Ethnicity and the 2019 Canadian Federal Election: Do Racialized Candidates Increase Voter Turnout?

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Abstract

Voting behaviour research in Canada has shown that racialized voters tend to support racialized candidates and candidates with whom they share an ethnic identity. However this work doesn't address why racialized voters might be turning out to vote in the first place. Using data from the 2019 Canadian Election Study, this project helps to bridge that gap by examining the mobilizing effect that racialized candidates may have had on racialized voter turnout during the 2015 and 2019 Canadian federal elections. South Asian candidates were found to positively increase reported turnout of South Asian voters in 2015. Similarly, the presence of a Chinese candidate in 2015 led to increased reported turnout among Chinese voters and increased reported plans to vote in 2019. These findings suggest that the presence of racialized candidates was linked to increased turnout and plans to vote among voters with the same ethnic identity. The analysis in this thesis provides further insight into the dynamics of racialized participation in Canadian politics.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Canadian Political Science scholars have turned their attention towards race and ethnicity, as they seek to learn how these identities fit into the voting behaviour puzzle. Researchers have mainly focused on vote choice (Besco, 2015; Bird et al., 2016; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2019; McGregor et al., 2017) and attitudes towards representation (Bird, 2011; Bird, 2012). Findings in both of these areas tend to suggest that racialized Canadians vote for and feel better represented by racialized and co-ethnic candidates.[1]

Despite these findings, too few racialized Members of Parliament (MPs) have actually been elected. From the 2011 to 2015 federal elections, the proportion of racialized candidates increased from 9.7% to 13.9% (Black, 2017, p. 18), and further increased to 15% during the 2019 election (Paas-Lang, 2019). 51 racialized MPs were elected in 2019 who compose 15.1% of MPs, making this the largest number of racialized MPs Canada has ever had (Griffith, 2019). While this points to positive increases between each election, it also highlights the remaining representation gap. At least 22.3% of Canadians identify as racialized[2], so while 15.1% is significantly closer than in previous elections this arguably still isn't sufficient.

This disconnect emphasizes the need to develop our knowledge of political participation among racialized Canadians, and looking at voter turnout is an effective way to help close this gap. While previous work has provided insight into who racialized Canadians vote for, this project is concerned with determining why they're turning out to vote in the first place. Based on previous findings that emphasize the influence of racial and ethnic affinity on vote choice and preferred representation, this thesis will argue that those same effects encourage racialized voters to turnout to vote. More specifically, it will examine differences in participation when there's a racialized candidate present in an election to provide further insight into how

[1] 'Racialized' refers to respondents who were estimated to be racialized based on their ethnic identity. 'Co-ethnic' refers to an individual with the same ethnic identity.
[2] Statistics Canada, 2017

racialized Canadians could be better represented in government.

Research Question & Hypotheses

The main research question that this project seeks to answer is: **do racialized candidates make racialized voters more likely to turnout?** Based on previous research concerning voting behaviour among racialized Canadians, I'm expecting that having a racialized candidate present will increase voter turnout among racialized voters. More specifically, I hypothesize that my findings will reflect the following two outcomes:

H1: Racialized voters will be more likely to turnout to vote when there's a racialized candidate running.

H2: Racialized voters will be more likely to turnout to vote when there's a candidate with the same ethnic identity running.

Research on ethnic identity and Canadian voting behaviour shows that racialized voters are more likely to support racialized candidates because of a shared identity and experiences. Since it is assumed that racialized voters are making a rational choice to vote for candidates who are also racialized, it is reasonable to expect that they would turnout for this same reason. Similarly, research has also suggested that voters are more likely to support and vote for candidates of the same ethnicity, so I'm expecting to see affinity effects between candidates and voters who share an ethnic identity as well.

To answer the research question, this project relied on a variety of resources. Data about voters and political participation in the 2015 and 2019 federal elections came from the 2019 Canadian Election Study (Stephenson et al., 2020a). Meanwhile, information about candidates was gathered from official Elections Canada candidate lists, social media pages, and local news media. Multivariate regression analysis was used to assess the hypothesized relationships and make deductions.

In analyzing those data, results suggest that there is a connection between the presence of a racialized candidate and voter turnout among racialized voters. As will be discussed, the degree of this influence should be investigated by further study as this project faced significant limitations as a result of the methods used.

Outline

This thesis is organized into five main chapters. Following the introduction is a detailed discussion of previous work concerning race, ethnicity, and political behaviour. This chapter will first refer to US-based research on this topic to demonstrate how these findings can be applied to the Canadian context to predict outcomes under similar circumstances. Then Canadian research on closely related topics like affinity voting and representation preferences will be reviewed to directly show why findings in these areas should carryover to turnout studies.

The third chapter provides a step-by-step overview of the data preparation stage and the methods used to answer the research question. It also provides a discussion of the anticipated sources of error and a discussion concerning current approaches to measuring ethnicity and estimating racialization. Chapter four provides detailed information concerning the data that was gathered on racialized candidates and findings from data analysis. These are compared to interpret the underlying meaning of findings, and also to provide context concerning the limitations of this project. Lastly, chapter five summarizes the contributions made by this project and expands on the meaning of my findings to link them with future studies. Furthermore, this section considers alternative explanations for my findings, and connects these to the major limitations of the project to make my conclusion.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

In order to gain insight into the effects that racialized candidates have on turnout among racialized voters in Canada, it is important to consider current knowledge concerning racialization, ethnicity, and elections. By reflecting on research in these areas, it provides context and demonstrates how projects like this one can make a contribution and help to fill a gap in knowledge surrounding racialized political behaviour.

While there is an extensive body of research concerning voting behaviour among racialized folks (particularly Black and Latino individuals in the United States), such work has only started to progress in Canada and needs further development before we can effectively understand how racialized voters behave in the political realm. Research on voting behaviour among racialized folks living in Canada can broadly be categorized into two different areas: research concerning representation preferences and vote choice. Such work mainly considers affinity effects and explores how a shared identity can translate into political support. While research on these topics has helped to provide a better understanding of how racialized voters wish to be represented and who they're supporting when they do participate, there's little research concerning participation among racialized folks.

I argue that learning about political participation among racialized voters will help to link current findings concerning representation preferences with those on affinity voting, and ideally can be used to help elect more racialized candidates and better represent racialized Canadians overall. By considering work that studies racialized voters within and outside of Canada, I will demonstrate why the expectation that racialized candidates will positively affect turnout among racialized voters is well supported. This chapter will begin with a brief outline of the theoretical framework shaping this project and its hypotheses. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of research on perceptions of linked fate among racialized voters, representation preferences, racialized voter turnout studies, affinity voting, and challenges for racialized

candidates. Considering work from these areas will provide the foundation required for contextualizing this project's findings and contributions.

2.1 Theoretical Framework: Rational Choice Theory, Political Psychology, and Voter Turnout

The basis for each of my hypotheses is that racialized voters will be more likely to turnout when there is a racialized candidate or a candidate who has the same ethnic identity running in an election. Voter turnout scholars have long considered the rational choice model in understanding voter turnout, and it is especially relevant for understanding the relationship between identity and turnout. The Downsian turnout model emphasizes that the choice to turnout relies on a costs and benefits analysis at the voter level (Downs, 1957). In other words, it suggests that voters weigh the perceived costs of turning out to vote against the perceived benefits, and that the results of this analysis will ultimately determine whether they turnout or not (Downs, 1957). Some have criticized that Downs' understanding of turnout only provides a partial explanation as it's better equipped to explain why voters do not turnout (Green & Shapiro, 1994). However, its emphasis on a costs and benefits analysis makes it the prime approach for this project.

Aldrich (1993) also views the choice to turnout as relying on a costs and benefits analysis, but points out that this is generally a low stakes decision with low costs and low benefits (p. 274). In contextualizing this understanding of turnout, Aldrich notes that "strategic politicians" can change this and actually increase the perceived benefits for voters in certain contexts (p. 274). He further emphasizes the impact of strategic politicians as they allow for "the integration of the rational choice of voting or abstention into broader theories of political behavior by tying individuals' decisions with the actions of parties, groups, and candidates in campaigns." (p. 274). In the context of this project, a racialized candidate can be viewed as the "strategic politician" that Aldrich is describing.

By considering the choice to turnout as a rational one that relies on a costs and benefits analysis, this allows for the consideration that the presence of a racialized candidate increases the perceived benefits of voting for racialized voters and ultimately outweighs the perceived costs. Despite criticisms surrounding this model for studying turnout, it is particularly effective for contextualizing the relationship between ethnic identity and turnout.

To address the weaknesses associated with rational choice theory, political psychology understandings will be used alongside of it to ensure a more complete understanding of the dynamics between turnout and ethnicity. While rational choice theory can explain why voters don't turnout, political psychology can be

used with it to explain why they do. Political Psychology considers social influences that can make-up for what rational choice lacks, and as race and ethnicity are social constructs it makes such considerations crucial for this project.

Political psychology is particularly effective when it comes to explaining the in-group/out-group divide that often shapes understandings of ethnicity and identity. Frederico and Luks (2005) argue that political psychology is the best theoretical lens when studying race and politics for exactly this reason. They emphasize how political psychology highlights these group dynamics, and allows researchers to consider commitment to the in-group by comparing it with the rejection of the out-group (p. 661). Uhlaner (1989) provides a strong example of how these two frameworks can coexist, as she merges rational choice understandings of turnout with political psychology ideas to create a new model for understanding voters. By doing this Uhlaner recognizes that voters are rational actors, while arguing that we should view them as members of a social group instead of just as individual actors (p. 391). By linking individual interests with group interests, Uhlaner is able to provide further insight into the benefits associated with the rational-individual voter model. As this model gives context to the group dynamics and relationships being explored, the choice to merge political psychology and rational choice understandings of turnout is effectively supported.

2.2 Perceived Benefits of Turning Out

Whether one ascribes to a rational choice understanding of turnout or not, many scholars studying turnout are concerned with answering the question of why people do turn out to vote when the likelihood that their singular vote will make a difference is quite low. When it comes to ethnicity and racialization, what we know about voter turnout isn't quite as straightforward. This doesn't mean a rejection of voting behaviour fundamentals, but rather it requires that researchers dig deeper to uncover the different effects that identity can have on voters. As will be explored here, a person's ethnic identity can influence how they participate in politics, how they perceive political issues, and how they make political decisions. The decision to turnout to vote is no exception, therefore I'm suggesting that voters may perceive the opportunity to support a racialized candidate as beneficial, as it aligns with their feelings of linked fate and may lead to more substantive representation.

2.2.1 Linked Fate

The concept of linked fate is often used to contextualize a person's political attitudes with their connection to a historically marginalized in-group. More specifically, linked fate refers to perceiving one's own life chances as linked to those of a group, and results in prioritizing the group's interests over self-interests

when perceiving political issues and making decisions. Research concerning linked fate is particularly relevant to this project as it can be used to explain why a racialized voter may be more likely to turnout when there's a racialized candidate running; if the voter views supporting a racialized or same ethnicity candidate as a way to support the group, its reasonable to believe that the presence of such a candidate would motivate racialized voters to turnout to vote.

For the purposes of this project, linked fate works as it provides explanations for why individuals who feel connected to a group may adopt and support the group's interests as their own. While it may seem to contradict the self-interested rational voter model discussed above, it actually supports it. As many scholars recognize linked fate as putting group interests first, I argue that group interests become self-interests because of the perception that they are inextricably linked and it means an individual believes that "resolving the problems facing their group will directly affect his or her individual life chances" (Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010, p. 520).

Conover (1984) explores group membership and the influence it has on political attitudes. While she doesn't consider linked fate specifically her work does have implications for it. She recognizes identification with a group "as having two related components: a self-awareness of one's objective membership in the group and a psychological sense of attachment to the group." (p. 761). In other words, it isn't just a relation to a group that influences perceptions but rather its an active recognition of membership and attachment to the group that lead an individual that determine This is so significant for understanding how identities influence political behaviour as she finds that it was only when these two components were both present that political perceptions were influenced. Moreover, Conover's findings are so relevant to this project because of how she connects group-interests with self-interests. She shows how group interests can shape individual perceptions and ultimately become self-interests, as the individual's attachment to the group and adoption of group-interests as their own means that group-interests become "a proxy for individual self-interests" (p. 783). This directly supports the expectation that seeing a racialized or shared ethnicity candidate running in an election will encourage racialized voters to turnout to vote.

Dawson (1994) explores the influence of linked fate for African Americans and argues that shared experiences of discrimination and marginalization have led them to recognize their own life chances as being directly linked with those of the racial group.[1] His work is relevant to political behaviour research in particular as he points out that it is because of this sense of linked fate that African Americans will consider the group's interests when making political decisions. Dawson's work has become a benchmark for linked fate research, as scholars continue to build on his ideas concerning group consciousness. Simien (2005) examines gender effects on Black linked fate and argues that it isn't just racial linked fate that

[1]The terms "African American" or "Black" will be used depending on which term was used in the referenced work.

influences decisions. She calls attention to a "hierarchy of interests"and finds that gender is the more salient identity for Black women. Her work has received recognition because she draws attention to the different lived experiences of Black women and the influence of diverging identities on perceptions of linked fate, providing an example of the influence of political intersectionality that others have brought to light (Crenshaw, 1991; Gershon et al., 2019). Recognizing how competing interests and identities influence political participation makes these findings crucial considerations for this project, as they can be used to contextualize distinctions between a voter's shared ethnic identity with a candidate and their identity as racialized.

Other scholars have similarly highlighted how focusing on racial identity overlooks the nuances of linked fate, as competing identities besides ethnicity can become more salient depending on context. Capers & Smith (2016) demonstrate why using a singular "Black" category limits our ability to fully understand voting behaviour from the linked fate perspective as they study Black immigrants in the US. They find that certain policy issues acted as "identity triggers" that led participants to react with and identify more strongly with the identity being influenced by the policy at hand (p. 416). Research concerning the dynamics of competing identities has implications for this project, namely determining which identity will be primed by the presence of a racialized candidate. Will a shared ethnic and/or racialized identity be enough, or will other diverging identities be more influential? While such work highlights the need for an intersectional approach to political behaviour research, it further emphasizes the delicate relationship between identity and political participation, as it shows how linked fate exists differently depending on which identity is being primed.

While most linked fate work focuses on African Americans, researchers have also studied linked fate among Latinos. Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) find that linked fate is perceived among Latinos in the US, but they are careful to distinguish it from Dawson's original understanding. They find that Latino linked fate is highly related to income and to immigration experiences (unlike the Black experience), so they propose that it may be a "temporary phenomenon" that fades as an individual assimilates into American society (p. 527-8). Stokes (2003) makes similar conclusions by considering group consciousness with the heterogeneity of the Latino population in the US. By looking at more specific identities within the broader pan-ethnic group (Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban) Stokes was able to measure and compare the more distinctive motivations of linked fate for each group, further highlighting how political issues can be perceived differently depending on which identity is more salient. Stokes does this by demonstrating that different components of group consciousness influenced political participation for each subgroup (p. 371). So while this work supports linked fate, it underscores that its stimulated under different contexts, even among subgroups within the same ethnic category.

While linked fate research predominantly focuses on African Americans and Latinos living in the US, research concerning linked fate among Asian Americans has started to develop. Junn & Masuoka (2008) compare perceptions of Asian American linked fate with Black linked fate, and find that identification with the in-group can be "manipulat[ed] ... when respondents are primed with political role models" (p. 736). They make this conclusion by showing that when primed with images of Asian American cabinet members that emphasized the significance of descriptive representation, Asian Americans' perceived level of linked fate significantly increased (from 46% to 56%). This research clearly shows how linked fate can be used to explain why racialized candidates may encourage turnout among racialized voters.

Some have started to question the use of linked fate as a measure for understanding racialized voters, often suggesting that the measure doesn't match the concept in the way that researchers have previously interpreted it (Gay et al., 2016; Sanchez & Vargas, 2016). These concerns with linked fate stem largely from a weak correlation between racial identity and attachment to the group when it comes to applying the concept beyond Black linked fate. Despite these concerns, linked fate is still relevant to our understanding of group interests in shaping political perceptions. This is because at the core of these findings linked fate shows how–depending on identity saliency–group interests can become self-interests; it just occurs under different conditions for different groups. This shifts the perspective to focus on identifying under which conditions one's ethnic identity might become salient enough for it to shape their perceptions and behaviour. So while projects like this don't address the mismatch between measure and concept, it does provide an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of how identity and attachment to a group can influence political participation.

2.2.2 Someone "Like Me": Descriptive & Substantive Representation

Arguably the most relevant perceived benefit of voting among racialized voters is the opportunity to receive both descriptive and substantive political representation. Descriptive representation refers to symbolic representation or being represented by someone because they belong to a given group, whereas substantive representation refers to the representation of issues and interests that may be important to a given group. Jane Mansbridge (1999) extensively explores the significance of descriptive representation for marginalized groups and argues that descriptive representation is the more meaningful form of representation (p. 228). However, Mansbridge's work is worth discussing in relation to ethnicity and turnout because it demonstrates how descriptive representation is significant as it often leads to substantive representation.

Minta (2011) studies descriptive representation in Congress among Black and Latino representatives. He finds that descriptive representatives are more substantively representative of racialized voters, pointing out that they are generally more responsive to the needs of racialized and poor constituents, and they're

more likely to speak up and get involved with issues that principally affect racialized communities like racial profiling (p. 5). Minta also shows that there's different expectations for racialized representatives (especially Black representatives) because of their identity, as he notes that their presence directly influences the likelihood that issues of concern to these communities will get addressed so there is an expectation that they will support and advocate for racialized folks in their district. For Black representatives, that expectation includes advocating for the interests of Black folks nationwide, not just in their own district (p. 20). To be clear, it is not that White representatives don't support issues affecting racialized constituents, but rather that racialized representatives show a different level of commitment to these issues.

In order to explain why Black and Latino representatives are more representative, Minta discusses "strategic group uplift" (p. 33). He suggests that strategic group uplift explains the difference in motivation to support racialized constituents because Black and Latino representatives:

> "have a vested interest in ensuring that agencies enforce policies that are favorable to the interests of their racial or ethnic group. Specifically, black and Latino legislators believe that their fate is linked with that of their black or Latino constituents, and they possess an ideology that holds that groups members should engage in collective action to further the interests of the group." (p. 33).

In other words, Minta is suggesting that feelings of linked fate persist even once an individual is in elected office. This directly links research concerning linked fate and representation, and showcases the role that both elements play in influencing political behaviour.

Others have suggested that it isn't just about how much more support comes from racialized representatives, but its also about how little support comes from non-racialized representatives. Butler and Broockman (2011) study how representatives treat constituents differently depending on race, by submitting inquiries to white and Black representatives concerning voter registration information. They find that regardless of party affiliation and the perceived partisanship of the constituent, white representatives sent fewer replies to inquiries from Black aliases than to white ones. However, when it came to racialized representatives, the opposite was true as they responded more frequently to the inquiries from Black aliases. While this was an experiment, if this is how racialized voters are treated by non-racialized representatives then it is reasonable to expect that they might feel better represented by a racialized candidate, and seek that out in an election.

Some have even found that descriptive representation outweighs ideological differences, further suggesting that being represented by someone with a shared identity is especially significant. Badas and Stauffer (2018) consider preference for descriptive representation among Supreme Court nominees, as they hypothesized that a shared racial, ethnic, or gender identity would be more salient than ideological differences and translate into support for an otherwise opposing nominee. With regards to racial and ethnic

identity, their findings support their hypothesis as liberal African Americans were more likely to support Thomas, and conservative Latinos were more likely to support Sotomayor (p. 137). What's more is that the researchers didn't notice gender differences when it came to support for Sotomayor, leading them to suggest that perhaps in the context of the nomination ethnicity was the more salient identity (p. 137).

There's also work that challenges the misconception that racialized voters aren't interested in politics, and therefore don't participate. Wolak and Juenke (2021) hypothesized that co-racial or co-ethnic candidates will lead to an increase in political knowledge among constituents, and measured this by asking respondents' to identify their congress member's party affiliation and ethnic identity.[2] Among all three ethnic groups observed (Black, Latino, and Asian American) respondents from each group were significantly more likely to know their representative's partisanship and ethnic identity when that representative was co-racial or co-ethnic. Such work offsets any notion that racialized voters have low levels of political knowledge and re-frames it to show that being descriptively represented demonstrates the opposite.

2.3 Racialized Voter Turnout: What We know

Preference for a candidate is one of the strongest influences on voter turnout (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). Therefore a racialized candidate on the ballot may change the context surrounding an election for racialized voters (Collins & Block, 2020; Cebula et al., 2017). Put more simply, if a racialized candidate raises the stakes for racialized voters, then it may also encourage them to turnout to vote.

In Canada, there is little information concerning turnout among racialized voters in recent elections, and what is available is primarily focused on exploring the effect of immigration status on participation rather than ethnic or racial identity.[3] However, turnout research concerning racialized voters in the US is much more developed. The 2008 Presidential election saw record turnout numbers among racialized voters, but especially among Black voters (Lopez & Taylor, 2009). This notable increase in participation has largely been linked to the presence of Barrack Obama as a presidential candidate, as there were significant increases in African American turnout rates during the 2008 and 2012 elections, but none in the three preceding ones (McFayden, 2013). Similarly, while turnout among these groups has gotten better over time, it is still no where near the rates seen during Obama's run (Frey, 2021).

Barreto (2007) considers turnout among Latino voters, and notes that low turnout levels unfairly lead to them being cast as politically apathetic and non-participating (p. 426). Barreto hypothesizes that this is actually due to a lack of diverse candidates and argues that "the presence of a Latino candidate mobilizes the

[2] In this paper, co-ethnic refers to an individual with the same ethnic identity.
[3] See Tossutti & Elections Canada (2007) for information concerning racialized turnout during the 2000 and 2004 federal elections.

Latino electorate, resulting in elevated voter turnout" (p. 425-6). To support his argument, Barreto assesses whether turnout among Latinos changes when there's a Latino or other racialized candidate running. His findings show that this is the case, as he notes that shared ethnicity mobilized Latino voters during an election where there was a Latino candidate, and even in cases where there was a non-Latino, racialized candidate (p. 438). Barreto's work suggests that it isn't disinterest that negatively impacts Latino turnout, but rather its a lack of representative candidates that's responsible. His findings directly show how the presence of a racialized or co-ethnic candidate may increase the benefits of voting for Latino voters and encourage them to turnout.

Washington (2006) also considers the influence that racialized candidates have on turnout, but does so by focusing on Black candidates. He emphasizes that there are a number of elements that could influence turnout levels when Black candidates run, as he noticed that turnout increased among both Black and White voters when a Black Democrat ran (p. 996). Washington highlights that differences in turnout can be explained by the notion that "Black candidates may increase turnout simply due to voter preferences for representation by a person of one's own race" (p. 976). He also adds that "Black candidates may raise turnout owing to a lack of information on the part of voters" suggesting that in low-information settings race can become a powerful heuristic much like gender or partisanship (p. 976). Furthermore, in considering why this may have increased turnout among White voters as well, Washington notes that Black candidates are often viewed as more liberal than similar White candidates, and points out that "a Black Democrat candidate on the ballot ... may infer that there is a great ideological distance between the Democratic and Republican candidates and hence much at stake" (p. 976). Washington's work reinforces previous findings concerning voters stereotyping Black candidates as more liberal (McDermott, 1998). Overall, recognizing race as a heuristic for voters helps to explain why the presence of a racialized candidate may increase turnout among racialized voters.

Cebula et al. (2017) make similar findings concerning racialized candidates and their impact on voter turnout. They examine varying turnout levels between states, and hypothesize that "within the context of the rational choice model ... the presence of a minority candidate atop the ticket will boost minorities' expected net benefits from voting, with the result that minority voter participation will be higher" (p. 29). They found that during the 2008 and 2012 elections—when a racialized candidate was nominated for president— state voter turnout rates were "positively affected by the percent of the population that is African-American and ... Hispanic" (p. 33). Findings like these further support the hypothesis that racialized candidates will increase turnout, and that such ideas should be considered from a rational choice perspective.

2.4 Race & Voting in Canada

While findings from the American context are helpful for interpreting racialized voting behaviour in Canada, the socioeconomic conditions and political climate are hardly identical. Therefore, it is crucial to consider current Canadian research on this topic alongside of findings from the US, to form more accurate expectations about Canadian outcomes.

Much of Karen Bird's work has contributed to developing research on representation styles and preferences among racialized Canadians in particular. Bird (2011) assesses the descriptive and substantive representation of visible minorities among Members of Parliament (MPs)[4]. Bird's work makes three major contributions to understanding political representation for visible minorities in Canada. First, she finds that visible minority MPs were more likely to support issues that matter to visible minorities than non-minority MPs (p. 218). Second, non-minority MPs were found to be more likely to address issues that matter to visible minorities when their constituencies were ethnically and racially diverse (p. 218). Lastly, Bird finds that visible minority MPs were more representative overall than non-minority MPs, even when they had diverse constituencies (p. 218). Much like Mansbridge's work, these findings demonstrate that the descriptive element of representation is more meaningful as it tends to lead to substantive representation (p. 218).

Besides examining representation among MPs, Bird (2012) considers the significance of descriptive and substantive representation for racialized voters in Canada. She advocates that we recognize these two representation styles as complementary as opposed to competing (p. 534). She interviewed Chinese and South Asian citizens in Toronto from 2009-2011 about which form of representation they preferred, and results showed that this preference is largely context dependent (p. 269). Substantive representation was valued as citizens liked having a representative who advocated for issues that were important in their constituency (p. 269). However, descriptive representation was preferred in contexts where constituents anticipated a language barrier with candidates belonging to a different ethnicity (p. 269). These ideas point to both forms of representation as being important for racialized folks, but they underscore why this may encourage them to turnout when there's a racialized or co-ethnic candidate running.

These ideas were further supported by her 2015 work, where she explores attitudes towards political representation styles among Black, Chinese, and South Asian people living in the greater Toronto area. These groups were selected because they composed the three largest racialized communities in the area (p. 255). Bird's main finding here was that members of each group had "contextually derived preferences" about representation, similar to her previous findings (p. 269). When it comes to group-specific preferences, she finds that Chinese and South Asian participants were content with descriptive and non-descriptive rep-

[4]'Racialized' is the preferred term that will be used throughout this paper, however 'visible minority' will be used when it appears in cited works.

resentation (p. 270). However, she highlights a cynicism among Black participants as they express feeling that they don't have much influence over how they're represented (p. 270). Bird suggests that this is due to them being the most underrepresented group of the three (p. 255). These attitudes reinforce the idea that being represented (either descriptively or substantively) influences feelings towards democracy, which further emphasizes the need to study voting behaviour and participation levels among racialized folks more directly.

2.4.1 Affinity Voting

Most of the research concerning voting behaviour among racialized folks in Canada is focused around affinity voting: a type of voting heuristic where voters choose to vote for a given candidate based on a shared identity trait like gender, race, or ethnicity (McGregor et al., 2017, p. 139). While current work concerning racial or ethnic affinity voting is primarily focused on vote choice, these ideas can be further applied to contextualize turnout. More specifically, if we know who racialized voters are supporting when they do vote, this can help us understand why they might be turning out in the first place.

McGregor et al. (2017) considers the impact of affinity voting with incumbency effects, and uses a low-stakes low-information ward election to do so. While they do find support for ethnic affinity voting, they notice that this effect didn't exclusively benefit racialized candidates. While racialized voters were found to support racialized candidates, non-racialized voters were similarly supporting non-racialized incumbents (p. 145). Since non-racialized voters turnout at higher rates, affinity voting actually worked against racialized candidates in this case. This makes this work especially relevant as it shows how racialized voters do support and ultimately prefer racialized candidates, but that it often isn't enough due to incumbency effects thus creating an additional barrier to being represented. This work also further emphasizes the gap in research on racialized political behaviour in Canada; we know that racialized voters support and prefer candidates who they view as being "like them" so why aren't more racialized candidates getting elected? This further suggests that at least part of the answer can be found by taking a closer look at political participation among racialized folks, especially where voter turnout is concerned.

Besco (2015) studies affinity voting in connection to rainbow coalitions by considering voting behaviour among racialized voters in Toronto. A rainbow coalition refers to "a political coalition of multiple non-white racial groups" and it "typically implies mutual co-operation and support of members, rather than just a coincidental coalition of groups voting for the same party or candidate" (Besco, 2015, p. 305). While Besco points out that proof of rainbow coalitions is limited, his findings suggest that they exist in Canada (p. 326). Racialized voters showed affinity for candidates of the same ethnicity, while also showing affinity for other racialized candidates, as racialized voters often preferred another racialized candidate over a White

one (p. 322). While these conclusions are not directly concerned with turnout, they do provide an important frame of reference for understanding race and voting behaviour in Canada. These findings suggest that racialized Canadians don't just view their in-group as being made-up of those that belong to their own ethnicity, but that this sense of a shared identity extends to other racialized folks as well.

Goodyear-Grant and Tolley (2019) explore racial affinity voting among Chinese Canadians. While their findings show that Chinese Canadians are more likely to prefer a Chinese candidate to a White one, their work is particularly valuable because of how they go deeper to assess the roots of racial affinity for this group. Similar to Conover's (1984) observations about group identification and political perceptions, Goodyear-Grant and Tolley emphasize that it isn't just group membership that leads to affinity voting, but its the politicization of that identity that leads voters to side with their in-group and support a co-racial candidate (p. 140). Furthermore, they find that racial affinity was strongest among those who also expressed a strong connection to their Chinese identity, as "voters whose sense of self-identity is strongly linked to their racial group will gravitate toward "one of their own" if they feel their group has been criticized." (p. 143).

Bird et al. (2016) similarly find support for the existence of affinity voting in Canada, and among Chinese voters specifically. This study was focused around the 2014 mayoral race in Toronto, where Olivia Chow was both the only racialized and only female candidate (p. 360). These researchers anticipated affinity voting in relation to gender as well, but results only demonstrated support for ethnic affinity voting (p. 359). Both Chinese voters and non-Chinese minorities were more likely to support Chow over the two White candidates (p. 374). While these findings support the existence of inter-ethnic affinity voting, these scholars are also careful to highlight that Chow received almost twice as many votes from Chinese voters as she received from other racialized voters (p. 374). Therefore, this work supports the existence of both ethnic and inter-ethnic affinity voting, further validating the anticipated relationship between shared ethnic identity and voter turnout.

2.5 What About Candidates?

The 2019 Canadian federal election saw the highest number of racialized candidates ever, as about 15% of federal candidates were racialized (Griffith, 2019). While this is an improvement from 2015 when roughly 13% of candidates were racialized, the increase in candidates didn't necessarily translate into an increase in racialized MPs as this only increased by 4 (Griffith, 2019). Such a disconnect suggests that there may be other factors influencing racialized candidate success besides participation among racialized voters.

There's an extensive body of literature concerning the election experience for racialized candidates, and

much of the findings demonstrate how they face unique challenges that seriously decrease their likelihood of getting elected. In some cases, racialized candidates are set-up for failure by their party as they run in ridings where they're unlikely to win, thus casting them as an unfit candidate and negatively impacting any future political career (Kulich et al., 2014). In others, it comes down to networks and connections with local party associations, who act as gatekeepers and don't always show racialized candidates the same active support that they do non-racialized ones (Ocampo & Ray, 2020; Tolley, 2019).

These challenges are even more difficult to overcome for women of colour. When women of colour run, they endure the effects of both gendered and racial media framing, which shifts the focus away from their ability to hold office and emphasizes their identity as a woman and/or person of colour in a negative way (Burge et al., 2020; Tolley, 2016). Similarly, while women are viewed as having low levels of political ambition this is often even less among women of colour, and methods for encouraging women to run in general often don't work in the same way for women who are racialized (Holman & Schneider, 2018; Silva & Skulley, 2019). Also, when women of colour do run, sexist and racist attitudes translate into resentment and negative candidate perceptions which further harms their chances of getting elected (Carew, 2016; Nelson, 2021).

Overall, racialized candidates are often stereotyped by their racialized or ethnic identity in a way that others them, promotes discrimination against them, and negatively impacts perceptions concerning their competency for leadership (Besco, 2018; Tolley, 2016; Wintersieck & Carle, 2020). Despite all of these obstacles, the research discussed overwhelmingly shows that racialized voters feel better represented by racialized and co-ethnic candidates, and are more likely to support them at the polls. This directly supports the need to consider the effects that racialized candidates have on participation, especially on voter turnout among racialized voters.

2.6 The Missing Piece

As has been discussed throughout this chapter, it is clear that a better understanding of political participation (especially turnout) among racialized people in Canada will further our understanding of racialized voting behaviour. Ideally, work concerning participation among racialized voters will also help to address Canada's under-representation issue.

The expectation that racialized candidates will increase turnout among racialized voters is well-supported theoretically: by considering the choice to turnout as a rational one where voters are self-interested, while still acknowledging the influence of groups in political decision making. Linked fate scholars demonstrate that while this phenomenon occurs differently for different groups and materializes depending on identity

saliency, it does have an influence on political perceptions and ideology as the interests of the group are often treated as self-interests. Similarly, researchers concerned with representation styles show not only that racialized folks prefer to be represented descriptively, but that they have this preference because it is perceived as translating into more substantive representation. Finally, studies concerning affinity voting and voter turnout among racialized voters show us that when racialized voters do vote, they are more likely to support racialized or co-ethnic candidates. These ideas explain why racialized voters participate, but they don't fully address how. Therefore, by examining the relationship between racialized candidates and racialized voter turnout, projects like this one can help to fill-in that gap.

Chapter 3

Data and Methods

This project seeks to determine if racialized candidates mobilize racialized voters and make them more likely to turnout to vote. I argue that because it has been shown that racialized voters are more likely to vote for racialized candidates and candidates with whom they share an ethnic identity, that voter turnout among racialized voters will similarly benefit from this affinity.

This theory is explored using a quantitative approach with secondary survey data for analysis. Multiple logistic regression assessed the connection between ethnic identity and voting behaviour with self-reported voter turnout from the 2015 and 2019 Canadian federal elections. The main dependent variable is whether or not someone reports having voted, and the explanatory variables focus on the ethnic identity of the voter and the candidates who ran in their riding. The overall goal is to determine if the presence of a racialized candidate or a candidate of the same ethnicity as the voter encourages that voter to turn out to vote. This chapter reviews the 2019 Canadian Election Study and its role in this project, and discusses the methods and analysis used to answer the research question.

3.1 The 2019 Canadian Election Study

The 2019 Canadian Election Study (CES) was used to identify racialized voters based on respondents' self-reported ethnic identity and to capture their voting behaviour. This survey was the ideal choice for this project not just because of its emphasis on measuring political behaviour, but because of how the 2019 CES was expected to focus on the diversity of the Canadian electorate (Stephenson et al., 2020b).

The CES was also chosen because of its rolling cross-sectional design. Using this design makes this study valuable because it allows researchers to look at changes in attitudes and behaviour between pre-

election and post-election waves, making it the go-to survey for measuring campaign effects during Canadian elections (Johnston & Brady, 2002). This made the CES the prime choice for this project because it allowed for comparison of self-reported behaviour like turnout both before and after the election. As will be discussed, the usefulness of this feature was limited due to a decrease in the number of respondents in the post-election wave, which was especially noticeable in the number of racialized respondents.

Furthermore, using a survey like the CES also helps to mitigate social-desirability bias; a source of error that's typically associated with turnout studies. This is a common issue with survey-based turnout studies as individuals often claim that they've voted when they actually haven't (Granberg & Holmberg, 1991; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) because voting is seen as socially desirable behaviour and respondents want to be viewed as such (Silver et al., 1986). While this possibility can't be fully eliminated, relying on the online version of the CES helps to minimize its impact as research has shown that self-administered surveys (especially online surveys) are less susceptible to desirability bias effects (Atkeson et al., 2014; Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010; Kreuter et al., 2008).

3.1.1 Response Rate

The 2019 CES surveyed Canadian citizens and permanent residents 18 year of age and older during two distinctive periods; a campaign period survey and a post-election survey (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 5). Sampling for the campaign period survey (CPS) occurred between September 13th and October 21st 2019 and closed at 9:00AM on the 21st (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 9). Sampling for the post-election survey (PES) occurred between October 24th to November 11th 2019 (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 9).

Qualtrics was hired by the CES team to conduct both waves. Respondents were able to take the survey either online or over the phone, however for this project only the online survey was used because of its significantly larger sample size (n=37,822 compared to n=4021) (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 14). Qualtrics relied mainly on panel IDs to match each respondent's CPS and PES answers (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 14).[1]

While having two distinctive waves gives researchers the opportunity to study campaign effects, it led to some unique obstacles for this project. There was a notable decrease in responses between the CPS and the PES, as just 10,340 of the original 37,822 online CPS respondents participated in both waves (Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 9). With the exception of those who voted in an advance poll, only PES respondents were asked about turnout in the 2019 election. This caused some difficulty when comparing voting behaviour among racialized respondents specifically, as only 1032 of the 4614 racialized respondents (roughly 22%)

[1] Panel IDs were excluded from the dataset to protect respondents' identities. Not all respondents were able to be matched using panel IDs, and some weren't matched at all.

answered the 2019 turnout question. Also, while CPS respondents were asked about their ethnic identity, questions concerning attitudes towards ethnicity were largely saved for the PES which further limited the ability to explore ethnic affinity as it relates to representation.[2]

3.1.2 Measuring Turnout

The main two questions that were used as dependent variables relate to self-reported voting behaviour in the 2015 and 2019 federal elections. For the 2015 election, there was a single-answer multiple choice question that asked respondents if they voted.[3] However, for 2019 the approach was slightly different because of the distinctive survey waves. The pre-election survey contained a question that asked about respondents' intentions to vote on October 21, 2019, and included an option for those who voted early.[4] The question concerning actual turnout in the 2019 election was asked in the post-election survey.[5] As mentioned, only 27% of all CPS respondents and 22% of racialized CPS respondents actually participated in both waves. This directly impacted the effectiveness of comparing 2015 and 2019 turnout and ultimately led to the choice to rely on reported intentions to vote as a proxy for 2019 voter turnout.

While not ideal, the choice to use intentions as a proxy for actual behaviour is relatively well-supported by political psychology scholarship. Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour suggests that among other influences, behavioural intentions are a direct determinant of actual behaviours (Ajzen, 2012). Many have implemented Ajzen's model when studying voting behaviour (including turnout) and often conclude that intentions and conscious plans have the strongest influence on actual behaviour (Bassili, 1995; Netemeyer and Burton, 1990). Furthermore, results from PES participants seem to support this as only 4% of respondents who initially reported that they intended to vote later reported that they didn't vote at all. Similar effects were also found among advance poll voters.[6]

Despite this, recent work suggests that intentions may not be as reliable as once thought and pushes on the notion that self-reported turnout reflects actual, validated turnout. Achen and Blais (2015) find that when intentions are used as a proxy, results are typically inflated. However, they also emphasize that while self-reported turnout is typically closer to actual turnout than intentions, that it too is often inflated. Other researchers have similarly concluded that while intentions are a good predictor of reported behaviour, these effects are likely exaggerated in comparison to the real thing (Quintelier and Blais, 2016).

So while intentions and self-reports of behaviour tend to exaggerate actual behaviour, intentions and

[2]This included questions asking respondents how important their ethnicity is to their identity (pes19_ethid) and how important they feel it is to be represented by someone who looks like they do (pes19_lookslikeme).
[3]See Appendix B.1
[4]See Appendix B.2
[5]See Appendix B.3 and B.4
[6]4 respondents who initially indicated that they voted early (cps19_v_likely) later indicated that they didn't vote at all (pes19_turnout2019 & pes19_turnout2019_v2).

self-reports are still closely related. Considering that access to validated voter turnout data in Canada is quite limited,[7] and intentions are relatively good predictors of self-reported behaviour, it is reasonable to use intentions in comparison with self-reported turnout.

3.1.3 The CES Measure of Ethnicity

In order to capture ethnicity, the CES included a multiple-answer multiple choice question asking respondents to select each ethnic group that they identify with[8]. In total there were eighteen specified ethnic identity options that respondents could select. There were also two "other" options where respondents could list ethnic identities in their own words that weren't included in the original question.

This question proved to be challenging when translating answers into defined ethnicity categories, as a significant number of racialized respondents relied on the fill-ins to correctly identify themselves and there were few specified ethnicity options for racialized folks in particular. To be more specific, the only options provided that were more likely to be racialized were Chinese, Indian, and Hispanic. While relying on Hispanic as an option is problematic and confusing in itself,[9] the limited options available for racialized respondents makes this an insufficient measure of ethnicity and creates obstacles for meaningful data interpretation.

While there's no universal standard for measuring ethnicity, there is a general consensus that such measures should aim to be as clear and inclusive as possible. Stevens et al. (2015) suggests either including more questions about ethnicity or providing ways for respondents to define their ethnic identity themselves (like the CES does) (p. 31). However, while collecting open-response data on ethnicity enhances inclusivity, it often leads to problems with data interpretation and actually limits the ability to make inferences about the population it originally sought to understand (Stevens et al., 2015; Winker, 2004). It is also worth pointing out that relying mainly on self-response data could be othering respondents who might not fit into the pre-defined identity categories on a survey. Having a lack of options that accurately reflect a person's identity has also been found to deter survey respondents from answering an ethnic or racial identity question altogether, leading to missing values and further limiting any insight gained about a population (Eisenhower et al., 2014). This is why some researchers have suggested that while recognizing every ethnic identity may not always be possible, any attempt to measure ethnicity should at least account for the ethnic makeup of the population being studied. In other words, while it might not be possible to make deductions about every individual ethnic identity, researchers have to find a balance between identity inclusivity and research way to measure ethnic identity without sacrificing the ability to reflect the Canadian population.

[7] See Achen, 2019.
[8] See Appendix B.5 for original CPS question.
[9] See Allen et al., 2011, and Rodríguez et al., 2013

Canadian political scientists have also started to tackle these problems as they relate to how we collect data on racialized and Indigenous political candidates.[10] Beyond the academy, the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted many in the public sector to reconsider how race and ethnicity are measured in Canadian data[11] These new standards for data collection are far more inclusive and can effectively be applied in social science research, as was done with this project.

3.2 Identifying Racialized Voters

The main unit of analysis for this project is racialized voters living in constituencies where racialized candidates ran in 2015 and/or 2019. This immediately limited the number of qualifying respondents, and made defining ethnicity and racialization a central part of this project. Ethnic identity is a highly individual social construct, so finding an effective way to measure ethnicity is a relatively complicated task. Much like other aspects of identity, ethnicity is rarely measured in a consistent way and continues to be debated as our understanding of the concept evolves.[12] Therefore, much of the data preparation stage was spent finding an appropriate and inclusive way to categorize respondents' answers while still achieving quantifiable results.

The categories used were quite broad and effectively eliminated any opportunity to consider effects between region-specific ethnic identities (eg. Han Chinese, Tamil, etc.). Unfortunately this was necessary in order to have a sample size that was representative of Canada's racialized population while also being large enough to make inferences. This often meant taking smaller categories that were originally created to capture specific participant-provided answers, and collapsing them into larger categories. For example, "Tamil" would have to be recoded as South Asian.

The Statistics Canada classification for visible minority was originally used as a guide to build these categories from the CES responses.[13] The ethnic identity categories created for this project were broad, but slightly more inclusive than the originally options from the CES. However, it is worth noting that even my chosen categorization for coding ethnicity could be problematic as well. As noted, data limitations meant that differences between ethnic groups from the same region had to be overlooked as more specific identities were collapsed under larger, regional identities (eg. Han Chinese and Uighur would both be categorized under Chinese). This is possibly an area for future research, but nevertheless is important to consider in a study where ethnicity is used as a variable.

After re-coding responses from the "other" portion of the ethnic identity question, only six groups

[10] See Johnson et al., 2021.
[11] See Canadian Institute for Health Information (2020) and Statistics Canada (2020).
[12] As recent as July 2020, Statistics Canada continues to update and change their standard for collecting ethnicity and race-based data.
[13] After starting this project, Statistics Canada released an updated and more inclusive data standard for capturing ethnicity. While not the original source, the new standard was used to validate ethnicity categories used for this project.

had approximately 300 or more respondents: Chinese, South Asian, Hispanic, African, Carribbean, and Filipino.[14] Unfortunately, after coding respondents into these groups it became clear that Chinese and South Asian were the only two ethnic groups that could be correctly identified from the survey and form samples large enough to make deductions. Even while using intentions as a proxy for turnout and bypassing the response rate problem with the PES, Chinese and South Asian were the only categories who had enough respondents answer the turnout questions being used for this project.

Chinese was one of the options included on the original CES ethnic identity question and therefore did not require a lot of additional data preparation. The South Asian category required a slightly different approach, and was composed by merging the "Indian" CES option with other write-in responses that could be categorized under South Asian[15]. Being able to look at voting dynamics among these two groups specifically is very beneficial to solving the larger representation problem. Following the 2015 election, the majority of racialized MPs were Chinese and South Asian (Tolley, 2015, p. 50). So while other under-represented ethnic groups weren't directly studied here, the findings concerning Chinese and South Asian candidates can be applied to help elect more candidates from all under-represented groups.

Due to the nature of the CES ethnic identity question, it is likely that some respondents who were coded as racialized actually aren't. The question prompted respondents to select all ethnic identities that they identify as. There was no way to rank identities that were selected, and beyond the "other" portion of the question there was no way for someone to self-identify as racialized which made it difficult to definitely categorize each respondent. This led to a choice to recode the data into multiple dichotomous variables for ethnicity and racialization. For example, a respondent who identified as Chinese, Italian, and Irish would be coded as "1" for each of these categories and also as "1" for racialized because they self-identified as Chinese. The racialized category was made-up of ethnic identities that were more likely to be racialized. By recognizing each identity and coding ethnicity and racialization as dummy variables, the likelihood of a respondent being misidentified is minimized.

3.3 Identifying Racialized Candidates

I relied on a combination of resources to determine each candidate's ethnic identity. The 2015 and 2019 Lists of Confirmed Candidates from Elections Canada were used to identify candidates by name and party affiliation for federal elections in each year[16]. A combination of news media and social media were used to

[14] Hispanic was one of the categories from the original CES identity question. I merged these responses responses that indicated Hispanic on one of the "other" lines. I did create a separate Latin American category however there were fewer than 200 responses that could be coded as such.

[15] Examples of responses included in the category are South Asian, Sri Lankan, Pakistani, Afghan, Tamil, Sinhalese, Bangladeshi, Bengali, Goan, Kashmiri, Nepali, and Dravidian

[16] See Elections Canada 2015; 2019

find information confirming the ethnicity of each candidate. To be more specific, public Facebook pages for campaigns and candidate Twitter accounts were used to find self-published information about their ethnic identity. Local news coverage and candidate interviews were also consulted for similar self-identification with an ethnic group. Also, information from organizations with profiles on racialized candidates like Operation Black Vote Canada were consulted as well.

Depending on the depth of information found and how detailed an identity was able to be confirmed, candidates were categorized into ethnic identity categories that mirrored those used to identify CES respondents. For example, if a candidate could only be identified as a person of colour, they were coded as racialized. If a candidate gave more than one ethnic identity, they would be coded as belonging to each category ("1" for each ethnicity, and "1" for racialized). It is worth pointing out that candidates were possibly misidentified as racialized or non-racialized.[17] Many people may identify as racialized but may not necessarily present as such, or may be misidentified and presumed to identify with an ethnicity that they actually don't. To protect against this, candidates were only categorized as belonging to an ethnic group if they self-identified as such. Otherwise, if a source emphasized their identity as a racialized person or person of colour, they would be coded as such but would not be associated with a specific ethnic identity. While this approach doesn't fully eliminate the possibly for error, it is reasonably limited by prioritizing self-identification.

3.4 Data Preparation and Analysis

StataSE was used to prepare and analyze data for this project. Dependent variables were indexed from the two pre-election survey questions relating to 2015 turnout and 2019 turnout intentions. "Turnout2015" became a dichotomous variable recoded from the original single-answer multiple choice question, where respondents were coded as "0" if they didn't turnout and "1" if they did.[18] Similarly, "planstovote" was also coded as a dichotomous variable where respondents were coded as "0" if they indicated that they didn't intend to turnout and "1" if they did.[19] There were further turnout variables created to focus directly on turnout among Chinese and South Asian identifying folks by indexing "Turnout2015" and "planstovote" with "Chinese" and "SouthAsian".[20]

The categories for coding ethnicity and racialization were used to create corresponding dichotomous independent variables: "racialized", "Chinese", and "SouthAsian". Respondents who could be identified as Chinese and/or South Asian were coded as "1" for "Chinese" and/or "SouthAsian" respectively. Chinese

[17] The Samara Centre for Democracy is expected to release data on this topic in the future, but it was not available for this project.
[18] See Appendix B.1 for original CES prompt.
[19] See Appendix B.2 and B.3 for original CES prompts.
[20] See Appendix A.16 to A.19

and South Asian respondents were also coded as "1" for the variable "racialized". Respondents who didn't identify as Chinese or South Asian but did identify with an ethnicity that's more likely to be racialized[21] were coded as "1" for "racialized" as well.

Candidates were coded based on the same ethnicity and racialized categories as respondents, but by taking a slightly different approach. Electoral district numbers were recoded into dichotomous variables to reflect whether there was a racialized candidate present or absent in each election. If there was a racialized candidate running in a riding in 2019 or 2015, that riding would be coded as "1" for "Present19" and "Present15" depending on the election year. Similarly, when there was a Chinese or South Asian candidate running, the riding would be coded as "1" for "PChinese19", "PChinese15", "PSouthAsian19", and "PSouthAsian15". Additional index variables were also created between respondent identity variables and the corresponding variable for candidate presence.[22]

Beyond variables used to consider turnout and ethnic identity, a number of demographic and attitudinal questions were also recoded and included as independent variables. The demographic variables relate to identifiers that are known for predicting voting behaviour such as age, education level, gender, region, partisan affiliation, religion, immigration status, and income class.[23] The attitudinal variables used were more limited and mainly related to interest in politics[24]. As discussed, most CES questions that were relevant to this project appeared on the PES only, meaning that their effectiveness here was negatively impacted by the decrease in response rate as they limited the number of cases included in regression models.

Before starting regressions, two-variable t-tests were completed to establish any potential relationships between each independent variable and the two dependent variables. The overwhelming majority of independent variables were recoded into dichotomous variables with 0 and 1 as the only values.[25] By coding most variables in this way, I was able to use multiple logistic regression as the main approach for testing. While OLS regression is often preferred because of its easy to interpret results, logistic regression is especially well-suited for focusing on nominal binary-outcome variables (Menard, 2010). The focus of this project is to determine if there's a relationship between racialized candidates and voters' likelihood to turnout, so choosing to focus mainly on outcome probabilities instead of relationship strength further made logistic regression the better fit.

[21] Answers that could be categorized as racialized based on Statistics Canada's classification for visible minority of person. See Statistics Canada (2015)
[22] See Appendix A.26 - A.27
[23] See Appendix A.4 to A.15 for all demographic variables.
[24] See Appendix A.1 to A.3 for attitudinal variables.
[25] The only variables that were not recoded as dichotomous variables were: yearborn, region, income, general interest, and 2019 election interest (see Appendix A).

Chapter 4

Results

This thesis examines the mobilizing effect that racialized candidates have on racialized voters. As discussed, I hypothesized that seeing a racialized candidate running in an election would encourage racialized voters to turnout to vote. Furthermore, I also expected to see similar effects when a candidate and voter shared the same ethnic identity. The results discussed here suggest that the link between ethnic affinity and voter turnout isn't quite as straightforward as expected. Multivariate analyses showed that there wasn't a relationship between the presence of a racialized candidate and racialized voters' participation. However, when we look more closely at specific ethnic/racial groups, more nuanced patterns emerge. South Asian and Chinese voters appeared to be mobilized to vote by co-ethnic candidates in 2015, and by other racialized candidates in 2019.

The previous chapter outlined the dependent and independent variables used to test these hypotheses and described how they were coded during the data preparation stage. This chapter will offer a detailed analysis of the logistic regression models where these variables were used. For each of the groups studied, I will compare connections between reported turnout in 2015 and plans to turnout in 2019 with the presence of a specified candidate (racialized or co-ethnic).[1] The first model focuses on racialized respondents overall and how the presence of a racialized candidate affects their plans to vote and decision to turnout. The following two models look at South Asian and Chinese respondents only. These identity-specific models build on the first model to focus on the effects that candidates with the same ethnic identity (South Asian or Chinese) had on voting behaviour.

This chapter will start with a review of my hypotheses and an overview of the candidates and voters being examined. The main portion of the chapter focuses on outlining results from multivariate analyses

[1] 'Racialized' refers to respondents who were estimated to be racialized based on their ethnic identity. 'Co-ethnic' refers to an individual with the same ethnic identity.

and comparing findings between predictors of 2019 plans to vote and 2015 turnout among each group. A discussion and interpretation of the results as they relate to the research question will follow.

4.1 Project Overview

Research Question & Hypotheses

The main research question that this project is focused on answering is **do racialized candidates make racialized voters more likely to turnout?** Based on data limitations discussed in Chapter 3, my original hypotheses had to be adjusted. As a result, three hypotheses were advanced in connection with this question:

H1: Racialized voters will be more likely to turnout to vote when there's a racialized candidate running.

H2: South Asian voters will be more likely to turnout to vote when there's a South Asian candidate running.

H3: Chinese voters will be more likely to turnout to vote when there's a Chinese candidate running.

Candidates and Voters

Table 4.1 gives an overview of candidate makeup.[2] Leading into the 2019 election, there were 47 racialized MPs. While not all MPs sought re-election in 2019, only 3 racialized incumbents actually lost their seat in the election.[3] Also, most repeat candidates were incumbents, but there were also a few candidates who ran and lost in both elections.[4] Roughly half of racialized incumbents were South Asian, and 15% were Chinese. However, when it came to candidates, just 30% of racialized 2015 candidates and 23% of racialized 2019 candidates were South Asian. While the proportion of Chinese candidates was similar during both elections (11% in 2015 and 12% in 2019), the proportion of South Asian candidates dropped in 2019. As reflected by Table 4.1, this doesn't mean that the number of South Asian candidates decreased (it actually increased), but rather the total of racialized candidates overall increased between elections.

By comparing the total number of candidates for each election year, with those who ran in ridings that had a racialized candidate in one election year only, we gain insight into how candidates were spread out across ridings. In 2019 there were 312 racialized candidates in 175 ridings, suggesting that most of the

[2] A dataset concerning race and Indigeneity among Canadian federal election candidates was released after this project had already been completed. The numbers of candidates provided in this project are notably larger than those found by Johnson et al. (2021) because I included candidates from all parties, not just the major six (Bloc, Conservative, Green, Liberal, and PPC).

[3] Six racialized incumbents didn't run in 2019. They are included in the incumbent count in Table 4.1.

[4] One South Asian repeat candidate and one Chinese repeat candidate were not incumbents. More specifically, they ran in 2015 and lost, but still ran again in 2019.

Table 4.1: Summary of Racialized Candidates

	Racialized	South Asian	Chinese
Incumbents	47	24	7
Repeat Candidates	51 (48)*	24 (23)	7 (7)
Candidates in 2019			
Total Number of Candidates in 2019	312 (175)	71 (58)	37 (28)
Candidates in 2019 Only	76 (60)	26 (22)	19 (16)
Candidates in 2015			
Total Number of Candidates in 2015	211 (141)	64 (54)	24 (21)
Candidates in 2015 Only	26 (26)	22 (18)	11 (11)

*Number of ridings in brackets.
'Incumbent' refers to the MP who held the seat ahead of the 2019 election.
'Only' refers to ridings that had a specified candidate in that election year, but not in the other.
'Racialized' category includes those reflected in 'South Asian' and 'Chinese' categories.
'Repeat Candidates' refers to individuals who ran in the same riding in both elections.

ridings that had a racialized candidate present in 2019 had more than one racialized candidate running. However, candidates appear to be less concentrated across ridings that had a racialized candidate present in 2019 only, as there were 76 candidates in 60 ridings. Similar results are reflected in the 2015 candidate counts, as 211 racialized candidates ran in 141 ridings overall, but 26 of those candidates ran in 26 ridings that didn't have a racialized candidate in 2019. This helps to reinforce the core assumption of this project: that voters know if there's a racialized candidate running in their riding, and that knowledge motivates them to turnout. By finding that most ridings with a racialized candidate had more than one, its reasonable to expect that if a voter didn't know one racialized candidate then they might know the other.

Table 4.1 is even more revealing when compared with Table 4.2. Despite there being 47 ridings with racialized incumbents, just 1460 racialized voters (out of a potential 4614) lived in those ridings. Nonetheless, it appears that most racialized voters lived in a riding with a racialized candidate present in 2019, as 798 had a racialized candidate run in their riding during the 2019 election and 2670 had a racialized candidate in both election years (3468 in total). This number was lower in 2015, but this is expected as there were significantly more racialized candidates present during 2019 (312 compared to 211) in 34 additional ridings.

When looking at South Asian and Chinese voters more specifically, we can see that most don't live in ridings with co-ethnic candidates or incumbents. 28% of South Asian voters live in a riding with a South Asian incumbent, and 31% had a racialized candidate run in their riding during both elections. Meanwhile,

Table 4.2: Racialized Respondents & Candidates in Their Ridings

	Racialized	South Asian	Chinese
Portion of CES sample	4614	1055	1514
Racialized Incumbent	1460	416	581
Racialized Candidate 2019 Only	798	188	238
Racialized Candidate 2015 Only	311	81	65
Racialized Candidate Both	2670	633	967
Racialized Repeat Candidate	1386	376	509
South Asian Incumbent	790	294	256
South Asian Candidate 2019 Only	424	106	136
South Asian Candidate 2015 Only	562	151	215
South Asian Candidate Both	908	329	279
South Asian Repeat Candidate	752	255	256
Chinese Incumbent	320	57	191
Chinese Candidate 2019 Only	337	71	128
Chinese Candidate 2015 Only	345	56	149
Chinese Candidate Both	455	64	296
Chinese Repeat Candidate	309	31	217

'Both' refers to ridings that had specific candidates in both elections.
'Incumbent' refers to the MP who held the seat ahead of the 2019 election.
'Only' refers to ridings that had a specific candidate in that election year, but not in the other.
'Racialized' category includes those reflected in 'South Asian' and 'Chinese' categories.
'Repeat Candidates' refers to individuals who ran in the same riding in both elections.

only 13% of Chinese voters live in a riding with a Chinese incumbent and 20% had a Chinese candidate run in their riding during both elections. If we consider these findings with those from Table 4.1, those concerning Chinese voters are especially telling, as this group had the fewest number of incumbents (7) and candidates (37 in 2019 and 24 in 2015), yet they makeup 33% of racialized voters. When we compare this with information concerning South Asian voters, Chinese voters appear to be particularly underrepresented.

4.2 Racialized Turnout and Plans to Turnout

2019 Plans to Turnout

When assessing the relationship between 2019 plans to turnout and the other variables, some interesting findings emerge. Based on the H1 hypothesis, I expected the presence of a racialized candidate to positively

increase the probability that a racialized voter would turnout.[5] However, when "plans to vote" was regressed with all other variables, there was no significant relationship between planning to vote in 2019 and being a racialized voter in a riding with a racialized candidate (in either 2015 or 2019).

As can seen in Table 4.3, the presence of a racialized candidate in 2019 was found to have a marginally negative impact on plans to vote with a regression coefficient of -0.426 and an odds ratio of less than one (0.653). On the surface, this suggests that voters were slightly less likely to turnout when they lived in a constituency where a racialized candidate ran. However, it is worth pointing out that this could have more to do with ridings, as just 175 federal ridings had a racialized candidate present.[6]

The variable found to have the most significant influence on planning to vote in 2019 was reported turnout in 2015. The odds ratio for this variable suggests that those who claim to have voted in 2015 were eight and half times more likely to plan to vote in 2019. This is not a surprising finding and aligns with work concerning known predictors of turnout (Loewen & Dawes, 2012; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

In addition to 2015 turnout, a number of other demographic and attitudinal variables were found to have a significant impact on plans to vote. Being interested in the 2019 election (coef. 3.560, $p \leq 0.00$) appears to have the strongest influence, followed by viewing voting as a duty (OR 5.966, CI: 4.046 8.799). Besides these, feeling best represented by the Conservative party (OR 1.683, 1.074 2.683) or the Liberal party (OR 1.577, CI 1.019 2.440) were also found to have a positive impact on planning to vote in 2019.

The most surprising result of all was that the variable for identifying as racialized was not found to be statistically significant. Considering the negative relationship between 2019 racialized candidate presence and turnout, this could be reflecting more of the same. However, a more likely culprit is the significantly smaller number of racialized voters compared to the rest of the sample.[7]

[5] 'Racialized' includes all respondents who's ethnic identity was estimated as likely to be racialized, based on the Statistics Canada classification for visible minority.
[6] See Table 4.1.
[7] See Table 4.2.

Table 4.3: Plans to Vote in 2019 and 2015 Turnout (DV)

	Plans to Vote in 2019		Voted in 2015	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Voted in 2015	2.151***	8.590***		
	(.167)	[6.187,11.93]		
Respondent is Racialized	0.295	1.343	-0.374	0.688
	(.506)	[0.498,3.619]	(.200)	[0.465,1.018]
Racialized Voters in Ridings with Racialized Candidates 2019	-0.252	0.777		
	(.575)	[0.252,2.398]		
Racialized Voters in Ridings with Racialized Candidates 2015	0.00343	1.003	0.0247	1.025
	(.462)	[0.406,2.479]	(.241)	[0.639,1.643]
Racialized Candidate Present in 2019	-0.426*	0.653*		
	(.189)	[0.451,0.947]		
Racialized Candidate Present in 2015	0.0151	1.015	-0.0273	0.973
	(.187)	[0.703,1.465]	(.099)	[0.801,1.182]
Level of Income	0.658	1.931	1.347***	3.846***
	(.395)	[0.890,4.191]	(.228)	[2.461,6.012]
Male	-0.238	0.788	-0.318***	0.728***
	(.161)	[0.575,1.081]	(.093)	[0.606,0.874]
Age in Years	0.0904	1.095	0.827***	2.286***
	(.109)	[0.884,1.356]	(.062)	[2.026,2.580]
University Graduate	0.234	1.263	0.702***	2.018***
	(.196)	[0.860,1.855]	(.108)	[1.635,2.492]
Immigrant	-0.288	0.750	-0.943***	0.390***
	(.223)	[0.484,1.161]	(.125)	[0.305,0.497]
Voting is a Duty	1.786***	5.966***	1.488***	4.429***
	(.198)	[4.046,8.799]	(.091)	[3.709,5.288]
Religious	0.122	1.130	0.0142	1.014
	(.160)	[0.826,1.547]	(.096)	[0.841,1.223]
Region of Country (East to West)	-0.110	0.896	-0.0736	0.929
	(.072)	[0.779,1.031]	(.042)	[0.856,1.008]
Liberal Party Best Represents Me	0.455*	1.577*	0.115	1.122
	(.223)	[1.019,2.440]	(.137)	[0.857,1.468]
Conservative Party Best Represents Me	0.521*	1.683*	0.0201	1.020
	(.229)	[1.074,2.638]	(.142)	[0.773,1.347]
NDP Best Represents Me	0.407	1.502	-0.184	0.832
	(.244)	[0.931,2.423]	(.151)	[0.619,1.119]
Green Party Best Represents Me	0.140	1.150	0.0204	1.021
	(.299)	[0.640,2.066]	(.193)	[0.700,1.489]
PPC Best Represents Me	-0.699	0.497	-0.339	0.712
	(.429)	[0.214,1.152]	(.300)	[0.395,1.283]
Interested in Politics	-0.154	0.858	0.797**	2.219**
	(.443)	[0.360,2.043]	(.248)	[1.365,3.606]
Interested in 2019 Election	3.560***	35.17***	1.077***	2.936***
	(.434)	[15.04,82.25]	(.247)	[1.810,4.760]
Constant	-1.250***	0.287***	-1.878***	0.153***
	(.265)	[0.140,0.585]	(.225)	[0.0984,0.238]
N	5236	5236	5316	5316
pseudo R^2	0.447	0.447	0.251	0.251

Standard of Error in round brackets, 95% Confidence Intervals in square brackets.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2015 Turnout

Findings concerning turnout in 2015 were similar to those concerning plans to turnout in 2019. Models that used 2015 turnout as the dependent variable used slightly fewer independent variables. Those variables that were excluded focus only on 2019 election candidates (such as the presence of a racialized candidate in 2019, or being a racialized voter in a riding with a racialized candidate in 2019), and therefore shouldn't have any effect on 2015 turnout, which preceded 2019. Much like the model focusing on plans to vote, the relationship between turnout and racialized candidate presence was not statistically significant. Also, there was no connection between turning out and being racialized in a riding with a racialized candidate.

Similar to the 2019 model, viewing voting as a duty (OR 4.429, CI 3.709 5.288) and being interested in the 2019 election (coeff. 1.007, $p \leq 0.00$) were some of the strongest influences of 2015 turnout. Other variables found to positively impact turnout include a respondent's level of income (coef. 1.347, $p \leq 0.00$) and being a university graduate (OR 2.018, CI 1.635 2.492). Unlike the 2019 model, being an immigrant (OR 0.390, CI 0.305 0.497) and identifying as male (OR 0.728, CI 0.606 0.874) were both found to have a negative impact on turnout.

It is surprising that interest in politics and interest in the 2019 election were among the most strongly associated variables with reports of 2015 turnout. This is such an interesting finding as these questions were asked in 2019, and while interest in politics from one election year to another is probably closely related, it is also reasonable to expect that a person's level of interest in politics changes over time. Temporarily, it doesn't make sense for interest in the 2019 election to drive turnout in 2015 but we can treat 2019 election interest as a proxy for 2015 election interest, despite the real fact that political interest may wax and wane. Only as a proxy for interest levels in 2015 does it make sense for 2019 interest levels to affect turnout in 2015.

In the 2015 model there was no significant connection between the presence of a racialized candidate and turning out to vote. Furthermore, there was no significant relationship between racialized voters who had a racialized candidate in their riding and their likelihood to vote. Altogether, the findings from both the 2015 and 2019 models suggest that the H1 null hypothesis should be accepted, as there's no clear connection between the presence of a racialized candidate in the district and racialized voters' estimated likelihood to turnout.

4.3 South Asian Turnout and Plans to Turnout

As discussed in Chapter 3, the only two ethnic groups that could be correctly identified from the survey and form samples large enough to make deductions were Chinese and South Asian respondents.[8] The results from the regression model exploring 2015 turnout among South Asian voters in particular appears to support the H2 hypothesis, as the presence of a South Asian candidate was found to influence turnout.

South Asian Plans to Vote in 2019

The model concerning 2019 plans to vote among South Asian voters doesn't appear to support either the H1 or H2 hypotheses. As can be seen in Table 4.4, there was no relationship between the presence of a South Asian candidate and plans to vote among South Asian voters. Similarly, the presence of a racialized candidate wasn't statistically significant here either.

2015 turnout continued to be the strongest predictor of plans to vote among South Asian voters (OR 44029.2.24, CI: 4013.5, 483013.8). Also, being religious (OR 11.04, CI 2.152 56.64) or being an immigrant (OR 10.17, CI 4.626, 22.35) positively increased the likelihood of voting. Otherwise, the only variable found to have a negative impact on South Asian plans to vote was age with a regression coefficient of -1.849 (significant at $p \leq 0.00$). Lastly, the region where a respondent lives appears to have an influence as well, as the further West they lived the more likely they were to plan to vote (coeff. 0.452, $p \leq 0.05$).

The apparent negative impact of age is surprising as research concerning the demographic influences of turnout suggests that older voters are more reliable when it comes to turning out to vote.[9] Meanwhile, both models focusing on South Asian voter turnout suggest the opposite, as age had an odds ratio of less than one in each. Also, the variable for 2015 turnout appears to have an exaggerated effect on plans to vote. The 95% confidence intervals for both identifying as an immigrant and as religious appear to be similarly exaggerated. As will be discussed, these issues could stem from the use of recall variables to capture 2015 conditions.

[8] All other ethnic identity groupings had fewer than 200 respondents. See Table 4.2 for an overview of South Asian and Chinese respondents.

[9] See Goerres (2007); Leighey & Nagler (2013)

Table 4.4: South Asian Voters' Plans to Vote in 2019 and 2015 Turnout (DV)

	SA & Plans to Vote in 2019		SA & Voted in 2015	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
SA & Voted in 2015	10.69***	44029.2***		
	(1.222)	[4013.5,483013.8]		
South Asian Candidate Present in 2019	0.330	1.392		
	(.501)	[0.521,3.716]		
South Asian Candidate Present in 2015	1.140	3.128	1.585***	4.882***
	(.605)	[0.956,10.24]	(.273)	[2.861,8.331]
Racialized Candidate Present in 2019	0.238	1.269		
	(.516)	[0.461,3.490]		
Racialized Candidate Present in 2015	-0.800	0.449	0.103	1.109
	(.560)	[0.150,1.346]	(.301)	[0.615,1.999]
Level of Income	-0.872	0.418	-0.443	0.642
	(.969)	[0.0626,2.793]	(.512)	[0.235,1.752]
Male	0.458	1.582	0.178	1.195
	(.384)	[0.746,3.355]	(.222)	[0.774,1.845]
Age in Years	-1.849***	0.157***	-0.655***	0.519***
	(.433)	[0.0673,0.368]	(.142)	[0.393,0.686]
University Graduate	-0.193	0.824	0.794***	2.213***
	(.408)	[0.370,1.834]	(.222)	[1.432,3.419]
Immigrant	2.319***	10.17***	1.521***	4.575***
	(.402)	[4.626,22.35]	(.215)	[3.000,6.976]
Voting is a Duty	-0.485	0.616	-0.0434	0.958
	(.405)	[0.279,1.361]	(.240)	[0.599,1.532]
Religious	2.401**	11.04**	1.892***	6.635***
	(.834)	[2.152,56.64]	(.403)	[3.011,14.62]
Region of Country (East to West)	0.452*	1.572*	0.441***	1.554***
	(.202)	[1.058,2.334]	(.118)	[1.232,1.960]
Liberal Party Best Represents Me	-0.474	0.623	0.356	1.428
	(.564)	[0.206,1.880]	(.335)	[0.741,2.753]
Conservative Party Best Represents Me	-0.674	0.509	-1.440**	0.237**
	[.595)	[0.159,1.636]	(.449)	[0.0982,0.571]
NDP Best Represents Me	-0.135	0.874	0.211	1.235
	(.611)	[0.264,2.897]	(.388)	[0.577,2.640]
Green Party Best Represents Me	-1.378	0.252	-1.195	0.303
	(1.112)	[0.0285,2.229]	(.781)	[0.0654,1.399]
PPC Best Represents Me	-3.990	0.0185	-0.994	0.370
	(3.564)	[0.0000171,19.99]	(1.081)	[0.0445,3.081]
Interested in Politics	-0.288	0.750	1.219	3.385
	(1.128)	[0.0822,6.845]	(.698)	[0.862,13.29]
Interested in 2019 Election	0.893	2.442	-0.601	0.548
	(1.176)	[0.244,24.49]	(.707)	[0.137,2.192]
Constant	-6.394***	0.00167***	-7.303***	0.000674***
	(1.349)	[0.000119,0.0235]	(.763)	[0.000151,0.00301]
N	5236	5236	5316	5316
pseudo R^2	0.783	0.783	0.267	0.267

Standard of Error in round brackets, 95% Confidence Intervals in square brackets.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

South Asian Voter Turnout in 2015

For 2015, the results were quite different. When South Asian reported past turnout was used as the main dependent variable, regressions showed that their does appear to be a connection with the presence of a South Asian candidate in 2015. The variable for South Asian candidate presence had an odds ratio of 4.882 (CI 2.861 8.331), which suggests that the presence of a South Asian candidate in 2015 increased the likelihood that a South Asian voter would turnout by nearly five times.

Findings here were quite similar to those concerning plans to vote among South Asian voters. Being religious had the strongest influence on turnout (OR 6.635, CI 3.011 14.62), followed by being an immigrant (OR 4.575, CI 3.000 6.976), or a university graduate (OR 2.213, CI 1.432, 3.419). The only variables found to decrease the likelihood of turning out were feeling best represented by the Conservative party (OR 0.237, CI 0.0982, 0.571) and a person's age (coeff. -0.655, $p \leq 0.00$).

When comparing results from both models focusing on South Asian voters, the results for the 2015 turnout model appear to be slightly more accurate. Some of the stronger predictors like South Asian candidate presence and identifying as religious have a much more narrow range between confidence intervals, suggesting that these relationships are more trustworthy. However, the influence of time cannot be overstated as these questions were all asked after the 2015 election had ended. For example, a person's level of income may have been lower in 2015 than in 2019, directly misrepresenting any influence between income level and reported turnout. Changes like this aren't unreasonable to expect as the elections were four years apart.

Similarly, a voter may have misremembered who the candidates were in 2015. While these results suggest that there is a connection between the presence of a South Asian candidate and South Asian voter turnout, its possible that this is exaggerated as well. This project relies on the assumption that voters know who their candidates are and that this knowledge encouraged them to vote, so the possibility that they can't remember the candidates is a strong source of possible error for the 2015 models in particular.

4.4 Chinese Turnout and Plans to Turnout

The findings concerning Chinese voters tell a slightly different story. Similar to the models that focused on South Asian voters, the presence of a Chinese candidate in 2015 was found to increase the likelihood of turning out among Chinese voters. However, this effect also extended to 2019 plans to turnout, as having a Chinese candidate present in 2015 increased the likelihood of planning to vote in 2019 by nearly four times. As will be discussed, these findings need to be interpreted cautiously, but overall they do support the H3

hypothesis.

Plans to Turnout Among Chinese Voters

As can be seen in Table 4.5, the strongest positive influences on plans to vote among Chinese voters were 2015 turnout (OR 6080.2, CI 2025.1, 18255.0), being an immigrant (OR 13.52, CI 6.870 26.59), and being interested in the 2019 election (coeff. 2.376, $p \leq 0.05$). As mentioned, the variable for Chinese candidate presence in 2015 was also among the strongest influences of plans to vote among Chinese respondents, with an odds ratio of 3.895 (CI 1.694 8.958).

On the surface this suggests that Chinese voters had a increased likelihood of planning to vote based on whether they voted in 2015, whether they're an immigrant, and whether a Chinese candidate ran in their constituency in 2015. However, the same issues that were discussed in relation to the South Asian voter models apply here as well, as the range between confidence intervals for 2015 turnout in particular is quite wide. This suggests that while this variable is influential the degree of its influence may be exaggerated.

A particularly interesting relationship is that between plans to vote among Chinese voters and the presence of a Chinese candidate in 2015. It might seem odd that candidates from a past election would be influential, but referring back to Tables 4.1 and 4.2 can provide some context. While only 11% of Chinese respondents live in a riding with a Chinese incumbent, this was spread out over 7 ridings. Also, 20% of Chinese respondents live in a riding that had a Chinese candidate present during both election years. Lastly, while the number of Chinese candidates increased between elections (from 24 in 2015 to 37 in 2019) the number of constituencies didn't increase as much (21 to 28), suggesting that at least some ridings had more than one Chinese candidate running. This allows for us to consider how 2015 election conditions may have carried forward to influence 2019 behaviour and plans to vote.

A number of variables had an unexpected negative influence on planning to vote in this model. Being religious (OR 0.398, CI 0.197 0.687), being older (coeff. -0.885, $p \leq 0.00$), and viewing voting as a duty (OR 0.507, CI 0.265 0.970) were all found to decrease the likelihood of planning to vote. Each of these findings go against what's previously been found concerning influences of participation, as these factors are typically linked to an increased likelihood to turnout.[10]

[10]See Driskell et al. (2008); François & Gergaud (2019); Goerres (2007)

Table 4.5: Chinese Voters' Plans to Vote in 2019 and 2015 Turnout (DV)

	Chinese & Plans to Vote in 2019		Chinese & Voted in 2015	
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Odds Ratio
Chinese & Voted in 2015	8.713***	6080.2***		
	(.561)	[2025.1,18255.0]		
Chinese Candidate Present in 2019	-0.0753	0.927		
	(.429)	[0.400,2.150]		
Chinese Candidate Present in 2015	1.360**	3.895**	1.100***	3.004***
	(.425)	[1.694,8.958]	(.209)	[1.994,4.526]
Racialized Candidate Present in 2019	0.486	1.626		
	(.436)	[0.692,3.823]		
Racialized Candidate Present in 2015	0.323	1.382	0.530**	1.698**
	(.388)	[0.646,2.958]	(.188)	[1.174,2.456]
Level of Income	-0.142	0.868	0.175	1.192
	(.723)	[0.210,3.581]	(.370)	[0.577,2.461]
Male	0.0248	1.025	0.212	1.237
	(.318)	[0.550,1.910]	(.169)	[0.888,1.721]
Age in Years	-0.885***	0.413***	-0.299**	0.741**
	(.230)	[0.263,0.648]	(.102)	[0.608,0.904]
University Graduate	0.483	1.621	0.921***	2.512***
	(.321)	[0.864,3.043]	(.172)	[1.794,3.516]
Immigrant	2.604***	13.52***	1.933***	6.911***
	(.345)	[6.870,26.59]	(.166)	[4.987,9.577]
Voting is a Duty	-0.679*	0.507*	0.339	1.403
	(.331)	[0.265,0.970]	(.194)	[0.959,2.052]
Religious	-1.001**	0.368**	-0.806***	0.447***
	(.319)	[0.197,0.687]	(.171)	[0.320,0.624]
Region of Country (East to West)	0.191	1.210	0.310***	1.363***
	(.158)	[0.888,1.648]	(.081)	[1.162,1.598]
Liberal Party Best Represents Me	-0.607	0.545	-0.309	0.734
	(.465)	[0.219,1.356]	(.250)	[0.450,1.199]
Conservative Party Best Represents Me	-0.322	0.725	0.0493	1.050
	(.478)	[0.284,1.849]	(.251)	[0.643,1.717]
NDP Best Represents Me	-0.351	0.704	-0.600	0.549
	(.532)	[0.248,1.999]	(.319)	[0.294,1.027]
Green Party Best Represents Me	-0.0851	0.918	-0.697	0.498
	(.630)	[0.267,3.158]	(.450)	[0.206,1.203]
PPC Best Represents Me	0.203	1.225	-0.865	0.421
	(1.059)	[0.154,9.766]	(1.040)	[0.0548,3.235]
Interested in Politics	-0.948	0.388	0.520	1.682
	(.862)	[0.0716,2.099]	(.504)	[0.626,4.519]
Interested in 2019 Election	2.376*	10.76*	-0.198	0.820
	(.944)	[1.690,68.49]	(.515)	[0.299,2.252]
Constant	-5.524***	0.00399***	-5.177***	0.00565***
	(.966)	[0.000600,0.0265]	(.488)	[0.00217,0.0147]
N	5236	5236	5316	5316
pseudo R^2	0.780	0.780	0.221	0.221

Standard of Error in round brackets, 95% Confidence Intervals in square brackets.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chinese Voter Turnout in 2015

Similar relationships emerge when Chinese voter turnout from 2015 is regressed with all variables and controls. Again, variables focusing on 2019 candidates are excluded as there's no expectation for them to influence 2015 behaviour. Like the model that focuses on 2019 plans to vote among Chinese voters, the presence of a Chinese candidate in 2015 was found to increase the likelihood of turning out to vote by three times (OR 3.004, CI 1.994 4.526). Additionally, the presence of a racialized candidate in general in 2015 was found to increase the likelihood that a Chinese voter would turnout by slightly more than one and a half times (OR 1.698, CI 1.174 2.456). Therefore, while these findings support the H3 hypothesis, they also appear to support the H1 hypothesis as well.

In addition to the presence of Chinese and racialized candidates, the most influential variables were being an immigrant (OR 6.911, CI 4.987 9.577), being a university graduate (OR 2.512, CI 1.794 3.516), and living towards the West side of the country (coeff. 0.310, $p \leq 0.00$). Similar to the plans to vote model, being religious (OR 0.447, CI 0.320 0.624) and being older (coeff. -0.299, $p \leq 0.01$) were found to negatively impact turnout among Chinese voters.

Again, it is possible that we aren't getting the full story here because most of the variables focus on 2019 demographics and only those relating to candidates consider 2015 conditions. This also means it is possible that the information reflected by these models has changed since 2015, and that the influence of these variables is being misrepresented. Nevertheless, when compared with the 2019 model, these findings allow us to infer that Chinese voters were mobilized to turnout by the presence of both racialized candidates and Chinese candidates. Therefore, these results appear to support the H3 hypothesis.

4.5 Discussion

My research provided mixed results. Table 4.3 shows that there was no relationship between the presence of a racialized candidate and racialized voter turnout in 2015 or plans to vote in 2019. Models that concentrated on South Asian voting behaviour seemed to show conflicting results, but did provide some support for hypothesis H2. While the 2015 turnout model indicated that the presence of a South Asian candidate increased the odds of turning out by nearly five times, there was no significant relationship between the presence of a South Asian candidate (in either election) and 2019 plans to vote. Regression analyses that focused on Chinese voters provided similar support for hypothesis H3. Unlike the models that looked at racialized and South Asian voters, those that focused on Chinese voters show that they were almost four times as likely to plan to vote in 2019 when a Chinese candidate had run in their riding in 2015. Further-

more, the model focusing on 2015 turnout among Chinese voters similarly supports this hypothesis, as the presence of a Chinese candidate made Chinese voters three times as likely to report having turnout out to vote.

Despite the rejection of H1 and only partial support for H2 and H3, the 2015 Chinese voter turnout model indicates that the presence of a racialized candidate positively increased their likelihood to turnout. When Chinese voters lived in a riding where a racialized candidate was present in 2015 they were almost twice as likely to intend to vote. So while the H1 hypothesis had to be rejected, these results suggest that there may be support for racialized affinity at a nuanced level. This further highlights the influence of the original ethnic identity question from the CES. Chinese was the only pre-determined CES category that was used for this project without great manipulation, and while these are positive results this draws further attention to the potential that comes with having more diverse response options. Similarly, hand-coding the variable for racialization may also have had an impact on the results. Those respondents who were identified as racialized only formed a small portion of the population, and this is especially true for racialized voters who live in ridings with racialized candidates.[11] In this case, affinity effects were found to be ethnicity-specific, so had there been more pre-determined ethnicity categories for respondents to choose from, we would likely be able to make better inferences about more racialized groups.

Among the models that focus on 2019 plans to vote, the only finding that was consistently influential among all groups was turnout in 2015, suggesting that voting in the last election increased the likelihood that voters would intend to vote in 2019. This aligns with other findings concerning voting as a habit in Canada (Pammett & Leduc, 2020). A more interesting finding was that racialized candidate presence in 2015 was often found to have a positive influence both 2015 turnout, and in some cases 2019 plans to vote.

This could be suggesting that there's incumbency effects occurring here. We know that the number of racialized candidates among major parties did increase from 12.9% in 2015 to 15.7% in 2019, but the number of racialized MPs elected only increased by 4 (51 up from 47) (Griffith, 2019). We also know that the majority of racialized MPs who were elected in 2015 are South Asian and Chinese (Tolley, 2015). Furthermore, the data gathered for this project specifically shows that only 32% of racialized respondents lived in a riding with a racialized incumbent.[12] Perhaps racialized voters in constituencies that had a racialized incumbent felt that the costs outweighed the benefits in 2019 and decided that it was "safe" to stay home during this election.

Among all three groups of voters (racialized, South Asian, and Chinese) the variable for region had a consistently significant effect on results, as living further West was positively found to increase the likeli-

[11] See Table 4.2.

[12] As mentioned previously, the number of racialized candidates included in this study was higher than those reported by others because I included candidates from all parties, not just the major six.

hood of turning out to vote. While this could be explained by pointing to the higher number of respondents from larger provinces outside of the Atlantic region, it's also worth referring back to Table 4.2. This table indicates that slightly more than half of racialized respondents had a racialized candidate run in their riding during both elections. The variable that captured whether respondents lived in an urban or rural setting had to be excluded, but it has previously been found that the overwhelming majority of racialized Canadians (95%) live in urban centres in one of four provinces: Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta (Statistics Canada, 2013).[13] Similarly, Table 4.6 shows that this finding appears to hold true among racialized respondents in this study, as the majority live in Ontario, followed by British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec. Considering this along with the apparent concentration of candidates, it is possible that the candidate-turnout relationship being examined here may have less to do with who's running and more to do with where they're running.[14]

Table 4.6: Where Racialized Respondents Live

	Racialized	**South Asian**	**Chinese**
Ontario	2563	695	814
British Columbia	686	140	351
Alberta	530	100	182
Quebec	513	51	95
Manitoba	135	27	29
Saskatchewan	90	21	20
Atlantic	86	17	22
Territories	11	4	1

'Atlantic' category includes Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island.
'Territories' category includes Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories.

The influence of recall variables makes it necessary to emphasize the potential impact of time. 2015 turnout was consistently found to be one of the strongest influences of plans to vote in 2019, and the presence of a co-ethnic candidate in 2015 was found to increase the likelihood of planning to vote in 2019 among both South Asian and Chinese voters. While these are positive findings, they have to be considered cautiously as the variables were not measured in 2015, but voters were asked to think back to the previous election. As mentioned previously, regression models that use self-reports of past turnout as a dependent variable could be exaggerated as respondents may have misremembered whether or not they voted four years ago. This creates an opportunity for social desireability effects to be more influential: respondents

[13] The question that asked respondents whether they lived in an urban or rural area was only included in the PES, and therefore its use in regression models decreased the total number of observations.

[14] After running additional tests that included dummy variables for each province, results were inconclusive. These new variables were not found to be significant, and other variables included in the original models barely changed.

may not remember if they voted, but they want to be viewed as good citizens and therefore decide that they probably did.

It is also likely that respondents may have forgotten which candidates ran in 2015, or mixed them up with those running in 2019. Because the focus of this project is to measure the mobilizing effect that racialized candidates have on voter turnout, this project assumes that respondents know the candidates and their ethnic and/or racial identity. So the possibility that they've mistakenly identified their candidates, or that they don't know the candidates at all is a potential source of error for all models, but especially for models that focus on reports of past turnout. However, as can be seen from Table 4.2, most respondents who had a racialized candidate run in their riding had at least one racialized candidate run in both elections. This slightly increases the odds that respondents knew that there was a racialized candidate in their riding.

Assuming that a person actually did vote in the last election and reported this on the CES, if they changed residences between election years this could also misrepresent the relationship between candidate and voter that I'm trying to measure. This is because the variable for racialized candidate presence is derived from the question that asks respondents which constituency they live in as of 2019. The CES question that most closely captured changing residence or moving between elections asked respondents how long they've lived in their current city or community (pes19_lived).[15] While this isn't ideal (you could move within the same city and still change electoral ridings) it was initially included with the models to account for the effects of the recall variable asking respondents whether they voted in 2015. The response options available were less than 1 year, 1 to 3 years, 3 to 10 years, and 10 or more years. This further limited the effectiveness of this variable, as those who didn't live in the same constituency for both elections would have to be coded as if they did since the elections were 4 years apart. Unfortunately, this question was only asked in the PES. As discussed, the PES had fewer respondents (especially racialized respondents) and therefore when added to the regression models, the number of observations included was significantly limited (from 5236 to 1358) due to missing values.[16]

The influence of time and recall variables could also extend to results from demographic variables. While identifiers like age and ethnicity are unlikely to have changed, other factors such as income, education level, and interest in politics can more reasonably be expected to change over time. For example, a person may have gained more interest in politics following the 2015 election but actually weren't that interested during it. Similarly, a respondent's education level may have changed if they were in enrolled in university ahead of the 2015 election, as most programs are four years in length. The potential for these changes further shows why the 2019 models are probably more reliable than those that focus on 2015 turnout.

[15] See Appendix B.6

[16] When the variable for length of time lived in their city was included in the model, it wasn't statistically significant. When those who reported living in their city for less than three years were excluded, the variable was omitted from the model due to collinearity.

As these possible sources of error come from variables that are known predictors of political behaviour, they were necessary to include to gain insight into the influence of racialized candidates on turnout. Recall variables also had to be relied on due to challenges with sample size and the focus on racialized voters. Furthermore, previous versions of the CES do not focus on ethnicity in the way that the 2019 version does, which ruled out the opportunity to use earlier versions of the survey to measure 2015 turnout. So while using 2019 demographic information to make deductions about 2015 behaviour isn't ideal, and relying on a recall variable makes errors more likely, these were risks worth taking as they helped to provide insight into 2019 plans to vote. Altogether, the models that focus on 2015 turnout may not be as reliable, but they are still effective as they help to provide context for 2019 behaviour.

Despite possible discrepancies from coding and the influence of time, this project did uncover a connection between candidates and voters with a shared ethnicity. These findings allow for us to infer that the presence of racialized candidates has a positive impact on turnout amongst racialized voters with the same ethnic identity. However, these findings were limited to South Asian and Chinese respondents only. So while the results from this project are helpful and do appear to support my hypotheses, they only reflect a small portion of Canada's racialized population and leave us with more questions about the influence of racialized candidates. This is evident as results from the racialized-focused models suggest that racialized candidates don't have a mobilizing effect on racialized voters, whereas the ethnicity-specific models imply that this may not be the case. Altogether, while the findings from this project should be accepted cautiously, they do indicate that racialized candidates influence voter turnout among racialized voters.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This project set out to determine if the presence of a racialized candidate in an election encouraged racialized voters to turnout. To answer this question, I used data from the 2019 CES along with publicly available information concerning candidates in the 2015 and 2019 Canadian federal elections. Multivariate regression analysis revealed mixed results. While there was no connection found between the broad presence of racialized candidates and racialized voters, models that focused on specific ethnic identities showed that the presence of a co-ethnic candidate did encourage voters to turnout. More specifically, when a Chinese or South Asian candidate ran in 2015, it increased the likelihood that Chinese and South Asian voters reported having turnout out to vote. Also, the presence of a Chinese candidate in 2015 appears to have encouraged Chinese voters to plan to vote in 2019 as well.

These findings align with previous work on voter turnout among racialized voters in general, and candidate preference among racialized Canadians specifically. Similar projects that focus on the US context show that racialized voters are more likely to turnout to vote when there's a candidate with the same ethnic identity running (Barreto, 2007; Cebula et al., 2017; Washington, 2006). Likewise, work that considers the Canadian context shows that Chinese and South Asian voters prefer to be represented by co-ethnic candidates (Bird, 2012; Bird, 2015), and are more likely to support them at the polls (Bird et al., 2016; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2019). This further makes these findings significant as they show how US-based turnout work can be applied to the Canadian context, and that at least some racialized Canadians are mobilized by the candidates in their riding.

A major inconsistency with this project came from looking at racialized voters as a singular, cohesive group. Other works that look at turnout among racialized voters show that when a co-ethnic candidate isn't available, racialized voters typically support another racialized candidate over a Caucasian one (Besco,

2015; Bird et al, 2016). However, when the same relationship was examined here, results concerning the influence of racialized candidates were null. This is presumably related to my methods for coding ethnicity and racialization. As discussed, the decision to combine all racialized voters into a single category instead of multiple, ethnic-specific groups was unavoidable due to sample size and the design of the CES ethnic identity question. Unfortunately, this directly limited any ability to examine the nuances in voting behaviour across different ethnic groups, and most likely caused the null result between racialized candidates and racialized voters. This inconsistency is significant not because it goes against previous findings, but rather because it highlights the need for better ways of measuring ethnicity and racialization.

It's also worth reinforcing that the findings from this study may have less to do with who's running and more to do with where they're running. It is beyond the scope of this study to delve further into these issues, but constituency composition and the concentration of candidates could provide an alternative explanation for my results. As discussed in Chapter 4, just slightly more than half of racialized voters lived in a constituency with a racialized candidate in both elections. Statistics Canada (2013) found that the overwhelming majority of racialized Canadians (96%) live in urban areas in Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta. Most of the racialized respondents in this study lived in Ontario, or British Columbia so this would also help to explain why living further West was often found to influence turnout and plans to vote. Furthermore, Table 4.2 showed that most racialized candidates ran in a riding where they weren't the only racialized candidate. While I mentioned previously that this might increase the likelihood that voters know at least one racialized candidate in their riding, it might also limit the expected mobilizing effect. If seeing a racialized candidate is nothing out of the ordinary in a voter's riding or there's a higher odds that the winner will be racialized, this could decrease the benefits associated with turning out for racialized voters.

Like any research project, this study had some limitations. Arguably the most impactful was the CES measure for ethnicity. The CES question concerning ethnic identity did not provide identity options that were sufficiently representative of Canada's racialized population. This led me to hand-code text responses, which made this part of the project particularly susceptible to error. Furthermore, in order to form samples large enough to make deductions, I was only able to look at voting behaviour among South Asian and Chinese voters. This meant that I had to overlook different identities and missed the opportunity to learn more about other, particularly underrepresented groups. Similarly, relying on plans to vote instead of actual turnout likely reflected exaggerated intentions among voters, and using recall variables to study 2015 turnout probably led to exaggerated results overall. Finally, the lack of peer-reviewed information on racialized candidates meant that candidates were coded and categorized based on my research alone, creating a significant opportunity for error. With emerging work that focuses on racialized candidates like

that from Johnson et al. (2021), these same issues won't be as limiting for future studies. New research like this provides an effective solution to some of the challenges that limited my project, and pave the way for more accurate findings on racialized candidates and voters.

Despite these issues, there's still reason to believe that the connections between racialized candidates and voter turnout observed here are valid, even if it is to a lesser extent than my results suggest. Each regression model included a variety of known predictors of voting behaviour that would account for most alternative explanations. With the exception of the model that focused on racialized voters as a whole, models that looked at South Asian and Chinese voters did indicate that the variable for co-ethnic candidate presence was among the most significant influences of turnout in 2015. Furthermore, the model that focused on plans to vote among Chinese voters suggested that the presence of a racialized candidate in 2015 may have encouraged them to plan to vote in 2019. While the limitations of this study may have overstated these relationships, they still confirm that there's a connection and therefore can be accepted with an acknowledgement of flaws. This project's contribution isn't concluding that candidates have a strong influence on turnout, but rather that there's signs that this influence exists.

Considering these positive signs alongside of alternative explanations and this study's limitations, this project can also act as a guide for future research on this topic. Even if in relation to what not to do, the challenges faced during this project will be helpful for future research on race and ethnicity in politics. Ethnicity and racialization are difficult concepts to measure, but this thesis shows how future surveys must aim to be as inclusive as possible, and at the very least be representative of the population that's being studied. Similarly, as there were few sources that provided information on political candidates, my methods for coding and categorizing candidates highlights the need for more publicly available information. I relied mainly on social media posts and local news media, but resources from groups like Operation Black Vote were by far the most helpful and effective. Having more groups like this who shine a light on racialized candidates and their platforms would help academics, but more importantly they would help to offset the negativity and novelty effects that racialized candidates often face during a campaign. Lastly, this project underscores an obstacle that's unique to voting behaviour research in Canada. Relying on plans to vote as a proxy for turnout is fine, but it still isn't as accurate as validated turnout. As a result, this project further supports the need for access to validated turnout information, as better insight into Canadian voting behaviour can't be gained without it.[1]

Overall, this project finds support for racialized candidates influencing voter turnout among racialized voters. While these findings can be accepted cautiously, the major underlying finding from this thesis is that there's a clear need to change how we collect data on racialization and ethnicity. My methods for measuring

[1] See Achen (2019).

ethnicity and estimating racialization were acceptable, but they call attention to missed opportunities for better insight into underrepresented communities. More specifically, this insight can only be achieved if we strive to develop more effective measures of ethnicity and racialization, and researchers continue to be transparent about how they conceptualize these identities. Altogether, this project reinforces the importance of continued research on this topic, so that we can learn more about how racialized Canadians participate in politics and how they prefer to be represented.

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Appendix A

Variable Names and Definitions

- **A.1 duty**: Recoded from question asking respondents if they viewed voting as a duty or a choice (cps19_duty_choice). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Duty was coded as "1" and choice was coded as "0".

- **A.2 elxninterest**: Recoded from question asking respondents how interested they are in the 2019 federal election (cps19_interest_elxn). This was recoded into a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1. Answers indicating that the respondent was very interested were coded as "1" and not very interested were coded as "0".

- **A.3 geninterest**: Recoded from question asking respondents how interested they are in politics generally (cps19_interest_gen). This was recoded into a continuous variable with values ranging 0 to 1. Answers indicating that the respondent was very interested were coded as "1" and not very interested were coded as "0".

- **A.4 unigrad**: Recoded from question asking respondents about their highest level of education received (cps19_education). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent was a university graduate (Bachelor's degree or higher) was coded as "1" and anything less than this was coded as "0".

- **A.5 gender**: Recoded from question asking respondents which gender they as (cps19_gender). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Responses indicating "Man" were recoded as "1" and those indicating "Woman" were recoded as 0. A non-binary option was provided on original CES question, but the number of respondents was too small to include (Only 291 selected "Other").

- **A.6 immigrant**: Recoded from question asking respondents about their immigration status (cps19 _bornin_canada). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent is an immigrant were coded as "1" and non-immigrants as "0".

- **A.7 income**: Recoded from question asking respondents which income category they fall into (cps19 _income_cat). This was recoded into an ordinal level variable ranging from 0 and 1. Respondents indicating that they made more than $200,000 were coded as "1" and respondents indicating that they had no income were coded as "0".

- **A.8 liberal**: Recoded from question asking respondents which federal political party they identify with (cps19_fed_id). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent identified as Liberal were coded as "1" and all others as "0".

- **A.9 conservative**: Recoded from question asking respondents which federal political party they identify with (cps19_fed_id). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent identified as Conservative were coded as "1" and all others as "0".

- **A.10 ndp**: Recoded from question asking respondents which federal political party they identify with (cps19_fed_id). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent identified as NDP were coded as "1" and all others as "0".

- **A.11 green**: Recoded from question asking respondents which federal political party they identify with (cps19_fed_id). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent identified as Green were coded as "1" and all others as "0".

- **A.12 ppc**: Recoded from question asking respondents which federal political party they identify with (cps19_fed_id). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent identified as PPC were coded as "1" and all others as "0".

- **A.13 religious**: Recoded from question asking respondents about their religious identity (cps19_relig ion). This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. Answers indicating that the respondent was religious were coded as "1" and non-religious as "0".

- **A.14 region**: Recoded from question asking respondents which province they live in (cps19_province). This was recoded into an nominal level variable ranging from 1 to 6. These values indicate the following: 1=Atlantic, 2=Quebec, 3=Ontario, 4=Prairies, 5=BC, 6=Territories.

- **A.15 yearborn**: Recoded from question asking respondents which year they were born in (cps19_yob). This was recoded into a ordinal level variable ranging from 1 to 3. These values indicate the following: 1=<45 2=45-59 3=60+.
- **A.16 ChinesePTV**: Index variable created from planstovote and Chinese to capture 2019 plans to turnout among Chinese-identifying respondents. Dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a Chinese-identifying respondent who planned to vote in the 2019 election.
- **A.17 ChineseVOTE5**: Index variable created from Turnout and Chinese to capture self-reported 2015 turnout among Chinese-identifying respondents. Dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a Chinese-identifying respondent who voted in the 2015 election.
- **A.18 SouthAsianPTV**: Index variable created from planstovote and South Asian to capture 2019 plans to turnout among South Asian-identifying respondents. Dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a South Asian-identifying respondent who planned to vote in the 2019 election.
- **A.19 SouthAsVOTE5**: Index variable created from Turnout and South Asian to capture self-reported 2015 turnout among South Asian-identifying respondents. Dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a South Asian-identifying respondent who voted in the 2015 election.
- **A.20 Present19**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2019 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a racialized candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no racialized candidate it would be coded as 0.
- **A.21 Present15**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2015 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a racialized candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no racialized candidate it would be coded as 0.
- **A.22 PChinese19**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2019 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a Chinese candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no Chinese candidate it would be coded as 0.

- **A.23 PChinese15**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2015 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a Chinese candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no Chinese candidate it would be coded as 0.

- **A.24 PSouthAsian19**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2019 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a South Asian candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no South Asian candidate it would be coded as 0.

- **A.25 PSouthAsian15**: Created using a metadata variable capturing which constituency each respondents lives in (constituencynumber) and information on candidate ethnicity for the 2015 election. This was recoded into a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values. If there was a South Asian candidate running in a given constituency it would be coded as 1, and if there no South Asian candidate it would be coded as 0.

- **A.26 presr19**: Index variable created from racialized and Present19 to focus on racialized respondents who lived in a constituency with a racialized candidate present in the 2019 election. This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a racialized respondent who lives in constituency where a racialized candidate ran.

- **A.27 presr15**: Index variable created from racialized and Present15 to focus on racialized respondents who lived in a constituency with a racialized candidate present in the 2015 election. This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" represents a racialized respondent who lives in constituency where a racialized candidate ran.

- **A.28 Turnout2015**: Recoded from question asking respondents if they voted in the 2015 Canadian federal election (cps19_turnout_2015). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" indicates that the respondent voted and "0" indicates that they did not.

- **A.29 planstovote**: Recoded from question asking respondents if they planned to vote in the 2019 Canadian federal election (cps19_v_likely). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" indicates that the respondent did plan to vote and "0" indicates that they did not.

- **A.30 Chinese**: Recoded from question asking respondents to indicate their ethnic identity (cps19_ethnicity). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" indicates that

the respondent self-identified as Chinese by either selecting the option for "Chinese" or filling-in a qualifying response under "Other".

- **A.31 SouthAsian**: Recoded from question asking respondents to indicate their ethnic identity (cps19_ethnicity). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" indicates that the respondent self-identified as South Asian by either selecting the option for "Indian" or filling-in a qualifying response under "Other".

- **A.32 racialized**: Recoded from question asking respondents to indicate their ethnic identity (cps19_ethnicity). This is a dichotomous variable with 0 and 1 as the only values, where "1" indicates that the respondent self-identified as racialized by either selecting "Chinese", "Indian", "Hispanic", or filling-in a qualifying response under "Other".

Appendix B

Questions Included from the CES

B.1 cps19_turnout_2015: Did you happen to vote in the last Federal election in 2015?

- Yes
- No
- Not eligible to vote in last election
- Don't know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 186)

B.2 cps19_v_likely: On election day, are you...

- Certain to vote
- Likely to vote
- Unlikely to vote
- Certain not to vote
- I am not eligible to vote
- I voted in an advance poll
- Don't know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 73)

B.3 pes19_turnout2019: The federal election was held on Monday, October 21. In any election, some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy, or for some other reason. Others do not want to vote. Did you vote in the recent federal election?

- Yes
- No
- I usually vote but didn't this time
- I thought about voting but didn't
- I wasn't registered to vote
- Don't know/ Don't remember
- Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 291)

B.4 pes19_turnout2019_v2: The federal election was held on Monday, October 21. In any election, some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy, or for some other reason. Others do not want to vote. Did you vote in the recent federal election?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/ Don't remember
- Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 292)

B.5 cps19_ethnicity: Please select all that apply.

- Aboriginal/ First Nations
- British
- Chinese
- Dutch

- English
- French
- French Canadian
- German
- Hispanic
- Indian
- Inuk Inuit
- Irish
- Italian
- Métis
- Polish
- Québécois
- Scottish
- Ukrainian
- Other 1 (please specify)
- Other 2 (please specify)
- Don’t know/Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 238-239)

B.6 pes19_lived: For how many years have you lived in your current city or community?

- Less than 1 year
- 1-3 years
- 3-10 years
- More than 10 years
- Don’t know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 511)

B.7 cps19_income_cat: We don't need the exact amount; does your household income fall into one of these broad categories?

- No income
- $1 to $30,000
- $30,001 to $60,000
- $60,001 to $90,000
- $90,001 to $110,000
- $110,001 to $150,000
- $150,001 to $200,000
- More than $200,000
- Don't know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 254)

B.8 cps19_gender: Are you...

- A man
- A woman
- Other (e.g. Trans, non-binary, two-spirit, gender-queer)

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 58)

B.9 cps19_yob: To make sure we are talking to a cross section of Canadians, we need to get a little information about your background. First, in what year were you born?

- Response options for birth year ranged from 1920 to 2010.

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 46-50)

B.10 cps19_education: What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

- No schooling
- Some elementary school
- Completed elementary school
- Some secondary/ high school
- Completed secondary/ high school
- Some technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique
- Completed technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique
- Some university
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Professional degree or doctorate
- Don't know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 62)

B.11 cps19_bornin_canada: Were you born in Canada?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/ Prefer not to say

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 197)

B.12 cps19_duty_choice: People have different views about voting. For some, voting is a duty. They feel that they should vote in every election. For others, voting is a choice. They only vote when they feel strongly about that election. For you personally, is voting first and foremost a Duty or a Choice?

- Duty
- Choice
- Don't know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 158)

B.13 cps19_religion: Please tell me what is your religion, if you have one?

- None/ Don't have one/ Atheist
- Agnostic
- Buddhist/ Buddhism
- Hindu
- Jewish/ Judaism/ Jewish Orthodox
- Muslim/ Islam
- Sikh/ Sikhism
- Anglican/ Church of England
- Baptist
- Catholic/ Roman Catholic/ RC
- Greek Orthodox/ Ukrainian Orthodox/ Russian Orthodox/ Eastern Orthodox
- Jehovah's Witness
- Lutheran
- Mormon/ Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints
- Pentecostal/ Fundamentalist/ Born Again/ Evangelical
- Presbyterian
- Protestant
- United Church of Canada
- Christian Reformed
- Salvation Army
- Mennonite
- Other (please specify)

- Don’t know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 192-193)

B.14 cps19_fed_id: In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a:

- Liberal
- Conservative
- NDP
- Bloc Québécois
- Green
- People’s Party
- Another party (please specify)
- None of these
- Don’t know/ Prefer not to answer

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 165)

B.15 cps19_interest_elxn: How interested are you in this federal election? Set the slider to a number from 0 to 10, where 0 means no interest at all, and 10 means a great deal of interest.

- If you do not know, or prefer not to answer, please click →

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 72)

B.16 cps19_interest_gen: How interested are you in politics generally? Set the slider to a number from 0 to 10, where 0 means no interest at all, and 10 means a great deal of interest.

- If you do not know, or prefer not to answer, please click →

(Stephenson et al., 2020b, p. 71)