THE POLITICS OF CARBON PRICING IN CANADA: A CASE STUDY OF ONTARIO STAKEHOLDERS PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION IN CANADA'S FEDERAL CARBON PRICING POLICY PROCESS

by

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Abstract

Public and stakeholder participation and deliberation in environmental governance have been acknowledged and endorsed by several international principles and organizations as saliently *sine qua non* in unlocking solutions to "wicked" problems. Like in other countries, Canadian law recognizes and endorses the benefits of these elements. Accordingly, the federal government consulted and gathered inputs from various stakeholder groups during the development of its carbon pricing policy. However, there have been stakeholder acceptability problems and legitimacy challenges with the policy in Ontario. This thesis, therefore, explores and analyzes the role of the public and stakeholders in participatory and deliberative processes that occurred during the federal carbon pricing policy development, using Ontario stakeholders' engagement as a case.

Using a qualitative research approach, participants from government/bureaucrats, political parties, academia/experts, ENGOs, and businesses/industries involved in the processes were interviewed. Key issues and questions structured around the study's objectives revealed that although there were participatory processes, which affected some aspects of the final policy decision, the processes were deficient in several key aspects. The processes employed by the policy designers, even though, were restricted to tokenism, therapy, manipulation, and group interest politics, they reflected the input, preferences, and values of most of the stakeholders. Unfortunately, the existing and emerging major controversies and disputes were left unresolved during and after the processes, which have affected the policy's legitimacy and acceptability in Ontario.

Given the various fundamental ideologies of the political parties/organizations, and their approaches to climate change and emissions reductions in Canada's climate history, no nationally coordinated policy decisions about climate change will be free from political tensions, criticisms, and controversies. This thesis suggests that it is prudent for the federal government to continue with the policy so far as it is meeting its intended purpose, while engaging the dissenting stakeholders since policymaking is an unending process. The thesis concludes by recommending approaches that could be used to improve participatory processes and serve as a yardstick to assess other practices in future projects. It also calls on researchers to look into how Canadian provinces can achieve unity in solving "wicked problems" like the GHG emissions.

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Dedication

I dedicate my research thesis work to my father, Nana Akwanzi Abroba aka Mr. John Kwame Yankey, for his immense support and encouragement throughout my university education even on his sick bed. I love you. Daddy. I wish you a speedy recuperation.

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List of Abbreviations

BC	British Columbia
CEA	Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ENGOs	Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
NRTEE	National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
IAP2	International Association for Public Participation
GGPPA	Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCF	Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

Chapter 1: Establishing the Research

1.1. Introduction

Since the middle part of the 20th century, the use of diverse social actors in discussions on defining problems and exploring potential remedies and alternative policy pathways has been the lifeblood in environmental governance (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003). The central reason is that the environmental issues at hand are often characterized by (a) multi-dimensional and inequitable impacts, (b) scientific uncertainty and ignorance, (c) contradictory interests and values, (d) urgency, and (e) mistrust in institutions (Stern, 2005).

Lately, environmental issues such as the energy transition and climate change present challenges to environmental governance and policy advisory machinery at all levels, and have policy interdependencies beyond environmental concerns alone (Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; Garard, Koch, & Kowarsch, 2018) Consequently, environmental governance has shifted towards decentralized decision-making and sub-global responses, where greater recognition has been given to public and stakeholders participation and deliberations.

In the spectrum of environmental governance and policy development, public and stakeholder participation and deliberation (see Section 1.2 for definitions), which scholars have acknowledged as *sine qua non* in unlocking solutions to "wicked" problems (See Rittel & Webber, 1973 for more on "wicked" problems), have been recognized and endorsed by several international policies and organizations. Telling examples include the Aarhus Convention, Agenda 21, the U.S. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and World Bank initiatives. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development's tenth principle particularly notes that:

> "Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided" (UNEP, 2016, p. 1).

These international recognitions, protections, and endorsements make public and stakeholder participation and deliberation impossible to be discounted in policy decisionmaking processes.

Public participation in decisionmaking is crucial. Generally, the worth of participatory and deliberative approaches in tackling environmentally intractable problems is echoed in the scientific literature (Armeni, 2016; Chambers, 2003; Stewart & Sinclair, 2007). These approaches increase the "input legitimacy" of policy procedures and increase policymaking effectiveness and quality (Bua & Escobar, 2018). Again, they can reduce conflicting interests, litigations, and delays, as well as constitute collective identities, build trust, and facilitate learning amongst participants. In effect, these participants are then more likely to accept and support proposed or planned activities objectives and ensure successful implementation of final decisions in the long term (Ljungholm, 2015; Mathur, Price, & Austin, 2006; Rowe & Frewer, 2005; Spash, 2001; Stewart & Sinclair, 2007; Wolfe, 2018). Experiences in the Netherlands' energy transition management, the United Kingdom's renewable energy choices, and Sweden's carbon pricing policy, and so on, further reveal and confirm the significance of these procedures in environmental governance and policy decisions (Catney et al., 2013; Funke & Mattauch, 2018; Loorbach, 2010).

Canadian law followed suit with international trends, and it recognizes the value and salient benefits of public participation and deliberations. It is not surprising that section 2(1)(e) of Canada's legislative instrument, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (1999), states that the

government of Canada must "encourage the participation of the people of Canada in the making of decisions that affect the environment." However, the usefulness of processes in environmental governance and decisionmaking processes, among others, is not without criticisms and doubts. Some studies have argued that these processes might compromise the objective of efficient regulation and exacerbate environmental damage or impacts on interests, especially where emotions are permitted to dictate a decision as opposed to scientific evidence or professional knowledge/expertise (National Research Council, 2008a; NOAA, 2015; Ventriss & Kuentzel, 2005; Webler & Renn, 1995). Chapter 2 of this thesis highlights more of these criticisms.

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), public participation and deliberation vary, and not all of them are the same. Conducting meaningful deliberation and participation involves obtaining "public input at the specific points in the decision process and on the specific issues where such input has a real potential to help shape the decision or action" (Shereen Kandil & EPA, 2018). With regards to improving the quality of environmental decisions, scholars point out clearly that the worth of such a decision is heavily reliant on the quality of the procedures that leads to it (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003; Mathur et al., 2006; Uittenbroek, Mees, Hegger, & Driessen, 2019).

1.2. Research Problem Statement

Carbon is "woven through the Canadian economy, identity, and way of life" (Burch, 2018, p. 3). A closer look at Canada shows that Canada, as one of the top global carbon emitters, also doubles as the largest advanced-world per-capita emitter of GHGs (Boothe & Boudreault, 2016). After missing out on two independent GHG emission reduction targets—the 1992 Rio target and the 2005 Kyoto target, Canada also could not meet its 2020 Copenhagen target. In 2016, among other

measures, the Canadian government launched the Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change and Clean Growth (PCF) with carbon pricing as its central policy instrument as a strategic means to sustainably exceed its 2030 emissions reduction goal and work to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.

The benefits of carbon pricing in addressing GHG emissions have been applauded as significant and workable. It is an efficient way to decrease emissions, drive innovation, and encourage people and firms to pollute less (National Energy Board, 2019). Article 6 of the Paris Agreement acknowledges the reliability and significant effects of carbon pricing in tackling climate change (International Chambers of Commerce, 2019). Importantly, the High-Level Commission Report on carbon prices in 2017 notes that "a well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing emissions in an efficient way" (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017, p. 1). Lately, the carbon pricing instrument is speedily becoming the norm worldwide (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2019).

The development of Canada's carbon pricing policy tool saw the federal government engage and collate inputs from the government officials of the various provinces and territories, national Indigenous organizations, environmental groups, key stakeholders, etc. (Government of Canada, 2016b). For more on carbon pricing and how it works, *see page 10, and The Globe and Mail (2021)*. However, in contrast to the plethora of literature on the significant benefits of public participation and deliberations concerning policy decisionmaking, public and stakeholders acceptability of Canada's carbon pricing policy instrument has been challengingly difficult.

The carbon pricing policy's introduction has been resisted. Some provinces (e.g., Ontario) resorted to court; others threatened court actions. Although Canada's supreme court rulings on March 26,

2021, cleared and endorsed the policy instrument, the most crucial unanswered questions are: Will the controversies and "politicking" of the climate action stop? Will the affected and interested parties embrace the court's decision? Now that the price is set to continue increasing, is there a guarantee that the partisan public will give up the political fight? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. This study aims at exploring and analyzing the role of the public and stakeholder participatory and deliberative processes during the policy's agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities.

The carbon policy tool has been fraught with legitimacy and implementation deficits, which has affected its performance and effectiveness in both the near and the long run. Rylan Urban (2019) and Winfield and Macdonald (2019) have recorded that the current policies that have emerged from the Pan-Canadian Framework (PCF) fall short on meeting its emissions target. Currently, the COVID-19 global pandemic has taken government's focus away from new climate targets and programs to cut Canada's greenhouse gas emissions.

The public and stakeholder acceptability, legitimacy, and implementation deficits of this ambitious policy tool bring to question the role and modes of participatory and deliberative approaches employed. As well, in environmental governance, if policy decisions fail to reflect the plurality of environmental values expressed by the public and key stakeholders, and are unable to yield the anticipated results, "then the legitimacy of those in political authority becomes a subject of concern" (Smith, 2003, p. 65). These issues point to this thesis's research problem: the limitations or deficiencies of the Canadian carbon pricing policy due to political challenges and controversies borne out of "inappropriate" or "passive" participation and deliberation processes during the policy's agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities.

Recent studies focusing on Ontario's and Canada's carbon pricing policies have looked at the politics of carbon pricing (Dolphin, Pollitt, & Newbery, 2016; Harrison, 2010, 2012; Rabe, 2018), government and public support for policies (Harrison, 2012; Klenert & Mattauch, 2019), the formulation of the policy (Good, 2018; Hepburn & Klenert, 2018), the Ontario's carbon pricing scheme and elections (Lachapelle & Kiss, 2019), the obstacles to carbon pricing in Canadian provinces (Houle, 2014), the constitutionality challenges (Choudhry, 2019), Ontario's court of appeal decision and its implications on the GGPPA (King, Fairfax, & Gelbman, 2019), etc. However, less attention has been paid to the role of public and stakeholders participation and deliberations during the policy's agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities. This represents a scholarship deficit and an area where more research is needed.

In acknowledging this gap, and using Ontario stakeholders consultation as a case study, this thesis will analyze the role of participation (public and stakeholders) and deliberations in the development of Canada's carbon policy instrument. The thesis statement of this research is that in environmental governance, policy decisions work effectively when diverse perspectives are well engaged, issues are clearly defined, and inputs considered. Democracy works poorly when citizens make judgments in isolation, lack empathy for others' standpoints, and passively partake in making decisions on various issues that affect them. The rationale of this study is to bring to the light the role played by the stakeholders during the policy development processes.

1.3. Research Objectives

The overarching aim of this research is to analyze the role of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process between Ontario stakeholders and the federal

government of Canada concerning the federal carbon pricing policy process. The following are related objectives that will be pursued.

1. To scrutinize the modalities of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process;
2. To identify the purpose and objectives of involving the public and stakeholders;
3. To identify and analyze the major challenges, and political controversies, tensions, and conflicts between the Government of Ontario and the Government of Canada during the federal carbon pricing policy formation activities; and
4. To suggest mechanisms or strategies that could be used to improve public and stakeholder participation in the frame of deliberative processes that have the potentials to enhance acceptability and legitimacy.

1.4. Research Questions

To achieve these goals, the central question this research is: what was the role of the public and stakeholders participation and the deliberative processes during the federal carbon pricing policy developing activities and the extent of it. The following are other related questions.

1. What were the modalities of public and stakeholders' participation and the deliberative processes?
2. What was the purpose and objective (s) of engaging or consulting the public and stakeholders during the policy formation?
3. What were the major challenges and political controversies, tensions and conflicts, and how were they resolved?
4. What mechanisms or strategies could be used to improve public participation and the deliberative process?

1.5. Significance of the Research

The results of the research will have significant benefits extending far beyond the immediate study location. The benefits will be of both practical and theoretical importance because the study analyzes the scope of the public participatory and deliberative processes from the perspectives of the participants themselves. Practically, it will bring to bear the significant role of public and stakeholder participation and deliberation in environmental policy development and implementation. In effect, government officials, policy experts, and scholars will appreciate the underlying causes of carbon pricing policy acceptability and legitimacy deficits. This thesis will place the federal, provincial, and territorial governments in a position to better equip themselves on how best to involve the public, affected and interested persons, and key partners effectively in a deliberative manner that brings about policy acceptability and legitimacy in the future. Furthermore, the findings could have implications for policy reform as it suggests ways to fill the identified gaps in implementing participatory and deliberative procedures and policy tools in Ontario and Canada-wide. Theoretically, this study's novel contribution is that it endeavors to enrich the existing literature and discourse on the politics of carbon pricing, environmental governance, policymaking, public participation, and deliberation. Again, it provides the needed empirical research to aid subsequent studies on emission control policies and public participation.

1.6. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis document comprises seven chapters in total. Chapter 1 has provided an overview of the rationale, the objectives and the significance of this thesis. Chapter 2 presents the relevant literature reviews and the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for analyzing participatory processes. The review looks at the historical accounts of public participation (in brief), and highlights the core values, the various levels and types, and criticisms of the participatory processes. It also covers

participation in environmental policy decisions and carbon pricing policy. Chapter 3 looks at GHG emissions in Canada and Ontario. It also presents the emissions trends and the various emissions control and management regimes, political history of climate change policies in Canada, including the federal carbon pricing policy, and how it is connected to Ontario's GHG emissions reduction strategies.

In Chapter 4, the research methodology adopted by the thesis is presented. This chapter includes a brief descriptions of the research area, the research design, sampling, data collection, and analysis methods, as well as the rationale behind their selection. It also takes a look at the interview processes and the various stakeholders contacted and interviewed. As well, it details the research ethics processes this study went through and the limitations of the research methodology. The results of the data analysis are detailed in Chapter 5 of this document. Chapter 5 presents the findings in line with the research questions and objectives. It also shows the various themes that emerged during the interviews.

Chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion and interpretation of the findings. Importantly, it considers how, grounded on these findings, future public participation and deliberation processes of a policy development could be improved to enhance public support and acceptability of an environmental policy. Chapter 7 contains conclusions and recommendations related to the objectives of this study and outlines possible future research and policy focus areas.

1.7. Key Concepts

This section briefly defines some key words/concepts such as carbon pricing policy, public, stakeholders, public participation as well as deliberation used throughout this study. A further and detailed scholar review on these key concepts are captured in the chapter 2 of this thesis. As

explained in the introduction section, the study has a focus on the federal carbon pricing policy, public developing activities, public and stakeholders participation and deliberation that occurred in Ontario.

Carbon pricing policy charges those who emit GHGs for their emissions. In essence, it is a way of charging a lowest cost for fossil fuels such as diesel, coal, gasoline, and the goods made from them, so that their prices come closer to the real environmental costs (The Globe and Mail, 2021, para 1.). The charges can also be applied either as a tax on goods produced or sold. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), carbon pricing is an effective tool for mitigating GHG emissions because it alters the behavior of the consumers by changing the prices of products and services based on their GHG content. This creates an economy where activities, services, and products that are more GHG-intensive are more expensive and, consequentially, those that are less GHG-intensive are cheaper (OECD, 2013).

As it will be shown in Chapter 2*, public and stakeholder participation and deliberation* have been defined loosely by several scholars, researchers, and institutions or organizations. They do not have a universally accepted definition. In general, public and stakeholder participation and deliberation are often viewed as complex concepts because of their broad definitions and spaces. Literature discloses that public and stakeholder participation are often used to mean 'public engagement,' stakeholder involvement,' 'citizen participation,' 'community involvement, and 'civic involvement'(Avramoski, 2004).

The *public* is any individual or group of people or any political entity/organizational body with a stake in the outcome of a government decision. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notes that "the public consists of a range of stakeholders holding an array of views

and concerns on an issue." Through public participation, stakeholders are offered the platform to influence decisions that affect their lives. *Stakeholders* could be individuals, interest groups, or communities. They may consist of "locally affected communities or individuals and their formal and informal representatives, national or local government authorities, politicians, religious leaders, civil society organizations and groups with special interests, the academic community, or other businesses" (IFC Stakeholder Engagement, 2007, p. 10).

Thomas Heberlein (1976, p. 55) construes public participation as a process of involving all organized and unorganized groups of citizens or citizen representatives on a particular issue. The National Research Council broadly defines the term "public participation" as consisting of organized processes adopted by elected officials, government agencies, or other public-sector or private-sector organizations to engage the public in environmental assessment, planning, decision making, management, monitoring, and evaluation (National Research Council, 2008b). In the same way, *deliberation* has been defined to mean either a specific sort of discussion—one that encompasses a vigilant and serious consideration of reasons for and against some proposition—or to an interior process through which an individual weighs reasons for and against courses of action (Fearson, 1998).

Regardless of how public and stakeholder participation and deliberation have been defined, these concepts have been defined distinctively to embrace involvement, empowerment, collaboration, communication, consultation, social learning, engagement, and co-management. Therefore, for the purpose of the study but without a particular definitiveness, this thesis will use public and stakeholder participation interchangeably throughout the discussion. In this study, public participation is understood as the process of deliberate and active involvement of citizens,

individuals, knowledge and interest-holders, group representatives, political parties, business, unions, and environmental organizations in goal-directed issues (services) that affect them directly or indirectly.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Overview of Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberation

This chapter presents scholarly work done on stakeholders and public participation and deliberation. It also looks at the historical account of participatory processes, types, core values, objectives, and effectiveness. As well, it highlights in brief scholarly studies on participation and deliberation in environmental policies. Documents that have been reviewed in this chapter includes books, academic thesis, reports, news issues, peer-reviewed articles, grey literature, and so on.

In the published literature on policy design, public participation and deliberation are always mentioned as one of the vital procedural instruments policymakers can use in shaping policies (Howlett, 2019). They have also become fundamental components of many state and local agencies' operations. The inputs gathered from the public and stakeholders are seen as a central factor in increasing the quality and trustworthiness of policy outcomes, designing public participation programs, and connecting to the goals and outcomes that the processes aim to achieve. However, identifying and engaging the affected and interested parties has also been a challenge (Stewart & Sinclair, 2007).

Participation, in particular, has been defined in so many ways and from diverse disciplinary approaches. In democratic settings, participation may refer to the "act of taking part in person in the decisionmaking process" (Sartori, 1987, p. 113). For Andreas Klinke, participation entails "the involvement of the people in debates about public matters" (Klinke, 2016, p. 89). *Deliberation* that congregates diverse people and stakeholders encourages participation (Wojcieszak, Baek, & Carpini, 2010) and enhances issue-specific participation.

The term *public* "means one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations, or groups" (Aarhus Convention, 1998, p. 4). Braun and Schultz (2010) distinguish four types of 'public', namely (1) the general public (mainly participating in opinion polls and so on), (2) the pure public (i.e., laypeople or citizens), (3) the affected public, and (4) the partisan public (organizations with collective opinions or strong interest). *Stakeholders* are mainly those actors—institution, group, or individual—with a specific interest or a role to play and suffer the effect of or being affected by a decision (NOAA, 2015). Stakeholders can be both collective actors or individuals, such as local networks or social movements in a given geographical location.

Like many social policies, environmental policies are formulated by certain actors/players to attain definite goals and they comprise certain courses of actions and inactions to be taken in certain procedures in any given time. *Public* just like *stakeholders,* are these vital actors in the policymaking process. They could be official/institutional and unofficial/non-institutional actors (Anderson, 1979). They are also participants involved in one way or the other in the policy process, and they remain *sine quo non* to good environmental governance, and influential in the sub-processes of agenda setting, choice of policy instrument, formulation, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. For this thesis, public and stakeholders means the partisan, affected public and the general public as defined by (Braun & Schultz, 2010). This implies that any interested or affected person or party who may probably have something to contribute to the decisionmaking process should be permitted to join (Doelle & Sinclair, 2006).

In general, *public participation* is often viewed as a complex concept because of its broad definition and scope (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Different authors have defined public participation

with different meanings when using the term 'public participation' depending on who the people are and what the setting is (World Bank, 1996). Beierler and Cayford (2002) defined it as "any of several "mechanisms" intentionally instituted to involve the lay public or their representatives in administrative decision-making" (p. 6). For Graham and Phillips (1998) public participation is the "deliberate and active engagement of citizens by the council and or administration - outside the electoral process - in making public policy decisions or in setting strategic directions" (p. 4). The National Research Council broadly defined the term "public participation" as consisting of "organized processes adopted by elected officials, government agencies, or other public-sector or private-sector organizations to engage the public in environmental assessment, planning, decision making, management, monitoring, and evaluation" (Dietz & Stern, 2008, p. 29).

Some scholars, for example, Schumacher and Stybel (2016) and Beierler and Cayford (2002), use the term "public participation" as an umbrella term, without underscoring the distinction between public participation and stakeholder engagement as other authors do. However, according to Ashford and Rest (1999), stakeholder involvement processes are more inclusive and targeted. Also, Petts and Leach (2000) issue a caveat that, depending on the issue, the public and stakeholders are different since there is no single group or interest which could be precisely defined as the "public" as different parties and interests appear and disappear at different occasions and in different forms (Petts & Leach, 2000). The most essential thing to do is to ensure that every party or group of persons and key partners are included in the participatory processes to avoid unmanageable and non-productive groupings.

2.2. Brief History of Public Participation

Public participation in policy decisions is an integral part of today's democratic societies. The first half of the 20th century witnessed citizens relying on public officials and administrators to make policy decisions and implementations. The latter part of the 20th century also embraced a shift toward greater direct citizen involvement (Roberts, 2004). The 21st century has seen citizen involvement, engagement, and their significant benefits in policy developing activities being recognized and endorsed by a host of national and international organizations. A telling example is the Aarhus Convention (the Aarhus Convention is the only legally binding global instruments on environmental democracy, which empowers people with the rights to participate in decisionmaking in environmental matters and to seek justice).

The first written account of direct citizen participation could be traced to the Greek city-states, and one of its earliest manifestations was in the Ecclesia of Athens. Also, during the Middle Ages, the post decay and fragmentation of the Roman Empire droved urban artisans to institute associations to manage public concerns related to their work (Roberts, 2004). In 1215, the Virginia and New England colonial settlements launched their own variants of citizen participation built on the Magna Carta, which guaranteed due process for all citizens and the self-rule of church congregations (Roberts, 2004). Other significant sources of democratic thought and practice have been identified in the early Muslim world (Holmes, 2011).

Citizen participation has been claimed to be a defining feature of the intellectual and political heritage of the West (Banfield& Wilson, 1966; Holmes, 2011). In North America and all European countries, even since the beginning of the 19th century, citizen participation was a major topic of debate and controversy; the same century was a milestone for citizens' participation. The century

greeted the expansion of democratic practice both at state and national levels. In the civil service, self-educated citizens, rather than elites only, became part of the civil service.

In issues of basic welfare and quality of life, the call for direct citizen participation swelled in the last two decades of the 20th century. Realizing the surge in the size of government, the power of experts, and so on, advocates of all persuasions demanded a more direct control and power in the decisions that concern them (Roberts, 2004). A union of voices from government workers, students, union members, working and middle-class, environmentalists, feminists, and consumers joined the struggle (Roberts, 2004). These civil rights and social movements in the cities challenged the existing systems of discrimination or exclusion, pushed for participatory democracy, and caused citizens' power to increase (Creighton, 1992; Day, 1997; Warren, 1969). In effect, citizens' voices mattered, and citizens' cooperation became significant.

"Public participation" can now be found in diverse disciplines such as environmental planning and risk assessment, social work and community psychology, architectural design, and spatial planning processes in many countries around the world. In environmental governance and policy decision-making, public participation has become a standard component. Public participation provisions started materializing in some states' planning and environmental regulations during the late 1960s and 1970s. These periods also coincided with the political upheavals where the public agitated for more democratic governance and stronger environmental protection (Richardson & Razzaque, 2006).

The 1970s and 1980s national states' rising interest in economic development saw social commentators buttressing on the value of a 'bottom-up,' people-centered, the value of grass-roots, and small-scale decisionmaking approaches in relation to economic development, growth, and

social welfare (Richardson & Razzaque, 2006). By 1990, public engagement and consultation became catchwords for successful environmental decision-making, spilling over to broader discourses on 'good governance, 'environmental justice,' and 'environmental citizenship' (Richardson & Razzaque, 2006). The participation agenda gained traction and prominence in developing and advanced countries' transformational planning and poverty alleviation strategies. Public participation has also become a professional specialty, with the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2), which was established in 1992 as its body.

In Canada, the centralized and bureaucratic nature of the federal system has caused the public to feel alienated. Deep distrust of government activities emerged, and the Canadian citizenry insisted on a more participatory style of governance (Sewell & O'Riordan, 1976). The eutrophication of Lake Erie in the 1970s, owing to phosphates discharge, for example, triggered growing public displeasure with the government's apathy toward environmental and natural resource concerns. Consequently, supports for the environmental-related issues became a significant phenomenon throughout Canada. As support for the movement sprouted, governments at all levels felt coerced to respond (McGurk, 2003) to calls on environmental- related issues. Environment Canada (the counterpart of US EPA) got its official start on June 11, 1971—making Canada the second country in the world to form an official department of the environment.

Public participation reforms in the US, Canada, Australia, and other countries with Indigenous minorities were also induced by the Aboriginal self-determination movement (Banner, 2006). The advent of Aboriginal land claims and demands for self-governance offered another lever for judicial reforms in order to develop and promote community involvement in environment and development decisionmaking (Richardson, 1990). Today, like in many other countries, public

participation is an integral part of Canada's policymaking and decisionmaking processes. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) and the Environmental Protection Act (1999) legislation endorse and undergird public participation and deliberation processes.

2.3. Deliberative Democracy Theory

In environmental decision-making, citizen involvement has been rationalized from two perspectives: a process perspective and a substantive perspective. Whereas the substantive perspective is based on arguments that public participation improves the substantive outcomes of decisionmaking processes, the process perspective strengthens the democratic legitimacy of those decisions (Richardson & Razzaque, 2006). Through these two perspectives, several schools of thought on the rationale and role of public participation have emerged. Deliberative democracy is one of the manifold theories about the role of public participation.

Deliberative democracy theory is a normative school of thought and model of contemporary democracies that is significant in 'democratic discourses', especially at the turn of the 21st century. Democratic discourses are a "civilized debate among convictions, in which one party can recognize the other parties as co-combatants in the search for authentic truths without sacrificing its own claims to validity" (Taylor, 1994, p. 133). Deliberative democracy "draws on fair chances and equal capacities for members of the public to shape policy" (Klinke, 2016, p. 89). The term 'deliberative democracy' was coined by Joseph Bessette (1980). Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas and Liberal thinker John Rawls were both the earliest influencers of the theory, who assisted with the 'deliberative turn' by circulating works in which they referred to themselves as deliberative democrats (Dryzek, 2002).

Deliberative democracy grew out of people's dissatisfaction, concerns of voting, underrepresentation, and disassociation with decision makers within the Western liberal democratic system. Since the 1980s, deliberative democracy has seen considerable expansion, coupled with emerging and internal differentiation— in terms of approaches and practices— which coexist and reciprocally interact (Floridia, 2013). Deliberative democracy theorists attempt to address these concerns and other "democratic malaise" that have characterized liberal-democratic societies. They point out that, in times of elitism and pluralism, "reasonable deliberation open to all citizens in a free and equal manner is the only adequate warrant for legitimate decision-making" (Geenens, 2007, p. 355). The theorists generate their epistemic advantage from individuals interacting with each other, since "two heads are better than one" (Estlund, 2009, p. 177).

The ground-breaking theoretical models which give prominence to the theory include the works of Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Amy Gutmann, Dennis F. Thompson, Joshua Cohen, James Fishkin, John Dryzek, and several others. At the "core of all theories of deliberative democracy is what may be called a reason-giving requirement" (Thompson, 2008, p. 498). According to Antonio Floridia, deliberative democracy theory is established on "argumentative exchanges, reciprocal reason-giving, and on the public debate which precedes decisions" (2013, p. 6).

Just like participation, deliberation has several definitions. For Cohen, deliberation is a process "about weighing the reasons relevant to a decision with a view to making a decision on the basis of that weighing" (Cohen, 2007, p. 219). Seyla Benhabib defines deliberation as:

> "A necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decisionmaking processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals" (Benhabib, 1996, p. 69).

Among the democratic deliberative scholars, there is a consensus that there are fundamental disagreements, conflicts, and social injustice that are inescapable in democratic societies. They argue that policy decisions communicatively achieved can aim to overcome these societal disintegrations and stratifications that characterize the modern governance and social life in these societies (Cohen, 1997b; Dryzek, 1990; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas & McCarthy, 1984). Even though there is little consensus on the appropriate form of that communication, they argue that in political decisions it is essential to involve the affected citizens, experts, and non-experts at all levels within the system (Chambers, 2003; Christiano, 2012). For them, in formal political structures in which citizens have the right to participate, the stability of such systems depend on legitimacy derived from this participation (Fischer, 2018).

Joshua Cohen, one of the pioneers of deliberative democracy, argued that in some regulatory domains (e.g., environmental regulation), it is difficult to act alone—states encounter difficulties when acting alone. Therefore, it is better to bring together various stakeholder groups and "all-interested-parties" who share some common concerns but remain uncertain about the means to address them (Cohen, 2007). For deliberative theorists, collective "problem-solving'' —a vital element of deliberation—permits "individuals with different backgrounds, interests, and values to listen, understand, potentially persuade and ultimately come to more reasoned, informed, and public-spirited decisions" (Abelson et al, 2003, p. 241). In political processes, if citizens' and their representatives' preferences are formed with much considering on internal factors and demands rather than external factors and forces, they shape and channel public opinion and will formation (Klinke, 2009).

Deliberative scholars point out several ways of making public decisions, conducting and influencing political actions, but the most suitable means to do this is through public deliberation. This is because public deliberation can transform an individual's understanding and enhance grasp of complex problems; reveal how certain preference formations may be linked to sectional interests, thereby securing an ideological purpose; and replace the language of interest with the language of reason (Held, 2006, pp. 237-238).

For deliberative democracy scholars, laws and policies produced in public deliberation procedures are legitimate. Legitimacy, to abbreviate their position, relies on a fundamental criterion—democratic decisions should entail (1) a free public sphere in which citizen discussion and debate can take place; (2) openness and publicity of issues and decisions; (3) inclusive debate: it must include all those affected by the decision and their respective points of view; (4) fair, equal, and impartial deliberation for all participants; (5) access to reasonably precise information; (6) discursive and rational deliberation that is dedicated to the larger public interest; and (7) governments translating the consensus into laws and policies (Chambers, 2003; Cohen, 2007; Dryzek, 2002; Fishkin, 2009; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2016). With this, political or deliberative decisions become more legitimate because they respect the moral agency of the participants (Thompson, 2008).

It is widely accepted that deliberative processes are beneficial to decisionmaking that informs public policy. For deliberative thinkers, it is possible for deliberation to occur in different format, but not all deliberative systems are democratic because deliberation might occur within a limited elite; inputs into such deliberations are technical-legal ones, and are usually not reflective of the preferences of those affected (Parkinson, 2012). Regarding the number of participants and location

where deliberative processes can occur, there is no consensus. According to Gargarella (1998) when a proportional representation of groups becomes challenging to achieve or is not desirable, the full range of views should be represented in the deliberation to avoid misrepresentation and unfairness. So long as "group representatives are present in proportion to their numerical strength, identities, and views, which command the allegiance of many will always dominate those of the few, regardless of the reasonableness of those views" (Parkinson, 2003, p. 189).

Deliberative theorists do not assert that all deliberation takes place in public (Thompson, 2008). It can occur within the government and outside the government via face-to-face interaction or a mediated process through the mass media (Abelson et al., 2003). They also believe that the second-order decision to deliberate in private should be subjected to public deliberation at some stage (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Again, they assume that such arguments will be more public-spirited and mutually respectful if made in the open (Thompson, 2008). Deliberative thinkers and others influenced by Habermas view the "public sphere" as the heart and soul of democracy (Gabardi, 2001; Habermas & McCarthy, 1984). In essence, the public sphere is where citizens talk about their common affairs and circulate public discourses (Gabardi, 2001).

To sum it up, like many other theories, deliberative democracy theorists also talk about the role of public participation in political decisions. For deliberative theorists, when diverse interested parties deliberate on collective problems, it ultimately leads to a more reasoned, informed, and public-spirited decisions. They argue that political decisions via public deliberation become legitimate because public deliberation provides a platform that can transform an individual's understanding, enhance grasp of complex problems, and respect the moral agency of the participants. To them,

the disintegrations and stratifications that characterize the modern governance and social life can be overcome with communicatively achieved decisions.

2.4. Typologies of Participation

Numerous frameworks conceptualize and classify participation according to the level of participant involvement in decision-making. Sherry Arnstein's (1969) oft-cited article showing various degrees of public participation is a classic example. Arnstein discussed the difference between empty (non-participation) and real (active engagement) participation. She delved into the issue of power and equated the level of participation with the citizen's power. Distribution of power between the proletariat (low class/grassroots) and bourgeoisies/elite (middle and upper) class) was the main theme of Arnstein's article. For her, the role of power is central to participatory procedures (Arnstein, 1969).

In Arnstein's "ladder of citizen participation," she created a typology of eight (8) forms of participation in a systematic way of distinguishing between varying levels of meaningful and effective participation. Her ladder shows participation ranging from high to low (Arnstein, 1969).

Figure 1. Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation



The 1 and 2 rungs which lie at bottom of the ladder indicate "non-participation" and are viewed as being used by powerholders as a substitute for genuine participation. The central aim is to cure or educate the participants. The 3, 4, and 5 rungs are information, consultation, and placation, respectively. They lie at the middle of the ladder. They progress to the level of "tokenism". Here, participants' voices may be heard because they have the platform to voice out their views. However, there is no guarantee that their expressed opinions will truly matter in the final decision. Rungs 6, 7, and 8 (partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) are considered "citizen power." Here citizens are empowered. They have the clout to negotiate with power holders or even have full managerial power. But, the issue of who wields power in participatory processes often culminates into conflict. In this light, Buchy and Hoverman (2000) and Roberts (2004) argue that the public participates in decisionmaking partly because they want greater control or demand more

direct control and power in the decisions that concern them. In contrast, powerholder (usually policy-makers or government officials) are not willing to surrender control.

According to Arnstein, informing the public can be a legitimate step toward their full participation. However, if public consultation is not supplemented with other levels of participation, this rung of the ladder is still insincere. This is because it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will matter or be considered when he final decision is made. Arnstein concludes that in order to have real participation, the participants should possess the necessary power to affect the decision; otherwise, it is merely "therapy" or "manipulation" (Arnstein, 1969). Fung Archon (2006) further developed Arnstein's typology. He conceptualizes participation in three dimensions, covering: (1) those who participate (e.g., elected officials, state administrators, professional stakeholders, lay stakeholders, and the public); (2) how they communicate (provide technical expertise, deliberate and negotiate, and express preferences); and (3 how much authority and power they exercise (direct authority, co-governance, advise and consult, communicative influence, and personal benefits) (Fung, 2006).

Also, Jules N. Pretty (1995) classifies participation according to the participants' extent of involvement in activities and control over outcomes. Pretty's classification includes manipulative, material-incentivized, functional, interactive and self-mobilization participation. In the same line with Arnstein's arguments about manipulation, Pretty states that participation is simply a pretense, with `people's representatives sitting on official boards but having no power. And where consultation occurs, it is just by answering questions; professionals are not obligated to take onboard people's views. At the level of interactive participation class, participation is seen as a "right, not just the means to achieve project goals" (Pretty, 1995, p. 10). People get involved in

joint analysis, development of action plans and strengthening of local institutions. And, as they participate, they take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used. In effect, they have a stake in maintaining structures or making them work. With self-mobilization, people participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems, and retain control over resource selection, utilization, and allocation. Of note, Pretty's typology suggests that the term participation should not be accepted without appropriate clarification (Pretty, 1995, p. 10). Sen Sevaly looks at the degree of participation from different levels, instructive, where governments make the decisions but mechanisms are in place for information exchange, to consultative, where the government is the decision-maker, but still, stakeholders can influence the process and outcomes—and, finally, to cooperative, where main stakeholders act as partners with governments in decisionmaking (Sen, 2001).

In participation literature, one model that describes various levels of public involvement in the decisionmaking and planning process is the spectrum developed by the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2). The IAP2's model identifies five (5) levels of public involvement, namely: 1) inform, 2) consult, 3) involve, 4) collaborate, and 5) empower. The details are elaborated in the table below:

Table 1: IAP2's Public Participation Spectrum



Source: Adapted From the International Association for Public Participation (2004) IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum

The association further adds that each level can be appropriate depending on the context. Also, like Arnstein's ladder of participation, which shows varying degrees of meaningful and effective participation, the (IAP2) model demonstrates the increasing impact of the public on the final decision. In all, these scholars and IAP2 agree that none of these kinds of participation is more suitable than another or mutually exclusive. But, the type and extent of appropriate participation is reliant on prevailing political and social norms as well as the capabilities and aspirations of the participants or the stakeholders themselves (Sen, 2001).

2.5. Core Values of Public Participation

In governance, for both policy development and implementation, the process of participation, either of the public or of stakeholders, is fortified by a number of core values. The IAP2 as an international body and a leading authority in public participation has, for instance, developed core values for public involvement (IAP2, 2008):

1. The people should have a say in decisionmaking processes concerning actions and inactions that affect the lives of the people.
2. The process must communicate to the participants how their inputs influenced the final decision.
3. The process must provide participants with the most significant and needed information that will permit them to meaningfully partake in the decisionmaking process.
4. The process must seek inputs from participants in designing how they participate.
5. The process must seek and facilitate the involvement of those possibly touched by the decision to be made.
6. The process must communicate the interests and meet the needs of all participants.
7. The process must contain the promise that the public's contribution will influence the final decision (IAP2, 2008).

According to IAP2, these core values help policy designers and decisionmaking bodies to make better and a well informed decisions which reflect the interests, preferences, and concerns of potentially affected people and all interested entities (IAP2, 2008).

2.6. Objectives of Public Participation

Several scholars have looked at the objectives of participatory processes from different dimensions without details and indicating their implication to practice. To put extra clarity on the objectives of public participation, Glucker, Driessen, Kolhoff, and Runhaar (2013) put together different goals of participation, upon intensive literature review, under three main rationales: a) normative rationale, b) substantive rationale, and c) instrumental rationale. Under the normative rationale, they argued that participatory processes:

1. Enable the affected public to influence a decision.
2. Modify the distribution of power within society, thus empowering formerly marginalized individuals and groups.
3. Enable participants to develop their citizenship skills and, at the same time, provide participants with an opportunity to exercise citizenship actively.
4. Enable deliberation among participants and thus can lead to social learning.

With the substantive rationale, they put forward that the goal of the participatory processes is:

1. To enhance the quality of the decision output by providing decision-makers with environmentally and or socially relevant information and knowledge.
2. Improve the quality of the decision output by providing decision-makers with relevant experimental and value-based knowledge.
3. Intensify the quality of the decision output by testing the robustness of information from other sources.

Under the instrumental rationale, they argued that the processes:

1. Legitimize the decisionmaking process, thus providing legitimacy to the authority and facilitating project implementation.

2. Contribute to identifying and resolving conflict before final decisions are made, thus facilitating project implementation.

In all, every participatory process has to be designed in line with the objectives they shall fulfill in order to promote quality, and legitimacy of decisions.

2.7. Arguments against Public Participation and Deliberation

Despite the salient benefits of participation in policy decisionmaking as indicated in Chapter 1, it is not free from criticism also. Public participation has been assessed with a lot of criticism from different angles. Critics worry that participation in practice may not achieve the promising goals articulated in theory and may actually impede good decision-making.

They point out that involving stakeholders and the public can be time-consuming and labor-intensive. The costs involved do not yield the expected benefits; it may be confrontational and drag decision-making, and the procedures rarely achieve equity in process and outcome. It can also create new conflicts or escalate existing ones (National Research Council, 2008b; NOAA, 2015).

Critics raise concerns about threats that come with public participation. These include the inability of nonexpert communities to comprehend and process complex scientific relationships, the improbability of arriving at a meaningful consensus among contradictory interests, group polarisation, the impact of misdirected pressure to achieve consensus at the disadvantage of achieving other important socioeconomic and political objectives, among others. Folk (1991) notes that some people believe that decisionmaking involves complex technical and scientific issues and uncertainties, therefore, it should be made by experts—perceiving the general public as being unqualified and needlessly getting emotional for the problems that need to be solved.

Furthermore, the public might not understand the complexity of the policy cycle enough to make crucial contributions, may not understand issues such as 'uncertainty' and may be unable to appreciate science as an incremental process, and these limits the extent to which citizens should participate in complex policymaking (Brooks & Johnson, 1991; Chicot & Domini, 2019). Charnley and Engelbert (2005) point out that public involvement processes are counter-democratic, claiming that they surge the influence of special interest groups. Given the wrong circumstances, these groups and participants may tend toward group polarisation (i.e., groups tend to make extreme demand other than the original preference of its members). With this, participation can become the problem, not the solution, and does more harm than good (Sunstein, 2001). For Arboleda (2014), the participation process is just a deceptive form of dominance—institutions make people trust they are the ones in charge or making the decisions when in reality, these people are being tele-guided. Although critics raised concerns regarding participation, none of the critics has, so far, offered a more comprehensive review of how to ensure a legitimate and public/politically acceptable means of making decisions.

2.8. Participation in Environmental Policy

Globally, a huge number of environmental policy initiatives have been challenged, and in some instance stopped altogether, by the combination of inadequate public and stakeholder acceptance along with controversies concerning the scientific analysis of impacts or a failure to demonstrate the economic value or rationalization of a proposed choice (Gregory & Wellman, 2001). The uncertainty and complex nature of environmental decisionmaking often demands "knowledge, commitment and action of multiple levels of government", interest groups and citizens and for a protracted period of time (Beierle, p. 77). Without these, implementation of designed

environmental projects, plans, and policies from local to international scales has not been realised. Participation in environmental decisionmaking is often considered a precondition for the democratic legitimacy of such decisions, and an important avenue to improve quality and effectiveness of those decisions. Therefore, environmental policymakers "should aim to involve the public not only in its design, to ensure thorough representation and consultation, but also in its implementation, to ensure that its targets are met through the actions of all individuals" (Eden, 2016, p. 184).

2.9. Effective Public Participation

Answers to the question of "what is a successful or effective public participation?" still remains debatable in the resultant participation literature search. This may be because there are no widely held criteria for assessing "success/effectiveness vs "failure"—making the determination of what an effective or a successful public participation is, a complex challenge among scholars and researchers. Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges a number of scholars from the environmental, health, and public policy fields have tried to structure the definition of "effective or successful public participation" according to two main categories: public participation outcome and process (Abelson et al., 2003; Ashford & Rest, 1999; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Webler, Tuler, & Krueger, 2001).

With outcome effectiveness or success, emphasis is placed on results of the participatory process. Scholars proposed important outcomes in term of; decision acceptability, consensus, mutual learning and improved understanding, conflict resolution, participants satisfaction with the outcome, cost efficiency, among others (Abelson et al., 2003; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Fiorino, 1990; Rowe & Frewer, 2000).

In terms of the process effectiveness too, researchers focuse primarily on means instead of the results, that is, ways in which decisions are made (Webler & Tuler, 2006; Webler et al., 2001). Here, scholars consider, inter alia, clarity of actions and objectives, fairness, information exchange and accessibility, early involvement of stakeholders, procedural justice, inclusiveness, mutual respects for participant, and diversity of representation (Abelson et al., 2003; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Syme & Sadler, 1994; Webler & Tuler, 2006; Webler et al., 2001).

Mark Reed (2008) suggests best practices in environmental decision-making. His framework addresses both "outcome and process effectiveness" of the participatory processes and it has been used widely to analyze and uncover the characteristics of effective or successful public participation and deliberation in environmental governance. He provides a comprehensive synthesis of characteristics of best practice from a grounded theory analysis of existing literature, which includes qualitative studies, quantitative evaluations, and case studies on and of environmental governance literature (Reed, 2008). He defines participation as a process that is best guided by the following:

1. A philosophy that emphasizes empowerment, equity, trust and learning;
2. Early involvement of participant in the process;
3. Systematic stakeholder representation;
4. Clear objectives that are agreed with stakeholders;
5. An appropriate selection of participatory methods;
6. Skilled facilitation;
7. Integration of local and scientific knowledge; and
8. Institutionalisation of participation.

Moreover, Reed also adds that factors that contribute to good participation needs to be assessed systematically against criteria originated from the literature and stakeholders themselves (Reed, 2008, p. 2427).

According to Chess and Purcell, there is the middle ground position between public participation outcome and process, where analysts advocate that public participation should have some balance between outcome and process criteria, thus neither good process nor good outcome is adequate by itself. They suggest that future evaluation should use both outcome and process criteria (Chess & Purcell, 1999). All in all, whatever form appraisal takes, it is difficult to facilitate public participatory processes to meet all anticipated elements. This study makes use of the various participatory concepts and theories reported here to discuss and analyse the role of the public participation processes between the government of Ontario and Canada government during the development of the federal carbon pricing policy instrument.

2.10. Carbon Pricing Policy

Globally, tackling climate change is an urgent and fundamental challenge that needs well-thought-out policy actions or mechanisms that are stringent and uncompromising. Contemporary studies reveal that political and economic responses for emission control or mitigation purposes include carbon pricing (carbon taxes, emissions trading); direct support (subsidies); regulation (performance standards, technology standards); clear long-term target setting; and research, development, and deployment policies (Aldy, Krupnick, Newell, Parry, & Pizer, 2010; Duval, 2008; Goulder & Parry, 2008; Secretary General of the OECD, 2013; Twomey, 2010).

Similarly, a study by De Serres, Murtin, and Nicoletti (2010) maintains that policy types including, price-based instruments, command-and-control regulations, technology support policies,

information, and voluntary approaches are important for climate change mitigation. Regarding these types of diverse policies, Bartle (2009) adds that a dissimilar range of climate policies may be needed to appeal to different rationales. The reason is that market instruments, for example, appeal to just one type of human rationality. Therefore a policy mix may be needed for broad political and public acceptability. On the contrary, Christina Hood (2011) argues that although the need for a policy mix has been recognized, recent experience indicates that interactions among multiple policies are often not well comprehended or well-coordinated. In effect, it leads to a policy redundancy or policies undermining one another, thus reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall package.

Among these range of climate policies, the market-based instruments have a theoretical base in A. C. Pigou's "polluters pay" principle (Pigou, 1920). These instruments are favored because the force people to bear the cost of their actions and inactions that contribute to the surge in GHG emissions, which consequently deters them from emitting more carbons. At the global level, according to Barry Rabe, policymakers have embraced and endorsed market-based instruments, such as emissions trading systems and carbon taxes, as a central instrument in domestic climate policy. There are two main types of carbon pricing systems: 1) a direct pricing system, where the price of a unit of GHG emissions is fixed, but the quantity of emission cutdown is uncertain; and 2) a cap-and-trade system, where the quantity of emissions is fixed, but the market determines the price (Hood, 2011).

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that human-generated GHG emissions are the dominant cause of the observed warming in the world (IPPC Secretariat, 2021). These human-generated GHG emissions, which are usually from the production and consumption of goods and

services, are not priced by default. In this regard, Jesse Good (2018) argues that supply and demand choices commonly do not reflect the reported adverse environmental, social, and economic costs of GHGs. Consequently, more GHGs are emitted than would have been if the adverse effects of GHGs had an explicit cost. The essence of this cost argument is that emitting GHGs comes with a cost, which inspires people to change their behavior by changing the prices of products and services based on their GHG content. With the change of behaviour, it leads to a creation of an economy where more GHG-intensive activities are more expensive whereas less GHG-intensive activities are less expensive (Secretary General of the OECD, 2013).

Furthermore, most contemporary climate policy researchers, economists and policymakers agree that explicit pricing instruments need to be complemented by other policies that can put an implicit price on carbon, especially when markets are not able to provide effective signals for reducing emissions. These could be energy efficiency standards for appliances, fuel economy standards for road vehicles, government support of research and development, and deployment of non-fossil fuel energy technologies (Secretary General of the OECD, 2013). Hood (2011) admitting that carbon pricing is a vital policy in climate change mitigation, also contends that these supplementary policies and carbon pricing interact and may undermine one another, therefore these policies need to be designed as a package, taking interactions into account in the initial policy design. She adds that these policy packages need to be reviewed constantly to sustain coherence over time, especially if policy interaction is strongly (Hood, 2011).

Different policies have their strengths and weaknesses, but to efficiently and fully appreciate the potential benefits or strengths of such climate policies, a careful policy design is imperative. Pakulski (2017) notes that the effectiveness of carbon pricing can be enhanced by the government

by creating an enabling environment, building technical and institutional capacity, and establishing an appropriate regulatory framework. A well-designed policy to price carbon and other measures is a crucial part of the mechanisms for cutting down emissions efficiently.

The World Bank (2020) notes that dynamic political and local contexts are significant when introducing carbon pricing policies or increasing prices. This is because new policies or policy reforms are greatly affected by their host political systems, and they may worsen or fuel broader issues within the community. This does not suggest that carbon pricing or climate action in and of itself will spur social unrest. Instead, it underscores the sensitivity over policies that impact basic commodity prices. Again, it demonstrates that political and governance considerations, including revenue use and the co-benefits of carbon pricing and stakeholder consultations, are as essential as technical considerations on the coverage and implementation of these policies (World Bank, 2020). Public and political acceptability issues may mean that pricing policies are designed or implemented weakly so that they will not deliver the complete range of suitable mitigation actions.

Carbon pricing instruments have been increasingly popular across national and state lines. In OECD countries and at the sub-national level, carbon pricing initiatives are expanding with increased cooperation among jurisdictions to align their carbon markets. In Canada, for instance, before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, provinces such as British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec – have had carbon pricing as one of the efficient means of controlling emissions.

2.11. Conclusion

This literature review shows that public and stakeholder participation and deliberation are very significant in democratic societies. It has been argued and proven empirically that in environmental governance and policies, especially where there are different interested parties, stakeholder

deliberative and participatory processes have led to policy acceptability and support. Even though these processes are not free from criticism, without them, environmental policies have been stopped altogether due to misunderstanding of the issues along with controversies concerning the scientific analysis of impacts or a failure to demonstrate the economic value or rationalization of a proposed choice (Gregory & Wellman, 2001).

In designing environmental policies such as a carbon pricing policy, a careful or well-thought design is imperative. A well-designed policy to price carbon demands the inclusion of the political and local contexts dynamism because these policies greatly affect the sociopolitical systems, and they may even worsen or fuel broader issues within the country. In considering the involvement of stakeholders, scholars, and practitioners in deliberative and participatory processes, most of the authors agree that there is no single ideal method, type, model that is more suitable than another or mutually exclusive. But the type and extent of appropriate participation and deliberation are reliant on prevailing political and social norms as well as the capabilities and aspirations of the stakeholders themselves (Sen, 2001).

Chapter 3: GHG Emissions Management in Ontario and Canada

This chapter briefly looks at GHG emissions in Canada and Ontario. It also presents the emission trends and the various emissions control and management regimes in Canada and Ontario, including the federal carbon pricing policy and its connection with Ontario's emissions reduction strategies. It is structured into 4 main sections, namely: 1) Canada's emissions trends and management, 2) Ontario's emissions and their management, 3) A political history of climate change policies in Canada, and 4) Ontario's cap-and-trade system and its links with the federal carbon pricing policy.

3.1. Canada's Emissions Trends and Management

GHG emissions have not spared Canada's economy, its identity and way of life. At the global level, Canada is one of the largest emitters per capita, and the third-highest among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Canada's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions currently represent about 1.6 percent of the global total (Boothe & Boudreault, 2016). GHG emissions are estimated in tonnes (t) and megatonnes (Mt), and are generally not measured directly but are estimated from calculations and data, such as how much fuel is burned or how much organic waste is sent to landfills, among others (The Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2019). In Canada, a wide range of factors have an influence on the level of GHG emissions. Between 1990 and 2018, emissions in Canada increased by 20.9%, or 126 Mt CO2 eq. The growth was mainly driven by swollen emissions from mining and upstream oil and gas production as well as transportation from the provinces (Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), 2020). The figures below show Canada's diverse sources of GHG emissions as well as

Canada's CO_2 emissions (the largest composition of GHG emissions) status among its sister countries, respectively.

Figure 2: Sources of Canada GHG Emissions



Adapted from Government of Canada (2020)

Figure 3: Global CO_2 Top Emitters



Adapted from Union of Concerned Scientists (2020).

Canada differs significantly across the provinces and territories, ranging from 272.6 milligram (mg) in Alberta to 0.7 mg in Nunavut in 2018. Like it is in most advanced countries, the most concentrated population in Canada's provinces and territories, and regional economies based on resource extraction or depending on fossil fuels to generate electricity, will in the end have higher emissions levels. In 2018, the top 5 GHG emitters were Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan

and British Columbia and they together released about 91% of Canada's national total GHG emissions (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019)

Figure 4: Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Province and Territory, Canada (1990, 2005, and 2018)



Adapted from Environment and Climate Change Canada (2020).

Given the hostile impact of climate change on the environment, human health, and the economy, Canada has appeared committed in its fight against high emissions since the 1980s. In effect, at the federal level, Canada pursued three major exceptional climate approaches, which can be labelled, as the Kyoto approach, the Turning-the-Corner approach, and the Copenhagen approach, respectively (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2012a). Internationally, Canada became the first G7 nation to have ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in the Toronto agreement of 1988 (Hrvatin, 2016)— signifying its immediate global climate change actions response and emissions reduction commitment. For the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the federal government again, exhibited its willingness

and commitment towards the fight against the harsh conditions the climate change presented to humanity (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2012a). In 2006, the federal government the introduced the "Turning-the-Corner " strategy, a domestic air emissions management strategy with emissions intensity as the base measurement for emissions reductions. Nevertheless, all efforts and attempts to implement effective policies failed to reverse the upward trajectory of GHG emissions.

Given Canada's commitment to emissions reduction, the federal government and the provinces implemented various carbon emissions management policies and programs to meet its emission targets. The choice of strategies or policy instruments and the level of stringency of these policies is reliant on the emissions dynamics as well as factors such as, among others, population, energy sources, natural resources, and economic activities within the provinces. Provinces with service-based economies tend to have lower emissions levels, whereas economies with more resource extraction tend to have higher ones.

Under the Constitution of Canada, the federal and provincial governments share jurisdiction over environmental matters. Recognizing the Paris Agreement in 2015 (which calls for significant reductions in global GHG emissions to limit global warming to less than 2˚C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5˚C above preindustrial levels), on March 3, 2016, Canada announced its joint federal-provincial declaration (the Vancouver Declaration) (Government of Canada, 2016a) Canada's joint federal-provincial efforts aims to reduce GHG emissions to 30 percent below 2005 levels by 2030, to meet or exceed Paris Agreement commitments, and to work towards achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Consequently, to achieve its target, the Canadian Government

launched the Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change and Clean Growth (PCF) in 2016, with carbon pricing as its central policy instrument (Working Group—Government of Canada, 2016). In Canada's history, the PCF is the first climate change plan to include joint and individual commitments by federal, provincial and territorial levels of government. It also includes inputs from stakeholders such as Indigenous Peoples, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and Canadians from across the country (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a).

Prior to the launch of the PCF, Canada had already made commitments, partnered with climate organizations, and played an active role both internationally and domestically aimed at mitigating, adapting and financing climate change actions. At the international level, Canada was a party to the Canada and European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2009, Paris COP21 (21rst Conference of the Parties) in 2015, Cancun Agreements in 2010, Durban Platform in 2011, etc. Domestically, the federal government adopted a sector by sector regulatory approach. At the provincial level, there were provincial carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, feed-in tariffs and so on—targeting emission reduction (Saint-Jacques, 2012).

Furthermore, to drive emissions down, the Government of Canada invested approximately $60 billion in the period between 2015 and 2019 in areas of clean technologies, public transit, and innovation and carbon sequestration and to support Canadians and communities to adapt to a changing climate and protect the environment (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). Also, at the provincial level, each government contributes with actions of their own under their respective jurisdictional targets, which aggregate mainly to match the level of ambitions established by the government of Canada.

3.2. Overview of Emissions and Their Management in Ontario

In Canada, Ontario is one of the top greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, second only to energy-rich Alberta. As a result, the threats of climate change have not been far away from the people of Ontario. It has damaged homes, businesses, and crops, increased insurance rates; and shattered communities (Ontario Government, 2015). In 2018, a study by the Green Party of Ontario revealed that devastations and damages due to extreme weather events in Ontario amounted to about $750 million in insured losses (Green Party of Ontario, 2018). Also, there are alarming signs that a warming climate in Ontario will make some existing problems worse. Despite the destructive nature and impending threats of climate change in Ontario, Ontario continues to emit high levels of greenhouse gas pollution due to its population size, sizeable transportation emissions, and energy consumption (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2012b). Most of these emissions come from the energy producing sector, agriculture, waste, and industrial processes and product use. The transportation sector is the single largest contributor to Ontario's GHG emissions (35%), followed by industry (30%), buildings (21%), agriculture (8%), waste (4%) and electricity (3%) (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018).

Since emissions reporting began in 1990, GHG emissions in Ontario reached it highest historical increase of 208 (Mt) in 2000 and the lowest GHG emissions in 2016. According to the National Inventory Report, emissions in 2016 were 161 mega tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2e), 10% below those in 1990. The downwards trend in 2016 emissions also saw a substantial growth in population and the economy (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018).

Figure 5: Ontario (GHG) Emissions, (GDP) and Population Trends by Year



Adapted from Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2018).

The reduction recorded was possible after years of climate-related action that included: closing coal plants, slowing urban sprawl and promoting conservation, the 2009 Green Energy and Green Economy Act, the 2016 Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, and the cap and trade system, joining a shared carbon market with California and Quebec (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018).

The year 2017 also saw a sharp decrease in Ontario's emissions, to 155 mega tonnes. This development was short lived. Ontario, although not a major oil and gas producer, unexpectedly increased its emissions level in 2018. Emissions from transportation, electricity, buildings, and industrial processes all increased enough to raise worries (Buchanan, 2020). The combined emissions from Alberta and Ontario, the largest emitters, represented 60% (37% and 23%, respectively) of the national total (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019).

3.2.1. Emissions Reduction Regimes in Ontario

The province of Ontario has witnessed a series of diverse political strategies on climate change. The late 1990s saw its major climate policy when the Ontario Medical Association and other public health advocates campaigned for a total phase out of coal-fired electricity generation in the province. The campaign was necessary because there was an increase in the usage of coal to generate electricity, which worsened the existing polluted air associated with coal-fired electricity generation—making life more problematic for Ontario's hundreds of thousands of asthmatics.

However, coal-fired emissions continued to rise, together with public anxiety about dirty air (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018). Again, around the historical period where Canada had signed and ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the largest portion of Canada's emissions came from Ontario. Yet, no action was practically taken to reduce GHG emissions until 2003 (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018), where Ontario eliminated its coal-fired electricity entirely (a single largest GHG emissions reduction action)—making Ontario achieve its 2014 emissions reduction target of 6% below 1990 levels.

Significantly, the aftermath of the 2006 UK Stern Review (of the huge economic costs of climate change and corresponding benefits of climate change action) drove the Ontario government to take a more formal and comprehensive approach to climate action (Stern et al., 2006). In 2007, furthermore, the Ontario government established the Go Green Climate Change Action Plan—directed at reducing emissions by 6 percent below 1990 levels by 2014 , 15 percent by 2020, 37 percent by 2030, and 80 per cent by 2050 (Go Green Booklet, 2007). In 2008, Ontario joined the Western Climate Initiative and began negotiations to build a regional cap-and-trade system with the target of reducing emissions by 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. Under the Green Energy

and Green Economy Act, 2009, Ontario introduced its first feed-in tariff program, which encouraged, supported, and promoted the use of renewable energy sources, leading to a jump in renewable electricity generation in 2009. Significantly, the program helped reduce Ontario's use of fossil fuels for electricity generation (Raymond, 2020).

In 2014, the province met its first formal emissions target of 6% below 1990 levels, increasing the share of nuclear, natural gas, and renewables while closing its coal-fired power generating stations. (Raymond, 2020). As at April 2014, the Thunder Bay Generating Station, has stopped using coal to produce electricity. Ontario's phase out of coal-fired electricity generation also stimulated climate actions in other jurisdictions. For instance, in 2017, all partners in the Powering Past Coal Alliance committed to phasing out all coal-fired power stations that do not have carbon capture and storage. According to the Ministry of the Environment Conservation and Parks (2018) , to date, Ontario's phase-out of coal between 2005 and 2014 is the single largest GHG-reduction initiative in North America.

According to the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2018), other key initiatives designed to curb the increasing emissions trend include the province's Places to Grow Act, 2005, the province's Integrated Power System Plan in 2007, the requirement for ethanol blending of gasoline in 2007, and the Big Move (investments in public transit) in 2008. All these initiatives have been positive towards, and driven nearly all of Canada's progress towards the country's 2030 Paris Agreement targets (Ministry of the Environment Conservation and Parks, 2018). Ontario successfully achieved its first GHG emissions reduction target (2014), which were 161 Mt CO2e, 10% below those in 1990 by 2016. To build stronger and share expertise with other parties, Ontario

linked its cap-and-trade program with Quebec and California, becoming part of the largest carbon market in North America in 2018.

3.3. A Brief Political History of Climate Change Policies in Canada

The later part of the 1980s recorded the importance of climate change discourse at the international level. As stated above, Canada joined the climate change movement in the 1980s. Importantly, Canada's Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney co-hosted the 1988 "Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere" and set the target of stabilizing the alarming rate of emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000 (Winfield, 2009). Consequently, he was even applauded as an international leader on climate issues (Smith, 2008). The Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney embarked on working with the provinces to develop a coordinated policy to achieve that goal. For the next twelve years, these actions or ideas were pursued without the use of effective policy instruments such as law or tax. Unsurprising, these efforts did not translate into emissions reduction.

Canada's provinces, with jurisdiction over use of natural resources, were not in support of the federal government plans to reduce the increasing rate of emissions because their capacity had been undermined via the imposition of significant cuts; members of cabinet disagreed over the policy tool, having engaged in public disagreements over regulations and taxation (Smith, 2008, pp. 51-52). According to Macdonald (2009), the government of Alberta, throughout that timeframe, was also championing the adoption of voluntary instruments against the 1990 target.

Before 2002, Canada was in no position to meet the framework convention target. In 2002 Canada, under the leadership of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien, ratified the Kyoto protocol in the face of provincial opposition from "the Alliance party, the Progressive Conservative party, and the

oil and gas sector (Smith, 2008). Given the opposition within the federal cabinet and provincial resistance to the Kyoto effort, Jean Chretien's action may have been regarded as a noble effort in Canada's climate history. The provincial opposition brought the attempt to develop a coordinated policy to an end (Winfield, 2009). As a result, Alberta and Ottawa began to move in different policy directions. Ottawa rescinded its decision on working with the provinces and later pursued independent plans to regulate industrial emissions.

According to Mark Winfield (2009), the Liberal Paul Martin government from 2003 to 2005 continued the independent federal regulation plans. Paul Martin was left with the task of crafting some sort of implementation strategy amidst growing emissions. Unfortunately, in December 2005, Liberal Paul Martin lost the elections to the Conservative Harper government, which affected the implementation of the regulations. From 2006 to 2015, the Conservative Harper government practically made no effort to continue the implementation; neither did he try to work with the provinces to develop a coordinated national policy nor implement its own emissions-reduction policy.

Toward this end, some provinces began to implement their effective policy independently. British Columbia, for example, introduced its carbon tax, Ontario introduced it phasing out of coal-fired electricity system, Quebec joined the California cap-and-trade system, among others. By fall, 2015 provincial governments started acting on their own for nine years, as the federal government made no attempts to develop a coordinated Canadian policy. To Mark Winfield, "the change of government in 2015 brought about a sea-change in federal-provincial climate policy" (Winfield, 2009, p. 5). Unlike the previous prime ministers, the new Liberal government led by Justin Trudeau was committed to finding solutions to climate issues while pushing for a coordinated national

policy with the provinces and the territorial governments. Notably, acting on his commitment, Justin Trudeau met all provincial Premiers on November 23, 2015, prior to the Paris summit. Throughout, Justine Trudeau had engaged with all the provincial Premiers on his plans, actions, and commitment to climate change. By early spring 2016, it had become obvious that the Trudeau government's central objective was to ensure that free pollution remains in the past and that carbon pollution is priced in all parts of the country.

3.4. Ontario Carbon Cap-and-Trade System and Federal Carbon Pricing Policy in Perspective

As indicated in the preceding sections, Ontario registered its intentions and commitment towards the fight against emissions increase and climate change by joining the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)—along with Quebec and California— for the year 2008. The parties to the WCI embarked on designing a regional cap-and-trade program to encourage subnational governments to take action and provide a framework for potential future national systems (International Carbon Action Partnership, 2015).

In 2015, Ontario declared its intention to join the cap-and-trade system under the Western Climate Initiative to reduce greenhouse gases in order to respond to climate change, protect the environment, transit to a Low-carbon Economy; and enable Ontario to collaborate and coordinate its actions with similar actions in other jurisdictions. On May 18, 2016, the Climate Change and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 ("Climate Act") became law in Ontario (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2016; Ontario Government, 2016), after broad stakeholder and public consultation under the Environmental Bill of Rights.

As party to the nationwide carbon policy instrument, Ontario, which started operating cap-and-trade systems under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), harmonized and integrated its cap-and-trade system (Quebec Ontario and California, 2017). Ontario's cap-and-trade program which, began in January 2017 was an economy-wide program and covered both process and combustion emissions (Ontario Energy Board, 2016). The two main objectives of this cap-and-trade system were to: 1) create an overall decreasing cap on emissions; and 2) drive investment in low-carbon innovation by increasing the cost of emissions adequately to make the cost of emissions reduction less expensive in comparison (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2016). In practice, the cap-and-trade system allowed large final emitters—transportation and buildings, including household energy utility—to purchase allowances to fulfill their emission cutdown obligations. Also, it positioned Ontario as one of the leaders in fighting climate change, and attracted international interest in working with Ontario, as well as millions of dollars of investment in Ontario. Businesses and industries in Ontario demonstrated that they were comfortably ready to comply with the cap-and-trade program (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018).

On June 15, 2018, the new government of Ontario announced its intentions of withdrawing and cancelling the cap-and-trade system. Without considering the existing agreements and conditions under the Western Climate Initiative, on July 3, 2018, the cap-and-trade regulation was abruptly annulled. All trading of emission allowances under the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, were prohibited, effectively ending the short-lived cap-and-trade program in the province. However, in contrast to the Section 16 of Ontario's Environmental Bill of Rights, which demands that government gives notices and consult the public before making environmentally significant decisions, the cancellation was done without the public and stakeholders' consultation (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2018). According to the then

Environment Minister, Rod Phillips, the cap-and-trade system was costly, it was ineffective, and it was killing jobs in the province (CBC News, 2018).

At the federal level, for Canada to achieve its net-zero emissions by the 2050 target, Canada aimed at strengthening its existing measures and introducing new sustainable GHG-reducing measures. As one of the signatory countries to the 2015 Paris Agreement, Canada's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) plan is to cutdown GHGs by 30% below 2005 emission levels by 2030. To accomplish this, in March 2016, all provinces (except Saskatchewan), territories and the federal government signed the *Vancouver Declaration,* which birthed *the* Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change and Clean Growth (PCF) of 2016. According to Micki Cowan of CBC News, Saskatchewan didn't sign because Saskatchewan is against the mandatory carbon pricing or tax system (Cowan, 2018). The Pan-Canadian Framework led to the forming of policies and regulations to cutdown emissions Canada-wide (Climate Action Network, 2019). These policies and regulations include, among others, carbon pricing, a 2030 coal phase-out, clean fuel standards and investment in zero-carbon technologies. According to Jesse Good (2018), the provinces and territories agreed that these measures and policies should be adapted to the specific conditions of each province and territory.

The central policy, a carbon-pricing tool, demands all provinces and territories to implement a minimum price on carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions by the January 2019. The minimum price on carbon pollution established by the federal government started at $20 per tonne in 2019 and is set to increase at $10 per tonne to $50 in 2022. Realising the need to accelerate the emissions reduction strategies in order to achieve a prosperous low carbon economy by 2050, the federal government on 11th December, 2021, released its plan "*Healthy Environment and a*

Healthy Economy", and indicated an increase in the minimum price on carbon pollution by $15 per tonne per year starting in 2023 through to 2030. In simple terms, the carbon price will rise from $65/tonne in 2023 to $170/tonne in 2030 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020b).

The federal government made the policy flexible. Provinces and territories are free to select either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system. These provinces and territories are also free to opt for a hybrid approach. A carbon tax is basically a charge placed on GHG from burning fossil fuels. It can be done by placing a surcharge on carbon-based fuels and other pollution sources . With the a cap-and-trade system (a tradable emissions permit policy), government puts cap or a firm limit on the overall level of carbon pollution from industries or certain facilities and the reduces that cap year after year to reach a set pollution target (David Suzuki Foundation on Nature, 2021). As the cap reduces each year, it cuts industry's total GHG emissions to the limit set by government regulator and the compels polluters that surpass their emissions quota to buy unused quota from other companies (David Suzuki Foundation on Nature, 2021). The hybrid system is sometimes referred to as output-based pricing (Wood, 2018). It syndicates both elements of a cap-and-trade system and carbon tax.

Joel Wood (2018) notes that carbon tax has a key advantage over cap-and-trade and a hybrid version because it permits for carbon price certainty, is less expensive to administer and is a major source of revenue. Whichever approach a province or territory takes can satisfactorily achieve emissions reductions but they must fully be in line with the federal government's benchmark requirements. For more on the benchmark requirements see (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2021)

Without a either a cap-and-trade or carbon-tax or hybrid system in place that meets the requirements of the federal government, provinces and territories are expected to be subjected to the federal carbon pricing legislation, the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, also called the "federal backstop", which received Royal Assent in June 2018. The federal backstop was expected to be effective on January 1, 2019. The backstop comprises of a carbon levy and an output-based pricing system (OBPS). Whereas the latter component of the federal backstop covers combustion and non-combustion emissions from large emitters, the former targets fossil fuel combustion emissions, for examples, those connected with home heating and transportation. In Canada's *Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy Plan*, which builds on the Pan-Canadian Framework and provides a road map forward to meet Canada's 2030 emissions reduction target. The Plan outlines actions in five main areas, including: (i) energy efficiency in homes and buildings; (ii) lower emission transportation options; (iii) increasing the price on carbon pollution; (iv) supporting the decarbonization of Canadian industry; and, (v) building more resilient communities (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020b).

With Canada's persistent commitment to cut down GHG emissions, the challenge with this policy tool is that some provinces and territories are not complying with the requirements, as they keep stepping back (Snoddon, 2018). The current Ontario government, for instance, challenged and questioned, the federal government's authority to impose a the federal backstop on provinces, which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the constitutionality of the carbon tax on March 25, 2021.

Chapter 4: Brief Description of the Case Study Area and Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction

This chapter of the thesis gives a brief description of the area of the case under study. It also outlines the research methodology, specifically, research design and methods used in undertaking this research and the rationales for these specific choices. It also describes the research population and how respondents were sampled, recruited, and interviewed.

4.2. Overview of the Case Study Area

In a case study approach, based on the context, understanding the various institutions (e.g., socioeconomic and political institutions) at play in the study area is essential. This makes the researcher and the reader better appreciate the environmental, sociopolitical, and the economic makeups, interconnectedness, and interactions of institutions as well as the various roles each of these institutions play. The following subsection discusses, in brief, the sociopolitical institutions, economic institutions, and environmental structure of the province of Ontario.

4.2.1. Sociopolitical Institutions, Economic Institutions, and Environmental Structure of Ontario

Ontario is located in Central Canada. It is Canada's second-largest province, covering more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles). With a population of about 14.6 million and a median age of about 40 years, Ontario is home to nearly 2 in 5 Canadians. Ontario's capital city is Toronto, and Ottawa, which is in southeastern Ontario, is the capital of Canada (i.e., the federal government’s home). Ontario shares borders with Quebec on the east, Manitoba on the west, Hudson Bay and James Bay on the north, and the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes on the

south. Politically, Ontario has three major political parties—the Progressive Conservatives, the Liberals, and the New Democratic Party (NDP). The Progressive Conservative Party leader Doug Ford is currently the head of the Ontario provincial government and leads a majority government in the legislature.

Economically, the massive presence of resources, manufacturing expertise, exports, and the drive for innovation undergird Ontario's economy. Ontario is home to the Canadian financial industry hub banks, investment firms, pension funds, and insurance companies. It is also a vital petroleum refining region, and transportation is its biggest source of GHG emissions. Natural gas is the major fuel utilized by all sectors of the economy, including residential, commercial, and industrial heating. Ontario contributes 37% to the national GDP and is home to nearly 50% of Canada's workers in high technology, financial services, and other knowledge-intensive industries (Ontario Government, 2019).

The province prides itself on hundreds of thousands of parks, hiking trails, forests, and green spaces as well as provincial parks—such as the Algonquin Provincial Park, Quetico Provincial Park, and Victoria Park in Kitchener. It is also home to hundreds of thousands of waterways, lakes, and rivers that are the lifeline of the province, where people fish, kayak, and swim. Climate change, however, threatens the beauty and the purpose of these resources, road access, homes, communities and businesses, infrastructure, food security, food and crops grown locally, and the health of ecosystems across the province. Preserving and safeguarding these resources for the next generation is the new vision promoted by the Ministry of the Environment Conservation and Parks (Ministry of the Environment Conservation and Parks, 2018).

Figure 6: Map of Ontario Province

Adapted from Zhao and Huaqing (2011) .

4.3. Research Methodology

This section of this chapter presents the research methodology applied in this thesis. A research methodology is simply the overall process of research, from the theoretical groundwork to the data collection and analysis (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). In essence, it is a way to systematically solve a research problem. It may also be understood as the science concerned with how research is conducted (De Vos, Delport, Fouche, & Strydom, 2011). The methodology applied in this thesis comprises these key sections and sub-sections: research design, sampling, sampling size and sampling method, data collection methods, data analysis method, and the related ethical considerations.

4.3.1. Research Design

A research design is a plan for detailing the methods and procedures for gathering and analyzing the required data or information (Creswell & Poth, 2016; Hakim, 1987). According to Lewis, Ritchie, Ormston, and Morrell (2003), a good research design should be visibly defined with coherence between research questions and methods, leading to valid and reliable data. Therefore, this thesis attempts to answer the research questions without any obscurity as possible and aims to produce valid and reliable data.

This study adopts qualitative exploratory methods of research that attempt to analyze the role of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process in Ontario between the stakeholders and the federal government of Canada on the carbon pricing policy instrument. Exploratory research is defined as research used to investigate a problem which is not clearly defined (Stebbins, 2001). It is usually used to conduct a study to have a better appreciation of the existing problem. It also explores relatively new ideas regarding a research problem with the aim

of, among others, developing new insights and priorities for future studies (Yankey, 2019). In this case, exploratory research was also imperative because of the lacking scope of existing research on participatory and deliberation processes about the carbon pricing policy. The approaches also enable researchers to examine the 'what and how' of a phenomenon in their natural settings.

Qualitative research is a systematic scientific inquiry that seeks to construct a holistic, mainly narrative description to contribute to researchers' views or understanding of a phenomenon (Astalin, 2013). According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993), qualitative research could be defined as "primarily an inductive process of organizing data into categories and identifying patterns (relationships) among categories" (p. 479). Qualitative research usually occurs in the natural setting familiar to the participants and considers issues that are of fundamental significance to them (Creswell, 2003). One vital advantage of the qualitative approaches that make it best fit in this thesis is that it permits the study of problems, events, or cases in depth and detail. It usually generates rich, detailed, and in-depth explorations and descriptions (Chompunth, 2011). Of note, qualitative research is recognized as a suitable method in the study of peoples' interests and views to be involved in the deliberative and participatory processes (Jabbour & Balsillie, 2003).

4.3.2. Selecting a Case and Justification

A case study is an empirical research approach that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident"(Yin, 2009, p. 13). Helen Simons (2015) defines a case study as "the study of the singular, the particular, the unique, whether that single case is a person, a project, an institution, a programme or a policy"(p.175). A case can be a group, an organization, an

individual, an event, an anomaly or a problem (Ridder, 2017). A case study is well suited when the contextual conditions are pertinent to the phenomenon of the inquiry (Yin, 2004).

Cases can have one, or a combination, of an exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory purpose (Yin, 199). A case study strategy permits the use of multiple sources of data collection and analysis, which allows the researcher to address the research objectives and answer the research questions fittingly. The drawback of case studies is that no case equals another case—making it difficult to generalise it from a single case to others. Again, there is also the risk of biases in the data collection because there is one person generating and analyzing all the needed information (Becker, Bryman, & Ferguson, 2012).

The selection of Ontario stakeholders as a case was mainly driven by Anton J. Kuzel's framework or concept of appropriateness (Kuzel, 1992). Appropriateness, according to Kuzel (1992) deals with demonstrating a fit to both the purpose of research and the phenomenon of inquiry. This framework increases the quality of a research design. To satisfy appropriateness, the issue that needs to be considered is how to sample cases. Purposeful sampling strategies is one of the approaches in achieving the appropriateness condition (Shakir, 2002). Purposively, Ontario stakeholders were selected because they contextually fit researcher's aims and what the research seeks to attain (Yin, 1994, p. 50). Finally, they are relevant to the phenomenon of the inquiry. Unlike some other provinces, Ontario canceled its carbon pricing policy and challenged the legitimate authority of the federal government in court over the policy instrument.

Furthermore, stakeholders in Ontario were readily available. In case selection, convenience could also be a factor—you may choose a specific case "because it's there" (Lazar, Feng, & Hochheiser, 2017). Ontario stakeholder groups involved in the processes were readily available with "rich-

information". The province provides all the needed information and hosted most of the stakeholders engagement and consultation processes during the policy developing activities, coupled with the reason that Ontarians are always spurring the existing and emerging issues. As well, most of the stakeholder groups involved during the decisionmaking processes were readily available in the province.

A case could be chosen because it is an extreme case, intensity case, critical case, and politically important case (Shakir, 2002). Ontario can be seen as an exemplary or politically important case. The government of Ontario's (a stakeholder) opposition to the federal carbon pricing policy is highly political and is of public policy importance. The pricing policy has been one of the main political planks by various political parties and organizations in Ontario. Ontario's case can be seen as an exemplifying case, as the goal is to understand the role of participatory processes and focus mainly on agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy developing activities that occurred. Ontario's court actions can inspire other provinces to think of similar actions across the country.

Selecting a single case for in-depth study allows for semi-structured interviews, question guides, and document reviews to be used as the data collection techniques. It also permits content analysis, cognitive mapping, and qualitative analysis to be used for data analysis. Literally, there was a lot of published material available on Ontario's case. Regarding whether the findings of a case study can be generalized and applied to other contexts, the researcher is not particularly concerned about generalizing. When conducting an exploratory case study aimed at building initial understandings of a situation, any case should be good or might work. In all of these occurrences, choosing a case is straightforward: you work with what you have available (Lazar et al., 2017).

4.3.3. Population, Respondents, Sample Size and Sampling procedures

Whatever research methods chosen, be it qualitative or quantitative approaches, it is essential to know the group of people who would be recruited to be the target groups and samples. This is significant because the researcher's respondents or interviewees selected should be representative of the whole population. An appropriate representation from this population advances the relevance of the research results and the subsequent policy implication and recommendations. In this case study, the population is participants or the stakeholders involved in the participatory and deliberative processes. For any given issue, stakeholder are the most suitable groups to provide in-depth and explicit data about a subject or an issue being studied (Coleby, Miller, & Aspinall, 2009).

4.3.3.1 Research Interviewees or Respondents

To achieve the aims of this study, a systematic review of existing relevant grey documents on the carbon pricing policy instrument, the Pan Canadian Framework, and of the public and stakeholders participation and deliberation programs was conducted to help identify key stakeholder groups to be studied. The review was done to understand the interaction between stakeholders and the level of influence they wield. In the end, stakeholders in this study were stratified into five groups of unit analysis: Government/Bureaucrats, Political Parties, Academia/Experts, Environmental Non-governmental Organizations (ENGOs), and Business/ Industries. The key underlying reason for this categorization is that, fundamentally, different parties/bodies play paramount and distinctive roles in policymaking processes. Utilizing these stakeholder groups will help the researcher draw a logical conclusion from large and diverse data sources.

Government Officials or Bureaucrats: Policy experts, designers, and managers from both the federal and provincial governments or government organizations were many, but a few who were

involved in the policy processes accepted to be interviewed. Those who could not be interviewed did not respond to the initial recruitment email and reminders. At the federal level, representatives from the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Canada, its Departments, and Agencies, were contacted and interviewed. Also, representatives from the Department of Finance office, Minister of Fiscal Policy and Economic Analysis, and Tax Policy and Legislation were consulted and interviewed. At the provincial level, representatives from the office of the former Premier of Ontario and Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Ontario (now known as the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks) were contacted.

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs): Through various mediums, ENGOs contribute to the policy development process, including direct lobbying of policymakers, building institutional capacity, increasing public awareness of environmental issues and sponsoring environmental activities, and acting as a clearinghouse for information and knowledge about environmental issues (Badruddin, 2015; Kingdon & Stano, 1984). For this research, representatives of environment, and climate-concerned organizations and think tanks participated, like the Canadian Institute for Climate Choices, Smart Prosperity Institute, EnviroEconomics, Eco Fiscal Commission, Pembina institute, David Suzuki Foundation, Environmental Defence, Centre for International Governance Innovation, and Conservation Council. These organizations were involved in the process of the carbon pricing policymaking process.

Political Parties or Organizations: Political support and acceptability of a policy are imperative in policy decisionmaking processes because political actors are responsible for deciding on, implementing, and enforcing policy decisions. Accordingly, political organizations, the current

and the former party elected officials of the Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, Green Party, New Democratic Party, and Assembly of First Nations (AFN) were contacted and interviewed.

Academia/Experts: A search was conducted based on bibliographic databases of scientific publications on climate change, environmental policy decision making, regulatory and pricing policies as well as consultancy and policy reports. Notably, the experts captured by the federal government Working Group final report as part of the carbon pricing mechanism development processes were consulted and participated in the study (Working Group—Government of Canada, 2016).

Business/Industries: Representatives of associations of businesses and industries with collective opinions or strong interests who were directly impacted by the carbon pricing instrument were recruited and interviewed. This included organizations like the Business Council of Canada, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the Canadian Electricity Association, the Cement Association of Canada, the Mining Association of Canada, the Canadian Fuels Association, and so on which participated in the study.

4.3.4. Sample Size and Sampling Methods

In research, sampling primarily refers to the "act, process, or technique of selecting a suitable sample, or a representative part of a population for the purpose of determining parameters or characteristics of the whole population" (Mugo, 2002, p. 1). In essence, it is important to select an appropriate sample from the stakeholder groups because the size of the population is very large. In general, there are two main types of sampling techniques: probability and non-probability sampling techniques (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Taherdoost, 2016). Non-probability, unlike

probability sampling, is usually associated with case study research design and qualitative research (Taherdoost, 2016).

For this research, non-probability sampling methods types such as purposive and snowball sampling methods were employed. The purposive or selective sampling technique is the deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informants/experts possess. With this technique, the researcher chooses what needs to be known and sets out to find experts who can and are willing to provide the information on the topic due to their rich experience or vast knowledge. Snowball sampling methods were also applied. This method allowed interviewees and potential respondents to recommend additional individuals with knowledge on the subject matter. According to Brewerton and Millward (2001) the snowball approach is mostly applicable in small populations that are difficult to access due to their closed nature (e.g., inaccessible professions and secret societies). This method was useful because it helped the investigator access a population of potential subjects who meet the inclusion criteria. Considering the political nature of the topic and its objectives, a few of the government officials and political party members declined to participate in the study. However, they referred the researcher to other competent authorities to participate. In all, 31 potential interviewees were sampled using purposive and snowball sampling methods. Out of the sample size of 50 representatives contacted, only 31 from the stakeholder groups became respondents and participated in the study. The samples of stakeholder groups are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Summary of Samples of the Stakeholders Groups in this Study

Stakeholders Groups	Affiliations/Institutions	Number of Sample size
Government/Bureaucrats	Department of Finance Canada, Government of Canada	1
	Office of the Former Premier of Ontario	1
	Office of the Former Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, Government of Ontario	1
	Environment and Climate Change Canada, Government of Canada	2
Academia/Experts	University of Ottawa	1
	McGill University	1
	University of British Columbia	1
	Simon Fraser University	1
	Carleton University	2
	Institut Qu b cois du Carbone,	1
Environmental NGOs	Smart Prosperity	1
	Eco fiscal Commission	1
	Pembina Institute	1
	EnviroEconomics	1
	Conservation Council	1
	Canadian Institute for Climate Choices	1
	Climate Defence	1
	David Suzuki Foundation	1
Political Organizations/Parties	Green Party (Provincial)	2
	Liberals (Provincial)	2
	Progressive Conservatives (Federal)	1
	Assembly of First Nations (AFN)	1
	New Democratic Party (Provincial)	1
Business/Industries	Business Council of Canada,	1
	Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers	1
	Canadian Electricity Association	1
	Cement Association of Canada	1
	Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario	1
Total		**31**

4.3.5. Data Collection Methods

In qualitative research methods, there are varied views on data collection. Often, the most widely used data collection method in qualitative research are document review, questionnaires, individual or group interviews (including focus groups), and observation (Beierle, 2002; Stewart & Sinclair, 2007; Taherdoost, 2016) They can be used in combination or alone. Creswell and Creswell (2017) argue that combination or "mixing" of data provides a more robust understanding of the problem or question. The application of a variety of qualitative methods helps the researcher to explore the details of the public participation context intensively.

Some previous studies regarding public participation have alternatively attempted to measure its success, stakeholders identification, and methods by ascertaining the participants' viewpoints and program proponents through mixed data collection techniques (Chompunth, 2011; Theophilou, Bond, & Cashmore, 2010). Recently researchers have argued that blending different data sources or methods comprised the concept of triangulation (Hastings & Salkind, 2013; Lewis et al., 2003) 2013. Denzin (1978) illustrates that triangulation involves combining varied data, diverse methods, theories, and perspectives to ground the acceptance of qualitative approaches. With the combination of sources of data, the weakness of one source of data is offset by the other's strength. Using different sources of data collection enhances the researcher's ability to evaluate the accuracy of the results as well as convinces readers of the accuracy of the findings without difficulties.

In this study, both primary and secondary sources of data collection methods were employed. Secondary data helped to reanalyze, interpret, and review past data from a broad scope of data (Yankey, 2019). Systematic document review was used to collect data from secondary sources

such as books, journal articles, reports, and news issues. Memorial University's e-library and search engines such as Google Scholar, Science Direct, EBSCO, and Microsoft Academic were intensively used. Grey documents such as reports, program logs, performance ratings, newsletters, among others, were very useful throughout this research in three stages; before, during, and after conducting interviews. These documents were helpful in gathering background information, identifying the various stakeholders involved in the participatory and deliberative processes, and understanding the space within which the researcher could operate.

4.3.5.1. Research Interviews

Interviews were the main primary data collection technique. In today's world, interviews are now the trend for information seeking, most especially in qualitative studies (Silverman, 2016). Griffee (2005) put forward that the popularity of qualitative research interviews is the nexus between humans and 'talking", and talking is natural. It is also the most suitable means of eliciting information from target groups' experience, perceptions, and meanings to investigate public participation practice (Chompunth, 2011). There are several types of interviews, but the most applied ones in qualitative research are unstructured, semi-structured, and structured. This study made use of semi-structured interviews. These were selected as the means of data collection because they are appropriate for exploring the viewpoints and perceptions of respondents about multifaceted and sometimes sensitive issues and permit probing for more detailed information and clarification of answers (Louise Barriball & While, 1994). They do not strictly follow a formalized list of questions. Rather, more open-ended questions were asked, allowing the researcher to deviate from the questions by asking additional questions to clarify any answers to the main questions.

When conducting the interview, three main aspects were considered: interview guide, interview process, and tape recording and note-taking. The question guide was structured in line with the research objectives and questions, divided to into four different parts covering: interviewee's/respondent's background information, knowledge on carbon emissions reduction, design and effectiveness of public participation and deliberation in policymaking, and policy recommendation. This set of questions was answered by two different categories of people, namely, (1) the policy designers or managers; and (2) the participants. The policy designers or managers were federal government officials or agencies concerned with the "policy instrument" as well as any organizations tasked or contracted by federal government officials to help design the policy instrument. Other stakeholder groups such as Academia/Experts, Business/Industries, Political Organizations/Parties, and ENGOs were the participants. Significantly, the questions were structured on the grounds of four basic types of questions demonstrated by (Forss, 2005), which are knowledge questions, opinion questions, feeling questions; and behavior questions.

For the interview process, in order to get potential participants, the initial contact information of the potential interviewees was obtained through publicly available online directories. All these potential interviewees/respondents were purposively recruited. In some instances, the snowball technique was used to recruit potential interviewees. These potential interviewees were sent initial recruitment emails and asked for their availability and involvement *(See Appendix F).*

Starting from December 27th, 2020 to April 15th, 2021, interviews were conducted using the interview guide, which comprised a set of key questions (*See Appendix A and B).* In most cases, a number of the interviewees wanted to see the interview schedule and questions in advance before the interviews were conducted. This was to enable them to prepare well and answer the questions

on issues as effectively as possible. Accordingly, these particulars were sent on request on a case-by-case basis. These particulars were intended to ensure that all questions were clear and concise and to permit other noteworthy matters to arise during the processes.

Given the traveling restrictions that came with the COVID-19 protocol, all the semi-structured interviews were conducted virtually in a setting of the interviewees' preference and convenience. Except for one interviewee who was interviewed using a telephone, all respondents/interviewees used visual communication applications such as Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams. These practices and applications were flexible during the entire process. The interviews lasted between 35 minutes to 75 minutes based on the interviewee's availability, interests, memory of the event, and experience with the process. In all, a total of 31 respondents were interviewed.

The in-depth interviews with these stakeholder groups were mostly held at their working places during their working times. Except for four interviewees who joined from British Colombia, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick province, all of the interviewees participated in from the Ontario province. The advancement in digital technologies and video platforms reduced the logistical difficulties, inaccessibility to geographically dispersed interviewees, interviewer safety concerns, and scheduling challenges that accompany the conventional face-to-face interviews, where the interviewer is physically present to ask questions.

During the interviews, the conversations were recorded concurrently with note-taking. Given that the interviews were via video platforms or visual communication applications, with the interviewees' permission, an Apple iPhone XS Max voice recorder device was used to record the interviewees' voices only. The voice recorder permitted the researcher to pay more attention to the interviewee and focus on the conversation rather than concentrate on jotting down what was being

said during the process (Patton, 2002). All the voices recorded were transcribed into Microsoft word document format using Microsoft Dictate Application. To check the accuracy of transcripts, the researcher manually transcribed 5 of the recorded voices, reviewed and matched them with what the Microsoft Dictate Application had already transcribed to see whether or not there were discrepancies. The Microsoft Dictate Application is fast and makes transcription less burdensome. Of note, the Dictate Application is not 100% accurate. Therefore, it is important to listen to it again when a quote from the interviewees is been used. The success of the Application mainly relies on the clarity of the interviewee' voice and how the recordings were done. These transcribed interviews were later used in the analysis process.

4.3.6. Data Analysis

Generally, data analysis is more about making sense of the unrefined, voluminous, messy, and unstructured format of a data collected. These practices are undoubtedly challenging in qualitative research because it is necessary to order and structure the collected data in a way that makes sense for interpretation. In achieving this, there are several different approaches with no clear set of procedures. However, what is common is that qualitative data analysis requires a careful, creative and systematic approach.

Using the research questions, this research used a mixture of both an inductive and a deductive approach. A thematic analysis of the data was employed to identify and analyze common threads and emerging patterns within the data in the form of themes. Thematic analysis is considered by many researchers to be the most suitable in "capturing the complexities of meaning within a textual data set" (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011, p. 10).

To start with the analysis, 25 out of the 31 respondents or interviewees were selected. This was needed because the researcher had a large number of respondents or interviewees representing a particular stakeholder group. To have a balanced sample of interviews for the analysis and results presentation, 5 interviewees each from the 5 stakeholder groups making 25 were considered. 25 were considered because upon cursory reading, the remaining 6 would not offer any extra information that was not covered already by those in their category. Again, these participants are not based in Ontario but expressed interest in participating. All interviews were assigned identifiers (G/B—1, ENGOs—1, Pp—1, A/E—1, B/I—1, and so on) before transcription.

With the support of the Microsoft Office 365 Word Transcription and Dictation Application, all the audio recordings were transcribed. The researcher went through a thorough reading of all transcripts to gain familiarization and insights from the data and form initial themes. NVivo, a popular software package for qualitative data analysis, was used to analyze the research data, code data, and generate families of codes based on themes found from the interview data. The NVivo program offers a structured storage file system that permits straightforward management of interview data without stress by locating material and storing data in one place.

Coding is an interpretive act of "focusing a mass amount of free-form data with the goal of empirically illuminating answers to research questions" (Hahn, 2008, p. 6). In NVivo, coding involves arranging related ideas into 'nodes.' The transcribed data were imported into the NVivo program and coded into new nodes. Throughout the process, coding at each stage made use of both pre-determined themes and new ones that emerged. Recurring themes were then sorted and grouped under families of broader and smaller categories placed within the overall research questions (Lewis et al., 2003).

In the presentation of findings and results of this thesis, excerpts or direct quotations from the transcribed interviews based on interview questions and the interviewee answers were used because they constituted the empirical data or evidence of interviewees' direct involvement in the participatory and deliberative processes. These excerpts and direct quotations helped enrich the quality and validity of data and analysis presented in this work.

4.4. Research Ethics

When conducting research that involves humans, it is essential to ensure that their private life, views, or opinions are not subjected to any undue harm. Accordingly, this thesis went through ethical screening by the Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board (GC-REB) to confirm it met the Canadian Tri-Councils Ethics criteria. Ethics approval was issued in December 2020 *(See Appendix D).* The vital goal of the screening was to find out how the researcher intends to conduct the research and the aim of the study. They ascertained how the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees will be protected by the researcher. In this study, the interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality, and all data were assured to have security and protection. Notably, they were also informed that they could withdraw at any time during the interviewing or in the research processes. The information was securely kept and inaccessible *(See Appendix C and E).*

4.5. Limitations of Research Methodology

Despite the deliberate effort to ensure that the study is scientifically sound, there were some limitations of the research methodology that need to be acknowledged. Given the political nature of the issues, the researcher aimed to contact and interview all the major political parties and organizations in Ontario Province, especially the Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, Green, NDP, and AFN. However, all attempts to interview potential participants or representatives from

the Progressive Conservatives, which lasted for about three months, failed. In fact, even those who had earlier on agreed later withdrew their consent. I was not able to recruit potential participants or representatives from the current Ontario government and even after making several attempts to get participants from the Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks, Ontario. However, these limitations will not significantly affect the adequacy of the data or the drawing of logically valid conclusions.

Chapter 5: Presentation of Research Findings

5.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the findings gathered from both primary and secondary sources and, most importantly, the interviewees as indicated in the preceding chapter. This chapter comprises seven main sections, and they are presented in line with the researcher's objectives and questions. The first section begins with the interviewee backgrounds or basic characteristics, knowledge on carbon emissions reductions, and experiences with public and stakeholders' participation and deliberation processes. The second section captures documents' review on the development of the carbon pricing instrument. The third section begins with the actual interview results: starting with the modalities of the participatory and deliberative aspects of the entire processes. The fourth section outlines the views of the policymaker/designers on the purpose and objectives of involving public and stakeholders in processes, and also from the public and stakeholders the reasons why they participated in the processes. The fifth section highlights the role played by the public and stakeholders in the process. The sixth section provides the major challenges, political controversies, tensions, and conflicts between the Ontario government and the federal government during the policy formation activities. The final section ends with potential mechanisms or strategies for improving public and stakeholder participation and deliberations in order to enhance public acceptability and legitimacy of a policy. All these sections are presented or built around themes that were generated from the interviews.

5.2. Interviewee's Background or Basic Characteristics

The background information of the interviewees was not a key focus of this research. However, they help the readers to appreciate the kind of interviewees involved in the study. The interviewees'

defining characteristics considered significant to the research were the stakeholders group to which an interviewee belongs and their role during the process. Other identifying information may be substantial, but they are beyond the scope of this study. Tables 3 and 4 below shows stakeholders groups (program designers/managers and participants) and identifiers as well as some excerpts of comments identifying their roles during the process.

Table 3: List of Interviewees by Stakeholder Group and Identifier

PROGRAM/MANAGER DESIGNERS **PARTICIPANTS**

Stakeholders Groups	**Identify**	Stakeholders Groups	**Identify**
Government/Bureaucrats Total=4	G/B—1 G/B—2 G/B—3 G/B—5	Government/Bureaucrats Total=1	G/B—4
Academia/Experts		Academia/Experts Total=5	A/E—1 A/E—2 A/E—3 A/E—4 A/E—5
Environmental NGOs Total=1	ENGOs —4	Environmental NGOs Total=4	ENGOs —1 ENGOs —2 ENGOs —3 ENGOs —4
Political Parties/Org.		Political Parties/Org. Total=5	Pp—1 Pp—2 Pp—3 Pp—4 Pp—5
Business/Industries		Business/Industries Total=5	B/I—1 B/I—2 B/I—3 B/I—4 B/I—5
Total=**5**		Total=**20**	**Sum Total= 25**

Table 4: Some Excerpts of Roles by Stakeholders Groups in the Participatory Process

Stakeholders Groups	Description of Roles in the Process
Government/Bureaucrats	1) "I was part of a small team which led the process of developing that plan, and so there were a couple of steps in that, and one of the roles I played was to coordinate the review of comments from the public online portal "(G/B—2). 2) "I had to convince my counterpart in Ottawa, that what we were doing was good enough; it met the criteria that was the first thing " (G/B—4).
Academia/Experts	1) "I was contacted by the policy designers from the Environment and Climate Change Canada. Also, I remember briefing Justin Trudeau before he became Prime Minister right on carbon pricing, and in fact, I briefed him, I guess, twice on climate policy before he was Prime Minister. I spoke to the Prime Minister after the Liberals formed government" (A/E—1). 2) "I suggested the carbon pricing policy they brought in, but I think it would be naive of me to say that I created this policy " (A/E—2).
Political Parties / Org.	1) "We were involved in negotiations leading up to the eventual adoption of the Pan Canadian Framework " (Pp—1). 2) "There was a negotiation on the Pan Canadian Framework, and we were part of that, and that work is broader technically than a carbon tax " (Pp—2).
Business/ Industries	1) "My role really was to understand the policy and to work with Environment Canada and Climate Change Canada officials on the elements of the policy that were most important to my center " (B/I—2). 2) "We are not regulated or affected by climate policy directly, but our members are, and so they use us to advance their objectives with the government " (B/I—1).
Environmental NGOs	1) "I did some analysis for the federal government on the backstop regulation and the large emitter program (the output-based pricing), so I also did a lot of engagement

for Ontario in Ontario's standalone cap-and-trade program" (ENGOs —4)

2) "Our role was kind of helping to find agreement because you have all these different stakeholders from all these different sectors, and they kind of want different things or the process" (ENGOs —1).

5.2.1. Knowledge on Carbon Emissions Reductions and Other Relevant Issues

Environmental-related issues such as environmental governance and policymaking, climate change, and emissions reduction are very complex and may be extremely complicated to handle. They are often afflicted by "wicked problems"—making it concerning for diverse interested parties and opinions to find common grounds. Therefore, it is imperative to involve not only interested parties but also key stakeholders with vast knowledge in the studies. All the 31 interviewees involved in the studies had a demonstrable understanding of the issues.

A few of the remarks by the interviewees are:

> "I think that the selected regulations like the clean fuel standard and passenger vehicle regulations is (sic) a good way to try to meet our 30% greenhouse gas goals. Also I think we need compulsory regulations and high greenhouse gas prices and that's the approach that's just been announced by the federal government" (A/E—2).

> "Canada first needs stronger targets. It is not just about meeting those targets; it is about meeting stronger targets that will actually have a hope of keeping us at 1.5 degrees and so that would be really important" (ENGOs—2).

> "I can tell you my personal view and when it comes to the government's view as a representative government. The climate plan that just came out in December is a good representation of how the federal government feels about it. I think as a policy analyst personally, I think it's clear Canada has a huge challenge. It's not easy to get our emissions to the levels that we've committed to the 30% below at 2005 levels by 2030. It's going to be very challenging partly because of our very emissions-intensive oil sands" (G/B—1).

> "We are as an industry, we believe that carbon pricing is a central part of meeting that 30% reduction target. But, I think it is also widely acknowledged that carbon pricing is not the only thing that's going to get us there, thus, there need to be sort of a suite of other complementary policies" (B/I—2).

Significantly, all the interviewees raised concerns about the increasing rate of emissions in Canada. They also expressed anxieties about the existential threats climate change presents to humanity and global economies. Some of the interviewees also questioned Canada's climate actions and inactions, as well as the federal, provincial, and territories' carbon emissions management regimes. They further suggested strategies, tools or mechanisms by which Canada can best meet its target of cutting GHG emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. All the interviewees stated that market-based climate solutions (like pollution pricing) are the necessary foundation of any climate action plan to reduce GHG emissions. However, there are other essential tools and actions such as a collaborative approach to innovations, and investments for infrastructure technology, transparent policies, awareness creation, capital injection into decarbonization, accountability legislation, partnerships with international companies on hydrogen, clean fuel standard, mechanical sequestration technologies, etc. These are practically fundamental in cutting down emissions. One of the interviewees said:

> "I also think there needs to be a combination of carbon pricing and other measures. You can't rely on one thing. There is no silver bullet to fix climate change and reduce emissions. If you throw everything into one policy, it makes it very risky because that one policy can be canceled, and in order to make a resilient plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, having a range of different policies and approaches is really important as well. So things like having a clean fuel standard in Canada and having, you know, methane emissions actions as well having targets for methane reduction that's really important in addition to carbon pricing" (ENGOs—2).

5.2.2. Experiences with Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberation Processes

All the participants have had extensive experiences with participation and deliberation processes of many kinds in a variety of settings prior to the carbon pricing policy development processes. For them, depending on the type of the public engagement processes, their general assessment in terms of their effectiveness was a mixture of a positive and negative outcome and perceptions—

covering frustrations, transparency issues, consensus-driven processes, collaboration, empowerment, inadequate time, etc. One of the interviewees from the office of the former Minister of Climate Change and Environmental Ontario noted:

> "It was very it was high level. When I looked at what became the National Housing strategy of Minister Jean-Yves Duclos, again, that was the consultation with all the provinces. We all sat around the table together; we all signed off on the National Housing strategy. When we sat down with him, we had already done a lot of our own work. We consulted with our stakeholders we've been talking to. I had talked to people around and across Ontario about what a National Housing strategy should look like, but you know, again, it was a breath of fresh air. The carbon pricing was a bit more heated. It was a bit more partisan, I will say. A lot of businesses vehemently opposed, and they spent millions of dollars trying to persuade the government not to move ahead, so it was much more heated" (G/B—4).

To conclude, the purpose of these sections (5.2.1. and 5.2.2.) was to show that the interviewees had a required and common knowledge level on carbon pricing policy and its emerging issues, and have had experiences with participatory processes in the past, that will be useful to the researcher and the study's general conclusion.

5.3. The Development of the Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments

This section presents data gathered from documents review or secondary sources on the development of the carbon pricing instrument. This section was needed to provide background information to readers on how the federal carbon pricing policy instrument was developed. Understanding how the carbon pricing policy was developed is essential in achieving the aims of this thesis. Like all other policies, carbon pricing policy was designed to realize defined goals and provide solutions to societal problems such as climate change. With this Canada-wide carbon pricing instrument, the federal government of Canada made "a clear statement" to cut down emissions in the most effective and efficient way all over the country.

March 3, 2016, saw a significant step in Canada's environment and climate history. The First Ministers convened in Vancouver to develop a robust plan to achieve Canada's domestic target and international commitments (i.e., Canada's commitment to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, France –COP21). The conclusion of their gathering brought forth the famous "Vancouver Declaration" that includes Federal action through a Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean Growth and Climate Change, to be implemented by early 2017 (Thompson & Lemmens, 2016). To do this, working groups were set up in four areas, clean technology, innovation and jobs; carbon pricing mechanisms; specific mitigation opportunities; and adaptation and climate resilience. The working group on carbon pricing mechanisms produced its report, which concluded that holistically:

> "Carbon pricing is one of the more efficient tools available to governments to incent a transition to a low carbon economy, allowing for an increase in the level of ambition in reducing GHGs, promoting clean economic growth, and the possibility for enhanced cooperation among jurisdictions" (Working Group—Government of Canada, 2016, pp. 3-4).

Consequently, the federal government of Canada adopted the Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution. The First Minister agreed with the federal government that "a range of measure such as carbon pricing be adapted to the specific circumstances of each province and territory" (Good, 2018, p. 3). Finance Canada and Environment Canada led all the transitional and development activities of the policy instrument. They also led participatory and deliberative processes on the policy choice and design using in-person and virtual meetings.

In this study, two of the interviewees from the Environment and Climate Change Canada office played significant roles in developing the carbon policy instrument. Excerpts of their comments are below:

> "When I was first told I needed to develop a carbon pricing system for Canada, we didn't have the authority, we didn't have the legal authority, and so we had to write brand new legislation. And, then you need to think well what are the social and economic impacts?, and you have to have at the federal level we have a national, so what works for BC may not work the same for New Brunswick or Newfoundland and Labrador because they've got very different resource bases and different economies, so it starts being like a kind of more complicated piece and then you have to think does this fit with what their priorities and mandate are"(G/B—1).
>
> "My role is to look at provincial and territorial systems when they propose a carbon pricing system and review those against the federal benchmark criteria for current pricing. If you're familiar with those, which set out the minimum standards that provincial systems have to meet or territorial systems, so my job is to manage the team that looks at those systems. Every year we do what we call a benchmark assessment. So when Ontario, for example, came up with its new carbon pricing system that it asked the federal government to allow to replace the federal system, my team was the team that reviewed that system against those criteria"(G/B—2).
>
> "I would say the intensive consultation happened with provinces and territories on the design of the federal system but then mainly with also all the regulatees and stakeholders that were going to be subject to the federal carbon pricing system"(G/B—1).

Clearly, when officials from the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Canada were mandated to develop the carbon pricing policy, they played significant roles by considering several policy alternatives, engaging various stakeholders on the design, effectiveness, and purpose of the policy as well as considering the existing emission reduction policies within various provinces and territories while paying attention to the various social, political, and economic impacts of the policy on their economies.

5.4. The Modalities of the Participation and Deliberation Processes

This section presents interview responses related to the thesis' objective number one: modalities of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process.

"Modalities" here means the particular structure of thinking, actions, and inactions that influences how stakeholder groups contribute to the design processes, interact, and communicate with others

and decision-makers throughout the processes, leading to the production of an object or a tool. Also, the researcher looked at various methods employed by the program designers or managers, and how participants were able to freely express, access relevant information, and have equal right and opportunity to contribute to the discussions.

5.4.1. Participatory and Deliberative Approach

The semi-structured interviews results indicate that a mixture of formal and informal participatory approaches was employed, and these methods were clearly apparent. It was clear from the result that the participatory approach was generally consultative in nature, where there was one-way flow of information and a few deliberative components.

5.4.2. Formal Participation and Deliberative Approach

According to one of the policy designers, the first formal participatory processes brought the term "carbon policy" into the discourse as an effective tool. The interviewee indicated that:

> "When the Liberal government took power, they launched that public participation process in as early as winter 2016 or spring 2016 through an online portal and so there were a lot of submissions about carbon pricing to that and those informed the thinking on carbon pricing" (G/B—2).

At the national level, there were "roundtables, private meetings, pretty standard government to government meetings" (Pp—1). All the interviewees expressed that the formal meetings with other stakeholders groups also consisted of roundtable-type processes, teleconference, constituency meetings, and bilateral meetings. These meetings were characterized mainly by presentations, discussions, invitations for feedback, and submissions. An interviewee from an ENGO expressed that:

> "This was a consultation process led by the federal government in Ontario and Ottawa. And I think to make it, the format is essentially the federal government making a presentation, and you know the sort of presenting their proposal for the design elements of the policy and then inviting questions from participants in person but of course on the phone, because we have Canadians across the country who are not necessarily going to be able to participate in person, but there is also at times the opportunity to request the chance to make a presentation during those meeting (sic) which was great. So that was one way of soliciting inputs in addition to the submissions on discussion papers" (ENGOs —1).

Interestingly, one of the interviewees expressed that there was also a consultation process with the general public through the 2015 general elections. The interviewee argued saliently that:

> "In that election, I don't recall, but in their material, they spoke about exactly how they would do it, but they did talk about pricing carbon again, and that was the first giant public consultation. There was an election; this was one of the questions that people needed to answer. Did they want to elect a government that believed in pricing carbon, or did they not? So I see that as the first round of public consultation. Then I know that there were the federal government conducted the series of public inputs asking formally for individuals nongovernmental organizations and business to make inputs and about how the carbon pricing program should look like" (G/B—4).

From the results, the method of seeking input in to the policy choice and design was made public. The method here was pre-planned and structured engagements that follow a set of agenda, and managed by trained facilitators/moderators.

5.4.3 Informal Participation and Deliberative Approach

With the informal meetings, the results indicate that it took a lot of different formats. Examples are excerpts below:

> "There were probably four or five meetings intergovernmental meetings in different formats that I was involved in, but the more important comments were informal one, so I rode my bicycle to Hamilton one day to go and meet with Catherine McKenna I spent a day talking to her about stuff. I had private meetings with her for lunch. We arranged a meeting between the Québec minister the Ontario minister and the federal minister to talk about carbon pricing. There was a series of informal meetings account probably three or four" (Pp—2).

> "I didn't participate in a formal participatory process, I was asked on an informal basis a number of times to bring my expertise to help both on the on the political side as well as on the bureaucratic side….I sat down over a coffee with the principal secretary to the Prime Minister before the election and talk about how to produce carbon emissions in Canada. Then subsequent to the election, I was asked to come in and speak to the policy groups at Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada about a particular aspect of the policy. Again it wasn't a formal stakeholder process in the way that you're thinking about. It wasn't something where the organizers open it to the public or a policy or discussion document is up for a discussion for 90 days and they solicit comments and then they amalgamate those comments, that didn't happen. It was something where it was an informal process"(A/E—2).

Clearly, this informal approach of participation and deliberation created a "kind environment" that gave the participants the platform to clearly and freely express themselves because it occurred outside of formal settings/political institutions, and it was seen as a routine human interaction. Over here, there were elements of dialogue and deliberation.

5.4.4. Transparency, Accessibility to Relevant Information, Equal Rights, and Opportunity

Results from the interviews reveal that all the participants had equal rights and the opportunity to make a case and express views freely, but they were restricted by time to make a meaningful change. The timing concerns were confirmed by one of the designers/managers, arguing that "the timelines for us to implement it from developing a new act to implementing were really compressed" (G/B—1). On transparency of the processes, information, and the design, the findings revealed that policy designers were clear with the PCF plan. However, regarding the details of the carbon pricing policy design and the analysis, there were divided opinions with majority expressing that the details were not well communicated. 19 out of 25 respondents stated that the entire process on the details and the economic analysis was far from being transparent and clear. One of the interviewees from the office of the former Minister of Environment and Climate Change in Ontario expressed that:

> "I felt they were. I think even my ministry staff. So the non-political staff the civil servants felt good with the conversations they were having with their counterparts in Ottawa, and I think part of the reason that I feel comfortable the way I was consulted and my fellow members were consulted, and the input is that we were all of the same party. We are not the Federal Liberal Party; we were the Ontario Liberal Party. We had worked just individuals to get them elected, and so the doors were open to us, calling and talking to them. The previous government, it was sometimes very difficult they were in a different political party in power, and it was difficult to get them to pay attention when we wanted to talk about climate change" (G/B—4).

Also, one of the interviewees from the Academic/Experts groups expressed that:

> "I actually think it's been quite transparent, they involved the provinces. Most policies as they get to develop, they didn't send them out to stakeholders and when stakeholders respond they debate them and then they modify the policies. I think this one is a case in point….I think the policy development process has been quite transparent and consultative. I think it's been exactly the process you want. And, that transparency by the way the more the more transparent you are the more you open yourselves up to attack in a democratic system"(A/E—1).

For those who felt that the process was full of secrecy, lack of transparency was a big challenge.

The excerpts below explains their stance:

> "I think the transparency was a bit lacking. Their approach to the economic analysis they employed in making decisions about the benchmarks for different industries was never really fully disclosed. Also, we found that officials weren't able to give us very good information on how that analysis was being conducted. With accessibility, especially at the more senior levels, one of the challenges we face is that at the more junior levels in the bureaucracy, the managers and directors responsible for our particular sector they often didn't seem to have the information that we needed, or they weren't able to share it, or they weren't able to make decisions or provide a lot of clarity"(B/I—2).

> "Federal and provincial negotiations aren't about transparency. A federation is extremely hard to do that. You can't have everyone in the room. Basically governments get elected with mandates to implement action and then they try to proceed with implementing them" (Pp—2).

> "Well so there's there has to be a lot of secrecy in developing policies, so during the process it was made clear about what the design options are or the range but it was never made clear this is what we're going to do"(ENGOs —4).

5.4.5. Representation, Inclusiveness, and Exclusiveness of the Processes

The results reveal that all stakeholder groups, especially regulatees and those who will be affected by the policy, were sufficiently consulted or engaged across all the provinces and territories. One of the program designers indicated that for the industries in Ontario: "I tried to consult with absolutely everybody on the list 150 industrial facilities" (ENGO —4). For the public consultation, "We posted papers for so many public comments and then sent it to all the stakeholders. We put people first and value their views so we tried to not self-select. We try and go as broad as possible" (G/B—1).

One of the interviewees from the Business/Industrial Associations confirmed the inclusiveness of the processes by noting that: "I think anyone who wanted to engage had the opportunity" (B/I—1).

Despite the intensive consultation, the results showed that groups such as consumer advocates, immigrants, youth, racialized and marginalized communities, low-income communities, and, most importantly, Indigenous groups were either not properly consulted or neglected in the process:

> "Well, certainly everyone in the industry that was going to be impacted by the regulation was present right and so on the flip side, of course, we saw folks from civil society participate in the process, health groups, environmental groups, but we didn't see indigenous groups in the development of such a key policy. The aspects of social justice and the concerns of these groups that are often marginalized were not part of the conversation. Although I do have to caveat that the design of the policy is progressive nonetheless, but that might have been a bit of a blind spot" (ENGO —1).

A few of the interviewees also expressed that one of the major opposition parties—the Conservative Party of Canada— was not interested in the conversation on the policy and removed itself from participatory processes. One of the interviewees indicated that:

> "They removed themselves by being so negative about carbon pricing. They politicize the policy and indicated that they would not support any policies that actually would tackle climate change….and some even said climate change is not real" (G/B—3).

5.4.6. Effectiveness of the Participatory and Deliberation Methods

In terms of the effectiveness of the processes, there were contrasting accounts. Except for the Political Parties/Organizational group who expressed dissatisfaction with the processes, the majority of the stakeholders groups indicated that processes were effective, in general, with a few setbacks. Also, the formal participatory approach, with a few deliberative components, applied in each stage of the processes was more effective than the informal one.

> "Well, you know, I think collectively they were quite effective. I felt like we had a lot of opportunities both through the collective engagements of the various expert task groups as well as the individual meetings that we set up as an association to educate and dialogue with both the political side and the bureaucratic side. I think they did listen to our advice and the advice coming from other industries, and they designed a process for certainly for the industrial emissions side. I think most industries are quite happy with it. They used a fairly robust economic analysis to determine how to design their output-based pricing system for industry, and some may not be perfect, but I thought that the process was quite effective"(B/I—2).

Those with contrasting views also felt that the processes failed to address their concerns, and their inputs were not considered. One interviewee makes the salient point that:

> "The procedures were "less collaborative and fell short in the sense that, the federal government without considering what they (provinces and territories) wanted to do and what is meant for their jurisdictions, went ahead to sign on to the Pan Canadian Framework" (Pp—1).

5.5. The Purpose and Objectives of the Participatory and Deliberative Processes

This section presents interview responses to the thesis's objective number two: the purpose and objectives of involving the public and stakeholders during the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy developing activities.

From the findings, some provinces and territories already had in place functioning emissions reduction tools/mechanisms, plans, and programs (before the development and adoption of the national carbon pricing policy). Therefore, the purpose of engaging them was to get their support and inputs on the policy design and the framework. In Ontario, in particular, the federal government wanted to know the considerations for their jurisdiction and how their cap-and-trade system will meet the federal government's criteria. The interviewee from the office of the former Minister of Environment and Climate Change Ontario government expressed that:

> "Well, we knew going into the consultation that they were going to put a price on carbon that it most likely would be a carbon tax, and so then the discussion was really about for us don't include Ontario; that was our message. For many of the other provinces that did not have a price on carbon, the discussion was about how high would the tax be and how fast would it be implemented, and what would some of the more technical things like how would the rebates work for citizens and smaller businesses, what would the impact be for people living in poverty" (G/B—4).

Also, the interviewee from the office of the former Premier of Ontario expressed that:

> "I said we were working closely with the Trudeau's government and they wanted to make sure that their allies at the provincial level were supportive of what they were doing. So the purpose of the consultation and the purpose of the ongoing conversation was to make sure that we were on the same page and that when Justin Trudeau stood up and said this is what we're going to do on climate change, I would stand up and say I'm supportive of that and that's what we did" (G/B—3).

Interestingly one of the participants from the political parties/organizations noted that the consultation was just a formality and wasn't meant to be productive from the beginning to the end. The interviewee expressed that:

> "The purpose was to do consultation for the sake of consultation and not to improve or listen to the content that's being provided. And, I guess that's like the difference between participation being a process to an outcome and participation being an outcome itself" (Pp—3).

For the other stakeholders groups, each had a different purpose for joining the participatory processes—either the evaluation of benchmarks, representation of interests, education, ascertaining the program's compatibility with WTO standards, or soliciting industrial feedback on the program design. All the stakeholders groups got involved because they were: 1) regulatees, 2) researchers and experts, 3) advocates, and/ or 4) interested parties.

Significantly, with inputs from all these stakeholder groups, the federal government's key aim was to gather inputs from various stakeholder groups and to know how the design of the proposed system could impact industrial operations, emissions reductions, trade, export competitiveness, and to ultimately meet its domestic and international emissions reduction targets.

5.5.1. Views Consideration and Result of the Consultations

The majority of the participants indicated that their views were taken into serious consideration during the participatory processes because their inputs were seen in the program design and regulations. Also, the program designers/managers kept calling on them. One of the interviewees expressed that:

> "I think that one thing it was listening to was in the end that the federal government recognized that the Quebec and Ontario were not giving up their cap and trade system. That would have been politically suicidal for their government. It also made no sense because the cap-and-trade systems were working better than the taxes. They were actually reducing emissions, and so for those two reasons, I think in the end, the federal government stopped pursuing a carbon tax only approach and just recognized them" (Pp—2).

However, a few of the participants indicated that the program designers/managers did not care about anything else. "They just want to implement a carbon price because they have campaigned on it" (Pp—1). In the areas where their views were considered, it did not make any meaningful impact on the design.

5.6. The Role of Public and Stakeholders Participation and Deliberation

This section presents the interview responses related to the main objective: the role of the public and stakeholders participation and the deliberative process between Ontario stakeholders and the federal government of Canada concerning the federal carbon pricing policy process. The results reveal the significant role of the participatory and deliberative aspect throughout the process. According to the program designers/managers, the stakeholders groups who participated in the processes contributed by providing better information on stringency, implementation, and scope—leading to better choices and better decisionmaking. In all, the participatory and deliberative processes did:

> "Highlight the trade-off so industry will ask for a weaker policy, so they don't have to spend money, the ENGOs and civil society will ask for more aggressive policy to impose more cost, and they will talk about the emissions reductions. They will talk about the benefits of action, and government has to sit there and listen to all these views, these sides, and balance when they do their design. So the consultations revealed preferences of the people both for more policy, for less policy but it also lets (sic) government understand the outcomes and the implications of their design choices" (ENGOs —4).

One of the program designers/managers noted that:

> "So they provided perspectives on stringency and how and what elements/factors should be part, what should the price be, they provided inputs on what are the impact. So one concrete example of how the policy was impacted by the inputs we received is the way we return revenue reflects a lot of what we heard. So there was clearly an understanding that households needed to be made whole; we needed it to be affordable. So the way that the revenue is returned from carbon pricing in the federal system where the majority of it goes back to households was reflecting of that"(G/B—1).

5.6.1. Outcome and Consensus

According to the majority of the interviewees, the outcome of the processes informed the federal government decisions on the original Pan Canadian Framework, its approach to carbon pollution

pricing, and decisions on the regulatory development. One of the participants expressed that the processes:

> "Landed in a place where they had largely satisfied the interests and concerns of the industry stakeholders. In terms of the design of the system, it is again not perfect, but it was clear that industries supported the overall process and analysis that went into the design of that system"(B/I—2).

On consensus, results from the findings indicate that the processes was never a consensus-based approach. The program designers and managers never wanted a consensus. Stakeholders were engaged intensively, but the government was always going to make the decision. At the national level, one of the interviews expressed that:

> "All of the Ministers walked out of the meeting in protest over the unilateral action by the federal government. So it was never a really truly collaborative process. It had the veneer of the surface because everyone was polite in their public conversations, but it was a very unpleasant experience" (Pp—2).

> "So the Vancouver Declaration was the negotiation, so it's collaborative and there was agreement there. The PCF again it was like here's a document you can sign it or not sign it" (Pp—1).

However, according to the representative of the office of the former Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Ontario:

> "The federal government agreed that they were not going to implement a carbon tax in Ontario because our cap-and-trade were good enough. I personally encouraged the Minister to impose a higher tax and to move faster to get to wrap that tax up. I think she wanted to do that but it was probably constrained by the pushback she got from business or the her fellow colleagues who got pushed back from the business, so I was pleased that the federal government put a price on carbon" (G/B—4).

Clearly, the results indicate that, at the provincial level, the federal government agreed with Ontario's cap-and-trade system, where the typical Business and Industrial Associations were

mainly happy with the conclusion— "ultimately we are happy with the conclusion that they came with the processes" (B/I—1).

5.7. The Major Challenges: Political Controversies, Tensions, and Conflicts during the Policy Formation Activities.

This section discusses the interview responses related to objective number three: the major challenges, and political controversies, tensions, and conflicts, between the stakeholders in Ontario and the government of Canada during the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy developing activities.

The results of the interviews show that, during the participatory and deliberative process, there were economic and political disputes, tensions, and problems around the policy choice, policy design, and its details. Interestingly, aside from the participants from the industries and business groups, the other stakeholder groups indicated that there were huge political and economic controversies, disputes, and tensions, which have lasted over decades and still do not seem to be ending soon.

For the economic controversies, the interviewees from Political Parties and Organizations expressed that some of the stakeholders groups do not believe in the (backstop system) because the "backstop for cap-and-trade system is tax and taxes don't work very well" (Pp—2), when compared to the cap-and-trade system that Ontario had already established. As well, according to the Political Parties/Organizations, heavy industry manufacturers in the Ontario province were very concerned about the increased cost of materials and increased cost of their processes.

Again, there were issues about distributional impacts associated with the policy. The uneven nature of the distribution of carbon emissions across geography and sectors triggered controversy about

this policy. “Oil and gas sectors felt that they were being targeted by the policy”(A/E—2). But shockingly, these concerns were not raised by the interviewees from the Business/Industrial group. The Business/Industrial group rather saw the ENGOs are spurring/ causing a lots of tensions and controversies because they wanted a more aggressive policy. One of the interviewees from the Business/Industrial groups noted that:

> “I would not say they were disagreements. For disputes there is (sic) always. I’m sure the environmental groups would say that, they should have been more involved in the sector by sector negotiations on the sector standards because they would like to see more aggressive policy than what was being considered but I think the industries and business associations were generally fairly happy with what came from that process because it was a recognition that Canada is still one of the few countries that actually has carbon pricing that is applied to its emissions intensive industries” (B/I—2).

From the results, the political controversies, tensions, and disputes were huge and apparent. The reasons for these controversies and tensions were that the Conservative Parties in Ontario and other provinces were heavily campaigning against carbon pricing based on the following: (1) climate change is not real or its impacts are not too severe, (2) carbon pricing is not an effective tool, (3) the taxes are expensive, (4) different political philosophy and ideology, and (5) limited jurisdiction to impose a carbon tax on their resource sectors.

Notably, a few interviewees expressed that some Political Parties and Organizations felt that the participatory and deliberative processes were insufficient. The “federal government made a unilateral announcement without consulting the provinces, so that is going to naturally raise people’s concerns” (A/E—2). Furthermore,

> “I think you know for those provincial governments the consultation process was always going to be in their mind insufficient or illegitimate as long as the decision of whether or not to impose the federal backstop was already decided by the federal government” (Pp—3).

5.7.1. Resolution

According to the majority of the participants, all these tensions and controversies remained unresolved throughout the adoption of the policy. The unresolved tensions, controversies, and disputes were concerning to most of the participants who expressed that there were controversies and tensions. But one of the participants noted that the controversies were somewhat resolved at the national level:

> "I said they were resolved basically because the Prime Minister convened the Premiers and put a deal in front of them based on the conversations that governments have been having for several months, and the compromises were negotiated in a series of consultation and private meetings between ministers. It was basically just hardball negotiations between the governments and the federal government" (Pp—2).

5.8. Strategies of Improving Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberations

This section discusses interviewees' answers related to objective number four: the mechanisms or strategies that could be used to improve public and stakeholder participation and deliberation that have the potential to enhance acceptability and legitimacy.

From the findings, the interviewees argued that the participatory and deliberative processes were very intensive and engaging. But, for such a policy to be accepted in Ontario and Canada at large, new mechanisms and strategies should be adopted by the federal government during policy review. Some of the interviewees expressed the following:

> "I think we need a lot more education and a lot more communication. If you look at the UK or any other government, they spend a lot of money on public education about climate change about communicating their policies. The federal government never really did that" (ENGOs —3).

> "I could be accused of being naïve, but I think the way that policy become legitimate and acceptable is that :1) you just have to have more and more, and better public debate based on fact, you eat them with fact. You probably debate them in ways and, with language that

is appropriate to the audience; so when I go and speak to a group of business people, I don't speak exactly the same way as I go and speak to a group of environmentalists, and 2) the strongest things to do for any policy to gain acceptability is the evidence that the policy works" (A/E—1).

"I think better communication. I think if the Government of Canada had adopted communication style that was similar to, for example, the Ecofiscal Commission's work and that they had put more effort into clear communication, more frequent communication, and more transparent communication that would have been a big improvement to the policy's support and acceptability"(B/I—1).

"I think we could be better about making sure people have the time and the resources to come to the conversation with sufficient knowledge in terms of being able to engage; and that may mean some capacity building, better education, and then I would say time and then the ability to return and have follow up engagement and deliberation" (G/B—1).

"Have a transparent plan that is easy for people to understand, that is credible and addressing the crisis in a way that doesn't threaten our economy or quality of life. Again, it is also through basically from consultation to collaboration and raising awareness. It is about problem solving and finding solutions together"(Pp—3).

"I think that one of the things that we've learned throughout this carbon pricing process is how important political acceptability is and how difficult it is to predict it's politically acceptable and not politically acceptable. I would say that political acceptability should probably play a larger role in decisionmaking that kind evaluate not just with the efficiency and what's effective in reducing emissions but also what the public wants, so I think that should play a bigger role upfront there's not a lot of role for that currently in kind of the formal regulatory assessment process" (A/E—2).

According to the interviewees, the federal government and program managers/designers should:

1) Simply communicate the outcomes of the policies often and more clearly;
2) Be transparent with the processes and the policy's design;
3) Educate the public with pieces of evidence and facts on issues and their adverse impact;
4) Aim to be cooperative or collaborative rather than merely informing;
5) Continuously review the participatory processes;
6) Work closely with the local municipalities to help them to see the benefit of policy

7) Consult a broad range of groups, including Indigenous groups, consumer advocates, immigrants, youth groups, racialized and marginalized communities, and low-income communities, and;
8) Consult political parties and organizations widely and adequately.

From their perspective, the above strategies will help improve future participatory and deliberative processes.

Chapter 6: Discussion

Investigations of the role of participatory and deliberative processes are crucial. They enable the identification of the missing elements of public participatory and deliberative processes in policy development and decision making. Using the public and stakeholders participation and deliberation during the federal carbon pricing policy process that occurred in Ontario a case study, this thesis attempts to analyze the role of public participation and the deliberative processes and their extent during the development of the federal carbon policy instrument. The working statement of this study is that in environmental governance, policy decisions work effectively when diverse perspectives are well engaged, issues are clearly defined, and various inputs are considered. Democracy works poorly when citizens make judgments in isolation, lack empathy for others' standpoints, and passively partake in making decisions on various issues that affect them.

With a set of questions designed from and in line with the research objectives, the five main stakeholders groups were recruited and interviewed. The results indicated that participatory and deliberative processes played an essential role in the development of the policy instrument. It also illustrated that various stakeholder groups with demonstrable knowledge and expertise participated in the processes via well-structured and unstructured formats. However, the participation was a low-level one, which was mainly restricted to consultation and one-way information flow—leaving behind the inputs of some of the stakeholders groups, especially political parties and organizations in Ontario. Despite it being low, the outcome (there should be a price on GHG emissions) was appreciated by most of the stakeholders. Again, the results show that the stakeholders groups knew the purpose and the objectives of the participatory processes. As well, it was also indicated that before and during the development of the carbon policy, there were

existing and emerging political and economic issues, controversies, and tensions around the policy framework and its design, but all these issues remained unresolved. To end it all, all the interviewees suggested strategies and mechanisms that have the potential of advancing and promoting policy acceptability and legitimacy.

Using the empirical results of the case study drawn up from the interviewees' perspectives from both semi-structured interviews, coupled with relevant literature, documents review, and in line with the research objectives and questions this chapter analyses, interprets, and discusses the role of participatory and deliberative processes between the federal government and the stakeholders in Ontario. Where needed, a number of quotations are used to accentuate these aspects.

6.1. Stakeholders' Existing Knowledge on Carbon Emissions, Policy, and Prevailing Issues

This section discusses stakeholders' perspectives and knowledge of Canada's carbon emissions and how the existing/ proposed policies could be useful in achieving its targets or objectives locally and internationally.

To ensure effective decision-making, various disciplines of social science research agrees that knowledge is recognised as a crucial factor. Based on the analysis, it is clear that the various stakeholders groups engaged in the processes reflected conceptual and theoretical arguments that the uncertainty and complex nature of environmental decision-making often demands "knowledge, commitment and action of multiple levels of government (Beierle, 1999, p.77). Evidentially, these were fully achieved in this study. The stakeholders consulted understood and used technical analysis and quality scientific information to settle factual claims and also to play a decisive role in deliberations (see also Chess, Dietz, & Shannon, 1998; Reed, 2008; Thomas & Seth, 2000).

Also, they were knowledgeable of the existing and emerging issues, which helped the policy developers or designers to investigate uncertainties and assumptions and develop a more rigorous understanding of the carbon emissions, climate issues, and policy implications. It is not surprising that one of the participants expressed that: "I care about climate policy, and I'm an expert in this area, and so it's normal to provide inputs to political groups or political parties as well as to the bureaucracy when I'm asked to provide advice"(A/E—2). Considering the stakeholders' knowledge, policy decisions out of these consultations are expected or likely to be more robust, significant, and effective.

6.2. The Development of the Federal Carbon Pricing Policy

This section discusses, in brief, the documents review on the background of the development of the carbon pricing policy process. According to Richardson and Razzaque (2006), several interrelated factors have fuelled the growth of participatory processes in decision-making. These factors include increased public awareness and concern about the relationships between ecological health and human well-being; the growth in importance of human rights in legal and political systems; international community concerns for good governance; and lack of trust in governments (pp. 166-167).

Related to this assertion, Canada's carbon policy developing activities, which saw the consultation and engagement of all interested parties, was influenced by Canada's quest to cutdown carbon emissions to meet its emissions reduction targets domestically and internationally (Government of Canada, 2016b). Consequently, the policy development process began with the "Vancouver Declaration," where all the First Ministers agreed with the federal government on Clean Growth and Climate Change actions, including how to build pricing systems for carbon pollution to

achieve its emissions reduction targets. Given the complex and controversial nature of the issue (climate change), it required a negotiated solution which will also count for the smooth implementation of the policy in all provinces. Hence, the federal government considered that it demanded a collective approach and solution. In essence, the standpoints of all interested parties matter in the decision-making processes. Consequently, the federal government engaged various provincial government, territories, National Indigenous Organizations, ENGOs, and other stakeholder groups. This is consistent with literature on environmental governance that, from the 1960s, when the need to ensure environmental protection arose on the political agenda, participation was a core component of the environmental movement (Fischer, 2000). Again, just as it has been argued by Joshua Cohen (2007), a deliberative democratic thinker, that it is difficult for States to act alone in regulatory domains (e.g., environmental regulations) because they will encounter difficulties in implementation. The government of Canada did not act alone, key stakeholder groups were consulted yet political acceptability of the policy (which is very significant) has been a difficult challenge.

Using the interview responses, the following sections look at how the participatory and deliberative processes were conducted and the role these processes played during the development of the policy instrument.

6.3. The Modalities of the Participatory Processes

This section discusses interviews answers related to research objective number one.

During the development of the carbon pricing policy, “intensive consultation happened with provinces and territories on the design of the federal system but then mainly with also all the regulatees and stakeholders that were going to be subject to the federal carbon pricing system”

(G/B—1). This clearly indicates that the government of Canada, based on its Environmental Protection Act (1999), and policymakers widely accept that the members of the public, especially the affected and partisan persons, should be involved in environmental planning such as climate pollution actions and carbon pricing. The participatory and deliberative processes are acknowledged as significant in achieving environment policy legitimacy as well as a vital avenue to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies. The "sense of ownership and responsibility for decisions that comes from being part of decision-making can encourage more thoughtful environmental behavior" (Richardson & Razzaque, 2006, p. 172). Arguably, this thesis asserts that it was for these reasons why various stakeholders groups were consulted during the policy forming activities.

Considering the modalities (that is, the frame of thinking, the methods, actions, and inactions that influence how stakeholders groups contribute to the decision-making processes, interact, and communicate), there are several different ones. When designing participatory processes, it is significant to understand a range of possible methods and choose the one that is most appropriate to help you reach your destination (Gordon, 2016). This is because different methods suit different individual personalities as well as collective ones (Richards, Carter, & Sherlock, 2004, p. 10). This statement was clearly evident in the development of the policy tool. In Ottawa, the methods and approaches to participation used by the program designers differed for each stakeholders group, and they were adapted at each significant stage in the process and to changing contexts. For example, during the presentation of the proposal for the design elements of the policy, stakeholders groups from the |ENGOs, Businesses, and Industries sat on a roundtable; and some stakeholders (political appointees) also rode their bikes to the office of the policy designers and engaged in

dialogue and presented their inputs. Interestingly, some made their input while sipping a cup of tea at the office of the policy makers.

Deliberative scholars point out that the most suitable means to conduct political action, to influence, and to make public decisions that encourage policy legitimacy is through public deliberation (Dryzek, 2002; Fishkin, 2009; Held, 2006), however, the consultation that occurred in Ottawa was not via public deliberation. Based on the analysis findings, there was a combination of methods, mainly formal and informal ones but none of them was via the public sphere (as recommended by deliberative democracy thinkers). An interviewee expressed that:

> "The consultation process led by the federal government in Ontario and in Ottawa was essentially the federal government making a presentation and presenting their proposal for the design elements of the policy and then inviting questions from participants in person" (ENGOs—1).

The formal participatory approaches saw some components of deliberation, where stakeholders groups with equal rights and opportunity were allowed to freely expresses themselves with reasons without coercion from any authority. Unfortunately, the entire process was non-participatory as the policy designers only sought to inform the participants about the policy design and take their views in a series of round table discussions. They were mainly top-down communication and a single-way flow of information. The program designer expressed that:

> "The participatory process was not any kind of consensus-building process in terms of the public engagement. It was really an information, and the people weren't engaging with each other. There isn't any kind of discussion or deliberation" (G/B—2).

One of the participants also expressed that: "On many times, we had to have like Ministerial-level meetings to exercise our frustration. We passed multiple resolutions and had those discussions, but they resulted in nothing" (Pp—4).

Clearly, these approaches or level of participation reflect and remain too close to Arnstein's "tokenism" level of participation, where participants freely expressed themselves because they have the platform, but there is no guarantee that their expressed views will truly matter in the final decision (Arnstein, 1969). In the light of Pretty (1995) and Arnstein (1969) typologies, this participatory method is "bogus" and it simply a pretense, with the representatives of the various stakeholders groups sitting on official boards but have no power to influence decisions.

Even at the provincial level, despite the balance of power between the federal government and other provincial and territorial governments, the views of some provincial and territorial governments did not matter in the policy decision. Notably, a meaningful public inputs or deliberation were not guaranteed. At that level, participatory processes were not appropriate because decisions were foisted on Ontario province and other provinces. The federal government made it clear to the various provincial and territorial governments that either they "sign it or be left out" of the policy. (Pp—2). As a result of these actions by the federal government some of them "walked out of the meeting in protest over the unilateral action…. So it was never a really truly collaborative process. It had the veneer on the surface" (Pp—2). Similarly, BC Assembly of First Nations (2019) noted that the foundational aspect of the plan (PCF) made Saskatchewan and Manitoba not to sign unto the PCF that birthed the carbon policy instrument. In total, the approach adopted at the provincial level contrasts some models of the levels of public involvement in decision-making and planning as prescribed by the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2).

6.3.1. Transparency, Time, and Accessibility to Relevant Information

The complex nature of environmental problems demands transparent decision-making that is adaptable to changing circumstances and embraces a diversity of knowledge and values of all affected and the partisan public, including the general public if possible. In any policymaking process, fulsome transparency dispels "public suspicions about the sponsors and their motives" leading to a greater sense of legitimacy and trust in the standpoint of stakeholders (Rowe & Frewer, 2000, p. 15). Government transparency is required in order to avoid "conveying any sense of secrecy" that leads to distrust (Webler et al., 2001).

In this study, the findings revealed divided opinions on transparency of and in the process, although the majority felt the processes were not clear and transparent. It was interesting to notice that two different participants from the office of the former Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Ontario give conflicting views on transparency of the process. While one said "You really don't get a lot of transparency. The federal and provincial negotiations aren't about transparency" (Pp—2), the other indicated that the processes were transparent. "I think even my ministry staff, the non-political staff, and the civil servants felt good with the conversations they were having with their counterparts in Ottawa and I think part of it the reason that I feel comfortable the way I was consulted" (G/B—4).

The majority of the participants expressed concerns that although the policy framework was transparent, but the details of it were not too transparent. What was shocking was that an ENGO expert who was part of the policy designers indicated "there is a lot of secrecy in developing policies" (ENGOs —4).

Another participant from the political party or organizations group said that:

> "The process was transparent up until the point that federal government needed a decision that was following a process that wasn't transparently clear. So yes, every province and territory had an opportunity to provide and exchange viewpoints, but at the same time, the process that was laid out was meant to be clapped given transparent, and the federal government changed their minds at some point and decided that it no longer needed to be collaborative nor transparent nor consultative"(Pp—1).

This development gives room to several forms of interpretation—making it difficult to draw a logical conclusion. But, clearly, how the participants perceived transparency was mainly grounded on their interests, affiliations or ideologies, and their sociopolitical status at that time. In such instances, a possible conflict of interest can compromise independent expertise and its accountability.

When we compare these research findings to others, there are considerable amounts of empirical evidence of the implementation of participatory processes and how the design of policies has failed to demonstrate transparency. A number of empirical studies have all found that the decision-making and public participation processes failed to show transparency, for example, Diduck and Sinclair (2002) and Van Hinte, Gunton, and Day (2007) on Canada's Environmental assessment; Del Furia and Wallace-Jones (2000) on the EIA system in Italy; Bickerstaff, Tolley, and Walker (2002) on local transport planning in the UK, as well as others. But, given the political nature, the interested parties, as well as the objectives and targets of the policy, it was very undemocratic and inappropriate to be lacking clarity, transparency, and to be awash with secrecy. Inadequate transparency casts doubt on the credibility of the policy choice and its effectiveness. It also deepens the mistrust citizens have for the government.

A flexibly protracted period of time suitable for all stakeholders groups to be consulted is seen as not only an essential aspect of participatory processes but it allows participants the opportunity to

fully comprehend the information (Creighton, 2005). Similarly, the Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention states that, public participation procedures: "... shall include reasonable time-frames for the different phases, allowing sufficient time for informing the public" (Aarhus Convention, 1998, p. 10). Although a too long a period of time may usher in analysis paralysis, too short a period of time will fail to fairly and effectively shape environmental decisions (Reed, 2008)). In this study, one of the policy developers admitted that:

> "There wasn't sufficient time because we needed to develop new legislation, new regulations and so we were under a tight timeline. We compromised the extent to which we could consult so for example we didn't have time to do rights-based Indigenous consultation on every part of that system" (G/B—1).

The issue of inadequate time has been confirmed by findings from others studies in the public participation field conducted in Canada, the USA, and the Netherlands as a barrier that precludes the locals from participatory processes (Chess & Johnson, 2006; Diduck & Sinclair, 2002; Woltjer, 2009). With this, the participants' awareness, social learning, and empowerment fall short or weakened, which to a large extent affects their acceptability and support. Considering the controversies and tensions before the policy choice, rushing the policy development processes should not have been a choice. Great practice is to be a bit flexible about the time required whilst respecting the needs of business for a prompt decision (Aarhus Convention, 1998) .

6.3.2. Representation, Inclusiveness, and Exclusiveness

Studies reveal that "participation will be impaired if there are imbalances or omissions in the representation of stakeholders" (Richards, Blackstock, & Carter, 2004, p. 13). This is because "it is a mistake to think that 'the public' has a single opinion" (Prendergast, 2000, p. 15). In a diverse society different 'voices' and styles of communication should be recognised and allowed equal legitimacy in environment policymaking processes. From the findings, relevant stakeholder groups

were consulted, especially the regulatees and partisan public, mainly: ENGOs, Industries/Businesses, Politicians and political organizations, Experts/academia, and Bureaucrats from the Provincial Government in Ontario were consulted. However, in general, the participatory processes were 'impaired' because a good amount of people were left out of the processes but were caught up in the "beltway politics", that is, their participation was only captured on papers (e.g., Indigenous communities).

Furthermore, given the analysis, the lay and general public were not the focus of the policy designers even though the policy will directly affect their way of life. This development leaves a deficit in the democratic processes because the interests and preferences of the general public as well as the pure public were not adequately considered in the policy process because they didn't directly participate in the processes. The approaches adopted by the policy designers could lead us to reasonably question whether all the stakeholders arrived at a considered judgment because all the stakeholders indicated that a significantly large number of groups were left out during the decision-making processes.

From the findings, groups such as consumer advocates, immigrants, youth groups, racialized and marginalized communities, and low-income communities. Most interestingly, Indigenous groups, whom in the domain of climate and energy politics are a new and powerful actor (Winfield & Macdonald, 2019), were practically neglected in the process. Does this suggest, in the eyes of the policymakers/designers, these powerful actors with enormous interests are not part of the affected/interested public or it is normal in the federal-led policymaking processes? The exclusion compels the researcher to question '*who"* according to the policymakers/managers the public or stakeholders were in the development process of the carbon pricing policy?

Given the neglect, according to deliberative democracy thinkers, it is difficult for an environmental policy to embrace public and political acceptability and legitimacy (Fishkin, 2009; Joshua, 1996).

> "I would say Indigenous stakeholders and Indigenous rights holders were neglected in that process. And I think that there could have been a lot more room for bringing in Indigenous rights holders and Indigenous governments into that conversation, especially in terms of use of revenue and authority over revenue recycling. If carbon prices are being collected in Indigenous land then I've got an interesting question that they just bypassed"(ENGOs —4).

This neglect was confirmed by one of the policy designers. The federal government official whose office worked on the file expressed that there was "no Ontario-specific engagement apart from the government-to-government consultation" (G/B—2). Because of the current controversies and tensions stemming from some of the stakeholders, coupled with political and public acceptability challenges, one of the policy designers stated that: "I still feel like the limitation of the participatory processes is like we didn't do rights-based consultation with the National Indigenous Organizations" (G/B—1).

In environmental governance, "interest group politics has seldom proven to be participatory democracy in action" (Fischer, 2000, p. 33). Related to this, some of the experts interviewed confirmed that advocacy group politics does not entirely reflect collective politics or participatory politics as their interests are supreme to them. From the findings, one of the interviewees indicated that:

> "I was satisfied with the part like the contact I've had with the federal government….. I wasn't advocating for something. I was trying to inform and respond to questions and so I

> think it would be difficult to trace a direct link from my participation to each outcome. I mean I will say that they consulted me before they brought in this policy" (A/E—1).

Toward this end, the research argues that, the ignoring of pure public or the general public consultation prevented the integration of the unique socio-cultural, political, economic, and environmental factors within the Ontario province and Canada-wide. In effect, the greater competence in decision-making and technical assessments that can come from the incorporation of local knowledge (Petts, 2003; Webler, 1995) was displaced or not considered. In line with this statement, one interviewee from the office of the former Premier of Ontario expressed that: "I think that the more local we can get in terms of the mechanisms and the understanding, the better off" (G/B—3).

> "The participatory method had no open public session. This is a very much inside the Beltway. The discussion of fairly small group of highly trained academics involved. The general public played a little role because they wouldn't be in a position to make a legitimate contribution. It's not the fault of the public. The government would never give them any information. I'm talking about Canadians at large family, if you as a citizen wanted to engage in this discussion I think you would find it impossible to do so. And right now the government of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario are just giving completely misleading information to the public" (G/B—3).

Clearly, the exclusion of the general public leaves them largely uninformed. They are usually enmeshed in the politics of issues and get exploited for various political gains. Arguably, the exclusion of the general public is one of the reasons why the policy is having acceptability deficit in Ontario, as well as why the current provincial government challenged the authority of the federal government on the policy in the Supreme Court.

Experiences show that, the greater citizen inputs can also accelerate community co-operation in implementing environmental decisions "the sense of ownership and responsibility for decisions

that comes from being part of decision-making can encourage more thoughtful environmental behaviour"(Richardson & Razzaque, 2006, p. 172). As well, it may enhance the accountability, and thus acceptability, of environmental decisions (Spyke, 1998). This study is of the view that without a concerted effort by all and proper coordination of distinctive partisan, affected, they lay and general public, environmental problems cannot be solved by governments alone (or with their interest groups) or a single entity because they are 'wicked problems'. The stability of such policy systems depends on legitimacy derived from this participation (Fischer, 2018).

6.4. The Purpose and Objectives of the Participatory and Deliberative Processes

According to IAP2, the first core value of participatory processes is: the people should have a say in decision-making processes concerning actions and inactions that affect the lives of the people. Again, given the fact that environmental decision-making is a complex system that cannot be dealt with solely by any set of experts, an agreement is only achievable through stakeholder consultation and negotiation. The participatory process was done to get the input of the participants in order to shape the final policy outcome. This relates well with Glucker et al. (2013)'s substantive rationale of participatory processes, which states that the participation processes enhance the quality of the decision due to the inputs and the relevant experimental and value-based knowledge of the participants. In the end, the decision output is robust, resonate well and reflects the collective needs of the stakeholders as well as the general and the lay public.

Furthermore, evidently, this research confirmed this core value because the primary reason for all the stakeholders groups to get involved was because they were either regulatees, researchers and experts, advocates, and interested parties. When we compare this research to other cases, the results are the same . On several regulatory domains, the government of Canada has involved citizens and

stakeholder groups in a lot of projects and policies with the aim of advancing government effectiveness and strengthening perceived legitimacy for government actions (See also Government of Canada, 2021). Cases in point include, but are not limited to, the Spicer Commission in 1990/1991, the Romanow Commission (2001/2002), Digital Canada 150 (DC150) in 2010, Open Government initiative in 2011, and the 2016/2017 Electoral reforms. Again, government institutions such as Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Health Canada, and Indian and Northern Affairs, have also established internal policies that inspire public involvement activities that enable Canadian individuals, groups, and communities to help shape policy decisions that affect them.

Importantly, Mark Reed (2008), put forward that "clear objectives for the participatory process need to be agreed among stakeholders at the outset" (p. 2424). This best practice was absent in the participatory processes relative to the carbon pricing policy development activities. The participatory processes between the federal government and the stakeholders in Ontario had each body with its predefined and different goals. For example, while the Ontario government didn't want to be included in the national carbon pricing policy because they had already a relatively functioning cape-and-trade system, the policy designers' key aim was to gather inputs from various stakeholders and to know how the design of the proposed system could meet their domestic and international emissions reduction targets. Interestingly, although both had irreconcilable objectives, they moved towards attaining an agreeable decision. Thus, the policy designers permitted Ontario government to carry on with its cape-and-trade system. This clearly tells that when partisan and affected parties are allowed to participate in policy decisions, despite their predefined objectives they could turn towards reaching an 'agreeable one', as far as it is equally quality and all participants may be satisfied and support its implementation.

According to the instrumental rationale of Glucker et al. (2013), the objective of the participatory processes "is to contribute to the identification and resolution of conflict before final decisions are made and thus facilitate project implementation" (p. 108). They pointed out that the pro-active resolution of conflict through public participation is in the interest of the policy designers because it helps to prevent opposition, controversies, and litigation and thus facilitates the translation of policies into actions. Unfortunately, in this case study, the policy designers did not use the participatory processes as a platform to resolve various conflicts, controversies, and disputes around the policy, even though they have been available as an option for over 2 decades. According to participatory scholars, this situation makes it difficult for the policy to be embraced and supported.

To IAP2, the second core value of participatory processes is: the process must communicate to the participants how their input influenced the final decision. The Ontario's experience contradicts this core value as a majority of the stakeholder groups indicated that the results of the consultation and how their inputs would influence the final decision were not communicated to them. Fortunately for a few participants, they witnessed their inputs in the final decision because they were reflected in the program design and regulations. In general, lack of feedback, biases, and inconsistencies of account in the participatory processes and outcomes made some participants conclude that their participation experience was negative, which can further breed 'conspiracy theories'. Hence, it is not surprising that one of the participants from the former Office of the Minister of Environment and Climate Change Ontario, expressed that:

> "There was not a big consultation, there wasn't consultation on the carbon pricing, there was not. It was a pretty perfunctory system. In the end, it basically came to a meeting in with BC or Alberta, where the Prime Minister basically laid down the law and he said to

> the provinces this is what's acceptable this wasn't acceptable…….The federal carbon pricing system was basically written by people who are not part of those processes, who had decided they prefer carbon tax and they wrote a report that the federal government convened some of these experts. The federal government went to try and get candidate for carbon tax system and started to realize largely pushback by labour, industries and environmental groups that it made no sense to go back and redo or change the systems that were in place that were working in the country"(Pp—2).

6.4. The Role of Public and Stakeholders Participation and Deliberation

In environmental decision-making and policymaking processes, stakeholders participation and deliberation have many benefits. For example, it helps to overcome the individually perceived rationality and to dissolve inconsistencies in order to produce collective preferences (Klinke, 2011).

> "The policy designers needed to make decisions around benchmarks and competitiveness. And ultimately they made several adjustments as the regulation was being drafted. And, I think it landed in a place where they had largely satisfied the interests and concerns of the industry stakeholders in terms of the design of the system, is not again not perfect, but it was clear that industries supported the overall process and analysis that went into the design of that system. So they designed a process for certainly the industrial emissions side that I think most industries are quite happy with " (B/I—1).

Based on the analysis, the findings confirm Klinke's dissolution of inconsistencies and production of collective preferences arguments. Some stakeholders groups like the businesses and industrial groups, ENGOs, experts, and academicians helped the design processes by contributing with the necessary information and some technical analysis, which in the end resolved some inconsistencies that emerged during the discussions, and later produced a result that was appreciated by the industries and the experts.

Furthermore, the public participation and deliberation play a significant role in environmental governance and policy decisionmaking. They ensured the effectiveness of decision-making, make the outcome of the process credible and legitimate, reduce conflict, increase the ease of

implementation, promote social learning, and enrich democracy – including by helping to ensure better decision-making and consolidating politicians' accountability to the public (Creighton, 2005; IAP2, 2008; Prendergast, 2000). Except for conflicts and tensions that were left unresolved, the deliberative and participatory processes played significant roles in the case of Ontario's public consultation. One of the interviewees from the ENGOs who was one of the program designers indicated that:

> "Highlight the trade-off so industry will ask for a weak or policy, so they don't have to spend money, the ENGOs and civil society will ask for more aggressive policy to impose more cost, and they will talk about the emission reductions. They will talk about the benefits of action, and government has to sit there and listen to all these views, these sides, and balance when they do their design. So the consultations revealed preferences of the people both for more policy, for less policy but it also lets government understand the outcomes and the implications of their design choices" (ENGOs —4).

Also, one of the bureaucrats from the federal government who designed the program commented on the vital role of the participatory processes:

> "One concrete example of how the policy was impacted by the input we received is the way we return revenue reflects a lot of what we heard. So there was clearly an understanding that households needed to be made whole; we needed it to be affordable. So the way that the revenue is returned from carbon pricing in the federal system where the majority of it goes back to households was reflecting of that" (G/B—1).

Clearly, from the results of the findings, the participatory processes offered a platform for communication between decision makers and the affected and partisan public, which at the end influenced the main output of the political system (final decision). However, what is striking is that, if the processes provided platforms to influence the final decision, why the inconsistences in their account of the processes among the various stakeholder groups that participated in the decision-making processes? Or perhaps those inconsistencies are due to their ideologies, how they

are able to recollect the process/ memory of the event, and their sociopolitical affiliation, just as some of the participants openly indicated? Like some of the participants expressed:

> "I think part of it the reason that I feel comfortable the way I was consulted and my fellow members were consulted and the input is that, we were all of the same party. We're not there the Federal Liberal Party, we were the Ontario Liberal Party. We had worked just as individuals to get them elected and so the doors were open to us, calling and talking to them. With the previous government, it was sometimes very difficult. They were in a different political party in power and it was difficult to get them to pay attention when we wanted to talk about climate change"(G/B—4).

> "I've known people in the federal government all my life, all my working life. I know them very well, many people are my friends so I've been involved very much in the informal processes and I've been involved in the formal processes both online or through teleconference or face to face"(ENGOs —3).

In all, the participatory processes played a key role in the decision-making processes that occurred in Ontario. The controversies and tensions that occurred are normal and functional in every decision-making processes. Regardless of the methods, effectiveness, and criteria the process used, it will still encounter some challenges from the various stakeholders because the needs of man are insatiable and the divergent interests as reflected in different party affiliations make it even difficult to arrive at a common goal. Importantly, it was imperative for the various relevant stakeholders to be contacted; climate change policy decision to be made; and targets be achieved gradually.

6.4.1. Consensus and Outcome

Empirical studies on public participation in decision-making demonstrate that the successful outcome of the processes lies within the results, which may be, among other deliverables, decision acceptability, consensus, mutual learning and improved understanding, and participants satisfaction (Abelson et al., 2003; Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Fiorino, 1990; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). On consensus, participatory and deliberative thinkers argue that consensus

is not always achievable, especially where participants hold opposing values, or fail to respect alternative standpoints (Chambers, 2012; DETR, 2000; Reed, 2008; Richards, et al., 2004). In this regard, stakeholders may prefer to advance their own objectives rather than seeking collectively agreed outcomes, especially in instances where the discussion in question challenges the vested interests and status quo. This was present in Ontario's case, especially with the government of Ontario's consultation with the federal government.

Evidently, the Ontario government's action and position during the engagement, demonstrate that they only preferred to advance their own objectives. The Ontario government had 'one message', which was "we've got a program; it meets your criteria, so for us don't include Ontario that was our message" (G/B—4). Ontario's 'one message' and position resonated well with the program designers and it was accepted. This confirms that both parties were only interested in furthering their own objectives rather than seeking collectively agreed outcomes or consensus. Practically, this implies that trade-offs are fundamental in environmental policy decisionmaking, where participatory and deliberative procedures are used (Reed, 2008). For some of the other stakeholders groups, even though the processes were not geared towards consensus building, they were fairly happy because some aspect of the final decision published by the federal government reflected the interests or showed the inputs they made.

Furthermore, per the analysis of the interviews and the documents review, consensus was never going to be an option for the policy designers given the position of some of the political parties and organizations even before carbon pricing policy was considered as a policy option. In all, the outcome was generally accepted by the majority of the stakeholders, especially the ENGOs and the typical business and industrial associations. Again, the federal government decided and never

wanted a consensus. This is analogous to Sevaly Sen's instructive level of participation, where participatory mechanisms exist but the final decision lies within the ambit of the decision makers (Sen, 2001). Given the political nature of the policy and its target, coupled with the fact that previous policies, plans, and programs have failed to meet emissions reduction targets, it was essential for the government to take actions that are vital but consensus may not be possible, particularly in a highly competitive political environment, where various political philosophies and ideologies interactively conflict.

6.4.2. Effectiveness of the Participatory and Deliberative Processes

Generally, participatory and deliberative processes are not employed in activities for no reasons. For every government or entity that uses them, there is a significant interest in determining whether or not their actions have been successful (Ashford and Rest, 1999). Public participation outcome and process have been used basically to determine whether a particular process was effective or not (Abelson et al., 2003; Ashford & Rest, 1999; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Webler et al., 2001).

In this study, there were contrasting views on whether or not the processes were effective although the majority of the interviewees stated that the processes were effective, but with inadequate transparency or clarity. This development further demonstrates how complex environmental decision-making could be. But, judging it with these criteria (outcome and process), it is clear that the effectiveness of the participatory processes met or satisfied more of the elements or conditions in the process (which are, among others, clarity of actions and objectives, information exchange and accessibility, early involvement of stakeholders, procedural justice, inclusiveness, mutual respects for participants, and diversity of representation) than the outcome criteria. That is, the participatory processes largely did not resolve the existing and emerging conflicts, and there was

no consensus, support, and acceptability with some of the political parties and organizations. In situations like this, it is difficult for a project or policy to see a meaningful implementation, supports in order to meet its targeted results, especially when there is a change in government, like we have experienced in Ontario.

Arguably, it is fair to say that there was a balance between the outcome and process effective criteria in the stakeholders engagements that occurred in Ontario. That is, the effectiveness of the process showed some equal components of both criteria. This study suggest that, looking at the power of the political parties and organizations, and the worth of their influence on the population, finding a balance between the two criteria should be the target while attempting to meet more of the outcome criteria. The reason is that when a participatory process does not meet more of the outcome process criteria, projects or policies usually face more vigorous opposition from the various stakeholders, especially the power holders (e.g. politicians). It is true that an effective process may lead to an effective outcome but in a polarized political environment, it is difficult to facilitate public participatory processes to meet all anticipated elements.

6.5. The Major Challenges: Political Controversies, and Conflicts during the Policy Formation Activities

Empirical research on participation reveals that the 1970s and 1980s period recorded several societal problems, tensions, and controversies, particularly environmental ones over developmental choices and programs. Environmental-related problems and tensions can arise over, *among other things,* management strategies, reforms, and environmental impacts from new development projects or existing ones. It has been argued that these problems are usually

scientifically complex, technically complicated, full of uncertainties (Daniels and Walker, 1995), and characterized with different concerned parties or stakeholders. Ontario's case is not different.

In this study, the findings indicate that before, during, and after the participatory processes there were (and are) some controversies and tensions which are economic but mostly political in nature. Studies report the same concerns in other jurisdictions and further demonstrate that some of these tensions and conflicting interests come up even during the participatory processes between program designers and stakeholders over scientific and technical approaches, skepticism over the performance of a tool, and adequate lay participation (Chompunth, 2011; Lee & Abbot, 2003).

Furthermore, in democratic settings, the statutory obligations of some stakeholders, mistrust in the system, and ideologies prevent some stakeholders from compromising with others on certain issues, so they come to the table with non-negotiable positions (Richards, et al., 2004). This phenomenon was present in Ontario's case because right from the beginning the "Conservative Party doesn't really believe in a tax on carbon" (G/B—4), and they were not ready to sacrifice their positions. In these situations, Mark Reed argues that "such limitations need to be identified and flagged up at the start of any participatory process….in order to avoid frustration and potential conflict" (Reed, 2008, p. 2423). Unfortunately, most identified concerns from the stakeholders groups, mainly political parties, were not addressed by the federal government. Considering this from the perspective of Arnstein (1969), there is a 'therapy' or 'manipulation' of the participation processes, meaning that there is no participation but rather curing and educating the participants, hence, the opposing political groups (for example, the Conservative Party) do not have any stake in maintaining structures or making them work (Pretty, 1995).

The various conflicting concerns and technicalities could have been addressed via intermediaries or independent bodies. Throughout the study, the significant roles of intermediaries in resolving existing tensions and emerging controversies and to advance policy acceptability and conflict resolution was underscored by most of the participants. The closure of the 'National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE)' was seen as a serious concern towards achieving policy support and acceptability of the carbon pricing policy in Canada. One of the participants indicated that:

> "I think if we had kept the National Roundtable, we would have been a lot better place too because they could have been a neutral and informed third party. And they could have analyzed the federal versus the provincial positions and interpreted it for the public" (G/B—5).

Clearly, in environmental governance or policy decisionmaking, the importance of intermediaries or independent bodies between the public and the policy developers in policy discourse should not be underestimated. The reasons are that they can enable cooperation between actors with complementary resources and interests; support the development and help define/breakdown technicalities or uncertainties on environmental/social issues; and advocate for new incentive regulations or policies.

In addition, participation rules can be structured to bridge conflicts between organizations and concerned parties. Wampler and McNulty (2011) argue that mitigation measures must be taken to curb the naturally occurring conflicts that emerge during any policy decision-making process. Similarly, in the Ontario stakeholders case, aside from the major political parties and organizations (e.g., Indigenous Organizations and Conservative Party), the majority of the participants were fairly happy with the outcome because the controversies and tensions relative to the technical and economic analysis were resolved during the engagement.

Importantly, before and throughout the processes, political tensions and policy controversies emanated from some political organizations (e.g., the Conservative Party), questioning the existence and actual impacts of climate change, the effectiveness of the 'already decided-on policy tool', the authority of the federal government to impose a carbon tax on their resource sectors, among others. However, in contrast to the popular notion that a participatory process is an avenue for conflict management (Creighton, 2005), the federal government didn't leverage on the participatory processes to resolve the long existing conflicts with the policy opposers (e.g., the Conservative Parties). The policy designers did not prioritize conflict management. The federal government made decisions so they can take the consequences as well.

The findings from the Political Parties and Organizations group indicate that: "For those provincial governments, the consultation process was always going to be in their minds insufficient or illegitimate as long as the decision of whether or not to impose the federal backstop was already decided by the federal government"(Pp—3). Consequently, when the Conservative Party formed the Ontario government, they "scraped the cap-and-trade because maybe not the entire reason but in part because of the way the federal government unilaterally imposed it on jurisdictions"(Pp—2). Naturally, people are quick in rebelling against systems and constantly displaying disregard when knowledge is foisted on them. It is, therefore, not surprising that some political parties are having difficulty accepting the policy, and they have therefore resorted to bastardizing it.

Importantly, at the national level, where some of the political disputes and tensions were resolved in Ottawa, it was basically via "hardball negotiations between the provincial governments and the federal government" (Pp—2). In policy decisions-making, hardball negotiations usually leave traces of uncertainty and unpredictability of an outcome because they are mostly deceptive and

manipulative. A study finds that in North American countries, hardball negotiations used in fulfilling one party's goals and objectives are often to the detriment of others, and drive parties apart even farther (Harvard Law School, 2021). Perhaps, these negotiation tactics and the unresolved tensions, controversies, and disputes have consequently affected the trust of some of the stakeholders including the general public, and to a greater extent, the policy's political support, acceptability, and legitimacy in Ontario and other provinces in Canada.

6.6. Mechanisms or Strategies of Improving Participatory and Deliberative Processes

From the perspectives of the participants themselves, the majority admitted that although there was low public participation in Ontario. In essence, the major parts of the processes were restricted to consultation and one-way flow of information, even though the outcome (price on carbon) reflected some of their input. Based on the analysis, the participatory process was not fully representative of the larger population but it was restricted to a "fairly small group of highly trained academics who are highly specialized in their research" (G/B—3). Unfortunately, interest group or advocacy politics has rarely proven to be participatory because their interests do not reflect the collective interests and preferences of the partisan and the affected public.

According to the interviewees, to ensure that the carbon pricing policy or any policy of such nature has the needed support, and is acceptable and legitimate in diverse societies in Ontario and Canada-wide, it is essentially imperative that program designers involve a broad range of groups, from the early stages, communicate the procedures and outcome of the processes in simple and plain terms. There should be more education and fulsome transparency about the processes and design. As well, instead of informing only, the process should be collaborative, political parties and

organizations should be widely and adequately consulted to incorporate their input, preference, and values, especially in a polarized political environment.

When their proposed mechanisms are compared to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 of this study, it is clear that the proposed strategies are consistent and reflective of what public participation practitioners, organizational bodies, and deliberative democracy theorists have been advocating as the best practices. To these practitioners, theorists, and organizations, a participatory process short of these practices or elements will lose its anticipated support, acceptability and sustainability, which will, in the end, affect the objectives for which it was designed. However, this research is of the view that, given the nature of the carbon pricing policy (e.g., payment of taxes, politics, and complexity of the instrument) and the intricacy of climate change itself (e.g. the understanding), it will be difficult to attribute its acceptability and support challenges entirely to the consultation processes. Naturally, human population do not want taxes on their activities, so regardless of the nature of the participatory and deliberative processes, the proposed policy will still meet stiff oppositions from some of the stakeholders so far as it entails payment.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1. Conclusion

The alarming rate of Canada's carbon emissions, coupled with failing to meet two independent emission reduction targets—the 1992 Rio target and 2005 the Kyoto target—has genuinely been an eminent concern for Canada's economy, environment, and, more importantly, its international climate change actions commitments. More recently, Canada, after the Paris Agreement in 2015, launched the Pan-Canadian Framework on Climate Change and Clean Growth (PCF) with a market-based instrument, carbon pricing policy, as its main policy tool. Like many other OECD countries, Canada prioritizes the carbon pricing policy tool as an efficient means to reach its 2030 emission reduction targets sustainably and to work to attain net-zero emissions by 2050. Since the 1980s, the government of Canada's climate actions and policy choices have always been politicized, drenched in environmental, economic, and political tensions and controversies by various organized groups and political parties/organizations—making it extremely difficult to have a nationally coordinated climate policy

Participatory and deliberative processes in environmental policy decision-making have been recognized and commended by scholars and practitioners as a vital means of achieving policy acceptability and legitimacy. Given the existing controversies and tensions about climate change actions, Canada's national carbon pricing policy development witnessed a collation, gathering, and consultation of various stakeholders, including policy experts/academicians, politicians and political organizations, bureaucrats and government officials, environmental NGOs, large emissions-related businesses, industries, and Indigenous organized groups, among others. However, contrarily to the much-applauded salient benefits of such processes, Canada's carbon pricing policy, which saw "the same" processes during its development, has been inundated with

"politicking" and political and economic controversies, tensions, and resistance, among others. The policy's introduction has been resisted and opposed by significant provinces, including Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba—leading to policy support challenges, and acceptability deficits in Ontario and Canada-wide. At the same time, given the importance of democracy in environmental governance, existing scholarly studies have paid insufficient attention to the role of stakeholders groups' consultation and engagement processes before and during the policy development.

Using, Ontario stakeholders participation and engagement as a case study, this research study analyzed the role of participatory and deliberative processes during the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy developing activities. Semi-structured interview questions were designed around the study's key objectives. Participants from stakeholders groups, for example, government/bureaucrats, political parties, academia/experts, ENGOs, and businesses/industries involved in the processes were interviewed.

The findings revealed that although some of the affected and partisan publics (who have knowledge on the existing and emerging issues on climate change and decarbonization) were consulted, the participatory processes were deficient. Of note, although the participation was very low, it still affected some aspects of the final policy decision. Again, deliberation, an integral practice in environmental governance and decision-making processes, was largely absent in Ontario. It must be emphasized that participatory governance in its strong form often includes elements of various procedures of deliberation, where participants do not only give advice but shape and even determine the actual policy outcome, either binding or non-binding (Fischer, 2000).

In Ontario, the participatory processes employed during the policy development processes were mainly restricted to "tokenism, therapy, and manipulation" (Arnstein, 1969). The processes did not adequately capture the input, preferences, and values of some major stakeholder groups (especially, political parties and organizations). And, this could probably be one of the reasons why these stakeholders have resorted to bastardizing the policy, and opposing its legitimacy and implementation. In addition, a good number of groups, organizations, and some key partners (e.g., Indigenous groups, consumer groups, racialized and marginalized communities, and youth groups) were either ignored during the processes or were not consulted. Consequently, they are mostly confused and are at the mercy of politicians, who have been exploiting their "vulnerabilities and uninformed minds" on the carbon pricing policy for electoral fortunes.

Furthermore, the participatory processes throughout the policy development processes lacked clarity and transparency, and they were executed within a limited time frame. Also, the policy designers and the stakeholders had different objectives and purposes, which were either complementing or conflicting with each other. Despite these, the processes were considered mostly effective because the final outcome met most of the consulted stakeholders' expectations. Additionally, although the outcome of the participatory processes was not a consensus-based one (which was not going to be possible in any form), some aspects of it reflected the preferences, interests, and values of some of the stakeholders groups. More importantly, the federal government allowed the Ontario government to continue with its existing cap-and-trade system. Despite the progress made with the process, it was unfortunate that, existing and emerging conflicts, tensions, controversies, disputes, and challenges between some of the stakeholders (mainly the political parties and organizations) were left unresolved during and after the participatory processes.

The working hypothesis for this study is that in environmental governance, policy decisions work effectively when diverse perspectives are well engaged, issues are clearly defined, and inputs considered. Democracy works poorly when citizens make judgments in isolation, lack empathy for others' standpoints, and passively partake in making decisions on various issues that affect them. Literature on public participation and environmental governance indicates that an alarmingly huge number of environmental policy initiatives have been stopped because of inadequate public and stakeholders acceptance and support along with controversies over the rationalization of a proposed policy choice (Gregory & Wellman, 2001).

To sum it all, even though in Ontario's case, acceptability and support for the policy have been "concerning" to both the policy designers/managers and the various stakeholders groups, which may affect the policy's ultimate target, it is vital to appreciate that several causes underlie policy effectiveness, acceptability, and implementation deficit of a policy: group interest politics; stakeholders interests and ideologies, low participation and non-deliberative approaches; non-collaborative approaches characterized by inadequate transparency and clarity of issues; exclusion of some key actors and partners; and, unresolved disputes, conflicts, and tensions. In Ontario's case, given the nature of the carbon pricing policy (e.g., payment of taxes, politics, and complexity of the instrument) and the intricacy of climate change itself (e.g. the understanding), it will be difficult to attribute the policy's acceptability and support challenges entirely to the consultation processes. Naturally, human population does not want taxes on their activities, so regardless of the nature of the participatory and deliberative processes, it will still meet stiff oppositions from some of the stakeholders so far as it entails payment. Again, given the various fundamental ideologies of the political parties/organizations, and their diverse/diverging approaches to climate change and

emissions reduction in Canada's climate history, no nationally coordinated policy decisions about climate change will be free from tensions, criticisms, objections, and controversies. Accordingly, it is prudent for the federal government to continue with the policy so far as it is meeting its intended purposes, while engaging the dissenting stakeholders since policymaking is an unending process.

7.2. Recommendations

Based on the analysis of the findings from the secondary and primary data collection, experiences from participatory and deliberative literature, the following recommendations have been suggested to guide future actions in a politically polarized environment. In most of the scientifically published participatory and deliberative literature, there is no one-size-fits-all approach for ideal participation and deliberation design. However, these approaches or strategies demonstrate the quality of the participatory process and the outcome of decisions. The quality of the processes generates outcomes that secure the public or common good and not the private good (Lee, 2016), which has the potential to be embraced and supported by all. These approaches should not be seen as a silver bullet, but they could serve as a yardstick to assess other participatory and deliberative practices in future projects to achieve support and acceptability.

7.2.1. Publicity and Openness

In developing a policy, policy facilitators and designers' participatory approaches to such policy decisions should be well publicized and opened to the public (of all kinds) to insure democratic accountability (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Achieving openness means that every stage of the decision-making process (e.g., the policy proposal, its alternatives, pros and cons, technical and economic analysis of the benchmarks) is deliberative. Without openness, deliberations will be

used as a token exercise to pacify dissenting groups, only after vital decisions have been made (Grogan & Gusmano, 2005). Given the politicized nature of the policy, openness to conflicting assertions and opinions expressed by some of the stakeholder (mostly political parties and Indigenous communities) would have increased the credibility of the final decision and encourage an active civil society.

Furthermore, it is expected that the public nature of decisions generates outcomes that are fair and reasonable. Hence, issues within democracy should be made public and be subjected to public scrutiny via public debate. Publicity of deliberations both broadens participation and allows the public to hold various stakeholders and their respective participants accountable for the reasoning and moral justifications behind the choice of the carbon policy. This, if it is done, will significantly impact the perceived legitimacy and policy proposals in Ontario and Canada-wide.

Transparency and accountability are crucial in every public policy decision-making process.
Bad governance, lack of transparency, and accountability are key factors detrimental to the effectiveness of deliberative and participatory processes. Stakeholders in Ontario and Canada at large want the accountability from the process; that is, they want their inputs to be considered in decisions related to them. When their input is seen as considered or is reflected in the final decision, they will see the decision as their own and lead its implementation processes. The ENGOs, for example, were very happy with the policy because they felt their input was fully captured in the outcome. Some government officials were "quite pleased that the federal government moved ahead with the tax" (G/B—4). Also, when commitment to transparency is seen and practiced, it permits outsiders and even dissenters to give informed and authentic consent to the processes and decisions (Raphael & Karpowitz, 2013). In instances where openness is not completely met (e.g., the

economic and technical analysis of the benchmarks), program designers or facilitators should clearly acknowledge with reasons.

7.2.2. Representative, Inclusion, and Diversity

Going forward, the decision-making process should be inclusive and represented by the diverse stakeholders (partisan, affected, and the general public if possible) in Ontario and Canada. Given the nature of environmental issues, their policy decision-making processes should not be limited to group interest politics. Achieving a perfectly inclusive body is always difficult, however, there are always more perspectives or major positions that could be included in a process (Grogan, 2005). The inclusion should reflect a concerted and collaborative effort to involve groups that are interested and are predictably marginalized from formal political decision-making or systemic marginalization. All inessential barriers of any kind to deliberation in Ontario should be removed. Democratic decisions, if they demonstrate representativeness, inclusion, and diversity, are normatively legitimate and increase the acceptance of decisions, thus improving compliance and implementation on the ground.

Representativeness is a means to ensure greater citizen involvement. Program designers should not restrict deliberative and participatory procedures to group interest and advocacy politics because we cannot assume that their single ideas and opinions represent the larger population's views. Of course, it is true that it is an empirical impossibility to have all citizens meet together and deliberate together, actually or virtually, particularly if debates are to be inclusive and have depth. Also, it is true that the nature of collective-action problems means that not all affected or partisan public want to participate directly in decision-making (Elstub 2009). Accordingly, when a proportional representation of groups in Ontario becomes challenging to achieve or is not

desirable, the full range of views should be represented in the deliberation to avoid misrepresentation and unfairness of the entire processes. As John Parkinson stated, "so long as group representatives are present in proportion to their numerical strength, identities, and views, which command the allegiance of many will always dominate those of the few, regardless of the reasonableness of those views" (Parkinson, 2003, p. 189).

7.2.3. Education and Information

When dealing with environmental issues such as climate change and emissions, stakeholders' access to reasonably precise information and education is very important. Good deliberative and participatory procedures are also based on broad access to information and a competent process ensures that appropriate knowledge and understanding of the issue is achieved through access to information and the interpretation of the information (Webler, 1995).

Going forward, the federal government should educate the stakeholders as well as the public on issues and offer equal access to information such as definitions, relevant scientific/lay knowledges about climate change, dangers of pollution, and models used by other jurisdictions (countries) in solving similar problems. Again, the federal government should offer pertinent information to the public and stakeholders about the issue to be decided; education should be provided by the education system of the country. As well, effect of the issues (such as impacts of climate change) should be presented in visuals to enable the participants, stakeholders groups and the general public appreciate and challenge the authenticity of claims (if needed). The quality of input obtained underscores the quality of information and education received by rather than provided to participants in Ontario and other provinces in Canada (Abelson et al., 2003). Insufficient information affects participants' comprehension and communication ability in the process and

decreases the likelihood of conformity. For example in Canada, due to the absence of adequate education and information on climate change issues, policy options, and policy choice, currently "the government of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario are just giving completely misleading information to the public" (G/B—3). Uninformed minds are easily and always manipulated.

7.2.4. Communication and Clarity of Issues

Most environmental problems are multifaceted, undefined, spread over large spatial and temporal scales and may have irreversible consequences. Policy decision-making to address such problems must be informed by a plurality of perspectives in Ontario and Canada at large. The definition of the problems (say: climate change) must be shared by the relevant stakeholders and organized groups in Ontario and Canada wide. This is because shared definition of problems advances a sense of belonging, civic responsibility, and individual behavioural change (Richards, et al., 2004).

Again, the pros and cons of the problems should be communicated clearly and in languages understandable to all concerned parties. The federal government should employ public participation in a two-way dialogue and communication approach rather than a presentation of arguments and information for and against the policy. The role and influence of the public in the participation process should be clear in advance before the forum or discussion is conducted. Furthermore, issues need to be clearly framed and communicated before the processes commence. It was interesting to know that even some of the stakeholders did not understand the differences between cap-and-trade and carbon tax.

> "In Ontario and certainly in Alberta carbon pricing policies are in place but people didn't really understand, people don't widely understand it. The cap-and-trade system is even worse people don't understand it. People don't understand carbon pricing like a carbon tax also. And for good reason, I hardly understand it like it is" (ENGOs—2).

Communication should be backed with facts and figures in a visualized way. Clear definitions of issues and policy choices communicatively achieved can overcome any potential disintegration and stratification that characterize today's governance and social life (Abelson et al., 2003; Cohen, 1997a). Communicating the value of these public benefits of the policy is also critical—public confusion over carbon pricing in Ontario and Canada wide is common, so the federal government should adopt a strategy that makes the tangible benefits of the policy clear to the general public. If the federal government had communicated the surge in carbon emissions, its impact, and policy choice in a clear and plain manner, it would have made the affected and partisan public well informed—making them less susceptible to exploitation for political gains.

7.2.5. Rationally Motivated Consensus, Majoritarian Decision, and Buy-in

During policy making decisions, the federal government should aspire to reach a rationally motivated consensus with the stakeholders, and reflect an understandably informed decision, if that is achievable. In political decisions, consensus should not be the ultimate aim because it will be hard to arrive at it. Stakeholders are anticipated to pursue their individual interests; however, during the process, when agreement is achievable or anything near it becomes a challenge majoritarian decisionmaking should be used (Cohen, 2007). When the majority decision is used, the federal government should inform the public (of all kinds) via the media about the outcome of decisions borne out of the majoritarian decision, and must reflect the decisions taken during the participatory process. If the outcome of the Ontario stakeholders consultation were made known, it would have deepen the credibility and legitimacy of the process. Considering the politically sensitive nature of climate policies, the outcome of the majority decision must be binding also, for a period of time to prevent any future disturbance, agitations, and possible cancellation, like we

have experienced with the termination of the cap-and-trade system by the Conservative government when they came to power in 2018. A fair procedure of majority rule makes democratic decisions legitimate (Estlund, 1997).

In democratic societies like Canada's, conflict is functional and it should be seen as an integral piece of every public policy decision-making process. However, because we cannot be sure of the magnitude of its adverse impact especially in the current political dispensation, policy designers and managers should structure participation rules to bridge existing and potential conflicts between stakeholders and possibly between the policy designers. Also, conflict mitigation measures should be taken to curb the potential and the naturally occurring conflicts. This could be identifying the potential risks of compromising your stands and accommodating other views (like that of the Conservatives and Indigenous organizations or groups), debating, and creating awareness of the circumstances in which conflicts can arise.

7.3. Limitation of the Research Findings

This thesis aimed at looking at the role of public and stakeholder participation during the development of the carbon pricing policy instrument in Canada. However, all relevant stakeholder groups partook in the research except the lead and the main opposer, the provincial Progressive Conservative Party, in Ontario. Their position of not getting involved was 'concerning' to the researcher and makes it crucial to question their exact views on the policy, claims, and reasons for not supporting but rather bastardizing the policy instrument. Also, it was disturbing to the researcher because they missed opportunities to learn more and to appreciate diverse ideas on the policy instrument. Generally, in as much as their absence probably did not affect the study's objectives and its logical conclusion, their ideas may have given this research a true picture of their

perspectives on the policy instrument and the participatory processes, which would have, to a greater extent, been critical to the study's general standing and its proposition for future research consideration.

7.4. Future Research Direction

The following has been recommended for future research.

1. Canada's efforts to have a nationally coordinated climate change or GHG reduction regulations and policies have been confronted with controversies, tensions, among others, from various stakeholders across the country. Accordingly, a research into how Canadian provinces can achieve unity in solving wicked problems like the GHG emissions is crucial in present academic discourse on energy and sustainable transitions.

2. Political parties or organizations and civil society organizations are vehicles for transformational agendas and development, ensuring social order and sustainability. Yet, most usually drag their feet and remain unmotivated in taking part in policy development even when opportunities are presented to them. Therefore, researchers should also consider looking at the underlying factors that prevented key stakeholders, such as political opposition parties or organizations, from participating in national environmental policy development.

3. Again, future researchers should as well refer to a higher sample of respondents, or look into the reasons why other Canadian provinces such as Saskatchewan or Alberta opposed the federal carbon pricing policy.

4. Further research should be conducted on why policy designers/managers do not organize properly the consultation process on environmental issues given the divergent interests.

5. The policy also requires high levels of scientific knowledge about climate change, dangers of pollution, and models used by other jurisdictions (countries) to solve the problem. Sweden, for instance, has a very efficient carbon pricing policy but with a huge carbon price ($4000/ton of emissions) targeting the big polluters. The high carbon price has acted as a strong incentive for big polluters to introduce technical innovation to avoid the high carbon price. Why such a high price was not considered a valid option by the Canadian government should be looked at by future researchers.

6. The interviewees also acknowledged the influence of the US in Canada's public policies throughout the study. The US's influence emerged as a critical factor in ensuring policy legitimacy and acceptability. Further research should look at how US's extraterritorial jurisdiction and influence in Canada's environmental governance and the role they can play in ensuring acceptability and support for climate change activities and policies.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Schedule for Program Managers/ Designers/Facilitators

A. Participant information and background questions

1. Which group do you belong or best associate yourself with?
   a. Political parties
   b. Academia
   c. Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations
   d. Government
   e. Industries/ Businesses
   f. Other(please specify)._____.
2. What role did you play in the process:
   a. Participant
   b. Program designers/ managers/ facilitator
   c. Other…….

B. General questions on participant and program designers/managers' knowledge on carbon emissions, participation and deliberation in policy making process

1. Could you tell me about your general view of carbon emissions in Canada? How can Canada best meets its target of cutting GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030?
2. Have you had experiences with public participation processes, such as in a public hearing, consensus conference, public opinion surveys, for any environmental organization or any environmental project? What was your general assessment of that process?

C. The design and effectiveness of public participation and deliberation

This section looks at the design and the effectiveness of public participation and deliberation. The questions are designed in line with major objectives and the questions the research attempts to achieve and answer. These questionnaires are structured in a way that maybe appropriate for program designers/managers and participants.

1. Could you please start by describing the participation and deliberative process for the development of the carbon pricing policy to me?
2. What were the modalities of the process, and how effective were they?
3. What role did the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process play during the carbon pricing developing activities?
4. Were all the relevant stakeholders present, what stakeholders or groups were neglected? How were the participants recruited? Did you take into consideration geographic, demographic or political elements?

5. What participatory and deliberative methods (e.g. hearing, roundtable, consensus conference, public opinion surveys, deliberative polls, voting, etc.) did you employ and where in Ontario did the process occur? And how effective was it or were they?
6. What was the purpose and objective (s) of engaging the public and stakeholders during the formation of the policy, and how were these clearly stated or interpretated to the participants?
7. How was the participatory and deliberative process fair and transparent in terms of time, review, share, accessibility and distribution of relevant information?
8. What was the outcome of the participatory and deliberative process?
9. Were there any major challenges and political controversies, tensions, and conflicts between the Federal Government and the Ontario Government regarding the instrument during its development? If yes, what were they, why did those controversies, tensions, disputes arise and how were they resolved?
10. Could you please describe how consensus was reached among the participants on the final documents?
11. What were the pros and cons of the participatory and deliberative process?
12. Why is the carbon pricing policy having acceptability challenges in Canada, especially in Ontario, and how could the recent political controversies about the policy instrument be resolved?

D. Policy Recommendation

1. How do you think this type of public participation and deliberative process could be improved?
2. According to you, in general, how best can effective participatory and deliberative procedures be ensured/achieved to enhance public acceptability and legitimacy ?
3. Are there any specific lessons about involving people in environmental decision-making that you would like the Government to take from this consultation?
4. Is there anything else you would like to say about the public engagement process that we have not covered?

Appendix B: Interview Schedule for Participants (Stakeholder groups).

A. Participant information and background questions

1. Which group do you belong or best associate yourself with?
   a. Political parties
   b. Academia
   c. Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations
   d. Government
   e. Industries/ Businesses
   f. Other(please specify)._____.
2. 'What role did you play in the process:
   a. Participant
   b. Program designers/ managers/ facilitator

B. General questions on participant and program designers/managers' knowledge on carbon emissions, participation and deliberation in policy making process

1. Could you tell me about your general view of carbon emissions in Canada? How can Canada best meets its target of cutting GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030?
2. Have you had experiences with public participation processes, such as in a public hearing, consensus conference, public opinion surveys, for any environmental organization or any environmental project? What was your general assessment of that process?

C. The design and effectiveness of public participation and deliberation

This section looks at the design and the effectiveness of public participation and deliberation. The questions are designed in line with major objectives and the questions the research attempts to achieve and answer. These questionnaires are structured in a way that maybe appropriate for program designers/managers and participants.

1. Could you please start by describing the participation and deliberative process for the development of the carbon pricing policy to me?
2. What were the modalities of the process, and how effective were they?
3. What role did the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process play during the carbon pricing developing activities?
4. Were all the relevant stakeholders present, what stakeholders or groups were neglected? How were the participants recruited? Did you take into consideration geographic, demographic or political elements?

5. What participatory and deliberative methods (e.g. hearing, roundtable, consensus conference, public opinion surveys, deliberative polls, voting, etc.) did you employ and where in Ontario did the process occur? And how effective was it or were they?
6. What was the purpose and objective (s) of engaging the public and stakeholders during the formation of the policy, and how were these clearly stated or interpretated to the participants?
7. How was the participatory and deliberative process fair and transparent in terms of time, review, share, accessibility and distribution of relevant information?
8. What was the outcome of the participatory and deliberative process?
9. Were there any major challenges and political controversies, tensions, and conflicts between the Federal Government and the Ontario Government regarding the instrument during its development? If yes, what were they, why did those controversies, tensions, disputes arise and how were they resolved?
10. Could you please describe how consensus was reached among the participants on the final documents?
11. What were the pros and cons of the participatory and deliberative process?
12. Why is the carbon pricing policy having acceptability challenges in Canada, especially in Ontario, and how could the recent political controversies about the policy instrument be resolved?

D. Policy Recommendation

1. How do you think this type of public participation and deliberative process could be improved?
2. According to you, in general, how best can effective participatory and deliberative procedures be ensured/achieved to enhance public acceptability and legitimacy ?
3. Are there any specific lessons about involving people in environmental decision-making that you would like the Government to take from this consultation?
4. Is there anything else you would like to say about the public engagement process that we have not covered?

Appendix C: Research Information Form.

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Research Project: ***"The Politics of Carbon Pricing in Canada: Analysis of the Role of the Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberations—The Case Of Ontario Province"***

Researcher: Mr. Ignatius Yankey, School of Environment and Science, Grenfell Campus, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 20 University Drive, Corner Brook NL, A2H 5G4, Canada. ikyankey@grenfell.mun.ca

Supervisor(s): Dr. Andreas Klinke, School of Science and the Environment/Environmental Policy Institute. aklinke@grenfell.mun.ca

This letter is an invitation to participate voluntarily as a virtual interview participant in a project entitled, *"The Politics of Carbon Pricing in Canada: Analysis of the Role of the Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberations—The Case Of Ontario Province.*" The goal of this research is to analyze the role of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process between the Government of Ontario and the Federal Government of Canada concerning the Carbon Pricing developing activities and the extent of it. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What was the role of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process between the Government of Ontario and the Federal Government of Canada concerning the Carbon Pricing developing activities and the extent of it; (2) What were the modalities of public and stakeholders participation and the deliberative process between the Government of Ontario and the Federal Government of Canada concerning the Carbon Pricing ; (3) What was the purpose and objective (s) of engaging the public and stakeholders during the policy formation?; (4) What were the major challenges and political controversies, tensions, and conflicts between the Government of Ontario and the Federal Government during the policy formation?; and (5) What mechanisms or strategies could be used to improve public participation and deliberative process in order to enhance the policy's acceptability and legitimacy?

This project is a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Environmental Policy.

You are being asked to voluntarily participate in an interview. This interview will take approximately -40-60 minutes to complete at a mutually agreed upon time and by virtual communication application. The anticipated benefits of this project will be the creation of a new knowledge on how government, environment, climate, and energy related organizations can ensure and enhance effective participatory and deliberative processes in policy formulation in order to enhance policy acceptability and legitimacy. Your participation in this interview is entirely

voluntary and there will be no negative consequences if you refuse to participate in or withdraw from the interview, or if you decline to answer certain questions. Your name will not appear in any form, and your comments or direct quotations will be assigned to numbers (i.e. P1 for a member of the participant and D1 for program managers, or designers, etc.).

All materials generated from this interview will be kept in a secure location by the researcher for a minimum of 5 years as required by Memorial University's policy on Integrity in Scholarly Research. Unless indicated otherwise your information will only be reviewed my supervisor who has signed confidentiality agreements, and only with your permission. The results of this research maybe published in standard academic outlets such as books and journals, as well as in policy briefs and reports and in school presentations and reports.

The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board (GC-REB) and found to be in compliance with Memorial University's ethics policy. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the GC-REB at gcethics@grenfell.mun.ca. or by telephone at (709) 639-2399.
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at (709) 215-6565 or by email at ikyankey@grenfell.mun.ca

Thank you for your assistance with this project.

Yours Sincerely,

Ignatius K. Yankey
MAEP Student
Environmental Policy Institute
Grenfell Campus, Memorial University

GRENFELL CAMPUS, MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
20 University Drive Corner Brook, NL, Canada, A2H 5G4
Tel: 709 637 6200 Fax: 709 639 8125
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Appendix D: Ethics Approval

GRENFELL CAMPUS | MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
Research Ethics Board
University Drive, Corner Brook, NL Canada A2H 5G4
Tel: 709-639-2399 Fax: (709) 637-2885 http://www.grenfell.mun.ca/research-ethics-board

December 17, 2020

Reference number: **20211085**

Dear Ignatius Yankey,

Thank you for your application for ethical clearance for your proposal ***THE POLITICS OF CARBON PRICING IN CANADA: ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATIONS—THE CASE OF ONTARIO PROVINCE***. The Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board (GC-REB) has reviewed your application and finds this application in ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines.

Your approval for this project expires on December 17, 2021. To remain in compliance with Article 6.14 (Continuing Research Ethics Review) of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethics in Human Research (TCPS2), should your project continue past that date, you are required to renew your ethics approval before that time. As well, please note that any changes to the proposed study will need to be cleared by the GC-REB first.

The Board wishes you success with your research.

Best wishes,

John Bodner, Ph.D., Chair

IMPORTANT REMINDERS – PLEASE READ:

Important Notice regarding COVID-19: As the situation changes and develops with COVD-19, it is up to the PI to ensure that the research team remains in compliance with Memorial's current status on in-person data collection. You can follow information on the current status of policy here: https://www.mun.ca/research/.

Appendix E: Consent Form

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Informed Consent Form (Interview)

You are invited to take part in a research project entitled *"The Politics of Carbon Pricing in Canada: Analysis of the Role of the Public and Stakeholder Participation and Deliberations—The Case Of Ontario Province"*

Researcher: Mr. Ignatius Yankey, School of Environment and Science, Grenfell Campus, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 20 University Drive, Corner Brook NL, A2H 5G4, Canada. ikyankey@grenfell.mun.ca
Supervisor(s): Dr. Andreas Klinke, School of Science and the Environment/Environmental Policy Institute. aklinke@grenfell.mun.ca

This form is part of the process of informed consent. It will provide you some basic information about the research and about what your participation will involve. Also, it describes your right to withdraw from the study at any time. In order to decide whether you wish to participate in this research study, you should fully understand about its risks and benefits to be able to make an informed decision. This is the informed consent process. Take time to read this carefully and to understand the information given to you. Please contact the researcher, Mr. Ignatius Yankey, if you have any questions about the study or for more information not included here before you consent. It is entirely up to you to decide whether to take part in this research. If you choose not to take part in this research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it has started, there will be **no negative** consequences for you, now or in the future.

Introduction: I am a graduate student with the Environmental Policy Institute at Grenfell Campus of Memorial University, Newfoundland. As required of my program, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. Andreas Klinke. The goal of this research is to analyze the role of the public and stakeholder participation and the deliberative process between the Government of Ontario and the Federal Government of Canada concerning the Carbon Pricing developing activities and the extent of it.

Purpose of the Study: This research project attempts to know why the carbon pricing policy is having acceptability and legitimacy deficit despite the public and stakeholders engagement and consultation during the policy developing activities of the instrument. These deficits bring the model of public and stakeholders participation to question. Going forward, how can we ensure effective public participation and deliberative process, and enhance the acceptability and legitimacy of the policy instrument**s?**

What You Will be asked to do in the research: You will be asked to participate in an individual, semi-structured interview lasting approximately 40-60 minutes. Your answers will be recorded using an audio recorder and in the form of summarized, written notes. You may choose to skip any question you are not comfortable with. The questions will ask about your previous experiences with public and stakeholders participation concerning the carbon policy instrument in Ontario and about your perspectives on carbon emissions as well as on how public participation on policy making can be improved to ensure policy acceptability and legitimacy

Withdrawal from the study: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the nature of the ongoing relationship you may have with the researcher, nor the nature of your relationship with Memorial University either now, or in the future. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible.

Possible benefits: This project has potential benefits for all government, environment, climate and energy related organizations and stakeholders as it informs the practice of public and stakeholders consultation, and to enhance effective policy formulation. An effective public and stakeholders participation process can bring about more trust, political/public acceptability and policy legitimacy.

Possible risks: Every effort has been put into avoiding potential risks to participants and their organizations in this research. Some questions relate to the role you played during the stakeholder consultation and engagement, and your suggestions for ensuring acceptable and legitimate policy. No identifiable information about you, your project or organization will be shared.

Confidentiality and Storage of Data: All information you supply during the interview will be held in confidence and your name will not appear in any written report or publication of the research. Your answers will be recorded (using an audio recorder) and compiled in a written report. Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility and only the researcher and co-researchers will have access to this information. The data will be kept for 5 years after the end of the project, and will subsequently be destroyed.
Reporting of Results: The collected data will be used for my thesis paper. It will also be used in academic journal articles and conference presentations. In these publications and reports, names will not be used in direct quotations, but rather an assigned number will be used (i.e. F1 for facilitators, P1 for member of the participant, and D1 for program managers or designers etc.).
Sharing of results: Results from this study will be shared by a presentation to be announced once the data has been analyzed. More details can also be obtained by contacting the researcher.
Questions about the research? If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact the Principal researcher Mr. Ignatius Yankey by telephone at (709) 215-6565 or by e-mail (ikyankey@grenfell.mun.ca) or the supervisor Dr. Andreas Klinke, aklinke@grenfell.mun.ca.

GC-REB Ethics Approval: The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Grenfell Campus-Research Ethics Board and found to be in compliance with Memorial University's ethics policy (GC-REB File #: 20201220). If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the GC-REB through the Grenfell Research Office (GCREB@grenfell.mun.ca) or by calling (709) 639-2399.

Consent: Your signature on this form means that:

- ☐ You have read the information about the research.
- ☐ You have been able to ask questions about this study.
- ☐ You are satisfied with the answers to all your questions.
- ☐ You understand what the study is about and what you will be doing.
- ☐ You understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason, and that doing so will not affect you now or in the future.
- ☐ You understand that any data collected from you up to the point of your withdrawal will be destroyed.

If you sign this form, you do not give up your legal rights and do not release the researchers from their professional responsibilities. ***(Please check all that apply)***

- ☐ I have read what this study is about and understood the risks and benefits. I have had adequate time to think about this and had the opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered.
- ☐ I agree to participate in the research project understanding the risks and contributions of my participation, that my participation is voluntary, and that I may end my participation at any time.
- ☐ I agree to be audio-recorded during the interview/focus group
- ☐ I do not agree to be audio-recorded during the interview/focus group
- ☐

_____ **Date** _____
Participant

_____ **Date** _____
Researcher

Keep a copy of this consent form for your record. A copy will be kept by the researcher.

GRENFELL CAMPUS, MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
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Appendix F: Initial Recruiting Email

INITIAL RECRUITMENT LETTER

Dear …….

I hope you and your hardworking team are doing well. First of all, let me register my pleasure and excitement in writing to you. I am motivated and extremely inspired each time I read any thought-provoking release or news from your office/secretariat. Also, I recognize and appreciate the role of your office in Canada's developmental and transformational agenda.

My name is Ignatius Yankey, and I am a graduate student with the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI) of Memorial University-Grenfell Campus. I am writing my **Master of Arts Research Thesis** under the supervision of Dr. Andreas Klinke, who is the Director of EPI, and the Chairman of the Masters of Art in the EPI program.

[*Name of a person*] I am working on a research project on the Politics of Carbon Pricing Policy Development and the Role of Stakeholders and Public participation using Ontario as case a study. If you are interested, I am wondering if you could partake in the **Research Interview** aspect of my thesis. I would also be glad if your high office could also link me to an authority(ies) who was involved in the Carbon Pricing Policy Development activities to share his/her experience with me. The participants identity would remain anonymous in the findings.

I hope your busy schedule will not deny me this wonderful opportunity. However, respectfully, the final decision about participation is yours.

I hope to hear from you positively. Thank you for your assistance with this project.

Yours Sincerely,

Ignatius K. Yankey
MAEP Student
Environmental Policy Institute
Grenfell Campus, Memorial University