteenth century implied that the relationship between navy and empire in North America usually had little relevance to the broader themes of naval history until deployment there resembled more closely that in Europe.²²

If overseas venues could not support large-scale operations, what they could handle, again sometimes with great difficulty, was individual and small groups of warships, even for extended periods. Therefore, by studying the early-modern Royal Navy from the vantage point of those captains commanding detached warships on duty outside of Europe, it is possible to fit the navy's trade protection service into current trends for studying the British Atlantic Empire. In the last few decades, the Atlantic World context has been welcomed as a method of examining social, cultural, and

²⁰ Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce," 202.

²¹ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 235-38; Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 114-16.

²² N.A.M. Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1689-1793," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 174; Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce," 194-96.

economic exchange within an oceanic environment unencumbered by modern state boundaries, or even the development of the nation-state itself. This approach, however, has come under challenge from writers who continue to endorse Atlantic history's break from older state-centric models that examine the development of imperial institutions, but question its limited geographical boundaries. Elements of human movement beyond Europe, they argue, tied Asia and the Pacific to Atlantic maritime processes from the very beginning. Thus, rather than expanding our understanding of global movement, the Atlantic context is in danger of stifling connections, exchanges, and comparisons in much the same way older imperial histories are argued to have done.²³

Nevertheless, within modest parameters, the British Atlantic can still provide workable models for examining transatlantic exchange. One useful method of exploring the British Atlantic – championed by authors such as Ian K. Steele, David Armitage, and Jack P. Greene – has influenced the types of questions asked within this dissertation. These authors have suggested that, with the ocean forming the basis of trade and communication, British colonies and imperial connections expanded, grew, and coalesced during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Attempts at direct control by the metropolitan government in London could be weak, easily threatened, or ignored in places such as the North of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and particularly in the distant American or Caribbean colonies. Weak authority on the periphery required government and elites to negotiate, rather than dictate, terms of obedience with people and societies

²³ A 2006 forum discusses the relationship between the positive contexts, yet limited geographic boundaries, of Atlantic History: Alison Games, "Beyond the Atlantic: English Globetrotters and Transoceanic Connections," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 63 no. 4 (2006), 675-92; Philip J. Stern, "British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparisons and Connections," *ibid.*, 694-712; Paul W. Mapp, "Atlantic History from Imperial, Continental, and Pacific Perspectives," *ibid.*, 713-24; Peter A. Coclanis, "Atlantic World or Atlantic/World," *ibid.*, 725-42.

on the periphery.²⁴ The navy, too, faced such challenges, including that of requiring captains going abroad to follow Admiralty policy without access to the same resources available in Europe.

The reconstruction of navy captains' activities when deployed to the New England station provides an opportunity to explore the influence of the periphery on metropolitan authority. This is because of the region's close identification with the development of an Atlantic empire following the Restoration. The New England colonies of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire lacked a single primary resource on which to build a staple-driven economy such as the Chesapeake's tobacco, Newfoundland's fish, or sugar from the West Indies. This encouraged the development of a more diversified economy that supported a widespread trading network throughout the Atlantic world, and took advantage of the trade opportunities provided by the Navigation Acts.²⁵ Boston's rise as an entrepôt, and its considerable shipping and shipbuilding interests, placed it at the centre of transatlantic trade. Boston relied on its participation within the Atlantic World for its survival; its deep-water sailing fleet grew, by contemporary estimates, into the third largest after London and Bristol, while the New England export fishing industry expanded steadily throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁶ As the seventeenth century progressed, the founding Puritan

²⁴ Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 11-27; Jack P. Greene, "Negotiation Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Politics of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History* ed. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24.

²⁵ John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 92-93.

²⁶ Bernard Bailyn and Lottie Bailyn, *Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A Statistical Study* (Cambridge,

community morphed into an urban society centred on Boston, combining profit with the original purpose of religious and social development.²⁷ The Puritan notion of political independence persisted even after New Englanders (and all colonists) found themselves accepting an overarching imperial rule in exchange for active participation in imperial trade. New Englanders, with greater tenacity, nevertheless joined other colonists in not accepting any government action that placed their interests secondary to those of the metropole.²⁸

Boston also proves useful as the hub of an informal zone of social, political, and economic interrelation within the wider Atlantic World. Identified variously as Greater New England, or Northeastern North America, this area encompassed the eastern seaboard of North America from New York to Newfoundland. This multi-ethnic, multi-political region along the borders of two European empires, and several Aboriginal nations, presents an opportunity to expand the breadth of current analysis where necessary and appropriate.²⁹ In particular, the fishing grounds off Nova Scotia and

MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); Stephen Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 272; Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 143-91; Daniel Vickers with Vince Walsh, *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 45; James G. Lydon, "Fish for Gold: The Massachusetts Fish Trade with Iberia, 1700-1773," *New England Quarterly* 54 no. 4 (1981), 539-82.

²⁷ Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Phyllis Whitman Hunter, *Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 1670-1780* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Jack P. Greene, "Recent Developments in the Historiography of Colonial New England," *Acadiensis* 17 no. 2 (1988), 161-62; James E. McWilliams, "Beyond Declension: Economic Adaptation and the Pursuit of Export Markets in the Massachusetts Bay Region, 1630-1700," in *Cultures and Identities in Colonial British America*, ed. Robert Olwell and Alan Tully (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 121-46.

²⁸ Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); Johnson, "Empire," 106; Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 14-18.

²⁹ D.W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 years of History, Vol. 1*

Newfoundland, along with their corresponding market for stores and provisions, attracted the attention of New England fishermen and merchants, sometimes in contravention of the Navigation Acts and outside official imperial boundaries.³⁰ New England station ship captains often found themselves off Nova Scotia patrolling the fisheries as part of their routine duties. Meanwhile, warships sent from Boston to the Caribbean often accompanied or encountered those from other stations on similar missions. All captains, especially those in Newfoundland, knew that Boston was likely the best (and sometimes only) port for complex repairs or provisioning. In the years after 1713, most captains were well aware that “Acadia or Nova Scotia” represented an important part of the imperial frontier between New England and their Aboriginal and French competitors to the north.³¹

1.2- The Protection of Trade

The regional aspects of trade protection can be observed in Patrick Crowhurst’s important study, *The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815*, which outlines the general nature of convoys during the Anglo-French conflicts of the long eighteenth century. Crowhurst discusses the broad relationships between developing trade networks based in

Atlantic America, 1492-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 100-09; John G. Reid, “An International Region of the Northeast: Rise and Decline, 1635-1792,” in *The Northeastern Borderland: Four Centuries of Interaction*, ed. Stephen Hornsby and others (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989), 10-25; Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 73-88.

³⁰ Ralph G. Lounsbury, “Yankee Trade at Newfoundland,” *New England Quarterly* 3 no. 4 (1930), 607-26; George Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973), 42-43, *passim*; Geoffrey Plank, “New England and the Conquest,” in *The ‘Conquest’ of Acadia, 1710, Imperial, Colonial and Aboriginal Constructions*, ed. John G. Reid and others (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 67-69.

³¹ These points will be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters. For example: Capt. Matthew Teate, *Reserve*, to Admiralty, 20 Aug. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572; Capt. Henry Partington, *Warwick*, to Admiralty, 5 May 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2281; Capt. Thomas Durell, *Seahorse*, to Admiralty, 28 Sept. 1721, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694; Capt. Robert Young, *Kinsale*, to Board of Trade, 6 Dec. 1743, TNA PRO Colonial Office (CO) 217/31, f. 206.

the West Indies, the East, and Northern and Southern North American colonies.

Crowhurst's main purpose is to explain how the British government sought to preserve trade, rather than to provide a detailed examination of what the navy did overseas.³²

Nevertheless, Crowhurst's study provides a detailed examination of both the relationship between the navy and trade, and the various interests involved in negotiations to develop regular convoys, their destinations, and their schedules. A.W.H. Pearsall, meanwhile, provides an important commencement point for the study of trade protection by describing the nature and composition of convoys and their operation at sea. In particular, Pearsall analyzes how warships responded to predatory attacks by French forces, making the crucial point that commerce raiding forced the navy to alter the composition and deployment of its warships during the period 1689 to 1713 in order to deal with the threat. In the end, however, the reconstructions of convoy actions are set primarily within the eastern half of the Atlantic. This is logical in the sense that many spectacular attacks occurred when convoys sailed homeward bound towards European choke points. Pearsall's focus leaves the Atlantic nature of convoys and station ships open for further exploration.³³ J.A. Johnston has examined the relationship between Parliament and trade protection for the crucial first half of the Nine Years' War. Parliament's control of financing pressured the navy into continuing the convoy service, but the narrow temporal boundaries here only hint at the wider issues relating to early-

³² Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, esp. Ch.2. For example, Crowhurst is completely unaware that New England received a station ship. Ibid., 114.

³³ A.W.H. Pearsall, "The Royal Navy and Trade Protection, 1688-1714," *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 30 (1986), 109-23.

modern trade protection, especially as Parliament was one of numerous corporate bodies with a concern for the safety of trade.³⁴

A body of literature does exist which describes the relationship between trade protection and the colonies. A 1929 doctoral dissertation by Joseph D. Doty examines the relationship between the Admiralty and the administration of the colonies between 1689 and 1763. Doty outlines the basics of colonial station ship service, and institutions such as the colonial courts of Vice Admiralty, while recognizing the regularization of relations between navy, colonies, and commerce. Many of the conclusions, however, require updating, and are often more applicable to the later decades than the earlier ones.³⁵ For example, N.A.M. Rodger recently argued that the power of the Admiralty Board in the broader decision-making process during the years 1689-1713 remained weaker than Doty assumes.³⁶ A piece by Arthur P. Middleton on Virginia examines convoys from the perspective of the tobacco merchants and their ships, but the majority of the research presented favours the eighteenth over the seventeenth century.³⁷ An unpublished 1973 doctoral dissertation by W.A.B. Douglas examines the relationship between the Royal Navy and Nova Scotia between 1713 and 1766. Its initial chapter discusses the activities of the New England station ship in Nova Scotia waters as background, in particular its relationship with the developing French commercial and military centre at Louisbourg. Douglas points out the lack of a Nova Scotia station ship,

³⁴ J.A. Johnston, "Parliament and the Protection of Trade, 1688-1714," *Mariner's Mirror* 54 no. 4 (1971), 399-414.

³⁵ Joseph D. Doty, "The British Admiralty as a Factor in Colonial Administration, 1689-1713" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1929; reprint Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980).

³⁶ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Admiralty* (Lavenham: Dalton, 1979), 48.

³⁷ Arthur P. Middleton, "The Chesapeake Convoy System, 1662-1763," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 3 no.2 (1946), 182-207.

despite the urgent pleas for assistance from the Nova Scotia government following that province's incorporation into the empire via the Treaty of Utrecht.³⁸ In a similar fashion, Neil R. Stout opens his monograph on the Royal Navy in America from 1760 to the beginning of the American Revolution with a summary of previous naval activity. Most relevant to the current work is Stout's observation concerning the early use of the navy to enforce the Navigation Acts, an objective that disappeared when war broke out in 1689 and was not revived again to any significant degree until after the Seven Years' War.³⁹

Of considerable utility is Sari Hornstein's monograph on the Restoration navy, which balances an examination of trade with the ships that performed convoy service and the campaigns fought in the Mediterranean against the Barbary corsairs. Hornstein outlines the importance of trade during a time of peace between England and its European rivals (1674-1688), and describes how the navy was required to establish a modest convoy system to deal with corsairs, pirates, and over-zealous competition from other traders.⁴⁰ With the exception of Newfoundland (and here not in as much detail as is possible), Hornstein did not intend to provide information on warships going to North America beyond those related to Mediterranean trade, although it is demonstrated that deployment numbers stayed small and erratic until after 1690. Hornstein is important for illuminating the existence of an organized trade protection service before 1688, the administrative core of which anchored the deployment of convoys and station ships during the years 1689-1713 and beyond. Hornstein and Christopher Ware do outline the

³⁸ W.A.B Douglas, "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766" (Ph.D. Diss., Queens University, 1973), 6-36.

³⁹ Neil R. Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 8-9; Thomas M. Truxes, *Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

⁴⁰ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, *passim*.

nature of colonial deployment on either side of the years 1689-1713 in a 1988 collected volume.⁴¹ Their chapters provide a general overview of service to America and the Caribbean, but remain introductory and exploratory essays. One of the few systematic overviews of transatlantic naval service comes from a difficult-to-obtain 1995 doctoral dissertation. I.R. Mather analyzes the nature of North American and Caribbean deployment between 1660 and 1720. Valuable work is performed counting and describing the nature of convoy and station ship deployment, but Mather's limited source base, yet broad context, allows only general answers to the questions asked. These answers are consistent with the overall conclusion of naval historians that the size and nature of resources did not permit the degree of influence that naval power achieved in Europe. Meanwhile, continued conflict between warships and colonial governors precluded any meaningful contribution to Atlantic development.⁴² Nevertheless, Mather demonstrates that the navy was indeed present during the emergence of England's commercial empire, and that the dispatch of station ships and convoys remained the more familiar deployment to North America over the less frequent squadrons and expeditions.

1.3 Navy and Empire

The development of professional naval historical writing during the twentieth century can be argued to have inhibited the inclusion of pre-1739 North American deployment within a broader naval context. The first problem with relations between the early modern navy and empire concerns the greater interest in the Seven Years' War,

⁴¹ Sari Hornstein, "The English Navy and the Defense of American Trade in the Late Seventeenth Century," in *Global Crossroads and the American Seas*, ed. Clarke G. Reynolds (Missoula: Pictorial Histories, 1988), 103-120; Christopher Ware, "The Royal Navy and the Plantations, 1720-1730, *ibid.* 121-26.

⁴² Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy;" Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire," 178.

American War of Independence, and French Revolution/Napoleonic era. At the very least, the massive attention paid to Horatio Nelson as a popular and scholarly icon in British history looms large, and fosters repeated interest in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.⁴³ The Stuart and Augustan navies, it has been argued, remained neglected and misunderstood until very recently, positioned as they were between the Elizabethan and Georgian periods of naval history, which were frequently deemed more relevant to the development of an English national identity. When introducing his 1991 monograph on the navy of the Restoration, J.D. Davies describes the seventeenth century as a “poor relation” compared to the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Despite being the era of the diarist and naval administrator Samuel Pepys, the seventeenth century produced no Spanish Armada or Trafalgar, with their accompanying heroes, Drake and Nelson.⁴⁴ Davies’ lament, however, does not indicate a lack of scholarship on the seventeenth century. Rather, it acknowledges that the eighteenth century has been perceived as the more significant epoch, where expanding naval coverage is easily identified with maturing Atlantic economies, the American and French Revolutions, and the expansion of Britain deeper into a highly mobilized, fiscal-military state.⁴⁵

⁴³ Gerald Jordan and Nicholas Rogers, “Admirals as Heroes: Patriotism and Liberty in Hanoverian England,” *Journal of British Studies* 28 no. 3 (1989), 201-24; Kathleen Wilson, “How Nelson Became a Hero,” *Historian* 87 (2005), 6-17; Michael Duffy, “Trafalgar, Nelson, and the National Memory,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, October 2006, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/92747>.

⁴⁴ J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 1. Although offering a curative, it is interesting that Andrew Lambert, *Admirals: The Naval Commanders who Made Britain Great* (London: Faber and Faber 2008), jumps from Robert Blake (1599-1657) to James, Duke of York (1633-1701) to George Anson (1697-1762). Also: John B. Hattendorf, “Sir George Rooke and Sir Cloudesley Shovell, c1650-1709 and 1650-1707,” in *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter LeFevre and Richard Harding (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole: 2000), 43-50.

⁴⁵ Several mentionable monographs that discuss the first half of the seventeenth century include: David D. Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government, 1616-1642* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1994); Bernard Capp,

If inadvertently marginalized within its own sub-discipline, the seventeenth-century navy still faced the overall limitations which constrained maritime and naval history within broader scholarly study. Writing in 2004, N.A.M. Rodger maintains that there is no longer a need to protest the neglect of naval history, but there is still much work to be done if it is to be accorded its proper place in British history.⁴⁶ Ten years earlier, however, naval historians re-thinking the state of their sub-discipline identified three important shortcomings. The first revealed that too many studies had been written for enthusiasts and retired naval officers, and hence lacked the rigour expected by professional historians. Second, naval historians too often ignored questions that animated the larger historical discipline within which they sought inclusion. The third shortcoming was the seeming inability of naval historians to produce regular syntheses of recent research. These problems, it was argued, contributed to a paradox whereby historians of various inclinations acknowledged the importance of the sea for national development, but denigrated naval history as a topic for serious academic study.⁴⁷

Several works have addressed the problem of syntheses: the recent *The Safeguard of the Seas* and *The Command of the Ocean* by N.A.M. Rodger, the earlier collaborative volume, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, and the works of Richard

Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Longman, 1996). For an indication of the scale of works produced for the eighteenth century in addition to those mentioned above: N.A.M. Rodger, "Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Military History* 63 no. 3 (1999), 683-703.

⁴⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, lxiii.

⁴⁷ W.J.R. Gardner, "The State of Naval History," *Historical Journal* 38 no. 3 (1995), 696; N.A.M. Rodger, "Britain," in *Ubi Sumus? The State of Naval and Maritime History*, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994), 41-58; Rodger, "Considerations on Writing a General Naval History," in *Doing Naval History*, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1995), 117-28.

Harding.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the stream of thought established by John Brewer in his seminal monograph *The Sinews of Power* has partially addressed the problem of broader imperial contexts. The British state and empire may have been a decentralized conglomerate of competing and contrasting peoples, places, cultures, and routines, but an evolving national government bureaucracy (in particular a professional tax-gathering service) incorporated these disparate individuals into a unified system.⁴⁹ The governmental and military institutions supported by this system provided a further unifying factor to the decentralized state and by extension the overseas empire. Brewer contends that the cost of seventeenth-century warfare burdened British taxpayers heavily. The years after 1688 witnessed unprecedented borrowing by the government, and the creation of a more-or-less permanent national debt. The emergence of a strong bureaucratic system to administer the debt, and to support military efforts, was therefore crucial to the formation of the modern state. Indeed, Brewer describes the process as the creation of the “fiscal-military state.”⁵⁰ A collected work, *An Imperial State at War*, expands upon Brewer’s framework to analyze how British bureaucratic institutions, including the navy, reached out to the various corners of overseas expansion during the numerous and costly wars with France between 1689 and 1815.⁵¹

From the colonial perspective, little work has been undertaken to examine the specific relationship between the navy and empire before 1739. That relationship has

⁴⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 600-1649* (London: Harper Collins, 1998); Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*; *Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, ed. Hill; Harding, *Evolution of the Sailing Navy*; Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare*.

⁴⁹ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, xvii.

⁵¹ *An Imperial State At War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994).

suffered from the legacy of earlier modes of analysis which interpreted the relatively low level of naval activity in the colonies as a sign of wilful neglect. Numerous writers have suggested that the station ships and convoys sent overseas represent the ineffective crumbs of naval deployment falling away from the principal fleet operations in Europe.⁵² Writing in 1939, Ruth Bourne assumes that periods existed during the War of the Spanish Succession when no warships could be found along the coast of North America, this despite evidence within the Admiralty Lists of continuous activity.⁵³ Naval personnel in the colonies, meanwhile, have been characterized as the uncritical representatives of an imperial monolith. Douglas E. Leach devotes an entire chapter of his *Roots of Conflict* to the navy's culpability for colonial resentment at the hands of British militarism. When imperial arrogance met with growing colonial independence (often manifested through negative reaction to the infamous press), it proved to be a volatile combination. As naval presence increased towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Leach argues, the inherent friction between citizenry and the navy increased to unbearable levels.⁵⁴

Leach identifies and discusses some of the very real problems of maintaining a naval presence far from the fleet in Europe, but the tendency to treat the context of naval and maritime history as universal and unchanging for the entire colonial period can no

⁵² For example: Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period in American History Vol 4: England's Commercial and Colonial Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938; reprint, 1964), 275-77; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 104; Gerald S. Graham, "Newfoundland in British Strategy from Cabot to Napoleon," in *Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies*, ed. R.A. MacKay (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), 254; Patrick O'Flaherty, *Old Newfoundland: A History to 1843* (St. John's: Long Beach Press, 1999), 50.

⁵³ Ruth Bourne, *Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 60-61.

⁵⁴ Douglas E. Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americas, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), Ch.7.

longer be considered adequate.⁵⁵ One hurdle for reconstructing naval activity lay with the employment of abstracts from the *Calendar of State Papers* in place of the Colonial Office papers themselves. Despite their utility during eras of difficult transatlantic travel, John McCusker comments that historians of British America frequently have used these calendars uncritically, and as a substitute for a wide research base.⁵⁶ Samuel Margolin demonstrates the results of relying primarily on the abstracts without the benefit of Admiralty sources by concluding that the navy sent only the worst ships with the worst officers and crews to Virginia throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁵⁷

The role of military officers within the empire emerges more directly in studies that focus on their relationship with colonial governance. Stephen Saunders Webb has published three books addressing transatlantic militarism and the early-modern empire, arguing that English colonial expansion and consolidation in the seventeenth century was less a function of commerce and trade, and more the deliberate employment of former and serving military officers within a “garrison government.”⁵⁸ Webb’s principal critic, Richard Johnson, lauds this approach as highly original, but condemns it as an oversimplification of the degree to which the English military could influence government. Furthermore, Webb’s argument relied on the superimposition of modern

⁵⁵ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (London: Collins, 1986), 12, identifies the dangers of such assumptions when studying the social history of the navy.

⁵⁶ John J. McCusker, “Guides to Primary Sources for the History of Early British America,” in *Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World*, ed. McCusker (London: Routledge, 1997), 8, note 18.

⁵⁷ Samuel G. Margolin, “Guardships on the Virginia Station, 1667-1767,” *American Neptune* 55 no. 1 (1995), 19-41. Cf. *ibid.*, 21; Davies, *Pepys’s Navy*, 245; and an alternative view in Ch. 4-6. Gerald Graham made a similar, and unsubstantiated, statement regarding the quality of captains serving in Newfoundland during the later eighteenth century. “Britain’s Defence of Newfoundland,” *Canadian Historical Review* 23 no.3 (1942), 273. The author accepts any identifiable limitations to employment of the *Calendar of State Papers* in the current work.

⁵⁸ Stephen S. Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).

notions of martial service upon an era that defined it quite differently. The Civil Wars and Interregnum alone dictated that a high percentage of individuals courting government favour would have had some military experience. The navy factors into Webb's analysis as a secondary actor based on several high-profile naval incursions into the colonies, such as Sir John Berry's 1676 expedition to relieve Virginia following Bacon's Rebellion, and the misfortune befalling the station ship *Rose* at Boston in the aftermath of the 1688 regime change in England.⁵⁹

Jerry Bannister focuses on military government of an entirely different fashion in discussing the role of the Royal Navy and the so-called "naval government" that developed in Newfoundland in place of colonial and imperial institutions as elsewhere, especially after 1729. In the absence of a colonial government, navy captains acted as naval governors, originally as convoy commodores and later with specific commissions. Bannister is interested in how officers such as George Rodney shaped the legal regime in Newfoundland, rather than what the navy was doing in the waters surrounding the island.⁶⁰ In an analogous treatment of Virginia, Douglas Bradburn argues that the dispatch of state warships, at the request of the tobacco lobby, to convoy the Virginia fleets shaped the cycle of tobacco export and sale. A system of merchant vessels sailing in convoys with predetermined schedules, quotas, and embargos on seafaring labour resulted in the entire year's shipment arriving in England all at once. This process

⁵⁹ Richard R. Johnson, "The Imperial Webb: The Thesis of Garrison Government in Early America Considered," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 43 no. 3 (1986), 408-30; Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 128-31; Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 182-95.

⁶⁰ Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

favoured the larger and more powerful tobacco merchants, who could weather the adverse effect on prices.⁶¹ Bradburn interprets the navy's role in the enforcement of this shipping regime as the most visible representation of state power in Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, but he assumes rather than demonstrates this.

Naval and maritime historians have always investigated the connections between trade, sea power, and maritime empire, but here too analysis often comes without a systematic examination of trade protection or overseas deployment at levels below that of the squadron or expedition for the period before 1739. Gerald Graham's survey *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* presents a broad study of international sea power and imperial expansion within a North American context. A number of ship-to-ship and small group engagements are detailed, but Graham does not discuss station ships or trade protection systematically. Only during the battles for North America and empire after 1713 does Graham concentrate on concrete transatlantic links.⁶² In two earlier essays, Graham examines the relationship between trade protection and squadron deployment as related to the Newfoundland fisheries, but again despite the broad reach of the analysis, his evidence and conclusions are valid more for the post-1750 period.⁶³ Jeremy Black upgrades Graham's concept of broad oceanic maritime expansion, but because the focus is on what resources the navy dispatched in force, it is not necessary to discuss low-level deployment. Specific acknowledgement of trade and

⁶¹ Douglas Bradburn, "The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 68 no.3 (2011), 363-66. Although compiling some primary research on warships appearing at Virginia, Bradburn seems unaware of the (albeit small) body of literature on trade protection as well as some of the principal Admiralty sources on the subject.

⁶² Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, esp. Ch. 3-5.

⁶³ Graham, "Britain's Defence of Newfoundland," 260-79; Graham, "Newfoundland in British Strategy," 245-64.

colony protection do not appear until the middle of the eighteenth century, after the navy had begun sending regular squadrons into the western Atlantic outside of Jamaica.⁶⁴

Graham, writing before the height of the Cold War, reflected the preoccupation of professional naval historians in debating maritime strategy and broad notions of sea power. Many twentieth-century British historians retained nineteenth-century positivist beliefs that the rigorous study of the past could unearth patterns and provide lessons for the present and future. Such an approach appealed to many naval scholars, and the questions they asked would have been acceptable within the historical discourse at the time.⁶⁵ An international dialogue on naval strategy emerged at the end of the nineteenth century involving academics as well as naval officers, lay writers, and journalists. Labelled “new navalism,” the interest generated by writings and debates on naval development presented history as the evolution of strategy, and it was frequently shaped to correspond to pre-determined beliefs of what naval power represented.⁶⁶ Often new navalism employed the history of the sailing navy to illustrate points for a modern analysis, especially when considering the subsequent Anglo-German naval race leading up to the First World War.⁶⁷

The most influential and definitive study to arise out of the new navalism was *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* by American naval captain Alfred

⁶⁴ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 155-56.

⁶⁵ Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1800* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1992, 2 vols.), Vol. 1, 88; Donald M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 5-6, 83-84; Andrew Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy, and the Historical Profession* (London: Chatham, 1998), 48.

⁶⁶ Barry D. Hunt, “The Outstanding Naval Strategic Writers of the Century,” *Naval War College Review* 37 no. 5 (1984), 87-88; Schurman, *Education of a Navy*, 11-15, *passim*.

⁶⁷ John B. Hattendorf, “The Caird Lecture, 2000: The Anglo-French Naval Wars (1689-1815) in Twentieth Century Naval Thought,” *Journal for Maritime Research* 3 no. 1 (2001), 41-69.

Thayer Mahan.⁶⁸ The book emerged out of a series of lectures written by Mahan in 1885-86, following his appointment to the United States Naval War College. Mahan studied naval history to formulate a series of laws and principles applicable to modern naval power in order to provide an intellectual foundation for those who supported ocean-going battleship building programmes.⁶⁹ Water-borne commerce provided the wealth on which great powers operated, so sea power was essential to the outcome of international conflict. Navies protected overseas commerce and colonial possessions through the principle of “command of the sea,” a concept based on the development of ships-of-the-line (battleships). Only one maritime force could hold command of the sea at any time and therefore, if achieved, the possessor’s trade could continue uninterrupted in wartime, and its peacetime commerce would be much more likely to flourish. Mahan downplayed strategies of commerce raiding as ineffective, wasteful, incapable of achieving command of the sea, and vulnerable to an opposing battle fleet without the support of its own.⁷⁰

Strategies of battle fleet power existed already within the public discourse, but Mahan’s novel combination of history and theory made the American captain an instant celebrity in Britain, where those seeking to validate their current beliefs embraced the book’s emphasis on Royal Navy victories, and its justification of battleship construction.⁷¹ Mahan employed history to buttress contemporary arguments, not to develop a historical paradigm, and his own warnings not to overemphasize sea power

⁶⁸ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1890; reprint, New York: Sagamore, 1957).

⁶⁹ John B. Hattendorf, “Alfred Thayer Mahan and his Strategic Thought,” in *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power*, ed. Hattendorf and Robert Jordan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 83-84; Donald M. Schurman, “Mahan Revisited,” in *ibid.*, 96; Schurman, *Education of a Navy*, 64.

⁷⁰ Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, 116-19; Paul M. Kennedy, “The Influence and Limitations of Sea Power,” *International History Review* 10 no. 1 (1988), 2-5.

⁷¹ Schurman, *Education of a Navy*, 80.

went unheeded. The limitations of fleet-based power generated little discussion. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* went on to become the role-model for naval historical writing probably, as Paul Kennedy suggests, because much writing produced during the era of British naval supremacy retroactively applied Mahan's principles to other periods.⁷² Nevertheless, many authors continued to celebrate Mahan and admire him for providing a starting point for studying the history of sea power.⁷³

Two pertinent examples of monographs discussing early-modern naval history from a Mahanian perspective are Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727*, and John Ehrman's *The Navy in the War of William III*, both published in 1953.⁷⁴ Richmond's unfinished monograph reflects his long-standing concern with the question of how statesmen and government used command of the sea for political purposes.⁷⁵ Ehrman's in-depth coverage of strategic, operational, and administrative issues makes it essential for a thorough comprehension of the Royal Navy between 1688 and 1697, despite its age. Both works begin with the assumption that command of the sea was vital for British political, economic, and social development.⁷⁶

⁷² Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, rev. ed. (London: Ashfield Press, 1983), 79; Kennedy "Influence and Limitations of Sea Power," 5-6.

⁷³ *The Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783,"* ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1991).

⁷⁴ Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*; Herbert Richmond, *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727*, ed. E.A. Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 203-04. This volume existed in manuscript form at the time of Richmond's death and was subsequently edited and published.

⁷⁵ Herbert Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), esp. Ch. 3; Mahan is *Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* ed. James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1993).

⁷⁶ Gardner, "State of Naval History," 696, writes that Ehrman elevated naval history from its campaign and strategy doldrums through his combination of administrative history and elements of grand strategy. H.M. Scott, "The Second Hundred Years' War," *Historical Journal* 35 no.2 (1992), 453, identifies the appearance of Daniel A. Baugh's *Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* as the commencement of modern historical writing.

Richmond and Ehrman acknowledge the limitations and setbacks faced by the navy, but only within the context of perpetual British command of the sea. Ehrman argues, for instance, that the difficulties confronting the navy were administrative rather than strategic, as rapid growth outstripped the ability of naval organization to adapt.⁷⁷

Expansion impinged upon essential fleet operations later in the Nine Years' War, when increased need for commerce protection necessitated the transfer of forces. It has been argued, however, that France intentionally diverted resources to more pressing land campaigns, engaged in commerce raiding, and avoided fighting the fleets of the Royal Navy in battle. The French never intended to challenge for "command of the sea," and chose to employ their limited naval resources toward the more feasible goal of attacking trade.⁷⁸ Thus, the English did not erroneously weaken the fleet; the French forced them to shift resources in the face of a serious threat to trade.

Although the need to provide trade protection services caused the administrative problems identified by Ehrman, he justified ignoring colonies by arguing that they had no bearing on fleet operations, and so were incidental to the outcome of the war.⁷⁹

Richmond paid more attention to colonial affairs than did Ehrman, but he still asserted that greater attention to colonial needs was neither possible, nor desirable, because of necessary European commitments. Richmond concludes that resources sent abroad were

⁷⁷ Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, xv-xix.

⁷⁸ Geoffrey Symcox, *The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688-1697: From Guerre d'Escadre to Guerre de Course* (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1974), 78-86.

⁷⁹ Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 602-3.

insufficient or grossly mismanaged, and the defensive nature of war in the West Indies detracted from offensive campaigns in Europe.⁸⁰

Even though the focus of *The Navy as an Instrument of Policy* is on squadron activities in relation to government objectives, Richmond seems almost unaware that an overseas convoy system existed. For example, Richmond implies that defence of trade in the colonies came via small squadrons in the West Indies, and discusses negotiations for a 1707 Virginia convoy in the wake of recent losses as if no warships had ever gone before. In fact, the navy had established regular convoys to Virginia after the beginning of the Nine Years' War.⁸¹ Thus, despite the connection of colonial trade networks to the transatlantic convoy service, both of which found themselves under siege from French commerce raiding, their relative unimportance for squadron-based activity permits their relegation to the background.

In attempting to construct a framework for studying trade protection overseas prior to 1739, it is perhaps surprising that J.H. Owen's 1938 monograph, *The War at Sea Under Queen Anne*, proves more useful. Owen argued that French strategies of deploying commerce-raiding squadrons created confusion and lethargy among British naval planners. Owen calculated that half of the Royal Navy's sailors, and two-thirds of its ships, engaged in commerce protection in England and abroad by the middle of the war. Nevertheless, the main fleet was still maintained at full readiness until late in the war, and was therefore unable to oppose what was in reality an effort to usurp England's

⁸⁰ Richmond, *Navy as an Instrument of Policy*, 273-74.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 313-14, 339; Admiralty Lists, 1689-1713, TNA PRO ADM 8/2-12.

wealth rather than an attempt to gain command of the sea.⁸² Despite dissenting voices such as Owen, it took the increasing sophistication of later twentieth-century naval history before many of Mahan's conclusions would prove to be unfounded, or valid only within limited parameters. The theory that effective naval power rested on the optimal deployment of a large, all-weather, long-range sailing battle fleet could not be applied in a practical fashion until the late eighteenth century and not prior to 1739, if ever.⁸³

The idea that sea power and command of the sea is obtained through the clash of opposing battle fleets continued to be utilized by many historians and modern naval analysts. Peter Padfield, for example, produced two volumes arguing that maritime supremacy facilitated the development of western democracy and, reciprocally, that the developing western democracies promoted the continued dominance of maritime relations. The key factor was the development of an ocean-going trade far more dynamic than the continental variety, and the subsequent need to protect it. This differs little from Mahan except that the greatness of the British Empire is replaced with the glory of British democracy, or Dutch and American republicanism. The explicit analytical principle remains the study of battle fleet operations.⁸⁴

The strategic framework for studying the history of sailing navies has been reworked and elaborated upon by other historians utilizing a battle fleet analysis, but acknowledging more fully the relationship between sea power and variables such as

⁸² J.H. Owen, *War at Sea Under Queen Anne* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 36-39, 55-56.

⁸³ Glete, *Navies and Nations*, Vol. 1, 89.

⁸⁴ Peter Padfield, *Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1588-1782* (London: John Murray, 1999), 1-6; Padfield, *Maritime Power & The Struggle for Freedom: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1788-1851* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2005).

finance and the contingencies of land warfare. In *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, Paul Kennedy presents a wide-ranging synthesis based on his curiosity regarding the evolution of sea power throughout British history. Kennedy works to avoid making unsupportable generalizations by basing his conclusions on a broader body of evidence than did Mahan. Essential to British development, sea power could never sustain the level of continental influence that the proponents of “command of the sea” contended simply because the bulk of Europeans lived on dry land. For Kennedy, sea power was far less essential for most of Europe than it was for Great Britain.⁸⁵

A decade after Kennedy, Daniel Baugh published an article expanding, modernizing, and polishing the approach pioneered by Mahan. Baugh refers to the definition of British sea power for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth century as a “blue water” policy. The primary role of the navy, he argues, was defensive rather than offensive. In home waters, the navy defended against invasion through control of the English Channel and North Sea. Secondary to this objective was protecting shipping and trade in order to sustain those financial networks that supported Britain’s ability to construct an ocean-going navy. Trade supplied both capital and customs revenue while shipping generated profits that the government could tax or borrow. Trade also sponsored a merchant fleet that could be requisitioned or hired in time of war and employed seamen who could be pressed for state service when necessary. Contemporaries viewed colonies as useful only if they contributed to the enhancement of trade, but the Navigation Acts focussed the system in part by channelling the options of ship owners towards colonies. The concept of a blue water policy, Baugh argues, was

⁸⁵ Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 7.

economically and politically stable because it minimized taxes and the need for a large standing army, an arrangement that suited all levels of British society. The problems of financing wars did not burden the landed interests to any painful degree, and the population at large was saved from the pressures of conscription.⁸⁶ A related concept is D.W. Jones' description of a "double-forward commitment" whereby money and armies were directed towards the European continent, while the navy's influence was overwhelmingly felt in the Mediterranean.⁸⁷ Both authors maintain that their conclusions provide a plausible case for placing less stress on the importance of British naval strength within an international context, but maintaining its importance for Britain.⁸⁸

Some historians have contended that such sweeping conclusions still imply determinism and overemphasize the premise of perpetual naval strength, something that Britain could not achieve at least before 1715. J.R. Jones has written that the acceptance of Mahan's dismissal of trade warfare and commerce protection by historians and naval strategists alike has led to studies concentrated on battleships and fleet warfare. Such a narrow focus omits instances where privateering campaigns decisively influenced the course of maritime war, as during the Anglo-Dutch Wars.⁸⁹ Jones and Jeremy Black have each argued that a lack of appreciation for alternative naval policies during the

⁸⁶ Daniel A. Baugh, "Great Britain's Blue Water Policy 1689-1763," *International History Review* 10 no.1 (1988), 40-42.

⁸⁷ D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 16.

⁸⁸ A recent work arguing that the overwhelming focus of Britons was toward land campaigns in Europe in the eighteenth century is Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783* (New York: Basic, 2009), 3-4; Jonathan R. Dull, *The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British & French Navies, 1650-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), meanwhile, provides a useful comparison of fleet power and its relationship to dynastic politics in Europe.

⁸⁹ Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 29. For a discussion on commerce raiding during the period under study: J.S. Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies, 1660-1760* (London: Hambledon Press, 1987).

seventeenth century led to the inability of England to adapt to the French strategy of commerce raiding (*guerre de course*). Constant fear of invasion generated by the campaigns in Ireland and the Battle of Barfleur (1692) resulted in concentrations of Royal Navy vessels in the English Channel despite periods of minimal enemy fleet activity. England did attempt to enhance its diplomatic power by employing its fleet to compensate for limited military capabilities on shore, as the blue water historians have noted. Nevertheless, both Jones and Black conclude that such strategic orientations rendered the English fleet incapable of effectively responding to French commerce raiding. The War of the Spanish Succession brought little reprieve from the wrath of privateering as the focus on the Channel precluded other options.⁹⁰

J.D. Davies argues that despite efforts by blue water authors to demonstrate the link between strategy and policy, they still suggest that British naval power was a decisive factor in the outcome of European land wars. In contrast, Davies argues, naval policy leading up to the Revolution of 1688 revolved around the inability to employ a single consistent strategy. Official policy emphasized the deployment of the largest possible fleet in the North Sea during the Anglo-Dutch Wars, a strategy compromised if English warships themselves engaged in commerce raiding, or when the state found it necessary to divert resources for the defence of trade, particularly to the Mediterranean.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Jeremy Black, "British Naval Power and International Commitments: Political and Strategic Problems 1688-1770," in *Parameters of British Sea Power, 1650-1890*, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), 39-40; J.R. Jones, "Limitations of British Sea Power in the French Wars," in *British Navy*, ed. Black and Woodfine, 38-44.

⁹¹ J.D. Davies, "The Birth of the Imperial Navy? Aspects of Maritime Strategy c. 1650-1690," in *Parameters of British Sea Power*, ed. Duffy, 14, 18-21.

It is ironic that by the time war erupted again in 1689, the ratio of large vessels to smaller escorts actually dictated a fleet strategy at the expense of much needed trade protection.⁹²

Michael Duffy continues on the theme initiated by Davies by arguing that “real” British naval power did not manifest itself until the navy developed sufficient support networks and proper facilities for victualling and repairs, something that did not occur until well after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Those shortcomings further complicated any search for a consolidated strategy for fleet deployment once England went to war in 1689. According to Duffy, the English may have denied the sea to the French, but the navy could not guarantee comprehensive security until the advent of a western squadron based out of Plymouth in the 1740s. Such a deployment of warships would free up units to combat the powerful French squadrons dispatched for commerce raiding and support of overseas colonies. On the surface, these conclusions appear similar to those reached by Ehrman. Authors such as Duffy and Davies, however, have tended to view the actions at Beachy Head and Bantry Bay, the destruction of the Smyrna convoy in 1693, and even the victory at Barfleur as demonstrations of the continued weakness of the navy rather than of its strength.⁹³

Even if not discussed in detail, recent analysis has established that trade protection did indeed extend overseas to the furthest corners of the empire. However, as with discussions of sea power and naval strength, attention given to trade protection can become preoccupied with what the service did for Europe rather than for the British Atlantic. The expansion of British trade and influence across the Atlantic during the

⁹² J.D. Davies, “The English Navy on the Eve of War,” in *Guerres Maritimes*, no. ed., 3-4.

⁹³ Michael Duffy, “The Establishment of the Western Squadron as the Linchpin of British Naval Strategy,” in *Parameters of British Sea Power*, ed. Duffy, 60-63.

period before the American Revolution remain linked to overseas commerce, while events such as the passage of the various Navigation Acts and the ensuing expansion of the overseas colonial empire are frequently tied to the development of a maritime empire.⁹⁴ If indeed one of the navy's chief functions was to protect trade, then the major studies of trade, navy, and empire follow the naval historiography by insisting that the defence of Britain, by default, secured the defence of its trade. An element of truth permeates this assessment, despite the critique of some historians that focusing the lion's share of navy resources in Europe may not have been the most practical option. N.A.M. Rodger suggests the potential for a compromise when he argues that the relationship between navy and empire was not based on a comprehensive strategy worked out by Admiralty, Crown, or Parliament; it was much more *ad hoc*, and the navy solved problems as they arose. Those in charge of the navy had practical ideas on how to run their service on a daily basis and they were not constrained by theories or civilian politicians.⁹⁵ An important structural support for such an assertion comes from Jan Glete's essential study, *Navies and Nations*. Glete ties the process of naval development to the seventeenth-century appearance of modern governmental apparatus capable of providing the material and administration necessary to maintain a permanent fleet. The state, nevertheless, had not yet achieved a full monopoly of "violence at sea," and no universal concept of naval doctrine existed. States employed centralized navies based on circumstance rather than a rationalized delineation of need.⁹⁶ Such insights are powerful

⁹⁴ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490-1690* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), Ch. 8.

⁹⁵ Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire," 170-71.

⁹⁶ Glete, *Navies and Nations*, Vol. 1, 158-60.

tools for explaining imperial deployment, and avoiding anachronistic Mahan-style concepts, even if Rodger's own conclusions suggest that the navy's role in the Americas was of minimal consequence before the middle of the eighteenth century.

1.4-The Navy and Atlantic History

Rodger's concepts point the way for incorporating the navy into the predominant context for studying transatlantic and colonial development recently popular with scholars, that of the British Atlantic World. As water formed the principal means of early modern communication, the best template for studying the navy, shipping, and other maritime transatlantic themes within this model remains that championed by Ian K. Steele in his monograph *The English Atlantic*. By the last third of the seventeenth century, ocean travel was normal and consistent. The layers of sea travel and communication established a circular routine where ships and vessels commenced their journey at one point along the Atlantic rim, traversed the ocean (perhaps touching several locales along the way), and returned home using the prevailing trade winds and Atlantic currents. The physical interrelation between transatlantic regions was based on the reciprocal nature of trade routes. The Atlantic Ocean was a social and economic bridge rather than a divide between nations, empires, and societies.⁹⁷ Consciously or not, the peoples of Britain began to rely on overseas areas of influence as much as colonies began to rely on the structure of the British government. This has been described recently as "mutual dependence," and assists in smoothing the analysis not to favour either side of the

⁹⁷ Steele, *English Atlantic*, vii-ix.

Atlantic.⁹⁸ Regular convoy and station ship deployment by its physical nature would be immersed in such transatlantic exchange.

A related theme is the concept of “negotiated authorities” and thus “negotiated empires.” Not unlike Steele, Jack P. Greene challenges nationalistic interpretations by arguing that empires were not able to impose policy at will upon colonists and native societies, and forced instead to negotiate a power structure with them. At the same time, few levels of colonial development and growth in British America prior to the American Revolution were physically possible, or socially desirable, without ties to Europe. People from every social stratum, but especially elites, saw advantages in remaining within the bureaucratic networks and loose ideological framework established by the British state. This did not prevent colonial societies from asserting their own individuality, but compromise was required at both regional and imperial levels. All parties recognized that deference to a central government could not be legislatively or militarily enforceable to any level of consistency given the limited resources of the early modern state. Within this mutual understanding, anyone could seek or grant concessions with relative ease and safety.⁹⁹

Atlantic history is not necessarily a new approach, but of late it has blossomed into an attractive method utilized by many to avoid the restrictive realm of constitutional and political empires, with their orientation on the development of modern boundaries and narrowly conceived nationalist history.¹⁰⁰ As one commentator phrased it: “To its

⁹⁸ Jeremy Smith, *Europe and the Americas: State Formation, Capitalism and Civilizations in Atlantic Modernity* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 5-6.

⁹⁹ Greene, “Negotiation Authorities,” 4-17.

¹⁰⁰ Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

advocates, Atlantic history carries fewer presuppositions about cultural hierarchies and displays more openness to multidirectional effects,” in order to downplay that vein of early modern history documenting the rise of imperial powers from Western Europe.¹⁰¹ All manner of Atlantic history suggests that the relationships between Europe and areas brought under imperial suzerainty, or within spheres of interest and contact, were reciprocal relationships in one manner or another, with the Atlantic Ocean itself as the principal means of exchange.¹⁰²

Where Atlantic history claims to differ from Imperial history is at the level of analysis. An Atlantic approach replaces the systems, institutions, and politics of the imperial powers by those persons subjected by, and in resistance to, such structures.¹⁰³ Such an approach proves beneficial, for example, in the exploration of the slave trade. The arena where Africans and Britons interacted most frequently was not Britain (despite London’s sizeable black population) but the Atlantic World of the slave trade and overseas plantation system.¹⁰⁴ The use of an Atlantic model in such cases has earned

2005), 30-56. Some pioneering works include: K.G. Davies, *The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1974); Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1973).

¹⁰¹ Carole Shammas, “Introduction,” *The Creation of the British Atlantic World*, ed. Elizabeth Mancke and Shammas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 2.

¹⁰² Steele, *English Atlantic*, vii-ix.

¹⁰³ Shammas, “Introduction,” 15-16; Allan I. Macinnes, “Connecting and Disconnecting with America,” in *Shaping the Stuart World, 1603-1714: The Atlantic Connection*, ed. Macinnes and Arthur H. Williamson (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1-30. Some illustrative monographs include: David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication Between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); David Harris Sacks, *The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Alan L. Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun: Scottish Migrants in Jamaica and the Chesapeake, 1740-1800* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Olson, *Making the Empire Work*; Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999); Even biographical formats have been employed to demonstrate wider transatlantic links. For example: Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1695* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

¹⁰⁴ Philip D. Morgan, “British Encounters with Africans and African Americans, circa 1600-1700,” in

dividends for the study of a wider British history, but it also has drawn criticism that English-speaking scholars have controlled the discourse, and this implies that the Atlantic World was little more than an English lake.¹⁰⁵ Practitioners of Atlantic and imperial histories have debated, among other things, whether centralized imperial institutions are at odds with the largely de-centralized lives of individuals and groups intermingling along seaways and the Atlantic littoral.

The strongest cautionary statements regarding an Atlantic paradigm operate against the inclusion of the navy and its personnel in any such analysis given its direct connection to state and government. Atlantic history, it is argued, should not simply be employed as a more acceptable way to study old-style national and imperial history. Formal structures did exist throughout the Atlantic world, but they were not necessarily the environment within which most people operated.¹⁰⁶ At best, such a position belies the superimposition of modern boundaries upon their early modern counterparts. At worst, the purging of empire and the nation state from Atlantic history can lead to the marginalization of alternative viewpoints and physical realities. Instead, the Atlantic World becomes an excuse to continue with equally narrow colonial histories, or the

Strangers Within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 160-61.

¹⁰⁵ Alan L. Karras, "The Atlantic World as a Unit of Study," in *Atlantic American Societies*, ed. Karras and J.R. MacNeill (London: Routledge, 1992), 5-6. Some works in English attempting to address the imbalance include: Paul Butel, *The Atlantic*, trans. Hamilton Grant (London: Routledge, 1999) and J.H. Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). See also: Frank Broeze, and others, "Roundtable," *International Journal of Maritime History* 12 no. 1 (2000), 261-86, which discusses Butel; *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Greene and Morgan, contains a section with chapters discussing the Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch Atlantics.

¹⁰⁶ Bailyn, *Atlantic History*, 61-62.

concentrated study of those colonies that became the United States of America, thereby ignoring the Caribbean and those regions that later formed Canada.¹⁰⁷

In the interest of dividing the genre into distinctive, but mutually reinforcing, methodologies, David Armitage outlines three broad structural concepts of Atlantic history: Circum-, Trans- and Cis-Atlantic history. Armitage's groupings provide a useful framework for blending an institution such as the navy into the Atlantic World. Circum-Atlantic history is described as the transitional history of the Atlantic world, focussing on the systems and processes leading to the exchange of culture and construction of identity. Trans-Atlantic history represents the comparative histories of various international bodies within the transitional Circum-Atlantic world. Cis-Atlantic history refers mainly to extracting the history "of any particular place – a nation, a state, a region, even a specific institution – in relation to the wider Atlantic world."¹⁰⁸ Of the three types of Atlantic history, Cis-Atlantic history easily applies to the parameters set within the present work in that the navy, both as an institution and a conglomerate of individuals, can be examined. Despite this framework, the early modern spilling of British trade and influence beyond the confines of the Atlantic Ocean into the Indian and Pacific provides an argument for favouring an imperial view over any restrictive application of Atlantic

¹⁰⁷ Peter A. Coclanis, "*Drang Nach Osten*: Bernard Bailyn, the World-Island, and the Idea of Atlantic History," *Journal of World History* 13 no. 1 (2002) 169-82; David Armitage, "Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?" *American Historical Review* 104 no. 2 (1999), 438. This article is part of a forum entitled "The New British History in Atlantic Perspective." The remaining articles are: Jane Ohlmeyer, "Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories," *ibid.*, 446-62; Ned C. Landsman, "Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800," *ibid.*, 463-75; Eliga H. Gould, "Virtual Nation: Greater Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution," *ibid.*, 476-89; and J.G.A. Pocock, "The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary," *ibid.*, 490-500.

¹⁰⁸ Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," 15-25.

history, especially given the value accorded to goods imported from Asia.¹⁰⁹ Ships or expeditions sent into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, sponsored in whole or in part by the navy, such as those undertaken by William Kidd, William Dampier, Woodes Rogers, and George Anson further blur a specifically “Atlantic” approach for the navy and early modern empire.¹¹⁰ In this regard, an Atlantic mode of study may not be applicable as small-scale overseas naval deployment extended beyond the Atlantic into the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Much like Armitage, Stephen Hornsby argues that discussion of broad imperial and maritime themes is one way to overcome the geographic limitations of histories based on modern state boundaries. Recognition and identification of the expansive and fluid frontiers of early imperial activity provides a more accurate basis for explaining the rise and fall of empires and creation of modern states.¹¹¹ Hornsby joins historians such as Linda Colley and C.A. Bayly whose work suggests that what may have been important for denizens of the Atlantic littoral differs from the histories perpetuated by modern nation-states.¹¹² As Colley points out by way of example, England received the Mediterranean outpost at Tangiers in 1661 as part of Charles II’s dowry upon his marriage to Catherine of Braganza. The Crown expended considerable effort to turn the city into a harbour and naval base, but the English vacated it in 1684 when the cost proved prohibitive and strategic value negligible. Largely forgotten and of little apparent

¹⁰⁹ P.J. Marshall, “The English in Asia to 1700,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 1: The Origins of Empire*, ed Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 264-85.

¹¹⁰ Ritchie, *Captain Kidd*; Peter T. Bradley, *British Maritime Enterprise in the New World: From the Late Fifteenth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 494-502, 521-35. For an example of an East Indian convoy see the three ships in the service of the East India Company in 1703. Admiralty List, Dec. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 8/8.

¹¹¹ Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 1.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 63-68.

importance to the explosion of imperial activity that followed, Tangiers was very much on the minds of English foreign policy planners and those soldiers assigned to the garrison, while travellers and sailors feared imprisonment into slavery at the hands of Barbary corsairs.¹¹³

Bayly meanwhile provides some important contextual ideas despite writing on the period following the American Revolution. Whether Anglocentric or not, most broad interpretations of British history incorporate the empire as a matter of course, and Bayly identifies traditional imperial historiography as arising out of the need to categorize and evaluate the transfer of British political institutions abroad. This was later accompanied by attention to Britain's economic successes. More relevant for the current discussion, Bayly suggests that events in the periphery have not been sufficiently recognized as having had an impact on decisions made in the metropolis. Developments within early-modern Asian empires are equal to European commercial expansion for explaining Britain's penetration into the Indian sub-continent.¹¹⁴ Such observations are not limited to imperial history and correspond, for example, to a general critique of seventeenth-century English political history by Jonathan Scott, who maintains that the polemics of historians left, right, and centre potentially marginalize what people themselves thought and believed, or what contemporary influences directed their actions.¹¹⁵

There is a danger, of course, in turning these arguments against the twelve ships serving in the western Atlantic because the bulk of deployment remained firmly in

¹¹³ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850* (London: Pimlico, 2003), 17, 23-41; Games, "Beyond the Atlantic," 690-91.

¹¹⁴ C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Longman, 1989), 14.

¹¹⁵ Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43-46.

Europe. But they can also support the suggestion that what was important to naval historians in the first half of the twentieth century, the correlation between history and the development of modern naval power, may not have been what animated contemporary policy makers needing to organize both fleets and trade protection services. From a different perspective: what might have been important for concepts of European naval power, namely the deployment of squadrons in the Channel and Mediterranean, may not have seemed important from the perspective of colonies and colonists who may have had direct experiences with only one or two station ships or convoy escorts at a time.

A recent forum by John G. Reid and Luca Codignola in the journal *Acadiensis* suggests several effective ways of employing Atlantic World methodologies rather than debating their veracity for imperial history. Codignola believes that early modern transatlantic contact was framed by a wide physical barrier, yet one regularly travelled by a comparatively small network of people. Such people knew, or at least had knowledge of, one another, and this included Aboriginal peoples when Europeans were in the Americas or Africa. As European transplants grew and flourished, the opposite began to occur: the physical barrier shrank, but the cultural barrier grew.¹¹⁶ Reid, meanwhile, asserts that the Atlantic World is best understood as a collusion of Aboriginal and imperial human interaction that may include colonial history if necessary. In general, those colonies that eventually came to form the United States by mid eighteenth century had grown to the point where they could act without consideration for Aboriginal societies, and maintain a limited autonomy from imperial interests. Reid argues that European inhabitants in what became mainland Canada, and other areas of the Atlantic

¹¹⁶ Luca Codignola, "How Wide is the Atlantic Ocean? Larger and Larger," *Acadiensis* 34 no. 2 (2005), 80.

World, did not receive this luxury. Native societies were far more powerful well into the eighteenth century.¹¹⁷ Empire becomes essential for examining the whole of British overseas expansion beyond those parts of North America that eventually became the United States.¹¹⁸ These two approaches effectively shrink the Atlantic Ocean during the period in question, thereby granting potentially greater importance for the navy captains in mediating daily, face-to-face interaction.

Despite a strong defence of the role of empire within a British Atlantic framework, placing the navy within a similar perspective can still prove a difficult task. Historiographical contexts deemed important to the Atlantic paradigm (gender, slavery, and Aboriginal societies for example) have not fully incorporated naval and maritime evidence.¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, some recent Atlantic and imperial analyses are often possible only by disregarding naval history itself. David Armitage critiques Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh's *The Many Headed Hydra* with such an assertion. In their attempt at delineating an early modern, multi-ethnic, transatlantic working-class culture and identity, Armitage maintains that the documents and texts selected as evidence by Rediker and Linebaugh do not clearly identify or construct a transatlantic identity, despite

¹¹⁷ John G. Reid, "How Wide is the Atlantic Ocean? Not Wide Enough!" *Acadiensis* 34 no. 2 (2005), 86. See also: Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 61 no. 1 (2004), 77-106.

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Mancke, "Another British America: A Canadian Model for the Early Modern British Empire," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 no. 1 (1997), 1-36; Pestana, *English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution*, 4-5.

¹¹⁹ Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 1. Examples of recent attempts include: Jeffrey D. Glasco, "The Seaman Feels Him-self a Man," *International Labor and Working-Class History* 66 (2004), 40-56; Margaret Hunt, "Women and the Fiscal-Imperial State in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 29-47; Philip D. Morgan, "Encounters Between British and 'Indigenous' Peoples, c. 1500-1800," in *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850*, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 58-60.

some creative interpretations. Rather, if any collective should provide a basis for the exploration of such an argument it would be the Royal Navy and the British army. Both institutions, in their quest for labour, forced, coerced, or attracted many persons of diverse backgrounds to serve together amid a common system of work increasingly embedded with a patriotic ethos as the eighteenth century progressed.

Any disinterested attempt to locate the making of an Atlantic, British, and, more broadly, imperial working-class in the eighteenth century would thus have to begin with the Royal Navy and, above all, the Army, not push them to the very margins of its analysis.¹²⁰

Rediker and Linebaugh correctly argue that sailors routinely defied the restrictions placed on them by the navy, and acknowledge its reach and importance as the largest early-modern institution. Yet *The Many-Headed Hydra* views the navy merely as a monolith of impressment and unfree labour that undermines any notion that sailors lobbied and negotiated their own terms of service within the limits placed on them by the navy. The authors consider outright rejection of naval service as the only means of worker emancipation.¹²¹

Rediker and Linebaugh are not alone in continuing to think of the navy as a bastion of imperial and governmental oppression rather than as an entity forced to engage and negotiate the conditions of its existence like any other transoceanic phenomenon. Conclusions that paint the navy as a faceless, violent oppressor downplay new research suggesting that the navy may not have been the floating prison of traditional lore. Even

¹²⁰ David Armitage, "The Red Atlantic," *Reviews in American History* 29 no. 4 (2001), 483-84. For the formation of a distinctly British identity throughout the eighteenth century the starting point is Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

¹²¹ Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 160-61; cf. N.A.M. Rodger, "Stragglers and Deserters from Royal Navy During the Seven Years' War," *Historical Research* 57 no. 135 (1984), 56-79.

some recent works that expand the analytical limits of maritime and imperial history continue to rely on the antiquated stereotype of the filthy and backward navy so as to emphasize that late-eighteenth century women, for example, not only faced the very real issues of legal marginalization and patriarchy in wider society, but their presence on board ships allowed them:

... to experience the disease, overcrowding, limited fresh water (which precluded the possibilities of bathing or washing clothes), rotten food, drunken crews, rough seas and recurrent threat of capture by hostile vessels that were standard features of shipboard life.¹²²

Even allowing for hyperbole and the legitimate hardships of life at sea, such conclusions are jarring in their dismissal of recent scholarship on the social history of the sailing navy.¹²³

Within the historiographical rush to seek international, transnational, and trans-social connections and patterns, Ian K. Steele cautions that empires still existed, and did so within the physical domain of the Atlantic World. Imperial expansion and imperial war did considerable damage to the development of a pan-national transatlantic culture. The existence of state-sponsored maritime activity (in the form of privateers, convoys, and blockade) during imperial war assisted in, and forced, the identification of overseas expansion with the metropolis.¹²⁴ Yet, before the middle of the eighteenth century, the

¹²² Kathleen Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 2003), 98; Suzanne Stark, *Female Tars: Women Aboard Ship in the Age of Sail* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 13. This is not to deny the greater contribution of Wilson to the understanding of eighteenth-century Britain and its empire. For example: *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹²³ Wilson cites N.A.M. Rodger's social history of the mid eighteenth-century navy, *The Wooden World*, with the qualifying statement "tends to underplay these difficulties." Wilson, *Island Race*, 98 note 20.

¹²⁴ Ian K. Steele, "Bernard Bailyn's American Atlantic," *History and Theory* 46 (2007), 55. Steele critiques Bailyn for essentially employing the Atlantic to uphold ideas of American exceptionalism, but the introduction to the important collection *Strangers Within the Realm* mentions in passing the importance of

total number of imperial forces in North America, even allowing for scale, remained small, a fact that continues to cast a shadow over questions concerning their overall impact upon metropolitan policies. Jacob M. Price paints a grim picture of the percentage of elites in the British Isles between 1715 and 1775 with discernible long-term experience, knowledge, or interest in the thirteen colonies that comprised the future United States. In particular, he discusses fifty-four navy officers who served in Parliament between 1715 and 1754. Price points out the difficulty of recreating the careers of many officers, but cites sources that locate twenty-one who had experience in Newfoundland or the West Indies, with only two who had served the mainland colonies. This contributes to the overall argument that within the halls of government, few had experience with the American colonies before mid-century¹²⁵

A more useful question to ask might be how many officers with overseas experience (including service outside the mainland of North America) beyond those who became Members of Parliament rose to the highest levels of the navy, or failed to rise at all? While the challenges of career reconstruction pointed out by Price remain, greater numbers of captains who survived to become senior officers within naval administration served in America than is generally realized.¹²⁶ Many officers served on multiple assignments in North America who did not rise beyond the rank of captain. A good

war for understanding the public sphere of overseas expansion. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, "Introduction," to *Strangers Within the Realm*, ed. Bailyn and Morgan, 25.

¹²⁵ Jacob M. Price, "Who Cared about the Colonies: The Impact of the Thirteen Colonies on British Society and Politics, circa 1714-1775," in *Strangers Within the Realm*, ed. Bailyn and Morgan, 401-02; Gwyn, "Royal Navy in North America," 144, echos this point.

¹²⁶ Four captains who served in New England, Robert Fairfax, Salmon Morrice, Thomas Mathews, and Peter Warren, reached flag rank. David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo, *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (Aldershot: Scolar Press/Navy Records Society, 1994), 149, 321, 304, 459.

example is Captain Vincent Pearse (died 1745).¹²⁷ Pearse travelled to Newfoundland in 1706 as a lieutenant, and as a captain served on station at New York (1717-1721), twice at Virginia (1725-1728 and 1730-35), and back to New York in 1738.¹²⁸ A contemporary and colleague of Pearse's, Admiral Peter Warren, has been well documented for his ability to coordinate opportunity with expanding colonial societies and their rising importance within British political and strategic thought. One of the fortunate captains to become rich from prize money, Warren also gained considerable experience as both a New York and New England station ship captain. As the commander of a squadron during the first siege of Louisbourg in 1745, he drew on his experiences to lobby for the establishment of a permanent North American squadron. Warren went on to marry into New York society, and proceeded to speculate on land purchases in America only to be stifled in his more ambitious attempts at high politics in England.¹²⁹ Pearse's efforts proved more modest, but he too attempted to utilize continuous employment in the colonies for personal benefit, without a fortuitous stash of prize money. While fitting for New York in 1737, for example, Pearse entered into negotiations with the Victualling Board for a victualling contract to supply himself while at New York, thereby pocketing the profits rather than seeing them go to the local merchants.¹³⁰

Service in the western Atlantic formed but part of an officer's career that could be global in nature. Thomas Mathews' first assignment as a post-captain in 1703 was

¹²⁷ Ibid., 352.

¹²⁸ Admiralty Lists: Sept.-Dec. 1706, TNA PRO ADM 8/9; June 1717-Sept. 1721, TNA PRO ADM 8/14; May 1725-June 1728, TNA PRO ADM 8/15-16; Apr. 1730-June 1735, TNA PRO ADM 8/17-18; Aug. 1738, TNA PRO ADM 8/20.

¹²⁹ Julian Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral, The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1974), 15-24; Gwyn, *An Admiral for America: Sir Peter Warren, Vice Admiral of the Red 1702-1752* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).

¹³⁰ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 27 Mar. 1737, TNA PRO ADM 110/11.

commanding the *Yarmouth*, assigned to Admiral Graydon's abortive squadron to the West Indies and Newfoundland. While captain of the *Dover*, he escorted a mast convoy to New Hampshire in 1706, and from October 1709 until January 1713 captained the New England station ship at Boston. While there, he participated in the 1710 capture of Port Royal, Acadia, and assisted Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker's squadron in its 1711 attempt on Quebec. Mathews served further in the West Indies and the Mediterranean, and commanded a squadron to assist the East India Company in 1721. Upon his return to England in 1724, Mathews faced a court martial over various alleged infractions. Fined and disgraced for his actions, Mathews rebounded to be promoted to Rear Admiral following the outbreak of war in 1739. Mathew's rise is all the more noteworthy given his combative personality; he seemed to quarrel everywhere he went. His most famous confrontation came with Admiral Richard Lestock, his subordinate officer during the engagement at Toulon in 1744. Mathew's distant travels were not unique within the fleet. At one point during Toulon, Admiral Mathews in the *Namur* was forced to shout out orders to Captain James Cornwall following in the *Marlborough*.¹³¹ Subsequently killed during the battle, Cornwall had served as the station ship captain at New England from 1724 to 1727.¹³²

A discussion on Atlantic history at least permits movement away from concentration on the relevance of naval power to empire in order to focus more on the

¹³¹ This passage: Daniel A. Baugh, "Mathews, Thomas (1676–1751)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18332>.

¹³² J. K. Laughton, "Cornwall, James (*bap.* 1698, *d.* 1744)," rev. Philip Carter, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6329>. Cornwall, a Member of Parliament (and probably headed for flag rank before his death), is not one of the two officers of mainland experience quoted by Price, they being John Norris and Peter Warren.

relevance of the navy in the form of its personnel. The captain, in particular, had a vital role as a link between imperial naval administration, colonial elites, and the world of the warship. A corresponding wealth of sources in the Admiralty records reflects these multi-dimensional, transatlantic relationships. It is fortunate that several important works and collections of documents already exist outlining the basic administrative and social structure of the navy in which these captains operated, including studies such as Ehrman's, despite their argued limitations. While it is frequently acknowledged that N.A.M. Rodger's *The Wooden World* represented a landmark in the writing of naval social history, Rodger himself recognizes the earlier contribution of Baugh's *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole*. Although primarily concerned with the war years beginning in 1739, many of the entrenched administrative routines and processes evolved earlier in the eighteenth century, and Baugh can still provide the answers to some questions. For the seventeenth century, Davies' *Gentleman and Tarpaulins* performs a similar, and essential, service. Several volumes of documents and commentary published by, or for, the Navy Records Society shed light on the operational routines of the navy, providing important background information and points of comparison.¹³³ Although discussed in detail within Chapter Three, a growing literature on the early-modern professions exists that can assist in placing the captain within a broader social construct,

¹³³ *The Sergison Papers*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: The Navy Records Society, 1950); *Queen Anne's Navy: Documents Concerning the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702-1714*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: Navy Records Society, 1961); *Naval Administration, 1715-1750*, ed. Daniel A. Baugh (London: Navy Records Society, 1977); *British Naval Documents, 1204-1960*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and others (Aldershot: Scolar Press/Navy Records Society, 1993).

and works by Geoffrey Holmes, N.A.M. Rodger, and Ian Ross have engaged the navy directly.¹³⁴

1.5- Conclusion

Sufficient source material exists to recreate the Royal Navy's convoy and station ship service between 1660 and 1739, with emphasis on those ships sent to New England between 1686 and 1739. Secondary literature dealing with the subject matter does exist, and it provides important contextual information, but it is limited, and a tendency exists among many historians to focus their analysis of overseas deployment on the more important (in naval terms) decades following 1739. Recent histories of the British Atlantic and British Empire tend to confirm such temporal distinctions, while others view the navy as an institution within the imperial machine, something to be distanced rather than understood. However, by discussing general trends within naval history alongside aspects of Atlantic and imperial history, a different set of questions can be raised regarding the relationship between the navy and North America prior to 1739. In particular, questions relating to the actions of individual captains within their own corporate body, and their connection to the Atlantic World. Thus, a study of the overseas trade protection service can be undertaken within its own contexts rather than as an afterthought of others. While this chapter has endeavoured to establish a context for analysis, it is necessary to outline the overall nature of transatlantic naval service to North America to compensate for the shortage of available secondary material. The

¹³⁴ Geoffrey Holmes, *Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 274-87; N.A.M. Rodger, "Honour and Duty at Sea, 1660-1815," *Historical Research* 75 (2002), 427-47; Ian Roy, "The Profession of Arms," in *The Professions in Early Modern England*, ed. Wilfred Prest (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 194-208.

reconstruction of convoy and station ship service and the underlying reasons for deployment is the goal of the next chapter.

Chapter 2: A Reconstruction of North Atlantic Naval Deployment, 1660-1739

Defending the British Isles constituted the principal function of the Royal Navy from the 1650s onward. The navy's second most important function, trade protection, grew into an important aspect of maritime defence as commerce, enhanced and protected by the Navigation Acts, continued its expansion further afield from Europe. Such growth provided the economic basis for England/Great Britain's participation in European wars. The defence of overseas trade combined with defence of the realm primarily through the navy's efforts to control Northern European waters, approaches to the British Isles, and trade routes in the Mediterranean. This defensive posture radiated out towards imperial holdings and areas of interest during both war and peace via convoys and station ships, supplemented with the occasional squadron or expedition. Throughout most of the period 1660 to 1739, British trade faced continued threats from Dutch, French, Spanish, and Barbary commerce raiders, as well as pirates and trade interlopers, who increasingly found ways to stab at British merchant vessels wherever they might travel.¹

This chapter will provide an overall survey of convoy and station ship deployment to mainland North America and Newfoundland between 1660 and 1739, in order to

¹ J.R. Jones, "Limitations of British Sea Power in the French Wars, 1689-1815," in *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 33-50; David Aldridge, "The Navy as Handmaid for Commerce and High Policy, 1680-1720," in *ibid.*, 51-70; Daniel A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of 'A Grand Marine Empire,'" in *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689-1815*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994), 185-86; Richard Harding, *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 85-86; N.A.M. Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1689-1793," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 169; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, rev. ed. (London: Ashfield, 1983) provides the long-term relationship between patterns of economic and naval development.

provide context for further analysis of individual captains' experience. Since the nature of naval deployment in the available literature can be confusing, the chapter examines evidence demonstrating that a regular North American naval service developed after the Restoration of 1660. Without the benefit of the monthly Admiralty Lists, and other records relevant to deployment, some older histories have suggested that little, or no, sustained naval coverage existed at all in North America outside the West Indies before well into the eighteenth century.² Meanwhile, naval histories that include discussions of North American trade protection within the period 1660 to 1739 frequently employ the otherwise practical divisions of pre-1688, 1688-1713, and post-1713.³ The regularization of both the Newfoundland convoy after 1660, and the North American station ships after 1684, however, emerged out of the increasing institutionalization of the navy and the expansion of overseas trade protection in a form still recognizable by 1739.

The separation of North America from the West Indies and similar British trade networks within this discussion is an expedient to introducing the detailed research in the chapters to follow, especially regarding New England. The administrative dispatch of convoys and station ships to North America did not differ in intent from deployment elsewhere, although factors such as climate, distance, and transfer of authority could

² For example: Philip S. Haffenden, *New England in the English Nation, 1689-1713* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 226-32. See the discussion above, Ch. 1, 41-43.

³ Sari Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991); Hornstein, "The English Navy and the Defense of American Trade in the Late Seventeenth Century," in *Global Crossroads and the American Seas*, ed. Clark G. Reynolds (Missoula: Pictorial Histories, 1988), 103-120; Patrick Crowhurst, *The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1977); A.W.H. Pearsall, "The Royal Navy and Trade Protection, 1688-1714," *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 30 (1986), 109-123; Christopher Ware, "The Royal Navy and the Plantations, 1720-1730," in *Global Crossroads and the American Seas*, ed. Reynolds, 121-126.

separate various regions.⁴ For convenience, the era is divided into three chronological phases of 1660 to 1691, 1692 to 1713 and 1714 to 1739. Each phase retains certain idiosyncrasies, but can be tied together within a common administrative routine and, as discussed in the previous chapter, by several interlocking themes related to the evolving British maritime empire. These themes include not only overseas commercial expansion, but also bureaucratic development and entrenchment, the stabilization of naval administration, the professionalization of the sea officer corps, and colonial growth and development within an increasingly centralized Atlantic imperial context.⁵

In one of the few systematic studies of American deployment covering both the Restoration and the war years from 1689 to 1713, I.R. Mather calculates that between 1660 and 1720 the Admiralty ordered 703 warships to the Caribbean, the mainland colonies, and Newfoundland. This averaged eleven or twelve vessels per year including ships attached to squadrons or expeditions.⁶ Excluding the Caribbean, a further ninety-eight ships can be appended for the years 1721 to 1739 with seven to New York, six to New England, twelve to Virginia, fourteen to South Carolina, two to Georgia, and an

⁴ For example: the 1703 convoy to the East Indies. Admiralty List, Nov. 1703, United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty (ADM) 8/8; Christian Buchet, "The Royal Navy in the Caribbean, 1689-1763," *Mariner's Mirror* 80 no. 1 (1994), 31; David Armitage, "Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?" *American Historical Review* 104 no. 2 (1999), 438.

⁵ Some recent works summarising these processes include: Elizabeth Mancke, "Negotiating an Empire: Britain and its Overseas Peripheries, c. 1550-1780," in *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820*, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 235-266; Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Ch. 2; Harding, *Evolution of the Sailing Navy*, Ch. 4; Daniel A. Baugh, "The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815," in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, ed. J.R. Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; paperback ed. 2002), 120-160; N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London: W.W. Norton, 2005), Ch. 7 and 12.

⁶ I. R. Mather, "The Role of the Royal Navy in the English Atlantic Empire, 1660-1720" (DPhil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1995), 17-18.

overwhelming majority of fifty-seven for the yearly Newfoundland convoy.⁷ Naturally, the absolute numbers of ships rose during wartime, but Mather argues that this does not mean deployment during peace should be thought of as less important. In fact, ships sent abroad formed the greater percentage of all deployment during peacetime, and during the winter months when the navy laid up its battle fleet.⁸ The continuity within the orders and instructions given to captains over time supports Mather's contention by demonstrating that the Admiralty's expectations regarding basic convoy and station ship service did not change from times of war to times of peace.⁹

Station ships and convoys proved more important to colonies than did the infrequently deployed, yet more visible, squadrons and expeditions. Mather identifies sixteen expeditions totalling 170 warships representing 24.25 percent of all ships dispatched between 1660 and 1720, but cautions that some of the expeditions to Hudson Bay and the West Indies are better classified within the context of convoys and station ships.¹⁰ Despite their efforts, the navy could not overcome physical, environmental, and logistical problems to successfully project squadrons overseas for extended periods, or unite them with effective local land forces to achieve tangible results against enemy targets, until after 1739.¹¹ Although not without difficulty, this was not the case for

⁷ Admiralty Lists, 1721-1739, TNA PRO ADM 8/14-20.

⁸ Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 18-20.

⁹ Cf. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. William Kiggins, *Arundel*, 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21; Instructions to Capt. Josias Crowe, *Arundel*, 18 July 1699, TNA PRO ADM 2/26; Instructions to Capt. Thomas Mathews, *Chester*, 8 Aug. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 2/40; Instructions to Capt. Thomas Durell, *Seahorse*, 29 June 1720, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Instructions to Durell, *Scarborough*, 24 Feb. 1732, TNA PRO ADM 2/53. These examples are from ships designed for New England. All, for example, ordered the captains to provide convoy for any ship travelling in their direction if they desired it. See also note 24.

¹⁰ Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 28. Nine expeditions sailed to the West Indies, two sailed to Hudson Bay, and one sailed each to New York, Virginia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec.

¹¹ Richard Harding, "America, the War of 1739-48 and the Development of British Global Power," *Journal for Maritime Research* 6 no. 1 (2004), 1-3; Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776,"

individual ships or convoys. The current study diverges from Mather in that it separates convoys and station ships from squadrons and expeditions based on their differing roles, methods of control, and designation of command. The few squadrons sent to America during this period operated as they did in Europe, with a distinct naval commander who usually did not answer to colonial governments regarding the internal workings of the units under his charge. Sir Francis Wheler, a former convoy captain with experience in Newfoundland, New England, and the Mediterranean, engaged in tough negotiations with the government to ensure that his 1692-93 squadron sailed properly outfitted for overseas service, and free of gubernatorial interference while in the West Indies and mainland America.¹²

In the case of detached warships such as convoys and station ships there was no local commander or centralized command structure. Partial operational command over warships assigned to their jurisdiction was given to the office of colonial governor, and captains were to obey, or consult with, the local government regarding regional operations.¹³ The navy, meanwhile, sought to keep its equipment and personnel out of imperial intrigue to the best of its ability, and checked local authority with evolving sets

in *British Navy and the Use of Naval Power*, ed. Black and Woodfine, 130-147.

¹² Sir Francis Wheler to Secretary of State Nottingham, 18 July 1692, TNA PRO State Papers, Naval (SP) 42/1; C. S. Knighton, "Wheler, Sir Francis (c.1656–1694)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29192>; K.A.J. McLay, "Sir Francis Wheler's Caribbean and North American Expedition, 1693: A Case Study in Combined Operational Command During the Reign of William III," *War in History* 14 no. 4 (2007), 383-407. Admiralty Lists, June 1684-Jan. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 8/1. Wheler's careful planning could not prevent the expedition's failure, due largely to the outbreak of disease. Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 160-61.

¹³ Governor's Authority over Officers of Navy, *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935; reprint, New York: Octagon, 1967), no. 636.

of orders and instructions issued to captains that trumped any orders considered dangerous to the integrity of the ship or to naval policy.¹⁴

In a British Atlantic world often lacking strong central institutions before the middle of the eighteenth-century, even a small warship represented a potential maritime tool in any attempt to extend imperial presence, sovereignty, or dominion overseas.¹⁵ Colonial governors understood this and they usually initiated negotiations for the deployment of station ships to their jurisdictions, especially as they received certain maritime and admiralty rights for which a warship could prove useful in maintaining.¹⁶ Even when the metropolitan government scaled back gubernatorial power over warships on paper, the navy still insisted that captains continue to follow the governor's operational directions in order to create a written account for their actions. Captains, meanwhile, developed enough professional prestige to be employed in diplomatic roles if needed, acting as liaisons to Aboriginal nations and the colonies of other imperial powers.¹⁷ The above points, however, should not be pushed too far beyond the Atlantic littoral as warship commanders received no orders to interfere in colonial politics, nor

¹⁴ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Fleetwood Emms, *Sorlings*, (New England), 6 June 1694, TNA PRO ADM 2/15; Instructions to Capt. Richard Culliford, *Fowey* (New York), 20 Sept. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24; Instructions to Capt. Charles Stucley, *Deptford* (New England), 4 May 1705, TNA PRO ADM 2/33; Instructions to Capt. Thomas Whorwood, *Rye* (Virginia), 5 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Instructions to Capt. James Gascoigne, *Hawk* (South Carolina), 7 Oct. 1735, TNA PRO ADM 2/54; Instructions to Capt. Charles Fanshawe, *Phoenix* (Georgia), 3 Dec. 1737, TNA PRO ADM 2/55. This topic is discussed more fully in Ch. 4 and Ch. 5.

¹⁵ Douglas E. Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americas, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 134.

¹⁶ Leonard W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System before 1783* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930; reprint New York: Frederick Ungar, 1958), 109-112; Ian K. Steele, "The Anointed, the Appointed and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 1689-1784," in *Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 2, ed. Marshall, 110-111.

¹⁷ Harding, *Evolution of the Sailing Navy*, 99. For examples from New England: Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1695* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 158, 171.

were they capable of doing so for extended periods. The partial transfer of operational authority to colonial governors established the working environment of the navy in the colonies, while the Admiralty placed restrictions (both directly and indirectly) on captains in an attempt to limit their participation within the imperial sphere. In the absence of a centralized command structure in North America such expedients did temper officer behaviour in a broad sense, but they also provided a catalyst for conflict with colonial governments.

2.1- North American Deployment

As outlined by Mather, deployment to North America and the West Indies can be broken down into four distinct types: convoys, station ships, advice (packet) boats, and squadrons or expeditions.¹⁸ Warships defending the waters around the British Isles can also be divided into cruising squadrons and individual ships attending various regional stations.¹⁹ Such divisions are useful, but do not reflect the diverse nature of individual deployment. Defence vessels, especially during wartime, frequently undertook multiple assignments by teaming up to patrol the coast, and temporarily falling in with convoys to provide as much protection as possible. When deployed, cruising squadrons, such as the Channel and Soundings squadrons of the 1680s, for example, enhanced safety by permitting escorts to stay with their convoys rather than chase attackers.²⁰ Designed to increase efficiency and strength, warships travelling abroad employed similar collective tactics. Outgoing convoys to a variety of destinations joined with each other to clear

¹⁸ Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 23-32.

¹⁹ John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712* (New York: Garland, 1987), 168-72.

²⁰ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 60-61; Hornstein, "English Navy and the Defense of American Trade," 104-05, 107-08.

home waters, with everyone staying together for as long as possible.²¹ Station ships acted as convoys on their outgoing and returning voyages and transported mail, special cargos, and government passengers and their families. Warships whose principal task was to escort merchant vessels usually remained in American waters only so long as was necessary for the turnaround of the trade. As this might take months, they could be expected to participate in regional defence or patrol the surrounding waters while they waited.²² All captains, whether “going convoy” or travelling to their station, usually received instructions to shepherd and protect all ships requesting escort so long as their paths coincided.²³ Perhaps the most engaging multiple use of the convoy occurred in Newfoundland. Navy officers were responsible for guarding the fishery and protecting harbours from the French or pirates, yet they also represented one of Newfoundland’s few direct connections to the British state. Newfoundland’s population was largely a transient one, so officials in London considered the existing settlements too small to allocate resources for a government, while English merchants argued that any political establishment would threaten both their interests and those of the metropolitan government.²⁴ Instead, the work of the navy evolved into a substitute form of governance for the inhabitants, especially after 1729.²⁵

²¹ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 60-61; Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, 50-51; J.H. Owen, *War at Sea Under Queen Anne, 1702-1708* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 55-58.

²² For example: Instructions to Capt. Charles Stewart, *Garland*, 24 Oct. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/36. Stewart was to cruise between the Virginia Capes until his stores were expended, and then return home with the merchant trade.

²³ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Hodges, *Guernsey* (Newfoundland), 30 Mar. 1661, TNA PRO ADM 2/1725; Instructions to Capt. Isaac Townsend, *Assurance* (Virginia), 29 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 2/8; Instructions to Capt. Richard Studley, *Norwich* (New England/New Hampshire), 23 May 1710, TNA PRO ADM 2/41; Instructions to Capt. George Clinton, *Salisbury* (Newfoundland), 11 May 1731, TNA PRO ADM 2/53.

²⁴ Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005), 33; C. Grant Head, *Eighteenth Century Newfoundland:*

Despite the precautions that were taken, the success of convoys during wartime is difficult to determine because an exact tabulation of merchant ship losses remains elusive thanks to the practice of ransom, recaptures, insufficient record keeping, and contemporary polemical hysterics. In all it appears that French commerce raiders took 12,000 prizes of varying sizes from all enemies between 1689 and 1713. English shipping suffered losses approximating 4000 ships and vessels, although some estimates range from 500 to 900 to 4000 for the Nine Years' War, and 1146 to 2000 to 4544 (with 2118 more ransomed off) for the War of the Spanish Succession.²⁶ Complaints from merchants over their losses reached levels high enough to force Parliament to legislate a Cruisers and Convoys Act for both the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession to ensure protection in home waters.²⁷ Admiralty mismanagement and lack of suitable warships in these instances cannot be dismissed as explanations for the undue numbers of merchant ships lost.²⁸ It is generally surmised, however, that most captures occurred when a ship strayed from the protection of the convoy to gain market advantage, or else became separated due to weather or other mishap. Two key histories of trade

A Geographer's Perspective (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 35-37; Keith Matthews, *Lectures on the History of Newfoundland, 1500-1800* (St. John's: Breakwater, 1988), 98.

²⁵ Ralph G. Lounsbury, *The British Fishery at Newfoundland 1634-1763* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1934; reprint Hamden: Archon, 1969), 273-75; John G. Reid and Elizabeth Mancke, "From Global Process to Continental Strategies: The Emergence of British North America to 1783," in *Canada and the British Empire*, ed. Phillip Buckner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 24, 31; Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 66-68, 133, *passim*.

²⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 158; Nicholas Tracy, *Attack on Maritime Trade* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 52-54; J.S. Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies* (London: Hambledon, 1987), 223; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 315-17.

²⁷ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 159-60, 177-78.

²⁸ The worst example was the French attack on the huge 1693 Smyrna convoy resulting in ninety-two vessels destroyed or captured and French prize money totaling thirty million *livres* thanks to poor intelligence, communication, victualling, and planning. *Ibid.*, 153.

protection suggest that a convoy of a “manageable” size with at least two escorts was usually capable of defending itself from the average predatory attack.²⁹

The Admiralty deployed station ships to “attend” on royal colonies bordering on important trade centres along the major shipping routes and imperial frontiers. Despite the nomenclature, station ships acted in a regional capacity, and did not restrict themselves to a purely local environment or jurisdiction. The New England station ships, for example, frequently patrolled along the coast of northeastern North America to guard the New England fisheries off Nova Scotia, searched along the Maine frontier to identify and intercept any enemy advances during wartime, and took convoys to the West Indies during the winter.³⁰ Unless an impending invasion required local defence, warships were not of much use in, or close to, port. In fact, the number of complaints after 1713 from the colonies regarding navy captains allegedly loitering in harbour rather than patrolling the coasts prompted the Admiralty to issue general orders against such practices in 1728.³¹

Advice boats carrying mail, packets, and proclamations often circumnavigated the Atlantic to reach many ports as quickly as possible. This category can include ships on surveying assignments, or those transporting colonial officials. Mather states that the navy dispatched only twenty-two such vessels in the sixty years between 1660 and 1720,

²⁹ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 56-57; Pearsall, “Royal Navy and Trade Protection,” 116. A detailed description of an attack on a convoy is provided in Ch. 4.

³⁰ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Thomas Smart, *Squirrel*, 19 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Donald F. Chard, “Canso, 1710-1721: Focal Point of New England-Cape Breton Rivalry,” *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 39 (1977), 49-77, W.A.B. Douglas “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766” (Ph.D. Thesis, Queen’s University 1973), 8.

³¹ Admiralty, Orders Against Lying in Port, 13 Dec. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

while the government launched its own packet boat service between 1702 and 1715.³²

Increasingly, warships supplemented, or even replaced, the small vessels employed specifically as advice and packet boats.³³

Expeditions or squadrons, meanwhile, were comprised of warships collected to undertake a specific task. Mather discusses squadrons as a separate deployment from those ships sent as convoy or on station for tabulation purposes, and notes their unique composition.³⁴ It is implied, however, that all deployment was part of a unified system or strategy. This is true, of course, in the sense that all warships and vessels operated within daily parameters set by the naval administration. Nevertheless, when deployment is broken down further, it can be argued that expeditions or squadrons were conceived differently and functioned on another level from individual postings. The organizational difference between the two methods of deployment affected not only how captains and other officers perceived their duty, but also highlights the administrative aspects of maintaining warships overseas. Warships sent on detached duty had a common denominator in that while the Admiralty often ordered junior captains to obey the senior captain going convoy or on station, all reported back directly to the Admiralty Secretary. Ships primarily did this on detached duty or while in port. When in squadron, individual captains reported to the Admiral or senior officer thereof.³⁵

The organizational differences between trade protection and squadrons are illustrated by the Walker expedition to attack Quebec in 1711. Preparations began after

³² Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 31-32; Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), Ch. 9.

³³ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. George Fairly, *Hind*, 25 Sept. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46. The *Hind* transported packets to John Moody, the new British Lieutenant Governor of Placentia.

³⁴ Mather, "Role of the Royal Navy," 28-29.

³⁵ *The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711*, ed. Gerald S. Graham (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1953), xvii.

repeated petitioning and soliciting from imperial governors and jobbers, among whom Joseph Dudley, Francis Nicholson, and Samuel Vetch stand out.³⁶ The project attracted government interest and its development moved in a more ominous direction once it was in the hands of politicians and planners with a less-than-thorough grasp of navy procedure and/or the particulars of North American campaigning. Secretary of State Henry St. John (later Viscount Bolingbroke) envisioned a victory in New France as a way to raise the profile of himself and the Tory party.³⁷ The Lord Treasurer, the Earl of Oxford, agreed to the plan on the stipulation that complete secrecy be maintained. As a result, St. John only partially informed the Navy Board (usually consulted in such matters) as to the squadron's destination and purpose, and kept the Lords of the Admiralty out of touch entirely. The leader of the expedition, Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker, had experience in the colonies, but his political connections to the Tory party and to Secretary of State St. John may have carried equal weight in his appointment.³⁸ The ill-fated expedition encountered difficulty obtaining needed supplies at Boston, lost several transport vessels in the fog of the Saint Lawrence River, and in the end failed even to reach Quebec. The Secretary of the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett, later angrily lashed out that had St. John sought professional advice, he would have been informed of the uncertainties of supply and repair in North America, and the fact that some of the expedition's third-rates would be too large to travel up the Saint Lawrence River or fit into colonial ports.³⁹

³⁶ J.D. Alsop, "The Age of the Projectors: British Imperial Strategy in the North Atlantic in the War of Spanish Succession," *Acadiensis* 21 no. 1 (1991), 43-45.

³⁷ William T. Morgan, "Queen Anne's Canadian Expedition of 1711," *Queen's Quarterly* 35 no. 4 (1928), 463; H.T. Dickinson, *Bolingbroke* (London: Constable, 1970), 85.

³⁸ *Walker Expedition to Quebec*, ed. Graham, 14-15.

³⁹ Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the most Remarkable Transactions at Sea from the Earliest Accounts of Time to the Conclusion of the Last War with France* (London, 1720), 778.

That Walker's squadron of eleven warships, and accompanying transports and support vessels, could be sent out ill-prepared and with naval administration ill-informed offers a contrast to the careful planning insisted upon by Wheler in 1692.⁴⁰ It also reflected the decentralized nature of naval administration, especially between 1688 and 1713. The Revolution of 1688 disrupted navy administrative cohesion, reduced the prestige of the Navy Board, diminished the usefulness of the Admiralty Board, and witnessed the replacement of monarchs who had a vested interest in the sea with William III who, while understanding the importance of sea power, delegated authority over naval affairs so he could concentrate on land campaigns.⁴¹ The Admiralty Board grew into a relatively sterile office for placemen and sinecure recipients during the years 1688 to 1713, and government officials often bypassed it in favour of the administrative Navy Board for urgent matters.⁴²

The Walker case demonstrates that political choices did influence the direction of naval deployment. Yet decisions regarding ship deployment, including convoys, came from a variety of places and interests, and no single body was wholly responsible. Debates arose over what proportion of warships should be employed to support the continental land war versus applying offensive pressure on enemies through various strategies, including blockade and capture of colonies and resources.⁴³ Identified with terms such as "Blue Water" or "Double Forward Commitment," naval planners frequently defied such modern notions of strategy to carry out their duties as a series of

⁴⁰ Admiralty List, June 1711, TNA PRO ADM 8/11.

⁴¹ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 181.

⁴² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Admiralty* (Lavenham: Dalton, 1979), 48.

⁴³ Daniel A. Baugh, "Great Britain's 'Blue-Water Policy,' 1689-1783," *International History Review* 10 no. 1 (1988), 33-58; D.W. Jones, *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 16; Owen, *War at Sea Under Queen Anne*, 40-41.

problems to be solved as they were encountered, rather than as a grand or explicit naval vision.⁴⁴ As listed by N.A.M. Rodger, ten government positions or bodies retained some right or privilege over naval operations between 1689 and 1714: Crown, Lords Justices, Privy Council, Secretary of State (Northern Department), Secretary of State (Southern Department), House of Commons, House of Lords, commander of the main fleet, the Admiralty, and the Board of Trade.⁴⁵

Although politically emasculated between 1688 and 1713, the Admiralty Board remained responsible for the organization and administration of convoys and station ships (although the Navy Board performed much of the actual routine work).⁴⁶ Both boards responded to requests for convoys, while the Admiralty Board formed a liaison between the navy and Parliament to the point of absorbing much of the criticism over trade losses. During the period 1660 to 1739, the Admiralty generally did not initiate trade protection services, but did shape the direction, content, and sailing thereof by reserving deployment until a process of consultation with interests (who lobbied, petitioned, and wrote memorials) finalized with requests from the highest levels of government and prompted action.⁴⁷ Once the decision was reached to regularize service to a particular venue, the navy dutifully dispatched a vessel to that station or organized a particular convoy. In general, this was the pre-1688 process for organizing trade protection and it survived the transformation of administration in 1688.⁴⁸ The Admiralty could not refuse in principle

⁴⁴ Rodger, "Sea Power and Empire," 170-71.

⁴⁵ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 184.

⁴⁶ Rodger, *Admiralty*, 48.

⁴⁷ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 91; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 57-58; Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, 49; Owen, *War at Sea Under Queen Anne*, 57-58; Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession*, 176-83.

⁴⁸ Rodger, *Admiralty*, 36-38; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 54-64.

to deny convoys or station ships following the conclusion of negotiations, but the availability of warships often dictated the level of protection that the navy could be provide.⁴⁹

As an example of how a convoy could be negotiated, the first of the nine specialized mast convoys to New Hampshire between 1692 and 1711 originated with the signing of a contract by William Wallis and John Shorter in December of 1691 to provide the navy with masts. The merchants requested a convoy, and the Admiralty directed them to attend on Secretary of State the Earl of Nottingham for confirmation of their licence.⁵⁰ Nottingham's secretary requested further information on the matter before granting approval. In response, Wallis and Shorter petitioned the Navy Board with a detailed outline of their operation, and pleaded for haste, as their harvesting needed to be finished before the onset of winter.⁵¹ The Navy Board then wrote to the Admiralty Board desiring immediate ratification of the merchant's request, and provision of a convoy for one ship belonging to Wallis and Shorter and two more owned by the mast merchant John Taylor.⁵² The Admiralty appointed the hired fourth-rate *Samuel and Henry* to escort the convoy, which lasted from May to December of 1692.⁵³

Because of myriad requests and orders for services, as well as the need to maintain existing deployments, the Admiralty and Board of Trade (the body that linked government and colonies) established regular correspondence in order to correlate their

⁴⁹ Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 19.

⁵⁰ Navy Board to Admiralty, 11 Jan. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 1/3565.

⁵¹ William Wallis and John Shorter to Navy Board, 2 Mar. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 1/3565.

⁵² Navy Board to Admiralty, 4 Mar. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 1/3565.

⁵³ Admiralty Board Minutes, 19 Apr. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 3/8; Admiralty Lists, May-Dec. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 8/3.

efforts and exchange information. The dispatch of a yearly Newfoundland convoy was essentially automatic after 1692, but the Admiralty and Board of Trade communicated routinely to confirm the selection of ships, their duties, and the nature of instructions to distribute to captains.⁵⁴ Similar correspondence can be found regarding colonies. In 1703, the Admiralty requested an opinion from the Board of Trade as to the proper strength of the New England station and sailing times for convoys now that war had broken out once again. The Board of Trade replied that sufficient forces to check the French in the region had not been deployed during the last war. This caused much suffering among the New Englanders who, the Board claimed, may have lost as much as two-thirds of their overseas shipping. As the enemy rarely sent fewer than two warships of fifty guns each cruising the coasts, the Board recommended two guardships with an outward-bound convoy leaving in February and another in September with a homeward-bound convoy in December. Attending warships could easily accommodate the convoy upon their departure or return.⁵⁵ Despite the suggestions, the Admiralty kept the one station ship already there, the fifth-rate *Gosport*, upgraded its replacement to a fourth-rate, and kept convoys restricted to those escorting mast ships and station ships travelling to and from the region.⁵⁶

The round-trip of the fourth-rate *Chester* could be considered a typical New England deployment for the War of the Spanish Succession. *Chester* entered Portsmouth harbour on 6 July 1709 to clean and take in provisions for service at New England. On 17 August, *Chester* weighed anchor from Spithead with the mast ships *Hampshire* and

⁵⁴ For example: Board of Trade to Admiralty, 27 Jan. 1698 and 6 Apr. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/3814.

⁵⁵ Board of Trade to Admiralty, 8 Dec. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/3814.

⁵⁶ Admiralty Lists, 1704-5, TNA PRO ADM 8/9.

Supply along with seven coasting vessels seeking short-term convoy. The next day, three ships joined the convoy, one each for Virginia, New York, and Boston. On 19 August, *Chester* and its charges cleared the English coast and sighted Cape Cod on 11 October, anchoring in Nantasket Road on the outer edge of Boston harbour the next day.⁵⁷ Over three years later on 23 January 1713, *Chester* left Piscataqua in New Hampshire with a convoy of four mast ships and a brig, anchoring at Spithead on 11 February. During its time as the New England station ship, *Chester* engaged in three winter convoys to the West Indies, a voyage in support of the 1710 capture of Port Royal, Acadia, support for the 1711 expedition to attack Quebec, and an extended patrol of the Northeast coast as far as Newfoundland.⁵⁸

In shifting from a micro to a macro level, the month of June 1733 can be employed to highlight the variety of locales frequented by the navy. The reduced peacetime deployment represents a manageable summary, yet illustrates how far navy resources stretched. The most prominent commitment of warships was the squadron at Jamaica commanded by Captain Sir Chaloner Ogle. This force consisted of two fourth-rates, six sixth-rates, two sloops and a hulk. A squadron of one third-rate and four fourth-rates assembled at Spithead, waiting to sail to the Mediterranean under the command of Rear Admiral Charles Stewart. A scattering of four ships and a lighter had already been dispatched to Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and Minorca, while three sixth-rates patrolled against the Barbary corsairs along the Mediterranean coast of Africa. Three more sixth-rates and five sloops cruised off of Ireland, with a yacht ordered to attend the Irish

⁵⁷ Captain's Log: *Chester*, 6 July 1709-12 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 51/194.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13 Oct. 1709-11 Feb. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 51/194.

government. Numerous sloops and yachts, meanwhile, patrolled off England and Scotland. The 1733 Newfoundland convoy consisted of a fourth-rate and a sixth-rate, with another sixth-rate dispatched to Canso in Nova Scotia. Several ships in port fitted out for foreign voyages, while several more were listed as returning from the West Indies. One second-rate and eight third-rates acted as guardships at Chatham, Sheerness, and Portsmouth. Stripped down to 100 men each, these ships could quickly be worked up in case of an emergency, but for the time being they remained stationary sentinels.⁵⁹ With the exception of the guardships, the largest ship in sea pay was the third-rate being sent to the Mediterranean. In addition to the Jamaica squadron in the West Indies, Barbados received two sixth-rates, the Leeward Islands received one sixth-rate, and two ships were engaged in surveying. On the American mainland, South Carolina, Virginia, New York, and New England all received one sixth-rate on station. Another sixth-rate, meanwhile, transported Lord Baltimore to Maryland. The Admiralty sent a fourth and a fifth-rate to the coast of Africa, another fourth-rate on a short cruise, and a sixth-rate on a diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg. In total, seventy-nine ships and vessels remained in sea pay for the month (totalling 10,408 men). For the most part, they were the smaller rates of warships, and compared to wartime, the level of deployment proved more modest.⁶⁰

The sixth-rate *Scarborough*, commanded by Captain Thomas Durell, was the New England station ship at Boston in 1733. *Scarborough* typified the navy's policy in the years after the War of the Spanish Succession of sending a standardized twenty-gun ship

⁵⁹ Admiralty List, June 1733, TNA PRO ADM 8/18; David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy, Built, Purchased and Captured, 1688-1860* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993), xii.

⁶⁰ Admiralty List, June 1733, TNA PRO ADM 8/18. For comparison, when the *Chester* left England in August of 1709, the number of ships and vessels in sea pay totaled 213 and the number of men 52 826. Admiralty List, Aug. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 8/10.

to guard colonies.⁶¹ Launched in 1722, the navy had completely rebuilt the older thirty-two gun fifth-rate *Scarborough* (dating to 1711) to conform to the specifications for sixth-rates established in 1718.⁶² Captain Durell, meanwhile, already had experience as a station ship captain at Boston having commanded the *Seahorse* on the same duty between 1720 and 1724.⁶³ Although smaller than the fourth-rates anchoring North American convoy and station ship deployment during the War of the Spanish Succession, the dispatch of uniform sixth-rates allowed the navy to send a ship with a smaller crew, yet one believed to be of sufficient strength for the job.⁶⁴

2.2- 1660-1691

The routine of overseas deployment and trade protection services appearing in 1733 had been established before 1688. It centred on deployment to the north of Europe and the Mediterranean, where the Barbary corsairs of North Africa were the principal threat to trade.⁶⁵ The phase between 1660 and 1692 represented a nascent, and more sporadic, deployment to North America, but it is nevertheless an important period for demonstrating how overseas trade protection evolved and expanded along with trade protection in Europe. The relative poverty of the Restoration Crown and government, coupled with European requirements, and the difficult physical challenges of keeping even small warships abroad for extended periods, hampered the development of a

⁶¹ Admiralty List, June 1733, TNA PRO ADM 8/18. In addition to *Scarborough* at New England, the twenty-gun sixth-rates *Seaford*, *Winchelsea*, *Gibraltar*, and *Squirrel* attended New York, Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina respectively, while *Solebay* and *Sheerness* attended Newfoundland.

⁶² Peter Goodwin, *The 20-Gun Ship Blandford* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 8.

⁶³ Admiralty Lists, Aug. 1720-Jan. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 8/14-15.

⁶⁴ Goodwin, *20-Gun Ship Blandford*, 7-8.

⁶⁵ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 259-60.

continuous or regular service.⁶⁶ Even the important Newfoundland fisheries and Virginia tobacco trade did not see uninterrupted service during the Restoration. The arrival of a permanent service for North America lay just beyond 1691. Between 1690 and 1692, both Newfoundland and Virginia began receiving continuous convoy service, while station ship deployment to Virginia and New England (commencing in the 1680s) became regular and was expanded to include New York.⁶⁷

Ongoing service to North America emerged out of the 1660 Restoration of Charles II, as the government intended the navy to provide a state presence in the royal colonies and to enforce trade policy through the Navigation Acts. The various Navigation Acts, beginning in 1651, restricted trade to English ships with predominantly English crews, and required that the goods of all except highly specialized or essential trades pass through English ports before re-export. The legislation encouraged the growth of shipping, denied trade and profits to competitors (in particular the Dutch and Scottish), allowed the central government to bring colonies under tighter regulation, and generated state income in the form of taxes from the import and re-export of goods. Some individuals defied the acts as they found smuggling to be profitable, or else the legislation inhibitive to the smooth flow of everyday life, but most colonial interests benefitted from a restricted market that permitted them equal participation. This allowed the system to flourish despite its underlying mercantilist ideal of benefitting England first.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid., 65-75.

⁶⁷ Admiralty Lists, 1692, TNA PRO ADM 8/2-3.

⁶⁸ This passage: Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 71; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 42-45; John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill:

The concentration of trade generated considerable wealth for the state from foreign goods and hard currency exchanged for Newfoundland fish, as well as customs duties on imported items such as Virginia tobacco and West Indian sugar. Customs, combined with excise taxes (domestic usage) and the hearth tax (on fireplaces; eliminated after 1688 and later replaced by land taxes), continued to represent the most important form of non-Parliamentary government revenue into the eighteenth century. A stipulation in the Restoration settlement channelled customs duties into the royal coffers. Parliament did acquire greater control over the customs as the seventeenth century progressed, but they still provided Crown and government with the ability to borrow money in exchange for the privilege of collecting the tax, either directly or in the form of annuities.⁶⁹ During the period 1558 to 1714, customs revenue provided thirty to forty percent of all state revenue, and anywhere from one-third to one-half of Crown revenue.⁷⁰ Therefore, all levels of government had a stake in seeing the effective and efficient flow of seaborne trade and the protection thereof.⁷¹

University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 46-47; Nuala Zahedieh, "Economy," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 52-54. The comprehensive study of the acts is: Lawrence A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).

⁶⁹ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 92-94.

⁷⁰ Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 106-113; W. A. Speck, "The International and Imperial Context," in *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 392; Michael Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 49; P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756* (London: Macmillan, 1967).

⁷¹ In a twist to the relationship between Crown, customs, and the navy, Parliament in 1675 insisted Charles II pay for a proposed building programme of forty ships out of the annual customs revenue. C.S Knighton, *Pepys and the Navy* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003), 123.

By the Nine Years' War, overseas trade buttressed the British economy, while an efficient system of financial administration helped manage the war effort, thereby allowing England the flexibility of continued participation in European conflicts. This "financial revolution," reorganized and institutionalized state borrowing, credit and national debt through new state institutions such as the Bank of England (established in 1694) and semi-private institutions such as the East India Company. The more efficient gathering and assignment of tax monies in the form of a professional tax-collecting service further aided the allocation of precious funds.⁷² Trade continued to provide the bedrock for the war economy, and the need for effective trade protection grew acute as France reoriented its naval deployment in support of a commerce-raiding *guerre de course* strategy at the midpoint of the Nine Years' War. Concerted attacks on trade by the French navy and privateers forced the regularization and expansion of the convoy and station ship service further into the Atlantic as European predators increasingly extended their sorties, French warships on convoy duty engaged in commerce raiding, or creole privateers attained letters of marque for local waters.⁷³

The early Navigation Acts should have been easily enforced by the navy, whose ships needed in theory only to patrol the principal lanes of navigation to check lawbreakers.⁷⁴ Throughout most of the Restoration, however, even finding enough warships for escort duty confounded naval planners, especially when the prevailing thought, typified by Charles II himself, and his brother James, Duke of York, meshed

⁷² Jones, *War and Economy*, 308; Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, 34-37, 88-101.

⁷³ Geoffrey Symcox, *The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688-1697: From Guerre d'Escadre to Guerre de Course* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 7, *passim*; Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies*, 230-31; James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas: 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 340, 356, 381-85; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 158-60.

⁷⁴ Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier*, 71.

with the tactical requirements of the Anglo-Dutch wars to favour the procurement of larger warships over the smaller rates needed for trade protection.⁷⁵ Consequently, this policy contributed to the navy's shortage of small warships needed to cover the explosion of requests for convoys when war with France broke out in 1688.⁷⁶ Early shortages of small frigates, among other things, necessitated the hiring of private ships to be outfitted and crewed by the navy, as was the case with the aforementioned *Samuel and Henry* in 1692.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the growing need to fend off pirates, interlopers, and the Dutch, French, or Spanish necessitated some naval presence in North America. The instructions given to those captains who were sent on convoy and station duty prior to 1688 encouraged them to seize interlopers in Newfoundland and elsewhere, and this suggests that the administrations of Charles II and James II intended, where possible, to use the navy to enforce the sophomore round of Navigation Acts in the colonies.⁷⁸ Concerted

⁷⁵ J.D. Davies, "The Birth of the Imperial Navy? Aspects of English Naval Strategy c. 1650-90," in *Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850*, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1992), 17; John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 210-215.

⁷⁶ J.D. Davies, "The English Navy on the Eve of War, 1689," in *Guerres Maritimes, 1688-1713*, no ed. (Vincennes: Service historique de la Marine, 1996), 1-2; Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, 46.

⁷⁷ For example: In the summer of 1692 the *Samuel and Henry* engaged in another convoy to New England, and the navy listed the hired fourth-rate *Wolf* as gone convoy to New York and Virginia, while the hired fourth-rate *Bonadventure* was part of the Newfoundland convoy for that year. Admiralty List, Aug. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 8/3.

⁷⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Hodges, *Guernsey*, 30 Mar. 1661, TNA PRO ADM 2/1725; Instructions to Capt. Henry Cuttance, *Forester*, 18 Mar. 1662, TNA PRO ADM 2/1725; Instructions to Capt. Henry Torne, *Milford*, 10 Apr. 1663, TNA PRO ADM 1/1725; Instructions to Capt. John Turwhitt, *Providence*, 15 Apr. 1664, TNA PRO ADM 2/1725; Admiralty, Instructions Concerning the Plantation Trade, 10 Aug. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727. Direct references to enforcement of the Navigation Acts do not appear in subsequent instructions from the Admiralty to captains going to Newfoundland except regarding the violation of the act by captains themselves. Orders to assist the governor in the enforcement of the acts appear with the first station ships sent to Virginia. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Thomas Allin, *Quaker*, 5 Jan. 1684, TNA PRO ADM 2/1726; Instructions to Capt. John Crofts, *Deptford*, 23 July 1685 and 16 Aug. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727; Instructions to Capt. Simon Roe, *Dunbarton*, 17 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727; Hornstein, "English Navy and the Defense of American Trade," 111.

attempts by the Crown to bring colonies more tightly into its dominion, meanwhile, led indirectly to the first station ships at Virginia, New England, and later New York. When war broke out, pleas from merchants for extended naval protection then became the reference point from which organizers could judge the need for convoys and guardship.⁷⁹

Some surviving navy lists from the early years of the Restoration reveal the limited deployment that existed outside Europe and the Mediterranean. In August 1661, six ships and 500 men served outside Europe out of a total of seventy ships and 8904 men in sea pay.⁸⁰ The Admiralty sent one ship to Newfoundland to convoy fishing ships. Two ships had gone to Jamaica, while another was at Woolwich having recently returned from that island. Meanwhile, two ships had sailed to Guinea in Africa. This pattern continued through 1664, but with increasing deployment overseas. Thus in February 1664, two ships went to the West Indies, two more to Jamaica, one was listed as gone to “Guinea and West Indies,” while another was at Tangier bound for Newfoundland.⁸¹ The Admiralty further dispatched three ships, the *Guinea*, *Martin*, and *Elias*, to New England. These ships belonged to a force sent to capture New Netherlands in anticipation of the second Anglo-Dutch War. The small fleet did not overwinter, as the deployment was not meant to be extended.⁸²

⁷⁹ Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, 47-49; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 25; Ian K. Steele, *The Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 31-34. For example: Board of Trade to the Queen, 19 Feb. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 1/3814. The Crown requested a report following numerous petitions from the merchants of Poole, the residents of Carbonear in Newfoundland, and other merchants regarding the composition of the fishing convoy.

⁸⁰ A List of all His Majesty's Ships with an Accompt of the Place Where They Are, 17 Aug. 1661, United Kingdom, British Library (BL) Additional Manuscripts (ADD) 9302, f. 171. A sixth ship with 110 men had recently arrived at Woolwich from Jamaica.

⁸¹ A List of All His Majesty's Ships Now at Sea and Fitting Forth, Feb. 1664, BL ADD 9302, f. 179.

⁸² Ibid.

Evidence exists for state-run convoys to Newfoundland dating to the beginning of the seventeenth century, but efforts during the Interregnum foreshadowed the creation of a regular convoy service from England to the nearby fisheries.⁸³ As outlined above, attempts at a regularized system of deployment to Newfoundland immediately following the Restoration saw individual ships sent as convoys between 1660 and 1663, and a pair sent in 1664.⁸⁴ The navy dispatched no escorts to Newfoundland for the 1665, 1666, and 1667 seasons.⁸⁵ The government had received several petitions requesting protection for the fishery during these years, along with appeals to settle a growing debate over settlement and government on Newfoundland.⁸⁶ Dutch commander de Ruyter took advantage of the defenceless fishery to capture several prizes and plunder fishing ports (including St. John's) in 1665 as he made his way home after raiding the West Indies.⁸⁷ In spite of the dangers, navy convoys did not resume until the 1668 season.⁸⁸

The immediate explanation for the elimination of Newfoundland convoys appears to be the financial collapse of the navy during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664-1667). Charles II inherited a powerful yet debt-ridden fleet upon his restoration to the throne in

⁸³ Lounsbury, *British Fishery at Newfoundland*, 102-103; Gillian Cell, *English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 120.

⁸⁴ A List of the Royal Navy of England at the Restoration of K. Charles II, May 1660, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library Vol. I*, ed. J.R. Tanner (London: The Navy Records Society, 1903), 256-63; A List of All His Majesty's Ships Now at Sea and Fitting Forth, 17 Aug. 1661, 5 Sept. 1662, May 1663, Aug. 1664, BL ADD 9302, ff. 171, 174, 175, 180.

⁸⁵ Sir William Warren to Commissioners of the Navy, 15 July 1665, United Kingdom, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series (CSPD)*, Charles II (CII), ed. Mary Ann Everett Green and others, (London: Her/His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1939, 28 vols.), Vol. 4, 447; Commissioner of Customs P. Manaton, to Under-secretary of State Joseph Williamson, 14 Sept. 1666, *CSPD CII* Vol. 6, 123. The evidence as to the absence of convoys for 1667 is negative, there being no reference to any within government sources employed presently, or within the Admiralty Orders and Instructions for those years.

⁸⁶ Petition of Robert Swanley to James, Duke of York, 8 May 1666, *CSPD CII* Vol. 5, 386; Petition of Bristol Merchants and Shipowners to the King and Council, 6 Dec. 1667, *CSPD CII* Vol. 5, 65.

⁸⁷ J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Longman, 1996), 36.

⁸⁸ M. Wren to Navy Commissioners, 3 Mar. 1668, *CSPD CII* Vol. 8, 266; Benjamin Johnson to Williamson, 4 June 1668, *CSPD CII* Vol. 8, 424.

1660, and during the war he found resources stretched to the limit. The pitched battles with Dutch fleets left a noticeable shortage of money and escort vessels for even coastal convoys.⁸⁹ The 1667 Dutch raid on the ships and facilities in the Medway River as the English fleet lay dormant and helpless for lack of operating funds illustrated vividly the problem of securing money and resources for use in home waters.⁹⁰ Protection for American trade devolved into home defence ships accompanying convoys out of the Channel to about 100 leagues past the western approaches.⁹¹ For homeward bound convoys, the government scanned intelligence reports in order to estimate when convoys would return, and then sent out several warships westward to await the incoming ships, or else pick them up once they reached Ireland.⁹² Such tactics kept needed warships close to home to combat Dutch commerce raiding, and avoided the problem of providing stores and supplies for extended voyages. Local officials still complained about long waits for escorts, while important coal or coastal fishing convoys sailed under-protected, or did not sail at all.⁹³

The situation improved during the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) despite merchant complaints about the sluggishness of trade protection deployment.⁹⁴

Throughout the 1670s, two warships were sent to Newfoundland for each season.

Exceptions occurred in 1678, when only one warship was sent, in 1679 when the convoy

⁸⁹ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 78.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 95-101; Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 174-76.

⁹¹ Thomas Holden to Clerk of the Post Office James Hickes, 27 June 1666, *CSPD CII* Vol. 5, 464.

⁹² Frances Malory to Hickes, 29 June, 1666, *CSPD CII* Vol. 5, 471; Holden to Hickes, 1 July 1666, *ibid.*, 487-88; John Maurice to Hickes, 2 July 1666, *ibid.*, 491; Joseph Fitzherbert to Williamson, 7 July and 21 July 1666, *ibid.*, 507-08, 562.

⁹³ Luke Whittington to Williamson, 16 Nov. 1666, *CSPD CII* Vol. 6, 266. This example regards a forty-ship coal convoy with one escort forced into Hull when faced with superior Dutch forces.

⁹⁴ Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 192-93.

included four warships, and 1673 when no convoy appears to have been planned.⁹⁵ Unfortunately, in 1673 a Dutch raiding party recaptured New York, attacked Virginia, and then travelled north to ravage the fisheries. As the goal was prize taking and not conquest, this emphasized the need for trade protection in America.⁹⁶ A gap in coverage occurred again when the Admiralty deployed no warships to Newfoundland for the seasons 1686-1688 (corresponding to the brief reign of James II). Although the exact cause has not yet been determined, it also corresponds to a general reduction of convoy services after the signing of a peace treaty with the Barbary regency of Algiers.⁹⁷ The Admiralty did order a convoy for the 1689 fishing season, but diverted the four ships to guard troop transports to Europe. Upon completion of this task, it proved too late in the year for the convoy to be of any use to the fishery.⁹⁸ As for the 1690 convoy, it appears that the Admiralty diverted the necessary resources at the last moment, and sent the two ships it had designated for Newfoundland into the main fleet.⁹⁹ In 1691, a convoy did sail to Newfoundland, and service remained constant thereafter.¹⁰⁰

Despite the gaps in coverage, the level of convoy protection to Newfoundland reflected the special status of the fisheries within the Navigation Acts. The Acts permitted English sack ships transporting dried Newfoundland fish to sail directly to

⁹⁵ Admiralty Lists, 1673-1679, TNA PRO ADM 8/2.

⁹⁶ Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 36; Donald Shomette and Robert Haslach, *Raid on America: The Dutch Naval Campaign of 1672-1674* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 129-51, 162-205.

⁹⁷ An Account of the Ships Annually Employed on the Herring, Turkey, Newfoundland, Iceland, Italian and Canary Convoys, 1685-87, United Kingdom, Pepys Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge, MS 2867, 192-97; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 29.

⁹⁸ Admiralty List, Aug. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 8/2; Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Thomas Raines, *Coronation*, 3 Aug., 13 Aug. and 12 Oct. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 2/4. Raines was to be convoy commodore for that year.

⁹⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Robert Sincock, *Nonsuch*, 14 June 1690, TNA PRO ADM 2/5; Admiralty List, Aug. 1690, TNA PRO ADM 8/2.

¹⁰⁰ Admiralty Lists, Aug.-Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 8/2.

European markets, absolving them of those sections which required all shipping to land their cargo first in England before redistribution.¹⁰¹ The fishery remained valuable for both merchants and the state throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while contemporary interests stressed the importance of Newfoundland as a “nursery for seamen” and therefore essential for national defence.¹⁰² The importance of the Newfoundland fisheries warranted the dispatch of at least one warship, usually two. The physical aspects of guarding the fisheries appeared superficially easy as voyages between Newfoundland and the British Isles were among the shortest in the Atlantic world.¹⁰³ When the fishing season was over, warships accompanied fishing ships back to England and sack ships to Iberia (sometimes as far as Italy), to sell their catches. A warship designated to escort the fishing convoy outward, and then the sack ships homeward, could take over a year to make the round trip, despite only being in Newfoundland for several months. The dual nature of convoys is explicit in this instance as Restoration navy planners considering Newfoundland warships part of Mediterranean defensive deployment.¹⁰⁴

Like their Newfoundland counterparts, Virginia convoys began inconsistently, but grew more regular in response to wartime conditions. Tobacco interests began

¹⁰¹ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 27.

¹⁰² Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 189-91; Ralph Davis, “English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700,” *Economic History Review*, new ser. 7 no. 2 (1954), 153-54. Peter E. Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 247. Zahedieh values the 1699 catch at £180,000 with another £60,000 from New England, shipped directly to southern Europe. The value of the fishery in 1699 was more than that of the 1701 tobacco imports (£ 154,533), but still eclipsed by the sugar imports from the West Indies (£501,616). Davis estimates that the fisheries and the slave trade could together bring in over £500,000 annually in the years just prior to 1688.

¹⁰³ Steele, *English Atlantic*, 82.

¹⁰⁴ Admiralty Lists, 1673-1689, TNA PRO ADM 8/1, *passim*; Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 57.

petitioning the Crown in 1662 for some manner of organization regarding their Virginia ships.¹⁰⁵ In addition to the policy of sending warships westward to meet incoming merchant vessels, in January 1665 the King and Council requested that Virginia ships sail in convoy for their own protection, especially since they travelled with reduced crews owing to the needs of the navy.¹⁰⁶ While no warships sailed to Newfoundland during the years 1665-67, Virginia received a warship for the 1667 trading season after Governor William Berkeley and the Virginia council begged for protection.¹⁰⁷ The dispatch of the *Elizabeth* suggests that the Crown acknowledged a threat to its important tobacco customs revenues, and this represented an exception to the general policy of retrenchment of services.¹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, while waiting for the outward-bound Virginia convoy to finish its lading, the *Elizabeth* became trapped, and was burned within the Virginia Capes (Cape Charles and Cape Henry), by a small marauding Dutch squadron of five warships and a smaller vessel.¹⁰⁹

Virginia suffered further losses during the aforementioned 1673 attack on English holdings in North America. On 11 July, eight Dutch warships and a fireship arrived to attack the tobacco fleet. Two hired armed merchant ships with navy crews, *Barnaby* and *Augustine*, had been sent to escort the Virginia convoy. The two hired warships plus

¹⁰⁵ Arthur P. Middleton, "The Chesapeake Convoy System, 1662-1763," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 3 no. 2 (1946), 183.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 183-84; Order in Council, 3 Jan. 1665, United Kingdom, *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series (APC)*, ed. W.L. Grant and James Munro (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908-1912, 6 vols.), Vol. 1, no. 642.

¹⁰⁷ Governor and Council of Virginia to Secretary of State Arlington, 13 July 1666, United Kingdom, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series (CSPC)*, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury and others, (London: Her/His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1994, 46 vols.), Vol. 5, no. 1241.

¹⁰⁸ Warren M. Billings, *Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 206-207; Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies*, 188-89. Tobacco and sugar made up 80% of overseas imports brought directly into London between 1660 and 1701.

¹⁰⁹ Billings, *Sir William Berkeley*, 206-207.

several heavily armed merchant ships defended the tobacco fleet as best they could, but eleven ships were lost. Nevertheless, an account of the action sent to England by the Virginia Council suggested that the outcome could have been much worse had there been no naval protection at all.¹¹⁰ Still, perceptions of Governor William Berkeley's inability to guard Virginia properly fuelled ongoing complaints regarding the ineffectiveness of royal government, climaxing with Bacon's Rebellion in 1676.¹¹¹ To quash the insurrection, the government in London hurriedly organized an expedition supported by four warships under Captain Sir John Berry. Although the force did not reach Virginia until after order had been re-established, Berry remained as part of a commission sent from the government to unearth the reasons for the rebellion, and to oversee efforts to create political stability.¹¹²

Virginia did not represent the only instance in which Berry shaped imperial development. In 1675, the Admiralty appointed Berry to go convoy to Newfoundland. Certain merchant interests petitioning the government insisted that the settlement of fishermen in Newfoundland represented economic and environmental impediments to the fishery, and denied seamen to the navy. This led to an Order in Council to resolve the debate over settlement, and the government directed Berry to inform the inhabitants to vacate Newfoundland. Upon surveying the situation, Berry defended settlement in

¹¹⁰ Governor and Council of Virginia to the King, 16 July 1673, TNA PRO, Colonial Office (CO) 1/30, 114-15, reprinted in *The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606-1689*, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 258-60; Billings, *Sir William Berkeley*, 223-24.

¹¹¹ Billings, *Sir William Berkeley*, Ch. 13; David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 42-52; Stephen S. Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984).

¹¹² Samuel Pepys to Capt. John Berry, *Bristol*, 29 July 1676, *A Descriptive Catalogue of The Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge. Vol. 3*, ed. J.R. Tanner (London: Navy Records Society, 1909), no. 3079; Billings, *Sir William Berkeley*, 252-53.

Newfoundland by stating that the migratory fishing ships did more to disrupt and discourage a peaceful environment at Newfoundland than did the residents. Berry also recognized the need for some form of settlement to provide a presence to discourage interlopers as England certainly did not intend to establish an official crown colony.¹¹³

Lingering fear of political upheaval contributed to Virginia's receipt of its own station ship, the first deployed on the mainland of North America. Governor Thomas Culpeper and his successor, Francis Howard, Lord Howard of Effingham, each pressed the need for a state ship at Virginia. In July 1682, amid reports of possible turmoil, Culpeper requested that the warship designated to transport him to Virginia be allowed to stay until calm was restored, and that a warship from the Caribbean stop at Virginia on its return voyage. Culpeper believed that a royal warship could provide a demonstration of state authority to a colony he felt was once again on the brink of rebellion.¹¹⁴ The Governor's transport was never intended as a station ship, and so in May of 1683 the Council of Virginia requested that a small naval ketch of about twelve guns and forty men be dispatched to battle piracy and revenue fraud.¹¹⁵ Culpeper, meanwhile, had taken the initiative by hiring and outfitting a local vessel in 1683 for such duties.¹¹⁶ Effingham echoed Culpeper, and both outlined the tangible benefits of a suitable royal vessel to enforce the Navigation Acts.¹¹⁷ Governor of New Hampshire Edward Cranfield had received passage in a warship, and he too clamoured for a more permanent deployment to enforce the Navigation Acts, as well as to ease the shift from charter to royal government

¹¹³ This passage: Lounsbury, *The British Fishery at Newfoundland*, 149-53; Pope, *Fish into Wine*, 66-67.

¹¹⁴ Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Lords of Trade Journal), 6 July 1681, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 597.

¹¹⁵ Council of Virginia to Lords of Trade, 4 May, 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no 1063.

¹¹⁶ Thomas Culpeper to Lords of Trade, 20 Sept. 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 1258

¹¹⁷ Howard Effingham to Lords of Trade, 27 Sept. 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 1273.

via the legal process of *quo warranto*.¹¹⁸ The King and Privy Council saw the wisdom of supplying Virginia with a guardship, but not New Hampshire, based on various reports from the Lords of Trade, Customs, Admiralty, and Treasury.¹¹⁹

The Admiralty dispatched a succession of warships to Virginia beginning in 1684, and at one point in 1687 their overlapping tenures resulted in the *Deptford*, *Quaker*, and *Dunbarton* patrolling the coasts. The open-ended instructions to their captains, Thomas Allin, John Crofts, and Simon Roe, stipulated their attending Virginia until further notice.¹²⁰ A request from Allin for the clarification of several sections within his instructions illustrates that the captains believed it to be their duty to uphold the Navigation Acts in full. Allin noticed three anomalies in merchant ships travelling to the colonies: ships carrying certificates signed by Sir John Shaw of the Custom House exempting them from restrictions on foreign ships built after October of 1662; English ships carrying written certifications signed in the Irish ports of Galway and Belfast for clearance in several English ports; and ships coming to the colonies carrying goods directly from Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands without bond from England. The Privy Council solicited replies from the Custom House and the Treasury to the three problems that confirmed the certificates signed by Shaw, denied any certificates from Ireland, and stated that only goods between English colonies remained legal without re-

¹¹⁸ Edward Cranfield to Secretary of State Leoline Jenkins, 20 Feb. 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 952; Cranfield to Lords of Trade, 20 Feb. 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 954; Cranfield to Lords of Trade, 19 June, 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 1130. *Quo warranto* affirmed royal supremacy over other legal considerations (such as the granting of charters) relating to land or privilege. Given the acrimonious power struggle ensuing between Cranfield and New Hampshire, it is perhaps fortunate that the Governor received no permanent naval support. Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 151-55.

¹¹⁹ Order in Council, 31 Oct. 1683, *APC* Vol. 2, no. 130.

¹²⁰ Admiralty, Instructions to Allin, 5 Jan. 1684, TNA PRO ADM 2/1726; Instructions to Crofts, 23 July 1685, and 16 Aug. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727; Instructions to Roe, 17 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727. Originally Crofts was to relieve Allin, but a reversal of that decision appears within Crofts' orders.

export from England with all others liable to forfeiture. The Privy Council further ordered Admiralty Secretary Samuel Pepys to distribute the three questions and their answers to all warships travelling to the colonies.¹²¹

Despite the activity at Virginia, the government did not grant New York a regular station ship until 1690. In 1674, the Admiralty sent the fourth-rate *Diamond* to transport the new governor, Major Edmund Andros, and provide him with assistance.¹²² *Diamond* overwintered at New York owing to the governor's needs as well as spoiled food, which left the ship without sufficient quantities of stored provisions for an Atlantic crossing.¹²³ As had been the case in Virginia, pleadings at the merchant and gubernatorial level influenced the decision for a more permanent arrangement once the Nine Years' War broke out. The deep-seated factionalism within the colony of New York further highlighted the need for a state presence when violent conflict broke out following the overthrow of James II. Factions previously marginalized by the political elites of the colony took control in the name of William and Mary and the Protestant cause. Jacob Leisler, a well-to-do but hitherto politically peripheral militia captain, rose to head the new government. Leisler's extremist policies generated considerable strife. Together with his inability to suffer any criticism, and growing threats from New France, this only reinforced those arguing in England for a return to power of the previous New York establishment. Moreover, as the policy of William and Mary's government sought to retain as many former colonial officeholders as possible, the new regime could not secure

¹²¹ Order in Council, 19 June 1685, *APC* Vol. 2, no. 192.

¹²² Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Griffith, *Diamond*, 31 July 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737.

¹²³ Griffiths to Navy Board, 10 Mar. and 12 May, 1675, TNA PRO ADM 106/311. See Ch. 6 for a more detailed discussion of the *Diamond*'s stay at New York.

legitimacy from London. Leisler's rule was doomed, and a new governor, Henry Sloughter, was appointed to bring New York back into the imperial fold.¹²⁴

As was becoming standard practice, Governor Sloughter would receive transport onboard a warship, in this instance with a detachment of regular troops to seize the government from the Leislerians if necessary. Captain Jasper Hicks in the fourth-rate *Archangel* received orders to transport the governor and escort the soldiers, but not to remain at New York following the landing of his passengers.¹²⁵ Upon hearing of the Admiralty's intentions, Sloughter wrote to William III's secretary, William Blathwayt, claiming that the senior Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Pembroke, had promised the employment of *Archangel*, as the Crown desired. Sloughter explained that a warship would be of great benefit in obtaining for the Crown the essential support of the New York merchants, suggesting that they would obey the new government in exchange for the protection of their trade in the face of French threats.¹²⁶

Sloughter's reasoning must have been persuasive, for Captain Hicks received revised orders on 10 November 1690 to remain at New York "for the security and defence of that place and to follow such orders as you shall receive from the governor thereof."¹²⁷ While a show of political strength and confidence may have been the incentive to turn *Archangel* from a convoy to a station ship, the perilous situation caused by war ensured the continuation of a warship at New York. Its location at the end of the Lake Champlain corridor exposed New York to threats of invasion, a fact realized well

¹²⁴ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 336-40; Robert Ritchie, *The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664-1691* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), Ch. 9.

¹²⁵ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Jasper Hicks, *Archangel*, 13 Oct. 1690, TNA PRO ADM 2/6.

¹²⁶ Henry Sloughter to William Blathwayt, 27 Sept. 1690, *CSPC* Vol. 13, no. 1078.

¹²⁷ Admiralty, Orders to Hicks, 10 Nov. 1690, TNA PRO ADM 2/6.

before the confusion surrounding the change of regime in England.¹²⁸ The February 1690 raid on Schenectady, resulting in the deaths of sixty-two villagers, with twenty-seven more taken captive, provided a grim demonstration of New York's vulnerability.¹²⁹ While a warship could not alleviate danger along the inland frontier, it is notable that when considering an attack on Quebec, Leisler issued commissions for three ships to act as a maritime defence force.¹³⁰ New York planners could not discount seaborne threats given the importance of commerce and merchant trade in holding together the diverse New York society.¹³¹ Therefore, Jasper Hicks' replacement, Captain Edward Chant, received orders to guard the coast, protect the colony from the French, and to cooperate with the attending station ship at New England, the fifth-rate *Conception Prize*. Chant was to follow the orders of the governor, and remain on station until called home.¹³²

To naval administrators and imperial authorities, New England implicitly meant the northeastern frontier of mainland British influence in North America. Any station ship assigned to New England came under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts government, and called on Boston as its home port. Boston had only one station ship between 1660 and 1692, the fifth-rate *Rose* (Captain John George), which arrived in 1686.¹³³ As with the first ships sent on station to Virginia and New York, the dispatch of the *Rose* had its origins in the efforts of the royal government in England to bring some manner of obedience and deference to metropolitan authority, qualities that the citizens of

¹²⁸ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 254. In reverse fashion, the corridor was to be the staging point of later assaults on Canada.

¹²⁹ Ritchie, *Duke's Province*, 221.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 223.

¹³¹ Thomas Archdeacon, *New York City, 1664-1710: Conquest and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 29, 58.

¹³² Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Edward Chant, *Albrough*, 29 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 2/8.

¹³³ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. John George, *Rose*, 25 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1726.

Massachusetts famously lacked. Provincial leaders had been employing the Massachusetts charter as an ersatz constitution in order to facilitate political independence from central rule. The Crown's strategy in response consisted of gentle suggestions that Massachusetts surrender its charter willingly, before eventually revoking it entirely.¹³⁴

Entrusted with delivering the necessary writ of *quo warranto* to revoke the Massachusetts charter, customs commissioner Edward Randolph suggested that, upon delivery, a royal warship should be present on the coast to ensure the obedience of Massachusetts, and he proposed that a frigate already destined for the West Indies be diverted.¹³⁵ Randolph had previously recognized that Boston was well suited as a place where warships could resupply in the event of war or emergency, while the town also had potential to become a regular source of naval stores, as well as a staging point for attacking French colonies.¹³⁶ The Lords of Trade agreed and lobbied the Admiralty for a suitable ship. In the end, Randolph could not wait, and took passage on a merchant ship, still insisting on the dispatch of a warship (which would eventually be the *Rose*).¹³⁷ When Edmund Andros received appointment as the governor of the new Dominion of New England (which by 1688 included all mainland colonies from New York northward), he was granted transport on board the fourth-rate *Kingfisher*, a squad of troops, and control over both warships during the transfer of government.¹³⁸ *Kingfisher* only

¹³⁴ Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 29-31; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 147-50.

¹³⁵ Edward Randolph to Leoline Jenkins, 26 July 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 1165.

¹³⁶ Randolph to Jenkins, 30 Apr. 1681, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 91.

¹³⁷ Randolph to Jenkins, 3 Aug. 1683, *CSPC* Vol. 11, no. 1174. Randolph, having returned to England, took passage back to Boston in the *Rose* when it sailed in 1686. See below, Ch. 5, 235.

¹³⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Thomas Hamilton, *Kingfisher*, 10 Oct. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727; Instructions to Governor Edmund Andros, 13 Oct. 1682, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727. The relationship between Andros and the *Rose* at Boston is detailed in Ch. 4.

overwintered at Boston in 1686, while *Rose* stayed until 1690. Following the departure of *Rose* in 1690, the navy ordered no ship in its place.

The ensuing lack of state resources initially did not stop Massachusetts and other New England colonies from subsidising expeditions against the French. During both the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, Boston formed the point of organization and departure for various schemes, both private and state sponsored, to subjugate the French in Quebec and Acadia. The better-known attacks on Quebec in 1690 and 1711 represented both types as the first was attempted without any state warships or funding, while state forces comprised the majority in the second (with all major warships belonging to the navy). Frequent raiding with the aid of the New England station ship occurred, while a small force of three warships and a bomb vessel, accompanied by a marine detachment, arrived in 1710 to assist the New York and New England station ships in a successful colonial venture to capture Port Royal.¹³⁹ This is in contrast the 1690 attack on Port Royal when, bereft of station ship coverage, the Massachusetts government formulated and launched its attack with local resources only.¹⁴⁰

2.3- 1692-1713

¹³⁹ Admiralty Lists, June-Dec. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 8/11; Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. George Martin, *Dragon*, 31 Mar. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 2/41; Martin to Admiralty, 8 Oct. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; John G. Reid, "The 'Conquest' of Acadia: Narratives," in *The 'Conquest of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, ed. John G. Reid and others (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 3-24.

¹⁴⁰ Baker and Reid, *New England Knight*, 96; K.A.J. McLay, "Wellsprings of a 'World War': An Early English Attempt to Conquer Canada during King William's War, 1688-97," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34 no. 2 (2006), 155-176.

The success at Port Royal and the failure at Quebec left New England exhausted, poor, and in need of metropolitan resources to defend against French retaliation.¹⁴¹ In the winter of 1691, the erstwhile leader of the 1690 expeditions, Sir William Phips, travelled to England to escape repercussions following the failure in Canada as well as alleged indiscretions during the capture of Port Royal.¹⁴² There he met with his Massachusetts patron, Boston minister Cotton Mather, who was in London negotiating for the granting of a new colonial charter for Massachusetts. Eventually, at Mather's prompting, further negotiations led to Phips' appointment to the governorship. While in London, Phips began to lobby for the deployment of martial resources to New England. He petitioned the Crown and sent a memorial to the Lords of Trade, stating that in order to guard the coasts of New England and Nova Scotia successfully, and launch any future attack on Quebec; at least a third-rate warship would be needed, along with a variety of weaponry and ordnance stores for garrisons. Phips requested as much naval support as could be spared, even going so far as to propose the dispatch of a four-ship squadron to assist in consolidating his regime. More realistically, Phips later stated in person to the Lords of Trade on 11 December 1691 that one fifth-rate and a sixth-rate represented the minimum force necessary to prevent a resurgence of French power in the northeast region.¹⁴³

Previously, on the evening of 6 November 1691, Phips attended the Admiralty to discuss the viability of building third-rate warships at New England.¹⁴⁴ The lack of a station ship must have entered the conversation at some point because the Admiralty

¹⁴¹ Baker and Reid, *New England Knight*, 103-04.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 108-09.

¹⁴³ This passage: *ibid.*, 129-30.

¹⁴⁴ Admiralty Minutes, 6 Nov. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 3/6.

decided to dispatch the fifth-rate *Conception Prize* to attend New England. The Admiralty had already designated this ship to a Virginia convoy, and merely ordered it to take up station at Boston after safely escorting the trade.¹⁴⁵ The Admiralty then informed the Lords of Trade of the decision to station *Conception Prize* at Boston following the Virginia convoy.¹⁴⁶ The Lords requested information from the Admiralty on the ships appointed to New England, and upon receiving word that *Conception Prize* would be the only warship dispatched, pointed out that until that ship could take up station, the region would be without any naval guard at all.¹⁴⁷ Based on that observation, an Order in Council dated 17 December 1691 instructed the Admiralty to dispatch either a fourth-rate or a sixth rate, or some other single warship of considerable force.¹⁴⁸ On 11 January, the Lords of Trade noted that they had received letters from New England describing an upsurge in French privateering in the northeast region, with eighteen vessels reported captured by a single French ship, while rumours abounded of French plans to retake Port Royal and attack the New England coast.¹⁴⁹ The Lords moved to inform the Crown and pushed for haste in sending a second station ship, resulting in a reiteration of the Order in Council on 14 January.¹⁵⁰ With the fifth-rate *Nonsuch* already slated to transport Phips and his entourage to New England, the Admiralty extended its orders so it could remain on station as a second guardship.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵ Admiralty Minutes, 21 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 3/6; Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Robert Fairfax, *Conception Prize*, 29 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 2/8.

¹⁴⁶ Admiralty to Lords of Trade, 15 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO CO 5/1306, 357.

¹⁴⁷ Lords of Trade Journal, 11 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO CO 5/856, 72; Lords of Trade Minutes, 15 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO CO 391/7.

¹⁴⁸ Order in Council, 17 Dec. 1691/14 January 1692, *APC*, Vol. 2, no. 431.

¹⁴⁹ Lords of Trade Journal, 11 Jan. 1692, TNA PRO CO 391/7.

¹⁵⁰ Order in Council, 17 Dec. 1691/14 January 1692, *APC*, Vol. 2, no. 431.

¹⁵¹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Short, *Nonsuch*, 5 Mar. and 18 Mar. 1692, TNA PRO ADM

Phips' lobbying in person may have been unusual, but two ships on station made practical sense, and once station ship coverage resumed in 1692, New England routinely received two warships for the remainder of the Nine Years' War. The waters around Acadia/Nova Scotia and Newfoundland proved dangerous not only for local inhabitants, but also for shipping returning to Britain as the prevailing winds and currents required many homeward-bound vessels to sail near to those coasts. French privateers operated throughout northeastern North America, and activity by French warships attacking commerce and raiding settlements remained a real threat in the eyes of both colonists and sailors.¹⁵² Justifications for subduing Acadia usually referred to the role of Port Royal in supplying and harbouring warships from old France, and the suspicion that the Acadians outfitted their own privateers.¹⁵³ The overpowering of the two New England station ships, the fifth-rate *Sorlings* and sixth-rate *Newport*, in 1696 by a French force (leading to the capture of the *Newport*) only intensified local nervousness.¹⁵⁴ The Admiralty reduced its deployment to one ship during the War of the Spanish Succession, but this was always a fourth-rate, and New England often received overlapping coverage when departing warships waited for homeward bound convoys to assemble. The nine mast ship convoys dispatched variously between 1692 and 1711 contributed to the layered coverage.¹⁵⁵

On the other side of the northeastern frontier, the Newfoundland convoys settled into a routine following the disorganized first stage of the Nine Years' War. The number

2/9.

¹⁵² Donald F. Chard, "The Impact of French Privateering on New England," *American Neptune* 35 no. 3 (1975), 153-65.

¹⁵³ Donald F. Chard, "'Lack of a Consensus:' New England's Attitude to Acadia," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 38 (1973), 5-26.

¹⁵⁴ Lt. Gov. William Stoughton to Board of Trade, 24 Sept. 1696, TNA PRO CO 5/859, no. 29.

¹⁵⁵ Admiralty Lists, 1695-1708, TNA PRO ADM 8/4-10.

of ships expanded during the War of the Spanish Succession, but the basic nature of the convoy remained essentially the same. Between 1692 and 1695, the convoy numbered three warships, except during 1693 when it contained only two. The convoy for 1696 comprised four warships.¹⁵⁶ During the brief peace between 1698 and 1701, the Admiralty kept the convoys to three warships.¹⁵⁷ With Britain's participation in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the number of escorts increased back to four ships, and beginning with the 1709 season the total rose to six.¹⁵⁸ Two important exceptions to general deployment occurred in 1697 and 1702. The first was in response to the raids led by Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville in the fall of 1696 and winter of 1697, which plundered or destroyed most of the English settlements on Newfoundland. The Admiralty sent a squadron of fifteen warships under Captain John Norris for the 1697 season to recover the losses.¹⁵⁹ The second occurred upon the resumption of hostilities in 1702 when the Admiralty dispatched a squadron of nine ships to secure the areas of English possession in Newfoundland.¹⁶⁰ Without exception, every Newfoundland convoy between 1691 and 1713 included at least one fourth-rate, while the later increase in the number of warships represented the need to extend coverage to several components of the convoy. Warships convoyed fishing ships to Newfoundland, and accompanied them back to England. A second wave later escorted the sack ships making their way to

¹⁵⁶ Admiralty Lists, 1692-1696, TNA PRO ADM 8/3-5.

¹⁵⁷ Admiralty Lists, 1698-1701, TNA PRO ADM 8/6-7.

¹⁵⁸ Admiralty Lists, 1702-1713, TNA PRO ADM 8/7-17.

¹⁵⁹ Admiralty List, May 1697, TNA PRO ADM 8/5; Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 76-77; Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 350-51.

¹⁶⁰ Admiralty List, July 1702, TNA PRO ADM 8/7; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 88. This does not include other squadrons intended for, or visiting, Newfoundland, such as Wheler's in 1693 and parts of Walker's in 1711. Two sloops accompanied the 1702 squadron to deliver packets, but did not stay to guard the fishery.

Newfoundland to load fish later in the season, and shepherded them to Europe once the fishing ended. On several occasions, ships carrying salt to cure the fish required escort before the start of the season, and the Admiralty instructed these warships to travel directly to Portugal before sailing to Newfoundland.¹⁶¹

New York did not receive its own convoy despite requests for one during the first years of the Nine Years' War because organizers reckoned that enough existing convoys permitted New York merchants to avail themselves of protection.¹⁶² As with all station ships, those outgoing to New York took care of all trade travelling in their direction who desired escort. Of the twenty-seven ships sent to New York between 1690 and 1739, fourth-rates made up only four vessels (dispatched between 1700 and 1704), with the remaining being either fifth-rates or sixth-rates. New York generally received its station ships one at a time, but coverage doubled after 1705 until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁶³

After 1688 Virginia received at least one ship on station (usually fifth or sixth-rates), except for an apparent gap in direct deployment from 1704 until 1709.¹⁶⁴ Even during this interval, however, Virginia generally did not find itself without some form of protection. Tobacco merchants lobbied the Admiralty and Board of Trade for increased convoy protection to take into account crop production cycles.¹⁶⁵ In response, the Admiralty often dispatched two convoys of (usually) two ships each to Virginia during the War of the Spanish Succession (the majority being fourth-rates). The first convoy left

¹⁶¹ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Henry Gore, *Bristol*, 13 Apr. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 2/39.

¹⁶² Admiralty to the Queen, 4 Sept. 1693, TNA PRO SP 42/2.

¹⁶³ Admiralty Lists, 1692-1713, TNA PRO ADM 8/3-12.

¹⁶⁴ Admiralty Lists, May 1703-Sept. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 8/8-10.

¹⁶⁵ Crowhurst, *Defence of British Trade*, 147.

the British Isles in the spring, while the second waited until late fall or early winter.

Because of the prolonged time needed to load tobacco, combined with the overlapping of convoys, Virginia benefited from usually having at least two ships off the coast.

Explicitly included in the Virginia convoys, Maryland nevertheless received its own station ship between 1697 and 1717, with gaps in coverage during 1704-05, and from 1707 to 1711.¹⁶⁶ As with Newfoundland, the 1702 Virginia convoy witnessed a spike in its numbers for that year with five ships sent out in April.¹⁶⁷

2.4- 1714-1739

The most noticeable differences between wartime and post-1713 deployments were the reduction in both the number and size of ships, a slight extension in the length of time spend away from the British Isles, and the addition of new deployments to areas of heightened importance. The first half of this period experienced a significant escalation of piracy following the disruption of maritime employment patterns at the end of the war, compounded by an increase in Caribbean treasure hunting on Spanish wrecks.¹⁶⁸

Historians have argued that the navy's response to piracy was a war or campaign in which captains were to act in concert to seek out and destroy pirates.¹⁶⁹ Combating piracy became the principal justification for continuing to send ships to the Americas, but within its ever-expanding instructions to captains, the Admiralty emphasized protecting the trade

¹⁶⁶ Admiralty Lists, 1689-1713, TNA PRO ADM 8/3-12.

¹⁶⁷ Admiralty Lists, Apr.-Sept. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

¹⁶⁸ Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 281-82; Earle, *The Pirate Wars*, 160; Olaf U. Janzen, "The Problem of Piracy in the Newfoundland Fishery in the Aftermath of the War of the Spanish Succession," in *Northern Seas: Yearbook 1997, Association for the History of the Northern Seas*, ed. Poul Holm and Janzen (Esbjerg, Denmark: Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet, 1998), 57-75; Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Ritchie discusses piracy for the peace years of 1698-1701.

¹⁶⁹ For example: Earle, *The Pirate Wars*, esp. Ch. 10.

from attack over searching for pirates directly.¹⁷⁰ Yet, in spite of the importance placed on the protection of trade, the navy eliminated its scheduled convoys to Virginia following the Treaty of Utrecht, notwithstanding those escorted by warships travelling to their stations. The navy kept convoys to Newfoundland, however, and introduced a fishing convoy to Canso after 1728.¹⁷¹

The nature of the Newfoundland convoy evolved following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, especially in the wake of changes in the governance of Newfoundland after 1729. That year ushered in what came to be known as naval government. Signalling this jurisdictional alteration was the division of convoy command with two separate commissions, one as governor and another as convoy commodore.¹⁷² Physically, the post-1713 Newfoundland convoy shrank back to two ships. The Admiralty, however, delegated special ships in 1713 and 1714 to facilitate the transfer of Plaisance (called Placentia by the English) over to British rule following the Treaty of Utrecht; one to escort some transports, the other dispatched as a packet boat.¹⁷³ Then, in 1716, a sloop undertook surveying duties in Newfoundland and the West Indies.¹⁷⁴ For the 1723-1725 seasons, the Admiralty sent three ships instead of two and

¹⁷⁰ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Yeo, *Enterprise* (Virginia), 11 Jan. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 275.

¹⁷¹ Admiralty Lists, 1714-1739, TNA PRO ADM 8/13-20.

¹⁷² With only two ships composing the 1730 Newfoundland convoy, for example, Capt. Henry Osborn carried the commission as governor while Lord Vere Beauclerk received a commission as convoy commodore. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Henry Osborn, *Squirrel*, 19 May 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Instructions to Capt. Lord Vere Beauclerk, *Oxford*, 19 May 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Lounsbury, *British Fishery at Newfoundland*, 273-75; Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 66-68.

¹⁷³ In 1713, a convoy of transports escorted by the *Solebay* was forced to winter in Lisbon. The Admiralty issued fresh orders to make the voyage in 1714 so that the 1713 convoy comprised only two ships. Admiralty, Orders to Capt. William Owen, *Solebay*, 20 Nov. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46; Instructions to Capt. George Fairley, *Hind*, 25 Sept. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46. Fairley sailed in Jan. 1714 and his sloop did not form part of a convoy.

¹⁷⁴ Admiralty List, July 1716, TNA PRO ADM 8/14.

added a small sloop to the convoy between 1734 and 1737. Again, at least one fourth-rate warship led all convoys, accompanied by fifth-rates or sixth-rates and the aforementioned sloops.¹⁷⁵

An intriguing modification of the Newfoundland convoy, often overlooked or underplayed by historians, is the dispatch of a single warship to Canso in Nova Scotia to guard the fishery there between 1728 and 1743.¹⁷⁶ Following the War of the Spanish Succession, the Admiralty altered its deployment patterns to account for the English takeover of French possessions in the south of Newfoundland, and the relocation of the French to Isle Royale (Cape Breton Island) where they began constructing the fortified town of Louisbourg. Between 1715 and 1722, the Admiralty dispatched a ship to the southern coast of Newfoundland to “settle” the fishery at Placentia before moving on to other duties.¹⁷⁷ After 1723, the Admiralty expanded their instructions to include protection of the Nova Scotia fishery, and ordered captains to patrol a triangular area between Cape Pine, Placentia, and Canso.¹⁷⁸ This accounts for the extra ship dispatched by the Admiralty between 1723 and 1725.¹⁷⁹ In 1728, a third ship appeared once more with those ships listed for Newfoundland, but it received orders not to stop there, nor to take any direction from the Newfoundland commodore, and to act independently to guard

¹⁷⁵ Admiralty Lists, 1715-1739 TNA PRO ADM 8/14-20.

¹⁷⁶ W.A.B. Douglas, “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766” (Ph.D. thesis, Queen’s University 1973), 34-35, lists the Canso ships but does not discuss them. See Ch. 4, 190-94 for more detail on the Canso deployment.

¹⁷⁷ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Wager, *Rochester*, 30 May 1716, TNA PRO ADM 2/48; Instructions to Capt. Samuel Atkins, *Panther*, 5 Apr. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 2/50. All convoy commodores in between received similar instructions.

¹⁷⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Tyrwitt Cayley, *Dover*, 16 Mar. 1723, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Cayley to Admiralty, 30 May 1723, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598; Instructions to Capt. John St. Lo, *Ludlow Castle*, 24 Apr. 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Capt. Robert Boulter, *Argyle*, 24 Apr. 1725, 26 Mar. 1726, 9 May, 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁷⁹ Admiralty Lists, May-Dec., 1723-1725, TNA PRO ADM 8/15.

the Canso fishery.¹⁸⁰ Within the annual correspondence between the navy and the Board of Trade, they listed and discussed the Canso ship together with the Newfoundland ships.¹⁸¹ The Admiralty stated within its instructions to captains going to Canso, however, that theirs was a separate assignment from Newfoundland.¹⁸²

The New England station ship had also been regularly involved with the Nova Scotia fisheries, and in 1711 the Admiralty responded to a request by New England merchants to dispatch a warship to Boston specifically to guard the fishing banks.¹⁸³ Throughout the 1720s, and even into the 1730s, the Admiralty issued orders to ships already on station at New England to occasionally visit Canso and report on the situation there.¹⁸⁴ New England station ships became involved in several incidents with the French at Louisbourg concerning illegal trading and French interloping. The New England government, for example, ordered Captain Thomas Smart in the sixth-rate *Squirrel* to protect the fishery at Canso from French encroachment during in the fall of 1718, and present New England's concerns to French officials.¹⁸⁵ Smart ultimately seized several vessels for violations of the peace treaty between France and Great Britain, and this caused a diplomatic incident. Canso also proved especially vulnerable when conflict

¹⁸⁰ Admiralty to Board of Trade, 10 May 1729, TNA PRO CO 217/5, f. 110.

¹⁸¹ Admiralty Lists, 1728-1739, TNA PRO ADM 8/16-20. A ship was designated for Canso in 1744, but the harbour was overrun in the spring before it arrived. Admiralty to Board of Trade, 3 Apr. 1730, TNA PRO CO 194/8, f. 238; Admiralty to Board of Trade, 6 Mar. 1733, TNA PRO CO 194/9, f. 170; Admiralty to Board of Trade, 3 Mar. 1737, TNA PRO CO 194/10 f. 85.

¹⁸² For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Weller, *Rose*, 20 May 1729, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Instructions to Capt. Robert Fytche, *Sheerness*, 19 Apr. 1732, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Instructions to Capt. Temple West, *Deal Castle*, 28 Apr. 1739, TNA PRO ADM 2/55.

¹⁸³ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. James Campbell, *Squirrel*, 8 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 2/44. This deployment proved to be a one-off occurrence.

¹⁸⁴ For example: Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Thomas Smart, *Squirrel*, 12 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Orders to Capt. Thomas Durell, *Seahorse*, 3 May 1721, TNA PRO ADM 2/50; Orders to Durell, *Scarborough*, 24 Feb. 1731, TNA PRO ADM 2/53.

¹⁸⁵ Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

broke out with the Mi'kmaq because New England fishing interests were easily raided while there and in transit.¹⁸⁶

Sporadic visitations by warships alone did not contribute to diligent fisheries protection as the primary instructions of the Boston captains oriented them towards their principal station, while the reduced Newfoundland convoys faced a broad region to patrol in addition to their other duties and could not provide the Canso ships with a needed convoy back to Europe. The colonial government in Nova Scotia pleaded for over a decade with London for some manner of regular maritime protection for Nova Scotia, and Canso in particular.¹⁸⁷ Petitions from the mayor, council, aldermen, and merchants representing the city of Exeter in western England also focussed on the considerable value of the fisheries at Canso, arguing that the harbour was defenceless against all manner of pirates. Proper protection, they insisted, would permit further growth of this valuable fishery. A convoy for Canso was negotiated and in its instructions to captains, the Admiralty highlighted the petitioning from Exeter as providing the basis for the decision.¹⁸⁸ The routine of the Canso convoy mirrored that of Newfoundland as the warships were ordered to take under care any vessels desiring convoy on the outward voyage, guard the fishery, and see the return convoy safe to the European fish markets and back to Britain once the season was over.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Chard, "Canso, 1710-1721"; Douglas "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy," 7-30; Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Governor Richard Phillips to Secretary of State Lord Carteret, Feb. 1724, TNA PRO CO 217/38 no. 5, and Phillips to Board of Trade, 3 Aug. 1734, TNA PRO CO 217/7, ff. 98-99.

¹⁸⁸ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to St. Lo, 13 Apr. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Capt. Henry Reddish, *Experiment*, 25 Apr. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52. The passage stating that Exeter was the source of the convoy are repeated in all orders to Canso between 1728 and 1739.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Instructions to Capt. Robert Fytche, *Sheerness* (Canso), 1 May 1733, PRO TNA ADM 2/54; Instructions to Capt. Lord Muskerry, *Romney* (Newfoundland), 9 May 1733, PRO TNA ADM 2/54.

Similarly, new deployments in South Carolina and Georgia reflected tensions along the southern frontier with the Spanish and French empires and various regional Aboriginal nations. Official approval for a station ship for South Carolina came only in 1719 following requests for protection against piratical attacks.¹⁹⁰ Although residents of both North and South Carolina frequently faced accusations of harbouring (and profiting from) pirates themselves, the growth of South Carolina as a stable province, and the rise of piracy following the War of the Spanish Succession, prompted its government to press for the dispatch of a station ship. The catalyst for the request came in the wake of a vicious border war with the Yamasee nation. In June 1718, the pirate Blackbeard (Edward Teach or Thatch) blockaded Charles Town with four vessels, and when harassing local shipping captured for ransom a colonial councillor, Samuel Wagg.¹⁹¹ The complaints of the governor and other provincial inhabitants regarding their recent brushes with piracy prefaced the July 1719 instructions to Captain John Hildesley in South Carolina's first station ship, the sixth-rate *Flambrough*.¹⁹²

Before *Flambrough* could be outfitted and dispatched, another attack came from the pirate crew under Stede Bonnett. In response to this threat, a force from Virginia organized by Governor Alexander Spotswood, and including navy men of the Virginia station, subsequently sought out and killed Blackbeard, capturing his crew and vessels.¹⁹³ Soon, reports of Spanish and Amerindian activity in the Carolina region following

¹⁹⁰ Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Board of Trade, 12 Dec. 1718, *CSPC* Vol. 30, no. 787; William Popple to Josiah Burchett, 7 Apr. 1719, *CSPC* Vol. 31, no. 141; Burchett to Popple, 20 Apr. 1719, *CSPC* Vol. 31, no. 155; Board of Trade to Gov. Robert Johnson, 29 Apr. 1719, *CSPC* Vol. 31, no. 168.

¹⁹¹ Shirley C. Hughson, *The Carolina Pirates and Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1894; reprint New York: Johnson Reprint, 1973), 69-72; Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (Millwood: KTO Press, 1983), 86.

¹⁹² Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Hildesley, *Flambrough*, 17 July 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50.

¹⁹³ Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 192-93.

Britain's entry into the Quadruple Alliance in 1718, and subsequent war with Spain, buttressed the original calls for protection from pirates.¹⁹⁴ Coincidentally, the dispatch of *Flambrough* corresponded to the end of the recent revolt against proprietary government in South Carolina, especially over issues of defence. Although the proprietors kept their ownership of the colony following the upheaval, the Crown took over defence and administration.¹⁹⁵ The Admiralty generally dispatched one ship to South Carolina, with periods of overlapping service granting the colony dual coverage. From 1725 to 1727, the Admiralty ordered the sloop *Shark* to divide its time between Carolina and Virginia in addition to those ships already dispatched to each colony. The Admiralty sent two ships directly to South Carolina for the years 1728 to 1731, 1734, and 1738 to beyond 1739. All ships were sixth-rates, with the occasional sloop sent as the second vessel.¹⁹⁶

The Admiralty's decision to agree to a Georgia station ship corresponded to a shift in orientation of British policy towards Spanish possessions to the south. Until the 1720s, British interests remained content to continue in the buccaneering vein by capturing plate ships returning to Spain. By the 1730s, British policy towards Spanish colonies included increasing the level of permanent British trade in the area, and maintaining the security of the American colonies, by force if necessary. This contrasted with the no less violent strategy of preying on Spanish silver ships.¹⁹⁷ Established in 1733, ostensibly as a philanthropic exercise with considerable potential for economic development, Georgia

¹⁹⁴ Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Board of Trade, 6 Nov. 1719, *CSPC* Vol. 31, no. 447; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 227.

¹⁹⁵ Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 94-103; Robert M. Weir, "'Shaftesbury's Darling': British Settlement in the Carolinas at the Close of the Seventeenth Century," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. 1: The Origins of Empire*, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 286.

¹⁹⁶ Admiralty Lists, 1719-1739, TNA PRO ADM 8/14-20.

¹⁹⁷ Duncan Crewe, *Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 1-4.

was to form a buffer between Spanish Florida and South Carolina.¹⁹⁸ Initially, however, it appears no one thought to lobby for a Georgian station ship. Nevertheless, in 1735, the captain of the sloop *Hawk*, James Gascoigne, received instructions to assist James Oglethorpe in stabilizing the settlement at Georgia.¹⁹⁹ The creation of this final station rounds off the nearly eighty years of North American deployment between the Restoration and war with Spain beginning in 1739. After this point, increasing numbers of squadrons and expeditions operating in North America opened up the maritime frontier to a degree it had not previously seen.

2.5- Conclusion

The Admiralty sent out between six and twelve ships each year to North America after 1692. These ships formed part of the overall scheme for the defence of the British Isles, which combined squadrons, convoys, and cruising warships. In servicing the needs of colonies, the circum-Atlantic trade networks, and the British Isles, warships such as the New England station ship *Chester*, or the mast ship escort *Samuel and Henry*, were the overseas extension of the Royal Navy's trade defence routine. This routine developed during the last quarter of the seventeenth century to protect England's European trade, with particular emphasis on the Mediterranean.²⁰⁰ The numbers of warships sent to America may not have been large compared to overall deployment, but as the summer of 1733 illustrates, the navy performed numerous tasks spread out over a variety of

¹⁹⁸ Trevor R. Reese, *Colonial Georgia: A Study in British Imperial Policy in the Eighteenth Century* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), 8; Kenneth Coleman, *Colonial Georgia: A History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 13.

¹⁹⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to James Gascoigne, *Hawk*, 7 Oct. 1735, TNA PRO ADM 2/54.

²⁰⁰ Hornstein, *Restoration Navy*, 54-64.

locations. Despite an erratic beginning, the North American section of the trade protection service became regular by 1692, and continued through to the end of the study period in 1739. The need for overseas trade protection had long been identified by vested interests, and this had been understood (if sometimes only obliquely) by government and navy, but the resources for a regular system often could not be found or freed up to initiate continuous service during the Restoration. Only after the pressures of European war and French commerce raiding, as well as the introduction of new methods of managing money, did regular service become available.

The importance of the tobacco and fish trades and their particular needs demonstrated that trade protection was required, even if it was not forthcoming. The driving force behind pre-1688 requests for station ships to North America came first through the offices of colonial governors, who initially argued for station ships as a method of enforcing obedience to the Crown and the Navigation Acts, and later as a way of ensuring the continued fealty of colonies. Evidence supports such explanations for the station ships sent to Virginia, New York, and New England. The needs of the war efforts and piracy after 1688 largely negated these efforts for the time being, and so William Phips argued the case for frontier defence when applying for warships to strengthen his governorship.

That governors and merchants regularly requested naval protection is telling as these groups form the two principal points of interaction between captains of the Royal Navy and the British maritime empire (beyond the obvious interaction with the sea and shipping themselves). Without a proper commander in the vicinity, there had to be some deference to a higher authority to direct the warship, so as to maximize utility. Colonial

governors came to fill that role. The local merchant availing himself of the navy's protection, meanwhile, became essential to the repair and re-supply of warships overseas.

Although individual ships sent to North America formed a small group compared to deployments in Europe, they formed part of the navy's trade protection service and going convoy or on station certainly carried great importance for the officers and sailors sent overseas. Regardless of how the navy sent its ships to North America, they remained part of a corporate whole, despite local contingencies. The individuals within this corporation needed to be highly trained and professional, especially as they moved further away from centres of command. But within an Atlantic empire of opportunity, temptation could prove too much for men whose level of expertise grew faster than their monetary reward.

Chapter 3

The Professionalization of the Sea Officer Corps: The Newfoundland Experience, 1660-1715

The previous chapter demonstrated that naval deployment to North America became regular after the Restoration, even if gaps could still appear in the frequently modest coverage. Therefore, the captains of detached warships could always expect a foreign voyage, and the expansion of extra-European convoy services brought increased numbers of naval personnel into contact with the growing British transoceanic empire. This contact corresponded to the growing professionalism expected of commissioned officers within the Royal Navy. The smaller warships of rates six to four (carrying ten to fifty-four guns) made up the overwhelming majority of those ships sent on station or convoy duty.¹ Such ships proved ideal for overseas service as they could keep the sea in almost any weather, fit easily into colonial ports, and fend off most privateers, pirates, and smaller enemy warships.² Furthermore, these ships permitted the opportunity for continuous employment (unlike the larger ships-of-the-line), and this could be of considerable importance, especially during the decades before the implementation of universal half-pay. Although frequently of junior status, convoy and station ship captains still held commissions from the Crown, and remained bound by the same regulations and expectations as their more senior colleagues. Additionally, it can be argued that the “middling sort” of persons emerging out of the seventeenth century included sea officers, regardless of seniority, as the occupational parameters of naval service became

¹ See Appendix 1.

² David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy-Built, Purchased and Captured-1688-1860* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994), 6; Admiralty Lists, 1674-1739, United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty (ADM) 8/1-20, *passim*.

increasingly codified along with those of various other professions.³

This chapter examines the professional behaviour of the Royal Navy's commissioned sea officers between 1660 and 1715 by focussing on those captains assigned to the annual Newfoundland convoy. Examining captains ordered to Newfoundland within the context of professionalization of the navy can be used to illustrate clearly how they envisioned the British oceanic empire as their work space. Lacking a colonial government like that of the other North American colonies, Newfoundland permitted officers serving there to showcase their duty to navy and state, as well as to exploit opportunity unencumbered by a middle layer of colonial administration. This chapter also contributes to a recent revitalization of early modern Newfoundland history as several new studies update and revise our understanding of society, community, and the pivotal role of the fishery to the British economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁴ This also serves to highlight the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century importance of Newfoundland which, like the English outpost at Tangier, arguably played a greater role in the early-modern Atlantic empire than during later periods. As a result, Newfoundland, along with other previously important locales,

³ Wilfred Prest, "Introduction: The Professions and Society in Early Modern England," in *The Professions in Early Modern England*, ed. Prest (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 1-24; J.D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649-1688* (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2008), 88; Robert Glass, "The Profession of the Sea-Officer in Late Seventeenth Century England" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, 1990), 6. The term sea officer generally referred to both commissioned and warrant officers in warships. The term naval officer in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries referred to an administrator of the navy or a shipping attendant in a colonial port. Following the lead of Glass this chapter refers to commissioned officers when discussing sea officers but recognizes that such usage is artificial.

⁴ Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); Peter E. Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). See also the various authors in two recent volumes of *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies*: Peter E. Pope, "Introduction: The New Early Modern Newfoundland, the Eighteenth Century," *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies* 17 no. 1 (2001), 139-42; Pope, "Introduction: The New Early Modern Newfoundland to 1700," *ibid.*, 19 no. 1 (2003), 1-4.

can sometimes be left out of subsequent imperial or Atlantic analyses because they did not correspond to the more visible development of India or the colonies that later formed the United States.⁵

Going convoy, or on station, to North America created opportunities for captains to generate additional income while simultaneously demonstrating their gentlemanly loyalty to Crown and state. Newfoundland became a perfect spot for sea officers to benefit from both legitimate and more opaque strategies of professional and personal advancement. The lack of legal facilities associated with the fisheries potentially hid fraudulent behaviour, but it also provided a place to demonstrate duty and competence, especially given the extra responsibility entrusted to convoy captains to fill the governmental void. Newfoundland may have been a frontier with few amenities, but it was far from an exotic location for the navy. Sailing times to Newfoundland were among the shortest for extra-European destinations, and the cycle of Atlantic travel dictated that most ships returning to the British Isles from North America and the Caribbean passed near, or through, Newfoundland waters.⁶ The fisheries, meanwhile, held a special place in English trade as the Navigation Acts gave merchants licence to take their product directly to market instead of landing it first in England. This suggests not only that Newfoundland was a hub of Atlantic navigation but, with regard to trade, also an

⁵ Elizabeth Mancke, "Another British America: A Canadian Model for the Early Modern British Empire," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 no. 1 (1997), 1-36; Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850* (London: Pimlico, 2003), 17, 40-41; Stephen Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005), 63-68; Peter E. Pope, "Comparisons: Atlantic Canada," in *A Companion to Colonial America*, ed. Daniel Vickers (London: Blackwell, 2003), 489-507.

⁶ Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 82.

extension of England and Europe rather than part of North America.⁷

Convoying fishing ships to Newfoundland remained a relatively short haul of several months for those warships returning directly to England at the end of the season. For those ships escorting the sack trade to market, the voyage included extended stays along the Iberian Peninsula and, especially during the seventeenth century, certain Mediterranean ports such as Livorno (Leghorn). Such routes turned the journey into a round-trip of a year or more.⁸ Because of this, the post-Restoration instructions to captains going to Newfoundland are among the longest of those issued by the Admiralty. As well, passage of the 1699 Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland specifically outlined the captain's requirements to keep the peace, and engage with fishing admirals over how to oversee the fishery.⁹ Although captains received copies of the act, and other supplementary instructions from the government body known as the Board of Trade, the direct orders for overseeing Newfoundland came from the navy, and it was the navy to whom captains were responsible directly.¹⁰ Essentially, parliamentary statute in 1699 codified what captains had been ordered to do by the Admiralty since at least 1674, thus perpetuating the navy's association with Newfoundland.¹¹

⁷ Pope, *Fish into Wine*, 80; Sari Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), 27.

⁸ Admiralty Lists, 1689-1731, TNA PRO ADM 8/2-17, *passim*; Hornstein, 58; William R. Miles, "The Newfoundland Convoy, 1711," *Northern Mariner/Marin du nord* 18 no. 2 (2008), 61-83.

⁹ England, An Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland, 10 Gul. III c. 14 (1698), *The Statutes of the Realm* (London: George Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1810-1828, 11 vols.), Vol. 7, 515-18. This notation will be employed for discussing the act, but debate on the bill continued into 1699 before it finally passed through Parliament. Alan Cass, "Mr. Nisbet's Legacy, or the Passing of King William's Act in 1699," *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies* 22 no. 2 (2007), 505-543.

¹⁰ The instructions for this era can be found in: TNA PRO ADM 2/1, 2/3-55, 2/1725, 2/1726 and 2/1737.

¹¹ Cf. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Wetwang, *Newcastle*, 15 June 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737; Instructions to Capt. Francis Wheler, *Tiger*, 10 June 1684, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727; Instructions to Capt. Christopher Fogg, *Archangel*, 16 July 1694, TNA PRO ADM 2/16; Instructions to Capt. Timothy Bridges,

Commissioned sea officers of the Royal Navy maintained a regular presence throughout the British maritime world and remained important actors in the multifaceted Newfoundland fisheries. Historians of Newfoundland routinely incorporate into their writings the demographic and other statistical evidence gathered by sea officers while guarding the yearly fishing fleet.¹² Further, the importance of Newfoundland's legal history with regard to later development highlights the navy's role as its captains evolved into the official imperial link with Newfoundland in lieu of a colonial government.¹³

This link between the navy and Newfoundland emerged from the tendency of early modern British governments to administer colonies on an *ad hoc* basis. Lacking the money and resources to extend complete control over their overseas interests, Crown and government tended to negotiate with concerned parties over the control of colonies and imperial holdings. In many cases, officials found themselves mediating between various interests rather than solidifying their dominion. Newfoundland is an important example of this type of administration as the government juggled the concerns of fishing interests in the West Country of England and London with the contingencies of imperial rivalry, settlement, and the government's own desire to control the territory it claimed.

Looe, 22 Feb. 1704, TNA PRO ADM 2/31; Instructions to Capt. Charles Fotherby, *Southampton*, 10 June 1714, TNA PRO ADM 2/48.

¹² Some examples employing the yearly convoy reports include: C. Grant Head, *Eighteenth Century Newfoundland: A Geographer's Perspective* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); W. Gordon Hancock, *So Longe as there Comes Noe Women: Origins of English Settlement in Newfoundland* (St. John's: Breakwater, 1989); John Mannion, "Victualling a Fishery: Newfoundland Diet and the Origins of the Irish Provisions Trade," *International Journal of Maritime History* 12 no. 1 (2000), 1-57.

¹³ Pope, "Comparisons: Atlantic Canada," 496; Christopher English, "The Development of the Newfoundland Legal System to 1815," *Acadiensis* 20 no. 1 (1990), 89-119; Keith Matthews, "Historical Fence Building, A Critique of the Historiography of Newfoundland," *Newfoundland Quarterly* 78 no. 1 (1978; reprint, *Newfoundland Studies* 17 no. 2 [Fall 2001], ed. Peter E. Pope, 143-65), 21-29; John Crowley, "Empire Versus Truck: The Official Interpretation of Debt and Labour in the Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland Fishery," *Canadian Historical Review* 70 no. 3 (1989), 311-36.

Employing the navy to police Newfoundland became the compromise in this instance.¹⁴ The yearly routine of defending and overseeing the fishery which had developed by the late seventeenth century became legally entrenched with the passage of the 1699 Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland. After 1729, the British government instituted an actual system of naval government with a sea officer assigned specifically to govern Newfoundland, while another officer acted as commodore for the yearly convoy.¹⁵ Such a system could not have been contemplated without the state's trust in its commissioned officers. The gestation period of naval government coincided with the evolution of a professional sea officer corps, and this was reflected by the manner in which officers carried out their duty.

3.1- The Professionalization of the Navy

During the seventeenth century, state naval service needed to evolve from a combination of royally owned warships supplemented during conflict with hired or conscripted merchant vessels, often with merchant captains enticed into national service. The creation of a permanent navy required full-time warships commanded by men pledging obedience to the rules of the state, regardless of where their personal priorities lay. The state exploited and encouraged codification to ensure access to a trained armed

¹⁴ This passage: Elizabeth Mancke, "Negotiating an Empire: Britain and its Overseas Peripheries, c. 1550-1780," in *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820*, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 239-41. Also: Jack P. Greene, "Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Politics of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History*, ed. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24. Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, Ch. 4 and 5, details the operation of full naval government.

¹⁵ Ralph G. Lounsbury, *The British Fishery at Newfoundland 1634-1763* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1934; reprint, Hamden: Archon, 1969), 273-75; Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 66-68.

force to defend Britain in the various wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁶

English naval administrators, especially Samuel Pepys (Clerk of the Acts, 1660-1673 and Secretary to the Admiralty, 1673-1679 and 1684-1689), endeavoured to forge a professional officer corps during the seventeenth century, with varying results. Despite the considerable efforts of Pepys, the navy could not completely eradicate abuse of its regulations by sea officers. Captains sought incremental income through alternative means, or even solicited future employment, while in the process of fulfilling their duty to navy and state. Consequently, a culture of opportunism flourished among officers in the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth until at least the Napoleonic Wars, despite the entrenchment of the navy as a state institution.¹⁷

Pepys desired the gentlemanly reform of the officer corps, but detested what he believed to be the foppish intrusion of elites who did not grasp the nuances of command or the complex skills required to sail a warship. The exaggerated debate over gentleman captains and their tarpaulin colleagues of more humble origin nevertheless reflected the navy's need to establish a gentlemanly profession to ensure collective, rather than individual, loyalty. Unfortunately, such efforts conflicted with constant budgetary constraints, in addition to prejudices against the influx of officers of high social

¹⁶ Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1800* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiskell 1992, 2 vols.), Vol. 1, 13-17; Michael Duffy, "The Foundations of British Naval Power," in *The Military Revolution and the State, 1500-1800*, ed. Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980), 49-85.

¹⁷ Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 86, 196; Geoffrey Holmes, *Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 278-79; N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London: W.W. Norton, 2005), 522-25; Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 108-09.

standing.¹⁸ The navy increasingly expected its officers to be gentlemen, but could not pay them a wage sufficient to support their social station. Seventeenth-century officer indiscipline often resulted from the desire to make money at the expense of carrying out instructions. The navy countered by restricting some extra-curricular methods of making money while regulating others, but it was never able to eliminate all deviant behaviour. Charles II himself often encouraged and excused the individualistic actions of officers attempting to make extra money as a commonsense approach to their employment's shortcomings.¹⁹ Such an attitude, borne out of ancient concepts of rewarding martial obligations to the Crown, clashed with modern naval warfare (including the responsibility of trade protection) requiring, among other things, the organization of complicated and expensive state hardware, the need to respond to high demand, the acceptance of criticism from variety of public interests, and expectations of accountability from parliamentarians.²⁰

Despite the navy's officer corps developmental problems at the end of the seventeenth century, Geoffrey Holmes is still able to apply his four criteria for identifying a profession between 1660 and 1730. A profession distinguished itself as a vocation or career with an established hierarchy of promotion. Next, entry into the profession required an extended period of specialized training. Thirdly, professionals laboured primarily with their minds rather than their hands. Lastly, a recognized body regulated

¹⁸ J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 34-35.

¹⁹ Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 76, 83-84; Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 183.

²⁰ Ian Roy, "The Profession of Arms," in *Professions in Early Modern England*, ed. Prest, 182-86; J.A. Johnston, "Parliament and the Protection of Trade, 1688-1714," *Mariner's Mirror* 54 no. 4 (1971), 399-414; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 201-02.

and enforced standards of behaviour.²¹ Holmes identifies professionalization with a movement towards state service emerging out of the Restoration. Several factors, including an increasingly centralized Stuart monarchy, bureaucratic expansion, and growing insistence on corporate versus individualistic behaviour, all contributed to the creation of the “fiscal military state.” This gifted Great Britain with the physical and monetary means to wage continuous war into, and throughout, the eighteenth century.²²

Some historians have suggested that the individualism and social diversity retained by defiant seventeenth-century sea officers precludes fitting them into parameters such as those devised by Holmes, while others prefer to emphasize the three major professions of clergy, law, and medicine.²³ The physical needs and dangers of naval service, the serious consequences of failure, and its relatively late professionalization do distinguish the profession of arms during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁴ Yet incessant warfare forced the Royal Navy to raise its professional standards quickly. The commissioned sea officer grew into a profession open to talent, and attracted many who did not possess wealth or title. N.A.M. Rodger suggests that the concept of personal honour developed to compensate for the lack of social credentials among officers. Without title, officers who worked their way up from modest beginnings had only their honour to fall back upon should their status be challenged. Personal honour and loyalty to the Crown between 1660 and 1750 drove

²¹ Holmes, *Augustan England*, 7-8.

²² Ibid., 241-42; John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), xvii, 34-37.

²³ Glass, “Profession of the Sea-Officer,” 84-86; Norbert Elias, “Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession,” *British Journal of Sociology* 1 (1950), 291-309; Penelope Corfield, *Power and the Professions in Britain, 1700-1850* (London: Routledge, 1995); Rosemary O’Day, *The Professions in Early Modern England, 1450-1800* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000).

²⁴ Roy, “Profession of Arms,” 182.

officers to carry out their orders, as much as it encouraged duels between men who felt they could not afford to lose their honour under any circumstances. As the social status of sea officers ascended after 1750, a sense of duty to navy and state surpassed personal honour as the basis for loyalty.²⁵

Honour tied the navy to other professionals who wove some degree of gentlemanly behaviour into the identification of early-modern professionalism. Closely associated with the advent of the “middling sort,” or middle classes, in early-modern Britain, what constituted gentlemanly behaviour has been open to question. Nevertheless, by 1700 a “gentleman” came to mean someone with money, regardless of their background, who retained a modicum of politeness and social grace.²⁶ Honour and gentlemanly behaviour cover the aspiration of respectability to those of humble origins, while Rosemary O’Day suggests the concept of social humanism to interpret the children of the wealthy entering the professional classes in increasing numbers. Social humanism placed service to church and state as the prime reason for the existence of the social elite. In relation to the professions, it gave the aristocracy leave to educate its children towards a useful existence within society. In the process, it compensated for the negation of economic reasons for professional training, as many elite students did not necessarily need to earn a living from their education.²⁷

According to O’Day, early-modern professionalism emerging out of the Renaissance and Reformation injected a certain degree of divine calling among the three

²⁵ N.A.M. Rodger, “Honour and Duty at Sea, 1660-1815,” *Historical Research* 75 (2002), 425-47.

²⁶ Prest, “Introduction,” 17-19; Peter Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London: 1660-1730* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 7-9.

²⁷ O’Day, *Professions in Early Modern England*, 5, 28.

most visible professions: law, clergy, and medicine. Even when spiritual overtones waned, professionals abided by the construct that they answered a call to a higher active service. Professionals served their clients rather than acting as patron, but were accountable to God and the standards set by their professions. Thus, a public rather than an individual good was served, providing the professional with humility, yet with a disposition of moral superiority. Meanwhile, although professional standards became associated with higher learning, those professions most influenced by the old guild system and least affected by academic education, proved to be the most fluid and the most able to develop original forms of education, training, and practise.²⁸ Although O'Day does not discuss the navy directly, commissioned sea officers can certainly be included in the above criteria, as they required training at sea for long periods to be considered effective, regardless of social background or method of entering the navy.²⁹ Concepts of honour and social humanism permit a diverse set of individuals to be included together under a single naval system regardless of more mundane bureaucratic developments.

A corresponding imperial context existed as the Atlantic world provided opportunity away from the British Isles, a phenomenon frequently identified with, and well documented for, aspiring merchants.³⁰ In this sense, sea officers shared common ground with Scottish professionals of the post-1750 period who were labelled

²⁸ Ibid., 42-43.

²⁹ Rodger, "Honour and Duty at Sea," 428-29.

³⁰ Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); H.V. Bowen, *Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688-1755* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996); David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Hancock, *Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

sojourners.³¹ Restricted opportunity in Scotland during the eighteenth century fostered a group of middle and upper class professionals hoping to generate additional income opportunities. These professionals travelled to the colonies in order to accumulate enough wealth to live comfortably in Britain. Although some did settle in the colonies, it was never the intention of sojourners to stay abroad.³² A correlation can be made between sojourners and Puritans before the middle of the seventeenth century who, for a variety of reasons, whether homesickness, business, or the politics of the British Civil Wars, returned to England after a period of settlement, or who travelled back and forth.³³ While prospects abounded for commissioned officers remaining in Europe, captains ordered abroad took advantage of the new opportunities created by imperial expansion out of necessity. Such activity fits into concepts of a cyclic Atlantic World rather than a narrow, frequently one-way, bridge between the British Isles and overseas colonies.³⁴

Commissioned sea officers provide a middle group between Puritan reverse migration and sojourning. Until the navy expanded its deployment to the squadron level in North America after 1739, few sea officers commanded sufficient time to establish connections with colonial societies for any long-term exploitation of opportunity.³⁵ An early example of one who did was Captain John Evans in the sixth-rate *Richmond*, who

³¹ Alan L. Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun: Scottish Migrants in Jamaica and the Chesapeake, 1740-1800* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 3-4. Karras bases his identification on the modern sociological definition of sojourner. See also: *Strangers Within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire*, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

³² Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun*, 13-22.

³³ David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication Between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 191-205.

³⁴ Ian K. Steele, "Moat Theories and the English Atlantic, 1675 to 1740," *Canadian Historical Association Papers* (1978), 18-33; David Armitage, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, ed. Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 15-25.

³⁵ Julian Gwyn, "The Royal Navy in North America, 1712-1776," in *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 130-47.

spent nearly five years on station at New York at the end of the seventeenth century.³⁶ In addition to mundane enterprises, such as hiring out his men for labour during *Richmond's* time in port, Evans endeared himself to Governor Benjamin Fletcher (in office 1692-1698).³⁷ Fletcher engaged in land speculation around New York totalling one million acres, which he dispersed to various friends, including Evans. Of dubious legality, the succeeding New York administration passed a 1699 law that annulled all of Fletcher's grants.³⁸

Peter Warren is perhaps the best example of an officer taking advantage of the increasing opportunities available by the middle of the eighteenth century. Warren made a fortune from prize money, contributed to the first capture of the French fortified town of Louisbourg in 1745, petitioned successfully for the establishment of a North American squadron, married into a prominent New York family, and engaged in considerable land speculation in North America.³⁹ Normally, however, it appears that the relatively quick turnaround time of several months to a year for convoys and two to four years for station ships, as well as the needs of active duty, curtailed the chances afforded to captains such as Warren and Evans.

While a sense of community and the entrenchment of universal standards have been deemed essential for the development of the professions, in the armed services such traits met with concepts of honour, duty, and service to the state to generate an *esprit de*

³⁶ Captain's Log, *Richmond*, 1 Oct. 1693-2 June 1698, TNA PRO ADM 51/4310.

³⁷ Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 69.

³⁸ Thomas J. Archdeacon, *New York City 1664-1710: Conquest and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 124.

³⁹ Julian Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral, The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), 15-24; Gwyn, *An Admiral for America: Sir Peter Warren, Vice Admiral of the Red 1702-1752* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).

corps. Naval administrators, however, did not count on such notions to ensure parsimony and obedience among the captains in charge of the navy's equipment and crews. While social humanism and honour may have been the driving force behind those ambitious souls vying for the top spots in the Admiralty hierarchy, they can be sometimes less helpful for explaining the everyday routine of running a warship engaged by numerous captains who surely realized they did not have the experience or connections to make Admiral, or whose goals in life and choice of profession did not extend beyond a captaincy in the Royal Navy. This is certainly the case with many tarpaulin captains of the seventeenth century, whose transformation from humble sailors to officers serving the Crown exemplified the enhanced opportunities for upward mobility (if not manners and social graces) during the Stuart era.⁴⁰ Furthermore, as one rose higher in the navy fewer opportunities existed for advancement with regard to command positions because fewer of them were available, and their distribution was plagued with political considerations.⁴¹

For many captains, running a warship remained their principal occupation, and no officer could climb the Admiralty ladder without any experience. As solicitations to the Admiralty secretary after 1688 indicate, securing continued employment often constituted the captain's immediate goal. Any job would be acceptable, especially during peacetime, or when the main fleet was laid up in ordinary (reserve). The utilization of experienced officers such as Sir John Berry to deal with colonial affairs stemmed as much from the desire of the Crown and Admiralty to keep its most loyal and experienced captains fully employed during times of peace as it did from the need for sober deliberation of imperial

⁴⁰ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, Ch. 2; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 115, 205.

⁴¹ N.A.M Rodger, "Commissioned Officers' Careers in the Royal Navy," *Journal for Maritime Research* 3 no.1 (2001), 87-88; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 201-02.

issues.⁴² Adding weight to this concept was the inter-war expedient of having post-captains serve at sea as lieutenants to senior officers to ensure continuity of employment.⁴³ Solicitations from officers for any employment offer a contrast to the assumption by some historians that most captains disliked convoy or colonial service.⁴⁴ Some certainly hated it, but others viewed it as part of the job description.

Early in 1693, Captain Robert Fairfax openly expressed to the Admiralty the poor treatment meted out to sea officers in Massachusetts, and felt that service so far from the Admiralty's view impeded his chances for advancement in the navy.⁴⁵ Fairfax's attitude reflected older perceptions of the path to promotion as well as the position of officers facing difficult situations far from England. Pepys frequently scoffed at such concerns among officers, insisting that attention to duty and service to the Crown mattered more than visibility at court, or the giving of gifts.⁴⁶ Displeasure with perceived insults and injustice from colonial officials may not have diminished with time, but the effects of years of warfare and overseas service on the psyche of the officer corps, and the realities of unemployment during peace, produced a different attitude in the correspondence of some officers. In the aftermath of going convoy to Newfoundland in 1723, Captain

⁴² Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 56. Berry served extensively in the Mediterranean where opportunity, not pay, led to his amassing a fortune.

⁴³ For example: Capt. George Smith sent to Newfoundland as first lieut. of the *Assistance*, Capt. Edmund Willey sent to New York as first lieut. of the *Advice*, Capt. Thomas Long and Capt. Edward Durley, sent to Virginia in the *Lincoln* as first and second lieut. respectively, and Thomas Smith sent lieut. of the *Gosport* to New England. Admiralty Lists, 1699-1703, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

⁴⁴ A.W.H. Pearsall, "The Royal Navy and Trade Protection, 1688-1714," *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 30 (1986), 116; Joseph D. Doty, "The British Admiralty as a Factor in Colonial Administration, 1689-1713" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1929; reprint Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), 67.

⁴⁵ Capt. Robert Fairfax, *Conception Prize*, to Admiralty, 31 Jan. 1693, TNA PRO Colonial Office (CO) 5/857, 125. Fairfax's diatribe came during a prolonged disagreement with Massachusetts governor Sir William Phips.

⁴⁶ Davies, *Gentleman and Tarpaulins*, 18, 22. This did not mean Pepys was above accepting gifts and payouts himself.

Tyrwitt Cayley found himself unemployed and petitioned the Admiralty repeatedly for work in the following years.⁴⁷ In August of 1727 Cayley pleaded with the secretary of the Admiralty:

I have been a great sufferer having a family and been so long out of employ makes me take this freedom to write to desire your favour to speak in my behalf, and if I could get a station in any part of America it would be of great service to me in my private affairs, which lie unsettled at several places, and supposing that some of the station ships will be relieved in little time took the liberty of mentioning it to you.⁴⁸

Cayley spent two years on station at New England between 1715 and 1717, and was therefore familiar with overseas duty.⁴⁹ Cayley did not receive any more work from the navy for nearly six years until the 1723 Newfoundland convoy, and upon his return employment dried up once more in the peacetime environment. In his letters, Cayley begged for any work, even on convoy or station duty.⁵⁰

The common denominator between Fairfax and Cayley was their dispatch to New England in small frigates relatively early following their commission to post-captain.⁵¹ New or junior captains frequently commanded convoy and station ships, but this was not necessarily a reflection of their abilities. Pepys considered captains who began in sixth-rates the most trustworthy sailors. Sixth-rate warships did not carry a sailing master, and this forced commanders to acquire the fundamentals of sea craft, especially navigation. Service in small warships in theory provided the perfect officer initiation to the sea-

⁴⁷ Capt. Tyrwitt Cayley to Admiralty, 15 Nov. 1725, 4 Apr. 1727, and 14 Nov. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

⁴⁸ Cayley to Admiralty, 5 Aug. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

⁴⁹ Admiralty Lists, Apr. 1715-Sept. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 8/14.

⁵⁰ Cayley to Admiralty, 2 Nov. 1724, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598. Cayley's long and loyal service eventually secured him positions on the Sick and Hurt Board in 1745, and the Victualling Board in 1748. Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 53, 58.

⁵¹ David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo, *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (Aldershot: Scolar Press/Navy Records Society, 1994), 111, 149.

keeping and managerial skills needed to command the larger ships-of-the-line.⁵² While the seventeenth-century sixth-rate could become a sump for tarpaulin officers deemed worthy of command, but not of gentlemanly status, by the Nine Years' War the expansion of the navy and increasing numbers of smaller warships required junior captains of all levels.⁵³ Therefore, even the wealthy and well connected within the officer corps often found their first command to be a fireship, or a sixth-rate on convoy duty.⁵⁴ In 1700, the Admiralty released its first proper seniority list for captains and lieutenants. Of the 186 captains on the list, sixty-five began in fireships, thirty-nine in sixth-rates, forty-seven in fifth-rates, twenty-five in fourth-rates, nine in third-rates, and one in a first-rate.⁵⁵

Despite the subordinate standing of many convoy and station ship captains, the extended period most spent working their way up to command positions ensured the production of experienced officers, many having already been in the navy since an early age.⁵⁶ Reforms implemented in the seventeenth century for the examination of lieutenants also guaranteed competence of seamanship. Aspiring captains could obtain no position in the navy without first being commissioned lieutenant as the navy remained loath to put incompetents in charge of its ships, regardless of connections. Patronage, of course, could (and did) influence the speed with which an officer could rise up within the

⁵² Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 66-67.

⁵³ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 203.

⁵⁴ Admiral Cloudesley Shovell and George Rooke are examples of two officers of diverse background but similar experiences as junior officers. John B. Hattendorf, "Sir George Rooke and Sir Cloudesley Shovell, c1650-1709 and 1650-1707," in *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Peter LeFevre and Richard Harding (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole: 2000), 43-50.

⁵⁵ A List of the names of such captains who serviced in His Majesty's Fleet during the late War... dated the 18th of April, 1700, *The Sergison Papers*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: The Navy Records Society, 1950), 345-51.

⁵⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 121.

navy hierarchy.⁵⁷ Ultimately, however, the navy desired good captains, so even patronage appointees were usually highly trained and capable individuals.

The pitfalls of naval service did not discourage those seeking upward mobility, so the state had little trouble recruiting eager and qualified officers.⁵⁸ Preventing them from engaging in overly self-interested behaviour, however, proved to be more of a challenge. Various rules and regulations introduced by the Admiralty to govern the behaviour of captains highlight professionalization from the state's point of view.⁵⁹ The implementation of written rules for officer conduct in the navy reached an important benchmark with the 1661 Act of Parliament known as the Articles of War. This legislation codified what was expected of sailors (especially officers) while in state service, dealing broadly with issues such as cowardice and embezzlement.⁶⁰ Should captains not carry out the Admiralty's primary instructions, the Articles of War provided recourse to punishment through court martial. For the regulation of everyday service, the Admiralty issued a series of printed instructions for shipboard routine, beginning with the 1663 general instructions sponsored by James, Duke of York, in his capacity as Lord High Admiral.⁶¹ The permanent general instructions regulated the daily routine of warship maintenance, including topics such as stores, rigging, the husbandry of victuals,

⁵⁷ Rodger, "Commissioned Officers' Careers," 89; *Queen Anne's Navy: Documents Concerning the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702-1714*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: Navy Records Society, 1961), 310-311; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 98.

⁵⁸ Holmes, *Augustan England*, 283-84.

⁵⁹ Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 194.

⁶⁰ England, An Act for Establishing Articles and Orders for the Regulating and Better Government of His Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea, 13 Car. II c. 9 (1661), *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 5, 311-14, reprinted and introduced by N.A.M Rodger, *Articles of War: The Statutes Which Governed Our Fighting Navies, 1661, 1749 and 1886* (Havant: K. Mason, 1982), 13-19; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 59.

⁶¹ James, Duke of York, General Instructions for Captains, 1663, TNA PRO ADM 2/1725, ff. 101-11, reprinted with omissions in *British Naval Documents 1204-1960*, ed. John Hattendorf and others (Aldershot: Scolar Press/Navy Records Society, 1993), 283-89.

and even the proper formats for entering men into the muster.⁶² Such instructions assisted with the installation of cohesive and uniform behaviour upon anyone serving the navy of the state at any time.⁶³

Failure to follow the general instructions to the satisfaction of the various components of Admiralty administration did not necessarily lead to dismissals, or even courts martial. Rather, many officers found their pay halted over improper and outstanding accounts, and then found themselves appealing to the Admiralty for redress. Examples are numerous among captains sent overseas, including the much-maligned Tyrwitt Cayley, who encountered problems clearing his accounts from both of his voyages to North America.⁶⁴ A near comic example, but one that nevertheless highlights the fine line between the professional and gentlemanly behaviour of the sea officer versus the meanness of navy administration, comes from Captain John Underdown, commodore at Newfoundland in 1707. To celebrate the union of Scotland, England, and Wales into Great Britain, Underdown decided to fire off all the ship's guns in a salute. This had the practical effect of creating a public display to celebrate the new nation, and of scaling the guns, which the crew had not done for some time. The Board of Ordnance apparently did not share the festive mood, or the necessity of clean gun barrels, and charged Underdown for the powder, leaving him unable to receive his pay. Having passed all his other accounts, Underdown appealed to the Admiralty for assistance, which appears to have

⁶² Admiralty, General Instructions, 22 Feb. 1693, United Kingdom, British Library, Additional Manuscripts 9319; Admiralty, *General Instructions* (London, 1714); Admiralty, *Regulations and Instructions* (London, 1731).

⁶³ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 320.

⁶⁴ Cayley to Admiralty, 22 July 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/1596, and 2 Nov. 1724, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

been granted.⁶⁵

Commissioned officers serving before the middle of the eighteenth century found themselves having to demonstrate fealty to those expanding government and naval bureaucracies who increasingly codified behaviour, yet were slow to grant recompense. With the creation and expansion of half-pay by the end of the seventeenth century, however, the state acknowledged that it needed to retain the services of its sea officers on a permanent basis.⁶⁶ Half-pay began as a reward for services rendered, but it served the purpose of establishing a pool of qualified officers for future mobilization. In 1668, the navy instituted half-pay for unemployed Admirals of the recent Dutch war. In 1674, unemployed captains of first and second-rate warships received half-pay. The system expanded in 1694 to cover five of the six rates of warships based on seniority, and by 1713 nearly all commissioned officers available for employment qualified for benefits.⁶⁷ Beyond rewards, half-pay evolved into a system of retainer, and as a form of social welfare for the infirm and insensible. Although not functioning as efficiently as it could have, half-pay for captains restricted alternate employment opportunities to create a cadre of professionals relying on the state for a job.⁶⁸ By 1700, officers on half-pay could not enter into any other public employment and were required to keep the Admiralty duly informed of their residence. Additionally, officers on half-pay could not travel abroad. This eliminated service in merchant vessels, a common solution to unemployment for sea

⁶⁵ Capt. John Underdown, *Falkland*, to Admiralty, 19 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2624.

⁶⁶ Holmes, *Augustan England*, 279-80.

⁶⁷ Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 104.

⁶⁸ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 203.

officers.⁶⁹ Yet the lack of job security and the meagreness of half-pay could be telling. Out of 323 lieutenants on the 1700 seniority list, at least sixty-two (plus five not on the list, and three post-captains) left the navy for the merchant service in 1699 and 1700, many with permission.⁷⁰

In theory, captains and lieutenants no longer needed to enter into other occupations during lulls in state-sponsored employment. Half-pay gave sea officers not only security of employment, but also the opportunity to transcend that employment into a collective sense of professional identity.⁷¹ The drawback to both regular and half-pay remained its slow expansion, distribution, and insufficient allowance compared to the increasing costs of maintaining a professional appearance within the officer corps, as well as providing for a family.⁷² Captains may have aspired to gentlemanly status, but they could not do so on navy pay alone. For the 1686 pay scale, the captain of a fourth-rate earned ten pounds and ten shillings for a twenty-eight day lunar month. In 1700, pay had risen to fourteen pounds for the same captain but all wages fell slightly following the Nine Years' War and half-pay remained restricted.⁷³ While this proved considerably more than the twenty pounds per annum minimum stipend guaranteed to Church of England curates, it was nowhere near the fees commanded by those in the legal

⁶⁹ *Sergison Papers*, ed. Merriman, 264-67; Admiralty to King's Council, 14 Feb. 1694, *ibid.*, no. 130; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 103-08, Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 120, 203.

⁷⁰ A List of the names of such captains who serviced in His Majesty's Fleet during the late War... dated the 18th of April, 1700, *Sergison Papers*, ed. Merriman, 345-51; Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, *passim*. This includes one lieutenant who entered into Swedish service. The total number of lieutenants and the number leaving the navy should not be considered complete.

⁷¹ Holmes, *Augustan England*, 275; Rodger, "Honour and Duty at Sea," 429.

⁷² Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 54-55.

⁷³ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 203, 620, 623.

profession, where the top barristers could earn thousands of pounds per year in London.⁷⁴

Although precise figures are difficult to obtain – and taking into consideration London remained the most expensive place for a middling family to establish itself – renting a house in the cheaper areas ran between twenty and thirty pounds per year. One contemporary source estimated expenditures of £232 per year for a London family of six plus one maid, not including rent.⁷⁵ Such costs do not incorporate the consumptive power expected of the polite family, which would not have been easy to maintain on a frigate captain's salary since officers could find themselves unemployed periodically.⁷⁶

The navy recognized the need to allow officers more money without raising pay, and permitted its captains perquisites such as a percentage for carrying bullion and specie. Seventeenth-century captains, especially in the Mediterranean, pursued such opportunities with competitive vigour.⁷⁷ Pepys, however, attempted to curb the incidence of officers engaging in these “good voyages” to the dereliction of their instructions.⁷⁸ The right to claim pay for servants brought on board ship continued to be another important income generator for captains.⁷⁹ Navy and government, meanwhile, remained leery of captains who hoped to profit through the embezzlement of wages and, more importantly, of precious naval stores.⁸⁰ Furthermore, during the Interregnum complaints emerged concerning officers engaging in personal commerce, or protection rackets in the

⁷⁴ Holmes, *Augustan England*, 106, 124-27.

⁷⁵ Earle, *Making of the English Middle Class*, 208-09, 271-72.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*; 270; Holmes, *Augustan England*, 278.

⁷⁷ Davies, *Gentleman and Tarpaulins*, 50-51; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 111.

⁷⁸ Glass, “Profession of the Sea-Officer,” 75.

⁷⁹ Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 108-109; Holmes, *Augustan England*, 278.

⁸⁰ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 50.

form of charging convoy money to ensure safe passage in dangerous waters.⁸¹ As Pepys' post-Restoration reform efforts did not entirely succeed, during the Nine Years' War reports of officer abuses prompted Parliament in 1697-98 to pass an act for combating fraud in the navy.⁸²

A variation on the theme of fraud concerned captains who did not provide adequate coverage for merchant vessels as instructed in order to engage in commerce, or to collect fees for ferrying passengers.⁸³ Beyond the defrauding of merchants or the navy, the attention of naval administrators centred on the inability of captains to carry out their instructions if they, for example, lingered in port to secure business deals rather than escort convoys in a timely fashion.⁸⁴ Reports and rumours of captains bending the rules the farther they sailed from London became commonplace. During the Interregnum, even Iceland provided sufficient distance from the Admiralty for captains to commit fraud and other abuses.⁸⁵ The West Indies, meanwhile, became notorious for captains disobeying orders, and taking liberties with their command.⁸⁶ Although moneymaking schemes may have clashed with official policy, they did not necessarily interfere with the development of a professional officer corps. Despite resisting attempts to regulate their behaviour, captains nevertheless employed their increasing professionalism to protect themselves, secure regular employment, and favour the legitimate capture of prizes over bribery and

⁸¹ Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 233-34.

⁸² An Act for the Better Preventing the Embezzlement of His Majesties Stores of War and Preventing Cheats Frauds and Abuses in Paying Seamen's Wages, 9 Gul. III. C.41 (1697-98), *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 7, 423-25.

⁸³ Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 233.

⁸⁴ Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 81-82.

⁸⁵ Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 233.

⁸⁶ Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 187.

embezzlement – although such crimes did not disappear completely. That seventeenth- and early-eighteenth century sea officers may have been prone to fraudulent behaviour goes beyond mere greed or disloyalty as systems for officer welfare and unemployment benefits evolved slowly.

3.2-Prize-Taking

Perhaps the most anticipated income supplementation for an entire ship's crew came from the capture of enemy shipping. All hoped that their ship would be fortunate enough to capture a prize, however small. The advantage of seeking prizes at Newfoundland lay with the yearly French fishing fleet guaranteed to be on the banks. French fishing boats could not compare to Spanish plate ships, but the condemnation of even the smallest vessels could result in extra money for the crew, especially if caught fully loaded and heading for France, or commanded by a master agreeable to a handsome ransom. Regularly practised in Newfoundland by both the British and the French, ransom reduced the need to deplete ships of precious sailors in order to provide prize crews who had to sail the capture through the crowded and dangerous approaches to Europe.⁸⁷

The convoy of 1702 illustrates that Newfoundland could yield a bounty in prizes. In effect a squadron, the Admiralty strengthened the convoy for that year as a precaution following the resumption of war with France.⁸⁸ The commander, John Leake, received permission to hold courts martial, and fly the pennant of a squadron commander, in addition to the usual instructions from the Admiralty and Board of Trade regarding his

⁸⁷ J.S. Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies* (London: Hambledon Press, 1987), 244.

⁸⁸ Admiralty List, Aug. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 8/7. The Admiralty still listed the squadron as a convoy.

overseeing the fishing season, and providing a detailed report thereof.⁸⁹ Leake also received instructions to reconnoitre the French fishery along the island of St. Pierre, survey the harbours of Trinity and Carbonear, and explore north of Bonavista, the furthestmost English fishing port. Leake received orders to attack the enemy where appropriate, and was granted permission to harass French fishing ships and fishing stations whenever possible.⁹⁰ At the completion of the fishing season, the squadron captured twenty-nine French fishing and merchant sail, and burned two more. The haul included three vessels laden with salt, twenty-five with fish, and one from Martinique carrying sugar and molasses. Of the nine ships in the squadron, the *Medway* took nine prizes, *Exeter* took eight, *Montague* captured four, *Litchfield* captured four, *Charles Galley* took three, *Reserve* captured one, and *Assistance*, *Looe*, and *Firebrand* left Newfoundland with none.⁹¹

The dispatch of a squadron to Newfoundland with the expressed intent of harassing the French fishery was an irregular occurrence. Sending extra warships in 1702 allowed the squadron to both protect English fishing harbours and attack the French, although it remained a matter of speculation as to what would have happened if other French warships had joined the one convoy escort reported to be in Newfoundland.⁹² Nevertheless, by 1711 Newfoundland became a magnet for prize taking to the point where the level of captures by privateers and state warships patrolling the region led the

⁸⁹ Admiralty, Orders and Instructions to Capt. John Leake, 24 June and 25 June 1702, TNA PRO ADM 2/28. A second captain, Thomas Swanton, captained the flagship *Exeter* so Leake could command the squadron. Admiralty List, Aug. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

⁹⁰ Admiralty, Orders to Leake, 24 June 1702, TNA PRO ADM 2/28.

⁹¹ Leake to Admiralty, 10 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033. Two sloops, the *Shark* and the *Wolf*, accompanied the squadron to Newfoundland but then travelled elsewhere carrying packets.

⁹² Leake to Admiralty, 10 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

French at Plaisance to believe that an actual naval blockade was in place.⁹³ This was not the case, as the Admiralty instructions always stipulated the protection of the fisheries and trade as the convoy's primary objective. While the Admiralty did not forbid or dissuaded the warships sent to Newfoundland from capturing prizes, they insisted that carrying out instructions to protect the fisheries was a captain's primary duty.⁹⁴

An example of a captain attempting to search actively for prizes while on convoy duty was John Goodall in the fifth-rate *Milford*, who sailed in successive Newfoundland convoys in 1711 and 1712. Goodall had been petitioning the Admiralty for promotion into a fourth-rate when his orders arrived to refit for the 1711 Newfoundland convoy. Goodall requested permission to cruise while at Newfoundland as compensation for being passed over. The Admiralty's response is uncertain, but Goodall managed to catch one small prize while on detached duty from the convoy.⁹⁵ When Goodall was ordered back to Newfoundland for the 1712 convoy, he repeated his request to go cruising. This time the Admiralty informed him he could only do so under orders from the commodore. *Milford* managed to capture three prizes during the 1712 fishing season to add to the one condemned from the previous convoy. Unfortunately for Goodall and his crew, a cessation of arms was called, and as a measure of good faith, commodore Nicholas Trevanion ordered all prizes released. Trevanion estimated the five prizes in hand at the

⁹³ The author owes this point to a conversation with James Candow of Parks Canada. David J. Starkey, *British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 96. The increased traffic brought by Walker's squadron doubtless contributed to such perceptions.

⁹⁴ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Timothy Bridges, *Looe*, 8 Apr. 1704, TNA PRO ADM 2/32. Bridges' instructions ordered him to "...cruise off the coast, for protecting the fishery from the enemy, and therein to use your utmost care and diligence."

⁹⁵ Capt. John Goodall, *Milford*, to Admiralty, 1 Mar., and 24 Apr. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/1825; Admiralty, Instructions to Goodall, 21 Mar. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 2/43; Captain's Log, *Milford*, 27-30 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 51/606.

truce (Goodall's plus two more) to be worth £20,000.⁹⁶

3.3- Robert Robinson and Thomas Cleasby

Prizes represented an obvious, and traditional, method of exploiting opportunity at Newfoundland. The actions of other captains, however, demonstrate the professionalization of the sea officer as it corresponded to the evolution of the navy as a substitute government during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Two captains with extensive experience in Newfoundland illustrate in particular the dual nature of the commissioned sea officer overseas: Captain Sir Robert Robinson combined national service with opportunism, while Captain Thomas Cleasby represented a more humble individual attempting to carve out a career in the navy during an era of patronage and influence. With Cleasby, it is easy to see the 1699 Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland as further written instructions for convoy captains in the wake of the barrage of similar regulations aimed at sea officers.⁹⁷ Robinson and Cleasby are among numerous officers who viewed Newfoundland not as an unfortunate assignment, but as a distinct place for personal advancement within the scope of their maritime world.

Robinson received his promotion to captain in 1661, and a successful early career emerged from his service with distinction during the Second Anglo-Dutch war.⁹⁸

Robinson received a knighthood in 1675, owing to the policy of Charles II and James, Duke of York, to reward exceptional and dutiful captains to encourage recruits.⁹⁹ The

⁹⁶ Goodall to Admiralty, 19 Mar. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1825; Capt. Nicholas Trevanion, *York*, to Admiralty, 11 Dec. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2574.

⁹⁷ On the document as a legal framework: Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 30-44.

⁹⁸ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 382; C.M. Rowe, "Robinson, Sir Robert," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 2*, ed. Frances G. Halpenny and Jean Hamelin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 580-81.

⁹⁹ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 18.

volatile nature of the commissioned officer's career, however, drove Robinson to engage in projecting.

Projecting was an activity in which sea officers could engage to seek personal gain without compromising their orders and instructions. The projector was an individual attempting to achieve profit or preferment by utilizing information and experience gained while abroad. Projectors drew up plans and lobbied government for resources and support. Using contacts within government, projectors sought to convince patrons, or other interested parties, to sponsor their ideas. Due to the decentralized nature of early modern empire, the government considered various projects as a method of achieving, or expanding upon, foreign policy objectives without spending undue time and money developing them. During the last half of the War of the Spanish Succession, in particular, government officials viewed successful projects in North America as a way of breaking out of the stalemate in Europe with no substantial increase in expense or resources. The speculative nature of such ventures resulted in many unsuccessful projects, or ones with only modest returns.¹⁰⁰ Occasionally, though, projectors such as William Phips could catapult themselves into positions of wealth and power. Phips made his fortune through the 1686-87 salvage of a Spanish treasure galleon using resources borrowed from the navy. His ensuing knighthood and newfound solvency permitted Phips to entrench himself as a member of the Massachusetts elite and this contributed to him becoming the governor of that colony in 1692.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ This passage: J.D. Alsop, "The Age of the Projectors: British Imperial Strategy in the North Atlantic in the War of Spanish Succession," *Acadiensis* 21 no. 1 (1991), 30-53.

¹⁰¹ Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1695* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), Ch. 2.

Atlantic Newfoundland became a frequent source for projects, but noteworthy are those proposals submitted by serving sea officers. Beginning in 1674, instructions to convoy captains required them to gather data on Newfoundland and its fisheries.¹⁰² For the 1677 season, the Admiralty appended an elaborate list of questions (known later as the Heads of Inquiry) from the Lords of Trade which were given as additional instructions to convoy captains.¹⁰³ In collecting answers to these questions, captains gained immediate access to information for the composition of projects. Robert Robinson compiled information from multiple voyages to Newfoundland (1661, 1668, 1680, and 1681) that he used to formulate plans for improvements to the region.

Robinson's projects involved a series of reports regarding the settlement of a government at Newfoundland, and the building of fortifications. In sum, fishing interests in the West of England maintained certain rights based on the Western Charters (royal patents granted in 1634, 1661, and 1676), but throughout the seventeenth century a small population, never more than a couple of thousand, kept winter residence on the island. After the decline of proprietary charters following the Restoration, the fishing interests in England feared that permanent settlement on Newfoundland would lead to royal government, thus increasing the population, eliminating their fishing privileges, reducing profits, and eroding their control of the fishery. Without proprietors or an established government, the only official form of control over the fishery, and the maintenance of order, rested with the first three fishing masters to arrive in each port: the Admiral, Vice

¹⁰² Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Wetwang, *Newcastle*, 15 June 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737.

¹⁰³ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. William Pool, *Leopard*, 21 May 1677, TNA PRO ADM 2/1.

Admiral and Rear Admiral.¹⁰⁴

In the wake of the 1668 convoy, Robinson sent a memorial to the Crown outlining how the situation in Newfoundland required some form of organization. According to the memorial, the lack of order, justice, and religion was plain to see, and even the inhabitants called for some form of regulation. Various parties suggested removal of the inhabitants, but Robinson argued that to do so would leave English fishing harbours open to foreign intrusion. The French had increased their maritime strength, and it would only be a matter of time before they would encroach on English possessions in Newfoundland.¹⁰⁵ In 1670, Robinson followed with a second memorial oriented more towards the lack of law and order on the island, the failure of fishing admirals to maintain the peace as stipulated in the 1634 Western Charter, the lack of religious guidance, and the destruction of the environment due to careless use of the forests. Defending Newfoundland, Robinson surmised, entailed little expense as the only harbour of consequence, St. John's, could be easily defended from attack by sea. Had there been even a small number of cannon set up to cover the harbour, Robinson concluded, it would have proven enough to deter the Dutch captain De Ruyter from attacking in 1665.¹⁰⁶

The vigorous response to Robinson's reports by fishing interests arguing against settlement and the establishment of government touched off a debate lasting more or less until England went to war against France in 1689.¹⁰⁷ The immediate governmental response to Robinson's reports came in 1674, when they empowered warship captains to

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Memorial of Robert Robinson, 1669, TNA PRO CO 1/22, no. 65.

¹⁰⁶ Memorial of Robert Robinson, 1670, TNA PRO CO 1/22, no. 111.

¹⁰⁷ Keith Matthews, "A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fisheries," (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1968), 204-39.

settle disputes on the Island and gather information.¹⁰⁸ Over the following years, the Privy Council vacillated between support and resistance to greater organization, going so far as to order settlers to abandon Newfoundland between 1674 and 1675. The government rescinded the order following the reports of a number of convoy captains, especially Sir John Berry.¹⁰⁹ Regardless of its year-to-year opinion on settlement, the Privy Council did recognize that Newfoundland required some form of metropolitan authority, and therefore continued with the original decision to rely on navy captains to keep the peace and file reports.¹¹⁰ Robinson's demeanour while a convoy captain at Newfoundland reflected a noticeable emphasis on law and order, and perhaps even the initiation of a permanent judicial presence at Newfoundland.¹¹¹ The government may have chosen not to act upon Robinson's projects, or directly reward his efforts (presumably with a governorship), but this did not deter Robinson from submitting further ideas and suggestions for regulating the fishery and fishing community prior to his participation in the 1681 convoy.¹¹² The state eventually rewarded Robinson's service with the governorship, not of Newfoundland, but of Bermuda from 1686 until 1690.¹¹³ Robinson never gave up on Newfoundland, however, submitting further proposals in 1693 and 1696.¹¹⁴

The façade of Robinson's unquestioning service to the state in Newfoundland may well have been genuine, but while on Mediterranean service during the 1670s the self-

¹⁰⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Wetwang, 15 June 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737.

¹⁰⁹ Pope, *Fish Into Wine*, 65-66.

¹¹⁰ Matthews, "History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fisheries," 206.

¹¹¹ Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 33.

¹¹² Robert Robinson to William Blathwayt, 27 Mar. 1680, TNA PRO CO 1/44, no. 46; Robinson to Blathwayt, 5 Apr. 1680, *ibid.*, no. 50.

¹¹³ Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda in the Old Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 28-35.

¹¹⁴ Rowe, "Robinson, Sir Robert," 581.

interested side of the captain's plans emerged with greater clarity. Robinson had been caught carrying merchandise for profit in violation of navy regulations, and fined £500. Charles II apparently waived the penalty and, according to Pepys, Robinson openly bragged about both his ability to court royal favour and the success of his moneymaking ventures. This exasperated Pepys, who felt Robinson's antics confounded the secretary's attempts to institute professional behaviour among sea officers.¹¹⁵ The negative portrayal of Robinson, however, may have resulted from the bias of Pepys, as the naval administrator emphasized allegations of Robinson bribing and courting his way up the professional ladder.¹¹⁶ Alternatively, it may be that Robinson did not see any obvious problem, or conflict of interest, in soliciting the position of governor on the one hand, and committing fraud on the other. The concepts of income supplementation and influence brokerage are certainly consistent with the behaviour of many public officials, including Pepys. A blurred line existed between corruption and opportunity within the nascent bureaucracy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹¹⁷

In contrast to Robinson, Captain Thomas Cleasby represents those officers adhering to the growing professional standards within the navy out of necessity, as they could not rely on personal fortune or connections to advance their careers. Cleasby is a good example of a captain of more humble means securing and protecting his place using navy regulations, and customs evolving from the routine of the Newfoundland convoy. Cleasby received his promotion to post-captain on 26 May 1694, and subsequently spent

¹¹⁵ Glass, "Profession of the Sea-Officer," 83-84; Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 25.

¹¹⁶ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 25.

¹¹⁷ Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, 74; Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 21-22.

a considerable part of his early career as a convoy captain to Newfoundland.¹¹⁸ In the five years between 1696 and 1700, Cleasby attend Newfoundland every season except for 1698.¹¹⁹

Overall, Cleasby's exploits could be labelled adventurous, but his career has nevertheless not proven to be the stuff of legend. Cleasby did not get rich from his service, so he needed the navy as his principal means of support. Despite being a skilled officer, Cleasby does not appear to have possessed the necessary patrons to advance to the top of the navy hierarchy.¹²⁰ On 21 February 1696, Cleasby received orders from the Admiralty to make ready his ship, the fifth-rate *Sapphire*, for a voyage to Newfoundland.¹²¹ In the most obvious way, this would be Cleasby's most dramatic convoy. While at Bay Bulls, *Sapphire* encountered elements of a French raiding expedition from Plaisance under the ostensible command of the governor, Jacques-Francois de Monbeton de Brouillan.¹²² Outnumbered and trapped in harbour, Cleasby and his crew held out for as long as they could, but decided to abandon ship and burn it to prevent its falling into enemy hands. Captain and crew attempted to escape overland to Ferryland and continue resistance, but French forces captured them.¹²³ As was procedure, the Admiralty brought Cleasby and his crew before a court martial following their release from imprisonment in order to determine the reason for *Sapphire*'s loss. The court could not find the actions of Cleasby and crew to fall under any of the Articles of War, and so

¹¹⁸ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 84.

¹¹⁹ Admiralty Lists, 1696-1700, TNA PRO ADM 8/4-7.

¹²⁰ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 22-27.

¹²¹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Thomas Cleasby, *Sapphire*, 21 Feb. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/20.

¹²² James Pritchard, "Le Profit et La Gloire": The French Navy's Alliance With Private Enterprise in the Defense of Newfoundland, 1691-1697," *Newfoundland Studies* 15 no. 2 (1999), 168.

¹²³ Alan F. Williams, *Father Baudoin's War: D'Iberville's Campaigns in Acadia and Newfoundland, 1696, 1697* (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1987), 32-33.

absolved them of responsibility for the loss. Cleasby's peers comprising the court concluded that the crew defended the ship to the best of their ability, and supported the decision to burn the ship rather than allow its capture.¹²⁴

Cleasby's recent adventures may have prompted the Admiralty to return him to Newfoundland the next year. As commander of the fifth-rate *Lime*, Cleasby joined a squadron under John Norris to secure Newfoundland following further French raiding in 1696 by a force under the command of Pierre le Moyne d'Iberville.¹²⁵ Notwithstanding an intense standoff with French forces, the English squadron did not escape internal intrigue as, among other things, a row erupted between Norris and Captain Thomas Desborough. The squadron, eventually totalling 15 warships, arrived off Newfoundland on 7 June, and spent the next month rebuilding St. John's and patrolling the area, taking many prizes.¹²⁶

Upon receiving intelligence that forces commanded by the marquis de Nesmond would arrive off Newfoundland soon, the squadron began to take defensive measures. Five French warships did appear off St. John's on 23 July. Believing them to be part of Nesmond's squadron, the English ships did not venture forth for fear they would quickly be outnumbered. Actually, Jean Desjean, baron de Pointis commanded the five ships, which were returning from the West Indies, and had overshot their intended destination of Plaisance. Based on the result of a council-of-war attended by both sea and land officers,

¹²⁴ Court Martial of Thomas Cleasby, 26 Nov. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 1/5257.

¹²⁵ Admiralty List, May 1697, TNA PRO ADM 8/5; Pritchard, "Le Profit et la Gloire," 168-69.

¹²⁶ John J. Murray, "Anglo-French Naval Skirmishing Off Newfoundland, 1697," in *Essays in Modern European History: Written in Memory of the Late William Thomas Morgan*, ed. Murray (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1951), 74-77.

the English squadron stayed in harbour to force the French to make the next move.¹²⁷

When it was discovered that the ships belonged to Pointis, and not Nesmond, Norris sent out Desborough's *Mary Galley* to cruise and scout the enemy's strength on three different occasions between 26 July and 9 August 1697. Norris found Desborough's efforts unsatisfying, and organized an immediate court martial against him for disobedience and neglect of duty. Desborough petitioned Parliament upon his return to England, and accused Norris of negligence. Desborough and other witnesses alleged that the stowage of prize goods in several warships prevented them from clearing for action properly, and this rendered them incapable of fighting the French if necessary.¹²⁸

When Nesmond finally did arrive off St. John's on 28 August with a force of ten warships, the English continued their tactic of remaining in harbour. The French tested the rebuilt defences by sending two warships towards the harbour to exchange gunfire. The results convinced the French that the English position was too strong, and after a council-of-war they decided to retire on 3 September and return to France. Despite having the strongest French naval force sent to Newfoundland during the entire Nine Years' War, Nesmond simply arrived too late in the season to be able to accomplish anything useful.¹²⁹

Cleasby, once back in England, found himself brought before a parliamentary committee to confirm the authenticity of various claims. His testimony in the parliamentary record recounts that the decision to stay in port, based on a majority vote of

¹²⁷ Ibid., 78-80.

¹²⁸ *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, Vol. II, 1689-1702*, ed. Leo F. Stock (Washington: Carnegie, 1927; reprint, New York: Kraus, 1966), 249-50, 252-57, *passim*; Murray, "Anglo-French Naval Skirmishing," 80-82.

¹²⁹ James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 352-53.

both army and sea officers, greatly troubled Norris who “wept” at the prospect. Cleasby could not comment on the degree to which prize goods interfered with the operation of the ships in St. John’s, as Norris had sent the *Lime* patrolling to the bottom of Trinity Bay in order to gain information regarding the French. Cleasby sent two men overland to Plaisance to gain intelligence and their findings did indicate a large French force in the area.¹³⁰ Such testimony supported Norris’ position by suggesting that the overwhelming French forces lurking about did indeed pose a threat to English harbours. Cleasby provided much-needed support for Norris as a popular outcry in England against the supposedly conservative strategy of refusing to engage the French added fire to Desborough’s allegations. Public opinion turned against Norris as it was alleged he gave undue deference to land officers during his council-of-war. The navy initially suspended both captains, but later reinstated them. Desborough carried on in the navy while Norris, despite all the public attention, eventually rose to the rank of Admiral, and served as a Member of Parliament.¹³¹

The final voyage of Thomas Cleasby to Newfoundland speaks to his immersion within the routine of the Newfoundland convoy more so than the loss of his ship, subsequent court martial, or the drama surrounding Desborough and Norris. The peacetime convoy for the season of 1700 consisted of Cleasby’s *Mary Galley*, the *Tilbury* under Sir Stafford Fairborne (as commodore), and the *Experiment* captained by Tudor

¹³⁰ *Proceedings and Debates*, ed. Stock, 290-91.

¹³¹ J. K. Laughton, “Norris, Sir John (1670/71–1749),” rev. D. D. Aldridge, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20278>; *Proceedings and Debates*, ed. Stock, 302.

Trevor.¹³² Cleasby found himself at the centre of a heated dispute over the allocation of fishing rooms. Captain Richard Moucher of the fishing ship *Viana Merchant* appealed to Cleasby for room in Trinity Harbour to land his catch. Fishing admiral John Tupper had denied Moucher space upon application, despite several clearly vacant fishing rooms. Tupper being ashore at the time, Cleasby sought him out to inquire into the matter and noted that Tupper himself took rooms for nine fishing boats as he had last year, but this season employed only six boats. Cleasby also recalled walking around the point with Tupper “admiring to see so much and good room lying with the flakes all down and the beach all over weeds and no sign of any body designing to make use of it.”¹³³ When Cleasby asked Tupper why Moucher could not have these rooms, Tupper replied that Thomas Nicholls occupied them the previous season, and suggested that Moucher could probably use the rooms for a small fee to Nicholls.¹³⁴ Cleasby admonished that such dealings lay contrary, not only to the recent Act of Parliament, but also against any known Newfoundland custom to take up more room than one person could use. Certainly, it ran against custom to make money off the speculation of fishing rooms.¹³⁵

Cleasby personally rowed out to the vacant rooms with Moucher and two other fishing captains in the face of threats from Tupper that “he would have the blood of Moucher and all his men.”¹³⁶ The next day Cleasby sent John Crew, his lieutenant, to check on Moucher, and found him and his men preparing stages. With the lieutenant still present, Nicholls and his crew attempted to land some fish that had been split (processed

¹³² Admiralty List, May 1700, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

¹³³ Cleasby to Admiralty, 27 Dec. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹³⁴ Ibid.; Richard Moucher to Cleasby, 7 July 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹³⁵ Cleasby to Admiralty, 27 Dec. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

for drying) elsewhere at the room given to Moucher by Cleasby. Upon protest from Moucher, Nicholls and his men prepared to land the fish by force. The lieutenant stepped in to mediate, only to be told by Nicholls that his commander had better provide Moucher with constant vigilance because as soon as the navy left he would gather twenty-five men and beat Moucher out of the room. Lieutenant Crew pacified Nicholls as best he could, and requested that nobody act until he acquainted Captain Cleasby with the proceedings. Fishing Admiral Tupper, meanwhile, arrived with several other masters and supported Nicholls' desire to land the fish by force if necessary. Upon word reaching Cleasby, he gathered the parties together to discuss the matter. While all agreed space enough for everyone did exist, Nicholls refused to relinquish claim to the stages set up in the room, and Crew noted he made his point using "very scurrilous language."¹³⁷

It appears that Moucher kept his room while Nicholls or his superiors filed a complaint against Cleasby to the Admiralty. Regardless of the legal question concerning Tupper and Nicholls' actions, they resented the intrusion of Moucher, but they also chafed at the navy meddling in their affairs. Their apparent disregard of naval authority culminated in their complaint against Cleasby. Upon his return to England, the Admiralty requested that Cleasby come to London in January of 1701 to settle the matter. Contrary winds kept *Mary Galley* in the Hamoaze, but Cleasby sent notarized affidavits ahead as well as a copy of the relevant article from the 1699 Act of Parliament supporting his decision. Cleasby believed this gave him sufficient power, and "as to the justice of it I appeal to any King's officer that ever was concerned in those matters in

¹³⁷ Lieut. John Crew to Admiralty, 24 Dec. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

Newfoundland.”¹³⁸ Cleasby collected sworn statements attesting to the fact that John Tupper hoarded land in his capacity as fishing admiral, or colluded in reserving supposedly free fishing rooms for personal advantage.¹³⁹

Employing both custom and the recent Act of Parliament, Cleasby not only reached his decision regarding the allocation of fishing rooms, but also protected himself against the accusation that he had appropriated land from someone else’s claim. Cleasby quickly asserted he had never met Moucher at any time before the fisherman’s appeal for room, and maintained that his previous voyages and “the trouble of determining thousands of such differences” rendered him well qualified to mediate the dispute between the fishing captains.¹⁴⁰ Cleasby showed obvious concern regarding the veiled accusation of taking bribes, and stated explicitly that he operated fully within his instructions. Unlike Robinson’s Restoration-era flaunting of regulation due to his royal patronage, Cleasby adhered to navy routine, and defended himself based on his knowledge of that routine. This protected him in the absence of a patron. Cleasby never reached the rank of Admiral, but in 1718 the navy rewarded his twenty-four years of service as a captain with the post of Lieutenant Governor of the Greenwich Hospital. Captain Cleasby did not enjoy his retirement sinecure for long as he passed away later that year.¹⁴¹

Throughout Cleasby’s adventures, it appears that the captain dutifully carried out his instructions. The tone of the letters regarding events at Trinity suggest that the

¹³⁸ Cleasby to Admiralty, 17 Jan. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹³⁹ Depositions of Benjamin Stent, Isaac Harvey, John Martin, John Crew, and Robert Hobbs, 2 Jan. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹⁴⁰ Cleasby to Admiralty, 27 Dec. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹⁴¹ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 84.

captain took his job as the arbiter of law and order seriously, and that he considered himself experienced at settling disputes. Cleasby perhaps shrewdly (but in all likelihood with sincerity) supported his commanding officer in the dispute with another junior captain. The manner in which he defended his ship against the French did not hint at cowardice, and while continued employment was Cleasby's immediate reward, the affair doubtless contributed to his retirement sinecure. At no time, however, did Cleasby give the impression that he intentionally put his individual welfare or his career ahead of service to the state. What is interesting about Cleasby's experience is that notwithstanding his appearance before the parliamentary committee, he dealt primarily with the navy administration, and not the government. This relationship hints at the motivation behind sea officers within the Atlantic World, as captains had to explain their actions to the Admiralty administration, their immediate supervisor.

3.4- Further Opportunities at Atlantic Newfoundland

Cleasby's actions reflected the increasing standardization of officer behaviour. But as stated above, opportunism could never completely be purged from the mindset of the captain. Robinson would not be the last naval captain to request the governorship of Newfoundland, although subsequent officers may not have had the opportunity to lobby as tenaciously. At a meeting of the Lords of Trade and Plantations on 14 February 1683, another proposal for the establishment of government was considered. Captain Charles Talbot, who went on convoy duty to Newfoundland in 1679, submitted a proposal for a governor to be established and fortifications erected to secure the fishery against the French. Talbot would oversee the project in exchange for the proprietorship of the island.

The scheme was rejected for being too expensive.¹⁴² In 1712 Captain Sir Nicholas Trevanion, receiving word of a recent cessation of hostilities, submitted a request for favour to both Admiralty and government. Trevanion oversaw the surrender of Plaisance and the maintenance of order, including the return of prizes and prisoners taken before word of the armistice reached Newfoundland. Trevanion sent letters to both the Admiralty and Secretary of State Dartmouth commenting that he received no profit from the recent convoy, and asked that he be granted “the honour of settling this island” if Plaisance was retained by Britain following peace negotiations.¹⁴³ Delivered in support of the captain’s request was a petition signed by ninety-six persons swearing to the effectiveness of Trevanion’s tenure as commodore, and his diligence in protecting them from the French. The petitioners requested Trevanion’s presence as governor should one be delegated.¹⁴⁴

On a somewhat diminished scale, Trevanion’s predecessor as convoy commodore, Josias Crowe, also attempted to secure extra benefits for himself. Crowe was approaching the end of his operational career when appointed commodore of the 1711 convoy. Receiving a commission in 1689, and captaincy of a fireship in 1691, Crowe rose to command an eighty-gun second-rate during the Nine Years’ War.¹⁴⁵ With the arrival of war in 1702, Crowe applied to the Admiralty for work, and was given the third-

¹⁴² Journal of Trade and Plantations (Lords of Trade Journal), 14 Feb. 1683, TNA PRO CO 391/4, f. 61.

¹⁴³ Trevanion to Admiralty, 9 Dec. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2574; Trevanion to Secretary of State Dartmouth, 29 Oct. 1712, TNA PRO CO 194/24, no. 10.

¹⁴⁴ Inhabitants and Merchants of Newfoundland to Admiralty, Dec. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2574; Inhabitants and Merchants of Newfoundland to Secretary of State Dartmouth, Oct. 1712, TNA PRO CO 194/24, no. 10 ii.

¹⁴⁵ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 107; Capt. Josias Crowe, *Warspight*, to Admiralty, 9 Mar. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

rate *Shrewsbury*.¹⁴⁶ Crowe was heavily engaged in petitioning for promotion when he received his orders for Newfoundland. By 1711 Crowe had been moved into the small (60 gun) third-rate, *Warspight*. After twenty-two years as an officer, Crowe argued that his age as well as previous overseas service had left him forgotten. Crowe had been no stranger to colonial service, having been sent on convoy duty to Virginia in 1695, and on station to New England from June 1699 to September 1701.¹⁴⁷ While in New England, Crowe entered into the exploration of North America as a potential source for naval stores, sending back several barrels of locally produced tar for the Admiralty to examine.¹⁴⁸

Crowe argued that service in America and elsewhere limited his opportunities for personal solicitations for promotion, maintaining that while on other duties the Admiralty filled several flag positions for which he had been eligible. Crowe lacked patronage, and relied on the newly implemented system of seniority, so his only recourse was to remind the Admiralty of his long service and an introduction to the Queen and her husband, Prince George of Denmark, by Admiral Sir George Rooke. The royal introduction supposedly ended with a promise to promote Crowe to admiral should a space become available. This promise was apparently reiterated by the Earl of Pembroke upon his assumption of the office of Lord High Admiral following the death of Prince George in 1708.¹⁴⁹ When the Admiralty issued orders in February 1711 for Crowe to act as commodore in Newfoundland, he undoubtedly realized he would not get his promotion,

¹⁴⁶ Crowe to Admiralty, 2 Feb. and 29 Mar. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590.

¹⁴⁷ Admiralty Lists, Jan.-Aug. 1695, TNA PRO ADM 8/3 and June-Sept. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

¹⁴⁸ Navy Board to Admiralty, May-Aug. 1702, *Queen Anne's Navy*, ed. Merriman, 164.

¹⁴⁹ Memorial of Captain Crowe, 9 Mar. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595. By 1702 the role of Lord High Admiral was largely a ceremonial one. In the case of Prince George it was a sinecure posting to give him some role in government. Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 185.

but nevertheless remained determined to make the best of the situation. The convoy for 1711 would be large, totalling six ships.¹⁵⁰ This may have prompted Crowe to make an appeal to the Admiralty to grant him “a distinct commission as Commander in Chief of the Squadron,” beyond his position of commodore. In his appeal Crowe drew attention to his “advanced age” and his “misfortune of being postponed in the navy.” Crowe stated that he was aware of precedents for such a commission, and hoped the Admiralty would grant him similar consideration to encourage him in the face of past hardship.¹⁵¹ The practical reason for such commissions grew out of jurisdictional problems, especially in the Caribbean, between command on land and at sea. Granting the convoy commodore a similar commission eliminated any potential problems with the small garrison in St. John’s.¹⁵²

Crowe openly sought accolades and acknowledgement for his long vassalage to the state in order to strengthen any forthcoming petition for a retirement package. The immediate strategy paid off as Crowe not only received the title of Commander in Chief of the Forts and Garrisons of Newfoundland, but was also given a royal warrant for this office.¹⁵³ Crowe, it has been argued, was particularly diligent in his duties as commodore. His establishment of a local court for addressing grievances has been cited as a turning point in the establishment of a legal system in Newfoundland.¹⁵⁴ Crowe presided over several general courts to establish some local stability and address grievances. The issues tackled included the curbing of drunkenness, and the lack of suitable winter housing, the

¹⁵⁰ Admiralty List, Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 8/11.

¹⁵¹ Crowe to Admiralty, 4 Apr. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

¹⁵² Glass, “Profession of the Sea-Officer,” 170-71.

¹⁵³ Royal Instructions for Captain Crowe, 17 Apr. 1711, TNA PRO CO 324/32.

¹⁵⁴ Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 37.

latter leading to provisions for accommodating inhabitants of the surrounding areas within the fort walls.¹⁵⁵ It has been commented that Crowe's actions apparently had no origin with any higher authority.¹⁵⁶ This is not entirely true, however, because Crowe planned to engage the problems at Newfoundland in the manner he did before he left England. Writing to the Secretary of the Admiralty prior to sailing, Crowe inquired as to how he was to govern himself in relation to handing out punishments to the breaches of the peace outlined in the Heads of Inquiry from the Board of Trade. When asked to give their opinion, the Board concluded that no actual punishments were outlined in the Act to Encourage Trade to Newfoundland, and therefore Crowe was to keep the peace as he saw fit, but to emphasize the prevention of crime rather than punishment.¹⁵⁷

Upon his return to England, Crowe received no tribute, but instead faced questions from the Navy Board and the Ordnance Board over *Warspight's* accounts. Crowe found his pay stopped because of items he left at St. John's for its better defence, including small arms, powder, ammunition, two cannon from another warship, and one old flag. Crowe believed that leaving the items fell within his instructions regarding the care of Newfoundland, and asked the Admiralty Board to support his actions so he could receive his pay.¹⁵⁸ Crowe also found himself out of pocket for the expenditure of surgeon's stores for the treatment of sick crew members while in Newfoundland.¹⁵⁹

Praise for any of Crowe's governmental or legal initiatives at Newfoundland would not come from the navy. Like those of Robert Robinson, Crowe's actions seem to

¹⁵⁵ Captain's Log, *Warspight*, 22 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 51/4387.

¹⁵⁶ Bannister, *Rule of the Admirals*, 37.

¹⁵⁷ William Popple to Josiah Burchett, 11 July 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/3815.

¹⁵⁸ Crowe to Admiralty, 5 Sept. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

¹⁵⁹ Crowe to Admiralty, 28 Nov. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

have been a genuine attempt to solve some of the problems inherent with Newfoundland's place in the Atlantic empire, but in doing so he ran afoul of his general instructions from the Admiralty to maintain the navy's hardware. In contrast, Thomas Cleasby broke no rules of the navy, and his problems originated from his enemies rather than his employers. Like Cleasby, Crowe did not live long after the completion of his duty as he died in 1714.¹⁶⁰ Crowe's efforts appear grasping, but they do represent an attempt to make the best of what he believed to have been a retarded career. Ironically, captains engaging in more modest, yet more tangible, methods of exploiting what Newfoundland had to offer provide less obvious examples of similar behaviour.

The court martial of Captain Andrew Leake illustrates a blurring of the lines between legal and illegal that the situation at Newfoundland encouraged. As captain of the fourth-rate *Hampshire*, the Admiralty appointed Leake commodore of the 1699 convoy, and he took the opportunity to engage in personal business while at Newfoundland. The navy subsequently charged Leake with embezzlement of naval stores, and the employment of a number of the ship's company in operating a fishing venture. Leake outfitted a sloop from September 1699 to January 1700 to procure fish and transport them to market.¹⁶¹ In his own defence, Leake produced a letter from the Navy Board confirming the usage of naval stores for his sloop, and stipulating that the cost of twelve shillings and two pence would be deducted from his wages.¹⁶² Leake, however, could not defend himself against evidence that the men he selected to crew the sloop remained on *Hampshire*'s books during the period they fished and sailed the catch

¹⁶⁰ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 107.

¹⁶¹ Court Martial of Andrew Leake, 1 Nov. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/5261.

¹⁶² Navy Board to Leake, 2 May 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/5261.

to market. This meant that the men drew navy pay while working for Leake, and thus violated the thirty-third article of the Articles of War.¹⁶³ The court fined Leake fifty pounds for employing the sailors, but cleared him of embezzling the King's stores.¹⁶⁴

The court did not question Leake's ability to outfit a sloop and profit from a fishing venture so long as it did not interfere with his duties to the navy. The Admiralty, however, had instructed Leake to acquire a vessel in Newfoundland to survey Bonavista Harbour. Leake wrote that, regrettably, he had arrived too late to effect a proper survey and could find no vessel suitable for such a task, despite sending his lieutenants to the north from *Hampshire*'s station at Bay Bulls to make arrangements. In any event, Leake surmised that no vessel smaller than a brigantine would be sufficient.¹⁶⁵ Although Leake's assessment may well have been correct, it of course eliminated his fishing sloop from consideration for the task. The fisheries, and their proximity to Europe, offered the chance for a quick pound as Leake would be in Spain following his orders to convoy the trade sailing there from Newfoundland.¹⁶⁶

3.5- Conclusion

The naval administration codified and expanded its general regulations, and orders and instructions, and insisted on their obedience as England/Great Britain entered into a period of nearly twenty years of continuous warfare broken by a five-year truce. Captains complied with the increasing standardization of their profession, and even immersed

¹⁶³ England, An Act for Establishing Articles and Orders . . . , 13 Car. II c. 9 (1660), Article XXXIII, *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 5, 313. This article concerns any relevant infractions not covered under any others.

¹⁶⁴ Court Martial of Leake, 1 Nov. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/5261. It is unknown if the sailors received extra compensation from Leake.

¹⁶⁵ Leake to Admiralty, 20 Sept. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

¹⁶⁶ Admiralty, Orders to Leake, *Hampshire*, 12 June 1699, TNA PRO ADM 2/26.

themselves within it, but they insisted on seeking out enhancement to their meagre compensation through a variety of methods. Newfoundland yields exceptional examples of the multilateral activities of the commissioned sea officer in the interest of income supplementation. Captains bent and broke the rules to earn more money, but they also used the rules to entrench themselves and their profession within the state and protect themselves from retribution, whether public or private. Newfoundland, without an official colonial government other than the navy, became a stage where sea officers could demonstrate their fealty to the state, and still exploit individualistic opportunity. The degree to which repeated trips to Newfoundland influenced the thought patterns of sea officers is evident, as familiarity with Newfoundland encouraged the actions of Robinson, Cleasby, Goodall, and Trevanion. The navy's role in governing Newfoundland, and the island's relative physical proximity to England highlighted officers' quasi-legal efforts, yet the fisheries were still far enough away from the centres of power to permit the quasi-legal, and even illegal, activities of those so inclined. Newfoundland offers an interesting contrast as the tension between captain and governor, described in the following chapters, did not exist as such. Captains faced fewer challenges over their behaviour from any authority other than the navy, and faced less competition from other individuals operating under similar principles to themselves.

The uncertain and insufficient pay of the navy meant that captains remained on the lookout for alternative sources of income. The conclusion that captains looked after themselves first may seem obvious, but if this is not remembered, then there is a danger that they might become mere ciphers of government policy, or conversely, overly heroic figures banding together within a romantic and isolated culture. Newfoundland proves to

be an interesting laboratory in which to study the behaviour of officers because it provided an environment whereby they could bend the rules for personal gain, and demonstrate loyalty to the state, often simultaneously. The dispensation of law and order in Newfoundland by sea officers is often linked to their social standing within greater British society. Therefore, their relationship to the navy itself obviously must have played some role in how they carried out their instructions. Robinson and Cleasby are but two officers of many who demonstrated similar strategies towards Newfoundland from the entrenchment of regular convoys after the Restoration, to the creation of naval government, and beyond. Josias Crowe, despite continuous service in the navy, feared for his retirement, and utilized any advantage he could to seek recognition from the navy. Andrew Leake merely tried to make a few extra pounds, and employed navy resources to do it. Although examples exist of officers attempting long-term investment in the colonies, the relatively short length of convoy or station ship duty required captains to be more modest in their expectations. Thus, their efforts must be seen as those of persons, such as sojourners, exploiting the Atlantic basin with an eye to improving their station in Europe, whether monetarily or professionally.

Chapter 4: Captains and Imperial Government: The New England Deployment, 1686-1739

While the navy expected all captains to carry out their assignments within the framework of the orders and instructions received from the Admiralty, captains from the Newfoundland convoy were able to exploit opportunities when they arose. In contrast to their counterparts stationed off Newfoundland, captains serving in New England dealt with the existence of a fully operational provincial government, and this limited the personal ambitions of sea officers to a greater degree. The navy, meanwhile, continuously revised its orders and instructions as needed to ensure uniform performance and temper overly self-interested actions undertaken by its captains. Nevertheless, the chance for personal gain did not disappear, as prospects from private enterprise and the capture of belligerent prizes during war (or pirates and interlopers during peace) could still influence the behaviour of sea officers.¹

Given the need for the navy to marshal the bulk of its forces for home defence and European theatres between 1689 and 1713, the evolution of orders and instructions can be interpreted as contingency planning until peace was restored when a more concerted effort was made by the Admiralty to gain tighter control over the daily operational routine, but not necessarily operational control, of its detached ships.² This chapter, and

¹ Compare the clashes between Capt. John George and Customs Collector Edward Randolph with that of Capt. Thomas Smart and Governor Samuel Shute three decades later. Deposition of Edward Randolph to President and Council of Massachusetts, 21 Oct. 1686, United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA) Public Record Office (PRO) Colonial Office (CO) 1/66 no. 157; Capt. Thomas Smart, *Squirrel*, to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1718, TNA PRO Admiralty (ADM) 1/2452; Ch. 5, 227-31, 250-57.

² The Admiralty administration focused considerable attention on how captains utilized the resources available to them as well as their spending habits when searching for provisions and stores within an environment of scarcity. These subjects are discussed below in Chapter Six.

the one that follows, explore operational parameters and expectations of obedience imposed on captains by the Admiralty.³ The competing demands from colonial governments are also highlighted, and this duality of control within the station ship regime is reflected in the principal duties carried out by the ships stationed at New England. These duties are discussed below under four basic broad headings: regional operations, fisheries protection, convoy duty to the West Indies, and defence against piracy. Each category is analyzed within the context of obedience to the appropriate authority, but in reality, these duties could be intermittent, overlapping, or cyclic in nature, as is demonstrated by the tenure of the fourth-rate *Reserve* between 1707 and 1710.⁴

Previous historians have put forth two arguments regarding the nature of control over station ships. One maintains that colonial governors never really had any authority over attending warships except on paper, though it would take many confrontations with navy captains before the matter was finally settled.⁵ The second suggests that governors slowly lost their power to command warships within their jurisdiction as the Admiralty actively limited their control, and placed greater initiative and independence in the hands of captains.⁶ The first argument is largely correct, but is in need of elaboration and expansion, as captains were required by the navy to obey local orders of an operational

³ For example: the 1712 orders issued to all captains on station in America and the West Indies to strictly follow the Navy Board's instructions for drawing bills of exchange for credit to purchase provisions and repairs. Admiralty, Orders to Nicholas Smith, *Enterprise*, 26 Mar. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 2/45. Smith's orders formed the basis for verbatim copies to all the other station ship captains.

⁴ See "Introduction," 18-24, and those captains discussed below regarding convoys to Salt Tortuga.

⁵ Ian K. Steele, "The Anointed, the Appointed and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 1689-1784," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 111.

⁶ I. R. Mather, "The Role of the Royal Navy in the English Atlantic Empire, 1660-1720" (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1995), 230-32.

nature and keep colonial governments well informed of their intentions and their ship's location. The second argument recognizes the evolution of orders, but it is an oversimplification because it assumes that the conflict between governor and captain was a zero-sum relationship. Station ship captains did not gain power and advantage at the expense of the colonial governor or government. Additionally, the argument overestimates the degree to which the Admiralty altered its practices in America by implying that some of the superficial changes to the orders and instructions given to captains represented major changes in operational policy.⁷

In taking both arguments further, colonial governors never did have complete or uncontested control over warships, but facing a lack of overseas command structures the navy insisted that captains consult with, and receive directions from, colonial governments before undertaking any activity not specified in their orders and instructions, even when the wording of instructions did not necessarily require direct obedience. Meanwhile, alterations in the orders and instructions did not design to give more power to captains or radically alter policy. What the Admiralty did do was modify its instructions to permit captains greater opportunity to opt out of dangerous orders at the local level.⁸ The Admiralty was attempting to patch gaps in previous orders and instructions to eliminate the arbitrary, self-interested, wasteful, or destructive usage of warships by

⁷ Ibid., 233-34.

⁸ This did not absolve captains from doing their utmost if engaging the enemy as dictated by the Articles of War. England, An Act for Establishing Articles and Orders for the Regulating and Better Government of His Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea, 13 Car. II c.9 (1660), *The Statutes of the Realm* (London: George Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1810-1828, 11 vols.), Vol. 5, 311-14, reprinted and introduced by N.A.M Rodger, *Articles of War: The Statutes Which Governed Our Fighting Navies, 1661, 1749 and 1886* (Havant: K. Mason, 1982). Articles numbered X-XV deal with engaging enemies with Article XII specifically providing instructions for proper behaviour with regard to convoys.

captains or governors.⁹

Those captains sent to American stations received instructions from the Admiralty to consult with the provincial government, and obey written orders and directions with regard to operations.¹⁰ The navy needed the provincial government as a proxy commander-in-chief to maximize the efficiency of warships abroad, and as a link in the administrative trail that ensured captains carried out their assignments. The Admiralty understood that, despite being outside the normal navy command structure, local officials maintained a better grasp of the operational needs of each region than did imperial officials in London. This was not merely a contingency for the American colonies as warships attending Ireland, for example, received similar orders to obey government bodies or officials such as the Lords Justices of Ireland.¹¹ The navy counterbalanced the power given to provincial governments through its cumulative sets of instructions given to captains, including the ship-centric examples discussed in the previous chapter. Captains could refuse or opt out of orders that endangered the ship or which contradicted the wishes of the navy.

The goals of provincial government and sea officer could be mutually inclusive, and positive work environments did exist. But having to acknowledge directions from authorities on both sides of the ocean could create a platform for competition, confrontation, and misunderstanding as warships and colonial governments began to

⁹ Although the instructions reflected this intent, the Admiralty did not make any explicit statements of such nature until the instructions to Capt. George Prothero, *Blandford*, 3 Apr. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

¹⁰ The Admiralty Orders and Instructions to captains and other officers and officials between 1686 and 1739 are located in TNA PRO ADM 2/1, 2/3-55, and related pieces such as TNA PRO ADM 2/1726, 2/1727, 2/1737 and 2/1741.

¹¹ For example: Capt. Philip Cavendish, *Feversham*, to Admiralty, 24 July, 12 Aug. and 25 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590.

compete over the scarce resources available to maritime communities, be they stores, prizes, sailors, or even the warships themselves.

The relationship between Massachusetts/New England, Northeastern North America, and the Royal Navy rested on the exploitation of the sea by provincial interests, and the connection of local maritime economies to the wider transoceanic system of English/British trade governed by the Navigation Acts. The New England colonies lacked the necessary agricultural conditions to grow valuable cash crops such as tobacco and sugar, but had access to rich fishing grounds. At the same time, New Englanders began to specialize in the related areas of shipbuilding, the overseas carrying trade, and the provisions market in the West Indies. Various transatlantic interests also exploited the essential mast trade, and the potential for naval stores supply.¹² All duties undertaken by New England guard ships had the protection of the economy as their main purpose. At the behest of merchant interests and the provincial government of Massachusetts, the governor's office could instruct the station ships at Boston to support some or all of these activities during their term abroad.

Warships cruised between New England and Acadia/Nova Scotia during times of war and peace to protect both local trading vessels and commerce from other regions, and deter all manner of enemy, interloper, or pirate. During years of war, French *guerre de*

¹² Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 74-86, 128-34; John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 91-116; Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 143-53; Bernard Bailyn and Lotte Bailyn, *Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A Statistical Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 20-22; James G. Lydon, "Fish for Gold: The Massachusetts Fish Trade with Iberia, 1700-1773," *New England Quarterly* 54 no. 4 (1981), 539-82; Richard Pares, *Yankees and Creoles: the Trade Between North America and the West Indies before the American Revolution* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956; reprint, New York: Archon, 1968).

course in the North Atlantic threatened the New England economy directly, and New Englanders believed that such actions received support from Port Royal, Acadia.¹³ This led to Massachusetts initiating a strategy of aggressive raiding and counter-raiding to the northeast that continued throughout the years 1689-1713. The Massachusetts government frequently employed New England station ships to support attacks on Acadia. These attacks, while not an exception to the pattern of naval routine in the region, were not always consolidated with imperial projects initiated in (or negotiated with) London, or even necessarily consistent with metropolitan policy. Nevertheless, the need for martial support in such instances helped draw the New England colonies into a closer political relationship with the metropolitan government.¹⁴

Regional operations against the French overlapped with fisheries protection as many of the major banks lay to the northeast. After 1697, station ships frequently spent the winter months convoying the New England provisions trade to Barbados, and then to the island of Salt Tortuga (off the coast of modern Venezuela) to secure salt for the fisheries. New England station ships then hurried back to Boston for the spring in order to resume their task of protecting the coast, fisheries, and local trade. Following the ceding of Acadia to Great Britain in 1713, the New England station ships were dispatched

¹³ Donald F. Chard, "‘Lack of a Consensus’: New England’s Attitude to Acadia," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 38 (1973), 5-26; Chard, "The Impact of French Privateering on New England, 1689-1713," *American Neptune* 35 no. 3 (1975), 153-65; George Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973), 58-65; John G. Reid, "1686-1720: Imperial Intrusions," in *The Atlantic Region to Confederation*, ed. Phillip Buckner and Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 82-93; James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 341-46, 391-401.

¹⁴ Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 142-43; Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 189-90, *passim*; William Pencak, *War, Politics, & Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 36-53.

on occasion to provide support and communication links between Annapolis Royal and Massachusetts. Station ships from Boston also escorted trade to Europe upon their recall to England, including the important mast ships during years when the Admiralty did not send a specialized convoy.

4.1- Obedience

Every captain sent to New England received instructions from the Admiralty to follow written orders or directions from the governor, lieutenant governor, or council, depending on whichever officials could be found in person to provide them. Within the period between 1692 and 1739, captains witnessed three discernable stages in the wording of their orders and instructions regarding gubernatorial obedience. Beginning with the instructions received by Robert Fairfax late in 1691 through to those given to Tyrwitt Cayley in 1715, the Admiralty stipulated that all captains were to follow the orders of the colonial governor.¹⁵ Variations in wording congealed with the 1699 instructions given to Josias Crowe, who read that he was to sail to New England and:

...attend there for the service of that colony and protection of his Majesty's subjects thereabouts and therein to follow such orders as you shall receive from the Right Honourable the Earl of Bellomont Governor of New England and New York or the Governor thereof for the time being.¹⁶

¹⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Robert Fairfax, *Conception Prize*, 29 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 2/8; Instructions to Capt. Tyrwitt Cayley, *Rose*, 9 Mar. 1715, TNA PRO ADM 2/48. The orders to Capt. George in the *Rose* are similar, but the commencement with Fairfax considers the two years in which New England did not receive a station ship as well as the beginning of extended instructions for New England station ship captains. Admiralty, Orders to Capt. John George, *Rose*, 25 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1726. If more than one ship attended a colony, the junior captain was instructed to obey his senior, while the senior was to inform the junior of the particulars of the instructions. For example: Admiralty, Orders to Capt. James Jesson, *Orford*, 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21. Jesson was to rendezvous his ship with the *Arundel* and follow any orders from Capt. William Kiggins for the voyage to New England.

¹⁶ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Josias Crowe, *Arundel*, 18 July 1699, TNA PRO ADM 2/26. Bellomont was exceptional in being mentioned by name within the instructions but this notwithstanding, the wording remained consistent until 1715. New York retained its own station ship with identical orders for its captain

After 1717, captains received instructions to consult with the governor and follow his directions rather than his orders. Thomas Smart's instructions stated that:

You are to attend thereon with the ship you command, for the service of that government, and the protection of His Majesty's subjects thereabouts, and to employ her in such manner as may most conduce to the advantage of that colony, wherein you are from time to time to advise with and follow the directions of the governor thereof for the time being.¹⁷

In the 1730 instructions to George Prothero, the Admiralty altered its wording once more:

When you arrive at New England you are to communicate these our instructions to the Governor and Council thereof, with whom you are from time to time to advise and consult in what manner the ship under your command may be best employed for guarding the coast, and securing the trade bound to and from that colony from any attempt of the pirates or others.¹⁸

The evolution of these instructions reflected the ongoing problem that the Admiralty encountered in controlling their warships. The shift from "orders" to "directions" allowed captains to better opt out of requests from provincial governments that would employ warships in a manner the Admiralty did not consider within the acceptable boundaries of navy protocol. Colonial governors did not hold authority in the navy, although they received judicial commissions as vice admirals to oversee maritime matters within their jurisdictions as well as specific Admiralty instructions from time to time to dispatch warships at their disposal in a particular fashion.¹⁹ The navy agreed to

to obey Bellomont. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Salmon Morris, *Newport*, 27 June 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/26.

¹⁷ Admiralty, Instructions to Smart, 11 Apr. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49; Instructions to Capt. Thomas Marwood, *Lime*, 21 Dec. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Prothero, 2 Apr. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

¹⁹ Leonard W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System before 1783* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930; reprint, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1964), 109-10. For example, the Earl of Bellomont as governor of New York, Massachusetts and New Hampshire received two letters from the Admiralty in 1697, one desiring he provide the King's ships with sailors upon request and

this partial transfer of operational authority because it desired some form of centralized organization and control over its ships.

This practice of deployment and obedience continued through to the end of the current study period (1739). By the outbreak of war in 1739, it has been argued that captains began to take greater initiative in expanding the navy's role overseas, while the broadening of imperial interests led to an increase in squadron-level deployment in the colonies.²⁰ Until then, however, the framework for Admiralty and imperial authority, wartime contingencies in Europe and America, and the constant spectre of financial limitation militated against revising the system of deploying convoys and station ships. Wholesale changes were likely not possible or on anyone's agenda except perhaps those persons required to operate within the system itself.²¹

In addition to delineating whom to obey locally, the Admiralty instructed captains to correspond regularly with England.²² In 1724, the Admiralty added a further passage requiring captains to send home copies of their journal every six months (shortened to

another empowering him to deploy ships to the West Indies during the winter months to escort the New England trade there. Admiralty, Instructions to the Earl of Bellomont, 7 June and 20 Sept. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24. The topic of gubernatorial jurisdiction is explored more fully in the following chapter.

²⁰ Julian Gwyn, *An Admiral for America: Sir Peter Warren, Vice Admiral of the Red 1702-1752* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 173-74. Gwyn focuses on the role of Peter Warren in the expansion of the navy in North America after 1739. Warren's instructions for New England while captain of the *Squirrel*: 20 Mar. 1736, TNA PRO ADM 2/54. Newfoundland (where no proper government existed except for the navy) was one area where a notable change in naval policy occurred by the 1730s. Jerry Bannister, *The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 67.

²¹ Daniel A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce," in *An Imperial State at War*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994), 202-03; N.A.M. Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire, 1689-1763," in *Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II*, ed. Marshall, 178-79.

²² This applied to every station ship captain sent to New England beginning with the aforementioned Fairfax. Admiralty, Instructions to Fairfax, 29 Dec. 1691, TNA PRO ADM 2/8.

four months in 1727).²³ The Admiralty explicitly stated that the new request was to ensure that captains had indeed carried out their orders and instructions, something only implied previously.²⁴ This instruction corresponded to complaints from the colonies in the years following the War of the Spanish Succession that station ship captains spent inordinate amounts of time malingering in port.²⁵ The Admiralty, if necessary, could send a request to the Board of Trade for specific information they may have received regarding ships on station in the colonies to check against the captains' journals.²⁶ Conversely, the Admiralty inserted further instructions to temper unilateral actions by captains beginning in 1699. Now the Admiralty ordered captains to inform governors duly of their intention to leave upon receiving their orders to return to England.²⁷ These orders allowed time to facilitate the assembly of homeward-bound convoys, and for the completion of any business pending or other contingency. This passage continued through to the 1727 instructions given to Thomas Marwood in the *Lime*.²⁸ Instructions to the next captain, George Prothero, eliminated this passage but maintained the spirit of gubernatorial communication. Regarding piracy suppression, any captain leaving to assist a colleague at another station was to inform the government of their receiving a

²³ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. James Cornwall, *Sheerness*, 26 May 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Marwood, 21 Dec. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

²⁴ Admiralty, Orders to Marwood, 23 Mar. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52. Although the Admiralty originally instructed Marwood to send his books every six months, they modified this before the *Lime* sailed.

²⁵ Admiralty, General Instructions Against Lying in Port, 13 Dec. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

²⁶ Ian K. Steele, *The Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 104.

²⁷ Admiralty, Instructions to Crowe, 18 July 1699, TNA PRO ADM 2/26.

²⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Marwood, 21 Dec. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/52. In 1708, Governor John Seymour of Maryland filed a complaint to this effect, arguing that the commodore of the Virginia convoy, John Huntington, compromised the Maryland tobacco trade by leaving without giving proper notification. Board of Trade to Admiralty, 18 Dec. 1708, United Kingdom, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series* (CSPC), ed. W. Noel Sainsbury and others (London: His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1994, 46 vols.), Vol. 24, no. 253.

request for help.²⁹

Prior to 1730, the expanding field of operations provides the rationale for modifications to the instructions given to New England station ship captains not related to resupply and labour, and they are reflected in various subtle changes to the four principal types of duty.³⁰ The evolution of operational instructions highlighted the reliance of New England on its trade and fisheries, and reflected the ongoing expansion of New England's interests along the coast of Northeastern North America. Although the roots of such economic expansion predate the Restoration, their relationship to the navy begins with regional operations, and the further evolution of instructions regarding obedience is outlined within the four sub-headings below.

4.2- Regional Operations

During the years 1688 to 1713, New England faced the challenges of two European wars intertwined with regional conflicts between colonies and adjacent Aboriginal nations, in particular a war with the Abenaki (1688-1699). The pattern of raiding and counter-raiding between English, French, and Aboriginal belligerents centred along the frontier with no side able to muster enough resources for a crushing blow.³¹ At sea, New Englanders were convinced that the fort at Port Royal offered a safe haven to privateers and French warships attacking colonial shipping.³² Moreover, in addition to the disruption of the New England fisheries and carrying trade, the Massachusetts

²⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to Prothero, 2 Apr. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/53; Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Thomas Durell, *Scarborough*, 24 Feb. 1732, TNA PRO ADM 2/53; Instructions to Warren, 20 Mar. 1736, TNA PRO ADM 2/54.

³⁰ Other passages relating to obedience and those relating to resupply and other matters will be examined in the following chapters.

³¹ Reid, "Imperial Intrusions," 82-83; Steele, *Warpaths*, 139-50.

³² Chard, "Impact of French Privateering," 160-61.

government believed that the French colonists at Port Royal relied on captured goods to cope with the disruption of supplies from France. Privateering sorties of various origins, and vigorous local defence by French colonists and French imperial officers, continued to fuel fears that New England faced a dire threat.³³ The Massachusetts response to the pattern of French sorties included counter-raiding thrusts into Acadia, and the implementation of coastal convoys guarded by provincial vessels, such as those initiated by Governor Joseph Dudley at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession.³⁴ Meanwhile, French naval forces maintained a dangerous presence during the Nine Years' War, as illustrated below. But even after the French navy largely abandoned the northeast by the War of the Spanish Succession, the French war on trade dictated that Royal Navy captains on station anywhere in the British Atlantic could not judge with certainty if, where, and at what strength an enemy would appear.³⁵

New England's increasing demands for improved trade protection and defence consistently outstripped the navy's capabilities. Therefore, the colonists needed to muster all available provincial maritime resources. The instructions that colonial governors received from the Crown made allowances for the commissioning of provincial warships and the distribution of letters of marque to locally outfitted vessels.³⁶ Provincial vessels (especially the *Province Galley*, commanded by sea captain, pilot, and provincial envoy Cyprian Southack) represented a maritime presence under the direct control of the

³³ Ibid., 154-59; Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 319-20, 361-62.

³⁴ Governor Joseph Dudley to Secretary of State Nottingham, 10 May 1703, *CSPC* Vol. 21, no. 643.

³⁵ Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 391-401.

³⁶ Labaree, *Royal Government in America*, 72, 110; Philip S. Haffenden, *New England in the English Nation, 1689-1713* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 99, 230-31.

Massachusetts government, one that did not necessarily have to be shared with the navy.³⁷ Such warships did frequently operate beside their navy counterparts, or supplemented their existing strength and capabilities. Provincial warships engaged in local patrols, convoyed coastal trade, and assisted in fisheries protection. This permitted navy warships to engage in activities more suited to their size and strength, namely deep-sea convoys and regional cruising. Colonial officials, for example, pointed out that even the smallest sixth-rate warship drew too much water for effective inshore patrolling, and sailed too slowly to chase smaller privateers. Such was the basis for Lieutenant Governor William Stoughton's decision in 1695 to send the *Province Galley* as the escort for a coastal convoy in lieu of the navy station ship.³⁸

Uneasy relations could exist between ships of the Royal Navy and their provincial counterparts. Repeated instances of locally commissioned warships wearing naval or state ensigns, in particular, prompted complaints from navy captains who jealously protected their prerogative of wearing royal colours. Thus, Captain Charles Stucley, inquiring locally upon his viewing the naval jacks and pendants on Southack's *Province Galley* in 1705, was told it was permissible because the ship was in state service at the behest of the governor. Although Stucley remained sceptical, his only action was to report it to the Admiralty, and he continued to work alongside Southack during his tenure

³⁷ Sinclair Hitchings, "Guarding the New England Coast: The Naval Career of Cyprian Southack," in *Seafaring in Colonial Massachusetts*, ed. Frederick S. Allis, Jr. (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1980), 53-54; Governor William Phips to Admiralty, 4 Apr. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857 no. 49; Phips to Lords of Trade, 3 Apr. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 46. The purpose of Phips' proposal was to replace *Conception Prize* with a ship not bound within Admiralty parameters. William R. Miles, "The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713" (M.A. Thesis: Saint Mary's University, 2000), 130-31.

³⁸ Lieut. Governor William Stoughton to Secretary of Connecticut John Allyn, 11 Feb. 1694, United States, Massachusetts, *Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court (Mass. Acts and Resolves)* (Boston: Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1663-) Vol. VIII, 417.

at Boston.³⁹ Other captains took a more active approach, including James Cornewall, as outlined below. In an early example from June 1693, Captain Fairfax returned a salute from a vessel entering Boston Harbour wearing naval colours. Upon identifying the vessel as the *Swan* of Massachusetts, Fairfax boarded it and confiscated the flags.⁴⁰ Because of such disagreements, royal governors began receiving instructions by the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession to forbid the use of naval jacks, even when commissioning vessels themselves for provincial service.⁴¹

Despite conflicts arising between provincial and state warships, the former provided essential reinforcement when facing larger, and more numerous, French opponents. The cruises of the fifth-rate *Sorlings* and its partner, the sixth-rate *Newport*, in the mid-1690s frequently included the *Province Galley* as well as a number of smaller craft hired by the navy captains both as tenders, and as vessels capable of traversing the shallow inshore areas.⁴² Warships sometimes loaned sailors to these provincial vessels and *vice versa*, especially when warships were laid up for repair or during the winter. On 7 November 1694, Captain Emms of the *Sorlings* turned over ten men to Southack's *Province Galley*.⁴³ In a 1712 example, Captain Mathews of the *Chester* outfitted the provincial sloop *Ann* with eighty-one men for a coastal convoy to Connecticut.⁴⁴

³⁹ Capt. Charles Stucley, *Deptford*, to Admiralty, 6 Aug. 1705, TNA PRO ADM 1/2444.

⁴⁰ Captain's Log, *Conception Prize*, 2 June 1693, TNA PRO ADM 51/3796.

⁴¹ Colours for Colonial Privateers (I) in *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935; reprint, New York: Octagon, 1967), no. 637. According to this source, Massachusetts did not directly receive such instructions until 1715.

⁴² For example: the *Sorlings* and *Newport* retained the services of several sloops, either one of the provincial sloops, or one hired specifically to attend on the navy. Captain's Log, *Sorlings*, 8 Apr. 1695, *passim*, TNA PRO ADM 51/3975.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 7 Nov. 1694.

⁴⁴ *Mass. Acts and Resolves*, Vol. IX, Ch. 29, 242; Captain's Log, *Chester*, 5 May 1712, TNA PRO ADM ADM 51/194. This was a mutually beneficial act as *Chester*, refitting and provisioning at Boston, was to receive victuals from New London, Connecticut.

Action near the Bay of Fundy during 1695 and 1696 illustrates both the threats faced by New England ships of war, especially during the Nine Years' War, and the collection of diverse resources assembled in the colonies to defend the coasts. In response to the high levels of French maritime activity, *Sorlings* and *Newport* patrolled the waters from Boston to the Bay of Fundy and up the eastern coast of Nova Scotia as far as Port Roseway (modern Shelburne).⁴⁵ In the spring of 1695, *Sorlings* engaged French forces heavily on three occasions during two separate cruises. The first encounter on 14 May 1695 saw a boat crew from *Sorlings* engage privateers inshore, and onshore, resulting in total casualties of one dead and thirteen wounded. Twelve days later *Sorlings*' attending sloop fought with privateers inshore, resulting in three dead and nine wounded. The next day, *Sorlings* encountered a French warship of fifty guns and suffered heavy damage with three dead and sixteen wounded.⁴⁶

A year later, Lieutenant Governor Stoughton ordered the two warships, along with their attending yacht, into the Bay of Fundy to intercept a suspected cargo of ammunition and other stores thought to be arriving at the Saint John River from France. On the afternoon of 4 July 1696, the two English warships came out of a fog to spy what appeared to be a French warship with a captured prize closer to shore. Emms and Captain Paxton of the *Newport* agreed to move in for an investigation. Upon reaching "musket shot" range the prize ran out two tiers of guns, and replaced its upside-down English ensign (an indicator of a vessel taken captive) with French colours. Captain Paxton later estimated one ship to be of forty-eight guns and the other twenty-eight, with each ship

⁴⁵ Captain's Log, *Sorlings*, 23 Sept.-12 Oct. 1694, TNA PRO ADM 51/3975.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14 May and 26-27 May 1695.

containing roughly 300 men.⁴⁷ In fact, the French warships would prove to be *L'Envieux* (fifty guns) and *Le Profond* (twenty guns).⁴⁸ Having the advantage of the wind, both French ships manoeuvred to fire full broadsides at their English opponents. *Sorlings* (thirty-two guns) and *Newport* (twenty-four guns) initially made their escape with the French warships in pursuit. Unfortunately, *Newport* sustained heavy damage to its mainmast, which toppled, causing the English ship to fall in with the *Le Profond*, who delivered a further pounding with broadsides and small arms fire. Captain Paxton ran *Newport* aground, and soon surrendered, as *L'Envieux* followed *Sorlings* closely and harassed it with gunfire. Emms escaped into the oncoming darkness at about eight o'clock that evening, and as he made for Boston observed one of the French ships bear away for the Saint John River at about four leagues distance.⁴⁹ *Sorlings* suffered one man killed, several shots through the hull, and a damaged mainmast. Surprisingly, *Newport* suffered no immediate fatalities despite the pummelling received at the hands of its French opponents.⁵⁰ The French force, including their prize and perhaps 400-500 soldiers with artillery, went on to assist in the capture of Fort William Henry at Pemaquid on 14 July 1696.⁵¹

Following the defeat of *Newport* and the capture of Fort William Henry, Lieutenant Governor Stoughton ordered a makeshift squadron to assemble at Boston for a counter attack. The fleet included *Sorlings*, the recently arrived replacements *Orford*

⁴⁷ Capt. Fleetwood Emms, *Sorlings*, to Navy Board, 4 Dec. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 106/485.

⁴⁸ Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 345.

⁴⁹ Emms to Navy Board, 24 Nov. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 106/485.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 4 Dec. 1696. The subsequent court martial inquiring into the loss of the *Newport* acquitted the captain and crew from any wrongdoing, stating that the degree of damage obliged them to run the ship inshore to avoid sinking, and thus surrendering. Admiralty, Court Martial of the *Newport*, 18 Jan. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 1/5257.

⁵¹ Stoughton to Board of Trade, 24 Sept. 1696, TNA PRO CO 5/859, no. 29.

(sixth-rate) and *Arundel* (fifth-rate), a converted merchant ship of thirty-six guns, and a French prize reworked into a fireship.⁵² On 25 August, the small squadron discovered the two offending French warships and the captured *Newport* sheltering at Mount Desert, but could not engage as unfavourable winds and fog permitted an escape. Stoughton commented that the French forces encountered recently were unlike anything seen in the region hitherto. He nevertheless reckoned that the timely arrival of the new station ships assembled with *Sorlings*, the local vessels, and a levy of 400 militiamen prevented the French force from descending on Piscataqua, believed to be their next target.⁵³

Massachusetts responded to this attack and other actions along the frontier with further incursions into the northeast. Raids in 1696, 1704, and 1707 continued to employ mixed naval coverage of local station ships and provincial auxiliaries. In the aftermath of the *Newport* and Pemaquid affairs, the autumn 1696 raid employed the station ship *Arundel* and the *Province Galley* to escort the provincial sloops and whaleboats carrying troops to the Saint John River and up to the French fort at Nashwaak.⁵⁴ While sending a landing party under a lieutenant, Captain Kiggins remained behind to carry out his principal role of escorting and guarding the transports.⁵⁵ The 1704 raid not only employed the New England station ship (the fifth-rate *Gosport*, Captain Thomas Smith) to assist in the project, but Governor Joseph Dudley requested, and received, permission

⁵² Secretary of Massachusetts Isaac Addington to Secretary of War William Blathwayt, 22 Sept. 1696, TNA PRO CO 5/859, no. 27; Captain's Log, *Sorlings*, 8 Apr. 1696, *passim*, TNA PRO ADM 51/3975.

⁵³ Capt. James Jesson, *Orford*, to Navy Board, 24 Sept. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 106/490; Captain's Log, *Sorlings*, 21-25 Aug. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 51/3975; Stoughton to Board of Trade, 24 Sept. 1696, TNA CO 5/859, no. 29.

⁵⁴ Captain's Log, *Arundel*, 16 Sept.-18 Oct. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 51/66; Governor Joseph Robineau de Villebon, Account of the Siege of Fort Natchouauk by the English of Boston, and of their Retreat, 22 Oct. (NS), 1696, *Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. John Clarence Webster (Saint John: The New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 89-97.

⁵⁵ Captain's Log, *Arundel*, 12 Oct. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 51/66.

from New York governor Lord Conbury to employ the New York station ship (the fifth-rate *Jersey*, Captain George Rogers), then at Boston refitting.⁵⁶ In company with the *Province Galley*, *Jersey* and *Gosport* escorted the raiding party to the Bay of Fundy area. In a pre-emptive initiative, the three captains travelled to Port Royal to attempt a bloodless take-over. The French commander received an ultimatum to surrender in forty-eight hours or the full force of the expedition would fall upon the fort. The bluff was called and the ships sailed away without further incident.⁵⁷

The 1707 expedition represented a concerted effort to attack the fort at Port Royal. Governor Dudley ordered Captain Stucley in the *Deptford* to provide naval coverage for the expedition.⁵⁸ The Massachusetts council even voted a gratuity of sixty pounds to Stucley and thirty to his commander of marines, Thomas Sutton, prior to the order for their encouragement.⁵⁹ Stucley had no jurisdiction over land forces, but Dudley still requested that he give all the advice he could, and provide a detachment of marines and sailors if it could be accomplished without endangering the ship.⁶⁰ Dudley sent another regular officer, British engineer Captain Charles Redknap, to take charge of the siege ordnance.⁶¹

The attacking force of 1100 (later reinforced to 1300) men under militia colonel John March arrived off Port Royal on 26 May. The force soon faced logistical problems

⁵⁶ Dudley to Board of Trade, 13 July 1704, TNA PRO CO 5/863, no. 107.

⁵⁷ Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 98; Captain's Log, *Gosport*, 31 May-7 June, TNA PRO ADM 51/405.

⁵⁸ Dudley to Stucley, 2 May, 5 May and 12 May 1707, *Mass. Acts and Revolves*, Vol. VIII, 693-94.

⁵⁹ Order of the Massachusetts General Court, 22 Mar. 1707, *Mass. Acts and Revolves*, Vol. VIII, Ch. 144, 217.

⁶⁰ Dudley to Stucley, 2 May 1707, *Mass. Acts and Revolves*, Vol. VIII, 693.

⁶¹ Dudley, Commission to Capt. John Redknap, 6 May 1708, *Mass. Acts and Revolves*, Vol. VIII, 694.

and aggressive harassment tactics by the defenders under Daniel d'Auger de Subercase.⁶² A council on 31 May concluded that the well-maintained fort contained forty-two guns (some heavy thirty-six pounders), and a garrison of 500. Upon surveying the terrain at Port Royal, Stucley, Redknap, and Cyprian Southack argued that, given the location of the attacking fleet, artillery could not be brought into a suitable position without considerable difficulty through rough terrain and across an unfamiliar river, all the while exposing the attackers to dangerous fire from the fort.⁶³ In any event, the attackers lacked sufficient types and numbers of siege artillery, especially mortars. The New England militia had not received the necessary training to carry out a formal siege, and artillery support would not be forthcoming. It would have been dangerous to expose the militia to sustained fire from the fort. In the face of some dissent, the leaders decided to retire the attacking force to Casco Bay.⁶⁴

Feeling that the force retired too quickly, Governor Dudley sent orders to make another attempt on the fort, dispatching reinforcements and a committee of three men to oversee further operations. The fleet returned to Port Royal in August without accomplishing anything more, and Dudley surmised that the fleet merely put in an appearance for the sake of following orders and little else.⁶⁵ The apparent confusion and indecision subsequently associated with the action only fuelled the growing ire of the Boston crowd, who publicly shamed the expedition upon its arrival back at Boston.⁶⁶

Some historians have labelled the 1707 assault on Port Royal a fiasco, initiated by Dudley

⁶² Reid, "Imperial Intrusions," 90.

⁶³ Capt. John Redknap to Board of Trade, 20 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO CO 5/912, 485-88.

⁶⁴ Autobiography of the Rev. John Barnard, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. V, Third Series* (Boston: John H. Eastburn, 1836), 192.

⁶⁵ Dudley to Board of Trade, 10 Nov. 1707, TNA PRO CO 5/864, no. 231.

⁶⁶ Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 106.

for political reasons, and undertaken by the province as retribution rather than for strategic reasons. Further suggestions for failure include poor planning, ineffective leadership, and strife between militia and regular officers.⁶⁷ A more subtle explanation favours the long-term problem of insufficient specialized equipment in New England necessary to assault an early-modern fortification, however small and remote.⁶⁸ Failure of this sort influenced requests for more substantial imperial forces, the response to which culminated with the capture of Port Royal in 1710.⁶⁹ On this occasion, the attacking force consisted of a greater navy presence (including two fourth-rates sent specifically for the attack), and the appearance of the bomb vessel *Star*.⁷⁰ Bomb vessels allowed an attacking force to fire projectiles over the walls of a coastal fortification without exposing the attack force to undue danger. These machines remained essential coastal siege and attack gear since their inception during the 1680s.⁷¹

In his final report, Captain Redknapp declared that the quality of the militia mustered by Massachusetts and New Hampshire was the best available in the region. Even so, to push the assault on Port Royal would have wasted more lives in addition to the thirty or so men already killed. Redknapp nevertheless emphasized the discomfort caused by the raid on the Acadian people, stating that had Massachusetts experienced a similar level of destruction and carnage they would have cried to England claiming the

⁶⁷ Ibid., 102-104. Rawlyk argues strongly in favour of all these reasons. Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 85-86, offers no firm conclusion as to the reasons for failure. Although mentioning the concern over artillery, he suggests incompetent leadership as a likely source.

⁶⁸ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10-16.

⁶⁹ Reid, "Imperial Intrusions," 90.

⁷⁰ Admiralty Lists, June-Dec. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 8/17.

⁷¹ J.D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649-1688* (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2008), 61.

province to have been rendered “undone.” Overall, New England remained united in its defence against the French, but a small group of troublemakers used the incident for political purposes. None of the government’s actions would satisfy such men, the engineer concluded.⁷²

In trying to ensure the cohesiveness of the invasion force, Dudley faced a specific problem concerning the *Deptford*. Stucley had carried out his orders by offering as much help as he could to support the landings. During the first attempt at a siege in May, Stucley visited the siege area personally with a small guard, while during the second attempt in August he sent a landing party ashore in support for twenty-four hours consisting of fifty sailors and all fifty of *Deptford*’s marines.⁷³ While at Casco, Stucley requested permission to return to Boston, as he was low on provisions and needed to discharge all local sailors impressed for the expedition and replace them with “foreigners,” seemingly in anticipation of soon returning to England. In support of such a contention, Stucley also commented that he had private business to conclude in Boston, and lamented how he was being “murdered by mosquitoes.”⁷⁴ Dudley deftly handled the situation through the immediate dispatch of victuals to Casco Bay, where *Deptford* harboured. This eliminated the pretence for *Deptford* leaving the fleet for fear of running out of food, something that would trump all other considerations at sea. With firm politeness, he then stated his need for the *Deptford* to remain if any attempt against Port

⁷² Redknap to Board of Trade, 20 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO CO 5/912, 485-88.

⁷³ Captain’s Log, *Deptford*, 27 May and 12-13 Aug. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/4160.

⁷⁴ Dudley to Stucley, 1 July 1707, *Mass. Acts and Resolves*, Vol. VIII, 733. Stucley’s orders to return home with the mast ships at New Hampshire arrived via the *Reserve* on 29 Oct. 1707. Capt. Matthew Teate, *Reserve*, to Admiralty, 1 Dec. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572; Admiralty, Instructions to Stucley, 12 June 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/36.

Royal were to succeed.⁷⁵

Dudley also took further care in drafting a new arrival at Boston into the invasion fleet. Captain George Paddon in the fifth-rate *Swallow Prize* had arrived on 24 July 1707 from Lisbon, where he had sailed as part of that year's Newfoundland convoy. While in Portugal, Paddon received orders from the Admiralty via Admiral Cloudesley Shovell to convoy two supply ships to New England to collect needed naval stores.⁷⁶ Understanding that he had no direct authority over *Swallow Prize*, Dudley wrote to Stucley requesting that he ask Paddon to join the fleet.⁷⁷ Dudley had hoped both Stucley and Paddon could provide some stability to the expedition at sea to counter the apparent breakdown of leadership among the land forces.⁷⁸ Paddon appears to have been receptive to Dudley's requests and orders, but the degree of damage suffered by *Swallow Prize* during the Atlantic crossing dictated a refit. By the time *Swallow Prize* was ready to set sail, the expedition had already begun trickling back to Boston.⁷⁹

Dudley may well have based his careful treatment of Stucley's situation on observations of a similar incident which had occurred fifteen years earlier.⁸⁰ Governor Phips had sent the station ships *Nonsuch* and *Conception Prize* to Pemaquid to cover the

⁷⁵ Dudley to Stucley, 1 July 1707, *Mass. Acts and Resolves*, Vol. VIII, 733. Spoiled provisions still required Stucley to order his crew to short allowance of victuals while at Casco Bay. Captain's Log, *Deptford*, 27 July 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/4160.

⁷⁶ Capt. George Paddon, *Swallow Prize*, to Admiralty, 9 May and 19 Aug. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2279.

⁷⁷ Captain's Log, *Deptford*, 1 Aug. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/4160; Dudley, Orders to Paddon, 18 Aug. 1707, *Mass. Acts and Resolves*, Vol. VIII, 743.

⁷⁸ Dudley to Paddon and Stucley, 23 Aug. 1707, *Mass. Acts and Resolves*, Vol. VIII, 746.

⁷⁹ Paddon to Admiralty, 13 Oct. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/2279; Captain's Log, *Swallow Prize*, 25 Aug.- 7 Sept. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/953; Captain's Log, *Deptford*, 21-20 Aug. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 51/4160.

⁸⁰ In 1692, Dudley had recently returned to Massachusetts from New York, and had been working towards his re-insertion at the head of gubernatorial politics in New England. Everett Kimball, *The Public Life of Joseph Dudley: A Study of The Colonial Policy of the Stuarts in New England, 1660-1715* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911), 64-67.

building of Fort William Henry, and to check the reported advances of French forces in the late fall of 1692. Captains Short and Fairfax carried out this duty throughout October until their provisions began to run short, and fear arose over the appearance of the first winter ice, for which they felt Pemaquid harbour lacked sufficient depth for safe anchorage.⁸¹ Phips insisted that the warships remain on station, but the officers and local pilots consulted with each other and decided to retire against Phips's orders.⁸² In his anger, Phips accused the captains of using dwindling provisions as a pretext to their retiring to Boston; he claimed they only needed to send their pursers to him beforehand for extra victuals. Whether an excuse or not, running low on provisions and the potential endangerment of the ship to ice ran against the various Admiralty instructions the captains received (not to mention common knowledge of the ferocious New England winters). Although not without protest to the Admiralty and the London government, this forced Phips to rescind his order and permit the two warships to return to Boston and lay-up for the winter.⁸³

In the end, a fourth-rate warship such as *Deptford* could convoy and guard the fleet, as Governor Dudley intended, and could even provide a landing party; but its strength and firepower could not carry the fort alone. Stucley's actions may appear overly cautious, but his orders and instructions, including those from Dudley, would have precluded him from risking his ship and the invasion force needlessly in an action that the Admiralty might not have sanctioned. Notwithstanding his admonishment of Stucley's

⁸¹ Captain's Log, *Conception Prize*, 9-27 Oct. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 51/3796.

⁸² Fairfax to Admiralty, 29 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 42; Capt. Richard Short, *Nonsuch*, to Admiralty, 29 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 44.

⁸³ Phips to Admiralty, 1 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 34. Phips had sent an exact copy of this letter to Secretary of State Nottingham on 15 Feb. 1693, *ibid.*, no. 19.

desire to leave the combat zone to return to Boston, the governor and captain maintained a good working relationship. Dudley did not accuse Stucley of cowardice, or of failing to carry out his orders, as Phips had done with Short and Fairfax. In fact, at least twice Dudley praised Stucley's diligence, and subsequently requested to the Board of Trade that the government remember and favour Stucley due to his positive performance in the service of Massachusetts.⁸⁴ Dudley employed this tactic with Stucley's successor, Matthew Teate. Dudley praised Teate's diligence at his station despite the captain's discomfort over problems with manning, to which Dudley reported he could do nothing to alleviate the situation given the labour shortage and aversion to impressments in the colonies.⁸⁵

4.3- Fisheries Protection

In reality, regional operations merely overlaid the protection of New England trade and fisheries in the northeast, the prosecution of which predated the conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸⁶ New England memorials and reports to the imperial government testified to the importance of maintaining access to the waters off Acadia. In 1698, Lieutenant Governor Stoughton complained of the harassment of fishing vessels by a French warship, despite the recent peace and English usage of the fishing grounds on the high seas around Acadia "since their discovery."⁸⁷ Two years later, the Earl of Bellomont reported that, as the region's principal staple, the fishery had

⁸⁴ Dudley to Board of Trade, 1 Nov. 1705, TNA PRO CO 5/863, no. 144; *ibid.*, 16 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO CO 5/864, no. 231.

⁸⁵ Dudley to Board of Trade, 31 Jan. 1710, *CSPC* Vol. 25, no. 81; Teate to Admiralty, 10 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

⁸⁶ Bailyn, *New England Merchants*, 76-80; Daniel Vickers with Vince Walsh, *Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 34-35.

⁸⁷ Stoughton to Board of Trade, 24 Oct. 1698, *CSPC* Vol. 16, no. 922.

little choice but to expand to the northeast as no cod could be caught west of Cape Cod through to New Hampshire.⁸⁸ Patrolling the frontier repeatedly took New England vessels, both royal and provincial, to the offshore fishing banks around the Gulf of Maine and Acadia/Nova Scotia. For the navy, such duty began immediately with the first station ship, the fifth-rate *Rose*. In the fall of 1687, Governor Edmund Andros described in a letter to the Admiralty how the *Rose* intended to cruise between Cape Cod and Cape Sable, then the principal area of the New England fisheries.⁸⁹ Instead, Captain George fitted out a smaller bark commanded by his lieutenant, a craft more suited for protecting the fishing vessels. The *Adventure* bark subsequently cruised the fishing grounds for a pirate which had been preying on the New England fisheries.⁹⁰

After England's entry into the Nine Years' War, French warships and privateers disrupted the fishery, causing considerable loss, especially to the seaport towns of Salem and Marblehead.⁹¹ Although reports of catastrophe poured in, New England fishing off Northeastern North America never completely abated. The Massachusetts government took action to arrange convoys to protect fishing vessels by ordering provincial vessels and station ships to cruise the fishing grounds. By the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession, the provincial government began ordering warships on specific convoy duty

⁸⁸ Bellomont to Board of Trade, 28 Nov. 1700, *CSPC* Vol. 18, no. 953.

⁸⁹ Governor Edmund Andros to Admiralty, 5 Sept. 1687, *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers Issued During the Period Between the Overthrow of the Andros Government and the Establishment of the Second Charter of Massachusetts*, ed. W.H. Whitmore (Boston: The Prince Society, 1868-74, 3 vols.), Vol. II, 274-75.

⁹⁰ Captain's Log, *Rose*, 30 Aug.-15 Sept. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁹¹ Vickers, *Young Men and the Sea*, 66-68; Christine L. Heyrman, *Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1750* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 232. Reports of devastation prior to 1691 may have been inflated by parties attempting to increase imperial intervention in Massachusetts affairs during the negotiations in England towards a new provincial charter. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 184-85.

to guard the fishing vessels off the Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. The first of these corresponded with the first tour of the fourth-rate *Reserve*. During the summer and fall of 1708, *Reserve* made three voyages from Massachusetts to the fishing grounds off Cape Sable and the area around Port Roseway. In the process, *Reserve* travelled as far up the coast as Cape Sambro (near modern Halifax Harbour). During the 1709 fishing season, the Massachusetts government ordered more convoys.⁹² Although not specifically identified as fisheries protection, *Reserve*'s replacement, the fourth-rate *Chester*, made several cruises to the northeast, one as far as the Newfoundland banks, seventy-three leagues from Cape Race. *Chester*'s participation in the capture of Port Royal in 1710, and the expedition against Quebec in 1711, continued the warship's presence in the region.⁹³

The utility of the fishing convoy led the Admiralty in 1711 to dispatch Captain James Campbell in the sixth-rate *Squirrel*. Campbell's instructions explained the decision as a response to a request submitted by New England merchants for a warship to cruise the fishing grounds. The merchants stated that the fishery was carried out nearly year-round (but especially in the spring), and prosecuted some 150 leagues east from the region. The Admiralty instructed Campbell to seek out the principal persons engaged in the fishery and inform himself as much as possible regarding its routine in order to plan the best method of guarding it. Upon returning to port, *Squirrel* was to behave as another guard ship, and the remainder of Campbell's instructions mirrored those of other station

⁹² Teate to Admiralty, 20 Aug. and 15 Dec. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572 and 10 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

⁹³ Capt. Thomas Mathews, *Chester*, to Admiralty, 15 June 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095; Captain's Log, *Chester*, 14 May-14 June 1710, 14 Aug.-20 Oct. 1710 and 1 July-25 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO 51/194.

ship captains.⁹⁴

The *Squirrel* anchored in Boston harbour on 27 September 1711, just in time to begin a lay-up at the wharf for the winter.⁹⁵ In the spring, *Squirrel* escorted a fishing fleet of sixty vessels that had collected at Marblehead. On 23 April 1712, the convoy set sail for Port Roseway.⁹⁶ Employing that harbour as an anchorage when needed, *Squirrel* remained with the fishing fleet off the coast until departing for Marblehead on 21 May, where they arrived three days later. Beginning on 29 May, *Squirrel* took a fortnight at Boston to refit and resupply before returning to Marblehead to convoy another fleet to the same area between 13 June and 6 July 1712.⁹⁷ *Squirrel* escorted a third fleet of seventeen fishing sloops and a ketch out of Marblehead after a turnaround of only six days. *Squirrel* detoured to visit Annapolis Royal for several days before returning to the fishing grounds. *Squirrel* travelled further northward to LaHave and on to Cape Sambro, where a strange shallop was briefly spied before it disappeared among the islands there. *Squirrel* arrived back at Marblehead on 11 August and sailed to Boston on the 15th to resupply again. Then the warship returned to Marblehead on 27 August to begin a fourth voyage off Nova Scotia, this time travelling along the coast as far as Country Harbour and Tor Bay, near Cape Canso. The final voyage lasted the whole of September 1712 and into October, interrupted only by a visit to Annapolis Royal between 1 and 10 September.⁹⁸

Squirrel's tenure on the coast of Nova Scotia proved generally quiet, with the exception coming on 17 September 1712. Elements of the fishing fleet had stopped in

⁹⁴ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. James Campbell, *Squirrel*, 8 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 2/44.

⁹⁵ Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 27 Sept.-24 Nov. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 51/926.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 23 Apr. 1712.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26 Apr.-6 July 1712.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13 July-11 Oct. 1712.

Judore harbour (Jeddore) to fetch water when the shore parties were attacked by a unit of Mi'kmaq who wounded three fishermen, and took two more as prisoners. Upon escorting the fleet back to Marblehead by 11 October, *Squirrel* returned to Boston and began preparations to lay-up for the winter once more when orders arrived to return to Great Britain immediately. *Squirrel* refit and then undertook the dangerous winter crossing, arriving heavily damaged, but safely, in Milford Haven by 31 January 1713.⁹⁹

Squirrel remains the only ship sent to New England during this period with orders to guard the New England fishing fleet as its primary objective. The merchants who requested the service expressed their pleasure in a memorial of thanks to the Queen signed by twenty-three of them, which made its way to England by January of 1712.¹⁰⁰ The Admiralty, though, seemed careful to keep *Squirrel* out of the hands of those men who were in charge of administering Nova Scotia following the 1710 conquest. Despite its capture, the re-emergence of Acadia/Nova Scotia as a British province proved problematic as the area beyond the town of Annapolis Royal remained contested ground for the British well beyond the peace of 1713.¹⁰¹ Imperial projectors Samuel Vetch and Francis Nicholson, who had a stake in Nova Scotia, initiated repeated calls for the new province to have its own guard ship, and their successors continued the requests throughout the first half of the eighteenth century.¹⁰² The interest of both the Admiralty

⁹⁹ Campbell to Admiralty, 3 Feb. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 1/1596; Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 10 Nov.-8 Dec. 1712 and 7 Jan.-30 Jan. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 51/926.

¹⁰⁰ Address of Inhabitants Concerned in the Fishery of the Massachusetts Bay to the Queen, 1711, *CSPC* Vol. 26, no. 244.

¹⁰¹ Barry Moody, "Making a British Nova Scotia," in *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710*, ed. John G. Reid and others (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 128.

¹⁰² Geoffrey Plank, "New England and the Conquest," in *'Conquest' of Acadia*, ed. Reid, 71-78; W.A.B. Douglas, "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766" (Ph.D. Diss., Queen's University 1973), 6; Samuel Vetch to Secretary of State Dartmouth, 14 June 1711, *CSPC* Vol. 29, no. 879.

and the Massachusetts government continued to be protection of the important New England fisheries, so by attributing the presence of *Squirrel* to merchant requests, the Admiralty kept its ships out of the uncertain situation in Nova Scotia following its capture, and out of the hands of imperial projectors. Campbell's orders would have given him all the reason he needed to avoid Nicholson and Vetch.¹⁰³

After the capture of Port Royal in 1710, it made sense for ships protecting the fishery to push further up the Atlantic coast as the major threat now theoretically came from Canada, Plaisance, and France. While Campbell in the *Squirrel* guarded the fishery during the 1712 season, Mathews in the *Chester* once again travelled to cruise off Newfoundland.¹⁰⁴ Following the Treaty of Utrecht, New England fishing vessels continued their movement up the coast with greater regularity to the banks off Cape Canso. With the reduction of Port Royal, and the demise of Plaisance, the new fortified town of Louisburg that the French were building on Cape Breton Island now provided the principal New England competition for fishing, and posed future threats during time of war. The proximity of the two fishing stations led to a boundary dispute over the islands within Canso harbour. In British imperial terms, Canso remained within the jurisdiction of the fledgling Nova Scotia government, but given the importance of trade (illicit or otherwise) the government of Massachusetts sought to protect and control its interest in the area. Massachusetts governors began requesting that their station ship captains extend their patrols further up the Nova Scotia coast and check in at Canso during its short

¹⁰³ Admiralty, Instructions to Campbell, 8 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 2/44.

¹⁰⁴ Mathews to Admiralty, 18 Oct. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095.

summer fishing season to ensure that the French partook in no illegal actions there.¹⁰⁵

In 1718, the governor of Massachusetts, Samuel Shute, directed the station ship *Squirrel* to Canso to “protect English fishery there from encroachment from French at Cape Breton.”¹⁰⁶ Captain Thomas Smart discovered French fishing vessels harbouring at Canso and made repeated requests to French officials at Louisbourg to order their removal. When not forthcoming, Smart confiscated a brigantine and a sloop for violations of the fifth and sixth articles of the 1680 Treaty of Peace and Neutrality in America.¹⁰⁷ Smart had the prizes condemned in the colonial Vice Admiralty court, which granted the proceeds to *Squirrel* as captor. Smart subsequently reported to the Admiralty that the governor overruled the court, claiming the prizes for the province based on its possession thereof and the fact that Smart operated under provincial orders while making the capture. This touched off a protracted conflict between Smart and the governor when the Admiralty upheld the decision of the colonial Vice Admiralty court, allowing Smart to keep the prizes.¹⁰⁸

This voyage has been emphasized for its diplomatic manoeuvres regarding alleged French incursion into British territory, and the subsequent squabble between Smart and Shute over prizes.¹⁰⁹ The Admiralty’s response to the incident reflected their recognition

¹⁰⁵ Donald F. Chard, “Canso, 1710-1721: Focal Point of New England-Cape Breton Rivalry,” *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 39 (1977), 49-77; Douglas, “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,” 34-37.

¹⁰⁶ Smart to Admiralty, 28 June 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 22 Oct. 1718; Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France for a Neutrality in America, 16 Nov. 1686, in *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, ed. Clive Parry (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969-1981, 231 vols.), Vol. 18, 91-92. Articles five and six precluded fishing in areas occupied by the opposing signatory, subject to confiscation. This did not including normal navigation and visits where proper notice had been given, although no trading or fishing was to be carried out while in harbour.

¹⁰⁸ Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct., 23 Nov. 1718 (The second letter was placed in the dossier for Cyprian Southack within the same volume) and 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁰⁹ Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts*, 125-28; Chard, “Canso, 1710-1721,” 65-67; Douglas “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,” 17-19.

of the growing importance of the Nova Scotia fishery by providing fresh orders to Smart in 1719, specifically to patrol the coast of Nova Scotia to protect the fishery of all British subjects, and to prevent illegal trade if so ordered. The Admiralty still required Smart to “...advise with the Governor and Council of New England, and receive their consent to your so doing.”¹¹⁰ This passage precluded Smart from attending to the fishery in lieu of more important duties as decided by the province. With the new orders, however, authorization for fisheries protection came from the Admiralty. This effectively trumped any provincial orders and would perhaps avoid similar problems over prizes and allow captains to excuse themselves from any local intrigue regarding Cape Breton.

Smart’s successor at New England, Thomas Durell in the sixth-rate *Seahorse*, received similar orders to visit Canso and its fishery. The next three station ship captains at Boston (Cornewall, Marwood, and Prothero) received no direct orders to visit Canso, while the last two captains before 1739 did.¹¹¹ Between 1724 and 1728, Canso fell within the realm of the Newfoundland convoy with the ship stationed at Placentia ordered to check in on the summer fishing.¹¹² In 1729, the Admiralty dropped a ship from the Newfoundland convoys and instead gave it orders not to stop at Newfoundland nor take any direction from the Newfoundland commodore, and to act independently in guarding the Canso fishery.¹¹³ This initiated a separate Canso convoy that lasted until 1743 when

¹¹⁰ Admiralty, Orders to Smart, 12 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50.

¹¹¹ Admiralty, Orders to Durell, 24 Feb. 1732, TNA PRO ADM 2/53; Instructions to Warren, 20 Mar. 1736, TNA PRO ADM 2/54.

¹¹² Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John St. Lo, *Ludlow Castle*, 21 Apr. 1724, 13 Apr. 1725 and 24 Feb. 1726, TNA PRO ADM 2/51. St. Lo’s Newfoundland orders for 1727 were to obey the convoy commodore, Robert Boulter in the *Argyle*. Within Boulter’s instructions were orders to send St. Lo and *Ludlow Castle* to Canso from Placentia. Orders to St. Lo, 9 May 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Boulter, 9 May 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹¹³ Admiralty to Board of Trade, 10 May 1729, CO 217/5, f.110.

the ship ordered for that year did not have an opportunity to carry out its assignment as the French at Louisbourg overran the tiny and impoverished garrison there.¹¹⁴

The striking aspect of the Canso Orders and Instructions with regard to the New England station was the Admiralty's declaration that calls for convoy protection had come from English merchants in Exeter.¹¹⁵ In contrast to the instructions given to the *Squirrel*, where it was noted that New England merchants lobbied for protection, attributing the request as coming from England distanced Canso from any claims for precedence from New England (and also Nova Scotia) interests. Thus, rather than revise its position regarding the control of New England station ships, the Admiralty restructured its own orders and instructions to emphasize the precedence of the navy's jurisdiction over captains and warship versus their desire to ensure that the governments to which the station ships were dispatched employed the resources in an efficient manner. The navy once again distanced its warships from the problematic situation of frontier Nova Scotia.

4.4- Salt Tortuga: Thomas Durell and the *Scarborough*

Securing the fishing grounds and protecting fishing convoys occupied the New England station ships during the spring, summer, and fall. The cycle of trade protection continued into the winter with convoys to the West Indies for ships engaged in the provisions trade to Barbados and the procurement of the essential preservative salt.

¹¹⁴ Admiralty Lists, 1728-1744, TNA PRO ADM 8/16-24; George Rawlyk, "1720-1744: Cod, Louisbourg, and the Acadians," in *Atlantic Region to Confederation*, ed. Buckner and Reid, 121.

¹¹⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to St. Lo, 13 Apr. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; *cf.* Instructions to Capt. Henry Reddish, *Experiment*, 25 Apr. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52 and Instructions to Capt. Temple West, *Deal Castle*, 28 Apr. 1739, TNA PRO ADM 2/55. The passage regarding the interests at Exeter as the source of the convoy is repeated in all orders to Canso between 1728 and 1739.

New England fishing interests preferred not to obtain their salt from Iberia, as was the case with Newfoundland.¹¹⁶ Instead, they mined large quantities of salt left from the evaporation of shore-side ponds on the Island of Salt Tortuga, not far from Barbados and even closer to the South American coast.¹¹⁷

First mention of the need for protecting the salt convoy came in 1687. The Governor of the Dominion of New England, Sir Edmund Andros, commented on both the utility of sending warships south instead of laying them up for the winter, as well as the need for protecting salt ships going to and from Salt Tortuga.¹¹⁸ The issue appears to have lain dormant for eight years until a series of petitions prompted discussion among various groups between 1695 and 1697. Participants included merchants, the Earl of Bellomont (the new governor of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire), the governor of Barbados Francis Russell, the Lords Justices of England, the Board of Trade, and the Admiralty. By February 1695, the government of Barbados responded positively to local requests for convoys to Salt Tortuga, and arranged for a warship to escort them between the two islands.¹¹⁹ Defending the New England salt convoys in this way would only benefit Barbados further as such ships also participated in the vital provisions trade.¹²⁰ The memorials to the Board of Trade and Lords Justices from the New England interests reiterated the basic points originally outlined by Andros in relation to winter

¹¹⁶ This does not mean all New England salt came from the West Indies. Lydon, "Fish for Gold," 568-73.

¹¹⁷ Evidence of salt collection in the West Indies for colonial use dates at least to 1662 and continued throughout the eighteenth century. Pares, *Yankees and Creoles*, 103-04. A 1667 memorial on behalf of the residents of St. Christopher in the aftermath of its capture by the French in April 1666 stressed the island's importance in the production of salt for New England and Virginia. Petition of Clement Everard, and others, 13 Nov. 1667, *CSPC* Vol. 5, no. 1629. The origin of Trade to Barbados from New England predates the 1660s. Vickers, *Young Men and the Sea*, 46.

¹¹⁸ Governor Edmund Andros to Admiralty, 30 June 1687, *CSPC* Vol. 12, no. 1511I.

¹¹⁹ Minutes of the Council of Barbados, 4 Feb. 1695, *CSPC* Vol. 14, no. 1667.

¹²⁰ Governor Francis Russell to Board of Trade, 7 May 1696, *CSPC* Vol. 14, no. 1807.

convoys to the West Indies, as did a similar request from Governor Christopher Codrington of Antigua in December of 1695.¹²¹

Discussions between the Board of Trade, Lords Justices, and Admiralty regarding New England led to, among other things, the conclusion that sending a ship to the West Indies during the winter to convoy the salt ships was feasible.¹²² The Admiralty subsequently provided Bellomont with instructions to engage the two New England station ships then at his disposal, the *Arundel* and the *Orford*, in protecting the salt convoy to the West Indies for the coming winter.¹²³ Bellomont dutifully performed this function beginning in the fall of 1697, but in 1699 he reported that Captain Crowe in the *Arundel* pointed out several limitations within the original instructions sent to the governor. Crowe would travel to the West Indies if Bellomont ordered, but suggested that the instructions were not “expansive” enough to protect either of them from censure if anything went wrong.¹²⁴ The Admiralty rectified this with expanded instructions sent to Bellomont in 1700.¹²⁵ As with fisheries protection off Nova Scotia, the Admiralty incorporated voyages to the West Indies into the instructions of captains going to New

¹²¹ Lords Justices to Board of Trade, 15 Aug. 1695, TNA PRO CO 5/849, no. 104; Memorial of Governor, Council, and Assembly of Massachusetts to Lords Justices, 1695, TNA PRO CO 5/849, no. 104II; Governor Christopher Codrington to Board of Trade, 12 Dec. 1695, *CSPC* Vol. 14, no. 2193; Board of Trade to Admiralty, 11 Feb. 1696, PRO TNA ADM 1/4083; Memorial of Merchants and Others Concerned in New England to Board of Trade, 5 Apr. 1697, *CSPC* Vol. 15, no. 894; Board of Trade Journal, 5 Apr. 1697, *CSPC* Vol. 15, no. 896.

¹²² Order of the Lords Justices of England in Council, 27 May 1697 and Admiralty to Board of Trade, 27 May 1697, TNA PRO CO 5/869, no. 107.

¹²³ Admiralty, Instructions to Bellomont, 20 Sept. 1697, TNA ADM PRO 2/24.

¹²⁴ Admiralty to the Governor of New England, 29 June 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21; Bellomont to Board of Trade, 24 Oct. 1699, *CSPC* Vol. 17, no. 890. Bellomont did not elaborate upon Crowe’s concerns.

¹²⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to Bellomont, 10 Jan. 1700, TNA ADM PRO 2/26.

England during the War of the Spanish Succession.¹²⁶ The station ships at New York received similar orders regarding trade to Barbados and the Leeward islands between 1697 and 1713. Salt Tortuga was incorporated into the New York orders after 1700.¹²⁷

Requests for the yearly convoy came from New England merchants via the government, with captains soliciting in advance to determine the overall character of the convoy and its time of departure.¹²⁸ Captains could always expect a West Indian convoy, but one was not sent every winter. Despite his discussion with Bellomont, Crowe did not go to the West Indies in the winter of 1699-1700 as the governor awaited directions from London regarding the transportation of a captured pirate to England.¹²⁹ In 1703, Thomas Smith of the *Gosport* merely reported that he had received no orders to sail for the West Indies, and so began the process of stripping the ship down to secure it at wharf side for the winter.¹³⁰ Captain Thomas Mathews in the *Chester* noted that he had received orders from the government to assist in a fall 1709 plan to take Port Royal from the French. However, he believed the plan might not be executed and would instead make ready for the winter convoy. In the end, *Chester* laid-up at the wharf for the winter when neither option came to fruition.¹³¹ Thomas Smart reported in 1718 that the local merchants

¹²⁶ Admiralty, Instructions to Stucley, 4 May 1705, TNA PRO ADM 2/33; Instructions to Teate, 11 June 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/36; Instructions to Mathews, 8 Aug. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 2/40; Instructions to Capt. Charles Brown, *Reserve*, 11 Aug. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 2/45.

¹²⁷ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Culliford, *Fowey*, 20 Sept. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24. Instructions to go to the West Indies if ordered did not appear in those to Capt. Salmon Morris of the *Newport*, 27 July 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/26, but reappeared in those to William Caldwell, *Advice*, 14 June 1700, TNA PRO ADM 2/26, and ended with Charles Vanburgh, *Sorlings*, 14 May 1712, TNA PRO ADM 2/45.

¹²⁸ For example: Dudley to Capt. Edward Blackett, *Phoenix*, 27 Oct. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 1/1471.

¹²⁹ *Arundel* did not transport the pirate or go to the West Indies, but laid-up for the winter and made the voyage in 1700-1701. Crowe to Admiralty, 4 Dec. 1699, 2 Jan., 16 Dec. 1700 and 27 Apr. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 1/1588.

¹³⁰ Capt. Thomas Smith, *Gosport*, to Admiralty, 8 Jan. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 1/2441.

¹³¹ Mathews to Admiralty, 25 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

decided not to request a convoy, the reasons for the decision Smart did not know.¹³²

Captain Thomas Marwood in the *Lime* wrote home in November 1728 that the merchants had a surplus of salt stored and some of those he spoke with already indicated that they required no convoy.¹³³ Matthew Teate laid-up the *Reserve* for the winter of 1708-09 because the ship's existing cables and cordage had worn to the point where such a voyage would endanger the ship, and he could obtain no substitutes locally.¹³⁴

For the most part, voyages to the West Indies proved routine, but eventful. Circumstances, for example, forced the *Deptford* to sail alone from Barbados in 1706 without going to Salt Tortuga in order to make it back to Boston in time to patrol the coast in the spring. The reason for leaving the convoy lay with the governor of Barbados, who placed an embargo on all shipping because of French naval activity in the area.¹³⁵ In 1708, the governor of Barbados advised Captain Teate in the *Reserve* to cruise the waters off Barbados for sixteen days while the fleet he escorted busied itself preparing for the return voyage.¹³⁶ Before his 1710 voyage, Captain Thomas Mathews expressed concern that the local commander would conscript his ship and desired clarification from the Admiralty because the officer was junior to him in seniority.¹³⁷

At Salt Tortuga itself, potential threats often came from the Spanish, whether at war or peace. Clauses within the Treaty of Commerce signed between Great Britain and Spain in 1715 codified the previous rights of British subjects to collect the evaporated salt

¹³² Smart to Admiralty, 28 Jan. 1719, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹³³ Marwood to Admiralty, 26 Nov. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 1/2097.

¹³⁴ Teate to Admiralty, 15 Dec. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572.

¹³⁵ Stucley to Admiralty, 4 May 1706, TNA PRO ADM 1/2445.

¹³⁶ Teate to Admiralty, 28 Feb. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572.

¹³⁷ Mathews to Admiralty, 20 June 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

at the Island of Salt Tortuga, so future fleets should have been left unmolested.¹³⁸

Unfortunately, prior convention did not seem to dissuade Spanish interests determined to harass British shipping. Captain Crowe reported in 1701 that the merchants feared robbery by Spaniards above all else.¹³⁹ In 1714, Captain Edward Blackett in the sixth-rate *Phoenix* faced such a threat himself after setting up a tent on the island for sick crew members. Twenty-six days later harassment at the hands of some Spaniards prowling the island forced him to bring his people back to the ship.¹⁴⁰

When serious trouble did occur, it underlined the importance of this otherwise mundane stop to the economy of New England, and demonstrated the utility of even a small warship as an escort. In 1733, Captain Thomas Durell in the sixth-rate *Scarborough* convoyed thirty-two New England ships and vessels from Barbados to Salt Tortuga, arriving after a three-day sail on 11 February. The fleet loaded salt and on 18 March prepared to depart at daybreak the next day. At six o'clock in the morning, Durell took note of two warships of seventy and sixty guns flying British colours. When within firing range, the two ships lowered their British colours, hoisted Spanish ones, and fired two warning shots. As Spain and Great Britain were at peace, Durell concluded the ships to be the local defence force, or *guarda costa*, and did not expect any trouble. Suddenly the two ships ran out their main guns and fired on the merchant fleet with both round and grape shot. Four merchant ships broke off from the fleet and the Spanish attackers

¹³⁸ Treaty of Commerce Between Great Britain and Spain, 14 Dec. 1715 in *Consolidated Treaty Series*, ed. Parry, Vol. 29, 372. Article III of the treaty states: "His Catholic majesty allows the said subjects to gather salt in the Island of Tortudas [*sic*], They having enjoyed that permission in the time of King Charles the Second without interruption."

¹³⁹ Crowe to Admiralty, 3 May 1701, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹⁴⁰ Captain's Log, *Phoenix*, 28 Jan. and 22-24 Feb. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 51/690.

rounded them up.¹⁴¹

Even at this stage, Durell did not entirely comprehend the aggressive actions taken against his convoy and sent his lieutenant and a boat crew to speak with the Spanish. The Spanish also sent a boat, but to capture another merchant vessel rather than parley. When Durell realized this, he swung *Scarborough* about, brought in his launch, and cut the Spanish off from their potential prize. This manoeuvre brought him parallel to one of the Spanish warships, who fired a broadside. *Scarborough* returned with its own broadside but as the two warships sailed on different tacks, they passed by and only fired some random shots. As the Spanish ship fired high, *Scarborough* received only slight damage. Durell perceived that the two Spanish ships might catch up to him, but their primary concern appeared to be capturing more prizes. Assuming Durell correctly identified the size of the Spanish warships, *Scarborough*'s battery of twenty guns would prove no contest if they had decided to attack. The two Spanish ships instead separated as one collected the prizes already captured and the other ventured to seek more, suggesting that they considered *Scarborough* to be of little concern. Durell placed *Scarborough* between the Spanish ships and his convoy to give the fleet time to escape and perhaps distract the enemy into releasing their captures. The fleet made good its escape but the Spanish ships sailed off with the four prizes. Although Durell met with only eight ships of the fleet on the return voyage, he determined that in the few days following his 21 April arrival at Boston most of the merchant vessels had reached home safely.¹⁴²

Durell described the incident as putting Massachusetts in "utmost consternation."

¹⁴¹ Durell to Admiralty, 25 Apr. 1733, TNA PRO ADM 1/1695.

¹⁴² Ibid.

The fishery, as a principal industry of the colony, faced ruin if it suddenly had no access to salt at Salt Tortuga. Durell also applied to the Admiralty on behalf of those merchants who lost their ships to the Spanish and sought restitution.¹⁴³ The encounter represented the end of Durell's trips to the West Indies as no convoys assembled for the winters of 1734-5 or 1735-6, and *Scarborough* instead laid-up at the wharf for the season.¹⁴⁴ This incident highlights the balance captains needed to maintain when making the decision to engage the enemy. *Scarborough* would not have been expected to fight two ships of such considerably greater size than itself, but Durell's aggressive defence posture permitted the convoy to escape. The decision-making process became more difficult when dealing with pirates, as the nature of the pirate ship gave it power disproportional to its size.

4.5- Piracy: James Cornwall and the *Sheerness*

With the coming of peace, both in 1697 and 1713, pirates replaced the French as the major threat to shipping in the Atlantic world. The Admiralty quickly modified their station ship orders and instructions to account for both the realignment of opponents and concurrent changes to the post-1713 deployment patterns. In general, the Admiralty reduced the size and number of ships dispatched to North America and the West Indies during peacetime, and eliminated regular convoy service to Virginia. The growth of peacetime piracy obviously troubled the imperial government, and it took direct steps to provide colonial officials and captains with the tools necessary to combat robbery at sea. The Admiralty tempered its instructions concerning the eradication of pirates, however, with the stipulation that captains pay equal attention to the protection of trade. This

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 31 Dec. 1734 and 2 Jan. 1736.

challenges allusions to a navy “war” or campaign against piracy carried out in the decade following the War of the Spanish Succession. Peter Earle points out that warships in America received orders to seek out pirates, and quotes the ubiquitous passage: “to use your best endeavours to take, burn, sink, or otherwise destroy them.”¹⁴⁵ However, the wording of the preceding passage only directs captains to do this if they should meet with a pirate ship. The instructions did not give permission to hunt actively for pirates without specific directions.¹⁴⁶ New England station ships continued their voyages to the West Indies and their other duties.

The case of Captain James Cornwall illustrates the dilemma in which captains could find themselves regarding their daily operational instructions and those relating to the suppression of piracy. Cornwall’s conflict with Lieutenant Governor William Dummer also represents the middle ground between imperial administration and colonial politics that both governors and sea officers occupied. In 1722, the Massachusetts-born Dummer took charge of the province for the next six years when Governor Shute traveled to London to argue for the establishment of a fixed salary for gubernatorial office.¹⁴⁷ Dummer faced the ongoing standoff with the assembly over money and a war with the Abenaki and Mi’kmaq.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, piracy continued to be a problem off the coast of Northeastern North America. In January 1725, the Admiralty issued orders to all captains of station ships to look out for a particularly active pirate operating in the North Atlantic.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted from Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars* (London: Methuen, 2004), 185-86.

¹⁴⁶ For example: Admiralty, Instructions to Crowe, 18 July 1699, TNA PRO ADM 2/26; Instructions to Blackett, 20 July 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46.

¹⁴⁷ Benjamin W. Labaree, *Colonial Massachusetts* (Millwood: KTO Press, 1979), 138-39.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 203; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts*, 129.

From these orders originated the confrontation between Dummer and Cornwall.¹⁴⁹

As captain of the *Sheerness*, Cornwall served New England between 1724 and 1727.¹⁵⁰ Typical of the postwar deployment, the sixth-rate *Sheerness* carried an official complement of 130 men and twenty guns. This compares unfavourably to the *Reserve*, the last fourth-rate to serve New England. *Reserve*'s official complement of 280 men and fifty-four guns would have proven more than a match for any pirate band if it made contact on the open seas.¹⁵¹ The smaller sixth-rates, however, often found themselves no bigger than the average pirate ship, and frequently with a smaller crew. Furthermore, the tactics employed when battling pirates often required warships to break up their crew into smaller sloops to accompany the warship and chase smaller pirate vessels into shallow bays and coves. Without additional sailors to outfit the sloops, the weakened warship would lack sufficient men to both sail the ship and work the guns in the event of an attack.

Perhaps because of size discrepancies, attempts at the suppression of piracy by station ship captains occupied a slippery slope. The rewards for capturing pirates remained fraught with danger as pirate vessels tended to be heavily armed and heavily manned, with the potential for prize money diminished if the pirates themselves had been unsuccessful.¹⁵² The Admiralty ordered its individual station ships in America to act in consort with their colleagues at other ports if they decided to challenge pirate vessels

¹⁴⁹ Admiralty, Orders to Cornwall, 18 Jan. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁵⁰ Admiralty Lists, 1724-27, TNA PRO ADM 8/15-17; Instructions to Cornwall, 26 May 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁵¹ *Reserve* served New England from 1712 to 1714. Admiralty Lists 1712-13, TNA PRO ADM 8/12-13.

¹⁵² Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 183-88; Marcus Rediker, *Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age* (London: Verso, 2004), 13-16. For a complaint regarding a short complement: Teate to Admiralty, 25 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

more powerful than themselves.¹⁵³ Yet size constraints did not necessarily inhibit lone warships from battling pirates, as demonstrated by Cornwall's New York colleague, Peter Solgard in the *Greyhound*, in 1723. Although the same size as the *Sheerness*, the crew of the *Greyhound* took on a pirate group of two sloops and 175 men led by Ned Lowe and Charles Harris. Solgard encouraged the two pirate vessels to chase him and then, when ready, turned upon them to engage in an extended battle. *Greyhound* captured Harris and his sloop, but Lowe escaped.¹⁵⁴ Three years later, reports of pirates (including Lowe) operating off the northeast fishing banks prompted Cornwall to appeal to the Massachusetts government for extra men to set out against them.¹⁵⁵

According to Cornwall, Lieutenant Governor Dummer refused repeated requests for men to supplement the crew of the *Sheerness*. This would have enabled Cornwall to carry out his orders from the Admiralty and search for the pirate. Desertion and illness had reduced the ship's complement from the 137 carried out from England to 106. Dummer claimed that deference to the Massachusetts Council tied his hands, and nothing in his own instructions or any precedent could allow him to issue an order for impressment unilaterally. Cornwall suspected Dummer of waffling on the issue and proof seemed to arrive in the form of a sloop (the *Loyal Heart*) outfitted and armed by the government, and carrying the lieutenant governor's commission. The vessel sailed past the *Sheerness* flying a facsimile of the Union Jack. Cornwall, who further believed the sloop intended to hunt for pirates alone, hailed and ordered it to stop. The sloop refused, insisting it only planned to sail down to Castle Island within Boston Harbour. *Sheerness*

¹⁵³ Instructions to Cornwall, 26 May 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁵⁴ Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 202-03.

¹⁵⁵ Cornwall to Admiralty, 4 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

then fired a shot across the sloop's bow and two more into the sails to force it to obey. Later attempts by Cornwall to confiscate the jack failed when an armed party from the sloop arrived to outnumber his boat crew. The furor over the incident resulted in complaints to the Admiralty, a memorial to the Crown protesting the shots fired, and a trial in the local Vice Admiralty court over the use of the King's jack by the provincial sloop.¹⁵⁶

Important considerations for the matter involved the potential for prize money and the benefits of provincial versus naval service. From the Massachusetts perspective, a private warship with the governor's commission provided a legal alternative to relying on (or sharing prize money with) the navy. Furthermore, provincial service encouraged local mariners to go to war against pirates unencumbered by the limitations of royal service. In the case of the *Loyal Heart*, the sailors who signed on received a generous bounty.¹⁵⁷ At that time, insufficient numbers of precious sailors prevented the outfitting and manning of both the provincial sloop and the granting of a supply of men to *Sheerness*.

In a letter to the Admiralty, Dummer explained that Cornwall knew about the provincial sloop and had still expressed his willingness to go to sea against the pirate. Then Dummer levelled several accusations at Cornwall to explain why the government was disinclined to lend him men. In addition to the latest affront of firing on the *Loyal Heart*, the captain had kept *Sheerness* too long in port, loaded salt onboard at Salt Tortuga

¹⁵⁶ This paragraph: Cornwall to Admiralty, 4 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598; Dummer to Admiralty, 8 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598; Massachusetts Court of Vice-Admiralty: Cornwall vs. Little, 14 Oct. 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598 (copy); Memorial of Lieut. Governor and Council of Massachusetts Bay to the King, 8 July 1726, TNA PRO CO 5/10, no. 183.

¹⁵⁷ Dummer to Admiralty, 8 July 1729, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

for private use, and lessened his own complement by loaning men to merchant vessels.¹⁵⁸ Dummer's strategy backfired. As Cornwall himself pointed out, once Dummer and the Council accused him of idleness, they could face counter-accusations of wilfully allowing an under-crewed warship to engage pirates.¹⁵⁹ Cornwall wintered his ship in Boston and, with the government pressing twenty men for his complement, *Sheerness* went out on patrol in the spring. The Admiralty quashed the Massachusetts memorial and did not disapprove of Cornwall's actions, but neither does it seem that any other official body openly criticized Dummer or the Massachusetts government.¹⁶⁰

The conclusion to the Dummer-Cornwall affair is interesting because so little became of it. The memorial sent to the Crown saw no punitive action taken against either the governor or the captain. The colonial Vice Admiralty court decided that the jack worn by the government sloop looked suspiciously like the King's flag, but it reserved final judgment for the Admiralty. Locally, Cornwall was publicly humiliated in his attempts to seize the flag from the provincial sloop, but the affair did not seem to hurt the captain's career in the navy, or impede his election to Parliament between 1732 and 1734. Had Cornwall not been killed in action at the Battle of Toulon in 1744 he might have risen to flag rank.¹⁶¹ His later bravery in battle contrasts with the apparent meekness he displayed in Boston for want of men. This only heightens the importance of the relationship between the captain and his instructions as losing to a pirate with an undermanned ship (contrary to orders) pointed to a negative result either in a court

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Cornwall to Admiralty, 16 May 1727, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 14 Oct. 1727.

¹⁶¹ J. K. Laughton, "Cornwall, James (*bap.* 1698, *d.* 1744)," rev. Philip Carter, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6329>.

martial, or with regard to future employment, as quickly as a victory might have brought money and fame. Furthermore, with no trip to the West Indies forthcoming, Cornwall asked to spend the winter of 1726 on Rhode Island or in Piscataqua to escape from the ferocious public outcry in Boston in response to his actions. He justified the request based on the wording of his instructions that stated he serve New England, of which Rhode Island and New Hampshire were part, even if under different governments.¹⁶² In this instance, the nature of the clash between Dummer and Cornwall was not enough for the captain to disregard the role of the lieutenant governor in navy operational routine. Cornwall still wrote and asked for Dummer's permission for the winter transfer of venue. Thus, although Dummer may not have been able to give *Sheerness* direct orders, for Cornwall to leave his station without consulting the lieutenant governor would have constituted a violation of his orders from the Admiralty.¹⁶³

4.6- Conclusion

It has been established that the governor and council of Massachusetts received nominal command and control over the New England station ship. How this was accomplished was outlined in terms of the broad categories of duty navy captains performed for the province. Regardless of the degree of authority actually transferred on paper by the Admiralty to a colonial jurisdiction, the navy did not expect its captains to undertake any operations without consultation with local authorities. On one level the transfer of partial authority permitted persons at the scene who had a better view of the situation to direct warships. On another, the arrangement assisted the Admiralty in

¹⁶² Cornwall to Dummer, 14 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

¹⁶³ Ibid.; Admiralty, Instructions to Cornwall, 26 May 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

determining whether or not their ships and officers performed their duties to the satisfaction of the parameters established in Chapter 3.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, when a captain indicated in his records that the provincial government ordered him on a particular assignment, this demonstrated to the Admiralty that the process had been completed. Admiralty administrators understood that colonial governments comprehended regional needs better than they did and supported local initiatives to employ warships to greater effectiveness. Nevertheless, through a long series of confrontations between governors and sea officers throughout the British oceanic world the Admiralty also believed that the potential for confrontation could not, or would not, change the overall operational parameters. The consequences of such confrontations are the subject of the next chapter.

Sending warships to guard the fisheries off Nova Scotia and convoy merchant shipping to Barbados/Salt Tortuga employed the warships in a manner agreeable to both New England interests and the navy. The Admiralty, however, was careful to structure subsequent instructions to ensure that, where possible, the permission appeared to come from them and not the provincial government. Therefore, the potential of sailing to Salt Tortuga if so directed made its way into the permanent instructions of station ship captains going to New England. Meanwhile, with regard to Canso, the Admiralty identified with those merchants in England desiring such a convoy rather than the real initiators of the service, the New England merchants. This gave the captain a direct link of obedience to the Admiralty rather than to the Massachusetts government. Such legal wrangling did not absolve captains from performing their duties at the request of the local government, but it allowed them to remain aloof from colonial affairs if necessary. Given

¹⁶⁴ See Ch. 3, esp., 134-38.

that European war and diplomacy already stretched naval resources to their limit, it did not serve anyone's interest to waste an expensive resource such as a station ship by putting it in danger for ill-conceived attempts at regional expansion. Imperial animals such as Joseph Dudley understood both the strengths and weaknesses of the guardship and comprehended the limitations to the orders and directions he could give to captains. As a result, Dudley intended only to use *Deptford* for naval coverage of the 1707 expedition and not in carrying the fort or overseeing the militia.

The evolution of instructions to captains fits in with recent analysis that characterizes early-modern naval and imperial planning as *ad hoc*. The Admiralty did implement additional orders and instructions, but often did so in response to a problem or contingency rather than as an initiative or a preventative measure. The orders and instructions provided to station ship captains at New England analyzed in this chapter have been limited to those of an operational nature.¹⁶⁵ They reveal a working relationship established between station ship captains and the government overseeing their region of deployment. A routine for warships developed that proved suitable for the basic needs of New England, broken only when captain or governor/government attempted to seek advantage within their relationship to the detriment of duty or the wishes of the Admiralty. Notwithstanding conflicts such as those over the colours and the status of provincial warships, all resources would come together in the event of a direct threat to the New England coast. This did not necessarily remain the case regarding the capturing

¹⁶⁵ Important passages relating to local government are continued in the next chapter; for example the diplomatic usage of warships by colonial governors and the problems with governors replacing officers in ships delegated to them by the Admiralty. It will focus more on the problems associated with the Royal Governor's utilization of those powers granted by the English/British government and the Admiralty.

of pirates and related competition for scarce seamen. The stage for such duties pushed the station ship northward to Nova Scotia where they would be in a position to stave off or warn of impending attack, and southward to the West Indies where New England merchant vessels travelled primarily for trade. This all, of course, supplemented the important convoys to and from Europe during times of warfare or intense piratical activity during peace.

Chapter 5: Captains and Colonial Governors: New England, 1686-1739

Colonial governors received a degree of operational control over warships to ensure that captains followed their orders and instructions to the best possible advantage for trade and empire. The evolving and expanding content of the orders and instructions given to captains, meanwhile, demonstrated that the navy never intended to allow royal officials uncontested power, regardless of any gubernatorial privilege granted from other sources such as the Crown or the government. The temporary transfer of authority over a warship provided a convenient, albeit imperfect, solution to the problem of how to manage resources far from home and keep warships out of imperial intrigue as much as possible. Ultimately, however, the Admiralty framework for sending warships overseas heightened the potential for conflict between sea officers and colonies via the office of governor, lieutenant governor, or council. In this sense, the navy's relationship with the American colonies can be incorporated into general discussions regarding the establishing and transferring of imperial authority and institutions overseas.¹ Naval personnel may have been physically immersed within the Atlantic empire, but, unlike imperial officials dispatched to dry land, they often could only influence colonial development peripherally.

Areas where conflict between navy captain and governor might have erupted have already been suggested, as with the case of James Cornwall and William Dummer over the manning and commissioning of provincial warships. This chapter explores the

¹ Richard R. Johnson, "Empire," in *A Companion to Colonial America*, ed. Daniel Vickers (London: Blackwell, 2003), 103-07; Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 11-13. For Massachusetts: Richard L. Bushman, *King and People in Provincial Massachusetts* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981).

sources of conflict between governors and captains further with detailed analyses of three of the four instances in which a captain faced incarceration at Boston.² Holding a captain in custody signifies the ultimate breakdown in relations among imperial officials, and demonstrates the relative weakness of captains when ashore and outside the safety offered by their warship. Attempts to control or punish sea officers through confinement also reveal the lack of imperial resources (martial or otherwise) that were available to colonial governors, as well as their lack of direct control over captains.

The first case involves Captain John George of the *Rose*, who in 1689 found himself swept up by the Revolution of 1688. Imprisonment and separation from his crew forced George to broker the survival of his ship through the creative and dynamic interpretation of his orders and instructions. Second, the imprisonment of Robert Jackson in 1702 by Lieutenant Governor Thomas Povey reflected the apparent inexperience of both men in negotiating those checks and balances established for overseas stations, and demonstrates the ultimate powerlessness of each man upon failure. Finally, Captain Thomas Smart tried his best to conform to his orders and instructions while attempting to secure profit for himself and his crew. Unfortunately, the allure of potential prize money and other benefits offered by the capture of illegal traders and pirates led to Smart's imprisonment by the governors of two different jurisdictions in the space of a little over one year between 1718 and 1720.

² Governor Sir William Phips' conflicts with Capt. Richard Short (*Nonsuch*) and Capt. Robert Fairfax (*Conception Prize*) fit within the contexts and conclusions of this chapter. This author and others have provided detailed studies of this case elsewhere. William R. Miles, "The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America 1689-1713" (M.A. Thesis, Saint Mary's University, 2000), 104-146; Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1695* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 130-31, 211-17, *passim*.

Conflict between captains and governors within the context of naval-imperial relations can appear more frequent (or at least more visible) than instances of cooperation and compromise. Perhaps this occurred because stable affairs generated less of a public discourse, whereas strife resulted in lengthy correspondence and confrontations between imperial officials and sea officers.³ Historians have duly noted such confrontations and have provided several interpretations. These generally correspond to some form of core-periphery argument, whether simplistic expressions of the navy as inefficient purveyors of hated imperial policy, or similar, but nuanced, conclusions based on more detailed examinations of imperial social and political development. For example, confrontations have been explained as the result of arrogant personality clashes, to be expected given the social hierarchies of those involved, or emanating from the nervous belief of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century sea officers that service far away from the administrative nerve centres of the navy isolated them, and thus reduced their chances for promotion.⁴

Certainly, captains serving in New England bemoaned the lack of respect that the citizens of Boston sometimes accorded the presumed position of officers as gentlemen and servants of the Crown. Upon his 1693 assault and subsequent imprisonment by

³ The dossier that Lieut. Governor Thomas Povey sent to the Board of Trade in 1702 to support his complaint against Robert Jackson amounted to nineteen separate documents. United Kingdom, The National Archive (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 5/862, no. 121 i-xix. The three years spent on station by Captain Matthew Teate in the *Reserve*, from October 1707 to February 1710, hardly rated mention in colonial correspondence to the Board of Trade. See the outline of Teate's voyage in the "Introduction," 19-22.

⁴ David E. Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), Ch. 7; Samuel G. Margolin, "Guardships on the Virginia Station, 1667-1767," *American Neptune* 55 no. 1 (1995), 19-41; John Lax and William Pencak, "The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740s in Massachusetts," *Perspectives in American History* 10 (1976), 163-214; Joseph D. Doty, "The British Admiralty as a Factor in Colonial Administration, 1689-1713" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1929; reprint Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), 66-67, 73; J.D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649-1688* (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2008), 99.

Governor Sir William Phips, Richard Short in the *Nonsuch* thundered to the Admiralty that he was only the latest in a long list of navy captains to suffer at the hands of colonial New Englanders, including John Weybourn in the *Garland*, John George in the *Rose*, George St. Lo in the *Dartmouth*, and Thomas Monk in the yacht *Albemarle*.⁵ Short added former navy captain Sir Robert Robinson, who spent the winter of 1691 stranded in Boston for want of proper transportation home following the completion of his term as governor of Bermuda.⁶ James Cornewall referred to New Englanders as a “race of levellers,” while Captain George Martin, whether sarcastically or not, wished in 1709 for orders to “remove me from this holy land.”⁷ In the midst of the Richard Short affair, Captain Robert Fairfax stated to the Admiralty in exasperation “Sir I have made it my endeavour to comply with the humours of persons in authority here so far as becomes a gentleman but find nothing that bears that name shall be so treated.”⁸

Colonial subjects, meanwhile, could dispense disparaging comments with equal venom in response to the poor manners and insubordinate attitude of junior officers. Boston merchant Andrew Belcher and his son Jonathan (a future councillor and Massachusetts governor) at one point during the War of the Spanish Succession held the navy contract to supply warships with victuals. Despite their reliance on the business and

⁵ Capt. Richard Short, *Nonsuch*, to Admiralty, 29 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 44.

⁶ Ibid.; Sir Robert Robinson to Lords of Trade, 27 Sept. 1691, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series* (CSPC), ed. W. Noel Sainsbury and others (London: His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1860-1994, 46 vols.), Vol. 13, no. 1786. Robinson wrote a letter of support for Short, declaring it strange for a colonial governor to strike a captain, but did not immediately suggest that he personally had been mistreated while at Boston. Robinson did comment that while he enjoyed New England, the people did not warm themselves to Old Englanders. Robinson to William Blathwayt, 15 Jan. 1694, CSPC Vol. 14, no. 827 XII.

⁷ Capt. James Cornewall, *Sheerness*, to Admiralty, 4 July 1726, TNA PRO Admiralty (ADM) 1/1598; Capt. George Martin, *Dragon*, to Admiralty, 20 May 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094. *Dragon* was not a New England station ship, but transported Samuel Vetch, Francis Nicholson, and ordnance stores to New York and Boston for the potential attacks on Port Royal and Quebec. Admiralty, Orders to Martin, 7 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 2/39.

⁸ Capt. Robert Fairfax, *Conception Prize*, to Admiralty, 31 Jan. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 24.

services of the navy, the Belchers were not inclined to suffer insults from its upstart officers. Future admiral Thomas Mathews found himself in a protracted quarrel with the Belchers over supplying the fourth-rate *Reserve* while at Boston during 1709-10. As relations between merchants and captain broke down, Mathews reported that Andrew Belcher sneered that, when dealing with London, “what’s in his pockets will gain him admittance while all captains wait outside...”, and stated further that he would answer any alleged neglect to Mathews’ superiors.⁹ Jonathan Belcher prompted the “levellers” comment described above when he witnessed the 1726 public clash between Cornwall and the crew of a Boston privateer over manning issues and the improper wearing of royal colours.¹⁰ Cornwall’s report claimed that in the midst of the confrontation, someone overheard Belcher on the wharf saying to a cohort that “that Gentleman Sir ought to be cut in pieces and if he were my friend I’d advise him not to come on shore anymore.” The companion replied that officers had instructions governing their behaviour and would have to account for any indiscretion back in England, but it was strange for a council member to discuss such an assault, and suggested that reading the Riot Act to disperse the assembled mob would perhaps be a better strategy. Belcher apparently ended the discussion with the reply that he was a “New England man.”¹¹ Cornwall avoided confinement, but had incurred the anger of the Boston crowd to the point where he feared for the safety of the ship should it berth alongside the wharf.¹²

⁹ Capt. Thomas Mathews, *Reserve*, to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹⁰ Cornwall to Admiralty, 4 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598. Details of this clash are located in Ch. 4, 200-06.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Cornwall to Lieut. Governor William Dummer, 14 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

Altercations between captains and other imperial actors throughout the British Atlantic are too numerous to dismiss as irrelevant. By 1703, the number of open confrontations throughout the empire forced the Admiralty to issue general orders for both captains and governors to treat each other with the civility and respect due to their station.¹³ Unfortunately, admonitions from the Admiralty did little to prevent clashes over any confusion over policy and jurisdiction. The attitude and disposition of various officers and gentlemen certainly assisted in escalating conflict between the navy and the colonies, but they were not necessarily the causes of it. Indeed, the confrontations can ultimately be traced to the orders and instructions that the Admiralty established to maintain control of its overseas warships, combined with the scarcity of resources available to those inhabiting Britain's oceanic peripheries, and the need of captains and governors to exploit empire to individual purpose. This suggests conflict of a more idiosyncratic nature despite similar processes of escalation.

The phenomenon of incarcerating sea officers was not unique to America and the West Indies. While at Edinburgh on 11 March 1702, Captain William Cleveland in the fourth-rate *Montague*, along with several other captains, embarked some soldiers for transport as stipulated by their orders from the navy.¹⁴ That evening, officers from the regiment in question came on board and requested that the soldiers disembark on the authority of the commanding major general. Cleveland replied that he could not do so without proper orders, but attended the Lord Chancellor of Edinburgh to gain an explanation for the request. In response, the official stated that news of the king's recent

¹³ Admiralty, General Orders, 17 July 1702, TNA PRO ADM 2/30.

¹⁴ Capt. William Cleveland, *Montague*, to Admiralty, 7 Mar. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590.

illness necessitated the return of the soldiers. The captain reiterated to the Lord Chancellor and Edinburgh Council that he could not release the troops without orders from the Admiralty. The Council suddenly arrested and incarcerated Cleveland, only releasing him after reaching a compromise in which he and the other captains promised not to sail until after the arrival of replies to the expresses sent to London on the matter.¹⁵ In Cleveland's case, neither the Lord Chancellor nor the Edinburgh Council had the same prerogative over *Montague* as did a colonial governor over a station ship, but it does signify the vulnerability of captains to local power when onshore, and raises questions of jurisdiction as demonstrated by the issue of transporting soldiers.

5.1- Controlling Warships

The position of royal governor throughout the period 1660 to 1750 evolved from a strong position (at least on paper) to one that both relied upon, and competed with, colonial assemblies for power. All laws, policy changes, diplomacy, and enforcement thereof required negotiation with the various interests involved, especially concerning monetary issues and the waging of war. Gubernatorial authority came from the Crown, but the governor received policy direction from a variety of places including the Privy Council, Parliament, Customs Service, Treasury, and Admiralty.¹⁶ Governors frequently found themselves caught between the colony on which they depended for support and the imperial government in London which they served. Ironically, manoeuvring at both ends

¹⁵ Cleveland to Admiralty, 7 Mar. and 12 Mar. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590.

¹⁶ Ian K. Steele, "The Anointed, the Appointed and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 1689-1784," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 105-10.

curtailed the substantial theoretical power of the governor over time during a period that brought colonies more closely into the imperial fold.¹⁷

The evolving issue of authority over warships highlights the uncertain role of gubernatorial power and its relation to the navy. The transfer of operational authority over a warship, in theory, created a danger to the public good as it provided governors with instant access to powerful military equipment. The office of governor throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries carried with it little by way of state-sponsored physical power, given that colonial armies usually consisted of local militia rather than royal troops.¹⁸ Governors, however, did not have ultimate responsibility over the well-being of a warship, and this acted as a brake on the abuse of power. The orders and instructions issued to captains from the Admiralty not to endanger the ship or to allow colonial officials to interfere with its internal workings created the potential for resistance to, and conflict with, governors rather than providing the latter with tools of aggression or oppression. A symbolic representation of the deterioration of gubernatorial authority over warships came with the addition of instructions in 1717 for captains “not to hoist the Union Flag” for any reason while colonial governors were on board.¹⁹ The

¹⁷ Ibid., 111-17; Jon Butler, *Becoming America: The Revolution Before 1776* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 121-23; Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Politics of the Early Modern Atlantic World” and “Metropolis and Colonies: Changing Patterns of Constitutional Conflict in the Early Modern British Empire,” in *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History*, ed. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24, 43-77; Alison Olson, *Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest Groups 1690-1790* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), Ch. 6-7.

¹⁸ Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 132-33; Leonard W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System before 1783* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930; reprint, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1964), 108.

¹⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Ellis Brand, *Lime* (Virginia), Capt. Thomas Smart, *Squirrel* (New England), and Capt. Vincent Pearse, *Phoenix* (New York), 11 Apr. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

intention was to prevent governors from employing warships to enhance colonial power or prestige when using them for travel purposes.

The governor of the Dominion of New England, Sir Edmund Andros, illustrates how governors could be weak and powerful at the same time. Andros' authority gave him the benefit of ruling New England without an assembly, thus allowing for tough policies regarding taxes, the Navigation Acts, and land tenure.²⁰ When the Revolution of 1688 reached Boston in 1689, however, the ex-professional soldier did not resort to martial law or force despite his prerogative to do so. With only a squad of soldiers and the first station ship sent to New England (the fifth-rate *Rose*) at his disposal, Andros employed passive means, in part because he did not have sufficient military resources. At the time of the insurrection, for instance, the *Rose* remained immobile in Boston harbour in need of major refit and repair.²¹ Nevertheless, one argument suggests that Andros probably recognized that the problems he faced in Massachusetts were political, his position was political, and therefore the solution should be political.²²

Those officials drafting the governor's body of instructions easily incorporated permission for the general use of the royal warships. In addition to standard instructions granting control over military affairs in the Dominion, Andros received control over any royally appointed ships as well as the right to commission local ships for governmental use. The governor found his authority tempered in that he had no right to discipline navy personnel for any charges against the Articles of War, which remained the duty of a

²⁰ Mary Lou Lustig, *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), 151-56.

²¹ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 98.

²² Ian K. Steele, "Governors or Generals?: A Note on Martial Law and the Revolution of 1689 in America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 46 no. 2 (1989), 311-12; Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, 196. Lustig's account suggests pragmatism on the part of Andros rather than philosophy.

commission of courts martial. The exception to this was that Andros, like all governors, retained the right to remove any captain from command who refused a written order.²³

The orders given to Captain John George in the *Rose*, meanwhile, followed the pattern given to ships at other stations. George was “diligently and carefully” to follow written orders given by the chief political officer of New England.²⁴ These orders from the Admiralty were deceptively simple because, in addition to George being bound by the Articles of War, he received supplemental orders and further instructions regarding behaviour at home and abroad beyond those involving Andros.²⁵

Although the navy required its captains to obey colonial governments regarding local operations, many aspects of daily routine still lay open to interpretation and contention. In 1706 Lord Cornbury, governor of New York, ordered Lieutenant Thomas Wilcox in the sixth-rate *Triton's Prize* to take command of that ship following the death of the captain and pending orders from the Admiralty.²⁶ Captain George Fane in the fifth-rate *Lowestoft*, senior officer on station at New York, overruled Cornbury and placed his own lieutenant, Richard Davis, as commander of the *Triton's Prize*. Fane then placed Wilcox in confinement, ignored Cornbury's protestations, and took *Lowestoft* out

²³ Commission for Sir Edmund Andros, 7 Apr. 1688, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (NY Docs)*, ed. John Brodhead and others (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853-87, 15 vols.), Vol. 2, 540-41. The commission for Andros cited here is a reissue after the restructuring of the Dominion of New England to include New York in 1688. Clauses granting governors permission to remove captains remained within their instructions up to at least 1728. Governor's Authority over Officers of Navy, *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New York, Appleton-Century, 1935; reprint, New York: Octagon, 1967), no. 636.

²⁴ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. John George, *Rose*, 25 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1726; Sari Hornstein, “The English Navy and the Defense of American Trade in the Late Seventeenth Century,” in *Global Crossroads and the American Seas*, ed. Clark G. Reynolds (Missoula: Pictorial Histories, 1988), 111; cf. Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. John Croft, *Deptford* (Virginia), 23 July 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727.

²⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to George, 14 Oct. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727.

²⁶ Patricia U. Bonomi, *The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 66-68.

to sea. Cornbury claimed he could have fired on Fane but instead arrested Davis, who, after an initial show of defiance, went along peacefully. Following consultation with the lieutenant, Cornbury re-established Davis as commander of the *Triton's Prize* and the issue settled down. Cornbury repeatedly complained about the ambiguity in his instructions, while the officers protested government interference in their duties.²⁷ Assuming Davis had seniority over Wilcox, his appointment may not have been a problem in a squadron with Fane as its commander. The convention of the navy regarding individual warships, however, dictated that when a captain died, the senior lieutenant took command.²⁸ Cornbury, therefore, followed navy procedure in appointing Wilcox. In contrast, the captain's own instructions dictated that he had the power to promote officers within his own ship, and to disregard any applications made by the governor. In promoting Davis over Wilcox, whatever logic Fane employed proved to be a stretch. As a result, the Admiralty later justified Cornbury's actions while the captain received a mild reprimand for his disrespect to the governor.²⁹

The decentralized nature of control over station ships meant that conflict and disagreement over authority would generally result in additions to the orders and instructions (such as the above example regarding flags), rather than wholesale punishments or purges as many problems originated through flaws or varying interpretations. In 1696, the navy had added the passages within Fane's instructions ordering him to promote from within the ship and deflect outside interference in an

²⁷ Ibid., 68-70.

²⁸ J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 18-19.

²⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. George Fane, *Lowestoft*, 26 Apr. 1705, TNA PRO ADM 2/33; Bonomi, *Lord Cornbury Scandal*, 69.

attempt to avoid such confrontation in the first place.³⁰ The new instructions ordered captains to replace all officers discharged dead, or otherwise incapacitated during the voyage, with qualified persons within the ship, and they were not to suffer anyone appointed by the governor.³¹ This passage again reflected the problems of command the further warships sailed from the navy's daily control procedures. The order of 1696 resulted from numerous examples during the seventeenth century, especially in the West Indies, of governors exploiting their privileges over station ships to insert clients into positions of power within the navy.³²

New England contributed to the problem of governors substituting personal replacements for officers with an incident involving Captain Short of the *Nonsuch*, who had entered into a private economic arrangement with Governor Phips.³³ In the aftermath of a violent falling out in January 1693, Phips ousted Short from his command and replaced him with the ship's gunner, Thomas Dobbins. Phips disregarded navy precedence by overlooking the lieutenant, Abraham Hoare. Phips had judged Hoare incompetent and unfit for command, basing the decision on personal observation of the lieutenant at his duty.³⁴ Dobbins, meanwhile, had proven to be malleable and someone willing to permit the governor even greater influence over the royal warship, thus replacing his captain as a client of Phips.³⁵ The action ultimately contributed to the list of

³⁰ Admiralty, Instructions to Fane, 26 Apr. 1705, TNA PRO ADM 2/33.

³¹ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. William Kiggins, *Arundel* (New England), 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21; Instructions to Capt. Richard Culliford, *Fowey* (New York), 20 Sept. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24.

³² Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 18-19.

³³ The details of the arrangements are vague, but related in part to the hiring out of seamen for their wages, and the embezzlement of prize goods. Baker and Reid, *New England Knight*, 212-14.

³⁴ Phips to Admiralty, 1 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857, no. 34.

³⁵ Baker and Reid, *New England Knight*, 214-17. Phips' low opinion of the lieutenant appears to be borne

accusations levelled against Phips' administration that led to his subsequent recall to answer for his behaviour.³⁶ In one sense, Fane's action in placing Lieutenant Davis in charge of *Triton's Prize* was similar to Phips' placement of Thomas Dobbins in command of *Nonsuch*. Fane attempted to position someone he could trust in command of the second warship, while Phips did the same in the interest of gaining tighter control over the navy ships stationed in his jurisdiction. In the case of Lieutenant Davis, it offered him valuable command experience.

A somewhat distraught passage in a 1698 letter from the Earl of Bellomont to the Board of Trade illustrates the vagarious nature of the relationship between governor and station ship captain in a less dramatic fashion. Bellomont (governor of both New York and Massachusetts – including New Hampshire and Maine) expressed concern when the two warships stationed at New York received a recall home following the end of the Nine Years' War. The navy appeared to slate no replacement, although at least one ship would still be at Boston for some time. The governor felt that the coast would be vulnerable to the swarm of pirates bound to emerge following the cessation of hostilities with France. On his own initiative, Bellomont tried to persuade Captain Richard Culliford in the fifth-rate *Fowey* not to leave for England. Culliford replied that having received the Admiralty's orders to return home, he was liable to lose his commission if he disobeyed. Bellomont managed to delay *Fowey* for almost a month to wait for packets as Culliford's

out by Hoare's reluctance to serve at New England, and his leaving the deck during the action between *Nonsuch* and a French privateer as outlined in the subsequent court martial inquiring into the loss. Admiralty to Lt. Abraham Hoare, 24 Mar. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 2/382; Admiralty, Court Martial of the *Nonsuch*, 24 May 1695, TNA PRO ADM 1/5255; Miles, "The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America," 125-30, 135-39.

³⁶ Baker and Reid, *New England Knight*, 236. Phips died in 1695 before he could respond to the accusations against him.

instructions stipulated a grace period of twenty days after announcing his intent to depart in order to permit the completion of any outstanding business. Nevertheless, Bellomont could not convince the captain to override the Admiralty's orders. Culliford would not risk his career despite the apparent danger to New York.³⁷

A comparable example involves Captain William Kiggins in the fifth-rate *Arundel* while stationed at New England. Kiggins was one of the first captains to be part of the regional initiative to send the New York and New England station ships with convoys to the West Indies rather than lay them up at the wharf for the winter. Lieutenant Governor William Stoughton issued orders for a convoy in late fall 1697, and Kiggins set sail on 13 December with eleven merchant ships. Twice the captain wrote to the Navy Board (once from Boston and once upon reaching Barbados) stating that since he received no directions to the contrary, he was carrying out the order to go convoy to the West Indies. Kiggins assured the Navy Board that the order came via the prerogative of the Lieutenant Governor and nothing in any of his instructions could justify his refusing to obey it.³⁸ It is tempting to read into Kiggins' letters a degree of concern, and a hint that if contravening orders had arrived from the Admiralty he would gladly not have sailed for the West Indies.³⁹ Kiggins would have been motivated, not only by the fear that his instructions may not cover forays into another jurisdiction, but also by the danger posed

³⁷ This passage: The Earl of Bellomont to Board of Trade, 21 Sept. 1698, *NY Docs* Vol. III, 378-79; Culliford to Admiralty, 24 Oct. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 1/1588; Admiralty, Orders to Culliford, 17 May 1698, TNA PRO ADM 2/25. The navy intended to have the sixth-rate *Newport* dispatched for New York by January, but it did not arrive until 10 October 1699. Capt. Salmon Morrice, *Newport*, to Admiralty, 14 Oct. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2090.

³⁸ Kiggins to Navy Board, 13 Dec. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 106/507; Admiralty, Orders to Kiggins, 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21.

³⁹ Kiggins to Navy Board, 11 Jan. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 106/519.

to the ship by taking it to the Caribbean, where unconditioned crews were more susceptible to disease.

Fortunately, no serious misfortune befell the *Arundel*, and orders for returning to England arrived in the West Indies via Captain Leader in the fourth-rate *Deptford*. While transporting the Earl of Bellomont to New York before taking station at Boston, violent storms damaged *Deptford* and blew it off course, forcing an over-wintering at Barbados. Had Kiggins received his packet on schedule, he would have had written justification for refusing the Lieutenant Governor's orders, as did Culliford a year later. After consulting with Bellomont about how long he should wait for the trade at Boston, Kiggins returned there and escorted a convoy home to England, as stipulated in his new instructions from the Admiralty.⁴⁰ In the end, the concerns over instructions led to mild inconvenience rather than confrontation or catastrophe.

Facing a scenario similar to Culliford's, Tyrwitt Cayley in the sixth-rate *Rose* explained his late arrival in England from Boston in early September 1717 as stemming from both a delay in receiving his orders home, and a request from the "government of New England" to cruise for two pirates reported to be in the area. Cayley obliged with two cruises totalling ten days.⁴¹ Cayley felt comfortable enough to modify his obedience to the recent Admiralty orders because combating pirates lay within his original instructional parameters.⁴² Kiggins and Culliford had been less certain twenty years

⁴⁰ Kiggins to Admiralty, 23 Apr. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 1/2004; Kiggins to Navy Board, 27 Apr. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 106/519; Admiralty, Instructions to Kiggins, 30 Oct. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24.

⁴¹ Capt. Tyrwitt Cayley, *Rose*, to Admiralty, 5 Sept. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 1/1597; Admiralty, Orders to Cayley, 22 Nov. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49. Cayley was to return home by 15 May whether relieved by another ship or not.

⁴² Admiralty, Instructions to Cayley, 9 Mar. 1715, TNA PRO ADM 2/48. On the surface, Cayley's orders represented a slight change from the previous captain on station, Edward Blackett, who received specific

earlier. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Captain John George in the *Rose* faced the catastrophic failure of colonial infrastructure less than ten years before Kiggins and Culliford's more mundane problems. George squeezed every precedent he possibly could out of his orders and instructions to ensure the survival of himself, his crew, and the warship under his command.

5.2- Captain John George and the *Rose*

Richard Short had been correct when insisting that John George and George St. Lo faced abuse at Boston, but the two captains gave as good as they received, and the circumstances surrounding the conflict proved far more complicated than to what Short could have attested. George, while at New England, found himself embroiled in a series of confrontations with Customs Collector Edward Randolph, the Boston mob (which included some of his own crew), and the revolutionary government of Massachusetts. George's adventures deviate from the general pattern of gubernatorial conflict in that he maintained a good relationship with both interim president of the Massachusetts Council, Joseph Dudley, and his replacement, Governor Sir Edmund Andros.⁴³

Given Randolph's abrasive personality, tensions with George may have begun as early as their voyage to New England in the *Rose* during the spring of 1686.⁴⁴ But the

instructions to be on the lookout for pirates. The Admiralty appears to eliminate that passage from Cayley's principal orders and instructions only to have it reappear in those of Cayley's successor, Thomas Smart. Most likely a clerical expedient of using the orders to Capt. John Balchen for Jamaica as a template for the orders sent to all station ships that season, in order to save time and space in the Admiralty Orders and Instructions copybook, was responsible for the problem. Balchen's instructions for the West Indies do not carry the same passage regarding pirates. This, perhaps, is also an oversight of some sort given the importance of combating piracy in America and the West Indies. Admiralty, Instructions to Captain John Balchen, *Diamond*, 9 Mar. 1715, TNA PRO ADM 2/48; Instructions to Capt. Edward Blackett, *Phoenix*, 20 July 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46; Instructions to Smart, 11 Apr. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

⁴³ Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, 160.

⁴⁴ Edward Randolph to Robert Southwell, 14 Oct. 1684, *Edward Randolph: Including his Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America with Other Documents*

real conflict occurred once Randolph resumed his duties as customs collector. The two men soon began quarrelling over who had greater right to seize merchant vessels which were in violation of the Navigation Acts, and thus collect prize money from their condemnation in the colonial courts of vice admiralty. Randolph had synchronized his career to the affirmation of Royal government in the colonies, and carried out his duty tenaciously. It has been argued that at perhaps no other time were the Navigation Laws so vigorously enforced in New England.⁴⁵ Reports describing repeated violation of the Navigation Acts even influenced the English government's decision to revoke the Massachusetts charter. Enforcing the acts provided a valuable source of potential income for customs collectors, especially the bonuses received for information and the capture of illegal traders. Unfortunately for Randolph, George also received orders to hunt for customs evaders.⁴⁶ The condemnation of prizes during war or peace had been established as a lucrative (and Admiralty-approved) exercise for captains and crews to supplement their own incomes.⁴⁷

Randolph and George fought openly over four captures in the spring and fall of 1686. In general terms, *Rose* had possession of prizes for which Randolph had laid claim

Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676-1703, (Randolph Papers) ed. Robert N. Toppan and Alfred T.S. Goodrick (Boston: The Prince Society, 1898-1909, 7 vols.), Vol. III, 61; Joseph Dudley and Randolph to the Committee for Trade and Plantations, 16 May 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 74. Southwell at the time was a senior customs official. Everett Kimbal, *The Public Life of Joseph Dudley* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911), 36, insists Randolph and George quarrelled on the outward-bound voyage, but the evidence cited does not necessarily bear this out. On Randolph's personality: Thomas C. Barrow, *Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America 1660-1775* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 30-31; Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 45-46; Michael G Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies 1676-1703* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 214-15, *passim*.

⁴⁵ Barrow, *Trade and Empire*, 36.

⁴⁶ Admiralty, Instructions Concerning the Plantation Trade, 10 Aug. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1727.

⁴⁷ Lawrence A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 97, 177-79.

in the court of Vice-Admiralty. The first two occurred in the spring of 1686. Randolph requested the services of *Rose*'s longboat to bring in two suspicious vessels, the barque *Swallow* out of the Canaries on 29 June, and the Scottish pink *Supply* on 1 July.⁴⁸ Randolph subsequently seized both vessels for harbouring illegal trade goods, and he intended to have the prizes quickly condemned.⁴⁹ But George was in possession of both vessels, so council president Joseph Dudley maintained that the captain contributed towards the seizures, and therefore was at least entitled to rights as an informer.⁵⁰ In order to solicit public assistance in apprehending customs violators, clauses within the Navigation Laws permitted informers to receive rewards of up to half of the proceeds from forfeitures.⁵¹ Dudley, as acting Vice Admiral of Massachusetts, granted the crown a third of the prize money, which he and George maintained would be put towards expenses incurred during refitting and resupply of the *Rose*.⁵² Incensed, Randolph challenged George on the issue. George fought back publicly, allegedly going so far as to insult the honour of Mrs. Randolph in the process. Randolph acknowledged the right of warships to make prize of illegal traders on the open ocean, but he argued that within the confines of the harbour the customs service held jurisdiction. Randolph accentuated his argument by pointing out that *Rose* was not even operational, but sat stationary in the harbour awaiting repair. Randolph concluded that the president of the council and the

⁴⁸ Captain's Log, *Rose*, 29 June-1 July 1686, TNA PRO ADM 51/ 3955. Although listed as the Captain's log, Lieut. Condon appears to have made the entries.

⁴⁹ Edward Randolph to Commissioners of Customs, 30 June 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. VI, 184-85.

⁵⁰ Randolph to Andros, 28 July 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. VI, 191-92.

⁵¹ Harper, *English Navigation Laws*, 97.

⁵² Joseph Dudley to William Blathwayt, 31 July 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. VI, 196.

warship captain acted in concert against him, and, by infringing on the jurisdiction of a royal official, they effectively stole money out of his pocket.⁵³

The feud escalated in the fall of 1686, again regarding captures that Randolph had filed in the Vice Admiralty court but held in the possession of *Rose*'s crew. On 20 September 1686, Randolph reported rumours that George was heading to the New York Vice Admiralty court with a brigantine from Newfoundland to which Randolph had already laid claim in Massachusetts.⁵⁴ The next month the suspicious actions of Joshua Rawlins, master of the Maryland ketch *Providence*, led to an analogous capture. David Simpson, a sailor from the *Rose* ordered to guard the prize, engaged in separate confrontations with two of Randolph's deputies. Randolph arrested Simpson in the presence of a crowd, which included town constable Isaiah Tay, and council member and Vice Admiralty court judge Richard Wharton. The group then met with Captain George in company with Captain George St. Lo of the fifth-rate *Dartmouth*, recently arrived from the Caribbean. An argument ensued, centring on Randolph and Wharton and the two navy captains as the latter attempted to rescue Simpson with the help of two crew members. Randolph testified that the captains were verbally abusive, with George threatening immediate violence by means of his cane, and promising future violence should the customs service come near his ship. George defended his crewman, claiming that any member of the navy had as much right to capture as did the customs officers. While George continued his verbal assault, Randolph managed to shuffle Simpson into

⁵³ Randolph to Southwell, 10 July 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 92; Hall, *Edward Randolph*, 106-07.

⁵⁴ Randolph to Governor Thomas Dongan, 20 Sept. 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. IV, 125-26.

the house of merchant and politician John Usher.⁵⁵ Wharton, for the most part, supported Randolph's version of events, but did mention in passing that the two captains believed that they had been assaulted first, or at least had been threatened.⁵⁶ The customs officers managed to hold on to Simpson, who gave a statement to council testifying that Lieutenant David Condon of the *Rose* had ordered him to seize the ketch and hold the customs officials at bay.⁵⁷

The Massachusetts Council subsequently ordered that no sailors were to remain on shore after dark except in emergencies, and summoned George and St. Lo to appear before them regarding the alleged abuse of Boston citizens. The captains refused, replying that should the President have any orders for them they would obey, but they would have nothing to do with the Council.⁵⁸ President Dudley took little action to discipline the captains or look into the situation. A frustrated Randolph felt betrayed by both the Council and Dudley since he had an active hand in their appointment, and he complained to the Commissioners of Customs, the Lords of Trade and Plantations, the Privy Council, and anyone else who would listen (including the Archbishop of Canterbury).⁵⁹ What Randolph failed to realize was that although the gentlemen with whom he curried favour appeared amenable to closer imperial ties between Massachusetts

⁵⁵ Deposition of Edward Randolph to President and Council of Massachusetts, 21 Oct. 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. IV, 121; also: TNA PRO CO 1/66, no.157.

⁵⁶ Deposition of Richard Wharton, 21 Oct. 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. VI, 202-04.

⁵⁷ Deposition of David Simpson, 21 Oct. 1686, CO 5/786, 77; also: *Randolph Papers* Vol. VI, 200-01.

⁵⁸ Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 21 Oct. 1686, TNA PRO CO 5/786, 76.

⁵⁹ Deposition of Randolph, 21 Oct. 1686, TNA PRO CO 1/66, no.157; also: *Randolph Papers* Vol. IV, 121; Randolph to Commissioners of Customs, 30 June 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 184; Randolph to William Blathwayt (clerk of the Privy Council), 28 July 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 288; Randolph to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 2 Aug. 1686, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 270. Although Randolph duly informed the government, no appeal to the Admiralty appears within the sources consulted at present. The above documents are a sample of the letters Randolph sent regarding George and Dudley.

and the Crown, they were still motivated by self-interest. Randolph's strict adherence to his duties could disrupt potential opportunities. Dudley and the Council knew Edmund Andros had been appointed governor of New England, and this left them limited time to use their offices for personal gain, largely through land speculation in Maine. This meant shutting-out Randolph, who also held the office of Register of Titles. Permitting the navy its right to search and seizure without restriction was likely related to the Council's strategy of alienating Randolph in an effort to curtail his ambitions.⁶⁰ Therefore, surprisingly little came of the scuffle between Randolph and the two Captains, this despite St. Lo's tumultuous recent past in the Caribbean regarding improper seizure of merchant ships.⁶¹

The legal justification for the search and seizures sanctioned by Dudley and undertaken by George could be found in the instructions issued to both of them by the Admiralty. Dudley (or whoever was president of the council at the time) was given standard instructions on the proper methods of utilizing warships in the colonies. *Rose* was to be employed for the public service of New England, or any needful neighbouring colony, only through express written orders. No private individual or interest was to have access to the ship. *Rose* was to stay on station until either recalled by the Admiralty, some necessity dictated sending the warship to England, or if the cost of providing victuals became prohibitive.⁶² Therefore, if the proceeds from the sale of prizes did indeed go towards repairing and outfitting the ship, this would be consistent with the tone of Dudley's instructions. George's seemingly defiant statements refusing to recognize

⁶⁰ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 72-73; Hall, *Edward Randolph*, 107.

⁶¹ R.D. Merriman, "Captain George St. Lo, R.N., 1658-1718," *Mariners Mirror* 31 no. 1 (1945), 15-18.

⁶² Admiralty, Instructions to Dudley, 28 Nov. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 2/1741.

the authority of the council were actually consistent with his orders to obey the head of government in the colony, since he technically had orders to obey no one else. So whether Dudley and George were conspiring to defraud the government and customs service, or merely trying to protect themselves and their entitlements from the tenacity of Randolph's enforcement of the Crown's desires, they did so within the letter of their instructions.

While George may have weathered challenges from Randolph, he faced greater adversity once word arrived in Boston that William III and Mary II had replaced James II following his flight from the throne in 1688. The Revolution of 1688 in America has been interpreted in several ways, but all point to the offense brought to New Englanders by the government of Sir Edmund Andros. Andros marginalized, alienated, and angered the polity of Massachusetts with his reliance on familiars from New York and England, his taxation and land reform policies, a futile frontier war with the Abenaki, and his unyielding determination to bring the colony under tight royal rule. Andros (like Randolph) was basically honest, but proved inflexible and uncompromising regarding his duty. Although inspiring slightly less vitriol than the universally hated customs collector, Andros' policies still provided a catalyst for revolution when the time came.⁶³ Even Dudley and the interim council, despite their greed and self-interest, had at least been home-grown opportunists.⁶⁴ Throughout the fluctuations in Massachusetts affairs,

⁶³ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 95; Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, 151-52.

⁶⁴ A sample of some relevant and/or recent works that deal with the Revolution of 1688 in America includes: David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), Ch .9; Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Ch. 6; Stephen S. Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered*

Captain George merely continued to follow his orders to obey the chief political officer, and the relationship between governor and captain appeared cordial, even friendly.⁶⁵ In a colony led predominantly by Puritans, however, actions such as George's attendance at Church of England services with Andros only further shaped the public image of *Rose* as an enforcer for the Crown's attempts at tightening imperial control.⁶⁶

Andros utilized the frigate under his control in a practical fashion. Immediately, he squelched the public fighting between Randolph and George by dividing the search and seizure duties evenly between them.⁶⁷ The crew of the *Rose* thus continued to search for customs evaders and patrol the coast, often manning smaller vessels to search the surrounding islands and inlets.⁶⁸ Andros also dispatched *Rose* on diplomatic junkets when negotiating with Native leaders or dealing with Saint-Castin, a French nobleman who married into Abenaki society. Firing accusations of selling arms and ammunition to New England enemies, Andros visited Saint-Castin's Maine trading post in the spring of 1688, but found that the whole household had fled. Andros then confiscated all arms, ammunition, and other goods, and placed them on board the *Rose*. New Englanders subsequently blamed Andros (and by default George) for the Abenaki war they believed arose out of this incident.⁶⁹

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

⁶⁵ Samuel Sewall, "Diary of Samuel Sewall," 25 Dec. 1686, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, ser. 5, vols. 5-7 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1878-82), Vol. I, 163; Captain's Log, *Rose*, 9 Sept. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁶⁶ Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, 160.

⁶⁷ Andros to Randolph, 24 June 1687, *Randolph Papers* Vol. III, 164-65.

⁶⁸ Captain's Log, *Rose*, Aug.-Sept. 1686, *passim*, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁶⁹ Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, 174.

Later complaints surfaced alleging that *Rose* wasted much time anchored in the harbour rather than cruising for enemies.⁷⁰ In reality, the crew of the *Rose* had been broken into teams, with one remaining in port to repair and maintain the ship, while others crewed two smaller vessels to engage in fisheries patrols to the north.⁷¹ Andros reported to the Admiralty on 5 September 1687 that George had refitted the ship and was preparing to go out cruising between Cape Cod and Cape Sable, the principal area of the New England fisheries. Andros commented favourably on the efforts of the ship and its crew:

...who have been very industrious and diligent in getting the same performed accordingly, and the captain demeaned himself well and kept the ship's company in very good order. And believing at his return he will give an account to your satisfaction, presume to recommend him to your favour as a good officer for his Majesty's further employ, which I doubt not but he will deserve and acquit himself well anywhere.⁷²

Having been identified as a royal official George was arrested by an armed militia that formed when word of the regime change in England reached Boston in April of 1689. Rebel factions seized George, *Rose's* master, and the surgeon upon their coming ashore on the morning of 18 April. Robert Small, the ship's carpenter, and a number of crewmen had deserted *Rose* and joined with those declaring for William and Mary. Small provided advice to those rebels seeking to disable the ship under the premise that *Rose* represented the principal display of royal arms in Boston.⁷³ This action would also have

⁷⁰ Increase Mather, "A Vindication of New England" (1690), reprinted in *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers Issued During the Period Between the Overthrow of the Andros Government and the Establishment of the Second Charter of Massachusetts (Andros Tracts)*, ed. W.H. Whitmore (Boston: The Prince Society, 1868-74, 3 vols.), Vol. II, 53-55.

⁷¹ Captain's Log, *Rose*, 30 Aug. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁷² Andros to Admiralty, 5 Sept. 1687, *Andros Tracts*, Vol. III, 74-75.

⁷³ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690*, ed. Charles M. Andrews (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 215-217.

the practical purpose of precluding the use of the warship's armaments against the town. Andros, meanwhile, took refuge in the fort at Boston with those of his supporters not already arrested. On board the *Rose*, Lieutenant David Condon purportedly hoisted the ships' colours, ran out the guns and declared that he would defend the ship or die trying (although the log book of the *Rose* makes no mention of the ship being cleared for action).⁷⁴ Condon did launch one of the ship's boats in an attempt to extricate Andros and the others trapped in the fort, but they could not be reached because of the crowd. After a brief standoff, Andros had little choice but to surrender.⁷⁵

In his subsequent report to the Admiralty, George maintained that the carpenter had spread rumours among the populace that *Rose* would open fire on the town, and even attempt an escape in order to join the French. At one point, Small endeavoured to initiate an assault on the ship, but bystanders prevented this, and all future suggestions of a like nature from the carpenter were ignored.⁷⁶ George was brought before the Council of Safety, an *ad hoc* government attempting to bring stability to the revolt, and which suggested he surrender the ship and exchange the King's commission as it was no longer in force. George stated that he would do neither. As a prisoner, the captain no longer had the authority to surrender as the lieutenant was now accountable for the ship, and regarding his commission: "I told them my commission was still good till one from the Crown of England made it invalid...." When the Council of Safety persisted with threats to capture *Rose* by force, George maintained that:

⁷⁴ Samuel Prince to Thomas Hinckley, 22 Apr. 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 186-190; Captain's Log, *Rose*, 18-19 Apr. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁷⁵ Prince to Hinckley, 22 Apr. 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 186-190.

⁷⁶ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 215-217.

...I advised them to the contrary, assuring them there would be a great slaughter before she could be taken, and that the Kings ships never did surrender; I also told them if they would let her ride quietly without molestation, there would be no danger from her, for the Lt. had no orders to move her from that place, nor would the ship move till advice from England...⁷⁷

Throughout the entire episode, *Rose* remained at anchor in harbour with key members of the crew deserted or in prison, and without effective resupply. On 19 April 1689, the crew became cut off from fresh supplies of local food and began to eat the dry provisions stored away for sea usage. It was only the second day of the rebellion. *Rose*, therefore, would be unable to sail anywhere.⁷⁸ While occupying George in discussion, the Council of Safety sent a small delegation on board the warship to convince the remaining crew to surrender to King William, which they did on 20 April 1689. To ensure calm among the population, Lieutenant Condon promised to send *Rose*'s sails ashore, for which the Council for Safety issued a written order on 22 April. The same day the Council ordered the release of a boat crew from the *Rose* which had been picked up on the 20th, giving them permission to repair quietly back to the ship with their pinnace, oars, arms, and ammunition.⁷⁹

George, unlike his fellow prisoners, was eventually transferred to the house of merchant Samuel Shrimpton, "who was very kind to me in all this affair."⁸⁰ Robert Small persisted in attempts to discredit George by promising to secure the wages of any crewman who would testify against him. George could not obtain a copy of the charges

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Captain's Log, *Rose*, 20 Apr. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955.

⁷⁹ Minutes of the Council of Safety, 22 Apr. 1689 and Council of Safety to David Condon, 22 Apr. 1689, *The Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts: Selected Documents, 1689-1692*, ed. Robert E. Moody and Richard C. Simmons (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1988), 56.

⁸⁰ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 216.

he faced, but did gain an audience with the Council of Safety, where he declared that their allowing his crew to wander about Boston following the surrender of *Rose* was detrimental to the operation of the ship. Permitting this situation to continue would not bode well for the Council, George suggested, as the navy was governed by an act of Parliament and therefore independent of any government ashore.⁸¹

George's ploy worked as the Council of Safety grew concerned with how the rebellion appeared in London, where Boston minister Increase Mather had been lobbying the government to reinstate the Massachusetts charter.⁸² The council declared that all members of the *Rose*'s crew were to return to the ship and thereafter denied them permission to be on shore without leave from the captain, lieutenant, or other responsible officer, except in case of emergency.⁸³ Most of the sailors eventually returned to the ship without trouble, but Small and about six recalcitrant crewmen, including the boatswain, remained at large, and continued to harass George. When a fire broke out in the north end of Boston on 16 May, Small claimed it had been set on George's orders. A mob broke into Shrimpton's house and dragged George off to the jail, while a number of armed boats were sent to the *Rose* to apprehend Condon and several others. All of this, according to George, related to efforts by Small to take over the ship based on the carpenter's belief that he had been promised a commission by the Council.⁸⁴ Two days

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 98.

⁸³ Minutes of the Council of Safety, 1689 (no date), *Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts*, ed. Moody and Simmons, 85. The editors place these minutes as if recorded in June, but they correspond to George's account and so probably date somewhere around mid-May 1689.

⁸⁴ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 217-18. During preparations for the 1690 expedition to Canada, a Robert Small received an appointment as captain of a fireship. Massachusetts Council Minutes, circa Aug. 1690, *Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts*, ed. Moody and Simmons, 273.

later, George was released back into Shrimpton's care (Condon and the others spent an extra day in jail), and informed the Council that so long as Small remained at large the ship was not safe. The Council replied that nothing could be done. With Shrimpton's help, George further lobbied for the sails to be returned, but to no avail. On 22 May, a representative assembly of country interests replaced the Council of Safety (composed largely of seaport merchants and gentry), and kept the same policy of refusing George his ship's sails.⁸⁵

On 7 June, Condon received an order to send sixteen men on shore who were to testify against George. Condon solicited George for advice, to which the captain stated that nobody could be dispensed with as all were needed on board ship.⁸⁶ The government still refused to act until orders were received from England, and even threatened to dismantle the warship further. At this point George appealed to the Admiralty to send orders, as a number of ships waited with trade bound for London and the West Indies, but dared not leave due to several pirates hovering off the coast, reportedly with deserters from *Rose* on board providing intelligence on the situation in Boston.⁸⁷ George's letter enclosed a memorial from thirteen merchants, including Shrimpton, testifying to the loyalty of George and calling for his release. Any potential danger posed by *Rose* during the recent revolution had passed, they stated, but the coast and the trade required protection. The merchants reinforced their letter with suggestions that the Navigation Acts remained unenforced, and the ship's stores were in danger of being embezzled.

⁸⁵ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 217-18. The new council did investigate Small, issuing a warrant for his apprehension in July following accusations from George that he embezzled stores. Massachusetts Council Minutes, 6 July 1689, *Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts*, ed. Moody and Simmons, 125-26; Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 118-19, 128.

⁸⁶ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 218-19.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

George also attached a copy of a letter he had sent to the revolutionary government emphasizing the need to carry out his orders despite recent difficulties.⁸⁸ Into October 1689, nothing could persuade the government to return *Rose*'s sails, and even Randolph grew worried as reports of French raiders and privateers continued to flood into Boston.⁸⁹

George's report and supporting affidavits prompted action from London. A letter to the Massachusetts government from the King, dated 15 August 1689, supported the argument made by George and the merchants that the coasts lay insecure so long as *Rose* remained immobilized. Therefore, those entrusted with keeping the peace in Boston were ordered to return the sails and any other gear needed to outfit the warship.⁹⁰ The new council had not seemed to comprehend the seriousness of the recent outbreak of war with France, and had not yet accepted that George and the *Rose* could be trusted not to engage in counter-revolution.⁹¹ Only when the Massachusetts Council received correspondence directly from William III did they relent and release the sails.⁹² Once calm had been restored, the imperial protection of trade and Boston harbour was to be encouraged, especially now that war with France added to the ongoing frontier conflicts with the Abenaki. As merchants, men such as Samuel Shrimpton likely recognized the ramification of imprisoning a commissioned sea officer, and leaving the coasts unguarded

⁸⁸ Proposals of sundry merchants of Boston to the Revolutionary Government, respecting H.M.S. Rose, 12 June 1689, *CSPC* Vol. 13, no. 196 I; Captain George, R.N. to the Revolutionary Government at Boston, 12 June 1689, *CSPC* Vol. 13, no. 196 II.

⁸⁹ Randolph to Board of Trade, 15 Oct. and 25 Oct. 1689, *Randolph Papers* Vol. IV, 300, 304.

⁹⁰ William III to Massachusetts Council, 15 Aug. 1689, *Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts*, ed. Moody and Simmons, 176-77.

⁹¹ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 118-19, 128.

⁹² Convention of the Governor and Council, 4 Dec. 1689, *Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts*, ed. Moody and Simmons, 176-77. This was one of several letters from the Crown tactfully confirming the new government while requesting freedom for those imprisoned.

to pirates and the French.⁹³ Perhaps this is why George's stay at Shrimpton's house contrasted to the common jail where Randolph, Andros, and Dudley found themselves incarcerated.

George's lengthy report of his involvement in the revolution, even allowing for bravado, self promotion, or subterfuge, outlines the basic nature of sea service and the duty of navy officers to the state. The captain and crew of the *Rose* had no orders or reason to molest the general public, and would not do so unless attacked first. For all of George's posturing and defiance, the breakdown of authority in New England caused a subsequent breakdown in the integrity of the warship. With the captain incarcerated, the warship disabled, and limited information available about who was actually running the navy, the crew began to wander off. Any accusations of mutiny must be limited to Small and several others, whether as a political act, or the result of a personal grievance against George. Most of the straggling crew returned to the ship once some authority gave orders to so do.⁹⁴

George employed the multiple layers of authority over the captain and his warship to fend off attacks from the Council of Safety and the attempted usurpation of his command. Simultaneously, the captain argued that his commission came from the Crown and could only be voided by the Crown (regardless of who held it), but that his instructions came from the Admiralty, and they prevented interfering in domestic affairs without direct orders to do so. George further suggested that the colonial government had

⁹³ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 98.

⁹⁴ Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 226. This corresponds to assessments of discipline during the Georgian navy whereby the hold over sailors, especially in port, was tenuous at best. N.A.M. Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (London: Collins, 1988), 190, 237-38.

no civil or criminal jurisdiction over naval personnel, it being the prerogative of Parliament under the Articles of War.⁹⁵ In denying he had any authority over the ship while a prisoner, meanwhile, George absolved himself of any action taken by the ship while not under his command. This precluded him from issuing any orders detrimental to *Rose*'s integrity. Andros also used his status as a prisoner to absolve himself of responsibility for any decisions or actions taken during the efforts to force the surrender of the remaining pockets of resistance during the mob action.⁹⁶

While George battled to regain his sails and restore his ship, the Admiralty recalled *Rose* to England, issuing orders on 10 August 1689 requiring George to convoy two mast ships home from New Hampshire along with any other vessels desiring escort.⁹⁷ The next spring, *Rose* sailed for England from Piscataqua on 19 May 1690. On 24 May, the *Rose* met with a French warship of similar size, but greater complement, off Cape Sable. *Rose* put up a two-hour fight, often at close quarters, utilizing both cannon and small arms effectively despite heavy damage to sails and rigging. George was killed during the fight (as was his opposing captain), but *Rose* managed to escape.⁹⁸ Lieutenant Condon received immediate promotion, and, like his former captain, was killed in action while defending English coastal convoys as commander of the *Hart* in June 1692.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ George to Admiralty, 12 June 1689, *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 218.

⁹⁶ Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup*, 193. Webb suggests this to be a standard answer given by captured English prisoners.

⁹⁷ Admiralty, Orders to George, 10 Aug. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 2/4.

⁹⁸ Account of the fight between H.M.S. *Rose* and French man-of-war off Cape Sable, 24 May 1690 *CSPC* Vol. 13, no. 898; Bruce Lenman, *Britain's Colonial Wars, 1688-1783* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001), 22. Lenman describes the incident without identifying the ship as the *Rose*.

⁹⁹ David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo, *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (Aldershot: Scholar Press/Navy Records Society, 1994), 94; William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy* (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1898), 498; David J. Hepper, *British Warship Losses in the Age of Sail, 1650-1859* (Rotherfield: Jean Boudriot, 1994), 15.

George's misfortune of being killed immediately following the revolution facilitated his employment as Puritan propaganda fodder. Increase Mather accused George *post-mortem* of allowing the *Rose* to rot in harbour instead of protecting New England, venturing out only to load up with treasure from the raid on Saint-Castin, which Mather claimed started the war with the Abenaki. *Rose* only served to intimidate the town during the disturbances of 1689, especially while the crew were allowed to roam on shore. Mather continued his attack, claiming a condemned pirate confessed that *Rose* supplied his band with arms and ammunition. Mather accused Lieutenant Condon, meanwhile, of being a Catholic.¹⁰⁰ Other propagandists claimed George was ready to turn the *Rose* over to the French, while Edward Randolph predicted that those of the ship's crew who had been so mutinous during the revolt were ready to do the same again, or worse, after it had ended.¹⁰¹ Such one-sided views have usually been incorporated into assessments of George by later historians without the benefit of interpreting George's duty to navy and state beyond his duty to the Crown.¹⁰² Yet the presence of a warship in harbour could be physically intimidating to a local population, or as a symbol of Royal government, so despite the revolutionary rhetoric there were both practical and

¹⁰⁰ Mather, "A Vindication of New England" (1690), *Andros Tracts* Vol. II, 53-55.

¹⁰¹ Anonymous, An Account of the Late Revolutions in New England In a Letter, *Andros Tracts* Vol. II, 194-95; Petition of Jervas Coppindale, prisoner on board H.M.S. *Rose*, to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 25 Feb. 1689, *CSPC* Vol. 13, no. 774; Randolph to Major Brockholes, 28 Dec. 1689, *Randolph Papers* Vol. V, 27-28.

¹⁰² For example: *Narratives of the Insurrections*, ed. Andrews, 213-14; Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup*, 188-89. In particular, these sources employ allegations that George kept *Rose* in harbour and away from its duty, or stress the potential of George and *Rose* to act as tools of imperialism and counter-revolution. Andrews, at least, acknowledged that there may have been another side to George's saga, and given the way he carried himself and the way he died, accusations of cowardice appeared false. Webb, meanwhile, employs the various rumours to demonstrate the tension and drama surrounding the revolution, as well as the potential danger of England's martial resources in the colonies.

philosophical reasons for the revolutionaries to dismantle *Rose* while it was anchored in Boston Harbour.

5.3- Captain Robert Jackson and the *Swift*

In contrast to the *Rose*, the *Swift* sloop was not a station ship, but had arrived at Boston on 29 June 1702 to deliver advance warning of the impending hostilities against France. Eight days later, Captain Robert Jackson received returning dispatches, but decided that the sloop should be cleaned for the voyage to England. On 9 July, the hauling of *Swift* up to the dock gave ten men the opportunity to desert. Having a crew of only thirty-five, this was a major loss that Jackson needed to recoup. With Governor Dudley away at Piscataqua, Jackson appealed to Lieutenant Governor Thomas Povey for permission to press, but his requests seemed to go unnoticed. Meanwhile, information surfaced indicating that most of the deserters who were still in Boston awaited berths on merchant ships homeward bound. Jackson decided to press one sailor from each of the eight ships in harbour, along with a stray seaman identified as being run from the fifth-rate *Gosport* (Captain Henry Crofts), then on station at New England. Satisfied, Jackson began preparations to sail when, as he claimed, the merchant Samuel Lillie came on board and offered twenty guineas to release three of the impressed sailors. Jackson refused and continued to ease *Swift* out of Boston harbour, while Lillie sought out the Lieutenant Governor to lodge a complaint. Povey accompanied Lillie back to the *Swift*, along with the Reverend Christopher Bridge and Joachim Addis as witnesses. Povey ordered Jackson to release the impressed men, but was refused. Povey, who was attending the garrison at the time, returned there, and when *Swift* approached ordered the fort on Castle Island to fire a warning shot, after which *Swift* came to an anchor. The

lieutenant of the castle was sent to inform Jackson of the reason for the warning and retrieve the pressed men. Jackson denied him permission to come on board, and declined to hear any of Povey's orders. Reverend Bridge then took it upon himself to go out to *Swift* and reason with Jackson, who responded that if Povey would put his orders into writing he would obey them and release the impressed men.¹⁰³

Following the meeting, Jackson rowed out to a nearby island with a boat crew to survey the harbour and position of the tide. The boat with Povey's written orders followed Jackson, but it appears that its coxswain was rude or insolent to Jackson so the latter's response was to cuff the hapless messenger several times. Nevertheless, Jackson wrote back reminding Povey that while he recognized the power of the lieutenant governor's office, he held the power over the Queen's ship, and was responsible for anything that may happen as a result of it being undermanned. Jackson questioned Povey's authority to remove the impressed seamen, but gave his assurances he would not leave Boston until some compromise was reached. Povey then left for town, instructing the lieutenant at the castle not to let the sloop outside the harbour, and to use force if necessary.¹⁰⁴

The results of Jackson's survey suggested that the tide was now going out, and with adverse winds blowing it would soon expose the *Swift* to shallow water. Jackson called to the castle to state that they were merely moving further back up into the harbour, and began preparing a boat under command of the carpenter to confirm it in person. As

¹⁰³ This passage: Capt. Robert Jackson, *Swift*, to Admiralty, 17 July, 28 July and 28 Sept. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979; Jackson to Lt. Governor Thomas Povey, 14 July 1702, TNA PRO ADM CO 5/862, no. 121 xi; Memorial of Thomas Povey, 20 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862 no. 121 ii; Deposition of Samuel Lillie, Christopher Bridge and Joachim Addis, 14 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, no. 121 viii.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

the boat was being launched, the job of raising the anchor had begun. The castle guard took the action as an escape attempt, and fired two shots in rapid succession. The first hit the *Swift*'s main brace while the second struck the capstan, killing one crew member and wounding four others. The sloop dropped anchor again, and a furious Captain Jackson went ashore to seek out Povey, calling him a murderer, uttering threats, and rebuffing all attempts to calm the situation. Povey then removed Jackson from command, imprisoned him, and began collecting evidence to send to the Board of Trade. According to the crew of the *Swift*, they approached the authorities to give testimony, but were refused a hearing. Captain Thomas Herne in the fourth-rate *Centurion* (in Boston for repairs), Captain Wentworth Paxton (formerly of the sixth-rate *Newport*, now a Boston resident), and several merchants together appealed for Jackson's release, but to no avail. The *Swift* was eventually sent home without its captain, who remained in prison for the next five weeks until released by Governor Dudley upon his return from New Hampshire.¹⁰⁵

In his capacity as lieutenant governor, it was Povey's duty to respond to complaints from local merchants, who needed to ensure a sufficient supply of labour to sail the all-important trade bound for England.¹⁰⁶ But the reasons for the extreme actions undertaken against the *Swift* can be related to Povey's tenuous position at Boston. The lieutenant governor was a good example of a placeman from England attempting to exploit New England's reintegration into the imperial fold. Povey was a former soldier with eight years experience in Flanders, and a cousin of William Blathwayt, at the time

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Povey to Board of Trade, 20 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, no. 121.

secretary to the Board of Trade.¹⁰⁷ In fact, Povey had only been in Boston since 11 June 1702. The merchant and diarist Samuel Sewall found himself “startled” by Povey’s arrival, he being a stranger of whom nothing had been heard.¹⁰⁸ The Massachusetts Council refused Povey any resources or salary other than as captain of the fort at Castle Island, with the proviso that he reside there three days a week.¹⁰⁹ So Povey, in fact, brought all the power he possibly could against Jackson. Unfortunately in the process, this led to the death of James Coupertwite, who, ironically, was identified as one of the men recently impressed by Jackson and a servant of merchant master Nathaniel Viall, who testified in support of Povey’s version of events.¹¹⁰

The large body of evidence sent to the Board of Trade in support of Povey centred on the illegal impressment, and the disrespectful and truculent behaviour of the enraged captain. Povey included testimony from Samuel Sewall and Andrew Belcher, each stating that Jackson’s violent outburst following the damage to his ship and the death of his crewman were among the worst they had ever seen.¹¹¹ Not only had Jackson resorted to the press without permission, it was testified he left some ships “unmanned” in the process, including the ship *Union* in which John Gullison was the cook. According to Gullison, Jackson impetuously removed him before he could put out the fire in his stove. Being the only person on board at the time, Gullison claimed that the ship would have

¹⁰⁷ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 330; Steven S. Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 492.

¹⁰⁸ Sewall, “*Diary*,” 11 June 1702, Vol. II, 58.

¹⁰⁹ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 397.

¹¹⁰ Deposition of Nathaniel Viall, William Thwing and Thomas Hals, 17 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, no. 121 xvi. James Coupertwite’s name is mentioned only once within the correspondence and even then placed in the margin.

¹¹¹ Deposition of Samuel Sewall and Andrew Belcher, 18 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862 no. 121 xviii.

been set alight had not another crewman, William Best, returned and extinguished the coals.¹¹²

When the Admiralty received word of the incident, it decided that the matter warranted inquiry, especially as Jackson claimed to be blocked out of the legal system in Boston and desired exoneration in England.¹¹³ At Jackson's court martial, witnesses received specific interrogation regarding whether the danger posed by the receding tide was as reported, and whether it would have been possible for the sloop to leave harbour once the tide had ebbed. These questions were answered affirmative and negative respectively. As for the issue of impressment, the court queried witnesses as to whether the men taken by Jackson had impeded the ability of the merchant ships to complete their voyages, which was answered in the negative.¹¹⁴ That Jackson had impressed illegally was not discussed, despite standing instructions that no impressments could be carried out within the colonies. Any captain desiring replacement sailors was to submit a written request to the governor's office, which was obliged to do its best to procure sailors.¹¹⁵ Jackson did confess that he had no written permission to impress, which was the closest the captain came to admitting that he had done anything wrong. The court martial cleared him, not so much of illegal impressment, but that he did not perform any act that was outside the boundaries set by Articles of War, and the judging officers suggested that he had already suffered considerable hardship from the affair.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Jackson to Admiralty, 17 July 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Court Martial of Robert Jackson, 24 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/5262.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.; Admiralty to Bellomont, 7 June 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24; Power of Impressing Seamen, *Royal Instructions*, ed. Labaree, no. 635.

¹¹⁶ Court Martial of Robert Jackson, 24 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/5264.

The most interesting testimony from the whole ordeal came from Edward Storey, the only secondary party to give evidence directly to the Povey portfolio and the Jackson court martial. Storey had been a mate on board the *Gosport* when news of his father's death prompted his request for a discharge to return to England to settle the estate. While signed on as a mate of the *Samuel* (Edward Lillie, master) in order to sail home, Storey testified that Jackson and his boat crew visited him at his lodgings in the house of Sarah Lambert, and whisked him away to the *Swift*, where he stayed until released by Lieutenant Governor Povey.¹¹⁷ Storey further testified that he was at the helm when the first shot was fired at the *Swift*. The sloop dropped anchor and remained for two hours, then weighed and prepared to sail with Jackson paying little regard to the castle. When the second shot rang out, Jackson reportedly swore at those in castle and encouraged them to fire at the great cabin as he would be in it drinking with friends. With mass confusion on board the *Swift* following the third shot, it was only through the unilateral action of Storey (as he testified) that the anchor cable was released, causing the ship to come to a stop once more.¹¹⁸

Storey's dramatic account differs somewhat from the testimony offered to the court martial. Storey reported that he had been pressed out of the *Samuel* and was the only member of the crew so done, despite there being two deserted crewmen from the *Swift* also signed on. Storey further testified that Jackson had informed the castle of the dangers of leaving the ship where it was anchored, and that the ship was only being moved to a safer venue. When asked about the tides, Storey replied that after the elapsed

¹¹⁷ Affidavit of Edward Storey, 29 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, 121 xix; Affidavit of Sarah Lambert, 29 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, no. 121 ii.

¹¹⁸ Affidavit of Edward Storey, 29 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, 121 xix.

time at anchor, the tide had waned, but he could not remember the direction of the wind.¹¹⁹

The selective memory of Edward Storey can be expected from someone in the act of self-preservation and/or appeasement of superiors, but the fact that the testimony for each instance differs so much in tone speaks to the case Povey needed to present to the Board of Trade. Downplayed was the possibility that Jackson was indeed only moving the sloop to a safer anchorage and not attempting to flee the harbour. Not directly mentioned by any of Povey's deponents was the possibility that Jackson did attempt to notify the castle about his movements. Povey made sure to mention the power within Dudley's instructions over maritime concerns, as well as the illegality of arbitrary impressment in the colonies. Povey at several junctures reminded the Board of Trade of Jackson's refusal to turn over the impressed men issued under written order.¹²⁰ Up to that point, Povey probably realized that nothing, including the authorization for firing the first shot at *Swift*, had been preserved in writing, and the order to release the sailors remained the only direct evidence that he had followed proper procedure. Povey, Lillie, Bridge, and Addis testified that Jackson did not consider the lieutenant governor to have any authority to request the release of the pressed men, but Jackson testified to the Admiralty that Povey appeared with no "warrantable order."¹²¹ According to gubernatorial instructions, refusing a written order was the only pretence by which a naval captain

¹¹⁹ Testimony of Edward Storey, Court Martial of Robert Jackson, 24 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/5264.

¹²⁰ Povey to Board of Trade, 20 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862 no. 121; Memorial of Povey, 20 July 1702, TNA PRO CO 5/862, no. 121i-ii.

¹²¹ Deposition of Lillie, Bridge and Addis, 14 July 1702, CO 5/862, no. 121 viii; Jackson to Admiralty, 28 July 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979.

could be removed from command.¹²² In the interest of consolidating his new, and apparently fragile, position by appeasing the merchant class in Boston, Povey had sanctioned the firing on a warship, resulting in the killing of an impressed sailor, without himself necessarily following the proper channels. Thus, demonstrating Jackson to be violent and irrational was crucial to Povey's argument that he was acting within his jurisdiction for the protection of trade and the Queen's subjects.

Although found not guilty of any wrongdoing at the court martial, Robert Jackson still had to fight the Admiralty and Navy Board for his pay. As Povey had confiscated *Swift's* papers, and did not authorize a survey of stores and provisions before sending *Swift* home, there was no way for Jackson to clear his accounts. Jackson sought redress and the Admiralty agreed to pay wages until the time he was incarcerated, which Jackson then complained only allowed him to cover his costs during the period he awaited his court martial and the two weeks at Deal during the trial for himself and his witnesses.¹²³ It is currently not known if subsequent pleas for recompense for his hardship were granted by the Admiralty. Throughout December of 1702, Jackson lobbied for any further employment, even offering to take command of a fireship and volunteering for service to the West Indies, before being given command of a brigantine in January of 1703.¹²⁴ Jackson made post-captain in 1706, was dismissed from the service in 1715, and died in 1725.¹²⁵

¹²² Privy Council, Instructions to Dudley, 25 June 1701, TNA PRO Privy Council (PC) 5/2, 100; Governor's Authority over Officers of Navy, *Royal Instructions*, ed. Labaree, no. 636.

¹²³ Jackson to Admiralty, 1 Dec., 10 Dec. and 11 Dec. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979.

¹²⁴ Jackson to Admiralty, 16 Dec. 1702 and 8 Jan. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979.

¹²⁵ Syrett and DiNardo, *Commissioned Sea Officers*, 240.

For all his compiling of memorials and depositions, Lieutenant Governor Povey did not receive any reward for his reactionary upholding of the Crown's pleasure. By 1706, Povey had been thoroughly rebuffed in his attempts to earn status and fortune in New England and left there, never to return.¹²⁶ Despite his overall lack of power and influence, Povey had utilized his authority as captain of the castle to imprison Jackson with relative ease. Jackson's incarceration reflected the general powerlessness of sea officers when not on board ship. Officers did not expect the base treatment from authorities received by Jackson, and ignorant that they had committed any infraction, or expecting only to discuss the matters at hand, often walked innocently to their fates. Certainly arrogance and temperamental outbursts factored into the equations, but in contrast to Jackson, the conflicts faced by Thomas Smart proved taxing, and tried the captain's patience, but the tenor of Smart's communication suggests he attempted to convince the Admiralty, at least, of his professional behaviour throughout.

5.4- Captain Thomas Smart and the *Squirrel*

Thomas Smart in the sixth-rate *Squirrel* received his instructions for New England on 11 April 1717, arrived at Boston on 23 June, and departed for England on 19 January 1720.¹²⁷ Upon arrival, Governor Samuel Shute immediately employed *Squirrel* on a diplomatic mission up the Kennebec River to the island of Arrowsic, in Maine. Shute secured transportation in *Squirrel* for his negotiation team, and intended to employ the frigate as a demonstration of imperial power to the delegations from the Wabanaki

¹²⁶ Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 397-98; Webb, *Governors-General*, 492. According to Webb, Povey served as Lieutenant Governor from 1702 to 1711.

¹²⁷ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Thomas Smart, *Squirrel*, 11 Apr. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49; Smart to Admiralty, 28 July 1717 and 9 Mar. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2451.

Confederacy assembled along the river. Against the advice of both Smart and provincial sea captain and pilot Cyprian Southack, Shute desired *Squirrel* to be brought up river closer to the meeting place. The strong current forced *Squirrel* onto the shore, requiring some effort by the crew to free the ship. While unfortunate, the accident was not serious, and Smart later assured the Admiralty that the damage had been slight and easily repaired.¹²⁸

While Smart may not have been bothered unduly by the incident, to Shute the *Squirrel*'s grounding became a diplomatic disaster as his intended regal entrance had now proven to be an embarrassment. Shute believed that the Wabanaki delegates who witnessed the grounding politely mocked his misfortune and used it to set the tone of the discussions, thereby gaining a negotiating advantage.¹²⁹ Whether or not Shute harboured any anger towards Smart at that point, the debacle was a harbinger of future relations between captain and governor, and it did exemplify the character of the governor's administration. Shute desperately wanted to negotiate a declaration of submission to the British government by the Wabanaki delegates in order to accommodate Massachusetts expansion into the Maine region.¹³⁰ Furthermore, Shute soon had to turn his attention to diplomatic issues with the French empire over jurisdiction of the islands surrounding Cape Canso and the New England summer fishery there.¹³¹ Locally, Shute faced the

¹²⁸ Smart to Admiralty, 4 Nov. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 1/2451; John G. Reid, "The Sakamow's Discourtesy and the Governor's Anger: Negotiated Imperialism and the Arrowsic Conference, 1717," in *Essays on Northeastern North America, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 153-55.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Reid, "Sakamow's Discourtesy," 154-55, 165-66.

¹³¹ Donald F. Chard, "Canso, 1710-1721: Focal Point of New England-Cape Breton Rivalry," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 39 (1977), 64-71. Smart's actions and the subsequent correspondence between Shute and Louisbourg touched off a boundary dispute, which Chard covers in detail.

same problems as his predecessors in courting and placating local interests, and securing sufficient funds out of the assembly. Massachusetts governors faced gruelling struggles to elicit money from the colonial assembly, and Shute fought a long and hard campaign for a regular salary.¹³² *Squirrel* and Smart began their tenure at New England as instruments for the governor to use in completing some of his policy objectives, but the warship and its captain soon became yet another problem.

The dispute between Shute and Smart began with the dispatch of *Squirrel* to fisheries protection duty off Canso in the summer and fall of 1718. Shute empowered Smart and Cyprian Southack to discuss the matter of French interloping with the governor at Louisbourg, Joseph Monbeton de Brouillan, *dit* Saint-Ovide. No agreement could be reached regarding the presence of French fishing vessels and shore facilities in the surrounding islands near Canso, as each side interpreted differently the boundaries established within the Treaty of Utrecht.¹³³ In the end, negotiations did not result in the removal of those French vessels and facilities already at Canso while *Squirrel* attended there. Following the failed negotiations, Smart took as prize two French vessels for illegal fishing contrary to the fifth and sixth articles of the 1686 Treaty of Neutrality in America, which captains received instructions to observe following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.¹³⁴

Squirrel arrived back at Boston from Canso on 5 October 1718. As captor, Smart had the prizes condemned immediately in the local court of Vice Admiralty. Shute

¹³² William Pencak, "Shute, Samuel (1662–1742)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25488>; Bushman, *King and People*, 111–14.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452; Admiralty, General Instructions Regarding the Treaty of Neutrality with France, 25 Aug. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 2/47.

suddenly vetoed the court's verdict, and sent the Vice Admiralty marshal to confiscate the prizes. Shute argued that the captures had been made while the *Squirrel* was under the orders of governor and council, and therefore belonged to the province, which could secure them better.¹³⁵ Shute's legal justification for doing so lay within his gubernatorial instructions requiring him to assist in squelching piracy and illegal trade, and granting him the power to dispose of confiscated pirate goods.¹³⁶ Smart collected the supporting paperwork and sent it to the Admiralty with the hope of redress for himself and his crew "in consideration of the great fatigue and trouble this piece of service has cost us."¹³⁷

By the middle of November, Smart added to his grievances, outlining how Shute had freed a Frenchman, named Lalonde, on 29 October 1718. At the request of Boston merchants trading at Canso, Smart had arrested Lalonde for piracy and illegal trading. Despite this, Shute permitted Lalonde to lodge a complaint regarding lost goods, and then provided him with a pass so he could make his escape from Boston back to Canso. This, Smart argued, ran counter to the desires of the Boston merchants, who insisted Lalonde be held accountable for his alleged crimes. The merchants feared that Lalonde had been inciting the local Mi'kmaq towards violence against them, and asked Smart to represent this to the Admiralty, given the quality and importance of the fishery, and the great necessity of its continued protection.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹³⁶ England, An Act for the More Effectual Suppressions of Piracy, 11 Gul. III c. 7 (1698), *The Statutes of the Realm* (London: George Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1810-1828, 11 vols.), Vol. 7, 590-94; *Royal Instructions*, ed. Labaree, no. 647, 649; Privy Council, Instructions to Gov. Samuel Shute, TNA PRO PC 5/4, 562-63.

¹³⁷ Smart to Admiralty, 22 Oct. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹³⁸ Smart to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452. This letter is located in the dossier of Cyprian Southack within the same volume.

Smart concurred with the merchants that Canso required due imperial attention as he felt that the French had established good relations with all Aboriginal nations from Cape Breton through to those along the Mississippi River. The weak public administration in New England, Smart argued further, bred an “unaccountable aversion to the exercise of any power or commission from the King.” The increase of corruption “spread to every part of the constitution” and if war should break out, it would be no trouble for the French to recapture Nova Scotia unless effective British settlement patterns in the area established a buffer. People in Massachusetts, Smart continued, further compromised security by trading with the French, and thus risked everything rather than receive help from Great Britain and gain all.¹³⁹

Smart complained to the Admiralty that he could overlook the attempts of Shute to argue that his gubernatorial instructions took precedence over those of the Admiralty, but he could not overlook a “surprising instance of his inveterate malice against me and his disrespect to the King’s Service that can only be parallel in the annals of his predecessors. I mean the Governor of this Independent Country.” Smart referred to his visitation at the house of a local gentleman in the aftermath of Shute’s seizing his prizes.¹⁴⁰ The Governor’s secretary then arrived, exhibiting rude and threatening behaviour towards Smart, who left the home to avoid disturbing his hosts. The next morning, Smart called on the secretary to determine the reason for his outbursts. Smart alleged the secretary attempted to assault him and he responded, causing the man to

¹³⁹ Smart to Admiralty, 28 Jan. 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Smart did not give the exact date of the visit.

retreat “... with no greater mischief than a slight wound in his arm.”¹⁴¹ At that time, the judges of the Massachusetts Superior Court had been assembled at the bench, and they sent for Smart via private messenger the next day. Without warning or due process, Smart claimed, they ordered the sheriff to take him into custody, where he was held in the jailhouse for twenty-four hours, and presented with a ten-pound fine to the King.¹⁴²

The Admiralty supported Smart and appealed to the Lords Justices to draft a letter of reprimand to Shute and encouraged him to take notice of this and such other irregular behaviour committed in relation to the maritime service of New England.¹⁴³ The Lords Justices responded positively and sent Shute a letter requesting that he submit documentation to justify his actions, as the treatment of Smart appeared out of the ordinary.¹⁴⁴

Governor Shute continued to persecute Smart, this time by detaining *Squirrel* in harbour by refusing to grant Smart his sailing orders. On 30 March and 13 April 1719, Smart wrote to Shute explaining that he had received correspondence from Captain Vincent Pearse in the sixth-rate *Phoenix* at New York, containing intelligence warning of Spanish forces and/or pirates approaching from the south. The Admiralty had ordered both captains to join forces in order to confront pirates should they threaten the colony of either station.¹⁴⁵ Smart sought permission to link up with Pearse, but Shute denied the request to go to New York for three reasons: first, *Squirrel* was needed to combat pirates

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Admiralty to Lords Justices of England, 13 June 1719, TNA PRO CO 5/867, no. 251i.

¹⁴⁴ Lords Justices to Shute, 19 June 1719, TNA PRO CO 324/33, 233. It is uncertain at present if Shute responded to the request regarding Smart’s incarceration.

¹⁴⁵ Smart to Shute, 16 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 1/ 2452; Admiralty, Instructions to Smart and Capt. Vincent Pearse, *Phoenix*, 11 Apr. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

from Jamaica expected in local waters in the spring; second, an urgent letter had been received from Annapolis Royal requesting *Squirrel* be dispatched for fisheries protection at Canso; third, the governor expected orders to arrive soon with regard to the *Squirrel*'s deployment. Shute then presented Smart with no written instructions at all, and left *Squirrel* sitting in harbour throughout the spring. In mid-June, Smart finally protested that Shute's explanations for not joining *Phoenix* might have been valid three months ago, but *Squirrel* had not received the necessary orders from the governor to engage in any of the outlined assignments.¹⁴⁶

On 16 June, Smart wrote to Shute, summarizing his orders from the Admiralty, and confirming that Shute's actions had been within the tenor of both their general instructions. Smart then argued that this still did not justify Shute leaving *Squirrel* to sit for several months in harbour attending to none of the duties at hand.¹⁴⁷ Smart unilaterally decided that Shute's inaction voided the deference to gubernatorial direction within his instructions, and he informed the Admiralty that he would take *Squirrel* out to cruise, regardless of Shute's wishes.¹⁴⁸ *Squirrel* left Boston harbour on 1 July 1719, and spent until 5 August patrolling the fishing banks off Cape Sable and LaHave before returning to Boston on the 12th.¹⁴⁹

The reason for Shute employing a strategy of inactivity is unclear, although a possible explanation is that with regard to the matter at hand, it gave the appearance that Smart did not follow his instructions to ensure the safety of New England. As warships

¹⁴⁶ Smart to Shute, 16 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Smart to Admiralty, 30 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁴⁹ Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 1 July-12 Aug. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 51/926.

could take considerable time to refit and repair, combining this with a lack of sailing orders could give the impression of lingering. *Squirrel*, for example, arrived at Boston from its cruise to Canso on 5 October 1718. Receiving no orders to go to the West Indies, Smart laid *Squirrel* up at the wharf for the winter on 8 December 1718. Thereafter, *Squirrel* did not leave harbour for nearly nine months.¹⁵⁰ Eventually, complaints of captains loitering in harbour accumulated to the point where the Admiralty issued instructions against such behaviour in 1728.¹⁵¹ John George and (as discussed in the previous chapter) James Cornwall both faced accusations of remaining in harbour for an inordinate amount of time.¹⁵² The fear of repercussions for not carrying out his Admiralty instructions to protect New England would have motivated Smart, and he may have decided to fight Shute by employing one section of his instructions to trump another. In sailing without proper written permission, Smart's self-referential letter would have to provide the necessary written evidence to the Admiralty.

Like Smart, but twenty-six years earlier, Robert Fairfax in the fifth-rate *Conception Prize* had faced a similar obstructionist tactic from Governor Sir William Phips. In the upheaval following Phips' conflict with Richard Short early in 1693, Fairfax protested Short's treatment, but did nothing outside of his or the governor's instructions to incur similar deposing or imprisonment. Phips held *Conception Prize* in harbour while he attended to the deteriorating situation regarding his administration, and ignored requests from Fairfax to issue a warrant for survey, as the ship needed repair. Eventually, Fairfax brought carpenters on board without proper permission, and only

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 5 Oct. 1718-1 July 1719.

¹⁵¹ Admiralty, General Instructions Against Lying in Port, 13 Dec. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

¹⁵² Lieut. Governor William Dummer to Admiralty, 8 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

instructions from the Treasury Office to the government of New England obliged Phips to issue the necessary warrant.¹⁵³ Phips continued to stall the captain by refusing to issue Fairfax with any sailing orders after the completion of repairs to *Conception Prize*. Fairfax twice waited on Phips personally, and cited reports of pirates off Boston, but the governor would not issue any written permission for *Conception Prize* to sail. Phips finally relented and instructed Fairfax to prepare for sea on 17 May 1693, only to change his mind again four days later. This situation continued until June, and ended only with the arrival at Boston of the squadron commanded by Admiral Sir Francis Wheler.¹⁵⁴ Wheler's unfortunate squadron had lost many officers to disease and on 22 June, Wheler appointed Fairfax to command the fourth-rate *Ruby* home to England following the death of its commander.¹⁵⁵ Thus, a higher authority permitted Fairfax to escape from Phips and New England.

Without an admiral to save him in 1719, Smart weathered Shute's policy of obstruction, and *Squirrel*'s routine returned to normal following his unilateral decision to cruise. Smart received instructions to shuttle the new governor of Nova Scotia, Richard Phillips, from Boston to Nova Scotia before going convoy to the West Indies. By 4 November, however, the advancing winter weather prevented *Squirrel* from taking Phillips any further than Casco Bay. Being unable make Annapolis Royal, nor return safely to Boston, Smart decided to carry out the task of convoying the trading fleet to

¹⁵³ Fairfax to Admiralty, 1 Mar. 1693, TNA PRO CO 5/857.

¹⁵⁴ Captain's Log, *Conception Prize*, 14 Apr. and 17 May-18 June 1693, TNA PRO ADM 51/3796.

¹⁵⁵ Warrant of Rear Admiral Francis Wheler to Robert Fairfax, 22 June 1693, United Kingdom, National Maritime Museum, Fairfax Papers, MS 81/116 (D.6).

Barbados and Salt Tortuga, and steered south on 5 January 1720.¹⁵⁶ *Squirrel* arrived at Carlisle Bay on 28 January, where Smart met with Orders in Council granting him and his crew final possession of the two prizes captured at Canso.¹⁵⁷

It did not take long for a new opportunity to present itself while at Barbados. Smart and Captain Thomas Whorwood in the sixth-rate *Rye* received intelligence from several merchants in Bridgetown that a suspected pirate had been sighted off shore. On 5 February 1720, Smart and Whorwood sent their lieutenants with boat crews to investigate. The vessel proved to be the merchant ship *Pearl*, which had been captured by pirates, rechristened the *Royal James*, and recently employed by the pirate captain Edward England. Found on board were numerous goods captured by the pirates and twelve African slaves from the Guinea Coast. The boat crews took the ship prize, put the pirates in irons, established a prize crew, and brought it into harbour.¹⁵⁸

On 13 February, Governor Robert Lowther of Barbados summoned Whorwood and ordered that the ship be turned over to the government, claiming the capture had been made within his jurisdiction, but without his authority. Whorwood replied that his commission gave him the power to make such seizures, and he would maintain possession of the prize until condemned in the court of Vice Admiralty.¹⁵⁹ Lowther then

¹⁵⁶ Smart to Admiralty, 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452; Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 29 Nov. 1719- 5 Jan. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 51/926.

¹⁵⁷ Smart to Admiralty, 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452. In a post-script to the capture, a petition of restitution from Johannis de Hiriberry, a French merchant who suffered heavy losses resulting from Smart's capture, was granted for the sum of £800. But it is not clear if he collected or if the government held Smart responsible for any of the payment. Chard, "Canso, 1710-21," 69-70.

¹⁵⁸ Capt. Thomas Whorwood, *Rye*, to Admiralty, 7 Mar. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2649; Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 5 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 51/926; Smart to Admiralty, 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452.

¹⁵⁹ Whorwood to Admiralty, 7 Mar. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2629. Admiralty, Instructions to Whorwood, 5 June 1719, TNA PRO ADM 2/50.

imprisoned Whorwood and sent his Provost Marshal to seek out and apprehend Smart, who was taken by surprise while onshore in discussions with local tradesmen over the ongoing refit of *Squirrel*. Smart spent an hour in confinement arguing with the Provost Marshal over the legality of his capture. Smart demanded to see the warrant for his arrest, insisting his imprisonment was unlawful without one. The marshal retorted that the governor's verbal instructions could permit imprisonment for up to twelve hours. Maintaining the illegality of his confinement, Smart managed to escape and make his way back to the safety of his ship. Two days later *Squirrel* sailed with a convoy of seventy ships for Salt Tortuga and New England, including the prize. Whorwood remained in custody when Smart sailed, but he too eventually escaped back to his own ship, and departed with a convoy to his original station of Virginia.¹⁶⁰

Although there is no direct evidence that Smart's first incarceration was related to prizes, the fact that the confrontation involved Shute's secretary in the midst of an atmosphere of tension may allow for the inference of a relationship. If so, Smart had the misfortune of being incarcerated twice over conflicts stemming from the ownership of prizes. If not, the prizes still lay at the heart of Smart and Shute's conflict, and this highlights the importance of even small captures for the pocketbooks and prestige of colonial officials operating within the British Atlantic. Regardless of the reasons, Smart carefully framed his complaints regarding illegal trading at Cape Breton within geopolitical and imperial terms, and not merely as a personal loss, or as an affront from the governor. Smart took pains within his correspondence to the Admiralty to point out

¹⁶⁰ Whorwood to Admiralty, 7 Mar. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2649; Smart to Admiralty, 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 1/2452; Captain's Log, *Squirrel*, 15 Feb. 1720, TNA PRO ADM 51/926.

his readiness to do his duty in carrying out his instructions, and protecting all trade and British subjects, whatever his opinion of Shute or the New England government. By sailing without written permission, Smart was not disobeying the governor, but upholding his instructions from the Admiralty to protect trade and defend against pirates. The imperial machinery responded in kind, and although international diplomacy dictated that the British government concede partial responsibility for restitution, Smart kept the prizes and received no reprimand from the Admiralty for his actions. Unfortunately for Smart, it also did not result in continuous peacetime employment as he did not receive another commission upon his return to England in 1720, and found himself applying for employment in 1726, reminding the Admiralty of his diligent service in protecting the fishery at Canso, and of his misfortune at Barbados.¹⁶¹

5.5- Conclusion

Despite the establishment of a routine for New England station ships at the end of the Nine Years' War, the method of turning partial operational control of warships over to colonial governors to ensure continuity in the structure of command worked in general terms, but the gaps in the instructions given to both captain and governors guaranteed that some confusion and conflict would result. John George illustrates the extreme example of what could happen during the failure of the entire political regime. George, nevertheless, was able to employ the various orders and instructions, commissions, warrants, and the Articles of War received by navy personnel to reinforce allegiance to the Crown and Parliament, but not necessarily any individual monarch. In this sense,

¹⁶¹ Smart to Admiralty, 1 Feb. and 13 Apr. 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453. Secretary Burchett assured Smart that while no more ships were being fitted out, he would pass his name along to the Lords of the Admiralty.

George played off the decentralized nature of his commission and instructions against one another, and this assisted in his resisting the revolutionary government while maintaining loyalty to the state, a tactic common among sailors during the Revolution of 1688.¹⁶²

The tribulations of Robert Jackson outline how a seemingly trivial event could end in death and conflict between two men on a scale usually unexpected for persons on the periphery of their respective professions. Neither Jackson nor Thomas Povey could be argued as being important actors, but their loose interpretation of those rules established to ensure harmony in the Atlantic World led to hardship for both captain and lieutenant governor as, in the end, neither party could successfully advance their personal interest. The court martial exonerated Jackson, but in denying him his pay for being unable to produce his completed accounts, it leads to the conclusion that if he had not illegally pressed, he would have kept his books and received all of his pay. If the Admiralty consciously punished Jackson, however, it did so in a manner that upheld the rules of the navy, but still retained Jackson for any future service. Finally, although Thomas Smart had the misfortune to be imprisoned twice during the same overseas assignment, he at least tried to control his indignation at Shute's conduct and the fact that ultimately he suffered because of the wider diplomatic context. Although Smart chafed at his treatment, he paid the fine levied against him as he did, after all, assault the governor's secretary, thereby accepting the rule of law (and ensuring his subsequent release). Nevertheless Smart, like George but unlike Jackson, successfully employed his instructions to defy Shute's irrational actions in refusing to issue sailing orders by sailing unilaterally to protect the fisheries. In Barbados, however, Smart judged his confinement

¹⁶² Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins*, 127-30.

to be unlawful, and within a jurisdiction that he felt had no operational authority over him, and so escaped at first opportunity. The fluid behaviour of George and Smart contrasts, not only with Jackson, but also with that, for example, of the temperamental Captain Thomas Mathews who, as further detailed in the following chapter, refused to compromise regarding the supplying of his ship.

As in Newfoundland, captains on the New England station exploited opportunity and attempted to entrench their position as nascent professionals, but unlike Newfoundland, they encountered determined colonial governors attempting to do the same. Sometimes captains and governors competed for the same resources, such as prizes. Given the lack of physical power retained by the governor's office, the warship itself could face exploitation as another resource; in these cases the colonial officials used the navy to capture prizes, and then tried to shut-out the crews from receiving reward.

The three cases discussed in detail within this chapter do reflect unusual circumstances, and because of this have been well-preserved in the documentary evidence. They are, however, still useful for illustrating a variety of scenarios outlining the relationship between sea officer and governor/government. Even within the extreme examples cited here, the degree of violence, death, and destruction remained slight, and apparently not serious enough to warrant a general overhauling of the station ship system. As argued in the next chapter, the Admiralty made greater attempts to bring conformity to its Atlantic deployment with the procurement of supplies by captains while abroad. The need to tap into local resources for victuals and stores brought the navy as close to the merchant community in Boston as the need to transfer operational control did to the local government. The generally lower profile of resupply was, however, not reflected in the

level of additions to the orders and instructions given to captains in the decades prior to the War of Jenkins' Ear.

Chapter 6: Captains, Boston, and the Problem of Atlantic Colonial Resupply 1674-1739

Although the Admiralty used its orders and instructions to control its detached warships while overseas and keep them separated from colonial affairs as much as possible without compromising their duty to ensure the safety of trade and colonies, the need to refit, repair, and resupply warships on “foreign” stations necessitated direct contact with transatlantic merchant networks and economies.¹ The acquisition of victuals and stores brought the navy as close to the merchant community in Boston as did the need to transfer operational control to the local government. Indeed, the importance accorded to this aspect of deployment was reflected in the number of additions to the orders and instructions issued to captains. As with the Admiralty directives regarding obedience, those related to resupply also evolved during the period 1660-1739, especially following the War of the Spanish Succession. Unfortunately for captains, they faced greater scrutiny over supply issues than with those of operational command, because some sections of the naval corporation continued to be suspicious of captains’ motives, and they used the resupply procedures to add another layer of regulation.

This chapter focuses on the problems encountered by captains attempting to keep their ships supplied according to Admiralty instructions while abroad. It primarily employs examples from New England, but bases the discussion on some general observations regarding overseas victualling. Until the navy developed its own repair and

¹ Douglas Hamilton, “Private Enterprise and Public Service: Naval Contracting in the Caribbean, 1720-50,” *Journal for Maritime Research* 4 no. 1 (2004), 37.

resupply facilities in the colonies, it left its captains responsible for such functions.²

When required to procure goods and services from colonial merchants, captains could face high prices and fluctuating availability. Resupply ultimately affected the ability of the captain to do his job because, in addition to the consequence of failure, it added another dimension to the interaction between captains, colonies, and the navy over control of the warship.

Nearly every captain on the New England station had some difficulty keeping his ship supplied and maintained, whether it pertained to food, ordnance stores, naval stores, labour, or repair. Four captains who encountered particular difficulties at Boston (and thus left a rich record), Thomas Mathews, Thomas Durell, James Cornewall and John St. Lo, have their cases discussed in detail below. These cases illustrate not only the extent to which things could go wrong, but also the competition for scarce resources, another factor that forced captains to negotiate their position within the Atlantic empire.

This chapter will also provide some observations on manning while in North America. This second topic should be a separate study, but it must be discussed in at least a cursory fashion because keeping a ship furnished with men became as daunting a task (if not more) as keeping the ship topped-up with victuals and naval stores. The basis for Robert Jackson's (1702) and James Cornewall's (1725-26) confrontations with the government at Boston, as discussed previously, stemmed from manning issues. Some captains felt constrained by their inability to procure men by normal means as the desertion and attrition levels in America compromised their ability to carry out their

² Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 391-92.

instructions. Notwithstanding those captains who may have engaged in fraud outright, most attempted to conform to all of their instructions, including those related to manning.

6.1- The Problem of Supply

The task of supplying, servicing, and victualling the navy presented a challenge unprecedented in other sectors of English society given the size and daily requirements of a public institution that employed some 30,000-50,000 persons. To complicate matters further, this institution spread out over the globe, and frequently operated under hurried conditions during times of war.³ Before the middle of the eighteenth century, the navy lacked proper facilities overseas, and the methods it developed for resupplying warships while in the colonies faced certain limitations and betrayed some administrative shortcomings. When these factors combined with the distance and the vagaries of ocean travel they further reduced the certainty of supply lines.⁴

By the Nine Years' War, the navy generally fitted out its warships with provisions for eight months when travelling to North America. Eight months' continued to be the standard allotment of victuals until 1730, when the Admiralty reduced the amount to six months' with voyages to Newfoundland remaining at eight.⁵ This kept warships on

³ John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its State and Direction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 144; *The Sergison Papers*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: The Navy Records Society, 1950), 235; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 386-90.

⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (New York, W.W. Norton, 2005), 305-07; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 344-47. Baugh identifies the construction of a careening wharf to clean ships' hulls as the first stage in the establishment of an overseas base. During the war years 1739-48, no permanent facilities established by the navy existed for cleaning outside Jamaica.

⁵ Admiralty, General Instructions Regarding Expenditure of Stores, 23 Aug. 1716, Great Britain, The National Archive (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty (ADM) 2/29. This order entrenched the convention of provisioning all ships going on a foreign voyage for eight months. Captain Thomas Marwood in the *Lime* was the last captain sent to New England to be victualled for eight months. Cf. Admiralty, Orders to Marwood and Capt. Colville Mayne, *Bideford* (Virginia), 7 Oct. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Orders to Capt. George Prothero, *Blandford* (New England), 16 Feb. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Orders

foreign duty self-sufficient for as long as possible, and took into account travel times, delays, and other considerations, such as time spent waiting for merchant ships to load cargo or, in the case of the Newfoundland convoy, the need for some ships to go to Iberia and the Mediterranean before returning home.⁶ Alternatively, captains serving on station, or whose voyages took longer than eight months, had to ensure the acquisition of provisions themselves from navy supply ships or colonial merchants.

Problems originated from a number of sources, and tended to follow captains back to England where naval administrators routinely scrutinized their reports and accounts. Colonial merchants who chose to sell to the navy usually participated in transatlantic trade, and therefore maintained a London contact to secure payment of bills. As a result, while lines of supply in the Americas may have been periodically unstable, solid communication networks meant that merely departing from a troublesome colony did not necessarily bring an end to a commander's woes. Meanwhile, various divisions within the navy responsible for supply – in particular the Victualling Board, the Navy Board and the semi-independent Ordnance Board – sought to curb what they considered exuberant, wasteful, spending and irresponsible behaviour. The Victualling Board proved particularly tenacious in calling captains into question for irregularities in their accounts.

Ever fearful of fraud and embezzlement, the navy cultivated control over its captains through the distribution of pay, either by withholding all or part until accounts had cleared, or else demanding payment for over-spending. The common denominator

to Capt. Peter Warren, *Squirrel* (New England), 23 Dec. 1735, TNA PRO ADM 2/54; Orders to Capt William Parry, *Torrington* (Newfoundland), 23 March 1736, TNA PRO ADM 2/54.

⁶ The shortest round-trip (Newfoundland) averaged five weeks sailing west and three sailing east, while the longest (Jamaica) took ten weeks west and fourteen east. Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 90-91.

throughout remained the captain's responsibility to keep his ship supplied, even when the Admiralty Board recognized that some of the difficulties originated with navy policies that evolved more quickly than the ability of colonial ports to supply warships in a consistent manner. Nevertheless, the onus fell on captains to make sure that their ships obtained sufficient stores and provisions at the best possible bargain in the face of limited choices or opportunities. Captains found themselves caught between the contingencies of colonial economies, and the desire for administrative standardization in the eighteenth century.

Fortunately, the mariner's diet of dried and pickled food transported easily enough around the Atlantic world if processed and packed properly by the supplier. Furthermore, regional ports could produce sufficient victuals, provided they had access to an adequate surplus of agricultural goods.⁷ Boston's entry into the fishing, shipbuilding, export, and carrying trades during the seventeenth century may have caused the town to outstrip its ability to feed itself as early as the 1640s, but this also encouraged its development as an entrepôt and centre for ship repair and maritime resupply.⁸ The other principal entrepôt in the northeast was New York. It witnessed the steady growth of its agricultural hinterlands and development of a modest shipping industry by the end of the seventeenth century. Between 1690 and 1740, New York slowly gained on (and eventually surpassed) Boston with regards to agricultural production, and thus obtained a greater

⁷ John Mannion, "Victualling a Fishery: Newfoundland Diet and the Origins of the Irish Provisions Trade," *International Journal of Maritime History* 12 no. 1 (2000), 9-10; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 374-78.

⁸ Karen J. Friedman, "Victualling Colonial Boston," *Agricultural History* 47 no. 3 (1973), 190; Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 54-56; Stephen Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), Ch. 7.

percentage of the export provisions trade.⁹ So long as a regional provisions surplus could be maintained (or else imported for resale), and warship deployment remained modest, both ports could service and resupply the navy.¹⁰

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English mariners ate prodigiously, and concerned themselves with the quality, and especially the quantity, of food.¹¹ By the Nine Years' War, each seaman at full allowance was to receive a weekly ration consisting of: seven pounds of biscuit; four pounds of beef and two of pork; 1/8th of a measured ("sized") piece of fish three days per week; two pints of peas; twelve ounces of cheese; and six ounces of butter. All sailors officially received one gallon of beer every day, a quantity not to be altered. Various substitutions were normal – such as wine for beer and oatmeal for fish – due to shortages, or voyages to warm climates. By the 1730s, oatmeal itself had become part of the standard allotment. Had the navy achieved consistent delivery, the seaman's daily diet should have been more than adequate, despite some nutritional limitations. This was frequently not the case, however, owing to issues of quality and availability among various contractors, even in Europe. It makes sense that the likelihood of supply problems increased the further warships sailed from their main sources of supply.¹²

⁹ Cathy Matson, *Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 90, 92-93; Nash, *Urban Crucible*, 54-56.

¹⁰ At first glance, Virginia appears to have been less able to consistently support its station ships. For example: Admiralty, Orders to Capt. George Gordon, *Pearl*, 22 July 1717, TNA PRO ADM 2/49. Upon the end of the cruising season, Gordon was to take his sixth-rate to Boston for the winter and clean and refit before returning to his station at Virginia the next spring. Also: see below the case of Capt. Girlington.

¹¹ Peter Earle, *Sailors: English Merchant Seamen, 1650-1775* (London: Methuen, 1998), 86-87.

¹² This passage: Admiralty to Navy Board, 4 Jan. 1701, in *Queen Anne's Navy: Documents Concerning the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702-1714*, ed. R.D. Merriman (London: Navy Records Society, 1961), 254-55; *Sergison Papers*, ed. Merriman, 235; Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 121-22; J.D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649-1688* (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2008), 152; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 375.

Poor victuals, or their inconsistent delivery, continued to be a point of contention among sailors, and provided one of their few official avenues for complaint as stipulated in the Articles of War.¹³ An early illustration of how basic problems of acquiring and storing sufficient victuals could influence operations in the colonies emerges from the 1674-75 over-wintering of the fourth-rate *Diamond* at New York.¹⁴ Captain Richard Griffiths received orders to transport the new governor, Major Edmund Andros, and escort the *Castle* (or *Castle Frigate*) loaded with stores and supplies for the fort at New York. Based on Griffiths' orders, it would appear that the *Diamond* itself was also to be laden with extra stores for the town.¹⁵ The Admiralty intended *Diamond's* journey to be a temporary one, instructing Griffiths to return home immediately via Cadiz and Lisbon, and to escort any awaiting ships back to England.¹⁶ Upon arrival in New York at the end of October, however, Governor Andros found himself needing to consolidate his regime, particularly with regard to the fealty of several Long Island towns wishing to remain under the jurisdiction of Connecticut. In order to provide transportation, and make a

¹³ J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Taraulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 98; Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 120-21; England, An Act for Establishing Articles and Orders for the Regulating and Better Government of His Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea, 13 Car. II c. 9 (1661), *The Statutes of the Realm* (London: George Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1810-1828, 11 vols.), Vol. 5, Article XXII, 312, reprinted and introduced by N.A.M. Rodger, *Articles of War: The Statutes Which Governed Our Fighting Navies, 1661, 1749 and 1886* (Havant: K. Mason, 1982), 17.

¹⁴ Admiralty Lists, Oct. 1674-June 1675, TNA PRO ADM 8/1.

¹⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to Capt. Richard Griffiths, *Diamond*, 31 July 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737. One source describes the *Castle/Castle Frigate* as a warship loaned to the government; Duke of York, Instructions to Capt. Burton, *Castle Frigate*, 6 Aug. 1674, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury and others (London: His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860-1994, 46 vols.), Vol. 7, no. 1343. The details of the instructions are not given. Both a warship and hired merchant ship bearing the same name did exist at the time, but the instructions to Griffiths and the Admiralty Lists suggest a merchant ship while Griffiths' letters are ambiguous. R.C. Anderson, *Lists of Men-of-War, 1650-1700: Part I, English Ships, 1649-1702* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), nos. 472 and 1141; Admiralty Lists, Sept. 1674-June 1675, TNA PRO ADM 8/1; Griffiths to Navy Board, 10 Mar. and 12 May 1675, TNA PRO ADM 106/311.

¹⁶ Admiralty, Instructions to Griffiths, 31 July 1674, TNA PRO ADM 2/1737.

statement of power to the colonists, the governor kept the *Diamond* until the end of November.¹⁷

Even had Captain Griffiths protested Andros' order, victualling circumstances ensured that his ship would remain at New York. A substantial portion of the food stores *Diamond* brought out from England had decayed, and local sources could not provide long-term resupply. As would be the case at other Atlantic venues, the regional economy sometimes proved unable to secure enough fresh food for long-term preservation in order to satisfy the large volumes needed for a transatlantic voyage. Griffiths, in his summary of the overwintering, reported that timely supplies of meat could not be had as New York's normal slaughtering period had not yet arrived, while sufficient quantities of salt for curing could not be procured until the end of the year. Enough bread or grain, moreover, could barely be found for the town's own needs.¹⁸ Resupply would not occur before the winter ice came into New York harbour. This forced both *Diamond* and *Castle* further up river, trapping the ships until the spring thaw. Captain Griffiths did manage to secure credit from two leading Dutch merchants at New York, claiming he could find no suitable English ones. He drew bills of exchange on the navy to the account of Cornelis Steenwijck and Nicolaes de Meijer (Meyer) totalling £825.20.00, payable to Mr. Philip Lloyd in England.¹⁹

Griffiths could at least obtain sustenance on a daily basis, but *Diamond* would have to wait some time to store enough victuals for the voyage home. The situation of

¹⁷ Griffiths to Navy Board, 10 Mar. and 12 May 1675, TNA PRO ADM 106/311.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. On the identity and position of the Dutch merchants: Jaap Jacobs, *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 338; Matson, *Merchants & Empire*, 53-54.

the fifth-rate *Rose*, on station at New England thirteen years later, further demonstrates the precarious nature of keeping ships supplied overseas. When the Revolution of 1688 reached Boston it cut *Rose* off from the town. The crew survived only one day before being forced to distribute the victuals that they had stored for sea use. With no opportunity to obtain any further supply from the town, whatever provisions were already on board would have dictated the crew's course of action. In any event, had the uprising not immobilized the warship, it was already sitting in harbour incapacitated while undergoing repairs.²⁰

The problem of keeping a warship in the colonies could, therefore, be a function of scale. Even a small warship concentrated a large number of adult males in an area where surplus materials could be expensive, or non-existent. According to the Admiralty lists, the official crews of *Diamond* and *Rose* respectively numbered 135 and 105.²¹ New York in 1674 carried a population of 3500 while Boston in 1690 contained 6000 persons.²² The quantities needed multiplied when having to stockpile victuals in advance for a voyage of any length. Despite the obstacles, supplying the navy with provisions did bring opportunity to seaport merchants, who already outfitted the local shipping and fishing industries. Yet specialized shipbuilding materials and naval stores (such as sails and cordage) proved more difficult to supply, and had to be imported from England on a regular basis. During times of want, such as disruptions due to war, or fluctuations in the

²⁰ Captain's Log, *Rose*, 20 Apr. 1689, TNA PRO ADM 51/3955; See above, Ch. 5, 236.

²¹ Admiralty Lists, Mar. 1674 and Jan. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 8/1.

²² Nash, *Urban Crucible*, 4, 54. Boston grew steadily to 9000 by 1711 and 17,000 by 1740. New York reached 4500 persons by 1690 and grew to 9500 by 1740.

distant markets that produced imports, the extra goods needed by warships put pressure on local stocks.²³

The employment of local merchants, or victualling agents, at various ports became an essential method of resupplying all warships outside of England because the corporate body overseeing food distribution, the Victualling Board, found itself overwhelmed, and struggled to keep up with demand during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Plagued by inexperienced officials and poor credit, the Board fought to remain solvent in the face of overall financial crisis during the Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession. During the Nine Years' War, the navy overall gained a notorious reputation among contractors and wholesalers in the British Isles for its tendency to defer payments.²⁴ Unstable supply lines limited naval effectiveness even in European waters.²⁵ Improvements to the administration and distribution of supply by the middle of the eighteenth century allowed squadrons to stay at sea for lengthy periods of time, an important consideration for the projection of power at sea.²⁶

The obvious means of resupplying warships overseas involved sending merchant ships hired by the navy to transport provisions and stores. The Navy Board attempted to resupply its first Virginia station ships entirely from England, so as to avoid what it

²³ Carl Bridenbaugh, *The Colonial Craftsman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950; reprint 1974), 110; Nash, *Urban Crucible*, 55.

²⁴ This passage: *Sergison Papers*, ed. Merriman, 235; Richard Harding, *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 91; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 192-93.

²⁵ Admiral Edward Russell's difficult overwintering of the main fleet in the Mediterranean in 1694-95 (a feat that was not repeated) offers a good example. Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 36, 526-33; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 154-55.

²⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 291.

believed to be staggering colonial prices for victuals, stores, and services.²⁷ When the sixth-rate *Dunbarton* was dispatched to Virginia in 1686, the Navy Board recognized that it could not be conveniently resupplied from the two vessels already on station, the ketches *Deptford* and *Quaker*. The Board assured the Admiralty that arrangements could be made with outward bound merchant ships to deliver stores to the region.²⁸ In a related episode regarding repairs a year later, Captain Croft in the *Deptford* desired to travel to New England to clean and refit, arguing that he could not get it done properly in Virginia. The Navy Board disagreed and assumed that the senior officer on station, Thomas Allin, shared their concern as he had apparently refused Croft permission to go. If it turned out Allin did not agree, and Croft could not adequately clean at Virginia, the Board surmised that it would be easier to bring *Deptford* home.²⁹

Captains could not always rely on supply ships hired by the navy, especially during periods of upheaval or intense enemy activity in Europe, such as the early years of the Nine Years' War. The aforementioned captains at Virginia expressed concern over the timeliness of resupply, having heard nothing of intent from the navy and being desperate for naval stores.³⁰ Similar problems cropped up as the navy expanded coverage to other venues in North America. Upon arrival on station at Boston following Virginia convoy service in the summer of 1692, the fifth-rate *Conception Prize* required extensive repairs. No one, apparently not even the governor, held any commission to authorize the

²⁷ Navy Board to Admiralty, 8 Aug. 1685, TNA PRO ADM 1/3555; Navy Board to Admiralty, 17 Oct. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 1/3556.

²⁸ Navy Board to Admiralty, 7 Nov. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 1/3555.

²⁹ Navy Board to Admiralty, 12 Oct. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 1/3556.

³⁰ Allin to Navy Board, 23 Jan., 9 Feb. and 20 Feb. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 106/380; Croft to Navy Board, 1 Jan. 1686, TNA PRO ADM 106/380. In October of 1687, the Navy Board reported the need for stores to be sent to the *Quaker*, it not receiving fresh naval stores in over a year. Navy Board to Admiralty, 17 Oct. 1687, TNA PRO ADM 1/3556.

repair and resupply of warships. Captain Robert Fairfax, therefore, arranged for a survey, and sought out credit to cover costs in the form of bills of exchange totalling £300 sterling from the Boston customs collector, Jahleel Brenton, payable to Stephen Mason of London, with the transaction certified by Governor Phips.³¹

In January 1693, Fairfax nervously reported that he had still had not received any directions for resupply, despite his initial store of provisions being expended for some months.³² As a result, Fairfax's purser arranged for more credit with Brenton, this time for £701.11.08 to purchase provisions and other necessities for *Conception Prize's* crew of 115 for 224 days.³³ By December 1692, the Admiralty had already noticed that captains in America, including Fairfax, had drawn bills of exchange with local merchants for supplies and repair. The Navy Board seemed satisfied with Fairfax's arrangements, as the ships hired to carry supplies to New England faced delays.³⁴ By the last years of the war, however, the lack of victualling agents in the colonies, and problems beset by such shortcomings, had attracted the attention of the government, although noticeable change would have to wait until the next war and beyond.³⁵

Drawing bills of exchange on the navy's account evolved into the standard method of securing money, credit, or goods in regions where proper supply facilities were insufficient before the War of the Austrian Succession.³⁶ Captains on remote stations

³¹ Capt. Robert Fairfax, *Conception Prize*, to Navy Board, 16 July and 16 Aug. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 106/417; Certificate of Governor Sir William Phips, 14 July 1692, TNA PRO ADM 106/417.

³² Fairfax to Admiralty, 31 Jan. 1693, TNA PRO Colonial Office (CO) 5/857.

³³ Fairfax to Navy Board, 2 Jan. 1693, TNA PRO ADM 106/431.

³⁴ Navy Board to Admiralty, 26 Dec. 1692, TNA PRO ADM 1/3567.

³⁵ Order in Council, 3 Dec. 1696, United Kingdom, *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series (APC)*, ed. W.L. Grant and James Munro (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908-1912, 6 vols.), Vol. 2, no. 652.

³⁶ Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 391.

thus developed practices conforming to those commonly used by merchants and their agents engaged in transatlantic commerce.³⁷ A notable collection of bills drawn on the Navy Board, revealing the amounts and lengths captains could go through to keep resupplied, survives for the fifth-rate *Gosport*, stationed at Boston from 1701 to 1704. Captain Henry Crofts died in mid-December 1702, a little more than a year after *Gosport*'s arrival, and Captain Thomas Smith took over. The two commanders drew at least thirteen bills of exchange totalling £1945 sterling from December 1701 until October 1704.³⁸ At least three separate merchants had been approached to provide money: Andrew Faneuil supplied five bills of exchange, Samuel Fraron three, and Andrew Belcher one. In five letters to the Navy Board, the merchants in question and their London connections were not identified.³⁹

Gosport incurred considerable damage during two rough voyages to the West Indies, the first convoying the New England trade, and the second providing an escort for two victualling ships that had arrived at Boston on their way to meet Rear Admiral

³⁷ John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 18-24.

³⁸ Capt. Henry Crofts, *Gosport*, to Navy Board, 10 Dec. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 106/542, 10 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 106/554 and 8 Dec. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 106/554; Capt. Thomas Smith, *Gosport*, to Navy Board, 21 Dec. 1702, 8 June 1703 (2), 14 Aug. 1703 and 10 Nov. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 106/578, (n.d.) Apr. 1704, 15 May 1704, 2 Aug. 1704, 4 Oct. 1704 and 9 Oct. 1704, TNA PRO ADM 106/592. Smith had previously been commissioned as post-captain in 1696 but occupied the lieutenant's position as a peacetime alternative to half-pay. David Syrett and R.L. DiNardo, *The Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (Aldershot: Scholar Press/Navy Records Society, 1994), 411; Admiralty List, June 1701, TNA PRO ADM 8/7.

³⁹ This information comes from the cover letters to the Navy Board and not the actual bills themselves, which are not in the same files. Two bills drawn on 21 Dec. 1702 require conversions from Massachusetts currency into sterling based on the estimated exchange rate for 1702 of £135 Massachusetts currency to £100 sterling as printed in McCusker, *Money and Exchange*, 147, and rounded up to the next pound. Thus bills of £235.06.00 and £80 become £175 and £60 sterling respectively.

Benbow's squadron at Jamaica.⁴⁰ Even normal wear and tear frequently required extensive and lengthy refitting, so there was nothing unusual about the bills drawn by Crofts and Smith. Nevertheless, in an effort to tighten-up supply lines, and steer captains away from dealing with multiple sources of money and goods, the navy sought to consolidate buying by arranging short-term contracts with suitable merchants. By May 1704, the Victualling Board had contracted with the English merchant John Shippen to supply provisions to all warships arriving in New England at the rate of 7 ½ d per man per day sterling, a sum cheaper than the navy's usual book-keeping estimate of 8 ½ d.⁴¹

In 1705, Captains George Fane (dispatched to New York) and Charles Stucley (dispatched to New England) received orders to take money for ordnance stores exclusively from Benjamin Faneuil at New York, and from his nephew Andrew at Boston.⁴² In July 1706, the Victualling Board negotiated a contract for provisioning warships at New York with Sir Jeffery Jeffreys for 7d per man per day sterling.⁴³ The next year, the Admiralty informed captains at New York and New England needing money for all occasions that a two-year agreement had been reached with Benjamin Edmonds for a set exchange rate of £145 local currency for £100 pounds sterling. The

⁴⁰ Crofts to Admiralty, 17 Dec. 1701, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590, 20 May 1702 and 9 Nov. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1590; Smith to Admiralty, 20 May and 9 Aug. 1703, TNA PRO ADM 1/2441.

⁴¹ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 8 Apr. 1706, TNA PRO ADM 110/3. The estimated rate in England between 1690 and 1714 was 19-20s per man per lunar month of 28 days, but this was usually acknowledged to be too low and closer to 23s per lunar month, reaching as high as 30s during years of poor production. Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 193; Ehrman, *Navy in the War of William III*, 159; *Queen Anne's Navy*, ed. Merriman, 252.

⁴² Admiralty, Orders to Capt. George Fane, *Lowestoft*, and Capt. Charles Stucley, *Deptford*, 28 Mar. 1705, TNA PRO ADM 2/33.

⁴³ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 31 July 1706, TNA PRO ADM 110/3. Jeffreys was a London politician and merchant who was active in colonial affairs. Jacob M. Price, "Jeffreys, Sir Jeffrey (c.1652–1709)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49858>.

navy claimed that this was the best exchange it could negotiate and captains should apply to Edmonds' correspondents in the colonies.⁴⁴ In 1709, the Admiralty renegotiated the deal and that year also instructed captains at, or going, to New York, New England, and Piscataqua (mast convoys) to call on Boston merchant Jonathan Belcher for provisions.⁴⁵ By the time the Admiralty extended station ship service to South Carolina in 1719, the Board had authorized victualling contracts to New England, New York, Virginia, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands.⁴⁶

The aforementioned Andrew and Jonathan Belcher and Andrew Faneuil became the most prominent names to receive contracts for New England.⁴⁷ Another Boston merchant, Thomas Ruck, appears to have supplied the navy at Newfoundland, but according to his ledger, not at New England. Several warships identified as part of the yearly convoy procured provisions from Ruck at Newfoundland between 1718 and 1722.⁴⁸ An interesting addition, Wentworth Paxton, came in 1713. Paxton had been captain of the sixth-rate *Newport*, captured by the French off the Bay of Fundy in 1696.⁴⁹ Upon his repatriation from Port Royal and clearance at a court martial, Paxton left the

⁴⁴ Admiralty, Orders to Fane, Stucley and Capt. Thomas Miles, *Triton's Prize*, 7 Feb. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 2/35. The correspondents are not identified within these orders.

⁴⁵ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 11 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 110/4; Admiralty, General Instructions for Provisioning with Jonathan Belcher, 15 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 2/39.

⁴⁶ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 2 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 110/5; *Ibid.*, 20 July 1719, TNA PRO ADM 110/8.

⁴⁷ Studies including Jonathan Belcher and the Faneuil family reveal only brief mention of navy contracts, or none at all. Michael C. Batinski, *Jonathan Belcher, Colonial Governor* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 8, 17-20; Phyllis Whitman Hunter, *Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 1670-1780* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 120. Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 145-47, 194-97. In discussing Andrew Faneuil, Hunter and Bailyn did not reveal any information on his dealings with the navy.

⁴⁸ Thomas Ruck & Co. Ledger, 1718-1722, Canada, Maritime History Archive, Memorial University, St. John's NL, MHA Mic. 1-1-4-15, ff. 34, 52, *passim*. The author thanks Daniel Vickers for this reference.

⁴⁹ Capt. Fleetwood Emms, *Sorlings*, to Navy Board, 4 Dec. 1696, TNA PRO ADM 106/485.

navy and retired to Boston.⁵⁰ Paxton negotiated a contract to victual the navy at 6 ½ d per day per man, and also submitted plans to service the garrisons at Annapolis Royal and Placentia after the War of the Spanish Succession.⁵¹ Unfortunately, Paxton's insider knowledge of the navy could not save him from a sharp rise in colonial prices caused by "a kind of famine" that hit New York and New England in the fall of 1713. He reported that he could not maintain supply without considerable loss, and was forced to deny services to Captains Edward Blackett at Boston, and Thomas Davers at New York.⁵²

The basic system of bills of exchange and early navy contracting in the colonies kept convoys and station ships afloat, but it could not handle any abrupt change to its tenuous routine, such as the arrival of a large number of warships, the sudden withdrawal of a contractor, or the inability to negotiate or renew a satisfactory provisioning agreement. Expeditions to America and the West Indies could suffer terribly from disease, but also from the belated realization that sufficient foodstuffs might not be forthcoming from the fragile colonial economies along the Atlantic rim. Admiral Hovenden Walker and General John Hill discovered this to their peril as they had assumed fresh supplies and men could be readily obtained at Boston for their expedition to subjugate Quebec in 1711.⁵³

⁵⁰ Admiralty, Court Martial of the *Newport*, 18 Jan. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 1/5257; Samuel Sewall, "Diary of Samuel Sewall," 13 Mar. 1710, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, ser. 5, vols. 5-7 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1878-72), Vol. II, 276.

⁵¹ Admiralty, Orders to Capt. Charles Brown, *Reserve* and Capt. Edward Blackett, *Phoenix*, 24 June 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46; Victualling Board to Treasury, 2 June 1713, TNA PRO ADM 110/6. Paxton's proposal of 22 May 1713 is reprinted here.

⁵² Wentworth Paxton to Blackett, 30 Oct. 1713 and Blackett to Admiralty, 3 Nov. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 1/1491; Capt. Thomas Davers, *Seaford*, to Admiralty, 17 Feb. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694.

⁵³ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 179.

With the expedition kept under strict secrecy, some ships of Walker's squadron sailed from England in need of repair, and stored with only three or four months' provisions instead of the usual eight designated for ships going to North America. Further complications emerged from the fact that three 80-gun third-rates in the squadron could not fit into Boston harbour for resupply and repairs, and it was feared that they drew too much water to sail up the St. Lawrence River as far as Quebec. As a result, Walker had to send the ships back to England. More importantly, victualling chaos ensued at Boston when the immediate demands for provisions could not be met without considerable difficulty. The town of 9000 persons now was expected to secure enough victuals to sustain more than 12,000 sailors and soldiers over the length of a siege and the following winter. Prices shot up, or supplies simply could not be obtained, and this necessitated looking further afield from New England for foodstuffs.

Andrew and Jonathan Belcher had held the contract to supply the ships on station prior to the expedition's arrival, and Walker solicited the senior Belcher for assistance. Belcher refused, maintaining that their contract with the Victualling Board had recently expired, and had only stipulated a per diem rate rather than the supply in bulk requested by Walker. The situation forced the appointment of two pursers from the squadron to act as temporary agent victuallers to facilitate transactions, as no one locally would take the job. Eventually, an appeal by Walker obtained the services of merchant Andrew Faneuil, who stepped in to oversee the processing of naval stores, especially after the expedition set sail for Quebec. Walker also secured merchants William and Francis Clarke to provide provisions as agent victuallers. Meanwhile, following consultations with commanders Walker and Hill, and the Massachusetts Council and Assembly, Governor

Joseph Dudley issued a proclamation requiring all able parties, including the Belchers, to assist in finding victuals to avoid a complete breakdown. In spite of such efforts, the expedition's ability to survive any extended period in Quebec remained questionable.⁵⁴

The squadron eventually failed even to reach Quebec. A decision to turn back was made after several transport ships foundered in the dangerous St. Lawrence River, due in part to a lack of knowledgeable pilots. Walker, who had previous experience in the western Atlantic (and perhaps should have known better with regard to victualling), spread the blame widely, and included the scarcity and "exorbitant" price of victuals at Boston among the sources of his difficulties and delays.⁵⁵ He concluded that the various circumstances were beyond anyone's control and differed little in context with those befalling far more capable officers. The Admiralty Secretary, Josiah Burchett, disagreed. Piqued, having been kept only partially informed about the true nature of the Walker expedition, Burchett implied in his 1720 work of naval history that it was common knowledge within naval administration that stores and provisions for such a large force would be hard to procure in the colonies. Had anyone bothered to ask, Burchett further complained, they would have been warned of the inherent dangers of sending ill-equipped warships overseas, and informed that the larger third-rates chosen for the expedition

⁵⁴ This passage: Richard Harding, "The Expeditions to Quebec, 1690 and 1711: The Evolution of British Trans-Atlantic Amphibious Power," in *Guerre Maritimes, 1688-1713*, no ed. (Vincennes: Service historique de la Marine, 1996), 206-209; Hovenden Walker, "A Journal or Full Account of the Late Expedition to Canada (London, 1720), reprinted in: *The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711*, ed. Gerald S. Graham (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1953), 24, 101, 110-11, 130-31, *passim*; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 179.

⁵⁵ J. K. Laughton, "Walker, Sir Hovenden (1666?-1725)," rev. J. D. Davies, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28487>; Walker, "Journal," 58-60. As a young man Walker had served as a volunteer in the *Dartmouth* (Captain George St. Lo) which in 1686 stopped at Boston for an extended stay in Massachusetts following service to Nevis. See Ch. 4, 225-26. Then, in 1703, Walker commanded a squadron to the West Indies to assist an attack on Guadeloupe.

would prove too large to be serviced in colonial ports and unable to sail up the St. Lawrence River.⁵⁶

Ironically, after the Walker expedition left to make its attempt on Quebec, two ships from the 1711 Newfoundland convoy arrived at Boston to offer a distinct contrast to the recent economic strains caused by the squadron. In July, intelligence had been received claiming that Annapolis Royal had been recaptured by French and Mi'kmaq forces. Four of the six ships dispatched to guard the fishery that year had already arrived at Newfoundland when the news came. The captains consulted with each other and decided that the fifth-rates *Milford* and *Warwick* would travel south, while the remaining two warships stayed to protect the fishery.⁵⁷ When *Milford* and *Warwick* reached Boston and discovered that Annapolis Royal remained safe, they stayed for two weeks, refitting and resupplying, before returning to Newfoundland. Both ships received bread and beer, *Milford*'s crew spent ten days cleaning the hull and scraping and coating the masts with rosin and tallow, and *Warwick* had its masts replaced.⁵⁸

Captain Henry Partington in the *Warwick* purchased a variety of items totalling £53.19.10 intended for the treatment of sick crew members. The variety of the items attests to the range of goods available at Boston, and the record survives because the Admiralty requested that Partington itemize the purchases to justify his claim for

⁵⁶ Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the most Remarkable Transactions at Sea from the Earliest Accounts of Time to the Conclusion of the Last War with France* (London, 1720), 778.

⁵⁷ Capt. Andrew Douglas, *Arundel*, to Admiralty, 7-10 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/1693; William R. Miles, "The Newfoundland Convoy, 1711," *The Northern Mariner/ Le marin du nord* 18 no. 2 (2008), 76-77.

⁵⁸ Captain's Log, *Warwick*, 30 Aug.-14 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 51/1072; Captains Log: *Milford*, 31 Aug.-14 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 51/606.

reimbursement.⁵⁹ Partington drew a bill of exchange from Andrew Faneuil to purchase the following items from Henry Franklyn: 290 pounds of brown sugar, 116 pounds each of white sugar and currants, 86 pounds each of rice and barley, 60 pounds of raisins, and 7 pounds of tamarinds. The list also included 15 ounces each of nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon, 14 bed sheets, 18 saucepans, and 4 boxes.⁶⁰

The experience of Walker's squadron contrasted with that of the two detached warships, and highlights the level at which the navy could operate in the Americas. Boston might accommodate several warships without problem, so long as no general shortage of stores and provisions existed, and the incident illustrates the port's ability as an entrepôt to rebound after being apparently stripped of goods by Walker's squadron only a month earlier (assuming that the merchants had not been previously hording merchandise). Scarcity, nevertheless, could occur at any moment and not only during instances of system overload as was the case in 1711. In 1698, one of the New England station ship captains, William Kiggins, reported on the general shortage of provisions at Boston that year.⁶¹ Although disconcerting, the situation proved to be better there than it was at New York. Running low on provisions while transporting Governor Bellomont from England to New York, Captain John Leader reported that the town could only provide enough victuals to sail the fourth-rate *Deptford* to Boston, where the captain hoped it would be easier to obtain supplies.⁶² In 1713, Captain Charles Brown in the

⁵⁹ Capt. Henry Partington, *Warwick*, to Admiralty, 5 May 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2281.

⁶⁰ Bill of Receipt from Henry Franklyn to Her Majesty's Ship *Warwick*, 12 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/2281.

⁶¹ Capt. William Kiggins, *Arundel*, to Admiralty, 5 Sept. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 1/2004.

⁶² Capt. John Leader, *Deptford*, to Admiralty, 27 Apr. 1698, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

Reserve reported that a general food shortage in Boston had prompted “the people” to raid the bake house and carry away bread intended to be stockpiled on board ship.⁶³

Precious naval stores remained at a premium in the colonies. In 1692, Captain Fairfax reported that the scarcity of cordage required even the local shipbuilders to seek rope and ground tackle from England.⁶⁴ Three years later, Fleetwood Emms suggested that cordage could be found at Boston, but along with “all manner of stores being extraordinary dear.”⁶⁵ Matthew Teate simply could not carry out his orders from the governor to go to the West Indies in the winter of 1708-09 because his ship’s rigging and cables had worn out to the point of danger. This forced him to await supply from England as the rope makers in Boston could not make cordage of the size required.⁶⁶ Captain Thomas Durell reported in 1724 that after three trips to the West Indies, the *Seahorse*’s sails and rigging had been “constantly failing since Boston,” forcing a stay in Lisbon on the return voyage to replace them along with a badly worn mast.⁶⁷ Upon the 1725 grounding of the *Ludlow Castle* in Canso harbour, Captain John St. Lo arrived at Boston for repairs and replenishment. St. Lo reported that while the necessary repairs could be made, replacements for two anchors broken in the ordeal would have to be sent from England as proper ones could not be found locally.⁶⁸

In addition to materials, services could be expensive and sometimes scarce given the shortage of labour at all levels in colonial America throughout the period under

⁶³ Brown to Admiralty, 13 Jan. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 1/1471. This incident may have been part of the 20 May 1713 foot riot in Boston, but Brown does not state specifically when it occurred. Sewall, “Diary,” 20 May 1713, Vol. II, 384-85.

⁶⁴ Fairfax to Navy Board, 16 July 1692, TNA PRO ADM 106/417.

⁶⁵ Emms to Navy Board, 25 Oct. 1695, TNA PRO ADM 106/465.

⁶⁶ Capt. Matthew Teate, *Reserve*, to Admiralty, 15 Dec. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572.

⁶⁷ Capt. Thomas Durell, *Seahorse*, to Admiralty, 23 Nov. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694.

⁶⁸ Capt. John St. Lo, *Ludlow Castle*, to Admiralty, 4 Nov. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453.

study.⁶⁹ Pilotage, for example, was essential to navigation in the western Atlantic, and a dearth of pilots could be dangerous, as Admiral Walker had discovered. Among Captain Partington's numerous expenses in 1711 was a £15 bill for hiring a pilot at Capelin Bay in Newfoundland to navigate the waters from Canso to Boston.⁷⁰ The Massachusetts government had contributed to the cost in the past, but appears to have grown increasingly disinclined to do so by the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1717, Captain Thomas Smart cited the example of Nathaniel Fadre, who petitioned for £27 to cover his expenses in piloting the *Squirrel* between Boston and Nantasket Road at the outer edge of Boston Harbour. The House of Assembly rejected the petition outright, prompting all pilots to agree not to guide any warships without the captain's guarantee of payment. Smart sought direction regarding the hire of pilots as travel within Boston's island-dotted harbour was "impractical" without assistance.⁷¹ The Navy Board appears to have permitted expenses for limited pilotage, but Captain James Cornwall championed the value of good regional navigational knowledge when he appealed to the Admiralty to place his pilot on the naval establishment like those on other stations. The Navy Board would only agree to pay the pilot for guiding the ship within the harbour, but Cornwall stated that the man performed duties beyond mere harbour pilotage, for which he was the best in the area for navigating the King's ships.⁷²

⁶⁹ Richard B. Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 44-45; Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 52-55.

⁷⁰ Bill of Receipt from Henry Franklyn to Her Majesty's Ship *Warwick*, 12 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/2281.

⁷¹ Smart to Admiralty, 28 Nov. 1717, TNA PRO ADM 1/2451.

⁷² Capt. James Cornwall, *Sheerness*, to Admiralty, 27 Apr. 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598. Cornwall also noted that the man had a large family to provide for.

Overshadowed by the manning problem, the ability to secure labourers with shipwright skills at reasonable rates could prove difficult, as the shipping and shipbuilding industries in New England kept them at full employment.⁷³ This was especially true of the all-important caulkers needed to seal a ship's planking. In 1712, an appalled James Campbell in the *Squirrel* slashed £300 off his bills from local tradesmen, feeling he had been overcharged. In response, the labourers promised not to work on *Squirrel* in the future. This generated unease as the captain was already experiencing problems victualling the ship, and the totals for his bills of exchange were being challenged at home.⁷⁴ In 1730, George Prothero in the *Blandford* outlined for the Admiralty an "evil custom" existing among the caulkers at Boston. At each cleaning, "graving beer" and other refreshments came to be expected on top of their original contract. Prothero attempted to disabuse the workers of the custom, and stated to those men hoping to secure work that he would provide no beer. The caulkers replied that they would not work without beer despite the captain's warrant from the government to procure their labour. Prothero knew such expenses would be questioned when he submitted his accounts, especially since the job of caulking the hull took a whole day, and incurred considerable cost to begin with.⁷⁵

To alleviate the expense of small jobs, and to combat any potential shortage in transit and during the early stages of overseas voyages, the outfitting of warships concentrated on keeping the vessel as self-sufficient as possible when leaving England. With regard to naval stores, ships carried as many spars, pieces of lumber, and other

⁷³ Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth*, 272, 291-92.

⁷⁴ Capt. James Campbell, *Squirrel*, to Admiralty, 20 Apr. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

⁷⁵ Capt. George Prothero, *Blandford*, to Admiralty, 17 Nov. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 1/2283.

fittings as could be properly stowed for the use of the ship's carpenter.⁷⁶ The crew itself provided an instant labour force for all manner of heavy lifting and general group work. The standard eight-month supply of victuals (in theory if not always in practice) suited the yearly Newfoundland convoy, certain Virginia convoys, and the New Hampshire mast ship escorts, who were not expected to stay any longer. While on station at New England, warships generally took stores in two-, four- or six-month increments depending on their assignment and the availability of consistent victualling. Examples of routine quantities provided to warships include two months' for fisheries patrol, and six months' for a convoy to Barbados and Salt Tortuga.⁷⁷

By 1730, the Admiralty's comfort with the availability of provisions in the colonies meant that they could reduce the outward-bound quantities to be stored in warships from eight to six months' for most voyages (Newfoundland being one exception). They turned their concern to wastage and expense incurred by captains who purchased undue amounts, issuing general instructions for captains in the colonies to take in only enough victuals to complete stores for ten weeks when recalled home.⁷⁸

The reduction in volume suited the fourth-, fifth- and sixth-rate warships as they routinely experienced problems storing a full load of provisions for eight months. Writing from Portsmouth in 1694 while preparing the sixth-rate *Newport* to attend on New England, Wentworth Paxton requested advice from the Navy Board as the ship

⁷⁶ Davies, *Pepys's Navy*, 102.

⁷⁷ For example: Teate to Admiralty, 20 Aug. 1708, TNA PRO ADM 1/2572; Brown to Admiralty, 15 Dec. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1471; Durell, *Seahorse*, to Admiralty, 27 June 1721 and 14 Nov. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694; Durell, *Scarborough*, to Admiralty, 15 May 1732, TNA PRO ADM 1/1695.

⁷⁸ Admiralty, General Instructions Relating to Provisions, 18 Aug. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/53.

could not hold eight months' provisions for his crew of ninety-five.⁷⁹ In 1705, Charles Stucley in the fourth-rate *Deptford* wrote from the Hamoaze to inform the Admiralty that in order to stow away all supplies he would have to store some between decks. This would nullify the use of his lower tier of guns. Stucley suggested that the Admiralty issue money to buy a portion of his bread in New England as he received information via the recently returned *Jersey* that bread proved cheap and plentiful in the colonies at that time.⁸⁰ Two years later, Matthew Teate in the *Reserve* lamented that his bread room contained space for only half of his allotment, and concluded that he would have to send the remainder on board some of the Virginia merchant ships in his convoy.⁸¹ Writing from Spithead prior to his 1712 sailing to New England, Charles Brown (also captaining the *Reserve*) reported that the two cables the Navy Board requested he transport to New England could not be taken on board because of all the provisions stored for the voyage. Brown suggested that the cables be put on board the mast ships in his convoy as they travelled empty on the outward voyage, a solution the Navy Board endeavored to implement.⁸²

At the end of the Nine Years' War, the Admiralty took additional steps to ensure the frugal husbandry of provisions and stores for ships sent overseas. Beginning in 1696, captains received instructions to put their crews on short allowance for the duration of their voyage. With the exception of beer, six men would receive the food rations of four men "or otherwise as shall be judged best for the lengthening out your provisions,

⁷⁹ Capt. Wentworth Paxton, *Newport*, to Navy Board, 17 May 1694, TNA PRO ADM 106/454.

⁸⁰ Stucley to Admiralty, 3 Apr. 1705, TNA PRO ADM 1/2279.

⁸¹ Teate to Admiralty, 1 Apr. 1707, TNA PRO ADM 1/1272.

⁸² Brown to Admiralty, 5 Aug. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1471.

assuring the seamen they shall be duly paid for the same” once they had cleared the English Channel.⁸³ Captain Kiggins in the *Arundel* became the first New England station captain ordered to undertake such action.⁸⁴ Short allowance was a common occurrence in Europe during times of scarce victuals, and the sailors were to be compensated for the inconvenience with the distribution of short allowance (“pinch-gut” or “shorto”) money to purchase extra supplies themselves.⁸⁵

In the context of overseas service, the Admiralty viewed short allowance as a strategy for lengthening out the standard provisioning from eight to twelve months when facing uncertain supply routes.⁸⁶ The Victualling Board steadfastly believed that in the face of financial hardship, the payment of short allowance money remained cheaper than permitting full allowance on overseas voyages. The Board sharply rebuffed an April 1722 suggestion from Captain Durell that the daily rate contracted at New England of 7½ d per man per day rendered it cheaper to leave the men at whole allowance, rather than pay short allowance money.⁸⁷ The Board argued that while New England often sold provisions at favourable rates, this was the exception as prices could reach as high as 11 d or 12 d per man per day at other ports of call, and it was therefore better to leave all crews on short allowance for the entirety of their voyage.⁸⁸

⁸³ Admiralty, Instructions to Kiggins, 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21. Some evidence suggests that captains put their men back up to full allowance while in the colonies before the distribution of the 1716 general instructions. For example: Capt. Thomas Mathews, *Chester*, to Admiralty, 5 Dec. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

⁸⁴ Admiralty, Instructions to Kiggins, 4 May 1696, TNA PRO ADM 2/21.

⁸⁵ *Sergison Papers*, ed. Merriman, 236; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 374; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 193. As with all payments, short allowance money could frequently be delayed.

⁸⁶ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 17 June 1715, *Naval Administration, 1715-1750*, ed. Daniel A. Baugh (London: Navy Records Society, 1977), 410.

⁸⁷ Durell to Admiralty, 22 Apr. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694.

⁸⁸ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 15 June 1722, TNA PRO ADM 110/8.

6.2- Captains Versus the Victualling Board

The Victualling Board's preoccupation with economy by the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession reflected the need for fiscal responsibility in the wake of their debt-ridden past. Another important factor anchoring their concerns was the Board's responsibility for clearing provisioning accounts so returning captains could collect their pay. The commissioners carefully scrutinized captains for overspending when drawing bills of exchange. The independent and opportunistic behaviour of captains irritated the commissioners, who suspected fraud and embezzlement at every turn. Heightening the Board's fears was the way in which captains in the past had incorporated victualling into their strategies for extra income by shopping around to various merchants and pocketing the savings.⁸⁹ Paradoxically, beyond scarcity and price, the poor credit rating of the navy further inhibited the ease of resupply while leaving captains largely responsible for any negative consequences.

Once the captain arranged credit and drew bills of exchange, the job of actually supplying the ship fell to the purser, as was traditional. The relationship between purser and captain had been designed to prevent fraud by having one act as a check against the other.⁹⁰ Colonial merchants, however, came to mistrust the navy's repayment schedule for bills of exchange, and they frequently insisted on direct dealings with the captain before they would even speak with the ship's purser. The personal bond of a captain against the non-payment of bills sometimes became the only way merchants and

⁸⁹ *Naval Administration, 1715-1750*, ed. Baugh, 402-03.

⁹⁰ Davies, *Pepys's Navy*, 102; *Queen Anne's Navy*, ed. Merriman, 252-53; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, 392-94.

craftsmen would guarantee the repair and supply of warships, especially for transactions not covered by navy contracts.⁹¹

A particularly useful example comes from New York as it demonstrates the nature of the problem in a succinct fashion. In the summer of 1713, the fifth-rate *Triton's Prize* (Captain Richard Girlington) left station at Virginia for New York seeking supplies and a refit. On 22 August 1713, Girlington wrote to the Admiralty that no merchant in town would perform services on credit with bills of exchange on the Victualling Board until he put up his personal bond in case of non-payment. Several merchants then offered to provide him with credit, so long as he agreed to their rates of exchange and interest. The rate of exchange offered by Benjamin Tunnell was forty percent (£140 New York currency for £100 sterling) with five percent interest added on to the final bill. The late penalty was twenty percent on £100 sterling if the bill was protested double the time past which it was drawn, which was twenty to thirty days sight. Girlington made similar arrangements with Henry Lane. The exchange rate on sterling was what the merchants claimed they charged themselves, but Girlington observed that this was ten percent higher than two years previous, and he implored the Admiralty to pay the bills promptly to restore good credit with the local merchants.⁹²

The matter-of-fact tone within Girlington's correspondence demonstrates how such dealings with local merchants had become second nature by the War of the Spanish Succession. It also alludes to the degree that merchants could dictate the terms for supply

⁹¹ For a New England example: Campbell to Admiralty, 26 Aug. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1596.

⁹² This passage: Capt. Richard Girlington, *Triton's Prize*, to Admiralty, 22 Aug. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 1/1825. If Girlington needed to search for merchants willing to supply him, then it is probable that no victualling contract existed for the time being at New York.

agreements. Unfavourable rates prompted the Admiralty and Navy Board to instruct captains to purchase ordnance stores and naval stores only in the event of an emergency, and employ proper procedure diligently when drawing bills of exchange.⁹³ The navy further desired that captains curtail practices such as renting storehouse space ashore, employing extra watercraft, and hiring labour when cleaning and taking in supplies. Captains should have been able to facilitate all their ship's functions with the crew and boats available on board, and were to refrain from accepting quantities of goods that they could not stow properly.⁹⁴

The Victualling Board seemed to accept begrudgingly the sometimes-exorbitant rates for provisions in foreign parts, and it continued to believe captains incurred needless expense, delay, and possible fraud. In June 1715, the Board reported that despite the various measures introduced during the War of the Spanish Succession and its immediate aftermath to curb excessive spending, captains abroad continued to employ improper procedures and display erratic behaviour.⁹⁵ The Admiralty obliged with a list of standing instructions to all captains going overseas beginning on 23 August 1716. The instructions summarized and consolidated the individual orders issued within the last five years or so into a single set of thirteen articles regarding the proper procedure for resupply.⁹⁶

The general instructions for captains going on foreign voyages implored them to engage in the good husbandry of stores. Captains were not to set sail unless fully loaded

⁹³ Admiralty, General Orders Regarding Naval Stores, 15 Oct. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 2/44; General Orders Regarding Bills of Exchange and Purchase of Stores, 26 May 1712, TNA PRO ADM 2/45; General Orders Regarding Supply, 5 May 1714, TNA PRO ADM 2/45; General Orders for Drawing Bills on the Office of Ordnance, 31 Aug. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 2/47. All orders are addressed to captains serving, or intending to serve, in the West Indies and mainland colonies.

⁹⁴ Admiralty, General Orders Regarding Storehouses and Provisions, 3 Dec. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 2/48.

⁹⁵ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 17 June 1715, in *Naval Administration 1715-1750*, ed. Baugh, 409-10.

⁹⁶ Admiralty, General Instructions Regarding Expenditure of Stores, 23 Aug. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

with the necessary eight months' provisions, or as otherwise ordered. If not all the necessary supplies could be properly stored within the ship, the certificates of the captain and master had to be sent to the Victualling Board providing information on what provisions could not be stowed, and the port at which they received lading. Furthermore, the captains were ordered not to take on board any more provisions than necessary for completing the task at hand, or to purchase unnecessary services – in particular storehouses, water transport, or cooperage. At all times the proper officers on board the ship were to witness all surveys and transactions and note any irregularities, such as short proportion of provisions. All stores and provisions required proper stowage to avoid spoilage or embezzlement by keeping containers secure, and rotating older stock to the front of storerooms. The final instruction forbade captains from attempting to uphold the practice at home of providing fresh victuals.⁹⁷ Since 1704, captains, upon return to port, could request the distribution of fresh provisions to maintain or improve the health of seamen.⁹⁸ The expense proved too great in the colonies, so captains were to do it only once per week, twice for a sick crew.⁹⁹

The Victualling Board had not waited for the 1716 standing general instructions to begin the strict enforcement of their policies. The Board frequently caught captains by surprise when refusing to reimburse them for the full amount of expenses during service abroad, claiming that they overspent. Beginning with Thomas Mathews in 1709 and ending with Thomas Durell in 1736, seven out of the eleven captains within the New

⁹⁷ This passage: Ibid.

⁹⁸ Admiralty, General Orders, 14 Feb. 1704, TNA PRO ADM 2/31.

⁹⁹ Admiralty, General Instructions Regarding Expenditure of Stores, 23 Aug. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

England group had portions of their accounts contested by the Victualling Board.¹⁰⁰ If contestations from the Navy Board are added, then the total is nine.¹⁰¹ The desire of the Victualling Board to introduce greater order into the overseas supply regime, together with their general mistrust of officers, meant that whenever issues arose with the merchants holding navy contracts, the captains were more likely to suffer.

6.2.1- Thomas Mathews

As captain of the fourth-rate *Chester*, Thomas Mathews clashed with merchants Andrew and Jonathan Belcher over provisioning at Boston. Accumulated disagreements convinced the frequently touchy and abrasive Mathews that the Belchers engaged in “villainy.”¹⁰² The plight of Mathews illustrates a significant breakdown in the merchant-captain relationship. Mathews’ conflict with the Belchers complicated the victualling of *Chester*, ultimately affecting the ability of Mathews to perform his duty and clear his accounts to receive his pay.

Mathews suggested that trouble began when the letters he sent to the Victualling Board, containing his bills of exchange for the first set of provisions purchased, seemed to have miscarried. The unanswered letters left the Belchers restless as this delayed their

¹⁰⁰ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 5 Feb. and 7 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 110/5 (Thomas Mathews); Campbell to Admiralty, 8 Apr. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595; Brown to Admiralty, 9 Feb. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 1/1471; Victualling Board to Treasurer of the Navy, 16 Mar. 1715, TNA PRO ADM 110/7 (Edward Blackett); Victualling Board to Navy Board, 22 Mar. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 110/9 (Thomas Smart); Victualling Board to Admiralty, 17 June 1726, TNA PRO ADM 110/9 (James Cornewall); Durell, *Scarborough*, to Admiralty, 7 Feb. 1737, TNA PRO ADM 1/1695.

¹⁰¹ Durell, *Seahorse*, to Admiralty, 2 Sept. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694; Capt. Tyrwitt Cayley, *Rose*, to Admiralty, 22 July 1718, TNA PRO ADM 1/1596. Of the remaining two captains: George Prothero feared that the money he would have to spend on beer for the local caulkers would be rejected by the Navy Board, but it is unclear at present if this occurred. Prothero to Admiralty, 17 Nov. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 1/2283. No evidence was found in his correspondence to indicate that Capt. Thomas Marwood experienced similar problems.

¹⁰² Mathews to Admiralty, 5 Dec. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

receiving payment.¹⁰³ Mathews, meanwhile, believed that the Belchers hoarded stores in order to engage in profiteering, and endeavoured to embezzle provisions that had been purchased for the aborted 1709 attack on Port Royal. In October 1709, Mathews attempted to order provisions in quantities less than those established as a minimum order, referred to as “broken proportions.” Mathews intended his ship’s company to consume the provisions already on board, with the broken proportions compensating for ones lost to spoilage. Mathews believed he was saving money by not risking the remainder of his provisions to decay.¹⁰⁴ The Belchers replied that their contract with the Admiralty did not stipulate the provision of victuals at less than full amounts, except for the bread and peas they had stockpiled for the cancelled expedition.¹⁰⁵ Two days later, Mathews requested two months’ bread, peas, and oatmeal out of the leftover stock. On 26 October, Mathews’ purser placed a further request for butter and cheese, reporting back to Mathews that the Belchers seemed to be delaying delivery.¹⁰⁶

The disagreements continued in December 1709 with confusion over bread. Upon arriving at Boston in October, Mathews requested a supply of bread for two months from the 1709 stocks, what he referred to as the “Queen’s bread.” Apparently, unknown to Mathews, this bread had already been rejected by his officers as moulding, and none had been sent in its place. When ordered to the West Indies that December, Mathews requested five months of provisions, but came up short of bread; only then did he discover that the rejected delivery of bread had not been replaced. Mathews seemed

¹⁰³ Mathews to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094. Mathews complained to the Admiralty and recollected copies of his correspondence with the Belchers in a dossier.

¹⁰⁴ Mathews to Andrew and Jonathan Belcher, 18 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹⁰⁵ Belchers to Mathews, 18 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹⁰⁶ Mathews to Belchers, 20 and 26 Oct. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

convinced that the Belchers had conspired to keep the Queen's bread for themselves as the merchants admitted that they did not think it necessary to send down the stockpiled bread specifically. This further irritated Mathews as portions of the current supply also proved mouldy, with no other supplies immediately to be had in town. In his report to the Admiralty, Mathews maintained that the Belchers did not believe him when he insisted that the original bread had been mouldy, instead they argued that the bread had been simply rejected outright by *Chester's* officers. Mathews became convinced that the Belchers had attempted to claim credit for the loss by swapping the bread rejected as unfit by *Chester's* officers with bread that had already been purchased for the aborted expedition against Port Royal.¹⁰⁷

In July 1710, Mathews clashed again with the Belchers over the providing of fresh victuals in port, which Mathews was permitted to do once a week.¹⁰⁸ When scurvy broke out among *Chester's* crew, Mathews ordered the Belchers to supply him with fresh beef in lieu of salt beef of equal weight.¹⁰⁹ The Belchers protested, stating that the price of fresh beef locally was nearly double that of salt beef, requiring that Mathews issue a warrant, and then account for the price differential. In any event, it was not the proper killing season, so securing a sufficient supply would be difficult. The merchants pointed out five other warships that had sought supplies of fresh meat while provisioning at Boston the previous summer, and all had accounted for the price differential. What Mathews asked of them, the Belchers complained, was unprecedented.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ This passage: Mathews to Admiralty, 5 Dec. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹⁰⁸ Admiralty, General Instructions Regarding Expenditure of Stores, 23 Aug. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 2/49.

¹⁰⁹ Mathews to Belchers, 11 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹¹⁰ Belchers to Mathews, 14 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

In answering the Admiralty's queries on these matters, the Victualling Board supported the Belchers and upheld their contract. They added that Mathews should have had no cause to order broken proportions if victualling his ship properly, and rejected the captain's requests for price adjustments on his accounts. The Victualling Board did state that they would nevertheless write to the Belchers and remind them to ensure that the Queen's ships remained supplied in a timely fashion.¹¹¹ The Board recognized that the only way they could solicit contracts from merchants in the colonies was to ensure that captains did not utilize alternative sources of supply.¹¹² Captains might claim extenuating circumstances, such as availability or cheaper rates elsewhere, but by not receiving supplies from proper channels, it put contractors at risk and made them less inclined to keep necessary supplies in stock, so as to avoid spoilage. The Victualling Board's bias meant that they tended to suspect naval captains of lining their pockets, rather than to accept that the navy experienced real difficulties in the colonies as its officers attempted to keep their ships properly supplied and provisioned. Erratic behaviour such as that exhibited by Mathews only reinforced the Victualling Board's perceptions.¹¹³

Six months after the broken proportions incident, another conflict emerged regarding the trimming (construction and repairing) of extra casks to fill with victuals. The Victualling Board rejected a bill worth £52.05.03 drawn by Mathews for the trimming of casks by a third party at Boston. The Board explained that the ship's own cooper should have performed such a task, and if requiring outside assistance for any reason, then the Belchers should have been given the duty. As no cause appeared to

¹¹¹ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 5 Feb. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 110/5.

¹¹² Victualling Board to Admiralty, 22 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 110/5.

¹¹³ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 28 Feb. and 28 Oct. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 110/7.

warrant Mathew's securing assistance in assembling the barrels, the Board denied the claim.¹¹⁴ Mathews reported that he could not approach the Belchers for aid because they refused to trim casks for the navy, having been denied payment on a previous occasion.¹¹⁵ Yet another billing mishap occurred in the summer of 1712, when two of Mathews' bills of exchange appeared at the Victualling Board from New England with no accompanying documentation. Mathews insisted that he sent copies of his accounts via three different warships. All other personal and navy correspondence reached their destinations, and this left Mathews confounded over the missing documents.¹¹⁶

When the 1710 expedition to attack Port Royal arrived at Boston, Mathews received orders to provide assistance. Captain George Martin in the *Dragon*, commodore of the small force, directed *Chester* ahead to reconnoitre the Bay of Fundy. This required Mathews to arrange for a quick resupply from the Belchers.¹¹⁷ In the process, *Chester's* officers rejected twenty barrels of beef as unfit, and with no other stock available, Captain Martin lent out 2000 pieces.¹¹⁸ With the summer being too hot to brew beer, the Belchers sent wine as a replacement, as was common practice. The officers signing for the shipment, perhaps under haste, would only take the wine on board without the usual mandatory taste testing, but the Belchers rejected the idea and did not complete the delivery.¹¹⁹ Mathews claimed that the wine had never been sent, and drew a bill of

¹¹⁴ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 7 Aug. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 110/5.

¹¹⁵ Benjamin Rosewell (Purser of *Reserve*) to Mathews, 7 Oct. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹¹⁶ Mathews to Navy Board, 15 June 1712, TNA PRO ADM 106/676.

¹¹⁷ Mathews to Capt. George Martin, *Dragon*, 20 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹¹⁸ Martin to Admiralty, 15 Sept. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094. Martin reports the loan as 1900 pieces of beef and 600 pounds of suet.

¹¹⁹ Belchers to Mathews, 9 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

exchange to order wine from another merchant.¹²⁰ Mathews complained to Governor Dudley, Captain Martin, and the Admiralty, acknowledging that while local shortages drove prices up, the Belchers were accountable for supply as they had contracted with the navy to provide provisions and understood the amounts required. Mathews believed the Belchers carried sufficient quantities, but hoarded them for private gain.¹²¹

The Belchers, however, considered the warrant to supply beer outstanding, and endeavoured to have it ready upon *Chester*'s return. When Mathews returned to port and issued another warrant for resupply, confusion and conflict resulted from the previous order of beer, compounded by an additional request from the purser, Benjamin Rosewell. The purser needed "necessary money" to buy non-food items, such as candles, which he insisted the Belchers issue in sterling. The Belchers commented that they had not contracted to provide sterling, and claimed they did not know the current state of the market well enough to make an accurate exchange. Meanwhile, the Belchers complained to Mathews that Rosewell would not sign his receipts, and since the wine substitute had been refused, the warrant for the beer remained outstanding and the account still open.¹²² Mathews' initial response did not help matters. The captain stated that the current problems were not his concern, but a matter to be worked out between the Belchers and the purser. Nevertheless, Mathews believed that since the contract had been made in England, it made sense to pay necessary money in sterling.¹²³ Standing to lose, they claimed, between £400-500, the Belchers retorted that if Mathews could not compel the

¹²⁰ Mathews to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²¹ Mathews to Dudley, 15 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Martin, 20 July 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Admiralty, 13 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²² This passage: Belchers to Mathews, 9 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²³ Mathews to Belchers, 9 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

purser to do his job properly then they would refuse to provide further provisions for *Chester*.¹²⁴ Upon query, Rosewell stated that neither the beer nor necessary money had ever been delivered, this being the reason for the indents (invoices) remaining unsigned.¹²⁵

Although angered and unconvinced that the Belcher's had ever victualled him properly, Mathews needed six months' provisions for the West Indies. The Captain appealed to Governor Dudley that he would be unable to sail unless *Chester* obtained the necessary supplies. Mathews then wrote to the Belchers stating that he would ensure the signing of all proper receipts, necessary money excepted, if the Belchers would pay the bill for the wine that Mathews had to procure when the Belchers supposedly could not supply him. Alternatively, Mathews would oversee the signing of all receipts (those for necessary money and beer excepting) immediately to ensure the Belchers received proper payment.¹²⁶ Mathews eventually received his provisions for the West Indies, but had to obtain the necessary money himself by drawing extra bills of exchange on the Victualling Board.¹²⁷

The Belchers extracted themselves from the situation in 1711 when their contract conveniently expired, also just in time to avoid responsibility for victualling Admiral Walker's squadron. William Clarke, who provisioned warships for the Walker expedition upon the Admiral's warrant, also gave up any official capacity following the fleet's

¹²⁴ Belchers to Mathews, 11 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²⁵ Rosewell to Mathews, 11 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Belchers, 9 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²⁶ Mathews to Belchers, 9 and 12 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Dudley, 14 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

¹²⁷ Mathews to Admiralty, 20 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094; Mathews to Victualling Board, 20 Nov. 1710, TNA PRO ADM 1/2094.

departure, as he had not yet received payment.¹²⁸ With neither the Belchers nor Clarke to supply him, Mathews victualled the crew “from hand to mouth” for the remaining months on station until recalled home in the fall of 1712.¹²⁹ Mathews eventually secured money through bills of exchange from Andrew Faneuil to buy provisions from Henry Franklyn Junior. Nevertheless, because of local shortages, victualling for the return home took until December 1712 as bad weather caused several coasting vessels laden with food to founder *en route* to Boston. This left the whole town, including *Chester*, short on food, with bread, butter, and peas being available only at extremely high prices.¹³⁰ Upon sailing to Piscataqua at the end of the month, *Chester* found itself short on beer and Mathews feared the crew would “be forced to drink water which at this season is very uncomfortable,” and so endeavoured to organize the convoy as quickly as possible.¹³¹

Mathews received little reprieve following a rough winter crossing.¹³² Upon reviewing his books, the Navy Board concluded that Mathews did not properly account for all expenditures during his time abroad to the sum of £500.¹³³ Some of the discrepancies related to ordnance stores. While in the West Indies, Mathews had loaned the Governor of Montserrat twenty barrels of powder.¹³⁴ In addition, with *Chester* laid up in harbour careening during September 1712, Governor Dudley had requested that Mathews outfit a small ten-gun ship to cruise for a French privateer reported to be in

¹²⁸ Campbell to Admiralty, 26 Aug. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/1595.

¹²⁹ Mathews to Admiralty, 29 Oct. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095; Mathews to Victualling Board, 29 Oct. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095.

¹³⁰ Mathews to Admiralty, 3 Dec. 1712, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095. Fortunately for Mathews, the mast ships he was to escort home would not be ready until at least Christmas.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 1 Jan. 1713.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 11 Feb. 1713.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 30 Mar. 1713.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30 Nov. 1713.

Massachusetts Bay. Mathews' lieutenant and one hundred men captured the vessel, but expended some ordnance stores in the process, which the Ordnance Board refused to refund.¹³⁵ This forced Mathews to bring his officers to London upon their discharge to resubmit the proper vouchers, which was time-consuming and expensive. Mathews requested a partial clearing of his account, so he could at least collect some of the four-and-a-half years of pay due to him, and be eligible for the half-pay list.¹³⁶

Still another contested claim came because of the assistance provided by Mathews to Admiral Walker's squadron in 1711. Walker had given Mathews orders to see to the victualling of 100 marines being returned to England. Mathews secured passage for the marines on board a merchant ship and drew bills of exchange for their provisions. The Victualling Board questioned his actions, stating that Walker's brief orders did not specify hiring space on a merchant ship or purchasing provisions in the manner that Mathews did.¹³⁷ After further audits, the Navy Board stated that they would clear Mathews' account of everything except £100, but they could do no more, leaving Mathews with difficulty in securing half pay.¹³⁸

Mathews is perhaps an extreme example of what could go wrong with overseas victualling. Yet on station at New England was not the first time (nor would it be the last) that Mathews ran afoul of the Victualling Board. In 1705, while captain of the *Kinsale*, Mathews took money from the navy to purchase wine for a trip to

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Mathews to Admiralty, 30 Mar. and 13 Apr. 1713, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095.

¹³⁷ Mathews to Admiralty, 12 Jan. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095; Victualling Board to Admiralty, 29 Jan. 1714, TNA PRO ADM 110/6; Walker to Mathews, 10 Sept. 1711, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095 and TNA PRO ADM 110/6.

¹³⁸ Navy Board to Mathews, 2 Mar. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095; Mathews to Admiralty, 12 Mar. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 1/2095.

Newfoundland. The *Kinsale* did not make the voyage, and the Victualling Board had to chase after Mathews for the advance.¹³⁹ The Victualling Board challenged Mathews for his provisioning the small squadron he commanded in India between 1722 and 1724, and charged him £58.10.10 against his accounts.¹⁴⁰ A 1724 court martial tried Mathews for several administrative inconsistencies related to the same squadron, but only found him guilty of having improperly transferred men to merchant ships, for which he was fined.¹⁴¹ In keeping with the navy's strategy of punishing offenders without eliminating their future employment, none of this in the long run prevented Mathews from reaching flag rank, nor his infamous 1744 conflicts with Admiral Richard Lestock in the Mediterranean.¹⁴²

A variety of mishaps, some unfortunate, and some self inflicted – including the row with the Belchers – contributed to the disorganization of Mathews' accounts. Notoriously prickly and argumentative, Mathews' behaviour only exacerbated his troubles; his apparent inability to keep his accounts in order coupled with the mistaken assumption that he could victual his ship at Boston in the same fashion he could in England. The captain, however, may have had a point regarding the Belchers and profiteering. Obviously, the Belchers did not endear themselves to Mathews, but some of their business practices also drew certain ire from the Boston townspeople, and also

¹³⁹ Victualling Board to Treasurer of the Navy, 18 Jan. 1706, TNA PRO ADM 110/3.

¹⁴⁰ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 12 Aug. 1724, TNA PRO ADM 110/9; Victualling Board to Treasurer of the Navy, 14 May 1725, TNA PRO ADM 110/9.

¹⁴¹ Court Martial of Thomas Mathews, 26 Dec. 1724, TNA PRO ADM 1/5271. The court dropped several charges when no one attended to represent the claims. Mathews was deemed blameworthy for improperly taking private goods on board related to piracy, but as regulations against so doing had not yet reached the squadron a guilty verdict could not be applied.

¹⁴² Daniel A. Baugh, "Mathews, Thomas (1676–1751)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Jan. 2008, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18332>.

Admiral Walker. They believed that the merchants hoarded grain to drive up local prices, and shipped foodstuffs to other, more lucrative, markets at inflated prices during times of want at home in Boston.¹⁴³ When the May 1713 food riot broke out, much blame fell on the Belchers, then in the process of exporting grain during a regional shortage.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately for Mathews, his inability to sort out his problems with navy regulation played into the fears of the various navy administrative boards, and this may have distracted attention from any nefarious dealings by the Belchers. As a result, Mathews paid the price when the navy withheld pay.

6.2.2- Thomas Durell

Temper or opportunism notwithstanding, expenses and rates of exchange could prove contentious for even the most diligent of captains. The case of Thomas Durell demonstrates this clearly. Durell, who appears to have been an honest and organized officer, received praise for his work on station from Governor Jonathan Belcher in the 1730s, and commanded surveying missions for the Admiralty engaged in mapping the coasts in southern Newfoundland, the West Indies, and Nova Scotia.¹⁴⁵ Yet late in 1724, the Navy Board decided to examine Durell's accounts for discrepancies regarding stores and supplies purchased for the *Seahorse* while at New England based on information within a letter they received from Boston signed only "W.R."¹⁴⁶ The Navy Board concluded that Durell had accepted an unfavourable rate of exchange, and thus spent extravagantly on resupply. The Board, therefore, refused to clear all of the captain's

¹⁴³ Walker, "Journal," 101; Batinski, *Jonathan Belcher*, 103-04.

¹⁴⁴ Sewall, "Diary," 20 May 1713, Vol. II, 384-85; Nash, *Urban Crucible*, 77-78.

¹⁴⁵ Durell, *Swift*, to Admiralty, 16 Sept. 1716, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694; Durell, *Seahorse*, to Admiralty, 10 Aug. 1722, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694; William Welch, "Research Note: Captain Thomas Durell's Charts of Nova Scotia," *Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society Journal* 11 (2008), 169.

¹⁴⁶ Navy Board to Admiralty, 23 Dec. 1724, *Naval Administration, 1715-1750*, ed. Baugh, 52-53.

accounts, leading to a reduction in pay. This forced Durell to submit a memorial to the Admiralty pleading to have the reductions on his wages overturned, amounting to £102.01.05 sterling.¹⁴⁷ The Navy Board refused to clear £62.03.09 sterling for what they considered to be an overcharge on the exchange. A further £31.13.09 (Massachusetts currency) had been deducted: £27.11.09 for cordage the Navy Board believed Durell had overpaid for; £ 2.10.00 for two barrels of tar; and £1.12.00 paid for refreshments to the merchant auditors who provided his certificates of authenticity. The cordage, tar, and hospitality amounted to £14.01.08 sterling. Durell received another deduction of £25.16.00 sterling for provisions provided to the ship's chaplain while at Boston.¹⁴⁸

Durell deduced correctly that the discrepancy arose from the Navy Board relying on the anonymous letter from Boston bearing "very false and malicious information," and an additional report as to New England rates of exchange by London merchants who had never resided in any of those colonies. In his remonstrance, Durell insisted that he kept *Seahorse* well supplied, cleaned the hull twice each year, and refitted three times to convoy the New England trade to the West Indies. In nearly four years abroad, the bills of exchange amounted to £1184.04.04. The expenses included pilotage, which Durell presumed was the same as, if not less than, that of previous station ships. During his time at Boston, Durell witnessed three other warships (*Feversham*, *Rose*, and *Shark*) outfitting at the same rates of exchange as charged to him, and he received credible information that their captains had passed their accounts without incident.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Memorial of Capt. Thomas Durell, 2 Sept. 1725, TNA PRO 1/1694.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Durell submitted copies of the certificates he collected from the Massachusetts governor and council, as stipulated in the standing instructions of 1716. Each time a transaction took place, the governor and various officials, merchants, and shipwrights notarized the rate of regional exchange. Noticeable among his certificates was the slight increase in the exchange rate between 1721 and 1724. After the Navy Board contested his accounts, Durell submitted fresh testimony confirming the past rates of exchange from several New England merchants then in England, and others who had previously lived in the colonies.¹⁵⁰ Durell went on to argue that the rope he purchased, through some error in dimension, weighed less for the same length than that purchased in England to Admiralty specification. With regard to the extra tar, the officers of the Deptford navy yard had concluded that Durell purchased excessive amounts to bream (coat) the sides of the ship. Durell countered that the colder New England climate forced him to bream the ship twice during the winter, requiring double the usual amount of tar.¹⁵¹

Durell defended his buying refreshments for the auditors as a small price to pay for their services, and that it was a customary gesture in Massachusetts to encourage merchants to provide the necessary certificates in order to avoid overcharges with regard to stores and provisions. Durell stated that they would not offer their time and expertise

¹⁵⁰ Durell to Admiralty, 2 Sept. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694. This letter contained copies of the following warrants and certificates: Governor Samuel Shute and Thomas Fitch, Certificate of Exchange, 25 Dec. 1720; Shute and Andrew Faneuil, Certificate of Exchange, 1 Dec. 1721; Warrant of Shute for audit to Cyprian Southack, John Coleman and Samuel Clark, 2 Nov. 1721; Southack, Coleman and Clark, Audit, 23 Dec. 1721; Warrant of Lt. Governor William Dummer to Southack, Coleman and Clark, 12 Dec. 1723; Southack, Coleman and Clark, Audit, 23 Dec. 1723; Dummer, William Tailer, and Faneuil, Certificate of Exchange, 23 Dec. 1723; Dummer, Nathaniel Byfield and George Cradock, Certificate of Exchange, 3 Oct. 1724; Warrant of Dummer for Audit, 29 Sept. 1724. Capt. Philip Dumar, Peter Luce and Clark, Audit, 3 Oct. 1724; Benjamin Faneuil, Joseph Lowe, Thomas Sandford, Samuel Baker, Francis Wilks, List of Exchange Rates, 1720-24, London, July 1725; J. Warburton, Certificate of Exchange, May 1724, London, 23 July 1725.

¹⁵¹ Durell to Admiralty, 23 July 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694.

without such compensation. It does not appear that *Seahorse* sailed with a chaplain, and Durell belatedly acknowledged the error of appointing one, but argued that this arose from standing custom in the colonies, and the precedent established by previous captains of retaining the service of one while at New England, for which their chaplains had received payment.¹⁵²

Durell came into conflict with the navy's spending policies (and the Navigation Acts) once again between 1732 and 1736, following further service on the New England station as captain of the sixth-rate *Scarborough*. Upon receipt of his orders to return home, Durell made the necessary arrangements, taking in no more than two months' provisions as instructed.¹⁵³ As *Scarborough* left in July 1736, Durell stated that he could not obtain beer for the voyage home as hot weather prevented brewing. Durell duly took in rum as a substitute from the victualling agent at Boston. The passage home took a quick twenty-five days, leaving *Scarborough* with 200 gallons of rum in two casks, which Durell stored on board when discharged at Deptford. The local excise officers took the rum into the customs house, and then charged Durell £20 import duty.¹⁵⁴

In February 1737, Durell wrote to the Admiralty asking for relief, as he had already sent several letters to the Victualling Board requesting that they discharge the rum into a ship travelling to a warm climate, where it would be of use. They replied that they could not do so without specific orders from the Admiralty Board.¹⁵⁵ A month later nothing had been done, although Durell had discovered that the *Diamond* would be

¹⁵² Memorial of Capt. Thomas Durell, 2 Sept. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/1694.

¹⁵³ Durell, *Scarborough*, to Admiralty, 9 Aug. 1736 and 7 Feb. 1737, TNA PRO ADM 1/1695.

¹⁵⁴ Durell to Admiralty, 7 Feb. 1737, TNA PRO ADM 1/1695.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

heading to the West Indies, and he again solicited to make a transfer. This time, the Treasury Board called Durell in to inform him that the rum still sat in the warehouse, and would remain there until the duty was paid. Once more Durell applied for relief as he had purchased the rum out of necessity to his crew and did not profit by it.¹⁵⁶ Although the details of how the affair was eventually resolved have yet to be determined, all of Durell's accounting problems, with the Victualling Board at least, had been cleared by 1739.¹⁵⁷

6.2.3- James Cornwall and John St. Lo

Two more examples that demonstrate how captains could lay at the mercy of the overseas victualling environment at New England are the cases of Captains James Cornwall and John St. Lo. Cornwall's *Sheerness* replaced Durell's *Seahorse* on station at Boston in 1724, while St. Lo in the *Ludlow Castle* arrived in 1725 for repairs following a violent grounding in Canso harbour. Andrew Faneuil, then supplying the navy at Boston, was approaching the end of his contract, and did not intend to renegotiate with the Victualling Board. In late fall of 1725, Faneuil received requests for provisions, but informed Cornwall and St. Lo that they would have to look elsewhere. The captains shopped around Boston, discovered that George Cradock (or Craddock) offered the best rates, and drew bills of exchange for eight months' provisions each.¹⁵⁸ Only twenty-five days after St. Lo wrote to the Admiralty Board concerning the lack of a contractor, the Victualling Board responded by stating that Faneuil's contract remained valid until the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 10 Mar. 1736.

¹⁵⁷ Victualling Board to Navy Board, 8 Mar. 1739, TNA PRO ADM 110/11.

¹⁵⁸ St. Lo to Admiralty, 5 Dec. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453; Cornwall to Admiralty, 27 Feb. 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

middle of January 1726, when a contract negotiated with London merchant John Caswall would replace it. Therefore, the Victualling Board continued, if Faneuil refused to honour his contract, Caswall's contact in Boston, his brother Henry, should have been able to supply provisions.¹⁵⁹

When it became apparent that Cornwall too had drawn eight months' provisions, the Victualling Board rejected both bills of exchange. If Faneuil had indeed reneged on his contract, and forced the captains to look elsewhere, the Victualling Board still did not feel that either of them had achieved the best bargain in dealing with Cradock. The Board argued that since both ships were already in America, eight months' provisions was too much, and would likely spoil before consumption. Granted, the Admiralty subsequently ordered *Ludlow Castle* back to southern Newfoundland and Canso for the 1726 fishing season, but, the Victualling Board argued, St. Lo could not have known this when purchasing supplies. *Sheerness*, meanwhile, was already at its station, and did not require eight months' provisions for any reason. Furthermore, both captains erred in paying for the provisions in full prior to delivery and without the proper vouchers. As the captain of a sixth-rate, Cornwall acted as his own purser, and did not submit any documentation to justify his purchase of eight months' provisions. The Victualling Board noted that they could not find the signature of St. Lo's purser on any of the documentation presented to support the purchases from Cradock, although he later drew a bill in April 1726 totalling £200 sterling for beer and other supplies to take *Ludlow Castle* back to Newfoundland. All of this appeared "very irregular and inconsistent" to the Victualling Board, and it

¹⁵⁹ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 31 Dec. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 110/9.

contradicted the 1716 standing instructions for captains provisioning their ships in the colonies.¹⁶⁰

The Admiralty Board accepted that Andrew Faneuil had given up his contract, and recognized that St. Lo and Cornwall had no choice but to accept the terms presented to them by the local merchants, or else risk the greater danger of leaving their ships without provisions. On 7 July 1726, the Admiralty issued orders for the Victualling Board to accept the bills of exchange on the condition that Cornwall and St. Lo cleared their accounts as usual.¹⁶¹ Undaunted, the Victualling Board merely changed tactics by refusing to issue certificates permitting the captains to clear their accounts, citing insufficient and improper paper work, and reiterating much the same reasons as before as to why the captains should be held responsible for paying the bills themselves.¹⁶² The Victuallers refused to accept the possibility that those persons contracted in Boston to supply the navy were unavailable. As a result, they remained firm in their belief that the actions of Cornwall and St. Lo contravened those instructions issued to combat abuse. The Victualling Board argued that to accept bills of exchange such as those drawn by Cornwall and St. Lo would leave the whole system open to continued fraud and embezzlement.¹⁶³

St. Lo attended on the Victualling Commissioners following his arrival back in England, and reported that the unusual circumstances regarding his purchase resulted from Faneuil dropping his contract, and the nature of the transactions with Cradock. On a

¹⁶⁰ This passage: Victualling Board to Admiralty, 17 June 1726, TNA PRO ADM 110/9.

¹⁶¹ Admiralty to Victualling Board, 7 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁶² Victualling Board to Admiralty, 7 Aug. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 110/10.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

practical level, St. Lo explained that he took eight months' provisions because Cradock had eight months' available, implying that this was a condition of the purchase. St. Lo and Cornewall did go first to Faneuil, who refused to comply with his contract, and referred the captains to other merchants, all of whom, except Cradock, declined to provide provisions at the rates contracted to Faneuil. All merchants, including Cradock, refused to deal with *Ludlow Castle*'s purser whatsoever, forcing St. Lo to broker the deal himself. The captain did not feel the usual vouchers applied in this case as the process did not include the purser. Finally, Cradock only agreed to Faneuil's prices on the condition of immediate payment, as he had no prior experience with victualling bills, although he does appear to have provided storage for those quantities not in use. St. Lo swore under oath to the truth of his explanations, and produced certificates in support of the transaction signed by one of his lieutenants and the boatswain of *Ludlow Castle*.¹⁶⁴

Once more, the Admiralty came to the aid of the two captains, first ordering the Victualling Board to clear St. Lo's account, and by 16 September 1728 no charge against him remained.¹⁶⁵ Unfortunately for Cornewall, the Victualling Board took longer to process his case, and he too arrived in person to present evidence like that in St. Lo's deposition. The Victualling Board repeated its objections, but acknowledged the Admiralty Commissioners' exoneration of St. Lo. They agreed that if Cornewall provided sworn statements confirming his costs, the Board would accept the bills in lieu of proper vouchers, which Cornewall maintained he had never received anyway.¹⁶⁶ The

¹⁶⁴ This passage: Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Admiralty to Victualling Board, 27 Aug. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 2/52; Victualling Board to Navy Board, 16 Sept. 1728, TNA PRO ADM 110/10.

¹⁶⁶ Victualling Board to Admiralty, 12 Mar. 1729, TNA PRO ADM 110/10.

Admiralty Board eventually issued an order to clear Cornwall's account on 2 May 1729.¹⁶⁷

6.3- Manning

Captains Cornwall and St. Lo ran afoul of the Victualling Board once their correspondence reached England, but their immediate problem at Massachusetts in 1725-26 lay in maintaining their complement, as outlined below. If dealings with merchants and tradesmen could be troublesome, at least their services could be readily found in a colony with a substantial fishery and deep-sea merchant fleet.¹⁶⁸ The reverse situation occurred when attempting to procure labour in the form of professional sailors. Acute labour shortages existed in the American colonies, especially for the skilled trades. As a result, the labour market in New England could favour sailors, especially during wartime. This rendered it difficult at times for even merchant vessels to secure enough workers. The efforts to do so on the part of merchants and merchant masters frequently led navy and government officials to level accusations of enticement using bounties, high wages, and protection.¹⁶⁹

The navy's principal method of obtaining sailors in time of need was to take sailors against their will with use of the quasi-legal press. Securing sailors by force or coercion had always been a problematic venture, although manning and impressment in the mid to late seventeenth century did not pose as many problems as it did during the late eighteenth century.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the protestations of local residents and their

¹⁶⁷ Admiralty to Victualling Board, 2 May 1729, TNA PRO ADM 2/52.

¹⁶⁸ Nash, *Urban Crucible*, 55-56; Innes, *Creating the Commonwealth*, 272-73, 300.

¹⁶⁹ Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America*, 247-48.

¹⁷⁰ Davies, *Pepys's Navy*, 108-09.

governments had rendered impressment unworkable in the colonies by the end of the seventeenth century.¹⁷¹ Yet during the Nine Years' War, at least one example exists of impressment executed along lines similar to those in England.¹⁷² On several occasions during the years 1695-96, Captain Fleetwood Emms in the fifth-rate *Sorlings* pressed sailors out of merchant ships, and operated a press tender for Boston and the surrounding area as far as Marblehead.¹⁷³ Emms also turned members of his crew over to the provincial vessel, the *Province Galley* (Captain Cyprian Southack), and the sixth-rate *Newport* during times when *Sorlings* remained in harbour refitting.¹⁷⁴

Evidence also exists of captains taking on local volunteers beyond those provided by governmental draft, and even brokering deals with sailors to maintain their complement. Captain John Evans in the sixth-rate *Richmond* (on station at New York for nearly five years from 1694 to 1699) employed several such strategies. During *Richmond's* tenure at New York, Evans took on local volunteers to make up his complement, and gave his word that he would discharge them upon recall home.¹⁷⁵ With *Richmond's* lay-up at the wharf each winter, Evans, desperate to keep his men from deserting to higher wages ashore, agreed to release them to seek employment, so long as they promised not to desert and return to the ship in the spring.¹⁷⁶ Evans claimed that the

¹⁷¹ Dora Mae Clark, "The Impressment of Seamen in the American Colonies," in *Essays in Colonial History*, no ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 205-07; Keith Mercer, "North Atlantic Press Gangs: Impressment and Naval-Civilian Relations in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 1749-1815" (Ph.D. Diss., Dalhousie University, 2008), 43-45.

¹⁷² Davies, *Pepys's Navy*, 107.

¹⁷³ Captain's Log, *Sorlings*, 8 Apr. 1695, 1 June 1695, 15 May, 2-3 June and 1 July 1696, TNA PRO ADM 51/3975. In total, Emms pressed forty men on these dates.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 7 Nov. 1694, 21 Oct. 1695. Emms also supplied men to Wentworth Paxton in the sixth-rate *Newport* on 21 Oct. 1695 and 6 Apr. 1696.

¹⁷⁵ Capt. John Evans, *Richmond*, to Admiralty, 5 July 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/1754.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 21 July, 1699.

trust gained with both navy crew and local sailors ensured that, for the entire time *Richmond* attended on New York, he did not have to apply to the government for a press warrant or a draft of men. Evans' strategy did, however, leave the ship forty short of its complement of 105 when orders arrived to return home. Subsequent requests for men contributed to a brewing conflict between Captain Evans and the new governor, the Earl of Bellomont, leading to the former's brief confinement.¹⁷⁷ Arrangements such as those made by Evans appear to have occurred less frequently as the War of the Spanish Succession progressed.

The general shortage of skilled labour, and reports of aggressive and indiscriminate pressing in the colonies, especially the West Indies, led colonial merchants and governments to complain to London.¹⁷⁸ The Privy Council responded with an Order in Council placing the authority to procure seamen strictly in the hands of colonial governors.¹⁷⁹ In 1697, Captain John Leader of the *Deptford* became the first New England station ship captain to receive orders not to impress any men directly, either within Boston or from any merchant ships. If he required men, and volunteers were not forthcoming, Leader had to make a formal application to the governor (as Vice Admiral in the colony and in pursuance of the Order in Council) for permission to press or receive a draft.¹⁸⁰ In 1698 Leader asked for, and received, permission from Governor Bellomont

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.; Admiralty List, Dec. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 8/6. Evans had been on excellent terms with the previous governor, Benjamin Fletcher.

¹⁷⁸ Order in Council, 3 Dec. 1696, *APC* Vol. 2, no. 652; Clark, "Impressment of Seamen," 203.

¹⁷⁹ Order in Council, 3 Dec. 1696, *APC* Vol. 2, no. 653; Clark, "Impressment of Seamen," 203-04.

¹⁸⁰ Admiralty, Instructions to Leader, 20 Sept. 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24; Admiralty to the Earl of Bellomont, 7 June 1697, TNA PRO ADM 2/24.

to press.¹⁸¹ Upon return to England in January 1699, and receiving orders to reduce his complement, Leader requested permission to discharge first those New England sailors he had pressed so they could return home to their families.¹⁸²

Perhaps owing to the unprecedented nature of the new orders, Leader still managed to encounter problems with his pressing. A complaint from the owners of a merchant ship, the *Charles*, accused Leader of several violations, including pressing men out of their vessel to the point where it could not sail. Upon receiving word of the complaint, the Admiralty stopped Leader's pay until the matter was resolved. Leader insisted that he had obtained a proper press warrant, one that precluded him from impressing all but sailors from incoming merchant vessels, and with which he complied. Leader further claimed that the eleven men he impressed from the *Charles* still left the ship with sixteen hands, more than enough for sailing to Europe during peacetime. The merchantman in question, Leader countered, did not sail due to a lack of sailors, but because a return cargo had not been arranged. Leader continued that the seven other ships from which he took sailors apparently had no trouble departing from Boston when the time came.¹⁸³

Leader's situation in New England illustrates not only the problems of resupply, but an important conflict of interest between the local orders given to captains, and the frequently winless situations they could find themselves in because of their Admiralty instructions. Not only did he receive a complaint against him for improperly pressing,

¹⁸¹ Leader to Admiralty, 17 Apr. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033. Bellomont issued two more press warrants to captains stationed at Boston. Kiggins to Admiralty, 20 June 1698, TNA PRO ADM 1/2004; Capt. Josias Crowe, *Arundel*, to Admiralty, 21 Sept. 1700, TNA PRO ADM 1/1589.

¹⁸² Leader to Navy Board, 25 and 27 Jan. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 106/528.

¹⁸³ Leader to Admiralty, 19 Apr. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

but the same complaint also charged Leader with lending some of his men to merchant ships in the fleet while they remained on the *Deptford*'s books. Furthermore, one of the merchant masters, named Everton, testified to having left money for Leader in a tavern. Whatever the origins of their disagreement with Leader, the complainants levelled as many charges against him as they could, especially ones guaranteed to elicit attention from the navy.¹⁸⁴

Leader countered the charges by arguing that he had lost many men to disease and desertion in the West Indies, New York, and Boston. In order to comply with Admiralty orders dated 5 June 1697 (requiring warships to maintain their complements) Leader had to make some arrangement for manning while abroad, and followed his instructions by obtaining a press warrant.¹⁸⁵ In response to the charges of lending sailors improperly, Leader justified this as an expedient based on the section of his instructions obliging him to offer any assistance possible to merchant ships, so long as no detriment to the navy resulted. Leader argued that he transferred the men to assist in loading cargo; otherwise the vessel in question would not have joined the convoy in time. While he did transfer the men to the merchant vessel without removing them from the ship's books, the captain explained that he did account for their absence with regards to victualling expenses. Leader confirmed that he carried merchant cash on board, but maintained the money he received was the customary fee entitled to captains for carrying specie, and not a

¹⁸⁴ For example: Captain Henry Wickam was fined £1000 and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment following the capture of his ship off Ireland, homeward bound from the West Indies in September of 1693. A mitigating factor in the court's decision was Wickam's weakening of his crew by lending men to merchant vessels in his convoy. David J. Hepper, *British Warships Losses in the Age of Sail, 1650-1859* (Rotherfield: Jean Boudriot, 1994), 16.

¹⁸⁵ Leader to Admiralty, 19 Apr. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

“gratuity” or convoy money, something which captains had been frequently accused of taking in the seventeenth century.¹⁸⁶

The navy did not initiate a court martial over the issue, but did leave Leader to defend himself in the common court. Leader’s final surviving letter in the Admiralty papers on the matter is a request for the services of the Admiralty solicitor, Edward Whitaker, to act as his attorney.¹⁸⁷ Leader, therefore, faced complaints of engaging in an overzealous search for sailors, despite maintaining that he followed instructions by obtaining a press warrant. The additional accusations of reducing his complement through lending sailors to stricken merchant ships and accepting convoy money appear spurious, but they nevertheless represented serious charges.

After the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, even the opportunity to request a press warrant was eliminated from the New England instructions. Captains could no longer obtain any men from the colonies under any circumstances, unless directly provided to them by the government. At first, any wastage due to disease or other causes was to be endured to the point where only enough men remained to sail the warship safely back to Great Britain, at which point the captain was to return home.¹⁸⁸ This stipulation lasted until the 1720 instructions given to Thomas Durell in the *Seahorse*.¹⁸⁹ All subsequent primary instructions to warships sent to New England up to 1739 did not contain any passage with references to impressment.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.; Bernard Capp, *Cromwell’s Navy The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 233-34, outlines the tradition of convoy money in the seventeenth century.

¹⁸⁷ Leader to Admiralty, 5 June 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033.

¹⁸⁸ Admiralty, Instructions to Blackett, 20 July 1713, TNA PRO ADM 2/46.

¹⁸⁹ Admiralty, Instructions to Durell, *Seahorse*, 29 June 1720, TNA PRO ADM 2/50.

¹⁹⁰ Admiralty, Instructions to Cornwall, 26 May 1724, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Marwood, 21 Dec. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 2/51; Instructions to Prothero, 2 Apr. 1730, TNA PRO ADM 2/52;

Although the navy forbade its captains to impress in the colonies as early as 1696, in 1708 “An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America” rendered the practice of impressment by the navy illegal in the colonies.¹⁹¹ Some confusion still existed among contemporaries (and later historians) as to whether this law remained in force following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.¹⁹² Regardless, it was clear that normal operational procedures for obtaining men could not be followed in the colonies. In the wake of the new instructions, several captains commented that they could not remain fully manned unless permitted a draft of sailors in one form or another.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, complaints of Royal Navy captains impressing without some form of permission from Massachusetts authorities between 1696 and 1739 are rare, and none concern any assigned station ship. As outlined in Chapter Five, Robert Jackson violated a principal rule of manning by procuring sailors without a proper press warrant from the government; pressing eight men from eight merchant vessels in harbour to make up those he lost. Jackson admitted he had no warrant, but justified his actions after receiving no answer from the Lieutenant Governor to his request, and believing the local merchants to be harbouring absconders.¹⁹⁴

In returning to the case of *Ludlow Castle*, a similar set of circumstances can be observed. Following its accident, the Admiralty salvaged *Ludlow Castle* from its

Instructions to Durell, *Scarborough*, 24 Feb. 1732, TNA PRO ADM 2/53; Instructions to Capt. Peter Warren, *Squirrel*, 20 Mar. 1736, TNA PRO ADM 2/54.

¹⁹¹ Great Britain, An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America, 6 Anne, c. 37, (1708), *Statutes of the Realm* Vol. 8, 804-808.

¹⁹² Clark, “Impressment of Seamen,” 210-12; Morris, *Government and Labor*, 275-76; Denver Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s,” *Early American Studies* 5 no. 2 (2007), 342.

¹⁹³ Leader to Admiralty, 17 Apr. 1699, TNA PRO ADM 1/2033; Teate to Admiralty, 10 Mar. 1709, TNA PRO ADM 1/2573.

¹⁹⁴ Capt. Robert Jackson, *Swift*, to Admiralty, 17 July and 1 Oct. 1702, TNA PRO ADM 1/1979.

misfortune by simply re-ordering it back to Newfoundland from Boston, thus sparing the ship a transatlantic crossing.¹⁹⁵ Unfortunately, the time spent laid-up at the wharf permitted sailors the opportunity to desert, and *Ludlow Castle* lost fifty-five of its crew of 200. In response, Captain St. Lo requested Lieutenant Governor Dummer for a draft of men.¹⁹⁶ The governor wrote back informing St. Lo that convention prevented him from pressing without the council's approval during times of both peace and war, and it appeared unlikely that they would grant the request.¹⁹⁷ St. Lo believed he had credible information that several of his deserted crew had signed on with the provincial sloop *Loyal Heart*, which carried a Massachusetts commission to go pirate hunting, and even accused the government of complacency by not preventing the enticement of sailors from *Ludlow Castle*. Local merchants, St. Lo continued, used a variety of methods to attract mariners, including an offer of sixteen guineas for sailors to make a return run to England.¹⁹⁸

Lieutenant Governor Dummer protested the accusations as insulting and damaging to the colony's reputation, especially as he saw to it that officials in all port towns received notice to publish advertisements calling on absent men to return to their ship or risk being labelled as deserters.¹⁹⁹ Despite his earlier subservience to the local merchants with regard to provisioning, St. Lo had already displayed an overt assertiveness to the Lieutenant Governor in upholding the prerogative of warship preferment for wharf-side berthing when laying-up for the winter. He complained that

¹⁹⁵ Admiralty, Instructions to St. Lo, 24 Feb. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 2/51.

¹⁹⁶ St. Lo to Dummer, 18 June 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

¹⁹⁷ Dummer to St. Lo, 20 June 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

¹⁹⁸ St. Lo to Admiralty, 1 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453; St. Lo to Cornwall, 1 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453.

¹⁹⁹ Dummer to Admiralty, 8 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

neither the proprietor of the wharf, nor the merchant ships then berthed, would make room for the King's ship, forcing St. Lo to browbeat them for a space.²⁰⁰ So when St. Lo suggested that he would be compelled to take men from inward-bound ships because all requests for men had been refused, the deteriorating patience of the town towards him reached the point where he feared arrest or a mob if he stepped on shore.²⁰¹ It would seem that St. Lo did not press, as he returned to Canso and Newfoundland without further discussion of the incident in his surviving correspondence, and no public complaint appears to have been made.²⁰²

Despite the elimination of specific orders not to press from his 1724 instructions, James Cornewall in 1726 certainly seemed under the impression that an application to the Massachusetts government for a draft was necessary to acquire extra men to combat pirates.²⁰³ As with St. Lo, Cornewall could not obtain a draft of men because of local efforts to procure sailors for provincial projects. Cornewall's frustration (as outlined in Chapter Four) culminated in his firing on the *Loyal Heart* for not heeding warnings to stand to. Later, Cornewall attempted to confiscate the vessel's flags as they looked suspiciously like the royal colours. Several near battles with the *Loyal Heart*'s crew alienated the local populace and if reluctant to supply men before the incidents, Cornewall reported afterward that someone within the Council commented publicly "that if I should stay here these twenty years, they would never supply me with a man."²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ St. Lo to Admiralty, 8 Dec. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453; St. Lo to Dummer, 14 Nov. and 5 Dec. 1725, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453.

²⁰¹ St. Lo to Admiralty, 1 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/2453.

²⁰² Ibid., 28 July 1726.

²⁰³ Cornewall to Admiralty, 4 July 1726, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 14 July 1726.

Cornewall speculated that he might be able to find sailors at Newfoundland, but the prospects from Boston did not look good.

The government did eventually grant Cornewall's request for a draft of men to make up his complement for *Sheerness*' 1726 spring cruise. In the process of various parties lodging complaints against Cornewall in the wake of the *Loyal Heart* incidents, several allegations against him surfaced out of Boston; including *Sheerness* malingering in port, the expropriation of salt for personal gain while at Salt Tortuga, and the weakening of his ship by lending out men to merchant vessels.²⁰⁵ The Admiralty eventually quashed the complaints against Cornewall, but in the meantime it left Dummer and the Council no choice but to provide *Sheerness* with sailors. To do otherwise voided their accusations of Cornewall's inactivity on the safety issue of sailing undermanned to fight pirates, something which might reflect badly on the province.²⁰⁶

The Admiralty exonerated Cornewall, but he still felt the need to rebut his accusers, remaining unsure as to the Admiralty's full opinion of his actions. Word of the reprieve had reached Massachusetts and again prompted grumbling from some of the Council members, who alleged that any further indiscretions on Cornewall's part would be dealt with summarily, and left for the Admiralty to undo later.²⁰⁷ Cornewall outlined that he did indeed lend men to a merchant vessel, it being a large New England ship that had been deserted by its crew, and his instructions obliged him to aid merchant shipping whenever possible. The loan occurred during a period when there would have been no immediate need for *Sheerness* to put to sea. Eighteen seamen and two petty officers

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 14 Oct. 1727.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 16 May and 14 Oct. 1727.

assisted in the rigging and fitting of the merchant ship and after three weeks of work the merchant master returned them. Cornwall then pointed out the irony of his assisting local merchants, yet being unable to obtain a draft from the colonial government to make up his complement.²⁰⁸

To the charge of staying too long in port, Cornwall challenged that upon returning from the West Indies, the ship was refitted for sea, but Lieutenant Governor Dummer instead requested that Cornwall divide his crew between two sloops under his lieutenant to campaign to the eastward, and participate in the ongoing war with the Amerindian nations to the northeast. Upon return, Cornwall had the ship careened, and by then it would have been time for a convoy to the West Indies. With no convoy being ordered, the crew prepared *Sheerness* for a winter lay-up. When the time came for *Sheerness*' spring fitting, the Massachusetts government provided no draft of men as usual, but instead fitted out their own sloop to act independently of the navy against pirates, thereby preventing Cornwall from attending to the same service. Finally, against the charge of expropriating salt for private use, Cornwall claimed that the only salt he came in contact with at Salt Tortuga was when assisting in its equal distribution to smaller vessels in less fortunate positions along the salt pond. The gathering of salt being an organized and communal endeavour, it would have made any attempt at fraud a particularly public one.²⁰⁹

Cornwall stayed on station and soon faced a crisis more familiar to other captains traversing the Atlantic. *Sheerness* joined the New York station ship *Lowestoft* in

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 14 Oct. 1727.

²⁰⁹ This passage: Ibid.

searching for a pirate reported in waters off Virginia.²¹⁰ Upon being caught in a storm, both ships lost all sails and rigging. Struggling back to Boston, Cornwall had to wait for stores and rigging to come from England the next spring. Cornwall could probably have taken cold comfort from the fact that New Hampshire masts represented perhaps the one item universally available to all ships and vessels in the region.²¹¹

6.4- Conclusion

Effective resource management determined the freedom of warship movement and the behaviour of captains as much as did the structure of operational command. Local economies (especially New England) could accommodate those ships sent to protect them, but periodic shortages and price fluctuations could interrupt full capacity. Obtaining a consistent quantity of stores and provisions in the colonies remained an ongoing problem with supplying warships on overseas service. The navy's lack of adequate facilities overseas provided another hurdle. The system of bills of exchange, supplemented with later contracts, permitted captains to keep their ships supplied, but it also transferred upon them greater responsibility for victualling. From the perspective of naval administrators, overseas victualling, like operational command, compromised direct supervision over warships and this, of course, was reflected in the orders and instructions given to captains regarding resupply. As their accounts also gave the navy another method of distant control, captains found themselves especially vulnerable to sudden market fluctuations and other problems. Following the War of the Spanish Succession, the navy, especially the Victualling Board, attempted to consolidate its provisioning

²¹⁰ Cornwall to Admiralty, 19 Oct. 1727, TNA PRO ADM 1/1598.

²¹¹ Ibid., 27 Nov. 1727.

system to increase efficiency and reduce expense by employing accounts and captains' wages as a check against mismanagement and abuse.

Unfortunately, the growing stability of Atlantic networks still did not justify the heightened degree of rigour expected by the Victualling Board. The opportunistic bent associated with captains, meanwhile, continued to incubate an air of mistrust among naval administrators, especially when local circumstances (including shortages, defaulting contractors, fluctuating exchange rates, and the necessity of hiring private port facilities) suggested fraud when appearing on paper – more so when combined with human error. The Admiralty Board came to understand the situation and frequently had to act as intermediary between its captains and other branches of the navy, ordering accounts to be completely cleared in those instances when local contingencies obviously explained discrepancies.

The decentralized command structure overseas continued to leave captains to atone for shortages, and face the navy's poor credit rating among Atlantic merchants. This is evident in the troubles experienced by the New England station ships, whether they originated over victuals, stores, or warships maintaining their complement of sailors. Captains had little choice but to accept the conditions they encountered at either side of the Atlantic, facing the prospect of not carrying out their duty to the navy, or defaulting on their obligation to the crew. That individuals in the colonies realized this is reflected in the types of complaints launched against captains felt to have wronged colonial interests. The accusations levelled by colonial officials against captains such as Leader and Cornwall appear to have been inflated, but they still centred on the captains alleged affront to the rules and conventions of the navy as much as any identified insult to the

province. The complainants chose words for their ability to illicit immediate attention from the various government and navy bodies rather than for their strict veracity.

The numerous examples of captains encountering difficulties when resupplying at Boston suggest a pattern of difficulty with the fewest problems appearing during the first five years of the eighteenth century. But the degree to which Boston resembled other ports cannot be stated for certain until a more detailed comparison of the principal overseas ports of resupply can be obtained. All that can be concluded at present is that Boston contributed to the broader problems and concerns outlined in the general orders and instructions issued to all captains going abroad, suggesting several universal misdemeanours such as not employing the merchant contracted to supply the navy, or the overzealous rental of transportation and store housing. The system of supply could create a trap for captains and whether accurate or not, some, such as Mathews, faced accusations that they were either abusing their authority for private gain, or that they were incompetent. This situation influenced the type of treatment that captains received from navy administrators, thus perpetuating the existing culture of mutual mistrust.

Conclusion

The regular presence of Royal Navy warships on detached service in the North American colonies between 1660 and 1739 provides an opportunity to study a state institution with direct access to a British Atlantic Empire/Atlantic World frequently identified as decentralized and uncontrollable without extensive compromise and negotiation. The focus of this dissertation has been placed on the captains of detached warships sent on convoy and station ship duty. To do so, it has examined in detail the experience of the twenty-seven captains in twenty-four warships sent to the New England station at Boston, Massachusetts, between 1686 and 1739. In attempting to retain maximum control over its ships and crews, the Admiralty obliged its captains to follow an increasingly expansive and rigid set of orders and instructions because of (and often in spite of) the need to compromise and negotiate the terms of their work environment. In establishing remote control, the navy granted colonial governors and governments operational privileges over individual warships assigned to their jurisdiction. The Admiralty designed its orders and instructions for overseas duty to temper conflict, but confrontations could not be eliminated, especially when all parties found themselves in competition for meagre resources within the Atlantic World. Such analysis demonstrates that, through the agency of its captain, the navy can be examined as an institution within Atlantic and imperial networks as suggested by the concept of Cis-Atlantic history proposed by Armitage.

In asking what the North Atlantic meant for captains of the navy, this dissertation, out of necessity, commenced by contemplating basic questions concerning colonial deployment. The navy in North America during the later Stuart and Augustan eras has,

unfortunately, received scant attention from mainstream historical study (including naval, colonial, imperial, and Atlantic sub-genres), and the modest interest generated by the dozen or so warships off the coast of North America before 1739 is becoming dated. Some studies have acknowledged the broad importance of British naval power for imperial development and highlighted the navy's essential role in areas such as Newfoundland and the West Indies, but the history of naval activity at the local level is frequently overlooked, or dismissed, despite the availability of sources. This lack of interest should be surprising given the frequent attention to sailors, pirates, maritime communities, the fisheries, and merchant trading networks within recent themes of the British Atlantic World and British Empire. Such lacuna is, however, not surprising given the overwhelming attention of many naval historians towards sweeping concepts of seapower, and the virtual ignorance of the navy among other historical sub-genres until common interests intersect after the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739. For such reasons alone, the study of convoy and station ship captains within this dissertation contributes to knowledge of the navy within the British Atlantic Empire between 1660 and 1739. Nevertheless, several conclusions can be reached with regard to the captain's place and experience within the late-seventeenth-century and early-eighteenth-century maritime world.

The method of ship deployment to the colonies evolved in response to the need to maximize limited resources for the protection of trade and maritime defence of colonies. By the end of the Nine Years' War, the navy had established regular convoys to Newfoundland and Virginia, with periodic convoys to New Hampshire, and deployed station ships to New England, New York, and Virginia, with station ships to South

Carolina and Georgia, and a convoy to Canso, coming later. All captains engaging in transatlantic voyages received orders to escort any merchant ships and vessels desiring convoy and travelling in the same direction. In dispatching these warships, the navy demonstrated flexibility with the transferring of operational control to colonial governments, and restricted that control with specific orders and instructions to its captains outlining the parameters for completing the tasks requested of them. When required, the Admiralty drafted additional orders and instructions as prolonged service in expanding colonies generated fresh contingencies. This frequently included the entrenchment of specific assignments originating out of colonial innovation, but formalized within the orders and instructions. New instructions expressed the navy's sanctioning of such actions with the retention of order and control being the long-term goal. Examples of such evolution have been outlined with regard to activities toward the north east of New England involving Acadia/Nova Scotia and the fisheries, as well as to the south with the yearly convoys to Barbados and Salt Tortuga. Additions to the orders and instructions suggest that navy and government policy makers do not appear to have seriously considered a substantial overhaul of the trade protection service, especially while preoccupied during the two wars between 1689 and 1713.

Historians (notably Steele) have pointed out that captains on detached service received operational orders, and permission to engage in any local activity, primarily from the civilian institution of colonial governor rather than directly from naval personnel. Few scholars, however, have elaborated upon such observations, or, more importantly, acknowledged that the navy established control mechanisms on its policies through the orders and instructions given specifically to its captains, in conjunction with

the evolution of daily standing instructions for ships and crews applicable wherever they sailed. Captains on detached duty reported directly to the Admiralty secretary rather than the Board of Trade, Secretary of State, or other government official with regard to the daily operation of a warship. Without the benefit of squadron or regional commanders, this system placed great responsibility on the captain of each individual warship. The combination of these factors limited the extent to which captains could endanger their expensive ship and highly trained crews by following operational orders of dubious intent or undue risk emanating from colonial governments.

The Admiralty's practice of holding the commanding officer directly accountable for the well-being of a warship, while granting operational privilege to certain colonial governments, explains why captains remained a daily part of maritime activity throughout the British Atlantic Empire, yet seemingly kept at arm's length from colonial development. Even during the early days of naval deployment, when primordial orders and instructions covered fewer contingencies, the navy strove to retain control over its distant ships, something easily overlooked when discussing the history of the navy in the colonies. The navy's orders and instructions focussed on the captains' duty to manage their detached warship first, and then carry out their primary roles of protecting trade and defending colonies ahead of any colonial or imperial policy.

In reaching any conclusion, to see the navy strictly in strategic or tactical terms blurs those problems which captains faced on a daily basis, problems exacerbated by the lack of facilities and structures found when taking warships abroad. The responsibility of captains to ensure the integrity of the warship and health of the crew in the form of repair and resupply kept them preoccupied in an area of the maritime world that was often

lacking consistent access to goods and services. It has been established that the port of Boston could easily handle most material needs of warships serving New England, as well as those of other stations, so long as the system did not become overloaded, as it did with the arrival of the Walker expedition in 1711. Nevertheless, warships dealt with the same limits and shortages that were facing all shipping in the colonies and frequently no one, including the navy, could find sufficient quantities of some items. Therefore, keeping a ship in operational condition, already a full-time challenge for crews, required heightened diligence in areas where sea ports could not guarantee full service. Acknowledging these points is important because they influenced the behaviour of captains in the process of carrying out their duties, and they explain the attitude of some colonial officials who viewed even a small warship as a valuable resource.

Although the navy was an essential state institution connected to the highest levels of government, the Admiralty sent its detached warships and their captains out into an Atlantic world to interact directly with persons who were often far removed from high politics. As has frequently been discussed in this dissertation, governors and governments were the initial point of contact, followed by merchants, but captains and crews met with an Atlantic world frequently inhabited by persons who could be far (and farthest) removed from imperial networks. Dockyard caulkers in Massachusetts, for example, may not have had direct contact with the monarch, members of parliament, or Admiralty commissioners, but they would have had contact with the captain of the station ship sent by those institutions to protect everyone's interest. Collectively, these caulkers protesting the terms of their labour contract could nevertheless impede the progress of a captain under orders to keep his ship in good repair and be at the ready to receive

instructions from the colonial government, facing repercussions if he proved unable to comply, as was the case with Captain George Prothero in 1730. The agency and influence of the caulkers did not dissipate once a ship left both yard and colony as their prices could haunt captains accused of overspending once they submitted their accounts to the navy in order to receive their pay.

While the navy as a whole displayed an elasticity acknowledged by historians such as Baugh and Rodger, the rigidity of particular navy offices created the potential for conflict when combined with the frequent opportunistic bent of captains seeking enrichment and compensation for the paltry financial remuneration from their employer. Over time, the navy expanded its instructions regarding the purchase of victuals, stores and services, but the Admiralty Board came to realize that extenuating circumstances regarding the vagaries of prices faced by captains sometimes fell outside the parameters set by their printed instructions. Unfortunately, other offices such as the Victualling Board, Ordnance Board, and Navy Board sometimes felt less generous. Thus, captains streaming out into the Atlantic far away from institutional eyes began interacting with persons such as merchants and governors who sought to exploit similar opportunities, and faced the same environment of limited resources. Captains did not automatically intend to circumvent the rules of the navy, but the past reputation of captains combined with perceived (and actual) evidence of fraud frequently precluded sympathy from some groups.

Meanwhile, despite incidents in which captains and colonial interests found themselves in public conflict, contact between the navy and colonies was not universally negative. All colonial subjects (not just governors and merchants) benefitted from the

protection offered by the navy as they participated in Atlantic and global trading networks. Yet prior to 1739, at least, the navy did not interfere with colonial societies beyond the maritime communities of various port towns. This is an important point to reiterate given the regular presence of the navy in the colonies, and the interaction between captains and royal government beginning at the Restoration and becoming more permanent by the early years of the Nine Years' War. Some captains certainly bemoaned their treatment at the hands of colonials (in particular the apparent lack of respect, and lack of deference to order in the colonies), and such incidents have often overshadowed others who encountered less difficulty while abroad. Thomas Durell in the mid-1720s and mid-1730s faced greater problems with the Spanish (then technically at peace with Great Britain), and the Navy and Victualling Boards during his overseas service, than he did from the supposedly disobedient and unruly New Englanders – albeit an anonymous letter from some displeased party in Boston initiated some of his problems. Instead, Durell received praise for his efforts from Governor Jonathan Belcher in the 1730s. As a merchant, Belcher sold provisions to the navy in previous decades, but did not hesitate to express his displeasure towards less cordial officers, as witnessed by the conflicts with Thomas Mathews and James Cornwall (the latter occurring while Belcher served on the Massachusetts council). Alternatively, James Campbell conflicted with independently minded Boston shipyard workers when he felt they overcharged for service, but the fisheries patrols he conducted in 1712-13 brought praise from the Massachusetts merchants who requested the service.

Governor Joseph Dudley in particular recognized the value of station ships in securing both trade and the coasts. Dudley's relationship with the navy appears to have

been far more productive than that of his colleague Samuel Shute, who instead chose to compete with captains, and to abuse his privilege over the warship assigned to his jurisdiction rather than work with it. Governor Edmund Andros also acknowledged the important role that warships could play in regional stability, and established a good working relationship with Captain John George, even when both faced accusations of contributing to the outbreak of war with the Abenaki in 1688. When news of the Revolution of 1688 reached Boston the following year, conflict and turmoil descended upon Captain George because of his association with an unpopular governor. Accusations that George did not perform his duty to protect the people and trade of New England were demonstrably false, and obviously polemic in nature, despite George's opportunistic attempts to profit from his enforcement of the Navigation Acts.

The growing reach of convoys and station ships required the Admiralty to enhance and expand their orders and instructions, and this demonstrated recognition that overseas service thrust captains into a complicated British Atlantic Empire. Yet as captains strove to carry out their orders, adherence to the Admiralty's operational parameters often left them in conflict with their standing instructions and procedures. This is particularly evident as the navy strove to instil in its captains fiscal responsibility, and universal patterns of professional behaviour. The Admiralty used the orders and instructions as a favoured method of controlling commanders for routine situations. Captains unable, or unwilling, either to comply with their instructions or balance their ships' accounts, frequently found themselves unable to collect all of their pay and benefits. This method of control worked to keep captains available for future employment should they make errors in areas such as husbandry or bookkeeping.

Regardless of heavy-handed employment regulations, the navy had little problem attracting capable officers as state service offered aspiring gentlemen upward mobility and a respectable career; its inadequate pay regime, however, could retard material advancement. This forced captains to search for wealth and other means of advantage, some of which potentially contravened navy policy, in addition to being of dubious legality or morality. Captains at Newfoundland demonstrated clearly the variety of approaches they might employ to generate income and favour without the interference of any direct naval command structure, or local government as existed in the American colonies. When faced with an entrenched colonial government, the private activities of captains became less obvious, although still identifiable. Some of the methods employed at Newfoundland included overt displays of fealty to crown, government, and navy, as in the cases of Thomas Cleasby and Josias Crowe, while others exhibited a more opportunistic flavour, as with Sir Robert Robinson's projects, and still others contained elements of fraud, such as Andrew Leake's fishing venture.

The culture of opportunism that developed among the sea officer corps, clearly demonstrated at Newfoundland, created a vicious circle by the time of the War of the Spanish Succession, when the Victualling Board decided to tighten its control over captains' accounts. As the navy did not develop permanent facilities in the colonies, it left the ultimate responsibility for resupply in the hands of captains. Fearful of fraud and waste, and mindful of the self-interested reputation of captains, the Victualling Board often refused to consider the very real problems of supplying warships overseas, forcing the Admiralty Board to intervene on behalf of captains obviously caught within the fluctuating economic conditions in the western Atlantic. Captains James Cornwall and

John St. Lo had no choice but to accept victuals within the conditions set by local merchants, regardless of whether the Victuallers thought it fair or just. Obligated to clear disputed accounts in order to permit affected captains to receive at least some of their pay, the Admiralty Board recognized that the economic environment in the colonies had not grown to the point where the Victualling Board could demand rigid obedience to instructions, regardless of any existing fraud or private enterprise. In contrast, the Admiralty Commissioners proved less willing to clear all of Thomas Mathews' contested accounts, as it would appear he was to blame for some of the mishaps, and his prior indiscretions doubtless stripped him of some credibility with regard to his accusations against Andrew and Jonathan Belcher, whether or not they were true.

Both the navy and colonial governors understood that the warship itself could be a valuable resource in peripheral areas bereft of permanent or significant imperial institutions. Governors employed warships to whatever advantage they could for their province and their office. The variety of jobs given to captains stationed at New England testifies to the utility of even a small warship. The summary of Matthew Teate's voyage found in the "Introduction" illustrates the wide range of warships as they sailed to protect the New England fisheries to the northeast, and trade convoys to Barbados and to Salt Tortuga in the West Indies, all of which tie into the principal New England industries of trade, shipping, and fishing. It is ironic then, that various interests used routine conduct, such as the sometimes lengthy down-times of warships in need of repair, and the necessity of winter lay-ups in the colonies, to strike out at unpopular or recalcitrant captains knowing that accusations of dereliction or fraud would attract the navy's attention. When complaining to the Admiralty regarding Cornwall's behaviour,

Lieutenant Governor Dummer and his associates chose offenses guaranteed to elicit queries from the Admiralty. The complaints against John Leader, Thomas Smart, and Thomas Cleasby also reveal similar tactics. Robert Jackson, who without question impressed illegally, still faced testimony intentionally designed to embellish his crimes to an imperial audience. Colonial subjects at all levels have not been given due credit for their understanding of the navy mentality and Admiralty procedure.

To protect their equipment and labour force against unnecessary risk and abuse, the navy attempted to limit the involvement of its ships in imperial affairs not related to colonial defence or trade protection. Captains, if they desired continued employment, had to participate in this transatlantic game regardless of what their private opinions might have been toward detached duty or a particular colony. It would appear that many officers (for example: John George and Thomas Durell) comprehended both the opportunities and limitations of colonial service while it seems others (such as Thomas Mathews and Robert Jackson) could not quite accept that, even though they attended on “British” colonies, the daily routine required lightheartedness, more perhaps than when in home waters.

Thomas Smart, Matthew Teate, and James Cornwall are good examples of captains who found themselves in direct competition for the same limited resources with the very governments that the Admiralty ordered them to obey and protect. Smart’s capture of prizes may have threatened peaceful interaction with Louisbourg (as well as any alleged illegal trade with New England), but a condemned prize offered instant income to the captor, hence the governor’s attempts to claim the French prizes for Massachusetts, and push the navy out of the picture. Teate desperately needed sailors in

order to keep his ship operational, yet remained under orders not to press sailors at Boston without a government warrant, something he was unable to obtain. At one point, Teate could not even carry out his orders to go to the West Indies, because he could not procure local supplies of cordage. Cornwall, meanwhile, faced similar problems as he struggled to obey one set of instructions to combat piracy, and another set dictating that he was not to engage any enemy with a ship too weak to defend itself because of a shortage of seamen. The Massachusetts government retained every right and privilege to commission private ships for its own purposes, but the insufficient pool of trained sailors, combined with the provincial ship *Loyal Heart*'s dubious choice for a flag, compromised not only Cornwall's pride, but also his ability to perform his duty. The captain's perhaps ill-planned attempts to confiscate the *Loyal Heart*'s jack pitted him against a local maritime community who also sought gain through the capture of pirates, leading him to fear for his own safety.

The ease with which colonial officials could imprison captains upon their coming ashore demonstrates the overall vulnerability of their position, despite being the commander of a heavily armed warship. Fortunately for John George, the dispersed nature of his instructions allowed him to escape serious recriminations from the revolutionary governments in Boston. George successfully argued that he owed deference to crown, parliament, navy, and his immediate orders and instructions. This strategy permitted him to downplay his own threat to the revolution and wait out much of the turmoil at Samuel Shrimpton's residence. George employed the contrasting elements of his orders and instructions effectively within the decentralized Atlantic environment. While the Admiralty stepped in to stabilize situations where possible, in other cases it let

the conflicts run their course. The court martial of Robert Jackson cleared him of any wrongdoing, but the navy denied him pay for the time he spent incarcerated as his actions led to the disappearance of his ship's account books. The navy returned Thomas Smart's prizes, but could do nothing regarding civil lawsuits or his imprisonment. The navy did not believe John Leader committed any crime against their regulations, but all they could do for his lawsuit in the common court was to provide the use of their lawyer.

The ignominy of a captain forced to borrow the navy lawyer to defend himself in court for operating within the tenor of his orders and instructions is one of many examples from this dissertation that point to the conclusion that captains were required to manoeuvre and negotiate their own presence within the colonies during a time when naval participation may be considered small and dispersed by the standards of squadron deployment in the principal European theatres of operations. When placed within an Atlantic context, the study of captains reveals hitherto under-explored aspects of the British Atlantic Empire, especially their considerable agency in carrying out their orders and instructions. The possibilities of expanding this research are considerable, and the methods employed herein are certainly capable of incorporating not only an extended examination of the navy, but also its relationship with colonial societies in other colonies and regions.

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APPENDIX ONE

Rates of Royal Navy Warships 1660-1739

Rate	Length (feet)	Tonnage	Men	Guns
1st	163-174	1486-1883	580-780	90-100
2nd	160-165	1395-1579	500-680	82-90
3rd	147-158	1045-1278	320-520	60-80
4th	118-148	551-987	160-365	42-64
5th	94-118	253-533	100-190	24-42
6th	56-98	125-273	60-115	10-30

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, The Royal Navy classified its warships according to rate. There were six rates, first rate being the largest. There was also a series of unrated ships such as fireships and bomb vessels. Originally, rate reflected the scale of captain's pay and while captains continued to receive their pay depending on the size of their ship, rate came to be identified as the number of guns carried. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the rating system altered somewhat in that the number of guns for each rate generally increased for third-rate ships and lower. This can be identified roughly by a comparison of the ships in Appendix Two. The pivotal example lay with the fourth-rate, usually acknowledged to be the workhorse of the navy for this period. In the 1680s, ships as small as forty guns could be classified as fourth rates. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the fourth rate usually carried

between fifty and fifty-five guns. During the seventeenth century, vessels of this size sailed in the line of battle, but were considered too small by 1688. At this stage, the fourth rate fell more into trade protection roles and formed the principal rate on overseas stations. Fifth-rates numbered between thirty and forty-eight guns, while sixth rates carried between ten and thirty guns. Most ships had two or three classifications within their rate. The first was the number of men and guns carried during war, the second the number carried in peacetime, and the third designated for overseas service, frequently similar to the peacetime complement. The lower figures for the guns and men columns frequently represent the peacetime or overseas complement.¹

This table does not represent precise parameters, but offers a point of comparison for the various sizes of Royal Navy warships. Warships between 1660 and 1688 were frequently smaller in terms of tonnage and number of guns carried. For example, a third-rate in the 1660s frequently carried around sixty guns and a burthen of 700-800 tons.² The size of the guns varied between warship rates as well. Length refers to the length of the main deck. Tonnage refers not to the dead weight of the ship, but to a mathematical calculation of the ship's hold capacity.

¹ David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy- Built, Purchased and Captured- 1688-1860* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1994), xi-xv. Lyon's numbers for the fifth and sixth-rates (the latter he gives no definitive number) have been adjusted based on samples from the Admiralty list books. Lyon acknowledges that in certain cases the system for rating was not as precise during the early period as it would be later in the eighteenth century.

² J.D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649-1688* (Barnsley YKS: Seaforth, 2008), 45.

APPENDIX TWO

Ships on Station: New England, 1686-1740

Boston

R	Ship	Captain	M	G	Begin	End
5	<i>Rose</i>	John George	105	28	1685 Dec.	1690 Aug.
5	<i>Conception Prize</i>	Robert Fairfax/ John Anderson	135	32	1691 Feb.	1694 Nov.
5	<i>Nonsuch</i>	Richard Short/Thomas Taylor	150	36	1692 Apr.	1695 Jan.
5	<i>Sorlings</i>	Fleetwood Emms	135	32	1694 July	1696 Dec.
6	<i>Newport</i>	Wentworth Paxton	110	24	1694 July	1696 Sept.
5	<i>Arundel</i>	William Kiggins	135	32	1696 June	1698 Sept.
6	<i>Orford</i>	James Jesson	95	22	1696 June	1698 Sept.
4	<i>Deptford</i>	John Leader	197	48	1697 Dec.	1699 Jan.
5	<i>Arundel</i>	Josias Crowe	115	28	1699 Sept.	1701 Sept.
5	<i>Gosport</i>	Henry Crofts/ Thomas Smith	115	28	1701 July	1705 Feb.
4	<i>Deptford</i>	Charles Stucley	280	54	1705 June	1708 May
4	<i>Reserve</i>	Matthew Teate	240	54	1707 Aug.	1710 Mar.
4	<i>Chester</i>	Thomas Mathews	250	54	1709 Sept.	1713 Mar.
6	<i>Squirrel</i>	James Campbell	115	24	1711 Sept.	1713 Apr.
4	<i>Reserve</i>	Charles Brown	280	54	1712 Sept.	1714 Jan.
6	<i>Phoenix</i>	Edward Blackett	100	24	1713 Sept.	1715 Aug.
6	<i>Rose</i>	Tyrwitt Cayley	100	20	1715 Apr.	1717 Oct.
6	<i>Squirrel</i>	Thomas Smart	100	20	1717 Jun.	1720 Aug.
6	<i>Seahorse</i>	Thomas Durell	115	20	1720 Aug.	1725 Jan.
6	<i>Sheerness</i>	James Cornewall	130	20	1724 May	1728 July
6	<i>Lime</i>	Thomas Marwood	130	20	1728 June	1730 Apr.
6	<i>Blandford</i>	George Protheroe	120	20	1730 May	1732 July
6	<i>Scarborough</i>	Thomas Durell	130	20	1732 Apr.	1736 Aug.
6	<i>Squirrel</i>	Peter Warren	140	20	1736 May	1740 July

Assault on Port Royal, 1710

4	<i>Dragon</i>	George Martin	280	54	1710 June	1711 Aug.
4	<i>Falmouth</i>	Thomas Riddall	280	54	1710 June	1711 Aug.
B	<i>Star</i>	Thomas Rochfort	25	4	1710 June	1711 Aug.

Piscataqua- Mast Convoy

4	<i>Samuel and Henry</i>	John Voleary	180	44	1692 July	1692 Dec.
4	<i>Samuel and Henry</i>	Charles Wagner	180	44	1693 June	1693 Dec.
4	<i>New Africa</i>	Robert Thompson	180	46	1695 May	1695 Dec.
5	<i>Unity</i>	Edmund Clarke	140	36	1695 Sept.	1696 Jan.
4	<i>Falkland</i>	Robert Hancock	197	48	1696 Dec.	1697 Jan.
4	<i>Advice</i>	Salmon Morrice	280	48	1704 Oct.	1705 Mar.
4	<i>Dover</i>	Thomas Mathews	250	50	1706 May	1706 Nov.
4	<i>Falmouth</i>	Thomas Riddall	280	54	1708 Oct.	1708 Dec.
4	<i>Norwich</i>	Richard Studley	280	54	1711 July	1712 Apr.

Key

R= Rate

M=Men

G=Guns

B= Bomb Vessel

Begin= Commencement of assignment (not arrival in colonies) as listed in the Admiralty List Books, TNA PRO ADM 8.

End= End of Assignment (arrival back at England or other destination (not departure from colony) as listed in TNA PRO ADM 8.