

Dynamic Risk Assessment of Process Facilities using Advanced Probabilistic Approaches

by

© Mohammad Zaid Kamil

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Abstract

A process accident can escalate into a chain of accidents, given the degree of congestion and complex arrangement of process equipment and pipelines. To prevent a chain of accidents, (called the *domino effect*), detailed assessments of risk and appropriate safety measures are required. The present study investigates available techniques and develops an integrated method to analyze evolving process accident scenarios, including the domino effect. The work presented here comprises two main contributions: a) a predictive model for process accident analysis using imprecise and incomplete information, and b) a predictive model to assess the risk profile of domino effect occurrence. A brief description of each is presented below.

In recent years the Bayesian network (BN) has been used to model accident causation and its evolution. Though widely used, conventional BN suffers from two major uncertainties, data and model uncertainties. The former deals with the use of evidence theory while the latter uses canonical probabilistic models.

High interdependencies of chemical infrastructure makes it prone to the domino effect. This demands an advanced approach to monitor and manage the risk posed by the domino effect is much needed. Given the dynamic nature of the domino effect, the monitoring and modelling methods need to be continuous time-dependent. A Generalized Stochastic Petri-net (GSPN) framework was chosen to model the domino effect. It enables modelling of an accident propagation pattern as the domino effect. It also enables probability analysis to estimate risk profile, which is of vital importance to design effective safety measures.

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List of symbols, Nomenclature and Abbreviations

BOP	Blowout Preventer
MIMAH	Methodology for Identification of Major Accident Hazards
MIRAS	Methodology for Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios
QRA	Quantitative Risk Assessment
PSA	Probabilistic Safety Approach
BN	Bayesian Network
GSPN	Generalized Stochastic Petri Net
ASCE	American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
DST	Dempster Shafer Theory
CPT	Conditional Probability Table
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
BT	Bow-Tie
FT	Fault Tree
ET	Event Tree
BPA	Basic Probability Assessment
Bel	Belief Measure
Pl	Plausibility
FOD	Frame of Discernment
PS	Power Set

CE	Critical Event
HLA	High Level Alarm
CAPECO	Caribbean Petroleum Cooperation
CSB	Chemical Safety Board
ASP	Accident Sequence Precursor
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
PN	Peri Net
SPN	Stochastic Petri Net
HAZOP	Hazard and Operability study
FMEA	Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
MAE	Major Accidental Events
t _{tf}	time to failure
HR	Heat Radiation
DRA	Dynamic Risk Analysis

1. Introduction

1.1 Authorship Statement

Mohammad Zaid Kamil is the principal author of this thesis and also prepared the first drafts of the two manuscripts included in Chapters 2 and 3. Professor Faisal Khan, co-author of this thesis, provided the fundamental concepts, technical support and guidance and verified all the concepts developed throughout the entire process. Dr. Salim Ahmed, co-author of this thesis, provided guidance, technical advice and troubleshooting assistance. In addition to the above, the co-authors contributed by reviewing, and revising the two manuscripts and the thesis.

1.2 Overview

Process safety is a crucial part of all process operations that take place in the industry. It aims to minimize the risk of a process hazard that may lead to the release of materials and/or energy with the help of preventive and mitigative layers of safety (Health and Safety Executive, 2015). However, despite the advancements of risk analysis techniques, they still fail to foresee many undesired events in process facilities, for example, the recent catastrophic accident at the Texas City refinery accident in 2005 (US Chemical Safety Board, 2007) and the Deep-water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). The Texas City accident was caused due to a lack of safety measures that allowed the risk to go above its acceptable limits (US Chemical Safety Board, 2007). For the Deepwater Horizon accident, a blowout preventer (BOP) failure was the root cause of the accident (US Chemical Safety and Hazard

Investigation Board, 2016). These accidents have significantly affected the industry practices of process safety.

The most important step in safety analysis is accident scenario modeling. Various approaches have been proposed for this purpose such as *maximum credible accident scenario* by (Khan, 2001) that short-lists the potential scenarios based on the likelihood and consequences of the undesired event, the *Methodology for Identification of Major Accident Hazards* (MIMAH) and the *Methodology for Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios* (MIRAS) proposed by Delvosalle (Delvosalle, Fievez, Pipart and Debray, 2006). The MIRAS includes a safety system but the MIMAH does not consider it.

1.3 Dynamic Risk Analysis Evolution

Risk analysis aims to quantify the occurrence probability of an accident scenario and its associated consequences (Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, 2013). In chemical/process industries, risk analysis followed by a safety system implementation is important, due to the involvement of hazardous substances. Several risk analysis methodologies have been used to model accidents, which can be broadly divided into two main categories: a) Qualitative approach and b) Quantitative approach. Both approaches identify hazards and estimate risk. However, the former approach is often performed for a group of systems, used for screening purposes and the estimated risk is relative in nature, whereas the latter is a comprehensive approach, used to quantify the risk (probability of failure and consequence assessment) and is often performed on specific system or equipment. The quantitative approach can be either deterministic or probabilistic.

To perform Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA), many attempts have been made to dynamically adapt the model based on new observations from a process. The two principal techniques used in DRA are the Bow-Tie (BT) and the Bayesian Network (BN). Both methods have the ability to capture the accident scenario from causes to consequences. However, the former suffers from the static nature of its constituents, i.e. the fault tree and the event tree. Researchers have made attempts to overcome the limitation; e.g., FT has been coupled with Bayesian theory to update the risk dynamically (Ching & Leu, 2009). Similarly, ET has also been coupled with Bayesian theory to update the likelihood of safety functions (Meel and Seider, 2006; Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt, 2009; Rathnayaka, Khan and Amyotte, 2011). Another attempt has been made to utilize the unique features of BN by mapping BT on BN (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013).

Moreover, BN has attracted much attention in the past five years due to its unique features, such as capturing event dependency, incorporating common cause failure and dynamically updating the risk by considering accident sequence precursor (ASP) data often gathered during the process. However, it has a few disadvantages, such as a high computational load which increases exponentially with the number of variables for constructing the conditional probability table (CPT) and an inability to capture complex behaviour/dependency among variables, deterministic and/or normally distributed failure probabilities. The current research is an attempt to address the gaps and challenges in DRA.

1.4 Motivation

In the present study, the application of advanced probabilistic techniques such as BN and PN are investigated and discussed in the context of dynamic risk assessment of process

operations. The following sections would provide a brief description of motivation as well as these mentioned techniques application to bridge the gaps to perform effective DRA.

1.5 Application of BN in Dynamic risk assessment of process operations

BN is a graphical technique used to model accident scenarios in chemical industries. It can incorporate causal relationships among variables using a Conditional Probability Table (CPT). Another advantage of this method is that it models the complete accident scenario, i.e., it has the ability to model causes as well as consequences in a single graphical diagram. Using Bayes' theorem, BN has the ability to perform reasoning and update the prior belief when new information about the system becomes available (evidence). However, sequential updating can also be performed using BN, as new data is gathered from the process. The precursor data can be considered to adapt the probability of the system, which is of great importance, particularly for rare event probability estimation.

In the past decade, BN has received a plethora of attention in the area of risk and safety engineering. Moreover, BN models can produce results when subjected to model uncertainty and/or data uncertainty. The former uncertainty can be caused due to imprecise logic relationships used in the CPT to model the causal relationship among variables, while the latter results from the crisp probability requirement of BN. Flexible logic gates are required to build the CPT; they incorporate various interactions of variables. Traditional logic gates such as OR & AND only depict the linear relationships among variables, which is a naïve assumption in accident modeling. In risk analysis, the uncertainty cannot be removed completely, due to the lack of system knowledge and variability in the system response (Markowski, Mannan and Bigoszezewska, 2009; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte

and Veitch, 2013). In industrial systems, it is hard to acquire failure probabilities of process components, due to the lack of understanding of failure mechanisms and design faults (Yuhua and Datao, 2005). Obtaining failure data from process history is not possible for all components. Therefore, subjective sources such as expert opinions become the only source available to obtain the required information. The data obtained from various subjective sources may have a high degree of inconsistency if all the experts do not reach a consensus and the probabilistic approach (BN) cannot efficiently deal with the problem. Various methods have been discussed in the literature; e.g. see Abrahamsson, (2002); Wilcox and Ayyub, (2003); Thacker and Huyse, (2007); Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch (2009). Ferdous et al. (2009) used bow-tie analysis, where the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST), commonly known as evidence theory, is used to aggregate multi-expert opinions, which reduces uncertainty significantly. In the present study, a modified Dempster-Shafer (DS) combination rule known as the Yager combination rule has been used, due to its numerical stability as compared to the DST (Sentz and Ferson, 2002).

The aim of this study is to utilize the advantages of BN in the risk assessment of process operations and also to overcome its limitations. Incorporating methods to manage model and data uncertainties in BN allows modeling an accident scenario more precisely, even with incomplete and imprecise information. The incomplete information can be dealt with using canonical models which are able to model various interactions among the causes and the effects of an accident. Vague information available about the system from subjective sources can be combined using the Yager combination rule. The study attempts to predict

the accident more precisely because it is preferable to avoid an accident rather than minimize its consequences.

1.6 Application of Generalized Stochastic Petri-Nets in modelling domino effect scenarios

Domino effects are in-frequent but can be very severe in consequences. To model domino accidents is a challenging task (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2013). Since 1947, the term domino effect has been documented in the literature (Kadri, Chatelet and Lallement, 2013); however, it gained more attention after the LPG leakage in Mexico City in 1984. Since then various attempts have been made in the past, based on different aspects of the domino effect such as escalation probability (i.e., damage probability), use of distance models (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991) and a combination of a probit model and threshold limits (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Cozzani et al., 2006). Moreover, other studies used statistical surveys, which show accident sequences and estimate the frequency (Darbra, Palacios and Casal, 2010; Vílchez, Sevilla, Montiel and Casal, 1995; Kourniotis et al., 2000). Additionally, in the context of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of domino accident modelling and propagation, some work has been done (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a; Cozzani, Gubinelli, Antonioni, Spadoni and Zanelli, 2005; Antonioni, Spadoni and Cozzani, 2009; Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010; Reniers, Dullaert, Ale and Soudan, 2005; Reniers and Dullaert, 2007; Khakzad, Reniers, Abbasi, & Khan, 2016; Khakzad et al., 2013; Khakzad, 2015; Khakzad et al., 2013; Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014). Previous attempts to model propagational patterns and likelihood assessments provide discrete probabilities. However, those attempts have limitations, such as the inability to

model complex process behaviour in combined loading and time-dependent equipment failure. In chapter 3 an attempt has been made to overcome limitations in modelling domino effects. A model based on Generalized Stochastic Petri-Nets (GSPN) helps to overcome the gap. The term Petri-net (PN) was first introduced in 1962 in the dissertation of Carl Adam Petri (David and Alia, 2010). This probabilistic technique is receiving much attention due to its flexibility to model concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel non-deterministic and/or stochastic systems (Murata, 1989).

The motivation is to utilize the potential probabilistic techniques which can model the domino propagation pattern and assess its likelihood. The developed framework for domino effect likelihood assessment by Cozzani et al., (2005) and Khakzad et al., (2013) is considered in the present study to develop a *DOMINO-GSPN* model for modelling accident scenarios, a model which is able to consider heat radiation from more than one source and thereby render a time-dependent failure profile of the primary, secondary or higher order domino level units.

1.7 Research objectives of the thesis

This thesis aims to bridge earlier identified knowledge gaps related to modelling dynamic risk assessment and domino effect scenario modelling. The work is conducted to fulfill two main research objectives:

- To address data uncertainty in BN which arises due to a lack of crisp data and model uncertainty arising due to the use of linear relationships among variables

- To model propagation pattern and domino effect likelihood in a combined loading and continuous time-dependent failure profile of equipment.

The first objective is to improve the BN model in order to predict the accident scenario precisely by addressing the data and model uncertainties. The data uncertainty arises due to the lack of available knowledge regarding failure probabilities of root causes and safety barriers. It is not easy to record all the data of each component in a process plant. The other uncertainty in BN is due to the use of traditional logic gates (OR & AND). These can only model the linear relationship between the causes and effects. However, canonical probabilistic models can overcome the arisen uncertainty by modelling various aspects of the interaction of causes and effects. In previous attempts, the data uncertainty has been addressed in Bow-tie analysis but not in BN. This study attempts to address it along with the uncertainty due to logic gates.

The second objective is to model a series of accidents (cascading effect) known as the domino effect. To model the domino effect is a challenging task because it requires more computational time to model complex behaviour of process equipment. From the literature review of the current chapter, it has been identified that there is a need for models which can assess the domino effect likelihood and propagation patterns. The model should be able to assess the likelihood in a combined load, i.e. heat loads from the different mechanisms and provide a continuous time-dependent failure profile of the components. It can help to monitor the process risk and also in applying the mitigation and control measures.

The aforementioned research objective is achieved by adopting advanced approaches to the model accident and domino effect analysis.

1.8 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is written in manuscript format. It comprises two manuscripts. The first manuscript which is presented in chapter 2 has been submitted to the ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part B: Mechanical Engineering. The other manuscript presented in chapter 3 has been submitted to the Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection. The organization of the thesis is also illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Chapter 2 is based on the first objective. It proposes a BN based model which is capable of modelling an accident scenario when the information is incomplete and imprecise. It includes a brief literature review of past techniques used in accident modeling along with their deficiencies. The proposed model is first applied to a simple example of a tank equipped with basic process control to show its efficacy. Further, a real-life case study is also used to validate the approach and to provide a comparison with traditional BN.




Figure 1.1 Thesis organization

Chapter 3 is based on the second objective. It proposes a *DOMINO-GSPN* model that can predict the domino likelihood of a combined loading and renders continuous time-dependent failure of equipment. The failure profile can be used to determine the vulnerability of a unit. This model has been used with heat radiation as an escalation vector; additionally, its application can be extended to other escalation vectors such as overpressure, impact of blast wave/missile etc. The proposed model has been applied to a case study to show its efficacy. The results obtained from the analysis have been compared with other probabilistic techniques to validate the model.

Chapter 4 comprises conclusions drawn from the study presented in chapters 2 and 3. It also provides recommendations for future work.

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2 Dynamic Risk Analysis Using Incomplete and Imprecise Information

Preface

A version of this manuscript has been submitted to ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part B: Mechanical Engineering. I am the primary author of this manuscript along with Co-authors Faisal Khan, Salim Ahmed and Guozheng Song. I developed the proposed framework of the model and its application using a case study along with the analysis of the result. I prepared the first draft of the proposed framework and revised it based on the co-author's feedback. The co-author Faisal Khan provided the research problem, help in developing the framework, revising and testing the application of the model. The co-author Salim Ahmed support in giving constructive feedback to improve the application of the model and also assisted in reviewing and improving the presentation of the proposed framework in the manuscript. The co-author Guozheng Song help to implement the feedback provided by other co-authors in revising and finalizing the manuscript.

Abstract

Accident modelling is a vital step which helps in designing preventive measures to avoid future accidents, and thus, to enhance process safety. Bayesian network is widely used in accident modelling due to its capability to represent accident scenarios from their causes to likely consequences. However, to assess likelihood of an accident using the BN, it requires exact basic event probabilities which are often obtained from expert opinions.

Such subjective opinions are often inconsistent and sometimes conflicting and/or incomplete. In this work, the evidence theory has been coupled with Bayesian network (BN) to address inconsistency, conflict and incompleteness in the expert opinions. It combines the acquired knowledge from various subjective sources, thereby rendering accuracy in probability estimation. Another source of uncertainty in BN is model uncertainty. To represent multiple interactions of a cause-effect relationship Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates are explored in the study. Conventional logic gates, i.e. OR/AND gates can only provide a linear interaction of cause-effect relationship hence introduces uncertainty in the assessment. The proposed methodology provides an impression how dynamic risk assessment could be conducted when the sufficient information about a process system is unavailable. To illustrate the execution of a proposed methodology a tank equipped with a basic process control system has been used as an example. A real-life case study has also been used to validate the proposed model and compare its results with those using a deterministic approach.

Keywords: Bayesian network; Uncertainty; Canonical Probabilistic model; Evidence theory

2.1 Introduction

Chemical process industries are prone to accidents and due to the handling of large amounts of hazardous chemicals. Process facilities consist of distillation towers, heat exchangers, separation units and various other equipment, depending on the process operation, along with a cluster of pipelines. These have the potential to cause escalation, turning small

incidents into catastrophic events (Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt, 2009). Such accidents can involve fire and explosion which can further lead to a domino effect (chain of accidents) resulting in severe losses, including fatalities, property damage and environmental degradation (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Process deviation is one of the main causes of accidents in a process system, leading to a chain of events resulting in an accident. These deviations are caused due to the malfunctioning or failure of equipment, human error and process upset. Among the different methodologies for risk assessment such as quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), there is a common step known as accident modelling. It is a theoretical framework used to analyze the cause-consequence relationship of an accident. Khan (2001) used maximum credible accident scenarios for realistic and reliable risk assessments, which help to analyze and investigate past accidents and to prevent future accidents by taking into account safety measures followed by risk assessment (Tan, Chen, Zhang, Fu and Li, 2014). Accident modelling is an important analysis which can help to determine the root causes of an accident, enhancing safety systems and developing preventive measures (Qureshi, 2008). Al-shanini, Ahmad and Khan (2014) provided a detailed review of accident models in chemical process industries along with the systematic classification of each model.

Among various available modelling techniques, Bow-tie (BT) and the Bayesian network (BN) have gained attention in the past decade. BT consists of mainly two constituents, namely, Fault tree (FT) and Event tree (ET). The former helps to develop the causal relationship between causal factors and abnormal events (accidents), whereas the latter is a sequential technique used to identify potential consequences of an abnormal event.

However, BT suffers limitations of both the FT and ET, which makes it less demanding than BN for accident modelling (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013). To address their limitations, some researchers tried to couple Bayesian inference with BT (Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010). BN reduces the limitations of BT such as common cause failure, event dependencies and multi-state variables which are encountered in chemical process industries (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013). Probability updating is another advantage of BN, which is inherent, due to Bayes' theorem. The model can be updated if new information from the process plant is available which in turn helps to update the prior belief about the root causes and safety barriers' failure probabilities.

Methodologies have been proposed to map BT into the BN. Fault tree mapping into BN is based on the work of Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, (2001), and Marsh, Bearfield and Marsh (2008) used event tree mapping for BN. Later, Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte (2013), introduced BT mapping into the Bayesian network by combining fault tree and event tree mapping methodologies. They applied BN to assess risk associated with vapour ignition accidents, considering event dependencies and used ASP (accident sequence precursor) data to dynamically update the probabilities for possible consequences and root causes. Yuan, Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, (2015) applied BN to assess the risk of dust explosion considering root causes, dependencies and common cause failures. Abimbola, Khan, Khakzad and Butt, (2015) used BN considering dependencies in the pressure-drilling technique to update the belief for operational data. Recently, Adedigba, Khan and Yang, (2016) developed the model of non-linear interaction of contributory

accident factors due to the flexibility of BN to accommodate relaxation assumptions in conditional dependence.

A risk is a function of accident probability and consequences associated with it. The present study focuses on improving prediction of accident probability because it is more viable to prevent accident rather than minimizing its consequences. The main objective of this study is to handle the uncertainty caused by imprecise logic relationships and incomplete (partial ignorance) prior data in accident modelling. The model and data uncertainties can be addressed using canonical probabilistic models and evidence theory. Traditionally, a linear relationship between causal factors is assumed and represented using OR (AND) logic gates. Flexible logic gates are needed to build the conditional dependencies that incorporate the various interactions of a cause-effect relationship. Canonical probabilistic models are used to define the conditional dependence between the parent node and child node in BN. It can also consider expert opinion (if data is unavailable) or available data, which includes various interactions between child and parent nodes. In the current study, Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND logic gates have been taken into consideration in place of OR and AND logic gates. The implementation of these logic gates is illustrated in detail using an example in section 3.

While performing risk analysis, it is not possible to rule out uncertainty completely because it arises due to lack of knowledge about the system and the physical variability of a system response (Markowski, Mannan and Bigoszezowska, 2009; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, (2013). The prior failure probabilities of basic events and safety barriers are not often found in the literature. Therefore, one has to rely on subjective sources (e.g.,

experts' opinions). The probabilities obtained from different experts suffer from the limitations of inconsistency, limited knowledge about the system, lack of understanding of failure mechanism and inability of the experts to reach a consensus. BN is not able to deal with such concepts. Various methods have been discussed in the literature to handle uncertainties arising from expert opinion and using it for risk analysis, including Abrahamsson, (2002); Wilcox and Ayyub, (2003); Thacker and Huyse, (2007); Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, (2009). Bayesian probability theory has a well-developed decision-making theory which needs precise probability.

The key question this work is addressing, how opinions (subjective) can be aggregated (in the probabilistic framework) to provide a consistent and robust prior and subsequent updating using Bayesian theory. Probabilistic opinion pooling is one of the techniques to find a consensus among a group of individuals. However, it is widely assumed that the combined opinion should take the form of a single probability distribution in case of probabilistic opinion pooling which is not an appropriate assumption when dealing with imprecise probability. Since each opinion is subjected to imprecision, hence, Bayesian probability theory may cause concern in dealing with imprecise probability. Stewart & Quintana (2018) has re-emphasized this point in their recent work. The DS theory can capture the imprecision in individual probability and also in multiple source probabilities aggregation. Use of DS theory with Yager modification provides a reliable likelihood estimate in an interval $[Bel, Pl]$ with a median estimate as a bet. The objective of this work is to capture the strength of Bayesian network and the DS theory, and thus, to provide a reliable and robust means of probabilistic assessment.

The evidence theory (commonly known as Dempster-Shafer theory) has been used in BT analysis and was found to significantly reduce uncertainty (Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, 2013). Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is used to aggregate multi-expert opinions to define prior belief about a system. The Yager combination rule is a modification of the Dempster- Shafer combination rule which has been used in this study due to its numerical stability in cases involving large conflicts among expert opinions (Sentz and Ferson, 2002).

The remaining chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief description of BN and canonical probabilistic models along with DST. Section 2.5 illustrates the application of the proposed model by modelling an accident using imprecise and incomplete prior information. Section 2.7 shows the partial validation of the proposed model using a case study based on a past accident. Finally, Section 2.8 provides the conclusion of the study.

2.2 Bayesian network

BN is a graphical model widely used in dynamic risk analysis based on uncertain and probabilistic knowledge (Pearl, 1988; Neapolitan, 1990; Heckerman, Mamdani and Wellman, 1995; Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, 2001). Its nodes represent a set of random variables, and arcs connecting the nodes represent the direct dependencies. The quantitative relationship between nodes is represented by conditional probabilities assigned in Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) (Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, 2001; Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte 2013). The BN represents the joint probability distribution $P(A)$ of a random variable $A = \{A_1, \dots, A_n\}$, based on the conditional independence and chain rule. It can be incorporated into the BN structure as:

$$P(A) = \prod_{i=1}^n P(A_i | p_a(A_i)) \quad (1)$$

where $p_a(A_i)$ is the parent of random variable A_i and $P(A)$ is the joint probability distribution of a set of random variables (Pearl, 1988; Nielsen and Jensen, 2009).

BN incorporates Bayes' theorem, which provides a way to revise prior probabilities given new or additional evidence. Bayesian statistics measures degree of belief by using prior probabilities, updating it by evidence (likelihood) to obtain a posterior belief. The equation used to obtain the posterior probability given evidence (E) is as follows:

$$P(A|E) = \frac{P(A,E)}{P(E)} = \frac{P(A,E)}{\sum_A P(A,E)} \quad (2)$$

2.3 Preliminary

2.3.1 Canonical probabilistic models

BN has been extensively used in accidental modelling of process facilities. However, one of the challenges is to acquire the knowledge about the system to develop conditional dependencies of child node to parent node. To develop a linear relationship of the former on the latter, conventional logic gates (OR and AND gates) can easily be used. In practical scenarios the conditional dependence is not always linear which introduces uncertainty in the model and undermine the credibility of the process. To relax the assumption canonical probabilistic models has been explored in modelling complex behavior in establishing conditional dependencies. The canonical probabilistic model reduces the required number of parameters to build the conditional distributions. There are various canonical probabilistic models available such as Noisy-OR, leaky Noisy-OR, Noisy-AND and leaky

Noisy-AND logic gates (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). These models can use expert opinion to estimate the conditional probability of a child node on the parent node. Expert opinion helps to reduce the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationship. Therefore, the current study focuses on explaining the use of Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates in a BN model, which better reflects practical scenarios in accident modelling.

The Noisy-OR gate is used to describe various interactions between n number of causes and their common effect Z . The term “Noisy” refers to the chance that causes fail to produce the effect, due to the inhibitor preventing it (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). Assume that C_i is the causation probability of a child node produced by the parent node while q_i is the probability that inhibition is active, in other words, q_i is the probability that the child node is present but does not affect the parent node. In a Noisy-OR gate, only n parameters are needed compared to 2^n in the case of an unrestricted model (Heckerman and Breese, 1996). Comparing, OR gates and leaky Noisy-OR gates, Noisy-OR gates provide the median condition among the mentioned logic gates. Therefore, it has been used in this study. When there are multiple parents to a child node, its probability can be calculated using following equation (Adedigba, Khan and Yang, 2016).

$$P(Z/A) = 1 - \prod_{i \in A} (1 - C_i) \quad (3)$$

The leaky Noisy-AND gate is an extension of the standard Noisy-AND gate in which an explicit inhibitor is added with a probability of q_L that may prevent the effect Z when all the conditions are fulfilled. Each condition necessary for Z to be true can be inhibited or

substituted. Let q_i be the probability that i^{th} inhibitor is active when condition A_i is satisfied. Then, the causation probability, $C_i = 1 - q_i$. Similarly, s_i is the probability that the i^{th} substitute replaces A_i when the condition is not fulfilled. The leaky-Noisy AND gate requires $2n+1$ parameter compared to the leaky Noisy-OR gate which only needs $n+1$ parameter, where q_L is the leak probability which accounts for the factors which have not taken into consideration. While in the AND logic condition, the leaky Noisy-AND condition provides the median values. The formula for deriving the CPT of the leaky Noisy-AND gate is represented by the following equation (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007).

$$P(Z/A) = (1 - q_L) [\prod_{i \in +A} C_i \prod_{j \in -A} s_j] \quad (4)$$

2.3.2 Evidence theory

The BN requires the probability of basic events and failure of safety barriers as prior information to conduct quantitative risk assessment (QRA). Usually, the occurrence probabilities of events are rarely available as accurate data; therefore, expert opinions are consulted to obtain prior information. Two types of uncertainties (i.e., aleatory and epistemic uncertainties) need to be addressed while using expert opinions (Ayyub and Klir, 2006). Randomness in the data availability, as well as the behaviour of the system, are reflected in the aleatory uncertainty. Vagueness and ambiguity are reflected in the epistemic uncertainty, which mainly arises because of incompleteness and imprecision (Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch 2009; 2011; 2013). Probabilistic methods are not effective to deal with imprecise and incomplete information without any incorporation of technique which can deal with uncertainties especially uncertainty arising from lack of

data (Druschel, Ozbek and Pinder, 2006). To obtain promising results from the probabilistic model the prior information obtained from subjective sources must be aggregated.

Evidence theory was first proposed by Dempster (1968) and later extended by Shafer (1976), and is commonly known as Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) (Sentz and Ferson, 2002). The DST consists of three basic parameters, namely, basic probability assessment (BPA), belief measure (Bel), and plausibility measure. These parameters are used to define the belief structure (Cheng, 2000; Lefevre, Colot and Vannoorenberghe, 2002; Bae, Grandhi and Canfield, 2004; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, 2009; 2011; 2013). The belief structure consists of a continuous interval in the form of belief and plausibility. The real probability lies in the belief structure. As the structure becomes narrower, the probability becomes more precise.

In a probabilistic framework, the outcome of an event is in the form of true or false. In evidence theory, frame of discernment (FOD) is nothing but defines the possible outcome of an event $\{T, F\}$ which lead to four possible subsets. To define the event occurrence probability a basic probability assessment (BPA) or belief mass has to be defined. Expert opinion is explicitly representing the degree of belief in determining the belief mass of each subset. The combined evidence helps to decide the event probability implicitly. Suppose, to define an event occurrence probability; the expert opinion would be in the form of 75% true and 20% false. Mathematically, it would be ($m\{T\} = 0.75$, $m\{F\} = 0.2$ and $m\{T, F\} = 0.05$)

The FOD $|\Omega|$ can be defined as a set of mutually exclusive elements that allows having $2^{|\Omega|}$ subsets in a power set (PS), where $|\Omega|$ shows the cardinality of a FOD. If, $|\Omega| = \{Y, N\}$, the power set (PS) will include four subsets, namely, $\{\{\phi\}, \{Y\}, \{N\}, \{Y, N\}\}$, since the cardinality is two. Moreover, the cardinality can be infinite.

The BPA represents the knowledge assigned to the proposition of the power set (PS). The sum of all the assigned propositions within the power set (PS) is 1. The elements, i.e. $b_i \in PS$ with $m(b_i) > 0$, represent the evidence. The BPA can be characterized by equation (4) (Ferdous et al., 2009, 2011, 2013).

$$m(b_i) \rightarrow [0,1]; \quad m(\emptyset) = 0; \quad \sum_{b_i \in PS} m(b_i) = 1 \quad (4)$$

The belief (Bel) measure also refers to a lower bound for a set b_i and can be defined as the summation of all BPAs of the interest set b_i . Mathematically, it can be defined as equation (5).

$$Bel(b_i) = \sum_{b_k \subseteq b_i} m(b_k) \quad (5)$$

The plausibility (Pl) measure, also referred to as an the upper bound for a set b_i , can be defined as the summation of all BPAs of the interest set b_i that intersects with the sets b_k . Mathematically, it can be defined as equation (7).

$$Pl(b_i) = \sum_{b_k \cap b_i \neq \emptyset} m(b_k) \quad (6)$$

The Bet estimation:

The belief structure [Bel, Pl] shows a continuous interval in which real probability lies. The Bet estimation provides a point estimation of a belief structure which can be calculated by equation (8).

$$Bet(PS) = \sum_{b_i \in PS} \frac{m(b_i)}{|b_i|} \quad (7)$$

2.3.2.1 Yager combination rule

The Yager combination rule is a modification of the DS combination rule. If there is a large conflict between expert opinions, the DS combination rule provides unstable results (Sentz and Ferson, 2002), first pointed out by (Zadeh, 1984). Unlike the DS combination rule, the Yager combination rule does not ignore conflicting evidence. Instead, it is assigned to be a part of ignorance Ω . However, when there is less or no conflict, both the rules exhibit similar results. In this study, the Yager combination rule has been considered. The Yager combination rule uses equations (8-11) to combine the expert opinions.

$$\{m_1 \times m_2\}(b_i) = \sum_{b_1 \cap b_2 = b_i} m_1(b_1)m_2(b_2), \quad b_i \neq \Omega \quad (8)$$

$$\{m_1 \times m_2\}(b_i) = \sum_{b_1 \cap b_2 = b_i} m_1(b_1)m_2(b_2) + K, \quad b_i = \Omega \quad (9)$$

$$\{m_1 \times m_2\}(b_i) = 0, \quad b_i = \emptyset \quad (10)$$

where $\{m_1 \times m_2\}(b_i)$ reflects the combined knowledge regarding a particular event.

‘K’ represents the degree of conflict between expert opinions, which can be determined by equation (12).

$$K = \sum_{b_1 \cap b_2 = \emptyset} m_1(b_1)m_2(b_2) \quad (11)$$

2.3.2.2 Definition of frame of discernment

Two different FODs are defined for the two uncertain parameters (prior probabilities of basic events and safety barrier failures). The operational state of a system is usually defined in terms of yes (Y) or no (N) for the failure of basic components (Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, & Haasl, 1981). Therefore, FOD of basic events can be defined as $\Omega = \{Y, N\}$. The power set (PS) will include four subsets, namely, $\{\{\phi(\text{null set})\}, \{Y\}, \{N\} \text{ and } \{Y, N\}\}$.

Similarly, the operational state of the safety barrier is defined in terms of success $\{S\}$ or failure $\{F\}$. Therefore, the FOD can be defined as $\Omega = \{S, F\}$. The power set (PS) will include four subsets, namely, $\{\{\phi(\text{null set})\}, \{S\}, \{F\} \text{ and } \{S, F\}\}$.

2.4 Proposed Framework

A generic framework of the Bayesian network has been proposed in Figure 2.1. For the model uncertainty, Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates are considered in the present study. These two canonical probabilistic methods provide a median condition for the respective Boolean logic, i.e. OR and AND. To handle imprecise and incomplete data, an evidence theory-based approach is considered, which allows aggregating the multi-expert opinions, which in turn helps to reduce input data uncertainty.




Figure 2.1 Proposed accident modelling framework using Bayesian network

2.5 Application of Proposed methodology




Figure 2.2 Tank equipped with process control system

The process considered in the present study is a tank which contains a hazardous chemical. The potential hazard is the liquid spill from the tank through the high inlet flow and the failure of the process control system. To ensure the safety of the system, it is equipped with a feedback level controller which helps to maintain the desired tank level which is depicted in Figure 2.2. The Level controller helps to ensure the desired inlet flow into the tank by manipulating the A-valve. If it fails to operate, the increased tank level should be detected by an independent High-level alarm (HLA) which will trigger the operator to open the bypass valve to remove excess liquid from the tank and stop the incoming flow by closing the manual valve. However, in the present study human error is not explicitly considered.

To demonstrate the process hazard in the case above, a Bayesian network has been made in Figure 2.3. The liquid spill (CE) outcome is divided into two separate consequences, namely, pool fire and loss of liquid.




Figure 2.3 BN for “Liquid spill from the tank”

The accident can be modelled using the framework in Figure 2.1. There are two major analyses, namely, accident causal analysis and consequences analysis. In this study, the accident causal analysis, as well as consequences analysis, can be carried out step by step as follows:

2.5.1 Accident causal analysis

The first step in accident causal analysis is the identification of the abnormal event. The abnormal event is the undesired, unintended and uncontrollable event which can cause loss of property and has the potential to cause further damage if proper safety barriers are not employed. The liquid spill is identified as an abnormal event in this case. Once the abnormal event is analyzed, the next step is to identify the intermediate events and basic

events responsible for causing the accident. In this case, two intermediate events are used, namely, the high inlet flow in the tank due to level controller failure and pump failure (high flow rate). Another event is the failure to remove excess liquid which is caused by due to HLA failure and bypass valve failure.

In this problem, the identified root causes are Level controller failure, which is responsible for maintaining the desired level in the tank and pumping failure, which causes a high incoming flow. Moreover, the High-Level Alarm (HLA) fails to alert the operator to open the bypass valve to remove the undesired liquid inside the tank.

2.5.2 Model Uncertainty reduction

The model uncertainty due to deterministic logic gates can be overcome by specifying the conditional probabilities. Traditional logic gates may not allow construction of a refined and detailed model because they are not able to reflect perfect knowledge about the system behaviour (Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, 2001). The conditional dependence of the child node on the parent node is denoted using CPTs, which provides a way to incorporate the canonical models to establish CPT's. One can condition the variable using Noisy gates on most of the possible behaviour of its parent node. This assumes that the variable could be influenced by any single parent node independently of the other parent node, which reduces the number of required parameters (Pearl, 1988).

The Noisy-OR and the leaky Noisy-AND gates are used in the present study, both the logic gates provide the median condition for their respective logic. Diez and Druzdzel (2007) provide details on the use of these canonical probabilistic models. In Figure 2.3, the node

“Removal of excess liquid” fails if either the Bypass or HLA fails. It has two parent nodes, which means four parameters must be specified. If this were a deterministic OR logic gate, only three parameters (equal to 1) would be sufficient.

In BN (Figure 2.3), the CPT for the Noisy-OR gate is shown in Table 2.1. In the case of the Noisy-OR gate, n number of parameters must be assigned to derive the CPT using equation (3). The CPT for the leaky Noisy-AND gate (Table 2.2) is derived using equation (4), and $2n+1$ number of parameters has been assigned. In the leaky condition, one more parameter, known as a leaky parameter, must be assigned compared to the Noisy- AND gate, which accounts for the explicit inhibitor.

Table 2.1 CPTs of “Removal of excess liquid fails” using the Noisy-OR gate (based on Expert judgement)

State	Bypass fails	HLA fails	Causation probability of “Removal of excess liquid fails” (c_i)	Non- Causation probability of “Removal of excess liquid fails” (q_i)
1	F	F	0.000	1.000
2	F	T	0.950	0.050
3	T	F	0.800	0.200
4	T	T	0.990	0.010

Table 2.2 Conditional probability table of “High inlet flow in the tank” using the leaky Noisy-AND gate (based on Expert judgement)

State	Level controller fails	Pump failure	Causation probability of failure of “High inlet flow in the tank” (c_i)	Non-Causation probability of “High inlet flow in the tank” (q_i)
1	F	F	0.001	0.999
2	F	T	0.048	0.952
3	T	F	0.018	0.982
4	T	T	0.858	0.142

2.5.3 Consequence analysis

The initiating event is the abnormal event which has the potential to cause severe damage. The liquid spill is taken to be the initiating event, which can cause more damage and losses if the proper safety system is not employed. The liquid in the process system is a hazardous chemical which if met with an unknown ignition source, can cause severe damage to the process plant.

The initiating event can be propagated to an end point by considering the working and failure of each safety barrier with the help of event tree analysis. If there is ignition, the liquid spill can lead to the purely flammable event (i.e. pool fire); while in the case of no ignition, a loss of liquid event is considered. It is worth noting that apart from the

consequences mentioned above (i.e. pool fire & near miss) another state, known as the safe state, is generated, which accounts for the non-occurrence of the abnormal event. It is developed by connecting the abnormal event (liquid spill) node to the consequence node.

2.5.4 Data Uncertainty reduction

The acquired input data is subject to vagueness and partial ignorance. To reduce the input data uncertainty, the following steps are conducted according to section 2.3.2. In the present study, an expert is one who has five to ten years' experience in the area of Safety and Risk Engineering and having a direct and indirect connection with process industry. Two expert's opinions have been taken, assuming each expert opinion is equally important. Therefore, to consider both opinions evidence theory comes into play.

2.5.4.1 Basic probability assessment

Basic Probability Assessment (BPA), also known as belief mass, encompasses acquiring expert opinion to define the likelihood of basic events and failure of the safety barriers. Table 2.3 shows the BPAs assigned to each event, assuming that each source (expert opinion) is independent.

Table 2.3 Expert opinion on the probability of events

Event	Expert 1 (e ₁)			Expert 2 (e ₂)		
	{T}	{F}	{T, F}	{T}	{F}	{T, F}
Failure of HLA	0.200	0.700	0.100	0.150	0.750	0.100
Failure of Bypass	0.015	0.850	0.135	0.020	0.750	0.230

Failure of level controller	0.250	0.700	0.050	0.150	0.750	0.100
Failure of Pump (high flow)	0.050	0.850	0.100	0.100	0.800	0.100
Failure of ignition barrier	0.100	0.800	0.100	0.150	0.750	0.100

2.5.2 Belief Structure

The Yager combination rule allows for an aggregate multi-expert opinion from independent sources. The Yager combination rule uses equations (8-11) to aggregate multi-expert opinion. To derive belief and plausibility measures for the probability of basic events, equations (5) and (6) are used, equation (7) is used to derive the point estimation (i.e. Bet estimation). Table 2.4 shows the belief structure which consists of the belief, plausibility and bet estimation of each root cause and safety system. Each term in belief structure is explained as follows:

Bet (bet): In DST, the uncertainty is defined by a probability distribution defined on $2^{|\Omega|}$ subset, if a decision has to be made it would be logical. Therefore, there must be a rule which can develop a single probability distribution from the continuous probability interval [Bel, Pl] when forced decisions have to be made. Hence, a bet is a pignistic probability function (probability function in a decision context) that derives from the belief function. The bet is often estimated using Generalised Insufficient Reason-Principle. Most often it is considered as a median value between belief and plausibility

probability interval. Smets et al., (1991) provide a detailed explanation and the derivation of bet estimation formula.

Table 2.4 Belief structure

Event	State	Yager combination rule		
		Bel	Pl	Bet
Failure of HLA	{T}	0.065	0.330	0.198
	{F}	0.670	0.935	0.803
Failure of Bypass valve	{T}	0.006	0.066	0.036
	{F}	0.934	0.994	0.964
Failure of Level controller	{T}	0.070	0.368	0.219
	{F}	0.633	0.930	0.781
Failure of Pump-high flow	{T}	0.020	0.155	0.088
	{F}	0.845	0.980	0.913
Failure of Ignition barrier	{T}	0.040	0.245	0.143
	{F}	0.755	0.960	0.858

2.6 Probability calculation

The deterministic approach is used to compare the result obtained from the proposed approach. It relies on a single source for prior information which undermines the credibility of accident modelling by illustrating a false impression of accident probability. In this

approach, a deterministic failure probability is assigned to each root cause and safety barrier in the BN model rather than using evidence theory to aggregate the multi-expert opinion to deal with input data uncertainty. The failure probabilities can be obtained by available data for a specific process and expert opinion. The availability of crisp data for a specific process is itself a difficult task and is one of the main sources of data uncertainty in accident modelling. The failure probabilities are assumed to be same and are illustrated in Table 2.1 by Expert 1(e_1). Table 2.5 shows the deterministic failure probabilities of each basic event and safety system.

Table 2.5 Deterministic failure probabilities of each root cause and safety system (using expert 1 opinion)

Event	Failure probability
HLA fails	0.200
Bypass fails	0.015
Level controller fails	0.250
Pump failure-high flow	0.050
Ignition barrier fails	0.100

Table 2.6 shows the belief structure obtained by providing the belief, plausibility and bet estimation for the basic events as well as a safety barrier. The obtained probability of a Liquid spill (CE) and its consequences will be in terms of bel, pl and bet I respectively. The combination rule consists of two bet estimations, namely, Bet I and Bet II, Bet I is an estimate of a prior probability which is used directly in the BN model by providing the

basic events and safety barrier prior probabilities in terms of “Bet”, while Bet II is an estimate for critical events and possible outcomes from BN with the help of belief and plausibility obtained by BN for a liquid spill and its consequence node. For example, with the Yager rule, Bet II for the liquid spill (CE) can be estimated as follows:

Since the cardinality of the event is two, therefore

$$\text{Bel}\{T\} = m\{T\} \quad (12)$$

According to equation (7)

$$\text{Pl}\{T\} = m\{T\} + m\{T, F\} \quad (13)$$

Substituting equations (12) & (13) into equation (7), the following equation is used to estimate the Bet II.

$$\text{Bet II (CE)} = \frac{\text{Bel(CE)}\{T\}}{1} + \frac{\{\text{Pl(CE)}\{T\} - \text{Bel(CE)}\{T\}\}}{2} \quad (14)$$

Table 2.6 Probabilities of different consequences using evidence theory and a deterministic approach

Event	Yager combination rule				Deterministic approach
	Bel	Pl	Bet I	Bet II	
Liquid spill	5.19E-03	3.54E-02	1.59E-02	2.03E-02	1.40E-02
Safe	9.95E-01	9.65E-01	9.84E-01	9.80E-01	9.86E-01
Pool fire	2.08E-04	8.66E-03	2.28E-03	4.44E-03	1.40E-03
Near miss	4.98E-03	2.67E-02	1.37E-02	1.58E-02	1.26E-02

In the evidence theory approach, the BPAs are assigned to define the prior probabilities of root causes and the safety system. The incomplete and imprecise information obtained from different sources is combined using the Yager combination rule, which provides a belief structure in terms of belief (lower bound) and plausibility (upper bound). The Bet I show the point estimation obtained by providing the bet obtained in Table 2.6 to all input events, whereas Bet II shows the point estimation which can be calculated with the help of belief and plausibility obtained from the BN model. The information about the system is based on a subjective source, the risk estimation is subjected to imprecision if the failure probabilities are not precise. Therefore, to overcome the issue it is desirable not to rely on a single subjective source. As depicted in Table 2.6, the probabilities obtained using evidence theory is continuous in nature which shows the real probability lies in the interval.

2.7 Case study

2.7.1 Accident description

To validate the proposed methodology, a gasoline release which led to a vapour cloud ignition during offloading of gasoline at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO) facility in Bayamon, Puerto Rico on October 23, 2009 was selected. According to the report submitted by the US. Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), an aboveground storage tank overflowed into a secondary containment dike. The gasoline converted to a fine suspension in the air (aerosolized), forming a vapour cloud which was ignited when it met an unknown ignition source after reaching the wastewater treatment (WWT) area, due to the opening of a dike valve around Tank 409. This resulted in a multiple tank fire which continued for almost 60 hours and later exploded. The accident resulted in the injury of 3 persons and

significant losses to the businesses up to 1.25 miles from the site, 300 neighbouring homes, and considerable environmental degradation.

At the CAPECO refinery, tank level measurements occurred several times during filling operations. The operator recorded the level of the tank hourly with the help of an automated tank gauging system which included a float and a tape gauge mounted to the side of a tank. In addition, an inspector had to check the tank level prior to starting and subsequent to the end of filling operations by lowering the gauging tape into the tank. These multiple checks helped them to determine the actual amount of gasoline in the tank.

According to the investigation report submitted by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), the only level control and the monitoring system, i.e. the automatic tank gauging system, were out of service due to the use of an unreliable level transmitter and failure-prone float and tape gauges system. Therefore, the level control and monitoring system failed to provide an accurate tank level. The overfill time calculation is become the source of error, during the gasoline unloading the variations in gasoline flow rate and pressure were not identified and considered. Apart from these factors, another potential factor was the failure of the internal floating roof due to fatigue, and other factors may have contributed to the overfill.

There was no independent High-Level Alarm (HLA) and Automatic overfill protection system. The CSB found that in addition to the lack of an independent overfill protection system, multiple protection layers failed within the level control and monitoring system, which further contributed to the overfill accident. According to CSB, James Reason's

Swiss cheese Model best represents the accident scenario (Figure 2.4). It demonstrates how the level control and monitoring failure led to overfilling of tank 409.




Figure 2.4 Multiple layers failure of level control and monitoring system (CSB, 2009)

2.7.2 Bayesian network analysis

BN was developed to investigate the accident scenario and the safety measure's effectiveness. As depicted in the previous example, the same step by step analysis has to be carried out, as illustrated in section 3. Figure 2.5 shows the BN analysis, in which the bottom structure shows the causal relationship between the root causes and accident, and the upper structure shows the associated consequences of gasoline release with the working and failure of each barrier. Table 2.7 shows the intermediate and top events along with their symbols used in BN. As gasoline is non-toxic, it has been assumed that any property

damage or injuries are due to vapour ignition of overflowed gasoline. Note that the failure probability of the sprinkler is influenced either by the Top Event (i.e. Gasoline release) or the immediate ignition barrier, which shows the event dependency of the former on the latter.




Figure 2.5 Bayesian network analysis for gasoline overflow

Table 2.7 Events along with their symbols used in accident modelling

Events	Symbols along with Boolean logic gates
Gauging system failure	Gauging_fails (OR gate)
Gauged level checking failure	Gauging_lvl check fails (AND gate)
Automatic-Tank Gauging system failure	A-TG_fails (OR gate)
Manual-Tank Gauging system failure	M-TG_fails (OR gate)
Internal Floating Roof failure	IFR failure (OR gate)
Tank gauging system fails	Tank gaug sys fails (AND gate)
Tank level measurement system fails	Tank_LM_sys fails (OR gate)
Error in real time calculation in estimating overfill time	Err_time calc
Gasoline release	Gasoline_rls (AND gate)
Safe evacuation from the facility	C ₁
Vapour cloud near tank 409	C ₂
Fire+ explosion, less damage in the facility	C ₃
Pool fire	C ₄
Gasoline Spill	C ₅
Vapour cloud near the ground in the neighbouring area of the facility	C ₆

Pool fire + explosion, moderate damage, fewer fatalities or injuries	C ₇
Pool fire, moderate damage	C ₈

Table 2.10 in the appendix depicts the BPAs assigned in modelling the CAPECO refinery accident. Table 2.11 (appendix) shows the combined belief structure for the likelihood of input data as shown in the previous example.

A deterministic failure probability is assigned to each root cause and safety barrier as illustrated in the previous example. The failure probabilities are assumed to be the same and are illustrated in Table 2.10 by Expert 1(e₁). Table 2.12 (appendix) shows the deterministic failure probabilities of each basic event and the safety system.

To implement the canonical probabilistic model in BN, expert opinion is considered. The Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates can accommodate various interactions between child and parent nodes which traditional logic gates such as OR (AND) gates are unable to do. It is worth noting that the Boolean logic gates (OR & AND gates) are replaced with Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates in BN to reflect the accident scenario better. These two provide the median condition for their respective logic gates which, therefore, helps in further reduction of uncertainty in accident modelling. The Noisy-OR and the leaky Noisy-AND logic gates help to model every possible behaviour between the cause and its effect to establish the practical scenario much more accurately compared with traditional OR and

AND logic gates when dealing with real-world problems which render a better prediction of accident probability.

The BN is analyzed using HUGIN 8.5 (“Hugin Expert A/S,” 2008). The probabilities obtained from BN are listed in Table 2.8. As can be seen, the probabilities obtained from the deterministic approach. As mentioned in earlier example, deterministic approach refers to an approach in which one subjective source is considered to obtain the failure probabilities of root events and safety barriers. However, in the present study the deterministic approach result shows the probabilities of most of the outcome is higher as compared to the probabilities obtained from the Yager combination rule. It can be observed that relying on a single source undermines the credibility of risk assessment. Hence, if the failure probabilities about the system, evidence theory helps to obtain a continuous probability interval. Bet estimation helps to compare a continuous interval median value with the deterministic approach to show its effectiveness. Bet I and Bet II probabilities provide more reasonable results to predict the accident which is related to the incompleteness and imprecision of the data. The deterministic approach relies only on one source and it has been assumed that the BPA’s obtained from expert opinion is not precise. The expert opinion is subjected to limited knowledge. Therefore, if information about the system is unavailable it is not viable to depend on single subjective source. In the present study evidence theory comes into picture to deal with uncertainty associated to subjective sources. The probabilities obtained from the evidence theory is in the form of continuous interval and has been forced to a point estimation in terms of Bet I and Bet II to show a comparison with deterministic approach.

Table 2.8 Results obtained from accident analysis using BN

Event's	Yager combination rule				Deterministic approach
	Bel	Pl	Bet I	Bet II	
CE	8.97E-03	7.38E-02	2.79E-02	4.14E-02	1.08E-02
Safe	9.91E-01	9.26E-01	9.72E-01	9.59E-01	9.89E-01
C ₁	8.48E-03	4.88E-02	2.20E-02	2.86E-02	9.30E-03
C ₂	1.42E-04	3.99E-03	1.34E-03	2.06E-03	1.74E-04
C ₃	1.91E-05	3.68E-03	5.47E-04	1.85E-03	1.16E-04
C ₄	1.40E-04	4.50E-03	1.13E-03	2.32E-03	9.69E-05
C ₅	1.55E-02	1.03E-02	2.53E-03	1.29E-02	1.09E-03
C ₆	3.14E-06	8.40E-04	1.54E-04	4.21E-04	2.05E-05
C ₇	3.49E-07	7.75E-04	6.29E-05	3.88E-04	1.37E-05
C ₈	2.56E-06	9.50E-04	1.30E-04	4.76E-04	1.14E-05

2.7.3 Probability updating

Another advantage of BN is probability updating given new observations. Through probability adapting, the conditional and marginal probability can be updated using Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) data. ASP is information accumulated over time, which can be used to revise the probabilities of an accident. It can be in the form of a number of observations of near misses, mishaps, and incidents or root events occurring during operation of the facility.

The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), found that multiple overfills and spills occur during the operations. According to records, a total of 15 incidents occurred from 1992 to 1999 among them, 8 were overfills, and 7 were spills and three incidents after 2005 have been reported, but the events are not clearly stated, it is assumed that these three incidents are overfilling and spills from 2006 to 2008. These recorded observations (Table 2.9) are considered in our BN model to predict the probability of Gasoline release and consequence C₇.

Table 2.9 ASP data recorded during plant operation

Consequences	Year 1992	Year 1994	Year 1996	Year 1998	Year 2000	Year 2002	Year 2004	Year 2006	Year 2008
C1	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-
C5	2	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	1




Figure 2.6 Dynamic probability changes of the Gasoline release

The updated probability of “Gasoline release” and consequence C_7 are obtained with the help of backward inference that can be performed with the help of Bayes’ theorem. Figure 2.6 shows the dynamic probability of gasoline release. Deterministic plot shows the posterior probability obtained from a deterministic approach, which relies on a single source for prior information about the system. However, Bet I show the posterior probabilities obtained when prior information is given in terms of Bet, whereas Bet II is calculated from the belief and plausibility obtained from the network. The year 1990 denotes the prior probability of the event and the years 1992 to 2008 show the posterior probabilities obtained from probability updating at the end of each year. It is worth noting that the posterior probability obtained in the form of Bet I and Bet II are converging, which provides a robust belief structure. On the other hand, the deterministic approach shows slightly higher probability. This can be explained by the prior probabilities being given to the root causes and safety barriers obtained from the knowledge of expert 1, which is on the higher side compared to the probabilities obtained from the Yager combination rule, which combines both the experts knowledge. Therefore, the deterministic approach provides a false impression of risk analysis due to the vagueness of the data.

With the help of probability adapting, one can also predict the probability of those consequences for which no information is given. Consequence C_7 occurred 2009, resulting in crucial property damage, environmental damage and injuries of persons. Figure 2.7 illustrates that during eighteen years of operation, the occurrence probability increases by three orders of magnitude in the cases of Bet I and Bet II, whereas a deterministic approach

does not provide promising results due to the lack of certainty from relying on a single source. This shows the safety measures of the plant were not adequate, which led to the occurrence of C_7 in 2009. This accident could have been prevented if proper safety measures had been taken.




Figure 2.7 Dynamic probability updating of consequence C_7

2.8 Conclusions

The current study proposed a BN-based probabilistic model to reduce uncertainty in dynamic risk analysis. Evidence theory has been used to address the uncertainty arising due to vagueness and partial ignorance of the acquired prior probabilities of basic events and safety barriers. Another source of uncertainty (model uncertainty) is addressed by the application of the proper logic gates (e.g., Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND) which are able to make the variables conditional on every possible behaviour of the parent node. The effectiveness of the approach is validated through an application to the CAPECO refinery

accident. The proposed method provides robust results by aggregating multi-expert opinions for determining prior probabilities, compared to a deterministic approach. Proposed methodology helps in improving the prediction of an accident probability which helps in reducing catastrophic events like CAPECO refinery accident to happen in future.

2.9 Appendix

Table 2.10 Expert opinion on the probability of events

Event	Expert 1 (e ₁)			Expert 2 (e ₂)		
	{T}	{F}	{T, F}	{T}	{F}	{T, F}
Failure of Tape	0.120	0.70	0.180	0.200	0.75	0.050
Failure of Float	0.220	0.68	0.100	0.100	0.88	0.020
Failure of Operator	0.100	0.80	0.100	0.001	0.95	0.049
Failure of Transmitter	0.200	0.75	0.050	0.050	0.80	0.190
Failure of Gauging tape	0.040	0.70	0.250	0.080	0.90	0.020
Fatigue	0.020	0.85	0.130	0.100	0.60	0.300
Turbulence	0.100	0.80	0.100	0.100	0.80	0.100
Roof submersion	0.100	0.70	0.200	0.200	0.75	0.050
Flow rate variation	0.020	0.85	0.130	0.100	0.60	0.300
Increased pressure	0.002	0.88	0.118	0.010	0.95	0.040
Containment dike	0.100	0.80	0.100	0.080	0.90	0.020
Water sprinkler	0.030	0.80	0.170	0.100	0.85	0.050

Immediate ignition barrier	0.010	0.70	0.290	0.050	0.90	0.050
Delayed ignition barrier	0.400	0.40	0.200	0.100	0.80	0.100

Table 2.11 Belief structure obtained from Yager combination rule

Event	State	Yager combination rule		
		Bel	Pl	Bet
Failure of Tape	{T}	0.066	0.305	0.186
	{F}	0.695	0.934	0.815
Failure of Float	{T}	0.036	0.300	0.168
	{F}	0.700	0.964	0.832
Failure of Operator	{T}	0.005	0.106	0.055
	{F}	0.894	0.995	0.945
Failure of Transmitter	{T}	0.043	0.248	0.145
	{F}	0.753	0.958	0.855
Failure of Gauging tape	{T}	0.025	0.122	0.073
	{F}	0.878	0.975	0.927
Fatigue	{T}	0.021	0.157	0.089
	{F}	0.843	0.979	0.911

Turbulence	{T}	0.03	0.200	0.115
	{F}	0.800	0.970	0.885
Roof submersion	{T}	0.0655	0.290	0.178
	{F}	0.710	0.935	0.823
Flow rate variation	{T}	0.021	0.157	0.089
	{F}	0.843	0.979	0.911
Increased pressure	{T}	0.001	0.017	0.009
	{F}	0.983	0.999	0.991
Containment dike	{T}	0.018	0.174	0.096
	{F}	0.826	0.982	0.904
Water sprinkler	{T}	0.022	0.136	0.079
	{F}	0.865	0.979	0.922
Immediate ignition barrier	{T}	0.016	0.074	0.045
	{F}	0.926	0.985	0.955
Delayed ignition barrier	{T}	0.100	0.480	0.290
	{F}	0.520	0.900	0.710

Table 2.12 Prior probabilities of deterministic approach obtained by expert 1

No.	Event	Prior probability
R ₁	Failure of Tape	0.120
R ₂	Failure of Float	0.220

R ₃	Failure of Operator	0.100
R ₄	Failure of Transmitter	0.200
R ₅	Failure of Gauging tape	0.040
R ₆	Fatigue	0.020
R ₇	Turbulence	0.100
R ₈	Roof submersion	0.100
R ₉	Flow rate variation	0.020
R ₁₀	Increased pressure	0.002
S ₁	Containment dike	0.100
S ₂	Water sprinkler	0.030
S ₃	Immediate ignition barrier	0.010
S ₄	Delayed ignition barrier	0.400

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3 Dynamic Risk Analysis of Domino Effect Using GSPN

Preface

A version of this manuscript has been submitted to Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection. I am the primary author of this manuscript along with Co-authors Faisal Khan, Salim Ahmed and Mohammed Taleb-Berrouane. I developed the proposed model and its application using a case study along with the analysis of the result. I prepared the first draft of the proposed framework and revised it based on the co-author's feedback. The co-author Faisal Khan provided foundational understating of the research problem, assisted in developing relevant model, provided constructive feedback to improve the application of the model and also assisted in reviewing the manuscript. The co-author Salim Ahmed helped in reviewing the proposed model, improving the presentation of the proposed model application and finalizing the manuscript. The co-author Mohammed Taleb-Berrouane help in developing the model and testing the application of the model.

Abstract

The domino effect accidents in process industries poses a severe threat to human life and the environment and has the potential to affect nearby facilities as well. Numerous techniques, such as the Bayesian network, have been used for modelling the domino effect. However, these techniques have inherent limitations. These include the ability to consider complex behaviour of process equipment in combined loading and the time dependency of equipment failure. In the current study, a Generalised Stochastic Petri-net model is developed to assess domino effect which is referred as *DOMINO-GSPN* model. This model is proposed to model domino effect accident likelihood and propagation pattern. The proposed model is capable of modelling time-dependent

failure behaviour of the process component in combined loading. The results of the model assist in monitoring process risk. A case study is used to demonstrate the application and effectiveness of the model. The results from the model are compared with the past study of a Bayesian network-based domino effect model. This comparative analysis highlights the unique feature of the model and its relevance as a domino effect risk assessment and management tool.

Keywords: Domino effect; Stochastic Petri nets; Risk analysis; Hazardous materials; Process safety.

3.1 Introduction

Accidents occurring in chemical and process industries are often more worrisome than for any other industry due to handling, storage, or processing of hazardous substances under potentially dangerous operating conditions (Khakzad, 2015; Cozzani and Salzano, 2004). The word “domino” is well described in the literature by Khan and Abbasi, (2001); it is derived from the domino toppling game. Many dominos are arranged in a line adjacent to one another. If one falls, it hits the next domino, triggering a series of collapsing dominoes. Simply, the domino effect can be defined as one thing unleashing the next thing and so on. Authors use many definitions of domino effects in the literature. Reniers (2010) and Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, Rashtchian and Abbasi, (2011) provided a list of those definitions, and most authors agreed that:

- A primary event (accident) is responsible for initiating the domino effect.
- Escalation vectors/physical effects (such as overpressure, heat flux, the impact of blast wave/missile) are responsible for the propagation of a first accident to secondary or higher order accidents based on the intensity of escalation vectors.
- The consequences of the domino effect are more severe in comparison to the primary accident.

In a domino effect, a primary unit acts as an initiating event, which triggers the involvement of the secondary unit by escalation vectors/ physical effects (Cozzani et al., 2006). The risk associated with such an event is of utmost importance because the severity of such accidents increases exponentially and the consequences of such an event is more severe in comparison to the primary accident (Kourniotis, Kiranoudis and Markatos, 2000).

Significant research has been done on accident modelling of a single unit in past years, but limited research has been carried out in the context of domino accident modelling, due to their high complexity and low frequency (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2013). Since 1947, the domino effect has been documented in literature (Kadri, Chatelet and Lallement, 2013), but it gained more attention after the most severe LPG disaster in Mexico City in 1984. LPG leakage occurred, which resulted in a vapour cloud explosion leading to several other explosions (Li, Reniers, Cozzani and Khan, 2017). Another violent domino accident occurred in the BP Texas City refinery in 2005, where a vapour cloud formed and ignite, followed by several explosions (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte, et al., 2013). Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, Rashtchian and Abbasi (2010) studied domino effect accidents occurring from 1917 to 2009. Two hundred and twenty-four accidents have been reported, mostly occurring in process plants, followed by transportation accidents. These accidents increased the demand for risk and safety analysis of the domino effect in process facilities.

Early studies on the domino effect focused on determining escalation probability (i.e., damage probability), using models based on distance (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991) and a combination of a probit model along with threshold limits (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Cozzani et al., 2006). However, other studies used statistical surveys, which help in understanding accident sequences along with frequency estimations (Darbra, Palacios and Casal, 2010; Vilchez, Sevilla, Montiel and Casal,

1995; Kourniotis et al., 2000). Additionally, some work has been done in quantitative risk assessment (QRA) on domino accident modelling and propagation (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a; Cozzani, Gubinelli, Antonioni, Spadoni and Zanelli, 2005; Antonioni, Spadoni and Cozzani, 2009; Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010; Reniers, Dullaert, Ale and Soudan, 2005; Reniers and Dullaert, 2007).

A novel approach has been introduced in the article to model and assesses the domino effect likelihood based on Petri-nets. The Petri-net is a mathematical modelling tool developed by Carl Adam Petri in 1962. It is a promising tool to model concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel non-deterministic and/or stochastic systems (Murata, 1989). Petri-nets consist of two types of elements, called places and transitions. Places represent states or conditions, whereas transitions show the events. Arcs connecting places and transitions are either from places to transitions (input arcs) or transitions to places (output arcs). In addition, the dynamic nature of the system is demonstrated by the movement of tokens from one place to another. The position of a token indicates the availability of resources at that particular place.

Section 3.2 of the thesis gives a brief description of GSPN, followed by proposed *DOMINO-GSPN model* in section 3.3. Section 3.4 is devoted to domino accident modelling, using GSPN for determining the propagation path and probability estimation. A hypothetical case study is used in section 3.5 to show the efficacy of the proposed methodology. The conclusion obtained from the study is presented in section 3.6.

3.2 PN model concepts

The Petri-net (PN) was first introduced in Carl Adam Petri's dissertation in 1962 (David and Alia, 2010). It consists of places which are circular, transitions (rectangular bars), directed arcs connecting input places to transitions and vice versa and tokens (black bullets). The places show

the state or condition of a system; the presence of a token shows the resource availability at that place. The transition depicts the change in state from input to output place, and the PN can also model the component dependency. Note that the token can only reside in places, not at transitions. However, the direction of the flow of tokens is governed by the directed arcs. Each arc has a multiplicity (weight), which depicts the token migration capacity of the arc. The transition firing can only take place if the input place has at least an equal number of tokens as the arc multiplicity. There are many extensions to PNs, such as timed, coloured Petri-nets that add properties which cannot be modelled with the original PN. PNs are widely used in many fields, including process industries (Angeli, De Leenheer and Sontag, 2007; Grunt and Briš, 2015; Wu, Chu, Chu and Zhou, 2010).

Murata, (1989), provided the definition of Petri-net as a quintuple:

$$PN = (P_i, T_j, IM, OM, I)$$

$$P_i = P_{i=1}, P_{i=2}, \dots, P_{i=k}$$

$$T_j = T_{j=1}, T_{j=2}, \dots, T_{j=l}$$

A Stochastic Petri-net (SPN) is defined as a sextuple (Talebberrouane, Khan and Lounis, 2016):

$$SPN = (P_x, T_y, IM, OM, I, F)$$

$$P_x = P_{x=1}, P_{x=2}, \dots, P_{x=k}$$

$$T_y = T_{y=1}, T_{y=2}, \dots, T_{y=l}$$

$IM = P_x * T_y \rightarrow (0,1)$ is an input matrix showing the input directed arcs from places to transitions.

$OM = P_x * T_y \rightarrow (0,1)$ is an output matrix showing the output directed arcs from transitions to places.

$I: P_x \rightarrow N$ is the initial marking of places for which the n^{th} component shows the n^{th} number of black bullet (token) in the n^{th} circle (place).

$F: T_y \rightarrow FR_+$ is a firing rate or which the n^{th} component represents the firing rate of n^{th} transition.

In SPN if a transition is fired, the token wait until the firing delay (which helps to stop the token), once the firing delay ends the migration of tokens take place from initial to final place, and the number of tokens migrating depends upon the input and output functions (Zhou, DiCesare and Guo, 1990). Note that the tokens always reside in places, not in transitions. Transitions are the conditions which allow them to go from one place to another. Further, the multiplicity of directed arcs must be at least equal to or more than the number of available tokens at the input place to fire the transition. This defines the token delivery capacity of the arc either from place to transition or vice versa.

Later, SPN was extended to incorporate the GSPN. All SPN features remain the same, with two new features added, namely, immediate transition firing (without any time delay) and inhibitor arcs (used to disable the transition when a token is present in input places). GSPN with predicates and assertions have been used in the present study. The predicates or guards are mathematical formulae used to allow the conditional transitions while assignments are mathematical variables used to update the information if the firing occurs through the transition (such as true or false and incrementation). Further, these variables' behaviours can be used as a GSPN outcome, which can be instantaneous, a time interval average or the firing frequency (Talebberrouane et al., 2016). In

PN each state is mapped based on Markov process. The firing of token (firing rate λ) corresponds to a Markov state transition with probability λ . However, In SP what is stochastic is the firing rate of token from the input place to the output place which is governed by probability distribution at each transition with firing delays.

3.3 The Proposed DOMINO-GSPN Model

The safety system is a crucial part of industrial processes, which aims to avoid severe conditions further developing into an abnormal situation. Failure of such a system can directly/indirectly affect nearby equipment, causing unexpected process deviations, unexpected work stoppage and threatening the environment. To assess the likelihood of such accidents, steps 1-11 describe the DOMINO-GSPN model. Steps 1-5 are based on the work of Cozzani et al., (2005); and Khakzad et al., (2013), whereas steps 6-9 are based on the development of GSPN to model the domino effect. Each step briefly explains the formulation of the PN structure. Figure 3.1 illustrates the development of *DOMINO-GSPN* to model domino effect accidents.




Figure 3.1 The DOMINO-GSPN model for domino effect likelihood assessment

Step 1: Identification of accident-prone units

Based on the available data and layout of the chemical plant, a circular place (P_1) is assigned to the position of a possible risk source that may generate primary sources of concern responsible for

the domino effect. The selected units either propagate a cascading effect or are likely to cause an accident, that may include chemical reactors, distillation columns, or atmospheric/ pressurized tanks (Khakzad et al., 2013).

Step 2: Primary units' specifications

Using risk assessment approaches such as HAZOP (hazard and operability study) or FMEA (failure modes and effect analysis), the event that is likely to trigger the cascading effect can be determined. A large amount of hazardous inventory that is capable of producing credible escalation vectors along with a high occurrence probability are important to consider when choosing primary events (Khakzad et al., 2013). Cozzani et al. (2005) have identified two major causes to be considered in this step: low-severity initiating event propagation and major accidental event's interactions. The former analysis should consider low severity events neglected in the safety analysis of a plant, such as a minor pool fire or jet fire, which may lead to accident propagation, whereas the latter analysis is used when there is a widespread damage from secondary or higher order events, and only if those events are major accidents.

Step 3: Identification of accident scenarios

This step identifies the escalation vectors associated with each scenario. For instance, a mechanical explosion escalation is triggered by a blast wave or fragment projection (Cozzani et al., 2005). Therefore, it is essential to know all escalation vectors associated with a particular scenario.

Step 4: Estimation of escalation vectors and comparison with threshold values

Once the primary event is identified, each scenario escalation vector transmitted to nearby units must be evaluated. Escalation vector's quantification, such as explosion overpressure and heat radiation calculations, can be found in Assael MJ (2010). Based on predefined threshold values

available in the literature for each scenario (Cozzani and Salzano, 2004; Mingguang and Juncheng, 2008), a comparison should be made with estimated escalation vectors to identify potential secondary units. Once potential secondary units are identified (escalation vectors exceeding threshold values), the unit is considered to be vulnerable. The failure profile helps to ensure the vulnerability of a unit in a later step.

Step 5: Probit values calculation

Once the vulnerable units are identified, the probit values (Y) can be computed using equation (1) from (Mannan, 2012). The calculated probit values are used to determine the distribution, which can be used in the *DOMINO-GSPN model* to provide the failure profile of secondary units.

$$D' = \frac{t * HR^{\frac{4}{3}}}{9 * 10^{-4}} \quad (1)$$

where D' is the thermal load, HR is the heat radiation (W/m²), and t is exposure time (sec). This equation is developed for human injury but has been modified and used in the present study to estimate the heat radiation effect from an external source. To account for heat absorption on the outer surface of the tank, factor 9 has been introduced in the original equation as an assumption. The introduced factor helps in estimating the thermal load on the outside tank's surface. However, if the original equation is used, it does not provide a satisfactory result because it has not been developed for the atmospheric tank.

To estimate the probit value (Y) for the thermal load, equation (2) is used, where (a) and (b) are the variables depending upon the type of escalation vector.

$$Y = a + b * \ln(D') \quad (2)$$

Once the probit values are obtained, then it can be easily converted into the probability with the help of equation (3) (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014):

$$P = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{Y-5} \exp\left(-\frac{A^2}{2}\right) dA \quad (3)$$

Step 6: Initial marking of tokens

Steps 1-3 help to determine the number of places which correspond to primary and higher order events as well as escalation vectors, which aims to establish the *DOMINO-GSPN* model. Places can represent each event/condition, while a transition represents a change of event/condition from the prior state to the posterior state. Initial marking of tokens is based on prior states of equipment and its failure conditions.

Step 7: Identifying the transitions specification

Each transition specification (distribution parameters, delay time and probability) will be different, depending on the input and output places and these places shows the events/conditions associated to the system. Steps 4-5 help in determining the specification of transition if a unit is found to be vulnerable using the threshold criteria, the probit values vs time plot helps to identify the parameters of distribution by distribution fitting. This step is explained in more detail when applied using the case study.

Step 8: Defining predicates and assertions

The predicates or guards are the formulae that can be true or false. These are used for validating the transitions, whereas assertions are variables that receive the predefined changes; their values

may be altered as a firing consequence, such as incrementation, and become false or true, depending on the condition. The behaviour of these variables can also be recorded as an outcome of the GSPN model. For more details about the firing mechanism in GSPN with predicates and assertions, the reader is referred to the work of Talebberrouane et al. (2016).

Step 9: Real-time risk/ failure profiles

Once the propagation pattern is developed, the simulation can be carried out and the output can be estimated in terms of the failure profile for each level of the domino effects. This determines the failure profile of secondary unit when the primary event has already occurred.

Step 10: Identification of secondary units

Once the secondary unit have been damaged, the potential hazard associated to it must be identified. The hazard identification can be done either by identification of significant accident hazards (MIMAH) (Khakzad et al., 2013) or the interactions of major accidental events (MAE) (Cozzani et al., 2005). Along with these methodologies, one should also consider the type of equipment, nature of the release, scale of damage and the surrounding ignition sources (Delvosalle, Fievez, Pipart and Debray, 2006; Paltrinieri, Dechy, Salzano, Wardman and Cozzani, 2012).

Step 11: Next level propagation of domino effect

At this stage, the secondary units can alter other surrounding units and act as primary units. The same process (i.e. steps 1-9) is repeated to identify potential tertiary units and other high order units.

3.4 The Application of the DOMINO-GSPN Model

Using GSPN, the propagation of the domino effect can easily be modelled. A simple case study discussed by Khakzad et al. (2014), involving four units, has been considered. Consider a process operation consisting of four atmospheric tanks. Figure 3.2 depicts such a process plant layout in which fire occurs in tank 1 and affects the nearby tanks 2, 3 and 4 due to an escalation vector (heat radiation in this case). These units are assumed to be four identical tanks; each tank is cylindrical with a maximum capacity of 10 metric tons of gasoline.




Figure 3.2 Process plant layout, tank 1 where the fire occurs and neighboring tanks 2, 3 and 4 affected by escalation vector (i.e. heat radiation)

3.4.1 Domino effect modelling using Petri-net

To model a domino effect, each unit (tank) is represented by a place. Once the primary unit is specified (i.e. tank 1), it is connected to other places with the help of arcs and transitions. The *DOMINO-GSPN* model is applied in section 3.

In this case study, tank 1 is considered to be a vulnerable unit. The accident first occurs in tank 1 and then propagates to other units, based on threshold criteria. The primary unit is responsible for escalating a small accident into a series of accidents. In the case of an atmospheric storage tank, the most probable accident scenario is a pool fire, which can escalate and affect the nearby units due to heat radiation (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014). To calculate the heat flux, a detailed explanation and calculation procedure are available in the works of Assael MJ (2010). The same procedure has been followed to calculate the heat radiation received by tank 2 and 3 when tank 1 is on fire, $Q_{1 \text{ to } 2} = 20.5 \text{ kW/m}^2$. As can be seen, the heat received by both the tanks 2 and 3 are same and exceed the threshold heat intensity (i.e. $Q_T = 15 \text{ kW/m}^2$). Therefore, tank 1 can potentially damage nearby units (tank 2 and 3), while $Q_{1 \text{ to } 4} = 11 \text{ kW/m}^2$ is based on the distance between tank 1 and 4, which is less than the threshold value. However, tank 1 being on fire along with tank 2 or 3 leads to credible damage to tank 4. Figure 3.3 shows how propagation would take place from the primary unit to the secondary unit. Firstly, tank 1 is in an operating state (i.e. token presence in place P_1), when leakage occurs (i.e. token presence in place P_2) accompanied by an ignition source (i.e. token presence in place P_3); then tank 1 ignites. The heat radiation received by the secondary unit due to the primary accident is modelled using three transitions, transition T_2 , T_3 and T_4 , which is discussed in table 1. Further, higher-order sequential level propagation is discussed later in this section.




Figure 3.3 GSPN model part of the domino effect propagation from the primary unit (Tank 1) to the secondary unit (Tank 2)

The probit values can be estimated using the probit equations mentioned in step 5. With the help of the probit model, a probability vs time plot can be generated, as shown in Figure 3.4. In order to use this information in the Petri-net model, distribution fitting has been done. The identified distribution parameters are then entered as the respective transition specifications.

Initial marking of tokens is based on prior states of equipment and its failure conditions. In the present case, tokens have been assigned to the operational state of each tank, leakage and ignition source. Since leakage and an ignition source are combined, these conditions lead to a fire in the primary unit (i.e. tank 1).




Figure 3.4 Distribution fitting on a probability vs time plot for transition T_{41} & T_{42}

Each transition specification is provided in Table 3.1. The transition governs the movement of the token from one place to another and dictates the dynamics of the model. The time to failure (t_{tf}) calculations of a processing unit requires a detailed estimation, including the primary accident's effect on the secondary unit and the amount of inventory (gasoline in the present case). An empirical correlation has been introduced by Landucci, Gubinelli, Antonioni and Cozzani (2009) based on the detailed simulation results. For the atmospheric cylindrical tank, t_{tf} is a function in terms of its volume, (V) in m^3 and heat radiation (HR) in kW/m^2 received from another source (i.e. external fire). The following equation is used to estimate t_{tf} (Cozzani et al., 2005). This criterion is used to validate the results of the present study.

$$\ln(t_{tf}) = -1.128 \ln(HR) - 2.667 * 10^{-5}V + 9.877 \quad (4)$$

$$Y = 12.54 - 1.847 \ln(t_{tf}) \quad (5)$$

Table 3.1 The specification of each transition used in DOMINO-GSPN model

Transition	Specification	Description
T ₁	No time delay	Fire takes place when leakage occur, and the flammable fluid enters in contact with an open ignition source.
T ₂ & T ₅	Exponential distribution	It is assumed that heat radiation follows an exponential distribution, HR1 and HR2 respectively. The propagation of heat is a continuous process affecting the nearby surroundings. The former governs the heat radiation of tanks 1, 2 and 3 while the latter is used for accumulated heat radiation for tank 4.
T ₃ & T ₆	Delay time	Based on the heat radiation received by secondary and tertiary units, the delay time includes the time taken by the heat radiation to reach another unit from the source and also to raise the temperature of the inner surface of the tank equal to the outer surface.
T ₄₁ , T ₄₂ & T ₇	Distribution fitting	Based on probability vs time plot, distribution fitting provides the specification of each transition. The distribution parameters vary due to change in heat load.




Figure 3.5 DOMINO-GSPN model for domino effect propagation pattern in a four tank system

3.5 Results and discussion

The propagation of fire in a four-tank system is shown in Figure 3.5 using the *Domino-GSPN* model. For clarity, Figure 3.3 only shows the propagation from the primary to the secondary unit. To model the domino effect, GRIF's PN module (GRIF, 2016) has been used. Petri nets are still in developing phase to become a user-friendly tool. There is a need for a model which can predict the domino effect accident scenario. There are commercial tools available that assist in developing Petri nets-based model. The GRIF is one such model used by industry.

The Monte Carlo simulation has been carried out from 0 to 30 mins with a step size of 1 minute. Therefore, each transition has been defined concerning distributions or delay time, based on the discussed calculation procedure and expert judgement.

The movement of the tokens decides the probability concerning the time at each observed place. The failure profile for tanks 2 and 3 due to the domino effect is shown in Figure 3.6. Once the heat radiation reaches the threshold criterion, the domino effect starts to propagate, which is shown by transition T_{41} and T_{42} respectively. Note that from *tff* criteria (equation 4), the credible damage occurs after 11 minutes. As a result, the estimated *tff* can be used to evaluate escalation probability based on equation 5, which gives the probability of 5.42×10^{-6} for tank 2 given that tank 1 is on fire. Although the earlier approach was quite capable of estimating the escalation probability, it assumes time independence, which is not a valid assumption, particularly in a domino effect case in which time is an important parameter to maintain the risk below acceptance criteria. However, the proposed method shows a continuous time-dependent failure profile of nearby units, which is the innovation of this work; a two-step approach is proposed for determining the secondary, tertiary or higher order domino sequence. Moreover, as depicted in Figure 3.6, the probability of

fire at tanks 2 and 3 starts to increase at 6 min during the tank 1 fire and significantly increases at 11 min. However, the former approach fails to provide any relevant information using continuous time-dependent analysis. It fails to capture the increase in probability from 6 to 11 mins, while the latter approach is dynamic and provides reasonable results when compared to analytical method, especially at 11 min, when compared to the analytical equation used in the previous study. There is a change of two orders of magnitude of probability from 6-11 min; the former approach fails to capture the escalation probability change. Moreover, after 11 min the escalation probability increases exponentially, in contrast with the former approach that shows that there will be credible damage to tank 2 at 11 min but fails to provide any time-dependent analysis. Hence, it can be concluded that the proposed methodology is quite capable of modelling the domino effect scenario. This method provides the probability of nearby units being affected at each minute, whereas the earlier approach is used to determine the discrete escalation probability. This approach is meaningful in determining the escalation probability at each minute, which is essential to implement the proper preventive and mitigative steps.




Figure 3.6 Failure profile of tank 2 and tank 3 by the domino effect

As discussed earlier, the distances of both the tanks 2 and 3 from the primary unit (i.e. tank 1) are the same. Hence, the failure profile is the same for both tanks. The results from the study by Khakzad et al. (2014) provide a discrete value of probabilities of each tank while comparing two approaches (worst case and dynamic approach) using a Bayesian network approach, which is widely used in risk assessment and probabilistic modelling (Taleb-Berrouane, Khan, Hawboldt, Eckert and Skovhus, 2018; Deyab, Taleb-berrouane, Khan and Yang, 2018). However, the proposed Domino-GSPN approach provides a failure profile of each level of domino effect, which is used to decide the potential secondary, tertiary or higher order of domino effect. Further, it shows how the risk increases exponentially with time. In the case of tank 2 and tank 3 being on fire, their probability is the same at each time interval, showing that the most probable configuration of a domino event is tank 1 to 2/3 to 4.




Figure 3.7 Failure profile of tank 4 by the domino effect of tank 1 & tank 2/3

Similarly, if we analyze the tertiary level of the domino effect, i.e., the tank 4 failure profile, Figure 3.7 illustrates how its escalation probability evolves with time. Note that at 11 minutes (*t_{tf}*), there will be credible damage to tank 2 and tank 3, causing the probability of tank four being involved to increase from 0 to 2 E-08, which shows the dynamic nature of the proposed model.

Further, based on the same *t_{tf}* criterion, it takes 18 minutes for tank 4 to have likely damage, given that tanks 1, 2 or 3 are on fire. As depicted in Figure 3.7, at 18 min the escalation probability increases to 1.42 E-06 from 2 E-08. The two orders of magnitude change in the probability of tank 4 is unacceptable and confirms the vulnerability of tank 4. However, the analytical model only proposes the vulnerability of the equipment/process but fails to illustrate the escalation probability evolving with time. The escalation probability increases exponentially, and as a result, it increases by one order of magnitude from 18 to 30 min of the time interval. However, the analytical equation provides a 1.53 E-04 escalation probability at 18 min, which is a significantly higher probability for tank 4 to ignite. Domino effect accidents are always considered to have a lower probability, and higher consequences accidents and any overestimation provide a false impression of the estimated risk.

This study demonstrates that the proposed approach provides a clear picture of domino effect behaviour and generates time-dependent results, unlike previous studies. In the past, the Bayesian network was only capable of modelling the conditional dependence between the events in a domino scenario. However, the *DOMINO-GSPN* model can model the domino propagation pattern which helps in determining the time dependence analysis.

Earlier approaches dealt with modelling the propagation pattern using mathematical equations, which provided the probability which can then be directly used as a prior and conditional probability, which can be used in techniques such as BN. To obtain crisp data for the Bayesian network is a challenging task, especially for modelling complex accident scenarios which include the domino effect. However, the proposed approach is capable of modelling all scenarios and patterns of the domino effect in the probabilistic framework and subsequently obtaining the risk profile of each level of the vulnerable unit. Therefore, it introduces a robust approach to model such propagation by using an extended Petri-net formalism. PN helps to model the propagation pattern by incorporating the firing rate regarding continuous distributions and time delays, which helps to model complex accidents simply, provided that the accident propagation pattern is known. This model also provides the escalation probability of each level of the domino effect with time dependency, which is essential to implement safety barriers for managing the risk. Although it is a challenging task to model the accident caused by domino effect due to complex interaction of components in process facilities. This article introduces a novel approach to model the domino accident using the proposed *DOMINO-GSPN* model. Further, if there is a need to model two or three consequences, namely, pool fire, jet fire etc. The authors acknowledge the level of complexity that may arise when dealing with combination of hazards. The concept presented here are able to capture the synergic interactions and model as dependent network. The Petri net model is a combination of many sub-networks or sub-models, each one is connected with the help of predicates and

assertions. Therefore, the traceability could be maintained while modelling the complex sequence of domino accident.

The DOMINO-GSPN model enables a time-dependent analysis of domino scenarios. This analysis would help to prepare better control and mitigation measures. The key advantage of this model is that it provides a continuous time-dependent domino effect probability of credible scenarios, which could be used for planning and design decision-making purposes. The tools like *PHAST* and *ALOHA* are powerful in modelling gas dispersion, fuel evaporation, and pool fire spreading. These tools are meant for consequence (impact) analysis, they have limited ability to analyze domino effect occurrence likelihood and most importantly these tools impact assessment is time independent. The present study is unique as it attempts to demonstrate domino effect likelihood analysis as function of duration of accident (pool fire) using advance probability analysis tool, Petri nets. The proposed DOMINO-GSPN model is a generalized model that enable studying accident escalation vector which lead to domino effect scenarios. The *DOMINO-GSPN* model can be integrated with *PHAST* or *ALOHA* for detailed impact (consequence analysis) of domino effect.

3.6 Conclusions

In process industries, a large amount of flammable material is stored and/or processed. A small incident such as leakage in a processing unit can affect nearby units, resulting in a cascading effect, known as the domino effect. Modelling the domino effect is a challenging task. This work employs advanced probabilistic techniques to model domino effects; the advantages of the proposed method are:

- A probabilistic analysis of the accident caused by domino effect provides a time-dependent risk profile for each level of the domino effect.
- The domino effect propagation path is modelled as a time-dependent process.
- The complex interaction among units can be easily depicted using a Petri-net.
- The failure profile obtained is used to analyze the vulnerability of the unit instead of using conventional threshold criteria to determine the next level of domino propagation.
- Combined loading i.e., heat load through different mechanisms is considered.

This study focused on developing innovative domino effect propagation and likelihood model, and also analyzing unit vulnerability based on the two-step criteria (threshold criteria and risk profile). For the sake of clarity, a system consists of four atmospheric tanks have been analyzed. The results obtained from that model are compared with another probabilistic method which has been widely used in the field of safety and risk engineering. In comparison to other techniques used to model the domino effect, this novel approach is capable of assessing the failure likelihood as time-dependent. Discrete values can only provide an evaluation of the system at a particular instant of time, whereas continuous time-dependent results help to monitor risk, especially in complex systems where domino effect accidents are quite common. Other aspects of the domino effect such as overpressure and blast waves can also be modelled using the same approach. Past accidents due to the domino effect can be easily modelled using the DOMINO-GSPN model, which helps to prevent future accidents. Prevention of domino effect accidents results in saving the environment, human life and property. This work can be improved by considering the

inventory of tanks as a probability distribution, all the calculations of heat radiation are carried out using tank 1 inventory as a constant. Further, wind speed and direction can also be considered to enhance the model further to capture complex, realistic situations.

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4 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 Summary

This thesis comprises three main Chapters. The first chapter presents a background of dynamic risk analysis methods used in process facilities. It highlights the limitations of available methods in QRA for process operations in the industry. The use of BN is widely recognized in the area of process safety; however, it has a few deficiencies which have been identified as research objective I. Moreover, another accident scenario, known as the domino effect, has been identified in the literature. The available modelling techniques are inefficient to model the propagation pattern of a combined loading, i.e. incorporating the heat intensity from the different mechanism and assess its likelihood as a function of time. This problem has been identified as research objective II. The application of a stochastic Petri net in the modelling of the domino effect has also been discussed. The second chapter proposes a generic framework of a Bayesian network to model the accident scenario under uncertainties such as input information (data) and dependency (model). The proposed framework shows how to incorporate missing or limited data, aggregate subjective knowledge and integrate them into a risk assessment. Evidence theory has been used to aggregate the expert judgements to determine the failure probabilities. To address the logical dependence of the variables, canonical probabilistic models such as Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates have been taken into consideration. These logic gates have proven to provide median conditions in their respective Boolean logic gates. The third chapter describe in detail a novel model based on the stochastic Petri net for probabilistic analysis of the domino effect scenario in chemical/process facilities. The DOMINO-GSPN model

can capture the propagation pattern of the domino scenarios in the form of Petri nets. The graphical demonstration using the places, transitions, directed arcs and tokens helps to visualize the patterns of domino effect scenarios. GSPN has the advantage of modelling the complex interactions of process units with the help of transitions. The failure profile obtained for secondary or higher order units represents the vulnerability of those units as a function of time and is used to identify the next level. The most probable configuration of the units can also be identified.

4.2 Conclusions

The present work illustrates the application of the advanced concept of the Bayesian network and stochastic Petri net in the area of process safety and risk assessment. It is focused on modelling complex process system and their behaviour by incorporating advanced probability theory and algorithms. This work has developed two novel models to i) analyze a single accident using limited imprecise data, and ii) analyze the chain of process accidents. Both models are tested using available data and compared with published literature. Their application has been verified using past accidents. The first developed model has enhanced Bayesian network performance by the including new logical relationships with the help of dynamic logic gates, along with incorporating expert judgement in determining the failure probabilities of basic events and safety barriers. The second model has enabled mathematical representation of the domino effect propagation pattern and their likelihood estimate. This work is beneficial for academicians as it provides novel methods and models; it is of equally high importance for industry practitioners, as it

enables better assessment of dynamic risk. Application of this work would help in designing effective safety measures to prevent process accidents.

4.3 Recommendations

The present study can be further improved by considering structural uncertainty apart from the model and data uncertainty. These uncertainties play an important role in rare event scenarios which includes a domino effect analysis. Completeness and incorrectness of data especially related to expert opinion is very important. This may be considered in future studies.

Integrating incorrectness or incompleteness of the data in developing the BN model would be a reasonable extension of the present work.

The modelling of the domino effect scenario presented in this study only considers heat radiation as an escalation vector. However, the model can be extended to consider more than one escalation vector such as overpressure caused by the explosion. Moreover, the work can also be improved by considering the inventory of atmospheric tanks as a probability distribution rather than as a constant value. Wind speed and direction can also be considered to enhance the model to consider a more complex and realistic situation.

Data and model uncertainty can also be considered in modelling the domino effect. The developed model may be integrated with a risk assessment framework.

The consequence analysis of the domino effect in economic terms will be an obvious extension of the present work. The economic consequence assessment could be conducted using loss function, which subsequently could be integrated with dynamic risk assessment.