“A Single White Line Running Through a Web of Blackness”:
Racism’s Occlusion from the Anti-Tom Novel to Charlottesville

by © David Mitterauer submitted
to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts at the English Department
Memorial University of Newfoundland

August 2019
St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador
Snowflake in the diving glow
Contemplating the waves over the ground
A grimace of fear and awe
Spreading in the crowd around
Amazing, unearthly
The figure’s face on the temple is me

—“Veridical Paradox,” Delusion Squared
Abstract

This MA thesis discusses how romance as a literary form makes the Anti-Tom novel a malleable rhetorical vehicle to carry white supremacist ideology. Drawing on an interdisciplinary framework of postcolonial theory and race studies, the thesis analyzes antebellum Anti-Tom novels (Sarah J. Hale’s Liberia [1853]; Caroline Lee Hentz’s The Planter’s Northern Bride [1854]; and Charles Jacobs Peterson’s The Cabin and Parlor [1852]) and expands the genre’s definition to include Thomas Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots (1902) and contemporary white-supremacist science fictions (William Luther Pierce’s The Turner Diaries [1978]; Ellen Williams’ Bedford: A World Vision [2000]; and Ward Kendall’s Hold Back This Day [2001]). The primary concerns of this thesis are to understand how the American slaveholding past signifies in the present political moment, to understand why the removal of the General Robert E. Lee statue catalyzed the violent riots in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, and to understand the affective preconditions Donald J. Trump created for this violence through racist rhetoric. The thesis argues that the pastoral romance changes in each new context. In the antebellum Anti-Tom novel it is tied to an idealized white plantocratic identity that is juxtaposed with the specter of black insurrection. In Dixon, open violence becomes a constitutive part. In the science fictions, violence becomes an intrinsic component of whiteness itself. The exploration permits inter alia an understanding of how Civil-War monuments can be detached from their historical contexts and repurposed for a current political movement. The thesis calls for opening a serious inquiry by legislators, academics, and teachers into white-supremacist literature rather than eschewing white-supremacist artefacts for fear of radicalization (or out of revulsion). It is in literature that white-supremacist ideologues communicate with a wider public by abandoning the obscurity of white-supremacist sophistry and drawing on existing literary traditions.
Acknowledgements

I respectfully acknowledge the territory in which I attended this program and wrote this thesis as the ancestral homelands of the Beothuk, and the island of Newfoundland as the ancestral homelands of the Mi’kmaw and Beothuk. I would also like to recognize the Inuit of Nunatsiavut and NunatuKavut and the Innu of Nitassinan, and their ancestors, as the original people of Labrador. I strive for respectful relationships with all the peoples of this province as we search for collective healing and true reconciliation, and honor this beautiful land together.

I would like to thank:

Andrew Loman, for being a perspicacious supervisor and sagacious mentor; for taming this monster of a thesis together with me; and for all the invaluable help and advice that far exceeded his supervisory obligations.

My examiners Jason Haslam at Dalhousie University and Christopher Lockett at Memorial University of Newfoundland for their lucid observations and exceptionally helpful criticism.

My parents, for the boundless support and understanding despite the long silences across the ocean.

Miranda, for your unwavering support, understanding, and patience; for being an integral part of this crazy duo; and for all the adventures that await.

Samuel, Patrick, Reinhold, Max & Annabelle, Raphael, Verena, Tina, Courtnee, Andreas, and Katharina, for accompanying me wherever I go—if not in person, then in spirit.
Table of Contents

“Making Arrows out of Pointed Words”—An Introduction to Hate ..........................1
Chapter 1: The Chasm of 0.01%: Empire, Emancipation, and Extremism .............15
Chapter 2: “The Comparatively Immaterial Question of Property”: The Pastoral
Plantation and the Fear of Insurrection ..........................................................48
Chapter 3: “Blackened Stripes and Stars”: Romancing the Invisible Empire ............68
Chapter 4: “The Mischievous Isms”: Monuments for the Future ............................88
Conclusion: America’s “Own Inseparable Shadow” ..........................................117
Works Cited .......................................................................................................127
While the election of Donald John Trump to the presidency of the United States of America certainly was the most surprising electoral outcome of 2016, it was far from the only one: German state elections were crashed by the anti-immigrationist Alt-Right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD);¹ Austria voted in a second election round with Dr. Alexander Van Der Bellen the country’s first Green Party president into office,² beating the far-right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs’ candidate Norbert Hofer only by a slim margin; and Great Britain voted to leave the European Union,³ bewitched by the arguments of its principal advocate, the far-right UK Independence Party. It was a year in which it was difficult for even the most politically oblivious not to notice “so characteristic a feature of our age” as the political pendulum’s swing towards the right in the ‘enlightened’ West. While the European Alt-Right largely gravitates towards immigration matters, its American counterpart draws on a long history of oppression of people of mixed or ‘non-white’ ancestry, with practices and rhetoric distinct from the European right that require a reading with a focus on America’s past.

¹ For example, the AfD became the second strongest party in Saxony-Anhalt.
² However, the presidential election could not avert the right seizing control in parliament, when, in 2017, Sebastian Kurz’ new Österreichische Volkspartei entered into a coalition with the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, leading to the first conservative–populist government since 2005, when a similar configuration imploded and split the FPÖ into two weaker splinter groups. Despite scandals catapulting Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache out of office and a no-confidence vote by parliament eliminating Kurz as Chancellor, the 2019 European elections, which took place right after the disintegration of government, indicate that neither party has significantly lost in popularity.
³ All the while, the EU itself appears more and more like a cabal for building a continental fortress rather than an alliance for rebuilding from fascism’s self-destructiveness and preventing the rekindling of its still red-hot embers through community and understanding—its initial aims in 1958.
Out of many possible thesis topics, I chose the Anti-Tom novel and its epigones because, in my preliminary research, I found that this nearly forgotten genre of pro-slavery narrative had surprising contemporary currency, given the present political moment of Trump’s election and the Charlottesville riots. As I began reading these novels at length, they seemed increasingly instructive to anyone trying to understand the Imaginary of American nationhood and the recent increase of hate crimes. America’s slaveholding past and the bellicose discourse that governed it reverberate strongly in present politics. Witness the magnetizing effect that a protest against the removal of a Confederate statue had for the newly-emerged American “Alt-Right.” In this context, one should also be astutely aware of how the present fad to obsess over Trumpian ‘alternative facts’ and online flat-earth cultists reaches back to, and possibly even further than, the antebellum ‘post-truth’ moment of “The South As It Really Is.” Political debate, mixed with a generous dash of

---

4 The Unite the Right rally was organized by Jason Kessler, a white nationalist with “Alt-Right” affiliations. In a press conference, he claimed that the motivation to “organize this event is precisely because of the hyperbolic and violent rhetoric not only from the media but members of [Showing Up for Racial Justice], Antifa and Black Lives Matter” (“Unite the Right Press Conference” 0:20-0:38) as a response to “anti-white” violence at a Ku Klux Klan rally in Charlottesville at the Lee statue a month before Unite the Right. In this protest, fifty KKK members were outnumbered by an estimated 1,000 counter-protesters (Ellis). Despite resistance from within the “Alt-Right,” Kessler admitted the KKK chapter in question to the Unite the Right protest. Note that, in the official press conference, Kessler in no way addresses Confederate ‘heritage’ or General Lee as a historical figure.

5 For 2017, the FBI reported that out of 5,060 hate-crime victims of racial bias, 48.6% were African American, followed by Whites with 17.1% (“Hate Crime”). For 2015, the FBI reported 4,216 victims of which 52.2% were African American, and for 2016 4,426 victims of which 50.2% were African American. Furthermore, out of 6,370 hate crime offenders, 50.7% were White, followed by 21.3% African American (ibid.).

6 The removal was commissioned by Mitch Landrieu, mayor of New Orleans, in response to the racial terror of the Charleston church shooting (cf. Landrieu). The project was met with stark resistance from the far-right. A contractor had his car firebombed (Wendland), and protesters poured sand in the gas tank (Lynch) of a crane deployed to remove the statue.

7 I follow Bruce McComiskey’s definition that “post-truth signifies a state in which language lacks any reference to facts, truths, and realities. When language has no reference to facts, truths, or realities, it becomes a purely strategic medium” (6).
crude rhetoric that proves the stubborn persistence of American racism in the guise of ‘tough’ zero-tolerance policies towards immigration and family separation, seems to be taking place more on Twitter than in Congress, waged not by an entourage of elected representatives but by a swarming host of online trolls. However, we should not delude ourselves that “post-truth” practices are a new phenomenon of our times, no matter how much Trump or the international iterations of the Alt-Right or misinformation campaigns in Russia or India may have popularized it. On the contrary, in the antebellum period, Reconstruction, and the Jim Crow era,8 ‘alternative truths’ abounded on questions of slavery, race, and social stability.

The Anti-Tom novel is a key articulation of this ‘alternative’ view on American reality, a view that has persisted from the unsettled debate on slavery in the 1850s past Thomas Dixon’s times around the turn of the century until the decline of race science and eugenics as a legitimization of white supremacy in the 1930s9—and, as I will argue, beyond the twentieth century to the present-day resurgence of ethnic nationalism. I have chosen three eras and three groups of texts, because in them persistence and transformation become visible in the following ways: first, in the antebellum period, when slavery emerged as the South’s raison d’être, the pastoralism of the Anti-Tom novel grounded the white-supremacist narrative in landownership; second, during the Jim-Crow era, increasing segregation as a response to diversified government congealed racist practices both in

---

8 The 2017 report of the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) documents 4,084 racial terror lynchings between 1877 and 1950 (4).
9 As genetic engineering increasingly generates profound ethical problems, the racist danger of negative eugenics, seemingly entombed and watched over by research ethics committees, might still prove a vicious revenant (cf. Fields), as is demonstrated by Alabama passing House Bill 379 in June 2019, which allows chemical castration for “certain” sex offenders.
legislation and ‘white’ culture, and violence, euphemized in the antebellum Anti-Tom novel, became an explicit part of the pastoral romance in Thomas Dixon’s *The Leopard’s Spots*; third, in the present moment, white-supremacist science fiction has made violence an intrinsic component of romanticized whiteness. This last development has occurred at a time when a decrepit neoliberal economy has put whites and non-whites alike under duress, giving rise to legislative isolationism that increasingly allows the random detainment and displacement of ‘non-whites’ on vague judicial grounds while cloaking neo-colonial projects embodied in the Trump administration’s trade war with China and an open call for a U.S.-controlled regime change in Iran.

This isolationism has not sprung from an opportunistic president who has to make good on election promises, but is a recombination of the racist practices put in place by the American plantocracy to quell black insurrection both inside and outside the Thirteen Colonies. It is in the Anti-Tom novel that this racism is expressed with the least embarrassment, because Anti-Tom writers present the anti-abolitionist movement as a defense of basic ‘rights’ of American citizenship and not on racial grounds, passing over the many instances of racial terror and oppression that the system allowed and instead arguing for the soundness of slavery ‘in principle.’ For lawmakers and scholars ignorant of this subgenre, the recombination of legal forms of racism has remained occluded. The Anti-Tom novel is a body of literature published from 1852 until well into the Civil War in response to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, which in the eyes of pro-slavery advocates greatly misrepresented the South. Although *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* is the epicenter of this abolitionist earthquake in a wider social tectonic shift that sent waves of racist
responses through American literature, I wish to use the available space in this MA thesis to go beyond mere comparativism, especially since the towering scholarship on *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* completely adumbrates the paucity of works on Anti-Tom literature in its own right (e.g. Gosset; Tracey; Gerteis; Duvall). The antebellum part of my archive, although much more substantial than the usual archive of Anti-Tom scholars,\(^\text{10}\) will comprise Sarah J. Hale’s *Liberia; or, Mr. Peyton’s Experiments* (1853), Caroline Lee Hentz’s *The Planter’s Northern Bride* (1854), and Charles Jacobs Peterson’s *The Cabin and Parlor; or, Slaves and Masters* (1852). By analyzing these novels specifically for their portrayal of black insurrection, I am not cherry-picking the most prominent examples. On the contrary, in *The Cabin and Parlor* as well as many others, it is exactly the absence of black insurrection that points to a profound fear that the authors try to misrepresent or omit to not exacerbate the brewing panic. Although much more is to be said about the Anti-Tom canon, I will only make passing remarks towards some other novels not listed above.

The Jim-Crow-era mutation of the Anti-Tom novel, in a period that witnessed widely coordinated attempts at entrenching segregation in the States, manifests itself in *The Leopard’s Spots*, the first of three Ku Klux Klan novels that Dixon\(^\text{11}\) published. The

---

\(^\text{10}\) Most scholarship on antebellum Anti-Tom texts focuses on Mary Henderson Eastman’s *Aunt Phillis’s Cabin; or Southern Life As It Is* (1852) and Hentz’ *The Planter’s Northern Bride* because they are quantitatively the most successful Anti-Tom texts—the latter work also has a particular allure for feminist critics since Hentz’ writing career made her more successful than her husband Nicholas Marcellus Hentz—success that never quenched her flaming envy of Stowe. Note also that the Anti-Tom novel has its precursor in early-nineteenth century plantation novels like John Pendleton Kennedy’s *The Swallow Barn* (1832), and successors after the Civil War like Joel Chandler Harris’ *Uncle Remus* (1880).

\(^\text{11}\) Dixon was a Southern Baptist minister, son to a slave-owning family, and of German-Scotch ancestry. *The Leopard’s Spots* contains many autobiographical elements; especially in his portrait of the Ku Klux Klan Dixon seems to draw on his family’s early involvement in the movement. W.E.B. DuBois—while arguing on the case of Edward Sheldon, Ridgely Torrence, or Eugene O’Neill that white writers could portray African Americans with a finesse often not appreciated by the selfsame audience—simply dismisses Dixon as a “shyster” (56).
novel is relevant for my archive because it transplants characters from *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* to Reconstruction North Carolina. The most notable of these borrowings is Stowe’s villainous planter Simon Legree, who remains the villain, although logically he should figure as the story’s hero. Dixon transforms Legree, already a Yankee in Stowe’s novel, into an industrial mogul who imposes industrial slavery on whites and, should they decide to strike, ruthlessly replaces them with African Americans.

Transplanted to *The Leopard’s Spots*, the theme of black insurrection established in antebellum Anti-Tom novels allows Dixon to set up his Ku Klux Klan and the Red Shirts as the liberators of the white South from black sexual aggression and Northern oppression, all the while keeping the integrity of his pacifist protagonists intact. *The Leopard’s Spots* is also important because, in conjunction with Dixon’s follow-up KKK novel *The Clansman* (1905), it formed the basis for D. W. Griffith’s *The Birth of a Nation* (1915), a racist film celebrating the ‘chivalry’ of the Klan but long praised for its cinematographic achievements. *The Birth of a Nation* helped bring the Second Klan to life in the same year.

The present-day white-supremacist science fictions are Anti-Tom not because they attack Stowe’s novel—none of the three in my archive even hint at *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*—but because they continue many Anti-Tom traditions, even transpose the pastoral romance to the future. Contemporary white-supremacist science fiction is an almost entirely uncharted territory in literary criticism. After discussing William Luther Pierce’s *The Turner Diaries* (1978) as an intertext to the other novels, I will consider Ellen Williams’ *Bedford: A World Vision* (2000) and Ward Kendall’s *Hold Back This Day* (2001) due to their relative popularity in the far-right subculture (cf. Chapter 4). *Diaries* is important
because it informs much subsequent white-supremacist\textsuperscript{12} thought, and the authors of the other two texts are old enough to have read \textit{Diaries} or witnessed how it shaped white-supremacist discourse. Kendall, who is affiliated with the “Alt-Right,” leans on Pierce’s narrative with its plot of impending apocalypse, whereas Williams represents the Neo-Confederate camp among the far-right with her portrait of the Bible Belt’s demise. I will offer a further albeit not literary body of texts in connection with these works. Since these science fictions comprise the gap between Dixon and the Charlottesville riots, I read the novels alongside the fluid textuality of Confederate monuments in public spaces. By reifying whiteness through romance, these novels can suspend the mutability of whiteness, whereas any other meaning remains pliable. In other words, the Anti-Tom novels of each period and Confederate monuments are all linked in so far as they are not forgotten historical artefacts, but pliant texts for imagining a strong, new white supremacy.

Mine will be an interdisciplinary approach of postcolonial theory and race studies, so a central concern of this thesis will be how ‘race’ is occluded in legal practices and national policy making, drawing on Ann Laura Stoler’s concept of durable imperial practices. The American self-perception that emerged in the twentieth century as a nation that must take the helm of international politics and economies but is nonetheless decidedly not an empire complicates discussing the States as a neo-colonial empire. In spite of

\textsuperscript{12} Many “Alt-Right” adherents refer to themselves as ‘white nationalists’ rather than ‘white supremacists,’ for, while the less extreme strains of the “Alt-Right” seek to establish the States as a white ethnostate, they think coexistence with ‘non-whites’ possible as long as it does not violate the integrity of the ethnostate. While I am willing to entertain this wish for recognition of identity—regardless of how ironic this emphasis on distinction is in light of the far-right’s battle against liberal identity politics and ‘political correctness’—I will refer to any form of racist practice as part of a wider white-supremacist ideology because white nationalism, despite its purportedly pacifist and nuanced aims, is founded on a white-supremacist framework.
America’s reluctance to define itself in these terms, its history is rife with imperialist practices. The displacement of Indigenous peoples; the Spanish-American War for Cuba and the Philippines; 800 military bases across the world; and an ever-expanding maximum-security carceral archipelago with an increasingly eroding legislature that allows government to detain—or deport—people without trial: these are only a few imperial practices that come to mind. Slavery unfolded in the context of this American imperialism and is one of its chief expressions. It is therefore warranted to read the plantocracy as an empire and slavery as a form of colonizing. Similarly, the post-9/11 occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of national security and Trump’s resurrection of a colonial Imaginary through a rhetoric of victimhood\textsuperscript{13} on both national and personal levels (in the former case, claiming that the US is supposedly being overrun and destroyed by refugees; in the latter, complaining that he is being persecuted by Democrats and the Mueller investigation), all the while practicing the very autocratic maximalism the States so loftily rose to combat in the twentieth century not only permit but even require a postcolonial reading. The field of race studies, in turn, enables access to intersections of race and power that are deeply engrained in American society. I am interested in untangling the social syntax that entrenches the racial subject in its place and supplies the racial object as a shield for the former.

From the antebellum period to the turn of the millennium, this fear of an imagined ‘non-white’ danger to ‘white’ security has spawned a body of literature that has been mostly ignored and rarely examined in detail. I will ask the following questions: How does

\textsuperscript{13} See Samuels 7ff.
the pastoral romance of the antebellum Anti-Tom novel convey white fears of black insurrection by either foregrounding or veiling it? How is the fear of black insurrection, which dates back to the colonial period, recombined in contemporary anti-black violence under a race-baiting president? How is the target of ‘non-white’ sexual danger popularized by the Klan reactivated in what Trump desultorily calls a ‘zero-tolerance’ immigration policy against Mexicans?14 How is the past memorialized, set in stone or bronze, and recombined in the present not only to evoke ‘pride’ in and to mystify a violent past but also to rally people unconnected to this culture to imagine a return of this violence? How do liberal academics, politicians, and activists speed the proliferation of racist practices or even obscure the more everyday racisms of the white bourgeoisie when they recoil from and ignore white-supremacist artefacts? Accordingly, my thesis is that romance as a literary form makes the Anti-Tom novel a malleable vehicle for reinforcing the imperial durability of manorialism to retain power over a subjugated or marginalized people.

A digression is in order to prepare unsuspecting readers for what lies ahead: The works in this archive are hateful, inimical to anything and anyone that undermines white hegemony, and in most cases abysmally written. They are rife with racial stereotypes and contrived themes, and would, at times, be hilarious parodies of Fitzhughesque race chauvinism if their authors did not make their intention unmistakably clear at every juncture. These writers distort, distract, blatantly lie, and conjure up the wildest fantasies to further their racist agenda. They contradict their own arguments and logic, are inconsistent in their goals, and confuse at every turn what, then, is the ‘Anglo-Saxon,’ this

14 Ironically, Trump himself has been known to recruit many undocumented Mexican workers (Partlow).
white man. But these reasons are precisely why we as readers, scholars, educators, and, simply, members of society must discuss these works. The antebellum Anti-Tom novels and *The Leopard’s Spots*\(^{15}\)—racist as they are—should be the anodyne components of this archive due to their historical remoteness, but this argument cannot hold for *Diaries* or the other science fictions. As a postcolonialist—and perhaps due to my Central European background—I am acutely aware of the dangers of giving these writers an intellectual platform, especially as *Diaries* has inspired several real-life terrorist acts (cf. Chapter 4). However, in contrast to the over-exposure that Trump enjoys in the media and that—at least, partially—has aided him in discrediting adversaries and normalizing obliquities regarding the U.S.–Mexico border situation, I believe that the danger of ignoring these works is far greater than if human rights advocates weaponize them against the racecraft conjurers—the occasional ones and the frequent ones alike.\(^{16}\)

Chapter 1 will provide a theoretical context for analyzing the Anti-Tom novels, drawing from a variety of sources. I will open with race to set the foundations for

\(^{15}\) *The Leopard’s Spots* has long been critically shunned for its hateful content.

\(^{16}\) I wish to be clear about this: Although this thesis studies works of racial terror, it is ultimately a work about peace. I have no sympathy or understanding for far-right ideologies, violence motivated by any kind of extremism, or racist practices, and these works, President Trump’s Machiavellian style of governance, and the “Alt-Right’s” practices and ideology I call nothing else but wrong and deplorable. When criticizing liberal commentators and far-left extremism, I in no way affirm far-right anti-white persecution fantasies, for my project is markedly different from that—recall the FBI hate crime statistic in the footnote above which shows the predominance of anti-black hate crimes over anti-white hate crimes. By dealing with these works and ideologues, an opportunity emerges to learn how to prevent people from flocking to the false Eden that white supremacists promise. But this dialogue cannot begin if liberals stoop to the same violence or verbal abuse that they seek to combat. Judging from the sheepish discussion of Europe’s fascist legacies and its ineffectiveness to curb the emergence of a new far-right, I do not think that we can afford more silence, more sweeping under the rug of imperial debris and exposed racist critters. However, panic-induced polemics are an equally weak theriac. As George Hawley suggests in *The Alt-Right* (2019), the “Alt-Right” has largely burnt its fuse and is receding back into insignificance; time will tell whether Trump and Brexit have the severe economic and socio-politic impact predicted today, or whether we will move on and remember them and the “Alt-Right” like a distant hot summer’s nightmare.
subsequent deliberations. Barbara J. and Karen E. Fields’ *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (2012), Nell Irving Painter’s *The History of White People* (2010), and Toni Morrison’s *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (1993) will be my central texts for discussing race and its literary workings. I will then move on to postcolonial texts with Edward Said’s *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994) to discuss imperial articulation of culture and language, Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983) to provide a crucial supplement for understanding the workings of nationhood in the literary Imaginary, and Ann Laura Stoler’s *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times* (2016) to draw on her crucial concept of occluded imperial durabilities.


Focused on the antebellum Anti-Tom novels, Chapter 2 will begin with a taxonomy of different refugee scenarios, in which the runaway slaves either return or cannot return to the plantation. In the subsequent exegeses of select antebellum Anti-Tom novels, I will analyze the representation of black insurrection in *Liberia* for the promotion of an
American neo-colonial project, the ontological vanishing of the insurrectional slave in *The Planter’s Northern Bride*, and white rioting figures as whitewashed black insurrectionists in *The Cabin and Parlor*. In this chapter, I will argue how the Anti-Tom novelists used the affective ‘truth’ they created in their works to both entrench their power in the South and recruit people in the North for their cause.

Chapter 3 will move into the Jim-Crow era and discuss *The Leopard’s Spots* as an Anti-Tom novel, offering the literary context in which it appeared, because it is the most successful, and, by dint of *The Birth of a Nation*, the most influential and durable Anti-Tom narrative. To understand the main difference between the *fin-de-siècle* and the antebellum narratives, I will examine the abundant themes in *The Leopard’s Spots* of black lasciviousness and insurrection. I will expand on Chris Ruiz-Velasco’s article “Order Out of Chaos: Whiteness, White Supremacy, and Thomas Dixon, Jr.” by discussing the function of North Carolina’s Red Shirts for securing white supremacy in contrast to the brief appearance of the Klan in Book One. Finally, I will examine George Harris, his pilgrimage to Ohio, and Dixon’s anxiety regarding racial mixing. I will conclude that Harris’ ultimate disappearance from the novel heralds a genocidal fantasy, but the Red Shirts, in turn, also police lesser degrees of whiteness by rendering lower-class whiteness fully visible in its racial performance.

Chapter 4 will begin by justifying a reading of white-supremacist science fictions as Anti-Tom novels, arguing that they share many central Anti-Tom elements. In my exegeses of the above-listed novels, I will trace the themes of ‘non-white’ sexual danger and black insurrection, and discuss how *Hold Back This Day* and *Bedford* weaponize
scientific inventions and literature by mythologizing Thomas Edison’s ‘genius’ and the durability of William Shakespeare’s creativity to realize their visions for a future white supremacy that reclaims culture for whiteness. Examining this monumentalization of returning white power will bridge the gap between Dixon’s introduction of the KKK to mass culture and Confederate monuments in our present day. Aside from the General Lee statue in Charlottesville, I will survey other monuments and recent developments in the quest for removing most of these monuments, and examine how Trump’s anti-immigration policy and race-baiting activated Confederate monuments as magnets for far-right extremism and lured liberal activism into attempts to dismantle white supremacy without any serious efforts at understanding it, thus driving more people to the far right. I will conclude that it is in literature that white-supremacist ideology becomes tangible when it draws on long-standing literary traditions to communicate with a mainstream audience.

Despite the substantial economic and democratic repair work it will necessitate, Trump’s presidency constitutes a prime opportunity to begin understanding casual racism in earnest.\(^\text{17}\) The more racism learns to divest itself from the paroxysms of potentates and clothe itself in easily-deniable ‘tough’ locker-room “bullshit” (Frankfurt 9) or fashionable

---

\(^\text{17}\) Certainly, I am not the first to call for this step. Since Charlottesville, voices are not only emerging on the Confederate monument debate, but also on white-supremacist literature (cf. Allen). The German research institute Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) published a critical edition of Adolf Hitler’s fascist manifesto Mein Kampf in 2016. Mein Kampf was previously banned from publication and only available in fragments for scholarly debate. As it was about to enter public domain, the IfZ sought both to curb unrestricted publication and to contextualize this hateful historical source for academic and educational purposes. The critical edition received a research award from the foundation “Gesellschaft braucht Wissenschaft,” (“Kritische Edition”) and sold over 85,000 copies in 2016 (“Mein Kampf” verkauft sich 85.000 Mal”). Both before publication and in light of the high sales figures, those who would bury the history of European fascism in the silence of one of Berlin’s concrete bunkers recoiled from the idea of publishing Mein Kampf and raised their voices in anger. Unsurprisingly, the vitriolic cacophony has died down in subsequent years as the sensational value receded and the media abandoned the subject. Only time will tell what effects the publication will have in the future.
youth culture, the more it becomes imperative to understand how the old is rehashed in the new, or, more precisely, how racism points to durabilities that have never waned. More than ever does this world need fewer radicals on either side of the political spectrum and more mediators who create understanding and bridges over the chasm that some people feel gaping underneath them, especially in our times when a neo-liberalism that has learned nothing from the financial crisis of 2007 pushes them closer to the existential minimum, while race-baiters offer readily-digestible reasons for why they are slowly dragged into the global debtor’s prison.

18 The “Alt-Right” draws extensively on meme humor (see Making Sense for an overview); furthermore, far-right extremism increasingly branches out into mainstream media formats, as when, in 2015, two young German identitarians in balaclavas had a vegan cooking show to disseminate Neo-Nazi ideology on YouTube.

19 Life After Hate is a non-profit organization, founded in 2011, dedicated to helping people leave hate groups, particularly white-supremacist groups. The organization has received a grant of $400,000 from the Obama Administration for its work. Unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration has discontinued the grant. Politico reports that the group’s requests for help have increased “twenty-fold” since Election Day (Lippman).
Chapter 1: The Chasm of 0.01%: Empire, Emancipation, and Extremism

But equally valuable is a serious intellectual effort to see what racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters. – Toni Morrison

The epigram raises the *a priori* question of what made whites ‘masters’ before the Civil War in legal terms and after it in social terms. And it poses the question of why ‘racial’ ideology—an ideology invented by European and American upper classes—has had, and continues to have, an impact on the epistemologies of these ‘masters.’ White Americans, before and after their break with the British Empire, had a tenuous hegemony, one that would profoundly trouble and question this superior status. ‘Race’ today may chiefly be perceived as a remnant of pseudo-scientific eugenics that ‘troglodyte’ racists and Neo-Nazis cling to nostalgically, but, ultimately, race had the more indirect purpose of stratifying society and making the ruling class whites ‘masters’ while keeping lower-class...

---

20 Race stands in quotation marks here to question the validity of deploying this concept academically outside of its direct connection to racism, as its application affirms an inherent biological difference based on skin color and invests skin with an invisible ontology (cf. Fields 209) that forms the basis for racist practices. Particularly in the American context of several waves of enlarging whiteness (cf. Painter), race appears not stable at all, and ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ seem a crucial binary opposition to probe this instability. For the sake of readability, I will henceforth omit the quotation marks, but the wary attitude towards the firmness of these concepts remains in place. Furthermore, I do not use the terms slave and enslaved person/people interchangeably. Some Americanists have suggested the latter as a more neutral term in order to not reduce an individual’s or group’s identity to their status of captivity, which I readily pick up for general academic discourse. However, in the context of emulating a given literary work’s diction or invoking pro-slavery voices, I will use the former term when it is exactly this reduction of identity that I wish to emphasize. Lastly, there are two main motivations why I will refer to fugitive enslaved people as refugees. The first is to improve readability, as ‘runaway enslaved person/people’ or ‘enslaved fugitive’ is not only egregiously logorrheic, but also perpetuates the invisible ontology of a given phenotype through its status of captivity. The second concern is that the term refugee resonates strongly with many realities in the present day (my thanks go to Andrew Loman for this lucid suggestion), where refugees are political pressure points just as much as enslaved people were in the antebellum period. The increasing stream of refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to the States is only the most recent human rights crisis, and already animosities towards the refugees grow among both the American and Mexican population, as the refugees, once again, become pawns in political power struggles.
whites subordinate and non-whites ‘inferior’—an ordering process with still-potent effects in the present day.

Scholarship on race in the American context, like race itself, is such a tangled web of multi-layered observations that ten MA thesis-length works could not discuss it exhaustively. Therefore, I will limit my discussion to three works that will unlock my core discussion of whiteness in this white-supremacy archive. I follow Barbara and Karen Fields’ definition of race as “the conception or the doctrine that nature produced humankind in distinct groups, each defined by inborn traits that its members share and that differentiate them from the members of other distinct groups of the same kind but of unequal rank” (16). In short, the ideology of a ‘natural’ social order authorizes racist actions (17). I likewise follow the Fieldses’ definition of racism as “the theory and the practice of applying a social, civic, or legal double standard based on ancestry, and […] the ideology surrounding such a double standard” (ibid.). In order to fortify hegemonic power, the white American ruling class adopted race to inscribe white and black bodies with the daily exercises of power relations, thereby differentiating themselves in the course of time from lower-class whites by pushing formerly bound white servants into racial proximity to black people as a means of policing white lower-class behavior. As the increase of hate crimes against black people and other non-white ethnic groups during

---

21 As Painter notes in her conclusion: “Each person shares 99.99 percent of the genetic material of every other human being” (391). The 0.01% of this chapter’s title reflect the marginality of genetic difference between individuals that is invested with such socio-cultural meaning that it ultimately eclipses the 99.99% of similarities.

22 As on many other issues, race scientists disagreed on the mono or polygenesis of humanity.

23 Mapping Police Violence documented that 25% of the 1,147 police brutality deaths in 2018 were black victims. In a different study in 2015, 99% of police officers accused of brutality were not convicted (cf. Mapping Police Violence) and only a small percentage was charged at all.
Trump’s election has shown, America has not entered a ‘post-racial’ phase with the Obama Administration: as an essentializing, ordering process, race is alive and well in American culture.

Not only is race a shadow that Americans cannot escape, but it also has lengthened with the centuries. In The History of White People, Painter shows how race science, with the nowadays debunked fields of craniometry, phrenology, and physiognomy, proved a taxonomic hell because its foremost propagators consistently contradicted themselves in their own analyses and rarely agreed on the most basic questions of how many races there are supposed to be (cf. William Z. Ripley’s insisting on using inconsistent parameters for determining race [219] or Blumenbach and Ripley disagreeing over the number of ‘Caucasian’ races [220]). Most importantly, Painter invigorates the mantra-like assertion that there is nothing ‘natural’ about race by supplying vital evidence that what today is unquestioningly referred to as ‘whiteness’ by white supremacists has a long history of taxonomic confusion. Painter shows that in Classical Greek and Ancient Roman societies race was unknown and the ethnic groups that especially nineteenth-century Americans understood as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ race were, in reality, nowhere close to the sanitized,

---

24 Painter identifies, among others, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Samuel George Morton, and Louis Agassiz as durable influences on the compounding of race theories.
25 Despite this scientific dead-end into which many scholars navigated themselves, race escaped the ivory tower and, in America, became a tool for nation-making when ideologues like Ralph Waldo Emerson, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, or George H. Lorimer drew extensively on race science to influence the search for American identity.
26 Painter makes the fascinating point that one of the main tenets of racist ideology that finds Africans sub-human due to their putative genetic proximity to primates is due to the misreading of a chart that placed an African skull next to a primate’s skull (66). However, Petrus Camper, the illustrator who created the chart, was a vocal propagator of racial equality. In a similar vein, Painter’s historical narrative suggests that some of Blumenbach’s findings are more due to an opportunistic move to ingratiate himself with his maecenas Sir Joseph Banks rather than a purely scientific pursuit (74–75).
Protestant whiteness Americans imagined, especially since Greeks and Romans chiefly adhered to environmental determinism (5ff). In subsequent centuries, a quest for determining universal beauty drew ethnographers’ attention to skin color and head size: some, like the French traveler and physician François Bernier (44), found beauty in African races—an idea unimaginable to white supremacists from the nineteenth century onwards—yet white slavery\textsuperscript{27} embodied in peoples of the Black Sea region became the ideal (43), metonymically conflated as Caucasians.

Furthermore, practitioners of racecraft have a history of joining gender to race. Political commentators from Julius Caesar to Emerson were fascinated with ‘savage’ masculinity due to a sense that their own civilization was emasculating (28, 269). This perceived effeminization points, first, to an envious relationship of the imperialist onlooker towards ‘uncivilized’ lifestyles of subjugated peoples that he sacrificed to achieve power, and, secondly, to the invention of the specter of black sexual danger as a strategy to police bodies’ sexualities and control the ‘other.’ In order to naturalize this invention, the ruling class needed a hybrid model of white virility not only to affirm their own sexual potency but also to elevate it to a level of ‘enlightened’ virility that combines the cerebral traits of the Anglo-Saxon race with the masculinity of ‘barbaric’ races while discarding their savagery, thus creating this sense of intellectual and sexual superiority that Teutonist Thomas Carlyle thought made the Anglo-Saxon unconquerable (Painter 160).

\textsuperscript{27} Painter debunks the notion of the indomitable Anglo-Saxon by showing that Britain was the primary source of slaves for the Vikings (35ff).
Aside from the anemic white bourgeoisie enlisting race in its fight against changing gender norms, race really gains critical power in the linguistic realm in which it originated and which amplifies its epistemological danger. American literati’s most crucial ingredients for their works were the intersections of class, gender, and sex, which they infused in the uncanny invisibility of the African American. In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Morrison presents the key concept of the Africanist presence, challenging the critical fallacies that, first, “regardless of the race of the author, the readers of virtually all of American fiction have been positioned as white” (xii), and, secondly, American literature “is free of, uninformed, and unshaped by the four-hundred-year-old presence of [African Americans] in the United States” (5). Morrison defines the Africanist presence as a “nonwhite, Africanlike (or Africanist) presence or persona” (6), which fueled the American literary imagination in crucial ways as means to define white identity against a black one—specifically, so Morrison suggests, by

---

28 In Racecraft, the Fieldses’ core concept whereby they aim to expose race as a false reality deployed to rationalize and justify racist actions is the eponymous merging of race and witchcraft, a social alchemy that distills belief into affective ‘truth.’ In contrast to genomes, which exhibit next to no biological difference between ethnicities, racecraft “originates not in nature but in human action and imagination” (18). As the Fieldses argue, no one would have found a sense of superiority “by blood or birth” (128) among the nobility of the Middle Ages, but the peasantry “came to be perceived as innately inferior by virtue of having fallen under the nobility’s dominion” (129). In other words, power engendered privilege, not vice versa. Racecraft believers need authorities—possibly an explanation for the far-right obsession with strong leaders—that sustain the system. As the Fieldses adapt E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s taxonomy: “(1) witchcraft accusations displace structurally inbuilt social tensions onto available victims; (2) oracles work within an idiom of thought that seems bizarre but nonetheless has markedly logical and systematic features; and (3) professional specialists in magic know how to obtain (within their own logic) both true and tricked results” (201).

29 Despite the term “presence,” Morrison does not presuppose that there always must be an African character present in the narrative; the Africanist presence can manifest in metaphorical devices of, for example, black and white imagery (33), themes of freedom and bondage (64), or sexual innocence and lasciviousness (85). Lasciviousness dehumanizes the Africanist presence, likens the character more to animals than humans, while keeping them in their allotted social role. This counterpart to Protestant pre-marital celibacy is one of the most potent racial stereotypes, as this predatory nature suggests lack of restraint and a beast that might break out of its confined space at any moment.
projecting whites’ own fears and social tensions onto black people. Thus, black Americans become the hosts for white freedom, which, because of its “parasitical nature” (57), needs black unfreedom, even captivity, to give meaning to its own privilege. However, Morrison’s diction suggests that there is a ghostly, haunting quality in this presence, which uncannily unsettles, undermines, and unbalances the narrative as authors explore the eerie caverns of white American identity.

This dependence on the Africanist presence is a key point that pro-slavery authors were acutely aware of. The Declaration of Independence may have entrenched slavery in the United States, but by the 1850s the nation was still struggling for literary independence from the former imperial center. In their battle for literary autonomy, these authors could not silence the African Americans who populated their plantations and houses, but black voices needed to be controlled to keep them from sounding notes that would resonate with Uncle Tom’s Cabin and abolitionist discourse. While Morrison correctly observes that the “Africanist presence is permitted speech only to reinforce the slaveholders’ ideology” (28), the case for the Anti-Tom novel is more profound because enslaved people are, at once, the subject that pro-slavery advocates defend as their property and appropriate to attack abolitionist criticism, and the object that abolitionists want to free and use to further Republican interests—in short: they occupy a liminal space between hostage and enemy, meaning that Anti-Tom novelists both had to use the black voice to defend the South and

---

30 Morrison writes: “The fabrication of an Africanist persona is reflexive; an extraordinary meditation on the self; a powerful exploration of the fears and desires that reside in the writerly conscious. It is an astonishing revelation of longing, of terror, of perplexity, of shame, of magnanimity.” (17)

31 To be clear: Morrison is here discussing Willa Cather’s Sapphira and the Slave Girl (1940) and is not interested in pro-slavery authors.
emphasize the danger the African American poses to white Southern society. Because this sub-genre responds to abolitionist fiction, the appropriated voice is not a representation of real enslaved people that these writers met on plantations or in the domestic context—no matter how much they protest to the contrary. In these novels, the Africanist presence constitutes a *simulacrum*-like second-degree appropriation of Tom in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, a voice already reified to suit Stowe’s purposes of debunking the pro-slavery characterization of benevolent slaveholders as the rule rather than the exception. As reactionaries, Anti-Tom writers could only wrest this Africanist presence from Stowe’s control, because situating the plantocratic fate in an emancipated society would have been unthinkable and deleterious to their hegemonic claims.

The parasitic quality of whiteness, however, does more than control black voices. When discussing Mark Twain’s *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884), Morrison notes that “freedom has no meaning to Huck or to the text without the specter of enslavement” (56). This parasitic dependence on another people’s captivity is occluded by pro-slavery advocates’ insistence that slavery was a benevolent paternalist undertaking, while, in reality, the plantocracy was just as governed by capitalism as the vilified Northern factories. With industrialization as the new economic engine, the plantocracy

---

32 Sven Beckert notes that over 50% of American exports between 1815 and 1860 were cotton (119), and that slavery became an international politico-economic gamble during the Civil War when “some European officials advocated recognition of the Confederacy and breaking the Union blockade to secure that urgently needed cotton” (250). This venture of Europeans to ensure access to American cotton starkly contrasts the pro-slavery portrayal of slavery as the Northern and British abolitionists’ pet peeve that no one else finds fault with and even gladly supports. Jürgen Osterhammel additionally explicates that Southerners developed a sense of nationalism around cotton as an economic factor, as “the nonslaveholding majority of whites identified as voters with a propagandistic image of the South and helped to sustain social relations from which they did not themselves profit directly; after all, the life of a big plantation owner often corresponded to their vision of an ideal existence” (845). In other words, planters were to the Southern proletariat what the cosmopolitan boulevardier is today.
chose its property as its raison d’État and held onto that property to entertain a hope of social superiority. The Southern upper class, then, cast being a slave-owner as the Southern iteration of being white and wealthy while they assigned the middle and working classes a lesser degree of whiteness that, first, excluded these classes from this sui generis plantocratic whiteness on the basis of privilege and property, and, secondly, barred them from shaping this emerging whiteness in any way.

It is no coincidence that Anti-Tom novelists largely adopted the romance of earlier plantation novels for their narratives. According to Morrison, romance is not an escape from reality but an engagement with reality, with an immediacy that enables authors to probe the most deep-set fears. Morrison refers to Americans’ “fear of loneliness, of aggression both external and internal” that accompanies human freedom. The fear of loneliness constitutes a symptom of a colonial and postcolonial society stuck with an

---

The term romance in the American context has undergone profound muddling from both contemporary sources as well as subsequent literary critics, as Nina Baym explicates. For example, literary critic Richard Chase sought a distinction between the British novel and its American counterpart, for the social realism of British writing, so Chase argues, was hardly applicable to America’s quest for distinct nationhood (Baym 427). Baym also shows that, in the nineteenth century, reviewers and commentators largely applied romance and novel inconsistently, if not synonymously (430ff), without any likening to the plot-driven, sensational narratives that Sir Walter Scott outlines (436). Wittingly or unwittingly, Nathaniel Hawthorne added additional confusion to the taxonomy when he repeatedly stated that he wrote romances rather than novels, despite works like The Scarlet Letter (1850) or The House of the Seven Gables (1851) having few romantic elements—or so Baym argues (438). For my purposes, I will use romance in the sense of plot-driven, love-centered prose fictions, closely related to the pastoral, especially because Dixon gave his Reconstruction Anti-Tom novel The Leopard’s Spots the subtitle “A Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan.” Scott, whose works are presumably invoked in Dixon’s subtitle, defines romance as “a fictitious narrative in prose or verse; the interest of which turns upon marvelous and uncommon incidents” (129) and asserts that “Romance and real history have the same common origin. It is the aim of the former to maintain as long as possible the mask of veracity; and indeed the traditional memorials of all earlier ages partake in such a varied and doubtful degree of the qualities essential to those opposite lines of composition” (134). The immediacy of action of the “marvelous and uncommon incidents” in romance is attractive for Anti-Tom writers precisely because it gives them narrative license to extricate themselves from the agency-less political corner into which abolitionism has forced them. One should also note the gothic dimension of Morrison’s understanding of romance (cf. 36), for elevating whiteness through romance for a presumed white readership necessarily entailed the haunting of that whiteness by something that had vanished or had been erased.
acrimonious, insurgent ‘other.’ Though markedly different from the romances that Morrison discusses, the plantation romance enabled pro-slavery authors to suspend their own fear of insurrectionist violence. The plantation’s romanticization is a key articulation of the fear of black insurrection. Anti-Tom writers purged dissent and the need for punishment, thereby eliminating meaningful silences or disappearances (as in the case of Prue in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* [Chapter XIX]) that would undermine their agenda. But, just as the Africanist presence subverts the intended narrative in other instances, here too it reinforces the very fear that these writers tried to excise. Aware of this subversion but unable to bend the Africanist presence to their will, they projected their own fear on the North by portraying themselves as beast-masters in the American menagerie, ominously warning that black insurrection would spread to the North once all these newly-freed people crowded into the labor market. In the pro-slavery contributions to the antebellum slavery debate, the Africanist presence not only spoke on behalf of the white master, but also became his battle cry.

Before we can interrogate the insights postcolonial theory grants into this archive, we must discuss several major postcolonial texts. Doing so will help us to understand Ann Laura Stoler’s challenges to central tenets of this school of thought. The main question to address is: How can one bring the archives of antebellum postcolonial and contemporary neo-colonial America into the same framework? Edward Said’s work will show how culture becomes part of imperial logic, Homi Bhabha’s how imperial hegemony enlists racism to increase control over a culture, and Benedict Anderson’s how, once a given
culture has been subordinat
gated, this culture’s sense of itself as a nation perpetuates the
hegemony of an imperial power.34

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said sees culture as an imperialist35 practice that
consolidates an empire’s power by weaving an exceptionist narrative, bolstering an
empire’s *raison d’état*. The process of selecting which narratives are told and which
are omitted gives rise to a nationalism that distinguishes between those within and without this
cultural nation-boundary (see xiii). Culture’s relative autonomy from individual
perceptions of nationhood implies a broader embeddedness in a nation’s socio-economic
landscape, which suggests the fatalistic notion that culture, regardless of how critical it is
of the state, will eventually be productive of nationalism to buttress its durability (xii). To
Said, the novel is the literary form most congenial to imperialist culture: it exercises power
through narration as a “quasi-encyclopedic cultural form” (71) and can assume the
authority to silence unwelcome narratives (xiii).36 Moreover, Said argues that the writer,
whether imperialist or anti-imperialist in their motivation (or both as in the case of Joseph
Conrad [xviii]), cannot easily ignore the influence of the past in the present, and, thus, the

34 Note that the States pose a different case than most other postcolonial societies, first, because, by the
twentieth century, they had become a colonizing force *sui generis*, and, second, because it was settlers, not
the colonized, who severed ties with the imperial center. I am therefore examining a cultural process in flux
in a country that sought distinction from the former imperial center, a process that Anti-Tom writers detected
within the antebellum United States, characterizing the North as the imperial center and the South as the
plantation colony aspiring to preserve the imagined aristocratic European status that became their
justification of power.

35 Said defines culture as “all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation,
that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms” (xii), and distinguishes between
imperialism as a metropolis ruling a distant geography, and colonialism as the settling of such a geography
(9).

36 Said characterizes the novel “as a cultural artefact of bourgeois society, and [the novel and imperialism]
are unthinkable without each other” (70-71), and names Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) as both the
genesis of the English novel and a prime example of its imperialist agenda, as the protagonist founds a new
world for England (cf. 70).
writer shapes the narrative (4) through language, which is necessarily formed out of the past, for a future end that may or may not be known at the point of writing.\(^{37}\) By defending white supremacy, Anti-Tom writers make no secret out of tracing their current power to the past, while at the same time deluding themselves by justifying plantocratic hegemonic power through European aristocratic ‘heritage,’ when it is the violence in the now that enables this power.

With an increasing helplessness to counter abolitionists dismantling plantocratic hegemony economically and politically, Southern pro-slavery proponents resorted to language and rhetoric to reinforce white power through the creation of black stereotypes. In *The Location of Culture*, Bhabha exposes the liminality of identity, nationhood, or culture by revealing the liminality of meaning in language itself (4). According to Bhabha, the racial stereotype, a signifier that conflates all people of a certain ancestry or phenotype, is pernicious not because it misrepresents reality but because “it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of difference […], constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic and social relations” (75, Bhabha’s emphasis). This racialized identity is othered through what Bhabha calls the *skin/culture* signifier (ibid.) and contained by attaching to it cultural notions of savagery and inferiority, metonymizing skin as an immediately discoverable sign of cultural deviance, or, put differently, converting a symbolic sign to an indexical one. This

\(^{37}\) As Said notes, any action an empire takes benefits its durability not only in the now, but also in the future (cf. 10). In that sense, writers use language easily for imperialist purposes because it has the same temporal function of taking an action now to ensure the persistence of meaning in the future.
metonymic potential is convenient for extremists, since it effectively bypasses the need to interact with the ‘othered’ person, whose traits are visible for all to see on the skin.\footnote{Bhabha is in direct conversation with Said and Anderson when he speaks of “the ‘primal scene’ of the modern Western nation: that is, the problematic historical transition between dynastic, lineage societies [the past, he notes] and horizontal, homogenous secular communities [the present]” (250).}

Bhabha sees a temporal overlap of the past and the present through the emphasis of cultural difference.\footnote{Bhabha notes: “The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition and modernity, at the level of cultural representation and its authoritative address. It is the problem of how, in signifying the present, something comes to be repeated, relocated and translated in the name of tradition, in the guise of a pastness that is not necessarily a faithful sign of historical memory but a strategy of representing authority in terms of the artifice of the archaic” (35).} Because the time-lag of \textit{différance}\footnote{Jacques Derrida shows that meaning varies through the context in which the signifier appears—i.e. meaning is deferred, hence the pun of \textit{différance} on \textit{différer}, which, in French, means both ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’ (62-63).} allows the cultural imperialist to transport the appropriated identity of the ‘other’ into the present moment, racism negates the stereotype’s epistemological erosion—engendered by the passing of time that other cultural signifiers are subjected to—or, as Bhabha puts it, denies “that form of negation which gives access to the recognition of difference” (ibid.). The racial epithet eliminates the enunciative ambiguity of \textit{différance}, the culture of the past is preserved in the present, and the conceptual instability in the present is stabilized in the now and for future reference. Therefore, uttering a racial stereotype calls the past into \textit{being} present, arresting the epistemologically-interpellated individual in the now and attaching to it because of the \textit{skin/culture} signifier ‘othering’ notions of savagery and deviance.

This temporal fixation of signification, in conjunction with the epistemological durability a nation’s history and values, leads us to a crucial question: How does ‘nationalism’ modify racism? In \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism}, Anderson supplies the eponymous “imagined community” (6) as
the definition of a nation, vital for understanding both antebellum and contemporary nationalisms. To state the obvious, the most helpful characteristic of the imagined community is the act of imagining such a community because, Anderson argues, to know every community member and their actions at any given point in time is spatially and temporally impossible (ibid.).

Like Said and Bhabha, Anderson traces the rise of nationalism to language (42) and asserts that the novel is the quintessential form of nationalist literature because of its ability to transcend the linearity of time through narrative due to techniques like pro- and analepsis and the divergence of narrated time and narrative time. In other words: the novel suggests a simultaneity of action (25-26); the reader thus gains synchronous access to the imagined community that they would otherwise be denied as they can hardly be in several places simultaneously. The novel, then, is a tool for nation-making: Anderson astutely points to the nostrifying ‘our hero’ trope, with a protagonist “who belongs to the collective body of readers” (32).

Therefore, it comes as little surprise that Anti-Tom writers use this nostrifying narrative device extensively to create a sense that the plantocratic hero is every white person’s hero. After all, this uniting property of the novel plays on our imagination, targeting an affective location in it. If a member of an imagined community, feeling securely nestled in that community, then clashes with the imagined ‘other,’ the encounter

---

41 Hence, the more a community expands geographically the greater the need to establish some form of commonality among its constituents. Once the Enlightenment dethroned religion as a raison d’état, Anderson reasons, the imagined community needed a new sense of continuity (11): now, all one could work for was the idea of the nation, an entity without beginning or end. In the imagined community, every member sees him or herself reflected, so by furthering the national cause, a member can immortalize him or herself because his or her ideals—policed by a very few individuals within that society—become the nation’s ideals.

42 Anderson sketches a love-triangle plot to emphasize the simultaneity of action for each individual character, noting “the novelty of this imagined world conjured up by the author in his readers’ minds” (26).
inspires in the member a suspicion of potential danger, or, more precisely, activates an affective apparatus of both previously-evoked and newly-encountered feelings of cultural difference. The member fears epistemological and ontological endangerment. Racist acts like the stereotype reestablish the member’s sense of security by purging the immediate ‘danger,’ but the respite is only temporary, since the acts add to the known feelings of cultural difference a fear of impending revenge at the hands of the victimized ‘other’—irrespective of whether the threat is real or only imagined. Concomitantly, nationalism modifies racism in several ways to guarantee the integrity of the imagined community.

Locating the epistemological space that allows the white American imagined community to dream its whiteness in safety and, through racecraft, to punish any infringement on its territory is imperative in order to render visible the hidden attacks white supremacists mount on marginalized people. This location I will call the palatium—Latin for ‘palace,’ but also the name for the Palatine Hill in Rome’s center. This onomastics is intended less as an allusion to the wealth of emperors like Augustus or Nero and the patricians who would erect their palaces on the hill—although the implications of luxury certainly are a factor for the plebeians to dream of upwards mobility—and more as a reference to the palatium’s mythological function of forming an imagined community,

---

43 Stoler notes: “Duress as I conceive it is a relationship of actualized and anticipated violence” (8). In a later chapter, Stoler observes that “[a] ‘colony’ criminalizes dissidence, disassembles and punishes those who refuse its terms, and suppresses contestatory and participatory politics. It produces and identifies enemies within and outside, eagerly invests in the hunt for those targeted as a threat, anxiously celebrates the ever false and short-lived security that follows the repeated rites of capture” (76).

44 In Roman mythology, the she-wolf that nursed Romulus and Remus had its cave on the Palatine Hill, and the shepherd Faustulus tended to his flocks there.
compounded with its visibility from all over Rome,\textsuperscript{45} couched between the capitalist centers of the Forum Romanum and the Circus Maximus. As such, the palatium stands removed from the \textit{agora}, but exerts influence on it from a distance. The comparative vulnerability against attacks is particularly interesting in the context of what the aristocracy on the hill signifies and what must be protected by further expansion. This place occludes the agency of the middle class, evoking both a nation’s creation myth and exposing the ruling class which lower strata can rally behind when it serves their purpose and excoriate when it does not, in suppressing an ‘other’ by heaping responsibility from themselves onto the leaders on the hill. Although the \textit{palatium} is an epistemological space detached from time, any attack mounted from it does not immediately target the infringement of white sovereignty in the now, but constitutes a form of pre-emptive strike to curtail any future attempts that would erode white control.

Since it is the case neither that empires instantly uprooted nor that postcolonial societies jump up in their stead in fully cleared soil, we need a grammar for the diachronicity of empire to understand how writers modify racism fluidly for their nationalist purposes. In \textit{Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times}, Ann Laura Stoler mounts a defense of postcolonialism’s\textsuperscript{46} currency by invoking the eponymous concept of

\textsuperscript{45} Recall John Winthrop’s rhetorical figure from his “A Model of Christian Charity” sermon in 1630 of America as a city upon a hill, taken from Matthew 5:14, and readily incanted by a salmagundi of political actors like Presidents John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama, or former Texas Senator Ted Cruz and former FBI Director James Comey.

\textsuperscript{46} While I agree with many of Stoler’s lucid observations, I will consciously not adopt her skepticism towards the ‘post’ in postcolonialism. First, for the sake of simplicity, I will eschew her “(post)colonial” wordplay, as the troubled relation of past and present should be a \textit{prima facie} matter in this thesis. Second, I do think that a synthesis of Said’s conception of an ostensibly clearly demarcated colonial and postcolonial time and Stoler’s recombined imperial durabilities is a powerful distillate in the context of the Civil War and the United States’ path to empire.
duress (6), in all its connotations of hardness, oppression, confinement, and legal constraint (ibid.), showing how imperial effects and their impact on colonies reach much further into the past than postcolonialists previously acknowledged and repeat in many disparate iterations into the present—in short, these effects become imperial durabilities, congealed remains of imperial practices that have hardened and solidified among the debris of crushed empires.

The durability that specifically interests me is that of manorialism because the planters derived their power from their demesne with white, black, or Indigenous people in a form of legal bondage. Indentured servitude and slavery made up a significant amount of labor power in colonial America, as there was abundant land to own but no significant

47 Stoler deliberates: “The analytical tools we use to identify either historical continuities or, alternatively, profound ruptures from the past may be obstacles rather than openings. […] Qualified and celebrated memories black out censored ones.” (5).
48 One of Stoler’s most salient examples is the systemic violence that survived colonialism rather than the imperialist authority itself which proved insufficient by itself to govern: Germany’s genocide of peoples in the modern-day Namibia is a precursor to the Holocaust rather than two unrelated practices; likewise, the concentration camps in the Boer War or the British detention camps in Kenya of the 1950s are manifestations of earlier violent practices.
49 Manorialism, though in decline in Western Europe from the eleventh century onward, proved highly durable in Eastern Europe, where it curtailed peasant resistance to the authority of the nobles, allayed the nobles’ fears of peasant insurrection, and produced a stable labor force. For New York, Sung Bok Kim notes that feudal manors never tapped the full hegemonic potential of their European counterparts, but became somewhat established after 1673 (17). Further, Kim explicates that colonial “lordship courts, patterned after manors established in Ireland and Scotland in the mid-seventeenth century, were supposed to function independently of any outside authority except that of the governor” (21), and Katherine Howlett Hayes shows on the case of the Sylvester Manor on Shelter Island, New York, that these manors were passed down in the family (46). Note that I am not asserting that North American white servitude and black slavery were an expression of the manorial system, but the colonial plantation and the Eastern European manor share many similarities, above all a technique of controlling a population by legally binding it to one lord and his land in his own jurisdiction to work the land profitably in the absence of a large enough population to create labor competition. This push towards gathering manorial power may systemically end with the Thirteen Colonies, but the turn of the nineteenth century witnessed a renewed interest in the manor. Two prominent examples in the South are the Biltmore Estate in North Carolina, which was built in the 1890s and is still owned by descendants of the Vanderbilt family, and Virginia House in Richmond, Virginia, which was built in the 1920s with materials from Warwick Priory in England. Consequently, I intend the term “manorialism” not only as signaling a hegemonic claim of whiteness that harkens back to landownership, but also as a material form of colonization when European buildings are literally transplanted and formed into a symbol of imperial power in America.
labor force to work it. The promise of freedom and land claims after a certain term of bound labor brought many Europeans to the colonies, but, as a labor force grew that could challenge plantocratic hegemony, the colonial elite needed new ways to solidify their control of the land. This, I argue, is the durability that fuels Southern white American fears of insurrection against plantocratic ‘sovereignty’ and raise persecution anxieties when Northern abolitionism threatens the South’s cultural and political autonomy.

The key concept enabling our understanding of the factors that catapult the Anti-Tom fear of insurrection into the present is “occlusion,” a process of hiding, concealing, and sealing off (10). Stoler writes: “That which occludes and that which is occluded have different sources, sites of intractability, forms of appearance, and temporal effects” (ibid.). This stealthy resilience interlocks with Said’s and Bhabha’s sense of cultural atemporality, of the past as linguistically inseparable from the present, and it further erodes the neat separation of ‘old’ and ‘new.’ To Stoler, an imperial practice neither transitions tidily from colonial past to postcolonial present, nor rises fiercely from its ashes after its ostensible demise. To begin with, imperial administration has never been an organized, structured, predictable action, but has always been chaotic, troubled, restless (21), and within this erratic practice lies a “strange continuity” (28) in the reappearance of

For some examples of occlusions, Stoler names the secrecy around the American and British Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and the irradiation of Navajo and Hopi reservations through nuclear mining and test sites (15). As examples of more subtly occluded colonial practices one could add the consistent denial of access to the radio spectrum for the Māori (see Everton) or the Canadian government’s decade-long and continuing inaction to combat mercury poisoning of water sources for the Indigenous community in Grassy Narrows, Ontario. In the latter case, the consistent exposure to mercury has disabled some of the protesters, which reminds one of colonial genocide of Indigenous peoples, when disease and starvation slowly dismantled resistance against settler hegemony. These occlusions Stoler partially attributes to fallacious habits in scholarship, but also to how scholars engage with colonial logics and how remnants of colonial narratives guide what we interrogate and what we do not (ibid.). These occlusions are not necessarily at play one at a time or simultaneously; they are striated and difficult to isolate.
characteristics of what Stoler calls new “colonial configurations” (ibid.). “[It] is their weighting, combination, and recruitment of earlier idioms of practice and perception,” Stoler argues, “that map the configurations of change” (ibid.). Therefore, a colonial practice like racism, having exited the stage, does not reenter wearing the same mask. But, if we cannot at first be sure of its identity, it eventually betrays itself either in movement, posture, or speech.

Racism as a colonial practice wears many masks indeed. Many scholars warn not to reduce racism to the dog-whistle populism that rallies skinheads and Aryan knights under its flag, as that is exactly what occlusion has achieved: racism is pinned on a particular class of lower social, economic, and educational standing, a taxonomy almost bordering, as Stoler repeatedly argues, on the pathologizing methodology of racism itself (see, for example 253-255). If we think about racism as pathological, then that is why the metaphor of white freedom as parasitism is, I think, so intriguing, because the parasite does not only feast on black subjugation but has adapted to make the non-white host appear intrinsically ‘sick,’ which, in turn, precipitates a phobic reaction expressed in a social quarantine from the white imagined community. In order not to deflect “attention from the ‘well-meaning’ larger society in which racism [is] well-nourished and devoutly maintained” (253), liberals need to push beyond a lower-class target group. We should

51 Stoler notes that racial essences “are made up […] of [a] malleable and substitutable range. Racial essentialism may be constant but its content is not.” (239, Stoler’s emphasis). Further, she explicates that “[r]acial formations combine elements of fixity and fluidity in ways that make them both resilient and impervious to empirical, experiential counterclaims” (ibid.). As Bhabha notes that différence preserves the essentializing force of the stereotype, Stoler suggests that a stereotype can both be fixed and admit new elements that amplify the original representation.

52 Although labeling racism as a ‘low-brow’ characteristic is perhaps a favorite nostrum among the far-left, I particularly address mainstream left politicians and the educated ‘elite’ when I use the term liberal. As I
ask how the middle-to-upper class racism of the Anti-Tom novel is recombined in the “Alt-Right,” and how the North’s perceived cultural colonization of the South is recoded today in the *nostrum* of what they perceive as an oppressively liberal agenda that targets ‘harmless’ citizens who turn to ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’ for inoculation against the perceived sickness.

What is crucial to interrogate in this panicky clinging to ‘traditions’ and ‘heritage’ is not the matter of which rights or culture people are stripped, but what *could* happen if these perceived direct interventions continue—be they abolitionism or the contemporary liberal agenda that disrupts the imagined community. Stoler argues that fear is the governing emotion in colonies because a colony, like the *palatium*, is inherently not secure (118). The colony is built on the premise that an ‘other’ needs to be controlled, that something *could* happen—which, in the case of the Thirteen Colonies meant increasing interference from Britain—and that insurgence *could* loom on the horizon (ibid.). To the temporal epistemology of a pastness and present-ness of an imagined community, I propose to add a futurate\textsuperscript{53} dimension of thinking an ‘other.’ By living on the premise that the ‘other’ will always be dangerous and the lord will, in time, be driven from ‘his’ land, the colonizing mentality expresses not anxiety about the future so much as a present concern

---

\textsuperscript{53} The futurate in English is a future-tense utterance that deletes *will* and, therefore, grammatically appears like a present tense utterance (Lakoff 339).

---

apply it in this thesis, *liberal* refers to the moderate faction within the Democratic party, among legislators, and within academia that, despite marshaling a ‘progressive’ mindset, implicitly perpetuates a neo-liberal economy that powers an unequal meritocracy. (As one of its clearest recent expressions one might name Kamala Harris’ supposedly pragmatic, ‘unideological’ approach to policy in order to affect minor changes—for example on infrastructure—in the face of the seeming impossibility to effect major systemic changes in the current political climate.) This constituency displays the same allergic reaction when the brittle American political metabolism encounters anything remotely ‘socialist,’ like furthering unionization or increasing federal control over the national economy or anything else similarly ‘extreme.’.
that is projected onto that future. Linguist Geoffrey Leech notes: “Since most future happenings are in principle subject to doubt, the Simple Present Tense, which describes a future event by a categorical statement of fact, is in general a special or ‘marked’ form of reference which overrides the normal feeling that the future is less certain than the present or past” (65). It is precisely this peculiar certainty of the futurate that interests me in connection to signification. Stoler echoes Anderson when she asserts, in her chapter on reason as a concept central to Enlightenment society, that reason, despite its connotation of sober, ponderous deduction, is “insufficient for governance” (220) of the masses and that deterrence through surveillance is the only way to quench this fear of fragile hegemony. However, as the present-day United States’ thriving security landscape ostentatiously affirms, surveillance and the violence that accompanies it as reinforcement to discipline bodies and establish docility, to use Foucault’s vocabulary, is only a temporary medication for these social anxiety attacks.

How Southern antebellum insurrection panics constitute an imperial durability becomes apparent when one looks back to colonial America. In The Counter-Revolution of 1776, Gerald Horne argues that the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 declared a counter-revolution of American colonists against British imperialism. Horne

---

54 One example Leech offers is “Next year the United Nations celebrates the anniversary of its Charter” (65). He also suggests that this future meaning of the Simple Present Tense can signify a plan or arrangement regarded as unalterable, like “The Chancellor makes his budget speech tomorrow afternoon” (66).

55 Stoler explicates that “[i]mperial dispositions have been and continue to be marked by a negative space—that from which those with privilege and standing could excuse themselves—an assertion of the ‘necessity’ of violence when reason is too pallid to justify their exemption and not sufficient to allow them to do so” (233).

56 Michel Foucault argues that “[i]n discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (187).
dismantles the creation myth of democratic freedom in the ‘New World’ by arguing that the independence movement responded to increasing abolitionism in Great Britain, which attempted to secure its overseas territories against Spain and France and assert waning control over the colonies by arming the free and enslaved African population for a proxy war (e.g. 237). Once the Royal African Company rescinded its slave trade monopoly following the Glorious Revolution in 1689, the Caribbean and the Thirteen Colonies witnessed a wave of incoming enslaved people, as independent traders capitalized on the all-time-high demand for slaves (viii). Horne notes that the slave trade proved double-edged for colonists. On the one hand, it fueled the American economy (x-xi); on the other, the danger of insurrection increased with every new shipload of enslaved people (7-8). In order not to be massacred by aggrieved West Africans, settlers had to push for independence\textsuperscript{57} to retain control over the enslaved population. In consequence, Horne concludes, the Declaration of Independence is a precursor to the Civil War because failed emancipation in 1776 ineluctably led to secession, for, as potent as it was for America’s emerging capitalism, slavery ultimately impeded economic expansion (xi), dooming the South in the race against an increasingly industrialized North.

The fear of black insurrection does not magically emerge through the ‘fake news’ media of the 1850s, but is firmly grounded in a long history of slave revolts in the Caribbean and the South (2). In the early eighteenth century, Barbados, Antigua, and

\textsuperscript{57} In order for settlers to rid themselves of Britain’s imperial control, they had to reinforce slavery (245), which entailed quenching the insurrectionist spirit as far as possible and securing enslaved people, the most important economic factor on the continent. Horne argues that, with African enslaved people around, the ruling class could avoid exploiting European labor (122)—which suspended European class tensions even if it did not resolve them. Hence, Africans were vital to create and maintain this white imagined community.
Jamaica became a black specter haunting the Thirteen Colonies (52). Furthermore, settlers lost confidence in their own ability to pacify the enslaved population when Spain incited many enslaved people to murder their masters so as to undermine stability in the Thirteen Colonies (90ff). The Spanish incitement of Africans, the settlers enlisting African assistance in defense against Spanish attacks, and the British military coopting Africans as part of the proxy war and leverage against the settlers: all of these factors put Africans in a precarious position. I am not suggesting that the skin/culture signifier was originally invested with the trait of ‘untrustworthy,’ but that, in Stoler’s sense, we see the durability of feudal vassalage in transatlantic slavery.

After the Revolution, a veritable class consciousness began to emerge in the industrialized North. In The Wages of Whiteness, David R. Roediger argues that the white working class that surfaced in the late eighteenth century in America did not always clearly demarcate itself from black people, as poor whites frequently participated in black festivals and rebellion (24). In order not to fall prey to the fallacy of racism as a sui generis working-class problem, the important question is how the Irish, and other not-yet-

58 Although Horne predominantly focuses on black insurrection and settler fear thereof, he notes that poor whites, the Catholic Irish in particular, occasionally cooperated with Africans for revolts, as in the New York Conspiracy of 1741 (158). Noting that the first use of white as a generic noun was in 1661, Horne argues that “the colonizers came to recognize that simultaneous enslavement of Europeans and Africans was too formidable a task and that narrowing bondage to the latter was more practicable” (31), so whiteness in the American context emerges well before American Independence, but the social separation of poor whites and black enslaved people was a protracted endeavor that gained traction with a rising class consciousness.

59 Roediger analyzes the emergence of a distinct, vicious anti-black Irish-American racism as a major force in anti-black labor union practices, but does not clarify whether he actually sees this particular racism as the genesis for a wider anti-black racism in laboring communities (137). The Irish community in the North during the Civil War was a major force in the emerging resistance to the draft, particularly in New York as a center of Democratic power (McPherson 609), as it meant putting one’s life on the line for African Americans and entailed that they would subsequently flood the job market after emancipation (cf. 1863 New York City Draft Riots in Roediger 136).
whites,\textsuperscript{60} were driven to these violent distinctions. After all, as Leslie M. Harris notes, in
the months prior to the Draft Riots the Democratic Party played no minor role in inciting a
white mob against African Americans (280), and, as Roediger shrewdly observes, there
was “a fear that the top and bottom in society would unite against the ‘producing classes’”
(Roediger 44), that is, against the white working and middle classes. Roediger’s quotation
resonates especially with Stoler’s notion of race as a “dense transfer point” (Stoler 252) of
power. In Roediger’s logic, the white middle class occupied the \textit{palatium} to demarcate
itself from the working class through the hegemonic whiteness easily-donned in the
\textit{palatium} while distracting from its own accountability of racism and class oppression by
cloaking the agency this whiteness bestowed and joining the working class in its resistance
against the upper class. To maintain the tenuous sense of alliance among these producing
classes, the middle class had to stoke the white working class’ anti-black sentiment through
rendering white working-class culture as symbolically black. Hence, the white middle
class, disregarding the security of the lower stratum’s class consciousness, may not have
had enough power to influence politics from the \textit{palatium}, but wielded enough power to
judge white working-class culture, which snowballed and affected formerly enslaved
people.

However, lower-class whites, W. T. Lhamon argues, did not want to break up this
“cross-racial energy and recalcitrant alliance between blacks and lower-class whites”

\textsuperscript{60} Recall Painter’s observations, first, that white slavery was common in Europe since the Viking raids in the
Early Middle Ages (34), and, secondly, that the muddled concept of whiteness did not yet carry unifying
potential, if it ever truly would thereafter, so clearly something happened that white servants all of a sudden
wanted to be perceived as ‘helps’ rather than ‘servants,’ distinct from black enslaved people. To Painter,
American whiteness is not a fixed concept hailing back to English Protestant settlers, but witnessed several
waves of extensions, including one in which the status of whiteness was conferred upon the Irish.
(Lhamon viii), so blackface with its stereotypes like the banjo-playing plantation slave who dances himself into a trance, Roediger argues, preserved a white working-class culture lost in the new industrial sobriety of the nineteenth century while, simultaneously, white workers “profited from racism in part because it enabled them to displace anxieties within the white population onto blacks” (Roediger 100). Yet the racist potential of blackface rests not just in the dehumanization of African Americans, but also in physical violence, as when mobs in blackface attacked African Americans during riots (106). With formerly enslaved people entering the free labor force after the Civil War, a new fear of being replaced joined the Northern white working class in addition to the fear of insurrection. African Americans could easily replace white workers, and the war had shown on both sides that African Americans were a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield (174). Roediger’s argument that some antebellum “whites thought blackface granted license” for violence (106, Roediger’s emphasis)—which surely constituted a far from perfect disguise—suggests that whites had to prove to themselves that they could be the more ‘real’ black people through blackface and that it would guard them from real

---

61 Eric Lott adds that “these new amusements [like minstrelsy, vaudeville, prizefighting etc.] were also primary sites of antebellum ‘racial’ production, inventing or at least maintaining the working-class languages of race that appear to have been crucial to the self-understanding of the popular classes, and to others’ understanding of them as well. In minstrel acts and other forms of ‘black’ representation, racial imagery typically soothed class fears through the derision of black people, and often became a kind of metonym for class. Even then it usually referenced only a cherished working-class relationship to its objects of fun; yet one occasionally finds in this imagery the tones of racial sympathy” (72).

62 Blackface was so potent because it enabled the white working class to kick both downwards and upwards in the social hierarchy through the scapegoat of humor, as “the real object of scorn […] was] either the white [would-be aristocrat] interlocutor or the dandified black” (Wilentz in Roediger 123). Casting the middle class together with the Black Dandy puts it in a role of servility, suggesting that the middle class is the slave of the ruling class, with only an imagined superiority over the working class.

63 Roediger nicely illustrates this projection by arguing that many racial slurs like ‘coon,’ ‘buck,’ and ‘Mose’ initially were terms applied to whites (100).
consequences of their actions, just like the folklore trickster figure of Jim Crow would deftly escape any predicament.

Just as nineteenth-century white Americans relied on racist humor and ‘fun’ to soothe its racial conscience, so too does the “Alt-Right” today use a casual racism in the guise of meme humor to subvert political and social changes. The “Alt-Right” is a prime example of how racism can latch onto other movements and traverse class and education.

In *Making Sense of the Alt-Right*, George Hawley traces the beginnings of the “Alt-Right” to ‘high-brow’ white nationalists such as Richard Spencer⁶⁴ (53) and Neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce. This appropriation hints at the most important property of the “Alt-Right,” one that significantly complicates situating the movement in any theoretical framework. The “Alt-Right,” Hawley shows, is a loosely-connected, leaderless movement that harbors a wide spectrum of ideologies ranging from fringe-libertarians as the most conservative (33) to hardcore Neo-Nazis and 3%ers (21) as the most radical elements. The “Alt-Right,” while being a wholly new form of political movement (11),⁶⁵ brings, like the Anti-Tom novel, no new ideological content to the table (15), has no policy beyond the destruction of the liberal and conservative establishment (18), and chiefly operates online through offensive humor and troll raids⁶⁶ on outspoken public critics like journalists (70-75).

---

⁶⁴ Spencer, whom Hawley credits with having coined the term *Alt-Right* through his website *alternativeright.com* (56), had long before Charlottesville ceded control of the website and the “Alt-Right” as a movement (63), so any founding ideology had been conquered when *Reddit* and *4chan* users took over after 2013. While *Reddit* bears more characteristics of a user forum, meme humor increasingly seems to dominate conversations, which is more or less the *raison d'être* of bulletin message boards like *4chan* or *9gag*.

⁶⁵ When asked to sketch the “Alt-Right’s” demographic, Spencer states: “[S]o many […] are tech savvy [*sic*] or tech professionals […]. I would probably say someone who is thirty years old, who is a tech professional, who is an atheist, and who lives on one of the coasts” (Spencer in *Making Sense*).

⁶⁶ I follow Hawley’s definition of *troll*: “An Internet troll is someone who fosters discord online, provoking strong emotional reactions from readers and often changing the topic of conversation. Trolling does not
After Charlottesville, it is safe to follow Erroll Southers’ taxonomy (4-5) and characterize the “Alt-Right” as a homegrown violent extremist movement. The use of violence at the protest was *de facto* pre-meditated:67 marchers used shields and poles on Day 1 and carried firearms on Day 2 (Heim). Moreover, James Alex Fields, Jr., drove his car into a group of counter-protesters, which killed Heather Heyer and injured twenty-eight others. In his new publication *The Alt-Right* (2019), Hawley notes that the “Alt-Right” has largely lost its potency on several fronts, most importantly “its reputation as a fun movement” (*The Alt-Right* 215). Yet, he cautions, a resurgence is not impossible (173). While the “Alt-Right’s” media exposure has largely deflated68 and key figures have split from the movement, #altright on Twitter is still in daily use,69 right-wing media outlet *Breitbart* is downplaying Charlottesville as an event “which Americans had largely forgotten” (Pollak), and the *Daily Stormer* is still churning out white-supremacist propaganda about the Charlottesville escalation as an Antifa provocation.70

always have an obvious political purpose” (19-20). More importantly, strategical trolling rarely seeks to persuade the counterpart of the debate, but introduce peripheral participants of the discussion or silent readers to “Alt-Right” ideology. A raid in this context is a coordinated effort of harassing other people or disrupting online events.

67 In leaked *Discord* (a voice-over-IP program similar to Skype, but primarily targeting a video-gaming audience) messages, it transpires that *Unite the Right* was a calculated provocation hoping for a violent outcome, as organizer Jason Kessler (under the handle of MadDimension) listed “picket sign posts” (MadDimension #gear_and_attire) as a means of melee self-defense, and overtly discouraged protesters from carrying firearms openly for the reason that “[w]e ultimately don’t want to scare them [Antifa members] from laying hands on us if they can’t stand our peaceful demonstration” (ibid.). He also noted that “[l]ots of normie [i.e. white Americans that do not share or have not yet embraced white nationalism] Confederates and Alt-Light will be in on it too” (MadDimension #announcements).

68 The *Unite the Right* 2 rally in 2018 completely failed to muster even a remotely similar turnout of protesters as the year before (estimates in the sources I consulted range between twenty to thirty people).

69 Although, as far as I can discern at the time of writing, it is chiefly used by opponents of the European Alt-Right, and mostly in the context of the eternal Brexit debate.

70 Andrew Anglin, the website’s editor, downplayed Fields’ murder of Heyer as an isolated case of road rage on the day of the riot (“Road Rage Does NOT Represent White Supremacy”), while he cast Fields, convicted to life in prison, as innocent in December 2018 (“Heather Heyer’s Disgustingly Bulbous Mother Demands Brutal Punishment for Innocent Man James Fields”). In the former article, Anglin discusses a picture from
The “Alt-Right” is fascinating as a theoretical concept, as it could not be more polymorphous and inherently unstable, filled with internal tensions that lead to frequent infighting and mutual denunciations (171); moreover, it epitomizes the occluding potential of imperial durabilities when whites from all classes and across the entire spectrum of far-right ideologies engage in racism easily dismissed by leaders and members alike to bait the GOP’s dwindling constituency of white, married, middle-class Christians, disenchanted with mainstream politics, into normalizing racism by ‘embracing infamy’ as a witty, subversive pastime. The parasitical nature of white freedom becomes visible once again when one pauses to think how this movement, with its imbroglio of contradictory ideologies and fraying attempts of cooperation, can actually be considered a movement. On a metaphorical level, the meme, the main tool of the “Alt-Right’s” virtual crusade, is parodic *per se*, as it constitutes the imitation of an idea. On a political level, the “Alt-Right,” like most populist opposition, can only exist as counterpoint to a mainstream culture. However, the “Alt-Right” has no interest in the American values that mainstream

the Charlottesville protest of Fields standing with the Neo-Nazi group *Vanguard* and cites the same group which denies that Fields was a member, while, in the 2018 article, he calls Fields’ trial a “hoax.”

71 Hawley quotes Richard Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist, who coined the term *meme*: “When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of the host cell” (Dawkins in *Making Sense* 81). The internet meme shares the replicability of Dawkins’ idea-as-gene, and takes on an imitative dimension when older memes are adapted or transformed into new formats. These imitations can obscure the original idea or intent behind a meme. Hillel Schwartz quotes John Locke on imitation as a central stage of human learning: “The issue, wrote John Locke in 1690 amidst debates about memory and language, is to get past the parrot [stage], ‘because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: Therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds’” (124 Schwartz’s emphasis). Schwartz, then, concludes that imitation and playful repetition “may be the prerequisites to reason and preamble to invention” (125). Thus, the internet meme can potentially obscure a racist original idea through seemingly harmless imitation or coopt existing ideas for racist purposes.
politicians marshal, which puts it at odds with Trump’s interest in reconstituting a past American glory presumed to be temporarily lost, since the “Alt-Right” does not have sufficient knowledge to pursue the underlying American values of preserving slavery that Horne identifies. The internet meme, in its humorous, multimodal nature, is ideal for making white-nationalist ideas palatable to a white mainstream audience, because it dwells in the liminal space of *différence*, obscuring the white-nationalist message, which can be denied or acknowledged depending on the situation, through the neutral signifier of its template, the humorous message.

Does the “Alt-Right,” then, even fit into our established framework of an imagined community? As already noted, it can hardly be considered as such a community, as there is little consent or peaceful coexistence in its ideological spectrum. However, in Hawley’s analysis it also transpires that both the media and liberal opponents, in casting Trump’s presidency as a Faustian bargain, have unwittingly conjured up the “Alt-Right” as a Mephistopheles more powerful than it probably would have been in its isolated virtual existence. Hawley specifically cites Hillary Clinton’s speech in Reno, Nevada, on August 25, 2016 (125) in which she is pre-occupied with panning Trump’s racist rhetoric and tying

---

72 Another *aporia* of the “Alt-Right’s” amicability towards Trump is his support of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s projects to annex the Golan Heights and expand West Bank settlements, which is problematic both for the “Alt-Right,” as Trump is *de facto* sanctioning Jewish expansionist projects, and also from a human rights perspective, as his support effectively spells an end to a two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. One might speculate about another American colonial project in Israel, as Sarah Yael Hirschhorn notes that 15% of West Bank settlers are American Jews (cf. Hirschhorn). Furthermore, the Jewish people in Trump’s inner circle, notably Ivanka Trump’s and her husband Jared Kushner’s open Jewishness, should greatly repel the more anti-Semitic factions of the “Alt-Right.”

73 It would seem that the common ground is that Trump and the “Alt-Right” intersect chiefly in their online dens—that is, Twitter for Trump, and forums for the more obscure far-right pages. While Twitter is the former’s mouthpiece for self-promotion and rallying a constituency against his targets (e.g. Hillary Clinton, Ilhan Omar, or LeBron James), online message boards are the latter’s isolated enclaves from which to disseminate racist content into mainstream social media.
him to the far-right. In a Saidian sense, Clinton thought the “Alt-Right” into being when she gave it mass-media exposure and cast it as a coherent, unified menace that even threatens “Republicanism as we have known it” (Clinton in Making Sense 122). I think her diction here illustrates the main problem: that the liberal bourgeoisie polices the whiteness of others—in this case, who gets to be Republican or not—instead of challenging the racisms it perpetuates itself.74 The susceptible individual educated middle-class white, struggling with epistemological challenges of his eroding social, economic, and sexual privileges in a rapidly changing multicultural society, will find no place on the left or the right to make his fears heard. Alienated from the agora, this white individual then turns to the palatium, and the liberal bourgeoisie, preoccupied with partisan politics, then amplifies their alienation by, denying them democratic participation instead of addressing their fears, thereby reducing the individual’s distance to the palatium. Unprovoked and only sheepishly punished acts of violence towards the “Alt-Right’s” most visible representatives further emboldens the movement’s sense of persecution, driving individuals partial to this ideology into the palatium.75 In short, the following chapters will probe how the middle

74 We should not forget Clinton’s own tenuous relationship to race as well. In a speech in New Hampshire in 1996, Hillary Clinton actively supported President Bill Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, an act that chiefly led to mass incarceration of African Americans (Colby), in which she drew on white fears of black insurrection when she called youths in gangs “superpredators” without conscience or empathy who have to be brought to heel. Similarly, she picked up on right-wing xenophobia when she lauded German Chancellor Angela Merkel for her compassion in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis, but argued that Europe must crack down on immigration, as, in her mind, it gave impetus to white nationalism (Wintour).

75 I must emphasize that, in my project of uncovering the middle class’ racist practices, the conditions that the left creates for white Americans to flock to the “Alt-Right” in no way exonerate these white Americans from their own agency or complicity in racist practices, as the left so often mocks the far-right for its rhetoric of victimization. I am interested precisely in these instances when communication fails between far-right extremists as a group that is clearly guilty of racist practices and the left as another that takes the moral high ground without taking any steps to bring these individuals from the palatium to the agora and reintegrate them into mainstream society. Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of the inadequate responses of the left towards the far-right. As some examples, Hawley cites the clash between the Traditionalist Workers Party
class occludes its own racism, and how ‘alternative’ movements invert middle-class polemics to bolster the ‘alternative’ ranks.

Now that I have outlined the “Alt-Right” and its influence on Charlottesville in broad strokes, it is time to bridge the temporal and theoretical gap between the Anti-Tom novel, *The Leopard’s Spots*, and white-supremacist science fictions. In the case of the “Alt-Right” one can see how a political movement can appropriate culture and take it completely out of its context to suit the movement’s goals. A look at white-nationalist iconography suggests that the rally was not a ‘heritage’ event crashed by bikers and outlaws, but that the former imagined communities of the slaveholding South and the Jim-Crow era were called upon by protesters for a specific purpose. Neo-Confederates’ goals differ significantly from those of Neo-Nazis and run-of-the-mill “Alt-Right” online trolls in that they seek the secession of the former Confederate states from the United States and independent nationhood (cf. “League of the South”). Furthermore, several sources collected by the *Los Angeles Times* show that Neo-Confederates were at the forefront of ensuing skirmishes (Pearce).

and anti-racist protesters in 2016 (*Making Sense* 169) as well as the attack of a masked attacker on Richard Spencer (170). One could add Jason Kessler being attacked and chased after his post-Charlottesville press conference (cf. Murdock). Although the violent reaction towards Kessler is not surprising a day after the riots, that the attacker received a $1 fine is a questionable judicial response to violence at best.

Most saliently, one could spot the Confederate battle flag and the Southern Nationalist flag, both frequently flown by members of the League of the South, a Neo-Confederate movement founded by former academics. The key figures Hawley names are Jared Taylor, Kevin MacDonald, and Greg Johnson. Taylor holds a BA in philosophy at Yale and an MA in international economics at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and founded the New Century Foundation that publishes the ‘race-realist’ magazine *American Renaissance* (*Making Sense* 26). MacDonald is a retired professor affiliated with California State University–Long Beach and functions as the editor of the white-nationalist webzine *The Occidental Observer* (28). Johnson holds a PhD in philosophy at Catholic University of America and created the webzine *Counter-Currents* (ibid.). Additionally, William Pierce held a PhD in physics and taught as an assistant professor at Oregon State University.
This evidence adds no new aspects to the present body of theory, but it is a vital foundation for theorization. Bringing these elements into focus reveals an important dynamic: the events at Charlottesville are not an entirely ‘new’ socio-political challenge, as disjoined as they may seem from the past, but rather are firmly rooted in and enabled through American history. Diverse governments in the Reconstruction era threatening white hegemony put in place by a white American Independence and reaffirmed by President Andrew Johnson’s failure to unite the country created the conditions for a return to white supremacy; the election of Barack Obama as the first black president of the United States and Clinton’s inability, after a decade-long campaign of demonization by Republicans, to speak meaningfully to conservative white middle-class Americans created, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, the conditions for a president like Trump. Trump is openly racist but has emerged after every affront, be it to political discourse or personal decency, unscathed. He thereby has created a “cognitive opening” (Southers 59) for disaffected white Americans to think their whiteness out loud.

Like the “Alt-Right,” the Anti-Tom movement is reliant on its opposition: without \textit{Uncle Tom’s Cabin}, Anti-Tom writers would not have had a narrative to model theirs on. The interplay of language, narrative, and semiosis creates this cognitive opening to seize control of the mainstream’s epistemology that is used against the opponent to do the latter’s work. It is in the \textit{palatium} that a non-bourgeois whiteness can be thought, where language has no meaning other than fighting words, where the restlessness of language is cancelled out in the chaos of lacking direction and erratic administration. And it is in this \textit{palatium} that imperial durabilities have the greatest impact, when a mainstream culture is unable—
and possibly unwilling—to communicate with an out-group that resists appropriation and turns mainstream polemics against itself.

Racial ideology plays a cheap conjurer’s trick on the ‘master’s’ mind that makes him believe that his privileged position is naturally ordained rather than due to a constructed narrative that requires force whenever ‘reason’ fails to govern. The durability of manorialism, with all its hubris and paranoia, found its way to America through plantation capitalism. It was capital that allowed the planter to become an aristocrat, to build this imagined community of noble Southerners and all others who wanted to be, by accumulating a peasantry to his heart’s content and his wallet’s reach. But with every new enslaved person and every violent deed, the anxiety rose that, one day, revenge might come. When the ‘master’ was no more a master in legal terms after the Civil War, it was only race science that held him in that position, and only attacks from the palatium in the shadow of the ruling class would give him a feeling that he could impact this increasingly crowded and industrialized world in which he, now, was only one among many. In turn, the present ‘master,’ having forgotten the epistemological legerdemain, is so puzzled by its arcane workings that he or she mistakes lie for fact and fiction blends into reality. Regardless of this self-delusion, however, the ‘masters’ of all periods were able to bolster

---

77 In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault briefly points to the durability of manorialism when he notes that “with feudalism, at a time when money and production were still at an early stage of development, a sudden increase in corporal punishments becomes evident—the body being in most cases the only property accessible” (25). The plantocracy, in turn, largely relied on torture to secure its hegemony, so any act of punishment—real or imagined—represents the correction against an insult to the imaginary sovereignty of the planter.
the durability of manorialism by embracing the corrosion of epistemological verities and
the invention of an affective ‘truth.’
Chapter 2: “The Comparatively Immaterial Question of Property”: The Pastoral Plantation and the Fear of Insurrection

17 – Listen for dangerous words. – Timothy Snyder

The shift to a racial claim to hegemony occluded feudalism’s privilege-through-landownership, a privilege invoked most clearly in the Anti-Tom novel. Looking at the moment this privilege exits the cultural subconscious to form an imagined community becomes vital in order to understand this shift. The palatium is instrumental for this rallying because it allowed people to come together from many states and walks of life: members of the Southern establishment like Caroline Lee Hentz are as much part of the movement as allegedly poor Northerners like Caroline E. Rush. The crucial question is what happens with the fear of insurrection when striated narratives of fiction and political commentary create an affective ‘truth’ of the South. The archive of this chapter will consist of Sarah J. Hale’s *Liberia* (1853), Hentz’ *The Planter’s Northern Bride* (1854), and Charles Jacobs Peterson’s *The Cabin and Parlor* (1852) to show that these writers use the refugee script as a means to center the planter as the imagined community’s hero, that they juxtapose overt insurrection and pastoral romance in order to bolster the durability of manorialism, and that they obscure insurrection in the skin/culture signifier to discriminate against the lower classes and recruit them in an anti-abolitionist movement.

---

78 Anti-Tom novelists did not comprise a coordinated movement. I use the term in the loose sense applied to the “Alt-Right,” as they are likewise a heterogeneous group that pursues a faintly mutual goal.

79 cf. Rush identifying as a Philadelphian and addressing a chiefly local audience (10, 15). Northern Democrats, in general, often catered to pro-slavery interests, particularly through President Franklin Pierce’s push for the Fugitive Slave Act. Moreover, Pierce’s signing of the Kansas–Nebraska Act (1854) not only undermined the balance of free and slaveholding states ensured by the Missouri Compromise (1820), but also paved the way to the Bleeding Kansas confrontations between pro- and anti-slavery advocates.
To begin an exegesis of the Anti-Tom archive, a few taxonomical remarks are necessary, as I am unaware of any examination of the entire canon that goes beyond description. The sub-genre of the Anti-Tom novel emerged following the 1852 publication of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, and, although these novels did not even begin to approximate the sales of Stowe’s novel, many were widely read in the North and South alike (“Anti Uncle Tom Novels”). The eighteen novels of this archive\(^80\) share one characteristic in that they all quote and attack Stowe directly or indirectly, yet in content and scope they diverge from one another markedly.\(^81\) Most of these writers, affiliating themselves with the South in some way, adopt the sentimentalist mode of Stowe’s narrative but invert it to suit the pro-slavery agenda.\(^82\) The similarities end here, however, and this archive also includes works that some scholars sheepishly group with anti-slavery narratives because the outcomes for slaveholders or slavery as a system are negative (cf. *Frank Freeman’s Barber Shop* and *The Master’s House*), even though these narratives are mired in pro-slavery sophistry. I will return to the taxonomical discussion in Chapter 4, for, as I will show, the criterion of appropriating and recriminating Stowe can extend well beyond the antebellum period.

---

\(^80\) The archive of twenty-seven pro-slavery works that Thomas F. Gossett outlines (212ff) is an eclectic mix of narratives: among others, non-fiction is grouped with children’s narratives.

\(^81\) While some narratives are set around the present time of Stowe’s publication, others take place well before the emerging antagonisms following the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The latter choice is no less an attack on Stowe, as it idealizes the comparatively unchallenged status planters enjoyed in the early nineteenth century as an indictment of abolitionists making laws like the Fugitive Slave Act necessary.

\(^82\) The protagonists are almost exclusively members of the plantocracy, and they are shown in their daily lives with their slaves, until some conflict arises, either through Northern trustees’ financial deceit or through mischievous abolitionists’ actions that coax the protagonists’ absurdly carefree slaves into escape or insurrection. The exceptions to this script are ‘Vidi’s’ *Mr. Frank*, G. M. Flanders’ *The Ebony Idol* (1860), V. G. Cowdin’s *Ellen; or, The Fanatic’s Daughter* (1860), and, perhaps to a lesser degree, Rush’s *The North and the South; or, Slavery and Its Contrasts* (1852) and Thorpe’s *The Master’s House*. 
Since these authors created narrative universes in which enslaved people are planets that orbit white suns, we can discern that the texts employ three different scenarios of the refugee’s fate\textsuperscript{83} and that the implications of these scenarios’ meaning for the writers’ pro-slavery agendas differ markedly:

**Scenario 1:** The refugee returns and is welcomed back (Jack\textsuperscript{84} in *Ellen*, Henry in *White Acre vs. Black Acre*, Tom in *Mr. Frank, the Underground Mail-Agent*, Crissy in *The Planter’s Northern Bride*, Tom in *Life at the South*, Cora in *The Cabin and Parlor*)

**Scenario 2:** The refugee returns and is rejected (Susan and Simon in *Aunt Phillis’ Cabin*, Vulcan in *The Planter’s Northern Bride*)

**Scenario 3:** The refugee dies in the North or in an attempt to return/upon return (Jack in *The Master’s House*, Betty in *Uncle Robin*, Charles in *The Cabin and Parlor*)

\textsuperscript{83} I have not attempted an exhaustive list here, but focused on the most prominent refugee characters in main plots or major side plots. Note that novelists may imbricate two scenarios, as in the case of *The Planter’s Northern Bride* and *The Cabin and Parlor*. Scenario 1 seems to be the default refugee plot, which either Scenario 2 or 3 can complement. We can easily divide this hierarchy into the faithful slave that is rewarded for their trust and the unreliable slave who is punished for transgression. In *The Planter’s Northern Bride*, Crissy, while in the North with her mistress, is abducted by abolitionists, and is thus allowed to return home, whereas Vulcan (as discussed below) actively labors to achieve freedom by violent means. Hentz’s work has a curious dynamic in which Judy, a freewoman of the North, seeks enslavement in a Southern household to escape Northern conditions. She replaces Crissy when the latter disappears, yet they both stay on the plantation once Crissy returns, so here the South is the refuge from the North, not vice versa. In *The Cabin and Parlor*, it is Charles who urges Cora to escape upon learning of the Courtenay’s financial ruin and Cora who hesitates and places her mistresses’ wellbeing over her own.

\textsuperscript{84} One could argue that Jack’s case belongs to Scenario 3, as he dies soon after the court trial (Cowdin 250) which he attends as a witness: in a sense, his punishment is deferred.
The most salient is Scenario 1, which in one respect conforms to but more fundamentally breaks with historical events. While it was imperative for slave-owners to regain their runaway ‘property,’ it is far from accurate that formerly enslaved people returned peacefully and of their own free will—after all, the number of runaway slave advertisements increased significantly in the 1840s, from which it follows that there must have been people willing to recapture refugees despite declining rewards (Franklin and Schweninger 177). In these novels, the runaway characters usually grow disenchanted with a freedom that has reduced them to poverty and starvation, and return to lead happy lives with their masters. In another common case, masters learn directly or indirectly of the slaves’ whereabouts and decide to go and save them—personally. These literary constructions of slave-owner benevolence defy the reality of punishments visited upon retrieved refugees. The resulting clash between the romantic mode and these violent facts would greatly undermine these writers’ political agenda, so they framed such punishment as an abolitionist libel.

However, an even greater incongruity between the imagined South and reality underlies Scenario 2, in which the refugees return successfully to their masters, who,

---

85 John Hope Franklin notes: “The punishments for runaways included placing them in irons or shackles, putting them in stocks, leaving them in jail, and, most commonly, whipping. ‘The highest punishment must not exceed 100 lashes in one day,’ a South Carolina planter instructed his overseer. For a first offense, an overseer might administer a mild correction, but even then the number of lashes might exceed 50, and on some plantations runaways routinely received 100 stripes.” (239)

86 The three scenarios compounded by the, at times, greatly diverging degrees of racial militancy also point to a lack of consensus on how to use narrative to overcome antebellum tensions. Where some indirectly admit slavery’s cruelties and argue for gradual emancipation (Rush 24), others occupy the opposite end of the spectrum and denominate African Americans an inferior race that must forever be governed or destroyed (Schoolcraft). This lack of consensus erodes the myth of an affective truth of ‘Slavery As It Really Is,’ for most writers clearly had different ideas of what the African-American future should look like and what must be done to bring about that vision.
pleading abused trust, decide to not take the slaves back. This outcome seems fabricated on both logical and economical grounds, although it was not altogether impossible. Slavery relied on inspiring fear among slaves: the odds for successful escape or insurrection had to be kept low and the prospect of harsh punishment aimed to deter the enslaved from attempting escape in the first place. Even if some slaveholders treated the people they enslaved in relatively humane ways, the social fallout on slaveholders for not exercising their ‘right’ to secure their property would have been considerable, as leniency would inspire more escape attempts and thus endanger the entire white community. Scenario 3, conversely, allows the Anti-Tom writer conveniently to bypass the dilemma of either being all-too-realistic, thus endangering the pro-slavery self-image, or completely sugar-glazing their narrative, thus conjuring up several narrative problems and aporias, as in Scenario 1. That way, the writer could indirectly exact punishment for transgression while preserving

87 The disparity between Northern industrialization and plantation economy becomes clearer when Sven Beckert notes that “[s]lave labor, moreover, incurred costs year round, sometimes for the life of the worker, and was not easily adjusted to the vexing boom-and-bust cycles of industrial capitalism. The model of the plantation, in other words, did not serve the needs of the factory” (181). According to Beckert, the cotton growth of Texas in the 1920s “equaled about 80 percent of that of the entire South in 1860” (353).

88 Most likely, Anti-Tom authors are distorting the motivation of refugees who returned to slavery so as not to abandon their families. But even in such a rare case, Tera W. Hunter argues (final par.), the refugee’s decision is a far cry from the rational choice that authors portrayed in these novels. John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger’s argument that “[t]he relationship between husbands and wives was used by some owners to control their slaves” (59) leaves room for the additional dynamic that slave-owners—encouraged marriage as a means to form bonds that would either prevent escape outright or force returns to loved ones and family—though they would also prevent marriage if the unions would attest to enslaved peoples’ agency (I am indebted to Jason Haslam for this latter insight).

89 The selfish function of the palatium becomes particularly clear when Walter Johnson notes: “[B]ecause their property was mobile, slaveholders came to see their individual interests in a common light. They came to understand themselves not simply as a class in themselves, but as a class for themselves. Slaveholding property did not exist in the set of ambient social conventions that allowed money to pass easily from one hand to another, or […] in the registered deeds filed somewhere in the county courthouse. It existed in social policing” (226). Johnson further quotes President Andrew Jackson, who sums up the communal agreement of slaveholders: “[I]t becomes a matter of mutual interest for each to protect his neighbor’s ‘rights’ in order to render his own more secure” (ibid. Johnson’s emphasis).

90 Ironically, this outsourcing of punishment to bolster the durability of manorialism is in line with industrial capitalism’s new forms of motivating people for work. Sven Beckert notes: “Coercion had almost always
the dignity of the protagonist, who was free to mourn the loss of an ‘extended family’ member. Still, all three scenarios circumvent the odious topic of retrieving runaways, one of the main points of conflict and source of increasingly heated sentiments between North and South after the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act\(^9\) (1850).

Yet regardless of whether a writer chooses one of the above scenarios or omits refugees or black characters altogether, even those who protest most ardently that they have philanthropic intentions towards African Americans still rail against abolitionist agitation and thus indicate the persistent fear of insurrection. With the panic of Caribbean insurrections still firmly imprinted on some writers’ minds (Peterson 172-173; Hentz 242; Rush 23),\(^2\) the media attention stoked by Stowe’s publication, compounded by trade boycotts, the Underground Railroad, and looming civil war raised a black specter that reminded the plantocracy of the British arming Africans to quell a revolutionary spirit among settlers, as, drawing on Horne, I have discussed in Chapter 1.

---

\(^9\) The act required that citizens and law enforcement in free states assist in the retrieval of refugees. It takes a prominent place in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* during Eliza’s escape (*Uncle Tom’s Cabin* Chapter VII).

\(^2\) These allusions to the West Indies may also be doing some cultural work to remind of British attempts to suppress settler rebellion. Alan Taylor notes in *The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia 1772–1832* (2013) that “American masters regarded their West Indian counterparts as the victims of an imperialism [i.e. Britain recruiting black soldiers in their war against France while simultaneously promoting abolitionism] rendered more insidious by its new moralism. Virginians feared the arrival of that imperialism on their own shores, as warships pushing into Chesapeake Bay with black troops on board” (121). In this sense, the novelists not only appeal to the horrors of an insurgent mob, but also to the imperial oppression in the guise of abolitionists infiltrating the plantation.
The cotton-like softness of the romantic narrative therefore covers the imagined corpses of the rising panic pre-1856,\(^93\) yet some pro-slavery writers deliberately broach this taboo. However, the autotelic interpretation that Anti-Tom writers\(^94\) raise the specter of insurrection for the sole purpose of dispelling it (Cowan 298) is unconvincing. Such a characterization falls short of the profound issue with which the writers were dealing and what invoking slave insurrection offered them, as opposed to conforming to the ‘Plantation Wonderland’ scheme. The novels I discuss in this chapter not only form a continuum of different forms of unrest, but also, and in disparate ways, further the pro-slavery cause and reinforce the plantocratic ideal. Rather than shattering the paternalist myth of the plantation as the only viable social form for America, these instances very much sustain the plantocratic claim to power by prophesying the endangerment of white supremacy,\(^95\) even the entire white race when, as pro-slavery authors would put it, ‘savagery should triumph over civilization.’ As I argue in Chapter 3, these narratives supply Dixon with his blueprint for *The Leopard’s Spots*, because he continues imagining the infringement of whiteness

\(^93\) In his article “The 1856 Slave Insurrection Panic and the Williamsburg Gazette,” Tynes Cowan analyzes the spread of unsupported rumors in Southern media outlets leading up to the presidential election, seeing them as expressions of both the Southern white psyche’s frail state and the value of deploying black stereotypes as remedy for the insurrection panic. He argues that the insurrection panic arose simultaneously in several states rather than hopping from state to state (297). Cowan astutely observes that the “constant interplay between the appearances and realities underlying the peculiar institution turns every encounter between black and white into a ritualized play of wits” (299), so printing became a key technology which excluded black people from gathering information and develop counter-strategies to the suggested ‘best practice’ for planters to handle insurrection rumors.

\(^94\) Most scholars take Hentz as Stowe’s main polemic adversary, and, hence, the larger part of scholarship focuses on her.

\(^95\) About a decade before the main wave of Anti-Tom novels, George Lippard’s *The Quaker City: Or, The Monks of Monk Hall* set the foundation for Southern visions of white genocide through coexistence with non-whites in Northern urban centers with his gothic imagery of the “Quaker City,” purportedly modelled on his own experiences of the chaotic, riotous life in Philadelphia (second par.), as a swamp of violence and amorality.
and dreams of an ultimate retaliation that reestablishes the planter’s pseudo-aristocratic position on a throne that rests on a foundation of working-class violence.

The Anti-Tom novel that most clearly articulates the fear of insurrection is Sarah J. Hale’s *Liberia; or, Mr. Peyton’s Experiments*. The theme of achieving emancipation resembles Augustine St. Clare’s anagnorisis in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, in that Charles Peyton, the planter-protagonist, through his own illness in the expository chapter realizes that the finiteness of the master’s life can doom his slaves to toil and death. Despite Charles’ seemingly anti-slavery agenda, *Liberia* circumvents the slavery debate and reinforces white supremacy by denying people of African ancestry an American identity, as they can only thrive when far removed from civilization. Charles’ eponymous experiments to create a free existence for his slaves across North America fail on account

---

96 Karen Sánchez-Eppler astutely remarks: “Perhaps the most disturbing insight of [Stowe’s] novel is that the utopian freedom she constructs is predicated upon the absence of black bodies: Tom’s ‘victory’ wins him the freedom of heaven; George, Eliza, and the rest find theirs only in Liberia” (50). Thus, *Liberia* also shares with *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* the imperialist assumption that there is no space for black people in America: George, his family, and Topsy leave to settle in Liberia despite the knowledge that “Liberia may have subserved all sorts of purposes, by being played off, in the hands of our oppressors, against us” (Chapter XLIII). In turn, Sutton Griggs possibly responded to Hale and certainly to Stowe when, in *The Hindered Hand* (1905), Ensal Ellwood sets out to return from Libera after Earl Bluefield implores him via mail to fight for black rights. Ensal responds to the landlady who thinks his duty to his ‘race’ lies in Liberia: “My race, dear madam, is to catch the first steamer returning to America. Just now the whole world with me converges to that one point” (Chapter XXXVIII, Griggs’s emphasis). I am indebted to Jason Haslam for recommending Sánchez-Eppler’s article.

97 This claim, however, significantly contrasts pro-slavery arguments that hold that return to Africa would only make black people ‘revert to savagery,’ assuming enslaved people to have some degree of ‘civilization’ that white supremacists so often deny them. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion in *Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford* (1857) corroborates this logic by arguing that “it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration” (26). That this was not an argument for the American Colonization Society, but for keeping African Americans enslaved, should be a *prima facie* matter.

98 He helps some slaves settle on farmland (Hale 39) and others settle in Philadelphia (in which, reminiscent of the anti-black mob in *The Cabin and Parlor*, “an old feud between the lowest class of laborers and the colored race had broken out afresh in the suburbs” [87]). All to no avail. Virginia, Charles’ wife, meets a runaway slave of a neighboring planter at Niagara Falls, who complains to her about the hardships he has had to endure in freedom and affirms that he would return if not for his cruel master. Bizarrely, Virginia
of their own ‘inherent laziness’ and the white North’s hostility towards free black people, so sending them to the newly-founded colony of Liberia becomes the only possible solution, fashioning Africa in the United States’ own image.

In Liberia’s exposition, the neighborhood of Cedar Hill, Virginia is ostensibly being terrorized by a black insurrectionist mob. Charles is bedridden, and the family deems it too dangerous to transport him to Somerton, where other planters gather in safety; hence, the entire family and its slaves stay. Since the overseer flees upon increasing reports of the approaching mob, it is up to Nathan, the novel’s Uncle Tom character, to organize both the armed defense of his master and, on the next day, the collective exodus to Somerton, with the feisty, tough Keziah at the head of the cavalcade, “her yellow turban […] , like Henry the Fourth’s white plume, a guide to the hottest of the fray” (31, 32). However, the mob remains an unseen specter, and it is only the imagination of slave and master alike that conjures up their impending destruction. That it is white women and children (and one convalescent white man) that depend on slaves for safety is a gendered allegory of white vulnerability among an African-American host, but, what is more germane is that the subsequent exodus to safety and the colonization of Liberia resembles a puppet theater recounting the Pilgrims’ flight to America. In the novel’s patriotism claims solidarity with him by saying: “[T]here was not a person in Clinton who was not glad when they found you were really off” (114ff).

Ironically—the narrative makes some efforts to approximate reality—Margaret Fairfax, Charles’ widowed sister, dismisses the fear of insurrection expressed by Mr. Burke, the plantation’s overseer, that “the negroes are rising all through the country” by remarking: “It may be only a false rumor” (Hale 14). For the lack of concrete information, the family is reliant on slaves’ reports to keep watch on the mob’s approach (Hale 20, 23).

Hale muses in her preface: “What other nation can point to a colony [i.e. Liberia] planted from such pure motives of charity; nurtured by the counsels and exertions of its noblest, wisest, and most self-denying statesmen and philanthropists; and sustained, from its feeble commencement up to a period of self-reliance and independence, from a pure love of justice and humanity?” (iv).
rests an attempt to disguise slavery as a false freedom, as Liberia enabled pro-slavery advocates to gain distance from African Americans and to keep them dependent on American support—or, later, to wield the power of recognizing it as a sovereign nation (see Ryan; Taketani). In short, their energy must be harnessed to power the South by making them do their slave work elsewhere, or, put differently, the specter of insurrection that inflects the portrayal of Keziah101 can only be exorcised in the African jungle, which would convert destructive energy into meaningful colonization—that is, meaningful for an American neo-colonial expansionist project.

While Liberia opens with an ethereal uprising, insurrection builds up until the climax of Hentz’s The Planter’s Northern Bride, and is much more material as a result. The novel synthesizes plots of many previous Anti-Tom novels.102 While traveling in New England, this story’s planter, Russel Moreland, meets his future wife Eulalia Hastings and takes her South. Eventually, the story’s Northern villain Hiram Coates, disguised as the fake Methodist minister Mr. Brainard, arrives at the plantation under the pretense of preaching to the area’s slaves while actually laboring, with the blacksmith slave Vulcan as his main assistant, to foment insurrection against their masters. Despite the care Brainard puts into remaining undetected, the plot is discovered, Brainard flees, and, in a prolepsis

101 Before being bought by Charles, Keziah had a cruel master, Mr. Carpenter, under whose beatings she grew “more obstinate, perverse, and sulky; at times a strange fire gleamed in her eyes, like that which may be seen in a newly-encaged wild beast; and if the mutterings of her restless lips could have been understood, she would have been guarded like some savage animal” (27). Despite the alleged mellowing of her vengeful spirit, Keziah displays schadenfreude when learning that Mr. Carpenter’s house had been pillaged by the mob (40).
102 Cf. the incisive Northern schoolmaster Mr. Bates and Dinah in danger of being lured away in Life at the South, the rhetorical fisticuffs of the protagonist with his love interest’s abolitionist father for consent to marry her in Buckingham Hall, and the rhetorical exchanges between the Anti-St. Clare and a vocal abolitionist in The Cabin and Parlor (I have presented a reading of the Anti-St. Clare in Mitterauer).
in Chapter XXI, reappears as the philanthropist Mr. Howard, presenting Vulcan as a mistreated refugee to capitalize on abolitionists’ cravings for the spectacle of a maimed slave. Through Moreland’s testimony, corroborated by his Northern friends, Brainard is finally apprehended.

What makes this novel distinctive is how it connects religion to insurrection. Hentz repeatedly evokes Gabriel Prosser’s revolution, a planned armed revolt in Henrico County, Virginia, in 1800 that was discovered, leading to the trial of seventy slaves. Gabriel, the mastermind behind the revolt, was a trained blacksmith, teaching other enslaved people to produce swords (von Daacke 421). Presumably modeled on him, Vulcan gains a sort of rebellious autonomy that is fueled by rage, crafting “[r]ude swords and murderous weapons” (Hentz 455) that he literally tempers with the anger generated through his slave labor as his sweat-drops fall on the weapons, “hissing as they evaporate” (ibid.). Furthermore, the local black church is used to store ammunition for the revolt (489), so religion conceals black insurrection as well as white (in the latter case, extremist abolitionists like Brainard with no regard for social peace). The novel’s allusions to Gabriel’s planned revolt expand the story’s conflict far beyond the rural plantation, indicating that the danger of black insurrection may spread throughout the country.

103 According to von Daacke, the uprising would have been the “largest attempted slave revolt on U.S. soil” (421) had the plan been set into motion.
104 A major influence on Gabriel’s revolutionary sense was Richmond’s Christian abolitionist scene; he enjoyed a fairly unsupervised life which enabled him to participate in abolitionist meetings (von Daacke 421) and use black church gatherings as a recruitment pool for allies.
Moreland frees Vulcan, because he does not want involuntary service. He proclaims: “[T]he rebel arm which dared to lift itself against my life, must never more wield the hammer or strike the anvil for me” (574). Contrary to Gabriel’s fate, who was tried and executed, Vulcan is released into freedom—a departure from real punishments of refugees one can hardly overemphasize. Thus, Hentz preserves Moreland as the immaculate intellectual hero, even though the Bible, according to pro-slavery readings, gives him every right to make Vulcan bend to his will. Yet one should not mistake Moreland’s forgiveness for magnanimity. The trickster nature of Brainard renders him, in a sense, a ‘white’ iteration of Jim Crow, but his final discovery and implied prosecution underscore the return to captivity for the slave character, so we witness a bifurcation in the refugee character. Moreland wields the power to make Vulcan render unto him again, yet, through the durability of manorialism, his privileged position demands an unflinching loyalty. If that loyalty wavers, it can never be trusted again. Freeing Vulcan removes the master’s protection, and Vulcan can only helplessly descend into the black Northern slums, which Anti-Tom narratives consistently portray as dens of vice and corruption. Consequently, Vulcan disappears from the narrative, which, however, still exacts

105 Moreland says: “I forgive you, Vulcan, […] but I cannot place that confidence in your fidelity necessary to the relation that has existed between us. I have always said that the moment one of my slaves became rebellious in feeling to me, they might go. I want no unwilling service. […] The relation of master and servant must exist no longer” (573)

106 Eric Lott sees the Jim-Crow figure as a compounding of the clown and the slave-tale trickster: “Clowns and harlequins are as often lovable butts of humor as devious producers of it; slave-tale tricksters are frequently (though not always) champions, heroes, backdoor victors for the weak over the strong” (22). That the ‘low-born’ and racially ambiguous Brainard changes fluidly from preacher to abolitionist lecturer is not only Hentz’s indictment of what she perceives as a gullible Northern bourgeoisie, but also her warning that each of Brainard’s victories, though effectively thwarted in the novel, can lead to greater damage if not immediately curtailed (cf. Lott 24-25).
punishment on Brainard by rendering him through this approximation to Jim Crow non-white.

Whereas these two novels deal overtly with black insurrection and enslaved peoples’ hate targeted against masters, insurrection is projected onto the white working class in Peterson’s *The Cabin and Parlor; or, Slaves and Masters*. In this novel, the pseudo-aristocratic family falls into poverty in the first chapter; the patriarchal planter Mr. Courtenay dies unexpectedly, leaving behind a pile of debt that forces the surviving members to sell mansion and slaves. Isabel, the elder Courtenay child, must take charge of her family by becoming a schoolmistress; Horace, the younger child, goes to work in an unnamed Northern city. About halfway through the novel, a new protagonist, the planter Walworth, enters the narrative upon returning from Europe. He rescues a runaway slave of the Courtenays and her child from an anti-black mob; and he meets Horace at the latter’s deathbed, as the boy has been brought down by poverty and disease after working for the local philanthropist Mr. Sharpe “like a naygar” (191), as the Irishwoman with whom Horace stayed remarks so tellingly. Via this connection, he learns of Isabel’s fate, and rescues her from poverty by uncovering the debts as fraudulent, eventually marrying the Southern belle. In this novel’s case, anti-black rioting in the urban North buttresses

---

107 The financial allure of Uncle Tom narratives was irresistible to some Northern publishers. T. B. Peterson published two works of the antebellum Anti-Tom canon, including his brother Charles’ novel (cf. Meer 77-78). The opportunism of some Northerners is epitomized in Charles Jacobs Peterson, who firmly stood with the Union when the war broke out (Hayne 514).

108 It is difficult to overstate Peterson’s romanticization of the plantocracy, in which he traces the Courtenays to English aristocracy, fighting alongside Richard I in the Third Crusade (11). More importantly, the imagery of the Courtenay mansion emphasizes the political power the family holds over the region: “The magnificence of its staircase, said to have been copied from an ancient manorial hall in England, was the boast of the county. The furniture of the drawing-room had been purchased in Paris, and was still the most elegant in the neighborhood” (ibid.).
Southern hegemony when Walworth traces the source of Mr. Courtenay’s and Horace’s demise to the finance capitalism of merchants like Skin & Flint and local players like Sharpe, fully knowing that it is this capitalism that enables anti-black riots like the one he experienced himself.

While Brainard in his preacher role is the mesmerist in *The Planter’s Northern Bride*, anti-black racism issues an enchanting call to violence in *The Cabin and Parlor* that enthralls the city’s white population. Walworth, after meeting Horace for the first time, is pulled along with the people gathering in the streets (198) and the city’s streets choke the angry mob into a “[s]urging and heaving” (ibid.) mass, “like a living ocean” (ibid.). The way the mob sets out to punish the ‘insolence’ of African Americans and how it quickly determines to attack the black slum after burning down a black church leads Walworth to believe that the riot was premeditated (207-208). The imagery of fire underscores the notion that an all-consuming white wrath finds articulation in this mob: the church burns with “a forky tongue of flame” that “[throws] a wild, ghastly radiance on the faces of the upturned crowd” and, although it eventually “smoulder[s], it [is] evident it [will] not soon go out” (203, 206). That most African Americans, upon receiving news of an emerging riot, have fled the city only exacerbates the mob’s anger, which acts like one body and targets anyone who does not join it in destruction.

---

109 Brainard uses religion to prevent the slaves from betraying the insurrection plot by making them swear on the Bible (453) and he holds an almost supernatural sway during sermons (448). Even the loyal slave preacher Uncle Paul cannot resist the “magnetic influence of Brainard, who at last found a spot in the negro’s yielding heart where he could place the lever of his strong will, and move him to his purpose” (454).

110 The pretext of the riot is an African-American social gathering that was violently disrupted by inimical whites, against whose assault the participants defended themselves (199).
Although the working class dominates in the riotous imagery (cf. 199), Walworth’s unnamed Northern acquaintance, whom he met earlier at a soiree, explains that anti-black sentiment is shared, more or less, by all classes, up to the most enlightened, though in a less degree. You will see, to-night, that while the active work will be done by the coarsest ruffians, there will be looking on, and passively, at least, engaged in the riot, thousands of comparatively well-dressed men. (200-201)\(^{111}\)

Thus, working-class ferocity that may potentially endanger national security is condoned and implicitly supported by the middle class, through its sheer presence giving the lower class the imprimatur of justified destruction—perhaps the most precise figurative description of the *palatium*’s end. The mob, here, much resembles Roediger’s black-faced mobs ‘acting black’ through a ferocity and savagery that pro-slavery writers, presumably chiefly affiliated with the middle class, so often inscribe on the white lower class to emphasize the ‘lowly’s’ primitivism.\(^{112}\) At this point we should recall Roediger’s argument about the early nineteenth-century interracial culture wherein whites joined black festivities and revolts of their own accord, for it is precisely this signification that casts the

---

111 This passage gains an almost oracular quality: Charles Chesnutt isomorphically describes the Wellington riot in *The Marrow of Tradition*: “The crowd, too, surrounding the hospital, had changed somewhat in character. The men who had acted as leaders in the early afternoon, having accomplished their purpose of overturning the local administration and establishing a provisional government of their own, had withdrawn from active participation in the rioting, deeming the negroes already sufficiently overawed to render unlikely any further trouble from that source […] On the outskirts of the crowd a few of the better class, or at least of the better clad, were looking on” (196-197).

112 Note also the Indigenous presence in the white mob when “[n]othing was heard but the crash of houses being sacked, the shrieks of the terror-struck fugitives, the pattering of missiles like a storm of hail, and the wild whoop of the demoniacal crowd” (211).
white working class as black, which they could only protest by meting out violence to African Americans. Only in this manner could they enter into a place of power and become, for a short moment at least, equals in hate with the other classes. While the other two novels marshal white supremacy as the only practicable social form, this narrative expresses a nihilism through the unstoppable surge\textsuperscript{113} of the raging mob. Thus, the novel calls for white nationalism, for, as long as African Americans share the same geographical space, there can never be social peace, and whites are in danger of falling into savagery (see my discussion of Dixon’s mixed-race anxieties in Chapter 3). This key scene articulates the pro-slavery distrust of the union with free states,\textsuperscript{114} in which the upper classes have no medium (overseers) to punish the target (slaves), so higher strata ineluctably must succumb to this very hate themselves, and betray their imagined nobility. Therefore, the novel marshals slavery not only for controlling a subjugated other, but for stabilizing the North in order to ensure the South’s safety from social atavism.

The three refugee scenarios and the novels’ diverse treatments of insurrection indicate the lack of a unified movement among pro-slavery voices and that, while most of their writers belonged to the bourgeoisie, all struggled to regain control of the plantocratic whiteness that Stowe unsettled. However, they also point to the many different avenues

\textsuperscript{113} As Walworth’s companion notes: “I fear the riots have broken out […]. They generally rage, when once begun for several nights. I shouldn’t wonder if a second negro church was to burn!” (207). The mob then moves on to the black quarter and a group of rioters attacks Walworth in his attempt to rescue Cora from the mayhem (224-225). But as with Moreland, one should not mistake Walworth’s intervention as a defense of equality. On the contrary, while the novel condemns the ‘black’ behavior of Northern whites, it calls for a more nuanced white supremacy that ensures the docility of lower-class whites and black people alike. Walworth effectively expands his control over plantations by marrying into the Courtenay household.

\textsuperscript{114} Within Anti-Tom writers’ arguments rests the implicit fear that influential abolitionists would erode the durability of manorialism through legislation and force emancipation into being without care for the consequences it would have in, for example, Philadelphia or Southern communities.
writers explored to depart from the ‘master’ narrative of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* to defend the imagined community of white slaveholders. Anti-Tom novels are less a mode of quelling abolitionist rhetoric than permutations to save face within their own community and to gain allies among a less radical or more easily influenced audience. While some Northern anti-abolitionists agreed\textsuperscript{115} with Stowe, others vehemently disagreed, which is corroborated by the longstanding anti-abolitionist sentiments in the North as expressed in the New York anti-abolitionist riots of 1834, the New York Irish-American anti-abolition influx to the Democratic party around 1856 (Delahanty), as well as pro-slavery advocates’ appetite for replies to Stowe, to which publishers in Philadelphia and New York eagerly catered.\textsuperscript{116}

The insurrection narratives are particularly relevant because they transcend the mere propagandistic aim of pro-slavery propagators and sympathizers to remove the terrible Legree mask that Stowe put on them in the public eye. More than just fortify a

\textsuperscript{115} As Thomas Chase Hagood’s study shows, the praise of Stowe’s story—less as a narrative and more as a document of reality—did not stop at the Mason–Dixon line. He notes that prominent Southerners like Mary Boykin Chesnut, among others (cf. 78, 80), were torn by Stowe’s portrayals (76), disagreeing with them but still taking up the book for a second reading. Chesnut notes: “Topsys I have known, but none that were beaten or ill-used. Evas are mostly in the heaven of Mrs. Stowe’s imagination. People can’t love things dirty, ugly, and repulsive, simply because they ought to do so, but they can be good to them at a distance; that’s easy. You see, I can not rise very high; I can only judge by what I see” (125).

\textsuperscript{116} As Sarah Meer notes, J. B. Lippincott published seven works of the antebellum Anti-Tom canon (78), which is neither surprising given fellow publisher James Cephas Derby’s description that “[p]rior to the civil war the business of J. B. Lippincott & Co. lay mostly south of the ‘Mason and Dixon’s line’” (387) nor a clear indicator for pro- or anti-slavery tendencies. However, despite Meer’s conclusion that Peterson’s writing of *The Cabin and Parlor* out of greed rather than the disinterested will to write a truthful account of the South that he professes in the preface (78), it seems hasty to ascribe the publishing of Anti-Tom novels predominantly to pecuniary motivations. Daniel Fanshaw, the printer of *Buckingham Hall*, was a member of New York’s first temperance society founded, among others, by abolitionist Lewis Tappan (Wilentz 147), which suggests that Fanshaw at least moved in ardent abolitionist circles. By contrast, Thomas McElrath, publisher of *The Master’s House*, was a business partner of Horace Greeley, a man known for his stentorian voice against slavery but ambiguous attitude to further emancipation. We should therefore be cautious not to simplify the possibly complex and conflicted relationship Northern publishers had towards slavery, even though, by publishing these Anti-Tom novels, they admittedly did a poor job at diversifying voices in the slavery debate.
Southern audience, the Anti-Tom novels address a wide readership to warn that, if the polemics were to continue, not only would the nation face disunion and war, but also that, in the case of successful abolition, the ‘problem’ that is African Americans would migrate North.\footnote{Although historians often date the beginning of the Great Migration to emancipation, the onset of the major migration is in the second half of the 1910s (Cohen 72). Note how the fear of the exodus is more governed by a fear for hegemony, as free labor dropped costs significantly: wages came much cheaper for planters than having to sustain enslaved people for their entire lifetime, and, when the major migration began and threats proved insufficient to retain African-American workers, employers raised wages and reduced rents to compete with the North for African Americans (Grossman 63).} In that sense, appropriating African-American voices had a more profound impact than merely repeating pro-slavery casuistry. By deploying these distorted voices, Anti-Tom writers present the possibility of black insurrection or anti-black mobs on rampages as a case of biological determinism: African Americans need to stay out of the cities and work on the plantations under supervision; otherwise the country would plunge into chaos. The white-nationalist conclusion in *The Cabin and Parlor* calls into question the reliability of democracy, when not even the upper stratum of the white community is impervious to the temptations of violence.\footnote{Herman Melville acknowledges this sense of white atavism when the speaker in “The House-Top” remarks on the Draft riots in 1863: “All civil charms / And priestly spells which late held hearts in awe— / Fear-bound, subjected to a better sway / Than sway of self; these like a dream dissolve, / And man rebounds whole æons back in nature” (“The House-Top”).} Hence, what Anti-Tom rhetoric occludes is the anti-democratic call for a politically dominant slaveholding caste to secure its plantocratic whiteness.

This observation is not new by any means, but it is new to emphasize the way Southern lower-class whites are obscured. It is uncanny\footnote{Sigmund Freud’s reading of *uncanny* as ‘unhomeliness’ (from the German *unheimlich*, derived from ‘homely’) invokes a form of not belonging. In short: there is no place for a white lower class in the South, according to Anti-Tom novelists, which erases a long history of white servitude before the slave trade accelerated in the eighteenth century.} how the Southern white lower class rarely finds any expression in these narratives—if anything, white Southern workers
are disparaged as useless servants.\textsuperscript{120} Liberia and The Cabin and Parlor attempt to enlist a Northern audience for the pro-slavery cause. In neither of these novels is there a place in the South for non-‘aristocratic’ whiteness, but there is in the North, and both novels argue that Northern whites of all classes will be directly affected should emancipation come about. In the Anti-Tom novel, white Americans without slaves either become overseers or end up as charity cases.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, lower-class whites, confronted with the impossibility of social upward-mobility, must be able to vent their frustration on African Americans. Abolitionist attacks on slavery directly challenge the self-image of aristocratic superiority, and, thus, constitute an attack on the fundamental values of the nation. The skepticism expressed by advocates of slavery towards a democracy that includes abolitionists is in keeping with the original spirit of the Founding Fathers, who envisioned a white polity.

However, Anti-Tom writers ultimately followed a self-interested goal, namely that the planter caste, in whose shadow they thrived, would prevail. What they did not understand was that formerly enslaved people would become a crucial tool for suppressing wider white working-class uprisings after the Civil War, as African Americans would be frequently employed—North and South—as strike breakers (Roediger 177-178; Cantor 74, 104-105), with little prospect of finding permanent employment alongside whites. The wide availability of black free labor due to unions’ racist exclusion of African Americans

\textsuperscript{120} cf. Uncle Robin in His Cabin, in which the Stephenses, a Northern couple, move South but do not want domestic slaves, choosing bound white children (112) instead with whom they are so exasperated that they eventually decide to have slaves after all.
\textsuperscript{121} For example, Dr. Boswell in Uncle Robin fights a lost cause to alleviate the irremediable sufferings of the Irish population in the South (Page 30ff). For more examples, see the demise of an impoverished former slaveholding family in Caroline E. Rush’s The North and South or the dangerous work of young British chimney-sweeps as a different form of indentured labor and ‘blackness’ in Tit for Tat by “A Lady of New Orleans.”
from skilled jobs was essential in entrenching capitalism in America around the turn of the century. By the time the Anti-Tom novelists commenced their literary assault, it was already too late to save the system.

Antebellum Anti-Tom writers knew they had to reconcile the beautiful with the uncanny, the landscape with the visible and invisible horrors of violence, torture, insurrection, and massacre. The fear of insurrection, thus, assumed a bipartite function in antebellum Anti-Tom novels. First, writers juxtaposed overt insurrection and pastoral romance in order to bolster the durability of manorialism. Secondly, they obscured insurrection in the skin/culture signifier, making a violent white working class stand in for an emancipated African-American population as a way of, at once, discriminating against the lower classes and enlisting them in an anti-abolitionist movement. However, the war came, and so did emancipation, and between them they removed the plantocracy from their real and imagined land. All they had left was their whiteness and a “Lost Cause.”
Chapter 3: “Blackened Stripes and Stars”: Romancing the Invisible Empire

Features distorted in the flickering light,
The faces are twisted and grotesque.
Silent and stern in the sweltering night,
The mob moves like demons possessed.
“Witch Hunt” – Rush

With abolitionism transforming into a different kind of political activism, pro-slavery advocates pitting a soft affective ‘truth’ about the benevolence of Southern slavery against the hard facts of emerging free labor capitalism threatened to dethrone white hegemony should they not find a new purpose and enemy. With plantocratic whiteness as the only means of stratification left to them, the malleable science of race ensured the durability of manorialism by imagining both African Americans and lower-class whites of the New South as inferior. The fear of black insurrection reemerged now when mixed-race people—now free and, despite segregation efforts, part of the public sphere—would become a new internal enemy notoriously hard to discover. Although anxieties about racial mixture were not a phenomenon unique to the post-Civil War era, they take center stage now. The ‘one-drop rule’ to some degree allowed policing ‘biological’ non-whites, but how could one control ‘race betrayers’—that is, people who are ‘biologically’ but not ‘socially’ white—who undermined white supremacy? Thomas Dixon’s *The Leopard’s Spots* (1902)\(^\text{122}\) exemplifies how whiteness receives a social dimension when the ‘right’ phenotype is no

\(^{122}\) Unlike the Anti-Tom canon, Dixon’s *The Leopard’s Spots* and *The Clansman* have received a measure of critical attention as the foundation for D. W. Griffith’s *The Birth of a Nation*, which catapulted the Ku Klux Klan into early-twentieth-century mass culture. Although I will make passing remarks to *The Birth of a Nation*, my focus lies on *The Leopard’s Spots* because it is the explicit Anti-Tom novel among Dixon’s works. With over a million copies sold (Ruiz-Velasco 148), *The Leopard’s Spots* can be said to have reached and even exceeded Stowe’s success. Additionally, through the novel’s film adaptation, Dixon anchored white supremacy in the consciousness of the American body politic—something antebellum Anti-Tom writers tried to do, but, as argued in the previous chapter, could not.
longer sufficient to secure membership in the imagined community and must be accompanied by specific behavior. Understanding how Dixon deploys this social dimension of race when he abandons the anonymous chivalry of the Ku Klux Klan that would literally give cover to unruly, hence socially non-white, whites and when he embraces the unmasked violence of the Red Shirts, creating a racial panopticism to police whites, is highly instructive, suggesting that restoring the pastoral plantation romance is a pretext for promoting a fascist fantasy. For the same reason, it is important to understand how Dixon vanishes George Harris from the narrative, erasing any danger of subversion to idealized whiteness through racial mixing. Violence in the Southern romance now becomes a means of backing up the affective ‘truth’ with tangible force.

While many scholars acknowledge Dixon’s direct assault on *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, none have explored his debts to the Anti-Tom archive. In addition to laying bare the Anti-Tom roots of *The Leopard’s Spots*, I wish to expand on observations other critics have made on whiteness, sexual violence, rhetoric, and romance (Ruiz-Velasco; Gunning; Gilmore; Brown) in order to grasp the intersections of gender, race, and imperialism and understand not only Dixon’s anti-black message, but also his stratifying agenda for whiteness through which he elevates plantocratic whiteness into a hegemonic position. Understanding these intersections will allow me to see how the novel bolsters the durability of manorialism, and how violence becomes a part of the Southern pastoral romance so that black insurrection can be countered more directly than in the antebellum Anti-Tom novel.

An *ab ovo* narrative of the New South, *The Leopard’s Spots* begins at the end of the Civil War, when the defeated North-Carolinian Confederate soldiers return from the
battlefield. Simon Legree, the villain of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*,\(^1\) appears on North Carolina’s political scene and, together with an entourage of ‘carpetbaggers’ and ‘scalawags,’ seizes the state in an iron grip that leads to the *de facto* disenfranchisement of all whites and to forced interracial marriage among the population. The provocations escalate; the Ku Klux Klan\(^2\) restores white supremacy; the ‘Invisible Empire’ disbands once it “has done its work” (171). Book II begins with a *prolepsis* of about 10 years: Charlie Gaston, the protagonist, is an aspiring lawyer, and a love plot between him and Sallie Worth, the daughter of cotton mill owner General Worth, commences after his speech at Independence.\(^3\) Charlie’s political and romantic rival Allan McLeod is the story’s main villain, who sides with the Republican-Fusionist government and denounces Charlie as lower class to General Worth.\(^4\) Charlie, honing his rhetorical skills and receiving help from the Red Shirt movement, increasingly gains political power among the North Carolina

---

\(^1\) I am less interested in Legree’s non-white status and more in Allan McLeod’s as a scalawag (cf. Romine 141 in Gillespie and Hall), for the latter is Charlie’s antagonist and impacts the narrative more profoundly, while the former has, admittedly, the greater socio-economic impact, but is ultimately much closer to the planter-capitalist that Dixon idealizes. Together with the non-white doublings of Nelse and Dick as the sexual predators punished by death, and McLeod and George Harris as the ones erased from the narrative, McLeod must take precedence in this reading, whereas a reading of Legree would chiefly revert to unproductive comparisons with *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*.

\(^2\) The real Klan is conventionally divided into three waves: the First Klan during Reconstruction, the Second Klan during the first half of the twentieth century, and the Third Klan in the wake of the Civil Rights movement until the present day (cf. Newton). The Klan was founded in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866 by former Confederate soldiers. Arkansas and North Carolina are the only states that broke up Klan chapters due to their escalating violence; in most other states, government intervention was required to suppress the Klan—and President Ulysses S. Grant allegedly enforced this law only sheepishly (Newton 23). Dixon predictably omits the outlawing of the Klan in his eulogy.

\(^3\) Dixon fictionalizes North Carolina’s geography. Hambright is presumably Shelby, for Dixon notes that Hambright is his birthplace (x), and Independence is likely to represent Wilmington, as Dixon’s counterpart of the *Daily Record* is located there.

\(^4\) When Charlie presses General Worth for an explanation why he is being denied contact with Sally, Worth notes that he has “positive information that [Charlie’s ancestors] on one side are what is known in the South as poor white trash” (361).
Democrats, much to the chagrin of McLeod.\textsuperscript{127} In a fervent speech, Charlie moves the crowd so much that the new white-supremacist sentiment and the ensuing African-American disenfranchisement pacifies the state. He becomes Governor of North Carolina, marries Sallie, and expels McLeod, thus claiming both the romantic as well as the political South for whiteness.

In the authorial triangle of Charles Chesnutt, Thomas Dixon, and Sutton E. Griggs,\textsuperscript{128} we can still feel the repercussions of Stowe’s narrative and the literary skirmishes that ensued from its publication in the antebellum period. However, the obvious appropriation of Stowe’s characters aside, The Leopard’s Spots is an Anti-Tom novel in more profound ways than Trent Brown suggests when referring to the “refiguring of the

\textsuperscript{127} Consequently, Charlie and McLeod are romantic and political rivals, as conquering Sallie means securing both sexual and political dominance of the New South; this literary device is in keeping with Anti-Tom tradition, as the binary oppositions of Southern courtly love/Northern economic matches and feudalism/capitalism establish the narrative’s main points of conflict. However, Dixon adds racial opposites with Charlie embodying plantocratic whiteness and McLeod, though according to Dixon’s own racial taxonomy white, embodying the ‘scalawag,’ or, more precisely, the racial apostate. In the fin-de-siècle socio-political vocabulary of the United States, scalawag refers to whites supporting the Republican-Fusionist party. Generally, scalawag denotes a ‘disreputable fellow,’ but, more germanely, possibly also stems from the Scottish scallag, denoting ‘farm servant’ or ‘rustic,’ an alteration of Scalloway, in turn one of the Shetland Islands. Not only does this Scottish connotation racially classify McLeod as a Celt, and, thus, as part of the interracial lower-class culture so objectionable to the upper class in the early nineteenth century, but it also doubles him with the non-whiteness of George Harris because of his obsession with and sexual aggression towards Mrs. Durham.

\textsuperscript{128} The Leopard’s Spots (1902) appeared soon after Chesnutt’s The Marrow of Tradition (1901), a fictionalization of the Wilmington coup d’état in 1898. In the coup, white supremacists used Alexander Manly’s newspaper article in The Daily Record, an African-American publication, in which he attacks the notion of endangered white womanhood, as justification for ousting the Republican-Fusionists and reinstating a Democrat government. In turn, Dixon’s glorification of the Wilmington coup caused Sutton E. Griggs to respond fiercely in The Hindered Hand (1905), dedicating the afterword to attacking Dixon (cf. Wallinger). Thus, the Wilmington coup rekindled and fueled the Anti-Tom novel’s popularity. Some sources cautiously suggest that Dixon may be responding to Chesnutt when Charlie and his white-supremacist entourage shut down an offending black newspaper and expel the owner (Dixon 209). I think the overlaps between Dixon’s and Chesnutt’s narratives do not end there (cf. the “Secret Nine” responsible for the Wilmington coup d’état versus the Big Three in Chesnutt and Hogg, Legree and Shelby in Dixon), and that Dixon was very much aware of and just as enflamed over Chesnutt’s novel as he was over Uncle Tom’s Cabin (cf. his citation of Chesnutt in his article “Booker T. Washington and the Negro” or Smith 49 in Gillespie and Hall). Therefore, I treat the correlation as a given.
domestic romance novel as a vehicle to advance arguments for a more ruthless policing of black men because of the danger they posed to whites” (Brown 59). Antebellum Anti-Tom writers’ romances warned of insurrection in the conditional tense; by contrast, Dixon’s narrative is in the imperative mood, requiring white America to subjugate African Americans on the mere suspicion of insurrection. But in *The Leopard’s Spots* the plantation romance is not endangered by possible slave insurrection: instead, it gains its romantic qualities precisely because of the potentiality of white Southern insurrection against a seemingly corrupt government, “reclothing the blood-stained earth in radiant beauty” (6). The Civil War becomes a stain on the feminized South’s sexuality, its antebellum virginity sullied, but all the more desirable as it has passed the trials of adolescence into ‘womanhood.’ Danger is part of this floriferous paradise. When the sun set behind the peaks of the Blue Ridge, a giant negro entered the village of Hambright. […] He walked softly up the alley that led toward the kitchen past the ‘big’ house, which after all was a modest cottage boarded up and down with weatherstrips nestling amid a labyrinth of climbing roses, honeysuckles, fruit bearing shrubbery and balsam trees. The negro had no difficulty in concealing his movements as he passed. (ibid.)

Drawing on the racial stereotype of the black buck, Dixon blends the danger exhibited in the black man’s gigantic size and strength and the mute stealthiness of his unhindered

---

129 The female sexual connotations of this floral symbolism should not be lost on the reader.
130 Carlyle Van Thompson writes: “The concept of the black man as a buck resides in the historical breeding of black men and women in an effort to increase the number of slaves [by producing] black bodies for consumption and tremendous white wealth. Many slave owners did use certain black males as studs. […] Linking black male slaves to animals, white society considered slaves literally subhuman, beasts. They were dangerous, breeding animals who were never more content than when toiling in the fields; idle, they were
movement into the romantic imagery of the sunset, just as the lethal grandeur of a dragon in the Nibelungenlied suffuses the sublime mythological landscape with uncanny terror. Even though the man in question is Nelse, the Gastons’ former slave, unconditionally benevolent and subservient, his ability to move about the pristine flora unnoticed foreshadows a dangerous potential underneath the surface. However, the offender and the punished are split into Nelse and Charlie’s mischievous black childhood friend Dick. Nelse usurps white male sexuality in the Gaston household when he receives the sword of Charlie’s father and Dick supposedly exercises this white sexuality when he is suspected of and lynched for raping and killing Tom Camp’s daughter Flora (Dixon 374). The situation recalls the refugee scenario in The Planter’s Northern Bride, which similarly splits Vulcan and Brainard. In this case, however, Dixon’s aim is not to foreground desirable behavior while transferring punishment, but to emphasize that not even subservience will save Nelse from ontological erasure.131

The sexual violence of Dick is foreshadowed in Nelse’s appropriation of the sword. Rumors emerge of a black mob132 on a rampage towards Hambright (102). The rumors are shiftless drunkards and potential rapists” (2). Furthermore, racial mixing lets the black buck pass as white (3)—or, in Nelse’s case, gives him stealthy qualities when the feminized foliage, so Dixon leaves us to assume, hides him from the white gaze. Compare Dixon’s with this passage from Herman Melville’s “Benito Cereno” (1855) of the slave Atufal: “Captain Delano’s attention was caught by the moving figure of a gigantic black, emerging from the general crowd below, and slowly advancing towards the elevated poop. An iron collar was about his neck, from which depended a chain, thrice wound round his body; the terminating links padlocked together at a broad band of iron, his girdle” (75). This stereotype has proved particularly durable. See the character of Montel Gordon in Steven Soderbergh’s Traffic (2000), or, for a more isomorphic portrayal of Atufal that queers the buck to amplify the signification of sexual deviance, Xerxes entering the battlefield in Zack Snyder’s 300 (2006).

131 Nelse dies (165) after a gang of black people beats him up for “votin’ agin his colour” (108), as he is a vocal supporter of the Democrats.

132 In conjuring this specter of the mob, The Leopard’s Spots echoes Hale’s Liberia; as in Liberia, this specter only haunts the narrative extradiegetically.
triggered by the killing of a white family of five, but the public fails to identify a perpetrator. What is more pertinent is the effect the rumor has on black sexuality. For the sake of defending the Gaston house from the depredations of the mob, Charlie’s mother gives Nelse the sword that Charlie’s father bequeathed to his son (13-14). The narrator asks: “Was there just a shade of doubt in her heart as she saw his black hand close over its hilt as he drew it from the scabbard and felt its edge! If so she gave no sign” (103). The danger is emphasized even further when the sexual tension is dispersed immediately after, and the white phallus in the form of the sword, which Nelse had sharpened for the purpose of defense, disappears from the narrative. By removing the sword, Dixon foreshadows the purgation of ‘race betrayers’ when a black mob mortally wounds Nelse, who, despite his self-proclaimed ferocity in battle, is unable to defend himself. Nelse’s utility for Dixon to act as an extension of the father that brings Charlie through childhood expires once the Klan seizes control of Hambright and white masculinity alike, so nothing shields Nelse from punishment for the appropriation of white sexuality.

Understanding the genocidal mission of The Leopard’s Spots necessitates detailed analysis of the work the Klan and the Red Shirts do to further white supremacy in this novel. To Dixon, the Klan, with its ghostly appearance and promise of merciless vengeance to create ‘order,’ is a central element of his project to romanticize beleaguered whiteness and assuage struggles within the white imagined community. Because of the novel’s romanticization of chivalry, morality and fidelity become just as important components of whiteness as the skin/culture signifier. Aside from Dixon’s occasional invocations of Charlie’s aristocratic ancestry, he departs from the antebellum Anti-Tom values that equate
gentility with goodness and assigns truthfulness as a quality of whiteness. Despite Allan McLeod’s ostensible Scottish descent (177), he is a racial apostate and therefore no less non-white than Nelse or Dick, so unsurprisingly under his command the Klan quickly transforms into a “crowd of desperadoes” (169) after its main mission is accomplished and boredom rises among the youth. Ruiz-Velasco astutely notes that Dixon leans extensively on visual imagery to create the novel’s system of binaries (cf. 149), and that the whiteness of the Klan’s robes creates tension because it at once supports Dixon’s agenda and undermines it, because he “constructs a hyper-whiteness, one that elides differences, not an invisibility of whiteness itself but an invisibility about ‘shades’ of whiteness” (Ruiz-Velasco 156). Dixon’s obsession with uniformity is ironic given the exceptionalism of the plantocracy that he seeks to promote, perhaps precisely because the image of the anemic, bookish Anti-St. Clare squares so poorly with nightly raids and ritualized cross burnings on hillside slopes.

The lightning with which *The Birth of a Nation* ‘wrote history’ seems to have blinded scholars with regards to white-supremacist groups’ function in the novel. This idealization of anonymized whiteness may be the salient aspect that *The Birth of a Nation* adapted from *The Leopard’s Spots* and that created an afterimage that would obstruct scholarly vision, but it merely concludes the novel’s exposition. As Elaine Frantz Parsons shows, the real First Klan was a sartorial hodgepodge of bull horns, animal skins, calico masks, and clownery (830)—in short: a deliberate mockery of the gentility that the Anti-

---

133 Recall President Woodrow Wilson’s durable if apocryphal endorsement of *The Birth of a Nation* when it became the first movie screened at the White House Family Theater. Wilson supposedly characterized the movie to be “like writing history with lightning. My only regret is that it is all so terribly true” (Wilson in Benbow 509).
Tom novel, in general, champions, and a direct subversion of the planter ideal that Dixon, specifically, sets up for Charlie, who is the antithesis to the carnivalesque. The Klan hoods support the notion of inverted blackface (Ruiz-Velasco 156) as their material frequently was cotton, a fabric processed by enslaved people. The hood covers every individual’s face and strips him of distinct whiteness; Dixon likens the hoods to the “mail helmets of ancient knights” (80). This fetishized cotton garment not only evokes the Christianizing terrors of Crusades in the Middle East, but also the honor of knighthood in service of a monarch. Dixon transports the Southern fascination with the European feudal system into the twentieth century in order to shore up the sense of white entitlement. Not without reason does Dixon contrast the North with the South by framing courtship in the South as chivalrous, whereas in the North it bears the gravity of commerce. Romancing the belle comes so naturally to the plantocratic Southerner because he is reared in this system. Thus,

---

134 The hierarchical stratification of the Second Klan is visible in the garments’ materials, as standard Klan robes were commonly of linen or cotton, whereas higher ranking members would wear satín robes (cf. Frantz Parsons 819). Contrary to Dixon’s mythology, the First Klan had its roots in minstrelsy and the carnivalesque in both appearance and behavior (Frantz Parsons 813ff).

135 Sir Walter Scott’s *Ivanhoe* (1819) with its returning crusaders and ailing nobility is an intertext of *The Leopard’s Spots*. Mark Twain sees *Ivanhoe* as a particularly durable narrative that shaped Southern notions of romantic chivalry when he notes: “[*Don Quixote*] swept the world’s admiration for the medieval chivalry-silliness out of existence; and [*Ivanhoe*] restored it. As far as [the American South] is concerned, the good work done by Cervantes is pretty nearly a dead letter, so effectually has Scott’s pernicious work undermined it” (*Life on the Mississippi* 470).

136 Sallie marvels: “Down here, the boys don’t seem to have anything to do except to make their girl friends happy, and feel [Southern women] are the queens of the earth, and that [Southern men’s] only mission is to minister to them” (Dixon 250). Dixon embarks on a paternalist mission of keeping Southern women subordinate by framing dependency as courtly love and derogating the contractual nature of marriage under the emerging market economy, as Southern women during Reconstruction started to claim traditionally male spaces. Amy Dru Stanley argues that, whereas the market economy split Northern society into the two separate spheres of household and production, that is, female and male, the spheres were conflated in the antebellum South as men “had exclusive right to own all household property as well as their wives’ labor and its proceeds” (81), keeping women in *de facto* bound relation to them. However, contract law “set its imprimatur on a relationship between women and the marketplace unmediated by husbands” (ibid.): it was clearly in Southern ideologues’ interest to maintain control over gender roles, especially because “[t]he spread of wage labor […] threatened to make men [in their domesticity] more like women” (85).
this elevation of the Klan into feudal nobility—imperfectly—reconciles the planter ideal with the Klan’s violent sodality.137

Here, we should pay attention to a crucial narrative leap that must inform our understanding of the difference between the outwardly anonymous but internally familiar Klan and the heralded but unidentified Red Shirts. Although the historical Red Shirts138 were absorbed by the Second Klan, in The Leopard’s Spots they have a very distinct function. After all, the Klan effectively disappears from the narrative scene, although its former members are still present.139 The genesis of the Klan in Book I follows a cause-and-effect pattern140 that sparks a migration-like movement that sprung up “like magic” as a “spontaneous and resistless racial uprising of clansmen of highland origin [an origin that

137 While the ‘Invisible Empire’ nowadays is mostly ridiculed by liberal artists as an idiotically harmless bunch (see O Brother, Where Art Thou? and Django Unchained), it was and is a profound source of violence and terror not only to African Americans but de facto any individual that could be classified either as non-white or otherwise deviant from Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Even BlacKkKlansman, despite its much more nuanced portrayal, is not entirely innocent of this nostrum. A dangerous fallacy, as the Klan has always been comprised of whites of all classes. Frantz Parsons calls the Klan a “chaotic multitude of antilblack vigilante groups, disgruntled poor white farmers, wartime guerrilla bands, displaced Democratic politicians, illegal whiskey distillers, coercive moral reformers, bored young men, sadists, rapists, white workmen fearful of black competition, employers trying to enforce labor discipline, common thieves, neighbors with decades-old grudges, and even a few freedmen and white Republicans who allied with Democratic whites or had criminal agendas of their own” (816, see also Harcourt 5-6).

138 The real Red Shirts rose in 1876 in South Carolina, their emergence tightly linked to the Democratic campaign that year. One Red Shirt group, led by former Confederate General Matthew C. Butler, attacked the town of Hamburg, South Carolina, which had a predominantly African-American population, and put it under white paramilitary control (cf. White 306). The Red Shirts were instrumental for the Democrats in intimidading the white and black population into voting Democrat or violently preventing them access to the ballot box. Unsurprisingly, Butler was elected Senator, and Benjamin Tillman, also a former Confederate soldier and hailing from a planter family, was elected Governor in 1876.

139 Ultimately, the Klan does little to improve characters’ economic situations. Charlie’s law career is off to a slow start, Tom Camp’s business is outdone by his African-American competition (205), Durham’s optimism for African Americans’ salvation fades. What the Klan reinstates is the possibility for whites to continue dreaming of the plantocracy outlined by antebellum Anti-Tom writers. It is this very state of social insecurity of the male main characters’ experience exacerbated by the chaos of the ensuing lynch law justice that striates whiteness and unsettles clear caste relations among whites.

140 cf. Tim Shelby’s lynching because of sexual harassment as a climax to a concatenation of other offenses (150).
McLeod shares and which he betrays] living along the Appalachian mountains and foothills of the South, and it appeared almost simultaneously in every Southern state produced by the same terrible conditions” (151). The Klan activities prompt the Legree regime summarily to arrest over 200 people on the mere suspicion of Klan affiliation, and, whether most of them are members or not, Dixon invests them with a collective personality in their convivial gathering in jail until freed due to lack of evidence (157ff).

The Red Shirt movement that arises in Book III diverges significantly from this camaraderie and makes the Red Shirts more militaristic and congeneric in its white-supremacist project than the Klan ever could be:

A strange thing had occurred that had upset all calculations. Beginning at Independence a race fire had broken into resistless fury and was sweeping along the line of all the counties on the South Carolina border and over the entire state with incredible rapidity. Everywhere, the white men were arming themselves and parading the streets and public roads in cavalry order dressed in scarlet shirts. This Red Shirt movement was a spontaneous combustion of inflammable racial power that had been accumulating for a generation. (418-419)

There are two important observations to be made here. First, cause and effect do not rule the Red Shirts’ actions, but Dixon renders the state plagued by a vague mix of incompetent black officials, burglary, and highway robbery, as well as the incendiary black newspaper (Dixon’s adaptation of The Daily Record article, which sparked the Wilmington coup). Because of this pent-up rage, the movement summarily lashes out against an undefined
body of victims. Secondly, the Red Shirts are not a secret society and display their power openly. Whereas the Klan miraculously gathers 1,500 men to parade the streets of Hambright while all its citizens are present lest suspicion should fall on any of them, Charlie’s “Speech That Made History” speech\(^\text{141}\) is followed by

five thousand white men dressed in scarlet shirts [who ride] silently through the streets in solemn parade, and six thousand negroes [who watch] them with fear. There [is] no cheering or demonstration of any kind. The silence of the procession [gives] it the import of a religious rite. A thousand picked men [are] in line from Hambright and Campbell county and they [form] the guard of honour for their candidate for Governor. (450)

Not only are the Red Shirts more numerous than the Klan, but in their undisguised display of strength they also have a different function. Gone is the chivalry that rides to the aid of white womanhood;\(^\text{142}\) now begins the reign of a militaristic effort to disenfranchise and oppress the population—an effort that politicians like Charlie outsource to an

\(^{141}\) In the speech, Charlie draws on the ‘Aryan’ race “with its four thousand years of authentic history” (440) as proof for white superiority. He contradicts himself when he breaks with the past by making America rise above Great Britain (439), “[t]he old world is buried and a new one appears,” while invoking the spirit of the Founding Fathers to herald a return to white supremacy (444). Dixon beautifully illustrates the taxonomic confusion of the white race when Charlie lumps together Celts, Normans, Huguenots, Vikings, Angles, Saxons, Danes, Gauls, Franks, Romans and Spartans (446), which runs counter to the Protestant Anglo-Saxondom that Dixon espouses with his Appalachian clans that descend from the mountains to create order—a practice the real Second Klan would take up expanding its pool of victims to whites deviating from this Protestant Anglo-Saxondom.

\(^{142}\) In \textit{Red Record}, Ida B. Wells-Barnett suggests that a fear prevails among male whites of white womanhood embracing interracial sex, spelling the demise of the white male sexual prerogative. Furthermore, she astutely notes how this sexual fear is chiefly an invention of Reconstruction: “While the master was away fighting to forge the fetters upon the slave, he left his wife and children with no protectors save the Negroes themselves. And yet during those years of trust and peril, no Negro proved recreant to his trust and no white man returned to a home that had been despoiled” (Chapter 1).
‘organized’ outfit. Whereas, during the KKK procession, mothers were smiling and children were playing in the streets out of relief at their liberation from oppression (153), the Red Shirt parade is one of pronounced gravity. White maternal relief and childish naïveté are replaced by African Americans’ naked fear, which stems from the specter of random lynch ‘justice.’ In other words, Dixon effaces the Klan’s origins in the carnivalesque, the ‘fun’ remnants originating in minstrelsy, and superimposes a “new oppressive mode” (Lhamon ix) that blends into the raw, visible anger of extremism marching in paramilitary solemnity through the streets. This striated racism of minstrelsy, however, proves much more durable than the Red Shirts or the Second Klan. According to Lhamon, the wit of minstrelsy “smudges and budges the line between invalidity and validity, exclusion and joining, nobody and somebody” (ix)—a description that rings true for “Alt-Right” meme humor that would rally torch-bearing men in T-shirts and shorts in lines of two around a Confederate monument over a century later. Although the promise of fun and belonging may have drawn them to the group, it is the prospect of collective violence that drains the parade of any lofty end.

Not only does Dixon distinguish the Red Shirts from the KKK’s chivalric order, but he also makes them signify differently. Their unity is not born out of a secrecy that allows them to target separate individuals with murderous intent, but out of a policy to

---

143 The idea of mobilizing and managing a ‘mass’ figures prominently in Dixon’s diction. I counted over thirty variants of ‘organize’ that frequently appear in oppositions of organized white supremacy and organized black crime (e.g. “the old answer of organized manhood to organized crime” [152]).

144 One must not forget the representational violence inherent in the entertainment of minstrelsy. In this racial mimicry “blackface comic and white spectator shared jokes about an absent third party” (Lott 142) thereby “faithfully [reproducing] the white slaveowners’ viewpoint” (Saxton 176), while, in its pop-cultural allure in the antebellum period, commodifying the culture of a dispossessed peoples (Lott 8).
normalize and institutionalize anti-black violence. While the KKK seeks to intimidate the Legree regime from behind the hood, the Red Shirts inspire fear in the African-American population through bare-faced hate. The mob’s implied tidal hatred (435) echoes the uncontrollable bloodlust of the mob in *The Cabin and Parlor* and represents the conflagration of racial violence the political elite carefully fostered rather than representing an attempt at ‘controlled’ racial deterrence. Although the Red Shirts’ faces are bare, they are more anonymous than the KKK. The unification of the white race that Dixon sees in the anti-Fusion movement—we should be reminded here of the unifying purpose of *Unite the Right*—only stratifies the white imagined community into bourgeois and working class when Charlie enters the upper class by ascending to the gubernatorial office, but remains a mediator and manipulator of the lower classes due to his former relation to poverty. I would argue that Dixon was very aware of the problem that this stratification causes for his propagandistic agenda of unifying the ‘white race,’ which is the reason that he immediately abandons the political scenery and ends with a distracting scene of courtship reminiscent of the antebellum plantation love plot. White supremacy has triumphed, and, now that it has reinstated antebellum conditions, Dixon can safely resurrect a key trope of the Anti-Tom novel. The challenges that these disparate classes of whiteness have faced in the past and face now in their recurrent position of power are tacitly bypassed.

Who, then, is Dixon’s chosen enemy? Antebellum Anti-Tom writers found theirs in other white intellectuals, largely obliterating the vocal host of black abolitionists in the debate. Because of Dixon’s main mission to unite the white race, his prime concern is not only fighting ‘social’ non-whites like McLeod, but also ‘biological’ non-whites like
George Harris. White fear of black sexuality is anchored in the paranoid futurate vision where racial background is elusive to even the most ‘trained’ eye. The Africanist presence in his socially black characters troubles Dixon’s narrative for it destabilizes the skin/culture signifier, which is why he has to abandon the Klan’s hyper-whiteness. Since the possibility of insurrection is semiotically coded into black skin, it is now impossible to know when and how black insurrection will break out because the death knell of slavery inaugurated the rise of people of mixed ancestry in the South from their enslaved position into the agora.

The Red Shirts solve this problem because they do not don hoods, and their scarlet shirts are the only sign of membership in the imagined community. To return once more to the two parade scenes: in contrast to the “fifteen hundred men” (153) that ride in the Klan parade, it is now distinctly “five thousand white men dressed in scarlet shirts” (450, my emphasis) that parade the street upon Charlie’s victory, presumably on foot as Dixon remains ambiguous in his sparing description of the parade. With this rendering visible of working-class whiteness through raising a host of foot soldiers, Dixon restricts the racial identity of the insurrectionist element. The Red Shirts are less ambiguously white than the Klan, because the formers’ whiteness is displayed for everyone to see; they have become, in a sense, the other extreme of the skin/culture signifier in that the fetishization of their military appearance makes their blind obedience immediately observable, heralding the rendering of a mindless mass unto a leader that fascist regimes would idealize.145

145 In 1954, C. L. R. James characterized the Klan depicted in The Birth of a Nation as a premonition of fascism: “The Birth of a Nation is the first great epic of a modern nation in revolutionary crisis. And reactionary as is his attitude to the Negro, in his famous scenes of the organization of the white-shirted Ku Klux Klan, Griffith gives us a portrayal, to this day unsurpassed, of the rise of the Fascistic movements which
Dixon’s narrative solution to the problem of ‘biological’ mixed racial identity is all too evident in the character of George Harris, the son of Eliza Harris in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin.* Dixon establishes a side plot for George Harris, who lives with Everett Lowell, a Member of Congress, and receives a humanist education, thereby becoming a “gentleman and scholar” (390), which echoes his father’s privileged situation at the bagging factory as long as his labor was unoffending and easily exploited (cf. Stowe Chapter II). Dixon portrays Harris as having a “dog-like worship” (389) of Lowell, making the former kiss the latter’s hand in veneration (392). But Harris offends Lowell by asking consent to marry Lowell’s daughter—who like Sallie is repulsed at the prospect of racial amalgamation—which activates the refugee script where Harris sinks into ‘negro’ criminality because he is unemployable among the white working class, generating strikes and discord wherever he appears.

When Harris comes to some money, instead of using it to improve his situation as Frank Freeman does in *Frank Freeman’s Barbershop,* he undertakes a pilgrimage to

---

146 Dixon weaves together several elements of Stowe’s narrative and antebellum Anti-Tom novels—among others, leaning on the theme of white slave labor in *The North and the South* and the black sexual predator admitted into the domestic sphere as in *Mr. Frank or The Ebony Idol*—in order to counter the martyrdom of Tom in *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* as a synecdoche for killed or lynched slaves.

147 Dixon consciously applies the toponym of Lowell, Massachusetts as a patronym to frame Everett Lowell as a synecdoche for the New England textile industry. In that respect, it is telling that Lowell, who also embodies abolitionism since he represents the state of Massachusetts, rejects Harris as an equal, interested in him only as far as his own tolerance of the latter promotes his own career.

148 We should note how Dixon inverts Stowe’s George Harris and his pride in his comparative autonomy and good standing with his employer, and how Dixon draws on the white-supremacist notion of liberals mindlessly showering non-whites with charity while neglecting their own race when he twists his George Harris into a complacent character upon whom is bestowed every luxury and the foremost education solely on the basis of his ancestry.

149 Dixon pedantically avoids referring to Harris as a ‘mulatto’ (except for when he introduces Harris), implicitly trumpeting his *ceterum censeo* that future America will be an Anglo-Saxon nation (e.g. 336) by effacing the only character of mixed ancestry who would be in a position to rival Charlie.
locales of lynchings, as well as the place where his mother crossed the Ohio River. Placing a wreath at the “ash-heaps at the foot of the monument in Indiana to the great Western colleague of Thaddeus Stevens” (407), he goes on to trace the Underground Railroad and, in “a village which was once a station of this system,” finds “one of these ash-heaps in the public square” (ibid.)—“strangest of all,” the narrator remarks ominously, as Dixon attempts to contrast the durability of his white empire with an imagined transience of the abolitionist spirit that the Underground Railroad represents. The novel then abandons Harris, just as The Planter’s Northern Bride abandons Vulcan, punishing his disloyalty with erasure from history. Just like Charlie’s mother and the narrator alike do not know what Nelse thought the moment he received Major Gaston’s sword, Dixon leaves unclear what the “one thing left” (ibid.) is that Harris must do. This erasure is a shift in the punitive methods that white-supremacist fictions adopt, because Harris, unlike Dick, is not monumentalized through lynching but absorbed by the lynching sites in that they are not only evidence of an individual’s lynching, but also a representation of the wider project to completely destroy non-whites.

This vanishing is not a warning for non-whites to know their place; Dixon begins his genocidal fantasy here. It is the reification of lynch law in the blackened earth as a monument that bespeaks Dixon’s dream in which the threat of black insurrection is obliterated in mass violence. To state that Harris commemorates the victims of lynch law justice ignores his descent into crime, the mysterious dispersion of tension, and the erasure
of his ontology upon his discovery of ash-heaps in a public square in the North. What Dixon venerates is not the victims, but the lingering aura of violence in these uncannily durable ash-heaps—they become monuments themselves of reinstating exclusive white control over the land. The ghost of the lynch mob that is resurrected in this ritual constitutes a gothic presence that makes Harris realize the purportedly overwhelming power and unity of white supremacy before he is ontologically swept away. If the “Western colleague” truly signifies Abraham Lincoln, then Dixon turns the locale of racial violence into a memorial for slavery as an institution, because Lincoln, despite being the South’s political and militaristic adversary, was perceived by Dixon and other pro-slavery writers as respecting the South’s institutions (35, 67).

The anti-climax of this mysterious dispersal of built-up anger from Harris’ ordeals forms a diegetic exclamation mark before Dixon moves on to eliminate the remaining ‘biological’ and ‘social’ non-whites. This effacement of the ‘mulatto’ leaves an important conclusion: The impossibility to detect mixed ancestry compounded with the fear of black insurrection forces Dixon to construct a hyper-whiteness for his KKK. This hyper-whiteness becomes the white imagined community’s unwritten imperial law (cf. Foucault 48), or, put differently, whiteness replaces republicanism. Every instance of lèse majesté has to be punished by

150 In a sense, Harris’ pilgrimage leads to “an anachronistic space, representing a temporal regression within industrial modernity to a time beyond the recall of memory” (McClintock 121). The “one thing left” may be that he follows in the steps of his father, turning to a self-destructive path of violent extremism. After all, George’s father, suspiciously absent in The Leopard’s Spots, is about to use violence not for the mere purpose of self-defense before he is picked up by the Quakers (cf. his remark while brandishing his pistols: “I’m ready for ’em! Down south I never will go. No! if it comes to that, I can earn myself at least six feet of free soil,—the first and last I shall ever own in Kentucky!” [Stowe Chapter XI]).

151 We should recall that Lincoln, in his first presidential inauguration speech, proclaimed his willingness to unalterably anchor slavery in the Constitution.
torturing the offender’s body as an “emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority” (cf. Foucault 49). Since this collective monarch is well-guarded in the *palatium*, immune to punishment by real legislature because officials either condone violence or are explicitly part of it, lynch law is elevated above legislation. In this extra-legal space lies what is possibly the greatest failure of antebellum Anti-Tom writers by their own lights, namely that statesmanship compounded with the romance of reconciliation between North and South was an inadequate vehicle to further the white-supremacist cause. Dixon was more ‘successful’ insofar as he justified the erasure of non-whites by appealing to the sanctity of white womanhood, and in so doing gave the Second Klan a stable set of gender and racial binaries to enforce.

Whereas the white South in antebellum Anti-Tom fiction only wants to be left in peace and welcomes unoffending, unquestioning white individuals into the community, Dixon’s ‘liberating’ South rises, ironically, to yoke the country under a white-supremacist banner. Thus, while antebellum Anti-Tom writers sought to market whiteness among pro-slavery and white supremacy-friendly audiences, Dixon asserts the right of autocratic force to seize control of the country by stratifying white classes in the name of white supremacy, a fascist system where everyone has to play their ordained part and play it obediently, visible for other whites to control. Whiteness, then, becomes the exact opposite of what the Klan envisioned as empowering: it becomes translucent under the gaze of the plantocratic ruler’s eye, and lays bare its purpose and deeds upon interpellation.

The various scissions in *The Leopard’s Spots*—of whiteness into ruling and action, of non-whiteness into domestic sexual danger and public punishment—and its erasures of
people of mixed ancestry and ‘social’ non-whites all create the epistemological basis for over a century of occluded racism. The durability of manorialism that legitimates this split hierarchy between white rulers and racist agents casts violence as an inseparable component of a society of strong leaders and clear boundaries. *The Leopard’s Spots* is less an attempt to legitimize violence—for among white supremacists violence is always a legitimate option—than a way of focusing violence and controlling punishment. The affective ‘truth’ created in antebellum Anti-Tom novels as it persists in *The Leopard’s Spots* commemorates the plantocracy’s hegemony, but likewise represents a present-tense demand to eliminate the ‘danger’ of racial mixing by purging society of non-white blood. Then, technology and two world wars caused a paradigm shift in genocidal effectivity and how one can think about eliminating other races.
Chapter 4: “The Mischievous Isms”: Monuments for the Future

Once this news had reached Rome, [...] a great panic ensued.
– Gaius Iulius Caesar, Bellum Civile

The skyrocketing effectiveness of destruction discovered and readily embraced in the two world wars carved a new epistemological path for the Anti-Tom novel. To attain white supremacy, one no longer had to wrest political power from an opposition and summon a host of Red Shirts to incite a long, gruesome genocidal campaign to achieve a white Utopia. Deadly inventions like ‘Zyklon’ sired in the laboratories of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung or the obscure yet pertinacious research interest in genetic weapons enabled white supremacists to dream of a white empire, one that could be achieved efficiently and impersonally, particularly in the wake of ongoing decolonization processes sparked, for example, by the Civil Rights Movement. This final chapter traces the jump of the Anti-Tom novel into the twenty-first century and the migration of the white Utopia from the bucolic past of the plantation romance to the technocratic future of science fiction.

A crucial question is how plantocratic whiteness is preserved in contemporary whiteness via rhetoric, especially because the symbolic appropriation of the General Lee statue by Unite the Right compounded with Trump’s inciting racist rhetoric to “Make America Great Again” points to the persistence of this plantocratic whiteness. Answering this question necessitates discussing the ideological motivations for Confederate monuments’ construction and their signification in the now—that is, who commissioned them to what end, who protects the monument in the present, and how a given message has changed over time. By understanding what these monuments represent to white supremacy, we can reveal the durability of manorialism occluded by these monuments and dismantle the myth
of white ‘heritage,’ opening a dialogue to stop the influx of new recruits to white supremacy.

Regardless of how vehemently intuition insists on the epistemological fraternity between antebellum pro-slavery, Jim-Crow white supremacy, and the present political moment, making the leap into twenty-first century politics and public spaces does not fit comfortably in the established framework, which is exactly why a diachronic postcolonial reading of Neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce’s The Turner Diaries (1978), Ellen Williams’ Bedford: A World Vision (2000), and Ward Kendall’s Hold Back This Day (2001) is paramount. In doing so we can uncover their debts to The Leopard’s Spots and bridge a crucial critical gap of the Anti-Tom novel. Certainly, contemporary white-supremacist narratives share much of the Anti-Tom novels’ ideology and themes, transposing the pastoral romance into postmodernity. However, I would argue that the similarities overlap to the point that these science fictions are themselves ‘Anti-Tom’ in nature, for they draw on the same foundation of preserving the durability of manorialism to maintain white control over land and cultural space. Although in this chapter I am chiefly concerned with Bedford and Hold Back This Day as turn-of-the-millennium pre-9/11 novels, they lean heavily on Pierce’s work, necessitating some discussion of Diaries.153

152 Pierce published Diaries under the pseudonym of Andrew MacDonald. Pierce’s life and religious philosophy, cosmotheism, are ruminated upon at length any time Diaries is discussed (see, for example, Cullick; Whitsel). I am more interested in the fact that these contemporary white-supremacist science fictions have their basis in the post-Civil Rights white genocide anxiety espoused in Diaries, which is clearly a product of the rapidly heating nuclear deterrence rhetoric of the Cold War. That Diaries has lost nothing of its violent currency is exemplified in Dylann Roof’s motive for the Charleston church shooting to spark a ‘race war’ (Morrison et al.)—a leitmotiv in Diaries.

153 Pierce was a vocal figure on the far-right from the mid-1960s onwards, and Diaries is probably the best-selling work in the white-supremacist community, so even if Bedford and Hold Back This Day do not reference Diaries directly, placing it alongside the other two is warranted because of the impact it had on this literary subculture. To be precise, neither of these authors fit the inferred “Alt-Right” demography, but all,
Like *The Leopard’s Spots, Diaries* had a significant impact on public life as its fascist government “The Order” became the namesake for a white-supremacist terrorist group and inspired Timothy McVeigh, an outspoken fan of the novel, to build chemical bombs used in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.

These science fictions\(^1\) are Anti-Tom novels in the future tense because they occlude the plantocracy’s feudalist caste fantasies by embracing a racial framework and class as stratifying elements (Jameson 60), displaying a manorialist ideology that fuels National-Socialist *lebensraum* anxieties and provokes efforts to shore this ideology up through white landownership. A planetary Utopia for a single race replaces the pastoral antebellum Utopia—the next logical step for white-supremacist expansion fantasies. As Fredric Jameson argues, the science fiction author is “obliged to invent an entire universe, an entire ontology, another world altogether – very precisely that system of radical difference with which we associate the imagination of Utopia” (101). Unlike the antebellum Anti-Tom novelists and Dixon, whose narratives were tethered to contemporary contexts and hence guided and constrained by the political debate, the white-supremacist science-fiction author, writing in an increasingly multicultural society, must

\(^1\)The missing link between these works and the “Alt-Right” is that these books are staple readings among white-supremacist circles (cf. Jackson)—if not ‘bestsellers,’ as far as the term can be applied to a limited circle of potential readers. These works chiefly circulate at gun shows and far-right rallies (cf. Jackson; Allen). Williams frequently attended Neo-Confederate rallies (Hicks 246), and Kendall assembled a digital archive of resources and links to “Alt-Right” media on his nowadays virtually abandoned website. This intricate web of cross-references and presences at events that draw—though not exclusively—a far-right audience suggests that, if an individual comes into contact with either of these novels, the jump to the others and, thus, into other “Alt-Right” media is not far.
envision the white Utopia without any concessions to historical circumstances. These future-tense Anti-Tom novels ache for the white pride and privilege displayed by their literary ancestors, a ‘heritage’ supposedly obliterated by a purportedly oppressively tolerant government.

Pierce’s novel presents itself as the collected diaries of Earl Turner, a white-supremacist rebel who ascends in the ranks of the underground resistance against a Jewish and black-controlled government\textsuperscript{155} in the United States of the early 1990s and is commemorated by future generations for successfully completing a suicide-bombing mission on the Pentagon\textsuperscript{156} to dismantle “the System’s” retaliatory strike on emerging white enclaves. The Jim-Crow era rationales for lynching reemerge in Pierce’s world, in which the rape of white women by African-American men is a legal, everyday practice, a crudely violent vision of white genocide; Turner is at first shocked and hesitant at the prospect of causing harm to whites through his bombing operations, but later callously shrugs off the increasingly escalating collateral damage. To summarize Turner’s deadly teleology: the prospective victims fall into two camps, those who deserve it because they are racial apostates and those who do not deserve it but die for the cause. Turner’s diary

\textsuperscript{155} This government, unsurprisingly, does not distribute power equally between Jews and black people. Pierce plays here both on Neo-Nazi stereotypes of the manipulative Jew and the easily exploited Black. Turner displays a grim schadenfreude when the actions of the ‘Organization’ lead to discord among Jewish media moguls and black politicians: “[Blacks] have long resented the high-handed way in which the Jews manipulate and exploit the entire ‘equality’ movement for their own ends, and this was the last straw for some of them. There were angry accusations and counter accusations” (121).

\textsuperscript{156} The sinister irony that a Neo-Nazi like Pierce fantasized in earnest about a suicide-bombing run on the Pentagon as a victory for white supremacy while Hani Hanjour flew American Airlines Flight 77 into the selfsame building on 9/11 acting on Al-Qaeda orders is one indicator among many on the similarities between white far-right and Islamic terrorism. This irony also lays bare the colonial logic in the American security landscape when the executive combats the latter group—and consequently anyone who could even remotely be identified as Muslim or of Arab ancestry—with Crusader-like zeal, yet few federal laws exist that effectively enable the trial of white terrorists.
ends shortly before his suicide mission, yet a heterodiegetic narrator writing 106 years after Turner’s successful suicide bombing chronicles how the campaign continued with the eradication of all non-whites across the globe through nuclear, biological, and chemical means (the new fascist government brought to power through Turner’s terrorism also mercilessly killed off a large part of the ‘unworthy’ white population). Ironically, this Pyrrhic victory leaves the planet a post-apocalyptic wasteland, as “bands of mutants” (210) roam Asia; and the chemical and nuclear strikes certainly were anything but “safe” for the whites, regardless of the narrator’s asseveration to the contrary. The conclusion’s racial ‘catharsis’ of this new world is therefore more than questionable.157

_Bedford_ follows the Anti-Tom novels’ notions of benevolent conservative Southerners persecuted by an oppressively liberal, multi-racial adversary. Written by an Alabamian teacher and member of, among others, the League of the South (Hicks 246),

---

157 This mythical emergence of mutants in distant lands reminds one of Pliny the Elder’s wild imagination of “freakish peoples” (20) in 77 CE, a durable fantasy reaching into medieval society when Carl Linnaeus included a taxonomy of monstrous peoples (cf. Painter 24-25). The mutants as dehumanized but still humanoid beings and the genetic alterations that long-term exposure to radioactivity and chemicals can have on the body suggest a distrust in the white Imaginary towards its own genetic integrity when other peoples subjected to these modes of warfare experience substantial mutations. Nicky Falkof notes: “A nuclear accident, more than any similar disaster, is an imaginary catastrophe: it is mythopoeic, excessive, extreme, precisely because many of its consequences cannot be grasped without the mediation of science and statistics. The individual cannot see, know or understand how nuclear [sic] operates or fails to operate. She can only suffer the consequences. Fear of radiation invokes a fear of the failure of personal agency. One cannot prepare for, or adequately respond to, a threat that cannot be seen, heard, smelled, anticipated, a threat that operates on a cellular level, a threat that implicates the coherence of the body without the mediating involvement of the mind: epidemic, infectious, a contagion that springs from the air itself” (935-936, Falkof’s emphasis). Even if we entertain Pierce’s fantasy of surgically-precise racial warfare, this fear of failing agency emphasizes the distrust of whites and the supposed perfection of their genes. Armand Marie Leroi, professor of developmental biology, points to this doubt of superiority through normal mutation, which means that white supremacists can only attain certainty of the superiority of white genes when those genes are the only ones in existence: “[i]t is likely that the most common [genetic] variant is the best under most circumstances, but this cannot be proved, for the frequencies of gene variants are shaped by history, and what was best then need not be best either now or in the future” (17). In that sense, it is telling that Pierce does not describe the nature of his mutants—although his diction suggests that they are somewhat sentient, possibly even human-like—and that he does not expose his white genome to the danger of becoming the inferior variant.
Bedford begins in medias res on an October day of the not more closely defined mid-twenty-first century at the Founders Day Festival of Bedford, Alabama, during which Adam Pruitt, at this point a renowned academic, recalls his childhood. Although Adam partially functions as a frame narrator, most past events are told by an omniscient extradiegetic narrator, whose focus shifts from one Bedfordian to another in quick succession. The novel chronicles Adam’s assent to liberal ideology chiefly through alterocneracterization, through which we learn how the radically liberal school staff of Bedford High and his pedophilic PE teacher Henry Sellers exert considerable control on Adam—or so the novel implies. Out of the blue, Adam refuses to attend church with his parents, who adhere to an evangelical church that condemns homosexuality and any deviation from the parish’s heteronormative ways. Portrayed as pacifists, Adam’s parents stoically endure every infringement on their son’s education, much like the Anti-Tom novelists portrayed their planters as enduring every attack on their benevolent empire.

In Williams’ vision, the liberal government does not stop at controlling education, but soon moves on to persecute the white conservative community. After a lengthy trial, Adam’s parents Horace and Virginia compromise and agree that they will no longer force Adam to share their faith, but the religious rift estranges the family. The fact that Adam chooses to attend one of the modern inclusive churches and that Virginia would readily divorce Horace rather than sacrifice her son breaks Horace’s spirit, who loses the will to live and dies well before Virginia does (264). Eventually, the strictly literal hermeneutics

---

158 In Williams’ mid-twenty-first-century North America, pedophilic relationships are virtually legalized and laws on parental consent are increasingly being eroded.

159 In the eyes of the evangelical characters, the future Bible is mutilated through censorship to appeal to the gender-neutral feel-good vibe of a ridiculously tolerant liberal bourgeoisie.
of pastor Reverend John Winston lead to his incarceration for hate speech. Bedford then spirals downwards into a despotic liberal government, the evangelical community is increasingly persecuted until they are pent up in a religious ghetto, and the elderly are euthanized.\textsuperscript{160} After Virginia is euthanized, Adam, who is experiencing occasional bouts of regret at the devastation his actions have wrought on the peaceful community,\textsuperscript{161} leaves Bedford for good. In the years between Adam leaving Bedford for an academic education and his return for the festival speech, the town becomes increasingly commercialized. The church in which Reverend Winston once preached later turns into the gay club “The Pink Triangle” and is, in the diegetic present, a Bed and Breakfast Inn combined with a Human Rights Museum\textsuperscript{162} that vilifies Winston and the evangelical religious community. The novel concludes with the complete victory of an imperialist regime that disowns, displaces, and eradicates a religious community—the realization of the antebellum white South’s nightmare, \textit{mutatis mutandis}.

\textsuperscript{160} All three novels share the anxiety of National-Socialist \textit{lebensraum} politics that socialism in combination with rising global population will lead to famine and poverty. Euthanasia is the favorite panacea of these oppressive regimes. Born out of right-wing paranoia of government interference, this nightmare of a Holocaust of the elderly in the name of social equality seems highly durable in connection to Sarah Palin’s ‘death panel’ myth with regard to the Affordable Care Act, according to which “[Obama’s] bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of the ‘level of productivity in society’ [of the sick, the elderly, and the disabled], whether they are worthy of health care” (Palin) and outright deny healthcare if said ‘bureaucrats’ deem it expedient.

\textsuperscript{161} The evangelical religious community is presented as the misunderstood moral heroes. Although Reverend Winston preaches about the sinfulness of homosexuality, the community is engaged in helping people diagnosed with HIV.

\textsuperscript{162} The narrator notes: “Although some of the parking lot had been sold and had a local law firm’s building on it, the outward appearance had actually changed very little. The bed and breakfast owners had kept the lovely steeple and the familiar bell” (296). The law firm figuratively guards the church from religious reclaiming, and the clumsy attempt at satire by combining Bed and Breakfast and museum represents Williams’ attempt to critique a shallow materialism, a South that only outwardly marshals traditional values but is inwardly mired in capitalism.
Kendall’s *Hold Back This Day* departs from Pierce’s and Williams’ Holocaust scenarios to some degree, and follows in the footsteps of the antebellum Anti-Tom novels when whites seek their Utopia in the stars. Because of an ever-increasing world population and the communist-like economic mismanagement of “WorldGov,” Earth’s monolithic government, world hunger rages, entire populations are euthanized for the sake of preserving resources, and the secretive ruling caste seeks to abandon Earth by accessing deep-space travel technology from the whites-only enclave Avalon, on Mars. Jeff Huxton—anti-hero, intellectual bystander, and proxy for the ideal reader as he moves from political disengagement to engagement—struggles to keep up with the turns the plot takes; since he understands neither the world he lives in nor the world that deuteragonist Karl Ramstrom seeks to create through his white-nationalist space colony project, everything must be explained to him overtly by other characters. Through a concatenation of side plots, Jeff comes into the possession of stardriveBlueprints in the form of datacules, a fluid that binds information to an individual’s genes when imbibed. Consequently, Jeff is

---

163 Despite its supposed egalitarianism, WorldGov is presented as a gargantuan bureaucratic apparatus. Chapter 13 and 14 reveal the decadent, Machiavellian upper class that thrives on the poverty of the rest of the world.

164 Avalon is in a tropical biosphere on Mars, where colonists prepare for intergalactic space travel. Especially given Ramstrom’s Scandinavian ancestry, framing the Martian colony as a tropical ark rather than one emulating the temperate climate of Sweden or Norway seems like a deliberate invocation of the West Indies’ plantocracy, thereby bespeaking Dixon’s fantasy of racial erasure when Kendall deploys technology that maintains this paradise, eliminating the need for slaves.

165 In the sense that the protagonist is the reader’s proxy, Jeff epitomizes the “Alt-Righter” in his incomprehension of the world’s workings and his ignorance of historical events impacting the present.

166 In an *analepsis* earlier in the narrative, Jeff discovers datadisks containing uncensored historiography in an abandoned space port that witnessed the last desperate stand of the white anti-Unification movement (23ff). The passage seems like a perverted reference to the Battle of Berlin at the end of World War II with Nazi officials trying to destroy incriminating records by the NSDAP, Gestapo, and SS, and with remaining Nazi troops defending the Reichstag under which Hitler had already committed suicide.
abducted and tortured by Ahmad Yehudit, the story’s ‘racially blended’ antagonist. As Earth is sliding into apocalyptic famine and insurrection, WorldGov’s privileged upper class wants to secure the space travel data for itself to flee the impending anarchy. Because the data can only be read by a specific device on Avalon, WorldGov mounts a full attack on the white colony. In a final showdown with Yehudit’s troops in a white heritage museum, Jeff sacrifices himself and thereby saves Ramstrom, who flees with the remaining white population to Alpha Centauri and creates a white colony on an unnamed habitable planet, having to overcome disease and “thornbeasts” (178), reminiscent of the whites in *Diaries* who face nuclear apocalypse and mutants. While Kendall lets the non-white Holocaust play out in the absence of whites, he follows Pierce when both novels shirk the ethical problems of early-modern American colonialism that would erode the notion of independent, dehistoricized white ‘achievement’ by either replacing indigens with thornbeasts or dehumanizing them by altering them into mutants.

*Hold Back This Day* synthesizes ideas of *Diaries* and *Bedford*. Kendall’s future society is a laughable farrago of world religions, cultures, and egregious *portmanteaus*. What sets *Hold Back This Day* apart is the classification of skin tones, with whites and black people comprising the opposite extremes of the spectrum and the completely ‘racially blended’ Skintone 5 as the most coveted racial identity. Whites loathe themselves for the imperialist legacy signified by their skin—recall at this point the *skin/culture* signifier, and

---

167 Yehudit, like Nelse, is portrayed as a buck: “Yehudit was a big man, Jeff noticed, bigger than most men. Even so, he had a gentle, lumbering way of walking, as if he were a bull elephant moving slowly through a herd of gazelle gathered around a watering hole. And like gazelle, people parted as he approached, lest they get trampled by his massive hulk” (7). We should be reminded of Dixon’s mixed-race anxieties, especially as Yehudit is the main threatening presence in *Hold Back This Day*. 
how Kendall’s inversion of guilt coded into skin is as racist as the Anti-Tom novel’s plantation slaves faithfully guarding their masters in recognition of the masters’ superiority—and are sexually shunned because of it.\(^\text{168}\) In Kendall’s vision, humanity has lost the know-how for space travel due to racial mixing, which has sacrificed ‘white’ intellect and excellence to diversity. In that regard, it is highly significant that Jeff binds the saving information to his genes, making his whiteness the key to unlocking the secrets of humanity, but, simultaneously, unsettling the white ‘purity’ by making him a genetic hybrid. Unaware of this irony, Kendall renders Jeff useless for white progress, for Ramstrom has already cracked the secret of deep-space travel by the time Jeff arrives on Mars; his genes are consequently worthless, and the only way he can contribute to the cause is through suicide bombing. Looking at *Diaries* and *Hold Back This Day*, the protagonists’ death wishes cast an interesting light on white extremism, as in the post-9/11 era Western cultures would characterize suicide bombing as a chiefly Islamist terrorist strategy. Moreover, they deviate from Anti-Tom notions for the preservation and protection of white bloodlines when the formerly white genes’ destruction becomes part of doing the duty for one’s race.

Monuments have the potential to become signifiers for white ‘heritage’—that is, the veneration of culturally salient achievements of whites enabled through an imperial apparatus that ensured and maintained white privilege through the exploitation of marginalized peoples—up until the point when the monument no longer refers to the

\(^{168}\) That this closely adheres to Jim-Crow anxieties of white men losing the sexual prerogative should not be lost on us.
historical period commissioners intended it to represent, but, instead monumentalizes white ‘heritage’ itself. This monumentalization unites *Bedford* and *Hold Back This Day*, since both novels appropriate education by detaching technological achievements from the imperial exploitation that historically made them possible. Both writers celebrate the inventor Thomas Edison as a champion of white inventive ‘genius.’ In *Bedford*, Barbara Kimbrough, a teacher at Bedford High and a member of the evangelical parish, laments the lost ‘white’ achievements due to a mendacious cultural revisionism in defiance of fact, which ascribes several of Edison’s inventions to non-whites and women, and the complete omission from the textbooks of “this practical American genius whose myriad of inventions led to the enviable standard of living which North Americans enjoy” (233). Mostly, Williams claims Edison for her libertarian agenda of home schooling in the wake of a ‘ruinous’ mandatory liberal education and frames his inventions as a form of racial altruism reminiscent of Anti-Tom portrayals of a benevolent paternalist South. In *Hold Back This Day*, Jeff and Ramstrom pass by a “display case chronicling Thomas Edison’s inventions” (171) when Ramstrom reveals that he has developed the stardrive himself and that they are ready to travel to distant galaxies. In mentioning Edison, Kendall parrots Williams, and draws on the same notion that ‘white’ genius is intrinsic and in no way based on and enabled through European and American colonial projects—more so, in the novel, ‘white’ genius is spatially removed from non-whites when Mars and later the unnamed planet become isolated playgrounds for ‘white’ genius. Thus, Edison conveniently enables Kendall to adopt this teleology of inventive genius. Although Edison was not a white supremacist, these writers appropriate his inventions to create this notion of an “enviable
standard of living” in a racialized culture, a standard that enabled the subsequent technological advances towards weapons of mass destruction. This shaky epistemological bridge makes him a champion of the race. In Anti-Tom logic, Edison is a ‘doer’ like Turner’s gray-robed “real men” (203) who form the ‘best’ stock of the race, rather than a ‘talker’ like the Anti-St. Clare or Charlie in The Leopard’s Spots. Connecting Edison’s inventions to racist practices makes the person monumentalized in these artefacts part of white-supremacist mythology.

Both authors not only monumentalize white ‘heritage’ through popular figures in the STEM sciences, but also—surprisingly, given the usual right-wing excoriation of the liberal arts—in literature. Kimbrough regrets that students would never get to read Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “Young Goodman Brown” (1835), Edgar Allan Poe, William Shakespeare, John Steinbeck, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884), or Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights (1847 [234]). Within this capricious inventory, I will focus on Shakespeare, for—again—Kendall toddles after

169 It is somewhat surprising that Williams mourns Edison (233), as he fits badly into her conforming biblical worldview: he had considerable trouble in school—his schoolmaster fell just short of accusing him of mental impairment (cf. “Life of Thomas Alva Edison”)—and Edison was frequently accused of being an atheist because of his adherence to Deism and his reading in David Hume and Thomas Paine (cf. “Education of an Inventor”).

170 For a recent example from the “Alt-Right,” see comic book artist Ethan Van Sciver’s call for a consumer-led boycott of what the “Alt-Right” generally perceives as a forcibly politicized and diversified comic book landscape in favor of “escapist, apolitical entertainment” (Lynskey, third par.)—that is, the sentiment that ‘genuine’ narratives must conform to a monomythical, heteronormative, intellectually-banal ‘default’ that either trivializes or completely erases marginalized and intersectional characters and themes. However, Van Sciver’s ‘apolitical’ ideal—or any similar argument against diversification in the film or video game industry—only proves the white supremacist ideology embodied in character types, like Superman and other early superheroes, which the “Alt-Right” wishes to preserve. This sophistry also falls prey to the fallacy that the ‘social justice warrior’ agenda, a favorite specter of the “Alt-Right,” is a recent development when the present movement for diversification draws on artists in the 1960s giving rise to more diverse comic book protagonists like the Black Panther. That Van Sciver specifically objects to the recent representation of a black character in the main role of the eponymous film—and its commercial success—consequently comes as little surprise.
Williams. Where, in *Bedford*, Shakespeare is largely erased from the education system for “sexist themes and his emphasis on the class structure in Elizabethan society” (ibid.), in *Hold Back This Day* his works are durably reified when “[a]nother blob of low-energy plasma shot past [Jeff, Ramstrom, and Mara], bursting in blue-green radiance against a marble bust of William Shakespeare at the far end of the hall” (Kendall 172), presumably withstanding the impact. *Hold Back This Day* thereby extends the themes of *Bedford*; where the latter mourns the loss of white ‘heritage’ because a modicum of memory still remains but threatens to disappear soon, the former in its more distant future creates a new link not through education, but through materialized, decontextualized remembrance.

Thus, the canon, centered on Shakespeare, joins with technology to reinforce—in a Saidian sense—imperial hegemony and the durability of manorialism. Monuments to the past comprise a literal safeguard against non-white aggression from which one can mount a new offensive. The scene of the stand-off in *Hold Back This Day* is the “Museum of Euro-Ethnic History” (163), which features a Model T Ford (173). Like Shakespeare’s bust that seemingly absorbs “Unification” fire, Jeff takes cover from the enemy’s assault behind the Model T, where he realizes that only a suicidal counter-attack can give his existence purpose. In short, the monuments receive meaning—and, in the case of the Shakespeare bust and the Model T, utility—by opposing an oppressive regime. Unsurprisingly, with characteristic ignorance Jeff does not ask himself whether the objects in the museum are genuine artefacts or replicas, rushing past them and taking what he sees

---

171 That Kendall would present Henry Ford as a paragon of white ‘genius’ is not surprising given the latter’s rampant anti-Semitism; as Painter notes, Ford used his publication *Dearborn Independent* to foment anti-Semitic sentiments (325).
for granted. The reader, in turn, is left to wonder whether the Avalon colonists only preserve inventions with a ‘white’ aura through their archeological projects, or whether the artefacts are reproductions that remind the colonists of and call for the return of imperial practices that white supremacy needs in order to function. If the latter case, then one must ask whether the supposed halt of human progress through racial equality, as Kendall presents it, is the fault of non-whites rising to power or, as the passage at the abandoned space port suggests, that of whites clinging to power and hoarding the remaining technology while defending it until death.

In each of these novels, there is a monument that fortifies the durability of manorialism through the linkage of education and nineteenth-century pro-slavery grievances. In Bedford, the monument takes a cautionary form: Williams conjures the lebensraum specter to haunt ‘good’ whites in that, once whites lose ‘their’ land, complete destruction is imminent. It is true that the Pink Triangle museum of Bedford commemorates, in the narrative’s logic, the extinction of hatred from the liberal point of view. However, when the minor character Grady Hill makes his last visit there before quitting the town for good and returning to his religious ghetto, he realizes the futility of resistance in the face of the overwhelmingly commoditized spaces of Southern history. The narrator concludes that liberalism has become an indomitable empire that deprives conservative Bedfordinians of their ‘rights’ to landownership, and, soon, to life itself, as Grady looks “[l]ike one who looks on the face of a dead loved one for the last time” (298)

172 It is difficult to imagine that these writers would bestow equal praise on Marie Curie for her achievements in radiology or Al-Zahrawi for his inventions that revolutionized European medical practices.
at his childhood home now sold and marked off-limits by security. *Hold Back This Day* offers the second, celebratory version, an indirectly achieved non-white Holocaust when Kendall finds meaning for the future in the past. The site of the final stand-off in *Hold Back This Day* on Avalon, like the Pink Triangle Museum in *Bedford*, symbolizes a legacy in jeopardy of being irrevocably destroyed, but simultaneously a past that is left behind to found a new, prospering white empire.\(^{173}\) When Jeff approaches Yehudit, he discovers a statue of Lincoln and a plaque with his remark from the 1858 Lincoln–Douglas debate—oft-quoted, especially by those nostalgic of the slave-owning South—that he did not believe in racial equality (176-177).\(^{174}\) By itself, this scene is only a crude attempt at *logos*, but it gains narrative impact\(^{175}\) in juxtaposition to the statue of Malcolm X, which appears earlier in the narrative, with a plaque of his equally oft-quoted reference to Jean-Paul Sartre in a speech at the *Organization of Afro-American Unity* on June 28, 1964 (64). In contrast to Lincoln’s statue, Malcolm X’s is dilapidated and the inscription “By Any Means

---

\(^{173}\) Jameson considers Ignatius Donnelly’s *Caesar’s Column* (1890) America’s “first genuine totalitarian dystopia.” The relation to *Hold Back This Day* is striking due to Donnelly’s anti-Semitism and ironic because of the main characters’ exodus from apocalyptic New York to Uganda, in the early twentieth century a possible destination for a Zionist state.

\(^{174}\) After reading the plaque, Jeff finally realizes that Earth is lost by understanding that white rulers “knew” (177) already then about the supposedly inevitable white superiority. Yehudit then reaffirms white supremacy when he says: “It was not nobility of spirit that made your leaders turn over the world to we [sic] non-whites. It was fear, Jeff. Nothing more. [...] Your people should have listened to a man like [Lincoln]...while you still had the chance” (ibid.). In making this declaration, he resembles the loyal slave in the Anti-Tom novel who reaffirms white supremacy.

\(^{175}\) The Lincoln statue gains additional significance when Kendall leans on *The Leopard’s Spots* and maps the ante-bellum context of Lincoln’s speech onto endangered white womanhood: Prior to the stand-off, Jeff finds the 12-year-old colonist Mara, who has been raped by attacking “Unification” soldiers (158)—the allusion to the Union Army should not be lost on the reader—and who becomes Kendall’s synecdoche for a brutalized white womanhood that preserves its infantile dependency on white masculinity to become the “Mother of Their Race” (174). The rapist, however, is not found, so the violation of white womanhood remains unavenged. Ironically, Kendall sabotages his portrayal of black sexual danger when Ramstrom and his acolytes have “Unification” uniforms and technology that allows them to racially blend in: their blackface makes them complicit in this rape.
Necessary” is barely legible. Since neither Malcolm X nor the inscription means anything to Jeff, the novel draws on Anti-Tom Refugee Scenario 2 with Vulcan’s disappearance from *The Planter’s Northern Bride* and George Harris’ ontological vanishing act in *The Leopard’s Spots*. Lincoln’s ideology proves durable in the future—or so we are left to assume—whereas unity and racial inclusion are doomed to fade in the ruins of diversified industrialism. Whites must own the land exclusively, for only they can build durable empires—so the novels would make us believe.

Because the monuments and the *mise-en-scene* of both novels lead to a future white framework where non-whites literally have no space, the narratives lay bare the circularity of Anti-Tom attempts to ‘purify’ whiteness. These novels defy Jameson’s characterization of science fiction in this respect: when the Bedfordians meet God and the Avalon colonists leave for Alpha Centauri, there is no need for Williams and Kendall to create new ontologies wholesale since, in this space of idealized race, they pursue the same hyper-whiteness that Dixon dreamed of with his KKK—and bring upon themselves the same problems that Dixon grappled with. In that sense, Turner, the Bedfordians, and Jeff become the future fate of whiteness, as this purification leads to an impossible whiteness that results in gradual extinction among whites as well. *Diaries* and *Hold Back This Day* leave the survivors in environments with unforeseeable consequences for their genes, and both Jeff and the evangelical community choose death rather than witness the white race turning against itself. In other words: they sacrifice themselves for a cause that leads to racial ambiguity and atavistic destruction. They become heroes without witnessing the destruction the lack of policy and the unattainable whiteness wreak on society. The
combination of education and memorialization forms a direct link to antebellum and Jim-
Crow-era conditions, which makes *Bedford* and *Hold Back This Day*, despite their
disparate goals, resonate with each other to form the coherent white-supremacist suicide
fantasy that Turner so fervently embraced.

The reified romantic notion of white ‘genius’ is key to how the logic of
contemporary ‘whiteness’ operates. One no longer needs to hail back to the First Families
of Virginia to have a claim to whiteness. Now, with the *palatium* having expanded into the
digital space of the internet, the individual must find ‘his’ claim to whiteness, for which
monuments are a malleable signifier. Edison himself is decidedly not of ‘noble’ birth, but
his achievements are substantial enough for contemporary white supremacists to claim him
as a defender of whiteness. Whether or not he had racist motivations is irrelevant, although
admittedly a pronounced anti-racist stance would pose an obstacle as to what parts of his
legacy can be appropriated. I have suggested in previous chapters that nineteenth-century
whiteness was very selective not only as to who was allowed to *be* white, but also as to
who would enter the canon of white heritage. Sarah Gardner observes that, while General
Lee is invariably celebrated in white Civil War remembrance, other Confederate generals
like General William Mahone are erased from this cultural memory despite serving the
cause more than adequately. Mahone’s offense was that he mingled with people of various
racial ancestries after the Civil War (cf. Gardner). Precisely through this memorial process,
the contemporary white-supremacist authors combine the antebellum Anti-Tom fear of
black insurrection and Dixon’s fragile chivalric revenge with Pierce’s Cold-War nihilism
in *Diaries* to forge artefacts and monuments into a futurate past that not only anchors the
white empire at its apogee in the narrative present, but also presages an even greater age based on this mythology of white champions, for these authors, like Dixon, immediately abandon the narrative to imagine how the “radical difference” of their vision creates a white Utopia, knowing that the consequences for the whites in their novels are extinction or racial ambiguity. Thus, these writers shift the focus and emphasize the urgency to do ‘something’ in the now.

This need to act ‘now’ is the command that is occluded in “Make America Great Again.” Much real and digital ink has been and continues to be spilt over Trump’s ever-escalating offenses and scandals. However, what requires reiteration is Trump’s presidential announcement speech on June 16, 2015, in which he stated: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. […] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (quoted in Hee

I have neither space nor inclination to discuss Trump’s offenses in their entirety, and Trump has received an overexposure by the media that, as the theoretical discussion has argued, proved more empowering to white nationalism than enlightening to those intending to dismantle it, so I will not dwell on the topic and refer to two extensive lists in the New York Times (cf. Leonhardt; Leonhardt and Philbrick) that chronicle his offenses and scandals. However, what is important to note is that, in April 2019, Trump responded to Joe Biden, who emphasized Trump’s defense of white-nationalist violence at Charlottesville when he entered the 2020 elections, noting: “I was talking about people that went because they felt very strongly about the monument to Robert E. Lee, a great general. Whether you like it or not, he was one of the great generals. I have spoken to many generals here right at the White House. And many people thought, of the generals, they think he was maybe their favorite general. People were there protesting the taking down of the monument of Robert E. Lee. Everybody knows that” (cf. “Trump Defends His 2017 Charlottesville Response”). Aside from emphasizing that Trump’s portrayal of the reason for the protest does not square with Kessler’s overt and covert reasons for organizing the rally, my point here is less that Trump praises Lee for his militaristic achievements, but casually glides past the opportunity to denounce Lee’s cause, even implicitly justifies the Confederacy’s raison d’état precisely because Lee’s aggressive strategies earned him the peculiar veneration among military leaderships that is likewise frequently bestowed on Nazi General Erwin Rommel. That Trump ignores the growing body of research that characterizes Lee’s strategies as reckless with regard to the Confederacy’s inferior manpower (Bonekemper III 388) should not need emphasis in light of Trump’s nescient approach to history. From this I gather that his original defense of the Charlottesville violence was not a slip-up in the heat of the moment, but a very conscious attempt to shore up a specific constituency whose allegiance still is important to him.
Lee). Although the concluding ‘assumption’ suggests that this was one of his notorious freestyled remarks, which even his closest advisors dread and cannot control, this is not a solitary offense, as he effectively repeated this very accusation during a press conference in West Virginia in April 2018: “And remember my opening remarks at Trump Tower […]. Everybody said, ‘Oh, he was so tough,’ and I used the word ‘rape.’ And yesterday, it came out where [Central American] women are raped at levels that nobody has ever seen before” (Wolf).  

Consciously or not, Trump is drawing on an imperialist discourse dating back to the border conflicts between the Thirteen Colonies’ and Spanish Florida in the 1740s, and fuses the supposed sexual licentiousness of African Americans with their untrustworthiness due to manipulation by Great Britain and Spain into one threat that can be fluidly extended to any non-white racial identity.

As should be clear at this point, Trump has not inaugurated a new age of ‘whiteness’ nor, to my knowledge, is he actively furthering the white-nationalist cause of the “Alt-Right,” but the way he uses racecraft to suit his purposes points to an occluded form of

---

177 The utter inaccuracy of Trump’s statements hardly needs to be pointed out, but note that he not only effaces his portrayal of Mexicans as rapists by removing the suffix ‘-ist’ and using rape as a general topic, but he also obfuscates the criticism brought against him by trivializing racist vocabulary as tough (again, I am indebted to Andrew Loman for this observation), rendering racism a rhetorical flourish of the usual populist tell-it-as-it-is style.

178 As Judith Butler comments on Mary Douglas’ deliberations on bodily contours as signifiers of cultural coherence: “what constitutes the limit of the body is never merely material, but that the surface, the skin, is systemically signified by taboos and anticipated transgressions; indeed, the boundaries of the body become […] the limits of the social per se […] the boundaries of the body as the limits of the socially hegemonic” (2544, Butler’s emphases). Since it is unlikely that Trump actually believes in a horde of rampant rapists spilling over the border, the violation and pollution of female bodily orifices functions more as a justification for isolationism and the “dangers that permeable bodily boundaries present to the social order” (2545) than for policing imagined non-white sexual aggression. That, in turn, is in keeping with Anti-Tom novelists’ obsessions with ensuring the durability of manorialism, which sheds light on Trump’s envy of Obama’s achievements, which he either seeks to outdo or dismantle. This envy brought him so far as to propose his own health care system, which was met with stark opposition from his party, horrified by Trump’s move that would undermine a decade-long campaign against universal health care.
‘casual racism’ to which we should pay minute attention, for doing so may permit us to expose the durability of manorialism among the white middle class that tacitly or inadvertently embraces white supremacy. As I argued above, Dixon’s violent version of the South’s affective ‘truth’ has proven a durable concept for contemporary white supremacists that is readily embraced by a wider public, but statistics show that fears of white persecution and ‘endangered white womanhood’ have no basis in factual evidence.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from this evidence. First, the visions espoused in the Anti-Tom novels provide a rhetorical vocabulary conveniently accessible for

---

179 I wish to be clear about this: By referring to Trump’s poor and, probably more often than not improvised, inflammatory rhetoric as ‘casual,’ I in no way intend to deflate his real xenophobic actions of border wall projects, travel bans, and family separations to “Alt-Right” pseudo-edgy racist memes or racial stereotyping in ‘low-brow’ comedy. My point is to illustrate how Trump, in his presidential campaign and in office, provides a conduit for racism with provoking language and a laissez-faire style of policing white nationalists’ claims to be operating according to his calls.

180 See, for example, Patriot Movement Arizona that frightens churches into stopping to accept migrants after being admitted into the States without any basic aid (González).

181 Contrary to white-supremacist sentiments, anti-white-biased crimes constantly oscillated around 20% between Obama’s election and Trump’s first presidential year (cf. “Hate Crime”), so nothing corroborates the notion that whiteness was under increasing duress under a black president and a diverse government. Similarly, the salient notion of ostensible non-white rampage mobs or the endangerment of white womanhood does neither correlate in any way to the mere existence of a black president or a diverse government, nor has the Trump Administration witnessed an upsurge of non-white sexual violence that would be combated with any of the measures Trump has taken so far and attempts to take. The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) has found that sexual violence overall has decreased by more than half since 1993 (“Scope of the Problem”) and that the vast majority of perpetrators are white (“Perpetrators of Sexual Violence”). In addition, the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) of 2010 detailed that 22% of black women in America had experienced rape whereas 18.8% of white non-Hispanic women (2-3) were subjected to rape at some point in their lives. Furthermore, NISVS and RAINN agree that ‘only’ a small share of sexual violence was exerted by strangers, which significantly calls the notion of a random non-white sexual threat into question. To be clear, I cite this data neither to dismiss the gravity of sexual violence nor to trivialize men’s or women’s security concerns in private and public spaces, but to debunk the far-right paranoia that the lion’s share of sexual violence is committed by non-whites on predominantly white women. Consider the steady decline of hate crimes with anti-black racial bias since Obama’s election until the rise in overall hate crimes following Trump’s presidential campaign: 2009: 71.5% in 8,336 victims; 2010: 70.0% in 8,208 victims; 2011: 71.9% in 7,713 victims; 2012: 66.2% in 7,164 victims; 2013: 66.5% in 7,242 victims; 2014: 62.7% in 6,727 victims; 2015 52.2% in 7,173 victims; 2016: 50.2% in 7,615 victims; 2017: 48.6% in 8,828 victims (“Hate Crime”).
demagogues. Secondly, Trump, if anything, dug racism out of the American middle-class closet for the middle class to wear it without embarrassment in public.

The memorialization of white ‘heritage’ in these white-supremacist science fictions points to why this conflation is dangerous and why scholars, educators, and activists must become alert to how they resonate with other cultural artefacts. Confederate monuments form the cynosure of the white-supremacist science-fiction narratives, the “Alt-Right,” Trump, and Charlottesville because they signify the values of a society built on slavery and are repurposed by contemporary white supremacists. In an article on Confederate monuments and the Lee statue’s impact on the Charlottesville riots, Timothy Luke notes that many memorials and monuments in the United States originated as “community fund-raising [projects or] private gifts from wealthy individuals” (219). In the case of Charlottesville, the General Lee statue was commissioned in 1917 by Paul Goodloe McIntire, a Southern investor and philanthropist who donated extensively to the University of Virginia. Luke argues that the general public takes for granted public spaces, the purpose behind the design of monuments, and their placement; we tacitly assume that the

---

182 Note that debates around monuments are not new, but that Americans seem to be waking up to this discussion very late. Chumani Maxwele, a student of Cape Town, South Africa, sparked a demonstration campaign (Stiem) in early 2015 that led to the removal of a statue of Cecil Rhodes, a mining magnate and professed white supremacist; Ukraine removed 1,320 statues of Lenin since the ousting of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 (Wilford); and the U.S. Army tore down statues of Saddam Hussein in the early days of Iraq’s occupation with liberating braggadocio without any concern to protect historical artefacts. In contrast, despite existing monuments and efforts for commemoration, Austrian resistance fighters against the Nazi regime remain largely forgotten in the public perception.

183 Michel de Certeau makes a similar point for toponyms, when they “slowly lose, like worn coins, the value engraved on them, but their ability to signify outlives its first definition. Saint-Pères, Corentin Celton, Red Square… these names make themselves available to the diverse meanings given them by passers-by; they detach themselves from the places they were supposed to define and serve as imaginary meeting-points on itineraries which, as metaphors, they determine for reasons that are foreign to their original value but may be recognized or not by passers-by” (104).
government has a reason, albeit often an elusive one, for placing what we see where we see it. This tacit assumption would be a rather harmless matter if a given monument’s meaning were to remain fixed in time, but far-right rallies at Charlottesville and elsewhere have shown that it does not (cf. 220). Regardless of what precisely General Lee signified to Reconstruction and Jim-Crow-era Southerners, to Dixon, to McIntire, even to contemporary Neo-Confederates, has little to do with what the transitory host of the sometimes tangible, sometimes elusive “Alt-Right” makes of it to gain a stage for agitation. George Hawley notes that most followers of the “Alt-Right” have little knowledge or interest in white nationalism’s history or its key figures (The Alt-Right 66-67); the reason for which Lee was memorialized in Market Street Park is of negligible relevance to how Unite the Right repurposed it for the protest.

This circumstance bears witness to the durability of manorialism that is deeply ingrained in the American legal system, reaching back to the Eighth Amendment and, as Colin Dayan argues, even farther to England’s Bill of Rights (6): Racist practices are protected or tolerated by the law. Where, in the antebellum era, it was the planters’ demesne that justified the subjugation of millions of African Americans, public space, too, approbates racist actions when state laws keep city governments from removing a given monument by proclaiming the preservation of monuments and war memorials as

---

184 Dayan notes that American draftsmen in 1791 adapted the phrase of “cruel and usual punishments” from the Bill of Rights, but that, from a legal perspective, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit excessive punishment per se, only specific methods of punishment (cf. 6-7). In other words, legislators from the slave codes to penitentiaries like Guantanamo have labored and are laboring to increasingly erode the meaning of “cruel and unusual” that a specific punishment becomes necessary, and through this necessity eventually usual (cf. 15).
paramount. Even after the removal\(^{185}\) of the General Lee statue and a swelling chorus of demands to dismantle Confederate monuments, state legislators—specifically from the Republican side—stepped up to hinder these movements. For example, in May 2017 Alabama passed the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act (AL Act 2017-354, Senate Bill 60), which forces municipal governments to obtain permission from the state legislature before either moving or renaming monuments more than 40 years old. The Act was chiefly marshaled by Republican Representative Mack Butler and Republican Senator Gerald Allen (Cason).\(^{186}\) Slavery and the ideology driving it therefore still have a real hold on landownership, as legislators have much power over what happens in public spaces. However, in early 2019, Jefferson County Circuit Judge Michael Graffeo overturned the act, finding that the Act violates the city’s freedom of speech because it denies the population its will to distance itself from Confederate imagery (cf. Stewart).

The General Lee statue and “Silent Sam”\(^{187}\) at the University of North Carolina campus are only two of many monuments; a graph by the Southern Poverty Law Center

\(^{185}\) The contractor initially hired for the removal backed out after receiving death threats (Mathias). The Huffington Post also reports that David Duke tweeted the name, address, and phone number of a local business hired for the removal, which led to a torrent of anonymous threats towards the business owner.

\(^{186}\) Another case is Virginia, where Minority Leader David J. Toscano of the Virginia House of Delegates sought to pass a bill that would make it easier for cities to remove their monuments, but the bill has been voted down by a majority (Moomaw).

\(^{187}\) Julian Shakespeare Carr, son to a slave-owning family and foremost sponsor of “Silent Sam,” was a vocal defender of white supremacy and made no secret of his interpretation of “Silent Sam’s” purpose: “[The Confederate soldier’s] courage and steadfastness saved the very life of the Anglo Saxon race in the South. [...A]s a consequence the purest strain of the Anglo Saxon is to be found in the 13 Southern States—Praise God” (Gardner). Modeled after a Bostonian, Harold Langlois (Gutierrez), “Silent Sam” is a bronze figure of a Confederate soldier without cartridges for his rifle, facing North towards the Union. The right plaque reads: “To the sons of the university who entered the War of 1861–65 in answer to the call of their country and whose lives taught the lesson of their great commander that duty is the sublimest word in the English language,” alluding to a letter of Robert E. Lee that proved a forgery (Heuston). Sarah Gardner correctly concludes that “[t]he purpose of these statues was not to honor the Confederate dead but to assert and celebrate white supremacy in the present” (Gardner).
(SPLC) shows a clear correlation between the construction of Confederate monuments and African-American activism. Construction exploded around 1909, contemporary with the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), lasting well into the 1920s and 30s. There was a second wave around the Civil Rights Movement of the 60s (Gardner). Yet the Confederate monument not only serves white supremacy in the present, creating momentum for white hegemony around a given political event, but also fluidly calls unto and modifies the past and future. Dixon’s call was an imperative to kick the ‘carpetbaggers’ out of the South and African Americans back into submission; Confederate monuments speak in the futurate voice of certainty that whiteness will return to ‘greatness’ by returning landownership, and, thus, confining political power to whites only—if not as a matter of course, then by force. White-supremacist cultural capital only does part of the mythmaking work by enabling the construction of a monument in the present that mirrors the present more than it recalls the past. In short, a monument, to serve a specific cause, needs context, and this context can be astoundingly

188 John Guillory distinguishes between two forms of cultural capital: linguistic and symbolic. I am interested in the latter, for it entails a “knowledge-capital whose possession can be displayed upon request and which thereby entitles its possessor to the cultural and material rewards of the well-educated person” (ix). If we view monuments as Barthesian texts that only gain meaning in the reader’s interpretation, then monuments become knowledge-capital about the ‘other’ that is both permanently displayed and entitles the reader to the reward of racial membership.

189 The case of the 1873 Colfax massacre illustrates how the contemporary argument that monuments preserve a politically blank cultural heritage collapses in on itself and confirms the striated signification of a given monument. When the monument was erected in 1920, the white-supremacist mission was clear: the obelisk commemorated the three white men who died in the storming of the courthouse. A group of formerly enslaved people had occupied the courthouse of Colfax, Louisiana, in defiance of a looming coup d’état, as a group of Democrats and defecting Republicans refused to accept election results. The formerly enslaved people held the courthouse for three weeks but were eventually overpowered and many were executed (cf. Viñas-Nelson). The monument received a new marker in 1950, detailing the deaths of three whites and “150 negroes,” marking “the end of carpetbag misrule in the South” (cf. Gardner). While the first marker completely erases the lynch-like executions of the African-American victims and valorizes the three whites as though they gave their lives in service to justice, the second marker adds the African Americans only to
striated to the point where a demonstration has nothing to do with the effect and its cause: Confederate monuments are removed in reaction to Dylann Roof’s shooting and a wide spectrum of far-right ideologues gathers to protest far-left extremism and media representation.

Incensed by legal and political stalemates, parts of the leftist and far-left social stratum took to violence to either destroy these monuments altogether or vandalize them to a degree that they would have to be removed regardless. Prior to the removal of “Silent Sam” in early 2019, a protest on the University of North Carolina campus with at least partial participation of UNC students led to the statue being pulled from its pedestal, kicked, and covered in dirt (Vera). Two days after Charlottesville, a mob of protesters pulled down the Confederate Soldiers Monument in Durham, North Carolina (Graham); more covertly, the Screven County Confederate Monument in Sylvania, Georgia was vandalized overnight in late August 2018 (Autry). Although it is true that all of these constitute isolated local reactions and that no one in their right mind would seriously equate this petty form of vandalism with centuries of institutionalized racial terror, the source from whence this misguided activism springs and manifests in the real world is as oblique as the one that summoned white men to march with torches through the night in Charlottesville.190 This vandalism is problematic for two reasons: First, blotting out the

190 In the wake of Charlottesville, a bot called “Destroy This Statue” went up in August 2017 on Twitter that automatically lists Confederate monuments and adds Google Maps coordinates. It pulls the data from the SPLC and the account page features a donation link to SPLC (@destroystatue). SPLC notes that it is “not affiliated with ‘Destroy This Statue’” (Allen).190 This automated, undiscerning form of resistance is highly troubling because it calls for blind violence without any contextualization of the underlying ideology which led to the monument’s construction and preservation.
offending artefact only confirms white-supremacist persecution fantasies and emboldens white supremacists to further action as their projects clearly generate the desired response. Secondly, this vandalism blocks any avenue of communication and dialogue, displaying a similar ignorance exploited for violent means as the “Alt-Right” does and thus betraying two of liberalism’s central virtues that have rendered the fight for human rights in its broadest sense just and democratic when liberalism sought out and countered precisely such misleading and corrosive movements through transparency and knowledge. In order to reconcile grievances that go back to the colonial era, scholars and activists must learn not to recoil from artefacts of hate or bury them in storage sites, but to understand their rationale and learn to prevent hate’s reproduction.

Let me be clear: my point is not to add commentary on the Confederate monument debate that erupted after the Charlottesville riot. My concern goes beyond what we do with these monuments, for I find the ineffectiveness of removing a monument from sight, just like any other attempt at banishing an artefact appropriated by white supremacists, painfully obvious. As so often, we commit the fallacy of the past as a neatly isolated disease and treat the symptoms of an underlying cause. Legal or not, these removals neither constitute the blow against white supremacy that overly enthusiastic leftist activists envision nor cleanse the public sphere of a glorified slaveholding past. On the contrary, the systematic removal of monuments might roll the legal dice in favor of white supremacists

---

191 To return to my footnote on Mein Kampf in the introduction, the rise of the AfD shows that censorship clearly has had little or, at best, a delaying effect on the hate buried under the rubble of the Wiederaufbau. Those in far-right circles have had abundant access to Mein Kampf, and, in the States, certainly to Diaries as well, but the public is largely prevented from learning how to approach this hate when the works that espouse it remain to a great extent ignored.
by removing monuments from public to private property. Jenny Jarvie of the *Los Angeles Times* notes that more than thirty Confederate monuments have gone up since 2000 (Jarvie),\(^{192}\) many on private property where city and state governments have no jurisdiction. Although many of these newer monuments focus on memorializing the fallen soldiers of the war (Jarvie) rather than eulogizing Confederate generals like Lee or Stonewall Jackson, Luke’s argument cautions us not to ignore the unstable signified of these monuments. What is more, these monuments are placed only rarely out of sight in a suburban backyard, and more often in places that symbolically interact with the monuments.\(^{193}\) The momentum for these monuments’ removal that has built up in the media after the Charleston massacre speaks to an inability or unwillingness of Americans to genuinely understand the white-supremacist past and learn how to counter its polarizing potential. One is tempted to ask—in a manner perhaps similarly hyperbolic to “Alt-Right” ‘grievances’—whether we will stoop to violent extremist methodologies and creep into people’s yards and homes to demolish these monuments as well and frighten people into cooperation, thereby further congealing the durability of manorialism when the probable response is a more rigorous defense of one’s property? Or will it be more meaningful to learn from white-supremacist artefacts how to counter inciting rhetoric and not pave the way for extremists from the *palatium* into the *agora*?

---

\(^{192}\) According to SPLC data on Confederate monuments, this is a significant increase compared to the 1980s or 1990s (“Whose Heritage Master Sheet”). In June 2018, *smithsonian.com* reported that 110 memorials had been removed since the Charleston church shooting (Katz).

\(^{193}\) For instance, a monument in South Carolina “was unveiled on a spot where Civil War enthusiasts gather each year to reenact the Battle of Aiken” (Jarvie); and the Confederate Memorial of the Wind in Orange, Texas (Gardner), looms over Martin Luther King, Jr., Drive. The former’s frame may be an innocent live roleplaying pastime for now, but it is impossible to know whether that will stay that way; the latter’s location is certainly no coincidence.
The present literary archive monumentalizes non-white genocide either directly as in the case of *Diaries* and *Hold Back This Day*, or by inversion as in the us-or-them mindset of *Bedford*. That Lincoln’s skepticism regarding racial equality is recollected in science fiction, a genre traditionally perceived as enabling a culture to imagine its future, points to the futurate potential of Confederate monuments; likewise, the invocation of white ‘genius’ through Edison and the enlisting of literature to the white-supremacist cause suggests that anyone—and possibly anything—can be appropriated for the white-supremacist agenda, even abolitionists like Elizabeth Barrett Browning, or expelled for racial apostasy, like General Mahone. No matter how clumsily and hyperbolized the contemporary white supremacy authors present their nightmare of white persecution, their narratives should provoke more nuanced investigations of whiteness and the durability of manorialism. The temporal gap between the publication of these science-fiction novels at the turn of the millennium and their currency in the present political moment reveals a racism that is just as dangerous as the persisting anti-black police brutality and homegrown Neo-Nazi terrorism. The subtler racisms of everyday public life and politics in which white hegemony obscures racist ideologies that surface at opportune moments go unnoticed in real and virtual rhetorical skirmishes in which each side tries to ‘trump’ the other. Instead

---

194 Not only did the Australian Brenton Tarrant, responsible for the murder of—at the time of writing—50 people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019, call Trump a “symbol of renewed white identity” (Gelineau and Gambrell) in his manifesto, but he also mentioned Swedish YouTube celebrity Felix ‘PewDiePie’ Kjellberg in his video of the shooting (Chokshi). PewDiePie, who, in the past, has repeatedly received negative publicity due to racist slurs, can be aligned with the “Alt-Right” for his habitual trolling and offensive humor, but otherwise he does not seem to pursue a converting agenda since he repudiated Tarrant immediately. In general, we can observe how the “Alt-Right” exerts a strong influence from the *palatium* in Tarrant’s shooting because, after the massacre, social media admins and users waged a battle to delete and re-upload Tarrant’s video from the shooting, especially on 8chan, where many white nationalists gather.
of attacking anything that white supremacists claim and, through this, helping increase the influx to extremism further, scholars, legislators, and educators should gain a detailed understanding of how race operates in cultural artefacts so that we are equipped to dismantle hateful narratives and defuse the agitational potential of cultural capital.

To “Make America Great Again” necessarily draws on the past. Whether or not Trump is aware of the national and global conditions and events that fueled the questionable growth of his business empire, deep into the intertwined or it is in the neoliberal economy of neo-colonial America—he cannot bring back the circumstances that fueled late capitalism. Similarly, that slavery had become unprofitable and that the New South required a new workforce to sustain its production and follow suit in growth must have been obvious to most during Reconstruction and the Jim-Crow era, but that knowledge did not stop them from seeking to reinstate the social conditions of the antebellum era. The only way he can make good on his promise to “Make America Great Again” is in the social realm by harkening back to anti-Civil Rights sentiments and by waging McCarthyesque battles with the media. The Anti-Tom rhetoric does this ideological work for the one who enunciates it, which makes it so enticing for the upper class because it fires the lower classes’ imaginations with a promise of upwards mobility, which then distracts from actual policy matters and the middle class, from the palatium, targets a host of people foreign to this imagined community. And the volatile signifier of a Confederate monument can easily be invested with a racial mission, making a past Utopia a future one.
Conclusion: America’s “Own Inseparable Shadow”

[T]o talk of nonviolence when things are going smoothly is not of much relevance. It is precisely when things become really difficult, urgent and critical that we should think and act nonviolently. – His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama

This thesis has developed a theoretical apparatus in Chapter 1 that has allowed me to discuss a range of texts from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, all of them written from positions of extreme white supremacism. In that respect, the thesis is at odds with one dominant tendency in the past generation of criticism, which is the recovery of works by authors whom white supremacy sought to eclipse. I have set out on this project not to provide these white-supremacist works with an intellectual stage that would undo the diversifying project of previous literary criticism, but to point to a wider danger in neglecting to discuss and combat white supremacy. The paucity of research on this archive indicates America’s ongoing inability to reconcile grievances dating back to the colonial period. From the emboldening of an international white supremacy in the Americas and Europe through far-right politics gaining ground in national and regional governments, we witness not only an overlap among these groups’ obsessions with immigration, but also marked differences in the narratives and artefacts they use to express their hate. Hence, this thesis has sought to probe American white-supremacist novels and these narratives’ presence in the current political culture and public spaces by examining the Charlottesville riots and the significance of Confederate monuments for the ensuing violence.

The white-supremacist science fictions from the turn of the millennium in this archive build on a tradition of white-supremacist discourse popularized by Thomas Dixon
in the Jim-Crow era, who, in turn, draws on the Anti-Tom novel from the antebellum period, a response that assumes its right to defend Southern slavery from white hegemony implemented in the colonial period. Each period of these narratives builds on a past period of white supremacy, which necessitated this thesis’ longue durée. The colonization project of the white-supremacist science fictions bears witness to a congealed durability of manorialism when it capitalizes on a discourse of white genocide in order to prevent diversification and retain exclusively white control over land. But this project in turn derived from a need to secure plantocratic whiteness from an awakening lower-class white consciousness. Upper-class whites in the antebellum North and South needed to redirect aggression towards non-whites to curtail the emerging revolutionary spirit, which served a double function: retaining the white lower class as an ally while keeping it docile by making it conform to industrial morality; and ostracizing individuals from the white imagined community by rendering them ‘socially’ black. Infusing the skin/culture signifier of blackness during Reconstruction with the potential for violence and sexual aggression was not only a convenient continuation of colonial and early republican panics about insurrection in the Caribbean, but also a tool for white supremacists to create a timeless, visually detectable enemy in non-whites. Already in the colonial period, by conjuring this violent ‘other,’ the ruling class had established an antagonist to the ostensibly moral, enlightened white through which it could police ‘lesser’ degrees of whiteness. In other words, the colonial ruling class considered lower-class whites to be just as untrustworthy as Africans. Bacon’s Rebellion illustrates this distrust because of the delicate power balance the plantocracy had to maintain over white communities, the enslaved African-
American population, and Indigenous communities. In 1676, Nathaniel Bacon, a member of the Virginian planter caste and exiled son of an English merchant, instigated a rebellion when Virginia Governor Sir William Berkeley blocked his career ambitions. Incensed by the corruption of Berkeley’s government and its lenient stance towards Indigenous peoples, Bacon started sabotaging the relations between settlers and Indigenous tribes, leading a host of three hundred men to attack a Pamunkey camp, and laying siege to Jamestown with a force of one thousand colonists, both white and black (Olivares and Tucker 45-47). Although Bacon’s Rebellion eventually won more rights for white indentured servants while enslaving Africans for life—thus driving a racial wedge between lower-class whites and Africans (Tatum 654)—the cooperation between white settlers and Africans to destabilize peaceful relations with the Indigenous peoples and rebel against the plantocracy made it apparent to the ruling class that lower-class whites were similarly unreliable allies. The plantocracy could then classify these whites as socially ‘black’ by condemning their non-white ‘savagery’ or they could be designated as collaborators with the ‘other,’ as ‘betrayes’ of their race. This durable notion of ‘racial apostasy’ is fossilized in the white-supremacist science fictions when whites lose ‘their’ future because, prior to the diegeses, liberals had condemned white pride and, thus, sold white exclusive ‘rights’ to land for a diversity that would destabilize white hegemony.

Although the durability of manorialism supports the stratifying quality of whiteness, it is hard to ignore how inherently unstable this stratified whiteness is and how it lends itself to different interpretation and performance. The major fault line between radical white supremacists of the Neo-Nazi kind and less militant ones like academic Neo-
Confederates such as Taylor, MacDonald, or Johnson (see Chapter 1) is the question of how openly whiteness should be performed. For antebellum Anti-Tom authors, whiteness was part of the plantocratic birthright, so the racist humor of minstrelsy contrasted the gravity of the planter’s economic, social, and political pressures with the mendacious portrayal of the careless plantation slave, and made the Anti-Tom message more palatable for the Northern lower-class audience. For Dixon, middle and lower-class whites must perform their whiteness overtly, a desideratum that he dramatized in the bare-faced presence of the Red Shirts—as opposed to the whiteface anonymity granted by the KKK’s hoods—so that the imperial panoptic vision could police race transgressions. For the science-fiction writers, in turn, whiteness is a firebrand that is either carried with guilt or worn with pride as a battle scar.

That ‘whiteness’ is performed differently depending on the States’ current dangerous ‘other’ has been on display in the post-9/11 War on Terror, when the fear of an Islamist external enemy first overrode and then converged with internal racial antagonisms towards African Americans. Unlike Bush and Obama, Trump pursues an isolationism through, among others, Executive Order 13769\(^\text{195}\) and his border wall project to focus on internal ‘enemies’ of white hegemony by extending the skin/culture signifier of black insurrection to include Hispanic people and Muslims.\(^\text{196}\) Meanwhile, the Trump

\(^{195}\) Atrociously dubbed the “Muslim ban,” Executive Order 13769 was in effect from January to March 2017 and lowered the number of admitted refugees to 50,000 and suspended entry for countries as disparate as, among others, Iran, Somalia, and Yemen.

\(^{196}\) Trump’s attempts both to quell discord within the National Rifle Association (NRA) and to hinder investigations of the New York attorney general’s office in the wake of NRA president Oliver North accusing Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre of financial misconduct (Cole) indicates that Trump and the NRA both aim to buttress the durability of manorialism, and, possibly, that the NRA is a junction for “Alt-Right” ideology. Recall the durable racism of the NRA when the only time it advocated for gun control was during
administration condones camouflaged and heavily-armed militia groups that detain hundreds of migrants on the U.S.–Mexico border (Boyette and Simon), a form of vigilantism that has, historically, reliably turned violent (Carranza). By hermetically sealing the States off from additional ‘dangerous’ immigration—and capitalizing on these borders’ ineluctable penetrations—Trump can stoke public sentiment against the internal ‘threat,’ thereby bolstering the durability of manorialism by claiming the land for whites. With this ‘racial’ guidance system targeting enemies on the inside, lower-class whites are free to choose for themselves how to perform ‘whiteness,’ thereby exposing the previously occluded durability of manorialism as a desire to attain the plantocratic status of whiteness as a birthright.

With the affective unbridling of anti-black sentiments through victorious political reaction in the 2016 election resembling the defenestration of ‘carbetbag misrule’ in the Reconstruction era, the narratives in this archive exemplify how racism latches onto or is attracted by the momentum of political movements for a romanticized common white cause. It is precisely this flexible quality of romance that characterizes the Anti-Tom novel and that makes one monument and not another the gravitational center of violence. Liberal attempts to silence these voices and eliminate symbols with which the far-right may

---

the rise of the Black Panther movement in the 1960s. In addition, the association has a long history of fueling anti-immigration sentiments and profiting from it. LaPierre himself drew liberally on the Reconstruction notion of endangered white womanhood combined with racist hyperbole in 2002: “I guess it’s okay to wandle-rape someone’s daughter in public [i.e. at an airport security area]. But no [racial] profiling! No, we don’t want to risk offending an Islamic ex-con with two aliases, no job and no luggage, paying cash for a one-way airline ticket, whose shoes are packed with plastic explosives” (LaPierre).

197 Trump’s direction to withdraw $500 million of foreign aid for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would intensify the stream of immigration rather than alleviate it (cf. Hennigan). Again, Trump pleads abused trust, claiming that the three countries “haven’t done a thing” to prevent immigration, not understanding or ignoring the fact that these foreign aid packages create the very infrastructures to prevent further immigration, and that the countries depend now more than ever on this support to create stability.
identify shows how the durability of manorialism occludes a fear among liberals to
anatomize white supremacy beyond the purpose of promoting a shallow but ‘en woke’
liberalism, which has proven time and again harmful to marginalized people, thus making
would-be anti-racists complicit in racist practices.

The colonial configurations that link supposedly benign liberalism and far-right
violence are excruciatingly hard to track precisely because racist practices are so striated,
but it is safe to assume that Mitch Landrieu’s doubtlessly well-intentioned project to
remove Confederate monuments triggered further race violence rather than prevent it, as
the overwhelming force of counter-protesters that turned out to the KKK’s protest enabled
*Unite the Right*—University of Virginia President Teresa A. Sullivan (de Bruyn) and
Mayor Mike Signer (cf. Ellis) perspicaciously attempted to discourage people from turning
out in large numbers to the KKK protest in order to not give the chapter an undue
impression of significance. Certainly, this is only one example where a generally laudable
but ultimately inadequate anti-racist action has caused profound racial backlash, but the
way Charlottesville is conveniently isolated from other events does not mean that a painful
but necessary exorcism of racecraft was performed successfully. The events at
Charlottesville may have a much more wide-ranging effect than mainstream media allows
for it. Especially since pro-slavery rhetoric and the grievances of the Civil War prove such
powerful narratives in the present day, it is doubtful whether the removal of any or all
Confederate monuments198 will have the desired effect of deracializing public spaces when

---

198 The private capital that commissioners of Confederate monuments invested to counter the momentum of
Civil Rights advocacy constitutes an extension of the economic parasitism the durability of manorialism has
on the public sphere. That the Civil War is still the American war with the highest amount of casualties with
racist practices are deeply entrenched in the country’s social, economic, and legal foundations. One is tempted to ask whether the chain of white domestic terrorism of Robert Bowers, Brenton Tarrant, and, as the most recent case, John Earnest at a San Diego synagogue would have gained a similar momentum without Charlottesville. Those who would argue that these backlashes constitute a momentary paroxysm of an insignificant extremist element that will die out in the fullness of time or even a necessary evil for dismantling racism in the long run both ignore the surfacing and still dormant dangers of white terrorism— which the emergence of the “Alt-Right” indicates and the coordinated attempt to unite it at Charlottesville heralds; they also perpetuate racist practices when marginalized people stand at the forefront of the fray while white upper and middle classes

---

a death toll of around 620,000 (“Civil War Casualties”) is well known. The war effort amounted to $8.3 billion on both sides, yet what this narrative often omits is that, by 1893 alone, pensions and costs of state soldiers’ homes amounted to $1,126,736 for Confederate veterans and $146,737,350 for Union veterans (Marten 17). But the financial effect of this war on the nation—all money that could have been spent on social security and incentives for a more sustainable, diversified economy—does not end with the final pension payment that Irene Triplett, the daughter of a Confederate soldier, was the last person to collect from Veterans Affairs as late as 2017 (McCarthy). In December 2018, Brian Palmer and Seth Freed Wessler for the Smithsonian Magazine noted that in the past ten years alone American taxpayers have paid at least $40 million to maintain Confederate monuments (Palmer and Wessler), and the removal, security effort, and storage of only four monuments in New Orleans already amounts to $2.1 million (LeBlanc). Thus, the Confederacy’s fight for slavery and white landownership, in the monuments erected in veneration of its main actors and events, has an economic impact on the present day because it absorbs resources to alleviating inequalities for all people marginalized and under duress from the American neoliberal empire. The money spent both on maintaining as well as removing and securely storing these monuments points to how capital sustains the durability of manorialism and how whiteness, even when attacked, only consumes more resources that could go to social policies. Whether the removal project is a meaningful endeavor when it places an increased financial burden on taxpayers only to have the effect of cleansing the public sphere of potentially hateful artefacts negated by Confederate monuments being erected on private property is therefore more than questionable, perhaps even counterproductive to decolonization.

While the Christchurch shootings have prompted the New Zealand government to pass a gun control legislation banning assault rifles with a vote of 119 to 1, gun laws in the United States have not budged an inch despite countless armed domestic terrorist attacks over decades. The removal of monuments as a response to one of these acts of domestic terrorism, in contrast, leaves little room for optimism that hate crimes with racial bias, implicitly fueled by gun culture with the narratives of freedom and defense of property as wings on the heels of Second-Amendment guardians, will subside in the distant future due to less Confederate iconography.
watch on from a distance—all in the hope that the next presidency will be more congenial to diversity than the current one and will easily undo the anti-non-white sentiments that Trump has stoked and entrenched in public discourse.

As welcome and, I think, as productive as the Equal Justice Initiative’s memorialization project to dedicating a memorial to lynch law victims may be, it is only a first step to dismantling white supremacy not by attempting to erase what we know to be false but by placing a counter-narrative alongside the existing one in order to remind and educate the populace not only about racial terror, but also about the many recombined narratives of white supremacy. To give this decolonization project full weight, we ought to anatomize the white supremacy that used racial terror as a weapon. The trite dictum to ‘never forget’ the Holocaust rings hollow when we only remember for the sake of remembering without an actual effort to bridge the widening ideological gaps. Before racism is recombined in a new “Alt-Right” under a different moniker and modus operandi, it is time for legislators, politicians, and artists to allay fears, bridge ideological and political gaps, and meaningfully interrogate and learn about whiteness and how the more elusive racist practices can amplify extremism.

Especially in academia, it is paramount that educators include in the curriculum works as pernicious as the ones in this archive. Admittedly, literature professors already hard-pressed to create meaningful reading lists for increasingly streamlined and shamefully underfunded programs may only wearily shrug off my exhortation, and marginalized students and settler students alike may be repelled by the hate in these works. But if we wish to design courses that meaningfully treat racism and strike at the core of imperial
durabilities we should, for example, consider supplementing Frederick Douglass’ *My Bondage and My Freedom* (1855) with Charles Jacobs Peterson’s *The Cabin and Parlor*, or Charles Chesnutt’s *The Marrow of Tradition* with Dixon’s *The Leopard’s Spots*. If we do not, we are not only deluding ourselves into a supposedly enlightened pedagogy, we are effectively hindering decolonization by encouraging a colorblind liberalism that does not understand its foundation in white hegemony.

Aside from quenching violence and continuing to strive for a diverse cultural and political landscape, it may be of little use to combat white supremacists directly, for, as I have argued throughout the thesis, rhetorical or violent attacks may only bolster the movement’s ranks and legitimize its cause by confirming that we are attentive (which we must be) and afraid (which we must not). Clearly, censorship and denying white supremacists platforms to speak, be it online or offline, can only go so far, for withdrawing the right to free speech, the crux of democracy, is a dangerous path to tread for a society committed to equality. To combat American white supremacy effectively, it is vital to understand it beyond reducing it to the intellectual poverty of a Southern ‘pride’ enshrined in the banjo-like pentatonic legato roll of “Sweet Home Alabama.” By understanding the racial and historical grounds on which white supremacy typically operates, one can deflate the affective ‘truth’ of the South and approach people in danger of being drawn into extremist circles. Our goal must be to diminish or even stop the influx to extremist groups, for, without ‘new blood’ ready to do the footwork, any extremist organization quickly collapses.
But how does one understand white supremacy and disrupt its essentializing claims when it is so casually enunciated and easily renounced both in the ephemeral realm of the meme and in the illustrious spotlight of the presidential podium? It is in white-supremacist literature that this ideology leaves the realm of intangible argumentative *non-sequiturs* and aporic conspiracy theories and enters a space where communication with people not steeped in its contradictory mire is possible.\(^{200}\) In other words, by shrouding their hateful messages in the guise of ‘art,’ white-supremacist writers enter a form of communication through the Anti-Tom novel in which they can be understood, for they draw on century-old literary traditions and patterns that were and are used for inclusive and exclusive purposes alike. Granted, I can only cover a sliver of the white-supremacist archive in this thesis, but, aside from thorough study of historical and contemporary white-supremacist narratives, these works must find their way into university courses and reading curricula, and on this basis scholars must open a dialogue unafraid of exposure and ‘contamination’ by the hate in these works. Rather than protecting our minds through avoidance but endangering people vulnerable to this ideology and to the violence this ideology engenders, we must become immune but not desensitized through contact. For, ultimately, it seems clear that no amount of silencing pressure can suffocate this hate.

\(^{200}\) After all, the average white person is much more unlikely than the white-supremacist proselyte to come across works like *Mein Kampf* or Anders Bering Breivik’s or Brenton Tarrant’s manifestos without actively seeking out the text in a respective far-right community, whereas they can come much more unsuspectingly in contact with works like the white-supremacist science fictions in the guise of regular commercial publications.
Works Cited


“A Lady of New Orleans.” Tit for Tat. Garret, 1856.


Allen, Kimberly. “SPLC Statement on ‘Destroy This Statue’ Attached.” Received by David Mitterauer, 19 March 2019.


Anglin, Andrew. “Heather Heyer’s Disgustingly Bulbous Mother Demands Brutal


Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. Routledge, 1994.


Carranza, Rafael. “Border Vigilantes, and the Wall They Might Be Watching.” *USA*


Cowan, Tynes. “The 1856 Slave Insurrection Panic and the Williamsburg Gazette.”


Delbanco, Andrew. The War Before the War: Fugitive Slaves and the Struggle for
America’s Soul from the Revolution to the Civil War. Penguin, 2018.


Gutierrez, Michael Keenan. “UNC’s Silent Sam and Honoring the Confederacy.”


Hale, Sarah J. *Liberia; or, Mr. Peyton’s Experiments*. Harper and Brothers, 1853.


Harris, Joel Chandler. *Uncle Remus: His Songs and His Sayings*. Grosset & Dunlap, 1880.


---. *The Scarlet Letter*. Ticknor, Reed and Fields, 1850.


Hayne, Barrie. “Standing on Neutral Ground: Charles Jacobs Peterson of ‘Peterson’s.’”


James, C. L. R. *The C. L. R. James Reader*. Edited by Anna Grimshaw, Blackwell, 1992


LeBlanc, Paul. “Cost of Removing Confederate Monuments in New Orleans: $ 2.1


Lippard, George. *The Quaker City; Or, the Monks of Monk Hall*. George Lippard, 1845.


McClintock, Anne. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest.* Routledge, 1995.


McIntosh, Maria J. *The Lofty and the Lowly; or, Good in All and None All-Good.* Appleton, 1853.


Peterson, Charles J. (pseud. ‘J. Thornton Randolph’). The Cabin and Parlor; or, Slaves and Masters. T. B. Peterson, 1852.


Rush, Caroline E. *The North and the South; or, Slavery and Its Contrasts*. Crissy & Markley, 1852.


---. *Ivanhoe; A Romance*. Archibald Constable, 1820.

Smith, John David. ““My Books Are Hard Reading for a Negro”: Tom Dixon and His
African American Critics, 1905-1939.” Thomas Dixon Jr. and the Birth of
Modern America, edited by Michele K. Gillespie and Randal L. Hall, Louisiana

Smith, W. L. G. Life at the South; or, Uncle tom’s Cabin As It Is. Geo. H. Derby & Co.,
1852.


in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800-1880, edited by

National Public Radio, 15 January 2019,
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/15/685672038/judge-throws-out-alabama-law-that-
protects-confederate-monuments.

Stiem, Tyler. “Statue Wars: What Should We Do with Troublesome Monuments?” The
Guardian, 26 September 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/sep/26/statue-wars-what-should-we-do-
with-troublesome-monuments.


---. Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life Among the Lowly. John P. Jewett & Co., 1852.

Taketani, Etsuko. “Postcolonial Liberia: Sarah Josepha Hale’s Africa.” American


Twain, Mark. *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. Chatto & Windus, 1884.


“Vidi.” *Mr. Frank, the Underground Mail-Agent*. Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1853.


Wintour, Patrick. “Hillary Clinton: Europe Must Curb Immigration to Stop Rightwing
Populists.” *The Guardian*, 22 November 2018,
